



City Research Online

City, University of London Institutional Repository

Citation: Ledwidge, M. & Parmar, I. (2017). Clash of pans: pan-Africanism and pan-Anglo-Saxonism and the global colour line, 1919–1945. *International Politics*, 55(6), pp. 765-781. doi: 10.1057/s41311-017-0105-1

This is the accepted version of the paper.

This version of the publication may differ from the final published version.

Permanent repository link: <https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/19098/>

Link to published version: <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-017-0105-1>

Copyright: City Research Online aims to make research outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to.

Reuse: Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way.

City Research Online:

<http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/>

publications@city.ac.uk

Mark Ledwidge, School of Humanities, Canterbury Christ Church University, Canterbury, Kent CT1 1QU, UK. Email: mark.ledwidge@canterbury.ac.uk

Inderjeet Parmar, Department of International Politics, City, University of London, Northampton Square, London EC1V 0HB, UK. Email: Inderjeet.parmar.1@city.ac.uk

Mark Ledwidge is Senior Lecturer in the School Of Humanities head of American Studies. He works on the relationship of African-Americans to US foreign policy, and his research interests also encompass politics & IR and the nexus between identity and power. He is a founding member of the AHRC Research Network on the Presidency of Barack Obama.

Inderjeet Parmar is Professor of International Politics, Chair of the Research Network on the Presidency of Barack Obama, Co-ordinator of the Research Network on Global Knowledge and World Orders, and of the Trump Elite Project. His current book project is *Presidents and Prime Minister at War: Race, Elitism and Empire in Anglo-American Wars from Korea to the Wars on Terror*.

Abstract: The article demonstrates both conceptually and empirically that PanAnglosaxonist knowledge networks reconstructed and reimagined an apparently de-racialised, scientific, sober and liberal world order that outwardly abandoned but did not eradicate the twin phenomena of racism and imperialism. Rather the new liberal (imperial) internationalists, organised in newly-formed ‘think tanks’ such as Chatham House and the Council on Foreign Relations, and through their increasingly global elite networks, mounted a top-down battle for minds at home and in the wider world. Operating in state-private elite networks, they drove the movement to manage change and develop a new liberal world order particularly to contain panAfricanists who combatted the domination and exploitation of Africans worldwide. More broadly, we indicate that the pragmatic response to the extremes of Nazi ideology and a countering movement from the cadres of Asian, African and African-American intellectuals, anti-colonial and anti-racist struggles within the national and global context, forced the Anglo-centric elites to promote change, albeit limited.

Key words: PanAnglosaxonism, PanAfricanism, knowledge networks, elite power, racialization, liberal imperial internationalism

Clash of Pans: PanAfricanism and PanAnglosaxonism and the Global Colour Line, 1919-1945

INTRODUCTION

Liberal internationalism, long celebrated as the incubator of the ‘long peace’ resulting from a rules-based order founded on an open, inclusive international system since 1945, was born fighting, is steeped in hierarchy, and saturated with mindsets that are racial, elitist and imperial. It was also initially conceived on the defensive, in a post-1918 world spiralling “out of control”, an Anglo-American hegemonic project/mission to manage, contain and channel fundamental change wrought by war, nationalism, anti-colonial resistance, and socialist revolution. Liberal internationalism, is frequently depicted as a progressive and idealistic era in global politics, as opposed to a panAngloSaxonist¹ conception of power, was exclusionary and self-interested, and embedded within new practices of transnational elite power.

This article argues that the Wilsonian moment was also a Lenin moment, a Gandhi moment, Du Bois’s pan-African moment, and also influenced the development of Chinese anti-imperialism, nationalism and communism. Hence, the responses of liberal (imperial) internationalists were a combination of offense and management, coercion and persuasion, violence, socialisation and incorporation. The article demonstrates both conceptually and empirically that PanAnglosaxonist knowledge networks reconstructed and reimagined an apparently de-racialised, scientific, sober and liberal world order that outwardly abandoned but did not eradicate the twin phenomena of racism and imperialism. Rather the new liberal (imperial) internationalists, organised in newly-formed ‘think tanks’ such as Chatham House

and the Council on Foreign Relations, and through their increasingly global elite networks, mounted a top-down battle for minds at home and in the wider world. Operating in state-private elite networks, they drove the movement to manage change and develop a new liberal world order. Additionally, counter-hegemonic assaults initiated by diaspora Africans combatted the intellectual, militarist and economic exploitation of Africans worldwide via a pan-Africanist offensive. The pan-Africanist counter offensive was rooted in the analysis of W.E.B Du Bois, the controversial and pre-eminent African-American scholar who stated that the problem, “of the Twentieth Century is the..... Colour-line”. Du Bois, as did Marcus Garvey, recognised that race and imperialism had been interwoven into the very fabric of both national and international politics. Although Du Bois and Garvey were reared and came to prominence (first) within the “English-speaking world” i.e., the Anglo-sphere, they knew that its ideological foundations were erected on the concept of western and white supremacy. Thus from the early part of the 20th century the European diaspora was forced to contend with a racially defined movement that sought to reverse the global order that was arguably partially responsible for birthing it. Here we suggest that the pragmatic response to the extremes of Nazi ideology was preceded by an earlier countering racial consciousness from cadres of Asian, African and African American intellectuals, anti-colonial and anti-racist struggles within the national and global context, which forced the Anglo-centric and Euro-centric elites to promote change, albeit limited.

As such the world did not and could not continue in the old way – it had to be reimagined to project an image of change – of empire into commonwealth, imperialism into internationalism, overt biological racism into subliminal racism through ‘the silent war’, hierarchy into equality. But the story is messy and not linear (Furedi, 1998; Hobson, 2012). Negotiating and navigating change and ‘hegemony’ is a project that never ends as every component of the historic bloc, let alone its opponents and enemies, is actively engaged in

tussles for position. Ultimately this article will point out the internal and external rivalries that accompanied the clashes and quest for power between the Pan-movements at critical junctures in international relations such as 1919, 1935, 1945, and beyond.

The article is structured thus: it begins with a brief historical contextualisation of the era of western/white supremacy and the crisis that ensued with World War I and its aftermath. It then moves to examine the panAngloSaxonists who formed the principal vehicles for managing change and countering rival concepts and movements by describing the elitism and world views of Chatham House and the CFR, formed in Paris 1919 as two branches of a single organisation. It was those organisations that led the movement to reimagine empire as commonwealth, imperialism as internationalism, hierarchy as formal equality, and overt racial superiority theory transformed to “race silence”. Key founders of the nascent field of academic international relations, CH and CFR leaders agreed with Du Bois that the principal problem of world politics was management of the global colour line. The article then provides an outline of the worldviews and activities of pan-Africanists as they developed alternatives and challenges to panAngloSaxonist strategies. We present and analyse several cases of points of contact between the rival ‘pans’ to demonstrate their rivalries in action – at Paris 1919, with the outbreak of the Italo-Abyssinian war in 1935, and the deliberations surrounding the formation of the United Nations, 1944-45. Therefore, we conclude that the interwar years, the initial period in which the main contours of liberal internationalism developed, rather than representing a failed interregnum, represented the end of an old era of overt imperial and racial world order and ushered in an embryonic system that came to full fruition after 1945 – still racialized, imperial and hierarchical, but with a new language, institutional framework, and less overt, or formal, power.

The first section of this article identifies the origins of the colour line and the associated attitudes of racial, cultural and religious superiority that helped fuel and rationalise Western expansionism.

EUROPE, ISLAM AND THE RACIAL COLOUR-LINE

Many mainstream discussions regarding the hierarchical social construct called “race” proceed from a familiar premise, whereby, European dominance in regard to non-white populations is couched in a manner implying their subordination could be attributed to their racial, cultural, technological and military inferiority. This is particularly glaring in relation to Africans who, despite the magnitude of Africa’s contribution to world history, have generally been characterised as playing a minor role (Walker, 2006; Asante, 2007; Diop, 1974). In contrast to this, Africans have been assigned a central role in Europeans’ racial discourses and the construction of the colour-line.

Although the colour line has been outlined by scholars and activists such as W.E.B. Du Bois, Winthrop Jordan, JA Rogers and Frantz Fanon, it is still frequently neglected in foreign affairs and IR scholarship (Ledwidge, 2013; Vitalis, 2015; Chinweizu, 1987). The thrust of the colour line thesis is that an ascendant Europe authored a complex power system that used their own phenotypical and cultural attributes to create a racial template to construct an overt and covert form of coding that could be employed as a discriminatory rationale to justify their pursuit of non-whites’ labour-power and resources (McCarthy, 2009, 24; Krenn, 2006, 6). Here, racism and white supremacy transcend the realm of feelings as they represent a functional set of behaviours designed to define and promote power relations to secure Europeans’ political and economic interests (Ture et al, 1992, 3; Ledwidge, 2014, 6).

While, most scholars trace the genesis of the racial paradigm to the rise of Europe during the 1400s, tensions regarding race and culture began in an earlier phase of European history. A key variable in Europe’s construction of the colour-line began in 711 AD when the

great black general, Tarik-Bin-Ziad, left North Africa, crossed the straits of Hercules (which were renamed the Gabel Tariq, the Hill of Tarik - the rock of Gibraltar) and commenced the Moorish conquest of Spain and parts of Portugal (Lugard, 1996, 29; Van Sertima et al, 1992, 54; Jackson, 1990, 128).

Tarik's actions initiated the several centuries-long reign of Moorish North Africans (Van Sertima et al, 1992; Lugard, 1996; Jackson, 1990)² and Arabs over a "white" populace. Significantly European historians have under acknowledged the role the Moors played in introducing advanced scientific, scholastic and cultural knowledge into a relatively backward Europe (Karenga, 2002). Although the Moors did not impose a racial hierarchy on the Spanish, their Spanish subjects developed a religious and racialised Christian ideology that was anti-African and anti-Islamic which fuelled their revolutionary zeal (Clarke, 1998, 28). Thus, with the strategic marriage between King Ferdinand and Isabella (1469) and the conquest of Granada, the last Moorish strong hold in 1492, the defeat of the Moors gave way to the intense colour coded, racial and religious purge exemplified by the Spanish inquisition (Clarke, 1998, 28) that sentenced the Moors to conversion, death, expulsion and enslavement (Karenga, 2002, 114; Van Sertima et al, 1992, 54; Jackson, 1990, 358). Spain and Portugal adopted an evolving racial worldview which when combined with the scientific, nautical and military expertise gleaned from the Moors, laid the basis for their militarised, economic, political, colour orientated and deeply ideological assault on the world. The enslavement, genocide and colonisation, that the Catholic and Protestant nations of Europe imposed on the Americas, Africa, Asia and the Pacific was uniquely infused with an imperialistic and racial worldview.

Despite fierce opposition from indigenous populations between the 14th and 20th centuries European nation states amassed vast empires. Arguably 1900, the date Du Bois made his signature speech regarding the colour-line, represented the zenith of Europe's global dominance, the closing of the global frontier whereby imperial fervour would be unleashed on

other Europeans. Heightened greed and militarism precipitated deadly rivalries for the possession, access to, or retention of the colonies, especially as the stakes were raised further due to the rise of Japan and Russia. It is not an over-simplification to argue that WWI was an international crisis triggered by Europe's complex system of alliances and the supposition that aside from Japan, Ethiopia and Russia all other non-western actors had been subjugated by the global system of white supremacy. The West plunged itself into a suicidal contest to establish which state or states would assume the mantle of global leadership, depleting its vitality and alerting their colonial subjects, many of whom had served in Western armies, to the tenuous nature of Western power (Lauren, 1996, 81; Furedi, 1988, 40).

White supremacy was an integral weapon in Europe's imperial arsenal that in relative terms helped to unify whites against the racialised other. The idea (and practices) associated with the colour line were designed to convince people of colour that white power was unassailable in addition to preventing internal disputes between Europeans from destabilising the racial status quo (Ledwidge, 2014, 10; Roediger, 1995, 12). Still at no stage was White supremacy ever assured without the hierarchical imposition of power in all of its permutations. However in terms of success, British proficiency was noteworthy in regard to imperialist expansion and in the particularistic construction of an Anglo-centric depiction of whiteness, which provided the rationale for the creation of the Anglos-sphere (Krenn, 2006, 9; Vucetic, 2011, 3). In particular the British and their WASP counterparts in America would adopt a calculated and covert approach to managing the colour-line in the aftermath of WW1.

PANANGLOSAXONISM MOVES TO MANAGE IMPERIAL CRISIS, COMBAT RIVAL 'PANS'

The Paris Peace conferences following World War I and the Bolshevik revolution were the site, then, of global crisis management through the construction of new forms of international

organisation, and colonial redistribution and reform. Vitalis (2015) has ably demonstrated the imperial-colonial mindsets of American founders of the discipline of IR which was consciously understood as an instrument to comprehend and manage global “race relations”. At Paris in 1919 were formed (what later became) the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and its British cousin, the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA, aka Chatham House), two of the most influential think tanks in the Anglo-American world, which spawned imitator institutes of international affairs in Europe and the British dominions. Contrary to how we think today, identifying and managing the global colour line as the world’s principal division and challenge was not something uniquely emphasised by W.E.B. Du Bois but the practical preoccupation of panAngloSaxonist elites. The CFR and Chatham House, along with their colleagues in the Foreign Office and State Department, were at the very heart of that project.

This section of the article shows the elitist characteristics of the CFR-CH, their embeddedness in the broader social, economic, and political establishments of Anglo-America, and hence their representativeness not of popular opinion but the imperial-reformist-internationalist sections of the political elite. Detailed studies show both their racialised outlooks but also their desire to sublimate racial hierarchies and issues beneath a veneer of equality and democracy, particularly through ‘internationalising’ or federalising overtly imperial arrangements. Empire was reimagined as ‘commonwealth’ – a state or community run for the common good rather than for the interests of the colonial power. The CFR’s journal, *Foreign Affairs*, was the direct descendant of its forerunner review, the *Journal of Race Development*, founded in 1910 to ventilate issues related to race relations’ management (Vitalis, 2015, 18). Much later, Chatham House spawned the Institute of Race Relations to think through problems of world race relations management (Furedi, 1998, 212). Chatham House itself was the brainchild of men who had helped construct the racist South African constitution of 1906, founded the imperial-reformist journal, *Round Table* as the organ of the

Round Table movement in 1910, and saw Chatham House as the direct continuation of that line of intellectual and political development. Cecil Rhodes had bequeathed the funds that fuelled the work of the Round Table movement, which had several of its American corresponding members at Paris – such as former Rhodes scholar Whitney H. Shepardson and George L. Beer. The Paris meetings that founded the institutes were not bolts from the blue, therefore, but the outcome of definite and increasingly significant reformist tendencies in Anglo-America – ‘new imperialism’ and ‘progressivism’, respectively (Leuchtenberg, 1952-53; Lavin, 1995; Kendle, 1975).

A detailed elite backgrounds analysis of Chatham House and the CFR’s founders and leaders may be found elsewhere (Parmar, 2004; Shoup and Minter, 1977), but suffice it to say that their leaders were embedded in the upper echelons of their respective social, political and economic elites. Private schools, elite universities, extensive corporate directorships and links with the City of London and Wall Street law and financial firms, affiliations with all the main political parties, governmental, colonial and military experience, membership of elite gentlemen’s clubs – all feature strongly in the collective profile of CFR and Chatham House leaders. They were ‘Wasps’ – white anglo-saxon Protestants – steeped in colonial-imperial attitudes, experience and worldviews. They saw national and international issues as intimately related – and the nation state as an anachronism. Hence they favoured international organisation, but with Anglo-American power at its head. They were funded by major Anglo-American financial institutions like J.P. Morgan and great corporate foundations – particularly Rockefeller and Carnegie and, later, Ford (Parmar, 2015). Wall Street and the City of London bankrolled the think tanks that several of their number helped to found, lead and develop into influential institutions in policy-oriented deliberations and elite and attentive opinion-management (Lippmann, 1922).

Hence, it is unsurprising that Chatham House leaders such as Lionel Curtis and Frank Ashton-Gwatkin were at the forefront of articulating their mission as managing a world of racial division and increasing racial consciousness – which was how they defined anti-colonial movements, as ‘anti-white’ movements that they feared would lead to a future race war in which whites would be severely outnumbered. Silencing and sublimating racial thinking and discourse, because they feared it would only cause further division by calling attention to the matter, and reforming empire into commonwealth, and transferring colonies into ‘mandates’ and ‘trusteeships’, therefore, became political necessities to meet the challenges of a radically altered world situation (Louis, 1984, 220). Ashton-Gwatkin, a Foreign Office official at Paris and Chatham House Council member, exemplified the panAngloSaxonist desire to maintain racial separateness but suppress discussion of racial issues. In a memorandum, *Racial Discrimination and Immigration*, Ashton-Gwatkin argued that although the issues of the Pacific were fundamentally racial, there was no real solution as races could not mix or live in equality – “one or the other must be the ruling caste,” he argued (Furedi, 1998, 4). It would take many decades and another global war before a Chatham House leader would admit that, historically, it was the “English-speaking peoples...[who] imposed on mankind a ‘race question’” (Arnold Toynbee quoted in Furedi, 1998, 27).

The two think tanks championed science and the scientific method to emphasise their objective and non-partisan approach but interpreted in such a way as to promote imperial thinking. Lionel Curtis, for example, when noting the direct continuation under changed circumstances of the mission of the overtly imperialist Round Table movement by Chatham House stated that ‘science’ was a mere tactic in the long-range endeavour to preserve the fundamentals of the British empire. Sublimating overt talk about ‘empire’, through terms such as ‘commonwealth’, became Curtis’s forte throughout the 1920s and 1930s (Lavin, 1995). International organisation played the same role. While international federation or Anglo-

American federal union were advertised as above race, power and interest, their core remained Anglo-American and heavily racialized. For instance, Curtis and American pro-federalist journalist Clarence Streit discussed how to ensure over-representation of white English-speaking peoples and the marginalisation of the more populous India in an international federation in the 1930s. After a long discussion of how to achieve that goal without exposing their racist thinking, which involved a thorough consideration of the means by which Deep south segregationists had stripped African-Americans of the franchise after 1865 – poll taxes, literacy tests, grandfather clauses, etc. – they decided that ‘individual taxable capacity’ as the basis of representation would place white, English-speaking New Zealand in pole position in the proposed federation. The “representation of the Asiatic countries like India and China”, they concluded, would be reduced to “manageable proportions” (Parmar, 2004, 68). Interestingly, even members of Chatham House criticised plans for federal union: experience of federal systems in South Africa and the USA had failed to improve black people’s lives; the new scheme “might turn out to be a great blonde beast,” according to Hugh Wyndham, a member of Chatham House’s World Order group (Parmar, 2004, 68). Barbara Wooton, another CH Council member, while supportive of “Anglo-American hegemony” preferred a broader based federation for tactical reasons – because of opposition from “a great part of the world, who do not see us as we see ourselves...” (Parmar, 2004, 68).

Curtis and the other founders of Chatham House believed, as Du Bois noted many years earlier, that “the great problems of the world now [1918] ... are peculiarly problems of the Anglo-Saxon race” (Parmar, 2004, 61, 68). In 1921, Curtis went further and argued that “all policies in the last analysis now turn on the mutual relations of the white races of Europe, America, and Australia to those of Asia and Africa” (Lavin, 1984, 113). At the Paris meetings, Curtis argued that the best way to achieve the national interests of major states was through a conception of an international society, to advance a “universal interest” (Dockrill, 1980, 667).

Anglo-Saxonism was the view that “the civilization of the English-speaking nations was superior to that of any other group on the planet; and that the primacy of English and American civilization was largely due to their innate racial superiority” (Anderson, 1981, 12). Yet, Anglo-Saxonism was always an amalgam of biological and cultural factors; in the post-WWI years it began to stress cultural superiority and inferiority as its fundamental characteristic, quietly sublimating its overt biological-racial aspects. By World War II, George Catlin, a close associate of the transatlantic federalists, argued that by “Anglo-Saxony,” he merely meant “a cultural bloc, with common traditions, habits, culture and (by and large) political views. The very core of that culture is a notion, not of race, but of freedom” (Catlin, 1941, 20). In practice, Catlin’s formulation expressed all the core assumptions of panAngloSaxonism but couched in the more acceptable language of culture and morality: where there was biological superiority and inferiority there now appeared cultural capacities and deficits, requiring technical and educational aid for development of the under-developed areas.

Chatham House founding and other British delegates at Paris confronted the changed world situation head on when Japan proposed a racial equality clause in the League of Nations Covenant. PanAngloSaxonists in Paris rejected the principle of racial equality – Lord Robert Cecil, head of the British delegation in Paris and Chatham House founder, regarded the proposal as a “painful amendment” while Harold Nicolson feared its acceptance implied not only the equality of the white and yellow races but also “the terrific theory of the equality of the white man with the black” (Nicolson, 1933, 145). But the tenor of the times was reflected in two responses: near-silence on the Japanese proposal in the West, but acclaim for Japan’s stand in the Afro-Asian world, propelling that power to symbolic leadership of anti-imperialist resistance. By 1935, W.E.B. Du Bois concluded that “Japan is regarded by all coloured people as their logical leader, as the one non-white nation which has escaped for ever the dominance and exploitation of the white world” (Du Bois quoted in Furedi, 1994, 27). By 1942, however,

State Department and Foreign Office discussions suggested that the 1919 ‘incident’ over racial equality confirmed the impact of race on international politics and implied that the issue of racial equality needed to be handled more positively (State Department paper sent to Foreign Office, cited in Furedi, 1998, 45). But in 1921, Ashton-Gwatkin noted that Britain, the US and the Dominions were “all equally interested in avoiding a discussion of this subject” – as Furedi so insightfully observes, panAngloSaxonist elites “regarded racial thinking as having the potential to disrupt the world system.... A shift from racial confidence to racial fear,” on their part. Hence, any racial conflict would inevitably challenge the imperial status quo (Furedi, 1998, 2). The ‘racial threat’, therefore, came from the unwillingness of non-whites to accept white leadership (Tinker, 1977, 131).

The transformation of, and in, the world system after WWI necessitated not only racial silence, so as not stir up further trouble from non-white races, but also changing the overt language of imperial power and inequality. As mentioned earlier, while the essence of racial and other power inequalities continued, panAngloSaxonist elites increasingly devised new ways to manage imperial power and strengthen the bonds of union between Britain, its Dominions and the USA. One of those was to increasingly use the term ‘commonwealth’ instead of ‘empire’. Lionel Curtis was in the forefront of such efforts as was the Oxford scholar, Alfred Zimmern, who was close to the Round Table movement and Chatham House. To Zimmern, the League of Nations was a continuation of liberal imperialism and, with the British Commonwealth, they were the twin forces of order and peace through law, the champions of civilisation (Rich, 2002, 120). In addition, as Curtis argued, the League would also preserve Anglo-European power to retain tutelage over “those races who cannot as yet govern themselves” and, with American membership, “render obsolete the old pernicious idea of empire, rightly abhorrent to the American tradition” (Curtis cited by Mazower, 2009, 45). Beneath such schemes, as Mark Mazower argues, lay a note of racial anxiety – as articulated

by Jan Smuts in regard to the white minority in Africa – to be soothed by an international organisation of white great powers (Mazower, 2009, 48). The language of commonwealth – as exemplified in Zimmern’s 1911 book, *The Greek Commonwealth*, and in Curtis’s *The Problem of the Commonwealth* – elided the rather brutal fact that long-term white “tutelage” over the backward races was being sealed in a deal between white powers that did not want a repeat of WWI – a white civil war.

Race was indeed a key factor in the thinking and role of the nascent CFR at Paris. As the official history of its first fifteen years notes, in Paris were assembled thought leaders from “the same country and the same race”, the best combination for an agency to create international affairs public opinion “at once charitable, sane, and well-informed...” (cited in Shoup and Minter, 1977, 12). Several leading CFR founders were part of President Woodrow Wilson’s Inquiry – academic and other peace planners – and closely linked with the Round Table group – including historian George L. Beer, Thomas W. Lamont of the JP Morgan banking house, and former Rhodes scholar Whitney H. Shepardson (Shoup and Minter, 1977, 13). Wilson himself wanted to avoid heated debate or publicity on any race questions at the Paris Peace conferences: “My own interest,” he stated, “is to quieten discussion that raises national differences and racial prejudices. I would wish them, particularly at this juncture in the history of relations with one another, to be forced as much as possible into the background” (Kawamura, 1977, 520). Yet, the activities of African-American scholars and activists in the US and in Paris in 1919, meant that race remained prominent and helped forge bonds of solidarity between panAfricanists and Japan (Onishi, 2007). Beer had written about the necessity of an organisation of English-speaking peoples in 1917 although couched in the language of cultural affinity as well as a conscious attempt to move away from the concept of empire and imperialism to commonwealth. As he noted, “the first savours of command; the second of service: the one of servitude, the other of freedom” (Beer, 1917, 171). Decades later,

during WWII, CFR leader, geographer and Johns Hopkins University president, Isaiah Bowman, essentially continued Beer's line of thought when he argued that, with the effective death of imperialism, newer forms of international governance, through which the Anglo-Americans would exercise power, were necessary – which he believed was the future role of the United Nations (Parmar, 2004, 123; Parmar, 1995). In the aftermath of Paris, however, Bowman had already noted that future global expansion would be driven by economic power rather than territorial; the governance of the globe, however, would require Anglo-American hegemony within an international organisation (Smith, 1986).

THREE EXAMPLES OF THE CLASH OF PANS

The following section will briefly explore three examples to demonstrate the global contest within which the new liberal world order was forged; they span the inter-war and second world war years.

Furedi's under-utilised study of imperialism and the global dimensions of white supremacy details the historical impact of the West's evolving racial worldview. This article suggests that the broad mass of Western and Anglo-centric scholars have not acknowledged the imperialist and racial substrata of the current world order (Hobson, 2012, is a notable exception). Consequently, the counter hegemonic struggles authored by continental and diasporian Africans have been relegated to the margins of academic enquiry except or until they have threatened to disrupt the status quo. Therefore, it is important to examine the historical roots of pan-Africanism: which was derived from centuries of racial enslavement colonization, and the brutal appropriation of Africa's mineral and human resources, which resulted in Africans mounting long term resistance movements and insurrections (Conyers et al, 2004; Geiss, 1974; Ledwidge, 2013). For example, the Haitian Revolution and other

insurrections within the Caribbean and North America help consolidate a counter hegemonic and self-affirming identity profile (Falola et al, 2015, 63).

Thus pan-Africanism was conceived by diaspora Africans robbed of their linguistic, cultural and ethnic identities, calling for the reconstruction of African identity within the racialized global context (Ledwidge, 2013, 25; Geiss, 1974, 11). The consequence was the rise of a small combative intellectual elite that challenged the intellectual foundations of white supremacy and propagated a gospel of African redemption at home and abroad (Falola et al, 2015, 216). Early examples of this black intelligentsia were exemplified in the writing and activism of David Walker, Martin Delaney (Clarke, 1992; Adi, 2003; Clarke et al, 1974) and the Caribbean scholar Edward Wilmot Blyden who, in 1881, called for Africans throughout the world to reclaim their Africaness' (Clarke, 1992, 27). The actions of the Black intelligentsia were the equivalent³ of those of the Western and Anglo-Saxon power elite who had constructed and utilised a behaviourist racial power paradigm; likewise black intellectuals formulated a race-first transnational identity dedicated to the protection of African interests.

The black intelligentsia challenged the West's propaganda that Africans had no history; and the deliberate denigration of the global African personality. In short like Fanon, Cabral, Chinweizu and other Africanist theorists, the early pan-Africanists recognised that the territorial parameters of African liberation must include the decolonisation of the African mind (Falola et al, 2015; Geiss, 1974; Chinweizu, 1987). Interestingly those activists responsible for popularising pan-Africanism hailed from the Caribbean (Clarke et al, 1974; Conyers et al, 2004; James, 2000). Ironically as the 19th Century came to a close diasporian Africans were constructing their race first power base, while the transnational white elite were preoccupied with the collective fears of an impending apocalyptic "race war" which they concluded threatened the status and existence of the white race. Consequently, the pan-Anglosaxonist white elite chose to adopt a modern brand of racism that invalidated the conspicuous

propagation of white supremacy in favour of a covert liberal variant to consolidate white power; whilst simultaneously negating non-whites efforts to construct their own organic counter hegemonic theories of power like pan-Africanism.

In 1900, H. Sylvester Williams, a Trinidadian lawyer, coined the term pan-Africanism as a anti-colonial theory of International Relations at the first pan-African Conference, held in London (Ledwidge, 2013, 26; Plummer, 1996, 14). During the conference, W.E.B. Du Bois announced that ‘the problem of the 20th Century is the problem of the Colour-line’ (Adi et al, 2003, 48). Although Williams failed to build the international pan-Africanist organisation he desired, he sounded the war horn that helped to propel Du Bois’ and Marcus Garvey’s forays into international relations. In addition Du Bois’ internationalism helped spawn the creation of an African American foreign affairs network from 1900 through to the 1960s and beyond that played an evolving role in international politics (Ledwidge, 2013).

Although Du Bois has been credited as the father of pan-Africanism notwithstanding the role of Williams, the Jamaican born Marcus Garvey surpassed Du Bois’ organisational efforts as a result of founding the United Negro Improvement Association (in Jamaica July 20th 1914), which popularised a transnational, race first brand of pan-Africanism (Meier et al, 1985). Unlike Du Bois’ efforts to receive great power patronage, Garvey asked the question where is the Blackman’s government and set out to build one. Garvey’s vision of African liberation called for the destruction of white supremacy and the radical reconstruction of global politics (Blaisdell, 2004). Du Bois’ elitist brand of pan-Africanism, conversely, was geared to persuading the white power elite to grant him entry into the establishment, explaining his post WWI request for entry into the 1919 peace talks in Paris (Ledwidge, 2013). Du Bois wanted to win concessions for the masses of colonised Africans everywhere including those in the United States (Ledwidge, 2013). Ideological differences aside, Garvey and Du Bois both intended to influence the directions of the discussions at the League of Nations, and the Paris peace talks.

The post WWI context had placed limitations on white supremacy and pan-Anglosaxonism which was imperilled due to challenges initiated by non-state actors along with protestations from Japan and China. For pan-Africanists the advantages derived from state power were non-existent as western imperialism had conquered all but three quasi-independent black Nations i.e. Haiti, Liberia and Ethiopia. Therefore unlike the elite power brokers of the pan-Anglo-Saxon and Western world the pan-Africanists had no state power through which they could advance their political agenda. Therefore paradoxically the reformist and radical pan-Africanists were reliant on appeals to the transnational white establishment committed to the maintenance of white hegemony. Unsurprisingly the UNIA and Du Bois, who were acting on behalf of the NAACP, received no significant support from the great powers. For example the UNIA sent a representative to the Peace Conference and assembled an African American delegation to petition the League of Nations, which included Monroe Trotter's National Equal Rights League, A. Phillip Randolph and Ida B. Wells; (Ledwidge, 2013, 36) but were ignored by the Wilson administration, the peacemakers, and the League of Nations. Decisively, the US State Dept. refused to issue the UNIA delegation with passports to travel to Europe. On the other hand, Du Bois was summoned to Washington DC by President Wilson's confidant Colonel House to discuss his plan to obtain six visas to enable African Americans to lobby at the peace conference in order to promote their pan-African agenda; subsequently aided by the white led NAACP Du Bois travelled to Paris in an attempt to gain access to the peace conference and to hold his own pan-African Congress. Nonetheless, faced with some obstructionism, Du Bois skilfully bypassed it by utilising his pan-Africanist network via the black French politician Blaise Diagne who persuaded the French Prime Minister G. Clemenceau to permit the pan-African Congress to meet in Paris, with attendees mainly from colonised Africa (Clarke, 1992, 216).

Clemenceau demonstrated his soft power acumen by shrewdly differentiating France from the other Great powers by appearing to suggest that France was more racially progressive. Overall the UNIA and Du Bois were neutralised by the pan-Anglo-Saxonist elites within the British and American governments, who instigated counter intelligence plots that neutralised Marcus Garvey and crippled the UNIA (Kornweibel, 1998; Lewis, 2000). Although Du Bois had been treated to a private audience with Colonel House in Washington, eventually like Garvey Du Bois fell out of favour with the NAACP which led to his resignation in 1934 for daring to promote a form of black separatism (Lewis, 2000, 567)⁴, in addition his radicalism led to years of harassment from the US government⁵.

ITALO-ETHIOPIAN WAR

A second example of a clash between the pan-African and pan-Anglosaxonist networks occurred in 1934 as a result of Mussolini's desire to avenge white Italy's cataclysmic loss to Menelik II at Adowa in 1896, by instigating the second Italo-Ethiopian War. Mussolini's invasion exemplified the aggressive aims of white supremacy and Italy's quest to enhance its imperial status. For Africans cross the globe the assault on Ethiopia was an assault on African independence and a testament to Europe's incessant thirst for African resources. African Americans viewed the war through a racial, historical, cultural and religious lens that provoked both outrage and a desire to defend their racial honor. Italy's racial imperialism was unsurprising to non-whites, as the League's rejection of Japan's racial equality clause had signaled the West's continued support for the color line. Equally, Anglo-French inertia regarding Italy's attack on the principle of sovereignty reflected their efforts to appease Italy and their belief in racial hierarchy, hence the League's failure to assist Ethiopia was consistent with the views of two of its most important members (Ledwidge, 2013).

In America, neutrality laws and the ethno-centric biases of the WASP elite within the foreign policy establishment and white America helped entrench support for the international colour line. Predictably, the executive branch leaned on the language of neutrality and ignored the fact that America's racial subjugation of African Americans was consistent with the racial subjugation of Africans in Africa. Henceforth African Americans championed the defense of Ethiopian sovereignty. In short African Americans and the AAFAN's defense of Ethiopia was predicated on a racial and pan-Africanist ethos, which found expression via their efforts to boycott Italian-American businesses, to provide medical supplies and recruit African Americans to fight for Ethiopia (Ledwidge, 2013, 47). African Americans also founded an array of new organizations which coexisted with and built on the fragments of the Garveyite and pan-Africanist movements. Notably the Black press' analysis of the War presented a pan-Africanist and anti-imperialist critique that highlighted the racial dynamics of international relations. Unsurprisingly, Du Bois and Garvey pointed to the conspiratorial character of Great power politics, which acquiesced in Italy's imperialist and racial agenda.

Irrespective of mainstream ideological considerations the WASP contingent in the U.S. foreign policy establishment was predisposed to ignore African Americans' efforts to safeguard Ethiopian sovereignty. The executive branch preached the virtues of strict neutrality laws in order to legitimize their failure to protect the national integrity of Ethiopia. For example, the CFR and the U.S. government ignored the lobbying efforts of the Ethiopian Research Council, backed by Howard University Africanist Leo Hansberry, Malaku Bayen, cousin of Haile Selassie, and political scientist Ralph Bunche (Ledwidge, 2013, 49). Overall the US government stifled Haile Selassie's attempts to secure economic or military assistance from Americans and specifically ceased African American attempts to fight on behalf of Ethiopia, with secretary of state Cordell Hull halting military recruitment (Ledwidge, 2013, 59). However, under pressure from Italian American lobbies, the Roosevelt administration allowed

Italian Americans to provide substantial economic and military aid to Italy (Ledwidge, 2013). The racial privileges of Italian Americans, neutrality laws and the racial worldview of the U.S. government, coincided with the imperialist and racial logic of the League and the Great Powers. Therefore the lamentations of African Americans and the pan-Africanist ideals of the global African constituency were eclipsed by the West's power politics and its allegiance to maintaining the colour-line in international politics.

UN FORMATION

The term WWII obscures the argument that the conflict was generally caused by acute rivalries between European nation States. Indeed, Du Bois highlighted its imperialist roots in centuries of racial oppression and the combatants' desire to become the global hegemon (Lewis, 2000; Plummer, 1996, Adi et al, 2001). Prior to America's entry into the war, the African American foreign affairs network (AAFAN) depicted it as an internecine war between white supremacists and an ascendant Japan; but over time Nazi ideology and the allies' alleged commitment to the Four Freedoms secured most African Americans support for the war. African American support was confirmed by their adoption of a transnational agenda called the Double V campaign that demanded racial equality for black people in America and abroad. In brief the African American foreign affairs network won concessions during the war and planned to lobby delegates to support the formal ratification of a racial equality clause at the Dumbarton Oaks peace talks and in San Francisco in regard to the formation of the United Nations Organisation.

In contrast to the previous two cases, African Americans' increased proximity to state actors during the War softened their calls for transnational racial equality and decolonization, as pan-Africanism was deemed too controversial even if partially acceptable (to black America). Such moderated positions won direct talks with US officials: Ralph Bunche attended the conference and "assisted the construction of 'US policy in the colonies'" (Ledwidge, 2013,

97). In addition the Council of African Affairs (CAA) which was founded in 1939 by Max Yeagan and Paul Robeson who were granted access to Henry S. Villard (head of the State Department's Division of African affairs), who "promised to consider...the CAA'S recommendations to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in relation to Africa" (Ledwidge, 2013, 97). Nevertheless despite African Americans' call for universal racial equality and decolonization, the Dumbarton Oaks accords ignored the colonial issue and enshrined the principle that the proposed UN Security Council would only accept "petitions from sovereign states" (Ledwidge, 2013, 98). In short the conference accords pursued a liberal internationalist agenda that prioritized the needs of America's WASP contingent, the Anglo-sphere and the Western power elite to attempt to keep American and global race relations and even colonialism outside of the purview of the Security Council's mandate.

The battle reconvened at San Francisco (April 1945) as African Americans and their various organizations braced themselves for another campaign to influence racially conservative Western elites. The African Americans' chief goal was to force the great powers to insert a pragmatic human rights/racial clause within the UN charter. The American establishment demonstrated its narrow vision of foreign affairs by sending an all-white delegation to the UN conference. Still, efforts for black inclusion at the UN conference paid off as the government officially requested that the NAACP send three delegates i.e. Du Bois, Walter White and Mary McCleod Bethune, all of whom became official consultants to the US delegation. While the selection of three African American consultants appeared promising, the more discerning members of the black intelligentsia noted that the NAACP was not a black or militant activist organization (Plummer, 1996, 150). Nonetheless the evidence indicates that the consultants pushed the US delegation to insert a clause that prohibited discrimination on the grounds of "Race, language, religion, or sex" (Lauren, 1996). Additionally the Soviet Union orchestrated an important strategy of underlining the US-France-Britain's abysmal record on

racial issues and colonialism. In short the Soviets' anti-imperialist and anti-racist rhetoric was designed to undermine the capitalist system and to win allies in the non-white world.

Ultimately, the pan-Anglosaxonists and racial imperialists may have softened their language and made some outward concessions to the mythical post racial world but: The US and West ensured that the UN charter did not sanction the UN to intervene to end colonialism or racial inequality in America (Lauren, 1996; Ledwidge, 2013). Nevertheless, the language of white supremacy was toned down after WWII and moderate African Americans such as Walter White and Ralph Bunche were incorporated into the foreign policy establishment. The principle of state sovereignty was used as smoke screen to prevent the UN from having the power to intrude into America's domestic race relations or to interfere with the West's colonial holdings in Africa and Asia. In brief, African Americans' efforts to dismantle pan-Anglosaxonism and the West's racial imperialism were skillfully blocked by transnational elites who profited from the colour line that existed in America and throughout the Anglo-sphere abroad. Thus in all three clashes the pan-Africanist intelligentsia was unable to dislodge its Anglo-Saxon counterpart. In fact, in the final analysis, the pan-Africanist concept was generally abandoned in favor of a more palatable conception of international affairs, more amenable to the post war brand of liberal internationalism.

CONCLUSION

Post-1918 liberal internationalism represented a new form of racialized struggle by panAngloSaxonists against, among others, panAfricanists, to manage and channel resistance in a changing world, and develop new imaginaries for a post-racial and post-empire world

order. However, as we show above, what was abandoned was the outer shell of the racialized global order via subtle language shifts – such as from empire to commonwealth and imperialism to internationalism and by substituting notions of race for what amounted to cultural imperialism. That was still tacitly or otherwise conjoined to the racial power paradigm. The shift in actual power relations was less significant and would require violent anti-colonial wars featuring massive casualties among colonial peoples and domestic movements for change that featured both non-violent and revolutionary movements subjected to massive and violent resistance from racial majorities. In short, the foundations of the contemporary liberal world order were built on the conceptual sturdy pillars of violent and non-violent struggle and intellectual combat. Western dominance derived from a violent, racial, hierarchical and imperial order that arguably remains deeply entrenched in the current power dynamics of global politics and continues to influence the ways in which the West views “the rise of the rest” (Turner, 2014).

¹ The term is used from a behaviourist perspective focused on the actual behaviour of elite Anglo-saxonists who, by definition, placed both overt and covert boundaries in relation to the creation of an elite and white network. We are not suggesting that pan-Anglo-Saxonism was a label those people assigned to themselves. Anglosaxonists were prepared to establish working relationship with other elite groups identified as white, while confining non-whites to the periphery of their ideological, racial and civilizational network in accordance with the racial, political and cultural status quo. Therefore, our use of the term provides an objective label to

highlight the beliefs and actions of the aforementioned group as opposed to asserting that the aforementioned group outwardly adopted the term.

² Which included two distinctly African dynasties the Almohad and Almoravids.

³ Note unlike the Europeans the PanAfricanist model of power did not include the construction of a doctrine of racial supremacy.

⁴ However, Du Bois returned to the NAACP as director of special research from 1944 to 1948
<http://www.naacp.org/pages/naacp-history-w.e.b.-dubois>.

REFERENCES

Adi, H. et al. (2003) *Pan-African History: Political Figures from the Diaspora since 1787*. London: Routledge.

Anderson, S. (1981) *Race and Rapprochement*. London: Associated University Presses.

Asante, M. K. (2007) *The History of Africa the Quest for Eternal Harmony*. London: Routledge.

Beer, G. (1917) *The English-Speaking Peoples: Their Future Relations and Their Joint Obligations*. New York: Macmillan.

Blaisdell, B. (2004) *Selected Writings and Speeches of Marcus Garvey*. New York: Dover Publications.

Catlin, G. (1941) *One Anglo-Saxon Nation*. London: Andrew Dakers.

Chinweizu, (1987) *The West and The Rest of Us*. Lagos: Pero Press.

Conyers Jr., J. I. et al., eds. (2004) *Pan African Nationalism in the Americas: The Life and Times of John Hendrik Clarke*. Trenton: Africa World Press.

-
- Clarke, J. H. (1998) *Christopher Columbus and the Afrikan Holocaust*. New York: A&B Publishers Group.
- Clarke, J. H. (1992) *Notes for an African World Revolution*. New Jersey: Africa World Press.
- Clarke, J. H., et al. (1974) *Marcus Garvey and the Vision of Africa*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Diop, C. A. (1974) *The African Origin of Civilization Myth or Reality*. Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books.
- Dockrill, M. (1980) Historical Note: The Foreign Office and the 'Proposed Institute of International Affairs 1919'. *International Affairs* 56(4): 665-672.
- Falola, T. et al., eds. (2015) *Pan-Africanism, and the Politics of Citizenship and Identity*. New York: Routledge.
- Furedi, F. (1994) *Colonial Wars and the Politics of Third World Nationalism*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Furedi, F. (1998) *The Silent War*. London: Pluto Press.
- Geiss, I. (1974) *The Pan-African Movement*. London: Methuen & Co.
- Hobson, J.A. (2012) *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760–2010*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jackson, J. G. (1990) *Ages of Gold and Silver*. Austin: *American Atheist* Press.
- James, W. (2000) *Holding Aloft the Banner of Ethiopia*. London: Verso.
- Karenga, M. (2002) *Introduction to Black Studies*. Los Angeles: University of Sankore Press.
- Kawamura, N. (1977) Wilsonian Idealism and Japanese Claims at the Paris Peace Conference. *Pacific Historical Review* 66(4): 503-526.
- Kendle, J. (1975) *The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union*. Toronto: Toronto University Press.
- Kornweibel, T. (1998) *Seeing Red*. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

-
- Krenn, M. (2006) *The Color of Empire: Race and American Foreign Relations*. Washington D. C.: Potomac Books.
- Lauren, P.G. (1996) *Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination*. Oxford: Westview Press.
- Lavin, D. (1995) *From Empire to Commonwealth*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Lavin, D. (1984) Lionel Curtis and the Idea of Commonwealth. In: F. Madden and D.K. Fieldhouse (eds.) *Oxford and the Idea of Commonwealth*. London: Croom Helm.
- Ledwidge, M., et al. (2014) *Barack Obama and the Myth of a Post-Racial America*. New York: Routledge.
- Ledwidge, M. (2013) *Race and US Foreign Policy: the African-American Foreign Affairs Network*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Leuchtenberg, W.L. (1952-53) Progressivism and Imperialism. *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 39(3):483-504.
- Lewis, D. L. (2000) *W.E.B. Du Bois: The Fight for Equality and the American Century, 1919-1963*. New York: Henry Holt and Company.
- Lewis, R., et al., eds. (1991) *Garvey His Work and Impact*. Trenton: Africa World Press.
- Lugard, F. (1996) *A Tropical Dependency*. Baltimore: Black Classic Press.
- Lippmann, W. (1922) *Public Opinion*. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
- Louis, W.R. (1984) The Era of the Mandates System and the Non-European World. In: H. Bull and A. Watson (eds.) *The Expansion of International Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mazower, M. (2009) *No Enchanted Palace*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- McCarthy, T. (2009) *Race Empire and the Idea of Human Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Meier, A., et al., eds. (1985) *Black Protest Thought in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company.

-
- Nicolson, H. (1933) *Peacemaking 1919*. London: Constable.
- Onishi, Y. (2007) The New Negro of the Pacific: How African-Americans Forged Cross-Racial Solidarity with Japan, 1917-1922. *The Journal of African-American History* 92 (2):191-213.
- Parmar, I. (1995) The Issue of State Power: The Council on Foreign Relations as a Case Study. *Journal of American Studies* 29(1): 73-95.
- Parmar, I. (2004) *Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy*. London: Palgrave.
- Parmar, I. (2015) *Foundations of the American Century*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Plummer, B. G. (1996) *Rising Wind Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960*. London: The University of North Carolina Press.
- Rich, P. (2002) Reinventing Peace: David Davies, Alfred Zimmern and Liberal Internationalism in Interwar Britain. *International Relations* 16(1): 117-133.
- Roediger, D. R. (1995) *The Wages of Whiteness*. London: Verso.
- Sertima, I. V. et al. (1992) *The Golden Age of the Moor*. London: Transaction Publishers.
- Shoup, L., and W. Minter (1977) *Imperial Brain Trust*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Smith, N. (1986) Bowman's New World and the Council on Foreign Relations. *Geographical Review* 76(4): 438-460.
- Tinker, H. (1977) *Race and the International Order*. London: Macmillan.
- Turner, O. (2014) *America Images of China*. London: Routledge.
- Ture, K., et al. (1992) *Black Power, The Politics of Liberation*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Vitalis, R. (2015) *White World Order, Black Power Politics, The Birth of American International Relations*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Vucetic S. (2011) *The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of a Racialized Identity in International Relations*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Walker, R. (2006) *When We Ruled*. London: Every Generation Media.

WEBPAGE

<http://www.naacp.org/pages/naacp-history-w.e.b.-dubois>.