



# City Research Online

## City St George's, University of London

**Citation:** Jagu, E. & Massol, O. (2020). Building infrastructures for Fossil- and Bio-energy with Carbon Capture and Storage: insights from a cooperative game-theoretic perspective (20/15). London, UK: Department of Economics, City, University of London.

This is the accepted version of the paper.

This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. To cite this item please consult the publisher's version.

**Permanent repository link:** <https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/25034/>

**Copyright and Reuse:** Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright holders. Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, unless otherwise indicated, provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way. For full details of reuse please refer to [City Research Online policy](#).



**Department of Economics**

**Building infrastructures for Fossil- and Bio-energy  
with Carbon Capture and Storage: insights from a  
cooperative game-theoretic perspective**

Emma Jagu

IFP Énergies Nouvelles, LGI, CentraleSupélec, Université Paris Saclay and  
Center for Energy Economics and Management, IFP School

Olivier Massol<sup>1</sup>

IFP Énergies Nouvelles, Center for Energy Economics and Management,  
IFP School, Department of Economics, City, University of London

**Department of Economics  
Discussion Paper Series  
No. 20/15**



<sup>1</sup> Corresponding author: Department of Economics, City, University of London, Northampton Square, London EC1V 0HB, UK. E-mail: [olivier.massol@ifpen.fr](mailto:olivier.massol@ifpen.fr)

# Building infrastructures for Fossil- and Bio-energy with Carbon Capture and Storage: insights from a cooperative game-theoretic perspective <sup>☆</sup>

Emma JAGU <sup>a, b, c</sup>

Olivier MASSOL <sup>a,c,d,e\*</sup>

August 2020

## Abstract

*This paper examines the deployment of a shared CO<sub>2</sub> transportation infrastructure needed to support the combined emergence of Bio-energy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) and Fossil energy with Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS). We develop a cooperative game-theoretic approach to: (i) examine the conditions needed for its construction to be decided, and (ii) determine the break-even CO<sub>2</sub> value needed to build such a shared infrastructure. In particular, we highlight that, as biogenic emissions are overlooked in currently-implemented carbon accounting frameworks, BECCS and CCS emitters face asymmetric conditions for joining a shared infrastructure. We thus further examine the influence of these carbon accounting considerations by assessing and comparing the break-even CO<sub>2</sub> values obtained under alternative accounting rules. We apply this modeling framework to a large contemporary BECCS/CCS case-study in Sweden. Our results indicate that sustainable and incentive-compatible cooperation schemes can be implemented if the value of CO<sub>2</sub> is high enough and show how that value varies depending on the carbon accounting framework retained for negative emissions and the nature of the infrastructure operators. In the most advantageous scenario, the CO<sub>2</sub> value needs to reach 112€/tCO<sub>2</sub>, while the current Swedish carbon tax amounts to 110€/tCO<sub>2</sub>. Overall, these findings position pragmatic policy recommendations for local BECCS deployment.*

**Author contributions:** The two authors contributed to the study conception, to the material preparation, data collection and analysis and to the writing. The two authors read and approved the final manuscript.

**Conflict of Interest:** The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

**Declaration:** This paper has not been submitted elsewhere in identical or similar form, nor will it be during the first three months after its submission to the Publisher

---

<sup>☆</sup> We are indebted to Pascal Da Costa, Emily Little, Filip Johnsson, Icaro-Sylvestre Freitas Gomes, Mehdi Senouci, Victor Court and Yannick Pérez for insightful comments and suggestions. Remaining errors are, of course, our responsibility. This research has been supported by the Chair “Carbon Management and Negative CO<sub>2</sub> Technologies: towards a low carbon future (CarMa)” funded by the Fondation Tuck.

a IFP Énergies Nouvelles, 1-4 av. de Bois Préau, 92852 Rueil-Malmaison, France.

b LGI, CentraleSupélec, Université Paris Saclay, 9 ter rue Joliot-Curie, 92190 Gif-sur-Yvette, France

c Center for Energy Economics and Management, IFP School, 228-232 av. Napoléon Bonaparte, 92852 Rueil-Malmaison, France.

d Department of Economics, City, University of London, Northampton Square, London EC1V 0HB, UK.

e Climate Economics Chair, Palais Brongniart, 28 place de la Bourse, 75002 Paris, France.

\* Corresponding author. Tel.: +33 1 47 52 68 26. E-mail address: olivier.massol@ifpen.fr

# Building infrastructures for Fossil and Bio-energy with Carbon Capture and Storage: Insights from a cooperative game-theoretic perspective

*August 2020*

## **Abstract**

This paper examines the deployment of a shared CO<sub>2</sub> transportation infrastructure needed to support the combined emergence of Bio-energy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) and Fossil energy with Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS). We develop a cooperative game-theoretic approach to: (i) examine the conditions needed for its construction to be decided, and (ii) determine the break-even CO<sub>2</sub> value needed to build such a shared infrastructure. In particular, we highlight that, as biogenic emissions are overlooked in currently-implemented carbon accounting frameworks, BECCS and CCS emitters face asymmetric conditions for joining a shared infrastructure. We thus further examine the influence of these carbon accounting considerations by assessing and comparing the break-even CO<sub>2</sub> values obtained under alternative accounting rules. We apply this modeling framework to a large contemporary BECCS/CCS case-study in Sweden. Our results indicate that sustainable and incentive-compatible cooperation schemes can be implemented if the CO<sub>2</sub> value is high enough and show how that value varies depending on the carbon accounting framework retained for negative emissions and the nature of the infrastructure operators. In the most advantageous scenario, the CO<sub>2</sub> value needs to reach 112€/tCO<sub>2</sub>, while the current Swedish carbon tax amounts to 110€/tCO<sub>2</sub>. Overall, these findings position pragmatic policy recommendations for local BECCS deployment.

**Keywords:** Bio-energy with Carbon Capture and Storage, Negative emissions, CO<sub>2</sub> transportation, infrastructure, cooperative game theory, carbon accounting.

**JEL Classification:** Q56, Q52, Q58, C71, L95.

## 1. Introduction

Bio-energy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) and Fossil energy with Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) are key to reaching the “below 2°C” global warming target in most Integrated Assessment Model scenarios (Koelbl et al. 2014; Nemet et al. 2018; Rogelj et al. 2018). A number of studies also emphasize the role BECCS and CCS may play in reaching carbon neutrality in Europe by 2050 (see, e.g., Kalkuhl et al. 2015 or Solano Rodriguez et al. 2017). Indeed, while CCS is expected to mitigate emissions from otherwise difficult to decarbonize industries (Benhelal et al. 2013; Griffin and Hammond 2019; IEA 2017), BECCS has the potential to produce both energy and highly needed negative emissions (Fuss et al. 2014; Gough and Upham 2011). However, the current uptake of these technologies remains limited and barely compatible with the ambitious development plans depicted in the scenarios (Nemet et al. 2018).

The barriers to the up-scaling of BECCS and CCS are mostly economic, political, and social rather than technical, as some carbon capture, transport, and storage technologies are already in commercial stages (Hammond 2018). One of these crucial yet often-overlooked barriers is the implementation of a CO<sub>2</sub> transportation and storage system (Krahé et al. 2013; Stavrakas et al. 2018), which is, by nature, costly, capital intensive, and likely to exhibit substantial economies of scale. These properties effectuate the use of a shared infrastructure that requires cooperation between the industrial CO<sub>2</sub> emitters and raises the question of cost allocation.

The purpose of this paper is thus to examine the conditions for the construction of a CO<sub>2</sub> transportation and storage infrastructure for BECCS and CCS emitters. We develop a cooperative game-theoretic approach to examine the coordination issues faced by a collection of heavy-emitting industrial plants that can install carbon capture capabilities and join a common CO<sub>2</sub> supply chain. Additionally, the influence of two parameters is assessed: the accounting system applied to negative emissions and the nature of the infrastructure operator – which can be either vertically integrated or vertically separated.

This paper contributes to the small, and very much needed, literature attempting to shed light on CO<sub>2</sub> infrastructures economics. In recent years, the deployment of CO<sub>2</sub> infrastructure systems has yielded an emerging body of literature that can be clustered in two categories, depending on the methodology retained for the analysis: optimization or game theory. Optimization-based analyses are by far the most numerous ones (*e.g.*, Bakken and Velken 2008; Middleton and Bielicki 2009; Kemp and Kasim 2010; Klokk et al. 2010; Mendelevitch et al. 2010; Kuby et al. 2011; Morbee et al. 2012; Oei et al. 2014; Oei and Mendelevitch 2016). In these contributions, a single decision-maker (modeled as a benevolent social planner) is posited to control the entire value chain, including all the agents involved (*e.g.*, the emitters where carbon capture is implemented or the countries in the case of an international value chain). Remarking that the latter agents are autonomous decision-making entities, a handful of contributions have recently emerged to investigate whether cooperation can be a rational move for these agents using game-theoretic notions. For example, Morbee (2014) analyzes the country-level negotiation process needed to develop a pan-European CCS infrastructure using a Shapley value approach. Massol et al. (2015) focus on the individual emitters' decisions to adopt carbon capture capabilities and clarifies the conditions for sharing of the infrastructure costs among them. In a subsequent contribution, Massol et al. (2018) examine the case of a collection of independent industrial clusters that can be connected to a meshed, national pipeline network aimed at transporting CO<sub>2</sub> to a few capacity-constrained storage sites. Overall, it is important to stress that the literature on CO<sub>2</sub> infrastructures has been primarily motivated by purely CCS applications and thus overlooks the possibility of installing a combined BECCS/CCS chain. The present paper extends these earlier analyses to study the associated gain/cost-sharing problem.

The scenarios based on the nature of the infrastructure operator allow us to position pragmatic policy recommendations for local BECCS deployment. But, more importantly, the scenarios based on different negative emissions accounting frameworks address an essential barrier to BECCS deployment: the lack of economic incentives for the deployment of BECCS. Bio-energy-fuelled industries are yet out of the scope of any carbon accounting framework because they have long been

considered carbon-neutral – meaning that the volume of CO<sub>2</sub> that is removed from the atmosphere through biomass growth corresponds to the volume of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions released during combustion (Fuss et al. 2014). As a result, the CO<sub>2</sub> captured in BECCS facilities is neither eligible for tax reductions nor rewarded by carbon quota allowances.

However, at least two lines of arguments indicate that one ton of stored CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from a BECCS facility can hardly equate one ton of negative emissions, which is defined as the net volume of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions that is permanently removed from the atmosphere. First, producing negative emissions and abating one's emissions are two different activities. For a CCS plant, the volume of captured CO<sub>2</sub> roughly corresponds to its abated emissions, once the capture process emissions are deduced. But in the case of BECCS processes, the production of CO<sub>2</sub> removal from the atmosphere must be accounted for in a full Life Cycle Assessment perspective, including emissions from the agroforestry sector (Fajardy and Mac Dowell 2017; Thornley and Mohr 2018). Second, only a fraction of CO<sub>2</sub> removal will stay permanently out of the atmosphere – and therefore become negative emissions – because of the complex dynamics of global carbon cycles (Jones et al. 2016).

A growing literature has been addressing this critical problem and proposes accounting and rewarding alternatives for BECCS and negative emissions (IEAGHG 2014; Ricci 2012; Torvanger 2019; Zakkour et al. 2014). Regardless of the policy instrument (tax, market mechanism, or subsidy), it is argued that negative emissions should be rewarded identically to abated emissions to ensure a cost-effective mitigation system. In particular, these considerations led Torvanger (2019) to reflect on the suitable carbon accounting values that should be retained for negative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions: *“Given the complexities and insufficient understanding of calculating the net negative effect of CO<sub>2</sub> removal due to interactions with the global carbon cycle, the best way forward is likely to agree on a discounting factor for negative emissions, and then also for BECCS. This implies that less than 100% of one ton of CO<sub>2</sub> removal is approved.”* Therefore, the added value of the analysis of a shared BECCS and CCS infrastructure deployment – rather than CCS only – lies in the asymmetric conditions for joining the

infrastructure; BECCS facilities may be rewarded less than CCS facilities for the same volume of sequestered CO<sub>2</sub>. This is captured in our model by several scenarios on the fraction of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions stored by BECCS facilities that can be considered as negative emissions.

Finally, we apply our model to a realistic case study in the south-west of Sweden, a region that is especially relevant for the following three reasons: (i) it is home to both biomass-fuelled pulp and paper plants and large industries that could be equipped with carbon capture capabilities (EEA 2017); (ii) it is geographically close to a sizable underground CO<sub>2</sub> storage site that is currently being developed offshore Norway (CCS Norway 2019); and (iii) a private sector-led initiative is now examining the possibility of deploying a dedicated CO<sub>2</sub> transportation infrastructure connecting these Swedish emitters with the Norwegian storage site (Global CCS Institute 2019; Preem 2019).

This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the conceptual framework of our analysis. In Section 3, we detail an application of this methodology to the case of a contemporary project in Sweden and present an overview of the computerized model used to determine the cost of the required CO<sub>2</sub> transportation infrastructure. Section 4 contains our results. Finally, Section 5 offers a summary and some concluding remarks highlighting the policy implications of our analysis. For the sake of clarity, the detailed structure of the computerized model and the cost parameters are presented in a series of appendices.

## **2. Methodology**

In this section, we first present the notation and then the conditions for the construction of a shared BECCS/CCS chain that involves a unique private operator controlling both the pipeline infrastructure and the maritime shipping of CO<sub>2</sub>.<sup>1</sup> Then, we show how the critical CO<sub>2</sub> price needed for the implementation of such a combined BECCS/CCS project can be determined. Lastly, we extend the

---

<sup>1</sup> *This specific infrastructure set-up is motivated by the application case study that will be presented in Section 3.*

analysis to examine the case of a vertically segmented organization whereby the logistics are provided by two separate firms: one pipeline operator and one for the maritime shipments.

## 2.1 Notation and assumptions

We consider a finite set of industrial plants that: (i) are eligible to install carbon capture units and (ii) can form a shared CO<sub>2</sub> transportation system. We assume that each of these CO<sub>2</sub> emitters represents an autonomous decision-making entity that can either adopt carbon capture and feed the volume of CO<sub>2</sub> to a shared logistic system or renounce CO<sub>2</sub> capture.

We let  $N$  denote the grand coalition gathering all these emitters and  $|N|$  denote the cardinality of this set. The grand coalition is partitioned in two subgroups  $N^{CCS}$  and  $N^{BECCS}$  respectively gathering the CCS and BECCS emitters (i.e.,  $N = N^{CCS} \cup N^{BECCS}$  with  $N^{CCS} \cap N^{BECCS} = \emptyset$ ).

Let  $C$  be the real-valued function on the subsets of  $N$  that gives the long-run costs for transporting the emissions captured by any coalition of emitters to the storage site. Here,  $C(S)$  denotes the standalone cost for serving the coalition  $S$ , that is, the costs incurred from building and operating the least-costly infrastructure capable of connecting the emitters in  $S$  to the storage site.<sup>2</sup> We assume that this cost function is subadditive – i.e.,  $C(S \cup T) \leq C(S) + C(T)$  for any coalitions  $S, T \subseteq N$ , with  $S \cap T = \emptyset$  – and that it verifies  $C(\emptyset) = 0$  and  $C(S) \geq 0$  for any non-empty  $S$  in  $N$ . We also assume that the technology used in CO<sub>2</sub> transportation is standard, not proprietary, and that market entry is possible and free in that activity.

The transportation costs  $C(S)$  incurred for serving a coalition  $S$  verifies  $C(S) = C_{pipeline}(S) + C_{ship}(S)$  where  $C_{pipeline}(S)$  and  $C_{ship}(S)$  are the costs of the onshore and offshore transportation subsystems.

---

<sup>2</sup> In the empirical section of this paper, the values taken by the function are obtained using an optimization model that is solved numerically (see Appendix A).

## 2.2 The provision of a combined and integrated BECCS-CCS infrastructure

### a) CO<sub>2</sub> transportation: a cooperative game-theoretic framework

We posit a subadditive CO<sub>2</sub> transportation cost function, which characterizes the natural monopolistic nature of that industry (Berg and Tschirhart 1988).<sup>3</sup> We also assume that the technology is not proprietary and that entry is free in the CO<sub>2</sub> transportation industry. Therefore, the pricing decisions of a monopolistic organization controlling CO<sub>2</sub> transportation has to take into consideration the rivalry that could result from the potential entry of a competitor. Following the theory of contestable markets (Baumol et al. 1977; Sharkey 1982), a natural monopoly serving the grand coalition  $N$  is said to be sustainable if there exists a revenue vector  $r = (r_1, \dots, r_M)'$  such that: (i) the monopoly recovers its costs, and (ii) a potential entrant cannot find any financially viable opportunity to serve any submarket  $S$  with  $S \subseteq N$ . Formally, these conditions for a sustainable monopoly are:

$$\sum_{i \in N} r_i \geq C(N) . \quad (1)$$

$$\sum_{i \in S} r_i \leq C(S), \quad \forall S \subset N, S \neq \{\emptyset, N\} . \quad (2)$$

Together, these conditions compel the monopolist to charge a revenue vector  $r$  that recovers the exact total cost, i.e.,  $\sum_{i \in N} r_i = C(N)$ , which indicates that even in the absence of a profit constraint, the total revenue charged by that firm cannot depart from its costs (Sharkey 1982).

In cooperative game theory (see, e.g., Young 1985), the set of revenue vectors that verifies conditions (1) and (2) is named the core of the cooperative cost game  $(N, C)$ . A non-empty core thus

---

<sup>3</sup> An industry is a natural monopoly whenever no combination of multiple firms can collectively provide the industry's output at a lower cost than a monopolist.

indicates that the infrastructure operator can charge a revenue vector that recovers its costs while preventing the secession of its customers (i.e., the emitters).<sup>4</sup>

b) The individual decisions regarding carbon capture

We now examine the emitters' decisions regarding the adoption of carbon capture (and thus the connection to a shared CO<sub>2</sub> transportation system). We let  $\chi_i$  denote the unit cost for installing and operating a carbon capture unit and  $Q_i$  the quantity of emissions that can be captured at plant  $i$ . We also let  $\sigma$  denote the unit storage cost and  $p_{CO_2}$  be the prevailing carbon value. The emitter's total cost thus amounts to  $(\chi_i + \sigma)Q_i + r_i$ .

As discussed in Section 2.3., the unit revenue obtained for capturing one ton of CO<sub>2</sub> depends on the energy source used by the emitter. In the case of fossil fuel (i.e.,  $i \in N^{CCS}$ ), that unit revenue is  $p_{CO_2}$ . As discussed in Massol et al. (2015), it is thus judicious for a CCS emitter to adopt carbon capture whenever its total revenue<sup>5</sup>  $p_{CO_2}Q_i$  exceeds the total cost incurred for the carbon capture  $\chi_iQ_i$ , for the storage operations<sup>6</sup>  $\sigma Q_i$  and the amount charged by the infrastructure operator, that is:

$$(p_{CO_2} - \chi_i - \sigma)Q_i - r_i \geq 0, \quad \forall i \in N^{CCS} \quad (3)$$

In the case of BECCS emitters (i.e.,  $i \in N^{BECCS}$ ), we assume that there exists some negative emissions accounting framework and that negative emissions are rewarded identically to abated CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. However, as highlighted in the introduction, only a portion of sequestered CO<sub>2</sub> may be

---

<sup>4</sup> From an empirical perspective, it is possible to verify the nonemptiness of the core by solving a linear programming problem similar to the one in Massol et al. (2015, Appendix B).

<sup>5</sup> Note that this model is adapted to the Swedish case study presented in the next section. Following Garðarsdóttir et al. (2018), we assume that the emissions caused by the carbon capture process can be neglected because of the low-carbon nature of the Swedish electricity system. The rewarded CO<sub>2</sub> abatement thus corresponds exactly to the volume of captured CO<sub>2</sub> emissions.

<sup>6</sup> We assume that there are no CO<sub>2</sub> losses during transport and storage.

considered as negative emissions, depending on the process emissions associated with the bio-energy chain and the global carbon dynamics. We thus follow Torvanger (2019) and introduce a *discounting factor*  $\tau$ , with  $0 < \tau \leq 1$ , that represents the fraction of sequestered  $\text{CO}_2$  that can be considered negative.<sup>7</sup> For a BECCS emitter a non-negative profit is thus obtained when:

$$\left(\tau p_{\text{CO}_2} - \chi_i - \sigma\right)Q_i - r_i \geq 0, \quad \forall i \in N^{\text{BECCS}} \quad (4)$$

### 2.3 The break-even price for combined BECCS/CCS adoption

The implementation of a grand infrastructure connecting all the emitters requires the operator to charge a revenue vector that is both in the core of the cooperative cost game  $(N, C)$  and such that each emitter obtains a non-negative profit (i.e., a vector that verifies the conditions (1), (2), (3) and (4)).

The prevailing carbon price  $p_{\text{CO}_2}$  has a direct influence on the emitters' individual profits and, thus, on the possibility for the infrastructure operator to determine a revenue vector that is a core allocation. One can thus determine the break-even price for combined BECCS/CCS adoption, which is defined as the minimum  $\text{CO}_2$  price that is compatible with conditions (1), (2), (3) and (4). We let  $p_{\text{CO}_2}^*$  denote that critical value. It can be determined by solving the following linear programming problem:

LP1 (integrated operator):

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Min}_{r, p_{\text{CO}_2}} \quad & p_{\text{CO}_2} \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \sum_{i \in N} r_i = C(N), \\ & \sum_{i \in S} r_i \leq C(S), \quad \forall S \subset N \setminus \{\emptyset, N\}, \end{aligned}$$

---

<sup>7</sup> As an example, for the BECCS project considered in Fajardy and Mac Dowell (2017), the volume of process emissions represents roughly 60% of the volume of stored  $\text{CO}_2$  emissions. Therefore a discounting factor of 40% should be applied. Additionally, if the global carbon dynamics are taken into account, only 60 to 90% of the negative emissions will effectively remain out of the atmosphere. In the worst case, the discounting factor would be :  $\tau = 40\% * 60\% = 24\%$ .

$$(p_{CO_2} - \chi_i - \sigma)Q_i - r_i \geq 0, \quad \forall i \in N^{CCS},$$

$$(\tau p_{CO_2} - \chi_i - \sigma)Q_i - r_i \geq 0, \quad \forall i \in N^{BECCS}.$$

$$r_i \geq 0, \quad \forall i \in N^{BECCS}.$$

## 2.4 Extension: The case of a vertically-separated transportation chain

The analysis above posits the existence of a single operator controlling both the onshore and the offshore components of the supply chain. However, pipeline systems and sea-going vessels are different activities, which can justify a vertically separated organization with two specialized operators. Such a separated industrial structure calls for an adaptation of our modeling framework, and the four lines of considerations below have to be considered.

First, regarding the pipeline operator, we let  $t = (t_1, \dots, t_{|M|})'$  denote the revenue vector it charges. To be financially viable that operator has to recover its costs and, because of the threat resulting from our free entry assumption, that firm cannot charge more than its costs. Thus, the condition  $\sum_{i \in N} t_i = C_{pipe}(N)$  has to be verified.

Second, regarding the shipping operator, similar considerations related to cost recovery and free entry also compel that firm to charge a total revenue that exactly recovers its total cost  $C_{ship}(N)$ , which we assume to be decomposable into a fixed component  $f_{ship}$  and a variable one with a constant marginal cost equal to  $c_{ship}$ . Furthermore, it is important to stress that once transported to the departure port, the CO<sub>2</sub> emanating from the industrial emitters is fungible, which drastically restricts the shipping operator's ability to implement discriminatory pricing among the emitters. To put it simply, that firm can hardly charge different prices for handling a given volume of CO<sub>2</sub>. As a result, the shipping company has to use non-discriminatory pricing schemes. In the sequel, we consider the two

usual cases of: (case #1) a single price set equal to the average shipping cost (i.e.,  $C_{ship}(N)/\sum_{i \in N} Q_i$ ) and (case #2) a two-part tariff that includes a fixed charge set to recoup the fixed cost<sup>8</sup> and a variable component with a slope set equal to the marginal shipping cost.<sup>9</sup>

Third, because of the entry considerations above, the total amount jointly charged by the pipeline and shipping operators to any coalition  $S$  cannot exceed the standalone cost  $C(S)$  it would incur with a potential entrant.

Lastly, the emitters' individual decisions to implement carbon capture (and thus the individual net benefits in conditions (3) and (4)) have to account for the sum of the total revenues charged by the pipeline and the shipping operators.

Altogether, these considerations indicate that, in the case of vertical separation, the break-even price for a combined BECCS/CCS adoption can be determined using an adapted version of the linear programming problem above.

If the shipping operator is compelled to use average cost pricing, the break-even price for a combined BECCS/CCS adoption is the solution of the following optimization problem.

LP2 (average cost pricing for CO<sub>2</sub> shipping):

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Min}_{t, p_{CO_2}} \quad & p_{CO_2} \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \sum_{i \in N} t_i = C_{pipe}(N), \end{aligned}$$

---

<sup>8</sup> Accordingly, the fixed cost  $f_{ship}$  incurred by the shipping firm is simply apportioned into  $|N|$  equal shares.

<sup>9</sup> In case of a linear cost function (as in the present) case, the proposed two-part pricing scheme is identical to the serial cost-sharing mechanism proposed in Moulin and Shenker (1992).

$$\sum_{i \in S} \left( t_i + Q_i \frac{C_{ship}(N)}{\sum_{i \in N} Q_i} \right) \leq C(S), \quad \forall S \subset N \setminus \{\emptyset, N\},$$

$$(p_{CO_2} - \chi_i - \sigma) Q_i - t_i - Q_i \frac{C_{ship}(N)}{\sum_{i \in N} Q_i} \geq 0, \quad \forall i \in N^{CCS},$$

$$(\tau p_{CO_2} - \chi_i - \sigma) Q_i - t_i - Q_i \frac{C_{ship}(N)}{\sum_{i \in N} Q_i} \geq 0, \quad \forall i \in N^{BECCS}.$$

Under a two-part pricing scheme for shipping, one can solve the following problem to determine the break-even price for a combined BECCS/CCS adoption.

LP3 (two-part pricing for CO<sub>2</sub> shipping):

$$\text{Min}_{t, p_{CO_2}} \quad p_{CO_2}$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad \sum_{i \in N} t_i = C_{pipe}(N),$$

$$\sum_{i \in S} \left( t_i + \frac{f_{ship}}{|N|} + c_{ship} Q_i \right) \leq C(S), \quad \forall S \subset N \setminus \{\emptyset, N\},$$

$$(p_{CO_2} - \chi_i - \sigma) Q_i - t_i - \frac{f_{ship}}{|N|} - c_{ship} Q_i \geq 0, \quad \forall i \in N^{CCS},$$

$$(\tau p_{CO_2} - \chi_i - \sigma) Q_i - t_i - \frac{f_{ship}}{|N|} - c_{ship} Q_i \geq 0, \quad \forall i \in N^{BECCS}.$$

### 3. A Swedish application

In this section, we first briefly present the Swedish situation regarding the potential for BECCS/CCS technologies to clarify both the background and the motivation of our analysis. Then, we detail a hypothetical yet realistic combined BECCS/CCS project in Sweden that serves as an application to the methodology detailed above.

### 3.1 Sweden as a topical case study

Sweden presents many features that scaffold BECCS and CCS deployment as an effective decarbonization option to meet the nation's ambitious climate objectives. First, carbon capture represents a realistic path. The country's power sector is already dominated by low emissions technologies (nuclear and hydroelectricity). Therefore, decarbonization should take place in other sectors. Interestingly, Sweden hosts a number of large carbon-intensive industrial facilities that can potentially be equipped with carbon capture capabilities: refineries, petrochemical plants, iron and steel factories, cement production (Garðarsdóttir et al. 2018).

Second, Sweden is part of Scandinavia, a region endowed with favorable geology for CO<sub>2</sub> storage. Mature aquifer storage capacity has been identified in Norway, and a sizable offshore storage site has now been developed there as part of an ambitious CCS project labeled Northern Lights (Cozier 2019). In its first phase, the project has a domestic nature as it is intended to store up to 1.5 million tons of CO<sub>2</sub>/year (MtCO<sub>2</sub>/y) captured in the Oslo region. However, given the large size of the storage site, the Norwegian authorities and the Northern Lights consortium envision scaling up the project to store CO<sub>2</sub> captured at other industrial clusters and, in particular, at the neighboring ones in Sweden (Global CCS Institute 2019). That project is expected to unlock the deployment of carbon capture in Sweden.<sup>10</sup>

Last but not least, the emergence of CCS also provides Sweden with an opportunity to unlock its BECCS potential. The country is endowed with an important biomass-fueled pulp and paper industry, which also represents a primary source of industrial CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (EEA 2017). Equipping these processing plants with carbon capture units is deemed to be technically feasible (Garðarsdóttir et al. 2018), and once equipped, the pulp and paper plants may be considered as BECCS. The deployment of such BECCS capabilities could provide the country with a credible option for generating negative

---

<sup>10</sup> *Preem – a Swedish oil refining and distribution firm – recently signed an agreement with the Northern Lights consortium to deploy a CCS chain. According to Preem's announcements, a carbon capture unit will be installed at its coastal refinery in Lysekil, and the captured CO<sub>2</sub> will be shipped to the Norwegian storage site using dedicated sea-going vessels. The commencement of these CCS operations is expected in 2020 (Preem, 2019).*

CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. In recognition of this, the government has explicitly listed it as a supplementary measure to reach the country's carbon neutrality target by 2045 (Regeringskansliet 2018). Altogether, these specific features make Sweden a realistic case for studying the economics of the combined deployment of CCS and BECCS.

### *3.2 The emitters, the storage site, and the associated logistics*

As an application, we focus on the south-western part of Sweden, where the emitters could be connected to the Northern Lights project in the future. We select all emitters within a 300km range from Lysekil<sup>11</sup> that have annual emissions volumes larger than 500 ktCO<sub>2</sub> per annum, as indicated in the 2017 European Pollutant Release and Transfer Report (EEA 2017).

The resulting list includes seven industrial sites where carbon capture capabilities can be installed (see Table 1 and Figure 1 – right). Each of these emitters is labeled from E1 to E7. Three of them have a coastal location, in the vicinity of deep-ports in Lysekil (E7), Stenungsung (E3), and Göteborg (E1). Conceivably, each of the three ports can be equipped with CO<sub>2</sub> loading facilities and is thus considered a potential maritime terminal. The four remaining emitters are located in the hinterland (notably, the pulp and paper plants located north of the Vänern lake). We suppose that all emissions are directed to a single storage site in Norway – the storage site deployed within the Northern Lights project – Figure 1, left.

**Figure 1: The envisioned BECCS/CCS project: General geography of the emission area in Sweden and the Norwegian storage site and the Swedish emission nodes**

*[PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]*

**Table 1. The industrial facilities under scrutiny**

*[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]*

---

<sup>11</sup> A CCS project is currently under scrutiny at the Preem refinery in Lysekil Preem (2019) which calls for further appraisal of the CCS/BECCS potential in that area.

The BECCS/CCS chain in question thus requires the installation of (i) an onshore pipeline system aimed at gathering the emissions captured at the industrial sites and transporting them to the Swedish ports; and (ii) one or several maritime supply chain(s) based on sea-going vessels transporting the CO<sub>2</sub> from these Swedish ports to the offshore storage site in Norway. Regarding the maritime component of the chain, we disregard the possibility of building an offshore pipeline system because the analyses in Kjärstad et al. (2016) and Svensson et al. (2004) indicate that shipping provides the cheapest technological option for the volume and the distance under scrutiny.

### *3.3 Identification of the least-costly infrastructure*

The application of our game-theoretic methodology requires the prior evaluation of the infrastructure cost incurred by each subgroup of emitters (see Section 2.2). We thus specify and parameterize an optimization problem aimed at determining the least-costly logistics for transporting the annual volumes of CO<sub>2</sub> captured at a given collection of Swedish emitters to the offshore storage site in Norway. We present an overview of the structure of this cost-minimization model below. The complete specification of this model is detailed in Appendix A.

This model aims at choosing the transportation routes (i.e., the pipelines and shipping routes) that minimize the total annual equivalent cost of building and operating the transportation and storage infrastructure. More precisely, it considers a predefined topology that includes a finite list of nodes representing the emitters, the possible maritime terminals, and the offshore storage site, as well as a predefined list of arcs representing the candidate pipelines and shipping routes connecting these nodes. The list of nodes and candidate routes is detailed in Appendix B. Figure 2 provides an illustration of the candidate infrastructure routes. From a cost perspective, each arc is characterized by a fixed and a unit cost component (see appendices C and D). Because of the fixed cost, there are arc-specific economies of scale.

## **Figure 2: The candidate pipelines and shipping lines**

*[PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]*

This cost-minimization model considers the following decisions. First, the model decides whether a given route should be opened or not given its fixed cost of deployment and its annual operating costs. That decision is modeled using route-specific binary variables whereby 1 indicates its installation and 0 means no construction. Second, for each of the installed routes, the model determines the transported quantity on that route. Lastly, the model decides the amount of CO<sub>2</sub> being injected at the storage site. These decisions have to verify a set of linear constraints that represent some fundamental requirements (e.g.: the mass balance equation at each node has to be verified; on each route, one cannot transport a positive flow of CO<sub>2</sub> if the construction of that route has not been decided).

The parameterization and the data retained in the present application, which are mainly taken from recent CCS techno-economic literature, are detailed in appendices C and D.

## **4. Results**

In this section, we first present the least-cost design of the CO<sub>2</sub> transportation infrastructure and then report the break-even prices needed for its deployment obtained under alternative market structures and carbon accounting rules for negative emissions.

### *4.1 The least-costly infrastructure*

We first use the optimization model above to determine the least-costly infrastructure connecting our seven emitters (i.e., the grand coalition  $N$ ) with the storage site.

## **Figure 3: The least costly infrastructure connecting the seven industrial emitters**

*[PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]*

The optimal infrastructure consists of a single pipeline system that goes around the Vänern lake on its west side and directs the captured CO<sub>2</sub> to a single maritime terminal: E3, a petrochemical plant. As a result, we are dealing with a fully-connected pipeline system aggregating all the captured volumes to a unique shipping line. This finding is noteworthy, as prior research on optimal CO<sub>2</sub> pipeline systems has shown that a fragmented infrastructure can also be optimal in cases with different geographical set-ups (see Massol et al. (2018) for an illustration in a Spanish case).

To gain further insights into the economics of that optimal infrastructure, we also report below the results obtained for a few remarkable subgroups obtained by partitioning the grand coalition into two mutually exclusive subgroups. The first partitioning has a technological nature as we independently determine the least-costly infrastructures needed to serve the BECCS and the CCS emitters separately (see Figure 4 (a) and (b)). The second one focuses on geography as we independently consider the emitters located in the coastal regions and the ones located in the hinterland (see Figure 4 (c) and (d)). In all cases, it is preferable to use a single shipping line with a unique departure port.

A comparison of the cost figures in Figure 4 with the ones reported in Figure 3 confirms the subadditive nature of the infrastructure cost function and documents the magnitude of the resulting coalitional gains. In all cases, serving the grand coalition with a unique infrastructure is substantially cheaper than the sum of the two standalone costs incurred to serve the two subgroups independently. The cost of serving the BECCS and the CCS emitters separately is 56% larger than that incurred for the grand coalition. Furthermore, if one evaluates the associated average costs, it is instructive to remark that CCS emitters could benefit from the addition of BECCS emitters: the average cost incurred by CCS emitters in a standalone case (i.e., 31.5€/tCO<sub>2</sub>) is noticeably larger than that obtained in the grand coalition (i.e., 27.6€/tCO<sub>2</sub>). A similar series of remarks hold in the case of spatial partitioning. For hinterland and coastal emitters, the total cost reaches 182,28 M€, which is 50% higher than the grand coalition. Coastal emitters are *de facto* closer to the storage site, but they can also benefit from an extended infrastructure connecting the hinterland emitter: their standalone

average cost (i.e., 36.4 €/tCO<sub>2</sub>) is also substantially larger than the 27.6€/tCO<sub>2</sub> figure obtained with the grand coalition.

**Figure 4 Least costly infrastructure for several noteworthy coalitions, respectively: (a): BECCS emitters, (b): CCS emitters, (c): Hinterland emitters, (d): Coastal emitters**

[PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE]

#### 4.2 Vertical integration vs. vertical separation

We now report the minimal CO<sub>2</sub> price such that a mutually acceptable allocation of the infrastructure cost is possible: the break-even CO<sub>2</sub> value. We successively consider three alternative industrial organizations for the infrastructure operator: (i) the case of a vertically integrated operator controlling both the onshore and offshore components of the logistics; (ii) the case of a vertical separation with two dedicated operators with a shipping operator charging a price set equal to its average cost; and (iii) the case of a vertical separation with a shipping operator charging the two-part tariff discussed in Section 2.4. We assume a *discounting factor* of  $\tau = 100\%$  (i.e., the full volume of stored CO<sub>2</sub> emissions is considered as negative emissions). Additionally, to gain insights into the difficulty of reaching a fair sharing of the infrastructure cost, we also report the simple average cost:

$$average\ cost = \frac{\sum_{i \in N} Q_i (\chi_i + s) + C^*(N)}{\sum_{i \in N} Q_i} = 100.40\ \text{€/tCO}_2$$

Such an average cost calculation *de facto* overlooks coordination issues but is commonly used by practitioners to evaluate the break-even value of a project. We report the results of this method as well as the three scenarios mentioned above in Table 2.

**Table 2 Break-even prices obtained under alternative infrastructure operator natures ( $\tau = 100\%$ )**

[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]

In the case of a vertically integrated infrastructure operator, the necessary break-even CO<sub>2</sub> value is as low as 112.43€/tCO<sub>2</sub> – which is a promising value, knowing that the Swedish carbon tax amounted to 110€/tCO<sub>2</sub> in 2020 (Government offices of Sweden 2020). Additionally, the break-even CO<sub>2</sub> value found with the model is at least 12% higher than the average cost. This difference documents the additional upwards pressure on the break-even value caused by the difficulty of reaching a mutually accepted cooperation among BECCS and CCS emitters.

Finally, the assumptions of vertically separated operators, either with an average cost or a two-part tariff method, increase the break-even value of 4% and 20%, compared to the vertically integrated case. These figures position a first noteworthy result: the shared BECCS and CCS infrastructure is most feasible – in terms of break-even values – when the infrastructure operator is vertically integrated.

However, when the *discounting factor* decreases – that is, when a smaller share of negative emissions is approved – the relative difference between the scenarios diminishes to the point where there is no longer any distinction ( $\tau = 75\%$ , Figure 5). This can be explained by the lower revenue obtained by BECCS facilities: below a certain *discounting factor*, the individual non-negative benefit constraints (see Section 2.2.b) become so tight that they drive the break-even CO<sub>2</sub> value, regardless of the nature of the infrastructure operator.

**Figure 5: Break-even values in each scenario, with different *discounting factors***

[PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE]

#### 4.3 The influence of the negative emissions discounting factor

We now let  $\tau$  vary between 100% and 10%, with 5% steps, and iteratively solve the linear programming problem LP1 with these values. Figure 6 gathers the resulting break-even prices across simulations and shows that the deployment of the infrastructure is unrealistic if the *discounting factor*

is too low: the break-even value exceeds 1000€/tCO<sub>2</sub> for  $\tau = 10\%$ . For  $\tau = 40\%$ , the break-even value doubles.

**Figure 6. Break-even prices for several *discounting factors*  $\tau$**

[PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE]

To put these figures into perspective, we derive a sample *discounting factor* from the assessment of a US-switchgrass fueled BECCS system by Fajardy and Mac Dowell (2017). In an optimistic scenario, they find that for 1 ton of biogenic CO<sub>2</sub> that is geologically stored, 0.6 tons of CO<sub>2</sub> is emitted back into the atmosphere. We translate this result into a *discounting factor* of 40%, by considering that only the difference between the stored biogenic emissions (1tCO<sub>2</sub>) and the associated process emissions (0.6tCO<sub>2</sub>) can be considered as negative emissions. If such a *discounting factor* were applied in our case, the break-even CO<sub>2</sub> value would reach 250.03€/tCO<sub>2</sub>. We can portray an even more pessimistic view by considering global carbon cycle dynamics. Jones et al. (2016) assess that only 60–90% of negative emissions will remain out of the atmosphere in the long term. Hence, in the worst-case scenario, the *discounting factor* of our example may be  $\tau = 40\% * 60\% = 24\%$  and may result in a break-even CO<sub>2</sub> value of around 410 €/tCO<sub>2</sub>. Negative emissions' accounting and rewarding thus appear to be most influential on the feasibility of a shared BECCS and CCS infrastructure. However, they are still inexistent. If such a framework existed, the principal challenge in the deployment of BECCS would seem to be the achievement of minimal *discounting factors* through the design of an efficient and sustainable bio-energy supply chain.

To summarize, three main results can be drawn from our analysis. First, it is in the interest of potential BECCS and CCS adopters to cooperate in building a shared infrastructure, as it enables them to face lower infrastructure costs. Second, the break-even CO<sub>2</sub> value is influenced by the nature of the infrastructure operator. The construction of the infrastructure is most feasible (*i.e.*, the break-even CO<sub>2</sub> value is lowest) for a vertically integrated infrastructure operator. Finally, and most importantly, the

negative emissions accounting framework has a critical role in the feasibility of the project, as high *discounting factors* put the highest upward pressure on the break-even prices.

#### 4.4 *Sensitivity analysis*

The investment and operation of carbon capture capabilities represent the highest cost component of the BECCS and CCS systems. These capture costs are site-specific, and their precise evaluation requires complex engineering studies that have to be conducted using detailed data on each site. That limitation is well known in the engineering literature. For example, Garðarsdóttir et al. (2018) – the main source used in the present study (see Appendix C) – provides both an expected value for the unit capture cost and a range of  $\pm 20\%$  around that value to account for the variability.

As one could wonder whether that variability may or may not substantially affect the validity of our results, we conduct a sensitivity analysis based on a Monte Carlo approach. We assume that the capture cost is a normally distributed random variable with a mean equal to the value in Garðarsdóttir et al. (2018) and a standard deviation set so that the width of a 99.7%-level confidence interval exactly matches the  $\pm 20\%$  range evoked in their article. We then randomly and independently draw 1,000 replicates for the capture cost and combine that sample with our linear programming models to generate a sample of break-even CO<sub>2</sub> prices. Figure 7 reports the empirical cumulative distribution functions of the break-even CO<sub>2</sub> prices obtained with the three possible organizations (i.e., integrated or vertically separated with the two pricing schemes) and for the case of a less than 100% discount factor. The results are completely consistent with the aforementioned ones as they confirm that: (i) a vertically integrated infrastructure statistically requires a lower break-even value than a separated infrastructure, and (ii) a low *discounting factor* undoubtedly puts the highest upward pressure on the break-even value.

### **Figure 7: Empirical cumulative distribution functions**

*[PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE].*

## **5. Conclusion**

The construction of a large-scale CO<sub>2</sub> transport and storage system is an essential issue that policymakers should address to support a rapid up-scaling of Bio-energy with Carbon Capture (BECCS) as well as fossil Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS). Accounting for the coordination of actors along the value chain is critical for identifying the viable and mutually agreed cooperation scheme at a regional level that is needed for accelerating the adoption. Furthermore, although BECCS and CCS may share a common CO<sub>2</sub> infrastructure, they face different challenges and accounting methods. Thinking of a shared deployment of BECCS and CCS, therefore, raises new questions. Which infrastructure set-up is most advantageous? How will accounting methods for negative emissions affect infrastructure deployment? And what are the conditions under which potential BECCS and CCS facilities cooperate?

This paper builds on a topical Swedish case study to clarify the conditions that enable the construction of a shared CO<sub>2</sub> transport and storage infrastructure. Using an adapted cooperative game-theoretic framework, we model the outcomes of the negotiations among emitters and use them to determine the critical value of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions that makes the construction possible: the break-even CO<sub>2</sub> value for BECCS and CCS adoption. We find that a sustainable and incentive-cooperation scheme can be implemented in the considered Swedish region, assuming a discriminatory CO<sub>2</sub> transport pricing and a high-enough CO<sub>2</sub> value. The most advantageous scenario involves a vertically integrated infrastructure operator and an identical reward for sequestered CO<sub>2</sub> for both BECCS and CCS plants. The break-even value then amounts to 112.43€/tCO<sub>2</sub>.

Biogenic emissions, however, remain beyond the scope of carbon taxes and markets. We examine the effects of possible accounting frameworks by assuming that BECCS emitters are rewarded at the

CO<sub>2</sub> market price for the negative emissions they produce. These may represent only a fraction of the sequestered CO<sub>2</sub>, and we assume that a discounting factor is applied to the reward attributed to BECCS. We find that the break-even price for adoption doubles for a discounting factor around 40%, *i.e.*, where only 40% of the stored emissions can be considered negative. This discounting rate is consistent with some carbon efficiency calculations for BECCS in the literature.

These results lead us to position two main policy recommendations on the deployment of a shared BECCS and CCS infrastructure. First, a vertically integrated infrastructure is preferred, as it allows a more advantageous cost allocation between participants. And second, the creation of a negative emissions accounting and rewarding framework is of paramount importance to enable the deployment of BECCS; such a framework must be agreed upon internationally in the coming years, in order to allow the upscaling of BECCS. Furthermore, if negative emissions produced by BECCS facilities are to be rewarded identically to CO<sub>2</sub> abatement, BECCS will only become an economically viable mitigation option if a large amount of sequestered CO<sub>2</sub> can be considered negative. Therefore, a sustainable and low emitting bio-energy value chain needs to be incentivized with an international sustainable biomass certification framework.

Notwithstanding the value of our findings, our analysis can be extended in several directions. For instance, an implicit premise of our model is that all emitters are simultaneously connected to the infrastructure. As the historical evidence gained from other infrastructure networks (e.g., natural gas or electricity) indicates that infrastructure can grow organically from a small territory to a larger one by gradually connecting adjacent users, future research could explore the conditions for such an organic deployment of BECCS and CCS infrastructures. Given the importance of capacity constraints in pipeline-based transportation techniques, one could also explore the need for an optimal degree of overcapacity on some critical components of the infrastructure (e.g., on some important transportation corridors). As that overcapacity is likely to be costly, another strand of research could also extend the analysis to examine the (fair) recouping of the associated extra-cost.



## Appendix A – Designing an optimal infrastructure

This appendix details the specifications of the optimization problem used to determine the least-cost design of an integrated transportation and storage infrastructure involving both pipelines and shipping lines.

### Notation

To begin with, we define three sets to identify the nodes of the network:

- $N = \{1, \dots, i, \dots, |N|\}$  the set gathering the emission nodes where emissions are captured;
- $K = \{1, \dots, k, \dots, |K|\}$  the set gathering the storage nodes where CO<sub>2</sub> is injected into an underground storage site;<sup>12</sup>
- $R = \{1, \dots, r, \dots, |R|\}$  the set of the network routing nodes that are not connected to either an emission node or to a storage site. These nodes typically represent an intersection between several pipeline links.

The three sets are mutually exclusive so:  $N \cap K = \emptyset$ ,  $K \cap R = \emptyset$  and  $N \cap R = \emptyset$ . For notational convenience, we also let  $Z = N \cup K \cup R$  denote the macro-set regrouping all the nodes and  $z$  is used as a generic notation for a given node in  $Z$ . We also let  $P = \{1, \dots, p, \dots, |P|\}$  denote the set of candidate pipeline links and  $L = \{1, \dots, l, \dots, |L|\}$  denote the set of candidate shipping lines.

We now present the exogenous parameters.

- $Q_i$  is the total quantity captured and injected into the network at emission node  $i$ ;

---

<sup>12</sup> In the present application, that set has only one element: the Norwegian storage site. That said, the model has a generic nature and it could be applied in other cases involving several storage sites.

- $\bar{Q}_k$  is the maximum amount of CO<sub>2</sub> that can be injected into storage  $k$ ;
- $I_{p,z}$  is an incidence parameter that only takes three values: -1 if pipeline  $p$  starts at node  $z$ , 1 if pipeline  $p$  ends at node  $z$ , and 0 otherwise;
- $J_{l,z}$  is an incidence parameter that only takes three values: -1 if shipping line  $l$  starts at node  $z$ , 1 if pipeline  $l$  ends at node  $z$ , and 0 otherwise;
- $F_p^{pipe}$  is the fixed cost incurred to open the pipeline link  $p$ ;
- $C_p^{pipe}$  is the unit cost incurred by using pipeline  $p$ ;
- $F_l^{ship}$  is the fixed cost incurred to open the shipping line  $l$ ;
- $C_l^{ship}$  is the unit shipping cost incurred by using the shipping line  $l$ ;
- $C_k^{inj}$  is the unit cost of the CO<sub>2</sub> injection operations conducted at storage  $k$ ;
- $M_{pipe}$  and  $M_{ship}$  are two arbitrarily large constants. Their values will be discussed below.

The decision variables are:

- $\delta_p$  is a binary variable that describes whether the pipeline link  $p$  is opened (i.e.,  $\delta_p = 1$ ) or closed (i.e.,  $\delta_p = 0$ );
- $q_p^+$  (respectively  $q_p^-$ ) is the non-negative quantity transported using pipeline  $p$  that flows in the direction posited for pipeline  $p$  (respectively in the opposite direction);

- $\gamma_l$  is a binary variable that describes whether the shipping line  $l$  is opened (i.e.,  $\gamma_l=1$ ) or closed (i.e.,  $\gamma_l=0$ );
- $q_l^{ship}$  is the non-negative quantity transported using shipping line  $l$  that flows in the direction posited for that line;
- $q_k^{inj}$  is the non-negative quantity injected into storage  $k$ .

For notational simplicity, we also let  $x_N = (\delta_p, q_p^+, q_p^-, \gamma_l, q_l^{ship}, q_k^{inj})$  be the decision vector to transport and store the emissions captured at the emission nodes in  $N$ .

### Optimization problem

The cost-minimizing design of an infrastructure gathering the emissions captured at the emissions nodes in  $N$  and transporting them to the storage site can be determined using the following mixed integer linear programming problem:

$$\text{Min}_{x_N} \quad Cost = \sum_{p \in P} [F_p^{pipe} \delta_p + C_p^{pipe} (q_p^+ + q_p^-)] + \sum_{l \in L} [F_l^{ship} \gamma_l + C_l^{ship} q_l^{ship}] + \sum_{k \in K} C_k^{inj} q_k^{inj} \quad (\text{A.1})$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad \sum_{p \in P} I_{p,i} (q_p^+ - q_p^-) + \sum_{l \in L} J_{l,i} q_l^{ship} + Q_i = 0, \quad \forall i \in N, \quad (\text{A.2})$$

$$\sum_{p \in P} I_{p,k} (q_p^+ - q_p^-) + \sum_{l \in L} J_{l,k} q_l^{ship} = q_k^{inj}, \quad \forall k \in K, \quad (\text{A.3})$$

$$\sum_{p \in P} I_{p,r} (q_p^+ - q_p^-) + \sum_{l \in L} J_{l,r} q_l^{ship} = 0, \quad \forall r \in R, \quad (\text{A.4})$$

$$q_p^+ + q_p^- \leq \delta_p M_{pipe}, \quad \forall p \in P, \quad (\text{A.5})$$

$$q_l^{ship} \leq \gamma_l M_{ship}, \quad \forall l \in L, \quad (\text{A.6})$$

$$q_k^{inj} \leq \bar{Q}_k, \quad \forall k \in K, \quad (\text{A.7})$$

$$q_k^{inj} \geq 0, \quad \forall k \in K; \quad \delta_p \in \{0,1\}, \quad q_p^+ \geq 0, \quad q_p^- \geq 0, \quad \forall p \in P \text{ and } \gamma_l \in \{0,1\}, \quad q_l^{ship} \geq 0, \quad \forall l \in L \quad (\text{A.8})$$

In this optimization problem, the objective function (A.1) to be minimized is the sum of the total pipeline costs, the total shipping costs, and the storage annual equivalent cost. The objective function is linear, and so are the constraints. The linear constraints (A.2), (A.3) and (A.4) respectively represent the mass balance equations at the source, storage, and intersection nodes. For each pipeline  $p$ , the constraint (A.5) forces the binary variable  $\delta_p$  to be equal to 1 whenever a positive quantity of gas is flowing into that pipeline (whatever the flow direction) and imposes a zero flow whenever it is optimal to not build it.<sup>13</sup> For each shipping line  $l$ , the constraint (A.6) forces the binary variable  $\gamma_l$  to be equal to 1 whenever a positive quantity of gas is shipped using that shipping line and imposes a zero flow whenever it is optimal to not open it. The constraints (A.7) represent the sink injectivity constraints: at each storage node, the quantity injected cannot exceed the local injection capacity.

We let  $x_N^*$  be the solution to that problem. Observe that this solution is such that on each pipeline  $p$ , at least one of the two directed flows  $q_p^{+*}$  and  $q_p^{-*}$  must be equal to zero.<sup>14</sup>

---

<sup>13</sup> It should be noted that the value of the parameter  $M_{pipe}$  (respectively  $M_{ship}$ ) is arbitrarily set at a level that is large enough for the constraint (B.5) (respectively (B.6) to be non-binding whenever the pipeline is built (respectively the shipping line is used). In the present case, we assume that these constants equal 10 times the sum of the quantity of CO<sub>2</sub> injected at all nodes (i.e.,  $\sum_{i \in N} Q_i$ ). Such « big M » constraints are commonly used in the operations research (O.R.) literature.

<sup>14</sup> Indeed, we assume that  $x_N^*$  is a solution and that there is at least one pipeline  $p'$  with  $q_{p'}^{+*} > 0$  and  $q_{p'}^{-*} > 0$ , we consider the decision vector  $x_N^{**}$  where the pipeline flows are the net non-negative flows in each direction  $q_{p'}^{+**} = \max(q_{p'}^{+*} - q_{p'}^{-*}, 0)$ ,  $q_{p'}^{-**} = \max(q_{p'}^{-*} - q_{p'}^{+*}, 0)$  and the other variables have the same values as the ones in  $x_N^*$ . By construction,  $x_N^{**}$  also verifies the constraints (B.2)–(B.7) while yielding a lower value for the objective function (B.1) because  $q_{p'}^{+**} + q_{p'}^{-**} = |q_{p'}^{+*} - q_{p'}^{-*}|$  and thus  $C_{p'}^{pipe} (q_{p'}^{+**} + q_{p'}^{-**}) < C_{p'}^{pipe} (q_{p'}^{+*} + q_{p'}^{-*})$ . Hence, we have a contradiction because  $x_N^*$  cannot be a solution of the optimization problem.

This optimization problem is a mixed-integer linear programming problem). Given its modest size in the instances considered in the present study, a numerical solution to that problem can be obtained in a few seconds using a standard solver and a laptop.

## **Appendix B – Topology**

Our parameterization considers a total of nine nodes including: the seven emission nodes E1 to E7, an intersection node labeled R1 that represents a possible network intersection between candidate pipelines, and a unique offshore storage site (Table B.1.).

**Table B.1. The nodes**

*[PLEASE INSERT TABLE B.1 HERE]*

Regarding onshore transportation, we consider a predefined set of ten candidate pipelines that can be installed in that part of Sweden (see Table B.2). These pipelines are located along the region’s main transport corridors, and the associated distances range from 30 to 284km, as represented in Table B.2.

**Table B.2. The candidate pipelines and their lengths**

*[PLEASE INSERT TABLE B.2 HERE]*

Point-to-point shipping is selected for offshore transportation between the three ports and the storage site located on the Norwegian continental shelf. The distance of these shipping lines varies between 613 and 641km.<sup>15</sup>

**Table B.3. The candidate shipping lines and their lengths**

*[PLEASE INSERT TABLE B.3 HERE]*

---

<sup>15</sup> The shipping line distances were calculated using an online calculator available at <https://www.searoutes.com/>, using the port of Bergen, Norway, as an approximation of the storage site location.

## Appendix C – Cost data

In this appendix, we present the cost data used in our study. All costs are reported in €<sub>2015</sub> and are levelized assuming 25 years of economic lifetime (except when stated otherwise) and a 7.5% discount rate. These assumptions are consistent with earlier techno-economic studies (Garðarsdóttir et al. 2018; Roussanaly et al. 2014; ZEP 2011).

### CO<sub>2</sub> capture

Carbon dioxide capture costs vary significantly depending on the considered sector and technology. As an illustration, the techno-economic review carried out by Leeson et al. (2017) provides unit capture costs for petroleum refineries ranging from 28.7 to \$250/tCO<sub>2</sub>. Here, we assume that a monoethanolamine-based (MEA) CO<sub>2</sub> absorption process is implemented.

CO<sub>2</sub> combustion emissions are most cost-effectively captured at stacks with high flue gas concentration and volumes. In petroleum refineries, this represents 30% of the total emissions (stemming from the H<sub>2</sub> production unit), whereas in the pulp and paper industry, 75% of emissions can be captured by equipping the recovery boiler. Finally, in the petrochemical plant considered here, 80% of emissions may be captured at the cracker furnace (Garðarsdóttir et al. 2018). We use specific capital cost estimations from the work of Garðarsdóttir et al. (2018), who evaluated CAPEX for a list of Swedish emitters, including the seven facilities considered here. The capital cost data shows a visible economy of scale (see in particular Figure 5b, Garðarsdóttir et al. 2018). There is little data, however, available on operational costs. We therefore use the OPEX calculated for a pulp and paper plant in the latter study as an order of magnitude for all plants. Table C.1. gathers the assumed capture rates and related CAPEX and OPEX costs for the selection of facilities in our application case.

**Table C.1. Capture rates and costs in for each emitter (Garðarsdóttir et al. 2018)**

*[PLEASE INSERT TABLE C.1 HERE]*

In should be noted that in this case, considering the low emissions of the Swedish power system, capture costs are close to the cost of avoided CO<sub>2</sub> and will be considered equal in this study.

*CO<sub>2</sub> transportation: a pipeline system and a maritime supply chain*

Following Morbee et al. (2012) and Massol et al. (2018), the construction cost of an onshore point-to-point CO<sub>2</sub> pipeline infrastructure is assumed to be directly proportional to its length. In the present study, we retain the cost parameters presented in Massol et al. (2018).<sup>16</sup> The annual equivalent investment cost of a 100km-long pipeline with an output of  $q$  MtCO<sub>2</sub>/y is:  $(A_0 + B_0q)\tau$ , where  $A_0 = 4.6045$  is the fixed cost coefficient (in million 2015 euros), the variable cost coefficient is  $B_0 = 0.1641$  in 2015 euros per (tCO<sub>2</sub>×100 km) and  $\tau = 1.1$  is the dimensionless terrain correction factor described in IEAGHG (2002).<sup>17</sup> Concerning O&M, (IEA 2005) indicates operation costs ranging from 1.0 to 2.5 euros per (tCO<sub>2</sub>×100 km). We use a value of 1.5 euros per (tCO<sub>2</sub>×100 km).

Regarding maritime shipping, we use an empirical function that gives the total annual cost (in M€/y) incurred for transporting a given annual flow of CO<sub>2</sub> over a given distance. This function has been estimated using the cost-engineering data presented in Roussanaly et al. (2014). The estimation procedure and the retained specifications are detailed in Appendix D.

*CO<sub>2</sub> storage*

We use a cost estimation given for offshore depleted gas oil fields by ZEP (2011), namely 10€/tCO<sub>2</sub> (high-cost scenario). Indeed, the storage site considered in the Northern Lights project will

---

<sup>16</sup> Original monetary values are in 2010 euros and were corrected for inflation to obtain 2015 euros.

<sup>17</sup> Here, we assume that the pipelines are installed on cultivated lands which explains the retained value for that parameter.

be exploited using existing oil and gas infrastructure on the Norwegian continental shelf (CCS Norway 2019). In this case, an economic lifetime of 40 years is assumed.

## Appendix D – The cost of maritime transportation

In the present study, we use an empirical approach to model how the cost of a maritime shipment of CO<sub>2</sub> varies with the volume shipped and the distance to the storage site.

The Scandinavian cost engineering literature provides several detailed evaluations of the total annual cost of a maritime CO<sub>2</sub> supply chain. That chain is aimed at transporting a given annual volume of CO<sub>2</sub> on a given distance using dedicated sea-going vessels that commute between a departure port equipped with specific loading and temporary storage facilities and an offshore site where the CO<sub>2</sub> is aimed at being stored permanently (Kjærstad et al. 2016; Roussanaly et al. 2014). In this paper, we leverage on these detailed cost evaluations to identify an approximate total cost function. More specifically, we use the information in Roussanaly et al. (2014), Table 13 – a data set comprising 100 observations for the unit transportation costs incurred for a supply chain shipping a given volume (from 2 to 20 MtCO<sub>2</sub>/y by regular steps of 2 MtCO<sub>2</sub>/y) over a given distance (between 200 and 2,000 kilometers by regular steps of 200km) – to estimate an empirical cost function.<sup>18</sup>

We posit the following parsimonious specification<sup>19</sup> whereby the total annual cost  $C$  (in millions €) is modeled as a linear function of the distance  $D$  (in 1,000km), the volume shipped  $Q$  (in MtCO<sub>2</sub>/y) and the product  $D \times Q$  aimed at capturing the interactions between these two variables:

---

<sup>18</sup> By construction, this approach is similar to the “pseudo data” method proposed to approximate complex engineering models using empirically-determined, single-equation cost functions (see e.g., Griffin (1977, 1978, 1979) or Massol (2011)).

<sup>19</sup> As there is no theoretical basis on which to select a particular functional form for that cost function, we have also tested a variety of other possible specifications including the simpler linear function with two explanatory variables (the distance and the volume) and several extensions including either quadratic, cubic or logged values of these variables). However, as the goodness-of-fit obtained with these more complex models was not substantially better than that obtained with our simple linear model.

$$C = \alpha + \beta D + \gamma Q + \delta(D \times Q) + \varepsilon \quad (\text{D.1})$$

where  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ ,  $\gamma$  and  $\delta$  are coefficients to be estimated and  $\varepsilon$  is an error term.

An ordinary least squares estimation yields the results presented in Table D.1. The estimated coefficients are highly statistically significant, the model has an excellent goodness-of-fit, and its residuals show no signs of non-normality. Unsurprisingly, the coefficients are positive, which indicates that the cost increases with both the distance and the volume shipped. For a given distance, that shipping cost function thus exhibits a positive fixed cost component  $\alpha + \beta D$ , and the variable cost is linear with a marginal shipping cost that is equal to  $\gamma + \delta D$ . By construction, the shipping cost function obtained for a given distance, thus exhibits pronounced economies of scale.

**Table D.1. Estimation results**

*[PLEASE INSERT TABLE D.1 HERE]*

## 6. References

- Bakken BH, Velken IvS (2008) Linear Models for Optimization of Infrastructure for CO<sub>2</sub> Capture and Storage. *IEEE Transactions on Energy Conversion* 23:824–833
- Baumol WJ, Bailey EE, Willig RD (1977) Weak invisible hand theorems on the sustainability of multiproduct natural monopoly. *The American Economic Review* 67:350–365
- Benhelal E, Zahedi G, Shamsaei E, Bahadori A (2013) Global strategies and potentials to curb CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in cement industry. *Journal of Cleaner Production* 51:142–161
- Berg SV, Tschirhart J (1988) *Natural monopoly regulation: Principles and practice*. Cambridge University Press New York
- CCS Norway (2019) Transport and storage: Northern lights. <https://ccsnorway.com/the-project/transport-storage-equinor-shell-and-total>
- Cozier M (2019) CCS takes centre stage. *Greenhouse Gas Sci Technol* 9:1084–1086
- EEA (2017) European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register (E-PRTR). <http://prtr.ec.europa.eu/#/home>
- Fajardy M, Mac Dowell N (2017) Can BECCS deliver sustainable and resource efficient negative emissions? *Energy & Environmental Science* 10:1389–1426
- Fuss S, Canadell JG, Peters GP, Tavoni M, Andrew RM, Ciais P, Jackson RB, Jones CD, Kraxner F, Nakicenovic N, Le Quéré C, Raupach MR, Sharifi A, Smith P, Yamagata Y (2014) Betting on negative emissions. *Nature Clim Change* 4:850–853. <https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2392>
- Garðarsdóttir SÓ, Normann F, Skagestad R, Johnsson F (2018) Investment costs and CO<sub>2</sub> reduction potential of carbon capture from industrial plants – A Swedish case study. *International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control* 76:111–124
- Global CCS Institute (2019) *Global Status of CCS 2019: Targeting Climate Change*

- Gough C, Upham P (2011) Biomass energy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS or Bio-CCS). *Greenhouse Gas Sci Technol* 1:324–334
- Government offices of Sweden (2020) Sweden's carbon tax. <https://www.government.se/government-policy/taxes-and-tariffs/swedens-carbon-tax/>. Accessed July 6th, 2020
- Griffin JM (1977) Long-run production modeling with pseudo data: Electric power generation. *The Bell Journal of Economics*:112–127
- Griffin JM (1978) Joint production technology: The case of petrochemicals. *Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society*:379–396
- Griffin JM (1979) Statistical cost analysis revisited. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 93:107–129
- Griffin PW, Hammond GP (2019) Industrial energy use and carbon emissions reduction in the iron and steel sector: A UK perspective. *Applied Energy* 249:109–125
- Hammond GP (2018) System Characterisation of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) Systems. In: Gough C, Thornley P, Mander S, Vaughan N, Falano T (eds) *Biomass energy and carbon capture and storage (BECCS): Unlocking negative emissions*, First edition. John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken NJ, pp 395–403
- IEA (2005) *In Building the Cost Curves for CO<sub>2</sub> Storage: European sector.*: Technical report
- IEA (2017) *Energy Technology Perspectives 2017*
- IEAGHG (2014) *Biomass and CCS - Guidance for accounting of Negative Emissions*
- Jones CD, Ciais P, Davis SJ, Friedlingstein P, Gasser T, Peters GP, Rogelj J, van Vuuren DP, Canadell JG, Cowie A (2016) Simulating the Earth system response to negative emissions. *Environmental Research Letters* 11:95012
- Kalkuhl M, Edenhofer O, Lessmann K (2015) The role of carbon capture and sequestration policies for climate change mitigation. *Environmental and Resource Economics* 60:55–80

- Kemp AG, Kasim AS (2010) A futuristic least-cost optimisation model of CO<sub>2</sub> transportation and storage in the UK/UK Continental Shelf. *Energy Policy* 38:3652–3667
- Kjärstad J, Skagestad R, Eldrup NH, Johnsson F (2016) Ship transport—A low cost and low risk CO<sub>2</sub> transport option in the Nordic countries. *International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control* 54:168–184
- Klokk Ø, Schreiner PF, Pagès-Bernaus A, Tomasgard A (2010) Optimizing a CO<sub>2</sub> value chain for the Norwegian Continental Shelf. *Energy Policy* 38:6604–6614
- Koelbl BS, van den Broek MA, Faaij APC, van Vuuren DP (2014) Uncertainty in Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) deployment projections: A cross-model comparison exercise. *Climatic change* 123:461–476
- Krahé M, Heidug W, Ward J, Smale R (2013) From demonstration to deployment: An economic analysis of support policies for carbon capture and storage. *Energy Policy* 60:753–763.  
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.05.019>
- Kuby MJ, Bielicki JM, Middleton RS (2011) Optimal spatial deployment of CO<sub>2</sub> capture and storage given a price on carbon. *International Regional Science Review* 34:285–305
- Leeson D, Mac Dowell N, Shah N, Petit C, Fennell PS (2017) A Techno-economic analysis and systematic review of carbon capture and storage (CCS) applied to the iron and steel, cement, oil refining and pulp and paper industries, as well as other high purity sources. *International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control* 61:71–84
- Massol O (2011) A cost function for the natural gas transmission industry: Further considerations. *The Engineering Economist* 56:95–122
- Massol O, Tchong-Ming S, Banal-Estañol A (2015) Joining the CCS club!: The economics of CO<sub>2</sub> pipeline projects. *European Journal of Operational Research* 247:259–275

- Massol O, Tchung-Ming S, Banal-Estañol A (2018) Capturing industrial CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in Spain: Infrastructures, costs and break-even prices. *Energy Policy* 115:545–560
- Mendelevitch R, Herold J, Oei P-Y, Tissen A (2010) CO<sub>2</sub> Highways for Europe: Modeling a Carbon Capture, Transport and Storage Infrastructure for Europe
- Middleton RS, Bielicki JM (2009) A scalable infrastructure model for carbon capture and storage: SimCCS. *Energy Policy* 37:1052–1060
- Morbee J (2014) International Transport of Captured CO<sub>2</sub>: Who Can Gain and How Much? *Environmental and Resource Economics* 57:299–322
- Morbee J, Serpa J, Tzimas E (2012) Optimised deployment of a European CO<sub>2</sub> transport network. *International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control* 7:48–61
- Moulin H, Shenker S (1992) Serial cost sharing. *Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society*:1009–1037
- Nemet GF, Callaghan MW, Creutzig F, Fuss S, Hartmann J, Hilaire J, Lamb WF, Minx JC, Rogers S, Smith P (2018) Negative emissions—Part 3: Innovation and upscaling. *Environ. Res. Lett.* 13:63003
- Oei P-Y, Mendelevitch R (2016) European scenarios of CO<sub>2</sub> infrastructure investment until 2050. *The Energy Journal* 37
- Oei P-Y, Herold J, Mendelevitch R (2014) Modeling a carbon capture, transport, and storage infrastructure for Europe. *Environmental Modeling & Assessment* 19:515–531
- Preem (2019) Här ska Preem fånga in koldioxiden. <https://www.preem.se/foretag/kund-hos-preem/hallbart-foretagande/har-ska-koldioxiden-fangas-in/>
- Regeringskansliet (2018) Kompletterande åtgärder för att nå negativa utsläpp av växthusgaser. (2018:70). <https://www.regeringen.se/rattsliga-dokument/kommittedirektiv/2018/07/dir.-201870/>

- Ricci O (2012) Providing adequate economic incentives for bioenergies with CO<sub>2</sub> capture and geological storage. *Energy Policy* 44:362–373
- Rogelj J, Shindell D, Jiang K, Fifita S, Forster P, Ginzburg V, Handa C, Kheshgi H, Kobayashi S, Kriegler E (2018) Mitigation pathways compatible with 1.5 C in the context of sustainable development. In: Masson-Delmotte V, Zhai P, Pörtner H-O, Roberts D, Skea J, Shukla PR, Pirani A, Moufouma-Okia W, Péan C, Pidcock R, Connors S, Matthews JBR, Chen Y, Zhou X, Gomis MI, Lonnoy E, Maycock T, Tignor M, Waterfield T (eds) *Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty*, Press. Press
- Roussanaly S, Brunsvold AL, Hognes ES (2014) Benchmarking of CO<sub>2</sub> transport technologies: Part II – Offshore pipeline and shipping to an offshore site. *International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control* 28:283–299
- Sharkey WW (1982) Suggestions for a game-theoretic approach to public utility pricing and cost allocation. *The Bell Journal of Economics*:57–68
- Solano Rodriguez B, Drummond P, Ekins P (2017) Decarbonizing the EU energy system by 2050: An important role for BECCS. *Climate Policy* 17:S93-S110
- Stavrakas V, Spyridaki N-A, Flamos A (2018) Striving towards the Deployment of Bio-Energy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS): A Review of Research Priorities and Assessment Needs. *Sustainability* 10:2206. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su10072206>
- Svensson R, Odenberger M, Johnsson F, Strömberg L (2004) Transportation systems for CO<sub>2</sub>—application to carbon capture and storage. *Energy Conversion and Management* 45:2343–2353

Thornley P, Mohr A (2018) Policy frameworks and supply-chain accounting. Biomass energy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS):227–250

Torvanger A (2019) Governance of bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS): Accounting, rewarding, and the Paris agreement. Climate Policy 19:329–341

Young HP (1985) Cost allocation: Methods, principles, applications. North Holland Publishing Co

Zakkour P, Kemper J, Dixon T (2014) Incentivising and Accounting for Negative Emission Technologies. Energy Procedia 63:6824–6833

ZEP (2011) CO2 Storage Report

**Table 1. The industrial facilities under scrutiny**

<i>Node</i>	<i>Facility name</i>	<i>Sector</i>	<i>Total CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (1,000 tCO<sub>2</sub>/y)</i>	<i>Biogenic emissions (1,000 tCO<sub>2</sub>/y)</i>
E1	St1 Refinery AB	Refinery	522	0
E2	Bäckhammars Bruk	Pulp and Paper	560	552
E3	Borealis Krackeranl.	Petrochemical	642	0
E4	Skoghalls Bruk	Pulp and Paper	1,000	944
E5	Gruvöns Bruk	Pulp and Paper	1,250	1,235
E6	Södra Cell Värö	Pulp and Paper	1,540	1,529
E7	Preemraff Lysekil	Refinery	1,580	0
<b>TOTAL</b>			7,094	4,260

**Table 2 Break-even prices obtained under alternative infrastructure operator natures ( $\tau = 100\%$ )**

	<b>Integration</b>	<b>Separation with average cost pricing</b>	<b>Separation with two-part tariff</b>
<b>Break-even value (€/tCO<sub>2</sub>)</b>	112.43	117.27	134.71
<b>Difference with average costs</b>	+12%	+17%	+34%

**Table B.1. The nodes**

<b>Node</b>	<b>Nature</b>	<b>Facility name</b>	<b>Comment</b>
E1	Emission	St1 Refinery AB	Refinery
E2	Emission	Bäckhammars Bruk	Pulp and Paper plant
E3	Emission	Borealis Krackeranl.	Petrochemical
E4	Emission	Skoghalls Bruk	Pulp and Paper plant
E5	Emission	Gruvöns bruk	Pulp and Paper plant
E6	Emission	Södra Cell Värö	Pulp and Paper plant
E7	Emission	Preemraff Lysekil	Refinery
R1	Routing		
S1	Storage	The Norwegian storage site	

**Table B.2. The candidate pipelines and their lengths**

<b>Pipeline</b>	<b>Origin</b>	<b>Destination</b>	<b>Distance (km)</b>
P1	E1	E3	72
P2	E3	E4	30
P3	E4	R1	168
P4	R1	E6	28
P5	R1	E2	60
P6	E2	E0	54
P7	E0	E5	70
P8	E1	E2	217
P9	E1	E0	238
P10	E1	E5	284

**Table B.3. The candidate shipping lines and their lengths**

<b>Line</b>	<b>Origin</b>	<b>Destination</b>	<b>Distance (km)</b>
L1	E7	S1	613.0
L2	E3	S1	638.9
L3	E1	S1	640.8


**Table C.1. Capture rates and costs in for each emitter (Garðarsdóttir et al. 2018)**

Node	Sector	Total CO <sub>2</sub> emissions (1,000 tCO <sub>2</sub> /y)	Capture rate	CAPEX €/tCO <sub>2</sub> /y)	OPEX €/tCO <sub>2</sub> /y)	Total €/tCO <sub>2</sub> /y)
E1	Refinery	522	30%	46	42	88
E2	Pulp and Paper	560	75%	23	42	65
E3	Petrochemical	642	80%	27	42	69
E4	Pulp and Paper	1,000	75%	20	42	62
E5	Pulp and Paper	1,250	75%	18	42	60
E6	Pulp and Paper	1,540	75%	16	42	58
E7	Refinery	1,580	30%	22	42	64


**Table D.1. Estimation results**

	Total annual cost
Constant	24.051 *** (1.141)
Distance	2.307 ** (0.920)
Volume	10.924 *** (0.092)
(Distance × Volume)	4.004 *** (0.074)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.9993
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.9993
Normality ( <i>p-value</i> )	1.178 (0.555)


Note: The standard deviations of the estimates is reported in brackets. Asterisks indicate significance at 0.1<sup>\*</sup>, 0.05<sup>\*\*</sup> and 0.01<sup>\*\*\*</sup> levels, respectively. Normality refers to the Jarque-Bera test for the null hypothesis of normally distributed residuals.




**Figure 1: The envisioned BECCS/CCS project: general geography of the emission area in Sweden and the Norwegian storage site and the Swedish emission nodes**




**Figure 2: The candidate pipelines and shipping lines**



**Figure 3: The least costly infrastructure connecting the seven industrial emitters**



**Figure 4 Least costly infrastructure for several noteworthy coalitions, respectively: (a): BECCS emitters, (b): CCS emitters, (c): Hinterland emitters, (d): Coastal emitters**



**Figure 5: Break-even values in each scenario, with different *discounting factors***





Figure 6. Break-even prices for several *discounting factors*  $\tau$



**Figure 7: Empirical cumulative distribution functions**