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The Role of Internal Third-Party Interveners in Civil Resistance Campaigns: The Case of Israeli–Jewish Anti-Occupation Activists

Introduction

A growing body of research on civil resistance – also referred to as nonviolent struggle (Sharp, 2005) – has analysed the role of 'external third-party interveners', foreign activists, organizations and transnational advocacy networks who intervene in and support a local resistance campaign. They have been shown to help campaigns in their goals (Dudouet, 2006, 2015; Dudouet and Clark, 2009; Hunter and Lakey, 2003; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Mahony and Eguren, 1997; Moser-Puangsuwan and Weber, 2000; Pallister-Wilkins, 2009; Rigby, 1995; Schirch, 2006; Seitz, 2003). They are particularly useful in cases where the resisters do not have leverage to challenge the opponent (Coy, 2012; Rigby, 1995). [1] Others argue that they hinder resistance efforts because of asymmetrical power dynamics, colonial attitudes and 'saviour' complexes (Mahrouse, 2014; Meyer, 2019). What this debate suggests is that studies should look not only at *how* civil resistance can challenge an opponent, but also *who* is engaged in civil resistance campaigns.

While external third-party interveners have been documented and analysed, less attention has been given to 'internal third-party interveners.' This refers to activists and organizations that are internal to the conflictual situation, as members of the population that are either directly or indirectly complicit in upholding and perpetuating a system of oppression. They are part of the dominant population, which confers to them power, rights and privileges not available to the local resisters. At the same time, they are dissenting from the dominant population and refusing to cooperate with the system of oppression. They differ from external third-party interveners due to their position as part of the dominant population; their strategic value in civil resistance campaigns; their access to resources; and their relationship to and with the local resisters. As such, an understanding of the role of internal third-party interveners cannot be subsumed under an analysis of external third-party interveners; they must be explored as distinct actors engaged in civil resistance campaigns.

The efforts of external and internal third-party interveners are not mutually exclusive and indeed can be used in conjunction to support a local resistance campaign. However, this study will show that internal third-party resisters are best placed to assist local resisters precisely because of their position as members of the dominant population. Drawing on the literature on civil resistance, this article will show that because internal third-party interveners are closer to the centres of power than both local resisters and external third-party interveners, their non-cooperation has greater potential to reduce the power of the rulers. Secondly, building on studies on external third-party intervention, I will show that internal third-party interveners can exploit certain rights, benefits and privileges associated with being a member of the dominant population in order to practically assist a local campaign.

In addition to these theoretical claims, an analysis of Israeli–Jewish activists who have joined Palestinian civil resistance against the Israeli military occupation will show that the physical presence of Israeli–Jews, who as members of the ruling population are internal third-party interveners, were needed to ensure the Palestinians could maintain their resistance efforts and presence on the land, despite the repression they faced. Furthermore, the knowledge and skills of the Israelis were needed to help the Palestinians achieve some of their goals, at least in the short-term.

Israeli–Jewish involvement has helped the Palestinians in three areas. First, their physical presence helped to sustain the nonviolent demonstrations in the West Bank by limiting repression of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). Secondly, through agricultural accompaniment, the Israeli–Jews ensured the Palestinians could conduct olive harvest and herd their sheep, despite Jewish settler harassment. Thirdly, the knowledge and skills of the Israeli activists in gaining media attention and in the legal arena has helped shift some of the practices and policies of the Israeli army, police and Civil Administration in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Although the Israeli military occupation remains, success of the resistance efforts can be understood through the concept of sumud – steadfast perseverance – in the face of increasing Israeli control. Sumud is a 'unique Palestinians national concept that contains different aspects of resistance and self-preservation against Israeli oppression and harassment' (Zatari, 2018).

Whilst external third-party interveners in Palestine have provided some similar assistance, this study found that they are unable to do so to the same extent as the Israeli–Jewish activists. This article does not assume nor conclude that internal third-party interveners are the key to the success of a resistance campaign and will also highlight ways in which the Israeli–Jewish activists have hindered resistance campaigns in Palestine, particularly in instances where they dominated the struggle.

These conclusions were drawn from three civil resistance campaign case studies in the context of Israel and Palestine: The Struggle against the Wall in Bil'in, which began in 2005; Countering Displacement and Harassment of Palestinians in Area C of the West Bank, which began 2001; and Stopping Housing Evictions of Palestinians in Sheikh Jarrah, which began in 2009. The three campaign case studies were chosen as most different examples of where Israeli–Jewish activists have physically joined Palestinian resistance. They are also some of the more well-documented anti-occupation campaigns and together respond to the key issues affecting the Palestinians since the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000. Each campaign was conducted in a different location, utilised different tactics, and involved different Palestinian and Israeli-Jewish activists, although some of the Israeli-Jewish activists were involved in all three campaigns. Each campaign also emerged, peaked and declined at different time periods and all are still active at the time of writing. In choosing these campaigns it is possible to provide a broad analysis of the role of Israeli-Jewish activists in Palestinian resistance campaigns.

The case of Israel/Palestine is particularly useful because it provides examples where internal third-party interveners have both helped the local resisters and where they have hindered the campaign. Furthermore, there has been both sustained Israeli–Jewish and foreign intervention in Palestinian resistance efforts. Whilst acknowledging the specificities of this case, the findings would be relevant to any context in which there are members of a dominant population trying to support the resistance of those who are dominated.

Data for this study has been gathered from a range of sources. Eleven interviews were conducted with activists during a trip to Israel and Palestine across a one-month period in December 2017 to January 2018 (Table 1). Six Israelis and five Palestinians were interviewed. These individuals were identified

from campaign websites, as well as the author's previous connections to them from earlier fieldwork in Israel and Palestine. For each campaign, two core members or leaders were interviewed, plus a third periphery activist. Two additional activists who were involved in more than one campaign were also interviewed. All the core activists and leaders interviewed had been involved in the campaigns since they emerged, thus giving an overview of the whole trajectory of each campaign. In addition, the author was present at different campaign activities throughout 2010 and for six months in 2013 and during the month in 2017 to 2018. This study also draws from media reports from English-language newspapers reporting from Israel and Palestine – Haaretz, YNet, JPost, +972mag, Ma'an News Agency and The Electronic Intifada; publications from human rights organisations – Rabbis for Human Rights, B'Tselem and ACRI; from the websites of organisations operating in the region; and additional interviews with Israelis and Palestinians from Just Vision and those conducted by Kaufman-Lacusta (2010). These sources have enabled a reflection on the campaigns from the time they emerged through to the latest period of fieldwork.

Campaign	Nationality	Gender	Age	Level of Involvement
The Struggle Against the Wall	Palestinian	M	50s	Village leader
	Israeli	M	80s	Original core activist
	Israeli	F	30s	Periphery activist
Countering Displacement Area C	Palestinian	M	40s	Core activist
	Israeli	F	20s	Periphery activist
	Israeli	F	30s	Core activist
Stopping Evictions in Sheikh Jarrah	Palestinian	M	50s	Campaign leader
	Palestinian	M	80s	Resident/activist
	Palestinian	F	20s	Periphery activist
Across campaigns	Israeli	M	40s	Core activist
	Israeli	F	20s	Core activist

Table 1: Interviews conducted by author December 2017 to January 2018

This article will first provide a theoretical discussion of the relative usefulness of external and internal third-party intervention in local resistance campaigns. It will briefly outline the three campaigns before drawing from across the campaigns to identify the concrete ways in which Israeli–Jewish activists have both helped and hindered Palestinian resistance. This will be followed by some concluding remarks.

The Theoretical Role of Internal Third-Party Interveners

Civil resistance is understood as the 'application of unarmed civilian power using nonviolent methods' (Chenoweth and Cunningham, 2013) and has been employed in a range of circumstances to pursue a variety of goals (Ackerman and DuVall, 2000; Carter, 2012; Roberts and Garton Ash, 2010; Schock, 2005; Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008). The commonality shared between cases is the presence of a group of civilians who 'deliberately [and] necessarily' work outside institutionalized and regular channels to challenge more powerful groups and do so without using violent means (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Shock 2005: 705).

The strategic value of civil resistance is derived from the 'power' that the resisters yield vis a vis the state (Sharp, 1973). Since power 'is not intrinsic to the rulers [but] comes from outside them' (1973: 10), 'every ruler, from the most despotic to the most democratic, cannot rule without the consent or compliance or a sizeable fraction of the populace' (Summy, 1994: 7). Furthermore, the power of the ruler is not monolithic, but derived from dispersed sources within society, rendering political power fragile (Sharp, 2005: 27–28). It therefore follows that reducing the amount of power that the many parts of a society confer on to the state is a means to challenge it (Schock, 2005: 38). Specifically, by withdrawal of 'the consent or acquiescence of the people' (Ackerman and DuVall, 2000: 505), the population 'can control and even destroy the power of [the] opponent' (Sharp, 1973: 4). It must be acknowledged that not all resisters are acting as claim-bearers against the state, but are contesting power from all angles (Pallister-Wilkins, 2009). Therefore, state-centric approaches to the power of civil resistance are not always applicable. However, the logic of withdrawal of consent still holds for other forms of power.

One of the factors that influence the outcome is the extent to which the targets of resistance require the cooperation of the resisters, referred to as 'dependency' (Summy, 1994). Should the acquiescence of the people not be required in order to maintain power, then nonviolent action will not succeed in reducing such power. Clark (2000: 57) notes this to have been the case in Kosovo in the 1990s. Similarly, studies have shown that cooperation of Palestinians under Israeli military occupation is not required by the Israeli government (Rigby, 1991; Schock, 2005: 159–61).

Under such conditions, where local resisters have little leverage in challenging structures and relations of power, third-party actors should be mobilized as intermediaries between the oppressed and the oppressor (Schock, 2005; Stephan and Mundy, 2006). According to Galtung's (1989) 'Great Chain of Nonviolence Hypothesis', those closer to the centres of power will have greater leverage to challenge the authorities than those further away. It therefore follows that if internal third-party interveners withdraw their consent to the policies and practices of the state and remove their own complicity in upholding structures of domination, they would reduce the power of the rulers, thus helping local resisters in their attempts to overcome oppression.

Security forces of the regime are often cited as a significant intermediary for the success of a civil resistance campaign. Their defection and shift in loyalties increase the likelihood of overthrowing the rulers (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Haas & Lesch, 2013; Nepstad, 2011; Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008). Galtung warns that such intermediaries may pick up 'the fruit of the struggle', whereby the oppressors do not yield to the oppressed but to those in-between. The consequence is that while the regime has 'capitulated' to some extent and the in-betweeners have gained legitimacy through struggle, 'objectively very much remains the same, the oppressed having lost the game to somebody else, the "intermediaries"' (1989: 32). Given this potential consequence, dynamics of internal third-party non-cooperation and intervention beyond military defection should be explored.

External third-party actors have been shown to be useful in a local resistance campaign by engaging in capacity building, boosting resources and providing technical assistance to civil resistance movements (Dudouet, 2015: 179). Arguably, internal third-party interveners can assist in ways that external third-

party interveners cannot. For example, they may have knowledge of the legal system or access to lawyers, which they can exploit for the benefit of the campaign. They may speak the language of the ruling forces and have held significant positions within the regime before they decided to dissent. They may also have physical access to spaces that foreigners do not, as well as other rights and privileges associated with being a member of the dominant population.

One of the more documented roles of external third-party interveners is their importance in accompanying resisters in their campaigns. In such cases international volunteers use their physical presence to deter government for from using violence against resisters (Burrowes, 2000; Coy, 2012; Dudouet, 2015; Mahony and Eguran, 1997; Schirch, 2006). Studies have shown that when international activists physically accompany the resisters, the adversary is less likely to respond violently, due to the higher political costs of an international being harmed or killed (Coy, 2012; Rigby, 1995; Weber, 1993). However, it has been shown that if the interveners are partisan and clearly favour 'one-side', then their deterrence is not as strong, since they may be perceived as a threat that justifies a violent response (Coy, 2012). In line with this argument, there have been cases where international activists have been killed by regime forces, but minimal outrage followed (Mahrouse, 2014). The likely outrage if an internal third-party intervener is harmed or killed by their own security forces could conceivably be the greatest of these three groups and therefore their physical presence in civil resistance campaigns is significant.

A number of studies have documented and analysed the nonviolent resistance efforts of the Palestinians (Darweish and Rigby, 2015; Hallward, 2009, 2011; Hallward and Norman, 2011; Johansson and Vinthagen; Kaufman-Lacusta, 2010; Norman, 2010; Rigby, 1991). These studies will provide useful additional information on the case studies chosen for this study, particularly Hallward's (2009) analysis of the joint action in Bil'in, where she identifies the strategic value of the 'joint struggle'. Some of her conclusions are reflected in this study. The in-depth interviews conducted by Kaufman-Lacusta (2010) with Israelis and Palestinians engaged in anti-occupation activism will also be useful. This study goes further than these existing studies by specifically analysing Israeli involvement, across multiple campaigns and by comparing their efforts with that of external third-party interveners. It is to these campaigns that the next section will turn.

Resistance Campaigns in Palestine

The struggle against the Wall in Bil'in

The Palestinian village of Bil'in began to resist Israeli plans to construct the Wall in February 2005 as the proposed route, east of the 1967 armistice line, would cut them off from their farmland (B'Tselem, 2017). The village became a particular focus and training ground for Israelis wanting to join to the struggle against the Wall (Kaufman-Lacusta, 2010: 205; Shalif, 2018) and a model for other villages (Hallward and Norman, 2011). The campaign is centred on nonviolent creative protest.[2] The Israeli army has responded violently to these protests. Two Palestinians have been killed in the Bil'in demonstrations and many more injured from tear gas, tear gas canisters, skunk water and rubber bullets. At its peak, around 450 Israelis joined the weekly demonstrations. However, in recent years, numbers are around ten Israelis, with more for special events, such as Land Day or the anniversary of the building of the Wall (Shalif, 2018).

Countering displacement and harassment of Palestinians in Area C

Area C refers to around 60% of the West Bank, where Israel has almost exclusive control of, among others, law enforcement, planning and construction. As a result of Israeli policies, the Palestinians have difficulties in getting planning permission and structures that do not have a permit are demolished. These measures, along with settler harassment, have meant that the daily lives and thus long-term presence of Palestinians on this land is threatened.[3]

Since the early 2000s, Israeli activists have been called upon to accompany Palestinian shepherds in the South Hebron Hills so that they could herd their sheep despite settler violence or military declarations of a 'Closed Firing Zone'.[4] In addition, they assist Palestinians in rebuilding demolished homes, harvesting olives, and returning to land from which they have been expelled. Such nonviolent interventions, which can also be defined as 'everyday resistance' (Scott, 1985), begun after a Palestinian was shot while conducting the harvest (Kaufman-Lacusta, 2010: 26).

Stopping house evictions of Palestinians in Sheikh Jarrah

Between 2009 and 2011, the largest involvement of Israelis 'in solidarity' with Palestinians in nonviolent protest against policies of the occupation emerged in the East Jerusalem neighbourhood of Sheikh Jarrah. Beginning in 2008, Palestinian families were evicted from their homes in Sheikh Jarrah and replaced by Jewish settlers who claimed ownership from before 1948. Local Palestinians began to protest the evictions and were joined by a group of Israelis, who staged a sit-in with the Palestinian families to stop them being evicted. The efforts in this neighbourhood caught the attention of other Israelis and the movement grew to weekly demonstrations and a 5,000-strong protest in March 2010. In addition, a legal campaign was launched using Israeli lawyers. As a result, the evictions were halted for a total of almost eight years.[5]

Drawing from across these campaigns, three practical ways in which the Israelis helped the Palestinians can be identified: physical presence helped sustain demonstrations by limiting the repression of the IDF; agricultural accompaniment enabled Palestinians to harvest olives and herd sheep; and the use of knowledge and skills changed the policies and practices of the Israeli army and Civil Administration.

The Role of Israeli–Jewish Interveners

Helping to sustain demonstrations

An analysis of the campaigns against the Wall in Bil'in and against housing evictions in Sheikh Jarrah show that Israeli–Jewish activists have helped to sustain the weekly demonstrations. Their physical presence at demonstrations limited the repression of the Israeli army, giving courage to the Palestinians to be more confrontational and enabling them to continue their resistance efforts despite unfavourable conditions. Even though the occupation remains, the ability to continue to resist is seen as a success.

In the Bil'in demonstrations, the Israeli army have used crowd-control measures, such as firing rubber-coated bullets and tear gas. The use of live fire is also allowed in some circumstances (ACRI, 2011: 5-7). When Israeli–Jews were present, activists witnessed the Israeli army act more restrained towards the protesters (Darweish and Rigby, 2015; Hallward, 2009; IA1, 2018; Kaufman-Lacusta, 2010; PA1,

2018; Shalif, 2018; Snitz, 2009; Yacovobitch, 2018). A veteran Israeli activist described how she stood next to two Palestinian children at a demonstration in the West Bank and realized that 'my blood is somehow worth more and just because of me these kids weren't shot' (Golan in Kaufman-Lacusta, 2010: 25). Since the killing of an Israeli activist in a demonstration against the Wall in 2003, the army stopped using live ammunition when Israelis were present, as confirmed by Lieutenant Colonel Tzachi Segev, who commanded the army unit that dispersed the Bil'in demonstrations when they first emerged (Segev in Rapaport, 2005).

Arguably, the presence of international activists should also deter the army from using ammunition. However, internationals have been injured and killed in demonstrations against the Wall (Coy, 2012; Mahrouse, 2014). An Israeli activist explained that the Israeli army became less concerned with withholding fire when internationals were present, but the presence of Israelis was still a deterrence. She explains that 'an Israeli soldier knows that if he kills an Israeli, he'll be held accountable. He knows he can't do that' (Golan in Kaufman-Lacusta, 2010: 149). In Bil'in this has meant that Palestinians can continue demonstrating with less fear of being killed when Israeli–Jewish activists join them.

Israeli activists were also helpful in assisting Palestinians who were at risk of arrest. Not only do they speak the same language, but the Israeli activists may have served in the IDF themselves, which gives them some ability to bargain with the soldiers. Furthermore, Israelis are less likely to be arrested than Palestinians and if they are, will be detained only for a few hours and treated humanely (Awad, 2007), unlike Palestinians who may be subject to administrative detention without trial (B'Tselem, 2017a; Vexler, 2012). As described by one Israeli activist, 'we got arrested and detained, we had our cell phones on us and they [Israeli soldiers] gave us food. As far as being detained goes it was pretty easy you know, and then they brought in this Palestinian who was blindfolded, handcuffed, had been arrested for 20 hours and had slept on the floor' (Strober, 2017). In Sheikh Jarrah, a Palestinian resident explained that the Palestinians have a lot to lose should they be arrested and rely on Israelis to help prevent this (PA2, 2018). Furthermore, the Palestinian leader of the community explained that if he did get arrested, he knew that his Israeli friends would continue to try to stop the evictions (Diab, 2018).

The reduced level of risk and better level of treatment afforded to the Israeli activists enabled them to 'create some buffer space between the soldiers and the Palestinians' (Awad, 2018) so that the presence of Israeli activists emboldened the Palestinians to maintain their resistance efforts (Yacovobitch, 2018). Rapaport (2005) confirmed that 'the very knowledge that Israelis will be present at a demonstration makes it easier for the Palestinians to decide to confront the soldiers, as it is likely that the troops will use less force when they see Israelis among the demonstrators.' Diab (2018) also explained that Israeli support gave him energy and encouragement to keep going despite the continuation of evictions in the neighbourhood. Overall, it is believed that, '[…] in order to make a difference, it really works in everybody's interest to have Israelis participate' (Kantorowicz in Kaufman-Lacusta, 2010: 146).

Agricultural accompaniment in Area C

In addition to reducing the likelihood of lethal repression, an analysis of the campaign to counter the displacement of Palestinians in Area C shows that Israelis activists acted as barriers against intimidation and violence from Israeli settlers and negotiated with the army on the ground, so that the Palestinians were able to maintain access to their land. In particular, Israeli involvement enabled Palestinians to harvest their olives and herd their sheep, who would have otherwise been deterred by settlers blocking access (Kaufman-Lacusta, 2010: 144; A, 2016; Assaf, 2018). A Palestinian from a village near Nablus explained that the Israeli activists 'prevent settlers from harming us' (Ali in Rasgon, 2016). Their presence is especially needed because the Israeli army have been shown to 'stand idly by' when Israeli extremists attacked Palestinians (Hareuveni, 2015; RHR, 2018). In 2017 Rabbis for Human Rights identified that in 26 out of 34 cases, the intervention of the Israeli organization allowed the Palestinians to harvest their olives by securing access to the land. Farmers from eight villages were able to access their land after significant periods of restricted access and in ten cases, the intervention of Israelis helped prevent attacks on Palestinians (RHR, 2017).

Some internationals activists have played a similar accompaniment role (Burrowes, 2000; Coy, 2012; Dudouet, 2015; Mahony and Eguran, 1997; Schirch, 2006), particularly volunteers from the Christian Peacemaker Team, the Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and the International

Solidarity Movement (ISM), who spend long periods of time in Palestine. However, a number of activists from these groups were deported as a result of their work (ISM, 2014, 2013; Kaufman-Lacusta, 2010: 148, 301; Ynet, 2008). Deportation laws in Israel changed in the mid-2000s to make deporting foreigners much easier (Golan in Kaufman-Lacusta, 2010: 148). In addition, in 2017 the Israeli Parliament approved a bill to refuse entry to foreign nationals if they publicly expressed support for a boycott of Israel (ACRI, 2017). Since this ruling, a number of foreign activists have been detained on arrival in Israel (ACRI, 2016), thus reducing the ability of internationals to join Palestinian resistance campaigns. Given the potential for international activists to be deported and barred from re-entry, their assistance as accompaniers cannot be guaranteed in the same way as the Israeli activists.

Furthermore, there is something particularly significant about internal third-party interveners standing side-by-side with local resisters. A representative of the Popular Committee of Bil'in described the Israelis as 'real partners – awake with us late at night, in confronting daily invasions of village homes by the army' (Mansour, 2007). 'The relationship between occupier and occupied' is thus transformed (Bilu in Israel Social TV, 2017), shifting the perception of Israelis as only soldiers or settlers (Morrar, 2009). The significance of this should not be underestimated.

Knowledge and skills to challenge Israeli policies

In addition to assistance derived from physical presence, the Israeli activists have developed and have access to useful knowledge and skills to support the campaigns. Legal action initiated by Israeli activists on behalf of the Palestinians has been successful in changing the actions and policies of the Israeli Civil Administration. A report by B'Tselem on Israel's land policies in the West Bank highlight a positive development whereby the Israeli Civil Administration will accept objections from Israel Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) on behalf of the Palestinian residents (B'Tselem, 2013: 16). In 2006 Israeli NGO Bimkom submitted objections to the Israeli High Court of Justice against Master Building Plans that were drawn up for villages in Area C of the West Bank. Some of these objections were accepted (B'Tselem, 2013: 14). Rabbis for Human Rights and ACRI have also successfully petitioned the Israeli High Court of Justice. Some of their successes include interventions to, 'allow

critical road access for isolated Palestinian villages in the South Hebron Hills' and 'preventing and reversing land take-overs' (RHR, n.d.).

Expertise in legal processes and legitimacy in the eyes of the Civil Administration and High Court of Justice is required for these legal claims to be submitted, something that the Israeli activists and NGOs have developed from their involvement. Whilst there are some Palestinian lawyers who support the campaigns, it has been acknowledged that, 'as a Palestinian, it is almost impossible to work through the Israeli system and to achieve something' (A, 2016). Hallward (2009: 552) also found that a significant strategic advantage of Israeli activists is that they are able to access the Israeli court system. In addition, there was a period where Palestinians were barred from entering the Jerusalem District Court to observe certain legal proceedings. The same rule was not applied to Jews and therefore, Israeli activists could attend the hearings to lend their support and ensure fair trial (ACRI, 2019).

Advocating on behalf of the Palestinians, particularly through gaining media attention, has also helped Palestinian campaigns. Israeli activists have identified the increased likelihood that the international community and Israeli society will listen to them than they will to Palestinians. As one Israeli activist remarked, 'one of the biggest privileges we have is getting information out there easily. People are more interested, unfortunately, in hearing me say it than they are from the villagers saying it' (Strober, 2017). This was first acknowledged when two Israelis went to the Palestinian town of Beit Jala, which was being shelled by Israelis early in the Al-Aqsa Intifada. The presence of the Israelis became the focal point of the Israeli media and drew attention to the situation (Golan in Kaufman-Lacusta, 2010: 146). Nonviolence trainer Husan Jubran also confirmed that the presence of Israelis at Palestinian demonstrations against the Wall drew the media (Jubran in Kaufman-Lacusta, 2010: 174).

In Sheikh Jarrah, the involvement of Israeli–Jews was seen as crucial in spreading the word and gaining the attention of the media. This in turn led to a temporary halt in evictions (Ziv, 2018). As one commentator noted, 'discrimination and dispossession systematically pervade all aspects of life in East Jerusalem. What makes Sheikh Jarrah unique is the fact that soon after the forced evictions of

Palestinian families from their homes; it became clear that many Israelis are simply not going to let this one slide' (Inbar, 2010).

Not all agree that Israelis should act as a mouthpiece for the Palestinians. A Palestinian activist noted that, 'we should not allow anyone to speak on behalf of us' (Khalifa, 2017). Despite this, the problem is that, 'a Palestinian can say exactly the same thing and people will listen to me much more because, oh the Israeli is saying it' (Vardi, 2017). The reason for this was explained by a Palestinian activist, whereby 'criticism of the occupation by its own people is more powerful than criticism by someone who lives under it, whose opinion is pre-determined' (Morrar, 2006). While international activists also have a privileged voice (Mahrouse, 2014), Morrar explained that the voices of Israeli dissidents are even more important. She notes that 'when [an American] hears from a fellow American talking about the situation [in Palestine], his views may change. When he hears eyewitness accounts from an Israeli, it has an even greater effect' (Morrar, 2006).

A new campaign initiated and led by a Jewish organization based in the United States in summer 2017 did not consider the importance of the expertise developed by the Israeli-activists overtime and highlights why external third-party interveners are less helpful to the Palestinians. The aim of the campaign was to enable two Palestinian families to return to their homes in the village of Sarura, from which they were evicted twenty years prior. According to one of the Palestinian activists, the American group, 'wanted to do a big action, to rebuild someplace, with attempts to link it to Standing Rock in people's consciousness' (Awad, 2018).[6] In some ways this campaign was successful; since they helped the Palestinians return to and maintain a presence on the land. However, after some time, the Israeli military destroyed the camp and activists were detained.

The ways in which this campaign was initiated, as well as the goals of the organisers, explain why any success in returning to the land was short-lived. The group of international activists had limited experience in the region, specific dates they could travel and a certain vision of what they wanted to achieve, which meant the campaign was not sustainable. Furthermore, a lack of awareness of the culture of the villagers led to situations that offended the Palestinians (Strober, 2017). As Sami Awad, the

Director of the Holy Land Trust, explained, 'Sarura is like a laboratory of nonviolence. A group of people, highly white, privileged, group of people practicing in very good conditions, highly resourced, going there putting it together. And eventually, Surura is now neglected again' (Awad, 2018).

In order to help the Palestinians gain access to land and avoid eviction orders, certain skills are required, specifically familiarity with the legal processes and an ability to attract media attention. These skills are learnt from extensive and long-term experience on the ground. This is something that external third-party activists who join on-site campaigns temporarily cannot achieve.

Hindering campaigns through domination

The previous sections have shown how Israeli–Jews have helped Palestinian resistance campaigns. However, their involvement has not always been helpful to or wanted by the Palestinians. Despite the clear benefits of Israeli involvement in the campaign against housing evictions in Sheikh Jarrah, Israeli dominance has been cited as the main reason why it dissipated (Khalifa, 2017). As the movement grew to include more Israelis, an Israeli-only organizing committee was set up, members of which did not attend the joint Palestinian–Israeli planning committee (Dana, 2010). The movement fell into the trap noted by Hassan (2011), whereby 'there is a great risk of groups hijacking the growing grassroots movement of Palestinian popular resistance under the cloak of solidarity and coexistence'. Specifically, there were strategic differences between the Israeli-only committee, who wanted to create a broader anti-occupation campaign, and the joint Palestinian–Israeli committee, who wanted to focus on the evictions in Sheikh Jarrah. A Palestinian East Jerusalemite explained that, 'most of the Palestinians were marching for the sake of their threatened homes in East Jerusalem neighbourhoods, therefore serving short-term aims of the march to put a stop to the ethnic cleansing of Arab Jerusalemites, and not to call for an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza' (Abukhater, 2011). Similarly, there was a period in Bil'in at the start of the demonstrations where the Israelis took over the resistance efforts and as a result the villagers stopped participating (Kamphoefner in Kaufman-Lacusta, 2010: 168).

In studies of external third-party intervention, it has been shown that colonial attitudes and saviour complexes often accompany intervention (Indigenous Action Media, 2014; Mahrouse, 2014; Meyer,

2019). Mahrouse (2014) finds that when white privilege is used to bring awareness to a nonviolent movement, it has the effect of 'reinforcing the very racist systems that it seeks to disrupt' (2014: 43) and imposes another relationship of domination. This transpires through activists using their 'white and First World privilege' to speak on behalf of the local resisters, obtain information for them and in receiving more attention when harmed. In order to avoid these issues, the concept of 'local ownership' is emphasized. The local activists must lead the resistance strategies and activities, with the third-party actors 'assisting' them, rather than directing them (Dudouet, 2008).

In awareness of this, both Palestinian and Israeli–Jewish activists are clear that the Israelis should never be the ones to lead the struggle. As was explained, 'we have such a unique role here, it's not about leading – it is not my place to lead – because I am not Palestinian and I am not the one facing occupation' (Strober, 2017). Another Israeli activist explained that, 'it is not up to me to dictate for the oppressed their means of struggle. My choice is whether to stand by those who struggle and speak up for their rights, or not do so' (Barkan in Negra, 2012). The Palestinian activists confirmed this view. Alsaafin (2012) was clear that, 'Israelis activists must never take a decision-making or leadership role in the Palestinian struggle, but instead must remain on the periphery' and scholar of Palestinian popular resistance, Marwan Darweish, noted that, 'it is essential that the Palestinian side has more control over the planning, thinking and activities of these projects' (Israel Social TV, 2017).

In order to provide the assistance documented from the case studies, a careful consideration of the dynamics between the interveners and the local resisters is needed.

Concluding Remarks

An analysis of the 3 case studies has shown concrete ways the Israeli–Jewish activists have helped Palestinian resistance campaigns. While long-term goals of Palestinian liberation and an end to the occupation have not been achieved, Israeli activists have helped Palestinians to achieve short-term aims that are linked to their belief in sumud: sustaining resistance in the face of Israeli repression and maintaining a presence on the land. In each of the campaigns, Israeli–Jewish involvement has been

shown to have been needed and often more useful than the involvement of foreign activists, particularly those who temporarily join campaigns.

In the struggle against the Wall in Bil'in, the physical presence of Israeli-activists enabled the Palestinians to continue their weekly demonstrations, despite Israeli repression. In particular, they acted as a buffer between the soldiers and the Palestinians. The fact that Israeli-activists and Palestinian activists were treated differently meant that having Israeli–Jews at the demonstrations enabled the Palestinians to be more confrontational and maintain their struggle. International activists have not had a similar impact on reducing the level of force used by the Israeli army and in recent years there has been an increased likelihood they would be deported or barred from entering Israel; thus, they could not provide the same level of assistance as the Israeli activists.

In the campaign against displacement in Area C of the West Bank, the Israeli activists played a similar role as buffers, but in this case between Jewish settlers and Palestinians. This enabled the Palestinians to gain access to their land to harvest their olives and herd their sheep, forms of everyday resistance. International activists who have been in Palestine long-term have also helped in these ways. However, the knowledge and skills the Israeli activists had in exploiting the legal system and in advocacy was particularly useful in changing the policies and practices of the Israeli army and Civil Administration in this area.

The involvement of Israeli–Jews in the campaign against the evictions in Sheikh Jarrah was particularly significant in gaining media attention and thus mobilizing even more Israelis, such that the level of awareness, coupled with legal action, led to a halt in the evictions for almost a decade. However, it was in this campaign that some Israeli–Jews took over the struggle, developing different strategic goals to the Palestinians. The disagreements that emerged led to the dissolution of the campaign and the eviction notices were later re-instated.

What has been shown both theoretically and in the case of Israeli–Jewish activists who join on-site Palestinian resistance campaigns, is that it can be strategically desirable for members of the dominant population to actively assist the dominated in their struggle. Internal third-party interveners should make

use of 'their rewards of being part of an oppressor class' in order to 'weaponize their privilege' (Indigenous Media Action, 2014: 6). At the same time, they must minimize their domination, by following the lead of the local resisters and confronting their own role in the structures of oppression. This study has shown that further attention must be given to internal third-party interveners, as distinct actors supporting nonviolent resistance campaigns. Further research should consider whether such conclusions can be drawn from resistance campaigns in different contexts.

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[1] According to Schock (2005), '*Leverage* refers to the capacity of a challenger to sever the opponent from the sources of power upon which it depends.'

[2] For details of tactics used see Hallward (2009).

[3] See B'Tselem (2016) for details of Israeli measures in Area C and B'Tselem (2017b) for information on Settler violence.

[4] In 1999 the Israeli military expelled over 700 under the claim they were living illegally in a declared 'firing zone'. The claims over this area are still in negotiation (ACRI, 2016; B'Tselem, 2012).

[5] See Fleischmann (2019) for a detailed account of the struggle in Sheikh Jarrah.

[6] A protest camp against the Dakota Access Pipeline in the United States.

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