Leadership Selection in United Nations Peacekeeping

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Abstract[4]

States covet leadership and staff positions in international organizations. Civilian leaders and force commanders of UN peacekeeping operations have a significant impact on the implementation of peacekeeping mandates and, as a consequence, international peace and security. In selecting civilian and military leaders of peacekeeping operations, the UN Secretariat needs to balance three competing imperatives: satisfying powerful member states; recognizing member states' contribution to the work of the organization; and ensuring that prospective leaders have the skillset to succeed in the post. We investigate appointments of more than 200 civilian and military leaders in 24 UN missions, 1990-2017. We find that civilian leaders of UN peacekeeping operations, unlike military leaders, tend to hail from rich and powerful countries, pointing to inequalities in UN peacekeeping governance. However, countries that are major troop contributors to UN peacekeeping often secure leadership positions, especially military ones, which offer developing countries an alternative pathway to influence at the UN. Yet the UN's dependence on troop contributors, together with the reliance on powerful states, can be a source of dysfunction if it prevents the organization from selecting effective leaders. This dynamic affects other international organizations that have significant power disparities among members or rely on voluntary contributions.

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Introduction

States covet leadership and staff positions in international organizations (IOs). Such positions offer opportunities for exerting influence, obtaining information, and increasing visibility (Hall and Woods 2017; Parízek 2017; Novosad and Werker 2019). While recruitment is formally based on merit and civil servants are expected to be loyal to the organization upon joining, member states lobby to place their nationals in these positions. By appointing nationals of a certain country, IO secretariats can please key member states, reward governments for supporting the organization, or tap into a unique skill set associated with the nationality, such as linguistic abilities or local knowledge.

Among IO officials, civilian and military leaders of UN peacekeeping operations have unique characteristics that distinguish them from top management and rank-and-file bureaucracy. Stationed in conflict zones around the world, their decisions can mean life or death for civilians. Their demeanor can determine whether a UN operation enjoys local support or is viewed with suspicion. As illustrated by cases such as Rwanda and Liberia, their choices can shape the prospects for mission success or failure, with ramifications for the overall reputation of the UN's flagship activity. Peacekeeping leaders are thus not faceless bureaucrats but visible public figures operating under the watchful eye of civil society and media. Despite the consequential and unique role played by peacekeeping leaders, however, they remain a theoretically and empirically neglected category. We know little about the process of peacekeeping leaders' selection. Is this process fair and transparent? Does it enable the UN Secretariat to select the best people for this challenging job? To what extent does it reflect the main cleavages that exist at the UN and in world politics, such as the divide between developed and developing countries?

In this article, we aim to fill this gap by examining how civilian and military leaders of UN peacekeeping operations are selected. We develop a theoretic argument emphasizing three key characteristics that affect leaders' chances of appointment: the power of the country of nationality, peacekeeping contributions by the country of nationality, and potential for effective performance in the post. Like in other IOs, the nationality of peacekeeping leaders weighs heavily in the appointment process. Both scholars and observers of the UN have noted that officials who hail from powerful countries tend to dominate the organization's upper echelons. Additionally, UN peacekeeping relies on voluntary troop contributions, which enables major contributors to demand recognition in the form of leadership posts. National background also equips potential leaders with skills – linguistic or cultural – necessary for running the mission effectively.

We evaluate our theoretical expectations against original data on the nationality of civilian and military leaders in UN peacekeeping between 1990 and 2017. We estimate the probability of each UN member state supplying a leader for a UN peacekeeping operation, focusing on power, recognition, and skill. We discover that a country's wealth, institutional power, diplomatic connectedness, and troop contributions increase nationals' chances of a peacekeeping leadership appointment. Yet, we also observe differences between civilian and military leaders: nationals of wealthy and institutionally powerful countries are more likely to be appointed to the key position of the civilian head of mission, while developing countries need to make substantial troop contributions in order to secure at least the military command of a mission.

Our findings have implications for the literatures on informal governance in IOs, the political economy of IOs, and, more broadly, hierarchies in world politics. In line with the expectations of the informal governance literature, powerful member states wield considerable

influence over IO secretariats. One of the avenues of influence is lobbying for key appointments for their nationals, such as peacekeeping leadership positions, especially the post of the top mission diplomat. Our results also reveal two novel findings. First, organizations' dependence on member states for the provision of voluntary resources – such as peacekeeping troops – can be a source of dysfunction if it prevents secretariats from selecting the most capable cadres. Second, unlike most other IOs where voluntary resources are financial, propelling developed states to the top of the institutional hierarchy, troop contributions offer a unique avenue for developing countries seeking influence at the UN. We thus provide empirical evidence for the argument that UN peacekeeping is structured by multiple hierarchies, where institutional power, economic wealth, and troop contributions can be leveraged to obtain influence (Coleman 2017). However, multiple hierarchies do not imply the absence of the "North-South" divide.[5] While developed countries provide financial resources and receive key posts, countries from the Global South need to take up difficult and dangerous work, like providing peacekeepers, in an effort to exercise influence.

The article proceeds in four parts. In the first section, we analyze why and how member states lobby to place their nationals in key positions in IOs and discuss the role of peacekeeping leaders. In the second section, we outline our hypotheses regarding the importance of the power of the country of nationality, troop contributions by the country of nationality, and nationality-related skills in the appointment process. In the third section, we introduce the dataset and the modeling approach. In the fourth section, we present the findings that emerge from quantitative analysis. In the conclusion, we discuss the implications of our findings and suggest new research avenues opened by this study.

[5] Developing countries at the UN have for decades complained that the UN bureaucracy is dominated by nationals of rich, Northern states (Benner et al. 2011; Weinlich 2014; Guéhenno 2015).

Leadership and Nationality in IOs and UN Peacekeeping

The comparative politics and management literatures treat leadership as a crucial factor affecting the behavior of governments, public and private organizations, and even terrorist groups (Bass et al. 2003; Fernandez et al. 2010; Abrahms and Potter 2015). In UN peacekeeping, the quality of leadership – or a lack thereof – is one of the most important factors in the success of a mission (Howard 2008; de Coning 2010). As former Under-Secretary-General (USG) for Peacekeeping Jean-Marie Guéhenno (2015, 16) argues, the job of the head of mission is "one of the most difficult, and most unrecognized, jobs on earth…[which] summarizes all the tensions and possible contradictions of the United Nations, an organization whose raison d'être is to serve the people, but whose influence depends on the capacity to generate and manage the support of powerful member states." Managing the support of various types of member states is a crucial concern of the UN Secretariat during leadership appointment. However, the UN is not unique in this regard: member states influence leadership and staff appointments in other IOs as well.

IO Appointments and Member States' Lobbying

It is well-known that "leaders of international organizations tend to be selected in less than fully competitive ways" (Hawkins et al. 2006, 29). There are many reasons why states lobby to place their nationals in leadership and staff positions in IOs. IO officials pass on information on organization's functioning to former colleagues (and future employers) in national governments, thus preventing IO bureaucracies from developing an information advantage (Parízek 2017). For example, during the Cold War, there was a unit in the UN Secretariat

staffed by nationals of one of the superpowers, whose entire purpose was to serve as a source of information for their state (Salton 2017, 135).

Politicians use IO officials of the same nationality to influence IOs (Urpelainen 2012; Kleine 2013). Within the European Commission, which is supposed to approximate the ideal of a post-national bureaucracy, governments use their connections to specific Commissioners, whose nationality affects many aspects of EU's functioning, including policy initiation, voting in the Council of the EU, and budget allocations (Thomson 2008; Wonka 2008; Killermann 2016; Gehring and Schneider 2018). At the UN, member states have used nationals in strategical positions to influence the work of permanent departments and temporary missions (Salton 2017; Johns 2007).

Members states also use staff and leadership appointments in IOs to reward loyal citizens: such posts come not only with prestige and visibility, but also perks like foreign travel and per diems (Gray 2016). Key IO posts give nationals valuable experience which enhances their chances of similar appointments in the future, allowing their countries to enhance influence in other IOs as well. The desire to secure leadership opportunities for nationals can take the form of "legacy positions" and "flags-to-posts" dynamics, or informal agreements tying key staff posts to nationality. For example, NATO Secretary-General is traditionally a European, while a US national gets the top military command post (Dijkstra 2016). In the EU, the post of the Director General for Agriculture and Rural Development has been occupied by a French national for 42 out of 50 years of the Common Agricultural Policy's existence (Kleine 2013, 337-8).

At the UN, "flags-to-posts" dynamics date back to the organization's founding years when the permanent members of the Security Council reached a "gentleman's agreement" that each would provide one Assistant-Secretary-General (Ravndal 2018, 30). During the Cold

War, the Great Powers expected the Secretary-General "to appoint their nationals to key positions, jealously protecting 'their' senior UN posts as *chasses guardées*" (Salton 2017, 130). Former British USG for Special Political Affairs, Marrack Goulding, recalled being "inserted by a major power at a young age into a prestigious post" when British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher "installed Goulding at UN Headquarters to gain a competitive advantage" (Salton 2017, 183). The practice continues today: for instance, the post of USG for Peacekeeping has been occupied by a French national since 1997. In 2016, China eyed the post, citing its growing troop contributions, which exceeded the combined contributions by the other four permanent members of the Security Council, and its financial contributions, which were second only to the US (Lynch 2016). Observers expressed concerns that China could have used the position to steer the direction of peacekeeping away from its focus on human rights, as it has already done through different channels (Lagon and Lou 2018, 243-4). Thus, the nationality of key IO officials is linked to states' quest for influence in IOs. Below we outline how the nationality of peacekeeping leaders influences the direction and effectiveness of UN missions. Following the discussion of the implications of peacekeeping leaders' nationality for the functioning of the UN, we then investigate what drives their appointment.

Leadership and Nationality in UN Peacekeeping

Multidimensional UN peacekeeping missions are headed by a civilian diplomat, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). The head of the military component is the Force Commander (FC).[6] Both categories of officials play important political and strategic

[6] Another category of senior leaders in peacekeeping missions includes heads of police components, Police Commissioners. However, the process of their appointment is different because it is assisted by the Standing Police Capacity, a small cell of police experts that can supply Police Commissioners and other senior staff to new missions on a temporary basis. Also, member states face costs associated with supplying Police Commissioners:

roles, although the contribution of SRSGs is better researched (Johnstone 2003; Karlsrud 2013; Fröhlich 2014; Karlsrud 2016), as compared to that of FCs.[7] In most Cold War peacekeeping operations, the FC served as the head of mission, reflecting their military composition and orientation.[8] By contrast, most post-Cold War operations have been led by a civilian head of mission, an SRSG. The head of mission maintains overall authority over the military, police, and civilian components of the operations and, since the advent of integrated missions, over the activities of all UN entities in the mission area (UN DPKO/DFS 2008, 7). The SRSG post offers significant opportunities for influence.

The nationality of both SRSGs and FCs affects the way in which they approach the implementation of peacekeeping mandates. In addressing difficult dilemmas that the job entails, they rely not only on personal experience, but also lessons from their country's history, cultural norms prevalent in their society, and informal networks developed during national service. For example, in the midst of the 2011 electoral crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, SRSG Choi Young-Jin authorized airstrikes against the forces of Laurent Gbagbo, the defeated incumbent who tried to hold on to the presidency through violence, leading to Gbagbo's capture by the opposition forces and the installation of the candidate believed to have won the popular vote. The SRSG's decision attracted sharp criticism from Russia, which argued the airstrikes constituted peace enforcement and amounted to an unauthorized expansion of the mandate. Before calling in the airstrikes, Choi had time to consult only the Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, and not the Security Council (Karlsrud 2016). Choi was "a South Korean diplomat and

it involves releasing their best police talent from the national force to serve in environment where they might not acquire valuable skills, considering different nature of police work in post-conflict environments.

[7] As Bellamy and Williams (2013b, 441) observe, "a large academic literature on the value of military leadership that has not yet been translated into a similar literature on leadership in peacekeeping".

[8] There were exceptions during the Cold War: the 1960 operation in Congo was headed by an SRSG. In some contemporary missions, a FC serves as the head of mission, such as operations that originated during the Cold War, like the mission in Lebanon, or small operations that are primarily military in nature, like the border monitoring mission in the Abyei region. Yet, these are very rare events.

friend of Ban" (Gowan 2011, 411). This suggests that Choi's nationality has played a role in the speed (and possibly the nature) of this consequential decision.

In Namibia, SRSG Martti Ahtisaari of Finland sought to ensure gender equality within the mission, a decision in which his "Nordic background may have played a role" (Hudson 2000, 27). Yasushi Akashi of Japan served as the SRSG in both Cambodia and the former Yugoslavia. In Cambodia, Akashi "had a measure of success in dealing with the intransigent factions in his emollient manner" (Shawcross 2000, 147), while in Bosnia, he was criticized for being too soft on the Serb forces due to his "Japanese character, which places peace above justice", a result of Japan's WWII experience (Geyer 1997, 83).

Activist FCs have also used national experience or connections. When Roméo Dallaire of Canada, the commander of the UN mission in Rwanda, sought to warn New York headquarters of the impending tragedy in the ill-fated "genocide fax", he addressed the cable directly to another Canadian, Maurice Baril, a military adviser in the UN's peacekeeping department. Dallaire (2008, 145) knew his action was "unprecedented" because he tried to open "a line of communication in an area where [he] had no authority to do so". Patrick Cammaert of the Netherlands, who commanded the Eastern Division of the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2005-2007, took robust action against militias that threatened civilians. Many years before the DRC assignment, Cammaert served in the Dutch battalion of the UN Protection Force, which was stationed in Srebrenica and failed to prevent the massacre there. That experience made Cammaert proactive in protecting civilians the DRC a decade later (Paddon Rhoads 2016, 130).

As we can see, SRSGs and FCs play a crucial role in promoting international peace and security, human rights, and civilian safety. Ideally, the UN should appoint the most

experienced, skillful, and suitable candidates to these positions. However, like with other categories of IO staff and leadership, member states seek to influence the process.

Peacekeeping Leaders' Appointment Process

The UN Secretary-General is vested with the authority of appointing civilian and military leaders of peacekeeping operations. In reality, the Secretary-General has limited ability to "withstand[] lobbying from Member States" (Joensson 2017, 8). Senior UN officials have complained that "political considerations had prevailed over requirements of competence and merit in some cases" (UN OIOS 2015, §74). The 2015 High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) stressed the need to enhance "Secretary-General's independence in the selection and appointment of senior leadership" (United Nations 2015, §271). UN senior leaders, including leaders of peacekeeping operations, are "usually appointed through a process of political bargaining between member states in decision-making organs and informally in behind-the-scenes discussions" (Lottholz and von Billerbeck 2019, 10). For SRSGs (and we suspect FCs as well), the selection process is "a delicate balancing game along nationality lines" (Sisk 2010, 241).

By placing nationals in SRSG and FC positions, member states seek to influence the direction of UN peacekeeping in a specific country or in general terms. Governments might use an SRSG or FC to support the resolution of a particular conflict or to prop up a client regime. They might seek to exploit nationals in staff or leadership positions to control mission's activities.[9] If they have a bilateral assistance programme in a certain country, they might use

[9] For example, Russian officials in the UN mission in Kosovo lobbied against devolving responsibility to Kosovar authorities as this was seen as a step towards independence (Eckhard and Dijkstra 2017).

their national who leads a parallel UN force to enhance coordination or, vice versa, prevent the UN from meddling in their own initiatives. They might wish to gain an economic foothold in the host country. They might wish to reward nationals with a lucrative posting, which is also a source of diplomatic experience[10] or military training.[11] This is valuable to their country of nationality as well, in two ways: first, it enhances the quality of its diplomatic corps and the military; second, it promotes loyalty to their home country on the part of these cadres, who feel an obligation toward the government who has lobbied on their behalf for an attractive international post.

The influence over a UN peacekeeping mission and in international politics in general often reinforce each other. For Brazil, the key contributor to the UN mission in Haiti, the appointment of successive Brazilian FCs in "a clear break with standard practice" allowed it "direct influence in every sphere of decision-making" (Braga 2010, 718); we call it "mission capture" by a specific troop contributing country (TCC). Subsequently, Brazil was invited to second an expert to the HIPPO, and a former Brazilian FC authored a controversial yet influential Cruz Report, enabling Brazil to exert a "palpable influence on the development of multilateral military interventions" (Harig 2017, §3). However, while all member states endeavor to place nationals in peacekeeping leadership positions, not all of them are equally capable of doing so.

[10] For example, Bert Koenders, who had served as SRSG in Mali, subsequently became Netherlands' Minister of Foreign Affairs.

[11] In the words of a Brigadier who acted as the FC in the UN mission in Cyprus, "to have held an international command of this sort is a stroke of good fortune which does not always come the way of a professional soldier" because it provides the benefit of networking and increased intercultural understanding (UN 1966, §3). This holds true in the contemporary era as well: in his memoire, Acting Force Commander of the UN mission in Haiti writes the following: "For a professional soldier, the opportunity to lead an international mission in a situation where resources are used in real-life situations is extremely valuable — especially in peacetime, when soldiers can train only with charts and simulated exercises" (Aldunate 2010, 3).

Power, Recognition, and Skill in Peacekeeping Leadership Appointments

We argue that three categories of factors affect individuals' chances of being appointed as a peacekeeping leader: the power of the country of nationality; troop contributions by the country of nationality; and skills, which are often nationality-related. In the following sub-sections, we discuss our expectations about the role that power, recognition of troop contributions, and nationality-related skill play in peacekeeping leadership appointments.

Power. In the UN and other IOs, power has been demonstrated to affect staff appointments (Parízek 2017; Eckhard and Steinebach 2018; Novosad and Werker 2019). It matters for peacekeeping leadership appointments as well. In his memoir, former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1999) recalled how he accommodated the US in the process of appointing SRSGs and FCs, examples being SRSG Jonathan Howe in Somalia and FC Joseph Kinzler in Haiti, both Americans. As the literature on informal governance in IOs suggests (Stone 2011), other member states might tolerate this practice in order to prevent superpower's disengagement from the UN or from a specific conflict. Former USG for Peacekeeping Guéhenno (2015, 135) appointed an American SRSG, William Swing, to lead the UN mission in the DRC because it made it "more difficult for the Congolese to ignore the UN and also more difficult for the United States to walk away from Congo." Besides being influenced by direct lobbying, for which powerful member states have greater capacity, the Secretariat might appoint nationals of such countries to top peacekeeping positions in order to tie their country closer to the organization or the mission. This leads us to our first expectation:

H1: *Peacekeeping leaders are more likely to come from powerful countries.*

Recognition. In IOs that rely on voluntary resources provided by member states, such as the organizations in the UN system, major donors have a disproportionate influence on staff

appointments (Thorvaldsdottir 2016), as well as other decisions (Graham 2017). For instance, UNICEF had traditionally been headed by an American, which raised no questions as long as the US was the largest financial contributor. When Scandinavian countries became the main financiers in the mid-1990s, the Boutros-Ghali (1999, 228) argued that "there was no longer automatic acceptance" that the post was to be occupied by an American. Scandinavian countries demanded recognition of their financial contributions. While financial contributions to UN peacekeeping are a compulsory expenditure,[12] member states provide troops voluntarily. In the unsuccessful attempt to wrestle the top Secretariat peacekeeping post from France, China, which is less powerful economically and diplomatically, stressed its credentials as a relatively active troop contributor – at least as compared with the other permanent members of the Council.

Other TCCs also expect to be rewarded with senior peacekeeping posts. According to a former Military Adviser in the Secretariat's peacekeeping department, it is not a secret that being from a major TCC increases the chances of being appointed to a peacekeeping leadership post (Ford 2018). Former USG for Peacekeeping Guéhenno (2015, 226) admitted that he "had to accept that the nationality of key commanders would be decided by the troop-contributing countries". There is an "unwritten rule" that FCs come from countries that "make large contributions to the operation in question" (Jakobsen 2016, 756). Eduardo Aldunate (2010, 39), who served as an acting FC in Haiti, recalled that with Brazil as the largest contributor, "established procedures required that the mission be in charge of a Brazilian general", while the position of the Deputy FC was given to a national of Argentina, "the country with the second largest contingent in Haiti". Italy, one of the largest contributors to the expanded mission in Lebanon, supplied three out of five FCs in 2007-2018 although it is "rare at the UN

[12] Each state is assessed according to its wealth; the five permanent members of the Security Council pay a larger share because of their special privileges and responsibilities.

that the leadership of a mission is repeatedly assigned to officials of the same nationality" (Tercovich 2016, 688). Similar considerations are at play in SRSGs' appointments: Guéhenno ruled out former Mexican Foreign Minister as the SRSG in Haiti "in part because Mexico is not deeply involved in MINUSTAH" (USUN 2014, §8).

While states contribute troops to peacekeeping for diverse reasons (Bove and Elia 2011; Bellamy and Williams 2013a; Ward and Dorussen 2016; Sandler 2017; Passmore et al. 2018), some of them do so "to influence decisions about the operation through the acquisition of key posts within the mission headquarters" (Bellamy and Williams 2012, 4). If TCCs feel that they are not recognized through leadership appointments, they might cut back on their peacekeeping participation. In 2009, India threatened to reduce its troop contributions to peacekeeping unless it got more leadership positions (Takshashila Institution 2010). The following year, an Indian was appointed to command the UN operation in the DRC, despite allegations of misconduct by Indian troops and objections by the host government (Krishnasamy 2010). Nepal, which had provided only five FCs despite being a TCC, complained in 2016 of "under-representation and sought 'justice' for its contributions going back to 1955" (Pariyar 2016, §2). Nigeria, the largest initial contributor to the UN mission in Sierra Leone and the lead of the preceding regional peacekeeping force, was infuriated when it did not receive both SRSG and FC posts. An Indian was appointed as the FC, although India provided 4,000 troops less than Nigeria. A severe intra-leadership conflict ensued.[13] The Secretary-General had to replace the Indian FC, yet "[w]ith much hesitation and coming under pressure from Nigeria" (Krishnasamy 2010, 237). More recently in Mali, a Nigerian FC of the preceding "re-hatted" African Union operation was not appointed to lead the UN one, causing Nigeria to scale down its contribution

[13] The Nigerian contingent might have misinformed the Indian FC, leading the latter to imprudent decisions, while the Indian FC accused Nigerian troops of illegal diamond mining and rebel collusion (*The Economist*, 2000; Olonisakin 2015).

to the mission (McGregor 2013). The Secretariat is aware of such risks, which leads us to our second hypothesis:

H2: *Peacekeeping leaders are more likely to come from countries that contribute troops to peacekeeping.*

Skill. Considering that peacekeeping leaders are expected to be excellent strategists, administrators, and mediators, the Secretariat aims to find the best person for the job despite member states' lobbying. Many of those skills are related to the nationality of a prospective leader, such as linguistic abilities, socialization into norms which the UN seeks to cultivate, and awareness of a specific cultural context. Some requirements mentioned in SRSG job adverts might have a (perceived) connection to the nationality, such as "integrity and respect for human rights" or "cultural and gender sensitivity" (UN 2017).

In addition, proximity between the leaders' country and the country hosting the peacekeeping operation confers advantages. In IOs with a large field presence, knowledge of the local context or mastery of a specific language has been demonstrated to help acquire staff posts (Parízek 2017; Eckhard and Steinebach 2018). Geographical and cultural proximity between peacekeeping troops and the host population is associated with less violence against civilians and fewer battle deaths (Bove and Ruggeri 2019). The success of UN peacekeeping operations depends on their leadership's familiarity with the civil war (Howard 2008, 18), a fact of which the Secretariat is keenly aware. For example, Boutros-Ghali (1999, 54) appointed Mohammed Sahnoun of Algeria as the SRSG in Somalia in part because of "his close knowledge of African affairs"[14] and Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh of Cameroon as the SRSG in

[14] The other reason was the desire to increase the number of Africans in key UN positions. Peacekeeping leadership is supposed to be recruited "on as wide a geographical basis as possible" (UNSC 2018, §8), yet the descriptive statistics which we present below show this remains an aspiration.

Rwanda because Booh-Booh was "a francophone African intimately familiar with Rwandan politics" (Salton 2017, 189).

Yet proximity can be a double-edged sword: neighboring countries often have a history of enmity or rivalry (Bove and Ruggeri 2019), while peacekeeping missions need to maintain impartiality, which was the reason why neighbors had not been invited to supply peacekeeping troops during the Cold War (Williams and Nguyen 2018). The Secretariat has also been cautious with religion: Boutros-Ghali (1999, 142) appointed Akashi to lead the mission in Yugoslavia because he was not an Orthodox Christian, a Catholic, or a Muslim, making the Japanese SRSG "100 percent immune to Yugoslav political pressures". It needs to be analyzed empirically whether cultural proximity and religious affinity are an obstacle or an asset for peacekeeping leaders in terms of their chances of appointment.

If a country has already provided a leader for a particular operation, hiring another leader of the same nationality provides the benefit of continuity. In addition, we also explore the effect that previous *personal* experience – as opposed to a country's experience – of leading a peacekeeping mission might have. Our third hypothesis thus focuses on Secretariat's expectations about leaders' skills:

H3*: Peacekeeping leaders are more likely to be appointed if they are perceived as possessing valuable skills.*

Data

Dependent Variable

We assembled monthly data on the name, nationality, and tenure of 89 SRSGs and 149 FCs for 24 UN peacekeeping missions over the 1990-2017 period.[15] We built on and extended Bove, Ruggeri, and Zwetsloot's (2016) dataset on leadership in peacekeeping operations. Since the dataset covers a limited number of missions/years, we used official UN documents to create leadership timelines in peacekeeping operations and supplemented this material with details from the academic literature and media reports. Our dataset represents the most comprehensive overview of leadership in UN peacekeeping operations to date. There is no available dataset of civilian and military leaders of peacekeeping operations; the UN does not provide one. To the best of our knowledge, there has been only one qualitative attempt to collect information on SRSGs (Fröhlich 2014). However, this contribution is about the nature of SRSGs' work (many SRSGs are thematic positions, like SRSG on Sexual Violence in Conflict, and do not serve as heads of peacekeeping missions), how the SRSG' role has developed over time, and how individual action translates into international agency. Our dataset allows us to explore how the nationality of SRSGs and FCs affects their chances of appointment.

Independent Variables

For H1, we use several indicators of power. Power at the UN is institutional, material, and diplomatic. Being one of the *permanent five members of the UN Security Council (P5*) cements the country's place at the top of the institution's hierarchy (Pouliot 2016). The P5 have a disproportionate influence over peacekeeping missions' mandates, timelines, and sizes (Allen and Yuen 2014). Even *non-permanent membership of the Security Council (E10)* might increase the chances of nationals' appointment in a given year. *Economic wealth* is also a form

[15] This leads to a maximum of 3,233 observations. Yet, note that due to missing values for some of our covariates, the sample size decreases in terms of the models presented in the next section.

of power (Parízek 2017; Novosad and Werker 2019), which is determined largely based on *GDP.* Among the top five contributors to the assessed peacekeeping budget, two – Germany and Japan – are non-P5 countries. Additionally, diplomatic salience can be viewed as a form of power, which requires developing a wide network of embassies (Henke 2017). Following Novosad and Werker (2019), we measure *diplomatic power* as the count of *foreign embassies*, using Correlates of War (COW) data (Bayer 2016). We also use *population size,* which is a key variable in the "bucket of capabilities" that determines a country's level of influence in the international system (Morgenthau 1967). It also affects the ability to wage wars; "military power and nonmilitary importance in terms of cultural, strategic, and economic factors are increasing functions of population size" (Hegre 2008, 578).

For H2, we use monthly data on troop contributions from the International Peace Institute Peacekeeping Database (Perry and Smith 2013). The variable *troop contribution* measures mission-specific contributions by each country, operationalized as the mean contribution in the second year since mission establishment. We measure the variable at this point to take into consideration possible delays in deployment. The variable *cumulative troop contribution* is measured as the total sum of troops provided by a country, across all UN missions, through to the point of observation.

For H3, we use several proxies for nationality-related skills. The *absence of political corruption* (Coppedge et al. 2017) in the country of nationality might serve as a proxy for UN officials' integrity: countries with low corruption scores are better represented at senior levels in the Secretariat (Parízek 2017; Novosad and Werker 2019). Since most multidimensional peacekeeping missions are expected to promote democratization (although in practice they might inadvertently enable authoritarianism, as von Billerbeck and Tansey (2019) have recently argued), a person socialized into the norms of democratic governance may have a

higher chance of becoming an SRSG or FC. It suggests a role for the level of *democracy* of the country of nationality, operationalized as the V-Dem liberal democracy index (Coppedge et al. 2017). We also test for the *size of the army,* on the assumption that large armies allow leaders to gain skills in managing complex organizations, using data from the World Bank's World Development Indicators.[16] We assess the effects of previous peacekeeping *leadership experience* both in general and in a specific mission.[17] While top positions are expected to rotate among leaders of different nationalities, "mission capture" by one country, especially a major troop contributor, would be strong evidence of the recognition logic.

Following Bove and Ruggeri (2019), we assess the role of cultural proximity and religious affinity using three indexes of *distance* between peacekeeping leaders' country and the host country: linguistic, religious, and geographical. In terms of linguistic distance, we use the data from Fearon (2003), which is based on linguistic "tree diagrams" and measures the maximum number of branches between any two languages. We also use a measure of religious distance based on the World Christian Database (Johnson and Zurlo 2018), which contains information on religious beliefs in each country. The distance is constructed by counting the number of common nodes between dominant religions in each country-pair. We follow Spolaore and Wacziarg (2016) who rank these distances from 0 to 1; we also take into account the existence of linguistic and religious sub-groups within countries. As such, we are employing weighted distances that account for sub-populations within each country and should more effectively reflect ethnic and religious heterogeneity that may exist. The data on (population-weighted) bilateral distance between the origin and destination country in kilometers is from the CEPII Distance Dataset (Head and Mayer 2014). Finally, we include a

[16] Armed forces personnel are defined as active duty military personnel, including paramilitary forces if they can be used to support or replace regular military forces.
[17] Our dataset of peacekeeping leaders has allowed us to identify whether a country has provided a peacekeeping leader in the past for the mission in question and whether a particular individual has already served as an SRSG or FC.

dyadic measure of economic interest: we use the *share of total trade* (0 to 1) that the leader's county of nationality has with the host country in the year of observation.

Descriptive Statistics

In Figure 1, we provide a global overview of the nationality of UN peacekeeping leaders. We can see that SRSGs and FCs tend to come from different types of countries. In Figure 1, top panel, we can see that six SRSGs are from the US and four from Germany, two powerful global economies. They are followed by the UK, Tunisia, Switzerland, Canada, and Pakistan (the only major TCC on the list). Others, like Canada, make frequent but small troop contributions, whereas Switzerland rarely contributes. SRSGs seem to come disproportionally from Northern countries, which suggest that economic power may be an important determinant of SRSG appointments. Figure 1, bottom panel, shows that FCs in our sample come from 48 different countries. Brazil, Pakistan, India, Nigeria, and Bangladesh are the top five countries of FCs' origin. It mirrors the recent increase in African and Asian peacekeepers. Yet, when we move further down the ranking of FC providers, the situation is less clear-cut: we find a heterogeneous set of countries and quite a lot of variation in troop contributions. Whereas Senegal and Kenya are top TCCs, Italy, Denmark, and Ireland are not. Without denying that contributions matters, there are certainly other dynamics at play. Interestingly, among major FC providers, there is only one country from Latin American, Brazil, and only two from Oceania, whereas other regions seem to be equally represented. These patterns can be further investigated with the leadership data in ways that have not been possible previously.





FIGURE 1: *Nationalities of UN peacekeeping leadership*

Results

We use logistic regression to estimate the probability that an SRSG or FC of a certain nationality is appointed. Our unit of analysis is dyad-month, pairing the host country with nations of potential leaders for all the months of the mission. We drop all observations between consecutive appointments to ensure that we are only modeling the factors affecting the appointment of new leaders rather than their tenure. We report logit estimates with robust standard errors, clustering by dyads to consider heteroskedasticity. Year fixed effects are entered to control for temporal, global shocks, or systemic effects. These effects capture cross-sectional dependence when the impact of common factors is similar across countries. As we cannot directly interpret the size of the coefficients in logistic regression, for our main hypotheses we also show marginal effects plot for the probability of appointments, depending on the characteristics of the country of nationality. Note that the odds that the leader of a peacekeeping mission is appointed from a specific country is very small, less than 1%, meaning that even a small substantive impact makes a great difference in the overall probability. Tables 1 and 2 present the result of logistic regressions estimating the probability that an SRSG or FC of a given nationality is appointed. Model 1 includes only the variables related to H1, H2 and H3. Model 2 is a full model that includes additional covariates and is estimated using the entire sample. Model 3 excludes the P5. Model 4 uses the sub-set of countries that have had at least one SRSG or FC appointed.

Table 1. *Appointment of SRSGs, Baseline models*

	(1) Baseline	(2) Full	(3) No P5	(4) At least 1 appoint
SRSG appointment				
P5	-0.089	0.271		0.650
	(0.476)	(0.476)		(0.466)
UNSC temporary	0.330	0.240	0.304	0.204
	(0.367)	(0.652)	(0.667)	(0.652)
Foreign embassies	0.019**	0.015**	0.020**	0.005
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
GDP (ml)	0.114*	0.176*	-0.358	0.091
	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.314)	(0.077)
Pop (ml)	0.696	-0.643		-2.074
	(1.634)	(2.002)		(2.241)
Troop contribution (000)	0.559*	0.717*	0.622	0.638*
	(0.241)	(0.317)	(0.394)	(0.317)
Cumulative troop contribution (000)	0.009	0.006	0.000	-0.005
	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.013)
Previous SRSG experience	-0.202**	-0.195	-0.458	-0.178*
	(0.076)	(0.152)	(0.372)	(0.099)
Previous SRSG same mission	0.665*	0.976*	0.804	0.591
	(0.369)	(0.391)	(1.126)	(0.381)
Liberal democracy index	0.836	0.956	0.539	0.156
	(0.846)	(0.604)	(0.767)	(0.820)
Political corruption index	0.669	0.543	0.389	0.046
	(0.946)	(1.016)	(1.561)	(1.238)
Armed forces personnel (000)	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Linguistic distance		-1.435	-1.733	-1.610
		(2.354)	(2.281)	(2.683)
Religious distance		-0.689	-0.576	-0.210
		(0.811)	(1.137)	(0.906)
Distance (pop-wt, km, 000)		-0.125*	-0.108*	-0.067
		(0.057)	(0.065)	(0.054)
Dyadic trade		-4.403	-7.220	-9.699
		(11.453)	(11.733)	(13.942)
pc GDP (000)			-0.003	
			(0.022)	
Constant	-7.128**	-3.670	-3.410	-1.994
	(0.974)	(2.484)	(2.475)	(3.027)
Observations	12075	7985	5917	2759

* p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the host country level. Year dummies are included but not reported

TABLE 2. *Appointment of FCs, Baseline models*

	(1) Baseline	(2) Full	(3) No P5	(4) At least 1 appoint
FC appointment				
P5	-0.788	-1.688**		-1.307*
	(0.511)	(0.580)		(0.551)
UNSC temporary	0.285	0.078	0.188	-0.067
	(0.289)	(0.339)	(0.303)	(0.315)
Foreign embassies	0.018**	0.015**	0.018**	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
GDP (ml)	-0.427*	-0.078	-0.078	0.232
	(0.221)	(0.111)	(0.230)	(0.172)
Pop (ml)	0.953	0.060		-1.183
	(1.615)	(1.360)		(1.383)
Troop contribution (000)	1.036**	1.282*	1.059*	1.114*
	(0.319)	(0.544)	(0.459)	(0.471)
Cumulative troop contribution (000)	0.010	0.021**	0.038**	0.012*
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.007)
Previous FC experience	-0.255*	0.073	0.017	0.056
	(0.103)	(0.176)	(0.121)	(0.154)
Previous FC same mission	2.028**	1.591*	1.579*	1.205*
	(0.692)	(0.670)	(0.685)	(0.585)
Liberal democracy index	1.703	2.480*	2.167*	1.897
	(1.105)	(1.175)	(1.179)	(1.320)
Political corruption index	1.039	1.468	0.195	1.515
	(1.053)	(1.047)	(1.085)	(0.996)
Armed forces personnel (000)	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Linguistic distance		-3.467**	-4.008**	-3.183**
		(1.226)	(1.534)	(0.983)
Religious distance		-0.043	0.624	-0.168
		(0.935)	(1.159)	(0.708)
Distance (pop-wt, km, 000)		-0.122**	-0.134**	-0.139**
		(0.037)	(0.048)	(0.038)
Dyadic trade		-12.316	-19.034	-19.817*
		(7.699)	(17.655)	(11.503)
pc GDP (000)			-0.038*	
			(0.021)	
Constant	-7.799**	-3.397*	-2.349	-1.453
	(1.133)	(1.360)	(1.680)	(1.376)
Observations	18958	13199	10246	4632

* p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the host country level. Year dummies are included but not reported

In Tables A.1 and A.2 in the appendix, we perform a number of robustness checks: appointment is a rare event, and to address potential bias due to a rare-events data-generating process, we re-estimate the full models using a rare-events logit design (model 1); we include dummy variables for the leader's country of nationality (model 2) or dummy variables for the mission (model 3); and we exclude countries with no armed forces (model 4). To mitigate concerns about selection bias, country and mission effects are added to account for the unobserved heterogeneities that are specific to each country or mission.

We begin by analyzing H1, or whether peacekeeping leaders come from powerful countries. We find that only one measure of power, the number of foreign embassies, is associated with higher odds of both SRSG appointments (Table 1) and FC appointments (Table 2). In Figure 2, we show the substantive impact of the number of embassies on the chance of supplying both civilian and military leaders of UN missions using the full model (2). Moving from two embassies to the maximum (164) increases the odds of having a civilian and military leader appointed by 2 and 1.5 percentage points, respectively.



FIGURE 2: *Marginal effects plot for probability of Appointment, depending on number of embassies of country of nationality*

Notes: Graph shows linear predictions of Appointment while holding all other covariates constant at their means; dashed lines signify 90 percent confidence intervals; rug plot at horizontal axis illustrates distribution of embassies in 2014.

For the other indicators of power, the results are different for SRSGs and FCs. Countries with a large economy, measured by total GPD, are more likely to have an SRSG appointed. At the same time, they are less likely to have a FC appointed. Also, whereas temporary membership of the UN Security Council (UNSC) is insignificant at conventional levels, P5 status is associated with lower odds of FC appointments. Figure 3 presents the positive effects of the size of the GDP on the probability of SRSG appointment and the negative effect on the probability of FC appointment. Top civilian diplomats in peacekeeping tend to come from rich countries while military commanders tend to come from developing and less institutionally powerful countries, which is a stark illustration of the "North-South" divide. Population is never statistically significant.



FIGURE 3: *Marginal effects plot for probability of Appointment, depending on GDP*

Notes: Graph shows linear predictions of Appointment while holding all other covariates constant at their means; dashed lines signify 90 percent confidence intervals; rug plot at horizontal axis illustrates distribution of GDP in million USD.

Turning to H2, we find that the more troops a country contributes to a specific operation, the more likely it is to supply the FC. Moreover, being a major contributor of troops to peacekeeping throughout history also increases the likelihood of having a FC appointed. When we look at SRSGs, the coefficients are imprecisely estimated, and the relationship between troop contributions to a specific mission and appointments is mostly positive and significant in the robustness checks (Table A.1). The cumulative number of troops provided in the past does not seem to affect SRSGs' selection. Figures 3 depicts the effects of troop contributions: as expected, troop contributions to a specific mission are associated with a higher odds of leadership appointments.



FIGURE 4: *Marginal effects plot for probability of Appointment, depending on troop contributions to the mission by country of nationality*

Notes: Graph shows linear predictions of Appointment while holding all other covariates constant at their means; dashed lines signify 90 percent confidence intervals; rug plot at horizontal axis illustrates distribution of troop contribution.

Turning to H3, we find that the political corruption score coefficient is never statistically significant at conventional levels for both types of leadership position. Similarly,

liberal democracies do not seem to be more likely to supply peacekeeping leaders based on the estimated coefficient. Also, being from a country with large armed forces does not affect the probability of SRSG or FC appointment. Tables 1 and 2 show that SRSGs or FCs with previous experience are not more likely to be selected again; *personal leadership experience* does not predict leadership appointments. On the contrary, *leadership experience in a particular host country context* does matter: countries that have already sent a top civilian official or military officer to a specific mission are more likely to have other SRSGs or FCs appointed (Figure 5).



FIGURE 5: *Marginal effects plot for probability of Appointment, depending on having previously provided a leader for the same mission*

Notes: Graph shows linear predictions of Appointment while holding all other covariates constant at their means; dashed lines signify 90 percent confidence intervals.

Among the three *distance-based measures of affinity* between the leader's country of nationality and the host country, only geographical distance is consistently statistically significant and predicts a lower probability of SRSG and FC appointment if they come from countries that are more distant from the host country. Linguistic distance is also negative and significant for FCs. As such, linguistic – and to same extent cultural – proximity plays an important role: especially FCs are more likely to be selected from countries with lower

distances from the host country. Since FCs are more likely to interact with both Blue Helmets and the local population than SRSGs, smaller distances mean that FCs are more likely to share host country's norms. These shared characteristics might reinforce the trust between the locals and the mission and ensure local support (Bove and Ruggeri 2019). As such, nationality-related skills mostly do not matter in the appointment of peacekeeping leaders, with the exception of geographical proximity for both categories of leaders and linguistic proximity for FCs. Finally, dyadic trade is never statistically significant, suggesting that economic concerns are not the main driver of leadership appointments.

Running rare events logit, adding country of nationality or mission fixed effects, or excluding countries with no armed forces does not alter our main results; the magnitude of the coefficients is in Tables A.1 and A.2 are overall similar to those in Tables 1 and 2.

In summary, we find that different considerations affect appointments of civilian and military leaders in UN peacekeeping. The two exceptions are diplomatic salience and geographical proximity, which enhance the chances of being selected for both positions. Economically powerful countries are more likely to supply SRSGs. Considering that FCs work under SRSGs' overall direction, such countries have more opportunities to shape peacekeeping through their nationals in the very top posts in peacekeeping operations. FCs are more likely to come from non-P5 and developing countries. The Secretariat recognizes troops contributions in selecting peacekeeping leadership: mission-specific contributions seem to matter for both categories of leaders (although for SRSGs they become significant only in robustness checks), while general contributions additionally increase the chances of FC appointment. In terms of skills, we find little support for nationality-determined characteristics and personal experience. Yet we find that supplying several leaders for the same mission – or "mission capture" by a specific country – is not infrequent, despite the UN's aspiration to ensure broad representation

and rotation within senior peacekeeping ranks. The fact that population, among all the measures of national capabilities, is the only one that lacks significance also suggests that the reality is far from the ideal of equitable geographic representation among peacekeeping leadership.

Conclusion

Appointments of civilian and military leaders of UN peacekeeping operations are affected by the leaders' nationality. Economically powerful countries are more likely to secure civilian leadership positions, while an extensive diplomatic network is helpful for both civilian and military leadership posts. Contributing troops to a specific mission increases the chances that a national will be appointed as the civilian or military leader of the mission in question, while cumulative troop contributions are additionally associated with better chances of Force Commanders' appointments. Geographical proximity to the country hosting a peacekeeping operation facilitates appointments, while linguistic proximity is additionally helpful for military leaders. Finally, while personal experience does not matter, providing a leader for a specific operation heightens the probability of future appointments to head the same mission.

These findings point to several ethical and practical problems with the functioning of international organizations and of the international community in general. The prominence of power in peacekeeping leaders' selection process can be a source of dysfunction if it stands in the way of appointing the most capable individuals. The Secretariat's dependence on troop contributors is also a potential risk. A former head of UN peacekeeping, Jean-Marie Guéhenno (2015, 226), recalls trying to resist the practice of distributing command posts based on troop contributions "because it weakens the loyalty of commanders to the UN and leads to a

dangerous system of rotations, limiting the pool of applicants, with the risk that the wrong commander may sometimes have to be appointed". Nevertheless, our analysis shows that the practice is widespread.

Economically powerful states are more likely to secure the most important post in peacekeeping missions: that of the civilian head. At the same time, developing countries can avail themselves of an alternative avenue for exerting influence by supplying troops and demanding a commensurate representation among mission leadership. Multiple hierarchies structure UN peacekeeping (Coleman 2017): institutional privilege in the form of permanent Security Council membership is not the only source of clout. Yet the existence of multiple hierarchies cannot conceal the "North-South" divide and the fundamental inequality of UN peacekeeping where developing countries risk the lives of their soldiers to get a seat at the table (Cunliffe 2013).

This study opens three research avenues. First, informal influence and hierarchies operate in subtle ways in international organizations that are not easily observable but worthy of scholarly attention. For example, powerful states are able to shape international interventions by placing nationals not only in leadership positions but also in less visible yet important posts in peacekeeping missions.[18] Additionally, powerful states have a say over appointments of nationals of other countries, especially when several of them make substantial troop contributions and present credible demands for military leadership posts.[19] Powerful and wealthy countries enjoy other informal preferences in UN peacekeeping. In rare cases when developed countries contribute troops, they demand special arrangements.[20] On the ground,

[18] Citizens of Western countries often secure key jobs at mission headquarters dealing with planning, logistics, and intelligence.
[19] For example, before offering the command of the mission in Haiti to Brazil, "Washington and Paris had already negotiated the matter informally with the other permanent member states of the UN Security Council and with the UN secretary-general". Seitenfus 2017, 75.
[20] An example is the Strategic Military Cell staffed by Western military experts in the UN mission in Lebanon.

contingents from non-Western countries are sometimes assigned tasks that are more dangerous than those given to Western contingents.[21] Further research is needed into informal hierarchies in international institutions besides the UN[22] and world politics more broadly.[23]

Second, member states make contributions to the work of international organizations that are not easily observable. While assessing financial and material contributions is relatively straightforward, there are other ways in which member states support activities of international organizations, such as seconding experts or hosting conferences. These contributions can serve as the basis for demanding appointments for nationals and a source of influence in general. Future research should conceptualize this relationship.

Third, member states' influence in international organizations affects organizations' performance. In peacekeeping, the Secretariat might find it difficult to dismiss leaders if their country of nationality is either powerful or central to the mission due to its troop contributions, which can undermine the UN's efforts to improve performance and ensure accountability. Similar dynamics are likely to be present in other organizations and deserve examination. Overall, influence in international organizations takes many forms and produces a variety of effects, which are essential for the understanding of international cooperation in multilateral fora.

[21] Cold-Ravnkilde et al. 2017.
[22] Lundgren 2018.
[23] Towns 2012; Mattern and Zarakol 2016.

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TABLE A.1. *Appointment of SRSG, Robustness checks*

	(1) Rare Events Logit	(2) Donor FE	(3) Mission FE	(4) No Military Size==0
main				
P5	0.332	6.167	0.261	0.270
	(0.482)	(6.876)	(0.467)	(0.476)
UNSC temporary	0.324	0.382	0.250	0.239
	(0.657)	(0.703)	(0.649)	(0.652)
Foreign embassies	0.014**	0.052	0.015**	0.015**
	(0.005)	(0.048)	(0.005)	(0.005)
GDP (ml)	0.118*	-0.440	0.178*	0.177*
	(0.061)	(0.592)	(0.071)	(0.070)
Pop (ml)	1.405	-13.365	-0.619	-0.634
	(2.021)	(31.155)	(1.998)	(2.004)
Troop contribution (000)	0.662*	0.494	0.702*	0.717*
	(0.299)	(0.314)	(0.320)	(0.317)
Cumulative troop contribution (000)	0.007	-0.003	0.005	0.006
	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Previous SRSG experience	-0.245	-0.171*	-0.369*	-0.195
	(0.152)	(0.080)	(0.189)	(0.152)
Previous SRSG same mission	0.997**	0.236	1.054**	0.974*
	(0.381)	(0.364)	(0.383)	(0.391)
Liberal democracy index	0.704	-0.314	1.000*	0.955
	(0.616)	(2.814)	(0.588)	(0.603)
Political corruption index	0.199	-1.658	0.500	0.551
	(0.948)	(2.882)	(1.020)	(1.016)
Armed forces personnel (000)	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Linguistic distance	-2.088	-1.572	-1.128	-1.458
	(2.352)	(3.944)	(2.592)	(2.354)
Religious distance	-0.772	0.175	-0.979	-0.701
	(0.778)	(0.990)	(0.880)	(0.811)
Distance (pop-wt, km, 000)	-0.113*	-0.040	-0.132*	-0.125*
	(0.053)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.057)
Dyadic trade		-8.288	-3.951	-4.460
		(11.206)	(10.569)	(11.561)
Constant	-3.066	-4.355	-4.097	-3.647
	(2.458)	(7.024)	(2.750)	(2.483)
Observations	8130	2128	7985	7979

* p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the host country level. Year dummies are included but not reported

TABLE A.2. *Appointment of Force Commanders, Robustness checks*

	(1) Rare Events Logit	(2) Donor FE	(3) Mission FE	(4) No Military Size==0
main				
P5	-1.370*	1.848	-1.635**	-1.688**
	(0.586)	(11.811)	(0.531)	(0.580)
UNSC temporary	0.171	-0.158	0.077	0.078
	(0.329)	(0.291)	(0.341)	(0.339)
Foreign embassies	0.015**	-0.046	0.016**	0.015**
	(0.004)	(0.051)	(0.004)	(0.005)
GDP (ml)	-0.179	0.096	-0.084	-0.079
	(0.176)	(0.389)	(0.110)	(0.111)
Pop (ml)	-0.117	0.868	0.286	0.062
	(1.434)	(11.172)	(1.240)	(1.360)
Troop contribution (000)	1.154**	0.997*	1.460*	1.282*
	(0.421)	(0.427)	(0.660)	(0.544)
Cumulative troop contribution (000)	0.014*	0.007	0.021*	0.021**
	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Previous FC experience	-0.196	0.069	0.139	0.073
	(0.176)	(0.122)	(0.107)	(0.176)
Previous FC same mission	1.486*	0.854*	1.536*	1.590*
	(0.686)	(0.513)	(0.719)	(0.670)
Liberal democracy index	2.004*	0.522	2.257*	2.479*
	(1.093)	(2.287)	(1.180)	(1.175)
Political corruption index	1.113	-2.450	1.393	1.468
	(0.988)	(3.119)	(1.058)	(1.047)
Armed forces personnel (000)	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Linguistic distance	-3.096*	-3.505**	-2.691*	-3.466**
	(1.391)	(0.913)	(1.467)	(1.226)
Religious distance	0.192	1.288	0.042	-0.042
	(0.841)	(1.306)	(1.170)	(0.935)
Distance (pop-wt, km, 000)	-0.109**	-0.238**	-0.141**	-0.122**
	(0.037)	(0.062)	(0.045)	(0.037)
Dyadic trade		-15.782*	-11.650*	-12.325
		(8.778)	(6.662)	(7.699)
Constant	-4.386**	3.094	-3.710*	-3.398*
	(1.359)	(2.370)	(1.468)	(1.360)
Observations	13209	3843	13199	13191

* p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the host country level. Year dummies are included but not reported