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## Globalization, cosmopolitanism, and leisure rights: The flaws of the *Sao Paulo Declaration*

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The Brexit vote and the election of Donald Trump in 2016 are widely held to signal the return of protectionism and isolationism in the Anglosphere. This ran counter to the *Sao Paulo Declaration*, issued by the World Leisure and Recreation Association (1998). For nearly 20 years, the *Declaration* has been at the axis of debates on the preferred trajectory of leisure relations in the West. The Brexit and Trump election campaigns seized upon the undesirable consequences of globalization and cosmopolitanism, that is, job losses and the contraction of real wages caused by outsourcing, immigration, and the threats to ‘the whole way’ of national life. The campaigns exposed globalization as an uneven process that primarily benefits the elite, and cosmopolitanism as a patchwork process. The paper examines the meaning of globalization and cosmopolitanism, and their shortfalls, in the *Sao Paulo Declaration*. It moves on to consider the argument made by some writers in Leisure Studies that volunteerism is an antidote to the worst consequences of globalization.

**Keywords:** globalization; *Sao Paulo Declaration*; inequality; poverty; crisis

Le vote du Brexit et l’élection de Donald Trump en 2016 sont largement considérés comme le signal du retour du protectionnisme et de l’isolationnisme dans l’anglosphère. Cela va à l’encontre de la *Déclaration de Sao Paulo* publiée par l’Association mondiale des loisirs et de la récréation (1998). Depuis près de 20 ans, la Déclaration est à l’axe des débats sur la trajectoire privilégiée des relations de loisirs en Occident. Les campagnes électorales du Brexit et de Trump se sont emparées des conséquences indésirables de la mondialisation et du cosmopolitisme. C’est-à-dire les pertes d’emplois et la contraction des salaires réels causées par l’externalisation, l’immigration, les menaces sur « l’ensemble » de la vie nationale. Les campagnes ont exposé la mondialisation comme un processus inégal, qui profite principalement l’élite, et le cosmopolitisme comme un processus disparate. L’article examine la signification de la mondialisation et du cosmopolitisme, ainsi que leurs lacunes, dans la *Déclaration de Sao Paulo*. Il examine ensuite l’argument avancé par certains auteurs de l’étude des loisirs selon lequel le volontariat est un antidote aux pires conséquences de la mondialisation.

**Mots clés :** mondialisation; *Déclaration de Sao Paulo*; inégalité; pauvreté; crise

This paper aims to critically evaluate the *Sao Paulo Declaration*, which set the ethos of discourse and debate about leisure as a world phenomenon at the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century. In the light of rising populism and nationalism in many Western countries, this ethos now has the air of *temps perdu*. Yet

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many of the assumptions and beliefs carry over into present-day thinking and policy about leisure. Article 1 of the *Sao Paulo Declaration*, issued by the World Leisure and Recreation Association, states, ‘all persons have the right to leisure through economic, political and social policies that are equitable and sustainable’ (WLR, 1998). It is a supremely confident overture to a document that has shaped thinking about leisure, cosmopolitanism, and globalization for over two decades. Prepared and published in the headwind of the neoliberal surge toward market deregulation, it assumed that the twin processes of globalization and cosmopolitanism are inevitable, and that their consequences are fundamentally, in the long run, benign. To be clear about terms, ‘globalization’ is used here to refer to the increasing interconnectedness and permeability of borders between nation-states; ‘cosmopolitanism’ refers to the increasing acceptance of multiculturalism and multi-ethnicity within national territories (Calhoun, 2007). In contrast to out-and-out neoliberalism, the Sao Paulo document identifies a pivotal regulatory role for the state. As Article 3 puts it, ‘all governments and institutions should preserve and create barrier-free environments . . . to express, celebrate and share leisure’ (WLR, 1998). It is taken for granted that bilateralism and multilateralism will inevitably be a larger component in the organization and habitual activities of nation-states and, by implication, the content and practice of leisure. By these means, while the *Sao Paulo Declaration* recommends cognizance of ‘threats to diversity and quality’ in leisure (Article 7; WLR, 1998), it advances on the principle that there is every reason to be assured that they will be overcome. Hence, globalization and cosmopolitanism are presented as demanding enhanced vigilance by the nation-state. Most characteristically, globalization is taken to proceed decisively to cultivate the proliferation of cosmopolitan values and ways of life. Economic and spatial considerations, such as the reduction of tariff barriers and freer movement of people, are ingredients here. But much more than interlocking arrangements for trade, educational exchange, economic protocols, and enhanced tourist flows are envisaged. Ultimately, nothing less than a whole-scale convergence of values, beliefs, and lifestyles around a cosmopolitan gazette is envisaged. Consecutively, the gravamen of difference, divergence, resistance, and opposition that have, hitherto, divided nation-states are consigned to a lower tier. In a word, globalization is understood to be the *fate* of the industrializing world. As such, leisure planning and policy must embrace it.

With hindsight, it is remarkable that the 10 Articles in the document outline globalization and cosmopolitanism to be both inevitable and, ultimately, subject to state regulation. On the whole, reference in the document to the role of multinationals in globalization is most charitably described as ‘under-theorized’ (Rowe, 2006). Admittedly, Article 6, refers to ‘threats’ to leisure posed by ‘local, national and international’ forces (WLR, 1998). This may be interpreted as hinting that business might conceivably play an obstructive role in interfering with the rights of all persons to enjoy freedom and diversity in leisure. Conversely, Article 7 mitigates the credibility of this interpretation. Here, the threats of ‘abuse and misuse’ in leisure are denoted to be matters of ‘individual’ conduct as opposed to structural tendencies integral to globalization (WLR, 1998). At the theoretical level, abuse and misuse are cast as disjointed behaviors, alien to one other, in their causes and effects. The focus is upon individual transgressions, rather than structural disequilibrium. This inclines analysis to treat departure from normative standards as aberrations rather than integral, inescapable consequences of global investment, opportunity allocation, resource distribution, and asset maximization. The option of fully hooking questions of abuse and misuse to the engine

of globalization, namely the corporate–state axis, is not precipitated. The corporate–state axis may be defined as the aggregated relations of interdependence and common purpose between the private interests of multinational corporations, committed to profit seeking, allied with the institutions of the state. The primary purpose of the latter is to engender an equitable climate for business to flourish. The term ‘equitable climate’ covers not only co-operative business ventures pertaining to interest rates, subsidies, and tax write-offs, but also favorable load-bearing, judicial, and policing measures.

From the off, the *Declaration* led to qualms about compliance, since it neglects to stipulate, or undertake to initiate, inter-state mechanisms of effective regulation to deliver international conformity to normative standards and protocols of conduct. In this regard, the absence of specificity in the *Declaration* throws up a number of intractable problems, relating to the meaning of globalization and cosmopolitanism in leisure forms and practice. On the whole, these derive from the *Declaration*’s drift to addressing questions of abuse and misuse in the content and practice of leisure philosophically and self-referentially instead of addressing sociological realities. That is, it applies concepts of diversity, freedom, integrity, and barrier-free exchange independently of the historical and sociological knowledge base pertaining to the organization and operation of global capital. The notion that multinationals will work together, rather than against each other in competition, is ahistorical. Furthermore, it is inimical to the logic of capitalism. This logic demands that profit maximization, and accumulation, require corporations to strive for monopoly, or quasi-monopoly, status in market share. The idea that they will voluntarily abstain from outflanking state controls that interfere with the logic of accumulation is wishful thinking (see Rojek, 2009). In common with other expressions of globalization and cosmopolitanism of the 1990s, the prospects for globalization and cosmopolitanism that underpin the document look less secure today (Calhoun, 2003a, pp. 531–532). Brexit (2016), and the election of Donald Trump (2016), drew lines against globalization and liberal policies of migration. Both sought to revive types of strident, unapologetic patriotic chauvinism and nationalist protectionism that in the letter of globalization theory was often treated as dead and buried. Tacitly, both approve of international leisure, in the sense of sporting fixtures or organized games, such as the Olympics, while seeking to maintain and refresh national leisure and recreation cultures.

### **The return of border mentality**

The *Sao Paul Declaration* looked forward to a century of freer movement and the emergence of a borderless (cosmopolitan) mentality. The return of protectionism in the twenty-first century has taken the wind out of the sails of documents like the *Sao Paul Declaration* (1998). Loss of momentum in the Anglosphere is not just a matter of the two key elections of 2016. Normative standards of ‘sustainability,’ ‘diversity,’ ‘freedom,’ and ‘integrity’ have always been tricky to enforce under capitalism. There is a good reason for this. Capitalist organization is predicated in property ownership and deregulated Strategic Investment Vehicles (SIVs) designed to maximize accumulation. These imperatives are incompatible with universalism. The prologue to freedom, justice, and judicial impartiality may be accented in the commitment to build and enforce universal solidarity. When all is said and done, they are essentially arrayed through the prism of sectional interest masquerading as national interest. Globalization makes much of nations working co-operatively, and cosmopolitanism points to the gradual subsidence of national divisions and hostilities. What is naïve about this is that it fails to perceive that nations are

partly imaginary constructs (Anderson, 1991; Rojek, 2007). There are two reasons for holding this view of nations. Firstly, the Western nation-building programs of the nineteenth century did not fully expose, or neutralize, rooted ties and divisions of community, caste, religion, superstition, regionalism, or tribalism (Brubaker, 1996; Gellner, 1983). Rather, they aligned them into provisional, operational agreements that were conditional upon sustained net growth in resource exploitation produced by industrialization and distributed by due democratic process. These arrangements have the capacity to hold fast for a long time. However, nation-building only operates smoothly if, in the medium to long term, the provisos of continuous economic growth, the maintenance of peace and internal order, and a perception of the redistribution of the fruits of industrial development are maintained. There are, then, sociological rabbit holes in the concept of globalizing ‘nations.’ Nations really are not homogenous entities, akin to an individual human mind and body that works harmoniously (Gellner, 1997). This brings me to the second point.

The crowning achievement of the West was to advance democracy as superior to other forms of industrial nation-building, such as dictatorship, despotism, plutocracy, or kleptocracy. However, since capitalism posits the advance of sectional property-owning interests as the prime mover of economic growth, it sows repeated problems of legitimation regarding the type of democracy in which it is clad (Habermas, 1976). To speak plainly, capitalism does not produce democracy as Ancient Society enumerated it (Keane, 2009). Rather, its characteristic nation-building programs foster *managed democracy* (Wolin, 2008). The nature of managed democracy is to position advantaged sectional groups to exercise hegemony over disadvantaged sectional groups (Anderson, 2017; Gramsci, 1971). This is a process requiring prodigious powers of persuasion, impression management, and often enough, not a little luck. The stamp of nationalism it engenders and supports ultimately privileges individualism over universalism, and, too dismissively, treats local social solidarities as vestiges of a doomed, discredited traditional order. Thus, on a *priori* grounds the *Declaration* (1998) tends to cast globalization and cosmopolitanism as enriching personal freedoms in leisure and recreation (through greater access, travel, and tariff-free investment). A large and growing body of empirical work in the sociology of leisure supports the position that globalization is, on the whole, a positive force (Adreasson & Thomas, 2017; Cronheim, 2004; Kelly, 2007). It is striking that the structural dimensions of globalization, cosmopolitanism, and managed democracy do not figure on their radar.

What does it mean to propose that the autonomous motion of individual practice is exaggerated? The proposition does *not* mean that freedom and choice should be treated analytically, as null and void in the leisure practice of individuals. Rather, it inserts the caveat that individual freedom and choice are only meaningful in relation to the normative values and standards of behavior articulated under the aegis of the corporate–state axis (Rowe, 2006). In the normal run of things, this axis works to produce and reproduce the market conditions favorable for the equitable advance of private business interests. In practice, the main problems triggered by globalization and cosmopolitanism derive from what corporations and states, each in their own ways, deem to be equitable. In this matter, there is an unfortunate habit to implement the rule of sectional power and circumstance rather than majority principle. The tendency is expressed wherever capitalism gains a foothold. The *Sao Paulo Declaration* (1998) is symptomatic of this. It treats globalization, and as a logical corollary, cosmopolitanism, as having only one gear. Against this, critics of globalization describe it as an ‘uneven process’ in which the

access and privilege granted to the 'trans-national elite' are fugitive for the many (Sassen, 2001). Just as damningly, critics of cosmopolitanism have coined the term 'patchwork cosmopolitanism,' to refer to the real state of affairs in the presently existing global cultural mix (Farrer, 2009). Access to the richness in leisure experience that globalization has brought to advantaged sections of the population (in terms of leisure technologies, travel, etc.) are pipe dreams for the majority. The historical failure of the corporate state axis torobustly apply the rule of equitable standards for all strata has resulted in a series of paradoxical outcomes. For example, deregulating the inward flow of cheap labor might be said to be compliant with the objective of dismantling barriers. Except that, inevitably, one inescapable effect of cheap migrant labor is to undermine the domestic job market by producing a surplus of available labor and exerting downward pressure on customary wage levels. In train, traditional leisure patterns are disrupted. Sociologically speaking, this aspect of globalization imposes a double burden upon domestic labor market equilibrium. Inward migration of cheap labor drives domestic wage rates down; simultaneously, outsourcing of production and services to low-wage economies makes significant sectors of the domestic manufacturing and service economies marginal and, in some cases, no longer viable. It is all very well to produce cheaper leisure goods and services. This certainly corresponds with one headline effect of globalization, i.e., to remove barriers to participation in markets by making goods and services affordable. Against this, the downward pressure on wage rates diminishes collective bargaining and reduces the propensity to consume. What globalization gives with one hand, it takes back with the other. It produces a minority of winners able to meaningfully enter into full cosmopolitan relationships and networks through travel, stable incomes (with real purchasing power), and access to the leisure and recreation market. By the same token, the number of people whose lives are capsized by globalization in being economically and politically abandoned grows. The Western Marxist tradition characterized the emiserated, unemployed, and marginal producers as the 'reserve army' of labor (Anderson, 1976). Today, differentiation of race, class, religion, consumer interests, and associated variables makes this aggregate resemble a vast refugee camp of abandoned, powerless labor than any sort of credible army in waiting. Being abandoned is not the same as being rendered mute. The camp of unemployed or marginal labor tented in the midst of the abundant riches of the consumer market inevitably feels resentful at being left behind. Just as nationalism ceases to operate smoothly in periods of economic dislocation, so the desirability of globalization and cosmopolitanism is checked when prolonged economic downturn sets in. The pattern of events since the Great Recession of 2007 confirms this.

### **The lessons of the Great Recession (2007)**

The seismic shock to the global economy produced by the Great Recession that commenced in 2007, exposed latent imbalances in the Western economy and leisure and recreation market. The recession has been far more severe and protracted than the economic contractions of 1974–76 and 1980–82 (Pontusson & Raess, 2012, pp. 13–14). In the 18 months after the recession, US GDP declined by 4.1%; UK GDP fell by 6.3%; and US investment fell by 23.4% (Crocker, 2015; Labonte, 2010). The fall in real wages translates into a reduction in macroeconomic demand. The shortfall in liquidity was met with a determined extension of the credit economy. But there are structural limits to the capacity of credit to operate as a holding measure. It is reported that in the USA, home foreclosures tripled between 2006

and 2009, to almost 2.5 million (Mian & Sufi, 2011). In the first quarter of 2012, consumer debt in the USA was \$11.4 trillion (of which \$904 billion was student debt) (*Investor's Business Daily*, 1.6.2012). Students owe nearly a trillion dollars of debt, an average of \$25,000 per student. Since the crash, 25 million people in the USA have lost their jobs through factory and office closures (Bellamy Foster, 2006).

At a deeper ontological level, the extension of the credit economy, without the counterbalancing measure of universal income, simply inures populations to live beyond their means. In July 2012 outstanding personal debt in the UK stood at £1.410 trillion. Average household debt (excluding mortgages) was £5972. The average amount owed by UK adults (including mortgages) was £28,704. Between July 2011 and July 2012, the total interest repayments on personal debt was £60.0 billion. The Office of Budget Responsibility predicted that household debt would climb to £2.044 trillion by the end of 2017 ([www.creditaction.org.uk](http://www.creditaction.org.uk)).

Within the EU, the average rate of unemployment rose from 6.7% in March 2008 to 8.9% in March 2009, leaving 21.5 million citizens without a job. Five years later it had risen to 9.0% (Bell & Blanchflower, 2015, p. 2). Unemployment rates in the southern economies in the periphery of the Eurozone are disturbingly high. In June 2014, the rate for adults (25–74-year-olds) was 10.5%; in Portugal 12.5%; in Spain 22.4%; in Greece 25.4%; and in Ireland 10.7%. However, when one turns to rates of youth unemployment in these countries the picture becomes even worse. In Italy, the rate for 16–24-year-olds was 43.7%; in Portugal 33.5%; in Spain 53.5%; in Ireland 23.2%; and in Greece 53.1%. Compare this with adult and youth rates in the wealthy core countries of the Eurozone. In Germany, the adult rate was 4.8% and the youth rate was 7.8%; in Denmark, 5.5% and 12.6%; in the UK, 4.6% and 17.9%; in the Netherlands, 6.1% and 10.5%; and in France, 8.9% and 22.4%. In the USA the respective rates were 5.0% and 13.3% (Bell & Blanchflower, 2015, p. 2). A generation is being denied the opportunities for social mobility and building a stake in society that for most of the postwar years has been seen as the birthright of those born and raised in the West.

But the use of the credit economy as a fig leaf for major structural faults in the distribution of wealth and the organization of society does not end there. Governments that had borrowed without adequate collateral were faced with demands from international banks and debt repayments. In particular, peripheral economies in the Eurozone, namely Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and above all Greece, faced bankruptcy (Streeck, 2016; Varoufakis, 2016, 2017). By and large, the fiscal and monetary stimulus measures adopted since the crash have failed to restore buoyant growth or significantly reduce accumulated debt (Caporaso & Rhodes, 2016). Between 2008 and 2016, governments' debt-to-GDP ratios have risen from 41% to 74% in the US, from 47% to 70% in the EU, and from 95% to 126% in Japan. High ratios usually produce an interest rate hike. Yet 10-year government bond rates in the USA are currently 2%, around 0.5% in Germany, and around 0.2% in Japan. Since 2008, despite near zero rates in the USA, and real interest rates of zero in the Eurozone, the West has been in a condition of 'secular stagnation' (Summers, 2016). That is, a structural condition in which there is a serious malfunction in the structure of the economy caused by an increasing propensity to save and a decreasing propensity to invest. This disequilibrium depresses economic activity by compounding funds in banks, financial management organizations, and fixed-asset portfolios. Low liquidity exacerbates the problem. The brief spurt in growth in America between 2003 and 2007 was reliant upon the transference of unsustainable levels of



savings into insupportable levels of investment. This produced the housing crisis (Summers, 2016; Tooze, 2019).

The increasing propensity to save is the product of many factors. Among the most significant are the rising inequality gap between the rich and poor, new uncertainties about the economic consequences of longevity and the retirement age, threats to the stability of benefits produced by austerity programs, worries about the coming robotization of jobs, and a greater concentration of assets in foreign central banks and sovereign wealth management funds. The impact on the inequality gap in the Anglophone countries is severe. In the USA, the top 0.1% of families has increased its share of wealth, decade by decade. It expanded from 7% in 1978 to 22% in 2012. Over the same period, the value of real wages has fallen. In the UK, between 1980 and 2011, wage share of output fell from 59.1% to 53.7%. Between 1990 and 2009, the median wage across the OECD member states declined from 66.1% to 61.7% (Crocker, 2015, p. 95). These levels of demonstrable, deteriorating economic inequality mean that to expect general, positive attachment to cosmopolitan values in leisure practice is unrealistic. In the Anglophone power bloc, governments have displayed a stubborn reluctance to apply fiscal measures against the richest in society. Instead, generally speaking, public policy has concentrated upon implementing austerity measures with various degrees of proficiency. These have had the most damaging effect on people on, or near, the poverty line. In addition, cuts in public expenditures have increased the leisure deficit in local economies and reinforced the trend to weaken local leisure traditions. The freer movement and borderless mentality envisaged by the *Sao Paulo Declaration* seem as far away as ever.

Set against the imperatives of the corporate–state axis, it is easy to see why many in the West have come to see globalization and cosmopolitanism as values more suitable for the cabinet offices of government and the executive boardrooms of multinational corporations, than for the ordinary, whole way of life of the people. The *Sao Paulo Declaration* (1998) portrayed globalization and cosmopolitanism as inescapable transformations in the morphology of advanced industrial nations. Protectionist demands to mitigate or reverse globalization and cosmopolitanism have been central to Brexit (2016) (‘Take back control’) and the Trump election victory (2016) (‘Make America Great Again’). In the long run, given the synergies and integration already achieved by globalization, these attempts to reverse globalization and cosmopolitanism are likely to flounder. In the final analysis, the benefits of global strategies of environmental protectionism, tariff-free trade environments, and fluid labor movement are likely to be vindicated. Doubtless there will be many a slip between cup and lip, but the pure forms of national independence and autonomous motion within national boundaries championed by the hard Brexit camp and Trump will turn out to be impracticable. The pressures upon price competitiveness produced by putting the brakes on outsourcing and the bottlenecks to optimal performance produced by skilled labor shortages will prove to be electoral hemlock. If, as seems probable, there is a correction to buccaneer capitalism, it does not follow that public attitudes to globalization and cosmopolitanism will switch automatically from rejection to assent. One lesson of the Great Recession (2007) is the need to reassess both processes so that their consequences and opportunities are considered for all sections of society, not just the dominant capital-investing dominant stratum.

### Volunteerism and cosmopolitanism

In this respect, Leisure Studies has, some claim, taken an early lead. Well before the Great Recession, commentators in the field were probing the consequences upon leisure content and practice of austerity, static and deteriorating real wages, increasing mortgage foreclosures, and the opportunity costs of outsourcing on domestic labor markets and job losses (Arai & Pedlar, 1997). Volunteerism emerged as a promising concept offering the prospects of reconstruction and hope (Henderson, 2018). Volunteerism has a long tradition in the history of leisure, recreation, and community (Gravelle & Larocque, 2005; Stebbins & Thibault, 2013; Wilks, 2016). It is understood to be a mutually determined articulation of democracy that uses leisure to expand supportive networks, enhance community connections, and build tolerance. Instead of the social distance involved respectively in representative democracy and the inflexible discipline of the corporate profit motive, volunteerism comes closer to the Ancient Greek ideal of the *agora* (the ‘open space’ or ‘popular assembly’) in which ordinary people debate, decide, and govern their affairs for themselves (Keane, 2009). Thus, volunteerism is inherently a process based in ideals and practices of individual choice and group collaboration. It is reasonable to submit that a cosmopolitan outlook underpins it, since the volitional attempt to understand and overcome difference and join together for an agreed, common purpose is at the heart of working with strangers. It is only natural to suppose that from little acorns, bigger trees will grow. Proponents of the virtues of volunteerism extol it as a possible ‘antidote’ to ‘local’ and ‘transnational problems’. It is proposed that acquiring a sense of meaningful empowerment in leisure practice at the local level potentially enriches civic culture at national/international levels by confidence building and expanding social networks (Arai & Pedlar, 1997). There is much to applaud here. Instinctively, the inference that people (rather than governments or corporations) can find their own ways of overcoming the differences between them, feels right. Learning to work together to achieve common local goals is also a source of empowerment that can plausibly lead to conjoined undertakings of a more ambitious kind. Consecutively, volunteerism is also transparently not solely an inclusive, power-sharing process. When groups come together and develop a sense of common purpose, they do so with a ‘commonality of understanding’, ‘access to the world,’ and ‘what is possible or not possible for them’ that make them able to act in the first place (Calhoun, 2003b, p. 560). The comprehension of individuals as group members that permits them to see things as *they really are*, is constitutive. In order for a group to be constituted, it requires a deep, often subconscious, bunker mentality of cultural connection that gives meaning and vitality to the relationships that they nourish and develop with each other. Refugee consciousness needs to be translated into oppositional consciousness. In some respects, the new century has produced evidence that this is occurring. The ‘Extinction Rebellion,’ ‘Me Too,’ and ‘Black Lives Matter’ movements reproduce and expand many of the traditional concerns of volunteerism. In particular, they point to the common good of protecting the environment, distributing resources more equitably, and opening up space to egalitarian forms of participation. Consecutively, these movements, and volunteerism in general, remind us of the first rule of a sociological perspective, namely that individuals and groups are positioned differentially in relation to scarce resources. These resources include mental maps of how the world *is* and how *being* in the world should be ethically and practically conducted. In Bourdieu’s sociology, these mental maps are called *habitus* (Bourdieu, 1980, 1984). Neither in relation to matters of access or outlook can social positioning

be said to be neutral. In one step, the constitution of the group that may act as an enabler in some circumstances, turns into a barrier to agreement or joint action with other individuals or groups. This is because the constitutive nature of group mentality inhibits the perceived common ground of the group from being surrendered in joint agreement with others. The whole fabric of group mentality and the texture of belonging are constituted around values, priorities, and relations that are *taken for granted, observed without question*, in a word, *taken to be obvious*. These considerations cannot be set aside when evaluating the prospects of volunteerism in generating oppositional consciousness in relation to uneven globalization and patchwork cosmopolitanism. Despite the ethic of people ‘coming together’ through volunteerism, and working ‘in partnership’ to attain goals that go beyond themselves, there are often ramparts of group mentality to be confronted.

All of this suggests that building a positive cosmopolitan outlook through volunteering is only a beginning. For cosmopolitanism to become second nature in large-scale communities, other requirements are required which have to do with the formulation of *Rights* and *Responsibilities*. In many ways, globalization takes the horse to water in achieving these requirements, but it doesn’t make it drink. There are many aspects of ordinary leisure practice that are global without people even realizing it. These are mostly concentrated at the cultural level. Open any shopping bag from a supermarket in the West and it will contain food, drink, and other household goods from countries all around the world. Any Northern European who likes bananas is already global! Similarly, any viewer who is a fan of the TV series *Game of Thrones* participates in a cultural product that is globally produced, globally distributed, and globally consumed. The same is true of much of the most popular content in film, popular music, and satellite broadcasting. The significance of webcasting and social media in the private leisure pursuits of millions in the West contributes to the social consciousness of living in a wired-up world. On top of this, tourism is a global phenomenon of genuine and increasing significance. In 1970, 159,690,000 people engaged in tourism out of a global population of 3.4 billion (less than 5%). In 2015 international tourists constituted 1,184,000,000 out of a world population of 7.4 billion (16% of the total; Corti, 2016, pp. 25–26).

On the whole there is not need to make the case that a transition to culture is necessary, because it is already constitutive of life in the West. Any attempt by Western governments to impose restrictions upon them would be attacked as interfering with consumer rights. To this extent, globalization and cosmopolitanism are a *fait accompli*. The *technology* of communication and the *organization* of economic exchange have become irretrievably global. And, upon this base, it is wholly legitimate to propose that a superstructure of cultural meaning and transaction has emerged. What was true of the eighteenth-century aristocrat who was raised with foreign tutors and took it as a rite of passage to go on ‘the Grand Tour’, applies to ordinary men and women in the West today: we have become familiar with many aspects of life that are unfamiliar in our immediate, domestic surroundings (Black, 2003).

### **Conclusion: Rights and responsibilities**

Yet what obtains at the cultural level does not necessarily transfer readily to the political level. For example, the right for Westerners to volunteer aid to those in need in the developing world is *volitional*, i.e., it is a matter of private conscience and private behavior. Many Westerners hold it to be a duty of government to distribute foreign aid wisely. Such sentiments belong to the category of *votive behavior*, i.e., indirect allegiance

to a cause, rather than direct action (Rojek, 2016). One person's sense of private responsibility is another person's right to defer action to the levers of democratic representative government. Broadly speaking, within the literature on cosmopolitanism, a schism has emerged between those who regard the cosmopolitan outlook to be a *Responsibility*, and those who hold that it must be a compounded *Right* (Calhoun, 2003a, pp. 538–544). A prominent exponent of the first view is the American philosopher Martha Nussbaum (1997, 2002). She submits that cosmopolitanism is a universal responsibility. Other responsibilities of a particularistic order are acknowledged, e.g., the responsibilities that parents have to their children or their own parents. However, for her, particularistic rights are only valid in so much as they are subsumed under universalistic rights. According to her philosophy, it would be unacceptable for parents to sequester their children from the undertaking to care for others, or for volunteering in leisure to be merely self-referential. This is an exacting version of cosmopolitanism since it recognizes no 'time off' or deviation from cosmopolitan duty. Scheffler (2001) has called it 'extreme cosmopolitanism.'

The Rights-based version regards cosmopolitanism to be an aspect of healthy democracy. It does not remove commitment to cosmopolitanism from personal volition. Instead, it recognizes cosmopolitan values as part of world citizenship. The latter is viewed as interlocking with the immediate local and national political concerns of democratic communities. This suggests that cosmopolitanism should be a larger component in the school curriculum, welfare provision, the labor market, judicial process, policing, environmental and retail controls, and relations of leisure and recreation. The most celebrated expression of this version is made by the political sociologist David Held (1995).

One may argue the toss over Responsibility- and Rights-based versions of cosmopolitanism. This is a matter for a separate paper, since the details are quite involved and require enlisting and commenting upon a separate, substantial, secondary literature. What is already apparent is that the two versions of cosmopolitanism disclose additional defects in the *Sao Paulo Declaration* (1998). For example, Article 3 looks forward to the creation of 'barrier-free environments,' 'where people have time, space, facilities and opportunity to express, celebrate and share leisure' (WLR, 1998). It is untenable to see this as a likely product of volunteerism. Local level activity may be necessary, but it is not, and can never be, sufficient. If 'barrier-free' environments mean anything, they mean global, compounded, legislative and executive rules and regulations. Since this goes beyond personal volition, it logically suggests a responsibility-based version of cosmopolitanism. However, the Article has no purchase unless the means of constitution and implementing meaningful legislative and executive measures are specified. The *Declaration* leaves them open. The result is that the future of leisure and recreation comes across as belonging everywhere and nowhere, rather than a concrete undertaking in the global framework.

The same applies to Article 5, which calls upon 'all governments' to 'enact and enforce' 'laws and policies designed to provide leisure for all' (WLR, 1998). The necessary element to achieve these laudable principles is the creation of effective multi-lateral institutions of co-operative state power within the main trading blocs of the world (and by extension, giving examples through partner relationships with corresponding trade blocs). Only this will ensure that globalization and cosmopolitanism do not end up as a two-horse race, in which an elite has access to the full range of cosmopolitan experience, while the majority are effectively debarred. This would involve addressing and preventing the emergence of new fences *within* territorially bounded states, just as

barriers *between* nation-states are deconstructed. Education is a necessary element here, but it is not sufficient. In addition, the corporate–state axis must look to prevent the new surplus produced by the elimination of tariff controls, and the multiplication of exchange relationships, from being absorbed in mere accumulation by sectional interests. Essential to this is economic and social reinvestment in communities that have suffered from outsourcing of labor. This means producing not only new jobs, but investigating new attitudes to the work–life balance, e.g., through lowering the retirement age, reducing the working week, and examining the costs and benefits of universal income arrangements.

When all is said and done, the history of globalization in the West suggests that it has been an unequivocal success in dismantling trade barriers and expanding economic transactions. Where it has faltered is in omitting to yield effective multilateralism in education, investment, resource distribution, and, at the civic level, imaginative thinking about the continued relevance of the work ethic to the work–life balance. What globalization and cosmopolitanism demonstrate in the structure of leisure and recreation (as in much else besides) is that the problem facing proponents is not chiefly one of production. Subject to necessary, inviolable legal provisions, outsourcing provides benefits for investors, employers, workers, and consumers. If workers in high-wage labor markets suffer job reduction or job loss as results of the traction of globalization, this is a matter for considering resource reallocation based upon divesting the greater surplus, subject to the principle of measurable need. The main world economic power blocs already, mostly, have equitable (in the sense of yielding perennial growth) *production* and *exchange* conditions to deliver surplus in most salient areas. The trajectories of global production and trade have been on an upward path for decades. In contrast, in relation to the question of *distribution*, the questions of ‘equitable conditions’ and ‘resource reallocation’ have barely passed the starting block. Article 1 of the *Sao Paul Declaration* is unequivocal about the universal right to leisure. To repeat: ‘all persons have the right to leisure through economic, political and social policies that are equitable and sustainable’ (WLR, 1998). This raises challenging questions about boundaries, access, and resourcing. The situation requires more considered articulations and binding Rights and Responsibilities that address problems of *horizontal* and *vertical* cosmopolitanism. The former refers to communion and ease of transaction between strata in different globalizing nations; the latter refers to the cultivation of cosmopolitan values, attitudes, and ways of life for strata *within* globalizing nations. Arguably, the elite are already relaxed about horizontal and vertical convergence. It is those banished by reason of property accumulation, the economically marooned, who lack an authentic vocabulary (i.e., based in direct experience) and financial resources (i.e., based upon real property relationships) to entertain the prospects of bridging social distance, and building a genuinely convivial life with others, that require attention. This means learning to see globalization not only as an outward-looking process but also as an inward-looking undertaking. Inevitably, it implies evaluating if the current ratio between the inequality gap within nations and the surplus produced through globalization is sustainable. Some of this is anticipated in Article 10 of the *Sao Paulo Declaration*, which states that ‘efforts be made to disseminate information on the costs and benefits of leisure from the several and profound forces of globalization’ (WLR, 1998). At the government level, this requires a review of fiscal regulation and wealth caps to ensure that ‘all persons have the right to leisure’ (Article 1). So far, this has proved to have been a step too far for countries at the forefront of globalization (Varoufakis, 2017). The price for this is patchwork cosmopolitanism. This produces pressure for opposing globalization and demanding the reintroduction of protectionism. For all of its evident strengths, the *Sao Paulo Declaration* (1998)

fatally neglected to enumerate corrective mechanisms to maintain equilibrium in the job and leisure markets in the domestic arena of globalizing nations. The challenge for the future is to determine how equilibrium can be attained without imperiling the benefits of resource distribution, access, and sharing that globalization brings in its wake. Future research might examine at greater length what the relationship is between a professional ethos of good practice and the material, structural possibilities of turning words into achievements. The overreaching statements and complacent assurances of the *Sao Paulo Declaration* (1998) raise the question of power, ideology, and self-image in the construct of ‘the leisure professional.’ It is a question that has perhaps been left fallow for too long in Leisure Studies.

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