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11.

The Ivory Tower and the Fourth Estate

Paul Lashmar

In early 2013 the disaffected National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden sought out two campaigning journalists, filmmaker Laura Poitras and *Guardian* columnist Glenn Greenwald. Snowden then provided Poitras and Greenwald with access to the tranche of up to 1.7 million classified NSA documents that, among other significant issues, revealed the massive growth in surveillance capability of the “Five Eyes” network of signals intelligence agencies of the US, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Using the pseudonym “Verax,” Snowden was also in contact with Barton Gellman, an investigative journalist with national security expertise working for the *Washington Post*. Another investigative journalist with national security reporting experience, Ewen MacAskill from the *Guardian*, joined the Poitras-Greenwald team in Hong Kong to structure and coordinate the release of their stories beginning in June 2013. Over the next months, investigative journalists from major news organizations across many countries cooperated with the core team to release documents into their regional media.

The Snowden documents caused a worldwide sensation and a polarizing debate in the Five Eyes countries about the merits of publication. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, then director of the NSA, said in June 2013, “These leaks have caused significant and irreversible damage to our nation’s security.” He added, “The irresponsible release of classified information about these programs will have a long-term detrimental impact on the intelligence community’s ability to detect future attacks.”¹ Sir Iain Lobban, the director of Britain’s Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ), said his spies had picked up “near-daily discussion” of the unauthorized disclosures among his agency’s targets. His colleague Sir John Sawers, the head of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), was even more critical. “It’s clear that our adversaries are rubbing their hands in glee,” he told a British parliamentary committee. “Al Qaeda is lapping it up.”² Heads of other Five Eyes eavesdropping agencies responded with similar criticisms. Others saw it as a fine example of the fourth estate

at work, and the *Guardian* and *Washington Post* shared a Pulitzer Prize for their work on the Snowden story.

An anthropological method is to look for the silences in any situation, and when it came to the Snowden leaks, one group had surprisingly little impact on this splenetic public debate. A group of specialists, drawn from universities across the world, spend their time monitoring, researching, advising, and critiquing intelligence. For all their research activity, these academics did not alert the public to a massive growth in the Five Eyes signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities, with its concomitant potential not only for global mass surveillance but also Orwellian nation-state control. Furthermore, it took years for these academics to produce substantive responses to the Snowden documents in academic journals. The question this chapter addresses is, If academic responses are so delayed, what impact do they really have on policy about a controversial issue like global surveillance? Is scholarship there for the sake of scholarship? Or as intelligence studies academic Peter Gill asks, “If journalists produce the first draft of history, do academics produce the second?”³

This chapter was commissioned to explore what academics might learn from investigative journalists and whether cooperation between the two groups is possible in a more formal setting. First, I describe the two cohorts and some of the conditions they work under. Then I explore the commonalities and the differences between the two groups before considering the lessons academics can learn. At various points I compare the two groups to a third group—the intelligence community—as this community is the common point of research for both journalists and academics in what is an overlapping Venn diagram of three professional fields. To help conceptualize how the groups function, I find Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory useful. In his lifetime he applied it to the “field” of journalism, among other groups, and it was further elucidated by Rodney Benson and Erik Neveu. I suggest that this theory describes better than other theories the relational self-reinforcing environment of journalism I know and that it could equally well be applied to the academy or the intelligence community. Within field theory Bourdieu proposed the concepts of *habitus*, which can be summarized as “socialized subjectivity,” and *doxa*, or the “universe of tactic presuppositions.” Both concepts are apposite, but in this chapter his concept of *illusio* has the most relevance. It describes “an agent’s emotional and cognitive ‘investment’ in the stakes involved in any field,” or more simply, the belief that the game is worth playing.⁴

A note of caution is that the cohorts of journalists and academics relevant to this discussion are relatively small, and this chapter tries to steer a path, making some general observations and suggestions, while recognizing that some dominant figures within the considered cohorts challenge those generalizations. Another point of fact is that the author is British and a journalism practitioner academic, so while the chapter refers to the landscape in the Five Eyes countries, it does tend to call on UK examples to make illustrations.

Describing the Cohorts

Who Are the Journalists Covering Intelligence?

Kenneth Payne notes that covering national security for the mainstream media draws in what he defines as the “access,” the “clippings,” and the “investigative” journalists.⁵ The access journalists are those for whom national security is their specialism, or beat. They tend to be experienced staff journalists as the beat is recognized as a difficult, if not the most difficult, one. One distinct feature of national security reporting is how challenging it is to cultivate meaningful contacts. In any beat the reporter needs not only the official media contacts for the organization but knowledgeable individuals formerly of or within the organization who are prepared to talk on a confidential basis and may challenge the official line.⁶ These reporters are, in effect, access or lobby journalists, and the danger for us and them is if they are not skeptical of any official line. In the UK most major news organizations have one or two reporters who are “accredited” and have mutually authorized contact with intelligence organizations. In the UK the agencies, with the exception of GCHQ, do not have press offices, and even GCHQ’s is mainly for community liaison. In the US, access seems more liberal but varies across the seventeen or so intelligence agencies. Experienced journalists from Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have told me that media access is restricted, difficult, and sometimes tense, unless you are deemed “a safe pair of hands,” for which you can read “lacking criticality.”

When a major story involving national security occurs, an influx of general reporters may cover it, making the best contacts they can in the moment and using the news organization’s “cuttings” or “clippings” library. This is routine and ephemeral and does not deploy any specialist knowledge of the sector.

Within investigative journalism in developed democratic countries, a subset of reporters tends to cover national security. Investigative journalists are largely driven by the search for exclusive revelatory stories and not by a particular beat. But by dint of stories covered and contacts developed, they usually have areas of special interest that they return to. National security is seen to be an important and newsworthy area, and for instance, in each of the Five Eyes countries, there are investigative journalists who cover national security time and time again. This is the group this chapter’s discussion centers on (see fig. 11.1). The US academic Loch Johnson has noted the role of rigorous journalism in bringing accountability to the intelligence world: “I think that (in the United States at least) the media has done much more than any other organization or group to advance intelligence accountability. Especially investigative journalists, in their drive for a good story that might lead to their professional advancement and honors (Pulitzers and Polks, for example), have been successful in sniffing out stories and alerting elected overseers in Congress to carry out investigations.”⁷

I conform to this characterization as a journalist who, for a large part of my career, was an investigative journalist in the UK national media with specialist knowledge of

Name	Nationality	Affiliation/Notes
Heidi Blake	United Kingdom	<i>Buzzfeed</i>
Jim Bronskill	Canada	<i>Canada Press</i>
Dr. Duncan Campbell	United Kingdom	Intelligence expert and freelance journalist
David Fisher	New Zealand	<i>New Zealand Herald</i>
Andrew Fowler	Australia	Formerly, Australia Broadcasting Corporation's <i>Four Corners</i> program
Colin Freeze	Canada	<i>Globe and Mail</i>
Barton Gellman	United States	Formerly of the <i>Washington Post</i> , a Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter and now a lecturer and author in residence at Princeton University
Stephen Grey	United Kingdom	Thomson Reuters
Nicky Hager	New Zealand	Freelance journalist and NZ's leading investigative reporter
Ewen MacAskill	United Kingdom	<i>Guardian</i>
Mark Mazzetti	United States	<i>New York Times</i>
Jenna McLaughlin	United States	<i>The Intercept</i>
Greg Miller	United States	Covers intelligence and national security for the <i>Washington Post</i> and was awarded the Pulitzer working with Barton Gellman
Andrew Mitrovica	Canada	Freelance journalist
Ellen Nakashima	United States	<i>Washington Post</i>
Dana Priest	United States	<i>Washington Post</i>
James Risen	United States	<i>The Intercept</i>
David Seglins	Canada	<i>CBC</i>
Scott Shane	United States	<i>New York Times</i>
Jeff Stein	United States	Covers the spy agencies and foreign policy for <i>Newsweek</i>
Peter Taylor	United Kingdom	BBC TV's <i>Panorama</i>
Ali Watkins	United States	<i>New York Times</i>
Dylan Welch	Australia	ABC's <i>7.30</i>

Figure 11.1. Examples of investigative journalists who have national security reporting experience

intelligence. While working for the UK's Independent Newspapers, I was an accredited reporter with the security services, and up to 2008 I dealt with intelligence agencies, including during the controversial weapons of mass destruction; July 7, 2005, London bombings; and extraordinary rendition briefings.⁸ More recently, I became a journalism academic practitioner whose research interests include the study of intelligence and media relations.

Who Are the Intelligence Academics?

A key group of academics this book addresses are those whose discipline is intelligence studies. As a branch of the international relations discipline, intelligence studies has as its core academic body the US-centered International Studies Association (ISA). I have engaged with the intelligence studies discipline with varying degrees of success over the years, noting reticence to engage from some members of that group. Some investigative journalists and some intelligence-focused academics contact each other, but to make a generalization based on experience, cooperation remains occasional and unsystematic. Richard Norton-Taylor was the *Guardian's* security correspondent until his recent retirement. He has a reputation for critical investigative journalism and observed that both journalists and academics can get too close to the intelligence people they are researching: "The security and intelligence agencies need [us journalists and academics], even more than 'we' need them especially now with pressure on MI5 (because of terrorist attacks) and on MI6 (on the back foot because of lack of protection of their Russian agents and over rendition), and GCHQ (desperately in need of recruits and good PR because of its increasing role re: cyber, etc.)."⁹ Why is this important? The intelligence agencies have the potential to exercise power through secrecy that, in certain circumstances, has been and again could be undemocratic. John le Carré, with his usual erudition, encapsulated the key question for intelligence in "Fifty Years Later," a foreword to a new edition of his novel *The Spy Who Came in from the Cold*: "How far can we go in the rightful defence of our Western values without abandoning them along the way?"

As Tina Basi and Mona Sloane have written about the UK higher education institutions, academics are driven by targets for affecting public and government policy, attracting research funds, and producing high-ranking scholarship.¹⁰ "While many higher education institutions (HEI) have come up with innovative ways to build impact case studies, the focus of impact practices has been increasingly narrowed down to tech transfer or policy impact." Basi and Sloane critically worry, "The 'impact agenda' is fueled, in part, by a cost-benefit framework." They place this in a wider context: "The discussion of impact is bound by both a poorly articulated purpose of higher education within social policy at large and a shift towards the marketisation of universities."¹¹

Gill pointed out that academics manifest different approaches to producing output from their intelligence-focused work: "For example, I would distinguish

those academics who conduct research from those who focus on scholarship. The former seeks to mine primary sources for material hitherto unpublished while the latter relies primarily on secondary sources and seeks to develop new perspectives, models or theories.¹² As Robert Dover, Michael Goodman, and Martha White note of the UK intelligence-academic environment, “There has historically been a measure of ad-hoc interaction between the UK’s intelligence community with individual academics and, of course, with those in privileged or knowledgeable positions outside of the community.” They go on to write that although universities are “public institutions, albeit funded in an increasingly private way,” they “are a key source of knowledge and innovation for the country.”¹³ The number of former intelligence practitioners turned academics is increasing. There are many in United States, fewer in the UK; Michael Herman and David Omand (both ex-GCHQ) are obvious examples. Over many years I have engaged with intelligence-focused academics both as a journalist and as an academic and have observed the following distinct groupings.

The first group, acolytes, see themselves as an academic adjunct of the professional intelligence community and seek to analyze and improve intelligence methodology. Their closeness to the intelligence community positions them better to achieve the career-enhancing grants that will meet impact criteria. This group engages in both research and scholarship, and they often share, as Bourdieu might have described it, the *illusio* of the intelligence community.¹⁴ These academics are often seen by intelligence leaders as useful aides-de-camp but best kept in the *vicus* and not the *castrum*. (One of the interviewees for this chapter pointed out that the idea that intelligence officials may welcome contact with useful outsiders in informal environments while not welcoming them into their inner sanctum could equally apply to journalists.)¹⁵

The second group, historians, seeks to portray the history of intelligence, and there tends to be a substantial time lag as official data and interviews with operatives may become available only many years after the events described. Some historians are sufficiently trusted to write the official histories with access to still classified archives. Interestingly, and somewhat counterintuitively, it is this group that is most called on by the media to commentate on intelligence-related stories, perhaps as they are seen to provide the long view and to have greater “respectability.”

The third group, critical friends, see themselves as rigorous academic analysts of the intelligence community and its wider political and social context. They seek an overview, even a sense making and search for truth, of the larger ontological question of intelligence and, while engaging with the intelligence community, seem to exercise resistance to the pull of the intelligence field’s *doxa*.

The fourth group, critical theorists, see themselves as very much a counter to the intelligence studies grouping and are outsiders, often Marxists, to the intelligence community. This group bases its analyses on the negative historical record of the intelligence community and can veer into conspiracy theory. They do provide a useful counter to the acolytes in any debate.

The Commonalities

The first commonality between academics and journalists is that both face the shared obstacle intrinsic to obtaining data on intelligence: secrecy. Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt have observed, “The connection between intelligence and secrecy is central to most of what distinguishes intelligence from other intellectual activities.”¹⁶ As Dover, Goodman, and White noted, “The practical business of government intelligence and security communities exist, for the most part, in necessary secrecy.”¹⁷ While secrecy may be an essential of intelligence activity, it can mask groupthink, incompetence, illegality, domain expansion, and political meddling. Thus intelligence organizations need to be accountable, although the more usual open government oversight is not a comfortable fit. As Gill noted in his work on the democratization of intelligence, the media must be much more than a mouthpiece for governments. They are the fourth estate and provide a crucial, if informal, accountability mechanism. He recommends they act as a watchdog against corruption and other abuses of power, including providing an outlet for whistle-blowers, and argues that since “formal intelligence oversight mechanisms are often relatively weak [it] is often some combination of civil society organisations and the media that brings abuses to public attention.”¹⁸

Gill also noted that the problem for media in covering security and intelligence issues is often presented as one of penetrating the “veil of secrecy,” but that is just one dimension of the problem. The job of journalists (and academic researchers) is similar in many respects to that of intelligence officers: both are seeking information, often from or about people who guard their privacy closely. Even if information can be obtained, the problem is making sense of it and drawing some reasonable conclusion.¹⁹ The most productive method for journalists to obtain intelligence insights is through sources. Access to those working in intelligence is difficult, and if access is to be achieved, the question has to be asked, At what cost?²⁰

Given the protective secrecy and the strength of their *habitus* and *illusio*, those within intelligence rarely feel compelled to explain themselves or discuss the ethical and conceptual basis on which they operate. They tend to talk to journalists or academics only if they feel they will gain something—the rare exception to this is the whistle-blower. While journalists have a good deal of freedom within legal and ethical constraints, academics find constraints embedded in the research infrastructure. It is clear that to remain relevant to public policy and opinion, academics need to become more agile and timely.

The second commonality is the research cycle, the process of identifying knowledge gaps, collecting information, analyzing it, and reporting it (fig. 11.2).²¹ Dover, Goodman, and White undertook an exercise to see what the intelligence community could learn from academics and compared the intelligence cycle with the academic research process using the eight-step hourglass model, which they summarize as using eight key steps in the research process. “Whilst academic research ‘models’ are neither uniform nor universally adhered to, the Hourglass Model represents the ideal

Intelligence cycle	Academic research model (hourglass)	Investigative journalism model
Identifying requirements	Identification of the research problem	Initial facts or clues
Consulting organizational memory—the files and open sources	Literature review	Cuttings review
Specific targeting	Specification of the purpose of research	
	Determination of specific research questions	Determination of specific research questions
Possible source identification and management		Possible source identification and management
Collection of information	Data collection	Data collection
Processing of information		Verification
Analysis of information	Analysis and interpretation of data	Analysis and interpretation of information
Evaluation by managers	Reporting and evaluation of research	Evaluation of story with editors and lawyers
Dissemination of analytic product, that is, “intelligence”	Communication of research findings and recommendations	Dissemination
Feedback from customer and policymakers	Citations	Feedback from targets and audience

Figure 11.2. Intelligence cycle, academic research model (hourglass), and investigative journalism model

process of academic research.”²² As a complementary exercise, I extend the comparison to include a third element, investigative journalism, using Mark L. Hunter’s “story-based inquiry model,” which is widely considered the best practice research method for in-depth journalism. Hunter writes that unlike most routine journalism, the story-based inquiry model takes “the hypothesis-based inquiry approach, which takes the basic assumption that a story is only a hypothesis until verified.”²³

The processes of research and analysis in all three cohorts closely correspond. The notion of hypothesis works across all cohorts as they use methods (not philosophical truth determinations) that provide the best available means of approaching “truth.” While the journalist does not explicitly state a hypothesis, it is usually paraphrased in the introductory sentence or paragraph of the story. As Gill noted, he had much sympathy with the idea that what analysts, academics, and journalists are trying to do is “make sense” of the world. “The idea of ‘sensemaking’ seems

highly appropriate to issues of such complexity. As someone once said, ‘truth is a difficult concept.’”²⁴

Core Differences

The three cohorts are in other regards quite different. Funding is different for each of the three groups, and Gill observed that, for academics, funding is more crucial for research than scholarship: “The former seeks to mine primary sources for material hitherto unpublished while the latter relies primarily on secondary sources and seeks to develop new perspectives, models or theories.” But, he adds, perhaps it is less so now that so much material is available online:

There has never been much funding available for academic research into intelligence but I believe much can be done without it. Now I think there will be more funding available for historical research than social science research into current organisational/governance issues because they raise trickier questions of getting access and may frighten donors. The lack of availability of big grants for research into intelligence (compared with elections, parties etc.) is one of a number of reasons why the number of intelligence studies academics is so small. Academics don’t really face the risk of capture by funders but may risk capture by agencies if they seek to bargain access for control over output.²⁵

Gill warned that even though there are differences in funding, journalists are also not free agents and will be subject to whatever editorial constraints are put on them. In many cases these restraints will reflect the preferences of owners and, in turn, may be shaped by informal or formal pressures from the state.²⁶

A second difference is dissemination. Dr. Duncan Campbell observed, “In journalism, we publish, and meet legal, professional, and/or situational restrictions and responses. We are de facto subject to ‘review’ (taking a very broad meaning) by anyone without restriction including targets of enquiries.” By comparison, he noted, “intelligence reports are ‘disseminated’ only to selected recipients, who are likely to be de facto paying or payment enabling customers, with strict and severe controls. The broad ‘reviews’ consequent on genuine publication are wholly and inevitably absent.”²⁷ The main academic dissemination is in peer-reviewed journals for which the audience is usually in three figures if the metrics are to be believed.

A third difference is in the collection of information. Sources are used across all groups, but academics do not tend to use sources in the same way as either journalists or intelligence officers. Gill noted, “Covert methods are standard and essential for intelligence, OK sometimes for journalists subject to editors and codes and regulators; but rarely OK in academic studies.” He expanded the point, saying it is easier and cheaper to gather information from open sources, but intelligence agencies are

specifically empowered to infringe on privacy and deploy many methods to gather information covertly: “Journalists do not possess such legal powers but may well deploy various forms of subterfuge up to and including illegal behaviour in order to gather what is not publicly available. How else could investigative journalism proceed? Once gathered, much effort is made to protect not just what has been learnt but also the sources.”²⁸

When it comes to technologically assisted intelligence, neither journalists nor academics can rival GCHQ for technological SIGINT data capture and imagery intelligence. That said, the availability of commercial imagery and the broader availability of open source information has empowered journalists and academics. For example, the crowd-sourced investigative group Bellingcat has done quite remarkable work with commercially available satellite imagery, notably in the case of the Malaysian airliner shot down over Ukraine in 2014. In this example, Bellingcat made a strong case for a mobile Russian missile launcher unit to have been the culprit.²⁹

A fourth difference is confidentiality. Information barriers are common to all three cohorts. They are especially prevalent in intelligence but are very small in academia. While predisposed to publication, journalists have an ontological duty of confidentiality to some sources. Academics, in contrast, do not usually operate with live issues, so confidentiality is not such a concern, except that university ethics committees push academics toward confidentiality even when it is not necessary.³⁰

A fifth difference is time. Urgency is a factor for both intelligence and journalist groups, whereas academics prioritize perceived authority of reporting. Intelligence collection and analysis can be a race against time to prevent catastrophic events. Journalism has a publication imperative, but investigative journalists are not so subject to the 24-7 news regime. Gill noted academic research is mainly historical and therefore urgency does not arise, except if there is a race to publish some new findings from recently opened archives. He wrote, “I’d draw a distinction between urgency of analysis in a developing counterterrorism investigation compared with anything journalists may face, e.g., fear of being beaten to publication by rivals.”³¹

As Gill observed, all three cohorts are subject to review by peers: “For intelligence analysts, the first people they have to convince with their product are managers who intervene between them and the policy people; for academics the equivalent is the external reviewer and for journalists, the editor.”³² Dover, Goodman, and White observed that intelligence analysis may utilize a range of structured analytical techniques or may be performed without any methodological approach: “Structured analytical techniques range from simple brainstorming instructions to the application of Subjective Bayesian Analysis.”³³ Within intelligence, analysis is a crucial element in producing a “product” ready for dissemination and involves assessing the credibility of both the information’s source and the information itself. This assessment may involve using sophisticated models but at the very minimum will involve seeking independent verification or cross-checking different sources.³⁴ The argument goes that despite the similarity of interests, journalists, unlike academics, operate with an imperative to inquire and publish, and their outlets are conceptually

framed around speedy delivery to the wider public sphere. Academics are under lesser temporal or dissemination imperatives. Gill wrote, "I think academics can learn much from investigative journalism, but taking the longer view, I don't think there is any point in academics trying necessarily to produce quicker—it's more important that one's work passes the test of 'intersubjectivity.'" However, like journalists, academics are facing more and more fiscal and productivity pressures in their institutions. Some of these are common across international borders, some are national in character, and others institutional. There are the systemic pressures of an increasingly consumer-driven higher education sector. Contemporary research academics express incredulity at the suggestion that they still have time to read and think within their contracted work hours.

The sixth difference lies in the ethics mechanisms. Professional journalists operate with an ethical framework, and ethics is integral to most journalism university training syllabi. In the UK most belong to the National Union of Journalists, which has an ethical structure and code, and they are also subject to self-regulation (print), an official regulatory body (broadcast), and the law. Nevertheless, they are generally free to contact potential interviewees without much ado, unless the interviewees are vulnerable or under the age of eighteen. Only when it comes to undercover work for interviews do matters become more complicated, especially for public service broadcasters, for whom the regulatory bodies now stringently require compelling evidence that subterfuge is justified.

In contrast, even if it is possible for academics to interview former and current intelligence officers, they almost certainly could not interview people on the periphery, like agents and contractors. In some cases these peripheral characters have engaged in criminal activity, and ethics committees are reticent to let academics interview criminals (unless they are in prison and supervised) or to enter environments where criminal activity may take place. From my experience, academic ethics committees tend to be one-size-fits-all enterprises and prefer risk-averse proposals. An academic's prior experience of these situations often holds no sway, and researchers who have previously done ethnographic work in environments frequented by criminals are just as likely to have their projects rejected as inexperienced doctoral researchers. These ethics committees and processes also push academics toward confidentiality for interviewees, which reduces their ability to fully authenticate their sources as valuable. (In fairness, insider sources will normally insist of anonymity anyway.) This is because these committees, in seeking to protect the vulnerable, treat all groups as though they are unable to see the bigger picture. It is as if highly experienced people from law enforcement and intelligence cannot manage their own risks, even though in most cases the potential interviewees have been doing just that for their entire careers. The danger of ethics committees is that they can infantilize both the academic and the sources. Ethics committees need to consider ethics from a real world rather hypothetical perspective. If journalists were subject to such committees, little quality reporting would ever be undertaken. Some of the most important research is to be found in areas that ethics committees will veto.

How Can Journalists and Intelligence-Focused Academics Cooperate?

For academic engagement with the public debate to be made timelier, all academics will have to challenge systemic barriers like overly rigorous ethics approval and the slow peer review publication process. Academics in the intelligence-related disciplines could, if so minded, take their cue from the journalists and improve certain areas. As noted, one measure academics have to consider now is impact. When an intelligence story breaks, journalists turn to existing or former intelligence insiders or oversight entities or even politicians. Stuart Hall and colleagues noted decades ago the role of elite interviewers, who they characterized as “primary definers. . . . Such spokesmen are understood to have access to more accurate or specialized information on particular topics than the majority of the population.”³⁵ I argue that the debate around Snowden was framed within the first weeks, if not days, of the story. Here the notion of an elite discourse fits well with Hall and colleagues’ way of thinking about where the debate was framed.³⁶ After the Snowden leaks, in most of the Five Eyes countries, the debate was polarized: government and the intelligence community, supported by parts of the press, stood on one side against the Snowden release, and journalists, some politicians, and considerable elements of civil society stood on the other, defending Snowden’s release.

Some academics do seek to get op-ed pieces in the media and are available to comment on major events in intelligence. In recent years academics, with encouragement from their universities, have been seeking to influence policy by writing for commentary websites, like *The Conversation* in Australia and *Open Democracy* in the UK. Although the actual impact is not yet clear, these websites do get accessible academic analysis into the public sphere quickly. Being concise and engaging is not a skill known to all academics. Richard Norton-Taylor noted, “Whenever there is an incident, I get a stream of comments or offers of comments from academics and universities and the vast majority of the comments are extremely banal.”³⁷ Countering, Gill noted that in the post-Snowden debate, academics have started to make contributions in other ways that are quicker than waiting for journal or book publication: “There were several post-Snowden inquiries: by the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), and that conducted by the UK Independent Reviewer of Terrorism legislation, David Anderson, to which academics contributed and in some cases were invited to public hearings. For example, I appeared with John Naughton, Julian Richards before ISC. Whether any of us had any impact on their conclusions, let alone policy, is another matter!”³⁸

Interdisciplinarity

For investigative journalists to work with academics would require a level of interdisciplinarity. Journalists are without a discipline and are by their nature interdisciplinary.

Their stories come from diverse sources, and journalists tend not to be constrained by boundaries. How about academics? Most universities say they encourage multi- or interdisciplinarity, and grant-awarding councils and bodies see it as advantage. This seems to work best in the sciences. As a research academic, I am surprised, despite the rhetoric, how reluctant academics, especially social scientists, are to engage with other related disciplines. When it enables understanding, I use an interdisciplinary approach, incorporating useful concepts from outside journalism studies. I have engaged with the intelligence studies discipline, in which there are discourse and methodologies for testing theory. My experience in the UK is that the silos are still concrete and not yet porous. Intelligence studies academics seem reluctant to integrate with security studies, surveillance studies, or terrorism studies and vice versa. Perhaps my view is harsh, as Gill argues that intelligence studies is itself at least multidisciplinary, if not interdisciplinary.

There is a small but growing discourse around intelligence and the media that a cross-discipline engagement adds value. However, as a journalism academic, I have felt deliberately discouraged by colleagues in UK intelligence studies at times. Some positively arbitrate against journalists (including journalism academics) attending their events or engaging in discourse. This is especially true when current or even former intelligence operatives are present. Essentially they think the presence of someone who has journalistic credentials will deter contributions from “the industry.” It is worth noting that journalism practitioners do understand Chatham House Rules, which state that “participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed.”³⁹ There have been some moves to persuade intelligence-focused academics to be more multidisciplinary, notably by Mark Phythian (see chapter 1 in this book).

Matters to Consider

Journalists are often quite willing to share their research material with academics once their story has been disseminated, as they frequently obtain far more data than they are able to use. I have noticed, however, that academics seem reluctant to use documents unless they are released by official sources or archives. For example, surprisingly little use has been made of the WikiLeaks Cablegate documents, a treasure trove of US State Department analysis of a wide range of countries, though some have suggested to me that could be because US academics who might want to obtain a security clearance in the future are reluctant to use Wikileaks documents. Such sensitivities do not cross the minds of journalists, who believe that “information is information” and the source of information is less important than its verification.

In addition to access to research material, academics might see other benefits of engaging with investigative journalists. A journalist who has been considering intelligence for many decades, for example, can bring mature subjectivity to the topic, especially given the data drought in intelligence.

International Cooperation

In the last decade or so, journalists have turned from being solo, retentive story hunters to far more collaborative operators. There have now been many stories in which journalists have collaborated across borders to exploit data leaks. The series of data leaks regarding offshore banking secrecy have been exemplary and have taught many lessons. The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists worked with the German newspaper *Suddeutsche Zeitung* and more than a hundred other media partners over the course of a year to sift “through 11.5 million leaked files to expose the offshore holdings of world political leaders, links to global scandals, and details of the hidden financial dealings of fraudsters, drug traffickers, billionaires, celebrities, sports stars and more.”⁴⁰ Academics of course often have international connections, and intelligence studies academics have the annual ISA conference. But it is worth considering whether these kinds of groupings could become more proactive in analyzing the contemporary landscape. Intelligence has international real-time links, and that raises serious oversight issues to consider and monitor.

Forums

In the UK, journalists and academics from a range of security and international relations disciplines meet in certain venues, like the Royal United Services Institute and Chatham House. In the US, they meet in venues such as the Brookings Institution in Washington. Some UK intelligence and security research groups invite investigative journalists to attend meetings and conferences. Duncan Campbell, for example, was invited to a Ditchley Foundation conference to discuss the impact of Snowden.⁴¹ Norton-Taylor, the most respected UK security correspondent, was invited regularly to such events but said he had attended only twice.⁴² The picture across the Five Eyes countries is varied, with the US being rather more open than others, especially with the intelligence-focused departments in its higher education institutions, like Georgetown University and University of Texas–Austin. Most specialist centers in UK universities do not engage with journalists. Academics could seek to organize forums in which intelligence matters are addressed by investigative journalists with experience in the field. The UK has a need for a new intelligence forum and research hub (similar in principle to the security hub created by a consortium of universities led by Lancaster University) that would engage more systematically with investigative journalists with national security interests.⁴³

Conclusion

The academic, often sitting in a single-occupancy office, is still often a lone operator and may benefit from a more collaborative and timely approach. This chapter argues for greater engagement and interdisciplinarity. Dover, Goodman, and White noted the key benefit of academic and intelligence interaction “is the enrichment of knowledge and

intelligence picture.⁴⁴ This can be extended to include journalists, especially those with a national security specialization. While intelligence-focused academic research and scholarship have integrated well-tested methodologies, academics might benefit from studying the ways and ethos of investigative journalism. Engagement might also reduce the polarization that featured so destructively in the Snowden debate. Taking their cue from investigative journalists, academics might consider a more proactive approach, perhaps taking on more contemporary research instead of historical scholarship and forgoing the consequential delay and lack of impact of the peer-reviewed publication process. However, the journalist-academic relationship is not a one-way street. Academics can also bring insight to journalists in understanding the processes of intelligence.

Given the too frequent failure of official oversight and accountability mechanisms for intelligence entities, there is a clear need for rigorous external monitoring from journalists and academics alike. In the UK I was involved with the interdisciplinary project DataPST!, which successfully trialed this approach.⁴⁵ Despite the revelations from and the debate over the Snowden case, it caused only a delay, rather than a rethink, of the expansion of Five Eyes' capability and mass surveillance. Bulk collection (as the intelligence community likes to frame it) continues its dangerous expansion; a US intelligence agency report stated the NSA had collected more than 500 million phone call records from Americans in 2017, more than triple the number gathered in 2016.⁴⁶ And there are new problems to confront. As this chapter was being written, Privacy International released a report titled *Secret Global Surveillance Networks: Intelligence Sharing between Governments and the Need for Safeguards*, which warned of "alarming weaknesses" in the oversight arrangements governing intelligence sharing between state agencies.⁴⁷ Engagement between journalists and academics would see enhanced cooperation and agility from the journalism side but also more measure and proportionality from the academic side.⁴⁸

There is work to be done. As Phythian points out, ethical issues are inseparable from intelligence activities and, like the question of failure, can take in the entire intelligence cycle:

Targeting of "friendly" states, the very notion of covert surveillance, and the more intrusive forms of collection, together with the question of covert action and other intelligence-led policy responses, all raise fundamental ethical questions. There is a growing body of work on this subject most recently clearly informed by developments in the "war on terror," specifically the torture debate in the US and the associated question of extraordinary rendition, in effect the outsourcing of torture by the US. Hence, more than ever before there is a need to adapt the just war paradigm to construct a concept of *jus in intelligentia*.⁴⁹

An ethical failure that brings a short-term gain (of information) but a long-term loss (of moral high ground) is illustrated in the case of Libyan dissident Abdel Hakim Belhaj and his wife, Fatima Boudchar. In 2004 MI6 (and the CIA) aided Belhaj's

rendition to Muammar al-Qaddafi's Libya, where the dissident was imprisoned and tortured. In 2018 British prime minister Theresa May had to make a full public apology for the rendition in front of the world.⁵⁰ Compelling evidence of British collusion in rendition had exposed a government cover-up. On matters of such importance, a mature dialogue across disciplines with experienced practitioners and academics may prevent repeating the mistakes of history.

Notes

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1. Claudette Roulo, "Leaks Damage National Security, NSA Director Says," American Forces Press Service, June 28, 2013.
2. "Spy Chief: Adversaries 'Rubbing Hands Together with Glee' after Snowden Revelations," *Daily Telegraph*, November 7, 2013, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/10431349/Spy-chief-adversaries-rubbing-hands-together-with-glee-after-Snowden-revelations.html>.
3. Peter Gill, email correspondence with the author, 2018.
4. Rodney Benson and Erik Neveu, *Bourdieu and the Journalistic Field* (Malden, MA: Polity, 2005), 3.
5. Kenneth Payne, email correspondence with the author, 2018.
6. This is difficult in national security reporting, especially in light of Snowden revelations, as journalists now know the full invasive capabilities of electronic surveillance methods that can be used to track sources. See Paul Lashmar, "No More Sources? The Impact of Snowden's Revelations on Journalists and Their Confidential Sources," *Journalism Practice* 11, no. 6 (2017): 665–88.
7. Loch Johnson, email correspondence with the author, 2015.
8. Paul Lashmar, "Urinal or Conduit? Institutional Information Flow between the UK Intelligence Services and News Media," *Journalism: Theory, Practice and Criticism* 14, no. 8 (2013): 1024–40.
9. Richard Norton-Taylor, email correspondence with the author, 2018.
10. In the UK, academics are under increasing pressure to engage with what is known as the "publish or die" culture of the government-inspired Research Excellence Framework (REF), a periodic review of academic research that will next be conducted in 2021. In the UK, papers are ranked by a four-star system, and for the REF, academics are under intense pressure to achieve three-star (nationally significant) or preferably four-star (internationally significant) ratings.

11. Tina Basi and Mona Sloane, "Impact Is Crippling Higher Education: But It Is Still Part of the Solution," *LSE Impact Blog* (blog), April 23, 2018, <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2018/04/23/impact-is-crippling-higher-education-but-it-is-still-part-of-the-solution/>.
12. Gill, email correspondence.
13. Robert Dover, Michael Goodman, and Martha White, "Two Worlds, One Common Pursuit: Why Greater Engagement with the Academic Community Could Benefit the UK's National Security," in *The Palgrave Handbook of Security, Risk and Intelligence*, ed. Robert Dover, Huw Dylan, and Michael Goodman (London: Palgrave, 2017), 461.
14. Related to Bourdieu's concept of the field with the *habitus*. *Illusio* is described most simply as the phenomenon whereby individuals are "taken in and by the game."
15. Gill, email correspondence.
16. Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence* (Washington, DC: Brassey's Inc., 2002), 171.
17. Dover, Goodman, and White, "Two Worlds," 461.
18. Peter Gill, *Intelligence Governance and Democratisation: A Comparative Analysis of the Limits of Reform* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2016).
19. Gill.
20. Although sometimes it is easier for academics (especially if they have a reputation for discretion) since interviewees know that they are not seeking immediate publication.
21. I have made minor amendments to these models and included in the intelligence cycle the evaluation of open-source material, which is now commonplace at an early stage, and the identification of source intelligence and sources (important in both journalism and intelligence).
22. Dover, Goodman, and White, "Two Worlds," 465–66.
23. Mark Hunter, Nils Hanson, Rana Sabbagh, Luuk Sengers, Drew Sullivan, Flemming Tait Svith, and Piva Thordse, *Story-Based Inquiry: A Manual for Investigative Journalists* (Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, 2011), <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-information/resources/publications-and-communication-materials/publications/full-list/story-based-inquiry-a-manual-for-investigative-journalists/>.
24. Gill, email correspondence.
25. Gill, email correspondence.
26. Gill, email correspondence.
27. Duncan Campbell, email correspondence with the author, February 23, 2018.
28. Gill, email correspondence.
29. For details of the full Bellingcat investigation, see <https://www.bellingcat.com/tag/mh17/page/9/>.
30. Campbell, email correspondence.
31. Gill, email correspondence.
32. Gill, email correspondence.
33. Dover, Goodman, and White, "Two Worlds," 470.

34. Gill, *Intelligence Governance*.
35. Stuart Hall, Charles Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke, and Brian Robert, *Policing the Crisis, Mugging, the State and Law and Order* (London: Palgrave Macmillan 1978), 61.
36. Entman said of framing, "To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described." R. M. Entman, "Framing: Towards a Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm," *Journal of Communication* 43, no. 4 (1993): 51–58.
37. Norton-Taylor, email correspondence.
38. John Naughton is professor of the public understanding of technology at the Open University. Dr. Julian Richard of the University of Buckingham spent nearly twenty years working in intelligence and security for the British government. Gill, email correspondence.
39. "Chatham House Rule," Chatham House, accessed May 31, 2018, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/chatham-house-rule>.
40. "About the Investigation," International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, accessed August 11, 2018, <https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/pages/panama-papers-about-the-investigation/>.
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42. Norton-Taylor, email correspondence.
43. Dover, Goodman, and White, "Two Worlds," 471.
44. Dover, Goodman, and White, 472.
45. "Welcome to Debating and Assessing Transparency Arrangements," Prifysgol Bangor University, accessed August 11, 2018, <http://data-psst.bangor.ac.uk/>.
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50. Declan Walsh, "Britain Apologizes for Role in Libyan Dissident's C.I.A. Nightmare," *New York Times*, May 10, 2018.