WOMEN'S WORK AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

THE LINKS BETWEEN EMPLOYMENT, LABOUR MARKETS, AND WOMEN'S INSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN EUROPE

by

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Table of Contents

Tables

Figures

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Declaration

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Abstract

This study explores the links between women's work, gendered labour markets, and women's institutional political participation in 25 European countries. Although employment is a standard predictor of (women's) political participation, previous research has treated women's work mostly as a characteristic of individual women, disregarding the broader structural inequalities that are behind women's work patterns.

Using data from the fifth round of the European Social Survey, in combination with detailed information on work-family policies and labour market structures of the countries included, this study aims to contribute to a more contextual understanding of the effects of employment. My research explores whether the effects of employment status, working hours, and job level are shaped by the context, in which they are embedded. Although labour markets and political systems vary considerably across countries and existing research has provided inconsistent findings, the context-dependency of employment effects has not yet been systematically assessed. Moreover, little research has focussed on direct effects of the labour market; therefore, this study explores the effects of two labour market characteristics that have a particularly gendered meaning: work-family policies and gendered structures in the labour market.

The findings indicate that the effects of employment are more complex than often assumed in the literature. Employment can not only affect, for example, mothers and non-mothers differently, but there is also an indication that some employment effects are shaped by the labour market context. Contextual characteristics also affect women's political participation directly by redistributing resources and shaping women's experiences in the work-place. Overall, the findings show that the political effects of work should be understood within the wider context.

List of acronyms

BBC	-	British Broadcasting Corporation
CAPI	-	Computer-assisted Personal Interview
CSA	-	Compulsory School Age
ESS	-	European Social Survey
EU	-	European Union
Eurostat	-	Statistical Office of the European Communities
GDP	-	Gross Domestic Product
ICC	-	Intra-Class Correlation Coefficient
ID	-	Index of Dissimilarity
ILO	-	International Labour Organization
ILOSTAT	-	Database of the International Labour Organization
IQR	-	Interquartile Range
ISCO-88	-	International Standard Classification of Occupations (version of 87)
ISCED	-	International Standard Classification of Education
ISEI	-	International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status
ISSP	-	International Social Survey Programme
LIS	-	Luxembourg Income Study
MLA	-	Multi-Level Analysis
MLM	-	Multi-Level Model
MP	-	Member of Parliament
MSA	-	Mokken Scale Analysis
NACE Rev.2	-	Nomenclature statistique des activités économiques dans la Communauté européenne (Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community) – Second Revision
OECD	-	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OLS	-	Ordinary Least Squares (Regression)
OR	-	Odds-Ratios
PAPI	-	Paper-and-pencil interview
PCA	-	Principle Component Analysis
PPP	-	Purchasing Power Parities
SES	-	Socio-Economic Status
UNESCO	-	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UK	-	United Kingdom
US / USA	-	United States of America
VPC	-	Variance Partition Coefficient

Statistical notation

d	-	Difference in means ($\bar{x}_1 - \bar{x}_2$)
D	-	Deviance (-2 log-likelihood)
df	-	Degrees of freedom
H / H_{ij}	-	Loevinger's H (overall / for items i and j)
n / n	-	Number of individual-level observations
N / N	-	Number of context-level observations
OR	-	Odds-ratios
π	-	Probability that $y = 1$
ρ	-	Predicted probability
p/ p	-	p-value (statistical significance testing)
r	-	Pearson's r
r_φ	-	Phi coefficient
r_s	-	Spearman's rho
(pseudo-)R^2	-	Explained variance
χ^2	-	Chi-square distribution

1 INTRODUCTION: WOMEN'S WORK AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN CONTEXT

> *"It is therefore useless to seek to give women a larger part in political life by special reforms in this particular field. The small part played by women in politics merely reflects and results from the secondary place to which they are still assigned by the customs and attitudes of our society"*
>
> – Maurice Duverger (1955, p.130) in the conclusion of "The Political Role of Women."

The equal opportunity of every citizen to take part in the political decision-making is a fundamental principle of democracy (Dahl 1989, Chapter 8). However, it is well established that levels of political involvement are not evenly distributed across the populace. One demographic group, for which lower rates of political activity have been described from the outset of empirical political research, are women (cf. Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1948; Campbell et al. 1960; Almond and Verba 1963; Milbrath 1972; Verba and Nie 1972). Gender differences in political participation still persist today, as more recent research shows: Although women vote at the same rate as men in many Western countries (Norris 2002; Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010), they are less active in non-electoral activities, such as party engagement or political campaigns (Karp and Banducci 2008a; Coffé and Bohlzendahl 2010; Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2012).

Existing explanations for gendered patterns of political participation have emphasised differences in individual characteristics, such as socioeconomic resources, social capital, and political engagement (Welch 1977; Burns, Scholzman and Verba 2001; Lowndes 2004). As a central and a profoundly gendered area of life, a significant portion of academic research has focussed on the effect of *women's work*, and specifically, the role of paid employment. Various studies show that women's lower employment rates and their tendency to work in different occupations than men can explain a fair deal of their lower political activity (Andersen 1975; Welch 1977; Beckwith 1986; Schlozman, Burns and Verba 1999; Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001).

Nevertheless, our understanding of the links between women's work and their political participation remains far from comprehensive. Unlike the more general scientific debate around gender and political behaviour (cf. Desposato and Norrander 2009; Karp and Banducci 2008a; Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2012; Beauregard 2014, 2017), most research on the effects of work is limited to single countries (predominantly the US) and the explanatory focus is restricted to characteristics of individuals. As a consequence, little is known about the influence of the macro-context, that is culture and norms within

a country, but also the political system and the labour market, in which work and political participation are embedded. Research to date has not yet systematically tested whether this macro-context can shape the links between work and political participation (*context-dependency*). Additionally, very few studies have explored whether characteristics of the national labour market can influence women's political activity directly (*contextual effect*).

This dissertation contributes to the literature by shedding more light upon the role of the national context. It aims to explore the relationship between individual work, gendered labour markets, and institutional political participation for women in 25 European countries.

1.1 Why study women's work and political participation?

Political participation is at the heart of democracy (Verba and Nie 1972, p. 3). It is commonly defined as any voluntary activity by ordinary citizens aimed to influence the political process (cf. van Deth 2014, pp. 351-352). This definition includes voting, but also non-electoral activities. A further distinction between political activities can be made according to the degree of institutionalisation[1] (e.g. Kaase 1999; Marien, Hooghe and Quintelier 2010). Activities located within formal political institutions, for example, engagement in a party, are often referred to as 'institutional'. In contrast, activities outside such formal institutions, such as protests or boycotts, are 'non-institutional' (cf. Albacete 2014). Both, institutional and non-institutional activities are a means of citizens to express their preferences to policy-makers, and as such, high and equal levels of participation are regarded as fundamental to the functioning of democracy (e.g. Dahl 1989; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Lijphart 1997).

However, in praxis, political participation is not distributed evenly. In the last 100 years, women have gained suffrage in all European democracies (Paxton 2000). Therefore, they have *de jure* obtained the same right as men to take part in formal political decision-making and, indeed, in most advanced democracies women participate in elections at the same rate as men. However, the same is not true for other forms of institutional participation, such as contacting politicians (Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010). From a normative perspective, unequal participation is considered problematic, at least if it results from structural constraints. For example, Robert Dahl argues that democracy requires not only the equal right of every citizen to participate but an "equal opportunity" (1989, p. 109; also see: Teorell 2006). If some citizens have *de facto* less capacity to voice their political preferences, then this criterion for democracy is not fulfilled (Dahl

[1] The terms 'conventional' and 'unconventional' political participation are commonly used in the literature. Due to the historical relativity of 'conventionality', I will instead join those studies referring to 'institutional' and 'non-institutional' participation (e.g. Kaase 1999; Albacete 2014).

1989, pp.114-15). In other words, democracies, in which women are less politically active, may be considered defective.

Women's involvement in the political process is also essential from a perspective of political outcomes. Only if women voice their interests[2] through political participation, can these interests be considered in the political process. Many issues in the current public and political debate in various European countries have a specific 'gendered' dimension, for instance, the ongoing discussions about the access to abortion in Germany, Ireland and Poland (BBC 2018a; 2018b; Connolly 2018)[3]. Even seemingly 'gender-neutral' topics, such as 'Brexit', can have different implications for men and women, for example by impacting on employment regulations (Guerrina and Masselot 2018). Women's interests in these debates are not only likely to differ from those of men, but they will also be considered less important if women do not have the same opportunity to communicate them. The same argument applies to political preferences more generally: Women are now more ideologically 'to the left' than men; both, in terms of preferences for political parties (Inglehart and Norris 2000; Abendschön and Steinmetz 2014) and questions on social expenditure, capital punishment, and sexual rights (O'Neill 2001; Campbell 2004). If unequal political participation translates into unequal political influence, political outcomes will be systematically biased towards men's preferences.

Given the importance of women's political activity, it is crucial to understand the determinants of political participation and perhaps even more important to identify the barriers keeping women from being more politically involved. Although some of these barriers are located within the political system (cf. Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2012), many are the result of gender inequalities in domains outside the political sphere (Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001). Several key predictors of political activity are fundamentally gendered. This is particularly true for work: Although a larger share of women is now economically active than ever before (OECD 2017a), other gender inequalities persist. Women spend fewer hours in paid work (Rubery, Smith and Fagan 1999; Pettit and Hook 2009, Chapter 4), they are more frequently employed in 'typical-female' occupations (European Commission 2009; Pettit and Hook, Chapter 5), and they are less likely to progress into high-level positions (Bukodi, Dex and Joshi 2012). Moreover, women are still primarily responsible for unpaid work within the family, even when they are full-time employed (Craig and Sawrikar 2009).

[2] When discussing 'women's interests' here and in the following, I do not wish to imply that women form a homogenous group with identical political goals and interests. However, I suggest that the specific life experiences associated with being female can create specific interests.

[3] Other recent examples include the public debate about the gender pay gap in the BBC in the UK (cf. Weaver 2017); or the legislation enforcing equal pay for work of equal value in Iceland (Henley 2018).

At the same time, the gendered organisation of productive (and reproductive) work is not only at the root of many social inequalities (cf. Phillips 1991, Chapter 4), but the empirical literature demonstrates that it also matters for political participation (McDonagh 1982; Beckwith 1986; Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001, Schur 2003). It is well established that employment fosters political activity: It is linked to various aspects associated with political activity, for example, economic resources and skills (Schlozman, Burns and Verba 1999), social capital (van Oorshot, Arts and Gelissen 2006; Mewes 2014) or feelings of political efficacy or political interest (Schur 2003; Verge and Tormos 2012). Furthermore, it is directly associated with political participation (Verba and Nie 1972; Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995). Inequalities in the economic sphere do therefore also have consequences for women's political behaviour. To put it differently, understanding women's work is essential for understanding their political participation.

1.2 Work and political participation in a multi-level perspective

Our understanding of the links between women's work and political behaviour remains incomplete. Despite their many useful insights, existing studies on the links between women's work situations and their political participation suffer collectively from an important limitation: they are almost exclusively based on US data[4]. A focus on North America limits the generalisability of results. The US can be considered a 'special case'[5], both in terms of its labour market structure and organisation and with regards to the political system. For instance, the American labour market is less regulated, has weaker worker protection, less generous benefits, and a lower union density than most labour markets in Europe (Faggio and Nickell 2007; Nickell 2008). Similarly, the US political system is unique, for example in terms of its electoral rules and the party system (Dalton 2012, Chapter 9). Studies on the impact of electoral systems show that design matters for voter turnout and non-electoral participation (Karp and Banducci 2008b; Beauregard 2013). Moreover, some scholars suggest that the electoral system can determine the relevance of individual-level predictors of political participation. For instance, for citizens in less complex plurality systems, political resources might be less important (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Beauregard 2013). In short, we can expect the determinants of political participation to be different in Europe and the US.

Some empirical evidence indicates that models of participation developed in the US do not work equally well for the European context (cf. Gabriel and Völkl 2008; Dalton 2014,

[4] Although employment status is routinely included in comparative work on political participation, the same is not true for employment characteristics. Specifically, studies on women appear to be case studies.

[5] The assumption that the political system of the US is unique has coined the term 'American exceptionalism' (cf. Lipset 1996).

Chapter 4). The same might be true for the effects of work. Indeed, the limited empirical research on the political effects of job characteristics employing data from other countries has produced conflicting results (c.f. Godard 2007; Adman 2008; Gallego 2009). Although this indicates the possibility that employment effects follow country-specific patterns, there has been little discussion in previous research whether US findings also apply elsewhere, and a systematic analysis of the possible context-dependency of effects is still missing.

A second consequence of the lack of systematic, comparative research is the understanding of work as a characteristic of individual women. However, putting the emphasis on work as individual characteristics conceals the fact that, on the aggregate, gendered patterns are an account of gendered structures within the labour market, which can exert an independent influence. The assumption that structures and institutions on the societal level, the macro-context, are meaningful for political behaviour is well established in the theoretical literature (e.g. Verba, Nie and Kim 1978). Nevertheless, only relatively recently has research started to examine their influence systematically (Vráblíková and Císař 2015). For women's political behaviour, institutions on the level of the macro-context might be particularly important, as they can produce and reproduce gender norms. Building upon this argument, many scholars have emphasised that gender differences in political behaviour need to be understood within their wider social and political context (e.g. Burns 2007; Waylen 2012). Additionally, several studies show that gendered *political* institutions, such as gender quotas or women's political representation, play an important role for women's activity (Desposato and Norrander 2009; Karp and Banducci 2009a; Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2012; Beauregard 2014, 2017). One explanation brought forward by the literature is that institutions provide cues about gender norms and about how inclusive of women the political sphere is. Although the same logic can be applied to the labour market as a gendered institution in the public sphere, few studies have considered direct effects of labour market structures[6] or an effect of gendered labour market policies.

To summarise, while we have a good understanding of how work is related to the political participation of American women, less is known about how employment matters for women in other countries. In particular, the role of the macro-context has been overlooked in previous studies. It remains poorly understood if and how the country-context shapes the relationship between work and political activity, and the direct impact of the labour market as an institution is understudied. Thus, the full extent to which

[6] These studies focus almost entirely on the effects of women's labour force participation; however, they do not examine other patterns of employment, such as women's tendency to be clustered in certain occupations, differences in working times, employment relations and contracts, women's lower labour force attachment etc.

inequalities in the labour market contribute to women's lower levels of political activity is likely to be underestimated.

This dissertation, therefore, sets out to develop a better understanding of the relationship between women's work and their political participation from a comparative perspective. The overall purpose of this study is to present a systematic, multilevel analysis of the political effects of women's employment patterns in the European context. This endeavour entails the analysis of influences on two analytical levels: the level of the individual women (*individual level*) and the level of the national labour market (*context level*). On the *individual level,* the aim is to assess the effects of employment and employment characteristics (such as working hours and job level). Specifically, this means to establish whether findings from the US apply to the European context, or whether employment effects operate differently across different labour markets and political systems. Since the gendered responsibilities for child-rearing are at the core of the persistent inequalities in the labour market (Gornick and Meyers 2003), while parenthood has also been linked to political activity (Thomas and Bittner 2017), I will also examine the relationship between employment and political participation for the group of mothers specifically.

Studying the relationship between work and political participation from a comparative multi-level perspective also allows me to explore context-level effects. Specifically, I concentrate on two aspects of the labour market that have particularly gendered implications: Work-family policies and gendered labour market structures. Work-family policies are regulations that aim to reconcile the competing demands of paid employment and childcare. As such, they can challenge or reinforce the traditional division of labour and, thus, gendered labour market structures (Gornick and Meyers 2003). This study explores whether they also shape women's political behaviour, by re-distributing resources and giving a 'contextual cue' about women's place in the public sphere. Gendered structures of the labour market, such as women's distribution across occupations, could operate in a similar manner. They, too, might provide a contextual cue about women's integration in the public sphere, while they determine the meaning and the experiences associated with employment. In short, this study departs from the focus on political institutions and tests whether the context of the labour market also matters for women's political activity.

By doing so, this dissertation contributes to the literature of women's political participation in at least three ways.

- *Firstly*, it provides a comprehensive, empirical analysis of the links between work and political participation for women in Europe. It offers valuable insights into the degree to which women's employment patterns facilitate or hinder their political

involvement. One focus will be the group of women, for which both, employment patterns and political participation, are distinct from other women: mothers. These insights might provide a fresh impetus in the debate about women's integration in the labour market by providing recent empirical evidence showing that gender inequalities in this domain of life have consequences for women's citizenship.

- *Secondly*, this study contributes to the research on work and political participation by introducing a second level into the analysis. It establishes the role of the context by providing a systematic, empirical assessment of the context-dependency of individual-level work effects. Furthermore, it examines the role of the labour market as a contextual institution, using variables that have not been included in analyses of women's political participation before.
- *Thirdly*, it contributes to the wider field of gender and politics by demonstrating the relevance of wider gendered structures outside the political sphere. It encourages future research to include other contextual variables in the analysis. By doing so, it also shows that the study of gender and politics benefits from including insights from other fields of sociology.

1.3 Outline of the dissertation

The remainder of this dissertation is organised as follows. The next chapter, **Chapter 2,** provides the reader with a brief synthesis of the existing literature on women's political participation in order to situate this study within the wider field of research. In particular, it summarises the key developments in the field and discusses the most relevant findings on the relationship between (women's) work and their political participation. I will point out that by focussing on single countries (in particular, the US) and individual level predictors, the existing literature does not provide a full understanding of the links between work and political activity, and I develop how this dissertation aims to contribute to the literature by addressing these gaps. The chapter concludes by outlining the main links that will be tested in the empirical chapters.

In **Chapter 3**, I provide information about the data and methods employed in the empirical analyses. The chapter begins with a brief review of the central concept of interest, women's 'institutional political participation' and a discussion of its importance for women's political influence. After introducing the main dataset used, the European Social Survey (ESS), the procedures for data cleaning, weighting, and merging will be described. The chapter then explains how institutional political participation was operationalised for this study and introduce the main dependent variable. Turning to the modelling strategy in the next section, I describe logistic multilevel models as my main modelling technique. The final section of this chapter will explore patterns of women's

institutional political participation in Europe by providing descriptive and bivariate analyses of the dependent variable. These analyses are the groundwork for the empirical work to follow, as they show that levels of participation do not only vary considerably across Europe but also that a good share of the overall variation can be attributed to differences between countries.

Chapter 4 examines the individual-level links between employment status, employment characteristics (working time and job level) and political participation for all women. This chapter introduces the main individual-level explanatory variables and discusses their theoretical relevance. It then proceeds to examine the individual-level effects of the employment variables for the European context, testing whether the findings established for the US context also apply to European countries. Although the findings show that similar effects can be observed for the European countries, there is also evidence that the strength of some of the effects depends on the particular country-context. The chapter concludes by summarising the results and highlighting the importance of assessing the context-dependency of effects.

The analytical approach of **Chapter 5** is similar to that of the previous chapter. However, here, the focus is on a specific group of women, namely mothers. Building on the observation that motherhood is an important predictor of women's labour market outcomes as well as their political activity, this chapter explores the nexus of care work, paid employment and women's political participation. Specifically, it examines if employment effects are different for women with children. It finds, that in contrast to women without children, working time does not have an effect for the political activity of this group of women. However, other employment effects operate in a similar manner. I also show that the effect of job level on the political participation of mothers depends on the context. The chapter contributes to the literature by analysing employment effects for a group of women for which these effects have not yet been the focus of research.

The purpose of **Chapter 6** is to explore the role of motherhood and care work in context. Specifically, it will explore the effects of policies aimed at the reconciliation of paid work and parenthood, so-called 'work-family policies'. Despite being a central concept in the sociology of work, these policies have hardly been considered in political research. The chapter begins with a discussion of the existing research on these policies, mainly from the sociology of work and gender. The second section describes their operationalisation and measurement. Finally, three analytical sections examine three different types of links between work-family policies and political participation: indirect, moderating and direct effects. Indirect effects are the effect on predictors of political participation, that is employment status and work characteristics. I show that different types of policies can encourage or discourage women's attachment to the labour force

and thus affect women's employment patterns. In the second analytical section, I aim to find out whether the context-dependency of the job-level effect, that has been found in the previous chapter, can be explained by the country's childcare provision. The final analytical section explores whether work-family policies affect women's political participation directly.

Finally, the last analytical chapter, **Chapter 7,** takes an analytical step back and focusses again on all women (mothers and non-mothers). Drawing on the contextual cue theory and arguments developed in the wider literature of political participation, it explores the effects of different characteristics of a gendered labour market on women's political participation. After a brief discussion of the theorised effects, the chapter introduces the second set of contextual variables measuring aspects of gender inequality in the labour market, namely, horizontal sex segregation, vertical sex segregation, and the gender pay gap. The analyses then show that these inequalities do indeed affect women's political activity, however, not always in the expected direction. I find that in certain regards, the experience of discrimination can mobilise women into political activity. On the whole, the chapter demonstrates that gendered structures outside the political sphere can be directly relevant for women's political activity; that is over and above their effects on individual resources.

The final chapter, **Chapter 8** concludes by summarising the empirical findings to provide an answer to the research question and synthesising the messages that can be taken away from this dissertation. I will discuss the implications for research on the topic, as well as for policy-makers.

2 THE LINKS BETWEEN WOMEN'S WORK AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

The concept of political participation is at the core of the idea of a representative democracy. Instead of making political decisions directly, in a representative democracy, citizens choose their representatives and express their preferences to the political decision-makers (Teorell 2006). Given this normative importance, it is hardly surprising that the study of political participation is one of the central fields in political research. Within this field, women's political participation has received considerable scholarly attention (Paxton, Kunovich and Hughes 2007). Throughout the history of political participation research, scholars have set out to understand the factors behind women's political involvement, and the puzzle around their – in comparison to men – lower levels of political activity (Duverger 1955; Milbrath 1972; Beckwith 1986; Schlozman, Burns and Verba 1994; Karp and Banducci 2008a; Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010; Beauregard 2017). Much of this research has focussed on women's specific life situations, including the effects of women's work (e.g. Beckwith 1986; Schlozman, Burns and Verba 1999). Accordingly, the body of research this study can build on is extensive.

This chapter summarises the existing literature on women's political participation, in particular, that portion of the research that has explored the links between work and political activity. This chapter's purpose is not only to provide the reader with the background required to situate this dissertation within the wider field of research but also to provide the theoretical context necessary to frame the empirical analyses in the following chapters. This review begins with a brief description of how citizens' participation has changed, and how the understanding of the concept of political participation has evolved accordingly in Section 2.1. It highlights that whilst women are just as active as men in newer (non-institutional) forms of participation, a so-called 'gender gap' in the traditional (institutional) activities remains. This description is followed by a brief summary of the dominant explanations of political participation focussing on characteristics of individuals. Summarised in the Civic Voluntarism Model, these explanations offer a helpful framework to understand how inequalities in other domains of life, including in work and employment, can impact on women's political participation.

The subsequent section, Section 2.2, discusses the link between work and political participation in more detail. It provides a summary of the existing empirical research on the political effect of employment (and domestic work), drawing on findings from both the general (i.e. non-gender-specific) literature and studies concerned with women's

participation specifically. I will show that a large body of research already exists; however most empirical studies are based on data from the US, and findings, therefore, do not necessarily apply to the European context. In the third section (2.3), I develop this argument further. Firstly, I provide a brief summary of research on context-dependency of participation predictors, and I argue that the effects of work might be similarly shaped by the context of the political system and labour market, in which they are embedded. Then, I provide a brief review of the existing literature on direct contextual effects to highlight the paucity of work focussing on labour market effects. The final section (2.4), then brings the insights of the previous sections together. It highlights how the analyses address the gaps identified in the existing literature and it provides a schematic model of the effects explored in this dissertation.

2.1 Background of political participation research

Changing political participation

Political participation is, simply put, any attempt by ordinary citizens to influence the political process. As simple as this definition might sound, it conceals the continuous changes in the ways in which citizen take part in the political process and the ongoing scholarly debate about the meaning of the concept (cf. van Deth 2014).

In the earliest empirical studies of political participation, the focus was on a single activity: voting. The US election studies of the 1940s (and the development of population surveys as a measurement instrument) (e.g. Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1944) mark the birth of the systematic empirical exploration of citizens' political behaviour. However, these studies understood citizens' input to political decision-making as limited to electoral participation. Two decades later, the first dedicated participation studies, such as Lester W. Milbrath's (1965) *Political Participation* and Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie's (1972) *Participation in America*, extended the understanding of the concept. These studies included, in addition to voting, also other activities related to the electoral process, for example, engagement in political parties or other organisations, campaigning activities, attempts to contact politicians or other political personnel. Since these activities are embedded in the framework of formal political institutions, they are referred to as *institutional* participation. With the rising wave of protests in the late 1960s in Europe and America, scholars started expanding their understanding of citizens' efforts to influence politics further to include activities located outside formal political institutions. In their seminal work, *Political Action,* Samuel Barnes and Max Kaase (1979)

examined, for the first time, what they labelled as 'unconventional'[7] forms of participation. These forms included legal protest activities, such as demonstrations, legal strikes and boycotts, but also illegal acts, for example, political violence. Since then, these activities have lost their unconventional character and have become a normal part of citizens' participation repertoire. Therefore, and because protests and strikes are not embedded in formal political institutions, they are better referred to as *non-institutional* participation. Most recently, a new form of participation has emerged: online activism. Although many modes of online activism resemble similar offline activities (i.e. signing an online petition, or contacting a politician online), some are more unique (e.g. social media campaigns and 'hashtag activism'), and researchers tend to analyse them as a separate form of activism (Oser, Hooghe and Marien 2013).

The development of the concept of political participation reflects the changes in the ways in which citizens choose to take part in the political process. Many scholars have pointed out that citizens' participation repertoires have diversified drastically over time, and that citizens have become more creative in how they express their political preferences (cf. Fox 2014; Inglehart and Catterberg 2003). However, not all forms of participation are equally popular amongst the citizenry. With the exception of voting, which remains the most common form of participation, the diversification of political participation was accompanied with a decline in institutional participation in most Western democracies (Inglehart 1997, Chapter 10). In addition, citizens' withdrawal from the formal political sphere has been paralleled by changes in the attitudes towards formal politics, showing, for example, in growing distrust in formal political processes or party dealignment (Inglehart 1997; Chapter 10; Norris 2002, Chapter 1). While for some scholars, these developments have been a reason for concern (Putnam 2000), since the lack of engagement undermines the legitimacy and functioning of democracy, others have been eager to point out that newer modes of participation are gaining popularity amongst the citizenry. They argue that, rather than overall decreasing, political participation is simply changing (e.g. Norris 2002; Dalton 2008).

At the same time, newer forms of participation have been acclaimed as an avenue towards more equality in political participation. As it is regarded as 'less demanding' on citizens, some scholars have suggested that non-institutional participation has the potential to engage groups of citizen that were traditionally less active (Marien, Hooghe and Quintelier 2010; but see: Schlozman, Verba and Brady 2010). For this reason, non-institutional forms of participation have received

[7] The terms 'conventional' and 'unconventional' participation are still commonly used in the literature. However, I refer to 'institutional' and 'non-institutional' participation, since these terms are less historically relative.

considerable attention from the scholars interested in women's political behaviour. Traditionally, women were found to be less politically active than men. Already in 1955, Maurice Duverger observed that women were slightly less likely to vote and that they were less represented in political parties than men. In 1977, Lester W. Milbrath and M. L. Goel concluded that "(t)he finding that men *are more likely to participate in politics than women* is one of the most thoroughly substantiated in social sciences" (1977, p.116, emphasis in original). Indeed, non-institutional forms of political participation appear to be able to overcome these inequalities. Newer research finds, for example, that women are as active as men, or even more involved, in some forms of non-institutional participation. For instance, they are more likely than men to boycott products for political reasons (Marien, Hooghe and Quintelier 2010, p. 197; also see: Inglehart and Norris 2003; Stolle and Hooghe 2011). As a consequence, research on women's political participation now seems to concentrate on these newer activities (Stolle and Hooghe 2011; Bode 2017)

Given the potential of non-institutional forms of participation to overcome the traditional gender gap, it is not surprising that a large body of recent literature on women's participation has focused on these newer forms of activity and has been less attentive to women's institutional participation. However, in many regards, a focus on women's *institutional* participation is just as important. Not only are these the channels specifically designed for citizens' input to the political process, but political organisations and parties have multiple functions in a democracy, such as aggregating and articulating interests and selecting political candidates (Norris 2002, Chapter 6). These functions can only be fulfilled if parties and organisations have members and get input from citizens.

From a perspective of gender equality, institutional participation remains relevant, because these activities are still male-dominated. Empirical evidence shows that women are still less likely to be a member of a political party, or to engage in political campaigns and other activities within the formal political sphere (Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010; Pfanzelt and Spies 2018). These differences lead to tangible disadvantages for women in the political process. For example, institutional participation has been found to have a positive effect on women's political knowledge and attitudes. It is evident, that the relationship between citizenship norms, political attitudes, and political participation is reciprocal: being politically active is not just a result of, but it equally enforces feelings of political efficacy, political interest, political trust, and citizenship norms (Finkel 1987; Quintelier and Hooghe 2012; Quintelier and van Deth 2014). At the same time, it is institutional participation that has been associated with higher levels of political trust and more support of the democratic regime (Hooghe and Marien 2013). The little empirical evidence directly addressing different effects of different forms of participation suggests

that only those who participate *within* the political system experience an increase in political efficacy, political sophistication, and more positive attitudes towards the system (Finkel 1987; Leighley 1991). In other words, higher levels of women's institutional participation contribute to higher levels of political trust, efficacy and knowledge.

Secondly, institutional forms of participation appear to be more effective than non-institutional forms in influencing political decision-making, as a study by Hooghe and Marien (2014) suggests. Although their evidence is limited to the Belgian case and should, therefore, be interpreted with caution, the study concludes clearly that participation within the system is more effective in reaching the relevant policy-makers. If women's political preferences are not only to be voiced, but also to be heard, it is therefore not sufficient for women to be active in non-institutional forms of participation, but they need to be equally active within the political sphere and in forms of institutional participation.

Women's activity in the formal political sphere is also important for another reason: political representation. To date, women are underrepresented in the parliaments of almost all advanced Western democracies (Inter-parliamentary Union 2018), with important effects not only on policy-making but also on women's political attitudes and engagement (Atkeson 2003; Karp and Banducci 2008a). Although selection effects and discrimination also play a role, women's self-selection is a crucial factor in their underrepresentation: If only a few women are active in political parties, it is difficult for a sufficient number of women to progress in more visible political positions. Although this link is most apparent for party membership, other forms of institutional participation might work as a stepping stone into political parties or political organisations, since it is much easier to get involved, when already familiar with the workings of the political system.

Given the importance of institutional political participation, and the persistent gender inequalities in the levels of activities, it is important to understand which factors shape women's involvement in institutional politics and what the barriers are that keep women from being more politically active. The next subsection summarises the existing research on predictors of political participation and shows how women's lower levels of political activity are strongly influenced by inequalities in other domains of life.

Explanations of political participation

A central objective in political participation research and a primary aim of this study is to explain why some individuals engage in the political process while others remain passive. Influences on political participation can be located at multiple levels of the political system. For example, the design of the electoral system (*macro-level*) can affect citizens' likelihood of going to the ballot, while the structure and orientation of political parties (*meso-level*) can influence party membership. Nevertheless, much of the

abundant research on explanations of political participation has focused on the characteristics of individuals necessary to become politically active, in other words, *individual-level* factors[8] (Dalton 2014). The explanations assume that in order to be able and willing to engage in the political process, citizens need the individual capacity, the motivation and the connection to others who are active (cf. Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995, p. 15)[9]. These conditions relate to the three groups of factors that empirical research consistently associates with political participation: *resources*, *motivations* and *social networks*. Taken together, these are called the *Civic Voluntarism Model* (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995).

The assumption that citizens require political resources to take part in the political process can be traced back to the early participation studies. These studies found that individuals with higher socioeconomic status (SES) are more likely to participate (Campbell, Gurin and Miller 1954; Almond and Verba 1963; Milbrath 1965). This observation is so well-substantiated that it has been labelled the *SES standard model* (e.g. Verba and Nie 1972). However, it was not until later that the concept of political resources provided a causal link between socioeconomic status and political activity (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). In essence, the argument is that political participation requires time, money and skills, and those with more of resources – which are often those with higher socioeconomic status – will find it easier to participate and will be more active. Despite going back to the scholarship of the 1970s and 1980s, the concept of resources remains dominant in the literature and is still used to understand differences in political behaviour (cf. Isaksson 2014; Kern, Marien and Hooghe 2015; Miller and Saunders 2016).

The three main resources explored in these studies are time, money and civic skills (cf. Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995). Free time is essential to engage meaningfully in any political activity; those who do not have the time, will not be able to engage, even if they are motivated to do so. However, time requirements vary across different forms of participation. For instance, signing a petition is much less time-intensive than active engagement in a political party or organisation. Financial resources can be used either directly, for example, to donate money to a political campaign, or indirectly, to acquire time. For example, money can be used to obtain help with domestic and care work, or it can pay for private transport. Both of these investments will impact on the free time available, which can then be used for political activity. However, more important than

[8] Throughout this thesis, I will use the terms 'individual-level' and 'micro-level' interchangeably when referring to explanations based on characteristics of individuals. The terms 'macro-level', 'context-level' or 'country-level' all refer to characteristics of societies/ countries.

[9] The authors started their exploration of political participation with the question why people do not take part in politics and provided the famous answer: "because they can't; because they don't want to; or because nobody asked" (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995, p.15).

time or money is the personal ability to become active; Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995) describe these 'civic skills' as "communications and organisational capacities" (p.304). A broader understanding includes general education and language skills, basic knowledge about the functioning of the political system, and an understanding of how citizens can get involved. Empirically, there is good evidence that resources matter for participation. Variables used as proxies for resources, such as education, employment status, occupation, and income are amongst the best-substantiated factors of political participation (e.g. Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Dalton 2008; Solt 2008; Gallego 2009; Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010).

The second group of factors that are linked to political participation is sometimes called 'motivations'. It is a summary term for several psychological dispositions, such as interest in politics, political knowledge, or feelings of political efficacy. Attention to and interest in politics are necessary conditions for individuals to direct their efforts and attention to the political sphere in the first place. Feelings of efficacy, which is the belief that the political system is responsive to input and that oneself is capable of participating, are equally important (Dalton 2008; Karp and Banducci 2008b). The effects of psychological involvement with the political process are empirically well-documented (Armingeon 2007; Dalton 2008; Karp and Banducci 2008b; Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010). Indeed, interest in politics is often the most powerful predictor of political participation. However, despite their theoretical and empirical strong association with political activity, some scholars advise caution due to problems of endogeneity (e.g. Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Leighley 1995). Arguably, political activity is not just the result of political knowledge, interest, and efficacy, but might equally precede them. Indeed, Quintelier and Hooghe (2012) show in a panel analysis with Belgian data that the effect of political participation on political interest is stronger than the reverse link.

The last group of factors is concerned with people's social connections and the effects associated with being involved in friendship groups and voluntary organisations or having networks of colleagues at the workplace. The idea that these social connections facilitate a politically active citizenry can be traced back to notions about the 'civil society' by Tocqueville (1938); but it has been taken up and popularised by scholars of the Social Capital Theory (Coleman 1990; Putnam 1993; 2000). The Civic Voluntarism Model assumes a similar positive influence but offers a clearer causal mechanism behind the political effects of social relationships. In their first major work on the Civic Voluntarism Model, *Voice and Equality*, Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995, Chapter 13) describe three links between social institutions and political participation. Firstly, activity in social institutions/connections, such as voluntary organisations can increase organisational and communication skills, which can then be applied to political activity.

Secondly, social contacts expose citizens to politics, for example when colleagues, friends, or neighbours involve them in political discussions. Lastly, being part of a social organisation increases the chances of being recruited into political participation, for example, being encouraged to join a political protest (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995, Chapter 13). Teorell (2003) demonstrates for the Swedish case that the first and the last link (increases in civic skills and recruitment) are the main causal mechanisms behind the positive effect of activity in voluntary associations. A large body of empirical research has shown that activity in social organisations does, indeed, foster political activity (cf. van der Meer and van Ingen 2009). Some scholars, however, suggest that the association is spurious: both forms of activity (in social organisations and politics) might be influenced by the same factors, rather than one causing the other (i.e. a self-selection effect) (van der Meer and van Ingen 2009).

Although the factors included in the Civic Voluntarism Model have overall a good empirical basis, the model is not universally accepted. Apart from the problems with endogeneity and spurious relationships already mentioned, critics of the model have also noted the failure to explain individual instability in participation and declining levels of participation over time (Whiteley and Seyd 2002, Chapter 2; Millers and Saunders 2016). Additionally, the model cannot sufficiently explain varying levels of participation across countries, which has spurred a focus on the role of the context (cf. Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2012). I will return to this influence of the context later in this review. Despite these criticisms, the model remains the most widely accepted (and applied) model of political participation, and it has been found to explain political participation reasonably well, at least in the US context (Millers and Saunders 2016, p.947).

The model also works well as a framework to understand women's lower levels of political participation. In contrast to, for example, genetic or personality models of political participation (cf. Fowler, Baker and Dawes 2008; Mondak et al. 2010) it does not presume that differences in political participation are due to inherent (and thus unchangeable) personal characteristics but influenced by inequalities in life situations[10]. An explicit assumption of the Civic Voluntarism Model is that gendered patterns of political participation "have their origins in a long, cumulative pattern of gender-differentiated experiences in the principle social institutions of everyday life" (Burns, Verba and Schlozman 2001, p.3). In other words, the model assumes that women's resources, social contacts, and motivations to become politically active are shaped by the manifold inequalities that they face in everyday life.

[10] This is an important premise of this work. If the barriers to women's political participation were inherent in women's genes or their personalities, it would be of no avail to attempt to address gender differences.

Many of these inequalities are rooted in the gendered division of labour – and in its consequences for women's life situations. For example, as a result of women's primary responsibility for childcare, women in almost all European countries are less likely to be employed, and if they are employed, they are less likely to work full-time and in lucrative positions (Pettit and Hook 2009). These differences lead to a comparatively lower income, as well as fewer civic skills. Burns, Schlozman and Verba (2001) have quantified women's disadvantages: American women have on average $7200 less in household income than American men (p. 249) and practice, on average, 0.57 fewer 'skills acts' (p.248). Similarly, free time available is affected by gendered work patterns. Women remain responsible for the lion's share of care work and housework (Sayer 2005). Women who are gainfully employed, then often face what Hochschild (1989) has called the 'second shift': a 'shift' of housework performed after finishing market work. Although Burns, Schlozman and Verba (2001) find no differences in free time between all men and women overall, they show that working women have on average 24 minutes less free time available per day than their male counterparts (Burns, Scholzman and Verba 2001, p.217).

Similar disadvantages are also found with regards to women's social connections and political motivations. For example, women's social connections are of a different nature than men's; they are more likely to be based on 'private sphere contacts', such as family and neighbours, in contrast to men's more professional contacts. In her seminal analysis of data from Britain, Vivien Lowndes (2001) shows that women's more private social connections are less likely to translate into political participation. Burns, Verba and Schlozman (2001) provide a similar conclusion. While women are as active as men in voluntary organisations and the church overall, their activity results in fewer civic skills and fewer requests for political activity (Chapter 10)[11]. The stronger focus on the 'private sphere' is also associated with different psychological dispositions towards politics. Some scholars have argued, that the perception that politics is a men's domain results in weaker political interest or lower levels of political efficacy (e.g. Atkeson 2003). Indeed, a multitude of studies has shown that women tend to be less interested in and less knowledgeable about politics and have lower levels of political efficacy (Verba, Burns and Schlozman 1997; Burns, Verba and Schlozman 2001, Chapter 4; Karp and Banducci 2008a).

In sum, many of the most important predictors of political activity are related to women's life situations, such as the social connections, family or employment situation. In particular women's work appears to play a central role: for the obtainment of

[11] However, the authors also suggest that the effect on political participation is stronger for women than for men.

resources, social contacts and attitudes towards politics – and this is where this study ties in. Naturally, the importance of work is not a new discovery but has been already discussed since the early work on women's political participation (e.g. Andersen 1975; Welch 1977; Beckwith 1986). The next section provides a brief overview of the extensive body of empirical literature on the links between employment, domestic work and political participation.

2.2 A tale of two spheres: The links between employment and political participation

The core idea that productive work is a necessary condition for women's political involvement and full citizenship is not new (cf. Marshall 1950). For instance, a good share of the feminist debate on citizenship centres around the question of whether women require access to paid work in order to be able to participate fully as citizen or whether women's reproductive work is an equal contribution (Pateman 1989; Orloff 1993; cf. Gornick and Meyers 2003, Chapter 4). Although I will not attempt to enter this debate, it illustrates how the concern about work (and productive work specifically) is central to the debate about women's involvement in politics.

Conceptually, the effects of employment can be differentiated into the effect of employment status, and secondly, for those who are employed, the effects of job characteristics and outcomes. In this section, I will outline the most important empirical findings, focussing on three different aspects: (1) employment status, (2) work characteristics, and (3) domestic work. I will equally rely on findings from the mainstream literature and the scholarship on gender and politics while identifying those gaps in the literature this study aims to address.

Labour force participation

Although the importance of work is equally well established in the mainstream political sociology – for instance, the Civic Voluntarism Model treats work as one of major determinants of resources (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995) – the majority of studies concerned with the effect of employment status explore the effect from a gender perspective[12,13]. This focus is perhaps not surprising, as women are still more likely to exit the labour force at least for a period of time (Plantenga and Remery 2013). As a

[12] Indeed, many mainstream analyses of political participation control for income, but do not include a measure of employment status in the analyses (cf. Armingeon 2007; Dalton 2008; Hooghe and Stolle 2011).

[13] There are also studies on the effects of the experience of unemployment without a specific gender-perspective (Scott and Acock 1979; Lorenzini and Giugni 2012). However, unemployment and inactivity are conceptually different, as unemployment is mostly temporary and those being unemployed are still attached to the labour force.

consequence, non-working has a different meaning for men and women: For working-age men, unless related to health reasons, not being employed generally indicates unemployment (i.e. being in the labour force and looking for work). For women, in contrast, it often means inactivity (i.e. being outside the labour force, not looking for work), often due to childcare responsibilities.

This also implies that for women, paid employment might play a different role for political participation than for men. In addition to the impact on resources, such as money and job-related civic skills, and to changes in the types of social connections, employment also affects women's economic bargaining power within the family, it can provide economic independence and access to the public sphere, and finally, it can mean a break with traditional gender roles. According to those, women are relegated to the private domain of home and family, and often economically dependent on their partner. In contrast, men are supposed to be economically active, and they occupy a place in the public sphere. It has been argued, that the traditional confinement to the private sphere contributes to women's lower political participation rates, since politics, in the public sphere, might be seen as a domain for men (Atkeson 2003). Interestingly, women who favour a traditional division of labour are also themselves less likely to be politically active (Valentova 2016).

Empirical research mostly confirms the empowering effect of employment. In her pioneering research, Kristi Andersen (1975) explored gender differences in campaign participation in America and showed that the political behaviour of employed women resembled that of men, while homemakers were less politically active. Similar research also on the American context generally supports these findings (McDonagh 1982; Andersen and Cook 1985; Beckwith 1986; Schlozman, Burns and Verba 1994; but see: Thomsen and Eichler 1985). When turning to studies from other geographic contexts, however, a less clear picture emerges. Strong effects of both, individual employment and female labour force participation rates have been associated with higher probabilities of voting and engagement for the African context (Isaksson, Kotsadam and Nerman 2014). Similarly, for Latin America (Desposato and Norrander 2009) and for 13 Muslim-majority countries (Coffé and Dilli 2015) positive effects of employment are found. In contrast, Coffé and Bolzendahl's (2010) analysis of 18 industrialised countries reveals mixed effects depending on the mode of participation. However, they base their analyses on single-level regression models and only indirectly account for differences between countries. Recent research from Europe is scant, but two (non-gender specific) studies demonstrate the conflict in findings: Whilst Gallego (2009) finds that employment status does not matter for most modes of political participation, Hooghe and Quintelier (2013)

identify a definite positive effect of employment for voting, institutional, and non-institutional activities.

Despite the widespread interest in the effects of employment status in cross-national research, it has not been established whether the inconclusive findings from the European context are merely a result of different data and modelling strategies, or whether they might indicate that employment status has a different effect within the European context or might depend on specific contextual characteristics. This idea seems not entirely unreasonable since gender norms and women's integration in the economic sphere also vary. There is, for instance, substantial variation in female employment rates across Europe (den Dulk and van Doorne-Huiskes 2010). However, the context-dependency of the employment effect has, to my best knowledge, not yet been systematically tested.

Job characteristics

In contrast to studies on labour force participation, much of what we know about the differential effects of different jobs stems from the mainstream literature (cf, Delli Carpini 1986; Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995; Greenberg, Grunberg and Daniel 1996; Godard 2007; Adman 2008). Applying the logic of the Civic Voluntarism Model, it should be expected that job characteristics play an important role for the political participation as they affect political resources. For instance, for many individuals in the workforce, wages are the primary source of income; thus, a job's pay is a key predictor of economic resources. Similarly, working time affects free time, since, to say it in Burns, Schlozman and Verba's words, "paid employment is the single most time-consuming adult endeavor" (2001, p.205). However, work might be most relevant for enhancing civic skills. The authors suggest that many activities undertaken on the job, such as organising and participation in meetings, supervising others, or giving presentations, provide skills that are equally beneficial in a political setting (Burns, Scholzman and Verba 2001, Chapter 8). At the same time, the degree to which the job provides opportunities to practice these skills depends largely on the job level – professional jobs tend to provide more civic skills than, for instance, manual labour.

Empirically, the knowledge on the effects of different work characteristics is mixed. There is, for instance, little research on the effects of working time[14]. According to the Civic Voluntarism Model, we should expect women's on average shorter working hours to give them an advantage for political participation, as it might be associated with more free time (Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001). However, part-time work is associated with lower income and less desirable jobs; in other words, it equally affects the other

[14] The blind spot of the mainstream literature might have to do with the overall very male-centred conceptualisation of work, as paid, full-time employment.

resources. Indeed, the scant empirical evidence that does exist is mixed. Schlozman, Burns and Verba (1999) find a weak negative effect of working time on participation when controlling for other job characteristics (such as job level) using American data. However, a more recent study from the American context (without gender focus) analysing 590 working individuals in the Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy survey finds no effect of working time (Newman, Johnson and Lown 2014). For the 18 Western democracies, Coffé and Bolzendahl (2010) find that the difference between the effects of part-time work and full-time work differs by the mode of participation. The inconsistent findings might be the result of different data or modelling strategies, but they also suggest that more research is required to understand better how exactly these working time patterns affect women's political participation.

Regarding job levels, a clearer picture of effects emerges, but one that is geographically limited. Several studies of the Civic Voluntarism Model find income and occupational status to be positively associated with political activity (Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). In newer work, significant effects of income, but not job level are found. However, that is in an analysis that controls for the level of civic skills (Schlozman, Verba and Brady 2012). Other studies from the American context confirm these findings mostly. For instance, Sobel (1993) and Arrighi and Maume (1994) assess the effects of job autonomy and participation in decision-making and find overall positive effects on political activity. Schur's (2003) slightly more recent study – also on the American context –also largely corroborates findings from Civic Voluntarism Model.

However, research from other contexts and particularly recent cross-national studies on the effects of work characteristics are surprisingly rare, although findings seem to overall support the American evidence. One exception is a study by Adman (2008) that finds, using panel data, no effect of work autonomy and skill acts for the Swedish case. In contrast, Godard (2007) finds for Canada and England that mentally challenging jobs and control over one's work have a positive effect on political activity, but the dataset used is small and of questionable quality. A more recent study on the Dutch case also suggests that labour market disadvantages (low pay, the experience of unemployment, temporary employment and involuntary part-time work) decrease the individual probability of casting a vote (Emmenegger, Marx and Schraff 2015). Two recent, cross-national studies find overall support for the theorised effects. In a study of 24 European countries, Gallego (2009) examines the effects of income, occupational category and employment status on participation in different modes of political activity. She finds a consistent positive effect of income, and those in higher-level occupations were more likely to vote or to participate in conventional forms of participation. Similarly,

Hooghe and Quintelier (2013) examine the effects of income on political participation in the EU and find effects similar to those reported for the US context. Finally, Coffé and Bolzendahl's (2010) study of industrialised countries shows that effects depend on the mode of participation: occupation is not related to party membership, but women in high-level occupations are more likely to participate in private forms of activism. The evidence from previous studies suggests that the effects of job level might be similar in Europe and the US, however, cross-national comparative studies, in particular, those focussing on women are rare. For working time, cross-national research is virtually missing.

Domestic work

One form of work that is almost entirely absent from the 'mainstream' literature is 'domestic work'. This omission, again, might stem from the fact that domestic work is still mostly 'women's work'. Even with their advances in the labour market, women remain primarily responsible for the performance of domestic work. Even when full-time employed, women are doing more housework than their partners, facing the so-called 'second shift' (Hochschild 1989). Similarly, the main responsibility for childcare (and care work more generally) is with women (García-Mainar, Molina and Montuenga 2011). This observation is not only interesting in itself, but it is also relevant, because it is linked to gendered patterns of work in the labour market, such as women's propensity to work part-time and women's, on average, slower career progression and lower pay, the so-called 'motherhood penalty' (Abendroth, Huffman and Treas 2014). Although these patterns are well-known in the sociology of work, they are hardly considered in research on women's political participation.

The effects of housework can be well understood within the framework of political resources. In contrast to market work, housework does not provide an individual income, and its contribution to the development of civic skills might equally be limited. However, just as market work, housework requires time, and the more time is spent on housework, the less free time is available for political participation. The empirical evidence on the effects of housework is rather limited. Burns, Schlozman and Verba (2001, Chapter 12) find weak (but not statistically significant) evidence that doing a larger share of housework is associated with weaker political participation for women. For the Indian context, Chhibber (2002) finds that being too busy in the household is an important predictor of not being active in politics. However, the study focusses on women in rural areas of the country only. Unfortunately, time spent on housework is not sufficiently

captured in most major cross-national datasets, and for that reason, it can also not be explored further in this dissertation[15].

Care work, in contrast, has received more consistent attention in the political participation research. Like housework, it can be understood within the Civic Voluntarism framework. In the empirical research, the effect of care work is often measured by the presence of children in the household, either as a binary variable or measuring the number or the age of children. Early studies on the US context have suggested that motherhood can have a depressing effect on political activity, which differed, however, by educational level of the mother (Lynn and Flora 1973; McGlen 1980). Although empirical findings have not been consistent, the overall consensus in the literature seems to be that the presence of pre-school children has a negative effect on women's political participation (Quaranta 2016). For school-aged children, however, sometimes a politicising effect is found (Voorpostel and Coffé 2012; O'Neill and Gidengil 2017). Indeed, younger children require more intensive care than older children (thus, more resources). At the same time, having school-aged children might strengthen the ties to the social networks of parents and therefore have a mobilising effect (Jennings 1979).

As much as these studies on house- and care work have contributed to our understanding of the effects of domestic work, they often fail to take the intersection between market work and domestic work into account. Thus, while we know that children have a negative or positive effect on mothers, we do not know, if the effects of employment are the same for mothers and non-mothers. With two notable exceptions (McGlen 1980; O'Neill and Gidengil 2017), studies have focussed either on market or on non-market work, but not their interaction.

2.3 Bringing the context in: Contextual effects on participation

In the previous sections, women's political participation was addressed from an individual-level perspective, leaving aside the wider context in which both work and political participation are embedded. While I have suggested before that the individual-level links found for the US might not apply to the European context, and that effects might, in fact, depend, in fact, entirely on the context, I have not yet explained why that might be the case. This section turns to the role of the context; the first subsection argues why it should not be simply assumed that effects from the US apply similarly to all Europeans countries. In the second half, exiting research on context effects will be reviewed and the paucity of research on the labour market context discussed.

[15] While there is an item in the European Social Survey, the dataset used for this study, it has been only asked to those respondents living with a partner, and therefore exclude a large share of respondents.

Conditioning effect

The term 'context' can refer to different levels, for example, women's work is embedded in the context of her family and employment is embedded in a specific company and field, as well as in the labour market. Although institutions on the meso-level, such as the family or the company, are meaningful, they will not be the focus of this study. This study focusses on the macro-context, in other words, characteristics at the country-level.

The role of the national context shaping the relationship between individual-level characteristics and political behaviour was already the subject of early comparative work, such as Almond and Verba (1963) or Verba, Nie and Kim (1978). However, it was only with the development and more widespread application of the appropriate statistical technique, multilevel modelling, that the *context-dependency* of individual-level effects could be systematically and efficiently modelled. I suggest that the context might also shape the link between work and political participation. For other predictors of participation, context-dependency has already been shown. For instance, Dalton (2014, Chapter 4) compares the effects a set of the major determinants of political participation, such as age, education, and group membership across the US, the UK, France and Germany. He finds that, for example, the effect of education on contacting a politician (an 'institutional' activity) to be strongest in the US, and weaker in the remaining countries. In contrast, group membership is found to be positively associated with contacting in France, Germany and the UK, however, not the US (Dalton 2014, p.72). A more systematic analysis by Bernhagen and Marsh (2007) assesses whether predictors of voting and protest operate similarly across Eastern and Western European countries. While socioeconomic status, group resources, and most values affect voting similarly in both sets of countries, the effects of some values and resources on protest differ significantly between Eastern and Western Europe.

A second set of studies have taken the analyses a step further and theorise a varying individual-level effect structured by a specific context characteristic. For instance, Vráblíková (2014) links the effect of mobilisation to the political opportunity structure within a country. The impact of personal values also depends on the cultural context, as a study by Welzel and Deutsch (2012) shows: They find that post-materialistic values have a stronger positive effect within countries with an emancipatory culture. However, perhaps most relevant is a study by Dalton, Van Sickle and Weldon (2010), in which the authors conclude that the effect of resources is larger in more democratic and more developed countries.

For the effects of employment specifically, context-dependency has (to my best knowledge) not yet been tested. However, there are two good reasons to expect different effects across countries, namely the diversity of labour markets, and country differences

in terms of the political sphere. Firstly, the meaning and outcomes of work are likely to be shaped by the specific context. For instance, cultural norms could affect the meaning of employment for women, and the organisation of the labour market might affect the resources associated with employment. In countries where traditional gender roles prevail, being in paid employment could have a more empowering effect than in countries where female employment is already the norm. Similarly, the influence of unions and employee organisations might determine whether there are opportunities to practice civic skills within the context of the workplace. At the same time, these characteristics – cultural norms, union density, and other aspects of the labour market – are substantially different in the US and Europe, and also across European labour markets. For example, the female share of employment is moderately high in the US and varies substantially across Europe (Faggio and Nickell 2007). Additionally, the US labour market is much less regulated and has weaker unions than most European countries (Faggio and Nickell 2007). In short, being employed might have different implications for women in America and Europe, and even within Europe employment might not have identical outcomes.

Secondly, political participation is also embedded in a political system, creating unique requirements for political activity. For example, the design and complexity of a political system might determine how much resources are required to become politically involved. Beauregard (2014) suggests that simpler political systems place weaker resource requirements on their citizens. Again, there is a substantive variation of the political institutions and systems across countries. With regards to the political system, the unique nature of the US is well established; that is to the degree that some scholars use the term 'American exceptionalism' (Lipset 1996). The European countries as well are characterised by difference, which might then shape the effect of employment. Building on Beauregard's (2014) argument above, we should expect that civic skills are of primary importance, and job level might be a stronger predictor of political activity in more complex political systems.

In essence, there are good reasons to expect that the effects of employment do not operate in the same manner across countries but are shaped by the context. The conflicting findings of cross-national research discussed in the previous section also support this assumption. However, so far, the possible context-dependency has not been systematically tested.

Direct contextual effects

The context can not only play a role by shaping individual-level effects, but it might also have a *direct* influence on women's probability to participate. Direct contextual effects on political participation are, again, not a new idea. For instance, the literature on electoral participation has examined the effect of different electoral systems in detail (e.g. Karp

and Banducci 2008b; Beauregard 2014). However, only recently has the empirical literature started to explore contextual effects more systematically, and to consider a wider range of contextual factors (Vráblíková and Císař 2015). Vráblíková and Císař 2015) summarise the characteristics explored in the general research into three categories: formal political institutions, socio-economic development, and political culture. Studies focussing on women's participation specifically, however, have largely focussed on women's integration in the political sphere and gender norms and culture.

A good deal of the existing empirical research has examined the effects of women's political representation. The main argument is that women's representation in parliament or other political institutions demonstrates how inclusive of women the political sphere is, and whether or not "politics is not just a man's game" (Karp and Banducci 2008a, p. 106). Various effects on women's political participation have been explored. For example, Atkeson (2003) shows, that competitive female candidates can increase women's psychological engagement with politics; the presence of female candidates fosters women's feelings of efficacy and their propensity to discuss politics with others. Campbell and Wolbrecht (2006) confirm that young girls anticipate being more politically active when female candidates are visible in the news. However, they suggest the effect operates through political discussion in the girl's families. Others have suggested that the effects of women's representation are conditional on the candidate's party (Reingold and Harrell 2010). Yet, all of these studies compare different contexts within the US. Cross-national studies have more mixed results. An analysis of time-series data from 20 sub-Saharan countries confirms empowering effects (Barnes and Burchard 2012). Karp and Banducci (2008a), however, do not find evidence for an empowering effect of women's representation in parliament.

Another set of studies have widened the focus from institutions of the political sphere to gender norms within society more generally. The gender gaps in political participation have been linked to economic development and societal modernisation. Inglehart and Norris (2003) argue that the cultural change associated with (post-) modernisation transforms gender roles and empowers women. However, Desposato and Norrander's (2009) analysis fails to replicate this effect for Latin America, and the authors suggest that economic development might change the distribution of individual-level variables, such as women's employment, but does not exert a unique contextual effect. A few studies have explored cultural gender norms from a perspective of religious influence. Coffé and Dilli (2010) test the assumption that traditional gender norms often associated with religious societies depress women's political activity. However, they find no support for an effect of state Islamisation in Muslim-majority countries. Similarly, a

study of 20 African countries by Isaksson, Kotsadam and Nerman (2014) find no effect of the religious composition.

Only very few studies so far have, however, explored the effects of the labour market. The ones that are conceptually the closest to this study usually focus on women's labour force participation rates and their outcome is mostly women's political representation, rather than political participation, although some arguments can be equally applied to women's political activity. For example, in his seminal analysis of Middle Eastern countries, Ross (2008) argues that women's weak political representation in oil-rich countries can at least partially be explained by the adverse effect of oil on women's labour force participation. He suggests that women's lower involvement in the labour force means that patriarchal structures can persist in society, which also impedes women's activity in politics. Other studies on women's political representation have similarly argued that higher levels of women's labour force participation are an expression of more egalitarian gender norms, which should have a positive influence on women's political involvement (e.g. Iversen and Rosenbluth 2008; Stockemer and Byrne 2012). Only a handful of studies have, however, directly assessed the effect on women's political participation. For the African context, Isaksson, Kotsadam and Nerman (2014) find a positive effect of the share of employed women on women's likelihood of voting and raising political issues. In contrast, Campbell and Wolbrecht (2007), who include female labour force participation (on the level of the district) as a control variable in their analysis of American data, find no significant effect on the anticipated participation of girls.

However, this might simply indicate, that labour force participation as such, might not be the best indicator to measure women's position in the economic sphere. In an older study, Kenworthy and Malami (1999) suggest that it is not women's labour force participation matters, but their integration in high-level occupations that matters. Indeed, there is some weak indication that women's integration in high-level economic positions could have an effect: Morgan and Buice (2013) find that in countries with higher shares of female professionals, women are more supportive of women's integration in the political sphere, whilst female labour force participation had no effect. However, the effect of women's integration in the economic sphere, and the consequences of inequalities and discrimination in the labour market on women's political participation have not yet been assessed directly. In other words, we do not yet know whether gendered characteristics of the labour market have consequences for women's political behaviour.

2.4 A multi-level model of work and political participation

The previous sections have looked into the existing knowledge about the effects of work and employment, and also the existing contextual literature on political participation. While the relationship between employment and participation is already well-researched, some important gaps in the understanding remain.

(1) Most empirical studies are case studies, many based on data from the American context. This holds, in particular, true for studies focussing explicitly on the effect of work. In contrast, many cross-sectional studies might include employment status as a 'control variable', but dedicated studies on the effects of employment are rare. In other words, it is not clear whether findings from the US context can be generalised to the European countries. In particular, the 'context-dependency' of employment effects has not yet been tested systematically.

(2) While some aspects of work have been researched in detail, aspects related to 'women's work' remain under-researched. There is comparatively little research on the effects of working hours or part-time work in contrast to the effects of job levels, and there is very little research on the effects of housework. The existing research has also failed to address the nexus of market work and care work. As a consequence, we do not know whether employment effects are the same for mothers and women without children.

(3) Research so far has paid little attention to the role of the labour market as an institution. While there has been a surge in research exploring the effects of the 'genderedness' of the political context, for example, electoral systems, women's political representations or gender quotas, the effects of the labour market as a fundamentally gendered institution have not been the scholarly focus. As a result, little is known whether, for example, labour market policies or gendered norms and structures within the labour market might have direct consequences for women's political involvement.

This study aims to contribute to these gaps in the understanding by providing a comprehensive investigation of the effects of women's work, and the influence of the macro-context. This entails an analysis, that takes two analytical levels into account. On the individual level, the study explores the effects of employment status and job characteristics, and the differences between mothers and non-mothers. However, this study also explores the influence of the context. On the context level, I explore the effects of work-family policies and gendered structures in the labour market. Figure 2.1 provides a schematic representation of the links examined in this study.



Figure 2.1: Schematic presentation of the links explored in this dissertation.

Characteristics on the individual-level are shown in the lower part of the schematic figure, while the context (or country) level is shown at the top. Traditionally, research was only concerned with the links shown in the lower half of the figure. Studies on the effects of employment and job characteristics often theorise a link via citizen's resources. In other words, they assume that work is a predictor for time, money and skills available, which then influence whether or not a woman takes part in the political process; the link between work and participation is, therefore, an indirect one. A handful of studies have attempted to measure all resources directly, most notably, the original Civic Voluntarism Model studies (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001). However, in this study, no direct measures of resources are available; thus, they remain unobserved. The effects of employment and job level will be explored in Chapters 4 and 5. The analyses will show whether the effects found in the American context apply in the same manner to European women. While the focus is on individual-level effects, the context plays a role nevertheless, as in these chapters I also test the context-dependency of effects. The analytical focus is on all women in Chapter 4, while Chapter 5 focusses explicitly on the group of mothers.

The first contextual characteristic that is work-family policies will be the focus of research in Chapter 6. As the various links in the schematic representation indicate, three different types of links will be explored. The first, shown in solid grey, are indirect links. These are the effects of work-family policies on the *predictors* of political participation (employment status and job characteristics). The ways in which work-family policies can

shape women's labour market outcomes are a central topic in the sociology of work and gender (cf. Hegewisch and Gornick 2011; Misra, Budig and Boeckmann 2011), but since the employment outcomes shape women's political participation, these effects are also relevant here. The second type of link is a conditioning link, shown in grey and dashed. These links assume that policies might not only affect whether a woman is employed or how much money she earns, but also how employment status or income are linked to political participation. One example would be the provision of childcare, that might shape the effect of working hours on political activity: In countries where childcare can ease the time pressures on working mothers, working time should be a weaker predictor of participation Thirdly, work-family policies might have a direct effect on women's political activity. As I have already described above, two different causal mechanisms might be behind such an effect, both of these are shown as solid black lines in the schematic representation above. The first is concerned with the contextual cue work-family policies provide. Whether they stress women's role as caregivers or whether they symbolise that women are equal members of the public sphere might also affect women's inclination to be involved in the political process. The second link is via women's resources. Work-family policies redistribute resources; they provide women with more time or money, which can then be used for political activity.

The second contextual effect shown above is the effect of labour market segregation, which will be the focus of the empirical analyses in Chapter 7. Drawing on findings from the sociology of work, I formulate expectations regarding effects of horizontal gender segregation (the tendency of men and women to work in different fields and industries), vertical gender segregation (the tendency to work at different levels of the occupational hierarchy) and economic inequalities (the gender pay gap). The effects of these aspects are particularly interesting, since they are, in a sense, the structural manifestations of inequalities of the individual-level job characteristics.

Taken together these analyses should provide us with a good contextual understanding of the linkage between work and employment on the individual level and the influences from factors of the economic sphere. However, before turning to the analyses of these effects in the empirical chapter, the next chapter provides more insight into how this research is designed.

3 WOMEN'S INSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN 25 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Women's engagement in the political sphere has been a concern in political scholarship since the early American participation studies (cf. Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1948; Campbell et al. 1960; Almond and Verba 1963; Milbrath 1972; Verba and Nie 1972). To the present day, the main conclusions derived from empirical studies remain similar: *Women tend to be less active in politics than men*. It has been established that women appear to be less interested in and less knowledgeable about politics, they are less likely to be active in a party or political organisation, and they are less likely to run for office (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001). In more recent studies, scholars paint a more differentiated picture; some research suggests, for example, that women have become just as or more active than men at least in some forms of participation, including voting and non-institutional forms of political activity (Stolle and Micheletti 2006; Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010; Marien, Hooghe & Quintelier, 2010).

Regardless of the findings, most empirical studies have in common, that they are concerned with women's political participation only *in comparison to men's* (Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010; Beauregard 2014). Despite the importance of understanding the mechanisms behind the gender gap of political participation, feminist scholarship has cautioned that this approach involves the risk of regarding men's political behaviour as 'the standard', and women's as the deviant version that has to be explained (cf. Bourque and Grossholtz 1974). As a consequence, factors that uniquely affect women might be easily overlooked or only explored superficially in the research[16], thus leaving our understanding of women's political participation incomplete. This chapter and the subsequent chapters will, therefore, explore women's institutional political participation in Europe taking a different approach; that is, they focus on women's political behaviour in cross-national perspective, rather than in comparison to men.

This chapter will start the empirical exploration by describing the patterns of participation across European countries, focussing on both, overall levels of activity and differences in the modes of participation. However, before providing an overview of

[16] An important example is the scarce literature on the effects of motherhood/ parenthood on political participation. While many gender gap studies include a simple variable measuring parenthood or the number of children in the analyses and have found different effects for men and women (e.g. Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001; Quaranta and Dotti Sani 2018), studies that explore the links/mechanisms behind these effects in more detail are relatively scarce.

women's political activity, this chapter discusses the research design and provides information about the data, measurements, and statistical methods used.

It begins with a brief discussion of the central research concept '*political participation*', explaining how it is understood in this study, and it briefly addresses questions of dimensionality and cross-national comparability in Section 3.1. The subsequent section (3.2) describes the main dataset used and outlines the procedures for data cleaning, weighting, and merging of micro-level and macro-level data. Then, the dependent variable measuring institutional political participation and its use in cross-national research will be described Section 3.3. After discussing the modelling strategy in Section 3.4, the chapter closes presenting and discussing women's political participation patterns in Europe.

3.1 The concept: Institutional political participation

The definition of political participation

Citizens' efforts to influence political decision-making can take very different forms. Voting, illegal strikes, and boycotting products for political reasons are all forms of political participation, although they are quite different with regards to their intensity, the degree of issue-orientation and their relation to formal politics. Given this diversity of political activities, and the emerging of new forms of participation, such as online-activism, it is hardly surprising that the definition of political participation has been subject to extensive scholarly discussion. In particular, the expansion of the participation repertoire (cf. Fox 2014; Inglehart and Catterberg 2003) has presented scholars with the challenge of finding a definition that is at the same time parsimonious and comprehensive enough to also include newer and newest forms of political engagement (such as clicktivism/ slacktivism). As a consequence, the literature offers a plethora of competing definitions for political participation.

Efforts to synthesise the existing literature to create a single, commonly accepted definition (cf. Conge 1988; more recently: van Deth 2014) have not been successful. Nevertheless, van Deth (2014) offers a useful summary of existing literature. He identifies four 'minimum criteria' of political participation that are shared by most definitions. According to these criteria, political participation can be understood as an *activity* performed by *ordinary citizen* on a *voluntary* basis, which is *directed at the political sphere* in a broader sense (van Deth 2014, pp. 351-352). These criteria are broad enough to be inclusive of newer forms of political activities, while they effectively differentiate between political participation and related but distinct concepts, such as civic participation (see Table 3.1 below). Although some studies divert slightly from this understanding of political participation (cf. Barnes and Kaase 1979 for the inclusion of

attitudes; or Stolle and Hooghe 2004 for a definition of 'political'), van Deth's definition reflects a broad consensus of the political participation literature. It, therefore, provides the basis for the understanding of *political participation* in this dissertation.

Table 3.1: Criteria for the definition of 'political participation'

	Criterion	Excluding…
»	Activity or action	Attitudes, interests, passive behaviour, intentions
»	Performed by citizen	Professional activities (by politicians)
»	Voluntariness	Activities enforced by law[17]
»	Directed at the political sphere[18]	Activities directed at civil society or other areas

Note: Based on van Deth 2014, pp. 351-352.

The expansion of the political participation repertoire has not only challenged scholars to find a comprehensive definition; it equally implies that the concept of participation is itself complex and multidimensional. Indeed, activities defined as political participation are diverse across multiple dimensions. For instance, different modes of political participation vary in terms of the resources required to perform them: Signing an online petition once is much less demanding than being an active member of a political organisation. Arguably, it also requires fewer civic skills and less initiative. Similarly, better knowledge of the political system is needed for contacting a politician in contrast to wearing a campaign badge. Modes of participation can also vary with regards to the degree of their issue-orientation. While demonstrations and petitions often address a single or a small set of related policy issues directly, voting or party membership express more general political preferences, including those related to political personnel.

However, the distinction that has perhaps enjoyed the strongest academic interest is concerned with the degree of institutionalisation: political activities can be formally or constitutionally regulated, and therefore a formal part of the political system, such as voting or partisan engagement; or they can be located outside the system itself, such as protests or demonstrations. As I have already discussed in the previous chapter, the early participation studies have focussed exclusively on activities related to the electoral process, such as voting or campaigning. However, already Barnes' and Kaase's (1979) *Political Action* study included a wider range of activities and established the distinction between what they labelled 'conventional' and 'unconventional' forms of participation. Conventional activities, according to Barnes and Kaase, include electoral and party

[17] Compulsory voting can still be considered a voluntary act, as only going to the ballot station is compulsory, while there is no obligation to cast a vote.

[18] This includes activities aimed to influence policy-making, directed at parliaments, policy-makers, government or the state in all policy areas and levels of the political sphere.

engagement, while unconventional forms are those located outside formal politics and include, for example, protests. However, the understanding of 'conventionality' is historically relative, and many of the activities that were considered unconventional are now a normal part of citizens' participation repertoire (cf. Dalton 2008; Inglehart and Catterberg 2003; but see: Caren, Ghoshal & Ribas 2011). Although the different forms of political participation can still be distinguished, their difference can be better understood in terms of *institutionalisation*. 'Conventional' activities, such as party membership, campaign work, voting, or contacting politicians, are themselves formal political institutions and can be better referred to as *institutional* political participation. In contrast, 'unconventional' activities, such as demonstrations, petitions, or boycotts, might be directed at the political system, but they are, themselves, located outside the political system (Barnes and Kaase 1979) – hence the term *non-institutional*[19] participation.

The empirical literature on the dimensionality of political participation is polarised (see for example Kaase 1990; Newton and Montero 2007; Hooghe and Marien 2013; Albacete 2014) and some scholars treat political participation as a unidimensional concept (Vráblíková 2014). However, from a theoretical perspective, the distinction is less controversial. Although both forms serve the same function – that is to influence political decision making – only institutional forms are formally embedded in the political system. The distinction has also proven useful in the empirical analysis, as research suggests that the way citizens participate has changed. Traditional forms of participation are in decline, partially as a result of people's dissatisfaction with and disengagement from the political processes. Petitions or boycotts, in contrast, fit well with emerging 'post-materialist' values and are said to be therefore on the rise in Western democracies (Inglehart 1997; Stolle and Hooghe 2011). As I have already mentioned earlier, the distinction between institutional and non-institutional participation also remains relevant from a gender perspective. Women have been traditionally excluded from formal politics, but not equally from protests, strikes or boycotts. Unsurprisingly, some scholars have found that women are just as or more active than men in non-institutional modes of participation, while a gender gap remains for institutional participation (Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010; Stolle and Hooghe 2011).

For these reasons, women's participation in institutional forms of participation is just as important to understand, and it will be the focus of this study. However, one restriction is made, that is the exclusion of 'voting' from the analyses. Voting is, in many regards, unique. It is restricted to a particular point in time, and the opportunity to

[19] This is not to say that 'non-institutional' modes of participation are not based on a set of norms and shared understanding, just that these norms tend to be less formalised than the rules associated with the electoral process.

participate is created for the citizen, thus requires little initiative. In contrast to other forms of participation, it is also limited to a single act of participation for any given election. Both theoretically and empirically, voting is generally found to be a separate form of participation (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Teorell, Torcal and Montero 2007), and it is therefore not included in the analyses. In sum, this study will explore women's *institutional, non-electoral forms of political participation* in Europe.

Exploring political participation cross-nationally

Having described the main concept, it is important to address its use in cross-national comparative research. In order to be able to compare patterns and levels of participation meaningfully across countries, it needs to be ensured that the concept is comparable across the different contexts. Only if *the same concept* is measured in all countries, can we assume confidently that any country-differences found do not just reflect measurement differences (Van Deth 1986, p. 261). Despite its importance for comparative research, cross-country equivalence of political participation is hardly addressed in the literature[20] and seldom empirically assessed (with some notable exceptions: Albacete 2014; Quaranta 2013; Teorell, Torcal, Montero 2007). This might be due to participation being a behaviour, which is generally considered to be less sensitive to cultural-linguistic differences than, for example, attitudes (Albacete 2014).

Nevertheless, comparability can still be a concern, since political participation depends directly on the larger political context, in particular, opportunity structures. As the most extreme example, all forms of participation have to be equally available to citizens in all countries. Political protest has a different meaning in a political system where it is a normal element of political expression compared to a country, where protesters face legal consequences. Since this study focusses on democracies and institutional forms of participation, availability/legality is not an issue. However, the meaning might still be different across contexts. For example, factors such as prevalence and accessibility, but also the cultural meaning of political parties might vary across political systems. This could be particularly true for the post-communist countries in Eastern Europe, where the historical experience of a single-party-system might continue to influence citizen's perception of political parties. Similarly, (political) organisations and associations are embedded in the social context and can differ in their meaning, acceptance, and role in society (van Deth and Kreuter 2013). Finally, context matters also in terms of institutionalisation: For instance, petitions are formalised in some European countries (e.g. Germany) and are consequently forms of institutional participation (cf. Artikel 45c GG (Germany) – as in: Deutscher Bundestag 2009), whilst

[20] Even van Deth's (2013) otherwise comprehensive classic 'Comparative Politics: The problem of equivalence' does not touch upon the concept of political participation.

they remain outside the formal political system in most other countries. To summarise, cross-national comparability of the concept of political participation should not simply be assumed but should be addressed and assessed.

This study applies a two-fold strategy addressing the cross-national comparability. On the one hand, it aims to minimise the possibility that cross-national differences in meaning arise a priori: A *most-similar-system research design* (cf. Lijphart 1971) has been adopted by focussing only on advanced European democracies. These countries provide a reasonably similar context with regards to their political opportunity structures and cultural backgrounds[21], which should minimise differences in the meaning of political participation. In addition, the cross-national equivalence of the dependent variable will be tested empirically to assess whether and to what extent cross-national differences are present. This allows to account for cross-national differences when interpreting empirical findings.

3.2 The dataset: The European Social Survey

The political participation of women in Europe will be explored using European Social Survey (ESS) data (2010/2011), which will be supplemented by additional country-level data in order to explore context-level effects. Since the contextual data will be discussed in more detail in the subsequent chapters, this section will focus mostly on the description of the ESS dataset. After a brief general overview and explanation of the choice of data, the population and the selected sample will be described, and the data cleaning and weighting procedure will be discussed.

Topic and methodology

The analyses in this study are based on data from the fifth round of the European Social Survey (ESS) (2010/2011). The ESS is an academically driven, longitudinal and cross-national survey, measuring social and political attitudes, beliefs and behaviour across Europe (European Social Survey [ESS] 2016a). It has been chosen primarily for two reasons. Firstly, it contains detailed micro-level data on the two main concepts of interest: respondents' political behaviour and their work and employment. This is particularly true for the fifth round of the ESS, which comprises a rotating module on 'Family, Work and Well-being' with more detailed information about work and family life than other waves of the ESS. It includes information on different modes of (institutional and non-institutional) political participation, established predictors of political participation, such as demographic and socio-economic information, and information about employment

[21] This means in contrast to non-Western or non-democratic countries and should not deny the considerable diversity among the countries with regards to their experience with democracy (Eastern versus Western European countries), as well their religious and cultural traditions.

characteristics; all of these are important for the analyses in this study. It contains more detailed information than other cross-national datasets covering Europe (for example, the *European Value Study* or the *European Quality of Life Survey*). The data are some years old, the targeted fieldwork period for data collection was the last four months in 2010; however, in fact, most of the data were collected in 2011 (ESS 2016b) (see Table A.1 in the Appendix for an overview of the fieldwork periods). While the missing recency of the data does not affect the test of the models in this study, it is worth keeping in mind that the findings reflect the situation some years ago.

Secondly, the ESS data have also been selected, because of its rigorous methodological approach and the distinct data quality. In the ESS, various measures are in place to assure consistently high standards of the data across different countries[22]. In most countries, a stratified, multistage probability sampling approach has been applied, however, in the Scandinavian countries, a simple random sample was drawn. In all countries, the survey is conducted as a face-to-face-interview, either computer-assisted (CAPI) or as a paper-and-pencil interview (PAPI). Different strategies, such as the use of advance letters or incentives were applied in some countries to maximise response rates, leading to response rates ranging from 30.5 per cent in Germany to 81.4 per cent in Bulgaria (ESS 2016b) (see Table A.1 in the Appendix for an overview of sampling strategies). Country differences in sampling design and response rates are made transparent and are also taken into account in the set-up of the survey: rather than attempting an equal number of interviews, the aim is an effective sample size[23] of 1,500 observations in every participating country and a gross sample of over 52,000 respondents. This sample size is sufficient for the analysis of, and inference from subsamples, such as women, which is central to this project's research design.

Population and sample

Countries

The geographical focus of this study is on European democracies, for both theoretical and practical reasons. Most European countries are industrialised democracies, sharing a common history, while they are economically, culturally, and socially closely interconnected. A similar cultural-political background facilitates comparative research, as it maximises the cross-national comparability of key concepts, such as work and political participation. It also helps to isolate the effect of labour market structures and

[22] Detailed information about the item development, pretesting, questionnaire translation, as well as interviewer training, sampling strategies and fieldwork details are available on the ESS website (ESS 2018), and in the ESS5 Documentation Report (ESS 2016a).

[23] The effective sample size takes the so-called 'design effect' ($deff$) of the survey design into account: It refers to the sample size of a simple random sample that produces the same sampling error as the present sampling design (Groves et al. 2009, p.112; Heeringa and O'Muicheartaigh 2010, p.261).

organisation from other contextual effects, as other influential contextual factors, for example, the level of democratisation (c.f. Marien, Hooghe and Quintelier 2010), are held constant. At the same time, European countries are diverse on a number of key characteristics, such as women's involvement in the labour force, the structure of the labour market, and work-family policies, which allows testing for their effects.

The ESS covers a good range of European countries (as well as Israel): The fifth round of the ESS covers 23 of the EU member states, as well as Israel, Norway, Switzerland, the Russian Federation and Ukraine[24]. However, three countries have been excluded from the analyses. At the time of data collection, Russia and Ukraine were not full democracies, defined as being a 'free' country on the Freedom House Index (Freedom House 2011). Political participation in these countries is likely to have a different meaning than in advanced democracies, as I have argued previously.



Figure 3.1: Universe of present European countries and ESS Round 5 countries selected for analyses in this study (dark grey).

Indeed, the level of democratisation has been found to shape institutional political participation (cf. Marien, Hooghe and Quintelier 2010). From a more practical point of view, data on a number of key context characteristics could not be obtained for the two countries. Austria has also been excluded, as Austrian data refer to 2013 and had not been made available at the time of analysis. In total, this leaves 25 European countries in the analyses, as highlighted in Figure 3.1 above.

[24] The full list of countries includes Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and Ukraine.

Individuals

The population of interest in this study is women in Europe. The ESS covers the residential population of the participating countries of the age of 15 years and over. This includes everyone regardless of their nationality, citizenship, legal status or language, but excludes persons outside private households (such as the homeless and the institutional population) (ESS 2016a). The gross sample (including men and women) across all selected countries consists of 47,932 observations, of which the 25,912 women have been selected as the basis of the analysis in this study. From this sample, four cases, for which more than half of the items were coded missing, were deleted. Similarly, the 100 observations with missing values on the dependent variable have been excluded. The number of observations per country varies from 586 in Cyprus to 1520 in Greece, with 1032 observations on average.

Data cleaning, weighting and merging

Data cleaning

Although the data quality is overall good, some cleaning was performed to ensure that the variables included in the analyses are not affected by quality issues. In cases where variables took unrealistic manifestations, these variables were recoded or coded missing. An example is the variable on 'contracted working time'. For a handful of respondents, a contracted working time of more than 72 hours was recoded (which equals 12 hours of work on six days a week). Since European legislation restricts working time to a maximum of 48 hours a week, all values over 72 hours have been regarded as unrealistic and recoded to 72. Overall such cleaning was only done very conservatively. Variables, for which such cleaning can be considered as non-trivial will be discussed in more detail in the sections on operationalisation in the respective analysis chapters.

Additionally, data on the sampling design information necessary for the weighting of the data had to be slightly adjusted. To obtain unbiased point estimates and unbiased variance estimates for *complex survey data*, the sampling design has to be accounted for in the analysis. In order to do so, two different pieces of information are required: the sampling probability of each respondent and details about the survey design, including information on stratification and the Primary Sampling Units[25] (PSU) within each country (Groves et al. 2009; Heeringa 2010). The ESS provides this information in separate data files, which are available from the ESS website[26] and have been merged with the primary

[25] The 'Primary Sampling Unit' refers to the units selected in the first stage of random selection in a multi-stage sampling process.

[26] These additional 'Survey Design Data Files' are publicly available on the ESS website (ESS 2015). However, due to data protection issues, the survey design data for Portugal and Israel are only available upon request.

dataset[27]. However, in order to able to estimate the sampling variance each stratum needs to contain more than one cluster (PSU). Therefore some minor changes to the data on sampling information were made. Following a conventional approach, strata with only one PSU have been collapsed with an adjacent ('similar') stratum, building the sampling error calculation model (Heeringa 2010). In cases, where the documentation of the stratification seems to be problematic in more general terms (for example the UK), strata have been aggregated to a higher level. A more detailed account of all adjustments and an overview of the sampling design can be found in Table A.2 in the Appendix.

Weighting

If data has not been collected using a simple random sample, respondents have different probabilities of being selected into the sample. These different probabilities (as well as different rates of non-response) can be addressed by assigning a different importance to each observation according to their selection probability. This weighting of observations is a common approach in inferential statistics. In terms of the weighting procedure applied in this analysis, I differentiate between descriptive and analytic statistics. Following common practice (cf. Chambers and Skinner 2003), I will always provide weighted estimates for descriptive statistics unless stated otherwise (design-based approach). As the parameters of interest relate to a *finite population* and the sampling design affects the outcome (i.e. is informative), disregarding it would lead to biased estimates (Binder and Roberts 2003, p.30). In the ESS, several weighs are provided: design-weights, accounting for the sampling design, post-stratification weights adjusting for non-response error, and population-size weights, accounting for the different population sizes of countries. The post-stratification weights together with information about each country's sampling design (stratification and PSUs) have been used to set up Stata's *complex survey data* prefix command (svy:). Where descriptive statistics across all countries in the dataset have been used, the data have been additionally weighted by population size weights. The svy: command has been used for the weighting of all descriptive statistics presented.

For inference-based models, scholars disagree on whether design-based or model-based inference should be preferred. I follow the model-based *superpopulation* approach, which assumes that the sampling-design is non-informative for the estimation of parameters in analytical models (conditional on the explanatory variables). In other words, weighting in these models is not necessary. If the model to be estimated was true, this would lead to equally consistent, but more efficient estimates than a design-

[27] The merging was performed matching the main dataset and the sampling information data based on each individuals personal identifier. The five cases for which the matching was not successful have been deleted from the dataset.

based (weighted) model. However, this approach also had to be chosen for more practical reasons: Firstly, weighting had not been implemented for all inference-based models in the statistical software Stata© (version 14) at the time of analysis. Secondly, multi-level models, as used in this study, would require second-level (weights) denoting the selection-probability of the countries in the study. However, the countries have not been selected randomly from a population of countries, and to date, no consensus has established as to how this issue should be addressed. As a consequence, the analytical models have not been weighted, and it should be kept in mind, that this might result in variance estimates to be less robust to misspecification (please see: Binder and Roberts 2003; Heeringa 2010, pp. 54 – 65 for a more in-depth discussion of weighting in inference models).

Merging

The ESS is a micro-level dataset; that means it only contains information about individuals. Although the individuals are nested in different countries, information on country characteristics is not originally included in the dataset. Since the interest in this study is on the effects of a number of contextual characteristics (i.e. characteristics of the country/ labour market), this information need to be inputted into the dataset. The data on country characteristics have been taken from a few different sources, however, for the most part, it is data collected and provided by the Statistical Office of the European Union (Eurostat) or by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) – the exact sources of all context data, as well as the issues of operationalisation and measurement, are discussed in more detail in the chapters in which they are used. The context data have been merged with the ESS dataset using so-called one-to-many ($1{:}m$) matching, matching micro-level and macro-level data on the country identifier of each individual.

3.3 The dependent variable: Political participation index

The central concept of this study is women's (non-electoral) institutional political participation. Although there is a lively scholarly debate about the theoretical definition of the concept, the empirical literature is often externally restricted by the indicators included in existing datasets. This section provides an overview of the measure for political participation used in this study and addresses questions of instrument quality, validity, dimensionality and cross-national equivalence.

Measuring political participation

The European Social Survey includes a number of questions on the respondents' behaviour in the political domain. However, not all of these items are suited as measures

of political participation as defined in Section 3.1 above. After excluding items on political interest (not an activity) or social activities (not directed at political sphere), eight items of political participation remain. These items measure whether or not the respondent has participated in each of the following activities in the last 12 months: *contacting a politician; working in a political party; working in another organisation; wearing a campaign badge; signing a petition; taking part in demonstration, boycotting products* and *voting in the last national election*[28]. Of these, only the first four items measure activities that are located *within* the political system (and are non-electoral) and thus fit my definition of institutional political participation (see Table 3.2 below).

Table 3.2: Indicators of political participation included in the European Social Survey

Institutional participation	Voting	Non-institutional participation
» Contacting a politician/official	» Voting	» Signing a petition[29]
» Working in a party		» Taking part in a legal demonstration
» Working in an organisation		» Boycotting products
» *(Wearing a badge)*		

Whilst the items have been used and tested before (as part of a battery of items in the *Citizen, Involvement, Democracy* project [Thomassen 2001]), they are not ideal measures of participation. Firstly, they are dichotomous, and only provide information about whether (1) or not (0) the respondent has participated in this activity in the last 12 months. This means that neither the volume nor the frequency of participation has been recorded, leaving us with little information about the extent of participation. Secondly, the questions cover a relatively long time-frame of 12 months. This makes them susceptible to inaccurate recalling of the behaviour (memory failure), specifically for activities that only occurred once. Lastly, as with other social and political behaviour, social desirability might affect the responses and lead to overreporting of political activity[30].

[28] See Table A.3 in the Appendix for the exact wording of the items in the questionnaire.

[29] It should be noted that in some countries, such as Germany, and for the EU level, there are institutionalised committees for petitions (cf. Artikel 45c GG (Germany) – as in: Deutscher Bundestag 2009). This would make petition signing an institutionalised activity. However, in most countries included in the analyses, petitions remain non-institutional and analyses have shown that petition signing is strongly associated with unconventional modes of participation (De Rooij 2011). It is therefore included in this category.

[30] Over-reporting is well documented for electoral participation, where results from survey data consistently overestimate the actual election turnout (Burden 2000), but it might equally occur for other forms of participation. Over-reporting is not problematic by itself, but it can affect findings if it is correlated with other characteristics of the respondent, such as their socio-economic status.

In addition, the items cover modes of participation that differ substantively, both regarding their nature and their intensity. However, this study is less interested in the individual modes as such but focusses on the underlying concept of political participation. In line with the lion's share of the empirical literature, I understand political participation as a latent construct, and I regard the specific modes as manifestations of this construct (cf. Albacete 2014; also: van Deth 2014, p.351). Therefore, I combine the items into a single measure of political participation, rather than analysing the modes independently. For this purpose, the item about wearing a badge had to be excluded – primarily because it causes problems with dimensionality and cross-national comparability, as will be discussed in more detail below[31] – leaving three modes of participation: contacting a politician, being active in a party, and being active in an organisation.

These three modes have been combined into a single binary measure, capturing whether (1) or not (0) the respondent has taken part in *any* of the modes of participation, irrespectively of the number of different modes she might have been active in. The items were summarised into a binary measure (and not an additive index) since this reflects the interest of this study on (any form of) political participation in contrast to political apathy, independent of the form this participation takes. Since the items do not provide information about the frequency or volume of participation, a cumulative scale would measure the number of different modes the respondent has participated in, or the participation *repertoire*, but it would not provide any information about the *extent* of engagement. As most citizens tend to 'specialise' in only a few activities and "do not accumulate different forms of political activity as they become more involved" (Newton and Montero 2007, p.206), a cumulative scale would measure something different than required.

However, a major drawback of a binary measure is that treats all modes of participation equivalent when they are clearly distinct. For instance, the variable takes the same value for someone who has contacted a politician once and for someone who is frequently active in a political party, despite the vast difference in the intensity and effort required. Furthermore, the internal consistency of the items is very low with a Cronbach's alpha[32] value of .47. However, this might be precisely an expression of the tendency to specialise in one or a few activities, as Cronbach's alpha measures the average inter-relatedness of the items (Sijtsma 2009). The dimensionality of political

[31] The covers the least 'active' of the activities and might arguably play a less prominent role in Europe, than in the American context, for which this item has been developed.

[32] The value of Cronbach's alpha should be interpreted with caution: Firstly, alpha depends on the number of items and is by implication lower for an index of only three items. More importantly, despite the widespread use as a measure of 'reliability', research has questioned its value to assess the 'unidimensionality' or internal structure of a group of items (Sijtsma 2009).

participation (specifically the distinction between institutional and non-institutional participation) will be addressed in more detail below and suggests that the items used here, fall, in fact, onto a single dimension.

A binary measure also avoids problems of unbalanced data that would arise if modes were analysed separately, most notably for the mode of 'party engagement', in which only a small minority of women (2.4%) have been active. While this should not be a problem in the pooled dataset, it could cause estimation problems for logistic models in country-specific analyses. Combining the three activities circumvents this problem: As the summary of the variable in Table 3.3 below shows, almost 20 per cent of women have participated in some form of institutional political participation.

The most important reason for using a binary measure remains, however, the research interest of this study. Ultimately, I hope to shed more light on the effects of work and employment on women's decisions to be politically active *at all*, which is irrespective of the mode or extent of political participation. This can best be achieved using a binary measure of participation.

Table 3.3: Index of institutional political participation

Variable	Modes included	Values	Distribution
Institutional Participation	» Contacting politician » Working in party » Working in organisation	0 - no participation 1 - participation	0 – 80.3 % (0.003) 1 – 19.7 % (0.003)

Source: ESS (2010a).
Note. Distribution in valid per cent (weighted data); linearised standard errors in parentheses.

Assessing (uni-)dimensionality

So far, I have explained the rationale for constructing a binary index of institutional political participation, however, without justifying the selection of indicators. Selecting items on theoretical grounds raises the question of whether the selection is supported by the data. This section aims to address this question. Specifically, examines if the theoretically derived distinction between non-institutional and institutional participation can also be found in the data, and, more importantly, whether the three selected items measure, in fact, a single, unidimensional concept.

Due to the binary nature of the items, standard Factor Analysis or reliance on Cronbach's Alpha to assess the dimensionality are, at best, problematic (van Schuur 2003; Bartholowmew et al. 2008). I have therefore conducted a *Principle Component Analysis (PCA)* based on the tetrachoric inter-item correlation of the items. A method called *Mokken Scale Analysis* (MSA), that specifically addresses the dimensionality of a set of binary items, will be used to validate the findings. MSA is a nonparametric scaling

method for binary variables based on principles of Item Response Theory. It provides several advantages over alternative scaling methods such as Guttmann scaling, as it is probabilistic rather than deterministic while it works well for a small set of items (van Schuur 2003). MSA can be to assess the unidimensional 'scalability' of a set of selected items, thus to assess the 'goodness' of the binary index[33].

The results of the PCA (rotated) on the seven binary (non-electoral) participation items are shown in Table 3.4 below. The analysis extracts two principal components, clearly differentiating between institutional and non-institutional activities. In other words, it supports the two-dimensional structure suggested by the theory. However, the analyses also show that the item 'badge' sits uneasily between the two forms of participation, loading moderately on both factors. As the analyses below will show, its association with both sets of items varies across countries – the item has, therefore, been excluded from the index.

Table 3.4: Principal Component Analysis of the political participation items

Political participation items	Factor loadings	Factor loadings
Party		0.881
Organisation		0.668
Contact		0.908
Badge	0.480	0.425
Petition	0.823	
Demonstration	0.803	
Boycott	0.860	

Source: ESS (2010a).

Note. Extraction method: principle component factor, Promax rotation; Factor loadings based on unweighted[34] tetrachoric inter-item correlations. Factor loadings < 0.3 not shown. Overall Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure: 0.854.

The PCA has supported the notion that all institutional participation items (with the exception of 'badge') load onto a single factor. In order to confirm the unidimensionality of the three institutional participation items (party, organisation, contact), a confirmatory Mokken Scale Analysis has been performed. Since MSA assumes strictly monotone hierarchical ordering of the items (according to item difficulty), as well as unidimensionality, the scalability coefficient ($Loevinger's\ H$) is conservative for this purpose. Nevertheless, it attests the items 'medium' scalability properties ($H = 0.41$), which indicates that they can, indeed, be combined into a unidimensional scale.

[33] Similar to Guttman Scaling, the Mokken Scale procedure produces *hierarchical* unidimensional scales, in which the items are ordered according to item difficulty. Since the interest here is not on producing such a scale, but merely on assessing the dimensionality, ordering of the items has been ignored. $Loevinger's\ H$ should, however, be interpreted with caution, since it is based on the assumption of double-monotony of the items (Roskam, Van den Wollenberg and Jansen 1986).

[34] Weights are not supported for Stata's `tetrachoric` command.

Overall, the data confirm the theoretical assumptions, both in terms of the unidimensionality of the index and with regards to the distinction between institutional and non-institutional participation. However, these analyses have only assessed the use of the dependent variable overall, that is in the pooled dataset. The next subsection tests whether the variable works equally well across all countries.

Testing cross-national comparability

For a meaningful comparison of political participation across all countries in the dataset, it is important that the dependent variable measures the same concept in all contexts. I have already briefly touched on the topic of cross-national comparison in section 3.1 above. Here, I assess it empirically. Following the approach of Teorell, Torcal and Montero (2007), I compare the dimensional pattern of political participation across the countries, as a similar dimensional pattern should indicate the equivalence of the measure. Since there are practical problems using a tetrachoric correlation matrix in some of the countries, the approach differs slightly from the strategy used for the pooled dataset. Instead of conducting a Principle Component Analysis, I mostly rely on a Cluster Analysis[35] of the items to assess their dimensionality[36]. Given the diversity of countries included, it might be not surprising that results are overall mixed. The cluster analysis supports the assumed two-dimensional structure, differentiating between conventional and unconventional items, in around two-thirds of the countries (16 of 25) (see Table A.4 in the Appendix for an overview of all findings). In other words, the same patterns can be observed in most countries, suggesting that the items measure similar concepts indeed. However, as was already evident from the pooled data, the classification of the item 'badge' is problematic since it is associated with non-institutional forms of participation in around half of these cases.

Again, an MSA has been run, both in an exploratory and confirmatory way, to validate the results of the cluster analysis. When used in an exploratory manner, MSA selects items from a set of items into a number of unidimensional scales that fulfil certain conditions about the scalability of the scale as a whole (H), as well as the scalability of each combination of items i and j within the scale (H_{ij}). Here, a single scale is suggested for most of the countries, when $H > 0.3$ and each $H_{ij} > 0$. Although this seems to challenge the distinction between non-institutional and institutional participation[37], I also find that the three items are placed together in one scale in 17 of the 25 countries.

[35] Based on the inverse of tetrachoric correlations as measure of dissimilarity and Ward's linkage as linkage method.

[36] In those countries, to which both methods could be applied, the results are overall very similar.

[37] Expectedly, 'stricter' requirements, specifically higher thresholds for H_{ij}, lead to the single scale being split into multiple scales in most countries, however, not in all cases along the line of institutionalisation.

Accordingly, the confirmatory analysis suggests that the three-item scale works well in 16 countries, with 'medium' or better scalability. However, in five countries (Czech Republic, Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia, Slovenia), the scalability is considered 'weak' and in Belgium, Croatia, Denmark and France, the items do not reach the minimum coefficient of $H > 0.3$. However, as discussed earlier, $Loevinger's\ H$ should be here interpreted with caution, as it assumes double-monocity of the items, and will therefore be conservative.

Looking at the results of all methods combined, it is found that the three items are grouped by at least one of the methods in 21 of the countries. Only Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Slovenia show patterns that are not consistent with the remaining countries. These are also countries, in which the confirmatory MSA has attested weak or no scalability of the items. This observation is potentially problematic, as it indicates the items might not measure the same concept in these countries and, perhaps, that the distinction between non-institutional and intuitional forms of participation does not equally apply. There is then the possibility that country differences reflect the difference in meaning, rather than 'real' differences. Although I acknowledge this lack of equivalence, for practical purposes and given the strong theoretical rationale, the index will be used nevertheless. However, where required, I will take these findings into account when interpreting country differences.

3.4 The model: Political participation in a multi-level structure

This study is not only comparative in nature, but it is characterised by its hierarchical structure: The core interest is on the influence the context (country) on the political participation of individual women (individuals). The modelling strategy to be employed has to accommodate this structure and allow the estimation of contextual effects. This section provides more detail about logistic multilevel analysis, the main analytical method used and describes the general modelling strategy of the empirical chapters. The last part of this section then provides a brief overview of the individual-level control variables included in the models.

Multilevel analysis

The primary analytical method used in this study is *logistic multilevel analysis (MLA).* Multilevel analysis is used, as this is the only method that can accommodate the hierarchical nature of the project, both in terms of the research question and the type of data used. Firstly, a two-stage sampling approach of individuals (level-1/ individual level) within countries (level-2/ context level), as applied for the ESS data, leads to dependent observations on the individual level. In a nutshell, this means that two observations from

individuals of the same country tend to be 'more similar' than observations from different countries. Therefore, their error terms (ε_{ij}) are correlated, violating the assumption of independent error terms in a normal regression model. In the analysis, this can deflate standard errors and can then lead to biased significance tests and, consequently, misleading, or erroneous conclusions, if not treated adequately (Snijders and Bosker 2012). The multilevel analysis accounts for nested observations and at the same time, it is more practical and parsimonious than alternative approaches, such as fitting separate single-level regression models for each country involved.

Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it is a core aim of this study to explicitly test the effect of contextual characteristics and the context-dependence of individual-level predictors. These questions can only be addressed in a multilevel analysis (Bartholomew et al. 2008). Multilevel models allow estimating the influence of individual- and country-level factors simultaneously, while also providing measures of the explained variance on both levels. Thus, they allow assessing how much of the variation is due to differences between countries.

However, the data used are not ideal for a multilevel analysis. While there is no universal agreement on the number of context-level units required for the estimation of multilevel models, the 25 countries included in the ESS are clearly at the lower bound of acceptability, particularly when using maximum-likelihood estimation (c.f. Stegmueller 2013). This might affect the reliability of context-level coefficients and confidence intervals, and is particularly relevant in the more complex models, specifically those containing cross-level interactions (Bryan and Jenkins 2016). What is more, the selection of countries is not random, so that, technically speaking, the inference to a wider population of countries is not possible. Consequently, the significance tests of the context-level coefficients are, at best, problematic (Langer 2010). However, while I acknowledge these problems, the use of multilevel models based on cross-national survey data is increasingly a standard approach in comparative political research. And for a lack of feasible alternative modelling approaches or data[38], I have decided to proceed with the modelling, while being aware of the limitations.

Since the aim is to model a binary outcome (no political participation [0] versus political participation [1]) a *logistic* multilevel model is required. Logit (and probit) models are so-called 'generalised linear models'. These models accommodate the error structure associated with the binary nature of the predicted variable by using a link function that transforms the variable. Instead of the outcome (which is binary), the logistic

[38] While there are datasets with a higher number of European countries (for example the European Value Survey), these are inferior in terms of data quality or do not include the concepts of interest.

model predicts the logarithm (log) of the odds of the outcome ($\frac{\pi}{1-\pi}$); where π is the probability that $y = 1$. The multilevel version of the logistic model additionally contains an error-term for the second level of analysis (u_0) and can include individual level variables (x), as well as context-level predictors (z). Thus, it takes the following form:

$$log\left(\frac{\pi_{ij}}{1-\pi_{ij}}\right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{1ij} + \beta_2 x_{2ij} + \ldots + \beta_n x_{nij} + \gamma_1 z_{1j} + \cdots + \gamma_m z_{mj} + u_{0j} + u_{2j} x_{2j}$$ [39].

A disadvantage of logistic models is that the interpretation of the coefficients can be difficult. However, by exponentiating the log-odds, the odds-ratios are obtained, which are easier to interpret. The odds-ratios show the multiplicative effect on the dependent variable for each one-unit increase in the independent variable. As the effect is multiplicative rather than additive, odds-ratios larger than 1 show a positive effect, while those smaller than 1 indicate a negative effect.

In addition to the simple effects of individual-level and context-level variables, the model can also accommodate interaction effects. Technically, these are effects of combinations of variables (usually a product of two variables), which can be used to assess whether the effect of one variable depends on the values of another. While the interpretation of this effect is the same as the interpretation of main effects, it should be noted that the inclusion of an interaction changes the interpretation of the main effects of the variables x_1 and x_2: The coefficient of the main effect of x_1 then shows the effect of the variable when $x_2 = 0$, and the coefficient of the main effect of x_2 shows the effect of z when $x_1 = 0$. '0' should therefore have an interpretable meaning for both variables (Snijders and Bosker 2012). Interaction terms can be between variables on the same level or variables on different levels. Interactions between variables on different levels, so called cross-level interactions, can be used to test whether individual-level effects (for instance the effect of employment) are shaped by characteristics of the context (for example female employment rates.

In logistic multi-level models, the variance can be estimated for all levels of analysis separately and jointly. On the lowest (the individual-) level, the variance is by definition $\frac{\pi^2}{3} = 3.29$, on higher levels it is estimated from the data. This information can be used to calculate the share of variation in political participation attributed to differences on the higher (country-) level, the Intraclass-Correlation Coefficient (ICC)

[39] Where π_{ij} denotes the probability that $y = 1$, j is the index for the countries and i is the index for the individuals within the countries. Accordingly, the β stand for the coefficients of individual-level variables, while the γ stand for the coefficients of the country-level variables. ß$_0$ is the overall mean; u_j denotes the random intercept of country j; $u_{2j}x_{2j}$ stands for the random effect of variable x_2.

(sometimes also called the Variance Partition Coefficient [VPC])[40]. A comparison of the ICC of any model with the ICC of the empty model allows to determine how well a model can explain differences between countries. The variance can also be used to assess the overall model fit. Following an approach suggested by Snijders and Bosker (2012), a pseudo-R^2 can be calculated using the variance of the linear predictor of a model (the 'explained variance') and the total variance[41]. Finally, for each model, the log-likelihood value is given. Whilst the value is not meaningful in itself, it can be useful for the comparison of models, where a smaller value indicates a better model fit, and it can also be used for formal tests, such as the likelihood-ratio test.

Modelling strategy

All models in this study will be estimated in the statistical software package Stata®, using the `xtmelogit` command for mixed-effect models. `xtmelogit` employs maximum-likelihood estimation (with adaptive quadrature), and I have retained the default setting of seven integration points. The modelling begins (in the last section of this chapter) with a model with a random intercept but no covariates (the 'empty' model), which is used to estimate the share of variance attributed to both levels of analysis. The empty model is a necessary step to assess whether a multi-level model is required: Only if countries vary substantially in the mean levels of women's political participation, does it make sense to fit a multilevel model instead of a simpler logistic regression.

In the second step, a model with individual-level covariates measuring the effect of the 'classic' work-related predictors such as employment status, job level and working hours will be fitted. In the first iteration, this will be a random-intercept model, in which the intercepts (i.e. the mean levels of participation) are allowed to vary across countries, but the coefficients (effects) are held constant for all context units (fixed effects). Subsequently, the coefficients of some of the variables are also allowed to vary across countries (random-slope model). If a likelihood-ratio test shows that the random-effects-model is a significantly better fit to the data than the corresponding fixed-effects-model, this shows the context-dependency of the effect. For example, I might find employment status to have a stronger effect in some countries than in others, which would suggest that the link between employment and political participation is shaped by the context (either the labour market or the political sphere) in which it is situated (Chapter 4 and 5).

If a random effect is found, cross-level interactions can be included in the next step in order to examine whether work-family-policies can explain the variation in the

[40] However, the comparatively small number of context-units in the analyses can lead to bias the estimation of the variance component parameters – ICC and pseudo-R^2 should therefore interpreted with caution (Bryan and Jenkins 2016).

[41] It should be kept in mind, that the pseudo-R^2 is more conservative than R^2 in OLS regression.

individual-level effects. In order to test their role, the context-level characteristics are included in the model, and their main effect, as well as interactions with individual-level effects, can be estimated. Since these policies might also play an indirect role, that is by affecting the *levels* of the individual-level predictors, such as employment, working-time and job level, I will also present models with work-family policies as predictors and these employment characteristics as outcome variables (Chapter 6). Finally, the last analytical chapter (Chapter 7) focusses on the direct effects of the context, specifically of the gendered structures within the labour market. In other words, this chapter will test models with individual-level and context effects. The exact modelling strategy, as well as the sample used in each model, will be described in more detail in each of the empirical chapters.

Control variables

All models include a set of common individual-level predictors of political participation as control variables, which I will briefly describe here,

Age is one of the best-established predictors of political participation (Nie, Verba and Kim 1974) and is included as a continuous variable measuring the age of the respondent at the time of the interview. Similarly, *level of education* is a standard predictor of political activity and one of the core elements of the Civic Voluntarism Model. Higher levels of education are associated with civic skills, thus, they lower the cost of participation (Verba and Nie 1972). Here, I include the level of education as a dummy variable, which is created from the ESS variable based on ISCED 2011 levels of education. It captures whether or not the respondent has at least degree-level education (ISCED 2011 levels 6, 7 or 8). While a dummy variable for education might appear crude, it is advantageous in terms of cross-national comparability, and it helps to keep the model parsimonious.

Marital status is also commonly included in models of political participation. However, due to missing data on the marital status variable for Finish respondents, a dummy variable on *cohabiting* has been included as a substitute. Perhaps the strongest and the best-corroborated indicator of political participation is *political interest.* In the ESS, it is measured as an ordinal variable, which has been recoded to take three values: 0 for those who are 'not at all or hardly interested in politics', 1 for those who are 'quite interested' and 2 for those who are 'very interested in politics'. It measures the part of the Civic Voluntarism Model, that has been described as political motivations. The second aspect of the model, social networks, is also included as the respondent's frequency of social activity. Again, this is a binary measure. The categories of the original ESS variable have been combined, so that the new variable just captures whether the respondent meets socially with friends at least once a week (1) or less (2).

Finally, all models control for the *gender role attitude* of the respondent. Since both, the labour market participation and political activity are likely to be influenced by a woman's understanding of her role in society; this is an important control. The variable has been created as an additive scale (recoded to range from 0 to 8, where higher values indicate a more progressive attitude) of two attitudinal items measuring a respondent's agreement to statements on women's inclusion in the labour market. The variables have been designed to measure the concept of 'Gender Traditionalism/ Gender ideology' (ESS p.27) and are highly correlated ($r = 0.43, p < 0.001$).

An overview of the individual-level control variables is shown in Table 3.5 below, the wording of the items in the ESS questionnaire can be found in Table A.5 in the Appendix.

Table 3.5: Description and distribution of control variables on the individual-level

Variable	Description	Range/ Distribution	
Age	Age of the respondent at the time of the interview in years	Min: 15; Max: 101;	Mean: 47.4 SD: 19.0
Education	Highest level of education of the respondent at least degree-level (binary)	0 (degree): 1 (no degree):	83.0% 17.0%
Partner	Respondent's cohabiting status (binary)	0 (partner): 1 (no partner):	41.7% 58.3%
Political interest	Self-ascribed political interest in three categories	0 (not/ hardly interested): 1 (quite interested): 2 (very interested):	61.0% 31.0% 8.0%
Social activity	Frequency of social interaction at least once a week (binary)	0 (< once a week): 1 (at least once a week):	36.9% 63.1%
Gender role attitude	Respondent's attitude towards women's place in the public sphere (scale)	Min: 0; Max: 8;	Mean: 4.6; SD: 2.0

3.5 Political participation of women in Europe

Having addressed how political participation is measured and modelled in this study, this section aims to provide an overview of the overall patterns of political participation of women in Europe. It begins by showing general levels of activity (across all groups of women and all countries), while the next subsection focusses on a comparison across different groups of women. Finally, the geographical variation across countries will be the focus of the last subsection.

Overall patterns of participation

Not considering voting, institutional political participation is not very popular with European women. As Table 3.6 below shows, less than a fifth (19.7 per cent) of the women in ESS countries have taken part in any form of institutional participation in the last 12 months. If broken down by mode, it becomes evident that different modes vary considerably in popularity: Only 2.3 per cent of all women have been active in a political

party, while about 10 per cent have contacted a politician. The most popular form of participation is organisational activity: about 12.5 per cent of women have been active in a political organisation.

Table 3.6: Women's participation in institutional political participation, overall and by mode of participation

Mode of participation	Not participated (%)	Participated (%)	Missings
Institutional participation (any)	80.3	19.7	94
Party activity	97.6	2.4	70
Organisational activity	87.5	12.5	83
Contacting a politician	89.3	10.7	73

Source: ESS (2010a).
Note: Percentage of women who have participated in each mode. Data weighted to account for complex survey design and non-response and to adjust for different population sizes of countries. Data on missing observations is not weighted.

The popularity of organisational engagement might be simply the result of insufficient prompting in the questionnaire, which leaves the definition of 'organisation' or 'association' up to the respondent. Consequently, respondents might include what can be considered 'civic' rather than just 'political' organisations[42]. However, it is also evident that the popularity of a mode also depends on its framing as a *political* action. Party engagement, at the heart of the political sphere, is at the same time the activity the least women have participated in. Organisational engagement, on the other hand, is less clearly political and also the most popular mode of participation. In a nutshell, this indicates that the more strongly an act is embedded in the political system, the fewer women participate in it[43].

The overlap of engagement in different modes of participation also shows interesting results. Women who participate in one mode, are not necessarily active in another one. I have argued earlier, that political participation is at least a two-dimensional concept, which implies that women who are active in one mode of institutional participation should be more likely to participate in another institutional mode, rather than any form of non-institutional participation. At the same time, scholars have suggested that citizen 'specialise' in one or a few modes of participation. Already Verba and Nie (1972) have observed that "citizens tend to concentrate their activity by mode" (p. 59). Thus, while institutional modes should be associated, this association might not

[42] The distinction between 'civic' and 'political' participation can be made on the basis of whether the engagement in the organisation in direct at the political sphere in or civil society.

[43] This argument can be extended to other forms of political participation in so far as non-institutional forms of participation appear to be, overall, more popular than institutional participation. A substantive share of the literature argues that citizens are becoming alienated from political processes and elites, and norms have shifted for citizens to prefer more 'expressive' and issue-oriented forms of participation (e.g. Inglehart 1997).

necessarily be strong. Indeed, the Phi-values show moderate, but significant, associations between all three combinations of modes (ranging from $r_\varphi = 0.24$ for partisan and organisational engagement to $r_\varphi = 0.26$ for organisations and contacting)[44].

A closer look at women's political participation *repertoire* indicates that women tend to specialise. Figure 3.2 shows that of those women who are politically active, the vast majority (75.1 per cent) have only participated in a single mode. Around a fifth of the active women have participated in two modes, while those, who have been active in all three modes, make up only 5.1 per cent of all active women. In short, I find that for most women, the participation repertoire is limited to only one or two modes of institutional participation.



Figure 3.2: Political participation repertoire of all women and political active women.

Participation by employment status and family situation

The previous subsection has looked at women as if they were a single, homogenous group, disregarding the fact that women are themselves characterised by diversity. This subsection explores the bivariate relationship between political participation and employment status and family situation. It aims to give a first impression of the relationship between domestic work and political participation, and employment and political activity to frame the multivariate analyses in the empirical chapters.

Family situation

Women's domestic situation, and specifically the responsibility for house- and care work have been linked to political participation in the existing literature (e.g. Welch 1977); and will be the focus of Chapter 5 and 6. Two factors have been specifically the focus of existing empirical research: being in a partnership and having children.

[44] $r_\varphi = 0.25$ for party engagement and contacting politicians.

The relationship between cohabiting[45] and political participation is illustrated in Figure 3.3 below. The effect of a partner is small, but straightforward. Women living with a partner are three percentage points more likely to participate politically than those who do not live with a partner. A look at the association between women's political participation and the presence of children in the household on the left hand side reveals that women with school-aged children seem to be the most active: the participation rate is 3.9 percentage points ($p = 0.001$) higher than that of childless women, and 3.3 percentage points ($p = 0.021$) higher than for women with preschool children. Since the figure does not control for age, the percentages also reflect different age-distributions across the groups.

The group of childless women is disproportionally made up of young and old women[46], who tend to be less politically active, while women with school-aged children fall into the age-range of the most active women[47]. However, at the same time, the results corroborate existing research that has found that having school-aged children mobilises women to participate more (Voorpostel and Coffé 2012). A closer look at the interaction of both variables reveals that the effect of having children in the household does also depend on whether a partner is present. Perhaps unsurprisingly, single mothers have overall lower political participation rates than their counterparts with a partner. This is specifically true for single mothers with preschool children, who have the lowest participation rate of all women with just over 13 per cent (see Figure 3.4 below)[48].



Note. Different letters across the categories of one variable denote that the political participation rates of these groups are statistically significantly different (at $p < 0.05$).

Figure 3.3: Political participation rate in 25 European countries by partnership status and age of children present in household.

[45] Here, cohabiting instead of marital status has been chosen, since data on marital status are missing for Finland.

[46] 'Childless' refers here and in the following to women in households with no children under the age of 18 and does therefore include women with adult children.

[47] While respondent's age and the presence and age of children are associated, the descriptive analyses here cannot answer the question which of the two factors is decisive. It could equally be the case that the effect of age is driven by the presence of children.

[48] However, only three per cent of the women in the sample belong to this group.

For childless women, having a partner does not make a statistically significant difference (1.3 pp, $p = 0.22$). At the same time, single mothers of school-age children are not more politically active than childless single women (0.6 pp, $p = 0.74$). This might, again, be an age effect: In comparison to mothers of school-age children who live with a partner, single mothers of school-age children are on average much younger (30.3 years compared to 43.4 years). Alternatively, the effect might show a genuine interaction of having a partner and school-aged children. Having school-aged children might only be mobilising within a certain domestic context, i.e. when the burden of child rearing can be split between partners. Although it will be up to the multivariate analyses in the following chapters to explore the nature of this effect further, the numbers here already indicate that family situation plays a role for women's political activity.



Figure 3.4: Political participation rate in 25 European countries by the combination of partnership status and age of children present in household.

Employment status

Finally, the interest is on the variation across different main activities of women. This study's overall goal is to explore the effects of work and employment on women's political participation – and comparing participation rates across employment statuses can provide a first impression of that relationship.

Figure 3.5 below shows that women in paid employment are indeed the most politically active, as 23.3 per cent of employed women have participated in the previous year. Women in education follow with around 19 per cent, whereas those outside the labour force (unemployed, inactive or retired) have lower participation rates of around 15-16 per cent. Whilst the differences between the remaining main activities are not statistically significant, the participation rate of those in paid work is statistically significantly higher

than that of any other of the categories[49]. Thus, being in paid work is associated with a higher probability of political participation. However, again, the figure does not control for other (confounding) characteristics, and women in the workforce are likely to differ systematically from, for instance, homemakers, in many of the characteristics associated with political participation. In other words, we do not know whether the 'effect' of employment found here is causal or merely the expression of a spurious relationship. The bivariate analyses also cannot tell us, whether the finding holds for different types of work and whether it is the same in all countries and consistent for all groups of women. These questions will be explored in the next chapter, but the results presented here already provide evidence that a further investigation of the effects of employment is justified and necessary.

To summarise, the bivariate analyses in this subsection have provided a first overview of the variation of political participation across subgroups, but the multivariate analyses in the following chapters will go more into detail and provide an understanding of the mechanism driving these differences. However, before turning to the analytical models, the next subsection describes the geographical variation in political participation.



Note. Different letters denote that the political participation rates of these groups are statistically significantly different (at $p < 0.05$).

Figure 3.5: Political participation rate in 25 European countries by the main activity.

Cross-national variation

Finally, the focus is again on all women, however, with an interest in the differences across countries. Whilst much of the earlier research on women's political participation, and specifically on the effects of employment, has focussed on the US context (e.g.

[49] This is not true for the 'other' category, which has a similarly high participation rate (Difference: 0.6 pp, $p = 0.81$). The category 'other' includes women who are permanently sick or disabled, women doing community or military service and those, who have selected 'other'. This category makes up 3.8 per cent of the sample.

Andersen 1975; McDonagh 1982; Beckwith 1986; Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001), more recent cross-national research has shown that the geographical variation of women's political participation and of the gender gap is an intriguing phenomenon in itself (Beauregard 2014). Indeed, the core assumption of this study is that the wider context in which work and participation are embedded, can have an effect on women's political participation. This suggests that women's participation levels vary across countries.

If we turn to Figure 3.6 below, we find, indeed, evidence for strong cross-national variation in women's participation: Participation rates range from just over 5 per cent in Bulgaria to almost 45 per cent in Finland. In other words, while in Finland almost every second woman was politically active in the previous 12 months, in Bulgaria, only one in every twenty women has participated in the political process. The United Kingdom, with a participation rate of 16 per cent, is situated in the middle of the distribution.



Figure 3.6: Women's political participation rates (with 95%-confidence intervals) by country in descending order.

The distribution shows an unequivocal geographical pattern: The Nordic countries are clustered at the top end, while Eastern and Southern European countries show overall low rates of participation. This is hardly surprising from either a political participation or a gender equality perspective, which tend to find that Nordic countries are generally politically active, but also have progressive gender norms in society at large and the political sphere specifically. However, the graph cannot show whether the variation is attributed to differences in the distribution of individual-level variables. Women in Finland might participate more than women in Bulgaria not because they live in Finland, but simply because they are, for instance, more highly educated, more interested in politics or more likely to be employed. If that was the case, it would be to no avail to further explore the influence of the context and the labour market specifically, and the focus should be on individual-level explanations only.

One way of exploring the influence of the context is to estimate the proportion of the variance that can be attributed to differences between context-level units (countries). A so-called 'empty' multi-level model is used to estimate the variance on both levels of analysis, which is then used to calculate the *Intra-Class Correlation Coefficient* (ICC) (also: Variance Partition Coefficient [VPC]), that is the share of the total variance due to differences in countries. As Table 3.7 below shows, almost 13 per cent of the variance is attributed to the contextual level or, in other words, cannot be attributed to differences in individual-level characteristics only. This is an important finding in two regards. Firstly, it provides evidence for the necessity of a multi-level modelling approach (in contrast to simple logistic regression models), as it shows that the context is informative and therefore, the assumption of independence of error terms is violated[50]. Secondly, I find support for the core assumption of this study, that context characteristics do play a role in women's political participation and should be explored further. This is what the following chapters will attempt to achieve.

Table 3.7: Partition of the variance by analytical level

Analytical level	Variance (SE)	Proportion of total variance
Individual-level	3.290[a]	87.3%
Country-level	0.478 (0.138)	12.7%

[a]In logistic models, the variance of the lowest level is set to $\frac{\pi^2}{3} = 3.29$

[50] The ICC is not only a measure of the proportion of the variance attributed to the higher level, but equally of the similarity of individuals within each country. Since women in the same country tend to more similar to each other, their error terms are correlated, which leads to an underestimation of standard errors, if not accounted for.

3.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have described the methodological framework of this thesis. The chapter has begun with an introduction and discussion of the core concept this study addresses, political participation, and its definition in political research. I have justified the focus on institutional forms of participation by arguing that, in contrast to newer forms of activity, institutional participation has received less attention in the recent literature, while it is very relevant to women's political voice and for tackling issues of persisting underrepresentation of women in the political sphere.

The next two sections have focused on the dataset used, as well as the dependent variable measuring women's political participation. An assessment of the dimensionality of all political participation variables in the dataset has provided support for the decision to analyse institutional forms of political participation separately. However, problems with the cross-national were identified. A cluster analysis has indicated that the concept might have a different meaning (or is not measured equally well) in some of the countries. Although the variable can still be justified on theoretical grounds, the lack of equivalence remains a concern should be kept in mind in the analyses in the following chapters.

Subsequently, I have described and justified the main modelling method used in this thesis. The hierarchical nature of both, the research question and data used, require a multilevel analysis. However, in this context, the number of context-level units (countries) in the dataset has been problematised, as the small number of countries might have a downwards-biased estimation of confidence intervals as consequence. I have pointed out that, perhaps equally importantly, the selection of countries is not at random, implying that inference to a wider population of countries is not possible and consequently, any findings might not hold for other regions of the world. I have then described the general modelling strategy and given a brief overview of the control variables included in all models.

The final section has explored women's political participation empirically and provided a general overview of participation levels and patterns. The findings have indicated that a multivariate analysis is required in order to disentangle effects of different individual-level characteristics. Also, substantial differences across countries have been found, suggesting that the context might play indeed be meaningful. Finally, an empty multi-level model has confirmed that impression. It has suggested that differences characteristics of the individuals cannot explain differences in participation levels entirely: More than 12% of the variance is attributed to differences between the countries, confirming the need for a multilevel model, and again, suggesting that the context plays an important role.

The following chapters will explore that role of the context in more detail, specifically the importance of the labour market. I will focus on the effects of individual-level employment, and the context-dependency of individual-level effects in the next chapter (Chapter 4), and for the group of mothers, again in Chapter 5. The final two empirical chapters (Chapter 6 and 7), then examine the role of the labour market.

4 EMPLOYMENT, JOB CHARACTERISTICS AND WOMEN'S POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Being in gainful employment makes a notable difference to one's life: it determines how time is spent and how much free time one has, it affects social networks, and it impacts on skills and economic resources. For women, it is said to be (economically) empowering and a key factor of independence from the family. Unsurprisingly given this importance, employment has also been linked to political participation, both, in general and also specifically for women (Andersen 1975; Welch 1977; McDonagh 1982; Togeby 1994; Schlozman, Burns and Verba 1994, 1999; Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001; Schur 2003; Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010). However, despite the fact that the positive effect of employment on women's political participation can almost be considered conventional wisdom, a closer look at the literature reveals that the picture on the effects of employment and different work characteristics is surprisingly patchy. 'Employment' is often included in analyses as a standard 'control variable', yet, there is (to my knowledge) no recent, systematic account of the effects of employment and job characteristics on the individual-level political participation of women in Europe[51].

Much of the most important or most frequently cited empirical evidence on employment effects is based on single-country-studies, predominantly the US context (e.g. Andersen 1975; Beckwith 1986; Schlozman, Burns and Verba 1994, 1999; Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001; but see: Adman 2011 for the Swedish case). It is widely assumed that those findings equally hold in other country contexts. However, this approach disregards the fact that, at the very least, levels of female employment and work characteristics vary by country. It is also reasonable to expect the *effects* of employment to be dependent on the different country-level contexts; specifically, characteristics of the labour market or the political sphere might play a decisive role. For a comprehensive picture of the links between women's employment and political participation, it is crucial to move beyond single case studies and to understand not only how the levels and the nature of female employment differ, but also how the effects on political participation might be different from the US context – and possibly vary in other contexts.

[51] Coffé and Bolzendahl (2010) explore the effects of full-time and part-time employment on men's and women's political participation using ISSP data. However, as they use a single-level model, they force the effects to be equal over all contexts and do not specifically explore any differences between the countries.

This chapter aims to fill a gap in the research by contributing to this understanding. It adds to the literature by providing a systematic, comparative account of (1) the female employment patterns in the different European countries and (2) the links between employment and political participation. Specifically, the chapter assesses the impact of two related micro-level factors. Firstly, it investigates the effect of *employment status*. Previous research has established that the mere fact of whether or not a woman is in gainful employment can make a significant difference to her life, and consequently, her probability to participate politically (Beckwith 1986; Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001). This chapter will analyse more closely how previous and current employment are linked to political participation, and most importantly, whether this effect varies across different contexts. Secondly, this chapter focusses on the effects of *job characteristics*. Here, I evaluate in which ways the intensity (hours of work) and level of work (job level) influence whether a woman is politically active, and again, if any of the effects found are context-dependent.

Although building on extensive existing research on this topic, it extends the literature in two ways. Firstly, by providing a more detailed account than previous studies and using employment and job characteristics as the main explanatory factors rather than just as 'control variables'. Secondly, this chapter assesses, rather than assumes the generalisability of findings from the US context by examining the context-dependency of effects. The chapter also provides a first indication of the influence of the context on the links between work and political participation, which will be then further explored in the later chapters of this dissertation.

The remainder of this chapter is organised into four main sections. In the next section, Section 4.1, I will give a brief discussion of the existing literature on (1) the effects of employment on political participation and (2) the effect of job characteristics; it will further outline how my analyses build upon and expand on existing knowledge. The operationalisation and modelling strategy applied in this chapter will be described in Section 4.2. The remaining two sections will then present the findings of the analyses: Firstly, Section 4.3 investigates the effects of employment status. Then, the effects of selected employment characteristics will be presented in Section 4.4. Lastly, the conclusion will provide a short discussion of the findings and their significance and situate them in the existing literature.

4.1 Work, employment, and political participation

Today, women in Europe are more likely to be gainfully employed outside the house than they were ever before (Fagan, Rubery and Smith 2003; OECD 2017a). However, a recent European Commission report on gender equality in the EU highlights the stark

differences between the countries, with generally lower rates of female employment in the Southern European countries and stronger participation in the active labour force in the Nordic countries (European Commission 2017). There is also considerable variation in terms of women's working time and the share of women in high-level positions (European Commission 2017; OECD 2012). These patterns are not only important from a standpoint of economic gender equality, but they might also be relevant to women's voice in the political sphere, if employment and job characteristics are indeed linked to women's political behaviour. This section reviews the existing research on these links, and it develops the hypotheses guiding the analyses in this chapter. The section starts with a review of the literature on the effect of employment status and continues to discuss the effects of job characteristics.

Employment status and political participation

Having a paid job outside the home has been associated with a higher probability of political participation for both men and women (Pateman 1970; Andersen 1975; Sapiro 1983; Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995; Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001; Adman 2008) and several (partially interconnected) causal mechanisms behind this link have entered the academic debate.

The first mechanism linking employment to political participation builds on the idea that paid employment has a major influence on an individual's resources. In their seminal article on the 'resource model' of political participation, Schlozman, Burns and Verba (1999) summarise how being in work can be conducive to political activity:

> *"Those who are in the workforce can augment their participatory resources in several ways: they earn money; they have opportunities to exercise participation-enhancing communications and organizational skills; if they are supervisors, they have a chance to develop leadership capacities" (p.42).*

The two types of resources discussed are *money* and what the authors call '*civic skills*'. While the impact of having money (all other things equal) is rather specific to the American political system and should matter less in the European context[52,53], having the skills (that is the knowledge and the ability) to participate is equally relevant to European women. The workplace provides an opportunity to learn and practice civic skills, such as general communication or organisational skills, which can then be used for political activity. Yet, at the same time, employment affects another resource negatively, that is the availability of *free time*. However, some empirical studies suggest that employed and non-employed women have, in fact, similar amounts of free time (Mattingly and Bianchi

[52] Money is mainly linked to 'checkbook activism' (Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995), a form of participation that plays a more prominent role in the American context than in most European political systems.

[53] 'Money' is also problematic with regards to data availability and quality, since there is a high proportion of missing values on all relevant variables in the dataset.

2003), or at least spend similar amounts of time on leisure activities (Nomaguchi and Bianchi 2004). This suggests that the positive effect on civic skills (and money) might prevail.

Secondly, employment is believed to impact on social contacts and the composition of social networks. Because social capital develops as "the product of regular and recurrent social interaction" (La Due Lake and Huckfeldt 1998, p. 570), the workplace should be a key context for social capital[54,55], which is linked to women's political participation, albeit in complex ways (Lowndes 2004). The contacts made in the workplace are more political in nature than 'private' contacts since the workplace is a key context for so-called cross-cutting political discussion (Mutz and Mondak 2006). For women, having contact with other employed women seems to matter: Banaszak and Leighley (1991) find that the number of employed female discussion partners strongly impacts on their political attitudes. Newer research supports this notion, finding that women (however, not men) benefit from political expertise within their networks (Djupe, McClurg and Sokhey 2016).

Finally, scholarship has linked employment to more progressive gender role attitudes and feelings of empowerment for women. In the workplace, women are exposed to situations and ideas that provide support for gender equality, for example as they are in contact with other employed women, as they gain confidence about economically competing with men, and as it creates awareness of systematic discrimination (cf. Bolzendahl and Myers 2004, p.762). As employment provides women with an independent income, which gives them more bargaining power within the family (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006), it can challenge attitudes on the traditional division of labour in the family and specifically towards women's involvement in the public sphere[56] (Coverdill, Kraft and Manley 1996; Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Cunningham 2008). In other words, employment may counteract one of the main reasons brought forward to explain women's comparatively lower levels of participation, namely their (adult) socialisation into private, family-centred roles and to see politics as 'a man's game' (cf. Welch 1977).

[54] Although it should be noted that La Due Lake and Huckfeldt (1998) find that controlling for income, the effect of employment status on political social capital is not significant.

[55] Originally, Putnam (1995) saw women's movement into the labour force as a reason for the decline in America's social capital, arguing that it leaves both men and women less time to be active in group and associations.

[56] Whilst one might presume that the effect could be in the opposite direction, that is that women with more progressive gender role attitudes are more likely to be employed (cf. Burns, Scholzman, Verba 2001, p.206), studies using (US) panel data, show clearly an effect of employment on attitudes (e.g. Coverdill, Kraft and Manley 1996; Cunningham 2008).

In sum, there are strong theoretical reasons (as well as empirical findings) to expect the effect of employment on women's political participation to be positive.

Hypothesis 4.1a: *Being employed increases women's probability of political participation.*

However, the rich discussion about the causal mechanisms behind the link between employment status and political participation distracts from the fact that the empirical account of the employment effect remains rather simplistic throughout most of this literature. Specifically, research appears to work on the (implicit) assumption of a spatial and temporal universality of the effect[57], without providing empirical evidence or testing this assumption.

In terms of temporal universality, it seems reasonable to expect the employment effect to be period- or cohort-dependent, given the changing meaning and significance of female employment over time. These effects can best explored using longitudinal data and are therefore not further addressed here. However, there is another temporal aspect that is similarly overlooked in existing studies: The majority of (empirical) studies create a dichotomy between those *currently* active in the labour force and all others, hence not addressing the question of employment history and effects of previous employment (e.g. Schlozman, Burns and Verba 1999; Schur 2003; Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010). From a resource perspective, it can be argued that leaving the labour force affects available time and money, but it does not immediately result in a loss of civic skills. Similarly, gender role attitudes and feelings of empowerment will not revert immediately after becoming expectedly or voluntarily economically inactive, such as for (child) care or retirement[58]. Those who have been previously employed might therefore still profit from this experience and should have a higher probability of being politically active than those who have never been employed. I, therefore, expect previous employment to continue having an, albeit smaller[59], positive effect on political participation.

Hypothesis 4.1b: *Previous employment increases women's probability of political participation.*

In terms of spatial universality, the literature widely assumes that employment effects are similar in all Western democracies. However, whether this is indeed the case has not been systematically tested. As argued before, the lion's share of in-depth empirical analyses is based on data from the US context (Andersen 1975; McDonagh

[57] There are, however, some notable exceptions, for example Kristi Andersen (1975).
[58] The experience of unemployment been associated with lower political efficacy and political interest (Scott and Acock 1979; Bay and Blekesaune 2002).
[59] The smaller effect is to be expected, as other characteristics do change, when leaving the labour force. For example, the social network and monetary resources.

1982; Brady, Verba and Scholzman 1995; Schlozman, Burns and Verba 1994, 1999; Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001), which represents a very particular case. In fact, it would be surprising if the effect was identical in all countries, given, for instance, the differences in their political systems and political opportunity structures. To give an example, in countries where political participation is 'harder', civic skills might play a more important role, and thus, having a job providing these skills should have a stronger effect. Indeed, already Verba, Nie and Kim (1972) have already established that the effects of socioeconomic resources vary in the seven countries they investigate in their study and that the US is, in many regards, a special case; findings can therefore not be generalised to all other contexts. Similarly, differences in the structure of the labour market can affect the social capital and recruitment resulting from employment, and differences in cultural gender norms can affect whether or not employment has an empowering effect on women. In a nutshell, I expect the positive effect of employment to vary over the different countries in terms of effect strength.

> **Hypothesis 4.1c**: *The strength of the positive effect of employment on political participation varies over countries.*

Job characteristics and political participation

The importance of employment for political participation does not only depend on the country context, but it should be equally contingent on the nature of the job. While being in the labour force is important by itself, as employment provides access to the public sphere and can challenge notions of traditional gender norms, jobs differ substantively in terms of the resources associated with them. They might also entail profoundly different experiences and different types of social contacts. In short, the specific characteristics of employment should play just as much of a role for political participation as the mere employment status. Here, I will explore the effect of two important job characteristics in more detail: *job level* and *working time.*[60]

Job level

Looking at the civic skills gained in a job, the *type of work* performed matters. Not all skills learned and applied at work are transferable to the political sphere. In their original resource model study, Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995) understand civic skills as organisational and communication skills[61] – in other words, competencies that are useful for political activism. These skills, however, are more commonly practised in some jobs

[60] These are also the characteristics on which the analysis of Burns, Verba and Schlozman (2001), chapter 8, focusses.

[61] The authors measure work-related civic skills as 'skill acts', namely letter writing, attending a meeting where decisions are made, planning/chairing a meeting, or presenting/giving a speech (Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995, p. 273).

– professional and administration occupations, for instance – and less common in others, for example in manual labour. Job level can be seen as a proxy for the amount of civic skills associated with a job (cf. Burns, Verba, Schlozman 2001). Generally speaking, high-level positions require continuous training, they should support analytical and critical thinking, encourage proactive behaviour, and require organisational skills. Those, who are supervising or responsible for others, will also gain managerial skills. Additionally, high-level jobs are more likely to provide women with a substantial personal income, creating economic independence both from the state and the family, and they should consequently be better at empowering other women.

At the same time, women in high-level positions are likely to encounter discrimination based on their sex. Encounters with stereotypes about women's ability to lead, as well as with the glass ceiling, make it more likely that women realise the systematic disadvantage they face in the labour market. Empirical evidence suggests that women's perception of sex-based discrimination increases with job seniority (Snizek and Neil 1992). However, paradoxically, the experience of discrimination has been found to mobilise women into political participation (Schlozman, Burns and Verba 1999; Schur 2003). Altogether, I, therefore, expect that high-level job positions should have a facilitating effect on women's political participation.

Hypothesis 4.2a: *Women in high-level positions have more civic skills and more likely to participate politically than women in lower-level jobs.*

However, as with employment status discussed above, this effect might not be identical in all contexts. Although participation research has repeatedly emphasised the importance of the differences in political systems, while the sociology of work shows the relevance of labour market differences, there is no research that has tested the context-dependency of the effects of employment characteristics. Yet, since political systems differ, skills might be more or less important for political participation in different contexts, which would show in varying effect sizes. Even if skills were equally important across all countries, problems of equivalence might arise[62]: jobs that are, on paper, equivalent can have a different meaning and entail more or less civic skills, depending on the context. The same holds for the experiences associated with high-level positions: countries have different work cultures and differ in terms of horizontal and vertical sex segregation,

[62] The attentive reader might inquire why this issue has not been brought up in the discussion of employment status. In contrast to the more abstract concept of 'job level', employment status (defined as having done paid work of any capacity in the last seven days [cf. ESS 2010b]) appears to be less sensitive to the cultural or national context.

therefore the same position in different countries should be associated with different experiences. Thus, in short, I expect some variation of the effect size of the job level.

> **Hypothesis 4.2b:** *The strength of the positive effect of high-level positions on political participation varies over the countries.*

Working time

A second characteristic that is discussed in context with the effect of employment status is the *intensity* of work. In particular, Burns, Schlozman and Verba (2001) stress in their analyses that being in employment impacts on the free time available – and working longer hours does naturally more so than working shorter hours. For women, working time is particularly relevant, since women in Western countries are still responsible for the lion's share of housework (Hook 2010). Working fewer hours might help to ease this double burden of paid work and household labour. Arguably, working in a part-time position equally provides access to the public sphere, it allows to form social networks with colleagues, and it can provide the same type of civic skills – all while having a less negative effect on the resource of time. Thus, shorter working time (ceteris paribus) increases the disposable time available, and this should have a positive effect on the probability to participate in politics.

> **Hypothesis 4.3a**: *Shorter working hours increase the probability of political participation for women.*

However, at the same time, part-time work is associated with slower career progression, lower pay and less desirable jobs (O'Reilly and Fagan 1998; Boling 2015). Perhaps even more importantly, and insufficiently addressed by Schlozman, Burns and Verba (1999), those in marginal employment (i.e. those working less than 15 hours per week)[63] are likely to regard work not as their main activity, and work might form a less integral part of their identity.[64] This type of employment should, therefore, have less impact on persisting gender roles; it provides less financial autonomy, and also fewer opportunities to practice civic skills. Very short hours of work might therefore not increase the participation probability, but in contrast, be associated with a lower probability of political activity. In other words, the relationship between working hours and political participation might follow an inverse u-shaped shape (convex), instead of being linear.

> **Hypothesis 4.3b**: *The effect of working hours on political participation is not linear, but convex, meaning that very short and very long working hours have a negative effect.*

[63] Here, I refer to employment that is marginal in terms of the hours worked, however, other definitions, for example in terms of income, are equally common.

[64] While the authors do account for 'workforce commitment' by including a dummy measuring full-time vs. part-time work (however, without clarification about their definition of part-time work), they do not account for differences between longer hours part-time work and marginal employment.

In contrast to civic skills, the effect of working time should be less influenced by the political system or context more generally, but rather depend on the specific mode of participation. Contacting a politician (once) arguably requires less time than (regularly) working in a party or other organisation, and should, therefore, depends less on the free time available. The time required to be active might also vary within each mode of participation, but there is little reason why this variation should be systematic by country. However, there might be a systematic difference in how working time translates into disposable time available to women. A study of 22 Western democracies indicates that the effect of working time on the amount of time women spend on housework varies significantly across countries (Fuwa 2004). In other words, in some countries, fewer hours of work are associated with more time spent on housework than in others. As a consequence, identical working time might translate into different amounts of free time available and the effect of working time on political participation should vary accordingly.

Hypothesis 4.3c: *The strength of the negative effect of working hours on political participation varies over countries.*

Other employment characteristics have also been discussed and assessed with regards to their influence on political participation, most importantly job autonomy (e.g. Burn and Konrad 1987; Arrighi and Maume 1994), workplace participation (e.g. Sobel 1993; Greenberg, Grunberg and Daniel 1996; Jian and Jeffres 2008) and union membership (e.g. Delaney; Masters and Schwochau 1988; D'Art and Turner 2007). Workplace participation and union membership are avenues through which workers can 'practice' participation in decision-making processes. In particular, Pateman (1970) argues in her so-called 'spill-over' hypothesis, that these experiences should increase the internal political efficacy of the employee. While the effect of workplace participation is without a doubt interesting, it is more problematic to test with the (non-panel) data available: Political participation might precede workplace participation, or both might be influenced by the same (for example attitudinal) factors, and the relationship might, therefore, be spurious[65]. For that reason, workplace participation (and union membership) will not be explored in detail. The effect of job autonomy will, however, be explored in the context of the effect of job level.

In sum, I have argued that employment should positively affect women's likelihood to participate politically, but this effect is likely to depend on the country context. Building upon existing knowledge, I also formulated expectations about a negative effect of

[65] In theory, the same concern can be raised about all independent variables. However, I believe that the causal order is less problematic for working hours or job level, as these are unlikely to be a direct consequence of political participation.

working hours and a positive effect of high-level position. However, again, I have suggested that the generalisability of these effects across all context cannot be assumed, but should be empirically assessed, which is the main aim of this chapter.

Figure 4.1 below summarises the links theorised in this section, which are located on the individual level of analysis and highlighted in grey.



Figure 4.1: Schematic presentation of the links between employment and employment characteristics and women's political participation.

4.2 Measuring the effect of employment and job characteristics

This chapter's focus is on the effect of employment and employment characteristics on women's political participation, in other words, on micro-level effects (see Figure 4.1 above). The analyses in this chapter are therefore based on the micro-level data collected in the fifth round of the European Social Survey (ESS) only, which has been described in detail in Chapter 3. The focus in following sub-sections is, therefore, on the operationalisation of employment and employment characteristics and the modelling strategy applied in this chapter.

Indicators of employment and job characteristics

The analytical interest of this chapter is in three factors specifically, (1) *employment status*, (2) *working time*, and (3) *job level.* For all three factors, multiple indicators have been selected, mainly to cover different aspects of each factor, but also to check the robustness of the findings (see Table 4.1 below for an overview of the indicators).

Table 4.1: Description of employment indicators used in Chapter 4

Dimension	Component	Indicator
Employment status	Current employment	Participation in paid work for at least one hour in the last 7 days (binary)
	Main activity	Respondent's self-declared main activity (categorical)
	Previous employment	Participation in paid employment in the past (binary)
Job level	Supervisory responsibility	Responsibility for supervising others in the main job (binary)
	Occupational status	International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI) based on occupation
	Job autonomy	Job autonomy scale (0-11)
Working time	Actual working hours	Total actual working hours, per week
	Full-time or part-time work	Marginal, part-time, full-time or long-hours full-time employment, based on contracted weekly working hours (categorical)

Employment status

Although the concept of 'employment' appears relatively simple on the first glance, it is not straight-forward to measure (cf. Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik and Warner 2014), and a number of conceptual decisions have to be made to define it. For example, it needs to be decided whether contributing family work counts as employment and whether a minimum threshold on the extent of work should be imposed.

For this analysis, my input on the conceptualisation and measurement is limited to the indicators available in the dataset. In the ESS, employment status is captured by three different variables. The first question asks which descriptions, from a list including the category 'in paid work', apply to the respondent with the last seven days (multiple answers possible); the second one assesses which of the activities mentioned is the respondent's 'main activity'[66]. For respondents, who have not mentioned 'paid work' in the first question, a control question was asked about whether or not they have performed any paid work of at least one hour in the last seven days[67].

For the purposes of this chapter, I construct three different indicators of employment status from the existing variables. The first one measures *employment* in the most simplistic, i.e. in binary form. Any respondent, who has stated either in the first or in the control question to have performed paid work of any capacity in the last week

[66] Please see Table B.1 in the Appendix for the exact wording of these (and all of the following) questions in the ESS.

[67] Apart from the last question, no definition for 'paid work' is provided, meaning the assessment is entirely subjective, potentially affecting the cross-national equivalence of the question. Differences might occur depending on whether, for example, parents on parental or maternity leave, classify themselves as 'in paid work' or as 'homemakers'.

has been assigned the code '1' (48.9 per cent of the sample [weighted data][68]), everyone else has been coded as '0' (50.7 per cent). The 123 women (0.4 per cent), who have not indicated to be paid work in the first question, and also have a missing value on the control question, have been deleted from the dataset. This measure is simplistic in terms of both, inclusion and exclusion: It includes those, who are only marginally employed (for example students or pensioners, who also work), while it does not distinguish between those who are not active in the labour market for whatever reason.

The second variable included aims to capture these differences by measuring the *main activity* of the respondent. Some categories of the original variable have been pooled for simplicity, so the variable has six categories: unemployed (6.6 per cent), homemaker[69] (14.2 per cent), in education (10.9 per cent), in paid work (41.9 per cent), retired (23.0 per cent) and 'other'[70] (3.4 per cent). Fifty-eight cases have a missing value on this variable.

The last indicator concerns the respondent's employment history. Those women, who are not currently in employment as defined above, have been asked whether they have *ever* had a paid job. The majority of those women who are not currently working has had a paid job in the past (76.7 per cent). The variable has been recoded so that respondents who had a job in the past are coded '1' and everyone else (including those who are currently employed) is coded '0'.

Job level

Job level is more difficult to conceptualise and, consequently, to operationalise. The idea behind job *levels* is that jobs can be brought into a hierarchical order according to some characteristic of interest. In this chapter, the interest is on the amount of civic skills a job conveys, however, since it is difficult to define and directly measure the civic skills associated with an occupation[71], it is also difficult to create a civic-skill-based ranking of jobs. I use three different proxies distinguishing the different amounts of civic skill levels associated with different jobs.

The first variable measures whether (1) or not (0) the respondent has *supervisory responsibility* in her main job. Being responsible for and monitoring the work of other employees arguably requires both organisational and communication skills to a higher degree than only being responsible for one's own work. Although the same is true for managerial responsibility, and some of the existing studies include a measure of being

[68] All percentages presented here and hereafter are based on weighted data.

[69] The category 'homemaker' is a summary label for "doing housework, looking after children or other persons" (ESS 2010b, p.40).

[70] The category 'other' includes those who are permanently sick or disabled, those in military or community service and those who have said 'other'.

[71] The problems of measuring the civic skills a job conveys is discussed in more detail in Brady, Schlozman and Verba (1995, pp.276-279).

in a managerial position (e.g. McDonagh 1982; Schur 2003), this measure is not well-suited, as only very few women overall are employed in a managerial position (around 7 per cent, compared to 22 per cent of women in a supervisory role), while the share of managerial positions differs widely across the countries in the dataset, reflecting different labour market structures[72].

The second variable included is a continuous measure of *occupational status*, making use of the 'International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status' (ISEI). ISEI assigns a score, based on the education and income associated with a job, to every occupational title as defined by the (four-digit) International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) (for the methodology, see: Ganzeboom, de Graaf and Treiman 1992). Although this measure does not perfectly reflect the civic skills associated with an occupation[73], I argue that it can serve as a proxy, as higher levels of education and higher income reflect, in general, more complex tasks and higher degrees of responsibility. Since the ESS data contain (post-coded) information about each respondent's (ISCO-88) occupation, it is possible to input the associated ISEI score, which has been taken from Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996). The measure ranges from 16 (e.g. 'Domestic helpers and cleaners') to 90 ('Judges') and has a (weighted) mean of 44.7. 118 women who have a missing value on the occupation variable, and the six women who are in the armed forces, have a missing value on the ISEI variable.

Lastly, I include an indicator of *job autonomy* (or 'task discretion'). Being able and required to make influential decisions on a regular basis in the workplace should foster independent thinking and decision-making skills; Sobel (1993) also argues that the participation in workplace decision-making creates a habit of participation that spills over to the political arena. Higher job autonomy is a common measure for job skills (cf. Halldén, Gallie and Zhou 2012), and can be used as a proxy for higher civic skills. The variable on job autonomy has been created from three items in the ESS capturing the perceived degree of influence a respondent has on structuring her work, that is the way the work is organised, the pace of work, and policy decisions of the company, each measured on an eleven-point scale. After an explanatory factor analysis has confirmed the one-dimensionality of the three items (see Table B.2 in the Appendix) the mean of

[72] The share of managerial positions (for men and women combined) ranges from 1.6 per cent in Cyprus to 17.6 per cent in Poland, indicating either different labour market structures or a problem of cross-national equivalence.

[73] The measure is also problematic in another regard: The authors have constructed it based on occupational data of *men only*. The measure might therefore overestimate the status of 'typical female' occupations, such as kindergarten teachers (due to the 'glass escalator' effect on men in such occupations). Due to the limited observations in these categories, it might also be less reliable (for a detailed discussion see Ganzeboom, de Graaf and Treiman 1992).

the three items was taken as the new 'autonomy' indicator, ranging from 0 to 10 with a mean value of 5.4 and 80 missing values[74].

Working time

In contrast to job level, working time is very straightforward to operationalise. There are two items in the ESS on working time, one measuring the contracted working hours on the main job, and the other one measuring the normal actual working hours including overtime. I use the latter item as a continuous measure of actual *working hours*, which should capture the effect employment has on the free-time available. I have truncated the variable at 72 hours (corresponding to working 12 hours on six days per week[75]), and the 60 respondents stating to work more than 72 hours a week have been recoded as 72 hours. The variable has been centred around its mean of 36.3 hours, and there are 298 missing values[76].

I also include a categorical variable, which measures whether the respondent is in a marginal (0), part-time (1), full-time (2), or long hours full-time (3) contract. This measure is based on the contracted working hours and uses the OECD definition of full-time work, which is a normal weekly working time of at least 30 hours a week (van Bastelaer, Lemaître and Marianna 1997)[77]. Following the suggestion of Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik and Warner (2014), part-time employment is defined as a working time that is less than full-time work, but more than 50 per cent of full-time working hours (i.e. more than 15 hours/week), thus, marginal employment is defined 15 hours of work a week or less. Long-hours full-time work is defined to exceed 42 hours[78]. In the pooled dataset, the majority of employed women work full-time (66 per cent); nine per cent work more than 42 hours. 16 per cent of women work part-time, and nine per cent are in marginal work. 298 respondents have a missing value on this variable[79].

[74] Only respondents who have a missing value on all three items have been coded as 'missing', for all others, the mean has been calculated from the non-missing items.

[75] The EU Directive 2003/88/EC of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time [2003], Official Journal J 299, 18/11/2003 [working time directive] guaranties workers in EU countries, that normal weekly working time should not regularly exceed 48 hours (including overtime).

[76] For respondents with a missing value on 'actual working hours', but a valid response on contracted working hours, the contracted working hours have been used.

[77] 30 and 35 hours are both commonly used cut-off points for the definition of full-time work. See van Bastelaer, Lemaître and Marianna (1997) for a detailed discussion of the different definitions.

[78] In Croatia, longer working hours (48 hours) seem to be relatively common. However, for reasons of comparability the same threshold has been used for all countries.

[79] In order to avoid a large proportion of missing values, for respondents with a missing value on the contracted working hours variable the actual working hours have been used.

Modelling strategy

Although this chapter focusses on micro-level links, the hierarchical structure (of individuals nested within countries) of the data requires a multi-level approach, as discussed in the previous chapter. Since the dependent variable is binary ('0' no participation; '1' participation'), the hypotheses in this chapter are tested in a set of logistic multi-level models. The models are estimated using maximum-likelihood estimation (with seven integration points) in Stata®, and for ease of interpretation, the coefficients are presented as odds-ratios.

The analyses are divided into two sections, each addressing one of the foci of this chapter and each interested in a different subset of respondents. The first section tests the effect of employment on political participation. Since the interest is on whether current and previous employment foster political participation, the analyses include all women, working and non-working ($n = 25{,}782$). In contrast, the second section focusses on the effects of job characteristics, consequently, only those women, who are currently employed (or self-employed) are included in the analyses ($n = 11{,}672$).

The effects of the different predictors of participation will be assessed not only by the effect size and significance but also through the effect on the model goodness-of-fit statistics, specifically the explained variance (Pseudo-R^2), the log-likelihood value and the Intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC), which measures the proportion of the variance that can be attributed to differences between countries.

4.3 The effect of employment status

Patterns of female employment in Europe

On average, around 60 per cent of working-age (15-64 years) women in Europe are employed, with some variation across countries. As Figure 4.2 shows, the Nordic countries together with Switzerland and the Netherlands are leading the field with female employment rates[80] of around 70 per cent, while the economically weaker Southern and Eastern European countries cluster at the lower end of the spectrum. The UK is situated in the upper third of countries with a female employment rate of 64.5 per cent. In Greece, at the bottom end of the distribution, less than half of the working-age women have a paid job. The observed pattern, however, is not only a geographical one, but more intriguingly, the countries also cluster by religious tradition: All countries in the lowest third of the distribution are also characterised by a strong Catholic or Orthodox religious

[80] In contrast to the 'labour force participation rate', the employment rate does not include women who are not currently employed, but 'actively looking for work' (i.e. part of the labour force).

tradition[81]. In contrast, the countries in the upper third are predominantly Protestant, mixed or non-religious (cf. Central Intelligence Agency 2017).

However, overall employment rates do not take differences in demographic structures or educational systems into account. Since everyone over the age of 15 is included, longer education or high levels of enrolment in tertiary education will be reflected in lower female employment rates (ceteris paribus). Similarly, low levels of employment among the older cohorts might conceal more recent advances in women's employment.



Figure 4.2: Female employment rates across different European countries in 2010 (Source: Eurostat 2017a; *Israel: OECD 2017b).

Figure 4.3 below shows, therefore, the employment rates of three different age groups: the group of 15-24-year-olds (with a considerable percentage still in education), the 25-49-year-olds, and finally the group of 50-64-year-olds, a cohort with traditionally low female employment rates. As expected, employment rates between these three groups vary considerably, being lower for both, the youngest and the oldest age-group. However, the employment rates for all three groups are strongly and positively associated[82], indicating a common factor influencing women's employment of all ages.[83]

[81] With the exception of Hungary (37%), more than 50% of the population is either (Roman) Catholic or Orthodox in the eight lowest ranking countries (Central Intelligence Agency 2017).

[82] The correlation between the employment rates of the youngest and the middle age group is $r = 0.60$ $(p = 0.002;\ N = 24)$, between youngest and oldest age group is $r = 0.68$ $(p < 0.001;\ N = 24)$ and between middle and the oldest age group is $r = 0.61$ $(p = 0.02;\ N = 24)$.

[83] It can be argued that this common factor is not necessarily a gendered one. For example, in the case of Greece and Spain, lower employment rates also reflect generally high levels of unemployment after the economic crisis of 2008. However, when looking at the 'labour force participation rate' (which includes those unemployed but looking for work) an overall similar distribution is found (cf. OECD 2017a). Interestingly, some Eastern European countries are in the top quartile of the distribution when looking at the labour force participation rate.

Focussing only on the prime working-age group allows disregarding differences in education systems and among the oldest cohort. We see that the distribution of countries remains overall similar to that in Figure 4.2, however, with a few interesting exceptions. For instance, the UK is only in the bottom half of the distribution, while Slovenia has the highest female employment rate with 83.8 per cent.



Figure 4.3: Female employment rates by age group across different European countries in 2010 (Source: Eurostat 2017a; no data available for Israel).

Employment status and political participation

On a first glance, employment rates seem to follow a similar geographical pattern as the political participation rates explored in Chapter 3. Indeed, countries with high levels of female employment have higher political participation, as Figure 4.4 below illustrates.

On the aggregate level, employment and participation rate are strongly and significantly associated ($r = 0.66, p < 0.001$). However, the conclusion that employment fosters political participation on the individual level would be, of course, an ecological fallacy. Common factors are likely to influences women's involvement in both areas of the public sphere, such as progressive gender norms or women's educational attainment. In order to test whether the contextual association holds on the level of the individual, a multi-level analysis is required.



Figure 4.4: Female political participation rates and female employment rates across different European countries in 2010 (Sources: own calculations based on ESS 2010a; Eurostat 2017a).

Table 4.2 below shows the effects of different employment variables on political participation of women in a logistic multilevel model. The first model (1) only includes the control variables and serves as a reference, for example in terms of explained variance. The control variables show a rather consistent pattern and confirm general expectations: Better educated women, those with a partner, with strong political interest, and women, who are more socially active and hold more progressive gender role attitudes are more likely to be politically active. Interestingly, age has a statistically significant effect only in some of the models, and in those, the effect is weak and negative. Employment (as a binary measure) is then added in the second model (2). As expected, being employed has strong and significant positive effect on women's political participation, confirming both, the first hypothesis (*Hypothesis 4.1a*) and findings from previous research (e.g. Schur 2003; Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010). Working women have 21 per cent higher odds of being politically active than those not currently in paid employment (all other factors equal). Despite the strong and significant effect, the variable increases the explained variance only very slightly from 8.9 to 9.1 per cent.

Table 4.2: Logistic multi-level analysis of the effect of employment on women's political participation

Independent variables	Effect of Employment Status			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Age	**0.997**** *(0.001)*	0.998 *(0.001)*	1.001 *(0.002)*	**0.997*** *(0.001)*
Degree level education *(Ref: less than degree level)*	**1.707***** *(0.070)*	**1.637***** *(0.069)*	**1.654***** *(0.070)*	**1.623***** *(0.069)*
Partner *(Ref: No partner)*	**1.143***** *(0.041)*	**1.111**** *(0.041)*	**1.116**** *(0.043)*	**1.093*** *(0.040)*
Medium political interest	**2.012***** *(0.080)*	**2.005***** *(0.079)*	**2.009***** *(0.080)*	**1.997***** *(0.079)*
Strong political interest *(Ref: Weak political interest)*	**4.043***** *(0.243)*	**4.066***** *(0.245)*	**4.058***** *(0.245)*	**4.045***** *(0.244)*
Socially active once a week *(Ref: Less than once a week)*	**1.260***** (*0.050)*	**1.269***** *(0.050)*	**1.269***** *(0.050)*	**1.272***** *(0.050)*
Gender role attitude *(more egalitarian)*	**1.072***** *(0.011)*	**1.066***** *(0.011)*	**1.066***** *(0.011)*	**1.065***** *(0.011)*
In work *(Ref: Not in paid work)*	-	**1.212***** *(0.048)*	-	**1.467***** *(0.103)*
Previously in paid work *(Ref: Now or never in paid work)*	-	-	-	**1.275***** *(0.093)*
Main activity: paid work	-	-	**1.195**** *(0.073)*	-
Main activity: unemployed	-	-	0.965 *(0.092)*	-
Main activity: education	-	-	1.137 *(0.107)*	-
Main activity: retired	-	-	0.866 *(0.065)*	-
Main activity: other *(Ref: Main activity: homemaker)*	-	-	**1.362**** *(0.144)*	-
Intercept	0.079*** (0.012)	0.070*** (0.011)	0.063*** (0.011)	0.062*** (0.010)
ICC	0.103	0.102	0.101	0.101
Pseudo-R^2	0.089	0.091	0.093	0.094
Log-Likelihood	*-10365.95*	*-10354.078*	*-10328.424*	*-10348.323*
n / N (countries)	24,796 / 25	24,796 / 25	24,742 / 25	24,796 / 25

Note. Logistic Multilevel Analysis estimating the effect of employment on political participation (0/1), maximum-likelihood estimation. Coefficients shown are odds-ratios, standard errors in parentheses. ***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05, †=p<0.1.

However, as indicated above, the binary measure of employment status is simplistic in the sense that it compares those in employment with everyone else, irrespective of their life situation. The group of non-employed women is, however, not homogeneous and includes women as diverse as homemakers, retired women and those still in education. In order to give a more differentiated account, Model 3, therefore, includes a categorical measure for the 'main activity' of the respondent, distinguishing between various groups of non-employed women. Compared to the reference category

of 'homemakers', employed women have 20 per cent higher odds of being politically active ($OR: 1.20;\ p < 0.01$). The post-hoc test of differences (full output not shown) indicates that they are also more likely to participate politically than women who are unemployed ($OR: 1.24; p < 0.01$) or retired ($OR: 1.38; p < 0.01$). There is no difference in the odds of political participation to women in education or those doing 'other'[84]. In terms of causality, some caution is required when interpreting the effect, since each of these groups is distinct – and possibly in characteristics that are not controlled for in the model. However, the fact that employed women are more likely to be politically active than women in three of the five (diverse) categories suggests that employment does, indeed, play a role in explaining political participation.

In addition to the effect of employment, the interest is on temporal and spatial generalisability of the effect. As argued before, age, cohort, and period effects can only be explored with longitudinal/ panel data and will therefore not be the focus of this discussion. However, another question about the temporality of employment effects concerns the effects of *previous* employment. I have argued that some positive effects of employment do not suddenly cease to exist when employment ends: For example, social networks and civic skills do not immediately change. In other words, the experience of *previous* employment might have a lasting effect on women's political participation. The last model (4) in Table 4.2, therefore, explores the effect of current and previous employment in contrast to those who have never had a paid job[85]. The results provide support for *Hypothesis 4.1b*: Previous employment also has a positive effect on women's political participation ($OR: 1.28; p < 0.001$), however, this effect is smaller than that of current employment ($OR: 1.48;\ p < 0.001$), with the difference between the two being statistically significant as a post-hoc test shows ($OR: 1.15; p < 0.001$). This suggests not only that indeed some of the effects of employment are lasting, but also that the dichotomy between employed and non-employed women commonly used in the literature might be too simplistic. Indeed, including both previous and current employment also increases the explained variance slightly more strongly than the binary measure (from $R^2 = 0.089$ to $R^2 = 0.094$).

In terms of the spatial generalisability, I have argued that the nature of the political system or characteristics of the labour market might interact with the employment effect,

[84] The 'other' category is very small (3.4 per cent) and diverse, as it includes women who are 'permanently sick or disabled', 'in community or military service' or simply stated 'other' (ESS 2010b).

[85] Although the reader might suspect that those who were previously employed are identical to the category of retired women in the previous model, only about half (52 per cent) of the previously employed women are retired; 22 per cent are homemakers and about 14 per cent are unemployed. Similarly, the group of never employed women consists of women in education (45 per cent), homemakers (29 per cent) and retired women (13 per cent).

which might therefore not be identical in all countries. For example, in countries where political participation is 'harder', more civic skills are required, and the effect of employment should be weaker. Figure 4.5 below shows the marginal effects of employment on political participation by country, as found in a set of separate logistic regression models[86]. It can be seen that both size and significance vary across countries; only in ten of the 25 countries does the effect of employment reach statistical significance at all. Given the rather small sample size for some of the countries, this is not surprising. However, it should be noted, that amongst the countries with an insignificant effect are also, for example, Germany and the UK, for which an effect of employment has been found in previous research (Westle 2001; Parry, Moyser and Day 1992, Chapter 6).



Figure 4.5: The effect of employment on political participation (as odds-ratios) in different countries.

A more formal way of testing whether the effect of employment varies (statistically significantly) across countries is to estimate a model in which the coefficient of employment is allowed to vary across countries (random-coefficient model). This random-coefficient model can be tested against the nested random-intercept model in a likelihood-ratio test (or deviance test). For this test, the deviance D_j for each model j is calculated as minus twice the log-likelihood value. The difference of the deviances $D_0 - D_1$ (where D_0 denotes the deviance of the random-intercept model and D_1 denotes the deviance of the random-coefficient model) is a test statistic, which follows a χ^2-distribution on the degrees of freedom equal to the difference in the number of the

[86] The same variables as in Model (2) are included in the regression models.

parameters in the two models (Snijders and Bosker 2012, p.97). In this case, the difference in the number of parameters is two (the random-slope variance and the random-slope-intercept covariance). The difference in the deviances $D_0 - D_1$ is $20708.16 - 20706.53 = 1.63$, which is not significant on a χ^2-distribution with two degrees of freedom ($\chi^2(2) = 1.63; p = 0.44$)[87]. In other words, the likelihood-ratio test rejects the random-coefficient model in favour for the simpler random-intercept model. In substantial terms, this means that the effect of employment on political participation does not vary (statistically significantly) over the countries in this study[88]; I therefore have to reject *Hypothesis 4.1c*; the effect of employment appears to be not context dependent.

4.4 The effects of working time and job level

The previous section has focussed on the effect of employment versus non-employment on political participation. This section explores what happens once a woman is employed, by analysing the impact of job characteristics, specifically working hours and job level, on political participation.

Patterns of working time and job level

Working time and job level are two of the employment characteristics in which women traditionally differ from men. Women in Europe are more likely to work part-time; they also tend to be clustered at the lower end of the occupational hierarchy, which is discussed in the literature as '*vertical sex segregation'* (Fagan, Rubery and Smith 2003). This comes with important implications, for example for the amount and type of work-related resources women have access to, and consequently, it is also relevant to political participation. Importantly, the two characteristics are both related: part-time work is generally found to be of lower quality, and more common in lower level jobs (Gornick and Jacobs 1996; O'Reilly and Fagan 1998; Jaumotte 2003).

Figure 4.6 below illustrates women's average working hours in comparison to the normal full-time working hours[89] by country. The average working hours of employed women differ quite substantively across Europe and the difference from the 'normal' full-time working hours is particularly marked in the Netherlands, Switzerland and Germany, countries with strong female part-time working cultures[90] (European Commission 2011),

[87] This is still true if I divide the p-value by two, as often suggested to account for the fact that the variance of the coefficient is, by definition, non-negative (cf. Steele 2009).

[88] This is of course only true for the small subset of European democracies included in these models. The effect of employment might be different in developing or less democratic countries – the effect might also be different in other cultural regions of the world.

[89] 'Normal' full-time working hours are here defined as the average working hours of those who consider themselves to be in full-time employment (men and women).

[90] In all countries in the dataset, women are substantively more likely to be employed in a part-time position than men. With the exceptions of Denmark (15.2 per cent), the Netherlands (25.4

but also with high rates of female employment (see Figure 4.2). Conversely, in most Eastern European countries, where women's employment rates are generally lower, female working hours are not substantively different from those of men. This supports the notion of interrelatedness of the prevalence of part-time work and female employment rates discussed in the literature, which has been linked to gendered care responsibilities and institutionalised support for working mothers; however, these links appear to be complex rather than straightforward (Smith, Fagan and Rubery 1998) and will be discussed in greater detail in later sections[91].



Figure 4.6: Women's average weekly working hours across different European countries in 2010 (Source: OECD 2017c).

While, just as employment more generally, working time remains profoundly gendered, women's propensity to work shorter hours could be regarded as an advantage in terms of free time available. However, this line of argument disregards that part-time work is most common in lower-level jobs and that even in identical jobs, part-time workers are often disadvantaged in terms of pay, working conditions or career progression (Gornick and Jacobs 1996; Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001). Unsurprisingly, part-time work is a factor contributing to '*vertical sex segregation*', the tendency that men and women are clustered at different places on the occupational hierarchy.[92]

per cent) and Norway (15.4 per cent), less than 15 per cent of employed men work part-time in all countries in 2010 (European Commission 2011, p.28).

[91] These links will be discussed in the following section (4.5) and in Chapter 5.

[92] In contrast to horizontal sex segregation, which refers to the tendency of men and women to work in different fields (Lowe 2013).

Women's distribution over the occupational hierarchy in the different European countries is illustrated in Figure 4.7. Occupational status is measured as by the International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI), countries are ordered descending by mean occupational status. The figure shows some variation across countries; however, it should be interpreted with some caution. Since the ISEI is based on the self-reported and then post-coded occupation (ISCO-88), it is susceptible to a different interpretation of job titles and descriptions (of both respondent and coder) (see Elias 1997; Harrison and Rose 2010). Therefore, differences between countries might be partially due to problems of equivalence and not just reflect actual differences in labour market structures. However, it is interesting to see that in most countries, women are clustered in the lower status jobs and only a small percentage of women can be found in the highest category (consisting of jobs such as higher education teaching professionals, medical doctors, or judges [Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996]). It also interesting, that, in contrast to working time data, there is no geographical pattern and no association between mean occupational status and employment rates or working hours.



Figure 4.7: Women's distribution over different occupational categories and mean occupational status across different European countries in 2010 (Source: ESS 2010a).

If, in contrast, we look at 'job autonomy', instead of occupational status, we find a very different picture: Figure 4.8 shows the mean level of women's job autonomy (on a 0 to 10 scale) across countries in descending order, and the countries are clearly clustered geographically. Women have the most influence on how their work is organised in the Nordic and Western European countries and less autonomy in the Southern and Eastern European countries. The different distribution of the two indicators is not surprising since the two concepts are clearly distinct (although related) and their individual-level association is only moderate ($r = 0.227; p < 0.001$)[93]. Although the differences between countries are quite large (there is a 3-point difference between Croatia [3.8] and Denmark [6.8]), there might, again, be an issue of cross-national comparability, since the understanding of and norms about job autonomy[94] are likely to differ. However, if we assume that at least part of the patterns observed above reflect actual differences, this would mean that an effect of work autonomy on political participation could contribute to explain different levels of women's political activity across Europe.



Figure 4.8: Women's mean job autonomy (with 95% confidence intervals) across different European countries in 2010 (Source: ESS 2010a).

Job characteristics and political participation

In the next step, I explore if these job characteristics have an effect on women's political participation probability and whether this effect might vary across the countries included

[93] The context-level association between a country's mean occupational status and mean job level is also modest and not significant ($r = 0.198; p = 0.343; N = 25$)

[94] This might be especially relevant for the East-West divide, since the organisation of labour in former USSR countries might still have an impact on norms regarding job autonomy today.

in the study. The focus is firstly on the two job characteristics separately, before their effects are explored together in an integrated model.

Working time

Table 4.3 below shows the effect of working time on the odds-ratios of political participation of working women. Since these models only look at employed women (thus, a subset of the women in the previous section), the first model (1) only includes the 'control' variables and serves as a point of references in terms of model fit. The control variables follow overall the same pattern as observed in the population model (Model 1, Table 4.2), with one exception: the effect of age is *positive* and significant in this model[95], meaning that older women are more likely to participate.

The second model shows the simple linear effect of the normal working hours on the odds of political participation. The effect is negative and significant; with each additional hour of work, the odds for political participation decrease by 0.7 per cent. Over the range of the variable, this translates to a change in the predicted probabilities from $\rho = 0.23$ (for 1 hour of work) to $\rho = 0.17$ (for 72 hours of work), as Table 4.3 below shows[96]. The effect is not only in line with existing literature, but it also provides support for *Hypothesis 4.3a*; shorter working hours are associated with higher probability of political participation. This suggests that women's propensity to work shorter hours might indeed be an advantage in terms of political participation since it leaves them with more time to engage politically.

Model 3 then explores the linearity of the effect by introducing a squared term to the model. In order to facilitate the interpretation, the 'working hours' variable has been centred around its (grand) mean of 33, and the squared term has been calculated from the centred variable. I have theorised earlier that very short working hours might not allow women to take full advantage of the positive effects of employment, thus, be actually counterproductive for their political participation. If this was the case, we should find a concave curve and respectively a negative sign of the squared term. The results show that the effect of working time seems to be indeed curvilinear, as both, the simple and the squared variable have a significant effect (at $p < 0.1$). However, the positive sign of the squared variable indicates a *convex* shape of the curve. This interpretation is supported by the results of the last model (4), which includes a categorical measure of working time (distinguishing between marginal, part-time, fulltime and long-hours fulltime work). Although the only statistically significant difference is between *marginal work* and *full-time work* ($OR; 1.38, p < 0.001$), the predicted probabilities (shown in Figure 4.9)

[95] The different effects indicate that the age does not have a strictly linear effect on participation.
[96] For the calculation of the predicted probabilities, all other variables are fixed at their means.

indicate that working very long hours might have a less negative effect on participation than working 'standard' fulltime hours. This could be the result of the exclusion of other job characteristics from the model; those who work longer than 'standard' fulltime hours tend to be employed in higher-level jobs[97]. In any case, there is no evidence that marginal work has a negative effect on political participation, thus, I have to reject *Hypothesis 4.3b.*

Table 4.3: Logistic multi-level analysis of the effect of working hours on employed women's political participation

Independent variables	**Effect of working hours**			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Age	**1.007*** ***(0.002)***	**1.008*** ***(0.002)***	**1.008*** ***(0.002)***	**1.008*** ***(0.002)***
Degree level education *(Ref: less than degree level)*	**1.683*** ***(0.089)***	**1.702*** ***(0.090)***	**1.728*** ***(0.092)***	**1.718*** ***(0.091)***
Partner *(Ref: No partner)*	**1.116*** ***(0.058)***	**1.114*** ***(0.058)***	**1.121*** ***(0.059)***	**1.119*** ***(0.059)***
Medium political interest	**1.916*** ***(0.104)***	**1.912*** ***(0.104)***	**1.911*** ***(0.104)***	**1.914*** ***(0.104)***
Strong political interest *(Ref: Weak political interest)*	**3.610*** ***(0.317)***	**3.608*** ***(0.317)***	**3.616*** ***(0.318)***	**3.616*** ***(0.318)***
Socially active once a week *(Ref: Less than once a week)*	**1.282*** ***(0.067)***	**1.274*** ***(0.069)***	**1.271*** ***(0.069)***	**1.274*** ***(0.069)***
Gender role attitude *(more egalitarian)*	**1.064*** ***(0.015)***	**1.068*** ***(0.015)***	**1.070*** ***(0.015)***	**1.069*** ***(0.015)***
Working hours	-	**0.993** ***(0.002)***	**0.996†** ***(0.002)***	-
Working hours (squared)	-	-	**1.000*** ***(0.000)***	-
Marginal work (<15h)	-	-	-	**1.379*** ***(0.121)***
Part-time work (15-29h)	-	-	-	1.111 ***(0.076)***
Long hours (> 45h) *(Ref: Full-time work (30-45h)*	-	-	-	1.144 ***(0.132)***
Intercept	*0.060* *(0.011)*	*0.073**** *(0.014)*	*0.054**** *(0.010)*	*0.055**** *(0.010)*
ICC	0.091	0. 087	0.088	.088
Pseudo-R^2	0.086	0.090	0.092	0.092
Log-Likelihood	*-5289.0728*	*-5284.4998*	*-5277.7374*	*-5281.8183*
n / N (countries)	11,130 / 25	11,130 / 25	11,130 / 25	11,130 / 25

Note. Logistic Multilevel Analysis estimating the effect of employment on political participation (0/1), maximum-likelihood estimation. Coefficients shown are odds-ratios, standard errors in parentheses. ***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05, †=p<0.1.

[97] For instance, those working longer hours tend to have more job autonomy than those working 'standard' fulltime working hours (mean autonomy of 6.35, compared to mean autonomy of 5.32).



Figure 4.9: Predicted probabilities of women's political participation.

Lastly, the interest is on the context-dependency of the effect. In order to test whether the negative effect of working hours is context-specific, another model has been fitted, in which the effect of working hours is allowed to vary over countries (random-coefficient model). This model can then be compared to the simpler random-intercept model in order to decide whether the additional random component improves the model fit significantly. For practical reasons and in order to keep the model parsimonious (and to facilitate the interpretation), Model 2 with only the linear working hours variable has been chosen. The corresponding random-coefficient model has a log-likelihood value of -5280.6, which gives a deviance of D_1=10561.2. The deviance of the random-intercept model is $D_0 = (-2) * -5284.5 = 10569.0$. The test-statistic, calculated as the difference of deviances ($D_0 - D_1$), is 7.85, which is statistically significant on a χ^2-distribution with two degrees of freedom ($\chi^2(2) = 7.85; p = 0.02$). In other words, a model, in which the effect of working hours is allowed to vary over the countries fits the data better – the effect of working time seems indeed to be context-dependent.

The covariance of the two random components of the model, the random intercepts (u_{0j}) and random slopes (u_{1j}), gives an indication of the pattern the random slopes follow. Here, the covariance is negative ($\sigma_{u01} = -0.004$), which means that countries with a larger intercept tend to have a stronger negative effect of working hours ('fanning-in'). Thus, where the mean level of participation is higher, working time has a stronger effect. I can visualise this effect by plotting the individual slopes for every country as shown in Figure 4.10. Although there are some exceptions (e.g. Finland at the top), those countries with and higher intercept generally have a steeper negative slope (e.g. Estonia, Germany, Spain, Switzerland). There appears to be no effect in France and Belgium, and in two countries, the Czech Republic and the UK I even find a positive effect of

working hours on political participation (see Figure B.1 in the Appendix for separate slopes for each country).

The results indicate that the assumption of identical effects within all Western democratic contexts does not hold for working hours. In fact, there are major differences in the effects of working time across countries, suggesting that either the effect of the free time available on political participation varies, or, alternatively, the association between working time and free time.



Figure 4.10: Country-specific slopes for the effect of working hours on political participation.

Job level

'Job level' is measured by three individual variables, which capture different aspects of the concept: the responsibility to supervise others, the occupational status, and work autonomy. All three items tap into the general organisation and communication skills that can be acquired and practised on the job and make it easier to engage politically, while occupational status has a stronger element of socio-economic position to it. Unsurprisingly, the variables are associated, however, as already discussed above, the correlation is only moderately strong[98;99].

Examined individually, all three variables show the expected positive effect (see Table 4.4, and Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.12 below). All other things equal, a woman with supervisory responsibility has around 50 per cent higher odds to participate politically

[98] The correlation between having supervisory responsibility and occupational status is $r = 0.212$ ($p < 0.001$), between supervisory responsibility and job autonomy it is $r = 0.280$ ($p < 0.001$), and between occupational status and job autonomy it is $r = 0.227$ ($p < 0.001$).

[99] Whilst all three variables are used as proxies for work-related civic skills, they measure distinct concepts and their relatively weak association is not surprising.

($OR = 1.52,\ p < 0.001$) than a woman who does not supervise others (Model 1). Occupational status also shows a positive effect; as the occupational status increases, so does the probability of political participation ($OR: 1.01, p < 0.001$) (Model 2). Over the range of the variable, this translates into a change in the predicted probabilities of political participation from $\rho = 0.17$ to $\rho = 0.27$ (see Figure 4.12). Lastly, I find that each one-point increase in work autonomy is associated with a nine per cent increase in the odds of political participation ($p < 0.001$) (Model 3).

In terms of model fit, the model including work autonomy is slightly better than the other two with Pseudo-R^2 of 0.11; and an ICC of just over eight per cent ($ICC = 0.082$). In contrast, the model including occupational status (Model 2) has the weakest model fit (Pseudo-$R^2 = 0.09$). Although the differences between the models are small and might merely reflect the quality of the variables (thus, should not be overinterpreted), this might indicate that the effect of job level can be better understood in terms of civic skills gained (which work autonomy measures most directly), rather than other aspects associated with higher level jobs, such as income or experiences of discrimination.

In the joint model, the sizes of all coefficients are slightly smaller but remain significant (Model 4). Overall, all models provide strong support for *Hypothesis 4.2a*, showing the expected strong and positive effect of the job level. However, the results also suggest that differences in job levels contribute only modestly to the explanation of country differences in women's political participation, as around 8.6 per cent of the variance remain to be due to differences between countries. As before, the next step is to test the context-dependency of the effects found. Therefore, another set of models, in which the coefficients are allowed to vary across countries (random-coefficient models), has been estimated. However, the likelihood-ratio tests against the corresponding random-intercept models do not provide evidence for the context-dependency of any of the three variables[100]. Thus, *Hypothesis 4.2b* has to be rejected, and I conclude that the effects of job level on the political participation of women do not vary significantly over the countries in the analysis.

[100] Supervisory responsibility: The deviance of the random-coefficient model is $D_0 = (-2) * -5{,}314.72 = 10629.44$, the deviance of the random intercept model is $D_1 = (-2) * -5{,}313.81 = 10627.62$. Therefore $D_0 - D_1 = 1.82$ and for $\chi^2(2) = 1.82 \quad p = 0.402$.
Occupational status: The deviance of the random-coefficient model is $D_0 = (-2) * -5{,}325.56 = 10651.12$, and the deviance of the random-intercept model is $D_1 = (-2) * -5{,}325.43 = 10650.86$. Therefore $D_0 - D_1 = 0.25$; and for $\chi^2(2) = 0.25 \quad p = 0.882$.
Work autonomy: The deviance of the random-intercept model is $D_0 = (-2) * -5{,}297.63 = 10595.26$, and the deviance of the random-coefficient model is $D_1 = (-2) * -5{,}297.08 = 10594.16$. Therefore $D_0 - D_1 = 1.09$; and for $\chi^2(2) = 1.09 \quad p = 0.579$.

Even if the p-values are halved to account for the fact that the variance of the coefficient is, by definition, non-negative (cf. Steele 2009), and all random-coefficient models are rejected in favour of the simpler random-intercept models.

Table 4.4: Logistic multi-level analysis of the effect of job level on employed women's political participation

Independent variables	Effect of job level			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Age	**1.007*** **	**1.008*** **	**1.006** **	**1.005** **
	(0.002)	*(0.002)*	*(0.002)*	*(0.002)*
Degree level education *(Ref: less than degree level)*	**1.585*** **	**1.413*** **	**1.552*** **	**1.344*** **
	(0.084)	*(0.085)*	*(0.083)*	*(0.081)*
Partner *(Ref: No partner)*	1.091	1.098	1.060	1.046
	(0.057)	*(0.057)*	*(0.056)*	*(0.055)*
Medium political interest	**1.894*** **	**1.875*** **	**1.881*** **	**1.834*** **
	(0.103)	*(0.102)*	*(0.102)*	*(0.100)*
Strong political interest *(Ref: Weak political interest)*	**3.541*** **	**3.516*** **	**3.543*** **	**3.421*** **
	(0.309)	*(0.307)*	*(0.310)*	*(0.300)*
Socially active once a week *(Ref: Less than once a week)*	**1.278*** **	**1.279*** **	**1.250*** **	**1.247*** **
	(0.069)	*(0.069)*	*(0.068)*	*(0.068)*
Gender role attitude *(more egalitarian)*	**1.060*** **	**1.056*** **	**1.059*** **	**1.048** **
	(0.015)	*(0.015)*	*(0.015)*	*(0.015)*
Supervisory responsibility	**1.521*** **	**-**	**-**	**1.338*** **
	(0.084)			*(0.076)*
Occupational status	**-**	**1.010*** **	**-**	**1.007*** **
		(0.002)		*(0.002)*
Job autonomy	-	-	**1.091*** **	**1.074*** **
			(0.010)	*(0.010)*
Intercept	0.059*** (0.010)	0.042*** (0.008)	0.044*** (0.008)	0.037*** (0.007)
ICC	0.090	0.092	0.082	0.086
Pseudo-R^2	0.095	0.092	0.108	0.113
Log-Likelihood	*-5314.7187*	*-5325.5588*	*-5297.629*	*-5274.231*
n / N (countries)	11,232 / 25	11,232 / 25	11,232 / 25	11,232 / 25

Note. Logistic Multilevel Analysis estimating the effect of employment characteristics on political participation (0/1) of employed women, maximum-likelihood estimation. Coefficients shown are odds-ratios, standard errors in parentheses.
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05, †=p<0.1.



Figure 4.11: Predicted probabilities of women's political participation for the different categories of supervisory responsibility.



Figure 4.12: Predicted probabilities of women's political participation over the range of the explanatory variables 'occupational status' and 'job autonomy scale'.

Integrated model

Working hours and job level are expected to be associated, as those working fewer hours are commonly clustered at lower job levels (cf. Gornick and Jacobs 1996; O'Reilly and Fagan 1998). In other words, they might be negatively confounded and including them simultaneously in the model might magnify their effects. There is also a possibility that the two variables interact, thus, that the effect of working hours might depend on the job level (or vice versa). Table 4.5 below shows, therefore, a simple integrated model, including the simple linear working hours variable as well as all three job level variables (Model 1). The last three models in the table show interactions of working hours with each job level variable. In order to facilitate the analysis of the interactions, the working hours variable has been centred on its mean (33 hours) in the last three models, and 'occupational status' has also been centred on its mean (45.35).

The joint inclusion of working hours and the skill variables does not seem to change the effect of any of these variables drastically, as Model 1 shows[101]. The random effect of working time also remains significant, when the skill variables are included in the model (output not shown). We can see, however, that two of the interactions of working time and skill variables are significant: the effect of working hours is different for those who supervise others than those who do not, and there is also an interaction between working time and job autonomy. The interaction of time and occupational status is not significant.

[101]Since the direct comparison of odds-ratios across models is difficult, this refers to the overall impression of the effect sizes.

Table 4.5: Logistic multi-level analysis of the effect of working hours and job level on employed women's political participation

Independent variables	Effect of working hours and job level			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Age	**1.005****	**1.006****	**1.005***	**1.006****
	(0.002)	*(0.002)*	*(0.002)*	*(0.002)*
Degree level education *(Ref: less than degree level)*	**1.364*****	**1.366*****	**1.366*****	**1.367*****
	(0.083)	*(0.083)*	*(0.083)*	*(0.083)*
Partner *(Ref: No partner)*	1.045	1.049	1.042	1.049
	(0.056)	*(0.056)*	*(0.056)*	*(0.056)*
Medium political interest	**1.816*****	**1.815*****	**1.818*****	**1.815*****
	(0.100)	*(0.100)*	*(0.100)*	*(0.100)*
Strong political interest *(Ref: Weak political interest)*	**3.342*****	**3.333*****	**3.347*****	**3.321*****
	(0.298)	*(0.297)*	*(0.298)*	*(0.296)*
Socially active once a week *(Ref: Less than once a week)*	**1.236*****	**1.239*****	**1.235*****	**1.239*****
	(0.068)	*(0.068)*	*(0.068)*	*(0.068)*
Gender role attitude *(more egalitarian)*	**1.054*****	**1.054*****	**1.054*****	**1.054*****
	(0.016)	*(0.016)*	*(0.016)*	*(0.016)*
Working Hours	**0.989*****	**0.986*****	**0.989*****	**0.974*****
	(0.002)	*(0.003)*	*(0.002)*	*(0.005)*
Supervisory responsibility	**1.381*****	**1.346*****	**1.386*****	**1.372*****
	(0.081)	*(0.080)*	*(0.081)*	*(0.080)*
Occupational status	**1.007*****	**1.007*****	**1.007*****	**1.007*****
	(0.002)	*(0.002)*	*(0.002)*	*(0.002)*
Job autonomy	**1.077*****	**1.076*****	**1.077*****	**1.076*****
	(0.011)	*(0.011)*	*(0.011)*	*(0.011)*
Supervisory responsibility *Working Hours	-	**1.012***	-	-
		(0.005)		
Occupational status * Working Hours	-	-	1.000	-
			(0.000)	
Job autonomy * Working hours	-	-	-	**1.002****
				(0.001)
Intercept	0.051*** (0.010)	0.035*** (0.007)	0.049*** (0.009)	0.034*** (0.006)
ICC	0.082	0.082	0.082	0.081
Pseudo-R^2	0.120	0.122	0.120	0.126
Log-Likelihood	*-5161.873*	*-5159.192*	*-5160.853*	*-5156.558*
n / N (countries)	11,010 / 25	11,010 / 25	11,010 / 25	11,010 / 25

Note. Logistic Multilevel Analysis estimating the effect of employment characteristics on political participation (0/1) of employed women, maximum-likelihood estimation. Coefficients shown are odds-ratios, standard errors in parentheses.
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05, †=p<0.1.

While the main effects remain similar to those in the previous model, the positive interaction terms indicate that the negative effect of working hours is less strong for those with supervisory responsibility and those with more autonomy in their jobs, this is visualised by the predicted probabilities in Figure 4.13 below. In other words, different types of resources appear to compensate each other: the lack of time associated with

longer working hours seems to be less problematic if skills are practised on the job. Or, alternatively, skills are more important for those women, who work long hours and have therefore less free time.

However, when interpreting these interactions, it should also be kept in mind, that those jobs requiring higher levels of skills are also distinct in other regards, for example, pay. It might be the case that the negative effect of working time is compensated through the flexibility provided by higher associated income[102], rather than skills. In any case, the findings suggest that the effects of resources are not as straightforward as often assumed in the literature. In particular, the effect of working hours seems to depend not only on the country-context, but also on other job characteristics.



Figure 4.13: Predicted probabilities of political participation showing the interaction between working time and civic skills.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the ways in which employment status and job characteristics affect women's probability of being politically active. Although the link between employment and political participation is long established, existing research has failed to provide a systematic, cross-national analysis of employment effects. Specifically, it has failed to address and assess the possible context-dependency of such effects. At least partially, this can be attributed to the predominance of single single-country studies, with the bulk of the research focusing of the US context, whilst existing cross-national

[102]Better economic means allow access to services such as childcare and domestic help, and they might also affect factors such as the modes of transport available or the length of a commute.

research often implicitly assumes homogeneous effects across all countries. This chapter contributes to existing knowledge about the links between employment and political participation by providing a systematic, cross-national analysis of the effects, and by specifically determine their context-dependency.

The empirical analysis in this chapter was split into two parts: The first assessed the effect of employment status and, accordingly, has looked at the entire female population. It was found that being employed does indeed have the expected positive effect on political participation. Women in paid employment were significantly more likely to have participated politically than those not in work. The positive effect of being employed appears to persist even after the employment has ended, as those who were previously in employment still profited, on a smaller scale, from that experience. This finding is particularly important for women, as many women leave the labour force at least temporarily, when entering motherhood. With regards to the context-dependency of the effect, there was no evidence that the effect of employment varies across countries.

The second main section has focussed on the effects of job characteristics, specifically on 'working time' and 'job level', on those women who are in paid employment. As expected, a higher-level job was associated with a higher probability of political activity – this holds true for all of the three different indicators used. The effect of job level was also not dependent on the context, as the random-effects model did not fit the data better than the respective fixed-effects model. Regarding the effects of working time, this chapter could make two interesting observations. The overall effect of working hours was negative, showing that working longer hours affects the free time available for political participation, and therefore confirming the conclusions made by Burns, Schlozman and Verba (2001) for the American context. However, this effect was found to be non-homogenous over all countries but appeared to be context-dependent. The analyses suggested a 'fanning-in' patterns, thus, signifying that there was a stronger negative effect in those countries with higher political participation rates.

This finding could not be conclusively explained, but a possible interpretation could be that in countries, in which women are more likely to be active, they might also be more *intensively* active and as a consequence, longer working hours have a stronger negative effect. In contrast, countries where women's political activity is less common, the available time might play less of a role compared to other factors. Nevertheless, further research is required to better understand what drives the differences of effects of working time.

Secondly, an interaction between job level and working hours was uncovered. Woking time appeared to have a less negative effect on those women in positions with

high levels of autonomy than those in less autonomous jobs. This is an important finding in two regards: Firstly, it suggests that different resources can compensate each other, which is positive for women working long hours in high-level jobs, as the lack of free time can be (partially) compensated by the civic skills earned. However, it secondly also implies that women working long hours in lower-level jobs are disproportionally disadvantaged. Since women in these jobs tend to also be disadvantaged in other regards, for example education, this poses a serious concern about their political voice.

A summary of all findings can be found in Table 4.6. Overall, the results of this chapter add to the literature by providing evidence that the political implications of employment are not as straight-forward as often assumed. They provide insights in the role the context plays, which will be further explored in the following chapters.

Table 4.6: Overview of the hypotheses tested in Chapter 4

Hypothesis		**Confirmed?**
Employment		
4.1a	Being employed increases women's probability of political participation.	✓
4.1b	Previous employment increases women's probability of political participation.	✓
4.1c	The strength of the positive effect of employment on political participation varies over countries.	✗
Job level		
4.2a	Women in high-level positions have more civic skills and more likely to participate politically than women in lower-level jobs.	✓
4.2b	The strength of the positive effect of high-level positions on political participation varies over the countries.	✗
Working hours		
4.3a	Shorter working hours increase the probability of political participation for women.	✓
4.3b	The effect of working hours on political participation is not linear, but convex, meaning that very short and very long working hours have a negative effect.	✗
4.3c	The strength of the negative effect of working hours on political participation varies over countries.	✓

In this chapter, I have assumed that the effects of employment and employment characteristics are the same for all groups of women, however, that is not necessarily a realistic assumption. The effects of being employed dependent on specific life situations, which can differ widely across different groups of women. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore the political effects of employment for all those groups, but the next chapter (5) explores this for the group of *mothers*. The chapters to follow will then come back to the impact of the context and explore the effect of labour market policies (Chapter 6) and the gendered nature of the labour market (Chapter 7).

5 CARE WORK, EMPLOYMENT, AND THE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF MOTHERS

Whilst one might presume mothers of young children have vested interest in shaping the political future, they are often found among the least active in conventional forms of political participation. Many studies have hypothesised or discussed the effect children might have on the political activity of their mothers. The effect of motherhood (or more generally parenthood) has been the focus of the seventies' and eighties' wave of gender and politics scholarship (Lynn and Flora 1973; Welch 1977; Jennings 1979; McGlen 1980; Clark and Clark 1986;), however, it has recently gained new attention in the empirical literature on political participation and political attitudes (Wolfinger and Wolfinger 2008; Voorpostel and Coffé 2012; Greenlee 2014; Banducci et al. 2016; Quaranta 2016; Thomas and Bittner 2017).

Surprisingly, most of these studies have paid little attention to the effects of employment, and it remains unclear to what extent the effect of motherhood on employment might contribute to the decreased political participation of this group of women. The little empirical research that does exist is dated and focusses on the American context only (cf. Lynn and Flora 1973; McGlen 1980; Andersen and Cook 1985). This paucity of research is particularly surprising given the central feminist discourse about productive work, reproductive work, and citizenship (Pateman 1989; Lister 2002); the plethora of work on parenthood effects on different employment outcomes in the sociology of work (e.g. Gornick and Meyers 2003; Pettit and Hook 2009) and the considerable body of research linking work and employment to political participation in general (Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001; also see Chapter 4).

There are good reasons to expect employment to operate differently on the political participation of mothers than it does on women without children. Firstly, some countries still either passively or actively encourage women with young children to leave the labour force at least temporarily, for example, through generous maternity leave schemes, or limited supply of institutional childcare. Therefore this group of women might assign a different meaning to paid work. Secondly, mothers are disproportionally responsible for another type of work, namely *care work*. As childcare[103] is still a profoundly gendered responsibility (García-Mainar, Molina and Montuenga 2011), employed mothers face an additional challenge, that is the balancing act between reproductive and productive work.

[103]I acknowledge that care work is not limited to the care of children, but equally includes the care for the elderly and other dependants or family members. However, there is no information in the ESS dataset on any of those forms of care, therefore the focus is her solely on childcare.

As a consequence, employment might not have the same facilitating effect on the political participation of mothers it has on the rest of the population. We can therefore not simply assume that the employment effects found for women in general equally hold for this subgroup of women.

However, due to the limited empirical research on the effect of employment on the political participation of mothers, our understanding of how care work, employment, and political participation intersect, remains limited. The typically lower levels of political participation of this demographic make this lack of knowledge particularly problematic, as an encompassing understanding of the specific challenges mothers of young children face is necessary when aiming to increase their political participation.

This chapter addresses this gap in the understanding. It aims to explore how different employment characteristics (employment status, job level and working time) can foster or hinder the political engagement of mothers specifically. By providing an insight in the relationship of market work and political activity for a group of women, for which this link has not yet been examined, it makes not only an original contribution to the literature, but it also contributes to the overall goal of this dissertation: it tests whether the relationship between work and political participation holds in general, or is situation-specific. To achieve this goal, the chapter takes an approach that is similar to the previous chapter, by first analysing the effects of employment status, and then going into detail about the job characteristics for those mothers who are employed. As the reconciliation of market and care work depends highly on the structure of and policies regulating the labour market, I will also assess the context-dependency of the effects found, and contrast and compare those with findings from Chapter 4.

The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows: The existing literature on motherhood, employment, and political participation will be reviewed in the subsequent section (Section 5.1). I will reflect on existing knowledge and develop an argument of why employment effects on mothers might differ from that on the general populace. The literature will provide the basis on which the expectations are formulated that will guide the analyses. Section 5.2 after is concerned with the data and variables used, and it also describes the modelling strategy of this chapter. In Sections 5.3 and 5.4, I will then present the results of the analyses of employment status and job characteristics respectively. The chapter will close with some concluding comments in the last section.

5.1. The double burden: Motherhood, employment, and political participation

Up until now, this dissertation has implicitly assumed the effects of employment and employment characteristics to be the same for all groups of women, however, as explained in the introductory section above, this is not necessarily a realistic assumption. The effects of employment will depend on specific life-situations. The intersection of employment, care work and political participation is particularly intriguing because motherhood has important implications for both, labour market behaviour and outcomes, (Gornick and Meyers 2003; Lewis 2009) and political participation (McGlen 1980). This section will review the existing literature on motherhood, employment and political participation and use it to develop the hypotheses to guide the empirical analyses later in the chapter.

The political effect of employment on mothers

There is a small but growing body of literature within the scholarship of gender and politics that is concerned with the effects of parenthood, and specifically that of motherhood on political activity. The research focusses predominantly on the effects children have on the resources (time and money) available to parents or the effects on their networks. Beckwith (1986) summarises: "[T]he impact for all women who have primary child-rearing responsibilities is that of isolating mothers from other adults and from public activities, or, if the mother is employed outside the home, of taking up the time after work that fathers are more likely to have for leisure, if not political, activities" (p.58). Empirical literature usually finds a small negative effect on the mothers of young (i.e. preschool-aged) children, and no or a small positive effect of school-children (Voorpostel and Coffé 2012; Burns, Scholzman and Verba 2001).

Two explanations for the negative effect of young children are prominent in the literature: the *psychological confinement* argument and the *time-constraint* argument. Although these two arguments are neither contradictory nor mutually exclusive, they are particularly interesting from a perspective of employment effects, as different expectations about the effect of employment for mothers can be derived.

According to the *psychological confinement hypothesis,* motherhood and duties of caregiving (which are still predominantly performed by women) emphasise women's traditional role in the private sphere. McGlen (1980) argues that women are socialised to prioritise motherhood over other duties; thus, the political activity might simply become a matter of secondary importance. Indeed, it might even influence women's internalised self-understanding as an (un-)political individual. This self-understanding can be reinforced through social networks. As a consequence of changed life situation and

responsibilities, new mothers might have overall less time for social interaction, and this, in turn, can foster feelings of isolation. Alternatively, mothers might be spending (more of) their time in predominantly unpolitical, child-centred (thus private-sphere) networks (Lynn and Flora 1973), reverting the focus, again, on the private sphere. In short, motherhood might lead to a psychological, as well as interactional, confinement to the private sphere.

Quite clearly, being (or remaining) in a paid job might compensate for these consequences of motherhood. If a mother stays employed, she remains attached to the public sphere and the associated professional (not child-centred) networks. Employment also diversifies a woman's roles and counteracts a narrow self-definition in terms of motherhood, for example by keeping a worker identity (cf. Johnston and Swanson 2006). In other words, following this argument, we should expect employment to have a positive effect on the political activity of mothers of young children. Since not being employed has stronger consequences for mothers of young children than it would have on childless women, we can also anticipate that the effect of employment is more strongly positive for mothers than it is for women without children.

Hypothesis 5.1a: *Employment increases the probability of political participation for mothers of young children.*

Hypothesis 5.1b: *The positive effect of employment on the probability of political participation is stronger for mothers of young children than for childless women.*

In contrast, the second perspective suggests that motherhood creates, above all, *time-constraints*, building upon the fact that child-rearing requires a substantive amount of both, time and energy. As, irrespective of their employment status, women in heterosexual relationships[104] commonly face the lion's share of care work (Sayer 2005; Craig and Sawrikar 2009; García-Mainar, Molina and Montuenga 2011, p.120), they have a limited amount of free time at their disposal. Younger children, in particular, require intensive parental care and can put a substantial time constraint on mothers (Ironmonger 2004, p.103; Craig and Sawrikar 2009). Reduced political activity is then, according to this argument, simply the result of different responsibilities competing for limited resources, primarily time.

Paid employment should, accordingly, exacerbate the existing time-conflicts. In other words, the double burden of care work and market work might leave mothers with no time – or no energy – for political activity. While there is little recent empirical evidence available, McGlen's (1980) study using American data from the 1970s comes to the

[104]While much of the literature concentrates on heterosexual couples, the argument of time-restriction applies equally to single mothers, who are solely responsible for the care work.

cautious conclusion that "at least for women already politically mobilized, workforce participation produces an additional time burden for mothers resulting in less, rather than more, political activity" (p. 312). In contrast to women more generally, we can, therefore, expect a negative effect of employment on the political activity of mothers.

Hypothesis 5.1c: *Employment decreases the probability of political participation for mothers of young children.*

Job characteristics and political participation for mothers

The link between work and political participation for mothers is not limited to the employment status. It is well established that motherhood affects women's working hours and career progression substantially; this subsection aims to theorise whether we can expect different effects of these employment characteristics on the political participation of mothers as well.

Working time

The line of reasoning of the time-constraint argument can be easily extended to predict the effect of working time on the political activity of mothers. Motherhood is closely related to working hours. Indeed, a transition to part-time work is commonly considered a strategy by mothers to deal with the double burden of care and market work.

The link between working time and political participation for mothers specifically is also compelling (and potentially different from that of non-mothers) because time is an especially limited resource for mothers. Having children and especially young children greatly affects the amount of free time available to women (not so much to men) (Burns, Schlozman, Verba 2001; Sayer 2005). This effect is not surprising since parenthood creates a whole new type of domestic work (i.e. childcare), but it also increases the volume of related household tasks, for instance, cleaning or laundry, while the additional work is disproportionally shouldered by women (Milkie, Raley and Bianchi 2009).

For working women, this leads to a scarcity of leisure time. Working mothers often face what Arlie Hochschild (1989) has pointedly described as the 'second shift'. In addition to their market work, working mothers come home to another 'shift' of care and housework that fathers do not face in the same way; leaving women with little free time, and as a consequence feeling time-constrained and tired. We can see this on the aggregate level: although women's time spent in market work has increased in recent years, time spent on housework has not decreased proportionally, while the time spent on childcare has stayed the same or even increased (Gauthier, Smeeding and Furstenberg 2004; Sayer 2005). On the individual level, women working more hours are found to spend fewer hours on housework and childcare, however, again, not necessarily

proportionally so (Baxter, Hewitt and Haynes 2008). In order to deal with the double burden, working mothers are found to redirect time, that is from their leisure activities to childcare or market work (Craig 2007).

This scarcity of leisure time is likely to affect the link between working hours and political participation. To my knowledge, the effect of working time on mothers of young children specifically has not yet been the focus of research, but there are good reasons to expect it to differ from the effect on women more generally. Specifically, I expect working time to be more strongly negatively associated with political activity in this group of women. This is because the double burden of market and care work causes women to redirect their time. Research has shown that employed mothers tend to use 'free-time' on the weekend to make up for missed time with their children during the week, due to market work (Craig 2007). In other words, working hours even affect the leisure time of mothers on the weekend; thus, they have a stronger effect on the resource of time available. Since the effect on free time is stronger, so should be the effect on political activity.

However, an important distinction needs to be made with regards to the child's age. The overall time spent on childcare strongly depends on the age of the youngest child (Craig and Bittman 2008; Milkie, Raley and Bianchi 2009). Indeed, the biggest change in mothers' time spent on care can be seen when the youngest child starts school – an event that reduces care responsibilities and time pressures on women significantly (Craig and Bittman 2008). A stronger negative effect of working time might, therefore, hold for women with younger children, but not equally for mothers of older children. Thus, leaving us with the following expectation:

> **Hypothesis 5.2a**: *The negative effect of working hours on the probability of political participation is stronger for mothers of young children than for childless women and mothers of older children.*

Finally, the effect of hours of work could be shaped by the national context. The time squeeze associated with combining market work and domestic work will depend on the formal care available to working mothers. Only in some countries, long-hour formal childcare is widely available to and affordable for working mothers, which should help to alleviate the negative effect of working hours on free time. More generally, Sayer and Gornick's (2012) study of nine Western countries has shown the effect of working hours on time spend on childcare to be highly context-dependent, an equal increase in working hours does not translate into an equal decrease in time spent on care in all countries. Similarly, the context appears to matter for the division of domestic work within couples

(Hook 2010). Accordingly, the link between working hours and free-time (and thus, political participation) can also be expected to be context-dependent:

> **Hypothesis 5.2b**: *The effect of working hours on the probability of political participation for mothers of young children is context-dependent.*

Job level

Motherhood strongly affects women's career trajectories: Empirical research from a number of different contexts suggests that having children, but also the timing of childbearing, the number and the age of children impact on women's career progression (Wilde, Batchelder and Ellwood 2010; McIntosh et al. 2012; Kahn, García-Manglano and Bianchi 2014; Cools, Markussen and Strøm 2018). Part of the gender pay gap literature attributes the biggest share of the pay gap to the motherhood penalty (Waldvogel 1998). However, while this explains the different 'endowment' with high-level jobs of mothers and childless women, it does not necessarily mean that the effect on political participation also differs. With regards to the skills associated with high-level positions, there is indeed not much reason to expect an effect that differs from the positive effect found for women more generally in the previous chapter.

However, the job level is also associated with other job characteristics and outcomes. For instance, high-level jobs can be more demanding than lower-level work and contribute to stronger work-life conflicts (Crompton and Lyonette 2006). Since working mothers of young children are more strongly affected by work-family conflicts, being in a high-level job might put additional strain on them, reducing the likelihood of political participation. However, at least part of the higher work-life conflict associated with high-level positions stems from more extended working hours (DiRenzo, Greenhaus and Weer 2011). In a model controlling for working hours, this effect to show more clearly through the working hour coefficient, rather than the job level.

Also, high skilled jobs produce a higher income. Income is important because it can be used to 'buy' other resources, in particular, time: For example, money can be spent to acquire care work outside the household, for example through babysitters or nannies, but it also supports flexibility more generally, for instance by providing access to private transportation, or allowing families to live more central. Whilst the same is true for women without children, this exchange of money for time might be more important to mothers since I expect them to have less free time available.

Secondly, job level is also linked to employment experiences, for example, the experience of discrimination. As I have discussed before (see Chapter 4), experiencing discrimination can politicise women and spark political activity. Since discrimination

against women in the labour market is linked to motherhood, such experience might be more salient to working mothers than to other women in the workforce.

Lastly, there is also a good reason to expect working mothers in high-level positions to differ systematically from both, mothers in lower positions and non-mothers in high-level positions, for instance regarding their attitudes. Since I expect it to be more difficult for them to be and remain in high-level positions, mothers of young children might be characterised by a stronger commitment to work and the public sphere, or by more egalitarian gender role attitudes, while some of these characteristics are linked to political participation. Since not all of these attitudes can be measured and are included in the model, they might contribute an additional spurious influence. Taking all together, we might, therefore, expect the job level to have a stronger positive effect on mothers than non-mothers.

> **Hypothesis 5.3a**: *The positive effect of job level on the probability of political participation is stronger for mothers than for childless women children.*

Again, there is also an argument for context-dependency of such effect. For example, the experience of motherhood-related discrimination and the degree to which this is related to high-level jobs is likely to be different across labour markets. Also, the degree to which income can (or has to) be used for private care should depend on the care arrangements available in each country. In short, it might be expected that the effect of job level on political participation is shaped by the context it occurs in:

> **Hypothesis 5.3b**: *The effect of job level on the probability of political participation for mothers is context-dependent.*

The interactions between motherhood and the employment variables are highlighted in the schematic illustration of the theoretical model shown in Figure 5.1 below. As we can see, the model has been extended to include an interaction between motherhood and employment variables, in other words, I explore whether the presence and age of children impacts on the links between labour market participation, job characteristics and political participation.

5.2. Measuring the effects of employment on mothers

Like the previous chapter, the focus of this chapter is on micro-level effects, i.e. the effects of employment status and job characteristics on the political participation of women with children. Therefore, the analyses in the chapter are based entirely on the micro-level data of the fifth round of the ESS. The dependent variable in all models is the binary measure of political participation which has been described in detail in Chapter 3.

The following sub-sections will, firstly, give a brief refresher of the operationalisation of employment status and job characteristics that have been already described in Chapter 4, and then continue to describe the modelling strategy of this chapter.



Figure 5.1: Schematic presentation of the links between employment and employment characteristics and women's political participation.

Indicators for employment and job characteristics

This chapter is, as the previous chapter, concerned with the effects of (1) employment status, (2) job level and (3) working time. In the analyses, a subset of the variables that have already been described in the previous chapter (see Section 4.2 on page 88), will be used; these also summarised in Table 5.1 below.

Employment status is measured as a simple binary variable, which assesses whether or not the respondent has participated in paid work for at least one hour in the last seven days. There are three different variables used for the *job level* of the respondent. The first one is a binary measure of the responsibility employees in the current job to supervise others. Those in positions of responsibility for others are not only likely to be in high-level positions, but more importantly, they are likely to make use of general civic skills, such as organisational or communication skills. The second variable is an assessment of the occupation status based on Ganzeboom and Treiman's (1996) International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI). The index aims to synthesise two elements associated with the status of an occupation, that is, firstly, the education required to perform it, and secondly, the associated income. Although not a perfect measure, a job that scores high on these two dimensions can arguably be considered a high-level job and should require more civic skills, than lower ranked jobs.

The last indicator for job level is the job autonomy. It is measured on a scale that has been constructed from three items, which assess the respondent's perceived degree of influence on the structure of their work, that is (1) the way the work is organised, (2) the pace of work, and (3) policy decisions of the company. The mean score of the three items has been calculated to create a composite scale that ranges from '0' for 'no influence at all' to 11 for 'complete control'. Lastly, *working time* is measured as the total 'normal' working time per week, this includes the contracted working hours, but also any overtime normally worked.

Table 5.1 Description of employment indicators used in Chapter 5

Dimension	Component	Indicator
Employment status	Current employment	Participation in paid work for at least one hour in the last seven days (binary)
Job level	Supervisory responsibility	Responsibility for supervising others in the main job (binary)
	Occupational status	International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI) based on occupation
	Job autonomy	Job autonomy scale (0-11)
Working time	Actual working hours	Total actual working hours, per week

Modelling strategy

The focus in this chapter is on women with children. Therefore the sample is different from that used in previous chapters: In order to compare effects on mothers to that on women without children, the sample will be divided. However, since different effects have been theorised and found for mothers of pre-school children and mothers of older school-aged children (e.g. Gornick, Meyers and Ross 1997), I will further subdivide the group of mothers into mothers of pre-school children (children under the age of a country's compulsory-school-age (CSA)) ($n = 3{,}542$), and mothers of school-aged children (over the compulsory-school-age to 18 years) ($n = 4{,}408$).

The definition of pre-school children used here is country-specific, in other words, a child is considered a 'pre-school child' if they are younger than the compulsory school age of their respective country of residence (shown in Table 5.2 below). A country-specific definition, in contrast to an age-based definition, has been adopted to ensure cross-country equivalence of the concept. Specifically, I argue that the defining characteristic of a pre-school child is not the exact age, but the fact that they do not yet attend compulsory, state-provided education/care. This is particularly important with regards to the effect on the mother, as the care responsibilities change most drastically

when the child starts attending school (consistently and continuously)[105] for at least part of the day.

Table 5.2 Compulsory school starting age by country

Age	Countries
4	Netherlands
5	Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, United Kingdom, Israel
6	Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland
7	Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, Sweden

Sources: Eurydice (2013) (all except for Israel); UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2015) (Israel).
Note. Compulsory education: The age at which children are legally obliged to attend school. All data refer to 2013 except for Israel, which refer to 2015.

For the same reason, a mother with more than one child will be classified according to the age of her youngest child. In other words, a woman with both pre-school and school-aged children will be classified as a mother of 'pre-school' children, as there is still a child present who does not yet attend school.

While the decision to analyse mothers of preschool children and school-aged children separately will allow me to explore differences in effects, this approach comes with a strong technical caveat. It leaves relatively small subgroup sample sizes, both overall, but more importantly by country. For instance, there are fewer than 100 mothers of preschool children from each Cyprus, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland in the sample (see Table C.1 in the Appendix for an overview of sample size by country). As a consequence, standard errors will be large in comparative analyses, and random-effects models should be interpreted with caution.

In the second part of the analyses, the focus is not on the employment status, but on the effects of job characteristics (working time and job level) on political participation. Consequently, only those women, who are currently employed (or self-employed) are included in the analyses in this part. This, again, has consequences for the sample size: there are, in total, $n = 1{,}958$ working mothers of preschool children, and $n = 2{,}738$ working mothers of school-aged children in the dataset. On average, each country has a sample of $n = 78$ employed mothers of preschool children ($n = 110$ mothers of school-aged children), but for Cyprus, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia and Switzerland, the sample size is smaller than 50 (see Table C.2 in the Appendix for a complete overview of sample

[105] I argue that this is also true for mothers that make use of other forms of (institutional) child care facilities for two reasons. Firstly, school provides care more *consistently* than earlier childcare, as it requires attendance for a fixed time of every day of the week for fixed number of weeks in the year. Secondly, school provides care/education *continuously* for most of children's early life, thus giving the family planning security.

size by country). Again, this should be kept in mind, when interpreting any country-specific analyses, as the power of these analyses will be limited.

In terms of the modelling strategy, this chapter follows mostly the approach already discussed in the previous chapter: Despite the focus on individual-level effects, the hierarchical structure of the data requires a suitable approach. Therefore the main models presented are logistic multi-level models. All models are estimated using maximum-likelihood estimation (with seven integration points) in Stata®, and for ease of interpretation, the coefficients are presented as odds-ratios. The context-dependency of effects will be tested through a likelihood-ratio test using the deviance of each model (the deviance D_j is minus twice the log-likelihood value). The difference of the of the random-intercept model and the respective random-coefficient follows a χ^2-distribution on the degrees of freedom equal to the difference in the number of the parameters in the two models (Snijders and Bosker 2012, p.97). As in the previous model, the overall goodness-of fit will be assessed through the explained variance (Pseudo-R^2), the log-likelihood value and the Intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC), which measures the proportion of the variance that can be attributed to differences between countries.

5.3. Employment status and political participation of mothers

The first part of answering the question of how employment affects the political participation of women with children is to establish how employment *status* influences political activity. The previous chapter has found that women are generally more likely to participate politically if they are gainfully employed, but the same might not be true for women with children. This section will explore the employment effects on mothers further. It will first look into the employment patterns of mothers of preschool- and school children, and then test the effects of employment status on political activity.

Employment of mothers in Europe

It is now well established from a large body of research, that parenthood affects the employment of both men and women, albeit in different directions. Fatherhood increases a man's probability of being employed and to work longer hours, while women with children are likely to transition into part-time work or (temporarily) exit the labour force altogether – although the strength of this effect appears to vary across countries (e.g. Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001; Crompton 2006; Plantenga and Remery 2013). The effect of parenthood has been attributed to a number of factors, including the persistence of traditional gender roles, which assign the primary responsibility for care work to women, sociocultural norms about maternal employment, and the poor institutional support for working families (cf. Correll, Benard and Paik 2007)

We can observe the adverse effect of small children on women's employment also in the ESS data. If we compare the proportion of working-age women (between 18 and 65 years) without children, those with preschool-aged children and those with school-aged children currently in paid work on the left-hand side of Figure 5.2, it appears, at first glance, that having school-aged children actually has a positive effect on women's probability of working, while having preschool children does not have a significant effect.

However, this can be mostly attributed to the composition of the group without children, which consists disproportionally of retired women and those in education; in other words, those who are both, too old or too young to be employed and to have children. If I exclude retired women and those in education from the analyses, we get a clearer picture of the effect of motherhood. As the right-hand side of Figure 5.2 shows, women with preschool children are statistically significantly ($p < 0.01$) less likely to be employed than the two other groups[106]. The difference between mothers of preschool children and mothers of schoolchildren gives an important clue about what drives this effect, namely children's care needs: These are higher for younger children (Ironmonger 2004), while, at the same time, in many countries, the access to formal childcare is particularly limited for the youngest children (cf. Plantenga and Remery 2013).



Note. Different letters denote that the employment rates of these groups are statistically significantly different (at $p < 0.05$).

Figure 5.2: Employment rates of working-age (18-65 years) women without children, women with preschool children, and women with school-aged children.

[106]The figure for mothers of preschool children might, if anything, be an overestimation of the actual proportion of women currently in work, since the ESS questionnaire does not give clear instructions on whether women on maternal/parental leave should consider themselves as being 'in work' or not (see Table B.1 the Appendix for the exact wording of the question).

Indeed, the importance of institutional support becomes evident, if we dissect the overall effect and turn to maternal employment rates by country. We find a picture that is characterised by both, similarity and difference. Figure 5.3 below is based on data from Eurostat (2018) and shows employment rates of women aged 20 to 49 by different household constellations: for (1) women with no children, (2) women with one child under the age of 6, (3) women with 2 children and the youngest under the age of 6, and finally (4) women with 3 or more children.



Figure 5.3: Employment rates of women aged 20 to 49 in 2010, by household constellation and country. Source: Eurostat (2018) (no data for Norway, Switzerland and Israel).

What stands out, is the fact that non-mothers have the highest employment rates in almost all of the countries included (except Croatia, Denmark, Lithuania, Slovenia and Sweden). In other words, the presence of children in the household appears to have a sizeable negative effect on women's employment in most European countries.

At the same time, there is considerable variation in the size of the effect, as the differences in the employment rates are bigger in some countries than in others. By far the largest differences in employment can be found in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. All four countries are characterised by a low provision of formal childcare, particularly for under-three-year olds (Plantenga and Remery 2013, pp.98-99; also see Chapter 6). Conversely, Denmark, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Sweden are amongst the countries with the smallest differences in employment rates, while they are also leading in childcare provision for pre-school children (see Chapter 6). Interestingly, in some countries, the children's age seems to be more important than the number of children in the household. In the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland and Slovakia, the

employment rates of women with three or more children is higher than for women with fewer children, where the youngest is under the age of six. However, there is no clear link to childcare provision, as Estonia and Finland have a relatively good provision of formal care for children under the age of six.

In summary, having children affects the labour force behaviour of women in different countries differently[107] and the context, particularly the provision of formal childcare, plays a decisive role. This finding will be in focus again in Chapter 6, where I specifically explore the role of work-family policies for political participation. For now, we can conclude that employment is not equally common for mothers of young children in different countries. This also means that there is a good chance that maternal employment has a different meaning for mothers in Denmark than those in the Czech Republic. And this can have implications for the effect of employment on those women's political participation. Whether this is indeed the case, and how exactly employment affects the participation of mothers will be analysed in the next subsection.

Employment status and political participation

To shed more light on the question how employment affects political participation for mothers, a set of multi-level models has been estimated, one for women without children, one for mothers of pre-school aged children and one for mothers of school children. The results are shown in Table 5.3.

The positive coefficient of the 'work' variable in models (2) and (3) shows that the concern about the double burden of domestic and market work to keep mothers from being politically active is unsubstantiated. On the contrary, I find that employment has a positive effect in all three groups: it increases the odds-ratios of both groups of mothers by 23 per cent ($OR: 1.23; p < 0.05$). The result provides support for *Hypothesis 5.1a* and against *Hypothesis 5.1c*.

In terms of strength of the effect, the first impression is that the odds-ratios are even larger in the last two models than in the model of women without children. However, it is difficult to compare odds-ratios across different models. Therefore a single model with an interaction term of motherhood and employment status has been fitted to confirm whether this impression holds (see Table C.3 in the Appendix). I find that none of the interaction terms reaches statistical significance, suggesting that the effect of being employed is similar across all three groups of women. Thus, I have to reject *Hypothesis 5.1b*. The weaker significance in the last two models might be due to the smaller sample

[107] A word of caution about the causality of the effect is required here: Since these bivariate statistics do not control for other factors that might be associated with employment (e.g. the age of the mother or the socio-economic status), we can, of course, not deduct with certainty that the results are driven by the effect of children.

sizes. There is a slight difference in the explanatory power of the employment variable, that is, the ICC in these models is slightly larger than in the respective model without the work variable (see Table C.5 in the Appendix) for Model 1 and 2, while it decreases slightly in Model 3. In other words, once I account for employment, the share of the variation that can be attributed to differences between countries increases slightly for women without children and women with preschool children.

Table 5.3: Logistic multi-level analysis of the effect of employment on the political participation of women without children, with preschool children and with school-aged children

Independent variables	Effect of employment status		
	(1) No children	(2) Preschool children	(3) School-aged children
Age	1.000	1.009	0.995
	(0.001)	*(0.006)*	*(0.004)*
Degree level education	**1.751*** **	**1.307***	**1.712*** **
(Ref: less than degree level)	*(0.093)*	*(0.137)*	*(0.171)*
Partner	1.085	1.188	1.149
(Ref: No partner)	(0.048)	(0.156)	(0.111)
Medium political interest	**1.965*** **	**2.108*** **	**2.167*** **
	(0.097)	*(0.220)*	*(0.192)*
Strong political interest	**4.054*** **	**4.224*** **	**4.101*** **
(Ref: Weak political interest)	*(0.286)*	*(0.779)*	*(0.643)*
Socially active once a week	**1.338*** **	1.189	1.128
(Ref: Less than once a week)	*(0.065)*	*(0.122)*	*(0.102)*
Gender role attitude	**1.066*** **	**1.099*** **	**1.056***
(more egalitarian)	*(0.013)*	*(0.029)*	*(0.024)*
In work	**1.180*** **	**1.230***	**1.230***
(Ref: Not in paid work)	*(0.059)*	*(0.126)*	*(0.118)*
Intercept	0.062*** *(0.011)*	0.041*** *(0.013)*	0.100 *(0.024)*
ICC	0.103	0.108	0.106
Pseudo-R^2	0.095	0.090	0.087
Log-Likelihood	*-6897.459*	*-1497.495*	*-1977.3459*
n / N (countries)	17,042 / 25	3,455 / 25	4,299 / 25

Note. Logistic Multilevel Analysis estimating the effect of employment on political participation (0/1), maximum-likelihood estimation. Coefficients shown are odds-ratios, standard errors in parentheses. ***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05, †=p<0.1.

The next question to address is whether the link between employment and political participation the same in all countries included. For women overall, I have found no evidence for the context-dependency of the employment effects; however, since the institutional support for working-mothers varies substantially across countries (see Chapter 6) and maternal employment rates vary (see above), the meaning of employment is also likely to be context-dependent. If this was the case, I should find the employment effect to vary across countries. To test the context-dependency of the effect,

three models with a random coefficient of the employment variable have been fitted. However, the likelihood-ratio tests against the corresponding fixed-effects models reject all three random-effects models in favour of the simpler fixed-effects model[108]. In other words, the effect of employment appears to be not context-dependent for mothers of young and older children, just as it was for women overall.

To summarise, employment has a positive effect on mothers, and this effect is not significantly different from the effect on childless women. Surprisingly, given the stark differences in maternal employment, I have also not found evidence for variation across countries, meaning that the effect is similar in all contexts. The implications of these findings are still not unproblematic if we keep in mind that employment rates for mothers are substantively lower than those of women without children in most European countries (see Figure 5.3 above). Although the coefficients are similar for childless women and women with children, the 'endowment' of employment is clearly not – and varies across countries. This means that unless otherwise compensated, lower employment rates translate into a lower probability of participation of a group of women that has a vested interest in shaping political outcomes.

5.4. Job characteristics and political participation

After having established the effect of employment status on the political participation of mothers, the second part of the analysis zooms in on those mothers of preschool and school-aged children, *who are employed*. This section aims to establish whether different job characteristics, specifically job level and working time, are also essential for the political activity of mothers and whether the direction and strength of the effect depend on motherhood status and age of the youngest child. Before turning to the causal analyses, the next subsection will first provide some context by giving a brief overview of women's job levels and working hours, describing both overall patterns and differences by country.

Job characteristics of mothers

Previous research has shown that motherhood does not only affect labour market attachment, it also affects women's working patterns: To be more specific, women are often forced to reduce working hours as a strategy to deal with the demand of childrearing, while women's career progression becomes slower (contributing to the 'motherhood penalty') (Stier, Lewin-Epstein and Braun 2001; Glass 2004). Although the

[108]For women without children: $\chi^2(2) = 2.56 \quad p = 0.278$; for mothers of preschool children: $\chi^2(2) = 1.06 \;\; p = 0.588$; for mothers of school-aged children: $\chi^2(2) < 0.01 \;\; p = 0.999$.

cross-sectional data used here does not allow to observe causal relationships, we should expect to find differences between the groups of women that corroborate these findings.

Working time

Since childcare requires time (and energy) and care responsibility remains to be largely on women (Sayer 2005; Francavilla et al. 2013), we would expect that women with young children would work shorter hours than childless women in order to compensate for their disproportionate domestic obligations.

Indeed, when comparing the mean contracted hours of the three groups of women (ESS data), I find that women with preschool children work two hours less per week ($d = -2.1;\ p < 0.001$) than non-mothers. However, the working time of mothers of schoolchildren is around three hours shorter ($d = -2.9;\ p < 0.001$) than that of childless women, giving no evidence for an increase in working hours once children are older. A similar pattern shows if we look at the distribution of working hours in Figure 5.4 below. The median working hours are slightly higher for women without children (37h) than for women with young children (35h) or those with schoolchildren (35h). We can also deduct that women without children are more strongly clustered in full-time work: The interquartile range (IQR) for childless women ranges from 27 hours, just under the lower bound value for full-time work (30h/week) to standard full-time hours (40 hours/week). In contrast, for mothers of preschool and school children, the IQR is wider, ranging from 24 to 40 hours per week and 20 to 40 hours per week respectively.



Figure 5.4: Distribution of contracted working hours of women without children, women with preschool children, and women with school children.

In other words, a larger proportion of mothers in comparison to non-mothers, work in part-time jobs[109]. This observation supports the notion that the shift to part-time work, at least by working-age women is often used as a strategy to reconcile work and family life (Fagan and O'Reilly 1998).

Even though these overall patterns are interesting, and in line with my expectations, they are, expectedly, not consistent across countries. Figure 5.5 looks at part-time working patterns (< 30 hours/week) and shows the share of part-time employment for women aged 20 to 49[110] by country. It illustrates the stark differences in the prevalence of part-time work overall and also regarding the effect of motherhood on part-time working patterns. We can identify three different clusters of countries: The Eastern and most of the Southern European countries are clustered at the lower end of the spectrum, with most countries having less than 15 per cent of women working part-time. At the same time, household constellation, that is the presence, number, and age of children, seems to have little impact on the decision to work part-time in these countries, as women with children are only minimally more likely (and in some cases even less likely) to work part-time.



Figure 5.5: Part-time employment rate of women aged 20 to 49 in 2010, by household constellation and country. Source: Eurostat (2018) (no data for Norway, Israel, and Switzerland).

[109]Indeed, around 28 per cent of mothers of preschool children work in part-time positions compared to 37.4 per cent of mothers of school children, and 40 per cent of childless women.

[110]As before, the restriction to women of that age range is to keep the three groups as comparable as possible, as the group of childless women would otherwise consist disproportionally of women in education or close to retirement.

In the Northern countries for which data are available, there is overall higher prevalence of part-time work (ranging from 16.3 per cent of childless women in Finland to 31.5 per cent of childless women in Sweden), however, again, with only a moderate difference between childless women and those with children, confirming findings from earlier research (Rubery, Smith and Fagan 1999, Chapter 3). Indeed, for Finland and Denmark, we find part-time rates to be lower for mothers than for childless women.

Thirdly, we can identify a group of Western European countries, which are characterised by both, higher rates of part-time employment overall, but also considerable differences between the different groups of women. In these countries with established part-time working cultures (European Commission 2011), including Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK, the decision to work part-time appears to depend strongly on the number of children in the household, as a bigger household size is associated with a higher rate of part-time work. The extreme case in this group is the Netherlands, where around half of the childless women work in part-time jobs (53.9 per cent), relative to 80 per cent of the women with one child, and almost 90 per cent of women with two children.

We can see from this comparison, that the country of residence plays a decisive role in women's shift to part-time work with motherhood. The existence of part-time working culture is essential in determining whether part-time work is a viable option, affecting the supply side of part-time work (Smith, Fagan and Rubery 1999). However, as we will see in the next chapter, the institutional support provided for maternal employment (through work-family policies) is also a primary contributing factor affecting the demand for part-time work (Crompton 2006).

Job level

Turning our attention to job levels, the expectations about group differences are less clear than they were for the working time. Motherhood has been found to slow down women's career progression substantively (but not that of men), by lowering labour force attachment and reducing working hours (Gornick 1999). Accordingly, I expect women without children to be able to achieve high-level positions more easily compared to women with children. However, while this effect can be found in longitudinal studies (e.g. Abendroth, Huffmann and Treas 2014), the cross-sectional nature of the data makes it likely that the effect does not show straightforwardly in group differences of the average job position. This is for two reasons: Firstly, we should expect a selection effect. Women in higher-level occupations are more likely to stay attached to the labour market, while there is a tendency for women in low-level jobs to exit the labour market at least temporarily (Crompton, Hantrais and Walters 1990; Crompton 2006; but also see: Gash

2009). Thus, those women remaining in the analyses here, are likely a select group of women in high-skill occupations. Secondly, the bivariate statistics do not control for age, which acts as a confounding factor. Younger women are most likely to be at the beginning of their careers, thus, at lower job levels, while older women will be in more senior positions in their careers. At the same time, age-profiles differ, and both very young and old women are disproportionally represented in the group of childless women. In short, the comparison of groups might be of limited value.

Indeed, if we compare the mean levels of the three job level variables (see Table 5.4 below), we find most of all evidence for a selection effect: On all three variables, mothers of young children score higher compared to women without children, although the difference is only significant (at $p < 0.05$) for job autonomy and occupational status. Regarding job autonomy, others have argued that mothers might pursue jobs with more autonomy as a strategy to facilitate work-life balance (Gash 2009), but it is impossible to infer from the data whether the higher mean of this variable reflects the selection effect or an active labour market strategy of mothers. Mothers of older children are not significantly different from non-mothers with regards to job autonomy, and they score slightly lower ($d = -1.96, p < 0.01$) on occupational status, which is possibly a weak indication for the motherhood penalty. There is no statistically significant difference between the proportions of women in supervisory positions.

Table 5.4: Means of job level variables across different groups of women.

	No children	Preschool children	School children
Autonomy	5.58	5.71 *a*	5.66
Occupational status	44.77 *b*	47.37 *b*	42.81 *b*
Supervisory responsibility	23.3%	24.7%	22.8%

Note: Means of autonomy and occupational status, proportion of those in a supervisory position. Weighted data. p-values adjusted for multiple comparisons (Bonferroni adjustment).
a: Mean is significantly different from the group of women without children (at p<0.05).
b: Mean is significantly different from the two remaining groups (at p<0.01).

Concerning country differences, I once again expect the context to matter. Just as the organisation of work and policies supporting working mothers affect women's part-time work, research has also found it affect women's career progression and motherhood penalty (Gash 2009). It might also affect the tendency of lower-skilled women to exit the labour force after childbirth.

However, the disaggregated findings are mixed. We see in Figure 5.6 below that the overall pattern we have observed for occupational status is replicated in the majority of countries. Mothers of young children have an on average slightly higher occupational status in comparison to non-mothers, while mothers of older children are, on average, positioned lower on the scale. Some exceptions are, for example, Bulgaria, Germany,

Lithuania and Slovakia, where women with children have on average a lower occupational status than childless women. However, since the sample sizes for Lithuania and Slovakia are small, these exceptions should not be overinterpreted.

For supervisory responsibility, no significant differences between the three groups of women were found overall, but a look at the disaggregated percentages in Figure 5.7 reveals that some countries exhibit quite pronounced differences.



Figure 5.6: Mean occupational status by country and household constellation.



Figure 5.7: Share of women in supervisory positions by family constellation and country.

These are different in different countries: In some countries, such as Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Slovenia, a larger proportion of mothers of older children hold a position with supervisory responsibility relative to non-mothers. In contrast, in Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Hungary, the proportion is smaller. In Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK, however, mothers of preschool children are most likely to be in a supervisory position. In terms of the strength and direction of the effect, there appears to be no apparent pattern.

In summary, I have found that mothers of young children are more likely than childless women or mother of older children to hold a higher-level job. However, this is likely to consequence of a selection effect, as women in desirable jobs are more likely to return (quickly) to work after childbirth than those in lower-skilled positions. As per contextual influence, the country differences follow much less a visible pattern than for working time and it not entirely clear whether to expect the effect of job level on political participation to be context-dependent.

The effects of job characteristics

Earlier, I have established that employment status has the same effect on all women regardless of motherhood and context, but the same might not be true for job characteristics. I expect, for instance, working time to play a much more prominent role for mothers. While the attachment to the public sphere associated with employment is overall positive, long working hours should make political participation especially difficult for those women juggling market and care work responsibilities at the same time.

There is also an expectation that the institutional context (especially the support for maternal employment) affects how working time affects political participation. The models shown in Table 5.5 below, therefore, explore not only the effects of job characteristics[111] on the political participation of the three groups of women, but they will also be used to assess context-dependency. Since our interest here is only on those women who are employed, sample sizes are relatively small, limiting the statistical power of the analyses. All findings should be interpreted accordingly.

Working Time

I have theorised above, that working hours should have a stronger negative effect on mothers since the resource of time is more limited for them than for non-mothers. Contrary to my expectations, I find that working time does not matter more for women with children, but less. In fact, working time only has a statistically significant effect in the model for women without children ($OR: 0.985; p < 0.001$). For women with school-aged

[111]The models presented include variables for working time as well as job level. However, the variables have also been tested in separate models with substantially similar effects.

children, the effect is small (OR: 0.992) and only significant at $p < 0.1$, while in the model of mothers with pre-school children, no effect is found[112]. In order to test the robustness of this counter-intuitive finding, another model for *all* working women, that includes motherhood status as well as an interaction between motherhood status and working time has been fitted and confirms the finding:

Table 5.5: Logistic multi-level analysis of the effect of job characteristics on the political participation of women without children, with preschool children and with school-aged children

Independent variables	Effect of job characteristics		
	(1) No children	(2) Preschool children	(3) School-aged children
Age	**1.008****	1.014	0.999
	(0.003)	*(0.009)*	*(0.007)*
Degree level education *(Ref: less than degree level)*	**1.448*****	1.006	**1.527*****
	(0.116)	*(0.151)*	*(0.191)*
Partner *(Ref: No partner)*	1.035	1.085	1.008
	(0.070)	*(0.205)*	*(0.119)*
Medium political interest	**1.718*****	**2.000*****	**2.015*****
	(0.126)	*(0.266)*	*(0.218)*
Strong political interest *(Ref: Weak political interest)*	**3.326*****	**3.685*****	**3.357*****
	(0.369)	*(0.878)*	*(0.666)*
Socially active once a week *(Ref: Less than once a week)*	**1.309*****	1.221	1.102
	(0.096)	*(0.162)*	*(0.120)*
Gender role attitude *(more egalitarian)*	**1.063****	1.032	**1.072***
	(0.021)	*(0.037)*	*(0.031)*
Working hours	**0.985*****	1.000	**0.992†**
	(0.003)	*(0.006)*	*(0.005)*
Supervisory responsibility	**1.426*****	**1.463****	1.210
	(0.111)	*(0.204)*	*(0.143)*
Occupational status	**1.009*****	1.006	**1.006†**
	(0.002)	*(0.004)*	*(0.004)*
Job autonomy	**1.070*****	**1.100*****	**1.078*****
	(0.014)	*(0.027)*	*(0.021)*
Intercept	0.026 (0.006)	0.028 (0.013)	0.057 (0.020)
ICC	0.080	0.081	0.080
Pseudo-R^2	0.133	0.113	0.120
Log-Likelihood	*-3003.7370*	*-882.9215*	*-1288.5417*
n / N (countries)	6542 / 25	1869 / 25	2599 / 25

Note. Logistic Multilevel Analysis estimating the effect of employment characteristics on political participation (0/1) of employed women, maximum-likelihood estimation. Coefficients shown are odds-ratios, standard errors in parentheses.
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05, †=p<0.1.

[112]It appears that this is finding cannot simply be attributed to the smaller sample size ($n = 1869$), since there is also no substantive effect. Similarly, it is not a lack of variation in working time, as the standard deviations of the working time variables are similar across all groups.

The effect of working time on mothers of preschool children is substantially and statistically significantly different from that of the other two groups of women (see Table C.6 in the Appendix). As the visualisation of this effect in Figure 5.8 shows, I find a strongly negative effect for non-mothers and mothers of school-aged children, but no effect for women with preschool children.

Several explanations for this finding are plausible. Firstly, it could be that working time does not matter, because those women, who have managed to remain in work in the first place – for instance, because they have access to good formal or informal childcare arrangements – can also make use of this support when participating politically. In contrast, those women, who cannot make use of support, are more likely not to be employed and therefore not included in the sample.



Figure 5.8: The effects of working time on political participation for women without children, mothers of preschool children and mothers of school-aged children

Alternatively, working time might not play a role because mothers of young children have very little time available, *irrespectively* of how many hours they spend in work. We can suspect that whatever time is not spent in market work, would be spent doing care or the associated housework. Indeed, research from the Australian context suggests that employed mothers spend much of the leisure time they have with their children (Craig 2007). Unfortunately, I cannot test this assumption directly, since the ESS does not measure time spent on care work. There is a related measure, time spent on housework (excluding care work)[113], however, this is only available for women living with a partner[114].

[113]The exact wording of the question can be found in Table C.4 in the Appendix.

[114]Approximately 60% of working non-mothers, 85% of working mothers of preschool children and 72% of working mothers of older children live with a partner.

Using this variable, we can make three observations. Firstly, mothers of pre-schoolers and mothers of school-age children spend on average 2.8 and 3.7 hours respectively more on housework than non-mothers (differences significant at $p < 0.001$). Taking into account average working time, this leads to, on average, an hour and a half more spent on paid and unpaid work combined for both, mothers of younger and older children (differences significant at $p < 0.05$). If we also consider that the amount of time spent on care for preschool children is much higher than that on schoolchildren (research from the US context suggests it might be about twice as much [Milkie, Raley and Bianchi 2009]), we find that, firstly, mothers of preschool children are the most time-deprived.

Secondly, the time spent on market work and the time spent on housework are negatively related. In other words, a reduction of time spent in paid work is associated with an increase in time spent on housework. The same has been found for time spent caring for children and domestic work in general (Baxter, Hewitt and Haynes 2008; Milkie, Raley and Bianchi 2009; Sayer and Gornick 2012). Fewer working hours do therefore not automatically translate into more free time.

Finally, this negative association between time spent on market work and time spent on housework is strongest for mothers of preschool children: Each hour less in work is associated with 7 minutes more spent on housework ($b = -0.12; p < 0.01$). The effect is weaker for non-mothers ($b = -0.097; p < 0.001$), and not statistically significant for mothers of older children. In other words, the trade-off between time spend in market work and time spend on domestic work is strongest for this group of women – the hours spent in paid work have the weakest effect in the availability of free time for mothers of young children in comparison to any other woman. I therefore hypothesise that for mothers of young children, political participation is, more than anything, a question of priorities: When political activity is very difficult to fit into one's life, a strong motivation to be active might be the only decisive factor. Indeed, there is some indication that this could be the case: The only not-work-related variable in the model with a significant effect on political participation is 'political interest'.

The next question to address is whether the effect varies across countries. I have found in the previous chapter, that for women overall, the effect of working hours on political participation is indeed context-dependent. It is possible that while there is no effect of working time of political participation overall, that in some countries working time does have a negative effect on mothers of young children. However, fitting a set of random-coefficient models and comparing them to the respective fixed-effects models shows that the effect does not vary across countries for mothers of younger or older

children.[115] For preschool mothers, this means that working time has no effect in any of the countries. Moreover, for mothers of school-aged children that means the effect is moderately negative in all countries. Only for women without children, weak evidence for the context-dependency of the effect remains ($p/2 = 0.07$)[116].

This leaves the question of why the effect behaves differently across countries for non-mothers, but not mothers. I suspect the different role of part-time work over the life cycle to be a factor: Part-time working triggered by motherhood is often in the same job and protected by specific policies regulating the transition to part-time work for parents, as it exists, for example in the UK or Sweden. In contrast, for non-mothers, part-time work is more likely be associated with the transition into or the exit from the labour market; and it is more likely to be in specific 'typical' part-time jobs, which are traditionally of lower quality. There are strong national differences of how well part-time work is integrated into the labour market, how it is regulated, and consequently how good the overall quality of part-time work is (Smith, Fagan, and Rubery 1998). In other words, the quality of their jobs might be more context-specific for part-time working non-mothers than for part-time working mothers and define by how far a reduction in working time might be associated with negative outcomes, such as a loss of quality of work.

To assess whether the effect of working hours depends indeed on the quality of part-time employment, I have fitted an additional set of models. The models contain a variable measuring the difference in the mean levels of job autonomy of part-time and full-time jobs as a proxy for the quality of part-time work in a country[117], and a cross-level interaction between the variable and the working-time variable (full output shown in Table C.7 in the Appendix). While there is no significant main effect of the quality of part-time work in any of the three models, I find a positive and significant (at $p < 0.1$) cross-level interaction for the model of non-mothers only. The effect is illustrated in Figure 5.9 below. Since the main effect of working hours is negative, this means that the negative effect of working hours is weaker in countries where the quality gap between part-time and fulltime work is bigger. The interpretation might be more intuitive the other way around: Working fewer hours has a more positive effect in countries where the quality of part-

[115]For women without children: $\chi^2(2) = 3.85 \quad p = 0.145$; for mothers of preschool children: $\chi^2(2) = 0.25 \;\; p = 0.881$; for mothers of school-aged children: $\chi^2(2) = 0.85 \;\; p = 0.653$.

[116]In line with general practice, the p-value is dived by two in order to account for the fact that the variance of the coefficient is, by definition, non-negative (cf. Steele 2009).

[117]Job autonomy or 'task discretion' is a central concept in the measurement of quality of work, which is related to skill development, skill levels, use of creativity in work, job satisfaction and mental health (Gallie 2007). A comparative instead of an absolute measure of 'job autonomy' has been chosen, as levels of job autonomy differ drastically across countries, and the main interest here is on the difference in quality of part-time and fulltime work within one country, rather than the quality of part-time work in cross-country comparison.

time employment is higher, and a less positive effect in countries where the quality– relative to full-time work – is lower.

Although job quality is a multi-dimensional (and fuzzy) concept, and the difference in job autonomy can only serve as a proxy, the analyses are at least indicative[118]. The quality of part-time employment appears to moderate the effect of working-time on political participation, at least for women who do not work reduced hours to facilitate a double responsibility of market and care work. The findings suggest that reduced working hours are more conducive for women's political participation in countries, where part-time work is not less desirable than full-time work.

Figure 5.9: Cross-level interaction of working time and quality of part-time employment (relative to fulltime employment) on political participation of non-mothers.

Job level

Turning now to the effect of job level I find, again, that a higher-level position is associated with a higher participation probability for all three groups of women. Job autonomy has a strong and positive effect in all three models. In contrast, the positive effect of supervisory responsibility (controlling for the other indicators of job level) is only significant for non-mothers and women with preschool children. Finally, the positive effect of occupational status only reaches the conventional level of significance for women without children but is significant at $p < 0.1$ for mothers of school-children.

[118]Repeating the analysis with the gap in occupational status leads to similar results; the effect is stronger, however, just misses the conventional level of significance.

In terms of effect strength, it appears that the effects of supervision and job autonomy are strongest for mothers of preschool children: the predicted probability of an otherwise 'average' mother with no job autonomy ('0') is $\rho = 0.127$ compared to a participation probability of $\rho = 0.265$ for an 'average' woman with the highest job autonomy ('10'). Similarly, being in a position with supervisory responsibility is associated with a 6 percentage-point increase in the probability to participate politically. For non-mothers, the increases in the predicted probabilities over the ranges of the variables are 9.6 and 5.4 percentage points respectively. However, when testing a set of joint models with interaction terms between motherhood status and the three job-level variables (output shown in Table C.3 in the Appendix), I find that this impression does not hold statistically, and I therefore reject *Hypothesis 5.3a*. In substantive terms, this means that the effect of job level on political participation does not depend on the presence and age of children.

Next, I turn to the influence of the context. In Chapter 4, I have tested the context-dependency of the effect for all women and have not found evidence for a random effect of any of the variables. However, rerunning the tests for the three groups of women separately shows that being in a position with supervisory responsibility does have a country-specific effect on some women. To be more precise, a random effects model fits the data significantly better (at $p < 0.05$) for mothers of preschool children ($\chi^2(2) = 7.11$ $p = 0.028$). There is no evidence for the context-dependency of the effect for mothers of older children or childless women.[119]In the model on mothers of preschool children, the random-intercept random-slope covariance is positive ($\sigma_{u01} = 0.178$), which suggest a fanning-out pattern of the effect. Indeed, the country-specific sloped depict in Figure 5.10 show that the effect is stronger in countries in which the intercept, i.e. the base level of participation, is higher. In contrast, in countries where mothers of young children are less likely to be politically active, the effect of being in a supervisory position is less positive, or even negative.

This finding is intriguing for two different reasons. Firstly, because only one of the three job level variables shows a random effect[120]; and secondly because I find it only for the group of mothers of young children. Although there are some concerns about the sample size in the models, and specifically the number of mothers in supervisory positions, and the finding should be interpreted cautiously, these two observations indicate a possible explanation: the context-dependency might be related to the work pressure associated with supervisory work.

[119]For mothers of school-aged children the random effect of supervisory responsibility is marginally significant (at p/2<0.1) (χ^2 (2)=3.54 p=0.170;[p/2=0.085]).
[120]This holds even when the variables are tested in separate models.



Figure 5.10: Country-specific slopes for the effect of supervisory responsibility on political participation (mothers of preschool children only).

Earlier research has found that children present in the household contribute to the so-called work-family conflict experienced by working mothers. Expectedly, preschool children have a stronger effect than older children (Crompton and Lyonette 2006; Gallie and Russel 2009). Women with young children are more likely to feel strain caused by the competing requirements of time and energy in work and private life. It is likely that being in a supervisory position contributes to that strain. Evidence from Ireland suggests that being in a position with supervisory responsibility contributes to feelings of stress and pressure. This is in contrast to work autonomy, which is a mitigating factor (Russell, O'Connell and McGinnity 2009). For mothers of young children, who might have little energy left for political participation, the additional stress caused by being in a supervisory position might moderate the otherwise positive effect found for supervising others.

The ESS data give some support for this argument: women in a supervisory position report overall higher work-life conflict (1.83) compared to women who do not supervise others (1.55)[121]. Similarly, I find mothers of young children have the highest scores on the work-family conflict scale (1.67 - compared to 1.61 for non-mothers and 1.62 for mothers of older children). The degree to which this additional pressure arises might have to do with the structure of the labour market. Although Gallie and Russel (2009) have not found evidence that either the employment regime or the welfare state

[121]Work-life conflict is measured on a 0-4 scale, which was constructed from four indicators in the ESS on work-family conflict: worrying about work, strain-based conflict, time-based conflict, tensions created in relationships due the demands of work (see: ESS 2011).

regime predicts country-specific conflict levels, there are good reasons to expect that, for example, the provision of long-hours high-quality childcare shapes the relationship between supervisory positions, job strain, and consequently political participation. The effects of work-family policies on political participation will be explored in more detail in the next chapter (Chapter 6). However, for now, we can conclude that job characteristics do indeed have a different effect for different subgroups of women and that some of these effects are shaped by the country context.

5.1 Conclusion

This chapter has engaged with the employment effects for a specific subgroup of women, that is mothers. While motherhood has a major impact on political behaviour (McGlen 1980; Quaranta 2016) and labour market outcomes (Gornick and Meyers 2003), the interaction between motherhood and employment has seldom been in the interest of political research. The few exceptions that do exist are dated and limited to the American context (cf. Lynn and Flora 1973; McGlen 1980; Andersen and Cook 1985). I have argued that the specific demands on mothers regarding childcare and housework, but also the construction of political identity as being part of the public sphere might shape the way in which employment affects political participation for mothers.

To test this assumption empirically, I have fitted sets of separate multi-level models for three groups of women: those without dependent children, mothers of pre-school children and mothers of schoolchildren. The context-dependency of effects has been assessed using random-effects models and a likelihood-ratio test against the corresponding fixed effects models. To summarise the results, the chapter has found that some, but not all effects, are different for mothers of young children (see Table 5.6 below for an overview of all hypotheses tested in this chapter).

With regards to employment status, I have focussed on the two contrasting theories, arguing that (1) employment might contribute to *time constraints* of mothers, making political participation less likely, or, in contrast, that (2) employment counteracts the *psychological confinement* to the private sphere and consequently fosters the political activity of mothers. The results have provided support to the latter argument since I have found that employment generally has a positive effect, that does not differ for mothers and non-mothers. The effect of employment is also not dependent on the country context. However, given that the levels of maternal employment vary widely across countries, employment levels will still be essential to explain different levels of political participation, according to motherhood, as well as across countries.

In terms of working time, the analyses have provided some unexpected findings: Firstly, the analyses showed that working time does not affect the political participation

probability of mothers of young children. As working women, and specifically mothers, still perform the lion's share of housework (and care work), the non-effect of working time appeared somewhat surprising. However, this finding might merely indicate that free-time is scarce for mothers, *irrespectively* of how many hours they spend in market work. Political activity would then be a question of strong commitment more than a result of the time spent in work. Some more fundamental changes in the division of labour and the support for working mothers will be required to make political activity easier for those women, who do not have a strong commitment to being active in the political sphere.

Table 5.6: Overview of the hypotheses tested in Chapter 5

Hypothesis		Confirmed?
Employment		
5.1a	Employment increases the probability of political participation for mothers of young children.	✓
5.1b	The positive effect of employment on the probability of political participation is stronger for mothers of young children than for childless women.	✗
5.1c	Employment decreases the probability of political participation for mothers of young children	✗
Working hours		
5.2a	The negative effect of working hours on the probability of political participation is stronger for mothers of young children than for childless women and mothers of older children.	✗
5.2b	The effect of working hours on the probability of political participation for mothers of young children is context-dependent.	✗
Job level		
5.3a	The positive effect of job level on the probability of political participation is stronger for mothers than for childless women children.	✗
5.3b	The effect of job level on the probability of political participation for mothers is context-dependent.	✓

A second interesting finding was the context-dependency of the working hours effect, which was found only for childless women. I have theorised that this effect might be linked to differences in the quality of part-time work. Indeed, the analyses showed that the difference in average levels of job autonomy between part-time and full-time work in a country shape how working hours are related to political participation.

There are at least two implications of this finding. Firstly, it suggests that working fewer hours is only helpful to women's political activity if working part-time is not systematically associated with lower quality jobs. This has been already suggested on the individual-level in Chapter 4 (through the interaction between working hours and job autonomy/ supervisory responsibility), but, importantly, it holds also on a contextual level. Secondly, the context-dependency is also a reminder that findings from single countries

do not always hold in other contexts in the same way, a relevant finding in particular with regards to the predominance of empirical research from the American context.

Regarding job levels, I have found that being in a higher-level job has a similar positive effect on all three groups of women. However, the effect was context-dependent for the group of mothers of small children. Although there is a big caveat of the sample size for this group of women, and results should be treated carefully, it seems plausible, that the effect reflects the pressure and strain associated with supervisory responsibilities. The pressure might have a stronger effect on the political activity of mothers in some countries than in others depending on the overall support available to working mothers in particular.

Overall, the chapter has shown that the effects of employment, including both employment status and employment characteristics, are not uniform for different groups of women and across countries. For mothers of young children, who are responsible for the lion's share of the care work, working time does not affect political participation – in contrast to childless women and those with older children. Working mothers have not only the least free time available, but they also experience the highest levels of work-life conflicts, with implications for their levels of political activity. This finding reminds us of the importance of an intersectional approach to gender research. Insights that have been established for 'women' as a group do not necessarily hold for all subgroups.

Secondly, the chapter provides an important impetus for policy-making by showing that extra support for working mothers is required, if the equal participation in the political decision-making is to be ensured. Employment and good, high-level jobs are key predictors for political participation, while motherhood still pushes women out the labour market and imposes a 'motherhood penalty' in career progression in most European countries. This could prove to be a vicious circle, as it means that women will not be able to articulate their needs. As McGlen summarised it: "[T]hus the particular policy demands (daycare, maternity benefits) of young mothers and, one might add, especially working mothers, are not being brought to the attention of public officials" (McGlen 1980, pp.312-13). Yet, it would be policies that address these needs, which could also have a positive effect on the political participation of mothers.

The next step is to have a closer look at those policies and how they affect not only the predictors of political participation, that is labour market participation and progression, but also political participation directly. Therefore, the next chapter (Chapter 6) will drill more into detail about the contextual effect of work-family policies in Europe. The last empirical chapter will then take a step back again, and explore the effects of gendered labour market structures more generally.

6 WORK-FAMILY POLICIES AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

> *"Quite simply, women will never be able to achieve parity with men in the political arena as long as the female political activists who choose motherhood must limit their political activism to care for young children" (McGlen 1980, p.312).*

One of the most salient observations in the literature on gendered labour market outcomes is that women's employment patterns and the effects of motherhood are shaped by the institutional context (Chapter 5; Stier, Lewin-Epstein and Braun 2001; Van der Lippe 2001). The influence of labour market and welfare policies has attracted considerable scholarly interest. Specifically, the importance of so-called '*work-family policies*' has been established in a plethora of existing (albeit geographically limited) studies. These policies, which aim to reconcile the competing demands of employment and childcare responsibilities, have been linked to maternal employment; part-time working patterns; career progression of women generally and mothers specifically; and the gendered structure of the labour market (e.g. Glass 2004; Mandel and Semyonov 2005, 2006; Stadelmann-Steffen 2008; Pettit and Hook 2005; 2009; Abendroth, Lippe and Maas 2012; Boling 2015). They have also been associated with a broad array of influences on wider gendered structures, for example, by affecting couples' division of labour, or women's gender role attitudes (Sjöberg 2004; Crompton 2006).

At the same time, there has been a surge of interest in the relevance of the cultural, social, and institutional context on women's political attitudes; preferences; and behaviour in the field of political sociology (cf. Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2012; Beauregard 2014). While the primary focus of the literature is still on the effect of political institutions, studies of 'policy feedback' have turned to the participatory effects of welfare policies (cf. Campbell 2003; Kumlin and Stadelmann-Steffen 2014). According to one line of argument, the effect on political activity operates through the redistribution of resources to those who are otherwise socio-economically disadvantaged (Shore 2014). Given the impact of work-family policies on women's work patterns and, consequently, their resources, one might expect that considerable attention has also been paid to the effect of these policies on women's political activity. However, empirical research is limited. While there is evidence that work-family policies matter for political attitudes; policy preferences; and women's representation (Banducci et al. 2016; Chung and Meuleman 2017; Detraz and Peksen 2018), a recent study has analysed effects on voting for single parents (Marx and Nguyen 2018), a systematic, cross-national analysis

of gender-specific participatory effects of work-family policies and, specifically, of the effect on mothers has, to my best knowledge, yet to be conducted.

The purpose of this chapter is to address this gap in the literature by examining how work-family policies affect the political participation of women with and without children[122]. Specifically, it explores three different links between the policies and women's political activity. The first link is *indirect.* Taking conceptually a step back from the findings of Chapter 4 and 5, I will explore how work-family policies affect the distribution of those employment variables linked to political participation (employment status, working hours and job level). A sizeable body of research has already looked at how employment outcomes are shaped by work-family policies (see above), but many studies are geographically limited to countries of the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). Research including Eastern European countries, by contrast, is scarce.

Secondly, this chapter examines whether work-family policies shape the link between employment characteristics and political participation. Specifically, the previous chapter (Chapter 5) has shown that the effect of being in a supervisory position is context-dependent for the subgroup of mothers of young children. I have hypothesised that this could be attributed to the cross-national variation in support available to working mothers. Since having supervisory responsibility is associated with increased stress and higher levels of work-family conflict, work-family policies – designed to reduce this conflict – could have a *moderating* effect[123].

Lastly, the chapter also explores a *direct* effect of work-family policies. Following arguments of the 'policy feedback' literature, I expect that policies can shape political processes as much as they are shaped by them (cf. Kumlin and Stadelmann-Steffen 2014). Work-family policies are linked to women's individual resources (over and above those affected by employment). At the same time, as a societal institution, they send a symbolic cue about existing cultural norms of women's roles in society and, specifically, norms about the primacy of childcare over women's attachment to the public sphere (Budig, Misra and Boeckmann 2012).

By systematically analysing these effects, this chapter expands our understanding of the relationship between work and political participation. In particular, by introducing the contextual level into the analyses, it will help us to understand better how the nexus of care work, employment, and political participation is shaped by the policies introduced

[122]Here, analysing the effects of work-family policy designs does not mean I conduct a classical 'policy analysis'. In line with the empirical research in the Sociology of Work and Employment (e.g. Misra, Budig and Boeckmann 2011), I refer to a statistical analysis of the effects of different policy designs on employment outcomes and political participation.

[123]A moderation effect means that the effect of a variable x on another variable y depends on the value of a third variable z. In the context of multilevel modelling, this third variable can be a characteristic of the context (thus, a context-level indicator). In this example, this means the effect of supervisory responsibility (x) on political participation (y) might depend on the availability of childcare in the country (z).

to reconcile the competing demands of the private and the public sphere. As such, it also contributes to the overall aim of this dissertation to gain more insight into the differences between these links across countries. Finally, the chapter adds to the emerging field of 'policy feedback', by examining the effects of an important subset of welfare policies on women specifically.

The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Building on the existing literature from the sociology of work and the scholarship of gender and politics, the section to follow (Section 6.1) will develop the hypotheses regarding indirect, moderating and direct effects of work-family policies. The data and operationalisation will be described, and the modelling strategy will be reviewed in Section 6.2. The last three sections will then present the analyses, focussing first on the effects of work-family policies on employment and employment characteristics (Section 6.3), second on a possible moderating effect (Section 6.4), and finally on the direct effects on political participation (Section 6.5). It will conclude by discussing the significance of the findings and implications for policy making and situate them within the existing literature.

6.1 Theorising the political effects of work-family policies

The term 'work-family policies' summarises different policies and arrangements, which aim to support the reconciliation of paid employment and family responsibilities (Misra, Moller and Budig 2007, p. 805). Although sometimes used to describe arrangements on the company-level, the focus of this chapter is on state-wide policies. Even though the precise 'mix' of those policies varies widely across welfare states, there are three different policies at the core of the term: (1) *maternal and parental leave*, (2) *financial support and benefits*, and (3) *childcare service provision*. These policies share the same aim in principle, that is to reduce the conflict arising from the competing demands of care responsibilities and employment. Nevertheless, they address this conflict from different perspectives and importantly, have different underlying norms about women's role as caregivers and in the labour market. Since these differences might lead to different labour market outcomes and different political effects, the policies will be regarded and discussed individually.

This section has two aims. The first is to review existing literature on work-family policies, as well as relevant work on policy effects on political engagement. Secondly, it will derive and discuss expectations about the effects on women's political participation. I will explore three different types of links, as illustrated in Figure 6.1 below. The first one (1) is indirect, affecting the distribution of employment and job characteristics of mothers (shown in grey); this link is the first to be discussed in this section and to be explored in the analyses. The second link (2) is a moderating effect on the link between supervisory

responsibility and political participation (shown in dashed grey), while the last link (3) is direct (black). The next subsection will focus in more detail on each of those links.



Figure 6.1: Schematic presentation of the links between work-family policies and women's political participation.

Indirect effects: Effects on employment status and job characteristics

The first link between work-family policies and political participation to be considered in this section is indirect. The previous chapters (Chapter 4 and 5) have shown that employment status and job characteristics matter for political participation; now, the aim is to take a step back and to explore how the distribution of these predictors is influenced by the level and nature of support available to (working) mothers.

A sizeable body of research has already been concerned with the employment effects of work-family policies, and I can draw on a lively theoretical discussion, as well as a considerable number of empirical studies. However, the empirical research, in particular, suffers from a critical shortcoming: its geographical scope. The lion's share of studies analyses data of the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) (e.g. Gornick, Meyers and Ross 1997; Mandel and Semyonov 2005; Pettit and Hook 2005; Misra, Budig and Boeckmann 2011; Budig, Misra and Boeckmann 2012) or even focusses just on the special case of the USA (Joesch 1997; Glass 2004; Gangl and Ziefle 2009; Low and Sánchez-Marcos 2015). As a consequence, Eastern European countries are not routinely included in existing works[124], while they tend to be different regarding both, scope and design of their policies (cf. Szelewa and Polakowski 2008; Robila 2012). In

[124]Even in the study from Stier, Lewin-Epstein and Braun (2001), which notably uses an alternative data source (the ISSP), the Eastern European countries are explicitly excluded from the analyses.

the following discussion, I synthesise and build upon the vast existing literature, but it should be kept in mind, that the hypotheses will be tested empirically on a geographically different set of data.

Employment status

Much of the discussion around the employment effects of work-family policies can be framed around underlying '*family models'*. On the one end of the spectrum is the 'dual-earner/dual carer' family model (Crompton 1999), a conception of family that is characterised by the assumption of equal responsibilities for care and productive work of both parents. The provision of childcare services is strongly associated with this model, as it transfers (part of) the responsibility for childcare away from the family (specifically the mother) to the state or the market and, thus, allows and encourages the labour force participation of women with children. Indeed, existing empirical research using data from the Luxemburg Income Study (LIS) suggests that childcare provision has an unambiguously positive effect on the employment of mothers: When it is available, as well as affordable, women with children seem to be more likely to be employed and to work full-time (Petit and Hook 2005; Hegewisch and Gornick 2011, p. 128).

The 'male-breadwinner' family model, in contrast, assumes the care responsibility to be primarily with the mother. High levels of childcare benefits are thought to promote this family model. Unless benefits are specifically tied to the purchase of childcare, they aim to compensate for the loss of income associated with the (temporary) labour force withdrawal of the caregiver. Tax-breaks and homecare allowances can provide an incentive for the partner who earns less money, to stay at home. Although research specifically on the effect of childcare benefits on labour market participation of women is rare[125], there is some indication that those financial incentives and benefits designed to support a 'traditional family model' decrease women's labour force participation (Korpi, Ferrarini and Englund 2013; Thévenon 2013).

Parental leave is conceptually located somewhere in the middle of the other two policies. On the one hand, employment-protected paid maternity and parental leave encourage women's return to their jobs and, thus, increase overall the employment rates of mothers (Hegewisch and Gornick 2011; Low and Sánchez-Marcos 2015). On the other hand, very long leaves might have the opposite effect. They detach women from the labour force and, in conjunction with high financial compensation, promote care within the context of the family. As they encourage women to remain at home after the leave,

[125]This is likely the consequence of the difficulty to provide a cross-nationally comparable measure of childcare benefits and financial support, as the design, scope and eligibility varies widely across countries, but can also vary within countries according to family type, income and employment status. See De Henau, Meulders and O'Dorchai (2008) for an overview of benefit types in EU-15 member states and the effort to construct cross-national indicators.

some research has suggested that they effectively reduce maternal employment (Morgan and Zippel 2003, p.70, but see Keck and Saraceno 2013, p.315).

According to these findings, work-family policies are often classified as being either 'work-facilitating', which includes childcare provision and short to moderate leave; or 'work-reducing', which refers to high levels of benefits and long leaves (cf. Misra, Budig and Boeckmann 2011). Following the existing evidence, I expect to find the respective patterns also in the ESS dataset used here:

Hypothesis 6.1a: *Work-facilitating work-family policies (childcare provision, leave), increase the probability of mothers of young children to be employed.*

Hypothesis 6.1b: *Work-reducing work-family policies (long and well-paid leaves, high benefits) decrease the probability of mothers of young children to be employed.*

Job characteristics

In terms of working time, work-family policies are expected to operate very much in a similar fashion as theorised for employment status. Since formal childcare eases the time pressures associated with having children, affordable and accessible childcare[126] should allow mothers to work longer hours, in particular when the costs of childcare do not offset the associated higher income. Indeed, empirically, there is some support for the link between childcare provision and women's working hours (Van der Lippe 2001; Uunk, Kalmijn and Muffels 2005). High levels of childcare benefits, on the other hand, should lead to reduced working hours. The additional source of income enables one partner to reduce their working hours and the associated income, if desired (Rosenfeld and Birkelund 1995; Abendroth, Van der Lippe and Maas 2012). Moreover, benefits can create an economic incentive for one earner to reduce the time spent in work. This should be particularly the case when childcare is not available or expensive, and a reduction of working hours is economically more feasible than paying for childcare.

The effect of parental leave is, again, less apparent. Abendroth, Van der Lippe and Maas (2012) suggest that the right to return to the same job after maternity leave makes it more likely for women to return to the same working hours, while the older age of children, when returning after very long leaves, makes it easier for women to work longer hours. However, others have found a curvilinear relationship between the length of leave and working hours and suggest that while shorter leave increases maternal working hours, very long leaves are associated with reduced working hours of mothers (Misra, Budig and Boeckmann 2011; Boeckmann, Misra and Budig 2014). This supports, again, the difference between 'work-reducing' and 'work-facilitating' leave designs.

[126] Of those women, who name childcare services as a reason for not working or working part-time, the cost and the availability of childcare are the most important factors (Mills et al. 2014).

In short, it can be anticipated that the effects on working hours operate very similarly to the effects on employment status and I anticipate the following effects:

Hypothesis 6.2a: *Work-facilitating work-family policies (childcare provision, leave), increase the working hours of employed mothers.*

Hypothesis 6.2b: *Work-reducing work-family policies (long and well-paid leaves, high benefits) decrease the working hours of employed mothers.*

In contrast to the literature on employment rates and working hours, the discussion about the effects of work-family policies on women's career progression, and thus their job level, is more contentious. The association between motherhood and penalties in pay and career progression is routinely discussed with reference to work-family policies (Glass 2004; Gangl and Ziefle 2009; Abendroth, Huffman and Treas 2014). However, there is disagreement about the direction and strength of effects, as well as the nature of this link.

At the very least, most studies agree that work-reducing policies can have a negative effect on the career progression of mothers, as they promote career interruptions and decreased working hours. Policies, which encourage a discontinuity in employment, such as long leaves and high levels of benefits, also prompt a loss of skills, and might cause women to return to a less lucrative or desirable job (Jaumotte 2003; Budig, Misra and Boeckmann 2012). The same policies are also associated with reduced working hours, which in turn can lead to fewer job opportunities and a pay penalty (Boling 2015). Other researchers (e.g. Estevez-Abe 2005) have argued that the adverse effect of work-reducing families is not limited to mothers but impacts on the very structure of the labour market, and therefore affects all women. Following this line of argument, employers in countries with extended parental leave account for women's higher probability to take this leave, and might consequently favour men for desirable, high-level positions[127]. The critique of Mandel and Semyonov (2005; 2006) takes this argument even further, by contending that more generous work-family policies *per se* (i.e. all policies, including childcare) create labour markets in which women are segregated into less desirable jobs. While this broad-brush negative picture of generous work-family policies has meanwhile been challenged (see: Korpi, Ferrarini and Englund 2013), it is plausible that work-reducing policies affect the labour market structure in a way that is relevant to all women.

Work-facilitating policies, on the other hand, have been associated with positive outcomes for mothers. Research on the motherhood penalty, for example, has suggested a smaller disadvantage for mothers in countries where work-facilitating policies prevail (Gash 2009). Specifically, the provision of formal childcare should have

[127]This has been labelled as "statistical discrimination" against women (Phelps 1972).

a positive effect: Since it facilitates maternal employment without long career breaks, it reduces the adverse effect on occupational progression for mothers (Abendroth, Huffman and Treas 2014). Consequently, the reason to discriminate against women should be weaker and the effect on all women's career should be positive. With regards to women's job position, I can, therefore, formulate the following expectations:

> **Hypothesis 6.3a**: *Work-facilitating work-family policies (childcare provision, leave), increase the probability of mothers and women in general to be in a high-level job position.*

> **Hypothesis 6.3b**: *Work-reducing work-family policies (long and well-paid leave, high benefits) decrease the probability of mothers and women in general to be in a high-level job position.*

To summarise, the hypotheses examine the effects of work-family policies on employment status and work characteristics. The expected effects depend primarily on the underlying logic of the policy (work-reducing vs work-facilitating) and refer, except the effect on job levels, to mothers only. By exploring how work-family policies affect the predictors of political participation, we can understand their indirect influence on political participation levels.

Moderating effect: The interaction with supervisory responsibility

Employment does not happen in a vacuum, but it is embedded in the national context of labour market structures, regulations and policies. Accordingly, the effects of employment might also be shaped by the context. The previous chapter has, therefore, examined the context-dependency of the employment effects. We recall that two 'random' effects were identified: firstly, the effect of working hours for the subgroup of non-mothers, and secondly, the impact of being in a supervisory position at work for mothers of preschool children. As for the effect of working hours, I have suggested and shown that the quality of part-time work, relative to fulltime work, moderates the effect of working hours on political activity. In other words, the participatory advantage of those working fewer hours is more substantial in countries where part-time work is not associated with lower job quality.

Regarding the random effect of being in a position with supervisory responsibility, however, there are good reasons to expect an influence of work-family policies. It has previously been found that, in contrast to other measures of job level, the responsibility to supervise others contributes to higher levels of job pressure (Russell, O'Connell and McGinnity 2009). At the same time, having (young) children also increases levels of conflict between family life and work (see Chapter 5; Scott and Plagnol 2012; Stier, Lewin-Epstein and Braun 2012). Assuming that those levels of conflict are also a good indicator of whether someone has the time and energy for political engagement, it seems plausible that the extra pressure associated with being in a supervisory position might

dampen its otherwise positive participatory effect for this subgroup of women. However, the degree of extra pressure is expected to have a less diametral effect on participation, where work-family policies lessen women's care burden. Consequently, we should expect a stronger positive effect of being in a supervisory position in countries with stronger work-family policies. Indeed, an earlier study of 27 countries has shown that childcare provision (on the country-level) can lower the work-family conflict experienced by working mothers (Stier, Lewin-Epstein and Braun 2012). Therefore, in countries with higher levels of childcare provision, I expect a more positive effect of supervisory responsibility. Childcare benefits and maternity leave, in contrast, are not expected to alleviate work-pressures, and, accordingly, are not expected to interact with supervisory responsibility.

> **Hypothesis 6.4**: *Childcare provision moderates the effect of supervisory responsibility on political participation for mothers of preschool children.*

Direct effects: Effects on resources and contextual cues

Finally, we turn to the direct effect of work-family policies on women's political participation. I draw on two major lines of arguments to formulate my expectations. The first is adapted from studies of policy feedback, referring to the re-allocation of resources through welfare policies. The second refers to the 'symbolic' power of policies and draws on elements of the contextual cue theory.

A principal purpose of work-family policies is the re-distribution of resources to families with children to alleviate the otherwise private burden of child-rearing. This is most apparent for the example of childcare benefits: In countries that grant parents higher levels of benefits, the financial burden of child-rearing is smaller (*ceteris paribus),* and the disposable income of the family higher. One strand of the so-called 'policy feedback' literature has argued that the redistribution of resources to otherwise socio-economically disadvantaged citizens can spark their political participation (Campbell 2003; Bruch, Ferree and Soss 2010; Shore 2014). Although these studies tend to refer to economic resources only, the argument should equally hold for the resource of time.

Childcare provision allows the parents to 'outsource' some of the care work, thus leaving more time for other activities, including political participation. Although evidence from the Australian case suggests that out-of-family childcare reduces the time spent on domestic work for working mothers, but not for those at home (Craig 2007, p. 81), the provision of full-time childcare should have a positive effect on the disposable time of all women. Indeed, there is also some indication that the (context-level) provision of childcare might play a role in the (child-free) leisure time available to mothers (Craig and Mullan 2013). Importantly, Kay (2000) suggests that work-facilitating policies, including

childcare provision, provide women with a sense of entitlement to personal leisure time and the confidence to free up time for personal activities.

With regards to childcare benefits, the participation effect might not be immediately apparent, as monetary donations play only a minor role in the political participation spectrum in the European context. However, money can be used to access other resources, for example, time in the form of informal childcare (such as babysitters) and flexibility, such as in the form of private transport, while the resource perspective on political participation suggests that both of these characteristics are conducive to political activity (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). It is, therefore, expected that both, childcare benefits and formal childcare provision have a positive direct effect on the political participation of mothers:

> **Hypothesis 6.5a:** *Higher levels of childcare benefits and better childcare provision directly increase the probability of mothers to participate politically.*

Work-family policies do not only have an impact on resources, but they also have symbolic power. As elaborated earlier, different cultural norms and gendered assumptions around care and women's place in the public sphere underlie different work-family policy mixes. Arguably, we can regard policies not only as a result of existing gender norms but also as an institutionalised symbol for these norms. The literature on the gender gaps in political interest and political participation has suggested that contextual characteristics of the political sphere have psychological effects on women. Studies of the so-called 'contextual cue theory' argue that, for instance, women's descriptive representation in politics[128] works as a symbol for the gendered nature of the political sphere, which produces a psychological barrier to participation (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Atkeson 2003).

Although both, theory and empirical analyses, refer specifically to the gendered nature of the *political* sphere, it seems plausible to expect other institutions expressing norms about women's place in the public sphere more generally to have a similar effect. Work-family policies provide cues about cultural norms regarding women's involvement in the labour market and the public sphere. On the one hand, work-facilitating policies encourage women's labour market participation even when the presence of children creates care responsibilities. They, thereby, normalise women's activity in the public sphere. In contrast, work-reducing policies signal the primacy of the role as caregiver within the family over activity in the public sphere. Unsurprisingly, work-family policies have been associated with individual-level gender role attitudes and motherhood norms

[128]The term 'descriptive representation' refers to the share of politicians who are female, in other words the purely numerical representation of women in politics. In contrast, 'substantive representation' refers to 'women's interests' being represented in politics (cf. Barnes and Burchard 2012).

(Sjöberg 2004; Ferrarini 2006, Chapter 6). However, even if personal norms are unaffected, where strong norms about women's role as caregivers prevail, contextual pressure might discourage women to pursue activities outside their private roles.

In contrast to the effects of resources, symbolic effects should not be limited to mothers. Women without children will equally perceive whether their involvement in the public sphere is valued and encouraged – or regarded as secondary to their role in the family. Women in countries with work-reducing work-family policies might, therefore, be overall less politically active than women in countries with more progressive work-family policies, albeit the effect could be stronger for women with care responsibilities, who are directly affected, than those without. In summary, following the logic of the contextual cue theory, two different effects can be expected:

Hypothesis 6.6a: *Work-reducing work-family policies (long leaves, high benefits) directly decrease women's probability to participate politically.*

Hypothesis 6.6b: *Work-facilitating work-family policies (childcare provision, short leaves) directly increase the probability of mothers to participate politically.*

To summarise, I have theorised three different links between work-family policies on political participation of women and, for each of these links I have derived a set of different hypotheses, which are shown in Table 6.1 below.

Table 6.1: Overview of the hypotheses tested in Chapter 6

Indirect effects	
6.1a	Work-facilitating work-family policies (childcare provision, leave), increase the probability of mothers of young children to be employed.
6.1b	Work-reducing work-family policies (long and well-paid leaves, high benefits) decrease the probability of mothers of young children to be employed.
6.2a	Work-facilitating work-family policies (childcare provision, leave), increase the working hours of employed mothers.
6.2b	Work-reducing work-family policies (long and well-paid leaves, high benefits) decrease the working hours of employed mothers.
6.3a	Work-facilitating work-family policies (childcare provision, leave), increase the probability of mothers and women in general to be in a high-level job position.
6.3b	Work-reducing work-family policies (long and well-paid leave, high benefits) decrease the probability of mothers and women in general to be in a high-level job position.
Moderating effects	
6.4	Childcare provision moderates the effect of supervisory responsibility on political participation for mothers of preschool children.
Direct effects	
6.5	Higher levels of childcare benefits and better childcare provision directly increase the probability of mothers to participate politically.
6.6a	Work-reducing work-family policies (long leaves, high benefits) directly decrease women's probability to participate politically.
6.6b	Work-facilitating work-family policies (childcare provision, short leaves) directly increase the probability of mothers to participate politically

6.2 Measuring the effect of work-family policies

Before turning to the analysis of effects of work-family policies in the next sections, this section will give a brief overview of the data and indicators used. As before (and discussed in more detail in Chapter 3), the individual-level data are taken from the fifth round of the European Social Survey (2010/2011). Since the analytical focus of the chapter is on the effects of work-family policies – i.e. country characteristics – the individual-level data have been supplemented with contextual data from a variety of data sources (mainly from Eurostat and the OECD)[129]. The operationalisation of the different policies, as well as the source of each indicator used, will be discussed in more detail below.

With regards to the dependent variables, this chapter diverges slightly from the previous ones. As a result of the different links theorised, three different individual-level dependent variables are employed in the analytical sections, measuring (1) employment status, (2) working hours, and (3) political participation. In order to examine the indirect effect of work-family policies, that is the effect on employment status and job characteristics, I estimate two models with employment status (binary) and working hours (metric) as micro-level dependent variables (see section 4.2 in Chapter 4 for a detailed description of the variables). Here, it is worth noting, that due to the difficulty to model macro-level effects on job level using cross-sectional data[130], I will instead explore the association between work-family policies and women's job levels on the aggregated level. The dependent (context-level) variable used is the 'female share of employment in senior and middle management' (ILOSTAT 2017b). The next two sections explore the moderating effect of work-family policies on the link between job characteristics and political participation, and the direct effect of work-family policies on political activity. These two sections use the binary measure of institutional political participation ('0' no political participation, '1' political participation) that is described in detail in Chapter 3.

Work-family policy indicators

Research on the employment effects of work-family policies has developed from the 'gendering of welfare regimes' theory (e.g. Orloff 1993; Sainsbury 1996). As a consequence, they are often discussed within the framework of welfare-regimes[131] or analysed as 'bundles' or indices (for example Gornick, Meyers and Ross 1997; Stier, Lewin-Epstein and Braun 2001; Mandel and Semyonov 2006). While this approach has

[129]The macro-level data have been imputed using one-to-many (1:m) matching, matching micro-level and macro-level data on the country identifier.

[130]These difficulties will be discussed in more detail below and in Section 6.3.

[131]However, in terms of work-family policies, countries map only poorly on the most prominent welfare state regimes (see: Thévenon 2011, p. 64-65; however also see the classification in Korpi, Ferrarini and Englund 2013).

the analytical advantage of smaller models, it conceals the effects of individual policies, their interaction with each other and with the context, and has thus been rightly criticized by newer works (e.g. Pettit and Hook 2005; Misra, Budig and Boeckmann 2011; Abendroth, van der Lippe and Maas 2012; Korpi, Ferrarini and Englund 2013).

This chapter takes a different approach and examines the effect of work-family policies individually. The focus is on an overall measure for the level of support given to working families, as well the three main types of policies (1) *Cash benefits*, (2) *Parental leave*, and (3) *Childcare provision*. Overall support and cash benefits are operationalised through a single indicator each, while parental leave and childcare provision are captured through different indicators. Table 6.2 below gives an overview of the indicators used, an overview of the data sources can be found in Table D.1 in the Appendix, a detailed description follows below.

Table 6.2: Description of context-level indictors

Dimension	Component	Indicator
Overall support	Spending on families	Government spending on children and families (as % of GDP)
Cash benefits	Cash benefits	Per-head government spending on family cash benefits (in 100 PPP-Euro)
Leave Policies	Length of leave	Weeks of total paid leave available to mothers
	Leave*cash benefits	Total length of paid leave available, weighted by level of cash benefits
Childcare provision	Fulltime childcare for under-3-year-olds	Children (0 to 2) in formal childcare for at least 30 hours/week (in %)
	Fulltime childcare for pre-schoolers	Children (3-CSA) in formal childcare for at least 30 hours/week (in %)

Overall support for families

The first indicator measures the overall government spending on children and families as a per cent of GDP, which can be understood as a measure of the overall importance a country assigns to supporting working families (Bradshaw and Finch 2010). The data have been obtained from Eurostat (2016b) (OECD [2016a] for Israel) and refers to the year 2010. It covers government spending on childcare and pre-primary education, as well as tax breaks for families, spending on cash benefits and benefits in kind.

Cash benefits

The generosity of cash benefits for families is very difficult to quantify, as the eligibility, level and length of payments often depend on the specific family situation, such as the number and age of the children, the family income or salary of the mother, or the duration of leave from employment (cf. De Henau, Meulders and O'Dorchai 2008). This is problematic, not only because it implies that levels of benefits can vary widely between families within one country, but more importantly, it makes it almost impossible to

compare the actual amounts of benefits received across countries. For that reason, I use government spending on cash benefits as a proxy for a country's benefit generosity. The data for the indicator have been taken from Eurostat (2016b) (OECD [2016a] for Israel[132]) and measures government spending on cash benefits *per head* in 100 PPP (Euro)[133] in 2010. Although the data cannot be used as an indication about the actual amount of money received by a typical family, it allows for cross-country comparison, while keeping the model as parsimonious as possible.

Leave Policies

The length of childcare leave can be measured in different ways, depending on whether the focus is on maternity, parental leave and/or other forms of leave; and conditional on whether only paid leave is considered. Here, the focus is on the *weeks of total paid leave* available to mothers. In other words, the indicator includes both, maternity leave and the portion of the paid parental leave that is available to mothers. However, it excludes special forms of leave available in some countries (for example breastfeeding leave in Spain), as well as 'home care leave', which is often paid as a low-level flat rate and conditional on not making use of public childcare services (e.g. in Norway). For the sake of simplicity and comparability, the assumption is, that the leave follows on an unproblematic birth of a healthy, single child, which is the first child of the family. Moreover, if a country offers more than one parental leave scheme, it is assumed that the family opts for the better-paid option. The data on paid maternity and parental leave are based on OECD Family Data (2016b), however, to ensure the comparability over countries and compatibility with the aforementioned definition, the data have been checked against various other sources[134], and adjusted if necessary. The data refer to the situation in 2010 (reference day: 31st of December) and is measured in weeks.

Since it has been argued that the uptake and effect of leave depend strongly on the level of payment (Joesch 1997; Gornick, Meyers and Ross 1997), a second indicator, a weighted version of the leave indicator, is also included: *leave*benefits*. This synthetic indicator combines the variable on paid leave with a rescaled version of the variable on cash benefits. The cash benefit indicator has been rescaled to express benefits as a proportion of the mean benefits (over all countries). In other words, the length of leave would be weighted up in a country with higher-than-average spending on cash benefits

[132]For the OECD data on Israel, the data have been converted from PPP in dollars, as used by OECD to PPP in Euros, as used by Eurostat, using the exchange rate of 31/12/2010: 1 USD = 0.747 EUR (taken from: Exchange Rates UK [2016]).

[133]The decision measuring the spending on childcare in PPP, rather than as a percentage of GDP is mainly for theoretical reasons: PPP are better for comparing the levels of spending in terms of the outcome for parents, while spending as % of GDP is a better measure to compare the willingness to spend and governmental importance.

[134]A detailed account of the data sources and changes, as well as country-specific notes to the leave data can be found in the Appendix, Table D.2.

and weighted down in a country with lower-than-average spending. In a country with average spending, the weight is set to 1. While this indicator, again, does not contain information about the actual level of payments, it captures to which degree the states creates an incentive for women to remain at home.

Childcare provision

Following the convention of policy-making and research (cf. Misra, Budig and Boeckmann 2011; European Commission 2013), I distinguish between childcare provision for under-3-year olds and that for preschool children, and therefore include two indicators for childcare provision in the analyses: the *percentage of children aged 0 to 2 in full-time formal childcare*, and the *percentage of children aged 3 up to the compulsory school age (CSA) in full-time, formal childcare*, where formal childcare refers to "centre-based services, organised day care and pre-school (both public and private) plus also professional child-minders" (OECD 2016c, p.1), however is excludes all forms of informal childcare, such as by relatives[135].

There are two reasons to distinguish between the two age groups. Firstly, childcare for under-2-year-olds has a stronger focus on the reconciliation of family and employment and differs more strongly across the countries (see Figure 6.4 in Section 6.3 below), while childcare services for preschool children have an additional educational element. However, secondly, it has been suggested that the effect on employment is more pronounced for the later (Misra, Budig and Boeckmann 2011, p. 151).

The focus on 'full-time'[136] childcare is for comparative, as well as theoretical reasons. Countries vary widely with regards to the intensity of childcare offered, which means that an identical participation rate can signify very different levels of support. For instance, in both, the UK and Sweden, around 90 per cent of 3-year-olds are in formal childcare; however, in the UK, children are, on average, less than 20 hours a week in childcare, whereas Sweden offers full-time care with over 33 hours a week (Eurostat 2016a). Also, from a theoretical point of view, full-time childcare is more relevant, as only long-hour childcare allows women to remain in paid work, to work more extended hours and to have time for political participation.

The data on both indicators have been taken from Eurostat (2016a) and refer to 2010. Unfortunately, no data on full-time childcare are available for Israel. While the full-time childcare participation rates for preschool children (3 years to CSA) in Israel could be calculated based on overall childcare participation rates (OECD 2016b), the regular 'study hours' in Jewish and Arab kindergartens in Israel (UNESCO 2006) and the proportion of Jewish and Arab preschool children (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics

[135]Although informal childcare plays an important role for work-family reconciliation in some countries, it is a private effort, rather than a measure for a governmental policy.

[136]'Full-time' childcare refers to 30 hours per week or more.

2011) (see Note c in Table D.1 in the Appendix for more details), the models exploring the effects of childcare for 0-2 year-olds exclude Israel, and are based on the remaining 24 countries only[137].

Control variables

Similar to the types of welfare states, the design and extent of work-family policies follow a geographical, as well as economic patterns, and there is a particular North-West/ South-East divide (cf. Gornick, Meyers and Ross 1997; Korpi 2000; Saxonberg and Sirovátka 2006). To ensure that the work-family policies do not merely pick up differences in economic power, which are linked to institutional political participation (Marien, Hooghe and Quintelier 2010), GDP per capita is included as a context-level control variable in all analyses. Table 6.3 provides an overview of the independent variables on the country-level and their distributions.

Table 6.3: Description and distribution of independent variables on the context-level

Name	Description	Range			
		Min	*Max*	*Mean*	*SD*
Spending on families	Overall government expenditure in 2010 on cash-benefits, tax-breaks and childcare/ preschools as a percentage of the GDP	1.3	4.1	2.3	0.8
Cash benefits	Approximate per-head government spending on family cash benefits (in PPP (Euro))	133.1	854.7	379.9	183.4
Length of leave	Total length of paid leave available to mothers in weeks (as of 31/12/2010)	14.0	164	56.9	40.9
Leave* Cash benefits	Length of paid leave weighted by the spending on cash benefits	5.8	132.9	52.6	35.3
Fulltime childcare (under-3-year-olds)[a]	Share of under-3-year-olds enrolled in formal childcare services for at least 30 hours per week	0.0	68.0	16.8	15.5
Fulltime childcare (pre-schoolers)	Share of children between 3 years and compulsory school age (CSA) enrolled in formal childcare services or preschools for at least 30 hours per week	10.0	87.0	50.3	22.1

Note. N= 25. See Table D.1 in the Appendix for data sources.
[a] Data missing for Israel (N=24).

Modelling Strategy

The analyses in this chapter are split into three parts. The first part focusses on the effects of work-family policies on employment status and job characteristics (i.e. indirect effects on political participation) and the second on the moderating effect on the link

[137]The model is, therefore, not strictly comparable to the remaining models. However, the remaining models have been estimated with and without data from Israel and the results are substantially the same.

between employment characteristics and political participation. The third part focusses on the direct effects on political participation. The primary analytical approach is, again, to use a set of multi-level models. However, in contrast to the previous two chapters, this chapter will introduce context-level variables as explanators. These variables are constant for all respondents within one country but vary between countries (e.g. all respondents in one country are entitled to the same length of maternity leave, but leave entitlement varies between countries) and their interpretation is essentially the same as for individual-level variables. For binary outcome variables, as mostly used in this chapter, that means the odds-ratios show the multiplicative effect of a one-unit increase in the explanatory variable.

In the second analytical section of this chapter, I explore whether the variation of the effect of supervisory responsibility (for mothers of pre-school children) across countries can be explained by the provision of childcare. In other words, I test whether the negative effect of supervisory responsibility (x) is smaller (or larger) in countries with a higher (or lower) percentage of children in full-time childcare (z). Empirically, this can be assessed by including an interaction term[138], that is the product of both variables (zx), in the model. If the coefficient of the interaction term is statistically significant, then the effect of supervisory responsibility varies with childcare provision. However, since interaction terms can be difficult to interpret, any significant effects found will be visualised.

Importantly, the introduction of an interaction term also changes the interpretation of the main effects of the two variables x and z: The coefficient of the main effect of x then shows the effect of the variable when $z = 0$, and the coefficient of the main effect of z shows the effect of z when $x = 0$. It is therefore advisable that the '0' has an interpretable meaning for both variables (Snijders and Bosker 2012). For the supervision variable, 0 stands for not being responsible for supervising others. However, 0 does not have a meaningful interpretation for one of the childcare variables, since there is no country in the dataset with no preschool children in full-time childcare. Therefore, both childcare variables have been centred around their respective means to allow for a meaningful interpretation of main and interaction effects.

Another difference from the previous chapters should also be noted. Although the main focus is on political participation (a binary variable), and the majority of models are logistic MLAs (coefficients presented as odds ratios), there are two exceptions. The first empirical section explores the effects of work-family policies on employment outcomes (employment status, working time, job level). Since 'working time' is a continuous variable, the model predicting working time (shown in

[138]Since childcare provision is a context-level variable, while supervisory responsibility is an individual level variable, this interaction is called a *cross-level interaction.*

Table 6.6 on page 174) is a *linear* MLA, and the coefficients presented are *unstandardised regression coefficients*. Moreover, it is not possible to model the effects of work-family policies on career progression and job level effectively using the data available. This is, firstly, because the ESS is not a panel dataset and it does not allow to include and control for individual work-histories, which are the decisive factor for career development and job levels. Secondly, due to different labour market structures, job levels might not be exactly equivalent in all countries, and it would be, therefore, difficult to isolate the effect of work-family policies from other structural effects. Instead of modelling the effects of work-family policies on individual-level job level, I will, therefore, only explore the macro-level association between women's job levels and work-family policies. In other words, I will present scatterplots (with regression lines) of the female share of employment in senior and middle management and the different work-family policies (parental leave, benefits, childcare). Although these scatterplots cannot show any direct effects, they can provide an impression of how the variables covary.

Other than these differences, the overall modelling strategy is similar to that in the previous chapter (Chapter 5). In order to distinguish between the effects on mothers and non-mothers, I will, again, estimate three different models for each context-level variable, one for women without children, the second for mothers of preschool children, and the third for mothers of school-aged children[139]. The effects of different work-family policies are assessed separately. This is partially to establish their unique effects, partially to avoid problems of multicollinearity, as some contextual variables are strongly and significantly correlated (see Table 6.4 below).

Table 6.4: Correlation matrix of context-level variables

	Spending on families	Cash benefits	Length of leave	Leave* Benefits	Childcare (0-2)	Childcare (3-CSA)
Cash benefits	**0.72*** **	-				
Length of leave	- 0.07	- 0.23	-			
Leave* Benefits	**0.41***	0.36†	**0.75*** **	-		
Childcare (0-2)	**0.51** **	0.13	- 0.28	- 0.11	-	
Childcare (3-CSA)	0.27	-0.29	0.22	0.21	**0.62*** **	-
GDP	**0.41***	**0.55** **	**- 0.58** **	- 0.21	**0.41***	-0.18

Note. Pairwise correlations (Pearson's r), N=25; (Childcare (0-2) excluding Israel, N=24); CSA= Compulsory school-age. **In bold**: Coefficients larger than $r = 0.4$. Variables that correlate highly might cause problems of multicollinearity in models.
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05, †=p<0.1.

[139]Preschool children are children younger than the compulsory school age of the respondent's country (see Table 5.2 in Chapter 5 [p.125] for an overview of the compulsory school age).

The goodness-of-fit of the models will be assessed through three different statistics: The log-likelihood, the Intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) and the explained variance (R^2 or Pseudo-R^2). The log-likelihood value is not meaningful in itself but allows the comparison of models through a likelihood-ratio test. The test can, for example, be used to compare two nested models and, thus, decide about the inclusion of a further parameter. The ICC assesses the proportion of the total variance that is attributable to differences between context-level units (countries). Consequently, the reduction in the ICC compared to a model without any explanators (the null-model) indicates how well differences between countries can be explained by the model. Lastly, the explained variance is a measure of the overall explanatory power of the model. The calculation of the R^2 for linear MLA in the first section follows the approach described by Snjiders and Bosker (1994)[140]. For the logistic MLAs, the Pseudo-R^2 will be calculated following the approach of Snijders and Bosker (2012) as the variance of the linear predictor divided by the total variance[141]. This Pseudo-R^2 is, however, more conservative than the OLS equivalent and should be interpreted accordingly.

6.3 Work-family policy effects on employment and work characteristics

In Chapter 4 and 5, I have shown that employment status and employment characteristics are important predictors of political participation of women in general, and also, however, in a slightly different manner, for mothers. This section takes a step back and shows how the distributions of these variables, specifically for mothers, are influenced by the work-family policies of a country. Although the effect on women's employment has been the focus of research before, this chapter does not only revisit and reassess findings of existing research, but it expands the geographical coverage to include a broader range of European countries. However, before turning to the empirical findings, the next section gives a brief overview of the design of policies in the dataset.

Work-family policies in Europe

Although variations of the same core policies – childcare leave, financial support and benefits, and childcare service provision – are in place in all countries in the dataset, differences in the goals that were aimed to achieve and the historical backgrounds against which they were developed, have resulted in considerable cross-national variation in their scope and specific design (Thévenon 2011, p.73).

[140]That is, the explained variance is calculated as total variance [in the null model] – unexplained variance [in the full model]) divided by the total variance. This can be done either for the full model, or for each of the levels separately.

[141]The total variance in a logistic multi-level model is given by the sum of the linear predictor variance, the intercept variance and the level-one residual variance ($\pi^2/3$) (Snijders and Bosker 2012, p.306)

Maternity, parental and family leave

All countries in the dataset offer childcare leave of some sort, however, it takes different forms and varies in terms of length, level of payment, design and criteria for eligibility. In this chapter, I concentrate on the paid provision of the two most common forms[142]: maternity and parental leave.

Maternity leave is employment-protected leave available to mothers before and just after the birth, with the focus on the health of mother and child. The minimum length stipulated by both, the 1992 Directive of the EU (Council Directive 92/85/EEC) and the ILO convention on maternity leave (International Labour Organization Maternity Protection Convention C183), is 14 weeks. Figure 6.2 shows the length of leave available to mothers for the countries in the dataset. On average, European countries grant just over 20 weeks of paid maternity leave. However, there is considerable variation. In Bulgaria, for example, women are entitled to over a year (58.6 weeks) of paid maternity leave, while Germany, Israel and Switzerland only grant the required minimum of 14 weeks. Portugal, Sweden and Norway have no separate regulation for maternity leave, instead, the leave is included in their parental leave schemes (OECD 2016d, pp. 11-12).

In addition to maternity leave, most, however not all, countries also offer paid *parental leave*. Parental leave is a period usually directly following maternity leave. It can be granted as a family or an individual right, but even as an individual right is often transferable so that in practice, it can be taken by either parent. Some countries have time specifically reserved for the father (*paternity leave*) or encourage the father's participation in parental leave. Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Spain, Switzerland, and the UK offer no paid parental leave at all.



Figure 6.2: Length of paid leave (maternity leave and parental leave) available to the mother in different European countries in 2010 (Sources: see Table D.2).

[142]Other types of leave that are not discussed here include 'breastfeeding' leave (e.g. in Spain), (mostly unpaid) 'home care leave' (e.g. Finland; Sweden).

Financial support for families and children

The term of financial support is defined to include both, in-cash and in-kind benefits[143] specifically aimed at children and families but excludes benefits that are not exclusively reserved to support families. The support can be broadly categorised into *child-related cash benefits*, *support of services for families with children,* and *tax breaks for families* (see: OECD 2016e, p.1).

On average, the countries in the dataset spent 2.3 per cent of their GDP on children and families in 2010 (see Figure 6.3). Unsurprisingly, given the generally strong welfare state, spending is high in the Nordic countries; however, it is also high in Ireland and the UK. In contrast, the Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Spain and Switzerland spend less than 1.5 per cent of their respective GDP on families. A closer look at Figure 6.3 reveals differences in the distribution over cash and in-kind benefits: The Scandinavian countries, Israel and Germany lead regarding spending on benefits-in-kind. In contrast, the high-spenders UK and Ireland spend by far the largest share on cash benefits.



Figure 6.3: Government spending on families and children as per cent of GDP in different European countries in 2010 (Source: Eurostat 2016b; OECD 2016c for Israel).

Childcare service provision

The provision of childcare services is directly aimed to support (full-time) employment of women by providing care outside the family and eliminating the need for one parent to stay home for childcare. In 2002, the European Council set targets for childcare provision in the EU member states. The so-called 'Barcelona objectives' stipulate that a third of the group of under 3-year-olds and 90 per cent of children between 3 years and

[143]In-kind benefits are non-cash benefits, for examples subsidies for childcare, reductions for families, and goods and services provided to children at home.

mandatory school age should have access to formal childcare (European Commission 2013, p.4). However, as of 2010, only a few member states had reached these goals, and the provision of formal childcare still varied widely across the member states.[144]

Figure 6.4 shows the childcare participation rates of the countries in the ESS dataset. In Eastern Europe, in particular, the take-up of formal childcare is low: in Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia less than 10 per cent of the under 3-year-olds are in formal care, compared around two-thirds of the children of the same age group in Denmark, Israel and the Netherlands. However, previous research has found that in these Eastern European countries the uptake of informal care (such as through grandparents or childminders) is generally higher (Plantenga and Remery 2013, p.97). The participation rates for the group of 3-year-old to school-aged children are overall higher. It is lowest in Switzerland, a country with no public childcare provision, and highest in France, with almost complete coverage, as pre-school is compulsory.

However, looking at participation rates conceals an important difference between countries regarding the intensity of childcare use[145]. There is a vast difference in the average childcare hours, and only in a few countries care services operate on a full-time basis of 30 hours or more (Plantenga and Remery 2013, p. 99).



Figure 6.4: Percentage of children in formal childcare (by age group) in different European countries in 2010 (Source: Eurostat 2016a).

[144]See Plantenga and Remery (2013) for an overview and Mills et al. (2014) for a detailed discussion of the situation in 2010.

[145]In the 24 countries for which Eurostat data are available, the average weekly hours of formal childcare range from 17.8 hours in the Netherlands to just under 40 hours in Poland and Portugal (Eurostat 2016a).

Effects on employment status

The theoretical expectations about the effects work-family policies have on women's employment status were derived from existing empirical work. In a nutshell, I anticipate that work-facilitating work-family policies increase the employment of mothers, while long leaves and high levels of cash benefits create an incentive for women to withdraw at least temporarily from the labour force.

Table 6.5 shows a summary of the estimated effects of the different work-family policy variables on the employment status of the three groups of women. The coefficients shown are the odds-ratios of each of the variables that have been estimated in a full model controlling for a number of individual-level predictors of employment status (such as age and education) and also controlling for GDP.[146] Since the interest is only on those, who could de facto be employed, the analyses are limited to women of working age (i.e. between 18 and 65 years old)[147]. The effects of the macro-variables have been estimated in separate models, partly to be able to establish their unique influence, partly to avoid problems of collinearity.

We can see from Table 6.5 below that work-facilitating policies show the expected positive effect on maternal employment (*Hypothesis 6.1a*): Both measures for childcare provision have a moderate positive and significant (at $p < 0.001$ and $p < 0.05$ respectively) effect on the employment status of mothers of preschool children. Each percentage point increase in the share of children aged 0 to 2 in full-time childcare is associated with a 1.8 per cent increase in the odds to be employed ($OR: 1.018$). That means mothers in Sweden, where 33% of under-3-year olds are in full-time childcare, are 1.7 times more likely to be employed than mothers in the UK, where only 4% of children on the same age group are in full-time care. For mothers of school-aged children, only the childcare participation rates for preschool children (3 years -CSA) have a significant (at $p < 0.05$) and positive effect. For this age group, no alternative formal arrangement for childcare is available, as, except in Slovakia, parental leave does not extend after the second birthday of the child. In other words, if no childcare for this age-group is available, the family has to resort to informal arrangements or has to provide care within the family, which encourages women to withdraw from the labour force. This effect is not just immediate, but appears to last when children are older, which suggest that once women stay home, they do not immediately return to work.

[146]The full models can be found in Tables D5, D6, and D7 in the Appendix.

[147]This restriction of cases follows the 'Possibility Principle' suggested by Goertz and Mahoney (2006, pp.178-9), which stipulates that only those cases should be included in the analyses for which the outcome of interest (here: to be in work) is theoretically possible.

Table 6.5: Summary table showing the effects of work-family policies (as odds-ratios) on the employment status of working-aged women without children, mothers of preschool children and mothers of school-aged children

Work-family policy	Women without children	Mothers of preschool children	Mothers of school-aged children
Government Spending on Families			
Spending on families	0.988 *(0.100)*	0.898 *(0.106)*	1.164 *(0.158)*
Cash benefits	1.002 *(0.046)*	**0.897*** *(0.042)*	0.988 *(0.061)*
Leave Policies			
Length of leave	**1.004*** *(0.002)*	0.998 *(0.002)*	**1.007**** *(0.002)*
Leave*Benefits	**1.004*** *(0.002)*	**0.996†** (0.002)	**1.007**** *(0.002)*
Childcare Provision			
Childcare (0-2)[a]	0.995 *(0.005)*	**1.018***** *(0.005)*	1.007 *(0.007)*
Childcare (3-CSA)	1.002 *(0.003)*	**1.008*** *(0.004)*	**1.008*** *(0.004)*
n	*11,530*	*3,364*	*3,949*

Note: Logistic Multilevel Analysis on the employment status (0=not in work, 1= in work) of women between 18 and 65 years, maximum-likelihood estimation. Coefficients shown are odd-ratios. All models control for age, education and gender role attitude of the respondent, as well as the work status of their partner on the individual level, and GDP per capita on the country-level. Coefficients in bold and highlighted are significant at $p < 0.1$. N(countries)=25; CSA= compulsory school age.
[a] no data for Israel, n= 11,086/ 3,118/ 3,759, N(countries)=24.
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05, †=p<0.1.

Turning now to the work-reducing policies, we find a picture that is less clear-cut. It was anticipated that work-reducing policies, thus long, well-paid leaves and childcare benefits have a negative effect on women's probability to be employed (*Hypothesis 6.1b*). This expectation is only partially confirmed. For mothers of pre-school children, higher levels of benefits, and long well-paid leaves have the expected adverse effect (significant at $p < 0.05$ and $p < 0.1$ respectively). Each 100 Euro (in PPP) increase in per-head spending on cash benefits reduces the likelihood of being employed by just over 10%. However, for mothers of school-aged children, the effects of both leave variables are positive (significant at $p < 0.01$), while the negative effect of benefits does not reach any conventional level of significance.

Intriguingly, there is also a positive and significant effect of parental leave on non-mothers. A closer look reveals that this effect can be attributed to the coding of the variable. The subgroup of *'women without children*' also includes women with children over the age of 18. When women with adult children and those without children are analysed separately, I find a positive effect only on women with older children (see Table D.4 in the Appendix). This result suggests that parental leave indeed has *a long-term positive* effect on labour force attachment, independent of the level of payment. This fits well with the argument made above: Long leaves allow women to stay attached to the

labour market when alternative arrangements are not available. While benefits and long, leaves have a negative effect on the employment of mothers of preschool children, this effect is not lasting.

Effects on job characteristics

Effect on working time

Table 6.6 below shows a summary of the results of a set of multi-level models estimating the effects of work-family policies on women's weekly working hours. As the dependent variable is continuous instead of binary, the estimated models are *linear* multi-level models and control, again, for individual-level predictors of working time and GDP. As the 'standard' working hours vary across countries, the models account additionally for the regular full-time working hours[148] in each country.

The effects on working time are relatively straightforward. In line with the expectation, the provision of childcare increases the weekly working hours of mothers (*Hypothesis 6.2a*). This holds equally for childcare for under-3-year olds and childcare for preschool children, and also for mothers of younger and older children, thus, suggesting a lasting effect. Considering that the variable is measured in per cent, the effect is also substantial regarding effect size. The difference in full-time childcare provision for under 3-year-olds in the Czech Republic (0%) and Denmark (68%) translates into an expected difference in working time of just over 10 hours per week.

As for work-reducing policies, only cash benefits show the expected negative effect (*Hypothesis 6.2b)*. However, this effect is only significant for the subgroup of mothers of older children. Nevertheless, the effect is sizable in terms of its magnitude. The estimated difference in working hours between otherwise similar mothers of preschool children in Spain, the country with the lowest spending on cash benefits, and the UK, one of the highest spending countries, amounts to almost 5.5 hours a week. In contrast, long-well paid leaves seem not to be related to a reduction in working hours. There is, however, again, a positive effect of the length of leave on women without children, which is, again, driven by women with adult children included in this category. For women without children, there is no significant effect (at $p < 0.1$) on working hours.

[148] Standard full-time working hours are set to 40 hours/week, apart from Denmark (37), Norway (38), France (39), Switzerland, Czech Republic, Slovakia (all 42), Israel (45) and Croatia (48) (based on mean working time of men in the ESS dataset).

Table 6.6: Summary table showing the effects of work-family policies on the normal weekly working hours of working-aged women without children, mothers of preschool children and mothers of school-aged children

Work-family policy	Women without children	Mothers of preschool children	Mothers of school-aged children
Government Spending on Families			
Spending on families	-0.365 *(0.699)*	-0.809 *(1.107)*	-0.127 *(1.275)*
Cash benefits	-0.176 *(0.305)*	-0.659 *(0.467)*	**-1.041*** *(0.519)*
Leave Policies			
Length of leave	**0.030*** *(0.013)*	0.027 *(0.022)*	0.026 *(0.025)*
Leave*Benefits	0.016 *(0.013)*	0.002 *(0.022)*	0.001 *(0.025)*
Childcare Provision			
Childcare (0-2)[a]	0.002 *(0.036)*	**0.111*** *(0.052)*	**0.152*** *(0.060)*
Childcare (3-SA)	0.016 *(0.023)*	**0.084*** *(0.034)*	**0.120**** *(0.039)*
n	*6,476*	*1,837*	*2,556*

Note. Linear Multilevel Analysis on the normal working hours of women currently in work (employment=1), maximum likelihood estimation. Unstandardized regression coefficients shown. All models control for age and education of the respondent, work status of their partner, and GDP per capita and standard working hours (see Footnote 148) on the country-level. N (countries)= 25; CSA= compulsory school age.
[a] no data for Israel, n= 6,225/ 1,687/ 2,442, N(countries)= 24;
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05, †=p<0.1.

Effect on job level

The expectations about policy effects on women's career progression in the literature are mixed. Scholars of 'varieties of capitalism' literature have suggested a negative effect of work-reducing policies on the career progression of mothers and women in general, while the 'welfare state paradox' postulates that generous policies, in general, have unintended negative effects on gender equality in the labour market (Mandel and Semyonov 2005; 2006). Others, looking at the gender pay gap, a measure related to women's career progression and the glass ceiling, have found positive effects of work-facilitating policies (Gash 2009).

At least part of these conflicting findings might be attributed to the difficulty to model macro-effects on career progression or job levels using cross-sectional data. Importantly, most cross-sectional datasets (and ESS data in particular) do not allow to adequately account for individual work-histories, including periods of unemployment, part-time working history, changes of jobs and employers, while these are the main predictors of career progression and job levels. This could result in severely underspecified models. Potentially even more important here is the difficulty in estimating contextual effects in a cross-national dataset. Labour market structures vary substantially, for example in the

prevalence of managerial positions or cultures of autonomous work, but also regarding the size of the public sector and part-time working cultures – all of these might potentially influence the likelihood to be in a high-level job position. In contrast to differences in working-time cultures, which are relatively straightforward to account for, these contextual differences are more complex and, thus, more difficult to control for. As a consequence, it would be difficult to isolate the effect of work-family policies.

For these reasons, I have decided to provide an impression of the contextual bivariate relationship between work-family policies and women's career progression, which can be seen in Figure 6.1 below, rather than estimating a statistical model.



Figure 6.5: Bivariate contextual relationships between different work-family policies (in 2010) and the female share of employment in senior and middle management (in 2011). Sources: ILOSTAT (2017b); various sources for work-family policies (see Table D.1 in the Appendix).

The scatterplots (and regression lines) show the female share of managers (as % of all managers[149]) in each country, as a proxy measure for women's career progression, plotted against different work-family policies[150]. Naturally, these relationships should be interpreted with caution, as some caveats apply. The scatter plots do not account for potentially confounding factors, such as women's labour force participation rate. There is also another potential problem of endogeneity, as the share of women in powerful economic positions might also affect the type and level of support for working mothers[151]. Moreover, the scatterplots do not account for differences between mothers and non-mothers, thus potentially underestimate relationships for mothers.

However, they do provide an impression of possible effects, and overall the observations are consistent with my expectation, as well as with findings from previous studies. I find that countries providing overall stronger support for working mothers are also characterised by a higher proportion of women in managerial positions. The contextual association is marginally significant ($r = 0.38, p = 0.06$; $r_s = 0.42, p = 0.04$). Cash benefits, on the other hand, are not related, neither significantly nor substantially, to the female share in managerial positions. As for the length of parental leave, a curvilinear relationship appears. Longer levels of leave seem to be associated with a bigger proportion of those managerial positions to be female, however, this seems to level off for very long leaves. Unsurprisingly, given the small n ($N = 24$), neither the linear nor the curvilinear relationship reach statistical significance. Finally, it can be seen that both measures on childcare provision are positively associated with the share of women in high-level positions (however, again, not statistically significantly so). Overall, keeping the limited explanatory power of these impressions for actual effects on individual women in mind, we might conclude that work-facilitating policies appear to be associated with more women in powerful positions in the labour market. At the same time, countries with work-reducing policies, such as very long leaves or higher level of benefits, are not associated with higher proportions of women amongst managers.

In sum, the analyses have, expectedly, shown strong evidence for the indirect effects of work-family policies on political participation. The policies have, overall, a positive impact on the employment-related predictors for political activity. Mothers in countries with better institutional support are more likely to be employed, and those countries are also characterised by more gender-balance in high-level positions.

[149]Using the proportion of managers who are female in contrast to the share of females who are in managerial positions allows to control for the country-specific share of managerial positions in the labour market.

[150]Data on the 'female share of employment in senior and middle management' have been taken from ILOSTAT (2017b) and does not include Israel ($N = 24$).

[151]Evidence from 12 Western democracies shows that the share of women in legislation (and the share of women in the labour force) does affect social spending (Bolzendahl and Brooks 2007).

6.4 The interaction between childcare and supervisory responsibility

The second effect of work-family policies theorised earlier is a moderating effect on the relationship between being in a supervisory position and political participation for the subgroup of mothers of small children. I have hypothesised that the availability of childcare might decide whether being in a supervisory position has a substantial positive effect, operating through the associated resources, or whether the increased stress and work-life conflict associated with supervisory responsibility dampen this effect.

To test the moderating effect of childcare provision, two models have been fitted, each including a cross-level interaction between the variable of being in a supervisory position and one of the childcare-variables[152]. If the effect of being in a supervisory position was indeed moderated by childcare availability, one or both of these cross-level interactions should have a significant effect. Indeed, turning to the results in Table 6.7, I find some support for *Hypothesis 6.4,* as the interaction term between childcare for under-3-year-old's and being in a supervisory position is positive and significant ($OR = 1.02; p < 0.05$). Since the main effect of supervisory responsibility is also positive, this means that the positive effect is stronger in countries with better childcare provision for the youngest children. There is, however, no evidence for a cross-level interaction with childcare for older children (3 years to CSA).

The results are in line with the theoretical expectation but should nevertheless be treated with caution. The very small n of the entire model, and especially in some of the smaller countries, render the results as indicative at best. There is also a major concern about selection effects. Mothers of small children are self-selected into the labour force and this selection varies across countries and by work-family policies as the previous section has shown. Following the approach by Stier, Lewin-Epstein and Braun (2012), I have re-estimated the model, including the selection probability as Heckman's lambda (Heckman 1976) as a predictor in the model[153]. Including the selection corrector decreases the significance of the interaction effect slightly to $p < 0.1$ but otherwise, the results remain the same. We can therefore cautiously conclude, that for the group of mothers of young children, the effect of being in an employment position with responsibilities for others might indeed depend on the level of institutional support available. In other words, work-family policies have a moderating effect in this specific case. However, it will be necessary to confirm these results on better data in the future.

[152]The childcare variables have been centred around their respective means to allow for a meaningful interpretation of main and interaction effects.

[153]The equation estimating the probability of employment (as inverse Mills ratio) included the age, education level, partner, labour force status of partner, gender role attitude, number of children and country as fixed effects (for a description, see: Guo and Fraser 2014, Chapter 4).

Table 6.7: Logistic multi-level analysis testing the interaction between childcare provision and supervisory responsibility on political participation for the group of mothers of young children

Independent variables	Effects of childcare provision and supervisory responsibility	
	(1) Childcare (0-2)	(2) Childcare (3-CSA)
Individual level		
Age	1.014 *(0.010)*	1.014 *(0.009)*
Degree level education *(Ref: less than degree level)*	0.945 *(0.146)*	0.981 *(0.147)*
Partner *(Ref: No partner)*	1.160 *(0.225)*	1.090 *(0.206)*
Medium political interest	**1.983*** ** *(0.273)*	**1.957*** ** *(0.261)*
Strong political interest *(Ref: Weak political interest)*	**3.711*** ** *(0.923)*	**3.638*** ** *(0.867)*
Socially active once a week *(Ref: Less than once a week)*	1.247 *(0.169)*	1.185 *(0.157)*
Gender role attitude *(more egalitarian)*	1.019 *(0.038)*	1.021 *(0.036)*
Working hours	1.003 *(0.007)*	1.002 *(0.006)*
Supervisory responsibility	**1.478** ** *(0.213)*	**1.459** ** *(0.203)*
Occupational status	**1.009*** *(0.004)*	1.007 *(0.004)*
Job autonomy	**1.098*** ** *(0.028)*	**1.093*** ** *(0.027)*
Context level		
Fulltime childcare (0-2) (in %)	1.001 *(0.008)*	-
Full-time childcare (3-CSA) (in %)	-	1.003 *(0.006)*
GDP per capita	**1.000*** *(0.000)*	**1.000** ** *(0.000)*
Cross-level interactions		
Childcare (0-2) * Supervision	**1.019*** *(0.009)*	-
Childcare (3-CSA) * Supervision	-	1.006 *(0.006)*
Intercept	0.017 *(0.009)*	0.017 *(0.008)*
ICC	0.047	0.056
Pseudo-R^2	0.164	0.153
Log-Likelihood	*-824.19417*	*-878.68495*
n / N (countries)	1722 / 24	1,869 / 25

Note. Logistic Multilevel Analysis of political participation, estimating the cross-level interaction between childcare provision and supervisory responsibility for employed mothers of preschool children, maximum-likelihood estimation. Coefficients shown are odds-ratios, standard errors in parentheses.
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05, †=p<0.1.

6.5 Work-family policy effects on political participation

Finally, I turn to the direct effects of work-family policies on women's political participation. In this section, I build on two different lines of reasoning to derive my expectations. According to the first, work-family policies affect women's resources, and we should expect a positive effect of childcare provision and benefits – on mothers only. The second has suggested a symbolic effect, which suggests a positive influence of work-facilitating policies and a negative effect of work-reducing policies – for all women. To test these expectations, I have estimated a set of multi-level models. The sample for these models includes all (working and non-working) women. However, a control for employment status is included to capture a direct, rather than the indirect effects explored earlier. To account for the correlation of the contextual variables, I have, again, fitted separate models for each of the policies. Table 6.8, Table 6.9, and Table 6.10 below show the results of the analyses.

Turning first to the two spending variables shown in Table 6.8, we can see a positive and significant (at $p < 0.1$)[154] effect of the overall support for families (measured by the overall spending on children and families) on mothers of preschool children (*Model 3*) and mothers of school-aged children (*Model 5*). In both models, each one-percentage-point increase in spending is associated with around 30 per cent larger odds of political participation. To put this into context, the odds of participating for mothers of preschool children in Denmark (the country with highest overall spending) are estimated to be 2.3 times larger than the odds in the Netherlands (the country with the lowest overall spending). For non-mothers, in contrast, political participation is not affected by overall spending on families.

Turning to spending on cash benefits, I only find a statistically significant (at $p < 0.1$), positive effect for the group of mothers of school-aged children. For this group of women, a one-hundred Euro (PPP per head) increase in spending on cash benefits is associated with a 12 per cent increase in the odds of participating politically. In substantive terms, this translates to 1.8 times higher odds of participating in the UK (a high-spend country) in comparison to Poland, the country with the lowest per head spending. Including cash benefits in the model increases the model fit slightly.[155] For mothers of younger children and non-mothers, the effects are also positive, but not significant on any conventional significance level.

[154] In contrast to individual-level indicators, for which a standard significance level of $p < 0.05$ is applied, I consider context-level indicator significant if $p < 0.1$.

[155] The Pseudo-R^2 increases from 0.142 in a model without the parameter (not shown) to 0.151 in Model 6. The likelihood-ratio test favours the larger model marginally ($\chi^2(1) = 2.81; p = 0.09$).

Table 6.8: Logistic multi-level analysis of the effect of work-family policies on women's (individual) political participation I

Independent variables	Effects of spending on families and cash benefits					
	Women without children		*Mothers of preschool children*		*Mothers of school-aged children*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Individual level						
Age	1.000	1.000	1.010	1.010	0.995	0.995
	(0.001)	*(0.001)*	*(0.006)*	*(0.006)*	*(0.004)*	*(0.004)*
Degree level education	**1.753*** **	**1.754*** **	**1.302***	**1.306***	**1.710*** **	**1.714*** **
(Ref: Less than degree level)	*(0.093)*	*(0.093)*	*(0.137)*	*(0.137)*	*(0.171)*	*(0.172)*
Partner	1.081†	1.081†	1.191	1.191	1.150	1.152
(Ref: No partner)	*(0.048)*	*(0.048)*	*(0.156)*	*(0.156)*	*(0.111)*	*(0.111)*
Medium political interest	**1.954*** **	**1.956*** **	**2.073*** **	**2.079*** **	**2.141*** **	**2.150*** **
	(0.096)	*(0.096)*	*(0.217)*	*(0.217)*	*(0.190)*	*(0.190)*
Strong political interest	**4.035*** **	**4.038*** **	**4.173*** **	**4.172*** **	**4.020*** **	**4.037*** **
(Ref: Weak political interest)	*(0.284)*	*(0.285)*	*(0.770)*	*(0.770)*	*(0.630)*	*(0.633)*
Socially active once a week	**1.328*** **	**1.329*** **	1.173	1.176	1.107	1.110
(Ref: Less than once a week)	*(0.065)*	*(0.065)*	*(0.120)*	*(0.120)*	*(0.100)*	*(0.100)*
Gender role attitude	**1.064*** **	**1.064*** **	**1.093*** **	**1.094*** **	**1.051***	**1.052***
(more egalitarian)	*(0.013)*	*(0.013)*	*(0.029)*	*(0.029)*	*(0.024)*	*(0.024)*
In paid work	**1.179*** **	**1.179*** **	**1.224***	**1.226***	**1.227***	**1.231***
(Ref: Not in paid work)	*(0.059)*	*(0.059)*	*(0.125)*	*(0.126)*	*(0.118)*	*(0.118)*
Context level						
Overall spending on families	1.212	-	**1.329†**	-	**1.284†**	-
(as % of GDP)	*(0.168)*		*(0.227)*		*(0.181)*	
Cash benefits *(more)*	-	1.090	-	1.107	-	**1.117†**
		(0.069)		*(0.087)*		*(0.072)*
GDP per capita	**1.000** **	**1.000** **	**1.000** **	**1.000** **	**1.000** **	**1.000** **
	(0.000)	*(0.000)*	*(0.000)*	*(0.000)*	*(0.000)*	*(0.000)*
Intercept	0.023***	0.027***	0.016***	0.020***	0.034***	0.040***
	(0.008)	*(0.007)*	*(0.007)*	*(0.008)*	*(0.012)*	*(0.013)*
ICC	0.061	0.061	0.076	0.082	0.056	0.057
Pseudo-R^2	0.154	0.153	0.139	0.135	0.153	0.151
Log-likelihood	-6902.02	-6902.06	-1494.10	-1494.61	-1970.64	-1970.72
n / N (countries)	17,086 / 25	17,086 / 25	3,465 / 25	3,465 / 25	4,309 / 25	4,309 / 25

Note. Logistic Multilevel Analysis estimating the effect of horizontal segregation on political participation (0/1), maximum-likelihood estimation. Coefficients shown are odds-ratios, standard errors in parentheses.
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05, †=p<0.1.

Table 6.9: Logistic multi-level analysis of the effect of work-family policies on women's (individual) political participation II

Independent variables	Effects of leave policies					
	Women without children		*Mothers of preschool children*		*Mothers of school-aged children*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Individual level						
Age	1.000	1.000	1.010†	1.010†	0.995	0.995
	(0.001)	*(0.001)*	*(0.006)*	*(0.006)*	*(0.004)*	*(0.004)*
Degree level education	**1.753*** **	**1.755*** **	**1.304***	**1.308****	**1.714*** **	**1.715*** **
(Ref: Less than degree level)	*(0.093)*	*(0.093)*	*(0.137)*	*(0.137)*	*(0.172)*	*(0.172)*
Partner	1.081†	1.081†	1.191	1.194	1.152	1.156
(Ref: No partner)	*(0.048)*	*(0.048)*	*(0.156)*	*(0.156)*	*(0.111)*	*(0.112)*
Medium political interest	**1.955*** **	**1.954*** **	**2.081*** **	**2.076*** **	**2.145*** **	**2.144*** **
	(0.096)	*(0.096)*	*(0.217)*	*(0.217)*	*(0.190)*	*(0.190)*
Strong political interest	**4.040*** **	**4.035*** **	**4.191*** **	**4.200*** **	**4.047*** **	**4.045*** **
(Ref: Weak political interest)	*(0.285)*	*(0.284)*	*(0.773)*	*(0.775)*	*(0.634)*	*(0.634)*
Socially active once a week	**1.328*** **	**1.330*** **	1.171	1.174	1.106	1.110
(Ref: Less than once a week)	*(0.065)*	*(0.065)*	*(0.120)*	*(0.120)*	*(0.100)*	*(0.100)*
Gender role attitude	**1.064*** **	**1.064*** **	**1.095*** **	**1.094*** **	**1.052***	**1.052***
(more egalitarian)	*(0.013)*	*(0.013)*	*(0.029)*	*(0.029)*	*(0.024)*	*(0.024)*
In paid work	**1.178*** **	**1.178*** **	**1.224***	**1.227***	**1.224***	**1.220***
(Ref: Not in paid work)	*(0.059)*	*(0.059)*	*(0.125)*	*(0.125)*	*(0.118)*	*(0.117)*
Context level						
Length of leave	1.004	-	1.003	-	1.003	-
	(0.003)		*(0.004)*		*(0.118)*	
Leave * Benefits	-	**1.007****	-	**1.007***	-	**1.006***
		(0.069)		*(0.003)*		*(0.003)*
GDP per capita	**1.000*** **	**1.000*** **	**1.000****	**1.000****	**1.000*** **	**1.000*** **
	(0.000)	*(0.000)*	*(0.000)*	*(0.000)*	*(0.000)*	*(0.000)*
Intercept	0.022***	0.021***	0.018***	0.016***	0.039***	0.035***
	(0.008)	*(0.006)*	*(0.009)*	*(0.007)*	*(0.016)*	*(0.012)*
ICC	0.061	0.051	0.084	0.073	0.062	0.054
Pseudo-R^2	0.150	0.162	0.128	0.140	0.144	0.153
Log-likelihood	-6902.00	-6899.75	-1495.01	-1493.33	-1971.66	-1970.17
n / N (countries)	17,086 / 25	17,086 / 25	3,465 / 25	3,465 / 25	4,309 / 25	4,309 / 25

Note. Logistic Multilevel Analysis estimating the effect of horizontal segregation on political participation (0/1), maximum-likelihood estimation. Coefficients shown are odds-ratios, standard errors in parentheses.
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05, †=p<0.1.

The second table, Table 6.9 above, shows the estimated effects of leave policies. The length of paid leave, by itself, has no significant effect on any of the groups of women. However, in combination with cash benefits, I find an effect that is positive and significant (at $p < 0.01$ and $p < 0.05$) for all three groups. This suggest that leave is conductive to women's political engagement only if it is well-paid. At the same time, the results are not solely driven by the level of payment, as the correlation with the cash benefit variable is only moderate ($r = 0.36;\ p = 0.095$). Moreover, the combined variable explains slightly more of the variation in the political participation of mothers of school-aged children than the variable measuring cash benefit spending[156]. The effect on women without children is, however, is intriguing. In contrast to the indirect effects discussed earlier, it is not entirely attributable to women with grown-up children in that category. The analyses for those women, who never had children reveal a weaker, but still significant effect ($OR = 1.005;\ p = 0.059$) (output in Table D.4 in the Appendix). In other words, the effects also hold for non-mothers.

Finally, Table 6.10 below shows the direct effects of childcare provision on political participation. Against the expectations, neither of the childcare variables shows a significant effect on any of the three groups of women. Accordingly, the likelihood-ratio test rejects the introduction of the variable to the models. It might be argued that this is due to the nature of the variable, which measures *full-time* childcare provision only. In order to explore whether the overall availability of childcare (regardless of the hours) has an effect, the model has been refitted using overall childcare participation rates[157]. Although these models indicate that childcare participation for preschool children (3 years to CSA) has a positive effect on the political participation of mothers of preschool children, this effect is not significant at any conventional significance level ($OR = 1.012; p = 0.132$). I therefore conclude, that childcare provision does not have any direct effects on political participation.

How can these results be interpreted in terms of the nature of the causal mechanisms between work-family policies and political participation? The positive effects found for the cash benefits and paid leave in combination with the non- effects of childcare provision and parental leave suggest that a symbolic effect might not be in place. If this was the case, we should also expect an effect on all women, however, apart from the leave/benefit variable, the effect of work-families is limited to mothers. In other words, there is no evidence supporting either *Hypothesis 6.6a* or *Hypothesis 6.6b*.

[156]The Pseudo-R^2 of Model 6 is 0.153, compared to 0.142 in the model without the parameter (not shown). The likelihood-ratio test comparing the two models also supports the inclusion of the parameter ($\chi^2(1) = 3.91; p = 0.048$).

[157]The model has also been refitted to include an interaction between employment status and the childcare provision in order to test whether childcare might affect working and non-working women differently, however, no difference was found.

Table 6.10: Logistic multi-level analysis of the effect of work-family policies on women's (individual) political participation III

Independent variables	Effects of childcare provision					
	Women without children		*Mothers of preschool children*		*Mothers of school-aged children*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Individual level						
Age	1.000 *(0.001)*	1.000 *(0.001)*	1.010† *(0.006)*	1.010 *(0.006)*	0.994 *(0.004)*	0.995 *(0.004)*
Degree level education *(Ref: Less than degree level.)*	**1.749***** *(0.094)*	**1.753***** *(0.093)*	**1.316*** *(0.142)*	**1.301*** *(0.137)*	**1.725***** *(0.175)*	**1.716***** *(0.172)*
Partner *(Ref: No partner)*	1.091† *(0.049)*	1.082 *(0.048)*	1.214 *(0.162)*	1.187 *(0.156)*	1.139 *(0.111)*	1.150 *(0.111)*
Medium political interest	**1.968***** *(0.098)*	**1.959***** (0.096)	**2.118***** *(0.227)*	**2.084***** *(0.218)*	**2.139***** *(0.192)*	**2.144***** (0.190)
Strong political interest *(Ref: Weak political interest)*	**4.048***** *(0.290)*	**4.035***** *(0.285)*	**4.208***** *(0.807)*	**4.180***** *(0.771)*	**4.102***** *(0.661)*	4.025*** (0.631)
Socially active once a week *(Ref: Less than once a week)*	**1.323***** *(0.065)*	**1.330***** *(0.065)*	1.167 *(0.122)*	1.167 *(0.120)*	1.097 *(0.100)*	1.105 *(0.100)*
Gender role attitude *(more egalitarian)*	**1.066***** *(0.013)*	**1.064***** *(0.013)*	**1.093***** *(0.030)*	**1.093***** (0.029)	**1.054*** *(0.024)*	**1.052*** *(0.024)*
In paid work *(Ref: Not in paid work)*	**1.178***** *(0.060)*	**1.178**** *(0.059)*	1.227† *(0.129)*	1.215 *(0.125)*	**1.251*** *(0.122)*	**1.224*** *(0.118)*
Context level						
Fulltime childcare (0-2) *(in %)*	0.997 *(0.007)*	-	1.002 *(0.009)*	-	0.996 *(0.007)*	-
Full-time childcare (3-CSA) *(in %)*	-	1.002 *(0.005)*	-	1.004 (0.006)	-	1.000 *(0.005)*
GDP per capita	**1.000***** *(0.000)*	**1.000***** *(0.000)*	**1.000*** *(0.000)*	**1.000*** *(0.000)*	**1.000***** *(0.000)*	**1.000***** *(0.000)*
Intercept	0.034*** *(0.007)*	0.029*** *(0.010)*	0.025*** *(0.009)*	0.020*** *(0.010)*	0.057*** *(0.016)*	0.052*** *(0.021)*
ICC	0.057	0.065	0.085	0.084	0.057	0.064
Pseudo-R^2	0.147	0.147	0.132	0.130	0.143	0.142
Log-likelihood	*-6734.73*	*-6891.4736*	*-1415.12*	*-1494.468*	*-1908.08*	*-1971.3636*
n / N (countries)	16,448 / **24**	17,086 / 25	3,218 / **24**	3,465 / 25	4,101/ **24**	4,309 / 25

Note. Logistic Multilevel Analysis estimating the effect of horizontal segregation on political participation (0/1), maximum-likelihood estimation. Coefficients shown are odds-ratios, standard errors in parentheses.
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05, †=p<0.1.

Instead, the findings provide support for the first theorised effect: via women's (political) resources (*Hypothesis 6.5*). It appears that higher levels of overall support through the state translate into higher probabilities for political participation of mothers[158]. This finding fits well with the existing literature on 'policy feedback', which has found similar mobilising effects of targeted policies on other disadvantaged groups in society, for example, the elderly (cf. Campbell 2003). Money seems to play an important role since all significant effects found are related to higher income. Childcare provision, in contrast, is not related to participation. This is surprising, but not unexplainable. Firstly, it could merely show that the resources generated through benefits can be used more flexible. Formal childcare is often limited to certain hours of the day – often regular working hours on weekdays – and might be of less support for activities that take place outside these hours. Benefits, however, can be used more flexible and tailored to the specific need of the family. Secondly, the free-time generated through childcare might be used differently: Employed women might work longer hours, as the previous section has suggested, and homemakers might use this time for regular tasks and housework (cf. Craig 2007), rather than for their own disposable time. For mothers of the youngest children, the finding also fits well with the observation in the previous chapter, i.e. that time might play a secondary role for this time-deprived group of women.

Overall, the results show that work-family policies are not only important for political participation, due to their effect on women's labour market behaviour, but they can also directly impact on the resources available to mothers. Although the models can only explain a modest share of the total variance in political participation (as shown by the Pseudo-R^2), they substantively reduce the share of the variance accountable to differences between countries (the ICC)[159]. All in all, it can be cautiously concluded that work-families matter for the political participation of mothers, and that they do so in a positive way: higher levels of support available to women are, overall, associated with a higher probability of participation.

6.6 Conclusion

Work-family policies play an important role in the reconciliation of employment and child rearing and can, therefore, have a notable impact on women's lives. This chapter aimed to explore whether this impact extends to women's political participation. I have

[158]It should be kept in mind, however, that a multilevel regression model cannot assess the direction of the effect. It might well be that the effect works as well in the opposite direction, and a more politically active female populace has effected more extensive work-family policies (cf. Bleijenbergh and Roggeband 2007; Morgan 2013).

[159]The ICCs in 'empty' models for women without children, mothers of preschool children and mothers of school-aged children are 0.129; 0.135 and 0.129 respectively.

suggested that work-family policies might be linked to participation in three different ways: Firstly, by impacting on the employment status and job characteristics of mothers, secondly by moderating the effect of supervisory responsibility on the political participation of mothers of preschool children, and thirdly by directly affecting political resources. Indeed, the findings of the empirical analyses have suggested that all three of these causal links exist, although some effects are moderate in size and slightly more complex than expected.

I have first explored the effects on women's employment and their job characteristics. In line with my expectation and existing literature, work-facilitating policies have shown a positive effect on women's employment. However, work-reducing policies only showed the expected negative effect on the group of mothers of preschool children, while, in the longer term, they had positive effects. While these findings mostly confirm previous research from the sociology of work, they are also relevant for political participation research: Since being in gainful employment increases the probability of political participation for mothers (see Chapter 5), stronger support for working mothers does not only increase female labour force participation rates but at the same foster women's political activity.

For those women, who are in paid employment, the effects of work-family policies are mixed. Childcare provision generally allows women to work longer hours, as expected; however, generous benefits only decrease the working time of preschool mothers but do not affect mothers of older children. The relation of working time to political participation, however, is not straightforward and since childcare availability only increases working hours of those *already in employment*, they have, overall, still a positive impact. Turning to the effects on job levels, I find further support for the overall positive effects of work-family policies. Although the cross-sectional nature of the data did not allow to fit an adequate model for women's job levels, the bivariate analyses have suggested that countries with strong childcare provision (and work-facilitating work-family policies in general) are also characterised with a larger share of women in high-level positions. Work-family policies can, thus, at least indirectly encourage women's participation in politics by increasing the labour force participation of mothers and promoting more gender-equality in high-level positions.

In the second part of the analyses, I have tested whether childcare provision moderates the effect of being in a supervisory position for the group of mothers of young children Although concerns about the sample size require a cautious interpretation of the findings, there is some tentative support for the expected moderating effect of childcare provision. This finding suggests that work-family policies can shape the impact of

different employment outcomes; and that future research should pay more attention to the role of policies when exploring the links between parenthood and political activity.

Table 6.11: Overview of the hypotheses tested in Chapter 6

Hypothesis		Confirmed?
Indirect effects		
6.1a	Work-facilitating work-family policies (childcare provision, leave), increase the probability of mothers of young children to be employed.	✓
6.1b	Work-reducing work-family policies (long and well-paid leaves, high benefits) decrease the probability of mothers of young children to be employed.	(✗)
6.2a	Work-facilitating work-family policies (childcare provision, leave), increase the working hours of employed mothers.	✓
6.2b	Work-reducing work-family policies (long and well-paid leaves, high benefits) decrease the working hours of employed mothers.	(✓)
6.3a	Work-facilitating work-family policies (childcare provision, leave), increase the probability of mothers and women in general to be in a high-level job position.	✓
6.3b	Work-reducing work-family policies (long and well-paid leave, high benefits) decrease the probability of mothers and women in general to be in a high-level job position.	✗
Moderating effects		
6.4	Childcare provision moderates the effect of supervisory responsibility on political participation for mothers of preschool children.	(✓)
Direct effects		
6.5	Higher levels of childcare benefits and better childcare provision directly increase the probability of mothers to participate politically.	✓ (benefits) ✗ (childcare)
6.6a	Work-reducing work-family policies (long leaves, high benefits) directly decrease women's probability to participate politically.	✗
6.6b	Work-facilitating work-family policies (childcare provision, short leaves) directly increase the probability of mothers to participate politically	✗

Legend:

✓	Results support the hypothesis
✗	Results do not support the hypothesis
(✓)	There is weak support for the hypothesis
(✗)	There is weak evidence against the hypothesis

In the last part, I have gone a step further and explored a possible *direct* effect of work-family policies. Until now, political participation research has paid little attention to effects of the country-context outside the political sphere. My analysis has shown that work-family policies are positively associated with women's political activity. These findings are in line with the emerging scholarship in the field of 'policy feedback', which has argued that the redistribution of resources can encourage politically marginalised groups to become active.

Regarding future research, these findings suggest that the inclusion of contextual characteristics outside the political sphere can help us to better understand women's political participation patterns in cross-national perspective. However, these findings also have important policy implications: They show that better support for families and mothers might help to remove those obstacles to the political participation of mothers, which Nancy McGlen already discussed and condemned in 1980. While the effects are limited to the group of mothers with children under the age of 18, this remains a sizeable group of the population: About 33 per cent of the women in the dataset (ESS 2010, weighted data) have children under the age of 18.

Nevertheless, it should be acknowledged that the analyses can only provide a superficial impression of the effects of work-family policies. Due to the complex design of most policies, cross-national comparisons capture a simplified picture of the policies in place, while the actual effects are likely to be more complex. They might depend on specific family situations, and there are reasons to expect policies to interact with each other. More research is required to address these limitations. Importantly, research on panel data will help to overcome those limitations inherent to cross-sectional approaches. Using cross-section data, it is impossible to test whether the differences in effects between the different groups of women are in fact the result of changes in the family situation, while it is equally impossible to establish the causality of the relationship.

Nevertheless, this chapter has shown that work-family policies matter for the political participation of mothers. It contributes to the literature by showing that the wider context of the public sphere, over and above the 'regular' political institutions research has focussed on, can impact on women's political participation. The next chapter (Chapter 7) will explore the influence of the context further, by exploring the effect of the gendered nature of the labour market on all women.

7 GENDERED LABOUR MARKETS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

In contrast to the abundance of studies linking gendered patterns of individual-level labour market participation and job characteristics to political participation (e.g. Andersen 1975; McDonagh 1982; Schlozman, Burns and Verba 1994,1999; Schur 2003) research on the contextual effects of gendered labour markets appears to be relatively sparse. Studies that do consider contextual effects are mainly concerned with women's labour force participation rates. The general argument is that women's integration in the labour force fosters an awareness of 'women's issues' and provides a symbolic cue about women's integration in the public sphere, which should in turn increase women's political activity[160] (c.f. Iversen and Rosenbluth 2008; Stockemer and Byrne 2012; Togeby 1994).

It can, however, be argued that rates of labour force participation *per se* are hardly meaningful: Parallel to the individual-level argument that the specific job characteristics, rather than the mere employment status, matter for women's politicisation (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Schlozman, Burns, and Verba 1999; Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001), participation rates say little about women's integration into the labour market and their economic opportunities (Morgan and Buice 2013, p. 656). At the same time, women's labour market experiences differ profoundly – and *systematically* – from those of men: Not only is women's attachment to the labour market weaker and they work fewer hours (as discussed in Chapter 4), they also tend to work in different fields and occupations; are more likely to experience discrimination; and less likely to work in powerful and prestigious positions in the labour market (Anker 1998; Charles and Grusky 2004; Pettit and Hook 2009). Those differences in experiences are likely to matter for political participation as well, not just because they determine individual-level resources available to women, but also because they are testament to institutionalised gender inequalities. The labour market, as a central and important institution, can send powerful messages about women's roles and their integration into the public life and reinforce existing conceptions about gender. Yet, despite these strong reasons to expect that the context-level structure of the labour market plays an equally important role in explaining gendered patterns of political participation as the individual-level work experiences do,

[160]As in the previous chapters, I understand political participation as any activity performed by ordinary citizen on a voluntary basis, which is directed at the political sphere in a broader sense (van Deth 2014, pp. 351-352), but my empirical analyses focus on institutional political activities only (see Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion).

political participation research has, so far, not paid attention to the gendered structure of the labour market.

It is the aim of this chapter to make a unique contribution to the literature by adding to close this gap. This chapter aims to evaluate how and to what extent gender inequality in the labour market (other than the labour force participation rate) affects women's political participation and thus, whether the inequalities are reproduced in the political sphere. In order to do so, it will look at three different aspects of the gendered nature in more detail: (1) the degree of *horizontal sex segregation*, (2) the degree of *vertical sex segregation*, and (3) the *gender pay gap*[161]. Although all three aspects are closely interlinked[162], I will aim to disentangle the effects of those characteristics for conceptual clarity. The arguments are developed largely by expanding on existing explanations from other areas of research on political behaviour and transferring them to the realm of the labour market. The arguments presented are mainly concerned with genuine contextual effects, that is they assume an effect that is more than just a sum of individual-level impacts in different countries[163]. Specifically, I argue that the gendered structure of the labour market will have psychological effects on women, while also being important for the structure of their social networks.

The section to follow will present arguments as to why gendered structures in the labour market should play a role and theorise possible links between labour market inequality and political participation. It also presents the hypotheses formulated from those possible links. Subsequently, I will present the data sources and discuss the operationalisation of the labour market characteristics and the modelling strategy, before the results are presented. Finally, the conclusion will situate the findings in the existing literature and discuss the implications for both, further research and practice.

7.1 From a gendered labour market to women's political participation

A key feature of labour markets around the world is the pervasive and persistent concentration of men and women in different types of jobs (Anker 1998; Charles and Grusky 2004; European Commission 2009; Rubery, Smith and Fagan 1999) – both in

[161]'Horizontal segregation' and 'vertical segregation' describe the tendency of men and women to work in different fields and occupations and on different positions on the occupational hierarchy. All three terms are explained in more detail in the section below.

[162]For example, the tendency of men and women to work in different fields and occupations, while 'typical-female' occupations tend to be less lucrative in pay, plays a major role for the gender pay gap (Petersen and Morgan 1995).

[163]This contrasts with many arguments brought forward by the political participation literature, which often either assume a direct macro-macro link (and risk committing an ecological fallacy) or at least they do not specifically explain why and how the contextual characteristic would affect the individual's behaviour directly.

terms of fields and industries, and in terms of the place in the occupational hierarchy. Based on terminology first introduced by Hakim (1979), the gendered clustering in certain fields and types of occupations is referred to as 'horizontal segregation'[164] (or sometimes 'overall segregation' – cf. Blackburn and Jarman 2006), while gendered differences in terms of job levels is known as 'vertical segregation' (Lowe 2013). Although to different degrees, gender segregation is present in all European labour markets: In Europe, women are, for instance, more likely than men to be employed in teaching and health-related professions, while they are underrepresented in blue-collar jobs, but also among managers and in science and engineering professions (ESS 2010a). Similarly, the gender pay gap is present in almost all European countries. For instance, in 2016, the average size of the gap between women's and men's hourly earnings in the EU was about 16% (Eurostat 2018). These patterns are not only important because they affect the individual woman's labour market position, but they might also have a direct effect on women's political engagement.

Horizontal segregation

Women's concentration in certain fields and occupations comes with a number of (mostly undesirable) consequences, such as inequalities in job quality and pay (Anker 2001; European Commission 2009; Stier and Yaish 2014). While economic inequalities are likely to play a key role for explaining women's political behaviour, they will be discussed further below and the focus here is on two other implications: Firstly, horizontal segregation affects to which degree there are jobs regarded as 'typically female', which might reinforce gender norms and expectations. Secondly, it determines whether women are more likely to work in a gender-mixed working environment or predominantly with other women.

The degree to which there are jobs that are 'typically female' is not only an expression of dominant traditional gender norms, but it might reinforce gender stereotypes, which, in turn, can have consequences for women's political participation. 'Female-typed' jobs are generally extensions of women's traditional tasks in the home: Education, hospitality and health-care related job are closely related to private sphere caregiving and housework. In other words, they do not as clearly symbolise women's integration in the public domain and might reinforce the notion of women's 'natural qualities' in the private sphere (Charles 2003, p.283). When women are clustered in these professions, this might represent a 'symbolic cue' for women (Rosenstone and

[164] In the context of this study the term 'segregation' refers specifically to separation by gender/sex, but there is also research on segregation by race/ethnicity (cf. Lowe 2013).

Hansen 1993; Atkeson 2003[165]) about their place in the (extended) public sphere and discourage women – or at least encourage them to a lesser degree than a more mixed gender market – from becoming active in the public sphere, and consequently in politics.

Secondly, the segregation of the labour market also determines how gender-heterogeneous the working environment for a majority of women (and men) is. This, in turn, is believed to affect women's political activity. The idea that the heterogeneity of social networks affects political behaviour has been firstly discussed in the context of early electoral research (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944). The original idea behind the so-called 'cross-pressures' argument is that individuals in networks of divergent political opinions are less likely to develop a strong party identification than people in very (politically) homogenous networks. More recent research, in particular in the field of social capital and political mobilisation has revisited the influence of networks, but some scholars now suggest the opposite effect to be true: heterogeneous discussion networks should have a deliberative effect and foster political discussion, knowledge and participation (Leighley 1990; Scheufele et al. 2006; Quintelier, Stolle and Harell 2012). At the same time, the workplace is an important social context. Not only do adults spend a substantial share of their time at work, but the workplace is also one of the most important contexts for cross-cutting political discussion and attitude formation (Mutz and Mondak 2006; Scheufele et al. 2006). In these studies, network heterogeneity is mostly understood in term of race, class or religion – with the assumption that differences in social backgrounds are important predictors for differences in political opinions[166]. While there is little research on the effect of gender heterogeneity[167], the effect might be similar, as women and men also tend to differ in the political opinions they hold[168] (Inglehart and Norris 2000; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006). In a less segregated labour market, women (and men) are more likely to be in a gender heterogeneous environment, which should have a deliberative effect and increase on women's political participation.

In other words, drawing on both, the gender norm argument and the network heterogeneity argument, I expect a less segregated labour market to be associated with a higher rate of women's political participation:

[165]As already discussed in the previous chapter, the original contextual cue theory refers to the political context, rather than the public sphere more generally. However, there are good reasons to expect that cues about women's general role in society can also influence political (i.e. 'public sphere') behaviour.

[166]However, research by Quintelier, Stolle and Harell (2012) suggest that 'ethno-cultural' diversity has a positive effect on political participation, even when controlling for diversity in political opinions.

[167]One study by Kokkonen et al. (2015) suggests that gender composition of the workplace has an effect on tolerance towards minorities.

[168]This shall by no means imply that women form a homogeneous group with identical experiences and preferences. It is still expected that women differ in terms of class, ethnicity, religion etc.

Hypothesis 7.1a: *A less horizontally gender-segregated labour market should have a positive effect on the probability of women's political participation.*

On the other hand, we might also expect a positive effect of a *more* gender-segregated labour market. I will discuss two reasons supporting this expectation in more detail, the first one is linked to a critique of the network heterogeneity argument, while the second one is concerned with the development of women's gender consciousness.

Since the literature on the effect on network heterogeneity is far from consistent in its findings, a second strand of studies suggests that heterogeneous networks are actually associated with *less* political participation (Mutz 2002; Alesina and La Ferrara 2000). It has been argued that network heterogeneity may lead to ambivalence or uncertainty towards issues and candidates, which in turn might discourage political participation (Scheufele et al. 2006). McClurg (2006) has demonstrated a negative effect of disagreement in discussion on political participation, at least for members of the political minority in a certain context – this should imply a negative effect of cross-cutting political discussions for women, when they work in mixed or male-dominated professions. Perhaps more importantly, a more gender homogeneous workplace might provide a safer space for political discussion for women, as research suggests that women are more active and assertive in deliberative political discussions as the share of women in the group increases (Karpowitz, Mendelberg and Shaker 2012).

For women specifically, a more gender homogeneous workplace might foster political activity also through another mechanism: by influencing women's sense of group consciousness. The theory of 'group consciousness' has originally been developed to explain the comparatively higher political participation rates of African Americans (Verba and Nie 1972) but has since been employed to explain women's political participation (Gurin 1985; Miller et al. 1981; Rinehart 1993; Schlozman, Burns and Verba 1999; Cassese and Holman 2016). Importantly, group consciousness does not simply equate identification with a certain social group, but it also requires the recognition and discontent about the group's resources, the belief that the difference to the 'outgroup' is illegitimate and systematic, and support for collective efforts to overcome this situation (Gurin 1985). Empirical research has supported the mobilising effect of gender consciousness. It is associated with higher political efficacy and higher political interest (Rinehart 1993), as well as with a higher probability to participate politically for women (Cassese and Holman 2016; Miller et al. 1981).

At the same time, gender consciousness is most likely to develop in a context with other women[169], as it seems to be important that women can collectively process their

[169]It could be argued that 'gender' is a more salient characteristic, when it is in contrast to one's environment. However, this should only be the case, when in a 'token position' rather than in a

experiences to recognise the systematic character of existing inequalities. Building on Williams (1975), Gurin (1985) argues: "Solidarity and recognition of group deprivation are fostered when category members interact most frequently with each other and only moderately with the outgroup" (p.145)[170] – which should be the case in a highly segregated workplace.

Indeed, Schlozman, Burns and Verba (1999) find a positive effect between gender consciousness and the percentage of women in the job. In other words, women, who work together with other women, tend to be more gender conscious[171]. A more gender-segregated labour market should not only increase the probability for the individual woman to work in a gender-homogeneous environment, thus to be 'gender conscious' herself, but there should also be a 'spill-over' effect: The higher the share of gender-conscious women in society, the more likely it is that gender inequality is brought to the political agenda and the more likely it is that other women might be recruited to take part in political action. The positive effect should therefore not be restricted to those in highly feminised occupations but hold for all women equally.

Hypothesis 7.1b: *A more horizontally gender-segregated labour market should have a positive effect on women's political participation probability.*

Vertical segregation and the glass ceiling

In contrast to horizontal segregation, the term vertical segregation refers to the women's and men's concentration in jobs at different places on the occupational hierarchy (Lowe 2013). While horizontal and vertical segregation are strongly intertwined[172], vertical segregation is more directly related to inequality and discrimination. Charles (2003, p.270) links men's concentration in higher status occupations to the cultural idea of 'male primacy', that is the belief that men are more status worthy and their traits are more valuable than women's traits.

Clearly, the gendered segregation does not only reflect cultural ideas about male traits, but sends, again, a symbolic cue: Seeing women and men equally in positions of

gender-mixed environment. In a gender-mixed environment, the cleavage between men and women might not perceived as equally important as the difference between the own occupational group (then the 'in-group') and everyone else (the 'out-group'). In very gender-homogeneous occupations, however, the in-group/out-group distinction between the occupational group and gender coincides.

[170]While Gurin (1985) herself qualifies this argument by pointing towards the interaction between men and women in the context of the family, I believe that the argument holds, when the 'outgroup' is understood as men in the political/public sphere.

[171]However, other research suggests that women working in a workplace with more men are more likely to experience discrimination (Avery, McKay and Wilson 2008), which is also positively linked to gender consciousness.

[172]As different occupations are associated with different prestige and economic outcomes, thus, do incorporate a 'vertical' element, the 'horizontal' dimension of segregation is often labelled as 'overall segregation'.

power and leadership in the context of the workplace should send a signal that women are fully integrated, confident actors in the public sphere, which should contribute to challenge gender stereotypes. While there is rich evidence that the presence and representation of women *in politics* can have a positive effect on their respective political engagement (Atkeson 2003; Barnes and Burchard 2012; Karp and Banducci 2008; Reingold and Harrell 2010), studies on the effect of women in powerful positions in the workplace are practically non-existent.

However, there are good reasons to expect that women in leadership positions in the workplace should have an effect similar to that of women in politics[173]. The presence of women in powerful occupational positions signals that the public sphere (more generally) is open to women, that women are capable of taking positions of power and that they have an active influence on decision making (in the workplace environment). Moreover, this experience of female power is more immediate than that of high-level politicians. Working women may find examples in their own occupational environment, thus, might take them as role models, but even women who are not in the workforce will encounter women in positions of power. Research suggests that such encounters can at least change women's attitudes towards female (political) leadership (Beaman et al. 2009; Morgan and Buice 2013). There is indication, however, that this is only the case if female leaders are not in a token position (Ely 1994). In other words, in order to influence women's political attitudes and behaviours, there needs to be a large enough share of women in higher level positions. As this will be the case if gender distribution at the top end of the job hierarchy is more equal[174], we should expect a 'thinner' glass ceiling to be associated with a positive influence on women's political participation:

> **Hypothesis 7.2a**: *A labour market with a 'thinner' glass-ceiling (less vertical segregation at the top) should have a positive effect on women's political participation probability.*

High levels of vertical segregation are not only an expression of inequalities, but it is (among other factors) the product of direct or indirect discrimination, either institutionalised in discriminatory practices or preferences, or directly through the employer (Charles and Grusky 2004; Heilman 2001). This gender discrimination can often be directly perceived: As Stainback, Rattliff and Roscigno (2011) find for the American case that women with a male supervisor are more likely to feel discriminated

[173]This argument builds at least indirectly on the rich literature suggesting that the workplace can be seen as analogous to the political sphere, it serves therefore as a place of democratic learning and 'practicing' of participation (Jian and Jeffres 2008; Pateman 1970; Sobel 1993), which can then be transferred to the political sphere.

[174]Although the argument developed here is mainly concerned with the gender distribution at the top end of the job hierarchy, it is not meant to dismiss that vertical segregation more generally equally refers to the gender distribution at other places on the hierarchy.

against (on grounds of their gender) than women with a female supervisor. For men, there is no effect of the supervisor's gender.

While some scholars have argued that discrimination leads to political apathy and lower political interest (Schildkraut 2005; but see Oskooii 2016 for differentiated account by type of discrimination), other studies have found discrimination, in particular when it's experienced directly, to have mobilising effects: Firstly, it can contribute to the development of group consciousness discussed above, as the individual experience of discrimination and incidents of sexism is positively related to women's gender consciousness (Duncan 1999; Swim et al. 2001). Even when discrimination is not experienced personally, but is pervasive throughout the labour market, it should contribute to the recognition of the systematic nature of inequalities, which is a necessary condition for gender consciousness to develop. As the "perception of inequality is more difficult when it is not extreme" (Gurin 1985, p.144), a strongly vertically segregated labour market should be related to a heightened sense of gender consciousness of both labour market insiders, and to a lesser degree labour market outsider as well.

Other research has linked the experience or perception of discrimination *directly* to higher probabilities of political activity for a range of different forms of political participation and for different groups of individuals (Schlozman, Burns and Verba 1999; Schur 2003; Cassese and Holman 2016; Oskooii 2016), assuming a similar effect of mobilisation through the perception of inequalities. Thus, if we presume that the vertical dimension of labour market segregation is an expression of and a symbol for gender discrimination, we can alternatively theorise a positive effect of gender vertical gender segregation (ceteris paribus):

> **Hypothesis 7.2b**: *A more vertically segregated labour market should have a positive effect on women's political participation probability.*

Gender pay gap

So far, the potentially mobilising effects of labour market inequalities theorised above have largely built upon psychological effects of the labour force structure. However, these arguments somewhat disregard the fact that inequality in the labour market is strongly linked to gendered disadvantages in other participatory factors, for example, economic outcomes[175]. Differences in pay between men and women are not only attributable to different job levels, working hours and gendered care responsibilities, but likewise occupational segregation plays a key role. The literature on the consequences of gender suggest a threefold effect: Firstly, female-dominated industries/ occupations

[175]Other factors include, for example, the access to other resources, such as time and skills or the degree to which women are integrated into mobilising networks.

are generally associated with lower pay (Charles and Grusky 2004; Petersen and Morgan 1995). Secondly, the degree to which 'female jobs' are devaluated seems to depend on the overall degree of segregation, with more strongly segregated labour markets being associated with a larger penalty for female-dominated jobs and being a woman (Cohen and Huffman 2003; Cotter et al. 1997). And lastly, the vertical gender distribution (in particular at the top of the hierarchy) within an occupational category also affects gender inequalities in pay in jobs in that category (Cardoso and Winter-Ebmer 2010; Cohen and Huffman 2007; Hultin and Szulkin 1999; but also see: Budig 2002). In other words, segregated labour markets are associated with an earnings disadvantage for women both within and across occupational categories.

This earnings disadvantage should not only translate into fewer individual-level resources available to women and the associated effect on political participation, but research also suggests that the *inequality* in earnings (a contextual characteristic) might have an effect over and above its consequences on women's income level.

More generally, economic inequality has been linked to negative political outcomes, such as overall lower levels of trust, political interest and less support for democracy (Andersen 2012; Solt 2008; Uslaner and Brown 2005), but also to less electoral participation (Solt 2010). There is also evidence that income inequality negatively affects women's political representation (Stockemer 2017). The relative power theory suggests that the negative effect on political engagement is strongest for those, who are economically deprived: As the political process is more responsive to the economically powerful, less affluent groups of society have less influence on the political agenda setting and a smaller chance to succeed in situations of political conflict, which might lead to individual-level feelings of political disempowerment and less participation (Solt 2008). Empirically, there is support for this effect (Lancee and Van der Werfhorst 2012; Solt 2008, but see: Solt 2010).

However, it could be argued that gender inequalities in economic resources are less relevant for political participation than, for instance, class differences, as for women (in heterosexual relationships) the lower individual income should be compensated by a higher income of their spouse. There are two weaknesses to this argument. Firstly, it assumes that women have equal access to and control over the household income irrespective of her contribution to it. Yet, research has suggested that women's control over the household money depends strongly on the share of the income she contributes (Kenney 2006)[176]. In addition, within-family control of household money depends on the

[176]Spending is also highly gendered in the sense that women are much more likely to spend money on the household or collectively, while man are more likely to spend money on themselves (Pahl 2000).

level of economic inequality in the society, where an economically more unequal society is also associated with more unequal control in the family (Yoandis and Lauer 2007). In a nutshell, it seems not realistic to assume that women's lower income is simply compensated through access to her spouse's money[177].

Secondly, the contribution to and control of household income is closely related to power relations within the family (Vogeler and Pahl 1994). For example, household income contribution has been discussed as an important bargaining factor in the negotiation about housework (Bittman et al. 2003; Aassve, Fuochi and Mencarini 2014). Women, who contribute less money than their partners, therefore, face a gendered power differential within the household. Burns, Verba and Schlozman suggest that the power relations resulting from income inequalities might have an effect on political participation, as "exercising power in the family, either as an equal partner or as the dominant partner in decisions, may enhance feelings of political competence" (1997, p.375). Power inequalities within the family might, therefore, contribute to more general feelings of (political) disempowerment and reinforce rather than attenuate any negative societal effect of income inequality. Overall, we should, therefore, expect a larger pay gap between men and women to have an overall negative effect on women's political participation:

> **Hypothesis 7.3**: *Higher levels of gender income inequality should have a negative effect on women's political participation probability*

In conclusion, building on existing explanations of women's political behaviour, a number of different – and opposing – effects of the gendered structure of the labour market have been theorised. With the exception of the gender pay gap, for which only a negative effect has been hypothesised, it has been argued that either positive or negative effects of a more 'gendered' labour market can be expected. All expectations are summarised in Table 7.1 below.

Table 7.1: Overview of the hypotheses tested in Chapter 7

Horizontal segregation	
7.1a	A less horizontally gender-segregated labour market should have a positive effect on the probability of women's political participation.
7.1b	A more horizontally gender-segregated labour market should have a positive effect on women's political participation probability.
Vertical segregation	
7.2a	A labour market with a 'thinner' glass-ceiling (less vertical segregation at the top) should have a positive effect on women's political participation probability.

[177]It is also an increasingly unrealistic to assume the majority of women to be in long-term, heterosexual relationships (cf. Sobotka and Toulemon 2008).

7.2b	A more vertically segregated labour market should have a positive effect on women's political participation probability.
Gender pay gap	
7.3	Higher levels of gender income inequality should have a negative effect on women's political participation probability

7.2 Measuring the effect of a gendered labour market

This chapter aims to explain the effects of gendered structures in the labour market on women's political participation. Thus, the focus of the analyses is on several context-level indicators capturing the three aspects of gendered labour markets discussed above. The dependent variable in all analyses is the binary measure of political participation ('0' has not participated; '1' has participated), as discussed in Chapter 4. The control variables on the individual-level are common predictors of participation, such as age, education, political interest and employment status (see Chapter 3 and 4 for a detailed description). The contextual data have been taken from a number of different sources (mainly ILOSTAT and Eurostat) and refer, unless indicated otherwise, to 2010. The contextual data will be described in detail below, before the modelling strategy will be reviewed.

Indicators for labour market characteristics

The interest of this chapter is on three different dimensions of a gendered structure of the labour market: (1) *horizontal segregation* (2) *vertical segregation* and (3) *the gender pay gap*. Each of these dimensions is measured through two different indicators in order to cover different aspects to each of the dimensions, but also to assure the robustness of the findings. Table 7.1 provides a description of the indicators used for each of the dimensions, a detailed overview of the sources of the contextual data can be found in Table E.1 in the Appendix.

Table 7.1: Description of context-level indictors

Dimension	Component	Indicator
Horizontal segregation	Occupational segregation	Index of dissimilarity (ID) in occupations
	Industry segregation	Index of dissimilarity (ID) in industries
Vertical segregation	Female share of top-level positions	Female managers (% of all managers)
	Genderedness of supervisory positions	Gender gap in supervision (%)
Gender pay gap	Earnings gap	Overall gap in (monthly) earnings
		Gap in mean hourly earnings

Horizontal segregation of the labour market

The measurement of labour market segregation has been subject to extensive debate in the literature, and there is little agreement on which of the number of indices suggested is the best (Blackburn, Jarman and Brooks 2000; Grusky and Charles 1998; see Anker 1998 for an overview). There are two conceptually distinct, however closely related concepts measuring the degree to which women and men work tend to work in different fields: Overall *occupational segregation* and *women's concentration* in certain occupations. Although they both capture the same underlying concept, segregation differs insofar, as it is symmetrical – it measures men's segregation from women as much as women's segregation from men. Women's concentration in certain fields, however, is specifically about women working in 'female-typed' occupation together with other women (Blackburn, Jarman and Brooks 2000; Lowe 2013). Here, the focus is on occupational segregation. However, in order to test the robustness of the results, the analyses will also be repeated for a measure of concentration.

Occupational segregation is measured by the 'Index of Dissimilarity' (ID), one of the oldest (suggested by Duncan and Duncan [1955]) and one of the most-widely used indices measuring occupational segregation. Although it has been criticised for being sensitive to the structure of the labour market (i.e. to the relative importance of occupations), it has the advantage of having relatively modest data requirements and being straightforward to interpret (Anker 1997). It is calculated as half of the sum of the percentage point differences between men and women employed in an occupational category i over all occupations in a country:

$$ID = \frac{1}{2} \times \sum_{1}^{i} |(M_i / M_t) - (F_i / F_t)| \quad ^{178}$$

It typically ranges from 0 to 1 and was rescaled 0 to 100 to facilitate the interpretation. It measures the proportion of men and women that would need to change occupations in order to reach an equal distribution of women over all occupational categories. The index has been derived on the basis of ILOSTAT (2017a) data on male and female employment in a number of occupational categories[179] (based on ISCO-88 classification, two-digit level) in 2010.

The concentration of women in female-typed jobs has been calculated as the share of women working in female-dominated occupations (in contrast to male-dominated or integrated occupations). Following the proposition made by Harkim (1993), which has

[178]Where M_i and F_i denote the number of men and respectively women employed in occupational category i and M_t and F_t denote the absolute number of men and women employed.

[179]Some occupational categories have been excluded, such as the armed forces, while others have been combined. Not all countries provide information on all occupational categories. However, ILOSTAT data are more detailed than other datasets.

also been used by the European Commission (European Commission 2009), female-dominated jobs have been defined in relation to the female share of the workforce: Occupations, in which the female share is 15 percentage points larger than the overall female share of the workforce[180], are defined as 'female dominated'. The data on the female share of the workforce have been retrieved from the World Bank (2016) and refers to the year 2010. The female share in each occupational category within each country has been calculated from the ESS dataset, using the variable on occupations based on ISCO-88, two-digit level[181]. Those occupations, for which the share of women exceeded the threshold (share of the workforce that is female + 15%), have then be coded as 'female-dominated' occupation. Finally, for each country the percentage of women who are employed in such a female-dominated occupation has been calculated.

Parallel to the measurement of the gendered patterns in occupations, the horizontal *segregation of industries* has also been calculated. This should not only serve as a test of the robustness of the results using a different data source but is also of interest as it is arguably a stronger measure of horizontal, rather than overall segregation. The data on industries have been taken from Eurostat (2017a), with industries defined according to the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community (NACE Rev.2)[182] and refers to men and women (aged 15 and over) in each industry in 2010[183]. It has been used to calculate the Index of Dissimilarity (ID) for industries in the same manner as described above, which correlates strongly ($r = 0.51; p = 0.01$) with the ID for occupational categories. The identical Eurostat data have been used to determine female-typed industries. The data have been matched to the respective individual level variable in the ESS dataset, which has then been used to calculate the per cent of women working in those female-types industries. The female concentration in occupations and industries are moderately positively correlated ($r = 0.33;\ p = 0.10$).

Vertical segregation of the labour market

Analogous to the debate about the measurement of horizontal segregation, there is also disagreement in the literature about how to best assess the vertical dimension of segregation (cf. Watts 2005). As the most notable suggestion, that is to approximate the

[180]Data on the female share of employment and the corresponding cut-off point for 'female-dominated' occupations can be found in Appendix E.2.

[181]For the information to refer to the current situation in the labour market, only those respondents currently in work have been included in the analysis. Occupations with less than 10 respondents per country have been excluded for the respective country.

[182]NACE Rev. 2 is the classification of industries used by the European Commission and Eurostat. Detailed information can be found on the Eurostat website and in Eurostat (2008).

[183]Eurostat data do not include information on Israel. However, the dataset has been selected, as it provides a more detailed account of industries (NACE instead of sectors) than other datasets.

vertical aspect of segregation through inequalities in pay (cf. Blackburn and Jarman 2006; Blackburn, Brooks and Jarman 2001; European Commision 2009), shows large overlap with measurements of economic inequalities addressed separately, two other indicators have been selected: the female share of employment in middle and senior management[184], and the gender gap in supervisory responsibilities. These indicators fit the theoretical arguments conceptually well, as they address inequalities at different places of the occupational hierarchy. Women's share in supervisory and management positions are often used to assess women's access to occupational power and the existence of a glass ceiling (e.g. Hultin and Szulkin 1999; Baxter and Wright 2000) and both indicators should be relatively robust in cross-national comparison.

The *female share in middle and senior management positions* gives an indication for the existence of structural inequalities and discrimination keeping women from progressing to top-level positions, in other words, the existence of a 'glass ceiling'. As it measures women in management positions in relation to the total of management positions, it should not be affected by different labour market structures in different countries. The data have been taken from ILOSTAT (2017b) and measures women's share of employment in senior and middle management (as % of total senior and middle management) in 2010, excluding those in hospitality, retail and other services, and general managers, as those are often working in small or family businesses. This restriction is useful for my analyses, as the interest is ultimately on women's access to positions of extensive (economic) power and decision-making.

The second indicator taps into the same concept, however, is not just concerned with the top-level positions of decision making. The *gender gap in supervisory responsibilities* serves as a proxy for gender differences in positions of responsibility in the labour market more generally. It has been calculated using the European Social Survey data, specifically the variable measuring whether (1) or not (0) the respondent is responsible for supervising others in her or his job. However, those in full-time employment are more likely to be in a position with supervisory responsibility. While women are less likely to be employed full-time, an overall measure runs the risk of simply picking up on women's propensity to work part-time[185]. Therefore, the differences are based only on those in full-time employment. As the labour market structure varies widely across countries, specifically regarding the share of employees with supervisory responsibility, a simple gap of supervisory rates of men and women would not be

[184]Although potentially interesting, separate indicators for the female share in middle management and the female share in senior management are not available.

[185]While this might be a desirable feature for a single-country measure, it is a problem in terms of cross-national comparability, as differences in the gap might then simply reflect different part-time working cultures.

meaningful in comparative perspective. Thus, building on the gender gap measure of the 'Gender Equality Index' (cf. European Institute for Gender Equality 2015), the gender gap in supervisory responsibility has been calculated as the ratio of the share of women with supervisory responsibility to the overall share of workers with supervisory responsibility minus one, and multiplied by 100:

$$Y_i = \left(\frac{X_{iw}}{X_{iT}} - 1\right) * 100 \quad ^{186}$$

A higher score, therefore, indicates a bigger gap between men and women, while a score of 0 indicates perfect equality between men and women in terms of supervisory responsibilities. In theory, a negative score indicates an advantage for women, however, in practice, there is only a single negative value, which is for Ireland.

Although the two indicators tap into the same concept, they measure segregation at two different points of the hierarchy, as supervisory responsibility can be attained in more moderate job positions. Nevertheless, the two indicators are moderately and (expectedly) negatively related ($r = -0.41;\ p = 0.04$).

Gender Pay Gap

Lastly, income inequalities are measured in terms of the gender pay gap. Again, two different indicators are used, covering two different facets of pay inequality. The first one measures the gender pay gap as the difference between men's and women's mean gross *hourly* earnings, expressed as a percentage of men's earnings. Since hourly earnings control for differences in working time, this measure captures differences in job positions, the effects of discrimination as well as differences of pay between 'female' and 'male' occupational fields and industries, thus the cultural devaluations of women's work. The data have been taken from Eurostat (2017b), thus are not available for Israel, and refer to the year 2010.

The second indicator measures the o*verall gap in actual monthly earnings*. It is a synthetic indicator produced by Eurostat (2017c), referring to 2010[187]. Additional to the gender pay gap (in hourly earnings) it also accounts for women's typically fewer working hours, as well as their labour force participation rate (Eurostat 2017d). It is aimed to capture the actual difference in earnings that men and women have at their disposal in a typical month, thus, taking women's specific employment profiles into account. Again, there are no data available for Israel. Depending on whether the effect is more directly linked to the differences in actual take-home pay and potential power differential in the

[186]Where X_{iW} denotes the share of women with supervisory responsibility in country i, and X_{iT} stands for the overall share of employees with supervisory responsibility.

[187]2014 for France.

family, or to discrimination, either of these variables might be more informative. Both indicators are strongly and significantly associated ($r = 0.53;\ p = 0.007$).

Context-level controls

As in the previous chapter, the models will be presented including GDP per capita as a country-level control in the analyses. GDP is widely regarded as a measure of economic development and has been linked to the political culture and specifically (post) materialistic values in countries (Inglehart 1997). Importantly, economic development is a strong predictor of norms of gender equality (Inglehart and Norris 2003), which should be related to both, gendered labour markets and women's political participation. In order to establish the unique effect of the explanatory variables, the models, therefore, control for the influence of GDP. Table 7.2 below gives an overview of all contextual variables and their distributions. A detailed account of the variables (and data sources) can be found in Table E.1 in the Appendix.

Table 7.2: Distribution of context-level variables

Variable	Description	Range			
		Min	*Max*	*Mean*	*SD*
Occupational segregation	*Per cent of men and women who would have to change occupations for an equal gender distribution in all occupations.*	34.6	62.6	50.1	6.7
Industry segregation [a]	*Per cent of men and women who would have to change industries for an equal gender distribution in all industries*	26.7	39.4	33.4	2.9
Female managers	*The proportion of females in senior and middle management (minus hospitality, retail and other services and general managers).*	14.3	43.3	33	7
Supervisory responsibility gap	*Gap in the percentage of full-time employees with supervisory responsibility.*	-12.4	38.4	18.8	11.6
Gender earnings gap [a]	*Gap in men's and women's monthly earnings, accounting for differences in working hours and employment rates.*	12.3	49.1	33.2	9.8
Hourly pay gap [a]	*Unadjusted gap in mean gross hourly earnings between men and women as per cent of men's earnings.*	0.9	27.7	15.5	5.8

Note. N= 25. See table E.1 in the Appendix for data sources.
[a] Data missing for Israel (N=24).

Modelling strategy

As in previous chapters, the effects of the different aspects of gendered labour market inequalities will be assessed through a set of logistic multilevel models with political participation (0 'no participation' / 1 'participation') as the dependent variable and the context-level variables as main independent variables. The models are estimated using maximum-likelihood estimation (with seven integration points) in Stata, and the

coefficients are presented as odds-ratios. As, in this chapter, the effects theorised are expected to hold for all women, the analyses will be performed on a dataset including all women (of all ages and employment statuses). However, as for three of the indicators (industry segregation; overall earnings gap; hourly earnings gap) data were not available for Israel, some models are based on 24, instead of the full 25 context-level units.

The goodness-of-fit and explanatory power of the models will be assessed through three different statistics. The log-likelihood is by itself not meaningful, but allows the comparison of two nested models, thus it enables me to test whether the inclusion of a parameter improves the model fit significantly (with the test statistic being twice the difference in log-likelihood values of the two models, which follows a χ^2- distribution on the degrees of freedom equal to the difference of estimated parameters). The Interclass-Correlation coefficient (ICC) estimates the share of total variance that can be attributed to differences between context-level units. In other words, the more the inclusion of a variable decreases the ICC, the better this variable performs in explaining the variation of political participation across countries. Finally, the Pseudo-R^2 provides a measure for share of the total variance that is explained by the model. Following the approach of Snijders and Bosker (2012), it has been calculated as the variance of the linear predictor divided by the total variance (a sum of the linear predictor variance, the intercept variance and the level-one residual variance). Although it is known to be more conservative in its estimation than the OLS estimates of R^2, it will be used to assess the explanatory power of individual models and it is also used to compare different models.

In order to gain a detailed picture of the impact of the different variables and in order to assess the hypothesis individually, all variables will first be tested in separate models, and the individual impact of each variable will be discussed. Predicted probabilities will be presented as a visualisation of the estimated effect. In contrast to the previous chapter, the effects of the context-level variables will then also be assessed jointly in a full model. From a methodological perspective, this is possible, since the correlation of most context-level variables is only moderate, and no issues of multicollinearity should be expected (see Table 7.3 below). However, a joint model should also be revealing from a substantive perspective, as the different variables are conceptually related. For example, the gender pay gap is driven by gender segregation into different jobs and occupations (Hultin and Szulkin 1999; Cohen and Huffman 2003). Including all variables jointly helps to isolate each variable's unique influence by controlling for the influence of the remaining variables.

Table 7.3: Correlation matrix of context-level variables

	Occupation segregation	Industry segregation	Female manager	Supervisory gap	Monthly earnings gap	Hourly pay gap
Industry segregation	**0.51***	-				
Female managers	0.26	0.05	-			
Supervisory gap	0.31	-0.13	**-0.41***	-		
Monthly earnings gap	0.02	0.15	**-0.37†**	-0.13	-	
Hourly pay gap	**0.51***	**0.41***	-0.21	0.12	**0.53****	-
GDP	**-0.38†**	0.30	-0.24	-0.18	**0.37†**	0.18

Note. Pairwise correlations (Pearson's r), N=25 (Industry concentration, monthly earnings gap and hourly pay gap excluding Israel, N=24); Variables that correlate highly might cause problems of multicollinearity in models.
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05, t=p<0.1.

7.3 The effect of gender inequalities in the labour market

Horizontal segregation

Before assessing their effect on women's political participation, it is informative to inspect the countries' different levels of occupational and industry segregation. Figure 7.1 below shows the 'Index of Dissimilarity' values for both, occupational categories (primary axis) and industries (secondary axis), ordered descending by the level of industry segregation level.

Two observations can be made from the figure: Firstly, although there is clearly a strong association between the two measures ($r = 0.51;\ p = 0.01$), they are far from perfectly correlated. Levels of occupational segregation are overall much higher than those of industry segregation[188] (note the two different scales), and also show greater variation across countries. In some countries, for example Denmark, Ireland and Norway, comparatively high values of industry segregation are not matched by equally high values of occupational segregation. This suggests that in these countries, women and men tend to work in different fields, however, there is less of a tendency of working in different occupations within these fields. In contrast, Estonia, Lithuania and the Czech Republic, levels of segregation across occupation is more pronounced than industrial segregation.

Secondly, with regards to occupational segregation, there is no simple geographical pattern. This is in clear contrast to some studies, which have postulated a relationship between welfare states and overall labour market segregation, specifically

[188]Although both are measured in per cent, values of the two measures are not strictly comparable, as the measure is sensitive to the number of occupational categories/industries used, which are not identical.

with reference to the Scandinavian countries (cf. Mandel and Semyonov 2005; 2006). Nevertheless, the findings are well in line with recent findings using the same data (using a different index) (European Commission 2009). What is more, we can find the expected geographical pattern when turning to segregation in industries. With the exception of Denmark, the Nordic countries are characterised by higher values of industry segregation. In other words, Nordic welfare policies might lead women to work in specific industries, rather than different occupations.



Figure 7.1: Levels of occupational and industry segregation (as Index of Dissimilarity) by country ordered descending by level of industry segregation (Source: own calculations based on Eurostat 2017a and ILOSTAT 2017a).

Turning now to the effects of horizontal segregation on political participation, Table 7.4 presents the multilevel models testing the effect of horizontal segregation. The first two models show the effect of occupational and industry segregation separately, while the last includes both indicators jointly. Substantively, all models show the same result, that is support for the hypothesis that horizontal segregation has a *facilitating* rather than a dampening effect on women's political activity: When tested separately, both measures have a positive effect on women's probability to participate.

More interesting, however, is the effect when industry and occupational segregation are jointly included in the analysis. Thus, focussing on Model 3, it is found that the positive effect of horizontal segregation is driven by the segregation in industries. This interpretation is also supported by the goodness of fit statistics: Both in terms of explained variance and in terms of the Interclass-Correlation Coefficient (ICC), the model including industry segregation (Model 2) is slightly more powerful than the model

including occupational segregation (Model 1). Similarly, the comparison between Model 2 and Model 3 suggest that the inclusion of occupational segregation – in addition to industry segregation – does not significantly improve the model fit: the likelihood-ratio test rejects the inclusion of occupational segregation ($\mathrm{X}^2(1) = 0.31; p = 0.58$).[189]

Table 7.4: Logistic multi-level analysis of the effect of horizontal segregation on women's (individual) political participation

Independent variables	Effect of horizontal segregation		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Individual Level			
Age	0.998	0.998	0.998
	(0.001)	*(0.001)*	*(0.001)*
High level education	**1.638*** **	**1.636*** **	**1.636*** **
(Ref: Medium or low education)	*(0.069)*	*(0.070)*	*(0.070)*
Partner	**1.108** **	**1.112** **	**1.112** **
(Ref: No partner)	*(0.041)*	*(0.041)*	*(0.041)*
Strong political interest	**4.067*** **	**4.085*** **	**4.086*** **
	(0.245)	*(0.251)*	*(0.251)*
Medium political interest	**2.000*** **	**2.001*** **	**2.010*** **
(Ref: Weak political interest)	*(0.079)*	*(0.080)*	*(0.081)*
Socially active >once a week	**1.261*** **	**1.253*** **	**1.253*** **
(Ref: Less than once a week)	*(0.049)*	*(0.050)*	*(0.050)*
Gender role attitude	**1.066*** **	**1.066*** **	**1.066*** **
(more egalitarian)	*(0.011)*	*(0.011)*	*(0.011)*
In paid work	**1.211*** **	**1.213*** **	**1.213*** **
(Ref: Not in paid work)	*(0.048)*	*(0.048)*	*(0.049)*
Context Level			
Occupational segregation	**1.045*** **	-	1.010
(higher)	*(0.014)*		*(0.018)*
Industry segregation	-	**1.110*** **	**1.093***
(higher)		*(0.031)*	*(0.043)*
GDP per capita	**1.000*** **	**1.000***	**1.000***
	(0.000)	*(0.000)*	*(0.000)*
Intercept	*0.003****	*0.001****	*0.001****
	(0.003)	*(0.001)*	*(0.001)*
ICC	0.047	0.037	0.037
Pseudo-R^2	0.157	0.169	0.169
Log likelihood	-10356.5	-10046.0	-10045.8
n / N (countries)	24,860 / 25	23,767 / 24	23,767 / 24

Note. Logistic Multilevel Analysis estimating the effect of horizontal segregation on *political participation* (0/1), maximum likelihood estimation. Coefficients shown are odds-ratios, standard errors in parentheses.
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05, †=p<0.1.

[189]It is interesting to note that when GDP is not included in the model (see Table E.3 in the Appendix), there is a significant positive effect of industry segregation (at $p < 0.05$) and a significant negative effect of occupational segregation (at $p < 0.1$). However, including GDP improves the model fit for all models significantly. This is true in terms of the explained variance (Pseudo-R^2), which increases substantively with the inclusion of GDP, and in terms of the log-likelihood statistic. The likelihood-ratio test between Model 3 in Table 7.4 below and Model 3 in Table E.3 in the Appendix clearly favours the larger model ($\mathrm{X}^2(1) = 7.99; p = 0.005$).



Figure 7.2: Predicted probabilities of women's political participation over different values of the horizontal segregation variables.

The difference in effects between occupational segregation and industry segregation can also be seen in terms of effect sizes. As odd-ratios can be unwieldy to interpret, the effect of both variables is visualised in Figure 7.2 below: It shows the predicted probabilities with their 95% confidence intervals for different values of the contextual variables over the range of observed values (in percentage point increments) estimated from the individual models. The participation probability of an 'average women'[190] in a country with the lowest level of segregation (Greece) is just under 10 per cent ($\rho = 0.09; p = 0.001$). The same women in a country at the high end of the industry segregation has a predicted participation probability of just under 30 per cent ($\rho = 0.28, p = 0.001$). In contrast, the effect for the occupational segregation variable is somewhat smaller.

In order to test whether the robustness of the result, the analyses have been repeated using two measures for women's *concentration* in occupations and industries, and although the effects are somewhat smaller, the findings are almost identical (see Table E.4 in the Appendix for the results).

What does it mean that the segregation into different industries, but not the segregation into different occupation has a positive effect on political participation? While there is a considerable overlap between the occupations and industries (think, for

[190]Here, 'average' does not refer to a typical woman in the specific country. It means that all other variables are set to their respective (pooled) means. For non-continuous variables, this can lead to manifestations that do not represent any individual in the dataset as it might mean, for instance, having a fraction of a partner. However, it allows to visualise this effect in a simple manner.

example, of 'teaching professionals' and 'teaching associate professionals' and the 'education' industry), occupations have a clearer hierarchical element to them, or in other words, they capture the vertical dimension of segregation to a larger extent than industries. Industries, as has been argued before, might be a better predictor of the purely horizontal dimension of segregation[191], showing the difference between men and women, but not inequality. Additionally, since workplaces can consist of individuals of different occupations, while there is usually only little overlap with other industries, gender segregation of industries might be a clearer predictor of the gender composition of the immediate work environment. This provides support for the argument that the degree of gender homogeneity of the work environment could be driving the effect. Specifically, as theorised above, a more gender homogeneous work environment provides a 'safer' space for political discussion for women. This is contrary to the expectations of the strand of social network research, that suggested more heterogeneous networks to have a facilitating effect on political participation (Scheufele et al. 2006; Quintelier, Stolle and Harell 2012), but is in line with McClurg's (2006) argument that heterogeneous networks, in fact, have a negative effect for those in the minority. Also, women in female-dominated environments can process their experiences, for example with inequality and discrimination, collectively and should, therefore, be more likely to develop a feeling of gender consciousness, which has been found to have a politicising effect.

The effect is expected to spill over to the society at large. Firstly, having politicised female discussion partners has been found to have a politicising effect on other women, irrespective of their own employment status (Banaszak and Leighley 1991). Thus, those who are gender-conscious and mobilised are expected to influence others. Secondly, high levels of gender consciousness amongst a large number of women should create more awareness of women's issues in general and include them in the political agenda (cf. Stockemer and Byrne 2012). This should have a politicising effect on all women, again, independent of their own employment status or occupation.

Indeed, testing a model including an individual-level variable of working in a 'female-dominated' industry shows that there is a strong positive effect ($OR = 1.22; p = 0.001$) of working in a female environment on women's political activity. Including this variable in the analyses reduces the effect of the country-level segregation variable slightly, but it remains positive and significant (see Table E.5 in the Appendix for results). In other words, the effect of more gender-segregated industries is two-fold: It increases

[191]This is not to say, that all industries are strictly equivalent. There is also a (largely gendered) hierarchy to different industries, that is for example reflected in the pay differences across industries.

the number of women working in gender-typical industries, and there is also a direct effect.

Vertical segregation

In the next step, the interest is on the effect of vertical segregation, that is the tendency of men and women to work in jobs at different places of the occupational hierarchy. To explore the nature of a possible link between vertical segregation and women's political activity, the analysis examines two indicators, one measuring the share of women in managerial positions, and the other one measuring the gender gap in supervisory positions. Six different logistic multilevel models have been fitted, the results are shown in Table 7.5 below. As before, the two test the variables independently of each other, while the last model (3) tests the two variables jointly.

Table 7.5: Logistic multi-level analysis of the effect of vertical segregation on women's (individual) political participation

Independent variables	**Effect of vertical segregation**		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Individual level			
Age	0.999	0.998	0.998
	(0.001)	*(0.001)*	*(0.001)*
High level education	**1.638*** **	**1.638*** **	**1.638*** **
(Ref: Medium / low educ.)	*(0.069)*	*(0.069)*	*(0.069)*
Partner	**1.108** **	**1.108** **	**1.108** **
(Ref: No partner)	*(0.041)*	*(0.041)*	*(0.041)*
Strong political interest	**4.060*** **	**4.064*** **	**4.064*** **
	(0.245)	*(0.245)*	*(0.245)*
Medium political interest	**2.000*** **	**2.001*** **	**2.001*** **
(Ref: Low interest)	*(0.079)*	*(0.079)*	*(0.079)*
Socially active once a week	**1.261*** **	**1.262*** **	**1.262*** **
(Ref: Less than once a week)	*(0.050)*	*(0.050)*	*(0.050)*
Gender role attitude	**1.065*** **	**1.065*** **	**1.065*** **
(more egalitarian)	*(0.011)*	*(0.011)*	*(0.011)*
In paid work	**1.212*** **	**1.212*** **	**1.212*** **
(Ref: Not in paid work)	*(0.048)*	*(0.048)*	*(0.048)*
Context level			
Female managers (in %)	0.996	-	1.000
	(0.019)		*(0.015)*
Supervisor gap	**-**	**0.982***	**0.982***
		(0.008)	*(0.009)*
GDP per capita	**1.000*** **	**1.000*** **	**1.000*** **
	(0.000)	*(0.000)*	*(0.000)*
Intercept	0.063***	0.025***	0.025***
	(0.035)	*(0.007)*	*(0.017)*
ICC	0.064	0.055	0.055
Pseudo-R^2	0.143	0.148	0.148
Log-likelihood	-10360.32	-10358.39	-10358.39
n / N (countries)	24,860 / 25	24,860 / 25	24,860 / 25

Note. Logistic Multilevel Analysis estimating the effect of vertical segregation on political participation (0/1), maximum-likelihood estimation. Coefficients shown are odds-ratios, standard errors in parentheses. ***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05, t=p<0.1.

Contrary to the expectation, the share of female managers does not have a significant effect on women's political participation in any of the models. While a number of studies have found that visible female politicians or female candidates can have a positive effect on women's political participation (Atkeson 2003; Reingold and Harrell 2010) the same effect does not seem to hold for women in high-level positions in the labour market. This might be the case, because experiencing women in positions of power in the wider public domain does not, as expected, empower women in the political realm. While the labour market and the political arena are both located in the public sphere, they remain separate, and specifically for those women who are not equally active in both domains, the link between the two might be rather weak.

Alternatively, the absence of an effect could also be due to the level of job positions this variable relates to. The percentage of managers who are female might be a good indicator for the existence of a *high-level* glass ceiling, but it might not reflect very well whether women are routinely included or excluded from positions of power at other levels. Depending on the occupation and establishment, the direct or even indirect contact with people in management can be rather limited – the experience of women in positions of influence might happen at a lower level, for example the own line-manager. For the case of the gender pay gap in Sweden, Hultin and Szulkin (2003) find that women's share in supervisory positions, but not the gender distribution in management positions, affects the size of the gap (but also see: Cohen and Huffman 2007). They argue that women in management positions are too remote to affect the average employee – the same might be true with regards to women's political participation. Indeed, a weak, but significant (at $p < 0.05$) negative effect of the second variable, the gender gap in supervisory responsibility, lends some support for this interpretation.

In terms of effect size, the impact of the supervisory gap is modest. Figure 7.3 below shows the predicted probabilities of political participation associated with different values for the supervisory gap (over the observed values for variable). An 'average' woman[192] in Ireland (with a gap of 12 percentage points *in favour of women)* has a probability of 0.23 to participate, whereas the probability of an identical individual in Cyprus, with the largest gap (38 percentage points), is only 0.11. A woman in the UK, with a modest gap in supervisory responsibility of five percentage points, has a participation probability of 0.18.

[192]As already described above, in this context, 'average' does not refer to a typical (or even possible) combination of characteristics, but it means that all other variables are fixed at their means.



Figure 7.3: Predicted probabilities of women's political participation over different values of the gender gap in supervisory responsibility variable.

Thus, changing from the least to the most vertically segregated context is associated with a 12-percentage-points difference in the chance of participation. Nevertheless, the findings indicate vertical segregation has a negative effect. In other words, in a country where women are disadvantaged in term of their job position, or specifically, when it is harder for them to reach positions with supervisory responsibility, women are less likely to participate politically. Since the share of women in managerial positions does not have an effect, this suggests that the degree or frequency of contact with women in positions of influence, or more generally, the prevalence of those women in society, plays a bigger role than their extent of power.

Chapter 4 has shown that, controlling for other job characteristics, being in a position with supervisory responsibility strongly and significantly increases a woman's probability of participating. The results presented here imply that, apart from increasing the number of women who are mobilised through their supervisory responsibility at work, having a more equal share of men and women in supervisory positions can have an additional mobilising effect on *all* women.

Gender pay gap

Lastly, the interest is on the effect of economic inequalities between men and women. Figure 7.4 shows the gender differences in mean gross hourly earnings, as well as the overall gender earnings inequalities for the countries in the dataset, ordered descending by the size of the hourly earnings gap.



Figure 7.4: Hourly and overall (monthly) gender earnings gap by country ordered descending by size of the hourly earnings gap (Source: Eurostat 2017b, 2017c).

Although both variables are clearly associated ($r = 0.53; p = 0.007$), there is some marked difference between the two, highlighting the importance of working hours and labour force participation for women's actual take-home pay: In all countries but Lithuania the size of the overall earnings gap is considerably larger than that of the hourly earnings gap. Since the Lithuanian labour market is characterised by practically inexistent gender gaps in labour force participation and working hours, this exception is not surprising. In contrast, in Greece, the large gender difference in labour force participation rates of men and women explains the discrepancy between a relatively small hourly pay gap and the comparatively large gap in overall earnings. In any case, this emphasises that while the two indicators are related, they measure distinct concepts and might show different effects on women's political participation.

Turning to the effects on political participation, Table 7.6 shows the results of a set of multi-level models testing the influence of the two variables separately. In contrast to the analyses presented in the previous sections, the two variables will not be tested jointly, as the indicator on overall gender earnings inequality has been directly calculated from the hourly gender earnings gap variable.[193]

Against the expectation formulated above, I find a *positive* effect of income inequality on women's political participation in some of the models. However, a differentiated account of the results is required. The monthly earnings gap shows no

[193]When controlling for the effect of the hourly earnings gap, the coefficient of the overall earnings gap would simply capture the gender gaps in labour force participation and working hours.

significant effect (when GDP is included the model)[194]. The *hourly* earnings gap, in contrast, shows a positive and significant effect (which is significant irrespectively of GDP) (Model 2). Not only is the effect strongly significant, but it is also substantial in terms of size. Figure 7.5 below shows the associated predicted participation probabilities of an 'average' women and different sizes of the hourly pay gap (over the range of observed values).

Table 7.6: Multi-level analysis of the effect of income inequalities on women's (individual) political participation

Independent variables	**Effect of the gender pay gap**	
	(1)	(2)
Individual level		
Age	0.999 *(0.001)*	0.999 *(0.001)*
High level of education *(Ref: Medium or low education)*	**1.636***** *(0.070)*	**1.637***** *(0.070)*
Partner *(Ref: No partner)*	**1.112**** *(0.041)*	**1.113**** *(0.041)*
Strong political interest	**4.073***** *(0.250)*	**4.072***** *(0.250)*
Medium political interest *(Ref: Low interest)*	**2.001***** *(0.081)*	**2.008***** *(0.081)*
Socially active once a week *(Ref: Less than once a week)*	**1.256***** *(0.049)*	**1.256***** *(0.050)*
Gender role attitude *(more egalitarian)*	**1.067***** *(0.011)*	**1.068***** *(0.011)*
In paid work *(Ref: not in paid work)*	**1.213***** *(0.049)*	**1.211***** *(0.048)*
Context level		
Hourly earnings gap (in %)	-	**1.049***** *(0.015)*
Overall earnings gap (in %)	1.011 *(0.011)*	-
GDP per capita	**1.000***** *(0.000)*	**1.000***** *(0.000)*
Intercept	0.028*** *(0.010)*	0.020*** *(0.005)*
ICC	0.057	0.040
Pseudo-R^2	0.145	0.160
Log-likelihood	-10051.0	-10046.8
n / N (countries)	23,767 / 24	23,767 / 24

Note. Logistic Multilevel Analysis estimating the effect of economic inequality on political participation (0/1), maximum-likelihood estimation. Coefficients shown are odds-ratios, standard errors in parentheses. ***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05, t=p<0.1.

[194]It does show a significant effect in the model excluding GDP (shown in Table E.8 in the Appendix). However, as before, GDP significantly improves the model fit and should be included, thus it is likely that the positive effect of the overall earnings gap picks up on the (moderate positive) correlation of the variable with GDP.



Figure 7.5: Predicted probabilities of women's political participation over different values of the hourly earnings gap variable.

The probability of participation of an 'average' woman in Slovenia, the only country without a substantial gender pay gap, is estimated to be about nine per cent. In contrast, in Estonia, where the pay gap is 28 percentage points, an otherwise identical individual has a 27 per cent probability to be politically active. In other words, moving from an inexistent earnings gap to an earnings gap of nearly 30 per cent is associated with an almost 16-percentage-point increase in the probability to participate.

Why would an increase in economic inequality be associated with *more* political participation amongst women? The expectation formulated earlier was that having fewer economic resources as a group is disempowering, firstly because it makes it harder for women as a group to take an influence on the political agenda setting and decision making, and secondly, because it exposes them to power imbalances within the family. However, the non-significance of the overall earnings inequality variable suggests that the difference in access to actual economic resources plays, if at all, a secondary role: If, as expected, the effect was driven by the money women have access to and control about, this variable would show a stronger effect.

However, as only the hourly pay gap shows a significant effect, this indicates that something else must be driving the effect. As discussed earlier, the gender gap in hourly earnings is the result from labour market segregation and discrimination. In fact, the gender pay gap has been suggested (and used) as an indicator for vertical segregation (Blackburn, Brooks and Jarman 2001; European Commision 2009), measuring overall gender inequality in the labour market. In other words, the effect found might be the precisely the effect theorised for vertical segregation: Women in labour markets characterised by strong vertical segregation are more likely to experience discrimination.

Also, the systematic inequality between men and women is more obvious – both of these factors have been found to increase women's gender consciousness and to have a mobilising effect (Cassese and Holman 2016; Schlozman, Burns and Verba 1999). In other words, while there is no evidence in support of Hypothesis 3, the findings provide support for Hypothesis 2b.

The effect is also not necessarily in contradiction with the effect of the gap in supervisory responsibilities found earlier. The two variables are not correlated ($r = 0.12, p = 0.58$), indicating that they tap into distinct aspects of gender differences in job positions. Arguably, the earnings gap is a more neutral indicator of inequality, as equal access to supervisory positions says little about the nature of the positions women get. Women might still be overrepresented in less lucrative or less powerful supervisory positions and in certain devaluated niches or might be paid less than their male counterparts. In short, it is possible that women in supervisory positions exert a mobilising effect on other women, which is independent of the effect of wider discrimination in the labour market.

Integrated model

Until now, the different aspects of gender market inequality have been explored independently of each other, which allowed assessing their unique effects. However, in reality, these aspects are closely intertwined, suggesting that they might interact with each other. Thus, an integrated model has been estimated, jointly testing all indicators[195]. Table 7.7 shows the estimated results, Model 1 shows the effects with the indicators used before, Model 2 uses women's *occupational concentration* as an alternative indicator for occupation segregation.

Overall, the models show that the results of the individual models substantively hold. When controlling for all other labour market characteristics, industry segregation shows the expected strong significant positive effect in all three models. The effect of the gap in supervisory responsibility remains significant negative and moderately strong, and the gender earnings gap (hourly earnings) shows the anticipated positive effect. As before, the share of managers who are female has no significant effect on women's political participation. The only difference to the individual models is a significant (at $p < 0.001$ and $p < 0.01$) and negative effect of occupational segregation in the first model. When controlling for both industry segregation (the clear horizontal dimension) and the hourly earnings gap (the clear vertical dimension), stronger occupational segregation leads to a smaller probability of political participation.

[195]The model includes the hourly earnings gap, but not the overall (monthly) earnings gaps for the reasons discussed above. In a model including the overall earnings gap instead, it shows a positive, however not significant effect on women's political participation.

Table 7.7: Multi-level Analysis of the effect of gendered labour market structures on women's (individual) political participation

Independent variables	Integrated model	
	(1)	(2)
Individual level		
Age	0.998	0.999
	(0.001)	*(0.001)*
High education	**1.634*** **	**1.637*** **
(Ref: Medium or low education)	*(0.070)*	*(0.070)*
Partner	**1.112** **	**1.112** **
(Ref: No partner)	*(0.041)*	*(0.041)*
Strong interest	**4.088*** **	**4.091*** **
	(0.251)	*(0.251)*
Medium interest	**2.008*** **	**2.013*** **
(Ref: Low interest)	*(0.080)*	*(0.081)*
Socially active	**1.251*** **	**1.251*** **
(Ref: Less than once a week)	*(0.050)*	*(0.050)*
Gender role attitude	**1.067*** **	**1.068*** **
	(0.011)	*(0.011)*
In paid work	**1.211*** **	**1.210*** **
(Ref: not in paid work)	*(0.048)*	*(0.048)*
Context level		
Occupational segregation	**0.945** **	-
(higher)	*(0.019)*	
Occupational concentration	-	1.003
(higher)		*(0.005)*
Industry segregation	**1.168*** **	**1.091*** **
(higher)	*(0.036)*	*(0.027)*
Female managers (in %)	1.014	0.994
	(0.011)	*(0.010)*
Supervisory gap	**0.976*** **	**0.987***
	(0.006)	*(0.006)*
Hourly earnings gap (in %)	**1.055*** **	**1.026***
	(0.015)	*(0.012)*
GDP per capita	1.000	**1.000*** **
	(0.000)	*(0.000)*
Intercept	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.001)	*(0.001)*
ICC	0.015	0.021
Pseudo-R^2	0.185	0.179
Log-likelihood	-10036.0	-10039.4
n / N (countries)	23,767 / 24	23,767 / 24

Note. Logistic Multilevel Analysis estimating the effect of economic inequality on political participation (0/1), maximum-likelihood estimation. Coefficients shown are odds-ratios, standard errors in parentheses. ***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05, t=p<0.1.

A possible explanation for this effect could be that occupational segregation taps into a similar effect as the gap in supervisory responsibility: the share of women in positions with decision-making power. Indeed, there is some (weak) evidence that the two are loosely related ($r = 0.31, p = 0.137$). In order to test whether the effect is robust, the model has been refitted using another indicator for gendered occupations, namely women's occupational *concentration*. As the results of Model 2 show, the results do not hold, thus raising the question of the robustness of the finding.

In terms of model fit, I find that the full model (Model 1) can explain a good share of the variation in the data: The ICC of 0.015 shows that only 1.5 per cent of the variation is due to variation on the context level. In other words, the model explains the participation differences between countries exceptionally well. Regarding the total explained variance, the model appears slightly less powerful with a Pseudo-R^2 of just over 18 per cent[196]. However, it should be kept in mind, that the values of the Pseudo-R^2 are not strictly comparable to OLS estimates of the explained variance. Overall, the model shows that gender inequalities in the labour market play a significant role in explaining women's political participation, and especially country differences in women's political activity.

7.4 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the effects of gendered structures in the labour market on women's political participation. Starting from the notion that women's labour force participation rates by themselves are not a sufficient indication for women's integration in the labour market, I have turned to three gendered patterns that are key concepts in the Sociology of Work: horizontal sex segregation, vertical sex segregation and the gender pay gap. I have argued that these patterns are not only relevant because they affect individual work patterns and job positions, and therefore affect political resources, but they also shape the overall labour market context in which individual work is embedded. This means it affects the (gender) composition of the labour force, occupational fields, and industries. It also provides a contextual cue about the role of women in the labour force and the public sphere more generally. Moreover, it can influence to which degree women experience discrimination or develop a gender consciousness.

Indeed, the empirical analyses have shown that gendered structures in the labour market do play a role in women's political activity. However, as the overview of the hypotheses shown in Table 7.8 below demonstrates, not always in an expected manner. For example, I have found that segregation can have a positive effect on women. This is at least true for horizontal segregation, which implies that women are more likely to work in female-dominated occupations and industries. The finding suggests that a horizontally segregated labour market provides women with a safe space for political discussion and might promote women's gender consciousness, two factors that facilitate political participation. Karpowitz, Mendelberg and Shaker (2012) have shown that women are

[196]This estimate is only slightly larger than the estimates Pseudo-R^2 for the horizontal segregation model and might raise questions, whether the additional parameter significantly improves the model fit. For both models, the Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) has been calculated, which favours the larger model.

more active in political discussions in women-dominated groups. My findings add to this notion, by showing that the workplace might fulfil a similar function and that this might lead to more political participation.

Indeed, the role of other women as mobilising agents has also been indicated in the second part of the empirical analyses. Exploring the effects of vertical segregation, I have found that the female share of supervisors, however, not women in management positions can affect political behaviour. Thus, the direct contact with women in the workplace is more important than a symbolic cue of women in high-level positions. Indeed, Chapters 4 and 5 have shown, that being in a supervisory position is mobilising; the finding of this chapter suggests a spill-over effect on other women.

Finally, I have found a positive effect of the gender pay gap. While, at first, this effect appears puzzling at least, it does fit well with previous findings on how the experience of inequality can mobilise groups of citizens into political action. Indeed, the experience of discrimination can contribute to the development of gender consciousness, which itself is linked to participation. The fact, that the gap in hourly pay, but not the gender difference in actual monthly earnings, supports the idea that the experience of discrimination rather than the actual economic resources drives this effect.

When interpreting these effects, it is essential to keep in mind that, in reality, all three phenomena are closely interlinked and interact with each other. For instance, women in horizontally segregation labour markets are also more likely to experience the glass ceiling – at least in male-dominated and mixed occupations. Similarly, the gender pay gap is strongly affected by gender segregation into different occupations and industries as well as into different place in the occupational hierarchy. For the interpretation of the findings, this means it is worth keeping in mind that certain combinations of manifestations are more common than others. When a highly horizontally segregated labour market is also strongly vertically segregated, the positive effect of the one characteristic and the negative effect of the other might well cancel each other out.

The gendered structures in the labour market are also embedded in the broader social context and should be understood within this context. For example, general norms on women's role in society are likely to play a role for gendered structures in the labour market. There is also a direct link between work-family policies and gender segregation. For instance, the central argument of the 'welfare state paradox' literature is, that generous welfare states and, specifically, generous work-family policies, produce segregated labour markets in which women are less likely to progress into lucrative positions (Mandel and Semyonov 2005, 2006). To summarise, this indicates that the nexus between labour markets, policies, and political participation is complex, and

requires further analyses that focus more directly on these interactions. Specifically, multi-level structural equation models might help to further our understanding of how the different characteristics are interlinked. Without this understanding, predictions of how individual characteristics – in context – will play a role, remain vague.

Table 7.8: Overview of the hypotheses tested in Chapter 7

Horizontal segregation		**Confirmed?**
7.1a	A less horizontally gender-segregated labour market should have a positive effect on the probability of women's political participation.	✗
7.1b	A more horizontally gender-segregated labour market should have a positive effect on women's political participation probability.	✓
Vertical segregation		
7.2a	A labour market with a 'thinner' glass-ceiling (less vertical segregation at the top) should have a positive effect on women's political participation probability.	✓
7.2b	A more vertically segregated labour market should have a positive effect on women's political participation probability.	✗
Gender pay gap		
7.3	Higher levels of gender income inequality should have a negative effect on women's political participation probability	✗

Legend:
✓ Results support the hypothesis
✗ Results do not support the hypothesis

A further limitation lies in the context-level indicators that have been used. These are restricted both by the availability of data and the fuzziness of the concepts they aim to capture. While I have attempted to measure vertical segregation and the glass ceiling at different levels of the occupational hierarchy, both indicators are crude proxies for the underlying processes they aim to measure. In particular, they do not account for related, but distinct phenomena, for example, women's labour force participation or their probability to work in part-time positions, making it difficult to isolate the effect of segregation. At the same time, the availability of detailed contextual data restricts the models. For instance, a separate indicator of women's share at different levels of management would have been useful but is not available (at least not for all countries).

Nevertheless, this chapter was able to show that gendered structures of the labour market matter for political participation. This finding has implications for both, practice and research. It shows again, how inequalities in other areas of life can have consequences for political behaviour. If the aim is to facilitate women's political activity in institutional forms of participation, policy-making should see women's political participation in the broader societal context, since structures in other areas of life equally play a role. Regarding research, the implication is that an exploration of other areas of

life can be fruitful and the labour market, as a central institution deserves perhaps more of our attention.

The following and last chapter will provide a more in-depth reflection on the analyses in this and the previous chapters. It aims to discuss and bring together the empirical findings to situate them in the existing literature and indicates avenues for future works.

8 CONCLUSION

The aim of this dissertation was to systematically examine the links between women's work, gendered labour markets, and women's institutional political participation in Europe. It took as a starting point the notion that persisting gender inequalities in most life domains, many of which are rooted in the gendered division of labour, ultimately have consequences for women's political behaviour. From a theoretical perspective, the focus on women's work ties in with the feminist debate about productive and reproductive work and their link to women's citizenship (e.g. Pateman 1989; Orloff 1993). Empirically, it builds upon the finding that productive work facilitates political participation, which is well-established, both in the general (non-gender specific) literature and in the research on women's political participation (Andersen 1975; McDonagh 1982; Togeby 1994; Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001; Schur 2003; Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010).

However, despite the prominence of the idea that women's work is central to their political behaviour, the existing empirical literature has painted a rather fragmented picture so far. Most empirical work is based on single-country data, in particular data from the US, while the few cross-national studies that do exist present inconsistent findings. I have suggested that these inconsistencies indicate that work plays a different role in explaining political activity across countries. However, this context-dependency of effects has not yet been systematically tested.

Furthermore, this study has theorised a direct, contextual influence of the labour market on women's propensity to engage in the political process. Specifically, it has examined the effects of two aspects of the labour market, which stand for gender inequalities in the economic sphere: *work-family policies* and *gendered structures in the labour market*. Building on existing theories of contextual effects, this study has suggested that both aspects are an expression of and a symbol for women's inclusion in the public sphere, and as such, they might encourage or discourage women's activity in politics. Although this argument was originally developed for *political institutions* (e.g. Atkeson 2003), I have suggested that it can also be applied to the labour market, as a (gendered) institution in the wider public sphere. In addition, I have theorised that labour market structures and work-family policies matter for political participation because they redistribute resources to women and families. According to the Civic Voluntarism Model and the Policy Feedback literature, the redistribution of resources can affect who takes part in the political process (cf. Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Kumlin and Stadelmann-Steffen 2014). However, direct effects of the labour market have been

largely overlooked by the research, and the effects of work-family policies and gender structures specifically have not yet been systematically examined.

This dissertation has set out to address these gaps in the research. Using data from the fifth round of the European Social Survey (2010/2011), it has examined the links between women's individual work, labour markets, and women's institutional political participation in 25 European countries. In a set of multilevel logistic models, it has explored the effects of employment status, working time, and job levels, and the variation of these effects across countries and groups of women (mothers and non-mothers). This study has also provided the first comprehensive assessment of the effects of work-family policies and labour market structures on women's political participation.

The purpose of this chapter is to summarise the main findings of the previous chapters and to provide some concluding thoughts on the contributions to the existing research these findings can offer, and how they matter for practical efforts to increase women's input to political decision-making. The next section starts out with a review of the empirical findings and a discussion of the results in the light of my theoretical expectations and in relation to the wider literature. Then, I outline how this study offers contributions to the literature on women's political participation and how my findings can provide an impetus for policy-making. The last section addresses the limitation of the present study and suggests avenues for future research.

8.1 Work, labour markets, and political participation: Summary of findings

Previous research on work and political participation has mainly explored this relationship from an individual-level perspective. In other words, the main focus of research was the effects of employment status and work characteristics, however, without explicitly accounting for the wider context in which these effects are embedded. I have suggested in the literature review, and again in Chapter 4, that employment might play a different role for political activity of women in Europe and the US, as the labour markets and political systems in which these two activities are situated are quite different. To test this hypothesis, I have fitted a set of multilevel models with so-called 'random effects'. In random-effects models, the slope of a variable (in other words, the direction and strength of an effect) is allowed to vary across second-level units, in this case, countries. If a random-effects model fits the data significantly better than the corresponding fixed-effects model, in which effects are fixed, there is evidence that the effect of the variable is different across different countries.

Overall, the empirical evidence for varying effects is mixed. The effect of employment status is very similar across all countries in the dataset. Confirming the

findings from the US context (Beckwith 1986; Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001), being in paid work is an important predictor of women's political activity in Europe. Thus, higher female employment rates contribute to an active female citizenry in all countries in a similar way. Higher job levels also foster political participation. This observation, too, is in line with insights from the non-gender specific literature and studies from the US context, which have suggested that positions that provide civic skills and economic resources spur political activity (Beckwith 1986; Schlozman, Burns and Verba 1994, 1999; Schur 2003). Since women are less likely than men to reach these positions, the effect of job levels contributes to enduring inequality in political activity.

In contrast, working time is negatively related to political participation. In line with the assumption of the Civic Voluntarism Model, this suggests that having less disposable time reduces the likelihood of engaging in the political process. However, this effect is not uniform, but varies significantly across countries. Serval explanations for the context-dependency of the effect of working time seem plausible. Firstly, the analyses point to the direction that the effect of working time is more strongly negative in countries with higher levels of political participation (i.e., larger intercepts). This could suggest that in countries, where women participate more, they also participate more intensively, and therefore time is a more important predictor of activity compared to countries in which women participate less.

Secondly, the strength of the effect could be related to the quality of part-time work in a country. It is well-established in the sociology of work, that part-time work is associated with lower job quality and slower career progression (Boling 2015). However, in some countries, part-time work is better integrated into the labour market and offers higher job quality than in other countries. Where part-time work is not inferior to fulltime work, shorter working hours are associated with more free time, but no loss of job quality, their effect on political participation should be strongly positive. However, in countries where part-time work is less integrated, the increase of free time is accompanied by a loss in job quality (and potentially civic skills). Therefore, shorter working time has a less positive effect. I have explicitly tested this explanation in Chapter 5. The analyses lend some support to the explanation, as there is a statistically significant cross-level interaction between the average quality of part-time work in a country and working time. As expected, I find that shorter working time has a more positive effect in countries with high-quality part-time work.

This observation also ties in with another finding. The two job characteristics, job level and working time, interact: The adverse effect of longer working hours is less negative for women in high-level occupations. The interaction suggests that resources can substitute each other. If a woman has little free time available, the necessary skills

to become active are all the more important, perhaps because skills can reduce the time required to become active. Equally, women with few civic skills might still engage in the political process, if they have enough time to do so.

The next empirical chapter, Chapter 5, has set out to explore the effects of employment for a group of women, who are predominantly responsible for another type of work, care work. It has examined whether employment affects mothers differently than women without children. Although previous studies have been concerned with the effects of care responsibilities on political participation, the intersection between care and market work has hardly been analysed (but see: McGlen 1980; O'Neill and Gidengil 2017). The nexus of care work, employment and political participation is especially intriguing since the two dominant explanations for the negative effect of motherhood on political participation generate two diverging expectations about the effects of employment. According to the isolation hypothesis, motherhood creates a focus on the family and disconnects women from the wider society. Since employment counteracts this focus on the private sphere, it should encourage mothers to be politically active. On the other hand, scholars have suggested that time constraints are behind the lower political participation rates of mothers. Childcare, in particular for the youngest children, requires time, which is then simply not available for political activity. Consequently, employment, which decreases the free time available even further, should have a negative effect on the political participation of mothers.

The empirical analyses of this chapter lend support to the former hypothesis. Employment increases the probability of political participation, for mothers of preschool children and mothers of older children. Although this implies that the double burden of childcare and market work does not further impact on women's political activity, the finding is not necessarily positive. I have also shown that mothers of preschool children are, in almost all countries, still less likely to be employed than women overall (and also than men). Thus, while the effect of employment is the same, the endowment is not. In other words, this group of women, who have a vested interest in shaping the political decision-making and also have particular interests (that differ both, from men and childless women) are less likely to make use of their political voices.

Regarding the effects of work characteristics, a few interesting observations were made. For example, against the expectations, I have found that working time is not more important for mothers of preschool children than for other women. As a matter of fact, it does not have any significant effect on this group of women's participation. Although the sample size for employed mothers of preschool children is relatively small ($n = 1869$), the absence of an effect does not appear to be a statistical artefact, as also no substantive effect was uncovered. The finding might nevertheless be an indication of the

time-deprivation of this group of women. I have hypothesised that if they have very little time available, the time spent in paid work might not matter. Instead, political participation might only be a question of priorities, the availability of care for the children and motivation.

As expected, job level is also associated with political participation for all three groups of women (i.e. women without children; mothers of preschool children; and mothers of school children). Working in a higher-level job increases political activity for all women. However, for mothers of preschool children, this effect is not equally strong across all countries, but varies across different contexts. I have theorised that the work-pressures associated with being in a supervisory position play a role. We know that supervising others increases work-life conflict (Russell, O'Connell and McGinnity 2009), which is already high for mothers of preschool children (Scott and Plagnol 2012; Stier, Lewin-Epstein and Braun 2012). In other words, the stress associated with the double pressures of childcare and a demanding job might offset the otherwise positive effect of being in a high-level position. The variation of the effect could then be an expression of the level of support available to these women. In countries providing extensive public childcare, the work-life conflict might be less pronounced, and there should be a stronger positive effect of supervisory positions. I test this explanation empirically in Chapter 6 by modelling a cross-level interaction effect between childcare provision (on the country-level) and being in a supervisory position. In countries where there is more public childcare for under-3-year-olds, the effects of supervisory responsibility on political participation is more strongly positive. However, childcare for older children did not have the same conditioning effect. The analyses are also limited by the relatively small sample for this group of women, so these should be treated as indicative at best.

In the next chapter, Chapter 6, the focus remained on mothers, but I have turned to the impact of the context, or to be more precise, to work-family policies. These policies aim to reconcile the competing demands of market work and care work. However, as they can take very different approaches, they can also affect women's labour market behaviour and their political participation differently. Work-family policies matter for political participation, firstly, because they influence whether women are employed and make it into professional occupations. The effects of different policies vary; however, differences were not as pronounced as expected. Overall, more support is associated with higher levels of labour force participation amongst mothers. Although cash benefits and well-paid leaves provide a financial incentive to exit the labour market, this effect is not permanent. In the longer term, these policies, too, help women to stay attached to the labour market. Work-family policies equally play a role for the type of jobs women tend to have. In countries with better support for working mothers, women are overall

more likely to work full-time and to work in good positions. In sum, the indirect effects of work-family policies are positive.

However, perhaps more interesting than indirect effects is the question of whether work-family policies *directly s*hape women's political participation. Building on existing theories of contextual effects on political behaviour, I have theorised two mechanisms through which policies might affect women's participation. Firstly, they might provide a 'contextual cue' about women's inclusion in the public sphere. To put it simply, policies, which prioritise women's role as caregivers over their labour market attachment suggest that women are not equally part of the public sphere and discourage their political involvement. In contrast, policies that are designed to ensure women's continuous employment, might have the reverse effect and encourage political participation. Secondly, applying the reasoning of the policy feedback literature, it could be expected that policies affect women's political participation by increasing their resources. Since all policies work to either increase the time or money of women, this suggests positive effects of all policies.

The empirical analyses have provided support for the second hypothesis. The overall support for families with children positively affects the political involvement of mothers of both pre-school and school children; similarly, financial support encourages political engagement. Intriguingly, there is no effect of childcare provision. The findings are more in line with the assumptions of the policy feedback literature, as they indicate a resource effect rather than the influence of a contextual cue. The absence of an effect of childcare suggests that money support can be used more flexibly and is, therefore, more helpful. In addition, the time gained through childcare might be used differently; for example, for market work – as the findings at the beginning of the chapter have suggested.

In Chapter 7, I have shifted the focus back to all women (mothers and non-mothers), and I have turned to the direct influence of gender inequalities in the labour market. The focus was on three related aspects of the labour market– horizontal segregation, vertical segregation and the gender pay gap – overall with intriguing results. Firstly, the analyses have shown that gendered work patterns do not necessarily need to have a negative effect. Higher levels of horizontal segregation (i.e. the tendency of women and men to work in different fields and industries) appear to encourage women's political involvement: Women are more politically active in countries where they are more likely to work in 'female-dominated' industries and occupations. This might be due to a more positive environment for women's political discussion. Indeed, there is some evidence that more homogenous networks can facilitate political discussion (McClurg 2006; Karpowitz, Mendelberg and Shaker 2012). These environments might also

contribute to the development of a 'gender consciousness', as they make a clearer division between the 'ingroup' and an 'outgroup'; which also has a mobilising effect (Cassese and Holman 2016).

The importance of contact with other women has further shown in the effect of vertical gender segregation (i.e. the tendency of women and men to work at different levels of the occupational hierarchy). In countries with more vertically segregated labour markets women tend to be less represented in higher occupational levels, which has consequences for their political activity: Where there are more male than female supervisors, women are overall less politically active. However, no similar effect was found for male and female managers. Rather than a symbolic effect, this suggests a role model effect: What seems to count is the direct contact with women in powerful positions.

Finally, the perhaps most surprising finding was a mobilising effect of the gender pay gap. It was expected that the economic inequality resulting from the gender pay gap would lead to a decrease in women's political participation. However, on the contrary, a larger pay gap is associated with more political activity amongst women. Although is not in line with the expectations, this finding is not implausible. Existing literature on political participation of minorities argues that the experience of discrimination can mobilise people into political activity (Schlozman, Burns and Verba 1999; Schur 2003; Cassese and Holman 2016). Similarly, it can spur women's gender consciousness, which, again, can spur political participation.

8.2 How employment and labour markets shape women's political participation: Implications for research and practice

The previous section has summarised the most important empirical findings; this section turns to the broader themes that have emerged from this study and explains what contributions these might offer to the wider field of research, as well as the implications for efforts to make institutional forms of political participation more inclusive of women. The overall purpose of this study was to examine how women's work and employment, as well as policies and structures of the labour market, are linked to women's political participation. As such, the study has provided a more contextual account of a relationship that has been the focus of previous research.

The contributions of this study to the field of research are three-fold. *Firstly*, the study has provided recent, cross-sectional evidence that confirms the importance of employment for women's political participation. While this effect is empirically well-established of the North American context, findings from cross-national research on the European context have painted an inconsistent picture so far. This study indicates that the effects of work and employment are still deserving of our scholarly attention. Since

employment and job characteristics shape women's political behaviour, while women remain in a position of disadvantage in the labour market (Rubery, Smith and Fagan 1999, Chapters 4, 5, 6), inequalities in the labour market inevitably translate into gender differences in the political sphere.

Secondly, this study appears to be the first study to assess the context-dependency of employment effects systematically. Previous research has often implicitly assumed that it is possible to generalise findings from one context to another. While the effects of employment status and job level were found to be similar across countries, other effects are influenced by the broader political and labour market context. Most importantly, the effect of working-time was found to be shaped by the quality of part-time work available. This finding should provide an impetus for future research to pay closer attention to the ways in which the context shapes the influence of individual-level characteristics. Even for well-established predictors of participation, such as work, formal empirical tests of context-dependency might provide us with a better understanding of the interplay of different analytical levels.

Lastly, the study has shown that the characteristics of the labour market can affect women's political activity. It provides the first comprehensive assessment of the direct contextual effects of work-family policies and gender inequalities in the labour market. Existing research on context-effects has primarily focussed on institutions of the political sphere (e.g. Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2012; Beauregard 2014, 2017). My analyses suggest that institutions in the wider public sphere can also have an effect. Work-family policies, for instance, shape, directly and indirectly, the political resources mothers have available and thereby influence women's political activity. These findings confirm observations from the emerging literature of the Policy Feedback theory. Gendered structures in the labour market, on the other hand, shape women's contacts with each other and with female role models. The workplace can provide women with a place to discuss politics and an environment that fosters the development of gender consciousness. More generally, the study demonstrates how concepts and insights from related fields of sociology might enhance our understanding of gender inequalities in the political sphere. As such, it stresses – much like Duverger did 63 years ago – the need to understand women's political participation in the wider contexts of gender inequalities.

Apart from contributing to the research of women's political participation more generally, the findings of this study also provide a more practical impetus. Taken together, these findings suggest that strong female involvement in politics requires equality in the labour market. Women need the same opportunity to be economically active and to progress in their careers if we want them to be as active in politics as men. My research has also suggested, in line with a large body of existing literature form the

sociology of work, that a possible way forward towards more gender equality is a strong and supportive set of work-family policies. These policies might not only have the capacity to decrease inequalities in the labour market, but at the same time, they encourage the political engagement of mothers, who are otherwise less active. Similarly, in countries where high-quality part-time work is available, women can benefit from attachment to the public sphere, while having the free time required to take part in politics. This might again provide a particular help to the group of mothers, for whom part-time work in combination with state-provided childcare might encourage labour force participation. Finally, the findings suggest that women benefit from contact with other working and politicised women and they indicate a positive influence of female role models in powerful positions in the labour market. Measures to ensure that women have the same opportunities to progress into supervisory roles will therefore also contribute to women's political empowerment. Also, while I do not wish to imply that labour markets should become even more horizontally segregated, I suggest that spaces that bring women together might have a similar effect. For example, political groups and organisations that provide a space for women to discuss their shared concerns and develop a gender consciousness might give women a voice in otherwise male-dominated parties or organisations.

8.3 Limitations and future work

Despite its contributions to the study of women's political participation, some limitations of this study should be noted. Most limitations are related to data quality and operationalisations. However, other qualifications stem from the empirical and conceptual focus.

As in all empirical studies, the quality and availability of data determine how robust the empirical findings are. This applies to micro-level and macro-level data equally. Some of the weaknesses regarding the micro-level (ESS) data have already been discussed in Chapter 3. For example, the items on political participation, although they can be considered standard items, might create problems of recalling the behaviour correctly (due to the long timeframe of 12 months) or might capture civic rather than political participation (due to the wording of the question about organisational participation). More generally, the cross-national nature of the dataset can lead to problems with the equivalence of concepts. Although the research design has aimed to minimise these problems, for example by adopting a most-similar-cases research design, these cannot be entirely eliminated. This was evident for the main concept, political participation. Although the three modes of participation could be reasonably well summarised into a single item in most countries, a few countries showed a different

dimensional structure and did not support the construction of the index. Similar problems of equivalence might also apply to the main independent variables. Although employment status and working hours are not expected to have a context-specific meaning, problems with the cross-national equivalence of occupational codes are well established (cf. Harrison and Rose 2010). These problems are endogenous to comparative research but should nevertheless be considered when interpreting the results.

A second limitation related to the data is the operationalisation of the contextual characteristics. The (cross-national) measurement of work-family policies remains a general challenge in the research. Most of the policy measures aimed at working mothers depend strongly on the specific circumstances of the family. For instance, the amount of cash benefits paid is in many countries conditional on the number and age of children in the household, as well as the income of the parents (cf. De Henau, Meulders and O'Dorchai 2008). This complexity makes it not only difficult to break the benefits down to a single (or a few) indicators, but it also provides a challenge for comparing the measures meaningfully across countries. Moreover, I have opted for a separate analysis of different policies, in order to establish their unique effects. However, in reality, the policies do not exist on their own, but in interplay with each other. It might well be possible, that the effects of one policy depend on the specific design and combinations of other policies; however, this has not been tested in the model.

Similar problems do also apply to the measures of gendered labour market structures used in Chapter 7. The phenomena I have tried to measure are quite complex, and also closely interrelated, which means an expression in a small set of variables is necessarily simplistic. For example, I have used the share of managers who are female as a measure of vertical sex segregation. Although this operationalisation fitted the hypotheses tested, it only captured a very restricted picture of the underlying structural phenomenon. It does not provide any information about the gender distribution at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy, which is arguably equally informative. Problems also exist with regards to the measure of horizontal segregation. In particular the use of the Index of Dissimilarity in comparative research has been criticised, as it is sensitive to labour market structures. Overall, these weaknesses of the contextual measures call for future research to confirm the robustness of my findings using a different set of indicators.

In terms of the research design more generally, the selection and number of countries included in the study limit the generalisability of results. Firstly, the explanatory power of the results is impacted on by the number of countries included in the multi-level models. Although it is not uncommon in political research to estimate multi-level models

based on fewer context-level units (countries), the 25 countries included here are clearly at the lower boundary of what can be considered acceptable (c.f. Stegmueller 2013). Problems can arise in particular with maximum-likelihood estimation (which was used here) and the inference in cross-level interactions and random-effects models. The significance of effects in those models should be interpreted accordingly. Secondly, the selection of countries also restricts the generalisability of results. European countries can be considered a particular subset, even of the developed countries. They are unique in terms of economic development, democratisation, but perhaps more importantly with regards to their shared history. This implies that the findings of these analyses are likely to be not generalisable to other geographic contexts or other points in time.

More generally, it should be noted that the models only do a reasonably decent job explaining women's political participation. The individual-level models in Chapters 4 and 5 explain slightly more than 10 per cent of the variance, while the full models in Chapter 7 can explain around 18 per cent of the overall variance in political participation. This lack of explanatory power is not surprising, as a behaviour, such as political participation, is likely to depend on a number of situation-specific conditions, that cannot be captured in population surveys. For example, the attempt to contact a politician might be conditional on the emerge of a pressing issue in one's immediate environment. Also, while the models predict women's individual participation only reasonably well, they do a better job explaining differences in political activity across countries. In the final models in Chapter 7, only around two per cent of the overall variance can be attributed to differences between countries (in comparison to 13 per cent in the empty model).

The exploration of women's political behaviour more generally, and of the role that employment and the labour market play, remains an ongoing endeavour. Although this study has aimed to shed more light on the relationship between work and political activity it does also open up the field to future research. I have four suggestions how future work can help to broaden and deepen our understanding of the political influence of the labour market.

Firstly, the study has put its focus on a single form of political activity, that is institutional participation. I have argued that understanding this form of participation is especially interesting, because women remain less active, while it might be more effective in influencing political decision-making. However, it remains nevertheless interesting to find out whether employment and labour market characteristics have a similar effect on other activities, such as political protests or online activism. Some scholars have shown that the predictors for different forms are not necessarily identical; thus, an analysis of the effects on non-institutional participation should be worthwhile.

Secondly, this study has treated women largely as if they were one large, homogenous group. Although I have analysed non-mothers and mothers separately, I have not equally accounted for other differences between women, for example those along the lines of social class or ethnicity. At the same time, there are good reasons to expect these differences to shape the effects of work or the meaning of political participation. It is a task for future research to examine the effect of employment for different groups of women, and to uncover the influence of intersecting inequalities both in the labour market and within the political sphere.

Thirdly, a next step might be to expand the analyses conceptually to also include men. The interest of this study was to better understand whether the inequalities women face in one important sphere of life, that is the economic sphere, ultimately affect their political behaviour, both directly or indirectly. Nevertheless, if the aim is to explain gender differences, it is important to also understand the effects on men. Indeed, some previous research on the effects of gender quotas suggests, that gendered structures can also matter for men. It remains to be seen whether work-family policies and gender inequalities in the labour market also shape men's political behaviour, and if so, whether they benefit or are also suffer from the existing gendered structures.

Finally, this dissertation has demonstrated that macro-contextual institutions outside the political sphere are important for women's political behaviour. As such, it provides an impetus for future research to focus more on the effects of macro-contextual institutions for women's political behaviour, as women's political participation needs to be understood in the broader context of gender inequalities, much as already Duverger suggested in 1955.

APPENDICES

A. APPENDIX A

Table A.1: Fieldwork periods and sampling strategies in the European Social Survey

Country	Fieldwork period	Interviews achieved	Response rate	Interview mode	Sampling strategy	Response strategies
Belgium	11.10.10-06.05.11	1 704	53.4	CAPI	Stratified two-stage probability sample	Advance letter Money incentive
Bulgaria	17.12.10-28.03.11	2 434	81.4	PAPI	Stratified three-stage probability sample	/
Croatia	16.09.11–14.12.11	1 649	54.5	PAPI	Stratified three-stage probability sample	/
Cyprus	01.01.11-21.06.11	1 083	69.7	PAPI	Stratified two-stage random sample	Advance letter
Czech Republic	20.01.11-08.03.11	2 386	70.2	PAPI	Stratified two-stage random sample	Advance letter
Denmark	20.09.10-31.01.11	1 576	55.4	CAPI	Simple random sample	Advance letter
Estonia	10.10.10-28.05.11	1 793	56.2	CAPI	Simple random sample	Advance letter Money incentive
Finland	13.09.10-30.12.10	1 878	59.5	CAPI	Single-stage equal probability systematic sample	Advance letter Non-money incentive
France	15.10.10-06.04.11	1 728	47.1	CAPI	Three-stage random sample	Advance letter Money incentive
Germany	15.09.10-03.02.11	3 031	30.5	CAPI	Stratified two-stage probability sample	Advance letter Money incentive
Greece	06.05.11-05.07.11	2 715	65.6	PAPI	Three-stage systematic PPS sample	Advance letter
Hungary	19.10.10-10.12.10	1 561	49.2	PAPI	Stratified two-stage multi-domain random sample	Advance letter
Ireland	20.09.11-31.01.12	2 576	65.2	CAPI	Three-stage probability sample	Advance letter Money incentive
Israel	09.01.11-13.06.11	2 294	72.9	PAPI	Stratified three-stage probability sample	Advance letter
Lithuania	21.04.11-20.08.11	1 677	39.4	PAPI	Stratified three-stage probability sample	Advance letter Non-money incentive
Netherlands	27.09.10-02.04.11	1 829	60.0	CAPI	Unstratified two-stage probability sample	Advance letter Money incentive
Norway	09.09.10-15.02.11	1 548	58.0	CAPI	Single-stage systematic random sample	Advance letter Money incentive
Poland	01.10.10-06.02.11	1 751	70.3	PAPI	Two-stage random/clustered sample	Advance letter Non-Money incentive
Portugal	11.10.10-23.03.11	2 150	67.1	CAPI	Stratified three-stage probability sample	Advance letter Non-Money incentive

Slovakia	29.10.10-28.02.11	1 856	74.7	PAPI	Stratified four-stage probability sample	Advance letter Money incentive
Slovenia	20.10.10-31.01.11	1 403	64.4	PAPI	Stratified two-stage probability sample	Advance letter
Spain	11.04.11-24.07.11	1 885	68.5	CAPI	Stratified two-stage probability sample	Advance letter Money incentive
Sweden	27.09.10-01.03.11	1 497	51.0	CAPI	Random sample	Advance letter Non-Money incentive
Switzerland	02.10.10-23.03.11	1 506	53.3	CAPI	Single-stage equal probability systematic sample	Advance letter Money/Non-money incentive
United Kingdom	31.08.10-28.02.11	2 422	56.3	CAPI	Stratified three-stage random probability clustered sample	Advance letter Money incentive

Source. ESS 2016a; ESS 2016b.
Note. Response rate in percent; CAPI: Computer-Assisted Personal Interview; PAPI: Paper and Pencil Interview

Table A.2: Sampling design in the European Social Survey by country

Country	**Stratification (number of non-empty strata)**	**Primary Sampling Units (PSU)**	**Adjustments**
Belgium	Regions (11)	Sample points in municipalities (363)	/
Bulgaria	Implicit	Electoral Sections (400)	Treated as unstratified.
Croatia	Region and level of development (13)	Municipalities (385)	/
Cyprus	Region and urbanity (9)	Households	No sampling design information was given for five respondents. These observations have been deleted from the dataset.
Czech Republic	Region and size of settlement (57)	Basic settlement units (442)	Stratum '622' contains only one PSU: Strata '622' and '799' (same region, adjacent settlement sizes) were merged.
Denmark	No stratification	Individuals	/
Estonia	Implicit	Individuals	/
Finland	Implicit	Individuals	Treated as unstratified.
France	No stratification	'Interviewer Action Zones' (221)	/
Germany	East and West (2)	Communities (sampling points) (168)	/
Greece	Implicit	'Buildings blocks' (census units) (200)	/
Hungary	Size of settlement (Budapest, large cities, smaller cities, and villages) (4)	Settlements (225)	In the dataset, the two strata in domain A3 ('Smaller cities' and 'Villages') are subdivided into 14 substrata denoting the region, although this does not reflect the actual sampling design. The strata have been collapsed back into two strata (in order to reflect sampling design and to avoid variance estimation problems); For strata '1' and '2', the whole stratum is set as PSU. As the sampling description states that individuals have been randomly selected within these strata, individuals have been set as PSUs.
Ireland	Implicit	Clusters of addresses (225)	Treated as unstratified.
Israel	Main nationality of the area, geographic region, type of community, SES level (10)	Statistical areas (190)	/
Lithuania	Implicit	Electoral districts (200)	Treated as unstratified.
Netherlands	No stratification	Postal delivery points	/
Norway	Age group, gender, region (42)	Individuals	/
Poland	Size of town (over/ under 50,000 inhabitants) (89)	Individuals in towns over 50,000 inhabitants; Towns	The 86 towns over 50,000 are divided in 86 different strata in the dataset, although this does not reflect the statistical sampling design (random selection of PSUs from the set of 86 towns, not for each separately). The strata have been collapsed into a single stratum to reflect this design;

			Information about PSU's is missing for the stratum of towns with over 50,000 inhabitants. As the sample design description states that respondents have been randomly selected (SRS) individual are set as PSUs
Portugal	Region and municipality size (23)	Municipalities (150)	Strata '10', '15', '20', '22', '14' and '19' contain only one PSU: Strata '5', '10', '15', '20'; strata '17' and '22'; strata '14' and '19' were merged (merged strata are in the same regions with adjacent sizes of settlement).
Slovakia	Region and municipality size (40)	Municipalities (250)	Strata '2' and '4051' contain only one PSU: Strata '2' and '1979'; and strata '4051' and '3195' (same region, adjacent municipality sizes) were merged.
Slovenia	Region and type of settlement (46)	Clusters of Enumeration Areas (150)	15 strata contain only one PSU: Strata were collapsed to the region only, two regions '23' and '24' (neighbouring regions) were merged (11).
Spain	Region and size of habitat (64)	Census sections	9 strata contain only one PSU: Strata were collapsed to the region only, regions ES22, ES23 and ES24; and ES43 and ES42; and ES62 and 63 (neighbouring regions) were merged, regions (14).
Sweden	No stratification	Individuals	/
Switzerland	Region (7)	Individuals	/
United Kingdom	Region, level of deprivation, % privately rented households, % pensioners (?)	Postcode sectors	Strata variable incorrectly denotes individuals: Strata changed to the region.

Source: European Social Survey (2016a); country-specific 'Sampling Design Data Files' (SDDF), available on the ESS website (ESS 2015).
Note. PSU: Primary Sampling Unit; Adjustments to the original sampling design data are made to specify a *sampling error calculation model*, which allows the estimation of variance for complex survey data (Heeringa 2010, pp.98-104). These adjustments should approximate the actual complex survey design as closely as possible.

Table A.3: Wording of political participation questions in the ESS (main) questionnaire

Question Stem		**Answer categories**	
Institutional participation			
B13	There are different ways of trying to improve things in [*country*] or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following? Have you… … contacted a politician, government, or local government official?	1 2	Yes No
B14	… worked in a political party or action group?	1 2	Yes No
B15	… worked in another organisation or association?	1 2	Yes No
B16	… worn or displayed a campaign badge/sticker?	1 2	Yes No
Extra-institutional participation			
B17	… signed a petition?	1 2	Yes No
B18	… taken part in a lawful public demonstration?	1 2	Yes No
B19	… boycotted certain products?	1 2	Yes No

Table A.4: Dimensionality of political participation according to different methods of assessment by country

Country	Cluster Analysis	Mokken Scale Analysis ($H>0.3$; $H_{ij}>0$)	Mokken Scale Analysis ($H>0.3$; $H_{ij}>0.2$)	Scalability (H) of institutional participation items
BE	1) **Party, Organisation Contact** Badge 2) Petition Demo Boycott	1) Party Organisation Badge Petition Demo Boycott	2) Party Organisation Badge Petition Demo	0.290
BG	1) **Party Organisation Contact** 2) Badge Petition Demo Boycott	1) **Party Organisation Contact** 2) Petition Demo	1) **Party Organisation Contact** 2) Petition Demo	0.424
CH	1) **Party Organisation Contact** Badge 2) Petition Demo Boycott	1) **Party Organisation Contact** Badge Petition Demo Boycott	1) Organisation Contact Badge Petition Demo Boycott	0.478
CY	1) Party Contact Petition 2) Organisation Badge 3) Demo Boycott	1) **Party Organisation Contact** Badge Petition Demo	1) **Party Organisation Contact** Badge Petition Demo	0.724
CZ	1) **Party Organisation Contact** Badge 2) Petition Demo Boycott	1) **Party Organisation Contact** Badge 2) Petition Demo Boycott	1) **Party Organisation Contact** Badge 2) Petition Demo Boycott	0.386
DE	1) **Party Organisation Contact** 2) Badge Petition Demo Boycott	1) **Party Organisation Contact** Badge Petition Demo	1**) Party Organisation Contact** Badge Petition 2) Demo Boycott	0.523
DK	*All items form separate clusters*	1) Party Organisation Petition Demo	1) Party Organisation Badge 2) Petition Demo	0.280
EE	1) **Party Organisation Contact** Badge 2) Demo 3) Petition Boycott	1) **Party Organisation Contact** 2) Badge Petition	1) **Party Organisation Contact** 2) Badge Petition	0.413
ES	1) Party Contact 2) Demo	1) **Party Organisation Contact** Badge	1) **Party Organisation Contact** Badge	0.495

	3) Organisation Petition Badge 4) Boycott	Petition Demo Boycott	Petition Demo	
FI	1) **Party** **Organisation** **Contact** Badge 2) Petition Demo Boycott	1) **Party** **Organisation** **Contact** 3) Boycott Petition Demonstration	2) **Party** **Organisation** **Contact** 4) Boycott Petition Demonstration	0.441
FR	1) Party Organisation Badge 2) Petition Demo 3) Contact Boycott	1) Party Organisation Badge Petition Demo Boycott	1) Party Organisation Badge Petition Demo Boycott	0.295
GB	*All items form separate clusters*	1) **Party** **Organisation** **Contact** Badge Petition Demo Boycott	1) **Party** **Organisation** **Contact** Badge Petition Demo Boycott	0.503
GR	1) **Party** **Organisation** **Contact** Badge 2) Petition Demo Boycott	1**) Party** **Organisation** **Contact** Badge Petition Demo Boycott	1) **Party** **Organisation** **Contact** Badge Petition Boycott	0.600
HR	1) **Party** **Organisation** **Contact** Badge 2) Petition Demo Boycott	1) Party Badge Petition Demo	1) Party Contact 2) Petition Demo Boycott	0.274
HU	1) **Party** **Organisation** **Contact** Badge 2) Petition Demo Boycott	1) **Party** **Organisation** **Contact** Badge Petition Demo Boycott	1) **Party** **Organisation** **Contact** Badge Demo Boycott	0.500
IE	1) **Party** **Organisation** **Contact** 2) Badge Petition Demo Boycott	1) **Party** **Organisation** **Contact** Badge Petition Demo Boycott	1) **Party** **Organisation** **Contact** Badge Petition Demo Boycott	0.499
IL	1) **Party** **Organisation** **Contact** 2) Badge Petition Demo Boycott	1) Party Organisation Badge Petition Demo Boycott	1) Party Organisation Badge Petition Demo Boycott	0.450
LT	1) Party Organisation Badge Petition 2) Demo Boycott 3) Contact	1) **Party** **Organisation** **Contact** Badge Petition	1) Party Organisation Badge Petition	0.537

NL	*All items form separate clusters*	1) Party Organisation Badge Petition Demo Boycott	1) Party Organisation Badge Petition 1) Demo Boycott	0.338
NO	1) **Party Organisation Contact** 2) Badge Petition Demo Boycott	1) Party Badge Petition Demo 2) Organisation Contact	1) Party Badge Petition Demo 2) Organisation Contact	0.364
PL	1) **Party Organisation Contact** 2) Badge Petition Demo Boycott	1) **Party Organisation Contact** Badge Petition Demo Boycott	1) **Party Organisation Contact** Badge Petition	0.429
PT	1) Party Contact Badge 2) Organisation Petition 3) Demo Boycott	1) **Party Organisation Contact** Badge Petition	1) **Party Organisation Contact** Badge Petition	0.401
SE	1) **Party Organisation Contact** 2) Badge Petition Demo Boycott	1) **Party Organisation Contact** Petition 2) Badge Demo	1) **Party Organisation Contact** Petition 2) Badge Demo	0.423
SI	1) Organisation Contact 2) Badge Demo 3) Party Petition 4) Boycott	1) Organisation Contact 2) Petition Badge Demo	1) Organisation Contact 1) Petition Badge Demo	0.395
SK	1) **Party Organisation Contact** 2) Badge Petition Demo Boycott	1) **Party Organisation Contact** Badge Petition Demo Boycott	1) Badge Petition Demo Boycott	0.351

Source: European Social Survey Round 5 Data 2010.

Table A.5: Wording of questions of the control variables in the ESS (main) questionnaire

Question	Stem	Answer categories	
F3	And in what year were you born?		*open-ended question*
F15	What is the highest level of education you have successfully completed?		*asked as a country-specific question, see* ESS5 Appendix A1, edition 3.1
F4	Now, I would like to ask you some details about yourself and others in your household […]. Looking at this card, what relationship is he/she to you?	01 02 03 04 05 06	Husband/wife/partner Son/daughter (inc. step, adopted, foster, child of partner) Parent, parent-in-law, partner's parent, step parent Brother/sister (inc. step, adopted, foster) Other relative Other non-relative
B1	How interested would you say you are in politics – are you…	1 2 3 4	very interested quite interested hardly interested or, not at all interested?
C2	Using this card, how often do you meet socially with friends, relatives or work colleagues?	01 02 03 04 05 06 07	Never Less than once a month Once a month Several times a month Once a week Several times a week Every day
G4	I am now going to read out some statements about men and women and their place in the family. Using this card, please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements. • A woman should be prepared to cut down on her paid work for the sake of her family.	1 2 3 4 5	Agree strongly Agree Neither agree nor disagree Disagree Disagree strongly
G5	• When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.	1 2 3 4 5	Agree strongly Agree Neither agree nor disagree Disagree Disagree strongly

B. APPENDIX B

Table B.1: Wording of questions in the ESS (main) questionnaire

Question stem		Answer categories	
	Employment status		
F17a	Using this card, which of these descriptions applies to what you have been doing for the last 7 days? Select all that apply.	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08	paid work (or away temporarily) (employee, self-employed working for your family business) in education, (not paid for by employer) even if on vacation unemployed and actively looking for a job unemployed, wanting a job but not actively looking for a job permanently sick or disabled retired in community or military service doing housework, looking after children or other persons
F17c	And which of these descriptions best describes your situation (in the last seven days)? Please select only one.		*as F17a above*
F18	Can I just check, did you do any paid work of an hour or more in the last seven days?	1 2	Yes No
F19	[*if 'Paid work' is not selected in F17 and 'No' is selected in F18]* Have you ever had a paid job?	1 2	Yes No
	Job level		
F25	In your main job, do/did you have any responsibility for supervising the work of other employees?	1 2	Yes No
F33	What is/was the name or title of your main job?		(open question, post-coded)
F27	I am going to read out a list of things about your working life. Using this card, please say how much the management at your work allows/allowed you… …to decide how your own daily work is/was organised?	00 to 10	I have/ had no influence I have/had complete control
F28	…to influence policy decisions about the activities of the organisation?		*as F27 above*
F28a	...to choose or change your pace of work?		*as F27 above*
	Working hours		
F29	What are/were your total 'basic' or contracted hours each week (in your main job), excluding any paid and unpaid overtime?		(open question)
F30	Regardless of your basic or contracted hours, how many hours do/did you normally work a week (in your main job), including any paid or unpaid overtime?		(open question)

Source: Source Questionnaire of the European Social Survey: ESS (2010b).

Table B.2: Factor loadings for explorative factor analysis of job autonomy

Item	Factor: Autonomy	Uniqueness
Work organisation	0.82	0.33
Work pace	0.78	0.39
Policy influence	0.68	0.54

Note. Extraction method: principle factor; overall Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure: 0.70. Cronbach's alpha (on standardised items): 0.83. n= 11,592.



Figure B.1: Estimated effects of working time on the log-odds for political participation for an 'average' women by country

C. APPENDIX C

Table C.1: Sample sizes for all women by motherhood and country

Country	Mothers of preschool children	Mothers of school children	Country	Mothers of preschool children	Mothers of school children
Belgium	134	185	Israel	252	217
Bulgaria	135	214	Lithuania	123	107
Croatia	101	153	Netherlands	96*	223
Cyprus	66*	102	Norway	142	152
Czech Republic	143	187	Poland	182	170
Denmark	92*	172	Portugal	137	169
Estonia	176	165	Slovakia	119	190
Finland	145	128	Slovenia	109	141
France	157	144	Spain	126	166
Germany	186	247	Sweden	120	121
Greece	175	265	Switzerland	81*	142
Hungary	107	167	United Kingdom	204	222
Ireland	234	259	**Total**	3,542	4,408

Note: Sample sizes highlighted with an asterisk are smaller than 100.

Table C.2: Sample sizes for working women by motherhood and country

Country	Mothers of preschool children	Mothers of school children	Country	Mothers of preschool children	Mothers of school children
Belgium	88	115	Israel	163	128
Bulgaria	59	108	Lithuania	45*	67
Croatia	53	77	Netherlands	64	169
Cyprus	44*	57	Norway	114	121
Czech Republic	60	132	Poland	91	90
Denmark	72	139	Portugal	81	88
Estonia	80	111	Slovakia	49*	124
Finland	78	92	Slovenia	71	89
France	108	105	Spain	79	88
Germany	85	164	Sweden	92	97
Greece	71	126	Switzerland	48*	93
Hungary	46*	97	United Kingdom	114	150
Ireland	103	111	Total	1,958	2,738

Note: Sample sizes highlighted with an asterisk are smaller than 50.

Table C.3: Logistic multi-level analysis measuring the interaction between employment and motherhood status on political participation

Independent variables	Effect of Employment Status by Motherhood
Age	1.000 *(0.001)*
Degree level education *(Ref: less than degree level)*	**1.656***** *(0.070)*
Partner *(Ref: No partner)*	**1.097*** *(0.042)*
Strong political interest	**2.010***** *(0.080)*
Medium political interest *(Ref: Weak political interest)*	**4.092***** *(0.247)*
Socially active once a week *(Ref: Less than once a week)*	**1.274***** *(0.050)*
Gender role attitude *(more egalitarian)*	**1.067***** *(0.011)*
In work *(Ref: Not in paid work)*	**1.193***** *(0.058)*
Preschool children	1.039 *(0.094)*
School-aged children *(Ref: No children)*	**1.277**** *(0.106)*
Work*Preschool children	0.990 *(0.107)*
Work* School-aged children	1.005 *(0.101)*
Intercept	*0.063* *(0.010)*
ICC	0.102
Pseudo-R^2	0.093
Log-Likelihood	*-10340.732*
n / N (countries)	24796 / 25

Note. Logistic Multilevel Analysis estimating the effect of employment on political participation (0/1), maximum-likelihood estimation. Coefficients shown are odds-ratios, standard errors in parentheses.
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05, †=p<0.1.

Table C.4: Wording of housework question in the ESS (main) questionnaire

	Question stem	Answer categories
	Housework	
G76	I would now like to ask you about housework. By housework, I mean things done around the home such as cooking, washing, cleaning, care of clothes, shopping, maintenance of property, but not including childcare or leisure activities. About how many hours a week, in total, do you personally spend on housework?	(open question)

Source: Source Questionnaire of the European Social Survey: ESS (2010b).

Table C.5: Logistic model of the political participation of women without children, mothers of preschool children and mothers of school-aged children, 'control variables' only

Independent variables	Control variables only models		
	(1) No children	(2) Preschool children	(3) School-aged children
Age	0.998	1.010	0.996
	(0.001)	*(0.006)*	*(0.004)*
Degree level education	**1.811*** **	**1.354** **	**1.794*** **
(Ref: less than degree level)	*(0.094)*	*(0.140)*	*(0.176)*
Partner	**1.108***	1.212	1.191
(Ref: No partner)	*(0.049)*	*(0.159)*	*(0.113)*
Strong political interest	**1.971*** **	**2.125*** **	**2.159*** **
	(0.097)	*(0.221)*	*(0.191)*
Medium political interest	**4.044*** **	**4.230*** **	**4.004*** **
(Ref: Weak political interest)	*(0.285)*	*(0.779)*	*(0.625)*
Socially active once a week	**1.331*** **	1.186	1.122
(Ref: Less than once a week)	*(0.065)*	*(0.121)*	*(0.101)*
Gender role attitude	**1.070*** **	**1.106*** **	**1.062** **
(more egalitarian)	*(0.013)*	*(0.029)*	*(0.024)*
Intercept	*0.070*	*0.043*	*0.103*
	(0.011)	*(0.013)*	*(0.025)*
ICC	0.105	0.109	0.109
Pseudo-R^2	0.093	0.087	0.083
Log-Likelihood	*-6902.9234*	*-1499.5448*	*-1979.6685*
n / N (countries)	17,042 / 25	3,455 / 25	4,299 / 25

Note. Logistic Multilevel Analysis estimating the effect of employment on political participation (0/1), maximum-likelihood estimation. Coefficients shown are odds-ratios, standard errors in parentheses.
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05, †=p<0.1.

Table C.6: Logistic multi-level analysis measuring the interaction between working hours and motherhood status on political participation

Independent variables	Effect of working hours by motherhood
Age	**1.007**** *(0.002)*
Degree level education *(Ref: less than degree level)*	**1.367***** *(0.083)*
Partner *(Ref: No partner)*	1.011 *(0.056*
Strong political interest	**1.832***** *(0.101)*
Medium political interest *(Ref: Weak political interest)*	**3.401***** *(0.304)*
Socially active once a week *(Ref: Less than once a week)*	**1.244***** *(0.069)*
Gender role attitude *(more egalitarian)*	**1.053***** *(0.016)*
Working hours	**0.986***** *(0.003)*
Preschool children	1.084 *(0.082)*
School-aged children *(Ref: No children)*	**1.300***** *(0.079)*
Working hours *Preschool children	**1.014*** *(0.007)*
Working hours * School-aged children	1.004 *(0.005)*
Supervisory responsibility	**1.371***** *(0.080)*
Occupational status	**1.076***** *(0.011)*
Job autonomy	**1.008***** *(0.002)*
Intercept	*0.031 (0.006)*
ICC	0.082
Pseudo-R^2	0.091
Log-Likelihood	*-5149.9804*
n / N (countries)	11,010 / 25

Note. Logistic Multilevel Analysis estimating the effect of working hours on political participation (0/1), maximum-likelihood estimation. Coefficients shown are odds-ratios, standard errors in parentheses.
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05, †=p<0.1.

Table C.7: Logistic multi-level analysis measuring the cross-level interaction between quality of part-time work and working hours on political participation

Independent variables	Effect of working hours by part-time work quality
Age	**1.008**** *(0.003)*
Degree level education *(Ref: less than degree level)*	**1.449***** *(0.116)*
Partner *(Ref: No partner)*	1.029 *(0.070)*
Medium political interest	**1.707***** *(0.125)*
Strong political interest *(Ref: Weak political interest)*	**3.282***** *(0.365)*
Socially active once a week *(Ref: Less than once a week)*	**1.294***** *(0.095)*
Gender role attitude *(more egalitarian)*	**1.058**** *(0.021)*
Working hours	**0.983***** *(0.003)*
Quality of part-time work (*better*)	1.085 *(0.157)*
Working hours *Quality of part-time work	**1.009†** *(0.005)*
Supervisory responsibility	**1.423***** *(0.110)*
Occupational status	**1.067***** *(0.002)*
Job autonomy	**1.009***** *(0.014)*
GDP	**1.000*** *(0.000)*
Intercept	*0.018 (0.005)*
ICC	0.059
Pseudo-R^2	0.091
Log-Likelihood	*-2998.1783*
n / N (countries)	6,542 / 25

Note. Logistic Multilevel Analysis estimating the cross-level interaction between working hours and quality of part-time work on political participation (0/1), maximum-likelihood estimation. Coefficients shown are odds-ratios, standard errors in parentheses.

***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05, †=p<0.1.



Figure C.1: Estimated effects of supervisory responsibility on the log-odds for political participation for an 'average' women by country

D. APPENDIX D

Table D.1: Contextual variables on work-family policies

	Government spending on families	Government spending on cash benefits	Total paid leave available to mothers	Total leave * Benefits	Fulltime childcare provision (0-2-year olds)	Fulltime childcare provision (3 years to school-age)
	% of GDP	*Euro in PPP per head*	*in weeks*	*..*	*% of children*	*% of children*
COUNTRY	**2010**	**2010**	**2010**	**2010**	**2010**	**2010**
Belgium	2.2	524.0	28	38.6	19	63
Bulgaria	1.9	149.4	110	43.4	6	50
Croatia	1.5	208.6	56	30.8	10	34
Cyprus	1.9	428.7	18	20.3	16	45
Czech Republic	2.0	400.8	110	116.1	0	39
Denmark	4.1	475.5	50	62.6	68	75
Estonia	2.2	345.3	82	74.5	19	86
Finland	3.2	459.4	44	53.2	20	56
France	2.5	455.7	42	50.4	26	47
Germany	3.1	657.1	57	98.6	13	46
Greece	1.8	267.5	17	12.0	5	23
Hungary	2.9	382.2	104	104.6	8	65
Ireland	3.2	854.7	26	58.5	8	17
Israel	2.0[a]	158.2[a]	14	5.8	- [b]	70[c]
Lithuania	2.2	274.2	114	82.3	12	59
Netherlands	1.2	239.0	16	10.1	6	15
Norway	3.1	559.8	36	53.1	37	65
Poland	1.3	133.1	126	44.2	2	32
Portugal	1.3	185.1	30	14.6	32	68
Slovak Republic	1.7	307.9	164	132.9	3	64
Slovenia	2.1	330.7	52	45.3	33	77
Spain	1.5	151.6	16	6.4	18	48
Sweden	2.9	451.9	60	71.4	33	65
Switzerland	1.4	424.6	14	15.7	5	10
United Kingdom	3.2	672.6	39	69.1	4	22
SOURCES	Eurostat (2016b)	Eurostat (2016b)	See table A5.1 below	Own calculations	Eurostat (2016a)	Eurostat (2016a)

[a] Data source: OECD (2016a).

[b] No data available for Israel.

[c] Data for Israel is based on the OECD (2016b) the estimate for raw childcare participation rate of 87 percent. The UESCO (2006) report on childcare in Israel suggests that Jewish kindergartens have standardised 32 'study hours' a week, while Arab kindergartens have only 27 'study hours'. The overall participation rate has therefore weighted by the share of children in Jewish kindergartens (80%), which has been obtained by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (2011). The value has been rounded.

Table D.2:Data sources of paid leave data

Source:	Paid Maternity Leave			Paid Parental/ Total Leave				
	OECD (2016d; 2016b)			Moss (2011)	ILO Working Conditions Laws Database (2016)	Casto-García and Pazos-Moran (2016)	OECD (2016a; 2016d)	**This study**
	Days	*Weeks*		*Weeks (parental leave)*	*Weeks (parental leave or total leave)*	*Weeks (total leave)*	*Weeks (total leave)*	*Weeks (total leave)*
	2010	**2010**		**2011**	**various years**	**2010/2011**	**2010/ 2015**	**2010**
COUNTRY								
Belgium	105	15		13	13	28	28	28
Bulgaria	410	58.6		-	110	-	110	110
Croatia	210	30		26	-	-	56	56
Cyprus	126	18		-	0		18	18
Czech Republic	196	28		17-82-108-186	56-82-186	154	110	110 g
Denmark	126	18		32	32	50	50	50
Estonia	140	20		62	0	82-149	166	82 h
Finland	105	17.5	a	26.3	26.3	44	44	44 i
France	112	16		26	-	42	42	42 j
Germany	98	14		44	52	57	58	57 k
Greece	119	17	b	0	0	17	43	17 b
Hungary	168	24		80	80 or 132	103.2	160	104 l
Ireland	182	26		0	0	26	26	26
Israel	98	14		0	0	14	14	14
Lithuania	126	18		-	86	-	62	114 m
Netherlands	112	16		0-26	0	16-42	42	16 n
Norway	42	9	c	27	46	36	88	36 o
Poland	182	22	d	104	-	126	22	126 p
Portugal	45	6	e	24	10	30	30.1	30 q
Slovak Republic	238	34		-	148	-	164	164 r
Slovenia	105	15		37	37	52	52	52
Spain	112	16		0	0	20	16	16 s

Sweden	60	8.6 [f]	60	60	60	60	60
Switzerland	98	14	0	0	-	14	14
United Kingdom	273	39	0	0	39	39	39

[a] The law specifies 105 working days, which is interpreted as differently by different sources (depending on whether a 5 or 6-day working week is assumed).

b: 119 days are basic maternity leave, some women qualify for an additional 26 weeks totalling in 43 weeks (see: OECD 2016d, p.11).

c: Norway has no maternity leave, just parental leave. However, as of 2010, the mother is required to take 6 weeks after birth (and 12 weeks before birth are suggested) (Moss 2011).

d: 22 weeks in 2010, has been prolonged in 2012 to 26 weeks.

e: Portugal has only parental leave, which is divided into initial and additional maternity leave. There is one part reserved for the mother: compulsory 6 weeks after birth (Jurviste, Prpic and Sabbati (2014)) The remaining bit of 120 days of initial maternity leave have been added with the additional parental leave (13 weeks) available to the mother for total parental leave allowance available to the mother (see also: Moss (2011, pp.192-195)).

f: Different sources give 14 weeks of maternity leave; however, this appears to be unpaid. The 60 days refer to the 60 days of parental leave that are reserved for the mother.

g: There are three different lengths possible, here the best paid option (2 years, plus 6 weeks' maternity leave before birth) is assumed. See ILO 2016 [database] and Moss (2011).

h: The first 66 weeks of parental leave are fully paid, the remaining 77 weeks are paid with 40 Euro a month, and thus disregarded here (see: Castro-García and Pazos-Moran 2016, pp. 1-2 of Appendix).

i: Legislation in Lithuania has changed, however ILO (2016) [database] suggests that at 31/12/2010 there was still the old system in place, that allowed for two years of paid parental leave. According to the new system, parents could choose between a higher paid 1-year option and a lower-paid 2-year option.

j: Parental leave is about 26 weeks (after the maternity leave), however there is also 'home care leave' available up to the 3rd birthday (OECD 2016d, p.19).

k: 26 weeks of maternity leave per parent for a family with a single child, if there are more children the leave can be extended to three years for two or more children in the family (Castro-García and Pazos-Moran 2016, p.2 Appendix/ OECD 2016d, p. 19).

l: 10 month (43-44 weeks) paid parental leave available after maternity leave. Two additional month if father takes up at least two months of parental leave (OECD 2016d, p.19).

m: There are two types of childcare, one lasting to the 2nd and one to the 3rd birthday of the child (additional to 4 weeks of maternity leave before the birth). However, only the first one is substantively paid (see: Moss 2011, p. 132-133).

n: Maternity leave in the Netherlands is 26 times the usual weekly working time (so 26 weeks), however, it is not supposed to be taken full-time, so it is not accounted for here (see: Castro-García and Pazos-Moran 2016, p.3 of Appendix; Moss 2011).

o: The OECD measurement includes 'home care leave', which parents can take only, if the child does not use publicly financed childcare services (OECD 2016d, p.20).

p: At the point of time (1/1/2011) the Polish system was in the process of change (hence, the different entitlements in later sources) (see: Moss 2011, pp. 188-189). Payment after maternity leave is at a very low level (around 100 Euro per month).

q: This is only the well-paid 'initial parental leave'. There is an additional 3 months available for each parent, which is paid as 25% of the income (OECD 2016d, pp.20-21).

r: Until the child is three years old, plus 8 weeks of maternity leave to be taken before birth.

s: Two to four additional weeks of maternity leave can be taken for breast-feeding (Moss 2011). These are included in Casto-García and Pazos-Moran (2016) but have not been accounted for here.

Table D.3: Logistic multi-level analysis of the effect of childcare benefits on the political participation of women without dependent children

Independent variables	Women with adult children	Childless women
Individual Level		
Age	**0.988***** *(0.003)*	1.003 *(0.002)*
Degree level education *(Ref: less than degree level)*	**1.880***** *(0.158)*	**1.577***** *(0.132)*
Partner *(Ref: No partner)*	1.041 *(0.070)*	1.054 *(0.084)*
Strong political interest	**1.963***** *(0.142)*	**1.894***** *(0.156)*
Medium political interest *(Ref: Weak political interest)*	**3.698***** *(0.375)*	**4.744***** *(0.585)*
Socially active once a week *(Ref: Less than once a week)*	**1.332***** *(0.092)*	**1.422***** *(0.129)*
Gender role attitude *(more egalitarian)*	**1.075***** *(0.019)*	**1.056*** *(0.023)*
In work *(Ref: Not in paid work)*	1.047 *(0.086)*	1.040 *(0.084)*
Context Level		
Leave*Benefits	**1.009**** (0.003)	**1.005†** (0.003)
GDP	**1.000***** (0.000)	**1.000***** (0.000)
Intercept	0.036 (0.014)	0.024 (0.007)
ICC	0.050	0.048
Pseudo-R^2	0.187	0.136
Log-Likelihood	*-3184.732*	*-2419.1876*
n / N (countries)	8004 / 25	5637 /25

Note. Logistic Multilevel Analysis estimating the effect of work-family policies on political participation (0/1) of mothers with no dependent children at home, maximum-likelihood estimation. Coefficients shown are odds-ratios, standard errors in parentheses.

***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05, †=p<0.1.

Table D.4: Effects of childcare benefits (as odds-ratios) on the employment status of working-aged women with no dependent children

Independent variables	Women with adult children		Childless women	
Individual Level				
Age	**0.927*** ***(0.005)***	**0.927*** ***(0.005)***	**1.007** ***(0.003)***	**1.007** ***(0.003)***
Degree level education *(Ref: less than degree level)*	**2.368*** ***(0.231)***	**2.367*** ***(0.231)***	**2.942*** ***(0.227)***	**2.942*** ***(0.227)***
Partner not in paid work	**0.664*** ***(0.060)***	**0.664*** (0.060)	**0.444*** ***(0.059)***	**0.444*** (0.059)
Partner in paid work *(Ref: No partner)*	**1.996*** ***(0.169)***	1.998*** ***(0.169)***	**2.252*** ***(0.180)***	2.252*** ***(0.180)***
Gender role attitude *(more egalitarian)*	**1.124*** ***(0.021)***	**1.122*** ***(0.021)***	**1.098*** ***(0.020)***	**1.098*** ***(0.020)***
Context Level				
Parental leave	**1.001†** ***(0.000)***	**-**	1.000 ***(0.000)***	-
Leave*Benefits	-	**1.006*** ***(0.003)***	-	1.001 (0.002)
GDP	**1.000**** ***(0.000)***	**1.000*** ***(0.000)***	**1.000**** ***(0.000)***	**1.000*** ***(0.000)***
Intercept	10.600 (4.528)	15.983 (6.353)	0.281 (0.085)	0.259 (0.063)
ICC	0.042	0.050	0.035	0.033
Pseudo-R^2	0.246	0.240	0.161	0.162
Log-Likelihood	*-2406.4154*	*-2408.4936*	*-2772.8155*	*-2772.2573*
n / N (countries)	4116 / 25	4116 / 25	4627 / 25	4627 / 25

Note. Logistic Multilevel Analysis estimating the effect of work-family policies on employment status (0/1) of mothers with no dependent children at home, maximum-likelihood estimation. Coefficients shown are odds-ratios, standard errors in parentheses.

***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05, †=p<0.1.

Table D.5: Logistic Multilevel Analysis estimating the effect of work-family policies on employment status for women without children

	Women without children					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Individual Level						
Age	**0.987*** **	**0.987*** **	**0.987*** **	**0.987*** **	**0.987*** **	**0.987*** **
	(-0.002)	*(-0.002)*	*(-0.002)*	*(-0.002)*	*(-0.002)*	*(-0.002)*
Degree level education	**2.573*** **	**2.573*** **	**2.572*** **	**2.576*** **	**2.599*** **	**2.571*** **
(Ref: Less than degree level)	*(-0.137)*	*(-0.137)*	*(-0.137)*	*(-0.137)*	*(-0.143)*	*(-0.137)*
Partner not in paid work	**0.590*** **	**0.590*** **	**0.589*** **	**0.590*** **	**0.601*** **	**0.589*** **
	(-0.036)	*(-0.036)*	*(-0.036)*	*(-0.036)*	*(-0.037)*	*(-0.036)*
Partner in paid work	**2.195*** **	**2.195*** **	**2.195*** **	**2.196*** **	**2.267*** **	**2.195*** **
(Ref: No partner)	*(-0.104)*	*(-0.104)*	*(-0.104)*	*(-0.104)*	*(-0.11)*	*(-0.104)*
Gender role attitude	**1.111*** **	**1.111*** **	**1.111*** **	**1.111*** **	**1.116*** **	**1.111*** **
(more egalitarian)	*(-0.012)*	*(-0.012)*	*(-0.012)*	*(-0.012)*	*(-0.013)*	*(-0.012)*
Context Level						
Overall spending on families	0.990					
(as % of GDP)	*(-0.099)*					
Cash benefits *(more)*		1.002				
		(-0.045)				
Length of leave			**1.004***			
			(-0.002)			
Leave* Benefits				**1.004***		
				(-0.002)		
Fulltime childcare (0-2)					0.995	
(in %)					*(-0.005)*	
Fulltime childcare (3-CSA)						1.002
(in %)						*(-0.003)*
GDP per capita	**1.000***	**1.000***	**1.000*** **	**1.000*** **	**1.000** **	**1.000** **
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Intercept	*0.762*	*0.745*	*0.499*	*0.581*	*0.755*	*0.672*
	0.179	*0.138*	*0.118*	*0.111*	*0.125*	*0.164*
ICC	0.031	0.031	0.025	0.026	0.031	0.030
Pseudo-R^2	0.166	0.166	0.170	0.170	0.170	0.167
Log-likelihood	-7008.4950	-7008.4991	-7006.2414	-7006.3892	-6718.0486	-7008.3321
n / N (countries)	11514 / 25	11514 / 25	11514 / 25	11514 / 25	11076 / 24	11514 / 25

Note. Logistic Multilevel Analysis estimating the effect of work-family policies on employment status (0/1), maximum-likelihood estimation. Coefficients shown are odds-ratios, standard errors in parentheses.
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05, †=p<0.1.

Table D.6: Logistic Multilevel Analysis estimating the effect of work-family policies on employment status for women w preschool children

	Women with preschool children					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Individual Level						
Age	**1.025***	**1.025***	**1.025***	**1.025***	**1.025***	**1.025***
	(-0.005)	*(-0.005)*	*(-0.005)*	*(-0.005)*	*(-0.005)*	*(-0.005)*
Degree level education	**2.204***	**2.193***	**2.201***	**2.193***	**2.144***	**2.185***
(Ref: Less than degree level)	*(-0.196)*	*(-0.195)*	*(-0.196)*	*(-0.195)*	*(-0.199)*	*(-0.194)*
Partner not in paid work	**0.651****	**0.644****	**0.650****	**0.647****	**0.650****	**0.651****
	(-0.102)	*(-0.101)*	*(-0.102)*	*(-0.101)*	*(-0.106)*	*(-0.101)*
Partner in paid work	**1.399****	**1.387****	**1.400****	**1.396****	**1.450***	**1.406***
(Ref: No partner)	*(-0.144)*	*(-0.143)*	*(-0.144)*	*(-0.144)*	*(-0.152)*	*(-0.144)*
Gender role attitude	**1.163***	**1.164***	**1.162***	**1.163***	**1.176***	**1.161***
(more egalitarian)	*(-0.024)*	*(-0.024)*	*(-0.024)*	*(-0.024)*	*(-0.025)*	*(-0.024)*
Context Level						
Overall spending on families	0.901					
(as % of GDP)	*(-0.108)*					
Cash benefits *(more)*		**0.894***				
		(-0.042)				
Length of leave			0.997			
			(-0.002)			
Leave* Benefits				0.996		
				(-0.002)		
Fulltime childcare (0-2)					**1.018***	
(in %)					*(-0.005)*	
Fulltime childcare (3-CSA)						**1.008***
(in %)						*(-0.004)*
GDP per capita	**1.000****	**1.000***	**1.000****	**1.000****	**1.000****	**1.000***
	0.000	*0.000*	*0.000*	*0.000*	*0.000*	*0.000*
Intercept	0.154	0.163	0.165	0.167	0.107	0.081
	0.051	0.043	0.058	0.049	0.026	0.026
ICC	0.035	0.027	0.035	0.032	0.022	0.029
Pseudo-R^2	0.136	0.146	0.138	0.141	0.162	0.148
Log-likelihood	*-2074.4419*	*-2072.3172*	*-2074.2751*	*-2073.434*	*-1921.0872*	*-2072.4004*
n / N (countries)	3354 / 25	3354 / 25	3354 / 25	3354 / 25	3117 / 24	3354 / 24

Note. Logistic Multilevel Analysis estimating the effect of work-family policies on employment status (0/1), maximum-likelihood estimation. Coefficients shown are odds-ratios, standard errors in parentheses.
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05, †=p<0.1.

Table D.7: Logistic Multilevel Analysis estimating the effect of work-family policies on employment status for women with school children

	Women with school-aged children					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Individual Level						
Age	**0.987*** **	**0.987*** **	**0.987*** **	**0.987*** **	**0.987*** **	**0.987*** **
	(-0.002)	*(-0.002)*	*(-0.002)*	*(-0.002)*	*(-0.002)*	*(-0.002)*
Degree level education	**2.573*** **	**2.573*** **	**2.572*** **	**2.576*** **	**2.599*** **	**2.571*** **
(Ref: Less than degree level)	*(-0.137)*	*(-0.137)*	*(-0.137)*	*(-0.137)*	*(-0.143)*	*(-0.137)*
Partner not in paid work	**0.590*** **	**0.590*** **	**0.589*** **	**0.590*** **	**0.601*** **	**0.589*** **
	(-0.036)	*(-0.036)*	*(-0.036)*	*(-0.036)*	*(-0.037)*	*(-0.036)*
Partner in paid work	**2.195*** **	**2.195*** **	**2.195*** **	**2.196*** **	**2.267*** **	**2.195*** **
(Ref: No partner)	*(-0.104)*	*(-0.104)*	*(-0.104)*	*(-0.104)*	*(-0.11)*	*(-0.104)*
Gender role attitude	**1.111*** **	**1.111*** **	**1.111*** **	**1.111*** **	**1.116*** **	**1.111*** **
(more egalitarian)	*(-0.012)*	*(-0.012)*	*(-0.012)*	*(-0.012)*	*(-0.013)*	*(-0.012)*
Context Level						
Overall spending on families	0.990					
(as % of GDP)	*(-0.099)*					
Cash benefits *(more)*		1.002				
		(-0.045)				
Length of leave			**1.004***			
			(-0.002)			
Leave* Benefits				**1.004***		
				(-0.002)		
Fulltime childcare (0-2)					0.995	
(in %)					*(-0.005)*	
Fulltime childcare (3-CSA)						1.002
(in %)						*(-0.003)*
GDP per capita	**1.000***	**1.000***	**1.000*** **	**1.000*** **	**1.000** **	**1.000** **
	0.000	*0.000*	*0.000*	*0.000*	*0.000*	*0.000*
Intercept	*0.120*	*0.161*	*0.078*	*0.098*	*0.145*	*0.090*
	0.041	*0.045*	*0.026*	*0.027*	*0.038*	*0.030*
ICC	0.050	0.052	0.037	0.036	0.053	0.042
Pseudo-R^2	0.208	0.204	0.218	0.219	0.201	0.218
Log-likelihood	*-2177.9001*	*-2178.5069*	*-2174.946*	*-2174.5116*	*-2078.5886*	*-2176.0766*
n / N (countries)	3941 / 25	3941 / 25	3941 / 25	3941 /25	3755 / 24	3941 /25

Note. Logistic Multilevel Analysis estimating the effect of work-family policies on employment status (0/1), maximum-likelihood estimation. Coefficients shown are odds-ratios, standard errors in parentheses.
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05, †=p<0.1.

Table D.8: Linear Multilevel Analysis estimating the effect of work-family policies on normal working hours for women without children

	Women without children					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Individual Level						
Age	0.012 *(-0.011)*	0.012 *(-0.011)*	0.011 *(-0.011)*	0.012 *(-0.011)*	0.008 *(-0.011)*	0.012 *(-0.011)*
Degree level education *(Ref: Less than degree level)*	**0.811**** *(-0.288)*	**0.807**** *(-0.288)*	**0.817**** *(-0.288)*	**0.820**** *(-0.288)*	**0.766**** *(-0.293)*	**0.811**** *(-0.288)*
Partner not in paid work	**-1.294**** *(-0.455)*	**-1.297**** *(-0.455)*	**-1.294**** *(-0.455)*	**-1.290**** *(-0.455)*	**-1.425**** *(-0.458)*	**-1.295**** *(-0.455)*
Partner in paid work *(Ref: No partner)*	-0.22 *(-0.279)*	-0.221 *(-0.279)*	-0.233 *(-0.279)*	-0.224 *(-0.279)*	-0.295 *(-0.282)*	-0.22 *(-0.279)*
Gender role attitude *(more egalitarian)*	**0.321***** *(-0.073)*	**0.320***** *(-0.073)*	**0.315***** *(-0.073)*	**0.319***** *(-0.073)*	**0.333***** *(-0.075)*	**0.320***** *(-0.073)*
Context Level						
Overall spending on families *(as % of GDP)*	-0.33 *(-0.666)*					
Cash benefits *(more)*		-0.181 *(-0.29)*				
Length of leave			**0.029*** *(-0.012)*			
Leave* Benefits				0.015 *(-0.013)*		
Fulltime childcare (0-2) *(in %)*					0.003 *(-0.034)*	
Fulltime childcare (3-CSA) *(in %)*						0.000 *(-0.022)*
Normal full-time work hours	0.121 *-0.238*	0.133 *-0.228*	0.26 *-0.206*	0.217 *-0.224*	0.359 *-0.271*	0.162 *-0.233*
GDP per capita	**-0.000***** *0.000*	**-0.000***** *0.000*	**-0.000***** *0.000*	**-0.000***** *0.000*	**-0.000***** *0.000*	**-0.000***** *0.000*
Intercept	33.251**	32.565***	24.047**	27.713**	23.126*	30.949**
	-10.42	-9.688	-8.949	-9.575	-11.374	-10.145
ICC	0.038	0.038	0.031	0.037	0.037	0.039
Pseudo R^2 (level 1/ level2)	0.057 / 0.561	0.058 / 0.564	0.065 / 0.644	0.059 / 0.581	0.063 / 0.595	0.057 / 0.557
Log-likelihood	-24048.337	-24048.268	-24045.759	-24047.746	-23113.883	-24048.46
n / N (countries)	6413 / 25	6413 / 25	6413 / 25	6413 / 25	6176 / 24	6413 / 25

Note. Linear Multilevel Analysis estimating the effect of work-family policies on normal working hours, maximum-likelihood estimation. Unstandardized regression coefficients shown, standard errors in parentheses. ***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05, †=p<0.1.

Table D.9: Linear Multilevel Analysis estimating the effect of work-family policies on normal working hours for women w preschool children

	Women with preschool children					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Individual Level						
Age	0.048 *(-0.034)*	0.047 *(-0.034)*	0.048 *(-0.034)*	0.048 *(-0.034)*	0.041 *(-0.035)*	0.047 *(-0.034)*
Degree level education *(Ref: Less than degree level)*	0.918 *(-0.486)*	0.902 *(-0.486)*	0.919 *(-0.486)*	0.916 *(-0.486)*	**1.027*** *(-0.499)*	0.906 *(-0.485)*
Partner not in paid work	0.236 *(-1.117)*	0.226 *(-1.117)*	0.262 *(-1.117)*	0.238 *(-1.117)*	0.428 *(-1.151)*	0.255 *(-1.117)*
Partner in paid work *(Ref: No partner)*	0.014 *(-0.667)*	0.01 *(-0.667)*	0.032 *(-0.667)*	0.015 *(-0.667)*	0.025 *(-0.669)*	0.023 *(-0.667)*
Gender role attitude *(more egalitarian)*	**0.738***** *(-0.127)*	**0.737***** *(-0.127)*	**0.735***** *(-0.127)*	**0.735***** *(-0.127)*	**0.683***** *(-0.133)*	**0.732***** *(-0.127)*
Context Level						
Overall spending on families *(as % of GDP)*	-0.913 *(-1.087)*					
Cash benefits *(more)*		-0.689 *(-0.457)*				
Length of leave			0.023 *(-0.021)*			
Leave* Benefits				-0.001 *(-0.022)*		
Fulltime childcare (0-2) *(in %)*					**0.116*** *(-0.051)*	
Fulltime childcare (3-CSA) *(in %)*						0.05 *(-0.034)*
Normal full-time work hours	-0.002 *-0.38*	-0.006 *-0.355*	0.184 *-0.364*	0.102 *-0.373*	0.757 *-0.4*	0.234 *-0.361*
GDP per capita	**-0.000***** *0.000*	**-0.000***** *0.000*	**-0.000**** *0.000*	**-0.000***** *0.000*	**-0.000***** *0.000*	**-0.000***** *0.000*
Intercept	35.813* -16.712	35.834* -15.193	24.245 -15.898	29.963 -16.072	2.652 -16.839	21.627 -15.785
ICC	0.103	0.097	0.101	0.106	0.085	0.097
Pseudo R^2 (level 1/ level2)	0.103 / 0.447	0.110 / 0.481	0.105 / 0.457	0.100 / 0.430	0.129 / 0.562	0.109 / 0.476
Log-likelihood	-6951.7891	-6951.0585	-6951.584	-6952.1355	-6367.2081	-6951.111
n / N (countries)	1875 / 25	1875 / 25	1875 /25	1875 /25	1726 / 24	1875 /25

Note. Linear Multilevel Analysis estimating the effect of work-family policies on normal working hours, maximum-likelihood estimation. Unstandardized regression coefficients shown, standard errors in parentheses. ***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05, †=p<0.1.

Table D.10: Linear Multilevel Analysis estimating the effect of work-family policies on normal working hours for women with school children

	Women with school-aged children					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Individual Level						
Age	**0.129*** **	**0.129*** **	**0.129*** **	**0.129*** **	**0.156*** **	**0.129*** **
	(-0.027)	*(-0.027)*	*(-0.027)*	*(-0.027)*	*(-0.028)*	*(-0.027)*
Degree level education *(Ref: Less than degree level)*	-0.23	-0.236	-0.233	-0.23	-0.09	-0.257
	(-0.463)	*(-0.463)*	*(-0.463)*	*(-0.463)*	*(-0.473)*	*(-0.463)*
Partner not in paid work	0.893	0.889	0.894	0.894	0.628	0.905
	(-0.915)	*(-0.915)*	*(-0.915)*	*(-0.915)*	*(-0.914)*	*(-0.915)*
Partner in paid work *(Ref: No partner)*	-0.695	-0.698	-0.692	-0.694	-0.919	-0.702
	(-0.474)	*(-0.474)*	*(-0.474)*	*(-0.474)*	*(-0.481)*	*(-0.474)*
Gender role attitude *(more egalitarian)*	**0.425*** **	**0.427*** **	**0.424*** **	**0.425*** **	**0.468*** **	**0.421*** **
	(-0.111)	*(-0.111)*	*(-0.111)*	*(-0.111)*	*(-0.114)*	*(-0.111)*
Context Level						
Overall spending on families *(as % of GDP)*	-0.075					
	(-1.283)					
Cash benefits *(more)*		**-1.075***				
		(-0.519)				
Length of leave			0.029			
			(-0.025)			
Leave* Benefits				0.003		
				(-0.025)		
Fulltime childcare (0-2) *(in %)*					**0.159** **	
					(-0.06)	
Fulltime childcare (3-CSA) *(in %)*						**0.103** **
						(-0.037)
Normal full-time work hours	0.169	0.011	0.278	0.19	0.773	0.458
	-0.452	*-0.401*	*-0.422*	*-0.435*	*-0.472*	*-0.385*
GDP per capita	**-0.000*** **	**-0.000** **	**-0.000** **	**-0.000*** **	**-0.000*** **	**-0.000*** **
	0.000	*0.000*	*0.000*	*0.000*	*0.000*	*0.000*
Intercept	26.708	35.422*	19.206	25.53	-0.493	8.83
	-19.834	-17.103	-18.361	-18.651	-19.804	-16.813
ICC	0.136	0.117	0.129	0.136	0.112	0.105
Pseudo-R^2 (level 1 / level 2)	0.010 / 0.400	0.119 / 0.488	0.107 / 0.433	0.100 / 0.400	0.139 / 0.537	0.131 / 0.543
log-likelihood	-9699.4635	-9697.4902	-9698.7948	-9699.4575	-9254.1751	-9696.0818
n / N (countries)	2588 / 25	2588 / 25	2588 / 25	2588 / 25	2475 / 24	2588 / 25

Note. Linear Multilevel Analysis estimating the effect of work-family policies on normal working hours, maximum-likelihood estimation. Unstandardized regression coefficients shown, standard errors in parentheses. ***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05, †=p<0.1.

E. APPENDIX E

Table E.1: Contextual variables on gendered structures in the labour market

INDICATORS:	Segregat. of Occupation	Segregat. of Industries	Female managers	Gender gap in supervisory responsib,	Overall (monthly) earnings gap	Hourly earnings gap
	in %	*in %*	*in %*	*in %*	*in %*	*in %*
COUNTRY	**2010**	**2010**	**2010**	**2010**	**2010**	**2010**
Belgium	47.3	33.7	34.8	12.3	35.9	10.2
Bulgaria	51.4	29.2	38.6	15.3	23.5	13.0
Croatia	44.3	31.4	27.4	28.8	23.0	5.7
Cyprus	55.1	32.9	14.3	38.4	33.7	16.8
Czech Republic	59.7	34.4	27.8	35.1	41.0	21.6
Denmark	34.6	32.5	19.5	12.1	25.5	15.9
Estonia	62.2	36.0	38.4	16.2	32.2	27.7
Finland	58.3	39.4	34.3	31.1	27.0	20.3
France	49.3	32.3	38.5	10.7	31.1[c]	15.6
Germany	49.6	32.5	28.3	18.2	45.4	22.3
Greece	39.4	26.7	26.9	22.2	45.2	15.0
Hungary	52.6	31.9	40.0	25.9	32.7	17.6
Ireland	48.5	36.1	40.8	- 12.4	34.7	13.9
Israel	43.6	- [a]	33.5	5.3	- [a]	- [a]
Lithuania	57.9	31.2	42.0	36.5	12.3	14.6
Netherlands	49.0	35.2	27.1	19.5	49.1	17.8
Norway	45.7	37.1	35.0	14.1	34.4	16.1
Poland	47.7	33.5	37.5	17.5	29.6	4.5
Portugal	52.3	32.7	35.7	15.3	27.8	12.8
Slovak Republic	62.6	38.9	35.5	8.6	37.5	19.6
Slovenia	44.7	30.1	43.3	11.9	12.8	0.9
Spain	49.8	34.5	27.1	26.4	38.0	16.2
Sweden	50.6	34.8	31.3	32.0	30.2	15.4
Switzerland	47.7	31.4	30.9[b]	24.2	45.7	17.8
United Kingdom	49.8	33.1	36.0	5.2	47.6	19.5
SOURCES	own calculations based on ILOSTAT (2017a)	own calculations based on Eurostat (2017a)	ILOSTAT (2017b)	own calculations based on ESS (2010)	Eurostat (2017b)	Eurostat (2017c)

[a] No data available for Israel;
[b] Reference year: 2011;
[c] Reference year: 2014.

Table E.2: Female share of employment and cut-off points for 'female dominated' occupations

	Female share of total employment	Cut-off point 'female-dominated' occupations	Cut-off point 'male-dominated' occupations
	(in %)	*(% women)*	*(% women)*
COUNTRY	**2010**	**2010**	**2010**
Belgium	45.4	60.4	30.4
Bulgaria	46.1	61.1	31.1
Croatia	45.9	60.9	30.9
Cyprus	43.5	58.5	28.5
Czech Republic	43.3	58.3	28.3
Denmark	47.1	62.1	32.1
Estonia	49.7	64.7	34.7
Finland	47.8	62.8	32.8
France	46.9	61.9	31.9
Germany	45.6	60.6	30.6
Greece	41.9	56.9	26.9
Hungary	46.0	61.0	31.0
Ireland	44.1	59.1	29.1
Israel	47.1	62.1	32.1
Lithuania	50.6	65.6	35.6
Netherlands	45.8	60.8	30.8
Norway	47.0	62.0	32.0
Poland	45.0	60.0	30.0
Portugal	48.0	63.0	33.0
Slovak Republic	44.8	59.8	29.8
Slovenia	45.5	60.5	30.5
Spain	44.2	59.2	29.2
Sweden	46.9	61.9	31.9
Switzerland	45.8	60.8	30.8
United Kingdom	46.0	61.0	31.0
SOURCES	World Bank (2017)	Calculated as female share of total employment + 15%	Calculated as female share of total employment - 15%

Table E.3: Logistic multi-level analysis of the effect of horizontal segregation on women's (individual) political participation not controlling for GDP

	Horizontal segregation		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Individual Level			
Age	0.998 *(0.001)*	0.999 *(0.001)*	0.998 *(0.001)*
High level education *(Ref: Medium or low education)*	**1.637***** *(0.069)*	**1.634***** *(0.070)*	**1.634***** *(0.070)*
Partner *(Ref: No partner)*	**1.109**** *(0.041)*	**1.113**** *(0.041)*	**1.112**** *(0.041)*
Strong political interest	**4.076***** *(0.245)*	**4.099***** *(0.252)*	**4.093***** *(0.251)*
Medium political interest *(Ref: Weak political interest)*	**2.004**** *(0.079)*	**2.015***** *(0.081)*	**2.013***** *(0.081)*
Socially active >once a week *(Ref: Less than once a week)*	**1.267***** *(0.050)*	**1.259***** *(0.050)*	**1.257***** *(0.050)*
Gender role attitude *(more egalitarian)*	**1.066***** *(0.011)*	**1.068***** *(0.011)*	**1.067***** *(0.011)*
In paid work *(Ref: Not in paid work)*	**1.214***** *(0.048)*	**1.215***** *(0.049)*	**1.215***** *(0.049)*
Context Level			
Occupational segregation *(higher)*	1.016 *(0.019)*	-	**0.973†** *(0.015)*
Industry segregation *(higher)*	-	**1.143***** *(0.038)*	**1.180***** *(0.043)*
GDP per capita	-	-	-
Intercept	*0.032**** *(0.030)*	*0.001**** *(0.001)*	*0.001**** *(0.001)*
ICC	0.099	0.058	0.052
Pseudo-R^2	0.091	0.142	0.153
Log likelihood	-10366.1	-10051.2	-10049.8
n / N (countries)	24,860 / 25	23,767 / 24	23,767 / 24

Note. Logistic Multilevel Analysis estimating the effect of horizontal segregation on *political participation* (0/1), not controlling for GDP, maximum likelihood estimation. Coefficients shown are odds-ratios, standard errors in parentheses.
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05, †=p<0.1.

Table E.4: Logistic multi-level analysis of the effect of women's labour market concentration on women's (individual) political participation

	Labour market concentration		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Individual Level			
Age	0.998	0.999	0.999
	(0.001)	*(0.001)*	*(0.001)*
High education	**1.637*** **	**1.634*** **	**1.634*** **
(Ref: Medium or low education)	*(0.069)*	*(0.070)*	*(0.070)*
Partner	**1.108** **	**1.112** **	**1.112** **
(Ref: No partner)	*(0.041)*	*(0.041)*	(0.041)
Strong political interest	**4.064** **	**4.076*** **	**4.076*** **
	(0.245)	*(0.250)*	*(0.250)*
Medium political interest	**2.000*** **	**2.008*** **	**2.008*** **
(Ref: Weak political interest)	*(0.079)*	*(0.081)*	*(0.081)*
Socially active >once a week	**1.261*** **	**1.255*** **	**1.255*** **
(Ref: Less than once a week)	*(0.049)*	*(0.050)*	*(0.050)*
Gender role attitude	**1.065*** **	**1.067*** **	**1.067*** **
(more egalitarian)	*(0.011)*	*(0.011)*	*(0.011)*
In paid work	**1.212*** **	**1.212*** **	**1.212*** **
(Ref: Not in paid work)	*(0.048)*	*(0.049)*	*(0.049)*
Context Level			
Occupational concentration	**1.015†**	-	1.001
(higher)	*(0.008)*		*(0.009)*
Industry concentration	**-**	**1.021***	**1.020†**
(higher)		*(0.009)*	*(0.011)*
GDP per capita	**1.000*** **	**1.000***	**1.000***
	(0.000)	*(0.000)*	*(0.000)*
Intercept	0.013***	0.020***	**0.019*** **
	(0.008)	*(0.007)*	*(0.011)*
ICC	0.057	0.048	0.048
Pseudo-R^2	0.151	0.159	0.159
Log likelihood	-10359.1	-10049.0	-10049.0
n	24,860	23,767	23,767

Note. Logistic Multilevel Analysis estimating the effect of horizontal segregation on *political participation* (0/1), maximum likelihood estimation. Coefficients shown are odds-ratios, standard errors in parentheses.

***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05, t=p<0.1.

Table E.5: Logistic multi-level analysis of the effect of industry segregation and individual work in a female-typed industry on women's (individual) political participation

	Industry segregation
	(1)
Individual Level	
Age	0.998
	(0.001)
High level education	**1.594*** **
(Ref: Medium or low education)	*(0.071)*
Partner	**1.089***
(Ref: No partner)	*(0.043)*
Strong political interest	**1.914*** **
	(0.080)
Medium political interest	**3.944*** **
(Ref: Weak political interest)	*(0.252)*
Socially active >once a week	**1.275*** **
(Ref: Less than once a week)	*(0.053)*
Gender role attitude	**1.143****
(more egalitarian)	*(0.050)*
In paid work	**1.062*** **
(Ref: Not in paid work)	*(0.011)*
In 'female-typical' industry	**1.222*** **
(Ref: In mixed or male industry)	*(0.049)*
Context Level	
Industry segregation	**1.099*** **
(higher)	*(0.030)*
GDP per capita	**1.000*** **
	(0.000)
Intercept	*0.002*
	(0.002)
ICC	0.037
Pseudo-R^2	0.160
Log likelihood	-9044.2122
n / N (countries)[a]	20498 / 24

Note. Logistic Multilevel Analysis estimating the effect of industry segregation on *political participation* (0/1), maximum likelihood estimation. Coefficients shown are odds-ratios, standard errors in parentheses.

***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05, †=p<0.1.

[a] Those never in paid employment have a missing value on the individual-level industry variable and have therefore been excluded from the analyses.

Table E.6: Logistic multi-level analysis of the effect of vertical segregation on women's (individual) political participation not controlling for GDP

	Vertical Segregation		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Individual Level			
Age	0.998	0.998	0.998
	(0.001)	*(0.001)*	*(0.001)*
High level education	**1.637*** **	**1.637*** **	**1.637*** **
(Ref: Medium / low educ.)	*(0.069)*	*(0.069)*	*(0.069)*
Partner	**1.108** **	**1.109** **	**1.109** **
(Ref: No partner)	*(0.041)*	*(0.041)*	*(0.041)*
Strong political interest	**4.072*** **	**4.076*** **	**4.074*** **
	(0.245)	*(0.246)*	*(0.246)*
Medium political interest	**2.004*** **	**2.004*** **	**2.005*** **
(Ref: Low interest)	*(0.079)*	*(0.079)*	*(0.079)*
Socially active once a week	**1.265*** **	**1.267*** **	**1.267*** **
(Ref: Less than once a week)	*(0.050)*	*(0.050)*	*(0.050)*
Gender role attitude	**1.066*** **	**1.066*** **	**1.066*** **
(more egalitarian)	*(0.011)*	*(0.011)*	*(0.011)*
In paid work	**1.214*** **	**1.214*** **	**1.214*** **
(Ref: Not in paid work)	*(0.048)*	*(0.048)*	*(0.048)*
Context Level			
Female managers (in %)	*0.973*	-	0.988
	(0.019)		*(0.018)*
Supervisor gap	**-**	0.988	0.993
		(0.010)	*(0.011)*
GDP per capita	-	**-**	**-**
Intercept	0.172**	0.056	0.131
	(0.102)	*(0.014)*	*(0.098)*
ICC	0.094	0.097	0.092
Pseudo-R^2	0.100	0.092	0.099
Log-likelihood	-10365.33	-10365.86	-10365.16
n / N (countries)	24,860 / 25	24,860 / 25	24,860 / 25

Note. Logistic Multilevel Analysis estimating the effect of vertical segregation on political participation (0/1), not controlling for GDP, maximum-likelihood estimation. Coefficients shown are odds-ratios, standard errors in parentheses.
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05, t=p<0.1.

Table E.7: Logistic multi-level analysis of the effect of economic inequalities on women's (individual) political participation not controlling for GDP

	Economic Inequalities	
	(1)	(2)
Individual Level		
Age	0.999 *(0.001)*	0.999 *(0.001)*
High level of education *(Ref: Medium or low education)*	**1.635***** *(0.070)*	**1.634***** *(0.070)*
Partner *(Ref: No partner)*	**1.113**** *(0.041)*	**1.114**** *(0.041)*
Strong political interest	**4.085***** *(0.251)*	**4.089***** *(0.251)*
Medium political interest *(Ref: Low interest)*	**2.013***** *(0.080)*	**2.014***** *(0.081)*
Socially active once a week *(Ref: Less than once a week)*	**1.260***** *(0.050)*	**1.261***** *(0.050)*
Gender role attitude *(more egalitarian)*	**1.068***** *(0.011)*	**1.069***** *(0.011)*
In paid work *(Ref: not in paid work)*	**1.214***** *(0.049)*	**1.214***** *(0.049)*
Context Level		
Hourly earnings gap (in %)	**-**	**1.060***** *(0.019)*
Overall earnings gap (in %)	**1.024*** *(0.012)*	**-**
GDP per capita	-	**-**
Intercept	0.032*** *(0.013)*	0.029*** *(0.009)*
ICC	0.083	0.068
Pseudo-R^2	0.107	0.120
Log-likelihood	-10055.5	-10053.2
n / N (countries)	23,767 / 24	23,767 / 24

Note. Logistic Multilevel Analysis estimating the effect of economic inequality on political participation (0/1), not controlling for GDP, maximum-likelihood estimation. Coefficients shown are odds-ratios, standard errors in parentheses.
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05, t=p<0.1.

Table E.8: Logistic multi-level analysis of the effect of gendered structures in the labour market on women's (individual) political participation not controlling for GDP

	Integrated Model
	(1)
Individual Level	
Age	0.998
	(0.001)
High education	**1.634*** **
(Ref: Medium or low education)	*(0.070)*
Partner	**1.113** **
(Ref: No partner)	*(0.041)*
Strong interest	**4.092*** **
	(0.251)
Medium interest	**2.009*** **
(Ref: Low interest)	*(0.081)*
Socially active	**1.254*** **
(Ref: Less than once a week)	*(0.050)*
Gender role attitude	**1.067*** **
	(0.011)
In paid work	**1.213*** **
(Ref: not in paid work)	*(0.049)*
Context Level	
Occupational segregation	**0.926*** **
(higher)	*(0.013)*
Occupational concentration	-
(higher)	
Industry segregation	**1.203*** **
(higher)	*(0.029)*
Female managers (in %)	1.018
	(0.011)
Supervisory gap	**0.973*** **
	(0.006)
Hourly earnings gap (in %)	**1.065*** **
	(0.013)
GDP per capita	-
Intercept	0.001***
	(0.001)
ICC	0.017
Pseudo-R^2	0.182
Log-likelihood	-10037.0
n / N (countries)	23,767 / 24

Note. Logistic Multilevel Analysis estimating the effect of gendered structures in the labour market on political participation (0/1), not controlling for GDP, maximum-likelihood estimation. Coefficients shown are odds-ratios, standard errors in parentheses.
***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01 *=p<0.05, t=p<0.1.

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