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Citation: Carey, M. (1990). Industrial relations and race: A case study of the catering workers' struggle for parity at Heathrow (Volume 2). (Unpublished Doctoral thesis, City, University of London)

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Industrial Relations and "Race":-

A case study of the catering workers' struggle for parity at Heathrow.

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Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of City University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

July 1990

APPENDICES

Appendix 1

Appendix 2

Appendix 3

Appendix 4

Appendix 5

Appendix 6

Appendix 7

Appendix 8

Appendix 9

Appendix 10

Appendix 11

Appendix 12

Appendix 13

Appendix 1

BRITISH AIRWAYS AND INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY

A brief account of the formulative years
of the British Airways Trades Union Council,
1975 - 1978

Peter Richards MSc(Economics) PhD

July, 1981

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	Page 1
CHAPTER 1 The Background to BATUC	Page 5
CHAPTER 2 BATUC, a By-Product?	Page 15
CHAPTER 3 1977, and the BATUC Baby Begins to Toddle	Page 28
CHAPTER 4 Diversification or Death	Page 39
APPENDIX 1 Summary of Discussion on Participation, August 1975	Page 50
APPENDIX 2 Industrial Democracy in British Airways, a Paper by Ron Crew	Page 53
APPENDIX 3 Conference on Industrial Democracy in British Airways, Summary by Ted Mackenzie	Page 59
APPENDIX 4 British Airways Industrial Democracy, letter from Ted Mackenzie, February 1977	Page 61
APPENDIX 5 Constitution and Rules	Page 63
APPENDIX 6 Summary of Proposals for a British Airways Council	Page 66
APPENDIX 7 British Airways Industrial Democracy, letter from Ted Mackenzie, July 1977	Page 67
APPENDIX 8 British Airways Industrial Democracy, letter from Howard Phelps, December 1977	Page 69
APPENDIX 9 Proposed Terms of Reference for Departmental Councils	Page 71
BIBLIOGRAPHY	Page 72

INTRODUCTION

During the mid-1960's the debate that was taking place throughout the country on the advantages and drawbacks of industrial democracy began to intensify. Closer attention was given to the exact meaning of expressions used, and opinions polarised in the spheres of management and the trade unions respectively. In the 1970's, a decade that was particularly turbulent for industrial relations, discussion on industrial democracy continued and resulted in the publication of the Bullock Report in January 1977 and a government White Paper in May 1978. At the time of writing the economic depression is acute, but the question of workers' participation in decision making processes is still in the foreground of industrial affairs.

Opinions may differ regarding the influence of particular factors in encouraging such interest. But with the introduction of new technologies and different forms of economic organisation, it is not surprising that attention should be given to the greater involvement of the work force as a possible help in solving the country's economic problems. Nor should there be surprise that the trades union movement, or at least sections of it, should see it as being in their interests to demand a different set of responsibilities from those of yesteryear.

It is therefore, against a quickly changing macro-situation that this paper has been written. But its objectives are limited, for it merely seeks to outline the story of what certain sections of the trades union movement within British Airways did between mid-1975 to mid-1978 in an endeavour to implement their version of industrial democracy.

The reason why the first date has been invoked is simply that it was in July 1975 when proposals were put forward that led eventually to a collective demand being presented to the comparatively new British Airways Board for seats to be allocated to elected representatives from the trades union. This led to the creation of the British Airways Trades Union Council (BATUC), a body that was charged with the task of furthering the trades unions' claims for seats. An explanation for the interruption of the account in June 1978 is that so much material remains that a book rather than a paper would be necessary to bring the story closer to date.

There are several reasons why this paper has been written at this point and in this form. In May 1979 I had the honour of being appointed the contemporary historian of BATUC, a step which arose mainly from my studies of the Engineering Review Committee and publication of my accounts of its work following the merger of BOAC and BEA. (These accounts are listed in the bibliography and referred to herein as Papers 1-7 respectively). However, towards the end of 1980 I had accumulated a considerable amount of material, and with debates arising concerning the original purposes for which BATUC was created, its Executive Committee agreed with the suggestion that an outline of the story might prove useful as a background for the consideration of current difficulties. I had hoped that by a fair amount of hedge hopping I would be able to provide a skeleton framework of the sequences of events from BATUC's inception to, say, the middle of 1980.

But when it came to the implementation of such an idea I quickly realised that such a technique would, by the resulting omissions, lead to a distorted account which would hardly be of much value. Indeed, even in its present form some important reservations must be expressed.

The first reservation is that only trade union and BATUC documents have been used with the exceptions of those management side papers that were presented for joint consideration. In other words there has been no attempt on my part to seek access to management memoranda regarding its assessment of particular developments, nor have I sought interviews with appropriate individuals for managerial points of view.

These omissions have in no way arisen from any fear of a lack of co-operation from the management side. On the contrary, the management of British Airways facilitated my appointment to BATUC and have always accorded me a high standard of assistance. Therefore, I hasten to make the point that a start has to be made somewhere and the telling of the story from one side, apart from being less time consuming, can provide at least an outline which can be amended later and possibly provide a basis for some useful exchanges on matters of principle between the interested parties.

The second reservation is that I have not attempted to obtain an Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers' point of view on its refusal to join BATUC. Readers of the paper will see that certain assumptions have been made, which may or may not be true, and this is a point which needs to be made clear. Again, I plead the question of time and the hope that any unfair conclusions will be corrected in subsequent papers.

At the time of writing, British Airways is facing serious financial problems and fierce competition which can have drastic effects on both the management and trade union sides. In offering this paper it is hoped that it will prove helpful to the on-going consideration of industrial relations that takes place within the airline, even if it stops short of the period when many of the present day problems began to assume their acute form.

It is obvious that without the co-operation of the members and the Executive Committee of BATUC, who have welcomed me to attend as many of their meetings as my duties at Slough College have allowed, this paper could not have been written. I should like to express my thanks to them. Perhaps I may mention in particular Messrs. Crew, Havill, Wate and Young for giving me their time, points of view, and in some cases documents invaluable to the telling of the story so far.

In addition, I am most grateful to Miss Susan Bromwich of the British Air Line Pilots Association, who not only typed the paper but gave painstaking attention to detail and presentation. Naturally I take full responsibility for what has been said, but it is clear that without the help that was given me nothing could have been said at this point in time.

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July, 1981

CHAPTER 1

The Background to BATUC

It is generally accepted that until the mid-1960's the trades union movement in Britain was hostile to the concepts of industrial democracy. Suggestions for "worker-directors" and schemes for "partnership in industry" were regarded as mere ploys to blunt the edge of collective demands for higher wages and better working conditions. Once trades union representatives could be induced into the board room, it was argued, they could be bribed either consciously or sub-consciously with a mixture of smooth talk and brandy until they became isolated from the workers on whose behalf they were supposed to speak. It was therefore logical to oppose any moves towards board room representation and any blurring of the division in the field of industrial relations between 'them' and 'us'.

Management side attitudes towards industrial democracy had been more varied, for the widely held unitarian theory of industrial relations with its basic idea that 'we are all in the same boat so let's pull together', held considerable attraction for executive boards. However, this idea contained the important proviso that a senior member of management had to be at the helm of the boat and be free to alter course without being accused of upsetting the 'status quo ante'. Indeed, some managers were so concerned with the freedom to change course that they opposed any extension of trade union negotiations beyond the established spheres of wages and conditions on the grounds that their managerial prerogatives would otherwise be seriously curtailed.

But in the mid-1960's various forces were at work that were to have a marked influence upon industrial organisation. They included new forms of technology, sophisticated electronic systems resulting from space exploration, the wider use of more efficient computers, the development of new chemical by-products, different uses of energy resources, and the changed terms of trade between the primary products of the so-called third world and the established industrial countries. Consequently, one saw in Britain a concentration of capital in the form of mergers and the growth of multi-national companies. Somewhat paradoxically while greater power began to be accumulated in the board rooms of the large organisations, at the other end of the production process the role of the shop steward underwent a change.

Different methods of production from roughly the early 1960's onwards were necessitating local agreements on wages and plant bargaining on a wider scale than previously. Although industry based wage levels were still the subject of national negotiating bodies, the agreements that were being reached were becoming to be looked upon as guide lines rather than firmly determined limits. Such agreements were often amended considerably by local shift patterns, bonus schemes and factors peculiar to a particular place of work. Consequently it was a common occurrence for shop stewards to meet managerial representatives across the negotiating table, thereby replacing work done previously by full time trades union officials.

Major problems were not lacking. In some instances when shop stewards were acquiring skills at local plant bargaining the situation would be changed by managerial decisions to merge, introduce different forms of

production, manufacture new products, or bring about a combination of all three. This would necessitate a shop steward acquiring further negotiating skills and to obtain a wider understanding of his industry than his own area of work. Meanwhile, to whom did the shop steward owe his first loyalty, the interests of the firm at large or the working group who elected him to office?

Although the Health and Safety at Work Act was a product of the 1970's, new thinking on the issues involved was in evidence in the previous decade. As a result safety representatives, who were often shop stewards, became engaged in negotiations regarding where machinery should be placed, when certain machines should be shut down, dust and noise levels, which chemicals constituted a health hazard, and what new production methods were possible that could obviate the need for workers to wear cumbersome protective clothing.

Hardly surprisingly the issues of re-deployment, re-training, and redundancies began to loom large in industrial relations. Solutions to the problems, which began to assume new forms were often not easy to find, and joint shop steward committees would sometimes be split as a result of inter-union disputes. Changing jobs and membership of appropriate trades unions can prove contentious, and shop stewards are not reluctant to express their thoughts when they feel that their vital interests are at stake. Hence, concern with company organisation was inducing trades unionists to take an interest in decision making areas which were hitherto exclusive to management.

While changes in industry were creating new opportunities for an extension of industrial democracy, there was the major factor that from the early 1960's successive governments became more heavily involved in the planning of the country's economy. It can be seen that governments and the treasury extended one of their main functions of acting as economic stabilisers in the best Keynesian traditions that had prevailed since 1945, to one of overseeing national economic strategy. The National Economic Development Council (NEDC) met for the first time in March 1962, and other bodies came into being with the main aims of stabilising prices, achieving a trade balance, maintaining full employment, and facilitating a steady increase in national production. Consequently income policies assumed a greater importance in economic affairs and had a marked influence upon concepts of joint co-operation. (1)

If both government and industry were to attempt not only to iron out the booms and slumps of the economy, but to aim at steady growth without inflation, was it not therefore necessary to involve the trades union movement in the required planning? Would the trades union respond in a positive fashion? These are wide ranging questions well beyond the scope of this paper, but their implications for the newly created British Airways in the 1970's were profound. It is to the developments within the airline that attention is now directed for it will be shown that many of the problems in relation to industrial democracy had particular significance for British Airways.

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(1) There is fairly extensive literature on the changes that took place. See for example, Blackaby, FT (Ed), 'British Economic Policy, 1960-74' (Cambridge, 1978) and Bailey, R, 'Managing the British Economy: a Guide to Economic Planning in Britain since 1962' (London, 1968).

The Interplay of Ideas within the Airline

Although the Trades Union Congress (TUC) cannot be said to reflect the views of every one of its affiliated bodies, it being in advance of some and behind others, its statements nevertheless offer a sound guide to trades union thinking. During the 1970's the TUC issued a number of policy documents concerning industrial democracy. (2) The first of these documents openly recognised the change in the attitude of the TUC from one of hostility towards worker participation to that of a willingness to explore the possibilities of terms for co-operation, indications of which had already appeared in the evidence it had submitted to the Donovan Commission in 1966. However, all of the TUC policy statements of the 1970's expressed unequivocal opposition to the idea of worker-directors serving as minorities on boards of management and prevented from keeping their trades union colleagues informed of developments on the grounds that confidentiality would be thereby breached.

It is not proposed to attempt to summarise the details of the TUC's findings on industrial democracy, but reference to the main documents is made in order to indicate an important influence upon staff side thinking within British Airways and on subsequent trades union attitudes that were adopted towards proposals for a form of a joint Airways Council. Also, comparisons can then be made with the statements of the British Airways Board (BAB) regarding worker participation in decision making processes.

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(2) In July 1973 the TUC's General Council issued an 'Interim Report on Industrial Democracy' which was the basis of 'A Statement of Policy' adopted by the Annual Trades Union Congress, September 1974. Reference to change of TUC policy is contained in paragraph 24 of the Interim Report. See also the bibliography.

One can ascertain that it was in 1973 when exchanges between the BAB and the trades union side of the National Joint Council (NJC) began to attempt to extend the sphere of negotiations from the established areas of wages and conditions to wider matters. Indeed, it was in the January of that year when the BAB issued an 'Industrial Relations Charter' which contained a proposal to set up a 'Joint Manpower Advisory Council'. The story of the Joint Manpower Committee (JMC), as the proposed Council was eventually called, has been outlined elsewhere, but some essential points should be emphasised. (3)

The Charter stated that it was the wish of the BAB to provide satisfactory career prospects for all of its employees, and the Board would undertake 'to consult Trade Unions about all major changes in working practice and organisation'. An appendix outlined the details concerning how this consultation was to take place, and it was explained that management would 'Hear the Union's points and, where possible, answer them'. Also management would give serious consideration to any counter proposals that the trades union side might care to offer.

However, it was clear that no dimunition of management's prerogative was envisaged, albeit that the Board's actions would be influenced by what the staff side had to say on a greater scale than before. A most important paragraph in the Charter stated:-

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(3) Paper 2, Chapter 1 'The Joint Manpower Committee' pp 5-22. The Industrial Relations Charter was issued on 3 January 1973. Appendix 3 of Paper 2 gives the revised terms of reference of the JMC as agreed jointly in November, 1973.

'Whilst recognising that it is Management's job to take decisions, the Board, being anxious to tap the advice and experience of its staff, will set up a Joint Manpower Advisory Council. This Council will be chaired by the Group Personnel Director with agreed representation from the Unions and from Management with the following terms of reference:-

i) to advise on future manpower policies (except matters which would normally be for negotiation within the orbit of the NJC) and, to that end, to consider manpower trends and all other relevant considerations.

ii) to consider and advise on in-company training (including retraining) policies and deployment'.

No doubt the management side of British Airways thought that it was being liberal in its approach to industrial relations, but it will be shown that there was quite a large gap between what it was offering and what the TUC was asking.

One may claim with reason that the JMC was a failure. It operated for less than four years and when it was buried in March 1977 its accredited battle honours were few. But it was not without its achievements, one of which was to facilitate the various feasibility studies coming into being, especially the study concerning Engineering.

One could easily spend time discussing whether or not the JMC and the subsequent feasibility studies constituted the introduction of industrial democracy within British Airways. What is clear, however, was that the JMC and the feasibility studies brought about an extension of management/trade union bargaining into the areas of who should work where, and at what, on a greater scale than beforehand. While it may be claimed that in the former BEA-BOAC organisations the managements had always been prepared to listen to suggestions from the staff regarding improving the running of the airlines, the new

consultative machinery that was created advanced the situation from the implementation of the pay deal of 1968, and dependence upon good personal relationships among individual managers and staff side representatives, to a more formal setting. (4)

Management could argue that if the JMC had its shortcomings it was possible, with a little goodwill on both sides, to overcome at least some of its faults. The merger, as the Industrial Relations Charter stated, offered great opportunities for joint work, but it has been shown elsewhere that between 1973 until 1975 it was the management side of British Airways which was the more anxious to see the feasibility studies brought into being. (5) What caused this reluctance on the part of the staff side and was it of significance for the development of industrial democracy within the airline?

Attention has already been given in other papers to the fears which the staff side had within British Airways in the 1973-5 period concerning the merger enhancing the possibility of redundancies following the dramatic fall in demand for civil air transport after the Middle East War of October 1973. Consideration should now be given to the difference in attitudes to industrial democracy that existed between BAB and the trades unions.

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(4) The Pay Deal of 1968 had been a joint BEA/BOAC agreement and had brought about greater flexibility and interchange among the workers of both airlines. The influence of this pay deal upon the merger requires further investigation.

(5) Papers 2, 3 and 6. Also Appendix 1 pp 50-52 below reveals that important joint consideration of the involvement of shop floor representatives in a proposed widened JMC took place in the summer of 1975. But moves in this direction were superseded by the creation of BATUC.

Reference to the TUC's Interim Report referred to above shows that in relation to the Public sector of the economy there had been a change in the immediate post-war philosophy that all trade union members of nationalised boards should be appointed from outside the industry in question. Henceforth, it was argued such board members should be from within, and:-

> ' (i) Legislation for nationalised industries should be altered to provide for one half of the board to be trade unionists, having some regard to the wider public interest;
>
> (ii) The procedure for appointment should be altered to provide that Ministers should formally seek nominations from the TUC for trade union appointments to all nationalised boards of statutory status;
>
> (iii) The TUC would normally seek nominations from unions within the industry covered by the board.'

Also, and of particular relevance to the feasibility studies within British Airways and proposals for joint control were the points that:-

> 'As well as extending the board level representation, it is necessary for the nationalised industries to play a leading role in the extension of industrial democracy at lower levels of managerial authority. Joint control can largely be extended through collective bargaining, and through the absorption of subjects for consultative machinery into the collective bargaining structure. At the same time direct involvement in managerial boards at lower levels (eg regional) should be provided for. It is important that there should be representatives of work people at the point where decisions are rarely taken, which in the public sector is often at sub-committees of the main board.' (6)

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(6) Interim Report paragraphs 96 and 97.

This can be seen, translated into British Airways terms regarding the structure of organisation which existed between 1974 and 1977, that staff side representatives should have been appointed to the Board itself, and to Divisional and Departmental Committees.

One may observe that the TUC's policy had swung from the extreme of no worker participation at all to one of participation on equal terms, which many members of management considered to be the opposite extremity. It was against this background that in the summer of 1975 Mr. Ron Crew, an active lay member of the Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs (ASTMS) and a staff side representative upon the Engineering Review Committee, tabled a paper which began a train of events that led eventually to the creation of the British Airways Trades Union Council.

CHAPTER 2

BATUC, a By-Product?

Any attempt to identify the origins of an organisation or historical trend is usually fraught with the danger of over-emphasising a particular action or the role of an individual. Often it is easy to minimise the complexity of factors involved in development and the interplay of forces which culminate in a change being effected. If one seeks to establish the origins of BATUC one can discern some of the causes which contributed to its creation in the events which were outlined in the last chapter, while others were inherent in the staff unrest over both redeployment and a government threat to tax staff travel concessions that prevailed in the 1974-76 period. Nevertheless, just as the gun that assassinated the Archduke Ferdinand of Austria proved to be the starting pistol for the German army's mad dash into Belgium in 1914, so it was the paper which Mr. Crew produced that prompted various forces on the staff side of British Airways to move into action and bring about the creation of BATUC, albeit that this was not one of the author's objectives. (1) Indeed, it will be shown that BATUC was basically a by-product of the document.

Luckily the consequences of Mr. Crew's paper, at least to date, have not proven so disastrous as the fatal shots fired by the misguided Gavrilo Princip at Sarajevo. Cynics might say that there is still time, and judging from the intensity of some of the debates both within and about BATUC, one could be excused for thinking that the cynics may yet

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(1) Crew, R, 'Industrial Democracy in British Airways' (July 1975). This is reproduced in full below as Appendix 2.

be vindicated. On the other hand it may be that the creation of BATUC will prove to have been a vital step towards the achievement of industrial democracy within the airline, with complementary staff side representation on the BAB accepted by the interested parties.

One may note from a historical point of view that industrial democracy had been discussed extensively within certain trades unions and the Labour Party during the 1960's, the outcome of which found expression in the policy statement of the TUC referred to above. Such discussions ensued in a number of the trades unions concerned with civil air transport both at a national and local level. (2) But despite the backing of the White Paper of 1969 on civil aviation which had given government support to the ideas of worker participation, nothing tangible had been achieved by the end of the decade.

Obviously there could be many reasons why a particular paper could prove successful in stimulating action while a host of others on the same theme could fail. But it seems reasonable to conclude that the protracted debate on industrial democracy during the first half of the 1970's and the changing technological scene combined to effect a revision of attitudes by a number of leading shop stewards at Heathrow. However, hostility to some of the main concepts remained strong in certain quarters and was to exert an influence upon the development of BATUC long after its inception.

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(2) 'Report of the Labour Party Working Party on Industrial Democracy' (London, 1967).

'Annual Delegate Conference Agenda 1965', Association of Supervisory Staffs, Executives and Technicians, (ASSET now ASTMS).

Bakewell, N.C, 'Worker Participation in Management', 1970.

Although it would be interesting to compare some of the papers involved this would delay the story of BATUC, and for the sake of brevity only Mr. Crew's document is reproduced below. One can see that it is a well presented case, and it may be noted that the arguments advanced included the basic policy of the TUC that worker directors should hold an equal share of board membership. The scope of the paper invites comment, but attention is herein restrained mainly to its fourth paragraph.

In this paragraph it can be noted that Mr. Crew maintained that the implementation of industrial democracy was 'as far away now as it has ever been'. But this assertion overlooked the extension of the range of management/trade union negotiations which, by dealing with matters other than pay and conditions of work, had brought industrial democracy closer to practical realisation. Indeed, in the penultimate paragraph of the paper Mr. Crew referred to developments of this nature, and concluded that they presented 'a great opportunity' for the introduction of industial democracy 'into British Airways'. One may judge the latter comments to be more realistic than the earlier and more pessimistic assessment.

It was also in his fourth paragraph that Mr. Crew argued that 'nationalised industries do not exist for private profit', and consequently it followed that 'democracy in the workplace is both feasible and advantageous'. Now while it is indisputable that nationalised industries did not, and do not, exist for private profit, it is a pity that Mr. Crew's paper did not indicate a recognition of the fact that

the financial basis of the nationalised industries had undergone some fundamental changes during the 1960's under both Conservative and Labour governments. These changes, it can be argued, had considerable significance for the implementation of industrial democracy within the public sector, and therefore warrant attention.

During the 1950's increased disquiet had been expressed at the financial returns of the nationalised industries. While it was accepted that good service should be provided by the industries, it was felt that the prices charged for goods or services were either too high or too low, and that inadequate returns were resulting from the numbers of staff and capital involved. As the importance of the nationalised industries was increasing the need to review the basis of their finance became more pressing.

Two government White Papers were introduced, one in 1961 the other in 1967, in attempts to determine the criteria by which the financial performance of the nationalised industries could be judged. This was not an easy task for some industries were expanding while others were declining, some were new and needed much capital, while others were old and had different investment needs.

All of these developments have been described elsewhere and only the conclusions reached need to concern us at this point. (3) The first White Paper 'emphasised that, although the industries had obligations of a national and non-commercial kind, they were not and ought not to be regarded as social services absolved from economic and social justification',

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(3) See Jones, K, 'Policy towards the Nationalised Industries', in 'British Economic Policy, 1960-74' op. cit. pp 484-514. The two White Papers described by Mr. Jones were 'Financial and Economic Obligations of the Nationalised Industries' Cmnd 1337, HMSO, 1961 and 'Nationalised Industries: a review of economic and financial

whereas the second White Paper 'started from the position that nationalised industries should be operated basically as commercial concerns and aim at promoting an efficient allocation and use of resources'. After examining different criteria it was shown by Mr. Jones that 'considerable progress was made in developing various techniques of investment appraisal', and that a pre-tax return of about 8%-10% on capital invested was, subject to qualification, a reasonable norm.

But in the financial year 1974/5, i.e. the period immediately preceeding Mr. Crew's paper and the last for which figures were then known, British Airways incurred a loss of £9.4 million. The short-fall on the expected return on capital invested was considerable, and if added to the loss actually incurred illustrates the degree of the financial set back that had taken place. (4)

A relevant question was whether or not the BOAC/BEA merger had assisted the newly created united airline to face the poor economic situation resulting from the Middle East War of 1973 in a better position than had two separate airlines remained. Lord Boyd Carpenter, Chairman of the Civil Aiviation Authority (CAA), provided a third party point of view in his evidence to the Parliamentary Select Committee in June 1975. He thought the merger had had a beneficial financial effect and stated that BA had done 'enormously better' than Pan American or TWA in the previous two years. (5) If financial benefits were to be obtained

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(4) 'First Report from the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries', 56 HMSO, December 1975. Quotations are taken from 'BA Reports and Accounts 1974-5', and it was stated by the Committee that during that year an operating suplus of only £0.7 million and a 1% return on mean net assets were achieved, which were insufficient to cover other costs p xxvii. In the financial year 1975-6 a loss of £16 million was incurred.

(5) Ibid, p xxviii

from the merger, and it was the opinion of senior BA management that this was so, it seems pertinent to ask what the attitude of BAB was regarding whether staff participation in decision making processes had helped or hindered integration developments.

The Select Parliamentary Committee report provides the answer, as a British Airways memorandum had informed the Committee that the BAB had sought:-

> 'the involvement of staff in the process of decision taking in areas which were under review for merger, nationalisation or reorganisation. Study teams with 50 per cent employee representation had been set up to examine Supplies function, Cargo, Personnel, Stationery and Printing, Space Control, and Engineering and Maintenance. BA acknowledged that participative studies of this kind, which they regarded as essentially a pioneering venture in industrial relations, had slowed down the progress of integration, for example in engineering and maintenance.' (6)

Such comments indicate that management felt it had gone a long way, and been rather bold, in the feasibility studies it had initiated.

A reader of the Select Committee report who is unfamiliar with events within British Airways could be excused for thinking that the participatory studies in the Engineering departments had been taking place for a lengthy period. In fact the first meeting of the Joint Engineering Review Committee was not held until 11 June 1975, at roughly the same time as management members and full time officers of the NJC were giving evidence to the Parliamentary team. What had caused delay was the fact that it had taken management approximately a year to persuade the staff at Heathrow to participate in the studies. (7)

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(6) Ibid, p xxxiv

(7) Paper 3 outlines the events which took place between June 1974 and the first Engineering Review Committee meeting one year later.

The causes for reluctance ranged from the already noted belief that the merger would exacerbate the danger of redundancies to shop floor views, previously held by the TUC, that there were serious disadvantages in trades unionists becoming involved in board room matters. While the feasibility studies fell short of constituting industrial democracy it seems reasonable to argue that staff side hostility to the studies overlapped with shop floor antipathy to board room involvement. Also, it is clear that such feelings prevailed in departments other than engineering.

The Wheels Begin to Turn

It was necessary for Mr. Crew's paper to have the backing of the trades union movement within British Airways before any positive action could be taken to realise its aims. As a first step Mr. Crew referred the document to the Airways National Advisory Council (ANAC), a subsidiary body of ASTMS, of which he was Chairman.

The ANAC considered the paper and arising from its presentation,

> 'there was a general discussion which largely centred on the wisdom of having Trade Union representatives on the BA Board. There was also consideration given to wider powers which might be given to worker representatives at Local Level.' (8)

It was decided that further thought should be given to the issues raised, and it was agreed that any motion that proposed action should be presented at the October meeting of ANAC. One is prompted to draw attention to the immediate evidence that was offered of the dubiety over the advisability of having trades union representatives on the BAB.

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(8) Minutes of ANAC held on 15th July, 1975 paragraph 81/74(a)

After further discussion at the October meeting of ANAC, a resolution was passed which asked the Naticnal Executive Committee of ASTMS,

> 'to give serious consideration to the acceptance of a policy for the introduction of industrial democracy in British Airways. In this context we recommend the paper by Ron Crew ..... as a basis for the necessary organisational changes to facilitate this policy. We would particularly emphasise the need for the participation of staff in the decision making process at all levels. To this end the present concepts of management authority and management responsibility must be replaced by the authority and responsibility of the staff. 'It appears to us that British Airways, a nationalised industry, is ideally suited to move forward to this form of control of its operation in the best interests of its staff, the industry and society at large.' (9)

Whatever criticism might be levelled at the resolution it was unequivocal regarding the kind of industrial democracy that ANAC wished to see introduced.

As a result of the October meeting Mr. E. (Ted) Mackenzie, Divisional Officer of ASTMS and a leading member of the NJC wrote to Mr. Clive Jenkins, General Secretary of ASTMS, conveying the terms of the ANAC resolution and asking for endorsement that it be forwarded to the Trade Union side of the NJC. (10) This was given, and at the next meeting of this body Mr. Mackenzie spoke on the need for a trade union policy relative to industrial democracy. In arguing his case Mr. Mackenzie,

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(9) Minutes of ANAC held on 14th October, 1975 paragraph 6/75 (g)

(10) Mr. Mackenzie wrote to Mr. Jenkins on 28th October, 1975. The positive response of Mr. Jenkins was reported to the next meeting of ANAC held on 13th January, 1976, minute 41/75 (b)

> 'stressed the urgency of the TU Side getting to grips with the problem and arriving at a unified policy for pursuance with British Airways; this particular aspect had assumed paramount importance, bearing in mind the nature of the new legislation on industrial democracy that is likely to be enacted by Parliament in the near future.' (11)

When the discussion was concluded it was agreed to refer the matter to the General Purposes Committee of the TU side of the NJC 'for further detailed examination ....'

At this point it can be noted that some five months had elapsed since the issue of industrial democracy was first placed before ANAC. Obviously it would make tedious reading, and require further research, if a blow-by-blow account were presented of all the relevant events which took place during 1976. Therefore it is hoped that some leap-frogging in the story will be acceptable and attention is now directed to a special conference that was held early in November of that year.

The November conference was held under the auspices of the Trade Union side of the NJC and invitations were issued on the basis of eight delegates 'for each Union per seat held by the Union in the National Joint Council'. Circulated with the agenda for the conference was a most useful paper prepared by Mr. Mackenzie which provided a summary of the events or 1976 as well as clarifying issues which required either a decision or action. (12)

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(11) Minutes of the NJC, TU side, quarterly meeting held 11th December, 1975, paragraph 8.

(12) Mackenzie, E. 'Conference on Industrial Democracy in British Airways' circulated in October 1976. This is reproduced below as Appendix 3, see pp 59-60 below. The Conference was held on 3rd November, 1976.

It can be ascertained from the paper that the trade union side was becoming more concerned with policy matters as distinct from the customary areas for negotiating. This was hardly surprising for apart from the moves towards staff side involvement with policy issues as outlined earlier, all workers in civil air transport had become increasingly concerned during the 1975/6 period with the role of the CAA and the allocation of route licences which had been reported upon extensively in the national press. It was thought that jobs were at stake, and this was another reason for staff side views to be heard at the highest possible level.

However it is clear from Mr. Mackenzie's paper that there was doubt on the trades union side regarding the form that worker participation in management should take, and in order to try to resolve the questions pertinent to the issue a delegate conference held during August had,

> 'decided there should be a British Airways Trade Union Council and formed a sub-committee to go into how it should be constructed and suggest terms of reference.' (Para. 8)

Delegates to the November conference were to be asked to adopt the terms of reference for this council, BATUC, and agree to the composition of its membership. From the paper one can see that great care had been taken to establish a relationship that would not clash with the NJC and the panel machinery, but instead become a complementary part of the existing framework. Nevertheless, some doubts still remained on the possibility of overlap between the NJC and BATUC and at the November conference an amendment to the terms of reference sought to clarify the responsibilities of the two bodies. (13)

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(13) See Appendix 3, pp 59-60 below.

But an important feature of Mr. Mackenzie's paper was the revelation of the manner in which BATUC had been decided upon. This can be judged to be the devising of a means to an end, namely the securing of staff representation at all levels, and not an end in itself.

No doubt research would reveal a summary of the November conference and of the subsequent conference held in January 1977. Such a summary would be interesting for revealing, possibly, the views expressed by shop steward delegates. But it seems reasonable to assume that any doubts on the progression of BATUC centred upon the continued hesitation over becoming involved in decision making, the possible undermining of the NJC, and the question of whether or not sectional interests would be affected. However, a summary of the decisions taken is presented in a succinct form in a circular letter which Mr. Mackenzie produced early in February that gave the agreed terms of reference and composition of BATUC. (14)

On the last day of February the first meeting of BATUC was held. It was well attended and got down to work to decide upon the dates for elections to various sub-bodies. But apart from procedural matters, certain policy issues were decided upon. (15)

The first policy matter was to ask the NJC to inform the management side that it would no longer co-operate with the Joint Manpower Committee, and this body was in fact terminated a few weeks later. However, of far greater importance was the resolution that was passed,

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(14) This letter of 2nd February 1977 is reproduced below as Appendix 4.

(15) Notes of the Meeting held on 28th February 1977, Large Cinema, Heston Training Centre.

> 'That this Trade Union Council asks the Executive Committee of this body to make early representation to British Airways to establish employee representation on all functional Management Committees and with this objective achieved the Council is to seek membership of the Executive Board of Management.'

It may be judged to be rather strange that no specific mention was made of the British Airways Board which was, and is, the supreme policy making body in the airline, and to which staff side membership was sought in Mr. Crew's original paper. Nevertheless, membership of the EBM would have given the trade union side a considerable degree of influence.

Some Brief Reflections

The attempts of BATUC to secure staff side representation on management bodies at all levels constitute, at the time of writing, an on-going story. It was hardly surprising that such a request should necessitate a most careful assessment of the implications by the trade union side no less than management. As shown above it took the staff side some 18 months to set up the machinery to examine what was involved and formulate precise demands regarding what should be implemented. This is not to make a criticism of the time taken, but to underline the magnitude of the tasks that were implicit in securing the introduction of industrial democracy.

It is hoped that it has been established that BATUC came into being to further certain specific aims. But there is a danger that an organisation set up for one purpose can be used for another, or in a manner not intended by its originators. Perhaps in looking at the

next part of the story one should bear in mind whether or not BATUC was being deflected from its original aims, and even if it were would this matter if it helped the trades union side, management, and the airline as a whole?

CHAPTER 3

1977, and the BATUC Baby begins to Toddle

After BATUC was established its activities fell into two main categories. One comprised its efforts to obtain staff representation at the highest levels of management in preference to the invitations to participate in non-executive Company and Departmental Councils. The other category concerned involvement in a number of day-to-day issues relative to the efficient running of the airline. It will be shown that in the first year of its existence BATUC's centre of concentration was upon the representation of staff issue, and that it was only by a comparatively slow process that it became involved in current problems.

Obviously its first year of its existence was crucial for BATUC to prove itself as a viable organisation, but 1977 was particularly turbulent for industrial relations within the airline. The progress of BATUC in its infancy has to be seen against a background of a major re-organisation of British Airways and a three-and-a-half weeks strike of AUEW member engineers that was particularly bitter in its consequences. The origins of the re-organisation lay in the latter months of 1976, an outline of which is pertinent to the story and should be considered first.

In November the BAB had presented an organisational report to Parliament which proposed, among other changes, the abolition of the Overseas and European Divisions of the airline. (1) The report was accepted and was due to take effect from 1 April 1977. It aimed to end the federal character of British Airways that had prevailed from its inception and make the merger of the former BOAC/BEA airlines more of a reality.

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(1) 'Fourth Report on Organisation' HMSO 722, November 1976. A full summary of the report was published in 'British Airways News', 12 November 1976.

But the plan was resented by large sections of management and staff, especially the engineers of the Overseas Division who felt that they were about to lose work as well as status to their opposite numbers in the European Division. Also, among the Overseas personnel there was a widespread feeling that too many top level managerial positions were being allocated to ex-European Divisional executives, which was giving the new airline a tilt towards its acquiring BEA characteristics.

For several years members of staff who were members of the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW) had claimed that their pay differentials relative to other staff grades were being eroded. An expression of this discontent was the withdrawal of the AUEW representatives from the airline's Panel Machinery in 1974. It therefore seems reasonable to assume a connection between the re-organisation of British Airways coming into effect in April 1977 and almost immediately afterwards a dispute beginning which involved the majority of AUEW members within the airline. The dispute escalated quickly into a full time stoppage of work, that was described both as a lock-out and an unofficial strike, and lasted for nearly the whole of April. (2)

It is difficult to make brief comments on the April dispute without being unfair to the parties involved. Obviously a separate assessment of the intricate claims and counter-claims would be helpful. But of importance to BATUC was the fact that during the dispute the other unions within the airline were critical of the unilateral action of AUEW members.

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(2) The dispute was reported extensively in the national press. In addition the main parties issued a series of news-sheets. A helpful record of the events leading to the dispute and which covers the first half of the conflict was published in diary form in 'British Airways News', 15 April 1977, p.8.

The consequences of the dispute and the cost to the airline and members were enormous. A British Airways statement claimed that in the first quarter of the 1977-78 financial year, the dispute had 'cost over £30 million in revenue and more than £20 million before taxation.' (3) Added to the dispute were the costs of several more local actions in the summer of 1977 regarding engine overhaul 'blacking'. Fears were expressed that engineering work contracted to British Airways by other airlines would be placed elsewhere, and undoubtedly there was a considerable loss of passenger goodwill.

These comments are not made in any sense of judgement but the cost of any dispute has to be faced and at this point one may note that the cost to BATUC was a souring of industrial relations at the very time it was to advance its claims for Board representation. Another cost, direct or indirect, was that the AUEW failed to participate in the organisational machinery of BATUC.

Documentary evidence, if any exists, regarding a conscious decision of the AUEW not to participate in BATUC is not readily available. What seems to have happened was that the AUEW's withdrawal from the Panel Machinery implied voluntary abstention from its representation on BATUC. The consequences of this development were serious, for although the number of AUEW members within the airline constituted only some 5%-6% of the total staff, the standing of the union within the Heathrow complex and its potential contribution to participatory exercises was clearly in excess of its proportional membership. (4)

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(3) A British Airways statement claimed that the April dispute had 'cost over £30 million in revenue and more than £20 million in profit before taxation'. 'British Airways News', 12 August 1977.

(4) No evidence of the exact number of AUEW members engaged in British Airways is readily available. It is thought that a figure of 3000 during 1977 would be a reasonable estimate. The total number of staff as at 31 March 1977 was 59,410. See 'BA's Report to Employees, 1976-77'.

AUEW absence was to create some embarrassment for BATUC's relationship with the NJC. Occasions arose when meaningful discussions could not take place without an AUEW presence and consequently meetings were to take place under a contrived joint NJC/BATUC umbrella that was not envisaged originally. However, this is to jump too far ahead and attention should be turned back to March 1977 and the early meetings of BATUC.

First Steps

When BATUC met for the second time towards the end of March attention was given to some outstanding constitutional and procedural matters. A previously circulated draft constitution was adopted formally, and an Executive Committee was elected which included a number of the leading full time trades union officials of the NJC. (5)

Immediately after the full Council's deliberations were concluded, the Executive Committee met and the first item of policy to be considered was that of industrial democracy. Mr. Mackenzie, the newly appointed secretary, reported that British Airways' management had prepared a draft statement on participation, and it was agreed that this should be circulated to all EC members. This took place early in April, and with the draft a paper on industrial democracy within the Post Office was included. (6)

It would be outside the scope of this paper to dwell upon the Post Office document, but it is relevant to point out that representatives of the Council of Post Office Unions (COPU) had 'argued strongly for union nominees to occupy 50 per cent of the total Board seats....' This

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(5) The Constitution is reproduced below as Appendix 5. The meetings of the Council and the Executive Committee were held on 28 March 1977. See minutes of these meetings.

(6) The British Airways management draft is reproduced below as Appendix 6.

may be seen as a further illustration of the acceptance by individual unions of the TUC's policy of demanding equal representation on the highest policy making bodies, and was a point that was not missed by members of BATUC when they considered the proposals of BA management for a 'British Airways Council' which they had before them.

BATUC did not meet in full session again until near mid-June, but it would seem that when it did convene management's proposals were not discussed in any great detail. (7) It was merely noted that the EC would meet with management later in the month.

On 22 June, Mr. Howard Phelps, the Personnel Director, and one of his staff met the EC, but there seems to have been some confusion regarding what the unions were demanding at this point and what management was offering. (8) From the summary of the exchanges and the minutes of the following meeting of the EC it is reasonable to assume that BATUC had believed that management had wanted to see an evolutionary process taking place regarding the creation of Departmental Councils which would lead to a British Airways Council. But management was in fact seeking the direct formation of an Airways Council without any preliminary stages, albeit it had noted that the absence of the AUEW representatives could cause difficulties.

Clarity on a number of these points was achieved at the EC meeting which had convened immediately before a second meeting with management was to take place. (9) In the discussion which ensued at the EC there was general

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(7) Minutes of BATUC, 13 June 1977.

(8) A management side summary of the interview is contained in document Pers.D 6.1, 6 July 1977.

(9) Minutes of BATUC Executive Committee, 12 July 1977.

agreement that what management was offering was a substitution for meaningful participation and that there was a danger that the proposed British Airways Council would be 'a mere talking shop'.

It was agreed that the trade union brief for the afternoon meeting would be:-

> '1) That as we see it, the creation of a BA Council is an alternative to TU membership on the Executive Board of Management. If this is so, the suggestion is wholly unacceptable, but if the BA Council is additional to membership of the Executive Board of Management, then its creation would be looked upon in a more favourable light.'
>
> '2) To make it clear to the Personnel Director that the TU nominees have got to be party to the "decision making" process wherever that may be.'
>
> '3) That if the current management structure does not exist to allow participation of this kind, then the structure should be altered to make such participation by TU nominees possible.'

While the EC believed that these points were reasonable, it was thought that the Personnel Director might wish to set up some kind of working group in order to examine and recommend upon the situation in depth. Accordingly it selected six of its members to serve if the occasion arose.

Whether an agreed summary of the Personnel Director/BATUC meeting exists is not certain, but six days after the exchanges had taken place Mr. Mackenzie sent a letter to all members of BATUC which gave a trades union version of what had occurred. (10) As this letter is reproduced as an appendix it is not necessary to summarise it, but one

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(10) Appendix 7, pp 67-68 below.

may note that the expected working party was set up, although there was 'a wide gulf between the views of the Trade Unions and the existing British Airways Board of Management'.

At the beginning of August on the eve of the first meeting of the joint working party, Mr. Phelps produced a paper that aimed at clarifying various concepts of management. (11) The paper was lengthy and made special reference to the legal obligations of the members of BAB. It is difficult to summarise the paper without incurring the risk of omitting points made, but reproduction of it as an appendix would take the present work to an extreme length. One important assessment of the envisaged Council was that,

> 'The Council is therefore to be set up specifically to introduce and develop participation which is itself an endless task. It will therefore grow into a larger role as it is felt appropriate by the participants without threatening those whose support for it is essential.'

Linked with the idea of growing authority was the elective principle, for the members were to be seen as the 'chosen representatives of the employees of British Airways'.

Mr. Phelp's paper also argued for worker participation 'in the more mundane levels of management', and this was a point that was in keeping with TUC policy. But it was made clear that it was not expected that any argument over the location of a particular piece of workshop machinery should be referred to the British Airways Council. However, the creation of the Council, and bodies at a lower level, would enable constructive exchanges of views to take place on the optimum use of resourses without every managerial move being subject to constant debate.

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(11) H. Phelps, 'The Management of British Airways and Employee Participation', August 1977.

Apparently members of BATUC were not over impressed by Mr. Phelp's paper nor the arguments of his colleagues for when the EC met afterwards, the document was described as one which would 'play down the need for worker participation in the Executive Board and extol the virtues of the proposed British Airways Council'. Discussion then ensued and it was agreed to recommend to the next quarterly meeting of BATUC that policy should be,

> ' i) To obtain a commitment from British Airways agreeing to Trade Union nominees becoming members of the Executive Board of Management by 1st January 1979 at the latest'.
>
> ' ii) Given this commitment the TU Council will join a BA Council in which a Participation Agreement can be settled'.
>
> 'iii) That we seek a meeting with the BA Chairman to make progress'.
>
> ' iv) Failing satisfaction we make representation to the appropriate Minister at the Department of Trade'. (12)

There could be no doubt that the EC was in a very determined mood and prepared to argue its case at the highest level possible.

At the quarterly meeting of BATUC held five days later most of the ground regarding the exchanges with the Personnel Director was gone over again. All the four points listed above were accepted by the members with an addendum, 'that failing satisfaction from the Chairman of British Airways within one month an approach be made to the Minister'. (13) Both sides seemed to be digging in for a protracted struggle.

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(12) Minutes of BATUC Executive Committee, 7 September 1977.

(13) Minutes of BATUC, 12 September 1977.

Unfortunately in the late summer of 1977, Sir Frank (later Lord) McFadzean, Chairman of British Airways, sustained a heart attack and was therefore unable to address the NJC on the state of the airline as planned. His place was taken by Mr. Ross Stainton, (later Sir Ross) the Deputy Chairman, who spoke to the paper that Sir Frank had prepared and which had been circulated to NJC members. (14) The contents of the paper made extremely gloomy reading and can be judged as sufficiently grim to tax the health of any of the airline's leadership. The influence of the April dispute of AUEW members, the poor state of industrial relations, inadequate levels of efficiency, and the difficulties of implementing the government's pay policy were the main matters described and examined.

A number of these issues voiced by Mr. Stainton had a clear significance for BATUC, and on the question of industrial democracy the Chairman's paper had stated,

> 'I have no hesitation in saying that I believe that staff can contribute to make the airline more efficient, if the right structure of relationships can be obtained and the right attitudes engendered. I believe that the best point to begin is by setting up a British Airways Council. The complexities of participation in British Airways, having regard to the multi-skill operation we are, and the numbers of Unions we have, means that we have to begin somewhere and I suggest that this shall be the British Airways Council, which we should aim to set up this autumn.'

But this was the starting point which BATUC could not, or would not, accept.

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(14) Minutes of the NJC, 15 September 1977. The paper was entitled 'Statement of the Chairman to the NJC'.

Any hopes which Mr. Stainton may have had for an autumn start to the proposed British Airways Council met a rebuff when he met the sub-committee of BATUC and headed the appropriate members of the management team late in October. At the December quarterly meeting of BATUC a report on the October exchanges made the statement that,

> 'The Management representatives had opposed our request for a commitment in principle to seats on the Executive Board. On being pressed they had expressed a need to report back to their Board and had promised a letter by late November or early December'. (15)

It was explained that the promised letter had been received by Mr. Mackenzie just before the meeting had begun. (16)

Discussion of the letter indicated that members felt that it advocated a backwards move and had only repeated 'the old arguments against worker participation'. It was then decided that an appeal should be made to the Secretary of State for Trade, but before this were done a further meeting should be sought with management in order to clarify 'a number of points in the letter'. This line of approach was accepted and it was agreed to seek such a meeting before the end of January 1978, 'and failing satisfaction, to make an immediate approach to the Secretary of State'.

Reflections on 1977

The birth of BATUC in February after the fairly lengthy gestation period of at least nineteen months (cynics might say nineteen years) was no doubt

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(15) Minutes of BATUC, 19 December 1977.

(16) The letter is reproduced as Appendix 8, pp 69-70 below.

seen by supporters of industrial democracy as a welcome event. But had it achieved very much in the first ten months of its existence?

A quick and not untruthful answer would be to reply in the negative, for it was clear that at the end of the year management had not yielded an inch regarding BATUC's demands for representation at the highest levels. An examination of the minutes of all the BATUC meetings reveals that such representation was the main and sometimes the only item on the agenda, and therefore lack of progress towards this end could only constitute failure.

But on a more positive note, even if as a by-product, BATUC had begun to meet regularly and had set up an administrative machinery. Members of different grades of staff, whose representatives were in separate NSPs, were meeting to exchange points of view and fairly close contact was being maintained with the full time officials of the NJC. Such developments hardly comprised a decisive step towards industrial democracy, yet the resilience shown towards the difficulties encountered had enabled BATUC to survive and be able to face the year which lay ahead.

CHAPTER 4

Diversification or Death

It is fairly obvious that if the 'shall' - shan't' argument had persisted between British Airways and BATUC regarding staff representation at executive level, then the Trade Union Council would have met an early demise. Management wanted staff co-operation, but it was in a position where it could continue to operate without staff presence at Board level. However, if BATUC were making no progress whatsoever towards achieving the one objective on which it was concentrating its efforts, then its future would have soon been at stake. But in the first half of 1978 BATUC changed its approach on the representation question, and it also became involved with a number of issues pertinent to the running of the airline. These included a scheme to transfer work from Heathrow to Gatwick airport, the closing of routes to Liverpool and parts of Scotland, and aircraft procurement policies in relation to new fleet plans. This extension of activities may be seen as a curtain raiser for events of a similar character that were to arise in subsequent years.

In the first quarter of 1978, the sub-committee of BATUC which had been set up to progress industrial democracy met, separately, Mr. Ross Stainton and Mr. Clinton-Davis, Under Secretary of State at the Department of Trade. These interviews made it clear that BATUC's desiderata would not be met, and it was the general belief of members of the sub-committee that the main opposition was stemming from Sir Frank McFadzean, while Mr. Edmund Dell, the Secretary of State for Trade and thus responsible for all BAB appointments, was not keen on staff side representation at

Board or EMB level. An individual staff side view was that,

> 'Clinton Davis, however, was helpful and urged our delegation to take up, as a first step, the question of representation on Departmental Committees. He said that he would do what he could to help.' (1)

When the Executive Committee of BATUC next convened a full verbal report was given on all the sub-committee's exchanges and policy was reviewed in depth.

The EC then prepared a draft resolution that summarised the results of the interviews that was to be placed before the next quarterly meeting of the full Council. This read,

> 'The Trade Union Council reaffirms its view that British Airways should be committed to introducing Trade Union representatives on to the British Airways Board within a specified time scale.'
>
> 'Nevertheless, and without prejudice to that view the Trade Union Council is concerned to make progress at Departmental level in British Airways and is anxious to achieve a greater involvement of their members in the organisation and day to day work of their departments. The Trade Union Council is, therefore, prepared to take part in a working party with British Airways Management on the following basis:-
>
> 1) That a working party be formed with an independent chairman and with representatives from the Trade Union Council and British Airways to examine the requirements needed for setting up Departmental Councils within British Airways. The working party shall report its findings within three months and shall include within its report its recommendations on the terms of reference, powers and constitution of the Departmental Council.

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(1) Letter from Mr. R. Crew to Mr. Clive Jenkins, General Secretary of ASTMS, 15 March 1978. In this letter Mr. Crew referred to the misunderstandings referred to briefly above, p 32 concerning management's proposals for a British Airways Council in contradistinction to Departmental Councils. It would take too long to describe this misunderstanding which is only of marginal importance to the story.

2) The working party shall also examine the more general implications for the introduction of industrial democracy into British Airways as a whole. In particular it will investigate the advantages and disadvantages of introducing a British Airways Council, including such a Council's terms of reference, powers and constitution. This examination will be without commitment to the Unions or to British Airways Management.'

At the quarterly meeting held a few days later this resolution was carried unanimously. (2)

Another item before the EC in March was a proposal to transfer work from Heathrow to Gatwick. Involved in the negotiations were the TU side of Ground Operations London (GOL), the General Manager of Employee Relations of British Airways, Mr. G. Bell, and the Chief Executive, Mr. Stainton. It was agreed that members from the interested panels of the NJC be elected to form the TU side of the proposed working party, that all members of BATUC should attend a special meeting to be convened by the Chief Executive on 22 March, and that the calling of a delegate conference be referred to the TU side of the NJC. Here one may note BATUC's involvement with an issue with an apparent overlap of responsibilities with the NJC.

Following BATUC's acceptance of the resolution on participation a meeting took place with senior management later in March. (3) Messrs. Stainton and Phelps headed the management team and thereby gave some indication of the importance that was being accorded to the deliberations. Of the six BATUC representatives, two, Messrs. Young and Mackenzie, were full time officials of the NJC.

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(2) Minutes of EC of BATUC held 9 March and those of the Council held 13 March 1978.

(3) 'Notes of the Meeting on Industrial Democracy' held on 20 March 1978 in the Board Room of Speedbird House.

Mr. Young, who had recently been elected the Chairman of BATUC, explained his organisation's views on how Departmental Councils could constitute an experiment which, if successful, could lead to full worker participation. In reply Mr. Stainton stated that he felt encouraged by the proposals, but was puzzled by the suggestion for an independent chairman. Mr. Phelps expressed his reservations regarding the character of the chairman and the possibility of an independent person being seen as a cataclyst rather than an arbitrator, which was the type of chairman required.

A counter-argument expressed by Mr. Young was that there was a need to experiment, and that every possible thing should be done to avoid the creation of a 'German style' supervisory board that could be regarded as a mere talking shop. After further exchanges it was agreed that Mr. Phelps would prepare a paper for BAB which would describe the new developments and make some specific proposals for a joint working party. He would then 'clear the shape of the proposal with Mr. Young', thus facilitating staff side acceptance if the Board agreed.

As a result of these deliberations a special meeting of BATUC was called when the two main items on the agenda were industrial democracy and the transfer of work to Gatwick. Circulated with the agenda were the proposed terms of reference for the joint working party. (4)

When the meeting began Mr. Mackenzie reported verbally on the exchanges with senior management and referred to the serious reservations which management had regarding the appointment of an independent chairman.

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(4) These terms of reference are reproduced below as Appendix 9. The special meeting of BATUC was held 11 April 1978, the minutes of which have been referred to.

If any member felt that the appointment of an independent chairman would be contrary to the spirit of TUC policy of appointments to boards coming from within the industry concerned he did not express such views. (5) Suffice to say that BATUC accepted the proposals for the working party to which management had somewhat surprisingly agreed.

When the question of the transfer of work to Gatwick was discussed, considerable alarm was expressed that work pertinent to British Airways was being lost to sub-contractors, and this was regarded as necessitating action. An indication of BATUC's broadening base was the passing of a resolution that,

> 'a Joint BA/TU Committee be established to discuss the development of BA operations at Gatwick and to recommend an effective plan to take full advantage of its commercial opportunities commensurate with the agreements commonly in operation at Heathrow.'

It was also agreed that the representatives on the TU side would be elected from within no less than seven NSP's, which is illustrative of the scope of the work involved.

In the discussion views were expressed that there should be further information made obtainable on the airline's commercial plans, and it was agreed to seek a one day meeting with management for this purpose. Another view was that a delegate conference should be held. It was agreed to ask for this, and, with the purpose of keeping a wider audience informed that,

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(5) See p 13 above.

> 'the TU representation to be, in addition to members of the NJC and other officials, 10 shop stewards or staff representatives per seat held by a Union on the NJC.'

In other words, among other matters, the door was open to AUEW representatives if they felt like walking through, thus circumventing their self-imposed ban.

There was one further development in the story of representation in the spring period. In late April, Mr. Mackenzie wrote to all members of BATUC that he had been advised that the BAB had serious doubts about proceeding with the proposed working party if there were to be an independent chairman. A counter-proposal was that the chair should be taken alternatively by a nominee of the airline and by BATUC. Mr. Mackenzie had consulted members of BATUC who had been at a meeting to discuss aircraft procurement and all had found this proposal acceptable. Therefore he was going to advise the Personnel Director of this agreement and it was hoped that the working party would begin to operate without delay. (6)

Procurement for a Moral Purpose?

Throughout the 1970's, the economic situation within Britain was declining. Unemployment levels, inflation rates, and balance of payments were all matters that at different times gave cause for concern. A genuine fear within the ranks of the trades unionists in British Airways, and no doubt in every industry, was that workers would be made redundant, or conditions of employment be seriously worsened by economic recession. The impact

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(6) Letter to members of BATUC from Mr. E. Mackenzie, Secretary, 26 April 1978.

of such apprehension as far as the sub-contracting of work outside of the airline upon the Engineering feasibility studies has been described elsewhere, (7) and it is hardly surprising that when the procurement of new aircraft was being discussed in the late 1970's that BATUC should have views regarding whether or not British aircraft should be bought.

British Aerospace (BAe) had only come into being as a nationalised concern comprising the British Aircraft Corporation, Hawker Siddeley Aviation, Hawker Siddeley Dynamics, and Scottish Aviation at the end of April 1977. (8) Many of the trades unions involved with BAe were also concerned with British Airways, and with a revival of the 1930's slogan that it was best to 'Buy British', BATUC became interested in what planes should be purchased. Just how it became interested is not clear from the documents, for it appears suddenly in the deliberations of the EC of BATUC. (9)

A few days before the EC meeting in question, its members had had discussions with managerial representatives of Rolls-Royce, and BATUC's report on the exchanges makes very interesting reading concerning that company's policy of aircraft engine production. When the EC convened it discussed the meeting with Rolls-Royce, and almost immediately some sectional differences arose, for whereas 'the E&M Panel unions were supporting British Aerospace and the re-equipment with 1-11's', two

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(7) Paper 6.

(8) 'Britain's aerospace industry' in 'Flight International' 21 July 1979, gives a history of the developments.

(9) Minutes of Special Meeting of the EC of BATUC 9 May 1978. Attached to the minutes was a report of a meeting between EC members and Rolls-Royce executives held on 5 May that was written by Mr. A.J. Clarry.

other members 'spoke of the need to have an aircraft capable of meeting BA's growing cargo carrying requirement and in the main the 1-11 does not do this whereas the 737 does.' Concern was also expressed regarding the route structure of British Airways and its capability of accommodating a mix of 1-11's and 737's.

The special meeting of the EC was followed by another one week later, and a full meeting of the Council on the same day. (10) At the Council meeting full reports of the exchanges with Rolls-Royce and the issues involved were given. A summary of the deliberations is, perhaps, best offered in the decisions that were taken,

> '1) That we accept the invitation of the Secretary of State for Trade to discuss with him BA's aircraft procurement policy.
>
> 2) That this BATUC recommends that the substantial amount of the BA order for new aircraft in the short term should be for Boeing 737's. We also recommend the purchase of a significant number of 1-11's commensurate with the commercial and operational requirements of BA.
>
> 3) In respect of longer term collaboration with either Europe or the USA the BATUC looks to collaboration that is consistent with optimum job creation for BA, R-R and BAe,
>
> 4) Arising from a view that aircraft procurement in BA should be subject to comprehensive and long term planning it was AGREED that this BATUC requests the Government to sponsor later this year a conference including representatives of airlines, manufacturers and trade unions to discuss future planning with a view to reconciling the interests of the three groups.'

Only two or three members opposed certain sections of the resolution, the scope of which makes clear the influence that a powerful BATUC could exert.

---

(10) Minutes of a Special EC meeting BATUC, 17 May 1978, and minutes of a Special Meeting of the Council.

On this point one can reflect that involvement with such issues was in line with TUC policy of worker involvement with those matters that had a direct bearing upon the well being of trades unionists. How well BATUC met the challenge may be judged by later events.

Mid-Summer and the Loss of Liverpool

The full Council met near to mid-June and it had a new item of business which overshadowed the issues of representation and aircraft procurement, for it was reported that British Airways was to withdraw its routes to and from the Liverpool airport. Also the transfer of work to Gatwick loomed larger than before. (11) These fresh developments could be regarded as symptomatic of a healthy organisation in an expanded range of activities.

On the issue of representation it was reported that agreement had been reached with management regarding the rotation of chairmanship of the working party. But despite strenuous efforts its first meeting could not take place until late June.

Mr. Tudor Thomas, a full time official of the Assocaition of Professional, Executive, Clerical and Computer Staff (APEX), and the NJC, reported upon various developments regarding aircraft procurement. A meeting with the Secretary of State for Trade had been arranged towards the end of the month. In addition Mr. Thomas spoke at some length on the problems confronting the Gatwick working party and he referred specifically to the difficulties of communication. He suggested that BATUC should consider the appointment of a full time secretary to the working party, and that British Airways

---

(11) Minutes of BATUC meeting held 12 June 1978. There was resentment within BATUC regarding what was considered a fait accompli by British Airways.

'should be invited to provide facilities for the secretary to operate.' It was agreed that this proposal be referred to the next meeting of the EC for consideration.

When the Liverpool question was discussed, the Secretary reported that the management of British Airways had made it clear that its decision to withdraw from Liverpool airport had stemmed from economic considerations. Manchester airport was comparatively nearby, and in the opinion of management the proximity of alternative sources could not justify the continuation of the heavy losses that were occurring in Liverpool.

Consideration was then given to the possibility of staff, as well as the routes, being transferred to British Midland Airways (BMA), but it was reported that efforts in this direction had failed. Questions were then asked regarding why BMA could contemplate making a profit, but British Airways' reply was reported as,

> 'that so far as they were concerned, structured as they are, they could not see the possibility of improving the profitability of the Liverpool routes within the next three years ....'

This then led to a discussion on the fate of the Liverpool staff and the undesirability from BATUC's point of view of handing over routes to a privately owned airline.

Apparently all the staff affected were to be offered redeployment within British Airways, but it was realised that many such staff were either unwilling or unable to transfer their homes to other parts of the country.

Obviously those staff who were to transfer to BMA and those who chose to be deemed redundant needed expert advice on their rights. Officials had met the staff, but that it would be necessary for them 'to meet the Liverpool shop stewards and staff representatives to discuss the matter further.'

Members of BATUC still felt worried over the Liverpool developments and a resolution was passed which gave expression to this concern. The same resolution instructed its appropriate sub-committee to seek a meeting with management in order to discuss route strategy 'and the apparent ease with which routes can be transferred to independent airlines'.

But as soon as discussion on the Liverpool question was ended, reference was made to similar developments which had occurred regarding some of the Scottish routes. It was agreed that as this matter was related to the Liverpool issue it should be raised at the proposed meeting with management.

As the month of June drew towards its close, active members of BATUC must have been surpised at the degree of diversification which had been achieved since the year began. In view of the long slow development period of 1977, and the lengthy gestation period before that, it would be inappropriate to describe the first half of 1978 as mushroom growth. Indeed, some may well have felt that the long preparation time was being justified by the quick but well entrenched developments that were occurring. But could the pace be maintained, and could BATUC prove adequate to face the challenges that seemed to be arising in so many different areas?

APPENDIX 1

BRITISH AIRWAYS

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION ON PARTICIPATION, 15TH AUGUST 1975

BETWEEN ENGINEERING SHOP STEWARDS

AND

GROUP PERSONNEL DIRECTOR

In the general context of participation, it was the view that simply putting a certain number of employee representatives on the British Airways Board was unlikely to lead to substantial changes. Any new structure must be related to current practice, including the position at local level. Continental proposals for separate supervisory and management boards were unlikely to be very beneficial. The attached diagram illustrates the sort of system which, it was felt, reflected these conclusions and which could form the basis for a useful discussion.

Briefly, it was the general view that the Joint Manpower Committee should be re-structured to include lay representatives. They would be current employees of British Airways and they would comprise at least 50% of the staff side of the Council. It would then be the centre of the new participative structure for British Airways, involving a close immediate liaison with the Executive Board.

Above the Council would be the unified British Airways Board for which in future the Staff side of the Council might elect from amongst themselves a number of representatives equal in number to the Executive Board members. The Chairman of the British Airways Board and the members of the Executive Board would continue to be appointed by the Government. There would be an "independent" third element on the Board, equivalent in number to each of the other two. A detailed description of the role of the Board would have to be worked out, but in general its function would be to guide the general policies of the firm, and to take decisions on major issues such as investment, mergers and closure. It would have the right to certain types of information, although members may be required to maintain the confidentiality of that information. The employee members would have particular responsibilities for communicating with the staff through the newly-established structure. Otherwise, they would have the same rights and obligations as the Executive Board members to safeguard the interests of the whole of British Airways and not any particular group.

The Council itself and any sub-committees it may care to establish, would be the focus for the consideration of those issues which are currently considered by either the Joint Manpower Committee or the full British Airways Board. It would include representatives elected by the Staff side of the proposed divisional councils, for which purpose the Engineering Review Committee would operate as though it were an engineering division. Assuming that there were two employee representatives on the Boards of Management of BACUK and BATL, they would automatically represent their organisations.

In turn below the divisional councils, all the work of the local panels in the NJC structure would fall most naturally within the scope of the local committees organised on the same basis as the new councils. Each council would re-organise the local panel structure within its boundary.

As assessment would need to be made of the operation of the new structure after a limited period, say two years. This would need to consider any further proposed impact on the existing machinery in the light of that operating experience.

APPENDIX 2

INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY IN BRITISH AIRWAYS

A Paper by Ron Crew

A society cannot be called truly democratic unless every aspect of that society is democratic. This apparently obvious fact is behind every call for industrial democracy.

Our society is based upon the assumption that every member of it has a share in, and, to a certain extent, is responsible for, the government of that society, through the medium of universal suffrage. Thus, it is called a democratic society. But that share, and that responsibility does not extend to the most important aspect of that society as far as the average worker is concerned; the place of work, upon which he relies to support himself and his family and at which he spends a major part of his life.

The importance of this omission can be gauged from the fact that our whole economic system is based on the worker - whether by hand or by brain - producing by his skill and effort the goods needed by society. Here, we have a paradox; a society that embraces fervently the principle of democracy except in one respect, in relation to the most important role of all; that of a man as a producer. The result is a crystallisation of the attitudes of the two sides of industry in permanent opposition: the interests of one diametrically opposed to the other.

In private industry, the task of overcoming this dichotomy of interest is enormous, but the nationalised industries, which do not exist for the purpose of private profit can show that democracy in the workplace is both feasible and advantageous. Thus it was hoped that when certain industries were nationalised by a Labour Government after the war the principle of industrial democracy would be built into the organisation of these industries. As we all know, it was not - indeed, that principle is as far away now as it has ever been. What happened, at least as far as the Air Corporations were concerned, was that an elaborate system of joint consultation committees was set up, but workers were rigidly excluded from decision making areas and the control of the industry was handed over to representatives of private enterprise.

What then, is industrial democracy? It means many things to many people; but at the very least, it must mean the involvement of staff in decisions affecting themselves and, ultimately, their dependents. This, in turn, means staff representation at all policy making levels within the firm, including the highest level of all - the Board of Directors.

In the formation of the Steel Corporation, some form of democracy was attempted, with the appointment of worker directors. Whilst this is a great improvement on the system of appointing trade union officers to Boards, as happened in BOAC, it does not in any way satisfy the demands of industrial democracy, as great pains had been taken to ensure that

the worker directors' ties with their shop floor origins have been broken, and the staff of the corporation have had no say at all in the appointments. Such a scheme is, at best, a rhetorical exercise and does nothing to satisfy the principle of involving staff, as a whole, in the decision-making necessary for the running of the industry in which they work, since the worker directors were appointed and not directly elected by the workers in the industry and the election of representatives is basic to true democracy.

What we know of the system of management in British Airways leads us inevitably to the conclusion that worker participation in their management is an experiment well worth tyring. Aircraft operation and maintenance is an industry which relies perhaps more than any other on harmony between staff and management: if the feeling of belonging in the industry, the feeling that British Airways is "ours" is lost, all the expertise in the world will not produce a good airline. It is our firm opinion that such a relationship is not possible where a sharp division exists between a decision-making management and staff.

The scheme outlined below is an attempt to put forward a practical and workable first step toward the principle of industrial democracy in British Airways. It is realised that it may not cover all the aspirations of those who seek workers' control, but the first step may be the hardest, and if the scheme is adopted, at least that step has been taken.

To make any system of industrial democracy meaningful, certain points of principle must be accepted. These may be summarised as follows:

(a) Worker participation in management is the involvement of staff at all levels in the process of decision making.

(b) The Panel system should be used to its full and proper extent.

(c) There should be direct representation of staff on the Board of Management of British Airways.

(d) Such representation should be by not less than one half of the total Board membership.

(e) The worker directors should be elected by the trade union membership in the airlines.

(f) No matter what election process be used, once elected a worker director would have responsibility to the whole of the airline staff membership.

PROCEDURE FOR THE ELECTION OF WORKER DIRECTORS

Several schemes are possible, all of which have various advantages and disadvantages. In the interests of simplicity and full democracy, the following scheme is probably the best, although some defects are inherent in it:-

(a) The whole of the staff of the Corporation who are covered by National Sectional Panels are arranged into sections by Panels. The details of each section can be decided at the time.

(b) A Conference of all Panel Representatives be held, at which the election would be discussed and the panel of Scrutineers and the Chairman of the panel be elected, from and by the Conference.

(c) Nominations from each section are then called for by the Scrutineers. Each nomination must have a number of endorsements - the suggested number is ten, but this can be decided - to reduce the possibility of frivolous nominations. All nominated persons must be members of their appropriate Trade Unions, as is the practice with Panel Representatives.

(d) Nominations are then published, and staff in each section elect one worker director from that section. Adequate distribution and collection of election papers would be essential. It is suggested that the possibility of using salary packets be explored followed by collection either physically or by the elector placing in ballot boxes.

(e) Scrutineers then count the votes and announce the results.

TERMS OF REFERENCE AND SERVICE OF WORKER DIRECTORS

When a Worker Director has been elected to the Board, he should act as a director and play his full part in the management of the Corporation.

This will clearly not be possible if he is disadvantaged in relation to the other directors by reason of his origins. It is therefore felt that the following should apply:

(a) His period of service should be the same as other full time directors. He would then retire but would be eligible for re-election. It has been argued that no representative should serve for more than two terms lest he lose contact altogether with his workshop floor or office origins and becomes a bureaucrat. This may be a real fear, but on balance it is better if a continuation of representation by a good representative is obtained. A worker director will have a difficult job; it will be even more difficult to have to find a succession of people to do it.

It is envisaged that in the early stages the employee members of the Board would be somewhat out of their depths in the rarefied atmosphere of the boardroom and would, practically out of necessity, concentrate on matters of more direct interest to staff: safety, conditions, welfare, education and so on. But as time goes by they would be in a position to take a closer interest in the more complex working of the Board. This is another reason why the compulsory limitation of service on the Board may be inadvisable.

(b) His salary should be the same of other full-time directors.

(c) His job must remain open, and he must lose none of his rights as an employee. As far as pension rights are concerned, these must operate in the same way as for any other person within the Pension Scheme; pension must be calculated on actual earnings during the relevant qualifying period.

(d) He must have equal rights with other directors with regard to clerical assistance and access to advisors. In addition, he will have access to advice from Trade Union and Panel sources.

PROCEDURES FOR REPORTING BACK TO STAFF

The success of any scheme for elected staff representation on a Board of Directors depends on continuing contact between worker directors and the staff who elected them. Regular reporting back and the ability of staff to question their representative is really the most important facet of the whole system; without it, the scheme is valueless. It would serve as a criterion when the worker director's quality of service is considered at election time.

To this end, it is suggested that meetings be held as follows:

PANEL REPRESENTATIVES

Worker directors should attend meetings with all Panel Representatives within his section of staff at least once a quarter.

STAFF

Worker directors should attend meetings with staff generally at least one per year.

TRADE UNION DEMOCRACY

If the scheme outlined above were adopted, participation of staff in the running of the Corporation's affairs would extend throughout the different levels of the Corporation from the Board of Management to shop floor level, providing that the local and national Panels function correctly under the Constitution, which forms the basis for all agreements between Management and Staff.

LOCAL LEVEL

The Memorandum of Agreement on the Constitution and Functions of Local Panel Committees states that these Committees "shall be empowered to consider and decide matters of local concern within the framework of agreements recorded by the appropriate Sectional (National) Panel" but cannot alter the agreements. The Constitution particularises certain matters, such as efficient use of the maximum number of productive hours;

maximum and most efficient use of vehicles, plant and machinery; ventilation; and so on. The only matters which are specifically excluded from discussion at local level are those which can only be covered at national level. The Constituion lays down that:

'Local Panel Committees may not reach decisions which are:

(i) contrary to national agreements on trade questions, such as wages and like subjects, or

(ii) on wide questions of policy going beyond the base concerned.'

It may be seen, therefore, that the range of matters within the purview of Local Panels is very wide indeed. For example, one subject quoted above, 'Efficient use of the maximum number of productive hours' may be held to cover practically every facet of work within the laid-down hours apart from wages.

The powers of Local Panel Committees therefore assume great importance and when the wording of the Constitution is studied the possibilities of the use of these Panels in a system which provides for industrial democracy become obvious. The Constitution lays down that these Panels shall 'consider and decide'. The prerogative of management to take decisions on any of the wide range of matters falling within the scope of Local Panel Committees is, to put it at its lowest, severely limited. The proper place for such decision-making is not the Manager's office but the Panel meeting.

The base for industrial democracy within British Airways therefore, already exists. Admittedly, up to now the Panels have not been used in this manner to any great extent but that is the fault of the operators, not the machinery. The machinery is there: it is up to the unions to make sure it works.

NATIONAL LEVEL

The principle of industrial democracy, however, would not be fully served in the Civil Air Transport industry unless full democracy on the staff side of the joint consultative machinery was achieved at the same time. To this end, the following proposals are put forward for consideration by the trade unions concerned:

(a) Lay members, employed in the industry, should be elected on to the Trade Union Side of the National Joint Council for Civil Air Transport in the proportion of one lay member to one full-time official.

(b) The staff sides of the National Sectional Panels should consist of lay members plus full-time officials, as at present on the SE & T Panel.

CONCLUSION

A draft document recently issued by ASTMS for discussion by the Hawker Siddeley Aircraft and British Aircraft Corporation NACs entitled 'Trade Union Involvement in Management of a Nationalised Aircraft Corporation' began:

'The Consultative Document on the public ownership of the aircraft industry contains the following paragraph on Industrial Democracy:

> "Workers in the aircraft industry have been among the leaders in developing the concepts of industrial democracy. The Government attaches great importance to increasing the democratic participation of workers in decision making at all levels of industry. Industrial democracy should develop organically from the views and proposals put forward by the management, workers and trade unions concerned. The Government will consider in the light of the present consultations with all parties in the industry how this process can best be encouraged."

The Secretary of State is in many senses issuing a challenge to the movement to clarify its ideas on this subject. For many years the policy of nationalisation of the industry has been adopted at conferences of major unions, the CSEU, TUC and Labour Party, and the need to involve the workers in the industry has been constantly stressed. However, the trade union movement has never clarified in concrete terms how this involvement would be carried out.'

The draft document refers, of course, to the nationalisation of the aircraft manufacturing industry, but its subject is equally relevant to the CAT industry, and this Paper is an attempt to show how such an involvement could take place in its nationalised sector.

The interest being taken in the subject of industrial democracy, both in this country and abroad, together with the unique Constitution upon which all agreements in the industry are based, present a great opportunity for its introduction into British Airways.

Its benefits, to the industry, its staff and to the country, I believe to be self-evident. The amendment necessary to existing legislation would be simple. It is to be hoped that, for reasons which can only be sectarian or dogmatic, this opportunity will not be lost.

[JULY 1975]

Author's Note: An earlier version of this paper had been written by Mr. Crew in the late 1960's.

APPENDIX 3

CONFERENCE ON INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY IN BRITISH AIRWAYS

1. At the request of constituent unions the TU Side of the NJC has been considering this subject.

2. There are a number of pressures operating at present - trade union and Labour Party policy, statements of intent by Ministers in the present Government etc.

3. British Airways through the NJC has a formal relationship with the Unions on industrial relations and collective bargaining matters and a less formal consultative attitude on policy matters.

4. The general view expressed is that the employees through their unions should be formally party to all decision making in BA - in other words there should be worker participation in management.

5. The question arises - to what degree? and at what levels?

6. The TU Side takes the view that these are matters for debate and consultation with staff before entering into discussions with the Employer.

7. To this end a small trade union delegate conference was held at the beginning of August.

8. This conference decided there should be a British Airways Trade Union Council and formed a sub-committee to go into how it should be constructed and suggest terms of reference. It also recommended a larger delegate conference be held later in 1976.

9. As a result of these deliberations the Trade Union Side of the NJC recommends this delegate conference to adopt the following:-

   a) There shall be formed a British Airways Trade Union Council.

   b) It will operate under the following terms of reference:-

      To be responsible for the joint trade union view on matters relating to the operation and planning of British Airways and for the development of worker participation in British Airways management.

c) The TU Council will be manned by members nominated by the TU Side of each National Sectional Panel on the following basis:-

Engineering and Maintenance	7
Clerical and Clerical Admin	6
Administrative Staff	4
Air Cabin Crew	3
Supervisory Engineering and Technical	2
Ground Services Staff	2
Ramp Services Staff	2
Pilots and Pilot Officers	2
Senior Staff	1
Flight Engineers	1
Technical Engineering Staff	1

d) The secretary of the TU Side of the NJC to act as secretary to the TU Council.

e) The chairman to be elected annually by the TU Council from among its members.

f) The TU Council should commence operation in January 1977.

(signed) E. MACKENZIE
SECRETARY - TU SIDE
NJCCAT

[Circulated October 1976]

APPENDIX 4

ASTMS

ANNABELLE HOUSE, 28 STAINES ROAD, HOUNSLOW, MIDDLESEX

2nd February 1977

To: AIRWAYS CIRCULATION LIST

Dear Colleague,

Re: BRITISH AIRWAYS INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY

Following a request from ASTMS, the Trade Union Side of the NJC has been considering the extension of industrial democracy (worker participation in Management) in British Airways. There are no pre-determined views on this but the publication of the Bullock Committee's report sharpens up the whole issue.

The Trade Union Side has taken the view that on this important policy issue it is essential to involve staff representatives, and to this end three conferences have been held, one for the TU Side members in August 1976, the others on a wider union membership basis in November 1976 and January 1977.

At the conference held on 31st January it was agreed to establish a British Airways Trade Union Council with the following terms of reference:-

> 'To be responsible for the Joint Trade Union View (outside of the current negotiating structure on terms and conditions of employment), on matters relating to the operation and planning of British Airways and for the determination of Worker Participation in British Airways Management.'

This Council will comprise the members of the Trade Union Side of the NJC (28 in all) plus 38 staff representatives to be appointed by the Trade Union Sides of National Sectional Panels on the following basis:-

PANEL	NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES
E & M	8
Clerical	6
Administrative	5
Air Cabin Crew	4
General Services Staff	4
Pilots	3
SE & T	3
Ramp	2
Technical Engineering	1
Senior Staff	1
Flight Engineers	1

It will be seen from the terms of reference that it is the responsibility of the Trade Union Council to develop a TU Side attitude to worker participation in British Airways acceptable to the various unions and the staff they represent, in preparation for negotiations between the Trade Union Side and British Airways on the subject.

Yours sincerely,

E. Mackenzie
Divisional Officer

APPENDIX 5

BRITISH AIRWAYS TRADE UNION COUNCIL

CONSTITUTION AND RULES

1. TITLE AND TERMS OF REFERENCE

There shall be a body known as the British Airways Trade Union Council to operate within the following terms of reference:-

" To be responsible for the joint Trade Union view (outside of the negotiating structure on terms and conditions of employment), on matters relating to the operation and planning of British Airways and for the determination of worker participation in British Airways Management. "

2. COMPOSITION

The membership will be each member of the Trade Union Side of the National Joint Council for Civil Air Transport and members appointed by the Trade Union Sides of National Sectional Panels on the following basis:-

Engineering and Maintenance	-	8
Clerical and Clerical Admin.	-	6
Administrative Staff	-	5
Air Cabin Crew	-	4
Ground Services Staff	-	4
Pilot Officers	-	3
Supervisory Engineering and Technical	-	3
Ramp Workers	-	2
Technical Engineering	-	1
Senior Staff	-	1
Navigating and Engineer Officers	-	1

3. OFFICERS

a) Chairman

The Chairman will be elected at the Annual General Meeting.

b) Secretary

The Secretary will be the Secretary of the Trade Union Side of the National Joint Council for Civil Air Transport.

c) Vice-Chairman

The Council will elect annually a Vice-Chairman from among members of the Executive Committee.

4. EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

There shall be an Executive Committee comprising the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, the Chairman of the Trade Union Side of the National Joint Council (if this office holder is not the Chairman of the Trade Union Council), the Vice-Chairman of the Trade Union Side of the NJC, the Secretary and one member from each National Sectional Panel grouping.

5. SUB-COMMITTEES

The Trade Union Council of the Executive Committee may form Sub-Committees for specific purposes, comprising five members. Sub-Committees have power to co-opt additional persons. Co-opted members will not have voting rights.

6. MEETINGS

The Trade Union Council will meet quarterly on the second Monday in March, June, September and December each year. The March meeting will be the Annual General Meeting.

The Executive Committee will itself decide the frequency of its meetings.


7. QUORUM

The quorum for meetings of the Trade Union Council shall be 20 and for the Executive Committee 6.

8. NEGOTIATION/CONSULTATION

When meetings are to be held with British Airways the Executive Committee will appoint the Trade Union Council's delegation.

No agreement within the terms of reference can be concluded with British Airways without endorsement by or authority from the Trade Union Council.


BRITISH AIRWAYS
BRITISH AIRWAYS BOARD
CHAIRMAN
B.A. Council representatives equal in number to the Executive Board Memebers.
NATIONAL JOINT COUNCIL FOR CAT
GENERAL PURPOSES COMMITTEE
NATIONAL SECTIONAL PANELS
LOCAL PANELS
Ultimately, Elect representatives
BRITISH AIRWAYS EXECUTIVE BOARD
Immediate monthly meetings
BRITISH AIRWAYS COUNCIL
Staff Side: One-third Full time officers; Two-thirds Lay representatives
Management Side: Appointment by Managing Director
BRITISH AIRWAYS
Line and Personnel Management
Elect representatives
Members
Divisonal Councils
Engineering Review Committee
(later Division)
Air Council
(Worker Members)
BACUK B of M
(Worker Members)
BATL B of M
LOCAL COMMITTEES

9. RIGHTS OF MEMBERS

Each member of the British Airways Trade Union Council is a member in his/her own right and is able to initiate business through the Secretary.

10. AMENDMENT TO CONSTITUTION

The Constitution can be amended by any member of the TU Council giving notice at or before a statutory quarterly meeting detailing his/her proposals. The proposal will be debated and decided upon at the quarterly meeting subsequent to the one at which the notice of motion has been given.

In emergency situations a member of the TU Council can give notice prior to a statutory quarterly meeting of his/her intention to propose an amendment to the Constitution at that quarterly meeting. In these circumstances, the proposer of the motion will be allowed to address the meeting on why he believes an emergency situation exists requiring a change to the Constitution. There shall be no deabte on this issue and the Council will proceed to decide whether the motion should be considered. In these circumtances a two-thirds majority of those voting will be required to enable the motion to be considered at the meeting in question.

In either case, a decision to amend the Constitution can be agreed by a simple majority.

[ADOPTED 28 MARCH 1977]

APPENDIX 6

AIDE MEMOIRE

BRITISH AIRWAYS COUNCIL

SUMMARY OF THE PROPOSAL [MANAGEMENT DRAFT]

1. A British Airways Council to plan, introduce and develop participation throughout British Airways.

2. All employees to be enabled to contribute to decisions on matters not subject to contractual bargaining.

3. First task to conclude a Participation Agreement.

4. A continuing function to assist in formation of main policy and strategy decisions.

5. Consist of President plus some 30 members who are representatives nominated or elected from British Airways employees.

6. About 20 employee representatives chosen through the Trade Union machinery.

7. About 10 management representatives to include both nominees of the Executive Board and some elected by their fellow managers.

8. Procedures for election to be approved by JMC in the first instance, thereafter the Council itself; the Council will write its own rules and procedures.

9. Council member not to serve by reason of his office, but as individual representative.

10. No deputies or alternates: quorum of three quarters: six meetings a year.

11. President nominated by the British Airways Board.

12. Secretary appointed by Council: secretariat to arrange for adequate reporting.

13. Council to be a 'round table'.

14. Financed by British Airways Board who will approve an annual budget.

[Circulated April 1977]

APPENDIX 7

NATIONAL JOINT COUNCIL FOR CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT

TRADE UNION SIDE

Secretary: E. MACKENZIE

ASSOCIATION OF SCIENTIFIC,
TECHNICAL AND MANAGERIAL STAFFS,
28 Staines Road,
Hounslow, Middlesex TW3 3JS.

Telephone: 01-570 2100

18th July, 1977.

TO: MEMBERS OF THE BA TRADE UNION COUNCIL

Dear Colleague,

I am attaching hereto a copy of the Minutes of a meeting of the Executive Committee held on 12th July, from which you will see that there has been a meeting with the Personnel Director of British Airways on 22nd June and the Executive Committee meeting was followed by a second meeting with the Personnel Director and certain colleagues.

I think you will find that the Minutes are self-explanatory, but I believe you should know that at the meeting with the Personnel Director during the afternoon of 12th July, apart from re-emphasising the views he expressed previously, no further progress was made. We stressed our opinion that we wanted to be represented wherever it is that the decisions are taken and so far as we could see from what was being explained to us, the most effective place to have our representatives was on the Executive Board of Management. Mr. Phelps told us that he had reported to the Executive Board the nature of the exchanges that had taken place on 22nd June and it had been decided that the Engineering Director, Mr. K. Wilkinson, and himself should be authorised on behalf of the Executive Board of Management to deal with the TU Council in pursuance of our aims.

It appears to me that there is some considerable hostility to any suggestion of worker directors on the Board of BA, which in any case would have to be agreed with the Secretary of State who makes the nomiantions. There is equal hostility to the suggestion that Trade Union nominees should be on the Executive Board of Management. We did, however, agree to examine each other's points of view in a smaller gathering and it was agreed that the small Sub-Committee of the Executive Committee mentioned in the Minutes will meet with Messrs. Phelps and Wilkinson to probe the matter further.

The Executive Committee takes the view that while the realisation of our objectives at the present time is going to be a difficult task to fulfil, there is some urgency in getting an agreement with BA because if there was to be a change of Government at a future general election the political climate then existing might make the conclusion of such arrangements impossible.

The Executive Committee, therefore, is dedicated to proceeding with this matter as urgently as possible, but already it is quite clearly established that there is a wide gulf between the views of the Trade Unions and the existing British Airways Board of Management.

Yours sincerely,

E. MACKENZIE
Secretary

APPENDIX 8

To Members of the BA TU Council

British Airways

B r i t i s h
A i r w a y s

PO Box 10
Heathrow Airport (London)
Hounslow TW6 2JA

Telephone: 01-759 5511

Mr. E. Mackenzie
Secretary of the TU Side of the NJC
ASTMS
Annabelle House
28 Staines Road
HOUNSLOW, Middx.

PersD 29.4

13 December 1977

Dear Ted,

You left us to consider a number of points which you raised in connection with the proposals we have made to you about the setting up of the British Airways Council.

The Board has given very careful thought to the points you raised. You asked for memebrship of the Executive Board Meeting because you said you wished to be present when decisions were taken. In our view it would be very difficult for managers to discuss certain lay matters, particularly detailed industrial relations affairs, with complete freedom and openness if staff representatives were present at such a forum. Such a presence would simply act as a severe inhibiting influence on management decision-making and would slow down the whole process by which the company is managed. Further, we are certain that staff representatives would find themselves party to decisions about which they would wish to bargain. Increasingly they would discover that their role in the collective bargaining process was undermined by the knowledge of, and identification with, management decisions. We believe that experience in other companies shows that such a route to participation is untenable for both managers and trade unions. For these reasons we cannot accept your request for places at our Executive Board meeting.

However, we fully accept the need for a structure to allow our employees' aspirations for greater influence to be fulfilled, while at the same time making necessary leadership more clearly understood and acceptable. The problem is that the day to day activities of managers should not be open for debate but there is a pressing need to develop an open participative management system where decisions are accepted against a background of known policy. We would like, against this background, to propose a forward looking set of proposals designed to lead us towards the goal of greater participation as follows:-

1. British Airways Council

2. Departmental Councils

3. Restructured local panels

4. New direct employee communciations.

We would like to open immediate discussions about these matters but we do believe that these proposals should be given wide publicity. It seems to us to be important that we should ensure that employees have the fullest knowledge of such proposals because it is they who will contribute to their effective working.

It follows from this that there will be a changed emphasis on the industrial relations machinery. We therefore ask you to join with us in making the appropriate changes to the National Joint Council and its National Sectional Panels.

These proposals are made in the light of the British Airways Board's re-affirmation of its commitment to participation. Further, we wish to give you our support for your own inter-union machinery. We would like you to join us in taking speedy action on the proposals, for we believe that it is only by moving in this direction that we can learn together. Indeed, the setting up of the British AirwaysCouncil and its contituents might well result in significant employee participation on the Board itself when we all judge that we have sufficient experience and understanding to make such an innovation work well.

Yours sincerely,

HOWARD PHELPS
Personnel Director

cc Mr. L. Shorter

APPENDIX 9

WORKING PARTY ON THE INTRODUCTION OF DEPARTMENTAL COUNCILS INTO BRITISH AIRWAYS

Terms of Reference:-

1. The Working Party will comprise representatives appointed by the British Airways Trade Union Council and by the Board of British Airways.

2. The Working Party will agree upon an Independent Chairman who will facilitate the proper discussion of the issues referred to the Working Party.

3. The Working Party will consider the setting up of Departmental Councils within British Airways including the constitution of any such Departmental Council, its terms of reference and methods of procedure.

4. The Working Party will also consider employee participation in the context of some overall structure and its relationship with the Departmental Councils.

5. The Working Party will report to the British Airways Trade Union Council and to the Chief Executive of British Airways.

[APRIL 1978]

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THE BRITISH AIRWAYS TRADES UNION COUNCIL

AND ITS STRUGGLES, JUNE 1978 - NOVEMBER 1979

Peter Richards MSc(Economics) PhD

July 1982

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	Page 1
CHAPTER 1 The Pace of Change Begins to Quicken	Page 4
CHAPTER 2 Not a Good Beginning to the New Year	Page 19
CHAPTER 3 Summertime and the going is ....?	Page 31
CHAPTER 4 Routes and Industrial Relations	Page 46
CHAPTER 5 The Crunch that never came	Page 67
APPENDIX 1 Draft Outline Constitution for Departmental Councils, Paper by Howard Phelps, July 1978	Page 70
APPENDIX 2 British Airways Industrial Relations, Paper by Ron Cew, November 1978	Page 72
APPENDIX 3 Full Statement of John Nott, Minister for Trade, announcing the Government's proposals regarding British Airways, July 1979	Page 76
APPENDIX 4 UK & Ireland Route Network: Problem Routes, Paper by Gerry Draper, August 1979	Page 77
APPENDIX 5 For Whom the Bell Tolls - A Trade Union Solution to British Airways Problems, leaflet by Tudor Thomas and Mark Young, October 1979	Page 80
PREVIOUS PAPERS BY PETER RICHARDS	Page 83

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INTRODUCTION

In an earlier paper on the development of the British Airways Trades Union Council (BATUC) an outline was made of the efforts of the airline Trades Unionists to secure equal representation upon the British Airways Board (BAB) in accordance with the policy of the TUC regarding industrial democracy. It was explained that these efforts led to the creation of BATUC which fairly quickly became involved with general policy issues, as distinct from the long established National Joint Council and its complementary panel machinery which handled negotiations on wages and working conditions. Such matters as route structures, the utilisation of airports, aircraft procurement and industrial relations were some of the matters with which BATUC became engaged, sometimes with only a 'grey area' separating its role from that of the NJC.

During the mid-1970s just before BATUC came into being, worker participation in decision making processes was heralded as the panacea for most production problems. But the present paper deals with a period, mid-1978 until the end of 1979, when industrial democracy fell like a lead balloon in the IR popularity polls, and its advocates found themselves being shunned like the pop stars of yester years.

Obviously not all the trends which were at large throughout the country had a proportional influence on BA, but the strong external forces with which the BAB had to contend had a marked influence upon its dealings with its workforce. Although this paper concentrates upon BATUC's development as a Council and its relations with the airline's Management, the chronological account is sometimes disturbed by reference to the national and international events which were having an impact on industrial relations.

Readers familiar with the present desperate measures which BA is taking in order to survive may regard the events described here as being episodes from a golden era of the past. Therefore, one might well ask, can one afford the time to reflect upon a situation that has been washed away within the space of between 2 - 3 years?

It is hoped that the indications of the speed of change will be of some help to interested parties in assessing the present situation in a more comprehensive fashion. For example, in recent times I have heard Managers and Trades Unionists within the airline blame current misunderstandings upon each other for getting yesterday's sums wrong. This account may help to illustrate how difficult it was to get one's sums right even with the help of micro and main frame computers. Indeed, one may well ask if any computer, micro or main frame, could be programmed to answer the type of question posed in the final chapter of this paper.

One may also reflect upon the point that the forces which drive a pendulum to swing one way have a reverse action. If this analogy is applicable, then the expression industrial democracy should be heard once more in Board rooms and TU conferences before the 1980s progress much further.

As indicated in a footnote to the text, from May 1979 onwards, I have been recording the work of BATUC from the prvileged position of having been invited to its meetings and having access to its documents. This account is based upon BATUC sources. Although access to Management material has been confined to its public statements and its exchanges with BATUC, I am grateful for the assistance which I have received from Management.

It might be of purpose to state that my connection with BATUC arose from my monitoring of the joint Feasibility studies that were set up to examine the possibilities of the unification of the separate Engineering complexes following the BOAC/BEA merger in 1972. Seven papers on these worker participation exercises have been published which have been listed separately. They are referred to in this paper in the order in which they appeared.

Finally I should like to thank all members of BATUC who have not only invited me to their meetings, but have been most patient in their explanations of matters of detail. Mr. Colin Varndell, the present Chairman, has been most helpful, even if he were responsible for my having to get up at 4 am one Sunday morning in order to hear him address his own particular work group who were on the early shift. To this day my usual trusting wife does not believe my account of where I went to that morning.

May I also place on record my thanks and admiration for the work of Miss Susan Bromwich of BALPA who has painstakingly typed and collated this and the previous paper.

Slough College of
Higher Education

Peter Richards
July 1982

CHAPTER I

The Pace of Change Begins to Quicken

The second half of 1978 may be assessed as being a period of comparative calm before the Management and Staff sides of British Airways were confronted with a number of major developments, either in new or sharper forms, that were vital to the future of the airline. Problems arising from the ever worsening economic situation, and the continuous need to keep ahead in the costly area of new technology, were compounded by the advent of deregulation which made Civil Air Transport far more competitive both nationally and internationally. Its introduction influenced industrial relations within British Airways, if not immediately, then in growing force as the decade ended.

Deregulation in its contemporary phase originated in the United States in the autumn of 1978. One expert described the main constraints that were abandoned and then asked, 'Is this anarchy?'. He answered his own query by observing that:-

> 'Although some airlines, mostly those who have been hurt by deregulation, say it is, the intent of Congress .... is to allow the "unseen hand" of Adam Smith to operate in the airline market place'. (1)

Almost immediately, the 'unseen hand' of market force competition spread from the United States to Europe. (2)

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(1) Burckhardt, R, 'Two Years of US Deregulation', 'Flight International', 22 November 1980, p. 1982.

(2) See also Rek, B, 'Europe at the Crossroads', Ibid, 26 May 1979, p. 1739 and Ramsden, J.M, 'No deregulation without "desovereignity"', Ibid, 27 October 1979, p. 1337.

Indeed, it was as early as October 1978 when BAB gave warning of the increased competition to be expected when it announced its plan for action:-

> 'British Airways will undergo a clear and decisive change of course over the next eight years, Chief Executive Ross Stainton said .... It will become a far bigger airline as it expands to meet the demands of a passenger and cargo market that is expected to double in size by 1986'

However, the report continued:-

> 'But it will be facing an "icy blast" of unrestrained competition from both foreign and British airlines and will have to change many long established ways of operating. "In the long run", he said, "the issue is survival."' (3)

If words meant anything this statement was a serious warning to all BA personnel of the dangers, as well as an indication of potential growth, that were inherent in the developing situation.

Details of BAB's plan appeared in the national press, which were summarised in one account as:-

> 'Fares: a 40 per cent cut short haul and a 25 per cent cut long haul. A deep raid by the State airline in the mass-travel holiday market. An all first class Tristar 500 as a subsonic successor to Concorde. London-Manchester-Paris shuttles, with probably Amsterdam and Paris too. New Boeing 745 Jumbos carrying 580 "all discount" passengers.' (4)

Change and cautious optimism were undoubtedly the keynotes for the future, but one must question to what extent the new situation that was emerging was appreciated by both Management and Staff.

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(3) Croall, J, 'Changing course for 1986', 'British Airways News', 13 October 1

(4) Wilson, A, 'British Airways: the plan for the 1980's', 'Observer', 15 October 1978, p. 16.

What of BATUC?

Obviously BAB and senior Management had given much thought and effort in the drawing together of the plan. What is less obvious is the degree of Staff side involvement in its formulation. It can be ascertained that in the early and mid-1970's the Board had been keen on worker consultation and had helped to initiate a Joint Manpower Committee and various feasibility studies, one of which, Engineering, was still operating. (5) But there is little immediate evidence to suggest that the Staff side was involved in either the formulation or implementation of the plan, and this raises the question of why this was so.

To include a BAB's point of view on this question would require access to Managerial archives and interviews with at least some of the principal personalities involved. It is hoped that if a request for this purpose is presented, agreement will be reached to enable this side of the story to be researched. But even without substantive evidence it would not be unreasonable to draw some conclusions regarding Managerial thinking.

Management was well aware that BATUC had come into existence only after considerable hesitation on the part of the Trade Union movement, both nationally and locally, regarding the extent to which its involvement in decision making processes, or some form of industrial democracy, was desirable. No doubt Management reviewed BATUC's ability to carry out its terms of reference, 'to be responsible for the joint Trade Union view on matters relating to the operation and planning of British Airways', in a careful fashion after the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW)

---

(5) Papers 2 and 3.

failed to co-operate with the new Trades Union body and never took up membership. (6)

There is also the point that by 1978, the BAB had before it the evidence of the various joint feasibility study groups which had been set up some three years earlier to recommend what organisational changes were desirable following the BOAC/BEA merger. It was clear that whatever benefits stemmed from these studies they were time consuming, and that the decisions reached could not always be easily implemented. (7) Therefore, if the BAB were facing the main issue of survival it had to feel free to initiate lines for immediate action. But like any Management of an airline it was not blind to the need to carry the Staff along with its decisions, lest poor industrial relations should lead to competitors gaining advantage. It is, of course, possible to speculate at greater length on Managerial reasoning, but it would be wiser to turn attention to the evidence of the BATUC documents.

Liaison between Management and BATUC was close during the summer months of 1978, but discussions centred upon industrial democracy, and not the plan referred to above. In May the Government had issued a White Paper which outlined its reactions to the Bullock Report published some seventeen months earlier. Of particular importance to British Airways was the directive that the Government had:-

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(6) Paper 8, pp. 29-31 refers to AUEW developments, p. 63 gives terms of reference of BATUC.

(7) The Engineering Review Committee, for example, began to operate in June 1975. By mid-1978 much of its original impetus had been lost although it continued to perform some worthwhile functions. It is hoped to present a booklet outlining its story in the near future.

> '.... asked the chairman of the nationalised industries to consult with the unions in each industry and make joint proposals by August 1978 for further improvements in consultation and participation. They might range from employee representation at board and lower levels to further developments in consultative and participative procedures.' (8)

Hence, the exchanges which had been started between BATUC and Management in late spring (9) assumed greater importance when they were continued in the new forum of a working party to consider 'The Introduction of Departmental Councils'.

An account of the first meeting of the working party reveals that when deliberations began attention centred upon defining the meaning of participation. It was eventually agreed that the process of giving employees the opportunity 'to take part in the development of corporate strategy, to contribute to decisions before they are taken and to share in the responsibility for their implementation', as specified in the White Paper, should be the basis for further discussions. (10)

In conformity with this definition it was agreed in relation to British Airways that:-

> 'in contrast to the NJC machinery, participation should take place early in the decision making process and before the stage at which issues might become negotiable, it should also occur at all levels in the organisation.'

Such subjects as budgeting, monitoring performance, and confidentiality were also discussed.

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(8) 'Industrial Democracy', Cmnd. 7231 HMSO London May 1978, paragraph 45.

(9) Paper 8, pp. 42-43 and p. 71.

(10) Notes on 'Working Party on the Introduction of Departmental Councils into British Airways' 27 June 1978. They were prepared by Management Side and accepted by BATUC as being an accurate record.

Consideration was then given to a suggestion from the BATUC side that 'participative initiatives be taken at departmental level first', which if successful could lead to a 'British Airways Council'. But another BATUC representative argued that participation at lower levels could be achieved by using the existing local panels machinery. However, Management contended that 'it would be more appropriate to relate the council structure to the work groups in a department rather than the existings NSPs'. This argument was accepted.

Before the first meeting of the working party ended, Mr. Howard Phelps, Personnel Director, promised to issue 'guide lines' on the proposed British Airways Council. The draft constitution which he produced was available to BATUC members shortly afterwards. (11) Almost immediately Mr. Ron Crew, Vice-Chairman of BATUC, issued a paper which criticised the draft for not stating that:-

> 'departmental councils would take any responsibility for decisions. It is obviously intended that these responsibilities would stay with BA management. Thus management's prerogatives would be unchanged.' (12)

He continued his criticism on the grounds that the draft had fallen far short of the terms of the White Paper of May.

Mr. Crew then argued that Departmental Councils could be regarded as a first step towards industrial democracy within the airline. But he warned that there was a danger that they would be regarded as ends in themselves instead of means to an end.

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(11) Appendix I, pp. 70-71 below.

(12) Crew Ron, 'BATUC: Departmental Councils', 26 July 1978. Paper produced but not published.

A second meeting of the joint Working Party met in July when Mr. Phelps presented a paper on planning and budgeting. (13) It was agreed that it was necessary for the Executive Committee of BATUC to consider the documents which had been prepared before any further useful exchanges could take place. BATUC members accepted the fact that the ball was in their court.

Problems rarely come singly, and in the third week of July the late Mr. E. (Ted) Mackenzie, then secretary of BATUC, wrote a letter to all its members regarding Management's decision to withdraw BA services from Liverpool Airport. A meeting had been held with Management and Mr. Mackenzie described the steps to effect the re-deployment of displaced personnel, and he reported that Management 'were quite positive about their plans, always assuming of course that they have control of the situation'. He then described the outcome of the meeting by reproducing a statement that 'was drafted for consideration by everybody'. The most important points may be judged to be:-

> 'BA Management stated that there are no plans for further cutbacks to its route structure network with the possible single exception of two services a day from Southampton to Jersey .... This is a matter that Management would be discussing with the Trade Unions before any decision is made.'

> 'BA Stated that its policy was to retain all its existing routes and seek every opportunity to expand its route network in the future.' (14)

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(13) Notes of Working Party of meeting held 19 July 1978.

(14) Letter to 'Members of the BA Trade Union Council', E. Mackenzie, 21 July 1978.

It is not clear whether or not this statement was accepted by Management, but it was believed that it was, which was to have an important bearing upon developments some twelve months later. Indeed, a most positive statement of Management's intentions was reported to the BATUC Executive Committee. (15)

Industrial Democracy and Departmental Councils

The month of August began on a positive note when a special meeting of BATUC accepted, without a division, an EC recommendation:-

> 'a) That the BATUC reaffirms its acceptance of the principle of the establishment of Departmental Councils in BA.
>
> b) That we enter into negotiations with BA on Mr. Phelp's draft document with a view to having it amended to display a commitment to achieving a goal of meaningful participation by staff in management.
>
> c) That we agree to the establishment of a joint body to co-ordinate the work of the Departmental Councils on the clear understanding that the ultimate goal is the achievement of staff participation in the management of BA.' (16)

One can see that BATUC was not losing sight of its aim for seats on BAB, and that Departmental Councils were a step in this direction.

BATUC reservations on the proposed constitution for Councils were conveyed to the Personnel Director in mid-August. He had taken note of BATUC's wish for more direct references to industrial democracy and a revised draft was promised. These facts were reported to the EC when it met at the end

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(15) Minutes of BATUC Executive Committee, 1 August 1978, EC 11/78.

(16) BATUC Minutes of Special Meeting, 1 August 1978, 25/78.

of the month. Management believed in an evolutionary approach to industrial democracy and was placing emphasis upon the Departmental Councils. (17)

What was uppermost in the minds of EC members were such questions as who were to be eligible to vote in Departmental Council elections, who were to be eligible to stand, and who was to conduct the ballot? One idea that was expressed, but rejected, was that BATUC should appoint the employee representatives. After lengthy discussion three main options were recognised:-

> 'a) That each trade union operating under the NJC Agreement in a department should be entitled to elect a representative ....
>
> b) That representation should be limited to one or more representatives from each National Sectional Panel grouping in a department, and
>
> c) That where appropriate Panel groupings should be linked together to form electoral groups.'

It was recognised that the subject matter was difficult and that further consideration should be given to the problems involved.

No mention is made in the minutes of the EC's deliberations regarding the BAB's reply to the Government, which was due in August, regarding 'further improvements in consultation and participation.' (18)

If a reply were dispatched it does not appear to have been discussed with BATUC, and this may be seen to be somewhat strange.

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(17) Minutes of BATUC Executive Committee, 30 August 1978, EC 16/78 and Notes of the Third Meeting of Working Party held 16 August 1978.

(18) See p. 8 above.

All of the August developments were reported to a full meeting of BATUC which was held in the second week of September. Members were informed that Senior Management had agreed 'to amend the document on Departmental Councils to display a commitment to full industrial democracy inside BA', and that the amendments were awaited. Reference was then made to some of the practicalities involved in the setting up of these Councils, and it was felt that it would be sound tactics to await the EC's recommendations on the issues in question. (19)

The meeting then considered the topic of aircraft procurement, and it was noted that the Government had authorised the airline to purchase Boeing 737's and BAe 1-11's, which coincided with BATUC wishes. Interviews had taken place with Mr. Kenneth Wilkinson, Engineering Director, and the Personnel Director, and some embarrassment had been caused by 'an instruction from the Prime Minister on confidentiality'. Also the Under Secretary of State for Trade, Mr. Clinton Davis, had been unable to respond to a BATUC request for a meeting on the airline's strategy, 'because of the delicate negotiations taking place at Government level'.

Obviously aircraft procurement was an important matter as far as BATUC was concerned for staff had views on what should be purchased arising from practical day-to-day working with aircraft. But one can appreciate the problems that could have arisen if contending aircraft manufacturers were to learn of BAB's intentions to purchase by means of leakages from Management/BATUC meetings. Whether such fears were justified or not, the problem of confidentiality runs like a thread through most of the documents on industrial democracy.

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(19) BATUC Minutes of Meeting, 11 September 1978, 32/78.

When the EC of BATUC began to examine Departmental Councils in detail it recognised that one pattern would not be suitable to all the Divisions within the airline. Consequently it was agreed to set up four sub-groups 'to consider the matter and report by 31st October, 1978'. The sub-groups were Engineering, Flight Operations, Commercial Operations, and Finance and Planning. (20)

One may note that although nothing definite had emerged from the summer deliberations some important preliminary steps had been taken to facilitate the creation of Departmental Councils. It is therefore somewhat surprising to ascertain, unless the minutes are sadly lacking in information, that when the EC met one day before the sub-groups' reports were due, that the subject was not mentioned. The only consideration of workers' participation was in relation to the English China Clay company and a proposal that BATUC members should visit it in order to study the system which had been adopted. (21)

What had come into prominence was the issue of industrial relations within British Airways for it was common knowledge that all kinds of petty disputes were souring the working situation to the detriment of all concerned. It was agreed that a paper should be prepared for future consideration.

Only a week was to lapse before the question of Departmental Councils was to come to the forefront again. In a letter to members of the EC, Mr. Mackenzie made the point that despite the 31st October deadline only one sub-group, the Commercial Division had submitted its findings.

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(20) Minutes of BATUC Executive Committee, 19 September 1978, 23/78.

(21) Minutes of BATUC Executive Committee, 30 October 1978, 27/78.

The report of this group was attached, and it revealed some of the complexities of setting up a Departmental Council if its membership were to be restricted to workable numbers. Included in the problems listed were geographical spread, the numerous sub-divisions, the different grades of staff, and the number of trades unions involved. Nevertheless, proposals for only 10 representatives to comprise the Staff Side were advanced, with a recommendation 'that members of the BATUC EC should be as of right members of their appropriate Departmental Council'. (22)

Industrial democracy and industrial relations seemed to be leap-frogging each other, for in the third week of November a full meeting of BATUC was convened to consider a paper written by Mr. Crew on the industrial relations scene. (23) This paper is reproduced below and readers can form their opinions on the case presented. One may note that he was critical of the over-staffing among Management members, but not of shop-floor numbers. Also his criticisms of Management's handling of the BOAC/BEA merger seems to pay scant regard to the magnitude of the problems involved and to the steps that Management had taken to attempt to overcome them, namely the setting up of joint feasibility studies. Mr. Crew was a prominent member of one such study, Engineering, and as such was aware of the difficulties to be found in inducing both Management and Staff to changes in working practices. Also, his paper seemed to pay little regard to the economic situation that was developing.

No doubt other points could be made, but even if Mr. Crew's comments were somewhat biased there was justification for many of his expressions of

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(22) Letter from E. Mackenzie, 7 November 1978. The attached report was entitled 'Commercial Divisional Council', 1 November 1978.

(23) See Appendix 2, pp.72-75 below. Also, BATUC Minutes of Special Meeting, 21 November 1978, 37/78.

discontent. Also his paper, which was accepted by BATUC, was invaluable for reflecting how members of staff saw the situation. Only one small amendment was made to the paper at the special meeting of the Council which considered and accepted the document.

In late November various members of the EC visited the English China Clay company and an enthusiastic report of the occasion was made later. (24) There were proposals to return the hospitality and continue exchanges of information, but these ideas came to nothing. It would seem that individual studies of the working of industrial democracy, as with many case studies, have limited value because the circumstances of organisations can be so different, thereby making realisitic comparisons impossible.

Also in late November three of the sub-groups who had been asked to submit their proposals on Departmental Councils by 31 October, reported only that they had agreed to submit papers, while another group, Flight Operations, had yet to meet. (25) But the EC agreed to make arrangements 'to meet BA management early in January 1979 to discuss the establishment of Departmental Councils further'. Possibly there were good reasons for this delay among the sub-groups, for it must be remembered that most of the people involved were lay officials with numerous issues to deal with and little back-up facilities provided. Yet when due allowance has been made for these problems one must question whether or not deep seated sectional interests were the real cause for the delay.

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(24) Minutes of BATUC Executive Committee, 27 November 1978, 40/78.

(25) Ibid.

Naturally industrial relations continued to be an on-going matter within the EC, and it was reported that Mr. Crew's paper had been submitted to the Executive Board of Management, (EBM) and a meeting to discuss it with BATUC representatives had been set for the second half of December. No documentary evidence of this meeting is readily available but one may reasonably conclude that it had no impact on the situation as it quickly disappears from BATUC records. This development must be judged to have been unfortunate as industrial relations within British Airways were to be beset with new problems in 1979, some of which may have been prevented had a better understanding been reached at the end of the old year. But one must avoid speculation.

As 1978 neared its end there was one further interesting development. A local dispute had arisen in the Longhaul Machine Shop of the airline which, at an EC meeting in late November, had been considered as 'relevant to the NJC machinery'. But near to mid-December two shop stewards were allowed to address a full BATUC meeting on the disagreement that had already resulted in members of the Engineering and Maintenance grade being 'off the clock' for four weeks. A special meeting of the NJC had failed to resolve the matter, albeit that its officers were to meet again in order to try to find a solution.

It was established practice that BATUC would not trespass upon territory proper to the NJC. Nevertheless, the December meeting resolved that:-

> 'BATUC welcomes the proposed meeting of the Officers of the NJC to solve the current industrial relations problem. If this fails BATUC should use its influence to seek a meeting with the EBM to find a solution.' (26)

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(26) BATUC: Minutes of Meeting, 11 December 1978, 40/78.

A solution was found, but what would have happend to relations between BATUC and the NJC if it had not?

There was also the fact that one of the two E & M shop stewards was a member of the AUEW, whose absence from membership of BATUC was most weakening to that body. Any student of industrial relations will know that when trades unionists are 'off the clock' it is natural for them to seek allies, and in this case one can see that BATUC was regarded as some type of back-up should the efforts of the NJC officials have failed. But when the dispute was over the trade union concerned did not revise its position, and no evidence is to hand to suggest that it wished to discuss matters with BATUC.

Instead, BATUC's standing was about to be dealt a serious blow by the withdrawal of the representatives from the Transport and General Workers Union (T&GWU). This episode, however, is proper to the new year and warrants detailed attention.

On reflection one can see that the second half of 1978, as well as being a period of comparative calm, was also a time of missed opportunities. The impetus for Departmental Councils which had been strong in the summer months had tended to fizzle out. On this issue much blame must rest with BATUC as, despite its declared policy of favouring such bodies, it failed to take the steps necessary to achieve them. On the other hand, the airline plan announced in October can be judged as a Management failure to involve Staff in measures that were to prove vital as competition intensified.

CHAPTER 2

Not a Good Beginning to the New Year

The Executive Committee of BATUC was well aware of the growing number of unofficial stoppages of work within the airline as evidenced by the discussions which led to its industrial relations paper of November 1978. (1) Also, it had met members of the Executive Board of Management (EBM) to discuss industrial relations just before Christmas. Nevertheless, it was completely surprised at the beginning of the new year when Management announced its intentions to apply a year's ban upon the staff travel concessions of employees who took part in any unofficial actions.

An attempt by the EC at the end of January to reach agreement with the EBM before the sanctions became operative failed. Management then announced in the airline's press that,

> 'The decision to withdraw travel concessions from any member of staff who took unofficial industrial action after February 1 was taken against a background of near industrial anarchy in some parts of the airline....'

> 'in October when British Airways had first registered its concern at the developing industrial anarchy, management tabled a list of 43 stoppages and 30 other forms of industrial action ....'

> 'Management had asked for help in this matter but although good will from some members of BATUC was evident, the engineering and maintenance overtime ban had continued until November, causing untold damage ....'

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(1) Appendix 2, p. 72-75 below.

> 'The rot had continued and in the period November to January .... there had been a further 23 stoppages and 23 other industrial relations incidents. This kind of action had cost the airline £10 million in lost revenue ....' (2)

Before attempting to describe the exchanges which took place between BATUC and Management, it would be of purpose to reflect upon the period and the main causes of industrial unrest which had hit the whole of the country as well as British Airways. One hardly needs reminding that this was the infamous 'winter of discontent'.

The changes in technology that had taken place in Civil Air Transport (CAT) in the 1960's, and which were increasing in scope in the 1970's, were not without their near equivalents in many other industries. As with de-regulation in CAT, the icy blast of competition generally not only intensified but assumed new forms. Capital investment began on a large scale in the hitherto non-industrial regions of the so-called Third World. In these areas labour power was particularly cheap and one consequence was that many British products could be undersold. These developments were reflected in the monetary crisis of 1975 when inflation in Britain was running at approximately 30% and unemployment figures had climbed to 1.3 million.

Expectations that were commonly held in 1977 and 1978 that unemployment would decline as the impact of International Monetary Fund measures abated were proven optimistic. For the first time following the end of the Second World War long term unemployment became a feature of the country's economic scene. However, unlike the depresssion of the 1930's inflation, albeit at lower levels than 1975, continued.

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(2) "British Airways News", 2 February, 1979, p.1. See also edition 9 February.

One can easily recollect that the first half of the 1970's was particularly turbulent following the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 and the coal miners strikes of 1972 and 1974. After the return of a Labour Government a number of measures were taken that favoured the Trades Union movement, of which the Employment Protection Act (Consolidated) 1978, was particularly important. Yet there remained considerable unease on the shop floor for it was felt by many lay union members that their acceptance of the 'Social Contract' in exchange for the surrender of free collective bargaining was resulting in a halt to the almost continuous rise in living standards that had been customary from about the mid-1950's onwards. In the late 1970's, as the comparatively large wage increases of 1975/6 began to be eroded by inflation and the Labour Government's pay policy of restricting increases to 5%, discontent grew as the level of unemployment continued to rise. (3)

For some years it appeared that the spread of unemployment would not reach the south eastern region of the country and that the airline workers at Heathrow would remain unaffected. But by 1978 several large local enterprises in the industrial area of West London had closed and others had reduced their staff complements. Even white collared workers in occupations hitherto considered 'safe', such as banking and insurance, were faced with the reality that micro-electronic equipment could displace staff in the field of commerce no less than in manufacturing. Although no BA worker was made redundant it became increasingly obvious to airline personnel that alternative sources of employment were contracting.

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(3) Numerous detailed accounts exist which describe this period. The TUC's "Economic Review 1976" is helpful for being a curtain raiser for the 1977-9 period.

In addition to these national developments the staff of BA had to adjust to the changes arising from the merger, as made clear by the BATUC paper of November 1978, and to the further reorganisation of the airline of April 1977. Hence, one many appreciate, even if one does not excuse, that the causes of the unrest which had hit the airline at the end of 1978 were complex and not just due to bloody-mindedness. There was also a factor which, although common to industrial unrest generally, had particular complications for the BA scene, and that was pay.

An important pay agreement was reached at the National Joint Council in 1969 which introduced a wide measure of commonality concerning grades and wage levels at BOAC and BEA. (4) Following this agreement it was of less purpose for staff to alternate between the two organisations as hitherto, when first one airline then the other leap-frogged to the fore in the wages race. But although common levels were established different practices remained, such as the responsibilities of leading tradesmen, shift payment patterns, and the 'any five days week' arrangement. These were but a few of the issues which had an influence on the take home pay of staff, particularly those in the Engineering and Maintenance grade (E&M) who comprised between a quarter and a third of total airline personnel.

As the effects of the merger began to be felt more keenly, staff who were faced with a change in job location were often apprehensive of a drop in take home pay and/or the prospect of worsened working conditions. Those who were apprehensive tended to be far more vociferous than those who were not.

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(4) The terms of the 1968 agreement under the title of "Pay and Productivity" have been included in the NJC's collation of "Council Agreements".

A move to iron out the differences between the two former separate organisations was made in the 1978 wage settlement, but a more comprehensive agreement was concluded in the spring of 1979, the complexities of which were felt to justify a special edition of 'British Airways Engineering News'. At the same time the airline's regular paper described the settlement in detail. (5) A third party view offered by a well informed authority on CAT claimed:-

> 'Management and unions .... have signed an agreement which could reconcile the deep differences between the old BOAC and BEA engineering departments .... they have been "us and them" for more than 30 years ....'
>
> 'The problems which the accord aims to resolve are mainly the fruits of BOAC/BEA mergeritis and double manning ....'
>
> 'The small print of the new agreement is painfully, almost pettily, detailed; but when arguments about who opens a hangar door can ground a 17 million passenger airline, the spirit has at first to give precedence to the letter.'
>
> 'The most important change is the creation of a new grade of licensed engineer, to be known as lead tradesman. About a 1000 in number, he will have direct responsibilities for his own work and hence for the safety and reliability of the airline's fleet. He will sign for his own work, reducing the over-heavy inspection burden and increasing job satisfaction and opportunity.' (6)

These extracts from a lengthy editorial, all in the same vein, emphasise the particular problems which had arisen from the BOAC/BEA merger and support the notion that discontent had stemmed not only from the levels of pay but the question of who was to do what.

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(5) 'British Airways Engineering News', April 1979. See also 'British Airways News', 24 April 1979, p.3

(6) 'Flight International' Editorial column, 19 May 1979.

One may argue that if the wages settlement of spring 1979 went a long way towards removing discontent arising from overmanning and a lack of job satisfaction, it follows that the causes of such unrest were present during the infamous winter of 1978/79. Indeed, it would seem that the 'Flight International' editorial tended to endorse a number of the claims advanced in the BATUC paper of November 1978 which lay much blame for the prevailing industrial problems upon the amalgamation of the former airlines. Attention must now be turned to what both sides were actually saying.

'.... the Wood for the Trees'

It is well known that when one is party to a dispute, concern with immediate issues can obstruct the pursuit of long term objectives. One may judge that it is all too easy to refer to the national state of the economy and its impact upon industrial relations generally, but overlook the urgency of the problems that were confronting the Management of BA in its efforts to keep the airline's services operating. It may be argued that what Management did and the line of reasoning which it adopted are more important than judgements made with the knowledge of hindsight. Fortunately evidence of Management's case has survived, and attention is directed to an account of the meeting mentioned above between members of the EBM and the EC of BATUC held at the end of Janaury. (7)

Mr. Howard Phelps, Personnel Director, began proceedings by referring to the meeting between EBM and the EC of BATUC held the previous October that had been called to discuss the E&M grade ban on overtime.

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(7) 'Meeting between Members of the Executive Board of Management and the British Airways Trade Union Council Executive' held on 31 January 1979.

> 'At that meeting the trade union side had responded to Management's request for assistance in improving the situation and had stated that they wished to have "a truce". Nevertheless, the overtime ban had continued until 20 November 1978.'

What may be considered strange is that no direct reference to this meeting is made in the minutes of the EC of BATUC. Of course the matter may have been discussed, but no record was made of the deliberations nor any decisions taken. Obviously BATUC had its problems of communication. (8)

Mr. Phelps continued his remarks by reminding the meeting of BATUC's November paper and the points it had made regarding 'the inability of management to manage' and 'the ineffectiveness of management'. A list of industrial disputes of the late part of 1978 was produced and the near state of anarchy emphasised. Therefore,

> 'Following the advice offered in the BATUC working party report, management decided that it had to manage, in support of official union action, the NJC constitution, the airline and the trade union members' jobs and prospects.'

The Personnel Director concluded by stating that Management had deliberately not consulted BATUC before deciding upon the ban, 'so as to avoid embarrassing the trade union side'. But anybody taking unofficial action after 1 February would automatically lose his travel concessions for a year.

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(8) Minute 26/78 of the EC Meeting held on 30 October 1978 states: 'This matter [industrial relations] had been referred to the EC from a special meeting of BATUC. It was felt that a paper was necessary.' It does not state that the special meeting was with the EBM.

Critics of BATUC could be forgiven for claiming that the EC had provided Management with a stick with which it could beat the Trades Union movement. But the BATUC paper of November also argues that the confusion arising from the merger was deeply rooted and not likely to be solved by 'strong' Management alone. In brief, it claims, Management had to know where it wanted to go and by what steps it intended to get there.

A feature of the airline's story, which was far more obscure in the 1978/9 period, is that whereas many Staff side members were vociferous in their opposition to the merger, similar dissatisfaction among members of Management was far more muted. Nevertheless, this Managerial opposition had its influence upon the day-to-day working of the airline as merger decisions were sometimes begrudgingly put into effect. It was only when the airline nose-dived into recession that this Managerial opposition hit the press when it was reported that high placed but anonymous 'moles' were advocating the return to two separate organisations. (9)

Members of the EC of BATUC were not slow in replying to Mr. Phelp's opening remarks. Mr. Mark Young, who was Chairman of BATUC, claimed that the withdrawal of Staff travel concessions would undermine Staff confidence in the joint exchanges that were taking place with the aim of improving industrial relations in the airline. The threatened ban was, he alleged, counter-productive, and he asked that its imposition should be delayed by a month in order to allow further negotiations to take place. These sentiments were repeated by other BATUC members. The late Ted Mackenzie, then secretary of BATUC, felt that 'a situation had arisen where it was virtually impossible to resolve anything with British Airways Management'. Another member stated that BA stood to lose financially if aircraft seats were not filled even at discounted Staff travel rates.

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(9) 'Split BA into two divisions, group of managers say', Report in 'The Times' 3 August 1981, p.3.

Management, however, stood firm and implied that BATUC had little power to influence the situation for the joint meeting which had taken place in October had 'had little effect in improving the situation'. To this point Mr. Young replied that 'without the October meeting British Airways would have faced an all out strike'. This reply indicates that even if the October meeting had not been discussed in detail by the EC it had played an important part in informal deliberations and in the overlap discussions among BATUC members and representatives on the various National Sectional Panels (NSPs).

Obviously no progress was being made and as the arguments began to be repeated Management members were asked to convey the disquiet of BATUC to BAB and this they promised to do. But before the meeting ended Mr. John Collier, full time Civil Air Transport Officer of the Transport and General Workers' Union (T&GWU) stated that his union 'would be withdrawing from membership of BATUC at the end of this meeting'. In the space of one hour the EC of BATUC had failed to move Management and its prestige had suffered a set-back.

To Go or Not to Go?

The T&GWU is a powerful Trade Union within British Airways. It has a commanding numerical TU representation on several NSPs and its members are to be found in different departments throughout the airline. Therefore, the announcement of Mr. Collier at a joint meeting with Management that his union was withdrawing from BATUC was undoubtedly a blow to that body. This withdrawal, when combined with the earlier refusal of the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW) to participate, seriously reduced BATUC's claims under its terms of reference, 'To be responsible for a joint Trade Union view .... on matters relating to the operation and planning of British Airways'.

However, as shown below, the application of the withdrawal was not so shattering to BATUC as it first seemed likely.

Evidence indicates that Mr. Collier was so incensed by the travel ban that he felt that some action was necessary in order to give weight to his union's views. This reaction might be understandable, but as was pointed out at a subsequent EC meeting, it was extraordinary for a Trade Union to withdraw from a joint union organisation in protest at sanctions imposed by Management. (10) Also, from a BATUC point of view, there was cause for criticism of the timing of the T&GWU's withdrawal. Throughout the joint meeting Management had stressed the point that BATUC had not succeeded in influencing an adoption by the various Trades Unions of more reasonable attitudes towards the prevailing industrial relations problems. Management might well have assumed that if BATUC were unable to influence the situation when the T&GWU was giving its support, that success was more unlikely in its absence.

Early in February Mr. Collier wrote to the secretary of BATUC formally giving notice of his union's withdrawal, to which the secretary replied that members of BATUC were elected to it by their respective NSPs and not by their Trades Unions. (11) Hence, although the full time CAT officer of the T&GWU ceased to attend BATUC meetings, numerous lay officers continued to play an active role both on the EC and the full Council by virtue of their NSP standing. How well this was understood by members of Management and the shop floor one can only speculate, but it may be reasonably assumed that at least some confusion prevailed.

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(10) Minutes of the EC of BATUC, 7 February 1979.

(11) Ibid. See also Minutes of Special Meeting held in Heston Training Centre, 7 February 1979.

Later in the month Mr. Collier wrote to the secretary and fully accepted the argument that 'representatives to the British Airways Trade Union Council are appointed from the Sectional Panels'. (12) He continued a most constructive letter by making a number of suggestions that were aimed at reducing overlap between the NSPs and BATUC, encouraging BATUC members to become involved in more industrial relations projects, and improving liaison between full time officers and the shop floor.

This letter was discussed at the Annual General Meeting of BATUC when it was agreed,

> 'to reply to Mr. Collier saying that there is no fundamental difference with a number of points he has made but change can take place only from within. Mr. Collier's letter is to be circulated to members of BATUC, and T&GWU members are asked to attend the June meeting to enable the points to be discussed.' (13)

In the meanwhile the rather strange situation that had arisen was to continue.

It would be incorrect to conclude that the Staff travel ban and the reactions of the T&GWU were the only items before BATUC in the spring of 1979. Indeed, a number of important matters such as aircraft procurement, an address from Under Secretary of State Mr. Clinton-Davis, Cargo, BA Helicopters and the moves towards Department Councils were discussed and in some cases acted upon. But BATUC steadfastly refused to attend a seminar with Management to examine the paramount issue of industrial relations which remained a barrier between BATUC and the EBM and thwarted real progress.

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(12) Mr. Collier to Secretary of BATUC, 23 February.

(13) Minutes of Annual/Quarterly Meeting of BATUC, 12 March 1979.

One may argue that the AGM held in March revealed that BATUC had continued to extend its range of activities and the prospect of a British Airways Council might be achieved by the evolutionary means of Department Councils. But as the spring developed into a summer another major dispute loomed large over a Management decision to axe a number of UK and I routes.

CHAPTER 3

Summertime and the going is ....?

In the summer of 1979 various technological, economic and political changes which had been gathering momentum from the middle of the decade combined to bring about a new situation for British Airways. Partly as a consequence of the earlier nation-wide 'Winter of discontent', a Conservative Government was elected in early May, and some ten weeks later it announced that it intended to allow a significant amount of private capital to be invested in the airline. A Parliamentary Bill was to be introduced to achieve this end. Less than one month after the election of the new Government, there were changes in the leadership of British Airways when Mr. (later Sir) Ross Stainton, Mr. Ken Wilkinson, and Mr. Roy Watts became, respectively, Chairman, Deputy Chairman, and Chief Executive. One of the first tasks confronting these gentlemen was to launch a new Corporate Plan for the airline which contained proposals of major importance regarding the composition of the fleet, heavy capital investment, targets for returns on capital and marketing objectives. As if these changes were not enough, there were indications that oil prices, after of period of comparative stability, were once again to spiral upwards triggering off further inflation and high interest rates. At the same time levels of employment, already low by post-war standards, were soon to spiral downwards.

With such changes occurring, or pending, one may ask whether or not the Management and Staff Sides at BA changed their attitudes towards each other and attempted jointly to overcome some of the main difficulties which had soured industrial relations within the airline. In the developing situation some new approaches were surely required?

Reactions to the new Government were expressed when the EC of BATUC met shortly after the general election. (1) The EC felt that the return of a Conservative administration would make industrial democracy, or any forms of worker participation, more difficult to achieve, and that 'pressure will need to be continued by the unions'. Renewed attention was given to the possibilities of establishing Departmental Councils, which were regarded as being stepping stones leading towards industrial democracy within the airline.

After discussion of some of the long standing problems associated with Departmental Councils, the EC agreed to recommend to the next full meeting of BATUC:-

'a) That the maximum number of trade union appointees on a Council shall be 12.

b) That the creation of constituencies shall be determined on the recommendation of the Trade Union Sides of the Local Panels concerned.

c) That the qualifications required of a nominee for membership of a Departmental Council shall be:-

i) A minimun of one year's employment at BA

ii) A paid-up member of an appropriate Trade Union

iii) To be employed in the area for which he or she is being nominated.

d) That each nomination must be supported by 10 sponsors form the area concerned.

e) That the election be conducted by ballot of all staff in the particular area.

f) That the elections be conducted under the authority of BATUC.'

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(1) Minutes of the Executive Committee of BATUC, 8 May 1979.
Author's Note It was at this meeting that my appointment as contemporary historian to BATUC was agreed and that an appropriate recommendation be placed before the next quarterly meeting. From this date forward I attended as many meetings of BATUC as my other commitments allowed and have used notes taken as a source of information for this paper.

Although these recommendations left several issues open to question, for example, for how long were elected representatives to hold office and what was to happen if a representative resigned from his or her trade union, it may be observed that there was no fundamental clash with the ideas of Management regarding such Councils as expressed in Appendix 1 below. The EC also agreed to place two Management papers relating to Departmental Councils before the June meeting of BATUC in a hope to expedite matters.

Another reaction of the EC towards the newly elected Government was a fear that the Conservative administration would de-nationalise the airline by hiving off the readily marketable sections for sale, and leave the unprofitable remains to incur increasingly heavy debts. When these sections had run into greater difficulties, it was argued, they would be wound-up, thus discrediting nationalised industries still further. This process, it was maintained, would prove harmful to Management of BA no less than the Trades Unions, and therefore this common danger could encourage joint action.

At the May meeting of the EC it was also reported that Management wished to discuss its Corporate Plan with BATUC. Prior indication of the direction which BAB wished to follow had been given the previous October to which reference has already been made (2), and in the June/July period of 1979 details of the proposed changes were given in a series of illustrated presentations which all BA staff were encouraged to attend.

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(2) P. 5 above.

Almost from its inception BATUC had been concerned with the question of aircraft procurement. This issue and BA's Corporate Plan were related insofar as the types of plane that the airline was to order had a bearing upon the national employment levels which were of particular interest to the Trades Union movement. In the late 1978 early 1979 period, BA placed a large order for American Boeing planes powered by Rolls-Royce RB211 engines, while almost at the same time British Aerospace, (BAe) renewed Britain's interest in a collective European venture by joining the Airbus Industrie partnership. (3)

Many Trades Unionists were of the opinion that BA should order its planes from the European consortium and this viewpoint was shared by sections of British Management. This European effort was seen as the only hope of preventing complete US domination of the manufacture of the 150-220 seater type of aircraft. But a contrary argument was that more work for British industry, and more foreign currency for the country, would be obtained from the agreements with American aircraft firms, Boeing and Lockheed, to power their planes with RB211 engines for which there was a potential international market. Obviously both arguments were tempered by guess work and vested interests, but they constituted an important part of the backdrop to the Corporate Plan.

Some Features of the Plan for 1979-1986

The illustrated presentation that was made to members of Management and Staff began by quantifying the size and scope of the airline. Naturally detailed reference was made to the airline's scheduled flights to most areas

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(3) "A Boeing and Rolls-Royce .... Coup", Flight International Editorial, 9 September 1978. "BAe and Airbus are united" Ibid, 4 November 1978, p. 1622.

of the world, but attention was not spared from other BA activities which included helicopters, cargo, hotels, package holidays, air radio, and engine overhaul. When the existing situation had been described, the presentation outlined the envisaged changes which were required to meet the developing situation.

With reference to the fleet plan it was stated that:-

> 'Whilst our fleet size will increase by about 10%, aircraft are on average 50% bigger and we are certainly going to work them a little harder. As a consequence we are going to produce some 80% or 84% more seats in that time. So in '86 we shall have more seats, and we shall have more capacity generally, for a doubled market, operated by bigger aeroplanes, the numbers only fractionally more than at present.' (4)

One is tempted to speculate what the anticipated consequences would have been had it been the intention to work the planes a lot harder rather than a little.

It was stressed, however, that an increase in market demand did not automatically mean greater prosperity for the airline. As far as BA was concerned deregulation meant:-

> '1) that there will be no control of capacity
>
> 2) pool agreements as we know them today will disappear
>
> 3) there will be nd control of price
>
> 4) there will be freedom of entry to markets.'

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(4) Commentary relating to Slide 21.

Additional comments were, 'This is happening today in the United States. What this means in UK terms and what this means to British Airways more than any other group, is that it will give an impetus to the development and expansion of the British independent carriers.' (5)

In order that BA could withstand growing competition it was stated that a capital investment programme of £2,400 million would be undertaken of which the airline hoped to raise £1,500 million by its own efforts.

Of particular importance to BATUC was the statement that,

> 'compared to the 57,500 staff we have today, it is planned that we should have 55,500 staff in 1986 - a figure we intend to keep steady. This represents 0.9% less staff per year right through this period, representing an 8½% increase in staff productivity per annum up to 1986, significantly more than we have had today and with, in all, 2000 less staff.' (6)

These changes were to be achieved without enforced redundancies, albeit that the increased productivity presented the Trades Unions with the need to define their policies regarding wage demands, conditions of service, and the length of holidays.

Other aspects of the plan made it clear that BA intended to be in the forefront of changing technology, the airline was to become more cost-effective in its operations and all types of passengers and freight were to be catered for. Any member of staff who felt bemused by the mass of information given, was able to verify points of detail a few weeks later when a special supplement, 'Into the Eighties; a plan for prosperity' was published in 'British Airways News'. (7)

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(5) Commentary relating to Slide 27.

(6) Commentary relating to Slide 23.

(7) "British Airways News", 27 July 1979.

Although BATUC was informed of the plan in early May, and subsequent discussions took place between its members and Management, it may be noted that, as in the autumn of 1978, BATUC was not involved in the formulation of the proposals. One may ask why this was so?

No definite answer to this question may be possible at this stage, but the story so far indicates a number of possibilities. One was that BATUC had not proven itself strong enough to claim involvement in such a large scale operation. If sectional interests could cause lengthy delays in formulating proposals for Departmental Councils was it reasonable to expect members of BATUC to review the scale of changes implicit in the Corporate Plan in an objective fashion? Would BATUC agree to measures of redeployment let alone reductions in staffing levels? Was it possible for planning to take place without the full co-operation of the AUEW and T&GWU whose relations with BATUC were to say the least, frosty?

On the other hand one must ask whether or not Management would really have appreciated a positive alternative set of proposals from a united BATUC? Apart from the jealousies associated with any limitations or infringements upon Managerial prerogatives, there is also the hard fact that collecting the facts and assessing the costs of alternative actions can prove expensive in terms of time, money, and effort. Yet the examination of alternative proposals could have possibly led to a sounder long term plan being adopted had the Staff been involved.

Whatever the outcome of these speculations, it is well known that within a comparatively short space of time the 'plan for prosperity' was superseded by 'tough measures for survival' as the deepening depression caused all airlines to adopt stringent economies. But the point remains that when

expansion was expected neither BATUC nor any other representative body was involved in the complementary planning. The reasons why should prove of interest to those concerned with industrial democracy and worker participation in major decision processes.

Before attempting to describe other events which concerned BATUC in the summer of 1979 further reference must be made to the deliberations of the May meeting of the EC, for there were indications which way the wind was likely to be blowing in the near future regarding the all-important matter of industrial relations. The minutes of the EC on this item were quite brief, it being reported 'that attempts to hold a joint seminar had been frustrated by management's attack on staff travel concessions.' However, various attempts were being undertaken by the Full-time TU Officers who served on BATUC to persuade BAB to change its policy on the Staff travel ban and further developments were expected before long.

Possibly, hopes for changes were encouraged by the senior appointments referred to above regarding the Chairmanship, Deputy and Chief Executive of the airline. A fairly common view was that the new holders of these posts, unlike some previous incumbents, were all 'airline men' and not people who, whatever their other qualities may have been, were not familiar with BA.

A minor, but important, decision taken at the May meeting of the EC was that it and full meetings of BATUC should henceforth be held on a regular basis. Dates were given for the rest of the year. This apparent trifling matter contrasts with the actions of the Engineering Review Committee which never agreed to hold regular meetings and, it may be argued, suffered badly as a result.

The June Quarterly Meeting

An indication of Management's desires to inform BATUC of the Corporate Plan, as distinct from its attitude on participation, is offered by the fact that before the June quarterly meeting of BATUC began the assembled members witnessed one of the illustrated presentations of the Corporate Plan. Supporting documentation was promised for the immediate future and this was duly circulated a few days later.

When the quarterly meeting started it was reported that Mr. Stanley Clinton-Davis, MP, the ex-Minister for Civil Air Transport affairs and recently appointed Shadow Minister, wished to continue his association with BATUC. Owing to BATUC's interest in aircraft procurement it was not surprising that it was agreed to discuss the Corporate Plan and airline strategy with him, and it was arranged for a meeting to be held the following month. (8)

In view of the character of the events of May and early June, the quarterly meeting was somewhat of an anti-climax. Long standing issues continued to dominate the proceedings without any real progress being achieved. On the question of industrial relations the impasse remained, for Management was not prepared to lift the Staff travel ban and without this BATUC was not prepared to attend an industrial relations conference.

There had been some shadow boxing on this issue with hopes being raised that Management was about to change its attitude on the one hand, and a group of Ramp workers threatening to take legal action against BAB for

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(8) Minutes of the Quarterly Meeting of BATUC, 11 June 1979.

the restoration of terms of employment if such concessions were not renewed on the other. Meanwhile the T&GWU was not participating in the activities of BATUC, and a T&GWU member, who was present as a representative of his NSP, stated that his union's Section Committee was unlikely to reverse its decision not to participate while the ban remained.

However, some progress on the formation of Departmental Councils seemed possible when the EC's recommendations on the size and methods of election were endorsed by the quarterly meeting. It was recognised that owing to the complexities of the airline that there would be variations in the composition of the different Councils, but this was not regarded as a major difficulty.

When the EC met a week after the quarterly gathering, it felt that further preparation for a full discussion of Departmental Councils was necessary. (9) Consequently, the next day the Secretary of BATUC wrote to all EC members, for a number had been absent from the meeting, stating that BATUC was 'continually setting aside consideration' of the paper prepared by Mr. Howard Phelps, which is reproduced as Appendix 1 below. This paper, he explained, together with the response tabled by Mr. Ron Crew would be considered at the next EC meeting in July.

Apart from the issue of Departmental Councils, a number of the issues which had been raised at the quarterly meeting were reviewed by the EC during its June deliberations. It was reported that a one day conference to discuss airline strategy, to be addressed by Mr. Clinton-Davis, had been arranged for a Saturday in mid-July. As events were to prove, the timing of this

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(9) Minutes of the Executive Committee of BATUC, 18 June 1979. Reference to Mr. Crew's paper has been made above p. 9.

conference was unfortunate for it took place just six days before Mr. John Nott, the Minister for Trade, announced the Government's proposals regarding British Airways. (10)

Government Policy Proclaimed

Mr. Nott's opening remarks that 'British Airways has embarked on a major programme of fleet replacement and expansion and I believe that it has excellent growth prospects', may be judged as an indication that the Government was no more prepared for the icy blasts which were soon to be felt by Civil Aviation than was the airline. One may note that the Minister's statement did not criticise the organisational structure of BA, nor express any regret at the reorganisational measures that had taken place in April 1977 which had required Government approval.

If the new Conservative administration shared any of the criticisms of BA regarding over-manning, alleged mis-management, and union bloody-mindedness that were to appear in sections of the national press less than two years later when the fortunes of the airline were in decline, they were not expressed when the Government took office. Of course, it may be argued that the new Minister could hardly be expected to have been familiar with all aspects of BA in his first few months of office. But Ministers have the services of permanent officials and are well briefed before making major policy statements.

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(10) The announcement was made to the House of Commons on Friday, 20 July 1979. The full text of his statement was published the following Friday in 'British Airways News". It is reproduced below as Appendix 3. The one day conference with Mr. Clinton-Davis had taken place on Saturday 14 July and had apparently been well attended.

Growing competition was anticipated by the Minister, but he seemed to be in accord with BAB that the long term solution for the airline was to have modern planes, which needed heavy capital investment, and not be so placed as to have to face increased rivalry with inefficient technology. Hence, the Government was concerned 'to give British Airways the most effective form of organisation for carrying out its programme in response to the changing demands of the market'. But the changes which the Minister was proposing concentrated upon the financial basis of the airline and it sought means whereby the airline should be placed under the Companies Act so that 'a substantial minority share-holding in the enterprise should be offered for sale to the public'. Organisation, in its general sense, was not to be altered.

Of considerable interest to BATUC was Mr. Nott's statement that, 'my proposal does not involve a separate disposal of any part of British Airways'. This unequivocal comment made it quite clear that when the necessary Civil Aviation Act was introduced to make the proposals effective, which was thought to be in about a year's time, there would be no 'hiving off' of profitable parts of the airline to the private sector of industry.

In a press conference after his Parliamentary announcement Mr. Nott said that he wanted full consultation with the Management and Staff of BA, 'He was inviting trade unions to meet him'. The press conference also identified a number of details which had still to be resolved which included such matters as what constituted a 'substantial minority' of shares for sale, and whether or not foreign as well as private British airlines would be entitled to buy such shares.

Reactions to the Government's statement were expressed by the Parliamentary Labour Opposition, the TU Side of the National Joint Council for Civil Aviation, and the Chairman of BA. The views expressed ranged from marked hostility to one of working with the proposals while simultaneously trying to make the airline as efficient as possible. It was after these initial reactions had been stated before BATUC had the opportunity to discuss the Government's plans.

At a hastily specially convened meeting at the beginning of August, Ted Mackenzie informed the members that on the day of the Ministerial statement, the Chairman of BA had spoken to as many BATUC members as could be assembled, and appraised them of what had been said in the House of Commons. (11) It was also reported that a few days later, the TU officers of the NJC had complimented the Labour spokesman in the House on their opposition to the Government's plans. On 27 July, the TU Side of the NJC had met and decided that it was:-

> '1) .... opposed to the principle of introducing private equity capital into British Airways and will discuss with their Parliamentary colleagues ways of opposing the coming legislation during its passage through Parliament.
>
> 2) That discussions with the Secretary of State should continue in order to safeguard the size, scope and integrity of British Airways as presently constituted ....
>
> 3) That activity in support of the Trade Unions' opposition will be co-ordinated by the TU Side who will keep members fully informed, and consulted through delegate meetings as required.'

These proposals were endorsed by the special BATUC meeting.

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(11) Minutes of Special Meeting of BATUC, 2 August 1979.

Although the BATUC meeting had expressed its opposition to the Government's proposals there was a certain amount of relief expressed by members that they were not as bad as were at one time feared. To some minds the sale of any proportion of shares of a hitherto nationalised enterprise was bad enough, but if sections of the airline were hived off this would have been infinitely worse. Nobody at the meeting spoke in favour of Mr. Nott's statement, and if there were sections of BA staff who were keen to buy airline shares on a privileged basis when they became available, such views were not represented.

Concern was expressed at the continued absence of AUEW and T&GWU representatives from the BATUC meeting, and it was felt that this boycott would weaken the struggle against the Government's proposals. At the same time it was felt by some members that if the Trade Unions were to wage too vigorous a campaign, this could cause the Government to become spiteful and induce the CAA to deprive BA of a number of key routes. BATUC had both its hawks and doves.

Some Reflections

By the beginning of August the mood of many members of BATUC must have alternated between optimism and pessimism. According to the Corporate Plan the airline was to become leaner, fitter, and more efficient and only Luddites would oppose development in this direction provided that Staff obtain its share of the benefits derived from greater cost-effectiveness. But the fortunes of Civil Air Transport had dipped dramatically in the mid-1970's and towards the end of the decade some ominous clouds were gathering.

If the ownership of the airline were to change with a declared aim of enhancing profitability, might not a combination of falling revenue, increased technology and cost cutting measures result in lower wages, in real terms, and enforced redundancies?

What seemed to be upper-most in the minds of BATUC members was not only that the jam that was being offered was for tomorrow, but that its quality was also suspect. These reservations, it may be argued, helped to obstruct greater co-operation between BATUC and the EBM at a time when expansion rather than contraction was envisaged.

Unfortunately, Staff side fears seemed to be substantiated when at the beginning of August, before the ink on the Corporate Plan for Prosperity was scarcely dry, there loomed the UK and I routes issue which entailed a loss of work for the airline. But this matter is proper to the next part of the story.

CHAPTER 4

Routes and Industrial Relations

Despite the resolve of the EC of BATUC expressed at its June meeting to give serious attention to the long standing question of Departmental Councils, no substantial progress was achieved in the latter half of 1979, nor has it been made to date. Exchanges took place between the EC and the EBM, and at one time it looked as if a breakthrough was about to occur in the Commercial Division, but this proved illusory for no Council resulted.

It would make tedious reading if the memoranda on the subject were summarised, especially as so little materialised, but the proposals that were made illustrate a range of matters pertinent to industrial democracy. Had Departmental Councils come into being, Trades Unionists within the airline would presumably have been better informed and a better level of understanding reached.

Whether or not Departmental Councils would have prevented some of the mis-understandings which occurred is a matter for speculation. What happened was that as the economic situation sharpened in the last quarter of the year, the EBM announced its plans to counter ever growing problems and BATUC reacted to the decisions taken. This reaction often took the form of outright opposition and sometimes resulted in both sides claiming that the other was pursuing the wrong policies. Had consultation taken place before decisions were reached the affect upon industrial relations might have been considerable. While history may encourage such speculation, which is not necessarily a useless by-product, it is nevertheless concerned with what actually transpired rather than what might have been.

If the issue of Departmental Councils is therefore placed to one side, one may observe that in the late summer and autumn, BATUC was concerned with two major problems. These were the continuing delay to a joint industrial relations conference arising from the Staff travel ban impasse, and a Management announcement that it intended to axe 26 United Kingdom and Ireland routes.

When BAB announced its Corporate Plan in the summer of 1979 it was careful to emphasise the increasing influence of deregulation and fiercer competition. Indeed, an important aspect of the plan was the aim of improving cost effectiveness. However, the sub-title 'A Plan for Prosperity' stressed expansion, while the description of the heavy capital investment involved led many BA workers to believe that growth, rather than contraction, was to happen. It was therefore a shock when leading members of BATUC were informed in early August of Management's intentions to reduce the number of UK and I routes.

Subsequently a special meeting of BATUC was convened and Mr. Tudor Thomas, a Full Time Official of APEX and a leading member of the NJC, reported upon the exchanges with Management. (1) He stated that BATUC had objected to the absence of consultation before Management had announced its proposals to cut the routes and had told Management accordingly. Mr. Thomas claimed that at least a joint working party should have been given the chance to examine all the data in order to ascertain whether or not there were any practicable options that warranted further examination, but this was not to be.

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(1) Minutes of Special Meeting of BATUC, 20 August 1979.
Leading members of BATUC had met Management on 8 August.

Of importance to the character of BATUC was Mr. Thomas' statement that,

> 'One of the purposes of calling a full BATUC meeting was that it was felt that as the organisation responsible for management policy making matters, this should be a BATUC issue. This would become an NJC matter when the issue referred to members of staff's jobs .... this was an occasion when both BATUC and the NJC, working together, could perform a useful function.'

To further this joint endeavour it was agreed to convene a special conference of all Panel representatives within the UK & I Division of the airline, the TU side of the NJC, and members of BATUC.

The meeting continued by expressing criticism of the Civil Aviation Authority which was felt to be hostile towards BA. It was argued that if BA were to surrender any of its routes, these would be reallocated by the CAA to the airline's rivals without any loss of time. BA would consequently be that much weaker and its competitors stronger.

It was recognised that the proposed route cuts would not directly affect the airline's workforce at London, Heathrow, and this would make centralised resistance to BAB's plans more difficult to organise. An overall review of the cost structure of the airline was required, it was claimed, and with this purpose in mind Mr. Anthony Clarry, a member of BALPA and the BATUC EC, tabled a paper. (2)

The paper argued that more harm would be done to the implementation of the Corporate Plan than any good derived from the savings to be acquired by cutting the routes. It maintained that the targets set for 1986 would not be achieved by 'Pulling out of difficult routes' and 'Losing a few hundred

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(2) Clarry, A.J, 'UK and Ireland Network: A discussion paper towards a BATUC Policy', 12 August 1979.

staff and lowering the morale of the rest'. What was proposed as an alternative was that there should be a restructuring of BA's second tier shorthaul operation, 'to match up to the keenest competition capable of offering the same service'.

In the ensuing discussion it was realised that BATUC's commitment to retaining the routes involved measures of re-deployment and the introduction of different work practices. These might have been seen as being too high a price to pay, or if the EC agreed to such measures would it have been in a position to deliver in the face of strong opposition from the rank-and-file TU members?

The Exchanges Begin

On 30 August 1979 members of the NJC and BATUC met representatives of the EBM in order to discuss the UK & I routes situation. Before the full meeting began the Trades Union side reviewed the situation and the possible tactics to be employed. (3)

Mr. Tudor Thomas reported that according to Management, the UK & I routes were costing too much money (£7-£9m) and were proving unprofitable. Management wanted to cut those routes which were incurring a deficit and a careful examination of yields had taken place. But it was maintained that it was questionable whether or not the correct system of accountancy had been employed, and the costs attributed accurately.

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(3) Substantiation of what transpired on 30 August is based upon my own notes of the meetings.

In the ensuing discussion an opinion was expressed that Management had already made up its mind and was determined to impose the cuts. This argument was supported by a claim that the Government was exerting pressure to reduce the size of the airline. If this were the case, asked a member, should Trade Union opposition be in the form of outright confrontation or other methods be adopted?

It was claimed that disintegration of the airline's domestic services was already taking place, and that the UK & I closures were merely the first shots in the battles that were to come. This led to various charges, which did not appear substantiated, that Management was acting deviously. What appeared to be a more serious question was why Management was feeding information to the Staff piecemeal instead of making a comprehensive statement.

At the end of the Trades Union sectional meeting it was agreed that Management be challenged to produce evidence of positive thinking. The general tone of the meeting was that the shop floor was prepared for change but not contraction.

When the two sides met in joint session, the differences in the approach to the UK & I routes problem were made obvious with Management's production of a paper. (4) Mr. Gerry Draper, Director of Commercial Operations, opened proceedings by emphasising parts of the paper and stating that the fuel bill for BA in the financial year would be £125m heavier than anticipated, that other costs were rising, and competition was increasing. If BA were to remain a profitable airline it had to increase its efficiency, and a strategic review of routes was essential for the implementation of the Corporate Plan.

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(4) Director Commercial Operations, 'UK & Ireland Route Network: Problem Routes'

Managerial colleagues supported Mr. Draper and drew attention to the criticism that was being levelled at the airline by groups of consumers. The influence of the CAA was being felt on an increasing scale, for only the previous March the Authority had refused to sanction fare increases to allow a number of routes to break even. There was a need to replace the 20 Viscount aircraft that were still in service as these were noisy and expensive regarding fuel. While the price of fuel was going up, fares in real terms had declined by 3% in recent years.

Mr. Draper added to the discussion by stating that planning requirements called for BA to make decisions by 1 October 1979. He argued that it would be wrong to throw good money after bad, and by giving up the problem routes £20m per year could be saved. That it was wrong to let unprofitable routes go to competitors was, Mr. Draper maintained, a fallacious argument. Instead all energies should be directed at saving the sound routes.

Whatever the quality of Management's case, extreme bitterness was expressed by a number of representatives from the outstations. They stated that decisions had been reached without any TU involvement, there had been a lack of information although rumours had been widespread, and that denials had been made regarding the Managerial decisions which had ultimately surfaced. Some 430 Staff were affected, and those in Jersey and Guernsey would be facing the decision of leaving the airline's employ or moving house to the mainland.

At this point Mr. John Collier of the TGWU gave notice of his union's opposition to the plans of Management, and stated 'We intend to fight'. To this Mr. Draper replied that such opposition would only exacerbate the problems of the airline and could lead to its ultimate collapse. On this somewhat bitter note members of Management withdrew and the Trades Union Side began a separate assessment of what had transpired.

In the ensuing discussion numerous tactical points were made. It was pointed out that neither the T&GWU nor the AUEW were represented on BATUC and a complaint was expressed that shop floor members were not aware of BATUC's actions. But what was more important were the lines of action that were agreed upon.

Somewhat naturally the meeting criticised Management for its failure to set up joint working parties to examine the route structures. Therefore the NJC and BATUC would recommend that no routes be closed, 'but joint discussion with Management take place in efforts to resolve the problem'. This meant that no immediate industrial action was contemplated.

A question from the floor queried whether or not this approach was strong enough and what of the immediate future? It was recommended that the Officers of the NJC and BATUC should set up committees with representatives from the stations affected and Management be asked for the status quo to prevail regarding the routes until the situation had been fully explored. This recommendation was carried overwhelmingly.

One may note, however, that there had been no indications from Management that this line of action would be acceptable. Indeed, if the above account of the joint meeting is reasonably accurate the closing of the routes seemed certain as made clear by Mr. Draper's paper. In seeking to set up ad hoc committees, one is tempted to ask if this was merely wishful thinking.

September Stocktaking

The decision of BATUC to hold regular meetings began to pay dividends in the turbulent period into which the organisation had now entered. It seems reasonable to claim that with the numerous and contentious meetings that members

had attended during August, a full meeting of the Council would not have taken place in September unless it had been decided upon before hand as a matter of principle. One can appreciate that the quarterly meeting held in the second week of the month afforded an opportunity to review the situation. (5)

Although members had the UK and I routes closures to the forefront of their minds they were well aware of the need to improve the industrial relations situation. If relations had been better, it was thought, an issue like the route closures would not have arisen in the form which it had, or better still not occurred at all. Not every member thought this way, for some believed that Management was hell-bent on getting its own way. Such members tended to subscribe to the view that within the industrial scene throughout the country (increased de-industrialisation, rising unemployment, and greater need for re-deployment of staff labour and resources) the initiative had passed to Management who could now act in a far more determined fashion than hitherto. In this developing situation, it was contended, the EBM would go ahead and take any measures it thought necessary to improve cost effectiveness irrespective of the affect of such measures upon industrial relations. (6)

In many ways the proposed joint conference on industrial relations reflected the difficult state of affairs within the airline, and the lifting of the ban on Staff travel continued to be seen as a crucial pre-requisite for the holding of joint deliberations. The minutes of the BATUC meeting record that Mr. Ted Mackenzie read the latest letter on the subject which had been received

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(5) Minutes of BATUC Meeting, 10 September, 1979.

(6) Readers who are conversant with the theories regarding industrial relations may be tempted to assess which theory was assuming greater significance. On this matter see 'Macho Managers and the New Industrial Relations", John Purcell in 'Employee Relations' Vol. 4 No. 1 MCB Publications, April 1982.

from Mr. Roy Watts, Chief Executive. This stated that,

> 'as the ban had been effective during 1979 Management is not inclined to lift it, but would hope to be in a position to hold the joint industrial relations conference which was planned for the beginning of the year and on the basis of any practical results coming from that, review its decision.'

Members reactions to Mr. Watts' letter were not favourable and it was alleged that the TU side of the NJC was dragging its feet. One contribution from the floor was that a further 60 members of Staff had lost their travel concession and unless there were some improvement in the situation 'there was likely to be some serious repercussions so far as BA is concerned'.

However, the meeting was reminded that the matter was still in the hands of the TU side of the NJC and that any contemplated action by BATUC would be inappropriate. As the NJC was to discuss the issue further at a meeting to be held later that week it was decided to await future developments.

BATUC then recognised that it had been defeated over aircraft procurement and its hopes that BA would order the European Air Bus. Mr. Mackenzie reported that BA had explained its reasons for ordering Boeing 757s and that a contract had been concluded. It was agreed that nothing more could be done on this matter.

Before the meeting heard the latest situation relating to the UK & I routes issue, it was stated that disquiet had been expressed regarding the airline's alleged under-utilisation of Manchester Airport. The Secretary and Mr. Thomas had met the UK & I Division Management and as a result it was hoped that there would be permanent liaison between the Local Joint Panel and UK & I Management.

A full report was given on the joint meeting held at the end of August to discuss the UK & I proposed route closures. The main development that had occurred in the interim period was that a special committee was being established comprising Management and one representative from each UK & I station. Management had been informed that the Trades Unions opposed its plans for closures; but 'wished to turn their opposition into constructive channels'. Whether or not the Trades Unions were to achieve anything constructive was to be proven in the immediate future.

The stocktaking process continued when the EC convened a week after the quarterly meeting of BATUC. (7) A considerable amount of time was expended on Departmental Councils before attention was switched to the proposed UK & I routes closures. Any hopes for an improvement in the situation which the special committee might have achieved received a marked set-back when it was reported that Management was determined to enforce its original decision. The committee had met, but the deliberations 'had been fruitless as the only matter the management were prepared to discuss was the possible future of two routes out of Jersey'.

It was proposed to raise the question of the route closures at the special Delegate Conference for which a date near to mid-October had been agreed by the TU side of the NJC. Various plans for publicising the TU point of view were discussed, which included a letter to 'British Airways News', a mass petition for Staff signatures, and the preparation of a leaflet. While the closures threatened, it was agreed that it would be inappropriate for BATUC to become involved in detailed discussion of the implementation of the Corporate Plan.

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(7) Minutes of the EC, 17 September 1979.

An explanation of the situation was then made concerning the proposed industrial relations conference and the attitude of the TU side of the NJC. After carefully considering all aspects of the matter the TU side had come to the conclusion that the impasse should be broken and despite the continuation of the Staff travel ban the joint industrial relations conference should take place. A factor which had worried the TU side was the degree of Staff support for Management's imposition and continuation of the ban, and in these circumstances it would be better if a dialogue with Management were to begin. These points were to be put to the Delegate Conference, and the EC merely took note of the reported situation.

Into Action?

Before the Delegate Conference took place, a collective EBM/BATUC/NJC meeting was held in the first week of October. (8) Mr. Roy Watts, who chaired the meeting, began by stating that in the current financial year there had been a short-fall of £80m despite growth in traffic. The losses were due mainly to rising oil prices, high interest rates, and inflation. It appeared that this pattern would continue for at least a year. Within that period some 30 new aircraft were expected. Mr. Watts continued by arguing that low fares were here to stay which made it clear that if the airline were to achieve profitability, costs would have to be reduced. To this immediate end BAB had confirmed the closure of the designated 26 UK & I routes.

Mr. Mark Young, Chairman of BATUC, thanked Mr. Watts for the information he had imparted which was 'the only positive aspect of the meeting'. But, he claimed, the Staff Side's case had been totally disregarded and this did not

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(8) Substantiation of what occurred at this meeting, held on 5 October 1979, is based on my own notes.

auger well for future relations. Indeed, the lack of consultation was deplorable. He stated that, 'We are convinced of the soundness of our case, we do not wish to take hasty actions but lack of consideration is serious'. Mr. Young continued by saying that the Staff side had consulted the Parliamentary Labour Party regarding what should be done. Trust was necessary between the BAB and the Staff side but what was the future of joint consultation? These opening exchanges made it clear that the meeting was unlikely to prove harmonious.

In a brief reply Mr. Watts asked for wise reflection. He stated that all the arguments had been considered by BAB, including the influence of the route cutting decision upon industrial relations. But, 'We are concerned with BA in its entirety'.

Somewhat naturally, Messrs. Thomas and Mackenzie, supported the line of argument advanced by Mr. Young. Both stressed the harm that was being done to industrial relations and to the joint feasibility exercises that were still taking place within the airline.

A further argument put forward by BATUC concerned the proposed sale of aircraft to other airlines. It was thought that competitors could then use such aircraft to compete with BA. In reply Mr. Watts stated that older types of craft tended to be more noisy and consumed more fuel than the modern planes which BA was expecting. Nevertheless, he continued, the question of the sale of planes would be kept under constant review.

When the meeting was thrown open to discussion some bitter comments were voiced. The general line of complaint was that there had been a lack of information to the Staff, the public had learned of the route closures before

members, and there was a serious lack of alternative employment in the outstations for Staff who did not wish to change their home location. After several more sharp remarks it was felt that an adjournment would be helpful and members of the EBM withdrew to allow a separate Staff side meeting to take place.

An immediate question that confronted the Staff side was what was to be done, and for the first time some form of industrial action was considered as a serious option. While there was no doubt of the anger of the representatives who were present, there was dubiety regarding the reactions of the shop floor. It was emphasised that the interests of the London, Heathrow workers were not being endangered, and it was doubtful if the vast majority of Staff would see the long term dangers which the TU leadership felt were threatening all airline personnel if the route closures were to be proceeded with as planned. On this gloomy note it was decided not to resume the dialogue with the EBM that day, but await the outcome of a special BATUC meeting planned to be held the following week.

At very short notice a special meeting of BATUC was held in the second week in October, four days before the Delegate Conference was due to convene. The only item on the agenda was the UK & I route closures. (9)

Mr. Mark Young reported on the joint meeting with the EBM and the fact that the BAB had agreed to withdraw 26 routes with effect from April 1980. This decision, it was emphasised, was the reason why the special meeting of BATUC had been called, for the EC wanted clear guidance from members regarding future action.

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(9) Minutes of Special Meeting of BATUC, 8 October 1979.

Reactions from the floor were not long awaited. Nearly all speakers condemned the way that Management had reached its decisions which, it was contended, boded ill for any worker participation schemes within BA. It was stressed that the routes issue concerned the whole of the airline and that 'all BA staff must be alerted to the dangers of Management's current thinking'.

It was reported that the T&GWU section committee had decided that the only way to defend the TU position was to organise a series of 24 hour strikes, which are known to be particularly damaging as far as Civil Air Transport is concerned. But the main question in the minds of those contemplating this action was, 'will the other unions join us?'

Attention was drawn to the fact that the Delegate Conference would also be discussing the routes issue, but the BATUC meeting decided upon a number of lines for action. Several mass meetings of Staff were planned, the first to be informative, the second to ask for any action that might be thought necessary, with 24 hour strikes a strong possible recommendation. It was agreed to seek the support 'of Government Ministers, the TUC, the Labour Party and Labour MPs'. In addition the meeting elected a campaign committee of all Full Time NJC Officials who served on BATUC and six lay members who were charged with mounting a major propaganda campaign.

On the day that the TU Delegate Conference met, the airline's weekly paper carried a lengthy article on the route closures, details of which routes were to go, the losses they were incurring, and the general financial situation of BA. (10) Most of the main arguments which had been put forward by Mr. Watts at the EBM/BATUC/NJC meeting were summarised. The article also stated that

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(10) 'Loss-making routes will close in April', 'British Airways News', 12 October 1979 p.8.

representations made by the Staff and Trades Unions had been carefully considered but, 'it has been clearly established that these proposals could not make the routes profitable'.

The same issue of the paper, indeed on the same page as the routes closure article, contained the information that, 'Four British independent airlines have asked the Civil Aviation Authority for permission to take over the 26 UK & I routes British Airways is giving up ....' This information aroused fears in the minds of the Staff, whether justified or not, that work was 'going out of the gate', and raised the question of why if the independent airlines could make a profit from the routes could not BA do likewise? (11)

When the Delegate Conference convened, attention was first given to the long standing problem of the proposed industrial relations conference and the Staff travel ban. The Chairman of BATUC, Mr. Young, outlined the case in favour of attending such a conference without the prior condition that the travel ban be lifted:-

> 'Refusal to discuss problems can prolong the embargo on individual members of staff. Unless industrial relations discussions take place a calamity will occur. It is essential that industrial relations within BA should be free from a plague of fragmented disputes. The Government is out to hit the airline and the relevant TUs. Are we to go to war over this issue?' (12)

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(11) 'BA route cuts: independents gather', 'Flight International', 20 October 1979 p. 1264. This article gave indications of the way the independent airlines hoped to make a profit. They included the use of smaller aircraft than BA's and a smaller infrastructure. It is hoped to trace the fate of these routes in future papers.

(12) Extracts taken from my own notes of the meeting, held 12 October 1979, which are the source of reference for the Conference.

These cryptic comments perhaps summarise the case for dropping the pre-requisite lifting of the travel ban, but few speakers supported this line of reasoning.

Instead, most speakers thought that to discuss industrial relations under what they termed duress was impossible. Although some spoke of Staff support for the ban, others described it as 'an affront to human dignity'. One member from the T&GWU stated that 200 drivers were on unofficial strike and in danger of losing their travel concessions. If they were to learn that the TU side was to sit down with Management in an effort to improve industrial relations before the ban were lifted there would be hell to pay.

The proposal for an industrial conference to be held without the travel ban being lifted beforehand was then put to the vote and rejected decisively.

Discussion then centred upon the Government's proposals to allow injections of private capital into the airline. It was reported that the BAB was not in opposition to the Government's plans, whereas the TU movement was hostile. Obviously, much depended upon the terms of the Civil Aviation Bill which was due to be published in November. What concerned the TU movement meanwhile was the envisaged role of the CAA. Would this authority act like a hatchet man on BA's route structure and hand large amputated sections to independent airlines?

The Chairman then spoke on the UK & I routes issue but hardly surprisingly very little new matter of substance was introduced. Most members present were all too familiar with both the Management and TU points of view. No doubt the most important decision taken at the Conference was that if the cuts were implemented then industrial action would be taken.

At the end of October, Mr. Watts' comments featured prominently in the airline's weekly paper which carried a main headline, 'Expansion programme goes on, says Chief Executive'. (13) Inside the paper a column written by Mr. Watts gave details of the latest financial developments concerning Civil Air Transport and BA in particular. Under the main headline was the statement that,

> 'New European route applications from British independent airlines would not divert British Airways from the greatest expansion programme in its history ....'

> 'Predicting a growth between five and six per cent in British Airways traffic in 1980-81, Mr. Watts reiterated his belief in the airline's plans to double its business over the next decade'.

On the same front page, indeed it was the lead story, was an account of BA's opposition to Laker's application to the CAA for licenses for scheduled services on 36 routes into Europe.

Staff who read the paper were no doubt encouraged by the prospects for growth and the stand that Management was making against rivals. Perhaps somewhat ironically on the same day as the paper appeared there was a further EBM/NJC/BATUC meeting which was presided over by Mr. Watts. (14)

As before, the Chief Executive opened the meeting by bringing the financial state of the airline up-to-date and there could be no doubt left in anybody's mind over the seriousness of the situation. Mr. Watts stated that the airline had made a profit of £60m in the previous financial year but this was

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(13) 'British Airways News', 26 October 1979, pp.1-3.

(14) Again, I have used my own notes to substantiate this part of the story. The meeting was held in the afternoon of Friday, 26 October 1979.

a poor return on capital and did not allow for sufficient re-investment. Present trends indicated a deteriorating profit return situation and that only half the expected gains would be realised at the end of the 1979-80 financial year. Owing to soaring oil prices, spot fuel was being bought and all fuel costs represented 25% of operating costs in contrast to 9% a year or two earlier. The strong pound was adversely affecting the purchases of the airline.

Mr. Watts continued by stating that the moves towards low fares and a greater liberalisation of route regulations had increased competition considerably. But he warned if there were a price war then competitors 'had better watch out'. A number of measures were then specified to indicate BA's greater efficiency.

Mr. Watts said that efficiency measures had already achieved a saving of £7m, and £40m had been lopped off capital expenditure. 6000 staff changes had already taken place, and efforts were being made to reduce comparative labour costs. New fares and tariff structures were to be introduced. The standardisation of equipment and vehicles was imperative.

Turning to the UK & I route closures Mr. Watts argued that the issue had become emotive because it involves people and the outstations. But the main issue was the fight for life in the market place. To this end all Viscount aircraft would be withdrawn by 1981 and rationalisation was taking shape with the fleet comprising 5 main types of planes.

Mr. Watts then turned his attention to BATUC and criticised it for being non-productive. Reliability was something that had to be achieved and on this point BATUC could make a contribution. But, claimed Mr. Watts, BATUC seemed to be dragging its feet. Productivity was another area where BATUC could play a role.

The first person to speak from the TU side was Mr. Young who rejected the idea that BATUC had been dragging its feet. He pointed to BATUC's genuine concern that route closures would harm the airline and all offers to collectively review the situation had been spurned by Management. He pointed to the issue of the acquisition of 737s and the positive role the Staff had played. Hopes for the lifting of the ban on Staff travel and the possibilities of an industrial relations conference ensuing had been increased by virtue of the TU side recognising the problems which had confronted Management. Industrial relations within the airline had a chequered history, there being good and bad aspects.

Another BATUC member emphasised that Staff opposed the route closures as it was felt that the routes could have been rendered profitable. But the unilateral decision of Management had prevented the Staff from making any positive contribution. All BATUC was being asked to do was to accept a decision which it felt was harmful to both BA and its Staff.

Obviously feelings were running high and at this point matters became bogged down over the precise state of affairs regarding the lifting of the Staff travel ban and the proposed industrial relations conference. A decision was made to adjourn to allow separate meetings to take place.

When the NJC/BATUC group assembled Mr. Crew contended that the fate of between 400-500 Staff either losing their jobs or having to move house was more important than the Staff travel issue. He strongly defended BATUC's record and stated that he was in total opposition to BATUC being used as a sounding board for Managerial ideas.

Serious criticisms of the EBM were made, especially over the lack of consultation. However, the question that loomed large in everybody's mind was what was the TU side to do? Was it to accept the route closures and an invitation to an industrial conference without the lifting of the travel ban, or was it to resist on one or both issues? The line accepted was that it would resist the closures and seek further clarification of the Staff travel ban, if necessary 24 hour strikes would be called.

On the resumption of the joint meeting, Mr. Watts stressed the importance of reliability and the improvement of relations. To facilitate the convening of the proposed industrial relations conference he was prepared to freeze the ban that was in operation. On being questioned as to what precisely did this freeze mean he stated that he was not prepared to lift the ban on existing offenders. But the terms offered were not accepted by the TU side, which led Mr. Watts to state that he was very disappointed as he felt there was not a lot of difference between the two sides over the industrial relations conference question. On the UK & I routes closures the Chief Executive felt that it was far too late for any meaningful discussions to take place as the decisions had been taken.

Mr. Young then raised the matter of possible monthly meetings between BATUC and the EBM when some positive exhanges could take place. But Mr. Watts replied that he could not talk about productivity while he was busy in 'putting out fires' in the various areas of industrial relations.

The joint meeting then ended on a sour note. Nothing positive was achieved and the marked differences between the two sides was perhaps epitomised in a

in a BATUC spokesman declaring at the conclusion of the deliberations

'If 400-600 people go down the road we'll never forget it.'

It seemed that the course was set for the first of the industrial stoppages.

CHAPTER 5

The Crunch that never Came

The campaign committee which had been set up in early October had not been idle. Within days rather than weeks it produced a glossy leaflet with a title, 'For Whom the Bell Tolls - a Trade Union solution to British Airways problems', which was dramatic and eye-catching. (1) A petition designed for staff signatures was prefaced with a humorous cartoon with the serious message 'Stop the Chop, Sign Now!!' Hence, when the ill-fated EBM/NJC/BATUC meeting concluded on 26 October there had already been a circulation of TU material and numerous meetings had been held to appraise rank-and-file members of the case against route closures.

Events were now to move fairly quickly for on the Monday (29 October) following the Friday meeting with the EBM, a letter was sent from Mr. Mackenzie to all members of BATUC which summarised the outcome of the deliberations. Members were informed that consequently the mass meeting of Staff proposed for 9 November had been brought forward and was now planned for the afternoon of 1 November. Mr. Mackenzie also stated that he had been asked,

> 'to write to the General Secretaries of affiliated unions seeking Executive authority for the calling of a 24 hour strike to protest against the BA Board's decision. I have therefore written to General Secretaries as per the attached letter from which you will see that the TU side is to meet on 9th November, hopefully to set the date for the day of action.'

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(1) This leaflet is reproduced in full as Appendix 5, pp. 80-82 below.

Everything now depended upon rank-and-file support.

Mass meetings are always difficult to assess regarding the actual size of attendance, and when votes are recorded by a show of hands there is often dubiety of the result if opinions are nearly evenly divided. Just how many members of Staff attended the mass meeting convened on 1 November would be a problem to say, but after listening to the recommendation put in support of a 24 hour strike there was no doubt about the Staff's decision. It was an overwhelming rejection of the call for industrial action.

Undoubtedly the TU side of the NJC and BATUC had sustained a defeat. How BATUC reacted to this set back must await a further paper, nevertheless it is hoped that the above account will cause those interested in the state of industrial relations within the airline, and possibly elsewhere, to ponder upon a number of questions. For the sake of simplicity these are listed, but not in any order of importance.

1) If the TU side/BATUC had not tried to take industrial action would it not have been accused of betraying the Staff in the outstations?

2) Having sought to organise industrial action was BATUC, which had a membership dominated by lay shop-stewards, out of touch with the shop floor? If so, why?

3) Was the case of Management so strong concerning not only the route closure question, but also the Staff travel ban issue, that rank-and-file members were convinced of the soundness of the arguments of Management?

4) Were rank-and-file members so influenced by rising unemployment, inflation, and sharpening competition that they saw the need for 'strong Management'?

5) What were the consequences of the UK & I routes closure question upon the future of BA and the state of industrial relations within the airline? What are the new prospects for worker participation schemes and industrial democracy?

Such are some of the questions which this attempt to outline a phase in BATUC's history reveal, the answers to which could provide interesting reading.

APPENDIX 1

B R I T I S H A I R W A Y S

BRITISH AIRWAYS TRADE UNION COUNCIL

DRAFT OUTLINE CONSTITUTION FOR DEPARTMENTAL COUNCILS

1. The management and employees of British Airways have a common objective to ensure the continued provision and development of profitable air transport services in the interests of the owners, the customers, themselves and the community at large.

2. The Board of British Airways and the British Airways Trade Union Council recognise the need for the fullest possible commitment by the staff to the operation and well-being of the airline and its employees. British Airways accepts for its part that significant decisions ought to take into account the views of the workforce. To these ends they agree that:-

   (i) staff will be involved in the processes leading to decision taking on matters that affect their working lives

   (ii) staff taking part in such processes do so as representatives exercising their judgement on behalf of the staff they represent

   (iii) a formal Council structure will be set up within which Directors, management and staff of British Airways will take part in the processes referred to in (i) and (ii)

   (iv) such deliberations will occur prior to the stage at which they might in whole or part become subject to contractual bargaining. The Council structure deals only with non-contractual matters and neither diminishes nor alters the established role of the National Joint Council.

   (v) Constituencies will be agreed to provide for Councils of not greater than 20 in membership and will be chaired by the Head of Department concerned.

3. Notwithstanding this, management must possess authority to make decisions which are necessary for the efficient operation of the airline. The responsibilities of the Board of British Airways, whose members are accountable by law to the Secretary of State is unaffected by the Council structure. Those to whom the Board has delegated authority remain accountable for their decisions.

   The Council structure will enable staff to contribute to decisions through representatives. Those representatives will render account to those who have chosen them.

4. FUNCTIONS

It shall be the function of each Council to:-

a. Give its views on, and in this way assist in the formulation of significant aspects of British Airways' policy.

(i) Receive from the management members a periodic report on airline and departmental affairs covering such matters as financial, operational and manpower performance and how these compare with established targets.

(ii) Receive from the management members plans relating to work requirements, organisation, the deployment of resources, the introduction of new equipment or work practices and changes in location.

b. Consider any matters placed on the agenda in due form by members of the Councils except:-

(i) Matters which are subject to collective bargaining.

(ii) Matters which are not of sufficient general concern to warrant discussion at departmental level and which seem capable of resolution at lower levels of the organisation.

[ND but issued July 1978]

APPENDIX 2

BRITISH AIRWAYS INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

1. Introduction - The Problem

The trades unions within British Airways are fully aware that there is a severe Industrial Relations problem within the Company. The aim of this paper is to show that the fundamental causes of the problem lie partly with the difficulty of trade union representatives and officials to co-ordinate and influence their members but mainly with the inability of management to 'manage'. This inability is manifest in the apparent refusal of management to take decisions and to negotiate. Decisions that are eventually made tend to be taken without true consultation and inevitably generate a lack of respect and confidence within the trade unions and the workforce. This in turn results in employees taking industrial action first and talking to management afterwards. This paper will provide illustrations of this and will then suggest causes and remedies.

2. The Problems

It must be said at the outset that the various departments and sections of the Company experience different problems, but it is maintained that the root cause of all the difficulties is the same.

The current situation is that all those involved in running the Company - the Board, Personnel, Industrial Relations and line management - either sit on problems hoping that they will eventually disappear or else give bald refusals to requests by unions. Negotiation seldom takes place. It has been the experience of national panels that at meetings with the Company management is frequently over-represented in numbers but under-represented in authority. Decisions are usually not taken and issues are fudged. Where decisions are taken middle management often intervenes to prevent agreed action from being implemented.

The result is that problems are left unresolved for months and are often lost or forgotten by management. The union representatives are continually having to remind the Company of outstanding matters and repeatedly ask for action.

This behaviour by management would seem to be in no way unique to British Airways and does seem to stem from the overstaffing of management, the numerous levels of hierarchy and the lack of authority vested in individual managers. It has led to a situation where management no longer has any respect for the staff and the staff none for management.

The merger between BEA and BOAC caused anxiety amongst both management and staff but unless management is seen to be strong the staff become imbued with feelings of ineffectiveness and consequently frustrated. The difficulties experienced by unions and the workforce in getting decisions from middle-management (who are forced to consult upwards before entering into any commitments) and in arranging meetings between management and staff do not reflect a shortage of management but rather their ineffectual use. The phenomenon has been described as the 'fog factor'. What is needed is not an increase in personnel, industrial relations staff etc. but the granting to line managers of real power to weigh up situations and after consultation to make decisions. The functions of personnel and industrial relations departments should be to give advice and not to exercise the power of veto over decisions of line managers. If this is coupled with strong direction from the top staff would feel that they were working for an organisation which knew where it was going, what it was doing and that their own needs and ideas were playing a real part in the business.

At the moment one of the most significant things that is lacking from the workforce is loyalty and pride towards British Airways. The Company is seen as an amorphous mass uncaring towards its staff. Various incidents can be cited which seem to indicate to staff that management does not have their interests at heart.

When the merger took place neither managers nor staff were given clear explanations of their role within the new structure, instead much noise was made about the over-staffing and the need for redundancies. Naturally, this made people feel apprehensive about their jobs and to form entrenched positions about their work duties. The subsequent and continuous re-organisation of the management structure simply reinforced the staff's feelings about the need for self-preservation. The use of so much energy in looking after themselves has meant that the workforce has not put as much effort into the Company as is necessary for its continued viability.

To some extent this could be overcome by the Company putting more stress on the need and role of the workforce than in its dispersal. The old feelings of loyalty and pride which staff had previously held towards either BEA or BOAC has not been transferred to the new single Company. Nothing has been done by management to retain those commitments and focus them on British Airways. More emphasis needs to be put into defining departments and their role. Loyalty to departments should be fostered by the investing of authority and decision making ability in departmental heads. Heads or Managers of departments need to become closer to their staff and to become identified with those with whom they work. Managers should cease to be so remote from their workforce and become more knowledgeable about the day to day tasks and problems of their staff. They should be concerned less with administration than with actual end product of their departments.

Trade unions and their members have a large part to play in fostering loyalty to both individual departments and to British Airways as a whole. Such loyalty is essential if the airline is to operate effectively for the benefit of both staff and the public.

The chaos caused by the shortage of aircraft is yet another instance of lack of understanding by management. The actual shortage may not have been the fault of the Company but the lack of responsibility towards the consequencies is. The general public is naturally very upset when after paying for a service it does not materialise or does so only after delays and confusion. The aggravation felt is taken out on the staff nearest to the public who are in no way at fault. The Managers themselves should appear and explain the situation to the public and accept the bad feeling generated. The general staff should be exonerated.

A further example of the breakdown in relations between management and the staff is evidenced by the Company's attitude over police intervention in the Central area. As the police are causing considerable harassment but only catching the perpetrators of the most trifling misdemeanors their presence is defeating the object of their intervention. Far more faith and trust in the Company would be generated and a better working environment created if steps were taken to ensure that the presence of the police was minimised and more emphasis placed on crime prevention.

3. The Causes

Continuous urging of the staff 'to do better' does not create good will. Staff, already feeling helpless and victimised need more than perpetual warnings to do better. At one time British Airways was one of the highest paying employers in the country, but this no longer is the case. The fault here does not rest primarily with the Company but with the Government. In a period of pay restraint there is even more need for management to be seen to treat its employees fairly and reasonably. Even if the Company stressed to its workers that it would pay more if it could it is doubtful whether now it would be believed. This is especially so when, at the same time, there is talk of overstaffing. The organisational structure of a Company must be seen to be correct before staff will accept that too many people may be doing one job.

Communication is appallingly bad within British Airways. This is not only the case between management and the unions/workforce but also within management itself. The situation is partly due to the size and hierarchical structure of management and partly due to the insecurity of the staff involved. If managers are aware that they are overstaffed they, like the workforce, become concerned to make their position appear invaluable to the Company. If they are seen to be superfluous then their own job is in jeopardy. This, of course, affects the morale of the workforce who realise that what may have been agreed with one section of management is not implemented or conveyed to the 'powers that be'.

Trades Unions are also at fault here as their own communication network tends to be poor. Within all three factions lines of communication need to be vastly improved and made effective and swift.

Emphasis must be placed on consultation and effective participation. Members of the workforce are often in possession of real knowledge which should never be under-estimated. If people have been doing a job for several years they are usually aware of defects in the system and of improvements that could be made. This information must be tapped and staff made aware of the usefulness of their input. It is only when staff feel they are truly contributing that they feel they have a stake in the business. Loyalty and pride are built up in this way and are essential to the success of a concern.

The trades union side has also a part to play in bringing this about and this is realised and accepted. The proposed departmental councils need to be established and unions need to do more to foster involvement amongst members. The impetus for participation and exhange of information must come from both sides. Methods of resolving local disputes quickly and effectively also need to be devised. One such attempt is described in Appendix 1. Such agreements should be more widely encouraged.

4. Conclusions

Undoubtedly the merger between BOAC and BEA has caused some of the more deep rooted problems in management to become more apparent. However, the merger has taken place and is now a fact of life and is here to stay. The aim is to establish a single Company with a single workforce with a single aim. At the moment the industrial relations problems stem from the ineffectiveness of management. Management cannot opt out of its responsibilities by refusing to make decisions, consult or negotiate as at present. This leads to staff taking unilateral action out of frustration and an unnecessarily abrasive situation is created which leads only to destruction and not to construction. The Company will simply dis-integrate. The 'fog factor' must be removed. Authority to make decisions and settle must be given to line management, departmental loyalties must be fostered and a two way process of consultation must be established. A clear definition of the role of line management, personnel management and industrial relations is also vital.

[Paper prepared by Mr. R. Crew and accepted by BATUC, 21 November 1978]

APPENDIX 3

THE FULL STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN NOTT, MINISTER FOR TRADE, MADE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON FRIDAY, 20TH JULY 1979 AND REPORTED IN "BRITISH AIRWAYS NEWS" ONE WEEK LATER

"British Airways has embarked on a major programme of fleet replacement and expansion and I believe that it has excellent growth prospects.

As our principal national carrier, it is operating in an increasingly competitive market and, while the world energy situation creates considerable uncertainties. I am nonetheless confident that the airline with the Government's full encouragement will face these challenges successfully.

Clearly there must be some flexibility about the rate of expansion in the face of these uncertainties. Nevertheless, the present appraisal is that British Airways will require a substantial increase in capital investment from both internal and external sources over the next few years in order to meet its objectives. For this reason I have been looking at its capital structure and financial requirements, and I should like to let the House have my views and proposals.

First, the Government are concerned to give British Airways the most effective form of organisation for carrying out its programme in response to the changing demands of the market rather than on the basis of Government targets and support.

Second, I propose therefore that the framework of the Companies Act should be used to provide British Airways with a new capital structure and that a substantial minority shareholding in the enterprise should be offered for sale to the public.

Third, the Government will give up control, for example, over British Airways' investment programme and it will in future satisfy its financial requirements from capital markets both at home and overseas.

Fourth, my proposal does not involve a separate disposal of any part of British Airways.

Fifth, special arrangements will be made to enable employees of British Airways to take up shares in the enterprise should they wish to participate in its future and share in its growth.

Sixth, I envisage the fullest possible process of consultation with the airline's management and employees.

Seventh, I will put forward proposals later in the year for the legislation which will be required. The timing of any issue of shares will depend on market and other circumstances.

Eighth, I will also set out the Government's thinking on the licensing provisions administered by the Civil Aviation Authority. I can say now, however, that there will be no arbitrary reallocation of routes.'

APPENDIX 4

UK & IRELAND ROUTE NETWORK

PROBLEM ROUTES

1. The Current Environment

Our routes are under attack on two fronts. We face heavy criticism from Parliament, the CAA and our customers about the level of fares and our recent performance. Our competitors are eager to take over our lucrative routes and this has prompted them to file a number of applications for licences.

In addition, we have to meet tough financial targets in order to pay dividends and to replace our older aircraft.

Against this background, our aim for domestic services is to produce a network which is viable in the long term and which will meet our financial objectives. It is clear that UK & Ireland Division's European and Major Trunk Routes are profitable or pontentially profitable and essential to the long term strategic development of the airline. The financial benefits of these services are, however, increasingly undermined by the poor results of a number of routes. These routes as a group lost money when they were operated by the regional airlines and, with two exceptions*, show no prospect of becoming profitable in the foreseeable future.

2. The Problem Routes

Birmingham	- London	Jersey	- London*
Leeds/Bradford	- London	Jersey	- Manchester*
Leeds/Bradford	- Dublin	Jersey	- Birmingham
Leeds/Bradford	- Belfast	Jersey	- Bristol
Newcastle	- Dublin	Jersey	- Cardiff
Newcastle	- Belfast	Jersey	- Edinburgh
Edinburgh	- Belfast	Jersey	- Glasgow
Cardiff/Bristol	- Belfast	Jersey	- Leeds/Bradford
Cardiff/Bristol	- Paris	Jersey	- Newcastle
Cardiff	- Dublin	Jersey	- Southampton
Isle of Man	- London	Guernsey	- London
Isle of Man	- Manchester	Guernsey	- Birmingham
		Guernsey	- Bristol
		Guernsey	- Cardiff
		Guernsey	- Leeds/Bradford
		Guernsey	- Manchester

Stations wholly dependent on these problems routes are:

Cardiff	Guernsey
Bristol	Isle of Man
Southampton	Leeds/Bradford
Jersey	

In 1979/80 the current estimated loss for UK & Ireland Division is £4.5m. This hides the fact that except for the 28 problem routes, the remaining network is profitable. The 1980/81 forecast results show increasing losses to the extent that the 28 problem routes lose £7.3m even before taking account of further increases in fuel costs.

3. The Routes in the Eighties

With increased pressure for lower fares - revenue yeilds will deteriorate even further. Our unit costs are currently too high and we intend to reduce them. However, after allowing for an overall reduction of 24% in unit cost levels, the problem routes will still lose at best £4.8m in 1986 - and that is at 1978 prices.

It has been suggested that the problem could be solved by forming a separate company on the lines of Airtours. This has been carefully examined by management. However, the following illustrates quite simply that it is not the overhead burden that is the major cause of poor profits from this group of routes. If all administrative costs were regarded as overheads and wholly avoidable (clearly untrue), then the 28-route result for 1986 would - in 1978 values - improve from a loss of £4.8m to a loss of £3.8m. (The 1986 evaluations had already assumed considerable reductions in all cost levels, including overheads and productivity).

Consequently, reorganising as a separate company would in no way solve our problems. Therefore, the Management conclusion is that there is no alternative to discontinuing these routes with effect from 1st April 1980. Immediate action plus improved productivity will enable us to strengthen the large remaining network - still 88% of the UK & I business. We can then finance the replacement of the remaining Viscounts with jets as well as pay for the B737 and B757 aircraft presently planned for the expansion of our UK & I traffic.

4. Staff Implications

Staff will naturally be concerned about the way in which any closure of stations and reduction in routes would affect them personally. BA would honour in full the Redeployment Agreement of 1975, i.e. that those staff who wish to stay with BA would be offered and found alternative employment within BA and where retraining were necessary, this would be given. Special arrangements for re-location expenses will be put in hand for application to staff who may be required to move house because of the UK & I route rationalisation. Where redeployment proved impracticable or unacceptable, those staff who chose not to be redeployed would be able to pick up the option of voluntary severance. Early retirement could apply to those staff who are 50 or over and have more than 10 years of service.

5. Future Action

Arrangements will now be made for Management to visit all the stations concerned to explain and discuss the problems in more detail. Furthermore it is hoped that staff will participate at local panel level in discussing ways and means of making the remaining network more profitable.

6. What it all means

If action is taken now, the result will be:

1. UK & I route results will be improved by over £20m between now and 1986. That is in 1978 prices. It will be even more in 1986 prices.

2. We will have an efficient and strong network that is able to meet competitive pressures.

3. £75m capital requirement will be freed for use on those routes that give a good economic return.

Director Commercial Operations
30th August 1979

APPENDIX 5

FOR WHOM THE BELL TOLLS - A TRADE UNION SOLUTION TO BRITISH AIRWAYS PROBLEMS

On 31st August [1979], BA News published the British Airways case outlining why it is believed necessary to cut 28 routes and retire a large number of Viscount Aircraft.

The Trade Unions have studied the BA view and consider it wrong simply to cut the routes in question. Because we believe it is a matter of fundamental importance to the future of BA and a matter that involves the security of every employee, we have requested the opportunity to respond with an alternative proposal.

In its future, British Airways has one large and overriding problem. How is the Corporate Plan to be achieved? A new aircraft fleet, 2½ billion pounds of investment, a ninety per cent increase in passengers handled by two thousand fewer staff, by 1986.

The ability of BA to implement its plan will have a direct effect on every employee. Unless the airline succeeds in improving its performance it will reduce its ability to buy the new aircraft fleet on which the future of the airline and its employees depends.

How is this plan going to be achieved? Certainly it can be achieved with the full co-operation and involvement of the staff in a major re-organisation of how work is done now and how it will need to be done by 1986.

The vast majority of BA employees are aware of the problem. They want the Company to succeed, but they are powerless to help unless they know how.

We urgently need a People Plan that will make the Corporate Plan a reality. Or even a possibility.

It is against this background that one must view the proposal to cut 28 UK and I routes. The routes, BA says, earn about £22.5 million, but cost some £28 million to operate. A loss of £5.5 million.

Why should the costs be so high? BA has admitted that even if all the Station Staff affected worked for nothing the routes would still lose money. The problem is clearly BA's internally generated costs.

Of the total route costs about half would be saved if the operation stopped because they are directly associated expenses. But what about the other half? No practical man would claim that they can all be saved, except perhaps as a paper exercise. So what is the point of closing all these routes? What in the end is the contribution towards our future?

In truth the load factors on many of the 28 routes are higher than BA's average and it is well accepted that the financial results are improved with the use of jet equipment in most cases. Currently too the network enjoys aircraft and crew utilisation on revenue flying that is abysmal by any standards.

Whose fault is it that our costs are so high? The answer is probably that it has just happened. It happened as a consequence of merging many different organisations, setting up a whole structure which has lost sight of the task we all perform at the end of the day: transporting passengers from A to B, safely and happily and as cheaply as possible.

In moving forward, what are the factors we must consider?

(i) If BA is to succeed it must be better than its competitors in every respect of its business by the target date of 1986. We will not achieve that by ducking the challenge on the worst routes before the real problem of effectiveness throughout the airline has been met.

(ii) It is strategically unsound to concede routes to competitors who grow larger and more formidable as a result and so strengthen their case for even more routes. Since the BA announcement, Dan-Air, British Island, Air Anglia and British Midland are all indicating their willingness to take over any routes we may discontinue and have suggested that additional routes be handed over as well.

(iii) BA's courageous Corporate Plan to improve and expand the operation will require the full co-operation and active involvement of the staff if it is to succeed. To commence the plan with a retreat, axeing staff and routes, will lower morale and create a climate of retrenchment and restriction. This year the whole staff of the airline have contributed large productivity improvements. This productivity was not given to put their own colleagues out of work, but on the assumption that the airline needs it for growth.

We have two opposing views. Two starkly different roads to travel. One we have proceeded down before.

In 1978, Liverpool was closed. In answer to the question posed at the time "what other routes would follow" we were told "none" with the possible single exception of one other route under review, Southampton - Jersey.

In 1979, we have been told that 28 further routes should go but nobody asks the question anymore. Who would believe the answer? In fact everyone knows that it is a further step along the same road. Fixed costs allocated to the 28 routes will inevitably be loaded into other routes and some of those will become unviable and the process repeated. Again and again until the real problem is tackled.

Why not face the real challenge now before further routes and jobs are threatened?

The road we prefer to go down has not been travelled before. Let us jointly try to save the routes and, through our efforts on them, the whole airline. The staff have agreed to make the necessary changes to improve performance and efficiency. Let us create a new and separate organisation, tailor-made and relevant to the job, and allow our staff the opportunity of doing what our competitors claim they can do. Let us all learn the lessons of this experiment and use it as the catalyst in the re-organisation necessary in the rest of the airline.

That is a constructive way to achieve the bridge necessary between now and 1986.

The cynics will say, we have heard all that before, but it will never happen. If we try it together and should we fail how much worse off should we be? Five, or ten, million in a turnover of £1600 million is a small stake to put on our future.

If we succeed, however, in this small area of our operation, the learning value for the rest of the airline will be high. In turn the pride of achieving a success that all BA staff want will even further strengthen our commitment, resolve, success. The sound base in turn guarantees our new aircraft for the eighties and out of this virtuous circle our productivity will equal the best in Europe which in turn underwrites salaries and conditions to match.

CHECKLIST FOR ACTION

Short Term

1 Retain all routes
2 Review critically cost allocations for immediate improvement
3 Reschedule aircraft and crew cycles to maximise utilisation
4 Examine each station in relation to its task and match up

Longer Term

Design and build a separate organisation specifically for the needs of UK and I Operation 1980.

Long Term

Re-organise BA on strictly functional lines. Consider relevancy of each function in respect of say: safety and cost effectiveness. Timescale: two to five years.

Mark Young
Chairman, BA Trade Union Council

Tudor Thomas
Chairman, TU Side National Joint Council

[Issued October 1979]

PREVIOUS PAPERS BY PETER RICHARDS

1) 'ENGINEERING A SHOT GUN WEDDING?'

(A study of the developments which preceded the Engineering Fesibility Studies at British Airways 1969-1973)

Thames Valley Regional Management Centre, 1977.

2) 'ENGINEERING THE EXCHANGES'

(The first stages of staff involvement in the Engineering Studies January 1973-July 1974)

Thames Valley Regional Management Centre, 1978.

3) 'THE EXCHANGES ARE ENGINEERED'

(A study covering staff involvement, July 1974-June 1975)

Thames Valley Regional Management Centre, 1978.

4) 'BUILDING AND PLANT MAINTENANCE CONSIDERATIONS'

(Outline of developments leading to the first meeting of a joint study to recommend upon the Building and Plant Maintenance requirements of British Airways in London)

Thames Valley Regional Management Centre, 1978.

5) 'THE OVERHAULING OF THE RB211 ENGINE'

(An introduction to the main problems related to the new turbo fan engine which confronted the British Airways Board on the eve of the dissolution of BOAC and BEA, 1972-1973)

Thames Valley Regional Management Centre, 1979.

6) 'ENGINEERING SUB-CONTRACTING'

(An outline of the transformation of the sub-committee, and its influence upon the Engineering Feasibility studies)

Thames Valley Regional Management Centre, 1980.

7) 'ENGINEERING THE MECHANICAL WORKSHOPS'

(A continuation of Paper 5 which concentrated upon a Joint Fesibility study group October 1975-November 1976)

Thames Valley Regional Management Centre, 1980.

8) 'BRITISH AIRWAYS AND INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY'

(A brief account of the formulative years of the British Airways Trades Union Council, 1975-1978)

Appendix 2

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF ENQUIRY

SET UP TO ENQUIRE INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING UP TO AND SURROUNDING THE INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE IN THE FLIGHT CATERING CENTRE OF BRITISH AIRWAYS ED ON SUNDAY 16th MARCH, 1975.

The Committee consisted of:-

Sir Leslie Williams, C.B.E. (Chairman)

W. P. Blair, Esq., J.P. (Trade Union nominee)

J. G. Smith, Esq., (Management nominee)

The Committee was appointed on Friday 21st March and met for preliminary discussions on Sunday 23rd March. It commenced its formal hearings on Thursday 27th March. Terms of Reference (in the form of an Agreement to achieve an immediate return to work) are set out in Appendix 'A'.

By agreement between the Trade Union concerned and British Airways the Committee received local administrative assistance from Miss R. M. Hamlin. The Committee wish to record their appreciation of her extremely willing and able help.

The Committee were extremely anxious to ensure that anyone who wished to do so was given an opportunity to express their views. Notwithstanding the practical difficulties they were able to make arrangements to receive representative viewpoints from all areas involved. In the case of Mr. Allen special arrangements were made to see him towards the end of the enquiry as he had been unable to accept earlier invitations to attend. Verbal or written evidence was received from:-

a) representatives of Management directly involved in the Dispute

b) representatives of staff who had participated in the industrial action

c) the Trade Union District Officer concerned

d) the 'D' Scale Local Panel

e) individual staff who had participated in the industrial action

f) Duty Officers, Supervisors, etc., involved in the Dispute

g) the Duty Officer (Mr. Quigley) who had taken the action to suspend an employee (Mr. Allen) for a breach of discipline; which action had culminated in the stoppage of work.

h) Mr. W. Allen, accompanied by his staff representative

Individual staff were seen either singly or in groups, according to their expressed preference. From the evidence given, the Committee is able to make the following observations:-

1. Although the Dispute commenced on Sunday 16th March, following the suspension of Mr. Allen, events involving him commenced on Thursday 13th March. The sequence is set out in Appendix 'B'. In the light of all

the evidence submitted the Committee is of the opinion that Management would be justified in carrying out a disciplinary enquiry into the case of Mr. Allen in the normal way.

2. The Committee accept that Mr. Quigley had no alternative, within the disciplinary powers at his disposal and in the absence of higher authority, but to suspend Mr. Allen. Further reference is made to this point in Paragraph 8.

However, the Committee is of the opinion that it was unfortunate that the events involving Mr. Allen should have been allowed to escalate to a point where Mr. Quigley needed to intervene. The Committee is convinced of Mr. Quigley's determination and conscientiousness but his manner of conducting his supervisory duties appears to have been in marked contrast to that adopted by other members of management in the past and present. This could have led to misunderstanding by many staff. Bearing in mind the preference of the shop floor staff for long-established routine and custom the stronger approach to discipline adopted by Mr. Quigley could well have led many of them to believe that they could not expect fair treatment from him. The Committee does not believe that such an assessment would be correct.

The Committee formed the opinion that the situation at shop floor level had deteriorated steadily over recent years. Firm and fair discipline tempered with natural justice must be reintroduced but it is necessary to build this up gradually if confrontation with the staff is to be avoided. The Committee believes that the great majority of shop floor staff will welcome the re-establishment of good discipline but uncoordinated attempts to tighten discipline suddenly can only hinder a smooth restoration of sound industrial relations.

Although this Enquiry arose from a specific incident the Terms of Reference are so drawn as to enable the Committee to make more general observations and the hope has been expressed that it would do so. The Committee, therefore, observes as follows:-

3. Shop floor staff are, now, predominantly Asian in origin and the Committee believe that a number of problems arise for attention by Management and the Trade Unions:

a) the need to understand the problems arising from the interaction of the traditional Asian living and working community with the British industrial relations outlook and the conflicts of an industrial society.

b) the need for Management to recognise the change and adapt its actions accordingly.

c) the need for the Trade Union concerned to encourage British trade union traditions and responsibilities among staff of non-British origin.

The Committee recommend:-

(i) that Staff Representative training courses should contain, as a specific major item, a session(s) specifically directed to educating non-British staff in the role and responsibilities of a staff representative in the British working environment. It has been suggested that there could be specific courses for non-British staff representatives but the Committee is not in favour of these. Such segregation appears undesirable and there are positive advantages in attendance at courses in company with British staff representatives.

(ii) that the Trade Union concerned make every effort to ensure that their staff representatives attend the agreed courses.

(iii) that the Trade Union and Management jointly agree guidelines which set out clearly the rights and obligations of staff representatives and shop stewards.

(iv) that the Trade Union and Management jointly agree a method of educating staff - as distinct from staff representatives and shop stewards - into their rights and responsibilities as British workers. Possibly this could take the form of a periodic seminar, in working time.

4. The Committee drew attention to the fact that the industrial action taken was entirely unconstitutional and in conflict with agreed procedures. Attention to the following points might lessen the likelihood of a recurrence:-

(i) The Committee believes, in this instance, that the staff representatives involved acted precipitately and made no effective attempt to contact their Trade Union before industrial action was taken. The Committee recommend that the Trade Union enquire into this and introduce whatever measures are necessary.

(ii) the Committee do not believe that the shop floor staff have a sufficient understanding of the National Sectional Panel Agreement entered into on their behalf and the rights and obligations thereby involved. It would seem sensible to remedy this situation and the seminar referred to in 3 (iv) above might prove a suitable means.

5. The Committee found no evidence of racial prejudice at supervisory

levels. Indeed, higher Management appear to have gone to extreme lengths to avoid any suspicion of this.

At the lower level of supervision - and it must be borne in mind that many Supervisors are non-British in origin - there is evidence of difficulties arising which stems from frustration at the belief that the origin of an offender may dissuade higher Management from taking effective disciplinary action.

At shop floor level it appears that colour and racial differences tend to be utilised by staff in certain circumstances as forms of abuse and means of protection. This, in turn, exacerbates the frustration referred to above and increases the likelihood of incidents.

6. The Committee is concerned that allegations were made that, during the recent dispute, there was intimidation of staff to prevent a return to work. It must be borne in mind that many of the shop floor staff live in close contact which makes this type of action easier to mount. The problem of intimidation is not something which either British Airways or the Trade Union can solve.

7. The Committee appreciate that the bulk of shop floor work is not skilled and is repetitive but there is no evidence that staff as a whole dislike it. It is likely, however, that it does contribute to outbreaks of indiscipline, etc. A certain amount of rotation of staff duties takes place and there is a conflict of evidence as to whether or not staff regard this as a good thing. The Committee recommend that this point be discussed locally as a matter of some urgency.

The Committee were told that the Staff Vacancy Notice procedure is regarded with suspicion and it would appear that many staff joined the unit as a way in to British Airways and are of higher qualification, either academically or by previous experience, than their current jobs require. On the other hand, many staff are of long service in the unit and include Supervisors who have been promoted from the shop floor. The Committee did not probe this situation in detail but recommend that Management should look into the promotion and transfer procedures and ensure that staff understand them and that they work fairly.

8. The Committee is of the opinion that the present situation is, to a large extent, attributable to lack of clear direction on the part of Management in the areas of supervision, discipline and communication. The Committee draw attention to the following points:-

(i) The Committee found it difficult to understand clearly the different spheres of responsibility. Although it was stated that the Duty

Officer acts for the Manager, Flight Catering Unit, the involvement of the Section Head in disciplinary matters would seem to imply a split of authority which may lead to confusion. The Committee understand that Management is currently reviewing the organisation and the Committee feel this action should proceed.

(ii) In Paragraph 2 reference was made to the contrast in methods of supervision. The Committee believe that inconsistency on the part of supervisory staff is a major cause of discontent. Attitudes to such matters as meeting, eating, tea breaks, warming-up food, consumable 'perks' vary widely. These variations in personal attitude and manner are added to rules - and they appear to differ widely - the staff become confused and small discontents are easily escalated and personalised.

The Committee considers that all Duty Officers should work to the same standards and every effort should be made to achieve consistent action that will be fair to all. The Committee see merit in the suggestion that an Officer with special responsibility to the Manager should be charged with the co-ordinating function, the agreeing and monitoring of standards and the steady implementation of decisions once they are made.

The Committee are of the opinion that the authority of the Duty Officers could be more clearly recognised and be more readily accepted if they were provided with uniforms to reflect their responsibility. The Committee is aware that Management have previously refused this request but believe that the position of the Duty Officer in the Flight Catering Unit is sufficiently "unusual" as to justify the departure from previous policy.

(iii) The remarks regarding consistency, etc. by Duty Officers, and training, apply with equal force to the shop floor Supervision. The Committee heard evidence of wide variations in standards of Supervision which in itself may have been contributory to the discontent. The Committee do not suggest that Management should automatically support the Supervisors and this comment in itself may suggest some review is necessary.

(iv) Nevertheless, the Supervisors have grounds for their complaint that their warnings of a deteriorating situation have been ignored by higher Management. The record does appear to show a need for a more direct and active involvement by higher Management.

It is incumbent upon Management to determine a corporate approach to discipline, communications and standards. It is important that Management thinking should be clear to the lower

levels or supervision. Above all, Management should act, or make known its conclusions, more speedily than has been apparent in the past.

(iv) It is believed that the only training course dealing with man-management is one entitled "Introduction to Supervision". The word "Introduction" implies limited information and the Committee suggest that Management review the course syllabus to determine if it does meet the requirements of a unit which presents special problems of supervision.

(v) The Committee consider that benefits would derive from a more active involvement of the Personnel function with the shop floor staff. At present the approach to Personnel has to be made through the immediate Supervisor. The Committee suggest that the Personnel branch should be made more easily accessible on the grounds that it is better for emotions to be expressed in an interview than for them to circulate to dispute level through lack of someone in authority to listen.

(vi) The Committee accepts that the disciplinary code of British Airways is right to afford maximum protection to any member of staff against possible unjust treatment by more senior staff. Nevertheless, this position can be interpreted as weakness by staff if discipline breaks down and there are signs that this has occurred in the Flight Catering Unit.

It appears that reprimands and threats to withold increments may have very little effect at shop floor level. In consequence there seems to have been a resort to threats of suspension as a form of punishment and there is evidence that suspension is so regarded even when pay is not withold. The Committee consider that the circumstances in which suspension is used should be reviewed with the aim of speeding up disciplinary enquiries.

The Committee are of the opinion that the ultimate sanction of dismissal is rightly reserved to the Manager although if an Officer with a co-ordinating function is appointed (see Paragraph 8 (ii)) it is recommended that he should have similar powers, subject to all normal rights of appeal.

The Committee propose that in respect of disciplinary matters the following should be considered:-

a) renewed efforts be made to explain to staff the disciplinary code of British Airways, possibly as the seminar referred to in Paragraph 3 (iv).

b) disciplinary procedures to continue as at present up to the point when suspension is contemplated. At this point a means of holding an immediate enquiry should be sought as a preferable course providing the staff member can be represented if he so wishes.

c) where the gravity of the offence(s) is such as to necessitate it, use should be made of the type of sanction suggested in Paragraph 7.3 of British Airways Staff Regulation No. 33.

Summary of Main Recommendations

1) The disciplinary enquiry into the case of Mr. W. Allen should proceed (Paragraph 1)
2) Methods of training and communication for staff representatives, shop stewards and staff should be improved (Paragraphs 3 and 4)
3) Management should review its organisation, methods of supervision, means of communication and application of discipline (Paragraph 8)

In making this Report, the Committee have reflected some of the criticisms made in the course of the Enquiry. This does not imply, however, that the essential ingredients of good industrial relations do not exist. The Committee believe, given real goodwill and effort on the part of all concerned, that there is every reason for success in the re-establishment of a good working climate and relationships.

Leslie Williams — Sir Leslie Williams

W. P. Blair

J. G. Smith

25th April, 1975.

Appendix 3


CCS - Industrial Grades Promotional System.

1. CCS promotions into Industrial grades are based on the following facts:

   a) An up to date seniority list of all operators (male and female) in each grade.

   b) Management's assessment of each operator's capability to carry out all the tasks required of a higher grade.

2. The promotional sequence will be as follows:



Note a) Transfer requests between sections as outlined above will be considered by Management prior to promotions being actioned. The initiative must, however, come from individuals wishing to transfer prior to any vacancies occuring.

b) The promotional sequence is subject to changes at the time of changes to the grading structure (i.e. Job & Pay.)

Continued./.....

Appendix 4

Investigation by the Race Relations Complaints Committee of the National Joint Council for Civil Air Transport conducted under S17 of the Race Relations Act 1968

This report has been compiled by the Shop Stewards of the Overseas Division of British Airways Corporation. The Catering Unit from statements taken from the coloured workers in this Division.

We would like to point out to this Committee from the outset that our workers have been extremely unwilling to come forward and especially to allow their names to be used for two reasons.

Firstly because we do not feel that this particular committee is independent of the influence of Management

And for this reason our workers fear that if they make themselves known they will be victimized much more than they are at present.

We would further like to point out to this Committee that we have conducted our own thorough investigation and that the situation that will unfold in the course of this statement is the one which we not only see to be true but, more importantly, the one in which we ourselves work.

On the basis of this investigation then we have come to the conclusion that unlawful racial discrimination, within the meaning of the 1968 Act, exists in the Overseas Division of the Catering Unit and that the Management by arbitrary practices disguise

its attitudes and behaviour.

We would ask the Committee to call upon our employers, the respondents in this inquiry, to answer all the questions posed in this report.

We require to know what criteria the Management applies in assessing the capabilities of the applicants for jobs with BOAC.

Why is it that in all the higher grad offices are all White and in all the lower grades coloured people are mostly of ~~Indian~~ Asian origin?

And why it is that there are no coloured male Chefs? See appendix 3a →

These amount to Segregation and are contrary to S1(2) of the Act.

At this point we would draw the attention of the Committee to S3

There are members of the colour work force whom ~~are~~ the Management and who are competent to work as cooks known and eaged to work as cooks

for example Here is the ~~A~~ worker who has had 3 years experience as a cook and employed elsewhere in position was ~~in fact~~ a equivalent to a white cook presently working in the unit.

(1) (2) of the Act. Furthermore we feel that this arbitrary segregation even from the beginning is not caught by S 8 (2) (b) of the Act.

We would also point out to the committee that the burden of proof lies solely with the respondents.

Why is there no rest room for the coloured workers, when there is one for the white workers?

And why is it that the coloured workers have to share their lockers?

We would like the Management to explain why it is that the food provided in the canteen is of lower quality and always extremely badly prepared; when the white kitchen staff are solely choosing and preparing their own meals?

with the crockery and cutlery etc
to be marked and yet marked, and
yet have At the same time they are
operating machines, cleaning and often
having to repair these machines. These
latter jobs are classified as semi-
skilled in other Departments.
Repairs are in fact supposed to be
carried out by the Maintenance Dept.
but frequently people from here do
not want want to come immediately
to say there are and machines have
been left out of order for anything
up to 6 weeks. If we do not fix
them ourselves we are still required to
do the work as if they were
working. / Labourers in the kitchen
section have been known to help the Chef.

[illegible] of [illegible] by the
grade of grading

Again in the Kitchen Section
Who had been cooks
women have been moved from
the night to the day shift and
were
have been told that because of
the move they cease to be cooks
they are being paid the wages of
Catering Attendants After long discussion
with management they agreed to rectify the situation
~~We see no logic in this situation.~~

In this connection we feel that the
higher jobs which are kept as a preserve
for White workers ~~has contravened~~
~~S 1 (1) of the Act as this~~ is segregation
amounts to
d amounts to "less favourable treatment"
under S 1(2) of the Act ~~and~~ It also contravenes
S 3 (1) (a) + (b).

Broadly the Bill works how it
links Rights - duties. Drill
Salaried workers do not. Thus
contravenes. S 3(1)(b) of the A

~~This~~ We feel that this state of affairs ~~is caught by~~ amounts less favourable treatment of coloured workers and is therefore caught by S 1 (1) (a) (ii) of the 1968.

We further feel that ~~apart from~~ by virtue of ~~being in addition to~~ being treated less favourably we are also not given same conditions of work as our fellow White workers. This is itself unlawful within the meaning of S 3 (1) b of the Act.

We further require to know what criteria is used by the Management to promote some workers rather than others?

Recruitment

As said in the first part of this statement we are at a loss to know on what basis if various applicants are chosen for jobs in this unit.

This arbitrariness gave rise in the 1960's to the situation where casualised workers, who were employed for long periods together, having been employed for ~~their~~ a number of years found that there was no continuity in their employment ~~period~~.

Workers would be moved from section to section and lack of a vacancy in a particular section would mean that the ~~one~~ worker would be sacked, and then

almost immediately re-hired.

This situation has only just been remedied and we seek a declaration from our employer that this situation will not recur.

We understand from long service workers that this situation did not prevail among comparable white workers. And we call upon Management to refute this contention by producing the employment records of comparable white workers; as this practice is contrary to s 3(1)(a)(b).

Promotion

Promotion even for the most literate black workers appears impossible. There are people who have worked with BOAC in this Division for 10 – 12 yrs who have tried repeatedly for promotion without success.

There are instances of people amply qualified – people possessing BAs, BSc from Indian universities where the medium of instruction was English; LLBs; people who have passed Matriculation from India & Pakistan ~~higher school certificate examinations~~; and those without specific qualifications but who are able to read and write; are even those who have been educated in this country being turned down for promotion.

The positions of Storeman and ~~Cook~~ Cook, apart from the higher grades are the ~~only~~ ones to which almost all of us ~~may be~~ are qualified to be immediately promoted

immediately promoted which required a basic knowledge of written English is required. ~~Yet we are not~~ Yet we are not contrary to S 3(1)(b)

this section to go here

Judges used by Management to avoid promoting black workers

Sitting

Most of the lower grade male workers complain of constant moving from section to section.

We find that this mobility occurs most

noticeably. When one of us is due for promotion — & When there is a vacancy which one of us may well apply for. When the application is ~~not known~~ made the management has ~~the management does not appear~~ sought to make this an excuse for failing to promote.

~~This section to be after~~

~~No appeal system of promotion~~

All the lower grade workers who with the exception of the loaders (the loaders are employed by another Department) are all black complain in the first instance that there is no system of promotion It is the practice in other departments to put vacancies on notice boards and to staff

PTO

In this section, are not posted for the ~~[illegible]~~ ~~call people for written applications~~ boards. Such but are broadcast by word of mouth ~~for interviews before advertisements~~ or not at all. Which means that people from ~~In fact vacancies have not posted~~ outside have been given the posts.

~~the staff boards but are brought to~~ ~~our attention by word of mouth.~~

~~When~~ There is no specific provision for written applications. In fact we are only encouraged to relay our interest in the vacancy for which we are applying through the senior officers In the past we stuck to this procedure but now we tend to make written applications. Often we do not even receive an acknowledgement but after all the interviews have taken place we would be sent letters saying that we have not been promoted

Factors used to avoid promoting inefficiency

In the absence of any known criteria we find it strange that unsuitable people are often the ones given preference for promotion. There are instances, both with the men and women, when illiterate people, have been given promotion over the heads of better qualified long-service employees. It is notable also that our employers frequently use the alleged question of illiteracy round as an obstacle to promotion. Perhaps there are instances of people who can read and write whom the management claim cannot, and against whom this reason is being used.

There are other people who feel they are prepared to face the management about the ill-treatment meted out to them and their fellows are labelled as "trouble-makers" and there is evidence that these people are consistently refused promotion.

There are too many instances of the management claiming that workers have had long periods of sickness, when in fact they have been taking their annual leave, and using this as a reason for not promoting. This seems grossly unfair.

Here again we know that sickness has not prevented a Labourer being promoted to Storeman. About 3 weeks ago a man with a disgraceable attendance record was promoted

over the heads of better qualified people who did not have such a record.

In concluding we would say that the system ~~being~~ is so arbitrary that it lends itself to abuse, and enables management to ~~discriminate~~ exercise their discretion in a discriminatory fashion contrary to S 31(1)(d).

~~Like heads of better qualified people~~
~~more pick & record~~

D/ Grading and Job descriptions

All other Departments have self-contained grading systems.

The higher White workers in our unit all have specific jobs that go with their grades. They know them and do only these jobs.

Even the leaders the workers closest on grade to whom with whom we have contact have a very firm grading system and know the boundaries of their duties.

In our unit however, ~~there~~ this either with the women or the men does not happen — Labourers are doing ~~doing~~ as unskilled and semi skilled tasks at the same time. In the Wash-up Section specifically the men are cleaning the work area, dealing

Behaviour of Higher Officers

All workers in this Division complain about the rudeness, the crudeness and the general lack of respect shown them by the Higher Grade Officers who are all White.

All workers say that ~~they~~ these Higher Grade Officers behave as if the coloured workers are either stupid or are animals.

Specifically the Chefs and Senior Cooks have pushed the women, shouted at them, and snatched things from them. ~~The women~~ When the White officers want to give orders they bawl and click their fingers.

~~During the~~

The women may not even chat

danger of relax when they go for their breaks. Whenever there is laughter or happy laughing the supervisors would come out of the kitchen and reprimand the coloured ladies for making too much noise. The coloured ladies have even been scolded for reclining in the chairs. They are not children, why should they be subjected to these rules that don't exist even in schools? In all other sections of the mill the men are being constantly harassed and abused. They too are subjected to bawling, shouting and clicking of fingers

on the night shift

Recently a young Indian man was chased by a chef with a long kitchen knife. The chef claimed that the man had been looking at his girl friend. In fact there was no girl friend there. And even if there was his behaviour was totally unwarranted. The Duty Control Officer came on the scene and merely took the two into his office. After listening to them for a few minutes he told them that it would be best to hush the matter up. In fact he realized full well that there was no reason for the chef to behave the way he had

done and wanted to protect him.
Similar perhaps not as dangerous
this situations occurs constantly.

- In all conflicts the white even though the instigators workers are given the protection of the management
- while the coloured workers have only to refuse to do
- overtime or to speak knowledgeably about his rights as a worker,
- for him to be sent to the disciplinary officers to be scolded and threatened with the sack.
- ~~There are occasions on which certain coloured workers have been permanently sent home without a reason given~~

We deplore this situation. We know of all the incidents that have recently occurred in the European Division where five coloured workers were separately sacked. We noted too that 2 of the white officers concerned were promoted.

Both men and women are prevented from speaking when they are working. They are told that they are not able to work quickly if they talk.

Both men and women are forced to stand all day, and may not even freely go to the toilet.

Although all this is expected from the coloured workers, the white

themselves, carrying on lengthy
conversations with each other,
sit and move about as they please.
We find discriminatory practices even
in the arrangements for taking
and booking leave.
In the first place the white worker
merely says what leave he wants
and signs his own leave card. He
whether he says he wants to take his seven
days with his annual leave or
separately, his request is granted.
The coloured worker, however, has
first to ask permission
to take specific days; to take their
seven days with their annual leave.
This is often refused and the

Black workers have to resort to begging or to argue persistently. Furthermore the black workers are not allowed to sign their own leave cards.

These practices are grossly unfair and discriminatory.

Issuing of Orders

Like other Departments the Catering Unit has a Hierarchy of officers through whom instructions should be given.

In fact on several occasions much higher officers, not the immediate superiors have walked into the work area and issued Orders to the coloured workers.

However if a coloured worker has a complaint and he tries to make it to anyone other than his immediate superior he is told to go him or her.

Recently a coloured Storeman received a very rude letter stating

from the Chief Executive Officer saying that he was "annoyed" to hear that the Storeman had not been complying with the Roster for his section. In fact that Storeman had been sticking to a Roster compiled by his immediate superior which he thought to be the correct one. Two the facts emerge. One that ~~to~~ any instructions on the subject should correctly have been sent to the Storeman's immediate superior for transmission to him; and two that ~~if he had been~~ it did not occur to the management that the Storeman in question may have been misled

and that they should have enquired
of him before issuing such a
and unauthorized
Mode of communication.

Discipline and Breaking of Rules

Discipline among the White workers seems to be non-existent. White workers are often drunk on the job especially on the night shift. They unhesitatingly make their breakfast in the kitchen and eat there; they go off to play darts when they feel like it; and they play radios.

Coloured workers are allowed to do none of these things.

If a coloured worker attempts to make breakfast, let alone eat any, he or she is ~~not~~ physically prevented from doing so. This is despite the fact that the loaders

who are 99% White and not even employed by the Catering unit are breaking this rule. The White cooks prepare breakfast for them and they come over to pick them up.

On the occasions on which the coloured workers have tried to play radios we have been prevented from so doing. Some times we want to listen to Indian programmes on Sunday mornings and are told to turn the radios off.

While the White workers seem to be lax in every respect they expect to be obeyed without

question.

In fact on several occasions labourers who are all coloured the ~~coloured workers~~ have been ordered to carry out specific tasks through their tea break. Often they comply on the condition that they are able to take the break at a later time. However, it frequently happens and in fact occurred several times recently that ~~they~~ either when the workers finally go for their break they are only given a few minutes or the canteen is closed so that ~~they~~ are unable to take any break at all.

Meals

Here again, the food served to the coloured workers ~~is~~ is inferior in quality to that eaten by the white workers. The white workers do not eat with us but prepare and eat their food in the kitchen. Their food is fresh and they choose it what ever they want.

The coloured workers on the other hand have no choice in the matter and are forced to eat frozen foods which are overcooked and often burnt.

The Management seem intent

depriving us of proper nourishment first we were issued with meal tickets worth 8p after tax; then we manage to get rid of this inadequacy, and now we are presented with badly prepared poor quality foods; now we have just discovered that for 2 years and 10 months we should have been paid for a further ½ hr of our meal break.

General working conditions

General conditions in the Catering Unit Overseas Division are bad.

There is no effective heating. In fact ~~add~~ there are only small gas heaters and even smaller electric fires. There is no ventilation. The temperature is never constant.

In the washup section the ensuing condensation adds considerably to the dampness.

The toilets are left for days in a filthy condition.

When machines break down we are expected to work like animals

do the work at the same speed often for periods up to 6 wks. We have visited other divisions belonging to BOAC where there are predominantly white workers and have seen that their working conditions are noticeably different from ours. The local canteen in particular has up-to-date machinery and equipment which is kept in excellent repair they never seem to have to wait more than a few hours for repairs to be carried out. All other departments have proper heating and ventilation and

Rest-room facilities

The White workers have a sq
recreation and locker rooms
recreation room has a TV,
games, tables and chairs
locker room is spacious and
person has his own locker
The coloured workers or the 5th
and have no recreation room
are provided with a small locker-
with lockers that have to be shar
and not a single table or chair

We require a written admission from British Airways Corp

3) all unlawful acts of discrimination which have taken place in the past and openly admitted; and an undertaking that these acts ~~are~~ be not repeated.

These are

a) the employment of trained temporary staff in the past in the OD

b) unequal treatment in ~~training~~ training to issue protective shoes to coloured workers in the past in the OD

c) that the following coloured workers were unlawfully dismissed in the OD.

2. We require a written admission from BA of all unlawful acts of discrimination which have taken place in the past and orally admitted but not rectified, as follows:

(a) the non-payment of the retaking day premium to [illegible] landladies from ___ to ___ in the common laundry. The arrears in payments are still outstanding.

(b) the non-payment of ½ per day's wages for the meal break for the [illegible] workers from ___ to ___; which arrears are still outstanding. We require that prompt payments be made and an undertaking that this omission will not be repeated.

3. In respect of all such alleged acts of unlawful discrimination which this Committee finds have not been refuted to its satisfaction we require of the BA Comp a written admission that they have committed each such unlawful act and that in respect of each such act we require in writing from them an undertaking to remedy each such act within a specified time which the Committee thinks reasonable.

A written copy of each such undertaking be handed to the panel & reps of each division.

4. If there is no procedure for promotion then we call upon the Committee to make recommendations to the Management to adopt a specific procedure which the Management shall undertake to abide by.

We require management to give an undertaking that the procedures laid down for advertising vacancies will be followed, and that the procedure operates fairly for both coloured and white workers by displaying the advertisements in prominent places accessible to all workers.

We further require that management disclose the present criteria for promotion and recruitment, and that copies of these are given to each of the panel reps of the two divisions

We further call upon the committee to ask manage-

to produce for the purpose of this inquiry all records for the past 10-15 years of recruitment and promotion of both black and white workers in all sections referred to herein; and that the Committee make a finding as to the criteria used and the manner in which ~~discretion~~ discretion has been exercised.

5. That the Committee make such recommendations for the transfer of workers so as to bring to an early end the segregation of white workers in better jobs and black workers in the menial jobs. We urge the Committee to lay down a specific period

within which these transfers should take place.

We require that the Management give an undertaking to this effect and a copy be given to both panel reps.

We would advocate that the Committee make proposal for the training of planned workers for position as clerks, loader drivers, cooks and higher supervising staff.

The Committee should specify

a time within which the programme should commence.

And we require a further undertaking from the Management that this will be implemented within the time limit.

---

7 There are further proposals not yet drafted. These are re- the excessive use of powers of supervision staff investigation of regulation 33 of staff disp Code.

Amendments to methods of management

. Management to make available assignments to Panel reps

9. Training for management

Item I

r m

2. BLOCKAGE OF PROMOTION

In the Day stores operate round the clock. Supervisory grades are only seen from 9a.m. and the rest of the time the storemen and loading hands cover the stores. On nights there is only one loading hand and when he is awaya lower grade covers.

Why do we not need supervisor at other times?

OFF LOADERS

Each team of loaders has its own supervisors whereas the other 8 Sections which are covered by immigrants have only one supervisor on each shift. There are at least 250 people on all sections together.

RUG SECTION

In the early 60's there were 2 loading hands on rug sections, now there is one even though the section has been expanded and when that one is off his job is covered by a lower grade.

BULK STORE

Used to be 2 loading hands in 1962, with the expansion there is now 1 loading hand.

WASH UP

In wash up there was 1 loading hand to a shift consisting of only 10 people. Now the shift has about 30 people. These are mostly immigrants. One supervisor from Bonded Stores is already disabled, has had a serious leg injury and will be out for an indefinite period, and his job is not being filled because in line for promotion are Immigrants.

There is one lady loading hand on washing up section the night shift and when she is away there is no-one to cover her.

MENU STORES

This job has been a loading hand job and there is now only one loading hand and two storemen. Again covered by storemen when ~~others~~ away.

KITCHEN

The job of cook has been handed over to Immigrant Ladies who were the catering attendants. Some of them are upgraded to cooks. They only received

~~$2.20 more than the catering attendants.~~

~~Some of the catering attendants have been working for 40 years doing the~~ same job as cook with the wage.

of

? In some areas the kitchen female head cook draws $10 more than the female the female cooks is beingdoing; By a catering attendant anf female cook.

This is the blockage which we see today.

MOST IMPORTANT

3. AGREEMENTS

NJC

These agreements have never been given to all the workers and have also been kept away from Shop Stewards.

It was only in 1973 that the agreement of 1970 came to light . Then we learnt that the entire airport with the exception of the catering units were paid meal breaks. Which made the Overseas Division take industrial action and it was only then in November 1973 that we were able to make the Management recognize the Agreement and pay us for the meal breaks from the end of that year.

MEALS & EATING ARRANGEMENTS

Asian Workers are given 100% frozen foods, and we demanded a common standard for all, the technicians and non-technicians.

5. ELECTION OF BREACH OFFICIALS

Immigrants and £1000 in the union.

Check the rules of elections TGWU with regard to the election of b branch officials.

Agreement - minutes of any meeting never been one.

Item 1a

STATEMENT FROM MR S S GILL, MR AS BRAR, MR BR SENDHU, MR D S LAIL AND MR B BHATTI, OF THE AIRCRAFT CATERING(OVERSEAS) DIVISION

NOV 10 1975

Is it possible to get % of breakdown of black/white in each grade?

There six sections in this division.

A) Kitchen

1 Sue -chef
2 Chef
3 Head Cooks -: 3 grades

4 Cooks

5 Catering Attendants

6 Labourers

B) Wash Up

1 Catering Officer

2 Leading Hands

3 Labourers

About 2/3 native people came some two monthsado, after the industrial acton.

C) Equipment Section

This secton supplies cutlery and cutlery for the aircraft.

1 Catering Officer

2 Leading Hands

3 Storesmen

4 Labourers

D) Dry Stores

1 CAtering Officer

2 Leading Hands

3 Storesmen

4Labourers

This section packs the meals for the various flights.

E) Bonded Stores

1 Catering Officer

2 Supervisor

3 ~~Head Loader~~ Leading Hands

4 ~~Loaders~~ Storesmen 5 Labourers

~~This section transports the meals and other necessities to the aircrafts.~~

~~Only two people in this section are black.~~

F) Loading Section

1 Catering Officer

2 Supervosor

3 Head Loader

4 Loaders

This section transports meals and other necessities to the aircrafts.

Item 2.

Statemdnt November 12 1975

Mr B A Senkuru
27 Beresford Rd
Southall

I have worked with BOAC OVERSEAS DIVISION from 6. 1 . 64

For eight years I worked as a Labourer in the wassh up secton.

I was doing cleaning and Production, and cleaning machines(wash up machines) and operating shexe machines, loading and off-loading.

Although I wazs doing all theas things as labourer I was only supposed to do the washin up.

Whenever I applied for a Storesman's job the Management would claim that I was ill too frequently, and was therefore not a fitting person for that position. I was always genuinely ill.On one occasion during whichI was on holiday in Imdia they claimed that I had beem ill. This was not so. It was my annual holiday.

On at least four occasions peoplehave died, one actually on duty, because they knew that if they should take the sick leave they were entitled to, they would be threath with the sack, jist as I was told that I could not be promoted because I w s ill too often.

At last after eight years I was promoted.

In all the yyears that I have beeen there the white workers have always played radios, and no-one has ever told them to turn them off: or even to turn them down.

Om some occasions if we turn on a radio the higher officers come and teel us to turn it off.

We tell our workers not to drink on thepemises, but if it has ever happened that we have been found drunk, we get the sack. the white catering officers, the other hand , are always drunk, misbehave, and nevef get the sack.

The food we receive is atrocious. It is prepared by BRL another department.

Sometimes this food is so inedible that no- one can eat it. Only because of repeatedly complaimts has an improvement been made. And even then it has only been a fraction better, and then the improvements only lasts a short time.

I say that it is inedible because because the main meals are frequently burnt, and sometimes the vegetables are not properly washed.

On one occasion nearl y three weeks ago the food was so badly burnt that no-one could eat.: That same night I took a four pound polkythene beg full of the burnt food to the duty cont ol officer of the BRL. It has improved only a little since then.

Item 3

STATEMENT OF HARDEEP KAUR BAINS, OF 60 TOWNSEND ROAD SOUTHALL ON NOVEMBER12 1975.

I have worked for five years in the inside kitchen.

It is not difficult to get a job in the inside kitchen.

There three Indian cooks in the Production department. And 12-13 Indian women working in this secton as Catering attendants..

There are also 7-8 Indian cooks in the larder out of 22-23 workers.

The inside kitchen consists of the larder, the bakery, the production, and the breakfasts sections.

When I first went to work at the airport I worked in the Wash up section for one year after which time I asked a white leading hand called Tina for a transfer to inside kitchen. Tina then approached the Head Chef who agreed. I have always worked as a catering atteendant. I have never applied for promotion.

White women are always employed as cooks-- at leasr since I have been there, but there are no catering attendantsnow and there have never been since I worked there. Indians are promoted,bt only those favoured by the production manager and chef. All Indians come in as catering attendants. When I first went to work in the inside kitchen there were many Indians but now there are more.

The section has expanded. And my job is exactly the same as it was before.

The cooks who are all Indian women do the same work as us but get £1.50 more than we do. There is 10 hours guaranteed overtime in thei section, for us as well as the cooks.

MISBEHAVIOUR

One day at the end of August Mr Schneider the head chef who was on duty came over to me and Mrs Salhotra whom I was working with at the time, that we were working

already. I said that I had done the night work working at the same [illegible] He then told me to leave Br Airways and go elsewhere.I replied that if he coulnot speak politely ~~properly~~ he should leave himself. He told me that I had better get out, and caught my hand and tried to throw me out. Mrs Salhotra told him not to touch me, and we went to Mr Grouse the head chef. He then called Schneider who was in a temper. Grouse then said that since we were both in atemper he woild talk to Schneider the next day and then give a decision.. I then went to Mr Bhatti and told him. The next day Grouse called me and said that Schneider was prepated to apologise. I said that I wasnot prepared to accept as the Union was dealing with the case The day after Schneider went on holiday. I didnot do anything futther as the Union was dealing with the matter.

[illegible] We never got maternity leave until last year. Now we get three months. Before that we had to leave and then try to be re-employed. This was always very difficult.

Since I first started to work there my holidazy has been three weeks and increased according to seniority. Now I get four eeeks.

I went to India for four weeeks. This was unpaid leave. We get 10% off the normal fare for ourselves, our husbasnds, and our children. Parents .sisters, and brothers are not allowed. I go every year.

Prevously we used to tske food from homeas we had we no canteeen / or rather it was too far.

In the kitchen the white people can eat as much they like, but we cannot have a [illegible]ything.

EXHIBIT 1.

BRITISH EUROPEAN AIRWAYS

P.O. Box No. 6
London (Heathrow) Airport North, Hounslow, Middx. Skyport 3131. Telegrams BEALINE WIRE LONDON

OC/RAE/PG

6th October, 1967.

Mrs. H.K.Bhalla,
Cook (Female)
Aircraft Catering,
LHR (N)

Dear Mrs. Bhalla,

This is to confirm that with effect from 8th October, 1967, you are transferred from temporary to permanent strength. A Contract is, therefore, enclosed to that effect together with a Staff Transfer Notice and Application Form for the Pension Scheme, since all permanent employees in BEA are obliged to join the scheme. Deductions from your salary will, therefore, be made on a weekly basis and paid into the Pension Fund - you will see the amount appearing on your pay slip. Will you please return the Pension Application Form together with your Birth Certificate and the top copy of your new Contract as soon as possible. If you want any advice about the change, please do not hesitate to come and see me.

Finally I would like to congratulate you and wish you success with BEA.

Yours sincerely,

J.E.Davenport
Assistant Catering Personnel Officer

1946-1966 twenty years

BRITISH EUROPEAN AIRWAYS

BEA

P.O. Box No. 6

London (Heathrow) Airport North, Hounslow, Middx. Skyport 5131. Telegrams BEALINE WIRE LONDON

OC/RAE/PG

6th October, 1967.

Mrs. S.L.Saini,
Cook (Female)
Aircraft Catering,
LHR (H)

Dear Mrs. Saini,

This is to confirm that with effect from 8th October, 1967 you are transferred from temporary to permanent strength. A Contract is, therefore, enclosed to that effect together with a Staff Transfer Notice and Application Form for the pension scheme, since all permanent employees in BEA are obliged to join the scheme. Deductions from your salary will, therefore, be made on a weekly basis and paid into the Pension Fund - you will see the amount appearing on your pay slip. Will you please return the Pension Application Form together with your Birth Certificate and the top copy of your new Contract as soon as possible. If you want any advice about the change, please do not hesitate to come and see me.

Finally I would like to congratulate you and wish you success with BEA.

Yours sincerely,

J.E.Davenport
Assistant Catering Personnel Officer

1946-1966 twenty years

General

CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT

between

BRITISH EUROPEAN AIRWAYS

and

Mrs Swaran Lata Saini

BRITISH EUROPEAN AIRWAYS CORPORATION (hereinafter referred to as "BEA") is pleased to offer you employment upon the following terms and conditions:

A PARTICULARS OF EMPLOYMENT

Your initial appointment will be as:

Grade Cook (Female) Scale..... Rate of Pay £10.4s.6d. + S.P. + M.A.

Salary ..... payable weekly*/[illegible]

Date of engagement 6th October 1967 Based at Flight Catering Centre, LHR (E)

B CONDITIONS OF ENGAGEMENT

1 You must satisfy BEA as to your medical fitness for employment.

2 Your references must be satisfactory to BEA.

3 You must be acceptable to the Guarantee Society under a Fidelity Bond, the premium for which is paid by BEA.

4 You will be on probation for a period of four week's from the date you start work. During the probationary period your engagement may be terminated by one week's notice on either side. The probationary period counts as service for all purposes. Upon satisfactory completion of the probationary period your appointment will be confirmed.

C CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT

1 You will observe and abide by the Constitution and Rules of Procedure of the National Joint Council for Civil Air Transport (hereinafter referred to as the "NJC") and by the agreements between BEA and Trades Unions represented in the NJC in so far as the terms thereof apply to you. The NJC agreements and procedures provide (for staff to whom they apply) full agreed machinery for negotiation and joint consultation and for the settling of staff differences and grievances. Provision is made in the agreements for full staff and management representation through panel committees at local and national level. Copies of the Constitution and Rules of Procedure and an introductory note on the functions of the NJC are attached. The Agreements covering your normal hours of work, holiday entitlement, sickness benefit and your employment generally, as set out in Section A above, are referred to overleaf in Section G and are also attached hereto.

2 Your employment will be governed by the staff regulations of BEA at present in force and any amendments made thereto from time to time. You will be deemed to know the contents of all regulations as far as they apply to you. These regulations may be seen on request.

3 Any special conditions of employment are referred to overleaf in Section H.

4 By accepting this offer you will be deemed to agree to be employed in your category at any BEA establishment in the United Kingdom or abroad and to fly in the Corporation's aircraft or on the services of any other recognised airline, if required to do so in the course of your duties.

5 You will be required to join the Airways Corporations Joint Pension Scheme from the date of engagement or from the date of reaching age 18, whichever is the later.

* Delete as required.

D TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT

When your appointment has been confirmed this Contract of Employment is then subject to the following minimum periods of written notice on either side, without prejudice to BEA's right to terminate employment summarily for misconduct. All entitlements and concessions available to you whilst employed by BEA will cease on termination of your employment except as otherwise provided.

Hourly- and weekly-rated staff

Minimum period of notice to be given on your part: one week.

Minimum period of notice to be given on the part of BEA:

Up to 2 years' continuous service	—one week's notice
Over 2 but less than 5 years' continuous service	—two weeks' notice
Over 5 years' continuous service	—four weeks' notice

(Note:—" Continuous Service " has the meaning set out in the Contracts of Employment Act, 1963 for the computation of the periods of continuous employment).

Monthly rated staff

Minimum period of notice to be given on either side:.....month(s).

E

Signature ..... Date 6th October 1967

Designation Assistant Catering Personnel Officer

for and on behalf of BRITISH EUROPEAN AIRWAYS CORPORATION

F ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER

I have read and understood the foregoing terms and conditions and accept employment with BEA in accordance with them.

Signature ..... Date .....

G NJC AGREEMENTS APPLICABLE TO THIS EMPLOYMENT*

Constitution and Rules—Local Committees (UK)

Procedure for dealing with redundancy

Termination of Service

Agreements of the National Sectional Panel for I/1,2,3, II/2,3,6,7,28,29,30, VI/26,27,28,29,30.

H SPECIAL CONDITIONS (IF ANY) APPLICABLE TO THIS EMPLOYMENT

* Delete any not appropriate.

CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT

between

BRITISH EUROPEAN AIRWAYS

and

Mrs Harjit Kaur BHALLA

BRITISH EUROPEAN AIRWAYS CORPORATION (hereinafter referred to as "BEA") is pleased to offer you employment upon the following terms and conditions:

A PARTICULARS OF EMPLOYMENT

Your initial appointment will be as:

Grade Cook (Female) Scale.....

Rate of Pay £10.4s.6d. + S.P. + H.A. payable weekly*/~~monthly~~*

Salary .....

Date of engagement 8th October 1967

Based at Flight Catering Centre, LHR (W)

B CONDITIONS OF ENGAGEMENT

1 You must satisfy BEA as to your medical fitness for employment.

2 Your references must be satisfactory to BEA.

3 You must be acceptable to the Guarantee Society under a Fidelity Bond, the premium for which is paid by BEA.

4 You will be on probation for a period of four week's from the date you start work. During the probationary period your engagement may be terminated by one week's notice on either side. The probationary period counts as service for all purposes. Upon satisfactory completion of the probationary period your appointment will be confirmed.

C CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT

1 You will observe and abide by the Constitution and Rules of Procedure of the National Joint Council for Civil Air Transport (hereinafter referred to as the "NJC") and by the agreements between BEA and Trades Unions represented in the NJC in so far as the terms thereof apply to you. The NJC agreements and procedures provide (for staff to whom they apply) full agreed machinery for negotiation and joint consultation and for the settling of staff differences and grievances. Provision is made in the agreements for full staff and management representation through panel committees at local and national level. Copies of the Constitution and Rules of Procedure and an introductory note on the functions of the NJC are attached. The Agreements covering your normal hours of work, holiday entitlement, sickness benefit and your employment generally, as set out in Section A above, are referred to overleaf in Section G and are also attached hereto.

2 Your employment will be governed by the staff regulations of BEA at present in force and any amendments made thereto from time to time. You will be deemed to know the contents of all regulations as far as they apply to you. These regulations may be seen on request.

3 Any special conditions of employment are referred to overleaf in Section H.

4 By accepting this offer you will be deemed to agree to be employed in your category at any BEA establishment in the United Kingdom or abroad and to fly in the Corporation's aircraft or on the services of any other recognised airline, if required to do so in the course of your duties.

5 You will be required to join the Airways Corporations Joint Pension Scheme from the date of engagement or from the date of reaching age 18, whichever is the later.

* Delete as required.

D TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT

When your appointment has been confirmed this Contract of Employment is then subject to the following minimum periods of written notice on either side, [illegible] prejudice to BEA's right to terminate employment summarily for misconduct. All entitlements and concessions available to you whilst employed by BEA will cease on termination of your employment except as otherwise provided:

Hourly- and weekly-rated staff

Minimum period of notice to be given on your part: one week.

Minimum period of notice to be given on the part of BEA:

Up to 2 years' continuous service	—one week's notice
Over 2 but less than 5 years' continuous service	—two weeks' notice
Over 5 years' continuous service	—four weeks' notice

(*Note*:—" Continuous Service " has the meaning set out in the Contracts of Employment Act, 1963 for the computation of the periods of continuous employment).

Monthly rated staff

Minimum period of notice to be given on either side:.....month(s).

E

Signature ..... Date 6th October 1967

Designation Assistant Catering Personnel Officer

for and on behalf of BRITISH EUROPEAN AIRWAYS CORPORATION

F ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER

I have read and understood the foregoing terms and conditions and accept employment with BEA in accordance with them.

Signature ..... Date .....

G NJC AGREEMENTS APPLICABLE TO THIS EMPLOYMENT*

Constitution and Rules—Local Committees (UK)

Procedure for dealing with redundancy

Termination of Service

Agreements of the National Sectional Panel for I/1,2,3, II/1,2,6,7,14,38,40 VI/26,27,28,29,30.

H SPECIAL CONDITIONS (IF ANY) APPLICABLE TO THIS EMPLOYMENT

* Delete any not appropriate.

P.J89 (3rd)

CONFIDENTIAL

STAFF TRANSFER NOTICE

BASE/STATION	LHR (H) F.C.C.
BRANCH/SECTION	Operations/Catering
BUDGET CODE NUMBER and FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS, if any	P480
CONTRACT OF SERVICE	*PERMANENT/TEMPORARY/PART-TIME
NEW BASE/STATION	LHR (H) F.C.C.
NEW BRANCH/SECTION	Operations/Catering
NEW BUDGET CODE NUMBER and FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS, if any	31-34 P480
NEW CONTRACT OF SERVICE	*PERMANENT/TEMPORARY/PART-TIME
This transfer is	*PERMANENT / (*TEMPORARY) for probable duration of
EFFECT ON STAFF POSITION OF NEW BRANCH	SUPERNUMERARY/REPLACEMENT

NOTES: Delete as appropriate where marked *

1. Form P.196 should be used for Job Title and Pay changes and arising from Transfer.
2. Where for any reason an Employee is transferred to a Permanent job whilst being under Temporary Contract of service this reason should be stated.

NAME AND INITIALS	BHALLA H.K. Mrs
	(If married during employment, give maiden name also)
STAFF NUMBER	93246
PRESENT JOB TITLE, SCALE AND RATE OF PAY	Cook (Female) £10.4s.6d + S.P. +M.A

You are advised of the following arrangements for your transfer

	Day	Month	Year
With effect from	8	10	

NEW JOB TITLE, SCALE AND RATE OF PAY	Cook (Female) £10.4s.6d. + S.P. +M.A.

	Day	Month	Year
NEXT REVIEW DATE	1	4	68

REASON FOR TRANSFER/REMARKS

To fill vacancy

SIGNED

(Operating Officer) ..... (Date) 6/10/67

(Appointments) Asst. Catering M.

CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT

between

BRITISH EUROPEAN AIRWAYS

and

Mrs Avtar Kaur Basara

BRITISH EUROPEAN AIRWAYS CORPORATION (hereinafter referred to as " BEA ") is pleased to offer you employment upon the following terms and conditions:

A PARTICULARS OF EMPLOYMENT

Your initial appointment will be as:

Grade Cook (Female) Scale..... Rate of Pay £10.4s.6d. + S.P. + M.A. payable weekly*/~~monthly~~

Salary .....

Date of engagement 29th October 1967 Based at Flight Catering Centre, LHR (H)

B CONDITIONS OF ENGAGEMENT

1 You must satisfy BEA as to your medical fitness for employment.

2 Your references must be satisfactory to BEA.

3 You must be acceptable to the Guarantee Society under a Fidelity Bond, the premium for which is paid by BEA.

4 You will be on probation for a period of four weeks from the date you start work. During the probationary period your engagement may be terminated by one week's notice on either side. The probationary period counts as service for all purposes. Upon satisfactory completion of the probationary period your appointment will be confirmed.

C CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT

1 You will observe and abide by the Constitution and Rules of Procedure of the National Joint Council for Civil Air Transport (hereinafter referred to as the " NJC ") and by the agreements between BEA and Trades Unions represented in the NJC in so far as the terms thereof apply to you. The NJC agreements and procedures provide (for staff to whom they apply) full agreed machinery for negotiation and joint consultation and for the settling of staff differences and grievances. Provision is made in the agreements for full staff and management representation through panel committees at local and national level. Copies of the Constitution and Rules of Procedure and an introductory note on the functions of the NJC are attached. The Agreements covering your normal hours of work, holiday entitlement, sickness benefit and your employment generally, as set out in Section A above, are referred to overleaf in Section G and are also attached hereto.

2 Your employment will be governed by the staff regulations of BEA at present in force and any amendments made thereto from time to time. You will be deemed to know the contents of all regulations as far as they apply to you. These regulations may be seen on request.

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5 You will be required to join the Airways Corporations Joint Pension Scheme from the date of engagement or from the date of reaching age 18, whichever is the later.

* *Delete as required.*

D TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT

When your appointment has been confirmed this Contract of Employment is then subject to the following minimum periods of written notice on either side, without prejudice to BEA's right to terminate employment summarily for misconduct. All entitlements and concessions available to you whilst employed by BEA will cease on termination of your employment except as otherwise provided:

Hourly- and weekly-rated staff

Minimum period of notice to be given on your part: one week.

Minimum period of notice to be given on the part of BEA:

Up to 2 years' continuous service	—one week's notice
Over 2 but less than 5 years' continuous service	—two weeks' notice
Over 5 years' continuous service	—four weeks' notice

(*Note*:—" Continuous Service " has the meaning set out in the Contracts of Employment Act, 1963 for the computation of the periods of continuous employment).

Monthly rated staff

Minimum period of notice to be given on either side:.....month(s).

E

Signature ..... Date 27th October 1967

Designation Assistant Personnel Officer Cabin Services

for and on behalf of BRITISH EUROPEAN AIRWAYS CORPORATION

F ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER

I have read and understood the foregoing terms and conditions and accept employment with BEA in accordance with them.

Signature ... Avtar Kaur Basara ... Date .....

G NJC AGREEMENTS APPLICABLE TO THIS EMPLOYMENT*

Constitution and Rules—Local Committees (UK)

Procedure for dealing with redundancy

Termination of Service

Agreements of the National Sectional Panel for. I/1,2,3. II/1,2,6,7,14,38,40. VI/26,27,28,29,30.

H SPECIAL CONDITIONS (IF ANY) APPLICABLE TO THIS EMPLOYMENT

* *Delete any not appropriate.*

EXHIBIT 2.

British airways

Personnel (Ground Services) Division

PO Box No 10
London (Heathrow) Airport Central
Hounslow, Middlesex TW6 2JA
Telephone: 01-759 4321
Telegrams: Belline London

PERSONAL

Mr M L Makol
Laundry
Cabin Services Centre
LHR North

29 September 1975

GS.2/3

Dear Mr Makol

I promised to let you have a copy of the Ground Services National Sectional Panel Agreement which covers you and your other Ground Services Staff colleagues in the Laundry. Like the Ground Catering Agreement which we discussed last week on the Staff Representatives' Course, one or two of the paragraphs require amending, e.g. on Page 8 call out pay under Paragraph 21a) ii) should be £2.00 and not 10/- as shown.

If you have any queries then I am sure Mr Hall, your Personnel Officer, will be only too pleased to help you.

Yours sincerely

D J Field

D J Field
Senior Industrial Relations Officer

Enc

[illegible] April 1974 [illegible] during double days on 2nd August 1974.

For these records [illegible] an actual calculation of exactly what they did not receive.

2. Those working during the period 1st November 1969 - 1st June 1974 when they transferred to running double days.

For these it is impossible to calculate exactly what they did not receive so the following formula has been devised:

Over a full year excluding leave/[illegible] days and ignoring any other absences 216 non-Sunday shifts will be worked which equals an average of 17.14 per month. Therefore:

Formula 'A' - 15p x 17.14 = £2.57 per month (1.11.69 - 31.12.73)

Formula 'B' - 39p x 17.14 = £6.97 per month (1.1.74 - 1.6.74)

Multiply each Formula by the complete months during which that Formula applied to calculate the amount due to each Staff member. This method of calculation is favourable to Staff because no deduction is being made for sickness absence.

3. It is agreed to make a payment to those Staff members still in our employment along the lines indicated above.

Senior Personnel Officer
12th November 1975

APPENDIX "A"

to Agreement dated 1st November 1969

1. RATES OF PAY

	Effective 1.10.72 £.p	Effective 1.1.74 £.p
Ground Services Supervisor 1	33.69	35.94
	34.32	36.57
	34.96	37.21
	35.59	37.84
	36.19	38.44
Ground Services Supervisor 2	32.32	34.57
	32.59	34.84
	32.92	35.17
	33.22	35.47
	33.55	35.80
Ground Services Worker 1	31.27	33.52
	31.60	33.85
	31.88	34.13
	32.18	34.43
Ground Services Worker 2	30.42	32.67
	30.78	33.03
	31.11	33.36
	31.41	33.66
Ground Services Worker 3	28.88	31.13
	29.21	31.46
	29.57	31.82
	29.90	32.15
Ground Services Worker 4	28.30	30.55
	28.58	30.83
	28.88	31.13
	29.21	31.46
Ground Services Worker 5	27.64	29.89
	27.94	30.19
	28.25	30.50
	28.58	30.83
Ground Services Worker 6	27.09	29.34
	27.39	29.64
	27.70	29.95
	28.00	30.25

	Effective 1.10.72	Effective 1.1.74
	£p	£p
Ground Services Worker 7	26.43	28.68
	26.73	28.98
	27.06	29.31
	27.37	29.62
Ground Services Worker 8	24.12	26.37
	24.45	26.70
	24.78	27.03
	25.06	27.31
Ground Services Worker 9	23.46	25.71
	23.79	26.04
	24.09	26.34
	24.42	26.67
CARGOCENTRE HEATHROW		
Cargocentre Supervisor	35.95	38.20
	36.52	38.77
	37.10	39.35
	37.65	39.90
	38.45	40.70
	39.03	41.28
Cargocentre Assistant (Handling)	32.07	34.32
	32.32	34.57
	32.62	34.87
	32.89	35.14

NOTES:

a) 1) Licence Pay

Ground Service Workers Grade 2 or 3 employed on MT duties who are required by the Employer to hold a Public Service Vehicle Licence will be paid an additional £0.50 per week for the holding of such licence.

ii) Call Money

Staff who, having completed a normal day's work (this to include a normal shift or normal night's work), and having left their place of employment without having been notified that they are required to work overtime, are thereafter summoned from home to work during overtime hours, shall be paid the sum of £0.50 as "call money", in addition to any payment to which they become entitled by reason of working.

b) Annual Increments

Annual Increments will be paid subject to a satisfactory year's work. They are payable from the incremental date (1st January, 1st April, 1st July or 1st October) nearest the anniversary of the date of appointment in the grade until the maximum salary appropriate to the employee's grade is attained.

c) Staff aged 18 and over will receive the full adult rates of pay.

2. Meal and Travelling Allowances

When Ground Services Workers grade 2 and 3 employed on MT duties are required to undertake journeys outside the radius of 45 miles from their base over the recognised meal times, allowances will be payable as provided for in the Employer's Staff Regulations.

3. Special Cargo

Staff detailed to handle a cargo which consists principally of monkeys shall qualify for additional payment of £0.45 per aircraft load.

Any cargo, the handling of which requires the use of protective equipment (e.g. respirators) other than that normally issued, and which in the opinion of Management comprises the bulk of the aircraft load, may, after consultation, be classed as Special Cargo and qualify for a special payment of £0.45.

APPENDIX 'B'

to Agreement dated 1st November 1969 ✓

SHIFT PREMIUMS

	MORNINGS & AFTERNOONS	NIGHTS	SATURDAY NIGHTS	SUNDAYS	ROTATING DAYS
	£.p	£.p	£.p	£.p	£.p
rvices rs 1 and 2	0.80	1.66	5.355	4.49	0.43
rvices 1 and 2	0.765	1.50	4.70	3.92	0.39
rvices 3, 4 and 5	0.64	1.375	4.205	3.475	0.35
rvices 6 and 7	— 0.57	1.29	2.87	2.87	0.32
rvices 8 and 9)	— 0.56	1.15	2.485	2.485	0.29 ✓
TRE HEATHROW					
tre Supervisors	0.81	1.66	5.355	4.49	0.44
tre Assistants ng)	0.765	1.60	4.97	4.18	0.39

1/10/74

NOTE: 1) Shifts commencing Sunday night receive the appropriate night shift payment only.

2) Ground Services Workers Grade 6,7,8 and 9 receive Sunday shift premium for shifts commencing on Saturday night.

APPENDIX 'G'

to Agreement dated 1st November 1969 ✓

PAYMENT DURING ABSENCES DUE TO SICKNESS AND/OR ACCIDENTS

tion I page 32.

1-11-73] @ 15p
31-12-73] @ 29p
1-1-74]

1-6-74

@ 29p

NATIONAL JOINT COUNCIL FOR CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT

GROUND SERVICES STAFF NATIONAL SECTIONAL PANEL

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

dated 1st November 1969

between

the Employer's and the Employees' Sides of the Ground Services Staff National Sectional Panel (hereinafter referred to as "the Employer" and "the Employees" respectively)

in respect of

Ground Services Staff employed by British European Airways in the United Kingdom

1. SCOPE OF AGREEMENT

The Agreement shall be restricted in its application to Ground Services Staff listed in Appendix 'A' attached hereto and employed by the Employer.

2. OVERRIDING EXISTING AGREEMENTS

This Agreement supersedes all arrangements (including Local and National Agreements) previously entered into by the Employer in respect of the terms and conditions of service of the staff enumerated in so far as those arrangements differ from the provisions of this Agreement.

3. TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT

This Agreement shall remain in force until 31st October 1972 and thereafter until the expiry of six months' notice given in writing by either party to the other of the intention to terminate the Agreement.

4. DISPUTES

In the event of a dispute occurring, whether in connection with this Agreement or otherwise, the matter shall be dealt with as provided for in the Constitution of the National Joint Council for Civil Air Transport.

Both sides will do their utmost to have such disputes dealt with expeditiously and whilst such matters are being dealt with in accordance with the Constitution employees will continue working in such a manner as will ensure the punctual completion of work programmes and all related documents.

5. REGULATIONS

The regulations of the Employer shall be deemed to be incorporated in this Agreement. Such regulations may be amended by the Employer from time to time to provide for changing conditions, but no such regulation shall be amended to the detriment of the staff without prior consultation with the Employees.

6. WORKING HOURS

(a) The working week shall normally consist of 40 hours (excluding meal times) but where heavy seasonal traffic loads or work requirements warrant it, the normal working week can be varied for particular Bases or Stations by agreement on the Sectional Panel.

(b) It is recognised that the Air Transport Industry is a public service requiring 7 day working and in order to cover this it is agreed that the normal hours of work may be rostered on shift systems throughout the week.

(c) The normal working hours for day workers shall be spread over any 5 days out of 7 to suit the work requirements at particular Bases or Stations.

(d) The normal working hours for night workers shall be spread over any 5 nights out of 7 to suit the work requirements at particular Bases or Stations.

(e) For the purpose of this Agreement the following definitions shall apply:-

(i) Day Work

The normal working hours for day workers shall not commence before 0700 hours or finish later than 1830 hours.

(ii) Night Work

The normal working hours of night workers shall not commence earlier than 1830 hours or finish later than 0800 hours.

(iii) Morning and Afternoon Shifts

Morning shifts shall be those where the hours of work do not commence before 0400 hours or later than 0659 hours or finish later than 1530 hours.

Afternoon shifts shall be those where the hours of work do not commence before 1200 hours or finish later than 2400 hours.

(iv) Double-day Shifts

Double-day shifts shall be those shifts which are rostered to provide for 2 shifts (morning shift and afternoon shift, as defined in (iii) above) to be worked between 0400 hours and 2400 hours.

7. [redacted]

8. CHANGEOVER OF SHIFTS

Staff switched to another shift from working on shifts to working on a fixed shift normally be given not less than a [redacted] period of not less than 10 hours from the normal time the old shift ends to the normal time commencing work on the new shift.

9. OVERTIME AND STATUTORY HOLIDAY WORKING

When operational and other special conditions require it, staff employed on any of the above systems may be required to work both rostered and ad hoc overtime and to work when rostered on statutory holidays as part of the normal cycle of the shift. Refusal to work rostered overtime without a reasonable explanation acceptable to the Employer shall constitute misconduct. As far as is practicable arrangements shall be made for rostered overtime to be mutually agreed. In the case of ad hoc overtime as much notice as possible shall be given to the staff concerned.

10. ALTERNATIVE WORK

Staff subject to this agreement must be capable of, available for, and willing to perform work associated with their usual occupation or such other reasonable alternative work if available as instructed by the Employer when the usual work is not available.

11. MEAL INTERVALS

Meal times shall be the subject of local arrangements to suit work requirements, it being understood that staff may be required to work through their meal time. In such circumstances an alternative meal interval may be allowed immediately before or after the time of the normal meal interval, failing which the staff shall be entitled to payment of overtime rate for the time worked during their normal meal time. (See Appendix 'F' para 7).

12. PREMIUM RATES OF PAY

(a) Saturday Night

Staff working Saturday night duty other than night work as part of a continuous shift system, shall be paid, in addition to basic rate, a fixed shift premium rate set forth in Appendix 'B' hereto.

(b) Sunday

Staff working duty commencing on a Sunday (except Sunday night shift) shall be paid, in addition to basic rate, a fixed shift premium rate set forth in Appendix 'B' hereto.

(c) Shift work

(i)

(ii) Shift

All overtime worked outside the rostered hours of the normal shift (other than Sunday), Public Holidays And Christmas Day shall be paid at the rate of one-and-one-half times the hourly rate (time and a half), the rate of one-and-two-thirds times the hourly rate for Public Holidays (time and two thirds), and twice the hourly rate for payment on Christmas Day (double-time).

When a full shift is worked on a Sunday as an overtime day the appropriate rate for Sunday shift premium will be paid, in addition to the basic rate for the hours worked. Ad hoc overtime worked on a Sunday will be paid at the rate of one-and-two-thirds times the hourly rate of payment (time and two thirds).

For the purpose of calculating overtime each day shall stand on its own and a full shift of duty shall be worked before overtime is reckoned, with the following exceptions:-

(i) Time lost through sickness certified to the satisfaction of the Employer.

(ii) Absence with leave.

12. RATES OF PAY AND INCREMENTS

Rates of pay shall be at the scales laid down in Appendix (A) and in accordance with the conditions stated therein.

13. PAYMENT DURING SICKNESS OR OTHER DISABILITY

Payment during absence due to sickness and/or accident shall be as set forth in Appendix (C) hereto and in accordance with the published regulations of the Employer.

14. HOLIDAYS

Holiday entitlement shall be as set forth in Appendix (D) hereto and in accordance with the published regulations of the Employer.

15. UNIFORM AND EQUIPMENT

If so required by the Employer staff shall when on duty wear such protective clothing as may be issued by the Employer or deem reasonable

to time as may be necessary as a result of fair wear and tear. Such uniforms or protective clothing must be worn on duty and left in good condition by staff and provided and replaced by them when necessary other than as a result of fair wear and tear. Staff issued with uniforms protective clothing or equipment on loan shall return such uniforms protective clothing or equipment to the issuing office on the cessation of employment or when otherwise required by the Employer. The Employer shall have the right to recover from salary and other payments due to the staff the value of such loaned issues not returned to the Employer on demand.

16. LOCAL REPRESENTATION

Local Committees shall be set up and operated in accordance with the procedure laid down by the National Joint Council for Civil Air Transport as outlined in Appendix 'E' hereto.

17. ABSENCE FROM DUTY

Subject to reasons for absence from duty being acceptable to the Employer payment will be made for time so lost.

18. PENSION SCHEME

As required by the Employer staff covered by this Agreement shall contribute to the Airways Corporations Joint Pension Scheme.

19. TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT

The employment of staff covered by this Agreement may be terminated by either the Employer or Employee giving in writing notice of termination which must be given to expire at the end of the normal rostered weekly period as follows:-

(i) notice to be given by an Employee - not less than one week;

(ii) notice to be given by the Employer - not less than one week if the period of employment is less than 2 years; not less than two weeks if the period of employment is 2 years or more but less than 5 years; not less than four weeks if the period of employment is 5 years or more

as provided for and subject to the Contracts of Employment Act 1963 (where applicable).

20. SPECIAL CONDITIONS

The special conditions set out in Appendices 'F' and 'G' hereto are agreed as constituting an integral part of this Agreement and are incorporated as such.

21. PROVISION FOR REVIEW

The parties to the agreement shall have the right to request at any time a meeting of the Panel to consider any matter arising under the agreement. Whether or not requests have been made for such meetings, there shall be a meeting of the Panel not less frequently than once each quarter. No alteration or variation of this Agreement shall take effect without the consent in writing of both parties hereto.

(Signed) W.P.C. HILL
Secretary, Employers' Side
Ground Services Staff
National [illegible] Panel

(Signed) JOHN COUGHLAN
Secretary, Employees' Side
Ground Services Staff
National [illegible] Panel

NOTES

a) i) Licence Pay

Ground Service Workers Grade 2 or 3 employed on MT duties who are required by their Employer to hold a Public Service Vehicle Licence will be paid an additional 10/- (£0.5000) per week for the holding of such licence.

ii) Call Money

Staff who, having completed a normal day's work (this is to include a normal shift or normal night's work), and having left their place of employment, without having been notified that they are required to work overtime, are thereafter summoned from home to work during overtime hours, shall be paid the sum of 10/- (£0.5000) as "call money", in addition to any payment to which they become entitled by reason of working.

b) Annual Increments

Annual increments will be paid subject to a satisfactory year's work. They are payable from the incremental date (1st January, 1st April, 1st July or 1st October) nearest the anniversary of the date of appointment in the grade until the maximum salary appropriate to the employee's grade is attained.

c) Staff aged 18 and over will receive the full adult rates of pay.

2. Meal and Travelling Allowances

When Ground Services workers grade 2 and 3 employed on MT duties are required to undertake journeys outside the radius of 45 miles from their base over the recognised meal times, allowances will be payable as provided for in the Corporation's Staff Regulations.

3. Special Cargo

Staff detailed to handle a/cargo which consists principally of monkeys shall qualify for additional payment of 9/- (£0.4500) per aircraft load.

Any cargo, the handling of which requires the use of protective equipment (e.g. respirators) other than that normally issued, and which in the opinion of Management comprises the bulk of the aircraft load, may, after consultation, be classed as Special Cargo and qualify for a special payment of 9/- (£0.4500).

APPENDIX 'B'

to Agreement dated 1st November 1969

SHIFT PREMIUMS

	MORNINGS & AFTERNOONS	NIGHTS	SATURDAY NIGHTS	SUNDAYS	BOXING DAY & CHRISTMAS DAY
Ground Services Supervisors and Chiefs	14/- (£0.7000)	31/- (£1.5500)	102/6 (£5.1250)	86/- (£4.3000)	2/- (£0.1000)
Ground Services Workers 1 and 2	12/6 (£0.6250)	28/- (£1.4000)	90/- (£4.5000)	75/- (£3.7500)	1/6 (£0.0750)
Ground Services Workers 3, 4 and 5	11/- (£0.5500)	25/6 (£1.2750)	80/6 (£4.0250)	66/6 (£3.3250)	1/- (£0.0500)
Ground Services Workers 6 and 7	10/- (£0.5000)	24/- (£1.2000)	(See Note 2)	55/- (£2.7500)	1/- (£0.0500)
Ground Services Workers 8 and 9	9/- (£0.4500)	21/- (£1.0500)	(See Note 2)	47/6 (£2.3750)	1/- (£0.0500)
CARGOCENTRE HEATHROW					
Cargocentre Supervisors	14/- (£0.7000)	31/- (£1.5500)	102/6 (£5.1250)	86/- (£4.3000)	2/- (£0.1000)
Cargocentre Assistants (Handling)	13/6 (£0.6750)	30/- (£1.5000)	95/- (£4.7500)	80/- (£4.0000)	1/6 (£0.0750)

NOTES: 1) Shifts commencing Sunday night receive the appropriate night shift payment only.

2) Ground Services Workers Grade 6, 7, 8 and 9 receive Sunday shift premium for shifts commencing on Saturday night.

APPENDIX 'C'

to Agreement dated 1st November 1969

PAYMENT DURING ABSENCES DUE TO SICKNESS AND/OR ACCIDENTS

See Section 7 page 32

APPENDIX 'D'

to Agreement dated 1st November 1969

HOLIDAY ENTITLEMENT

(Effective 1970-1971)

1. The leave year shall be from 1st April to 31st March.

2. Staff covered by the Agreement shall have an annual leave entitlement on the following basis:-

On entry into service	-	15 days (to apply pro rata during first year)
After 1 year's service	-	16 days
" 2 " "	-	17 "
" 3 " "	-	18 "
" 4 " "	-	19 "
" 5 " "	-	20 "

3. (a) So far as is possible to suit operating conditions at particular units and stations, annual holidays shall be granted at times requested by the employees concerned, but in all cases prior approval of Management shall be obtained. Leave entitlement cannot be carried forward from one year to another unless the employee has been prevented from taking leave during the year owing to the requirements of Management.

(b) Staff leaving the employment of B.E.A. shall have holiday entitlement calculated and discharged in the following manner:-

(i) If the employee is being discharged for misconduct, there shall be no entitlement.

(ii) If the employee has less than 1 year's continuous service at the time of termination, leave shall be granted on the basis of one twelfth of the annual entitlement for each complete month's service since the previous 1st April or from the date of engagement less any leave taken.

4. (i) In addition to the annual holiday entitlement outlined above, staff shall be granted six additional days holiday with pay during the year plus any days declared by the Queen to be public holidays (except when an alternative day of public holiday is proclaimed in respect of Christmas Day falling on a Sunday).

These six days shall normally be allocated:-

Easter	2 days	Good Friday and Easter Monday
Spring Bank Holiday	1 day	As Determined by Royal Proclamation
Summer Bank Holiday	1 day	" " " " "
Christmas	2 days	Christmas Day and Boxing Day

In Scotland New Year's Day and 2nd January shall normally be allocated instead of Christmas Day and Boxing Day.

(ii) By local agreement, other days equivalent in number may be substituted in parts of the United Kingdom only where it is not in accordance with local custom to observe the days referred to in paragraph 4(i) as holidays.

(ii) [illegible] any [illegible] which would normally fall on a rostered rest day, an alternative rest day shall be allowed in lieu of the normal rest day on the basis of one day for one day worked, the day to be allowed in lieu shall be announced. In the case of shift workers the alternative rest day shall normally be mutually agreed.

(iii) Days off in lieu of Statutory Holidays will normally be given before the next Statutory Holiday. Alternatively by mutual agreement Management will pay staff one day's pay at single time rate in lieu of the given day.

(iv) The day of the holiday in the case of staff engaged on shift work shall be deemed to be in the period of duty commencing on the day of the public/other holiday.

(v) Entitlement to the additional Holidays with pay specified in this paragraph shall not be given to any employee who is absent from duty on the working day immediately preceding or the working day immediately following the prescribed holiday (except if this arises from any permission granted by, or other reason acceptable to BEA or who, having been given not less than three days written notice, either by individual notification or instructions posted on Notice Boards, that he(or she) is required for duty on a prescribed holiday and has not given valid reason why such duty will be impracticable, fails to report for duty on the prescribed holiday).

(vi) The six days of additional holiday will be published each year by notice, together with any alternative rest days as applied to day workers and arising out of sub-section (iii).

5. Payment for hours worked on authorised holidays shall be as follows:-

(a) (i) Except as provided in sub-section (b) all hours worked midnight to midnight on Good Friday, Easter Monday, Spring Bank Holiday, Summer Bank Holiday, Boxing Day (or such days as may be substituted according to local custom) shall be paid at the rate of one-and-two-thirds times the hourly rate of payment (time-and-two-thirds).

(ii) Except as provided in sub-section (b) all hours worked midnight to midnight on Christmas Day (or New Year's Day in Scotland) shall be paid at the rate of twice the hourly rate of payment (double-time).

(iii) In addition to the above premium rate of pay an alternative day off in lieu shall be granted with payment at the normal rate. Such alternative time off may be taken by mutual arrangement subject to paragraph 4(iv).

(b) Premium payment for hours worked on authorised holidays in the case of night workers and shift workers shall be for the shift commencing on the holiday.

(c) Staff required to work on an alternative rest day arising out of sub-section (iii) of paragraph 4 above shall be entitled to compensation appropriate to overtime working as provided for under Clause 11 (d) of this Agreement dated 1st November 1969.

(d) For the purpose of calculation one day shall be 8 hours.

i) Acceptance when required of Warehouse Staff loading palletised and non-palletised freight aircraft.

j) Acceptance by Loading Staff when required conventionally to load and unload palletised freight at aircraft, to palletise and de-palletise freight at aircraft and to load and unload loose freight at aircraft which normally carry palletised freight.

k) Acceptance that Warehouse Staff shall be interchangeable between import cargo/export cargo/mail (conditions may require).

l) Staff in Grades 6, 7, 8 and 9 may be required to drive without additional payment, subject to holding the necessary licences.

m) Staff in Grades 6 and 7 will accept the use of simple tools for unskilled work such as dismantling and re-assembling furniture.

n) Staff in Grades 6 and 7 will change tungsten lights and will clean light fittings. They will also include in their duties, where necessary, the cleaning of plant rooms and outsides of boilers.

The working of shift patterns and cycles and acceptance of rosters as may be necessary to meet operational requirements, after consultation through the local panel machinery. Economic considerations based upon schedules requirements to be borne in mind.

Acceptance of the new rates of pay as covering all duties required under new methods of work (e.g.) acceptance of new forms of traffic handling vehicles and loading equipment and work associated with these.

An acceptance of changes in organisation or duties in the future after full consultation at local level.

Full facilities for work and methods study including, where appropriate, job timing and methods demonstration as set out at Appendix G to this Agreement.

Staff to recognise the need for a continuing effort to collaborate in production efficiency.

Acceptance of the following amplification of Clause 10 of the Agreement dated 1st November 1969:

Meal Breaks: Where essential and logical shifts may continue to be rostered to include meal arrangements as operational circumstances or services allow or demand on the understanding that the position will be subject to review if circumstances change, e.g. an alteration in circumstances at particular stations.

The time allowed for any paid meal break, at the discretion of Management but in no case will exceed thirty minutes.

Payments applying Part 6 and 7 of the Agreement

Applicable to Weeks

Grades as per Wages Agreement dated
and Shift Times & Conditions as per List dated January 1974 (as varied)

Shifts Fixed:-

1	[illegible]				
	Night Shift				
	Shift Consisting Mainly Nights	5.30		5.30	
2	BRITISH AIRWAYS (ASSISTANCE) LTD				
	Full Rotating Day	2.76		2.76	
	Night Shift	7.76		7.76	
	Double Day (Sat. - Sunday)	5.80		5.80	
3	EUROPEAN DIVISION GROUND CATERING				
	Permanent Nights	7.25		7.76	
	Rotating Double Day	5.34		5.50	
4	EUROPEAN DIVISION GROUND SERVICES				
	Uncontrolled Untied Premia - Rate w.e.f. 1.3.74				

	Saturday Night Shift	Sunday Night Shift	Bank Holiday Night Shift	Bank Holiday Day Shift
GSS I & GSS II	0.80	1.00	0.80	1.00
GSW I & GSW II	0.70	1.50	1.40	1.00
GSW III, IV & V	0.60	0.75	1.20	0.75
GSW VI & VII	0.37	1.30	2.67	0.37
GSW VIII (a)	0.08	1.30	0.16	0.08
CCT Supervisor	0.81	1.00	1.60	1.00
CCT Asst (Handling)	0.70	1.00	1.40	1.00

5	NORTHEAST			
		Rotating Double Day	Continuous Nights	
	Original Rate/Premium			
	Increase			

EXHIBIT 3.

APPENDIX 'A'

Committee of Enquiry

ED FLIGHT CATERING DISPUTE

In order to achieve an immediate return to work, resolve the dispute and in the interests of our service to the customer, it is agreed that:-

1. An enquiry into the circumstances leading up to and surrounding the industrial dispute in the ED Flight Catering Centre on Sunday 16th March, will commence immediately and will make recommendations for resolving the issue. It will be chaired by Sir Leslie Williams (Independent Chairman of the NJC Conciliation Committee).

2. The staff member concerned will remain on paid suspension until the committee makes its recommendations and approriate action will be taken in the light of these recommendations.

3. Without accepting that the Duty Officer concerned acted in other than a proper manner Management agree that in the meantime he will not be employed in an area in contact with the staff involved in the dispute until the Committee has made its recommendations.

21.3.75

APPENDIX 'B'

to Report of

Committee of Enquiry

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE SUSPENSION OF MR. W. ALLEN

Thursday 13th March, 1975.

a) allegation of absence from duty in morning

b) allegation of refusal to carry out instructions in afternoon

Friday 14th March, 1975.

a) late for work and alleged to be abusive when questioned regarding this

b) alleged to have obstructed other staff in performance of duties

Saturday 15th March, 1975.

a) alleged to have refused to clear blocked drain

Sunday 16th March, 1975.

a) alleged to have been singing in provocative manner, following reprimand on earlier issues

b) alleged to have been abusive when told to desist

E X H I B I T 4.

British Airways

Serial no: 49
Date of issue: 1 SEPTEMBER 1974
Cancelling serial no:
Date:

Staff regulation No 33

Authority: Group Personnel Services Manager

DISCIPLINARY CODE AND APPEALS

1. Introduction

Disciplinary action, including dismissal, may be taken by British Airways against any member of the staff for a variety of offences. Every offence will be considered in the light of its own circumstances and disciplinary action decided upon according to the merits of the case.

2. British Airways Policy

It is British Airways policy to:

2.1 accord equitable treatment

2.2 give staff adequate rights and means of representation in all disciplinary matters

2.3 provide staff with a right of appeal

3. Probationary Period

This procedure will not be applicable to staff during the probationary period.

4. Precautionary Suspension with Pay

When the senior official on duty believes that following an alleged offence, it would be undesirable for a staff member to remain at work, he may as a precautionary measure suspend him from duty with pay pending formal investigation by the appropriate authority, which must be held at the earliest opportunity. It may also be used where an offence has been committed, but the senior official on duty is not authorised to deal with it. Pay during suspension is basic pay and does not include shift pay or overtime

5. Air Safety

Action in connection with any incident under investigation by the Air Safety Branch, shall be limited to suspension with pay pending publication of the findings of the Air Safety Committee. Disciplinary action already taken, the subject of which becomes a matter for Air Safety Branch investigation, shall be suspended temporarily while investigation proceeds.

6. Criminal Offences

Where a criminal offence is involved either on or off duty and an employee is charged with this and thereafter remanded on bail, and where the responsible British Airways official believes it would be prejudical to British Airways interest for the employee to continue at work, precautionary suspension with pay should be imposed until the court case is completed.

If, however, a breach of British Airways Regulations has been committed, the disciplinary procedure will be invoked and may involve dismissal.
If remanded in custody, the employee is thus unable to perform his contract of employment which must be deemed terminated. When an employee has been found guilty of a criminal offence, the question of his continued employment will be decided, having regard to the nature of the offence in relation to the responsibilities and characteristics of the employee's job and whether he remains able to fulfil his contract of employment.

Serial no: 50
Date of issue: 1 SEPTEMBER 1974
Cancelling serial no:
Date:

Staff regulation No 33

In the event of an employee who has been remanded in custody being found not guilty (or not proven) he may apply to British Airways for reconsideration of his termination and the case will be reviewed by the official who initiated his termination. This review will include all relevant circumstances including whether or not a breach of British Airways Regulations has been committed. This reconsideration does not preclude reinstatement where the responsible official considers this to be appropriate.

7. Disciplinary Action

The following list of possible disciplinary action is in order of severity.

Admonishment

Reprimand

Reprimand involving sanctions

Dismissal

Summary dismissal

It is necessary to inform employees in writing of any disciplinary action taken against them, with the exception of an admonishment.

7.1 Admonishment

This is essentially a verbal reprimand not normally recorded on the personal file. An admonishment may be given by any person in a supervisory capacity. This should be an immediate action and can be on a formal or informal basis. Repetition of the offence after an admonishment can result in more severe disciplinary action.

7.2 Reprimand

This is a more formal admonishment which is recorded on the personal file.

7.3 Reprimand Involving Sanctions

Where the gravity of the offence is such that some sanction in addition to a reprimand is necessary, the type of sanction which may be imposed include the following:

Reduction in grade

Withholding/withdrawing of increments

Withdrawing of concessions

Suspension without pay

7.4 Dismissal

Dismissal is ~~normally~~ reserved for the more serious offences or the repetition of less serious offences. Employees will not normally be dismissed for a first offence except in cases of gross misconduct.

Examples of gross misconduct could be:

Criminal offences

Incapacity on duty due to the effect of intoxicating liquor or drugs.

Habitual neglect of duty or neglect resulting in serious consequences.

Conduct prejudicial to safety

Wilful misconduct or disobedience of lawful and reasonable orders.

Conduct prejudicial to the interests of British Airways

Breach of British Airways Regulations.

This list is not exhaustive, nor is it intended to be.

7.5 Summary Dismissal

If the circumstances surrounding a case appear to be such as to constitute a threat to the well being of the organisation or to members of staff, and the most appropriate course of action would be the summary dismissal of the staff member(s) concerned then the appropriate Personnel Director, or other nominated personnel official, may sanction departure from the following procedure.

8. Disciplinary Procedure

8.1 Representation

During all stages of procedure the individual may be accompanied by his TU representative or by a person who works with him.

8.2 Delegation

In order to avoid delays that may occur through the absence or non-availability of the appropriate authority any such person may delegate his duties under this procedure to his deputy.

8.3 Hearings

8.3.1 This procedure will apply to all cases of disciplinary action except in the special circumstances outlined in preceeding paragraphs and where an admonishment is administered as described in para 7.1 of this regulation.

8.3.2 The appropriate authority must first satisfy himself that there is a case to answer. Providing circumstances permit, the employee must be seen before this decision is taken and be given the opportunity to explain his involvement to the investigating official.

8.3.3 When, on the basis of the preliminary investigation, the appropriate authority believes there is a case to be answered the employee must be notified in writing of the alleged offence and a hearing shall be held within seven days of this notification.

8.3.4 Either party may call witnesses, submit evidence and question the parties present. Copies of written evidence or reports should normally be given to the other party at least forty-eight hours before the hearing.

8.3.5 After the hearing the appropriate authority may tell the employee of his decision, the reasons for it and any disciplinary action to be taken. In any event this will be confirmed in writing within seven days of the conclusion of the hearing and a copy will be placed on the employee's personal file.

8.4 Appeals

An employee shall have the right to appeal against the original disciplinary action taken against him, and against the decision of the first stage appeal authority. Appeals must be submitted in writing within seven days after the decision has been notified to him.

8.4.1 The appeal authority shall have the power to confirm, increase, decrease or otherwise vary a penalty.

8.4.2 The appeal authority will be accompanied at the appeal hearing by the appropriate personnel official.

8.4.3 First Stage

The appeal will be heard within seven days of the employee exercising his right of appeal by the next appropriate level of authority above the original disciplinary authority. The appellant and his representative will be informed in writing of the result of the appeal within seven days of the conclusion of the hearing.

8.4.4 Final Stage

This will be heard by the next appropriate level of authority above the first stage appeal authority. All time limits shall be as for the first stage appeal.

8.5 If the staff member is acquitted of the offence either at the initial hearing or on appeal, then all references to the alleged offence will be removed from his personal file.

9. Time Limits

9.1 Time limits referred to above should be adhered to wherever possible. Variations may, however, be permitted where agreed by the appropriate official and the employee concerned.

9.2 All time limits are exclusive of statutory holidays.

Serial no: 53
Date of issue: [illegible]
Cancelling serial no:
Date:

Staff regulation No 33

10. Payments to Staff Attending Hearing and Appeals

	ON DUTY	OFF DUTY		
	To be released during hearing	Flat time for hours spent not exceeding normal working hours	Reimbursement of public transport fares	Payment to be directed by Hearing Authority
A. APPELLANT				
1. Appeal against dismissal				
Dismissal upheld		-		
Reduced punishment		-	X	
Exonerated			X	X
2. Appeal against other than dismissal				
Punishment upheld	X			
Reduced punishment	X		X	
Exonerated	X	X	X	
B. STAFF OTHER THAN APPELLANT	X	X	X	

11. Disciplinary and Appeal Authorities

Penalty	Minimum Level of appropriate authority*	Immediate Appeal authority	Final Appeal
Reprimand; suspension up to 3 days; Withholding/Withdrawing of increment; Reduction in grade.	Section Head	Manager	General Manager
Suspension more than 3 days; Dismissal.	Manager	General Manager	Div. Director

* Equivalent appointments are understood where appropriate.

12. Industrial Tribunal

Nothing in this procedure inhibits or restricts the right of an individual who considers he has been unfairly dismissed from seeking redress before an Industrial Tribunal as provided for in current legislation.

CANCELLING BOAC SN 18
BEA SR GEN I

E X H I B I T 5.

From: Duty Catering Officer 16-3-75

To: Mr. Bhullar
Staff No. 304846

I saw you yesterday in the presence of your supervisor Mr. Taylor and your staff representative Mr. [illegible] with regard to the clocking on your time card for 15 3/75, the clocking was for 10.01.

As you were seen by your supervisors Mr. Miller, Mr. Steele and Mr. Taylor crossing the path lead to work at 10.01 precisely. This could not have been a true record of your time on. [illegible] this, you claimed that you had clocked your own card on. [illegible] that anyone else had clocked you in. Your supervisor stated that you reported for work between 10.10 and 10.15.

In view of this evidence of your three supervisors you could not have told the truth.

Your staff rep. when asked if he wished to say anything on your behalf, was unable to say anything.

I then gave you a verbal warning that any similar incident could result in disciplinary action being taken against you.

.....
Mr. W. Seal

E X H I B I T 6.

NATIONAL JOINT COUNCIL FOR CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT

GROUND SERVICES STAFF NATIONAL SECTIONAL PANEL

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

dated 1st March 1970

BETWEEN

The Employer's and Employees' Sides (hereinafter referred to as "the Employer" and "the Employees" respectively) of the Ground Services Staff National Sectional Panel

in respect of

GROUND CATERING STAFF

employed by

BRITISH EUROPEAN AIRWAYS CORPORATION

1. SCOPE OF AGREEMENT

This Agreement shall be restricted in its application to the Catering Staff, enumerated in Schedule 'A' attached hereto, employed by and working in premises operated by the Employer in the United Kingdom.

2. OVERRIDING EXISTING AGREEMENTS

This Agreement shall supersede all existing arrangements which conflict with the provisions of this Agreement.

3. TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT

This Agreement shall remain in force until 31 August 1972 and thereafter until the expiry of 6 calendar months' notice given by one party in writing to the other party of the intention to terminate the Agreement.

4. DISPUTES

The Employer on the one hand and the Employees on the other hand undertake that no lock-out, strike or other disruption of normal working shall take place. In the event of a dispute occurring, whether arising in connection with this Agreement or otherwise, the matter shall be dealt with as provided for in the Constitution of the National Joint Council for Civil Air Transport.

It is understood that any matters of dispute or difference will be dealt with in accordance with the constitutional procedures. Whilst the problems are talked out, work will continue without resort to unconstitutional action. It is recognised that the maintenance of the Corporation's services and activities is fundamental to its prosperity, and that if unconstitutional action should arise, either or both parties will deal with it and place any item they

consider requires attention within the constitutional procedures, and ensure that normal working continues.

NOTE: Normal working is working in accordance with practices and rosters, including overtime normally worked, in operation before the disagreement arose.

5. RATES OF PAY AND INCREMENTS

Rates of pay shall be in accordance with the scales laid down in Schedule 'A' attached hereto and in accordance with the conditions stated therein.

6. REGULATIONS

The Regulations of the Employer shall be deemed to be incorporated in this Agreement. Such Regulations may be amended by the Employer from time to time to provide for changing conditions, but no Regulation shall be amended to the detriment of the staff without prior consultation with the Employees.

7. WORKING HOURS

(a) . The standard working week to which the basic rates of pay apply, consists of 40 working hours.

The standard working week may include any permutation of 5 out of 7 days and any permutation of agreed shift times, always providing that the average per week over a period is 40 hours.

Split rest days will be avoided wherever possible. When operational conditions require it, staff shall be called upon to work overtime, and to work when rostered on customary holidays as part of the normal shift cycle. Refusal to do so without reasonable explanation shall constitute misconduct.

(b) Morning shifts shall be those shifts which do not commence earlier than 04.00 hours or later than 06.59 hours and finish not later than 15.30 hours. Afternoon shifts shall be those shifts which do not commence before 12.00 hours and finish not later than 24.00 hours.

(c) Double-day shifts shall be those shifts which are rostered to provide for 2 shifts (morning shift and an afternoon shift as defined in (b) above) to be worked between the hours of 04.00 and 24.00.

(d) Day work shall not commence earlier than 07.00 hours and finish not later than 18.30 hours.

(e) Night work shall not commence earlier than 18.30 hours and finish not later than 08.00 hours.

(f) Continuous 3-shift system shall be where arrangements are made to provide for continuous working where the day is divided into 3 equal or approximately equal parts (i.e. morning, afternoon and night shifts) as defined above, whereby staff change from one shift to another in rotation at pre-determined intervals.

(g) Staff rostered to work on Double-Day Shifts, or Night Shift or any combination thereof, shall be paid at the premium rates laid down in Schedule 'A' hereto. Day working shall not attract any premium payment, and where a worker remains constantly on morning or afternoon shift without provision for rotation, whether as part of double-day shift or not, and the hours of such shift, fall between 07.00 hours and 18.30 hours shift premium payment in respect of such shift will not apply.

(h) Hours of work of all staff coming within the scope of this Agreement shall be exclusive of meal breaks.

8. ROSTERS

(a) It is the function of Management to decide the total number of staff required for its operational commitments and to allocate staff as necessary between working areas and working patterns and shifts. Staff are in no way precluded from making representation on these matters, which shall be the subject of local consultation, although within the terms of the Agreement the final decision will rest with Management.

(b) Shift rostere shall be prepared by Management, and will be the subject of local consultation with staff representatives. Staff will normally be given 7 days' notice of changes in shift patterns.

(c) Employees allocated to a shift pattern who are required to change to a day shift or vice-versa or who are required to change from one shift pattern to another will normally be given 7 days' notice.

(d) Roster changes shall not be made without 3 days' notice, although staff shall operate roster changes at shorter notice in case of emergencies, e.g. fog. diversion, sickness, etc.

(e) Starting and finishing times of shifts shall be determined by Management and can be staggered within the shift hours as defined in Paragraph 7(b), (c), (d), (e), (f).

9. HOLIDAYS

Holiday entitlement shall be on the scale and in accordance with the conditions set forth in Schedule 'B' hereto.

10. MEAL INTERVALS

Meal times shall be arranged to suit work requirements, it being understood that staff may be required to work through their meal times. In such circumstances an alternative meal interval may be allowed immediately before or immediately after the time of the normal meal interval.

11 PENSION SCHEME AND STAFF INSURANCE SCHEME

If so required by the Employer, staff covered by this Agreement shall contribute to the Airways Corporations Joint Pension Scheme.

12. PAYMENT DURING ABSENCE DUE TO SICKNESS OR ACCIDENT

(i) Payment during absence due to sickness or accident shall be in accordance with the provisions of the National Joint Council Agreement dated 16th August, 1948 (Section I page 32).

(ii) Employees absent from duty, except as specially provided, shall not be entitled to payment for time lost.

13. UNIFORM, PROTECTIVE CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT

If so required by the Employer, staff shall when on duty wear such uniform and protective clothing provided by the Employer on loan, replaceable from time to time as may be necessary as a result of fair wear and tear. Such uniform and protective clothing will be worn on duty and left in good condition by staff so provided and replaced by them when necessary other than as a result of fair wear and tear. Staff issued with equipment on loan shall return such equipment to the issuing office on leaving a station on posting or on the termination of employment. The Employer shall have the right to recover from salary and other payments due to the staff the value of such loaned issues not returned to the Employer on demand.

14. LOCAL REPRESENTATION

Local Committees shall be set up and operated in accordance with the procedure laid down in the National Joint Council Memorandum of Agreement dated 20th September, 1948 on the Constitution, Functions and Rules of Procedure of Local Committees - U.K. Establishments.

15. DIFFERENCES

Any difference arising from the implementation of the Agreement shall be referred to the National Sectional Panel. Both Management and Trade Union Officials have stated their resolve to settle the differences without delay, it being understood and accepted by both parties that during such a reference, work shall continue normally. Where differences arise from rosters, normal working shall continue until the difference is cleared.

16. WORK STUDY - EMBRACING METHOD STUDY AND WORK MEASUREMENT

(a) Work will be examined using the techniques of Work Study.

(b) A selective programme of work measurement will be carried out using the appropriate techniques and recording methods. This may include the observation and timing of work in progress (using such timing devices as necessary) so that work can be more effectively programmed in sequence.

(c) The examination, planning and measurement of work will be carried out by the Corporation's staff or consultants as determined by Management.

(d) The methods of working require that time spent on productive and unproductive work can be recorded by staff themselves, or their Supervisors, by manual or automatic means.

(e) The results of work measurement shall be implemented following consultations with the Trade Union.

17. CO-OPERATION AND FLEXIBILITY

(a) The right of personal search by Security is a condition of employment.

(b) It shall be a condition of employment that (when required by Management) staff handling consumable items and catering equipment shall have current anti-typhoid inoculations.

(c) Interchange of staff on similar grades of work is accepted and undertaken, at Management discretion, to meet operational requirements.

(d) Acceptance in principle that:

Catering Porters will load and off-load Catering vehicles at Aircraft Catering Unit as required.

18. SUSPENSION, DISMISSAL AND TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT

(a) The Employer may dismiss from his service, or suspend from duty without payment and allowances, any member of their staff who shall:

(i) wilfully neglect the interest of the Employer; or

(ii) drink spirituous or intoxicating liquors or take or use drugs to such an extent as the Employer may deem excessive and as incapacitating, or as being likely to incapacitate him from properly performing his duties; or

(iii) be guilty of disobedience or other misconduct or any conduct which is likely to be prejudicial to the interests of the Employer; or

(iv) be absent from duty without leave or other valid cause.

19. In the event of any employee being suspended or dismissed, he/she shall have the right to make representations against the decision in accordance with the Corporation's regulations.

20. PROVISION FOR REVIEW

The parties to the Agreement shall have the right to request at any time a meeting of the Panel to consider any matter arising under the Agreement or the variation of any part of it. Whether or not requests have been made for such meetings, there shall be a meeting of the Panel not less frequently than once each quarter. No alteration or variation of this Agreement shall take effect without the consent in writing of both parties hereto.

Signed:	W.F.C. HILL, Secretary, Employers' Side, Ground Services Staff National Sectional Panel	Signed:	JOHN COUSINS, Secretary, Employees' Side, Ground Services Staff National Sectional Panel

SCHEDULE 'A'

to Agreement dated 1st March 1970

2. JOB DESCRIPTIONS

2.1 HEAD COOK

Flight Catering

Working cook in charge of a section of a large kitchen e.g. bakery, butchery, hot meal preparation, including the supervision of the staff in that section.

Staff Catering

Working cook in charge of a section of a large kitchen e.g. bakery, butchery, hot meal preparation, including the supervision of the staff in that section.

2.2 CATERING SUPERVISOR I

Flight Catering

Working Supervisor in charge of a Group involved with the preparation of aircraft meals. Ensures efficient operation and completion of cabin equipment, packing and servicing.

Staff Catering

Responsible for administration of consumable materials used in Catering units, and for administration duties relating to control, payment and utilisation of staff. Is responsible for employing supervising and work allocation of staff, to provide an efficient service, in catering unit concerned. Control and authorise shift patterns and overtime working.

2.3 COOK I

Flight Catering

Fully skilled and interchangeable in all aspects of preparation and cooking of food. Capable of taking charge of a section in a large flight kitchen on a day or shift basis.

Staff Catering

Fully skilled and interchangeable in the preparation and cooking of food. May be required to be in charge of a kitchen on a day or shift basis. Responsible for cleaning their own equipment and immediate working areas between and at the end of specific duties.

2.4 COOK II

Flight Catering

Skilled and partially interchangeable within certain sections of a large flight kitchen (e.g. Sandwich preparation, canape preparation, cold meal make-up) in the preparation and cooking of food carried out in such sections.

Staff Catering

Fully skilled and interchangeable in the preparation and cooking of food. Responsible for cleaning their own equipment and working areas between and at the end of, specific duties.

2.5 LEADING HAND STORESMAN

Flight Catering

Responsible for the assembly of aircraft kits (i.e. cabin service equipment) to configuration requirements.

2.6 EQUIPMENT STORESMAN (Paid according to salary scale for Storesman)

Flight Catering

Responsible for the making up of sets of equipment and amenities to laid down schedules and configuration requirements. Preparing dry stores to laid down schedules and configuration requirements.

2.7 CATERING STORESMAN (Paid according to salary scale for Storesman)

Staff Catering

Responsible for the receipt and issue of catering stores and equipment and the maintenance of associated records. Load, unload and stack goods and equipment associated with receipt and issue of stores. Responsible for maintaining a clean and tidy store.

Flight Catering

Responsible for the receipt and issue of catering stores (including if necessary liquor as well as food) or all items of equipment and amenities with the maintenance of associated records.

2.8 ASSISTANT COOK

Flight Catering

Employed in the preparation of hot beverages to scheduled requirements. May be required to carry out other basic simple cookery operations under the guidance of a Cook I.

Staff Catering

Wholly or mainly employed in preparing and cooking food under guidance of a Senior Cook grade. Responsible for cleaning their own equipment and working areas between and at the end of, specific duties.

2.9 CATERING SUPERVISOR II

Staff Catering

Responsible for efficient operation of a shift in catering unit concerned. Supervises dining room preparation (where appropriate). Ensures adequate job rotation and work allocation taking into account leave, sickness and absence. Recommends overtime working for authorisation by Supervisor.

2.10 CANTEEN SUPERVISOR

Staff Catering

Providing general supervision of a group of staff involved in catering services. May be required to be in charge of the whole operation including meal preparation, cooking and service at a specified location during rostered working hours.

2.11 CATERING PORTER

Flight Catering

Stripping and cleaning trays, operating washing machines and other pieces of cleaning equipment, washing and cleaning premises including equipment and pot washing. General duties. Loading and unloading all types of supplies and raw materials and moving these as instructed. Vegetable preparation. As required will be completely flexible and interchangeable between any of the aforementioned tasks in a large flight catering unit.

Staff Catering

Cleaning of equipment and premises including vending machines, plates, pots and cutlery. Load and unload as necessary in the movement of goods. Vegetable preparation; attendance as required at tea-points * also provide counter and trolley service. Will be completely interchangeable between these tasks throughout any Staff Catering Unit.

* when Catering Attendant not available.

2.12 STOREKEEPER

Staff Catering

Responsible for the receipt and issue of catering stores and equipment and the maintenance of associated records.

2.13 CASHIER/VENDING MACHINE OPERATOR

Staff Catering

Responsible at defined times for taking cash and giving change for a full meal service. Remainder of duty time will be spent on duties as defined for Catering Attendant, or on servicing vending machines and replenishing contents sold, and being responsible for cash proceeds.

2.14 WAITRESS (SILVER SERVICE)

Staff Catering & Flight Catering

Waitress duties at specified dining rooms.

2.15 CATERING ATTENDANT

Flight Catering

General kitchen duties; preparation of food/vegetables, washing up, cleaning and provisioning vending machines, tea-point and trolley service, service at counter and taking cash, waitress duties (not including Silver Service), re-constituting previously prepared commodities.

Staff Catering

General kitchen duties; preparation of food/vegetables; washing up; cleaning and provisioning vending machines; tea-point and trolley service; service at counter and taking cash at other than main meal service; waitress duties (not including silver service) cleaning of counters, floors and their working areas at all points of service.

2.16 HOUSE ASSISTANT

Staff Catering

General cleaning, polishing, tidying and duties associated with accommodation - bedrooms, showers, corridors, etc.

3. PART-TIME EMPLOYEES

Part-time employees are those employees whose normal hours do not exceed thirty per week.

They will be paid for all hours worked up to 40 hours per week on the basis of one fortieth of the quoted weekly rate for the appropriate category in which they are employed.

Only hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week will be paid at the premium rate for overtime as detailed in Schedule 'A' para. 6(b).

4. INCREMENTS

Increments are awarded for efficiency and are subject to satisfactory service and conduct. They are payable from the incremental date (1st January, 1st April, 1st July or 1st October) nearest the anniversary of the date of appointment in the grade until the maximum salary appropriate to the employee's grade is attained.

5. MEALS WHEN ON DUTY

The remuneration shown in this schedule are payable to workers employed in the circumstances that they are provided by the Employer with such meals as are available during the time the worker is on duty.

S OF PAY

ıY

ıd to work on double-day shifts, morning shift, afternoon
n shift, or any combination thereof, shall be paid in
ith the rates given in paragraph 10 of this Schedule.

2

ıked in excess of the standard working week as defined in
ı) of the Agreement shall be paid at the rate of one-and-one-
basic hourly rate of payment except that all hours worked on
ıess of these planned or rostered shall be paid at the
ınd-two-thirds the basic rate.

o has completed a normal day's work, (this to include a
or normal night's work), and having left his place of
thout being notified that he is required to work
thereafter summoned from home to work during overtime
be paid the sum of £0.3750 as "call money" in addition
t to which he becomes entitled by reason of working.

DAY

quired to work on a rest day shall be employed for a minimum
ours or be paid a minimum of 4 hours' pay. If the period of
s beyond 4 hours, employment shall be continued for a period
r payment be made for the full 8 hours period, or such
as worked.

LOWANCE

of £0.7500 per week shall be paid to Storesmen whose duties
frequently to go into deep freeze or refrigeration chambers
erature of less than 15°F.

3

le Days (Including Sundays)	£4.00 per week
ıt Shift	£6.00 " "

SCHEDULE 'B'

to Agreement dated [illegible]

HOLIDAY ENTITLEMENT

SECTION I-ANNUAL LEAVE

Subject to the conditions stated herein, Catering Staff falling within the scope of the Agreement dated 1st March 1970 shall have an annual leave entitlement on the following basis:

Basic 15 days (to apply pro-rata according to service in the first year)
16 days after 1 year
17 days after 2 years
18 days after 3 years
19 days after 4 years
20 days after 5 years

The conditions governing the granting of annual leave are:-

1. (i) Staff with more than 1 year's continuous service will be required to take 5 days of their holiday entitlement during the off-peak period October - March.

(ii) The leave year shall run from 1st April to 31st March.

(iii) So far as is possible to suit operating conditions, annual holidays will be granted at times requested by the employees concerned, but in all cases prior approval of the Employer must be obtained.

(iv) Annual Leave shall commence to accrue from the date of engagement at the rate of 1/12th of the annual entitlement for each complete month's service.

(v) Holiday remuneration for annual holidays shall be paid during the week preceding the holiday.

An employee leaving the employment of the Employer shall have holiday entitlement calculated and discharged in the following manner:

(i) If the employee is being discharged for misconduct, there shall be no entitlement.

(ii) Leave shall be granted on the basis of 1/12th of the annual entitlement for each complete month's service since the previous 1st April or from the date of engagement if no leave has been granted since employment commenced.

SECTION II - STATUTORY HOLIDAYS

(a) (i) In addition to the annual holiday entitlements outlined in paragraph 1 above, staff will be granted six additional days holiday with pay during the year plus any days declared by the Queen to be public holidays (except when an alternative day of public holiday is proclaimed in respect of Christmas Day falling on a Sunday).

(i) These six days will normally be allocated:

Winter	2 days	Good Friday and Easter Monday
Spring Bank Holiday	1 day	As Determined by Royal Proclamation
Summer Bank Holiday	1 day	" " " "
Christmas	2 days	Christmas Day and Boxing Day

In Scotland New Year's Day and 2nd January will normally be allocated instead of Christmas Day and Boxing Day.

(ii) By local agreement, other days equivalent in number may be substituted in parts of the United Kingdom (including Channel Islands) only where it is not in accordance with local custom to observe the days referred to in Paragraph 3.(a)(i) as holidays.

(iii) Days in lieu of statutory holidays will only be discharged in acoordance with the following formula. Such alternative time off may be taken by mutual arrangements subject to operational needs. Every effort will be made to grant such days off in accordance with the following:

Lieu days earned for working Good Friday, Easter Monday Spring Bank Holiday to be taken before 1st August. Lieu days earned for working Summer Bank Holiday to be taken before 1st December. Lieu days earned for working Christmas Day, Boxing Day, New Year's Day (where applicable) to be taken before the following 1st August. Any lieu days not taken in accordance with this formula will then be paid for at the single-time rate.

(iv) The day of holiday in the case of employees engaged on Shift or Night work shall be deemed to be the period of duty commencing on the day of the published holiday.

(v) Entitlement to the additional holidays with pay specified in this paragraph shall not be given to any employee who is absent from duty on the working day immediately preceding or the working day immediately following the prescribed holiday (excepting if this arises from any permission granted by, or other reason acceptable to, the Employer) or who, having been given not less than three days' written notice (either by individual notification or instructions posted on Notice Boards) that he (or she) is required for duty on a prescribed holiday and has not given valid reason why such duty will be impracticable, fails to report for duty on the prescribed holiday.

(vi) The six days of additional holiday will be published by notice each year together with any alternative rest days as applied to day workers and arising out of sub-section (iii).

(b) Staff required to work on authorised holidays will receive payment for such day or days worked at the rate of time-and-two-thirds for all days of holiday other than Christmas Day (or New Year's Day in Scotland), double-time payment for Christmas Day (or New Year's Day) and will also be granted an alternative day off in lieu with pay at the normal rate for each day of holiday worked. For purposes of calculation "one day's pay" shall be 1/5th of the weekly basic pay.

4. Staff required to work on an alternative rest day arising under sub-section (iii) paragraph 3.(a) above will be entitled to compensation appropriate to overtime working.

(previously NJ staff)

	Salary 1.1.74	Special Change	Salary 1.1.75	Salary 1/1/76
Chef de Parti (old title Head Cook)	43.57		52.77	57.17
	43.13		52.28	56.66
	42.66	-	51.77	56.12
	42.17		51.23	55.56
	41.73		50.74	55.05
Catering Supervisor I	40.34		49.10	51.31
	39.58		48.38	50.56
	39.09		47.84	50.01
	38.62	-	47.32	49.47
	38.15		46.81	48.92
	37.68		46.29	48.38
	37.24		45.80	47.87
	36.12		44.57	46.60
Cook I	39.06		(47.81)	(49.98)
	38.43		47.81	49.98
	37.79	-	47.11	49.25
	37.38		46.41	48.52
	36.89		45.96	48.05
	36.39		45.42	47.48
Cook II	35.40		43.78	45.77
	34.96		43.30	45.26
	34.47	-	42.76	44.70
	34.00		42.34	44.26
	33.53		41.72	43.62
	33.09		41.24	43.11
L.H. Storesman	33.78		42.00	43.91
	33.31		41.48	43.37
	32.87	-	41.00	42.86
	32.38		40.46	42.30
	31.94		39.97	41.79
	31.44		39.42	41.22
Storesman	31.50		39.49	41.29
	31.17		39.13	40.91
	30.86	-	38.79	40.56
	30.56		38.46	40.20
	30.23		38.09	39.82
	29.96		37.80	39.51
Assistant Cook	31.50		39.49	41.29
	31.17		39.13	40.91
	30.86		38.79	40.56
	30.56	-	38.46	40.20
	30.23		38.09	39.82
	29.96		37.80	39.51

	Salary 1.1.74	Special Change	Salary 1.1.75	Salary 1.1.76
Catering Supervisor II	31.50		39.49	41.29
	31.17		39.13	40.91
	30.86		38.79	40.56
	30.56	-	38.46	40.20
	30.23		38.09	39.82
	29.96		37.80	39.51
Canteen Supervisor	28.80	(29.48)	37.27	38.96
(special change is to	28.47	29.48	37.27	38.96
BNL Cafeteria Supv. II)	28.17	29.18	36.94	38.62
	27.87	28.90	36.63	38.30
	27.54	28.54	36.23	37.91
Catering Porter	28.83	28.89	36.62	38.29
(special change to	28.55	28.56	36.26	37.90
BNL Catering Labourer)	28.20	28.25	35.92	37.55
	27.92	27.92	35.55	37.17
Catering Attendant	24.97		32.31	33.78
House Assistant	24.53		31.82	33.27
Waitress	24.06		31.31	32.73
	23.59		30.79	32.19
	23.24	-	30.40	31.79
	22.74		29.85	31.21
	22.27		29.34	30.67
	21.83		28.85	30.16
	21.37		28.35	29.64
Cashier	25.52		32.91	34.41
Storekeeper	25.08		32.43	33.90
Waitress (Silver Service)	24.61		31.91	33.36
	24.14		31.39	32.82
	23.79	-	31.01	32.42
	23.29		30.46	31.84
	22.82		29.94	31.30
	22.38		29.46	30.80
	21.92		28.95	30.27

E X H I B I T 7.

[illegible] Airways are willing to [illegible] Casual Workers payment might [illegible] payment as paid [illegible] to similar Casual Catering [illegible] Airways Corporation [illegible] are willing to join positively [illegible] with the Trade Union and will [illegible] to this end to establish whether current Government [illegible] has no less calling the payment and applying it from 1 January 70.

[illegible]

[illegible] Casuals will be [illegible] there is an established [illegible], Ltd., Wandsworth, London [illegible]

[illegible]

Applying the principle [illegible] provided on a personalised basis where it is available [illegible] result of these annual duties, to work overtime [illegible] in all weather conditions, the following leave is applied:

Period Stores Duties (PSD)	- Personal leave days
Catering Chefs [illegible]	- " " "
Cabin Equipment Chefs [illegible]	- " " "
Cabin Driver [illegible]	- [illegible]
Vehicle Attendants [illegible]	- " " "
Fuel [illegible]	- " " "

[illegible]

Staff may be [illegible] 7 [illegible] days but all [illegible] days will need to be [illegible] of the year. ✓

Staff may be [illegible] in conjunction with personal [illegible] days. In order to [illegible] days, between annual leave and [illegible]

(i) Any [illegible]
(ii) In [illegible] shall will be permitted.
(iii) If [illegible] will, in [illegible] of the [illegible] [illegible] days.
In this [illegible] will use the best endeavours to [illegible] requirements do not suffer.

[illegible] leave days + [illegible] days [illegible], may be permitted [illegible] does not [illegible] [illegible] during the period [illegible] -

Without [illegible] Personal Leave Agreement

Calculate [illegible] to operational requirements

It is normally [illegible] may be [illegible] of staff to be on leave at any one time. [illegible] circumstances permit this may be increased [illegible] providing it does not incur [illegible]. This additional leave allocation may only be used for [illegible] emergency cases which will be sympathetically considered by management.

Continued

[illegible] (continued)

(i) [illegible]

(ii) [illegible]

(iii) [illegible]

(iv) [illegible]

[illegible] August 1975

18th of August 1975

Appendix 5

BRITISH AIRWAYS OVERSEAS Division
Aircraft Catering Unit
Heathrow

(01-[illegible])

You are fully aware of the reasons and background of the industrial action pursued with reference to dance band musicians working terms in the Aircraft Catering Unit of the British Airways Overseas Division.

The action has been forced upon the workers by the stubborn and intolerable attitude of the management refusing to even sit on a negotiating table to consider some of the long-standing and legitimate demands of the staff and to redress their genuine difficulties and grievances about working conditions.

The action is, unfortunately, also result of the failure of the Transport General & Workers' Union officials to effectively fight for the rights of its members.

Without going into details of the causes and reasons of the action, we, the undersigned as the Shop Stewards, still impress upon the management to meet our major demands immediately and start negotiations for the remaining. We also urge upon the TGWU to play its desired role for resolving the situation and in getting the workers their just and due rights conceded.

Throughout the protracted negotiations going on since 1968 on the following demands of the Catering Unit staff, we have held and expressed the view that in the best interests of the management as well as the workers, solution to the issues which have caused the present action should be found through mutual understanding and negotiations and an atmosphere of cordiality should be maintained. We still uphold this view and would very much like the management to respond constructively and review the position as it was unfortunately taken so as to avoid the situation turning to the worst.

Our demands are :

(1) The staff in the Catering Unit should be given similar basic pay grades as are at present available to staff in other units, such as, cargo, Ramp services, support services, car, aircraft cleaning and H.T. Basic grade of the staff in the Catering Unit are lesser by £5 to £7 per week.

The grades should be given according to the job. The entire staff of the Catering Unit should not be given one uniform basic grade.

The staff in the Catering Unit should not be treated on the basis of the technical term applying to the staff employed in the catering industry.

The staff working in the Aircraft Catering Unit is handling the work which has got altogether no connection with the catering in the strictest sense of the term. Their job involves operating

... 2.

involves operation, maintenance and sterilisation of machines, supervision of catering services and stock taking. The nature of the above services is completely different to what is done by the workers in the catering industry.

Therefore, basic grades of the workers in the Aircraft Catering Unit, handling different jobs, should be fixed at par with the staff of British Airways in other units.

We are pained to point out that the management had been refusing to concede to this demand because of the fact that the Unit consists of mainly coloured workers. The percentage of White workers in the Unit is minor, hardly half percent. We feel that the attitude of the management would have been different if there was a large number of White workers in the Unit. Management's insistence to refuse to review the wage-structures of the staff of the Catering staff is based on racial discrimination.

(2) SAFETY SHOES should be provided to every member of the staff of the Catering Unit on a policy based on equality and justice.

At present the coloured workers of the Unit are discriminated against in the matter of making them safety shoes available by the management.

Only the White workers have been considered eligible to get the safety shoes free of cost from the management whereas the coloured workers are to make part payment for them.

The management had for a long time been refusing to concede the right of the coloured workers to have, as their white fellow-workers, safety shoes free of cost. Only recently it changed its previous policy and agreed to provide the coloured workers safety shoes if they make half payment for them.

(3) TEMPORARY STAFF : Period of probation for the staff in the Catering Unit should be similar to that of staff in other units.

The temporary staff is recruited only in the Catering Unit Temporary workers are kept on probation for years together, sometime three years, and not made permanent; whereas in other units a worker is made permanent after a certain limit of period, i.e., six months or so.

Period of probation should be fixed for the catering staff. We feel that it is not being done for the simple reason that majority of the staff in the Catering Unit is coloured and by keeping them temporary for years together the management wants to use them as cheap labour.

.... 3

The temporary staff has no security of job. They are dismissed from the service summarily. In some cases workers with three years service have been dismissed without any proper reason.

(4) AMENITIES : There is complete lack of basic amenities for the staff working in the Catering Unit. There is no provision for the mental or physical recreation. Even the cloak room where the workers have to change clothes before and after their duty is so congested that one finds himself locked up in suffocating place.

The staff in other units and even in the lockers room of the Unit, white workers have been provided with considerable facilities and amenities. Other Units have been provided with television sets, refrigerators, billiards tables, cards. They have comfortable retiring rooms. No such facility exists in the Catering Unit.

(5) MEALS ALLOWANCE : Discrimination in the matter of meals should be stopped.

Although we are working in the Catering Unit, making food available to the passengers and other fellow workers of the British Airways, we are the worst sufferers in the matter our meals just because of the colour of our skin happens to be different to that of the White workers.

The White staff in the Unit is entitled to enjoy free meals, whereas the coloured workers have to pay for the meals.

The management, of course, gives a nominal Meals Allowance of 13p per day. This amount is subject to tax deductions after which the worker is left with only 9p for taking his meals.

All workers in the Catering Unit, irrespective of colour or creed, should be brought under a uniform policy.

BACKGROUND :

The staff in the Catering Unit had been pressing for the above demands since 1969. The Transport & General Workers' Union, to which the staff belongs, agreed to take them up with the management and negotiations between the two had been going on since 1969 without yielding any result.

Before resorting to the present action the workers made their utmost effort to resolve the situation through mutual discussion.

They served a notice on the Management through their Shop Stewards on 5th July that industrial action would be started if the demands were not met within 24 ~~years~~ hours. The management did not take any notice of it.

Even after the expiry of the notice period, they approached the Union officials to negotiate with the management in this regard. The workers were very much disappointed over the lack of interest shown by the union officials.

.. 4.

On 7th July they decided not to do overtime till 12th July so that the management could be pressurised. This did have some effect and a meeting took place between the management, shop stewards and district secretary of the Union/ The management /on 12th. outrightly rejected the demands and refused to even enter into further negotiation on them.

With the permission of the management, the shop stewards convened a meeting of the workers. The meeting unanimously decided to start industrial action from 13th July if the [illegible]rs..ted its stubborn attitude.

The workers noted with regret that the Distt. Secretary of the TGWU failed to attend the meeting, although the situation was grave and demanded of the Union officials not only to participate in the meeting but also to give proper lead to its members.

Still the workers gave one more day to the management and to the Union officials to find some agreeable solution to avert the situation take the present turn. They requested the Union officials to hold talks with the management but no action was taken.

The workers were left with no other alternative but to go on strike as from 13th July.

Since then more than 450 workers have been on industrial action. But still wish to make it known that they are prepared to resume work provided the management agrees to accept their demands which have been overlooked for years together.

At the same time we appeal to the Union and workers in other departments of the British Airways to foil every attempt of the management to create division among our ranks on the basis of colour or creed. Our fight is against injustice and for legitimate rights. This is not the question of one or the other section of the workers. This is a common cause and we appeal to every worker of the British Airways to show their solidarity with our struggle.

CHARAN PAL SINGH)
BAKSHI RAM SANDHU)
BASHIR AHMED BHATTI)
DIDAR SINGH) Shop Stewards
MOHINDER SINGH)
BALJIT SINGH)

ISSUED BY

BRITISH AIRWAYS OVERSEAS DIVISION
Aircraft Catering Unit
ACTION COMMITTEE

165, Western Road,
Southall. Middx.
[illegible]

Appendix 6

This Agreement is supplemental
to the Agreement dated 13th July, 1975.

NATIONAL JOINT COUNCIL FOR CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT

BRITISH AIRWAYS OD AIRCRAFT CATERING UNIT

It is agreed that the Employers, British Airways and the Unions will use their best endeavours jointly to conclude a Job and Pay Restructuring Exercise for the Ground Service National Sectional Panel which will take into account, when producing a new structure, general comparisons with other British Airways industrial structures involving similar work. The outcome of the Job and Pay Restructuring Exercise will be implemented as soon as Government Pay Policy permits.

In the intervening time, negotiations will start immediately to produce a new agreed grading structure for the new ACU by October 1975.

The claim for DC10 allowance will be programmed within the Conciliation procedures of the NJC within 14 days.

As to the local claims on working conditions submitted by the shop stewards, these will be discussed at a meeting to be held tomorrow.

17.7.75

OD AIRCRAFT CATERING UNIT


At a meeting held today 13th July 19/5 between Howard Phelps Group Personnel Director, British Airways, and John Cousins National Secretary of Transport & General Workers Union it was acknowledged that any settlement out of the present Flight Catering Dispute could not breach the Government's Pay Policy announced by the Prime Minister on Friday 11th July.

British Airways agreed:

1) That the Job and Pay Restructuring Exercise will continue in relation to the Ground Services Staff NSP, and that any new jobs arising out of the changed agreement both in the context of the new A C U and any other changes in work content will be included in that restructuring. The outcome of the Job and Pay Restructuring will be implemented as soon as Government Pay Policy permits.

2) That the Meal Allowances currently paid to the Aircraft Catering Staff ought to be reassessed, and will make representation jointly with the Union to the TUC and the CBI to establish whether or not this can be done.

3) To reassess the issue of safety clothing with a view to their improvement.



Appendix 7

JOB AND PAY SCHEME

Approximately nine years ago a dispute took place concerning Apron Services, the MT Section and Catering Loading and the Overseas division. This dispute basically stemed from a situation where Apron Services staff would not work overtime at the weekends.

A deal was done by the local management with the support service department (now disbanded) and the Apron Service staff, which to all intents and purposes meant that the Apron Services staff were enjoying a higher rate of pay at the weekends. This led to a situation where the MT Section, Catering Loading would not work overtime at the weekends. An agreement to solve this situation was that there would be a type of evaluation study between the three groups to solve the differences surrounding the dispute.

All the Shop Stewards were called to a meeting at the Heathrow Hotel in the early part of 1974 where John Cousins, the then National Officer and Howard Phelps (then Personnel Director) presented a job evaluation scheme based on a bench mark system. This was quite surprising as now that the committment for the three groups (MT, Catering Loading) had been [illegible] up to 3 [illegible] and the complete GSS Agreement.

Following on from this the E and M decided that it was not for them. This left the Ramp and the GSS to pursue the proposals through their own NSPs. The outcome of this was to set up a Joint Study Group which would consist of members from management and the Trade Union sides of the Ground Services Ramp. The group studied the proposals which were made at the presentation at the Heathrow Hotel but the Trade Union decided that they could not accept this type of system and they decided they wanted a points rated system.

Once the principle of a points rated system was accepted by management the Joint Study Group felt it was too complicated and involved to be handled by such a large Committee. It was, therefore, decided to set up a sub committee consisting of four staff representatives and a management team to work on the development of a full scheme. The Trade Union side of this committee started this task with zero knowledge of evaluations systems and basically started off the scheme with blank sheets of paper.

During the initial stage the Ramp NSP decided to withdraw from participation. This led management to decide that if the Ramp were not involved they could see no logical sense in pursuing the matter. Therefore, the scheme closed down for several months and it was only pressure from the Catering staff which decided management to bring the scheme back into being.

Once the development of the scheme had started up again the sub committee developed the manual and proceedures step by step. Each part of the manual and the systems were voted and ok'd by the Trade

Union sides, co-ordinating committee (the forerunner of the briefing committee) which had a representative from each local panel of the Ground Services throughout the United Kingdom, as it was believed that the membership need to be communicated with on a regular basis; there was approximately a co-ordinating committee once a month. Once the manual had been approved by the co-ordinating committee, a communications exercise was begun to that each member of the Ground Services staff throughout the United Kingdom could be aware of the scheme. We also developed a slide presentation on the scheme for this purpose. Once the communication exercise was finished with, we believed that the issue was so important that it should be left to the membership of the Ground Services staff in total to vote on the situation and not be left to the NSP whether the scheme was acceptable or not. To this end, a ballot took place in May 1977 where the vote to accept was 4-1.

Once the decision had been made to accept the scheme we developed project teams made up of one management and one staff representative and a job analyst to check job descriptions for consistency and accuracy. They first took twenty-one jobs which covered all aspects of Ground Services functions; these were used on a trial and error basis to see if the manual was operating properly and also to develop the break points in the grading structure. This was an immense task as we discovered there were 300 identifyable job descriptions covering 90 pay scales.

Appendix 8

INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY IN BRITISH AIRWAYS

A Paper by Ron Crew

A society cannot be called truly democratic unless every aspect of that society is democratic. This apparently obvious fact is behind every call for industrial democracy.

Our society is based upon the assumption that every member of it has a share in, and, to a certain extent, is responsible for, the government of that society, through the medium of universal suffrage. Thus, it is called a democratic society. But that share, and that responsibility does not extend to the most important aspect of that society as far as the average worker is concerned; the place of work, upon which he relies to support himself and his family and at which he spends a major part of his life.

The importance of this omission can be gauged from the fact that our whole economic system is based on the worker - whether by hand or by brain - producing by his skill and effort the goods needed by society. Here, we have a paradox; a society that embraces fervently the principle of democracy except in one respect, in relation to the most important role of all; that of a man as a producer. The result is a crystallisation of the attitudes of the two sides of industry in permanent opposition: the interests of one diametrically opposed to the other.

In private industry, the task of overcoming this dichotomy of interest is enormous, but the nationalised industries, which do not exist for the purpose of private profit can show that democracy in the workplace is both feasible and advantageous. Thus it was hoped that when certain industries were nationalised by a Labour Government after the war the principle of industrial democracy would be built into the organisation of these industries. As we all know, it was not - indeed, that principle is as far away now as it has ever been. What happened, at least as far as the Air Corporations were concerned, was that an elaborate system of joint consultation committees was set up, but workers were rigidly excluded from decision making areas and the control of the industry was handed over to representatives of private enterprise.

What then, is industrial democracy? It means many things to many people; but at the very least, it must mean the involvement of staff in decisions affecting themselves and, ultimately, their dependents. This, in turn, means staff representation at all policy making levels within the firm, including the highest level of all - the Board of Directors.

In the formation of the Steel Corporation, some form of democracy was attempted, with the appointment of worker directors. Whilst this is a great improvement on the system of appointing trade union officers to Boards, as happened in BOAC, it does not in any way satisfy the demands of industrial democracy, as great pains had been taken to ensure that

the worker directors' ties with their shop floor origins have been broken, and the staff of the corporation have had no say at all in the appointments. Such a scheme is, at best, a rhetorical exercise and does nothing to satisfy the principle of involving staff, as a whole, in the decision-making necessary for the running of the industry in which they work, since the worker directors were appointed and not directly elected by the workers in the industry and the election of representatives is basic to true democracy.

What we know of the system of management in British Airways leads us inevitably to the conclusion that worker participation in their management is an experiment well worth tyring. Aircraft operation and maintenance is an industry which relies perhaps more than any other on harmony between staff and management: if the feeling of belonging in the industry, the feeling that British Airways is "ours" is lost, all the expertise in the world will not produce a good airline. It is our firm opinion that such a relationship is not possible where a sharp division exists between a decision-making management and staff.

The scheme outlined below is an attempt to put forward a practical and workable first step toward the principle of industrial democracy in British Airways. It is realised that it may not cover all the aspirations of those who seek workers' control, but the first step may be the hardest, and if the scheme is adopted, at least that step has been taken.

To make any system of industrial democracy meaningful, certain points of principle must be accepted. These may be summarised as follows:

(a) Worker participation in management is the involvement of staff at all levels in the process of decision making.

(b) The Panel system should be used to its full and proper extent.

(c) There should be direct representation of staff on the Board of Management of British Airways.

(d) Such representation should be by not less than one half of the total Board membership.

(e) The worker directors should be elected by the trade union membership in the airlines.

(f) No matter what election process be used, once elected a worker director would have responsibility to the whole of the airline staff membership.

PROCEDURE FOR THE ELECTION OF WORKER DIRECTORS

Several schemes are possible, all of which have various advantages and disadvantages. In the interests of simplicity and full democracy, the following scheme is probably the best, although some defects are inherent in it:-

(a) The whole of the staff of the Corporation who are covered by National Sectional Panels are arranged into sections by Panels. The details of each section can be decided at the time.

(b) A Conference of all Panel Representatives be held, at which the election would be discussed and the panel of Scrutineers and the Chairman of the panel be elected, from and by the Conference.

(c) Nominations from each section are then called for by the Scrutineers. Each nomination must have a number of endorsements - the suggested number is ten, but this can be decided - to reduce the possibility of frivolous nominations. All nominated persons must be members of their appropriate Trade Unions, as is the practice with Panel Representatives.

(d) Nominations are then published, and staff in each section elect one worker director from that section. Adequate distribution and collection of election papers would be essential. It is suggested that the possibility of using salary packets be explored followed by collection either physically or by the elector placing in ballot boxes.

(e) Scrutineers then count the votes and announce the results.

TERMS OF REFERENCE AND SERVICE OF WORKER DIRECTORS

When a Worker Director has been elected to the Board, he should act as a director and play his full part in the management of the Corporation.

This will clearly not be possible if he is disadvantaged in relation to the other directors by reason of his origins. It is therefore felt that the following should apply:

(a) His period of service should be the same as other full time directors. He would then retire but would be eligible for re-election. It has been argued that no representative should serve for more than two terms lest he lose contact altogether with his workshop floor or office origins and becomes a bureaucrat. This may be a real fear, but on balance it is better if a continuation of representation by a good representative is obtained. A worker director will have a difficult job; it will be even more difficult to have to find a succession of people to do it.

It is envisaged that in the early stages the employee members of the Board would be somewhat out of their depths in the rarefied atmosphere of the boardroom and would, practically out of necessity, concentrate on matters of more direct interest to staff: safety, conditions, welfare, education and so on. But as time goes by they would be in a position to take a closer interest in the more complex working of the Board. This is another reason why the compulsory limitation of service on the Board may be inadvisable.

(b) His salary should be the same of other full-time directors.

(c) His job must remain open, and he must lose none of his rights as an employee. As far as pension rights are concerned, these must operate in the same way as for any other person within the Pension Scheme; pension must be calculated on actual earnings during the relevant qualifying period.

(d) He must have equal rights with other directors with regard to clerical assistance and access to advisors. In addition, he will have access to advice from Trade Union and Panel sources.

PROCEDURES FOR REPORTING BACK TO STAFF

The success of any scheme for elected staff representation on a Board of Directors depends on continuing contact between worker directors and the staff who elected them. Regular reporting back and the ability of staff to question their representative is really the most important facet of the whole system; without it, the scheme is valueless. It would serve as a criterion when the worker director's quality of service is considered at election time.

To this end, it is suggested that meetings be held as follows:

PANEL REPRESENTATIVES

Worker directors should attend meetings with all Panel Representatives within his section of staff at least once a quarter.

STAFF

Worker directors should attend meetings with staff generally at least one per year.

TRADE UNION DEMOCRACY

If the scheme outlined above were adopted, participation of staff in the running of the Corporation's affairs would extend throughout the different levels of the Corporation from the Board of Management to shop floor level, providing that the local and national Panels function correctly under the Constitution, which forms the basis for all agreements between Management and Staff.

LOCAL LEVEL

The Memorandum of Agreement on the Constitution and Functions of Local Panel Committees states that these Committees "shall be empowered to consider and decide matters of local concern within the framework of agreements recorded by the appropriate Sectional (National) Panel" but cannot alter the agreements. The Constitution particularises certain matters, such as efficient use of the maximum number of productive hours;

maximum and most efficient use of vehicles, plant and machinery; ventilation; and so on. The only matters which are specifically excluded from discussion at local level are those which can only be covered at national level. The Constituion lays down that:

'Local Panel Committees may not reach decisions which are:

(i) contrary to national agreements on trade questions, such as wages and like subjects, or

(ii) on wide questions of policy going beyond the base concerned.'

It may be seen, therefore, that the range of matters within the purview of Local Panels is very wide indeed. For example, one subject quoted above, 'Efficient use of the maximum number of productive hours' may be held to cover practically every facet of work within the laid-down hours apart from wages.

The powers of Local Panel Committees therefore assume great importance and when the wording of the Constitution is studied the possibilities of the use of these Panels in a system which provides for industrial democracy become obvious. The Constitution lays down that these Panels shall 'consider and decide'. The prerogative of management to take decisions on any of the wide range of matters falling within the scope of Local Panel Committees is, to put it at its lowest, severely limited. The proper place for such decision-making is not the Manager's office but the Panel meeting.

The base for industrial democracy within British Airways therefore, already exists. Admittedly, up to now the Panels have not been used in this manner to any great extent but that is the fault of the operators, not the machinery. The machinery is there: it is up to the unions to make sure it works.

NATIONAL LEVEL

The principle of industrial democracy, however, would not be fully served in the Civil Air Transport industry unless full democracy on the staff side of the joint consultative machinery was achieved at the same time. To this end, the following proposals are put forward for consideration by the trade unions concerned:

(a) Lay members, employed in the industry, should be elected on to the Trade Union Side of the National Joint Council for Civil Air Transport in the proportion of one lay member to one full-time official.

(b) The staff sides of the National Sectional Panels should consist of lay members plus full-time officials, as at present on the SE & T Panel.

CONCLUSION

A draft document recently issued by ASTMS for discussion by the Hawker Siddeley Aircraft and British Aircraft Corporation NACs entitled 'Trade Union Involvement in Management of a Nationalised Aircraft Corporation' began:

'The Consultative Document on the public ownership of the aircraft industry contains the following paragraph on Industrial Democracy:

> "Workers in the aircraft industry have been among the leaders in developing the concepts of industrial democracy. The Government attaches great importance to increasing the democratic participation of workers in decision making at all levels of industry. Industrial democracy should develop organically from the views and proposals put forward by the management, workers and trade unions concerned. The Government will consider in the light of the present consultations with all parties in the industry how this process can best be encouraged."

The Secretary of State is in many senses issuing a challenge to the movement to clarify its ideas on this subject. For many years the policy of nationalisation of the industry has been adopted at conferences of major unions, the CSEU, TUC and Labour Party, and the need to involve the workers in the industry has been constantly stressed. However, the trade union movement has never clarified in concrete terms how this involvement would be carried out.'

The draft document refers, of course, to the nationalisation of the aircraft manufacturing industry, but its subject is equally relevant to the CAT industry, and this Paper is an attempt to show how such an involvement could take place in its nationalised sector.

The interest being taken in the subject of industrial democracy, both in this country and abroad, together with the unique Constitution upon which all agreements in the industry are based, present a great opportunity for its introduction into British Airways.

Its benefits, to the industry, its staff and to the country, I believe to be self-evident. The amendment necessary to existing legislation would be simple. It is to be hoped that, for reasons which can only be sectarian or dogmatic, this opportunity will not be lost.

[JULY 1975]

Author's Note: An earlier version of this paper had been written by Mr. Crew in the late 1960's.

Appendix 9

BRITISH AIRWAYS

JOB DESCRIPTION FOR INDUSTRIAL GROUND STAFF JOBS

A. JOB IDENTIFICATION

1.

JOB TITLE	PRODUCTION ASSISTANT
DEPARTMENT	CATERING SERVICES
LOCATION	CATERING CENTRE SOUTH

1 (a)

JOB REF CODE	ZC 9607A
DATE	1.9.79

2.

Number of jobholders	292
Shift systems worked	Continuous 3 shift.
Number of subordinate staff (supervisors only)	

3. Organisation Structure.

B. GENERAL DESCRIPTION.

ZC 9607A

4 Main purpose of the job

To provide a general support for a complete catering service within the Catering Centre for all services and contracts handled by British Airways.

5 Principle Tasks

The jobholders work in any one of various areas, all undertaking the following common functions:

1. Loads/offloads vehicles/trolleys, stacks/unstacks equipment/items.
2. Conveys equipment/items between and within Sections and distributes according to instructions in a safe manner.
3. Unpacks/packs equipment/items/trolleys as instructed.
4. Sweeps, washes, cleans and tidies all work areas, and disposes of rubbish.
5. Washes and cleans walls (according to schedule), floors, fixed and mobile equipment and ad hoc spillages.
6. Uses cleaning machinery/equipment and connects to supply where necessary.
7. Uses mechanical conveyor machinery for packing/production.
8. Reports any malfunction of fixed or mobile equipment and machinery, and rejects any unserviceable equipment.

In addition to the above common duties, the following duties are undertaken in the specific areas:

EQUIPMENT PROCESSING (WASH-UP).

9. Segregate aircraft return load onto trolleys, distributing to appropriate wash or salvage area and disposing of rubbish.
10. Hoists mechanically/manually trolleys/containers and other items of equipment onto conveyor belt and removes components, placing into baskets according to type (e.g. all cups in one basket).
11. Starts/stops conveyor belt to regulate the flow of trolleys/containers/baskets, etc.

12. Rejects all broken and/or unserviceable components.

13. Prepares and positions basket/equipment containers onto appropriate washing machine.

14. Hand washes and polishes items which cannot be machine processed. (E.g. Mapco ovens, beverage containers, aircraft trolleys, as necessary.)

15. Collects and fits barrels of cleaning fluid to washing machines.

16. Cleans washing machines by hosing out, removing and cleaning jets and filters, and removing broken items (e.g. crockery). Also cleans machines externally.

17. Loads dirty cutlery into burnishing machine and removes.

18. Collects ball bearings from stores and fills burnishing machine.

19. Sorts, inspects, rejects and loads onto trolleys all cleaned items, distributing to appropriate areas.

20. Reports all machines'poor performance and/or defects to Supervision.

RESERVE STORE.

21. Loads/offloads vehicles.

22. Distributes, stacks and unstacks incoming equipment and items in appropriate storage areas.

23. Sorts and packs items for despatch as instructed.

24. Issues, loads onto trolleys and distributes equipment according to equipment list detailing sectional requirements.

25. Connects forklift to battery charger and reports any malfunctions.

DESPATCH & CENTRAL AREA.

26. Collects beverage containers, prepares and fills with appropriate beverage and identifies with flight number and contents. (E.g. makes coffee, decants orange juice, etc.)

27. Collects ice bins and fills from ice machines according to work sheet.

C RESOURCES

ZC 9607A

6 Equipment Used

Category	Type Used
Simple hand tools	Spanner, Industrial Can Opener.
Communications Equipment	
Non-mechanical mobile equipment	Various types of Aircraft/Production Handling Trolleys. Palletron.
Static machinery and/or equipment	Conveyor Belts, Overhead Conveyors, Water Boilers, Ice Making Machines, Industrial Equipment Washing Machines, Cutlery Wrapping Machine, Automatic Can Opener, Automatic Tray Washer, Automatic Trolley Washer, Storage Racking/bins, Burnishing Machine, Platform Hoist, Deep freezers, Cold Rooms
Light vehicles	
Mechanical mobile equipment	
Heavy rigid vehicles	
Heavy articulated vehicles	
Equipment Used by subordinate staff	
Other equipment used	Pedestrian-controlled Floor Scrubber, 'Sit-on' Floor Scrubber, Brooms, Mops, Buckets.

DESPATCH & CENTRAL AREA. (cont.)

28. Selects trolleys/containers from cold room according to flight number and conveys to despatch area.

29. Consolidates aircraft uplifts onto appropriate despatch trolley or bay.

30. Positions empty trolleys in Marshalling area.

31. Loads bar trolleys with plastic glasses.

32. Counts and stores bags of ice.

33. Loads dry ice for trolleys/containers to laid down procedures.

34. Actions increases and works from documentation (C/Area).

35. Cleans deep freeze and refrigerators as directed or after defrost.

BONDED STORE.

36. Replenishes minerals up to a predetermined level. Sorts and packs return minerals.

37. Washes and cleans bar containers/trays/trolleys.

38. Loads dry ice for trolleys/containers to laid down procedures.

CUTLERY.

39. Wraps First Class cutlery, salt and pepper and 'bulk' cutlery according to production list and laid down instructions.

40. Packs economy cutlery to laid down standards, either by hand or using cutlery wrapping machine. Reloads machine with wrapping film.

41. Labels cutlery with flight number and assembles into bins.

42. Maintains checks for correct amounts and type of cutlery while wrapping. Rejects and/or cleans poor quality items.

43. Signs list against production completed.

DRY STORES

44. Offloads vehicles and distributes goods to appropriate locations and racks, packs, stacks, unstacks to instruction.

45. Segregates aircraft return dry stores and salvages dry stores from the wash-up area.

46. Uses manual and automatic can openers, adjusting height with spanner. Opens cans and decants contents into containers for use in kitchen.

47. Connects forklift and scrubbing machine to battery charging equipment and reports any malfunctions.

47a. Cleans deep freeze. Removes Ice as necessary using chemicals and equipment as directed.

KITCHEN

48. Offloads meats, segregates by type and stores in butcher's refrigerator. Collects and signs for bulk wines and spirits from Bond (duty paid).

49. Prepares and processes vegetables for washing by machine/ hand.

50. Dismantles manually - removable parts of all kitchen equipment/machines, e.g. slicing machines, fritomat fryer, and cleans.

51. Loads/unloads automatic washing machines e.g. tray-washing machine, trolley-washing machine, utensil washing machine.

52. Cleans machines by hosing out, removing and cleaning jets and filters, and removing broken items. Also cleans machine externally.

53. Cleans freezers and refrigerators internally, before and after defrost and as directed.

CLEANING TEAM

54. Undertakes cleaning and 'deep cleaning' of all areas to laid down standards, including fixed, mobile and aircraft equipment/trolleys.

EQUIPMENT ISSUES

55. Collects shift requirements, conveys, sorts and stows equipment/items as instructed.

LINEN & PAPERWARE - AIRCRAFT & DOMESTIC.

56. Sorts, salvages and segregates return items and redistributes for disposal, cleaning or re-issue.

57. Sorts, counts, packs, seals and stacks clean linen, paperware and blankets.

TRAY PREP.

58. Rejects all broken and/or unserviceable equipment.

59. Sorts and loads onto trolleys all rejected items and transports to equipment processing.

60. Distributes equipment/items to appropriate storage areas.

61. Collects, loads and distributes equipment/items according to work list.

62. Positions full trolleys/containers into cold storage areas.

63. Connects scrubbing machine to battery charger and reports any malfunctions.

64. Cleans cold rooms and refrigerators, undertakes 'deep cleaning' as instructed.

AMENITY & MENUS.

65. Offloads vehicles and distributes amenities to appropriate locations and packs/stacks/unstacks according to instructions.

66. Collects return aircraft amenity uplift from the offload bank and positions these items into the amenity stores for salvage/distribution/disposal and re-use.

67. Assists in decanting return amenities for salvage and re-use.

68. Reclaims from other departments amenity and equipment items for processing and re-use.

69. Disposes of rubbish.

7 Materials used or handled.

ZC 9607A

Category	Description
Cargo/ baggage	
Air Larders/ Bars	Air Larders, Bars.
General Stores	Dry Stores, Aircraft catering uplift stores.
Perishable Foodstuffs	All types of foodstuffs, according to work area.
Materials used/ handled by subordinate staff	
Other materials used/ handled.	All Catering Materials required for the catering of all aircraft handled by British Airways, including cleaning materials, (e.g Brawn oven cleaner), dry ice.

20.1.77

D SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

ZC 9607A

8

Essential Qualifications	

9 Description of previous experience required

Full-time vocational	
pre-British Airways	
British Airways	

10

Other supplementary information	

E

APPROVAL

	SIGNATURE	DATE
Senior Line Manager:	[signature]	28.5.80
Line Manager: for accuracy of content:	[signature]	25.5.80
Local panel representative: for accuracy of content:	[signature]	28.5.80
Job Evaluation Branch: for quality/consistency	[signature]	4.6.80
Staff-side representative: for quality/consistency	[signature]	4-6-80

F EFFECTIVE DATE 1.9.79

14.2.77

INTERIM AGREEMENT

(To be annexed to the Minutes of the GSS NSP meeting at which the Job and Pay Restructuring Scheme is adopted).

AN AGREEMENT between BRITISH AIRWAYS, hereinafter referred to as the EMPLOYER, and the EMPLOYEES' SIDE OF THE GSS NSP, hereinafter referred to as the EMPLOYEES, to jointly introduce a job evaluation system for jobs of employees of British Airways covered by the GSS NSP Agreement.

This interim Agreement shall cease to apply and shall be superceded by the substantive Agreement, when it is agreed that all the provisions of the Interim Agreement have been concluded and the Scheme is operational.

Preamble

1 The parties have agreed jointly to establish means for achieving the following objectives:

1.1 Equal pay for work of equal value amongst jobs covered by this NSP.

1.2 Increased efficiency and job satisfaction by better restructuring of jobs.

The Job Evaluation Method

2 To this end, the parties have agreed upon the adoption of a points-rating method of job evaluation which they have developed jointly. The evaluation criteria and the rules for applying them are embodied in the Job Evaluation Manual annexed to this Agreement (Appendix I).

The Joint Evaluation Committee

3 The Manual shall be used by a jointly constituted Evaluation Committee to evaluate all British Airways jobs covered by the GSS NSP Agreement.

4 The employer and employees shall respectively nominate Boards of 10 members, which shall jointly comprise the Evaluation Committee, and an up to date list of members shall be kept by the Joint Secretaries of the GSS NSP.

The employer's representatives shall be of Senior Staff level, and the employees' representatives shall themselves be employees of British Airways covered by the GSS NSP Agreement.

An Evaluation Meeting shall comprise 4 substantive representatives drawn from each of the Boards, presided over by an independent Chairman appointed jointly by both sides of the GSS NSP. The rules of procedure of Evaluation Meetings are annexed to this Agreement (Appendix II).

The Joint Secretaries

5 The employer and the employees shall each additionally nominate a Joint Secretary to service the Evaluation Committee. The employees' Joint Secretary shall also be an employee of British Airways covered by the GSS NSP Agreement. The Joint Secretaries shall not be members of the Boards which comprise the Evaluation Committee.

6 The two sides' Joint Secretaries shall agree upon all arrangements for meetings of the Committee and the business of each Evaluation Meeting, and shall respectively identify those among their sides' Board of members whose attendance for each Evaluation Meeting is appropriate to that Meeting's business and shall inform each other in advance of each such Meeting of the names of those on their respective sides who will be taking part.

7 The Joint Secretaries shall jointly assist the Chairman of the Evaluation Committee in the execution of his responsibilities, and shall, when required by him, carry out such tasks on behalf of their respective sides as he may consider to be requisite for the smooth operation of all procedures associates with this agreement.

The Chairman of the Evaluation Committee

8 The responsibilities of the Chairman of the Evaluation Committee are annexed to this Agreement at Appendix III.

Preparation of Job Descriptions

9 Job Descriptions of jobs requiring evaluation shall be prepared and agreed in accordance with the procedure annexed at Appendix IV.

Employee Side Representatives

10 The employees shall initially nominate four full-time representatives, who shall themselves be employees of British Airways covered by the GSS Agreement, to be members of the Project Team. They, together with Management nominated representatives, will act on behalf of the Joint Evaluation Committee in the checking of draft job descriptions as described in Appendix IV. The number of such designated representatives may be increased or decreased during the installation of the Scheme, as is mutually agreed to be necessary.

11 The designated representatives shall not be members of the Joint Evaluation Committee.

Access

12 Access to the Evaluation Committee's proceedings shall be allowed, for the purposes of observation only, and at the discretion of the Chairman, to employees covered by the GSS NSP upon prior arrangement with the Joint Secretaries, in groups not exceeding 6 in number on any one occasion. Employees shall not be present as observers at meetings of the Committee at which their own job is to be evaluated. All observers will withdraw — together with the Line Manager and the jobholders — when the Committee scores the job.

Installation of the Scheme

13 All scores for jobs will be regarded as provisional, and the results shall not be released to the interested parties, until paragraph 19 is reached.

14 Every job, for which a job description is produced and agreed, will be placed before an Evaluation Meeting at the earliest convenient opportunity.

15 In order to ensure that the Manual has been correctly interpreted, the Chairman may direct that a particular job be scored more than once. In such a case the Chairman will determine after discussion with the Joint Evaluation Committee which is the score to be adopted for the job and the other score or scores will be disregarded.

16 When results, which are regarded as final, have been reached for all jobs the Joint Secretaries will inform the Chairman, who will ask the Joint Evaluation Committee to formally adopt the complete set.

17 When a complete set of scores has been adopted, covering all jobs, the Joint Secretaries will transmit the results to the Joint Study Group.

18 The Joint Study Group will then meet to examine the results and provisionally agree the number of grades and the break-points. If the Joint Study Group are unable to reach an agreement the matter shall be referred to the NSP for resolution.

19 When agreement has been provisionally reached on the number of grades and the break-points the Joint Secretaries will transmit the points and grades to the parties concerned.

20 The jobholders can raise with the Joint Secretaries any queries they have in connection with the evaluation of their job.

21 Where jobholders feel that they have a legitimate grievance concerning the evaluation of their job, they will contact the Joint Secretaries requesting a re-examination of their job's points score giving their reasons.

22 When all such requests for re-examination are known, the Joint Study Group having fixed a last date, will meet to consider all the requests submitted. Any job for which the Joint Study Group feel, in the light of the evidence produced, reasonable doubt can be cast upon the result will be submitted to the Joint Evaluation Committee for re-evaluation.

23 When all cases for re-evaluation have been considered by the Joint Evaluation Committee, the Joint Study Group will meet to examine the final set of results and confirm the agreement on the number of grades and the break-points. If the Joint Study Group are unable to reach an agreement the matter shall be referred to the NSP for resolution.

24 When this process has been completed the results shall be referred to the GSS NSP for the purposes of concluding an Agreement.

APPENDIX 1

CONTENTS

	Pages
FORWORD	(i)
DETERMINATION OF THE OVERALL POINTS SCORE	(ii)
FACTOR DEFINITIONS	
SKILL	
– Nature of the Skill	NS.6/1 – 6/4
– Experience	EX.4/1 – 4/2
EFFORT	
– Physical Effort	PE.7/1 – 7/4
– Mental Effort	ME.9/1 – 9/5
RESPONSIBILITY	
– Supervision of Others	SN.5/1 – 5/4
– Responsibility for Resources	RR.8/1 – 8/6
– Health and Safety of Others	HS.8/1 – 8/5
WORKING CONDITIONS	WC.8/1 – 8/5
SCORING SHEET	SS.2/1 – 2/9

JOB EVALUATION SCHEME FOR INDUSTRIAL GROUND STAFF

JOB EVALUATION MANUAL

FOREWORD

This manual is for the use of members of the Joint Evaluation Committee, set up under the Agreement between the Employers and Employees sides of the Ground Services Staff National Sectional Panel dated , to regulate the joint application of a job evaluation system to the jobs of all British Airways employees covered by the Ground Services Staff National Sectional Panel, and constitutes Appendix I to that Agreement.

The members of the Joint Evaluation Committee, hereinafter referred to as 'raters', should examine the job under review under each of 8 factors and make an assessment accordingly. These factors are listed below and form four distinct groups.

Group	Factor No.	Factor
Skill	1	Nature of the Skill
	2	Experience
Effort	3	Physical Effort
	4	Mental Effort
Responsibility	5	Supervision of Others
	6	Resources
	7	Health & Safety of Others
General	8	Working Conditions

Throughout the evaluation process raters should remember that they are assessing the **job** and not the individuals performing the job. All assessments should take into account the normal rotation of duties within the job i.e. the tasks undertaken by **all** the jobholders covered by the particular job description.

Finally it will be noted that all references in this Manual to the average jobholder relate to male employees. This is purely for convenience in the absence of a single word for 'his/hers' in the English language. Therefore the word 'his' is intended to cover all employees whether male or female.

DETERMINATION OF THE OVERALL POINTS SCORE

At the conclusion of the evaluation process, raters will be asked by the Chairman of the Joint Evaluation Committee, to declare to him their scores for each factor, in terms of degree levels 1 to 5, for the job under review.

Following any amendments to these scores resulting from subsequent discussion, the Chairman, assisted by the Joint Secretaries, will then total the scores for each factor of all the eight Members of the Committee and apply the agreed factor weightings to those total scores.

These agreed factor weightings are as follows:—

Factor	Title	Weighting
1	Nature of the Skill	X 5
2	Experience	X 7
3	Physical Effort	X 4
4	Mental Effort	X 6
5	Supervision of Others	X 4
6	Resources	X 2
7	Health & Safety of Others	X 2
8	Working Conditions	X 2

The Chairman will then advise the Joint Evaluation Committee of the overall points score for the job under review and instruct the Joint Secretaries to transmit that score to the parties concerned.

SKILL

FACTOR 1 — THE NATURE OF THE SKILL

Preamble

The nature of the various skills and abilities that are required by the jobholder in order to be suitable for appointment to the post, and to undertake the tasks of the job to an acceptable level of performance.

These various skills and abilities can be grouped together under three headings, namely:—

(i) **Academic**
General knowledge and abilities normally acquired during a period of formal education.

(ii) **Practical/Vocational**
Skills and abilities acquired either through post-school training or on-the-job training, without which the jobholder would be unable to perform the practical tasks of the job.

(iii) **Supervisory**
Abilities normally acquired through job experience, to direct and provide leadership for a group or groups of staff.

Instructions to Raters

The assessment of the degree level appropriate to the job under review is performed in three distinct stages, each of which deals with one of the aspects of skill and ability listed above. Raters will be asked to make an assessment under each of these headings and it is the highest level of skill and ability that determines the overall degree level.

Throughout these assessments, raters should ensure that they consider only those skills and abilities that are essential to enable the jobholder to undertake the tasks of the job to an acceptable level of performance, and regard must not be paid to skills and abilities relating to the jobholder's future promotional prospects.

/continued

STAGE 1 – Academic Abilities

Experience has shown that specific educational qualifications (such as GCE passes), an examination of the tasks of the job and research have shown that different jobs require different levels of what are, broadly, academic abilities. Ratings are therefore made by such an examination of the tasks of the job under review and by reference to [illegible] into which of the three levels that job should be rated.

TABLE I

Level	Description of Academic Abilities
1	The ability to read, write and understand basic English and undertake basic arithmetic tasks such as counting. or The ability to comprehend simple documentation and instructions (e.g. invoices, coding instructions). or The ability to complete simple documentation (e.g. issue or receipt of stores items).
2	The ability to comprehend complex documentation (e.g. load distribution sheets, airwaybills, food demands, etc.) and to take action where necessary. or The ability to complete administrative documents (e.g. leave, sickness or overtime returns).
3	The ability to initiate complex documentation (e.g. airwaybills). or The ability to complete detailed written reports concerning the activities of a team or the operation of a section. or The ability to undertake complex calculations (e.g. cargo costing, estimates of food requirements).

continued

STAGE 2 – Practical Vocational Skills

[illegible] many different types of static and mobile equipment [illegible] machinery is comparatively straightforward to use, and the necessary [illegible] complex types, however, [illegible] period [illegible] [illegible] not require a licence [illegible] operate, but in terms of the [illegible] vehicle. There is no convenient yardstick, such as a common licence system, by which these various practical skills can be assessed. Rather it is the **type** of equipment used or vehicle driven (its complexity, size, weight, etc.), that determines the level of practical skill required by the jobholder.

Table II below, gives examples of the types of equipment and vehicles that are considered to require equivalent levels of practical skill.
Raters should, therefore, examine the full range of equipment used and vehicles driven by the jobholder, and by reference to this Table, decide which is the highest level of practical skill that he requires.

As far as vocational or trade skills are concerned, these are recognised by the need to complete a formal period of full-time training culminating in a City & Guilds or other qualification. These practical skills are also shown in Table II below.

TABLE II

Level	Examples of Equipment Requiring Practical Skills
1	**Light Equipment** e.g. pallets, simple hand tools, communications equipment. **Non-mechanical Mobile Equipment** e.g. trollies, barrows, furniture skates, palletron, aircraft steps. **Static Machinery** e.g. weighing machines, laundry presses, ovens, washing machines, dishwashers, food preparation equipment (slicers, liquidisers etc.).
2	**Vehicles and Similar Mechanical Mobile Equipment** e.g. cars, vans, mini-buses, baggage tractors/tugs, fork lifts.
3	**Heavy Rigid Vehicles** e.g. open/closed lorries, catering hoists, single and double-decker coaches vehicles requiring HGV 2 or HGV 3 licence. **Specialist Equipment** e.g. heavy-duty fork lifts, hi-los, elevators, air jetties.
4	**Heavy Articulated Vehicles** e.g. articulated freight transporters, articulated passenger coaches, vehicles requiring HGV 1 licence. **Vocational/Trade skills** e.g. Intermediate City & Guilds qualification such as 706/1.
5	**Vocational/Trade Skills** e.g. Advanced City & Guilds qualification such as 706/1 and 706/2.

continued

STAGE 3 – Supervisory Skills

[illegible]

[illegible] different types of [illegible] and raters should [illegible]

[illegible]

TABLE III

Level	Description of the Type of Supervision Undertaken
1	The jobholder provides advice and guidance to other staff, when necessary, but the job does not call for supervisory skills.
2	The jobholder leads staff engaged in a single task, or closely related tasks (e.g. loading/unloading passenger baggage at a town terminal)
3	The jobholder provides direction and leadership to staff engaged in a variety of complex tasks (e.g. loading/unloading baggage and freight at aircraft turnround). or The jobholder has overall control of groups of staff engaged in a single task, or closely related tasks.
4	The jobholder has overall control of groups of staff engaged in a variety of interdependent and complex activities.

DETERMINATION OF THE APPROPRIATE DEGREE LEVEL

Thus raters, by this means, will have made an assessment of the nature of the skill and ability required of the jobholder under each of three headings.

1 Academic abilities (Stage 1)

2 Practical/Vocational skills (Stage 2).

3 Supervisory skills (Stage 3).

It is the highest of these three levels that determines the overall degree level that is appropriate to the job under review for this factor of the Nature of the Skill.

SKILL

FACTOR 2 — EXPERIENCE

Preamble

The level of skill required by the jobholder in order to undertake the tasks of the job to an acceptable standard of performance is measured by the essential experience that is required in order to attain that skill.

Such experience can be broken down into various stages, any combination of which may be relevant to a particular post. These stages are as follows: –

(i) Full time vocational training at a Technical College or similar establishment, in order to obtain essential academic or trade qualifications.

(ii) Pre-British Airways non-airline experience in a related job, in order to obtain essential skills, knowledge or licenses, or private experience in order to obtain qualifications such as a private driving licence.

(iii) British Airways experience in a previous job, or jobs, to a level such that the jobholder is capable of being promoted to the job under review.

(iv) Experience in the job under review from the date of appointment to a point in time when an acceptable level of performance is attained.

Instructions to Raters

Raters should initially identify the various stages of experience, as outlined above, that are essential to enable the jobholder to gain the necessary skill, knowledge or qualifications for the job under review.

Raters should then estimate the time period necessary within each stage, such time periods being the minimum within which the jobholder would reasonably be expected to obtain the necessary prerequisites to enable him to progress to the next stage, or, in the case of stage (iv), to reach an acceptable level of performance.

In making this assessment, raters should relate experience to the tasks of the job and regard must not be paid to other constraints on the appointment or promotion of staff, such as lack of promotional vacancies in the area concerned or local agreements which inhibit promotional opportunities.

Raters may consider that, in a particular job, there is more than one career path available which would enable the jobholder to gain the necessary essential skills. In such cases raters should select the most common career path that fulfils the requirements outlined above.

Continued

Determination of the Appropriate Degree Level

TABLE I

Degree Level	Degree Definition
1	Jobs requiring a total experience of up to 3 months. Such jobs will not normally require any previous experience, but require a relatively short period of familiarisation and on-the-job training.
2	Jobs requiring a total experience of over 3 months and up to 9 months. Examples of jobs in this category could be those normally requiring either: — (a) no previous experience but a longer period of familiarisation and on-the-job training, or (b) a short period of previous experience, say 3-4 months, and a short period of familiarisation and on-the-job training.
3	Jobs requiring a total experience of over 9 months and up to 18 months. Examples of jobs in this category could be those normally requiring either: — (a) a medium period of previous experience, say 9-12 months, and a short period of familiarisation etc., or (b) a short period of previous experience, say 3-4 months, and a longer period of familiarisation, say 8-9 months.
4	Jobs requiring a total experience of over 18 months and up to 3 years. Such jobs would normally require a lengthy period of previous experience, probably in lower level jobs in British Airways.
5	Jobs requiring a total experience of over 3 years. Such jobs would require extended experience probably including extended formal training periods.

By this means, raters will, therefore, have determined the degree level that is appropriate to the job under review for this factor of Experience.

EFFORT

FACTOR 3 — PHYSICAL EFFORT

Preamble

The extent to which the jobholder is required to expend physical effort in performing the tasks of the job under normal working conditions.

The most obvious way in which such physical effort can be expended is in the physical manhandling of loads be it by lifting, pushing, pulling or otherwise manoeuvering the load, and account has, therefore, to be taken of the extent of this activity. However, the extent to which the jobholder is required to expend physical effort will also vary according to the general working posture that he is required to adopt by virtue of the tasks of the job.

Instructions to Raters

The assessment of the degree level appropriate to the job under review is performed in two distinct stages, namely: —

Stage 1 — The Physical Manhandling of Loads.

Stage 2 — The General Working Posture.

Continued

STAGE 1 – The Physical Manhandling of Loads

The [illegible] of loads is an activity that is [illegible] as being predominantly physically demanding as opposed to mentally demanding. Under this factor raters should therefore, [illegible] the risks [illegible] the jobholder to lift, push, pull or otherwise manhandle loads.

In this context, a load is defined as:-

> *'an individual item, the movement of which imposes upon the jobholder a physical demand equivalent to lifting a direct weight of at least 5 kg, taking into account any aids to manhandling that may be employed.'*

Thus, an item weighing more than 5 kg would not be regarded as a 'load' if the manhandling aids employed were to have the effect of reducing the physical demand required to a level less than that required to lift a direct weight of 5 kg.

Raters should, therefore, bear in mind the above, and examine the frequency with which the jobholder manhandles loads, as defined, taking into account the normal rotation of duties within the job. Raters should then establish whether the extent to which the jobholder undertakes this activity can be considered as 'LOW', 'MEDIUM' or 'HIGH' by reference to Table I below.

TABLE I

The Extent to which the Jobholder Physically Manhandles Loads	
'LOW'	The jobholder does **not** spend a significant proportion, (i.e. **not** more than 10%), of his normal duty physically manhandling loads.
'MEDIUM'	The jobholder spends a significant proportion, (i.e. more than 10%), but **not** the majority, (i.e. **not** more than 50%), of his normal duty physically manhandling loads.
'HIGH'	The jobholder spends the majority, (i.e. more than 50%), of his normal duty physically manhandling loads.

Continued

STAGE 2 – The General Working Posture

The [illegible] extended by the jobholder will also vary according to the general working [illegible] If the tasks of his job require him to spend prolonged periods [illegible] he is likely to expend more physical effort than if he were sitting or [illegible]

In this [illegible] is defined as:-

'A work area that imposes impediments to the jobholder's movements by virtue of a severe height restriction which necessitates him adopting a crouched position'

An example of such an area would be the hold of an aircraft

It is also recognised that a requirement to be on one's feet for prolonged periods, i.e. standing and walking, is also more physically exerting than sitting.

Raters should, therefore, bear in mind the above, and consider the various postures that the jobholder is required to adopt in order to undertake the tasks of his job. Raters should then establish whether, taking into account the normal rotation of duties within the job, the physical effort resulting from the general working posture for the job concerned can be described as 'LOW', 'MEDIUM' or 'HIGH' by reference to Table II below.

TABLE II

The Extent of Physical Effort Resulting from the General Working Posture	
'LOW'	The jobholder spends the majority, (i.e. more than 50%), of his normal duty in a seated position, and does not spend a significant proportion, (i.e. not more than 10%), in a crouched position in 'confined' spaces.
'MEDIUM'	The jobholder spends the majority, (i.e. more than 50%), of his normal duty in a position other than seated, but does **not** spend a significant proportion, (i.e. **not** more than 10%), in a crouched position in 'confined' spaces. or The jobholder spends the majority, (i.e. more than 50%), of his normal duty in a seated position, but **also** spends a significant proportion, (i.e. more than 10%), in a crouched position in 'confined' spaces.
'HIGH'	The jobholder spends the majority, (i.e. more than 50%), of his normal duty in a position other than seated, **and** spends a significant proportion, (i.e. more than 10%), in a crouched position in 'confined' spaces.

Continued

DETERMINATION OF THE APPROPRIATE DEGREE LEVEL

[illegible] to two conclusions, namely

1. [illegible] involvement in the physical manhandling [illegible] as 'LOW' 'MEDIUM' or 'HIGH' (Stage 1)

2. Whether the extent of the physical effort required of the jobholder due to his general working posture is to be considered as 'LOW' 'MEDIUM' or 'HIGH' (Stage 2)

Raters should then refer to Table III below which indicates the degree level appropriate to the various combinations of these assessments.

TABLE III

		STAGE 1 The Physical Manhandling of Loads		
		'LOW'	'MEDIUM'	'HIGH'
STAGE 2 The General Working Posture	'LOW'	1	2	
	'MEDIUM'	2	3	4
	'HIGH'	3	4	5

Raters will, therefore, by this means, have determined the overall degree level appropriate to the job under review for this factor of Physical Effort.

EFFORT

FACTOR 4 — MENTAL EFFORT

Preamble

The extent to which the jobholder is required to expend mental effort in performing the tasks of his job under normal operating conditions.

Generally such mental effort is expended through concentration in the use of the jobholder's skills, or by undertaking activities which call upon the jobholder to use his powers of reasoning. These activities can, therefore, be considered as being 'mentally demanding'.

However, other activities which are not in themselves 'mentally demanding', may, in some circumstances, impose a mental effort upon the jobholder due solely to their repetitive or tedious nature.

Instructions to Raters

The assessment of the degree level appropriate to the job under review is performed in two distinct stages: —

Stage 1 — Mentally Demanding Activities

Stage 2 — Repetitive Activities

STAGE 1 — Mentally Demanding Activities

Raters should initially consider and identify the activities undertaken within the job which impose a mental demand **over and above** the normal level of alertness and concentration required in everyday life, and which are predominantly mentally demanding as opposed to physically demanding activities.

Such mental demand will generally result from the regular use of the jobholder's powers of reasoning (e.g. assessing various courses of action or undertaking calculations), or from regular periods of concentration in the use of his skills (e.g. driving or cooking).

In measuring the mentally demanding activities, raters should guard against remeasuring the nature of the skill. The mental effort expended by the average jobholder in such activities will be affected by: —

(a) The frequency with which such mentally demanding activities are undertaken.

(b) The extent of the mental demand imposed upon the jobholder as indicated by the nature of the activity undertaken.
These two elements, taken together, make up the degree of '**mental demand**' upon the jobholder.

(c) The frequency with which the jobholder, whilst undertaking mentally demanding activities, is subjected to external work pressures.

(d) The nature of that work pressure.

These latter two elements, taken together, make up the degree of '**work pressure experienced**' by the jobholder.

Continued

STAGE 1

'The Mental Demand'

(a) Can the majority of the mentally demanding activities undertaken by the jobholder during the normal duty period, taking into account the normal rotation of duties, be generally classified as:–

(i) Less than a significant proportion, i.e. not more than 10% of the normal duty period, or

(ii) A significant proportion, i.e. more than 10%, but not a majority, i.e. not more than 50% of the normal duty period, or

(iii) A majority, i.e. more than 50%, of the normal duty period?

(b) Can the majority of the mentally demanding activities undertaken by the jobholder during the normal duty period, taking into account the normal rotation of duties, be generally classified as:–

(i) Category X – Clerical, advanced numerical, driving, cooking and or similar mentally demanding activities, or

(ii) Category Y – Activities concerning the co-ordination of manpower and or equipment?

Having answered these two questions, raters will have made an assessment of the 'Mental Demand' imposed upon the jobholder in undertaking these activities, which can, by definition, only be one of the five possible alternatives shown in Table I below.

TABLE I

Alternative	Description
A	The jobholder spends not more than 10% of his normal duty undertaking 'mentally demanding' activities.
B	The jobholder spends more than 10% but not more than 50% of his normal duty undertaking 'mentally demanding' activities, the majority of which are of Category X.
C	The jobholder spends more than 10% but not more than 50% of his normal duty undertaking 'mentally demanding' activities, the majority of which are of Category Y.
D	The jobholder spends more than 50% of his normal duty undertaking 'mentally demanding' activities, the majority of which are of Category X.
E	The jobholder spends more than 50% of his normal duty undertaking 'mentally demanding' activities, the majority of which are of Category Y.

Continued

STAGE 1

The Work Pressure Experienced

(c) Taking into account the normal rotation of duties within the job, can the frequency with which work pressures are experienced whilst undertaking 'mentally demanding' activities, be classified as accounting for: –

(i) Less than a significant proportion, i.e. not more than 10%, of the normal duty period, or
(ii) A significant proportion, i.e. more than 10%, but not a majority, i.e. not more than 50%, of the normal duty period, or
(iii) A majority, i.e. more than 50%, of the normal duty period?

(d) Taking into account the normal rotation of duties within the job, can the majority of the work pressures experienced whilst undertaking 'mentally demanding' activities, be generally classified as: –

(i) 'Single' pressures – arising from the need to meet a sequence of short term deadlines as directed, or
(ii) 'Multiple' pressures – arising from the need to control staff engaged in a variety of interdependent activities against deadlines and under conditions of uncertainty?

Having answered these two questions, raters will have made an assessment of the 'Work Pressure Experienced' by the jobholder whilst undertaking 'mentally demanding' activities, which can, by definition, only be one of the five possible alternatives shown in Table II below.

TABLE II

Alternative	Description
A	The jobholder experiences work pressures, as defined, for not more than 10% of his normal duty.
B	The jobholder experiences work pressures, as defined, for more than 10%, but not more than 50%, of his normal duty, and the majority of those work pressures can be classified as 'single' pressures.
C	The jobholder experiences work pressures, as defined, for more than 10%, but not more than 50%, of his normal duty, and the majority of those work pressures can be classified as 'multiple' pressures.
D	The jobholder experiences work pressures, as defined, for more than 50% of his normal duty, and the majority of those work pressures can be classified as 'single' pressures.
E	The jobholder experiences work pressures, as defined, for more than 50% of his normal duty, and the majority of those work pressures can be classified as 'multiple' pressures.

Continued

STAGE 1 Continued

Determination of the Appropriate Degree Level

Refer to the assessments of the 'mental demand' and 'work pressure experienced' for the job being evaluated. Find the appropriate box in Table III and note the degree level. Should the assessments of these factors fall in the shaded boxes of Table III, refer to the Stage 2 Guidance Notes.

TABLE III

		'The Work Pressure Experienced' Alternatives in Table II				
		A	B	C	D	E
'The Mental Demand' Alternatives in Table I	A	1				
	B	1	2	3		
	C	1	2	3		
	D	2	3	4	4	5
	E	2	3	4	4	5

Continued

STAGE 2 — Repetitive Activities

Raters should consider those activities undertaken by the jobholder during the normal course of his duties which are not considered as being 'mentally demanding' as defined in Stage 1, i.e. they do not require the normal level of alertness and concentration required in everyday activities. Any demanding activities which are not mentally demanding are less

Raters should consider the tedious and repetitive nature of such tasks and, bearing in mind the normal rotation of duties within the job, assess the degree level in Stage 2 that is appropriate to the job by reference to Table IV below.

TABLE IV

Degree level	Degree Description
1	The jobholder: — (a) spends the majority, i.e. more than 50%, of his normal duty undertaking 'mentally demanding' activities, **or** (b) he is required to perform a variety of tasks or to work in a variety of locations or work stations during a typical shift period.
2	The jobholder: — (a) spends the majority, i.e. more than 50%, of his normal duty undertaking activities that are **not** considered as being 'mentally demanding', **and** (b) he is required to perform such tasks in a short repetitive cycle in the same work station for prolonged uninterrupted periods for the majority of each typical shift period, e.g. a production line activity.

DETERMINATION OF THE OVERALL DEGREE LEVEL

Thus raters, at this point, will have determined a degree level appropriate to the job under review in terms of: —

(i) Mentally Demanding Activities (Stage 1), and

(ii) Repetitive Activities (Stage 2).

It is the **higher** of these two levels that determines the overall degree level appropriate to the job under this factor of Mental Effort.

RESPONSIBILITY

FACTOR 5 — SUPERVISION OF OTHERS

Preamble

The nature and extent of the responsibility for the supervision and leadership of other staff that is exercised by the jobholder during the normal course of his duties.

In this respect, the role of the industrial Supervisor can be broken down into three main areas of responsibility, namely: –

(i) Job Supervision.

(ii) Work Allocation, and

(iii) Administrative Supervision.

It is the extent to which some or all of these responsibilities are present in a particular job, together with an indication of the size of the workforce supervised by the jobholder, that determines the level of supervisory responsibility for that job.

Instructions to Raters

Initially, raters should examine the job under review in terms of the three areas of responsibility outlined above in order to establish whether or not the job entails any such responsibilities. In making this assessment, raters should only consider formal ongoing responsibilities and should bear in mind the following points.

(a) Regard should not be paid to any responsibilities which are only assumed in the absence of a supervisor.

(b) A requirement to provide guidance or advice to new staff, or to pass on information or instructions to other staff, is not, in itself, considered to involve a 'supervisory' responsibility.

If raters conclude that the job under review does not carry any such supervisory responsibility, as defined, then the degree level appropriate to the job is Level 1 and no further analysis is required.

If, however, this is not the case, raters should then examine the supervisory responsibilities of the job from two separate points of view, namely: –

Stage 1 — The nature of the supervision undertaken, and

Stage 2 — The extent of the supervision undertaken.

Continued

STAGE 1 – The Nature of the Supervision Undertaken

Raters should begin by undertaking a more detailed examination of the job in terms of the three areas of supervisory responsibility previously mentioned, which are defined below.

(i) Job Supervision
The jobholder has immediate supervision and leadership either direct or through a subordinate for a group or groups of staff in the execution of an assigned task or tasks.
In this role, the jobholder has an immediate responsibility for the methods and standards of work and for the initiation of disciplinary action concerning the staff under his control. He may also have a responsibility for the training, development and assessment of those staff.

(ii) **Work Allocation**
The jobholder is responsible for the allocation of staff to a sequence of tasks over the shift period, having regard to any constraints on the deployment of the workforce, such as meal breaks, roster considerations and the possession of the necessary skills and experience.

(iii) **Administrative Supervision**
The jobholder is responsible for the administrative control of a group of staff including such matters as the preparation of rosters, allocation of overtime and leave, and the initiation of documentation relating to absence, sickness, special payments, etc.

Raters should establish which of the above areas of responsibility are present in the job under review on a day-to-day basis, again disregarding any responsibilities that are only assumed in the absence of the jobholder's supervisor. Raters will, therefore, have made an assessment that the job falls into one of the three categories shown in Table I below.

TABLE I

Category	Areas of Supervisory Responsibility
'A'	Has a responsibility only for **either** Job Supervision **or** Work Allocation.
'B'	Has a responsibility for **both** Job Supervision **and** Work Allocation **or** Has a responsibility for **both** Work Allocation **and** Administrative Supervision.
'C'	Has a responsibility for Job Supervision, Work Allocation **and** Administrative Supervision.

If the jobholder has a different Category of responsibility for different groups of staff, as might be the case with staff from other organisations, this fact should be noted by raters and borne in mind when arriving at the final assessment of the degree level.

/Continued

STAGE 2 – The Extent of the Supervision Undertaken

[illegible] raters should therefore establish, by this means, whether, on average, the jobholder has a responsibility for the supervision of a small or a large group of staff, the supervision of a large group being considered to exist when the average number of staff for whom each supervisor is responsible is greater than 12.

In some instances, such as when staff of other organisations are involved, statistics may not be available to establish the average number of staff for whom each supervisor is responsible and an estimate has then to be made to determine whether, on average, the jobholder has responsibility for a small or large group as defined. In addition, if the jobholder exercises a different Category of responsibility for different groups of staff, then separate assessments should be made for each group and borne in mind when arriving at the final assessment of the degree level.

DETERMINATION OF THE APPROPRIATE DEGREE LEVEL

Thus raters, at this point, will have made two assessments, namely:—

1. Whether the nature of the supervision undertaken is of Category 'A', 'B' or 'C'. (Stage 1)

2. Whether the jobholder exercises those responsibilities for a 'small' or a 'large' group of staff. (Stage 2)

Raters should then refer to Table II on the following page which indicates the degree level that is appropriate to the various combinations of these assessments.

If raters have concluded that the jobholder exercises a different Category of responsibility for different groups of staff, then the responsibility for each group should be assessed separately by use of Table II. In such cases it is the higher degree level that determines the final level appropriate to the job.

Continued

Determination of the Appropriate Degree Level (Continued)

TABLE II

STAGE 1 **The Nature of the Supervision Undertaken**	STAGE 2 **The Extent of the Supervision Undertaken** On average, the jobholder exercises responsibilities of the Category shown under Stage 1 for: —	
	a 'small' group	a 'large' group
Category 'A' — has a responsibility only for **either** Job Supervision **or** Work Allocation.	2	3
Category 'B' — has a responsibility for **both** Job Supervision **and** Work Allocation, **or** has a responsibility for both Work Allocation **and** Administrative Supervision.	3	4
Category 'C' — has a responsibility for Job Supervision, Work Allocation, **and** Administrative Supervision.	4	5

By this process raters will, therefore, have determined the overall degree level appropriate to the job under review for this factor of Responsibility for the Supervision of Others.

RESPONSIBILITY

FACTOR 6 — RESPONSIBILITY FOR RESOURCES

Preamble

The nature and extent of the responsibility for resources that is exercised by the jobholder during the normal course of his duties, bearing in mind that such resources may either be owned by, or temporarily in the care of, British Airways.

The nature of this responsibility can be broken down into four areas, namely responsibilities associated with: —

i) **the direct use or handling of equipment or materials**
The responsibility that every jobholder has for the correct use or handling of the equipment or materials that are directly in his care,
equipment being defined as — all static or mobile equipment including vehicles, trolleys, machines, tools and communications equipment, and
materials being defined as — all materials, both consumable and durable, stores, and any kind of load such as freight, air larders, bars or baggage.

ii) **the use or handling of equipment or materials by subordinate staff**
The additional indirect responsibility that a jobholder may have for the equipment or materials of a section or a team through the supervisory role that he performs.

iii) **the handling of cash**
The additional responsibility that a jobholder may have for the handling of cash, i.e. coins and notes, for the purposes of undertaking transactions or accounting.

iv) **the security of property**
The additional specific responsibility that a jobholder may have for the overall security of British Airways' property, i.e. for the prevention of damage to, or loss of, British Airways' premises or other assets.

It is the extent to which some, or all, of these responsibilities are present in a particular job that determines the level of responsibility for resources for that job.

Instructions to Raters

The assessment of the degree level appropriate to the job under review is performed in two distinct stages.

Stage 1 — Can the jobholder's responsibility for the **direct** use or handling of equipment or materials be classified as 'LOW', 'MEDIUM' or 'HIGH'?

Stage 2 — Can the jobholder's **additional** responsibilities for resources such as those relating to his supervisory duties, the handling of cash or the security of property, be classified as 'LOW', 'MEDIUM' or 'HIGH'?

It is the combination of the assessments made in these two stages that determines the final degree level appropriate to the job under review.

/ Continued

STAGE 1 – Responsibilities associated with the direct use or handling of equipment or materials

Every jobholder has a responsibility for the direct use or handling of some kind of equipment or materials. The [illegible] to ensure that he uses or handles them only in accordance with [illegible] This may involve responsibility for ensuring that the equipment or materials are [illegible] from loss or damage, and that any duties or [illegible] are

The extent of this responsibility is determined by the likely financial cost of loss or damage to resources that might result from [illegible] errors on the part of the jobholder, should he accidentally mis-use or mis-handle the equipment or materials that are in his care. In the case of accidental damage, this financial cost need not necessarily be as great as the replacement cost of the items concerned as it will depend upon the extent of the damage likely to be caused by the direct actions of the jobholder.

The likelihood of such damage or loss will depend upon the nature of the activities undertaken by the jobholder and whether those activities are undertaken for a significant proportion of his normal duty. All activities can, therefore, initially be classified, in terms of their 'likely cost consequences' to the resources concerned, as falling into one of the three categories that are defined in Table I below, which also includes some examples of the sort of activities that are considered to be typical for each category.

TABLE I

Category	Description and Typical Examples
'A'	Activities during which accidental mis-use or mis-handling by the jobholder is **unlikely** to lead to **'significant'** financial cost consequences to the resources concerned. e.g. Using all types of office equipment, communications equipment or computer terminals, or carrying documents. Using hand trucks, trolleys or barrows, or certain sorts of static equipment where the likelihood of significant damage is minimal such as conveyor belts, presses or ovens. Handling materials that, by their nature, make significant damage or loss unlikely such as foodstuffs, baggage or certain cargos.
'B'	Activities during which accidental mis-use or mis-handling by the jobholder is **likely** to lead to **'significant'** financial cost consequences, but is **unlikely** to lead to **'substantial'** cost consequences to the resources concerned. e.g. Driving light vehicles or operating slow-moving mobile motorised equipment such as fork-lift trucks. Handling materials where there is a likelihood that significant, but not substantial, damage or loss could occur, such as general cargo. Cooking food in bulk.

Continued

TABLE I (Continued)

	Description and Typical Examples
	[illegible] during which accidental misuse or mis-handling by the jobholder is likely to lead to substantial financial cost consequences to the resources concerned.
	e.g. Driving expensive vehicles such as HGVs or Directors' cars.
	Driving vehicles or operating mobile motorised equipment in contact with, or in close proximity to, the aircraft side for the purposes of loading/unloading or providing services to the aircraft, e.g. elevators, hi-los or air-jetties.
	Handling particular fragile **and** expensive cargoes or loads such as aircraft engines.

Raters should, therefore, initially consider and identify, in terms of the three categories outline above, the activities undertaken by the jobholder during the normal course of his duties.

Raters should then examine the frequency with which these activities are undertaken, taking into account the normal rotation of duties within the job, and establish whether the extent of the jobholder's responsibility for the direct use or handling of equipment or materials can be considered as 'LOW', 'MEDIUM' or 'HIGH' by reference to Table II below.

TABLE II

The Extent of Responsibility for the Direct Use or Handling of Equipment or Materials	
'LOW'	The jobholder undertakes activities of Category 'A', but does **not** spend a signaificant proportion, i.e. **not** more than 10%, of his normal duty undertaking activities of Categories 'B' and 'C' taken together.
'MEDIUM'	The jobholder spends a signficant proportion, i.e. more than 10%, of his normal duty:— **either** undertaking activities of Category 'B', **or** undertaking activities of Categories 'B' and 'C' taken together, **but** does **not** spend a significant proportion, i.e. not more than 10%, of his normal duty undertaking activities of Category 'C'.
'HIGH'	The jobholder spends a significant proportion, i.e. more than 10%, of his normal duty undertaking activities of Category 'C'.

Continued

STAGE 2 – Additional Responsibilities

Raters should [illegible] additional responsibilities for resources that are exercised by the jobholder [illegible] As a guide [illegible] in addition of the jobholder's [illegible] under these headings.

Responsibility associated with the use or handling of equipment or materials by subordinate staff

A jobholder may [illegible] an additional responsibility through the supervisory role that he performs (as opposed to [illegible] direct actions), there is a likelihood that accidental errors on **his** part could lead to 'significant' financial cost consequences to the equipment or materials of his section or team.

This likelihood is considered to be at its greatest if: –

(i) the jobholder has an immediate responsibility for the methods and standards of work, and for the initiation of disciplinary action concerning the staff under his control, i.e. he undertakes 'Job Supervision' as defined in Factor 5, and is therefore involved in the use or handling of equipment or materials by his subordinates, **and**

(ii) the staff concerned are engaged for a significant proportion, i.e. more than 10%, of their normal duty in activities during which accidental errors are likely to lead to 'significant' financial cost consequences, i.e. their responsibility for the direct use or handling of equipment or materials is assessed as being 'MEDIUM' or 'HIGH' in Stage 1.

It is also recognised that, although a jobholder may not necessarily undertake 'job supervision', he may nevertheless have a responsibility for the equipment and materials of a section through his administrative control, e.g. the actioning of defects, the allocation of resources to subordinate staff, or to other organisations, and the completion of associated documentation. This can, however, only be considered as an Additional Responsibility if the subordinate staff concerned are assessed as having a 'MEDIUM' or 'HIGH' responsibility under Stage 1.

Raters should, therefore, make an assessment of the jobholder's responsibilities in this area by reference to Table IIIa below.

TABLE IIIa

The Extent of Responsibility for the Use or Handling of Equipment or Materials by Subordinate Staff	
'LOW'	The jobholder is not normally responsible for the use or handling of equipment or materials by subordinate staff, or he has a supervisory responsibility for staff who are assessed as having a 'LOW' responsibility under Stage 1.
'MEDIUM'	The jobholder, for a significant proportion, i.e. more than 10%, of his normal duty, is responsible for the administrative control and allocation of equipment or materials to staff who are assessed as having a 'MEDIUM' or 'HIGH' responsibility under Stage 1.
'HIGH'	The jobholder undertakes 'job supervision' of staff who are assessed as having a 'MEDIUM' or 'HIGH' responsibility under Stage 1.

(NB. See notes over page.)

/ Continued

TABLE IIIa

(b) **Responsibilities associated with the handling of cash**

A jobholder may have responsibility in this area if he is significantly involved in the handling of, and accounting for the purposes of transactions. The level of that responsibility will depend upon the nature of the activities that are undertaken by the jobholder.

Raters should, therefore, make an assessment to establish whether the jobholder's responsibilities in this area can be considered as 'LOW', 'MEDIUM' or 'HIGH' by reference to Table IIIb below.

TABLE IIIb

The Extent of Responsibility for the Handling of Cash	
'LOW'	The jobholder is not involved in the handling of, and accounting for, cash for a significant proportion of his normal duty.
'MEDIUM'	The jobholder is significantly involved in the handling of, and accounting form cash for the purposes of transactions, including the recording of those transactions.
'HIGH'	The jobholder has an overall responsibility for the cash handled in a section, including the reconciling of cash received with transaction records and or stock levels for accounting purposes.

(c) **Responsibilities associated specifically with the security of property**

A jobholder may have an additional responsibility in this area if he has, as a distinct part of his job, a specific responsibility for the security of, including the prevention of wilful damage to, British Airways' premises or other assets. Provided that he exercises this responsibility for a significant proportion of his normal duty, the level of responsibility will depend upon the nature of the activities undertaken by the jobholder.

In this context, regard should not be paid to the security aspects of a jobholder's responsibilities that are catered for elsewhere in this Factor, namely for the security of resources that are directly in the jobholder's care or under his supervisory responsibility. In addition, a requirement to ensure that a workplace is secure if left unattended is not considered to be a 'specific' responsibility for the security of property.

Raters should, therefore, make an assessment to establish whether the jobholder's responsibilities in this area can be considered as 'LOW', 'MEDIUM' or 'HIGH' by reference to Table IIIc on the following page.

Continued

TABLE IIIc

The Extent of Responsibility for the Security of Property

	The jobholder does not have specific responsibilities for the security of property for a significant proportion of his normal duty.
'MEDIUM'	The jobholder has, for a significant proportion of his normal duty, specific responsibility for restricting entry to British Airways' premises in accordance with procedures, or for the surveillance of property or other assets in order to ensure that they are not at risk from the actions of unauthorised persons or from damage by fire.
'HIGH'	In addition to the above, the jobholder has, for a significant proportion of his normal duty, a specific responsibility to search personnel, vehicles, cargo or baggage for anti-sabotage purposes or to prevent the loss of British Airways' assets by theft, **or** has, as a distinct part of his job, a specific responsibility for fighting fires on British Airways' property.

Having made assessments in these three areas, it is then the highest of the three assessments that determines the extent of Additional Responsibility for the job under review.

DETERMINATION OF THE APPROPRIATE DEGREE LEVEL

At this point raters will have come to two conclusions, namely: —

1. Whether the jobholder's responsibility for the direct use or handling of equipment or materials can be considered as 'LOW', 'MEDIUM' or 'HIGH'.
2. Whether the jobholder's addtional responsibilities for resources can be considered as 'LOW', 'MEDIUM' or 'HIGH'.

Raters should then refer to Table IV below which determines the degree level appropriate to the various combinations of these assessments.

TABLE IV

		STAGE 1 The Extent of 'Direct' Responsibility.		
		'LOW'	'MEDIUM'	'HIGH'
STAGE 2 The Extent of Additional Responsibility	'LOW'	1	2	3
	'MEDIUM'	2	3	4
	'HIGH'	3	4	5

Raters will, therefore, by this means, have determined the overall degree level appropriate to the job under review for this Factor of Responsibility for Resources.

RESPONSIBILITY

FACTOR 7 — HEALTH AND SAFETY OF OTHERS

Preamble

The nature and extent of the responsibility for the health and safety of others that is exercised by the jobholder, bearing in mind the tasks undertaken and the equipment used by the jobholder during the normal course of his duties. 'Others', in this context, may be employees of British Airways, other organisations or members of the public.

The nature of this responsibility is broken down into four areas, namely: —

(i) Direct responsibility — the responsibility for the health and safety of others that the jobholder has through the equipment he operates and the actual tasks he undertakes.

(ii) General responsibility — the responsibility for the health and safety of others that a jobholder may have by undertaking job supervision or by performing a specialist advisory role.

(iii) Special responsibility — the specific responsibility that the driver of a vehicle carrying passengers has for their safety whilst in his charge.

(iv) Rescue responsibility — the specific responsibility that a jobholder may have for the rescue of others from dangerous situations.

It is the extent to which some, or all, of these responsibilities are present in a particular job that determines the level of responsibility for the health and safety of others for that job.

Instructions to Raters

The assessment of the degree level appropriate to the job under review is performed in three distinct stages, namely: —

Stage 1 — Can the jobholder's **direct responsibility** for the health and safety of others be classified as 'LOW', 'MEDIUM' or 'HIGH'?

Stage 2 — Does the jobholder have any **additional responsibility** such as an overall responsibility for the health and safety of others as exercised by those engaged in job supervision, or a special responsibility for the safety of vehicle passengers?

Stage 3 — Does the jobholder have a specific **rescue responsibility?**

It is the combination of the assessments made in these three stages that determines the final degree level appropriate to the job under review.

Continued

STAGE 1 – Direct Responsibility

[illegible] for the health [illegible] of others. The burden of exercising that [illegible] To assess [illegible] on the [illegible]

significantly [illegible] and [illegible] incidental errors [illegible] of others, then the burden of responsibility is relatively high.

Activities can be classified in terms of their likely effect upon the health and safety of others, as falling into one of the three categories that are defined in Table I below, which also includes some examples of the sort of activities that are considered to be typical for each category.

TABLE I

Category	Description and Typical Examples
'A'	Activities during which accidental errors by the jobholder are **unlikely** to lead to health and safety consequences to others that are of a '**serious**' nature. e.g. Using all types of office equipment, communications equipment or computer terminals, and certain sorts of static equipment such as carousels or conveyor belts. Using hand trucks, trolleys or barrows for the movement of baggage, freight, equipment or stores. Stacking or unstacking light packages or stores. Carrying or using hand tools or non-mechanical aids such as ladders
'B'	Activities during which accidental errors by the jobholder are **likely** to lead to '**serious**' consequences to others, but are **unlikely** to lead to consequences of a '**severe**' nature. e.g. Operating, as part of a team, certain kinds of static motorised equipment which can injure other members. Stacking or unstacking heavy packages or stores. Making vehicle or aircraft loads secure, or checking that they are secure. Involved in maintaining standards of cleanliness of equipment or work/public places for reasons of hygiene or safety. Involved in the preparation, cooking or serving of food, or the storage of perishable foodstuffs, and associated hygiene aspects.

'Continued

TABLE I (Continued)

	Description and Typical Examples
	severe health and safety consequences to others.
	Driving any type of vehicle.
	Operating any type of mobile motorised equipment used in the loading, unloading or transshipping of baggage, freight, equipment or stores.
	Involved in the identification of defects to fire-fighting or fire prevention equipment and the maintenance of that equipment.
	Involved in the searching of personnel, vehicles, cargo or baggage for anti-sabotage purposes.

Raters should initially consider and identify, in terms of the three categories outlined above, the activities undertaken by the jobholder during the normal course of his duties.

Raters should then examine the frequency with which these activities are undertaken, taking into account the normal rotation of duties within the job, and establish whether the extent of the jobholder's direct responsibility for the health and safety of others can be considered as being 'LOW', 'MEDIUM' or 'HIGH' by reference to Table II below.

TABLE II

The Extent of Direct Responsibility for the Health and Safety of Others	
'LOW'	The jobholder undertakes activites of Category 'A', but does **not** spend a significant proportion, i.e. **not** more than 10%, of his normal duty undertaking activities of Categories 'B' and 'C' taken together.
'MEDIUM'	The jobholder spends a significant proportion, i.e. more than 10%, of his normal duty: — **either** undertaking activities of Category 'B', **or** undertaking activities of Categories 'B' and 'C' taken together, **but** does **not** spend a significant proportion, i.e. **not** more than 10%, of his normal duty undertaking activities of Category 'C'.
'HIGH'	The jobholder spends a significant proportion, i.e. more than 10%, of his normal duty undertaking activities of Category 'C'.

/Continued

STAGE 2 – Additional Responsibility

Having established the level of responsibility, raters should then consider any additional responsibilities for [illegible] by virtue of their particular duties.

A [illegible] to [illegible] his [illegible] to health and safety consequences to others that are of a 'serious' nature. This can only be the case if –

(i) the jobholder has an immediate responsibility for the methods and standards of work, and for the initiation of disciplinary action concerning the staff under his control, i.e. he undertakes 'Job Supervision' as defined in Factor 5, and is, therefore, involved in the health and safety aspects of the tasks performed by his subordinates.

or

the jobholder, for a significant proportion, i.e. more than 10%, of his normal duty, is in a specialist advisory role concerned specifically with ensuring that health and safety regulations are strictly complied with,

and

(ii) the staff concerned are engaged for a significant proportion, i.e. more than 10%, of their normal duty in activities during which accidental errors could lead to health and safety consequences that are of a 'serious' nature.

Thus, if the jobholder significantly performs the functions outlined above, **and** the staff concerned are assessed as having a 'MEDIUM' or 'HIGH' level of responsibility under Stage 1, then the job is considered to have an additional responsibility.

Alternatively, if the jobholder spends a significant proportion, i.e. more than 10% of his normal duty, taking into account the normal rotation of duties within the job, driving vehicles with passengers, then the job is also considered to have an additional responsibility for the health and safety of others. The passengers concerned may be employees of British Airways, other organisations or members of the public.

Raters should therefore establish whether or not the job under review carries such an Additional Responsibility for either of the reasons outline above

STAGE 3 – Rescue Responsibility

Finally, raters should establish whether or not the jobholder has, as a distinct part of his job, a specific responsibility for the rescue of others from dangerous situations.

/Continued

DETERMINATION OF THE APPROPRIATE DEGREE LEVEL

At this [illegible] the three assessments, namely:—

1. [illegible] direct responsibility for the health and safety of others can be [illegible] HIGH.

2. Whether or not the jobholder has an additional responsibility for the health and safety of others.

3. Whether or not the jobholder has a rescue responsibility.

Raters should then refer to Table III below which determines the degree level appropriate to the various combinations of these assessments.

TABLE III

		STAGE 1 Direct Responsibility		
STAGE 2 Additional Responsibility	**STAGE 3** Rescue Responsibility	'LOW'	'MEDIUM'	'HIGH'
NO	NO	1	2	3
YES	NO	2	3	4
NO	YES	2	3	4
YES	YES	3	4	5

Raters will, therefore, have determined, by this means, the overall degree level appropriate to the job under review for this factor of Responsibility for the Health and Safety of Others.

GENERAL

FACTOR 8 — WORKING CONDITIONS

Preamble

[illegible] the normal [illegible] duties.

The presence or absence of such conditions will depend upon the unpleasantness of the general work environment, the extent to which particularly unpleasant tasks have to be performed, and the extent of the jobholder's exposure to unavoidable accident hazards. At all times it has to be assumed that prescribed protective clothing is worn and that all statutory and British Airways health and safety regulations are strictly observed.

Instructions to Raters

The assessment of the degree level appropriate to the job under review is performed in three distinct stages.

Stage 1	—	The Work Environment
Stage 2	—	Disagreeable Tasks
Stage 3	—	Accident Hazards

STAGE 1 — The Work Environment

Raters should first consider the general work environment in which the tasks of the job are normally performed, with a view to establishing, at the end of Stage 1, whether, taking all aspects into account that general environment can be described as: —

(a) 'fair',
(b) 'unpleasant', or
(c) 'very unpleasant',

In order to objectively assess that environment, consideration should be given to the following features which contribute to the level of disagreeableness of the work environment.

1. All the year round exposure to the 'elements'.
2. Exposure to dusty and/or dirty conditions.
3. Exposure to noise and/or vibration.
4. Exposure to hot and/or humid conditions.
5. Exposure to cold conditions.
6. Exposure to obnoxious odours and/or fumes.

Raters should, therefore, refer to Table I on the following page and assess a level for the job under review in terms of each of the six features and thereby establish a 'profile' for the work environment of the job.

'Continued

TABLE I

DEFINITIONS

Measures of Frequency

'Seldom' – not more than 10% of his normal duty.
'a significant proportion of' – more than 10% of his normal duty.
'a majority of' – more than 50% of his normal duty.

Measures of Temperature

Features 4. and 5. below relate to exposure to hot or cold conditions other than those due to the 'elements'. The terms used are defined as follows: –

'Hot' conditions – when the general temperature in the workplace is greater than 30°C.
'Cold' conditions – when the general temperature in the workplace is in the region of 0°C.
'Very cold' conditions – when the general temperature of the workplace is below -10°C.

FEATURE	LEVEL		
	'A'	'B'	'C'
1. All the year round exposure to the 'elements'.	Does not spend the majority of his normal duty exposed to the 'elements'.	Spends the majority of his normal duty exposed to the 'elements.	–
2. Exposure to dusty and/or dirty conditions	Does not spend the majority of his normal duty exposed to dusty and/or dirty conditions	Spends the majority of his normal duty exposed to dusty and/or dirty conditions	–
3. Exposure to noise and/or vibration.	May be exposed for the majority of his normal duty to minor noise or vibration disturbance, and/or be exposed for a significant proportion, but not a majority, of of his duty to a high level of background noise, but is seldom exposed to severe noise such as that caused by live aircraft.	Is exposed for the majority of his normal duty to a high level of background noise, and/or is exposed for a significant proportion, but not a majority, of his duty to severe noise such as that caused by live aircraft.	Is exposed for the majority of his normal duty to severe noise such as that caused by live aircraft.

Continued

TABLE I (Continued)

FEATURE	LEVEL		
	'A'	'B'	'C'
4. Exposure to hot and/or humid conditions	Does not spend the majority of his normal duty exposed to hot and/or humid conditions	Spends the majority of his normal duty exposed to hot and/or humid conditions.	—
5. Exposure to cold conditions	May be exposed for a significant proportion, but not the majority, of his normal duty to cold conditions, but is seldom exposed to very cold conditions.	Is exposed for the majority of his normal duty to cold conditions, but is seldom exposed to very cold conditions,	Is exposed for a significant proportion of his normal duty to very cold conditions.
6. Exposure to obnoxious odours and/or fumes	May be exposed for a significant proportion, but not the majority of his normal duty to obnoxious odours or fumes, but is seldom exposed to concentrated fumes such as those caused by live aircraft on stands.	Is exposed for the majority of his normal duty to obnoxious odours or fumes, and/or is exposed for a significant proportion, but not a majority, of his duty to concentrated fumes such as those caused by live aircraft on stands.	Is exposed for the majority of his normal duty to concentrated fumes such as those caused by live aircraft on stands.

Having established the 'profile' for the job, raters should then refer to Table II below to determine whether the work environment described by that profile can be considered as being 'fair', 'unpleasant' or 'very unpleasant'.

TABLE II

Profile	Work Environment
Not more than 1 level 'B', and No level 'C's.	'FAIR'
More than 1 but less than 4 level 'B's, or 1 but not more than 1 level 'C'.	'UNPLEASANT'
More than 3 level 'B's, or More than 1 level 'C'.	'VERY UNPLEASANT'

Continued

which contributes to the disagreeable nature of the job.

STAGE 2 Disagreeable Tasks

of the ingestion of [illegible] substances or liquids.

Raters should establish whether or not such tasks account for a significant proportion, i.e. more than 10%, of the jobholder's overall shift period, taking into account the normal rotation of duties within the job.

STAGE 3 — Accident Hazards

Finally, raters should establish whether or not the jobholder, having exercised all reasonable care and attention, is significantly exposed to unavoidable accident hazards, the consequences of which could be serious.

In making this assessment, raters should bear in mind the following points which define some of the terms used above.

(a) A jobholder is considered to be 'significantly' exposed to hazards if that exposure accounts for more than 10% of his overall shift period, taking into account the normal rotation of duties within the job.

(b) The consequences of a hazard are considered to be 'serious' if they result in the jobholder losing significant time off work (i.e. over three days) through accidents which cause injuries such as severe burns or cuts, fractured limbs or other severe body or head injuries.

Such injuries could occur if the jobholder is involved in activities such as the handling of hot liquids or sharp instruments, working in an active aircraft or vehicle movement area, working at heights, operating mobile equipment or vehicles, or the physical unpacking and searching of suspect baggage or cargo for sabotage devices.

Raters are reminded that, throughout this factor, it is essential that all assessments are based on the assumption that prescribed protective clothing is worn and that all statutory and British Airways health and safety regulations are strictly observed.

Continued

DETERMINATION OF THE APPROPRIATE DEGREE LEVEL

[illegible] have made three assessments, namely: —

1. [illegible] environment can be described as 'fair', 'unpleasant', or 'very unpleasant'. (Stage 1)

2. Whether or not the jobholder spends a significant proportion of his normal duty period undertaking unpleasant tasks. (Stage 2)

3. Whether or not the jobholder is significantly exposed to unavoidable accident hazards. (Stage 3)

Raters should then refer to Table III below which indicates the degree level which is appropriate to the various combinations of these assessments.

TABLE III

		STAGE 1 The General Work Environment can be described as: —		
STAGE 2	**STAGE 3**			
Does the jobholder spend a significant proportion of his duty undertaking **unpleasant tasks?**	Is the jobholder significantly exposed to unavoidable **accident hazards?**	'FAIR'	'UNPLEASANT'	'VERY UNPLEASANT'
No	No	1	2	3
Yes	No	2	3	4
No	Yes	2	3	4
Yes	Yes	3	4	5

Raters will, therefore, have determined the overall degree level appropriate to the job under review for this Factor of Working Conditions.

JOB EVALUATION SCHEME FOR INDUSTRIAL GROUND STAFF

DRAFT SCORING SHEET

A. IDENTIFICATION

1. **Job Evaluation Committee**

(a) Date of Committee	
(b) Name of Rater	

2. **Job Identification**

(a) Job Title	
(b) Division/Department	
(c) Location	
(d) Job Reference Code	

B. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this Scoring Sheet is not only to record the assessments made by the rater in arriving at a degree level for each factor for the job under review, but also to record his/her reasons for making those assessments, i.e. by reference to particular tasks or other information contained in the Job Description or raised during the course of the Committee proceedings.

Raters should record their assessments by clearly circling the appropriate figure in the box provided, except where otherwise indicated.

C. SUMMARY

Having completed the evaluation process, raters should then enter their assessments of the overall degree levels for each factor for the job under review in the Summary Table below, and sign where shown.

FACTOR	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
DEGREE LEVEL								

Signature of Rater: .....

Continued

FACTOR 1 – THE NATURE OF THE SKILL

Stage 1 – **Academic Abilities**

Select the level appropriate to the job under review by reference to Table I and indicate below

Level	1	2	3

Reasons (i.e. academic abilities required):

Stage 2 – **Practical/Vocational Skills**

Select the level appropriate to the job under review by reference to Table II and indicate below.

Level	1	2	3	4	5

Reasons (i.e. equipment used or qualifications required):

Stage 3 – **Supervisory Skills**

Select the level appropriate to the job under review by reference to Table III and indicate below.

Level	1	2	3	4

Reasons (i.e. type of supervision undertaken):

Determine the overall degree level for the job under review for this factor, i.e. the highest of Stages 1, 2 and 3, and indicate below.

DEGREE LEVEL	1	2	3	4	5

/Continued

FACTOR 2 – EXPERIENCE

[illegible] the minimum time periods necessary within each of the various stages of experience (i) [illegible] and enter in the table below, together with your reasons for making these assessments.

Stage of Experience	Yes No	Minimum Time Period	Reasons (i.e. previous essential jobs, essential skills or qualifications gained.)
(i)			
(ii)			
(iii)			
(iv)			
Total time period =			

Determine the degree level appropriate to the job under review for this factor by reference to Table I, and indicate below.

DEGREE LEVEL	1	2	3	4	5

Continued

FACTOR 3 – PHYSICAL EFFORT

Stage 1 – The Physical Manhandling of Loads

Assess the extent to which the jobholder physically manhandles loads by reference to Table I and indicate below.

Extent of Manhandling	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH

Reasons (i.e. estimate of extent and examples of tasks or loads concerned):

Stage 2 – The General Working Posture

Assess the extent of the physical effort resulting from the general working posture of the jobholder by reference to Table II and indicate below.

Extent due to Posture	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH

Reasons (i.e. estimate of extent and examples of tasks or work stations concerned):

Determine the overall degree level appropriate to the job under review for this factor by reference to Table III and indicate below.

DEGREE LEVEL	1	2	3	4	5

Continued

FACTOR 4 – MENTAL EFFORT

Stage 1 – Mentally Demanding Activities

Identify the 'mentally demanding' activities undertaken. Assess the extent of the **Mental Demand** imposed upon the jobholder [illegible] and indicate below.

	A	B	C	D	E
[illegible]					

Reasons (i.e. mentally demanding activities undertaken):

Assess the extent of the **'Work Pressure Experienced'** by the jobholder by reference to Table II and indicate below.

Alternative	A	B	C	D	E

Reasons (i.e. examples of tasks involving pressure):

Determine the degree level in Stage 1 that is appropriate to the job by reference to Table III and indicate below.

Degree Level	1	2	3	4	5

Stage 2 – Repetitive Activities

Select the degree level in Stage 2 that is appropriate to the job by reference to Table IV and indicate below.

Degree Level	1	2

Determine the overall degree level appropriate to the job under review for this factor, i.e. the higher of Stages 1 and 2, and indicate below.

DEGREE LEVEL	1	2	3	4	5

Continued

FACTOR 5 — RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SUPERVISION OF OTHERS

Establish whether or not the job under review carries any supervisory responsibilities, as defined, and indicate in the box provided.

YES	NO

If NO ignore Stages 1 and 2 below, and enter degree level 1 in the box at the front of this guide.

Stage 1 — **The Nature of the Supervision Undertaken**

Establish which of the various areas of supervisory responsibility are involved, and indicate relevant areas below.

Area of Responsibility	Yes	No	Reasons (i.e. staff supervised)
Job Supervision			
Work Allocation			
Administrative Supervision			

Determine the Category of supervision undertaken by the jobholder by reference to Table I and indicate below.

Category	A	B	C

Stage 2 — The Extent of the Supervision Undertaken

Determine from staff strength statistics the numbers of staff concerned, then calculate the average number of staff supervised in order to determine the size of the workgroup supervised and enter below.

Average Number of Staff Supervised

Size of the Workgroup Supervised	
SMALL	LARGE

Determine the overall degree level for the job under review for this factor by reference to Table II and indicate below.

DEGREE LEVEL	1	2	3	4	5

Continued

FACTOR 6 — RESPONSIBILITY FOR RESOURCES

Stage 1 — **Responsibilities Associated with the Direct Use or Handling of Equipment or Materials**

Identify the various Categories of activity undertaken by the jobholder by reference to Table I

Category	Yes	No	Reasons (i.e. activities concerned)
A			
B			
C			

Assess the extent of responsibility for the direct use or handling of equipment or materials by reference to Table II and indicate below.

Extent of Direct Responsibility	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH

Stage 2 — Additional Responsibility

Assess the extent of additional responsibility carried by the jobholder by reference to Tables IIIa, IIIb and IIIc and indicate below.

Table	Subject and Extent			Reasons (i.e. activities or staff concerned)
IIIa	**Subordinate Staff**			
	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH	
IIIb	**Cash**			
	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH	
IIIc	**Security**			
	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH	

Determine the extent of additional responsibility carried by the jobholder, i.e. the highest of the above, and indicate below.

Extent of Additional Responsibility	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH

Determine the overall degree level for the job under review for this factor by reference to Table IV and indicate below.


DEGREE LEVEL	1	2	3	4	5

Continued

FACTOR 7 – RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF OTHERS

Stage 1 – **Direct Responsibility**

Identify the various Categories of activity undertaken by the jobholder by reference to Table I and enter below.



Assess the extent of direct responsibility for the health and safety of others by reference to Table II and indicate below.

Extent of Direct Responsibility	LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH

Stage 2 – **Additional Responsibility**

Assess whether or not the jobholder has an additional responsibility for the health and safety of others and indicate below.

Additional Responsibility	YES	NO

Reasons (i.e. staff concerned/activities concerned)

Stage 3 – **Rescue Responsibility**

Assess whether or not the jobholder has a specific responsibility for the rescue of others and indicate below.

Rescue Responsibility	YES	NO

Determining the overall degree level for the job under review for this factor by reference to Table III and indicate below.

DEGREE LEVEL	1	2	3	4	5

Continued

FACTOR 8 – WORKING CONDITIONS

Stage 1 – **The Work Environment**

Assess the work environment of the job under review and, by reference to Table I, select the appropriate level for the job under each of the six features and enter below.

1	A	B	C	
2	A	B	C	
3	A	B	C	
4	A	B	C	
5	A	B	C	
6	A	B	C	

From the profile above, determine the description of the work environment that is appropriate to the job by reference to Table II and indicate below (tick where applicable).

Work Environment	Fair		Unpleasant		Very Unpleasant	

Stage 2 – **Disagreeable Tasks**

Assess whether or not the jobholder spends a significant proportion of his normal duty undertaking disagreeable tasks and indicate below.

Disagreeable Tasks	YES	NO

Reasons (i.e. tasks concerned)

Stage 3 – **Accident Hazards**

Assess whether or not the jobholder is significantly exposed to unavoidable accident hazards and indicate below.

Accident Hazards	YES	NO

Reasons (i.e. tasks concerned)

Determine the overall degree level for the job under review for this factor by reference to Table III and indicate below.

DEGREE LEVEL	1	2	3	4	5

Enter your assessments of the overall degree levels for each factor for the job under review in the Summary Table on Page 1.

APPENDIX II

Rules of Procedure of Joint Evaluation Committee

1 A meeting of the Joint Evaluation Committee shall consist of four members eligible to score from each [illegible] (Chairman and the Joint Secretaries who do not score

2 An Employer's Side member may not score jobs which are under his immediate control as a manager and an Employees' Side member may not score:

(a) his own job, or

(b) jobs of staff in his own work section.

3 Job descriptions which have been produced according to the prescribed procedure (see Appendix IV) will be furnished to the Committee members before the relevant meeting of the Committee by the Joint Secretaries.

4 At the Committee meeting, the Chairman will direct the members' attention to the job descriptions one at a time to be evaluated. When each member has satisfied himself that he has a sufficiently full understanding of the content of the job under consideration he will notify the Chairman.

5 The manager in charge of the unit where the job is situated and a spokesman for the jobholders will be present whilst the members of the committee are familiarising themselves with the job's content. The Chairman will invite them to enlarge upon or clarify matters of fact which are unclear to any member of the committee or to the Chairman himself.

6 If the committee is unable to satisfy itself on a matter of fact concerning a job, the Chairman may adjourn that evaluation and call upon each side to nominate a member who will then jointly visit the place of work with the purpose of establishing those facts which in the Chairman's view are in question.

7 When all members have notified the Chairman that they have a sufficient understanding of the job, the Chairman will ask the immediate manager and the staff's spokesman to withdraw, remaining on call until the scoring is finished should any further factual clarification be needed.

8 The members of the Committee eligible to score will then do so individually, using the manual, on the score-sheets provided.

9 When all members of the committee have finished scoring the Chairman will call upon each member to declare his set of factor scores. When any differences of scoring are apparent on a particular factor, the Chairman will seek to bring amount amendments to remove such differences.

10 Should the Committee fail to agree, the Chairman will identify whether the differences arise from differing factual interpretation, or from irreconcilable differences of interpretation of the manual. In the former case he will invite the local parties to rejoin the meeting with the objective of resolving the matter. In the latter case, or if this fails or if the differences arise from a refusal to accept the interpretation of the manual by either party in dispute, he will withdraw the Committee and ask the Joint Secretaries to assist him in determining the area or areas of disagreement prior to any resumption of the meeting. If no resolution is achieved, the Chairman may report upon this situation in writing to the NSP giving his own observations as to the matters in dispute.

11 When a complete set of factor scores for the job have been adopted by the Committee, the Chairman, assisted by the Joint Secretaries, will determine the evaluation result in the manner described in the Job Evaluation Manual.

12 At the Chairman's discretion the Committee may score a particular job more than once, prior to a result being announced (for the purposes of validation, or where reasonable doubt is cast by a member of the Committee upon the facts or interpretations upon which an earlier score for the job was based). In such a case, the Chairman will determine which is the score to be adopted for the job and the other score, or scores, will be disregarded in deriving the job's grade. Once a particular result for a job has been adopted and announced it may not be withdrawn or further altered unilaterally by the Committee.

13 The Joint Secretaries will be responsible for communicating to the interested parties the results adopted by the Committee.

APPENDIX III

Responsibilities of the Chairman of the Evaluation Committee

1 The primary responsibility of the Chairman of the Joint Evaluation Committee is to ensure that the evaluation criteria are fairly and consistently applied by the Committee.

2 In pursuit of this objective, the Chairman will apply his own judgement to any matters which are the subject of disagreement between members of the Committee and will invite the whole Committee to accept his arbitration in any such matters.

3 In particular, the Chairman will:—

3.1 Give his interpretation of the Job Evaluation Manual as necessary:

3.2 Determine whether a point in dispute is a matter of fact and, if so, cause to take place any further examination which he deems to be necessary in order to establish the true facts, or whether it is one of interpretation.

3.3 Determine — in the interests of fairness and consistency of application of the Manual — whether a job which the Committee has already scored previously, but the grade for which has not yet been announced, should be scored again; and

3.4 In relation to any such jobs, determine which of the scores achieved is that which is most in conformity with the basis upon which all other jobs have been scored and should therefore be the result to be adopted by the Committee and announced, any other score being discarded;

3.5 Arbitrate where there is a dispute or doubt about the relevance to the evaluation of a job of any facts (their accuracy being accepted).

4 The Chairman will preside over all meetings of the Evaluation Committee, but shall not score jobs himself. In the conduct of meetings, he will be governed by the Rules of Procedure of the Evaluation Committee (see Appendix II).

APPENDIX IV

Procedure for Preparing and Agreeing Job Descriptions

1 The manager who has responsibility for managing a unit in which a job is performed (or is to be performed if not performed already) will be responsible with the local Personnel Official for ensuring that the following procedure is operated.

2 It is the manager's responsibility to ensure that any obligations management have entered into to consult with staff or their Trade Unions concerning the organisation of the particular operation are complied with Before producing a first draft job description the manager will hold preliminary discussions with staff representatives at a local level, outlining the overall job structure and indicating any changes he foresees in the way the work is organised.

3 The manager will then produce a draft job description in accordance with the standard format and instructions (sample attached). All jobs requiring to be performed within a unit at any given time will be described in the given format.

4 The manager's draft job description will be supplied by him to:

(a) all of the jobholders — or a spokesman or spokesmen nominated from amongst them if they are too numerous or dispersed to permit of direct contact with all of them, or if this is for any other reason mutually acceptable;

(b) the accredited Panel Representative of the jobholders (if he is not one of those covered by (a)).

5 The manager and the jobholders (or their spokesman/men) and their Panel Representative will meet to discuss the manager's draft. When the manager and the jobholders have agreed upon the wording of the draft job description, the manager will formally submit that unsigned draft to the Project Team.

6 The Project Team, acting on behalf of the Joint Evaluation Committee, will check the draft job description against the agreed instructions, and will propose such amendments, if any, as are considered necessary to conform with those instructions.

7 The Project Team will return the draft job description, with any amendments proposed, to the local manager for signature by his senior line manager, together with his own and that of the local panel representative.

8 The signed job description will then be returned to the Project Team for signature by the Employees' side Representative and the Employer's side Representative and the Employer's side Joint Secretary before presentation to a meeting of the Evaluation Committee on the next convenient occasion thereafter.

9 At any stage of this process, by request of the local parties, members of the Project Team may give advice to both parties on the drafting of the job description or the operation of the job evaluation system.

APPENDIX IV

Procedure for Preparing and Agreeing Job Descriptions

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8 The signed job description will then be returned to the Project Team for signature by the Employees' side Representative and the Employer's side Representative and the Employer's side Joint Secretary before presentation to a meeting of the Evaluation Committee on the next convenient occasion thereafter.

9 At any stage of this process, by request of the local parties, members of the Project Team may give advice to both parties on the drafting of the job description or the operation of the job evaluation system.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR DRAWING UP JOB DESCRIPTIONS

FOR INDUSTRIAL GROUND STAFF JOBS

A JOB IDENTIFICATION

1 **Job Title** Give the job title.

Department Identify the broad organisation position of the job within British Airways.

Location Indicate the point to which the jobholder reports for work (e.g. LHR Terminal 3).

1(a) — For office use only — leave blank.

2 **Number of Jobholders** Show number of staff covered by the job description.

Shift system worked Give a general indication of the type of shift system worked (e.g. days, double days, continuous 3 shift etc).

Number of subordinate staff In the case of jobs with a supervisory content give the number of staff supervised.

3 **Organisational structure** Show how the job fits into the organisation structure giving the job titles of direct supervisors as far as Senior Staff level, and the job titles of any subordinate staff. Give the number of staff covered by each job title.

B GENERAL DESCRIPTION

4 **Main purpose of job** Describe in one sentence where possible the main purpose of the job in order to give a general impression to someone not familiar with it (e.g. 'To ensure the correct loading and unloading of aircraft with baggage, freight, mail').

5 **Principal tasks** Describe individually the tasks which fit together to make up the complete job under normal operating conditions.

First break down the job into sub-sets of tasks which may be performed independently of one another, e.g. at different work stations or on different shifts.

Next for each sub-set describe in their proper sequence the tasks which make up each work cycle, listing those which occur most-frequently first. For each task specify **what** the task is, and where necessary **how** it is performed.

C RESOURCES

6 **Equipment** List the different types of equipment used or handled in each of the categories. Describe the equipment by reference to functional characteristics and avoid using manufacturer's trade-names. Where appropriate list any equipment used by subordinates.

7 Materials – [illegible] different types of materials used or handled in each of the categories and where appropriate materials used or handled by subordinates.

D SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

8 **Essential Qualifications** List any qualifications which the job-holder **must** have before appointment to the job. Qualifications which are desirable, but not essential, should be excluded.

9 **Previous experience** Does the job require the jobholder to have completed a full-time vocational course, such as City and Guilds? If so give the name of the course.

Is it necessary for the jobholder to have had experience in particular job(s) outside the airline prior to appointment? Where such previous experience is essential identify the job(s).

Is it necessary for the jobholder to have had experience in **airline** job(s) before appointment? Where such previous experience is essential identify the job(s).

10 Give any other supplementary information not covered by the above, which may be relevant to the evaluation of the job.

E APPROVAL

11 When the draft job description has been agreed by staff, and checked for quality and consistency by Job Evalution Branch and a designated staff representative, it is signed by the parties concerned.

F EFFECTIVE DATE

Put the date from which the Scheme becomes operational.

BRITISH AIRWAYS

JOB DESCRIPTION FOR INDUSTRIAL GROUND STAFF JOBS

A JOB IDENTIFICATION

1

Job Title	
Department	
Location	

1(a)

Job ref code	
Date	

2

Number of jobholders	
Shift system worked	
Number of subordinate staff (Supervisors only)	

3 Organisation structure

B GENERAL DESCRIPTION

4 Main purpose of the job.

5 Principal tasks.

C RESOURCES

6 Equipment used

Simple hand tools	
Communications Equipment	
Non-mechanical mobile equipment	
Static machinery and/or equipment	
Light vehicles	
Mechanical Mobile Equipment	
Heavy Rigid Vehicles	
Heavy articulated vehicles	
Equipment used by subordinate staff	
Other equipment used	

7 Materials used [illegible]

	Description
Cargo Baggage	
Air Larders/ Bars	
General Stores	
Perishable Foodstuffs	
Materials used/ handled by subordinate staff	
Other materials used/ handled	

D SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

8

Essential

9 Description of previous experience required

full-time vocational	
pre-British Airways	
British Airways	

10

Other supplementary information	

E APPROVAL

	SIGNATURE	DATE
Senior line manager:		
Line manager: for accuracy of content		
Local panel representative: for accuracy of content		
Job Evaluation Branch: for quality/consistency		
Staff-side representative: for quality/consistency		

F EFFECTIVE DATE

AN AGREEMENT [illegible] BRITISH AIRWAYS hereinafter referred to as the EMPLOYER, and the EMP[illegible]SP hereinafter referred to as the EMPLOYEES dated [illegible] establishing the joint application of a joint evaluation system to jobs of British Airways [illegible] GSS NSP

Preamble

1 The parties have agreed jointly to establish and maintain means for achieving the following objectives:

1.1 Equal pay for work of equal value amongst jobs covered by this NSP.

1.2 Increased efficiency and job satisfaction by better restructuring of jobs.

The Job Evaluation Method

2 To this end, the parties have agreed upon the adoption of a points-rating method of job evaluation which they have developed jointly. The evaluation criteria and the rules for applying them are embodied in the Job Evaluation Manual annexed to this Agreement (Appendix I).

The Joint Evaluation Committee

3 The Manual shall be used by a jointly constituted Evaluation Committee to evaluate all British Airways jobs covered by the GSS NSP Agreement.

4 The employer and employees shall respectively nominate Boards of 10 members, which shall jointly comprise the Evaluation Committee, and an up to date list of members shall be kept by the Joint Secretaries of the GSS NSP.

The employer's representatives shall be of Senior Staff level, and the employees' representatives shall themselves be employees of British Airways covered by the GSS NSP Agreement.

An evaluation Meeting shall comprise 4 substantive representatives drawn from each of the Boards, presided over by an independent Chairman appointed jointly by both sides of the GSS NSP. The rules of procedure of Evaluation Meetings are annexed to this Agreement (Appendix II).

The Joint Secretaries

5 The employer and the employees shall each additionally nominate a Joint Secretary to service the Evaluation Committee. The employees' Joint Secretary shall also be an employee of British Airways covered by the GSS NSP Agreement. The Joint Secretaries shall not be members of the Boards which comprise the Evaluation Committee.

6 The Joint Secretaries shall agree upon all arrangements for meetings of the Committee and the Evaluation Meeting, and shall respectively, identify those among their sides' Board of [illegible] for each Evaluation Meeting appropriate to that Meeting [illegible] of each Meeting [illegible] who will be taking part.

7 The Joint Secretaries shall jointly assist the Chairman of the Evaluation Committee in the execution of his responsibilites, and shall, when required by him, carry out such tasks on behalf of their respective sides as he may consider to be requisite for the smooth operation of all procedures associated with this Agreement.

The Chairman of the Joint Evaluation Committee

8 The responsibilites of the Chairman of the Evaluation Committee are annexed to this Agreement at Appendix III.

Preparation of Job Descriptions

9 Job Descriptions of jobs requiring evaluation shall be prepared and agreed in accordance with the procedure annexed at Appendix IV.

Employee Side Representative

10 The employees shall nominate representatives, who shall themselves by employees of British Airways covered by the GSS NSP Agreement, to act on behalf of the Joint Evaluation Committee in the checking of draft job descriptions as described in Appendix IV. An up to date list of such representatives shall be kept by the Joint Secretaries of the NSP. The number of designated representatives and the facilities provided shall be as is from time to time mutually agreed to be necessary.

11 The designated representatives shall not be members of the Joint Evaluation Committee.

Appeals

12 The parties agree that while every effort will be made by all concerned on both sides to ensure that the agreed method is correctly and fairly applied, means must nevertheless be provided for representations to be made on behalf of jobholders of particular jobs who consider they have a legitimate grievance concerning the evaluation of their job, and for such a grievance to be jointly enquired into in a systematic manner. The parties have agreed upon the procedure to be followed in such cases which is annexed at Appendix V.

13 The employer and employees shall each nominate two representatives from within British Airways to be members of the Review Committee. The employees' side representatives shall also be employees covered by GSS NSP Agreement. All four representatives should be familiar with the operation of the scheme but should not be members of the Joint Evaluation Committee. The Review Committee shall give initial consideration to appeals in the manner described in Appendix V.

Access

14 A [illegible] Committee's proceedings shall be allowed for the purposes of observation only [illegible] to employees covered by the GSS NSP upon prior arrangement with the Joint Secretaries in groups not exceeding 6 in number on any one occasion. Employees shall not be present as observers at meetings of the Committee at which their own job is to be evaluated. All observers will withdraw – together with the line manager and the jobholder – when the committee scores the job.

Monitoring of the Scheme

15 The parties agree upon the necessity to maintain their confidence in the scheme. The GSS NSP shall, therefore, at annual intervals, or as required, nominate a joint working party who will examine the working of the scheme and report back their findings, including any recommendations for modification of the procedures.

Termination

16 The Agreement may be terminated at the request of either party, providing six month's notice of the intention to terminate is given, in writing, to the GSS NSP.

Signed _____

_____

APPENDIX II

Rules of Procedure of Joint Evaluation Committee

1 A meeting of the Joint Evaluation Committee shall consist of four members eligible to score from each side with the independent Chairman and the Joint Secretaries who do not score.

2 An Employer's Side member may not score jobs which are under his immediate control as a manager and an Employees' Side member may not score:

(a) his own job, or

(b) jobs of staff in his own work section.

3 Job descriptions which have been produced according to the prescribed procedure (see Appendix IV) will be furnished to the Committee members before the relevant meeting of the Committee by the Joint Secretaries.

4 At the Committee meeting, the Chairman will direct the members' attention to the job descriptions one at a time to be evaluated. When each member has satisfied himself that he has a sufficiently full understanding of the content of the job under consideration he will notify the Chairman.

5 The manager in charge of the unit where the job is situated and a spokesman for the jobholders will be present whilst the members of the committee are familiarising themselves with the job's content. The Chairman will invite them to enlarge upon or clarify matters of fact which are unclear to any member of the committee or to the Chairman himself.

6 If the committee is unable to satisfy itself on a matter of fact concerning a job, the Chairman may adjourn that evaluation and call upon each side to nominate a member who will then jointly visit the place of work with the purpose of establishing those facts which in the Chairman's view are in question.

7 When all members have notified the Chairman that they have a sufficient understanding of the job, the Chairman will ask the immediate manager and the staff's spokesman to withdraw, remaining on call until the scoring is finished should any further factual clarification be needed.

8 The members of the Committee eligible to score will then do so individually, using the manual, on the score-sheets provided.

9 When all members of the committee have finished scoring the Chairman will call upon each member to declare his set of factor scores. When any differences of scoring are apparent on a particular factor, the Chairman will seek to bring amount amendments to remove such differences.

10 [illegible] the Chairman will identify whether the differences arise from differing factual interpretation, or from irreconcilable differences of interpretation of the manual. In the former case he may if he so decides to invite the local parties to rejoin the meeting with the objective of resolving the factual disagreement. Otherwise, or if this fails, or if the difference arises from irreconcilable differences of interpretation, the facts not being in dispute, he will adjourn the discussion of that particular job and ask the Joint Secretaries to assist him in determining the area or areas of disagreement prior to any resumption of the meeting. If no resolution is achieved, the Chairman may report upon this situation in writing to the NSP giving his own observations as to the matters in dispute.

11 When a complete set of factor scores for the job have been adopted by the Committee, the Chairman, assisted by the Joint Secretaries, will determine the evaluation result in the manner described in the Job Evaluation Manual. The Joint Secretaries, will be responsible for communicating to the interested parties the result adopted by the Committee. Once a particular result for a job has been adopted and announced it may not be withdrawn or further altered unilaterally by the Committee.

APPENDIX III

Responsibilities of the Chairman of the Evaluation Committee

1 The primary responsibility of the Chairman of the Joint Evaluation Committee is to ensure that the evaluation criteria are fairly and consistently applied by the Committee.

2 In pursuit of this objective, the Chairman will apply his own judgement to any matters which are the subject of disagreement between members of the Committee and will invite the whole Committee to accept his arbitration in any such matters.

3 In particular, the Chairman will:—

3.1. Give his interpretation of the Job Evaluation Manual as necessary:

3.2 Determine whether a point in dispute is a matter of fact and, if so, cause to take place any further examination which he deems to be necessary in order to establish the true facts, or whether it is one of interpretation.

3.3 Arbitrate where there is a dispute or doubt about the relevance to the evaluation of a job of any facts (their accuracy being accepted).

4 The Chairman will preside over all meetings of the Evaluation Committee, but shall not score jobs himself. In the conduct of meetings, he will be governed by the Rules of Procedure of the Evaluation Committee (see Appendix II).

APPENDIX IV

Procedure for Preparing and Agreeing Job Descriptions

1 [illegible] Evaluation Agreement, the Manager responsible for the organisational unit in which a job is performed (or is to be performed if not performed already) will be responsible with the Local Personnel Official for ensuring that the following procedure is operated.

2 It is the manager's responsibility to ensure that any obligations management have entered into to consult with staff or their Trade Unions concerning the organisation of the particular operation are complied with. Before producing a first draft job description the manager will hold preliminary discussions with staff representatives at a local level, outlining the overall job structure and indicating any changes he foresees in the way the work is organised.

3 The manager will then produce a draft job description in accordance with the standard format and instructions (sample attached). The job may either be a new job or a job which has changed. For changed jobs the manager should separately identify the changes which have taken place. All jobs requiring to be performed within a unit at any given time will be described in the given format.

4 The manager's draft job description will be supplied by him to:

(a) all of the jobholders — or a spokesman or spokesmen nominated from amongst them if they are too numerous or dispersed to permit of direct contact with all of them, or if this is for any other reason mutually acceptable;

(b) the accredited Panel Representative of the jobholders (if he is not one of those covered by (a)).

5 The manager and the jobholders (or their spokesman/men) and their Panel Representative will meet to discuss the manager's draft. When the manager and the jobholders have agreed upon the wording of the draft job description, the manager will formally submit that unsigned draft, together where necessary with the list of changes since the previous job description, to the head of the Job Evaluation Branch of British Airways Personnel Department.

6 The Job Evaluation Branch, acting on behalf of the Joint Evaluation Committee, will check the draft job description against the agreed instructions, and will propose such amendments, if any, as are considered necessary to conform with those instructions.

7 The Job Evaluation Branch will forward the draft, with any amendments proposed, to the designated employee-side Representative for agreement. The Job Evaluation Branch will then return the jointly agreed draft to the local manager for his signature and that of the local Panel Representative.

8 All job descriptions when duly signed will be forwarded by the Job Evaluation Branch to the Joint Secretaries of the Evaluation Committee for presentation to the Committee on the next convenient occasion thereafter.

20.1.77

Mater[illegible] materials [illegible] each of the [illegible] where [illegible]

D SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

8 **Essential Qualifications** List any qualifications which the job-holder **must** have before appointment to the job. Qualifications which are desirable, but not essential, should be excluded.

9 **Previous experience** Does the job require the jobholder to have completed a full-time vocational course, such as City and Guilds? If so give the name of the course.

Is it necessary for the jobholder to have had experience in particular job(s) outside the airline prior to appointment? Where such previous experience is essential identify the job(s).

Is it necessary for the jobholder to have had experience in **airline** job(s) before appointment? Where such previous experience is essential identify the job(s).

10 Give any other supplementary information not covered by the above, which may be relevant to the evaluation of the job.

E APPROVAL

11 When the draft job description has been agreed by staff, and checked for quality and consistency by Job Evalution Branch and a designated staff representative, it is signed by the parties concerned.

F EFFECTIVE DATE

a) In the case of a job where changes have already been worked, put the date from which those changes took place.

b) In the case of a job where changes are to take place in the future, put the date from which those changes are to take place.

APPENDIX V

Introduction

1 Jobholders who consider that either:

a) their job description has, through changes, ceased to give a full and accurate account of their job, and consequently that the evaluated grade no longer reflects the worth of their job's content; or

b) the evaluated grade for their job does not reflect the worth of their job's content, the accuracy of the job description not being in dispute,

can register an appeal against their grading. In the case of b) at least one year must have elapsed since any such appeal covered by the Main Agreement.

2 However, it must be borne in mind that the evaluation is of jobs, not of individuals (although in some cases a job may have a single occupant), and that all current and future jobholders of any particular job are affected by what happens to its grade. Therefore, those jobholders of a job who wish to register an appeal must first secure the concurrence of at least a majority of their fellow jobholders.

3 It will be the responsibility of the manager of the unit in which the job is performed to ascertain, in conjunction with the local Panel Representative(s) of the jobholders, that such a majority in favour of making an appeal does exist. The manager will act in concert with — and will normally when meeting the local Panel Representative(s) be accompanied by — a local Personnel Official as his advisor.

Procedure to be Followed

4 Jobholders wishing to appeal against the grade for their job arrived at by the Joint Evaluation Committee, must notify their manager accordingly in writing, giving their reasons. A spokesman or spokesmen of the jobholders may undertake this notification, if deputed to do so by at least a simple majority of the jobholders in the job at the date the appeal is notified. Documentary evidence that such a majority exists may be required.

5 Within one week, the manager will inform:

a) the jobholders' local Panel Representative (if he is not himself one of the jobholders),

b) the two Joint Secretaries of the Evaluation Committee, forwarding copies of the appeal notification and evidence to them.

6 The Joint Secretaries will then convene a meeting of the Review Committee (constituted as described in paragraph 14 of the Agreement) to hear representations and will notify the jobholders' spokesman and his manager of the date of the meeting.

7 At the meeting of the Review Committee, the spokesman will be invited to state his case as to why he considers the Joint Evaluation Committee's previous scoring of his job to be wrong. When the Committee is satisfied, having listened to and questioned the spokesman and his line manager, that they are in full possession of all the relevant facts, the spokesman and his line manager will withdraw, and the Review Committee shall consider whether or not there are sufficient grounds for the job to go back to a meeting of the Joint Evaluation Committee for re-evaluation.

8 If the Review Committee decides that there are insufficient grounds for the job to be re-evaluated, the Joint Secretaries will transmit this to the respective parties and the existing points-score and grade shall stand.

9 If the Review Committee decides that the job should be re-evaluated, the Joint Secretaries shall make the necessary arrangements for a meeting of the Joint Evaluation Committee, and shall notify the jobholders' spokesman, a local Panel Representative (who will not be one of the jobholders) and his manager of the date of the meeting. The Review Committee will also decide whether the existing job description gives a full and accurate account of the job. If they decide it does not the Joint Secretaries will be responsible for ensuring that a new job description is prepared in accordance with the procedure outlined in Appendix IV, prior to the meeting of the Evaluation Committee.

10 At the meeting of the Joint Evaluation Committee, the Chairman will invite the spokesman to state his case as to why he considers the previous scoring to be wrong. When the Committee is satisfied, having listened to and questioned the spokesman and his line manager, that they are in full possession off all the relevant facts, the Chairman will ask the spokesman to withdraw. The Committee will then score the job in the normal manner, in the presence of the jobholders' manager and local Panel Representative, who shall from this stage onwards address any points they may wish to raise to Chair only (and not to individual members of the Committee). The Chairman will determine the applicability or otherwise of any points so raised and may — if he deems it appropriate — call upon individual Committee members to answer him upon particular points.

11 Following the hearing, the Joint Secretaries will transmit the result to the respective parties. The result of an evaluation arrived at by a meeting of the Joint Evaluation Committee in response to an appeal shall override any result previously arrived at for that job.

Appendix 10

Registered Office:
[illegible]
Asst. Gen. Secs: G. H. UPWIN

"WOODBERRY",
218 GREEN LANES,
FINSBURY PARK,
LONDON, N.4 2HB.

REGION No. 1
(London and Home Counties)
Regional Secretary: B. FRY
Telephone: 01-800 4281/7

Your Ref.:

REGIONAL OFFICE
COMMUNICATION

Our Ref.: MM/BL/5730

5th May, 1975.

To
THE CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT MAILING LIST

Dear Colleagues,

British Airways - Redeployment Policy

At a meeting of the Trade Union Side of the National Joint Council and delegates of all Unions concerned in the National Joint Council held at the Centre Airport Hotel on Friday, 2nd May, the attached document was agreed by the Trade Union Side, and endorsed by the delegates, as the terms and conditions to be applied to any staff redeployed by agreement with the appropriate National Sectional Panels within British Airways.

I would point out that this document sets out and is intended as a basis of protection of conditions for people redeployed and at no time accepts that the employer has the right to redeploy either now or in the future unless it is agreed to do so by the National Sectional Panel concerned.

The present position on redeployment of staff is one which is being looked at by the National Sectional Panels and if difficulties arise then the Joint Official/Lay Member Liaison Committee of the National Joint Council will be called in to assist.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN COUSINS

National Secretary

M. B. MARTIN

Public Services Group Secretary

BRITISH AIRWAYS

DRAFT AGREEMENT

PAY AND CONDITIONS FOR STAFF WHO ARE REDEPLOYED

PREAMBLE

1 It is recognised that Civil Air Transport is an industry subject to continued change, brought about by technical advancement, market fluctuations and variations, and the need constantly to improve working arrangements.

2 A characteristic of this constantly changing situation tends to be expansion in some areas whilst contraction may be occurring at the same time in others; the disappearance of certain tasks; the creation of new ones.

3 It is also recognised that such changes have considerable impact on the circumstances of individual employees, or groups of employees.

4 It will continue to be British Airways policy to minimise disruption to employees through the careful planning and use of manpower and the application of recruitment, selection and training policies in order to avoid unnecessary fluctuations in manpower requirements.

5 It is recognised by British Airways and the Trade Unions that, in order to achieve effective use of manpower and avoid uneconomic use of resources in the circumstances detailed above, agreed arrangements should exist for transferring employees from one job to another within the undertaking, (ie redeployment of staff). The following arrangements have been agreed to facilitate such transfers and to ensure the minimum of disturbance to individuals who are redeployed.

6 Full consultation will take place with the Trade Union Officials of the appropriate NSP's, the Staff Representatives and the staff concerned.

7 The Trade Unions agree that staff can be redeployed into different jobs which may be at different locations and fall within a different NSP Agreement. However, in implementing redeployment, account will be taken of personal and domestic circumstances of the individuals, the skills required and the association of occupations within the industry.

8 The method of selection of individuals for redeployment would also take into consideration paragraph 7 above, but would be based on the principle of 'last in/first out' from those grades at the Unit and location where a surplus exists (unless some staff wish to volunteer). This method will vary according to the organisation of the Unit involved and can only be finalised following appropriate consultation as defined in paragraph 6 above.

9 It is agreed that effective employees who become surplus in their job can be redeployed (after suitable retraining where necessary) into different jobs which may be at different locations and fall within a different NSP Agreement.

10 Where employees are redeployed into jobs with a lower basic rate of pay and a lower salary expectation, British Airways undertake to safeguard current salary scale expectation (ie incremental progression to the top of the current scale, together with any subsequently negotiated increases) as a 'personal grade' when within the same NSP Agreement as a 'personal differential' when under a different NSP Agreement.

11 It is recognised that in the circumstances of redeployment, it is possible that some individuals may receive a higher rate of pay than the group with which they are working. This is accepted by both sides in the interest of maintaining people in employment and will not be cited by the Trade Unions in furtherance of any claim.

12. Employees redeployed within the same NSP Agreement will retain, where more favourable, their existing terms and conditions (as laid down in the National Agreement) excepting shift pay rates, additional payments, allowances, uniforms and rank markings which will be according to the new job. Overtime working will be in accordance with the requirements of the new job. Shift pay will be calculated from the premiums applicable to the shift pattern worked and paid at the rate specified for the grade into which the individual has been redeployed.

13 Employees redeployed into a different NSP Agreement will assume the terms and conditions of that Agreement except where they are more favourable for annual leave and minimum periods of notice which will be retained on a personal basis. Where applicable, shift pay will be calculated at the rate appropriate to the grade into which the individual has been redeployed. Overtime will be calculated at the rate appropriate to the individual's rate of pay.

14 a Where a redeployment involves a transfer from shift working to non-shift working, a sum equal to the individual's last week's shift pay will be paid for six months and a sum of half this amount for the following six months and then cease.

b Where a redeployment involves a transfer from a job involving permanent shift working to a job where the shifts worked attract a lower premium, a sum equal to the difference between the individual's last week's shift pay and the shift pay he receives in his new job will be paid for six months, and a sum of half this amount for the following six months and then cease.

c These arrangements do not apply where employees are redeployed into the Air Cabin Crew NSP, when they will immediately adopt the appropriate allowances as soon as they start work on the line.

d These arrangements are also subject to the individual being redeployed into a job at the same basic rate of pay. Should the individual receive a higher basic rate of pay as a result of the redeployment, then the sums delineated in 14b above will be reduced by the difference between the new basic rate of pay and the previous basic rate of pay.

15 Where necessary, British Airways will provide retraining and redeployed employees will accept such training. During retraining, employees will be paid in accordance with paragraphs 12 to 14 above.

16 Where redeployment means a move of location which entails extra travelling cost or a move of house, the appropriate British Airways staff regulations will be applied. Additionally, cases of special hardship will be looked at on their merits.

17 Where vacancies subsequently occur in their original job or different jobs of a similar type and nature to that from which individuals have been redeployed, they may be required to transfer back into those vacancies by British Airways without recourse to normal Staff Vacancy Notice procedures. Consultation between Trade Union officials and management would determine whether the 'offered job was of a similar type and nature' to that from which he had been redeployed.

18 If, following consultation, it is agreed that it would be unreasonable to ask the individual to take up his old job or a different job of a similar type and nature to that from which he had been redeployed, he will retain his 'personal grade' or 'personal differential' (see paragraph 10 above) in the job to which he has been redeployed.

19 Where following consultation, an individual unreasonably refuses to accept a transfer back to his original job or to a job of a similar type and nature to that original job, he will be placed on the rate of pay and full conditions for the job being done.

20 Redeployed employees will receive a letter from British Airways setting out the full details of the reasons and of the conditions under which they would then be working and will be asked to sign a copy of the letter to confirm their understanding and acceptance.

TRANSPORT & GENERAL WORKERS' UNION

Registered Office
TRANSPORT HOUSE,
SMITH SQUARE, LONDON S.W.1
Gen. Sec. J. L. JONES, M.B.E.
Asst. Gen. Sec. C. H. URWIN

"WOODBERRY",
218 GREEN LANES,
FINSBURY PARK,
LONDON, N.4 2HB.

"TRANSPORT HOUSE"
7/9 SOUTH ROAD,
SOUTHALL,
MIDDLESEX, UB1 1SU.

REGION No. 1
(London and Home Counties)
Regional Secretary: B. FRY
Telephone: 01-800 4281/7

LOS/FJH

1st October 1974

Dear Colleague,

Redeployment and Retraining

Please find attached a draft document issued by the employers side of the Joint Manpower Committee.

I would appreciate receiving any comments, as soon as possible, on the document, in view of the fact that the matter may well be discussed in the very near future.

Yours sincerely,

L. O. SHORTER

AIRPORT OFFICER

SPECIAL MEETING 22 AUGUST 1974 — REDEPLOYMENT AND RETRAINING

AGENDA ITEM 3 — STATEMENT OF BRITISH AIRWAYS BOARD

1 It is the policy of British Airways to provide satisfactory career opportunities for all persons entering their employment who wish to remain with them.

2 Because civil air transport is an industry subject to continuous change through technological advancements, market fluctuations and the need to improve working arrangements in a highly competitive environment there is always a need for expansion in some areas and contraction in others; the disappearance of some tasks and skills and the creation of others. This provides great opportunities for staff who adjust to change.

3 Such changes have considerable impact on the circumstances of individuals or groups of employees, but at the same time offer opportunities for wider experience and the acquisition of new skills.

4 In order to minimise disruption to employees and to provide the best possible security of employment, it is the intention of British Airways to:

a avoid unnecessary fluctuations in manpower requirements through careful planning and use of manpower and the application of effective recruitment, selection, training and development policies.

b redeploy staff who become surplus into suitable alternative jobs.

c design retraining programmes to meet the particular needs of identified surplus groups.

d safeguard current grade expectation on a personal basis during retraining and when individuals are redeployed into jobs with a lower basic rate of pay and grade expectation.

5 British Airways recognise that in order to achieve effective use of manpower and avoid uneconomic use of resources in the circumstances detailed above, agreed arrangements should exist for transferring employees from one job to another.

6 Full consultation will take place with Trade Union officials of appropriate National Sectional Panels, with staff representatives and the staff concerned before redeployment action is instituted.

7 Redeployment refers to any situation involving an obligatory displacement of any individual who is fully effective in his/her present job to another that may be significantly different as regards knowledge and skills required or as regards its effect on domestic circumstances, or to a job of a lower grade.

8 This policy does not apply in any other circumstances (eg when an individual transfers to another job for his/her development or because he/she is unable to perform effectively their current job due to ill health or other reasons).

August 1974

TRANSPORT & GENERAL WORKERS UNION
RECEIVED
25 SEP 1974
7/9, SOUTH ROAD, SOUTHALL, MIDDX.

Transport and General Workers Union

OUR REF JC/PEF

YOUR REF

TELEPHONE 01-828 7788 TELEGRAMS 'TRANSUNION LONDON SW1' TELEX No 919009

19th September, 1974.

Dear Colleague,

The Employers Side of the Joint Manpower Committee have produced a draft document on Redeployment and Retraining and quite clearly if the airline industry is still in decline then more and more of our members may be faced with the prospect of re-employment and whilst appreciating that it is difficult to give assessment without knowing the particular details of whom may be transferred and to where, the views of our members on the document would be appreciated in time either for the next Joint Manpower Committee, or what is probably likely, an early meeting of the General Purposes Committee.

Yours sincerely,

John Cousins

JOHN COUSINS
NATIONAL SECRETARY

TO: AIRPORT OFFICERS/SOUTHALL
MICK MARTIN/WOODBERRY.

B R I T I S H A I R W A Y S

Agreement on

PAY AND CONDITIONS FOR STAFF WHO ARE REDEPLOYED

1. It is recognised that Civil Air Transport is an industry subject to continued change, brought about by technical advancement, market fluctuations and variations and the need constantly to improve working arrangements.

2. A characteristic of this constantly changing situation tends to be expansion in some areas whilst contraction may be occurring at the same time in others; the disappearance of certain tasks; the creation of new ones.

3. It is also recognised that such changes have considerable impact on the circumstances of individual employees, or groups of employees.

4. It will continue to be British Airways' policy to minimise disruption to employees through the careful planning and use of manpower and the application of recruitment, selection and training policies in order to avoid unnecessary fluctuations in manpower requirements.

5. It is recognised by British Airways and the Trade Unions that, in order to achieve effective use of manpower and avoid uneconomic use of resources in the circumstances detailed above, agreed arrangements should exist for transferring employees from one job to another within the undertaking, (i.e. redeployment of staff). The following arrangements have been agreed to facilitate such transfers and to ensure the minimum of disturbance to individuals who are redeployed.

6. Full negotiation will take place through appropriate National Sectional Panels.

7. The Trade Unions agree that staff may be redeployed into different jobs which may be at different locations and fall within a different NSP Agreement. However, in implementing redeployment, account will be taken of personal and domestic circumstances of the individuals, the skills required and the association of occupations within the industry.

8. The method of selection of individuals for redeployment would also take into consideration paragraph 7 above, but would be based on the principle of 'last in/first out' from those grades at the Unit and location were a surplus exists (unless some staff wish to volunteer). This method will vary according to the organisation of the Unit involved and can only be finalised following appropriate consultation as defined in paragraph 6 above.

9. It is agreed that employees who become surplus in their job who are redeployed (after suitable retraining where necessary), into different jobs may be at different locations and fall within a different NSP Agreement.

10. Where employees are redeployed into jobs with a lower basic rate of pay and a lower salary expectation, British Airways undertake to safeguard current salary scale expectation (i.e. incremental progression to the top of the current scale, together with any subsequently negotiated increases), as a 'personal grade' when within the same NSP Agreement as a 'personal differential' when under a different NSP Agreement.

11. It is recognised that in the circumstances of redeployment, it is possible that some individuals may receive a higher rate of pay than the group with which they are working. This is accepted by both sides in the interest

Consultation between Trade Union Officials and Management would determine whether the 'offered job was of a similar type and nature' to that from which he had been redeployed.

18. If, following consultation, it is agreed that it would be unreasonable to ask the individual to take up his old job or a different job of a similar type and nature to that from which he had been redeployed, he will retain his 'personal grade' or 'personal differential' (see paragraph 10 above) in the job to which he has been redeployed.

19. Where following consultation, an individual unreasonably refuses to accept a transfer back to his original job or to a job of a similar type and nature to that original job, he will be placed on the rate of pay and full conditions for the job being done.

20. Redeployed employees will receive a letter from British Airways setting out the full details of the reasons and of the conditions under which they would then be working and will be asked to sign a copy of the letter to confirm their understanding and acceptance.

21. Nothing in this Agreement shall preclude the application of better terms and conditions in respect of staff who are redeployed should future Government legislation so provide.

25.4.75

Appendix 11

RAMP NEWS

UNITY IS STRENGTH

DISPUTE CONTINUES

WE ARE WINNING

Do Not Forget Why We Are Locked Out

We are locked out because we refused to accept a deterioration in our hard won, negotiated, safe working practices, working conditions and contracts of employment imposed by management on 9th Feburary.

We are locked out because we carried out the policy of our Union by arguing the retention of jobs.

Has Anything Changed ?



30 Minute Mealbreak ?

Reports are coming in that volunteers are receiving 'Money in the Hand' and being supplied with meals. The Daily Mail reported a secretary who claims that her 3 children have hardly seen her and that the BACK BREAKING WORK is doing TERRIBLE DAMAGE TO HER NAILS.

NO !

- British Airways have never given us anything.
- We have had to negotiate everything. (6 months to achieve 2.9% last year)
- All we are demanding is the right to negotiate changes.
- A BASIC TRADE UNION PRINCIPLE.
- The press tells us we are conceding defeat today.
- DO THE PRESS NOW MAKE OUR DECISIONS?

WINNING MEANS WORK



Ron Todd Tried

What Has Been Done?

Our union ex. has offered a peace formula designed towards an honourable return to work.This was totally rejected by management, and can only indicate that the management's motives are to destroy any effective union structure at Heathrow and not, as they claim, to find a resolvement of the issue..

Why Did They Reject This Peace Formula?

Management's major reason for rejection is based on the fact that having released 150 staff, they could not maintain a credible operation.

They Have Destroyed Their Own Argument

If their propaganda is to be believed, they are maintaining a more efficient operation without us being there(maybe we should negotiate a payment to stay out, in order that we don't mess it up again when we win the battle and return to work?).

What PRICE Management

PROPAGANDA ?

Could not a great deal of cash have been saved over this infantile campaign by the employment of the surplus B.A.L.P.A. members to drop leaflets? This would have enabled them to retain their flying skills should they ever be required to earn their fat salaries again.



Stop Press

'Thiefrow' Insult AGAIN

Ramp Accused

The 'Sun' newspaper rang the Dispute Committee on Saturday to ask if it was true that, since the strike, theft had stopped at British Airways! The Dispute Committee felt sure that all 2,000 Ramp Workers might like to 'phone or write to the Editor of the 'Sun' to make some comments on the subject.

What Effect Are We Having ?

Despite the high volume of propaganda from British Airways and the media, to the contrary, the Ramp Workers action is having an increasing effect.The initial enthusiasm of the volunteers is already waning as the novelty wears off.

Areas in T3, South Side Catering and in T1 have engaged in token stoppages as they realise the implications of the attack on the Ramp. T. & G. W. U. areas attached to the E. & M. will be holding mass meetings early next week to consider their role in relation to the use of 'blacklegs' in an official dispute.

Areas outside Heathrow are also concerned at the overall effects of our dispute in relation to the overall effect on our Union. These are examples of growing support and is a direct result of the determination & solidarity displayed by all Ramp Workers, against all the odds, and indicates that now is the time to dig our heels in with a firmer determination than ever.


B.A.
VACANCIES

RAMP WORKERS REQUIRED

DUTIES	*	Management Determines
QUALIFICATIONS	*	Acquiescent
PAY	*	Subject to Management's Requirements
HOLIDAYS	*	Same
FRINGE BENEFITS	*	Same

THIS CONTRACT MAY BE TERMINATED BY MANAGEMENT AT ANY TIME

In our attempt to avoid confrontation some of our alternative proposals were rejected because it is against BA policy to disturb the management structure.



Dispute Pay

We first of all apologise for the problems encountered this week.This is a new experience for us all in this area. However, next week we expect to have a much slicker operation. Those of you who have dispute cards, please fill them in before you arrive. Put your Staff No. for Membership No.

TIME TABLE

THURS	11.00-14.00 -	1/238 Handlers Cleaners
	14.00-16.00 -	1/755 Ramp Supervisors
FRI	11.00-14.30 -	1/616 Ramp Sections
	14.30-16.30 -	1/1453 Cargo Movement

B.A.
VACANCIES

RAMP ACTORS REQUIRED

DUTIES	*	SCAB LABOUR
QUALIFICATIONS	*	PILOT, MANAGERIAL EXPERIENCE PREFERRED
PAY	*	£18,000-£30,000 p.a.
HOLIDAYS	*	UP TO SIX MONTHS
FRINGE BENEFITS	*	WHILST RAMP ACTOR YOU WILL RECEIVE OVERALLS, REFRESHMENTS FREE ON THE JOB, YOUR PHOTO IN THE PRESS ETC.

SHORT TERM CONTRACT OF WORK

WHEN RAMP WORKERS SLINK BACK BEATEN AND ACCEPT MANAGEMENT'S ULTIMATUMS YOU CAN ALL HAVE A REST BY RETURNING TO YOUR NORMAL DUTIES

INTERNAL APPLICATIONS ONLY

According to the Daily Mail, in reference to the Ramp dispute, the volunteer squad flies faster.

The implication of this report is that less people can do a better job than those who have been doing these functions on a regular basis for years. Apart from alleged reports that volunteers are receiving 'money in the hand', and being supplied with meals in the area, the manner in which this is being done, is somewhat highlighted by the report of a secretary who claims that her three children have hardly seen her and that the back-breaking work is doing terrible damage to her nails.

It would appear that the present operation being jacked up by British Airways, is intended to imbue a 'Dunkirk' aura, with the idea that the volunteers' contribution is imperative to the survival of the airline. According to British Airways, 'survival is dependant on competition, and competition can only be achieved on the basis of cost cutting', which inevitably means jobs.



Sierra Charlie Alpha Bravo

Calling

HEATHrow ROBINSON

I'm Getting Knackered



It is obvious that a large percentage of the volunteers are motivated by fear of job losses, rather than an acceptance of the stringent contraint and fundamental changes embodied in the survival plan. The enthusiasm reported from some of the volunteers may well be the novelty of actually working on aircraft, which in itself provides a degree of job satisfaction, but there is no doubt that hard facts will quickly emerge, which will indicate in no uncertain manner that the 'enthusiastic' response from the volunteers, will in fact cost them their own jobs in the end.

The struggle which the Ramp is engaged in, is firstly the principle of retaining the fundamental right that the employer cannot unilaterally alter a contract. Secondly, that workers must be able to oppose the enforcement of rosters which will fundamentally interfere with their family life. Thirdly, that all workers have a legitimate right to protect whatever gains, achieved in the course of time i.e. hours of work and working conditions.

While these aspirations can hardly be described as revolutionary, it would appear that 2,000 Ramp Workers have raised the wrath of the establishment. As with the Railways, public money is being used to destroy trade union organisation in the public sector, which must inevitably mean a depletion of living standards.

The implication of the Ramp's position needs to be quickly recognised by other workers in the industry. It is not just a simple matter of 'rosters', it is whether or not trade unionism continues to exist at L.H.R. The decision by groups to continue tolerating blackleg labour is in breach of fundamental trade union principles and appears to be becoming endemic to L.H.R.

Currently the Ramp is in the forefront of the defence of [illegible] principles and any areas who fail to recognise that fact, do so at their peril. [illegible] to maximise support for [illegible] of the T.G.W.U. in particular and the [illegible] movement in general.

At present, with the anti-trade union laws being [illegible] Tebbitt, in the offing, it is more than ever necessary for unity [illegible] industry.

The Ramp does not claim to be the custodian of trade union principles, it is the employer who is determining the escalation of this struggle by the engagement of 'scab labour' and therefore, if left unchallenged, this cancer will inevitably encompass the whole of the movement.

Your support for the Ramp means the defence of your own areas.

RAMP'S REPLY

TO

British airways NEWS

The report in British Airways News, 18-12-81 referring to a meeting of Ramp Shop Stewards addressed by Operations Director Howard Phelps is, to say the least, one sided and consequently inaccurate by ommission.

The suggestion that the Ramp's attitude is a threat to British Airways' survival plan is open to question. Firstly, one is expected to accept that the plan is for survival, which leads on to the next question, survival for who?

One of the first announcements of the present Government, was the proposal to sell off British Airways shares as quickly as possible. At no time were the Trade Unions consulted before this piratical decision was made. The Government's deregulation of Civil Air Transport, on the one hand, and deliberate constraints on British Airways, on the other, is designed to ensure that privatisation will become a fact as soon as possible. The appointment of Sir John King as part-time Chairman of British Airways, it is hoped, will guarantee the fruition of the Government's policy

The so called 'survival' plan which was issued on September 10th, 1981, without consultation with the Trades Unions, has been clearly described by Sir John as measures necessary, particularly in the use of manpower, to attract private investors and speculators. The Ramp Shop Stewards made it quite clear to Operations Director, that the 'survival' plan and the Chairman's objectives, can only mean 'ripening the plum for the speculators plucking' at the expense of jobs throughout the airline and inevitably, consequential job losses in other peripheral areas of the industry. While Ramp areas are prepared to continue dialogue within the autonomy of each particular Task Force, it has stated clearly that it cannot engage in discussion on changed working methods and increased attendance factors, designed to facilitate the reduction of staff, whether that be through severance or otherwise. The demands being put to the Ramp, are contrary to the terms of reference of a trade union, i.e. to improve wages and working conditions and increased job security.

The Operations Director stated that he did not believe the Airline would be privatised and in any case in his view, it would make no difference as to who owned it. This view seems rather 'naive' as history records continual pressure for this aim from the private sector, and also de-nationalisation continues to be a priority of the present Government's policy.

With typical media misrepresentation, the report refers to Management's desire to remove 'rostered overtime'. This is a guaranteed earnings clause which was a condition of acceptance of the Ramp Agreement, and which the Trade Union side has tried to get absorbed into the basic rate for many years. At present the matter is at national level awaiting Management's pleasure to go to conciliation. Any delay on resolving the issue is quite clearly Management's responsibility in being reluctant to activate their own arbitrary interpretation of a 'failure to agree'.

As far as the Common Industrial Agreement was concerned, it was the Ramp Trade Union side, who proposed a common industrial agreement, quite some time before it became an item in the 1980 pay deal, and the Ramp Trade Union side remains ready to discuss and examine the viability of such an agreement within the definitions of its original proposition.

It is blatantly mis-leading for Operations Director to suggest that many grading problems could have been solved by the job and pay restructuring scheme. The Ramp Trade Union side is very much aware that dissatisfaction has been recorded by many areas covered by such a scheme. British Airways' refusal to fully recognise the findings of an independent mediator, who found in favour of Staff, and who recommended a regrading within the Ramp Structure, is an example of Management's obstructive tactics. It might be pertinent to remind Operations Director that the Ramp played an important role in the initial discussions on the job and pay restructuring scheme, but it was Management at that time who tried to wind up the Ramp completely before a manual was agreed, consequently the Ramp Trade Union side withdrew from the scheme, and while aware that job evaluation is subjective, it never abandonned the principle, providing an acceptable manual could be agreed. The Ramp Trade Union side believes it is diabolical that Staff who earn the praises of Operations Director on the front page of the same issue of British Airways News, for their loyal contribution during the spell of bad weather, should be portrayed as unco-operative on the back page. It might be as well to remind the EBM that the Ramp workers who are at the sharp end of the operation, and are there in all weathers, as a National Group, received a lower percentage of pay overall for 1981, than any other National Group. Now of course, although the workforce cannot in any way be blamed for the overall current economic difficulties being faced by the industry, along with all other National Groups, whatever co-operation is expected, there is no

offer of pay for 1982. No doubt if fuel goes up, or landing fees increase, the money will be found, but to pay staff for the commodity they have to sell, the money will not be forthcoming. Yet British Airways as a publicly owned airline, has been responsible for millions of pounds to the National Exchequer. If the Government were to take steps to reduce the current unemployment figure by a mere 60,000, it would recoup over £200 million on the present estimated cost for the unemployed, let it invest that in British Airways. Under such circumstances the Ramp would be in a position to play its part in improving efficiency with a view to expansion of the industry.

The Ramp Trade Union side is well aware that British Airways, as a publicly owned airline, has been the source of job security in the industry. Advanced living standards have been won through strong trade union organisation. All these gains are now under attack. The Government's policy of creating mass unemployment, designed to weaken the Trade Union Movement, has depressed the economy with the consequential loss of freight and passengers for the airlines. By de-regulation of routes, cut-throat competition is the rule, resulting in job losses and threatening safety. This situation is in danger of setting workers against each other in an endeavour to protect their own particular position. By privatising British Airways, the public service aspect of Civil Air Transport will be destroyed and result in uncertainty for the future.

The Ramp Trade Union side believes the only security for the future, lies in unity across the whole spectrum of British Airways and beyond. For the restoration of all routes to British Airways and the expansion of Civil Air Transport based on a larger public sector. The introduction of a big extension of industrial democracy and supporting the right of trade unions to be fully involved in all major decisions affecting investment, jobs, routes and longterm planning.



From....The Ramp National Sectional Panel (Trade Union Side)

Appendix 12

Transport
and General
Workers Union


TRANSPORT HOUSE · SMITH SQUARE · WESTMINSTER · LONDON S.W.1P 3JB.

OUR REF FW/YLF/12161
YOUR REF RGP/SEG

TELEPHONE 01-828 7788 TELEGRAMS TRANSUNION LONDON SW1 TELEX No 919000

LEGAL DEPARTMENT
Secretary: A. C. BLYGHTON

25th August 1983



Mr R G Pither
Airport Officer
SOUTHALL

Dear Brother Pither

re: Counsel's Opinion - British Airways

Your letter has been passed to this Department and please note that Brother Whitty is not employed in the Research Department. It is extremely difficult for us to comment on the views of Counsel without having full access to the brief which has been prepared by the solicitors. In our view, Counsel outlines a series of options to justify privatisation. It is difficult to see how the Law could prevent privatisation and we are gloomy as to the prospects of successfully relying on the Transfer of Undertakings Regulations 1981.

In conclusion, we consider that the problem for British Airways is that the staff employed at Catering Centre South receive salary levels 30% higher than those applicable in outside aircraft catering businesses. Privatisation is a device to get around this "problem" and we consider that, in the final analysis, the attitude of the Courts would be sympathetic to British Airways.

Yours sincerely

A C Blyghton

Appendix 13

Appendix 'A' to Master Copies of the Officers of the Administrative Staff N.S.P. dated 20th January, 1988.

'A' SCALE NSP

PAY AGREEMENT - 1988/1989

Further to the NJC address made on 15 October 1987 and the detailed discussion and debate now contained in the agreed minutes of two National Sectional Panels held on 10 November 1987 and 26 November 1987, British Airways is prepared to implement the pay proposal made to the NSP which is as follows:-

1. An increase of 5.5% with effect from 1 January 1988

2. An increase of 6% with effect from 1 January 1989

It should also be noted that this pay award is applicable to those staff who are on personal grades which arose from the introduction of the new Job Evaluation Scheme in 1986.

Additionally, increases in London Weighting and Shift Pay from 1 July each year (1988 and 1989) in line with the Retail Price Index as published in June of each year.

The continued payment in 1988 and 1989 of Holiday Pay Supplement based on each eligible employee's grade and increment point.

Signed:

P. VAUGHAN
Employers' Secretary

F. THOMAS
TU Side Secretary

2296G
20/1/88

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF PAY SCALES - 1988/1989

GRADE	CURRENT	1988	1989
A7	14899	15718	16661
	14618	15422	16347
	14338	15127	16035
	14059	14832	15722
	13737	14493	15363
	13422	14160	15010
	13116	13837	14667
	12816	13521	14332
	12523	13212	14005
	12237	12910	13685
	11956	12614	13371
		12008*	12728*
	10807	11401	12085
	10100	10656	11295
A6	13066	13785	14612
	12754	13455	14262
	12451	13136	13924
	12154	12822	13591
	11864	12517	13268
	11582	12219	12952
	11307	11929	12645
	11037	11644	12343
	10774	11367	12049
	10517	11095	11761
	10267	10832	11482
		10383*	11008*
	9416	9934	10530
	8800	9284	9841
A5	11111	11722	12425
	10857	11454	12141
	10609	11192	11864
	10366	10936	11592
	10130	10687	11328
	9898	10442	11069
	9672	10204	10816
	9450	9970	10568
	9234	9742	10327
	9023	9519	10090
	8817	9302	9860
		8911*	9448*
	8075	8519	9030
	7547	7962	8440

ENGINEERING & SUPPORT MANAGEMENT GROUP BARGAINING UNIT

1988/1989 Pay Rates w.e.f. 01 DEC 1987

GRADE	CURRENT	1988	1989
A	17141	18084	19169
	16842	17768	18834
	16542	17452	18499
	16243	17136	18164
	15943	16820	17829
	15643	16503	17493
	15344	16188	17159
	15044	15871	16823
B	15322	16165	17135
	15044	15871	16823
	14766	15578	16513
	14488	15285	16202
	14210	14992	15892
	13931	14697	15579
	13653	14404	15268
	13375	14111	14958

1988/1989 Pay Rates w.e.f. 01 DEC 1987

GRADE	CURRENT	1988	1989
C	13931	14697	15579
	13653	14404	15268
	13375	14111	14958
	13097	13817	14646
	12819	13524	14335
	12540	13230	14024
	12262	12936	13712
	11984	12643	13402
	11833	12485	13457
	11668	12311	13258
	11663	12304	13042
	11478	12109	12836
	11293	11914	12629
	11101	11712	12415
	10917	11517	12208
	10714	11303	11981
	10531	11110	11777
	10327	10895	11549
	10122	10679	11320
E	10469	11066	11730
	10311	10876	11531
	10172	10685	11330
	9919	10467	11127
	9761	10301	10921
	9584	10111	10718
	9400	9917	10512
	9219	9726	10310
	9093	9593	10169
	8935	9426	9992

2229G

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF PAY SCALES - 1988/1989

GRADE	CURRENT	1988	1989
A4	9798	10337	10957
	9545	10070	10674
	9299	9810	10399
	9061	9559	10133
	8828	9314	9873
	8601	9074	9618
	8379	8840	9370
	8163	8612	9129
	7952	8389	8892
	7748	8174	8664
		7830*	8300*
	7096	7486	7935
	6632	6997	7417
A3	8592	9065	9609
	8373	8834	9364
	8159	8608	9124
	7950	8387	8890
	7748	8174	8664
	7551	7966	8444
	7357	7762	8228
	7170	7564	8018
	6987	7371	7813
	6808	7182	7613
		6970*	7388*
	6406	6758	7163
	5987	6316	6695
A2	7367	7772	8238
	7198	7594	8050
	7033	7420	7856
	6872	7250	7685
	6715	7084	7509
	6562	6923	7338
	6413	6766	7172
	6266	6611	7008
	6123	6460	6848
	5982	6311	6690
		6120*	6487*
	5620	5929	6285
	5252	5541	5873
A1	6766	7138	7566
	6592	6955	7372
	6424	6777	7184
	6260	6604	7000
	6100	6436	6822
	5945	6272	6648
	5793	6112	6479
	5645	5955	6312
	5501	5804	6152
	5361	5656	5995
		5418*	5743*
	4910	5180	5491
	4589	4841	5131

SECRETARIAL PAY SCALES - 1988/89

GRADE	CURRENT	1988	1989
SE	13263	13992	14832
	13002	13717	14540
	12747	13448	14255
	12498	13185	13976
	12254	12928	13704
	12012	12673	13433
	11776	12424	13169
	11546	12181	12912
	11320	11943	12660
	11098	11708	12410
		11216*	11889*
	10165	10724	11367
	9500	10023	10624
SD	12346	13025	13807
	12103	12769	13535
	11866	12519	13270
	11634	12274	13010
	11405	12032	12754
	11182	11797	12505
	10963	11566	12260
	10749	11340	12020
	10537	11117	11784
	10330	10898	11552
		10416*	11041*
	9416	9934	10530
	8800	9284	9841
SC	10541	11121	11788
	10333	10901	11555
	10132	10689	11330
	9933	10479	11108
	9738	10274	10890
	9547	10072	10676
	9359	9874	10466
	9176	9681	10262
	8997	9492	10062
	8820	9305	9863
		8886*	9419*
	8025	8466	8974
	7500	7912	8387

ENGINEERING APPRENTICES

STAGE I	65.67	69.28	73.43
STAGE II	94.40	99.59	105.56
STAGE III	123.12	129.89	137.69

STUD/UNGRAD APPR ONC

6413.67	8876.42	9409.01
8212.95	8664.66	9184.54
8008.66	8449.14	8956.09
7804.38	8233.62	8727.64
6449.21	6803.92	7212.16

STUD/UNGRAD APPR A/LVL

8413.67	8876.42	9409.01
8212.95	8664.66	9184.54
7709.36	8133.37	8621.37
6904.10	7283.83	7720.86
6171.29	6510.71	6901.35

CRAFT BARGAINING UNIT

1988/89 Pay Rates w.e.f. 01 DEC 1987

GRADE	CURRENT	1988	1989
AIRCRAFT ENGINEER	230.77	243.46	258.07
	227.22	239.72	254.10
	223.67	235.97	250.13
	220.13	232.24	246.17
	216.58	228.49	242.20
	212.90	224.61	238.09
	209.37	220.89	234.14
	205.47	216.77	229.76
	201.96	213.07	225.85
	198.05	208.94	221.48
	194.12	204.80	217.09
TRADESMAN*	201.16	212.22	224.95
	197.74	208.62	221.14
	194.31	205.00	217.30
	190.82	201.32	213.40
	187.29	197.59	209.45
	183.80	193.91	205.54
	180.27	190.18	201.59
	176.80	186.52	197.71
	174.39	183.98	195.02
	171.36	180.78	191.63
	164.16**	173.19**	183.58**

* Plus £240 p.a. Lead Tradesmans Supplement where appropriate.

** Starting rate.

* Signifies an additional incremental point

2271G

2475G

SECRETARIAL PAY SCALES - 1988/89

GRADE	CURRENT	1988	1989
SB	9492	10014	10615
	9307	9819	10408
	9124	9626	10204
	8946	9438	10004
	8771	9253	9808
	8599	9072	9616
	8428	8892	9426
	8265	8720	9243
	8103	8549	9062
	7944	8381	8884
SA	8447	8912	9447
	8281	8736	9260
	8119	8566	9080
	7960	8398	8902
	7802	8231	8725
	7649	8070	8554
	7501	7914	8389
	7353	7757	8222
	7209	7605	8061
	7067	7456	7903
	6929	7310	7749
	6792	7166	7596
	6660	7026	7448
	6530	6889	7302
	6401	6753	7158

• Signifies an additional incremental point

2271G

MAINTENANCE WORKER 1 (AIRCRAFT TOWING)
SENIOR STOREKEEPER
AIRCRAFT PROCESS WORKER
BATTERY WORKER
STOREKEEPER
AIRCRAFT COMPONENT WORKER

178.65••	188.48••	199.79••
176.03••	185.71••	196.85••
173.39••	182.93••	193.91••
170.78	180.17	190.98
168.15	177.40	188.04
165.53	174.63	185.11
162.90	171.86	182.17
160.27	169.08	179.22
157.64	166.31	176.29
155.02	163.55	173.36
152.39	160.77	170.42
149.76	158.00	167.48
147.71•	155.83•	165.18•

• Starting Rate. (STOREMAN/PKR)
•• Apply to Process Wrk (TRE). (Personnel Grade)

MAINTENANCE WORKER
PRODUCTION ASSISTANT
PROPERTY SERVICES
SUPPORT ASSISTANT
LEAD STOREKEEPER

180.58	190.51	201.94
177.51	187.27	198.51
174.42	184.01	195.05
171.36	180.78	191.63
168.27	177.52	188.17
165.20	174.29	184.75
162.11	171.03	181.29
159.04	167.79	177.86
155.96	164.54	174.41
152.89	161.30	170.98

NON CRAFT BARGAINING UNIT

1988/89 Pay Rates w.e.f. 01 DEC 1987

GRADE	CURRENT	1988	1989
MAINTENANCE WORKER 3	148.84	157.03	166.45
	146.21	154.25	163.51
	143.59	151.49	160.58
	140.96	148.71	157.63
	138.33	145.94	154.70
	135.70	143.16	151.75
	133.08	140.40	148.82
	130.45	137.62	145.88
MAINTENANCE WORKER 2	158.33	167.04	177.06
	155.71	164.27	174.13
	153.08	161.50	171.19
	150.45	158.72	168.24
	147.82	155.95	165.31
	145.20	153.19	162.38
	142.57	150.41	159.43
	139.94	147.64	156.50

GROUND SERVICES STAFF NATIONAL SECTIONAL PANEL

PROPOSED PAY SCALES 1988/89

Grade	Basic £/w Current	Basic £/w wef 1.1.88	Basic £/w wef 1.1.89
GS7	181.81	191.81	203.32
	179.18	189.03	200.37
	176.55	186.26	197.44
	173.86	183.42	194.43
	171.27	180.69	191.53
	168.63	177.90	188.57
	166.00	175.13	185.64
	163.38	172.37	182.71
	160.75	169.59	179.77
	151.64	•159.98	•169.58
	137.59	•145.16	•153.87
GS6	170.93	180.33	191.15
	168.63	177.90	188.57
	166.39	175.54	186.07
	164.14	173.17	183.56
	161.88	170.78	181.03
	159.63	168.41	178.51
	157.35	166.00	175.96
	155.12	163.65	173.47
	152.85	161.26	170.94
	147.41	•155.52	•164.85
	130.84	•138.04	•146.32
GS5	160.75	169.59	179.77
	158.47	167.19	177.22
	156.22	164.81	174.70
	153.99	162.46	172.21
	151.70	160.04	169.64
	149.47	157.69	167.15
	147.21	155.31	164.63
	144.93	152.90	162.07
	136.72	•144.24	•152.89
	124.06	•130.88	•138.73
GS4	152.85	161.26	170.94
	150.58	158.86	168.39
	148.34	156.50	165.89
	146.10	154.14	163.39
	143.81	151.72	160.82
	141.56	149.35	158.31
	139.32	146.98	155.80
	137.08	144.62	153.30
	129.32	•136.43	•144.62
	117.34	•123.79	•131.22

GS3	144.93	152.90	162.07
	142.68	150.53	159.56
	140.43	148.15	157.04
	138.19	145.79	154.54
	135.91	143.39	151.99
	133.65	141.00	149.46
	131.43	138.66	146.98
	129.18	136.28	144.46
	121.87	*128.57	*136.28
	110.58	*116.66	*123.66

* New Starter Rates - to be deleted from each grade when all staff recruited after 1.1.86 have progressed to the incremental point above the bar.

1709H

CATERING GSS BAND 2

BASIC £/w CURRENT	BASIC £/w W.E.F. 1.1.88	BASIC £/w W.E.F. 1.1.89
138.41	146.02	154.78
136.36	143.86	152.49
133.88	141.24	149.71
131.64	138.88	147.21
129.38	136.50	144.69
127.13	134.12	142.17
124.87	131.74	139.64
122.62	129.36	137.12
119.15	125.70	133.24
115.68	122.04	129.36
113.53	119.77	126.96
111.39	117.52	124.57
109.24	115.25	122.17
107.09	112.98	119.76
104.96	110.73	117.37

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