Gentrification, artists and the cultural economy

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Introduction

This chapter examines the changing nature of the relationship between gentrification and the cultural economy in theory and practice, it also highlights a gap in debates about gentrification. Whilst the role of culture in the gentrification process has received much attention, the cultural economy has not. The gap stems from tendencies to instrumentalise culture, to reduce it to consumption, and to ignore its value(s) and the means of its production. This chapter focuses on a complex and sometimes misunderstood field, that of cultural production. The paradox that we encounter is that cultural workers and artists are often portrayed as both the causes and the victims of gentrification. An important step in my argument is to broaden and contextualise debates about gentrification to make sense of this paradox. I will argue that gentrification – if we take Ruth Glass’s (1964) classical definition of the process as displacement of former residential tenants – should also be further explored in relation to movements and displacements between manufacturing, office, retail and cultural sites. Such changes, outside of residential-residential moves, have been subject to un-nuanced analyses of social and political agency in respect to cultural workers and artists. On one hand, artists have been portrayed as dupes and uni-dimensional; on the other hand, the economic contribution of cultural (production) activities has been under-valued (see Park 2016, d’Ovidio and Rodríguez Morató 2017).

Formerly industrialised inner cities of North America and Europe have been through a particularly intense pattern of social and economic change over the last 50 years. This process has involved rebuilding and transforming spaces, often into quite different uses. This transformation primarily has not involved residential property (although there have been transformations of residential spaces in tandem: it is the latter that has been the focus of much of the gentrification literature). The picture has been of old manufacturing infrastructure (factories and warehouses, storage and related transport, especially port-related) being either razed to the ground and replaced by new buildings, or refurbished; in both cases the site is converted into other uses: sometimes offices, other times residential, and exceptionally cultural.

The causes of this transformation lie in the process of de-industrialisation (of mainly North American and Western European cities), and the concomitant industrialisation of East Asia. The outcomes in each city are different as local responses have been mobilised; however,
they are commonly bundled under the label of the emergence of the ‘post-industrial’ city. Gentrifying cities in North America and Western Europe experienced, first depopulation and then re-population of the inner city; in many cases, at the same time, the balance of employment shifted to the service sector, in notable cases financial services. It is important to underline that this involved a double movement in labour markets: of former industrial workers out, and new service workers in: very few workers made the transition in person. This had important implications for housing stock, and housing demand (see Lees, Slater and Wyly, 2008).

A less-reported trend is that concerning the cultural economy; as a productive sector it has also grown in relative and absolute importance in cities. Indeed, many would argue that the growth of creative employment, and the demand for creative employees, is a characteristic of the post-industrial, or knowledge, economy (Pratt 2007, Hutton 2015). In addition, there have been substantial shifts in the governance regimes of North American and West European cities and nation states which in general terms have been characterised by a shrinking of the state (that is reducing the responsibilities of the state for collective guidance and provision of goods and services), and a focus on importing economic growth activities through competition. This latter competitive practice ranges from the attraction of companies and sectors of the economy that are perceived to be growing, to the attraction of tourist and visitor spending. To attract investment and to compete with other cities, urban governments have developed many tools starting with subsidies, and extending to lifestyle and branding. Culture has become an important instrument in the city booster toolkit (Palmer-Rae Associates 2004, Florida 2008, Anholt 2010, Kong 2012).

The processes outlined above are complex and manifold, and it is not the intention to explore them in detail here. My point is to underline the fact that the Euro-American inner city has become a major opportunity for developers to exploit the ‘rent gap’ opened up in the redevelopment process. Arguably, economic restructuring, especially globalisation, provides the most fertile ground for gambling on revaluation of land uses and property: a foundation of the gentrification process. Following from this my concerns in this chapter are first, to widen the focus from housing to the economy more generally; and secondly, to argue that culture (as heritage, or experience; or, as practice) is a common theme which is generally in the background. The aim here is to foreground the ways in which culture plays a part in urban transformations. Finally, to highlight the neglect, or/and the instrumentalisation of culture in the global cities paradigm (Pratt 2011a), and analyses framed by the concept of the ‘creative class’(Pratt 2011b); and instead to encourage more attention to situated analyses in the spirit of comparative, or planetary, urbanism.

The gentrification literature has already begun substantive debate over the relationship between gentrification and globalisation (Lees 2003; Atkinson and Bridge, 2005; Butler and Lees 2006; Lees, Shin and Lopez-Morales, 2016), in addition, there has also been a long-running debate about the relationship between culture and gentrification. To embrace the transformations wrought by the emergent cultural economy I want to argue that these debates need to be extended further. I will re-inforce a relatively neglected aspect of this new trend to include not just residential to residential ‘upgrading’ (classic gentrification), but also including transitions such as manufacturing to residential, manufacturing to cultural work, and cultural work to residential uses (see Zukin, Trujillo et al. 2009, Curran 2010, Yoon and
Currid-Halkett 2014, Hubbard 2016, Kim 2016). Displacement of less powerful actors by more powerful actors characterises these transitions, moreover it presages a cultural change, not simply one of consumption and identity (as already discussed in the gentrification literature), but also one of cultural production and cultural value(s) (Jung, Lee et al. 2015, Grodach, Foster et al. 2016).

I want to make the case that the displacement of artistic and cultural workers is not the ‘victimless crime’ that it appears to be presented as in much urban regeneration literature; it has significant negative impacts on the livelihoods and economic output of one of the few growing sectors of contemporary economies. Moreover, this continual displacement of artists and cultural workers undermines the delicate cultural ecosystems that sustain such economic and cultural output in our cities.

The chapter is divided into three parts. Part one, opens up the debate about the artist and the city. The second part reviews the urban regeneration regimes that have implicated culture and produced distinct cultural gentrification effects. The third part, pulls the focus away from cultural consumption and instrumentalism and explores how a concern for cultural production re-configures that fate of the cultural worker in the city.

**Part 1: Artists and the City**

In this part I want to introduce the subject ‘caught in the middle’: the cultural worker. I will show that we need to understand the related, but often dislocated, flows of production and consumption in the city. I will represent these through the contrast of the figures of the artist and the hipster. Second, I revisit a classic of gentrification, Zukin’s (1982) work on ‘loft living’ in New York City, and suggest that some further contemporary lessons can be learned.

**Artists and Hipsters**

It is difficult to avoid debates about gentrification today, but they have a different character to those of former years. In addition to the working-class family being forced out of their property and replaced by a middle-class family, other common characters include the cultural worker (artist) and cultural consumer (Hipster). An emblematic case is that of the ‘Cereal Killer’ shop in Brick Lane, London (Khomami and Halliday 2015; see Figure 1). This is a store selling boutique breakfast cereal at vastly inflated prices, which has clearly attracted a market who are willing to pay. However, Brick Lane is on the ‘fault line’ between the City of London and Tower Hamlets, a predominantly poor and ethically-diverse community dominated by social housing, it is one of the poorest boroughs in the UK. The ‘hipster’ shop, of which Cereal Killer is emblematic, the lifestyle and cultural milieu that surrounds it, has become a notable feature of many North American and European cities in recent years.

A common trope of inner urban cultural redevelopment these days is the Hipster. It is a term widely and loosely used, but refers to a style and affectation of an artistic producer; in its current stylistic manifestation with a throwback to a Victorian fashion sensibility; it is a subculture that has powerful consumption effects. The Hipster is a dedicated cultural consumer who puts ‘taste’ at the top of the agenda. Associated with this trend is the extreme consumption choices offered for products such as coffee or beer: the craft beer scene being
one example. It is clearly a complicated phenomenon, but what unites it is that it requires considerable disposable income to maintain the lifestyle which is, like most sub-cultures, manifest by conspicuous consumption. Despite its affectation of ‘craft’ and ‘making’ it is a form and practice of consumption. As will be noted later, what Richard Florida (Florida 2002) refers to as the Creative Class, or David Brooks (Brooks 2000) refers to as Bourgeois Bohemians, overlaps with the Hipster; the common feature being a focus on (a variety) of cultural consumptions, and the purchasing power to attract suppliers.

It is not surprising that ‘Cereal Killer’ became a flash-point in demonstrations about rising property prices (not just residential prices), and the displacement of people and activities from traditional neighbourhoods. A similar manifestation of ‘hipster’ consumer outlets can be found in many property ‘hot spots’ in London, and across the world. Indeed, they are perceived by property professionals, or even praised, as an index of an area ‘coming up’ (being gentrified). The transformation offered by developers is derelict industrial land sites made over into luxury condominiums. The shock is not simply of cultural and economic transformation, but also the physical scale. As an example, the development of Bishopsgate Goods Yard, which is part of the back story of the ‘Cereal Killer’ demonstrations, is planned to be one of the tallest in London. So, the point is that residential and commercial property transformation is closely linked with cultural consumption (see the recent work on touristification discussed in Lees, Shin and Lopez-Morales, 2016; and retail gentrification and hipsters in (Zukin, Trujillo et al. 2009, Hubbard 2016)).

But, there is another side to the story. Brick Lane has been an emblematic epicentre of the growth of cultural and artistic workers in East London; it is not a consumption sub-culture but a ‘scene’ (Straw 2001), a community of artistic practice (Mar and Anderson 2010). For 25 years, artists have moved to the cheaper property of the East End (deserting West and Central London) (Green 1999). Initially they used short let housing as live-work spaces, these have been supplemented by ‘art factories’, larger industrial spaces converted into artist studios. The Truman Brewery Site, on Brick Lane, is an exemplar (Oakley and Pratt 2010). As the name suggests this was a redundant brewery that was converted into cultural studio spaces. Other models of space provision are also found, from the not-for-profit, artist-owned, studio providers such as (in London) Acme and Space, to the short-life housing owned by local authorities. What unites these property forms is that they are vehicles to insulate tenants (artists) from property price inflation, a form of social rent control. More successful artists—those with a global audience—also have studios near Brick Lane, but they have been able to own them in their own right (for example Tracey Emin, and Gilbert and George). What has been referred to as the greatest concentration of artists in Europe, has been facilitated by forms of studio provision that have been devised in opposition to upgrading/gentrification. However, it is not a form that is secure, nor guaranteed. We will revisit this in Part 3.

The phenomenon is not confined to London, a notable example is the article that David Byrne (2013) (curator and formerly in the band Talking Heads) wrote about New York City, bemoaning the fact that artists could no longer afford to have studio space, let alone live, in the inner city. This is especially poignant as New York (see below), especially the area around SoHo, was in effect given a new life when artists moved in in the 1970s. The very notion of the ‘loft’ as an artistic space was coined here.
We can add yet another layer of significance here, that cities such as London and New York now promote themselves as desirable locations for tourism and living, as well as for work, on the basis of the presence of this cultural buzz (Mayor of London 2012). For the most part artists are instrumentalised as creators of a playground for Hipsters, BoBo’s and the Creative Class: what City Mayor’s now consider as a necessary bauble to attract the latest hi-tech producer to the city. At the same time, this creates the conditions to precisely undermine the possibility of creative producers to remain in the city. This has been an ongoing, and naturalised, aspect of urban regeneration. The economic (as opposed to the cultural and social) dimensions of the cultural and creative industries have become more important in cities in the last decade. In London, for example by 2010, they counted as the fourth largest employment sector (Freeman 2010).

Thus, it is very clear that the artist and cultural worker is being displaced from the inner city. The dominant policy and political discourse is that artists can simply move on and regenerate another neighbourhood; in fact, it is wonderful and necessary that they should (see Park 2016). This process can be characterised as a viscous cycle of artistic gentrification. One would expect that artists would be cherished given their seemingly ‘Midas touch’ to property markets; far from it they would perhaps be better characterised as ‘cannon fodder’. The economic role of the cultural and creative industries has until recently been overlooked at both national and urban scales (Buitrago Restrepo and Duque Márquez 2013, NESTA 2013). The well-known artist, Grayson Perry (2014), has a 4-part cartoon illustrating this process in his book “Playing to the gallery”. Image 1 shows a decaying factory building, possibly squatted by artists; image 2 has the building now renamed ‘old industry studios’, it is clearly managed studio space; in image 3 the building has another makeover, this time it is labelled a ‘creativity hub’ fronted by a trendy café, and is obviously a fancy co-working space for new media workers. The coup-de-grace is image 4, the building has been torn down and rebuilt in a modern style and is called ‘Bohemia apartments’ (see Figure 2). This process, and its ever-decreasing time-scale, presents major challenges for the creative, and urban, economy.

Before beginning to reconnect the opposing aspects of production and consumption, culture and economy, we need to understand how we have framed the debate thus, this requires us to revisit debates about the global city and culture. In the following part of the chapter I will review the policy and practices that flow from normative misconceptions. In part 3 they are reconnected.

The global city

Debates rooted in the Global City paradigm as exemplified by Sassen (2001) characterise a massive transformation of world urbanism and the emergence of a ‘super-league’ of ‘command and control centres’ of the global economy- the Global City- rooted in the power of the financial services. Sassen and Castells (1989) have pointed to the emergence of the dual, or polarised, city as a result: between rich and poor, between those linked to a local economic system, or a global one.

In a series of papers Loretta Lees (Lees 2003; Butler and Lees 2006) and colleagues have developed an argument for the emergence of super-gentrification in some cities associated
with the huge sums paid to workers in the financial services sector. This is an argument that has a correspondence with the social polarisation thesis of those writing about the Global City. The elite gentrification of older and established housing stock is beyond the reach of even the locally ‘very well off’; other manifestations of this emergence of a super elite have been plotted across many global cities, especially associated with either elite gated communities and buildings, and the construction of massive basements to existing large properties. Some displacement is going on here, but between the rich and the super-rich.

A key weakness of the Global Cities paradigm literature has been its understanding of culture. King and others have stressed the importance of colonialism, and cultural diasporas; but this has tended to be swept up as a part of a debate about labour markets and migration. A similar economic reductivism applies to the cultural economy which is generally characterised as a dependent ‘service’ of the core economy, having little if any autonomous significance, and none in respect to the economic realm (Pratt 2011b). In part this deficit is a function of history, the cultural economy was not significant in cities 25 year ago, although it is now. Today, rightly, we can question just how ‘dependent’ the cultural economy is, and if it is emerging as a driver in its own right. I will argue that the gentrification literature suffers from a similar problem.

I want to direct us back to an earlier manifestation of what might be called gentrification in an earlier period. I want to highlight the lens through which it was viewed. Sharon Zukin’s (1982) seminal work on ‘loft living’ has always had an uneasy relationship both with the global cities paradigm and the gentrification literature. The properties that she examined were previously industrial spaces. Zukin’s work offered a particular insight into what would later be called, after Bourdieu (1979) ‘habitus’. Zukin was writing before the translation of Bourdieu, and working more closely to a tradition of structural Marxism. Zukin’s work on Loft Living was notable for many reasons, here I want to point to the methodological import of recovering culture from the economic, an insight which can help with contemporary debates about gentrification and culture. Her focus on ‘gentrification’ concerned the cultural mores and aspirations as expressed through proximity and decoration of the converted lofts she found in lower Manhattan. Of course, a parallel concern was a focus which has been codified as a second iteration of the gentrification literature, the embrace of culture (Lees, Slater and Wyly, 2008); Zukin did this avant la letter but in a way that was different from how culture was subsequently framed in the gentrification literature (see Lees, 1994, on Zukin in the economic versus culture debate).

The standard reading of Zukin’s work stresses cultural differentiation, and glosses over the fact that this was a form of economic revaluing (a rent gap existed for sure), and that the displacement was of manufacturing and warehousing activity; an activity that had already left: the buildings were empty. Readings of Zukin’s work are often shorn of a sense of place and time, and context. We noted above in David Byrne’s cri de coeur that the artists were being moved out of their lofts; by just the people that Zukin was writing about, and those that followed. The pioneers of the ‘downtown scene’ in what became SoHo (before it became a by-word for high –end consumption) were a group of artists that valued the cheap rents that allowed expansive studio space for ‘space hungry’ art forms: abstract art, dance, music and everything in between. Perhaps the best known, Andy Warhol - had his studio space which he called ‘The Factory’ (Pratt 2012), creating a resonance through every such conversion to
today. From artists such as Pollock to Anderson, to Maattu-Clark, Tharpp and Glass, and eventually to Byrne, the studio space was a breeding ground for new art forms (Yi 2011; (Miller 2016)).

The use of the term ‘loft’ was/is not original to these factory buildings; but is a nod to the original mid-19th century Parisian Latin Quarter, popularised by Puccini in La Boheme; the loft or garret room was the cheap space at the top of a multi-dwelling house occupied by artists. Of course, this was the early usage of the term ‘Bohemian’ (to designate a style of living, and consumption) as well (Lloyd 2006). The gallery scene of SoHo in the 1970s, and its demi-secret, was part and parcel of the attraction for Zukin’s loft dwellers. The irony is that the loft dwellers in New York City that Zukin wrote about were doing it on the cheap (they were not super-gentrifiers), indeed New York City was bankrupt and property was cheap.

It is important to note that Neil Smith (Smith 1987, Smith 1996) was writing about gentrification, from a Marxist point of view, at the same time, in the same city, narrating events a few blocks east. Smith’s story was of the classic economic cycle of decline, refurbishment and revaluing in the residential areas of Alphabet City. The point to be made is the development of particular analytical lenses. Whilst acknowledging the role of the state, Smith’s interpretation put economics first, and characterised culture as dependent. Later interpretations sought to re-balance this. What got lost in the narrative were the artists, the very embodiment of the delicate relationship between the economic and the cultural. It became a neat fit to view artists as another class of the displaced.

Whilst the loft-dwellers moved uptown, or to Brooklyn, the artists moved on too, as a later paper of Zukin’s (Zukin and Braslow 2011) elaborates. However, it is important to note a further step many of these converted warehouse spaces progressed through, many (in San Francisco and London, as well as New York) became the site of new media companies (Pratt 2000, Jarvis and Pratt 2006, Pratt 2009), only later to become found residential conversions. This serial displacement has significant impacts for the changing mix of creative industries, as well as their eventual eviction altogether. The history of Hoxton Square (half a mile north of Brick Lane) provides a neat empirical chronology – as we saw illustrated by Perry previously - of residential decline and vacancy, to artist studios, to new media offices, to night-clubs and restaurants, and finally to high-end residential. In the London case the life cycle shortened from that of New York’s 25 years, to less than 15 years.

These cases illustrate the importance of examining the serial and progressive displacement of different users (within a use class). In this case, the change in of economic character in the locale. This process challenges the employment and the economic basis of the city. As noted above, the economic contribution of the new cultural economy to cities has changed in recent years. It is this new tension, and its economic implications that the over emphasis on both ‘cultural’ and the relative neglect of displacement of economic uses by high end residential developments, that needs more attention (for indicative studies see Curran 2004, Hutton, Catungal et al. 2009, Curran 2010, Yoon and Currid-Halkett 2014).

The normative view is to naturalise this process as one of growth and succession, and the attitudes that have been prevalent support this, namely that artists are expendable, or that new media workers, or artists, will move on and find another cheap space. A Marxist
interpretation might simply be that the artists were used and exploited in the process of revaluing. However, there is nothing natural or inevitable about it. On one hand, as we know from 'rent gap' theory there is the economic opportunity created by property speculation. On the other hand, there are individuals looking for environments in which to experiment and innovate. It seems remarkable in moral terms, but also economic terms, that the latter be quashed by the former. Would we apply such a logic to the financial services industries? Quite the opposite, in the case of financial services cities fall over themselves to provide subsidised office buildings and residential accommodation, and even to the extent of creating new transport infrastructure. It is the argument of this chapter that this point of view needs revisiting. However, before doing that I want to plot out the fate of culture and the cultural economy in the post-industrial city.

Part 2: Culture and the Post-Industrial City

Global city formation has clearly intensified and projected gentrification studies into a new space; but as we have seen it also marks the re-entry of debates about artists and cultural workers. Despite the shifting theoretical focus from the systematic and universal global city paradigm to a more contextual approach (variously described as comparative, or planetary, urbanisation) a continuing question concerns the relationship of the cultural and the economic. Despite Zukin’s (1982) inclusion of culture in a Marxist framework and Lees (1994) and Clark’s (1994) wish to broach the economic-culture divide in gentrification studies, debates are still, more often than not, presented as separate issues, or focused on the role of cultural makers in gentrification. In this section, we interpret a shift in the linkage of culture and the city, one that has some (mostly unacknowledged) impacts on cultural workers; the impacts are manifest as displacement. I present three variants of linking culture and the city under conditions of post-industrial redevelopment: design-led development, cultural branding, and instrumental remediation. They are all characterised by state-led initiatives, and the subordinate position of culture in relation to large scale infrastructure projects; showing how culture is viewed as instrumental in ‘re-valuing’ land, and in generating consumption.

A perspective that I want to explore next concerns what is – for the most part – a state-led response to de-industrialisation: urban regeneration. The ravages of de-industrialisation and the decaying hearts of Euro-American cities were clearly a barrier to new development. If cities were to attract new people (to pay taxes and finance the city), new homes and jobs would have to be found; and moreover, appropriate buildings constructed to accommodate different economic activities. The old infrastructure was decayed and in disrepair, but it was also not suitable for modern uses. For the most part the city was given a boost of regeneration by state led investment in mega-projects, culture played and plays a subservient role in these plans.

Design-led development

A notable feature of this redevelopment is the large-scale challenge of creative public space and public uses as well. The challenge was clear to all; this was not simple ‘in-fill’ development but whole-scale rebuilding. A theme that emerged was for cities to redevelop extensive land-uses such as port areas. A cultural shift was required that sought to celebrate ‘waterfront
development’, for housing and retail, and sometimes offices. Due to the history of most rivers and ports in cities, development had literally ‘turned its back’ on the waterways (Brownill 2013). Any number of schemes sought to regenerate port facilities this way; and to develop riverside activities in the urban centre (Jones 1998).

The model of the entertainment or cultural anchor tenant for urban redevelopment has been a common one explored in the US to repopulate the inner city, a strategy referred to as the ‘urban entertainment machine’ (Lloyd and Clark 2001). This governance concept references the notion of the (mainly retail and hotel) ‘growth machines’ of many US cities whereby retail and entertainment capital dominate urban regeneration programmes (Molotch 1976). In many cases this economic control was supported by social control where police adopted aggressive positions with respect to behaviour that disrupted the ‘clean’ city image (Parenti 2000). Most clearly, action targeted the homeless, but it also impacted on other non-normative street practices.

The irony is that ‘cleaning the streets’ created a bland and ‘culture-less’ space. This was experienced most notably in massive urban regeneration projects such as that of London’s Docklands. The short-term benefits to developers were seldom moderated by long term responsibility for city building; simply, as in cases such as London, developers were given a free hand to develop buildings, but with no social responsibility for community, housing or public space. It took nearly 20 years for Canary Wharf to develop the aspects of urban conviviality that one might expect of a city. The grandiose nature of these developments and the master-planning style adopted neglected the social and the cultural; a point latterly acknowledged in a significant UK report (Rogers 1999) that highlighted the importance of mixed uses, and of a social agora, for good city planning and design (Imrie and Raco 2003). Not surprisingly, many precarious tenants of abandoned port facilities were artists, clinging onto gaps in the real estate market; they had to move on. It is notable that the ‘needs’ of artists and cultural workers were simply not part of the agenda in this phase of urban regeneration.

Cultural Branding

Culture, but not artists, did become a focus of regeneration in a different style of redevelopment. This was driven by an instrumentalism of competition between cities, whereby high-profile public buildings, usually contemporary art galleries, are used to ‘pimp’ a city’s image. The classic example is the Guggenheim in Bilbao; striking architecture is used to create global visibility and to act as an anchor tenant for a redevelopment project. Moreover, contemporary art has a symbolic power projecting an old deindustrialised city to appear forward and culturally engaged. The strategy is based on place-branding, underpinned by the notion that in an increasingly homogenous global landscape differentiation can be achieved by culture (Evans 2003). Contemporary art is a particularly useful platform as it is new, and still being made, in contrast with Classical art (and the galleries, and cities, which these new cities seek to compete with).

There has been much debate about the success and failures of hard branding, and the Guggenheim model (Plaza 2000); however, the position of local artists and creative workers is not part of this debate. On the one hand, there are many examples of artist communities
and studios that were destroyed as part of such gallery redevelopment; on the other hand, the high-end apartments that accompany projects such as the Tate Modern exacerbate an already starkly polarised housing market (Dean et al., 2010). Either way, there is no space for artists. Along the lines of the ‘urban entertainment machine’, the audience are tourists and consumers, the city benefits from the number of bed-nights, and other generated income from visitors.

The singular project, usually a contemporary art gallery, is one variant of city banding; another is a more extensive approach pioneered by cities such as Glasgow. The European Capital of Culture was a project devised to circulate Europe to celebrate the cultural diversity, and history of the continent. Glasgow’s contribution was to mobilise the designation to an extensive set of projects based on a re-branding of Glasgow, and an association of Glasgow with culture. Due to the perceived success of the Glasgow event, similar objectives have underpinned other candidate city strategies since (Palmer-Rae Associates 2004, Garcia, Melville et al. 2010, Lähdesmäki 2012). However, despite the more strategic perspective, and the more variegated art forms, as well as a stronger focus on participation, the more integrative Glasgow model still viewed culture as consumption, and not production(Garcia 2005).

**Instrumental remediation**

A third variant of culture-city relationships in post-industrial regeneration concerns what are best referred to as mega-projects. Of course, the European Capital of Culture is a contender here; I want to differentiate the Glasgow case from some of the examples that followed based on a critical factor: land remediation. So far, the examples that have been discussed have predominantly concerned conversions, and rebuilding, and new developments on existing sites. For urban redevelopment, these are the ‘low hanging fruit’, the real problem concerns redeveloping sites on polluted land. The key point here is that the land value is in effect negative (due to the upfront investment in ‘cleaning’ the site before any development can take place) (Syms 1994). Culture has been part of an instrumental package to ‘unlock’ this land (often located close to the city centre).

A classic example was that of the Millennium Dome in London. The initial plan was that public remediation would be paid for by the ‘celebratory’ experience of the Dome (which was to be temporary), which would act as a marketing tent (literally, as it was a tent) for the site, the same model can be seen to underpin the Liverpool Garden Festival (Pratt 2010). Despite substantial criticisms of the perceived value for money (to the public purse) of such developments the model was used to create the London Olympic Park, the site of the 2012 Olympics. A temporary cultural event is a staging post for polluted land to be remediated, and then sold on to the market. The place for culture and the event is temporary, based solely on short term consumption.

As will now be a familiar story, the London Olympic site development created significant displacement of a community of cultural producers (a few of whom are still hanging on in the Hackney Wick cultural quarter). Whilst, Hackney Wick is now seen as London’s next cultural growth zone, it was not part of the original plan. That original plan did have a cultural economy focus; the Olympic media complex was to be redeveloped as London’s new media
quarter (Foord 2013). However, the idea to relocate what is known as ‘Silicon Roundabout’ the new media community that had grown up around Hoxton and Old Street proved to be a non-starter (Nathan, Vandore et al. 2012).

So, to add further irony the London Olympic site plan did include a focus on the creative economy, however in making the plan cultural workers were displaced and destabilised, and a temporary cultural project was mounted. The new development was proposed based on relocating creatives from one part of London to another. These projects are misguided due to a ‘blindness’ to the operation of the creative economy. Developers and planners do not see already existing cultural activity (or they do not value it). Moreover, there is a lack of appreciation of the extent to which cultural activities are embedded in a social, economic and cultural ecosystem that forms a co-dependent environment (Martins 2015). Constant relocation imperils such communities of practice; as well as ignoring the cultural embedding of creative activities in the city itself. It is to these issues that we turn in Part 3 of the chapter. Before that we can to explore the high-point of the culture-city (consumption) relationship: the creative class and the city.

This section has dwelt on UK examples for a reason; they have commonly been taken as ‘best practice’ for policy makers worldwide. Clearly, on one hand this is part and parcel of neo-liberal evangelism exemplified by ‘fast policy’ (Peck and Theodore 2015); on the other hand, policy making underpinned by a global city paradigm that is insensitive to local cultures and institutions (Pratt 2009). The following approach, based upon Florida’s creative class thesis combines the worst of both approaches.

The Creative class and the City

The debate, and policy movement, inspired by Florida’s (2002) ‘rise of the creative class’ has become identified with the notion of the ‘creative city’. Arguably, this is the worst iteration yet of the relationship between culture and the city for creative workers. Florida’s argument boils down to the attraction of foreign direct investment to cities. The assumption being that if capital is mobile, then the unique selling point of a location will secure the investment, and hence jobs. Cities have long engaged in this process; their tools were first lowering costs: rent free periods, subsidized land, holding local wages down. In the era of globalisation, the multi-plant enterprise faced a problem of moving experienced staff around the world, and overcoming resistance from staff and their families on relocation. City Mayors realised that if they sold their cities as attractive to managers responsible for re-location decisions, they might win the game through a ‘soft power’ of welcoming green and clean environments, augmented by high culture and heritage attractions.

Florida’s insight was taken from Daniel Bell’s notion of the growth of a post-industrial economy (Bell 1973), recognising that in the new economy the ‘talent’ was what mattered to companies. Florida developed this argument, suggesting the existence of a ‘creative class’, who are attracted to liberal, and contemporary cultural environments. Florida’s key intervention was to suggest that the creative class were the critical human capital that would attract hi-tech, high growth companies (reversing the traditional idea that labour would move to employers). Thus, by modelling themselves as a cultural class playground, workers would gravitate to cities, and then companies would seek them out, and want to be located there.
Such an argument plays to the eternal weaknesses of politicians of self-promotion and short term popularity, and a veneer of academic respectability.

There are two significant issues with the ‘Creative City’ argument. First, that the creative class identified by Florida, are the workers of hi-tech, not the cultural industries; in fact, the argument is one about the consumption power of the creative class. The culture is instrumental, to provide a ‘funky environment’. Second, the consequence that cities should privilege the creative class. That a city could decide that the creative class (already a privileged group) should be first in the queue for resource and support is challenging. Moreover, that the city should make its infrastructure and services over to please this group sets some clear priorities. The knock-on effects are plain and apparent, that gentrification is legitimised and promoted as the motor process of urban regeneration, and that the distributional balance of resource is skewed to the least needy, and to a sectional taste. The paradox, or rather stark contradiction is of a city, promoting itself as ‘creative’ whilst at the same time limiting access to culture, focusing on consumption, and not simply neglecting but actively undermining cultural production through a super-fuelled gentrification of commercial and residential properties (Pratt 2011a). Clear examples of the sort of forces that are unleashed and legitimised by such support for a creative class strategy are evidenced in many cities, but particularly starkly in San Francisco (Jarvis and Pratt 2006), Vancouver (Hutton 2008), Shenzhen (O’Connor and Liu 2014), and Lees, Shin and Lopez-Morales, (2016), on ‘creative cities’ in the global south.

Part 3: Finding a place for cultural production in the city

It will be clear that the extant models of culture and the city do not have a place for the creative worker. The site is occupied by creative consumption, one where culture is used instrumentally to achieve a short term economic benefit. In the meantime, it will actually displace and undermine cultural producers. Artists and cultural workers have been caught in a perfect storm of contradictions where they are noticed, but ignored; wanted, but then disposed of. The problem, is twofold. First, that empirically the cultural economy has grown in many cities (and in the global economy), it challenges ‘traditional’ industries in terms of its economic strength, it carries additional cultural power as well. Second, and perhaps related to the first, our conceptual lenses need refocusing on culture and the cultural economy, not viewing them as dependent, or expendable, but as integral to the urban process. In this final part of the chapter I will outline why and how the creative economy, artists and cultural workers may be recognised as a central part of urban change.

Alternatives for culture and the city

The need for creative cities, and creativity, is a common refrain from politicians. However, in practice what has been delivered either through policy, or simply urban redevelopment practices, undermines the possibility of a vibrant cultural and creative community. In part, as I have argued, this is because culture and creativity have been primarily conceived of through the lens of consumption, from museum and gallery visits to bars, restaurants and nightclubs. Culture is seen as a way to burnish the city’s image. None more so than in the age of the Creative City where the edgy-contemporary arts consumerism is one more necessary environmental must have to attract hi-tech investors in search of creative class knowledge.
workers. In this normality it is regarded as fine for artists to be regularly uprooted from their studios and pushed further out of the city. In fact, artists are now put in the (unwilling and unasked for role) of the ‘shock troops’ of gentrification: troops that will be the first to suffer as economic growth in a community takes off. In short the gentrification of artists has been normalised (Park 2016).

However, at the same time the value of urban cultural production has been transformed from that of primarily heritage and provision of consumption experiences to one of cultural production that produces both substantial economic and cultural value. The growth of cultural production has taken place despite the conditions. The normal pattern has been for artists to fight a running battle to simply hold their place in the city. Artists have been subject to the same, some might say more exaggerated, form of the rent gap as industrial properties have been re-developed and re-valued. To some extent, commentators have been blind to the experiences of artists as they occupied industrial spaces.

The strategies that artists have used to ‘cling on’ has been via collective ‘self-provisioning’. A popular model to step off the rent gap escalator has been to remove the property from the market, to buy it; then to provide rent control for artists. These collectives, found in many cities are predominantly run by and for artists. However, recent studies have highlighted the complex and nuanced responses of artists (Grodach, Foster et al. 2016, Borén and Young 2017); rather than being the unwitting cause or dupes of community erosion, artists may be at the forefront of community action (Gainza 2016). Other critics have pointed to the narrow social representation of artists and their role in the reproduction of male heteronormativity in ‘community’ development (McLean 2014). This range of perspectives underlines the inadequacy of, and the unitary and universal notions sustained in, the ‘creative class’ as a concept. Moreover, that the notion of the creative class is not a foundation for understanding the creative city in practice.

Artists have not been given respect as citizens, not only have they suffered the usual challenges of displacement due to rental increases and redevelopment, but they have been used, consciously or not, to popularise run-down areas. Policy-makers and politicians, and many in the local community, and artists, seem to accept that this is ‘how it is’.

Little attention has been paid until recently to artistic activity, how it is organised, and the importance of its social, economic and cultural embedding (Pratt, 2017). Understanding this, and responding to it, would be a normal response to other sectors of economic development in a city. However, such a realisation has been slow to dawn with regard to the creative economy. Not-for-profit provision of studio space insulated from extreme rent reviews is one thing, however, there are other lessons to learn from these ‘creative hubs’, or ‘art factories’ (Pratt, Dovey et al. 2016). Closer inspection reveals that they are not simply flexible co-working spaces, nor simply cheap. Instead their defining characteristic is the provision of a community of practice (Wenger 1998) associated with art forms, and commonly a support infrastructure of service provision (Virani and Pratt 2016). The latter is particularly important as most artists work individually, or in small groups, and the economics of service provision works against them. A variant of collective services that are often provided include training courses, business advice, and access to professional networks, and experience. This folds back
into the former point, participation in a community of practice where skills and experience can be exchanged and discussed.

It is this realisation, that cultural work is a viable option in today’s urban economy, that has latterly prompted city authorities to learn from, and acknowledge, what third sector agencies have been doing. This has required a conceptual shift away from the dependency of culture, and an exclusive focus on consumption. It is nothing short of recasting a ‘new normal’ for the city, one that includes cultural production as well as cultural consumption.

**Conclusion**

Arts and culture have a precarious position in the city. Until recently it is true to say that the artist was likely to be a victim of gentrification. Confusingly, cultural consumers – the creative class, hipsters – have been mistaken for artists and cultural producers, creating a bizarre perspective of the artist being both perpetrator and victim of gentrification. Whilst Zukin’s work alerted us to the cultural dimensions of gentrification the dominant focus in gentrification writings has concerned the implications for consumption and representation in relation to retailing, residential and regeneration projects more generally. This chapter has sought to bring equal attention to the relationship with cultural production. Recent studies reveal a complex and nuanced position of the creative economy in urbanisation; the change of emphasis to comparative and planetary urbanism has led to a welcome attention being paid to the situated nature of development. In turn, this has also undermined the notion of creative class as a valid, unified, or universal agent in contemporary urbanisation.

From a normative perspective, the artist is overlooked, and only manages to make a living at the margins – an ever-shifting margin in short life housing, and poorly maintained industrial buildings. The post-industrial city with its large-scale redevelopment of space, and of the working population, literally did not see a place for creative labour. As the cultural economy has grown – in cities, and across the world – this image of the artist and cultural worker has been challenged; it also challenges our conceptions of the position of the artist in the city. There is a dawning realisation that the cultural economy matters, and that artists and creatives need to have a place found for them in the ‘new normal’ city.

Instead of being forced to be nomadic and precarious, some policy makers are realising the value of the artistic and cultural economy being stabilised. Property provision models are being devised that give dignity to artists and do not see them as ways of simply boosting residential prices. More sophisticated understandings of how the cultural economy works, and what cultural practice and organisation looks like, and what its strengths and weakness might be are changing the ways that city authorities regard culture. The short-term and instrumental uses are not going to disappear overnight, but they are part of a change which could see an accommodation of the city to the artist. However, this viewpoint is still a minority perspective.

At the same time, we need to find a place for artists in the literature and debates about gentrification. For too long they have been marginalised, or excluded. Recent developments are a stimulus to reconceptualise and refine our insights. Can industrial and economic use changes be considered as gentrification, or must the term only apply in the case of residential
to residential changes? I would argue that it can and should; in fact, the complex and multiple switching between building uses requires us to do so. So, this is perhaps a unique sub-class of gentrification, but one that is subject to similar processes. Moreover, discussion of artists and cultural practice should also challenge us to think about what role ‘culture’ plays in this picture. Analyses of cultural production have begun to challenge simple production/consumption binaries, culture – economy tensions, as well as culture as practice versus cultural as category. These are conceptual as well as practical issues that face both those concerned with gentrification and those concerned with cultural economy.

References


Figures

Fig1.
Fig 2.