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Citation: Reimers, S., Donkin, C. & Le Pelley, M. (2018). Perceptions of randomness in binary sequences: Normative, heuristic, or both?. *Cognition*, 172, pp. 11-25. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2017.11.002

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Perceptions of randomness in binary sequences: Normative, heuristic, or both?

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Abstract

When people consider a series of random binary events, such as tossing an unbiased coin and recording the sequence of heads (H) and tails (T), they tend to erroneously rate sequences with less internal structure or order (such as HTTHT) as more probable than sequences containing more structure or order (such as HHHHH). This is traditionally explained as a local representativeness effect: Participants assume that the properties of long sequences of random outcomes—such as an equal proportion of heads and tails, and little internal structure—should also apply to short sequences. However, recent theoretical work has noted that the probability of a particular sequence of say, heads and tails of length n , occurring within a larger ($>n$) sequence of coin flips actually differs by sequence, so $P(\text{HHHHH}) < P(\text{HTTHT})$. In this alternative account, people apply rational norms based on limited experience. We test these accounts. Participants in Experiment 1 rated the likelihood of occurrence for all possible strings of 4, 5, and 6 observations in a sequence of coin flips. Judgments were better explained by representativeness in alternation rate, relative proportion of heads and tails, and sequence complexity, than by objective probabilities. Experiments 2 and 3 gave similar results using incentivized binary choice procedures. Overall the evidence suggests that participants are not sensitive to variation in objective probabilities of a sub-sequence occurring; they appear to use heuristics based on several distinct forms of representativeness.

Keywords: probability, randomness, gambler's fallacy, heuristics, biases

1. Introduction

Many of the judgments that humans make are based on the abstraction of patterns in events that occur in the world. These patterns can take many forms, such as weather – deciding whether to take a coat or an umbrella based on the temperature and rainfall of previous days – the behaviour of other individuals – guessing when a co-author is likely to complete a manuscript draft based on their previous timeliness – or the behavior of wider groups of people – forecasting sales for upcoming months based on figures from recent months.

One of the challenges of any pattern-detection system, whether human or artificial, is to separate signal from noise: to extract, and base predictions on, systematic patterns that appear in the environment, and ignore observations that are—to the system at least—random. If distinguishing between regularity (which has predictive value) and randomness (which does not) is a basic requirement for making successful predictions about the environment, it is surprising that, in higher-level cognition at least, humans are relatively poor at recognizing randomness (for reviews see, Nickerson, 2002, 2004; Bar-Hillel & Wagenaar, 1991; Falk & Konold, 1997; for a similar overview of randomness *production*, see Rapaport & Budescu, 1997).

Most empirical research examining human (mis-) understanding of randomness has used equiprobable binary outcomes (see Oskarsson, Van Boven, McClelland, & Hastie, 2009, for a review), such as the occurrence of red or black on a roulette wheel (e.g., Ayton & Fischer, 2004), or birth order of boys and girls in a particular family (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). The most common scenario is the occurrence of heads and tails when repeatedly tossing a fair, unbiased coin (e.g., Caruso, Waytz & Epley, 2010; Kareev, 1992; Diener & Thompson, 1985). Across a variety of tasks—including choosing the most random of a set of sequences (e.g. Wagenaar, 1970), classifying individual sequences as random or non-random (e.g., Lopes & Oden, 1987), and prediction of future outcomes of a sequence of coin tosses or roulette wheel spins (e.g., Ayton and Fischer, 2004)—participants appear to mischaracterize the outputs of a random

generating mechanism.

The mischaracterizations that people make are similar across different types of task. They include (using Hahn & Warren's, 2009, characterization): (a) a preference for negative recency between trials rather than independence, meaning that in binary outcomes there is an expectation of an alternation rate between outcomes of greater than .5.; (b) a belief that in short sequences, equiprobable outcomes should occur equally often; and (c) a belief that an unstructured or unordered appearance indicates that a sequence of outcomes is more random and hence more likely to occur from a random process (see, e.g., Wagenaar, 1970; Falk & Konold, 1997). These biases lead to participants showing a gambler's fallacy for random events (e.g., Ayton & Fischer, 2004), or a hot-hand bias for events under human control (Gilovich, Valone, & Tversky, 1995; but see Miller & Sanjurjo, 2014, 2016): Following a run of the same outcome from a random process, such as five heads in a row in a coin tossing procedure, participants rate the probability of the same outcome occurring again as lower than following other sequences for sequences believed to be generated randomly (gambler's fallacy, showing negative recency), and rate the probability as higher for sequences that could be under human control (hot-hand, positive recency). Similar effects are seen using continuous outcome measures in forecasting: participants make forecasts that reflect an assumption of serial dependence in a time series, when outcomes are in fact random (Reimers & Harvey, 2011).

In one of the most influential studies in randomness perception, Kahneman and Tversky (1972) conducted two experiments in which participants estimated the relative frequency of two birth orders of boys (B) and girls (G) across families with six children in a city: GBGBBG or BGBBBB. Participants judged that there would be far fewer families with BGBBBB than GBGBBG, suggesting a more representative 1:1 ratio of boys and girls was more likely. However participants also rated BBBGGG as less likely to occur than GBGBBG, suggesting the structure of the sequence, as well as the ratio of outcomes, was important. Their account, based on local

representativeness (which we discuss below), has been the dominant explanation for human judgments of random sequences.

In this paper, we examine some of the ways in which people mischaracterize randomness. Specifically, explanations for deviations from normativity in randomness tasks have traditionally taken a heuristics and biases approach (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). More recent theoretical approaches have emphasized the potential for apparent biases to reflect rational judgments in situations with limited experience. We discuss these two approaches now.

1.1. Heuristics and biases account

The set of arguments that comes from the heuristics and biases literature suggests performance can be characterized as the application of a representativeness heuristic to short sequences of outcomes. We would expect a random binary sequence of infinite length to have a number of properties: It should contain the same proportion of each outcome; it should have an alternation rate of around .5; it should not contain any internal structure that allows it to be compressed (these properties are discussed further below). The heuristic account argues that people assume that these properties of infinite-length random sequences will also tend to be expected to be seen in short, exact strings of random outcomes. If they are not, a string is judged to be less random or less likely to be generated by a random process. But in reality they are not: for example, in a series of four coin tosses, the chance of tossing four heads in a row (HHHH), and HTTH is equal, at one-sixteenth. By misapplying a representativeness heuristic to short, exact strings of outcomes, participants would rate unrepresentative-looking outcomes (such as HHHH) as being less likely to occur through a random process than are more representative-looking outcomes (e.g., HTTH).

The notion of representativeness has, however, been criticized as nebulous and untestable. Gigerenzer (1996) argued that many heuristics like representativeness lack theoretical

specification, and therefore offer enough flexibility to risk being unfalsifiable, and can between them be used to make a post hoc account of almost any experimental finding. Ayton and Fischer (2004) noted that representativeness was used to account for both the gambler's fallacy, and its opposite, the hot-hand fallacy. Falk and Konold (1997) also noted that there was no a priori way of predicting how representativeness might affect performance on a task, making falsifiable predictions difficult.

Kahneman and Tversky (1972) did make some attempt to define representativeness in binary randomness tasks. As noted above, they suggested that the relative proportions of the two outcomes might be important. In addition, strings containing more alternations (e.g., HHTHTH, which contains four alternations) typically appear more representative of a random generation process than strings containing fewer alternations (e.g., HHHHTT, which contains one alternation). Strings with relatively few alternations tend to contain long runs of a single outcome type, which are heuristically unrepresentative of a random generation process. (Of course, these attributes are not independent: High alternation rates tend to have shorter runs, and vice versa. See Scholl & Greifeneder, 2011, for an attempt to disambiguate the role of run length and alternation rate in longer sequences of outcomes.)

Finally, a random generation process should produce sequences that are uncompressible; that is, that contain no internal structure that allows them to be expressed any more concisely than by giving the entire sequence. For example, HHHHHHHHHHHH could be compressed as $(H \times 12)$, or HHTHHTHHTHHT could be compressed as $(HHT \times 4)$. In contrast, HTHHTTTHTHHT is not so easily compressed. On this basis, Kahneman and Tversky noted that strings of outcomes that can be given descriptive short-cuts (e.g., HTHHT being "HT three times") appear less random. This was more formally codified in Falk and Konold's (1997) Difficulty Predictor (DP). Although DP primarily attempted to capture the subjective difficulty of encoding a sequence of outcomes, it is closely related to Kolmogorov complexity (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2003; see

also Gauvrit Singmann, Soler-Toscano, & Zenil, 2015, for a method of calculating Kolmogorov-Chaitin complexity for short binary strings. For longer sequences, formal and subjective compressibility may diverge due to cognitive limitations.). As complexity is one way of defining the randomness of a sequence, use of DP in judgments could be seen as reflecting the misapplication of a norm in which participants make their judgments based on the entropy of a sequence, rather than its probability of occurrence.

The idea that several different properties may contribute to the representativeness of a string introduces further degrees of freedom to the heuristic-based account, and renders it correspondingly difficult to test. In particular, the relative influence, under an account of local representativeness, of proportions, alternations, and compressibility, is something that remains untested. Examining the extent to which one kind of representativeness is more important than others in guiding randomness performance could help with understanding the representations and processes involved, and constrain local representativeness predictions for other situations. This is one of the aims of the current experiments.

1.2. Experiential account

An alternative set of arguments treats apparent biases in randomness judgments as adaptive responses to environmental experience. Several authors have noted that events in the world may exhibit negative recency, that is, immediately following an outcome, the same outcome is less likely to occur again. For example, after several days of rain, the nature of weather patterns may make it less likely that rain will continue the following day (see, e.g., Ayton & Fischer, 2004; Pinker, 1997).

More abstractly, participants may confuse sampling with replacement and sampling without replacement (see Fiorina, 1971; Morrison & Ordeshook, 1975, for early discussion of this possibility, and Rabin, 2002 for an attempt to model the idea). If I draw beads from an urn

containing 10 red and 10 green without replacement, after drawing 4 reds in a row, the probability of the next bead being green is greatly increased. Many real-world samples involve drawing without replacement, which may encourage more general assumptions of negative recency in randomness judgments, either through overgeneralization or through misconstruing the experimental environment (Hahn & Warren, 2009; Ayton & Fischer, 2004).

There is also a set of models that build on counterintuitive properties of random sequences, suggesting that erroneous or biased judgments might reflect the (mis-) application of *alternative norms*; that is, accurately representing one's experience of random sequences, but misapplying that experience when asked to make judgments or choices. For example, Kareev (1992) demonstrated that participants who were instructed to generate random sequences, tended to produce typical sequences with respect to the number of heads and tails they contained. This was accounted for by noting that across all 1024 possible sequences of 10 coin flips, 252 contained exactly 5 heads, whereas, for example, only 10 contained 9 heads. Thus, the most frequent number of heads is 5, and sequences containing exactly 5 heads are most typical of 10-item random sequences. Kareev used this observation to account for overalternation biases seen in randomness production: If participants generate typical sequences containing 5 heads and 5 tails, then these sequences will on average have an alternation rate higher than 50%.

As another example, Miller and Sanjuro (2016) recently showed that in a short random binary sequence of outcomes, the expected proportion of three occurrences of an outcome that were then followed by the same outcome again was less than .5 (and of course conversely, the proportion of three outcomes followed by the opposite outcome was greater than .5). Thus, evidence traditionally seen as supportive of the Hot Hand Fallacy (Gilovich et al., 1985) actually suggests that it may not be a fallacy.

Most significantly, and of most relevance to this paper, Hahn and Warren (2009) have developed a theory employing the fact that in a short random binary sequence, some strings of

specific outcomes are actually less likely to be observed than others (see Reimers, 2017, for a discussion of similarities between this theory and the work of Miller and Sanjurjo, 2016; see also Konold, 1995, Nickerson, 2007, and Kareev, 1992, for earlier psychologically-motivated work relating to this phenomenon, and Feller, 1968 for mathematical background). Hahn and Warren's argument involved considering strings as component parts of longer sequences of events. While it is true that the two strings HHTHTT and HHHHTH are equally likely to occur given exactly six tosses of a coin, it is *not* the case that these strings are equally likely to occur at least once in any global sequence of finite length $n > 6$. The argument is presented in detail by Hahn and Warren (see also Sun, Tweney & Wang, 2010; Sun and Wang, 2010a, 2010b), and summarized here. For this purpose, we use the term *string* to refer to a relatively short sequence of heads and tails that participants might be asked to make a judgment on, and global *sequence* to refer to a longer sequence of heads and tails, generated by tossing a coin, in which that string may appear. For example, the string THT (with length $k = 3$) appears three times in the global sequence HTHTTTTHTHT, which has length $n = 11$. Note that two of the occurrences overlap.




Figure 1: Raster plot of a sequence of 1,000 simulated coin flips. Vertical lines show where, between the first flip on the far left and the last flip on the far right, each of the strings occurred.

Note that the total number of occurrences of each string is approximately equal. However, occurrences of HHHH tend to cluster together.

If the global sequence is infinitely long, then any two strings of the same length k will occur the same number of times. However, the distribution of these occurrences will not be the same for all strings: The string HHHH will tend to cluster. Suppose that HHHH appears at position t in the global sequence (where by ‘appears’ we mean ‘is completed’; i.e. the elements at positions $t - 3$, $t - 2$, $t - 1$, and t are all H). Consequently, there is a 50% chance that it will appear again at position $t + 1$ (i.e., if the coin toss on trial $t + 1$ yields H, then positions $t - 2$, $t - 1$, t , and $t + 1$ are all H). In contrast, the string HHHT cannot cluster in the same way, because there is no way for two occurrences of HHHT to overlap – all different occurrences of this string must be entirely separate. To illustrate this, Figure 1 shows a raster plot of a simulated global sequence of 1,000 coin flips, with bars marking the points at which each of the strings HHHH and HHHT occurred. Since the global sequence ($n = 1000$) is very long relative to the length of each string ($k = 4$), the total number of occurrences of HHHH and HHHT in the global sequence is approximately equal. However, the distribution is very different. Specifically, occurrences of HHHT are relatively regular (a ‘steady drip’), whereas occurrences of HHHH tend to occur in irregular clusters, with large gaps in between. This results in significant areas of white space in the HHHH sequence, where HHHH did not occur for many flips.

The upshot is that there are many more windows of a given sequence length ($n > 4$) that do not contain the string HHHH than do not contain the string HHHT: In a sequence of length, say, 20, the probability that the string HHHH does not occur (which we label P_{GN} , standing for probability in the **G**lobal sequence of **N**on-occurrence, following Sun et al.’s terminology) is greater (at around .5) than the equivalent probability for HHHT (at around .25). Equivalently, the probability that HHHH occurs *at least once* as part of this global sequence of 20 tosses (labeled P_{GO} , standing for the probability in the **G**lobal sequence of **O**ccurrence) is less than for HHHT.

Hahn and Warren noted that people’s experiences of random sequences such as coin tosses are necessarily finite, and likely to be of moderate length, say 20 or 30 elements at most.

Consequently, in the sequences that people have observed, there is a greater probability of not observing HHHH than not observing HHHT. When asked by a cognitive psychologist to pick which of HHHH or HHHT is more likely, if people assume this question refers to occurrence in a similar finite sample, then their preference for the latter should not be classed as an error; instead it is a sensible inference based on their experience and the statistical properties of the task at hand. More generally, Hahn and Warren stated that “There is not only a sense in which laypeople are correct, given a realistic but minimal model of their experience, that different exact orders are not equiprobable, it seems that the same experience might be able to provide a useful explanation of why some sequences are perceived to be special” (p. 457).

Although Hahn and Warren use P_{GO} as the basis for their theory, they include simplifying assumptions, that aside from strings of streaks of a single outcome, HHHHH, or perfect alternations, HTHTH, people treat all strings with the same proportion of heads and tails identically – so do not differentiate between, say, HHHTT and HTHHT. As P_{GO} does not vary much across strings with the same proportion of heads and tails, this simplifies the predictions made by the theory.

The central argument made by Hahn and Warren (2009) is that judgments may stem from participants over-extending their previous experience of genuine differences in probabilities-of-occurrence to artificial situations contrived by experimenters – the application of alternative norms. This is intriguing, and offers a more experiential explanation of participant behavior to the notion of a representativeness bias in which participants accurately recall limited frequency information. Of course the non-normativeness of a judgment may be relatively inconsequential in many laboratory studies. However, representativeness-based biases occur in both memory for random sequences (Olivola & Oppenheimer, 2008), and higher-stakes choices with real financial (e.g., Chen, Moskowitz, & Shue, 2016) or health (e.g., Kwan et al., 2012) outcomes. This suggests that whatever the cause, the bias is not merely the consequence of low-stakes or

hypothetical tasks.

1.3 Optimization versus heuristics

The accounts above represent two sides of a broader debate on optimization. Some approaches (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1972) assume that randomness judgments are one more example of ways in which we deviate from optimality, adding to the canon of situations in which, perhaps because of processing or motivational limitations (Simon, 1957), we show suboptimal, but functionally adequate judgment and decision making. The dominant alternative account suggests that our judgment and decision making reflect our limited experience with the environment (Hahn, 2014; Hahn & Warren, 2009; see also Miller & Sanjurjo, 2016, and Hertwig, Pachur, & Kurzenhäuser, 2005). In accounts of this nature, experimenters inadvertently encourage participants to give mathematically or logically incorrect answers by structuring the experimental stimuli in a way that does not reflect experience with the environment to which they are adapted. For more general reviews of these positions, see Oaksford and Chater (2007), Bowers and Davis (2012), and Gigerenzer (2007).

However, the use of heuristics and environmental optimization are not mutually exclusive. Hahn and Warren argue that their alternative norms might not be best seen as necessarily an *alternative* to heuristics. Instead, the reason we have adapted to use heuristics may be as a result of their capturing regularities in the environment reasonably well.

There appear to be four ways in which the relationship among alternative norms, heuristics, and behavior could be related. One relationship is that in randomness judgment tasks, although people appear to use heuristics, in fact they do not. Instead they use the alternative norm of probability of string occurrence, which generates behavior that happens to look like use of heuristics because, for example, both accounts predict that people should find the sequence HHHHH as particularly improbable relative to other 5-item sequences. A second possible

relationship is that alternative norms combine additively with heuristic use to improve judgment. A third relationship would be that alternative norms explain the reason for the existence and application of the heuristics we use in randomness tasks: The reason we apply a representativeness heuristic is that it does a better job of capturing the alternative norms in the environment than assuming equiprobability, even if it is not successful for all sequences, and of course fails in the less ecological tasks devised by psychologists. Finally, it is possible that although these alternative norms may be a statistical reality, they have no influence on behavior, and similarities between predictions of alternative norms and behavior are coincidental.

1.4. Experiment aims and rationale

Kahneman and Tversky's original experiments used just two examples of six-item birth-order strings, and consequently lack the sensitivity to assess the relative influence of different aspects of representativeness (e.g., relative proportion of outcomes, alternation rate, compressibility) or use of alternative norms of the kind suggested by Hahn and Warren (2009). We know of no more systematic attempt to examine the factors affecting people's judgments of likelihood of occurrence of different strings of binary outcomes, using an approach similar to Kahneman & Tversky's. The closest example is perhaps that of Scholl & Greifeneder (2011), which attempted to disentangle alternation rate and longest run as predictors of perceived randomness in 20- or 21-item binary sequences. Of course with sequences of this length P_{GO} would be near-zero in any plausibly experienced sequence of outcomes, making it essentially untestable. The aim of this paper is therefore to provide empirical evidence to determine (a) the extent to which people's judgments in evaluating random sequences show sensitivity to alternative norms; and (b) what kinds of representativeness are important in determining perceptions of randomness in the kind of task that had led to development of local representativeness accounts. We note that this work focuses on the perception of random

sequences presented as a single entity, as done by Kahneman and Tversky, rather than a general account of randomness perception and production.

2. Experiment 1

In Experiment 1, we made P_{GO} (the probability of a string occurring at least once in a sequence) normative, by asking participants explicitly to estimate the probability of a string occurring at least once within a longer, finite global sequence. This was done in order to maximize the chance of detecting an influence of P_{GO} on judgments. Our rationale for this was that if the alternative norm represented by P_{GO} does not influence judgments when it is actually normatively appropriate, then it seems unlikely that it will do so when it is normatively inappropriate (such as when people are asked to judge the probability of a string of k items given exactly k observations).

2.1. Method

2.1.1. Participants. A total of 149 participants (43% female; median age = 32, range = 20-74; 57% university educated) were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk, with recruitment handled by mturkdata.com. The experiment took around 10 minutes to complete, and participants were paid \$1.50.

2.1.2. Design and Procedure. All experiments reported in this article were coded in Adobe Flash (see Reimers & Stewart, 2007, 2015 for an overview), and run online.

In Experiment 1, participants completed a series of trials in which they estimated the probability of a string's occurrence as part of a longer sequence. To ensure that they understood this concept, the first page of this experiment gave a concrete example. Specifically, participants were asked to imagine generating the sequence of 10 random consonants GKLRWLMFPK. It was then highlighted that the string RWLM appears in this sequence, while the string RWLK

does not. In order to maximise the likelihood that participants were basing their decisions on P_{GO} , instructions stated explicitly that:

‘Of course, the string could appear more than once in the sequence. But we’re not interested in that here. So what you are rating is the probability that a string will appear at least once in the sequence, versus not appearing at all.’

Likelihood ratings were made by moving a slider on a 400-pixel line, labelled on the left ‘impossible that the string will appear’, in the middle as ‘the string is as likely to appear as it is not to appear’, and on the right as ‘it is certain that the string will appear’. Beneath the slider, a percentage value was displayed indicating the participant’s judgment: If the position of the slider was on the far left, it was at 0%, with integer increments to the percentage value with rightward slider position so that it showed 100% if the slider was on the far right. Instructions stated:

Imagine that I am going to be tossing the coin separately 20 times for each string. So if we were doing this for real, you’d make your judgment for the first string, then we’d toss the coin 20 times and see if the string appeared. Then you’d make a judgment for the second string, and we’d toss the coin 20 times again and see if the second string appeared. And so on.

The experiment used 4-, 5- and 6-item strings. In total, there are 16 distinct 4-item strings, 32 distinct 5-item strings, and 64 six-item strings. However, half the strings are inverses of the other half, that is, they are identical except that H and T have been swapped (e.g., THHT is the inverse of HTTH, HTHTH is the inverse of THTHT, and HTTHTH is the inverse of TTHTHT). As all theories under consideration here predict identical judgments across inverses, participants were presented with a single item from each pair of inverses, chosen at random for each

participant. This means that participants made probability judgments for 8 4-item strings, 16 5-item strings, and 32 6-item strings.

Trials were blocked by string length, and both block order and trial order within a block were randomized across participants.

2.2. Results and Discussion

Figure 2. Results of pairwise comparisons for (A) 4-item strings, (B) 5-item strings, and (C) 6-item strings of heads (H) and tails (T). For each pair, the arrow points to the string that was

rated as more likely to occur at least once as part of a global sequence of coin tosses (the red or blue color of the arrow also indicates choices of the left-hand or upper string, respectively). The saturation of an arrow indicates the strength of the relationship. A solid border around the arrow indicates an uncorrected p -value for a paired t -test of $<.001$, and a dashed border indicates an uncorrected p -value of $<.05$. No border indicates $p>.05$.

Data from the experiments reported here are available for download from <https://osf.io/hy5b7/>. Figure 2 shows the pairwise pattern of rating differences for 4-, 5-, and 6-item strings. For this and all subsequent analyses we averaged across inverse strings (e.g., the ratings for THHT and HTTH were averaged, and are represented by the label ‘THHT’ in Figure 2).

For this analysis, we use the exact values of P_{GO} for every string, as the normative baseline. Note that Hahn and Warren’s (2009) model groups strings into sets containing the same proportion of each outcome. As P_{GO} values among strings that contain identical proportions of H and T (e.g., HHHT and HTHH) are very similar, replacing all individual values with the central tendency of the set does not change results substantially¹. Many of the observed pairwise differences are inconsistent with the normative metric provided by P_{GO} . For example, HHHT is rated significantly lower than HHTH, HHHHT is rated lower than HHHHTH, and HHHHHT is rated lower than HHHHTHH (all $ps < .001$). In each case, P_{GO} is higher for the former string. In general, for strings containing a single oddball, P_{GO} is higher the closer this oddball is to either end of the string (since the closer it is to an end, the fewer ways the string can cluster; see Introduction). However, the empirical data show that, the closer the oddball to an end of the string, the lower the string’s perceived likelihood (see Figure 3). The inconsistencies with P_{GO} do not apply only to strings with a single oddball. For example, THHHT ($P_{GO} = .59$) is rated lower than THHTH ($P_{GO} = .56$), THHHHT ($P_{GO} = .44$) is rated lower than THHHHTH ($P_{GO} = .43$), and

(replicating Kahneman & Tversky's, 1972, comparison) HHHTTT ($P_{GO} = .45$) is rated lower than THHTHT ($P_{GO} = .44$). In each case P_{GO} is higher for the former.




Figure 3. Bars show mean likelihood ratings for exact strings of heads (H) and tails (T) which contain a single oddball, as part of a global sequence of coin tosses. (A) Estimates for 4-item strings as a part of a global sequence of 20 tosses. (B) Estimates for 5-item strings as a part of a global sequence of 30 tosses. (C) Estimates for 6-item strings as a part of a global sequence of 40 tosses. Error bars show standard error of the mean. Black circles show corresponding values of probability of occurrence at least one (P_{GO}) for each string. Strings with oddballs closer to one end have higher rated likelihood, but lower P_{GO} .

It is worth noting that the P_{GO} values for many of these strings are quite similar. In fact,

Hahn and Warren (2009) suggested that differences in P_{GO} would be reflected in judgments only when these differences were relatively large. In the absence of any information regarding what constitutes a sufficiently large difference in P_{GO} to be observable in judgments, this suggestion risks being untestable. For example, the difference in likelihood ratings for HTHHHTH ($P_{GO} = .40$) and HHHTHT ($P_{GO} = .45$) is in the opposite direction to a considerable difference in P_{GO} , but is this difference sufficiently large for an influence of P_{GO} to be expected? We return to this issue in the General Discussion.

The question now becomes: if participants' estimates bear little relation to P_{GO} , then on what information are they basing these estimates? In the Introduction, we noted three aspects of (non-) representativeness that have been raised in previous theorizing: (1) relative proportion of the two outcomes, (2) alternation rate, and (3) complexity. Below we consider each of these in turn.

The first type of local non-representativeness comes from strings in which the overall ratio of heads to tails deviates from 50:50. Here we quantify 'proportion' as the lower of either the proportion of H in the string, or the proportion of T in the string. For example, proportion for HHHT is .25, and for TTHHTT is .33. Thus, a proportion of .5 indicates equal numbers of H and T, and a proportion of 0 indicates a string containing only one outcome.

The alternation rate heuristic refers to the proportion of transitions between adjacent items in a string that involve an alternation between the binary outcomes, e.g., HHHTTT has an alternation rate of 1/5 because it has one alternation out of five transitions, while HTHTHH has an alternation rate of 4/5.

Finally, the complexity heuristic provides a more general conception of randomness perception. The more complex a sequence appears to be (that is, the less structure it appears to possess – which can be measured in terms of how hard it is to compress, remember, or transcribe), the more random it should appear. Many ways of quantifying complexity have been

suggested based on concepts such as sequential independence, irregularity, entropy, and incompressibility. It is beyond the scope of this article to evaluate these alternatives (for reviews, see Falk & Konold, 1997; Nickerson, 2002). For the sake of simplicity, here we use Falk and Konold's (1997) *Difficulty Predictor* (DP), which provides a numerical measure of encoding complexity, with higher values indicating greater complexity (for calculation details, see Falk & Konold, 1997).




Figure 4. Scatterplots of mean likelihood ratings for 4-item strings (top row), 5-item strings (middle row), and 6-item strings (bottom row) against: Probability of occurrence at least once (P_{GO} ; first column); Lower of either the proportion of heads in the string, or the proportion of tails in the string (Proportion; second column); Alternation rate (third column); Falk and Konold

(1997) Difficulty Predictor (DP; fourth column). In all panels, the data point closest to the bottom left of the graph is for perfect repetitions of outcomes (e.g., HHHHH).

Figure 4 shows scatterplots of mean likelihood ratings for 4-, 5- and 6-item strings against P_{GO} , proportion, alternation rate, and DP. Looking at the plots for P_{GO} , the point at the bottom-left of each plot represents the string of perfect repetitions (e.g., HHHHH), which has the lowest P_{GO} by a considerable margin, and also received the lowest rating in each case. However, there is no evidence of a positive correlation between P_{GO} and ratings over the remaining strings. In contrast, ratings over a range of strings appear to correlate with each of the representativeness heuristic's criteria. To analyze these data, we performed a regression analysis on the observed likelihood ratings for the 4-, 5-, and 6-item strings, with the following predictor variables: (1) P_{GO} ; (2) proportion; (3) alternation rate; (4) DP. We use a Bayesian regression analysis, so that we can find evidence in favor of predictors being unable to predict the observed likelihood ratings.

In our analysis, we fit all 16 regression models that exclude interaction terms (i.e., 4 models with one predictor, 6 models with two predictors, 4 models with three predictors, 1 model with all four predictors, and 1 model with no predictors). Our analysis gives us a marginal likelihood for all 16 models. We use the marginal likelihoods for two purposes: First, to determine the most likely model to have generated the observed likelihood ratings out of our candidate set of 16 models. Second, by averaging over different combinations of fitted models, we can also assess the overall evidence for each predictor variable. In particular, we can compare the marginal likelihood of the models that include each predictor with the marginal likelihood of the models that exclude that predictor.

For 4-item strings, there are two models that parsimoniously predict the observed data, neither of which include the P_{GO} predictor. The best-fitting model includes the proportion,

alternation rate, and DP predictions, and performs slightly better ($BF = 1.66$) than the model that includes the alternation rate and proportion predictors. The next best-fitting model includes all four predictors, including P_{GO} , but is 8.6 times less likely to have generated this observed data than the best-fitting model. Averaging over all 16 models, our Bayes factor analysis of effects indicates that models which include the P_{GO} predictor are 8.7 times less likely to have generated the observed data than the models that do not include P_{GO} . Non-Bayesian regression found that a model including only the proportion, alternation rate and DP predictors accounted for 97.7% of the variance in mean ratings across the different strings.

For 5-item strings, the Bayesian analysis revealed that best-fitting model includes the proportion and alternation rate predictors, being 4.6 times more likely than the next best model (which also included the P_{GO} predictor). Again, the inclusion of the P_{GO} predictor leads to worse fitting models, overall ($BF=0.207$). Non-Bayesian regression found that a model including only the proportion and alternation rate predictors accounted for 94.0% of the variance in mean ratings across the different strings.

For 6-item strings (our richest dataset), we see a similar result as for the 4-item strings. The best-fitting model is one that includes the proportion and alternation rate predictors, but this model provides an equivalent account ($BF = 1.02$) as one that also includes the DP predictor. The next best-fitting model also included the P_{GO} predictor, but was 10.3 times less likely to have generated the observed likelihood ratings than the models that did not contain that predictor. Averaging across models, those that included the P_{GO} predictor were 14.5 times less likely to have generated the data than the models that excluded P_{GO} . Non-Bayesian regression found that a model including only the proportion, alternation rate and DP predictors accounted for 92.0% of the variance in mean ratings across the different strings.

In summary, participants' probability judgments in Experiment 1 were essentially unrelated to the alternative norm provided by P_{GO} . Instead judgments were better explained by simple

heuristics relating to local representativeness, and a linear combination of these heuristics (but not P_{GO}) provided a good account of people's performance. Returning to the potential relationships between alternative norms and heuristic use, it seems clear from Experiment 1 that participants do not use the alternative norms discussed by Hahn and Warren (2009) in place of heuristics, nor do they appear to improve heuristic-based judgment by taking into account these alternative norms. It is still possible that alternative norms explain the existence of heuristics. It is also possible that although these alternative norms are a statistical reality, they are not related to human judgment. We return to this issue in the General Discussion.

By asking participants to judge the likelihood of a given string appearing at least once in a longer, finite global sequence, we ensured that P_{GO} provided the normative basis for performance in Experiment 1. So, for example, the correct response would be to provide a higher rating for HHHT than HHTH, since HHHT has a higher value of P_{GO} . And yet participants rated HHHT as *less* likely than HHTH. It is clear, then, that participants' estimates in Experiment 1 reveal non-normative biases. Given that people do not follow the pattern of ratings predicted by this alternative norm in a situation in which it is appropriate, it seems unlikely that their perception of randomness in situations where using P_{GO} is *not* appropriate (such as the procedure of Kahneman & Tversky, 1972) is a consequence of an overgeneralization and misapplication of this metric.

3. Experiment 2

Although Experiment 1 showed clear effects, it has limitations. The task of predicting the probability that a string occurs in a sequence *at least once* is both a difficult task about which to reason, and is low in ecological validity. We also observed that several participants noted that they thought that all strings had equal probability of occurrence, so gave similar ratings for all options. In Experiment 2, participants made a series of binary choices between pairs of strings, indicating which they thought was more likely to occur (at least once) in a sequence of given

length. As each binary choice provides only a single bit of data, we decided to use only 5-item strings in this study (rather than dividing participants between 4-, 5- and 6-item strings), in order to maximize the number of comparisons for each pair.

We also provided a small amount of incentivisation for participants' correct choices in Experiment 2. This use of incentivization is potentially important. It has been argued that the gambler's fallacy is not really a fallacy, because participants who display it have the same chance of winning as someone choosing randomly, showing the opposite (hot-hand) bias, or using any other strategy. The probability of winning is always .5. While in Experiment 1 there *was* a normatively correct pattern of responses (given by P_{GO}), participants in this experiment made judgments rather than choices, and hence in this case too they had no disincentive to show biases. In Experiment 2, we used a task in which participants could do substantially better than winning on 50% of trials, and in which their pay depended on whether they made the correct choice².

3.1. Method

3.1.1. Participants. A total of 151 participants (47% female; median age = 31, range = 19-64; 48% university educated) were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk, as in Experiment 1. No participant who had completed Experiment 1 completed Experiment 2. The experiment took around 10 minutes to complete, and participants were paid \$1.50, along with a performance-related bonus which was \$0.49 on average.

3.1.2. Design and Procedure. We created a subset of the set of 32 possible 5-item strings, to exclude inverses (so the subset would not include both HHTTH and TTHHT), meaning there were 16 items in the set, and thus 120 possible binary comparisons between non-identical members of the 16-item subset.

Participants completed a series of 120 trials in which they chose the option from a pair of strings that they thought was more likely to occur at least once in a sequence of 20 coin flips.

General instructions introducing the idea of strings in sequences were the same as in Experiment 1. Additionally, participants were informed that they would win \$0.01 on each trial that the string they chose appeared in a virtual sequence of coin flips to be simulated at the end of the study, and that the outcomes were independent in this regard:

It doesn't matter whether the other string appears or not - if the string you chose appears, you get a \$0.01 bonus. If it does not, you get no bonus. So you should always choose the string you think is most likely to appear.

After reading the instructions, participants made the 120 binary choices, with one option on the left of the screen, and the other on the right. Each option had a button beneath it labelled 'THIS ONE', and participants had to click one of the buttons to make their selection. They then had to click a 'NEXT' button in the middle of the screen to continue to the next trial. For each of the 120 binary choices, left-right position of the options was randomized for each participant, and each option had a 50% chance of being presented as its inverse. So, taking HHTHH vs HHHHT as an example of one of the 120 binary comparisons made, around a quarter of participants chose between HHTHH and HHHHT; a quarter between THTTT and HHHHT; a quarter between HHTHH and TTTTH; and a quarter between THTTT and TTTTH. As all theories under consideration make identical predictions for all these pairs, the analysis treats them as a single stimulus.

At the end of the experiment, a sequence of 20 random coin flips was generated for each binary choice that the participant had made, and if the string that they had chosen appeared in the sequence, their bonus was increased by \$0.01.

3.2. Results and Discussion




Figure 5. Proportion of binary choices made for item in Experiment 2 as a function of differences in ratings between the two items in Experiment 1.

We first examined the congruency between the results of this choice Experiment and the ratings in Experiment 1. A scatterplot showing the relationship between the difference in ratings for a pair of strings in Experiment 1 and the probability of choosing a string in Experiment 2 is shown in Figure 5. To analyse the data from Experiment 2, we ask how well we can predict participants' choices between each pair of strings, based on the various properties of each string. For each pair of strings presented, we first evaluated the signed differences between the left and right options in terms of the following variables: P_{GO} , proportion, alternation rate, and DP. For example, the string HHTHH has two alternations and HTHTH has four alternations, and so the predictor value for this pair of strings would be +2, if HTHTH was the string on the right. Participant choices were entered into a binary logistic regression (left option = 0; right option = 1). The predictor variables were the signed differences between the left and right options on the

following variables: P_{GO} , proportion, alternation rate, and DP. We conducted this regression using a Bayesian approach so that we can quantify evidence for a null effect of predictors. The model also assumed that each participant had their own set of coefficients for each prediction (and an intercept), we assumed that individual parameter values were drawn from a population-level Normal distribution. For example, we assumed that individual-participant alternation rate coefficients, β_{ALT} , were drawn from a Normal distribution with mean, B_{ALT} , and standard deviation, σ_{ALT} . We focus our inference on the population-level mean parameters for each of the predictor variables.




Figure 6. Posterior distributions for the coefficients for each of the predictor variables in our Bayesian logistic regression analysis of Experiment 2, for the full dataset (top row), and for the dataset excluding cases in which one of the items in the choice-pair was a string of perfect repetitions (HHHHH or TTTTT). The dashed line at 0 in each panel is equivalent to a null-effect of that predictor variable.

The five panels in the top row of Figure 6 plot the posterior distribution of the coefficients for each predictor variable (i.e., the B parameters). The posterior distribution represents the distribution of predictor-weights that are most likely, given the observed choices that participants

made. Each of the five panels also contains a vertical dashed line at 0, which corresponds to a ‘null’ predictor variable.

The posterior distributions for the three local representativeness heuristic predictors (proportion, alternation rate and DP) sit far from 0, suggesting that they are reliable predictors of choice. The posterior for P_{GO} has relatively little density at zero, suggesting that it is contributing to participants’ choices, but its contribution is not as strong as for the heuristics.

Almost all support for the influence of P_{GO} comes from trials in which one item of the pair presented to participants is the string of perfect repetitions (HHHHH or TTTTT). Panels in the bottom row of Figure 6 show the posterior distributions of coefficients for each predictor when excluding trials containing perfect repetitions. As for the full dataset, these distributions reveal strong support for an effect of proportion, alternation rate and DP. However, now the distribution for P_{GO} has considerable mass at zero, suggesting that it is unrelated to participants’ choices when this small subset of extreme cases is removed.

There are numerous ways of quantifying the degree of support for these statements. For example, if one has a prior likelihood that any given predictor variable was 0, then the ratio of the prior and posterior likelihoods would yield a Bayes factor (cf. the Savage-Dickey test: Wagenmakers, Lodewyckx, Kuriyal, & Grasman, 2010). Alternatively, one could construct a 95% credible interval for each predictor variable and determine whether zero (or a region surrounding zero) fell within that interval (Kruschke, 2010). We prefer to abstain from either approach, since it is clear from Figure 6 that our conclusions are robust to our choice of inference.

4. Experiment 3

The results of Experiment 2 are strongly congruent with, and readily predicted by, those of Experiment 1. In a final experiment, we used a task that was procedurally even easier to

understand than Experiments 1 and 2, namely choosing which of two strings is likely to occur first in a sequence of coin tosses. This makes the task particularly straightforward for participants, and is not dependent on participants' attention to the specifics of a string appearing "at least once" in a sequence of coin flips.

We also ran Experiment 3 completely between-subjects, for two reasons. The first is that providing probability ratings or binary choices for dozens of different sequences (as in Experiments 1 and 2) is repetitive and effortful, and as such, participants may be inclined to use heuristics that they would not use in shorter, less repetitive tasks. This could give the impression that judgments are always driven by heuristics, when under normal circumstances they are not. Secondly, the within-subjects design of Experiments 1 and 2 meant that participants saw a number of strings of outcomes. Matthews (2013) has shown trial-to-trial context effects in randomness judgments, and it is thus possible that our previous within-subjects designs produced context effects which led to judgments that would not have been made in isolation.

We designed Experiment 3 to involve only a single trial per participant, combined with a more readily understandable task, and some incentivization for normative choice. The rationale was to use a simpler choice task, and a between-subjects design to trade off experimental power with ecological plausibility. If, using a very different design, we found similar results, we could be more confident that the phenomena observed here are not artifacts of the precise implementation of the experiment. Thus, in Experiment 3, participants made a single binary choice of which string they thought would occur first in a series of coin tosses. Clearly, with only a single bit of information per participant, arranging for sufficient comparisons of every possible pair of strings to allow robust statistical analysis would require an impractically large number of participants. In Experiment 3 we therefore used a subset of all possible pairwise comparisons, and recruited over three thousand participants online.

The other significant change in Experiment 3 was in the instructions. The instructions for

Experiments 1 and 2 were designed to make the use of P_{GO} normative. However, despite our best efforts they may not have been easy for participants to understand. Thus, in Experiment 3 participants were asked the simpler question of which of two strings they thought would appear first if a coin were tossed repeatedly.

Making the task more ergonomic for participants adds a layer of normative complexity, because although P_{GO} is positively correlated with the actual probability of a string occurring sooner, for binary choices, the correlation is not perfect. Notably, probability of occurring first in sets of pairs violates transitivity; for example, for any string length $k > 2$ it is possible to find another string of length k that has a higher probability of occurring first (see Gardner, 1974, Penney, 1969).

Thus, the normative basis for behavior in Experiment 3 was different from that in Experiments 1 and 2 (where P_{GO} was the appropriate norm). We refer to the normative metric in Experiment 3—the probability that string X will occur before string Y in a sequence of binary outcomes—as $P_{first,X,Y}$. As P_{first} is not directly estimable by P_{GO} , we include both measures as potential alternative norms that participants might use. (We note that P_{first} is a relatively unlikely candidate, given the amount of experience required to learn the first occurrences of each possible pair of strings, but as it is actually the normative baseline in this task, we include it for completeness.) We examine whether these metrics describe behavior here, or whether instead behavior was related to same representativeness properties that predicted behavior in Experiments 1 and 2.

4.1. Method

4.1.1. Participants. A total of 3447 binary choices were collected. Participants completed the choice task at the end of an unrelated 2-minute judgmental forecasting experiment (Reimers & Harvey, in preparation), and were paid 50 maximiles points (~USD 0.25;

www.maximiles.co.uk; see Reimers, 2009 for a brief introduction) for completing both experiments. They were also paid a bonus of 10 maximiles points if their choice of string actually came first in a sequence of random coin tosses that was simulated immediately after they made their selection.

4.1.2 Design. Each participant made a choice between a pair of 5-item strings (see Procedure). We used a subset of possible pairings, which covered all possible strings, but not all possible pairings. As in Experiment 1, of the 32 different 5-item strings, two sets of 16 were constructed. One set held all sequences that contained 2 or fewer heads. The other set held the inverse strings that contained 2 or fewer tails. Within each set, all possible pairings of strings were generated (120 per set). In other words, the two sets were identical except that in one set all heads and tails had been swapped. All theories under consideration make identical predictions for the two sets.

Participants were assigned a code based on the number of participants who had previously started the experiment. This meant that across each set of 480 participants, all possible pairings across the two sets were used as stimuli, with counterbalanced left-right positioning (although as not all participants completed the experiment, there remained significant variation in the number of participants for each pairing).

4.1.3. Procedure. Participants read the following instructions:

‘Next, we have a very quick two-choice question. If you get the right answer, you’ll receive a bonus 10 maximiles points. Imagine a trusted friend is tossing a coin again and again, and is noting down each time whether it comes down heads (H) or tails (T). Your friend is going to carry on tossing the coin until a certain sequence of heads and tails comes up - for example it could be three heads in a row (HHH), or a tail followed by another tail followed by a head (TTH).

You have to say which of the two sequences of heads and tails below you think will occur first. Then we’ll run a sequence of simulated coin tosses to see which one actually comes first. If your

chosen sequence occurs first, you'll receive 10 bonus maximiles points. If the other sequence occurs first, you won't receive the bonus points (but you'll still get the points for the rest of the survey of course).

Repeatedly tossing a fair unbiased coin, which of the following precise sequences of heads and tails do you think will occur first?

Below these instructions were two 5-item strings, one on the left and one on the right of the screen. Participants clicked to indicate their choice. Immediately after making their choice, participants saw a sequence of randomly simulated coin flips generated at the bottom of the screen, which continued until one of the two strings presented in the choice came up. When this happened, participants were informed whether they had won or not, and were debriefed.

4.2. Results and Discussion

To minimize the risk of repeat submissions, second and subsequent submissions from a single email address or single IP address were deleted, leaving 3282 participants' data.

Participants with response times of under 5 seconds (including reading the task instructions) were also removed, leaving 3123 in the analysis. This gave a mean of 13.0 (SD = 2.27) participant choices across the set of 240 pairs (min = 8, max = 18). For the analyses that follow our dependent variable is the proportion of choices of the left-hand option, as presented on the participant's screen, as a function of the difference between the left- and right-hand options along the dimensions of interest (such as P_{first} , alternation rate, etc).

Overall participants chose the string which actually did appear first on 51.5% of trials, which was not significantly different from chance [binomial test, $p = .11$, 95% CI = (.497, .532)]. This suggests that whatever strategy or information participants were using, it was not helping their overall performance.

Performance as a function of normativity and heuristics

First, we compare the proportion of people choosing string X over string Y with the

normative choice, given by the difference between the actual probability of string X occurring first and the probability of Y occurring first ($P_{first,X,Y} - P_{first,Y,X}$). For each pairing of strings we ran 100,000 simulated trials on which coin tosses were generated randomly until one of the strings appeared. These simulated data were used to calculate an estimate of $P_{first,X,Y}$, and since either string X or string Y must occur first we have $P_{first,Y,X} = 1 - P_{first,X,Y}$.




Figure 7. Scatterplots showing the proportion of participants choosing the left-hand option

in Experiment 3, as a function of differences between the two strings in: (A) Hahn and Warren's P_{GO} , (B) Hahn and Warren's P_{GO} , excluding streaks of the same outcome, (C) deviation from equal proportions of H and T, (D) Falk and Konold (1997) Difficulty Predictor, (E) number of alternations, and (F) actual probability of occurring first [P_{first} , based on a simulation of 100,000 sequences].

Figure 7A shows that there is a weak positive relationship between participants' choices and Hahn and Warren's alternative norm, P_{GO} . As in Experiment 2, the two clusters at the bottom-left and top-right of this plot are the two sets of 15 pairs in which one of the pair is a string of perfect repetitions (HHHHH or TTTTT). If these are removed only the central cluster remains, and evidence for a positive correlation between P_{GO} and choices disappears, as depicted in Figure 7B.

Figures 7C-E show scatterplots of participants' choices against the local representativeness heuristics studied in Experiment 1: proportion, Falk and Konold (1997) Difficulty Predictor (DP), and alternation rate. In contrast to P_{first} , each of these scatterplots shows evidence of a systematic relationship between the heuristic and participants' responses across the range of choices. Finally, Figure 7F shows a scatterplot of participants' choices against this normative metric, P_{first} . There is little evidence of a systematic relationship between the two variables.




Figure 8. Posterior distributions for each of the predictor variables in our Bayesian logistic regression analysis of Experiment 3, for the full dataset (top row), and for the dataset excluding cases in which one of the items in the choice-pair was a string of perfect repetitions (HHHHH or TTTTT). The dashed line at 0 in each panel is equivalent to a null-effect of that predictor variable.

To examine the relative predictive power of the different variables on participant choices, we repeated the same regression analysis as in Experiment 2 with two differences. First, since each participant contributed only one response, we could not estimate regression coefficients for each individual. Second, we also included a predictor for the difference between values of P_{first} for the left and right strings. The five panels in the top row of Figure 8 plot the posterior distribution of each predictor variable, using the same format as in Figure 6.

This analysis revealed that the posterior distribution for the P_{first} predictor had considerable mass at 0, suggesting that P_{first} does not reliably predict participants' choices. However, the coefficients for the three local representativeness heuristic predictors (proportion, alternation rate and DP) have essentially no posterior density at 0, suggesting that they are reliable predictors of choice.

The posterior for P_{GO} follows a similar pattern to that in Experiment 2. There appears to be some evidence for the predictive value of P_{GO} (top row of Figure 8), but this conclusion rests entirely upon choices between pairs that include strings of perfect repetitions (bottom row of Figure 8).

In summary, as in Experiments 1 and 2 participants' choices were well-explained by the application of local representativeness heuristics based on a small number of properties of a string's outcomes. For the whole dataset, there was some evidence to suggest an effect of the alternative norm represented by P_{GO} , but this was entirely driven by the fact that participants rarely chose the string of perfect repetitions (HHHHH) when it was presented in the choice pair, and this string has the lowest P_{GO} (but of course it also has the lowest values of proportion, alternation rate, and DP). When choices involving the string of perfect repetitions are excluded, P_{GO} is unrelated to choices. This stands in contrast to the heuristic measures, which reliably predict participants' choices across the whole dataset. Non-Bayesian logistic regression revealed that the best-fitting model including only the proportion, alternation rate and DP predictors explained 51% of the variance in participants' proportional choice of each item in a pair of options across the whole dataset.

These findings suggest that, while proportion, alternation and DP all penalize HHHHH, they do not do so as strongly as participants, and it is this additional variance that is picked up by P_{GO} . However, this isolated success does not provide a strong case for a more general role of P_{GO} in participants' randomness perception. An alternative view is that the failure of heuristics to accurately model the size of the disadvantage for HHHHH reflects our assumption of a linear effect of each heuristic. For example, in terms of alternation rate, the linear assumption means that the difference between strings containing zero versus one alternation is considered psychologically equivalent to the difference between strings containing one versus two alternations. Our data may instead be taken to suggest that the 0–1 difference is psychologically

more salient than the 1–2 difference.




Figure 9. Scatterplot showing the proportion of participants choosing each string from a pair in Experiment 3, as a function of the difference in likelihood ratings in Experiment 1 (left panel, $r = .67$) and choices in Experiment 2 (right panel, $r = .77$)

Consistency with Experiment 1

Finally, we compared participants' behavior in Experiment 3 with the choices that would be predicted on the basis of the results of Experiment 1. If decisions were based on similar processes in the two different tasks, as we predict, then we should expect to observe a strong positive correlation between them. The scatterplot in Figure 9 shows the proportion of choices of the left-hand option in Experiment 3 as a function of predictions based on the ratings in Experiment 1 and choices in Experiment 2. The clear positive relationships suggest that participants in Experiment 3, as a group, performed comparably to, and consistently with, those in Experiments 1 and 2. Bearing in mind that responses in Experiment 3 were binary choices, and some cells contained only 8 of these binary observations, the strength of these correlations seem consistent with the idea that participants used very similar strategies across all three experiments. These findings therefore help rule out any account under which the patterns of choice observed in

Experiments 1 and 2 were the result of the surface characteristics of any one of the experiments.

5. General discussion

A pervasive view in the cognitive psychology literature is that people's perception of randomness is fundamentally biased: that judgments regarding the relative likelihood of different strings of events reflect non-normative heuristics relating to the local representativeness of those strings. Much of the basis for this reasoning comes from a very small number of exemplars used by Kahneman and Tversky (1972). Consequently, these studies lack the sensitivity to distinguish between judgments based on the use of representativeness heuristics, versus judgments based on environmental experience of real patterns that, in some cases (but not all), coincide with representativeness. This latter view suggests that randomness perception is fundamentally a property of (unbiased) experience that can then be over-extended to situations in which this experience is no longer a good guide to classifying sequences of outcomes as random or not. In other words, judgments in a particular task may be based on (or sensitive to, or correlated with) *alternative norms* developed on the basis of related prior experience

Three experiments assessed participants' sensitivity to alternative norms, by measuring likelihood ratings (Experiment 1) or incentivized choices (Experiments 2 and 3) for different strings of heads and tails that could occur in a sequence of coin tosses. In none of these cases did participants' behavior show sensitivity to the appropriate normative metric. Instead, behavior in all experiments was best explained by a small number of properties relating to local representativeness: the proportion of each outcome, alternation rate, and local complexity. The fact that the different methodologies of the three experiments gave similar results suggests that participants use very similar approaches to assess the relative probability of a particular series of outcomes occurring.

5.1 Evaluating the scope of models such as Hahn and Warren (2009)

As noted in the Introduction, there are several ways in which normative baselines of the sort described by Hahn and Warren (2009) can be reconciled with the heuristics that have traditionally been argued to underlie perception of randomness. It could be that people do not actually use heuristics, it merely looks that way because they are using alternative norms. While this could explain people's behavior with regard to the limited sets of strings that have been compared in previous research (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1972), the richer dataset provided by the current experiments shows that this is not the case, even in situations such as Experiments 1 and 2 where the use of experiential norms such as those of Hahn and Warren would be normative.

Alternatively, it is possible that heuristics exist for other reasons, but that alternative norms make an additive contribution to judgments. Indeed, Hahn and Warren (2009) argued that differences in P_{GO} would be reflected in judgments only when these differences were relatively large, and that for strings with similar values of P_{GO} , judgments may instead be dominated by the influence of proportion or alternation rate. As noted earlier, in the absence of any information regarding what constitutes a sufficiently large difference in P_{GO} to be observable in judgments, this suggestion is in danger of being untestable. Importantly however, each of the current experiments demonstrated that the appropriate norm did not provide substantial additional explanatory power over and above a linear combination of representativeness properties.

The third possibility raised in the Introduction is that we use only heuristics in tasks of this nature, but the reason we do so is because they reflect a normative adaptation to the regularities in the environment. In other words, these heuristics exist because they capture the differences in objective probability highlighted by Hahn and Warren better than the assumption of equiprobability for all strings. However, although the heuristics examined in the current article accurately capture the relatively low probability of a string of the same outcome occurring, they

also mean that participants should make strong distinctions between strings in which the objective difference in probability is minimal. For example, Figure 2 shows that participants rated HHHT as much more likely than HHHH, which is compatible with Hahn and Warren's account. However, they also rated HHTT as much more likely than HHHT, the difference being numerically even larger than between HHHH and HHHT. Objectively, strings HHTT and HHHT have equal P_{GO} and hence are equally likely, but participants' higher rating for HHTT is compatible with the use of a proportion heuristic. Any account that assumes heuristics are used because they capture the alternative norms discussed by Hahn and Warren would have to justify why capturing genuine regularities—such as HHHH being less likely to occur than HHHT—is of so much more adaptive importance than, say, accurately representing the fact that HHHT and HHTT have an approximately equal probability of occurrence. This is not impossible – situations in which a particular outcome never occurs may be much more adaptively important than situations in which both outcomes occur but at varying frequencies. For example, in foraging, with outcomes of Food and No Food, a streak of No Food outcomes could lead to starvation, and as such, paying particular attention to streaks might be important for survival. See also Sun and Wang (2010a) for an argument that the timing of streaks of a single outcome might be particularly important markers for both the nature of the environment and changes to it.

The final possibility that we raised in the Introduction is that although of P_{GO} may be a statistical reality, and an indicator of normativity, it has no influence on behavior, and similarities between predictions of alternative norms and behavior are coincidental. This possibility is certainly consistent with the results of the current experiments. That said, our findings do not undermine the validity of the alternative norms presented by Hahn and Warren (2009), or the importance of attempting to determine carefully what normative baselines should be (see also Miller & Sanjurjo, 2016). Nor do they speak to the potential localized effect of experience on randomness judgements. It may well be that where participants gain substantial experience of

random outcomes, the experienced alternative norms could influence judgment. For example, Matthews (2013) found clear effects of experience on randomness perception, suggesting such experiential effects are feasible, although Olivola and Oppenheimer (2008) have suggested memory for random sequences may be systematically biased. Recently, Farmer, Warren and Hahn (2017) also showed that passive exposure to a sequence of 200 binary random outcomes improved performance on randomness generation and perception tasks, and reduced the magnitude of gambler's fallacy effects. Furthermore, they found that this improvement depended on the presentation structure: where the same 200 outcomes were presented in short sequences of 5 rather than longer sequences of 10 or 100, performance did not improve.

We suspect that the influence of alternative norms would depend both on experience and on the precise methodology used – for example, sequential presentation (e.g., Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2004; Farmer et al., 2017), as a more ecologically plausible approach, might be more likely to lead participants to use P_{GO} . However, the aim of our research was to examine whether Hahn and Warren's experiential account can explain 'classic' findings suggesting biases in randomness perception, such as those shown by Kahneman and Tversky (1972). In that respect, they do not fare well.

5.2 Recasting representativeness

In the Introduction, we noted that the notion of representativeness has previously been criticized as vague and hard to falsify (e.g., Gigerenzer, 1996). At a high level, the existence of multiple potential heuristics—representativeness, anchoring, availability, among others—allows almost any behavior on a task to be explained post hoc. However, even the application of a single heuristic such as representativeness has the potential to explain a wide variety of potential results. There are many ways in which an item can be considered representative of a larger set, and correspondingly many ways in which these different 'dimensions' of representativeness can be

combined to provide an overall measure. As such, the predictions of a representativeness account have a great deal of in-built flexibility. This is problematic when applying such an account to small numbers of items, since the number of free parameters in the model may outstrip the amount of data available. Our approach here has instead been to gather likelihood ratings over a large set of items. Bayesian multiple regression can then be used to quantify the support, or lack of support, for the use of various forms of representativeness in generating these data. These experiments revealed that a combination of a small number of properties provided a good account of participants' responses across a wide range of different items, in both single and joint evaluation, for both rating and choice, and both incentivized and non-incentivized procedures.

Overall our findings suggest that people do not use a single kind of representativeness in evaluating randomness: Alternation rate, relative proportions and complexity all appear to be predictive of participants' evaluations. In future work it will be important to examine the extent to which the relative contribution of these different forms of representativeness varies across individuals and contexts. However, it does appear to be the case that heuristics described by Kahneman and Tversky (1972) make significant contributions to predicting participants' judgments and choices across our datasets. More generally this study provides an important step in recasting the vague notion of representativeness, by identifying and quantifying the influence of different dimensions of representativeness on judgment and choice.

Footnotes

¹ We note that Hahn and Warren's (2009) theory predicts a rank ordering of ratings or preferences, where perfect streaks are seen as less probable than perfect alternations which in turn are seen as less probable than all other outcomes. The authors note that they do not make any predictions about probability ratings among strings that are not streaks or perfect alternations. This substantially constrains the predictive power of the theory, which is why we use values of P_{GO} rather than the three possible levels of surprisingness that Hahn and Warren predict. However, it is the case that many strings that were not perfect alternations were seen as more improbable than perfect alternations (e.g., HHHHHT was seen as substantially less likely to occur than HTHTHT), which is at odds with the predictions regarding levels of surprisingness made by Hahn and Warren.

² Although incentivization is generally seen as a way of making tasks more ecologically valid, and improving data quality, it is also possible that it can lead participants to switch from their default strategy to one of attempting to calculate what the optimal choice would be. As such, incentivization could lead to atypical patterns of behaviour. The fact that our findings across incentivized and non-incentivized designs were so similar suggests that this was not an issue here. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for making this observation.

Acknowledgments

We are grateful to Peter Ayton, Nick Chater, and Yaakov Kareev for helpful discussions regarding this work. Mike Le Pelley was supported by an Australian Research Council Future Fellowship (FT100100260).

Supplementary material

Raw data from the experiments reported here can be downloaded from: <https://osf.io/hy5b7/>.

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