Foreign Policy Change as Rhetorical Politics: Domestic-Regional Constellation of Global South States

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Although the recent advancements in critical constructivist IR on political rhetoric has greatly improved our understanding of linguistic mechanisms of political action, we need a sharp understanding of how rhetoric explains foreign policy change. Here we conceptualize a link between rhetoric and foreign policy change by foregrounding distinct dynamics at the regional and domestic institutional environments. Analytically, at the regional level, we suggest examining whether norms of foreign policy engagement are explicitly coded in treaties and agreements or implicit in conventions and practices of actors. And at the domestic level, we suggest examining whether a particular foreign policy issue area is concurrent or contested among interlocutors. In this constellation, we clarify how four different rhetorical strategies underwrites foreign policy change – persuasion, mediation, explication, and reconstruction – how it operates, and the processes through which it unfolds in relation to multiple audiences. Our principal argument is that grand foreign policy change requires continuous rhetorical deployments with varieties of politics to preserve and stabilize the boundaries in the ongoing fluid relations of states. We illustrate our argument with an analysis of Brazil’s South-South grand strategy under the Lula administration and contrast it against the rhetoric of subsequent administrations. Our study has implications for advancing critical foreign policy analysis on foreign policy change and generally for exploring new ways of studying foreign policies of nonwestern postcolonial states in international relations.

Introduction

One of the most important foreign policy changes of Brazil in the post-Cold War period is a grand shift towards South-South strategy. Although, there is a protracted history of Brazil’s shifting commitment to an automatic alignment with the United States\(^1\) and a long diplomatic history of Brazil’s autonomous relations with the developing world,\(^2\) in the post-Cold War period several political actors in Brazil have devoted an increasing amount of attention to South-South as a grand foreign policy strategy. Beginning in slow motion with Fernando Cardoso administration (1995-2002) and a splendid take-off during the Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva administration (2003-2010) and its controversial disenchantment with Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016), a strained engagement under the Michel Temer administration (2016-2018) and a sullied displacement in the Jair Bolsonaro administration (2019-present), the politics of South-South grand strategy defines Brazil’s distinct engagement in international politics.
In assessing Brazilian foreign policy under the Lula administration, the Foreign Minister Celso Amorim wrote, “At the crossroads of all the main guidelines of Brazilian foreign policy is the effort to establish closer relations with other developing countries. South-South cooperation is a diplomatic strategy that originates from an authentic desire to exercise solidarity toward poorer countries.”

Similarly, many others consider Brazil’s South-South foreign policy as a grand strategic change to its prior automatic alignment with the United States and an example of a self-confident Brazilian way of reshaping the international order. In this light, many analysts bemoan the Bolsonaro administration’s rupture of Brazil’s South-South foreign policy in bandwagoning with the United States under the Donald Trump administration. The ways in which the debates over South-South grand strategy are commonplace in Brazil’s foreign policy analysis – not merely in terms of technical cooperation agreements and partnership with the developing countries – but South-South as a post-Cold War anchor in Brazil’s worldview is striking.

Thus, the question we want to answer is how to make sense of this paradigmatic change from politics identifying the state within the Western-led order to reorienting the foreign policy of the state in terms of South-South strategy? In other words, how does the politics of Brazil’s South-South grand strategic change work in practice? How do then we make sense of the rise and fall of Brazil’s South-South grand strategy? At a general theoretical level, the principal question we focus on is on how do we understand the politics of foreign policy change?

One important way of understanding foreign policy change is the utilization and deployment of rhetoric by political actors. Traditional accounts do not take rhetoric seriously for the analysis of foreign policy change. However, recent advancements in critical constructivist International Relations (IR) scholarship emphasize the importance of how strategic political actors deploy rhetoric to argue with opponents, outmaneuver them, and change boundaries of relations between actors. A focus on political rhetoric affirms the idea that language is constitutive of political action.
opportunities to examine the processes through which political actors in their dense normative social environment engage with multiple audiences to bring forth change. We build on these existing advancements by developing an analytical framework that helps us move away from too static views of rhetoric and foreign policy change.

To elaborate one important dynamic between rhetoric and foreign policy change, in this article, we foreground the institutional environment of states in the hierarchical international system. We offer a stylized ideal-typical model of rhetorical strategies to elaborate the link between rhetorical deployments and the politics of foreign policy change. First, we propose that states work within the hierarchy of world politics in distinct regional and domestic institutional environments. Here sedimented rules and norms guide interactions among interlocutors. To understand the power of rhetoric, we suggest examining whether the norms of foreign policy engagement are explicitly coded at the regional level in treaties and agreements or implicit in regional conventions and practices of actors. And at the domestic level, we suggest examining whether a particular foreign policy issue area is concurrent or contested among interlocutors. This domestic-regional institutional constellation allows us to understand at least four different rhetorical politics in bringing about foreign policy change: persuasion, mediation, explication, and reconstruction. Here grand strategic foreign policy change is always an achievement that must be stabilized in rhetorical deployments and performances in the ongoing fluid transactions among states. Second, we apply this framework to illustrate South-South foreign policy change in Brazil. We argue that Brazil’s South-South grand strategy is rhetorical politics in the state’s foreign policy distinctly stabilized in Lula’s politics of reconstruction. By contrasting this achievement of rhetorical politics with previous and subsequent administrations the rupture brought about by Bolsonaro in their varied linguistic performances, we illustrate the rhetorical importance of South-South grand strategy in Brazil. By critically extending the analysis of Brazil’s
South-South foreign policy this way, we also explicate the contingently generalizable mechanisms of the model.

Our study makes two general contributions to foreign policy change research agenda. First, a focus on rhetoric affirms the language-focused mechanisms that are constitutive of political action where the socio-institutional settings of states matter for different political projects in the use of rhetoric for foreign policy change. This is normatively significant because states are embedded in different unequal interactional situations of hierarchical international order and domestic legitimacy crisis and these institutional transactions exert a normative pull in foreign policy strategies. In other words, such socio-institutional settings are important in rhetorical deployments to make sense of how opponents can be legitimately engaged in the process. Here static models of political communication, which backgrounds this dynamic institutional environment within hierarchy and inequality are insufficient to understand the foreign policies change. Second, in foreign policy issues, regional and domestic institutional environment matters more than the status of global institutional order. This bottom-up local realities mean that that the deeply held commitments towards universal-cosmopolitanism as a route to progressive foreign policy change is mistaken. Thus, the rise and fall of Brazil’s South-South foreign policy is a local issue stabilized by rhetorical performances. Seen this way, rhetoric takes centre-stage in norm-localization, stigma management, and in handling nonrecognition on matters relating to foreign policy change.

The structure of the article is as follows. First, we examine the recent IR literature on rhetoric for understanding foreign policy change and where it requires improvement. Second, we offer our typology of rhetorical strategies in the politics of foreign policy change and justify why we emphasize norms and rules in institutions, and domestic-regional constellation of interlocutors in foreign policy rhetoric. After elaborating the appropriate research methods and procedures for empirical investigation in the third section we apply the framework to understand Brazil’s South-South grand
strategic change. If, obviously, it is unreasonable to offer a full-fledged theoretical framework and a detailed case study covering all aspects of South-South strategy within the scope of this article and we suggest avenues for further research in the conclusion.

**Rhetoric and Foreign Policy Change**

Rhetoric is a practical art in politics. It is skilful use of arguments by political actors to influence interlocutors’ values and convince them of a belief or persuade them to action.\(^\text{12}\) Here three considerations matter. First, well-crafted rhetoric offers the opportunity to overcome obstacles to foreign and security policy change. Events at international level such as a change from bi-polar to multi-polar order, technological change affecting warfare, global crisis such as the ongoing Covid 19 pandemic, global norms on addressing crimes against humanity, or economic crises do not automatically percolate to domestic structures to change the old ways of doing things. Instead, it is the bottom-up rhetoric that enables political actors to attribute meaning to these events, persuasively make claims for new paradigmatic policies and thence new normative ideas. Thus, when activists rhetorically formulated female genital mutilation by replacing terms like circumcision with mutilation, opposition (not only from the domestic realm) began to give way to change.\(^\text{13}\)

Second, political rhetoric enables agents to frame new ideas to accommodate or challenge existing normative structures and thus justify positions to other interlocutors in important ways. Absent an argumentative effort to provide a more compelling link with the dominant episteme, identity narrative, or normative idea, policy change is limited.\(^\text{14}\) Finally, political rhetoric pays attention to different audiences and their perspectival nature of accepting, rejecting, or legitimating rhetorical deployments. To target and persuade the relevant audience is an art of bringing about political change. As Krebs and Jackson put it, the audience “sits in judgment of their [claimants and opponents’]
rhetorical moves.”  

Political rhetoric then is integral to the argumentative and communicative actions of practitioners in international politics.

For states embedded in a hierarchical international system, rhetoric is not empty use of words but an opportunity to voice views upwards to be heard. Rhetoric, with its connection to values and norms thus is distinct from often-used concepts such as interactions, framing, narratives, and discourse in foreign policy research. A skilful rhetorician not merely interacts with opponents but makes claims seeking opponents’ adherence to certain values; not only frames issues but brings normative judgment in privileging certain subaltern identifications in argumentation; and seeks action within the imperial structures of dominant discourse in a political system to change the status-quo value orientation of interlocutors. Here multiple frames function within a grand rhetorical strategy, for example. Similarly, the dominant discourse of a state might normatively prohibit certain deployments, – e.g., the endorsement of slavery as a rhetorical trope. Here a skilful rhetorician might challenge some prohibitions by reworking their role in the discourse – trafficking as modern-day slavery – to persuade opponents to respond as would to slavery. In making the distinction between rhetoric and discourse, Perelman reminds us that rhetoric “is central to discourse because its role is to intensify adherence to values, adherence without which discourses that aim at provoking action cannot find the lever to move or to inspire their listeners.” In other words, rhetoric is a significant “tool” with which discourse produces, reproduces, and changes in the political system.

Two important strands of Constructivist IR put rhetoric at the centre of the study of international politics and foreign policy. Specifically, “liberal” constructivist scholarship equates rhetoric with persuasive framing and advocacy to show how norm entrepreneurs craft argumentation with considerable skill and mastery to ensure that their ideas make a mark on politics by changing the cognitive dynamics of opponents towards a paradigmatic idea. Here an explanandum such as grand strategic foreign policy change rests on a “progressive” top-down understanding of how rhetoric
wielding norm entrepreneurs champion their ideas against opponents. By fitting their claims with diffusion of global normative structures, coercing opponents based on their own acknowledged principles, or through the force of better arguments rhetorical agents bring progressive change. The “coercive” constructivists on the other hand challenge the liberal bent of such views and emphasize strategic rhetorical interplay in explaining political outcomes without equating it to advocacy dynamics. Rhetoric wielding claimants utilize *topoi* or rhetorical commonplaces to weave socially sustainable arguments that the audiences deem acceptable and then strategically deploy these tropes in such a way that their opponents are unable to offer a meaningful rebuttal.

These existing accounts require improvements on elaborating the domestic-regional institutional environment of states in which rhetorical actors and their interlocutors are embedded. Specifically, liberal constructivism overstates the degree to which international (global) normative structures determine political action and policy change. And, coercive constructivism does not differentiate between multiple audiences at the domestic and regional levels. It presumes that actors must legitimate claims in the eyes of *same* audiences. This is a problematic assumption given that in the hierarchical international system multiple audiences from the regional and domestic environment keep track of rhetorical claims in different ways. Thus, we require an analytical model that helps us to address these limitations and the static debates between principled and strategic role of rhetoric in foreign policy change. It requires taking the socio-institutional settings of rhetorical actors seriously.

**Political Rhetoric, Institutions, and Foreign Policy Change: A Typology**

*Institutions, Norms, and Meaningful Rhetoric*
We start from the critical constructivist premise that investigating foreign policy change requires attention to the communicative interplay between rhetorical actors in a given institutional environment. Institutions matter not only for enabling and constraining the type of rhetoric that is normatively meaningful among interlocutors but also by making certain political project preferable to others in bringing foreign policy change. To be sure, institutionalist accounts come in different forms. In this project, we analytically emphasize norms as the centre of our institutional focus on the variety of rhetorical strategies in foreign policy change. This is because, institutions, as Stacie Goddard shows are networks of “ties” among participants with “the continuing series of transactions to which participants attach shared understandings, memories, forecasts, rights, and obligations.” Institutions rests on norms and rules to make or unmake the ties among participants, meaningfully share understandings among interlocutors, and structure the rights and obligations of insiders and outsiders.

In three ways, such a view of the constitutive role of norms in institutions is relevant for understanding the meaningfulness of rhetorical deployment and its appraisal by other interlocutors. First, institutional norms are constitutive of language use and in interactions interlocutors engage in crucial appraisal activities by interpreting and making sense of these norms. Most political institutions are not equal by natural necessity but hierarchical by historical contingency. Thus, within the hierarchical world politics, political actors utilize norms to engage in rhetorical deployments for their policy choices and other interlocutors engage with same or different norms in the institutional setting and identify such rhetorical deployments as right, wrong, what is a mistaken practice, and what are acceptable or unacceptable inferences. In international politics norms are not absolute but always contested and appraisal activities, despite hierarchies, could at best offer relative stability of norms within a given context.
Second, rhetorical deployment within institutions is a rule-governed activity and actors cannot deploy any rhetoric with impunity. Even to challenge or overturn these rules, the political actor and their audiences must be part of the ongoing shared practices. Within institutions, interlocutors share distinct ways of engagement with rhetoric based on a certain logic, like making moves in a game.\textsuperscript{30} This is because institutions come with specific “ought” conditionalities. As John Searle argues, “The combination of institutional reality, itself created by the imposition of status functions according to the constitutive rule ‘X counts as Y in C,’ together with a special form of status function, namely the imposition of meaning enables individual human beings to create certain forms of desire independent reasons for action.”\textsuperscript{31} The communicative interplay between rhetorical actors and audiences works through these shared practices and assessment of obligations.

Finally, the shared practices, appraisal functions, and ought conditionalities are constitutive of institutional norm only if actors are moral agents. That is, duties, responsibilities and mutual regard for each other’s appraisal only function smoothly when agents agree that there are ethical and moral components associated with being part of an institution. If rhetorical actors are not moved by reason or opt out of institutions because of their change in mood, then it is misleading to characterize the agents as working within institutions.

\textit{Delimiting Domestic-Regional Institutional Setting for Foreign Policy Change}

In political rhetoric aimed at foreign policy change and in keeping with the above conception of institutions we prioritize the domestic-regional institutional constellation. First, actors work at the domestic and regional levels as active agents who reconstruct global institutional norms. As Amitav Acharya put it, actors reinterpret global rules in regional contexts, to maintain regional autonomy whereby regional groups “keep outsiders from defining the issues that constitute the local agenda.”\textsuperscript{32}
Furthermore, the hierarchical international order is beset with unequal access to global activism, structural problems of internalized stigmatization, and misrecognition.\textsuperscript{33} Thus, many actors work at the domestic-regional level and scale up to global norm entrepreneurship rather than the other way around.\textsuperscript{34} Second, states work at the domestic-regional environment to localize norms, secure local support and legitimacy rather than a seemingly global support but alienation in party politics and in the neighbourhood. Domestic actors are concerned about protecting their own interests and thus filter global norms to their party politics.\textsuperscript{35} Here states cannot be oblivious of local support at the domestic-regional environment. Even actors from the Global North whose privileged position from their empires cannot ignore regional accountability.\textsuperscript{36} Here totalizing talks of United States’ offshore balancing and Global Britain ideas are cases in point. They cannot ignore local-regional institutional environment and treat domestic-regional institutional actors unworthy of persuasion as the tensions in NAFTA negotiations and Brexit shows.

So, how is the domestic-regional institutional setting relevant for rhetoric and foreign policy change? At the domestic level, electoral, coalition, and party politics are relevant institutional settings for argumentation, contestation, and change.\textsuperscript{37} There are shared practices and norms in electoral and party politics, distinct appraisal activities among different political coalitions with specific “ought” conditions in the evaluation of political projects, rights and obligations of audiences to hold rhetorical actors accountable, which are in-turn are contextually specific to the history of the state and representation of actors in the institutions. These considerations indicate that an analytical focus on whether a particular foreign policy issue is agreed across party lines or severely contested from different domestic institutional settings sets the stage for argumentation.

An issue area such as “Protection of Human Rights” in a state with a ruling liberal political party or coalition might secure concurrence across party lines. Yet rhetoric-wielding political agents who aim to appropriate this issue area in one way or another such as military intervention for the
protection of human rights abroad, for example, might trigger disagreements in the communicative interplay even within the party members on the ways and means of protecting human rights. On the other hand, an issue area such as “Climate Change” might be largely contested in a conservative domestic coalition funded by an industrialist lobby. When rhetoric-wielding political agents aim to bring about a change in their state’s foreign policy on climate change accord such as, for example, through “common but differentiated responsibility” appraisals through communicative interplay might trigger agreements. Thus, one cannot establish a covering law for the incentives and disincentives within domestic institutional settings on any particular issue. Rather the constellation is an ideal-type that offers opportunities for empirically investigating what actually happens and why a particular configuration emerges.38

Further, by foregrounding issue concurrence or issue contestation as an important factor in domestic institutional contexts, we move away from a problematic formal understanding as the only institutional context to understand policy outcomes. In taking issue area dynamics seriously, we also do not ex ante aim to see certain policy outcomes based on a liberal, corporatist, statist, and state-above-society model of domestic institutional settings. Instead, we acknowledge that convergence or contestation is not confined to any particular domestic structure.

At the regional institutional level, explicitness or implicitness of shared practices is an important consideration for understanding how political actors weave their rhetoric for foreign policy change. At the explicit level, the shared practices are codified in instruction type rules where appraisal and evaluation functions of agents are part of certain contractual obligations and legally binding practices for accountability. The inheritances of states to treaty obligations formulated during the period of empire is a case in point. Further, some states also arrive at explicit shared practices. For example, the Latin American nuclear-free area explicitly negotiated between Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, Uruguay, Panama, Salvador, Costa Rica, and Haiti or the Mercosul (Southern
Common Market) are regional institutional practices with predominantly explicit appraisal functions over commitments of members and non-members, including what counts as violations of treaty obligations and legally binding nature of these obligations on the institutional actors. However, even with such an explicit institutional framework, there are implicit ways through which members work through the system. Here again, former colonial superordinate states like Britain, United States or France in unspoken mediating role in former colonies is a case in point. Even among some state there might be certain shared practices and norms within regional institutions where a hegemon’s appraisal – Brazil’s role in Mercosur for example – is vital, or rules of the game that require justifications only from some unruly actors and not others. These implicit-functioning regional institutional norms could be sufficiently stable because of the common interests among participants to maintain the ties in the network. As in domestic institutional dynamics, the explicit-implicit distinction is also an ideal-type.

_Varieties of Rhetorical Strategies_

Seeking to bring about a change, rhetorical agents direct an argument towards the opponents working within the regional and domestic institutional environments. Combining these two institutional norms we see four “types” of rhetorical strategies with distinct politics in the pursuit of foreign policy change (Table 1). The following discussion elaborates the theoretical basis of argument.

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<td>Explicit Institutional Norms</td>
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<td>Implicit Institutional Norms</td>
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In Case 1, rhetorical agents engage with explicit norms of a regional institution and there is a general concurrence on an issue area across party lines. Under these conditions, the rhetorical strategy of persuasion dominates. Rhetorical strategy of persuasion is defined as art of influencing opponents without manipulation or pandering in order to induce them to change their own beliefs and desires by exercising their political judgment in the light of what has been said.\textsuperscript{39} As Finnemore and Sikkink show, through persuasion, “agent action becomes social structure, ideas become norms, and the subjective becomes the intersubjective.”\textsuperscript{40} The theoretical logic connecting the intersection of the axis in Case 1 on the rhetorical strategy of persuasion is based on the literature on communicative action where explicit institutional norms and issue concurrence creates a shared lifeworld among argumentative actors.\textsuperscript{41} It is because such explicitness in institutional settings exert an influence on interlocutors who already share a set of common norms to draw upon. It creates opportunities for authentic persuasion in communicative action.

For example, rhetorical agents in a country might aim to seek explicit membership of their state to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. If there are explicit regional norms on nuclear non-proliferation in the form of “nuclear-free zones” or explicit agreements to control exports through the Nuclear Suppliers Group and if there is a general consensus across party lines on joining liberal regimes of non-proliferation then rhetorical deployments aim to persuade opponents in the parliament, military, or the media to cooperate. In Case 1, persuasion is not optional because rhetorical agents working with opponents evaluate, judge, and engage in the appraisal of the socio-institutional status (lifeworlds) of each other. Here strategic manipulation or arm-twisting could lead to rhetorical agents losing their moral status in the game. Further, in engaging with the explicit terms of membership and legal obligations of the regime such as the implications of being part of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, opponents seek genuine persuasion for action as equal concurring members in the institutional
system. Here a strategic manipulation by rhetorical agents by treating opponents as not worthy of persuasion cannot create a meaningful policy change. Absent the form of persuasive rhetoric, when opponents take power in the domestic institutional setting, they seek to overturn the strategic consensus.

In Case 2, rhetorical agents face explicit regional norms but a contested domestic institutional environment. Under these conditions, the rhetorical strategy of mediation dominates. Mediation strategy is defined as an “an overall plan, approach, or method a mediator has for resolving a dispute.” Here political actors use rhetoric for conflict management, and work as intermediaries, using the explicit regional norms to settle conflicts or remove obstacles to their course of action. The theoretical logic connecting the intersection of the axis in Case 2 with the politics of mediation is based on extensive scholarship on diplomatic communications where the tasks explicitly enshrined in charters, documents, treaties, and other constitutive documents make conflict resolution “objective” and a mediator's role as one aimed at a solution within a contested environment. With a strong link between prestige and mediation on this axis, rhetorical actors cannot try whatever means available to beat opponents: instead, “assuming a distinctly active role, mediators strongly intervene in the negotiation process, for example by providing incentives and issuing ultimatums.”

For example, when some rhetorical agents aim to dilute protectionism within a regional trade agreement, engaging with domestic opponents on such a political project involves mediating differences by acting as an intermediary but with a clear directive role. Rhetorical agents could arrive at some sort of settlements or concessions, of “light-protectionism” for example. Or rhetorical actors mediate the differences by persuading domestic opponents of short to medium term economic benefit. Success is not guaranteed but a major foreign policy change requires mediation and concessions without which the situation of explicit regional institutional norms and domestic institutional contestations would lead to deadlocks.
In Case 3, agents face implicit regional norms and a largely conducive domestic setting on a particular issue area. Under these conditions, the dominant rhetorical strategy is to redefine implicit norms by making them explicit. Explication is defined as the process through which political actors utilize rhetoric to make certain aspects of the implicit norms explicit to other interlocutors in order to validate their political project of change. The theoretical logic of intersection of the axis in Case 3 is based on the idea that rhetorical agents, like lawyers, engage in practical reasoning by selecting some aspect of background norms to foreground with the audiences. Here norm localization and subsidiary effects in how agents choose norms matter. Since there is a binding quality of the implicit norm, the rhetorical strategy aims to make this “bindingness a fact” to the domestic-regional institutional context.

For example, concerned with the problems of crimes against humanity some rhetorical agents might want their state to accept greater responsibilities in UN peacekeeping operations. Their opponents might resort to implicit regional norms against such projects. Perhaps the implicit regional norm is to avoid engagement with ethnic civil wars where secession is at issue or the fear of US or great power intervention practices in the neighbourhood. If the domestic institutional environment across party lines accepts greater integration into the liberal order, for example, parties across political divides agree on the ideas on democracy, protection of human rights, and liberty, then the rhetorical strategy is to make these implicit ideas explicit. In other words, rhetorical agents make explicit the implicit commitments of domestic actors across party lines and the implicit liberal regional institutional norms. It is a distinct rhetorical strategy in the sense that rhetorical agents interpret such implicit practices and deploy them skilfully towards their political projects. For example, concerned with the problems of crimes against humanity, rhetorical agents might make explicit the domestic institutional commitment to human rights protection. Similarly, the rhetorical agent might make explicit the implicit regional institutional norm against US led humanitarian intervention projects and argue for a non-US
model. By making implicit issues explicit, rhetorical agents sway the audience to judge the debate on the norms made explicit and then utilize the audience’s approval to defeat the opponents.

Finally, Case 4 represents an implicit regional institutional normative environment coupled with a contested domestic institutional space. Such configurations are wide-ranging and fundamental in international politics. Some agents aim to bring about a change in the established way of doing things but also understand that implicit institutional norms impede such change. Further, politics is replete with controversial values and even within a particular episteme in the domestic institutional setting, multiple interlocutors might contest the conditions and processes of specific projects. Under these conditions, the rhetorical strategy of reconstruction dominates. Here narratives are important in challenging times. As Jelena Subotic puts it, “Narratives help prove these securities during challenging times. They rhetorically link what needs to be done (policy change) with why it is done…and why the policy change should be accepted.”

Reconstruction is defined as a performative process where rhetorical agents create an engagement with interlocutors by offering new vocabularies for those sedimented features of politics, engaging in rituals with claims of emancipatory pathways for change, and deploy ideas not just to meet the goal but to yoke it with ethics in order to defeat opponents. The theoretical logic connecting the intersection of the axis in Case 4 with the politics of reconstruction is based on developments in new rhetoric and problematology debates. For Meyer: “When values are controversial, and experienced as such…rhetoric is the adequate method for treating what is problematic.”

Within humanitarian intervention debates, some rhetorical agents might contest the dominant ways of engaging with crimes against humanity abroad. They might advocate a radical policy change such as calling for unilateral military intervention. However, advocates are also aware of the implicit norms that inhibit such changes. For example, the regional institutional network within which advocates and opponents are situated might have an implicit understanding that unilateral
interventions are not part of their history, culture, or worldviews. Further, there might be implicit
domestic norms to address humanitarian crises abroad through multilateralism rather than
unilateralism. In such an environment, rhetorical agents engage in *politics of reconstruction* to foreground
their ethical contestation and at the same time challenge the implicit domestic and regional institutional
norms so as to bring about a radical solution to the problem. How rhetorical agents weave their politics
in such challenges, making claims, negotiate, contest, and articulate their position is a struggle over
meanings and thus replete with transformative policies.

To summarize, the analytical model proposed in this article emphasizes the contingent role of
rhetoric of states in a hierarchical international order working within the domestic-regional
institutional constellation that produces a variety of politics in foreign policy change. It generates
useful contingent generalizable mechanisms on foreign policy change for Global South states, which
are mistakenly treated within mainstream Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) epistemology as *sui-generis*
thereby relegating the historical, institutional, and regional realities of Global South states as irrelevant
to theories of FPA.

*Research Method and Case Selection*

The ideal-typical framework of the varieties of rhetorical strategies is an “over-simplified
representation” of the complex reality in the link between rhetoric and foreign policy change.49 In
keeping with the framework, we suggest a two-pronged interpretive research method. First, an
inductive research based on the styled-model through iterative data collection and interpretation in a
context-bound study tells us what sort of strategies should become manifest under ideal circumstances
to investigate the processes of what actually happened and why.50 Second, a contrastive counterfactual
analysis offers a rich empirical account of the link between rhetorical strategies and foreign policy
change. It could show that a political actor enacted a foreign policy change because she deployed a distinct rhetoric and if she had not deployed this rhetorical strategy she would have achieved a different outcome or unable to substantially change the foreign policy. In the following section, we apply our model to concrete empirical situation of foreign policy change.

Here Brazil’s South-South grand strategic foreign policy change in the post-Cold War period is selected for three important reasons. First, Brazil as a representative sample of Global South state from the universe of many possible cases such as India, South Africa, China – in hierarchical relations of deep inequality with a desire to move up ranks in the international order – is a challenging case for the theoretical claim that foreign policy change rests on the contingency of rhetoric of political actors. Considering the persistent desire of these states for higher status, the ebb and flow of its grand strategic foreign policy must be explained. Second, the selection of Lula’s politics allows for within-case comparison and counterfactual contrast with Rousseff, Temer, and Bolsonaro administrations. A sui-generis explanation based on Lula’s charisma alone cannot explain Brazil’s grand strategic foreign policy change because as we will see the Lula administration itself was constrained by audience evaluations at the domestic-regional environment. Finally, for the theoretical focus on rhetoric and domestic-regional constellation, Brazil sheds light on selective factors of “what needs to be explained” and invites other case studies across the Global South states for cross-case comparison. As Andrew Abbott argues: “This selective attention goes along with an emphasis on contingency. Things happen because of constellations of factors, not because of a few fundamental effects acting independently” and here interpretation of tiny events is useful.

In keeping with our analytical model to the Brazilian case, we rely on an inductive method based on four clusters of texts: (1) speeches and writings of the Lula, Rousseff, and Temer administrations; (2) Congressional debates in Brazil; (3) reactions in major English and Brazilian newspapers such as Folha de São Paulo, Carta Capital; New York Times and the BBC (international
editions); and (4) historical work and secondary materials reflecting on Brazilian foreign policy. Along with Brazilian Presidents, audiences engaged in communicative interplay belong to three groups: (1) Domestic opposition parties to the Worker’s Party (PT) along with domestic business enterprises and attentive domestic publics; (2) important regional audiences such as political actors from Argentina and Chile; and (3) the UN. Within the scope of this article, it is unreasonable to offer a comprehensive case study through full-length quotations. The following analysis on rhetorical basis of foreign policy change and its analytical illumination of hitherto ignored areas in relation to alternative explanations of change in Brazilian foreign policy is important.

**Brazil's South-South Foreign Policy Change: Rhetorical Politics in Constellation**

One of the most important foreign policy change of Brazil in the Post-Cold War period is its strong emphasis on South-South grand strategy during the Lula administration (2003-2010). In keeping with the analytical model, an inductive analysis shows an *implicit* Latin American normative environment coupled with *contentious* Brazilian domestic politics on the issue of appropriate foreign policy of the state. In the hierarchical international system, Latin American states, at least at the *interstate level*, share an implicit normative consensus for peaceful settlement of international disputes. It is the result of long South American peace since 1883 with only brief interruptions of the Chaco War (1932-1935) and the Peru-Ecuador conflict (1941, 1981, and 1995). The end of the Cold War also saw resolutions of interstate conflicts in Central America. Similarly, with the long history of U.S. interventionism in the region, the post-Cold War period, witnessed Latin American diplomatic ties reach a shared understanding of guarding national sovereignty from hegemonic external interferences. Here, Brazil's domestic politics among elites remained *contentious* with regard to the appropriate foreign policy. The electoral, coalition, and party politics in Brazil on the specific issue of foreign policy was within the
realms of general Latin American debates on whether pro, neutral, or anti-US foreign policy orientation can advance a state’s interests in challenging times.\textsuperscript{54} In Brazil, these debates, albeit elitist, created corrupt and “lethal” competitions between different internal factions within the state.\textsuperscript{55}

Under these conditions of implicit regional institutional normative order and contested domestic institutional setting on the foreign policy priorities of Brazil, we should expect a distinct rhetoric strategy employing politics of reconstruction. Below we show the processes through which Lula administration’s rhetorical strategy of reconstruction worked. Through appropriating history and modelling innovation in bringing about a paradigmatic South-South foreign policy change, Brazil’s grand strategy ascended and was arrested through rhetoric. It also shows that South-South grand strategy fell apart when the Rousseff and Temer administrations could not employ this rhetoric of reconstruction and regressed in the vituperative rhetoric of the Bolsonaro administration.

*Reconstructive Rhetoric of Appropriating History and Remodelling Innovation*

Under the conditions of implicit regional norms and a contentious domestic environment, the Lula administration deployed two important argumentations that constituted its politics of reconstruction.\textsuperscript{56} It is distinctively “reconstructive” in the sense that none of these arguments were new or revisionist but woven with ethical rhetorical deployments from the shared practices of members that had a significant effect in bringing about the foreign policy change without deadlocks from audiences.

The first aimed at appropriating Brazil’s history towards Brazil’s black identity in the international system.\textsuperscript{57} In the UN, Lula asserted:

> We are, with great pride, the country with the second largest black population in the world. I will visit five countries in Southern Africa to boost our economic, political, social and cultural cooperation. We will also hold a summit between the South American countries and the states
that make up the Arab League. With India and South Africa we have established a trilateral forum, oriented towards political cooperation and projects of common interest.\textsuperscript{58}

In all subsequent engagements, the Lula administration widely circulated the appeal to the blackness of Brazil, the persistent racial discrimination, and inequalities of black people in the country, and to Africa as one of the cradles of Brazilian civilization insisting that “Brazil is not just a country of the African Diaspora. Brazil is also an African country, the second largest Negro nation in the world [sic]”\textsuperscript{59}

Brazil’s foreign policy appeal to questions of race is not new but the Lula administration skilfully weaved a political strategy out of it. Surveying the language of Lula’s Black Nation discourse and its reach to Africa, Andre Cicalo notes that, “Itamaraty [Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs], in its efforts to address the contested ambiguities of Brazil’s racial democracy, is instead foregrounding discourses of historical racial inequality. These discourses, which started making their institutional appearances under Cardoso, are now strategically projected onto Brazil’s international politics.”\textsuperscript{60}

Already in the initial part of the regional and domestic interactions, the Lula administration continued to emphasize Brazil’s black history, which the Foreign Minister Celso Amorim called the new symbolism of Brazil’s advent in international politics.\textsuperscript{61} In series of national, regional, and international conferences from 2003 onwards, Brazil gravitated to giving new meaning to its black history and thus opened possibilities for lateral interactions with countries in the Global South. It is in this sense that Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, President Lula’s key foreign policy strategist, elaborated the division between center and periphery as competition between “contented” and “contesting” states squarely placing Brazil with members of the Global South in the latter category.\textsuperscript{62} This re-appropriation of Brazilian history through reaching out to the African continent involved both material and ideational dimensions. Lula’s rhetoric about the African continent developed into greater
economic, political, and diplomatic investments in remarkably different ways from the previous Cardoso administration.  

The second rhetorical move highlighted the innovation of developmental projects to create lateral partnerships with countries in the Global South. Such rhetoric of innovation practically aimed at important issues such as hunger, poverty, and inequality and centred Brazil’s own role on these issues. As Lula put it, we need to ensure global partnership for overcoming poverty with “really innovative solutions to eliminate this economically irrational, politically unacceptable and ethically shameful phenomenon – hunger.” The Brazilian foreign policy attempted to keep in line with its domestic institutional goals, especially with the income distribution program, such as the “Zero Hunger Program” and “Bolsa Familia” (Family Grant) and innovatively took up ideas of reducing poverty and international hunger into different multilateral forums such as the G-8, the UN, and the World Bank.  

Again, as Lula put it:

I tire of repeating that, as long as the distorted support (in subsidies) of developing countries reaches the shameful sum of US$ 1 billion per day, 900 million people survive with less than US$ 1 per day in poor and developing countries. This is a political situation that is morally unsustainable.”

This rhetoric on remodelling innovation for poverty alleviation and development aimed at generating lateral partnerships with countries in the Global South and to exercise ethical responsibility of addressing social problems. It asserted that Brazil’s Global South coalition(s) can both recognize Brazil’s vulnerability in the unequal international order but also Brazil can ethically address the problem of poverty and inequality by creating innovative solutions. In an assessment of Lula’s foreign policy, Celso Amorim’s wrote, “Along with the other IBSA Fund partners (India and South Africa), Brazil has financed a solid residues recycling plant in Port-au-Prince, which creates jobs and helps clean the environment. This ‘cash for work’ project was considered a model of South-South cooperation by the United Nations Development Programme, from which it earned two special prizes,
including one in the context of the Millennium Development Goals.”68 Through this rhetorical strategy that involved appropriating black historical identity for Brazil and remodelling innovation for development, the Lula administration pushed a foreign policy orientation towards the Global South.

In this rhetorical strategy of reconstruction, the South-South grand strategy was held in place through distinct ordering practices by the Lula administration arresting this stability with multiple audiences at the domestic and regional environment. Here two important ways through which audiences were co-constituted are important.

First, is the propitious rise of “pink tide” in the regional institutional environment. This simultaneously rise of “New Left” domestic political regimes in Latin America such as in Venezuela (1998), Chile (2000), Argentina (2003), Uruguay (2004), Bolivia (2005), Ecuador (2006), Nicaragua (2006), Paraguay (2008), and El Salvador (2009) offered endorsements of each other despite disagreements and accorded regional institutional legitimacy to the Lula administration thereby connecting ideas of social development with new lateral linkages through the South-South strategy. Here elites from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay converged on the ideas of regional integration and consensus-building through South-South strategies as the study by the Network of Progressive Foundations of the Southern Cone showed.69 Yet, the Lula administration mistook such primus inter pares commitments of Latin American states as their deferral of Brazilian leadership and was thus punished by regional audiences when Brazil tried to mobilize its South-South grand strategy for a permanent seat in UNSC, Director-General position of WTO, and Presidency at the Inter-American Development Bank in 2005. The co-constituted relations between Brazil and regional interlocutors does not entail deferral, submission, or complete subordination of the audiences.

Now, the Lula administration’s reconstructive rhetoric on South-South strategy focused on outreach to Africa to build new consensus among domestic-regional audiences. Crucially, Brazil apologized for the role in the slave trade70 and took measures to address its Cold War racial policies
in African states. As Lula put it, “It’s not just about reaching business deals but it’s the strategy of a politician who is conscious of the historical debt towards Africa.” This rhetoric preserved the historical precedents of Latin America’s engagement with the Third World and specifically Brazil’s “civilizing” relations with Africa but now reconstructed it with a powerful obligatory moral responsibility onto the earlier discourse. Similarly, the Lula administration’s rhetoric on remodelling innovation for poverty alleviation and development was reconstructive specifically in its affirmative policies. In other words, instead of only making explicit the regionally implicit norms of human rights, the Lula administration embarked on “affirmative action policies.” Here, Brazil secured support from Latin American regional audiences because of Brazil’s large black population. A case in point is Brazil’s leadership of UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti in 2004 where both Chile, Argentina, and members part of the region (2X9) acknowledged Brazil’s deployment of South-South strategy to avoid the role of United States in the region to help in the realization of democracy in Haiti. Again, the issue-specific relation on Haitian crisis between rhetorical actors and regional audiences mark the crucial aspects of communicative interplay on South-South grand strategy.

Second, multiple domestic audiences in a contentious domestic environment faced with strategic reconstructive rhetoric of the Lula administration for a comprehensive South-South grand strategy challenged the administration in important ways. The Cardoso Government in Brazil (1994 – 2002) already favoured cooperation between Brazil and the United States. Cardoso and his party affiliates charged the Lula administration as “anti-American,” “Third-Worldist” and functioning without pragmatism. In the communicative interplay, some former diplomats evaluated Lula's rhetoric as driven by leftist ideological visions and as Almeida puts it, the Lula administration “took initiatives to isolate the United States in the region and enlarge the sphere of self-coordination among Latin American or South American countries.” Similarly, active public intellectuals such as Bernardo Sorj claimed that "The discourse that emphasizes South-South relations presents rhetorical
excesses.” They forcefully (but also wrongly) feared that South-South policy is anti-US in orientation. For others such as, José Augusto Guilhon Albuquerque, the non-Western orientation of Brazil towards China for example, is costly and “unwise.” Aside from regular contestations on such a stance from political opponents and large business enterprises (Federation of Industries of Sao Paulo, for example), media outlets such as O Estado de São Paulo and Folha de São Paulo also challenged this form of foreign policy.

Yet, with the rhetorical politics of reconstruction, the Lula administration effectively co-opted several domestic audiences into the South-South grand strategy. The Brazilian armed forces endorsed intervention in Haiti in 2004 as unique Southern way of peace operation different from the erstwhile practices of the Global North and sought greater participation in UN peacekeeping operation in Portuguese speaking countries. Other institutions like the National Bank of Social and Economic Development (BNDES) and Brazilian Agricultural and Research Corporation (Embrapa) were co-opted in the South-South grand strategy for new developmental projects for Africa. At the domestic institutional setting, Brazil’s rhetoric on foreign policy skilfully integrated some African descendants into Brazilian elite society. Here the elaboration of opportunities for candidates of African origin to serve in the diplomatic corps of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through targeted scholarships programs is an important example. The success of this co-optation in the rhetorical politics of reconstruction is clear: a major foreign policy survey in Brazil among political elites and opponents showed that 65% of the respondents prioritized Brazil’s Global South foreign policy versus 21% that preferred the erstwhile North-South alignment. Further, the formalization of the IBSA forum (India, Brazil, and South Africa), the institutionalization of the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), and Brazil’s diplomatic activism in “South American” region further established the Brazil’s foreign policy priority of the Global South.
Brazil’s South-South grand strategic foreign policy change arose as rhetorical politics of reconstruction in the Lula administration. In terms of contrasting counterfactual, if the rhetorical strategy was one of persuasion not reconstruction, we should not see a radical change to this foreign policy orientation after the end of the Lula term. Yet we precisely see such unravelling in Brazilian foreign policy. Absent the concerted rhetorical politics of reconstruction, South-South grand strategy changed in these transactions.

The Rousseff and Temer administrations undid the advancements of the predecessor in important ways by suspending the politics of reconstruction. In keeping with our model on domestic-regional institutional setting, it is important to note that the Rousseff administration faced different sort of domestic contestation that altered the interactional environment and the sort of rhetorical strategy required for sustaining the Global South foreign policy change. Already in her first term, President Rousseff has an uneasy start with the Brazilian armed forces because of her history of participation in the urban guerrilla resistance and liberation during the periods of military dictatorship and a tough start with neoliberal opponents in the plans for managing the economic slowdown because of her emphasis on social engineering projects. Here Rousseff’s rhetoric on protecting human rights, environmental sustainability, and coordination of foreign policies for social justice alienated contentious domestic groups and the significant co-optation pursued by the Lula administration through the political rhetorical strategy of reconstruction became impossible.

Similarly, the receding “Pink Tide” in Latin American regional institutional setting also changed the sort of rhetorical strategy required for foreign policy change. Thus, in the African Union anniversary event in May 2013, Rousseff deployed a rhetorical strategy of South-South: “Brazil is…setting a South-South standard of cooperation. What is this standard? It is a non-oppressive
cooperation, based on mutual advantages and shared values.” In other words, Rousseff failed to add anything substantially new through the politics of reconstruction but aimed for status-quo of the Lula administration. Without any rhetorical reconstructive effort, the South-South became routine technical issue rather than a grand foreign policy strategy. Before the end of the second term, the domestic opposition already ousted the President in a factional struggle.

The Temer administration characteristically avoided any form of linguistic-rhetorical engagement on South-South grand strategy and prioritized Brazil’s foreign policy towards the United States, thus slowly abandoning global south projects. By critiquing the reconstructive rhetoric of the prior administrations, José Serra as External Affairs Minister of the Temer administration stated that Brazil’s foreign policy and diplomacy must “update itself and innovate…promoting a great modernizing reform in the [Foreign Policy] objectives, methods, and techniques of work.” As Lucas Rezende rightly points out, the priority immediately changed from a South-South axis to North-South and returned to the “American” tradition of Brazil’s foreign policy.

Further, based on our analytical model we see that without explicit regional rules, the Lula administration’s rhetorical strategy could not aim to mediate different groups in the divided domestic setting. There were no “objective” criteria even for members of PT to mediate opposition. The Temer administration capitalized on the contentious domestic institutional setting and lack of support at the regional level to engage in a rhetoric of us versus them: “With regard to foreign policy towards Africa [and Global South] and translating the values and interests of our country, ‘we’ [the Temer administration] represent the values of Brazil in contrast to ‘them’ [the Lula and Rousseff administrations].” Further, the Temer administration consistently articulated a rhetoric concerned with the problems of corruption at the domestic level and the lack of diplomatic direction of past governments, which polarized the society and hijacked any meaningful engagement with regional norms on the appropriate foreign policy. If the foreign policy change towards the South-South was a
grand strategy arrested through rhetorical politics of reconstruction, the change in South-South strategy arose in rhetoric performances of the Temer administration in making distinctions between us-versus-them. It also manifests in the Bolsonaro administration’s vituperative rhetoric that ignored the norms of domestic-regional institutional environment and destroyed any project of reconstruction, mediation, or persuasion, with an evangelical zeal. It is this lack of politics in rhetorical moves of the Bolsonaro administration that made Brazil rejection of South-South grand strategy both meaningless and dangerous. The loosening of Brazil’s foreign policy towards the Global South in the period of Rousseff and the complete overturning of the foreign policy under the subsequent Temer and Bolsonaro administrations is a useful reminder on how specifically the social-institutional settings mattered for distinct political projects in the actor’s utilization of rhetoric for grand strategic foreign policy change.

This way of understanding the continuity and change in Brazil’s grand South-South foreign policy strategy as rhetorical politics offers important correctives to existing explanations of change in Brazilian foreign policy. First, many accounts credit powerful and charismatic personality of Lula himself for Brazil’s paradigmatic Global South foreign policy change. Certainly, Lula was an important factor in stirring the Global South foreign policy in innovative ways. But accounts that rely only on Lula’s charisma in a persuasive rhetorical strategy underplay the socio-institutional environment – the propitious regional interlocutors and co-optation of select domestic audiences – within which strategic Lula was able to steer his rhetoric on foreign policy change. As the above discussions showed, Lula made an important difference in the sort of rhetorical argumentation on “black history” and “development innovation” not because of idiosyncratic factors but by reconstructing the domestic-regional institutional norms that contingently made sense for his audiences.
Second, many accounts consider Brazil’s foreign policy change as a product of its material advancements alone. Here conceptions of the state’s economic potential or its relations in BRICS groupings as “rising Brazil” are offered as indicators of grand strategic foreign policy change. Yet, indicators of material capabilities alone as empirical facts are limited because it is filtered through rhetoric for political projects. The Washington Consensus aims to lower inflation, induce economic boom, and boost investments. If material considerations alone mattered in Brazil’s grand strategic foreign policy change, then Bolsonaro’s neoliberal consensus in foreign policy strategy towards the US must not surprise academic pundits. Yet, it is the filter of vituperative rhetoric of the Bolsonaro administration in rejecting persuasion or reconstruction in foreign policy efforts and that overturning the institutional norms of “consensual hegemony,” which makes analysts view Brazil’s foreign policy with alarm.

Finally, traditional analysis of Brazil’s foreign policy change is based on paradigmatic approaches conventionally divided into liberal-conservative period (1822-1930); developmentalism (1930-1989); neoliberalism (1990-2002); and logistical (2003-2016) periods in Brazilian international relations. Inspired by the English School view, here any assessment of foreign policy change is organically viewed as a product of the evolutionary development of the state. In contrast, the analytical framework and empirical claims developed in this article foregrounds the hierarchical international system and the variegated realities of socio-normative environment at the domestic and regional levels. Brazil’s South-South foreign policy grand strategy is not given by any evolutionary necessity and this policy is a product of rhetorical politics of political actors held strategically with and against multiple audiences in a fluid and contingent world. The analytical framework developed in this article sheds light on area traditionally missed by evolutionary accounts, offers a useful corrective to a teleological view in the paradigmatic models and advances a critical foreign policy analysis as a way forward for foregrounding diplomatic performances of political actors.
Conclusions

By creating an ideal-typical framework based on specific domestic-regional institutional constellations, this article established an analytical framework of rhetorical politics of foreign policy change for states functioning within a hierarchical international order. This conceptualization challenged a static understanding political rhetoric and foreign policy change in IR by offering four different types of rhetorical strategies that actors utilize based on the dynamics in their institutional environments. When grand foreign policy projects are arrested in distinct ways through rhetoric it is an achievement of politics rather than an outcome of material or natural necessity. In the ongoing continuous fluid transactions in world politics, grand strategic foreign policy change cannot arise or be stabilized without some form of performative linguistic rhetorical engagement by political actors. As a double-edged sword, opponents could wield rhetoric to undo the achievements of foreign policy change in important ways.

Our model offers an important contingent generalization on role of domestic-regional environment in the rhetorical politics for foreign policy change. The rise and fall of Brazil’s South-South grand strategic foreign policy change in the rhetoric of reconstruction and its abandonment coexists with Brazil’s grand strategic foreign policy continuity on issues relating to nuclear non-proliferation based on politics of persuasion. Future research agenda could usefully examine the interaction effects of such varieties of rhetorical politics in Brazil’s engagement in the international order. Similarly, our model offers avenues for studying foreign policy changes of other states in the hierarchical international system such as India or China. In the case of India, its foreign policy change, for example through the civilian-nuclear deal with the United States in 2005 moved from a rhetoric of pariah to partner state in the global nuclear order. China’s contentions in the South China Sea disputes rhetorically refers to inheritances of treaty rights from the 19th century and impressed on this
importance in rejecting the ruling by The Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration. Our framework can offer opportunities for investigating the distinct regional-domestic institutional constellations that enable and constrain these rhetorical forces in foreign policy change. Such an exploration could shed light on the distinct political processes rather than view these moves as automatic balancing and bandwagoning behaviours of rising powers.

Finally, two key conditions matter. First, rhetorical strategies on foreign policy come to bear when different socio-institutional members in these settings linguistically play their role in the games. When participants’ evaluations of each other are “silent” or “silenced” our model requires improvements on rhetoric and foreign policy change. Second, it rests on institutional actors having certain (even thin) moral solidarity with each other. When opponents are outside the realm of morality and solidarity and aim to undo shared understandings, our model requires improvement on the political processes. Thus, we encourage detailed case-studies and systematic theory development based on the model to further our understanding of rhetoric and foreign policy change.

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