In the book *The Technoscientific Witness of Rape: Contentious Histories of Law, Feminism, and Forensic Science*, Andrea Quinlan provides a powerful examination of the history of the Sexual Assault Evidence Kit (SAEK) in Toronto. She does so in a well-written piece of work that can be seen as the first major scholarship to assess the contradictions in the development of a rape kit as *technology*. The SAEK first provided antirape activists in the 1970s, who were lobbying on behalf of rape victims, with the necessary tools to underpin the narratives of those who had suffered from sexual abuse as “objective” and legitimate ones (i.e., the kit would thus appear as the very “witness to sexual assault”). This occurred within a context where the accounts of women who had been victims of rape were frequently dismissed and deemed unreliable. Quinlan makes here a contribution to feminist technoscience studies in her examination of the rape kit and the evidence granted by forensic medical examinations, as well as to state responses to sexual violence and the treatment of victims in the hands of the criminal justice system, within the particularities of the Canadian context.

By investigating the kit’s past with the aim of building better responses for victims in and outside of the criminal justice system, Quinlan signals that if the SAEK could have been truly transformative, then it still can be. Her work also invites us to rethink the act of rape, and society’s responses to it, in a time of neoliberalism, austerity and the state’s retreat in most modern democracies from its role in providing citizen rights and guaranteeing welfare policies to women. We can read Quinlan’s research within a broader international context, which sees various countries, from Brazil to India, experiencing a rise in conservative reactions against legislations and rights obtained by women and other minority groups in the last decades. This can include the hardening of policies to convict sexual assault perpetuators in Brazil to the “rape crisis” scenario of India, where the sexual abuse act ranks in fourth place as the most common crime in the nation.

Quinlan’s work can be situated within the literature on the historical predominance of male spaces within science, technologies, engineering, and mathematics, which has been deconstructed by a range of feminist theorists as being systems of knowledge that throughout history reinforced white male privilege and power, marginalizing the experiences of less privileged groups. Here we can point to works such as Donna Haraway’s classic “A Cyborg Manifesto” ([*Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature*](https://www.routledge.com/Simians-Cyborgs-and-Women-The-Reinvention-of-Nature-Haraway-1991), 1991), Sandra Harding’s outline of a feminist approach to science that goes against the tradition of explaining the world through the perspectives of dominant groups ([*Whose Science? Whose Knowledge: American Journal of Sociology*](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/286848)).
Thinking from Women's Lives [Cornell University, 1991] and Sciences from Below: Feminism, Postcolonialities and Modernities [Duke University Press, 2008], and Evelyn Fox Keller’s quest for a gender-free science and questions of why the traditional association of objectivity/reason with the male and emotion/subjectivity with the female body (Reflections on Gender and Science [Yale University, 1985]). Technological culture has thus been denounced by feminists as being exclusive of the feminine, and, much like the disciplines of law and medicine, these have carried within them a cultural understanding of being “neutral,” and thus “superior,” and capable of producing reliable truths. According to these feminist accounts, this goes against the reality of decades of exclusion imposed on racialized minorities and other women’s groups from these institutions.

In the last decades, however, the literature within social science on digital feminist activism and use of information, communications, and technologies for gender empowerment has seen in new technologies sites of contention—spaces that offer possibilities for the articulation of new discourses on gender identity and tools, ones which can assist in the struggle against misogyny and patriarchy while also being sites where gender inequality and the structures of oppression can be reaffirmed. Studies on cyberfeminism, or on feminist technoscience studies, from different disciplinary traditions, ranging from Sadie Plant’s positive association of technology to the female and the very act of weaving (“The Future Looms: Weaving Women and Cybernetics,” Body and Society 3–4 [1995]: 45–64) to Wendy Harcourt’s investigation, from a gender and development perspective, of women’s online activities throughout the world, particularly from the “Third World” (Women@Internet: Creating New Cultures in Cyberspace [Zed Books, 1999]), are some of these examples. These seek to reclaim the role of women on the web, probing into how new technologies can better serve them in their struggles while at the same time undermining notions of such tools as being inherently masculine (or “objective”).

Quinlan manages to thus situate the kit within all its contradictions: for some antirape activists, its very emergence was a sign of institutional reform; for others, it continued to operate within a patriarchal system which failed rape victims and which reflected the tensions between the masculinity of disciplines such as medicine, science, and law. The author conducted 62 interviews with retired and employed sexual assault nurses, police investigators, lawyers, and forensic scientists, among others, in 26 urban communities across the province of Ontario. Quinlan makes use of Donna Haraway’s notion of diffraction of technoscience and the possibility that this can work toward more possible ethical alternatives (How Like a Leaf: An Interview with Thyrsa Nichols Goodeve [Routledge, 2000]), as well as the concept of the “modest scientific witness” Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium.FemaleManMeets_Oncomouse [Routledge, 1997]). The book nonetheless is heavily situated within the Canadian context, making little inroads with other histories of feminist lobbying for state responses to sexual abuse. Nevertheless, if there has been growth in the debate on the uses of
new technologies for political mobilization for social and feminist movements, there has not been enough on the development of rape kits as technology, and the best way for feminist groups to appropriate these kits in their fight against rape, particularly at a time of increasing relativism around this very act as being a “criminal offense,” and a violation of women’s rights. It is precisely here where the strength of Quinlan’s work lies.


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In his 1998 Academy Award acceptance speech, Roberto Benigni thanked his parents for giving him “the biggest gift: poverty.” The 50, well-to-do, New Yorker interviewees featured in Uneasy Street would likely have nodded in agreement. Though many of them were born into economic comfort, their reflections about their finances reverberate with a sentiment that sees nobility in deprivation and corruption in undeserved wealth. As members of the top 1%, however, that moral reasoning puts them in a difficult cognitive dissonance. Rachel Sherman’s insightful and elegantly written book, Uneasy Street: The Anxieties of Affluence, is a journey through the narratives these affluent Americans conjure in reconciling their privileged economic position with their moral worldviews.

Some solve this contradiction by denying their advantage. These “upwardly oriented” individuals, as Sherman calls them, consider themselves members of the middle class through comparison to those who are equally or more affluent. But the “downwardly oriented,” those who acknowledge their advantaged position, invoke a more elaborate set of narratives to construe themselves as worthy occupants of privilege.

First, these interviewees describe their wealth as a product of hard work. This justification is challenging for those who inherited their fortunes, however. While acknowledging their luck and recognizing that not all of their wealth was independently earned, inheritors often go to great pains to distinguish themselves from the undeserving, “lazy” rich by portraying their lifestyles as productive. Second, Sherman’s interviewees depict their consumption choices as prudent, frugal, and reasonable. They do not consume conspicuously in order to display their affluence to others; rather, their choice not to publicize their economic means is what makes them morally worthy of having them.

Sociological theory often assumes that, as the greatest beneficiaries of economic inequality, those at the top of the wealth ladder espouse ideologies that naturalize economic disparity and see fortune as an unequivocal sign of worthiness that one should boast about. No one embodies such a disposition more than the current U.S. president. But Sherman’s interviewees