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Between forms of life and immanent criticism: towards a new critical theory?

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ABSTRACT

The main purpose of this paper is to examine Rahel Jaeggi's critical theory. To this end, the analysis focuses on central aspects of Jaeggi's account of forms of life. In addition, it considers the case for immanent criticism and its place in a critical theory of forms of life. The final section sheds light on some key issues arising from Jaeggi's framework. The paper concludes by suggesting that Jaeggi's approach represents a major contribution to contemporary social philosophy and that, more broadly, critical theory will continue to serve as a reservoir of conceptual tools for the study of power relations.

KEYWORDS

Critical theory; forms of life; immanent criticism; Rahel Jaeggi; normativity; power relations; practices

1. Introduction

The main purpose of this paper is to examine Rahel Jaeggi's critical theory. Jaeggi's work has become increasingly influential, especially in European and Anglo-American circles.[1] The following analysis focuses on central aspects of Jaeggi's account of forms of life and immanent criticism. The first section provides some preliminary remarks on the concept of forms of life, emphasizing its importance for the critique of social domination and the possibility of human emancipation. The second section argues that the construction of forms of life, understood as orders of human co-existence, poses serious questions about the relationship between instrumental rationality and value rationality. The third section grapples with concepts and phenomena relevant to fleshing out the constitutive components of forms of life. The fourth section identifies core characteristics of forms of life and criteria for establishing their presence. The fifth section illustrates why practices, rather than actions, are the backbone of forms of life. The sixth section asks why forms of life may be regarded as both interpretive and functional contexts. The seventh section scrutinizes the role of norms and normativity in the consolidation, and potential transformation, of forms of life. The eighth section considers the case for immanent criticism and its place in a critical theory of forms of life. The ninth section clarifies seven key features of immanent criticism, in addition to highlighting their significance for a critical theory of forms of life. The tenth section seeks to push the debate forward by reflecting on several issues arising from Jaeggi's framework. The paper concludes by suggesting that,

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notwithstanding its shortcomings, Jaeggi's approach represents a major contribution to contemporary social philosophy and that, more broadly, critical theory will continue to serve as a reservoir of conceptual tools for the study of power relations.

1.1. Forms of life: between domination and emancipation

'Forms of life' [*Lebensformen*] can be defined and categorized in different ways: in descriptive terms, for instance, as 'traditional' or 'modern', 'collectivist' or 'individualist', 'marginal' or 'hegemonic', 'alternative' or 'mainstream'; in evaluative terms, for example, as 'good' or 'bad', 'successful' or 'unsuccessful', 'rational' or 'irrational', 'emancipatory' or 'repressive'. From the perspective of *idealist monism*, it is both possible and desirable to bring *the* 'right' kind of form of life into existence. From the perspective of *realist pluralism*, it may suffice to generate social conditions allowing for the peaceful co-existence of different, and often competing, forms of life.[2] If, however, these visions are converted into *paternalist normativism* (in the monist case) or *autonomist subjectivism* (in the pluralist case), then they are deeply problematic: the former is expressed in the temptation to 'dictate' to ordinary actors 'from above', notably from the detached standpoint of the high moral ground taken by proselytizing philosophers; the latter is articulated in the liberal idea of self-determination and the alleged primacy of the pursuit of individual freedom.

And yet, the normative constitution of forms of life is vital to the critical study of social arrangements. Conflicts and controversies over their constitution – and, by implication, their quality, legitimacy, and defensibility – reveal the value-laden nature of social constellations. Criticisms of specific forms of life, therefore, are not reducible to '"icing on the cake" questions of the good life'.[3] Rather, they are concerned with 'the internal constitution'[4] of the elements, including 'institutions and supraindividual connections',[5] shaping people's lives and their capacity for action. Viewed in this light, the critical engagement with forms of life cannot be dissociated from the question of their relative capacity to contribute to, or to obstruct, mechanisms of social *domination* and processes of human *emancipation*:

> Criticism of forms of life – or better: a *critical theory of criticism of forms of life* – [. . .] is not intended as advocacy of a relapse into premodern paternalism, but instead as an exploration of the conditions of what can be conceived in the tradition of critical theory as a ferment of individual and collective *emancipation processes*.[6]

While such an approach rejects any kind of 'moral dictatorship'[7] founded on ideological dogmatism, it is committed to exploring the value of particular forms of life in terms of their capacity *either* to promote *or* to hinder individual and/or collective processes of human flourishing and self-realization. Ironically, the problem with which we are confronted is not that we, as actors capable of making decisions, can express our personal preferences in relation to different forms of life on offer; rather, 'our problem is that *we don't know of even one optimal way of life*'.[8] One need not be a Popperian sceptic to be critical of monistic versions of utopian thinking, which give the misleading impression that there may be one particular mode of social existence endorsed, or at least worthy of being endorsed, by everyone. The desirability of forms of life – irrespective of whether they exist as thought experiments or as empirical realities – is always open to contention.

Crucially, however, they are 'not only the *object* but also the *result* of disputes'[9] – that is, they are shaped by the controversies through which their constitution is being scrutinized.

Jaeggi's inquiry 'starts from the assumption not only that we *can* criticize forms of life but also that we *should* criticize them (and thus ourselves in the conduct of our lives) and that we also *always already do this*, implicitly or explicitly'.[10] In other words, criticizability is not only a noticeable *feature* of forms of life but also a *sine qua non* of their fruitful development. Their criticizability reflects their 'specific *rationality*',[11] posing the question of the extent to which the validity and legitimacy of their main components are justifiable on the basis of compelling reasons. In this sense, 'the question of the *possibility* of criticism of forms of life'[12] is as central as the question of their *possibility*. We cannot have one without the other.

The potential or actual success [*Gelingen*] of forms of life, while confirming their functional viability [*Funktionsfähigkeit*], illustrates their capacity to contribute to human flourishing.[13] Criticism, understood in these terms, is not simply an instrumental, strategic, or procedural affair; rather, it is a profoundly normative, evaluative, and value-laden activity. Insofar as human emancipation constitutes an idea (and ideal) worth pursuing, the consolidation of a particular form of life should be understood not as *a means to an end* but, rather, as *an end in itself*. The moment human emancipation is converted into a means to an end outside itself, it is degraded to a meaningless dead end.

Just as forms of life can be successful in a positive (but not positivistic) sense, they can fail 'in a negativistic sense'.[14] If we conceive of forms of life as 'ensembles of social practices'[15] and if, moreover, we recognize that they can be examined and judged in an immanent fashion (and, hence, 'from within'), then the criteria of evaluation by means of which we assess their worth and defensibility 'take their orientation from the normative conditions of the success of these practices'.[16] When actors experience 'problems, crises, or conflicts'[17] in their lives, 'criticism and self-criticism'[18] need to be intertwined to avoid any kind of externalist, paternalistic, authoritarian, or 'ethically abstinent'[19] reading of the situation. On this account, forms of life can be regarded as 'historically developing *learning processes* endowed with normative claims to validity that is the key to their evaluation'.[20] Let us consider some implications of this view in the following sections.

1.2. Forms of life: between instrumental rationality and value rationality

Forms of life may be conceived of as 'orders of human co-existence'.[21] As an 'ensemble of practices and orientations',[22] every form of life manifests itself in a particular – intersubjectively constructed – modus operandi. Forms of life play a foundational role in our species-constitutive ontology: 'the *cultural and social reproduction of human life*'[23] would be impossible without them. Despite their quasi-transcendental status within the universe of human existence, it would be erroneous to talk about forms of life in the singular. There is no such thing as *the* form of life, as perspectives inspired by ethical naturalism may suggest.[24] In the spirit of the later Wittgenstein, there is no hiding away from the fact that the condition of humanity has always been, and will always remain, dependent on context-specific constructions of forms of life. Forms of life are, at once, *universal* (in the sense that they are an integral part of the human condition) and *particular* (in the sense that they are empirically diversified).

Modernity is marked not only by the commodification *of* forms of life but also, in a more fundamental sense, by commodification *as* a form of life. In ethical terms, forms of life may be characterized as 'good' or 'bad', 'just' or 'unjust', and 'defensible' or 'indefensible'. In economic terms, however, the key question is whether they are 'functional' or 'dysfunctional', 'efficient' or 'inefficient', and 'wealth-creating' or 'wealth-destroying'. Viewed through the lens of critical theory, every conception of forms of life is value-laden. Marxist analysis has drawn attention to 'the *inappropriateness* of applying economic criteria to certain areas of social life'.[25] These are irreducible to the narrow systemic logic of profit-maximization, according to which, in principle, every element of existence can be treated as 'an object of huckstering'.[26]

Modern forms of life contain and express the fundamental tension between *instrumental rationality* and *value rationality* – that is, between the reality of a world governed by *systemic* (including economic, administrative, and utilitarian) imperatives and the possibility of a world guided by *substantive* (including normative, moral, and ethical) principles. The answer to the question of the extent to which different aspects of forms of life can or should (or cannot or should not) be commodified through the power of marketization[27] depends, to a significant degree, on one's 'order of appreciation [*Wertschätzungsordnung*]'[28] and, by implication, on one's order of perception, interpretation, and evaluation.

Criticism of forms of life as the focus of critical theory has substantial consequences: 'it not only examines *different things*, it also examines *things differently*'.[29] It concerns not only individual actions as such but also, crucially, 'the *frame of reference*'[30] within which these take place and acquire, or fail to acquire, meaning. Thus, the challenge of criticizing forms of life requires addressing both 'practical-evaluative questions'[31] concerning the '*right action*'[32] and the defensibility of intersubjectively shared 'patterns of interpretation'[33] underlying 'the *correct conception of the world*'.[34] Given its emphasis not only on the agential and structural but also on the representational and ideological dimensions of human existence, the critique of forms of life comprises 'a denaturalizing effect',[35] thereby calling the apparent self-evidence of their legitimacy into question.

The construction of forms of life, then, poses *ethical questions*, including the question of whether or not it is possible to establish 'objectively justifiable principles governing how to conduct one's life'.[36] If such an ethical judgement is converted into 'a moral dictatorship',[37] however, then the normative potential inherent in all forms of life is suppressed in an overtly or covertly authoritarian, rather than authoritative,[38] fashion. Irrespective of whether ethical concerns are generated 'behind the backs of individuals'[39] or 'freely chosen'[40] and articulated by them (or based on a combination of unconscious and conscious processes), they constitute an integral part of forms of life. If a form of life portrays itself as 'a kind of "meta-paradigm"',[41] then it may conceal the degree to which it is embedded in a socio-culturally specific 'horizon of understanding and value',[42] upon which its actors draw when engaging with the world.

> [. . .] forms of life are complex bundles (or ensembles) of social practices geared to solving problems that for their part are historically contextualized and normatively constituted.[43]

Their problem-solving orientation is not only spatiotemporally contingent and value-laden, but also reflected in different degrees of success [*Gelingen*], which can be measured in both formal and substantive terms – that is, both in terms of *functioning*, from the

point of view of instrumental rationality [*Zweckrationalität*], and in terms of *normative worth*, from the point of view of value rationality [*Wertrationalität*]. The evolution of forms of life hinges upon both functional and ethical learning processes and, hence, upon both individual and collective developments that are guided not only by *Verstand* but also by *Vernunft* and *Urteilskraft*.[44]

1.3. Forms of life: between concepts and phenomena

The concept of a form of life can be employed to refer to a wide range of phenomena, all of which, in one way or another, are related to modes of existence, notably those constructed by human beings. In German intellectual thought, the terms *Lebensform* (in the singular) and *Lebensformen* (in the plural) gained traction from the 1920s onwards, following the publication of Eduard Spranger's book *Lebensformen*.[45] Spranger's explanatory framework identifies four main types of form of life: 'economic', 'aesthetic', 'theoretical', and 'religious'. In a characterological sense, these correspond to 'ideal types of individuality', conforming to particular ways of relating to and engaging with both one's internal world and one's external world.[46]

Unsurprisingly, there are some semantic overlaps between the concept of a form of life and contiguous concepts.[47]

1.

The concept of *conduct of life [Lebensführung]* denotes a person's capacity to live her life in accordance with a set of assumptions, principles, and convictions and to accomplish this in a more or less systematic fashion. It highlights the role of the *individual* – including his or her capacity to make decisions in line with his or her personal beliefs and persuasions, reflecting a significant degree of *responsibility* and *agency*. The concept of a *form of life*, by contrast, stresses the role of the *collective* – including its capacity to shape social practices in line with the implicitly accepted background values, norms, and conventions shared by members of a particular community, whose actions are subject to the influence of *determinacy* and *structurality*. In the former, individuals play a remarkably *active* role, since 'leading one's life is something that one *does*'[48] in an agential and purposive manner. In the latter, individuals play a largely *passive* role, since they are socialized into a form of life, which constitutes the socio-ontological framework of their being-in-the-world [*Dasein*] and, thus, illustrates their thrownness into a reality that, as a stage of spatiotemporally contingent practices and structures, is always already there – that is, *prior* to their personal existence.

2.

The concept of *habits of life [Lebensgewohnheiten]* is remarkably similar to that of *forms of life*. It is associated with 'regularity, stability, and self-evidence',[49] stressing both the habitualized and the habitualizing aspects of social existence. Unlike individual habits, however, forms of life – especially if they are performed as 'isolated practices'[50] in relatively confined settings – are characterized by 'clusters, or even a coherent ensemble, of practices'.[51] In this sense, forms of life tend to have a more solidified and collective nature than habits. In some cases, the latter may be more short-lived and individual(ized) than the former. In addition, forms of life are marked by profoundly normative traits, which, since they are realized through social practices, go beyond the limited horizon of individual actions.

3.

The concept of *ways of life [Lebensweisen]* also significantly overlaps with that of *forms of life*. Similar to habits of life, ways of life are more contextual, situational, and personal – and, hence, less comprehensive – than forms of life. If an individual changes his or her personal habits and, consequently, his or her way of life, this does not necessarily mean that he or she also enters a fundamentally new form of life.[52] In fact, most individuals, when changing their way of life, continue to be part of the same form of life.

4.

The concept of *lifestyle [Lebensstil]* designates 'a conglomerate of different matching practices and habits'.[53] Unlike forms of life, however, lifestyles are characterized by high degrees of transience, evanescence, and contingency. This is why, in many cases, they are part of fashions and trends, which, by definition, come and go. Granted, lifestyles develop within – and cannot be dissociated from – 'the regularly recurring general context of a person's modes of behaviour, interactions, opinions, stores of knowledge, and evaluative attitudes'.[54] The normative expectations that are created to sustain and to co-ordinate interactions taking place within specific forms of life, however, do not exert the same amount of regulative power within the economy of lifestyles. Owing to their adjustable nature, lifestyles fit the cultural logic of individualization and the economic logic of commodification, making them an essential ingredient of market-driven systems.

5.

The concepts of *custom [Sitte], usage [Brauch]*, and *tradition [Tradition]* are essential to understanding the construction of forms of life. *Customs* are established rules obeyed more or less voluntarily by actors engaging in processes of 'long habituation'.[55] Given their regulative function, customs have a strong normative component, stipulating 'how things are done' and, crucially, 'how they are not done'. *Usages* influence the ways in which customs are produced by individuals, and passed on from generation to generation, by virtue of ritualized actions, thereby contributing to the cultural idiosyncrasies of particular forms of life. *Traditions* hinge on customs and usages, allowing for the emergence of relatively predictable and stable patterns of behaviour. Traditions add a profoundly 'historical dimension'[56] to forms of life.[57] Strictly speaking, a tradition can be considered 'a long-standing form of life that derives its validity and dignity from this time-honoured quality'.[58] There are no forms of life without the production and reproduction of traditions.

6.

The concept of *institution [Institution]* cannot be ignored when examining the term 'form of life'. Institutions are relatively solidified forms of action and interaction, which make social life more or less stable and predictable.[59] Within institutions, social practices tend to be firmly established and codified.[60] Within forms of life, by contrast, social practices 'appear to be "softer" and more informal',[61] leaving more room for flexibility and adjustability, depending on the circumstances in which those who perform them find themselves. Within institutional settings, practices tend to be arranged in a clear and unambiguous manner, especially if they are formally regulated and legally constituted. Within forms of life, on the other hand, practices are 'not founded or established'[62]; in fact, they may – in Simmelian terms – be realized as part of 'the unstable "flow of life"'.[63] Forms of life provide the background to, as well as the conditions of possibility for, the consolidation of social institutions. At the same time, social institutions are 'constituent

parts of forms of life and even facilitate or stabilize them'.[64] Regardless of whether institutions emerge suddenly or evolve over time, develop in an accidental or deliberate manner, and exert their power at a micro- or macro-level, they play a pivotal role in the construction of forms of life.[65]

7.

There are substantial overlaps between the concept of *culture [Kultur]* and the concept of a *form of life*. In fact, it is not uncommon to explain the former in terms of the latter, and vice versa. On this view, culture may be defined as a 'form of life of nations, peoples, communities [*Lebensgestalt und -form von Nationen, Völkern, Gemeinschaften*]'.[66] In this sense, it can be understood as 'the *whole way of life* of a people'[67] – that is, as their mode of *Dasein*, which encompasses *every* aspect of their existence. Insofar as it includes all constitutive (notably epistemic, representational, intellectual, artistic, moral, judicial, and customary) dimensions of human societies,[68] 'culture' is the species-distinctive foundation that raises humans above 'nature'.[69] Culture, however, comprises not only *symbolic* but also *material* components – including technologies, tools, and artifacts, all of which are embedded in, and in turn shape, specific forms of life.[70] Arguably, the meaning of the term 'culture' is 'notoriously obscure'.[71] Given its multiple uses by different commentators in diverging social and/or disciplinary contexts, its meaning may become increasingly ambiguous. Monolithic approaches may associate the concept of culture with 'the idea of a comprehensive and self-contained totality',[72] as if each society were reducible to a single, uniform, and homogenous way of being.[73] The concept of a form of life, therefore, may be 'preferable as a de-essentialized and a de-substantialized alternative to the concept of culture',[74] especially if one seeks to account for the hybrid, multifaceted, and polycentric constitution of highly differentiated societies.[75]

1.4. Forms of life: between characteristics and criteria

In light of the preceding reflections, it becomes possible to conceive of forms of life not only as 'ensembles of practices and orientations'[76] but also as 'systems of social behaviour'.[77] This interpretation has the following implications[78]:

1. Far from being reducible to conglomerates of individuals or isolated actions, forms of life are *clusters of practices*, which – on different levels and in different ways – are interconnected and interrelated.
2. Forms of life are *collective formations* and, in this sense, 'orders of human coexistence'.[79] It is not possible for an individual to possess, let alone to bring about, a form of life in a self-sufficient and self-referential manner. Forms of life rest on the establishment of intersubjective relations and, hence, epitomize the ontological centrality of human interdependence.
3. Forms of life are realms of *habitual patterns*. Tautologically speaking, they are based on both habitualized and habitualizing habits, structured and structuring structures, constructed and constructing constructions. Just as they are habitualized, structured, and constructed by their participants, their participants habitualize, structure, and construct them.

4. Forms of life are *orders of social co-operation*, whose relative stability and reproducibility hinge on the codified regulation of human behaviour. There is no social order without the possibility of social disorder. Otherwise, there would be no need to distinguish the former from the latter. Given their regulative function, forms of life are marked by 'a certain *normative pressure of expectation*'.[80]

There are at least three principal criteria for establishing the presence of forms of life[81]:

1. The criterion of *permanence* or *stability* is relevant in the sense that a socio-historical formation needs to display a certain degree of constancy and solidity to allow for the existence of a form of life. To be clear, forms of life exhibit significant levels of malleability and adjustability, implying that they are in a constant state of flux. At the same time, however, they are inconceivable without a minimal degree of durability, which converts them into structural frameworks of more or less solidified sociality.
2. The criterion of *depth* is relevant in the sense that a socio-historical formation needs to exhibit existential weight in order to qualify as a form of life. Given its socio-ontological significance, it is irreducible to a set of individual actions or an ephemeral expression of communal life. Instead, a form of life can be considered *foundational* in that it represents a precondition for the emergence of societal structures and practices.
3. The criteria of *scope* and *self-sufficiency* are relevant in the sense that a socio-historical formation needs (a) to be situated in space and time in a more or less extensive fashion and (b) to possess a certain degree of autonomy – and, by implication, distinctiveness – in relation to other configurations. Based on 'clusters of interconnected and interrelated practices'[82] and structures, forms of life are spatiotemporally situated *and* situating: they organize their participants' immersion in space and time. Actors attribute meaning to this experience through the culturally specific lens provided by the patterns of behavioural, ideological, and institutional functioning of their forms of life.

It is possible to analyse the concept of forms of life in terms of several key relationships, such as the following: (1) the relationship between *whole* and *parts*[83]; (2) the relationship between *substantial* and *accidental* features[84]; (3) the relationship between different factors that *condition* each other and *interact* with each other,[85] while 'the parts [. . .] retain their distinctive identities relative to the whole'[86]; and (4) the relationship between *different kinds of forms of life*,[87] illustrating their variability across spatiotemporally contingent contexts.

1.5. Forms of life: between actions and practices

Given that *(social) practices* are the backbone of *forms of life*, it is not possible to understand the constitution of the latter without grasping the key aspects of the former. All practices share a number of features[88]:

1. Practices usually entail 'a *sequence of several actions*'.[89] These may come in different forms: verbal or nonverbal, public or private, overt or concealed, formal or informal, co-operative or competitive, disinterested or strategic, conscious or unconscious – to mention only a few.
2. Practices tend to be performed '*repeatedly* and *habitually*'.[90] Since they comprise a sequence of actions, practices manifest themselves in behavioural *patterns*. Practices hinge on the frequent repetition of particular types of action. A practice, then, is *not* a single or one-off action; it is not tantamount to an action that takes place only once. By and large, practices depend on action sequences, which are embedded in 'quasi-automatized',[91] habitualized, and naturalized performative schemes. Practices rely primarily on implicit, intuitive, unconscious, embodied, and practical (rather than explicit, reflective, conscious, abstract, and theoretical) knowledge. In short, practices are based on the know-how, rather than the know-that or know-why, of those who realize them.
3. Practices are *socially constructed*. Just as they can be constructed, they can be deconstructed and reconstructed by those who perform them. Practices cannot be dissociated from the socially configured settings in which they take place, including the context-specific meanings ascribed to them by those directly or indirectly involved in them. Strictly speaking, the concept of social practice is pleonastic, since *all* practices are, by definition, social. There is no such thing as a non-social practice. Even practices that appear, or purport to be, anti-social or asocial *are* social, because they are embedded in networks of social relations.
4. Practices are *rule-governed*. They do not only display observable regularities and patterns, but, furthermore, they comprise 'sequences of actions governed by rules and regulations'.[92] In this sense, a social practice may be defined as 'any form of activity specified by a system of rules [. . .] which gives the activity its structure'.[93] Part of this structure is the normative constitution of practice, which is expressed in the 'internal distinction between right and wrong action[s]'[94] and, hence, between legitimate and illegitimate, justifiable and unjustifiable, praiseworthy and blameworthy forms of engaging with and intervening in the world. Crucially, however, the 'operative criteria'[95] by which the legitimacy or worth of an action may be judged are '*internal to practice*'.[96] Thus, acting rightly or wrongly concerns not only the defensibility of the action itself but also, more fundamentally, the normative structure of the set of practices – and, ultimately, of the form of life – in which it is embedded. Put differently, rule violations (and rule confirmations) undermine (or reinforce) 'the point of the practice itself',[97] rather than just of the individual actions by which it is sustained. Practices unfold in relation to *internal* criteria, which are both ontologically and epistemically different from *external* criteria – that is, from the criteria by which the legitimacy or worth of an action (or practice) may be judged from the point of view of an (outside) observer.
5. Practices are – at least potentially – *enabling*. They are – at least in principle – empowering to those who perform them. In this sense, they provide human subjects with a sense of agency. To be sure, there is no agency without structure. Every practice is embedded in and builds upon sets of underlying structures, without which they could not be carried out in the first place. The question of whether *agency* emanates from, or indeed inhabits, *structurality* or, rather,

structurality stems from, or is inherent in, *agency* is tautological to the extent that one cannot exist without the other. Irrespective of whether or not one wishes to draw a distinction between *regulative rules* and *constitutive rules*,[98] it is hard to overlook that practices serve a double function: (a) to regulate actions by generating patterns of behaviour (*regulative rules*) and (b) to produce new forms of conduct, giving rise to specific performative configurations, which are supported by corresponding social roles and expectations, as well as positive and negative sanctions (*constitutive rules*).[99]

6. Practices shape *purposes* and, in turn, are shaped by these purposes.[100] Purposes are not a peripheral or accidental element of practices; rather, the former belong to the latter's ontological core. Practices 'are what they are because of the purposes that they pursue or are pursued with them'.[101] Their teleological structure is not only built into practices, but it also defines their very sense of direction, illustrating that our immersion in the world is conceivable only as an existential *aboutness* and *towardness*. Practices are 'internally *structured* by their purposes'[102] – that is, in Heideggerian terms, by 'practical connections of *in-order-tos*'.[103] In this regard, however, it is important to draw attention to three caveats:
    a. While all practices are 'constituted, structured, and individuated by purposes',[104] it is possible for an action, or a sequence of actions, to serve multiple purposes *at the same time*. Just as an action or practice can be situated *simultaneously* in multiple fields (for instance, cultural, political, and/or economic), it can be driven *simultaneously* by multiple – conscious or unconscious – motivations (for instance, instrumental, reputational, rational, emotional, and/or sexual). The polycentric motivational constitution of human actions can be explained, but – owing to its subjacent complexity – never fully captured, by the systematizing power of ideal types.

    b. While all practices have purposes, this does *not* mean that 'they must be based on intentions that are fully known'.[105] In fact, purposes can be – and, arguably, tend to be – implicit, latent, and unconscious.[106] From a structuralist perspective, purposes not only exceed personal intentions but also operate 'behind people's backs'. On this view, intentions are not primarily *subjective* (that is, derived from an individual's capacity to make autonomous decisions) but, rather, *normative* (that is, shaped by social structures) and/or *objective* (that is, conditioned by physical – including biological, chemical, and neurological – structures).

    c. It is far from obvious whether the purposes behind practices may be classified as *objective, normative*, and/or *subjective* (or as a combination of these). Moreover, it is open to debate whether purposes may be categorized as 'context-dependent' or 'context-transcending', 'ascribed' or 'achieved', 'determined' or 'chosen', 'structural' or 'agential', 'implicit' or 'explicit', 'deliberate' or 'accidental', 'practical' or 'theoretical', 'empirical' or 'conceptual', 'unconscious' or 'conscious', 'societal' or 'individual', 'constructive' or 'destructive', 'empowering' or 'disempowering', 'good' or 'bad'. In short, a critical theory of society may require both a typology of practices and a typology of purposes.[107]

7. Practices have an *active-passive* character.[108] Put differently, while practices *generate* activities, the former have always already been *generated* by the latter. Practices are both structured and structuring: they are structured by antecedent activities, and they structure impending activities. In a philosophical sense, they 'transcend the subject-object relation'[109]: practices may be characterized as 'subject-independent patterns of action that are still not entirely transsubjective',[110] to the extent that they are built on structural constellations of objectivity and normativity, whose multilayered constitution escapes the consciousness – and intentionality – of pure subjectivity. Practices 'arise [. . .] *through* subjects and yet exist *prior* to them (and their intentions)'[111]; they exist *before, during*, and *after* – and, by implication, *in anticipation, by means*, and *as a result* of – human actions. Strictly speaking, every yet-to-be-realized practice is partly always already there.

1.6. Forms of life: between interpretations and functions

Forms of life can be regarded as both *interpretive* and *functional* contexts.[112] In terms of the former, participation in a form of life involves not only engaging collectively in a set of practices but also 'sharing the interpretations – but above all the *schemata* of interpretation – for these practices'.[113] In terms of the latter, every form of life hinges on functionally interconnected components, allowing for the emergence of more or less solidified forms of sociality, which are based on collectively habitualized actions and, thus, on practices.

The construction of a form of life is inconceivable without the presence of a 'practical-hermeneutic circle'[114]:

> [. . .] *practices* that feature in the nexus of a form of life or constitute it are interpreted in the light of an anticipatory reference to *the (imagined) whole* of a form of life. Conversely, the latter is constituted and progressively concretized by the interrelated practices in question.[115]

The reciprocal relationship between the whole and its parts, which is a central hermeneutic concern,[116] is not a *vicious* but a *virtuous* circle[117]: 'the parts are reciprocally enriched, differentiated, and determined by the whole and the whole in turn by the parts'.[118] Owing to 'the surplus of the practice[s]'[119] performed by the moving parts, the architecture of the structural whole can, and indeed must, be constantly readjusted through experiential and interpretive processes of trial and error. The ultimate *épreuve* of practice is the practice of *épreuve* itself.[120] The history of all hitherto existing forms of life is the history of both tested and testing practices.

1.7. Forms of life: between norms and normativity

Every form of life rests on the intersubjective exchange of normative codes, reflected in the production, reproduction, and potential transformation of social norms. In essence, a social norm is 'a rule for behaviour, or a definite pattern of behaviour'.[121] A social norm, if it is upheld, has the power to operate as an 'institution whose intention is to structure and to regulate social life'.[122] Just as the existence of social norms is a precondition for the

functioning of human practices, it is a requirement for the emergence of social order. *Norms* have several key features:

1. Norms stipulate a *standard*, or a set of standards, which actors – situated in a given context – *can, should*, or *must* meet. Norms generate role-specific expectations.
2. Norms exist within and through networks of *normativity*. Norms are prescriptive – that is, they stipulate what *ought to* be done. This regulative function manifests itself in the diverging 'directions of fit'[123] of *descriptive* statements and *normative* statements: the former seek or claim 'to fit *the world*',[124] in a representationalist fashion; the latter 'want the world to fit *them*',[125] in a normativist fashion. Whereas descriptive statements are meant to *represent* the world, their normative counterparts are intended to *shape* it.
3. Norm-conforming behaviour is not simply *regular* but, rather, *rule-guided*, if not *rule-governed*.[126] Granted, the successful implementation of norms presupposes a minimal level of regularity. Regularity per se, however, is not tantamount to a norm, especially if it does *not* 'prescribe any standards for actions that could [. . .] remain unfulfilled'.[127] Rule-guided or rule-governed actions emerge only when a specific kind of regular behaviour is *normatively required*, implying that an expectation, or set of expectations, *can* be violated.
4. Norms are *man-made formations*.[128] They are constructed by humans while, at the same time, constructing them (and their practices). Just as they are constructed, they can be deconstructed and reconstructed. The normative pressure exerted by norms is 'artificial'[129] in that it is created by humans, rather than being determined by natural laws, such as the force of gravity. If actors were 'naturally' forced, or even determined, to act in a particular way, then the creation of norms would be redundant.
5. In the human world, the 'space of norms' is always also 'a *space of reasons*'.[130] Although the reasons behind a norm, or a set of norms, may not always be transparent or convincing, it is possible – at least in principle – to demand these be clarified and, hence, a justification be provided. If, for instance, a norm is justified on the basis of the assumption that it simply reflects a specific tradition ('this is how it has always been done'), then this may be legitimately rejected as a dogmatic, and thus hardly persuasive, line of reasoning. Good norms, in other words, are those that can be justified by virtue of compelling reasons.

In light of the above, forms of life may be regarded as *normative formations*.[131] They are 'normative ensembles'[132] in the sense that 'participating in them involves the expectation that one should participate in the constituent practices in appropriate ways and share the interpretive framework laid down with this expectation'.[133] Different forms of life will display different degrees of flexibility, in terms of the extent to which patterns of action and interpretation can deviate from dominant modes of normativity. Norms are, and will always remain, of major socio-ontological significance: they are essential not only to the production and reproduction of forms of life, but also to their potential or actual transformation. Social existence is inconceivable without the implicit or explicit negotiation of intersubjectively shared rules, standards, and conventions. Unlike in social settings or fields in which 'the rules of the game' are clearly defined, however, in forms of

life they may not only be fairly elastic, if not ambiguous, but, moreover, 'neither the author nor the addressee of a norm can be easily identified'.[134] In this sense, forms of life run counter to the intentionalist notion that a particular individual, or group of individuals, can be singled out when seeking to uncover the genealogy of a norm, since – in most cases – it is the result of complex processes of intersecting, competing, and conflicting practices.

Jaeggi distinguishes three principal ways in which norms can be justified.[135]

1. *Conventionalist* justifications of norms make reference to the fact that members of a social group have cultivated a particular norm (or set of norms), thereby establishing a convention (or set of conventions).
2. *Functionalist* justifications of norms derive the validity of norms from their capacity to establish and to maintain a particular practice (or set of practices).
3. *Ethical* justifications of norms defend the legitimacy of norms in terms of the goodness of the practices with which they are associated.

While rejecting the conventionalist model, Jaeggi aims to demonstrate that ethical and functional(ist) justifications are intertwined and serve as a solid foundation for a critical theory of forms of life. On this view, norms prevalent in an ethical life can be understood as '*ethical-functional norms*'[136] that make processes of individual and collective self-realization, articulated in emancipatory practices, possible in the first place. They are *ethical* in the sense that they are oriented towards the possibility of 'the *good* life', and *functional*, in the sense that they allow for the *success* of practices and, by implication, of the form of life in which they are embedded.[137]

In summary, normativity is at work in forms of life on three levels.[138] (1) The normativity of ethical life is based on *internal* norms. Relevant to the viability of a form of life are its internal standards, rather than those that may be prevalent externally. (2) Normativity, even when understood in philosophical terms, has no currency without its *actualization* [*Verwirklichung*] in everyday reality. Every reality [*Wirklichkeit*], however, is irreducible to an empirical arena of truths and facts. It represents a horizon of possibilities, endowed with 'a *surplus* that goes beyond the actual practice'.[139] (3) Normativity is *integral* to any form of life. The norms through which it expresses itself have a *tangible* impact on 'the practices that constitute the forms of life into what they are'.[140] The ontology of a form of life rests upon the normativity of the practices that create and shape it.

1.8. Forms of criticism: internal, external, and immanent

Jaeggi distinguishes three main forms of criticism: (1) *internal criticism*, (2) *external criticism*, and (3) *immanent criticism*.[141] For her critical theory of forms of life, she favours the third option:

> Immanent criticism [...] takes as its starting point the claims and conditions posited together with a form of life; it responds to the problems and crises that arise in this context, and it derives from this in particular the transformative potential that goes beyond the practices in question and seeks to transform them.[142]

Indeed, she goes a step further by asserting that immanent criticism is the only approach capable of solving 'the problem of establishing a critical standard in a certain way'.[143] Such a strategy avoids falling into the traps of *internalism* and *contextualism*, on the one hand, and *externalism* and *transcendentalism*, on the other. In the former, critique is degraded to 'a matter of self-clarification within a framework'[144] whose validity and legitimacy cannot be called into question. In the latter, critique is (mis)guided by external standards that fail to 'measure up to the task of criticizing forms of life as forms of life'.[145] The former are caught in the comfort zone of *Lebensformimmanenz*. The latter promote a seductive, but ultimately paternalistic and self-serving, version of purported *Lebensformtranszendenz*.

For Jaeggi, effective criticism of forms of life can remain *neither* purely internal (as if one could simply *stay within* the boundaries of a native language game) *nor* purely external (as if one could simply *invent* the parameters of a meta-language game). Both the *contextualist* project of an immersed perspective ('from within') and the *transcendentalist* pursuit of a detached or neutral Archimedean point ('from outside') cannot produce compelling modes of criticism that are able to 'find the new world through criticism of the old one'.[146] By contrast, the persuasive power of immanent criticism is twofold. It succeeds in generating its standards 'out of the thing (criticized) itself'[147]; this is what makes it *immanent*. At the same time, it succeeds in avoiding the relativist traps of particularism and contextualism, since it is 'strong enough to be able to criticize forms of life *as* forms of life'[148] and to accomplish this in a *transformative* manner[149]; this is what makes it *critical*.

In short, immanent criticism obtains its normative 'standards based on the very situation it criticizes'[150] and, in doing so, acquires 'its orientation from the crises to which social practices and ideals can succumb'.[151] Far from simply confirming or restoring the dominant ideas, ideals, and principles of a given order by naïvely subscribing to their (implicit or explicit) normative foundations, it provides 'the critical ferment of the self-transformation of a form of life'[152] and, thus, contributes to the possibility of human emancipation.[153]

Immanent criticism, then, 'criticizes its object based on standards that are already contained in this object itself'.[154] In the history of intellectual thought, immanent criticism – in terms of its epistemological, methodological, and theoretical ramifications – has been particularly important in Hegelian and Marxist approaches as well as in critical theory and psychoanalysis.[155] In addition to rejecting the pretence of epistemic neutrality, immanent criticism involves a high degree of 'self-clarification and self-criticism'[156] and, hence, of reflexivity.[157] In accordance with this 'double hermeneutic'[158] spirit, critical interpretation requires self-interpretation. Just as 'it is essential to educate the educator himself',[159] it is essential to reflect upon the reflecting subject: the criticizing moment forms as much part of society as the moment criticized.[160] In this respect, four considerations are crucial:

1. Immanent criticism is *objective* – not in the sense that it claims to be true or irrefutable, but, rather, in the sense that it 'does not merely proceed from the critic's subjective critical intention'.[161] Such an anti-subjectivist mode of criticism entails 'a

critical re-enactment of the tensions, moments of crisis, or deficits on the side of the objects'[162] – that is, of the structural conflicts and contradictions that are part of the social reality at which it is directed.

2. Within immanent criticism, one's analysis is not reducible to an instrumental, let alone detached, precondition for reflection. Rather, one's analysis forms an integral 'part of the critical process itself'.[163] Analysis and criticism are deeply intertwined: *qua analysis* criticism and *qua criticism* analysis presuppose, rather than exclude, each other.[164]
3. Immanent criticism is not only a *destructive* and *negative* but also a *productive* and *affirmative* undertaking. In this sense, it epitomizes the Hegelian process of *Aufhebung*: the synthesis that results from the conflict between thesis and antithesis emerges in the lap of the hitherto-been [*im Schoße des Bisherdagewesenen*] and points at the horizon of the always-still-and-always-again-becoming [*Horizont des Immer-noch-und-immer-wieder-Werdenden*].[165] Through a constant unravelling of tensions and contradictions, 'the new arises as a transformation of the old',[166] with the latter being incorporated into the former. As expressed in Adorno's negative dialectics, '[t]he false, once determinately known and precisely expressed, is already an index of what is right and better'.[167] In other words, the still-to-be-constructed is always already part of the soon-to-be-negated.
4. Immanent criticism is 'performed *in the process of being carried out [im Vollzug]*'[168] – that is, tautologically speaking, it is *vollzogen im Vollzug*. By definition, it is not a formulaic or dogmatic affair, but, rather, a processual and evolving challenge. It does not rely on 'a rigid, unchanging yardstick',[169] situated outside the constraints imposed by the social conditions of possibility. Rather, the yardstick of criticism is itself dynamic and open to change, meaning that 'it transforms itself in the exercise of criticism'.[170] The secret of immanent criticism is that it is never immune to internal or external criticism. 'It has to justify itself in the process of criticism itself.'[171] Immanent criticism, then, is 'a self-grounding process',[172] which – strictly speaking – is never-ending. From its perspective, the pursuit of ultimate evaluative standards is in vain. If there are any standards for immanent criticism, these – in accordance with its fallibilist spirit – have to be accepted, questioned, or rejected over and over again.

1.9. The case for immanent criticism

Jaeggi identifies seven key features of immanent criticism:

1. Immanent criticism insists upon *the normativity of the actual [des Wirklichen]*.[173] It not only recognizes that norms are 'inherent in an existing (social) situation'[174] but also builds its own case upon these norms, while – paradoxically – both presupposing and questioning their validity and legitimacy. It acknowledges the fact that '*social reality is always normatively constituted*'.[175] More specifically, it grapples with 'the *implicit normativity of social practices*',[176] highlighting the intersections between behavioural, ideological, and institutional modes of functioning. On this account, normativity permeates, and is permeated by, what actors *believe* as well as by what they *do*. Both their interpretations and their actions manifest themselves in

the construction of institutions and, hence, in relatively solidified forms of social being.[177] Committed to uncovering the intertwinement of factuality and normativity in all forms of sociality, immanent criticism faces up to both the normative force of the factual and the factual force of the normative.[178]

2. Immanent criticism stresses *the (functional-)constitutive character of norms*.[179] On this reading, norms are irreducible to a peripheral, let alone dispensable, element of social reality. Rather, they correspond to or even '*constitute* (social) reality'.[180] Owing to their socio-ontological significance, norms are 'systematically necessary'[181] for the unfolding of practices – including the individual and collective performances, beliefs, and institutions by which their patterned constitution is sustained.
3. Immanent criticism draws attention to *the inverted effectiveness of norms*.[182] It does not maintain that the relationship between norms and reality in the situation under scrutiny has been undermined or dislodged. Rather, it contends that this relationship is 'inverted or *wrong in itself*'.[183] On this view, norms can be, or indeed are, *effective*, but they are nevertheless '*contradictory* and *deficient*',[184] since they are marked by the structural conflicts, frictions, and antagonisms of the society of which they are part and in whose service they operate. In this sense, immanent criticism goes beyond an impressionistic account of the multiple contradictions that may (or may not) exist between norms and realities, including the fact that norms fail to be realized in reality. It is, on a profound (or, as one may suggest, noumenal) level, 'directed at the *internal contradictoriness* of reality and its constitutive norms'.[185] Immanent criticism, therefore, 'lies *in* the social practices and institutions'[186] of the formation with whose inner constitution its diagnosis is concerned. In accordance with this uncovering mission, which is as vital to Hegel's phenomenology of spirit[187] and Marx's ideology critique[188] as to Adorno's negative dialectics[189] and Freud's psychoanalytic study of the unconscious,[190] immanent criticism sheds light on the *constitutive* functions of contradictions, notably in terms of their capacity to shape human reality in a simultaneously stabilizing and destabilizing manner.
4. Immanent criticism has a peculiar, and somewhat tenacious, orientation to *crisis*.[191] It 'takes as its starting point the *crisis-proneness* of a particular social arrangement'[192] and, more fundamentally, of *all* forms of life. On this account, contradictoriness is inherent in the interplay between behavioural, ideological, and institutional modes of functioning, revealing the fragility that is built into all socio-historical constellations, including the seemingly most stable ones. While regarding crisis and contradiction as anthropological invariants insofar as they emerge in *all* human societies, immanent criticism interprets their specificities and idiosyncrasies as expressions of – culturally variable – forms of life. It recognizes that 'systematically inherent'[193] crisis tendencies cannot be resolved unless the antagonism by which they are caused is sublated [*aufgehoben*] through the emergence of a historical formation that, in terms of both its functional and its normative components, replaces the previous one.
5. Immanent criticism emphasizes *the parallel contradictoriness of reality and norms*.[194] The transformation that may (or may not) result from immanent criticism concerns social reality, including the norms by which it is sustained. Crucially, immanent criticism measures 'not only reality against the norm, therefore, but also *the norm against reality*'.[195] This means that the relationship between social reality and norms is based on both reciprocity and interdependence: there is no form of life in which it is possible to

have one without the other. From this follows that the contradictions uncovered and problematized by immanent criticism can be resolved 'only through a change that affects both sides'.[196] There is no such thing as a pure, pristine, or unsullied variant of reality or norm. Both sides are always already permeated by internal contradictions, which may be laid bare and exacerbated when social reality and its norms enter into contradiction with one another.

6. Immanent criticism possesses a *transformative* potential.[197] Unlike internal criticism, immanent criticism is not reconstructive but transformative and hence, at least potentially, subversive.[198] On this account, its aim is *not* to 'restore a prior harmony between norm and reality',[199] which no longer exists in the present, but, rather, 'to transform a contradictory and crisis-riven situation into something new'.[200] *Aufhebung* is not an act of adjustment, reform, and restoration, aimed at staying *within* the boundaries of the given; rather, it is a process of subversion, sublation, and transformation, capable of going *beyond* the boundaries of the given. *Die aufhebende Kraft der Aufhebung kann niemals aufgehoben werden, noch nicht einmal durch die Aufhebung selbst*.[201]
7. Immanent criticism constitutes both an *experiential process* and a *learning process*.[202] To be exact, given its dynamic and context-sensitive character, immanent criticism is 'the medium (or better, the catalyst) of an *experiential and learning process* that becomes richer and more differentiated as a result of criticism'.[203] It is not tantamount to a static, abstract, or detached thought experiment; rather, it reflects an empowering, concrete, and embodied process, which is anchored in the practices by means of which the form of life in which they are performed is sustained. Far from pushing for a 'one-sided destruction and supersession of a wrong position'[204] or contradictory historical constellation, it establishes 'a new position through the experience of failure',[205] as epitomized in Hegel's notion of 'determinate negation'.[206] Within the parameters of immanent criticism, the challenge of superseding the previous set of positions and dispositions involves accepting that conflicts 'do not simply disappear as such but remain constitutive for the outcome'.[207] Key elements of the preceding constellation are present in the new formation, which has emerged out of the old one.

Thus, the method of immanent criticism can be synthesized as follows:

> [. . .] starting from necessary (systematic) contradictions, immanent criticism is the *ferment of a transformation process* that overcomes the deficiencies of the situation marked by these contradictions.[208]

On this account, every set of social constellations entails both *transformative immanence* and *immanent transformation*: immanence is transformative, in the sense that it contains the potential for change; transformation is immanent, in the sense that it is part of the yet-to-be-changed. Even if, eventually, a process of transformation exceeds the boundaries of the hitherto-been, the former is prefigured in, and anticipated by, the contradictions of the latter.[209] For the immanent critic, crisis-prone contradictions are not only *necessary* but also *productive*: they are a source of the creative potential released by the transformative force of *Aufhebung*, without which forms of life would remain trapped in the chains of eternal recurrence.

The reconstruction of immanent criticism through a systematic engagement with forms of life, therefore, faces several challenges[210]:

1. *Norms* can be conceived of as 'at once *functional* and *ethical*'.[211] Put differently, norms are 'simultaneously norms of functioning and norms of goodness'.[212] They articulate systemic necessities and are shaped by instrumental rationality [*Zweckrationalität*]. At the same time, they reflect substantive concerns and are motivated by value rationality [*Wertrationalität*]. They are as much a matter of functionality and facticity as of morality and normativity.
2. To the extent that immanent criticism represents a method committed to establishing connections between conflicting forces at work in the social world, it is possible to give this procedure a '*constructivist-performative turn*'.[213] On this reading, both the connections and the contradictions under scrutiny are 'simultaneously given and made'[214]: while they exist as inherent features of the social order in question, they are constructed by both the agential and the structural forces of the historical formation they bring about and, eventually, do away with. In a fallibilist fashion, immanent criticism must resist the search for 'conclusive ultimate reasons'[215] as well as the patronizing temptation to impose interpretive schemata and criteria that can claim to be 'definitive and independent of the actors'.[216] Without their experiences and learning processes, the very thought of human emancipation, not to mention the concern with its social conditions of possibility, would be pointless.
3. Unless it is prepared to be relegated to the history books, immanent criticism must face up to 'the *multiplication of contradictions*'[217] in contemporary forms of life. Just as it has to be committed to 'exposing diverse, multiplying, and partially conflicting contradictions',[218] it needs to reject any kind of reductionist explanatory framework based on a simplistic distinction between 'main contradictions' [*Hauptwidersprüche*] and 'sub- or side-contradictions' [*Nebenwidersprüche*].[219] A comprehensive understanding of power relations requires a critical analysis of its intersectional constitution. The structural power of key sociological variables (such as class, ethnicity, gender, age, and [dis]ability) is reflected in mechanisms of social domination (such as classism, racism, sexism, ageism, and ableism) and, crucially, in struggles for recognition and emancipation (expressed in attempts to subvert the multiple forms of discrimination generated by these '-isms'). To be clear, immanent criticism does not advocate the pursuit of 'a romantic-harmonistic ideal of consistency',[220] which would result in 'overcoming conflicts once and for all',[221] as if the process of *Aufhebung* could be *aufgehoben* forever. Contradictoriness, although it can be overcome provisionally, can never be transcended irretrievably. Attempts to accomplish this tend to end, at best, in sterile theories and deceptive realities or, at worst, in misguided blueprints and great crimes.
4. The careful reconstruction of immanent criticism provides us with a significant insight: *rational learning processes* are as much part of immanent criticism as they are part of forms of life themselves.[222] The task of 'establishing a critical standard for evaluating forms of life'[223] rests on the rational defensibility of the normative criteria on which it is based. Forms of life can be understood as spatiotemporally contingent and intersubjectively constructed modes of existence, whose participants' 'problem-solving competences'[224] make civilizational developments possible in the first place. By raising validity claims, subjects capable of speech and action convert their communicatively mediated rationality into the socio-evolutionary force behind the 'experiential or learning process[es]'[225] that shape the course of

history.[226] Similar to epistemic truth, normative rightness is *not* an independent realm of existence to be discovered 'out there'.[227] Rather, it is the result of inter-subjective engagements in discursive processes of criticism, which – notwithstanding the situational, perspectival, and emotional contingencies impacting upon their motivational directionality – cannot be devoid of human rationality.[228]

1.10. Critical reflections

This final section seeks to push the debate forward by reflecting on several issues arising from Jaeggi's framework. The following comments are meant to be constructive, in the hope that they may contribute to strengthening the development of Jaeggi's critical theory.[229]

1.

Jaeggi asserts that the type of criticism she seeks to endorse is neither 'ethically abstinent' nor 'paternalistic' and that, moreover, it is neither 'relativistic' nor 'antipluralist'.[230] In addition, she provocatively claims that '*to ask whether forms of life can be criticized is, in a certain sense, to ask the wrong question*'.[231] Even if we accept her assessment of the drawbacks of both 'internal criticism' and 'external criticism', along with her defence of 'immanent criticism', however, we need to recognize the following: asking whether (and, if so, how and to what extent) specific forms of life can be criticized is not only a *legitimate* but also a *necessary* question. Regardless of whether this may be accomplished in an internal, external, or immanent (or any other) fashion, forms of life *can* and *must* be criticized if we, as members of the same species, hope to stand any chance of creating emancipatory conditions of existence.

Ultimately, the question of whether some forms of life are *preferable* to others is intimately intertwined with the question of whether some of them are more *defensible* than others. In each case, the cogency of any answers to these two questions is contingent upon the persuasiveness of their claims to validity. Reason-guided actors may make reference to (implicit or explicit) criteria based on the pursuit of truth, rightness, and sincerity, as they find themselves immersed in realms of objectivity, normativity, and subjectivity. The defensibility of a form of life, however, depends on its capacity to withstand the pressure of criticizability, which is laid bare by reflective and discursive subjects, equipped with the ability to draw upon the species-constitutive power of communicative rationality.

2.

Another matter arising from the critical analysis of Jaeggi's approach concerns the issue of *evolutionism*. This is not to contend that Jaeggi endorses a reductive version of social evolutionism. Rather, this is to argue that any future elaboration of her critical theory may benefit from addressing the following problems in more detail:

First, there is the problem of *teleologism*.[232] If we conceive of forms of life as 'historically developing *learning processes* endowed with normative claims to validity'[233] and, furthermore, assume that this feature 'is the key to their evaluation',[234] then we portray them as ensembles of practices that are not only situated in space and time but also evolve in a particular *direction*, namely towards ever higher degrees of sophistication and perfection. According to this premise, individual and collective learning processes

take place both within and between 'competing forms of life',[235] but these are subsumed 'under the umbrella of a *higher-level* form of life',[236] towards whose realization they are striving.

Second, there is the problem of *universalism*.[237] To the extent that ethical learning processes, which are essential to the emergence of emancipatory practices, require 'the *critical thematization* of one's own form of life and those of others',[238] the question of *perspective* arises. As extensively discussed in standpoint theories of truth, every attempt at describing, analysing, interpreting, explaining, and evaluating a form of life (or a specific dimension of a form of life) occurs from *within* a form of life – irrespective of whether one pursues an internal, external, or immanent mode of criticism. What may be regarded as 'a learning process towards progress' by an individual in one group may be perceived as 'a step backwards' by another individual in the same, or in another, group. Jaeggi's 'approach is in a certain sense an intermediate position between anthropological universalism and constructivist culturalism'.[239] As such, it rightly insists that it is erroneous to deny the presence and significance of 'certain universal constants of the *conditio humana*',[240] just as it is misguided to suppose that, as members of the same species, 'all of us always confront the same problems',[241] let alone that these problems 'arise in the same way irrespective of any historical-cultural constellation'.[242] One of the tasks of critical theory, therefore, is to locate the dialectic of 'the universal' and 'the particular' *within*, rather than *beyond*, the construction of forms of life, which are united by anthropological constants and divided by countless – socio-historically contingent – idiosyncrasies.

Third, there is the problem of *rationalism*.[243] We may all agree that 'there is not just *one* form of progress'[244] or – as a Hegelian reading of history appears to suggest – 'only *one* possible progressive development'.[245] One need not be a pluralist, still less an intersectionalist, to recognize that human history has been shaped by 'different, in part overlapping, and possibly even mutually contradictory progressive movements',[246] including *social* movements. These – partly competing and partly complementary – movements have had, and continue to have, a tangible impact upon the development of forms of life across the globe,[247] including the ways in which their members cope with the challenges that arise as 'empirical problem constellations',[248] whose facticity permeates the horizon of possibilities within a given society. As spelled out by advocates of immanent criticism, '[w]hat matters is whether they make progress *with respect to these* constellations'[249] – that is, *within* the form of life in which both objective and normative challenges emerge. If, however, we define their development as the result of primarily '*rational* learning processes',[250] then we downplay, if not dismiss, the pivotal role played by other (notably emotional, expressive, dramaturgical, artistic, and cultural) factors that are irreducible to the presumed civilizational force of an overarching rationality at work in the theatre of human existence.

Fourth, there is the problem of *essentialism*.[251] From an anti-essentialist position, it is important to resist the 'naturalization of values'.[252] Despite major advances in the natural and social sciences, 'we as yet are far from having complete knowledge of our nature, abilities, desires, and interests because they are not fixed'.[253] Indeed, not only are the problems themselves (on an *ontological* level) 'subject to change',[254] but so are the possible solutions to these problems (on a *methodological* level) and, crucially, 'how problems are formulated'[255] (on a *conceptual* level). Insofar as forms of life 'constitute

attempts to solve problems',[256] they 'should be conceived as *experiments*'.[257] As emphasized by pragmatist philosophers à la Dewey,[258] 'problem-solving action is always experimental'.[259] Even if we share the pragmatist spirit that pervades such an *experientialist* conception of forms of life, however, the previous account is contentious for several reasons:

a. Some key elements of the human condition may be far less malleable – and, by implication, less arbitrary – than social constructivists are willing to concede.[260]
b. It is not because these elements may – or may not – be fixed, but, rather, because of their noumenal complexity that we may never obtain an irrefutable understanding, let alone complete knowledge, of their constitution.[261]
c. Problem-solving actions are characteristic not only of forms of life but also of the realms by which they are constituted – such as, for instance, social fields (in Bourdieusian terms) or systems and lifeworlds (in Habermasian terms).[262]
d. The problem-solving actions shaping forms of life may be not only *experimental* in the trial-and-error sense of exploratory experience, but also *rational* in the reason-guided sense of *Verstand, Vernunft*, and *Urteilskraft*. One need not be a Kantian to appreciate the complementary insights of empiricism and rationalism – not as an abstract epistemic joint-force of academic ivory towers but, rather, as a socio-ontological foundation underlying *all* forms of life.[263]

Fifth, there is the problem of *normativism*.[264] The critique of forms of life draws attention to their potential 'irrationality, obsolescence, contradictoriness, or dysfunctionality',[265] aiming 'to transform them *for the better* in ways directed and motivated by norms'.[266] It is far from obvious, however, on what *normative grounds* one should (or should not) make judgements about the quality, legitimacy, and defensibility of forms of life. If the assessment of forms of life presupposes that one's main evaluative criterion, or set of criteria, can be found in 'the success of problem-solving processes',[267] then their worth is defined in terms of instrumental, rather than substantive, rationality – that is, in terms of the outcome and utility of human actions, rather than in terms of their subjacent normativity. If we reduce progress to social evolution driven by problem-solving processes, then we lose sight of one of the most important ingredients of emancipatory realities – namely, humanity's capacity to shape its destiny through its members' daily quest for autonomy and responsibility [*Mündigkeit*] as well as for recognition, self-realization, and resonance.[268]

3.

Perhaps the most fundamental question one may pose when grappling with Jaeggi's approach is what is to be gained, both intellectually and practically, from elevating the concept of a form of life to the cornerstone of critical theory. Indeed, critics might argue that the concept of a *form of life* could be replaced with that of *society* and that, on many levels, the latter would provide a more solid normative foundation for critical theory than the former. In Jaeggi's defence, it is worth pointing out that she posits that 'several competing *forms of life* [may] exist alongside each other *within* a given *society*'.[269] This assertion suggests not only that the two concepts need to be carefully distinguished but also that, in reality, the latter can comprise several variants of the former. Let us, however, consider the following examples:

- Jaeggi stresses that 'conflicts over the integrity and constitution of forms of life'[270] may arise, notably when there are minor or major disagreements over particular practices and/or structures by which these are sustained. Essentially, the same applies to the integrity and constitution, as well as the conflictual nature, of *societies*.
- Jaeggi insists that 'forms of life are complex bundles (or ensembles) of social practices geared to solving problems that for their part are historically contextualized and normatively constituted'.[271] Broadly speaking, this definition encapsulates the nature of *societies*. Their (a) complex, (b) practice-based, (c) problem-solving, (d) historical, and (e) normative constitution overlaps with that of forms of life.
- Drawing on Hegel, Jaeggi characterizes forms of life as 'manifestations of "ethical life"'.[272] Just as one may object that their ethical constitution is only *one* of their key features, one may – in a Durkheimian fashion – employ the same description in relation to *societies*. Societies are manifestations of ethical life, in the sense that they are sustained by morally codified practices, structures, and institutions, without whose regulative power they would collapse. Put differently, social orders are normative orders.
- Throughout her study, Jaeggi interprets 'forms of life as ensembles of social practices'.[273] This definition, however, is problematic for several reasons: (a) It is vague. (b) It fails to capture the qualitative specificity of forms of life. (c) Given its lack of precision regarding the alleged ontological distinctiveness of forms of life, this definition is sufficiently broad to be applicable to other key concepts – such as 'society', 'the social', 'social fields', and 'social institutions'. (d) Forms of life are not only ensembles of social practices but also ensembles of discourses and institutions. In other words, they are based on the confluence of performative, interpretive, and institutional elements, without which relatively stable modes of human co-existence would be inconceivable. (e) Forms of life depend on the interaction between objective, normative, and subjective dimensions of human existence. Unless we explore the complex relationship between 'the' physical world, 'our' social world, and 'one's' inner world, it will be difficult to grasp the production, reproduction, and transformation of forms of life.
- Jaeggi states that she aims to develop a conception of forms of life 'that renders them intelligible as phenomena with a certain importance and weight by comparison with more ephemeral phenomena'.[274] This laudable ambition can also be applied to the concept of *society*, thereby distinguishing it from the more short-lived components by which it is partly constituted. Jaeggi's analysis may benefit from differentiating between (a) foundational, (b) contingent, and (c) ephemeral components of existence – that is, between those that are (a) necessary for, (b) possible within, and (c) largely irrelevant to the emergence of forms of life.[275]

4.

It is noticeable that Jaeggi's account does not comprise a *typology* of forms of life. In a schematic – and, admittedly, somewhat dualistic – way, forms of life may be categorized as follows: 'primitive' *vs.* 'complex', 'tight' *vs.* 'loose', 'horizontally structured' *vs.*

'vertically structured', 'control-based' *vs.* 'freedom-based', 'collectivist' *vs.* 'individualist', 'relatively homogeneous' *vs.* 'relatively heterogeneous'.[276] To this list, one may add other forms of categorization, such as the following: 'technologically backward' *vs.* 'technologically advanced', 'socially egalitarian' *vs.* 'socially asymmetrical', 'rural' *vs.* 'urban', 'traditional' *vs.* 'modern', 'conventional' *vs.* 'alternative', 'repressive' *vs.* 'emancipatory' – to mention only a few. It is hard to see how a *critical* – that is, anthropologically, sociologically, and historically informed – theory of forms of life is possible without such a typology. In order to be able to move from the descriptive level ('What form of life *do* we have?') to the normative level ('What form of life *should* we have?'), it is necessary to ask what *types* of forms of life are not only actual but also possible and desirable.

5.

The central thesis running through Jaeggi's study is that forms of life can be evaluated and compared with one another because 'they embody *problem-solving strategies*'.[277] On this account, 'criteria for their success or failure can be established based on their capacity actually to solve the problems they are supposed to solve'.[278] Once again, this conception of forms of life is debatable – not only because it may apply to several other key concepts (including 'society', 'social fields', and 'social institutions'), but also because it is far from obvious how to define 'success' and 'failure'. Supporters of authoritarian, dictatorial, and totalitarian regimes may contend that the forms of life they have produced are 'highly successful' – notably in terms of being equipped with, and able to implement, 'problem-solving strategies', whether these be political, cultural, economic, scientific, medical, technological, or military. In other words, we need to provide solid normative foundations that are sufficiently *elastic* to allow for a pluralist and historicist understanding of forms of life and, at the same time, sufficiently *restrictive* to exclude any reduction of 'problem-solving strategies' to a merely instrumentalist approach, according to which (a) the end justifies the means and (b) a value-rational examination of both ends and means is superfluous. Who decides what is 'success' and what is 'failure'?

Having developed her argument in more detail, Jaeggi spells out that 'forms of life are (in each case different) strategies for solving problems confronting humanity – as a species, but in different, historically, and culturally specific ways'.[279] She concedes that forms of life may converge or diverge in terms of how they solve problems.[280] In her view, these affinities and differences make it possible not only to compare and to contrast forms of life but also to make value judgements about them:

> [...] the disagreements between them are disagreements over the best solution to the problem, and forms of life must be judged by their ability to solve the problems they face.[281]

If, however, the normative quality and defensibility of forms of life are judged merely in terms of their capacity to solve problems, then we run the risk of evading the task of establishing the parameters that enable us to assess the extent to which they facilitate or obstruct processes of human emancipation. If we portray forms of life as problem-solving enterprises, then we come dangerously close to reducing them to modes of existence that are driven by instrumental, strategic, and functionalist types of rationality, rather than shaped by value rationality. There must be more to life, and more to forms of life, than solving problems.

It is no accident that the reductive approach outlined above maintains that failing forms of life are essentially those that 'are not able to solve the problems they face'[282] and, hence, to grapple with 'crisis experiences'[283] in an appropriate manner. On this account, a strong problem-solving capacity is the ultimate currency of a 'successful' form of life. Of course, 'unsuccessful' forms of life may 'suffer from a collective practical reflexive deficit, from a blockage to learning'.[284] We need to recognize, however, that they may suffer from various *other* issues, some of which are *not* reducible to problem-solving strategies. To reiterate this point: advocates of authoritarian, dictatorial, and totalitarian regimes may claim that the forms of life they generate are 'superior' to their democratic counterparts in terms of 'solving problems' (whether these be of political, cultural, economic, scientific, medical, technological, military, or any other nature). As critical theorists committed to exploring the conditions for the possibility of 'the good life', we should seek to provide normative foundations for such a project – that is, evaluative and value-laden grounds that are irreducible to problem-solving strategies.

6.

In her analysis of forms of life, Jaeggi stresses the confluence of *objective* and *normative* dimensions, while paying little attention to the role of *subjective* factors. Granted, she acknowledges that *purposes* may have not only an objective and normative but also a subjective character.[285] For the most part, however, her study lacks a systematic understanding of the interplay between the objective, normative, and subjective facets of human existence.

To be clear, Jaeggi explores the extent to which interpretive frameworks and behavioural patterns prevalent in a given form of life may 'fit the matter' [*zur Sache passen*],[286] in accordance with their participants' consideration of 'substantive or factual adequacy [*Sachangemessenheit*] or the reference to real conditions [*Sachbezug*]',[287] especially – one may add – when coping with practical constraints [*Sachzwänge*]. She assumes – in a Hegelian fashion – that nothing is 'objectively given'[288] in the social world, since every form of life is 'a result of historical cultural positings'.[289] In other words, all socio-culturally contingent arrangements are value-laden, interest-laden, and power-laden. Viewed in this light, it becomes apparent why Jaeggi ascribes ontological primacy to the regulative influence of normativity.

This perspective has major implications for the nature of criticism. Whatever occurs in the world *without* being directly or indirectly caused by human (and, thus, morally accountable) beings and *without* being changeable by them (not even in principle) 'cannot be made into a meaningful object of criticism'.[290] *While only those things that can be changed are open to criticism, 'not everything that can be changed is criticizable'*.[291] For instance, bad weather is not open to meaningful criticism.[292] If the natural course of a river is amended by technological interventions, it would not make sense to 'critique' the river, since it has no moral responsibility for its own constitution and development.[293]

Unsympathetic critics may object that Jaeggi is stating the obvious. An alternative way of depicting the issue at stake is to refer to the age-old dichotomy between, on the one hand, *natural causality* and *non-human determinacy* and, on the other hand, *moral responsibility* and *human agency*. Another option is to conceive of this problem in terms of the 'ontological trinity' of objectivity, normativity, and subjectivity. On this account, criticism is articulated *from* a simultaneously *objective, normative*, and *subjective* point of view – that is, *from* an angle that is shaped by one's socially acquired and

individually assimilated cognitive dispositions, which are reflected in specific modes of perception, appreciation, and interpretation. At the same time, criticism may be directed *at* the *objective, normative*, and/or *subjective* constitution of particular sets of practices, structures, and arrangements. Criticism of (objective) states of affairs, however, does not make sense if it is addressed towards modes of existence, entities, or occurrences that lack moral accountability, responsibility, and autonomy [*Mündigkeit*] in a Kantian sense. In order to grasp the criticizability of some subjects and objects, and the non-criticizability of others, we need to cast light on the confluence of objectivity, normativity, and subjectivity in the daily construction of human reality.

7.

While Jaeggi's elucidation of the socio-ontological centrality of *practices* is, for the most part, nuanced and differentiated, it would have benefitted from a stronger emphasis on the issue of their potentially *ambivalent* role in the construction of forms of life. More concretely, her contention that '[p]ractices have an *enabling* character'[294] appears to ignore the fact that they may also have a *disabling* character. Practices may be perceived as empowering and enriching, thereby contributing to a person's sense of agency, autonomy, and self-realization. Practices, however, may also be perceived as disempowering and impoverishing, thereby contributing to a person's sense of captivity, heteronomy, and alienation. Granted, different actors may perceive the same practice, or set of practices, differently. Performing a practice is one thing, but scrutinizing it is quite another. In addition, the confluence of objective, normative, and subjective factors impacts upon one's mode of relating to a specific practice or set of practices. In one way or another, the structuring power of key sociological variables pervades all forms of practice. The degree to which practices are shaped by these variables (notably class, ethnicity, gender, age, ability, etc.) and several other factors (such as reason, affect, morality, consciousness, the unconscious, etc.) may be interpreted and experienced as *enabling* by some actors (and observers) and as *disabling* by others. This discrepancy is not trivial, because it illustrates how difficult it is to reach a consensus on establishing reliable criteria for distinguishing between 'desirable' and 'undesirable' practices, let alone between 'emancipatory' and 'non-emancipatory' forms of life.

8.

Jaeggi's approach contains noticeable *rationalist* features. This, of course, is not a problem per se, but the question that arises is whether or not the rationalist tenets underpinning her endeavour oblige her to portray reason as a quasi-transcendental force, whose ontological power is largely – if not completely – detached from social practices. Given her (Hegelian) commitment to a socio-historical understanding of forms of life, Jaeggi does not subscribe to a transcendental(ist) conception of reason. This does not mean, however, that the role that reason plays in her critical theory is unproblematic. Consider, for instance, the following contention:

> The reasons at work in forms of life – insofar as the space of norms is a space of reasons – are also rarely specified explicitly when it comes to establishing and transmitting forms of life.[295]

It is true that *reasons* are at work in *forms of life*, meaning that both the constitution and the development of the latter are profoundly shaped by the cognitive force of the former. It is also correct that *rational learning processes*[296] are not only indicative of 'problem-solving competences'[297] (which permit actors to cope with, to adjust to, and to transform their environments), but also essential to the very functioning of forms of life. It is reductive, however, to conceive of 'the space of norms' *primarily*, let alone *exclusively*, as a 'space of reasons'.[298] For 'the space of norms' is a space of numerous ingredients – such as emotions, affects, biases, preconceptions, traditions, stakes, strategies, and interests. In other words, *philosophical rationalism* needs to be cross-fertilized with *sociological realism*, if one aims to understand how reason operates, and fails to operate, in forms of life.[299] Validity claims are always also legitimacy claims.[300] The validity that is ascribed to a proposition is not just a matter of *what* is being said, but also a matter of *who* says it, *to whom, when, where*, and *how*. Forms of life are shaped by reasons and reasoning processes, no less than reasons and reasoning processes are shaped by forms of life – and, hence, by the multiple (objective, normative, and subjective) contingencies permeating human realities.

9.

It is striking that the quality of some parts of Jaeggi's argument suffers from several *straw-man arguments*. Although, in most cases, these are of relatively minor significance, they weaken the strength of her analysis. Let us, for the sake of brevity, consider only three examples:

- Jaeggi asserts that, '[a]lthough the *concept of a form of life* corresponds to a certain *everyday intuition*, its content, as it is used in sociology and in philosophy, has *not really been clarified*'.[301] This claim ignores the fact that the concept of a form of life has been defined, examined, and discussed in great detail by numerous scholars in the humanities and social sciences.[302] Indeed, in some areas of research (notably in philosophy, cultural studies, anthropology, and sociology), it enjoys a central status, not least due to the considerable influence of Wittgensteinian thought on critical modes of inquiry.[303]
- Jaeggi affirms that the concept of culture, especially when associated with the notion of 'a people', 'often evokes the idea of a *comprehensive and self-contained totality*',[304] giving the misleading impression that 'a *society* has only *a single, uniform culture*'.[305] In her opinion, the concept of a form of life provides 'a de-essentialized and a de-substantialized alternative to the concept of culture',[306] since it accounts for 'the hybrid character of the formation under discussion here'.[307] It is hard to come across many, if any, contemporary scholars in the humanities and social sciences who conceive of societies, cultures, and/or forms of life in a monolithic, uniform, and/or homogenous fashion. There is no need to de-essentialize or to de-substantialize something that is hardly ever being essentialized or substantialized in the first place, at least not by the vast majority of researchers.
- Jaeggi reminds us that values, beliefs, and orientations are 'not *free-floating*'.[308] In a similar vein, she stresses that 'norms of ethical life are not a kind of *free-floating "value heaven" situated above social practice*'.[309] One will struggle to find any

seminal twenty-first-century thinkers who endorse such an ahistorical, asocial, and acontextual view of the symbolic, discursive, and moral constituents of forms of life.

10.

Jaeggi's analysis comprises various noteworthy *dichotomies*. It seems worth considering some of them in further detail to illustrate their significance for a critical theory of forms of life.

a.

There is the distinction between *functional* and *ethical* dimensions. Jaeggi maintains that these two elements are 'constitutively interrelated'.[310] On this view, '[f]unctioning and (ethically) *good* functioning, practice as such and *good* practice, are inseparable'.[311] If this is true, then, '[i]n the domain of human activities, there is no such thing as functioning *per se* but only always more or less *good* functioning'.[312] On this interpretation, norms of a genuinely ethical life can be regarded as '*ethical-functional norms*'[313]. Jaeggi's claim concerning the intertwinement of ethics and functionality ties in with Habermas's understanding of the intimate, yet tension-laden, relationship between life-world and system (and, by implication, between communicative rationality and functionalist rationality, value rationality and instrumental rationality, ends and means, normativity and objectivity, *Vernunft* and *Verstand*).[314] Forms of life contain competing constitutive forces, which, due to their conflictual nature, shape the direction of social development. It is far from clear, however, which of these two socio-ontological sides tends to have the upper hand in a given context. Arguably, both sides may be attributed a foundational status: in a conflictual but complementary fashion, both communicative-experiential and systemic-functional forces play a pivotal role in the construction of forms of life. The key question, then, is under what conditions it is possible to convert the tension between these forces into a source of, rather than an obstacle to, individual and collective modes of *emancipation*.

b.

There is the distinction between *material* and *symbolic* dimensions. Arguably, this distinction raises several important questions, such as the following: Do forms of life actually exist? If so, can we prove their existence (and, if so, how)? One's answers to these questions will largely depend on the epistemological and ontological assumptions underpinning one's worldview. For instance, empiricists may search for empirical evidence, rationalists for strong arguments backed up by logical reasoning, and Kantians may endeavour to combine the data reported back by our senses with the insights obtained from the triadic interplay between *Verstand, Vernunft*, and *Urteilskraft*. Furthermore, some scholars may seek to respond to the aforementioned questions by drawing on metaphysics, whereas others may do so through evidence-based frameworks derived from the natural sciences and/or the social sciences. Finally, one may aim to cross-fertilize metaphysics and science when tackling 'the big questions', including those related to the existence – but also the verifiability and criticizability – of forms of life.

Stressing the contextual contingency of practices and attitudes, Jaeggi makes a perceptive observation:

> [. . .] we often have quite a precise intuitive idea when it comes to forms of life about which practices and attitudes fit and which do not fit or are incongruous within certain ensembles, and also about what does and does not belong to a specific form of life.[315]

When practices and/or attitudes do *not* fit a particular form of life, those performing and/or endorsing them will experience a sense of 'out-of-sync-ness' – that is, a lack of harmony, congruence, and attunement. The more fundamental question arising from the previous reflections, however, is whether or not it is possible to ascertain criteria for establishing the *presence* of forms of life. Arguably, the confluence of objective, normative, and subjective factors is vital not only to the (empirical) production, reproduction, and transformation of forms of life but also to their (conceptual) representation and (scientific) study.

The fact that people appear to 'have strong intuitions about what *does not fit into* or belong to the ensembles sketched here'[316] indicates that (i) they are equipped with basic *competences*, enabling them to make judgements about the appropriateness or inappropriateness of practices and attitudes in particular forms of life, and (ii) their very existence is marked by the spatiotemporal contingency of the *contexts* in which they find themselves. This insight – regarding the *context-specific* interdependence of material and symbolic forces – is variably expressed in seminal conceptual frameworks: 'base' and 'superstructure' (Marx),[317] 'forms of life' and 'language games' (Wittgenstein),[318] 'field' and 'habitus' (Bourdieu),[319] and 'modes of engagement' and 'regimes of justification' (Boltanski and Thévenot)[320] – to mention only a few. Arguably, Jaeggi's critical theory raises important questions about the material and symbolic components making the emergence of forms of life possible in the first place.

c.

There is the distinction between *individual* and *social* dimensions. In theoretical terms, it is reflected in the paradigmatic opposition between 'methodological individualism' and 'social holism'. The former tends to explain events by reference to *actions performed by individual entities*, capable of engaging with and attributing meaning to the world by virtue of normatively mediated and subjectively motivated interventions. The latter tends to explain events by reference to *actions performed by collective entities*, capable of organizing the structural and agential components of reality as a whole, including the actions carried out by individuals situated within it.[321]

Jaeggi regards forms of life as 'nexuses of practices',[322] which are '*held together* and *individuated* as interpreted functional interconnections against the background of substantive or factual initial conditions'.[323] While each nexus has both individual and collective elements, it is 'moderately holistic',[324] in the sense that 'being situated within this nexus changes the individual practices'[325] and, thus, exerts structural power upon its participants. In brief, the concept of a form of life, as understood by Jaeggi, is a *socio-holistic* category.

Consequently, the question of *intentionality* arises. Do forms of life (including their main components) have intentions? For Jaeggi, social norms operate not only as behavioural rules but also as an 'institution whose intention is to structure and to regulate social life'.[326] On this view, intentionality is built into forms of life, including their collectively constructed cornerstones, such as social institutions. If this is true, then 'neither the author nor the addressee of a norm can be easily identified'.[327] Indeed,

'customs usually do not have an author (or at any rate not one who can be identified individually)',[328] meaning that they do not possess 'a clearly identifiable norm-giver',[329] who can be held to account for their existence or for their constitution. Customs may be described as 'anonymous norms'.[330] As such, they exert structuring power upon actors 'behind their backs'. In this (arguably structuralist) scenario, central categories of modern intellectual thought – that is, not only 'intentionality', but also 'responsibility', 'accountability', and 'autonomy' – fail to gain a foothold. One of the key tasks of critical theory, therefore, is to examine the ways in which the interplay between individual and social forces drives the development of forms of life and, in a broader sense, of history.

d.

There is the distinction between *intuitive* and *reflective* dimensions. Every form of life is sustained by a combination of two principal modes of functioning: intuitive *vs*. reflective, implicit *vs*. explicit, unconscious *vs*. conscious, practical *vs*. theoretical, know-how *vs*. know-that/know-why.[331] What needs to be explored in further detail, however, is the extent to which these are both competing and complementary components of human existence. It would be erroneous, for instance, to associate the former exclusively with the *reproductive* and the latter exclusively with the *transformative* features of forms of life. The former – especially if they contain alternative and progressive, if not subversive, elements – *can* trigger social change. The latter – especially if they contain conventional and conservative, if not complicit, elements – *can* reinforce the status quo. Notwithstanding the variety of normative functions that they may serve in different contexts, both *intuitive* and *reflective* forces play a pivotal role in the production, reproduction, and transformation of forms of life. Even if the former remain preponderant in the everyday functioning of society, the latter are crucial to converting our immanence into a source of transcendence – that is, our *Dasein* into both a *Darübersein* and a *Darüberhinaussein*. This transition from *da* to both *darüber* and *darüber hinaus* – that is, from 'withinness' to 'aboutness' and from 'hereness' to 'beyondness' – allows for the emergence of purposively constructed modes of existence, whose protagonists are not only *immersed in* but also *concerned with* (and, potentially, *concerned about*) their being.

11.

Jaeggi exposes the detrimental consequences of the *marketization* of forms of life, including 'areas of life not previously organized along market lines'.[332] Moreover, she warns that 'an education system organized in accordance with the economic imperatives of the market is open to the suspicion that it primarily promotes the self-reproduction of the elites',[333] implying that it is designed to defend the interests, resources, and ideologies of the most privileged sectors of society. Even if one is broadly sympathetic to Jaeggi's *critique of commodification*, one should consider at least three caveats:

First, the immediate response she may receive from those who defend marketized education systems is that their non-marketized, or only partially marketized, counterparts are just as problematic, if not more problematic, for the following reason: in social-democratic regimes, working-class citizens, most of whom do *not* go to university, end up subsidizing the education of middle-class citizens, most of whom *do* go to university. In other words, the taxes paid by the working classes are used to fund the academic education of the middle classes. Of course, the picture is far more complicated than such a crude counternarrative may suggest. It is difficult to deny, however, that this objection is not entirely unfounded.

Second, it is true that some educational systems (such as the French and the German ones) are far less market-driven than others (such as Anglo-Saxon ones). To a greater or lesser degree, however, *all* of them promote the self-reproduction of the elites. The irony is that, owing to the interpenetrability and convertibility of different forms of capital,[334] the former may contribute to the reproduction of social inequalities no less than the latter. In other words, educational inequalities are reproduced not only through economic capital, but also through various other (notably social, cultural, educational, linguistic, and symbolic) forms of capital. These forms of capital are at work as much in social-democratic and corporativist (and, arguably, even in socialist and communist) as in neoliberal and laissez-faire regimes.

Third, what is missing from Jaeggi's account is recognition of the fact that *different types of capitalism generate, and depend on, different degrees of commodification*.[335] Key differences between capitalist regimes manifest themselves in diverging *regional* traditions[336] and in diverging *national* traditions.[337] These traditions are characterized by varying degrees of commodification: the more market-driven and the less state-interventionist a particular type of capitalist reproduction, the more intense and the more extensive its processes of commodification. Jaeggi is right to stress, however, that – notwithstanding the historical specificities of, and significant differences between, major economic systems – the 'commodity condition'[338] is built into the architecture of all capitalist societies.[339]

12.

Unsurprisingly, the concept of *culture* takes centre stage in Jaeggi's analysis of *forms of life*, not least because the latter is often seen as equivalent to the former. Her account of culture, however, could have been more differentiated along the following lines:

a. In *anthropology*, the concept of culture commonly refers to a set of symbolically mediated behaviours and ideas acquired by human beings as members of forms of life.[340]
b. In *philosophy*, the concept of culture is crucial on various levels: (i) *ontologically*, as an existential source of *species-constitutive transcendence*; (ii) *epistemologically*, as a vehicle allowing for *symbolic meditation and interpretation*; (iii) *ethically*, as a locus of *normative regulation*.[341]
c. In *sociology*, the concept of culture has acquired, and been studied in terms of, several meanings: (i) in *cultural sociology*, as the performative nucleus of *social constructions*; (ii) in *economic sociology*, as a *commodity*; (iii) in *digital sociology*, as a *hyperreality*; (iv) in *critical sociology*, as an interest- and power-laden field of *competition and struggle*; (v) in *political sociology*, as an arena of contested *ideas, beliefs, norms, and values*.[342]
d. In the *arts*, the concept of culture is conceived of, first and foremost, as a source of *aesthetic experience*.[343]
e. In *politics*, the concept of culture has, especially in recent decades, acquired the meaning of a relationally constructed and power-laden sphere, which has the characteristics of a *social battlefield*.[344]

This is by no means an exhaustive account of the concept of culture. It illustrates, however, that a nuanced understanding of culture is needed, if one intends to grasp the various functions it plays in the construction of forms of life.[345]

13.

Jaeggi provides an insightful discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of *internal criticism* and *external criticism*.[346] By contrast, her defence of *immanent criticism* – although it is not only largely persuasive, but also intellectually rigorous and, in many respects, original – is less balanced: it focuses on its principal strengths, without exposing at least some of its major weaknesses. Granted, one may argue that this is not surprising, given that Jaeggi's aim is to support her own position, notably by advocating immanent criticism as a tool for developing a critical theory of forms of life. One should also recognize, however, that – paradoxically – her framework would have benefitted from scrutinizing not only the advantages and achievements but also the pitfalls and limitations of *immanent criticism*.[347]

To be sure, Jaeggi makes a strong case for the place of immanent criticism in her approach. Her justification for this undertaking, however, is far from straightforward. Consider, for instance, the following statements:

> Immanent criticism [. . .] takes *as its starting point the claims and conditions posited together with a form of life*; it responds to the problems and crises that arise in this context, and it derives from this in particular the *transformative potential* that goes beyond the practices in question and seeks to transform them.[348]

> And *criticism is possible only where what is criticized*, the object of criticism, *has succumbed to a crisis of itself.* [349]

Let us reflect on two problems arising from this perspective.

a.

If one takes as one's starting point 'the claims and conditions posited together with a form of life',[350] then it is not obvious whether (and, if so, to what extent) it is possible to achieve *radical transcendence* – that is, a kind of rupture that breaks with the given state of affairs in a truly profound fashion. It is also not clear where 'the transformative potential that goes beyond the practices in question'[351] is supposed to be located, especially in forms of life that – due to the impact of authoritarian, dictatorial, and/or totalitarian rule – are tantamount to 'total domination'. One may, of course, take a Foucauldian line, suggesting that even the most extreme regimes of power and domination cannot eliminate the potential for resistance.[352] It would be overly optimistic, however, to regard immanent criticism as an infallible guarantee of progress and change, let alone radical transcendence.

b.

If criticism were possible only 'where what is criticized [. . .] has succumbed to a crisis of itself',[353] then there would be no point in criticizing a state of affairs that has *not* yet succumbed to a crisis of itself (or which, in fact, may never be forced to succumb to a crisis of itself). Practices, structures, and/or institutions may be permeated with contradictions, frictions, and antagonisms. This does not mean, however, that the former will eventually succumb to a crisis caused by the latter, leading to the complete dissolution of the object of criticism. Criticism is entirely possible where what is criticized does *not* succumb to a crisis of itself. In fact, such a scenario makes radical – including immanent – criticism all the more necessary.

14.

Jaeggi reminds us of Hegel's famous assertion that the Kantian endeavour to criticize knowledge from an *external* point of view, expressed in the attempt to provide an epistemic standard for such an undertaking *prior* to the act of cognition itself,[354] is tantamount to 'wanting to swim before going into the water'.[355] As Jaeggi convincingly argues, Hegel's version of phenomenology is meant to offer 'a critique of the forms of self-deception, one-sidedness, and false objectification [*Vergegenständlichung*] to which consciousness succumbs in its attempt to situate itself in relation to its object'.[356] Immanent criticism, in Hegelian terms, not only sheds light on these modes of distortion and misrepresentation but also renders the norms by which these are sustained explicit.[357] As part of this reflective exercise, it lays bare the deficiencies and frictions as well as – in a more fundamental sense – the inherent contradictoriness, fragility, and instability of social reality.[358] The question that arises in this respect is on what grounds such a critique can, or should, be justified.

Jaeggi is determined not to fall into the traps of *internalism, contextualism, and particularism*, on the one hand, and *externalism, transcendentalism, and universalism*, on the other.[359] The problem, however, is that a happy-medium strategy that aims to find a compromise between *internal criticism* and *external criticism* – building on their respective strengths, avoiding their respective weaknesses, and cross-fertilizing their key insights – in the form of *immanent criticism* is fraught with difficulties. Unsympathetic critics may contend that, by combining internalist with externalist tenets, Jaeggi is trying to have it both ways. Arguably, the more interesting question is to what extent, in *immanent* forms of criticism, it is (or is not) possible to combine the implicit and/or explicit standards prevalent in one's object of criticism (at the *internal* level) with those underpinning the criticism itself (at the *external* level).

Even if one seeks to minimize the distortive impact of one's own biases, one cannot make judgements about anything in the world *without* mobilizing one's underlying presuppositions and *without* doing so from a particular point in space and time. Granted, both internalist and immanent forms of criticism aim to avoid the pitfalls of naïve versions of their externalist counterparts. As critical hermeneutics teaches us, however, one's own background horizon is always already present in one's interpretive universe, even if one makes a deliberate attempt to engage in perspective-taking and/or to look at the world from the point of view of another person, group of persons, or form of life.[360]

Unlike *internal criticism*, which tends to reinstate the dominant ideals of a given form of life, and *external criticism*, which tends to take a paternalist attitude towards them, *immanent criticism* obtains its normative 'standards based on the very situation it criticizes'[361] and, in doing so, obtains 'its orientation from the crises to which social practices and ideals can succumb'.[362] Undoubtedly, this makes it an attractive option for making value judgements about the quality, legitimacy, and defensibility of particular forms of life. Its commitment to measuring 'not only reality against the norm, therefore, but also *the norm against reality*'[363] is empowering: it permits us to realize that, in the social world, *all 'facts' are value-laden*, in the sense that human actors attribute individual and/or collective meanings to them, and *all 'values' are factual*, in the sense that they have

a tangible impact upon the empirical organization of forms of life.[364] The transformative, rather than reconstructive, character of immanent criticism[365] is expressed in its capacity to contribute to the construction of forms of life whose members – not only through unconditional access to socially relevant resources, but also, more fundamentally, through the *aufhebende Kraft der Aufhebung* – can fulfil, or at least seek to fulfil, their emancipatory potential.

15.

Aufhebung allows for the emergence of an enriched state of affairs. This can be achieved 'only by confronting and overcoming the old, not by disregarding it'.[366] If, however, we follow the immanent critic in assuming that 'the existing order is not purely negative',[367] that it 'contains the potential that must provide a starting point for criticism'[368] (if only as part of a set of contradictions and process of transformation), and that 'the better' is always already present (albeit in incipient and subjacent form) 'in the existing order of things',[369] then such an approach contains both a negative and an affirmative potential: its *negative* potential consists in the fact that it seeks to *overcome* the already existing state of affairs, notably its undesirable features; its *positive* potential consists in the fact that it seeks to *preserve* some valuable aspects of the preceding order.

Part of the seductive power of this 'negativistic-immanent method'[370] (à la Adorno) is that it hints at 'the *possibility* of something other than the prevailing state of things'[371] and, crucially, 'ascribes a certain *actuality* to this other possibility',[372] but without endorsing a conservative, romantic, or retrograde attitude oriented towards restoring the past. Arguably, this is one of the greatest strengths of immanent criticism. It is, however, also one of its most noticeable weaknesses, because one still needs to decide which elements of the previous order should be preserved [*aufbewahrt*] and which ones should be transcended [*aufgehoben*], not to mention the normative grounds on which such a judgement can be justified. Paradoxically, immanent criticism hinges on both the *Aufhebung der Aufbewahrung* and the *Aufbewahrung der Aufhebung*. If there is any eternal recurrence in immanent criticism, it is the fact that its immanence can never be fully transcended, let alone realized.

3. Conclusion

The main purpose of this paper has been to examine Jaeggi's critical theory. To this end, the foregoing investigation has focused on central aspects of Jaeggi's account of forms of life. Notwithstanding the drawbacks and pitfalls of her approach, Jaeggi has made a significant contribution to contemporary social philosophy. Her work is a strong reminder of the fact that criticizability is built into the seemingly most solidified modes of normativity. In light of the previous analysis, it is worth stressing that critical theory will continue to serve as a reservoir of conceptual tools for the study of power relations. As should be clear from the preceding inquiry, Jaeggi's version of critical theory offers a valuable framework for grasping the pivotal role played by power relations in the construction of forms of life.

There have been several attempts to equip critical theory with a paradigm that serves as the principal explanatory reference point for its understanding of social life, including its normative constitution.[373] Arguably, it is hard, if not impossible, to make sense of the history of critical theory without studying the 'paradigm shifts' by which its key

trends and developments have been marked over the past decades. In many – albeit not all – cases, these shifts have been 'motivated by the ambition to offer a solid foundation of socio-philosophical presuppositions on which the conceptual architecture of its diagnosis of society may be based'.[374] Among the most influential examples are the following: Theodor W. Adorno's theory of negative dialectics[375]; Jürgen Habermas's theory of communicative action[376]; Axel Honneth's theory of recognition[377]; Rainer Forst's theory of justification[378]; Martin Saar's theory of power[379]; Hartmut Rosa's theory of resonance[380]; and, as discussed in this paper, Jaeggi's theory of forms of life.[381]

Notwithstanding their points of divergence, one central aspect that these approaches have in common is that, in one way or another, they are situated – or at least claim to be situated – within the Frankfurt School tradition of critical theory.[382] As such, all of them share an interest in grappling with both concealed and overt mechanisms of social domination, while insisting on the possibility of human emancipation. In this sense, all of them are committed to *uncovering* the workings of underlying social (especially cultural, political, and economic) constellations that prevent human actors from participating in the construction of 'the good life' and thereby realizing their potential as sovereign and accountable subjects, equipped with a sense of agency and responsibility. Jaeggi's version of critical theory differs from the conceptual models proposed by her counterparts, however, in that it does not centre on one particular aspect *of* forms of life (such as negation, communication, recognition, justification, subversion, or resonance). Rather, her approach focuses *on* forms of life '*as a whole*',[383] thereby elevating 'orders of human co-existence'[384] to the *decisive* ontological category for the critical study of society.

Given the significant impact of Pierre Bourdieu's 'critical sociology'[385] and Luc Boltanski's 'pragmatic sociology of critique'[386] upon contemporary forms of social analysis,[387] it is worth pointing out that the aforementioned scholars, including Jaeggi, share two central features with both the former and the latter:

- with Bourdieu, the assumption that it is the task of *critical* social analysis to uncover the underlying dynamics and mechanisms that sustain relations of power and domination, whose (largely hidden) causes – while shaping, if not governing, asymmetrically structured modes of co-existence – tend to escape people's common-sense perceptions, conceptions, and interpretations of the world;
- with Boltanski, the assumption that it is the task of *pragmatic* social analysis to take ordinary actors seriously and to recognize that they are equipped with critical, reflective, and moral capacities, permitting them not only to attribute meaning to the world, but also to make judgements – and informed (and potentially justifiable) decisions – when navigating the universe of facts and norms.

The former task relies on the disciplinary (notably terminological, epistemological, theoretical, methodological, and empirical) resources of the humanities and social sciences. The latter task builds on the species-distinctive (notably critical, reflective, and moral) capacities of human beings. Granted, these two – arguably complementary – tasks may be carried out through processes of negation (Adorno), communication

(Habermas), recognition (Honneth), justification (Forst), subversion (Saar), resonance (Rosa), or immanent criticism (Jaeggi) – or, indeed, through a combination of these emancipatory resources. In each case, however, they require us to acknowledge that the power of critique emanates from the socio-ontological capacities of ordinary actors.

All forms of life depend on the objective, normative, and subjective resources mobilized by experiential beings. *All* economies depend on the purposive, co-operative, and creative resources mobilized by working entities. *All* languages depend on the constative, regulative, and expressive resources mobilized by communicative subjects. *All* cultures depend on the connective, collective, and individuative resources mobilized by socio-constructive creatures.[388] Forms of life are socially codified, symbolically mediated, and materially anchored orders of human co-existence. As normative constellations, they are sustained by interactional (that is, value-, meaning-, perspective-, interest-, tension-, and power-laden) sets of practices and structures. These are, by definition, *criticizable*. Forms of life, however, may be criticized (and, hence, either legitimized or delegitimized) not only by those who – as 'observers' – study them but also by those who – as 'participants' – construct and experience them.

Just as there are no forms of life without power relations, there are no power relations without forms of life. Trading zones between forms of life are, at the same time, trading zones between their respective power relations. Thus, a critical theory that builds on the knowledge and insights of both 'observers' and 'participants' needs to cross-fertilize the epistemic resources of experts and scientists with the cognitive capacities of laypersons and ordinary actors. Strictly speaking, there is no critical sociology without a sociology of critique, just as there is no critical theory without an engagement with social practices. Without the immersive power of experience, the projective power of work, the communicative power of language, and the socio-constructive power of culture, forms of life would be both formless and lifeless.

Notes

1. See, for instance: Fraser and Jaeggi (2018); Jaeggi (1997); Jaeggi (2005); Jaeggi (2014); Jaeggi (2018 [2014]); Jaeggi and Celikates (2017). See also, for example: Forst *et al.* (2009); Jaeggi and Loick (2013); Jaeggi *et al.* (2016); Jaeggi and Wesche (2009a). In addition, see, for instance: Honneth *et al.* (2007); Jaeggi (2007); Jaeggi (2009a); Jaeggi (2009b); Jaeggi (2013); Jaeggi (2015); Jaeggi (2016); Jaeggi (2021); Jaeggi and Wesche (2009b). For recent discussions of Jaeggi's work, see, for example: Allen and Mendieta (2018); Bianchin (2021); Bodde (2021); Choquet (2021); Evans (2022); Gregoratto (2021); Gros (2021); Marcucci (2021); Pellizzoni (2022); Solinas (2021); Solinas and Testa (2021); Testa (2021); Vázquez-Arroyo (2021).
2. See Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. ix–x, 10, 12–14, 20, 21, 23, 188, 242, 316–319, 324–325*n*28, and 326*n*45.
3. Ibid., p. xi.
4. Ibid., p. xi. See also ibid., pp. x, 6, 240, 268, and 315.
5. Ibid., p. xi.
6. Ibid., p. xi (italics in original).
7. Tugendhat (1985), p. 41. See Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. xi, 9, and 21.
8. Putnam (1995), p. 194 (italics added). See Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. xii.
9. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. xii (italics in original).
10. Ibid., p. xii (italics in original).

11. Ibid., p. xii (italics in original). See also ibid., p. 242.
12. Ibid., p. xii (italics in original). See also ibid., p. 218.
13. See ibid., p. xii. See also ibid., pp. 5, 30, 312, and 321*n*4.
14. Ibid., p. xiii.
15. See ibid., pp. xiii, 29, 33, 55, 62, 84, 85, and 227.
16. Ibid., p. xiii.
17. Ibid., p. xiii.
18. Ibid., p. xiii.
19. Ibid., p. xiii.
20. Ibid., p. xiii (italics added).
21. Liebsch (2003), p. 17. See also Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 3 and 42.
22. Wingert (1993), p. 174. See also Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 3.
23. Ibid., p. 3 (italics in original).
24. Cf. Foot (2001) and Thompson (2008).
25. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 6 (italics in original).
26. Ibid., p. 6.
27. See, for example: Anderson (1993); Honneth *et al.* (2007); Jaeggi (2007); Radin (1996); Satz (2010). See also, for instance: Boltanski and Esquerre (2016); Boltanski and Esquerre (2020 [2017]); Bourdieu (2005 [2000]); Bourdieu (2003 [2001]); Browne and Susen (2014); Elster (1986); Esping-Andersen (1985); Holloway (2010); Holloway and Susen (2013); MacKenzie *et al.* (2007); Mandel and Humphrey (2002); Susen (2012); Susen (2018a).
28. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 6.
29. Ibid., p. 7 (italics in original).
30. Ibid., p. 7 (italics in original). See also ibid., pp. 18, 31, 170, 171, 187, 188, 189, 250, 253, 255, 297, 323–324*n*17, 363–364*n*12.
31. Ibid., p. 7.
32. Ibid., p. 7 (italics in original). See also ibid., pp. 96 and 242.
33. Ibid., p. 7. See also ibid., pp. 218, 284, 323*n*16, and 373*n*51.
34. Ibid., p. 7 (italics in original). Cf. Wellmer (1991), esp. pp. 197–198.
35. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 8.
36. Tugendhat (1985), p. 41. See Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 9.
37. Tugendhat (1985), p. 41. See Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. xi, 9, and 21.
38. On the normative aspects of authority, see, for instance, Haugaard (2018a), esp. pp. 120–127 and 127–128.
39. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 16 and 196.
40. Ibid., p. 16. See also ibid., p. 339*n*55. Cf. Hampshire (1983), p. 19.
41. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 16.
42. Ibid., p. 16. See Rosa (2003), esp. p. 76.
43. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 29.
44. On this point, see, for instance: Susen (2009b), pp. 104–105; Susen (2010c), pp. 112–113; Susen (2013b), pp. 326 and 330–331; Susen (2015a), pp. 13, 105, 215, 219, 234, 236, 259, and 275; Susen (2015b), pp. 1027–1028; Susen (2020c), pp. 131, 137, and 138.
45. Spranger (1927 [1914/1921]). See also Spranger (1928 [1914/1921]). Cf. Teo (2016). In addition, see Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 36 and 329*n*3.
46. See Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 36.
47. See ibid., pp. 37–41.
48. Ibid., p. 38 (italics added).
49. Ibid., p. 38.
50. Ibid., p. 38. See ibid., pp. 41 and 43.
51. Ibid., p. 38.
52. See ibid., pp. 38 and 330*n*9. See also, for instance, Hartmann (2002).
53. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 38.
54. Hradil (2005), p. 46. See Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 39 (quotation modified).

55. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 39. See Weber (1978 [1922]), p. 29. See also Wundt (1918), Chapter 4.1: 'Sitte und Recht'. In addition, see Tönnies (2017 [1961]).
56. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 39. See also ibid., pp. 127 and 234.
57. Cf. Hobsbawm and Ranger (1992 [1983]).
58. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 39 (quotation modified).
59. See, for instance: Boltanski (2011 [2009]), Chapter 3; Susen (2014 [2012]), pp. 182–185; Susen (2021c), pp. 29, 30, 34, 37, 38, 39, 40, and 46.
60. See Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 39–40.
61. Ibid., p. 40.
62. Ibid., p. 40.
63. Ibid., p. 40.
64. Ibid., p. 40.
65. See ibid., pp. 40 and 331*n*16. See also, for instance, Hauriou (1986 [1925/1933]) and Jaeggi (2009b).
66. Ritter *et al.* (1976), Vol. 4, column 1310. See Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 331*n*17.
67. Eliot (1948), p. 31 (italics in original). See Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 40 and 331*n*18.
68. Cf. Tylor (1920). See Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 40 and 331*n*19.
69. Cf. Susen (2007), Chapter 10 (esp. pp. 287–292).
70. See, for instance, Kohl (2012 [1993]), esp. p. 132. See also Kohl (1992). In addition, see Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 40–41.
71. Busche (2000), p. 69. See Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 41. See also, for instance, Busche (2018). In addition, see, for example: Archer (1988); Baecker (2000); Bernardi (1977); Bhabha (1994); Bollenbeck (1994); Böhme (1996); Böhme *et al.* (2000); Dempf (1932); Eickelpasch (1997); Elias (2000 [1994/1939]); Gillison (2010); Hofmann *et al.* (2004); Janich (2006); Konersmann (1996a); Konersmann (1996b); Lamprecht (1900); Lindholm (2008); Luhmann (1999); McMahon (1999); Ort (2008); Randeria (1999); Reckwitz (2000); Schnädelbach (1985); Schnädelbach (1996 [1992]); Sewell (1999); Spengler (1973 [1918/1922]); Susen (2015a), Chapter 3; Susen (2017b), pp. 105, 112–113, and 114; Weber (1927); Williams (1981); Williams (1994); Wimmer (1996).
72. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 41.
73. For a critique of such a reductive view, see, for instance, Wimmer (1996).
74. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 41.
75. See, for example: Susen (2007), pp. 174, 241, and 252; Susen (2015a), pp. 35, 46, 71–72, 81, 91, 101, 107, 118, 156–160, 164, 190, 248, 262, 265, and 271; Susen (2018c), pp. 9–10, 13–14, and 24; Susen (2020a), pp. 41, 116, 133–134, and 156; Susen (2021 [2014]), pp. 352–353 and 361; Susen (2021b), pp. 387, 397–398, and 402.
76. Wingert (1993), p. 174. See Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 41, 62, and 63.
77. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 41 (quotation modified).
78. See ibid., pp. 41–42.
79. Liebsch (2003), p. 17. See also Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 3 and 42.
80. Ibid., p. 42 (italics in original). On this point, see also ibid., Chapter 3.
81. See ibid., pp. 42–43.
82. Ibid., p. 43.
83. See ibid., pp. 51–52.
84. See ibid., pp. 52–53.
85. See ibid., p. 53.
86. Ibid., p. 53.
87. See ibid., pp. 53–54.
88. See ibid., pp. 56–61.
89. Ibid., p. 56 (italics in original).
90. Ibid., p. 56 (italics in original).
91. Ibid., p. 57.
92. Ibid., p. 57.
93. Rawls (1955), p. 3*n*1. See Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 57 and 334*n*8.

94. Stahl (2013), p. 263. See Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 57 and 334*n*9.
95. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 57. See also ibid., p. 8.
96. Ibid., p. 57 (italics in original).
97. Ibid., p. 57. See also ibid., Chapter 3.
98. See Searle (1964). See also Searle (1995). In addition, see Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 59 and 335*n*13.
99. See Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 59.
100. See ibid., pp. 59 and 335*n*14. See also Pinkard (2004), pp. 277ff. In addition, see, for instance: Miller (1992); Miller (2001); Miller (2003); Miller (2007); Miller (2009).
101. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 59.
102. Ibid., p. 59 (italics in original).
103. Ibid., p. 59 (italics in original).
104. Ibid., p. 59.
105. Ibid., p. 60.
106. See Miller (2003). See also Susen (2007), pp. 36–37, 57, 94, 114, 119, 136, 137, 154, 161, 163, 164, 184, 186, 188, 191, 205, 211, 212, 217, 222, 237, 241, 244–248, and 267–268.
107. Cf. Susen (2018c), pp. 16–17 and 23–24.
108. See Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 60–61.
109. Ibid., p. 60.
110. Ibid., pp. 60–61.
111. Ibid., p. 61 (italics in original).
112. See ibid., pp. 63–65.
113. Ibid., p. 63 (italics in original).
114. See ibid., pp. 65–66.
115. Ibid., p. 66 (italics added).
116. See, for instance: Heidegger (1996 [1927]) and Gadamer (1989 [1960/1975]).
117. See Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 66.
118. Ibid., p. 66. See also ibid., p. 336*n*28.
119. Ibid., p. 336*n*28.
120. Cf., for instance: Boltanski and Thévenot (1999); Boltanski and Thévenot (2006 [1991]; Kaufmann (2012); Thévenot (1998); Thévenot (2014).
121. Blackburn (1994), s.v. 'norm'. See Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 91 and 340*n*3.
122. Stemmer (2008), p. 239. See Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 91 and 340*n*4 (quotation modified). Cf. Popitz (1961) and Popitz (2003), p. 95.
123. See Humberstone (1992). See also Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 92 and 341*n*7. In addition, see Anscombe (2000 [1957]).
124. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 92 (italics in original).
125. Ibid., p. 92 (italics in original).
126. See ibid., pp. 92–93.
127. Ibid., p. 93. See also Wittgenstein (2009 [1953]). See also, for instance, Kripke (1982).
128. See Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 92.
129. See ibid., pp. 93 and 341*n*11. See also Stemmer (2008), p. 30.
130. On the concept of 'the space of reasons', see Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 20, 93, 95, 341*n*12, and 361*n*32. See also Sellars (1997) as well as Scharp and Brandom (2007). In addition, see, for instance: Forst (2015), esp. pp. 112, 116, 124, and 125; Susen (2018c), esp. pp. 8, 10–11, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 25, and 26.
131. See Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 94–100.
132. Ibid., p. 94.
133. Ibid., p. 94.
134. Ibid., p. 96.
135. See ibid., pp. 105–132. On the concept of 'justification', see, for instance: Abdel-Nour (2004); Bergmann (2006); Boltanski (2002); Boltanski and Thévenot (2006 [1991]; BonJour and Sosa (2003); Cooke (2005); Corcuff (1998); Forst (2012 [2007]); Forst (2013 [2011]); Forst

(2014); Gautier (2001); Habermas (1990 [1983]); Habermas (1993 [1991]); Habermas (2003 [1999]); Haugaard (2018b); McCain (2014); Porter (2006); Susen (2017c); Susen (2018b); Wagner (1999).

136. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 113 (italics in original).
137. See ibid., p. 113.
138. See ibid., pp. 131–132.
139. Ibid., p. 131 (italics in original).
140. Ibid., p. 131.
141. See ibid., pp. 173–214.
142. Ibid., p. 174.
143. Ibid., p. 174.
144. Ibid., p. 174.
145. Ibid., p. 174.
146. Ibid., pp. 174, 193, and 355. See, more generally, ibid., Chapter 6. Cf. Marx (2000/1977 [1843]), p. 43: 'to discover the new world by criticism of the old'.
147. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 174.
148. Ibid., p. 174 (italics in original).
149. See Susen (2015b), esp. pp. 1028–1030.
150. Jaeggi (2009a), p. 63. See also Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 175 and 355–356*n*5. In addition, see Honneth (2009 [2007]), esp. pp. 43–53.
151. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 175.
152. Ibid., p. 175.
153. Cf. Susen (2015b).
154. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 190.
155. See ibid., pp. 191 and 357*n*2. In addition, see Honneth (2009 [2007]), esp. pp. 43–53 and 63–79.
156. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 191.
157. Cf. Susen (2016b).
158. See, for instance: Giddens (1977a), pp. 12 and 28; Giddens (1977b), p. 151. See also Habermas (1987 [1981]-c), p. 110.
159. Marx (2000/1977 [1845]), p. 172.
160. See Susen (2007), pp. 56–57.
161. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 191–192. See also ibid., p. 357*n*3. Cf. Jaeggi (2013).
162. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 192 (quotation modified).
163. Ibid., p. 192.
164. See ibid., p. 192. Cf. Holloway (2005 [2002]).
165. See Susen (2007), pp. 56, 59*n*26, and 59*n*27.
166. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 193.
167. Adorno (1998 [1963/1969]), p. 288. See also Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 193, 209, 358*n*8, and 361*n*35.
168. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 193 (italics in original).
169. Ibid., p. 193.
170. Ibid., p. 193. See also ibid., p. 358*n*9, and Röttgers (1981), esp. p. 163.
171. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 193.
172. Ibid., p. 193.
173. See ibid., p. 199.
174. Ibid., p. 199.
175. Ibid., p. 199 (italics in original).
176. Ibid., p. 199 (italics in original).
177. See ibid., pp. 199 and 359*n*20. Cf. Susen (2016d).
178. See, for instance: Ladavac *et al.* (2019); Susen (2018c), p. 32; Susen (2020d), pp. 751–752.
179. See Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 200.
180. Ibid., p. 200 (italics in original).
181. Ibid., p. 200. See ibid., p. 246.

182. See ibid., pp. 200–201.
183. Ibid., p. 200 (italics in original).
184. Ibid., p. 201 (italics added).
185. Ibid., p. 201 (italics in original).
186. Ibid., p. 201 (italics in original).
187. See Hegel (1977 [1807]).
188. See Marx and Engels (2000/1977).
189. See Adorno (1973 [1966]).
190. See Freud (1962 [1923]).
191. See Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 201–202.
192. Ibid., p. 201 (italics in original).
193. Ibid., p. 202.
194. See ibid., pp. 202–203.
195. Ibid., p. 203 (italics in original) (quotation modified).
196. Ibid., p. 203. See also ibid., p. 360*n*24.
197. See ibid., pp. 203–204.
198. See ibid., pp. 203 and 360*n*25. See also ibid., pp. 33, 211–214, 355*n*4, and 355–356*n*5. In addition, see Honneth (2009 [2007]), esp. pp. 43–53. For alternative views, see, for instance, Benhabib (1986), esp. p. 67.
199. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 203.
200. Ibid., p. 203.
201. This sentence may be roughly translated as follows: *The sublating power of sublation can never be sublated, not even through sublation itself.*
202. See Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 204–205.
203. Ibid., p. 204 (italics in original).
204. Ibid., p. 204.
205. Ibid., p. 204.
206. On the concept of 'determinate negation' [*bestimmte Negation*], see ibid., pp. 194, 204, 205, 243, 291–293, and 360*n*27. More generally, see ibid., Part IV. See Hegel (1977 [1807]), §79, and Hegel (2010 [1812]), esp. p. 54. See also, for instance: Rosen (1982), p. 30; Stewart (1996); Stewart (2000), pp. 41–43; Winfield (1990), p. 56; Wretzel (2014).
207. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 205.
208. Ibid., p. 208 (italics in original).
209. See ibid., pp. 208–210.
210. See ibid., pp. 211–214.
211. Ibid., p. 211 (italics added).
212. Ibid., p. 211.
213. Ibid., p. 212 (italics in original).
214. Ibid., p. 212.
215. Ibid., p. 212.
216. Ibid., p. 212.
217. Ibid., p. 212 (italics in original).
218. Ibid., p. 212.
219. On this point, for example: Susen (2012), p. 299; Susen (2014 [2012]), pp. 194–196; Weber (1995).
220. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 212.
221. Ibid., p. 212.
222. See ibid., pp. 212–213. See also ibid., pp. xiv, 219, 237, 274, 286, 297, and 318.
223. Ibid., p. 212.
224. Ibid., p. 213.
225. Ibid., p. 213.
226. Cf. Habermas (1999/1998 [1996]).
227. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 214, 216, and 218.
228. See ibid., p. 214.

229. For alternative accounts, see, for instance: Allen and Mendieta (2018); Bianchin (2021); Bodde (2021); Choquet (2021); Evans (2022); Gregoratto (2021); Gros (2021); Marcucci (2021); Pellizzoni (2022); Sabia (2010); Solinas (2021); Solinas and Testa (2021); Testa (2021); Vázquez-Arroyo (2021). See also Jaeggi (2021).
230. See Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. xiii, 171, 174, 189, 242–243, 317, 321*n*5, and 369*n*15.
231. Ibid., p. x (italics added).
232. See ibid., pp. 70, 133, 219, 244, 282, 290, 305–308, 335*n*14, 363*n*10, 367–368*n*25, 376*n*30, and 378–379*n*58. See also, for instance: Miller (2001); Susen (2015a), Chapter 4.
233. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. xiii (italics added).
234. Ibid., p. xiii.
235. Ibid., pp. 9 and 16.
236. Ibid., p. 16 (italics added).
237. See ibid., pp. 12, 13, 19, 23, 144–145, 177, and 243. See also, for instance: Susen (2015a), esp. Chapters 1, 4, and 5; Susen (2022a), pp. 52–54.
238. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 31.
239. Ibid., p. 144.
240. Ibid., pp. 144–145.
241. Ibid., p. 145.
242. Ibid., p. 145.
243. See ibid., pp. xii, 24, 29–31, 93, 95, 128, 213, 215–313, 315–316, 341*n*12, and 363*n*5. See also, for instance: Macintyre (1988); Putnam (1981); Rorty (1998), esp. Chapter 10 ('Rationality and Cultural Difference' [pp. 186–201]); Susen (2015a), esp. Chapter 1.
244. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 318 (italics in original).
245. Ibid., p. 318 (italics in original).
246. Ibid., p. 318.
247. See, for instance: Susen (2010a); Susen (2010b), pp. 268–274; Susen (2015a), pp. 127, 129, 134, 135, 176, 177, 186, 187, 188, 189, and 272. See also, for example: Della Porta *et al.* (1999); Eschle (2001); Hamel *et al.* (2001); Mayo (2005); McDonald (2006); Smith and Johnston (2002); Waterman (1998); West (2013).
248. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 318.
249. Ibid., p. 318 (italics in original).
250. Ibid., p. 318 (italics added). See also ibid., pp. xiv, 213, 219, 237, 274, 286, and 297.
251. See ibid., pp. 8, 21, 23 and 318. See also, for instance: Putnam (2002), esp. pp. 130–131; Susen (2015a), esp. pp. 27, 67, 74, 90, 200, 208, 216, 251, and 254; Susen (2022a), pp. 52–54.
252. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 23 and 318.
253. Ibid., p. 318.
254. Ibid., p. 318.
255. Ibid., p. 318.
256. Ibid., p. 318.
257. Ibid., p. 318 (italics added).
258. See, for instance: Dewey (1927); Dewey (1930 [1929]); Dewey (1938).
259. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 319.
260. See Pinker (2002) and Pinker (2011). See also Susen (2020c) and Susen (2022b).
261. Cf. Susen (2021c), esp. pp. 26, 28, 30–31, 41, 42, 44, 45, and 46.
262. Cf. Susen (2007), esp. Chapters 3, 7, and 9.
263. Cf. Susen (2021c), esp. pp. 42–43 (section 1) and 44 (section 3).
264. See Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 27, 124, 162, 192, 208, 219, 328*n*68, 347*n*66, 353*n*52, 361*n*34, and 362*n*5. See also, for instance: Antonio (1989); Forst (2017 [2015]); Habermas (1987 [1981]-b), esp. pp. 204–234; Habermas (1987 [1985]); Stemmer (2008); Susen (2015a), esp. p. 61; Susen (2017b), pp. 109–110; Testa (2021).
265. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 31.
266. Ibid., p. 31 (italics added).
267. Ibid., p. 31.

268. See Rosa (2019 [2016]) and Rosa (2020 [2018]). See also Susen (2007), Chapter 10, and Susen (2020b).
269. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 16 (italics added).
270. Ibid., p. xi.
271. Ibid., p. 29.
272. Ibid., p. 30.
273. Ibid., pp. 33 and 85. See also ibid., pp. xiii, 29, 55, 62, 84, and 227.
274. Ibid., p. 34.
275. See, for instance: Susen (2013a), p. 236*n*121; Susen (2013b), pp. 326, 339, 351, 359–361, 364, and 366–367; Susen (2014a), pp. 762–763*n*568; Susen (2016c), pp. 461–463; Susen (2016d), p. 131; Susen (2017a), pp. 144 and 146; Susen (2018c), pp. 27–28; Susen (2020a), pp. 183, 194*n*132, 277, 350, and 350*n*1; Susen (2020b), p. 337; Susen (2022a), pp. 59–61.
276. See Triandis (1996), esp. pp. 408–409. (According to Triandis's typology, the following main 'cultural syndromes' can be identified: tightness, cultural complexity, active-passive, honour, collectivism, individualism, and vertical and horizontal relationships.) On this point, see also, for example: Susen (2007), pp. 214 and 287–292; Susen (2010d), pp. 67–68 and 80*n*12; Susen (2012), pp. 309 and 323*n*147; Susen (2015a), esp. pp. 140 and 203; Susen (2016a), p. 72; Susen (2016d), pp. 132–133 and 139*n*48.
277. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 30 (italics in original).
278. Ibid., p. 30.
279. Ibid., p. 171.
280. See ibid., pp. 171–172.
281. Ibid., p. 172.
282. Ibid., p. 315.
283. Ibid., pp. 232, 296, and 315.
284. Ibid., p. 315.
285. See, for instance, ibid., p. 60.
286. See ibid., p. 70.
287. Ibid., p. 70.
288. Ibid., p. 71. See also ibid., pp. 140 and 211.
289. Ibid., p. 71.
290. Ibid., p. 84.
291. Ibid., p. 85 (italics added).
292. See ibid., p. 84.
293. See ibid., p. 85.
294. Ibid., p. 58 (italics added). See also ibid., p. 61.
295. Ibid., p. 95.
296. See ibid., pp. xiv, 213, 219, 237, 274, 286, 297, and 318.
297. Ibid., p. 213.
298. See previous note on the concept of 'the space of reasons'.
299. See, for example: Bourdieu (1982a); Bourdieu (1994); Bourdieu (2002). See also, for instance: Susen (2007), Chapters 5–8; Susen (2013a); Susen (2018c).
300. On *the relationship between 'validity claims' and 'legitimacy claims'*, see, for example: Susen (2007), p. 257; Susen (2009b), pp. 99, 100, 102, 103, 105, 113, 114, 115, 117, and 119; Susen (2010c), pp. 104, 106, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, and 116; Susen (2011a), pp. 46, 55, 57, and 58; Susen (2011b), pp. 49, 53, 57, 60, 63, 64, 69, 70, 71, 75, 77, 80, and 82; Susen (2013a), esp. pp. 200, 207–215, 217–218, 219, 222, and 225–230; Susen (2013b), esp. pp. 330, 331, 334, 335, 337, 339, 341, 342, 343, 344, 349, 363, 365, and 369; Susen (2014b), pp. 91, 92, 94, 95, 96, 97, 99, and 100; Susen (2015a), pp. 10, 55, and 200; Susen (2017c), esp. pp. 350–353, 361–362, and 368; Susen (2017d), pp. 15, 30–31, 39, 42, and 44; Susen (2018c), esp. pp. 6, 9, 11, 13–15, 17, 22–23, 26–27, 30, and 31; Susen (2018d), pp. 44–45, 47–48, and 50–55; Susen (2020a), pp. 231, 236*n*97, 286, 330*n*3, and 337*n*141. See also, for instance: Bourdieu (1971); Bourdieu (1982a); Bourdieu (1982b); Bourdieu (2002); Bourdieu (1987

[1971]); Bourdieu (1992); Habermas (1984 [1976]); Habermas (1987 [1981]-a); Habermas (1987 [1981]-b); Habermas (2001 [1984]-a); Habermas (2003 [1999]); Habermas (2018 [2009]).

301. Ibid., p. 30 (italics added).
302. See, for example: Allen and Mendieta (2018); Bodde (2021); Collins (2019); Fischer (1999); Fischer (2003); Floyd (2020); Gier (1980); Hartmann (2002); Hunter (1968); Kishik (2008); Lash (2001); Liebsch (2003); Liebsch and Straub (2003); Pinkard (2004); Rosa (2003); Rosa (2019 [2016]); Spranger (1927 [1914/1921]); Susen (2020b); Thompson (2008); Winner (2014).
303. See Wittgenstein (2009 [1953]). See also, for instance: Ambroise (2004); Bourdieu (2002); Chauviré (1995); Habermas (2001 [1984]-b); King (2009); Nagl and Mouffe (2001); Ogien (2009); Pinkard (2004); Pleasants (1999); Schatzki (1996).
304. Ibid., p. 41 (italics added).
305. Ibid., p. 41 (italics added).
306. Ibid., p. 41.
307. Ibid., p. 41.
308. Ibid., p. 63 (italics added). See also ibid., p. 113.
309. Ibid., p. 113 (italics added).
310. Ibid., p. 112.
311. Ibid., p. 112 (italics in original).
312. Ibid., p. 112 (italics in original).
313. Ibid., p. 113 (italics in original). See also ibid., p. 153.
314. See Habermas (1987 [1981]-a) and Habermas (1987 [1981]-b). See also, for example: Susen (2007); Susen (2009a); Susen (2009b); Susen (2010c); Susen (2011a); Susen (2018d); Susen (2021a).
315. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 67.
316. Ibid., p. 68 (italics in original).
317. Marx (2000/1977 [1859]).
318. Wittgenstein (2009 [1953]).
319. Bourdieu (1977 [1972]) and Bourdieu (1990 [1980]).
320. Boltanski and Thévenot (1999); Boltanski and Thévenot (2006 [1991]).
321. See Susen (2021c), esp. pp. 32–38.
322. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 24, 50, 69, 70, 72, 73, 75, 84, 87, 103, 104, 113, 138, and 363*n*11.
323. Ibid., p. 73 (italics added).
324. Ibid., p. 73.
325. Ibid., p. 73.
326. Stemmer (2008), p. 239. See Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 91 and 340*n*4 (quotation modified). Cf. Popitz (1961) and Popitz (2003), p. 95.
327. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 96.
328. Ibid., p. 97.
329. Ibid., p. 97.
330. Ibid., p. 97. Cf. Wright (1963), p. 9.
331. Cf. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 64, 74, 76, 78, 81, 84, 207, 218, 223–224, 226, 227, 234–235, 238, 242, 249, 254, 259–260, 267, 285, 292, 294, 303, 315, 361*n*33, 363*n*5, and 376*n*34.
332. Ibid., p. 5.
333. Ibid., p. 5.
334. See, for instance: Bourdieu (1986 [1983]); Bourdieu (1989); Bourdieu and Passeron (1990 [1970]); Bourdieu *et al.* (1994). See also, for example: Deer (2003); Edgerton and Roberts (2014); Grenfell and James (1998); Grenfell and James (2004); Grenfell and Kelly (1999); Harker *et al.* (1990); Naidoo (2004); Nash (1999); Robbins (2004); Robbins (2006); Susen (2016a).
335. See Susen (2018a), pp. 6–8.
336. For instance, Anglo-Saxon, continental European, Latin-American, Asian, and African models. On this point, see Weiss (1997), pp. 16–17.

337. In Europe, for example, Great Britain's neoliberal 'spectator state', Germany's neo-corporatist 'facilitative state', and France's neo-statist 'developmental state'. On this point, see Dunning (1997), pp. 244–282 (on Great Britain), pp. 335–358 (on Germany), and pp. 313–334 (on France].
338. See Boltanski and Esquerre (2020 [2017]), pp. 71–74. See also, for instance: Fraser and Jaeggi (2018); Jaeggi (1999); Jaeggi (2007); Jaeggi (2016); Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 5–6, 201, 323*n*12, and 360*n*26.
339. See Susen (2018a), pp. 6–8.
340. See Susen (2015a), pp. 93–94.
341. See ibid., pp. 94–96.
342. See ibid., pp. 96–101.
343. See ibid., pp. 101–108.
344. See ibid., pp. 108–110.
345. On this point, see, for instance: Susen (2011c), esp. pp. 174–175; Susen (2013c), pp. 92–93; Susen (2015a), pp. 93–110; Susen (2016a), esp. pp. 5, 15, 24, 28–29, 32–33, 40, 54–57, and 70–73; Triandis (1996), esp. pp. 408–409; Williams (1994), esp. p. 48.
346. See Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), esp. pp. 173–189.
347. See, for instance: Bianchin (2021); Browne (2016), Chapter 4; Finlayson (2014); Gregoratto (2021); Jaeggi (2021); Procyshyn (2019); Sabia (2010); Solinas (2021); Solinas and Testa (2021); Stahl (2017); Testa (2021).
348. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 174 (italics added).
349. Ibid., p. 192 (italics added).
350. Ibid., p. 174.
351. Ibid., p. 174.
352. See, for example: Foucault (1979 [1975]); Foucault (1980); Foucault (1983 [1982]); Foucault (1984). See also, for instance: Bloom (2013); Bourdieu (1998 [1998]); Browne and Susen (2014); Butler *et al.* (2016); Haugaard (2017); Holloway (2005 [2002]); Holloway (2010); Holloway and Susen (2013); Lilja (2018); Lilja *et al.* (2017); Scott (1990); Stabile (2000); Susen (2008a), esp. pp. 76–80; Susen (2008b), esp. pp. 155–158 and 167–169; Susen (2012); Susen (2014 [2012]); Susen (2018c).
353. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 192.
354. See ibid., pp. 194 and 358*n*12. See also, for instance, Habermas (1987 [1968]) and Krahl (1979). Cf. Kant (1995 [1781]).
355. Hegel (1995 [1892–1896], p. 428. See Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 194 and 358*n*13.
356. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 193.
357. See ibid., p. 199.
358. See ibid., p. 202.
359. See ibid., esp. p. 174.
360. On the concept of 'critical hermeneutics', see, for instance: Apel (1971); Garz (2000); Habermas (1971); Kögler (1996 [1992]; Susen (2007), pp. 22, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59*n*14, 90, 112, and 305; Susen (2017a), esp. pp. 143–145; Susen (2022c); Thompson (1981).
361. Jaeggi (2009a), p. 63. See also Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 175 and 355–356*n*5. In addition, see Honneth (2009 [2007]), esp. pp. 43–53.
362. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), p. 175.
363. Ibid., p. 203 (italics in original) (quotation modified).
364. Cf. Susen (2014 [2012]), esp. pp. 174, 175, 179–181, 190, and 194.
365. See Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 203 and 360*n*25. See also ibid., pp. 33, 211–214, 355*n*4, and 355–356*n*5.
366. Ibid., p. 209.
367. Ibid., p. 209.
368. Ibid., p. 209.
369. Ibid., p. 210.
370. Ibid., p. 210.
371. Theunissen (2007), p. 186 (italics in original). See Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 210 and 361*n*36.

372. Theunissen (2007), p. 186 (italics in original). See Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 210 and 361*n*36.
373. On this point, see Susen (2020b), p. 310.
374. Ibid., p. 310.
375. Adorno (1973 [1966]).
376. Habermas (1987 [1981]-a) and Habermas (1987 [1981]-b).
377. Honneth (1995 [1992]).
378. Forst (2012 [2007]) and Forst (2013 [2011]).
379. Saar (2007) and Saar (2013).
380. Rosa (2019 [2016]) and Rosa (2020 [2018]).
381. Jaeggi (2014) and Jaeggi (2018 [2014]).
382. On this point, see, for instance, Burton *et al.* (2021), esp. pp. 143–147.
383. On this formulation, see Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 36, 53, 60, 72, 112, 115, 138, 155, 163, 177, 219, 227, 327–328*n*66, 336*n*29, and 339*n*55.
384. Liebsch (2003), p. 17. See also Jaeggi (2018 [2014]), pp. 3 and 42.
385. See, for instance, Bourdieu (1977 [1972]), Bourdieu (1990 [1980]), and Bourdieu (2000 [1997]).
386. See, for instance, Boltanski (2011 [2009]), Boltanski (2012 [1990]), and Boltanski and Thévenot (2006 [1991]).
387. See, for instance, Susen and Turner (2011) as well as Susen and Turner (2014).
388. Cf. Susen (2007), Chapter 10.

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