



# City Research Online

## City St George's, University of London

**Citation:** Saini, R. (2019). Between privilege and prejudice: social and political identity negotiation across the British South Asian middle classes. (Unpublished Doctoral thesis, City, University of London)

This is the accepted version of the paper.

This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. To cite this item please consult the publisher's version.

**Permanent repository link:** <https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/24244/>

**Copyright and Reuse:** Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright holders. Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, unless otherwise indicated, provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way. For full details of reuse please refer to [City Research Online policy](#).

**Between privilege and prejudice: Social and political identity  
negotiation across the British South Asian middle classes  
[CORRECTIONS]**

**Rima Saini**

Academic Supervisors:

Dr Rachel L Cohen

Dr Eric Harrison

Thesis submitted in requirement for the Doctor in Philosophy (D.Phil.)

Department of Sociology

City, University of London

Original document submitted: September 2018

Corrections submitted: November 2019

# CONTENTS

## VOLUME I: MAIN BODY

TITLE PAGE	1
CONTENTS	2
FIGURES AND TABLES: VOLUME I MAIN BODY	9
FIGURES AND TABLES: VOLUME II APPENDIX II	12
DECLARATION	13
ABSTRACT	14
ABBREVIATIONS	15

## **1. Introduction** **16**

1.1 Overview of project	16
1.2 Impetus for study	17
1.2.1 Dearth of research on the ethnic minority middle classes	17
1.2.2 Reflexivity and personal resonance	20
1.3 Situating the South Asian diaspora	22
1.3.1 The British South Asian diaspora at a glance	22
1.3.2 Commonwealth migration to the UK from the South Asian sub-continent	23
1.3.3 The formation of the South Asian middle-classes	24
1.4 Research questions	26
1.5 Overview of key findings	27
1.6 Structure of thesis	28

## **2. Literature review** **29**

### **2.1 Introduction** **29**

### **2.2 Class** **30**

2.2.1 Theoretical perspectives on class	30
2.2.2 Socio-economic measures of class	31
2.2.3 Occupation and class position	32

2.2.4	<i>Occupation and middle-class position: professionals</i>	33
2.2.6	<i>Occupation and middle-class position: managers</i>	34
2.2.7	<i>Class identity</i>	35
2.2.8	<i>Class consciousness</i>	35
2.2.9	<i>Objective class position and subjective class identity</i>	36
2.2.10	<i>Class as a salient social identity</i>	37
2.2.11	<i>Class identity enquiry</i>	37
2.2.12	<i>The British middle-classes</i>	38
2.2.13	<i>Middle-class practices</i>	38
2.2.14	<i>Middle-class identity</i>	40
<b>2.3</b>	<b>Race and ethnicity</b>	<b>41</b>
2.3.1	<i>Racial and ethnic categories</i>	41
2.3.2	<i>Race and racialisation</i>	42
2.3.3	<i>Race and racism</i>	43
2.3.4	<i>Ethnicity and ethnic identity</i>	44
2.3.5	<i>Ethnic identification and negotiation</i>	46
2.3.6	<i>Ethno-national identification</i>	47
2.3.7	<i>Ethno-religious identification</i>	49
2.3.8	<i>The relationship between race and ethnicity</i>	50
<b>2.4</b>	<b>Politics</b>	<b>51</b>
2.4.1	<i>Political identity</i>	51
2.4.2	<i>Political party identity</i>	52
2.4.3	<i>Political action and efficacy</i>	53
2.4.4	<i>Race, ethnicity and politics</i>	54
2.4.5	<i>Ethnic minority political representation</i>	56
2.4.6	<i>Ethnic minority voting</i>	57
2.4.7	<i>Class and party politics</i>	59
2.4.8	<i>Class identity and political identity</i>	59
2.4.9	<i>Class identity and relative deprivation</i>	60
<b>2.5</b>	<b>The British South Asian middle-classes</b>	<b>61</b>
2.5.1	<i>Critical theories of race</i>	61
2.5.2	<i>The British South Asian middle-classes</i>	62
2.5.3	<i>Ethnicity and middle-class identity</i>	62
2.5.4	<i>Ethnic minority middle-classness</i>	63
2.5.5	<i>Ethnic cultural and social capital</i>	65
2.5.6	<i>Racism and the British South Asian middle-classes</i>	68

2.5.7 <i>British South Asian middle-class politics</i>	70
<b>2.6 Conclusion</b>	<b>71</b>
<b>3. Methods</b>	<b>73</b>
<b>3.1 Introduction</b>	<b>73</b>
<b>3.2 Triangulation</b>	<b>74</b>
3.2.1 <i>The need for triangulation</i>	74
3.2.2 <i>Epistemological dialogue between methods</i>	74
3.2.3 <i>Mixed-methods models</i>	75
<b>3.3. Research design</b>	<b>79</b>
3.3.1 <i>Quantitative research design: RQ 2 &amp; 3</i>	80
3.3.2 <i>Qualitative research design: RQ 1, 2 &amp; 3</i>	80
<b>3.4 The data</b>	<b>83</b>
3.4.1 <i>The quantitative data</i>	<b>83</b>
<u>3.4.1.1 Description of the quantitative data</u>	83
<u>3.4.1.2 Operationalisation of key concepts in quantitative data</u>	94
<u>3.4.1.3 Quantitative data analysis</u>	98
3.4.2 <i>The qualitative data</i>	98
<u>3.4.2.1 Qualitative data collection</u>	98
<u>3.4.2.2 Operationalisation of key concepts in qualitative data</u>	105
<u>3.4.2.3 Similar studies engaging in subjective identity enquiry</u>	107
<u>3.4.2.4 Qualitative data analysis</u>	113
<b>3.5 Reflections on research design and methods</b>	<b>115</b>
3.5.1 <i>Data availability and temporality</i>	115
3.5.2 <i>Sample size and representativeness</i>	115
3.5.3 <i>Classificatory identity measures</i>	116
3.5.4 <i>Quantitatively analysing race and ethnicity</i>	116
3.5.5 <i>Interpretation of structured survey indicators</i>	118
3.5.6 <i>Quantitative identity analysis using interaction terms</i>	118
3.5.7 <i>Qualitative identity research</i>	119
3.5.8. <i>Reflexivity and ‘insider’ research</i>	120

<b>3.7 Conclusion</b>	<b>123</b>
<b>4. Perceptions, subjectivities, and experiences of class</b>	<b>124</b>
<b>4.1 Introduction</b>	<b>124</b>
<b>4.2 Problematizing class categories</b>	<b>125</b>
<i>4.2.1 Class and socio-economic status</i>	125
<i>4.2.2 Class and capitals</i>	127
<i>4.2.3 Class and background</i>	129
<i>4.2.4 Class and privilege</i>	132
<b>4.3 Defining middle-classness</b>	<b>133</b>
<b>4.4. Self-definitions of class</b>	<b>136</b>
<i>4.4.1 Working-class / hybridised class identity</i>	136
<i>4.4.2 Middle-class identity</i>	139
<i>4.4.3 No class identity or rejection of classification</i>	142
<b>4.5 A British South Asian ‘model’ of middle-classness?</b>	<b>145</b>
<i>4.5.1 Whiteness, Britishness, and the middle-classes</i>	146
<i>4.5.2 Ethnic capital as middle-class capital</i>	149
<i>4.5.3 Gendered ethnic capitals</i>	152
<b>4.6 Conclusion</b>	<b>155</b>
<b>5. Racial / ethnic identity formation and salience</b>	<b>158</b>
<b>5.1 Introduction</b>	<b>158</b>
<b>5.2 Facets of ethnic identity and their relative importance</b>	<b>159</b>
<i>5.2.1 Ethnic identity salience</i>	159
<i>5.2.2 The interplay of ethnic and religious identities</i>	165
<i>5.2.3 The role of religion in cultural identity</i>	165

5.2.4	<i>The intellectualisation of religious identity</i>	166
5.2.5	<i>Social mixing and group belongings</i>	167
5.2.6	<i>Inter- and intra-ethnic mixing</i>	168
<b>5.3</b>	<b>Negotiations of ethnic, religious and national identity</b>	<b>170</b>
5.3.1	<i>Social identity negotiation</i>	173
5.3.2	<i>Mutually exclusive identities</i>	177
5.3.3	<i>'British' culture</i>	178
<b>5.4</b>	<b>Discrimination and prejudice</b>	<b>179</b>
5.4.1	<i>Perceived levels of racism in the professions</i>	182
5.4.2	<i>Post-racial rationalisations of social mobility</i>	184
5.4.3	<i>Anti-Muslim racisms</i>	187
5.4.4	<i>Discrimination and ethnic identity formation</i>	188
5.4.5	<i>Ethnic stereotyping and identity</i>	189
5.4.6	<i>Oppressions in middle-class spaces</i>	190
<b>5.5</b>	<b>Relating class identity to ethnic identity</b>	<b>195</b>
<b>5.6</b>	<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>199</b>
<b>6.</b>	<b>Political consciousness on political identity and activity</b>	<b>201</b>
<b>6.1</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>201</b>
<b>6.2</b>	<b>Minority racial / ethnic and class consciousness</b>	<b>202</b>
6.2.1	<i>Class consciousness</i>	204
6.2.2.	<i>Racial / minority ethnic consciousness</i>	206
6.2.3	<i>Consciousness factor scores</i>	208
6.2.4	<i>Manifestations of political consciousness in interviews</i>	213
6.2.4.1	<u>Reconciling objective class status and social inequality</u>	213
6.2.4.2	<u>Conflicting political ideologies</u>	215
6.2.4.3	<u>Protecting minority interests</u>	216
6.2.4.4	<u>Black and Asian political representation</u>	217

<b>6.3 Political party identity</b>	<b>219</b>
6.3.1 <i>Examining explanations of party identity</i>	221
6.3.2 <i>Blairite tendencies across the Indian respondents</i>	225
6.3.3 <i>Immigrant history and party identity</i>	226
6.3.4 <i>Political parties and group representation</i>	229
6.3.5 <i>Ethnic minority political representation and tokenism</i>	232
6.3.6 <i>Representation of the Muslim community</i>	234
<b>6.4 Political activity</b>	<b>235</b>
6.4.1 <i>Political action and engagement</i>	236
6.4.2 <i>Civic engagement</i>	238
6.4.3 <i>Constructing a political and civic activity scale</i>	241
<b>6.6 Consciousness on political party identity and activity</b>	<b>242</b>
<b>6.7 Conclusion</b>	<b>247</b>
<b>7. Conclusion</b>	<b>249</b>
7.1 Introduction	249
7.2 Key research gaps and theoretical contributions	250
7.3 Overall findings	252
7.4 Limitations of the study	257
7.5 Future research	260
7.6 Concluding remarks	261

## **VOLUME II: APPENDICES**

<b>TITLE PAGE</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>APPENDIX I: BIBLIOGRAPHY</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>APPENDIX II: FIGURES AND TABLES</b>	<b>42</b>

## APPENDIX III: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

A3.1 Participant Information Sheet	69
A3.2 Participant Consent Form	73
A3.3 MacArthur Ladder of Social Status	75

## FIGURES AND TABLES

### VOLUME I: MAIN BODY

#### FIGURES

##### Chapter 3

Fig. 1 Research questions and corresponding methods	76
Fig. 2 The convergent-parallel mixed-methods model	76
Fig. 3 The exploratory-sequential mixed-methods model	77
Fig. 4 The embedded approach to mixed-methods	78
Fig. 5 The research process	82

##### Chapter 4

Fig. 6 Rakhi's (Indian Gujarati Hindu lawyer from London) identity map	129
Fig. 7 Deepak's (Indian Gujarati Hindu lawyer from London) identity map	132
Fig. 8 Sunil's (Indian Gujarati Hindu engineer from London) identity map	141
Fig. 9 Mohan's (Indian Punjabi Sikh engineer from Warwickshire) identity map	147

##### Chapter 5

Fig. 10 'Which best describes how you think of yourself': More [Black/Asian] or more Religion / More [Black/Asian] or more British / More British or more [Religion]. Respondents in professional and managerial occupations only. EMBES 2010.	171
Fig. 11 Priya's (Indian Hindu Gujarati engineer from London) identity map	185

##### Chapter 6

Fig. 12 Indicators tapped by consciousness components generated from Principal Components Analysis	211
Fig. 13 Mean estimate and 95 per cent error bars for rescaled consciousness factor scores	212

#### TABLES

##### Chapter 3

Table 3.1 Comparison of quantitative and qualitative sample parameters	77
------------------------------------------------------------------------	----

Table 3.2 Overview of quantitative datasets used in study: The British Election Study Ethnic Minority Survey 2010 (EMBES) and the Citizenship Survey 2010/11 (CS)	84
Table 3.3 Key demographic indicators in the British Election Study Ethnic Minority Survey (EMBES) and Citizenship Survey (CS)	86
Table 3.4 Key demographic indicators in the White sample for the main British Election Study (BES) and Citizenship Survey (CS)	89
Table 3.5. Key demographic indicators across the professional and managerial samples by ethnicity for British Election Study Ethnic Minority Survey 2010 (EMBES) and Citizenship Survey 2010/11 (CS)	92
Table 3.6 Quantitative indicators from EMBES and CS used in study	97
Table 3.7 Demographic information of qualitative interviewees	103
Table 3.8 Ethnicities, gender and class background across the qualitative sample	105
Table 3.9 Qualitative interview script with rationale	110
<b>Chapter 5</b>	
Table 5.1 Binary logistic regressions for ethnicity and occupational class with outcome variables: importance of religion / country parents originally from / nationality to sense of who you are. Pakistani and Indian respondents only. CS 2010/11.	162
Table 5.2 Binary logistic regressions for ethnicity and occupational class with outcome variables: great deal in common with ethnic group / great deal in common with British people. Pakistani and Indian respondents only. EMBES 2010.	164
Table 5.3 Binary logistic regressions for ethnicity and occupational class with outcome variables: More prejudice against R's ethnic group than others / More prejudice against R's religious group than others / experienced discrimination based on religion. Pakistani and Indian respondents only. EMBES 2010.	181
Table 5.4 Principal components analysis with varimax rotation for 8 ethnic- and class-related identity salience indicators. South Asian respondents in professional and managerial occupations only. CS 2010/11.	197
<b>Chapter 6</b>	
Table 6.1 Indicators of class consciousness. All South Asians. EMBES 2010.	205
Table 6.2 Indicators of a racial / ethnic minority consciousness. All South Asians. EMBES 2010	207
Table 6.3 Principal components analysis with varimax rotation for 16 class and racial / minority ethnic consciousness indicators. All South Asians. EMBES 2010.	209
Table 6.4 Party identification by party voted for in 2010 General Election. All South Asians and White British. EMBES 2010 and BES 2010.	228
Table 6.5 Correlation coefficients for dependent variables and consciousness factor scores.	243
Table 6.6 Linear regression and binary logistic regressions for ethnicity, occupational class and consciousness with outcome variables: level of political activity, and left / right political party orientation. Pakistani and Indian respondents only. EMBES 2010.	247

## **VOLUME II: APPENDICES**

<b>APPENDIX II: FIGURES AND TABLES</b>	<b>42</b>
<b>A2.1 British South Asian ethnic groups by religion. Office for National Statistics 2011.</b>	<b>42</b>
<b>A2.2 Final thematic coding framework for interview data</b>	<b>43</b>
<b>A2.3 Importance of ethnic or racial background / country family originally came from / religion / nationality to ‘sense of who you are’ and a ‘great deal in common’ with others from respondent’s ethnicity / religion / British people. Percentages by South Asian ethnicity. Respondents in professional or managerial occupations only. CS 2010/11.</b>	<b>47</b>
<b>A2.4 Parameter coding for categorical variables in all regression analyses. EMBES 2010.</b>	<b>48</b>
<b>A2.5 Do you think there is more or less prejudice against [respondent’s] ethnic group / religious group than against other ethnic groups / religious groups?’ and experiences of discrimination based on ethnicity, race or skin colour / religion in the past 5 years. Percentages by South Asian ethnicity. Respondents in professional or managerial occupations only. EMBES 2010.</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>A2.6 ‘Which groups, if any, do you think there is prejudice against?’. Percentages by South Asian ethnicity. Respondents in professional and managerial occupations. EMBES 2010.</b>	<b>50</b>
<b>A2.7 Most or all of members of neighbourhood/ place of work/ friends same ethnicity or religion. Percentages by South Asian ethnicity. Respondents in professional and managerial occupations. EMBES 2010.</b>	<b>50</b>
<b>A2.8 ‘Which best describes how you think of yourself’: More [Black/Asian] or more [Religion]. Percentages by ethno-religion. Respondents in professional and managerial occupations. EMBES 2010.</b>	<b>50</b>
<b>A2.9 ‘Which best describes how you think of yourself’: More [Black/Asian] or more British. Percentages by ethno-religion. Respondents in professional and managerial occupations. EMBES 2010.</b>	<b>51</b>
<b>A2.10 ‘Which best describes how you think of yourself’: More British or more [Religion]. Percentages by ethno-religion. Respondents in professional and managerial occupations. EMBES 2010.</b>	<b>51</b>
<b>A2.11 Ethnic / racial background, religion, occupation, country family originally came from, income, education and social class important to ‘sense of who you are’. Percentages by South Asian ethnicity. Respondents in professional and managerial occupations. CS 2010/11.</b>	<b>52</b>
<b>A2.12 Principal components analysis with varimax rotation for 8 ethnic- and class-related identity salience indicators within each ethnic group. South Asian respondents in professional and managerial occupations. CS 2010/11.</b>	<b>53</b>

<b>A2.13 Kaiser-Meyer Olkin (KMO) and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity for 8 ethnic- and class-related identity salience indicators. All South Asian respondents in professional and managerial occupations. CS 2010/11.</b>	<b>53</b>
<b>A2.14 Kaiser-Meyer Olkin (KMO) and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity for the 8 class and ethnic identity salience indicators by South Asian ethnic group. Respondents in professional and managerial occupations. CS 2010/11.</b>	<b>54</b>
<b>A2.15 Scree plot and table depicting variance by component number in PCA for the 8 class and ethnic identity salience indicators. All South Asian respondents in professional and managerial occupations. CS 2010/11.</b>	<b>55</b>
<b>A2.16 Scree plot and table depicting variance by component number in PCA for the 8 class and ethnic identity salience indicators. Indian respondents in professional and managerial occupations. CS 2010/11.</b>	<b>56</b>
<b>A2.17 Scree plot and table depicting variance by component number in PCA for the 8 class and ethnic identity salience indicators. Pakistani respondents in professional and managerial occupations. CS 2010/11.</b>	<b>57</b>
<b>A2.18 Scree plot and table depicting variance by component number in PCA for the 8 class and ethnic identity salience indicators. Bangladeshi respondents in professional and managerial occupations. CS 2010/11.</b>	<b>58</b>
<b>A2.19 Kaiser-Meyer Olkin (KMO) and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity for the 16 class and minority racial / ethnic consciousness indicators. All South Asians. EMBES 2010.</b>	<b>59</b>
<b>A2.20 Scree plot and table depicting variance by component number in PCA for 16 class and minority racial / ethnic consciousness indicators. All South Asians. EMBES 2010.</b>	<b>60</b>
<b>A2.21 Party identification across main UK political parties. Percentages by South Asian ethnicity and for White British. Respondents in professional and managerial occupations. EMBES 2010 and BES 2010.</b>	<b>61</b>
<b>A2.22 Recoded left / right political party identity variable. Percentages by South Asian ethnicity. Respondents in professional and managerial occupations. EMBES 2010.</b>	<b>61</b>
<b>A2.23 Party identification by party voted for in 2010 General Election. Proportions within party identification for each South Asian ethnicity. Respondents in professional and managerial occupations. EMBES 2010.</b>	<b>62</b>
<b>A2.24 Party identification by party best for ethnic minorities. Proportions within party identification for each South Asian ethnicity. Respondents in professional and managerial occupations. EMBES 2010.</b>	<b>63</b>
<b>A2.25 Labour / Conservative look after Black and Asians, the working classes, and the middle-classes fairly or very well. All South Asian party identifiers and Labour identifiers in professional and managerial occupations. EMBES 2010.</b>	<b>64</b>
<b>A2.26 'Parties only interested in votes of Black and Asians'. Percentages within South Asian ethnicity. Respondents in professional and managerial occupations. EMBES 2010.</b>	<b>64</b>
<b>A2.27 Political engagement. Percentages by South Asian ethnicity. Respondents in professional or managerial occupations. EMBES 2010.</b>	<b>65</b>
<b>A2.28 Civic engagement. Percentages by South Asian ethnicity. Respondents in professional or managerial occupations only. EMBES 2010.</b>	<b>66</b>

<b>A2.29 Descriptive statistics for civic and political activity scale. By South Asian ethnicity. Respondents in professional and managerial occupations. EMBES 2010.</b>	<b>66</b>
<b>A2.30 T-test between consciousness factor scores and left- / right-of-centre party orientation. All South Asians. EMBES 2010.</b>	<b>67</b>
<b>A2.31 Normal P-P plot and histogram of standardised residuals. Political activity, two-way interaction model. All South Asians. EMBES 2010.</b>	<b>68</b>

## **DECLARATION**

I grant powers of discretion to the University Librarian to allow the thesis to be copied in whole or in part without further reference to me. This permission covers only single copies made for study purposes, subject to normal conditions of acknowledgement.

## ABSTRACT

Ethnic minorities in the UK who occupy middle-class social locations exist at the juncture of privilege and prejudice. They are, on the one hand, seen as harnessing high levels of economic, cultural and social capital. On the other hand, they suffer, as ethnoracial minorities, from 'everyday' and structural racisms and exclusions. This thesis analyses how these positionalities shape class and racial / ethnic identities for the UK South Asian middle classes. It ultimately seeks to understand how these identities are negotiated, and their potential effect on the political orientations and activities of this population. It attempts to address the dearth of academic research into the everyday experiences and identities of middle-class ethnic minorities in the UK. There is also an acknowledgement of the diversity of the South Asian middle classes with, in places where feasible, a discussion of the differences between the largest South Asian ethnic minority groups in the UK – Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis – who are characterised by differing migration and settlement histories, patterns of social mobility, and experiences of racialisation.

Secondary quantitative data from the British Election Study Ethnic Minority Survey (EMBES) 2010 and the Citizenship Survey (CS) 2010/11, combined with primary, semi-structured qualitative interview data carried out from 2015 to 2016, forms the evidence base for this study. Analysis of quantitative identity indicators and in-depth conversations about class, ethnic, religious, national and political identity allowed for in-depth examination of the framework of identifications across a still under-researched minority ethnic sub-population. The first analysis chapter addresses subjectivities of class, the second racial / ethnic identity salience, and the third how class and race / ethnicity interact to form a sense of political consciousness.

The findings establish that middle classness is problematised by those in the South Asian middle classes and generally lacks the salience that ethnic and religious identity does. Class and minority racial / ethnic identity are co-constitutive for the British South Asian middle classes and often shaped by historical and ongoing experiences of discrimination and exclusion from racialised constructions of middle classness. The South Asian middle classes tend to be attached to the Labour party but this differs between the Indian and Pakistani sub-groups with the former tending to exhibit more political conservatism. Political consciousness embedded in a sense of racial / ethnic solidarity and a worker / working-class consciousness sense affects political identities and engagement differently for the middle classes and the non-middle classes, particularly in the case of the British Pakistanis.

## ABBREVIATIONS

CS:	Citizenship Survey 2010/11
EMBES:	British Election Study Ethnic Minority Survey 2010
Pak.:	Pakistani
Bang.:	Bangladeshi
RQ:	Research question
SES:	Socio-economic status
UK:	United Kingdom
WC:	Working-class
MC:	Middle-class
EM:	Ethnic minority
PI / Party ID:	Party identity
Con.:	Conservative
Lib Dem.:	Liberal Democrat
C:	Component
PCA:	Principal component analysis
df:	degrees of freedom
CI:	confidence interval
sig.:	significance
var.:	variance
cum.:	cumulative
diff.:	difference

# 1. Introduction

This introduction sets out the ‘problem’ I attempt to address in this thesis. It begins by discussing and outlining the impetus for the study. It then sets out the research questions and allude to key findings. It discusses the positionality of the researcher as both an impetus of, and a limitation of, the study. Finally, it outlines the structure of the thesis.

## 1.1 Overview of project

South Asians in the UK are often characterised as an immigrant success story. From the corner shop / curry house stereotype (Charsley and Bolognani 2017; Joshi 2014; Thussu 2013) they are now increasingly seen as entrepreneurial, hard-working, aspirational, and, in parts, well-integrated. This is, however, a simplistic picture of a diverse population. The groups that make up the British South Asian diaspora<sup>1</sup> have different histories, ethnic and religious traditions, and social mobility trajectories. As a result, they hold varying social identities, belongings, and political profiles. Their journeys have been characterised by social exclusions and structural racisms that have coloured their class and ethnic formation, including the ways in which some experience being both middle-class and minority ethnic.

In this thesis, I focus on analysing the importance of class and racial<sup>2</sup> / ethnic identity amongst male and female British South Asians<sup>3</sup> in the ‘middle-classes’ (objectively defined as those in professional and managerial occupations).

---

<sup>1</sup> ‘Diaspora’ is a complex socio-political concept. It is largely used to refer to a scattered transnational ethnic population, living in a land other than that in which its majority resides. Vertovec (1997) states that the term has been over-used by academics who fail to apply appropriate analytical rigour to it. Diaspora can be conceived as an identity which encompasses histories and unique, collective experiences of migration, settlement and development. Diasporic groups “attempt to maintain (real and/or imagined) connections and commitments to their homeland *and* recognize themselves and act as a collective community” (Bhatia 2002, p. 59) to the extent that they can be seen to constitute institutions that house their own economies, networks, and organisations. This thesis explores some of these shared identities, networks and processes, but a meta-analysis of the concept of diaspora within a South Asian context is not its aim. In this thesis, the term will be employed largely in a descriptive sense to refer primarily to the UK South Asian population.

<sup>2</sup> Race will be referred in juxtaposition to ethnicity in this study (‘racial / ethnic identity’). Race has a complex but nonetheless close relationship to the concept of ethnicity which will be discussed in detail in section 2.3.8. It is salient to understanding the experiences and social identities of ‘visible’ ethnic minorities like British South Asians. Race will not be written with quotation marks in this thesis because although the hierarchies of racial difference are now (largely) accepted as biological fiction, race and racial classification as social constructs have tangible ‘real life’ consequences.

<sup>3</sup> I have not looked in detail at the working classes in relation to the middle classes in this thesis. I have also not analysed other sizeable British ethnic minority groups such as Black Africans or Caribbeans, or East

I do so through the analysis of primary qualitative interview data with British South Asian (Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi) men and women in professional occupations and analysis of secondary quantitative data on ethnic minority identity (the British Election Study Ethnic Minority Survey 2010 and the Citizenship Survey 2010/11). I then seek to establish the effect of these identity frameworks on party political identity and political activity. This is to assess the extent to which the British South Asian middle classes can be considered a distinct political grouping, apart from the White middle classes or working-class South Asians who have been researched to a greater extent, and what social identity-related factors might drive their politics (see section 1.4 for a full discussion of the research questions). The thesis is grounded in critical theories of race which assert the need to place issues of race / ethnicity, religion and racism at the centre of understandings of class formation and lived experiences of class, and to acknowledge the multiplicity of experiences, oppressions and identities based on race / ethnicity and class wherever empirically possible.

## **1.2 Impetus for study**

This section outlines the impetus for this choice of research area. Firstly, I discuss the need for more comprehensive research into the British ethnic minority middle classes and argue for the timely nature of the research which feeds into current political debates and discussions about multiculturalism. Secondly, I look at the personal resonance of the subject to matter to myself, the sole researcher in this thesis. I outline how my social positioning, personal history and identities drew me to the subject matter, and the effect it had on the evolution of this study and my role as an identity researcher.

### *1.2.1 Dearth of research on the ethnic minority middle classes*

British South Asian identity has been the subject of a number of studies on diasporic identity construction and negotiation (Jaspal and Cinirella 2010; Werbner 2004; Vertovec 1999), intersecting marginalised identities (Hussain 2005; Dwyer 2000), social mobility and racial disadvantage (Modood 2004), and the negotiation of ethno-religious - particularly Muslim -

---

Asians. The focus of this thesis is a within-ethnoracial group analysis, focusing on the middle-class South Asian diaspora. Existing research has alluded to the uniqueness of the ethnic minority middle classes in relation to 1) the White British middle classes and 2) the ethnic minority working classes, warranting a focus on class and racial / ethnic identity for the South Asian middle classes. In Chapter 6, the White British sample and the South Asian non-middle class sample have been referred to in the quantitative analyses in order to politically place the South Asian middle classes in relation to another ethnic group and class group of considerable size. In the regression analyses, the non-middle classes are the reference group for occupational class.

identity (Ahmad and Evergeti 2010; Maxwell 2006; Jacobson 1997). However, a comprehensive analysis of identity frameworks across the British South Asian middle classes has been somewhat lacking.

While the British ethnic minority middle classes may be socio-economically 'well-off', they are part of a minority ethnoracial collectivity that has suffered (and is still suffering) from social, economic and political exclusions (discussed further in section 1.3 in this chapter). The consequences of such a unique positioning for class and racial / ethnic identity is both an interesting and under-researched area in sociology. Platt (2011) has commented on this, stating: "In relation to ethnicity, the experience of well-off minority group members has received scant research attention; we know little about whether those at the upper end of the income distribution feel a sense of belonging with others of the same ethnic group, or the extent to which ethnic and class identities intersect" (p. 12).

The nature of the class-race intersection has been explored at length by a range of scholars (Sivanandan 1976; Collins 1993; Fenton 1999; Boris and Janssens 2000; Brah and Pheonix 2004; Khattab et al. 2011; Anthias 2013). Although Marx and Engels did observe in the context of the Irish in England and Blacks in the US that ethnic subgroupings can lead to distinctive subcultures which could break up class groups (Marx and Engels 1961; 1971), classical, foundational Marxian theories of class have tended to come across difficulties in explaining ethnic differences in the context of social stratification: "there are at least some instances where the independent influence of ethnicity overrides that of class for the specialist in race relations to regard Marxian stratification theory as of relatively limited application to the problems with which he is particularly concerned" (Runciman 1972, p. 497).

When race and class did emerge as a distinct field of analysis in sociology the working classes were the primary focus. And when the middle classes emerged in class theory as a population of interest, "'race' rarely came on the agenda as an influence of middle-class formation" (Phillips and Sarre 1995, p. 76). Contemporary studies of race and class have, to some extent, branched out from their focus on the working classes as a result of the significant social change and class transformation that has taken place over the last few decades (Savage 2003). Khattab et al. (2011), Platt (2005a) and Modood (2004) have discussed the unique relationship ethnicity and ethno-religious inequalities have on social mobility and the upward trajectories of UK ethnic minorities. Song (2003), Archer (2011) and Rollock et al. (2013) have, among others, sought to explore the identities and experiences of the racialised middle classes, and how ethnic minority groups negotiate and internalise classed identities. Daye (1994), in particular, has interrogated the 'anonymity' of the Black middle classes, exposing their struggles of being posited as 'sell outs' and 'token Blacks' in their predominantly working-class communities.

These sorts of studies are still few and far between, however, with little specific focus on the British South Asian middle-class experience. In terms of the sorts of research questions being probed in the field of class and race analysis, there is more scope to examine the extent and meaning of class and ethnic identities, the co-constitutive nature of these identities, and their political consequences for middle-class ethnic minority groups. The mixed-methods approach to this thesis – combining quantitative and qualitative analysis – is well placed to engage in such a comprehensive analysis (discussed in section 3.2).

This thesis also addresses subject matter that is increasingly drawing the attention of the political media. Middle-class British South Asians – Indians in particular - were said to have been key in shifting the balance of power between the primary UK political parties (Labour and Conservative) in the 2010, 2015 and 2017 elections. Headlines on this include: '*How the Conservatives stole the Indian vote from Labour*' (Ehsan 2017) and '*British Asian Tory voters: You don't have to be White to vote right*' (Mehta 2015). Middle-class British South Asians are beginning to be considered a distinct political population, capable of breaking the long-standing political loyalty of ethnic minorities to the Labour party, known for its protection of immigrant and minority interests (Heath et al. 2013; Saggar 1998). This has largely been posited as a function of the changing class interests of predominantly second-generation South Asians, both economic and social in character. However, particular attention is required to the role racial / ethnic group identifications play in this so-called political shift and the ways in which these shape, and are shaped by, changing class interests and identities, and therefore what this might say about the 'ethnic-dependent' nature of middle-classness.<sup>4</sup>

As the second and third generation immigrant communities grow and diasporas begin to acquire the same sort of social diversity as the wider population, the development of the ethnic minority middle classes - and the extent to which they can be seen and indeed see themselves as part and parcel of the economic and political practices of the broader middle classes - has taken on significance. There has been a spurt of academic literature in the last five years looking at the ethnic minority middle-classes in the UK and the US, in terms of ethnic-specific routes to economic, social and cultural capital accumulation. These seek to destabilise current class-determined theories of social mobility as well as understand how ethnic minority groups themselves conceptualise their successes from a racial, classed and gendered perspective (Chung 2018; Wallace 2018, 2019; Meghji and Saini 2017).

---

<sup>4</sup> 'Middle-classness' and the 'middle classes' will be referred to throughout this thesis. The latter largely refers to a particular population, the former, the sorts of attributes, practices and behaviours associated within this population.

The extent to which race ‘trumps’ class or class ‘trumps’ race in determining the extent of inequality or privilege conferred on a particular group is a key area of discussion in the context of seismic global and national political changes such as Brexit. Brexit has been precipitated by, in many scholars’ opinions, majority national and racial self-interest operating against a context of increased economic uncertainty and rising class inequality (Rajan-Rankin 2017; Bhambra 2017b; Virdee and McGeever 2017). With increased scrutiny of European migrants in the UK since the EU referendum in 2016, Muslim hate crimes have only increased as a response to broad antipathy of the ‘other’ against the context of increasing xenophobic political and media discourse. ‘Muslim’ identities in Britain have already long been posited as a threat to liberal, British values of individual sovereignty, pluralism, and tolerance. The Integrated Communities Strategy Green paper (March 2018) expressed the vision of the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government for ‘building strong integrated communities’. The document echoed harmful discourses which pathologise ethnic minority (particularly Muslim) communities and posit immigration as inherently problematic for national and social cohesion. These include the view that some ethnic minority communities are ‘held back’ socially and economically not by institutional and everyday racisms and poor local and national political representation, but by self-segregation and negative cultural attitudes (p. 11-12). Policy responses with regard to ethnic minority communities are therefore disproportionately focused on the promotion of ‘British values’ (p. 14). Analysis of this dichotomy - ‘Britishness vs Muslimness’ - forms much of the discussion in the second and third analysis chapters of this thesis, and establishes both the continued importance of group identities, loyalties and affiliations to questions of belonging and political identity, and the complexity yet importance of ‘being British’ for ethno-religious minorities. This builds on academic research about British Muslim belonging in the light of rising Islamophobia (Birt 2013; Ahmad and Evergeti 2010; Bowlby and Lloyd-Evans 2009; Vertovec 2002). By focusing on members of the ethnic minority middle classes, this thesis shows that nationalist discourses exacerbate the feeling of ‘otherness’ felt by British ethnic and religious minorities across all socio-economic strata, albeit in differing ways.

### *1.2.2 Reflexivity and personal resonance*

Reflexivity is the acknowledgement of the complexity of knowledge production. Research is shaped by a myriad of situated factors and cannot (indeed should not) be divorced from these. The preconceptions, assumptions, values and beliefs of the researcher are irrevocably tied up in the research process (Jootun and McGhee 2009; Gibbs 2007). This has often been framed pejoratively, however, associated with research ‘bias’. As a self-identified member of the population I analysed in this study, the subject matter held personal resonance and fascination for me. As a social science researcher, it was my duty to employ a sociological lens to analyse and acknowledge reflexivity: how my social positioning, my identities, my

research specialisms and my theoretical stance shaped this study, placing limitations but also opportunities in my path. The practice of reflexive research involves deconstructing the distance traditionally placed between the researcher as a person, member of society, political actor and so on, and the researcher as analyst (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). The way the researcher fits into the dynamics of privilege and oppression experienced by the respondents is particularly important in identity research where multiple identities are under scrutiny. The interpretation of data carried out by the researcher is a reflexive exercise through which meanings (Mauthner et al. 1998) – and researchers – are made. My positioning as a self-defined professional and a ‘member’ of the British South Asian diaspora was thus integral not only to the impetus but the content of this study (see section 3.5.8).

Critical reflexivity is centred on acknowledging the impact a researcher’s own subjectivity has on their interpretations, communication, understandings and conclusions from the data, not simply asserting a claim to knowledge based on a combination of identities. To give justice to the ensuing data, therefore, not only the content but the *context* in which that content evolved must be acknowledged. Considering the real, emotional connections made between the researcher and participant – humour, joy, shock, confusion – results in a richer understanding of the subject matter in question.<sup>5</sup> One of my interview participants - a senior engineer and business owner now living in suburban Warwickshire - became emotional when talking to me about his past, using anecdotes from his life history to describe his rise from poverty to wealth. Whereas ‘opening up’ can prove a helpful and welcome release for research participants (Karp 1996), the researcher must ensure this doesn’t risk emotional harm (Rubin and Rubin 1995). The interviews were not intended to elicit particularly sensitive responses, and each participant was reminded that, as stated in the consent form (see Appendix III A3.2), they only have to participate insofar as they feel comfortable doing so. However, when delving into life histories and identities, it is expected that emotions may come to the fore. The similarities between myself and this respondent evoked a mild emotional reaction from me, as I could empathise with parts of his life story. This part of the interview was thus significant for the ‘communion’ that was experienced between both parties (Benjamin 1988). In this communion the boundaries between interviewer and interviewee and the tension that exists in such a space of formality and performativity were at their most blurred. It was also here where the importance of this research was vindicated, in terms of making sense of the experiences and postcolonial traumas of those with similar backgrounds

---

<sup>5</sup> Researchers who rely heavily on recordings tend to lose their ability to recall conversations and events from memory (Rubin and Rubin 1995). In this study, therefore, written observational notes were recorded during and immediately after each interview. The interviews over the phone and on Skype were problematic in this respect, precluding the opportunity for interesting one-to-one experiences.

to me, and in illuminating the symbolic distance these individuals had travelled and the precarity of the liminal spaces which they now inhabit.

### **1.3 Situating the South Asian diaspora**

The three main groups which comprise the UK South Asian diaspora have had differing experiences of integration into the labour market, arriving as immigrant groups into the UK with varying economic and social resources. They have also had differing experiences of racism. Muslim Pakistanis and Bangladeshis suffer from anti-Muslim racisms (Cashin 2010) and distinct ethno-religious inequalities (Khattab and Modood 2015) which affect both their life chances and their everyday experiences of minority ethnicity somewhat differently from Hindu and Sikh Indians. Alongside their differing cultural make-ups and experiences of racialisation, South Asian ethnic groups have had different migration histories and experiences of settlement in the UK that diverge as well as converge with other large immigrant groups in the UK such as Black Caribbeans and Africans. Although there exists a general level of cultural similarity amongst the groups that comprise the British South Asian diaspora that sets them apart, as a larger collectivity, from the White British majority (Ghuman 2003) and other large ethnic minority groups, the socio-economic as well as cultural diversity of the group itself bears due consideration. The next section will lay out the demographics of the UK South Asian diaspora in relation to other, large UK ethnic groups, as well as the differences between the constitutive groups.

#### *1.3.1 The British South Asian diaspora at a glance*

Data from the 2011 census indicates that 2.3 per cent of the UK population consist of Indians, with most residing in London, and the East and West Midlands. Indians comprise approximately 2.5 per cent of the population of England and Wales. They are the largest visible ethnoracial minority group in the UK. Pakistanis comprise 2 per cent of the UK population, and most live in London, Yorkshire and the Humber, and the West Midlands. Bangladeshis form a much smaller 0.8 per cent of the total population, less than Indians, Pakistanis, Black Africans or Black Caribbeans (ONS 2018a). Approximately a fifth of these are concentrated in a single area of East London - Tower Hamlets. 57.1 per cent of Indians, 43.9 per cent of Pakistanis and 48.1 per cent of Bangladeshis were born outside the UK according to the 2011 census (ONS 2018e).

2017 Annual Population Survey (ONS 2018c) shows that out of all ethnic groups, Indians have the highest percentage of professional workers. 31 per cent of Indians are professionals compared to just 16 per cent of Pakistanis/Bangladeshis (conflated in the analysis), 21 per cent of British Blacks and 20 per cent of White British. The same proportion of Indians,

Whites, and Pakistanis/Bangladeshis – 11 per cent – are managers, directors and senior officials. 38 per cent of workers from the Pakistani/Bangladeshi ethnic group, however, were employed in the 3 least skilled types of occupation combined ('elementary', 'sales and consumer services' and 'process, plants and machine operatives' jobs), the highest percentage out of all ethnic groups. Distributions of ethnic groups across UK employment sectors differs quite widely. 29.1 percent of workers from the Pakistani/Bangladeshi ethnic group were employed in distribution, hotels and restaurants, the highest percentage out of all sectors for this ethnic group (ONS 2018d). Black workers had the highest percentage of any ethnic group working in public administration, education and health, and White workers had the highest percentage of any ethnic group to work in construction and the lowest percentage in transport and communication industries. More people from the Indian ethnic group worked in banking, finance and insurance - the most lucrative sector - than any other ethnic group (20.9 per cent). We can see quite clearly, therefore, the occupational distinctiveness of the British Indian population in relation to other UK ethnic groups.

### *1.3.2 Commonwealth migration to the UK from the South Asian sub-continent*

Commonwealth migration with precipitated the establishment of the UK South Asian and Black Caribbean diasporas was spurred by the British Nationality Act of 1948. The 1950s and early 1960s saw a considerable influx of low-skilled or unskilled labour, predominantly from the Caribbean. Many of these migrants experienced downward mobility where they had occupied a middle-class socioeconomic status in their home countries and had to work back up to a similar position on arriving in the UK (Archer 2011). However, they continue to be underrepresented in professional and overrepresented in skilled and unskilled manual occupations. Black Caribbean men today suffer from discrimination-based ethnic penalties (Rafferty 2012). Black Caribbean women, however, have higher rates of employment than all other non-White minority ethnic groups (Li et. al 2008) because they tend to combine childcare and paid work rather than sacrifice the latter for the former (Dale et al. 2004).

Between 1955 and 1965 there was an influx of Indians to Britain who also came to fill unskilled or semi-skilled labourer roles. The vast majority of migrants from the South Asian sub-continent comprised Hindu Gujaratis and Sikh Punjabis from India, Punjabi and Mirpuri Muslims from Pakistan, and Sylheti Muslims from Bangladesh. Most (but not all) being of rural origin, few arrived with any significant qualifications and were generally unfamiliar with British language and culture (Hiro 1971). In the late 1960s and 70s came political upheaval in East Africa, particularly Uganda, which resulted in another wave of Indian and Pakistani migrants to the UK of predominantly Gujarati heritage. When Indians were forcibly expelled from Uganda and Kenya in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the British attempted to bar them from entering Britain but eventually allowed many to enter. After the 1962 Commonwealth

Immigrants Act, legislation also became more biased towards highly-skilled and professional labour (Daye 1994). Indian immigrants thus consisted of some highly educated doctors, mainly of Gujarati origin, alongside many Indian Sikhs from Punjab who had been dislocated following the partition of India in 1947 and who had served in the British armed forces.

There are several similarities between Pakistani and Indian migration to Britain. Some Muslims from (now) Pakistan had settled in East Africa and when they were expelled also attempted to enter the UK. Many Muslim Punjabis were also displaced by partition and many had served in the British armed forces. For Indian and Pakistani migrants, much migration was also the result of family reunion. Men tended to be the primary migrants during the early phases, and subsequently brought over their wives and families. However, many British Pakistani women also married and brought over men from villages in Mirpur or Punjab as per the socio-political 'biraderi' tradition in Muslim Pakistani communities to marry within the same clan (Akhtar 2013). Like the Indians and Pakistanis, many Bangladeshis were part of the British merchant navy and came to the UK to join family, not all poor agriculturalists. A large number of came to the UK in the 1950s and 1960s for employment, largely from Sylhet to work and live in industrial towns and cities. The Immigration Acts of 1971 and 1972 and the decline of heavy industry following large-scale privatisation halted the flow of immigration beyond family reunion, and led to many of Sylheti origin opening up 'Indian' and restaurants in the UK, largely in and around East London (Gardner 1995).

The Indian and Pakistani populations in the UK are characterised by considerable heterogeneity of regional identity, languages and religions. State-based categories (e.g. Indian) are in and of themselves broad categories which comprise ethno-linguistically and ethno-religiously (see Appendix II A2.1, p.42) diverse populations. Indian groups in the UK encompass relatively large numbers of Christian, Muslim, Jain and Parsi as well as Hindu and Sikh immigrants and descendants. Pakistanis in the UK hail from not only Mirpur and Punjab but from numerous regions in the country, speaking a myriad of languages and dialects with a not insignificant number of atheists, Christians, Hindus and Sikhs as well as (predominantly, nonetheless) Muslims (Coward et al. 2000). The Bangladeshi group is the most homogeneous of the main South Asian ethnic groups being neither greatly ethnically nor religiously divided (although with a sizeable number of Christians alongside Muslims). The overwhelming majority hail from Sylhet in Northeast Bangladesh (Gardner 1995).

### *1.3.3 The formation of the South Asian middle classes*

Ballard (2003) states that on arrival, South Asian groups and their offspring "have followed sharply differing trajectories of adaptation and upward mobility as the years have passed" (p. 202). The British Indian population are generally perceived to have done well in economic

terms, as evident from section 1.3.1. Out of all ethnic groups in the UK, Indians are the most likely to occupy higher managerial and professional occupations, even more so than Chinese who have been similarly socio-economically successful. Smith (1976) highlighted evidence early on of a higher proportion of Indian and African Asian workers occupying White-collar positions and small business ownership in Britain - than that of British-born Black workers. According to Hear et al. (2004), UK-resident Indians have the highest levels of owner-occupation, the highest educational performance in school, and occupy senior and elite positions in high-level public and private sector organisations. Whereas the Caribbean population are said to have followed the socio-economic trajectories of Irish migrants before them, “the Indian population seems to have progressed some way along the Jewish trajectory of white-collar, self-employed, suburbanized and owner-occupier route” (Peach 2005 p. 178). The ethnic penalty in labour market does not affect Indians (and Chinese) to the extent it does other non-White minority ethnic groups (Heath and Cheung, 2006). Ballard (2003) attributes this to the possession of ‘multi-cultural competence’ or, broadly, the possession of certain ‘useful’ types of social and cultural capital including the ability to “act and react appropriately in a wide range of differently ordered arenas” (p. 203). The time spent by some Indian Gujaratis in East Africa in middle-class occupations before their emigration to Britain allowed them to acquire adaptive resources, such as entrepreneurial skills and a high command of English, which helped them thrive as a community<sup>6</sup> in the UK (Ghuman 2003, p. 14) as mainly professionals as well as small business owners. The relative economic prosperity of Indian Punjabi migrants from agricultural areas of Punjab also equipped them to fare well in their new environment (Ballard 2003). The ‘education ethic’ which surrounds British Indians in particular is seen to be a form of long-standing capital derived from the relatively higher occupations of Indian migrants who came to the UK (Gillborn 2008).

Pakistani Mirpuris and Bangladeshi Sylhetis who hailed from poorer areas struggled to match the pace of upward mobility of Indian Punjabis and Gujaratis, lacking many of the above-mentioned resources. It is important to note, however, that not all of these migrants were poorly educated rural agriculturalists (Heath et al. 2013). Socio-economic heterogeneity did exist to some extent within as well as between these groups. Among Indian men, for example, there is ethno-religious variation which translates into significant socio-economic differentiation. Sikhs are more likely than either Hindus or Muslims to be over-qualified in their occupations (Johnston et al 2010 p. 584) suggesting that this, not insubstantial, community is disadvantaged and less able to capitalise on their educational qualifications than the larger Hindu group. As a whole, Bangladeshis experience greater levels of economic deprivation in comparison to Pakistanis and Indians (Maxwell 2012; Brynin and Güveli 2012;

---

<sup>6</sup> When ‘community’ is referred to in this thesis, it denotes a specific ethnic minority, multicultural local area and its inhabitants who share a group identity, norms, and / or culture.

Khattab et. al 2011) but increasingly they are gaining traction in education and the labour market. 61 per cent of Bangladeshi students achieved five 'good' GCSEs in 2014 compared to 51 per cent of Pakistanis. The average monthly household income of Bangladeshis, though still low in absolute terms, is now slightly higher than that of Pakistanis (The Economist 2015). Although some studies that focus on within-South Asian group comparisons conflate Pakistanis and Bangladeshis because of their similar economic trajectories and predominantly Muslim religious backgrounds, it is prudent to – if feasible – consider them separately.

Whereas this study seeks in part to problematise objective and establish subjective definitions of middle-classness in the context of the British South Asian population, it employs an occupational definition of class - namely those within lower and higher professional and managerial (not foremen or small business owners) job roles. The justification for operationalising middle-class in this way is provided in the literature review (section 2.2).

#### **1.4 Research questions**

The three analytical chapters of this thesis focus on combined quantitative and qualitative analysis which address and build on, in turn, the three following research questions:

**1) How do the British South Asian middle classes conceptualise social class, and to what extent is there a discrepancy between their subjective class identity and objective 'middle-class' position?**

The first research question entails an analysis of the meanings and understandings of class across those in the qualitative sample (British South Asian professionals, men and women born and / or brought up in the UK). It attempts to identify and analyse dissonance between the 'objective' class position of ethnic minority professionals and their 'subjective' class identity. It also analyses meanings of middle-classness and who comprises the middle classes according to the respondents, adding a racial / ethnic dimension to understandings of middle-class practices, attitudes, and behaviours.

**2) To what extent do the British South Asian middle classes identify with a minority racial / ethnic identity, and how does this relate to their subjectivities and experiences of class?**

The second question builds on the first by mapping out meanings and levels of racial / ethnic identity, and exploring its facets. Both quantitative (the British Election Study Ethnic Minority Survey 2010 and the Citizenship Survey 2010/11) and qualitative data is required here. It

builds on themes in the first question related to how class and minority race / ethnicity are experienced on an everyday level, particularly within the predominantly White, middle-class and male dominated professional spaces many of the respondents inhabit.

### **3) To what extent are class and minority racial / ethnic identities politicised, and what are the implications of this for party political identity and civic and political activity?**

The third question draws together the first two research questions, with a focus on the ways in which a marginalised identity does or does not translate into political consciousness for the British South Asian middle classes. It explicitly draws links between a sense of class and a sense of racial / ethnic minority political solidarity, analyses if / how this – in conjunction with occupational class and ethnicity – drives political activity and party orientation.

## **1.5 Overview of key findings**

This study finds that the framing of subjective social class and the strength of one's class identification is often contingent on experiences of - and affiliation with - a minority ethnic identity. This complexity is related to the class backgrounds of the individuals in question. Although not analysable through quantitative analysis this was alluded to in the quantitative data. Religious identity is also implicated here. Muslims have historically suffered higher levels of economic and social deprivation than Indians and – in some cases - still feel less well integrated, despite many having achieved professional occupational status. This contributes to, in general, a sense of ethno-religious marginalisation. Politically, middle class South Asians are still largely left-of-centre leaning. The types of political consciousness i.e. group solidarities they harbour interact with occupation class position and determine in part - particularly for British Pakistanis - the party identities they hold and the level to which they engage politically and civically. There are indications, however, of a sense of instrumental political conservatism linked to economic interests and cynicism towards the party system.

## **1.5 Structure of thesis**

The thesis begins with the literature review, the structure of which reflects the three substantive areas of focus: class, race / ethnicity, and politics. The final section of the literature review focuses on the specific body of research carried out most relevant to study of the ethnic minority middle classes. It is followed by a justification of the mixed-methods research process, an outline of the research design, an overview of the data, and reflections on the data collection, analysis and interpretation. Limitations of the data, particularly in terms of sample size and data quality, are discussed here alongside ethical considerations related

to researcher positionality and the representation of marginalised and racialised groups in social science research.

The first analysis chapter (4) predominantly analyses self-definitions of class, using the qualitative data alone. It addresses the first research question by analysing respondents' understandings, interpretations and critiques of aggregate class categories and boundaries. It focuses on the meanings of middle-classness amongst British born South Asians in 'traditional' professional occupations. It also explores their own classed experiences, and how these are racialised.

The second analysis chapter (5) analyses subjectivities of minority racial / ethnic and religious identity. The qualitative as well as quantitative data are utilised in this chapter. It uncovers the relative salience and negotiation of difference facets of ethnic identity. It also explores the relationship between discrimination and ethnic identity salience. The qualitative analysis is in conversation with the findings in the previous chapter, particularly with regard to the central question of how subjectivities of class relate to subjectivities of race / ethnicity across the population in question.

The third and final analysis chapter (6) begins with an analysis of class and race / minority ethnic group consciousness. It thus shifts the focus to the politicisation of identity, marking a progression from discussion of identity to consciousness / political solidarity. It begins with the construction of measures of political consciousness using the quantitative data. It then goes on to establish similarities and differences in political party identity and levels of political and civic engagement. It analyses the effect of political consciousness on these phenomena for two largest South Asian ethnic groups in the sample, Indians and Pakistanis, across professional / managerial and non-professional / managerial occupational types.

The final chapter (7) summarises the thesis. It details the findings from each chapter in light of existing knowledge in the fields. It also reflects on the methodological limitations of the thesis. It outlines research avenues that have opened up as a result of this study, and the theoretical and methodological implications of the findings.

## **2. Literature Review**

### **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter includes a comprehensive examination of historical and contemporary academic scholarship in the fields of social class, racial and ethnic identity, and the politics of race, ethnicity, and class. The scholarship largely comprises academic literature from the fields of sociology, politics, and cultural studies. In each section of the literature review I define and problematise the key concepts in this study. I draw on relevant findings from similar studies to map existing knowledge in the field. I also define the questions that have been left unanswered thus far in the literature. The purpose of the literature review is thus three-fold: i) to identify the research gaps, (ii) to map the development of key debates in the scholarship of race and class and identify where this thesis aligns itself and (iii) to construct the research questions in line with previous research and findings.

The literature review begins with a discussion of how best to empirically ‘model’ class. I then assess the literature on class identity and consciousness, focusing on the identities, behaviours and attitudes of the British middle classes. The scholarship on racial / ethnic identity is then explored. This section defines race and ethnicity respectively and the tension between these two concepts. This helps frame the ways in which the two are conceptualised throughout the thesis. Important debates in the field of race and ethnicity are mapped out, including: Whiteness and privilege, racisms and discrimination, racial and ethnic identity formation, and ethno-national and ethno-religious identities.

The penultimate section explores the relevant scholarship on political identity and engagement. It outlines the key literature on political party identification and voting behaviour, and political and civic engagement. It situates the study within key scholarship which has sought to establish how class identity and minority racial / ethnic identity affect political orientation and behaviour. The final section focuses on the literature of class and race as it pertains to the specific experiences of middle-class ethnic minorities. It identifies where the literature is lacking in relation to theorisation of class and identity amongst well-off minority group members. It identifies what has been found in terms of the politics of middle-class ethnic minorities, and where further research is needed.

## 2.2 Class

### 2.2.1 Theoretical perspectives on class

Marxist, Weberian and Durkheimian perspectives on class have couched the concept in, broadly, possession of economic assets and occupational relations. Their work has formed the basis of most class analysis in sociology by conceptualising how social class can explain a myriad of societal and individual phenomena: life chances and outcomes; health, disease and death; tastes and attitudes; and social and political standpoints and behaviours. An overview of the bases of 'classical' thought on class from Marx, Weber and Durkheim is a necessary starting-off point for this thesis, therefore.

Marxists have conceptualised class on the basis of conflictual relationships between those with divergent access to the means of production: "a pure Marxist approach predicts that an individual's relationship to the means of production (owner vs. worker) defines his socio-economic class" (Jackman and Jackman 1973, p. 570). The exploitative relationship between the working classes and owners of production have formed the crux of most traditional Marxist analyses. The middle classes are largely theorised as a fragmented group who straddle the owner / worker dichotomy and thus defy, somewhat, the class polarisation envisaged in a capitalist society. However, there is still 'room' for them in Marx's account of an advanced industrial society. He conceptualised the middle classes as a burden weighing on the working base, increasing the social security and power of the upper classes (Marx 1969). From a traditional Marxist perspective, therefore, the middle classes predominantly bolster the position of the elites, working against the interests of the working classes.

The Weberian approach sees social classes as differentiated by life outcomes (Weber 1978) determined by possession of skills, employment, credentials as well as property. To a Weberian, class is of interest because it links individuals' positions in the capitalist market to inequality in the distribution of life chances and lifestyles. Weber positioned the middle classes below the propertied groups, managers and petit bourgeoisie but, like Marx, above the working classes. The only asset of the working classes is their labour - they lack the formal credentials (Breen 2005) which provide status and security to the middle classes.

The Durkheimian interpretation of class focuses on occupational groupings and therefore departs from the 'big theories' of class formulated by Marx and Weber (Grusky and Galescu 2005). Classification based on occupations derives, in part, from Durkheim's concept of labour division though 'units of occupation' sets of technically similar activities institutionalised in the labour market through trade unions or associations (Barata et al., 2013). These correspond to certain lifestyles, consumption practices, group associations to

fight for common interests and so on. Different occupations share different organisational characteristics, cultures, and even moral frameworks. On this basis, occupations engender their own group identities (Fenton 1984), identities that are arguably stronger and more contemporarily relevant than those based on aggregate 'working-class' or 'middle-class' groupings.

Having briefly established how class is conceptualised by seminal classical theorists like Marx, Weber and Durkheim, it is necessary to see in which directions class analysis has since departed. There has been significant real-world change in 'traditional' class lines<sup>7</sup> over time within the UK (Clark and Lipset 2001; Gayle et al. 2015). Class analysis has reflected these changes, with a number of new perspectives on class having been developed in recent decades. There has been a surge in focus on 'cultural' and 'social' capital alongside economic capital, concepts derived by sociologist Bourdieu (1984) and developed by, among others, Savage et al. (2013). These concepts set 'resources' like education, social networks, and engagement in cultural activities in equal importance to income and wealth in determining one's social position. This perspective not only departs from the theories of Marx and Weber but claims to better model an individual's position in the social hierarchy than their occupation, as per Durkheim. Some argue, however, that this perspective is not necessarily new. The Bourdieusian theory of class is simply a reformulation of classic notions of class stratification (Grusky and Weeden 2001) which attempt to understand social exclusion, whether based on control of production (Marx and Weber), professional services (Durkheim), or cultural knowledge (Bourdieu).

### 2.2.2 Socio-economic measures of class

Measures of socio-economic status (SES) like occupation, income, education and wealth are often seen as synonymous with class. These often inform, to a broad extent, perceptions of social class and / or a person's own understanding of where they might lie in the social hierarchy. Although the overall explanatory power of measures of SES in explaining the underlying complexities of *subjective* class position is still limited (Goldman et al. 2006), as will be explored in Chapter 4, they are still useful measures of *objective* social position – a

---

<sup>7</sup> Hall (1991), talking from a cultural studies perspective, states that the position of class as a defining collective identity has declined. He does not deny the continuing relevance of class, but suggests it no longer underpins the roles and status of individuals and groups: "Class was the main locator of social position, that which organized our understanding of the main grid and group relations between social groups [...] If they have a relationship to our identities, cultural and individual, they do not any longer have that suturing, structuring, or stabilizing force [...] they do not give us the code of identity as I think they did in the past" (Hall 1991, p. 45). The role of class as an identity will be discussed from section 2.2.7 onwards.

springboard from which to interrogate the subjectivities which form (part of) the basis of enquiry in this study.

### *2.2.3 Occupation and class position*

Much of the literature on class and SES argues that occupation is the most reliable, contemporary socio-economic indicator of class position, primarily in terms of its stability as a measure of lifetime earning potential (Gayle et al. 2015, p.2). The institutionalisation of occupations within society as well as the labour market makes it a highly relevant locus of class position (Grusky and Galescu 2005). For those who dismiss the contemporary relevance of aggregate class categories ('working', 'middle' and 'upper' class), occupational or 'disaggregate' level categories of class are often considered 'meaningful entities'. Grusky and Weeden (2001) argue that "detailed occupations continue to be one of the main social identities for contemporary workers [...] occupational categories are deeply embedded in the institutions of advanced industrialism, whereas aggregate classes are highly abstract constructs" (p. 204). Runciman (1990) expresses similar sentiments stating that "in a society like Britain, the most important such roles are occupational since the paid work which people do is the most obvious determinant of their life chances" (p. 377). Regarding the appropriateness of occupation in analysing stratification within ethnic minority populations, Werbner and Anwar (1991) advance a similar argument, stating that "the position of ethnic minorities in the labour market is a fundamental aspect of their position in British society" (p. 7). The type of work available to them not only determines their incomes but where they live and go to school, how they participate in civic life, how they interact with the ethnic majority, how they participate in civic life, and their overall status in society (Werbner and Anwar 1991).

Differences in income and employment status make little difference to the class position of, in Runciman's example, (i) a salaried engineer, (ii) a freelance engineering consultant and (iii) the proprietor of a small engineering business, because "each exemplifies a different, but functionally equivalent, criterion of economic power – control in the first case, ownership in the second, and marketability in the third" (Runciman 1990, p. 380). For Runciman, these roles share an equivalence by virtue of the similar level of economic power each bestows upon the individual, despite their different institutional relations to the process of production. The differentiating factor here is not class, therefore, but the distinctiveness of the economic 'privilege' conferred by each occupation: "roles ostensibly dissimilar in significant aspects of market-cum-work situation may nevertheless belong squarely in the same class" (p. 381). Those in the professions, particularly legal, can, according to Runciman, be said to hold a pivotal role in the direction of capitalist enterprises and possession of economic power, at the subordinate as well as directorial and shareholder level.

The well-defined routes to progression through training and certification, and clear organisational practices within occupations (Windolf 2002, p. 129) allow professional industries to facilitate social closure (Weeden et al. 2007), in other words cut off entry to the industry to those not suitably qualified and provide unique opportunities and benefits to those who are. Some occupations do this a greater degree than others. As Brown (2013) states with regard to the professions: “the ability of professional organizations to create and maintain labor market shelters that provide higher salaries, benefits, and occupational privileges is related to their ability to control entrance into those professions through credentialization” (p. 45). People within certain occupations thus develop similarities in terms of values (Grusky and Galescu 2005). Not only do similar types of people go into similar jobs, but they socialise and associate with one another based on their membership to this group (Durkheim 1984). This, arguably, facilitates a collective alignment of world views and modes of behaviour (Block 2014, p. 36). From this perspective, occupations can be seen to determine economic, social and potentially political positioning and privileges.

#### *2.2.4 Occupation and middle-class position: professionals*

As this study seeks to, in part, interrogate ‘middle-classness’ as well as understand who might comprise the middle classes, it is necessary to ascertain which sorts of occupations best reflect an objective middle-class position. Butler and Savage (1995) point to three key groupings which broadly constitute the middle classes: the petit bourgeoisie (small business owners), managers, and professionals. The Erikson-Goldthorpe class schema, one of the most influential occupation-based social classifications (Evans 1992a), demarcates the former from the latter two, however. Professionals, high-grade technicians, administrators, and managers (of large and small firms) are placed in separate categories to self-employed small proprietors and smallholders (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1993). The professional middle classes are unique in this more demarcated schema in that they hold skills and expertise which allows them to both access status positions of authority and control in large companies, and, in some cases, establish their own independent practices offering specialised professional services. Professionals also hold an important role in the historical formation of the British middle classes. According to Lockwood (1995), the rise of “distinctive and privileged employment”, apart from White collar and manual employment, catalysed the growth of a “well-formed class with its own distinct social identity” (p.3) (see section 2.2.4 for discussion of occupational identities).

Barriers to participation are acute in professions such as Law and engineering, particularly for women, ethnic minorities and / or those from working class backgrounds (Solicitor’s Regulation Authority 2014; the Law Society 2010), albeit to differing extents. Ethnic minorities have largely harnessed the relatively clear and well-defined occupational trajectories of

professions like medicine and accountancy to gain a foothold in the middle classes. Nonetheless, the predominantly working-class backgrounds of ethnic minorities impose a class (background) penalty as well as an ethnic penalty which prevent them from securing similar earnings as those from middle-class (higher professional and managerial) backgrounds (Friedman and Laurison 2018). In industries like Law where ethnic minorities constitute a small proportion of the workforce, they fail to occupy the most senior, high paying roles. The Solicitor's Regulation Authority stated that in 2017 women made up 40 per cent of all lawyers in all UK firms, although only a third of partners in law firms are women. One in five lawyers were Black and minority ethnic, mainly Asian lawyers. There was little difference in terms of seniority among BAME (Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic) lawyers, although the largest firms tend to have fewer numbers of women and BAME in senior positions (Solicitor's Regulation Authority 2017). The engineering profession has similar but more entrenched issues. According to the Royal Academy of Engineering, the UK has the lowest proportion of female professional engineers of any European country (8 per cent) and only 6 per cent of professional engineers come from Black and minority ethnic backgrounds. This is in contrast to the demographics of the larger UK population where half of the working age population of which is female and 14 per cent Black and minority ethnic (Royal Academy of Engineering 2015).

Because of the myriad and differing inequalities and barriers to inclusion that exist in these professions, the occupational differences between the respondents in the qualitative sample will not be discussed. A large enough sample representative of the gender, racial/ethnic and class make-up of the law and engineering industries was not present and therefore a useful and robust comparative analysis of lawyers and engineers could not be facilitated. Furthermore, the focus of this thesis is on class, and thus the broad, shared characteristics and work experiences of the occupational groups which reflect class positioning are of more salient consideration here.

#### *2.2.6 Occupation and middle-class position: managers*

Managers are also often used to represent (in part) the middle classes in social stratification research, alongside professionals. They are arguably, however, an even more heterogeneous group. Although small business owners are usually separate from managers in most contemporary occupational schemes, 'managers' still covers disparate employment situations - those in positions of authority in large corporate organisations or mid-level project and / or employee management roles, as well as those managing and / or owning smaller firms. Savage et al. (1992) state that managers are, in general, "more likely to rely on their place within organisations in attempting to achieve security and identity" (p. 116) whereas professionals are less dependent on establishing their place within a particular organisational

hierarchy for authority and status, using their credentials to move between firms, and even operating as smaller firms themselves. The experiences of those professionals who work within their own organisations may be markedly different from those who work within large, established, corporate organisations. The motivations for moving between these employment situations, or settling on one over the other, is also highly group-specific. Ethnic minority owned 'middle-class' businesses established by those trained in professional services like accountancy, law and pharmacy allow professionals to avoid the sorts of class and ethnic penalties they would encounter working within large, potentially elite organisations. Furthermore, the ethnic communities within which they often establish their businesses or practices often constitute both a loyal client and employee base (Aldrich and Waldinger 1990, Turnstone Research and Consultancy 2004, Brown 2013). Work on ethnic enclavity by theorists such as Portes (1998) might class these sorts of ethnic businesses as a failure of 'integration'. However, these discourses overlook the hyper-racialisations and structural discriminations based on race, ethnicity, and religion that abound in the professions. Creating their own professional ethnic businesses has been both a 'push' and a 'pull' for ethnic minority 'manager-professionals' allowing them to remain embedded within, as well as to some extent 'serve', their community (Brown 2013). Ethnic identity as well as economic opportunity thus goes some way to determine the structural character of the ethnic minority middle classes.

### *2.2.7 Class identity*

Class identity relates to the idea of social class as a collective, group identity to which people subscribe and feel a sense of affiliation. It is most likely to manifest amongst people who work, live, and socialise together (Scott 2013, p. 34), i.e. those who share similar socio-economic locations. Class affiliation can be heightened by a feeling of having less or more than others in higher or lower socio-economic situations (Jackman and Jackman 1973). A politicised awareness of where one is in the social system is usually referred to as class consciousness, fleshed out in the next section.

### *2.2.8 Class consciousness*

The working classes identify as a class on the basis of their exploitation by the owners of the means of production. When this feeling becomes coherent and politically organised (Savage 2000, p. 37) and people form interest groups to give voice to their class-based interests in political struggles, we see the manifestation of working class consciousness. Mann (1973) identifies four elements in the Marxist conception of a worker's class consciousness: class identity (self-defining as working-class); a perception of classes as being opposed; the belief that class is the defining characteristic of society; and the perception that an alternative type

of society is possible. Working class consciousness is therefore rooted in a commitment to transformation from below, by those from below.

As aforementioned, Marx saw the middle classes as working not in the interests of those below them, but those above them i.e. the bourgeoisie who also recognise and act on their class interests. Coyner (1997) suggests, however, that middle-classness has been formed in the absence of working-class consciousness.<sup>8</sup> Those who lack working-class solidarity and political commitment become, by default, middle-class: “[the middle-class label] has been assigned to White collar employees because they lacked a working-class consciousness, because they abstained from most working-class movements – not because they shared common interests with others similarly labelled” (Coyner 1997, p. 310). The lack of class consciousness and historical class action amongst the middle classes has arguably deemed them less worthy of sociological research than the working classes. Whether we maintain there is or is not a distinct sense of class consciousness amongst the middle classes, class analysis doesn’t have to solely focus on the working-class struggle (Goldthorpe and Marshall 1992, p. 383) or presume the existence of a monolithic, single interest working-class, to be worthwhile. The complexities of occupying an objective middle position and hailing from a working-class background – as many second-generation ethnic minorities in the UK do - may result in complex, hybrid class solidarities and socio-political interests that have yet to be comprehensively analysed but are worth exploring.

#### *2.2.9 Objective class position and subjective class identity*

‘Objective class position’ refers to the class categorisation a researcher might attribute to an individual based on material indicators of wealth, income, occupation and education. As mentioned in section 2.2.2, indicators of socio-economic status do not necessarily reflect a person’s class subjectivity, in other words where an individual feels they lie in terms of class. Those who analyse subjective class positioning focus on how individuals construe the social structure, where they see themselves within it, and the extent to which they actively identify with others in similar class positions. Most research on subjective class identity has found that people tend to see themselves as members of a middling group of ‘ordinary’, ‘working’ citizens. They read the world from their own positioning and extrapolate from their own

---

<sup>8</sup> Many argue that the working classes do not possess consciousness in the classical sense either. Tanner and Cockerill (1986) challenge the notion that members of the working-class share a clear political stance i.e. pro-trade union and anti-big business. However, they also state that this does not make them unpolitical or incoherent – political standpoints are just more complex. It is not necessarily ideologically inconsistent that workers believe both trade unions and big business hold too much power in society, it might just mean that they assign more significance to particular socio-political issues (p. 399).

experiences which encourages a 'middling' tendency in subjective social location, and an underestimation of the breadth of social inequality (Irwin 2016; Bottero 2005; Evans and Kelly 2004). Class identity has generally had less academic focus than consciousness, begging the question as to whether class identity can be considered a group affiliation with a sense of identification in the same way as race, ethnicity, nationality or religion.

#### *2.2.10 Class as a salient social identity*

For SurrIDGE (2007), a phenomenological focus on subjectivities of class, and particularly how they intersect with other identities, is key to critically assessing objective, researcher-led class categories. Class identity, like race, is considered by seminal cultural theorists like Stuart Hall (1991) to be "one among many forms that group identification can take" (Malesevic 2004, p. 148). It is also only one of many fault lines that constitute social division and cause social inequality. This does not necessarily suggest that class is not materially and culturally important. Simply that this is contingent on, and relative to, other forms of identification and the contexts in which they 'play out'. This counters traditional Marxist views on the overarching salience of class next to other identities.<sup>9</sup> Devine (1992) argues that consideration must be given to the ways in which social identities interact with each other, and the contexts in which they interact. This perspective is key to this study, as it allows for a more malleable and situated understanding of class identity.

#### *2.2.11 Class identity enquiry*

Marshall et al.'s (1988) representative national study of sources of social identity found social class and class-affiliated characteristics to be some of the most salient frames of reference among the individuals surveyed. However, this study was criticised by class scholars such as Saunders (1990) because the questions asking people about their relationship to class came after a string of other questions on class. Having put questions of class at the forefront of their minds, therefore, would make them more likely to assert the salience of a class identity, potentially skewing the extent of its actual importance to sense of self and feelings of belonging. The context-specific nature of identity including class does not necessarily lend well to survey enquiry, and can generate, in Saunders' opinion (1989) implausible findings which 1) overemphasise the salience of class to other social identities, and 2) deny the contextual, situated nature of identity: "Are we seriously to believe that in their everyday lives people think of themselves as members of a class rather than say, as British, or as parents,

---

<sup>9</sup> Wright (2002) argues that Marxist scholars have pulled back from overarching theories of history based on class. However, he maintains that "class retains a distinctive centrality within the Marxist tradition and is called upon to do much more arduous explanatory work than in other theoretical traditions" (p. 7).

or as White or Black, or male or female, young or old [...] Elementary sociology tells us that social identities are constructed through interaction, that we play many roles, and that identity is grounded in social contexts” (Saunders 1989, p. 4). Emmison and Western (1990) similarly make fundamental critiques about the investigation of class subjectivities in surveys.<sup>10</sup> They argue that “it is important to investigate the contours of identity in a way that [does] not unduly privilege one category over another” (Emmison and Western 1990, p. 246). For this reason, this study analyses the relative salience of class identity alongside and in conjunction with other social identities in both the quantitative and qualitative analysis.

Skeggs (1997) talks about how the symbolic weight of class problematises its analysis within a qualitative as well as quantitative context. Individuals have difficulty in facing the complex realities of class inequality which often leads to a disassociation or disidentification with class. This is further problematised by the difficulties of reconciling or interpreting the real-world complexities of class within aggregated, broad, and imperfect contemporary notions of class (Irwin 2015). The salience of class is often better expressed when it is discussed contextually and obliquely. Despite the initial ambivalence with which most individuals approach questions of their social positioning, when reflecting on their own biographies people hold more nuanced accounts of class processes and phenomena (Irwin 2016). In this study, both direct and indirect enquiry about identity will tease out where and how class is deemed important to individuals’ sense of self.

#### *2.2.12 The British middle classes*

Despite the difficulties in defining who the middle classes are, Lockwood (1995) states that they harbour a relatively defined socio-political agenda, built around successfully harnessing social and cultural capital to defend their sectional and family interests (p. 3). This may not constitute group consciousness in the traditional sense (see section 2.2.8), but nonetheless makes the middle classes a huge contemporary political phenomenon in their own right. According to Ball (2003), however, there is still relatively little empirical or conceptual development around middle-class practices (p. 6) and middle-class formation. This is problematic given that these practices “produce or contribute to the perpetuation, inscription and reinvention of social inequalities both old and new” (Ball 2003, p.5). The reproduction of middle-class status through the deployment of cultural and social capital creates exclusions for other groups with ‘lesser’ resources seeking upward mobility. Savage (2003) and Bennett et al. (2009) argue it is important to expose these practices which allow the middle classes to reproduce their privilege and monopolise advantage in society. This includes the

---

<sup>10</sup> The efficacy of identity indicators in structured survey analysis will be discussed further in section 3.5.

innocuous yet ultimately misleading presentation of themselves as 'ordinary', neither upper-class 'snobs' nor members of the working-class 'masses' (Savage 2005a).

### *2.2.13 Middle-class practices*

The middle classes are characterised in large part by their ability to access superior education (Skeggs 2004; Reay 1998; Lareau 2003). Middle-class parents are more likely to 'activate' educational capital through "direct involvement with the school, the provision of supplementary educational programs, better contacts with teachers and administrators, and efforts to achieve confluence between the school culture and that of their home" (Levine-Rasky 2011, p. 246). Upper- / middle-class parents provide their children with cultural resources that are overwhelmingly valued in society and particularly in the educational system.<sup>11</sup> Bourdieu, who defined cultural capital as tools for the appropriation of symbolic wealth, "socially designated as worthy of being sought and possessed" (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977, p. 488), argued that schools and teachers reward possession of elite cultural capital in students and set up standards rigged to favour upper and middle-class children (Tzanakis 2011, p. 76). When children in middle-class families are exposed to elite culture outside of the classroom and rewarded for it inside, he saw this as a form of symbolic violence against lower classes, deeming them unworthy (Bourdieu 1984, p. 251).

Lareau (2002) talks about 'concerted cultivation' in the way middle-class parents approach childrearing. Middle-class parents enrol their children in organised extra-curricular activities, for example, which transmit specific life skills to children, whereas working-class parents use strategies of 'natural growth'. They do not focus on developing talents but provide love, food and safety within extended families. The former thus develop a sense of entitlement and superiority, whereas the latter a sense of constraint and powerlessness in institutional contexts (p. 748). Notions of social superiority thus strongly determine the moral boundaries between middle and working classness. The middle classes are seen as harbouring stable family structures, financially independent of the state and self-reliant, set apart from the vulnerability and irresponsibility of the working classes (Hancock and Mooney 2012; Macdonald et al. 2014). This demarcation denies the way in which the accumulation and maintenance of middle-class privilege is tied up with the disenfranchisement of the lower classes, however.

---

<sup>11</sup> Sullivan (2003) describes how Bourdieu is criticised for under-explaining how cultural and educational capital transmits into privilege. There are contradictions within his work in terms of the relative importance he accords to cultural capital next to economic and social capital. She states, however, that despite this inconsistency he makes clear his argument that for some groups in particular, like professionals, cultural capital is key to the reproduction of social privilege (p. 5).

Middle-class practices are not only seen as damaging for the working classes but for those negatively racialised in society. They have historically been tied to the maintenance of racial as well as class privilege for the White British middle classes (Reay et al. 2007, Byrne 2009). Middle-classness is therefore inextricably tied to Whiteness. Wallace (2017) describes Whiteness as “a historical system of thought and action that affords undue structural, material and political privileges that often remains unmarked and unquestioned” (p. 2). Gillborn (2015) similarly refers to it as the beliefs and practices that place the interests of White people at the centre of what is thought to be ‘normal’. It is essentially a category of superiority that goes unchallenged, ingrained within years of British colonialism and imperialism, structuring the relative losses and gains of race *and* class across individuals (Nayak 2007). Whiteness operates within middle-class practices to determine the extent to which social privilege is bestowed based on race, practices such as those to do with education as aforementioned. For example, the education system still systematically stereotypes Black student as non-academic, thus they start at a disadvantage to others (Rollock et al. 2014). This study seeks to further understand how Whiteness ties into the exercise of middle-class privilege, and thus how non-White middle-class groups ‘do’ middle-classness.

#### *2.2.14 Middle-class identity*

Despite the prioritisation of worker / working-class identity in both traditional and contemporary class analysis, there are a growing number of empirical studies exploring middle-class identity. SurrIDGE’s analysis of class belonging (2007) using 2003 British Social Attitudes survey data demonstrated the reluctance of any social group to adopt the ‘middle-class’ label. Although class was the second most commonly cited locus of identity, those occupying middle-class social locations preferred the description ‘working person’ (SurrIDGE 2007, p. 223) (see section 2.2.9). It is important to understand where and why the middle-class identity is ‘rejected’ as well as adopted, particularly given the aforementioned insidiousness of middle-class practices. Family background, for instance, strongly accounts for class identification amongst those in middle-class social locations. Research from 2015 British Social Attitudes survey data found that those in a middle-class occupation who expressed a working-class identity disproportionately came from working-class backgrounds (NatCen 2016, p. 8).

Reay et al.’s (2010) study of working-class students in elite universities identified a quasi-sense of unease with middle-classness amongst respondents – a sense of being a ‘familiar stranger’ (Puwar 2004). They often adopt / mirror the ‘image’ of the hegemonic, middle-class

norm in order to fit in whilst constantly negotiating the tensions between habitus and field<sup>12</sup> given their working-class backgrounds. They often try, therefore, to retain a sense of loyalty, commitment and identification with their class background. Given the relationship between Whiteness and middle-classness, and the predominantly working-class histories of the UK South Asian diaspora, there may exist a similar reluctance to identify with a middle-class identity amongst some respondents in the study. The (few) studies which have sought to analyse subjectivities of middle-classness across ethnic minority groups will be highlighted in section 2.5.

## **2.3 Race and ethnicity**

### *2.3.1 Racial and ethnic categories*

'Ethnic minority' refers to, primarily, immigrants and the descendants of immigrants who are racially / ethnically distinct from the majority White (British) ethnoracial group who comprise the bulk of the UK population. Scholars such as Gunaratnam (2003) use the term in quotation marks, preferring to say 'minoritised', alluding to the active process of racialisation that designate certain groups in certain contexts as 'minority'. The liberal use of the term 'ethnic minority' and less frequent use of the term 'ethnic majority' in both academic and everyday usage implies that members of the dominant majority group do not have an ethnicity (Cole 2013), positioning them as the racial norm (Burkett 2013). However, it is arguably one of the lesser problematic terms to describe immigrants and their descendants in the UK.

'Non-White' and 'Black' fall into (often problematic) binaries. The former does little to denote the cultural and ethnic heterogeneities of 'non-Whites' in Britain and is defined against the hegemonic category of 'White'. The latter ('Black') is similarly catch-all but has significant political meaning (see section 2.4.4), and is a common form of self-identification for those of African and Caribbean origin in the UK. BME or BAME has also been used to describe Black and ethnic minority, or Black, Asian and ethnic minority populations (IRR 2018). However, these terms again subsume disparate groups under catch-all terms. These acronyms have come under increasing scrutiny for being unnuanced and outdated, distracting from the real disadvantages faced by the specific groups described by them

---

<sup>12</sup> 'Habitus' is defined by the preferences and dispositions a person acquires to navigate their social world. It is rooted within their upbringing and their position in the social structure and thus shapes the boundaries of their sense of agency (Bourdieu 2002). 'Field' refer to the norms that govern a sphere of activity such as school, work, community and family and is the site of power struggles over the control of capital (Thompson 2008). These concepts, alongside capital, are pertinent to parts of this study – in Chapter 4 and 5 in particular – which analyse the way the respondents negotiate their prejudice and privilege in spaces governed by certain class and racialised norms.

South Asian is useful to describe those from the Indian subcontinent, particularly in an international context where Asian often denotes those from global regions other than South Asian ('Asian' in the US usually refers to those from East and South-East Asia). However, these terms are rarely used in self-description on their own. According to Aspinall (2003), they are more meaningful when qualified with national, regional, or religious identities (p. 94). This will be evidenced in Chapter 5 when exploring subjectivities of ethnicity and race across the qualitative interview respondents.

In this study, alongside the term 'ethnic minority', the term 'ethnoracial group' will be used to refer broadly to the 'South Asian' population under scrutiny, a broad group who share a similar (but not identical) cultural identity (see section 1.2.2). 'Ethno-religion' will also be used to refer to the religious sub-groups within each ethnic group (mainly Indian Sikhs, Indian Hindus, Pakistani Muslims, and Bangladeshi Muslims) where appropriate.

### *2.3.2 Race and racialisation*

Hall (1997) describes race as a 'floating signifier', a historical form of classification which marks similarities and differences across populations. It is not a fixed entity with fixed ideas about biological difference, but encompasses notions of cultural difference, intellectual and emotional difference, and produces and reproduces structural difference between racialised groups in society. Divorcing race from its biological bases, therefore, does not mean racialisation is not taking place (Garner 2012, p. 447) and thus race is no longer problematic.

Racialisation occurs when bodies are ascribed a racial identity, identified as 'other' (Fassin 2011). It has to do with "homogenising groups, de-historicising and not seeing their struggles, reducing their distinctiveness and viewing them as bearers of particular kinds of cultural norms" (Garner 2012, p. 7). It is particularly harmful when it ascribes certain negative attributes to this imposed racial identity. Hall (1997) discusses how the negative racialisation of Black people and their essentialisation as unintelligent functions as the norm in our society: "In a way, you don't need to have a whole argument, you know, about "are Blacks intelligent? [...] already the equivalences begin to trip off people's mind. Blacks then, sound bodies, good at sports, good at dancing, very expressive, no intelligence, never had a thought in their heads, you know, tendency to barbarous behaviour. All these things are clustered, simply in the classification system itself" (Hall 1997). The way in which racialisation connects with popular consciousness is via the Gramscian notion of 'common-sense' (Cole and Stuart 2005) - the taken-for-granted 'naturalised' world' (Hall 1988b) - which constitutes those beliefs and understandings which are often seen to be ahistorical and 'given' but are actually hegemonic ways of rationalising and defining the world.

'Reflexive racialisation' from below describes the way ethnic minorities recapture racist discourses to express new forms of identity (Parker and Song 2006), and bring uncomfortable and silent questions of racialisation to the fore in order to address them. Saggar and Geddes (2000) state that 'positive' racialised debates about politics and minority representation, for example, "contribute to the creation of scope for increased levels of representation" (p. 27) and place race meaningfully on the political agenda. It is the 'ghettoisation' of ethnic minority issues – when debates about political representation, for example, are linked to narrow understandings of ethnic minority concerns with outcomes benefiting some groups whilst disadvantaging others – that constitutes negative racialisation (the racialisation of politics will be discussed further in section 2.4).

### 2.3.3. *Race and racism*

Racism characterises situations in which a racial / ethnic group dominates, or attempts to dominate, another set of people, and seeks to impose a categorical identity defined by inherent characteristics of that group and their differences from the dominating group (Jenkins 2008, p. 23). Racism is an ongoing site of personal and social tension according to Ahmed (2004) who talks, from the context of the cultural politics of emotion, about race as a 'sticky sign'. Within the racist epithet 'Paki', for example, a long-standing slur used in the UK for those of South Asian origin, associations of the dirty immigrant, the outsider and the 'other' are concealed and bound within the one, emotionally-charged term (Munt 2007, p.12).

Omi and Winant (2014) define racism as a characteristic of the social projects which produce and reproduce structures of domination based on long-standing essentialist categories of race. Understanding the historical basis of racism is thus key to understanding how it works in modern developed societies. Hierarchical racial binaries were ingrained during colonial periods of rule, and racism has endured since then because of the rigidity and fixity (Newton 1997) of ideas of racial difference. The study of racism thus goes beyond racial prejudice to the formation of racial inequality through its institutionalisation. Structural and institutional discrimination affect ethnic and racial minorities in all aspects of everyday life including work, education, healthcare, housing and the political sphere. Racism doesn't therefore exist solely in 'acts' of discrimination and prejudice but underlies the systematic, historical and contemporary oppression and 'othering' of people. 'Everyday racisms' (Essed 1991) are, however, a key feature of being a racial / ethnic minority in the UK. The lived experience of racial oppression means that racial / ethnic minorities are constantly faced with questions of identity and belonging. The contestability of whether the event in question is 'actually' discrimination allows everyday racism to perpetuate whilst chipping away at the dignity of the individual. It is the 'trivial' acts of disrespect and exclusion such as facial expressions and avoidance of contact which adversely affect ethnic minorities and are harder to 'pin down' as

legitimate discriminations. These, when internalised by the individual but publicly unacknowledged, allow racism to perpetuate and proliferate.

For Muslims in the UK, racialisation and racism is inextricably bound up with religion. Muslim Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups experience a greater ethnic penalty in education and the labour market than Indians (Heath et al. 2006), even when controlling for class origins, pointing to the existence of unique forms of ethno-religious discrimination (Heath and McMahon 2005). Platt (2005a) identified an economic hierarchy within South Asian ethno-religious groups that places Muslims at the bottom of the ladder. Pakistanis and Bangladeshis (who are predominantly Muslim in terms of religious profile) have only slightly larger employment penalties than other Muslim groups, including Indian and White Muslims. Research by Heath et al. (2013) shows that Indian Muslims and Pakistani Muslims are much more likely to desire jobs that offer special provision for their religious practice at work, which restricts the number of workplaces where they are prepared or able to find employment. Muslim women, as highlighted in a recent House of Commons report on employment opportunities for Muslims (2016), have felt huge levels of workplace discrimination experiencing a 'triple penalty' of being female, Muslim and a minority. Meer (2016) argues that the Omi and Winant racial formation thesis fails to explicitly capture the history behind the racialisation of religion, arguably lending too much focus on theoretical definition. This has led to the continued, problematic conceptualisation of Islamophobia as a phenomenon to be analysed outside the boundaries of what is conceived as racism and racialisation. In this study, anti-Muslim racism as well as larger ethnoracial discrimination will be at the centre of much of the analysis on racism given its relevance to the population of interest.

#### *2.3.4 Ethnicity and ethnic identity*

An ethnic group is, broadly, a collectivity within a larger population who share a number of the following: ancestry, memories of a shared past, a shared struggle of migration, and a cultural focus upon one or more elements which define the group's identity and sets 'criteria' for membership such as kinship, religion, language, shared territory, nationality or physical appearance (Bulmer 1996). Parentage and ancestry in particular determine the inherited characteristics which are critical to ethnicity (Burton et al. 2008). The shared meanings within these ethnic collectivities constitute its cultural identity (Shore 2002). The way an ethnic identity is defined is specific to the individual and the group of which they claim membership.<sup>13</sup>

---

<sup>13</sup> In UK surveys, ethnicity is often conflated with ethno-nationality - 'Chinese' or 'Indian' - and / or ethnoracial categories - 'White British', 'British Asian' - to create delineated ethnic categories. It is still not clear whether ethnic minorities actually think of themselves in terms of these official aggregate classifications (this will be

The authenticity of membership to an ethnic group is dependent on mutual recognition of membership (Fowler and Kam 2007). Participation in cultural practices, associations and networks, and shared language are 'active' indicators of an ethnic group identity (Phinney 1990) that signify an individual's membership to an ethnic group, as well as reinforce their own, individual sense of ethnic identity. Experiences of overt discrimination can prompt an individual's exploration of their ethnic identity (Cross 1991) and perhaps even increase their level of ethnic attachment (Jaspal 2015; Schmitt et. al 2003; Verkuyten 1995). Yuval-Davis (2006, 2011) talks about the 'politics of belonging' and the ways in which individuals construct and posit certain forms of marginalised, minority belonging as exclusive to imbue them with status and notions of entitlement. For example, to be Pakistani, one must, like them, speak the language. This allows individuals to reclaim the power and meaning of their ethnic identities and make sense of them on a grassroots level.

South Asian ethnic identities are heavily rooted in ethno-regional identity (e.g. 'Indian Gujarati' or 'Pakistani Punjabi' identity), religion, language, caste and more.<sup>14</sup> Caste is a particularly salient ethnic and class phenomenon within India but, as Sato (2012) states, within the South Asian diaspora as well. His work highlights the intricacies of caste consciousness and division amongst Sikhs in Leicester. He states that although these communities seem to resist hierarchical distinctions based on caste on a superficial level, "in reality they have used caste as their standard method of classifying individuals in society [...]" It is not always obvious to the casual observer, but it surfaces when one individual meets someone from the same Indian ethnic or religious community but from a different caste, or in matters pertaining to marriage and the extended family" (Sato 2012 p. 17). Vertovec (1999) talks about how, despite, the construction of reified racial / ethnic / religious communities, the way affiliations and ties play out – as well as how identities are adopted and sustained - in real diasporic settings are much more complex and cross-cuttings than one would believe. He talks about Baumann's ethnographic study of Southall (1996), a region of London heavily populated by those of South Asian origin:

"picture, for instance, an East African Punjabi Sikh of the Tharkan caste. He or she can speak to certain Muslim and Hindu Southallians as a fellow East African; they may do likewise with former East Africans who are Gujarati, rather than Punjabi; they may similarly speak to fellow Sikhs of the Raj or Lohar caste

---

analysed in parts of Chapter 5), although the power and ubiquity of such descriptions lead many to adopt them for their own self-definitions (Heath et al. 2013).

<sup>14</sup> Analysis of 'sub-ethnic' identities based on region and caste are difficult to operationalise quantitatively given the way they are adopted and invoked in a fragmentary way, particularly across the second-generation. They come to the fore in places in the qualitative analysis. However, national (British) and religious identities *will* be analysed both quantitatively and qualitatively in this study given the availability of suitable data.

as fellow Ramgarhia, whether they hail from the subcontinent or from East Africa” (p. 115).

This illustration of local, national and transnational web of ethnic, religious and caste-dependent web of affiliations represents the dependent and contextual nature of British South Asian identifications, and how these develop organically, with complexities often difficult to capture analytically. The strength of an individual's ethnic identity is, like all identities, context-specific. One's awareness of, and the relative social and political importance they place on, their ethnicity differs depending on the situation in which it is, or is not, invoked (Forehand et. al 2002, p. 1087) or called into question (Kenny and Briner 2013). This, however, is difficult to pin down in social science research given methodological limitations.

### *2.3.5 Ethnic identification and negotiation*

Brubaker (2004) and McCrone (2002) advocate the use of 'identification' as the active rather than passive form of identity, a term which gets closer to the way in which identity actually manifests itself in reality: 'identity is not to be understood as a badge or label that is pinned on us at birth or at school [but] as a complex set of cultural markers [for] a game of identification and identity construction' (McCrone 2002, p. 316). Individuals seek to achieve significance and personal meaning to their place in a given social context, and thus construct, rather than merely adopt, an understanding of their self that is both coherent and valued by them (Atewologun and Sealy 2011; Alvesson et al. 2008). Immigrant parents and their native-born children are constantly negotiating their "multiple, often conflicting, dialogical voices, histories and / positions" (Bhatia 2002, p. 57), constantly in the sense that identity construction is a routine task (Jamal and Chapman 2000). The assimilation view of immigrants and their children moving from traditional to modern, or ethnic to mainstream, overlooks that what is 'traditional', as well as what is 'modern', is not fixed (Zontini 2007).

Identity negotiation refers to how identities are conceived, internalised and performed. It takes into account the tensions (Swann 1987), reconciliations, and relationships between identities in terms of how individuals construct their sense of self, engage with society and the social order, and with members of their social groups. Bechhofer and McCrone (2010) state that there is a 'complex matrix' involving self-definitions, definitions of others, and perceptions of definitions by others in terms of identity. The process of identification and identity negotiation for ethnic minorities is thus influenced by both professional and personal circumstances (e.g. inherited identities from family and adopted identities at work) as well as social and structural contexts, both domestic and global (e.g. immigration discourses, global anti-Muslim sentiment), which frame certain ethnic and racial minorities in certain ways.

Tangible cultural goods or 'properties' such as speaking one's mother tongue, engaging in religious activity and participating in cultural events related to the home country are important 'active' markers of ethnic identity for descendants of immigrants who may have no intention or little opportunity of returning to their ancestors' country of origin (Barn 2008; Modood et al. 1994) and seek to maintain a connection to the culture of their ancestral home.<sup>15</sup> British South Asians feel learning and using their 'native' languages and dialects are important (Modood et al. 1994), even though the use of South Asian languages, particularly in terms of reading, writing and speaking outside the home, is in decline (Shaw 2000). Ethnic identities evolve over time, and although they may become further removed from their cultural origins<sup>16</sup> with hybrid ethnicities taking their place (Sanders 2002), they nonetheless endure.

### *2.3.6 Ethno-national identification*

National identity is often an important part of an individuals' ethnic identity (Burton et al. 2008). For example, second-generation South Asian youth often use hyphenated ethno-national labels such as 'Pakistani-British' to describe their ethnic identity - a reflection of the bi-cultural (Berry et al. 2006) 'ethnically mixed way' (Modood et al. 1994, p. 110) in which they combine minority and majority heritages, languages and lifestyles. The ability of ethnic minorities to negotiate and maintain multiple identities and group belongings means that minority identification does not necessarily imply a loss of majority identification (Nandi and Platt 2014, Nava 2002). To reconcile their national (majority) and ethnic (minority) belongings, UK ethnic minorities create their own hybrid identities and modes of belonging. These both forge imaginative cultural links to South Asia as well as reimagine Britishness within a complex multicultural context (Alexander and Kim 2013, Brah and Phoenix 2013). For example, the 'desi' identity (from the South Asian term for 'homeland') is adopted by some from the diaspora to reflect their sense of urban 'British Asianness' (Kim 2012). Like all identities, however, the boundaries of hybrid identities like these are blurred and complex.

---

<sup>15</sup> Some customs and traditions - such as arranged marriage - may bind ethnic communities but ultimately favour their male members (Mohammad 2005). The extent to which views on cultural preservation differ by gender will be explored in chapters 5 but are largely beyond the empirical scope of this thesis.

<sup>16</sup> A 2018 ComRes poll commissioned for the BBC Asian Network (a UK radio station targeting young people of South Asian descent) analysed the social attitudes and identities of 2,026 British South Asians. In the poll, a larger proportion of the Indian-origin sample stated that their cultural traditions are dying out (28 per cent) than the Pakistani and Bangladeshi samples (24 and 22 per cent respectively). The Indian respondents were also more likely than the Pakistani and Bangladeshi respondents to describe their British Asian culture as 'modernising' and 'evolving'. This suggests that perceptions of cultural change, and perhaps the rate of change itself, differ notably across the South Asian diaspora.

Identification with a national identity is seen by many social identity scholars as an indicator of social and political integration, as it “implies sufficient identification with one’s sub-group to experience basic security, and sufficient identification with the overarching group to preclude divisiveness” (Klandermans et al. 2008, p. 995). Typologies of integration and assimilation versus separation and marginalisation have, however, been critiqued as overly simplistic. Although accounts by cultural psychologists such as Berry et al. (2006) have moved away from the idea of majority and minority culture as mutually exclusive, they still 1) lack of attention to contextual factors which determine how cultures and identities are negotiated, and 2) overlook exclusionary and hegemonic conceptions of the ‘national’. Overt and structural discrimination created huge difficulties for both the first and subsequent waves of South Asian immigrants to integrate into mainstream British culture, each posited as a potential threat to the cohesion and character of the British national community (Burkett 2013, p. 8). Keddie (2013) states that “while Britishness may not be an inherently racist concept, it does carry racial connotations that impact on the extent to which minority groups affiliate with Britain” (p. 2). A lack of acceptance as ‘British’ given the racialisation of Britishness leads many South Asians, therefore, to think of themselves in instrumental terms as British citizens, rather than identify as British on an affective basis. This is somewhat less common, however, amongst second-generation South Asians who have been born and raised in the UK (Jaspal 2015, p. 5).

Integrationist and multicultural state discourses have long painted racialised minorities as self-segregating (Bonilla-Silva et al. 2006) and blame minorities for refusing to assimilate with a ‘British’ way of life (Alexander 2000). This claim has most recently and strongly been levied at British Muslims (Garner 2012). Questions have emerged in relation to the compatibility of ‘British’ values and Muslim identity (Ahmad and Evergeti 2010), despite the fact that hyphenated / hybrid identities like ‘British Muslim’ are common and favoured amongst many Muslim ethnic minorities. Muslim women who wear the hijab have particularly been put at the centre of political wrangling in not only the UK but much of Western Europe for years regarding the extent to which ‘visible’ cultural symbolism is compatible with a ‘British’ way of life. Pitcher (2009) notes how given the “racialized understanding of the obligations that come with membership of the British nation [...] certain expressions of race, culture and religion continue to be thought to contravene the acceptable limits of national belonging” (p. 143). Whereas some posit that this might increase rejection of the dominant culture amongst Muslims (Rumbaut 2008), this is not always the case. A 2004 report from the Islamic Human Rights Commission regarding British Muslims’ expectations of the Government found that whilst almost half of Muslims were politically active on ‘Muslim’ issues because of policies on religious discrimination, a similar proportion felt a strong sense of belonging to Britain (Ameli and Merali 2004).

### 2.3.7 Ethno-religious identification

Religion is strongly implicated in South Asian diasporic conceptions of ethnicity (Rai and Sankaran 2011), often constitutive of ethnic identity even if an individual harbours low levels of religiosity. The term ‘culturally Hindu’ adopted by many second-generation Indians in the diaspora is the expression of a non-spiritual desire to maintain a connection to their ethnic heritage through Hindu ritual, customs and celebrations (Fenton 1992). Nonetheless, a commitment to ‘Hindu-ness’ as well ‘Sikh-ness’ are still important parts of membership to the predominantly Indian Hindu and Sikh diasporas. Hindu nationalist organisations in the UK, such as the umbrella group ‘Hindu Forum of Britain’ (HFB), work to promote a sense of ‘Hindu-ness’ amongst UK Hindus. Like the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), the HFB is a prominent voice of Hindu faith groups at the level of institutional politics, and for faith organisations as a whole (Zavos 2015). According to Singh and Tatla (2006), British Sikhs are also willing assert their right to represent and even defend their religious sensibilities when the occasion demands it (p. 2). Sikh campaigns such as those to protect the rights of British Sikh policeman to wear their turbans instead of helmets (Bebber 2017) highlight the distinctly religious, community-building responses of British Sikhs to living as a religious minority in a multicultural but fundamentally secular modern state (Raj 2000, p. 553).

For other South Asian ethnic groups, religion is less ‘bound up’ with ethnicity (Jaspal 2011). Modood et al. (1997) found that of all faith communities, British Muslims were the most likely to view religion as playing a very important part in their lives with many asserting the importance of their religious identity as a marker of identity that transcends the politics of borders and nationalities, and potentially even supersedes ethnic group identification: “Islam is therefore an entity that—unlike Britishness and Bangladeshi culture—is perceived to be most flexible and enduring. It is not withheld because of third-party disapproval, nor is it evanescent with increasing time and distance” (Gest 2015). This is a trait shared to a lesser extent by British Hindus and Sikhs.<sup>17</sup>

Common (and increasing) experiences of Islamophobia / anti-Muslim racism have bolstered an assertive religious identity politics (Birt 2013, p. 217) for some Muslims in the UK. According to Cashin (2010), biases against Muslims are more likely to be explicitly expressed, and thus result in racist exclusions for Muslims and those assumed to be Muslim, than for those in other groups (Cashin 2010, p.127). Events including and since 9/11 and the

---

<sup>17</sup> For both Sikhs and Muslims, religion entails a sense of both global unity and political consciousness bolstered by threats to self-determination. The Sikh identity is, however, strongly tied to a specific homeland in the same sort of vein ethnic identity is, which is why Sikhs often ethnically self-define as ‘Sikh Punjabi’ over ‘Indian’ (Shani 2008).

'war on terror' have increased the visibility of Muslim people's religious affiliation (Sirin et al. 2008). One of the consequences of this is the increased unity of Muslims. Some see themselves as part of a worldwide *ummah* (Muslim community) rather than as a member of a specific ethnic group (Heath et al. 2013, p.18). This has also been reflected in their political identifications (Kepel 1994). Meer (2014) discusses how Muslim identity has become a basis for political expression, with reference to 'Muslim consciousness'. Islamophobia necessitates the mobilisation of Muslim consciousness which utilises transformative, democratic channels (albeit imperfect ones) that are primarily political rather than religious to affect change (Meer 2014, p.514). For example, much of the impetus for religious discrimination to be written into legislative equality frameworks came from Muslim forums such as the MCB acting as a representative locus for mobilisation on behalf of the British Muslim community.

Earle (2015) discusses how some Muslim Americans deal with 'intolerance' in a post-911 context by downplaying, rather than rallying against, anti-Muslim racism. They "creatively wield the language of tolerance, (neo)liberal multiculturalism, and US exceptionalism to claim belonging and guard against overt intolerance [...] concealing everyday and systematic forms of anti-Islamic intolerance in the name of the tolerant and multicultural nation" (p. 134). This can be linked to the sort of post-racial discourses – denial of the significance of racism – wielded by some ethnic minorities (Bonilla-Silva 2010; Bobo 2011; Meghji and Saini 2017) which helps perpetuate and normalise a system which metes out injustices to ethnic and religious minorities (Costa 2016). Chung (2016) argues that immigrant communities build a public image based around hard work and sacrifice for the 'American dream' that deliberately seeks to mask their doubts about it. Thus "characterizing America as racist and the American dream as a failure would only serve to demean the sacrifices their parents made to secure their children's success and highlight racial differences that would reinforce their exclusion from American society" (Chung 2016, p. 17).

### *2.3.8 The relationship between race and ethnicity*

'Ethnicity' has largely overtaken 'race' in sociological and political discourse as a reaction to the perceived inadequacies of the latter. A focus on ethnicity avoids the biological determinism inherent in ideas of race and appeals, in part, to the self-definitions of members (Mason 2000, p. 104). Gilroy (1987), however, is critical of the notion of ethnicity, emphasising the importance of focusing on processes of race and how racial meanings underlie solidarities and identities. He sought to bring back the cultural as well as the political to understandings of race and racism, recapturing it from ethnicity which tended to reduce problems of race to problems of community. This not only obscures the realities of racism but has fuelled the popularity of post-race discourses. Race is still a defining determinant of inequality, and, furthermore has distinctly transformative political connotations (discussed in

section 2.4.4). Anthias (2001) argues, however, that Gilroy and his adherents fail to treat race “in terms of ideas and practices relating to ethnic and national collectivities and how they are understood and used under particular social, political and economic conditions” (p. 206). Ethnicity thus has its own specific and useful analytical focus, but it is also impossible to credibly discuss ethnicity without race, as it encompasses descent, colour, difference and other racial / racialised characteristics that both bind as well as exclude groups.

Both the diverse ethnic and cultural characteristics of British South Asians and their historical (and socio-economic) formation as a racial population informed by the UK and South Asia’s colonial past bears consideration. For a study such as this which seeks to analyse a certain ethnoracial population and reflect on difference between the ethnic sub-groups within, ethnicity is a salient and appropriate concept to harness alongside race, insofar as the ultimate focus remains on analysis of the distribution of power and resources across racialised groups (Carter and Fenton 2009).

## **2.4 Politics**

### *2.4.1 Political identity*

With regard to politics and social identity, three questions are at the forefront of the framing of this study: the extent to which racial / ethnic identity influences political identity, how / if class still fundamentally shapes political orientations, and how these interact to determine the political affiliations of ethnic minorities. An individual’s political identity comprises their political orientation and political party affiliation, and relates to the sort of political behaviours including voting, political activism, and civic or community engagement they exhibit. People sometimes engage in political action to fulfil identity needs: “meanings of identities have implications for how one behaves” (Burke and Tully 1977, p. 137). In other words, the more one identifies with a group involved in political action, the more they are themselves likely to take part (Klandermans et al. 2008, p. 995). Social identity is therefore strongly tied to political identity, perhaps acutely so for historically disenfranchised and marginalised ethnic groups.

Research into the politics of ethnic minority groups has largely sought to establish the extent of divergence between the political profiles of White and non-White populations (Saggar 1998), focusing on how politically engaged or disengaged ethnic minorities are in the UK (Garbaya 2005) and how well represented ethnic minorities are in the political infrastructure (Saggar and Geddes 2000, Sobolewska 2013a, Sobolewska 2013b). There has been much discussion around the concept of ‘identity politics’ and the ‘politics of recognition’, particularly with regard to the political demands of hyper-racialised groups like British Muslims (Eade 1996, Vertovec 2002, Kundhani 2007). With regard to the existing literature on the political

identities of British Bangladeshis, for example, there has been much scholarship mapping the changing political priorities of the second and third generations from their focus on anti-racist politics and Black politics to the new renewed focus on local, faith-based community cohesion with integration, particularly amongst those in East London, with local political infrastructure (Eade and Garbin 2005) in the last two decades. However, there is still a lack of research into how ethnic minorities define *themselves* politically on the individual level.

Since the ethnic minority middle classes are a fairly 'under-researched population, in-depth analysis into the political identities of particular ethnic and class fractions like the South Asian middle classes is also scant. Part of the issue with regard to quantitative research on this subject for these sub-populations is lack of sufficient data which with to explore and interrogate the concept of political orientation, affiliation, and partisanship. However, there is some qualitative sociological and political scholarship relating particularly to the political participation of specific, upwardly mobile ethnic minority groups and communities which will be referenced in parts of this section.

#### *2.4.2 Political party identity*

Party identity is defined broadly, but not unequivocally, as the attachment one feels to a political party, above and beyond a preference or affiliation. Community norms and attachments can often explain the enduring political relationship between an ethnic minority group and a party. Although likened to an affective, emotional attachment by Michigan scholars (Burden and Kloffstad 2005), party identity is not necessarily as immutable as posited by political scientists. It can differ in intensity from individual to individual, and wax and wane in strength over time in response to contextual factors such as the political and social environment. Revisionist scholars therefore posit party identity as a running tally of political evaluations, which grows in strength and stability as an individual's understanding of their own political positioning increases (Groenendyk 2013). Party identification is thus related to an individual's political knowledge and self-awareness, the political climate, and the changing landscape of party manifestos, policy, candidates and past performance. Burden and Kloffstad (2005), in their evaluations of American partisanship, state that there is a subset of the American electorate who are "Democrats in their heads but Republicans in their hearts" (p. 87). In other words, their *thinking* about politics favours the Democratic Party, but their *feeling* favours the Republicans. The psychological motivation to vote emotionally for a party often competes with the motivation to evaluate the rational reasons for party support (Groenendyk 2013). We might best understand party identification, therefore, as a combination of preferences as well as loyalties, with an affective as well as rational component that is constantly in negotiation (Budge et al. 2010).

Scholars who reject the Michigan and revisionist models argue that although party identifiers hold attitudes that conflict with their party identity, they do this “without feeling any pressure to update their identity, as revisionists argue, or to defend their identity, as the Michigan model argues” (Green et. al 2002, p. 4). We could frame party identity, therefore, in the same terms as an ethnic identity: an overarching, deep-seated affiliation to a group which engenders pride and loyalty, and is not necessarily (nor needs to be) defensible. With respect to the measurement of party identification, it may thus prove difficult to 1) capture the complexities of people’s own subjective interpretation of their party identity (Budge et al. 2010, p.53) - much like single measure attempts to capture social identity often fail to encompass the breadth of meaning and complexity of group identifications (see section 3.5) - and 2) establish clear rationales for choice of party identity across individuals and groups.

### *2.4.3 Political action and efficacy*

US-based political science scholarship has long-since established the relationship between political efficacy (broadly, trust in government and a belief that one can understand and influence politics and thus help affect social change (Campbell et al. 1954)) and political participation, the latter as both a predictor and outcome of the former (Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Finkel 1985). This relationship, however, is heavily mediated by both class and race. A lack of social and economic resources like education (discussed earlier with regard to concerted cultivation (Lareau 2002)) makes it difficult for individuals to understand community problems and to directly influence them (Barnes and Kaase 1979, Verba et al. 1995) through, for example, contacting politicians (McDill and Ridley 1962, Scott and Acock 1979). Both civic and political engagement is also dampened by alienation from social networks, and a lack of social and political trust (Newton 1999, Foley and Edwards 1996, Henn et al. 2005). This effects predominantly young people (Marsh and O’Toole 2006, Heath and Park 1997) and those in lower socioeconomic positions in society. The economic, social and cultural power advantage of wealthier individuals allows them to have a greater say in the political system and deliberately drown out the interests of poorer citizens (Goodin and Dryzek 1980). The effect of this on poorer citizens – demotivating them to engage in politics – leads to a decline in their sense of political efficacy and an overall decline in political action. Given the high proportion of working class ethnic minorities in the UK – particularly of Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Black African and Black Caribbean origin – the issue of class here intersects with race. Whether wealthier ethnic minority individuals would have it in their interests to preclude issues like the redistribution of wealth being debated is contingent on the extent to which they feel a sense of belonging and / or obligation to those within their ethnic minority group or to non-Whites as a whole and act politically for or alongside them, regardless of class differences / conflicts in socio-economic interests. Literature has largely shown that the type of civic and political activities minorities engage in are generally more

geared towards their own ethnic minority community (Stepick et al. 2008), although this has not been sufficiently analysed by class.

High levels of social trust or 'bonding capital' (Putnam 2000) exist within ethnic minority communities, particularly those with strong religious traditions for whom 'prosociality' – engagement in community service and charitable activity – is 'morally' motivated (Hardy and Carlo 2005). The decision to act politically at the collective level to challenge stigmatised and reified identities and improve their societal status (Fowler and Kam 2007, p. 813) has (albeit slowly) helped disproportionately economically underprivileged minority groups secure due political rights and recognition over the years (Bell 1975), and continues to do so. This has been evidenced over time in both the UK and the US. Research by Stokes (2003) on the Latino community in the US looked beyond the link between political participation and socio-economic status to find that, in general, group consciousness rooted in a sense of political and economic relative deprivation increases political participation for this broad population. A strong ethnic minority political and civic culture also makes it more likely that a broader civic culture will develop (Fennema and Tillie 1999, p. 714), one which fosters 'mainstream' political participation and engagement with broader local and national politics. Minorities do not simply co-opt the political process for their own ends, as some of the research on ethnic group identity politics might assume (Maxwell 2006). 'Conventional' political activity and the effectiveness of this is still dependent, however, on the extent to which minority individuals feel and see their voices being heard through mainstream channels (Klandermans et al. 2008). It is not just whether 'ethnic' civic society promotes engagement or disengagement with the host society, therefore, but the latter's disengagement with the interests and needs of ethnic minorities and immigrants (Pachi and Barrett 2013) that determines levels of political interest, efficacy and activity.

#### *2.4.4 Race, ethnicity and politics*

The 'Black' identity has long served as an 'umbrella' identity of racial marginality for those of African, African-Caribbean and Asian descent in the UK to unite under (Maylor 2009). Political activity based around a marginal racial identity is grounded in the acceptance of race as a social fact - the acknowledgement that racial inequality in status, privilege and power exists (Woldemikael 1989) - and identification with a collective racial identity (Durrant and Sparrow 1997, p. 340). 'Political Blackness'<sup>18</sup> describes the anti-racist identity under which

---

<sup>18</sup> Lipsitz (2006) frames Whiteness, like Blackness, as a political identity in itself. Unlike (political) Blackness, it is an identity that doesn't exist at the margins, and isn't overtly mobilised for recognition, rights and justice, but is created and perpetuated for the provision of resource, power and opportunity. It is historical in that it has its roots in colonialism, slavery, and 'Empire' (Garner 2012), but contemporary Whiteness has deftly

racial minorities in the UK have mobilised for racial equality and recognition, with a particular commitment to the economic priorities and concerns of the lower Black classes (Daye 1994). Dawson (1995) argues that the notion of 'what is good for my 'race' is good for me' fosters a strong political community of interest among Blacks of *all* classes. Paul Gilroy in his seminal work *There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack* (1987) drew attention to how existing sociological models contextualise race within the class structure. He sought to shift the focus to looking at the "status of 'race' as a distinct order of social phenomena" (Gilroy 1987, p. 27), recognising the way in which the racial political struggle is both an alternative to class consciousness, and contingent in class formation itself.

There has been a weakening of racial solidarity over recent decades, however, conceptualised by many scholars as a deliberate project of the state. Kundnani (2002) discusses how, in the mid-1980s, representatives from different ethnic communities were brought into the local political infrastructure to compete for funding. This dampened radicalism while fragmenting minority racial communities horizontally by ethnicity, and vertically by class: "while multiculturalist policies institutionalised Black culture, it was the practice of ethnicised funding that segmented and divided Black communities. The state's strategy, it seemed, was to re-form Black communities to fit them into the British class system" (p. 68). Pryce's (1979) studies of West Indian communities in Bristol highlights the effects of such policies. He identified the presence of a 'mainliner' class, an elitist, White collar sub-group of the West Indian population. They held senior official positions in local community organisations, espousing the race relations rhetoric of the White people involved in their community work. This isolated them both socio-economically and politically from their ethnic communities: "their integrationist orientations and their preoccupation with status and respectability cut them off from the grassroots in their own community" (Pryce 1979, p. 220). Contemporary UK political movements including 'Operation Black Vote' and 'Black Lives Matter' have (re-)sparked discussion about the way race has been constructed in the political arena, and have forged transnational links with the US and beyond to highlight the persistence of both global and domestic racial (and class) discrimination and injustice. Operation Black Vote (OBV) has also (re-)harnessed the pan-ethnic umbrella term 'Black', stating that they campaign for a strong political voice for "African, Asian, Caribbean, Chinese and other ethnic minorities" (OBV 2010).

Within the South Asian population, there is both historical and ongoing evidence of deliberate socio-economic and ethnic fragmentation. The way in which the state has represented and co-opted groups – positing Indians as the 'model minorities' (Gillborn 2008) for instance - has

---

navigated progress made in the race equality era to maintain and perpetuate its supremacy. This can be seen, among other places, in the machinations of White middle-class cultural capital discussed later on.

fractured the political unity of different ethnic minority groups. Raghuram et al. (2008) suggest that the greater success of Indian immigrants in the UK, and the ability of Indian Sikh and especially Hindu groups to largely avoid an ethno-religious penalty in the labour market, has demarcated them from Muslim Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrants. Bangladeshi and Pakistani communities have had to engage in distinct, local, community-focused politics to deal with issues of racism, deprivation, and lack of adequate representation. For example, 'homegrown' politicians have long been nurtured in and amongst the Tower Hamlets Bangladeshi community to represent the interests of British Bangladeshis at both local and national level. Carey and Shukur (1985) discuss the problem of racial attacks on White housing estates in the 1980s in the east of Tower Hamlets which was (and still is) heavily populated by Bangladeshi immigrant families. Without a concerted attempt by the police and housing authorities to deal with this and similar problems, strong grassroots political networks sprang up amongst these tight-knit Bangladeshi communities which have endured over time.

For Muslim South Asians, both 'Asian' and 'Black' collective identities have proved weak as political categories (Modood and Ahmad 2007, p. 187). Not only do British Muslims suffer from stark ethno-religious penalties but they are hyper-racialised as threats to national security and cohesion. Werbner (2004) describes how the political significance of Islam changed at the turn of the new century and thus drastically changed the political priorities of British Muslims: "Islam began for South Asian Muslims arriving in Britain in the post-war era as an acceptable incorporative identity [...] Since the Rushdie affair, however, and even more so since September 11, we have seen a kind of reversal of the usual process of religious incorporation. Instead of religion being defined as a legitimate source of identity for incoming migrants arriving into an established multi-faith society, Islam has become a flag of political dissent" (Werbner 2004, p. 905-6).

#### *2.4.5 Ethnic minority political representation*

Garbaye (2005) states that as most South Asians in Britain come from or have origins in democracies with well-established participatory traditions<sup>19</sup> there is a generally high level of

---

<sup>19</sup> Non-resident Indians in the UK and US have increasingly begun to seek democratic political representation in Indian Parliament. The passing of the dual citizenship bill provided a new platform for the political role of the UK-based diaspora in India (Hear et. al. 2004, p.15) and there are also discussions to allow non-resident registered voters to vote in the Indian elections via a proxy (Krishnamurthy 2018). Some Indian states, such as Punjab, have also a state-created political body representing the Indian Diaspora. According to Singh and Rajan (2016) this infrastructure promotes transnational ethnic bonds and assists the participation of the diaspora in the development of the states in question. It is also indicative of the way in which ethnically loyal and socio-economically successful Indian communities in the UK have managed to position themselves as both 'model' immigrants *and* emigrants.

political and civic democratic participation amongst these groups in the UK. Traditionally ethnic politics has been marginalised with ethnic minority MPs representing ethnic minority areas (Saggar and Geddes 2000) but this has changed somewhat in the last few elections (Sobolewska 2013a). The 2010 British Election saw the near doubling of the number of ethnic minority MPs (from 15 in 2005 to 27 in 2010). It also saw a break in the traditional dominance of the Labour party in the field of minority representation with the election of 11 ethnic minority Conservative MPs in 2010 compared to just 2 in 2005 (Fieldhouse and Sobolewska 2013; Audickas 2015). The 2015 election saw 41 minority ethnic MPs enter Parliament. This constituted 6 per cent of all MPs but was still not proportionate to the non-White UK population. The 2017 election saw an even larger increase, however, with 52 ethnic minority MPs elected, mainly to Labour seats (British Future 2017), suggesting that ethnic minority representation in the UK Parliament is (arguably) steadily on the rise. There are issues with minority religious representation, however, particularly within the Conservative party. There are few Muslim MPs within the Tory party (3 elected in the 2017 general election, compared to 12 for Labour). The Conservative party candidate for the 2016 London mayoral campaign – Zac Goldsmith - disseminated racially divisive campaigning materials which targeted the Hindu and Sikh Indian population in London (Saini 2016) and further alienated Pakistani and Bangladeshi Londoners. The Muslim Council of Britain called an inquiry into Islamophobia within the Conservative party in 2016 after this campaign and again in 2018 which drew stark attention to potential anti-Muslim elements within the party.

With regard to the relationship between ethnic minority parliamentary presence and the representation of ethnic minority issues and interest, Fieldhouse and Sobolewska (2013) ask: “Is the growing number of ethnic minority origin MPs translating into a better substantive representation of minorities? Are minority MPs the only ones carrying the can for minorities? Or are White MPs representing their minority constituents as well?” (p.237) Saalfeld and Bischof's (2013) study of MP's parliamentary questions found that Black and Asian MPs asked considerably more questions about the problems and rights of ethnic minorities than average, which suggests that ethnic minority influence in Parliament is still conducive to the interests of ethnic minority groups. Nonetheless, it is the diversity of the constituency, and the extent to which ethnic minority voters are politically vocal, which drives representation.

#### *2.4.6 Ethnic minority voting*

There is a well-documented, close relationship between ethnic minorities and the UK Labour party that has endured for decades. The extent of the Labour party's domination amongst ethnic minority voters may have declined from overwhelming vote shares of over 80 per cent

in the 1970s-80s, but non-Whites still favour the party over the Conservative party by an overwhelming margin (Messina 2007, p. 203). In the 2010 General Election, 68 per cent of ethnic minority voters supported the Labour Party, compared to just 16 per cent supporting the Conservatives (Runnymede Trust 2015). The reasons behind the continuing strong support from ethnic minorities for the Labour party have been analysed in a number of studies of contemporary British voter behaviour and political identity. A study by The Electoral Commission (2005) into ethnic minority voting behaviour identified a residual loyalty to the Labour party among older voters who feel a historical gratitude to the party. This gratitude can be attributed in part to the Labour party's defense of ethnic minority equality measures and their legacy of 'race'-relations legislation (Heath et al. 2013, Saggar 1998) which have been of value to minority communities, as well as their welfare-orientated policies which served the interests of working-class members (Ashcroft 2012). Heath et al. (2013) argue that strong community norms and sentiment amongst (most) ethnic minority voters overwhelmingly account for the specificity of their party attachment: "Quite possibly minorities were less swayed by general considerations about the state of the economy, but more influenced by how much (or little) Labour had done for them and their ethnic group" (p. 155).

As stated in section 2.4.2 with regard to revisionist understandings of party identity, political affiliation is liable to wax and wane in response to the political climate. The popularity of the Labour party amongst British Muslims decreased dramatically after the onset of the Iraq War in 2003 which occurred during the tenure of Tony Blair's Labour government. The Labour party has also lost (some) South Asian supporters to the Conservative party in recent years. According to a 2015 post-election online poll conducted for British Future (2015), the Conservative party resonated with minority voters on themes including leadership and economy<sup>20</sup> - less affective but nonetheless salient instrumental considerations for the ethnic minority electorate. In the 2017 election there was, conversely, a steep rise in ethnic minority support for the Labour party. Ipsos MORI (2017) research indicated that nearly three-quarters of the Black and Asian vote went to the Labour party and less than a fifth to the Conservative party. The 'Windrush scandal' in 2018 which saw the citizenship rights of first- and second-generation Black Caribbeans in the UK challenged by a Conservative government, seen as

---

<sup>20</sup> YouGov critiqued the methods employed by British Future in this poll, suggesting that the kind of ethnic minority voters who fill in web panel surveys may be disproportionately Conservative leaning. The Conservative party may have been making modest progress with all ethnic minority groups, particularly Asians, but not that dramatically, which would account somewhat for the Labour resurgence in 2017. Weighted data from YouGov (2015) panel surveys showed that there was a 6 percentage point increase in Conservative support amongst Asians but no change in Labour support from the 2010 to 2015 elections. The consensus about changing ethnic minority party preferences is still tentative, and an area of research that must be ongoing to account for survey shortcomings as well as rapid changes in the political landscape.

creating an increasingly 'hostile environment' for immigrants.

#### *2.4.7 Class and party politics*

The middle classes have traditionally been seen as harbouring interests that, on the whole, lead to 'conservative' political leanings and endorsement of the dominant institutional order (Lockwood 1995, Whiteley et al. 1994, Parkin 1967). Conservative party policies have long been geared towards preserving the interests of the wealthy, suburban, established middle classes. The 'Big Society' policies of David Cameron's Conservative leadership of the UK (2010-2016), which advocated social action to put local people in control of public services, were criticised for their lack of applicability to those beyond the UK's 'civic core' i.e. middle-class families living in the wealthiest areas in the UK, most able and likely to engage in philanthropic and charitable giving as well as volunteering (Mohan and Bulloch 2012). There has, however, been (some) regular working-class support for the Conservative party - support that goes beyond 'political deviance' or false consciousness - from manual workers socialised into the political and social values of Conservatism and less embedded in their working-class communities (Parkin 1967).

The *professional* middle classes have, in contrast to the established middle classes, been increasingly characterised as politically plural, a group seeking to both increase their economic and political power (as discussed with regard to middle-class practices in section 2.2.13) and also promote liberal causes through social movements (Crozier et al. 2008; Clark and Lipset 2001). Heath et al. (2013) found from longitudinal analysis of British Social Attitudes data that whereas in 1984 professionals were twice as likely to support the Conservatives as they were the Labour party, in 2012 they were more likely to support the Labour party than the Conservative party. When analysing party support, it is also necessary to assess the extent to which political parties have shifted image, leadership, and policy platform over time. The Labour party under Jeremy Corbyn has been posited as highly dissimilar – broadly, more left-wing and arguably radical - to that of New Labour in the mid- to late-1990s. Therefore, the sort of Labour party one was voting for in the 1997 election is, to many, worlds apart from the one they may be voting for now. Corbyn's Labour party may therefore now consist of a range of supporters from across the political spectrum and class lines (Dorey 2017), but may have also lost support from many former centre-ground Labour supporters who have been drawn to the Conservative party.

#### *2.4.8 Class identity and political identity*

Whereas occupational class may no longer be the most important influence on how British voters are aligned (Dunleavy 2012), interests aligned with one's socio-economic positioning

still influence political identity. NatCen (2016) found that “occupationally middle-class people who feel they are working-class do not differ in their attitudes towards redistribution from other middle-class people” (p. 1). Their study showed that 59 per cent of those in professional and managerial occupations who identify as middle-class are classified as right-wing and a similar proportion (60 per cent) of those in professional and managerial occupations who identify as *working-class* are *also* classified as right-wing. Objective class position, therefore, is arguably stronger than subjective class identity in determining middle-class political orientation.

For those who subscribe to the view that pro-welfare attitudes are rooted in instrumental self-interest rather than egalitarianism (Evans 1992b), it stands to reason that the ‘objective’ middle classes would protect their perceived material interests despite their subjective class identities. This brings to the fore questions, however, about what a working-class identity means to those in middle-class occupational locations, and the extent to which it harbours a political component. In terms of socio-political action, it is not easy to ascertain “whether the incumbent of different roles which belong in different classes acts as a member of the higher or the lower ranked class” (Runciman 1990, p. 381), for example whether a landowning schoolteacher acts as a reactionary landowner or a radical schoolteacher, or as either at different times.

Furthermore, there is evidence of other socio-political dimensions besides left-right orientation being influenced by subjective class identity. British Social Attitudes data from 2015 found that of professionals and managers, a much lower proportion of middle-class than working-class identifiers were found to be authoritarian, and a much higher proportion were found to be pro-immigration (Curtice et al. 2016). It is still undetermined, however, whether the effects of objective and subjective class identity on socio-political positioning for middle-class ethnic minority groups are the same as for the population at large.

#### *2.4.9 Class identity and relative deprivation*

Runciman (1969) linked the concept of status inconsistency – the feeling that in some respects you have high status (for example a higher qualifications) and in other respects low status (a low income despite a high level of education) – to the concept of relative deprivation (the idea that a person is deprived materially or otherwise compared with other groups in society). Analysis of the cultural and social context can point us towards whether a rich but uneducated man will compare himself to the uneducated poor and feel *good*, or the educated rich and feel *bad*. Only where individuals feel unfairly deprived in relation to their chosen reference group will negative political attitudes towards them (potentially) arise. According to Rose (2006) people’s reference groups tend to be “homogenous in class and status terms”

(p. 11), like them, in the middle of society. They may be aware of inequality but it doesn't have much personal bearing on them, and they individualise the reasons for those who do worse than them. For (some) higher SES ethnic minorities, however, ethnic ties may provide more exposure to those in lower socio-economic strata given that (i) many ethnic minority groups in the UK are, on average, lower down the social hierarchy than the white majority, and (ii) most groups were, on average, socio-economically disadvantaged for many years post-arrival in the UK in comparison to the White majority population. This may heighten awareness of and sympathies to racial inequalities amongst middle-class ethnic minority groups even where feelings of relative deprivation do not personally arise.

## **2.5 The British South Asian middle classes**

### *2.5.1 Critical theories of race*

Critical theories of race have informed two of the key theoretical underpinnings of this thesis, namely the salience of race and racism to questions of identity and the everyday lived experiences of racial / ethnic minorities, particularly as they play out through class. Whereas critical race theory puts the analysis of race and racism at the forefront of sociological analysis, particularly where class has been unable to explain the effects of power and inequality, both classical and contemporary critical race scholars have incorporated a substantial class analysis in order to fully interrogate the structural and lived experiences of communities of colours (Stovall 2006). Seminal race scholars like C. L. R James and W.E.B Du Bois theorised relations between class and racial oppression to fully interrogate the class / race dichotomy. Du Bois in particular sought to draw attention to social and socio-economic distinctions between Blacks in the US to understand if and how a class struggle played out in the 'Black world'. In his work on the 'Philadelphia Negro' he emphasised the need to interrogate the 'real conditions' of this population: "what sub-groups and classes exist, what sort of individuals are being considered?" (Du Bois 1899, p. 5).

A key difference between class and race is that of ascribed versus achieved mobility. Ostensibly, one can move between classes more easily than they can 'move' between ethno-racial groups. Some ethnic groups, however, are more able to effect class mobility than others, as outlined earlier with regard to the differences between the social mobility trends of Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities in the UK. The relationship between class and race, particularly the contingency of the latter on the former, is inextricable. Runciman (1972) thus asks whether class is best analysed on a broad, society wide level or within ethnic sub-cultures. There is such a variety in social stratification systems that each particular case must, in his opinion, be considered locally, in depth and in isolation: "the quest for generalizations about stratification and ethnicity is better conducted in terms of detailed

narratives, limited comparisons, and models of deliberately parochial application” (p. 498). Marxist-led critical approaches to race in the UK from cultural theorists and race scholars like Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy raised important questions about the interrelationship between class inequality and racial inequality in the UK to the extent that both were analytically inextricable. Hall (1978) described race as the “modality in which class is lived, the medium through which class relations are experienced” (p. 394), asserting the need to combine class and race-based analyses when trying to understand the life chances and lived experiences of marginalised populations.

### *2.5.2 The British South Asian middle classes*

The British South Asian middle classes have a unique formation history. First-generation working-class South Asians held little social and cultural capital. Though immigrant parents thus generally held a “suppressed class position [they] did not fail to instil in their children a sense of determination and aspiration to strive for a better life [...] the second generation, in spite of a significantly lower starting-point, still managed to fight against the odds and outperform Whites in education” (Li 2017, p. 9). Successfully negotiating the school and university system and gaining entry to professional routes (Brown 2013, Ballard 2003) were key to the growth of the British South Asian middle classes and, as Li (2017) suggests, their reproduction. First-generation middle-class immigrants, by contrast, have more contact with indigenous Whites, much alike to the White British middle classes. Their children go to ‘better schools’ and are thus better equipped than working-class immigrants, or educated immigrants who could not secure professional opportunities, to navigate various institutions in society (Ghuman 2003). When talking about the British South Asian middle classes, therefore, it is important to bear in mind where lived experience and identity differs based on class background, particularly with regard to the accumulation and exercise of capital.

### *2.5.3 Ethnicity and middle-class identity*

In Archer's (2011) qualitative study of class identity amongst upwardly mobile first-generation ethnic minorities, many felt their middle-class identity was inauthentic. The values accrued from a working-class background remained an important part of their self-conception (p. 140). Rollock et al. (2013) similarly found that perceptions about working classness within a minority ethnic (Black British) community were positively associated with notions of pride, self-sacrifice, integrity and hard work: “there is a kind of embodied heroism that encompasses certain values around integrity and selflessness, which unproblematically and unquestioningly are seen as exclusive working class terrain” (p. 262).

For Archer's (2011) respondents, a discomfort with middle-classness "appeared to be heightened [...] perhaps, it might be assumed, due to their positions in relation to racialised inequalities" (p. 142). She found that "a number of second and third generation participants strongly dis-identified with middle-classness, highlighting how 'race' or ethnicity can trouble and complicate feelings of class authenticity even among more (supposedly) 'established' middle-class respondents" (Archer 2011, p.141). In their study on race and class consciousness amongst lower- and middle-class Blacks in the US, Durrant and Sparrow (1997) also found that both middle-class and lower-class Blacks acknowledged the socio-economic implications of racism and expressed a sense of race consciousness. According to Rollock (2013), "skin colour acts as a form of embodied capital that disrupts and lessens the worth of the cultural capital held by Black middle classes. They are perpetual outsiders because of their 'race' irrespective of class status, and this contributes to their hesitation about comfortably self-identifying as middle-class" (p. 448).

#### *2.5.4 Ethnic minority middle-classness*

Studies of the White middle classes in both the UK and US have shown little ambiguity in how they rationalise their class positions (Brantlinger 2003; Vincent and Ball 2006). As touched on in the previous section, class identifications amongst ethnic minorities are more complex. Moore (2008) differentiates the 'multi-class minded' from the 'middle-class minded' in an attempt to capture the nuance of class identifications across the African American middle classes. The 'middle-class minded' are "more likely to come from established middle-class families and more aware or accepting of class difference [...] [they tend] also to situate themselves within environments where most of their contemporaries were also middle-class" (Rollock et al. 2013, p. 255). The multi-class minded are individuals, on the other hand, less securely established within the middle-class and seek to maintain a personal and symbolic connection to the working-class (Moore 2008, p. 506). Rollock et al. (2013) identified five distinct groupings of class identity amongst the middle-class Black Caribbean respondents in their study on class status and identification ('comfortably middle-class', 'middle-class ambivalent', 'working-class with qualification', 'working-class' and 'interrogators') which expressed a breadth of middle-class, working-class, hybrid, and critical class identities.

One of Rollock's interrogatory Black middle-class interviewees discussed the imposition of uncomfortable objective class categorisations that disregard his class background and his racial history. As a result, he self-identifies in multiple ways, illuminating that identity is neither singular nor all-encompassing, and highlighting the dissonance objective class categorisations create for middle-class ethnic minorities in particular:

“Even though I have argued that class is more than income, all sociological codifications I have seen have placed me in that [middle-class] category despite my discomfort and wriggling. To console myself I rely on the fact that my parents were working class with ‘middle-class aspirations’ which makes me a result of their aspirations. I have multiple identities: I am middle-class by profession, working class by birth and attitude and African Caribbean by culture, history and social experience. *Ray, head of service (public sector)*” (Rollock et al. 2013, p. 260)

First-generation British minority ethnic middle-class participants in Archer’s study (2011) of class identity - largely from working-class backgrounds - highlighted their hybrid class practices and identities, in other words their ability to invoke and identify with more than one class grouping. However, despite holding a range of middle-class capitals, taste and values and engaging in middle-class practices – such as the prioritisation of education (section 2.2.13) - many tended not to feel middle-class. Racial marginality and racist readings of minority ethnic identities had led some to engage not in hybridisation but an almost wholesale rejection that they could be authentic members of the middle classes (p. 148). The exclusion that minority ethnic individuals report from dominant forms of middle-classness, even when they embody or perform classic markers of middle-class ‘taste’ (Bourdieu 1984) and distinction, underscores their location at the intersection of privilege and subordination (Archer 2011, p. 147). Although education and qualifications provide ‘formal’ access to predominantly White middle-class spaces – such as professional places of work – there are other ‘tacit’ requirements (Bourdieu 1986) to membership and acceptance for those who do not fit the racialised and classed norms of these spaces (Reay 2007; Reay 2010), a phenomena that hold whether they were born in the UK or not. Rollock et al.’s (2011) Black middle-class respondents engaged skills from their ‘cultural toolkit’ (Moore 2008) such as code-switching and changing accent (Loveday 2015) to distance themselves from ‘undesirable’ working-class and / or minority racial signifiers which could undermine their legitimacy as members of the middle classes.

Ethnic minorities speak the ‘language of Whiteness’ to not only fit into and navigate White, middle-class spaces, but to guarantee their acceptance into these spaces. These ‘public’ identities act as “purposeful, instrumental strategies that either reduce the probability of discrimination or curtail the extent of discrimination middle-class Blacks face in their public interactions with White strangers” (Lacy 2007, p. 73). They are both tools of survival and legitimation, as well as self-worth and status. According to Sommerlad (2007), although individuals of any colour can adopt a professional identity, signs of working-class identity must be internalised in order to adapt to the classed norms of the middle-class professional environment. However, Collins (1993) asserts the vulnerability of Black people of any class background (middle- as well as working-class) in high-status jobs in White majority

corporations. Being 'too' ethnic or 'too' religious is often read, regardless of objective class status, as working- or lower-class (Archer 2011, Wallace 2016). The compounding oppressions of race / ethnicity, religion and class therefore change the very implications of each of these identities, 'classing' race / ethnicity and 'colouring' class.

While those in Rollock's (2013) study possess and display 'appropriate' capitals (education, qualifications, accent, dress), recognition (by the White majority) that their capital carries legitimacy is not certain, given their racial marginality. Acceptance ultimately depends on members of the dominant (racial) group (Min and Kim 2000). Rollock (2013), reflecting on her own positioning as a Black, female, middle-class professional, states that despite middle-class signifiers like her 'posh' accent which facilitate a certain degree of acceptance within mainly White (middle-class) spaces, the 'fact' of her Blackness does not grant her an equivalent degree of privilege as her White middle-class counterparts (p. 446). Gender provides another dimension of oppression within middle-class spaces (one which is largely beyond the scope of comprehensive analysis in this study but will be nonetheless alluded to where relevant and viable). White men who have traditionally been the carriers of organisational culture and authority in professional places of work (Acker 1990; Kanter 1977), determine the boundaries of acceptable behaviour, communication, style and dress. This has had implications particularly for women of colour, who do not fit either the masculinised or racialised norms of these environments (Durr and Wingfield 2011) and find themselves subject to a heightened 'out of field' experience (Bourdieu 1990).

### *2.5.5 Ethnic cultural and social capital*

As alluded to earlier, ethnic minorities are often excluded from dominant notions of middle-classness because of their symbolic proximity to working classness (Archer 2011; Wallace 2016). This is structurally linked to the working-class histories of ethnic minorities (some more working-class than others), and the persistence of this stereotype lies in enduring racism and classism. In social research, a racialised class determinism still persists which "equates Blackness and other racial minority significations to material and cultural poverty, and Whiteness to cultural visibility and social class variation" (Wallace 2017, p. 7). Furthermore, the sorts of cultural and social capital that have been deemed 'worthy' are those which have been largely accrued and harnessed by the White middle classes. Shah et al. (2010) and others who develop the concepts of 'ethnic' cultural and social capital do so on the basis that "ethnicity is not just part of the cultural and symbolic schema of groups but has material impact" (p. 1111).

'Ethnic' norms and skills transmitted both inter- and intra-generationally, such as a commitment to higher education, the ability to manoeuvre across fields which demands

different languages, and to show resilience in the face of discrimination and other social obstacles are resources which those in communities of colour develop (Yosso 2005) and must constantly harness for both economic survival and cultural negotiation. They have long acted as compensation for a lack of both economic and cultural capital (Gillborn 2008; Li 2017) and thus might be considered 'ethnic capital'. Modood (2004) states that the 'classic' Bourdieusian interpretations of cultural and social capital have certain limitations in not being able to deal sociologically with contemporary ethnic phenomena in relation to resources, capital and the likelihood of mobility (p. 88). They cannot explain, for example, why some ethnic minority groups do better educationally and economically than predicted, whereas an analysis of ethnic capital may. Carter (2005) argues that attention must be paid to the types of capital racialised minorities bring to the table as it serves to posit them not as lacking but as possessing norms and practices with value, not only within their own communities but beyond. These forms of capital, according to Wallace (2017), advance a culturally heterogeneous understanding of capital within the contemporary scholarship of class beyond that of White middle-class social reproduction, particularly the sort of capital which facilitates social mobility and middle-class formation amongst ethnic minority communities and serves the interests of the both individual and the group.

Forms of cultural navigation, such as reflexive approaches to the adoption of cultural norms, are capitals fostered, in particular, by socially mobile South Asian women. They must negotiate both the culturally limiting family and community spaces of 'fields' they inhabit (Bagguley and Hussain 2016), and the classed, racialised and gendered norms of the professional workspace. They thus translate and adopt the cultural and religious expectations of their parents, maintaining "continuities with the past, whilst being successful in their personal projects in their present" (p. 7) and, ostensibly, bypassing some of the bicultural stress (Thomas and Aldefer 1989) of having to negotiate their career trajectory and the demands of 'home life' (family and childcare responsibilities, acting as role models in the community, and so on). This acquired ability to navigate different worlds can explain both "the increased participation of South Asian women from working class backgrounds in higher education [and] the reproduction of the South Asian middle-class" (Bagguley and Hussain 2016, p. 44). These skills or capitals may be born out of marginality, but help British South Asian women maintain both their professional status and their ethnic role identity.

Ethnic resource mobilisation, discussed at length by Aldrich and Waldinger (1990) is another form of long-standing ethnic capital. Ethnic minorities still tend to be over-represented in self-employment (Clark and Drinkwater 2010), predominantly as a result of discrimination in the labour market (Pilkington 2003). Furthermore, they tend to be embedded within predominantly ethnic minority communities so often struggle to acquire information about jobs outside of these social networks. This was particularly the case for first-generation ethnic

minorities but still extends to latter generations for whom place and community are strongly intertwined with ethnic and cultural belonging (Tyler 2012). Ethnic networks have, however, long provided exclusive opportunities and resources such as employment networks and financial aid to ethnic minority group members (Sanders 2002, p. 333), reaching into formal institutions to provide unique access to housing and job opportunities. Ethnic communities concentrated within a certain residential area also provide both a source of employment and a consumer core for their members. Money, time and labour are therefore harnessed in order to facilitate both individual and community uplift.

The concept of the 'immigrant' or 'ethnic' work ethic has been discussed in the albeit limited existing literature on ethnic capital. The concept of 'work ethic' was introduced into the sociological lexicon by Weber (1920) in his early work on the 'Protestant Work Ethic'. Individuals' beliefs about work developed through religious values that emphasised hard work and devotion to the call of a higher power. Yankelovich (1974) from his poll of US adults in the 1960s identified four themes in relation to work ethic - the masculine good provider, the independent worker, the successful hard worker, and the theme of self-respect/dignity through hard work – that are still broadly relevant today. The concept of the work ethic manifests somewhat differently, however, for ethnic minorities. Modern nation states position 'hard work', stability, and respectability in proximity to being a 'deserving' citizen as much as ethnic minority families position them in proximity to progress and success, and is therefore tied to notions of belonging and citizenship for immigrant communities (Anderson 2013). By positioning those with a strong work ethic within a 'community of value', UK 'model minorities' like middle-class Indian groups become 'good immigrants'. The 'model minority' myth in the UK has been built around British South Asian (specifically British Indian) and British Chinese communities in the UK, largely due to comparisons made with other ethnic minority groups in which South Asians and Chinese have come out as being particularly successful in terms of education and jobs (Gillborn 2008). It has served to frame both educational institutions and increasingly the labour market as not institutionally racist (Hartlep and Porfilio 2015), as well as criminalise and scapegoat less socially mobile, 'non-deserving' immigrants.

Chung (2016) discusses the different elements that underpin the Asian (primarily Korean, Chinese and Taiwanese) model minority myth in the US, namely the cohesion and stability of the Asian family (low divorce rates, traditional one-earner married-couple households) which provide the moral training ground for their children, and the inculcation of norms and values which reflect the middle-class, White Protestant work ethic. Given the socio-economic success of Asian groups in the US, the myth serves three purposes: 1) to validate meritocracy of America, 2) to validate the heterosexual, nuclear family, and 3) to pathologise and blame poor, non-heterosexual, and Black households as deviant (p. 6) without considering the structural effects of discrimination and poverty on these group. It also, however, detrimentally

stereotypes Asian families by presenting them as overly competitive and disciplined, patriarchal, excessively pragmatic, and emotionally stifling. Both frames achieve the same purpose of “highlighting the racial foreignness of Asian Americans against the normativity of the “traditional American family” – one that is presumably White, middle-class, heterosexual, and nuclear-oriented” (p. 7). Asian families are framed as almost abnormal, therefore, to the extent that assimilation is required not only from the first but all subsequent generations.

#### *2.5.6 Racism and the British South Asian middle classes*

As aforementioned, the Indian, particularly Indian Hindu, community are largely seen as ‘model minorities’ in the UK with regard to key socio-economic indicators of income, occupation, and especially education (Wong 2015). Research has shown that in spite of racial discrimination and disadvantage in British society, the Indian community is better off than their Pakistani and Bangladeshi counterparts<sup>21</sup> (Modood et al. 1997) and are migrating out of poorer, urban ethnic minority areas at a greater rate (Rees and Duke-Williams 1995, Finney and Simpson 2007, Hussain and Stillwell 2008). These findings have been harnessed for two key political purposes: 1) to undermine their Pakistani and Bangladeshi South Asian counterparts as self-segregating and ‘backwards’ and 3) to deny the persistence of racism and obscure the real problems many ethnic minorities face in effecting a level playing field. Although middle-class ethnic minorities exist in Britain with some groups more ‘middle-class’ than others, they all have a harder time translating their social background into labour market success. Because of the lack of economic wealth such as family inheritance, they are also more vulnerable to seeing their children experience downward social mobility.

Research by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (Catney and Sabater 2015) found that employed people in some ethnic minority groups are over-represented (‘segregated’) into certain occupation types and occupational levels. The disproportionate concentration of ethnic minorities in certain jobs, such as self-employed managerial roles for South Asians in particular, is evidential of the warped occupational distributions of ethnic minorities in the UK. Brown (2013) notes, with regard to African-American men and women in the US, that intersecting patterns of race and gender continue to shape opportunity structures and outcomes in the larger class structure, including and particularly the professional middle-class. Steinberg (1991) called this ‘occupational apartheid’, a phenomenon that can be applied to the UK as a similarly, although less extreme, racially segregated society. The

---

<sup>21</sup> Platt (2005a) states that to measure the success of ethnic minority groups in the labour market we must consider that the previous generation were, on the whole, in a disadvantaged position. Some of this success is therefore compensation for the limited opportunities in the migrant generation (p.17), so we must not understate the achievements made in terms of mobility of any ethnic group.

'glass ceiling' also persists for ethnic minorities seeking to attain managerial or board level status. While some South Asians have successfully moved into professional and managerial jobs, they have only rarely entered the top echelons of their organisations, which remain largely White. The Equality and Human Rights Commission's (EHRC) August 2016 report on racial inequalities in the UK states that significantly lower percentages of ethnic minorities work as managers, directors and senior officials compared with White people.

Ibarra (1995) has drawn attention to the breadth of organisational literature on minorities which has established the ways in which interpersonal (racial) similarity increases ease of communication and fosters trust and reciprocity between managers in organisations. A lack of intimate network relationships can thus not only prove an obstacle to career progression but contribute to the lack of ease ethnic minorities feel in the professional workspace. Black and Asian professional associations - such as the *Association of Muslim Lawyers* and the *Society of Black Lawyers* in the field of law - arose to respond specifically to the marginalisation and discrimination of ethnic minorities in the profession. They do this at both the structural level, as well as the individual level by providing support networks and mentoring opportunities for members. This support is both political and emotional, allowing minority ethnic group members to feel part of a racialised collectivity where minority members can express their feelings without being judged or challenged. They also help redefine occupational racism as discriminatory at the organisational and institutional level rather than just a function of individual experiences (Phillips 2005).

Ashe and Nazroo (2015) in their qualitative analysis of race at work found that racism remains a persistent, if not routine and systematic, feature of work life in Britain. In the field of law, the dominance of the corporate law firm has been encouraged a shift to more meritocratic and thus economically efficient practices. This has meant a diversification in the workforce which has to some extent benefited working-class and / or ethnic minority entrants (Sommerlad 2007, p. 193). However, due to the exclusionary culture of elite workplaces with harbour structural biases (class, race and gender penalties and ceilings), their options to succeed within these workplaces are limited to either settling for a lower status and lower paid role, internalising their difference as inferiority, or seeking to assume the habitus of the field, emulating their dominant, successful (predominantly White, male and middle-class) colleagues (Sommerlad 2007, p. 217). The unavoidability of the racial marginality that comes with a non-White minority ethnic identity, however, complicates efforts to convey alternative identities (Rajagopal 2000). Ethnic minorities can place themselves in proximity to Whiteness, but cannot 'become' White. Ethnic minority workers are frequently subjected to racism by managers, colleagues and clients. They everyday micro-aggressions and 'banter', as well as more explicit Islamophobia, antisemitism, anti-Black and anti-Asian racism (Ashe and Nazroo 2016, p.5) and othering (Bowlby and Lloyd-Evans, 2013) based on gender, race

/ ethnicity, and religion. A report by the House of Commons Women and Equalities Commission (2016) found that Islamophobia and racial / gender stereotyping compound to have a particularly adverse impact on working Muslim women. Although middle-class status may provide some insulation to some forms of racism, as well as sexism, it “does not automatically open all doors; nor does it ensure all forms of social acceptance” (Song 2003, p.31).

#### *2.5.7 British South Asian middle-class politics*

Some argue that “‘race’ may in terms of consciousness and political orientation remains an intrinsic point of reference” (Daye 1994, p. 8) for the ethnic minority middle classes. This is because, despite their socio-economic positioning, their class experiences are shaped by their experiences as racial / ethnic minorities. As aforementioned, however, the South Asian immigrant experience in the UK has been characterised by their working-classness as well as racial marginality. Saggar and Geddes (2000) thus suggest that the general impetus amongst UK minority groups is to support the redistribution of wealth to tackle economic inequality given “a combination of, first, social background and, second, a form of ‘disproportionate-winners’, self-interest argument” (p. 38). It is unclear however, if this extends to the ethnic minority middle classes - they exempt Indians from this hypothesis because of their relatively higher level of economic success in relation to most other ethnic minority groups in the UK.

The rapidly increasing middle-class profile of British Indians has been said to explain both their shift towards the Conservatives, and their greater levels of political participation relative to other ethnic minority groups. According to Heath et al. (2011), Indian political conservatism makes “good sense in the light of the greater economic success of the Indian community and could well be explained by their greater access to middle-class and entrepreneurial positions” (p. 266). British Future (2015) analysis showed that (predominantly Indian) Hindus and Sikhs were more likely than other ethno-religious groups to vote Conservative. This has been attributed to changing policy concerns among these groups which have made them less attracted to Labour’s welfarism platform, reignited since Jeremy Corbyn took leadership of the party in 2015.

There are fewer studies mapping the politics of professional and managerial Pakistanis and Bangladeshis than Indians. Due to their small size as a proportion of their ethnic groups, there has been much less theorising, as above, with regard to their political profile. There may also be an assumption that minority interests primarily drive the politics of these upwardly mobile fractions given the strong ethno-religious, working-class community identities harboured by Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in the UK. However, bespoke analysis

is needed to understand the specificities of their politics, particularly if interests based on class, race / ethnicity, religion and beyond interplay in any meaningful way to determine their political positionings.

## **2.6 Conclusion**

The literature review has established key themes and developments across the historical and contemporary scholarship of race, ethnicity, class and politics identity which relate to the broad aims of this study. It has established the primary definitions of class, race and ethnicity that will be harnessed and problematised in this study and noted where there are contentions and complexities in terms of definitions of concepts and theories across the scholarship. For example, professionals will be used as a proxy for middle classes in the study, but 'being' a professional and 'being' middle class differs in meaning for minority groups. Similarly, ethnic identity denotes different things for different individuals, depending on their religious belonging, their gender, their experiences of racism and more. A more comprehensive study / set of studies highlighting where religion and gender specifically plays into an individuals' understanding and experience of 'being' an ethnic minority and middle-class will thus be a natural point of progression from this thesis.

The literature review has also highlighted key studies which have addressed the relationship between class and race / ethnicity, particularly those by Louise Archer (2011, 2012), Nicola Rollock (2011, 2013, 2014) and Sharon Daye (1994) which have specifically focused on the racialisation of middle-class / socially mobile people of colour. Given the relationship between Whiteness and middle-classness explored at length in this literature review, and the predominantly working-class and racialised histories of the UK South Asian diaspora, we may find a reluctance to identify with a middle-class identity amongst some respondents in this study. However, we might also expect that some will express complex, hybrid class and ethnic identities as a result of their unique positioning at the intersection of privilege and prejudice. There is scope here to build on the work of Moore (2008) and Rollock et al. (2013) in identifying typologies of class identity across the South Asian middle classes.

The literature review has outlined the (relatively few) studies which have sought to establish how social identities determine political identities for ethnic minorities, and the potential implications this has had on political engagement and party politics in recent decades. Ethnic minorities in the UK have been researched fairly comprehensively in terms of their political participation and electoral habits in the field of politics. However, they have been under-researched on complexities of their belongings and identities, and the political implications of these. Whereas the work of Anthony Heath and colleagues (2005, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2013), Maria Sobolewska (2013a, 2013b) and Shamit Saggar (1998; 2000) has interrogated

the politics of ethnic minorities including British South Asians, it has only touched on the politics of the South Asian middle classes. There have been a number of studies which have also looked at political orientations based on objective versus subjective class identity (outlined in sections 2.4.7 – 2.4.9), an area of research which will be drawn upon in Chapter 6 of this thesis through overarching analysis of the qualitative data.

The key gaps identified in the literature are centred on pinpointing the social and political identity frameworks of the South Asian middle classes who are an under-researched sub-population. These cover 1) the interplay and relative salience of social identities across the South Asian middle classes and 2) the drivers of political identity and participation for the South Asian middle classes. There are a number of other gaps in the literature with regard to the relationship between racism in the professional sphere and class / ethnic identity formation. This will be analysed as far as possible in this thesis, but may require additional research (discussed in Chapter 7).

As Archer and Francis (2006) quite rightly note, despite the ‘fuzziness’ and contested-ness (p. 37) of the concepts harnessed in this study, it draws upon best practice from the studies discussed in this chapter in order to elicit a workable study of social and political identity negotiation for British South Asian middle classes. This may entail compromising on truly explicating the complex, interrelated and hybridised nature of identity. Discrete categories will be used to model different types of identity insofar as suitable interactions and intersections can be drawn out between these different modes of being in both the qualitative and quantitative research.

The next chapter outlines the empirical bases of this study. I describe the methods employed to answer the research questions and address the gaps in scholarship stated above. I also discuss the limitations of the methods used, critically analysing the methodological choices made.

### **3. Methods**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

This study's evidence base comprises quantitative data from two cross-sectional national social surveys (The British Election Study Ethnic Minority Survey 2010 and the Citizenship Survey 2010/11) with ethnic minority boost samples, and 20 semi-structured primary interviews with second-generation male and female British Indian, Bangladeshi and Pakistani professionals.

The quantitative datasets selected were well known to me, having been used in a number of key studies identified in the literature review. The scope of available datasets given the number of topics covered in the research questions (class, ethnicity, politics) and the need to have a substantial ethnic minority sample was small. The EMSBES and the CS have been used to analyse the relationship between minority identity and discrimination, the party identities of ethnic minorities (Heath et al. 2011; 2013), belonging amongst second-generation ethnic minorities, and the relationship of British identity to civic attitudes (Heath and Roberts 2008). However, they do hold limitations, most notably in the lack of indicators for subjective class identity and respondents' class background (discussed at various points through this study as a key constraint). As this chapter will outline, many of these limitations were partly addressed through the lines of enquiry pursued through the qualitative research.

I employed a mixed-methods research design in order to sufficiently address the multifaceted research questions listed below, and bring together a more comprehensive account of social and political identity amongst the population of interest:

RQ1: How do the British South Asian middle classes conceptualise social class, and to what extent is there a discrepancy between their subjective class identity and their objective 'middle-class' position?

RQ2: To what extent do the British South Asian middle classes identify with a marginal racial, ethnic and / or religious identity, and how does this relate to their subjectivities and experiences of class?

RQ3: To what extent are class and / or minority racial / ethnic identities politicised, and what are the implications of this for political identity and activity?

## **3.2 Triangulation**

The following section outlines the impetus for mixing methods in this particular study with reference to the research questions above, the combination of mixed-methods models that were drawn upon as the basis for planning and implementing this study, the research process and the broad plan for analysis that was adopted in this study.

### *3.2.1 The need for triangulation*

As aforementioned, exploration of lived experience as well as more 'precise' hypothesis testing were used to answer the research questions. This required the implementation of both quantitative and qualitative analysis. In a mixed-methods study, it is important that the data is combined in a thoughtful and useful way. It is not only methods but methodologies that are being mixed (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998) so the researcher must be able to fully justify how, why and where triangulation comes into play.

Triangulation is defined by Denzin (1978) in its broadest sense as "the combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon" (p. 291). There are a number of reasons why methods were triangulated in this study, but the primary aim was to "capture a more complete, holistic, and contextual portrayal of the unit(s) under study" (Jick 1979, p. 603). Both methods utilised in this thesis were designed to shed light on the phenomena in question from diverse perspectives (Denzin 1978), key in a study which seeks to analyse identity on both the macro and micro, phenomenological level.

According to Gillborn et al. (2018) "different methods are appropriate for different aspects of social research and critique. Quantitative methods cannot match qualitative approaches in terms of their suitability for understanding the nuances of the numerous social processes that shape and legitimate race inequity. However, quantitative methods are well placed to chart the wider structures, within which individuals live their everyday experiences, and to highlight the structural barriers and inequalities that differently racialized groups must navigate" (Gillborn et al 2018, p. 160). In this study, this entailed using the quantitative data to, for example, analyse relative levels of identity salience and group belonging across the population in question, whilst interrogating the social and political relevance and meaning of the identity itself and the sense in which it may or not be salient to individuals through qualitative questioning.

### *3.2.2 Epistemological dialogue between methods*

Quantitative research tends to be conceptualised as value free. It is used with large, representative samples allowing the findings to be generalised beyond the limits of the sample being researched. It usually – although not always - involves formal hypothesis testing. Qualitative research, on the other hand, is based on the premise that it is impossible

to conduct research objectively. It focuses on inductive, exploratory research. The standpoint of the research and the situated, contextual nature of the research is central to the research process and the findings generated. Qualitative research findings cannot therefore be generalised. These binaries tend to presuppose that the epistemological underpinnings of qualitative and quantitative research are diametrically opposed. This framing of qualitative and quantitative research suggests that the two cannot be integrated or used together in a single study, as one is fundamentally grounded in positivism and the other constructivism / interpretivism. Those seeking to employ mixed-methods in a single study thus have to employ, according to Bergman (2008), a “strangely schizophrenic position” where they must accept the divergent qualities of the two methodological positions listed above whilst seeking to combine them within a single research design. If we consider, however, that quantitative and qualitative methods are not necessarily as siloed and internally homogenous as suggested above, they can be considered compatible, albeit to a certain, limited extent.


Quantitative research – particularly identity research - can be considered as contextual and situated as qualitative research is. From the selection of questions in the survey – as in this study, where the choice was made in Chapter 5 to analysis indicators of prejudice and discrimination given its importance to the understanding of ethnoracial identity and minority lived experiences - to the respondent’s interpretation, to the analysis chosen and the way the statistical data is interpreted (Bergman 2008 p. 19). Gillborn from a Critical Race Theory perspective states that “statistics are socially constructed in exactly the same way that interview data and survey returns are constructed i.e. through a design process that includes, for example, decisions about which issues should (and should not) be researched, what kinds of question should be asked, how information is to be analysed” (Gillborn et al 2018 p. 163). Furthermore, not all quantitative research is concerned with hypothesis testing and generalising findings, more so with exploring data structures through statistical methods such as factor analysis, for example (p. 20), which are used in Chapters 5 and 6 of this study.

### *3.2.3 Mixed-methods models*

The secondary datasets chosen for this study contain an optimal mix of variables relevant to the research questions. The qualitative research sought to address some of the questions not sufficiently covered in the statistical datasets and explore in an open, discursive manner conceptualisations and subjectivities of class, racial / ethnic, religious and political identity (for more detail see section 3.3). The negotiation between the volume and extent of qualitative to quantitative analysis within a mixed-methods study is important. Some studies may have an emphasis on one or the other, although this should largely be determined by the interests and priorities of the researcher and the audience (Creswell 2003) as well as the quantity and quality of the data available. Within Chapters 5 and 6 of this study, the analysis

of the quantitative data tended to lead the discussion in each section, followed by the qualitative analysis. Chapter conclusions as well as the final conclusion bring together the findings from both sets of data to draw out key, overarching findings. Given the focus on subjectivities and lived experiences, the qualitative research provided some of the most nuanced insights, particularly with regard to definitions of class and class identities as specified by the first research question. The quantitative and qualitative analysis thus only both featured in the second and third analysis chapters which address the second and third research questions (fig. 1):


**Fig. 1 Research questions and corresponding methods**



The mixed-methods model adopted in this study was an amalgamation of the 1) convergent-parallel, 2) exploratory sequential, and 3) embedded approaches. These were chosen given the aims of the study and the relevant focus of the three approaches, detailed below (diagrams adapted from Creswell and Plano-Clark (2007) by Plano-Clark et al. (2008)):

1) The convergent-parallel mixed-methods model is designed primarily to compare or interrelate different perspectives from quantitative and qualitative data (fig. 2):

**Fig. 2**



The convergent parallel approach sees a researcher collect both quantitative and qualitative data concurrently but independently, analyse them separately and compare or relate them to see whether the findings support one another or not. Although different types of information are produced (crudely put ‘thin’ statistical and ‘thick’ qualitative data), when the research is carried out on the same or similar samples (for example, interviewing the same individuals


with closed and open ended questions) using similar constructs, the results should be the same. In this study, similar constructs were probed, as per the convergent-parallel approach. However, the qualitative sample differed from the quantitative sample (see table 3.1 below) and sample sizes were divergent, so a direct comparison or deep interrelation between results could not be made.

**Table 3.1 Comparison of quantitative and qualitative sample parameters**

<b>Samples</b>	<i>Ethnicity</i>	<i>Gender</i>	<i>Occupation</i>	<i>Class background</i>	<i>Region</i>	<i>Generation</i>
<b>Quantitative (CS and EMBES)</b>	Indian Pakistani Bangladeshi	Men Women	Higher and lower professional and higher technical; higher and lower managerial and employers in large organisations	Unknown	England and Wales	First and second generation
<b>Qualitative</b>	Indian Pakistani Bangladeshi	Men Women	Mid- to high-level professionals and in some cases also small business owners in fields of law and engineering	Predominantly working-class (17 out of 20 respondents)	Greater and Central London, East and West Midlands, Manchester	Second / 1.5 generation (born abroad and migrated to UK as an infant)

2) The exploratory-sequential mixed-methods mode is designed to gain a more in-depth understanding of the quantitative results using follow-up qualitative data (fig. 3)

**Fig. 3**



In this model, the researcher can either report the quantitative or qualitative results first, and then follow this up with the results from the other data to see if the latter confirm or refute the former. Some researchers ‘quantify’ the qualitative themes and combine the two quantitative databases. In this study, I used preliminary quantitative analysis to inform the qualitative interview script and ‘fill in’ some key gaps in the data, using the qualitative data to elaborate on broad themes found in the quantitative analysis. I did not, however, fully quantify the qualitative data to ‘match’ with the quantitative. Given the small sample size, the divergence

of sample characteristics and only the partial overlap of constructs, the qualitative data was not confirmatory. One of the key limitations of mixed-methods research, particularly studies like this using large-scale secondary quantitative data and small scale primary qualitative data, is inequality in sample size and unmatched sample characteristics. There are a number of ways in which mixed-methods researchers seek to resolve issues of inequality in sample size including (i) weighting the qualitative cases so they match the quantitative sample, (ii) increasing the number of open-ended interviews carried out, or - as in this study - acknowledging that “the intent of qualitative and quantitative research differ (one to gain an in-depth perspective and the other, to generalize to a population)” (Creswell 2014, p. 222).

3) The embedded approach to mixed-method allows the researcher to use ‘thicker’ data to ‘enhance’ the quantitative results. The qualitative data thus provides a supporting, secondary role (fig. 4):

**Fig. 4**



The exploratory sequential / embedded approaches were drawn on this study in part to appeal to the desire to have the qualitative data explain in more detail the broad phenomena that were analysed quantitatively, despite the quantitative data ‘leading’ the conversation. Much of the qualitative interview script was designed to 1) further probe the extent and nature of racial, ethnic, religious and national identity beyond the quantitative analysis, and 2) to probe questions relevant to the research questions but not measured / not measured to a sufficient extent in the quantitative datasets such as subjective class identity. In this mixed-methods approach, many researchers do indeed use quantitative results to plan the qualitative research which allow a sole researcher 1) the logistically useful opportunity to spread out data collection over time and 2) to facilitate a greater dialogue between the datasets with one informing the other. After data collection and collation of results, the researcher specifies how the qualitative results explain or - more appropriately in this study - expand the quantitative results (Creswell and Creswell 2017).

There was also inspiration from transformative mixed-methods with are used in studies concerned with uncovering inequalities, or those with a social justice aim. In this thesis, indicators about group and individual racisms were analysed in the quantitative data, and

these questions were probed where they arose in the semi-structured interviews, in order to place the relevance of questions of inequality as well as identity at the centre of analysis of class and race, as per the tenets of critical race theory (see section 2.5.1).

### 3.3 Research design

As mentioned earlier, different research questions were posed which entailed the use of different methods / different combinations of methods (see fig. 1) combined loosely on the basis of the three mixed-methods models discussed above. This section will outline in more detail the mixed-methods research design and process (depicted diagrammatically in fig. 5), and the design of the quantitative and qualitative arms of the study.

The first research question – *‘How do the British South Asian middle classes conceptualise social class, and to what extent is there a discrepancy between their subjective class identity and their objective ‘middle-class’ position?’* - was operationalised with the qualitative data alone. The second and third research questions, however – *‘To what extent do the British South Asian middle classes identify with a marginal racial, ethnic and / or religious identity, and how does this relate to their subjectivities and experiences of class?’* and *‘To what extent are class and / or minority racial / ethnic identities politicised, and what are the implications of this for political identity and activity?’* entailed the use of both qualitative and quantitative data. These were for (taken from Bryman 2008, p. 93):

- (i) Completeness and illustration - bringing together a more comprehensive account of the relationship between class and ethnic identity (RQ2) and the effect of class and ethnic consciousness on political identity (RQ3)
- (ii) Process and context - using the quantitative data to highlight interesting phenomena to be expanded on through the in-depth interview process (RQ2 and RQ3)
- (iii) Explanation - understanding why there happens to be a significant relationship between two phenomena for the population of interest, how these manifest and how this is rationalised by those under scrutiny (RQ2 and RQ3)

The methods were matched to the phenomena intended for study (see fig. 1) but the research questions were honed during the beginning stages of the study given the availability of data. The first question was only suitable to qualitative enquiry as there was no available quantitative data which enquired about meanings and subjectivities of class for the British South Asian population/ Furthermore, the subject matter – problematising and critiquing researcher-led objective definitions of class from a respondent perspective - necessitated in-depth enquiry. The second and third questions, by contrast, have scope for hypothesis testing. They were designed to gauge levels of ethnic, religious and national identity across

the British South Asian middle-class population. This was facilitated through the large number of indicators tapping self-reported ethnic identity in the survey data. In order to understand how this is potentially related to experiences of class, however, the qualitative data was necessary. Through the interviews, one could gauge where ethnicity plays a role in, for example, the levels of conspicuousness individuals feel within the middle-class spaces in which they work and often socialise. The research design employed in both the quantitative and qualitative branches of research are described below.

### *3.3.1 Quantitative research design: RQ 2 & 3*

As aforementioned, the quantitative data was used to address – in part - the second and third research questions. The quantitative research design was informed 1) by previous empirical studies which have explored the phenomena of class or racial / ethnic identity and 2) through the process of preliminary analysis of the two large-scale national cross-sectional datasets chosen for analysis. The Citizenship Survey 2010-11 (CS) has a wealth of indicators which tap a broad range of identities including social class, and was utilised primarily to analyse these phenomena. The British Election Study Ethnic Minority Survey 2010 (EMBES) covers political and civic identity, social outlook, and ethnic and religious identification, and was largely used to answer the second and third research questions. It was particularly useful for the final research question regarding the political consequences of identifications.

The extent of similarity in the demographics of both datasets, and the overlap between some variables, allowed me to probe patterns and trends found in each. For example, I was able to ascertain differing patterns in ethnic and religious identification depending on whether the ‘importance of religion to sense of self’ (CS) was asked or ‘amount respondent has in common with religious group’ (EMBES) was probed (see Chapter 5). Babones (2016) advocates this ‘interpretivist approach’ to quantitative research where the use of multiple types of analysis and multiple iterations of analyses on the same variables across different datasets helps to interrogate the phenomena in question in a more rigorous way.

### *3.3.2 Qualitative research design: RQ 1, 2 & 3*

The qualitative data provided insight into all three of the research questions, particularly the lived experience of identity across the groups in question. It was most valuable in answering the first research question by probing objective and subjective definitions of, and levels of identification with, class groupings. Preliminary analysis of the data identified useful avenues of enquiry for the qualitative interviews. Data gaps in the quantitative datasets - with regard to subjective class identity in particular – informed many of the qualitative interview questions. Having firmed up the research design, preparation and cleaning of the statistical datasets

and qualitative data collection was carried out at approximately the same time. Data analysis and consolidation of initial findings was an overlapping process and results brought together and evaluated in light of the existing literature to draw conclusions (see fig. 5 for an overview of this process). For an interpretive narrative to form, there was no clear, initial framework in the analysis and interpretation stages of the research of where and how the data was to be brought together. This was emergent as the thesis progressed and themes / findings arose.

There was a triangulation of methods within the qualitative branch of the project itself to broaden the mode of inquiry. The main portion of each interview consisted of a discussion guided by a script covering the three main concepts in the study – class, ethnic / racial and political identity. This was prefaced by a short survey-like questionnaire ascertaining the respondent's class background (parents' occupation and education), the respondent and respondent's partner's occupation and education, their geographical movements over the course of their lifetime, and their ancestral home / country of origin. After the interview itself, the respondents were approached with identity 'exercises' – the MacArthur Ladder of Social Status<sup>22</sup> (see Appendix III A3.3) – and free-form identity drawings. These were used to glean their conceptions of the structure of society beyond the binaries of working-class and middle-class, for example, through a non-verbal, pictorial medium. According to Silverman (2006), "what people say in answer to interview questions does not have a stable relationship to how they behave in naturally occurring situations" (p.39). Using pictures and diagrams helped elicit further insight into the complex realm of identity. Although free reign was given to the respondents in completing the free-form drawings or 'identity maps', some hesitant interviewees required prompts. I specified that they could draw anything including pictures, words, thought bubbles, diagrams, stick figures. Some relied more on the content of the preceding conversations regarding class categorisations, social hierarchies and socio-economic status to inform their drawings, which was noticeable by the structured, almost diagrammatic way some depicted their social positioning. Others, however, used the opportunity to express creatively, and more abstractly, their sense of identity and belonging.

---

<sup>22</sup> The MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status (Adler and Stewart 2007) was developed to capture the 'common sense' of social status across socio-economic status indicators such as income, occupation and education. In an easy pictorial format, it presents a "social ladder" and asks individuals to place an "X" on the rung on which they feel they stand. Although largely harnessed in psychosocial studies to ascertain how and if SES relates to subjective social status, it was useful in this study to add a third dimension to the class enquiries which, in the interview discussions, largely focused on interrogating aggregate class categories.




Fig. 5 The research process

### 3.4 The data

Having outlined the research design, this section focuses on the data used in this study. The first section describes, evaluates and compares the two datasets, and establish the socio-demographic and socio-economic profiles of the respondents. Given the operationalisation of middle-classness in this study as those in professional and managerial occupations, a short comparison of these two groups for the three ethnicities in question and for the full South Asian samples will also be given. This is to justify their conflation under the 'middle-class' label given their differing population profiles detailed in sections 2.2.5 - 2.2.6.

The description of the qualitative data begins with an overview of the sample 'parameters' and why these particular criteria were chosen. The recruitment process along with ethical and logistical issues in terms of accessing suitable interviewees, and a description of the final interviews along with a full description of the interviewees, are also given. Following this is a discussion of how the key concepts in the study – notably class, ethnic / racial / religious, and political identity – are operationalised using the data.

#### *3.4.1 The quantitative data*

##### 3.4.1.1 Description of the quantitative data

Table 1 gives an overview of each quantitative dataset that will be used in the study, including the rationale of the survey, the sampling strategy, response rate, and its relevance to the analysis in this thesis. Both have fairly sizeable, representative ethnic minority samples and together cover a wide, yet not exhaustive, range of indicators useful for this study. With the EMBES, there are noteworthy issues with the small sample size for the mailback survey which problematised the robustness of the analysis of political consciousness carried out Chapter 6.

**Table 3.2 Overview of quantitative datasets used in study: The British Election Study Ethnic Minority Survey 2010 (EMBES) and the Citizenship Survey 2010/11 (CS)**

	<b>British Election Study Ethnic Minority Survey 2010 (EMBES)</b>	<b>Citizenship Survey 2011 (CS)</b>
<i>Rationale of survey</i>	One of the longest running social surveys in Britain covering voter behaviour. A boost of ethnic minority respondents was carried out as part of the 1997 British Election Study (BES). Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) then agreed to fund a standalone cross-sectional survey of ethnic minorities to be conducted immediately after the 2010 general election. The research was intended to be complementary to the main BES and a large number of items are shared between the two surveys.	Ran from 2001 to 2010-2011, providing an evidence base for the policy work of the Communities and Local Government department (DCLG) on issues of community cohesion, civic engagement, 'race', faith, volunteering and participation.
<i>Rationale of ethnic minority boost survey</i>	The aim of both minority 'boosts' <sup>23</sup> were to conduct a nationally-representative post-election probability sample of the main 'established' ethnic minority groups in the UK: Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean and Black African, and in the Citizenship survey 'Chinese or other'.	
	The BES ethnic minority survey was designed to understand the social and political integration or exclusion of ethnic minorities in Britain today.	The citizenship survey boost sample was intended to understand aspects of community cohesion and 'integration' as well as attitudes surrounding discrimination and prejudice among ethnic minorities and Muslims.
<i>Survey approach</i>	Random probability approach to allow for a representative sample of each group. Bulk of the fieldwork was concentrated on identifying eligible households, given that ethnic minorities comprise such a comparatively small proportion of the British population at large, and are somewhat geographically scattered. A small boost was carried out for Bangladeshis only because of the added	Two-stage stratified random sample was used to obtain addresses. In the first stage, for core and ethnic minority boost samples, a systematic sample of wards was selected. In the second stage addresses were systematically sampled within the selected wards obtained from the postcode address file. The Muslim boost sample was comprised by screening addresses where no eligible

<sup>23</sup> Despite the usefulness of survey boost samples for ethnic minority research, developing questionnaires for them comes with its own specific restrictions. A sufficient number of generic questions need to be asked so the ethnic minority sample can be analysed alongside the ethnic majority sample (not a particular issue for a primarily within-ethnoracial study such as this, however). Questions pertaining specifically to ethnic minority experiences also need to be asked, whilst retaining a questionnaire length that does not fatigue the respondent (Lynn et. al 2018).

	difficulties of accessing this particular group. A stratified random sample of primary sampling units (PSUs) was followed by a systematic random sample of addresses within these, with the individual chosen to take the survey randomly sampled from those eligible.	individuals were identified for the ethnic minority boost sample and drawing a separate sample of addresses from areas in which at least 2.5% of the population were Muslim.
<i>Survey response rate</i>	58 – 62% to the main questionnaire. There was a poorer response to the mailback questionnaire which was left with all respondents to complete after their interview – only 975 were returned.	For the core sample, response rate for core addresses was 58%. The response rate for the ethnic minority boost sample was 54% and the Muslim response rate was 56%.
<i>Sample size</i>	2,787 across the five main UK minority ethnic groups self-identifying as Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Black African or Black Caribbean.	Core sample of 10,307 adults in England and Wales (2,500 in each quarter). Ethnic minority boost sample is 4,712 with a Muslim boost of 1,096.
<i>Uses of data in thesis</i>	Number of variables covering political and civic identity, social outlook and ethnic / religious identification. Will be particularly useful for the final question asking what the political consequences of group belongings and identifications are.	Wealth of indicators to tap a broad range of identities including social class. Will therefore be a key source of data on racial / ethnic, national, religious, and class identity.
<i>Concepts covered</i>	Ethnic and religious identity: Belonging to (amount in common with) ethnic / religious group; Discrimination and prejudice; Feelings of marginalisation and relative deprivation as a minority. Political identity: party and civic identification, orientation and activity.	Primarily indicators of identity salience: Importance of class; Importance of ethnicity; Importance of religion; Importance of occupation / income / education to sense of self. Also covers a number of indicators on ethnic, religious and political belonging and activity also present within the EMBES.

In both datasets, there is extensive socio-demographic and socio-economic information. Ethnicity, religion, national identity, citizenship status, gender, age, income, education and occupation are all measured by at least one indicator. Although there is a far larger ethnic minority sample in the Citizenship Survey (CS) owing to both the ethnic minority and Muslim boost, there is a broader set of relevant indicators to this thesis in the British Election Study Ethnic Minority Survey (EMBES).

In the multivariate analysis, age, gender, employment status, marital status and generation are included as independent variables. It would have been useful to analyse the results in this thesis by gender as well as class and ethnicity rather than controlling for gender given empirical, quantitative research which indicates that gender is (i) an important mediating factor in occupational class outcomes (Platt 2005b) and thus potentially for class identity and

also plays a role in diasporic identity construction (Hussian 2005, Dwyer 2005). However, the sample sizes for the indicators of interest and the focus of the quantitative research in this thesis (although not for further journal articles) on class and ethnicity precludes a robust gender analysis. Controlling for UK birth allows the effects of migration on identity to be controlled for, as was done with the qualitative data where only second generation British South Asians were sampled. Region of residence is also controlled for given the economic and social disparities that exist between various parts of the UK (the so-called 'North / South divide', a reductive but persistent concept concerning the broad inter-regional differences in prosperity between primarily London and South East and the North East / North West (Martin 2004)) and the changing ways in which ethnic minorities map onto these geo-spatial inequalities (Garner and Bhattacharya 2011, Finney and Simpson 2007), the latter of which will be discussed somewhat in the analysis chapters. This study, as per the tenets of critical race theory, acknowledges that many of these control variables interact with each other as well as with the independent variables of interest through mechanisms of racism (Gillborn et al. 2018). Seeking to control for these factors does not presuppose, therefore, their independence to constructions of social and political identity, to the migration histories and trajectories of the groups in question, or to their structural and everyday experiences marked by privilege and prejudice.

In terms of the socio-economic profile of the ethnic groups across the EMBES and the CS (table 3.3), the distribution of respondents across key demographic indicators (ethnicity, ethno-religious group, UK or non-UK birth, gender, age, education and occupation) broadly match across the two datasets. In both, the Pakistani sample is slightly larger but similar to the size of the Indian sample, and the Bangladeshi sample is the smallest out of all three given the relatively smaller size of this population in the UK in comparison to the other two (see section 1.3.1). The proportion of South Asians to the whole sample is larger in the EMBES because it was carried out as a standalone survey for UK ethnic minorities only. There are 1525 South Asians in the EMBES and 3488 South Asians in the CS. South Asians account for approximately a fifth of the CS, smaller than the EMBES because the White sample is still the largest ethnoracial group in the dataset. However, this is still larger than most national surveys due to the ethnic minority and Muslim boost. The White sample are analysable only in the main BES (British Election Study) survey dataset.

**Table 3.3 Key demographic indicators in the British Election Study Ethnic Minority Survey (EMBES) and Citizenship Survey (CS)**

		BES Ethnic Minority Survey 2010		Citizenship Survey 2010-2011	
		<i>N</i>	<i>% of total sample</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% of total sample (COMBINED)</i>

					CORE WITH BOOSTS)	
Ethnicity	All South Asian		1525	54.8	3488	20.6
	Indian		587	21.1	1430	8.4
	Pakistani		668	24.0	1485	8.8
	Bangladeshi		270	9.7	573	3.4
			<i>N</i>	<i>% of ethnic group</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% of ethnic group</i>
Ethno-religion	Indian	Hindu	228	43.1	659	46.1
		Sikh	164	31.0	314	21.1
	Pakistani	Muslim	638	99.1	1453	97.8
	Bangladeshi	Muslim	264	99.6	552	96.3
Born in Britain			<i>N</i>	<i>% of all South Asians</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% of all South Asians</i>
	All South Asian		505	33.1	1191	34.1
			<i>N</i>	<i>% of ethnic group</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% of ethnic group</i>
	Indian		188	32.1	439	30.7
	Pakistani		247	37.0	543	36.6
	Bangladeshi		70	25.9	209	36.5
Gender			<i>N</i>	<i>% of all South Asians</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% of all South Asians</i>
	All South Asian					
	Male		793	52.0	1830	52.5
	Female		732	48.0	1658	47.5
			<i>N</i>	<i>% of ethnic group</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% of ethnic group</i>
	Indian					
	Male		299	50.9	764	53.4
	Female		288	49.1	666	46.6
	Pakistani					
	Male		356	53.3	762	51.3
	Female		312	46.7	723	48.7
	Bangladeshi					
	Male		138	51.1	304	53.1
	Female		132	48.9	269	46.9
			<i>Mean</i>		<i>Mean</i>	
Age	All South Asian		38		39	
	Indian		42		42	
	Pakistani		36		37	
	Bangladeshi		35		36	
Highest educational qualification			<i>N</i>	<i>% of all South Asians</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% of all South Asians</i>
	All South Asian					
	First degree or higher		288	33.3	984	28.2
	A-level and equivalent		106	12.3	383	11.0
			<i>N</i>	<i>% of ethnic group</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% of ethnic group</i>
Indian						

	<i>First degree or higher</i>	148	42.1	521	40.7
	<i>A-level and equivalent</i>	38	10.8	143	11.2
	Pakistani				
	<i>First degree or higher</i>	109	29.7	356	25.7
	<i>A-level and equivalent</i>	47	12.8	164	11.8
	Bangladeshi				
	<i>First degree or higher</i>	31	21.2	107	20.3
	<i>A-level or equivalent</i>	21	14.4	76	14.4
Professional or higher technical occupation		<i>N</i>	<i>% all South Asians</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% all South Asians</i>
	All South Asian	283	19.9	508	14.6
		<i>N</i>	<i>% of ethnic group</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% of ethnic group</i>
	Indian	174	30.9	309	21.6
	Pakistani	83	13.2	151	10.1
	Bangladeshi	26	11.2	48	8.4
Managerial occupations		<i>N</i>	<i>% of all South Asians</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% of all South Asians</i>
	All South Asian	125	8.8	214	6.1
		<i>N</i>	<i>% of ethnic group</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% of ethnic group</i>
	Indian	66	11.7	123	8.6
	Pakistani	46	7.3	64	4.3
	Bangladeshi	13	5.6	27	4.7

NB: Unweighted counts and unweighted valid percentages listed.

Table 3.3 shows us that the Pakistani and Bangladeshi samples are almost exclusively Muslim in terms of ethno-religious character. The modal religious tradition within the Indian group is Hindu, with a lower proportion of Indian Sikhs in the CS than the EMBES. Approximately a third of the South Asian sample in both datasets were born in the UK, although this indicator in and of itself does not indicate whether the rest of the sample is first (born and brought up outside the UK) or 1.5 (born outside but brought up within the UK) generation. These proportions are much smaller than those across the population at large (ONS 2018e). Across both datasets and across all ethnic groups there are slightly more males than females, with the mean age for the Indian sample slightly higher than for the others. The Indian group has the highest proportion of degree-level educated respondents across both datasets. There are proportionally fewer professional and managerial South Asians in the CS than the EMBES. This has implications in terms of ensuring a large enough middle-class sample size for analyses. However, as aforementioned, the CS South Asian sample is already relatively large – larger than the EMBES - given the multiple boosts.

Table 3.4 allows us to contrast the demographic data in table 3.3 with the White British respondents in a) the main counterpart British Election Study carried out in 2010 which has a majority White sample, and b) the Citizenship Survey where White respondents constitute just over half of the sample. Analysing the counterpart White data in Chapter 6 allowed me

to broaden the scope of the analysis to see if and how the ethnic 'majority' meaningfully differs or not in profile from the (albeit large) South Asian minority. The gender balance for the White sample is similar to the South Asian samples, although there are marginally more women than men in the White samples. This could be an artefact of the data - research does suggest that women are more likely to participate in surveys than men (Curtin et al. 2000, Singer et al. 2000). However, according to 2011 Census data, in the White British population there is a slightly higher proportion of women to men at large. The larger proportion of male respondents in the South Asian sample also reflects the slightly larger male to female ratio in the population, also found in the 2011 census (ONS 2011a).

The mean age is higher in the White sample than the South Asian sample, the latter a reflection of the younger migrant and second-generation population. However, this is rapidly changing with a growing and ageing UK ethnic minority population (Lievesley 2010). In terms of education, the profile of the Pakistani sample matches most closely to the equivalent White sample with approximately a quarter of each group holding degrees. The Indian sample exceeds the White sample on most socio-economic indicators including middle-class occupation which supports the existing research on British Indian prosperity in the UK (see section 1.2).

**Table 3.4 Key demographic indicators in the White sample for the main British Election Study (BES) and Citizenship Survey (CS)**

		British Election Study 2010		Citizenship Survey 2010-2011	
		<i>N</i>	<i>% of total sample</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% of total sample</i>
<b>Ethnicity</b>	White	3126	80.0	9432	55.6
		<i>N</i>	<i>% of ethnic group</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% of ethnic group</i>
<b>Gender</b>	White				
	<i>Male</i>	1441	46.1	4211	44.6
	<i>Female</i>	1685	53.9	5221	55.4
		<i>Mean</i>		<i>Mean</i>	
<b>Age</b>	White	53		52	
		<i>N</i>	<i>% of ethnic group</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% of ethnic group</i>
<b>Highest educational qualification</b>	White				
	<i>First degree &amp; over</i>	567	24.8	1841	25.1
	<i>A-level or equivalent</i>	167	7.3	1170	15.9
<b>Professional occupation</b>	White	639	20.4	1856	19.7
<b>Managerial occupation</b>	White	409	13.1	1087	11.5

NB: Unweighted counts and unweighted valid percentages listed.

In order to increase sample size, managers as well as professionals form the ‘middle-class’ occupational category in the quantitative analysis.<sup>24</sup> Furthermore, those born abroad as well as those born in Britain are analysed. To create the occupational category of ‘professionals’ in the CS, those in the categories of higher and lower professional and higher technical occupations were subsumed. For ‘managers’, those in higher and lower managerial occupations and employers in larger organisations were subsumed. These categories were taken from the NS-SEC (National Statistics Socio-economic classification) occupational groupings in the dataset, broadly based on the Erikson-Goldthorpe class schema. In the EMBES, professionals are already conflated with those in higher technical occupations, and managers already conflated with senior administrators.

Table 3.5 compares the profile of managers to professionals in both datasets across ethnic groups. There 408 managers and professionals in the EMBES and 722 in the CS. There are

<sup>24</sup> The issue of divergent sample size between the Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi middle-class samples will be referenced throughout the thesis as an unfortunate but unavoidable limitation of the quantitative data.

proportionally more managers and professionals in the Indian samples than the Pakistani and especially the Bangladeshi samples in both datasets. There are fewer female than male managers and professionals across the board, however, as expected. This is particularly the case for (small sample of) Bangladeshi managers in both datasets, and Indian and Pakistani managers in the CS. There are also proportionally fewer professional Indian Sikhs than managerial Indian Sikhs as a proportion of professional and managerial Indians respectively, in contrast to the Indian Hindus. This indicates the ethno-religious differentiation in the middle-class sample. There are reasonable proportions of South Asian managers and professionals born in the UK, more so on average than in the sample at large – between approximately 35 to 40 per cent all the South Asian professionals and managers in both datasets were born in the UK. There are notably proportionally more managers than professionals born in the UK in the EMSBES, particularly for the Indians. Despite this, the higher proportion of professionals to managers overall is one reason why the qualitative analyses focus on the former. Professionalisation has been a key route to social mobility for UK South Asians (some more than others as suggested by the data). Although self-employment also has, achieving higher managerial i.e. potentially higher class roles, particularly in established organisations, is an ongoing problem for all non-Whites and especially non-White women (see section 2.5).

**Table 3.5 Key demographic indicators across the professional and managerial samples by ethnicity**

			BES Ethnic Minority Survey 2010				Citizenship Survey 2010/11			
			Managerial		Professional		Managerial		Professional	
			<i>N</i>	<i>% of managers in total sample</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% of professionals in total sample</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% of managers in total sample</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% of professionals in total sample</i>
All South Asian			125	50.2	283	58.0	214	14.2	508	16.9
Ethnic group			<i>N</i>	<i>% of managers in ethnic group</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% of professionals in ethnic group</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% of managers in ethnic group</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% of professionals in ethnic group</i>
	Indian		66	11.7	174	30.9	123	8.6	309	21.6
	Bangladeshi		13	5.6	26	11.2	27	4.7	48	8.4
	Pakistani		46	7.3	83	13.2	64	4.3	151	10.2
			<i>N</i>	<i>% of managers in ethnic group</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% of professionals in ethnic group</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% of managers in ethnic group</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% of professionals in ethnic group</i>
Ethno-religion	Indian	Hindu	29	43.9	79	45.4	55	44.7	157	50.8
		Sikh	19	28.8	32	18.4	30	24.4	49	15.9
	Bangladeshi	Muslim	12	92.3	24	92.3	23	88.5	43	89.6
	Pakistani	Muslim	42	91.3	79	95.2	62	96.9	142	94.0
Born in Britain			<i>N</i>	<i>% of managerial South Asians</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% of professional South Asians</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% of managerial South Asians</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% of professional South Asians</i>
	All South Asian		57	45.6	99	35.0	80	37.4	208	40.9
			<i>N</i>	<i>% of managers in ethnic group</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% of professionals in ethnic group</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% of managers in ethnic group</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% of professionals in ethnic group</i>
	Indian		27	40.9	51	29.3	43	35.0	107	34.6
	Bangladeshi		6	46.2	11	42.3	14	51.9	27	57.4
	Pakistani		24	52.2	37	44.6	23	35.9	74	49.0

Gender		<i>N</i>	<i>% of managerial South Asians</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% of professional South Asians</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% of managerial South Asians</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% of professional South Asians</i>
	All South Asian								
Male		74	59.2	162	57.2	153	71.5	296	58.3
Female		51	40.8	121	42.8	61	28.5	212	41.7
		<i>N</i>	<i>% of managers in ethnic group</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% of professionals in ethnic group</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% of managers in ethnic group</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% of professionals in ethnic group</i>
Indian									
Male		36	54.5	97	55.7	80	65.0	183	59.2
Female		30	45.5	77	44.3	43	35.0	126	40.8
Bangladeshi									
Male		11	84.6	12	46.2	22	81.5	25	52.1
Female		2	15.4	14	53.8	5	18.5	23	47.9
Pakistani									
Male		27	58.7	53	63.9	51	79.7	88	58.3
Female		19	41.3	30	36.1	13	20.3	63	41.7
		<i>Mean</i>		<i>Mean</i>		<i>Mean</i>		<i>Mean</i>	
Mean age	All South Asian	38		37		40		39	
	Indian	40		38		40		40	
	Bangladeshi	33		34		39		38	
	Pakistani	37		36		41		38	

NB: British Election Study Ethnic Minority Survey 2010 (EMBES) and Citizenship Survey 2010/11 (CS). Unweighted counts and unweighted valid percentages listed.

### 3.4.1.2 Operationalisation of key concepts in quantitative data

Identity was operationalised by a number of different indicators in the quantitative datasets, There is a self-defined element at play in all identities (Heath et al. 2013), a behavioural aspect where the identity manifests itself through social action (Leary and Tangney 2005), a social aspect concerning which others around you that you identify with, and a politicised aspect where identity manifests itself through a political agenda. These were all covered where possible, to create as comprehensive an overview of the social and political identity frameworks of the South Asian middle classes as possible.

Table 3.6 delineates the indicators into identifiable groups depending on what they broadly measure: identity salience, activity based on a social / political identity, group belonging (commonality), and relative deprivation / feelings of marginalisation. The columns represent whether the indicators fall within the realm of class, ethnicity (encompassing race, religion and nationality), and politics as per the structure of the thesis. Some straddle more than one cell but a 'best fit' approach was employed in the construction of this table. The dataset in which each indicator is found is also listed. There are some 'gaps' with regard to indicators representing class 'belonging' and political identity salience in particular. However, many of the indicators straddle cells. Political activity could be classified as class-based activity depending on the basis political protest, for example, is undertaken.

**Table 3.6 Quantitative indicators from EMBES and CS used in study**

	<b>Class indicators</b>	<b>Ethnicity indicators</b>	<b>Political indicators</b>
<b>Saliency</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Importance of class / SES to sense of self</li> </ul> <p>Importance of social class to sense of who you are (CS)</p> <p>Importance of level of education to sense of who you are (CS)</p> <p>Importance of occupation to sense of who you are (CS)</p> <p>Importance of level of income to sense of who you are (CS)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Importance of race / ethnicity to sense of self</li> </ul> <p>Importance of ethnic or racial background to sense of who you are (CS)</p> <p>Importance of country your family came from to sense of who you are (CS)</p> <p>Importance of national identity to the sense of who you are (CS)</p> <p>Importance of religion to sense of who you are (CS)</p> <p>Importance of religion (EMBES)</p>	
<b>Activity</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Trade union activity</li> </ul> <p>Trade union or staff association member (EMBES)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ethnic / religious activity</li> </ul> <p>Take part in ethnic, cultural or religious / other associations or clubs (EMBES)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Political / civic activity</li> </ul> <p>Taken part in voluntary organisation (EMBES)</p> <p>Given money political cause last 12 months (EMBES)</p> <p>Signed petition in last 12 months (EMBES)</p> <p>Participated in protest in last 12 months (EMBES)</p> <p>Participated in boycott in last 12 months (EMBES)</p> <p>Voted 2010 general election (EMBES)</p> <p>Voted in local election (EMBES)</p>

Belonging			Volunteering in politics or community affairs (EMBES)
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Belonging to ethnic group</li> </ul> <p>Amount in common with others from R's ethnicity (EMBES)</p> <p>Amount in common with British people (EMBES)</p> <p>Amount in common with others from R's religion (EMBES)</p> <p>As far as you know, how many [of the people in your neighbourhood / of the people you work with / of your friends] have the same ethnic / religious background as you (EMBES)</p> <p>Which best describes how you think about yourself: More Asian or more British / More British or more [religion] / More Asian or more [religion] (EMBES)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Political party belonging</li> </ul> <p>Party identification (EMBES)</p> <p>Party best for ethnic minorities (EMBES)</p> <p>Party voted for in 2010 General Election (EMBES)</p>
Relative deprivation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Class</li> </ul> <p>It is the government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one (EMBES)</p> <p>There is one law for the rich and one law for the poor (EMBES)</p> <p>In a true democracy, income and wealth are redistributed to ordinary working people (EMBES)</p> <p>Major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership (EMBES)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Race / minority ethnic</li> </ul> <p>Discrimination for ethnicity, race or skin colour / religion in past 5 years (EMBES)</p> <p>More or less prejudice against R's ethnic group / religious group (EMBES)</p> <p>Black and Asians don't have same opportunities as White (EMBES)</p> <p>Which groups, if any, do you think there is prejudice against (EMBES)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Political</li> </ul> <p>Labour / Conservatives look after Black and Asians (EMBES)</p> <p>Labour / Conservatives look after working classes / middle classes (EMBES)</p> <p>Black and Asian MPs represent Black and Asian interests better (EMBES)</p> <p>More Black &amp; Asian in Parliament Better for Ethnic Minorities (EMBES)</p>

	<p>Ordinary people get a fair share of wealth (EMBES)</p> <p>Private enterprise is best for economic problems (EMBES)</p> <p>There is no need for strong trade unions (EMBES)</p>	<p>Government must protect interests of / give special treatment to minorities (EMBES)</p> <p>In a democracy will of majority should prevail (EMBES)</p> <p>In a democracy the majority have a right to protect their culture (EMBES)</p>	<p>People should be allowed to organise public meetings to protest against the government (EMBES)</p> <p>Neither politics nor protests get Black and Asian people anywhere (EMBES)</p>
--	-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

### 3.4.1.3 Quantitative data analysis

With regard to the quantitative data, analysis was ongoing throughout the research process of the study. The chosen indicators in each dataset were 'cleaned' – missing values recoded, categories subsumed, variable names and labels changed – before analysis. This was to prepare the data for analysis but also helped aid familiarity with the secondary data. The transformations each variable underwent are described in the analysis chapters.

The analysis grew from simple descriptive statistics of key variables to multivariate regressions in line with the objectives set out in the research questions, as well as in response to the organic way in which the analysis progressed as interesting findings arose. These were then integrated to form a clear narrative structure, and further honed as each analysis chapter took shape. The practical limitations of the quantitative analysis are made apparent throughout the analysis chapters, particularly with regard to the limitations of sample size and the efficacy of some of the more abstract indicators for drawing conclusions about identity (discussed in section 3.5).

## *3.4.2 The qualitative data*

### 3.4.2.1 Qualitative data collection

As laid out in table 3.1, the parameters for the qualitative respondents are far narrower than for the quantitative sample. The first criteria for recruitment was to identify those who are professionals in the legal or engineering fields. Interviewees were chosen to loosely fit two minor groups in the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) 2010 volume 1 (ONS 2010): engineering professionals (major group 2, sub-major group 21, minor group 212) and legal professionals (major group 2, sub-major group 24, minor group 241). Both harbour distinct professional cultures, hierarchical structures of management, and clear paths to progression (Greenwood 1957). These industries were chosen in order to simplify the process of recruitment, by focusing on specific industries and companies that exemplify what it is to be an accredited and established professional in the UK. The differences between these professions will not be analysed in this thesis, however, as the study is focused on class identity (see section 2.2.4).

The age group was capped at 60 with the youngest respondent 25. The intention here was to capture individuals at various stages of their professional career and life trajectory. Respondents were selected who have been resident in the UK all or most of their lives - emigrated as small children or born in the UK. This was to focus on the trajectories, experiences, and subjectivities of those who had grown up and 'professionalised' as minorities within the UK, a group less easily analysable within the quantitative samples.

Indian Hindu and Bangladeshi Muslim respondents were initially sought because these are, arguably, two of the most polarised ethnic groups of the British South Asian population in terms of educational and occupational profile (see section 1.3 and 3.4.1.1). Given problems with accessing what are still comparatively small groups as a proportion of the larger professional UK workforce, otherwise suitable respondents from Pakistani Muslim and Indian Sikh groups were also recruited later on. There are, however, fewer Pakistani respondents in the qualitative data which somewhat impeded an analysis of sufficient depth for this group.

Equal numbers of self-identified male and females were initially recruited from London and Birmingham but given recruitment limitations due to time and resources I was left with uneven numbers across genders and regions (see tables 3.5 and 3.6). These cities have different but substantial proportions of South Asian ethnic groups with varying settlement histories. According to the 2011 census, London has a 12 per cent South Asian population, approximately half of which constitute Indians, and a quarter each Pakistanis and Bangladeshis (ONS 2012). By contrast, Birmingham, another one of the large metropolitan UK cities has over a quarter South Asians, half of which are Pakistanis. The regional focus was later expanded to aid recruitment. This included Leicester (East Midlands) and Manchester, large regional hubs with high proportions of ethnic minorities. This helped impart a tangential understanding of how regional identities develop and interact with ethnic and national identities for those embedded within South Asian communities across the country.

24 interview participants were aimed for to achieve sufficient representation across the sample criteria. Saturation was not a consideration given the practical issues of cost and time associated with carrying out primary qualitative research in a mixed-methods project. 23 interviews were eventually carried out, but 20 were finally selected who satisfied the relevant criteria, specifically hailing from the 1.5- or second-generation (born in the UK or emigrated here as a small child). 3 interviews were carried out with those in the 1<sup>st</sup> generation (one each from Pakistan, Bangladesh and India) who had each lived in the UK for approximately 10-15 years. These interviews were transcribed and analysed but not used in the study, given the overwhelming differences in conceptions and experiences of class, race / ethnicity, religion and nationality that arise from having been born and brought up in, as opposed to having been an adult immigrant to, the UK. They served a key purpose, nonetheless, in helping clarify the decision to focus on the second-generation.

The recruitment process began systematically, by contacting the top ten law and engineering firms in London and Birmingham, as defined by online trade publication league tables including *Legal Week*, the *UK Legal 500* and *Chambers UK* (for Law), and *The Construction Index*, *The Engineer*, and *Wired* (for engineering). It then branched off into identifying smaller firms in the two initial regions of interest online. Ethnic-specific networking societies and

groups online were useful to some extent in identifying key companies to contact and potentially suitable interviewees. In the latter stages of the recruitment process, LinkedIn was a particularly useful social media site in identifying relevant organisations who did not have a large online presence elsewhere. In terms of accessing Bangladeshis, the *British Bangladeshi Lawyers' Network* – the details of which were found through initial online searches – was a useful resource. This is an ethno-religious, community-based online professional network with an administrator who helped with finding and accessing potential interviewees. It was particularly difficult to access South Asian women in engineering due to their lack of presence in the industry itself (see section 2.2.5). Females in law proved to be somewhat more plentiful, but again, accessing individuals with a range of levels of seniority proved a challenge because of the lack of ethnic minorities in the higher echelons of these professions. Female engineers were identified through engineering organisations and online networks, or from details of industry awards and trade articles online celebrating their achievements. The lack of women in contrast to men – but indeed the small numbers of both within each ethnic group - impedes the ability to make hard and fast conclusions about group differences based on ethnicity and gender.

It is difficult to gauge whether my 'insider status' as an Indian female professional aided the study in a practical sense with regard to recruitment. The importance of the research in voicing issues of minority identity was communicated clearly to each potential interviewee, framed as one of the key motivations for involvement in the study (see Appendix III A3.1, p. 68). However, the personal relevance of the subject matter seemed to be the most significant impetus for some. Priya (Indian Gujarati Hindu engineer from London) - one of the very first interviewed - seemed to have given relatively more thought to the subject matter of the study than the other interviewees. She stated that the British Asian aspect of the study '*struck home*', as this is how she broadly identifies herself. I did reflect on whether it may have been better to omit the working title of the study from the participant information sheet in order to elicit more 'natural' and less prepared responses from respondents in the interviews. However, in Priya's case most notably, it acted as a recruitment aid, drawing in respondents interested in, and prepared to discuss, their identity.

Diversity 'champions' – both independent individuals and those affiliated to companies and organisations contacted directly via e-mail and post – were keen to help and suggest suitable potential interviewees. One of the respondents even suggested potential interviewees. Baljit (Indian Punjabi Sikh lawyer from Birmingham) was keen to aid in me in recruitment. This echoed his awareness of the gender and ethnicity gap in the law industry, and his moves to address this within his own firm: '*Training is a big thing with me. Training is personally relevant. It's what we call giving somebody a hand up. And in fact, the fact that the last two or three trainees have been female, Asian girls, you can see the equality situation*'. Baljit's suggestions were not pursued to maintain the systematic nature of the recruitment process.

Ethical and logistical issues regarding the qualitative data collection procedure were discussed and reviewed with an internal ethics committee prior to research being undertaken. Formal research approval was granted in mid-October 2015. Ethical consent was obtained from each interviewee prior to each interview. An information sheet was given detailing the purpose of the study, the format of the interview, and issues regarding confidentiality, anonymity, and the voluntary nature of participation in the research (see appendix III, A3.1 and A3.2). Potentially confidential information such as mention of prominent roles held in industry organisations were brought up with the respective interviewee after the transcripts had been reviewed. They were asked to clarify whether this information needed to be anonymised. For any respondent that could not be reached for clarification after the interview, appropriate anonymity was given to all potentially sensitive information. There was little problem securing participants on the basis of ethical issues. Those contacted with the time and interest to participate found the information provided to them regarding the safeguarding of their content sufficient.

The interviews themselves varied in length, between 45 minutes and 2 hours each, with the average time approximately 1.25 hours. The corpus of the interviews is, in totality, sufficiently large to allow thematic patterns to be drawn from the data but not robust comparative insights between ethnicities and genders, however. The aim was not, with the qualitative data, to draw strong, empirical conclusions, treating each individual as representative of their group. Rather, it was to engage with the complexity of individuals who are racially and culturally situated in certain ways (Archer 2012). Most of the interviews were conducted face-to-face. Two of the interviews, regrettably, had to be carried out over the phone or online via Skype due to respondent availability issues. Thought provoking and complex matters of identity were best discussed in the face-to-face interviews where there was scope for field notes to be made on body language, verbal hesitations, and emotional reactions from the respondents. Those who were interviewed during the working day did seem to be mindful of the time and the need to return to work, thus some were shorter in length than would have been ideal. Ideally all the interviews would have taken place in a quiet public or private location away from the offices of the interviewee. However, approximately half of the interviews took place in private conference or meeting rooms within their place of work, owing to their time and travel constraints. The rest took place in cafes or hotel lobbies outside working hours, with one taking place on campus in my office.<sup>25</sup> There was a significant wait

---

<sup>25</sup> SurrIDGE's quantitative study of subjective class belonging (2007) used British Social Attitudes Survey from 2003. This data was collected by interviews conducted in the respondents' homes, thus in a 'private' environment. It is possible that this may have had an impact on the identities selected, for example a respondent may feel their parental identity more strongly when in the home, possibly with children close by. With regard to this study, there is the risk that 'professional' identities may have been inflated when the interview took place in the respondent's place of work, as opposed to in a more 'neutral' public setting.

in the lobby of Hasan's (Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London) firm as he finished work. The interview thus started approximately half an hour late. There was a distinct sense of a hierarchy of power before the interview had started, therefore, and the setting of the office increased the sense of formality between participants. This was mirrored in some of the other interviews that took place in the respondent's office. However, the discursive nature of the interview meant that as it progressed, the mood became less formal.

Table 3.7 depicts the demographics of each interviewee (the names used are pseudonyms) including their gender, age range, current living location, occupation and position, class background, broad self-defined ethnicity, religion and citizenship status. The table is merely a descriptive matrix of the interviewees and does not reflect or presuppose their own identities and the oppressions or relative privileges that may arise from these. As aforementioned, there are a range of ages and genders in the sample, and respondents were spread out across London, the Midlands, and the North of England. In terms of occupations, respondents were drawn from a mix of engineering jobs from software to environmental to architectural engineering. The legal professionals in the sample are a mixture of small-firm owners and large corporate employees, all currently practising Law.

Ethnically, the majority of participants were either Indian Gujurati or Punjabi, or Bangladeshi Sylheti, with a few of Pakistani heritage. Religiously there was a range of religious identities ranging from 'culturally Hindu' to secular to atheist. Class background here is a crude objective description based on parents' occupations, as described to me by the respondents. There were an absence of indicators that could accurately capture class background in the quantitative data, so it was useful to be able to, in the analysis process, contextualise self-definitions of class within the backgrounds of the respondents. Although most of the respondents had working-class backgrounds, those with parents who were small shop owners are more accurately definable as petit bourgeoisie, or upper working-class / lower middle-class, than those who were manual workers. There were only three respondents with clearly middle-class backgrounds. They had at least one parent educated to university level who held a professional occupation.

**Table 3.7 Demographic information of qualitative interviewees**

<i>Interviewee</i>	<i>Gender</i>	<i>Age range</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Occupation</i>	<i>Class background (defined by parent's occupation)</i>	<i>Delineated self-defined ethnicity</i>	<i>Religious identity</i>	<i>Citizenship status</i>
<b>Anita</b>	Female	50-55	West London	Senior global management role in large corporate law firm	Middle-class	Indian Bengali	Culturally Hindu	Born in India. Moved to UK as child. British citizen.
<b>Priya</b>	Female	30-35	West London	Energy manager in a large corporate firm	Working-class	Indian Gujarati	Hindu (Swaminarayan)	Born in UK. British citizen.
<b>Rakhi</b>	Female	25-30	North London	Associate solicitor in large global corporate law firm	Middle-class	Indian Gujarati	Hindu/ Jain	Born in UK. British citizen.
<b>Sunil</b>	Male	30-35	London (area unspecified)	Technology lead for large government organisation	Working-class	Indian Gujarati	Hindu	Born in UK. British citizen.
<b>Hasan</b>	Male	40-45	South East London	Solicitor's firm owner and practitioner	Working-class	Bangladeshi Sylheti	Muslim	Born in UK. British citizen.
<b>Mohan</b>	Male	50-55	Warwickshire	Senior engineer and businessman	Working-class	Indian Punjabi	Sikh	Born in India. Came to UK as a small child. British citizen.
<b>Deepak</b>	Male	35-40	East London	Associate lawyer in mid-sized corporate law firm	Working-class	Indian Gujarati	Atheist / 'Culturally Hindu'	Born in UK. Spent some time in India as a child. British citizen.
<b>Zain</b>	Male	50-55	Birmingham	Social housing lawyer and community leader	Working-class	Pakistani Punjabi	Muslim	Born in UK. British citizen.

<b>Farhan</b>	Male	35-40	East London	Solicitor-advocate in small local law firm	Working-class	Bangladeshi Sylheti	Muslim	Born in UK. British citizen.
<b>Neha</b>	Female	25-30	West London	Junior entry-level engineer	Working-class	Indian Punjabi	Hindu	Born in UK. British citizen.
<b>Nadya</b>	Female	35-40	East London	Criminal lawyer	Working-class	Bangladeshi	Muslim	Born in UK. British citizen.
<b>Hussain</b>	Male	40-45	Birmingham	Solicitor-advocate with own firm	Working-class	Bangladeshi Sylheti	Non-religious	Born in UK. British citizen.
<b>Baljit</b>	Male	50-55	Birmingham	Solicitor advocate in local law firm	Working-class	Indian Punjabi	Sikh	Born in India. Moved to UK aged 5. British citizen.
<b>Aisha</b>	Female	35-40	Manchester	Prison solicitor	Working-class	Pakistani	Muslim	Born in UK. British citizen.
<b>Tariq</b>	Male	30-35	London (area unspecified)	Network manager for large engineering firm	Working-class	Pakistani	Muslim	Born in UK. British citizen.
<b>Karim</b>	Male	40-45	East London	Legal aid lawyer	Working-class	Bangladeshi Sylheti	Secular/Atheist	Born in UK. British citizen.
<b>Ali</b>	Male	35-40	London (area unspecified)	Architectural engineer in large central London firm	Middle -class	Bangladeshi	Non-religious	Born in UK. British citizen.
<b>Bisma</b>	Female	30-35	East London	Legal aid lawyer	Working-class	Bangladeshi	Muslim	Born in UK. British citizen.
<b>Dinesh</b>	Male	50-55	Leicester	Immigration lawyer	Working-class	Indian Gujarati	Hindu	Born in UK. British citizen.
<b>Nabeela</b>	Female	45-50	Manchester	Employment lawyer	Working-class	Pakistani Punjabi	Muslim	Born in UK. British citizen.

The tallies by ethnicity, gender and class background are listed in table 3.8. The transcripts of 12 men and 8 women were analysed. It is worth noting that all but three respondents came from working-class backgrounds, which has implications for their current sense of class identity as well as their racial / ethnic and gender identities. In the qualitative analysis, where class or ethnic identity differs between individuals with similar class and ethnic backgrounds, the numbers of respondents who did and not express a particular positioning will be cited. Although the sample is skewed towards Law, the analysis will focus on issues of broad markers of identity amongst those in currently similar socio-economic – i.e. middle-class - locations rather than a discussion of occupational differences given the stark differences between lawyers and engineers in terms of selection into the industry, proportions of men to women, proportion of ethnic minorities to the ethnic ‘majority’ and so on (see section 2.2.4).

**Table 3.8 Ethnicities, gender and class background across the qualitative sample**

<b>Ethnicity</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Class background</b>	<b>Frequency</b>
Bangladeshi	Men	Working-class	4
		Middle-class	1
	Women	Working-class	2
		Middle-class	0
Indian	Men	Working-class	5
		Middle-class	0
	Women	Working-class	2
		Middle-class	2
Pakistani	Men	Working-class	2
		Middle-class	0
	Women	Working-class	2
		Middle-class	0

#### 3.4.2.2 Operationalisation of key concepts in qualitative data

Having described the qualitative sample, it is necessary to outline how the scripts for the qualitative interviews were developed and the reasoning behind the final set of questions, prompts and tasks. The interviews started off tightly structured in a life history format, with guiding questions directly enquiring about childhood and background, school, university and labour market experiences, charity and community involvement, and social and political engagement. This was amended to shift the focus to some of the more abstract concepts in this study that could not be full operationalised by the quantitative data. These included subjective definitions and perceptions of class, feelings of racial / ethnic / religious / class belonging, and political orientation and identity. For the ease of eliciting objective and subjective definitions of these concepts from the respondents, discussions of these identities were framed sequentially in the interviews. It was interesting to see in the coding and analysis

stage how despite this, conversations encompassed all sorts of salient aspects of people's identity frameworks. Listening to some respondents discuss the experience of being a visible Muslim female of colour in a largely White, male workplace, for example, allowed me to see how intersecting identities play out on the phenomenological level.

The script went through two sets of pilot interviews with friends of friends (a convenience sample) - those easily accessible but who also fit the demographic criteria for the qualitative sample - after the script was amended as described above. This happened before the recruitment stage of the qualitative research began. Cognitive 'reviewing' occurred at the end of each pilot interview. Each pilot interviewee and I discussed how well the questions were understood, and whether they reflected the description of the project given at the beginning of the interview. Timing, the extent to which the conversation seemed to 'flow' freely, and the extent to which it was led by the interviewee rather than the researcher were also considered. Comments from the pilot interviewees on question formation included:

*'I think you should simplify your questions. Like, I think you should start small, and then just really build up. So, start with 'what would you define as class', 'what would you define as race'... 'if you had to summarise yourself in half a dozen words, how would you put yourself in relation to race' and then just build it up slowly.'*

The suggestion here was to build up the conversation incrementally on 'larger' issues such as class and race to ease the respondent into discussion about their subjectivities. Asking respondents to examine their life choices through the lens of social identity salience which the draft interview script sought to do, is 'a big question':

*'I mean that is a really big thing to say, you know, in terms of where you make your life decisions about your friends, your family, your partner, is class more important than race, I think that's quite a big question.'*

Initially clarifying the respondent's frame of thinking with regard to these larger concepts was ultimately found to be useful for getting to the crux of their views as well as contextualising their later comments. The run-through of the draft interview script with one pilot interviewee failed to flag up his very relevant views on South Asian communities and class, which he talked about after the interview itself had finished:

*'I'd associate certain South Asian communities with having larger families [...] generally being working-class rather than middle-class. I would associate Indian Hindu families as being middle-class, university educated.'*

Interviewing style was also flagged up, particularly the need to repeat questions and sufficiently probe to elicit full answers. Reminders for prompts (used only when necessary) were therefore added to the final interview script and used to further the interviewees' understanding of the question and to encourage them to speak further on or around the subject matter in question.

*'If someone says anything, rather than summarising what they've said and asking a question based on it, just ask 'so tell me more about that, what do you mean by that?'*

*'Just ask the question and listen to the answer. And if I haven't answered the question, just ask the question again'.*

*'I think you need to probe if I'm not answering your questions'*

After this stage, the script went through another edit to improve some of the questions given the findings from the pilot interviews. Notes from the University of Essex's 2012 project on developing better social identity questions for their survey 'Understanding Society' also helped inform the type of language employed in the interview guide, highlighting, for example, the way in which ethnic, religious and class identities can be tapped by asking respondents' their significance in relation to the 'sense of who you are' (also like in the CS).

#### 3.4.2.3 Similar studies engaging in subjective identity enquiry

Reay et. al (2007) employed "ethnographic interviewing practices" (p. 1044) in their study of white middle-class identity formation in which they interviewed white middle-class parents in order to examine how their choice related to urban schooling were influenced by class and ethnicity. The interviews comprised of open-ended questions and selective prompting in order to "elicit not only individuals' deeply held values and commitments, but also ambivalences, fears, and anxieties about acting in contradiction to normative white middle-class behaviour" (p. 1044). The aim was to generate a theoretical understanding about social privilege in the context of multicultural urban schooling. This aspect of identifying - through the process of a longer interview - where people are unsure of their views, or indeed where values contradict one another, was a key aim of the qualitative enquiry in this study.

Archer and Francis (2006) carried out a similar study of social and learner identities amongst British Chinese students, teachers and parents. Questions in their semi-structured interviews (which by their admission seemed to blindside the parents in their sample) included: 'do you think that education's important?' and 'is your child a good pupil?'. They describe how numerous prompts of 'why' were required in order to qualify broad statements such as 'of course' (p. 75). These questions, however, were fundamental to the study in teasing out the

definitional and normative preconceptions the respondents held about broad but value-laden concepts such as 'education' and being a 'good' or 'bad' learner. These, however, were employed alongside relatively more straightforward questions such as 'What do you think of the English education system', which allowed the parents to employ a comparative analysis of Chinese and English schooling, and also went a large way in drawing out normative judgements about the two systems as well as the wider aspects of education they value. In terms of their enquiries about race and racism, questions or prompts were given to ask or clarify the relative level of racism the respondents thought British Chinese students receive. These were along the lines of 'You don't think there's much racism or anything like that?' They also prompted when less overt statements about racism or differing experiences between ethnic groups were highlighted by respondents, for example:

'Sometimes I think I have to work harder and I do feel a bit like out of place sometimes 'cos ... like English people in England [pause] [Interviewer: yeah, so when you say you have to work harder, is that – ] So that I like I get past the prejudices and things' (p. 158).

This study chose to focus on broad brush identity enquiry akin to the questions asked in the CS and EMBES but, like Archer and Francis (2006) and Reay et al. (2007), prompted where necessary and interesting to tease out a) the specificity of constructions of identity from individual to individual and b) understand the value judgments underpinning the way they frame identities in relation to one another. Archer's 2011 study about middle-class identity and the meaning of middle-class to ethnic minorities was thus directly relevant to the qualitative script design in this study. In her semi-structured interviews with parents, children and young professionals she raised the topics of class, race and gender directly. She asked respondents to "self-identify their social class and discuss their feelings about what class 'means to them'" (p. 138), the extent to which they felt able to locate themselves as middle-class, and – if the subject had not arisen at that point in the interview – "whether they felt that ethnicity makes a difference to social class (or not)" (p. 138).

Although there was a temptation to amend the script as the interview stage progressed, the final script was fit for purpose until the end of the data collection stage. The questions seemed to elicit interesting responses, and few of the interviewees outwardly expressed difficulty in interpreting the question or formulating an answer, whether long or short. Where they did find trouble, prompts were used or the next question on the script was asked, but this hesitancy or confusion was also in places analytically insightful as will become clear in the analysis chapters.

In hindsight, given class background was enquired about, the political orientations of the respondents' parents and family should have also been *explicitly* asked about given the extent of literature on the role of parental socialisation in political identification (Percheron

and Jennings 1981, Beck and Jennings 1991, Dalton and Weldon 2007, Kroh and Selb 2009). This was a limitation of the qualitative data and would have potentially afforded insight where the quantitative data was lacking, as both class background and parents' political identities were not probed in either the CS or EMSBES. Nonetheless, some of the interviewees did, unprompted, cite the political inclinations of their family members and ethnic community in relation to their own political identity.

Table 3.8 depicts the final interview guide / script with prompts, and the purpose behind the content and form of the questions. Depending on the organic way in which each interview evolved, the form and order of the questioning differed slightly from person to person. However, each discussion point in the script was eventually covered. In some cases, for example, when the subject of politics was brought up early on by the interviewee themselves, the questions about class and race / ethnicity were addressed later on. Given Zain's (Pakistani Muslim lawyer from Birmingham) leadership position within a regional law association, he was keen to discuss the role of ethnic minorities in Law which diverted focus from the interview script. This was somewhat distracting but overall enlightening in terms of gaining an insight into how he construes diversity in the field of law in the Midlands which echoed corporate business-case justifications of diversity<sup>26</sup> seen in organisational policy:

*'they're [the BME community] reasonably well-represented, I don't think that's been an issue [...] [there is a] strong business case for why law firms need to be representative of their, er, local work force, and looking for individuals that don't come from their traditional background, I suppose those who have been on a more difficult journey, because of the chance that they may make really great lawyers'.*

For Rakhi, (an Indian Gujarati Hindu lawyer from London), having a master's degree in politics seemed to give her a pre-formed academic perspective on issues of class and politics. It was difficult to tap her personal experiences and subjectivities beyond her academic perspectives on these issues, therefore, which led to a long and quite dense

---

<sup>26</sup> Discourse on diversity in organisations often overtakes / dilutes discussions of structural inequalities based on race, and instead focuses on superficial, cultural differences. Edelman et al. (2001) state that diversity as a criterion for organisational success "tends to deflect attention from the societal and historical practices that disenfranchised particular groups" (p. 1632). The Race in the Workplace report from the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (2017) states that "the underemployment and underpromotion of people from BME backgrounds is not only unfair for the individuals affected, but a wide body of research exists that has established that diverse organisations are more successful" (p. 6). The social justice case for workplace equality is therefore often bolstered by the business case for economic productivity and growth, arguably to the detriment of the former (also see section 7.5).

interview session. However, this was again an insight into the way she thinks about concepts like class, race and politics and a reflection of her high level of cultural capital.

**Table 3.9 Qualitative interview script with rationale**

Interview questions	Rationale for questions
<p><b>A: Short demographic questionnaire</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Which city / town(s) did you grow up in?</li> <li>2) In which city / town do you live now?</li> <li>3) Where are your parents from (country / city)?</li> <li>4) What is your highest level of education?</li> <li>5) What are or were your parents' highest level of education and job?</li> <li>6) What is your partner's highest level of education?</li> <li>7) What is your current job (industry and role)?</li> <li>8) What is your partner's current job?</li> </ol>	<p>These questions were asked at the beginning of the interview, designed to both ease the researcher and interviewee into discussion, as well as establish some background context to each individual. The form of some these questions were lifted from the quantitative datasets. The biography and background of the interviewee is important to make sense of the emergent themes in the discussions. For example, it is important to identify if and to what extent the importance of education stressed by the interviewee is informed by their family and community background, for instance.</p>
<p><b>B: Questions on class</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ How would you or do you define social class?</li> <li>○ Do you think class has played a role in your own life?</li> <li>○ Do you think social class is a useful way to differentiate between types of people in society and why? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <i>[Prompt: relate to your own experiences]</i></li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p><u>Their conception of middle-classness:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Do you refer to yourself as middle-class or otherwise, and why?</li> <li>○ What characteristics do you associate with a middle-class person / the middle classes in the UK?</li> </ul>	<p>These questions were designed to address the first research question in the thesis, tapping how ethnic minorities in middle-class social locations define and relate to the concept of social class, if at all. It asked them not only to critically define the concept of class, as well as their own positioning in relation to class, but prompted them to discuss the relevance and importance of the concept to them.</p>

<p><b>C: Questions on race / ethnicity</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ To move on to another aspect of social identity, race and ethnicity. What do these concepts mean to you? How would you or do you define them?</li> <li>○ What role have they played in your own life?</li> <li>○ Do you feel they are useful ways to differentiate between types of people, and why? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <i>[Prompt: relate to your own experiences]</i></li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p><u>Their personal relationship to their race and ethnicity:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ How important is your racial background, ethnicity and / or religion to your sense of who you are and why/why not? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <i>[Prompt: is your mother tongue important to the sense of who you are? Your religious background? Your ancestral home? Your skin colour or other visible attributes?]</i></li> </ul> </li> <li>○ Do you feel a sense of belonging to your ethnic group and/or your ethnic identity, and why / why not? What about with your religion / religious group?</li> <li>○ Do you refer to yourself Asian, or Bangladeshi / Pakistani / Indian or Muslim / Hindu / Sikh and why / why not? How else do you refer to yourself, if at all? Do you feel a strong connection to any of these identities? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <i>[Prompt: as opposed to or in conjunction with British or English, and / or a Londoner / 'Brummie' / 'Northerner']</i></li> </ul> </li> <li>○ Do you interact a lot with people who are from the same racial / ethnic and/or religious background as you?</li> </ul>	<p>In a similar vein to the questions on class, the questions on race and ethnicity were designed to establish objective definitions of these concepts from the interviewees, before going on to explore how these relate to them on a personal level. Discussion points covered here included racial and ethnic belonging, experiences and feelings of discrimination, prejudice, and exclusion, social mixing, and ethnic 'groupings' and networks. Some of the questions were deliberately designed to expand on some of the identity indicators in the data, particularly those asking about the importance of race / ethnicity / religion to sense of self.</p>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

<p><b>D: Political and civic attitudes and behaviour</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Would you say you are political? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <i>[Prompt: i.e. do you have a clear political orientation/affiliation, political interest, political engagement]</i></li> </ul> </li> <li>○ What particular social or political causes, if any, are you interested in? <i>[Both domestic (UK) and international (your ancestral home / country of birth)]</i></li> <li>○ What particular types of social or political issues are most important to you and why?</li> <li>○ Do you feel as if you share the same political affiliations as your friends/family/colleagues <i>[discuss each respectively]</i>?</li> <li>○ How do you express your politics? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <i>[Prompt: through local groups, with friends and family, on social media]</i></li> </ul> </li> <li>○ Do you think your politics reflects in any way your social identifications i.e. class, ethnic or religious, and why / how?</li> <li>○ What do you feel has informed the way you think about politics and the workings of society?</li> </ul>	<p>This section was designed to gauge the political affiliations and orientations of the respondents and their immediate social circle, covering both their engagement with local and national politics and community, and the potential bases for these.</p> <p>The question about whether their politics is informed by their social identities was only really asked outright if not already sufficiently addressed thus far in the interview, given its complexity and potentially 'leading' nature.</p>
<p><b>E: Ladder exercise (see Appendix III, A3.3)</b></p> <p>Q - Where would you place yourself on this ladder, on whichever indicators of social status you yourself deem important?</p>	<p>The MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status was developed to capture 'common sense' understandings of subjective social status across socio-economic indicators (income, wealth, education, occupation). I encouraged respondents to think behind these traditional SES indicators to consider other aspects of social status - community standing, status in the workplace, and so on – if they were important to them.</p>
<p><b>F: Drawing Exercise</b></p> <p>Q - I want you to create a visual representation of how you see the structure of society (drawing on everything we've discussed in this interview) and your place within it</p>	<p>I asked each participant (if there was remaining time) to visually represent the way they see the social structure in the UK and their place within it given their social and political identifications and anything else relevant. The idea of this free-form drawing 'identity map' was to work on conceptualising class, and especially subjective class, in a different way, given the restrictiveness of language in the realm of abstract and highly personalised concepts such as identity. Interpretations of 'society' - their local community, the UK society at large, the transnational UK Diasporic community – was left up to their discretion, as well as 'structure' and their subjective placement within it (see section 3.3.2)</p>

#### 3.4.2.4 Qualitative data analysis

With regard to the qualitative data, verbatim transcriptions were produced for each interview via secure (password-protected) transcription and dictation online software. Sections of conversation unrelated to the subject matters in discussion - any lengthy overviews of the project and the interview tasks, as well as administrative / logistical clarification points - were omitted. On completion, each transcript was coded separately and sequentially into broad themes, delineated into smaller sub-themes through re-readings, on the qualitative analysis software package NVivo. Each transcript was analysed as a whole in and of itself as well as comparatively with the others. This was useful for the 'micro' analysis of interactions between interviewer and interviewee, as well as for understanding each individual narrative. Each interview was coded separately from start to finish. A grounded theory approach was taken (Blumer 1969; Glaser and Strauss 1967). Codes were generated inductively from the data itself (insofar as possible given the sub-conscious preconceptions harboured from many months of literature reviewing and preliminary quantitative analysis). These started off broad, and as the coding process continued existing codes were added and new codes developed. Some were grouped together, and eventually a comprehensive list of initial codes was established. A second round of coding then identified more codes, with similar ones subsumed. The second round of codes also identified more specific references to relevant phenomena. This included explicit discussion of where, for example, gender and religion were discussed in conjunction with another. These were less organic and more analytical, generated far later in the analysis process once the shape of each analysis chapter had become apparent.

The parent nodes followed the major themes that arose in this project: class, ethnicity, race, education, family, religion, politics and culture. Some of these themes were inevitable given that the interviews were roughly divided by discussion of class, race / ethnicity, and politics. The others were more organic themes that tied into the conversations about these three topics. For the theme of class, for example, multiple child nodes were identified. These delineated the ways in which people described their own class identities (subjective class identity), how they described class (class definitions) and how they described the middle classes and middle-classness (middle-class attributes). Stereotypes of ethnic minorities cited by the respondents generated a number of sub-nodes, as did discussions of racism and discrimination. These formed much of the analytical 'meat' of the substantive chapters of this thesis.

Certain excerpts in the transcripts covered a number of nodes, and these were often, seemingly, contradictory and this formed key analytical findings. For example, some respondents expressed an identification with both the Labour and the Conservative party for

different reasons, or at different times in their lives (see section 6.3). Some also expressed a sense of ethnic pride and ethnic identification whilst also discussing how the cultural norms of that ethnic community were, often, restrictive on individual autonomy. These needed in-depth analysis of that particular respondent's narrative in the context of their demographic background and in relation to other identifications they had expressed.

A number of themes outside the scope of the research questions arose from the qualitative data that were omitted from analysis. This streamlining helped create a coherent and parsimonious structure for the substantive chapters of this thesis. The final qualitative codes were chosen on the basis that they addressed some of the unanswered questions that arose from the quantitative data, had themes which built on or, interestingly, conflicted with the quantitative data, and addressed the complexities that couldn't be addressed through survey data analysis.

Each case was classified in NVivo by gender, age, place, industry, ethnicity and religion in order to delineate the frequency of certain themes by demographic factor. A2.2 in Appendix II (p. 43) shows the final set of parent and child nodes (represented by the blue arrows) generated across all cases after three rounds of coding. This comprised the final thematic coding framework generated in NVivo.

Regarding the analysis of the identity maps, a semiotic as well as thematic approach to analysis was employed which intended to identify processes of meaning-making through their construction, and the sorts of relationships and hierarchies drawn between identities. They were particularly useful in assessing how respondents link the macro to the micro, in other words link the larger structure of society to their own life stories. They were analysed alongside and as a part of the larger 'spoken' narratives of the respondents, and in conjunction with the spoken description of them given by the respondents as they drew. The identity maps – given both the situated and temporally dynamic nature of identity – were also a reflection of the conversations that preceded them. The complexity of the maps related to the complexity with which they construed notions of identity, belonging, hierarchy, and status.<sup>27</sup> This will become apparent in the following substantive chapters where the maps are integrated into the analysis and discussion.

---

<sup>27</sup> The Marshall-Saunders critique regarding the extent to which class can be accurately captured in structured surveys (see section 2.2.11) could be levied at both the semi-structured interviews and the maps, the latter of which were created after in-depth conversations deliberately designed to (in part) probe the meaning and salience of class. However, one can only work within and acknowledge the limitations of the method.

### 3.5 Reflections on research design and methods

#### 3.5.1 *Data availability and temporality*

Acknowledging the temporality of data is important within an identity study. This is because “privileges and disadvantages, including intersecting identities and the processes that determine their value, change over time and place” (Hankivsky et al. 2012, p. 37). It is important to contextualise the events surrounding the time and place of data collection to understand what particular social and historical occurrences have shaped the data collection processes (Kenway and McLeod 2004; Gunaratnam 2003). This avoids drawing essentialised and ahistorical conclusions from the data.

One limitation of the secondary data is the time lag between the point of data collection and the actual time of analysis. The quantitative data reflects the time immediately after the 2010 general election, but the bulk of the data analysis took place from 2015 to 2017. The qualitative data, by contrast, reflects the political situation of November 2015-May 2016. Over the time period covering the full research process, therefore, domestic and global political events - such as the EU referendum and discussions about ‘Brexit’, as well as the European refugee ‘crisis’ - have changed the nature of the debate on a number of relevant issues including national sovereignty, immigration, and global migration. Data following the 2015 rather than the 2010 election may have better reflected the more recent political landscape. More recent CS and EMBES data was unavailable, however.<sup>28</sup> Ultimately, phenomena like identities are inherently dynamic and difficult to empirically pin down. A constant dialogue between the findings of this thesis and the literature allowed the research to find its place, however, within the larger, ongoing academic dialogue and public discourse.

#### 3.5.2 *Sample size and representativeness*

Discrepancies in minority ethnic group sample sizes is in some part a reflection of the size their populations within the UK. Sophisticated sampling and weighting techniques are employed by the survey methodologists working on the production of ethnic minority datasets to ensure proportionate samples within sub-groups, and to account for non-response. According to the EMBES research team, “the sample design aimed to efficiently yield the target number of interviews in each group using a random probability approach allowing for

---

<sup>28</sup> The British Election Study data did not employ a comprehensive ethnic minority boost after the 2015 or 2017 general elections, and the 2010-11 Citizenship Survey was the final survey run due to financial cost (Department for Communities and Local Government 2011).

a representative survey of each ethnic group” (p. 4). However, lack of coverage<sup>29</sup> and non-response are unavoidable problems in survey research, particularly when researching hard to reach<sup>30</sup> and relatively small-in-number ethnic groups such as the Bangladeshi population in the UK (Uddin et al. 2008). Not only are response rates declining across surveys as a whole, but they tend to be lower for minority groups which impacts sample size and representativeness (Font and Mendez 2013). Ahmed (2016) notes that until recently “most data sets have combined the experiences of Bangladeshi and Pakistani communities where there has been a lack of ethnic monitoring and as Bangladeshi and Pakistani surnames are similarly of Islamic origin, or due to small sample sizes” (p. 14). This can have ethical consequences for researchers with regard to the way in which certain minority groups are represented in quantitative research. The EMBES was different in this respect as it drew a small Bangladeshi-only boost sample given the difficulty of achieving a large sample of this group while targeting equal numbers in the other ethnic groups (Howat et al. 2011, p. 5). When analysing across class, therefore, sample size again becomes a problem. In this study, therefore, the Bangladeshi sample are not referred to in most of the quantitative analysis.

### *3.5.3 Classificatory identity measures*

We might question the extent to which pre-designated categories of social identity in structured social surveys tap the complexity of identification or belonging person-to-person. In this study, the qualitative data usefully highlighted this. With regard to religious identity, for example, the interview respondents who broadly described themselves as Hindu were keen in the course of the conversation to clarify their adherence to a specific religious tradition such as Jainism, or temple such as Swaminarayan. Some of the Bangladeshi respondents who saw themselves as non-religiously Muslim or ‘ex’-Muslim were keen to stress their alignment with humanism or secularism. Some ‘ex’-Muslims hold a political, non-religious identity that would be unidentifiable by the closed-ended religious identity questions in most structured surveys. In the CS and EMBES, the overwhelmingly majority of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis describe themselves as Muslim, and the small minority who do not are subsumed in the analysis.

### *3.5.4 Quantitatively analysing race and ethnicity*

---

<sup>29</sup> For the EMBES, coverage was a key issue. Many potentially suitable respondents were excluded because they lived in areas where the eligible population was too thinly spread.

<sup>30</sup> Issues of inclusivity and engagement of hard to reach ethnic groups, particularly surrounding language barriers and translation services, are arguably less of an issue when targeting second-generation and middle-class individuals. However, as Lynn et. al (2018) point out, the added financial burden of accessing those who *are* hard to reach and recruit within these ethnic groups hinders attempts to build a substantial ethnic minority sample which is optimally representative of all class fractions.

British national statistics have historically homogenised African, Caribbean and South Asian descended people under the broad categorisation of 'Black' and 'Asian'. Throughout the thesis, the term 'South Asian' is used instead of 'Asian', to represent the origin of the population in a specific region of the continent (as explained in section 2.3.1). Furthermore, the focus of much of the study is a critical analysis of the ethnic identifications of those within the British South Asian population which sought to, in part, problematise and probe these categories. The study thus adopts a 'doubled research practice' to work both with and against objective racial / ethnic categories (Gunaratnam 2003, p. 29), using 'official' ethnic classifications for an entry point but exploring the heterogeneities of self-identification.

Carrying out research that is racially sensitive is paramount for every race and ethnicity researcher, particularly within quantitative research where the use of one-dimensional categories of race or ethnicity can lead to reductive findings. Quantitative research has been key to establishing existing inequalities and exposing hidden structures of oppression (Gorelick 1991), but we must be wary of characterising race / ethnicity, or gender for that matter, as a statistical 'cause' (Zuberi and Bonilla-Silva 2008). Zuberi (2000) states: "race is not an attribute but a dynamic characteristic dependent on other social circumstances" (p. 172).

Critical theorists such as Patricia Hill Collins and Dorothy E. Smith are similarly concerned with the way certain kinds of knowledge represent specific groups (Allan 2010) as a function of the way data is produced and modelled. Gillborn et al. (2018) highlight, for example, how "in relation to access to elite British universities [...] White students appear to be disadvantaged when compared with a crude BME composite group (that lumps together all minoritized students); and yet the same White students emerge as relatively privileged when compared with their Black Caribbean peers [...]" (p. 172). If using ethnic / racial categories that are too broad can be problematic, so can be using categories that are too differentiated, given the statistical problems that can arise from low cell counts.

A critical, interpretivist approach to quantitative research also acknowledges that the measures harnessed in surveys do not always necessarily reflect the breadth of experience within ethnic groups. This entails placing race within a social context given that "the social concept of race affects how we interpret quantitative representations of racial reality" (Zuberi and Bonilla-Silva 2008, p. 127). In this thesis, I have tried to – where possible – (i) contextualise the results within the differing historical and continuing structural and everyday inequalities the British South Asian middle-class experience, and (ii) control for factors including age, gender, marital status, generation and region of residence (as mentioned in section 3.4.1.1) which are all class and race contingent.

### *3.5.5 Interpretation of structured survey indicators*

Bryman (2004) states that we must acknowledge the interpretive limitations of all structured survey indicators that require respondents to choose essentially a 'best fit' answer. The usefulness of identity measures in surveys are particularly at scrutiny. We might ask, for example, whether a question such as '*to what extent is your [class / ethnicity / religion / nationality] important to the sense of who you are*' (like that used in the CS) with response options on a short, Likert scale, captures a 'real' sense of subjective identification. The researcher must therefore be careful about overstating or over-interpreting findings. The triangulation of the quantitative data with the qualitative in this study allowed the latter to 'fill in the gaps' of the former, in other words to interrogate the underlying meaning of holding a certain identity at a certain point in time. Marshall et al. (1988) are critical of the role of social surveys in studying class consciousness. They argue that it is a concept best studied as a component of class practices, and thus qualitative research is more suitable. This study will employ both quantitative and qualitative methods to critically evaluate racial / minority ethnic and class identity amongst the South Asian middle classes, but will not presuppose that this provides a comprehensive overview of the phenomena for this population.

### *3.5.6 Quantitative identity analysis using interaction terms*

Traditionally, quantitative researchers investigated inequity on individual axes considering only potential interrelationships between them (Rouhani 2014). Intersectional theorists argue that analysing specific categories in isolation are a poor reflection of the way individuals and groups experience society - they only have social meaning when accounted for simultaneously (McCall 2005). In interactional quantitative regression models, demographic indicators representing all relevant identities should be included as explanatory variables (Spiering 2012) and then as interactions. This initial 'additive' approach addresses the principle of simultaneity (Veenstra 2011), in other words that all identities make important and necessary contributions, and enables the researcher to determine the independent influence of these variables. Interaction terms then attempt to model the 'cumulative' effect of these identities on the outcome variable. Two-way interaction terms may not always be adequate to address the levels of complexity within the research aims of an identity study. Higher-order multiplicative interactions between three or more variables are therefore often desirable. In this study which was interested in modelling not only outcomes based on class and ethnicity but levels of political consciousness, three-way interaction terms were necessary (see Chapter 6) but few were found to be significant.

A number of practical factors have historically hampered the development of quantitative analysis in identity research. These include issues of data availability and sample size (Kohlman 2006, Dubrow 2008, Scott and Siltanen 2012, Bauer 2014), particularly when

analysing small sub-populations. Interactions involve smaller sample sizes than tests of main effects and have less statistical power. In this study, it was necessary to have the largest UK South Asian minority ethnic groups – Pakistanis and Indians - sufficiently represented in the data for at least some comparative, descriptive analyses to be undertaken. This was (somewhat) achievable. Although sample sizes are not as large for the ethnic minority samples as for the counterpart White samples, the boost samples allowed for (some) useful inferential analysis. There were challenges, however, in balancing the number of interactions in the regression models and maintaining adequate statistical power needed to make sufficiently robust conclusions (Spiering 2012). Limiting the number and content of interactions (to three variables maximum) addressed the issue somewhat. Also, given that some of the variation in the outcome variable explained by the interactions are often captured in the main effects, (tentatively) increasing the conventional level of statistical significance to a higher cut off point (from  $p < 0.05$  to  $p < 0.1$ ) - purely for interpretation of the results of the regression analyses - expanded the scope of analysis.

### *3.5.7 Qualitative identity research*

In a qualitative context, ethnographic and participatory action research are usually seen as the most compatible with identity research allowing the researcher to fully interrogate the experiences of individuals claiming membership to multiple and potentially marginalised communities. However, interviews are also useful in illustrating the complexities of collective identities through in-depth, one-to-one discussion. There were concerns in this study about the interviews reinforcing identity binaries by asking about identities and experiences of class and race / ethnicity / religion sequentially (see section 3.4.2). However, the intention was not only to glean where these social identities and experiences might intersect, but also to engage in a 'meta-analysis' of grassroots understandings of these concepts and categories, exposing and interrogating their essentialised nature in turn, whilst allowing for subjective understandings and experiences to come forth.

There are, however, a number of challenges in qualitative identity research, many similar to the challenges in quantitative research. With respect to a diffuse concept such as class, the researcher must proceed with caution and not overstate the meaning it may hold for respondents. Previous research on class belonging has found that people are increasingly unlikely to consider themselves in class, or even working, terms (Surridge 2007). We might ask, therefore, how appropriate it is to continue to 'probe' class awareness in interviews, and whether these questions will, and can, elicit 'true' experiences or reflections on class experience: "when sociologists have ploughed on to ask people to place themselves into class, have they simply obliged when really the topic means very little to them?" (Devine 2004, p. 200). It is important to allow the respondent to express a lack of identification with

the subject matter under discussion, and for the researcher to acknowledge this as an analytically important finding in and of itself.

Marshall et al. (1988) advocate the oblique approach to interviewing in order to unearth the subtleties of social identities. Bryman (2004) similarly states that it is preferable to ask a number of questions in the course of an interview that might tap a certain concept (p. 67). In the interview guide, a host of broad questions that refer not only to the concept of, for example, class itself but to where it may else be tangentially relevant or identifiable – when talking about family background, work, social circles and so on - helped build a broader picture of its significance to the interviewees. In the qualitative interviews for this study, respondents were ‘eased into’ the somewhat abstract identity questions by first being asked questions about their life history which, in some cases, elicited some interesting and important reflections on identity. For example, when Mohan (Indian Punjabi Sikh engineer and entrepreneur from the Midlands) was asked about his marital status, he reflected at length on his arranged marriage and the ethnic stereotypes that he believes prevail about this cultural practice. This segue from a simple question generated rich data about the salience of this respondent’s cultural identity and the way it has been challenged and misrepresented by dominant liberal discourses.

#### *3.5.8. Reflexivity and ‘insider’ research*

As fleshed out in section 1.2.2, reflexivity was a key methodological consideration in the qualitative research, in terms of 1) the interactions between myself and the interviewees that helped contextualise the verbal discussions we had and thus shape the findings made from the qualitative data, and 2) the potential limitations of leaving implicit, shared meanings unsaid and thus un-probed.

The increased focus on reflexivity in the social sciences can be attributed to the postmodern turn, where questions raised by issues of social ‘reality’, subjectivity, and interpretation began to be confronted (Marcus and Fischer 1987). Feminist theorists have been the main proponents of reflexivity in the social sciences. Their objective is not to discover a better ‘truth’ but to provide another way to see the world (Stanley and Wise 1993). Critical reflexivity has arguably not been accurately deployed in the social sciences (Marcus and Fischer 1987), however. It is centred on acknowledging the impact a researcher’s own subjectivity has on their interpretations, communication, understandings and conclusions from the data, not simply asserting a claim to knowledge based on a combination of identities.

An ‘insider’ researcher is, broadly, someone who shares a particular characteristic such as gender or ethnicity with the research participant (Mercer 2007). One might assume that my position as an ethnic ‘insider’ would minimise the extent to which my research would be seen as

appropriating or colonising the voice of the 'other'. However, power relations and hierarchies in the research process are far more complex. For example, some of the Bangladeshi and Pakistani participants in the qualitative part of my research may not have considered me, of Indian ethnic origin, to share the same cultural positioning as them. Others, however, sought to draw likenesses between our cultural experiences, including me in their experiences of, in a broad sense, 'Asian-ness'. This indicates the situated nature of a researcher's insider-outsider status. Because we can all draw upon and embody multiple forms of identification, one can find themselves an insider at one moment and an outsider at another (Merton 1972).

From a methodological perspective, mutual understanding between interviewer and interviewee in qualitative research can aid rapport between participants and provide a springboard upon which sensitive issues of culture, race, and prejudice can be discussed. However, there are problems associated with being the insider, including being blindsided by certain issues which may hold personal resonance. Furthermore, the act of explaining culturally specific experiences to an 'outsider' can prove productive in terms of gaining an insight into how the individual in question interprets and communicates ethnic phenomena. There were assumed cultural understandings between me and a number of the interview participants I met during the qualitative fieldwork. Neha – an Indian Hindu engineer from London of a similar age to me - was, in her interview, describing the difficulties of explaining a certain religious festival to her work colleagues. Rather than prompting her to explain how she does this, and how this unprompted requirement to educate others about her culture makes her feel, I – having experienced similar situations – instinctively agreed with her:

*I know there's some things which some people won't understand, like Karva Chauth is the most abstract thing to explain to someone.*

Yeah, it's very culturally difficult to get across, what it means and why you do it.<sup>31</sup>

Although this could be seen as rapport-building, it also cut off interesting discursive avenues into her feelings of cultural alienation at work which only really occurred to me after the interview had finished. Nabeela – a Pakistani Muslim lawyer from Manchester - and I similarly experienced shared cultural understandings, despite being of different ethnic backgrounds. This is demonstrated by the repetition of '*you know*' and '*yeah*' in place of a clear explication on her part of the issue of cultural shaming:

*My sister who's 5 years older than me was actually the first Pakistani girl in Doncaster who ever went away to University, and everybody was like oh my God what are you*

---

<sup>31</sup> My voice is non-italicised throughout the thesis. The voices of the respondents are italicised both in the indented excerpts and the discussion / interpretation.

*doing, your daughter's gonna get ruined, she's gonna go off with a White man, you know all that type of nonsense-*

Yeah-

*Er, you know people, trying to fill parents' heads with.*

Yeah.

*Yeah yeah.*

These reflections on interviewer-interviewee interactions indicate the potential limitations of insider-ness when the boundary between researcher and group insider become blurred. However, it did prove fruitful in places. When discussing racial profiling that Sunil had experienced after the 2005 terrorist attacks in London, I was asked by him about my memory of the events as a woman of colour. This was a clear case of 'breaking objectivity', in that I responded with my feelings about the increasing conspicuousness of being an Asian person. However, this was within a particularly insightful conversation about racialisation and could be construed as part of a useful back-and-forth, generating insights into the role racism played for Sunil at school, in his career progression, and on the streets.

Emotional reactions, including specific, notable changes in behaviour or speech, said a lot – not necessarily in words - about the latent feelings some of the interviewees in the qualitative part of the research had about the subject matter. Nadya (a young, female Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London) laughed when discussing what might have been construed as sensitive and potentially traumatic topics including cultural oppression and racism in the labour market. It is difficult to construe the meaning of laughter, both at the time of the interview and especially during the transcription and analysis stages. As Luton (2015) states: "if someone laughs, it may be jovial or nervous laughter. How do you know which it is? The meaning you take from it will differ significantly depending on what kind of laughter it is" (p. 41). The laughter in Nadya's case seemed to be nervous laughter, a reaction to the seriousness and / or personal nature of the subject matter:

*I faced a lot of rejection trying to get training contracts, I must have had at least 100 to 200 rejection letters, it's funny actually some of those people that rejected me know me now on a professional level [laughs].*

*My father used to teach back home in Bangladesh so he was very articulate in Bengali, fluent in writing, reading, everything else, my mum wasn't obviously, you know, avoided school [laughs] she got married off at a young age, very common.*

In some instances, emotional reactions were useful discussion prompts. On being prompted about his private school experience, Sunil – a young Indian Gujarati engineer - stated, with his head in hands: '*I hated it, I think [sighs] sorry I said I hated it*'. I in turn asked: '*I want to*

*know why you just apologised*. In response to this, some illuminating insights arose about his experiences of racism as a child, as well as his differing experiences at private school and state school as a working-class, ethnic minority child. Anita – an older Indian Bengali lawyer - was very quiet when answering whether her race / ethnicity had played a salient role in her life, prompting me to have to lean in to hear her. She answered ‘*not at all*’ very softly, suggesting that she was giving an answer that she may have thought I do not want to hear. She could have been expressing guilt at, for example, managing to avoid discrimination, while others in similar social positions to her ostensibly may not have. If so, this was an indication not necessarily that she doesn’t think a minority racial / ethnic identity *can* meaningfully and palpably affect someone’s life trajectory, but that for *her* it hadn’t. These reflections are made throughout the analysis in the main body of the thesis where relevant in order to add a dimensional perspective to the verbal narratives constructed by the interviewees.

### **3.7 Conclusion**

This chapter has described the research design and the methods employed to answer the research questions framing this study. The quantitative data has been described in detail with the ‘middle-class’ sample explored with reference to key demographic and socio-economic indicators. The qualitative data process was also discussed from the design to the implementation and analysis stages.

This chapter also outlined the interpretive limitations and concerns that must be borne in mind when carrying out quantitative research, including that of sample size when carrying out statistical research on minority ethnic groups. For qualitative research, the limitations involve acknowledging the situated and contextual nature of the data, understanding the advantages and disadvantages of using semi-structured interviews to glean information about identity, and acknowledging the interview process as productive as well as reflective of meaning.

## **4. Perceptions, subjectivities, and experiences of class**

### **4.1 Introduction**

This chapter focuses on the first research question. Analysis covers respondents' understandings, interpretations and critiques of aggregate class categorisations and class boundaries, self-positioning in the social hierarchy, and accounts of classed experiences. The performative aspect of class is explored through the respondents' descriptions of how they negotiate aspects of class in their personal and professional lives. The aim of this chapter is to build an understanding of difference, similarities, and complexities in class subjectivities across the different ethnic groups which will inform the analysis of racial / ethnic subjectivities in the next chapter.

The chapter begins by analysing how participants defined the concept of social class in the UK, focusing particularly on their definitions of the middle classes and 'middle-classness'. It then sees how, if at all, they described themselves in class terms. It goes on look to the ethnoracial specificities of their conversations on class. The key theoretical conclusions drawn from this are: 1) how popular conceptions of middle-classness and integration into middle-class spaces (primarily professional places of work) are dependent on a specific type of classed, racialised and gendered conformity, and 2) the parallel, 'ethnic' models of middle-classness specific to the experiences and challenges of these groups centred around often moralised and politicised notions of betterment through education, 'hard work', and financial security / status.

The analysis in this chapter is inductive, with themes arising from the data in line with grounded theory approaches to qualitative analysis (Blumer 1969; Glaser and Strauss 1967). It seeks to avoid reifying the class positionings of those being studied, drawing out the complexities and subtleties of the participants' own narratives. It does so by couching them within frameworks which are commensurate with their own unique experiences as a particular racialised group in society. Platt (2017) alludes to this by stating that for immigrants, the realisation of 'success', for example, can mean a number of things: doing better than you would have done in your country of origin, your children doing better than you, or their doing better than they would have done in their country of origin.

## 4.2 Problematising class categories

### 4.2.1 Class and socio-economic status

In conversations about the meaning and definition of class, respondents were given ample space to advance any theory or conceptualisation of class that came to mind, if any. Most invoked 'traditional' 'Goldthorpe-esque' class schema. However, there was, for most, some hesitation when asked how they would define social class. This suggests, first and foremost, that class is not a concept they evoke often in everyday life. Even though most mentioned class in terms of aggregate categories, some expressed difficulties in defining these, and identifying where the boundaries between classes lie. Many stressed that class categories represent broad and dynamic groupings and are thus potentially reductive and simplifying.

'Traditional' class categorisations of lower / working, middle, and upper class were cited by approximately 13 of the 20 respondents across the range of ethnicities, genders and class backgrounds in the sample. The remaining respondents tended to refer to their own experiences with social mobility to both conceptualise class and describe themselves (or not) in class terms (which will be discussed later on in this chapter). Excerpts from the conversations with Nadya and Tariq, both Muslim professionals living in London, characterise the tentativeness with which these categories were used to describe class / socio-economic differences in society, however. The hesitation with which they described these categorisations was palpable through their use of non-committal phrases such as '*I don't really*' and '*erm, you know, I think*'. Nonetheless, Nadya states that she '*normally*' brackets people into three groups, suggesting that she ultimately does think in, or refer to people in, aggregate class terms:

*'I'd split it up into three, it'd be your working-class, your middle-class and your upper-class, I don't really, I know there are branches going off into each one but I normally kind of bracket people up in those three groups really'* (Nadya, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London)

*'I'm aware of your traditional definitions of working-class, middle-class and upper-class, erm, you know, I think there's those elements'* (Tariq, Pakistani Muslim engineer from London)

Although all the respondents discussed more 'abstract' ideas related to class in the initial part of the interview such as social networks, tastes and behaviours related to, for example,

consumption<sup>32</sup>, family reputation and social status (discussed further on in this section), class boundaries were, initially at least, largely and broadly drawn with respect to 'traditional' socio-economic indicators of occupation / work, income, and / or education. This held for all of the interviewees. Excerpts from conversations with Rakhi, Neha and Hasan illustrate these definitions of class based on socio-economic status:

*I think that in the UK and particularly in London, which I can speak to more because I've lived here all my life, social class is very much a product of your educational background and your achievements professionally (Rakhi, Indian Gujarati Hindu lawyer from London)*

*So straight away I think of income but social class, it could be, I don't know what else it could, in my mind that's just the way I think of it (Neha, Indian Punjabi Hindu engineer from London)*

*I think class is something that [...] [in] sociological terms obviously, you know, people in different working stages in life (Hasan, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London)*

Those who discussed the relationship of class to money (income and wealth) noted paradoxes where, for example, you could move in middle-class 'circles' or possess some trappings of middle-classness – like access to private school education - but not be very wealthy, and vice versa. Approximately 10 of the 20 respondents explicitly questioned the consistency of the relationship between measures of SES and aggregate, traditional class groupings. To draw examples of this, both Ali, from a middle-class background, and Deepak, from a working-class background, noted that blue-collar individuals whose occupation may be classed as manual / working-class in traditional, occupation-based class schema could earn a considerable income, i.e. an income higher than would be associated with a working-class (or at least non-middle-class) individual:

---

<sup>32</sup> In Sunil's (Indian Gujarati software engineer from London) face-to-face interview, there was a telling interchange when he commented on the designer branding of my handbag. This led me to clarify almost immediately that it is was counterfeit, and my salary does not stretch to genuine designer brands. This is indicative of how class is often communicated via taste and consumption, and particularly so for this respondent. I also exhibited a sense of shame and embarrassment at potentially being mis-recognised as someone of a higher socio-economic positioning, an indicator of my own class awareness. The salience of these markers were, arguably, heightened by the content of the spoken portion of the interview. Sunil was one of very few respondents who discussed the consumption patterns of middle-class Indians on the sub-continent with reference to handbags: "*Affluence in India and the changes in society there are becoming more apparent, you see a lot more Prada handbags*".

*'there's a blue collar person [...] you could say they're in the building trades business but they themselves could have their own business and they might be making way more money than someone else' (Ali, Bangladeshi Muslim engineer from London)*

*'if you class middle-class according to your bank balance then I know a lot of people who work, for example plumbers and you know, I would say they're in that sort of, financially they're in a higher bracket than a working-class family would be, because I know a lot of plumbers whose children go to private school' (Dinesh, Indian Gujarati Hindu lawyer from Leicester)*

The sense of economic precarity experienced by highly educated, professional individuals was cited by Tariq, an engineering professional living in London where the housing market is highly inaccessible for those in both low- and middle-income brackets (Dorling 2013). He drew attention to the geo-spatial contingencies of middle-classness, and the inability of some professionals in the region to accrue the sorts of assets that one might deem a necessary attribute of middle-classness:

*'If you earn 50 grand, which is actually a very top end salary in this country, even now, yet if you can't afford your home in Redbridge, for example, then are you really middle-class?' (Tariq, Pakistani Muslim engineer from London)*

Benson and Jackson (2017) note that although housing ownership has been theorised as the cornerstone of middle-class reproduction, status and distinction, an increasingly competitive rental market and inflated property prices in London have precipitated a discussion about changing class boundaries, class subjectivities and claims to space amongst those who would traditionally be defined, by marker of where they live, as middle-class (p. 215).

#### *4.2.2 Class and capitals*

As mentioned in section 4.2.1, discussions of class boundaries went beyond education, occupation and income / wealth. Approximately 12 of the 20 respondents – most women - explicitly highlighted ways people 'assume' or perform class through lifestyle, behaviours and practices such as weekend hobbies, social activities, cars owned, and frequency of holidays. Neha, Nadya and Bisma - all female professionals living in London - suggested that, as per Durkheim, factors such as the types of people you associate with is a reflection, if not a determinant, of class status, at least within the context of their own urban, professional environment:

*'Social class, so I would describe it as the people you associate with [...] if you're associating with people who are earning more, your class would be different' (Neha, Indian Punjabi Hindu engineer from London)*

*'I think it depends on, you know [...] what kind of work you're working in and who you interact with' (Bisma, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London)*

*I suppose then the circle of people that you mix with become the certain people that you work with, and they become your social groups [...] I suppose social groups in a certain way do mould your class' (Nadya, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London)*


Aspects of cultural and social capital focusing on professional credentials, professional networks, career achievements, and access to opportunities for professional and social advancement were also cited, by 10 out of the 20 respondents, as a marker of class and status. Rakhi felt that an individual's income or salary and / or wealth did not sufficiently tap the concept of class. It must be noted however, that Rakhi hails from a middle-class and, by her accounts, prosperous background (discussed further in section 4.4.2). For her, therefore, material achievements are less salient in her conceptualisations of class. She does, however, caveat that this is a UK-specific definition, implying that in other countries, perhaps, wealth is a stronger indicator of social standing (discussed further in section 4.2.3):

*'Social class is very much a product of your educational background and your achievements professionally, and the opportunities that that gives you, erm in terms of contacts, financial standing and status [...] I think in the UK I guess the distinction I'm trying to draw is that it more depends on your social standing within a kind of, er, in a professional context rather than on your monetary worth' (Rakhi, Indian Gujarati Hindu lawyer from London)*

Rakhi's identity map (fig. 6) reinforces the emphasis herself and her family place on education. The substance of her middle-classness is informed by her respect for knowledge and betterment. Stability and security features in her definition of middle-classness in terms of family and finances. This is a fairly normative definition of middle-classness, more so than any of the other respondents, because of the emphasis not only on education and occupation but also the type of family structures within which prosperity is most likely to occur. It lightly echoes discourses which paint the working classes as lacking in communality and stable families (Hancock and Mooney 2012), and Asian - particularly Indian - immigrant families as 'model minorities' (Gillborn 2008; Hartlep and Porfilio 2015; Chung 2016). There is evidence in her narrative, therefore, of middle-classness being bounded by what is not-middle-class, in other words what is ostensibly working-class or lower. Interestingly, however, the working-class section of her identity map is blank, indicating that she even though does not consider

the working classes to possess any of the attributes she's listed in the section above, she has possibly thought less about their (negative or positive) characteristics:

**Fig. 6 Rakhi's (Indian Gujarati Hindu lawyer from London) identity map**



Rakhi sees herself at the top of the middle-class bracket (as indicated by the 'X' on the identity map), but the wavy arrow indicates some hesitancy in this self-positioning. As she defined those in the '*higher*' classes as being part of the '*professional service*' in the City of London (like her), and those in the middle classes offering local professional services, she may see herself in actuality straddling the middle and upper classes, at least the London-specific middle and upper classes. This is reinforced by the dashed line she created between the boundaries of the middle and upper classes brackets:

*'I think in a London context being part of the professional service and being part of the City of London puts you in a higher-class bracket, erm, sort of more local professional services would put you in a middle-class bracket [...] And then this is like, this tiny segment is the upper-class, although that would probably be smaller, probably like shrink it a bit. And I, I would think of myself around here [marks 'X' on drawing] [...] as you're moving up from this station to that station [moves pen from 'working-class' to 'middle-class' section], what's changing [writes on paper] it's education, it's financial security, opportunities, networks, and erm...I don't know if this is far-fetched, but I also think family structures? I think of people belonging to the middle-class as having quite stable family structures?'*

When Rakhi discusses '*moving from station to station*', we can see some evidence that she harbours a belief in mobility between these two class positions, despite the definitiveness of the line between them on the map, and the fairly comprehensive (perhaps inhibiting) list of attributes she associates with 'achieving' middle-classness. This is an interesting assertion for someone with a middle-class background, in a currently middle-class social and occupational location to make. She, unlike the 17 (out of 20) respondents from working class backgrounds, has had little direct experience of social mobility. It is thus important to look at how social mobility is construed for those in the sample from working-class backgrounds, and how this in turn affects their class definitions and subjectivities. Rakhi's definition of middle-classness as well as her understanding of social hierarchy is reflective of her own social positioning, and we can postulate this may also hold for the other respondents who will be discussed later.

#### *4.2.3 Class and background*

Class and cultural background were relevant not only to self-definitions of class (as will be explored in section 4.4) but the way in which respondents defined the concept of class itself. Ethnic caste was invoked by 5 predominantly Indian respondents, 3 with Indian Hindu and 1 with Indian Sikh background. It was used by the Indian respondents primarily to benchmark the socio-economic structure in the UK against another society (Indian) with a comparable but different, albeit somewhat familiar, social hierarchy. It also allowed them to ease into a discussion of social class by discussing an 'extreme' yet familiar example (by virtue of their ethnic / culture heritage and / or transnational identifications) of a socially divisive society.


Rakhi used the example of class, caste, and communal division in India to argue that social mobility is relatively fairly easily achieved in the UK. Ali draws an almost direct link between class in the UK and caste in the Indian sub-continent, by contrast. Given the broad way he defines class in the UK – dependent on, among other things, hierarchy, birth right, and family – the similarities to him are evident:

*'if I think about India for instance, social class is very much connected to and dependent on money, essentially, the status of the family is dependent on their financial erm standing within society, and in a way that enables social mobility to move quite quickly, erm obviously subject to the limitations of caste, religion and community, communal attitudes which are very rigid and harder to correct' (Rakhi, Indian Gujarati Hindu lawyer from London)*

*'it [class] is, and especially in the UK anyway it's, it can be about all sorts of things, taste, how much money you have, erm, you know, your sort of hierarchy, who you were born into, who you were family were, all those sorts of things [...] the same thing would be called in India for example [...] caste or, in Bengali we would say 'zaat' which is to say, in Hindi I think it's 'Jat' [...]' (Ali, Bangladeshi engineer from London)*

Deepak's identity map (fig. 7) which 'measures', in a sense, his social standing on various axes (sex, education, living location, family status, job, and UK class) references Indian caste in the context of social status and hierarchy. He does not see his high Hindu caste status (represented by the red dot in final column) as a boon to his UK class status (but perhaps, given his use of 'UK' in reference to class, to his Indian class status). However, his high-level professional position, his high-level educational level and his gender privilege which he himself notes unprompted by me in these spheres and beyond also do not boost his class standing (shown by the dip in the green line in the penultimate column). Although he acknowledges the importance culturally-specific aspects of social hierarchy like caste, he still describes himself as lower middle-class which is an *'average of his'* working-class background and his current professional standing. Unlike Ali, the 'loaded' question' for Deepak in terms in class, and the most relevant indicator of class for him, is *'what your parents do'*. On this basis, therefore, Rakhi is quite right to label herself firmly middle-class. Although Deepak's children will be put *'very much in that middle-class very easily'* by virtue of his professional job, this, in his opinion, does not apply so cleanly to him by virtue of his class background.

**Fig. 7 Deepak's (Indian Gujarati Hindu lawyer from London) identity map**



Contradictions not only occur in defining class for individuals whose socio-economic position may put them in differing class categories, but also for those who have experienced social mobility within their lifetime and do not see themselves as to lying easily within aggregate boundaries. This chapter and the next will explore in more detail how factors like class background and ethnic background might influence these class subjectivities.

#### *4.2.4 Class and privilege*

Views on the privileges afforded by class differed greatly among respondents. It is interesting to assess the extent to which respondents were aware of and / or acknowledged some form of 'class privilege', and how this differed by class background as well as ethnicity and religion. 2 of the 3 respondents from middle-class backgrounds – both Indian Hindu - acknowledged the social gains that came with having parents with some knowledge and / or experience of the UK higher education system and the professional labour market. Anita, an Indian Bengali Hindu lawyer with a senior role in a global corporate law firm notes how, in contrast to first-generation university students from ethnic minority groups, she had a mother with informed views on higher education who was able to guide her through the process:

*'My mother was able to guide me through that, you know. I totally appreciate that there are many, many people from ethnic minority backgrounds where they are the first-generation possibly going to university [...] [who] don't have the privilege I had'.*

Two of the 17 respondents from working-class backgrounds – both older, Indian males - were acutely aware of the lack of 'level playing fields' in society and lamented that working-class parents are not able to secure the opportunities they have now managed to provide for their own adult children. Baljit is cognisant of the wealth of educational choices open to middle-class families and the inequality in terms of cultural capital this generates. Despite complicity in this inequality, he sent his own daughter to private school in order to for her to benefit from the privileges he himself was denied:

*'...my daughter had been sent to private school [...] but it's not level playing fields is it. It's not level playing fields [...] just because we had the money we could send her, she did a Spanish degree at Queen Mary's in London and then she went off to Spain for a year, how many parents would be able to afford that if you're in a working-class environment' (Baljit, Indian Punjabi Sikh lawyer from Birmingham)*

Nadya, although not a parent, was conflicted over whether a middle-class inheritance is advantageous, particularly for those working in an urban, professional environment. A criminal lawyer in East London, she stated that her working-class background helped her excel in a job where 'a snob that's been straight out of Cambridge' may not succeed. She believes this is because she can 'relate' to her predominantly working-class clients. Whether she actively chose a role where she would be in proximity to those with similar class backgrounds as her, an example of multi-class mindedness (Moore 2008) is unclear. However, Bisma - of a similar ethno-religious and class background as her, expressed similar sentiments, and even actively construed her work through the framework of class solidarity (discussed further in section 4.4.1). There is potentially some form of 'reverse capital' to be gleaned from harbouring a working-class as opposed to middle- or upper-class background in terms of the types of social resources and strategies that one develops from having an insight into 'another world'. The prevailing assumption in works by Bourdieu and his proponents is that working-class culture is less valuable / less rewarded than elite culture in fostering cultural capital (Lareau 1987). However, this is not necessarily the case. The framing of cultural capital as a predominantly middle-class attribute will be critiqued in more detail in section 4.5.2, particularly with respect to the emergent concept of 'ethnic capital'.

### **4.3 Defining middle-classness**

Respondents cited a range of attributes when prompted to discuss and define the middle classes / middle-classness, some of which were discussed in section 4.2.

In terms of occupation, interviewees characterised a wide range of people who could be members of the middle classes: hands-off senior directors of companies (cited by 2 respondents), professional workers of all levels of seniority (cited by 6 respondents), small and medium-sized business owners (cited by 2 respondents), as well as 'working people' on a moderate, steady income (cited by 4 respondents) as middle-class. However, an established professional occupation, along with living in a 'posh suburb' and holding higher educational credentials, were attributes of the middle classes cited by every respondent as being most clearly indicative of an individual's belonging to this group:

*'Middle-class would be someone who is University educated, who has a professional job, probably owns his own home, probably lives in a suburban district somewhere, not necessarily in London I suppose, a suburb anywhere in the country (Farhan, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London)*

*'I think income, good education, so probably like yeah a degree level education maybe, erm, income, job, er, maybe where you live, so certain areas I think you know people, posh area or whatever' (Karim, Bangladeshi lawyer from London)*

*'Somebody who works in a large corporation [...] has some higher education, has then joined a relatively stable professional environment, either a doctor, lawyer, accountant whatever, and has sort of worked their way up and had a 20, 30 year steady career, has, you know, a family, a house in the suburbs etc. (Rakhi, Indian Gujarati Hindu lawyer from London)*

A middle-class education was defined as 1) having attended a grammar or a private school as well as university (cited explicitly by 10 out of the 20 respondents and all of those with grammar or private school educations) and 2) having exposure to an environment where education, self-improvement, and academic success is valued and fostered (cited explicitly by 8 out of the 20 respondents across all ethnicities, genders and class backgrounds). Some also cited what they described as 'typically' (or perhaps stereotypically) middle-class behaviours such as learning musical instruments and multilingualism, and the ability to adapt to different situations and people.<sup>33</sup> This latter attribute was explicitly cited by five of the respondents across the sample as an essential quality they possess and others also need to have in order to survive and thrive in a professional environment. It might be construed

---

<sup>33</sup> Social adaptability and multilingualism could be framed as key characteristics of first- and second-generation immigrants of any class positioning. They employ the language of their host country as well as their country of origin, and also develop an ability to navigate both their own ethnic minority cultural space as well as that of the 'outside' native culture. Section 4.5 will further unpick the concept of middle-class cultural capital within the context of the South Asian diaspora.

therefore, as a quality of a professional identity more so than a middle-class identity, but was nonetheless discussed at length in conversations about class identity and classed practices:

*'I think I'm of a different particular character whereby I don't, one of the things people say to me is you could sit at a table and have a good conversation with a company director or a, you know, very rich person and you could sit at a lower level with other people, that's me [...] I think being [like that] has erm given more weight to my character' (Hussain, Bangladeshi lawyer from Birmingham)*

This kind of adaptability was interpreted by four of the working-class respondents as a deliberate act of performativity ensuring success as a (formerly) working-class minority in a professional (middle-class and predominantly White) environment. Whereas for Nadya working-classness is a boon for client relationships, in other contexts such marginality can prove a barrier. Hasan's passage below illustrates the way middle-classness, Whiteness and Britishness (alluded to through the use of the terms 'integrated' and 'culture') intersect to structure the hegemonic norms of his professional work environment:

*'There'll be certain expectations when you go into the courts, that you walk the walk, talk the talk, and if you don't then they immediately have such prejudices, you know [...] the less integrated you come across, and the more vocal you are about your individuality, whether it's culture or religion, the more problematic it becomes' (Hasan, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London)*

Hasan suggests that the need for resilience in certain spaces is, to some extent, mutually exclusive with expressing one's cultural identity. The onus is on the minority individual to 'integrate'. There is a clear racialised element to this expectation. Hasan, however, is hyper-racialised not only as a person of colour but as a Muslim, which he alludes to by stating *'whether it's culture or religion, the more problematic it becomes'*. The ethnic options (Song 2003) open to individuals like Hasan - the ability to assert desired ethnic, religious as well as class and national<sup>34</sup> identities without repercussions relating to the authenticity of one's status as a professional - are constrained.

As Rollock et al. (2014) argues, racial marginality cannot necessarily be erased through professional assimilation. It is not the extent to which your individuality is vocalised, but the very 'fact' of your Blackness (Archer 2011, Wallace 2016) that problematises the legitimacy of your role in White, middle-class spaces, and ostensibly your ability to consider yourself a

---

<sup>34</sup> When 'national' identity is discussed, this will largely refer to 'British' identity. When it refers to something other, this will be flagged up. However, none of the respondents explicitly referred to their country of origin in relation to their, or in the context of a, distinctly 'national' identity.

member of the professional middle classes. The theme of 'fitting' in will be explored in more detail in the next chapter in section 5.4. The next section instead analyses how the respondents think of themselves specifically - i.e. self-define - in terms of class.

#### **4.4 Self-definitions of class**

Within each interview, questions on self-defined class identity were posed immediately after discussions of the broader concept of social class. Some respondents organically began discussing class in relation to themselves from the onset of conversation, whereas others were prompted only to think about their own class identity when directly asked. Rollock et al.'s (2013) five groupings of class identity ('comfortably middle-class', 'middle-class ambivalent', 'working-class with qualification', 'working-class' and 'interrogators') amongst the middle-class Black Caribbean respondents in their study foreshadowed some of the typologies of class identity generated from the qualitative data in this study. There was, however, a great degree of fluidity and complexity amongst subjective class positioning which straddle even these nuanced groupings. This section nonetheless clusters subjective class identities into the following, broad groups: working or hybridised class identity (characterised as *one* group in this study unlike in Rollock et al.'s (2013)), middle-class identity, and no class identity (often characterised by a rejection of class and the concept of social classification itself).

The key finding was one of potential ethno-religious differentiation that bears further research with a larger and perhaps more homogenous sample. The Indian Sikh, Pakistani Muslim, and Bangladeshi Muslim respondents expressed, on the whole, a more diverse range of class identities than the Indian Hindus (a finding that must be read with caution given the uneven numbers of each ethnic group in the total qualitative sample). These ranged from complex hybrid working- / middle-class identities to strong, working-class identities, to a rejection of the class system and class and classification as a whole, with only very few largely ambivalent middle-class identifiers. As these are elaborated on in the following sections, frequencies of each type of identifier in the qualitative sample will be given in order to communicate the scale and extent of identification with each typology, and the demographic characteristics of the individuals in the sample who seemed to subscribe to which grouping of subjective class identity.

##### *4.4.1 Working-class / hybridised class identity*

Surridge, in her quantitative study on class belonging (2007), found that social location was ultimately the best predictor of whether someone expresses a working-class identity or not. In this study, class background along with factors such as current living location, closeness to community, professional priorities, and consumption patterns all seemed to factor into

respondents' associations with a working-class identity. 7 of the 20 respondents expressed a sense of sole or hybridised working/middle-class identity, 4 Bangladeshi and 3 Indian Hindu. All of these particular respondents claimed working class roots, but interestingly 10 of the other respondents from working-class backgrounds did not explicitly ascribe themselves this class identity whether fully or partially (to be discussed later on in this chapter).

Although acknowledging the professional status of their jobs and 'comfortable' incomes, Muslim respondents Farhan, Nadya and Bisma attributed their affinity with a working-class identity to their working-class backgrounds, their place of residence in working-class areas, and their predominantly working-class clientele. Proximity, therefore, to working classness problematises the other attributes they hold that might suggest they are middle-class.

Farhan, a Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from East London, exemplifies the fluidity he himself sees between traditional class categorisations. He first and foremost states that on the basis of his council estate background and his continuing presence in and around what he defines as a working-class area (Tower Hamlets in East London) he is '*thoroughly working-class*'. He states: '*I didn't feel the need to necessarily move out of Tower Hamlets just to rub shoulders with people who are a bit more middle-class, I'm quite happy with where I am*'.

The classed distinctions of place and community (Tyler 2012), therefore, help determine his class identity. On the basis of education and income, however, Farhan described himself as middle-class, being '*very well informed of society having studied, Law, Politics, Economics, History*', as well as having a '*middle-class income*'. He jokingly referred to the fact that he lives in a working-class area but has a middle-class income as an '*identity crisis*'. The throwaway nature of the comment suggests that he has, to some extent, sought to reconcile what could be a problematic internal identity conflict. He engages in critical, reflexive identity work to reject mutually exclusive binaries of working classness and middle-classness, stating '*I certainly wouldn't box myself as strictly a middle-class person, nor would I say I am only a working-class, cos I share different aspects from both classes*'.

Nadya, a Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer working and living in London but with roots in a working-class community in the North of England argues, not dissimilarly to Farhan, that the people in her life ultimately determine her class identity. With a working-class background, she wouldn't bracket herself in the middle classes just by virtue of a professional career: '*I came from a very working-class background, it's very difficult to kind of extricate yourself away from that*'. She attributes this to the closeness she feels to her family and '*culture*', expressing a sense of belonging to and embeddedness within a specific working-class Bangladeshi community. The day-to-day realities of work - '*I still have to work every day to pay a mortgage, to, you know, to still live*' – further defy her understanding of what it is to be middle-class

(section 4.4.2 discusses the ordinariness of being a 'working person' and its relation to class identity).

Bisma, also a Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer living and working in London, describes herself as almost unequivocally working-class. Whereas Farhan and Nadya advanced little judgement on the desirability of being working-class, Bisma expressed awareness of negative connotations associated with a working-class identity, and explicitly challenged these. She discussed how when she was young and growing up in a working-class family, her mother would take her to the local markets in West London. Given the social mobility her family has experienced since that time, she comments on how, regrettably in her opinion, shopping in local markets is now frowned upon:

*[...] there was this really pretty dress, and I know the first thing my sister-in-law would ask is 'where did you get it from?' It wasn't about the cheapness or nothing of it, it could be the same price in H&M or Next or whatever, had I said I got it from Next in the sale, isn't that great, but it was that 'oh we don't shop in markets anymore' (Bisma, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London)*

Her sister-in-law might typify the 'pretentious middle classes' described by Archer (2011), outwardly striving to seem middle-class and thus socially respectable. To be a respectable middle-class individual, or at least to place yourself in proximity to middle-classness, entails (in part) distancing yourself from working classness. This is pertinent for ethnic minorities who, already racialised and stigmatised as 'other' in terms of race, seek to avoid being misrecognised and further stigmatised as working-class. Bisma finds it unsettling that these previously normal shopping habits have become associated with shame amongst her family and community. Her critique of this shaming thus helps her represent as currently, and authentically, working-class. It also helps her represent as authentically *Muslim*. As a self-defined working-class Muslim woman, she takes not only working-class pride but religious pride in the fact that her sister still makes her Islamic dresses by hand, with material from the market:

*'I take good pride in saying yeah, my sister made it, pound a yard, and it's like, I don't have this thing of where, maybe it's a working-class thing where you actually, you know, you actually boast about how cheap something is [laughs]' (Bisma, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London).*

Bisma's sense of pride in being working-class also extends to her professional life, where it holds symbolic as well as material importance. Her client base is largely comprised of working-class people who she believes keep her grounded and cognisant of her class identity in what she refers to as an 'elite' middle-class profession: *'I think what keeps it real for us is*

*the people we work with, the clients we represent. I think so long as I have that, and that link, erm, it'll always be there*'. There is evidence here of a sense of class consciousness that will be discussed further in Chapter 6. Despite this, her 'in-between' identity – symbolically working-class but materially middle-class – gives her options that an objectively working-class person would not have, such as the ability to assert a sense of working-classness but still benefit from the, albeit mediated, economic privileges of her professional occupational location.

#### 4.4.2 Middle-class identity

A middle-class identity seemed to be adopted with the most ease by the Indian Hindu professionals. A middle-class identity was expressed in some form (including hybridised) by approximately half of the 20 respondents, 7 of these of Indian Hindu background (all the Indian Hindus in the sample including the two with middle-class background). 3 of these Indian Hindu respondents (as aforementioned) also acknowledged their working-class 'roots' whilst maintaining their current objective class position as middle or lower middle-class.

In section 4.4.1 we found that the Bangladeshi interviewees tended towards a working-class or hybrid class identity, and often problematised the concept of class itself. For some of the Hindu respondents their private school or mixed private / state-school educations (applicable to 4 out of the 7 Indian Hindu respondents and only 1 of the non-Indian Hindu respondents), their occupations, and in most cases their stable and sizeable incomes were generally cited as clear and unproblematic indicators of their middle-classness:

*'I think we're upper middle-class in the sense that I come from a very good educational background, I'm in a good stable occupation, I have a profession and I have financial stability. So in that sense I would class myself as middle-class' (Rakhi)*

2 of the 7 Indian Hindu respondents have at least one parent in the professions and / or some family wealth in the form of property and business. Many also currently live and work in wealthier areas of London. The more objective 'middle-class' profile of Indians in the UK (Ballard 2003) as a whole may factor into a less problematic uptake of middle-class identity across this ethnic group as a whole. However, the hesitant and often functional way in which over half of the Indian Hindu respondents spoke about their subjective class identity brings into question its strength and meaningfulness, as well bringing to the fore broader issues about where class boundaries lie.

Dinesh not so much affirms his middle-classness as denies his non-middle-classness (*I can't say I'm not*), indicating it is less so an active identity, and more a benign self-classification:

‘Do you refer to yourself as middle-class, I think you said that before? Can you talk about it a little bit?’

*Yeah, I would say definitely, but I'm not sure how to differentiate’ (Sunil, Indian Gujarati Hindu engineer from London)*

*‘If you ask me ‘am I middle-class’ erm if I just think of that being erm somebody who has been erm lucky enough to live in a nice part of London, lucky enough to have sent her child to er a public school, er lucky enough to go on a couple of holidays or more per year, I’m middle-class’ (Anita, Indian Bengali Hindu lawyer from London)*

*‘I suppose I am middle-class, I can't say I'm not. Er, because my children went to private school, erm, and we live in a very sort of expensive area of Leicester so, yeah’ (Dinesh, Indian Gujarati Hindu lawyer from Leicester)*

Do these individuals constitute the ‘middle-class minded’ (Moore 2008) therefore? A not insignificant number of Indian Hindu respondents (3 out of the 7) including those who ‘accepted’ a middle-class positioning *also* stated that they had never thought about class or valued any discussion of class, had never been prompted for an evaluation of their class identity up until this point, or were ill- equipped to advance a definition of class:

*‘I don’t think I would ever, I’ve never really talked about class, none of my friends or family would necessarily talk about class’ (Anita, Indian Bengali Hindu lawyer from London)*


*‘I think, I wouldn’t, if someone asks me am I middle or upper, I would say what, I don’t know what the metrics are, I wouldn’t know how to define it’ (Sunil, Indian Gujarati Hindu engineer from London)*

*‘I’ve never really been asked, no one would ever ask you what class are you in. Er, and so I’ve never really bothered to ask myself the question or had any, attached any value to that question’ (Deepak, Indian Gujarati Hindu lawyer from London)*

When drawing his identity map, Sunil (fig. 8) nonetheless seemed to have a clear assessment of the structure of society, and saw no qualms with placing himself in the middle bracket, although, interestingly, towards the top (his position is represented by the purple star). The pyramidal shape reflects classic Marxist conceptions of society where the working classes comprise the largest group but reside at the bottom of the social structure. In conversation, he expressed acute difficulty differentiating between class boundaries, in contrast to the clarity of his drawing. Sunil, alongside Rakhi, put class central to his understandings of the structure of society and his place within it in the identity maps, indicating the ways in which

the salience of class manifests differently through different mediums, and in response to different yet not wholly dissimilar types of questioning.

**Fig. 8 Sunil's (Indian Gujarati Hindu engineer from London) identity map**



Sunil cited his current financial prosperity and educational background as the primary reasons for his, albeit tentative, self-identification as middle-class. He also mentions being *'cultured'* as an aspect of his middle-classness, indicative of the salience of taste to class distinction in his mind (Hek and Kraaykamp 2013). Even with prompts, however, he didn't elaborate meaningfully on any of these components in conversation which again indicates that his class identity perhaps lacks the 'depth' of Bisma's (section 4.4.1):

*'I'm going to put working-class, middle-class, upper-class [...] I see myself as kind of around here [draws a star on picture] [...] the reason I'm in there is because of the attributes I said which is around kind of prosperity, education and then kind of, erm, background, and maybe you know a little bit of [being] cultured builds into that'.*

Whereas Sunil gave an interpretation of the concept of class in his identity map, and alluded to the salience of class in his understanding of society, Deepak stated explicitly that he had never *'attached any value'* to the question of class, suggesting that he does not view it as an important, defining feature of society. This did not seem to be case as his interview progressed into discussions of race and ethnicity, however, as he became more confident about his views on class and how it plays out in his working life. It is important therefore to

analyse *around* class conversations in order to delve deeper into the subtleties of their understandings and experiences of class.

Neha labelled herself as middle-class because she defines the middle classes as '*working people*', the same, she suggests, as the working classes:

*'Working-class are just someone who are doing a 9-5, may have a hobby and a passion in the weekend but is literally erm kind of working for a living, that's how I would describe a working-class.*

So that's working-class, what about middle-class?

*So that's where I can't differentiate. So, I would put them in the same if I were brutally honest, for me-*

That's interesting-

*Working-class is middle-class [...]*

So, would you class yourself as middle-class?

*Because I'm working, yes' (Neha, Indian Punjabi Hindu engineer from London)*

By conflating the working classes and the middle classes under the rubric of 'working person', Neha rejected any basis of differentiation between middle- and working-class people (it was not clear how she defines upper classes in this working / non-working framework however). She could be described as holding a hybrid class identity, believing that they are both relevant classifications for someone in her position. This again indicates the dependency of class identity on one's understanding and acceptance of the presence of distinct classes in society. If someone ostensibly does not believe class distinctions exist, or exist in a meaningful way, it would be unlikely that they would express a sense of class identity, as analysed below.

#### *4.4.3 No class identity or rejection of classification*

Despite offering their own definitions / conceptualisations of class or how they might objectively be classified, approximately 6 respondents - interestingly across a fairly even mix of Indian Sikh, Pakistani and Bangladeshi backgrounds unlike those above - discussed how the concept of class is not fundamentally relevant to them, or that traditional class distinctions simply do not exist in the society.

Hussain as a case in point discussed the lack of relevance of traditional class categories to his own life experiences. He used his perceived ability to mix (in a professional context) with those in different socio-economic strata as evidence that class divisions don't exist. This type of social omnivorousness could be classified, however, as a middle-class trait (discussed in section 4.3 and with regard to ethnic capital in section 4.5), objectively evident, to some extent, of his middle-classness. Analysed in conjunction with his larger claim that '*the [class]*

*lines have disappeared*<sup>35</sup>, his point is that if class is, as per Marxist theory, socially as well as economically *divisive*, his interactions with company directors and shoplifters suggest otherwise. The very fact that he differentiates between these types of people, however, means that although he is sceptical of defined, aggregate classes, he recognises that some sort of socio-economic hierarchy exists:

*'I could associate with, you know, all levels of, one day I could be representing a company director on a, you know, big multi-million pound case, another I could be representing someone who's shoplifting [...] See what I mean, I straddle between, the reason I, for me, er, the lines have disappeared because there's no class I think, that's my view' (Hussain, Bangladeshi lawyer from Birmingham).*

Hussain went on to suggest that it is ultimately *'immigrant'* status (as well as his social omnivorousness) that cross-cuts traditional class boundaries. He believes that all *'immigrants'* (although he is second-generation, he identifies with the term) are all in *'one class'*, presumably due to their similar migrant histories, cultures, and minority struggles:

*'I'm just like any immigrant, we're all in one class. That's my view. Whatever class that is. You may be a professional but still we're in one class, and I don't buy into this, erm, higher-class, lower-class, and middle-class' (Hussain, Bangladeshi lawyer from Birmingham)*

Karim similarly references the fluidity of socio-economic boundaries to undermine the concept of class, with reference to the broad types of situations a so-called middle-class person might inhabit. He cites both tangible, social behaviours like holidaying which presuppose a certain level of financial prosperity, as well as more abstract indicators like *'values'* and *'political views'* (discussed further in Chapter 6):

*'What does middle-class mean any more today I don't know what it means, does it mean that you go on holiday once or twice a year [...] what does it mean in terms of values, my political views might be very, very different from somebody else, so, and they are from a lot of my friends who might be considered middle-class as well'*

Karim values his quality of life – friends, holidays, reading – over his wealth, and thus placed himself higher up on the MacArthur ladder of social status on the basis of these indicators.

---

<sup>35</sup> Hussain redirected many questions to the interviewer, sometimes to ask for clarification and sometimes rhetorically. This could reflect a sense of stress and frustration from interruption in his work day, a lack of understanding of certain lines of questionings, as well the *'fuzziness'* of the concept of identity in his perspective. When he asked: *'how do you define it [class], tell me'*, he was indicating in part, perhaps, his inability / reluctance to define a complex, and for him almost irrelevant, phenomena.

However, his financial precarity (financial security being central to Rakhi's definition of middle-classness (fig. 3)) - '*we're kind of mortgaged to the hilt, if anything goes seriously wrong we'd have to make some serious decisions*' – as well as his inability to pin down what middle-classness actually means leads to a clear rejection of a middle-class identity:

So you wouldn't refer to yourself as middle-class then?

*I don't, I never have done actually (Karim, Bangladeshi lawyer from London)*

For Karim and Hussain, the lack of homogeneity within, and lack of distinction between, traditional class categories undermines the relevance of adopting a class identity. For them, clear class distinctions would comprise clear divisions between groups defined by lifestyles, politics, income and occupation, divisions that determine who you live, work and socialise with. Again, the heterogeneity and complexity of social positionings is something expressed most acutely by the Bangladeshi Muslim respondents working and living within their own multicultural and socio-economically heterogeneous ethnic minority communities.

Hussain, Baljit and Nabeela discussed the lack of relevance of class with specific reference to the ethnic minority experience. With regard to the applicability of class definitions to her own experience, Nabeela suggested that the categories of working, middle and upper do not reflect '*elements*' specific to an upbringing in an Asian community. Although there are aspects of the (British) middle classes '*Asian*' people can relate to, there are elements of another (immigrant / ethnic minority) '*world*' that problematise a comfortable self-definition of middle-class, regardless of how clearly one may be able to define the attributes of this group. Nabeela's framing presupposes a mutual exclusivity between being Asian and being middle-class, problematising the possibility that the two positionings can co-exist. The implication here is by '*upbringing in an Asian community*' she is not only talking about the racial / ethnic minority experience and how this may not be reflected in the Whiteness of the mainstream British middle-class experience, but (like Nadya in section 4.4.1) alluding to the working-class aspect of her upbringing:

*When you're Asian [...] you're almost like [inhabiting] two different worlds. So there's elements of the middle-class you can relate to, but there's other [things] that you can relate to, there's other elements, your upbringing in an Asian community that you can relate to (Nabeela, Pakistani Muslim lawyer from Manchester)*

Baljit stated specifically that he feels as if the (British) class system doesn't apply to him as an Indian Punjabi, an identity he described in latter parts of the interview as '*very important*' to him. By virtue of being brought up in a higher ethnic caste (a '*Jat Sikh*'), he feels that class is unimportant to him being '*of a higher-class [caste] anyway*':

*'I think being Punjabi we don't have that class system, we don't, middle-class, higher-class, upper-class, because in a sense we're brought up as Jats being of a higher-class anyway [...] I don't have a hangover over class (Baljit, Indian Punjabi Sikh lawyer from Birmingham).*

Caste and class are strongly intertwined for Indian Hindus and as well as Indian Sikhs both in India and in the diaspora (Judge and Bal 2008; Ram 2012). 'Jat' Sikhs are seen as one of the most economically powerful, politically / socially influential and occupationally privileged caste groups (Bhachu 1991; Jodkha 2002), akin to Brahmins in the Hindu caste system. Indian caste was mentioned in section 4.2.3 with reference to Hindu respondent Deepak's identity map (fig. 4), the only other respondent besides Punjabi respondent Baljit to mention it in terms of his own class subjectivities. Although Deepak stated that his caste background does not afford him sufficient cachet to elevate his social positioning in the UK, Baljit suggested that his caste in fact renders his UK class positioning irrelevant. It is unsurprising that he recognises and identifies with social hierarchies in which he would be placed at the top, and that also afford him a strong sense of ethno-religious belonging and pride. There may also be a regional effect here, however. Baljit, unlike Deepak, is embedded within a strong Indian (specifically Sikh Punjabi) community in Birmingham, both professionally and socially, which may account for the high level of caste salience he expresses and its effect on his conceptualisation of class as a whole.

#### **4.5 A British South Asian 'model' of middle-classness?**

Savage (2003) talks about the importance of exposing the practices of the middle classes which allow them to reproduce their privilege and monopolise advantage in society. The extent to which these sorts of practices apply in the same way to the ethnic minority middle classes as they do to the White middle classes, however, requires further examination. Only in the last few decades have the British South Asian middle classes emerged as a distinct contemporary phenomenon. Their class privilege is also mediated by their predominantly working-class backgrounds as well as their racial / ethnic, and religious minority statuses. It is therefore important to question the extent to which ethnic minorities are implicated in the boundary making processes of the middle classes at large as discussed in much of the contemporary sociological literature on the UK middle classes, as well as what a South Asian model of middle-classness may look like.

Attention must be paid to the types of middle-class practices deployed by South Asian middle classes, and the unique forms of capital they have fostered in the face of marginalisation (Carter 2005; Rollock et al. 2014) in order to facilitate social mobility and maintain 'higher' class positionings. Cultural capital is a defining factor in the maintenance of class privilege. Bennett et al. (2009) and Modood (2004) have noted that research has only partly addressed

how race / ethnicity and nationalism might be associated with class privilege. This section therefore explores and problematises popular notions of class, capital and power within the context of the British South Asian professional sample.

#### 4.5.1 Whiteness, Britishness, and the middle classes

Whiteness and Britishness are bound up with notions of class in the UK. This is particularly relevant to way in which middle-class practices have historically been tied to the maintenance of classed and raced privilege for the 'native', White middle classes (Reay et al. 2007; Byrne 2009). One of the key questions to consider when looking at class subjectivities, therefore, is how notions of racial and ethnic inequality relate to questions of class positioning across the respondents. This will be discussed to some extent here, and more so in the next chapter.

Both Mohan and Deepak believe that in any socio-economic definition of class / social hierarchy, ethnic minorities are at the 'bottom'. Mohan's interview was punctuated by discussions of the extreme poverty and the extreme wealth he has fluctuated between from his childhood to the present day. He believes the traditional notion of class is an irrelevant consideration for British South Asians whose priority has historically been the accumulation of wealth and status through education. This is echoed by Deepak, another Indian male respondent who, with reference to the MacArthur ladder, states that if you're an ethnic minority you start at the bottom of the scale. Both express a belief in mobility for wealth accumulation – '*we need to make money for a start*' and '*you start off at number one*' - but suggest that economic deprivation is an unavoidable, almost intrinsic part of the ethnic minority experience:

*'as an Asian, we don't think of it as a social class, we don't think of any class, er, I think what we tend to say is okay, we need to make money for a start because we're all very poor, we know how important money is, and we need education to earn that money, and also education puts us on equal standing'* (Mohan, Indian Punjabi Sikh engineer from Warwickshire)

*'I can't possibly be in the top class, I'm certainly not a Monarch or a royal [laughs], definitely not an aristocrat, nowhere near any kind of title, erm, and so I think inevitably if you're an ethnic minority you start off at number one'* (Deepak, Indian Gujarati Hindu lawyer from London)

Talking as 'we' – on behalf of other South Asians – Mohan stated that the focus for immigrants and ethnic minorities has been on the accumulation of money and education to achieve a '*better house, a better car, move to the outskirts ... a better life*'. Mohan's identity map (fig. 9) is a micro depiction of his life aspirations, focusing less explicitly on society or

the structure of society like the other respondents. He discusses and depicts social mobility, therefore, but without explicitly naming class. The house in his drawing is not just a representation of his ideal living situation – which he seems to have attained – but a reflection of the ideals of the upwardly mobile South Asian diaspora as a whole. It is, interestingly, the manifestation of a quintessentially British, almost idyllic, middle-class lifestyle:

*'Very simple, Georgian house. Because I love Georgian buildings. I like a long pathway to my front garden. I don't like it...like my terraced house used to be different. It has to be a big house, okay? It's got to have a tree. It's got to have sunshine in the background. And there's me [draws stick figure on path]'.*

**Fig. 9 Mohan's (Indian Punjabi Sikh engineer from Warwickshire) identity map**



When describing the middle classes, 6 of the 20 respondents (across all the genders and ethnic groups sampled) stated that the first image they would have is of a White person, or associated middle-classness with images of (White) Britishness and Englishness. In her study of ethnic minority middle-class identities, Archer (2011) similarly found evidence of

'real' or authentic middle-class identities being constructed as predominantly White by some of her respondents. Although many of the respondents who conceptualised middle-classness this way did state that there actually are many professional or managerial ethnic minorities in the UK these days, both implicitly and explicitly, the connection between Whiteness and middle-classness in a broader sense was clear from their narratives:

*'I mean, in my head they're White. But only because that's my instinctive reaction, I can think of Asians that are in that world' (Anita, Indian Bengali Hindu lawyer from London)*

*'I think this whole middle-class thing for ethnic minorities is bit of a new thing actually [...] way back when it was just White, middle-class and definitely upper-class [...] whereas now as ethnic minorities have started to progress (Tariq, Pakistani Muslim engineer from London)*

*When we were growing up, most of my friends funnily enough were English [...] White. There was one Hungarian but the others were very much English born and bred in this country, and they had better houses and I envied them' (Mohan, Indian Punjabi Sikh engineer from Warwickshire)*

An association between liberal, intellectual British values and middle-classness was made by Farhan, who suggests that Muslimness has been pitted not only against Britishness and British values, but middle-classness and (superior) middle-class values. He felt it necessary to clarify that Islam is not the domain of the uneducated, parochial working classes. For him, 'British' values and 'Islamic' values do, in fact, overlap (discussed further in section 5.3.3). Whereas Farhan seeks to draw links between Muslimness on the one hand and Britishness and middle-classness on the other, Hasan believes the tenets of his religion, grounded in equality and fairness, allow him to operate above and beyond divisions of class:

*'if you're a Muslim it doesn't mean you cannot be a professional, you cannot be educated, you cannot be intelligent, you cannot be middle-class in terms of your values as indeed a lot of the values I share, erm, in origin may have been Islamic but they're values most of us Brits probably share as well' (Farhan, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London).*

*'for me, for a Muslim everyone is equal in so far as you know dealing with people genuinely, so you don't treat people differently because of the fact that they have colours or speak different languages etc. etc., so that cuts right the way through that class distinction [...] speaks to the religious values that you hold' (Hasan, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London)*

This is somewhat different to those such as Baljit for whom caste distinctions are more relevant than class, or Hussain who believes immigrants are all in one class. For Hasan, a sense of pan-ethnoracial Muslim consciousness (Meer 2014, Heath et al. 2013) 'outranks' class in salience, and thus undermines the perceived divisiveness of class distinction. This will be discussed further in the next chapter which examines negotiations and saliences of group identities.

#### *4.5.2 Ethnic capital as middle-class capital*

Everyone in the sample who discussed their route to professionalisation stated that they had done so by successfully navigating the school and university system and excelling academically, despite all but 3 of the respondents having spent some or all of their formative in deprived areas without access to 'superior' types of education (Gillborn 2008). Deepak, for example, states:

*'If it wasn't for [University] I wouldn't be where I am today, I'd probably be, hopefully a clever person but I'd be a clever person working in a shop or a factory, I wouldn't have been at the lower middle-class section that we discussed'. (Deepak, Indian Gujarati lawyer from London)*

This section analyses the way in which education and educational 'values' like 'hard work' have been harnessed within ethnic communities and families as culturally-specific 'ethnic' capitals (Yosso 2005; Carter 2005; Wallace 2016) that are seen to help facilitate the professionalisation and social mobility of ethnic minorities. It is important here to link 1) the class identities of the respondents to their framing of ethnic capitals as working or middle-class attributes, and 2) their racial ethnic identities to their framing of ethnic capitals as White or specifically immigrant / ethnic phenomena.

Two of the 20 respondents drew an explicit parallel between 'ethnic' and 'middle-class' culture when discussing the rapid intergenerational social mobility of the British South Asian diaspora. This produced a positive reading of what it is to inhabit both middle-classness and a South Asian ethnic minority identity – a focus on education, family, hard work or 'work ethic' and strong moral codes (often infused by religious values). The emphasis on education and work ethic cited by almost all respondents has been conceived as an ethnic resource / strategy (Aldrich and Waldinger 1990) with which to mitigate the effects of structural labour discrimination. However, it is also linked to the need / desire to position oneself and / one's community as hard-working and thus deserving citizens - the neoliberal 'good immigrants' (Anderson 2013) - in proximity to both Whiteness and middle-classness.

Zain suggests the deployment of the immigrant work ethic is a White middle-class practice in origin, not unique to (but harnessed across the board by) ethnic minorities. In doing this, he seeks, perhaps, to symbolically 'uplift' immigrant practices by placing them in proximity to culturally superior White, middle-class practices. For Baljit, the extent to which ethnic minorities have managed to successfully, and within one generation, 'achieve' social mobility positions them as culturally unique. This suggests that ethnic minorities defy the sort of class divisions and relatively stunted social mobility characteristic of 'English' families:

*'There was this classic immigrant work ethic which was first-generation, you know what, we're here, we made all these sacrifices, so we wanna make sure our children capitalise [...] it is actually a White middle-class, er, model, which is we want our kids to go and do well in education' (Zain, Pakistani Punjabi Muslim lawyer from Birmingham)*

*'...you can see an illiterate mother who cannot read and write, she can still have five children who, you know, are educated in the professions, that wouldn't happen in an English family to that extent' (Baljit, Indian Punjabi Sikh lawyer from Birmingham)*

Shah et. al. (2010) argue that "individuals whose parents come from more prosperous or educated backgrounds in Pakistan (particularly those coming from urban areas) will hold orientations and outlooks which might be defined as 'middle-class' even though they might be categorized as 'working class' on economic measures in the UK" (p. 1111). However, there are 'capitals' that working class immigrant parents can also ostensibly transmit to their children, such as the co-ethnic networks, norms transmission (as alluded to by Zain above) and cultural obligations and expectations suggested by Zhou (2000, 2005) and their work on Vietnamese and Chinese immigrants that can translate into socio-economic outcomes.

2 of the 7 Indian Hindu respondents – Deepak and Sunil - had parents in traditionally working-class occupations who sent their children to private school in order to optimise their life chances. Proximity to working classness heightens parental anxiety about their children's ability to succeed academically (Reay et al. 2008). For first-generation immigrant parents like Deepak and Sunil's, working-class precarity along with first-hand experience of struggles of racial prejudice in the labour market imbues them with feelings of economic vulnerability and a related strong work ethic that are passed down the family line. The 'immigrant' work ethic stated by Zain above thus becomes a cross-generational ethnic minority work ethic. This is exemplified by Deepak who states he felt he owed it to his father to plan his career carefully:

*'I thought to myself, I wanna do something at University that's vocational, that would get me a job, because my Dad having you know sent me to private school for 3 years*

*and having worked so hard, I didn't want to leave university and then think, ooh, what am I gonna do with my life' (Deepak, Indian Gujurati Hindu lawyer from London)*

Hussain, who like Deepak works in law but for his own firm, discusses how ethnic capitals continued to help him post-education in terms of bolstering his business. His decision to set up his own ethnic business helped him both in terms of clientele and recruitment. His local Asian community provide a community-centred client-base for his firm, and also act as a reliable and hard-working pool of potential employees. His workforce is predominantly South Asian (both first- and second-generation), which he construes as an asset in the context of their specific cultural work ethic. Not only is his profession dependent on his ethnic minority clients, but his ethnic minority colleagues:

*'a White person would try and work between 9 and 5.30 or 9 to 5, they'll go on their particular holidays, whereas you can ask an Asian person, I need you in on Sunday, you need to come and work, or can you work, you'll get that' (Hussain)*

These co-ethnic family and community networks are the sort of collective, economic resources that allow ethnic minority businesses to thrive (Aldrich and Waldinger 1990). This strategy may be conceived as exploitative given the fact that Hussain is extracting, and profiting from, surplus labour from his employees. Nonetheless, he provides his workers with an economic safety net, along with the opportunity to harness cultural and social capitals specific to a professional workplace (Karan 2017, p. 29). One of the issues with ethnic minority professional businesses, however, is the extent to which they equip their employees with the means to access mainstream professional roles which hold strong barriers to entry in terms of class, race, and gender. These barriers to integration in mainstream companies is one of the reasons why so many professionally qualified ethnic minorities choose to remain in self-employment (Clark and Drinkwater 2010). The experience of Hussain's employees as British Asian trainees in a British Asian firm do not necessarily prepare them for what it's like in a larger, corporate firm where their difference is likely to be constructed as inferiority, and where to survive they must "mimic the majority group" (Sommerlad 2007, p. 125). In other words, ethnic capital does not always reap benefits outside an ethnic minority context and thus does not always aid the 'mainstreaming' of ethnic minority professionals.

The ethnic work ethic was most strongly lauded by older, male respondents Baljit and Mohan who built up their own grassroots businesses and seemed to lament the loss of an immigrant-inherited work ethic amongst succeeding generations. The younger respondents noticed, in contrast, the growing importance of more nuanced types of cultural capital such as networking and fostering professional relationships which come at the expense of a unilateral focus on hard work. The salience of life stage and the changing priorities of some ethnic minority professionals is evident here from Tariq's comments:

*'it's that softer side of it that ethnic minorities, generally we're not very good at, er, we seem to have this old mindset of [...] If I work twice as hard you have to give it to me, don't rock the boat, you know, and some of these other people say well I've tried doing that, I'm comfortable, I'm secure, I've got a family, I've got a mortgage, I don't need to rock the boat, you know, I'll just keep as I am, it's fine' (Tariq, Pakistani Muslim engineer from London)*

3 of the younger respondents (out of 11 in the 25-40 age bracket) also positively discussed their membership to ethnic-specific professional networks which have helped them build professional bonds as well as share experiences with likeminded ethnic minority professionals. Some act more as social groups whereas others are focused on professional or personal development, recognition of achievements, and voluntary activity.

Nadya stated that she is a member of the *'Asian Lawyer's Society'*, an organisation which promotes the legal profession within the British Asian community. Priya, an engineer and also a mentor for women in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics), talked in detail about her involvement with the *'Asian Women of Achievement Awards'*, and how she was attracted to it by virtue of the recognition, support and inspiration she garners from, specifically, the ethnic minority women involved. Hussain, by contrast, stated that he uses ethnic networks a much more economically functional manner. He stated: *'the more people know about you the more clients or the more revenue you'll make, it's called networking, you know'*. The difference here is largely due to the divergent focus between those with their own businesses looking to maximise profits, and those embedded within large, corporate organisations seeking status and recognition. Both, however, are motivated from a position of racial / ethnic marginality. Nadya and Priya are, like Hussain, seeking to solidify their position as legitimate (female) professionals but recognise that, as ethnic minorities, maintaining connections within their specific cultural communities are key to fostering either the symbolic or material support they require.

#### *4.5.3 Gendered ethnic capitals*

Ethnic strategies differ across men and women based on the different types of demands and expectations they face in their personal and professional lives. Ghuman (2000) found that although immigrant parents push their children academically "partly to compensate for their own poor prospects in employment and partly in order to achieve social and economic mobility" (p. 150), there are gender differences. Women often find themselves negotiating the demands of educational and professional achievement with the gendered roles required of them within their home and / or community. Chung (2016) states that "boys and girls are socialized differently about their obligations to family from birth to adulthood [...] daughters

generally struggle with a wider range of emotionally intimate and conflict-ridden family roles and obligations than sons do” (p. 14).

Nadya discussed the cultural shame inflicted upon her when she decided to pursue higher education.<sup>36</sup> The hesitancy in doing this, denoted by her repetition of ‘erm’ in the extract below, is indicative of the emotional difficulty she had discussing the hostility she felt from a community she cannot (but also would not) extricate herself from (see section 4.4.1):

*“As far as sexism goes I guess I felt that more, erm, more because of like tradition, my culture [...] I was obviously the first person to go to university in my community, let alone in my family, erm, so therefore, erm, not a lot of people were happy with that, erm, I was fortunate enough that my father was around then when I was deciding to go to university [...] My sister who's 5 years older than me was actually the first Pakistani girl in Doncaster who ever went away to University, and everybody was like oh my God what are you doing, your daughter's gonna get ruined, she's gonna go off with a White man, you know all that type of nonsense” (Nadya, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London)*

The maintenance of cultural tradition and customs can be a source of anxiety and social pressure within the context of family and community. Experiences like Nadya’s highlight the cultural (not to mention structural) difficulties some young British South Asian women from working class backgrounds have when choosing to pursue higher education and a professional career (Mohammad 2005). Priya described the amount of emotional and physical labour that goes into negotiating her role of professional and homemaker. Although she wasn’t discouraged from going to University like Nadya, it had become apparent to her, at a much later stage, that professional status doesn’t negate the multi-faceted gendered cultural expectations / imposed identities placed upon her. Although Priya expressed a strong Indian identity (section 5.3.1), here she laments, in part, her ‘Asian-ness’, indicating how oppressive cultural norms can impact the extent of one’s ethnic belonging in certain contexts:

*“As much as I am a breadwinner, I'm still a home-runner. And it sounds really cliché, but, you know, the amount of time I dedicate to the house, the cleaning, the cooking, the nurturing, the looking after my dad, my husband, my brother, and as much as my mum, you know, promoted fair share of work for everybody, there's still that cultural you know 'you need to be home at that time because that's when the cooking's done'”*

---

<sup>36</sup> It is interesting that Nadya initially asserts she was the first person in her community and family to go to University, then shortly later says her older sister actually was. It may be a case of false memory, and / or an effort for her to build a narrative which communicates with as much emphasis as possible that her family were culturally atypical in their attitude to gender and education.

*[...] I feel like I have to be a good daughter, a good sister, a good girlfriend/wife, you know, a good devotee to the temple and it just felt like, actually, non-Asians maybe don't have so much on their plate all in one go..." (Priya an Indian Gujarati Hindu engineer from London)*

Despite evidence in this study being limited to the narratives of only two respondents - Nadya and Priya - similar research has suggested that the impact of cultural norms on mobility and professionalisation is both a structural barrier for women as well as South Asian communities at large: "inequality generated by patriarchal power structures that are supported by societal structures can serve to propel a community backwards rather than forwards as a result of a denial of women's agency" (Takhar 2006, p. 295). Ijaz and Abbas (2010) support this with their research on working-class first generation South Asian Muslim parents and the different attitudes towards the education of their sons and daughters. They find that attitudes towards the latter are "largely a function of traditional and conservative religio-culture norms and values, laced with Islamised interpretations of Muslim life", of course mediated by larger structural gender and racial inequalities (p. 324).

Bagguley and Hussain (2016) focus more so on the way women in these potentially constrained situations try to reclaim a sense of autonomy and self-determination. They discuss the deliberate and deft way aspirational South Asian women translate and adopt the cultural and religious expectations of their parents, maintaining "continuities with the past, whilst being successful in their personal projects in their present" (p. 7). Despite Priya's challenges at balancing her household and professional roles, she discussed how she engaged, in the past, in this sort of cultural navigation by choosing not to attend a school where she would be only one of few Asian female students. Although discouraged by her mother, she persevered and credits choosing to temporarily dis-embed herself from her ethnic community as the defining factor of her life:

*"I decided not to go onto the natural high school where all the other Indians went, and I went to a Church of England school, [...] my mum said actually I think, you're a girl, you might feel more comfortable at [X school] not at [Church of England school]<sup>37</sup> [...] But for me that [Church of England school] just opened me up to 'oh my god, there's this whole other world out there that doesn't involve taking chapatti and curries to school for your packed lunch', like, that was it, that was the defining moment, and all my friends [...] I know they didn't fulfil their potential in [X] school because they were surrounded by each other" (Priya, Indian Gujarati Hindu engineer from London)*

---

<sup>37</sup> The names of the schools have been edited out for confidentiality.

Whereas traditional, cultural norms might be considered in some respects a limiting aspect for mobility and professional success – an ‘anti-capital’ of sorts – second-generation South Asians forge their own types of belonging to their community and culture, and do not (and often cannot) simply relinquish their parents’ culture (Chung 2016, p. 16). This demonstrates the dynamism of ethno-religious identity (Alexander and Kim 2013), as well as the different ways in which one can, within these frameworks, ‘be’ middle-class / ‘do’ middle-classness as a young British South Asian woman.

As aforementioned, the discussion of gendered ethnic capitals is based on 2 interviews with female respondents, both from working class backgrounds but from different industries and ethno-religious groups (Priya being of Indian Hindu background and Nadya of Bangladeshi Muslim background). There were a total of eight female respondents out of 20 in the full sample that ranged across the ethnic groups - 2 Pakistani, 2 Bangladeshi and 4 Indian (see table 3.1) - with half identifying as Hindu and half as Muslim. Only Nadya and Priya talked at length about their intersection between their cultural and professional roles, but they are drawn from both the Hindu female and the Muslim female sub-samples. It is also interesting that they are both of working-class background, although only two of the females in the sample are of middle-class background.

The ethno-religious differences between Nadya and Priya are somewhat reflected in the way they discuss the differing levels of constraints in the context of, for example, cultural expectations, which in the case of Nadya are more pronounced given her fairly conservative Muslim background. Nonetheless, there is a shared sense of experience across the two. The interviews did not specifically seek to assess gender based difference in class identification or experiences - the findings discussed here were thus spontaneously presented to me by women who chose to disclose their experiences of womanhood, given a perceived sense of personal and perhaps cultural connection (see section 3.5.8 on reflexivity and researcher effects). Further research with additional and more focused interviews on gendered experiences is needed to see whether, amongst a larger and similarly ethnically diverse middle-class South Asian sample, the same sort of experiences of cultural negotiation would be recounted. Firm conclusions cannot be drawn from such a small current sample.

#### **4.6 Conclusion**

This chapter has analysed the respondents’ interpretations of class categorisations and class boundaries, as well as, more broadly, their understandings and self-positioning in relation to the social structure (through their identity maps), and in terms of social status (through the MacArthur ladder of social status). Three typologies of class identity were found that build on the work of Rollock et al. (2013) and Moore (2008), but within a specific British South Asian

professional context. These were, broadly, 1) middle-class identity, 2) working / hybridised class identity, and 3) no class identity / a rejection of class. The chapter went beyond this to discuss, more critically, how class is performed and negotiated in their personal and professional lives. The relationship between middle-classness, Whiteness and Britishness was explored. The sorts of gender-specific and generation-specific 'ethnic capitals' that are harnessed by British South Asian professionals were touched upon. The extent to which these capitals constitute a unique British South Asian model of middle-classness is unclear, however, given the multifaceted origins and manifestations of these skills, resources, and practices and the restrictions of sample size and thus data. The fact that many are born out of both economic precariousness and racial marginality, however, and the sort of horizontal and vertical segregation<sup>38</sup> and pay gaps still experienced by both native born and immigrant ethnic minority groups<sup>39</sup> suggests that the British South Asian middle classes may not be so easily implicated in the exclusionary practices of the middle classes at large.

A majority of the respondents grouped education with income / wealth and profession as interrelated indicators of social class with was largely unsurprising. The extent to which these socio-economic attributes are in and of themselves more or less important to one's sense of self will be further analysed in the following chapter, alongside indicators of ethnicity, race and religion (section 5.5). Although respondents did apply measures of SES to their own evaluations of class positioning, both the conversations *on* and the discussions *around* class (oblique interviewing, as per Marshall (1988)), suggested more diversity in the way respondents conceptualised the social structure and their place within it, implicating notions of caste hierarchy most notably for Indian respondents Deepak and Baljit. There was also a regional effect found with 2 of the London-based respondents making direct reference to the specificity of middle-classness in the area due to, for example, high house prices increasing the economic precarity of even its very well educated, professional inhabitants.

The ethnic and religious cleavages across which class subjectivities fall seem to lie predominantly between the Indian Hindu and the other ethno-religious groups. The former were more willing to identify (functionally at least) as middle-class than the latter who either found the idea of class categorisations irrelevant or inapplicable to their minority experience, or identified with a working or hybrid class identity. We also saw a specifically ethnic minority-

---

<sup>38</sup> Horizontal segregation is the under or overrepresentation of a certain group in occupations or industries whereas vertical segregation is the under or over representation of a group of employees at certain levels of an organisation, in other words the 'glass ceiling' (Bettio and Veraschchagina 2009).

<sup>39</sup> Elliott and Lindley (2006) found that ethnic minority native born and immigrant men are less likely to be employed in higher paying professions in comparison to white native men, and non-white immigrants and natives under perform in terms of earnings compared to white immigrants and natives, even when controlling for difference in human capital and socio-economic characteristics.

informed reading of class, with over a third of the respondents engaging in reflexive interrogation of the UK class system – using their own personal biographies and life experiences to critique traditional class distinctions - and its flawed classification schemes. The ethno-religious difference here may have its roots in the divergent socio-economic backgrounds of these groups within the UK. British Indian Hindus have had the highest rates of social mobility out of all ethnic minority groups in the UK, with some Indians having brought a fair amount of cultural capital with them on arrival to the UK depending on their occupations in India or East Africa (Gillborn 2008). This is indicative of the contingency of class background (NatCen 2016) and ethnic / ethno-religious group success and subjectivities of class. Nonetheless, the way in which middle-class identities were adopted was often ambivalent and instrumental. Those who expressed working classness, in contrast, evoked notions of solidarity and community (explored with regard to consciousness in Chapter 6).

Similarities across all ethnic groups arose in terms of the types of ethnic capital they accrue and harness, largely in terms of work ethic, a focus on education and professionalisation, and embeddedness within their local communities. This was explicitly construed by 2 of the respondents as a form of White middle-class capital / model of social mobility, but more (at least 6 of the respondents) as something inherently immigrant / ethnic minority in origin, particularly re. the concept of work ethic. Perceptions of the utilities of these capitals differed, however, by age group, with the younger respondents in comparison to the older respondents tending to prioritise the need for 'soft skills' in the contemporary job market.

Ethnic capitals manifested differently for 2 of the women in the sample. Their narratives illustrated the potentially gendered nature of cultural norms within South Asian communities and families (Thomas and Aldefer 1989; Hussain and Bagguley 2016). These respondents were found to engage in unique forms of cultural navigation in order to negotiate the demands of their home life and work life, but found their relationships to their communities and ethnic identities to be affected as a result. These discussions were, during the interviews, quite remarkably unprompted by me and indicate the usefulness of the oblique and in-depth interviewing in teasing out potentially interesting findings. More research on women in this particular area of research could further ascertain the extent the uniqueness of these gendered experiences of South Asian female professionals, but is beyond the scope of this thesis and as hard and fast conclusions cannot be formed on the basis of this niche finding.

## **5. Racial / ethnic identity formation and salience**

### **5.1 Introduction**

This chapter analyses the extent to which South Asian middle classes harbour a sense of racial / ethnic minority identity. I begin with an analysis of ethnic identity salience and belonging, including ethnic heritage, religion, and nationality. I then focus on how professional and societal pressures affect the way minority group identities are negotiated by the British South Asian middle classes. I then end with a multivariate analysis of ethnic and class identification as a precursor to the analysis of racial / ethnic minority and class consciousness carried out in Chapter 6.

Both the British Election Study Ethnic Minority Survey (EMBES) and the Citizenship Survey (CS) include a broad range of variables measuring minority ethnic identifications which will be analysed and interrogated. These gauge the extent to which individuals feel a sense of belonging with others from their ethnic groups, the extent to which their racial, ethnic and religious identities are important to their sense of self, and whether they have experienced racism. In the qualitative data, the complexities of belonging and identity become more apparent. Interviewees were asked to describe their relationship to their ethnic identity and the extent to which they feel part of a larger ethnic or religious consciousness. Discussions regarding racism and discrimination occurred with half of the interview respondents. This formed an unintended but strong basis for qualitative analysis, and further quantitative analysis, on questions of the extent / evaluations of prejudice experience by respondents. Interviewees discussed, sometimes at length: the types of cultural and religious activities they engage in, the extent to which they feel embedded in an ethnic community, how they conceptualise their 'Britishness', 'ethnic-ness' and 'religious-ness', and what this means in a professional context.

The qualitative data and the quantitative data are both analysed in this chapter to explore: the interplay of ethnic, religious and national identifications and the relative importance of these to self-identification; the complex relationship between ethnicity and religiosity; attitudes to minority and majority cultural and social norms; and the insider / outsider dichotomy experienced by racialised and gendered minorities in the corporate, professional workplace.

## 5.2 Facets of ethnic identity and their relative importance to sense of self

### 5.2.1 Ethnic identity salience

The first section of this chapter analyses quantitative indicators measuring the importance of components of ethnic identity to sense of self. Ethnic identity salience in this context refers specifically to the importance of 1) ethnic and racial background, 2) country of origin, 3) religious identity, and 4) national identity. National identity salience is included here because much of the literature on ethnic identity discusses the close relationship between national belonging and conceptions of one's ethnic identity, minority as well as majority (see section 2.3.6). Empirically, there is also a strong association between national, ethnic and religious identity salience shown in section 5.5. The relative importance of ethnic, religious, and national identity to an individual's sense of self, as well as potential conflicts between these components, are analysed throughout the chapter.

The Citizenship survey (CS) included a section on 'self-identity' asking respondents how important various factors are to the sense of who they are. These included: ethnic / racial identity, religion, occupation, social class, family, country family originally came from, level of education, income, where you live, gender, and age and life stage. Respondents were then asked to evaluate which of these is most important to the sense of who they are, an indicator modelling, to some extent, identity salience. The questions chosen for this analysis asked: '*How important is your ethnic or racial background to your sense of who you are?*'; '*How important is your country your family originally came from to your sense of who you are?*'; '*How important is your religion to your sense of who you are?*' and '*How important is your national identity to your sense of who you are?*'

Table A2.3 in Appendix II (p. 47) shows the proportion of those within professional and managerial occupations who deemed ethnic / racial background, country of origin, national identity and religious identity important (or 'salient') to their sense of self, delineated by South Asian ethnicity<sup>40</sup>. The corresponding variables were recoded from a four-category variable into a binary variable comprising '*not important*' ('not very' or 'not at all' important) and '*important*' ('quite important' or 'very important').<sup>41</sup> The first two variables (country of origin

---

<sup>40</sup> Where ethnic group sample sizes are too small to facilitate comparative analysis (primarily with the Bangladeshi sample), the results are greyed out in the tables and largely omitted from analysis. The bivariate analysis is purely descriptive, the multivariate analysis instead, which controls for potentially mediating demographic factors, analysing levels of statistical significance.

<sup>41</sup> Throughout the quantitative analyses in this thesis, variable categories have been subsumed to elicit cleaner analysis and to avoid low cells counts in tables. In all analyses, missing responses ('don't know',

and ethnic / racial background) may seem to substantively overlap. However, the first indicator measures the presence of an ethnic or racial identity that goes above and beyond attachment to country of origin. This could include identification with an ethnic / racial minority group, belonging to a specific minority cultural community, identification with a minority ethno-religious identity, and a sense of solidarity with a diaspora born out of a complex post-colonial and multicultural context (Alexander and Kim 2013; Brah and Phoenix 2013). Ethnic or racial background is important to a higher proportion of the Pakistani middle-class sample than the other groups. Nonetheless, percentages are high for all ethnic groups (84.4 percent of the South Asian middle-class sample stated that ethnic / racial background is important to the sense of who they are) which indicates a generally strong sense of ethnic identity salience across the whole South Asian middle-class sample.<sup>42</sup> Salience of country of origin is less prevalent but, unlike ethnic / racial identity salience, differs little between ethnic groups. Without controlling for generation (as will be done later on), we can only speculate why this is the case. Religious identity salience is also high across all ethnic groups, but fewer in the Indian middle-class sample hold their religion to be important to the sense of who they are relative to the Pakistani middle-class samples, by approximately 14 percentage points. National identity is, interestingly, salient to an overwhelming 87.2 per cent South Asian middle-class sample. This points towards some potentially interesting findings, therefore: (i) differing dynamics between the Indian and Pakistani middle-class samples with regard to the importance of ethnicity and religion to sense of self, and (ii) the overriding importance of national identity to the South Asian middle-class sample at large.

The binary logistic regression models ascertain the relationship between ethnicity, class and salience of ethnicity, religion, country of origin and nationality. They control for potentially mediating factors including age, gender, generation, region of residence, marital and employment status (parameter coding listed in Appendix II A2.4, p. 48). The reference category for ethnicity is Pakistani (0) with Indian coded as '1' (Bangladeshis are omitted from the analysis due to comparatively small sample size). The reference category for occupational class is all those not in higher or lower professional or managerial occupations (clerical and sales work, small business owners and foremen, skilled and unskilled manual workers and those not working). The outcome variable is a binary (0,1) variable measuring importance of the aspect of identity in question (1) over lack of importance (0) to 'sense of who you are'. I revert to the simple models for interpretation as none of the two-way interactions between class and ethnicity were significant (greyed out in table 5.1). Only for the dependent variables 'importance of religion' and 'importance of country of origin' were the independent variables of theoretical interest – occupational class and ethnicity –

---

'refused', 'inapplicable', 'prefer not to say') have been omitted, only mentioned if relevant to the substantive discussion of the results. These were, nonetheless, typically low across the board.

<sup>42</sup> 'Middle-class sample' denotes the professional and managerial respondents in the respective dataset.

significant so importance of ethnicity / racial background does not appear in the table. This suggests, therefore, that ethnic identity salience is potentially bound up with some of the other factors rightly controlled for in the models, which mediate its relationship with occupational class and ethnicity.

The findings in table 5.1 indicate the comparative strength of religious identity for non-middle-class Pakistanis compared to their middle-class ethnic counterparts, and to non-middle-class Indians. Indians in non-professional / managerial occupations have 78.5 per cent lower odds than Pakistanis in non-professional / managerial occupations of asserting religious salience ( $p < 0.001$ ), and professional/managerial Pakistanis have 43.9 per cent lower odds of asserting religious salience ( $p < 0.05$ ) than non-professional / managerial Pakistanis. Professional / managerial Pakistanis also have 44.1 per cent lower odds of asserting national identity salience (although only at a 10 per cent level of significance) as well as 44.2 per cent lower odds of asserting salience of their country of origin ( $p < 0.05$ ) to the sense of who they are than non-professional / managerial Pakistanis. It is clear, therefore, that salience of both minority and majority group identities are mediated by occupational class for Pakistanis, at least within the framing of its relevance to sense of self.

**Table 5.1 Binary logistic regressions for ethnicity and occupational class with outcome variables: importance of religion / country parents originally from / nationality to sense of who you are**

	Importance of religion		Importance of country of origin		Importance of nationality	
	Model 1 Exp(B) (SE)	Model 2 Exp(B) (SE)	Model 1 Exp(B) (SE)	Model 2 Exp(B) (SE)	Model 1 Exp(B) (SE)	Model 2 Exp(B) (SE)
<i>Constant</i>	15.468*** (.530)	18.953*** (.594)	6.304*** (.402)	6.070*** (.408)	8.004*** (.520)	8.062*** (.535)
<b>Age</b> ( <i>ref: 25-34</i> )						
24 and under	.820 (.396)	.828 (.397)	.674 (.352)	.672 (.353)	1.229 (.463)	1.230 (.463)
35-49 years	.983 (.347)	.984 (.346)	.847 (.292)	.845 (.292)	1.051 (.368)	1.051 (.368)
50 and over	1.724 (.448)	1.759 (.448)	1.019 (.360)	1.000 (.361)	2.396^ (.522)	2.403^ (.524)
<b>Female</b> ( <i>ref: male</i> )	2.722** (.309)	2.693** (.309)	1.543^ (.236)	1.551^ (.236)	2.012* (.337)	2.011* (.337)
<b>Born in Britain</b> ( <i>ref: non-British born</i> )	1.132 (.294)	1.129 (.293)	.517** (.243)	.515** (.243)	.972 (.322)	.972 (.322)
<b>Region</b> ( <i>ref: London &amp; SE</i> )						
Yorkshire & Humberside	2.138 (.801)	2.058 (.803)	1.285 (.415)	1.307 (.416)	2.300 (.789)	2.294 (.790)
Midlands	1.308 (.349)	1.312 (.348)	1.026 (.273)	1.023 (.273)	.841 (.364)	.842 (.364)
North East & West	.676 (.464)	.677 (.466)	1.071 (.395)	1.074 (.395)	.622 (.483)	.622 (.483)
Other UK regions	.338** (.354)	.342** (.354)	1.056 (.379)	1.050 (.380)	.766 (.466)	.767 (.461)
<b>Currently in paid work</b>	.768 (.317)	.782 (.318)	1.155 (.257)	1.143 (.258)	1.271 (.351)	1.273 (.352)
<b>Married or cohabiting</b>	1.873^ (.334)	1.866^ (.333)	.843 (.288)	.845 (.288)	1.157 (.373)	1.157 (.373)
<b>Professional or Manager</b> ( <i>ref: non-professional or manager</i> )	.561* (.293)	.307^ (.705)	.558* (.255)	.672 (.433)	.559^ (.332)	.543 (.596)
<b>Indian</b> ( <i>ref: Pakistani</i> )	.215*** (.378)	.166*** (.490)	1.143 (.242)	1.243 (.287)	.794 (.331)	.784 (.402)
<b>Professional or Manager X Indian</b>		2.010 (.750)		.761 (.504)		1.041 (.678)
<i>Unweighted N</i>	2915		2915		2915	
Cox & Snell R Square	.130	.131	.035	.035	.028	.028
Nagelkerke R Square	.237	.239	.058	.058	.063	.063
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test	$\chi^2=8.236$ (8) p>0.05	$\chi^2=7.547$ (8) p>0.05	$\chi^2=13.857$ (8) p>0.05	$\chi^2=6.974$ (8) p>0.05	$\chi^2=5.869$ (8) p<0.05	$\chi^2=5.332$ (8) p<0.05

NB: Pakistani and Indian respondents only. Weighted data. Citizenship Survey 2010/11. ^ = p<0.1; \* = p<0.05; \*\* = p<0.01, \*\*\* = p<0.001

In the EMBES main questionnaire, the section measuring 'ethnic and religious identity and group consciousness' asked questions tapping feelings of group belonging – specifically group commonality - rather than levels of ethnic identity salience as in the CS. The questions asked: 'How much do you feel you have in common with (ethnic group) people in general?' and 'How much do you feel you have in common with (religious group) in general?' Table A2.3 in Appendix II also shows the proportion of respondents in each ethnic group who stated that hold a great deal in common (the 'highest' category) with others in their religious and ethnic group, and with the British people. Commonality with British people was low across the board, in contrast to the previous indicator measuring importance of national identity to sense of self. The lower levels of national than ethnic and especially religious commonality indicates the strength of minority group belonging across the South Asian middle-class sample. A higher proportion of the Indian middle-class sample than the other ethnic groups responded that they have a great deal in common with their ethnic group. The Pakistani sample holds low ethnic group belonging but also low national belonging alongside high religious belonging. Religious belonging is also fairly high for the Indian sample but few see themselves as having a great deal in common with British people (only 22.3 per cent). Despite some evidence of differing dynamics between groups this cannot be evidenced with any statistical certainty given the small and divergent sample sizes.

There are a number of confounding factors that must be controlled for before making assumptions about the specificity of the South Asian middle classes in relation to group belongings. We can, with appropriate demographic controls, analyse how class interacts with ethnicity in determining levels of ethnic and 'national' commonality (table 5.2). Pakistani professionals / managers have 64.6 per cent higher odds than Pakistani non-professionals / managers of asserting a great deal of commonality with the British people. Indian non-professionals / managers have 51.1 per cent higher odds of feeling a great deal in common with British people than Pakistani non-professionals / managers. Despite there being no significant interaction between class and ethnicity, model one nonetheless indicates the potential salience of middle-classness to national belonging for British Pakistanis.

There is, by contrast, a significant interaction between class and ethnicity for the ethnic commonality model which notably increases the model fit. The descriptive analysis found a much greater discrepancy between responses to 'great deal in common with ethnic group' between the Indian and Pakistani middle-class sample than between responses to religious commonality, and amount in common with British people (Appendix II A2.3, p. 46). The significance of the simple effects for class and ethnicity and the large, significant interaction odds ratio representing the differential effect of class on ethnic commonality for Indians in comparison to Pakistanis (OR=2.401,  $p < 0.05$ ) indicates that class mediates the effect of ethnic belonging both within *and* across the two ethnic groups in question.

The lack of significance of both class and ethnicity in the religious commonality model (omitted as a result in table 5.2) and the ethnic identity salience model (omitted as a result in table 5.1) in comparison to the religious identity salience and ethnic commonality models suggests that the two constructs – belonging / group commonality and identity salience - are potentially qualitatively different for the population in question. The extent to which these diverge will be probed further later on in this chapter.

**Table 5.2 Binary logistic regressions for ethnicity and occupational class with outcome variables: Great deal in common with ethnic group / great deal in common with British people.**

	Great deal in common with ethnic group		Great deal in common with British people	
	Model 1 Exp(B) (SE)	Model 2 Exp(B) (SE)	Model 1 Exp(B) (SE)	Model 2 Exp(B) (SE)
<i>Constant</i>	4.692*** (.278)	5.095*** (.283)	1.676 <sup>^</sup> (.266)	1.773* (.269)
<b>Age</b> (ref: 25-34)				
24 and under	.768 (.218)	.766 (.271)	1.687 <sup>^</sup> (.309)	1.657 (.309)
35-49 years	.616* (.218)	.632* (.219)	1.342 (.222)	1.367 (.222)
50 and over	1.080 (.283)	1.114 (.285)	1.768* (.251)	1.813* (.252)
<b>Female</b> (ref: male)	.980 (.166)	.974 (.167)	1.016 (.172)	1.015 (.172)
<b>Born in Britain</b> (ref: non-British born)	.806 (.196)	.840 (.198)	2.419*** (.531)	2.473*** (.227)
<b>Region</b> (ref: London & SE)				
Yorkshire & Humberside	1.605 <sup>^</sup> (.279)	1.594 <sup>^</sup> (.279)	12.070*** (.531)	11.805*** (.530)
Midlands	1.213 (.217)	1.201 (.217)	1.017 (.195)	1.011 (.195)
North East & West	.855 (.265)	.850 (.265)	3.925*** (.359)	3.877*** (.358)
Other UK regions	.744 (.282)	.732 (.283)	1.863 <sup>^</sup> (.328)	1.828 (.328)
<b>Currently in paid work</b>	3.258 (.765)	3.405 (.770)	.296 (1.601)	.314 (1.600)
<b>Married or cohabiting</b>	.431 (.274)	.404 (.776)	3.583 (1.607)	3.349 (1.607)
<b>Professional or Manager</b> (ref: non-Professional or Manager)	.732 (.194)	.500** (.248)	1.646* (.211)	1.171 (.302)
<b>Indian</b> (ref: Pakistani)	2.213*** (.185)	1.644* (.217)	1.511* (.182)	1.298 (.207)
<b>Professional or Manager X Indian</b>		2.401* (.377)		1.829 (.405)
<i>Unweighted N</i>	1233		1235	
Cox & Snell R Square	.036	.040	.068	.069
Nagelkerke R Square	.061	.071	.121	.124
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test	$\chi^2=14.928$ (8) p>0.05	$\chi^2=12.892$ (8) p>0.05	$\chi^2=11.661$ (8) p>0.05	$\chi^2=9.836$ (8) p>0.05

NB: Pakistani and Indian respondents only. Weighted data. British Election Study Ethnic Minority Survey 2010. <sup>^</sup> = p<0.1; \* = p<0.05; \*\* = p<0.01, \*\*\* = p<0.001

### 5.2.2 *The interplay of ethnic and religious identities*

In terms of what the findings from the CS and EMBES data can broadly tell us about ethnicity and middle-classness, Indians are more likely than Pakistanis to assert a great deal of commonality with their ethnic group but less likely to believe there is prejudice against their religious group or experience religious discrimination, the latter two findings differing significantly across class. The qualitative data speaks to the quantitative findings in more detail, telling us how individuals conceptualise and negotiate their ethnic and religious identities, and the extent to which this affects, or is affected by, their class experiences, specifically for second-generation or 1.5 generation South Asian professionals.

The only two respondents of Indian Punjabi Sikh origin in the qualitative sample, discussed their (strong) religious and ethnic identities interchangeably, in a way not expressed by any of the other respondents. The survey data indicated to us that a similar proportion of Indian Sikhs expressed a commonality with their ethnic as well as religious group, much like the Indian Hindu group but to a lesser extent. The interview data demonstrates how these two identities are culturally intertwined. Baljit, an Indian Punjabi Sikh lawyer from Birmingham, stated he is '*very very proud*' to be Indian. He said he is '*very quick to identify myself as a Punjabi*' but specified in the same part of the conversation the importance of '*Sikh identity*' and '*Sikh culture*' to him as well.

For two thirds of the respondents from Muslim backgrounds, Islam was explicitly expressed as a pivotal and overriding factor in the landscape of their social identifications. Farhan, unlike Baljit, doesn't mention his ethnic identity in relation to his religious identity. This chimes with the extensive research on the overriding salience of Muslim religious identities (Modood et. al 1997, Gest 2015):

To talk a little bit about your belonging to your ethnic group, and your religious group and the community, is that important to you and your sense of self?

*I am a practising Muslim, I would first and foremost identify myself as a Muslim [...] my Islamic identity informs and shapes who I am as a person' (Farhan, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from Birmingham)*

### 5.2.3 *The role of religion in cultural identity*

Despite the small number of qualitative interview respondents there were a range of well-informed non-religious standpoints. Two of the Bangladeshi respondents identified as 'privately' secular individuals but still took part in community based religious events. Two of the Indian respondents similarly described themselves as 'culturally' Hindu or 'born Hindu',

not practising but affiliated to the religion by virtue of the community-focused, ethnic-specific nature of being a Hindu:

*'I call myself a Hindu because I was born a Hindu. I don't know anything else, do you know what I mean? [...] I don't practise Hinduism at all, I am a Hindu' (Anita, Indian Bengali Hindu lawyer from London)*

*'I'm atheist, I don't believe in God, but I'm culturally Hindu, like my parents don't know that I'm atheist [...] And my wife knows, but I'll play the part, I'm a social Indian I suppose' (Deepak, Indian Gujarati Hindu lawyer from London)*

The 'Hindu' element of their identity was less a spiritual and more a cultural component of their ethnic identity (Fenton 1992), to the extent of, in Deepak's case, the labelling of himself as 'Hindu' alongside 'atheist'. Deepak, therefore, would assert a strong level of commonality with those in his religious group, perhaps, but a place religion low in importance to the sense of who he is. Anita, on the other hand, likens being Hindu to an ethnic or racial identity, i.e. something you are 'born' into. We see evidence, therefore, of her perhaps conflating her ethnic identity with her religious identity under the term 'Hindu', an intrinsic component of her sense of self, not dependent on behaviours or actions.

#### *5.2.4 The intellectualisation of religious identity*

Karim and Hasan discussed at length the '*intellectual*' approach they took to their religion, and how the process of University and higher education had helped them clarify their religious beliefs:

*'You get to a point where you explore life as far as you can go and you think is that it, you know, and that was the turning point for me and by the time I'd finished university I was a different person, I was a lot more thoughtful about, you know, who I was and tried to find my identity, exploring religion for myself as opposed to listening or trying to just practice what my parents taught me, it was an extension of your intellectual search for what is out there' (Hasan, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London)*

*'We're not just going through the motions of certain things, it's like we're trying to understand why do we do this and, you know, who was erm our prophet, what was his life, his companions, erm, trying to just learn more about where does this all come from [...] maybe that's linked to the whole thing about advancing in education, people have developed that intellectual curiosity about their religion as well' (Karim Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London)*

According to Hasan and Karim, increasing education and cultural introspection amongst the most recent and socially mobile generation manifests in a more critical yet nonetheless religiously devout generation of Muslims. This is indicative of not only how culture evolves over generations, but does so in conjunction with changing and evolving socio-economic status. As Karim suggested, *'maybe that's linked to the whole thing about advancing in education, people have developed that intellectual curiosity about their religion as well'*. It is also evident of the sort of reflexivities the interviewees engage in to negotiate and challenge the cultural legacies and traditions of the first-generation whilst also maintaining a relationship with their minority identities. This sense of 'informed' religiosity has also been shaped by the external group threats and hyper-racialisations that British Muslims have increasingly been subject to (Meer 2014; Birt 2013), which will be discussed further in terms of minority political consciousness in Chapter 6.

#### *5.2.5 Social mixing and group belongings*

Questions within the sub-section 'community cohesion' in the EMBES measured the extent to which ethnicity and religion colour the respondents' social lives. It is a more 'material' measure of ethnic identity than those above, as it maps the extent to which individuals surround themselves with, or are surrounded by, people 'like them'. This question from the main EMBES questionnaire asked: *'How many members of X are from the same ethnic or religious group as you?'* The response options were *'all of them'*, *'most of them'*, *'about half of them'*, *'a few of them'* and *'none of them'*. Across all groups, at least 40 per cent stated that most or all of their friendship group is comprised of those of the same ethnicity or religion as themselves (see A2.7 in Appendix II, p. 50). Proportions are much higher than for neighbourhood or place of work. In terms of who those in the South Asian middle-class sample choose to socialise with, therefore, those of the same ethnic or religious group are somewhat preferred. However, these could very well comprise those from their local area and their place of work. The Indian group are less likely than the Pakistani (and Bangladeshi, although the small sample size must be taken into caution here) to live in neighbourhoods with those who are the same ethnicity or religion as them.

Research by Finney and Simpson (2007) shown a unique tendency amongst Indians to migrate from high concentration ethnic minority in urban areas to lower concentration ethnic minority areas including resort, port and retirement districts where migration of White groups has also increased and mixed urban-rural districts. The authors attribute this to the relative prosperity of the Indian group in relation to other South Asian and non-South Asian ethnic minority groups in the UK (p. 19) but also cultural explanations (p. 3) such as family and community-building factors. There may be a wide range of other – some observable and some unobservable - issues related to group migration and settlement history, racisms and

discriminations, work and employment patterns, that determine differing patterns of internal migration between ethnic groups, even at the middle-class level.

Living in more 'prosperous' areas and working in high-level professional or managerial jobs might be said to increase the social as well as professional proximity of ethnic minorities to the White British who comprise a higher proportion of the UK middle classes.<sup>43</sup> Mohan, an Indian engineer and businessman from the Midlands, discussed his move to a large house in a predominantly White, middle-class suburban area in Warwickshire, a reflection of his rising socio-economic status and desire to emulate White, middle-class lifestyles (section 4.5.1). Deepak, an Indian Hindu lawyer similarly discussed his move from Bow (a multi-ethnic area of east London) to a largely middle-class, White area in Twickenham as a reflection of his '*moving up in the world*'. In recent decades, there has been a move from ethnic minority-dominated inner cities to outer areas of cities, including commuter belts and regional centres, with Indians leading this type of migration (Rees and Duke-Williams, 1995; Hussain and Stillwell 2008). There has been a clear, linear pattern of net migration of Indians away from areas where they constitute large proportions of the population, more so than any other South Asian group in the UK (Finney and Simpson 2007). Section 4.4.1 discussed the embeddedness of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi respondents of working class backgrounds within their communities, by virtue of their work, as well as their class and ethnic ties.

#### *5.2.6 Inter- and intra-ethnic mixing*

The qualitative data shines a light on how individuals discuss and rationalise the ethnic make-up of their social and professional circles. Neha, an engineer based in London, largely discussed those in her place of work when she was asked to describe the ethnic mix of her friendship groups, and was keen to stress the lack of ethnic diversity within her firm in contrast to that of London as a whole, highlighting the monoculture of some professional workplaces:

*'In terms of the ethnic mix of your friends, are they mainly Indian or is it varied?  
'Being in London [...] it's so diverse, but with work a lot of my friends, it's just not as diverse, to be honest I only have one Caribbean friend, she's the most, that's the diversity at my work [laughs] [...] one thing I've realised is, the closer you get to people you realise that everyone has the same kind of things when they're growing up, so it's like even with Caribbeans it's the same, you gotta work hard' (Neha, Indian Punjabi Hindu engineer from London)*

---

<sup>43</sup> An exception here is Leicester, a South Asian (predominantly East African Indian) dominated area of the UK which is relatively prosperous, and thus one of three cities in the UK where ethnic minorities are less likely than average to live in the most deprived neighbourhoods (Garner and Bhattacharya 2011, p. 7)

As one of few ethnic minorities of any background in her company (not just her own), Neha sought to draw meaningful similarities (based interestingly on work ethic, discussed as a facet of ethnic capital in section 4.5.2) with those colleagues who share the same racial / cultural minority status as her. She laments the lack of colleagues from her own ethnic background, however, stating that her work is *'just not as diverse'* as the city it is in. This awareness of the uniqueness of her ethnicity, as well as the ironic lack of diversity in a firm based in a multicultural city like London, reflects the salience of her racial / ethnic marginality in a context where it is continually brought to the fore (Kenny and Briner 2013; Forehand et al. 2002).

Rakhi, also young Indian Hindu professional, focused on the ethnic and smaller sub-ethnic<sup>44</sup> profile of her social groups when asked the same question as Neha. Unlike Neha, she chose to focus her discussion on her specific Indian Gujarati community. She discussed the - in her opinion *'stark'* - differences, across Indian regional or 'state' groups (such as Punjabi, Gujarati, Bengali) which prevents intra-ethnic group mixing within the broader local Indian community: *'Gujuratis versus the Punjabis versus the Sindhis, and there the differences are quite stark and there's not a lot of inter-group, I don't know how to depict these groups, they're, we don't have a lot of socialising between groups'*. Whereas the quantitative data gives little insight into the relative importance of the Punjabi to the Indian identity, for example, the interview data gave rise to extensive discussion about the interaction of ethnic, sub-ethnic, regional, caste and religious identities, some which have been discussed in Chapter 4. Rakhi's description of ethnic differences indicates the extent to which she is heavily embedded within a particular and highly ethnically differentiated cultural community. Although she went on to describe how the ethnic mix of her friendship group has been fairly homogenously Indian / South Asian since childhood, given the affluent (albeit ethnically diverse) suburban part of London she grew up in, the red-brick University she went to, and the corporate profession she ended up in, her friendship group has *also* been fairly homogenously middle-class:

*'the school I went to, it's one of the top girls schools in the country, we had about a third Indians, British Asians, a third Jewish and then the remainder were sort of I guess local British people [...] in my area, we have a big community and whether or not you do it intentionally you end up spending so much of your time with the people from that group, whether it's at school or your local club, or, even at University we had a big Asian community there as well [...] a lot of them are in Banking, Management Consultancy, a few accountants, some people like me are lawyers [...] a lot of my local friends who I've been friends with since I've been really little, erm,*

---

<sup>44</sup> 'Sub-ethnic' refers to the smaller groupings within the ethnic classifications operationalised in this study (Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi) based on caste, religious tradition, or region (Punjabi, Gujarati, Bengali).




*we went to the same local primary school, even when I look at the sorts of professions they're doing it falls into the categories of, you know, some sort of medical science [...] accountancy is obviously a very popular one, banking is very popular, and management consultant's less so, lawyers is another, you know, very popular area' (Rakhi, Indian Gujarati Hindu lawyer from London)*

She describes her Asian schoolmates as predominantly 'Indian, British Asians' and 'Jewish'. She calls the rest 'local British people' – a term which many of those in the Jewish and Indian / British Asian group might ostensibly come under – but which presumably refers to 'indigenous' White British people. She conflates nationality, ethnicity, and religion in these descriptions which is indicative of the interrelatedness and complexity of these categories, as well as the unique way in which she interprets the ethnic diversity around her. Although she lives in a large ethnic minority community, she is still aware of an 'us and them' divide. Rakhi has been almost exclusively surrounded by middle-class South Asians – specifically Indians – in her life and thus positions herself fairly easily as a strong middle-class identifier (section 4.4.2) as well as a strong Indian Hindu identifier. The strength of both her class and ethnic identities are, however, unique in the qualitative sample, particularly amongst the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis who have had less exposure to a close-knit middle-class ethnic community of an equivalent size.

### **5.3 Negotiations of ethnic, religious and national identity**

This section focuses on the *relative* importance of ethnic, religious and national identity across the dominant ethno-religious groups which comprise the population of interest. Increasingly, and for some groups more than others, these hold a complex and (as is often posited in political and media discourses) potentially problematic relationship with one another. A set of questions in the EMBES asked respondents to gauge the importance of their national (British) identity over their ethnic (Asian) identity, their British identity over their religious identity, and their ethnic (Asian) other their religious identity. They took the form of: 'Some people think of themselves first as [X]. Others may think of themselves first as [Y]. Which best describes how you think of yourself...'. Although the relationship between these identities is more intricate than framed here, it points towards possible meaningful differences in how individuals frame these concepts in relation to one another. Each response option featured a five-point ordinal scale with the middle category asserting the importance of neither one over the other, and each end of the scale asserting one of the two identities wholly over the other.

**Fig. 10 'Which best describes how you think of yourself': More [Black/Asian] or more Religion / More [Black/Asian] or more British / More British or more [Religion]**



NB: South Asian respondents in professional and managerial occupations only. British Election Study Ethnic Minority Survey 2010. Weighted percentages. Unweighted base: Ethnic vs Religious identity n = 359; Ethnic vs National identity n = 388; Ethnic vs Religious identity n = 353

Fig. 10 indicates that amongst the South Asian middle-class sample at large, there is a tendency towards asserting religious identity over ethnic or national identity. Ethnic and national identity in contrast are somewhat more evenly balanced in respondents' perceptions of the salience of each to their sense of self. A2.8-A2.10 in Appendix II (pages 50-51) show more nuanced results by ethno-religious group. Over 70 per cent of the Pakistani Muslim middle-class sample responded that they themselves as more Muslim than Asian / wholly Muslim. In contrast, most of the Indian Hindu professionals saw themselves as equally Asian and Hindu, with only a quarter stating that they felt more or wholly Hindu over Asian. With regard to negotiations of Asian and British identity, responses were more dispersed. Approximately a third of the Pakistani Muslim middle-class samples saw themselves as more British than Asian. This is in comparison to only a tenth of the Indian Hindu middle-class respondents who saw themselves the same. More of the Indian Hindu and Sikh than Bangladeshi and Pakistani Muslim respondents suggested that they feel equally British and Asian, or more Asian than British. When religious identity salience was juxtaposed with national identity salience, the majority of the Pakistani middle-class sample, however, stated that they saw themselves as more or wholly Muslim than British. Although the tendency across the sample was thus to broadly assert equal importance between all combinations of these three identities, the differing saliences of British and religious identity in relation to ethnic identity are notable, and support somewhat the earlier analyses. A considerable proportion of the Pakistani Muslim sample asserted the importance of their British over their ethnic identity to their sense of self, particularly in comparison to the Indian Hindus. Religious identity for the former was more salient when juxtaposed with ethnic identity than with national identity, but still paramount.

Fenton (2003) talks about how marginalised communities who have sought recognition and inclusion worry about their cultural integrity and cohesion being compromised by their own 'success' (p. 190). Minority identifications may take on a different symbolic significance for upwardly mobile 'middle-class' or aspiring middle-class individuals, but they do not necessarily wane, instead evolving in conjunction with a sense of Britishness. As seen above, minority ethnic and religious identities are highly salient, albeit in different combinations. The phrasing of these questions gives us little indication of the extent to which people can and do in fact see these identities as binaries as they are posed above, however, particularly given the extensive amount of research which has found that it is more than possible for individuals to hold equally strong national as well as ethnic and religious identifications (Nandi and Platt 2014; Nava 2002). Furthermore, the framing of ethnic identity as 'Asian' identity alluded to a

broader ethno-racial identity that may not capture individuals' own, specific ethnic identifications.

We must assume an extensive amount of heterogeneity across the way identity is conceived and the way distance and belonging between identities is conceptualised, dependent on mediating factors not considered in the above charts including gender, generation, class background, and region of residence. Asking respondents about their ethnic, religious, and national identities can be de facto problematic in a quantitative survey context given the different elements which can go towards capturing people's social identities, especially when considering the way in which each individual may differently rationalise and express them at different times (Burton et al. 2008). In a qualitative context there is scope to engage in more depth about people's definitions, rationalisations and relationships to, and between, their identities, as well as the meanings and implications of holding a social identity. For some, for example, a minority ethnic identity will entail pride, for others it may signal mobilisation against discrimination, for others civil society engagement (the latter of which will be explored in more detail in Chapter 6). In the interviews, the respondents were all asked or prompted if and how they identify with various ethnic, racial, religious and national identities (British, Asian, and / or Indian, Pakistani or Bangladeshi) which implicated sub-ethnic caste and regional identities (Jat or Brahmin, Gujarati or Punjabi, Londoner or 'Brummie').<sup>45</sup>

### 5.3.1 Social identity negotiation

The well-worn language of official identity classifications was a useful initial reference point for the interview to begin discussion of their social identifications. Amongst the majority of the 9 Indian respondents in the sample there was evidence of a sort of 'biculturalism' (Berry 1997), where the British Indian or diasporic ethnic identity, the national (British) sense of belonging, and the transnational (Indian) identity seemed to be well incorporated within their sense of self. We can see the type of ongoing identity work that Priya, in particular, undertakes to synthesise parts of her ethnic and national identity:

*I see myself as British first and Indian thereafter. I call myself Brindian! (Priya Indian Gujarati Hindu engineer from London)*

Her coining of the term 'Brindian' indicates the thought has gone into her self-identification to establish the order of her identities – '*British first and Indian thereafter*'. According to Birt (2013), "social identities are not simply reactive, formed through taking on dominant

---

<sup>45</sup> Very few mentioned English-ness in context to their own identity, more so when talking about White people. Some minorities may believe they have 'achieved', to some extent, 'Britishness', but to what extent can and does 'Englishness' incorporate them? This requires further research.

categories that circulate within hegemonic discourses and inverting their meaning and significance, but rather are creative, emerging through the fusion and cross-cutting of multiple identities and making new visions possible” (p. 216). Her description mirrors quite closely the framing of identities in the EMBES questions, but we can see here the fusion of identities she has actively created between British and Indian. Priya also gave a lengthy explanation of the significance of her ethno-regional ‘Gujurati’ heritage which to her more accurately reflects the salient aspects of her ethnic background than the term ‘Indian’. As a strong member of her local Gujurati community (mentioned by her at numerous points in the interview) it was little surprise that it was both a source of identification for her. The other 4 Indian Gujurati respondents in the sample (Dinesh, Deepak, Sunil and Rakhi) were, by contrast, less enthusiastic (but nonetheless acknowledged) their sub-ethnic / ethno-regional identities.

*I'm British, I'm Indian and I'm a Hindu, erm, but more often than I say I'm Gujurati because it just then naturally leads on to, yes, I don't speak, this is the language that I speak, this is the part of India that I'm from... This [Gujarat] is the part of India that I'm from, this is where the Prime Minister's from, you know (Priya, Indian Gujurati Hindu engineer from London)*

Priya states that alongside being British and Indian (again in that order) she is Gujurati, to highlight that the language she speaks is a regional dialect and not the national language of India, Hindi. The delineation is necessary to disrupt the cultural assumptions some may have of her - i.e. speaking Hindi - but also to highlight the pride she has in this regional, ‘sub-ethnic’ identity. This is echoed by other interviewees such as Anita who identifies as Indian (she ‘is’ Indian like she ‘is’ Hindu’ (section 5.2.5)) but ‘*especially Bengali*’:

*Indian? I feel very Indian, you know, I am Indian. Well...Indian and especially Bengali, I'm dead proud to be Bengali (Anita, Indian Bengali Hindu lawyer from London)*

The discursive format of the semi-structured interview gave us some insight into the cognitive processes undertaken by Anita when answering questions about her ethnic identity. Earlier in the interview, she had mused over whether she had ever considered herself middle-class and what, if anything, this meant to her. When asked about her ethnic identity, she again posed the question back to herself: ‘*Is it important for me [...] to know that I'm Indian?*’. For Anita, more so than ‘*feel*’ Indian or perhaps even actively identify as such, Indian is what she is, indicating the innateness of her ethnic identity to her very sense of being. Responses such as these which reflected the unspoken but inherent salience of ethnic identity were raised by a number of the Indian participants who stated that they had never been prompted to think about, let alone discuss, their group identities (see section 4.4.2).

Sunil apportions different identity labels depending on his place of birth, his heritage, culture and his appearance, for instance he states: *'I look like an Indian'*. But as like others, he finds it difficult (or unnecessary) to justify or rationalise his sub-ethnic identity in more complex terms. Instead, he alludes to the intrinsic nature of his sub-ethnic identity, much like Anita, when he states *'[I'm] Gujarati because I am Gujarati'*;

*I think of myself as a British Asian Gujarati Hindu (...) I don't think one has precedence over the other, I see myself as a nationality as British, I was born here, I am British, I see myself as an Indian because I am Indian, I look like an Indian and I'm an Indian through heritage and culture, Gujarati because I am Gujarati (Sunil, Indian Gujarati Hindu engineer from London)*

For Rakhi, the aspect of nationality, residence and citizenship is associated with the British (national) aspect of her identity, whereas the less tangible sense of who she is as an individual is rooted in her Indian (ethnic) origins. She associates aspects of cultural capital with her British (national) identity when she talks about benefiting from institutions and opportunities in this country. She feels she has thrived professionally and seems to attribute this to her Britishness. Opportunity, therefore, is key to her British, middle-class<sup>46</sup> experience. The less tangible, less instrumental, and seemingly more affective sense of who she is— like Anita, she stated Indian is 'who I am' - is rooted in her Indian (ethnic) origins. There is the sense, therefore, that whereas being British has acted as form of cultural, social, and economic capital for her, being Indian has acted as a locus of culture and values. She thus frames her ethnic identity in more abstract terms than her British identity:

*I would always class myself as a British Indian for this reason: I am British in the sense that I was born in this country, I was brought up here, I've benefited from all of its institutions and opportunities, but who I am as an individual and where I've come from is very firmly rooted in my Indian roots (Rakhi, Indian Gujarati Hindu lawyer from London)*

---

<sup>46</sup> In the British Asian Network ComRes poll of British Asian society (2018), 76 per cent of the Indian compared to 69 per cent of the Pakistani and 64 per cent of the Bangladeshi sample believed that Britain is a place where you can fulfil your aspirations and ambitions. However, there is more to Rakhi's comment here than a reflection of the success of Indians in Britain. Unlike most of the other interviewees, both of Rakhi's parents are professionals and she self-identified throughout the course of her interview as middle-class. When she talks about the benefits she has gleaned from being British, therefore, much of this might be attributed to a function of her middle-class (albeit ethnic minority) upbringing in British society, and the widely regarded cultural and social capital she has gleaned as a result of this.

It was predominantly the Indian Hindu respondents who were keen to discuss the constitutive aspects of their ethnic identity, and the importance of it to their sense of self. This was the case for approximately 5 out of the 7 Indian Hindu respondents. One of the remaining two Indian Hindu respondents, a child of East African Indian Gujarati immigrants (Dinesh), discussed the complexity of his relationship to India when asked about his ethnic identity, given both his parents and grandparents upbringing largely took place out of India. There is an absence of similar, lengthy discussions about ethnic identity from the Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Indian Sikh respondents with a notably smaller proportion of respondents in each of these expressing a strong sense of 'ethnic-ness'. As established in Chapter 4 with regard to class, and thus far in Chapter 5 with regard to ethnic and religious identifications, for the Pakistani Muslim but also the Bangladeshi Muslim and Indian Sikh respondents, religion is central to their broader identities (Ghuman 2000; Modood et. al 1997). This is not dissimilar to findings from existing research on politicised minority identities like Islam and Sikhism in the UK (Singh and Tatla 2006; Raj 2000; Birt 2013; Meer 2014).

Mohan's (one of the two Indian Sikh Punjabi respondents in the study) responses to questions about the importance and meaning of his ethnic identity centred around a discussion of the importance of religion to his sense of self. His 'Punjabi-ness' seems to be inextricably linked to his 'Sikh-ness'. For both Sikhs and Muslims, religion entails a sense of both unity and consciousness informed by threats to self-determination, which may explain the overwhelming sense of religious identity salience expressed by these respondents. The Sikh identity is, however, tied to a specific homeland, hence the conflation of 'Sikh-ness' and 'Punjabi-ness' (Shani 2008). In terms of the way he speaks about his Punjabi Sikh identity, there are similarities to Sunil, Rakhi and Anita in that he sees it as an intrinsically important part of his and his family's life: *'we are what we are'*:

*The ethnicity, whether I'm Punjabi or this or that...yes, we go to the temple, yes I encourage my children to read Punjabi when they're growing - they don't want to know now for whatever reason, they're grown up - but we do go to the temple, we are Punjabi, we are what we are, and that is the backbone (Mohan, Indian Punjabi Sikh engineer from Warwickshire)*

Like Mohan, Hasan suggests that in terms of identity salience, his Muslim identity is predominant, above his British and ethnic identity. He acknowledges the broader debate about the so-called conflict between British and Muslim identities (Ahmad and Evergeti 2010; Pitcher 2009). Whereas the Indian Hindu and Sikh respondents do not discuss the politicised nature of their identity frameworks, Hasan feels the need to bring it up even before he discusses his own, personal relationship to his identities. He expresses a strong religious identity not matched in intensity by any of the Indian respondents discussed above. Unlike

Priya and her coining of the term '*Brindian*', Hasan does not seem to forge any clear hybrid or fusion identities, but expresses an overarching sense of religious identity salience:

*It's the age-old of question about are you British first or are you Muslim first [laughs] [...] If you've come to a stage where you've put Islam or your belief above all, you'll always be Muslim first and everything else later, and for me that's where I am. I would first and foremost identify myself as a Muslim. Well above my British identity. I would say my Islamic identity informs and shapes who I am as a person. Like most other people I probably wear many hats. I am a professional, I am a male, I'm a husband. I'm a Bengali. So on and so forth. I have many identities like other people. But in and amongst all of that my Islamic identity probably plays the most pivotal role (Hasan, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London)*

Hasan acknowledges the hats he wears in terms of (professional and thus objectively high-status) occupation as well as gender and ethnicity, but stated that his Muslim identity plays '*the most pivotal role*'. The language is telling - his occupation, gender and ethnicity are described as '*hats*', performative roles in some cases perhaps, but his religion constitutes an '*identity*', pivotal to the sense of who he is.

### 5.3.2 Mutually exclusive identities

Hasan's Muslim identity could be said to be shaped, even bolstered, by the discrimination and 'othering' he feels puts him and other Muslim religious minorities are subject to, put in '*the position where we have to defend ourselves*'. He puts the onus on the British establishment and the difficulties they have trying to understand the '*strong identity*' religion imparts on Muslim immigrants of all class backgrounds. He alludes here to the 'model minority' status of Indian Hindus as a benchmark against which other less 'assimilatory' groups are judged. He also suggests the universality of Islam is transcendent of class boundaries (see section 4.5.1), and that dominant political discourses cannot grasp this unique model of class and ethnic belonging:

*'I feel, they don't wanna say 'they' or 'us', but they put us in the position where we have to defend ourselves, and we shouldn't have to defend ourselves, they should accept us, we're born here, most of us, you know [...] Why is it that Asian erm educated intelligent middle-class Muslims, why is it that they are so religious, why is it that they see themselves so close to Islam [...] I think one of the questions that the British establishment is trying to grapple with is that dichotomy between, you know, immigrants from the sub-continent maybe who are quite strong about the Islam identity and immigrants from say Hindu community from within India who are not so strong on their identity [...] my own view is Islam has a role to play in that, whether*

*we like it or not. Because I think Islam does to an extent give people a strong identity'*  
(Hasan, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London)

### 5.3.3 'British' culture

Although Hasan feels his commitment to his British identity is sometimes undermined by others as a result of his Islamic faith, Farhan stated that he's closer to 'British culture' than his ethnic Bengali culture. He operationalised this with reference to general positive attributes of British society but didn't expand on these. He seeks to align himself with what he finds 'positive' about being British, denigrating arguably stereotypically and pejoratively working-class aspects of British culture such as drinking, which are also incompatible with his religion. The classed as well as racialised aspects of what it is to be British are implied. Mohan, on the other hand, gives explicit examples of what he construes as positive about British culture, such as going on holiday, positioning it directly in contrast to 'what Indians do':

*'To be honest culturally I wouldn't describe myself as Bengali, and this is again another anomaly that you will get in this interview, I would probably identify myself culturally as more, probably more close to the British culture-*

*Yeah-*

*And again by British culture I don't mean binge drinking, sexual promiscuity, I don't mean, you know [...] going to the pub [...] when I say British culture I'm referring to some of the sort of good attributes that one expects and sees in society' (Farhan, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London)*

*'...everything that my English mates do, I do exactly the same thing. Holidays, families, you know, taking the children away, that kind of thing. You know, we, I, I'm not, we, it's very much more what the English than what the Indians do' (Mohan, Indian Punjabi Sikh engineer from Warwickshire)*

In both these examples there is evidence that British or English culture (and thus in no small part Whiteness) is posited as normatively 'better'. However, these conversations were contradictory in terms of the types of positive and negative stereotypes associated with different cultures. Mohan, for example, expressed pride at emulating the behaviour of his English mates, but is also highly praiseworthy of his cultural and religious foundations, and talks pejoratively about his children 'mixing with the English' rather than reading in their native language: 'they've grown up, they're mixing with the English [inaudible] they don't do much Punjabi reading any more'.<sup>47</sup> This selective adoption of cultural values is evidence of the

---

<sup>47</sup> The need to protect and preserve cultural expression through language was expressed by many of the interview respondents when asked about the meaning of their ethnic identity to their sense of self. Farhan

sorts of complex social identity negotiation and hybrid identity work middle-class South Asians engage in. It is strategic and thus may appear inconsistent as individuals strive to adopt the sorts of values and behaviours from the 'native' culture which allow them to present as middle-class and perhaps even socially 'integrated' in certain situations, but retain aspects of their minority culture i.e. their 'ethnic-ness'.

#### **5.4 Discrimination and prejudice**

In this chapter I have thus far explored differences in identification across key facets of ethnic identity for the South Asian middle classes, reinforcing the complexity and multi-faceted nature of this identity for British South Asians and how it is, in some cases, tied up with experiences of social mobility / middle-classness for the South Asian middle classes. This section delves further into how identities are negotiated with reference to evaluations of, as well as responses to, discrimination, given its relationship to the formation and salience of group minority belonging, particularly within a British Muslim context (Meer 2014).

For the EMBES question '*Do you think there is more or less prejudice against [ethnic group] people than against other Black and Asian groups?*', over half of the Pakistani middle-class sample (51.5 per cent) stated that there is more prejudice against their ethnic group (see Appendix II A2.5, p. 49). Pakistanis in the UK have, historically, experienced a high level of racism and hostility, not just structural but 'everyday' (Essed 1991). In a 2016 YouGov survey, a considerable 20 per cent of the British public were against accepting migrants from Pakistan on the basis of fears about criminality, English language skills, and educational level (Smith 2016). The Indian middle-class sample were the most likely out of all three ethnicities to perceive that there is less prejudice against their ethnic group than against others. A considerable proportion, however – nearly half - believe there is the same amount of prejudice against them than there is against other ethnic minority groups. In terms of evaluations of religious prejudice across the predominantly Muslim Pakistani middle-class sample, approximately 80 per cent stated there is more prejudice against their religious group than others, a far higher proportion than the Indian sample.

Similar proportions of both samples felt Asian people as a whole are prejudiced against (47.3 per cent of the Indian and 44.4 per cent of the Pakistani middle-class samples) (Appendix II A2.6, p. 50). This suggests that there is a considerable proportion of the South Asian middle-class sample who feel they, as a broad ethnic group, are racially / ethnically victimised.

---

stated: '*Our children seem to speak little or no Bengali, which is of great concern to us because obviously that would mean the death of that language with our death, so we are quite keen to preserve and continue speaking in Bengali*' (Farhan, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London). For him, therefore, ethnic identity salience lies in the preservation of active, inter-generational markers of ethnic identification (Phinney 1990).

Similar, low proportions of both samples also felt Hindus are prejudiced against (8.3 per cent of the Indian and 8.5 per cent of the Pakistani middle-class samples) and Sikhs are prejudiced against (10 per cent of the Indian and 9.4 per cent of the Pakistani middle-class samples). The lack of religious discrimination felt by the Hindu and Sikh respondents in the survey data calls to mind positive and seemingly non-politicised constructions of the ethno-religious identities of the Indian interviewees (see section 5.3), bearing in minds the differences in the samples both in terms of size and demographic criteria. Whereas 35 per cent of the Indian middle-class sample stated that Muslims are prejudiced against, 47.9 per cent of the Pakistani middle-class sample did, a difference of almost 13 percentage points. This is an indicator of the broad awareness of anti-Muslim racism by the South Asian middle-class sample at large, but potential ethnic group divergence in terms of personal experience with such racisms.

The following regression models gauge the relationship between class and ethnicity on evaluations that there is more prejudice (as opposed to the same or less) against the respondent's ethnic group and religious group than others. For the ethnic prejudice model, we revert to model one as the interaction term is not significant. The odds of Indian non-middle classes asserting that there is more prejudice against their ethnic group than others are 88.3 per cent lower than that of the Pakistani non-middle classes ( $OR=.117, p<0.001$ ). There is a similar and somewhat more pronounced finding in the religious prejudice model ( $OR=.095, p<0.001$ ). The Pakistani middle classes, by contrast, have 67 per cent higher odds than their non-middle-class ethnic counterparts of asserting that there is more prejudice against their ethnic group than others, although this is only significant at the one per cent level. The significance of the interaction term for both the racial prejudice model ( $OR=.358, p<0.01$ ) and the religious discrimination model ( $OR=.267, p<0.05$ ) tells us that the differential effect of class on religious racism is mediated by ethnicity. Specifically, the odds of asserting that there is more prejudice against your religious group and that you have experienced religious discrimination are significantly lowered by middle-class status for Indians in relation to Pakistanis, inverse to the differential effect we found that class has on ethnic commonality between the two groups (table 53).

**Table 5.3 Binary logistic regressions for ethnicity and occupational class with outcome variables: More prejudice against R's ethnic group than others / More prejudice against R's religious group than others / experienced discrimination based on religion.**

	More prejudice against R's ethnic group than others		More prejudice against R's religious group than others		Experienced discrimination based on religion	
	Model 1 Exp(B) (SE)	Model 2 Exp(B) (SE)	Model 1 Exp(B) (SE)	Model 2 Exp(B) (SE)	Model 1 Exp(B) (SE)	Model 2 Exp(B) (SE)
<i>Constant</i>	.715 (.253)	.705 (.255)	1.310 (.257)	1.186 (.260)	.854 (.379)	.703 (.393)
<b>Age group</b> (ref: 25-34)						
24 and under	1.420 (.251)	1.428 (.251)	1.837* (.261)	1.870* (.261)	.557 (.404)	.587 (.404)
35-49 years	1.021 (.201)	1.015 (.201)	1.964** (.207)	1.941** (.210)	.854 (.342)	.823 (.351)
50 and over	1.338 (.235)	1.334 (.235)	1.677* (.240)	1.693* (.242)	1.213 (.445)	1.284 (.451)
<b>Female</b> (ref: male)	1.050 (.149)	1.051 (.149)	.949 (.154)	.962 (.154)	.810 (.265)	.787 (.268)
<b>Born in UK</b> (ref: not born in UK)	1.041 (.185)	1.030 (.186)	2.555*** (.192)	2.485*** (.194)	2.569** (.317)	2.570** (.323)
<b>UK region</b> (ref: London & SE)						
Yorkshire & Humberside	.654^ (.236)	.656^ (.236)	.602* (.237)	.608* (.237)	.415* (.418)	.455^ (.422)
Midlands	1.589* (.190)	1.592* (.190)	.748 (.198)	.758 (.199)	1.162 (.319)	1.232 (.321)
North East & West	.792 (.249)	.793 (.249)	.816 (.259)	.817 (.259)	.350* (.525)	.325* (.535)
Other UK regions	1.339 (.271)	1.351 (.272)	1.658^ (.306)	1.757^ (.310)	3.743** (.443)	3.927** (.448)
<b>Currently in paid work</b>	1.180 (.920)	1.176 (.921)	1.478 (.983)	1.450 (1.003)	1.498 (2.122)	1.715 (2.015)
<b>Married or cohabiting</b>	.850 (.926)	.855 (.927)	.775 (.797)	.799 (1.012)	.837 (2.212)	.757 (2.015)
<b>Professional or Manager</b> (ref: non-Professional or Manager)	1.211 (.185)	1.315 (.230)	.998 (.186)	1.671^ (.279)	1.023 (.293)	1.931 (.415)
<b>Indian</b> (ref: Pakistani)	.117*** (.183)	.126*** (.222)	.072*** (.176)	.095*** (.198)	.158*** (.288)	.239*** (.334)
<b>Professional or Manager X Indian</b>		.798 (.374)		.358** (.387)		.267* (.599)
<b>Unweighted N</b>	1053		1016		366	
<b>Cox &amp; Snell R Square</b>	.174	.174	.294	.299	.197	.208
<b>Nagelkerke R Square</b>	.244	.245	.392	.399	.272	.288
<b>Hosmer and Lemeshow Test</b>	$\chi^2=15.583$ (8) p<0.05	$\chi^2=7.532$ (8) p<0.05	$\chi^2=9.687$ (8) p<0.05	$\chi^2=8.352$ (8) p<0.05	$\chi^2=9.687$ (8) p<0.05	$\chi^2=16.644$ (8) p<0.05

NB: Pakistani and Indian respondents only. Weighted data. EMBES 2010. ^ = p<0.1; \* = p<0.05; \*\* = p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001

#### 5.4.1 Perceived levels of racism in the professions

Across the interview respondents, many – and some more freely than others - shared anecdotes of what they perceived to be workplace-based discrimination based on their Muslim identity. Nadya attributes the troubles she had with securing a training contract in the early days of her career to inadvertent racism based on her name. Others like Hussain and Hasan were keen to stress that racism had improved amongst their generation and has not marred their professional experiences. Hasan in particular makes a class distinction with regard to racisms, suggesting, that it is more prevalent amongst *'non-professional groups'*. However, he specifically refers to *'harassment and prejudice'* which might be considered more overt forms of racism in comparison to the structural biases Nadya refers to:

*'I would say it's because of my name, you know, you get me and somebody else that is in a perfect comparable level as far as our CVs are concerned but if your name is John Smith, or your name is [her name], you will get the person who is John Smith getting picked [...] so I faced a lot of rejection trying to get training contracts'* (Nadya, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London)

*'I don't think it's hampered my, I've been a generation whereby things were getting better'* (Hussain, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from Birmingham).

*'I think professionals have a very different perspective on race and obviously it exists [...] I'm not saying it doesn't, but I think they're a lot more mature about it, erm and you don't, it's not so much in your face [...] you look at the non-professional groups and I think racial harassment and prejudice is more prominent'* (Hasan, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London)

The commonly expressed view across many respondents, including Hussain, was the lack of surety as to whether they had been direct victims of racism. It is interesting to consider this in light of the binary 'yes' / 'no' options to the discrimination questions in the EMBES. Anita stated that she has never felt racism, or at least has never been aware of it. The hesitancy in her response below reflects the difficulties she has of reconciling a professional career with a largely smooth upwards trajectory and the realities of racism. She counts herself *'lucky'* for having *'never felt racism'* but cannot categorically say whether it has affected her or not:

*'I have not felt – maybe I'm very lucky, hmm...never felt racism. Not in my job, not – this is like way before [current firm], local firms, regional firms I've worked for touch wood, nobody has ever looked for me, well at least I'm not aware of it'* (Anita, Indian Bengali Hindu lawyer from London)

The survey questions in the EMSBES quite clearly asked respondents to assess whether they 'feel' they have been discriminated against, a reflection of the invisibility / insidiousness of racism that Hussain and Anita allude to above. However, many others not only noted issues of a lack of tolerance (based on minority religion and gender as well as ethnicity) within their own organisations, but had been motivated to take action to remedy it:

*'...the legal profession is a very conservative profession [...] With this firm I'm the training partner. And training is a big thing with me. Training is personally relevant. It's what we call giving somebody a hand up. And in fact, the fact that the last two or three trainees have been female, Asian girls, you can see the equality situation' (Baljit, Indian Punjabi Sikh lawyer from Birmingham)*

*'...our [ethnic] network that we've got within the company we've done a bit of raising awareness, so i.e. erm you know let's say there's been a cultural or religious festival, we might do like an event and people can come and find out a bit, you know, learn a bit more [...] when I was in Warwick we did quite a number of presentations about Islam [...] obviously post 9/11 and then 7/7 we tried to clear some of the misconceptions about the Islamic faith' (Tariq, Pakistani Muslim engineer from London)*

Baljit is keen to counter the conservative nature of the legal profession by employing women of colour within his own firm. Tariq, who works within a larger corporate organisation, seeks to educate colleagues about culture and religion, particularly the Islamic faith as it pertains to his own religious identity salience. It is interesting how both Tariq and Baljit use their own initiative, and no doubt informed positioning as ethnic and religious minorities, to address issues of diversity, representation, and cultural sensitivity within their organisations. This suggests there may be insufficient formalised initiatives within their organisations to address these matters. It also reflects that respondents are willing to draw attention to their minority status at work, despite the potential repercussions this may hold in a predominantly White, middle-class place of work. This could be indicative of both a strong sense of ethnic / religious identity, and of a sense of socio-political responsibility to address racial marginalisation in the professional (and supposedly enlightened, according to Hasan) spaces they inhabit (explored more in Chapter 6).

The idea of ethnic minorities starting out on an uneven (lower) footing to the majority was a prominent theme across approximately half of the respondents of all ethnicity in the sample. Deepak believed that if you are an immigrant you are likely to reside at the bottom of the social hierarchy (he mentioned this twice in his interview, contrasting 'monarchs' at the top

versus immigrants / ethnic minorities at the bottom (see section 4.5.1)). Nabeela discussed gender inequality above and beyond racial / ethnic inequality, as a gender as well as ethno-religious minority in her place of work. She noted the inhibiting nature of the masculinised environments where social networks are formed at her work. Her status as a professional is therefore never as secure as a man with her education and credentials:

*I raised it a couple of times with our HR and said look it's not a level playing field because opportunities are handed over in a fashion that is not equal, and the women end up having to get all their connections from scratch while the men just help each other. So, you know, networks are, you know, vitally important (Nabeela, Pakistani Muslim lawyer from Manchester).*

#### 5.4.2 Post-racial rationalisations of social mobility

In terms of *positive* discriminations, 4 of the 20 respondents believed they had benefited from equality initiatives, diversity policies, and organisational quotas in their career. The Indian interviewees were most likely to discuss the benefits of minority status in the professions. Baljit, Priya and Sunil suggested that they had benefited from being ethnic minority (and female in Priya's case) in homogenously White, male, middle-class firms seeking to capitalise on their 'diversity':

*'I went for my first job which was in X<sup>48</sup> as a trainee solicitor, they actually gave me the job, you know, which was strange because there were 15, 16 people who had applied for jobs from all top universities and I think being Indian actually works because they'd never employ, [X] had never employed a Black person or an Asian person' (Baljit, Indian Punjabi Sikh lawyer from Birmingham)*

*'I don't think I've ever been denied an opportunity and I think if anything people have wanted to, I've had certain champions along the way that have acknowledged the fact that yes I am a young Asian female and trying to get into this world of the polar opposite, White middle-aged men, let me support her that much more and I think I've had the luxury of that benefit' (Priya, Indian Gujarati Hindu engineer from London)*


---

<sup>48</sup> Name of organisation omitted for confidentiality purposes.

*'I always look at [minority ethnic status] as it might help me from a positive discrimination perspective if I'm honest<sup>49</sup>, I'm not, I don't look at it as a negative thing' (Sunil, Indian Gujarati Hindu engineer from London)*

Baljit only implies the role of positive discrimination in the early stages of his career, suggesting it was 'strange' that he won out over a number of other candidates in an organisation that had never employed an ethnic minority. It is interesting to consider, however, why this organisation had never employed an ethnic minority in the past, suggesting that positive discrimination had never worked for any previous ethnic minority candidates that had applied, and thus perhaps had not been a consideration in the employment of Baljit despite his suspicions. Priya, on the other hand, was far more certain that her minority status had allowed her to disproportionately benefit from mentorship and support in her career. It must be noted, however, that one of the early mentors in her career was, like her, Indian Gujarati. She discussed the way he took an interest in her career and set up coaching sessions for her with his wife, stating that: *'I don't know if he would've done that is I was not Asian...he's also Gujarati [...] so I think he saw a bit of, you know I've actually had to do this the hard way, let me try and boost her up a little'*. The opportunities have not come from within the 'White middle aged men' contingent but from those, like her, who stand outside this privilege. This co-ethnic solidarity is central to her identity map (fig. 11) as well.

**Fig. 11 Priya's (Indian Hindu Gujarati engineer from London) identity map**



<sup>49</sup> Although Sunil is talking in the context of his career and the labour market, he noted at numerous points during his interview that he had experienced racism in his life both at school and in public, particularly after the 2005 terrorist attacks in London.

The figures at the top of her drawing are her mentors, and the figure in the middle represents herself. The connecting lines between the stick figures denote this mentoring / helping-hand relationship mentioned above. She expresses a desire to help those 'below her'. Those at the bottom of the drawing represent those in her community, particularly those less fortunate than her. Reciprocity is therefore central to both her life experiences and the sense of who she is. Like in most of the other respondents' identity maps, she notices there is a clear social hierarchy. However, she sees herself as straddling this somewhat.

Despite positive discriminations, at least 3 of the 20 respondents noticed how economic precarity as an ethnic minority can translate into what Tariq suggests are 'self-limiting' behaviours in the workplace. Tariq suggests that 'we' (ethnic minorities as a whole) are set back not by external forces but by the ethnic work ethic (section 4.5.2) which he suggests preaches hard work and humility over ambition and confidence. Hussain, like Tariq, puts the onus for surviving and thriving in the workplace on the minority professional rather than on structural factors. He stated that before you attribute a judge's dislike to you in the courtroom to your race or gender, you should question your own competence:

*'I try to catch myself before I'm like, well, you know, what are the possible reasons I could've, they could've not liked me or they could've and that sort of thing, you know back when I was working and it's very easy to think, well it's because I'm a woman, it's because I'm Asian. But you have to kind of be a bit more contextual about it and a bit more rational' (Hussain, Bangladeshi lawyer from Birmingham)*

Hussain previously stated in his conversations that he had never experienced racism himself, but had colleagues who, because they did not in his words '*walk the walk talk the talk*' (section 4.3) of the courtroom, complained of prejudicial attitudes from judges. For him, such racisms are potentially self-inflicted. It is interesting, in the excerpt above, that he decides to take aim at not only ethnic but gender discrimination, something unprompted by me. His views on workplace prejudice extend beyond his realm of experience, indicating that he believes claims of discrimination across the board are too frequent and perhaps ill-founded. Mohan similarly chooses to criticise the stunted occupational mobility of Asian people for their failure to socially integrate with the '*English*'. As stated in section 5.3.3, however, his views on the benefits of 'Englishness' are inconsistent:

*'I do blame the Asian community, erm, I don't blame the English. I think the Asian community themselves have got a lot to answer for. I think if I say the English tend to stick together, so do the Asians, in a much bigger way, and they don't wanna venture out either' (Mohan, Indian Punjabi Sikh engineer from Warwickshire)*

There is evidence of internalisation of the middle-class logics of Whiteness here which place the focus on the minority individual or the minority community for being too insular or lacking resilience, rather than the limiting institutional structures where racisms still persist. Despite Tariq and Hussain's views, this tendency seems to be weighted towards the Indian interviewees. This may in part be attributed to the greater economic success of the Indian group, and the lack of anti-Muslim prejudices this group experiences in comparison to the Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups. Together, these would, for some, make a weak case for the limiting nature of racisms.

#### 5.4.3 Anti-Muslim racisms

In the specific realm of religious discrimination and particularly anti-Muslim racism, the majority of the Muslim interviewees expressed concerns with what they believe are high levels of negative Muslim racialisation and anti-Muslim discrimination. Farhan argues that specific policies – such as Prevent<sup>50</sup> – are an 'evolved' and legitimate version of racism targeting Muslim communities. His concern about anti-Muslim state racism is not only personally relevant to him as a Muslim, but professionally relevant as a lawyer operating in a high-density ethnic minority area, defending the interests of predominantly Muslim clients. Bisma feels personally targeted within her predominantly White British professional environment by anti-Muslim microaggressions, also echoing Farhan's view about the increasing legitimacy of Islamophobia:

*'Prevent is, it's an evolved version of racism, specifically targeted towards the Muslim community, and what therefore, er, one can say fairly safely in my view is that institutional racism in this country hasn't really changed, it has now morphed itself into something else. It's no longer acceptable to say to an Asian, you know, but it probably is now acceptable to call someone an Islamic radical' (Farhan, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London)*

*'It's alright to call anyone an extremist, terrorist sympathiser, in these particular cases, you know, I come across it all the time with my fellow legal professionals, these are the people I work with, they're my team, they're the people I trust, you know, and, you know, I hear the little comments here and there [...] the other day, some barrister we were just sitting in conference rooms and he's like 'it's a bit cult-ish Islam, isn't it'' (Bisma, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London)*

---

<sup>50</sup> The Prevent Duty is part of the 2015 UK Counter-Terrorism and Security Act designed to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. Authorities and institutions across a wide range of sectors including education, criminal justice, health, charities and faith are trained to recognise and deal with 'vulnerable people', in other words those at risk of radicalisation (Home Office 2015).

These narratives (alongside the results from table 5.3) suggest that middle-classness does not necessarily obviate or buffer racisms<sup>51</sup> (Bhattacharya 2017). These experiences and evaluations of racism may also go some way to shining a light on why middle-classness, exemplified in the sort of exclusionary White, elite professional environments described by some of the respondents above, was undermined as a potential form of identification by so many of the Muslim interviewees in this study (sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.3).

#### *5.4.4 Discrimination and ethnic identity formation*

Establishing opinions towards the prevalence of discrimination doesn't necessarily tell us how this is bound up with ethnic / racial identity, despite the tentative links drawn thus far. Although it is difficult to discern a causal link between discrimination, racialisation, feelings of relative deprivation<sup>52</sup> and ethnic identity formation it is nonetheless interesting to see how they might be related.

Bisma discussed how negative attention to her religious community had not only bolstered her own sense of religiosity and religious identification, but that of Muslim communities at large. She attributes the rise in the uptake of the headscarf within Asian communities at large as indicative of a growing Muslim consciousness, bolstered by national and global socio-political events which have targeted Muslims (as per Birt 2013). Hasan similarly notes a generational shift in the way Islam is approached, suggesting that greater attention on the religion has precipitated greater self-examination and a greater identification with Islam:

*'When I was growing up, erm, no one wore hijab, in fact if I look at my yearbook going back from year 7 to year 11, you can go through the entire yearbook and you could probably spot one or two hijabis, and they were traditional hijabis like Moroccans, they weren't Asian hijabis [...] [now] you'll see hijabis of all race and religions, Bangladeshi hijabis, Pakistani hijabis, Gujarati hijabis, and it just, and, you know, I do think what'd happened in society, what's happened around the world, people have*

---

<sup>51</sup> Whereas the terms 'prejudice' and 'discrimination' can and are often used interchangeably to refer to unfair / unequal treatment based on race / ethnicity, religion, gender and so on, 'racism', which is often regarded as a more loaded concept, tends to include the broader structural, institutional and ingrained nature of prejudice and discrimination which conveys power and privilege on some groups at the expense of others.

<sup>52</sup> Relative deprivation has commonly been conceptualised as the root cause of conflict among ethnic groups which causes them to mobilise for a set of shared political and economic objectives. It is broadly defined as the feeling that a group has when they have been deprived of something which they once had, or when others gain relative to them (Freeman 2005, Nafziger et al. 2000). In this chapter it is harnessed as the feeling an individual has when they perceive they are worse off relative to other social groups.

*become more politically aware, and then you do identify with your religion more (Bisma, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London)*

*'I think a lot of people that I work with or socialise with, you know, have gone through similar experiences and we're very different people to who we were fifteen years ago [...] that's simply because of you know what part religion has played, and I think society has a lot to do with that, the reason why so many people are turning towards Islam is because of the questions raised about the religion' (Hasan, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London)*

Not only have changing global and domestic and shifting discourses about multiculturalism and migrants impacted on the levels of identification and introspection of some particularly marginalised groups, the (slowly) increasing middle-class profiles of UK Bangladeshis and Pakistanis and the upwardly mobility of individuals (like Farhan and Bisma) have fostered an intellectualised (section 5.2.4), informed, and politicised sense of Muslim-ness and Muslim consciousness (Meer 2014). This will be explored further in Chapter 6.

#### *5.4.5 Ethnic stereotyping and ethnic identity*

Neha, a young Indian Hindu engineer, spoke positively about her Indian and Punjabi identity throughout the discussion on her ethnic identity. She talked about Indians as *'hardworking'* – an attribute explored at length in section 4.5.2 with regard to ethnic work ethic - with a strong family bond.<sup>53</sup> She describes these cultural qualities as *'transparent'*, or known to those outside as well as within the boundaries of ethnic community. When questioned as to whether perceptions of her ethnic group are *only* positive, however, she states how negative stereotypes about her ethnic group which posit them as self-segregating forces her to confront cultural practices she takes for granted. She doesn't explicitly critique this stereotyping as racist, however, more so thought-provoking:

*'It can be negative as well, because some like, you know, I've been asked, an example of a situation I had, someone said 'oh are you going to have an arranged marriage, are you going to only marry an Indian, you're racist, you're like'-  
Yeah, yeah-*

---

<sup>53</sup> Rakhi talked about stable family structures as a criterion of middle-classness (section 4.2.2), and Neha talks similarly about strong family bonds as a feature of Indian / South Asian-ness. Rakhi's definition of middle-classness may to some extent, therefore, be informed by cultural features, exhibiting again the links - both conscious and unconscious – made between middle-classness and minority culture by some of the respondents.

*That's interesting, and again it gets you thinking because I don't wake up every morning thinking why is it like that' (Neha, Indian Punjabi Hindu engineer from London)*

In terms of educating others about her cultural practices, her enthusiasm is palpable. She stated: *'my really good friend he was Greek and he's not met an Indian person before, he's never had an Indian friend so he liked Indian food and was very excited from that end'*. She is happy to field questions from people to, as she stated later on in the conversation, *'represent Indians'* and challenge what she classes as *'just people's naivety'*. This confidence as well as ability to speak on behalf of her group to 'outsiders' could be construed as a form of ethnic cultural capital. Nevertheless, the burden of justification and the emotional labour associated with it still lies with those in the minority culture, whether acknowledged or not. Karim similarly stated that he doesn't see it as racist or impolite *'if an English person or whoever, it doesn't have to be an English person these days, asked me [about my ethnicity]'*. He states that there is scope for even those of different South Asian ethnicities to learn about one another and is more than happy to engage in this cultural exchange.

Both these respondents seem keen not to conflate people's lack of cultural understanding or awareness with racism. It is simply an opportunity for them to demonstrate their strong sense of ethnic identity through cultural education. Their ethnic group belonging is therefore not necessarily based on shared experience of external racism and discrimination but on internal positive characteristics of the community and culture. Ethnic identity formation, for the South Asian middle classes at least, can thus be posited as a multi-faceted as well as subjective process depending on the experiences and perceptions of those involved.

#### *5.4.6 Oppressions in middle-class spaces*

Within a professional context, the rarity of being Asian is complicated by gender and ethnic / religious identity for women of colour, and particularly 'visible' Muslim women of colour. The extent of 'othering' (Bowlby and Lloyd-Evans 2013) as well as structural racism (House of Commons 2016) experienced by Muslim women in the labour market is exemplified by Bisma and Aisha's accounts of how their female, Asian status had in part determined, and potentially limited, the trajectory of their career paths:

*'I did a few mini pupillages where I work shadowed Barristers and my brother told me about the pros and cons of being, of one or the other, he did warn me that it's harder being, you know, a woman and brown, and, you know at that time I didn't wear hijab...'* (Bisma, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London)

*'when I was approaching my final year at Law school I was approached by one of my friends who was a couple of years ahead of me [...] I had a conversation with her and she did say look, it's lot more difficult to become a barrister, being an Asian woman than it is a solicitor, erm, and that obviously made me rethink my options and then obviously I did the LPC and became a solicitor' (Aisha, Pakistani Muslim lawyer from Manchester)*

Aisha and Bisma are both from working-class backgrounds. Approximately half of the females in the sample highlighted their gender and ethnicity (being 'brown' or South Asian) in relation to their profession, 3 of these from Muslim and working class background and just one of Indian Hindu middle-class background. They all expressed concerns about the potentially career-limiting nature of their status as women of colour in a predominantly middle-class but also a predominantly White and male industry. Bisma, one of the 10 respondents of working-class Muslim background, also discussed her working-classness and her visible Muslim identity (she wears a hijab) at length in conversations about her work life (discussed later on in this section), highlighting the multiple levels of conspicuousness and discrimination that she has suffered from given her multiple marginalised identities.

Hasan, a strong Muslim identifier who owns and manages a small law firm in London, stated that his discomfort while taking the bar and his decision to go into private practice was two-fold: firstly, because of the extent of presumably negatively stereotypical '*value judgements*' he believes people were making about him regarding his religion, and secondly because he wanted to work with Muslim and / or ethnic minority colleagues and clients with shared backgrounds, experiences, and values. There is a moral as well as business case made here, therefore, for ethnic entrepreneurship. His Islamic beliefs and the stigma attached to these restricted the types of professional work he could go into. His Muslim identity was also, interestingly, key to his conceptions of class, and the lack of salience he attributed to it in relation to his religion (section 4.5.1). His personal and professional commitment to Islamic law and its lack of fit with contract law was explicitly mentioned by him during his interview:

*'I think the principles that you hold religiously define you as a person, and define the way you deal with people, and the choices that you make as to what you want to practice. I could be working for [...] one of those big shot firms but I chose not to er because of the principles I hold about certain areas of Law that wasn't particularly acceptable [...] I went down the civil route and into things that didn't involve contract, I do contracts but I choose the clients I do contract for, so Muslim clients who believe or have the same ethical principles' (Hasan, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London)*

For Bisma, the need to role-play or perform (Reay et al. 2007) to assimilate to the norms of her White middle-class work environment for professional survival, as it were, risks her being (negatively) characterised as both un-religious and un-traditional by those of her religious background. Her 'authentic' self is her religious self, best reflected at home or in her religious community:

*'people see me as oh God she's a lawyer, she's quite an argumentative type person, when they look at, like, on paper or they look at me dressed and fighting in court or whatever they think yeah, she's not religious at all or she's not traditional at all [...] when actually this is just a role that I play, you know, behind closed doors I'm a completely different person' (Bisma, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London).*

The awareness of being 'exceptional', of being the 'only Asian in the room' or one of the only Asian females in the workplace or industry at large was one of the most common responses by the female interviewees working in large, corporate organisations. Anita, who stated that she has 'never felt racism' in her job (section 5.4.1) may not have experienced racism, but the lack of representation in her industry is tangible to her. Her comment of 'wow' could indicate her disbelief at the lack of diversity, and / or her pride at having secured a senior role within a homogenously White, male-dominated firm. Her mention of her gender exceptionality was not prompted by me in this discussion but was clearly pertinent to the issue of her multiple minority status in the firm. Sunil has a similar awareness of his racial exceptionality but the gender ratio in the management team of his firm is not mentioned by him:

*'I still find it surprising er and in some ways probably a bit disappointing when I go to large events be it big meetings or large conferences, whatever, that I am still probably the only Asian person of my generation [...] a couple of months ago now we had a meeting that we hosted at [her firm] [...] there were, I don't know about 35, 40 people around a table, I was the only female Asian person there. Erm, and you still kind of think like wow. Wow' (Anita, Indian Bengali Hindu lawyer from London)*

*'It's weird that today I was sitting there thinking 'oh I'm the only Asian, or the only one of any different race in the management team', and sometimes when you walk into meetings you think oh, I'm the only erm, erm you, you look at the race ratio in the room [...] I think I do certainly look at both, oh, there's different races in the room and there's also different classes' (Sunil, Indian Gujurati Hindu engineer from London)*

Sunil rationalises his awareness of being the only Asian in management meetings by stating that it is 'natural' to notice those of different races, as well as classes. He does not seem to associate a lack of ethnic minority representation with systematic racial exclusion, however.

He expressed at different points in his interview that he does not believe race or ethnicity necessarily affect one's life chances, or that discrimination has affected him negatively – just that race and class are visible points of difference.

Descriptions of the sort of 'out of field' feelings experienced by Mohan living in a predominantly White, middle-class suburb, and the microaggressions experienced by Bisma based on class background, bring to the fore the oppressions and exclusions based on class as well as race / ethnicity and gender in middle-class spaces, and the difficulties of identifying with middle-class people as a result:

*'Even though we live in a very middle-class area, as we say it, I have got nothing in common with them [...] whilst I was going to these hockey matches and cricket matches and rugby matches, I was mixing with these parents, er, so, but with their, you know, I didn't have much in common with them and they didn't particularly like me sort of coming to live in their patch in the first place' (Mohan, Sikh Indian Punjabi engineer from Warwickshire)*

*'Where I work now, my partner is, you know, in her sort of early 60s, erm, grew up in, I think she's very middle-class, she lives in South Woodford, she's the 11+ generation that went to grammar school, and erm sometimes she's caught me, like I used to say 'haitch' [H]. And she used to say 'there is no 'aitch' in 'haitch'. When I used to spell my name over the phone, S-H-A-H, she used to say, she taught me that it's not 'haitch' it's 'aitch' (Bisma, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London)*

The normative requirements for being middle-class in professional spaces are often at odds with a working-class, racialised and / or culturally specific ethnic minority identity (Archer 2011). Those working in larger, established organisations rationalise the performativity required in their profession as a necessary part of their job. Accent is a particular expression of classed embodiment (Loveday 2016, Moore 2008, Rollock et al. 2014), and Deepak and Bisma both acknowledge that they modify their accents depending on who they are talking to in order to adjust to the classed expectations of the field:

*'my voice, is completely dictated by the professional environment that I live in. So when I speak to my friends in East- back in Forest Gate where I grew up, I won't speak like this, they'll just think I've gone mad [...] so I'll be like 'y'alright mate'? That's how I'll talk to them...that's just the way it is. And when these guys hear me talking to my mates, they're like who the hell's that guy? (Deepak, Indian Gujarati Hindu lawyer from London)*

*'when you're talking amongst professionals, when you're in court when you're addressing the judge, you do see your voice just changing naturally, just erm, you can, I think it's part of the job, it's part of the occupational hazard, you've gotta sound a bit posher [...] I can switch it on switch it off, I won't, when I'm with my friends, you know certain friends, you know, you want to have a banter and it's like yeah, no, shut up, those little working-class sort of things come in'* (Bisma, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London)

Bisma is somewhat able to 'assimilate' when necessary to the more adaptable class norms of the professional space: *'you do see your voice just changing naturally, just erm, you can, I think it's part of the job, it's part of the occupational hazard, you've gotta sound a bit posher'*. However, it is not only by virtue of her class background (and ethnicity) that she risks being 'othered' in her professional environment, but also her religious beliefs (as aforementioned) and gender. Her identity as a visible Muslim woman and its role in her professional life are mentioned at various points throughout her narrative, whether in relation to the reactions people have to her in court, or in considerations of her career path. For example, she states that as a Muslim: *'I will never be in a situation where I can drink'* which can often prove problematic for those working in an industry, like Law, where drinking is a large part of the professional culture, and often central to networking.

Deepak who, having grown up in a largely urban, working-class Asian community, changes the way he speaks when amongst his colleagues and legal clients. In the interview he used working-class slang - *'alright mate'* - in his 'native' London accent to flag up the disjuncture between his 'authentic' voice, and his professional voice. He also notes that there is a 'role' he has to assume beyond the voice in order to avoid the (albeit subtle) everyday racisms (Essed 1991) he experiences. Again, the onus is on the minority individual to conform the norms and expectations of the majority (see section 4.3) and *'make people feel comfortable'*:

*'I know that to work in an environment like this, in addition to having to put on this voice, you know, be this person, assume this role, I have to overcome the...racism, a very very very subtle thing, gotta get over that almost in every interaction in a subtle way, make people feel comfortable'* (Deepak, Indian Gujarati Hindu lawyer from London).

Although he recognises the pervasiveness of racism in his workplace, it is not spoken about pejoratively. In fact, the above excerpt is from a larger discussion in which he argued against the necessity of racial / ethnic quotas and positive discrimination. Performing / adjusting to White middle-classness is, to Deepak and Bisma, a necessary and ingrained survival mechanism that allows them to become more 'acceptable' to other White, middle-class people (Sommerlad 2007) who they do not, and cannot, align themselves with (see sections

4.2.3 and 4.4.1). Deepak's need to negate his working-classness is related to the need to negate his 'ethnic-ness' because of the way the latter is read as working-class (Archer 2011).

Both Bisma as well as Deepak talk about how they switch accent unconsciously, an indicator of the sorts of unique cultural capitals they have imbued on their difficult routes to professionalisation. Although code-switching was only explicitly highlighted by 2 of the 20 respondents in the qualitative sample, it was nonetheless illuminating to hear about the struggle between the invisibility and the conspicuousness of being a racialised other in a professional space. Bisma and Deepak highlighted the need to downplay cultural and religious specificity to increase proximity to Whiteness, and to integrate and assimilate whilst simultaneously being hyper-aware of one's own 'difference' are part of the day-to-day experiences of South Asian professionals. Individuals naturally assume varying identity roles depending on the spaces they inhabit and the type of persona that culture demands, but for those suffering from multiple oppressions as a result of their marginalised identities this might be said to constitute a heightened form of symbolic violence (Bourdieu 1984). It also serves to problematise 1) the relationship of ethnic minority professionals to middle-classness and 2) their conceptualisation of social stratification as a whole, as evidenced in Chapter 4.

## **5.5 Relating class identity to ethnic identity**

To book-end this chapter, we return to the analyses carried out in section 5.2 to integrate the quantitative analysis on the importance of different aspects of ethnic identity with analysis on the salience of different aspects of socio-economic status.

Questions related to class identity salience featured in the Citizenship Survey covering the importance of social class, occupation, education, and income to the 'sense of who you are'. Responses to these by ethnic group as well as across the whole South Asian middle-class sample are depicted graphically in Appendix II A2.11 (p. 52) alongside counterpart indicators related to ethnic identity which were also shown in A2.3 (p. 47). Although education, occupation and income are not necessarily considered group identities in the same sense as class, ethnicity / race or religion, they are nonetheless defining features of a person's overall sense of social status and key determinants of SES, having been flagged up as salient to self-conceptions and constructions of class by the interview respondents in Chapter 4.<sup>54</sup>

---

<sup>54</sup> Despite this, when controlling for age, gender, region, UK birth, marital and employment status, there was no significant association found between occupational class or ethnicity and importance of social class, education, occupation or income, hence the absence of counterpart regression models for these indicators.

Occupation and education are important to an overwhelmingly majority of individuals in every ethnic group (over 90 per cent) more so than social class and even more so than ethnic / racial, religious and national identity. Chapter 4 highlighted the importance of education to many of the respondents as both a source of pride and status, and as a facilitator of social mobility. Occupation was also discussed as an indicator of social status (the qualitative sample was selected on the basis of professional occupation so the salience of occupation to class may have been assumed) although it did not seem to hold the sort of symbolic importance education did. The proportion of the overall sample who asserted social class salience was notably lower than for all the other social identities in the table. Only 66.5 per cent of the South Asian middle-class sample stated that social class is importance to the sense of who they are. This indicates the potential weakness of class as an identity in relation to other identities, albeit expressed solely in terms of importance to sense of self. By contrast, the more tangible aspects of identity – work and career, credentials and qualifications, faith and national identity – are important across the sample. Despite uneven sample sizes across ethnic group, it is perhaps worth noting that class, occupation and education are salient to a higher proportion of the Bangladeshi than Pakistani and Indian middle-class samples. It is only with regard to ethnic / racial background and religious identity salience where the Pakistani sample ‘outranks’ the Bangladeshi, and Indian, samples<sup>55</sup>, as evidenced in earlier analyses.

In order to ascertain potential interrelationships between the ethnic and class salience variables, a principal component analysis (PCA)<sup>56</sup> was run for the South Asian middle-class sample at large (table 5.4). The eight variables were recoded to reflect ‘less’ to ‘more’ importance to sense of self rather than ‘more’ to ‘less’.

---

<sup>55</sup> Unlike importance of religion, country of origin and nationality, when controlling for age, gender, UK birth, UK region, employment status and marital status, neither occupational class nor ethnicity have a significant relationship with importance of social class, occupation, education, or income. As a result, corresponding regression models like the ones in Chapter 5 are omitted here.

<sup>56</sup> Principal component analysis (PCA) is a statistical data reduction technique which transforms a number of potentially correlated variables into a smaller number of uncorrelated variables. It is different from factor analysis which is concerned with identifying the underlying factor structure (Baglin 2014). PCA and other factor analysis techniques are best harnessed with continuous variables and should be avoided with nominal categorical variables because Pearson correlation matrices are used. The variables used here and in Chapter 6 are on a five-point ordinal scale which, given the lack of suitable alternative data, have been input into the PCA as is. However, it must be kept in mind that this technique has its limitations for exploring multidimensionality with ordinal variables (Bernstein and Teng 1989). Post-thesis, it may be prudent to rerun these analyses using polychoric correlation which estimates the correlation between measures using an ordinal scale (Olsson 1979). However, this technique is also imperfect as it again assumes the variables are derived from a normal population distribution (Baglin 2014).

**Table 5.4 Principal components analysis with varimax rotation<sup>57</sup> for 8 ethnic- and class-related identity salience indicators**

	Component	
	1	2
Importance of social class	.269	<b>.604</b>
Importance of occupation	.067	<b>.591</b>
Importance of education	-.006	<b>.745</b>
Importance of income	.174	<b>.755</b>
Importance of ethnicity or racial background	<b>.813</b>	.091
Importance of country your family originally came from	<b>.646</b>	.225
Importance of religion	<b>.778</b>	-.003
Importance of national identity	<b>.702</b>	.185

NB: South Asian respondents in professional and managerial occupations only. Citizenship Survey 2010/11. Weighted data. Unweighted base n = 704.

As anticipated, the ethnic identity variables – ethnic background, religion, nationality and country of origin – load highly onto the same component. The class and SES variables load highly onto the second component. There is little inter-dimensionality between the class and ethnicity indicators. Despite these two distinct components being returned from the PCA, the Cronbach’s alpha score<sup>58</sup> across all eight indicators (7.32) indicates a high level of internal consistency amongst the measures across the South Asian middle-class sample.

As established from both the literature and the findings in section 5.2, ethnic and religious identity have a strong but relationship with one another for the South Asian middle classes. Education and income are also strongly related with one another. We saw that for the respondents from working class backgrounds these two factors were closely aligned, key to their social mobility ‘success story’: *‘we know how important money is, and we need education to earn that money, and also education puts us on equal standing’* (Mohan). There

<sup>57</sup> Among rotations, varimax is most commonly used. Its purpose is to achieve a solution where each factor has a small number of large loadings and a large number of small loadings, simplifying interpretation (Basto and Pereira 2012, p. 3).

<sup>58</sup> Cronbach’s alpha measures how closely related a set of items are as a group. A score of 0.70 or higher is usually considered evidence of internal consistency. The cronbach’s alpha score should be used with caution, however, and alongside other measures of score consistency, or with measures of uni-dimensionality such as PCA. This is because it has limited explanatory power in measuring the efficacy of a potential scale (Sijtsma 2009). In this case, for example, it may be that the high alpha score is a reflection of the similar phrasing of the ordinal response options, and the placement of these questions together in the survey which may have led to respondent fatigue. Also, it is unclear to what extent the score is capturing the interrelationship between the class and ethnicity measures that we are most interested in.

is a qualitative difference between the ways these sets of identities are deemed salient, however. Ethnic identity, religious identity and national identity root South Asians in strong communities of belonging, as had been evidenced in this chapter, whereas income, occupation and education (Grusky and Galescu 2005; Grusky and Weeden 2001) are somewhat instrumental (though not meaningless) by comparison.

To delineate the results in table 5.4 by ethnic group, I ran a PCA for each sub-sample. A larger number of components were returned for the Bangladeshi and Pakistani than the Indian middle-class samples (Appendix II A2.12, p.53). There is, for these two groups, evidence of inter-dimensionality between indicators of class and ethnicity, although caution must be applied to interpretation here given the divergence of sample size between the three ethnic groups and the small size of the Bangladeshi sample. For the Indian group, there was no notable inter-correlation between the class and ethnic indicators. The first component for the Pakistani group covers ethnicity, country of origin, religion, nationality, as well as, interestingly, social class. Education and income load highly onto the second component. Social class, occupation and, interestingly, ethnicity load highly onto the third component. There is some clear evidence of inter-dimensionality between class / occupational and ethnic identity salience for the Pakistani group, therefore.

These findings must be taken with caution, given that they are based on analysis of quantitative indicators of identity salience, modelling a complex concept in the abstract. The salience as well as the very definition of these social identities varies from time to time, situation to situation as well as from person to person (Van den Berghe 1987, Huddy 2001, Yuval-Davis 2011), and interact in complex and highly individualised ways as we have seen, to some extent, through the qualitative data. However, we can say with some certainty that although ethnic identity is of overwhelming salience, class does bear some relevance to the identity frameworks of the South Asian middle classes whether obliquely or otherwise.

## **5.6 Conclusion**

In this chapter, I found that despite generally high levels of ethnic and religious identity salience, differences exist in relation to subjectivities of race / ethnicity, nationality and religion between ethnic groups. The Indian middle class samples, in relation to the Pakistani classes samples, tended to have higher levels of ethnic and lower levels of religious identity. Through the quantitative modelling, class was found to significantly mediate the relationship between ethnicity and both ethnic commonality and evaluations of religious prejudice for Indians and Pakistanis. The South Asian middle class sample seemed, at large, to consider their national identity often just as if not more important to their sense self as their minority ethnic identity. In the descriptive analyses, differing results were found across similar

phenomena depending on the type of question asked – identity salience in contrast to ethnic commonality, for instance. This indicates the importance of contextualising results within the context of the wording and framing of survey questions.

The qualitative data found differences across ethnic identities – broader ethnic, smaller sub-ethnic, and caste-based – which were largely predicated on the types of communities the respondents are embedded in. The interviewees in general held a plurality of religious identifications, and complex relationships between ethnic and religious identity were found. Those with strong Muslim identities were keen to discuss rising anti-Muslim racism. A tentative association was found between heightened awareness of religious discrimination and religious identity salience across those in the Muslim ethno-religious groups (Jaspal 2015, Schmitt et. al 2003, Verkuyten 1995). This seemed to do little to dampen the salience of British identity for some. Muslim respondents Karim and Hasan intellectualised and linked Britishness to their own normative interpretation of middle-class values indicating the conceptual links some respondents made between constructions of Britishness and middle-classness.

Intersections of female-ness, Asian-ness and working classness were also found to create unique environments of oppression in both the personal sphere and the professional workspace (Reay et al. 2007). Most respondents noted instances where they had been hyper-aware of their ethnicity and / or gender in predominantly White, male, middle-class spaces (Song 2003). Deepak and Bisma – both of working-class background – work in large, corporate organisations and described how they codeswitch from situation to situation to conform to the classed and raced norms of their organisations, but both were reluctant to label this as exclusionary, more so an occupational hazard. Those of all ethnic backgrounds but particularly Hussain and Mohan individualised such issues, rationalising them as a personal or even cultural failing rather a real, structural phenomenon (Meghji and Saini 2017), despite their strong sense of ethnic and cultural pride. This lends credence to Statham's (1999) view that the divisive framing of ethnic minorities in British multicultural society encourages 'quietism' from the most economically successful South Asians, the political implications of which will be explored in the next chapter.

Limitations in terms of the data harnessed in this chapter must be acknowledged. Even within a semi-structured setting, it is difficult to ensure all possible avenues of thought are covered given the dynamism, relationality and multiplicity of identity frameworks (Levine-Rasky 2011, p. 242). With the quantitative data, robust group comparisons, as mentioned throughout, are difficult with small minority ethnic datasets. This is why much of the Bangladeshi middle-class data from the EMBES was not viable for comparative statistical analysis, and a robust analysis by gender and generation could not be facilitated within the class and ethnic

analysis. Furthermore, it was discussed that the reductive and abstract framing of some of the questions from the surveys is not necessarily ideal for tapping the complexities of identities.

Chapter 6 analyses the extent to which minority identifications translate into a discernible sense of political consciousness – both in terms of class and minority race / ethnicity - which affects political party identity and civic and political activity.

## **6. Political consciousness on political identity and activity**

### **6.1 Introduction**

Chapters 4 and 5 established similarities and differences between South Asian ethnic groups in relation to conceptualisations and self-definitions of class, racial, ethnic and religious identity. This chapter focuses on the politicised manifestations and consequences of these identifications. Political identity is operationalised by indicators measuring party identity on the left-right political spectrum, and political activity covers the extent of engagement in civic and political acts.

Most of the quantitative data in this chapter derives from attitudinal and behavioural political indicators in the EMBES but also - with regard to civic activity in particular - the CS. In places, data from the White British sample in the main British Election Study will be used as a broader comparative group, and the working as well as middle classes will be referred to in places to provide broader context. This is important in this chapter given the need to politically 'situate' the British South Asian middle classes, although the intra-ethnoracial that has been carried out thus far dominates. The qualitative data gives us scope to analyse rationalisations of political identity from the interview respondents which in places links to narratives on class and ethnic identity explored in previous chapters. As in Chapter 5, the qualitative findings feature alongside the quantitative data.

In this chapter I analyse indicators of class and race consciousness across the different ethnic groups in question. I use data reduction techniques to analyse the interplay of racial / ethnic minority and class consciousness. Quantitative and qualitative analysis on political identity and activity are then be carried out, with the onus again on if and how these manifest differently across ethnicities and occupational class groupings. I finally run regression analyses to determine differential levels of party identity and activity across different South Asian ethnic and class fractions who harbour different types of political consciousness. Throughout, the limitations of the quantitative analysis are discussed.

## 6.2 Minority racial / ethnic and class consciousness

This section explores the politicised beliefs and attitudes of the South Asian middle classes with regard to views on racial / ethnic minority and class inequalities and discriminations. Although consciousness is difficult to empirically pin down, this chapter harnesses it as a concept that reflects the politicisation of socio-political identities and beliefs. The focus is on two 'types' of consciousness: 1) minority racial / ethnic consciousness and 2) class consciousness. Whereas Chapter 5 used the quantitative data to analyse racial and ethnic identity salience alongside perceptions of discrimination and relative deprivation, this section looks at race / minority ethnic consciousness insofar as it is defined as an awareness of, and consensus about, the need for minority group action based on these feelings of discrimination and relative deprivation. Measuring relative deprivation on an individual level more directly would entail indicators based on, for example, perceived over- and under-payment to analyse the degree to which South Asian individuals in professional and managerial occupations believe they are worse or better off in relation to other in similar positions to them. Rose (1996) discusses this analysis in the context of 1999 British Social Attitudes survey data which found that (not controlling for any other factors) GPs, skilled and unskilled factory workers and shop assistants in all income brackets and social classes perceive themselves to be underpaid while solicitors perceive themselves to be overpaid.

Indicators used in this analysis cover views on minority representation in politics, views on the majority versus the minority will, and evaluations on the benefits of pro-Black and Asian political action. Class consciousness is somewhat more complex. Most of the relevant indicators found in the data - views on trade unions and trade union membership, wealth and inequality, nationalisation and privatisation, and worker's rights – tap a left-of-centre<sup>59</sup> class consciousness embedded in traditional working-class interests. The diffuseness of middle-classness makes it harder, by contrast, to ascertain the bases of a middle-class political consciousness (Coyner 1997) thus a pro-equality, worker-solidarity form of class consciousness will be measured instead. It is important not to uniformly equate left-leaning dispositions such as these with a) objectively working-class people identity given the rise of a large, urban increasingly left-wing middle-class (Crozier et al. 2008), and b) working-class identifiers, given previous research which has found that attitudes to redistribution differ little between objectively middle-class people who feel they are working-class and objectively middle-class people who feel they are middle-class (NatCen 2016). We might find in the

---

<sup>59</sup> Left-of-centre broadly refers to views "favouring more equal distribution of income and wealth, the nationalisation of industry and state provision of health, education and welfare" (Argyle 1994, p. 218) which reflect, to some extent, with the sorts of indicators tapping class consciousness in this analysis.

qualitative analysis, therefore, that both working- and middle-class identifiers in this study share similar levels of class consciousness.

The differing nature of class consciousness on the one hand and minority ethnic / race consciousness on the other (McAll 1992) brings to the fore questions about the extent to which the two can be substantively as well as statistically brought together. However, the class and racial / ethnic minority political positionings arguably cannot be compartmentalised because of the symbiotic nature of race and class formation in society (Hall 1978), hence the need for analysis to ascertain relationships between the two. Most ethnic minorities in British society are working-class or were from working-class backgrounds so both sets of indicators (race / minority ethnic and class consciousness) might be said to tap a general sense of concern about socio-economic inequality, which we may assume most ethnic minorities in the UK resonate with. The extent to which class and race consciousness do actually converge, therefore, as well as their levels across the groups in question, will be seen in the following analyses.

As discussed briefly in the methodology chapter with regard to the interpretive limitations of survey indicators (section 3.5), it is prudent to acknowledge whether consciousness is best measured in a context where one's class or racial positioning is brought into question, rather than through structured survey indicators. There is also the more practical limitation of the restrictions the data place on fully operationalising the concept of consciousness. There seem to be, however, a sufficiently broad and comprehensive set of indicators tapping many of the salient facets of what can be called political consciousness.<sup>60</sup> These will be analysed and interrogated fully in this section before being operationalised as independent variables in the final regression models in this chapter. Also, the qualitative data will provide a useful addition to the quantitative findings.

With regard to the analysis in this section, a principal components analysis will identify latent relationships both within and across the two sets of consciousness variables (table 6.3). The chosen indicators of class and race / minority ethnic consciousness will first be analysed in tables 6.1 and 6.2. The results are listed separately for middle-class and non-middle-class South Asians in order to gauge where the two socio-economic groups diverge on indicators that tap broader ethnic group and specifically (working-class) solidarity. The sample for the PCA will *not* be restricted to professionals and managers here, in contrast to the PCA run in Chapter 5 (table 5.4) because the ensuing components will be input into regression models in section 6.6 which will be run across the South Asian sample at large. It is also statistically

---

<sup>60</sup> 'Political consciousness' in the context of this refers to both class and racial / minority ethnic consciousness together.

prudent given the low sample sizes accrued from the mailback questionnaire in which these questions featured (PCA requires as large a sample size as possible to minimise errors of inference in the process of analysis (Osborne and Castello 2004)).

### 6.2.1 Class consciousness

Variables 'a' to 'h' feature in the EMBES mailback questionnaire and tap a sense of class consciousness. Each variable featured in table 22 is listed with the identical wordings as they appear in the questionnaire. The respondents were asked in the case of each question to mark, on an ordinal Likert scale, the extent to which they agree or disagree with the statement. The options appeared in this order: *'agree strongly'*, *'agree'*, *'neither agree nor disagree'*, *'disagree'*, *'strongly disagree'*. Some of these variables have differing 'valences' in the sense that they tap opposing sentiments, highlighted in the table. For example, the statement *'in a true democracy, income and wealth are redistributed to ordinary working people'* could be said to measure the extent of agreement with the democratic principle of wealth redistribution. We might posit an individual subscribing to a left-of-centre, worker-centred sense of class consciousness would agree strongly with this statement. The question *'ordinary working people get their fair share of the nation's wealth'*, on the other hand, seems to measure agreement with the idea that wealth is already fairly distributed, somewhat antithetical to a left-of-centre anti-capitalist stance. An individual with a sense of class consciousness - someone cognisant of working-class struggle and invested in eradicating class inequality (section 2.2.8) - may disagree with this statement and agree with the former. The same goes for the variables which measure agreement with the statement that there is *no* need for strong trade unions, and that private enterprise *is* the best economic strategy. Variables 'f', 'g' and 'h' therefore measure the percentage of the sample who disagreed, rather than agreed, with the statement.

**Table 6.1 Indicators of class consciousness**

	MC	N	Non-MC	N	All	N
<b><i>Agree / strongly agree with statement</i></b>						
a) It is the government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one	57.5	155	69.2	334	65.9	489
b) There is one law for the rich and one law for the poor	46.9	154	49.7	336	48.9	490
c) In a true democracy, income and wealth are redistributed to ordinary working people	34.3	155	45.9	338	42.7	493
d) Major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership	48.7	155	34.3	335	38.3	490
e) People should be allowed to organise public meetings to protest against the government	63.7	154	61.8	333	62.3	487
<b><i>Disagree / strongly disagree with statement</i></b>						
f) There is no need for strong trade unions to protect employees' working conditions and wages*	56.9	154	52.0	335	53.3	489
g) Private enterprise is the best way to solve Britain's economic problems*	27.4	154	23.0	334	24.3	488
h) Ordinary working people get their fair share of the nation's wealth*	51.0	152	37.6	333	41.3	485

NB: All South Asians. British Election Study Ethnic Minority Survey 2010. Weighted data. MC = those in professional / managerial occupations. Non-MC = those in non-professional / managerial occupations. Counts in table represent unweighted base. All questions drawn from the mailback questionnaire which had a lower response rate and smaller sample sizes than for those questions featured in the main CAI questionnaire. \* These variables have been recoded so they tap a similar political sentiment to variables 'a' to 'e'.

The consensus is largely pro-protest, pro-union and pro-job creation across the sample at large, although there are significant differences in the extent to which the latter is prioritised by the middle and non-middle-class South Asian samples ( $\chi^2=11.977$  (4)  $p<0.05$ ). Almost two-thirds of the South Asian sample at large agree with the right to hold political protest, approximately half agree that there is one law for the rich and one for the poor, and over half disagree that there is no need for strong trade unions. There is a significant difference in levels of agreement between middle-class and non-middle-class British South Asians with the statements regarding wealth redistribution: 'ordinary people get fair share of wealth' ( $\chi^2=17.173$  (4)  $p<0.01$ ) and 'in a true democracy redistribute wealth' ( $\chi^2=17.412$  (4)  $p<0.01$ ). The directionality of the difference varies between the two indicators, however, depending on the extent of appeal in the question to democratic values. Over half of the South Asian middle classes (51 per cent) disagree with the statement that ordinary people get their fair share of wealth (13.4 percentage points more than the non-middle classes) but only 34.3 per

cent would equate wealth redistribution with true democracy (11.6 percentage points less than the non-middle classes). This hinders, somewhat, assessing where the class difference lies in views on wealth redistribution across the South Asian sample. The divergence in the samples sizes between middle-class and non-middle-class South Asians also means that the significant differences stated above must be interpreted cautiously.

## 6.2.2 Racial / minority ethnic consciousness

In terms of racial / ethnic minority consciousness, there are a range of indicators in the EMBES measuring attitudes to the protection of ethnic and racial minorities, ethnic minority representation in Parliament, and the need for / utility of ethnic and racial minority group political activity.<sup>61</sup> Some of these explicitly refer to 'Black and Asian' whereas others refer to 'minority' and 'majority' interest. They tap a politically salient sense of racial and / or ethnic minority belonging, solidarity, and relative deprivation as a result of holding a marginalised group position in society.

There are issues here with regard to definitions of 'majority' and 'minority'. The assumption, given the shared racial / ethnic minority status of the sample, is that respondents will have been thinking of their minority South Asian ethnic or ethno-religious identity when answering these questions. However, with the questions that specifically refer to both Black and Asian people instead of 'minority' ('i', 'j', 'k' and 'p' in table 6.2), some may have harboured conflicting views about the needs and struggles of Blacks in comparison to Asians (Modood 1994). Furthermore, the non-UK born-and-brought-up respondents in the sample may have differing perceptions of their individual and group minority status to the UK-born respondents. The regression analyses at the end of this chapter will control for generation. The qualitative analysis will, to some extent, allow us to see which sorts of minority interests were expressed by the South Asian professional interviewees, and whether these were broad or specific, and based on race / ethnicity or otherwise.

Each indicator in table 6.2 ('i' to 'p') appears exactly as it does in the mailback questionnaire. The frequencies below are, again, the responses for '*agree*' and '*strongly agree*' or '*disagree*' and '*strongly disagree*' depending on the valence of the question.

---

<sup>61</sup> There is an absence of indicators directly relating to gender equality and women's rights in this set of variables. Political solidarities amongst South Asian women based on gender is a subject that absolutely requires further research and analysis (Takhar 2006) but is largely beyond the scope of this section.

**Table 6.2. Indicators of a race / ethnic minority consciousness**

	MC	N	Non-MC	N	All	N
<b><i>Agree / strongly agree with statement</i></b>						
i) Black and Asian MPs can represent Black and Asian interests better than White MPs can	50.3	156	44.7	339	46.3	495
j) Black and Asian people don't have the same opportunities and chances in life as White people, as they are held back by prejudice and discrimination	46.0	155	47.8	338	47.2	493
k) Getting more Black and Asian people into Parliament would improve things for ethnic minorities in Britain	63.0	156	63.6	340	63.5	496
l) Even if it is not liked by the majority, the government must protect the interests of the minorities	79.9	154	64.8	341	69.0	495
m) Giving equal treatment is not enough, the government should give special treatment to minorities	15.7	156	24.2	335	21.8	491
<b><i>Disagree / strongly disagree with statement</i></b>						
n) In a democracy, the majority has a right to pass laws to protect its own language and culture*	17.1	156	14.7	336	15.3	492
o) In a democracy, the will of the majority community should prevail*	22.4	151	10.7	337	13.9	488
p) Neither politics nor protests will get Black and Asian people anywhere. There is no point in trying to do anything*	53.0	153	41.6	340	44.7	493

NB: All South Asians. British Election Study Ethnic Minority Survey 2010. Weighted data. MC = those in professional / managerial occupations. Non-MC = those in non-professional / managerial occupations. Counts in table represent unweighted base. All eight questions are drawn from the mailback questionnaire which had a lower response rate and thus smaller sample sizes than for those questions featured in the main CAI questionnaire. \*These variables have been recoded so they tap a similar political sentiment to variables 'i' to 'm'.

Despite strong sentiments about protecting minorities – over two thirds of the whole South Asian sample and 80 per cent of the middle-class sample (significantly more than the non-middle-class sample ( $\chi^2=15.613$  (4)  $p<0.01$ )) believe the government must protect the interests of minorities - few across the whole South Asian sample (only 15.7 per cent of the middle-class sample, significantly fewer than the non-middle-class sample ( $\chi^2=10.388$  (4)  $p<0.05$ )) are in agreement that *special treatment* must be given to minority groups. There is a limit, therefore, to the extent that the South Asian sample (and particularly the South Asian middle classes) believe radical measures like affirmative action should be used by the government to redress issues of minority deprivation. For most, the cultural majority *does*

have a democratic right to cultural preservation, despite a higher proportion believing that the will of the majority community should not prevail, and significantly more of the seemingly less minority orientated middle-class ( $\chi^2=13.706$  (4)  $p<0.01$ ) believing so. As the second statement is broader than the first, it may have evoked different connotations regarding the meaning of democracy, concerning issues beyond 'language and culture'. Approximately half of the whole South Asian sample, and similar proportions of the middle and non-middle-class samples, believe that Black and Asian MPs can represent Black and Asian interests better than White people, and that Black and Asians are held back by prejudice and discrimination. There are, however, significant differences in levels of agreement between middle-class and non-middle-class British South Asians with the statement 'neither politics nor protests gets Black and Asian anywhere' ( $\chi^2=13.948$  (4)  $p<0.01$ ).

The need for affirmative action and minority parliamentary representation are, out of all the issues addressed by the race / minority ethnic consciousness indicators, the most agreed upon across the whole South Asian sample where the sample size is fairly large at approximately 500. Protest / agitation was brought up in the last set of indicators and also features in this set in the context of its usefulness for Black and Asian people. Both sets of indicators (class and race / minority ethnic consciousness) suggest a fair amount of pro-minority, pro-worker, left-of centre political consciousness across the (albeit small) South Asian middle-class sample. The extent to which this sentiment is politically mobilised will be explored through the qualitative data and more quantitative analysis. A principal component analysis (PCA) to ascertain statistical inter-dimensionality between all 16 consciousness indicators now follows.

### **6.2.3 Consciousness factor scores**

A PCA was conducted using the above indicators for all South Asians (table 6.3). The aim was to reduce the set of racial / minority ethnic consciousness and class consciousness indicators to a smaller set of composite factors with which to carry out regression analyses later on in the chapter. Including all the indicators for class as well as race / ethnic minority consciousness (16 in total) into the initial PCA generated 6 components (eigenvalues > 1). This indicates that there are a number of different, underlying relationships between them that we can tease out for further descriptive and inferential analysis. The first three components in the rotated model account for nearly a third of the total variance (see Appendix II A2.20, p. 60). All loadings higher than .3 and lower than -.3 have been highlighted. For variables 'f' to 'h' and 'n' to 'p', the wordings have been changed to reflect their recoding.

**Table 6.3 Principal component analysis with varimax rotation for 16 class and race / minority ethnic consciousness indicators**

	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6
<b>CLASS</b>						
a. Government responsibility to provide everyone a job	.070	-.136	.153	-.179	.674	.160
b. There is one law for rich & one law for poor	.131	-.221	.679	.108	.235	-.083
c. In a true democracy, wealth is redistributed	.052	-.111	-.186	-.383	.437	.216
d. Public services & industries should be state owned	.070	.175	-.025	.100	.771	-.170
e. People should be allowed protest	.414	.213	.476	-.329	-.045	-.044
f. There is a need for strong trade unions	.053	.647	.222	.123	.116	.070
g. Private enterprise is not the best for economic problems	-.191	.359	.086	.245	.162	.612
h. Ordinary people do not get fair share of wealth	.066	.329	.732	.076	-.179	.017
<b>MINORITY RACE / ETHNICITY</b>						
i. Black & Asian MPs represent B&A interests better	.870	-.033	.063	.030	.062	-.035
j. B&As don't have same opportunities as Whites	.461	.001	.383	-.037	.122	.345
k. More B&As in parliament better for ethnic minorities	.839	.057	.099	-.004	.077	.016
l. Government must protect interests of minorities	.403	.370	.052	-.134	-.001	.237
m. Government should give special treatment to minorities	.199	-.222	-.135	-.163	-.069	.719
n. In a democracy will of majority should not prevail	.101	-.072	-.102	.769	-.046	-.154
o. Politics or protest do get B&As somewhere	.032	.746	-.112	-.075	-.126	-.154
p. In a democracy majority do not have right to protect culture	-.128	.078	.153	.702	-.061	.159

NB: All South Asians. British Election Study Ethnic Minority Survey 2010. Weighted data. Unweighted base: n = 425.

Component 1 fairly straightforwardly taps a sense of pro-minority (political) representation. The two indicators concerning Black and Asian political representation load heavily onto this component. Sentiments regarding racial inequality of opportunity and minority interest protection also load onto this component, although somewhat less strongly. What was classified as a class-related indicator – people should be allowed to protest the government – also loads onto this component. This suggests that the latent sentiment in this component is of a broad desire for better political representation. Pro-union and pro-minority politics / protest characterises component two, along with indicators expressing the need for nationalisation, wealth redistribution, and minority interest recognition. This component

therefore combines sentiments from across the two sets of consciousness indicators, largely tapping a sense of positivity towards the benefits of collective action. Component 3 covers wealth and racial inequalities, with the variables tapping agreement with the statement 'there is one law for the rich and one law for the poor' loading highly, along with the view 'ordinary people do not get their fair share of wealth'. Again, protest loads onto this indicator, suggesting again an interrelationship between political belief based in social equality, and recognition of the need for grassroots political action.

The two most similar indicators in terms of wording load heavily onto component 4 – that the majority will and the majority culture should not dominate in a democratic society. This suggests that the former two indicators which tap a sentiment that specifically relates to the need for minority cultural protection and recognition are set apart from other, broader considerations of social and economic equality. Component 5 is the only component where high loadings don't cross both the class and the minority racial / ethnic consciousness set of indicators. Indicators regarding welfare and socio-economic equality (nationalisation, job provision, and wealth redistribution) load highly onto this component. The overriding sentiment in component 6 is more difficult to gauge by contrast. Lack of equality of opportunity and the need to give minorities special treatment (which few in any ethnic group agreed with) load onto this component. However, so does left-wing anti-private enterprise / anti-capitalist sentiment. This component seems to tap a broad sense of agreement with affirmative action.

For the South Asian sample at large, therefore, there is indeed some overlap between what has been characterised as class consciousness on the one hand, and racial / minority ethnic consciousness indicators on the other. These components will (somewhat reductively but for the purposes of efficiency) be referred to from here on out as:

**C1:** Pro- B&A political representation

**C2:** Pro- agitation

**C3:** Pro- socio-economic equality


**C4:** Pro- minority will

**C5:** Pro- welfarism


**C6:** Pro- affirmative action

Fig. 12 depicts the sentiments each of these components tap in a diagrammatic format. Fig. 13 compares the mean estimate for the middle-class (professional and managerial) and, non-middle-class South Asian respondents, across the consciousness scales. This allows us to see the extent to which consciousness differs, and thus may be dependent on, objective class positioning.

**Fig. 12 Indicators tapped by consciousness components generated from Principal Components Analysis**



**Fig. 13 Mean estimate and 95 per cent error bars for rescaled consciousness factor scores**



NB: All South Asians. British Election Study Ethnic Minority Survey 2010. Weighted data. Unweighted base: South Asian middle-class n = 136; South Asian non-middle-class n = 289.

The non-middle-class South Asian sample is, on average, more pro-welfare and more pro-affirmative action. The middle-class sample are somewhat more pro socio-economic equality, holding stronger views about wealth disparity and socio-legal inequality. The larger confidence interval, however, suggests this estimate is somewhat more unstable than the others. The middle-class sample are more positive about the need and worth of ethnic minority political and parliamentary representation, and especially political protest. This could suggest a heightened sense of political efficacy for the South Asian middle classes, motivated to effect group uplift, and with the resources to do so (Klandermans 2005).

It is important to understand if and how political consciousness can be evidenced in the conversations with the interviewees, and how this relates to class and race / ethnicity as social identities explored in the previous chapters. Given the nature of political consciousness as a dynamic phenomenon which is sensitive to the economic and political climate, it will be interesting to see how political stances are situated within time and place for the interview respondents, and amongst whom and to what extent there is an enduring sense of, for

example, pro-welfarism or pro-agitation sentiment grounded in the social positioning and identities of the respondents. Anecdotes and accounts of political action and agitation from the respondents will illuminate the extent to which they evoke a sense of class and / or race solidarity, and enrich as well as challenge the statistical findings established thus far. This will be helpful given reservations certain scholars like Marshall (1988) have with regard to the efficacy of structured survey questions in capturing political consciousness.

#### *6.2.4 Manifestations of political consciousness in interviews*

The qualitative data can highlight how minority political consciousness links to class and race / minority ethnic identification. 2 of the 7 Bangladeshi interviewees expressed firm views about equality, representation and social justice. This seemed to be driven by a) by their own minority positionalities and identities, and b) the content of their professional work. We see through the qualitative data how individuals reconcile their middle-class social locations with poverty and wealth inequality, and how their proximity to such injustice (the extent to which they are (still) embedded in working-class communities) determines their political positioning on these matters. We can also ascertain the extent to which political orientations might be more complex and conflicted than posited in the quantitative analysis. Given discussions in the previous chapter regarding the perceptions of discrimination and prejudice, it is also interesting to see where the respondents stand on the social and political representation of minorities and minority culture, given their often politically conservative views as will be evidenced later.

##### 6.2.4.1 Reconciling objective class status and social inequality

When defining his position on MacArthur's ladder of social status, Tariq struggled to reconcile his 'fortunate' social positioning with the uneven distribution of wealth he sees in society. He acknowledged societal inequality and understood that, socio-economically, he is currently in a good position. When discussing aggregate class categories, the issue of wealth inequality didn't explicitly come up in his conversation. It is interesting that when a more abstract and open framing of social hierarchy was presented to him like MacArthur's ladder of social status, he decided to focus on this particular aspect of social division: '*You've still got such a disproportionate distribution of wealth, and you know that the percentile of, and I know that I'm very fortunate in my position actually*' (Tariq, Pakistani Muslim engineer from London). Zain similarly acknowledged, like Tariq, that inequality is a social problem, although he did not refer to his own social positioning when discussing this. For Karim, however, even his proximity to those in the lower echelons of society through his legal aid work cannot convince him that the poorest in society are not only the worst off in society, but worse off than him:

*'One thing that's become evident in the last 30 years is that [rich-poor] division has actually grown. It's getting bigger, that split, that division is getting bigger (Zain, Pakistani Punjabi Muslim lawyer from Birmingham)*

*'I'm in legal aid, a lot of my clients are not in work, the reason why they get legal aid is because their either on benefits or they're on a very very low income. We might find that in terms of disposable income, their disposable income is a lot better than the people who are actually in work, who might be, who might be earning lower income. Even on an income like mine, cos most, more than 67 per cent of my income goes on my mortgage, erm, you'll find somebody who's on benefits, their disposable income is quite high' (Karim, Bangladeshi lawyer from London)*

There is an underlying critique of welfarism here which echoes his comments in section 4.4.3 on the spurious relationship he sees between income / wealth and middle-classness: *'What does middle-class mean any more today I don't know what it means'*. Bisma, who we found in section 4.4.1 identified as working-class, is driven in her socialist beliefs by wealth inequality. In contrast to Karim, who has a similar ethno-religious positioning, class background, and job, and with whom we might thus expect views are shared, Bisma is sympathetic to those on benefits. As with her expressions of class and religious identity, she is firm on her political beliefs and passionate when expressing them. In contrast to Tariq and Zain, societal inequality drives Bisma to be *'angry'* and *'upset'*:

*"I am a socialist at heart, I do, I, you know, one of the things that does make me angry and upset is when I see inequality in wealth, when you see, you know, the richest 1% owning, being richer than the rest of the population [...] you do see people really struggling on benefits and, you know, they're being made out to be the scapegoats"*

Rakhi's defence of welfarism is less expressive than Bisma's and less critical than Karim's. As a corporate lawyer from a middle-class background she has less proximity to those at *'the bottom'* than Karim and Bisma. She therefore refers to principles of rights and liberties and the need for *'social stability and cohesion'* (echoing her comments about stable middle-class family structures in section 4.2.2). Her accounts of her class and ethnic identity were almost academic in their rigour, and this is reflected in the way she expresses her political views. She refers to India as a comparison point here, as she did with regard to her views on class (section 4.2.3). However, whilst highlighting her knowledge and experience of her country of origin, she places her interests firmly within Britain, by referring to it as *'our society'* and relegating India to *'a society'*. She thus stated she would never want the inequality situation there *'to be replicated in this country'*:

*'If you neglect the bottom, you know, the bottom majority of this country, ultimately tensions are created [...] I think it's about social stability and cohesion and obviously worrying about the basic human rights and fundamental liberties of the lowest kind of classes in our society [...] [in] India you know, you see the impact that extreme inequality has on a society, and what an awful environment it is to live in, and you would never want even elements of that to be replicated in this country, which is why the welfare state is so important' (Rakhi, Indian Gujarati Hindu lawyer from London)*

#### 6.2.4.2 Conflicting political ideologies

In terms of political orientation, Rakhi discussed the potentially conflictual political identifications upwardly mobile South Asians hold. She described herself as well as her social circle as pro-welfare and pro-civic responsibility, and thus might be best classed as part of the left-leaning, liberal middle classes (Crozier et al. 2008). However, she noted that a focus on economy, entrepreneurship, business and private enterprise has shifted the political priorities of what she describes as the *'Asian community'* towards those parties who potentially better protect their financial concerns. Whether she aligns herself with these concerns is unclear, as when she discussed the *'Asian community'* she talked about *'them'* and their business interests, which do not necessarily apply to her personally given her job in a large, established corporate law firm. However, as established in section 5.2.8, she is well embedded within her local (and affluent) Asian community, and thus it stands to reason that she would be aware of, and sympathetic to, their broader political interests:

*'I think we're [her and her friends] all Guardian readers, we are all left-of-centre, we believe in the importance of the welfare state, erm, social responsibility [...], but equally recently there has been a general shift towards centre ground and an increasing sort of, the increasing popularity of the Tories because, erm, the economy is very important to the Asian community, you have to understand that most Indians are self-made, most Indians have big businesses, and it's very important to them' (Rakhi, Indian Gujarati Hindu lawyer from London)*

This political dissonance is also exemplified, to some extent, by Deepak who believes in the worth of some nationalised institutions but also in the *'free market'*. He described himself as Labour from the point of view that he wants to protect fundamentally British institutions (an indicator of his national identity informing his political priorities), but Conservative again based on economics:

*'I want to protect the NHS and the BBC, the kind of institutions that I think make this country unique, special and good, so from that point of view I'm like a Labour person.'*

*That said I'm a strong believer in the free market, generally speaking, in generally in business and so on it's only with that liberalisation again it generates innovation, it generates jobs, so I'm probably a bit like a Conservative' (Deepak, Indian Gujarati Hindu lawyer from London).*

Not only do Deepak and Rakhi hold potentially contradictory political orientations, but these ideological left-of-centre views seem to co-exist fairly unproblematically with their more pragmatic right-of-centre views. Rakhi in particular, however, suggests that the specificity of the needs of the 'Asian community' have brought about this level of political 'bricolage'.<sup>62</sup> As with class identifications, therefore, we begin to see the emergence of unique and potentially ethnic-specific modes of political identity being expressed by the respondents.

#### 6.2.4.3 Protecting minority interests

As stated in section 5.4.2, a select few respondents were positive about the gains made over their lifetime with regard to equality of opportunity and diversity. This was echoed in discussions about improvements made with regard to minority political representation. Karim was keen to discuss the success of South Asians within business and politics. His generalisations about 'everybody' doing professional jobs and 'making money', indicate his desire to emphasise the progress he thinks South Asians are making in the UK. He cited the examples of Sadiq Khan (the Mayor of London) and Sajid Javid (now Chancellor of the Exchequer but at the time of the interview Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills), using them as 'cornerstones' of the South Asian success story, their notoriety allowing him to extrapolate from the success of individuals to the success of a group. The divergent politics of the two figures and the extent to which their presence is more than simply a symbolic gain for the South Asian community is almost irrelevant. His mention of Tata steel, however (Europe's second largest steel producer owned by Indian Tata family), also denotes the significance, for Karim, of the economic as well as political 'power' held by those of South Asian origin in the UK:

*'Everybody's doing professional jobs, even if they're not doing professional jobs, you know, everybody's making money, got their businesses, all sorts of things, so you know, Sadiq Khan is maybe about to become London mayor, it's interesting the story about British steel, the Tata story, there you had like the seller was Tata, one of these British-Indian companies which has a long history. They were going to sell to another*

---

<sup>62</sup> Bricolage in this context refers to the 'patch-working' of political identity forged by Indian Asians seeking to reconcile their often divergent social and economic interests within the existing political landscape.

*Indian buyer, and the ministry in charge of the whole thing was Sajid Javid, you know, that's progress' (Karim, Bangladeshi lawyer from London).*

Karim's statement here exemplifies the sort of discourse consistent with post-racial ideological views. The 'successful' experience of social mobility, compounded by mainstream political discourse which routinely pays lip service to equality and diversity, often constitutes sufficient evidence, for some, of a reduction in systemic racism: "those who give support to post-racial ideology do so because it is consistent with their practical consciousnesses and life experiences. Most were born poor or working-class, strived to achieve well educationally [...] moved into professional jobs where they now earn a competitive salary and continue to do so while being on a ladder of upward mobility [...] post-racial ideology thus appears completely *non-ideological* to them; it appears more so as a storyline of their own personal successes" (Meghji and Saini 2017, p. 8).

Rakhi and Ali, both from middle-class backgrounds (2 of only 3 in the qualitative sample) speak positively about levels of '*diversity*' and '*tolerance*' in the UK:

*"In the UK we're very tolerant of different cultures, and I think that's one of our greatest strengths, our diversity, but it almost means that we celebrate diversity, and we encourage communities to identify with their roots and with their cultural background" (Rakhi, Indian Gujurati Hindu lawyer from London)*

*"There's lots of tolerance going on for all minorities, it's not even colour, it's gay, straight, whatever, people with mental issues, these sorts of things are getting much more [...] there's more awareness of things" (Ali)*

Like Karim who also talks about '*progress*', they talk around rather than about sticky, political issues (Ahmed 2004) of race, which arguably lie at the heart of the debate about ethnic minority integration and mobility. Their comments, particularly Rakhi's, denote a strong sense of national identity that feeds into, and / or is fed by, their view that British society is inclusive of minorities, and is becoming more progressive.

#### 6.2.4.4 Black and Asian political representation

Whereas Karim mentions Sadiq Khan in a fairly politically benign way, within a larger conversation about South Asian progress, Bisma and Ali specifically discuss Sadiq Khan in the context of political representation. For Ali, whose ethno-religious identity did not come through as strongly as the other Bangladeshi interviewees, it is Khan's status as a fellow Muslim that he thinks is uniquely positive. He is reluctant to point this out, however, as he

states, *'it shouldn't be a big factor'*, also citing a number of his other positive attributes to indicate that he has widespread appeal:

*[Sadiq Khan] seems alright, he seems like he's, and I think to be honest, it shouldn't be a big factor but I think a Muslim person coming through can only be a positive thing, he's got a good gauge on different communities, he's modern, educated, he's, you know, he seems alright, he does charity runs and stuff like that, seems like he keeps himself healthy and fit, he's a family man, so he seems alright, he seems like he cares (Ali)*

Bisma, on the other hand, again expresses her strong, critical political stance by directly referring to the Whiteness of Khan's competitor to the mayoral position. Bisma and Ali almost say the same thing but in very different ways. Bisma talks about politicians like former London mayoral Conservative candidate Zac Goldsmith being *'completely out of touch'* with normal people, and Ali alludes to the same attribute, that he's *'got a good gauge on different communities'*. For Bisma, therefore, this particular political situation is a site of identity conflict, implicating class, gender, and race. For Ali, it has been an opportunity for a good person and a good political candidate to rise to a position of political power. Whereas Bisma does not explicitly mention the divergent class backgrounds of Zac Goldsmith and Sadiq Khan, she states that the working-class background of the latter, as well as his non-Whiteness, is a political boon:

*"Look at the Tories now and it's all White male, completely out of touch with what normal people are [...] I think a lot of people identify with [Sadiq Khan], you know, they did say yeah, rather him than someone like Zac Goldsmith who probably has no idea what it's like to, you know, grow up having parents struggle to put food on the table" (Bisma, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London)*

Whereas Ali stresses that Sadiq Khan is *'modern, educated'*, placing him in proximity to middle-classness, Bisma, as a working-class identifier herself, focuses on the benefits of his unprivileged background. Bisma finds her working-class background to be beneficial to her own job (section 4.4.1) and sees this also as a positive attribute – which we can possibly link to conversations in Chapter 4 about class and ethnic capital - for a modern-day politician. Ali, however, despite his positivity about the 'capital' Khan's religious positioning could bring to the role of the Mayor, still feels the need to 'credentialise' him by citing his more 'traditional' political credentials.

The different rationalisations of minority representation were subsumed under the quantitative analysis which suggest that, if they had taken part in the EMBES 2010 survey,

individuals like Ali and Bisma would be likely to score high on the pro-Black & Asian minority representation scale. The qualitative data has allowed us to assess where potential contradictions lie in terms of stances on issues such as wealth redistribution and the reasoning behind these. The next section focuses on the party identities of the South Asian middle classes, furthering the analysis of political orientations, but with a particular focus on drivers related to ethnic minority interests which have only been touched on this far.

### **6.3 Political party identity**

This section looks at political party identity and voting behaviour, and subjective evaluations of the main UK political parties based on their perceived track record of protecting the interests of ethnic minorities and different classes in society. It specifically provides insight into the way the South Asian middle classes reason their party identity and voting behaviour respectively, and any potential discrepancies between the two.

The question under scrutiny in the following analysis measures party identity: *'generally speaking, do you think of yourself as Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat, (Scottish National/Plaid Cymru1) or what?'* There are a number of indicators in the EMBES which measure party political attitudes including 'closeness' to a particular party in relation to others, party 'preference', electoral preference, and the party which 'represents one's views' best. Party identity is best understood a (complex) approximation of not only party preference but affective loyalties and solidarities to a political group (Green et al. 2002). The extent to which party identity may or may not be associated with voting behaviour will be analysed later on. A2.21 (Appendix II, p. 61) shows party identity across the main political parties for the three ethnic groups in question and across the full South Asian sample. The results of the White British middle-class sample are also shown here to gauge differences between the landscape of party identity from the South Asian middle-class sample at large to the 'native' middle-class ethnic 'majority'.

Labour was the modal choice across each ethnic group in the South Asian middle-class sample. Over a quarter (27.4 per cent) of the Pakistanis opted for the Liberal Democrats and 5.1 per cent for the Conservative party. This is in contrast to the Indians, 13.7 per cent of whom asserted Liberal Democrat party identity and 19.1 per cent Conservative. The Indian middle classes in the EMBES had the highest level of support out of all three for the Conservative party, chiming with the recent literature on the longer-standing socio-economic prosperity and thus growing political conservatism of this group (British Future 2015; Heath et al. 2013). Interestingly, where Labour identity is most prominent – amongst the Bangladeshis – lack of party identity is also most prominent. Despite the small sample sizes here, this is potentially indicative of disengagement with mainstream party politics but

requires further research with a larger sample. A far higher proportion of the full South Asian middle-class sample (44.9 per cent) than the White middle-class sample (25.6 per cent) asserted Labour party identity. This indicates that, determinants aside, there is a potential ethnic specificity to the politics of the South Asian middle classes.

We would expect South Asians to predominantly align themselves with Labour, a party which has historically protected both their class and ethnic minority interests party (Saggar 1998, The Electoral Commission 2005). We might expect the South Asian middle classes to identify with Labour less on the basis of class on instrumental terms, but still potentially on the basis of their minority status. Given that liberal, metropolitan professionals have been increasingly voting Labour (Heath et al. 2013), middle-class ethnic minority Labour popularity may be, in part, a reflection of this trend as well as a reflection of the historical affinity South Asian migrants have had to the party among other factors. For the non-UK born respondents, we might posit a mixture of ideological positioning based on immigrant status as well as a sense of socio-political group belonging might drive their affiliations towards Labour. Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are hyper-racialised as predominantly Muslim ethno-religious groups which may explain some of their lack of affinity with the Conservatives which many have argued is Islamophobic at the party level (Frost 2007). The stronger tendency towards Labour amongst the Bangladeshi respondents may be related to the way this group has historically used their local networks to successfully infiltrate 'mainstream' politics specifically via the Labour party (Eade and Garbin 2006), allowing them to address issues of group marginalisation and political disenfranchisement.

Party identity will be interrogated further in section 6.6.3. I ran a logistic regression analysis to establish whether types of class and minority racial / ethnic consciousness act as a driver for left-of-centre over right-of-centre political party identity for middle-class over non-middle-class South Asians. The party identity indicator analysed in A2.21 was recoded into a binary variable for this purpose. Labour, the Liberal Democrats,<sup>63</sup> Respect and the Green party are

---

<sup>63</sup> After the 2010 general election, the Liberal Democrat party entered into a coalition government with the Conservative party. Much of this was due to speculation that then-leader of the Liberal Party Nick Clegg was more ideologically aligned with the Conservative party at the time (Jones 2013). The interviewing for the EMSBES began the day after the election and was completed three months later, so some of the respondents had some exposure to the Coalition government when the survey was administered. Historically, the Liberal Democrats are seen as occupying the libertarian centre in UK politics, more aligned to socialist than capitalist economic views but not to the extent of the Labour party (Webb 2000). They are therefore known for occupying the centre ground in politics, though somewhat left-of-centre. For this reason – and despite the coalition agreement - the Liberal Democrats in this analysis have been conflated with Labour and further left-wing Green and Respect parties under the broad 'left-of-centre' category.

framed as 'left-of-centre' and the Conservatives, UKIP and BNP 'right-of-centre' parties (Appendix II A2.22, p. 61).

I've thus far evidenced (continuing) Labour party popularity across the South Asian middle-class EMBES sample, albeit to differing degrees between ethnic groups. These results have not shown, however, how individuals rationalise their feelings towards parties and the extent of their party identification. The interview data can help indicate the extent to which trends in party identity are clear cut, or whether individuals hold a more complex and fractious position on party politics. It can also tell us, most importantly, how this may be contingent on their minority identities and class belongings. A clear limitation is evident in the qualitative analysis however, is that the respondents were not directly probed about the political affiliations of their parents. As the qualitative analysis in Chapter 4 showed, class background had a bearing on respondents' rationalisations of their class identity. We can posit that the party identifications of one's parents, or the respondents' 'party political background' – may have a bearing on their current feelings towards, rationalisations of, and potentially current affiliations with, political parties. Percheron and Jennings (1981), Beck and Jennings (1991), Dalton and Weldon (2007) and Kroh and Selb (2009) suggest that parental socialisation is a strong - although not the only - source of partisanship. However, citizens update their political preferences and behaviours in response to a myriad of factors including the influence of class positioning, class identity, ethnic identity, rational political evaluations based on party efficacy, the broader political climate, media messaging and so on. We must also consider the variability of political attitudes, not just across long periods of time, but even – in the case of Butler and Stokes' (1969) study on political attitudes - between successive research interviews. Past the age of 25 (Jennings and Niemi 1981), i.e. the formative years, individuals tend to decline in their impressionability. With regard to second generation ethnic minorities, however, an enduring and politicised sense of relative deprivation handed down from parents may prove strong in determining adult political identities. Parental SES has certainly been found to contribute to political involvement and class-specific orientations due to the effect on attitudes encouraged in the home (Verba et al. 2005; Jennings et al. 2009). Dinas (2104) states, however, that on approaching adulthood, politically engaged adolescents are more open to changing their political preferences and perhaps, in the case of second-generation immigrants, those of their own parents (Kwon and Terriquez 2015).

### *6.3.1 Examining explanations of party identity*

One of the 9 interviewees in the 40-55 age bracket, Anita, stated she has '*always voted for the Labour party*' when asked to position herself on a left-right scale of political orientation. She contradicted this, however, by stating that she has also voted for the Liberal Democrats. She does not align herself with the Conservative party, but (somewhere) on the left. However,

unlike Bisma, a younger respondent who is a self-identifying socialist and thus firmly left-wing (section 6.2.4.1), Anita is keen to temper the extent of her alignment with left-of-centre politics, stating '*not too left*':

'Would you say you are a political person?

*Erm...not really [laughs].*

*Do you vote?*

*I do vote, I do vote.*

And where would you say you are on that left-right scale?

*'I would- I have always voted for the Labour party.*

Okay.

*I will probably, erm...actually have I? I've voted for Liberal as well. So I think I would sit along that fence. So, not too left' (Anita, Indian Bengali Hindu lawyer from London)*

This ambiguity towards her political identity and lack of party loyalty mirrors the ambivalence she holds towards her class and ethnic identities. As stated in section 4.4.2, Anita would classify herself as middle-class but doesn't necessarily have a strong affiliation to that identity. We also found in section 5.2 that although she '*feels Indian*', she isn't a strong identifier, or particularly embedded within her ethnic minority community. We could tentatively draw a relationship between her weak social identity salience and her weak political identity salience. However, even those respondents with strong social identifications held weak levels of party identification. In the whole qualitative sample, only Bisma – a young working class Muslim Bangladeshi - felt both strongly Muslim and working-class, and strongly party political.

For those respondents who held some discernible political positioning, choice of party chimed with self-positioning on the left-right political spectrum. When questioned about her voting behaviour, Nadya (Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer) stated '*I am very left. I'm not Conservative at all*'. Unlike Anita, Nadya was keen to position herself away from Conservative party, mentioning them explicitly. Nadya described herself as working-class in conversations, stating that she is firmly embedded within her ethnic minority working-class community (4.4.1). There is a strong established link between working classness and Labour party support, particularly amongst ethnic minorities (Saggar and Geddes 2000). This is said to persist even for those in middle-class social location because of a combination of long-standing party loyalty and pro-welfare attitudes. Nadya described herself as a Labour identifier but caveated this by saying '*probably*'. Given her '*very left*' political positioning, Labour is perhaps not left-wing enough for her, or they do not adequately represent the sorts of left-of-centre political views she holds.

It is interesting to see two of the female respondents with differing class and ethno-religious backgrounds and identities both express Labour / left-of-centre sentiment, but to far different extents, and with differing rationalisations. Nadya cites issues such as legal aid cuts (related to her work) and Islamophobia exacerbated by Conservative-led anti-terrorism policies to justify her left-wing political orientations. This is in contrast to Anita who aligns herself more with the politics of New Labour<sup>64</sup> and former Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair (see section 6.3.2). Whereas they may vote for the same party and express a left-of-centre positioning, their political identities (and class identities) were found to be far more differentiated.

Rakhi finds her political party identity problematised by the realities of the political environment. She expressed tension between ideology and rationality, stating that she does not *want* to affiliate herself with the Conservative party because of her pro-welfare stance, but, from a perspective of practicality and rationality, that they are the most politically stable option. As both an objective and subjective middle-class identifier who is disillusioned by left-of-centre parties, it is interesting that Rakhi doesn't in actual fact align herself with the economics-led business-owning Indian Conservatives she mentions in section 6.2.4.2. Although she indicates a lack of partisanship at the moment, her vehement rejection of the Tory label due to their welfare policies suggests her party identity is led in part by her left-of-centre ideological stance on the politics of redistribution:

*'In the present political climate I would be hesitant to associate myself with any political party because I feel completely disengaged by Labour, I feel let down by the Lib Dems, and it worries me that the only party that I feel a remote connec- a remote affiliation with is probably the Tories, and I am definitely not a Tory [...] it's just a travesty that they are breaking down our concept of the welfare state' (Rakhi, Indian Gujarati Hindu lawyer from London)*

Sunil has a clear non-partisan way of approaching party politics. He states that he votes on the basis of, primarily, leadership and party manifestos, but unlike Rakhi expresses little sense of a clear political ideology. None of the respondents were specifically asked to discuss their (immigrant) parents' political identifications although some like Sunil did discuss these unprompted. Although Sunil he understands why his parents might have voted Conservative - to distance themselves symbolically from the working classes / working classness - he does

---

<sup>64</sup> Although New Labour under Tony Blair (1997-2007) maintained a firm commitment to traditional Labour policies like investment into public services, they are still regarded in the history of the party as centrist in their ethos, with a business-friendly image and a commitment to fiscal prudence more characteristic of the Conservatives. This is in contrast to the current Labour party under Jeremy Corbyn (elected in September 2015 just before the interviews for this study commenced) which is seen, at its core, as more left-wing.

not claim to have been socialised into this party identity. He suggests here, interestingly, that his parents' Conservative identification might have been based on a value-driven sense of middle-class aspirationalism that he has not adopted, at least to the same extent. The literature on British Indian political preferences, by contrast, largely stresses the current more so than aspirational economic bases of their shifting political orientations (Heath et al. 2011). This is a clear indication, not discernible from the quantitative data, of the generational differences between party identity and its relationship to class positioning and aspirational class identity. The instrumentality of Sunil's current middle-class identity (section 4.4.2), like Anita's, is reflected in the instrumentality of his approach to voting:

*'I look at policies [...] on the leadership, and some of the, probably around, yeah, probably more around leadership and less so on policies [...] for example if all of a sudden Labour turned out to be brilliant next month I'd probably think 'oh okay, I'll vote for Labour', it just depends on the presentation and the manifesto and those bits. I think you might have mentioned it but when you were young was it kind of palpable which way your parents leaned in terms of politics or were they also - I think they were very Conservative, Conservative, Conservative and then this New Labour thing, and then back to Conservative. They were always very, very Conservative I would say. I'm pretty sure [...] If I recall I think it was always very Conservative, not Labour, I don't know why, maybe they aligned Labour to working-class' (Sunil, Indian Gujarati Hindu engineer from London)*

All of the older (40-55) respondents from working-class backgrounds (8) were acutely aware of the historic working-class following Labour had in the recent past and, unlike Sunil's parents, seemed to have adopted and retained this affiliation to the party. The way Dinesh talks about those with working-class backgrounds being *'all sort of Labour'* expresses an almost default, possibly indissoluble relationship between class and party, akin to the sort of conversations that were had about the indissoluble relationship between being an immigrant / ethnic minority and at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder (section 4.5.1). Nonetheless, Dinesh – like Rakhi – juxtaposes his intrinsic Labour positioning with his current disillusionment with the party:

*I think coming from a working-class background we're all sort of Labour in that sense, so I'm Labour leaning but I'm not outwardly Labour.*

Okay.

*But I'm not happy with the Labour policies at the moment, erm-*

Why, what is it?

*I don't see Jeremy Corbyn as being that appealing at the moment, and he's a bit of a leftie as well, erm, and I would say I'm more centre ground, like Blair was to a certain*

*extent, erm, but I'm not left or right, I'm more centre' (Dinesh, Indian Gujarati Hindu lawyer from Leicester)*

The sort of Labour party he is aligning himself with is fairly centrist. Dinesh like Anita and Rakhi, therefore, would perhaps not align himself with the sort of burgeoning pro-Corbyn Labour supporting liberal metropolitan elite. This suggests that some of the Labour identifiers within the Indian middle classes may be more politically aligned with the Conservative identifiers, despite their ostensible Labour identity, a nuance not necessarily discernible from the quantitative data.

### *6.3.2 Blairite tendencies across the Indian respondents*

The type of Labour support expressed by approximately half of the 7 Indian Hindu respondents has, as evidenced somewhat so far, seemed early New Labour / Blairite and politically centrist in ethos, as seen from the excerpts below:

*'Tony Blair would've been my ideal Labour party man' (Anita, Indian Bengali Hindu lawyer from London)*

*'I'll abstain from any voting at this particular point in time, but yeah, you know, previously for instance with the Blair government, I was a very solid Labour supporter' (Rakhi, Indian Gujarati Hindu lawyer from London)*

*'I was 18 in 1998, July, but I remember paying more of an interest in New Labour thinking, they're quite good, you can trust Mr. Blair' (Sunil, Indian Gujarati Hindu engineer from London)*

Only 2 of the 7 Bangladeshi respondents (and none of the 4 Pakistani respondents) mentioned Tony Blair, expressing more conflicted feelings about him. Hasan stated he had only voted once, when he was *'bowled over by Tony Blair'* but expresses feeling let down after the Iraq War that began in 2003. Hussain was turned off the Labour party as his political priorities began to align with his business interests, a key driver behind the increasing Conservative support amongst (primarily managerial) British South Asians at large (British Future 2015) and also mentioned earlier by Rakhi. However, the primary reason he *'despises'* the Labour party and Tony Blair seemed to be, like Hasan, because of his decision to involve the UK in the Iraq War, which lost the party a lot of support at the time amongst Muslims (Travis and Bunting 2004):

*'Second time I voted was after long years of the Conservatives and I voted Labour*

*party, and Tony Blair was in there. It was the worst mistake I ever made, I despise the Labour party [...] when I was at university I was fundamentally a socialist I would say, but the moment I opened my own business I became a fundamentalist capitalist, you know, I know it sounds too extreme, and then, but I despised the Labour party because of Tony Blair, I mean, don't forget he was the person, the reason why I voted initially, then because of Iraq, because of the arrogance [...] Labour party I still despise them, erm, Corbyn hasn't really changed anything. Conservatives I think, you know, not because I'm a lawyer and whatever, I would say, you know, when you're running a business you want to pay less tax' (Hussain, Bangladeshi lawyer from Birmingham)*

Despite the spurious track record of the Conservative party with Muslim ethno-religious minorities Hussain's economic interests drives him towards them. He is one of the very few interviewees from a Bangladeshi or Pakistani Muslim background who is pro-Conservative, even if just for instrumental reasons. The quantitative data evidenced the rarity of Conservative identification across the predominantly Muslim Pakistani and Bangladeshi South Asian middle-class samples in relation to the Indian middle-class sample. The excerpt above thus gives us a relatively unique insight into a potentially rare and complex political positioning.

### *6.3.3 Immigrant history and party identity*

Baljit states that he has been Labour in the context of parliamentary elections but Conservative in the context of local council elections. The impetus in both cases was the personal connection he had to each individual (indicative of Baljit's proximity to local politics and the extent to which he is embedded within his local community). Baljit's politics, therefore, is not only localised but individualised. Whereas his political party affiliations are fairly instrumental as well as linked to his own group belongings - his Conservative councillor has not only supported his ethnic-centred civic commitments but has a similar ethno-religious background to Baljit - he harbours an open distaste for the Conservative party and their anti-immigration agenda given his self-identified background as an 'immigrant'. Despite the affective power of deep-seated, historical political affiliations based on group identities, these don't necessarily always translate into voting behaviour:

*'X<sup>65</sup> was our MP, and he helped me a lot when I was younger [...] I'd always vote for X, but I'm a member of the Conservative Party when it comes to the local council elections because the chappy who is now our councillor is an Asian Sikh [...] they*

---

<sup>65</sup> Name has been omitted for purposes of confidentiality.

*give us sponsorship for a, I'm involved in a tournament called the WASA [Walsall Asian Sports Association], and the council, the local council sponsor it to the tune of about £10,000 on average, so the local Sikh councillor helps us [...] supports us, so I vote for him.*

In terms of the Conservative agenda itself [...] that doesn't really float your boat?

*No, not at all. Not at all [...] I'm an immigrant myself, erm, you know, born in India, came to this country and I don't feel that their immigration boss is right, I don't feel that they stretch they arms, they forget that a lot of the people in this country are immigrants themselves so again it doesn't erm, it doesn't rest comfortable with me, their policies, their immigration policies (Baljit, Indian Punjabi Sikh lawyer from Birmingham).*

This 'pan-party' identity / contradictory mix of party affiliations exhibited by Baljit is echoed by the only other Sikh Punjabi respondent in the sample, Mohan. On moving to what he described as a largely White, suburban, middle-class area in Warwickshire, Mohan describes how he was socialised into the area through involvement in money-raising events for the Tory party, and dinners with the local Tory member of Parliament. It seems as if this was something that 'happened' to Mohan as opposed to something engineered by him:

*'When we first moved to Barford, the first thing the neighbours did, they said the Tory party MP is here, we'd like to come in and introduce you to him. That's the first thing they said. Because he's a Tory, Warwick's all Tory [...] and we got to know him, er, and then we got to raise money for the Tory party, he had lunch at our place, dinner at the next place when we were raising money for the Tory party, and that was fine too, and I think a lot of the affluent Asians who moved out do tend to vote Tory party. But, you know, we still tend, after doing all that, I'm still biased and I wanted to vote Labour' (Mohan, Indian Punjabi Sikh engineer from Warwickshire)*

His statement that 'Warwick's all Tory' and 'I think a lot of the affluent Asians who moved out do tend to vote Tory' suggests an assumption on his part that political conservatism is a natural progression / a rite of passage in 'becoming' middle-class. However, his party identity is similarly conflicted, like Baljit's and Rakhi's. He states: 'after doing all that, I'm still biased and I wanted to vote Labour'. Long-standing party loyalties to the Labour party given Baljit and Mohan's immigrant / ethnic minority working-class background (Saggar and Geddes 2000) seemingly still resonate (also evidenced in section 4.4.3 with regard to rejection of a traditional class identity). There is, however, a disconnect present with regard to the drivers of voting behaviour and the drivers of party loyalty, dependent on issues such as instrumental gains as well as class expectations.

Table 6.4 shows us the relationship between party identity and voting using the EMBES data. It sheds some light on existing research on the specificity of ethnic minority political behaviour by analysing South Asians in middle and non-middle-class locations alongside a counterpart White British sample from the main British Election Study 2010. However, it does not control for potentially mediating factors like class background, gender, generation, and region of residence so the conclusions that can be drawn here are limited. Furthermore, the South Asian middle-class sample is far smaller than the other sub-samples which results in some zero cell counts which impedes the robustness of inferential analyses.

**Table 6.4 Party identification by party voted for in 2010 General Election**

			Party vote 2010 General Election					
	N		N	Labour	Conservative	Lib Dem	Other*	
<b>Party ID</b>	South Asian MC	274	None/no	24	36.0	44.0	12.0	8.0
			Labour	145	85.5	3.8	6.9	3.8
			Conservative	44	-	91.3	8.7	-
			Lib Dem	45	15.9	4.5	79.5	-
			Other*	16	14.3	-	35.7	49.9
	South Asian non-MC	785	None/no	49	46.0	22.0	16.0	16.0
			Labour	490	91.5	3.8	4.4	0.3
			Conservative	88	6.3	92.7	1.0	-
			Lib Dem	99	7.1	1.0	91.8	0.1
			Other*	59	51.6	19.4	6.5	22.5
	White British MC	796	None/no	87	21.4	28.6	40.8	9.2
			Labour	215	78.4	3.6	16.0	2.1
			Conservative	315	1.3	91.3	5.3	2.0
			Lib Dem	128	3.9	6.3	89.0	0.8
			Other*	51	6.7	6.7	16.7	70.0
	White British non-MC	1236	None/no	124	17.5	30.7	31.6	20.2
		Labour	462	84.7	1.5	11.1	2.7	
		Conservative	385	0.7	93.6	4.0	1.7	
		Lib Dem	150	3.4	6.8	88.1	1.7	
		Other*	115	7.9	9.2	10.5	72.4	

NB: South Asians and White British. British Election Study Ethnic Minority Survey 2010 and British Election Study 2010. Weighted data. Counts represent unweighted base. Empty cells = cells with zero counts. \*'Other' covers the Scottish National Party, the Green Party, UKIP, BNP, Respect, Plaid Cymru and Coalition-Conservative/Liberal Democrats. 'Don't know', 'refused' and 'not stated' responses coded as missing. South Asian middle-class:  $\chi^2(12) = 344.383$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ; South Asian non-middle-class:  $\chi^2(12) = 1113.184$ ,  $p < 0.001$ . White middle-class:  $\chi^2(12) = 2059.423$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ; White non-middle-class:  $\chi^2(12) = 1240.759$ ,  $p < 0.001$

There is a significant association between party identification and the party respondents stated they voted for in 2010 within each of the four class and ethnic sub-groups (see the notes under table 6.4). This indicates that the tendency is, for both South Asians and White British respondents, to vote for the party they identify with. The extent of this differs somewhat between each sub-sample, however. Out of all Labour identifiers, the South Asian non-middle classes were the most likely to vote for the Labour party followed by the South Asian middle classes. 16 per cent of Labour identifiers in the White British middle classes and 11 per cent in the White British non-middle classes, however, stated that they voted for the Liberal Democrats. This indicates a higher level of 'loyalty' towards to Labour party amongst South Asians across class groups. Conservative identifiers are the most 'loyal' party voters – over 90 per cent of Conservative party identifiers in both the White and the South Asian middle-class and non-middle-class samples voted for the party in the 2010 general election. No South Asian middle-class Conservative identifiers voted Labour in contrast to the South Asian non-middle-class sample where 6 per cent of Conservative identifiers voted for Labour. One of the other most interesting specificities in the South Asian middle-class sample is the 16 per cent of Liberal Democrat identifiers who voted for the Labour party. The 'floating voters' – i.e. those with no party identity – were more likely in the South Asian middle-class sample to vote for the Conservative party than those in the other sub-samples (keeping in mind the small size of this particular sub-group, however).

Sobolewska (2013b) states that the Conservative party made efforts in the run up to the 2010 election to match the Labour party in the implementation of strategies to improve minority representation in order to develop a more inclusive image (p. 5). Alongside their longstanding popularity amongst middle-class groups (Lockwood 1995, Whiteley et al. 1994, Parkin 1967) although not necessarily amongst professionals to the same extent (Heath et al. 2013), indications of Conservative popularity amongst the South Asian middle classes generally stands to reason. Some have suggested that Labour took their minority support for granted, and after the decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003, many ethnic minority – particularly Muslim - Labour supporters defected to the Liberal Democrat and other left parties in the 2005 (Curtice and Fisher 2005) and 2010 elections. A2.23 (Appendix II, p. 62) shows us, however, that a number of Liberal Democrat identifiers in the Pakistani (and Bangladeshi middle-class, although small sample size precludes analysis here) samples actually voted for the Labour and Conservatives, with voting behaviour chiming most strongly with party identification for Labour and Conservative identifiers. Although the proportions of Liberal Democrat supporters outweighs Conservative supporters in both the South Asian middle and non-middle classes, Labour identification and electoral support is still enduring.

#### *6.3.4 Political parties and group representation*

The earlier qualitative analyses found that few express a sense of identification with any political party, more so a sporadic preference or instrumental alignment. There was a conflict for some of the Indian Hindu interviewees between political ideology and instrumental reasons for supporting a party, including sound, stable leadership and clear policies. Others - particularly the predominantly working-class Bangladeshi Muslim and Indian Sikh respondents - drew on specific policies and treatment of certain communities, or personal relationships they hold with local political actors, when discussing their party views. Across interviewees in all ethnic groups, however, sympathy was expressed towards the Labour party and antipathy towards the Conservative party, largely based on the historic legacy of each party in their treatment towards immigrants/ ethnic minorities and vulnerable groups.

Hussain, who described himself as *'just like any immigrant [...] all in one class'* (section 4.4.3), highlighted what he believes is a disconnect between the historically disliked Conservative party seen as broadly anti-immigration and the actual party that sanctioned mass immigration. He states that it was Labour who predominantly engaged in monitoring of immigrants and uses this to illustrate his party political view that *'every party is the same'* when in power, rendering loyalty to a single party illogical. This ties into his functionally Conservative party preference and his broader scepticism of party politics as a whole:

*'We were all brought up to hate the Conservatives. Not everybody but on the whole all Asians were brought up to hate the Conservatives [...] if they really think about it, it was the Conservatives that allowed the immigrants into this country, if you look at the history [...] it was the Labour party that brought in the English test for the immigrants, you know, the Labour party ran into and did policies for immigrants, against immigrants that the Conservatives thought twice about'* (Hussain, Bangladeshi lawyer from London)

The EMBES features indicators which measure the extent to which respondents believe certain parties 'look after' certain groups in society. These shed some light on whether the South Asian middle classes believe Labour looks after ethnic minority groups like them, and the proportion within each ethnic group who hold more sceptical views like Hussain. A2.24 (Appendix II, p. 63) shows the relationship between party identification and the party respondents think is best for ethnic minorities. The question asked: *'Which party do you think is best able to help improve life in Britain for ethnic minority groups'*. There is a significant relationship between party identification and the party respondents believe is the best for ethnic minorities for the South Asian middle classes ( $\chi^2(16) = 648.095, p < 0.001$ ).<sup>66</sup> The

---

<sup>66</sup> Again, despite the decent size here for the South Asian middle-class sample (312) there are 2 cells with missing counts, so the conclusions drawn here about statistical significance must be taken with caution.

overwhelming consensus amongst the South Asian middle-class Labour party identifiers is that the party looks after ethnic minorities. Although there are far smaller proportions of Conservative and Liberal Democrat identifiers in every ethnic group, proportionally fewer of these than the Labour identifiers believe their party is best for ethnic minorities. Out of all the Conservative identifiers, far fewer stated that the Conservative party is best for ethnic minorities – 47.5 per cent – with approximately a third stating *Labour* is best. Whether the decision amongst these respondents to identify with the Conservative party is dependent on their level of ethnic identification or the (lack of) extent to which they believe their interests are group-based is uncertain.

Given previous research on the Labour party support base in the UK we would expect the South Asian middle-class sample to feel as if the Labour party had, to a greater extent than the Conservative party, not only the interests of Black and Asians but those of the working classes in mind. It is less clear how they may feel about the party's past performance with regard to the interests of the middle classes. A2.25 (Appendix II, p. 64) shows evaluations of the Labour and Conservative party's track record with certain societal groups: Black and Asians, the working classes, and the middle classes. The questions from the EMBES mailback questionnaire asked: '*Some people say that political parties look after the interests of some groups and are not so concerned about others. How well do you think that the [Labour party / Conservative party] looks after the interests of the following groups?*' Response options were '*Very well, fairly well, not very well, not at all, don't know*'. In the table, conflated results for '*very well*' and '*fairly well*' are shown under the category of '*well*'. A high proportion of the middle-class South Asian sample (69 per cent) believe Labour looks after Black and Asians well. 77 per cent believe the Labour party look after the working classes well, which suggests a greater certainty regarding the working-class than the ethnic minority credentials of the party. Low opinions with regard to the efficacy of the Conservatives in looking after the working classes and particularly Black and Asians suggest a clear indication from the sample that the parties have different group interests in mind.

To determine what might count as a 'pull' factor away from the Conservative party, Labour's primary political rival, we can look at how *Labour identifiers* feel about the Labour and Conservative party's attitudes towards certain groups (bearing in mind the smaller sample size here, see A2.25 again). Labour identifiers in the data are in greater opinion that the Labour party looks after Black and Asians, the working classes, and even the middle classes well than all party identifiers. This suggests a greater optimism about the track record of their party of choice. Less than 13 per cent believe the Conservatives look after Black and Asians well, indicating that not only are they more favourable about the credentials of their party in terms of supporting marginalised populations, but equally unfavourable about the credentials of others. What these results fail to tell us, however, (i) if and how these evaluations play into

party identity, and (ii) what those who do not believe *either* party looks after marginalised groups believe they should do better, which the qualitative data can illuminate.

### 6.3.5 Ethnic minority political representation and tokenism

There was much cynicism across the interview respondents about whether ethnic minority political representation is both genuine and effective. As both Fieldhouse and Sobolewska (2010) and Saalfeld and Bischof (2013) have questioned, to what extent are ethnic minority interests represented in Parliament, either by ethnic minorities or White MPs? Some of the respondents were motivated to bring their own voices to the table in order to rectify this, whereas others were deterred from taking up opportunities to enter the political sphere as a result of this.

Two of the most politically cynical but community-embedded of the 7 Bangladeshi interviews interviewees – Hasan and Hussain - did not seem to believe that any parties represent the interests of their predominantly working-class minority ethno-religious community. Within his local law firm in Tower Hamlets, East London, Hasan discussed how he regularly provides information and advice about legal matters affecting immigrants. He talked specifically at the time about individuals asking him about the implications of Brexit for them. He seemed to have given substantial thought about getting involved in a more politically influential role given the sorts of skills his job had helped him foster, and the key role he plays in his community. Despite this, he expressed reservations about how ethnic minorities as well as women are seen by all political parties as predominantly ‘token’ members – ‘puppets’:

*‘If I [inaudible] sure about the environment and whether there’ll be a real voice for people erm who are of my background who I could represent, I would step into that [political] arena but given what I see around me and they become effectively puppets of the government with very little voice [...] I find it very difficult that, you know, ethnic minorities can actually have a say, and they only play one crucial role, and that is to tally numbers as to whether they’re being, you know, a party with enough brown faces, enough women, as opposed to people who erm are equal or have some contributions that will be recognised in bringing in changes’ (Hasan, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London)*

Although parliamentary representation of ethnic minorities has been growing across the last three UK general elections, questions remain as to the extent to which genuine representation of ethnic minority interests is afforded by MPs of any background (Fieldhouse and Sobolewska 2013, Saalfeld and Bischof 2013). Hasan expresses a very low sense of political efficacy here partly as a result of this. Despite harbouring the appropriate sort of

capitals such as authority and legal / political knowledge, his disillusionment in the democratic process deters him from becoming actively politically involved.

A2.26 (Appendix II, p. 64) depicts the extent to which the middle-class South Asian EMBES sample believe parties are only interested in the votes of Black and Asian and not in their opinions. This variable taps a similar sentiment to that expressed by Hasan above (although Hasan refers specifically to party members and representatives) that political parties are disinterested in genuinely representing the interests of ethnic minorities. It may also express a deeper sense of suspicion that the party system is racially biased. The question in the EMBES asked for agreement with the statement: '*Parties are only interested in the votes of Black and Asian people, not in their opinions*': The Pakistani middle classes are more in agreement with the statement that parties are only interested in the votes of Black and Asians than the Indians but across the full sample views are balanced, with 40 per cent agreeing and 40 per cent disagreeing with the statement.

Hussain, who owns a small law firm, has been directly involved in electoral politics (the only respondent in the qualitative sample to have stood for any type of political seat), but sees political leadership as instrumental from a personal and professional perspective. He was encouraged to stand for local elections at a local community-based religious gathering, but his impetus to do was almost solely to increase exposure of himself and his business given his lack of party identity and indeed coherent sense of political identity at large:

*'I was at this Iftar party, you know, [inaudible] asked why don't you stand? You know, as a councillor, for the Lib Dems. I said oh I've never thought about politics really, I don't know where my politics lies. Maybe the Lib Dem party's my, middle ground, whatever it is [...] he said to me look, you know the best thing you could do in this election? I said what? He said lose the election. I said why? He said you've gained the popularity but you don't have to do all the crap, you know?*

[Laughs]

*And he was right! I came second, first time, you know, and I came second, and my business went 100%, because people got to know me, And I didn't have to do all the crap. So the second time I stood again about three years later, I only stood to lose'*  
(Hussain, Bangladeshi lawyer from Birmingham)

Hussain's business interests - which could be identified as (middle) class interests despite his lack of subjective class identity and his critique of class as a whole (section 4.4.3) - not only colour his (in this case clearly instrumental) party choices (section 6.3.2) but his level of political engagement, to the extent that he was willing to actively engage in the local political

infrastructure. Although we have seen with respondents like Hasan that the professional can be political, there is also evidence of the political becoming professional.

### 6.3.6 Representation of the Muslim community

Bisma and Nadya, both living within East London near tight-knit Bangladeshi Muslim communities (much like Hasan but working within larger organisations) are politically as well as professionally motivated by their Muslim identity to legally represent and help those affected by terrorist legislation. What they believe is unlawful state-sanctioned discrimination through the monitoring and vilification of Muslims mobilises both their political as well as social identities as a Muslim (Kepel 1994, Birt 2013, Heath et al. 2013, Meer 2014):

*'I'm a trustee for a charity that was set up to help families who'd been impacted by the terrorist legislation. Erm, I'm active in, you know, vocalising and supporting legislation which I think, you know, primarily targets Muslims [...] you've got the Prevent legislation and it's, you know, legislation I think, at the end of the day when people say, when you talked earlier on about my Muslim identity it's, when some things are happening in the world or in your country, it does bring out your sense of identity as a Muslim' (Bisma, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London)*

*'In terms of the other political side of things that my job, or me as a Muslim, is obviously the whole, you know, terrorism thing, it's very rife in my job as well, you know, dealing with terrorist cases, erm, so you know, all that kind of stuff, I think, I think with society the way it is with terrorism it makes you more kind of, erm...aware, of your social identity' (Nadya, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London)*

For Nadya, responses to terrorism make her question the extent to which she belongs, and is seen to be belonging, to British society. Despite some evidence thus far in this study (section 5.3), as well as within the literature, that British identity is not necessarily incompatible with a Muslim ethno-religious identity, state action against terrorism which vilifies minorities and heightens distrust of Muslims alienates her from a sense of Britishness. Hasan's worry, in contrast, is not necessarily that Muslims are excluded from a sense of Britishness, but that they are no longer engaging in the sorts of political action that is necessary to voice their distinct concerns as British middle-class Muslims:

*'I think with society the way it is with terrorism it makes you more kind of, erm, aware, of your social identity. Of [...] where you stand in society in, again, a country that's not your own it almost reinforces that, you know, erm and a lot of it is, you know, down to ignorance and you hope that the majority of the people, the British people*

*would realise that it is just ignorance, and it's just a minority few that, you know, do these kinds of stuff, erm, you know and I get quite passionate about it (Nadya, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London)*

*'With Prevent and all these things clearly targeted people with a certain belief, making no distinction whatsoever, making no apologies whatsoever, it's starting to move people even in the middle classes and upper classes away from politics and the apathy is growing high, erm, and that's not helping integration' (Hasan, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London).*

Karim's secular, non-religious identity which he interchangeably describes as 'atheist' and 'ex-Muslim' is also rooted within a political community of individuals, although one quite differently positioned to Nadya, Bisma, and Hasan's. Karim believes that Muslim interests are, in fact, over-represented in society. He is involved with a renowned, national secular organisation and thus his political lobbying is largely centred around voicing concerns about the disproportionate amount of concessions made to religious minorities in what is essentially a secular liberal democracy. Karim represents a very different identity-informed political platform from the majority of the Muslim identifiers in the sample, but a similar level of political commitment to his (albeit lack of) belief. He stated with regard to a particular campaign:

*'In 2015 there was a huge issue about Shariah wills in the UK, I don't know if you read about it [...] I was the one who actually brought it to people's attention if you like, sort of kick-started the campaign [...] it's like when you become religious, when you convert to a religion or in this case when you lose your religion you become a bit zealous about it' (Karim, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London).*

Heterogeneity of political views exists within those from very similar ethno-religious backgrounds, cautioning us to make sweeping generalisations about not only the relationships these individuals hold to their ethnic and religious identity but how they may act on these politically. Although we may, on the evidence thus far, characterise the South Asian middle classes as on the whole Labour leaning, there are a number of competing rationalisations and internal contradictions to their party identifications, along with evidence of political scepticism and disillusionment.

#### **6.4 Political activity**

Political activity can be seen as a manifestation of political consciousness, and a site of both political discontent as well as an expression of political efficacy. This section looks at patterns of conventional and less conventional political and civic action, engagement, and activity,

which will culminate in the construction of a quantitative scale measuring level of political and civic activity. This is used as a dependent variable, along with political party identity, in the multivariate regression analyses in section 6.6.

#### *6.4.1 Political action and engagement*

A2.27 (Appendix II, p. 65) depicts frequencies for minor and major 'political acts' including signing a petition, boycotting, participating in protests, donating to a political cause, and engaging in trade union activity. The questions are listed in the table exactly as they were asked in the main EMBES questionnaire, with responses for 'yes' shown for each ethnic group. Few in each ethnic group engage in what might be classed as political campaigning such as boycotts, protests, or giving money to political causes. The Indian group seem the least politically active across the board (although the Pakistanis are marginally less likely than the Indians to be trade union members), which again suggests a sense of 'political quietism' (Statham 1999) amongst this group. Signing petitions, which is somewhat more passive in comparison to and trade unionism, is popular across all groups, but more so with the Pakistani respondents. The Pakistani respondents are also more likely to engage in boycotts and give money to a political cause than the Indian respondents. A2.27 also depicts more 'mainstream' political behaviour – general and local election voting – across the three ethnic groups. It also shows levels of political interest, specifically the proportions within each group who responded '*quite a lot*' or '*a great deal*' to the question: '*How much interest do you generally have in what is going on in British politics*': Voting was higher than levels of political interest across the board, suggesting that the former is not necessarily contingent on the latter. The Pakistani middle-class respondents are less likely to harbour political interest, and fewer voted, than the Indian sample. The descriptive analysis here shows us some potentially interesting if somewhat tentative (given sample sizes) ethnic differences in both extent and type of political activity across the South Asian middle-class sample

In terms of political mobilisations and political activism across the interview respondents, few described themselves as actively political. At least 4 of the 20 respondents explicitly acknowledged their political apathy, ranging across the ethnic and gender sub-groups in the sample. Baljit spoke on behalf of the Punjabi community (an indicator of his strong sense of ethnic belonging (section 5.2.4)) in stating '*we do not get involved politically as much as we should*'. He references the 'hard work' ethic of his ethnic community (section 4.5.2) as a reason for this but suggests that it's a '*sad reflection*' on the Punjabi community that they do not get involved more. The reasons for the need for greater political involvement are made unclear by him, however, and could be to represent the interests of the Indian Punjabi community, and / or to become 'model citizens' with social standing and influence within the

political sphere.<sup>67</sup> Hasan wouldn't describe himself as politically 'active', acknowledging like Baljit this lack of engagement. However, he likens himself to 'any other citizen', a 'little bit apathetic', and doesn't extrapolate his behaviour to the rest of his ethnic community:

*'Very little at the moment I'm afraid. Very little. That's a sad reflection on the Punjabi community, because we're very busy working, so we do not get involved politically as much as we should' (Baljit, Indian Punjabi Sikh lawyer from Birmingham)*

*'I wouldn't say I'm a political person in the sense that I'm active, I observe, erm and just like any other citizen I, the observations, you're a little bit apathetic towards political trends' (Hasan, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London)*

Bisma, who sees herself as working-class and socialist, holds relatively strong social and political views which are mobilised within, and inspired by, her work in legal aid (see section 4.4.1 and section 6.2.4.1). Argyle (1994) citing Heath et al. (1991) states that professionals in welfare jobs / public sector work are, politically, the least Conservative and most pro-Labour and liberal (p. 221). Bisma exemplifies this, working in a professional, public-facing role with a strong welfare component, and harbouring a strong, active left-wing, pro-Labour political positioning. With regard to her political activism, she states:

*I still boycott M&S and Starbucks and Coke and this that, and my niece is like 'they're all the same, it doesn't have an effect' and I'm like yes it does, you know, and I always remind them about the apartheid, boycotting Jaffa, that's how apartheid in South Africa was stopped, you still have to, I do believe in BDS<sup>68</sup> and boycotting movements, and, you know, you'll always have that, that'll always be part of me (Bisma, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London)*

Bisma's political stance is arguably dependent on her working classness and vice versa, evidenced by the way she contrasts her left-wing political activism, values and opinions, with the 'middle-class' ones her brother holds: *'I'd say he's [brother] more middle-class than me [...] I don't always share his views about certain things, certain things I've always been very*

---

<sup>67</sup> There is scope for specific research here on 1) whether Indian middle-class groups in the UK consider themselves to be model minorities or aspire to this positioning, and what they believe this entails, and 2) to what extent caste hierarchy and strong 'Jat' identities (section 4.4.3) among Indian Sikhs in the UK drives their economic and political aspirations, if at all.

<sup>68</sup> The BDS or Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions movement is a pro-Palestine campaign which aims to put pressure on Israel to comply with international law in recognising the rights of the Palestinian people. The movement is thus particularly popular amongst Muslim activists which lends a distinct religious solidarity aspect to Bisma's political activity.

*passionate about which is, you know, world politics, the Palestinian cause has always been been very very dear to me, it's something I got involved in at Uni days, campaigning'. She conflates activist with socialist, a fixed political positioning (unlike other respondents for whom political priorities and identities have shifted over time) which she has carried through from her university days to her career as a solicitor. When she suggested in section 4.2.2 that you 'assume' the class of the people you interact with, she is referring to both her legal clients as well as her fellow socialist solicitors, who, like her 'keep it real' (section 4.4.1), and constitute her own, specific community of grassroots, professional political activists:*

*'Lot of your friends, are they on the kind of campaigning-  
Yeah they campaign, they're activists, they campaign or they're activist solicitors [...] we're the socialist type solicitors that will, you know, fight for the underdog' (Bisma, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London).*

Farhan has a similarly strong and cogent political ideology which is informed by, amongst other factors, his university degree in politics. He is anti-establishment and, like Bisma, anti-capitalist, as well as (somewhat) working-class by identity (section 4.4.1). He describes himself as an anti-establishment and non-mainstream '*grassroots political activist*' – potentially less 'left-wing' an assertion than Bisma's 'socialist'. His activism seems to be driven by the financial crisis and its impact on 'ordinary people' (perhaps a description of working-class people like he might class himself). It seems less focused on the concerns of particular ethnic or religious minorities such as himself, despite his strong sense of religiosity (5.2.4) and his comments about the ways in which Muslim minorities in the UK are political targets (5.4.3)

*I would describe myself as a grassroots political activist who wants good of society, who doesn't like what the political establishment is doing [...] I don't believe in what the bankers have done to screw up society, they have destroyed the lives of many ordinary people, you know, they have meted out the biggest financial crisis that this country has seen for seventy to eighty years (Farhan, Bangladeshi Muslim lawyer from London)*

These two Bangladeshi Muslim respondents seemed to be particularly embedded within their ethno-religious communities, professionally as well as politically. Given their relative socio-economic privilege in comparison to others within their ethno-religious population, they are afforded a space, or can themselves create a space, within which they can express their political identities, couched in their minority and / or working-class identities or not.

#### 6.4.2 Civic engagement

Civic engagement taps the community mindedness of individuals. It can encompass behaviours that are both 'overtly' political and also less political in nature and therefore lends a different perspective on collective action to the variables analysed so far. A2.28 in Appendix II (p. 66) shows whether respondents have taken part in a specifically ethnic association, any other kind of association or club, a voluntary organisation (results listed for those who responded they had been 'very' or 'somewhat' active), or in political affairs. Non-specific voluntary activities are engaged in by approximately half of the South Asian middle-class sample but only a fifth have been recently involved in politics or community affairs. The Indian middle-class sample are more likely to take part in ethnic or cultural associations but less likely to be active in political affairs than the Pakistani middle-class sample.

In the qualitative data, at least 3 of the 7 Bangladeshi respondents engaged in political activity influenced by a strong sense of Muslim and / or community-based working-class minority identity which for them mobilises - at the professional level - political consciousness into political action. There was evidence of committed yet largely unpolitical culturally-inspired or community-based charity involvement amongst 3 of the 9 Indian respondents in community temple activities (Priya), sports activities and homelessness (Baljit), and pro-bono work (Anita). Anita talked about how she is involved in the development of a finance and law course in India in conjunction with her current firm. In terms of the type of volunteering this constitutes, it is generally low commitment and employer-led, but it is tied up with her strong sense of ethnic identity and the 'pride' she expressed in being Indian (section 5.3.1). Baljit, on the other hand, is involved on a more grassroots local community level with a project that similarly resonates with his ethnic (as well as religious) identity. Like Anita, he has a leadership / organisational role in the scheme, commensurate with the senior position he holds in his job:

*'It's delivered at the national law schools in India to give them exposure to international finance law, which wasn't taught in India. We run that programme once a year, we organise it, I take a partner from London, lawyers from Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand to deliver the 3-day programme, erm I'm very proud of that [...] every time we run that programme I look out there and I think well the future PM is probably sitting out there somewhere, it's fabulous, hugely rewarding' (Anita, Indian Bengali Hindu lawyer from London)*

*'I'm also known, close involvement with the Midlands [Sikh homeless charity]<sup>69</sup>- they've got a website, they have their, in fact they had the first board meeting here a*

---

<sup>69</sup> Name of charity omitted for confidentiality purposes.

*couple of weeks, we've got an event this week in the city centre. We do sponsorships and they all have T-shirts with [the initials] written on, so yeah, the Indian identity, the Sikh identity is very very important to me' (Baljit, Indian Punjabi Sikh lawyer from Birmingham)*

Priya is strongly involved with charitable activities that take place within her local Hindu temple. This reflects both her embeddedness within, and the sense of obligation she feels to, her ethno-religious community - although she is keen to place limits on the extent of her religiosity by stating she is not *'in your face religion this religion that'*. She stated later in the conversation how she also seeks to rally her *'non-temple'* friends as she describes them – professionals like her – to get engaged in non-religious community events. Her volunteering, therefore, has a broader non-religious element, but is nonetheless ultimately driven by it:

*'It [the temple] absolutely forms part of my identity, it's not something that I'm shy of either, so I'm not like an in your face religion this religion that, but kind of scroll through my Facebook and there'll be loads of posts around how I went to support their band in the New Year's parade, or how I've taken pictures at the open day' (Priya, Indian Gujarati Hindu engineer from London).*

Ali discussed the mentoring he used to do for young children in schools in Tower Hamlets, an area with a high concentration of Bangladeshis. Although he indicates the ethnic similarities between him and these children – *'I'd go in there, speak Bengali'* – he talks about them in more detached tone, describing them as *'the ethnic community'*, a function perhaps of his predominantly middle-class upbringing in largely non-ethnic minority areas:

*'I used to do mentoring for young children at schools, so I'd go and set up projects for them and things, in fact I did it at Tower Hamlets schools which needed that encouragement so, particularly in the ethnic community, I'd go there, speak in Bengali, some of them don't know English, the parents, so I did a little talk, and they came up to me saying my kid, she's interested in architecture, I was like, great' (Ali, Muslim Bangladeshi engineer from London)*

His charitable work, unlike Anita's which is geared towards South Asians abroad, is closer to 'home' in the geographical sense. It brings together his professional interests and his ethnic identity, allowing him to help (as was alluded to in Priya's identity map, fig. 11) those from similar ethnic backgrounds as him through mentoring. Nabeela's charitable work resonates with her experience of being a first-generation university attendee. Unlike Ali, she can identify to a greater extent with her mentees given her working-class background, and this seemed to directly inspire her civic engagement:

*'We had a programme that's called Unlocked, and basically what the programme does it try to support individuals who are first-generation and their family to go to university [...] we have a cohort of a year that we support and we offer a bursary as well, so I've got two Unlocked mentees as well' (Nabeela, Pakistani Muslim lawyer from Manchester).*

Volunteering is thus driven in many instances by local, often ethnic or religious community commitments, and is also often inspired by the class background of the respondents and the impetus to 'give back'. Proximity to / embeddedness within deprived communities is a factor here, affecting both the way ethnic, religious and class identities develop (as established in chapters 5 and 6), and the way they are mobilised in the civic and political sphere.

#### *6.4.3 Constructing a political and civic activity scale*

A scale was computed from the different types of civic and political action analysed above, in order to form a measure for use as a dependent variable in a linear regression model. Both civic (volunteering, charity involvement, associations) *and* political activities (campaigning, voting) were incorporated to create a more comprehensive scale which measures the wider socio-political engagement of respondents. The indicators which comprise this scale cover the political acts analysed in table 33 – protest, boycott, given money to a political cause, and petitions – as well as voting in the General Election and trade union membership. Civic activity covers participation in associations – cultural or other - activity in a voluntary club or organisation, and volunteering in political affairs. These indicators were chosen on the basis that they have few missing cases and cover a wide range of political and civic activities.

The scale was computed by 'count' - the ensuing indicator is therefore computed on a 0-10 11-point scale of none to all these activities. Descriptive statistics for the scale across the three ethnic groups in question is shown in A2.29 (Appendix II, p. 66). The Pakistani data has a small maximum value with no one in the sample exceeding 7 activities out of 10 on the scale. The larger standard deviation also indicates a slightly greater dispersion around the mean, in other words a greater variety of levels of political and civic activity amongst the Pakistani middle-class respondents. The Indian sample has the largest range but a mean of only 2.85. The positive skew indicates most of the Indian middle-class respondents are clustered around the lower end of the scale, although not to the extent of the Pakistani sample which has a mean of 2.84 but a median of 2, indicating a generally lower average level of activity for this group. This will be analysed further in the context of political consciousness in the political activity regression model in the next section. The mean for political activity was

highest for the Bangladeshi middle-class sample, however the small size of this group precludes any conclusion being drawn here about their relative level of political engagement.

## **6.6 Consciousness on political party identity and activity**

Having carried out analyses for political consciousness, political party identity, and political activity independently, I ran multivariate analyses to see how the latter two phenomena are contingent on consciousness for the South Asian population, differently for the middle classes in relation to the non-middle classes and for the Indian in relation to the Pakistani group.<sup>70</sup> The dependent variables consist of the 0-10 civic and political activity scale<sup>71</sup> (section 6.4.3), and the dichotomous political orientation indicator measuring left-of-centre and right-of-centre political party identity ((left = 1 right = 0), discussed earlier.

There is a significant limitation in this analysis in the absence of a variable which controls for class background. As the qualitative analyses have suggested so far, class identity and class consciousness is in many instances, for the second generation, influenced if not determined in large part by one's class background. Social mobility trajectories differ between the British Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi populations (see section 1.2.2) which explains in a large part why the proportion of middle-class individuals in each group as shown from the datasets differs between groups (see table 3.3). The conclusions will thus take into consideration the inability to account for the class trajectories of these groups and the impact this may have on not only their sense of political consciousness but their political activity and political party identity, and how the two may therefore be related.

Table 6.5 depicts Pearson's correlation coefficients between the continuous dependent variables and the consciousness factor scores generated in section 6.2.3 for the South Asian sample at large. Only the factor scores which have a significant correlation with the dependent variables will be input in the regression analyses (Field 2013), allowing for parsimony in the model which is important given the addition of both two- and three-way interaction terms.

---

<sup>70</sup> As per the previous analyses, the Bangladeshi group will, as a result of their markedly smaller sample size in the EMBES, be omitted from the following multivariate analyses.

<sup>71</sup> Although political activity is technically on a numbered, bounded ordinal rather than continuous scale, it is treated like a continuous variable for the purposes of the ensuing linear regression analysis.

**Table 6.5 Correlation coefficients for dependent variables and consciousness factor scores**

	<b>Civic and political activity</b>
Pro- Black & Asian Political Representation	-.023
Pro- Agitation	.161**
Pro- Socio-economic Equality	.060
Pro- Minority Will	-.109*
Pro-Welfarism	-.073
Pro- Affirmative Action	-.064

NB: All South Asians. British Election Study Ethnic Minority Survey 2010. Weighted data. Unweighted base: n = 425. \* =  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* =  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* =  $p < 0.001$ .

There is a highly significant, positive correlation between pro-agitation sentiment and civic and political activity, suggesting that those South Asians who are more likely to believe protest is both necessary and effective are also more likely to engage themselves politically. There is also an inverse relationship between pro-minority / anti-majority will, and civic and political activity. This suggests, again, a potential sense of political disengagement amongst those South Asians who are politically pro-minority. For the dichotomous dependent variable 'left / right political party identity' a T-test (appendix II A2.30, p. 67) shows where there lies a significant difference in means. There is only a significant mean difference ( $p < 0.01$ ) for pro-affirmative action, indicating that those South Asians who harbour strong views about the need to protect the interests of minority groups are more likely to identify with left-of-centre parties.

The following sections feature the results for the multiple regression analyses for the two dependent variables with their corresponding consciousness factor score. These analyses are carried out on the whole South Asian sample, with occupational class added as an independent variable in the regression analyses along with ethnicity and other key control variables also utilised in the regression analyses in the previous chapter: marital status, employment status, country of birth, region of residence, age and gender. As in the previous chapter, in the regression models there are two levels for ethnicity – Pakistani and Indian – with Indian set as the reference category (the group with the largest sample size). Bangladeshis were omitted for the analyses given the small sample size. Occupation is a dichotomous variable comprising professional / managerial and non-professional / managerial occupations. The latter category is again the reference category given our focus in this study on those in middle-class occupational locations.

Three iterations of each model were run: firstly with the main effects ((*ethnicity*) + (*occupation*) + (*consciousness*)); secondly with the simple effects and all two-way

interactions,  $((ethnicity \times occupation) + (ethnicity \times consciousness) + ((occupation \times consciousness)))$ ; thirdly with the simple effects, all two-way and all three-way interactions  $(occupation \times ethnicity \times consciousness)$ .

For the political activity model, there is a notable jump in model fit from the main effects to the additive model, but not from the two to the three-way interaction models. This is expected given the lack of significant estimates returned for the three-way interaction. Each model iteration is significant at the 5 per cent level, in other words each is an improvement over the baseline model. Diagnostic tests were run for the two-way interactional political activity regression model (the model which will be analysed given the lack of significant three-way interactions in model 3) to assess the extent to which each met the assumptions of linear regression. There is some positive skew on the histogram of standardised residuals for political activity (see Appendix II A2.31, p. 68) and some notable but not pronounced discrepancy in the P-P plot between 0.25 and 0.55. As evident from the pseudo R-square values for the political party logistic regression model, the step from the main effects to the 2-way interaction model features the largest increase in model fit (see table 6.6). The two-way interactions between consciousness, class, and ethnicity thus increase the explanatory power of the model for predicting left- over right-of-centre party identity.

**Table 6.6 Linear regression and binary logistic regressions for ethnicity, occupational class and consciousness with outcome variables: level of political activity and left / right political party orientation**

	Level of Political Activity			Left / Right Political Party Orientation			
	Model 1 B (SE)	Model 2 B (SE)	Model 3 B (SE)	Model 1 Exp(B) (SE)	Model 2 Exp(B) (SE)	Model 3 Exp(B) (SE)	
<b>Constant</b>	.949 <sup>^</sup> (9.488)	1.166* (.499)	1.195* (.505)	<i>Constant</i>	7.137** (.584)	7.995** (.631)	7.998** (.628)
<b>Age group</b> (ref: 25-34)				<b>Age group</b> (ref: 25-34)			
24 and under	.226 (.362)	.104 (.368)	.093 (.371)	24 and under	2.926 (.479)	2.977 (.781)	2.833 (.782)
35-49 years	.333 (.278)	.309 (.283)	.288 (.288)	35-49 years	1.167 (.479)	.867 (.509)	.858 (.510)
50 and over	.587* (.284)	.533 <sup>^</sup> (.287)	.508 <sup>^</sup> (.293)	50 and over	.536 (.470)	.441 <sup>^</sup> (.495)	.440 <sup>^</sup> (.497)
<b>Female</b> (ref: male)	-.168 (.198)	-.159 (.199)	-.156 (.200)	<b>Female</b> (ref: male)	.540 <sup>^</sup> (.334)	.526 <sup>^</sup> (.350)	.512 <sup>^</sup> (.354)
<b>Born in UK</b> (ref: not born in UK)	.807** (.254)	.794** (.258)	.778** (.261)	<b>Born in UK</b> (ref: not born in UK)	.697 (.450)	.724 (.460)	.748 (.463)
<b>UK region</b> (ref: London & SE)				<b>UK region</b> (ref: London & SE)			
Yorkshire & Humberside	-.144 (.320)	-.138 (.322)	-.143 (.324)	Yorkshire & Humberside	3.010 (.697)	3.258 <sup>^</sup> (.704)	3.285 <sup>^</sup> (.704)
Midlands	.202 (.258)	.181 (.258)	.181 (.259)	Midlands	2.229 <sup>^</sup> (.413)	1.990 (.423)	1.991 (.423)
North East & West	.396 (.320)	.359 (.322)	.353 (.323)	North East & West	3.360 <sup>^</sup> (.626)	4.472* (.656)	4.588* (.659)
Other UK regions	.784* (.355)	.786* (.356)	.783* (.358)	Other UK regions	.558 (.562)	.534 (.560)	.547 (.559)
<b>Currently in paid work</b>	-2.362 (1.654)	-2.249 (1.653)	-2.241 (1.658)	<b>Currently in paid work</b>	6.910 (.2.308)	4.919 (3.058)	4.609 (3.085)
<b>Married or cohabiting</b>	2.378 (1.649)	2.214 (1.649)	2.215 (1.654)	<b>Married or cohabiting</b>	.186 (2.306)	.226 (3.055)	.239 (2.082)
<b>Professional or Manager</b>	.302 (.235)	-.327 (.427)	-.274 (.442)	<b>Professional or Manager</b>	.921 (.380)	1.788 (.920)	1.897 (.953)
<b>Indian</b> (ref: Pakistani)	.367 (.227)	.149 (.263)	.149 (.264)	<b>Indian</b> (ref: Pakistani)	.487 <sup>^</sup> (.393)	.695 (.473)	.715 (.473)
<b>Pro-Agitation</b>	.349** (.105)	.340* (.154)	.361* (.161)	<b>Pro-Affirmative Action</b>	1.187 (.163)	.593 (.344)	.641 (.355)
<b>Pro-Minority Will</b>	-.247* (.100)	-.133 (.142)	-.144 (.151)	<b>Professional or Manager X Indian</b>		.662 (1.026)	.650 (1.064)
<b>Professional or Manager X Indian</b>		.845 <sup>^</sup> (.469)	.780 (.513)	<b>Professional or Manager X Pro-Affirmative Action</b>		2.427* (.401)	1.090 (.966)
<b>Professional or Manager X Pro-Agitation</b>		-.028 (.247)	-.213 (.479)	<b>Indian X Pro-Affirmative Action</b>		1.525 (.428)	1.342 (.453)
<b>Professional or Manager X Pro-Minority Will</b>		-.394 <sup>^</sup> (.230)	-.344 (.362)	<b>Professional or Manager X Indian X Pro-Affirmative Action</b>			2.500 (1.054)
<b>Indian X Pro-Agitation</b>		.041 (.221)	-.009 (.248)				
<b>Indian X Pro-Minority Will</b>		.074 (.226)	.110 (.278)				
<b>Professional or Manager X Indian X Pro-Agitation</b>			.257 (.565)				
<b>Professional or Manager X Indian X Pro-Minority Will</b>			-.093 (.468)				
<i>Unweighted N</i>		337		<i>Unweighted N</i>		288	
Standard Error of Estimate	1.86036	1.85654	1.86114	Cox & Snell / Nagelkerke R Square	.109 / .179	.138 / .227	.140 / .230

R Square / Adjusted R-Square	.129 / .092	.145 / .096	.146 / .092	Hosmer & Lemeshow Test	$\chi^2=5.681 (8)$ $p>0.05$	$\chi^2=15.563 (8)$ $p<0.05$	$\chi^2=12.942 (8)$ $p>0.05$
------------------------------	-------------	-------------	-------------	------------------------	--------------------------------	---------------------------------	---------------------------------

NB: Pakistani and Indian respondents only. Weighted data. EMBES 2010.  $\wedge = p<0.1$ ; \* =  $p<0.05$ , \*\* =  $p<0.01$ ; \*\*\* =  $p<0.001$ . All consciousness factor scores are mean-centred.

Table 6.6 indicates that a one-unit increase in levels of pro-agitation sentiment is associated with a .34 unit increase in levels of political activity ( $p < 0.5$ ) for the Pakistani non-middle classes. Although the relationship between pro-agitation sentiment and political activity is not dependent on class, the relationship between pro-minority will and political activity is. The differential in levels of political activity between Pakistani professionals and managers and non-professionals and managers given a one-unit increase in pro-minority will is -.394 units on the 11-point scale ( $p < 0.1$ ). Middle-class Pakistanis, therefore, are less politically motivated by minority group consciousness than their non-middle-class counterparts. The relationship between ethnicity and political activity is significantly mediated by class, even though the simple effects of both are not significant. The effect of middle-class status significantly (albeit at the 10 per cent level) increases the mean political activity level of Indians by an average of .845 units. The political orientation model only returns one significant interaction term. A one unit increase in pro-affirmative action sentiment considerably increases the odds of left- over right-wing political party identity for professional or managerial Pakistanis in relation to non-professional or managerial Pakistanis ( $OR = 2.427$ ,  $p < 0.5$ ). This tells us, therefore, that – like political activity - consciousness is a significant factor in the relationship between class and political party orientation for this group.

## 6.7 Conclusion

This chapter has explored political identity, ideologies and consciousness across the South Asian middle classes, with a focus on political party orientation and political activity.

In terms of what we already know about the specificity of the South Asian group with regard to political party identity based on previous research of the EMBES 2010 (Heath et al. 2013), Indian Hindus' support for the Labour party is closer to the overall White British level, and lower than all other minority ethno-religious groups. Pakistanis are more inclined to vote for the Liberal Democrats than the Conservative party, with the inverse being true for Indians and Bangladeshis. Heath et al. (2013) also found that social class doesn't explain ethnic minority voting for the Labour party, even though research has found that those in middle-class social locations are more likely to support free-market policies (characteristic of right-of-centre political parties) and those in working classes social locations are more likely to support the redistributive policies of left-of-centre parties. From the analysis on quantitative measures of party identity in this study, the majority of the South Asian middle-class sample identified with Labour. This is most likely a combination of long-standing, group-based partisan loyalties (Heath et al. 2013) and rational economic policy orientated evaluations (Groenendyk 2013) given the types of comments garnered from the interviewees in the qualitative research who also expressed pro-Labour sentiment. There was, however, evidence of Indian middle-class conservatism.

In the qualitative data, the ambivalence of class and ethnic identity found in previous chapters was mirrored in the ambivalence in party identity across the majority of the interview participants. For some, party choice is clearly linked to political ideology. Those who described themselves as left-wing with strong views on equality, justice, and minority representation were generally strong Labour sympathisers. We saw how the intersection of a strong marginalised religious identity and working class identity interact meaningfully to create a strong left-wing and civic-minded political identity. This was characterised most acutely amongst two of the six working class Bangladeshi interviewees Farhan and Bisma who also expressed a strong sense of working-class and religious identity. Political 'passions' were noticeable when they chimed with the religious identities of the Muslim interviewees. The Bangladeshi respondents stood out as the most 'politicised' from the qualitative sample<sup>72</sup>. Simultaneously, however, their politicisation was highly reflexive and intellectualised. Amongst the Indian respondents, volunteering and civic engagement was also manifested through work and community, in some cases through their own ethnic networks. The quantitative data found that ultimately the sorts of political activities the different groups engage in is different, however, with the Indian middle classes engaging in more 'formal' and less 'activist' types of political engagement.

The results from the regression models indicate that political consciousness is a mediator in the relationship between class and both political activity and political party identity for Pakistanis. The negative effect that political consciousness has on Pakistani middle-class over non-middle-class levels of political activity shines a light on many of the findings in classical studies of socio-economic status and political engagement in the UK which find that those with more resources are generally more likely to engage in politics (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Verba et al. 1995). The positive effect that pro-affirmative action sentiment has on left wing political orientation for middle-class Pakistanis disrupts common conceptions of the Labour party being the predominantly 'objective' working-class ethnic minority favourite.

Chapter 7 draws together the analyses from the previous three chapters. With reference to existing studies and theoretical debates sketched out in the literature review, it engages in overarching discussion to form conclusions about the social and political identity frameworks of the British South Asian middle classes. It also reflects on the project from a methodological standpoint to see where mixed-methods studies are useful as well as limited in terms of analysing subjectivities of social and political identity, and where further research lies.

---

<sup>72</sup> In terms of the UK Bangladeshi population at large, settlement patterns and high levels of group discrimination have resulted in strong, close-knit, grassroots community-based political mobilisations (Carey and Shukur 1985; Eade and Garbin 2006) broadly linked to their British Muslim and working-class rather than broader politically Black or Asian identities.

## 7. Conclusion

### 7.1 Introduction

This thesis constitutes a mixed-methods study of social and political identity across the British South Asian middle classes. It offers a perspective on class, racial / ethnic, and religious subjectivities across an under-researched population. It relates to relevant political and public discourses regarding the integration of 'established' ethnic minority communities into 'British life', speaking to ongoing questions in the academic fields of minority identity, multiculturalism, social and political integration, and social mobility. The aim was to use both qualitative and quantitative methods to interrogate the complexity and potential interrelatedness of social identities, and ascertain how and why these might drive orientations and behaviours in the political sphere across a specific ethnic subset of the UK middle classes, or indeed class subset of the British South Asian diaspora. It took as its starting point the notion that class and minority ethnic identities are socially and politically co-constituting, even amongst those who occupy relatively prosperous socio-economic class locations in UK society. It builds on and brings together the academic empirical work on (i) British South Asian identity formation and particularly the role of racisms and exclusionary constructions of Whiteness and Britishness within that, and the work on middle-class subjectivities and ethnic minority middle-class formation popularised by Moore (2008), Reay (2007; 2010), Archer (2011; 2012), Rollock (2012; 2013; 2014). It has also taken the empirical work of Heath et al. (2011; 2013) further by specifically analysing the inter-relationship (or lack thereof) of class and ethnic identity in political orientation and activity for British South Asians and their main constituent ethnic sub-groups, where feasible. As per Runciman (1972), the study acknowledges the complexities of understanding the relationship between stratification and ethnicity. It sought, in its methodological approach, to draw on both macro and micro perspectives on class and ethnic identity in order to garner both generalisations and 'detailed narratives' on the relationship between the two.

I attempted to address the following research questions in the course of this study:

RQ1: How do the British South Asian middle classes conceptualise social class, and to what extent is there a discrepancy between their subjective class identity and their objective 'middle-class' position?

RQ2: To what extent do the British South Asian middle classes identify with a marginal racial, ethnic and / or religious identity, and how does this relate to their subjectivities and experiences of class?

RQ3: To what extent are class and / or minority racial / ethnic identities politicised, and what are the implications of this for party political identity and civic and political activity across the British South Asian middle classes?

I used data from the 2010 British Election Study Ethnic Minority Survey, the 2010 British Election Study and the 2010/11 Citizenship Survey to examine, through descriptive statistics and multiple logistic and linear regression models, (i) the relationship between class, ethnicity and ethnic, religious and national identity salience and belonging, and evaluations of ethnic and religious group prejudice, (ii) interrelationships between salience of ethnicity, nationality, religion and salience of class and indicators of socio-economic status, (iii) interrelationships between indicators measuring ethnic and class consciousness / political solidarity, and (iv) the relationship between class, ethnicity, consciousness and political party orientation and levels of political activity. I also used primary semi-structured interview data from 20 British South Asian second generation men and women in professional jobs to ascertain (i) definitions and conceptualisations of social class in the UK and their subjective class identity, (ii) levels of ethnic, religious and national identity and constructions of group identity, (iii) lived experiences of middle-classness and minority ethnicity in cultural and corporate spaces, and (iv) political identifications, ideological stances, and engagement in the political sphere.

The purpose of this chapter is to summarise the main findings of the previous chapters and how existing knowledge in the subject areas tackled has been challenged or furthered. I also comment on where research gaps in the literature have potentially been filled and thus the key theoretical contributions that can be made with this body of work. I then reflect on the limitations of the study, particularly with regard to data quality and availability, and outline areas for further academic research.

## **7.2 Key research gaps and theoretical contributions**

There were a number of gaps in the existing literature which this study sought to address. There is a lack of empirical work on the relative salience of social and political identities *and* the lived experiences of ethnic minority middle classes who exist at the juncture of privilege and prejudice. The two key theoretical gaps that were identified and addressed, however, were (i) the lack of interrogation of the relationship between Whiteness, Britishness and middle-classness and how the co-constituting nature of the three can destabilise racially limited notions of cultural and social capital, and (ii) the lack of research on the motivations and rational or ideological frameworks – cultural, socio-economic, religious – behind the politics of the South Asian middle classes.

There are mixed and limited findings in the existing literature with regard to the extent that class is considered an 'important' identity, particularly for those in middle-class social

locations. The dearth of literature which empirically analyses subjective class identity salience from a broader quantitative (SurrIDGE's 2007 quantitative study using the British Social Attitudes Survey being a notable, recent example) and / or an in-depth, qualitative perspective - particularly amongst ethnic minorities - underpinned the unique contribution of this thesis to the sociology of class. The 'oblique' salience of class through the ways in which middle-class ethnic minorities 'live' was a unique area of enquiry for this study. The under-researched salience of Whiteness, Britishness and middle-classness to the lived experiences of middle-class ethnic minorities was addressed within this study with reference to the concept of 'ethnic capital'. In the sociology of race, this has been developed primarily in the context of the ways in which middle-class Black develop 'public identities' to cope with exclusion and discrimination (Lacy 2007; Archer 2011; Wallace 2016). I theorise ethnic capital, as per Yosso (2005), as both a material and symbolic set of strategies adopted by second generation British South Asians to (i) manoeuvre themselves into higher professional and socio-economic positions through credentialisation, hard work and reliance on ethnic networks, and (ii) the cultural negotiations they undertake to ensure their survival in high-level gendered, classed and racialised places of work and the maintenance of their ethnic and / or religious sense of self-determination.

With regard to the political scholarship, the research gaps were clear. Although the growing differences in political party identification between some ethnic minority groups as a result of, among other factors, divergent rates of social mobility, has been well established. An account of this beyond changing class interests has been lacking. There is little comprehensive analysis of the ways in which the ethnic minority middle classes in the UK act in the political and civic sphere, and their motivations for doing so given existing findings about the link between socio-economic status and political orientation (Parkin 1967; Whiteley et al. 1994; Lockwood 1995; Clark and Lipset 2001; Crozier et al. 2008; Heath et al. 2013) and the still lacking political representation and engagement of ethnic minorities in the UK (Saggar and Geddes 2000; Sobolewska 2013a; Sobolewska 2013b). The empirical work carried out in this study has established the ways in which political consciousness, embedded in a sense of class and ethnic solidarity, interacts with class differently for British South Asians to shape political party orientation and levels of political activity. It has gone further to interrogate the idea of 'identity politics' and the 'politics of recognition' which has long been researched in the field of particularly hyper-racialised groups like British Muslims (Eade 1996; Vertovec 2002; Werbner 2004; Kundnani 2007) by analysing how ethnic minorities on an axis of relative socio-economic privilege define themselves politically, with reference to (i) their own class backgrounds (ii) their changing political outlook through their social mobility journeys and (iii) the implications their feelings of relative deprivation have on their political activity and interest (or lack thereof).

### 7.3 Overall findings

This thesis thus makes important theoretical contributions to the sociology of race and class. It advances our understanding of class and minority racial / ethnic social and political identities and what they mean to individuals existing at the juncture of privilege and prejudice. Key findings from the analysis chapters, whether from the qualitative research, quantitative research or both, will now be fleshed out in the light of current scholarship.

Current scholarship on class identification has found that aggregate classes rarely form the basis of any sort of strong class identification, with most seeing themselves as occupying a 'middling' position in society (Irwin 2016; Bottero 2005; Evans and Kelly 2004). Qualitative research in this study found that British South Asian professionals - from predominantly working but in some cases middle-class backgrounds - had difficulty identifying where contemporary class boundaries lie, and thus where they might lie within these (Gayle et al. 2015). This in turn diluted their identification with a class, either in a social or political sense. Nonetheless, aggregate class categories (working, middle, and upper) were cited across the board in individuals' understandings and often subjectivities of class. Quantitative analysis of identity salience indicators identified that the majority of each South Asian ethnic group see class as important to the sense of who they are, although not to the extent of other identities based on occupation, income, ethnic identity, nationality, or religion. As Hall (1991) stated, class is, in contemporary society, one of the many bases of group identification but it is also, crucially, a situated identity which is not necessarily best represented or most meaningful when expressed in a close-ended survey setting (Saunders 1989). This was evidenced by the semi-structured interview respondents who seemed to 'experience' class in their daily lives discernible through class 'talk' (discussed by Irwin 2016) in the form of discussions regarding the existence of some sort of socio-economic hierarchy and their place within it, and in the context of financial security, life opportunities, social networks and social status. This indicates the ways in which oblique open-response interviewing can be revelatory (Marshall et al. 1988) with regard to uncovering the everyday salience of social class in a broad sense, avoiding, as Emmison and Western (1990) state, unduly privileging the overriding salience of one identity to another. The findings on class conceptualisation and identification support, to a strong extent, the existing research on the importance of class background to current identification with class, the multiplicity of group identifications of which class is one such group identity, and the everyday or situated salience of class over and above a generalised sense of affiliation with an aggregate class identity. Ethnic caste was also found to be an ongoing, salient form of intra-ethnic stratification amongst some of the Hindu and Sikh respondents as per research by Sato (2012), Judge and Bal (2008) and Ram (2012), one that often seemed on par with class – or indeed a replacement for class - as a means of determining intra-group social status.

Despite the uneven representation of different South Asian ethno-religious groups in the qualitative interview sample, there was evidence that those respondents from middle-class backgrounds were more likely to express, and less likely to problematise, a subjective middle-class identity. They aligned themselves with the attributes and practices which researchers on middle-classness such as Lockwood (1995), Ball (2003), Savage (2005; 2009) and others have established as the successful harnessing of economic, social and cultural capital through occupational success, financial prosperity, and subjectively high levels of social status. Existing quantitative research from the 2015 British Social Attitudes Survey established a discernible link between class background and current class identity (NatCen 2016). This also brought to the fore, however, the functionality of middle-class identity as more of a broad descriptor of socio-economic positioning, similar to findings in more robust studies of class subjectivity (SurrIDGE 2007) which establish the unacknowledged 'ordinariness' of middle-class identity (Savage 2003; Savage 2005a; Bennet et al. 2009). Nonetheless, the qualitative analysis of political identities in this study also allowed for the political basis of ethnic minority middle-classness to come to the fore. Some of those in the qualitative sample who expressed a middle-class identity held political interests grounded in the desire to preserve - in the case of a racially minoritised population - relatively hard-earned - socio-economic gains. Although research has found that Whiteness operates within middle-class practices (Lacy 2007; Nayak 2007; Gillborn 2015; Wallace 2017) socio-economic privilege – mediated as it is by race – operates within ethnic minority middle-class practices and, in some cases, political beliefs.

The inextricability of immigrant / minority ethnic status to experiences and subjectivities of class was discernible in many cases and adds to the body of knowledge on the relevance of class, and identifications with class, across ethnic minority populations. Research by Rollock et. al (2013) and Archer (2011) highlights the complexity of class authenticity amongst the racialised middle classes. In this study, the analysis of the qualitative data found that those who rejected a class identity or questioned traditional, categorical class boundaries did so because of the uniqueness of their immigrant / ethnic minority experience, feeling that all their shared, racialised social mobility struggles defied traditional conceptions of class. However, the reflexivity expressed by the Indian professionals in particular with regard to their status as 'good immigrants', as it were, sets apart this sub-population from the more stigmatised Black populations in the existing research cited above. The model minority (Gillborn 2008) 'ethnic work ethic' was, across the board, construed as a positive attribute of South Asian immigrant culture but was, in places, linked symbolically with White / British middle-class culture. However, contradictions arose with regard to the strong sense of ethnic and religious identity expressed by all the middle-class respondents on the one hand – evident in both the quantitative and qualitative data - and the post-racial remarks about self-limiting cultural behaviours expressed by some of the qualitative interviewees on the other.

The unique contribution of the qualitative findings to the critical sociology of race and class is the insight given on what I class 'ethnic capital'. This part of the study builds on research established by, among others, Wallace (2017), Rollock (2013), Archer (2011), Yosso (2005), Carter (2005) and Modood (2004) which problematises Bourdieusian frameworks of class analysis that fail to make the distinction between 'appropriate' White middle-class cultural capital and 1) the racialised capitals (norms, skills and perspectives) that ethnic minorities bring to the labour market and 2) the legitimacy that 'White capital' carries when embodied by racialised individuals. The qualitative research in this study found that specific forms of cultural and social capital are developed and harnessed by the South Asian middle classes which have played a part in helping them achieve and maintain professional success and navigate the competing norms of their professional and personal worlds. These capitals were found to mirror those stated by Yosso (2005) - a commitment to higher education, the ability code-switch and manoeuvre across fields by virtue of multilingualism, multicultural acumen i.e. the ability to negotiate professional and often gendered cultural / community demands (as discussed by Hussain and Bagguley 2016), and resilience in the face of discrimination. Code-switching and other strategies to mitigate racisms by 'fitting in', as per the work of Reay et al. (2010), have been found in previous research to be a part of the wider devaluing and stereotyping of people of colour, particularly women of colour, within White middle-class spaces (although this could not be analysed at length given the limitations of the qualitative sample). These strategies identified by Reay et al. (2010) and others, however, were not always acknowledged as structural racisms by the interview respondents, often rationalised post-racially – as discussed in Meghji and Saini (2017) - as occupational hazards.

As per the sociological and socio-psychological literature on minority and majority identity negotiation, identities are constantly and actively constructed and reconstructed in relation to constructions of the self, engagement with society, and the social groups with which ethnic minorities embed themselves (Vertovec 1999; Baumann 1996; Brubaker 2004 and Bechhofer and MCrone 2010). Research on British South Asian ethnic minority identity has found that they are heavily rooted in regional, religious, national and caste identity. The ethnically mixed way in which second-generation South Asians describe their ethnic identity (Modood et al. 1994) was found to hold across the middle-class qualitative sample. The quantitative data found that national and religious identity is important, and for groups like middle-class Pakistanis more important, depending on the line of questioning, than racial / ethnic identity. There was some more nuanced evidence in the interview data to suggest that South Asian Muslim middle-class identities, and their relationship to Britishness, are intellectualised and politicised to a greater extent than national or ethnic identities in response to events like the rise in 'Islamic' terrorism and the ensuing hyper-racialisation of Muslim populations (Bhatia 2002, Jamal and Chapman 2000). The qualitative research in this study established that although some Muslim individuals acknowledge discourses which pit Muslim against British culture (as has been discussed by Pitcher (2009)), this does not necessarily

diminish their own sense of 'Britishness', as per existing research by Ameli and Merali (2004). The Britishness and Muslimness of middle-class South Asian Muslims is reimagined (Alexander and Jim 2013; Brah and Phoenix 2013) in ways which consider their commitments to their faith and belonging to their ethno-religious community, as well as their intellectual and professional standing. The ways in which they discussed this perceived conflict demonstrates meta-reflexivity in their approach to their identity which could be construed as a form of capital - an ability to deftly rationalise the potential political implications of their social identifications.

Research on growing secularism amongst second generation British South Asians from scholars such as Fenton (1992) has found that the term 'culturally Hindu' is adopted as an expression of ethnic identification linked to Hindu customs and traditions without an explicit spiritual element. This was evidenced in the interview data in this study. One of the key contributions of this study, therefore, is establishing the heterogeneity of religious identifications and religious meaning across ethno-religious groups. Although the quantitative data allowed us to gauge levels of religious identification and belonging across the South Asian middle class sample, it did not give scope to interrogate the meaning of 'importance' in the context of identity. The quantitative analysis did, however, show us that class has a significant mediating effect on ethnic commonality and evaluations of religious prejudice between Indians and Pakistanis. Religious racisms are notable at both the middle and non-middle-class level for Pakistanis, which supports research on the hyper-racialisation of Muslims at all levels of contemporary British society (Meer 2014; Birt 2013, Bhatia 2002, Jamal and Chapman 2000). Respondents in the interview data expressed ambivalence and uncertainty towards the roles racism has played in their lives, particularly given the extent of their professional successes. It was found, in many cases, that racisms – and specifically anti-Muslim racisms for the Muslim respondents - had shaped their career trajectories and everyday lives of many of them.

Existing research in the sociology of race and class has posited class identities as being symbolically 'loaded', tied up with Whiteness and Britishness (Nayak 2007, Wallace 2017). The tangibility of Whiteness as well as hegemonic masculinities in exclusionary middle-class spaces and the effects of these on British South Asians was a key finding contributing to this body of research. This was identifiable in the sort of out of field experiences expressed by many of the respondents in the qualitative sample, particularly those from working-class backgrounds, building upon the work of Archer (2012), Rollock et al. (2011, 2013, 2014), Moore (2008), Reay (2007, 2010), and Daye (1994). Just as the structural and subjective aspects of class implicate race, ethnicity, religion and gender, so do the symbolic aspects such as membership to, and integration within, certain spaces.

With regard to party political identity, the quantitative research found that Labour party identification still holds strong amongst even middle-class South Asians, as already alluded to in previous research on the political integration and orientations of social mobile ethnic minority groups by Heath et al. (2013) and Saggar (1998), although with notable exceptions from the Indian Hindus in both the qualitative and quantitative data. This affirms some of the discourse in the political media about the increasing right-of-centre political tendencies of the Indian middle classes (Statham 1999). Some political conservatism was also evident from the Pakistani, and to some extent the Bangladeshi, interviewees. This was often exhibited in discussion of the prioritisation of their economic and business – ostensibly ‘middle-class’ interests - in their political opinions.

Political consciousness based on class and racial / ethnic solidarity was found to mediate the relationship between class, ethnicity and political activity and orientation. This adds a fresh perspective and a class dimension to research which looks at group consciousness / solidarity and political activity such as that by Stokes (2003) on the Latino community in the US which found that group consciousness increases political participation, differently for different ethnic sub-groups. Tentative aspersions can be cast on the direct predictive power of class and minority ethnic heritage on engagement in the political sphere and political orientations which are shaped not only by factors unmeasurable in the regression models such as class background and parents’ political orientations but experiences and rationalisations of discrimination and feelings of status inconsistency (Runciman 1969) which differ from individual to individual as well as group to group, alongside levels of community embeddedness, and contextual factors such as the national and global political climate.

Political disengagement and lack of political efficacy has been classically framed in the political sociology literature as a phenomenon broadly affecting apathetic young people and those with fewer resources (Barnes and Kasse 1969; Verba et al, 1995), a function of low economic, social and cultural capital. However, there are other groups who do not fit these profiles and feel relatively (to other ethnic groups) disillusioned by the current political party system despite prosociality (Hardy and Carlo 2005) and high levels of capital. These include socio-economically prosperous groups like the South Asian Muslim middle classes as evidenced in both the quantitative and qualitative research. The qualitative data tentatively suggests that questions of religious victimisation might go some way to understanding how and why some, albeit economically successful groups – particularly hyper-racialised Muslim groups - feel socially and politically excluded and underrepresented, despite the historical collective political action of these groups to challenge their stigmatised identities (Bell 1975; Fowler and Kam). There is a lack of empirical work that has been done so far, however, and more that needs to be carried out in the field of political exclusion and middle-class and ethnic minority politics.

## 7.4 Limitations of the study

Despite its contributions to the literature, some limitations of this study – methodological, analytical and theoretical - should be noted.

The mixed-methods approach to this thesis has contributed in methodological terms to the empirical literature on race and class. Combining quantitative and qualitative methods has facilitated an interesting and fuller identity analysis. The quantitative research has established interesting and often statistically significant findings. The qualitative research has expanded on the scope of the quantitative data. A range of methods were triangulated in this study, from quantitative data to semi-structured interviews to visual identity maps. Although – as the previous section attests to – the qualitative and quantitative data shone on a light on key unresearched areas, the divergence of the sample parameters meant that a more confirmatory or embedded approach could not be facilitated. In hindsight, it may have been useful to reflect more keenly on how the two could be better integrated. This could have been done through more directly matching the gender, ethnic, religious, regional and occupational profile of the qualitative participants to those in the quantitative data, or perhaps utilising the qualitative interview as a change to cognitively test the broader and vague measures of ethnic identity salience (CS) or ethnic commonality (EMBES).

There is a lack of quantitative data on class subjectivities for UK ethnic minorities, particularly for those interested in sub-group analysis. A question in the British Social Attitudes Survey which asks seminal questions with regard to class identity: *'Do you ever think of yourself as belonging to a particular social class'* and *'Most people say they belong either to the middle-class or the working-class. If you had to make a choice, would you call yourself middle-class or, working-class'* would have been a useful counterpart to the qualitative data in this thesis but was missing in the datasets used. There were other missing indicators including class background which could not be controlled for and potentially mediate the relationship between current occupational class, ethnicity, and social and political identification. Class subjectivity measures like those cited above are still problematic in terms of the extent to which they can 'accurately' capture the phenomena in question, a perennial limitation of quantitative identity analysis (Bryman 2004) and one that goes for the other identity salience indicators used in this study. The limitations of the quantitative data in modelling social identity negotiation was apparent from the ways in which the survey questions compartmentalised different social identities. This categorical approach to identity was managed somewhat in Chapters 5 and 6 with the use of interaction models. However, the qualitative data proved most illuminating where the quantitative data was insufficient (although the latter allowed us to control for demographic factors). An unstructured interview format may, on hindsight, prove optimal in researching lived experiences of identity from a dimensional perspective.

The operationalisation of consciousness as the manifestation of a politically mobilised social identity came into the study at a later stage. It was an emergent concept that arose from the analysis of ethnic and class identity in Chapters 4 and 5. Class consciousness is measured abstractly in this thesis using quantitative indicators which do not necessarily measure the true extent to which the respondents in the study are politically organised in class or race terms. Therefore, the indicators were only insightful to an extent in tapping whether feelings of relative deprivation, discrimination, and inequality based on a minority and / or ex-working-class identity exist amongst socio-economically successful ethnic minorities. Sample size was also problematic here, as the consciousness indicators came from a far smaller self-completion sample and inflated standard errors in the final regression analyses. In terms of the analyses in Chapter 6, the regression models for political activity and political orientation were reductive and potentially over-determined in that they measured (i) a broad level of political participation stretching from civic engagement to voting to petitioning, and (ii) political party orientation in a binary fashion, conflating potentially dissimilar parties to a distinct side of the political spectrum. A study which focused only on political engagement may have considered different aspects of political activity – mainstream, such as voting, and civic / local such as council meeting attendance – separately for a more nuanced analysis.

A limitation of the qualitative data was the extent to which, in hindsight, some important avenues relating to political and civic activity engagement within the workplace and outside could have been further explored with respondents. This would entail more probing and thus more data on the sort of in-work charity and volunteering work as well as the equality, diversity and inclusion initiatives respondents engage in, which gives a perspective of their level of professional commitment to social justice causes. This thesis has highlighted the usefulness of in-depth interviewing of minority professionals – particularly women and those with working-class backgrounds – in assembling a clearer picture of where individuals feel diversification needs to be made in professional organisations. Minorities should therefore be at the forefront of research into diversity and inclusion policy organisations. Some organisations, like the Chartered Institute for Highways and Transportations acknowledge that face-to-face engagement through informal one-to-one conversations, focus groups, structured interviews, staff networks or consultation / engagement events are useful to garner workforce data on diversity and inclusion (Bond and Wollaston 2015). When diversity policy is meted out 'top-down' it risks reproducing institutional Whiteness by watering-down its political bases, which should be rooted in decolonising more so than diversifying professional workplaces. Linklaters, a multinational law firm based in London that is part of the 'magic circle' of elite British law firms, recently instituted a reverse mentoring scheme for junior members of staff to help those in senior management positions understand the perspectives of those in underrepresented groups such as minority ethnic and low socioeconomic groups (Linklaters 2019). Reverse mentoring has traditionally been theorised as useful for facilitating cross-generational knowledge exchange across the millennial divide (Murphy 2012, Morris

2017) but is increasingly used between ethnic minority junior staff and senior White staff in traditionally elite organisations and industries in order to (i) break down racial stereotypes and biases and (ii) provide senior staff with an understanding of how the organisation is like for disadvantaged staff.

Although there was heterogeneity across respondents in this study in terms of ethnic group, gender, religion, region, and class background – some of which were controlled for in the quantitative analysis - there were some marginalised sub-groups unrepresented in both the qualitative and quantitative data. This has implications for both the representativeness of the study, and the applicability of the findings to the population at large. These 'missing' groups include South Asian LGBTQ+ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual, queer and / or intersex) respondents, those from mixed-racial / ethnic backgrounds, and those with origins in smaller British South Asian ethnic groups such as Nepalese and Sri Lankans. Further qualitative research could include these groups within analysis. However, sufficient quantitative identity data on many of these groups is still largely unavailable and thus, at present, including them within a mixed-methods study such as this would be untenable. A larger sample of religious minorities within each of the ethnic groups in question in the quantitative data – Indian Muslims and Sikhs, Buddhists, Pakistani Sikhs and secular or atheist British South Asians - would have been interesting in order to facilitate a nuanced comparative ethno-religious and class analysis. It would have been useful to further analyse sub-groups where the intersection between religious and ethnic identity is less 'obvious' and less researched, and thus explore the ethnicity-religion relationship in more complexity.

As discussed at the end of Chapter 4, five of the female respondents described - largely unprompted - how they balanced their roles as professionals in predominantly White, male industries with the sort of cultural gender expectations which exist in their home and community lives. However, the small number of women in the qualitative sample (8) precluded any hard and fast conclusions being made about the uniqueness of the female South Asian professional experience. A larger gender sample across the three ethnic groups in question would have allowed the incorporation of qualitative analysis to draw, albeit tentative, conclusions about the intersectional nature of class, ethnicity / race and gender.

The regional effect was interesting in this study, particularly in the qualitative analysis, for locating and contextualising the geographical histories of the ethnic groups in question, both in terms of origin in the Indian subcontinent and settlement in the UK. The regions which were chosen in the qualitative research design – London, Birmingham, Leicester and Manchester – are similar in their ratio of White to non-White residents. However, more contextual research could have been carried out and flagged up with regard to, for example, the distribution of South Asian groups in the professional industries in these regions. Further research would also incorporate the experiences of middle-class South Asian individuals

from areas with small ethnic minority populations to understand how, if at all, this affects their sense of ethnic group as well as class belonging. There is a related question here with regard to how the social mobility of British South Asians has affected their internal migration, and what the effect is of moving to the suburbs or the countryside - being, in essence 'twice' or even 'thrice' migrants, having ethnic origins in the Indian sub-continent and diasporic roots in the urban areas but now residing in 'out of the way places' (Nayak 2011) – on identities. There were some interesting analytical points that could have been made in the body of thesis (if there had been scope to do so) about the changing living choices of at least two of the respondents from working class backgrounds, which indicated much about their ongoing social mobility trajectories. At the time of the interview, Deepak was moving from Bow (a multi-ethnic area of east London) to a largely middle-class, White area in Twickenham, coinciding with his promotion to Partner in his law firm. He specifically stated that he is not doing this '*for status reasons*', but when constructing his identity map, he did explicitly state that in terms of living location he is '*moving up in the world, literally*'.

There were some data on the *transnational* identifications of each ethnic group, specifically their symbolic and material relationships with their country of origin, that would have added an extra dimension to the analysis on ethnic and national identifications in Chapter 5. These came not only from the 1.5 and second-generation respondents in this study, but from the first-generation respondents who were interviewed but not analysed. There was not space for this analysis in this study, however. Research specifically focused on first-generation middle classes in the UK will be covered in forthcoming mixed-methods academic journal articles looking at how class and ethnic identities are forged across borders by South Asian adult migrants in professional or managerial occupations.

## **7.5 Future research**

There is much scope to build on the work done in this thesis, some of which has been highlighted above. Avenues for further research are discussed below with reference to the changing political landscape in the last half a decade.

A longitudinal analysis looking at changing political orientations and activity over time of professional second generation ethnic minorities would see how, given increasing time out from adolescence, potentially changing class position and changing political environment does or doesn't affect political identity. A quantitative analysis of how political identity and activity is dependent on subjective class identity salience for the British South Asian middle classes would also be useful. Krauss (2015) found that (across a predominantly White, male US sample) those who believe they are of a low social rank (based on a ladder of social status) were less likely to participate in politics and reported lower political efficacy than those who believed they were in a higher rank, controlling for objective social class. How this plays

out in an ethnic minority context and against a changing backdrop of rising social inequalities but increasing ethnic minority social mobility would add to the research in this thesis.

The existing analysis needs to be refreshed with new data in light of the huge political changes that have taken place since 2010 / 2011 when the EMBES and CS data were collected and even 2015 / 2016 when the qualitative data was collected, given the increasing challenges to social and national cohesion in the UK in light of Brexit'. Recent analysis of 'Brexit' voters has shed light on that fact that the vote to leave the European Union was predominantly driven by the 'squeezed' British middle classes (Antonucci et al. 2017), undermining the prevailing view that it was driven by an anti-immigration / anti-elite White working-class sentiment. The elite and middle classes were crucial to the final outcome (almost three in five votes came from those in the highest three social classes) (Dorling 2016). It would thus be interesting to see where the ethnic minority middle classes lie in terms of their European as well as British identity in a 'post-Brexit' society.

Brexit has been posited as an expression of imperial longing (Virdee and McGeever 2017), so how do ethnic groups with ancestral roots in a colonised land relate to this nationalist sentiment? The rise in racial prejudice and attacks on ethnic minorities since the EU referendum alongside this might have resulted in an increase in racial solidarity and a renewal of the politically Black identity which crosses class, ethnic, and religious boundaries, but this requires further research within the context of the British South Asian middle classes specifically. The complex cultural, social and economic values which have created the polarised views on Brexit are important to analyse in order to ascertain how ethnic minority and class groups might vote in future elections. Surridge (2019) frames the 'Brexit axis' as a reflection of values of social liberalism and conservatism which does not map easily onto the primarily economic left-right political dimensions we historically tended to base voting predictions on. Her research on British Election Study Internet Panel Study data found that "on social issues Labour Leave voters are closer to Conservative voters (both Leave and Remain) than they are to Labour Remain voters", thus analysis on political ideology must reflect this multidimensionality.

## **7.6 Concluding Remarks**

This study has embedded itself within the sociological and political scholarship of class and race with a focus on an under-researched but highly interesting sub-population. It has both implications for debates around multiculturalism, belonging and identity, racisms and discriminations, political mobilisations and political disengagement felt by British South Asians in middle-class occupational locations. It has brought to the fore questions about when, how, and why even 'model minorities' feel othered and excluded. It has harnessed political as well as sociological scholarship to provide an analysis of how identity negotiation

for racial / ethnic minorities can be as much about political self-determination as it is about constructing a coherent sense of self. It has also discussed the diversity of the South Asian middle classes, and the continuing salience of culture, religion and race to the ethnic groups which comprise the South Asian diaspora. Although the UK ethnic minority middle-class keeps growing, the 'fact' of race is inescapable, despite efforts of generations of immigrants to facilitate social as well as economic uplift and integration through professionalisation and entrepreneurialism. In terms of the sociological analysis of class and race, the question of which 'trumps' which will therefore continue to be salient but ultimately crude. More seminal questions about the interrelationships between experiences and identities based on class and race must take precedence despite their complexity, to go beyond the ongoing theoretical class-determined / race-determined tussle and attend to race and class formation in the context of key, growing minority groups in the UK.