Political Effectiveness at Work

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Introduction

‘Politics at work’ is a term that most employees associate with colleagues and managers engaging in Machiavellian behavior, or operating outside accepted organizational procedures to achieve self-serving ends. For most people workplace politics relates to the darker side of organizational behavior; something that needs to be avoided or removed if we are to achieve healthy, efficient, and productive places of work (Buchanan, 2008; Mintzberg, 1983). But industrial, work, and organizational (IWO) psychologists have paid far less consideration to the counter view: that organizations are inherently political, and that political behavior is a natural and endemic feature of work environments, resulting from competing views about how work should be performed, the goals to be achieved, and the conflicting needs of individuals, groups, and organizational functions. According to this perspective workers must develop an understanding of their political environment, and the skills to navigate it, in order to wield power effectively and progress to senior levels (Dawson, 1986; Doldor, 2014; Ellen, 2014; Pfeffer, 1981, 2010).
Yet in a database search of ‘political effectiveness’ targeting IWO-psychology journals and journals from management, political science and sociology (using PsychINFO and Web of Knowledge respectively), we found remarkably few articles. The articles that were generated mostly discussed the effectiveness of corporate-level and national-level political strategies, and the remainder discussed political skill as a social effectiveness construct. Significantly, no papers were found examining the broader concept of individual-level political effectiveness at work.

The focus of this chapter is therefore to refocus attention on the questions ‘what is individual-level political effectiveness?’ and ‘how is it developed?’ Defining political effectiveness as ‘the ability to understand and navigate political work environments, in order to acquire power, influence others, and achieve political goals’ we review the existing IWO-psychology literature on organizational politics, and examine why the discipline has such a conflicted relationship with politics at work (i.e., why researchers conceptualize political behavior as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ – not both). We discuss how studying politicians could afford valuable insight into the nature of political work and inform a broader understanding of how political effectiveness is developed. Finally, we outline a model of the likely antecedents and processes of political effectiveness, and identify future directions for research and practice in this area.

Politicians and Political Work

Before we review the literature it is worth explaining why we became interested in political effectiveness, because this interest began in 2001 with an unexpected and somewhat unusual request from the Director of Candidates of a British political party. Having read of our work on diversity and employee selection in a national newspaper, she wrote to ask whether it would be possible to discuss how best practice from employee recruitment might be used to create a fair and robust selection process for the
political party to identify and approve prospective Parliamentary candidates with the potential to become good Members of Parliament (MPs) (Silvester, 2012; Silvester & Dykes, 2007).

The US alone has more than one million roles occupied by elected leaders who play an important role in ensuring economic and social wellbeing. Until now, however, IWO-psychologists have paid surprisingly little attention to politicians or political work, and hardly anything is known about the knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) required to perform political roles, nor how these can be developed (Silvester, 2008). In fairness, politicians are elected to office, not selected or appointed, and research and practice on employee recruitment might not seem immediately relevant. But, intra-party candidate selection (i.e., how legislators gain permission to use a party’s banner) is one of the most important functions performed by a political organization (Katz, 2001; Shomer, 2014), particularly in parliamentary systems of government where the political parties exert considerable control over who is allowed to be a political candidate (Norris, Carty, Erikson, Lovenduski, & Simms, 1990). In fact most political parties in Britain and other Western democracies have at least one selection process where prospective candidates are judged according to whether they are thought to possess the qualities needed to become a good MP. Although, party approval procedures are often referred to as the ‘secret garden of politics’ because so little is known about the criteria used by political parties to judge prospective candidates (Gallagher & Marsh, 1988).

In what proved to be the first of several projects investigating political roles (e.g., Silvester, 2006; Silvester, 2012; Silvester, Wyatt & Randall, 2014), we worked with the Director of Candidates to develop a multi-trait multi-method assessment center. This involved conducting a role analysis to identify competences and behavioral indicators for the MP role, designing a series of role-related exercises, and training
assessors (i.e., MPs and Party volunteers) to evaluate prospective candidates using the same agreed criteria. A subsequent validation study found that critical thinking and communication skill predicted the percentage of votes and percentage vote swing achieved by parliamentary candidates fighting seats in the British 2005 general election (Silvester & Dykes, 2007).

This and subsequent projects have provided a unique opportunity to study politicians at work, and we are convinced that IWO-psychology as a discipline could contribute much in terms of broadening academic and public understanding of political roles, and how politicians and candidates can be better supported. Nevertheless, the work has also challenged our assumptions about political behavior; rather than viewing political behavior as deviant and problematic, we would argue that *politics is work for politicians* and therefore political effectiveness is important for both the performance of those elected to office and to democracy as a whole. Moreover, it is equally plausible that IWO-psychologists could learn much by studying politicians at work. Therefore in this chapter we draw on these experiences to theorize about the meaning of political effectiveness in the workplace, and to how it can be developed. We begin by examining how existing IWO-psychology research typically fits one of two views: political behavior as ‘bad’ or political behavior as ‘good’.

**Political Effectiveness and IWO-Psychology**

IWO-psychology has a conflicted relationship with political behavior in the workplace. Most research falls into one of two broad categories: the first conceptualizes political behavior as an illegitimate activity that is essentially ‘bad’ for employees and organizations, while the second considers it core to social influence, and necessary for operating successfully in ambiguous and competitive work environments. Very little IWO-psychology research discusses political behavior as socially constructed and
contested phenomenon, where the same action can be perceived as good, bad or neutral depending on whose perspective is taken and whether the behavior serves to benefit or disadvantage them.

**Politics as ‘Bad’**

For most people, the popular conception of politics at work is one of individuals engaging in ‘back-stabbing’ and devious Machiavellian behavior in order to undermine colleagues, get ahead, and achieve personal objectives (Buchanan, 2008; Provis, 2006). Pettigrew (1973), for example, describes company politics as the by-play that occurs when a person or group wishes to advance themselves or their ideas regardless of whether this is likely to help the organization or their colleagues. In an effort to identify the types of behavior people are most likely to describe as political, Gandz and Murray (1980) asked 428 managers to write accounts of political incidents that they had experienced or observed at work. Most of these narratives described episodes of self-serving and self-advancing behavior by colleagues and managers; typically involving decisions about promotions, transfers, demotions or dismissals that were perceived as unfair or based on hidden criteria. Also common were descriptions of colleagues avoiding blame, supervisors focused on protecting their own position, and competition between work units for control over projects or resources. Based on these findings, Gandz and Murray defined organizational politics as ‘a subjective state in which organizational members perceive themselves or others as intentionally seeking selfish ends in an organizational context when such ends are opposed to those of others’ (1980, p. 248).

The idea of political behavior as pursuit of self-interest to the detriment of others has persisted (e.g., Byrne, Kacmar, Stoner, & Hochwarter, 2005; Cropanzano, Kacmar,
& Bozeman, 1995; Silvester, 2008; Treadway, 2012), generating a large body of research concerned with the negative affective, motivational, and behavioral consequences for employees who perceive their workplace to be political. Defined as ‘an individual’s subjective evaluation about the extent to which the work environment is characterized by co-workers and supervisors who demonstrate such self-serving behavior’ (Ferris, Harrell-Cook, & Dulebohn, 2000, p. 90), perceptions of organizational politics (POP) are considered to act as a work stressor that leads employees to experience strain, lowered job satisfaction, and higher levels of turnover.

In their pivotal article ‘Politics in organizations’, Ferris, Russ and Fandt (1989) propose a conceptual framework of the organizational (i.e., workplace formalization, hierarchical level and span of control), role (i.e., job autonomy, feedback), and individual antecedents of POP (e.g., employee age, sex, Machiavellianism, and self-monitoring ability). Three subsequent decades of research has provided good support for the model, with moderate to high relationships between POP and job anxiety, fatigue, helplessness and burnout, turnover intentions, commitment and job performance (e.g., Bedi & Schat; 2013; Brouer, Ferris, Hochwater, Laird, & Gilmore, 2006; Chang, Rosen, & Levy, 2009; Ferris, Adams, Kolodinsky, Hochwater, & Ammeter, 2002; Miller, Rutherford, & Kolodinsky, 2008; Perrewé et al., 2012; Randall et al., 1999; Rosen, Levy, & Hall, 2006; Vigoda, 2002). Taken together these studies support the contention that political behavior at work is bad for individual and ultimately organizational performance.

**Politics as ‘Good’**

According to the second perspective, however, political behavior is not only a natural and endemic feature of organizational life, it is a required competence in most job roles where incumbents are expected to persuade and influence others, and negotiate between
competing demands. Much of the IWO-psychology research on political behavior has strong roots in social influence theory (Ferris & Treadway, 2012). Although social influence tactics are not typically described as ‘political’ they do involve individuals using personal power to persuade another person or group to act or think in particular ways (e.g., Bolino, Kacmar, Turnley, & Gilstrap, 2008; Gardner & Martinko, 1988; Turnley & Bolino, 2001; Wayne & Liden, 1995). In his early work, Jones (1964) identifies three forms of ingratiation tactics used by employees to influence their managers: other-enhancement tactics such as ‘flattery’, self-presentation tactics including smiling, rendering favors or ‘false modesty’, and opinion conformity tactics like voicing opinions or beliefs similar to those of the target person. Eight social influence tactics are identified by Kipnis, Schmidt, and Wilkinson (1980), including acting assertively, ingratiating oneself, using rational arguments, imposing sanctions, offering an exchange, making upward appeals, blocking the activities of others, and forming coalitions. Dullebohn and Ferris (1999) make a further differentiation between supervisor-focused tactics like praising a manager’s accomplishments, volunteering help or performing extra-role tasks, and job-focused tactics such as working harder in the presence of managers or making them aware of personal accomplishments. Studies show that effective use of social influence has a positive impact on many different work-related outcomes, including appraisal ratings (Bolino, Varela, Bande, & Turnley, 2006; Dulebohn & Ferris, 1999; Judge & Ferris, 1993; Wayne & Liden, 1995; Wayne, Liden, Graf, & Ferris 1997), promotion (Sibunruang, Capezio, & Restubog, 2013; Thacker & Wayne, 1995; Wayne et al. 1997), salary level (Gould & Penley, 1984; Wayne et al. 1997), and career success (Judge & Bretz, 1994; Westphal & Stern, 2006). A meta-analysis by Higgins, Judge, and Ferris (2003) has also found that employee
ingratiation and rationality have the most positive influence on managers’ performance assessments.

However, political skill is the social effectiveness construct that has received most attention from researchers over recent years. Defined as the ‘ability to effectively understand others at work and to use such knowledge to influence others to act in ways that enhance one’s personal and/or organizational objectives’ (Ferris, Treadway, Kolodinsky, Hochwater, Kacmar, Douglas, & Frink, 2005: pp. 127), political skill explicitly recognizes social influence as a political activity and that individuals vary in their ability to influence others and achieve goals. Political skill is also distinct from other forms of social effectiveness like emotional intelligence, because it comprises a set of social competencies that enable individuals to influence social situations, acquire organizational knowledge and resources, and build power (Ferris, Treadway, Perrewé, Brouer, Douglas, & Lux, 2007). These are social astuteness – a person’s ability to accurately interpret social interactions and understand their own and others’ motivations and behavior; interpersonal influence – the ability to persuade and influence others across different situations; networking ability – an ability to develop and leverage diverse networks and coalitions at work to generate opportunities and secure resources, and; apparent sincerity – the ability to appear trustful, authentic and genuine (Ferris et al., 2005).

A growing body of research, most of which has used the 18-item Political Skill Inventory (PSI: Ferris et al., 2005), has found that political skill is positively associated with many different work-related outcomes (Munyon, Summers, Thompson, & Ferris, 2015; Treadway, Hochwater, Ferris, Kacmar, Douglas, Ammeter, & Buckley, 2004), including leadership effectiveness (Brouer, Douglas, Treadway, & Ferris, 2013; Douglas & Ammeter, 2004), job performance (Blickle, Meurs, Zettler, Solga, Nothen,
Kramer, & Ferris, 2008; Jawahar, Meurs, Ferris, & Hochwarter, 2008; Semadar, Robins, & Ferris, 2006), reputation (Blass & Ferris, 2007; Blickle, Schneider, Liu, & Ferris, 2011), income, hierarchical status, and satisfaction (Todd, Harris, Harris, & Wheeler, 2009). Silvester, Wyatt, and Randall (2014) also found that political skill predicted 360-degree performance ratings for politicians provided by their political colleagues and appointed officials.

Political skill is explored further in chapter ***, but of particular interest here is the finding that political skill moderates the perception and effects of organizational politics and role conflict, with politically-skilled individuals less likely to experience negative consequences of POP (Brouer, Harris, & Kacmar, 2011; Perrewé, Zellars, Ferris, Rossi, Kacmar, & Ralston, 2004). One explanation is that politically-skilled individuals are better able to understand and react to political environments and therefore experience a greater sense of power and control. Shaughnessy, Treadway, Breland, Williams, and Brouer (2011), for example, found that politically-skilled female employees could adapt their influence tactics to avoid gender role expectations that constrain the effectiveness of influence behavior for women, leading them to be rated more likeable and promotable. Thus, taken together, these findings provide strong evidence that political behavior is good for individuals and organizations.

**A Question of Legitimacy**

These contradictory views of political behavior as good or bad in IWO-psychology can be explained in part by considering whose perspective the researchers have taken in the studies and whether the political activity serves to benefit or disadvantage those individuals (Lepisto & Pratt, 2012). For example, POP research is mostly concerned with how employees at lower organizational levels perceive the political behavior of senior and more powerful actors, while political skill research is typically focused on
managers in more senior roles. It is very likely that less powerful junior employees feel more threatened by political activity by powerful others because it has greater potential to disadvantage them, while more powerful senior organizational members may well tolerate or even encourage political behavior among managers if they believe it will benefit company (or indeed their own) interests. Certainly, evidence suggests that managers view political behavior as a normal, expected, and legitimate part of their role (e.g., Buchanan, 2008; Gandz & Murray, 1980).

Similar conflicted views of political behavior can also be found in researchers’ definitions of political behavior (see Table 8.1). One of the most common features is a reference to political behavior being driven primarily by self-interest (i.e., 12 out of 19 definitions listed). Eight definitions also refer explicitly to negative consequences for organizations (e.g., producing conflict and disharmony, being divisive, or a disregard for organizational interests). Only Ferris, Fedor, and King (1994) describe political behavior as an activity where individuals manage or shape meaning for others, alluding to political outcomes as socially constructed and therefore dependent as much on the observer’s viewpoint as the actions of political actors.

[TS: Insert Table 8.1 here]

Table 8.1 Definitions of political behavior at work

Importantly, however, six definitions refer to political behavior as illegitimate or unsanctioned. For example, Mayes and Allen define political behavior as ‘the management of influence to obtain ends not sanctioned by the organization or to obtain sanctioned ends through non-sanctioned influence means’ (1977, p.675, italics added). IWO-psychologists have paid far less attention to this defining feature of political behavior, despite the fact that defining political behavior as illegitimate or unauthorized
positions it as an activity that occurs outside, and therefore interferes with, formal
human resource management (HRM) systems like recruitment, performance review and
promotion. Importantly, defining political behavior as unauthorized also implies
accepting the legitimacy of a formal authority in the organization with power to
sanction certain behaviors – and label other behaviors as illegitimate or ‘political’.

According to Ferris and Judge (1991), HRM is the organizational function that
labors most under assumptions of rationality, even though it is in fact a political system
that exists to formalize managers’ power and control over employee behavior (Ferris &
King, 1991). Founded on scientific principles and evidence-based practice, the
discipline of IWO-psychology is naturally aligned with the view that there are
legitimate (i.e. sanctioned) and illegitimate (i.e., non-sanctioned) ways to make
personnel-related decisions. For example, employee assessment procedures are
designed on the premise that decision-making is more accurate and fair if transparent,
standardized procedures are used, and raters are trained to apply agreed assessment
criteria (Ferris et al., 1996; Gioia & Longenecker, 1994; Levy & Williams, 2004).
Scientific methods are also used to evaluate whether these selection procedures predict
subsequent work performance. Yet, IWO-psychologists rarely question the authority
and power of management to define good and poor performance; or that managers’
ratings feature as the predominant outcome measure for assessing recruitment validity
(Arvey & Murphy, 1998). As such IWO-psychologists also align themselves with
management interests by creating the formal ‘legitimate’ HRM systems that shape,
control, and reward workplace behavior.

This conflation of managerial and scientific legitimacy makes it very difficult for
IWO-psychologists to question their own role as political actors, to accommodate
pluralistic views about what constitutes good and poor work performance, or question
assumptions about legitimate and illegitimate behavior in organizations. In fact the de-legitimization of political behavior becomes a control mechanism in itself (Doldor, 2014), because as Butcher and Clarke (2002) argue ‘the value placed on unity within any organization renders the process through which democracy is enacted – politics – illegitimate’ (pp. 38–39). More importantly, it follows that, by defining behavior that deviates from sanctioned HRM procedures as political, and presenting IWO-psychology procedures (e.g., standardized assessment) as an ‘antidote’ to political behavior, the very concept of ‘political effectiveness’ becomes problematic for the discipline, because it implies successful use of unsanctioned methods to bypass legitimate procedures.

**The Politics of IWO-Psychology**

To date, very few studies have considered the political nature of IWO-psychology practice; two notable exceptions are studies of political behavior in performance appraisal and recruitment settings by Longenecker, Sims, and Gioia (1987) and Bozionelos (2005). In their study, Longenecker et al. originally set out to investigate executives’ cognitive processes when judging subordinate performance, but they were struck by the number of times interviewees described deliberately manipulating appraisal procedures for political gain. As a consequence they refocused the research to look at appraisal as a political activity. They found that executives nearly always took political considerations into account when appraising direct reports: they described being mindful of the day-to-day relationship they had with a person, and that the appraisal resulted in a formal and therefore permanent written document that could have important consequences for the individual’s ability to advance. Political manipulation also increased if more senior members of the organization appeared to engage in political tactics or treat appraisal as a bureaucratic rather than necessary procedure.
Longenecker et al. (1987, p. 184, italics added) conclude that executives ‘have ulterior motives and purposes that supersede the mundane concern with rating accuracy’, that appraisals ‘take place in an organizational environment that is anything but completely rational, straightforward, or dispassionate’ and that the efforts of IWO-psychologists to conceptualize performance appraisal solely in terms of managers objectively, reliably, and accurately assessing employee behavior are likely to fail as ‘accuracy does not seem to matter to managers quite so much as discretion, effectiveness or, more importantly, survival’.

Similarly, Bozionelos (2005) describes the political nature of an academic appointment procedure where, far from concentrating on explicit selection criteria, interview panel members who belonged to different organizational and academic power networks lobbied actively for the candidates whose backgrounds and interests were most similar to their own. Bozionelos argues that political activity is a normal yet neglected feature of most recruitment procedures. Yet, while IWO-psychologists routinely encounter political behavior in selection, it is usually treated as ‘noise’ or a source of error to be minimized using scientific procedures, rather than an important activity deserving attention in its own right (Silvester, Anderson-Gough, Anderson, & Mohammed, 2001).

A third area of research with links to issues of legitimacy and therefore political behavior is that concerned with counterproductive work behavior (CWB). Defined by Gruys and Sackett (2003, p. 30) as ‘intentional/volitional behavior enacted by employees and viewed by the organization as contrary to its legitimate interests’ a substantial body of research has investigated ‘undesirable’ behaviors like rule-bending, disobedience, misconduct, wrong-doing and deviance. The concept has also been extended to include counterproductive leader behavior (CLB), which Jackson and Ones
(2007, p.114) define as ‘behavior enacted by leaders that involves misuse of position or authority for personal and/or organizational benefit’. Some of these behaviors are very similar to behaviors described as political in the organizational politics literature. Notably, both CWB and CLB define undesirable behavior in terms of what is good for the organization and achievement of organizational goals, suggesting an uncontested view of ‘good behavior’. But, depending on the perspective of the observer and whether the outcome disadvantages or benefits them, many behaviors cited (e.g., hiding information, breaking promises, favoritism and misuse of power) could easily be relabeled selective disclosure of information, reframing agreements, patronage or acting with authority.

Likewise, organizational citizenship behaviors, such as volunteering for extra work assignments, helping co-workers learn new skills or offering suggestions to improve how work is done, are all considered positive and legitimate because they are aligned with organizations’ goals (Spector & Fox, 2010). Yet these behaviors could also be construed as political tactics (e.g., impression management and reputation building: Bolino, Klotz, Turnley, & Harvey, 2013; Klotz & Bolino, 2013), with the potential to cause unfavorable reactions in observers who attribute them to self-enhancement and egoistic motives (Cheung, Peng, & Wong, 2014; Eastman, 1994).

While IWO-psychologists have generally neglected the existence of conflicting viewpoints about how work should be performed, or competition between resources and actors, politicians and political work are a powerful reminder that politics exists precisely because conflict is a normal feature of organizational life. Therefore we argue that political effectiveness, which involves negotiating consensus, persuading others, mobilizing support, and using power to achieve objectives, should be an important focus for IWO-psychology research and practice.
Reflections on Political Work

It is worth reflecting on political work at this point, because it could provide important insight into the nature of political effectiveness and how it is developed. The term ‘politics’ originates in Ancient Greece. Derived from πολιτικός (politikos), which means ‘of, for, or relating to citizens’: a broader meaning concerns the practice, or theory, of influencing others in contexts of governance. Of particular significance here is that politics is work for politicians, and therefore political effectiveness is fundamental to democracy and good government. Unlike business where unsanctioned behavior is perceived as a threat to a powerful majority capable of undermining the achievement of business objectives, politics exists in government settings to address, and potentially resolve, conflicting views about what is important and what actions should be taken. As such democracies recognize the legitimacy of pluralistic views, whereas in business the views of a particular group (i.e., management) dominate, and (political) behavior by out-group members is seen as a cause of conflict, because it threatens the formal hierarchies and procedures that enforce in-group power.

There are certainly differences between political and traditional job-roles: in democratic governments, for example, individuals are elected to leadership roles where they are expected to represent and take decisions on behalf of citizens. Politicians therefore have the legitimate power (i.e., derived from their elected status) to decide how they will perform their roles and respond to constituents’ needs (March & Olsen, 1999; Morrell & Hartley, 2006). While the power of a politician is held in check by periodic elections (i.e., when the public can decide whether he or she should be returned to power) there are very few formal procedures that define or constrain how political roles should be performed. So, unlike business, where performance criteria are usually explicit and enforced via HRM procedures, politicians have considerable freedom to
decide how they will act, albeit needing to be mindful of public views if they wish to be re-elected.

Importantly, because there are no proscribed definitions of ‘good’ and ‘poor’ performance, and because different stakeholders have different views about what a politician should do in office, political performance is a contested construct. Thus a politician can be judged good, bad, or both depending on how the observer believes the elected representative should enact their role (Silvester et al., 2014). In order to be effective politicians must be able to navigate this contested environment by understanding opposing views, developing a political vision, mobilizing support and building consensus around specific actions to achieve goals.

In reality, there are more similarities between the job demands of political roles and those of business leaders. Both roles involve understanding and resolving conflict between the different interest groups. Business leaders, for example, have to tread a careful path between the views of different stakeholders like shareholders, boards of directors, employees and senior directors. Leadership work, like political work, means representing different interests/constituencies, aligning agendas, and operating in ambiguous environments. Consequently, political effectiveness for business and political leaders is likely to mean learning how to manage perceptions and create meaning for others (Ferris et al., 1994). At times this may involve engaging in the ‘darker’ aspects of organizational behavior, with political effectiveness the ability to do so while preserving a positive public reputation of competence and trustworthiness.

**Summary of IWO-Psychology Research**

While a significant amount of IWO-psychology research has examined politics in the workplace, studies broadly divide into those conceptualizing politics as ‘bad’, and those that regard it as a neutral or ‘good’ characteristic of organizational life. A salient issue
is therefore how IWO-psychology works to acknowledge these conflicting views of political behavior. We argue that much can be learnt by studying politicians at work – where conflicting judgments of what constitutes good political performance are constantly in flux, and that IWO-psychologists need to be more reflective of their political role in determining what constitutes legitimate or illegitimate organizational behavior. In order to facilitate further IWO-psychology research and practice, the following section describes a model of political effectiveness that can apply to both political and more traditional work roles.

A Model of Political Effectiveness

Building on existing IWO-psychology research, this model theorizes likely antecedents and mechanisms by which individuals develop political effectiveness (Figure 8.1). We define political effectiveness as ‘the ability to successfully navigate political environments at work in order to acquire power, influence others, and achieve political goals’, and suggest that political effectiveness depends, first, on an individual’s propensity to engage in political behavior, and that this will be influenced by organizational and individual factors. Propensity to engage in political behavior will, in turn, influence political actor’s sense-making and learning in relation to their political environment, and this in turn will impact on choice of political behavior. We also propose that social effectiveness will moderate the effectiveness of political behavior in producing desired political outcomes.

[TS: Insert Figure 8.1 here]

Figure 8.1. A model of political effectiveness

Organizational Context
There is broad agreement that the organizational context influences both the need for political actors to engage in political activity and the types of political behavior likely to achieve desired outcomes. Our model follows Ferris et al. (1989) in differentiating between two aspects of organizational context, namely the political environment (i.e., defined here in terms of organizational structure, formalization, and the distribution of power and resources), and role factors (i.e., the type of work performed by an individual, their level in the organizational hierarchy and control over resources).

Organizations vary in terms of structure, rules, formalization of decision procedures and the social norms that guide accepted behavior (Ammeter, Douglas, Gardner, Hochwarter, & Ferris, 2002). These impact on the form and prevalence of political behavior (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; James, 2006). Typically, political activity is more prevalent in organizational environments typified by ambiguity, and low levels of formalization or adherence to rules about how people should behave. Political organizations typically have few restrictions or formal procedures to guide how people behave, and a lack of formal hierarchy means that individuals have more need to engage in political activity and develop political effectiveness in order to navigate these less structured and transparent environments and procedures. Research has also shown that employees are more likely to participate in political behavior if it is seen to be rewarded by managers (Ferris & Judge, 1991), and that increased accountability to superiors reduces the likelihood of political behavior (Breaux, Munyon, Hochwater, & Ferris, 2009; Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989). Moreover, group and organizational culture have been found to influence individual political action via subjective norms about what constitutes appropriate and inappropriate behavior (Ashford, Rothbard, Piderit, & Dutton, 1998).
The type of role occupied by an individual is also important. For example, span of managerial authority has been found to be positively associated with propensity to engage in political behavior, and individuals in boundary-spanning roles are also more often required to understand and engage in political activity (Ammeter et al., 2002). Similarly, roles undertaken by knowledge workers, organizational consultants, and change agents all involve dealing with multiple groups, conflicting interests, and fluid work environments, resulting in a need for higher levels of political ability (Alvesson, 2001; Buchanan & Badham, 2008; Empson, Cleaver, & Allen, 2013). Therefore, the need and opportunity for individuals to develop political ability will depend both on the nature of the organizational environment and the type of role they occupy.

**Political Motivation**

There is a long history of interest in psychological characteristics associated with political behavior, much of which originates in the aftermath of World War II when researchers sought to identify personality constructs associated with motivation to seek and retain power (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Christie & Geis, 1970). Studies have explored predictors of political behavior at work (e.g., Machiavellianism: Biberman, 1985; Drory & Gluskinos, 1980; Grams & Rogers, 1990; O’Boyle, Forsyth, Banks, & McDaniel, 2012; Pandey 1981), and among political elites (Deluga, 2001; Dietrich, Lasley, Mondak, Remmel, & Turner, 2012; Silvester et al., 2014; Simonton, 1998; Winter, 1987). However, much of this work concerns individuals’ motivation to engage in political activity. As Mintzberg (1985) argues, individuals need both political will and political skill to achieve their aims. Therefore in our model we draw on the concept of political will defined by Treadway, Hochwarter, Kacmar, and Ferris (2005, p. 231) as an ‘actor’s willingness to expend energy in pursuit of political goals (which is) an essential precursor to engaging in
political behavior’. This definition incorporates both the ‘willingness’ to engage, and possession of political ‘goals’, and we differentiate in a similar way between an individual’s *propensity to seek power* (i.e., the psychological characteristics influencing an actor’s likelihood of expending energy or effort to achieve power), and their *reason to seek power* (i.e., the values, needs or desires that mean effort will be directed towards specific goals).

There is good evidence that psychological characteristics differentially impact on an individual’s *propensity to seek power*. For example, McClelland (1985) identifies several power motives (i.e., need for Power, need for Affiliation, and need for Achievement) that influence how likely people are to seek to influence others. Treadway et al., (2005) also show that intrinsic motivation and need for achievement is positively associated with employee political behavior in a range of occupations. Much less well understood are factors associated with ‘*reason to seek power*’. For the most part political actors are often wary of divulging political aims (i.e., what they want to achieve by engaging in political activity) and for good reason – being explicit provides others with information that can be used to undermine the actor. Politicians may be similarly wary of sharing certain personal aims, but they are expected to communicate their political values and vision as part of their manifesto during political campaigning (Silvester, 2012). These public aims may therefore provide an important source of information about ‘*reason to seek power*’ and political effectiveness.

**Political Cognition**

Political actors must be able to recognize, understand, and interpret the events and behavior they encounter to navigate political environments successfully. Political cognition therefore involves making sense of the political landscape in order to decide what or who needs to be influenced and how. Researchers have paid relatively little
attention to cognitive precursors of political effectiveness (Ammeter et al., 2002), and in this model we differentiate between: *sense-making*, defined as an actor’s on-going efforts to understand and explain events in their political environment, and *political learning*, which relates to a political actor’s acquisition and storage of knowledge about the political landscape such as where power is held and how it is wielded.

Although sense-making and political learning are likely to be interdependent, sense-making involves a conscious episodic and reactive process that is generally triggered by specific events or behavior. In contrast we construe political learning as more concerned with the development of procedural knowledge, and cognitive scripts stored in long-term memory. Thus political learning occurs over time, and with experience, as individuals acquire knowledge about their environment and the political tactics and strategies likely to be effective in different situations. Together these two aspects of political cognition form an individual’s political expertise. Whilst limited, existing work does suggest that learning about the wider political context has a positive impact on the acquisition of political skill and leader reputation (Blass & Ferris, 2007), and there is also evidence of positive association between political knowledge, salary progression and career satisfaction (Blass, Brouer, Perrewé, & Ferris, 2007; Seibert, Kraimer & Crant, 2001).

**Political Behavior**

Many attempts have been made to describe and define political behavior. Lepisto and Pratt (2012), for example, distinguish between short-term ‘tactical’, long-term ‘strategic’, proactive ‘assertive’, and reactive ‘defensive’ forms of political behavior. In this model we focus on observable behavior, and differentiate between non-verbal (i.e., actions, expressions) and verbal (i.e., spoken or written) forms of behavior that can be used by actors to change others’ views, mobilize support, or undermine opponents.
There is a substantial body of IWO-psychology research focusing social influence tactics (e.g., negotiating, alliance building, lobbying and networking: Anderson & Kilduff, 2009), and self-serving and group-serving behavior (Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, Kingstone, & Heinrich, 2012). Research has also investigated the impact of power on stereotyping, hubris, and individual decision-making (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Fiske, 1993).

There has been less focus on how political actors use communication to shape meaning for others in order to achieve desired aims. Ferris, Fedor and King’s (1994) definition of political behavior as the ‘management of shared meaning’ (see Table 8.1), adopts a social constructionist perspective whereby actors use communication to proactively manage how others interpret and understand situations and events. This is also illustrated in the use of story-telling, narratives, and persuasive communication to convey political vision and to shape a collective identity based on shared values and purpose (Humphreys & Brown, 2002; Silvester, Anderson & Patterson1999). Politicians are well aware of the importance of communication in achieving influence (e.g., Bull, 2008; Silvester et al., 2014), but management have also been increasingly interested in how individuals use communication at work to develop a strong public identity and reputation to enhance their power, build consensus, and achieve political aims (Grant, Hardy, Oswick, & Putnam, 2004). Thus, communication is included here as a mechanism of ‘sense-giving’ that enables political actors to create a shared understanding about the importance of particular actions, and we suggest that future research should focus more explicitly on the use of language to achieve political goals.

**Social Effectiveness**

The impact of political behavior will depend in part on an individual’s social effectiveness. Political actors must be flexible in adapting their behavior to meet the
needs and interests of different people or groups being targeted, therefore, political effectiveness requires that an actor is both sensitive to others’ needs and skilled in knowing how best to adapt their response (Treadway, Breland, Williams, Cho, Yang, & Ferris, 2013). There is considerable evidence that individual characteristics like emotional and social intelligence, self-monitoring, and empathy, sensitize individuals to political targets, increasing the likelihood of effective political behavior (Ammeter et al. 2002; Fandt & Ferris, 1990; Harris, Kacmar, Zivnuska, & Shaw, 2007; McClelland, 1985). For example, empathic individuals are perceived as more trustworthy (Silvester, Patterson, Koczvar, & Ferguson, 2008), and the ability to empathize has been identified as a key trait for political leaders by voters (Deluga, 2001). Likewise, increased social awareness and self-monitoring have been shown to moderate the effectiveness of political behavior because they reduce the likelihood of political actors engaging in stereotyping or demonstrating hubris as their power increases (Kipnis, 1976 Fiske, 1993).

Of particular importance here is the social effectiveness construct – political skill. This includes dimensions of ‘social astuteness’ and ‘apparent sincerity’, and individuals who are high on political skill are more sensitive to the actions and interests of others and better able to adapt their political behavior to present as sincere and genuine (Ferris et al., 2005). Harris et al. (2007), found that politically-skilled employees were able to use impression management tactics more appropriately in supervisor-subordinate dyads, and this resulted in higher performance evaluations from supervisors. We therefore propose that political skill, together with other social effectiveness constructs such as self-monitoring, empathy and self-awareness, will moderate the success of political behavior in achieving political goals.

**Political Outcome**
Although political ‘effectiveness’ implies the existence of political ‘ineffectiveness’, measuring political effectiveness is problematic for researchers. Not only do negative perceptions of politics as Machiavellian and/or divisive make it more difficult for researchers to solicit self-evaluations from individuals about achievement of political goals, judgments of effectiveness are likely to vary according to who is evaluating the political behavior and whether it serves their interests. In this model we differentiate between political outcomes as judged by political actors, and political outcomes as judged by observers. Moreover, the evaluation of political outcomes for political actors can be based both on (i) whether the actor believes he or she has achieved their intended political aims (i.e., their reason for seeking power), and (ii) the actor’s rating of unintended outcomes such as perceived changes in reputation or power that results from the political activity (although for the more political astute, these might be one and the same, because some individuals may engage in political behavior solely to enhance their reputation, for example).

Asking observers to judge political outcomes is similarly complicated by the fact that the consequences of political behavior will vary for individuals; as such, different observers may well perceive and evaluate the same behavior in different ways. Thus, at least from the observer’s perspective, political effectiveness may not exist in positivist terms as a single measurable outcome but as a social construct that will vary according to pluralistic viewpoints. This constructivist-interpretivist view of political behavior as something ‘in the eye of the beholder’ presents a challenge to more traditional scientific approaches to measurement found in IWO-psychology. If behavior is ‘political’ only when actors or observers label it as such (Buchanan, 2008), researcher-derived definitions or taxonomies are likely to be of secondary importance to the definitions and interpretations of respondents (Doldor, 2014). Therefore, like
political actors who, in order to be politically effective, must be able to understand and take account of contradictory perspectives, researchers must somehow accommodate pluralistic views about political effectiveness and how to assess it. One possibility would be to adapt multisource feedback to allow exploration of different perspectives, much like Silvester et al. (2014) use 360-degree feedback to capture shared and discrepant views about role performance for politicians.

**Future Directions**

This chapter has built on IWO-psychology research and theory to outline a model that theorizes possible antecedents and mechanisms of political effectiveness, including relationships between the organizational context, individuals’ political motivation, cognition, political behavior, social effectiveness, and political outcomes. Our aim is to provide a framework for future empirical research and practice, and in the next section we focus on a number of key areas where we propose further work is likely to prove worthwhile in understanding and developing political effectiveness.

**Political Understanding – Making Sense of Political Environments**

We have argued that individuals need to understand the political nature of work environments in order to make sense of the events they observe, the motives of others, and determine the best ways to influence stakeholders. Although we know relatively little about political cognition, work on power mental models and political scripts (Ammeter et al. 2002) is relevant here, because both provide a focus for researchers to investigate the organized mental representations that individuals formulate about their own power and that of others. Defined as memory structures acquired through experience of previous political activity, researchers suggest that political scripts prompt the development of political strategies, which in turn inform action in new
political contexts. Future research investigating the nature of political scripts and power mental models, could draw on qualitative methods like ‘story-telling’ to elicit how politically effective individuals at work, and successful politicians, explain their own political experiences and how their understanding evolved over time (cf, Doldor, 2013).

The model also identifies political sense-making as important, where political actors monitor their environment to detect and explain events and behavior (i.e., by opponents, supporters, and colleagues) that has potential to affect their power or influence. Attribution theory is relevant here, because it proposes that individuals engage in causal sense-making when they encounter novel, surprising, or potentially threatening events in order to render future events more predictable (Heider, 1958; Wong & Weiner, 1981). Attribution theorists have generated a substantial body of research across different domains, including how individuals react to powerful others and exert authority (e.g., Bugental & Lin, 2001; Kipnis, 2001), but less is known about how actors attribute causality to political events and how these attributions may influence successful political strategies. We therefore suggest that in future research, individuals might usefully explore how political actors engage in attributional activity to explain political activity of others and how their explanations influence choice of political behavior.

**Developing Political Effectiveness – Practical Support**

Popular conceptions of political activity as Machiavellian and divisive make it difficult for organizations to acknowledge that their workplaces are political, and it can be challenging to persuade companies to invest in formal development of political effectiveness for employees. Such activities are often referred as ‘social influence’ or ‘emotional intelligence’ training to down-play the less palatable ‘political’ aspects for business audiences. Somewhat ironically, however, efforts to provide formal training
and development for politicians also meet with considerable resistance, and surprisingly little formal training is available for aspiring, or incumbent, politicians (Avellaneda, 2009; Silvester, 2008). In two recent studies of new Members of Parliament (MPs) in the British House of Commons (Fox & Korris, 2012, and the New Zealand House of Representatives (Cooper-Thomas & Silvester, 2014), the authors found that not only do political candidates receive little information from their political parties about what to expect if elected, MPs receive little if any formal training and development. Newly elected MPs typically receive 1–2 days induction training about how Parliament works, where to find people, and how to use the library: beyond that they must rely on informal socialization practices to learn what is expected of them and how to navigate the ambiguous political environment.

As the development of political effectiveness is treated with such caution in politics and business, it is perhaps not so surprising that few studies have investigated the process (Doldor, 2014; Ferris & Treadway, 2012), however, political skill training, employee socialization, and mentoring have been identified as the methods most likely to aid development of political effectiveness. For example, researchers suggest that political skill is comprised of a set of competencies that be trained, shaped, and developed using methods such as communication training, drama based training, and role play (Ferris et al., 2005; Ferris et al., 2000). To date evidence remains limited, as relatively few organizations have implemented political skill training. Researchers have given more consideration to how informal socialization practices and interpersonal relationships develop political knowledge (Chao, O’Leary-Kelly, Wolf, Klein, & Gardner, 1994; Ferris, Bhawuk, Fedor, & Judge, 1995; Lankau & Scandura, 2002; Perrewé & Nelson, 2004; Perrewé, Young, & Blass, 2002). Chao et al. (1994) suggest that a key area of knowledge for organizational newcomers is learning about political
norms and behaviors during socialization, and in their longitudinal study of socialization during organizational induction and orientation programs, Kammeyer-Mueller and Wanberg (2003) found that political knowledge was better developed via informal relationships. In contrast, formal training about individuals’ responsibilities, and about the organization’s hierarchies and functions increased role clarity for employees. Relationships with leaders were particularly useful as leaders were able to explain how informal and political processes worked, and could introduce newcomers to their own social networks. Mentoring has also been identified as important for developing political effectiveness, with mentors assisting protégés by imparting knowledge about ‘how things really work around here’, and the informal ‘rules of the game’, enabling employees to understand who has power and how influence is wielded (Blass & Ferris, 2007; Ferris et al., 2007; Kram, 1985). Thus, mentoring is more likely to provide individuals with an opportunity to learn about the power dynamics of the organization, formal and informal relationships between groups, and hidden social norms that guide how peers and superiors engage in political behavior (Blass et al., 2007; Drory, 1993; Ferris et al., 1989).

These findings suggest that organizations need to pay careful consideration to the methods they adopt when aiming to develop political effectiveness. For example, choice of mentor can be important for the development of political effectiveness, with more powerful and senior mentors better positioned to impart knowledge about the political environment and the skills required to navigate it (Blickle, Witzki, & Schneider, 2009; Ragins, 1997). Although it has also been argued that formal mentoring arrangements, those where mentors and protégés are assigned to one another, are less effective than informal mentorships where relationships are more organic and based on mutual identification (Ragins & Cotton, 1999; Underhill, 2006). Similarly, because
formal mentors are more visible, they may be more apprehensive about encouraging protégés to engage in political behaviors that may be construed as illegitimate or unsanctioned (Ragins & Cotton, 1999). We suggest that organizations consider the role of mentoring and its various forms for the development of political effectiveness. We also advocate further study of mentoring relationships and socialization processes, to explore how political learning is acquired, could provide important insight into the nature and development of political effectiveness at work.

The Politics of Inclusion – Political Effectiveness and Diversity

A final potential area for future research and practice concerns the differential ability (or power) of individuals and groups to access political knowledge and develop political effectiveness. As we have seen, political knowledge is hard to access, because it is rarely made explicit or included as part of formal training and development activities. Individuals therefore depend on being granted privileged access to hidden information that is only made available to a select few by more senior powerful actors. Researchers have highlighted the predicament of those individuals (e.g., women and minority ethnic employees) who experience more difficulty accessing relationships with senior workers able to impart political knowledge (Blass et al., 2007; Wyatt & Silvester, 2015). For example, employees from minority groups find it more difficult to develop informal mentoring relationships with demographically dissimilar senior organizational members, as white males tend to dominate senior roles in most organizations (McDonald, 2011).

Minority groups may therefore need additional training, and proactive identification of mentoring partners through formal programs, to facilitate the development of political knowledge. At present most IWO-psychology training and development research focuses on transfer of explicit knowledge about formal
organizational systems and processes rather than knowledge about informal political processes. As these informal processes often capture ‘the way things are really done around here’ they may in fact contradict the information provided via formal organizational routes. As such, those individuals who are more reliant on formal learning opportunities, and find it difficult to access informal routes, are likely to be disadvantaged in their development of political effectiveness (Wyatt & Silvester, 2015). It is therefore important for future research and practice to examine formal and informal methods of developing political effectiveness, and IWO-psychology practitioners might consider proactive pairing of individuals from minority groups with powerful, politically effective mentors. Organizations also need to consider ways to ensure that members of minority groups have equal access to informal leader support as well as information from formal orientation programs.

**Summary for IWO Practice**

In summary, to support the development of political effectiveness we suggest the following future directions for IWO practice:

- IWO-psychologists should acknowledge that organizations are political and reflect on their own role as political actors in organizational contexts.

- Political effectiveness is a contested construct, therefore researchers and practitioners need to develop methods of assessment that can accommodate multiple and potentially conflicting perspectives.

- More research is needed into the utility of formal training methods in enhancing the development of political knowledge and skill (e.g. drama-based training, communication training, and role play).
• Practitioners should be aware that political information is more likely be transferred via informal relational mechanisms (e.g., leader support), than formal orientation programs, therefore careful consideration should be given to how planned and unplanned socialization activities impact on the development of political knowledge.

• As mentoring is a valuable resource to develop political effectiveness, practitioners should consider the power of mentors, the benefits offered by informal mentorships and of longer-term relationships.

• There is a need for further research to identify the causes of differential access to political information, and to raise awareness of the difficulties that women and minority ethnic employees can experience in their efforts to develop political effectiveness at work.

Conclusions

The political effectiveness literature reveals a conflicted relationship between IWO-psychology and political behavior at work. IWO-psychologists develop formal systems of selection, assessment and development that derive from the premise that scientific methods remove ‘noise’, including that associated with illegitimate political behavior, in order to improve the accuracy and fairness of employment decisions. As such, IWO-psychology is often positioned as an ‘antidote’ to political behavior at work. However, very little attention has been paid to the role of IWO-psychologists as political actors. One of our aims in writing this chapter has been to explore often implicit assumptions about political behavior within the discipline, whilst revisiting political effectiveness as an important topic worthy of future study.
In theorizing a model of antecedents and processes associated with political effectiveness, we identify several areas where future research is needed both to facilitate better understanding, and support practical activities to develop political effectiveness in work and politics. That said, there is little doubt that the topic of political effectiveness presents uncomfortable challenges for IWO-psychology researchers and practitioners. For example, if we acknowledge that much of the work of IWO-psychologists involves creating HRM procedures that enhance managers’ power to control employees, does this make the discipline undemocratic? Likewise, given that most assessment methods compare individual performance against behavioral norms defined by managers. And, is it realistic to accommodate pluralistic views about how individuals should behave at work or what constitutes good job performance?

Do we need to acknowledge the importance of the informal and therefore uncontrolled methods by which individuals acquire information to gain power and wield influence at work? How do we accommodate unsanctioned political behavior if it runs counter to formal systems and, by definition, is perceived as illegitimate? Is it possible to be politically effective without engaging in the ‘darker’ side of Machiavellian political tactics and behavior?

Although IWO-psychology advocates the use of rigorous, transparent, and evidence-based methods for assessing individuals for or at work, their use within organizations is frequently politicized, and used to enhance the power and influence of specific individuals or groups. Researchers and practitioners need to be better aware, and potentially accommodating, of multiple perspectives when identifying and defining outcome criteria like performance ratings. That said we recognize that this in itself is a political action likely to meet resistance, because it challenges an historic alignment
with management, and also means critically appraising fundamental reductionist assumptions about the ‘true’ objective nature of job roles and performance.

Notes

References


Doldor, E. (2014). Personal communication with authors.


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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Definition of Political Behavior</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pettigrew (1973, p.17)</td>
<td>Behavior by individuals, or in collective terms by subunits, within an organization that makes a claim about the resource-sharing system of the organization.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mayes and Allen (1977, p.675)</td>
<td>The management of influence to obtain ends not sanctioned by the organization or to obtain sanctioned ends through non-sanctioned influence means.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tushman (1977, p.207)</td>
<td>The structure and process of the use of authority and power to effect definitions of goals, directions, and other major parameters of the organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allen, Madison, Porter, Renwick and Mayes (1979, p. 77)</td>
<td>Intentional acts of influence to enhance or protect the self-interest of individuals or groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gandz and Murray (1980, p. 248)</td>
<td>Self-serving behavior (that is) a deviation from techno-economic rationality in decision-making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bacharach and Lawler (1980, p.1)</td>
<td>The tactical use of power to retain or obtain control of real or symbolic resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pfeffer (1981, p.7)</td>
<td>Activities taken within organizations to acquire, develop, and use power and other resources to obtain one’s preferred outcomes in a situation in which there is uncertainty or dissensus about choices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mintzberg (1983, p.172)</td>
<td>Individual or group behavior that is informal, ostensibly parochial, typically divisive, and, above all, in the technical sense, illegitimate – sanctioned not by formal authority, accepted ideology, or certified expertise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferris, Russ and Fandt (1989, p.145)</td>
<td>Social influence process in which behavior is strategically designed to maximize short-term or long-term self-interest, which is either consistent with or at the expense of others’ interests (where self-interest maximization refers to the attainment of positive outcomes and prevention of negative outcomes).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferris, Fedor and King (1994, p.4)</td>
<td>The management of shared meaning, which focuses on the subjective evaluation and interpretations of meaning rather than on the view that meanings are inherent, objective properties of situations; from the standpoint of managerial political behavior, the objective is to manage the meaning of situations in such a way as to produce desired, self-serving responses or outcomes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author(s) and Year</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ferris, Frink, Bhawuk, Zhou and Gilmore (1996, p. 26)</td>
<td>Behavior not formally authorized, officially certified, or widely accepted by the organization - efforts to maximise self-interest, perhaps at the expense of others and/or the organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferris, Frink, Galang, Zhou, Kacmar and Howard (1996, p. 234)</td>
<td>Behavior not formally sanctioned by the organization, which produces conflict and disharmony in the work environment by pitting individuals and/or groups against one another, or against the organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrell-Cook, Ferris and Duhlebohn (1999, p. 1094)</td>
<td>Self-serving behavior (involving) tactically assertive behaviors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kacmar and Baron (1999, p.4)</td>
<td>Individuals’ actions that are directed toward the goal of furthering their own self-interest without regard for the well-being of others or their organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Randall, Cropanzo, Bormann and Birjulin (1999, p.161)</td>
<td>Unsanctioned influence attempts that seek to promote self-interest at the expense of organizational goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valle and Perrewé (2000, p. 361)</td>
<td>The exercise of tactical influence, which is strategically goal directed, rational, conscious, and intended to promote self-interest, either at the expense of or in support of others’ interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hochwarter, Witt and Kacmar (2000, p.473)</td>
<td>Behaviors designed to foster self-interest taken without regard to, or at the expense of, organizational goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byrne (2005, p.176)</td>
<td>Intentional actions (covert or overt) by individuals to promote and protect their self-interest, sometimes at the expense of and without regard for the well-being of others or their organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perrewé, Rosen and Maslach (2012, p. 215)</td>
<td>A group of activities that are not formally sanctioned by organizations; are associated with attempts to benefit, protect, or enhance self-interest; and are engaged in without regard for the welfare of the organization or its members.</td>
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</table>
Figure 1. A Model of Political Effectiveness

**Organization**

(a) *Political environment:* Formalization of procedures, distribution of power and resources, culture and subjective norms.

(b) *Role:* Organizational level, span of control, and legitimate authority.

**Political Motivation**

(a) *Propensity to Seek Power* (i.e., individual differences in political will, personality, power motives, self-efficacy and Machiavellianism).

(b) *Reason to Seek Power:* Values, political goals, interests and vision.

**Cognition**

(a) *Sense-making:* causal attributions about events, and the behavior and motives of others.

(b) *Political learning:* political ‘savvy’, knowledge of political landscape, who has power, political scripts, and power mental models.

**Behavior**

(a) *Nonverbal* (i.e., social influence tactics, network building, lobbying negotiation, impression management).

(b) *Verbal* (i.e., political narrative, communicating vision, story-telling and sense-giving).

**Social Effectiveness**

Political skill, social and emotional intelligence, empathy, self-monitoring.

**Outcome**

(a) *Actor* – Intended consequences (i.e., achievement of political goals) and unintended consequences (e.g., enhanced power, reputation and skill).

(b) *Observer* perceptions of political behavior.
Chapter 11 in this *Handbook* for an extensive discussion of political skill.

2 The US is comparatively unusual in that the two main political parties do not control who can run for political office, leaving political candidates more independent of party discipline, policy and finance (Stokes, 2005).

3 Cf, role analysis and cross-party political skills framework for local politicians (Silvester, 2006), implementing multi-source feedback for politicians and candidates (Silvester & Wyatt, 2014; Silvester, Wyatt, & Randall, 2014), and reviewing politician development needs and mentoring (Silvester & Menges, 2011).

4 For an extensive review of this literature see Ferris and Treadway (2012).

5 For further discussion of problematization as theory building see Alvesson and Kärreman (2007).