



# City Research Online

## City St George's, University of London

**Citation:** Cosijns-Plump, R. (2003). Japanese Newspapers' International Reporting: Case Study Israel 1973-91. (Unpublished Doctoral thesis, City, University of London)

This is the accepted version of the paper.

This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. To cite this item please consult the publisher's version.

**Permanent repository link:** <https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/30889/>

**Copyright and Reuse:** Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright holders. Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, unless otherwise indicated, provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way. For full details of reuse please refer to [City Research Online policy](#).

**Cosijns-Plump, Rachel**

**Ph.D. Degree**

**City University**

**Department of Journalism**

**July 2003**

**JAPANESE NEWSPAPERS' INTERNATIONAL  
REPORTING: CASE STUDY ISRAEL 1973-91**

## Table of Content

|                                                                                          |    |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| JAPANESE NEWSPAPERS' INTERNATIONAL REPORTING: CASE STUDY                                 |    |
| ISRAEL 1973-91 .....                                                                     | 1  |
| Table of Content .....                                                                   | 2  |
| List of Charts and Figures.....                                                          | 6  |
| Acknowledgement.....                                                                     | 8  |
| Abstract .....                                                                           | 10 |
| Conventions.....                                                                         | 11 |
| INTRODUCTION .....                                                                       | 12 |
| CHAPTER ONE: PUTTING JAPANESE MEDIA IN CONTEXT .....                                     | 17 |
| 1.1 Introduction.....                                                                    | 18 |
| 1.2 Discussion on Culture.....                                                           | 22 |
| 1.2.1 Culture: Introduction .....                                                        | 22 |
| 1.2.2 Cultural values as common sense.....                                               | 23 |
| 1.3 Japanese Religions.....                                                              | 24 |
| 1.3.1 Introduction .....                                                                 | 24 |
| 1.3.2 Shinto .....                                                                       | 26 |
| 1.3.3 Confucianism .....                                                                 | 30 |
| 1.3.4 Buddhism .....                                                                     | 32 |
| 1.3.5 Summary .....                                                                      | 33 |
| 1.4 Dominant Values in Japanese Culture .....                                            | 33 |
| 1.4.1 Introduction .....                                                                 | 33 |
| 1.4.2 Japanese Culture: Selected Values.....                                             | 34 |
| 1.5 Family, Society and Culture .....                                                    | 47 |
| 1.5.1 On the Family System .....                                                         | 47 |
| 1.5.2 Japanese Education .....                                                           | 49 |
| 1.6 Politics and Society: Political Culture, Political System, Institutions, and the Law | 57 |
| 1.6.1 Political Culture.....                                                             | 58 |
| 1.6.2 Political System.....                                                              | 59 |
| 1.6.3 Institutions: Symbiosis among the elite .....                                      | 60 |
| 1.6.4 Law, Culture and Society .....                                                     | 65 |
| 1.7 Summary .....                                                                        | 69 |
| CHAPTER TWO: THE JAPANESE MEDIA AND ITS JOURNALISTS.....                                 | 71 |
| 2.1 Introduction.....                                                                    | 72 |
| 2.2 Japanese Mass Media .....                                                            | 73 |
| 2.2.1 General Overview .....                                                             | 73 |

|                                                                                                                        |            |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
| 2.2.2 Mainstream media: definition .....                                                                               | 74         |
| 2.2.3 Japanese Newspapers .....                                                                                        | 75         |
| 2.3 The Journalists .....                                                                                              | 78         |
| 2.3.1 Recruitment and Career:.....                                                                                     | 78         |
| 2.3.2 Professional Roles and Ethics .....                                                                              | 79         |
| 2.4 The Organisation and Structure of News-Gathering and Processing .....                                              | 85         |
| 2.4.1 Internal Structure .....                                                                                         | 86         |
| 2.4.2 External Structure: The Press-Clubs .....                                                                        | 89         |
| 2.5 Extra-media Level of Inquiry .....                                                                                 | 96         |
| 2.5.1 The Role of Outsiders: Magazines and Foreign Correspondents.....                                                 | 96         |
| 2.5.2 Legal Constraints.....                                                                                           | 100        |
| 2.5.3 Political Constraints .....                                                                                      | 100        |
| 2.5.4 Economic Constraints .....                                                                                       | 101        |
| 2.6 Japanese Journalism-Practice and Interpretation .....                                                              | 102        |
| 2.6.1 The consequences of the system .....                                                                             | 102        |
| 2.6.2 How the aforementioned cultural values relate to the working of the Japanese Media? .....                        | 103        |
| 2.7 A few specific events.....                                                                                         | 107        |
| 2.7.1 Micro instances .....                                                                                            | 107        |
| 2.7.2 Macro level instances .....                                                                                      | 108        |
| 2.8 What role for the mainstream media ?.....                                                                          | 109        |
| 2.9 Conclusions .....                                                                                                  | 111        |
| <b>CHAPTER THREE: JAPANESE MAINSTREAM MEDIA AND INTERNATIONAL NEWS REPORTING.....</b>                                  | <b>113</b> |
| 3.1 Introduction.....                                                                                                  | 114        |
| 3.2 Foreign policy and International news coverage .....                                                               | 115        |
| 3.2.1 Literature Overview .....                                                                                        | 115        |
| 3.2.2 Theorising on News Media and Foreign Policy Relations.....                                                       | 118        |
| 3.3 The Japanese Mainstream Media and International News Reporting .....                                               | 121        |
| 3.3.1 Introduction .....                                                                                               | 121        |
| 3.3.2 The Japanese Media and International Reporting .....                                                             | 122        |
| 3.3.3 Sources of Influences Sustaining the Shaping of International News Through the Filter of National Interest ..... | 131        |
| 3.4 Literature Overview-Summary .....                                                                                  | 138        |
| 3.5 Conclusions .....                                                                                                  | 140        |
| <b>CHAPTER FOUR: INTERVIEWS WITH JAPANESE FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS POSTED IN LONDON, OCTOBER 2001 – MAY 2002.....</b>    | <b>143</b> |
| 4.1 Introduction.....                                                                                                  | 144        |
| 4.2 Career Patterns.....                                                                                               | 145        |

|                                                                                                  |     |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 4.3 Roles and Functions.....                                                                     | 146 |
| 4.3.1 Director – Generals: Roles and functions .....                                             | 146 |
| 4.3.2 Foreign Correspondents: Roles and functions .....                                          | 149 |
| 4.3 The News Production Process .....                                                            | 149 |
| 4.3.1 News-Gathering and News Sources .....                                                      | 149 |
| 4.3.2 News-values .....                                                                          | 150 |
| 4.3.3 Relations with other journalists: Japanese and non-Japanese .....                          | 152 |
| 4.3.4 Communication with Tokyo Headquarters .....                                                | 154 |
| 4.3.5 Reporting and the national interest.....                                                   | 155 |
| 4.4 Summary .....                                                                                | 164 |
| CHAPTER FIVE: JAPAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST .....                                                    | 166 |
| Israel and its Neighbours: A Brief Recent Chronology .....                                       | 167 |
| 5.1 Introduction.....                                                                            | 169 |
| 5.2 Japan–Middle Eastern relations from the end of WWII until the 1973 First Oil<br>Crisis ..... | 170 |
| 5.2.1 The Political Dimension.....                                                               | 170 |
| 5.2.2 The Economic Dimension .....                                                               | 173 |
| 5.3 Japan and the Oil Crisis of 1973.....                                                        | 174 |
| 5.3.1 Introduction .....                                                                         | 174 |
| 5.3.2 The 1973 Oil Crisis: Chronology .....                                                      | 175 |
| 5.3.3 The Oil Crisis: Analysis .....                                                             | 178 |
| 5.4 Japan and the Middle East Since 1973 .....                                                   | 180 |
| 5.4.1 Political Dimension .....                                                                  | 180 |
| 5.4.2 Economic Dimension .....                                                                   | 182 |
| 5.5 Japanese images and views of the Jewish People and Israel .....                              | 186 |
| CHAPTER SIX: RESEARCH DESIGN .....                                                               | 193 |
| 6.1 Introduction.....                                                                            | 194 |
| 6.2 Research Construct .....                                                                     | 196 |
| 6.2.1 Research Questions and Hypotheses.....                                                     | 197 |
| 6.3.1 Methodology .....                                                                          | 200 |
| CHAPTER SEVEN: RESEARCH FINDINGS .....                                                           | 217 |
| 7.1 Findings .....                                                                               | 218 |
| 7.1.1 General Findings .....                                                                     | 218 |
| 7.1.2 RQ1: Findings .....                                                                        | 221 |
| 7.1.3 RQ2: Findings .....                                                                        | 243 |
| 7.1.4 RQ3: Findings .....                                                                        | 251 |
| 7.1.5 RQ4: Findings .....                                                                        | 266 |
| 7.2 Summary .....                                                                                | 272 |

|                                                                                                                                                  |     |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS .....                                                                                                                 | 274 |
| Appendix 1----Interviews' Questionnaires .....                                                                                                   | 280 |
| Interviews' Questionnaire: Director-Generals .....                                                                                               | 280 |
| Interviews' Questionnaire: Foreign Correspondents.....                                                                                           | 281 |
| Appendix 2---Nikaido Declaration (November 22, 1973) .....                                                                                       | 283 |
| Appendix 3---United Nations Resolution 242.....                                                                                                  | 284 |
| Appendix 4---Security Council Resolution 2628.....                                                                                               | 285 |
| Appendix 5---Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Official Visit to Japan<br>of H.M. King Faisal Ibn Abdul Aziz Al Saud (excerpt)..... | 287 |
| Glossary .....                                                                                                                                   | 288 |
| Bibliography .....                                                                                                                               | 289 |

## List of Charts and Figures

### Charts

|                  |                                                                  |       |
|------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|
| 1. Chart 1       | Total number of articles per newspaper per sample                | p218  |
| 2. Chart 2       | Total number of editorials per newspaper per sample              | p 219 |
| 3. Chart 1.1     | Reporting on Israel: pre-Oil Crisis                              | p221  |
| 4. Chart 1.2     | Reporting on Israel: the Oil Crisis                              | p224  |
| 5. Chart 1.3.1   | Reporting on Israel: (pre & post Nikaido Declaration)            | p230  |
| 6. Chart 1.3.2   | Reporting on Israel: editorials (pre & post Nikaido Declaration) | p231  |
| 7. Chart 1.4     | Reporting on Israel: 1985                                        | p233  |
| 8. Chart 1.5     | Reporting on Israel: the Gulf Crisis                             | p238  |
| 9. Chart 1.6     | Reporting on Israel – Summary                                    | p 242 |
| 10. Chart 2.6.1  | Reporting on Arabs: pre-Oil Crisis                               | p244  |
| 11. Chart 2.6.2  | Reporting on the Palestinians: pre-Oil Crisis                    | p244  |
| 12. Chart 2.7.1  | Reporting on Arabs: the Oil Crisis                               | p245  |
| 13. Chart 2.7.2  | Reporting on the Palestinians: the Oil Crisis period             | p245  |
| 14. Chart 2.8.1  | Reporting on Arabs: 1985                                         | p246  |
| 15. Chart 2.8.2  | Reporting on the Palestinians: 1985                              | p246  |
| 16. Chart 2.9.1  | Reporting on Arabs: the Gulf Crisis                              | p248  |
| 17. Chart 2.9.2  | Reporting on the Palestinians: the Gulf Crisis                   | p250  |
| 18. Chart 2.10.1 | Reporting on Arabs – Summary                                     | p251  |
| 19. Chart 2.10.2 | Reporting on the Palestinians – Summary                          | p251  |
| 20. Chart 3.10.1 | Reporting on Israel: articles & their frames, pre-Oil Crisis     | p252  |
| 21. Chart 3.10.2 | Reporting on Israel: articles & their frames, the Oil Crisis     | p252  |
| 22. Chart 3.10.3 | Reporting on Israel: articles & their frames, 1985               | p253  |
| 23. Chart 3.10.4 | Reporting on Israel: articles & their frames, the Gulf Crisis    | p253  |

|                                                                                                   |      |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| 24. Chart 3.10.5 Reporting on Israel: articles(%) & their frames, the Gulf Crisis                 | p253 |
| 25. Chart 3.11.1 Reporting on Arabs: articles & their frames, pre-Oil Crisis                      | p254 |
| 26. Chart 3.11.2 Reporting on Arabs: articles & their frames, the Gulf Crisis                     | p254 |
| 27. Chart 3.11.3 Reporting on Arabs: articles & their frames, 1985                                | p255 |
| 28. Chart 3.11.4 Reporting on Arabs: articles & their frames, the Gulf Crisis                     | p255 |
| 29. Chart 3.11.5 Reporting on the Palestinians: articles & their frames, pre-Oil Crisis           | p256 |
| 30. Chart 3.11.6 Reporting on the Palestinians: articles & their frames, the Oil Crisis           | p256 |
| 31. Chart 3.11.7 Reporting on the Palestinians: articles & their frames, 1985                     | p256 |
| 32. Chart 3.11.8 Reporting on the Palestinians: articles & their frames, the Gulf Crisis          | p256 |
| 33. Chart 3.13.1 Articles(%) with sources & articles(%) without sources                           | p259 |
| 34. Chart 3.13.2 Reporting on Israel: Comparison of sources' tone                                 | p259 |
| 35. Chart 3.13.3 <i>Asahi</i> : Journalists' location and negative tone of reporting on Israel    | p260 |
| 36. Chart 3.13.4 <i>Yomiuri</i> : Journalists' location and negative tone of reporting on Israel  | p260 |
| 37. Chart 3.13.5 <i>Mainichi</i> : Journalists' location and negative tone of reporting on Israel | p260 |
| 38. Chart 4.14.1 Reporting on Japan: articles & their frames, the Oil Crisis                      | p266 |

## Figure

|                                       |     |
|---------------------------------------|-----|
| 1. Figure 1: Japanese cultural values | p46 |
|---------------------------------------|-----|

## **Acknowledgement**

I would like to thank Professor Stephenson for all his support and advice during the supervision of my research and the writing of this thesis. I would also like to express my deep gratitude to all the other people who helped me achieve the completion of this thesis. Especially I would like to thank Professor Ellis Kraus, Mr. David Powers, Mr. Takigawa Yoshito as well as all the anonymous interviewees. Additionally, I would like to thank Ms Ono Yukiko and Ms Hamana Takakao for their contribution to the analyses. I would also like to express my thanks for the examiners, for their insightful and constructive comments. Finally, I would like to thank my family who supported me all the way.

Rachel Cosijns-Plump

July 2003

## Library Permission

I grant powers of discretion to the university librarian to allow the thesis to be copied in whole or in part without further reference to the author.

This permission covers only single copies made for study purpose, subject to normal conditions of acknowledgement.

Rachel Cosijns-Plump

July 2003

## Abstract

This thesis aims at establishing the factors involved in the mainstream Japanese newspapers' international news reporting process, and verifying their permanency through a case study of reporting on Israel from 1973 until 1991. In the process, disparity between the norms of Japanese and western mainstream media becomes evident.

The first part of the thesis is devoted to uncovering critical influences on the process of international reporting in Japan, particularly, culture and its omnipresence in a variety of significantly important contexts.

The way in which these influences affect international reporting is evaluated through a literature overview, particularly of foreign-policy related case studies, with the assessment's findings further tested and confirmed by interviews with Japanese foreign correspondents posted in London between October 2001 and May 2002.

The second part of the thesis focuses on verifying whether the identified influences and their manifestations in the processes of the mainstream Japanese newspapers' international news reporting are of an enduring character.

The period of reporting on Israel from 1973, prior to the outbreak of the first Oil crisis until the end of the Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991, has been selected to analyse whether, and to what extent Japan's foreign policy changes towards the Middle East as a result of the Oil Crisis of 1973, exerted influence on the reporting for the next two decades.

Two methods of content analysis of the three selected national newspapers, the *Asahi*, *Yomiuri* and the *Mainichi*, are employed; frame analysis measured quantitatively and used for all the selected articles, and qualitative content analysis for editorials.

Both methods of analysis revealed that the influences of the Japanese contexts on international news reporting are enduring. Furthermore, the quantitatively measured frame analysis revealed that the media acted indeed as part of the 'State', as in Gramsci's (1971) "Hegemony theory", as well as reconfirming Entman's (1993) insight on the implication of frames as a "challenge to democracy".

As to the qualitative editorial analysis, it complemented the frame analysis by unveiling the ubiquity of Japanese values and related morals and their disparities with western ones.

Based on these findings, an alternative theory for analysing the Japanese mainstream media's international reporting is offered. The two conspicuous features of the theory are that the democratic-Libertarian model of the media is discarded as irrelevant, and that Japan's national interests, as embodied in its foreign policies, are identified as critical factors in the shaping of international reporting.

## **Conventions**

Names:

For Japanese names, surname appears first, while for non-Japanese names, surname appears last.

Japanese words:

When Japanese words are used in the text they are printed in italics.

## INTRODUCTION

“One of the most controversial questions facing those who study mass media content is the extent to which communicators’ attitudes, values, and beliefs affect content” (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 87). In *Deciding What’s News*, Gans (1979) writes that “Journalists try hard to be objective, but neither they nor anyone else can in the end proceed without values. Furthermore, reality judgements are never altogether divorced from values” (Gans, 1979, as quoted in Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 88). The fact of the matter is that these “personal attitudes, values, and beliefs are primarily shaped by forces outside of mass communication, such as their personal characteristics, backgrounds, and experiences” (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 92).

Acknowledging these disparities enables people, including journalists, to belong to and operate in the same communities. Thus, living in a western-style democracy, as the writer of this thesis has, leads one to believe that while our backgrounds are somewhat different, there are sufficient shared core values that facilitate the maintenance of relatively harmonious life. However, upon arriving first in Japan some two decades ago, and then a decade later living and studying in Japan as a student of media and politics at a prestigious Japanese university, it became abundantly clear to me that the so-called “global village” does not have a large core of shared values at its disposal. While being aware of the uniqueness of each society, in this case Japan, as well as our common values, I was frequently bewildered by a variety of instances, such as the following two examples.

For example, what triggered Hayano (2001), a journalist, to write that “Any globally-minded politician worth his salt should be exploring measures that would please the Arab world and bring honour to Japan at the same time”? (Hayano, 2001).

Or, what motivated *Asahi* TV’s former bureau chief in Cairo, Kawamura Koji (2001) who appeared as “expert commentator” on *Asahi* TV’s program “Super Morning”, to say that “Jews were targeted for anthrax attacks because they control the US media” and that “the common thread linking the targets of anthrax attacks was that they were Jews” (Simon Wiesenthal Center, 2001).

Understanding why Hayano (2001) and Kawamura (2001) uttered these words with respect to the Arab world and the Jews became one of the primary impetuses for this thesis. Another was the fact that while

studying media in Japan, particularly international news reporting, using Western written sources (as that is the way the subject is taught in Japan), it became apparent that the theories and practices of and about the Western media did not reflect the reality on the ground as practiced by the Japanese media. Evidently, a fresh approach/view/theory was needed to better describe the practices and process of the Japanese media's reporting of international news.

The common thread of both spurs was the realisation that, on the whole, reality as shaped by context is different in Japan as compared with the West.

Consequently, this thesis has two main goals. The first is to determine the core factors participating in the shaping of the Japanese media's international reporting. The second is to assess the way these factors shaped the Japanese newspapers' coverage of Israel from January 1973, before the First Oil Crisis, until 1991, the end of the First Gulf Crisis. As a case study for analysis, Israel was deemed an attractive choice. It is an original work since, at present, no similar research exists. Yet, at the same time, there is sufficient similar research with respect to Western media's coverage to make it valuable for comparison purposes (for example Zelizer et al., 2002).

The 1973-1991 period was selected since the First Oil Crisis of 1973 is often viewed as both, abruptly bringing the political reality of the Middle East into the daily life of the Japanese people through oil shortages and as a watershed in Japan's foreign policy towards the countries of the Middle East, with the following two decades seen as a continuation of this policy (e.g., Sugihara and Allan, 1993; Nobuo, 1991). The end of the selected period, the 1990-1991 Gulf Crisis, was another major defining moment for Japan's Middle East policy, since this crisis also forced Japan to take a clear political stand with respect to its relation with the countries of the Middle East (e.g. Ikeda, 1993).

To accomplish the aims of the thesis, the initial objective was to identify the factors involved in shaping the Japanese newspapers' international coverage in general and the coverage of Israel in particular.

Shoemaker and Reese's approach as outlined in the hierarchical model of influences on media content, is employed to achieve this goal (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 64). In this hierarchical model, there are various levels of inquiry, starting with the inner most level of influence, the individual level, and then followed by media routines level, organisational level, extra-media level and so forth (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 64). Drawing an overview of the main sources influencing the Japanese media in general, and

its international reporting, in particular through systematic application of theories on practice, will assist in comprehending the dominant factors influencing the way reality is shaped in the Japanese media, as evident in content. Achieving this will also clarify the actual role, functions, and practices of the Japanese media in the process of international news reporting taking place in Japan.

In the following chapters (Chapters One to Four), discussion of each level is carried out with emphasis on inquiry into the individual, media routines, organisational, and extra-media levels.

In Chapter One, Putting Japanese Media in Context, Japanese culture and society are examined to identify “influences on content from individual media workers” as the inner most level of “influences on media content in the hierarchical model” (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 64). By inquiring into the Japanese context the three main objectives of this chapter are accomplished. The first is to introduce a selected number of Japanese values, which are considered paramount for the understanding of Japanese society, and therefore, consequently, its media. Second, the sections that follow are intended to elucidate the ways these values are emphasised, taught, cultivated and, finally, manifested by the individuals following their internalisation and upon their embarkation as mature adults into society and career life. Third, and crucial for the present research, it also aims at indicating the futility of attempts to present the Japanese media as a media operating in a Western-style democracy, with Western journalistic norms. This point is illustrated by the Japanese journalists themselves in their responses to a major survey taken in Japan between November 1993 and February 1994, the results of which are presented here in English for the first time (NSK, 1994a, 1994b).

Overall, it can be said that Chapter One forms the contextual basis that this thesis rests upon. The subsequent chapters were written with the conviction that the Japanese context as introduced in Chapter One, constantly serves as a source of reference all through the thesis.

Chapter Two, The Japanese Media, continues the discussion of individual influences on media content in the hierarchical model (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 64), but also expands further the inquiry by examining the media routine level, the organizational level and the extra-media level of influences on media content.

The Japanese Mainstream Media and International Reporting are the subjects of Chapter Three. The intention of this chapter is to examine further and highlight crucial extra-media factors that exert particular

influences on the shaping of international news reporting in general, and on the Japanese mainstream media as a whole.

Since the Japanese newspapers' coverage of Israel is assumed to be linked to the country's foreign policy towards the Middle East region (e.g., Shulman, 1984; Shillony, 1985/6; Sugihara and Allan, 1993), an overview of existing literature on foreign policy's influences on the media aims at uncovering the ways foreign policy, as an extra-media factor, exerts influence on the media's international news coverage. Subsequently, a survey of existing research on the Japanese media's international reporting is introduced to reveal the characteristics of this reporting as well as the similarities and variances between Japanese and Western media regarding international news reporting. By highlighting the ways foreign policy influences the Japanese media's international reporting, additional sources exerting influence on the Japanese media's foreign news reporting are identified to provide a comprehensive view as to the factors shaping the Japanese media's foreign news reporting.

Chapters One, Two and Three together clarify, to a large extent, the relations between contexts and the international' news reporting process taking place in Japan. These three chapters make clear that the Japanese context offers an alternative view on the media as derived and influenced by its context. The exploration into the extent that the findings of these chapters are enduring is the concern of Chapter Four. Verifying the validity of these findings is accomplished through interviews with Japanese foreign correspondents posted in London between October 2001 and May 2002. With respect to its functional part in the thesis structure, this chapter is one of the two primary sources used in this thesis. The other is the case study data. However, this chapter is significant in one more aspect. On its own, it offers an insight into the working of Japanese foreign correspondents, which as far as English literature on the subject is concerned, has no equivalent.

Chapter Five, Japan and the Middle East, is the final component for the overall foundation for the inquiry into the Japanese mainstream newspapers' reporting on Israel. This chapter elaborates on the various dimensions of Japan's relations with the countries of the Middle East, particularly Israel, in a chronological manner in order to establish the state of affairs among these countries.

Based on previous chapters and their conclusions, the research questions and hypotheses as well as the research design are introduced in Chapter Six. Israel's coverage in three major Japanese national newspapers, the *Asahi*, *Yomiuri* and *Mainichi*, was selected to represent the mainstream Japanese media.

Two main methods of analysis are employed to analyse these newspapers' output. Frame analysis is used for content analysis of all the selected articles. The data is measured quantitatively using the statistics package SPSS. For the analysis of the editorials of the selected period, in-depth qualitative content analysis is used.

To adhere to the principles of objectivity, two native speakers of Japanese, trained in content analysis, conducted the quantitative frame analysis of the selected articles. The results of both analyses were similar and satisfied the requirements of objectivity. The qualitative editorial analysis was done by myself. Both exercises produced similar results, thus corroborating one another.

The research's findings, introduced in Chapter Seven, reveal that from the frame analysis as well as the editorial's qualitative content analysis two main aspects become apparent. One is that the conclusions and findings of previous chapters are indeed enduring. Another is that the Japanese context in conjunction with Japan's relations with Israel was found to exert greater influence on the reporting of its mainstream media than previously expected. These findings, which brought about sufficient evidence for the links between the Japanese context and the mainstream Japanese newspapers' output, are groundbreaking in view of the fact that establishing this linkage is new. While doing that, the findings also validate the conviction all through the research that a new theory is indispensable.

Thus, based on the findings of this thesis, Chapter Eight, in addition to presenting the conclusions of this research, offers an alternative theory for analysing the Japanese mainstream media's international reporting. With respect to the findings and consequently, the related conclusions of this thesis, it becomes clear that analysing the mainstream Japanese media's international reporting using the democratic-Libertarian model will fail to capture the actual process. Instead, the alternative theory presented in this chapter takes into consideration the Japanese context and, while doing so, stresses the crucial importance of national interests as translated into foreign policies in the shaping of the media's output.

## **CHAPTER ONE: PUTTING JAPANESE MEDIA IN CONTEXT**

## 1.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to probe into the Japanese context since various research papers suggest that the Asian media in general, and the Japanese media in particular, are in a number of ways different from the Western media.

In a paper on journalism ethics in Asia, focusing on China, Japan, and Korea, Brislin (1997) concludes:

A survey of journalistic practices in Asia that reflect two fundamental journalism principles of truth-telling and independence shows a wide range of interpretation of the role, status and relationship of the journalist with government, and a structure of journalism, firmly rooted in cultural values. The differences between those roles, relationship and structures and their counterparts in Western, particularly American, styles of journalism are important to note when analysing press reports from Asian countries... (Brislin, 1997: 7)

In another noteworthy research, *Locating Asian Values in Asian Journalism*, Massey and Chang (2000) write, "If the proposition that Asian journalism is informed by Asian values is true, evidence of it should be observable in news-media content". They assumed that it would be possible to "discern a distinctly Asian tone in the reporting". However, if that is not the case, "then it could be reasonable to expect Asian and Western journalism to be relatively indistinguishable". For the purpose of their analysis, Massey and Chang (2000), selected two useful values, and explain their selection as follows:

'Harmony' is frequently cited as a value which journalists throughout Asia must be mindful. It is contrasted with the Western norm of emphasising – some would say sensationalising – conflict and drama. 'Supportiveness' such as working as government's nation-building ally, also is often-mentioned attribute of journalism in Asia. Its polar opposite would be Western journalists' penchant for adversarial and critical reporting (Massey and Chang, 2000: 4).

In their research, Massey and Chang (2000) conducted content analysis of English-language web newspapers in ten Asian nations, including Japan, and found that "Asian values indeed can be observed in Asian journalism" and that "these findings lend some quantitative support to anecdotal assertions that Asia has evolved a unique journalistic form based on uniquely Asian values" (Massey and Chang, 2000: 6). But at the same time, the data also "offer some support to the case against a uniquely Asian form of journalism" (Massey and Chang, 2000: 6). What is consequential for the present thesis is their further findings, which offer a rare insight into Asian journalism:

For one, there was a strong ethnocentric orientation to the journalistic application of Asian values. Asian journalists embedded Asian values into their stories most often when they reported on home-

country citizens, yet they tended to be more Western-like when covering foreigners and foreign events. The least conflictive and least critical Asian-source stories generally were those that may have held the highest relevance to home-country readers: local news or news of local citizens engaged in activities abroad. In this sense, Asian values may be situational values for Asian journalists, applied locally but not globally (Massey and Chang, 2000: 6).

Therefore, it is possible that in the case of Asian journalism, neither 'Western' journalistic values nor Asian norms are universally applied.

Some findings from research into the Japanese media lend support to the proposition that Japanese media's content and patterns of behaviour, exhibit some distinctive traits. On the topic of 'How International Correspondents Choose Their Sources', and more specifically, *How Japanese and American International Correspondents Choose Their Sources*, Horvit (1997) writes in the discussion of the research results that "Another issue that deserves attention is the importance of nationality and culture in influencing the journalists' practice...Nationality, and the way journalists in various countries are socialised, appears to be a good predictor of how journalists approach their job" (Horvit, 1997). Moreover, "A more in-depth analysis of journalists' values and motivations would...shed light on how the media's agenda is set" (Horvit, 1997). Horvit (1997) also turns to McCombs' onion metaphor for some underpinnings to her enigmatic findings. She writes,

Remember McCombs' onion metaphor for media agenda-setting. He says the innermost layer 'consists of the professional core of journalism itself, those practices, values and traditions into which every journalist is socialised, beginning with his or her college days and continuing through daily experiences on the job. These attitudes and behaviours are the ultimate filters shaping the nature of the news agenda (Horvit, 1997).

While McCombs limits the innermost layer to the later stages in life, starting with higher education, the examples below indicate that in the case of Japan at least, it might prove valuable to extend this time frame to earlier stages.

The extent that peculiarities, as contrasted with similarities with the Western media, are both apparent and enigmatic, is evident from data produced by other researches as well. For example, following a five countries' gate-keeping comparison, Cooper-Chen (1992) concludes that "Japan may not share the world view of other developed countries...The study did show Japan's relative inattention to stories that made

news elsewhere in the world" (Cooper-Chen, 1992). Or, in "*East Meets West in the Newsroom*", the journalist, Spencer Sherman, who worked for the national *NHK* television<sup>1</sup>, writes that

Co-production between NHK and foreign broadcasters had often been dissolved when both sides saw the gulf between Japanese and Western journalism as too great to cross...When Japanese and Americans work together, they tend to call editorial conflicts 'misunderstanding' or 'technical differences.' But that belittles the problem facing journalists from different cultures. Most important conflicts...reflect deep differences in the way they see their role in society (Sherman, 1994).

The outcome of the discrepancies between Western and Asian media, and between Japanese, and as in the above case, American media, is in Atwood (1987)'s words, different realities. Erwin Atwood, of the School of Journalism, Southern Illinois University, US, writes in conclusion to his paper, *News of U.S. and Japan in each other's newspapers*,

The conventional wisdom that holds that by reading the foreign news people of different countries can learn about each other and in so doing increase international understanding appears seriously misleading given the differences in reporting describes here...Rather than enhancing international understanding, disparities in the news such as those demonstrated here are likely to drive wedges between the people of different nations as the press prints its own version of reality (Atwood, 1987: 86).

Finally, in the paper *Newspaper Coverage of U.S.-Japan Frictions*, Krauss and Budner (1995) found that while most of the time the press was neutral, when it was not, "the press in both countries was more likely to blame the U.S. than Japan. In other words, Japanese coverage would appear to be reflecting some allegiance to their nation's position, but American coverage appeared just the opposite. However, while American coverage tended to portray the U.S. as the one at fault, Japanese coverage did so even more strongly" (Krauss and Budner, 1995: 345).

In the discussion of their results, the writers note differences between the countries' newspapers, and recapitulate explanations for them. They first identify 'Media Structure and Organisation', followed by 'Differences, Balance, and Blame', and lastly, despite reluctance<sup>2</sup>, touch on 'Different Cultures, Different Realities'. They write: "Culture – the relatively distinctive mesh of beliefs, attitudes, values, and expectations characterising a group – is one of the major factors determining people's perceptions of reality and behaviour, directly as well as indirectly through its role in determining the structure and norms of social institutions and organisations" (Krauss and Budner, 1995: 352-353). Despite interpretation of the

---

<sup>1</sup> NHK (*Nippon Hoso Kyokai*), is Japan's national television, which is often grouped together with Japan's major newspapers due to extensive similarities in structure and news-gathering practices, see Krauss, E., S. (1996) In *Media and Politics in Japan* (Eds, Krauss, E., S. and Pharr, S., J.) University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, pp. 89-129.

<sup>2</sup> Personal interview with Professor Ellis Krauss, Warwick University, October 1, 2001.

findings through the employment of structural and organisational explanations, they recommend an investigation into culture “especially in light of our findings”. Their findings include the following:

Japanese reports...seemed to show no understanding, much less awareness of the sharp if brief upset in the U.S. that the purchases (of Columbia Pictures/Rockfeller) engendered...

The frequent reference to ‘Japan bashing’ by the U.S. in Japanese stories. Obviously, this tendency to resort to the notion of ‘bashing’ as an all purpose explanation of criticism is to a large extent simply an example of the tendency of individuals and societies to view their behaviour as more justified, and criticism of it less justified than others might do. At the same time, it may also reflect the oft-noted national penchant of the Japanese to see themselves as victims.

The greater uniformity in the extent and structure of Japanese coverage compared to that in the U.S. may among other things, reflect the fact that Japan tends to be consensual culture, the U.S. more of an individualistic one (Krauss and Budner, 1995: 353).

In fact, the issue of cultural differences has been aroused even before, and also following their research, according to Krauss and Budner (1995), since the research was based on collaboration with Japanese researchers. They write that these cultural differences “strongly suggested that even definition of research norms can be affected by cultural differences” (Krauss and Budner, 1995: 353). And following the research,

During a conference convened to review the results of the study, a dispute arose between Americans and Japanese journalists in connection with the perceived triumph of the Pentagon over the press in the Gulf War. The Americans argued that journalists must adopt adversarial stance vis-à-vis their government, a point of view rejected by the Japanese ...it may also reflect differences in beliefs correlated with nationality (Krauss and Budner, 1995: 353).

All in all, it becomes clear that to understand the Japanese media’s domestic as well as international coverage, and more specifically, the Japanese newspapers’ coverage of Israel, a probe into the Japanese context is indispensable.

With respect to the context introduced subsequently, it must be emphasised that the dominant components which will be identified and include values, beliefs and expected practices, are not seen exclusively as the organic evolution of Japanese culture and society. Though it can be said that the ground was ripe for the development of the specific culture and society of Japan as it is today, precisely because of the Japanese context introduced below, various researchers (e.g. Sugimoto and Mouer, 1989; Mouer and Sugimoto, 1986; Yoshino, 2000; Goodman and Refsing, 1992) have shown that many of these values and practices have acted also as self-fulfilling prophecies, in the sense that these values and practices are preached, enforced, and therefore, expected of the Japanese people, including the journalists<sup>3</sup>. The ways

---

<sup>3</sup> Due to the limit of this paper, a full discussion had been abandoned, however, Mouer and Sugimoto (1986) among others, offer an excellent analysis on the subject.

Japanese cultural values, norms, and practices are deliberately rejuvenated from top to bottom, and otherwise, will be slightly touched upon in the appropriate conjunctions.

## 1.2 Discussion on Culture

### 1.2.1 Culture: Introduction

The definitions of culture are numerous. However, the approach taken here is, to quote Goodenough, that “A society’s culture consists of whatever it is one has to know or believe in order to operate in a manner acceptable to its members” (Ward Goodenough as cited by Geertz, 2000: 11). This definition is instrumental for the comprehension of what is pertinent in the discussions of culture. For example, in the book “*Becoming Japanese*”, the social anthropologist Joy Hendry, reflects on precisely those determinants which are requisite for a child to become ‘proper’ Japanese (Hendry, 1999). Consequently, what is evident is that there are some pivotal paradigm to be accomplished before being considered a ‘mature’ Japanese. A ‘mature Japanese’, as will be discussed later, is expected to possess a set of values, beliefs, practices and knowledge as to the proper behaviour in various circumstances that he/she will encounter in their future life in society (van Wolferen, 1989: 98 ; see also Henshall, 1999: 122; Japanese Civilization, 2001; Goodman and Refsing, 1992).

Expanding on the definition of culture, Geertz (2000) writes, “...it denotes a historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which humans communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes towards life” (Geertz, 2000: 89). What are the symbols and symbolic forms that are indispensable for the development of a person to become ‘mature Japanese’, or a person equipped with enough common sense, to be able to feel at ease in a Japanese environment? In Japan, for example, when a person moves into a new neighbourhood, he should within three days present certain neighbours around his new house with a small gift. It is the neighbours on “either side of your new home, the house directly across the street, and the houses on either side of that house” (Japanese Civilization, 2001). The gift should be the same for all neighbours; “perhaps a package of *Soba* noodles, which are long and thus symbolic of one’s hope that the

new relationship will be long-lived” (Japanese Civilization, 2001). According to the renowned Japanese anthropologist Befu Harumi (1986), gift-giving is a minor institution in Japan, “with complex rules defining who should give to whom, on what occasion he should give, what sort of gift is appropriate on a given occasion, and how the gifts should be presented” (Befu, 1986: 158). Another example from daily life is the sitting arrangement in a car, “All Japanese know that in a car, the most distinguished person takes the seat behind the driver, the next most distinguished sits at his or her side, and the most junior person sits up front with the driver – an understanding that has the advantage of eliminating curbside scuffle” (Japanese Civilization, 2001).

### **1.2.2 Cultural values as common sense**

The importance of reviewing cultural values lies in the fact that these are culturally bound and culturally defined (Allan, 2000: 71-2). “Our ideas, our values, our acts, even our emotions, are, like our nervous system itself, cultural products – products manufactured, indeed, out of tendencies, capacities, and dispositions with which we were born, but manufactured nevertheless” (Geertz, 2000: 50).

What is a cultural value? “A cultural value is a shared idea about how something is ranked in terms of its relative social desirability, worth, or goodness. Values can be used to rank virtually anything” (Allan, 2000: 339-340). As to the importance of cultural values, “Values are important parts of any culture because they influence how people choose and how social systems develop and change” (Allan, 2000: 339-340).

To conceptualise Japanese common-sense, or in other words, to conceive Japanese values, belief systems, and practices among other contextual aspects, which are all cultural product, attention must be paid to Japanese religion as the foundation of Japanese culture (according to the functionalist approach, e.g., Holborn and Haralambos, 2000: 434). Identifying the major beliefs, values and norms as advocated by Japanese religions, is the aim of the following section.

## 1.3 Japanese Religions

### 1.3.1 Introduction

The functionalist perspective on religion sees religion as contributing to the requirements of society needs, which includes a degree of social solidarity, value consensus, and harmony and integration (Holborn and Haralambos, 2000: 434). On religion and value consensus, the sociologist Parsons asserts that “religion provides general guidelines for conduct which are expressed in a variety of norms. By establishing general principles and moral beliefs, religion helps to provide the consensus which Parsons believes is necessary for order and stability in society” (Parsons 1937, 1964, 1965, as cited in Holborn and Haralambos, 2000: 434). Similarly Durkheim emphasised the role of religion in reinforcing shared values and moral belief that form what he called, the ‘collective conscience’ (Durkheim 1961, as cited in Holborn and Haralambos, 2000: 433).

Likewise, the importance of religion, both as a source of present day framework of Japanese culture and society and also as a living tradition, cannot be underestimated, nor overlooked. This point has been stressed by various scholars. The sociologist Kumagai (1996), for example, describes the complex nature of modern day Japan as a coexistence of a dual structure model where modernity, epitomised by Western capitalism, coexists with indigenous tradition, which includes systems, customs, values and cultural traits (Kumagai, 1996: 5). In the book, *Religion in Japanese Culture, Where Living Traditions Meet a Changing World* (Tamaru and Reid, 1996), the title speaks for itself. This collection of works by leading sociologists and religion specialists demonstrates the significance of religion for the understanding of present day Japan.

As soon as one tries to define what is, or are, Japanese religions, one faces difficulty. It is extremely difficult to separate religion *per se* from customs and norms. Some researchers on Japanese religions prefer to leave the matter of defining Japanese religion open to discussion, since, “It remains a difficult task to find one’s way through the maze of religiosity and non-religiosity that typifies the Japanese” (Swyngedouw, 1993: 49). Others, like Yanagawa (1993), one of Japan’s foremost scholars on religion, states the reality of Japanese religion as follows: “In Japan, the unit of religion is human relationships and religion is indistinguishably mixed with custom” (Keiichi Yanagawa, 1993, as cited in Swyngedouw, 1993: 50).

It can be said that, the reason for this complexity is due to the fact that “Japanese religion is a blend of at least five major strands: folk religion, Shinto, Buddhism, religious Taoism and Confucianism” (Earhart, 1982: 1).

The extent that this blended religion, which is indistinguishably mixed with customs, plays a role in present-day Japan has been already mentioned earlier. In the chapter on Religious life in Contemporary Japan, H. B. Earhart (1982) explains as follows:

Although in 1945 the emperor renounced his divinity, and although the notion of *kami* is not taken so literally today, nevertheless the presence of *kami*(god), remains important...Although the proliferation of purification, rituals, and charms that Japan once knew has greatly diminished, many are still found in present-day Japan... Japanese religion is still very much related to the problems of daily life...probably the most popular charm in all Japan is the one of traffic safety...The natural bond between Japanese religion and the Japanese nation lives on today, although not so much in explicit terms as in implicit understanding....The Japanese generally do not consider the divine founding of Japan to be a historical event, but their notion of Japanese culture and the Japanese people as a unique historical entity is implicitly religious (Earhart, 1982: 195-197).

Similarly, in the conclusion to his chapter on *The Revitalisation of Japanese Civil Religion*, Takayama K. P. (1993) concludes that “The traditional cosmology and religious values that help shape the Japanese cultural identity and upon which civil religion was constructed have survived without much alteration to the present day” (Takayama, 1993: 119). Thus, it becomes apparent that Japanese beliefs are, in fact, a blend of various religions. They are also tied with customs, and that Japanese religion lives on today.

To what extent do Japanese people feel/have affiliation to any, or all of these religions? Contrary to Earhart’s (1982) statement, researches and statistical data show that Japanese on the whole, believe themselves to be not religious, and do not have a strong affiliation to any religion (Ellwood and Pilgrim, 1985). Swyngedouw (1993) for example, found that “...according to all surveys, up to two third of the population claim to have no personal religious affiliation: and this percentage rises still if we focus on the younger generation” (Swyngedouw, 1993: 50). However, these researches and surveyors used a Western style questionnaire, with the Western idea of religion in their mind. The disparity between the Western idea of religion, and the evidence of religious practices in Japan today, can explain the gap between Earhart’s findings, which analysed the actual practice of religion in today’s Japan, and Swyngedouw’s findings, based on a Western style questionnaire, which used Western definitions of religion, for the non Western, Japanese. Matsumoto Shigeru (1996), who found a similar contrast, attributes it to the complexity of Japanese religions. In like manner, he claims that while on the one hand, Japanese people seem to show

little interest in religion, on the other hand, they are very religious if we look at the great number of religious groups, the millions of people who are affiliated with one or more religions, and also from the masses of people who visit famous shrines, especially during new year festivities (Matsumoto, 1996: 13).

All in all, it can be said that Japanese people do practice religion, but not according to the Western definition of institutionalised religion. Also, since religion and custom/daily habits are non-separable, it becomes an infeasible task to differentiate between them. An illustrative example is the yearly visits by prominent Japanese politicians to the infamous Shinto shrine, Yasukuni in Tokyo, were 2.8 millions of the war-dead, including notorious class A criminals tried and executed by the Allies, are enshrined as *kami* (gods/deities). The most recent visits included the present Prime Minister, Koizumi Junichiro (Frei, 2001). Despite the constitution's Article 20 clause of separation of religion and state, judges ruling on the visits' issue declared, that they were "in accord with social custom of consoling and praising the souls of the war dead" (Herzog, 1993: 128), and that "the participation of public personalities in these ceremonies was an act of social etiquette"(Herzog, 1993: 129)<sup>4</sup>.

In the following section the two most prominent Japanese religions in terms of shared values/beliefs/norms, the native Shintoism, and the imported Confucianism, and to a lesser degree, Buddhism, will be discussed.

### 1.3.2 Shinto

Among Japanese religions, Shinto is the oldest and considered the only pure Japanese religion (Mullins et al., 1993)<sup>5</sup>. Its beginning is in the prehistoric period of the Japanese archipelago. Over its long history, Shinto changed and came to include various socio-cultural aspects, in addition to the religious aspect. According to Ueda Kenji, a professor at Kokugakuin University, contemporary Shinto has four main forms: the Shinto of the Imperial House (*koshitsu shinto*), Shrine Shinto (*jinja shinto*), Sect Shinto (*kyoha shinto*), and Folk Shinto (*minkan Shinto*) (Ueda, 1996: 27). The Shinto of the Imperial House is for and observed by the imperial institutions, while the Shrine Shinto includes a system of beliefs and also shrine rituals and

---

<sup>4</sup> As will be seen later, similar attitudes toward the constitution and the law are not uncommon among the populace including journalists.

<sup>5</sup> Some researchers claim that also Shinto's origins are not Japanese, e.g., Earhart, B., H. (1982) *Japanese Religions, Unity and Diversity*, Wadsworth Publishing Company, Belmont, California.

festivals in the honour of the gods/deities (*kami*). Under Sect Shinto come various groups with common characteristic of being founded by charismatic personalities, while Folk Shinto is a term that includes all the “amalgam of superstitious, magico-religious rites and practices of the common people” (Ueda, 1996: 29). Prior to the end of World War II, there was another form of Shinto called State Shinto, which can be seen as a political creation, and as a combination of Shrine Shinto and Shinto of the Imperial House (Ueda, 1996: 27).

A thorough discussion of Shinto in general has been carried out by Dyke R. Ken, Brigadier General, Chief, CI&E Section for the Allied Forces’ Chief of Staff, following Japan’s surrender and consequent occupation by US military, since it was to a large extent seen as the mobilising power of the Japanese people on the road to war, and consequently, to defeat. In writing his *Memorandum on State Shinto to the Chief of Staff*, Dyke made use of major Japanese and Western scholarly sources on Japanese religions. Among the sources for the memorandum were Anesaki Masaharu (1930), who wrote, *History of Japanese Religion*, Aston, W. G. (1905), *Shinto* (The way of gods), Chamberlain, Basil Hall (1939) *Things Japanese* and Sansom, George B., *Japan: A Short Cultural History* (Mullins et al., 1993).

The major points that are noteworthy from the memorandum on the nature of Shinto are that: it is an ancient religion, in the sense that it originated from earliest times (Hornby, 1974); it is related to the ancestors of the Japanese people; it is national; in modern times, it was put together, or reproduced, as a State Shinto, to serve the official class, and consequently, the nation at large (Mullins et al., 1993). Or, in the words of Passin (1982), the State Shinto that had been preached at schools, was a selective adaptation of traditions, and that “The divinity of the Emperor and the obligation of absolute obedience to him, for example, were essentially, revivals of pre-feudal concepts. What the Meiji leaders did was retain the principle of unquestioning loyalty but transfer it from the feudal lord to the Emperor (Passin, 1982: 153).

The next part of the memorandum discusses the methods by which State Shinto was vitalised. Submissiveness, loyalty to the state and acceptance of the official views as to the proper nature of the political and social morality, were obtained through school education. Moreover, good citizenship was ‘identified with the acceptance of Shinto mythology’. This was deemed important because Shinto provided the pre-war nationalists with the only pure Japanese religion. And as for the repressive side of State Shinto, it rejected vigorously any challenge to it (Passin, 1982: 85; for a similar view, see also Inoue, 1996). As to

the nature of State Shinto, the memorandum clarifies that Shinto is racially/nationally bound; it is the expression of the Japanese people's belief that they are part of a nation that is racially bound, and that their loyalty is to the Emperor, who is at the centre (Passin, 1982: 86).

Thus, it can be said that Shinto in general is a purely Japanese religion, connecting the Japanese to their ancestors. As to State Shinto, it had been transmitted, and strengthened through schools and through repression of any deviating ideas/challenging religions, and it demanded total loyalty/devotion to the emperor and to the state, since 'good citizenship' was identified with acceptance of State Shinto (Passin, 1982: 86).

As to the relevance of Shinto to present day Japan, Takayama (1993) found that:

Many government leaders are convinced that Japan needs to restore the sacred Shinto symbols and historical legacies that once gave the Japanese a strong national identity and cosmic unity. To be sure, the movement to revitalise the Japanese civil religion rests on a resurgence of nationalistic and religious sentiments among many ordinary Japanese citizens, who accept Shinto as a 'public' religion, as they did in pre-war times (Takayama, 1993: 105; see also Befu, 1992).

### **Shinto Regeneration and discussions of 'Japaneseness'**

The wide spread acceptance of Shinto by many ordinary Japanese, and efforts to revive Shinto on the national level, is part of a general development, which increasingly gained strength during the 70s and 80s to parallel Japan's economic booming years. If one will look into the proliferation of publications regarding *Nihonjinron* (discussion of 'Japaneseness'), one might be surprised by the enormous quantities of material written about the topic. "*Nihonjinron* literally means 'theories of Japaneseness' and refers to a genre of literature and stream of ideas which suggest that Japan is different from all other societies" (Dale, 1986, as cited by Goodman and Refsing, 1992: 11). In the book *Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan*, the sociologist Yoshino Kosaku (2000) investigates in depth the phenomenon of '*Nihonjinron*', which he calls 'intellectual nationalism'. He writes the following on the *Nihonjinron* and its literature: that "The *Nihonjinron*...refer to the vast array of literature which thinking elite have produced to define the uniqueness of Japanese culture, society and national character" (Yoshino, 2000: 3). And as for the producers of this literature, Yoshino (2000) writes that they are not confined only to academics but include also thinkers of various occupations such as journalists, critics, writers and even the business elite (Yoshino, 2000: 9).

In what ways, does the *Nihonjiron* thinking manifest itself in literature? According to Yoshino (2000), there are two distinct categories of the literature on Japanese uniqueness: one is concerned with culture and includes literature on the uniqueness of the Japanese linguistic-communicative culture, and also the uniqueness of the Japanese social culture (Yoshino, 2000: 13). The other cluster of literature discusses the racial aspect of this uniqueness. This racial thinking has two dimensions: one dimension is concerned with the 'Japanese race' itself and the other is concerned with the relations between the Japanese race and culture (Yoshino, 2000: 24). Many Japanese believe that their society is composed of one race, and therefore an homogenous society. Also, their race is a distinct racial group with a unique culture. These two elements are an important component of Japanese identity (Yoshino, 2000: 24). "The idiom of 'Japanese blood' is used in popular speech to refer to that aspect of Japanese identity which tends to be perceived as immutable by the Japanese (Yoshino, 2000: 24). The Japanese belief in distinctive Japanese culture is manifested also in their perceptions of their national identity, "...is typically shown in the statement 'you have to be born a Japanese to understand Japanese mentality' (Yoshino, 2000: 24; for further discussions on *Nihonjinron* see Henshall, 1999; Goodman and Refsing, 1992; Ivy, 1988; van Wolferen, 1989).

There is one major explanation for these demands for the revival of Shintoism, from invisible, albeit practised, to visible/official religion, and also, to the proliferation of *Nihonjinron* discussions, which include, as noted above, what/who are the Japanese, their uniqueness, the Japanese blood/brain, and, in general, the differences with the outside world. Since the late 1970s, when Japan's economic success in the world became apparent, so did its self-confidence and pride return too. Moreover, the puzzle of an Eastern country, developing up to, and even better, in many cases, than established developed countries of the Western world, provoked the world into a chase to learn the 'Japanese tricks' for success. From a defeated country, with lost pride and self-confidence, Japan has evolved into a confident, proud country, which is sought after by established powers, as a model for success. The effects of these development on Japan were great: "The nation's traditional values – in some respects the very ones that had been rejected in 1945– were now acclaimed as having provided Japan with a unique advantage in building an advanced industrial society" (Takayama, 1993: 12-113).

The important fact was that, "Such comments were made not only by Japanese analysts, but, perhaps more importantly to the Japanese, by foreign observers" (Takayama, 1993: 112-113). Moreover, this newly

discovered pride and self confidence, have had also social and political implications, as Takayama (1993) notes “ Japan’s economic success and its consequent pride in its social values and institutions pushed the people further to the right” (Takayama, 1993: 112-113; see also Abegglen and Stalk, 1990: 3-16; Vogel, 1980: 9-28).

More than other Japanese religions, the native Shinto continues to play a major role in the reassertion of Japanese values, their national identity and what Hiro and Yamamoto (1986) call ‘civil religion’ (Hiro and Yamamoto, 1986, as cited by Befu, 1992; on the relationship between Shinto and Japanese values and national identity see also Reader, 1991: 27; Ueda, 1996: 27).

The nature, characteristics, and vitalisation mechanisms of Shinto and the discussion of *Nihonjinron*, as described above, must be kept in mind in order to grasp their centrality in present day Japanese society, culture and education, and their influence on the perceptions of the average Japanese in general, and Japanese journalists in particular regarding their identity and nationality among others. Conversely, the significant role the media plays in spreading the theories of *Nihonjinron*, have been confirmed already by a number of researches (e.g. Yoshino, 2000; Sugimoto and Mouer, 1989; Mouer and Sugimoto, 1986; Befu, 1992; Goodman and Refsing, 1992).

### 1.3.3 Confucianism

Confucianism, which also contributed to much of Japan’s economic, and some say, social success (Reid, 1999: 5-28), mainly addresses aspects of order in society. In the Memorandum on State Shinto to the Chief of Staff (3 December 1945), it is stated that:

Many of the more oppressive aspects of Japanese society, sometimes loosely attributed to Shinto and indeed sometimes intermingled with modern State Shinto, have their origin in other sources. The five human relationships specifically enumerated in the 1890 ‘Rescript on Education’, were of Confucian origin. The Shushi Confucian heritage of rigorous morality, the subordination of everyone to superior, and the assignment to every man and woman of a fixed place in the hierarchy of social and family life has dominated Japanese society” (Mullins et al., 1993: 83).

Confucianism stresses: morality, subordination to superior, and strict hierarchical order. Moreover, it also stresses that control of the mind is one of the most important virtues and is the true learning (Nakae Toju: Control of the Mind is the True Learning, 1628, as cited by Passin, 1982: 167 ; see also Lebra and Lebra, 1986: 295). The rules governing order in society, and their importance to the extent that they were

given prominence in education can be seen from early documents. For example: Yamazaki Ansai (1650) wrote on the 'Principles of Education':

It would seem ... that the aim of education, elementary and advanced, is to clarify human relationships. ... The five regulations: Between parent and child there is intimacy, Between lord and minister there is duty, Between husband and wife there is differentiation, Between elder and junior there is precedence, between friend and friend there is fidelity (Yamazaki Ansai: Principles of Education, 1650, in Passin, 1982: 170; see also Hendry, 1998: 23, 125).

The clear hierarchy within and outside the family, between men and women was precisely defined. In addition, the particular and differing qualities expected of men and women were clearly resolved too. Now, a look at the *Imperial Rescript of Education* (1890), discloses the general qualities which had been expected from the population at large, when conducting these five types of relations:

Our Subjects, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious, as friends true; bear yourselves in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; pursue learning and cultivate arts, and thereby develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers; furthermore, advance public good and promote common interests; always respect the Constitution and observe the laws; should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State, and thus, guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth. So shall ye not only be Our good and faithful subjects, but render illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers" (Mullins et al., 1993: 81).

The human qualities expected of the individual were: control of the mind, modesty, moderation, learning and cultivation of arts. The expected qualities of the individual, in his relations to others, were: harmony, benevolence, and promotion of public good and common interest. In his relations to the state, respect of the law/constitution and loyalty to the state, to the extent of sacrificing oneself to the nation, were stressed. All these social rules were intended to produce the 'harmony' that the Confucian rationale praised, harmony which meant, "the peaceful co-operation between benevolent rulers and obedient people" (Earhart, 1982: 32-37; see also Lebra and Lebra, 1986: 295). In this "social harmony": the ruler rules justly, the ministers administer honestly, and most important, the people are united in their loyalty to the emperor" (Earhart, 1982: 32-37). As to the degree that the *Imperial Rescript on Education* had been realised, Passin (1982) writes:

The Japanese family was, as someone has observed, a 'training ground in hierarchy'. Relations within the family had a strong hierarchical element: The head of the family had subordinates authority, legally enjoined by the Civil Code, over the family members: female were subordinate to males; juniors were subordinate to seniors; younger brothers were subordinate to older brother, the family head's heir-apparent (Passin, 1982: 159).

Evidently, the Confucian order was not an idealised order, but a fully practised one. The large-scale compliance with the Confucian order resulted in "the subordination of the self to the collective family

group”, which was “concordant with the more generalised notion of subordination of self to the national collective” (Passin, 1982: 153).

Thus, the five Confucianist relations were well in place, and practice. These familial rules of conduct, or, ethics, which were basically Confucian ethics of the upper classes have been advocated throughout society, via the dissemination of the different official documents, and through the actual promotion of them in all spheres of life, starting at home, and through education (Passin, 1982: 153). As will be seen later, it becomes obvious that Confucian ethics are still being taught, promoted and cultivated from early childhood at home, through the education system, till adulthood, and then, once internalised, are expected, and to a large extent practised by adult Japanese, throughout society, including also Japanese journalists.

### **1.3.4 Buddhism**

Although a major religion in Japan, owing to its main functions in daily Japanese life as explained subsequently, Buddhism’s relevance to this thesis is rather limited and therefore the discussion is brief.

When Buddhism was first introduced in Japan, it was in a selective manner, principally for two main functions, which remain unchanged also at present. One is to deal with death and the pacification of the spirits, since Shinto does not concern itself with death due to its impurity. Buddhism’s central role in death-related matters is illustrated by the often heard phrase “born Shinto, die Buddhist” (Tamaru and Reid, 1996; Reader, 1991). Moreover, for ordinary Japanese, this function is Buddhism’s major role in their daily life, as Tamaru elaborates, “...most people still look to the Buddhist temple for funeral and post-funeral ritual services...” (Tamaru and Reid, 1996: 27). The other role of Buddhism is to offer “magical spells for various benefits such as prosperity, health and peace” (Andereasen, 1993: 35).

In addition to these functional division of roles that came to co-exist with pre-existing religions, aspects regarding the individual in society were also selectively adopted and promoted (Andereasen, 1993: 35).

With respect to the individual in his relations with others, Buddhism promotes the love of compromise and pliability. As to the individual himself, Buddhism strongly emphasises internal discipline (like Confucianism), single-minded commitment, perseverance, diligence, and patience, all of which reinforce self-discipline (Reader, 1993: 153-154; see also Lebra and Lebra, 1986: 295; Henshall, 1999: 3).

### 1.3.5 Summary

Following the discussion on the three major Japanese religions, an idea as to the nature and characteristics of Shinto, and the related discussion of *Nihonjinron*, and also as to the values, qualities, and norms that are stressed by Confucian and Buddhist teachings, has been made clear. As a synopsis, it can be said that Shinto provides the Japanese with a set of beliefs and norms mainly regarding their origins, history and identity, while Confucianism and to a lesser extent, Buddhism, provide the Japanese with a set of values and patterns of behaviours. Thus, the religious context provides what and Durkheim, in their functionalist approach, call the “general guidelines for conduct which are expressed in a variety of norms” (Parsons 1937, 1964, 1965 and Durkheim 1961, as cited in Holborn and Haralambos, 2000: 433-434). Through the establishment of these general principles and moral beliefs, “religion helps to provide the consensus which Parsons believes is necessary for order and stability in society” (Holborn and Haralambos, 2000: 434).

As will be seen in the following, all that was said about Japanese religions regarding beliefs, and value system, among others, is very much alive today through not only the continuity of tradition, but also through the conscious and vigorous encouragement by the Japanese elite (Mouer and Sugimoto, 1986: 168-171).

## 1.4 Dominant Values in Japanese Culture

### 1.4.1 Introduction

Calling to mind the functionalist perspective on religion, which sees religion as providing the general guidelines for conduct, in Parsons words, or in reinforcing shared values and moral belief that form what Durkheim called, the ‘collective conscience’ (Durkheim 1961, as cited in Holborn and Haralambos, 2000: 434-4), this section aims to link religion and culture in the sense that, culture ‘consists of whatever it is one has to know or believe in order to operate in a manner acceptable to its members’ (Ward Goodenough as cited in Geertz, 2000: 11).

Various scholars agree that in the case of Japan, separating religion from culture is a complicated task, due to the fact that the various religions are mixed and intermingled in daily beliefs, customs, and practices (for example De Vos, 1986; Ellwood and Pilgrim, 1985; Lebra and Lebra, 1986; Takayama, 1993). In the following, a selected number of prominent values of Japanese society will be introduced in order to appreciate the basic requirements, in terms of cultural values, one has to internalise and exhibit, in order to behave in an acceptable manner to society. Needless to say, these values, to be introduced below, are consistent with the religions introduced earlier, a link which will be briefly touched upon. In addition, the relevance of this consideration to the Japanese media will be briefly taken, though a more elaborate discussion, which will follow in the forthcoming chapter on the Japanese media.

#### **1.4.2 Japanese Culture: Selected Values**

The following prominent values were singled out in view of the fact that they are the most recurrently discussed in literature concerning Japan, and deemed essential for comprehending Japanese culture and society (Finkelstein et al., 1991; Fukue, 1991; Hall, 1998; Hendry, 1986; Lebra and Lebra, 1986; Mannari and Befu, 1991; Tasker, 1987).

##### ***Formal/proper behaviour (Tatemaie) and Inner feelings (Honne)***

The dichotomy of *honne* and *tatemaie*, formal/proper and inner feelings, dates back, to at least the 14<sup>th</sup> century (Befu, 1991), and originated from both, Confucianism and Buddhism (Henshall, 1999; Lebra and Lebra, 1986; Passin, 1982; Mullins et al., 1993). "The dictionary defines *tatemaie* as principles or rules established as natural and proper" (Japanese Civilization, 2001). Or, in other words, the formal appearance, the proper way to behave, do things etc (Finkelstein et al., 1991; Henshall, 1999). In contrast to *tatemaie*, *honne* represents the inner feelings, opinions, motives, the way we would have liked to behave, do things etc, all that should be kept to oneself, especially when in a group (Tasker, 1987; Mannari and Befu, 1991; Lebra and Lebra, 1986; Hendry, 1986; Finkelstein et al., 1991). "The Japanese think of *honne* as constituting as much of real life as does the ceremonial *tatemaie* function. Thus, the Japanese see the making of an announcement as half the reality, the other half being the action behind the scenes" (Pascale and Athos, 1984: 95). Expanding on *tatemaie*, in the book "Behind the Japanese Bow", De Mente (1993)

describes the proper forms of doing things in all spheres of life, and incorporates subjects suchlike the proper way to eat, the way to sit, the way to bow etc (De Mente, 1993).

Grounded on this dichotomy and in association with the Japanese media, it is often asserted that the mainstream media<sup>6</sup>, predominantly the newspapers, manifest the *tatema* of Japan, while magazines externalise the *honne* of Japan (see for example Kato and Kiuchi, 1984; Watanabe, 1996; Tasker, 1987; Sherman, 1990; Young, 1996). This claim alleges that the Japanese mainstream media introduces to the public the proper/official/formal countenance, while non-mainstream media, especially the magazines are the ones who exhibit veracity.

### *Inside and Outside (Uchi and Soto)*

Recalling the section on Japanese religions, the following dichotomy of 'inside' and 'outside' seems to originate from Shinto, as demarcating Japan and possibly strengthened by the structured human relations of Confucianism (Mullins et al., 1993; Earhart, 1982; Goodman and Refsing, 1992). *Uchi* means inside, home, but also my company, my school, the inner group etc, as opposed to *soto*, outside, which means literally outside the home, but also outside the domains one deems to be *uchi*, the outer group. The cultural values of *uchi* and *soto*, encompass varied realms from the literal home, as differing from the outside, to Japan as the denotation of home, when demarcated from the outside, the foreign lands. The connotation of inside, as safe, warm etc, is contrasted by the unfamiliar, unpredictable, and therefore chaotic outside. The differentiation between inside and outside is learned from the earliest stages of developments, as Hendry (1986) maintains that the first word associated with outside is dangerous (*abunai*). "The development of fear seems to be associated always with the outsiders and the outside of the house, and it is perhaps an important contrast with safety and indulgence of the inside, which has also been carefully fostered" (Hendry, 1986: 113; see also Fukue, 1991; Mannari and Befu, 1991). Moreover, Japanese treat differently people who are considered part of the *uchi*, and people who are considered to be outsiders of the *uchi*. "Family and backdoor guests are treated with much more spontaneity than formality while the ratio is reversed for front door callers" (Japanese Civilization, 2001). To slightly expand on this dichotomy, it is

---

<sup>6</sup> The concept of 'mainstream media' will be explained later, however, in short it denotes members of the Japan Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association (NSK).

essential to state that Japanese speech patterns and interpersonal relations are all fabricated on this distinction. That is to say that there are dissimilar speech models when talking to people from the inside group, and people from the outside.

This dichotomy is crucial for the understanding of the Japanese media since it demarcates between the mainstream media (inside = the in-group) and the non-mainstream media (outside = out-group), and at times, also between Japan, including its media, as a whole (inside), when confronted by non-Japanese (outside). Consequently, due to this demarcation, it seems plausible to say that this dichotomy may affect international reporting in two related ways. First, in general it may exert influence on international reporting in the sense that reporting on foreign countries – the *soto*, will differ from reporting on domestic issues – the *uchi*. Indeed, such a differentiation had been already uncovered in research (for example Massey and Chang, 2000; Krauss and Budner, 1995; Cooper-Chen, 2001) and also clearly asserted by a Japanese journalist who stated that “when reporting on foreign countries, we do not have to keep the rules of objectivity and balance...”<sup>7</sup>. Second, it may play an important role in the Japanese media’s coverage of Japan’s international relations, and its reporting on countries Japan is involved with. That such a link may exist, had been already suggested in previous research (for example Atwood, 1987; Horvit, 1997; Lloyd, 1996; Sherman, 1994; Uchikawa and Arai, 1991; Tase, 1994; Suzuki, 1993), and is also apparent by Japanese foreign correspondents’ utterances<sup>8</sup>. A more comprehensive discussion on the subject will follow in Chapters Three and Four, elaborating on the issue of the Japanese mainstream media’ international reporting.

### ***Giri–Ninjo***

Another dichotomy is *giri* and *ninjo*. *Giri* is the protocol that controls the interaction, a duty to a specific person, whom one has relations with. It is also strongly related to the value of *on*, which is understood as indebtedness for a favour given, or kindness shown, as Doi (1986) stressed: “*On* refers to debts of personal gratitude, while *giri* refers to a specific obligation implicit in a relationship” (Doi, 1986: 75).

---

<sup>7</sup> A personal interview conducted on 15<sup>th</sup> April 2002, London, with a Japanese journalist that will be called from now on journalist B. All mentions of journalist B in this paper, are related to this interview.

<sup>8</sup> For full details of these statements, see Chapter Four: Interviews with Japanese Foreign Correspondents Posted in London, October 2001-May 2002.

As to *ninjo*, it refers to as ‘human emotions’, and defined as the spontaneously arising emotions, or, one’s real feelings, which is closely related to *honne* (see for example Japanese Civilization, 2001; Finkelstein et al., 1991; Henshall, 1999). This dichotomy of *giri* and *ninjo*, that outlines rules for human relations, evidently is to be attributed to Confucianism (Mullins et al., 1993; Henshall, 1999; Goodman and Refsing, 1992). As to *on*, according to Lebra (1986), the “culture-loaded concept of *on*” is related to the norm of reciprocity within human relations, where there are expectations of keeping balance “between debts and credits” (Lebra and Lebra, 1986: 50).

Consequently, the rules of human relations, as expressed by *giri* and *ninjo*, have implications also regarding the working of mainstream journalists, both internally—within the media organisation, and externally—in relations with non media workers. It is especially relevant to the Journalists’ Club that will be discussed in Chapter Two, where *giri* and consequently *on*, are the major reasons cited for the exclusion of non-members from nearly all kinds of news briefing, since they do not possess the necessary personal gratitude, nor indebtedness (*on*) towards the news source. As such, these non-member journalists, will therefore not accept that person’s *ninjo*, the denotation for a variety of instances including improper conduct or spontaneously arising emotions such as slips of the tongue, which would not be exposed usually by the loyal journalists of the club (see for example Freeman, 2000: 118-120; Feldman, 1993: 108,114; Hara, 1992: 196). In addition, as these rules are related to established human relations, it also may affect international reporting, as stated by an Israeli diplomat “Japanese journalists have great difficulty with objectivity...if you become one of their *nakama* (friend, insider), they find it impossible to criticise you”<sup>9</sup>. Thus, this statement encapsulates the essence of human relations where once acquaintance is established, human relations in terms of *giri/ninjo* as well as *on* evolve, and as such, owing to the rules governing these cultural values, the journalists become incapable of criticising that person, who is in fact, a news source for them.

---

<sup>9</sup> A personal interview conducted with an Israeli Diplomat on the 19<sup>th</sup> December, 2001, Israel. All mentions of Israeli diplomat in this paper are related to this interview.

### ***Senior and Junior (Sempai and Kohai): Vertical relations within the group***

The final dichotomy to be introduced in this essay is that of *sempai* and *kohai*, senior and junior. This dichotomy, which is essentially a Confucian idea of seniority, reflects vertical relations within the group. It also mirrors very closely the family group. The key element is the vertical relationship between parent (*oya*), and child (*ko*), and in fact these same terms are often used to describe relationships within groups outside the family proper (Henshall, 1999; see also Ellwood and Pilgrim, 1985: 109-145; Befu, 1983). In discussion on loyalty for example, Hendry (1998) found that: "The idea of giving loyalty in exchange for benevolence is expected in pairs of relationships in various walks of life, and the expression *oyabun/kobun*, or parent/child part, is used to describe such relations. It applies to "teacher/pupil, master/apprentice, landlord/tenant, and, in particular, criminal and accomplice bond" (Hendry, 1998: 39).

What is eminently significant in the consideration of *sempai* and *kohai* is the insinuation of this laden cultural dichotomy. This vertical classification is, of course, situational, in as much as at certain times a person is *sempai*, and at other times that person is *kohai*. A person can be an older brother at home, while at work he is a junior. The person knows which code of behaviour/speech to use when he/she is *sempai*, and conversely, when he/she is *kohai*. Either of the positions have obligations and rewards. When someone is a senior, it means among others, that the person is usually older, is longer in the group (be it family, Judo club, university, or workplace), is in a position of power over the junior, is secure and established and is expected to guide and promote the junior, as if the junior was his/her child. The junior, conversely, accepts this tutelage from his metaphorical father, feels indebted, and repays it with obedience, respect, (unmitigated) devotion, loyalty etc (for further discussion see Finkelstein et al., 1991; Fukue, 1991; Hendry, 1986; Lebra and Lebra, 1986; Mannari and Befu, 1991; Moeran, 1986 ; Befu, 1983). The importance of these human relations is that, as time goes by, members in any group become increasingly aware of the web of obligations each one has towards the others in the group, and their group feelings grow stronger. Moreover, Japanese etiquette ritualises obligations and defines relationships with great clarity, and this may be the mechanism that makes Japanese group consciousness so powerful. "Groups of people held together by a network of promises and obligations make for a stable society, which, in Japan, is the ultimate social good" (Japanese Civilization, 2001; see also Finkelstein et al., 1991; Fukue, 1991; Hendry, 1986; Lebra and Lebra, 1986; Mannari and Befu, 1991; Moeran, 1986; Befu, 1983).

This ‘ultimate good’ must be preserved by all means, and deviation from it in terms of disrupting it, means upsetting the harmony (*wa*) of the group. The members in the group see themselves, not in terms of individuals, but as members of a group. This “...underlines the obligations one has to the other group members and to relieve one of any obligation to anyone not a member of the group” (Japanese Civilization, 2001; for further discussion see Finkelstein et al., 1991; Fukue, 1991; Hendry, 1986; Lebra and Lebra, 1986; Mannari and Befu, 1991; Moeran, 1986). Here, the distinction between inside (*uchi*) and outside (*soto*) should be emphasised. Members in the group have commitment, in terms of *on*, *giri* and *ninjo*, solely towards other members of the same group (*uchi*), and none for people perceived outsiders (*soto*).

There are three points to be made in relation to the Japanese media. On the relations between the main newspapers and their affiliate companies, the relations are often described as parent (*oya*)–child (*ko*) relations, and as such the imperative follows that the affiliated companies usually follow the lead of their parent newspaper. Second, the relations within the media, relations within the press-clubs among the journalists themselves, and also their relations with the news source, all can be described as *senpai–kohai* relations. For instance, since the news source is usually a senior, this shared value of hierarchy holds major implications regarding the role, functions, and ethics of journalists, as opposed to the ‘watchdog’ role, independence in reporting etc. Third, it is also consequential to note the implication of these vertical relations between mainstream and non-mainstream media. It can be said that these vertical rules apply to the media (inside–*uchi*), but not to non-mainstream media (outside–*soto*), apart from the times when the whole Japanese media becomes one– inside (*uchi*). The fact that non-mainstream media are usually considered and treated as outsiders means that they are not bound by obligations, and therefore free in their reporting activities. Further elaboration on the effects of vertical relations within the group (*senpai/kohai*) on the working of the Japanese media as stressed above will follow in the subsequent chapter.

### ***Harmony (Wa)***

The famous Japanese proverb ‘A sticking out nail should be hammered down’, alludes to what had been discussed earlier that keeping the harmony means “avoiding outright disputes and differences and concentrating instead on compliance and harmony (*wa*) in relationships...” (Hendry, 1986: 117). This much revered value, derived from the three religions discussed previously (Takayama, 1993; Henshall,

1999; Reader, 1993), accentuates that if someone stands out, that person should be 'hammered down', in order to be brought back to line. Although written in pre-war times, the following 1937 Ministry of Education statement epitomises the significance of harmony, and the means by which it should be achieved: "The harmony of our country is not mechanical co-operation, starting from reason, of equal individuals independent of each other, but the grand harmony which maintains its integrity by proper statuses of individuals within the collectivity and by acts within these statuses" (Kenrick, 1991: 65).

The above emphasises the importance of group membership and knowing one's status and through this acknowledgement that a person contributes to the harmony of the group.

The rules for keeping the harmony should be kept in mind, since they are consequential for the comprehension of numerous aspects of Japanese journalism, including 'pack journalism', uniformity in the reporting, conformism (Sherman, 1990), and also to the dynamics in the journalists' club (Sato, 1995b; Freeman, 2000).

### ***Spirit: Seishin***

On *seishin*, which is vaguely translated as spirit, Moeran (1986) says that it refers to one's inner being which, "...often drives spiritual fortitude from self-discipline. Both Confucian and Buddhist ideals are found in *seishin*, which relies on physical training as a means towards attaining spiritual well being and harmony within the self" (Moeran, 1986: 65-66). The importance of *seishin* is especially stressed in traditional occupations such as martial arts and the arts (Moeran, 1986; see also Rohlen, 1986; Lebra and Lebra, 1986; Finkelstein et al., 1991), however, *seishin* has also wider meanings in addition to the inner spirit. In his research on the 'spiritual education' in a Japanese bank, Rohlen (1986) links *seishin* also to nationalism and patriotism. He writes that through various acts such as learning the history of the bank, being told of the 'company spirit', and hearing inspirational messages from leaders, the trainees are taught pride and respect. And as for feelings toward the country, "The nation is not ignored but rather the company stresses the service given to Japan by the bank and urges its trainees to fulfil their responsibilities to the nation through loyalty to their company" (Rohlen, 1986: 309; see also Henshall, 1999: 127)<sup>10</sup>.

---

<sup>10</sup> Very similar to the bank is the institutionalised 'The seven 'spiritual 'values'' of Matsushita corporation, where the first value is "national service through industry" (Pascal, 1984, p. 51).

The group *seishin* indicates that loyalty/devotion to the nation is expressed through loyalty/devotion to the company. The passage reminds one of the native religion of Shinto, however, instead of directing their attention to the nation with the emperor in the top, it is directed to the company and through it to the nation.

The relevance of *seishin*, in terms of patriotism and nationalism, remains paramount with regards to whether and to what extent it is influential in Japanese foreign correspondents reporting on their nation and other countries. Some researches suggest that there is a particular quality to the link between Japanese foreign correspondents and their country (Lee, 1985; van Wolferen, 1989; Hall, 1998; Pharr and Krauss, 1996). Moreover, in various interviews conducted with Japanese foreign correspondents, there was a widespread agreement that their 'country's interests' are central<sup>11</sup>, and hence, overshadow any journalistic norm or code of conduct.

### ***Consensual Decision-Making (Nemawashi)***

The denotation of *nemawashi* "is related to the preliminary stages of reaching an agreement prior to formal discussion or negotiations; the building up of a consensus so that the eventual agreement is a foregone conclusion" (Matsumoto, 1989: 19). It implies a long decision-making process, where prior to the final decisions, careful and time consuming negotiations take place before a final proposal is introduced or a final decision is announced" (Doi, 1986: 57). The importance of this process lies in its effectiveness, "Because effective implementation of decisions is viewed as requiring a reconciliation of competing interests – the assistance of all of them is essential to success..." (Pascale and Athos, 1984: 111-112). Decisions taken by *nemawashi* are fruitful because they oblige the members to abide by the decision, even if in their inner feelings (*honne*), they are against it. Since *nemawashi* implies group decision-making and members' support of the final decision, disobedience by any member can result in severe punishment to the disobedient by other members of the group. These definitions of consensual decision-making allude to Shinto's group-orientation, and ostracism for disobedience, and also to Buddhism's love of compromise and pliability (Reader, 1993; Mullins et al., 1993).

The value of *nemawashi* and its relation to the working of the Japanese media is also significant. As will be discussed subsequently, it shades light on the dynamics within the press-clubs as well as on the club's

---

<sup>11</sup> Elaborate discussion on the details as revealed during the interviews is given in full in Chapter Four.

relations to the news source. It is also directly related to the characteristics of the press-clubs as information cartel, as illustrated by the rules of the clubs and punishments related to disobedience (Freeman, 2000; Hadfield, 1991; Cooper-Chen, 1997b). While it astonishes Western journalists and researchers alike, such as Hadfield (1991) and Freeman (2000) that the punishment comes mostly from colleagues and not from the news source as would be expected, it can be seen as a retribution for breaking the rules of *nemawashi*.

### ***Maturity and Endurance (Gaman)***

In Japan, to be mature, is also often called, to become 'society person' (*shakaijin*). This terminology refers to a person who has acquired the skills to recognise contexts and attune one's demeanour accordingly. Though related to Confucianism due to association with human relations conduct, it is also connected with Buddhism's internal discipline and perseverance (Reader, 1993; Lebra and Lebra, 1986; Moeran, 1986). Attributes that denote a mature person in the West, are precisely those which depict a person in Japan as immature. In Japan a person who acts independently, will be interpreted as behaving in disregard to others and will be called selfish (*wagamama*), both in the context of home and especially in the group. Moreover, a mature person is expected to have certain flexibility towards others, indicating that the person should not adhere solely to prescribed forms, but accept and indulge isolated deviations from them. This is often termed as *yuzuriai*. "*Yuzuriai* is a sort of reciprocal dependence, a flexible and practical 'back-up' lubricant in social relation for cases where, for whatever reason, the prescribed ideal form cannot be perfectly followed" (Henshall, 1999: 122) This anticipated conduct of flexibility calls for self-restraint (*gaman*), which is another feature of grown-up behaviour. Endurance comes into play when mature adults at times feel hard done by, but are expected at such times to show self-restraint (*gaman*) that is in many regards the opposite of being selfish (*wagamama*)" (Henshall, 1999: 122). In a culture that to a great extent, prizes group effectiveness, "razzle-dazzle individual performances are discouraged. Success means success within the group. Not surprisingly, the Japanese have evolved a value system to reinforce individual behaviour that is consonant with harmonious group functioning" (Pascale and Athos, 1984: 129).

As to the relevance of these values in conjunction to those previously delineated to Japanese journalism, maturity and self-restraint might have wide implication. For example, one might ask to what extent maturity and self-restraint, as contrasted with selfishness displayed possibly by investigative journalism,

come to play a role in covering-up of scandals and off-the-record slip of the tongue, and other kinds of information withholding. Indeed, as testified by a major survey, nearly 50% of the Japanese journalists interviewed agreed that there is too little investigative journalism, and only a minority of the journalists, 22.5%, thought that their role in scrutinising bureaucrats and parliament (Diet) members, is being fulfilled (NSK, 1994a)<sup>12</sup>.

### *Non-Verbal Communication ( Haragei)*

According to Robert Christopher (1993), a veteran journalist of *The Times* and *Newsweek*, Japanese do not like explicit statements and prefer indirect and ambiguous talk, and on the whole, would rather minimise verbal communication since according to a Japanese proverb “words are the root of all evil” (Christopher, 1993: 42). He elaborates that among themselves, Japanese rely to a large extent on *haragei* (Christopher, 1993: 43). *Haragei*, which has no direct English equivalent, but can be roughly translated as “gut-reading” (Feldman, 1993: 140) encompasses all three religions, and suggests that through non-verbal communication, but intuition and experience, that is beyond formalities and logic, a person can respond to a situation (Shinmura, 1990: 1971; Kenrick, 1991: 109-110). In the context of social interaction, it is “... an extension of normal Japanese conversation, which is rarely definitely positive or negative. And is a combination of mind and gut” (Kenrick, 1991: 109-110). Its relevance to daily life is crucial and indicative, as is illustrated in the following; “...*Haragei* is, by definition, the complete opposite of debate. It has been described as the art of tight-rope walking in everyday affairs and as ‘the Japanese art of deception’...” (Kenrick, 1991: 109). The imposition of *haragei* in daily life interaction is epitomised by its unwritten rules. The do’s and do not’s of the heart of *haragei* according to Matsumoto (1989), include the following do and do not list of practices. The do not list includes: do not debate/define yourself/ say no/justify yourself/ attract attention/ be direct/ ask why/explain why/be specific/show emotions/ seek identity/ be

---

<sup>12</sup> This and any further reference to a survey of Japanese journalists is related to this survey. This major survey, which was carried out between November, 1993 and February, 1994, covered over 10% of all mainstream Japanese journalists, a total of 2800 journalists NSK, N. R. I. (1994a) A Portrait of Present Day Journalists, Part I, *Shinbun Kenkyu (Newspaper Research)*, 48-96.  
NSK, N. R. I. (1994b) A Portrait of Present Day Journalists, Part II, *Shinbun Kenkyu (Newspaper Research)*, 52-72..

independent. The do's list includes: avoid answering no/ be extremely polite/explain situation without reasons/ use vague language/make your argument abstract and metaphysical/ keep the other person guessing etc (Matsumoto, 1989: 108-113; see also Kenrick, 1991: 109-110; Read, 1993: 64).

The importance of understanding *haragei* is echoed by the anthropologist, Edward Hall, who states that *haragei* is a key operating principle to be followed by anyone who wants to understand Japan (Matsumoto, 1989: 15). Furthermore, the practice of *haragei* brings to play, and attaches importance to numerous Japanese values, some of which had been discussed previously such as harmony (*wa*), maturity, inner feelings and formal appearance (*honne-tatemae*), senior-junior codes of practice (*senpai-kohai*), consensual decision making through artful negotiations (*nemawashi*), give and take (*yuzuriai*) and obligations under the protocol and spontaneously arising emotions (*giri-ninjo*). *Haragei* can also explain the irrelevance of law in Japan, when the law is non-compatible with Japanese values and practices. The Japanese writer, Matsumoto Michihiro (1989), for example, discusses the prevalent practice of *dango* (bid-rigging), which is a pre-arranged meeting intended to avoid embarrassment caused by unexpected events. The practice of *dango* is a "standard operating procedure in trade, although it is outlawed since it stifles fair competition" (Matsumoto, 1989: 70). During *dango* meetings, the harmony among competing rivals must be maintained, and everybody should be kept happy. Thus, *dango* participants achieve harmony and understanding through verbal communication (*nemawashi*) and also through non-verbal communication (*haragei*). If someone is caught taking part in the illegal *dango*, and even if he is forced to testify under oath in the Japanese Diet (Japanese parliament), he will still lie. He will perform *haragei*, as described above, or, in other words, employ 'the art of deception', to protect the numerous parties involved in this illegal act, as did happen in the Lockheed scandal, which involved the then Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei (Matsumoto, 1989: 72).

*Haragei* and its implied rules of conduct included in the above list of do's and do not's, has much relevance to the discussion of the performance of mainstream Japanese journalism. Interestingly, looking into the criticism towards the characteristics of the Japanese media's reporting that will be elaborated later, it seems that *haragei* is being practised all the time by the mainstream media in the sense that the reporting is for example often uniformed, vague, ambiguous, avoids conflict etc (Cooper-Chen, 1997b; Sherman,

1990; Miller, 1994; Freeman, 1996; Jameson, 1997; Hara, 1992; Tase, 1994; Kato and Kiuchi, 1984). In a similar vein, criticism from within the media as admitted by mainstream Japanese journalists, showed that 70% of the journalists interviewed thought the reporting was too identical, only 43% thought they provided “the issues/points of arguments regarding government policies”, and 36% said they do not write about important facts, implying they might cause a conflict (NSK, 1994a).

### ***Summary of Cultural Values***

The importance of the values delineated above are crucial to the understanding of Japanese society in general, and the performance of the Japanese media in particular, both domestically and internationally. In other words, attempts at analysing the Japanese media’s performance solely in universal or Western terms, without paying due attention to these values, will intrinsically be lacking since, as was already briefly illustrated, these values or norms of behaviour, may assist in explaining the various discrepancies that arise with regards to expectations concerning the performance of a media in a democratic system. In addition, it must be stressed again, that when mainstream Japanese journalists act in accord with Western norms of journalism, if they happen to transgress any of these values, they will surely be punished, usually by a sort of ostracism, in congruity with Japanese mythology where the ultimate punishment for anti social behaviour is of ostracising the offender (Buruma, 1984: 1-8 ).

In order to simplify and summarise for the Western observer these particular Japanese values, an attempt had been made to tabulate these values as shown in Figure 1.

|                                                                      |                                                                                                                                                                    |                                                    |                                        |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|
| Disobedience of<br>these rules may lead to punishment, and ostracism | Harmony (wa):                                                                                                                                                      |                                                    |                                        |
|                                                                      | <u>The prescribed</u>                                                                                                                                              | Senior–Junior/<br><br>Situational/<br><br>circular | <u>The real self:</u>                  |
|                                                                      | <u>behaviour:</u>                                                                                                                                                  |                                                    |                                        |
|                                                                      | Outside ( <i>soto</i> )                                                                                                                                            |                                                    | Inside ( <i>uchi</i> )                 |
|                                                                      | Formal Appearance<br>( <i>tatema</i> )                                                                                                                             |                                                    | Real feelings ( <i>honne</i> )         |
|                                                                      | Self-restraint ( <i>gaman</i> ),<br>maturity                                                                                                                       |                                                    | Selfish ( <i>wagamama</i> )            |
|                                                                      | Obligation ( <i>giri</i> )                                                                                                                                         |                                                    | Spontaneous behaviour ( <i>ninjo</i> ) |
|                                                                      | Spirit (especially group<br><i>seishin</i> )                                                                                                                       |                                                    | Spirit ( <i>seishin</i> )              |
|                                                                      | Social relations lubricants:<br><br>Non verbal communication ( <i>haragei</i> ), consensual decision making ( <i>nemawashi</i> ),<br><i>yuzuriai</i> (reciprocity) |                                                    |                                        |

**Figure 1** General outline of Japanese values–system

## 1.5 Family, Society and Culture

The following sections (sections 1.5 and 1.6) aim at illustrating the dominance and precedence of Japanese belief systems and cultural values in all aspects of life. The section on the family will reveal that cultural values are promoted from early stages in the family and also outside the family. Upon entering the education system, the continued promotion of these beliefs and values is done concurrently at home and at schools. In the section on politics and society (section 1.6), the influence of these internalised values on the political culture of Japan, together with the identification of a few Japanese institutions, will assist in uncovering the extent Japanese society is influenced by these values and belief systems. Consequently, the extent Japan is at variance with the Western democratic system that is influenced by the Judeo-Christian religious beliefs and ethics, will be uncovered. Accordingly, clarification of the prevalence of values and practices that reflect disparity with the West, cast shadow not only on Japanese democracy in the Western view, but also regarding the role, functions and practises of the media, in Japanese society.

### 1.5.1 On the Family System

According to Parsons' functionalist view "unless culture is internalised – that is, absorbed and accepted – society would cease to exist" (Parsons 1959, 1965, as cited in Holborn and Haralambos, 2000: 509). He sees the family's role as crucial in the cultivation of cultural values during the primary stage of socialisation (Parsons 1959, 1965, as cited in Holborn and Haralambos, 2000: 509). Parsons' view is valuable on two accounts. First, with regards to the nuclear family's role in the cultural values' internalisation process. Second, in view of the fact that in Japan any grouping outside the family is mirrored on the family system, further accentuate and extend the process as an unceasing cycle of rejuvenation and internalisation.

On the family system, as defined by Confucian rules of conduct, Hendry, (1998) asserts that despite the legal abolition of the 'family system' in 1947 by the Allied Occupation, since it was blamed for all sorts of evil, "deeply held values die hard, and the principles of that old system have by no means disappeared, even in the urban sprawl" (Hendry, 1998: 23). Henshall (1999) discusses this point with regards to Japanese women stressing that the Confucian ideal regarding 'a good wife and a wise mother' is very much

alive today, and a majority of women support it (Henshall, 1999: 25). The interesting point to note is that these traditional views are not held only by men, but also by the majority of the women (Henshall, 1999: 22).

With respect to the fact that this family system or *ie* system, is actually incompatible with the present day Japanese Constitution, i.e., not based on democratic principles, the renowned Oxford's anthropologist mentioned above, Joy Hendry explains that, "just as people coped with the differences between their own ideas and the law in matter of the inheritance of the eldest son, so they are not necessarily too concerned with the legal code in other matters (Hendry, 1998: 27-29). In fact, "the notion of the *ie* continues to be held quite happily in many parts of Japan" (Hendry, 1998: 27-29). In a similar manner, Fukue Hiroshi (1991) talks about *The persistence of the ie in the Light of Japan's Modernisation* (Fukue, 1991: 66-73). He includes in his discussion rank consciousness, group orientation, emphasis on harmony, and the distinction between *uchi* (inside, home), and *soto* (outside) (Fukue, 1991: 66-73). The real, but contradictory co-existence of democratic law, together with traditional cultural values is evident. And when their incongruity is striking, cultural values will often prevail. This brings one to question which is the supreme, cultural values and practises, or the constitution and law?

Both Nakane (1986) and Henshall (1999) further expand on the role of the family system outside the family *per se*, by emphasising the centrality of the family system in terms of parent-child relations in explaining groups and organisations outside the family (Nakane, 1986: 173; Henshall, 1999: 159; see also Hendry, 1998: 38-39; Ellwood and Pilgrim, 1985: 109-145). To the extent that the family system is adopted outside the family, Nakane (1986) stresses that the way group consciousness works, becomes apparent "in the way Japanese uses the expression *uchi* (my house) to mean the place of work, organisation, office, or school to which he belongs...Thus in most cases the company provides the whole social existence of a person and has authority over all aspects of his life; he is deeply, emotionally involved in the Association" (Nakane, 1986: 173; see also Hendry, 1998: 38-39; Henshall, 1999: 159).

In short, the role of the cultural values delineated previously in explaining present day structures and dynamics of the Japanese family, and also any other groups outside the family *per se*, is both evident and crucial for the understanding of Japanese society in general, and also the Japanese media in particular. Consequently, it would seem erroneous to inquire into the Japanese media, without reference to the

Confucian characteristics of human relations as described in familial terms and the derived implications. Indeed, as will be discussed later, the family system is useful in explaining relations in the media, particularly within the press-clubs.

### **1.5.2 Japanese Education**

The importance of education according to Durkheim's (1961) functionalist view is that, "Society can survive only if there exists among its members a sufficient degree of homogeneity; education perpetuates and reinforces homogeneity by fixing in the child from the beginning the essential similarities which collective life demands" (Durkheim, 1961, as cited in Holborn and Haralambos, 2000: 777). Similarly, Parsons (1961) also emphasised the role of education in socialising young people "into the basic values of society" (Parsons, 1961, as cited in Holborn and Haralambos, 2000: 779). With regards to Japan, two points will become apparent from the succeeding discussion. One is that Japanese values taught at school are consistent with the values discussed previously. The other point is that Japanese education indeed produces the homogeneity Durkheim calls for, and the basic values of society Parsons talks about. These facts are again consequential for the understanding of Japanese journalists' behaviour as a result of their internalised values. Moreover, to say that these values are at variance with Western style journalism will be an understatement.

### **Education as a Shared Value**

Already from early times education was considered to have an important role in Japanese society. It was advocated by Confucianism as the path to wisdom, and later by the Shogunate, followed by the Meiji rulers (1868-1906), as a patriotic means of ensuring security and wealth of the nation (Tasker, 1987: 94; LeTendre, 1994: 44-58 ). What is striking in the Japanese education of the time was the emphasis put on the non-academic aspects of education. There was a clear prominence to the "the moral nature of education, teachers as moral guides, the importance of non-academic material in schools..." (LeTendre, 1994: 45). And in moral education *per se*, "the virtues of loyalty, of obedience to elders, and self-sacrifice" (LeTendre, 1994: 44), were stressed. In short, teaching and learning were stressed as an exercise in developing morals.

As to present day Japanese regard for education and its relation to past views, it is an eminently important and shared value in a society calling itself 'curriculum vitae society' since "education holds the key to all that is desirable in life—power, wealth, social respect, and identity. The best universities lead on to the best companies, lifetime employment, fat bonuses and generous welfare arrangements" (Tasker, 1987: 94-95).

## **Learning on Japan, and Being Japanese**

### ***Origins***

As a background to the content of Japanese education, especially Japan's history, and also as a continuity of the discussion of Shinto earlier, the following passage elucidates how Japanese see their origins. In her book on Japanese education White, (1987) writes:

Although individual Japanese incline toward conformity, the nation as a whole believes itself to be utterly unique; there is no other place in any way like Japan. The insistence on Japan special and apart has deep historical and cultural underpinnings. Beginning, as most tales of national identity do, with a creation of a myth... The story of heaven—created islands dropped into the sea, Japan's myth of origin, is like many others which contend that a people and place were set into the world by divine intervention and thus bear the qualities of godhood (White, 1987: 15).

### ***Identity***

Japan's uniqueness is a widely held belief according to White (1987), among others (for example Mouer and Sugimoto, 1986; Sugimoto and Mouer, 1989; Yoshino, 2000). The belief, as noted, is related also to the myth of Japan's birth, i.e., the origins of Shinto. On the meaning and importance of this uniqueness, Finkelstein (1991) elaborates:

While this myth may be regarded askance in contemporary Japan, the conviction of a genetic link unifying all Japanese is firmly entrenched. Belief in 'Japanese blood' being carried among the Japanese is commonplace. The expression *Nihonjin no chi ga nagareteiru* (*this person has Japanese blood*) has two meanings: The primary one refers to Japanese blood (in the ordinary physiological sense) circulating through the body and, by implication, streaming through generations. The second and more important meaning in this context links the idea of blood to a belief in the genetic transmission of culture and language (Mannari and Befu, 1991: 35, italic bracketed section added by the writer)

Blood and genetic transmission of culture and language, Japan as one homogeneous nation with one racial group, one language, one unique culture, are some of the topics that are discussed especially at length, by proponents of *nihonjinron*/theories of Japaneseness (for example Yoshino, 2000; van Wolferen,

1989; Goodman and Refsing, 1992; Henshall, 1999). However, the fact that *nihonjinron* theme is not a deviant idea but is the dominant theme in Japan regarding Japanese identity, explains the prevalence and deeply held belief in these nationalistic ideas. It is the dominant theme in Japanese society regarding their identity since it is purposefully advocated and promoted by the academic, business, and political elites, while competing ideas are systematically excluded (Mouer and Sugimoto, 1986 ; Sugimoto and Mouer, 1989: 1-38). In education, the advocating of *nihonjinron* is done through the screening process of textbooks, and Education Ministry's directives, where unique Japanese identity is fostered in education. And as to the Imperial House as the unifying force, love and respect for the Emperor are also cultivated, and at times enforced (Hendry, 1998; Kitazume, 1990; Yomiuri, 1999). In fact, nationalistic tendencies in education regarding Japan have been exacerbated and are more pronounced since the 70s, coinciding with Japan's economic development (Textbooks Gain Approval, 2001; Kitazume, 1990; Yomiuri, 1999). The effectiveness of the Education Ministry's policies lies in the fact that throughout the Japanese educational system, the directives are identical and only approved textbooks are used, and by that assure the success in the implementation of unified policies.

### ***Teaching of History***

Coinciding with the trends in education regarding Japanese identity, which quite a few scholars point to be a manifestation of growing nationalism in Japan (e.g. Yoshino, 2000; Johnson, 1995; Befu, 1992; Frei, 2001), there is a growing tendency by the Ministry of Education for revisionism in the teaching of history in Japanese schools, an issue that attracts much attention and criticism, both within and outside of Japan, particularly among its neighbours (Herzog, 1993; Johnson, 1995; McCormack, 1996; Japan Textbook Angers Neighbours, 2001). For example, a recent statement by the South Korean government said that the textbooks rationalise and glorify Japan's wrongdoing "based upon a self-centred interpretation of history" (Japan Textbook Angers Neighbours, 2001).

The two processes involved in this revisionist inclination are the tendency of minimising Japan's role as an aggressor during WWII on the one hand, and the rationalisation of the nation's behaviour on the other hand, both of which are increasingly institutionalised through the screening process, despite the enormous criticism. The course taken by the Ministry of Education to assure national amnesia, or the rewriting of a

selective WWII' Japanese history is relentless, as a recent article by the prestigious *Asahi* newspaper indicates. The *Asahi* writes that all the approved history textbooks for the 2002 history lessons "have fewer references to Japan's role as an aggressor in World War II compared with books presented in the 1995 review process" (Textbooks Gain Approval, 2001), and only three books of the 2001 screening mentioned the issue of 'comfort women', the euphemism for the thousands of women forced to provide sex for Japanese soldiers during the war, compared with all the 1995 approved textbook (Textbooks Gain Approval, 2001).

Moreover, history revisionism in Japanese school education is conjoined, and for the outside observant, worsened by the fact that due to the exam oriented Japanese educational system, "few students ever actually read their texts on post-Meiji history (*post 1906*) since the examination questions normally concentrate on earlier periods" (Johnson, 1995: 259, bracketed italic added by the writer).

### ***Epitome***

To sum-up post-war education on Japan, it can be said that while the unique aspects of Japan and the Japanese are increasingly emphasised, the modern history of Japan, particularly WWII, and the period leading to it, are purposefully de-emphasised, through both the mandatory approved textbooks and the utter avoidance of confronting the issue in school studies.

All that said, in relation to the Japanese media, two intriguing questions regarding education on Japan remain: first, how does this curriculum affect Japanese journalists' perceptions of their country and its relations to the outside world, and consequently, how does it influence their writing? Second, regarding the role of the media in society, how can history revisionism progress unhindered, despite protests by all the major Japanese newspapers (Johnson, 1995: 255), and by foreign governments (Japan Textbook Angers Neighbours, 2001)?

### **Japanese Education: General Overview**

As to the general content of Japanese education, what can be said about the Japanese education in general, is that façade and reality are two different things, as White (1987) clarifies:

Because the superficial similarities between the material cultures are so striking, and because Japan meets and exceeds our most obvious measures of a 'modern society,' we easily assume that Japanese children are raised on 'modern', 'Western' principles and that whatever differences may exist are a matter of degree, not kind. But, off the coast of Asia, in Japan, we encounter a different route to modernity, and, indeed, material success is a happy and incidental result of a human system based on a quite different set of priorities and expectations (White, 1987: 21).

The set of priorities and expectations and their underlying assumptions have been summarised in 1991 by the United States Department of Education government following the 'Japanese boom', when the world was mystified, and wanted to learn from Japan's way to success. On the general aspects of Japanese education in general, the report stated that:

Respect for society and the established order, the prizing of group goals above individual interests, diligence, self-criticism, and well-organised and disciplined study and work habits are all traits which are believed to be amenable to instruction. The Child's learning experiences at each level from pre-school through twelfth grade reinforce their acquisition. Japanese teachers believe that the proper development of these values, attitudes, and habits is fundamental to success in the classroom as well as in adult life (U.S. Department of Education, 1991: 143).

Moreover, all these qualities can be developed in any child. There is no regard to the differences among children. "The Japanese believe that hard work, diligence, and perseverance yield success in education as well as in other aspects of life. A certain amount of difficulty and hardship is believed to strengthen students' character and their resolve to do their best in learning and other important endeavours (U.S. Department of Education, 1991: 144).

The cultivation and internalisation process of these qualities, values and norms, some of which have already been introduced at home, is done gradually.

From the earliest stages of education, in the home, priorities in early socialisation are given to human relationships and group membership, and the related values of dependence and the ability to distinguish between outside and inside (White, 1987: 26; see also Azuma, 1986 ; Mannari and Befu, 1991). The child learns and develops the rules of the group, and the codes guiding the interactions with the *uchi* as opposed to the *soto*. Moreover, good education at home will also help the child having a smooth transition when he has to leave home, since "Every group to which the child will belong as he grows up will resemble the original *uchi*, or the family to some degree, having its own denominators and expectation of membership" (White, 1987: 26 ). When looking at the terms used to describe a 'good child'; one can understand the qualities children are expected to have. Terms that are used to describe a good child include: "mild/gentle, compliant, obedient, co-operative, bright-eyed, smart" (White, 1987: 27). Among the qualities children are

expected to gradually internalise there is hierarchy of importance, which is specified by the Education Ministry, “to teachers of moral education classes, the following are emphasised, in the order given:

1.Diligence. 2.Endurance. 3.Ability to decide to do the hard thing. 4. Wholehearted dedication.

5.Cooperativeness” (White, 1987: 43-5). In addition, each of these qualities incorporates other qualities and values discussed previously<sup>13</sup>. For example, endurance encompasses, spirit (*seishin*), strong self-discipline, patience, single-mindedness regarding a goal etc. Cooperativeness instructs the individual to prioritise the group over him and to work with others in harmony. The cultivation of these qualities is continuous, where each stage in the development is assigned a different, albeit, complementing role in the development of the individual from a child to a mature person. The different stages of development as summarised by White (1994) are as follows:

While elementary school socialises children to many of the nuances of Japanese life, middle school is the child’s introduction to hierarchical organisation and adult patterns of teaching and learning....The Japanese middle school is a major disjuncture in the educational experience of children. The nurturing and ‘child-centred’ atmosphere of elementary education is replaced by a very formal and rule-laden social setting ( White as cited in LeTendre, 1994: 58).

LeTendre (1994) elucidates that upon entry into high school, the transition is complete, “...Sacrifice, efforts, and all-out devotion will be the hallmark of success” (LeTendre, 1994: 58).

By the time the child graduates from high school, according to LeTendre (1994), he/she acquired understanding of the hierarchical order in society, and their place in it, and also the rules governing the relations within the hierarchy. In addition, all through, differences among individuals are de-emphasised and, “In diverse areas of life...effort and dedication are emphasised over ability” (LeTendre, 1994: 58). Moreover, to achieve further uniformity, to this “very formal and rule-laden social-setting” (White, 1987: 58) children learn that there is a proper way of doing things for every action such as studying, sitting, reading and so on—the *kata* (the way), leaving little room for variance (De Mente, 1993 ; LeTendre, 1994: 58).

In short, it becomes evident that beyond knowledge, the Japanese child is expected to acquire and internalise a comprehensive set of qualities, values and forms of behaviour, which prepare him/her to life as a ‘mature person’. In addition, the child learns that he is a Japanese, and a member of a unique nation/race and its imperatives.

---

<sup>13</sup> See discussion on Japanese Culture: Selected Values (1.4.2).

The particular Japanese education system delineated above, poses a serious obstacle to Japanese children who lived abroad, and denominated 'returnees'. According to White (1987), "What the overseas Japanese child learns that he has missed...is not only more math, Japanese language, social studies and science, but forms of behaviour, sets of influences, and social manners– what one teacher called 'Japanese common sense'– without which his competence and identity are deeply flawed" (White, 1987: 16). This statement on the 'returnees' is actually, quite similar to Ikuta (1980)'s statement regarding Japanese foreign correspondents, who, if stay too long abroad on assignment, might lose their 'Japanese sense' (Ikuta, 1980).

As for the last stage of education, before entering society, Lowell (1989) writes on the importance of whether a Japanese passes the entrance examination to a first rate university or not, as making a life-long difference. "If you can pass the entrance exam of the University of Tokyo or Kyoto, it is like getting on an express train. If you get into a university with a lesser reputation, it is like getting on a local" (Lowell, 1989, as cited in Hisama, 1994: 20; see also Tasker, 1987: 94; White, 1987: 75-6).

Thus, the university a person enters, and not one's studies, will ultimately determine that person's future. Wornoff (1996) elaborates that the consequence is, that once students enter the university, whose name will assure good prospects for future work, all the students will eventually graduate with very little study done during these four years (Woronoff, 1996: 108-111). Or in the words of an American professor in Japan, Gold Stan, "One clear tendency among about 90% of the Japanese students I have taught is their strong determination not to study..." (Woronoff, 1996: 111).

## **Japanese Education: Criticism**

In more recent years, following the hyperbole years of the 1970s and 1980s, there is growing criticism of Japanese education. The criticism is mostly directed towards faults, which are inherent to the system as a whole, and are difficult to solve, unless the Japanese abandon some integral parts of their culture, as it influences Japanese education. Finkelstein (1991) reiterates this point by stating that "the merits of Japanese education are also the causes of its weaknesses" (Finkelstein et al., 1991: 217-218; see also Lowell, 1989, as cited by Hisama, 1994: 20).

Inagaki (1986), De Vos (1986), Lowell (1989) and Miyamoto (1995), among others agree for example, on the negative impact of conformity and group-orientedness, values that themselves encompass numerous

different cherished values, on education (Inagaki, 1986; De Vos, 1986; Miyamoto, 1995a; Lowell, 1989, as cited by Hisama, 1994: 20). Or, on the impediment to critical thinking, De Vos (1986) writes that:

...critical assessment by a student is praised in the United States, where in Japan it is discouraged. In the Japanese school system, assertiveness receives no positive evaluation and is not seen as a desirable outcome of effective education; hence, the fear on the part of some Japanese that their system leads to too much docility and conformity (De Vos, 1986: 294).

On bullying in Japanese schools, which is seen as the more violent result of conformism and group-orientedness, much has been written, both by researchers and also by the Japanese media, especially when it results in death (e.g. Kumagai, 1996; Miyamoto, 1995a, b; Hendry, 1999; Hisama, 1994).

Thus, by and large, Japanese cultural values, though on the one hand were seen as contributing to much of Japan's success, especially during the 70's and 80's, are on the other hand also appearing to be the causes for many of the problems facing Japanese education. Since the mid 90's, possibly as a result of the burst of the bubble economy and the relative decline in growth, criticism towards Japanese education has been further exacerbated (for more on criticism of Japanese education see for example Woronoff, 1996; Miyamoto, 1995c; van Wolferen, 1989).

And as for prospects for change, they are not too bright either, as was already partially noted in the section on Studies on Japan. In January 2000, a government advisory panel, the Commission on 'Japan's Goals in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century', published its recommendation and consequently, created shock waves in Japan by telling the nation it must change, and in fact, go West, if it wants to survive in the coming century. Or, in the Guardian's journalist, Jonathan Watts's words, the report was telling the Japanese "stop being so 'typically' Japanese" (Watts, 2000). On education for example, the report calls for Japan to "abandon its obsession with conformity and equality...to curb the excessive degree of homogeneity and uniformity in education" (Watts, 2000). And in general, it recommends a Japan "where people's vitality is not inhibited by precedents, regulations and established interests" (Struck, 2000). In a society where group consensus is preferred over individual initiative, the report recommends "the empowerment of the individual" and more support for risk takers (Struck, 2000). Naturally, many of the Commission's recommendation challenge the status quo in terms of values and norms, which although in the post-war period contributed to the success, now are deemed obstacles for the future (Struck, 2000).

With respect to prospects for change, opposition was especially pronounced among the mainstream Japanese media. The stance taken by the mainstream newspapers is significant as to their political leaning and role in society, as well as insightful regarding the characteristics of Japanese newspapers and the plausibility for change. For example, the right-leaning newspaper, the *Sankei* (van Wolferen, 1989: 97) protested saying “we already have too shallow national unity, and too much respect for personal rights” (Struck, 2000). The largest financial and economic paper, the *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* (van Wolferen, 1989: 173) warned that “there will be opposition, ‘a contrary wind to reform’, and that a lot of people would like to stay where we are and do not want to change” (Struck, 2000). However, the most unexpected objection comes from the *Asahi*, the most prestigious Japanese paper (Cooper-Chen, 1997b: 15), famous for its leftist inclination, and anti-establishment stance (van Wolferen, 1989; Cooper-Chen, 1997b). According to *Asahi*’s columnist, Yoichi Funabashi, “We are already being criticized for putting too much emphasis on the individual, for forgetting the critical importance of ‘community’ and ‘Japanese-ness’...” (Struck, 2000).

As to the Japanese media, there are a few pressing questions that come to mind. In what ways and to what extent the omnipresent Japanese education system, as delineated above, moulds and shapes the norms, values, and patterns of behaviour of the Japanese people, including the journalists, upon becoming mature adults? And concerning the Japanese mainstream newspapers’ reaction to the panel’s recommendations, if this is the reaction, then what is the role of the mainstream Japanese newspapers in Japanese society? Are they vehicles for change? Or, are they a medium for keeping the status-quo and protecting the establishment? These questions will be tackled in the following chapter on the Japanese media.

## **1.6 Politics and Society: Political Culture, Political System, Institutions, and the Law**

Following the discussions on religion, culture, and education, which according to Parsons, and Durkheim (Parsons and Durkheim as cited in Holborn and Haralambos, 2000), provide members in society with general guidelines for conduct, in terms of shared values, beliefs, and norms of behaviours (Parsons and Durkheim as cited in Holborn and Haralambos, 2000), in the sections below, the ways these set of values and norms of behaviour exert influence on Japanese politics, and Japanese political culture, will become apparent. As to the question of who rules Japan, while it will remain open, through the introduction

of three established institutions, the *amakudari*, *shingikai* and *keiretsu*, the extent of symbiosis among the elite, will demonstrate, and possibly offer some idea as to who rules the country.

According to Gramsci (1971), the Italian sociologist's 'hegemony theory', the state is "the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to maintain the active consent of those over whom it rules" (Gramsci 1971, as cited in Holborn and Haralambos, 2000: 615). Thus, where is the media, in relations to the 'state' as Gramsci defines it? Is the media outside of the ruling class, and thus functioning as a 'watchdog' of the elite, or is the media an insider, acting concurrently as a power holder and as an instrument for maintaining consent, and the status quo? Or, does it belong somewhere else? In the following, some ideas as to the position of the media, in relation to the state, and consequently, to the public, will be unveiled.

### 1.6.1 Political Culture

On the political culture of Japan, which is as a matter of course assigned the "Western democracy" label, the political scientist and Japan expert, Chalmers Johnson (1995), writes that Japan's political culture is a 'non-adversarial' political culture (Johnson, 1995: 8). His assertion is echoed by others, who allege that Japanese cultural influence on politics is manifested in an advocacy, non-confrontational system, that stresses consensus, harmony, and communal traditions with their emphasis on duties and obligations to the collective and social harmony (Brislin, 1997; Gunaratne, 1999).

Consequently, the Japanese people tend to leave difficult matters to the elite, be it the politicians or bureaucrats, as Ito (1993) writes that "Due to a long history of feudalism, the Japanese...tend to leave major decisions on difficult matters to *okami* 'people above us'..."(Ito, 1993, as cited in Cooper-Chen, 1997b). In fact, this tendency on behalf of the public has much older roots, according to Holtom (1993). In his essay on Japanese religion, Holtom (1993) writes that apart from the Shinto denotation of the word *kami*, which usually signifies god/gods, there is another, specific meaning: "They are ...superior human beings in actual society, such as living emperors, high government officials, feudal lords, etc; the government itself, that which is above in space, or superior in location or rank..." (Holtom, 1993: 79; see also Hanai, 1976: 96). This tendency to leave matters to 'people above us' had been reverberated more recently by Iio Jun (2002), a visiting scholar at Harvard University, who partially attributed Japan's

present economic and political troubles to the public's propensity of "being content to leave things for its leaders to handle" (Iio, 2002).

This idiosyncrasy in Japanese political culture, that is derived from Shinto and Confucian teachings, accentuates deference for 'the people above us'. What about the Japanese media and its journalists? Do they look up at the ruling elite with deference, failing their 'watchdog' role? Or, are they looked at with veneration by the public, thus neglecting their public role? In a 1994 survey of Japanese journalists, only 2.3% thought they performed well the 'watchdog' function regarding the political elite, 23.6% thought they somewhat performed it, while a majority of 51.5% thought they did not perform it, with 22% abstaining from answer. With regards to the 'watchdog' role of scrutinising the business elite, i.e., 'big businesses', the data produced even more disturbing results as only 12.4% of the journalists interviewed thought they performed this function (NSK, 1994a). Do these data reflect deference to the elite, or is it a result of the media being part of the same in-group (*uchi*), and therefore, does not want or is unable to scrutinise its own group?

### 1.6.2 Political System

As to the political system that rules and operates in Japan, agreement among scholars is nowhere to be seen, as many researchers seem to be baffled and/ or offer various definitions. Some political scientists such as Ezra Vogel (1985) of Harvard University and Gerald Curtis (1999), long-time Japan experts, claim that the Japanese political system is in fact not fundamentally different from other modern democratic systems (Vogel, 1985; Curtis, 1999; Mauney, 1991). And as for the cultural side of Japanese politics, Curtis (1999) explains that "... 'Cultural knowledge' in this sense is a prerequisite for understanding many aspects of Japan's political system, but it is not a substitute for it" (Curtis, 1999: 16). Contrary to this conviction, the president of Japan Policy Research Institute, and also a long-time expert on Japanese politics, Chalmers Johnson (1995) contends that one statement can be said on political analyses of Japan, "all efforts to make Japan look like a Western state are doomed to fail" (Johnson, 1995: 2).

Concerning attempts to define the political system operating in Japan apart from the customarily Western democracy definition, Sugimoto (1997) for instance, labels the Japanese political system as 'Friendly Authoritarianism' (Sugimoto, 1997), Johnson (1995) calls it 'Soft Authoritarianism' (Johnson,

1995: 48), while Herzog (1993) categorises it as 'Pseudo-Democracy' (Herzog, 1993). Indeed, in respect to the question of whether Japanese democracy is strongly rooted, as of 1994, only 6.2% of Japanese journalists interviewed thought it was, and 34.7% of them thought it was somewhat rooted, while 20.5% could not answer, and 38.4% of those surveyed did not think Japanese democracy was strongly rooted (NSK, 1994a). Thus, though they do not offer the answer as to the actual political system operating in Japan, the majority of Japanese journalists agreed that the definition of Japan as established democracy is problematic.

There remains the question of where does power lie in this system? Though various works indicate a puzzle, such as *The Enigma of Japanese Power* (van Wolferen, 1989), *Who Rules Japan?* (Kerbo and McKinstry, 1995), and *Japan: Who Governs?* (Johnson, 1995), they also offer a clue. Their suggestions and accompanying evidence are shared by numerous other researchers. They all agree that Japan is ruled by political, bureaucratic and economic/business elite. Some contend that it is a 'Triangular League' (Taguchi Fukuji, as cited by Johnson, 1995: 116; McCormack, 1996), while others claim the supremacy of the bureaucracy (Miyamoto, 1995c; van Wolferen, 1989). Still some additional researchers, incorporate the Japanese media in the ruling elite (Cooper-Chen, 1997b; Akhavan-Majid, 1990; Freeman, 2000).

### **1.6.3 Institutions: Symbiosis among the elite**

#### ***Amakudari: Descent from Heaven***

"If you can pass the entrance exam of the University of Tokyo or Kyoto, it is like getting on an express train. If you get into a university with a lesser reputation, it is like getting on a local" (Lowell 1989, as cited in Hisama, 1994: 20; see also Tasker, 1987: 94; White, 1987: 75-6). The result of this is that, many of the elite members have known each other already since university time, as many of them went to the same elite universities (see for example Johnson, 1995: 149; Kerbo and McKinstry, 1995: 140), and, in fact, often to the same department at university (Kerbo and McKinstry, 1995: 140-141; van Wolferen, 1989: 84). Thus, the system of *amakudari* helps to further solidify the existing relations among the elite. Nearly any book or research about Japanese politics will not neglect the phenomenon called *amakudari*, which explains the close relations among the elites.

Regarding the definition of *Amakudari*, it is sometimes called ‘the circulation of elites from government to business’ (Johnson, 1995: 24), the “revolving door system of personnel exchanges” (Cooper-Chen, 1997b), or, “the magic circle of shared business–bureaucratic–political benefit” (McCormack, 1996). In essence it means that retired bureaucrats land prestigious and well paying jobs in the private sector. Johnson (1995), for instance recorded that 26% of Japanese bank’s presidents were from the financial bureaucracy, and that every major company director in the construction industry came from the Ministry of Construction (Johnson, 1995: 107-108 ; see also McCormack, 1996). Kerbo and McKinsty (1995), similarly demonstrate how numerous top positions of presidents or vice presidents in major corporations such as Toshiba, Sumitomo Metals, Mitsui and so on, are held by former bureaucrats from the Ministry of Trade and Industry (Kerbo and McKinsty, 1995: 92-96 ). Van Wolferen (1989), who compared the *amakudari* to a similar French practice, emphasises that the purpose of *amakudari*’ bureaucrat is “to ensure smooth relations with the ministry he retired from, but not to perform the kind of decision-making role expected of the French bureaucrat entering the private sector” (van Wolferen, 1989: 156). In a similar vein, and with repercussions regarding the Japanese judicial system, Mauney (1991) writes on the futility of law suits against public agencies and administrators, and encapsulates all that is said above:

It should be remembered that prosecutors and judges, as well as top administrators, usually attended the same prestigious universities and studied the same curriculum. They are members of ‘the club’, so to speak. Retired administrators move toward administrative positions in industry and business or the Diet as politicians. Again, informal association would seem to accommodate *status quo* in the legal environment (Mauney, 1991: 10).

In relation to the Japanese media, *amakudari* means that “retired high-level bureaucrats from the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunication move into top executive positions in the media industry...” (Cooper-Chen, 1997b: 26), cementing the overlap between various elite power groups in Japan. However, in addition to the way van Wolferen (1989) sees the purpose of *amakudari*, according to professor Watanabe of Doshisha University, Kyoto, *amakudari* in the media is also one of the mechanisms through which the government exerts control over the media (Watanabe, 1996).

### ***Shingikai*: Deliberation Council**

The *shingikai* are government advisory bodies (Pharr and Krauss, 1996: 56), or official public–private deliberation councils (Johnson, 1995: 24), which were already established in 1893 in order to foster institutional linkages (Freeman, 2000: 33), and/or to be used as ‘political lubricants’ (van Wolferen, 1989: 152).

Their function according to van Wolferen (1989) is to help diffuse, or to avoid antagonism to bureaucrats’ plans or schemes. Special advisory bodies are sometimes established by the Prime Minister to “present high-minded schemes, long on abstract ideals and short on concrete proposals, which they can pass off as policy” (van Wolferen, 1989: 153).

The way the deliberation councils perform their function is by helping work up a sense of national consensus regarding the incendiary decisions taken by bureaucrats, or politicians through bringing together representatives of those related to the decision and others, “and make them party to what will be presented as an harmonious mutual adjustment” (van Wolferen, 1989: 339). On occasion the *shingikai* bring up or might develop an original approach to an urgent matter but mostly they are “symbolic expressions of ‘consensus’, a proof that the public has been served by having a variety of the best minds thoroughly mull over a course of action” (van Wolferen, 1989: 339).

As has been noted earlier, the Japanese bureaucracy ‘s ascendancy is indisputable, and they do take initiatives actively, despite potent opposition through the support of these numerous *shingikai* at their disposal (van Wolferen, 1989: 145). The members of the advisory bodies are usually businessmen, prominent interest-group leaders, scholars and journalists, whom Yoshino (2000) calls the ‘thinking elite’, and who are highly respected in Japanese society (Yoshino, 2000). To add to their existing prominent status, taking part in these councils is “considered an honour” (van Wolferen, 1989: 145). However, despite the ostensible pronouncements about the ‘growing harmony’, in essence, according to van Wolferen (1989) “opinions are generally manipulated to echo those of the bureaucrats in question, who also participate”(van Wolferen, 1989: 145).

As to the participation of the Japanese media in these deliberation councils, Kraus (1996) writes that their participation in these councils is an indicator of inter–penetration of the media in governmental bodies

“which has no real equivalent in the United States” (Pharr and Krauss, 1996: 57), while Freeman (2000) writes that it epitomises the lack of demarcation between the state and the press (Freeman, 2000: 33). Whereas Freeman (2000) sees the institutionalised deliberation councils as exercise in information control (Freeman, 2000), Kraus (1996) points to a dual purpose of media participation “as spokespeople for public interests and as potential architects of public opinion who will probably provide some sympathetic coverage of the issues before the committees”(Pharr and Krauss, 1996: 57).

All that said, from the 1994 survey of Japanese journalists, it becomes clear that membership in the deliberation councils is, on the whole, undesirable. Only 15% of those surveyed thought that taking part in them poses no problem. This was sharply contrasted with the 43.5% who thought it was clearly undesirable, and 22.4% who thought it was somewhat undesirable, a grand total of 65.9% who opposed participation.

From these answers it seems as though the *shingikai* are probably used for manipulation and control, as Van Wolferen(1989) and Freeman (2000) claim, and not as spokespeople for public interests, as Krauss (1996) suggests, otherwise journalists would not have rejected so vehemently, honourable status in such respectable councils. Regardless of journalists’ position however, the fact remains that media representatives do sit in numerous deliberation councils.

### ***Keiretsu*: Affiliation System**

“*Keiretsu* are companies linked together by continuous business relations” (Oda, 1999: 328). A *keiretsu*, or affiliation system often includes co-operation among banks, different firms, and trading companies in conglomerates such as the Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Toshiba and Hitachi groups (Johnson, 1995: 81-82; see also Hall, 1998: 77,130).

As to the existence of such institution, Johnson (1995) explains that the Japanese economic system is actually based on a sociological theory of the market in the sense that the theory takes into account not only market forces, but also institutions, rules, and cultural norms among others (Johnson, 1995: 43). He further states that “the Japanese system is filled with such institutions as *keiretsu* (developmental conglomerates), cross share holding, cartels of all kinds, insider trading, bid-rigging (*dango*), linkages between banks and

borrowers, and officially created trade associations. In short, the Japanese theory of the market rests on an assumption of the naturalness of oligopoly (Johnson, 1995: 43).

In relations to the media, *keiretsu* means the tying together of numerous units of newspapers, TV broadcasting, radio stations, weekly magazines and so on, under the leadership of one of the major Japanese newspapers (Freeman, 2000: 143). For example, looking only at TV affiliates, under the Yomiuri, the biggest newspaper in the world, there are 30 TV stations including national and locals (Freeman, 2000: 156-157). The implications of media *keiretsu*, who at top positions have also former bureaucrats through the practice of *amakudari*, are numerous and include information control, 'all powerful media', lack of access to foreign media, and elimination of alternative media, among others (Freeman, 2000 ; see also Cooper-Chen, 1997b: 22). The consequences of the media affiliation system will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

## Summary

The close relations between the private and the public sector, between businesses and government among others, are strengthened and concurrently epitomised by the practices of *amakudari*, the advisory councils – the *shingikai*, and the *keiretsu* system. Recalling Gramsci's 'hegemony theory' that delineates hegemony of the state as "the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to maintain the active consent of those over whom it rules" (Holborn and Haralambos, 2000: 615), it does transpire that these three institutions do seem to serve to keep the hegemony of the ruling elite.

What remains enigmatic is the place of the media, in relation to the 'state'. Japanese journalists do share similar elitist academic background (Horvit, 1996; Kim, 1981), with other members of the elite. In addition, as was indicated above, media companies are directly involved in the three symbiotic mechanisms, the *keiretsu*, *amakudari* and *shingikai*, introduced above, which further enhance elites' cohesion. Moreover, journalists attitudes regarding both, participation in the *shingikai*, and media–businesses co-operation in terms of content, do seem to indicate that the media act as part of the 'state', as in Gramsci's definition. From a major survey conducted in 1994, and partially introduced in the discussion on the *shingikai*, two things become clear. First, Japanese journalists, 65.9% of them, clearly reject the

aspirations to be members of a *shingikai*, thus, part of the elite. Secondly, regarding relations between businesses and the media, termed in the survey as “editorial co-operation with advertisers”, 60% of Japanese journalists surveyed, opposed such co-operation (NSK, 1994a). Hence, while it does become clear that the majority of the journalists oppose these two practices, the survey itself, through its questions, testifies to their existence. Moreover, due to the overall majority opposition to these practices, it may be possible to deduce from it the indication as to their widespread prevalence, otherwise there possibly would not be such a majority that is aware and opposes these practices.

#### 1.6.4 Law, Culture and Society

The deliberation on law and culture aims at illustrating the gap between practice in real Japan—the *honno*, in contrast to its democratic constitution, the *tatema* (Matsumoto, 1989: 70), a disparity that already has been mentioned . On Japanese’ attitudes to the written law, Karl van Wolferen, a former Far Eastern correspondent for the Dutch paper *NRC Handelsblad* and a former president of the Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan, who has lived in Japan for over a quarter of a century, writes:

If Western democracies relied as little on law as Japan does, they would be rocked by incessant civil commotion and probably witness a collapse of the authority structure. Conversely, if Japan were to use the law as it is used in the Western democracies, and as it is supposed to be used under the Japanese constitution, the present Japanese authority structure would collapse (van Wolferen, 1989: 212).

In this statement, Van Wolferen (1989) captures the Japanese reality, as numerous other researchers sees it (for example Gibney, 1996; Herzog, 1993; Matsumoto, 1989; Mauney, 1991; Oda, 1999; Urabe, 1993).

Tokuyama, for example, allegorises the Constitution and the written law, to a treasured sword used for decoration or a prestige symbol (Tokuyama of Nomura Research Institute as cited by Gibney, 1996: 68 ). Matsumoto (1989) further elaborates by recalling often-heard Japanese conversation regarding law: they would normally say “Yes, that is what the law says...But that is not the way it is” (Matsumoto, 1989: 70; see also Mauney, 1991; Oda, 1999).

Putting allegory aside, the prevalence of disparity between the written law and actual practice is documented in countless sources. Herzog (1993) demonstrates time and time again, through an extensive number of court cases, how court judgements diverge from the written Constitutional framework (Herzog,

1993). Moreover, he also found that “the most appalling lack of democratic consciousness and deplorable manifestation of undemocratic behaviour can be seen among politicians... and the bureaucracy” (Herzog, 1993: 10). On more specific instances, Okudaira (1993), a law professor, writes for instance, about the prevalent discrimination against women, minorities, and others, and also about the lack of freedom of expression, despite guarantees in the constitution against these practices (Okudaira, 1993: 12). Yokota (1993), also a law professor, writes similarly, about the non separation between the state and religion, as guaranteed by the constitution (Yokota, 1993)

Recalling Herzog’s words on the undemocratic behaviour of politicians, recent events illustrate his words once more. In May 2000, while speaking to Shinto-backed members of parliament (Powers, 2000), Prime Minister Mori declared that he wanted the people to recognise that Japan is the ‘land of the gods’, with the emperor at its centre...and that the 1890’ *Imperial Rescript on Education*<sup>14</sup>, contained some good points (Cortazzi, 2000). Meanwhile, Tokyo’s governor, Ishihara used WWII’s derogatory term when referred to foreigners living in Tokyo. Professor Iriye of Harvard criticised both and said that Japan should embrace post-war democracy and not Shintoism or the emperor’s system. But, he explained worrying gaffes as mistakes by politicians who think only about domestic politics (Japan Must Overcome the Past and Look Ahead, 2000). His words may be, therefore, interpreted as statements that do appeal to the Japanese public, regardless of the fact they contradict the Japanese constitution.

When summarising scholarly work on the causes of the disparity between the constitution and reality, three groups of explanation emerge. One group attributes the gap to culture and tradition. This group of works claim that when law and tradition collide, custom and tradition prevail, and the law is ignored (For example Mauney, 1991; ELJ, 1997; Gibney, 1996; Luney and Kazuyuki, 1993; Urabe, 1993; Hendry, 1998). The following passage by Hendry (1998) illustrates this approach:

That these (US) influences are foreign is starkly clear in the three main principles of the 1947 Constitution... aimed to introduce the ideals of democracy. They are: sovereignty of the people, pacifism and respects for basic human rights, which include equality, liberty and life... These principles, are completely at odds with previous Japanese values... With the introduction of these alien values, there have been of course changes, but the present legal system represents another example of a Western-like exterior, with rather different workings on the ground”(Hendry, 1998: 206).

---

<sup>14</sup> The content of the *Rescript on Education* is detailed in section 1.3.3 Confucianism.

Likewise, Okudaira (1993) explains that "Japan is politically free, but socially not free" (Okudaira, 1993: 10), and identifies the group supporting values discussed earlier such as formal /informal, harmony, senior/junior and so on, as in conflict with the written law.

The second group of scholars puts the blame on the ruling elite that includes politicians, bureaucrats, and businesses. These scholars assert that the ruling elite act to minimise changes to the status quo in order to protect their interests, by keeping the courts weak (Luney, 1993; Okudaira, 1993; Urabe, 1993; Beer, 1993). For example, on the common practice of bid-rigging (*dango*), Matumoto (1989) writes that "everybody knows its illegal", however, it will not stop because the elites have lucrative stakes in this system (Matsumoto, 1989: 70). This group of scholars clearly points to the hegemony of the ruling elite as Gramsci (1971) delineates it (Gramsci, 1971, as cited in Holborn and Haralambos, 2000: 615). Correspondingly, regarding the ways the elite "...maintains its dominance...(and) manages to maintain the active consent of those over whom it rules" (Holborn and Haralambos, 2000: 615 ), though Urabe (1993) does not discuss the ways, he talks about the result. Urabe (1993) writes that the Japanese reality is such that the Japanese seem not to be aware of the purpose of the Constitution in general, and in binding the power of the government in particular (Urabe, 1993: 184).

The third group ascribes the failing to institutional and structural reasons. For example, the separation of private and public law, and the fact that the elite, including lawyers and judges for that matter, are from similar, often the same universities and share the same values, results in continued precedence, and supremacy of the state as represented by the elite, over the citizenry, and sometimes over the law (Miyamoto, 1995c; van Wolferen, 1989; Johnson, 1995).

Regardless of the reasons, the fact remains that in Japan, there are at times wide discrepancies between the written law and practice, which should be recognised. Furthermore, these disparities also put Japan apart from its international club, the G-8. This was recently illustrated most vividly in a G-8 meeting, where the members were supposed to condemn Russia's human rights abuses in Chechnya. The matter of condemnation caused chaos in the Japanese Foreign Ministry, because the G-8 are assumed to share the same values on human rights (Jo, 2000). At the end, Japan excused her mild condemnation as being grounded "on the basis of the Japanese people's prevailing mentality on human rights (Jo, 2000). Answering interview questions following the meeting, a Foreign Ministry official expanded on the

disparity between Japan and the West saying: “Of course, we are well aware of the need to remind the people that human right issues are so important to European nations that they think that their identity is based on human rights” (Jo, 2000).

In terms of practice as opposed to the law, the contrast between Japan and the West seem to widen the more one looks deeper. No example can illustrate this better than a recent editorial in the prestigious *Asahi* newspaper (Cooper-Chen, 1997b: 15) on Euthanasia. The editorial writes on euthanasia in Holland and compares the health-care environment there, with the Japanese one. It says that while the health-care environment in Holland is mature enough for legalising euthanasia, following thirty years discussion on the topic, Japan is not ready yet because in Japan “...many doctors do not even comply with patients requests to see their medical record or be told of the names of the drugs they are taking. And tying patients to their beds and keeping them in confinement are routine at Japanese hospitals” (Japan Not Ready to Accept Bill that Legalises Euthanasia, 2000).

As to the law and the Japanese media, in a 1974 grand survey by the Japan Newspapers and Publishers Association (NSK), only 17% of the journalists interviewed thought that “the law should be respected at all times, compared to 43% of ordinary Japanese” (Pharr, 1996: 29). Indeed, the Liaison Committee on Human Rights and Mass media Conduct (JIMPOREN), was established in order to address issues related to the media such as ‘endemic abuse of the civil liberties of ordinary people’, and ‘state manipulation of the news through the press club system’, among other aims. The establishment of this committee in 1996 is in itself a manifestation of the severity of human rights abuse by the media, who is “harassing the very people they ought to be protecting” (JIMPOREN 9, 1999). Human rights abuse by the media is especially severe regarding the treatment of criminals (JIMPOREN 3, 1999; JIMPOREN 4, 1999; Watanabe, 1996). It should be noted that while the media abuses citizens’ human rights on the one hand, their rights are also abused by others, especially superiors in the organisation (see for example Macgregor, 1995; Sato, 1995a)

In fact, in the 1994 Japanese journalists’ survey, only 7.3% of those surveyed thought that “enough “ considerations are made regarding human rights during news gathering, and 45.8% thought efforts were somewhat enough, while 22% could not answer, and 24.7% did not think enough efforts are made. As to the reasons for overlooking human rights, 31.6% of the journalists said it was related to “lack of morals and

professional knowledge among the journalists”, 22% “due to journalists attitude which gives little consideration to the general public position/opinion” (NSK, 1994a).

Regardless of the reasons, looking at the journalists’ positions regarding respect for the law, including respect for human rights, they do not make a strong case for the defence of the law, and consequently the public. They seem to stand closer, or, indeed, to share a similar position, with other elite members such as the politicians and the bureaucracy, as Herzog (1993) found (Herzog, 1993).

## 1.7 Summary

To summarise the probe into the context of Japanese society, and consequently, its media, a few points are deemed noteworthy.

First, many of the dominant Japanese values discussed, suggest that in Japan, in Goodenough’s words, “what one has to know or believe in order to operate in a manner acceptable to its members” (Ward Goodenough as cited by Geertz, 2000: 11), is at variance, at times, great one, with Western values and norms such as individualism, equality, the supremacy of law and so on. Thus, Japan as a firmly rooted democracy in the western view is in doubt too, as is also indicated by its own journalists, since many of the Japanese values are in contradiction with democratic ones. These norms are naturally also reflected in Japanese political culture, which is a non-confrontational system, and stresses consensus, harmony, and communal traditions with their emphasis on duties and obligations to the collective and social harmony (Brislin, 1997; Gunaratne, 1999).

Second, as a result of the dissonance between practices and democracy, there is a conflict between the written democratic law and practice. In the event that discord arises between the two, and the law is incompatible with tradition/existing norms of behaviour, the dominant cultural norms will win over the written law.

Third, the discussion on education has illustrated the particular characteristics of the Japanese system. The content on Japan, and the non-academic aspects of education, though they may be due to coercion by the elites, nonetheless reflect the prevalence, and are in harmony with existing dominant cultural norms, and beliefs. The curriculum indeed, may be seen as the elite’s tool for the preservation of the status quo.

Fourth, the existence and ubiquity of the three institutions mentioned, the *amakudari*, *shingikai*, and *keiretsu*, indicates a high degree of inter-penetration and symbiosis among the various elites, to form part of Gramsci's 'state hegemony'. As these symbiotic relations are omnipresent, their assumed ready acceptance may be interpreted as due to being in accord with the Japanese cultural context, as well as a result of the impact of the education system.

Fifth, with regards to the mainstream Japanese media and its journalists, following the discussion above, it does stand to reason, that Japanese journalists share the same religious background, internalise the same values, and study the same curriculum, as any other member of Japanese society. This poses great problems as to the actual position, role and functions of the media and its journalists in Japanese society, as expressed in media output, if the media is to act as would be expected of a media in a Western democratic system. To add to these complexities, due to the existence and media participation in the *keiretsu*, *shingikai*, and *amakudari*, the probability that the media is indeed part of the elite, further complicates these aspects.

In the following chapter on the Japanese media, attempts will therefore be made to clarify the impact of the Japanese contexts on the working of the Japanese media, as well as the status, roles and functions of the media in society.

## **CHAPTER TWO: THE JAPANESE MEDIA AND ITS JOURNALISTS**

## 2.1 Introduction

At the beginning of their book, *Mediating the Message, Theories of Influences on Mass Media Content*, Shoemaker and Reese (1996) write that they “...do not assume that mass media content reflects an objective reality. It does not mirror the world around us. Rather media content is shaped by a variety of factors that result in different versions of reality” (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 1). Similar to McCombs’ onion’s layers metaphor (Horvit, 1997), they divide their examination into various levels of inquiry, summarised in the ‘individual influences on media content in the hierarchical model’ (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 64). In this hierarchical model, the inner most level is the individual level, followed by media routines level, organisational level, extra-media level, and lastly, the ideological level (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 64). Thus, in this chapter and in relation to the Japanese media, while the relevance of contexts will be seen and indicated throughout, an independent discussion of each level will also take place, with special emphasis on inquiry into the individual, media routines, organisational, and extra-media levels.

In conjunction with the previous chapter, the individual level of inquiry’ scope will be expanded further to include and assess journalists’ professional roles and attitudes, and the ways they may influence media content. Furthermore, Japanese media’s organisational norms regarding recruitment and career patterns will also be introduced, since, they as well, are assumed to exert influence on media content. Proceeding to the level of media routines as influencing media content, the discussion will focus on the main features and characteristics of the ‘press-clubs, since these clubs are considered to be at the centre of mainstream media’s news-gathering activities. In addition, the inquiry into the press-clubs will examine also the interplay between the individual level and media demands as expressed in media routines, and some evidence for the resulting influences on content. Finally, an elaboration on extra-media influences on content will include a brief discussion on the role of magazines and foreign correspondents in Japan, in exerting external pressure, to be followed by an inquiry into the role of legal, political and economical constraints, in influencing media content.

Drawing an overview of the Japanese media’s main sources of influence through systematic application of theories on practice will assist in comprehending the dominant factors influencing the way reality is

presented in the Japanese media, as expressed in content. Achieving that will also clarify the actual role, functions, and practices of the Japanese media in the political communication process. While the aim is ambitious, building on existing research, some of which is comprehensive in scope (for example Freeman, 2000; Cooper-Chen, 1997b; Feldman, 1993; Pharr and Krauss, 1996), together with data from the biggest survey carried out so far, taken in 1993-1994, which include about one-tenth of all mainstream Japanese journalists (NSK, 1994a, 1994b)<sup>15</sup>, the objective, though with delimiters, may be accomplished. It must be stated however that the main objective of this research is not the domestic process of political communication in Japan as an end by itself, but to identify the major aspects of the political communication process in order to assist later in comprehending the way this process affects and shapes Japanese media's international coverage, especially when Japanese foreign policy is involved.

## 2.2 Japanese Mass Media

### 2.2.1 General Overview

To begin with, the linguistic homogeneity in Japan and the country's high literacy rate – one of the highest in the world at 99.3 percent (Feldman, 1989: 9) – have facilitated the existence of all forms of mass media.

As to the magnitude of the media, in 1995, six out of the top ten newspapers in the world, in terms of circulation, were Japanese, and included the *Yomiuri*, the biggest newspaper in the world with a circulation of 14.5 million, the *Asahi*, second in the world, with 12.6m, and the *Mainichi*, third in the world, with 5.9m. The financial newspaper, the *Nihon Keizai Shinbun* (*Nikkei*) comes fifth, with 4,5million, the *Chunichi*, which is a regional paper, comes sixth, with 4,3 m, and the *Sankei* comes eighth, with 2.8m (Cooper-Chen,

---

<sup>15</sup> The journalists selected for the survey were all journalists that are engaged in news-gathering activities, regardless of their position in the organisation. Therefore, the survey also included 'desk' journalists, who function as section heads, or fulfil other prominent position, as they are senior journalists.

1997b: 54)<sup>16</sup>. The scope of these major mainstream newspapers is further extended by the affiliation system (*keiretsu*), which will be discussed later on.

Locally, there are 98 newspapers, at least one in each of the 47 prefectures. There are also a number of 'block' newspapers, such as the Hokkaido (950.000), Tokyo (1.3 million), *Chunichi* (mentioned above), and Nishii Nippon (930.000), with some of their circulation extending into several neighbouring prefectures. In publishing terms, there are in total 121 NSK affiliated dailies whose daily circulation was about 53.7 million (1.16 copies per household) in 1998. This figure combines morning and evening edition as a single copy. However, many Japanese newspapers publish both morning and evening editions under the same name and sell them as one set. When both editions are counted separately, the total circulation reaches 72.4 million (Saito, 2000: 568). Since more than 90 percent of Japan's newspapers are home delivered to subscribers, the morning and evening editions are edited in such a way as to maintain continuity from one to the other. Street sales occupy only around 6.4 percent of daily newspaper sales (NSK, 1990: 90).

Japanese broadcasting is led by N.H.K. (*Nippon Hoso Kyokai*), the sole public broadcasting system, which is the second largest broadcasting corporation in the world, after the BBC (Pharr, 1996: 4), and which has two television channels (general and educational), two AM radio networks (105 stations) and one FM radio network, all nation-wide. Virtually equal to N.H.K. in scale, strength and impact are some 120 privately owned commercial television networks who run their own radio networks, among other businesses. However, it should be noted that most (118) commercial broadcasting companies belong to one of the five nation-wide networks centred on Tokyo's key station, which in turn, are related to one of the 'big five' newspapers (NSK, 1990; Saito, 2000). This affiliation system, called *keiretsu* (mentioned earlier), will be further discussed below.

## 2.2.2 Mainstream media: definition

In her analysis of the press-clubs as information cartels, the political scientist Freeman (2000), found that the first criterion of Journalist Club membership is belonging to the NSK, the Japan Newspaper

---

<sup>16</sup> As of 2003, newspapers' circulation remains, on the whole, unchanged Timeout Project (2003), *Media Communication Timeout Project 3*, [electronic journal], Meijigakuin University, Available from: <<http://webmail1.meijigakuin.ac.jp/~seward/3002/timeout03.PDF>> [6th February]..

Publishers and Editors Association (Freeman, 2000: 88). The importance of the press-clubs as the main venue for news-gathering, will be elaborated below. However, prior to an inquiry into the press clubs, it is consequential to demarcate who is allowed in, and who is left out with limited access to information. In other words, which media belongs to the mainstream (*uchi*-- in-group), and which media does not (*soto*-- out-group).

NSK's membership is determined by the NSK' Board of Directors, which has its own formal and informal criteria for membership selection. This criteria includes among its formal terms the agreement to abide by the Canons of Journalism, and in the informal standards, requirements such as the member organisation must be a Japanese company, therefore, excluding any foreign media (Freeman, 2000: 145). In total, there are about 164 member organisations in the NSK, but only about fifteen to twenty organisations are members of a particular Journalist Club, which again reflects severe selection (Freeman, 2000: 88). However, the control of the clubs, including their management and makeup, is determined by a handful mainstream media outlets, and it is regardless of whom they let in. "One author even goes so far as to suggest that the 'big five' – *Asahi*, *Yomiuri*, *Mainichi*, *Kyodo*, and *NHK* – are fighting it out for hegemony" (Freeman, 2000: 89)<sup>17</sup>.

### 2.2.3 Japanese Newspapers

Among the mainstream media, this thesis will focus on the print media, or more accurately, on the big daily newspapers. The decision to focus on the big dailies has been derived from the assumed Japanese newspapers' power to influence the daily life of the Japanese people. This assumed power is based on a number of factors.

The first is due to the major characteristics of the Japanese newspapers. Japanese newspaper organisations must operate in a society where the rate of newspaper dissemination is according to the *Asahi Almanac* (2002) the highest in the world, with 668.7 newspapers per thousand people, compared with the US, 263.6 and the UK, with 408.5 newspapers per thousand people (Asahi Shimbun, 2002). This high rate is correlated with a high level of literacy, a high standard of living, and an advanced technology and is

---

<sup>17</sup>Kyodo is one of the two major Japanese news agencies, the other is Jiji, see Cooper-Chen, A. (1997b) *Mass Communication in Japan*, Iowa State University, Ames..

reinforced by fierce competition and promotional campaign among the major dailies. The high degree of newspaper concentration, as reflected in the dominance of the national dailies, tends to sustain the high quality, in terms of presentation and format, of the Japanese newspapers in general (Tasker, 1998: 76; Freeman, 2000: 19). Elaborating on this point Freeman (2000) writes that “the core print media represent a hybrid - they are both ‘quality-oriented’ (as opposed to sensationalist) and ‘mass’ (in terms of readership level). This combination has important virtues in terms of producing serious but widely read news” (Freeman, 2000: 19). And it is an important and unique feature of Japanese newspapers, when compared to other countries such as Britain, Germany, and France, where there is a tendency to differentiate papers “based on the style of reporting and the nature of readership”(Freeman, 2000: 19).

The significance of the high concentration of Japanese newspapers though great in its own right, is further enhanced by the affiliation system (*keiretsu*), or in other words, the close linkage between the major dailies and television and radio (Kim, 1981: 16-17; see also Cooper-Chen, 1997b; Freeman, 2000). According to Feldman (1993), the result of this affiliation system is such that “a relatively large percentage of the population is subject to the direct and indirect potential influence of the national newspapers” (Feldman, 1993: 13).

The second reason is the readers’ factor. In addition to the fact that the Japanese newspapers’ diffusion rate is the highest in the world, surveys have shown that more than 90 percent of the population read a newspaper on a daily basis and that the average reader spends about 40 minutes on this (Foreign Press Centre, 1990: 13; Pharr, 1996: 4). The time spent on reading increases with age and education. Moreover, to add another idiosyncrasy to readers’ characteristics, is the journalists’ assertion, of whom 75.4% think that “readers tend easily to believe the articles they read” (NSK, 1994a).

Thus far, it can be said that the press not only comprises a primary source of information about important matters as perceived by the press and later by the readers, but it also may have an impact on the behaviour and attitudes of the general public as well as on the political elite, and therefore plays a pivotal role in Japanese daily life. Thus, the newspaper constitutes, potentially at least, a formidable instrument of influence in Japanese society (Feldman, 1993: 13; Kim, 1981: 25).

The third reason for choosing newspapers among the other media in Japan, is the freedom of the Japanese press, a factor that had been mentioned also by the readers as a reason for the newspapers’

credibility. Freedom of the press has long been considered to be one of the cornerstones of Japanese journalism, a dimension in which the print media has enjoyed its activities without interference since the end of World War II (Feldman, 1993: 13 ; Cooper-Chen, 1997b: 176). As a result of this freedom, the Japanese press, according to Pharr (1996) operates “in an environment free from all overt forms of control” (Pharr, 1996: 12).

There are no laws in Japan specifically regulating the mass media. Newspapers, of course, are subject to criminal and civil law regarding libel, antimonopoly regulation, and labour laws, but the law recognises entirely their freedom to report and to comment. Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees the freedom of speech, press, and all other forms of expression (Feldman, 1993: 13; Foreign Press Centre, 1990; NSK, 1990). By virtue of this freedom, the newspaper industry differs from most other Japanese industries in not being subject to guidance and regulation by various government agencies. Moreover, unlike the broadcast media, which are regulated by the Post and Telecommunication Ministry through various broadcasting and telecommunication laws, the newspaper industry has no government body overseeing its activities. On the contrary, some existing laws provide the newspapers with special benefits and privileges. For instance, Article 204 - 1 of the Commercial Code stipulates that newspaper companies may restrict the granting of stock only to those who are connected with the newspaper enterprise, i.e., employees of the company. While this seems to go against the general purpose of the stock system, it is a specific exception enacted in recognition of the newspapers' public - interest status. It is intended to prevent any single person from taking over control of a newspaper and to protect the newspapers from being subjected to business influence and other outside pressure (Foreign Press Centre, 1990; NSK, 1990).

In addition to the laws for the protection of the freedom of the press, the editorial pledge to policies of “impartiality, political neutrality, and fairness” (Foreign Press Centre, 1990; NSK, 1990), are aimed at assuring the press's independence and indeed bring about a wide public trust to the extent that items reported in the national dailies, for instance, are taken at face value, and the interpretation that the newspaper place on facts is likely to become the generally accepted interpretation (Feldman, 1993: 22; see also NSK, 1994a).

All in all, it is conceivable to say that the potential power of the press today in Japanese society is formidable. It is most notably a dominant influence in the shaping of public sentiment and opinion on both

domestic and international issues to the extent that the public readily accepts what the newspapers often claim to be 'public opinion' (Feldman, 1993: 22). And at times it can not only shape and affect attitudes, but also, as Flangan (1993) found, even mobilise the whole population (Flangan, 1993: 294).

## 2.3 The Journalists

### 2.3.1 Recruitment and Career:

What are the organisational norms of the mainstream Japanese newspapers, regarding recruitment and career? In the first stage of work, already in the recruitment stage, there is a striking difference from the Western patterns of recruitment:

Not only that there are no professional expectations, in fact they are unwelcome. The reason is clear: Socialisation can be seen in the hiring and training process, where systematic early recruitment allows for a long period of common socialisation. Kim says loyalty to one's organisation and its norms is also reinforced by 'virtual absence of lateral entry into or mobility between news organisations; the practice of permanent employment with a single employer, and the traditional norms concerning group's orientation' and conformity (Kim, 1981, as cited by Horvit, 1997).

Calling to mind the discussion on contexts, and consequently the importance of the group and loyalty to it, now, the loyalty of the new recruits had been transferred from university to the company, since the in-group (*uchi*) also moved to the company, and all those internalised norms of behaviour and values, are put into practice, this time in the company, and are very welcomed in the new environment. Moreover, the new recruits, who passed difficult exams in order to enter the company, share a similar, elitist background (see Horvit, 1996; Cooper-Chen, 1997b: 23,203). From then on, they learn to do their jobs via on - the - job training. The process is virtually the same for reporters at any of the major newspapers, "Like employees of most Japanese companies, they have lifetime employment - plenty of time to be fully socialised into the norms of their organisation and plenty of motivation to do so because they want smooth relations with their co - workers and superiors over the long term" (Horvit, 1996; see also Cooper-Chen, 1997b: 203).

Thus, most journalists are employed soon after graduation from elite universities and as such, are also from the same social circles as the business, political and bureaucratic elite; they are employed for life; are

preferred not to possess journalistic education/background and indeed usually do not have one; are expected to have the same qualities and common sense expected of any 'salary man', i.e., to possess those highly regarded values/norms of behaviour/customs, including, a shared notion of what it is to be a Japanese (Freeman, 2000; Hall, 1998; JIMPOREN 11, 1999; JIMPOREN 4, 1999; Kim, 1981; Horvit, 1996; Cooper-Chen, 1997b). The result of these recruitment and career patterns is what "Sigal...calls 'context of shared values' with those around you. These values shape the context in which events are viewed and the selection of the aspects of each event that will become news" (Sigal, 1973, p.3 as cited in Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 92).

All in all, it can be said that, in general, recruitment and career patterns of Japanese journalists reflect their socio-cultural environment rather than journalistic professional standards. This is in contrast to American journalists, for example, most of whom are graduates of communication studies, and where "a lot of people try journalism as a first career and then move on to something else" (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 71-75).

### **2.3.2 Professional Roles and Ethics**

#### **Professional Roles**

As to professional attitudes and ethics of journalists, according to Gurevitch and Blumler (2000), there are eight significant expectations regarding the media in a democratic country, among other expectations.

They are:

1. Surveillance of the socio-political environment, reporting developments likely to impinge, positively or negatively, on the welfare of the citizens.
2. Meaningful agenda-setting, identifying the key issues of the day, including the forces that have formed and may resolve them.
3. Platform for an intelligible and illuminating advocacy by politicians and spokespersons of other causes and interest groups.
4. Dialogue across a diverse range of views, as well as between power holders (actual and prospective) and mass publics.
5. Mechanisms for holding officials to account for how they have exercised power.
6. Incentives for citizens to learn, choose, and become involved, rather than merely to follow the kibitz over the political process.
7. A principled resistance to the efforts of forces outside the media to subvert their independence, integrity, and ability to serve the audience.
8. A sense of respect for the audience member, as potentially concerned and able to make sense of his or her political environment (Gurevitch and Blumler, 2000: 25-26).

Though the writers are aware, and indeed enlist major obstacles to the achievement of these goals, they write that despite “such pressures and problems, symbolically at least, journalism in the Western liberal democracies does reflect the influence of democratic values” (Gurevitch and Blumler, 2000: 27).

How these expectations are interpreted by the journalists regarding their role? According to McQuail (1991), journalists usually see their role as expressing and shaping public opinion in addition to informing the public. They do this by directing national attention to the events they treat as being newsworthy and important. As a consequence, their function is then one of agenda-setting and the creation of reality by influencing the salience of issues and shaping the cognitive world of the readers (McQuail, 1991: 275). There are at least three distinctive, but not exclusive, roles journalists often mention regarding their role in society; it is the *interpretative* function, the *dissemination* function, and the *adversary* function (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 94).

With regards to mainstream Japanese journalists, how do they see their role in society, what are their criteria for selecting news? There are slight differences among the journalists of the big five newspapers concerning news value, but in general they all agree on the two following criteria. First, international significance and importance in terms of probable impact on internal politics. Second, major domestic political development like government reshuffle etc. Additional criteria were developments intimately connected with, and those which would significantly affect the livelihood of the people, novelty, or whether an item is interesting (Kim, 1981: 68-69; Cooper-Chen, 1995). These shared values regarding news selection, both within the media organisation, and also among the mainstream Japanese newspaper ultimately affects the way reality is constructed through the media.

While the common values for news selection do seem to be close to the expectations enlisted above in general terms, a look at the actual performance of Japanese newspapers, through the journalists' eyes, will attest to the extent of the realisation of these expectations. Moreover, through this insight, the ways Japanese journalists assess their actual work, will be revealed.

The data to be introduced below is drawing on the major NSK survey carried out in 1993-1994, and which was collected from about 2800 journalists, who comprised over 10% of all Japanese mainstream media's journalists at the time of the survey.

One section of the survey addressed the issue of normative functions of the media, as expected in a democratic country, and indeed most of the questions touch on the issues brought up by Gurevitch and Blumler (2000), as mentioned above. In the survey, journalists were asked whether, and to what extent the following normative functions of the newspapers are indeed being performed by the newspapers<sup>18</sup>. With regards to the media's function in "transmitting the news quickly", overall 64.9% of the journalists agreed. Concerning the responsibility of "providing commentary and analysis to difficult issues", 69.6% thought the media fulfils this function. As to whether the newspapers "report major information regarding news that are interesting for readers", 68.2% of the journalists interviewed agreed with the statement (NSK, 1994a). Regarding the three functions mentioned, quick transmission – analytical - interesting news, the majority of the journalists agreed that they are performed. What about functions the newspapers should perform with regards to the various elites, functions that are clearly congruent with the expectations of media in a democratic country, as enlisted by Gurevitch and Blumler (Gurevitch and Blumler, 2000: 26)?

With respect to the responsibility "not to publish unconfirmed reports", 22.7% thought it was performed well, while 33.3% thought it was somewhat performed. As to the role of "checking/verifying whether government reports are factual/true", only 2.5% thought it was performed well, and 15.9% thought it was somewhat performed, an overall of only 18.4% who thought this function is performed. Concerning the function of "providing issues/points of arguments regarding the formation of government policies", only 5.1% thought it was performed well, and 38.6% thought it was somewhat performed, an overall of 43.7%. On the responsibility of "scrutinising officials and parliament members' activities", only 2.3% thought it was performed well, and 23.6% thought it was somewhat performed, a total of 25.9%. With reference to the function of "scrutinising Big Businesses' management activities" a mere 1.2% thought this function was performed, and another 11.2% thought it was somewhat performed, a total of only 12.4%. Lastly, regarding the function that the newspaper "on its own initiative, brings up and emphasise social problems/issues", 4.3% thought it was performed well, and another 29.3% thought it was somewhat performed, a total of 33.6% (NSK, 1994a).

---

<sup>18</sup> It must be noted however, that regarding nearly every answer in this section, around one fifth of the journalists replied with the answer 'don't know'.

From this data it is evident that Japanese journalists are relatively confident regarding their performance of transmitting fast, analytical, and/or interesting news. Accordingly, the majority of them thought their role as transmitters and interpreters of events are performed relatively well. However, the variety and scope of these functions is greatly limited by the fact that the great majority of the journalists interviewed do not think they function as 'a watchdog' of government, the bureaucrats, and much less even the "Big Business". Hence, they do not function as adversary and /or 'watchdog' of the elite. Moreover, by publishing without checking, verifying, and confirming institutional, business, and governmental reports, they possibly show allegiance, trust, and loyalty to the elite rather than responsibility towards the public. Likewise, with respect to providing the point of arguments on governmental policy issues, what Gurevitch and Blumler (2000) note as "dialogue across a diverse range of views" or "incentives for citizens to learn, choose", and by this showing "a sense of respect for the audience member, as potentially concerned and able to make sense of his or her political environment (Gurevitch and Blumler, 2000: 26), a majority of the journalists did not think they performed this function. Lastly, regarding the expectation the media act to establish "meaningful agenda-setting, identifying the key issues of the day, including the forces that have formed and may resolve them" (Gurevitch and Blumler, 2000: 26), only around 30% of journalists thought that newspapers took the initiative in bringing up social issues/problems.

Thus, on the whole, the picture that can be drawn is that Japanese journalists will in most cases transmit and analyse reports and data, some of which, at times, may be false, to the public as soon as possible. The content of news in the majority of cases will exclude scrutiny, and criticism regarding the political and bureaucratic elite, and even to a lesser degree, big businesses. Furthermore, since on the whole, the newspapers do not present the variety of opinions regarding policy issues, discussions and debates are possibly limited by the elite's readiness to discuss issues. These limits on vigorous discussion in society regarding various issues, is further enhanced by the fact that on their own initiative, only 30% of the journalists thought they bring up important issues for discussion. The result therefore seems to be, that in most cases, the elite sets the agenda, salience, scope and content of the issues discussed in the mainstream media. And by so doing, as well as through the co-option/coercion of the journalists themselves, as will be seen later, the ruling elites, including the politicians, bureaucrats and big businesses are shielded from the public eyes.

Indeed, the survey results, as reflecting the working and functions of the mainstream Japanese media, is consistent with claims by numerous researchers and journalists (for example Maeda, 2000; Kim, 1981; van Wolferen, 1989; Freeman, 2000; Hall, 1998; Hara, 1992; Uchikawa and Arai, 1991; Tase, 1994).

## Ethics

According to Altschull (1990), ethics is “the study of the formation of moral values and of principles of right and wrong” (Altschull, 1990, p.357, as cited in Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 95). From the inquiry into contexts, a general, but clear idea regarding what is right and what is wrong in the Japanese context has been already delineated. Do these moral values have an everlasting influence on journalists’ ethics, or are they conjoined or replaced by additional different journalistic morals, influencing their work?

What is explicit from the previous discussion is that among the chief functions of the Japanese media, scrutiny of the elite as interpreted in the ‘watchdog’ function, and being the adversary, are not among its main functions. This deduction from the data may indicate one or more possible implicit meanings. One is that it reflects the impossibility of scrutinising the elite, due to various reasons, such as mechanisms of control. Another possibility is that it reflects journalists’ reluctance to perform these roles, conceivably, due to their shared ideas regarding what is good, bad, acceptable and unacceptable in their society. Another explanation may be that this reality is due to the combination of elites’ control mechanism, including shared values’ manipulation, together with the journalists’ shared morals.

A look at the data from the 1994 survey addressing questions of morals may reveal some answers. By defining the situation as “when there is some information you think *it is essential* the public knows about, which of the following actions, in the selected scenarios will you justify?” (NSK, 1994a), the surveyors put the “the public’s right to know of events of public importance and interest” (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 95)<sup>19</sup>, in focus.

In scenario 1: “I will pay money to get this information” 15% of journalists justified, 24.4% could not say, while 59.8%, the majority, could not justify such action (NSK, 1994a). Hence, paying money for *essential information* is not justified. In a comparative survey, just over 25% of American journalists

---

<sup>19</sup> From the US’s *Society of Professional Journalists Code of Ethics*, Shoemaker, J. P. and Reese, D. S. (1996) *Mediating the Message, Theories of Influences on Mass Media Content*, Longman Publishers, USA..

approved paying money "for confidential information" (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 101). Paying money for information seem unethical for both, though Japanese seem, more than Americans to think of it as unethical.

In scenario 2: "I will write about it without government, or the business' permission" 58.7% wrote they could justify it, 30.7% could not answer, while 10% could not justify such action. Thus, in contrast to their answers above regarding their actual practice, the majority of the journalists supported such deed. This disparity may presumably be explained as the gap between the aspiration, as contrasted by reality where in practice the journalists do not or cannot fulfil such function. The Japanese journalists' support of such action is even stronger than their American counterparts, of whom around 50% could justify such action (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 101). It is indeed similar to Brislin's perplexing findings, where Chinese journalists put more weight on the value of independence than Americans and similarly to the Americans, low value on humility (Brislin, 1997: 6). It was explained by one Chinese journalists and supported by other ones, in the following way: "We value independence because we want more of it and don't value humility because too much (of it) is expected of us" (Brislin, 1997: 7).

Scenario 3: "Although had been agreed not to write about, to break the promise and report about it", the great majority of Japanese journalists, 82% of them could not justify such action, with 15% who could not answer. This clearly indicates the importance of loyalty and trust relations, discussed in the previous chapter, and also possibly to the related threat of punishment, for violating norms.

Scenario 4: "will report even if it causes trouble to news sources", 19.9% said they could justify it, 28.2% could not, and the majority, 51% could not answer. Here, while the majority could not answer at all, the opposition to such act was bigger then the support.

Scenario 5: "will use without permission such private objects such as letters and pictures" 71% of the respondents could not justify it, and 15.5% could not answer, which again testifies to the importance of trust and loyalty, as paramount shared values.

Finally, regarding scenario 6: "hide your identity in order to collect material" a great majority, 78.6% could not justify such action, compared with 5.5% who could justify it. This is in sharp contrast to the American survey where around 75% of journalists "accepted going undercover...in order to gain inside

information” (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 101). The Japanese journalists’ animosity is again maybe related to loyalty and trust one receives as long as one follows the rules.

All in all, Japanese journalists seem to put priority on values such as loyalty and trust relations considerably higher than ‘the public’s right to know’. These values are indeed, “linked with a lesser valuing of inquisitiveness, aggressiveness and perseverance” (Brislin, 1997: 7). The findings from this survey are consistent with the dominant, shared values in Japanese society, discussed in Chapter One. It is also somewhat in accord with the Japanese Canons of Journalism (NSK, 1990: 4-5), which does not put the “public’s right to know ...(as) the overriding mission of the mass media”, as in the US one (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 95 ). In fact, if one looks into the Japanese Canons of Journalism, the public does not loom large in it.

## **2.4 The Organisation and Structure of News-Gathering and Processing**

In the following, the media routines’ level and organisational level will be considered. Implicit in this consideration is the ways organisational factors and media routines affect content. Since, “...what is defined selected, and presented as ‘news’ has much to do with the organisation that gathers and transmit it” (Krauss, 1996: 108).

Media routines are defined as “those patterned, routinised, repeated practices and forms that media workers use to do their jobs” (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 105). As to the importance of media routines, they are indispensable for the effective “gathering and evaluating” of raw material, and in fact, they are “part of the news business, giving workers clearly defined and specialised roles and expectation” (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 117).

As to an inquiry into the organisational level, according to Shoemaker and Reese (1996) there are four groups of core questions to be asked. The first regards organisational roles, Who does what? It is a vital question since “the number and type of roles represented show how specialised or differentiated are the jobs that constitute the media organisation” (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 142). Second, addressing organisation structure: how the organisation is structured? What are the lines of authority between the departments? Is power centralised with strong vertical connections or spread among several departments

(Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 142)? Third, concerning policy and its implementation: What is the policy and how it is implemented? Who answers to whom? What are the guidelines and how are they set and implemented? And four, policy enforcement: How policies are enforced? How the lines of authority are enforced (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 143)?

Through an inquiry into the organisation and structure of news-gathering and processing of the Japanese newspapers, some of the questions listed above will be addressed. When analysing the Japanese newspapers, it is feasible to distinguish two aspects of the news making process, the outside and inside structures. The outside structure mainly focuses on the press-clubs as the main institutional framework within which reporters gather information, and also includes the foreign correspondents and news agencies. The inside structure centres on the various sections and offices from which the reporters receive instructions and within which the news is processed. While the outside structure is more related to news-gathering routines, and the internal structure is more concerned with organisational factors, both structures are influenced by media routines and organisational determinants.

### **2.4.1 Internal Structure**

The organisation of each of the big dailies is very similar and includes the General Affairs Bureau, Accounting Bureau, Editorial Bureau, Advertising Bureau, Production (printing and engineering) Bureau, Cultural Promotion Headquarters, and Publication Bureau (Feldman, 1989).

Each newspaper breakdown is also very much alike, with each story having its accepted place, since the newspaper layout is divided into specialised sections. Though page numbers may differ among the newspapers, the differentiation among the various sections is very much alike. Thus “after the first page, which has the major stories of the day whatever their type, there usually follows a political page, international news page(s), economic pages and so forth” (Krauss, 1996: 251; see also Thayer, 1985; Saito, 2000). Corresponding to the topical divisions, each newspaper will have political, economic, foreign, sports, photo, culture, women, social, editorial, and radio/TV sections. In addition, all will have press clubs, regional and overseas service sections, among others. Responsibility for each section in the newspaper, therefore, is assigned to one particular department, and reporters assigned to a particular department are more or less exclusively concerned with the affairs under their jurisdiction. Thus, for instance, the foreign

news section handles the reports from overseas correspondents and translates the reports of foreign wire services or articles from foreign newspapers, while the radio and the television section prepares and transmits news to the radio and television stations belonging to the newspaper through the affiliation system (*keiretsu*) (Thayer, 1985).

Among the various sections, the political, economical and foreign news bureaus are known as the 'hard group' (Thayer, 1985; see also Krauss, 1996: 111).

As to the internal structure of each section, it is organised along hierarchical lines, where higher positions are filled by older and more experienced journalists (NSK, 1994a). Every section is headed by an editor/section chief, followed by deputy editors, who direct the reporters under them. The deputy editors are called the 'desk', and they, in fact, run the section and are the most vital link in the news organisation (Kim, 1981: 54-55; see also Krauss, 1996: 111). Hence, the 'desk' is the consequential factor in terms of the facet of news content, or, in other words, the main gate-keeper.

All in all, it can be said that within the organisation, hierarchy of functionally differentiated roles is defined and the line of authority is clear, and within this hierarchy older people will occupy higher positions.

As to the way policy is implemented and enforced within the organisation, it is especially through the chain of command inside each section, mainly through the power of the 'desks' that policy is enforced (Kim, 1981: 54-55; see also Krauss, 1996: 111).

A look at the 1994 journalists survey reveals that there are some strict content-related policies that are common to all mainstream media (NSK, 1994a), and are enforced in a similar way, by systematically turning down articles that are considered not fit for reporting. One question especially addresses the policy enforcement issue, and was defined as follows: "The following issues are considered difficult to report on. Have you yourself experienced cases where your article had been turned down among the following topics?" (NSK, 1994a). The aggregated results of articles turned down by topic, are as follows: 27.1% of articles on discrimination, 23.5% - regarding internal information about other media company, 20.5% - about a particular business's internal affairs, 19.2% - on a scandal about a famous politics/economics related person, 15% about a political party's internal affairs related, 14.5% on a ministry's internal affairs, 13.9% about the emperor/ imperial household related affairs, 6.5%- defence related, 5.8% - on a foreign country's

domestic situation (NSK, 1994a). Hence, it is evident that there are numerous subjects which are indeed difficult to write about such as: discrimination, other media company, the imperial house, the political/bureaucratic/business elites, , defence, and foreign countries - all that constitute what news is all about. It must be stated that data for this question, though in itself revealing, is somewhat misleading. Or, in other words, the situation is worse than it looks. For example, while 1.8% journalists reported themselves as belonging to the foreign news department, 5.8% of journalists reported that their articles about foreign countries had been turned down, around three times more cases than the ratio of journalists. Similarly, 10.5% of journalists registered themselves as belonging to political and economic departments, while the multiple answer shows that the combined rejected cases exceeds 50%. The ratio of these answers may reflect severe news management policies, or censorship in the sense that anything regarded as undesirable is being cut out. Shoemaker and Reese (1996) write that "The rewards for quickly learning and following policy are from co-workers and employers within the media organisation... Socialisation to your medium's policies give you what Sigal... calls 'a context of shared values' with those around you. These values shape the context in which events are viewed and the selection of the aspects of each event that will become news" (Sigal, 1973, p. 3, as cited in Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 92).

Hence, through trial and error, journalists learn which issues and in what ways to pursue them, if they want them published, and which issues they should avoid altogether. Interestingly, and in relation to the previous chapter, what is clear from the survey is that many journalists chose journalism precisely because they assumed it to provide more freedom compared to other professions, but discovered that, in fact, control is quite severe also in the media, if one belongs to the mainstream media (NSK, 1994a).

The internal structure and the news-room dynamics as described above identify the 'desk' as the main gate-keeper. This function of the 'desk' has been illustrated in the Japanese journalists' testimony regarding the numerous articles rejected by 'desk'. However, while rejection by the desk is the most obvious act of gate-keeping, there are other complementary dynamics also at work. News items arriving at the desk have already passed previous gate-keeping. From the individual level, journalists' views regarding their roles and ethics (see the previous section: 2.3.2) make clear that gate-keeping, or self-censorship, is widely shared practice. It is constantly done by the journalists themselves, limiting to a large extent what they put on the news agenda, or what kind of news ultimately reaches the 'desk'. Based on Chapter One, it can be

said that the individual journalists are, initially, conditioned by their contexts regarding what they view as proper/acceptable news item. In addition, from the analysis of the external structure level, as the following section on the press-clubs illustrates, the dynamics within the press-clubs among the journalists themselves as well as in their relations with the news source, can also be clearly identified as gate-keeping. These processes are also, to a large extent, conditioned by the Japanese context. What eventually passes the individual and press-club gate-keeping lands for approval on the 'desk', the highest level of authority in the gate-keeping process (on the working of the different levels of gate-keeping see for example Hara, 1992; Uchikawa and Arai, 1991; Tase, 1994; Yamamoto, 1994; Kato and Kiuchi, 1984; Suzuki, 1993).

#### **2.4.2 External Structure: The Press-Clubs<sup>20</sup>**

Proceeding onwards to an inquiry into the external structure of the news making' process, the Japanese 'press-clubs' are in focus, as the main venue for news-gathering. While the significant role the 'desk' has in the news making, had been already referred to, the function the clubs play in 'constructing reality', will be tackled next. The location of the clubs, their limited membership, their functions and delimiters, are presented, and followed by a summary of the implications of the press-clubs on the process of news making.

##### **Location:**

The journalists press-clubs are situated within, or attached to any major institution in Japan which is deemed to have valuable news. There are press-clubs within the vicinity of the national Diet (Japanese Parliament), regional assemblies, political parties, police, the courts, major economic organisations, prominent research institutes, and so on (Freeman, 2000; Cooper-Chen, 1997b; Kim, 1981). Though no list exists, according to various sources, there are between 400 to 700 press-clubs in total, of which around 120 are located in Tokyo (Freeman, 2000: 68). The news sources of the institution the journalists are covering, usually, equip the clubs meticulously and often pay club related expenses (Freeman, 2000: 80-84).

The fact that press-clubs are situated in places deemed to be important as sources and generators of news, may exert considerable influence on the content of news. It can also be interpreted as 'structural

---

<sup>20</sup> The press clubs are also known as journalists clubs, or *kisha* clubs (their Japanese name).

bias', since reporters coverage might over - emphasise their importance and discount other, undoubtedly, equally important news worthy sources. In other words, who is included and who is excluded in the press-clubs' network, or, to put it differently, who has access to the media and, conversely, to whom does the media reach out for news and who do the media ignore, may affect the output of reporting. Indeed, Krauss (1996) for example, found, there was an overwhelming amount of news on the state, predominantly the bureaucracy (Krauss, 1996: 118), while Prestowitz (1988) asserted the prominence of business news among the content of mainstream Japanese media (Prestowitz, 1988: 318-319). Both of these venues are extensively covered by the press.

### **Membership:**

Membership in the press-clubs is restricted to a small number of mainstream media, who must be also members of the NSK, with its own membership criteria (For details see Freeman, 2000)<sup>21</sup>. Each club has its own rules and provisions, also regarding as to which media can become member, from among NSK members. However, all the mainstream dominant media will have representatives in any journalists club. In total they amount to 17 media organisations: "...the five national papers...the four block papers...two news agencies...and six broadcasters" (Freeman, 2000: 91). However, regarding the six broadcasters, five out of the six are actually subordinate to one of the five national papers, due to the affiliation system (*keiretsu*) papers (Cooper-Chen, 1997b; Hall, 1998; Johnston, 2000; van Wolferen, 1989). The remaining broadcaster is the public broadcaster NHK. The significance of this affiliation system is that through the *keiretsu*, the five national papers extend their reach "...to the reminder of the media industry" (Freeman, 2000: 141). This consequence that the national papers permeate the media market in Japan is further enhanced by the fact that upon the establishment of their affiliation system, each "...national newspaper mandated that its affiliated television station use the parent newspaper as the primary source of its news" (Freeman, 2000: 155)<sup>22</sup>. In general, therefore, it is viable to state that all other media, e.g., foreign journalists, magazine journalists and free lance journalists are systematically excluded from the NSK and therefore from the clubs (e.g., Hall, 1998; Sherman, 1990; van Wolferen, 1989 #52; Kim, 1981; Brislin, 1997).

---

<sup>21</sup> For additional information about membership criteria, see section 2.2.2 of this chapter.

<sup>22</sup> For a comprehensive list of this affiliation system (*keiretsu*), see Freeman (2000), p. 158-159.

## Press-Clubs as the main news-gathering' venue

With the exception of a category of journalists called roving reporters (*yugun*), who cover usually a certain prominent figure or an ad-hoc in-depth story, press-clubs serve as the 'home base' for the majority of Japanese journalists. They usually arrive at their respective clubs early to mid-morning, starting their day by reviewing the morning editions of rival newspapers, and checking for missed information. This can be followed by attendance at a regularly scheduled news conference, a post conference off-record briefing (*kondan*), a lecture on a related topic, or any other activities related to the reporting of current events. This load of activities and scheduled events often produce what is called: 'announcement journalism' (*happyou jourunalisumu*). A fact that was confirmed by 69.7% of the journalists who took part in the 1994' NSK survey and relates also to the journalists's assertion, 68.5% of them, who said that the reporting was "too identical" (NSK, 1994a).

In addition, journalists often assert that each club has too many scheduled events, which leave very little, if at all, time for independent, investigative journalism, though it is unclear whether they would have opted for independent, investigative journalism, since as they admitted, the amount of information provided in these events, by the news source, by itself, saturates their desire to seek more information (Feldman, 1989; Freeman, 2000).

Journalists also leave their clubs to pursue stories and conduct interviews, but even then they often go as a group, in an institutionalised manner, despite belonging in fact, to rival media companies. Some journalists, especially younger ones, who cover major politicians, or major political parties, often also spend considerable part of their day conducting morning and evening rounds known as *asagake* (morning outing) and *yomawari* (night round). From early morning until quite late at night groups of journalists follow prominent people with whom they ultimately develop very close relationship (Freeman, 2000; Cooper-Chen, 1997b; Kim, 1981; Vogel, 1985). While in the clubs, or walking around together to pursue information, journalists from competing media, who become intimately related, discuss the information they obtained, its importance and value, and also which information they should withhold and which they

should disclose. As Feldman (1993) writes, their “gut-reading” (*haragei*)<sup>23</sup> is often precise: “Even without explicitly suggesting which information reporters should or should not reveal in their stories, an information source can rely on reporters to distinguish based on prolonged contact, what can be published and what is off the record”(Feldman, 1993: 140).

Though intimate relations among journalists inevitably develop, they are run along traditional, hierarchical lines, where seniors run the clubs and all club members are expected to abide by the rules of the group and not act individually (Freeman, 2000; Feldman, 1993; Sherman, 1994). Likewise, club members usually have prolonged relationship with their source (s), who becomes part of the inner group (*uchi*), as a senior member. The source, for his part, equips and pays some of the club expenses (Freeman, 2000: 80-84).

The club–source relations are furthered and strengthened by the off-record briefings (*kondan*). During off-record briefings, both in the club and at the source’s house during morning and evening rounds, informal and intimate talks take place. These informal meetings, though used at times for socialising, are a major news-gathering venue for reporters. According to information Feldman (1993) collected from reporters, “Together, the *kondan* and ‘night attacks’ seem to be the most useful methods of gathering information in Japanese politics” (Feldman, 1989: 92). Journalists claimed that while “the press conferences provide them with about 20% of the information...the *kondan* and ‘night attacks’ provide them with the other 80%” (Feldman, 1993: 92). Journalists consider press conferences as *tatema*, or staged events, because prior to press conferences, reporters pool their questions, present the source with them, and negotiate the final list of questions with the source (Feldman, 1993: 116). Whereas they can obtain the major, and crucial information during the informal sessions, often referred to, by journalists, as the *honne*, the real thing (Feldman, 1993: 116). Consequently, as to information obtained during informal, off-record briefings/meetings, “Editors tend to publish such information without hesitation or further verification” (Feldman, 1993: 92).

Thus, prolonged acquaintance among the club members, including the news source (s) through the club’s activities, exerts a major influence on what ultimately will be made public, i.e., reported, since the dynamics within the clubs are guided by the dominant shared values of Japanese society. The ways these

---

<sup>23</sup> For extensive discussion on *haragei*, see Chapter One, 1.4.2 Japanese Culture: Selected Values.

shared dominant values like hierarchy and the related senior-junior reciprocal relations and consequently the weight of values such as loyalty in human relations exert influence to mould the news product, is evident from journalists' testimonies. One senior journalist, for example, spells it out as follows: "The longer I know someone else, the better we can clear the way to develop personal relations expressed in such terms as *shinyou* (trust, confidence), *tsukiai* (social obligation), and *ninjou* (human feelings)..." (Feldman, 1993: 108). Another reporter explained why he will not disclose crucial information about a news source: "All that I have constructed for years, all the confidence and trust that Diet members have in me, I am not going to sacrifice for the price of one scoop...I am not going to write about something that may cause embarrassment to a certain Diet member, even if it would make the headline in tomorrow's paper" (Feldman, 1993: 138). Indeed, Feldman (1993) found that, "Almost all reporters interviewed stated that they always respect the requests of an information source and do not reveal, even to the members of the desk" (Feldman, 1989: 151; see also Krauss, 1996).

That this group dynamics restricts press freedom, and is being detrimental to the journalistic ethics, and is in fact the focus of much criticism regarding the press-clubs, is irrelevant to both the reporters and the sources, who see the nature of their relations as 'common sense' (Feldman, 1993: 114).

For his part, the news source, both as a senior and the source of information, tries by all means to accentuate and use this Japanese 'common sense', to his own advantage, mainly by equipping the clubs and paying for some of their expenses (Freeman, 2000: 80-84), as well as through confiding with journalists, especially in the various kinds of off-record gatherings. On the latter endeavour Feldman (1993) writes, "by talking with a reporter and revealing certain information regarding... and then asking that it not be published, an information source indicates the extent of trust involved in the relationship, that is, believing that the reporter would not take advantage of such confidence and exploit that trust"(Feldman, 1993: 143).

The reciprocal relations in the club can be delineated as relations of harmony, where trust, loyalty, deference and human feelings, among other values, and on behalf of the journalists are expressed in exchange for the source's (senior) information (Freeman, 2000).

The value of trust is omnipresent and once abused, is irretrievable: "If the reporter reveals to somebody, it might result in the end of the contact, as happened many times, however, more than that, the reporter might lose the trust of many other Diet members" (Feldman, 1993: 141). Hence, though trust is highly

valued, it is not always guaranteed. In order to measure their journalists' commitment to it, "politicians and their aids scan the papers daily to check who did not respect their requests (Feldman, 1993: 142).

All in all, through co-operation and coercion, the interaction within the club, is based on traditional human relations, a fact which has consequential effects on the content produced from within these clubs. While Freeman (2000) summarised the repercussion on content as effects that result in an inferior product (Freeman, 2000), further elaboration on the influences of the clubs on the mainstream media's output, will follow.

As for the more ambitious journalists, who find it restrictive to abide by these rules, "The same reporters often write to magazines more detailed and interesting information from their off-the-record information, as freelancers—without by—lines" (Feldman, 1993: 143; see also Freeman, 2000)<sup>24</sup>.

## **Rules and regulations**

There are numerous and detailed rules; some are similar to all press-clubs; some are particular to certain clubs; some of them are written, but many of them are not. The significance is that all the members are mindful of these regulations, and are also aware of the punishment for breaking these rules. An engaging example cited by Freeman (2000) are regulations as to 'Blackboard Agreement', which are in fact, a register of scheduled events, posted on a board in the clubs. The dictum is that "journalists are not permitted to conduct independent news-gathering or reporting that might allow them to obtain a scoop on the posted item" (Freeman, 2000: 103).

When a member breaks the rules of the club, not only is he/she punished, but also his/her organisation as a group is punished. Most times the punishment is by the other members of the clubs, but some times by the news sources. Punishments can range from one week to half a year banishment from news-gathering at the club (Lloyd, 1996; Sherman, 1990; Hadfield, 1991; Freeman, 2000). Needless to say, there are people who break the formal and informal rules, and there are punishments for these people, and quite often they are disciplined by their own group members, which is again contrary to western journalists, who will

---

<sup>24</sup> For further information on the press clubs and their consequences see Cooper-Chen (1997), Sato (1995), Sherman (1990), Horvat (1990), Freeman (1996), Lloyd (1996), van Wolferen (1993), Pharr (1996).

usually support a colleague, but reflect more Japanese journalists' regards for their own set of values (Hadfield, 1991; Freeman, 2000).

### **Press-Clubs: Summary**

The essential aspects and implications of the press-clubs' system are subsequently summed up and should be kept in mind:

With respect to the nature and characteristics of the relations, there are three main aspects to them. First, the daily interaction among the club members and news sources results naturally in congenial relations, often termed 'cosy' (for example Sato, 1995b; Brislin, 1997; Cooper-Chen, 1997b). Second, the relations are usually hierarchical (*sempai/ kohai*), where the news source is usually in a superior position (*sempai*), or as a parent figure (*oya*), and the journalists are in the subordinate position (*ko/kohai*). These vertical relations also reflect the age gap, where journalists are often younger than their news sources. Third, the relations are maintained through reciprocity. The news source equips and pays for club expenses, as well as talks exclusively to 'his/her' club. In return, the journalists express their deference, loyalty, and indebtedness, by confining themselves almost exclusively to information supplied by the source and the strings attached to it.

As to the general characteristics of the press-clubs' system, Freeman's (2000) findings are consequential. As the major environment of news-gathering, she notes characteristics of cartels that are evident in the clubs: 1. Their membership is limited to a small group of main stream media. 2. There are strict rules governing the activities of the members. 3. There are severe punishments for rules' breakers (Freeman, 2000: 15). However, it should be noted, and also as stated by Freeman (2000), and Hall (1998), the phenomena of cartelization is not unique to the mainstream media, but is prevalent in Japan (Freeman, 2000; Hall, 1998; Johnson, 1995).

Regarding the influence of media routines on content, the effects of the press-clubs, as the main venue for news-gathering is of immense scope. Though will be discussed later, a look at the 1994 NSK survey gives some idea as to the extent of the clubs' effects on content. With regards to the question "among the following types of readers' criticism, which ones are justified?" the journalists, who could choose multiple

answers, replied as follows: 69.8% agreed that there was too much 'announcement journalism'<sup>25</sup>, 68.5% agreed that the content was very similar/identical, 48.7% thought that there was too little investigative journalism and the reporting was too shallow, 40.6% thought that critical mentality was poor, 36.1% agreed they did not write about important facts, 30.5% agreed that they did not produce constructive ideas, lastly 17.6% agreed that too many articles do not disclose sources (NSK, 1994a).

## 2.5 Extra-media Level of Inquiry

### 2.5.1 The Role of Outsiders: Magazines and Foreign Correspondents

Most, if not all the major scandals of Japanese politics in the past few decades have been uncovered, not by those who knew best and were closest to the culprits, but by those who are often referred to as the 'outsiders' of the Japanese media. The 1974 'Lockheed scandal', the 1988 'Recruit Stocks for Favour scandal', and the 1991 'Prime Minister Uno's scandal' just to cite a few, were all revealed by foreign journalists, or magazine journalists, or, in other words, outsiders (Hadfield, 1991; Hall, 1998; Freeman, 2000; van Wolferen, 1989).

Farley (1996) explains it as follows, "given the symbiotic relations between the *kisha* club members and their sources, it often takes an outsider to bring about the disclosure of accumulated inside information" (Farley, 1996: 140). In her analysis of the *Politics of Scandal in Japan*, Farley (1996) writes that "To understand how the press has covered major scandals, it is crucial to distinguish between the establishment press and the 'outside' press" (Farley, 1996: 135). In the study, she portrays the non mainstream media, notably the magazines, and the foreign media, as the outsiders of the Japanese media environment. In the passage below, the meaning and way magazines function as 'outsiders' in the media environment, will be elaborated on, as well as the ways magazines and foreign media and their correspondents, fulfil their role as 'outsiders' (*soto*) by exerting, what is often termed 'external pressure' (*gaiatsu*). Through exercising

---

<sup>25</sup> Euphemism to information reported as received from authorities, and any other major institution, mainly where there is a press club.

external pressure (*gaiatsu*), magazines and foreign media play a part in, and influence the content of the mainstream media.

## Magazines

While the main stream media is often dubbed as the *tatema*—the formal, the weeklies and magazines are often considered to portray the *honne*—the real thing. These ‘outsiders’ are systematically kept out of mainstream media’s news-gathering venues mainly by the NSK, but also by Journalists Club members as well as their news sources. The reasons for the exclusion are manifold, however, the main reason is in Tasker’s words “...magazine writers will not heed the complex unwritten code which establishes the extent of the news that fit to print” (Tasker, 1998: 82).

Regardless of the reasons for their exclusion from the press-clubs, since the magazines and weeklies are considered outsiders, the conventional rules do not apply to them (*uchi/soto* dichotomy’s essence) and therefore, they can be the *honne*, or, the ‘real thing’ [Horvat, 1990 #43; Freeman, 1996 #39; Brislin, 1996 #3; Watanabe, 1996 #44; Young, 1996 #41]. As was mentioned earlier, a number of main stream journalists write also for the magazines, on a freelance, no-by-line basis. Some do it due to the repressive aspects of club membership, and some do it for money, or both (Freeman, 2000; Hall, 1998; Feldman, 1989).

However, since no rules are applied to them, and despite being considered by many, as Japan’s ‘real journalism’, in practice, these freedoms from obligations, create abusive media, which sometimes tells what is ‘really happening’, but at other times, disseminate groundless information, and by that, ruins its own image as the *honne* of Japanese journalism, along with individuals’ lives (Brislin, 1996; Horvat, 1990; JIMPOREN 7, 1999; Watanabe, 1996; Young, 1996). Despite their faults however, their value cannot be disregarded, as it is echoed by Tasker (1998) “Salacious, libellous, utterly unreliable, they are the most vital of all information sources for anyone who wants to know what the Japanese are really thinking” (Tasker, 1998: 84). And how do Japanese themselves find ‘what is really going on’ in their country? “The Japanese have access both to officially processed ‘club’ reality and to the murky rumour-world of the weeklies. Neither is adequate on its own, but in combination they enable the discriminating reader to form a reasonable picture of what is actually going on” (Tasker, 1998: 84).

As to the way magazines exert external pressure on the mainstream media, and consequently, direct influence on its content, can be illustrated through the Sagawa Kyubin Scandal, one out of numerous similar ones. The Sagawa Kyubin Scandal was about “a fast growing delivery company with *yakuza* (Japanese Mafia) ties (that) allegedly was making gargantuan donations to politicians in exchange for favours”(Farley, 1996: 151). The story of the scandal broke in July 1991 by a weekly magazine, *Shukan Shincho*. The article led to investigation by police, which resulted in some arrests. However, “Despite rumours and leaks, and the fact that a list of politicians who had received money had circulated among journalists for several months, there was a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ among the major media not to report anything until it could be confirmed by the prosecutor’s office” (Farley, 1996: 151). The mainstream media did not pursue an investigation as to which politicians and for what purposes they received money. They “remained content to merely publicise the (prosecutor’s) office findings” (Farley, 1996: 15). In addition, the legal authorities seemed, on their part, to avoid quick exposure, as Farley (1996) explains they were “in no hurry to press the case because of their fear of damaging Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi’s support base in the party” (Farley, 1996: 151). Only following the admission by a prominent politician, Shin Kanemaru, of taking bribes, and the consequent ridiculous fine of less than \$2000 for accepting over \$4 million in bribes, did the major media erupt in criticism, but mainly at the “bald discriminatory leniency toward a powerful politician” (Farley, 1996: 152).

### **Foreign Correspondents in Japan**

The story of the major earthquake at Kobe in 1995, where more than 6000 people died, illustrates vividly the way foreign media exerts influence on the local media. According to the Washington Post foreign correspondent, T.R. Reid (1995), there was a clear distinction between Western and Japanese media in their coverage of the aftermath of the quake. While the Western media accentuated the negative side, in terms of destruction and personal loss, the Japanese media focused on ‘keeping distance’, concentrating the coverage on harmony among the survivors and on the living people and standing buildings. “Taken as a whole, Eastern and Western reporting created distinctly different impressions among consumers of news” (Reid, 1995). However, more importantly, “the Western media first pursued a story that became subtext of quake coverage: that Japan’s government was guilty of a major blunder in failing to provide rescue and

supplies on time” (Reid, 1995). At the time, the Japanese press “just did not see the story, or did not report it” according to Matsuzoe Yoichi, a Japanese media critic. But as the Western press kept relentlessly pursuing the issue “the Japanese media picked it up and started hitting the government themselves” (Reid, 1995).

In another scandal story, related to Prime Minister Tanaka, Farley (1996) reveals how both the magazines and the foreign media concurrently helped expose one of the biggest, if not the biggest, scandal in post-war Japan, with the mainstream media just following their lead. As to Tanaka’s uniqueness, Farley (1996) writes that while in post-war Japan, almost every prime minister has been tainted by suspicion and corruption, “Tanaka has come to symbolise the phenomenon in its extreme” (Farley, 1996: 146). Tanaka’s scandal was exposed in 1974, by a number of investigative journalists from the renowned magazine *Bungei Shunju*. The leader of the investigation, though formerly a staff of the magazine, was in fact at the time of the investigation a total outsider, working as a freelancer, and therefore had even “less to lose, than most outsider journalists” (Farley, 1996; see also van Wolferen, 1989: 129). The group exposed Tanaka’s “questionable manoeuvrings” in two long articles, and the scandal developed as follows:

The general press ignored the articles at first: it was old news to them, and Tanaka had not broken any laws. But at a press conference with Tanaka at the Foreign Correspondent’s Club in Tokyo, *Los Angeles Times* reporter Sam Jameson led the foreign journalists in intense questioning about the articles’ revelations, thus launching the story internationally. Only then did Japan’s insider journalists, led by the *Asahi Shinbun*, jump onto the story, bringing it back into the country and onto the front pages of the major newspapers. A predictable storm of criticism and press attention followed, ultimately forcing Tanaka out of office (Farley, 1996: 146-147).

These two stories adequately illustrate the major role played by both ‘outsiders’, the magazines, and the foreign media, in the Japanese media environment.

In sum, since the mainstream Japanese media systematically avoid important issues, especially when they are critical to the elite, despite often having full knowledge of the problem, the foreign press together with the magazines play an important role in bringing the news to the public. As was depicted above, in many such instances, the ‘outside’ media will first scoop the story and then the Japanese media will follow suit and a scandal will be borne and with it a wealth of information that was withheld so far by the Japanese media (Sherman, 1994; Sato, 1995b; Cooper-Chen, 1997b; Hadfield, 1991; Hall, 1998: 46; Brislin, 1997; van Wolferen, 1993: 65; Reid, 1995; Sato, 1993; Daimon and Kitazume, 1993).

### **2.5.2 Legal Constraints**

There are no laws specifically regulating the mass media, and in fact, the existing laws provide the mass media with special benefits and privileges. For example, the Public Office Election Law contains stringent regulations on campaigns, particularly with regard to the newspapers' documents and drawings. The law also recognises the mass media's freedom to report and comment on elections, provided that fair elections are not impaired by the abuse of freedom of expression such as false reporting. The newspapers also enjoy a special status under the Commercial law, as had been mentioned earlier in this section, in order to protect the newspapers from being subjected to outside pressure (Feldman, 1989).

On the whole, it can be said that, from a legal perspective, the mass media of Japan operates in an environment of freedom from direct control, or interference of government (Cooper-Chen, 1997b: 175). Most of the restrictions on mass media activities are, in fact, imposed by its own rules and 'unwritten constitution', which are a product of its socio-politico-cultural heritage, discussed previously (see also Beer, 1993: 246). Beer (1993) emphasises, for example, the group orientation factor as operating both for and against free speech (Beer, 1993: 246). Similarly Cooper-Chen (1997) writes that overt censorship is banned by the constitution's Article 21, but "self censorship pervades the Japanese media" (Cooper-Chen, 1997b: 176).

### **2.5.3 Political Constraints**

The Japanese Laws of Broadcasting and the Media, both enacted in 1950, say that only a corporation that can get a license from the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunication can make broadcasts and this license must be renewed by the Ministry every five years. The government says that this system is indispensable as the resources of the radio waves are limited and that it is necessary so as to make broadcasting companies contribute themselves to the public interest (Watanabe, 1996). However, Watanabe Takesato (1996), a professor of journalism and mass communication at Doshisha University, Kyoto, disagrees with this claim, and finds the licensing policy a convenient method of control by the government over broadcasters and the contents of news information (Watanabe, 1996). In addition, this system can lead to questionable relations between the Ministry and the broadcasting corporations, since some former

bureaucrats from the Ministry of Post and Telecommunication obtain prestigious position in media companies following their retirement through the practice known as 'descent from heaven' (*amakudari*) (Watanabe, 1996).

The implication is that both the commercial broadcasting companies and NHK, which are dependant on the licenses, are subject to indirect control by the political elite and its power.

This control is further extended due to the pervading affiliation system (*keiretsu*) within the Japanese media discussed previously, where most of the broadcasting companies, magazines and other media outlets are part of a huge media conglomerate headed by one of the five major Japanese dailies. Accordingly, "because almost all the broadcasting companies both, TV and radio in Japan, are invested in by newspaper companies and even depend upon them in news-gathering, and so if newspaper writes against the government, it can use the system as indirect means of controlling" (Watanabe, 1996).

#### **2.5.4 Economic Constraints**

Japanese newspaper companies are heavily depended on advertising for their revenues. Among their total revenue, 54.8% comes from sales, while 45.2% comes from advertising (Cooper-Chen, 1997b: 137; see also Saito, 2000: 568). Due to the enormous amount of money needed in order to put advertisements, especially in the major media, small and medium size enterprises cannot become sponsors. This leaves advertising space and airtime to the major Japanese enterprises. When looking into the issue of newspaper advertising, it is again crucial to keep in mind the affiliation system (*keiretsu*) in order to understand the major influence one advertising company, Dentsu, can exert over the whole Japanese media. Dentsu, which is the fourth largest advertising company in the world, receives one fourth of Japan's advertising revenues. Dentsu "handles about half of all prime time television ads, one fifth of the ads in major newspapers and close to a third of the ads in the more important magazines (Cooper-Chen, 1997b: 143). With vast financial resources at its disposal, Dentsu buys up large amount of space and airtime and by doing so, it assures the media companies of a reliable source of revenue. However, on the other hand, this state of affairs gives Dentsu a leverage, allowing it to exert a considerable influence on the Japanese media companies. In fact, van Wolferen (1989) even named it, "the hidden media boss" (van Wolferen, 1989: 176). To further assure its influence, Dentsu uses its hiring policies and retirement arrangements to cement its position. For

example, “Dentsu provides presidents and top-level executives for major newspapers, national and regional TV stations and other firms connected with the mass media, as well as its own subsidiaries” (van Wolferen, 1989: 177-178).

As a result, in terms of reciprocity in the relations, Dentsu exchanges assurances of stable advertising revenues with the authority to exert “undue influence over content and ad rates charged” (Cooper-Chen, 1997b: 143). In fact, Dentsu actively uses its authority to control media content, by exerting influence on media companies to downplay consumer’s issues, by censoring unfavourable coverage of its client businesses, and so on (van Wolferen, 1989: 178). Confirming Dentsu’s power, Watanabe (1996) writes “...that the Japanese media do not report usually the name of big businesses when they are involved in anti-social behaviour, whereas they easily name individuals in similar cases and violate their human rights” (Watanabe, 1996). The issue of advertisers’ influence on content was also not ignored by the NSK. In the 1994 survey, NSK asked journalists “do you agree with editorial board efforts/co-operation regarding advertising?” Again, implicit from this question, is that undoubtedly, pressure by advertisers is being exerted. As to the journalists’ response, a majority of 59.9% opposed it, while 21.7% agreed to this practice to a certain degree, with 18.4% who could not answer (NSK, 1994a).

## **2.6 Japanese Journalism—Practice and Interpretation**

### **2.6.1 The consequences of the system**

The consequences of the system, some of which have been already mentioned, are reflected in the very attributes of the main stream Japanese media. The Japanese media is often delineated in the following manner: as being part of the elite (Tase, 1994; Akhavan-Majid, 1990; Cooper-Chen, 1997b), uniformed in its content and conformist (Tase, 1994; Horvit, 1996; Jameson, 1997; Vogel, 1980), reinforcing the status-quo and through this, maintaining order in society (Maeda, 2000; van Wolferen, 1993), systematically avoiding major and polemical themes (Kato and Kiuchi, 1984; Abe et al., 1994; Cunningham, 1995; Lloyd, 1996), having various taboos (Hara, 1992; Tase, 1994; Kim, 1981; Tasker, 1987; Sherman, 1994),

manipulate information via censorship/ self-censorship/regulations (Hara, 1992; Tase, 1994; Sherman, 1994; Kim, 1981; Hay, 1995; Hall, 1998 ), acting as a government spokesmen,(Hara, 1992; Tase, 1994; Otani, 1987; Maeda, 2000; Kim, 1981; van Wolferen, 1989), creating a myth of chaotic outside as compared with tranquil and harmonious Japan (Fukunaga, 1993; Ikuta, 1980; Sherman, 1994; Tasker, 1987), protecting the national interest(Hall, 1998; Kim, 1981; Sato, 1995b; Suzuki, 1993; Otani, 1987; Tomeki, 1984) and so forth.

The result of this as one journalist has said, is that it is difficult to know in Japan what is 'really happening'. Moreover, due to all these flaws, various researchers have claimed that the media's conscious or unconscious intention is a creation of a myth of a society living in peace and harmony, governed by the same long held and cherished traditional norms, discussed in the previous chapter (Hadfield, 1991; Nakasa, 1987; Sherman, 1994; Fukunaga, 1993; Cooper-Chen, 1995; CULCON, 1995; JIMPOREN 4, 1999; Jameson, 1997; Tasker, 1987: 148; Watanabe, 1996).

Needless to say, these representations are a departure from the Western expectations of a media in a democratic society (Gurevitch and Blumler, 2000)<sup>26</sup>. However, taking into account the cultural values described, these consequences should not be surprising. If harmony is the key word for describing the idealised situation, then, in the following, the writer will try to interpret the meaning of this harmony, through the socio-cultural context of the Japanese media.

### **2.6.2 How the aforementioned cultural values relate to the working of the Japanese Media?**

Starting with the smallest unit, the unit of the 'press-clubs'. Among the group members themselves, co-operation, information sharing, consultation, group decision-making, are deemed common sense and rewarding, and seen as for the ultimate good of the group. Decision-making process within the group functions as a crucial gate keeping since the group takes decision regarding which news, in what angle and how much of it will be further processed (Kato and Kiuchi, 1984; Hadfield, 1991; Freeman, 2000; Hall, 1998; van Wolferen, 1989; Kim, 1981). On the relations with their news source, the journalists and the source as well, aim to maintain harmony among themselves. Harmony (*wa*) within the club is maintained

---

<sup>26</sup> For further details on the expectations of a media in a democratic country, see Professional Roles and Ethics, section 2.3.2.

by the aforementioned common sense rules. The rules mean that on their part, the journalists (as juniors – *kohai*, as children – *ko*) should be deferent, obedient, devoted, loyal, indebted, interdependent, grateful and so forth, towards the news source. In practice it means, that club journalists will not write anything critical, offensive, damaging on their source (Brislin, 1997; Sherman, 1990; Kim, 1981; Sherman, 1994). Moreover, often they will adhere verbatim to what had been permitted by the source to be processed as news (Lloyd, 1996; Freeman, 2000: 77), to the extent that the news source suggests even headlines and sub-headlines (Freeman, 2000: 77). The news source, as a senior (*sempai*, a ‘parent’-*oya*) and consequently powerful figure, should, on his part, provide them with exclusive news/background briefing/ information. The source will talk solely to members of his club for a precise reason. The source knows that only members of ‘his’ club (*uchi*), feel indebtedness, and therefore, are trustworthy. In contrast, all other journalists are outsiders (*soto*), therefore, are deemed untrustworthy since they have no obligation (*giri*) towards him (for example van Wolferen, 1989; Freeman, 2000; Hara, 1992). This also explains the reason foreign correspondents in Japan find news-gathering extremely frustrating, since their access to news sources is indeed limited (for example Shukanasahi, 1975; Tase, 1994; Hall, 1998; van Wolferen, 1989; 1996).

To strengthen the reciprocal relations, and ensure the journalists indebtedness, the news source also provides the clubs with various amenities, and at times gifts and money as well (Freeman, 2000; Brislin, 1997; Yamazaki,;). Through these activities and other ones such as periodical coming- together events, group cohesion is strengthened, and the social rules of the group solidify. This stable, harmonious system is maintained in times of conflicts and outside-protocol situations, through various institutionalised mechanisms. For example, when human failing occurs in a sense that an act that is outside the prescribed protocol (*tatema*) takes place, it might be referred to as a human behaviour (related to *ninjo*, *honne*), which calls for tolerance and give-and-take (*yuzuriai*). In this case, members of the group give the support that is expected of them to that member of the group who needs it. In case of the news source’ failings, this dynamics can explain various cover-ups of corruption, slips of the tongue, and so on, which will not be reported by the trustful members of the club.

Another mechanism, previously mentioned, is concerned with solving problems through consultative decision-making (*nemawashi*). This is a widely used method in all sphere of life, where all the members of

a group are consulted, and a decision is reached by consensus following the *nemawashi*. Such a decision is abiding for all group members even if it is against one's wishes (*honne*). The success of the system is illustrated through an incident taken up by van Wolferen (1989). When in 1987, New York Mayor Ed Koch criticised Japan's policy toward Israel, none of the two hundred journalists present in the press conference, wrote about it (van Wolferen, 1989: 343; see also Freeman, 2000: 4-5). Failure to abide by decisions taken together by the group, will result in a severe punishment (See for example Freeman, 2000: 131). Both *nemawashi* and *yuzuriai* call for the employment of the art of 'gut reading' (*haragei*) mentioned earlier, or the non-verbal communication. Hence, one has to know what behaviour is expected of him without the need to use verbal communication.

Furthermore, 'gut reading' (*haragei*) seems to apply more widely to the general practice of Japanese journalists as it is expressed in content presentation and news style of the mainstream Japanese newspapers. Recalling the do's and do not's of *haragei*, where the do not list includes: do not debate/define yourself/ say no/justify yourself/ attract attention/ be direct/ ask why/explain why/be specific/show emotions/ seek identity/ be independent, and where the do's list includes: avoid answering no/ be extremely polite/explain situation without reasons/ use vague language/make your argument abstract and metaphysical/ keep the other person guessing etc (Matsumoto, 1989: 108-113), it is surprising to find how similar the rules of *haragei* are, to the practice of journalism in Japan. In much of the literature on Japanese journalism the complaints are similar and include, no by-lines (for example Carr, 1989; Abe et al., 1994; Kim, 1981), uniformity and conformism (for example Sherman, 1990; White, 1987; Kim, 1981), poor content (Watanabe, 1996; Freeman, 2000; Tase, 1994), unspecific (Jameson, 1997), shun confrontation (Freeman, 2000; Hall, 1998; Lloyd, 1996), etc, which is precisely what *haragei* is all about.

According to Geertz (2000), "Cultural analysis is (or should be) guessing at meaning, assessing the guesses, and drawing explanatory conclusions from the better guesses..." (Geertz, 2000: 20). Trying to explain the above, it seems that the journalists, who are involved in networks of relations (*uchi*: company/ club/news sources) and their associated obligations (*giri* and *on*), and who are in a secure and well paying workplace, practice the 'art of tight-rope walking', trying at all cost, to avoid any disruption to the harmony within their inner-group (*uchi*).

As for those who do not want to perform 'tight-rope walking', there is no choice. For as is often in Japan, when there is a conflict between one's own wishes and the group wishes, the group takes precedence over the individual, and the individual must show endurance (*gaman*) as well as a mature behaviour (of a *shakaijin*). Members who do not abide by the rules are considered immature and selfish (*wagamama*) as they disrupt the harmony of their group, and therefore should be punished for the violation or in extreme violation cases, ostracised altogether.

As for other units, like the TV, newspapers, media company etc, they are all in varying degrees similar. Therefore, though to varying degrees, this reoccurrence transpires in every level of the Japanese media, with the mainstream newspapers, as the most confined to such behaviour, due to their close association to news sources.

Consequently, if one visualises the mainstream Japanese media as a pyramid with five national newspapers at the top and other mainstream media in the country as belonging to a certain level in this pyramid through the affiliation system (*keiretsu*), then decisions taken at the top exert influence all the way to the bottom of the pyramid. Moreover, this mainstream media pyramid, can also be referred to as the inside (*uchi* = Japan), especially when confronting the outside (*soto* = foreign country/countries).

To summarise it all, the analogy of inside (*uchi*) and outside (*soto*), can describe relations from the micro, the smallest unit of the metaphorical 'home', the 'press-club', to the macro, the biggest unit of the figurative home, the entire pyramid of the Japanese media. It must be remembered though, that differing rules apply for the 'inside' and the 'outside'. While strict rules are applicable to the inner group, no defined rules whatsoever, are there for the out-group. When a media institution is classified as outside, or, in other words, the non-mainstream media, the prescribed protocol does not apply to it, be it a magazine, or at time foreign media/entity.

In the following, examples from the micro and macro levels will be referred to, in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of the system.

## 2.7 A few specific events

### 2.7.1 Micro instances

It is a common knowledge among Japanese media that most of the noteworthy scandals are never uncovered by journalists covering the culprits, as was already illustrated and explained before. Needless to say, revelation by the journalists would mean breaking the social rules, which is unacceptable, and/or punishable.

The following story concerning Sumitomo Corporation, is another illustration for the many scandals uncovered by outsiders. In the *Independent*' issue of the 24<sup>th</sup> June, 1996, the newspaper's journalist, Lloyd – Parry Richard, wrote about "A wall of silence on Sumitomo". In it, Lloyd – Parry (1996) writes the story of a trader in Sumitomo Copper, who concealed huge losses, somehow funded them, and consequently, somebody else benefited from his losses. The trader, Hamanaka Yasuo, had disappeared, and the *Independent*'s journalist wanted to find about the story details, through the Japanese media, since all governmental organisations and Sumitomo personnel said they know nothing. However, the Japanese media revealed nothing of substance. They wrote all kind of articles around the topic, though, nothing substantial to the investigation of the scandal, "they have been almost entirely passive". They avoided the story "...of the biggest loss of its kind, suffered by one of Japan's mightiest and best respected corporation". Knowing the working of the press-clubs, for Lloyd – Parry, the writer, "It is inconceivable that these men do not have idea of what is going on inside Sumitomo. But the role of the media in Japan is very different from that in the West, and nowhere is this seen more clearly than in business and financial coverage". The article, through a testimony by Japanese journalist, tells how news are distributed to journalists in the club, and how they must write exactly what they are told to write, if not, they are punished and /or must apologise. At the end of the article, the writer mentions another incident, with different consequence. When Daiwa bank suffered similar losses, the story was widely covered, because "...all the dodgy dealings were carried out entirely overseas, by a long-term Japanese expatriate who had made America his home", which

classified him in the outside sphere (*soto*). "...Hamanaka, by contrast, was at the heart of the Tokyo financial establishment, and operated out of one of the corporate citadels of Japan Inc", or in other words in the inside sphere (*uchi*), which Lloyd suspects might be the reason for the media's lethargy. Finally he write, "Either way, when and if the truth finally comes out, it will be in spite, not because of, Japan News Inc" (Lloyd, 1996).

### 2.7.2 Macro level instances

Nation-wide: Macro level instances, where the power of the media pyramid comes into the play, can be seen by the case of the total blackout on coverage regarding the crown prince search for bride, which was enforced throughout the Japanese media, but was eventually broken down by foreigners, 'unaware' of the rules of the game (Media Disagree Over merit of News Blackout, 1993; Freeman, 2000).

In the international arena, the implications of instances in the macro level have naturally wider implications. How does the media in the second largest economy in the world, covers for example countries which are deemed important, or in other words, it is in the national interest of Japan to have friendly relations with that country? What about factual and/or critical coverage of friendly countries? How does the national interest, in terms of interest of the inside (*uchi*), is being interpreted by the media?

The following example discusses coverage of China, which for a variety of reasons is deemed important, and therefore, positive coverage is indispensable. In the article *A Talk with China's Silenced Champion of Freedom*, the writer Philip Cunningham (1995) interviews a Tibetan political activist who has been imprisoned for many years for his activities. In the activist's comments about Japanese journalists, he says, "Japanese journalists can go there, but don't say anything. They just want to collect information. If you don't know what's going on that's one thing, but if you know something bad is going on and don't share that information, then in the eyes of the local people you become the bad guy" (Cunningham, 1995). Similar statements are echoed in other literature regarding China coverage, which normally avoids criticism, and on the whole is positive (For examples, see also Kato and Kiuchi, 1984; Sherman, 1994; van Wolferen, 1989; Kim, 1981). Quite similar to coverage of China, is the coverage of Arab countries. As van Wolferen (1989) writes that "Films which show Arab countries in a bad light are under no circumstances shown in Japan" (van Wolferen, 1989: 243).

Interpreting this coverage, it does seem that the obligation (*giri*) of the journalists is first of all to their country (*uchi*), an interpretation that lends credibility from assertions by a number of Japanese foreign correspondents<sup>27</sup>. Others see this practice as the sheer defence of the national interest (See for example Krauss and Budner, 1995; Hadfield, 1991; Kim, 1981). A meaningful example for the defence of the national interest during the apex of the U.S. – Japan trade friction, is brought up by Ikuta (1980). Ikuta tells the story of US-posted Japanese journalists who reveal the kind of news Tokyo office of a major newspaper, expected of them, “news that made Japan the victim. The desk does not want positive articles about the US” (Ikuta, 1980). As to the result of the negative reporting during the trade friction between Japan and the US, Budner (1995) writes “... that because of one-sided reporting, Japanese don't understand what the US wants from Japan, (Krauss and Budner, 1995)<sup>28</sup>”.

## 2.8 What role for the mainstream media ?

Taking the functionalist approach, one needs to ask what is the role of the media in Japan? How does it contribute to the overall working of the social system?

Various researches on the Japanese media and its role in society reveal a variety of interpretation as to the role of the media in Japanese society. For example, investigating electoral campaign in Japan and the U.S, Akuto (1996) found support for the media's role as 'spectator' (Akuto, 1996; see also Feldman, 1993), Westney (1996) who researched into mass media as business organisation, found the media's role as 'servant' of the state (Westney, 1996). Farley (1993) found evidence for the media as a 'guard dog' rather than 'watchdog' owing to the fact that they pursue “the criminal once his existence is revealed, but doing little to initially point attention to the wrong doer” (Farley, 1996). Pharr (1996) attempted to resolve conflicting interpretation of media behaviour by defining the media as 'trickster', since “the complex duality of the media's role which they serve the state and society simultaneously, but never in a predictable

---

<sup>27</sup> Details of the personal interviews conducted with Japanese foreign correspondents positioned in London, during 2000-2001, will be given in Chapter Four.

<sup>28</sup> The issue of international reporting will be discussed in more detail in the subsequent chapter.

fashion" (Pharr, 1996: 41). And Groth (1996), who analysed the political protest of the Bullet Train Movements, found some limited support for the media's role as a 'watchdog', but turned to the definition of trickster, to explain the media's behaviour (Groth, 1996).

Feldman (1993) who conducted numerous interviews, found support for journalists functioning in a variety of roles, all of which indicate to the role of participants in the political process. He found evidence for journalists functioning as PR for the political elite (Feldman, 1993: 145), as information source (Feldman, 1993: 164-5), as mediators among the various factions of the dominant ruling party (Feldman, 1993: 170), as go-between on behalf of the various Diet members, political parties, and party factions (Feldman, 1993: 181), and also as spies among the various faction (Feldman, 1993: 180). And on the whole, he sees Japanese journalists as participants in the political process of Japanese politics, and not just as "observer and chronicler" (Feldman, 1993: 205).

Finally, according to Freeman (2000), the mainstream Japanese media is 'co-conspirator', because it has been active collaborator with the system for reasons of mutual convenience. Freeman (2000) elaborates on this definition by stressing that the media benefits from its close ties with official news sources, and that the media and their sources collaborate to exclude others from enjoying the same benefits. When they do break the cartel's rules, it is when they believe it is to their advantage (Freeman, 2000). The result of the information cartel, according to her, is that the mainstream media function on the whole as speaker of the government (Freeman, 2000; van Wolferen, 1989), and as to its social function, Freeman (1996) says, it is "anything but market place of ideas" (Freeman, 1996; see also Freeman, 2000).

To sum it all up, the media seem to play various roles in Japanese society. While some of the literature puts the media more as an outsider of the elite, with the denotation of the media as 'spectator', 'guard-dog', and 'servant', others put the media on equal footing. Feldman (1993) depicts the media as 'participant', while Freeman (2000), as 'co-conspirator'.

To resolve this dilemma, a look at a number of indisputable aspects puts the mainstream Japanese media as part of the elite. Akhavan-Majid, (1990) compared the Japanese media environment with the Libertarian model, and consequently asserted that the media is part of the elite, and not an outside observer of the elite, a major difference with the Libertarian model (Akhavan-Majid, 1990). She asserts that the media is part of the elite through: 1) the concentration of ownership—as opposed to diversity and plurality of media units. 2)

the integration with other elite power group—as opposed to independence from the power elite, which is due to shared elitist background as well as integration through *amakudari*, *shingikai*, and *keiretsu*. 3) two-way flow of influence and control between the government and the press—as opposed to freedom of the press from government control (Akhavan-Majid, 1990: 1007-9 ; see also Cooper-Chen, 1997a; Cooper-Chen, 1997b: 27; Nakasa, 1987: 31; Sherman, 1990: 39).

In addition, a look at the 1994 survey affirms the validity of the thesis that the media is part of the elite. From the survey it became evident that the majority of the journalists thought their role as transmitters and interpreters, with the great majority who thought they did not function as ‘watchdog’ of government, the bureaucrats, and much less even the Big Businesses. Moreover, by publishing without necessarily checking, verifying, or, confirming institutional, business, and governmental reports, they possibly show allegiance, trust, and loyalty to the elite rather than responsibility towards the public. That the journalists feel part of the elite, was evident from their responses regarding ethics, where they put priority on values such as loyalty and trust relations, considerably higher, than the ‘public’s right to know’. The values of trust and loyalty, are values that reflect relations within the inner group, as was extensively discussed in chapter one. The denotation of the media as ‘participant’, as well as ‘co-conspirator’, therefore, may well fit into this portrait of the Japanese media.

## 2.9 Conclusions

From the discussions of this chapter, a few conclusions can be drawn with respect to the mainstream Japanese media. From the characteristics and scope of the mainstream Japanese media, its omnipresence and its enormous potential to play a major role in Japanese society become evident.

From the organisational level, and media routines level of analysis, it is obvious that the Japanese media is in numerous ways disparate from media in the Western democratic system. The variance becomes apparent through the inquiry into recruitment and career patterns, professional roles and ethics, internal organisation, as well as news-gathering activities centred on the ‘press-clubs’.

Most of these disparities can be attributed, one way or another, to the context of Japanese society, which by itself, is again at great variance from the contexts of comparable Western democracies.

Another interesting and possibly unique aspect of the Japanese media is the role played by its outsiders, the magazines and the foreign correspondents. Both of these outsiders exert 'external pressure' on the Japanese media, thus forcing it to confront issues it would otherwise avoid.

As to the legal, political, and economic constraints, while the legal environment can be assumed to be a free one, political as well as economic constraints do exist, and indeed exert control on context.

Taking the functionalist approach, and embedded in the Japanese context, an interpretation of the mainstream Japanese media's practice was carried out. Through this interpretation, the many consequences of the Japanese media were elucidated.

As to the dilemma concerning the role of the mainstream media in Japanese society, grounded on varied sources, most importantly the journalists themselves, the media do seem to be part of the elite, possibly as 'co-conspirators', and 'participants', and as such, the media act as part of the 'state', as in Gramsci's 'hegemony theory' (Holborn and Haralambos, 2000: 615). In this view, the media serves to keep the hegemony of the ruling elite by taking part in "the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to maintain the active consent of those over whom it rules" (Holborn and Haralambos, 2000: 615). However, while in the West, according to Hallin's interpretation of Gramsci, the 'hegemony theory' is not static as Chomski and Herman's "propaganda model" is, but "something to be contested" (Hallin, 1994: 12-13), in Japan where the "hegemony" of the ruling elite has grown organically from its contexts, the contest still remains to be seen.

And finally, due to all the evidence presented in this chapter, it does seem necessary to take a fresh approach to analyse the Japanese media. This approach must take into consideration the ways and extent of the effects of contexts on the workings of the Japanese media. An appropriate theory for the Japanese media might also help in understanding other Asian media, which seem to be closer to the Japanese, rather than to the Western media (on the western media, see for example Gurevitch and Blumler, 2000; Shoemaker and Reese, 1996; and on a comparative view see for example Brislin, 1997; Massey and Chang, 2000).

## **CHAPTER THREE: JAPANESE MAINSTREAM MEDIA AND INTERNATIONAL NEWS REPORTING**

### 3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter discussed and examined the various levels of influences on media content starting from the individual level of inquiry through to extra-media level of examination of influences on content, while the present chapter aims at exploring further extra-media influences on media content. More specifically, it is the objective of this chapter to examine and highlight crucial extra-media factors that exert particular influences on the shaping of international news reporting in general, and on the Japanese mainstream media in particular.

It must be kept in mind however that since the aim of the present thesis is to investigate and analyse the Japanese mainstream newspapers' coverage of the Middle East, and specifically their coverage of Israel, it is not a matter of factors affecting international news in general, but a case of foreign policy's influences on international news reporting. As will be elaborated in the forthcoming chapter; 'Japan's Relations with the Middle East', it is evident that the Middle East is considered an intensely important region for Japan.

While an inquiry into the specific influence of Japan's relations with the countries of the Middle East on the Japanese main stream media's coverage of Israel is the object of the research itself and will follow subsequently, an overview of existing literature on foreign policy's influences on news coverage will assist in assessing the potential qualities of the influences of foreign policies as the means of advancing national interests, on the media's coverage of international news. Following the examination of this body of research, a survey of existing research on the Japanese media's international reporting in general, and on specific countries in particular, will be reviewed. Examining existing research on the Japanese media's foreign news reporting will give some clues as to similarities and variances between Japanese and Western media regarding international news in general and influences of foreign policy on reporting in particular. Moreover, by highlighting the nature and characteristics of foreign policy influences on the Japanese media's international reporting, two complementing aims will be achieved. First, foreign policy related sources of influences on Japanese foreign news reporting will be identified. Second, once identified, these sources will contribute to a comprehensive view regarding factors shaping Japanese foreign news reporting, i.e., supplementing the findings of the previous chapter to establish a newer approach.

## **3.2 Foreign policy and International news coverage**

### **3.2.1 Literature Overview**

What type of international news is relevant to the present inquiry? The type of international news that is appropriate to the current research is any news involving another country with whom the news - producing country has some kind of interaction, be it diplomatic, economic, political, or all of them together, or conversely, competitive and/or antagonistic relations. In sum, it can be said that this international news is context-oriented (Cho and Lacy, 2000: 832). Through this conceptualisation all news stories that are about countries with whom the news - producing country has no relations whatsoever, are excluded from the present discussion. Needless to say, an idea as to the types and extent of the relations between any two countries is crucial in order to comprehend and assess the interaction between foreign policies and international news coverage.

Much of the existing research on this subject can be divided into two main groups, with each one in turn divided into further two subgroups. One group explores news coverage of countries with whom the news - producing country has some kind of discourse, be it positive co - operation, or conversely, adversarial, while the other group of research deals with the coverage of the 'other' v. 'us' during crisis time. Much of the research however falls into the latter group. Within each of these bodies of research, there is a further division into research that found coverage to be in accord with the nation's foreign policy, and research that finds no such influence and, in contrast, reflects independent and objective reporting.

For example, in the following three case studies, which analysed news coverage of other countries in non-crisis times, the researchers found that the coverage reflected and was in concord with the foreign policy of the country in question: in these cases, the U.S.

In research into the influence of Carter's initiative regarding human rights in Central and South America, and its influence on foreign news, Cassara (1998) found that due to the Carter initiative, news coverage of the region had quantitatively and qualitatively changed, and was in tune with Carter's initiative. More emphasis was put on human rights, not only with regards Central and South America, but also in general (Cassara, 1998: 161-175). In an analysis of elite U.S. newspapers' editorial coverage of

“Surviving Communist Countries in the Post-Cold War Era”, Grosswiler (1998), who compared editorials on Cuba, Vietnam, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, found the following: 1. “The media focus on areas that reflect U.S. foreign policy such as Cuba and Vietnam, while ignoring countries with little foreign policy interest, such as Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Mozambique” (Grosswiler, 1998: 2008). 2. The U.S. media supports foreign policy where the U.S. has one (1), but criticises when policy fails, such as U.S. failure “to bring down the Cuban government” (Grosswiler, 1998: 208). 3. “The levels of condensational symbols and referential symbols in the 1990s editorial coverage of Cuba and Vietnam would imply that the media are following U.S. policy even as their editorials criticise it” (Grosswiler, 1998: 208). 4. Regarding Africa, “The media images of Africa, by virtue of their absence, also indicate an adherence to U.S. foreign policy, turning away from a region that is under-covered and that is falling even farther from view as the Cold War recedes” (Grosswiler, 1998: 209). Finally, Dorman and Fahrang (1987) found in their analysis of the coverage of Iranian affairs up to the revolution that the media supported the position of the U.S. However, they stated that the media’s support of U.S. foreign policy was due to lack of choice since the American media “was incapable of understanding the political culture in Iran”. As a result, the poor reporting “contributed to the surprise of the Iranian revolution in the West” (Dorman and Fahrang, 1987, p.204 as cited in Malek and Wigand, 1998: 11). The failure to report the developments in Iran, was attributed by the researchers to ideological and ethnocentric reasons rather than economic, or political reasons” (Dorman and Fahrang, 1987, p. 204 as cited in Malek and Wigand, 1998: 11).

One illuminating example of reporting during crisis is the coverage of the Gulf War by seven different countries; the U.S., U.K., Germany, Chile, Malaysia, India, and Jordan. Each of these countries had its own unique relations to the war, and each of them presented the war in a different way. The U.S. and U.K., were directly involved in the war; Germany minimally involved; and the other three countries not directly involved, though Jordan is Iraq’s neighbour and is also a fellow Arab country. The findings of the research showed that both the U.K.’s BBC and the U.S.’s CBS, were supportive of the coalition army in its war against Iraq (Carrier, 1998: 181-183), and on the whole, Carrier (1998), concludes that “national broadcasts do, to some extent, reflect national policies, cultures, and institutional interests in news about the Gulf War” (Carrier, 1998: 193). Another research that dealt with coverage during the Gulf War, analysed coverage of dissent. When U.S. and Canadian media’s coverage of the dissent within the U.S. regarding the

Gulf War were compared, it became evident that the Canadian press “paid more respectful attention to antiwar dissent” when compared with the American press coverage (Hackett, 1998: 145). Moreover, although due to their journalistic ethos, U.S. journalists did cover the internal dissent, the movement “was put on the defensive” (Hackett, 1998: 151). In this case, the discrepancies in the coverage were attributed to the extent of involvement of each country in the crisis, the global position of each, and also to internal disagreement in Canada (Hackett, 1998: 149). The final example in this section is of the Canadian national press’s crisis coverage. In a study of the Canadian press coverage of the “Near-Genocide in Occupied East Timor 1975-1980” it was found that the coverage of Canada’s national paper, *The Globe and Mail*, “reflected the interrelations of state and corporate capitalism” and that “the national economic interests undermined the reporting” (Klaehn, 2002: 315). This coverage systematically “diverted public attention away” from important consideration, failed to report what was going on despite being in the scene and seeing the situation, and on the whole “failed in its public responsibility to provide adequate news coverage” (Klaehn, 2002: 311-315).

In addition to these case studies, there are numerous other researches that provide evidence supporting the thesis that in times of crisis, the media supports the establishment’s foreign policy, whether by consent, or coercion (for example Hallin, 1994; Malek, 1998; Mollenkott and Brendlinger, 1996; Iyenagar and Simon, 1993).

The other group of research is one that refutes the theory of foreign policy influences on foreign news coverage and displays independent and objective journalism. Li (1999), who analysed U.S. – China coverage of each other between 1987-1996, found for example that his hypotheses regarding the influences of national interests on reporting were not supported by his findings. As such, “trade and non-trade issues were weak predictors of news content” (Li, 1999 ). U.S. ’s media’s coverage of Japan, even during the highest tensions of the 80s due to trade frictions between the two countries, also reflected a relatively neutral coverage of Japan (Cooper-Chen, 1999). Finally, Becker (1977) found that *The New York Times* not only did not support the government position on the Indian-Pakistani War of 1971, but in fact moved in “a direction opposite that of the leaders in Washington” (Becker, 1977 ). Thus, these examples represent media functioning independently from the foreign policy of the country, as is expected of it in the liberal-democratic countries of the West.

However, few researchers find evidence for independent journalism in times of crisis. One such research is concerned with coverage during the Libya-U.S. conflict in 1986. Hertog (2000), unexpectedly found that “The elite press provided a significant critique of the U.S. administration...during periods of intense conflict with Libya”. He attributed this coverage to the “influence of professional journalistic values” (Hertog, 2000). Another study, though not a case of international reporting, lends support to this body of inquiry is a case of press independent stance despite formidable internal crisis. This inquiry is a recent analysis of editorial positions on the issue of “National Security v. Civil Liberties” (Moro, 2002). The case focused on editorial coverage of a new U.S. law, the Patriot Act, that is “a new anti-terrorism law...(which) was the most important federal response to prosecute perpetrators of the September 11 attacks and to preempt future attacks” (Moro, 2002). Despite the horrific attack, the large number of casualties and the ensuing and ongoing sense of threat and insecurity, a majority of 80% of the editorials supported civil liberties rather than national security. The findings repudiate one major hypothesis, that in a conflict between civil liberties and national security, a majority of the newspapers will support national security (Moro, 2002).

### **3.2.2 Theorising on News Media and Foreign Policy Relations**

Following this small sample, there remains the question of how can such varied and contradictory evidence exist, in the face of the Western journalistic norms which are supposed to embody the democratic-Libertarian model?

One of the first attempts to reconcile these contradictions and tackle the complexities of the relationships between the news media and foreign policy was Cohen’s groundbreaking research on *The Press and Foreign Policy* (Cohen, 1993). Cohen (1993) summarizes the three major roles for the press in foreign policy as observer, participant, and catalyst (Cohen, 1993: 4). With respect to the press role as observer, Cohen (1993) enumerates the role of informer, interpreter, and the press as instrument of government - by reporting “obvious news” (Cohen, 1993: 23-30). The press as participant encompasses another set of roles, including “the press as representative of the public, the press as critic of government and the press as advocate of policy (Cohen, 1993: 31-36). Lastly, the press as a catalyst places it in a position of policy maker (Cohen, 1993: 39).

Following Cohen's exploration, numerous other researchers have tried to resolve this complex issue. Hackett (1998), for example, presents "three conventional perspectives on the relationship between the press and foreign policy" (Hackett, 1998: 141). The first is the dominant position, the liberal – pluralism view, which "sees the media as an independent institution fulfilling important functions" (Hackett, 1998: 141-142). In this perspective the media moves from opposition to cooperation, depending on the situation, and in times of crisis, the media supports the government (Hackett, 1998: 142). The second perspective, "a politically influential conservative variant of this conventional pluralist view, sees the news media as not just independent, but as power - seeking institutions populated by left-liberal journalists who are hostile to business and authority" (Hackett, 1998: 142), as was exemplified by the criticism towards the media for helping Saddam Hussein's war propaganda during the Gulf War (Hackett, 1998: 142). The third view belongs to "a radical school in media theory", which regards the media as "indirectly but systematically subordinate to capital and the state" (Hackett, 1998: 142). This "radical critique, namely the 'propaganda model' (is) advanced by Herman and Chomsky" (Hackett, 1998: 142). According to Herman and Chomski (1988), news is "shaped by the following five 'filters': concentrated, corporate, profit-oriented ownership; dependence on advertising revenue; media reliance on information sources employed, funded, or sanctioned by government and business; right-wing pressure campaigns against the media; and finally, the ideological control mechanism of anti-communism" (Herman and Chomski, 1988, Ch. I., as cited by Hackett, 1998: 142). As a result of these filters the "dominant media act virtually as extensions of state propaganda, framing, emphasising or ignoring events in accordance with elite interests" (Hackett, 1998). And the media will offer varied debate over foreign policy "only when elites are themselves divided" (Hackett, 1998: 143).

Hallin (1994), who rejects the 'Propaganda model' since it is "flat and static" (Hallin, 1994: 11), states that he considers Gramsci's 'hegemony' model for the media as "valid and essential" (Hallin, 1994: 12). He further explains:

the behaviour of the media is closely tied to the degree of consensus among political elites: when consensus is strong, the media play a relatively passive role and generally reinforce official power to manage public opinion. When political elites are divided, on the other hand, the media become more active, more diverse in the point of view they represent, and more difficult to manage (Hallin, 1994: 11).

This thesis regarding media behaviour is supported by a “good deal of subsequent research” (Hallin, 1994: 11). As to those who reject the ‘hegemony’ model, Hallin (1994) poses the question “Is it really plausible, after all that, that major cultural institutions would not be so closely tied to the structure of power?” (Hallin, 1994: 12)

Rivenburgh (1998) approached the media – foreign policy relations from a somewhat different angle, the view that social identification has consequential influences on foreign news coverage. She wrote that “the collective identity as a cognitive process... may be an important influence on the construction of the external world through media content” (Rivenburgh, 1998: 79). She enumerates three approaches to understanding media coverage of foreign affairs. One is an approach that focuses on the social organization of news work. Another, a more critical view, “links the institutions of media and government to their governing political and economic ideologies – and thus to each other, to explain media coverage of government foreign policy activities” (Rivenburgh, 1998: 82). The third approach, which Rivenburgh (1998) attaches particular importance, is one “which considers media content and its makers as inextricably linked to dominant cultural discourses, symbols, myths, and values” (Rivenburgh, 1998: 82).

Finally, Malek and Weigand (1998), who attempted to integrate these relations into a coherent framework, highlighted in turn three major perspectives of media influences. The first is the active perspective where the media is active participant and watchdog. The second is the passive perspective where the media “structurally serve as an instrument in the actual implementation of foreign policy” (Malek and Wigand, 1998: 5). The media in this view tends to support the elite class and existing political initiatives and show deference to authorities (Malek and Wigand, 1998: 6). The third standpoint, supported by most scholars, is the view of neutral relations (Malek and Wigand, 1998: 6). According to Malek and Weigand (1998) “these writers, to one degree or another, argue that neither the media nor the government are as manipulative as extreme positions suggest, nor do they work together to manipulate public opinion” (Malek and Wigand, 1998: 6). Needless to say, there is ample support for each point of view (Malek and Wigand, 1998: 4-6).

However, despite a comprehensive attempt and a large body of research at their disposal, Malek and Weigand (1998) came to the conclusion that due to the complexity of the relations between the foreign policy and the news media, they could not reach and construct a single sufficient view that will encompass

these complicated relations, and at the end, they seemed to come accept Batcha (1975)'s view on these relationships that:

the role of the media whether watchdog, critic, upholder of status quo, fourth branch, or people representative is as much, if not more, the result of the actual role conceptions of the participants in the press corps as it is of our philosophical and political traditions that attempt to prescribe what its role should be. This debate has never been settled (Batcha, R.M. 1975, p.61, as cited by Malek and Wigand, 1998: 21).

This view endorses the approach that the media – foreign policy relations is very much a product of a society and its context. However, regardless of the nature and quality of these relations, the crucial influence of the outcome of these relations on consumers of media is consequential. Inasmuch as for consumers of media, news is “like the beam of a search light that moves restlessly about, bringing one episode and another out of the darkness” (Lippman, Public Opinion, 1922, p.275, as cited in Cohen, 1993: 99-100). Furthermore, the resultant ‘pictures in their heads’ is to a large extent, distorted, as was delineated distinctly by Cohen (1993:

the really effective political map of the world - that is to say, their *operational* map of the world - is drawn by the reporter and the editor, not by the cartographer...and if we do not see a story in the newspapers (or catch it on radio or television), it effectively has not happened so far as we are concerned...This is to say, then, that the press is significantly more than a purveyor of information and opinion. It may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think *about* (Cohen, 1993: 13, italics in the original text).

### **3.3 The Japanese Mainstream Media and International News Reporting**

#### **3.3.1 Introduction**

What about the Japanese media? How does the mainstream media act in relations to Japan's foreign policy? While the idiosyncrasies of the Japanese media and its journalists have been already introduced in Chapter Two, in the following, research regarding the Japanese media's international reporting will be reviewed. A number of these pieces of research point to the paramount importance of culture and nationality as factors influencing and/or shaping the Japanese media's international reporting (for example Horvit, 1997; Brislin, 1997; Krauss and Budner, 1995). Moreover, as will be seen below, numerous journalists and Japan experts point to the national interest as a major factor influencing reporting in general,

and international news in particular. The extent to which the national interest is influencing Japan's relations with other countries, and consequently, plausibly, the Japanese media's international reporting was eloquently epitomised by Wakasugi Kazuo, a former minister of International Trade and Industry. He said: "If the U.S. and Europe do not trade with Japan, there would be no benefit for Japan to remain a member of free world. If that happens, we could probably join the Communist block" (Wakasugi as quoted by Shibusawa, 1984, and cited by Lee and Yang, 1995: 6). Thus, with this in mind, prior to the introduction of case studies on the Japanese mainstream media's coverage of international news, a brief conceptualisation of the national interest is due. Subsequently, additional sources of influences on the Japanese media's international reporting are introduced to provide a more comprehensive view as to the variety of factors contributing to and/or interfering with the shaping of international news in the mainstream Japanese media.

### **3.3.2 The Japanese Media and International Reporting**

Massey and Chang (2000), who inquired into Asian journalism, analysed international news in 10 Asian countries, including Japan (Massey and Chang, 2000). In their findings, the researchers found surprisingly that apparent Asian values such as harmony as opposed to conflict, and supportiveness of government as opposed to adversarial relations in the West, were applied locally, but not globally. They write:

For one, there was a strong ethnocentric orientation to the journalistic application of Asian values. Asian journalists embedded Asian values into their stories most often when they reported on home-country citizens, yet they tended to be more Western-like when covering foreigners and foreign events. The least conflictive and least critical Asian-source stories generally were those that may have held the highest relevance to home-country readers: local news or news of local citizens engaged in activities abroad. In this sense, Asian values may be situational values for Asian journalists, applied locally but not globally (Massey and Chang, 2000).

Brislin (1997) who investigated journalism ethics in Japan, China, and Korea found that in various ways they are different from Western media. He concluded as follows:

A survey of journalistic practices in Asia that reflect two fundamental journalism principles of truth-telling and independence shows a wide range of interpretation of the role, status and relationship of the journalist with government, and a structure of journalism, firmly rooted in cultural values. The differences between those roles, relationship and structures and their counterparts in Western, particularly American, styles of journalism are important to note when analysing press reports from Asian countries...(Brislin, 1997: 7).

In sum, Brislin (1997) 's research points to the fact that journalism in Asia is perceived differently from the way it is perceived in the West and is deeply rooted in culture, while Massey and Chang's findings, indicate that journalistic values in Asia are applied in an ethnocentric, dichotomous manner, with Asian values applied locally and Western journalistic values applied globally.

In what ways are these findings applicable to Japan *per se*? Sherman (1994), an American journalist who worked for NHK television, affirmed with numerous examples the large disparity in the way American and Japanese journalists see their role in society, which makes working together nearly impossible (Sherman, 1994). One of the issues that frequently caused friction was news selections, in terms of news-values (Sherman, 1994).

What are the values by which Japanese journalists select international news? On the whole, the Japanese media pay relatively little attention to international news when compared with other countries (Cooper-Chen, 1992, 1995; Miller, 1994). In addition, Cooper-Chen (1995) found in a five-country analysis of gate-keeping that, though Japan did not share "the world view of other developed countries" regarding the most prominent international news of the day (Cooper-Chen, 1995), one of the parameters for the inclusion of international news was violence (Cooper-Chen, 1992, 1995). The selection of violent foreign news is not extraordinary by itself, but it is for the Japanese media, since domestic news is characterised by non-violence, non-conflict reporting, presenting to the Japanese audience, according to some observers, a false myth of tranquil and harmonious Japan and giving a false sense of security (Fukunaga, 1993; Ikuta, 1980; Sherman, 1994; Tasker, 1987; Miller, 1994). Compare for example, the coverage of the following two incidents: the riots in Washington in 1973, and the Kobe earthquake of 1995. Komatsubara (1973) writes: "Those Japanese readers who read the Japanese newspapers reporting on the riot in Washington had the impression as if the whole city was inflamed by the mobs" (Komatsubara, 1973, as cited by Ikuta, 1980: 63) . In contrast, the coverage by the Japanese media of the Kobe earthquake was characterised as emphasising "harmony rather than discord", showing mainly not the vast destruction, but buildings intact (CULCON, 1995), and presenting a message that everything was under control (Reid, 1995).

This picture of events was in contrast to the Western media , which focused their coverage on the massive destruction in Kobe, and also severely criticised the inaptitude of the Japanese government in handling the crisis (Reid, 1995). The fact that nothing was under control was reconfirmed by the former

BBC correspondent, David Powers. He said: "I called from London to Hyogo Police, however, I was told that everything was under control. Soon after, I got a call from the BBC correspondent who was on the spot. He said it was not true. He said that there was total management crisis" (Powers, 2001)<sup>29</sup>.

Thus, this news selection confirms Massey and Chang (2000)'s findings of the dichotomous treatment of local versus global news. It also reasserts once more the prevalence of the Japanese dichotomous cultural value of the safe and harmonious inside (*uchi*), as contrasted with the violent and chaotic outside (*soto*), as discussed in Chapter One.

Can news selection that presents the inside (*uchi*) as safe and harmonious and the outside (*soto*) as chaotic and violent, be part of the national interest? It is conceivable that that is the case. An American journalist working in Japan said: "In the absence of prodding by overseas publication, the Japanese press will usually decide what is or is not news by reference to the 'national interest' rather than to the 'public's right to know',...In this sense, little has changed since the days of press censorship during the war" (Hadfield, 1991). This view was echoed by a *Yomiuri* journalist, who said: "In America a reporter thinks first about the story. But in Japan, if someone is covering political issues for a long time, he thinks first about the national interest, second about his company, and third about his job as a reporter" (Sherman, 1990). Thus, in this sense criticising the government, or covering the destruction of Kobe was not in the national interest, while covering the harmony, was. Similarly, magnifying the riots in Washington, or in other words, presenting the U.S. in a negative light, was in accord with the national interest. An additional or alternative explanation is that the media applied cultural values domestically, but not globally, as Massey and Chang indicated (Massey and Chang, 2000).

Countless journalists, academics and Japan experts from various fields, contend that the Japanese media attach great importance to the national interest when reporting news, both domestic and international (see for example Krauss and Budner, 1995; Hadfield, 1991; Sherman, 1990; Miller, 1994; Ikuta, 1980; van Wolferen, 1989; Hall, 1998; Lloyd, 1996; Feldman, 1993; Johnson, 1995; Clausen, 2001; Kim, 1981; Sato, 1995b; Prestowitz, 1988; Otani, 1987; Tomeki, 1984). Before the introduction of case studies analysing the influence of foreign policies as dictated by the national interest on international news takes place, a conceptualisation on the meaning of national interest is indispensable.

---

<sup>29</sup> Personal interview with David Powers on 16<sup>th</sup> November, 2001, London.

## ***The National Interest***

In his book *Diplomacy*, Kissinger (1995) writes about the 1865 definition of the national interest by Palmerston, a former British Prime Minister, quoting him as follows: “ ‘When people ask me ...for what is called a policy, the only answer is that we mean to do what may seem to be the best, upon each occasion as it arises, making the interests of Our Country one's guiding principle” (Kissinger, 1995: 95). Half a century later, a similar definition was used by the Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, who stated: “British Foreign Ministers have been guided by what seemed to them to be the immediate interest of this country, without making elaborate calculation for the future” (Kissinger, 1995: 95-96). In the U.S. up to President Nixon, “Americans have never been comfortable acknowledging openly their own selfish interests. Whether fighting world wars or local conflicts, American leaders always claimed to be struggling in the name of principle, not interest” (Kissinger, 1995: 810). However, “Nixon was the first president...to conduct American foreign policy largely in the name of national interest” (Kissinger, 1995: 731). On the whole, Kissinger contends that American leadership is “not as comfortable with the concept of national interest as those of, say, Great Britain, France, or China” (Kissinger, 1995: 731).

Hanai (1976), a professor at Kyoto Industrial University, discussed the Japanese view of national interest at length. Touching on the sensitivity and near taboo in Japan on discussing openly the national interest, he starts by saying: “There is nothing to be afraid of in defining the national interest” (Hanai, 1976: 93-94). While in the discussion, Hanai (1976) accepts a definition of the national interest that is in accord with Palmerston and Grey (Kissinger, 1995: 95-96), but goes further. He sees three levels of national interest. The first level is the level of “most important values and benefit” (Hanai, 1976: 98). Within this level, Hanai (1976) includes all that is related to the survival of the country, including defense of the land, defence of the people, property and the defense of the independence of the country. These are the minimum condition for this level (Hanai, 1976: 98). The second type of national interest encompasses medium level values and benefits. In this level there are three types of values and benefits. One is the development of economic and social welfare of our country: “ Through international mutual dependence, our country manages its economic development and its social welfare. For Japan, the most important are markets, natural resources and trade routes” (Hanai, 1976: 98). Another is the objective to increase the

country's honour/prestige (Hanai, 1976: 100). The third type of values relates to the country's expansion. Hanai (1976) contrasts present day "neo-colonialism" with pre - WWII territorial expansion. For him, the present Japanese trade strategies towards Korea, Thailand and other countries, represent this type of expansion (Hanai, 1976: 102). He advocates Japan's strategies, while strengthening his argument by reiterating Japanese theories of uniqueness discussed in Chapter One.

"Looking at Japan's unique character, we must choose interdependence to achieve our country's economic development and social welfare...since (we) are in a unique position that there are no resources, (hence) only through dependence on international markets we can achieve our most important objectives (Hanai, 1976: 102, brackets added). As to the third level of national interest, "it is about long-term universal values and benefits-objectives" (Hanai, 1976: 104). These objectives can be called "dreams" or "visions" and are related to the global society. Within this level, Japan's long-term objectives are related to the world's stability, welfare and peace (Hanai, 1976: 104). However, different interpretations for these universal objectives and contradictions cause clashes between countries (Hanai, 1976: 104).

### ***Literature Overview: Case Studies of National Interest influences on Reporting***

Much of the literature discussing the Japanese media's international reporting focuses on its reporting on the U.S. This is due to the fact that both countries are the two global economic superpowers, with the U.S. first, and Japan second in the world. It is also due to the importance of U.S. to Japan as its largest market. Numerous trade disputes arose since the 1970s between the two countries, which consequently influenced the reporting. In 1987, Atwood (1987) found that, in reporting on each other, the U.S. and the Japanese media "Rather than enhancing international understanding...(were more)...likely to drive wedges between the people of different nations as the press prints its own version of reality" (Atwood, 1987: 86). More than a decade later, Inoue (1999) found evidence that reporting on the U.S. has not changed much (Inoue, 1999). He writes: "The data suggests that the more one watches news programs the less one likes the U.S". He adds in his conclusion that "perhaps Japanese television news provokes viewers' nationalistic and chauvinistic attitudes" (Inoue, 1999; for similar views see also Takenaka, 1991; Suzuki, 1993; Tase, 1994; Uchikawa and Arai, 1991).

Case studies which delineate reporting on the trade friction specifically, found the following. Sato (1995) found that, in its reporting on the trade issues with the U.S., the Japanese media's propensity for its government position in a "mono-perspective", causes a severe problem of "biased reporting" (Sato, 1995b; see also Takenaka, 1991; Suzuki, 1993; Tase, 1994; Uchikawa and Arai, 1991). In addition, he writes, that such reporting "tend to portray Japan as poor victim of U.S. pressure" (Sato, 1995b). In the same year, Krauss and Budner (1995) came to similar findings. In the paper *Newspaper Coverage of U.S.—Japan Frictions*, they found that, while most of the time the press was neutral, when it was not, "the press in both countries was more likely to blame the U.S. than Japan" (Krauss and Budner, 1995: 345). In other words, the Japanese press "appear to be reflecting some allegiance to their nation's position, but American coverage appeared just the opposite...while American coverage tended to portray the U.S. as the one at fault, Japanese coverage did so even more strongly" (Krauss and Budner, 1995: 345). Trying to explain the Japanese reporting, and despite obvious reluctance (Krauss, 2001)<sup>30</sup>, the writers touched the issue of 'Different Cultures, Different Realities' (Krauss and Budner, 1995: 352-353). The issue of culture, they write, is crucial, "especially in light of our findings" (Krauss and Budner, 1995: 353). These findings include: 1. Lack of sensitivity to others, in this case, the U.S. 2. Strong emphasis on 'Japan bashing' possibly reflecting the "oft-noted national penchant of the Japanese to see themselves as victims" (Krauss and Budner, 1995: 353). 3. The large extent of uniformity in the "extent and structure of Japanese coverage" (Krauss and Budner, 1995: 353).

Krauss and Budner (1995) also mention briefly two incidents that occurred during the course of their research, which reflected further disparities between the Japanese and the Americans. As a collaborative effort with Japanese researchers and journalists, they write: "Even definition of research norms can be affected by cultural differences" (Krauss and Budner, 1995: 353). As to the role of journalists regarding the Gulf War, a dispute arose between Americans and Japanese journalists, where "the Americans argued that journalists must adopt adversarial stance vis-à-vis their government, a point of view rejected by the Japanese" (Krauss and Budner, 1995: 353). Krauss and Budner (1995) explained: "It may also reflect differences in beliefs correlated with nationality" (Krauss and Budner, 1995: 353).

---

<sup>30</sup> Personal interview with Professor Krauss, Warwick University, October 1, 2001.

All in all, it seems that negative reporting on the U.S., is not uncommon. Moreover, Japanese reporting on the U.S. reveals additional dimensions. While the reporting conveys a one - sided view in accord with its government's national interests, in the case of US—Japan's relations, the reporting seems to be inevitably accompanied by two additional aspects. Concurrently with transmitting its government position, the Japanese media also portrays Japan as a victim as well as showing neither sensitivity nor consideration to U.S. feelings. The result is, that the Japanese people do not understand “what the U.S. wants from Japan” (Krauss and Budner, 1995: 355).

So far, four main characteristics of the Japanese media's international reporting, particularly on the U.S., have been introduced. They all seem to be connected with the national interest: 1. The peaceful and harmonious inside contrasted by the violent and chaotic outside. 2. Reporting in accord with government's foreign policy. 3. While doing that presenting Japan as the victim. 4. Showing no sensitivity towards other nations. While the first characteristic has been discussed, what about the other three? Are they unique to reporting on the U.S.—Japan trade friction, or, are they more prevalent?

Reporting in accord with the national interest captures the majority of research on the Japanese media's international reporting. In these case studies, negative and positive reporting is in harmony with the national interest. For example, in *Comparing U.S. and Japanese Coverage of a Chinese Movement*, Lee and Yang (1995) write, with regards to Japan—China relations, that “Japan had little desire to enrage the Chinese rulers”. Consequently, following the Tiananmen crackdown “Japan was the last among the industrial democracies to impose economic sanctions, and was first to lift them” (Lee and Yang, 1995: 7). In their conclusion, they write that both the American and Japanese reporting were affected and shaped by their national interests. For the U.S., the reporting was “consistent with U.S. ideological interests in China, whereas its economic interests assumed secondary importance” (Lee and Yang, 1995: 14). For Japan however, “in contrast to U.S. ideological interests...Japan's paramount concern – globally or in China – is economic” (Lee and Yang, 1995: 6). News coverage reflected a strikingly closer position to the Chinese government (Lee and Yang, 1995: 12-15). Japanese media's favourable coverage of China, achieved by highlighting only the positive while omitting negative news, has been already noted by a large number of commentators and researchers (see for example Otani, 1987; Kato and Kiuchi, 1984; Uchikawa and Arai, 1991; Johnson, 1995; Lee and Yang, 1995; Clausen, 2001 ; Kim, 1981; van Wolferen, 1989; Jameson,

1997). As to other countries' coverage, van Wolferen (1989) writes that, negative reporting on Arab countries is "unthinkable" (van Wolferen, 1989: 343). When Ed Koch, the Mayor of New York, criticised Japan's adherence to the Arab Boycott in a press conference not one of the present 200 Japanese journalists reported on the incident (Willy Stern, Tokyo Business Today, November 1987, pp. 26-28, as cited by van Wolferen, 1989: 343). This is in sharp contrast to the general reporting on the U.S., where every small news item about Japan becomes news in the Japanese media (Ikuta, 1980: 62-70 ; Hibino, 1997: 168-169; Krauss and Budner, 1995: 344). As such, not only what is reported on but what is purposefully omitted may have significant meaning. For example, Sherman (1994) writes that, regarding Taiwan, NHK omitted using the Taiwanese national flag, refrained from using "government officials", or "leaders of Taiwan", in order not to offend the Chinese government (Sherman, 1994). And, regarding a series of reports on Thailand, Sherman (1994) discusses the "macro-management" of the news and the scrapping altogether of a negative report on "AIDS in Thailand". The reasoning for the censored version was explained by the managing editor, thus: "We have good relations with Thailand" said Ohta Masahiro (Sherman, 1994). And Sherman (1994) elaborates "The 'we' he was talking about was not NHK, but Japan" (Sherman, 1994).

As to the portrayal of Japan as the victim, in relations to other countries' demands or pressures, there also seems to be sufficient evidence for its prevalence use in international reporting (see for example Ikuta, 1980; Sato, 1995b; McCormack, 1996; Hall, 1998; Fuse and Mueller, 1996; Johnson, 1995; Sugimoto and Mouer, 1989). The tendency to portray Japan as a victim is explained by Krauss and Budner (1995) as serving to "downplay or dismiss the significance of an unwelcome complaint" (Krauss and Budner, 1995: 344). Sugimoto (1989), a sociologist, explains it in somewhat similar manner, but within the context of Japanese society. He explains that during the 1980s, coinciding with Japan's phenomenal economic success the strengthening and spreading of the *Nihonjinron* (theories of Japaneseness) had accelerated. This process was accompanied by the contempt Japan feels for Asia as epitomized by the revisionist justification of WWII, which produced a "sense of superiority and arrogance" towards the world (Sugimoto and Mouer, 1989: 21). He elaborates that this attitude is expressed in a 'persecution complex'. The more there is criticism towards Japan, the more there is paranoia there (Sugimoto, 1997: 21). Sugimoto (1989) further adds:

It is instructive to note that this sense of paranoia seems to increase in proportion to popular ethnocentrism and the dissemination of an official doctrine which promotes neo-nationalism as a

coherent way of providing self-justification and self-rationalization for the policies which Japan's political leadership are adopting in the face of Japan's 'internationalisation' (Sugimoto and Mouer, 1989: 21).

In an earlier book, Mouer and Sugimoto (1986) wrote that this manipulation of the national image by Japanese politicians to gain advantage in negotiations is serving well Japan's national interests abroad (Mouer and Sugimoto, 1986: 88,171; see also Suzuki, 1993).

Lastly, lack of sensitivity for other nations, or people from other nations in Japanese international reporting has also been observed by a number of researchers (see for example McCormack, 1996; Mouer and Sugimoto, 1986; Sugimoto and Mouer, 1989; van Wolferen, 1989; Yoshino, 2000). Monna (1995) explains that "both pre-war and post-war Japanese journalism lacks the conception of 'journalism for the populace' which treats others' pains and suffering as its own" (Monna, 1995, 14, as cited by Fuse and Mueller, 1996). Fuse and Mueller (1996) write in the same vein, "Historical contexts illustrate the Japanese media's insufficient recognition of the feelings of Japanese - oppressed Asia, indicating Japanese arrogance towards Asia" (Fuse and Mueller, 1996). This is sharply contrasted by the Japanese media's over-dramatisation of their suffering during WWII (for example Fuse and Mueller, 1996). In a multi-national analysis of the coverage of Princess Diana's death, Cooper-Chen writes on the Japanese media's reporting on the accident: "but the presence of monarchy in Japan—where the media treat local royals with deference—does not translate into respect for a gaijin (outside) monarchy" (Cooper-Chen, 2001). Here, Cooper-Chen (2001) reiterates the dichotomous treatment of insiders and outsiders. Finally, regarding the *Marco Polo* magazine's article *There were no Nazi gas chambers*, which was published by one of the most distinguished Japanese publishing houses. The article caused an uproar due to massive protests, not domestic ones, but by 'outsiders' (Brislin, 1996). Iwata Isuki, the Los Angeles bureau chief for the *Yomiuri*, wrote "The (*Marco Polo*) incident...reveals that the *logic of Japanese society does not always apply in the international community*" (Iwata Itsuku, *Yomiuri Shimbun* Los Angeles bureau Dispatch, 2 February, 1995 cited by Brislin, 1996, *italic added*). Another Japanese analyst, also working for *Yomiuri*, explained the *Marco Polo* reporting is a reflection of the fact that, when Japanese journalists write, they believe it is only for "Japanese eyes" (Brislin, 1996).

It is noteworthy that, while there is sufficient evidence reflecting Japanese media's lack of sensitivity towards others, Japanese foreign correspondents complained, as will be seen in the next chapter, that foreign journalists were insensitive towards their country.

All in all, the discussion above presents some evidence to the validity of the three characteristics of the Japanese media's international reporting, as had been revealed by Krauss and Budner's (1995) research, and of the dichotomous treatment of insiders and outsiders. Furthermore, as evidence showed, the treatment of outsiders is not uniform, but have also dichotomous qualities, or, 'double standards'. Some countries, or peoples, are treated with extra-caution, while others with disrespect and/or disdain. There is Japan, the inside (*uchi*), and there is the outside world (*soto*), with different kinds of 'others', some that are treated better, and some worse.

Lastly, with reference to the discussion on the national interest, it becomes clear from the cases discussed above, that when discussing the national interest in its relations to international news, we are concerned, in fact, with medium level national interests. That is, the focus is on 1. "Markets, natural resources and trade routes" 2. "To increase the country's honour/prestige" 3. "Country's expansion-in a neo-colonial fashion" (Hanai, 1976: 98-102).

When trying to understand Japanese media's international reporting, it does seem necessary to comprehend what are the factors that contribute to and/or exert influence on the media to report in accord and with the Japanese government's foreign policy. The following discussion will highlight some of the major factors.

### **3.3.3 Sources of Influences Sustaining the Shaping of International News Through the Filter of National Interest**

Though not exclusive, there are two major influences on the shaping of international news, so that they are in accord with Japan's foreign policy. One is related to internal influences, within the media organisation and its foreign correspondents. The other is external pressure, mainly from the government.

### *Internal sources of influences on Japanese Journalists*

In order to assess how and to what extent foreign policy can and does exert influence on Japanese foreign correspondents, and consequently on international news in the Japanese media, a look at the Japanese media, in a comparative manner, is due. How Japanese foreign correspondents fare in the global context, in terms of numbers, and dependence on the global news system?

Numerous books discuss the dependence of the majority of the world's countries on the major news agencies. Additionally, due to the high costs of maintaining foreign correspondents, fewer and fewer media outlets can afford to have their own correspondents abroad. Moreover, the major news agencies themselves are engaged in cutting down their own costs by using less of their own foreign correspondents and more local stringers and freelancers. The overall results is that many countries of the world are seen through fewer eyes (see for example Sreberny-Mohammadi et al., 1997; Hess, 1996; van Ginneken, 1998). The existing global news system is dominated by the major western news agencies, which "command the global news system, and contribute to the Westernisation and homogenisation of global culture" (Boyd-Barrett, 1997: 142-143). Are these assertions valid for Japanese international reporting as well?

In 2001, according to Japan's Newspaper Publishers & Editors Association (NSK), there were 172 Japanese foreign correspondents in the U.S. Of them, 66 were in Washington, 73 in New York, 18 in Los Angeles, and the rest in various prominent places (NSK, 2001: 130). There were also 175 foreign correspondents in Europe. Of them, the highest concentration was as follows: London had 56 foreign correspondents, followed by Paris and Moscow with 29, Berlin with 14 and Brussels with 12. Rome had nine and Geneva had eight correspondents (NSK, 2001: 130). The next highest concentration of Japanese foreign correspondents was in Asia, with a total of 213 journalists. Among them, 41 were in Beijing, 31 in Seoul, 35 in Bangkok, 20 in Hong Kong, 13 in Singapore, 12 in Manila, 11 in Jakarta and six in New Delhi. All the rest of the foreign correspondents were mostly working on their own in various Asian cities (NSK, 1990). The last major concentration of Japanese foreign correspondents was in Africa and the Middle East, with a total of 34 foreign correspondents. Of these, Cairo had 17, Israel had six, and Teheran and Johannesburg had five correspondents each. All the rest of the foreign correspondents were working on their own in various major cities in the region (NSK, 2001: 130). In total, in the year 2001 there were 616 Japanese foreign correspondents (NSK, 2001: 130), an increase of 75 when compared to the number of

foreign correspondents in 1990 (NSK, 1990). The major increase in the number of foreign correspondents was in Asia, an increase of 65 from 148 to 213 foreign correspondents (NSK, 2001: 130). The large increase in the number of Japanese foreign correspondents, therefore, is in a sharp contrast to the global trend of a decrease in the number of foreign correspondents.

These numbers of Japanese foreign correspondents corps are impressive when compared to the number of foreign correspondents of the leading American newspaper for international news. In 1995, the *New York Times* had, for example, 30 foreign correspondents in total, and the *Los – Angeles Times – Washington Post News Service*, had 65 foreign correspondents, at around the same time (Rampal, 1995: 45).

However, a large number of foreign correspondents does not necessarily guarantee extensive coverage, as Cooper-Chen (1995) writes: “The personnel and budgets exist to cover the world; the will to do so does not” (Cooper-Chen, 1995).

Regardless of the quantity of international news in the Japanese media, to what extent do Japanese media rely on their own staff and foreign correspondents for foreign news? With respect to the coverage of the U.S., by Japanese correspondents, Attwood (1987) found that “the Japanese newspapers credited most of their stories, from 73% to 85% to their own sources, the desk or correspondents” (Atwood, 1987: 80). These findings are also supported by earlier research (Ikuta, 1980: 63). Whether this is true also for coverage of other regions of the world still needs to be investigated. However, if these findings are indeed indicative of foreign coverage of other regions of the world, then, the Japanese media and the Japanese people, contrary to numerous assertions on countries’ dependence on the global news system, are not, to any large extent, part of the global news system. As such, the Japanese correspondents’ global network is nearly self-sufficient to support world coverage for the Japanese media, and consequently for the Japanese audience. This inclination for self – sufficiency is not unique to the media as had been reverberated by Johnson’s (1995) who demonstrated that the “Japanese self-sufficiency” drive is evident in international trading patterns as well (Johnson, 1995: 95).

With reference to Japanese foreign correspondents, a number of researchers assert that their news-gathering activities abroad are in fact, as much as possible, a duplication of domestic practices (Horvit, 1997; Krauss and Budner, 1995; Hay, 1995; Ikuta, 1980). Again, most of the information about news-

gathering abroad is about Japanese foreign correspondents in the U.S., where there is the highest concentration of any group of Japanese foreign correspondents abroad. Sato (1995) writes, “*Yomawari* (evening rounds) is also practised by Japanese journalists in Washington D.C., ...Residences of Japanese staff become the patrol areas...This makes the reporting ...vulnerable to the same kind of manipulation under the press club” (Sato, 1995b). As a result, Japanese journalists there, without double - checking Japanese officials’ information, transmit the news as they “humbly” receive it (Sato, 1995b). A testimony by an *Asahi* journalist demonstrates that even the most critical mainstream newspapers’ journalists do not check information received from embassy officials, which the writer explains is due to the feeling of indebtedness (*giri*) (Sato, 1995b).

Confirming the dependence on Japanese sources even when abroad, Krauss and Budner (1995) found that Americans are more likely to cite sources, and that “those Japanese stories that cited substantive arguments are far more likely to be one sided...”, that is, giving the Japanese side (Krauss and Budner, 1995: 342).

Horvit (1997), who conducted research on *How Japanese and American International Correspondents Choose Their Sources*, in order to assess a major influence on ‘the picture in our heads’, wrote “What is immediately striking about the rank ordering is the Japanese correspondents’ greater use of government sources” (Horvit, 1997). The researcher relates this to Japanese journalists attachment to the practice of using the press-clubs as the main venue for news - gathering activities (Horvit, 1997). In the discussion of the findings, Horvit (1997) writes regarding the hypothesis that “the Japanese would be more influenced by such factors as the source’s political stance, whether they agree with the source, and responsibility to country, was supported by statistical tests” (Horvit, 1997).

What are other factors that exert influences on Japanese foreign correspondents when they report from other regions of the world? The data from personal interviews conducted with Japanese foreign correspondents based in London and introduced in the forthcoming chapter, sheds some light regarding reporting from different, but major location.

### ***External sources of Influences on Japanese Journalists***

Whereas the various external pressures exerted over the Japanese media in the domestic arena have been delineated in the previous chapter, identifying particular attempts to influence foreign coverage, is significant for understanding the range, and extent of these efforts.

The focus of attention is on the Japanese government, particularly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). The Ministry Of Foreign Affairs tries in two major ways to influence foreign coverage. One way is mainly through control mechanisms exerted over Japanese journalists' international reporting. The other is through the control of foreign correspondents's activities in Japan, in order to influence what foreign correspondents can write about Japan, and Japan's international relations, while they are based in Japan.

Various methods of information controls, which were already discussed in the previous chapter, such as the press-clubs (*kisha club*), deliberation councils (*shingikai*), descent from heaven (*amakudari*), and the affiliation system (*keiretsu*), are already at the disposal of the government to control outward information flow. Regarding these 'conventional' information controls, Freeman (2000) notes that MOFA and the Imperial Household Agency have "the most draconian control over the Japanese media and, not coincidentally, are the locations of Japan's oldest press-clubs" (Freeman, 2000: 108). When these control mechanisms seem to be lacking, or the stakes are high, there is also an ad-hoc approach. Kim (1981) discusses several case studies of successful governmental attempts to influence the media. One case in point is "an overt government campaign to mobilize and elicit media support ...in relations to the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1965" (Kim, 1981: 163). The campaign used two methods; inviting senior journalists to dine with highest level politicians at the politicians' residence, and visits by similar people to media headquarters. Kim (1981) relates: "On September, 8, 1965, ranking officers of the 13 provincial/local newspapers...were invited to a luncheon with Prime Minister Sato...On September 14 ranking officers of the major newspapers in Tokyo...were similarly invited" (Kim, 1981: 164). In addition, in November, high ranking officials visited major newspapers headquarters (Kim, 1981: 64). As a result, "most papers reportedly established an editorial policy under which no opposition would be voiced and little coverage would be given to the demonstration opposing the treaty" (Kim, 1981: 164).

Finally, another method employed by the Japanese government to exert control over media's reporting of Japan's foreign affairs, has been delineated by Feldman (1993). Feldman (1993) writes that, when

Japanese politicians travel abroad, the journalists covering these personalities accompany them. These journalists' media companies spend huge amount of money so that large groups from various sections, will be able to accompany the source. Consequently, news from these reporters get priority in the media in terms of front-page, headlines and space (Feldman, 1993: 118). Since these reporters are not expert on foreign affairs or international politics, they get briefings prior to visit from MOFA's officials (Feldman, 1993: 119; for a similar view see also Tase, 1994). They get information on the particulars of the specific events, and also "they are told what is expected of them during the trip and how they can contribute to its general success" (Feldman, 1993: 119). Feldman (1993) elaborates:

Reporters are told that they are not allowed to transmit information except that issued by officials of the Foreign Ministry...(and)reporters are expected to write stories based solely on the particular Diet member or one of their closest aides. Officials of the Foreign Ministry instruct and 'advise' reporters not to pay attention to rumours spread by their counterparts from other countries and not to look for items of news by themselves...instead, during such trips, the Foreign Ministry officials spare no effort to update reporters about all matters so they can complete their assignment in the best possible light (Feldman, 1993: 119).

MOFA efforts have also a 'stick and carrot' approach to reporters covering foreign trips, as Feldman (1993) further tells:

The Foreign Ministry expends a great amount of energy and money for reporters and, perhaps as 'a reward' for those who followed the instructions mentioned above, will even organize a special trip for the reporters to see attractive locations in the area and do some shopping (Feldman, 1993: 119).

### ***Endeavours in influencing the 'Undisciplined' Foreign Correspondents in Tokyo***

With reference to foreign correspondents posted in Tokyo, first and foremost, one needs to mention the difficulty in news-gathering in Japan. Though language is a formidable barrier on its own, other issues consolidate to pose as an enormous obstacle in the reporting of international news from Japan. As one journalist declares: "Japan is the most difficult and challenging place to find out what's happening" (Shifrel, 1988, p.28, as cited by Cooper-Chen, 1999). He elaborates that the problem is "not in terms of what so-and-so said, but what is really happening" (Shifrel, 1988, p.28, as cited by Cooper-Chen, 1999). The factors that contribute to the difficulty of news-gathering in Japan are explained as follows: "Japanese sources reluctance to do interview by phone; the need to build rapport over many meetings; and the lack of substance in interviews because Japanese 'shy away from accepting responsibility or going out on a limb'"

(Shifrel, 1988, p.28, as cited by Cooper-Chen, 1999). Hay (1995), a foreign journalist covering the APEC meeting in Japan, in 1995, reported the following on the control mechanisms towards the foreign press, employed during the meetings:

Control seemed extremely excessive to the foreign journalists...a state of information control, as seen by the example of the Japanese journalists. Thomas Wagner, with a US agency says: "They (Japanese security arrangement) are efficient, but efficient to the exclusion of success"...What frustrates Wagner...it is the pool system, under which even accredited journalists are barred from nearly all news events unless they are given one of a handful of pool cards for a particular event..."They make us jump through hoops to get our press - pass. Then all we get is a press kit and lots of toys, but no access", said Wagner...The heavy handed choreography of the event means photographers can get 'nothing behind the scenes'...James Palmer, Asia photo editor for Associated Press who has covered international conferences for 25 years, said the lack of access is the worst he has ever seen...Three Japanese journalists said they were pushed away while speaking to someone at a symposium, even though the person was merely a businessman there to hear the speeches (Hay, 1995).

Needless to say, the difficulty of reporting from Japan has been mentioned by numerous other foreign correspondents based there (see for example Sherman, 1994; Cooper-Chen, 1999; Jameson, 1997; van Wolferen, 1989; Hall, 1998; Hay, 1995; Lloyd, 1996; Freeman, 2000; Shukanasahi, 1975).

If these attempts, as described above are not as efficient as the Japanese government has hoped for, then there is another way to try to control the 'undisciplined' foreigner. Hall (1998), an academic, and a foreign correspondent who wrote among others for the *Wall Street Journal*, *Washington Post*, *Los Angeles Times*, discusses numerous issues of controls in Japan in his book *Cartels of the Mind* (Hall, 1998). In the chapter *Manipulated Dialogue*, he surveys Japanese ways of "Discrediting Dissent" (Hall, 1998: 163-172). In these pages, the writer identifies numerous cases where the Japanese government tried to suppress the views of foreign journalists and academics who presented some form of criticism of Japan. For example, the case of a Dutch journalist turned academic, Karl van Wolferen, is illuminating. In addition to a "vendetta" by the Japanese media, following the publication of his article, *The Japan Problem* in the 1987 issue of *Foreign Affairs* (Hall, 1998: 164), the government spared no effort in marginalizing him, exerting pressure on his employer in Rotterdam, through a visit by the Japanese ambassador to The Netherlands. The editor in chief of the daily *NRC Handelsblad* replied to the coercion by the ambassador: "that he did not know how things worked in Japan, but that in his own country they had something known as the freedom of the press" (Hall, 1998). It is worth noting that Karl van Wolferen received in 1986 his country's "Best Journalist of the Year Award" for his coverage of the ousting of Marcos Ferdinand in the Philippines (Hall, 1998: 166).

The former BBC correspondent, David Powers, also recalls a similar example of pressure being applied:

Regarding the Japanese foreign Ministry, they are extremely sensitive to foreign reporting. Once they called my office here in London following a broadcast I made here (in the BBC). The story was about a Liberian cargo ship with toxic chemicals, which was on its way to Yokohama. The five top people on the ship were British. The contact from the ship was suddenly cut when they approached Japan. A Japanese Sea Security guard ship saw from a distance smoke coming from the ship. It took them six hours to get closer and see that the ship was burning up. At this stage it was too hot to get closer and they called emergency help. However, soon after, the ship broke into two and sank. When I reported on that I said at the end of the broadcast, that some people will have to answer to the question as to why it took them six hours to get closer to the ship, when it was already too late to save anybody. Shortly after, the (Japanese) Foreign Ministry called me and asked why did I said that, and I answered with a question: If the people on the ship were Japanese, and it would have taken the British six hours to reach the burning ship, what would be the Japanese reaction? The Foreign ministry said: *Naruhodo* (as we thought) and hung - up... The Japanese Foreign Ministry has a black list of people<sup>31</sup>.

### 3.4 Literature Overview-Summary

There seems to be sufficient evidence to support a statement saying that the Japanese media's international reporting is, on the whole, in accord with Japan's foreign policy. A research that repudiates this statement could not be found. The national interest related to this foreign policy is identified by Hanai's (1976) medium level objectives: the national interest in terms of markets, natural resources, trade routes, positive national image, and expansion.

In contrast to the West, where it is often the case that media reports in accord and with their country's national interests, especially in times of crisis, in the case of the mainstream Japanese media's international reporting, the national interest seems to be a major criterion for framing international news on a permanent basis, and not only in times of crisis. Moreover, in time of crisis, as was presumably perceived to be the situation in the case of the trade frictions between Japan and the U.S., negative reporting on the 'other' had been accelerated. One journalist testified that his Tokyo headquarters will accept only negative news about the U.S., or news that "made Japan the victim" (Ikuta, 1980: 67-68 ; for an identical view see Tase, 1994: 74; for other, similar views see also Uchikawa and Arai, 1991; Suzuki, 1993; Tomeki, 1984).

Regarding external sources of influences on the media to report in accord with the national interest, it turns out that the Japanese government spares no efforts in controlling information, both on important countries for Japan in terms of foreign policy, and also regarding Japan, in terms of restricting information in order to maintain Japan's positive image abroad.

---

<sup>31</sup> Personal interview with David Powers, 16<sup>th</sup> November, 2001, London.

From various examples introduced above, it becomes apparent that Massey and Chang's (2000) findings are applicable to the Japanese media. There is a dichotomous treatment where Japanese values are applied locally, within the inside (*uchi*), but not globally (*soto*).

Moreover, within the Japanese media's international reporting in harmony with the Japanese foreign policy, the practice of applying various standards has been obvious. There are at least three different sets of standards, in addition to standards applied only to Japan. One set of standards is reserved for countries with which Japan is in some sort of conflict, such as the U.S. Here, in addition to reporting that reflects no consideration for the 'other' country, the frame of 'Japan as victim' is employed to strengthen the 'mono - perspective' reporting. A second set of standards applies to countries which 'we must be very careful about',<sup>32</sup> that is all the countries that are considered important for various reasons. Thirdly, there is the group of countries which are 'not important' in terms of direct Japanese interest, where "we can write what we want". This last group is also covered in a way reflecting lack of sensitivity to the 'other'.

These findings may reflect the Japanese media's adaptation to Japan's foreign policy principle, where advancing the national interests, while always paramount, is done through adapting foreign policy line to the domestic environment of the country Japan has interests in (e.g. Lee and Yang, 1995; van Wolferen, 1989; Otani, 1987; Tase, 1994; Uchikawa and Arai, 1991; Tomeki, 1984). The Japanese government and media can openly criticise and portray negatively the liberal-democratic countries of the West, when Japan is in conflict with them, since their media are diverse and critical in their domestic reporting. Conversely, when the country in question is not a liberal democracy and/or does not have an independent, diverse, and critical media, the Japanese government and consequently, its media, adapt and take a more cautious, subdued approach, where on the surface harmony prevails.

Nationalistic reporting, in the sense that "it draws boundaries vis-à-vis others, who thereby become outsiders" (Eriksen, 1993) is enduringly evident. So too is the dichotomous treatment of Japan vis-à-vis 'others', and even more so, in the reporting on the U.S., reflecting support for the nation in line of 'our country right or wrong'. Moreover, "cultural nationalism" is also apparent in the framing of "Japan as a victim", which is in effect part of the *Nihonjinron* (theories on Japaneseness), framing of Japan as victim in international relations, whereby Japan is often depicted as "a small island country with no resources

---

<sup>32</sup> An expression that was often used by the Japanese journalists interviewed, as will be seen in the next chapter.

....(and therefore) must react as whole if it is to survive” (Mouer and Sugimoto, 1986: 234; see also Yoshino, 2000; Tase, 1994; Suzuki, 1993).

All in all, to a large extent, ‘the picture the Japanese have in their head’ of the world, is constructed through the filter of national interests, as interpreted into Japanese foreign policy. Conversely, ‘the picture the world has of Japan’, is as much as possible a manipulated picture, in accord with a ‘positive image’ interest, and/or, in accord of the *Nihonjinron* ideology (theories of Japaneseness), portraying Japan as a peaceful and harmonious country.

These findings on the nature and characteristics of the Japanese mainstream media’s international reporting are congruent with the previous chapter’s findings on adherence to journalistic principles. Diverse, balanced and objective reporting are not of primary importance.

It seems that much of the literature on global news system ignores Japan. Japan has a news system of its own, and, though it uses the global media system, it is not dependent on it. Moreover, if the case of the U.S. reporting is an example to the rule, then the great majority of the articles are written by the Japanese mainstream media’s own staff.

### 3.5 Conclusions

Are these characteristics of the Japanese mainstream media’s international reporting in any way surprising? Based on the previous two chapters, they do not seem to be. Various researchers assert that in the democratic countries of the west, the media behave differently with regards to domestic and international reporting (Malek and Wigand, 1998: 4 ; Rivenburgh, 1998: 81). Thus, domestic reporting on the whole represents journalistic practices as expected according to the liberal democratic philosophy of journalism, while international reporting is influenced in addition to normative factors, by determinants such as the Galtung-Ruge (1965)’s “news factors” (Galtung and Ruge, 1965), and the country’s foreign policy, an influence further enhanced during times of crisis. Hence, domestic and international reporting are influenced by different factors. However, the interplay among these factors and the reporting is within the western socio-politico-cultural context. Consequently, it can be foreseen that in ordinary times the media acts according to its prescribed role in domestic arena, such as upholding ‘the people’s right to

know', and 'a watchdog' and so on. In times of crisis, such as war, the media may act in accord with the government's foreign policy and also often do become patriotic and nationalistic, as could be seen during the reporting of the Gulf War (Hallin, 1994; Malek, 1998), and the Falkland /Malvinas war (Acosta-Alzuru and Lester-Roushanzamir, 2000), for example. However, when the foreign policy seems to fail, or where there are divisions within the administration, the media will follow suit and will appear to be adversarial and diverse (Malek, 1998; Hallin, 1994: 11).

In contrast, the Japanese context offers an alternative view on the media, as derived and influenced by its context. Chapter One: Putting the Japanese Media into Context, highlighted Japan's variances with the west in numerous ways including, religions as setting cultural values, and consequently education and political culture, and so on. Correspondingly, it had been stated even before an inquiry into the Japanese media, that this context poses great and varied perplexities as to the actual position, role and functions of the media and its journalists in Japanese society, if the media is to act as would be expected of a media in a liberal democratic system.

Consequently, Chapter Two: The Japanese Media and Its Journalists, indeed presented a media at great variance from the western one. Based on Shoemaker and Reese's (1996) inquiry levels (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996), it became apparent that the influences of contexts on the various levels examined is consequential, and undeniable. The influences of contexts result in a media acting as "co-conspirators" and "participants" and, therefore, as part of the "state" as in Gramsci's "hegemony theory"; or alternatively, acting in the form of "Confucian Corporatism" (Lee and Yang, 1995: 6), in the eastern sense. These characteristics of the Japanese media were further exacerbated in the international reporting cases where in addition to the media acting in accord with Japan's foreign policy, there was a strong propensity to see Japan and the world through a "cultural nationalistic" (Yoshino, 2000) frame. Thus, there are no major differences in the attributes of the domestic and international reporting in the case of the Japanese mainstream media, but enhancement of the former in the later case, with the additional cultural nationalistic prism. Therefore, the findings from the inquiry into the Japanese mainstream media's international reporting are not unexpected.

The exploration into the extent that the findings of this chapter are enduring is the concern of the following chapter. In contrast to the present chapter where findings were mostly based on analysis of media

output and where influences are evident in content, the subsequent inquiry will move into examination of news producers' perceptions as to the influence of foreign policy on reporting. To accomplish this level of inquiry into Japanese journalists' perceptions of this influence, in - depth interviews with Japanese foreign correspondents based in London have been conducted, and the results of these interviews are introduced and discussed.

**CHAPTER FOUR: INTERVIEWS WITH JAPANESE  
FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS POSTED IN LONDON,  
OCTOBER 2001 – MAY 2002**

## 4.1 Introduction

Following the previous chapter, the aim of this section is to verify to what extent the insights gained in the preceding chapter are irrefutable and enduring. Through interviewing Japanese foreign correspondents and general directors of major Japanese media's head-offices based in London, data has been collected and is introduced below.

Unlike a number of studies on western foreign correspondents (e.g. Cohen, 1993; Hess, 1996; Peterson, 1979), and research on reporting in relation to foreign policy (for example Malek and Wigand, 1998), no similar research that focuses on Japanese foreign correspondents in particular seems to exist, apart from Horvit (1997)'s systematic research on *How Japanese and American International Correspondents Choose Sources* (Horvit, 1997). Hence, it seems that the present data is the sole source in English on Japanese foreign correspondents, their views regarding their work, and coverage in relation to Japan's foreign policy.

As will be seen below, the data collected from the interviews is, fundamentally, in accord with the findings of the previous chapter<sup>33</sup>.

### *Interviews and interviewees*

Journalists' identity: Unfortunately, due to the interviewees' request for anonymity, their identity and their companies' name cannot be revealed. Hence, from now on they will be referred to as: Director A (49 years old), Director B (53 years old), Director C (53 years old), Journalist A (37 years old), Journalist B (33 years old), Journalist D (42 years old), and Journalist E, who also is a General – Director (52 years old).

Total interview time: 13 hours. The longest interviews lasted 2.5 hours and the shortest ones 2 hours.

Average length of interview: 2 hours and 10 minutes.

---

<sup>33</sup> It should be pointed out that the interviewer did not follow the advice of some Japan specialists on the 'proper' indirect approach, i.e., consensual (*nemawashi*) approach one should take when addressing the Japanese correspondents. Instead, a rather direct approach was taken, asking direct questions, while showing limited consideration for the Japanese context. Though at some points the correspondents felt clearly offended, their answers, as will be seen, are in fact in accord with the findings of the previous chapter.

***Location: London***

Interviews style: All interviews were individual, face-to-face interviews, excluding one e - mail interview.

With respect to the e - mail interview, it was conducted in this way since the interviewee, a news agency's General Manager who acts as a foreign correspondent as well, said that he had no time for face-to-face interview. His answers were brief and partial and, therefore, data from his answers will only briefly be taken into consideration, when appropriate.

Interview questionnaire: Two types of questionnaires were constructed to address the variance in position of foreign correspondents and director-generals. While the first part, which discusses the background of each individual up to the present position, is identical, subsequent questions differed<sup>34</sup>.

## **4.2 Career Patterns**

### ***Background***

All the foreign correspondents interviewed are elite universities' graduates. They all stated that they started working at their company immediately upon graduation, excluding the news agency's correspondent, who did not elaborate apart from stating he entered the company at 30. Five of the seven foreign correspondents started work in the provinces for several years, before moving to the headquarters in Tokyo. The two others are the news agency's correspondent who started at the Tokyo headquarters before going abroad, where he has been ever since, and Director A, whose economic newspaper, compared to other newspapers, does not have many journalists in the provinces.

### ***Professional Career Patterns***

Director C's career pattern, as delineated in the following, is taken as a representative case for the other directors' careers, since, to a large extent, they are similar. Director C started his career in the provinces, in Shizuoka, covering for two years the police beat, "as all journalists do that". Then he covered social affairs and police beat in Shizuoka prefecture for another two years. Following this assignment, he was posted in Chiba, where he covered politics for two years. For the next 10 years he was a political journalist in Tokyo,

---

<sup>34</sup> For the full text of the questionnaires used in the interviews see Appendix I.

at Nagatachou, covering the Prime Minister's office, the ruling LDP party's major factions, and Foreign, Law and Defence ministries, one at a time. After 16 years as a journalist, he became foreign correspondent in the US for a year. He was brought back to Tokyo and became Deputy Editor of Foreign News Department for a few months. Then he was sent back to Washington as foreign correspondent for three years. After the Washington assignment, he went back to Tokyo to work as a Deputy Editor-Desk of Political Department for one year. Next, for five years he was on the Editorial Board of the newspaper. For the last three years he has been Director General for Europe and London Bureau Chief.

As to the foreign correspondents, with slight differences, they have experienced shorter but similar cycles of working patterns. All of them spent nearly 10 years as journalists in the provinces, starting with covering the police beat. Following that, they were all moved to the headquarter in Tokyo, and at certain age entered the Foreign News Department.

All in all, it can be said that Japanese foreign correspondents' professional education and training in journalism and their professional careers are mostly limited to the company they joined upon graduation, which they will probably remain in until retirement. In this respect, they are markedly different from their counterparts in the US (e.g. Hess, 1996). The main similarities between the Japanese and the Western foreign correspondents are that they are both middle class with mostly elite university background, and are predominantly male (NSK, 1994a; Hess, 1996).

## **4.3 Roles and Functions**

### **4.3.1 Director – Generals: Roles and functions**

Director A, who is the Director-General of the economic newspaper, has a staff of 31 foreign correspondents in London, Europe, Middle East and Russia. Usually meets every day with his two deputies, and sometimes with all the staff. He elaborated that although "the foreign journalists have actually proved themselves as outstanding journalists "90% (of the time) he tells them what to write about". In addition, he also decides where and when to send the journalists under him. In these meetings within the office, and also in his communication with the journalists under him, who are scattered throughout the area under his

command, he tells them “what the paper must report, and in what way it should be report”. Asked to further expand on this “way”, his reply was that “we must always highlight the economic aspects...for example, on the Middle East conflict, we write from the aspect, or point of view of oil supplies. With regards to news about Saddam Hussein, for example, “the information, or news about oil is more important than the Middle East conflict”. Clearly evident from this statement is the reiteration of the importance of the economic interest, in this case, in terms of oil supplies, rather than reporting economic news within their contexts. In addition, he as a director conveys to the correspondents clear criteria as to which news and in what way they should write.

Director B, who has a staff of 30 foreign correspondents in Europe, Africa & Middle East., answered that “our role is to tell the Japanese public things they do not know about, in the best possible way. What I think is good for them to know. I am very patriotic, I always think about the future of Japanese society. We must widen the horizons of the public”. Regarding his instructions to his journalists, “On the whole, I trust the journalists to do their job. Sometimes I suggest to them what to concentrate on...If I think they do not listen, I remind them”. Here Director B emphasises his role as an educator of the Japanese public. As to his approach towards the journalists, it is unmistakable that journalists under him must conform to his preferred criteria and writing guidelines.

Director C responded that “they must present the Japanese public with news from abroad, news that we must send quickly and accurately....(and) we must write news stories that will have correct impact on the Japanese readers. For example, regarding the Middle East, we must keep our readers’ attention at a certain level. We must help the Japanese public recognise and be familiar with important foreign news”. Thus, Director C’s sense of mission on educating the Japanese public on important issues in a particular way in order to have the “correct impact”, is apparent. When asked to expand on the correct impact, Director C said: “In terms of space allocated to news, space means importance. The more space allocated, the more important the news items are. Also good editing is important. That is where I see my role as crucial regarding both selection, i.e., news judgement, and also how to write these news. My decisions are concerned with news under my jurisdiction”. In addition, “foreign news stories are not independent, they can always have an impact on the Japanese public. I always think what kind of news, which are directly related to Japan, can have impact and influence Japan”. Director C, therefore, sees his role in two main

aspects; as educator, and as participant in international relations. He elaborates that he sees his and the rest of the foreign correspondents 'role as educators, because "we educate the public and also our friends in Tokyo headquarters". Because "On the whole, I think that in their minds, the Japanese people think that Japan is isolated from the world. And they see this isolation both in a positive and negative ways". As to the second role, he said that "foreign journalists can exert influence on international relations, depending on what they write. In terms of news, in order to create the correct impact, we must be truthful, not to exaggerate and not to underestimate. We must put as many facts as possible, and then to give value judgement regarding the news". Interestingly, though reiteration of earlier findings, Director C does not seem to see the necessity of separation between news proper and editorial writing.

Though not a stated role, his company also acts as a PR agent for Japan: "we also organize informational activities, to explain to the British public about Japan. For example, last year our newspaper sponsored an exhibition on Shinto at the British Museum, in order to introduce to the British public Japanese things".

Altogether, the three directors, who have under their control around 30 foreign correspondents each and who are in charge of a vast area, had similar views as to their roles and functions. They all see themselves, to varying degrees, as educators of the Japanese public, and they all have a resolute editorial line as to not only which news is important, but in what way it should be reported. There is a strong emphasis that news related in some way to Japan is the most important. These strong convictions are conveyed to the staff under them directly, or through the deputies. Director C, who was the most articulate and outspoken, also sees his role in educating not only the public at large, but also the "Tokyo headquarters". In addition, he is the one declared himself also as a participant in international relations, as well as an 'image builder / PR for Japan'.

On the whole, it can be said, in contrast to Morrison and Tumber (1985)'s findings (Morrison and Tumber, 1985), most mainstream Japanese foreign correspondents in London work from a relatively populous offices, and consequently are under clear and rather strict commands regarding their work from their Director-Generals. As to the chain of command within the London offices delineated above, it is quite similar to the home office structure, thus reiterating earlier findings.

### 4.3.2 Foreign Correspondents: Roles and functions

Concerning the way foreign correspondents themselves see their role, journalist A said: "I am a Japanese journalist. When I write, before everything I am a journalist. My role is to tell the Japanese public what is happening in other countries in the shortest and clearest and the most independent way. (my role) is to teach the Japanese people what is taking place in other countries". Regarding the same question, journalist B, the most junior among all the interviewees, said "I must write in a way that the Japanese public will understand. If the public will not understand, or is not interested, I will not write". He did not elaborate, however, as to how he knows what Tokyo is interested in, but he did say that he consults constantly with a his superior in the office, who is in communication with Tokyo. If according to Tokyo, they missed important stories—i.e., their news judgment was not sufficient—"Tokyo advises us to cover them. Although, we normally know by ourselves what we should write about". Another, journalist E, who answered this question said that his role is "news reporting", nothing more.

Thus, journalist A stressed his role as an educator, journalist B as relayer of news relevant to Japan, while journalist E sees his role as news reporter.

## 4.3 The News Production Process

### 4.3.1 News-Gathering and News Sources

Journalist A, who covers politics and diplomacy, uses wires, interviews and press conferences which he "tries to go to as many as possible". He said that he does not use British newspapers much because "you cannot trust any one of them apart from the *Financial Times*. They write in such a speculative, non-fact based manner, it is unbelievable". The junior, Journalist B, who covers social affairs, said that he uses the wires, press releases and newspapers, and in addition, Internet sources and phone interviews. Most of his sources are second hand while in the UK, unless he and other colleagues do their own story, or series, which they then do all on their own. However, he mentioned separately that when not covering news, his superior indicates topics/features that he and colleagues must pursue, thus, leaving in fact little freedom. Journalist D said that all his schedule is determined by the Tokyo office's schedule. He first uses BBC to get cues as to what is happening, then checks all the wires and newspapers for interesting news. He also

goes to press conferences. Echoing journalist A, he said that though he listens to the BBC, he complained that the local media is unreliable: "In Japan there is emphasis on facts, while in the West there is a tendency for stereotypical articles. In England more storytelling, in Japan it is more important to write where, when, what".

All the foreign correspondents mentioned "the twice-a-month, 'off-the-record briefings' with the Japanese ambassador to the UK". These meetings are, according to journalist D, "only for Japanese". In these briefings, said journalist A, "the ambassador talks usually on various relevant topics such as Japan-UK relations, the Middle East and so on, and we can always sense what he means regarding Japan's position on the issue". He said that usually there are about 10 journalists who come to these meetings, possibly representing all the major mainstream Japanese media in London.

The answers to this question disclosed some unexpected information. While expressing their criticism on western and British media in particular, summarising them as stereotypical writing, both journalists A and D make themselves stereotypical claims. At the same time, by invalidating British and/or western journalists, they both also implied that the Japanese are better journalists than British and/or western ones, since only Japanese journalists adhere only to facts. These views reflect, in fact, ethnocentric conviction and, some would say, even racist claims<sup>35</sup>.

#### 4.3.2 News-values

While there was no question in the questionnaire which directly addressed the news-values journalists use in order to judge whether to exclude or include a story, various sources are in place to assist them in their judgement. One major source is the Director-General, the most senior person in their office. While important as being the most senior, he also knows best what Tokyo wants, due to his many years experience, his position in the company, and the close working relations he has daily with the headquarters. Consequently, not only do these Director-Generals tell their juniors which news stories to write, but also in what way to report them. Among the selection criteria, all the Director-Generals mentioned the paramount

---

<sup>35</sup> According to Holborn and Haralambos (2000) "people may be described as racist when they ...express derogatory or stereotypical beliefs about...(other people) regardless of what sort of theory, if any, underlies their actions" Holborn, M. and Haralambos, M. (2000) *Sociology, Themes and Perspectives*, Harper Collins Publishers, London..

importance of news that is related to, or may have some impact on, Japan. All the journalists interviewed confirmed at one stage or another this news value. Second, they all mentioned the need to *educate* the public on issues/areas/events they deem as important. Therefore, the criteria as expressed by the Director-Generals, are not only a useful news-values' judgment tool, due to the Director-General's position and seniority, these news-values criteria cannot be ignored.

Another important source that helps the foreign correspondents clarifying the Director-General's most important criterion— news that are in some way relevant to Japan — is the twice - a month Japanese ambassador's 'off - the - record briefings'. These briefings presumably assist the foreign correspondents in defining which news stories are relevant to Japan, in what ways, and to what extent.

In addition to these two important sources of reference, there is the daily communication channel with the Tokyo headquarters which tells them sometimes their preferences, request them, or, give permission to journalists requests. Finally, there is the feedback system, sometimes institutionalised as in the case of journalist D, where journalists see for themselves the types, and subjects of articles that are published by their company.

The journalists were asked two indirect and rather open questions on their own news selection: 1. What kind of stories do you send to Japan? 2. How many of your articles are eventually published? According to the junior, journalist B, he writes "stories that will interest the public, and will be comprehensible". However, as will be elaborated below, on reporting in relation to the national interest, the same journalist said that "I always think if the news is related to Japan", thus priority is given to news somehow related to Japan, and not just any story. Journalist A was more precise and more in accord with what the Director-Generals indicated. He said; "First of all, anything that is said about Japan. However, there is not much. (since) Japan does not have conflict of interests with the UK, though there are some problems/differences". Second, he said "anything about the British economy, anything about Tony Blair. He is very popular, and also anything about his family". Journalist D who said that, "everything apart from economic news", stated that he also decides which news to send based on the preference of the Tokyo headquarters. Mentioning the feedback system discussed earlier, he said that twice a day all foreign correspondents get informed as to which articles are going to be published in the forthcoming edition. From this information he learns which

articles in general, and his in particular, are being published and by whom. He stressed that this information is important and it assists and influences his own reporting.

But, as to precise articles that would make it into the newspapers, journalist D said “something very British like the Gentlemen’s Club admitting in women, will make it”. In addition, stories about “football hooligans, about nuclear plant issues, because Japan is very sensitive to nuclear issues. There is also interest in Tony Blair...because the Japanese system does not produce politicians such as Tony Blair, he is like a role model for something that does not exist in Japan.” However, negative stories regarding Tony Blair will also always make it, including news about “his wife, her fashion and the waste of money (related to that), their son’s arrest” and so on. Since no crucial conflict of interests exist between the UK and Japan, and consequently little is said about Japan in the UK, reporting on Britain reflects the diversity of British society and its media, and therefore includes the positive and negative aspects of Britain and its leaders. This is in sharp contrast to domestic Japanese reporting delineated in Chapter Two, where for example, the elite is sheltered from public scrutiny by the media. It is also a reiteration of the application of double standards, where Japanese values are applied locally, but not globally.

All in all, there is a general agreement among the interviewees regarding news-values, with news related to or about Japan as the most important. However, the Director-Generals had precise news-values in somewhat descending order with news related to Japan and about Japan at the top, followed by news deemed by them important for Japan. While the foreign correspondents seem to have a slightly more general notion regarding news criteria, in addition to the significance of news about or related to Japan. With respect to this point, one journalist indeed admitted that he felt a sense of freedom while as foreign correspondents. Journalist D said that though he writes only following consultation “I have a lot of freedom here. I could not write like this in Japan. In Japan there are always groups, and always something you must cover. There is a lot of control in Japan”. Thus, this statement is in accord with Morrison and Tumber’s findings on foreign correspondents sense of journalistic freedom (Morrison and Tumber, 1985: 453).

#### **4.3.3 Relations with other journalists: Japanese and non-Japanese**

All the journalists interviewed said they work with their Japanese colleagues at the office. Furthermore, Journalist B, the junior, said that, though he works with other Japanese journalists in his office, “there is

one, older, with whom he discusses constantly...he is like my teacher", hence, reiterating the hierarchical relations within the media company.

As to venues outside their office, all the journalists mentioned the importance of the ambassador's briefing for meeting Japanese journalists from other companies. One journalist elaborated on the aftermath of press conferences, and especially after the Japanese ambassador's briefing, "We usually split and have our inside group. We meet with the same kind of journalists. I belong to the group, which covers everything apart from economics. Also televisions have their own group, and so are the economics' specialists. In my group I meet journalists from the five big nationals: *Yomiuri*, *Sankei*, *Asahi*, *Nikkei* and *Mainichi*, and also *Jiji* and *Kyodo* join us". And as to the stated purpose of these meetings, he further expanded, "Most relations are friendship. We exchange information and have discussions on various topics". Identical in membership, though far more limited in scope, these meetings seem to resemble the press club system in Japan, discussed in Chapter Two.

All correspondents said they have contacts with non- Japanese journalists, especially when they are outside the UK. They all said that the contact is because, "they are so helpful", and one added "we do not compete with each other and we are all in need of help". These statements also are in accord with Morrison and Tumber (1987)'s findings on co - operative relations among foreign correspondents (Morrison and Tumber, 1985: 463). Spontaneously, one interviewee added: "The British are very nice and helpful. It is interesting in the UK that British media talk to other (foreign) media people. In Japan it is different". He was explaining, saying that British journalists do not treat foreign media as foreigners, as in Japan, but as journalists, belonging to the same professional group. He expanded on the difference between British journalists and Japanese ones "If I work for the X newspaper, I will write only for X, while in the UK it is not like that. A journalist from one newspaper writes in another, or appears in another media. I cannot understand still how ...if the journalist has something to say, then he should say it in his own newspaper and not in another media". He was echoing the importance Japanese attach to loyalty to one's company.

All in all, while in the UK, it transpires that Japanese foreign correspondents tend to stick by their compatriots, and since they are relatively numerous, this strategy is viable.

#### 4.3.4 Communication with Tokyo Headquarters

Regarding the question on communication with the headquarters, Director A said that he has daily communication with Tokyo, where he tells them what articles they are going to send. His communication from Tokyo headquarters is usually related to details regarding articles that have been sent already, or if they have special requests for articles.

Director B replied: “we help each other, because if you work alone, you lose your legitimacy, therefore, you must cooperate with others”. Though he seemed reluctant, he also communicates often with his headquarters, but for the reasons he stated.

Director C answered that the communication is, as above, daily, and both directions, however, his confidence in his position within the company is reflected by his words; “I tell Tokyo how to treat the news....therefore , my news judgment is crucial. I talk to Tokyo and explain the importance of the news stories we are sending, and how to edit them. We educate ...Tokyo regarding news processing. Sometimes I explain my colleagues in Tokyo the meaning and importance of certain news stories”.

As to journalists’ communication with Tokyo headquarters, journalist A, who is rather senior, said he has contact with Tokyo on a daily basis. The purposes of communication are to “take care of his stories – that the stories to be published are accurate, to check Tokyo’s requests for articles, to find out readers preferences/interests and to suggest to Tokyo topics of interest”. Journalist B, the junior, said that though contact with Tokyo is constant, most of it is done through his seniors in the office, since he does not know anyone in the foreign news department. He thinks that this is an advantage “because Tokyo does not pressurise me”, though, he does call Tokyo occasionally when he needs to ask something. Journalist D, who is rather senior, said that he has daily communication with the Tokyo headquarters. Contacts on his part are for the purpose of stating what he would like to write about, and when Tokyo calls, “it is usually to clarify details of articles he had sent, or to request some particular articles they want.”

In sum, communication with Tokyo is constant, and is done in both directions for a number of reasons, such as understanding and meeting Tokyo’s expectations as well as informing Tokyo headquarters on local developments. In these interactions, human relations and hierarchy circumscribe the communication, hence, senior correspondents feel more free, while the junior have seniors acting on his behalf, in communicating with Tokyo.

#### 4.3.5 Reporting and the national interest

The question on the relation between national interest and foreign reporting was left to the end of a long interview since it was deemed to be a sensitive question. Thus the question was put forward following numerous questions, which served in a way, as *nemawashi* (consensus-building). Despite the process, this outright question stirred a marked uneasiness among all interviewees. In spite of, or, may be because of this agitation, the question produced the following information. Since this was an open question, all the responses below were brought up voluntarily by the interviewees. What is striking is the similarity, in terms of the issues as well as views regarding these issues, expressed by the different interviewees.

Director-General A was obviously offended by the question. He said "It is clear, of course that we are not spies. We do not work for the national interest. In our case, we give a lot of economic news to the Japanese public, which serves the national interest". He paused and added, "Our activity serves the national interest (since) whoever reads our newspaper, learns many things and ways to improve economic performance. All this information helps for good economic performance, and good economic performance is the national interest". Lastly he stressed "We write what we want to write".

Regarding political news, Director-General A made the following statement: "In politics we must be very careful. For example, regarding negotiations between Japan and Russia, we must be very careful not to damage Japan's national interest, which means that we cannot give Russia any advantage over Japan. ... In the Foreign Ministry, for example, there are a few positions regarding negotiations with Russia, however, we must be very careful not to give Russia an advantage over Japan"<sup>36</sup>.

In addition, regarding Japan's neighbours, he said "We are always careful because China always complain on Japanese politicians. With Taiwan we are very careful. Although we have somebody in Taipei, (he is) low profile (because we are ) always careful not to challenge the 'one China policy'. Also regarding Korea we are very careful. Mostly we must be careful with our neighbours because our main interests are there".

---

<sup>36</sup> The main issue at stake is the so-called 'Northern Territories'. It denotes a group of islands, the Kuril islands, which both Japan and Russia claim as their own. At present they are under Russia's control. For more on the subject see for example, Reischauer, E., O. (1991) *The Japanese Today*, Tuttle Company,, Tokyo..

As to news regarding Russia, reporting must be coherent and unified, in accord and with Japan's national interest, in order not to give Russia an advantage over Japan in their negotiations on the so-called 'northern territories'. To accomplish this aim, reporting should not betray this objective. Thus, journalists cannot report on the real divisions within the foreign ministry regarding the issue. This statement echoes Mouer and Sugimoto (1986)'s observation on the prevalence of *nihonjinron* (theories of Japaneseness)<sup>37</sup> and the related cultural nationalism in Japan, where the prevalent conviction is that Japan is and must act as one "if it is to survive" (Mouer and Sugimoto, 1986: 234). In his views concerning reporting on Russia and Japan's Asian neighbours, Director A in fact acknowledges that the correspondents are not reporters of news, nor relayers of information, but active participants in the process of international relations, and as such, they are there to protect Japan's national interest. They do so by applying various standards to reporting on various countries, in accord with the national interest.

Concerning the same question, Director B: "I always think about the national interest. Of course we must protect the national interest. For me it means the liberalisation of Japanese society...I would like (the) Japanese to be able to talk freely to neighbouring countries without guilty feelings. To discuss the war experience and overcome it". Though not very clear, this statement with regards to the national interest is possibly a reiteration of the revisionist view on the war era, as introduced in Chapter One.

As for the U.S. "Good relations are essential...(but) Japan must criticise the U.S. when they do something against Japan's will, or intention. (Japan) must be assertive". With reference to news about Japan in the U.S., a topic he brought up, Director B said that "I do not mind U.K.'s media reporting, (but) I do mind U.S. media (reporting on Japan) because the U.S. is the biggest market for Japan. In the U.S. every small news regarding Japan is reported because of U.S. importance to Japan." As for other countries, he said that "Japan must maintain good relations with everybody. Japan must get closer to its neighbours".

The following day after this interview, Director B sent the interviewer an e-mail discussing the national interest. It included the following excerpts: Regarding an article in the *Sunday Times* about Japanese society, which stirred anger among Japanese, Director B wrote "I took a glance at the essay and thought it was ridiculous and his (the journalists' ) view on Japanese society was too poor and shallow to criticise". However, regarding other cases, he wrote "In some cases, (when) their remarks or behaviour have a real

---

<sup>37</sup> See Chapter One, section 1.3.2 for a discussion on *Nihonjinron*.

impact on Japanese (society/nation) directly, or indirectly, I will criticise them". He then goes on to describe cases he found appropriate to criticise back:

I criticised back in the late 80s, when pop stars started to criticise the Japanese (by ) saying that (the) Japanese were abusing forests. They simply thought (that ) in order to make chopsticks, Japanese destroyed forests in the world. They purposely made press conferences and started international campaign to save the tropical forests and (consequently) criticised (the) Japanese with such shallow understanding. They should have known (that the) Japanese never cut trees to make chopsticks, but (use) only branches or fallen trees by typhoon or natural disaster. I thought they purposely tried not focus on McDonald' s fast food hamburger industry. It was they and (the) oil industry that destroyed tropical forests in the world.

In the e-mail he addressed certain grievances he had with the U.S. in particular: "I criticised the U.S. congressman who destroyed Toshiba cassette recorder in front of the public and the media, when Toshiba was wrongly criticised for so-called exporting crucial machine to the Soviet Union to help them build quiet nuclear submarine. If you check the case, it is easy to understand that Toshiba was elaborately made scapegoat for helping the Soviets build quiet nuclear submarine"<sup>38</sup>.

In sum, in addition to acknowledging the importance of the national interest, from Director B's answer it becomes clear that within it, the economic interest, as well as Japan's positive image abroad are of major importance. In addition, the varied standards applied, in this case, to the US as an important country, and the UK as a relatively unimportant country to Japan, is apparent. As to Japan's neighbours, closer and better relations are important.

Here also, the influences of the *nihonjinron* are evident in two instances. One is in the complaint that Japan is misunderstood, a theme often repeated by Japanese, as Mouer and Sugimoto (1986) write "A look at how major issues are interpreted in the mass media ...reveal the pervasiveness of the great tradition (*nihonjinron*--where the Japanese) dismiss completely foreign criticism of Japan's trade policies; instead the problem was consistently presented as one of cultural misunderstanding" (Mouer and Sugimoto, 1986: 88; for similar views see also Dale, 1990; Johnson, 1995). The second instance is by blaming the other, which seems in the above cases to mean the U.S., as well as the west, and making Japan the victim.

---

<sup>38</sup> In fact three different sources assert that there was substantial evidence for criticising Japan. Moreover, accepting responsibility for the incident, the president of Toshiba resigned from his post. The different sources can be found in the following books: Curtis, G. (Ed.) (1993) *Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War, Coping With Change*, M.E. Sharpe, New York.  
van Wolferen, K. (1989) *The Enigma of Japanese Power*, Macmillan London, London.  
Prestowitz, C., V. Jr. (1988) *Trading Places*, Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, New York.

Director C answered the following regarding the question on the relation between international reporting and the national interest: "Of course, the national interest is taken into consideration in our work...I think the national interest, or the sense of it, is a major factor in international reporting, and the selection of news. At the same time, there must also be global interest, regional and human interest". Director C was reiterating clearly the second finding of the previous chapter, which stated that the national interest is a major criterion in international news reporting.

Regarding Japan's relations with China, Director C said "Many people are afraid of China. China today poses a threat to Japan. With Japan's weakening economy, China is increasingly seen as a threat". Thus, by testifying to the fear of China, he reconfirms previous findings, though he indicated at changing circumstances.

Director C emphasised Japan, and Europe as the victims of U.S. pressure: "The U.S. pressed Japan to do many things with regards to the 'Cold War'...and the Japanese public paid a lot of money for defense. However, in their hearts, most Japanese did it because of fear from the U.S., rather than fear from the USSR. In Europe it is the same. NATO members were more afraid of the U.S. than the USSR". Here, Director C echoes the portrayal of Japan as 'the victim' of the US, a standard reference in conjunction with reporting from and about the US, though, in this case, Europe is a victim as well.

Regarding Japan's relations with Russia and the dispute over the so-called "Northern Territories", he says "I do not think it is important, but it is natural for the Japanese government to be hard on this, but it is different from the issue of Palestine. It will not really help Japan if it gets the 'northern territories', but the Middle East is much more important". Here, while Director C seems to challenge the Japanese government's priorities, he still discloses that since it is viewed as an important Japanese national interest, it is natural. It is striking that such a view, as reflected in the above, is echoed by the director of a newspaper considered to be the most leftist among the mainstream media.

Director C further expanded on the Middle East: "I think the Middle East for Japan is far more important, and that is where Japan's national interest is". As to writing on the Middle East, Director C said:

Journalists must write correct news...in order to inform all the elite on the situation in Palestine.(They) also must think of the meaning and implication of the conflict on oil. We already experienced this during the 'Oil Shock' of 1973; the TV stopped broadcasting early, in the big centres the light was turned off, there was no toilet paper. it was a great shock to us all. Therefore, the Palestine conflict can influence the whole world in terms of oil. The Palestine conflict can influence the U.S., Russia, Europe

and of course, Japan. So, despite the fact that in terms of territory it is a tiny place, it is extremely central in terms of global politics.

Here, Director C notes that Japan's national interest in terms of oil supplies, is in a way served by the proper reporting which will lead to proper understanding of the Palestine conflict. Director C's mistaken assumption, widely held in Japan, on the direct relations between oil supplies and support for the Palestinians (Radke, 1988: 529), will be issue discussed in the following chapter.

A few things are noteworthy with regards to Director C's statements on the Middle East. First, various paradoxes arose in his discussion of the subject. While at the beginning of the interview he said that they have four journalists covering the situation in Palestine, and "the public is very interested in the subject", he later said: "Japanese must be interested in what is going on there...because of our dependence on oil from the Middle East. I think the newspapers must discuss what is going on in the Middle East in order to make the readers think about it". Thus, more than the public wants to know, the director wants to teach, and sees his mission in educating the public and the elite about the topic. Second, though a left leaning newspaper, not the suffering of the Palestinian people, but the national interest is of consequential importance. Third, during the whole discussion on the Middle East conflict, Director C did not mention Israel once, and repeatedly used the words Palestine and the Palestine conflict. A look at *The Times Guide for the Middle East* reveals that in the Middle East, there is no country called Palestine nor is there a conflict called the Palestine Conflict (Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, 1991). Moreover, Director C, according to the former editor of *The Sunday Times*, and *The Times*, Harold Evans, in fact, repeats *The anti-Semitic lies that threaten all of us* (Evans, 2002). Among the lies Evans (2002) lists, he writes on the negation of Israel's existence: "It seems a small matter that without exception Palestinian school textbooks supplied by the PA authority, and funded by Europe, have no space for the sovereign state of Israel, no mention of its five million people" (Evans, 2002). By purposefully ignoring the existence of a major player involved in the Middle East conflict, or "Palestine conflict", Director C, in fact, endorses the PLO's strategy (on Arab and Palestinian negation of Israel see e.g., Double Standard, 2002; on Arab' anti – Semitism, including the negation of Israel, see for example Wistrich, 1992).

Finally, all of a sudden, Director C added this last bit: "It is not in the interest of Japan that Koizumi, the Prime Minister, will visit Yasukuni Shrine on the 15<sup>th</sup> August. Koizumi visited Yasukuni (shrine) a couple of days ago (in May), therefore, I think he had matured as a politician, since he had not gone in August".

To put it in context, Yasukuni Temple is where 2.8 millions of the war-dead, including notorious class A criminals tried and executed by the Allies, are enshrined as gods, and the 15<sup>th</sup> August is the anniversary day commemorating the end of WWII. Visiting Yasukuni causes two problems; it contradicts the constitution (Herzog, 1993: 128; see also Befu, 1992: 38; Takayama, 1993: 112; Reischauer, 1991: 407), and it repeatedly sparks indignation among neighbouring Asian countries, who suffered under Japanese occupation (for example see Reischauer, 1991; van Wolferen, 1989). The BBC put it recently as follows: the visits to Yasukuni shrine “appears to the left to symbolise (Japan’s) foreign invasions” and to the right “it is a symbol of patriotism” (Murphy, 2001)<sup>39</sup>. What is significant here is not only that Director C mentioned the Yasukuni visit, but instead of condemning it, he condoned the visit as well as praised the Prime Minister. Thus, Director C’s words, in fact, refute BBC’s Murphy’s (2001) assertions on the Left as well as contradict his own newspapers’ leftist inclination.

All in all, if nationalists are “individuals (who) seem to identify more with their nation than with any other grouping” (Holborn and Haralambos, 2000), then, on the issues of the Middle East conflict, Russia, China as well as the Yasukuni visits, Director C’s views exhibit nationalistic propensities rather than leftist inclinations, though at least in the case of Middle East coverage, on the surface it might look as if in accord with leftist views. Moreover, calling to mind all that was said on cultural contexts as affecting the media environment, it would seem plausible that Director C’s views are not only heard, but implemented as well.

As for the foreign correspondents, Journalist E, who did not expand, put it straightforwardly, as follows: “It is indispensable for foreign correspondents to select and report the news from the point of view of own country’s interests toward the other countries”.

Journalist A, who stressed that he is first of all “a journalist” and that he does not think that the national interest influences reporting, stated that in news selection priority is given “first of all, (to) anything that is said about Japan”. And then, answering the question of the influence of national interest on reporting, despite saying it does not influence, he said: “If there is criticism about Japan in the UK, I will write about it. It is always important to know how people of the world see (and ) think about Japan. A positive image is part of the interest”. Thus, positive image of Japan abroad is clearly seen by him as part of the national

---

<sup>39</sup> For discussion on the Yasukuni visits, see section 1.3.1, Introduction to Japanese Religions, Chapter One.

interest. By writing about criticism of Japan, the foreign correspondent probably believes he will stimulate reaction in the Japanese establishment to counteract the criticism.

Regarding Japan and EU and UK relations, journalist A said "I also wrote that Japanese companies are more and more impatient with British reluctance to accept the Euro. When it is regarding business, it is easier to write (because) it is to ensure that Japanese companies will succeed. We are against protectionism.". Thus, while echoing the importance of the national interest, the demarcation of 'we', the in - group against 'them', the out - group, is clear. And the statement regarding protectionism by itself aims at dismissing numerous complaints at Japanese protectionism (e.g. Prestowitz, 1988; van Wolferen, 1989; Hall, 1998; Johnson, 1995).

Concerning other subjects of coverage, journalist A expanded:

Regarding politics and diplomacy, it is difficult to write something about Russia for example, because they will gain an advantage for their national interest... The Japanese position regarding Russia is that the four (northern) islands belong to Japan. (therefore) it is very difficult to report... Also about Malaysia we should be careful. Regarding China, Japanese journalists restrict themselves too much... I think we are talking about 'common sense'. China is very strict with journalists, they will not let a journalist enter if he/she writes critically about China, therefore, in order to enable journalists to stay in Beijing, they must compromise.

The common sense "we are talking about" appears to mean that writing about countries considered important to Japan, such as Malaysia or China, has to be subdued, to avoid provoking the respected countries and thus to safeguard Japanese interests there.

As to Japan's relations with North Korea, and reporting on these relations, he said "we must be very careful for a variety of reasons. There are still left over problems such as kidnapped Japanese, terrorism, money from pinball games. These are probably issues that we cannot touch. Everybody knows (common sense) that there is a transfer of a lot of money from Japan to North Korea, but it cannot be proved. Those who tried to investigate felt threatened". On covering South Korea, journalist A said: "we must be careful because of the history issue and also because of politics. There are people in Korea who believe the country has been destroyed by Japan, and they cannot accept that and hate us".

It is clear that in any of the cases above, the national interest is paramount, and reporting standards are adjusted accordingly, and explained as 'common sense'. Moreover, cautious reporting on South Korea is partly explained as due to some South Korean 'belief' about Japan, which the journalist does not seem to

comprehend, thus reiterating the revisionist view on WWII, and again making Japan a victim of some Korean 'beliefs'.

Concerning reporting on Asia in general, journalist A said: "I agree that Japan must be most careful when reporting on Japan's neighbours. I do not like to pay much attention to what governments think, but I must pay attention to what people in these countries feel". Hence, the caution regarding reporting on Asian countries is repeated. However, journalist A once more contradicts himself saying he cares about what 'the people' think, while in fact, earlier he disclosed the importance of protecting Japanese interests as well as paying close attention to anything said and related to Japan, and not what 'the people' say. In fact, he dismisses what the Korean people have been saying as some 'Korean beliefs'.

Regarding the UK, journalist A said: "The British cannot write about racism. In Japan, the society is homogenous, apart from Buraku and Ainu<sup>40</sup>, so it is easier to write about racism and related issues (of other countries)". By stating that Japan is homogenous, and therefore journalists can write on racism, the journalist repeats two myths. First, the *nihonjinron*'s one, that Japan is a homogenous society, a myth contradicted by numerous sources (see for example Sugimoto, 1997; van Wolferen, 1989; Mouer and Sugimoto, 1986). Second, and related to that, is that Japan has no racism problem, again an assertion which is contradicted by numerous sources indicating racism in Japanese society (Oblas, 1995; Donahue, 1998; Sugimoto and Mouer, 1989; Mouer and Sugimoto, 1986; van Wolferen, 1989). Interestingly, by pointing to the Ainu and Buraku, the journalist discloses his own racist views (for definitions of racism see footnote in section 4.3.1 of this chapter as well as in Holborn and Haralambos, 2000: 238, 260).

Expanding on the Buraku people issue, he added the following: "Regarding Buraku for example, we must be very careful, because if there is a tiny mistake, they will make huge troubles". Thus, the blame is conversely put on the Buraku, the other, rather than their legitimate claims regarding the systematic discrimination they have been enduring. The issue of the Buraku people is one of the taboos of the Japanese media, mentioned in Chapter Two, hence, an issue that is not discussed (March, 1989; Pharr and Krauss, 1996; Sherman, 1994; van Wolferen, 1989).

---

<sup>40</sup> The Ainu are the natives to the northern island of Hokkaido, whom many consider the original inhabitants of the Japanese islands. The other group, the Buraku, was traditionally a Japanese 'outcast' group, who worked in what was considered the most defiled occupations in society. Though the class system long abolished, Buraku discrimination continues. For more on the two groups see for example van Wolferen (1989), Christopher (1993), Henshall (1999) and Donahue (1998).

As can be seen from views regarding coverage on South Korea and the Buraku, one reason for the cautious reporting is “we must be careful from those who cause us troubles”.

Finally, at the end of the interview, journalist A, all of a sudden, mentioned Israel in relation to the so-called ‘Jenin Massacre’, a story circulating in the world’s media accusing Israel of a massacre of Palestinians in Jenin (for example see Gross, 2002; UN Says No Massacre in Jenin, 2002). He said: “I was surprised that there is censorship in Israel. Israel confiscated films from us that quoted (people talking about the) genocide. The Israeli government was very angry. I cannot understand that”. Here the journalist reveals ethnocentric views as well as the tendency to apply various standards to different countries. In the case of Israel the standard seems to be that there is no need to be cautious, “we can write what we want”. As may be recalled, this is in stark contrast to the censored coverage of Japan, and subdued coverage on countries important to Japan.

Additionally, though not limited in this case to this journalist alone, he discloses disregard for basic journalistic standards (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 95; Gurevitch and Blumler, 2000: 25-26) as well as a tendency for moral equivalence, in the sense that report is filed without reliable, verified and diverse sources, and reported as fact. He was referring to his report which quoted Palestinians’ assertions of genocide taking place in Jenin, as were echoed by the Palestinian Authority’s spokesperson, Saeb Erakat, who “spoke first of 3,000 Palestinian dead” (Gross, 2002). However, as noted, journalist A was not alone. For example, on April 15, a leading columnist wrote in the UK’s *Evening Standard*: “We are talking here about a massacre...genocide”. Similarly, on April 16, the *Independent*’s Phil Reeves wrote about “a monstrous war crime...there are hundreds of corpses, entombed beneath the dust...(it is the) killing fields” (for further media analysis of the ‘genocide’ see for example Gross, 2002). Needless to say at this stage, that journalist A as well as numerous others, were in fact, recycling unfounded ‘facts’, since it became clear that there was no “genocide” (UN Says No Massacre in Jenin, 2002), “no massacre, no mass graves” (Evans, 2002). “Human Rights Watch has since put the death toll at 54, including, on their count, 22 civilians –the Israelis say 53. Some Palestinians militants in fact claim Jenin as a victory in the killing of 23 Israeli soldiers” (Evans, 2002; see also UN Says No Massacre in Jenin, 2002; Gross, 2002).

All in all, journalist A’s views epitomise many of the findings of the previous chapter, including a propensity to see the world through nationalistic and cultural nationalistic eyes, to view reporting of

international news as having to be in accord with the national interest and so on. In addition, journalist A also exhibited the profound influences of the *nihonjinron* thinking.

As to Journalist B, who was an exception in that his career patterns lacked experience in political as well as international news coverage, and whose coverage was mainly focused on social affairs, said the following on the question of the relation between national interest and foreign news reporting. "I do not think about the national interest. I just always think if the news is related to Japan, if it has implication to Japan, in order to make it acceptable news". For him, acceptable news means only/mainly news stories that are relevant to Japan. The journalist added then, "The British for example, are not interested in Japanese news and therefore, they lack sensitivity (regarding Japan)". Thus, the stereotype of the British as insensitive to Japan is explained by their lack of interest. The journalist then added the following: "I do not think in terms of the wide meaning of the concept of national interest. May be because I do not have the previous experience of working in the department of international news. I am interested especially in people. I do not think I am supposed to write about big issues". According to him, lack of previous experience added by perceived expectations, conditions his views on the question. But, on the whole, regarding the rules/codes of international reporting, journalist B said: "we do not have to keep the balance (like in Japan), but must think how to make the news interesting to the readers". This statement confirms that when reporting on/from the UK to Japanese audience, there is no need to observe journalistic norms. As such, the statement echoes the dichotomous treatment (*uchi/soto*) as well as the application of various standards.

#### 4.4 Summary

The data from the interviews, as presented above, reconfirm that the findings of the previous chapter are indeed enduring. The national interest is an important criterion in news reporting; Japanese values are applied locally but not globally; various standards are applied to different countries, depending on the country's political system, and Japan's interests and policies toward that country; propensity to see Japan's relations with other countries through nationalistic and cultural nationalistic frame, and finally, liberal journalistic norms do not seem to influence international reporting.

Japanese foreign correspondents as well as the director-generals words, reiterate Chapter Two findings. They see themselves as participants in the process of international relations, but not as various researchers suggested and were discussed in the previous chapter, but in one main way, that is, they participate by actively defending their country's national interests through their reporting patterns.

Throughout the interviews, a picture of reporting on the world as seen through the interviewees had emerged. Thus reporting on Asian countries, including China, North Korea, South Korea, Malaysia, has to be careful and subdued; on the US as an important country with which Japan has some conflicts of interests, reporting should be critical and assertive; on the UK as a relatively unimportant country to Japan, reporting is a reflection of diverse domestic coverage; on Russia reporting has to be unified and in accord with the official foreign ministry's stance to avoid exposing the divisions within the MOFA regarding Russia; and reporting on the Middle East has also to be in accord with Japan's interests there.

Lastly, the influence of contexts emerged in yet another, somewhat unexpected way. The propensity for stereotyping the *other* as well as ethnocentric views regarding people from other nations, sometimes to the extent that the views expressed could be termed as racist, since "people may be described as racist when they ...express derogatory or stereotypical beliefs about them" (Holborn and Haralambos, 2000: 238), can possibly be attributed to the influences of Shinto, *nihonjinron* thinking as well as Japanese education among others, on the interviewees' perceptions regarding the outside world.

## **CHAPTER FIVE: JAPAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST**

## Israel and its Neighbours: A Brief Recent Chronology

To put Japan's relations with the countries of the Middle East, particularly with Israel, in context, a brief recent chronology of major events in the Middle East are introduced in the following.

At the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century almost all the Middle East and North Africa was part of the Ottoman Empire, which gained control over the area during the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> century (Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, 1991: 7).

The area called Palestine contained three considerable and distinct communities: Jews, Muslims and Christians (Smith, 1992: 1-13).

In the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Mark Twain's classic memoir of his travels to Palestine in 1867 as recorded in his travel book, *The Innocents Abroad*, 1881 (London), captures vividly the reality on the ground:

...desolate country whose soil is rich enough, but is given over wholly to weeds-a silent mournful expanse...A desolation is here that not even imagination can grace with the pomp of life and action...We never saw a human being on the whole route...There was hardly a tree or a shrub anywhere. Even the olive and the cactus, those fast friends of a worthless soil, had almost deserted the country (Davis, 1989: 12).

At about the same period, the Jewish national movement of Zionism was forming in Europe with its goal "to recover for the Jewish people its historic Palestinian homeland (the *Eretz Israel*) after centuries of dispersion" (Lenman and Boyd, 1994: 1006). As a result of the movement's activities, "Zionists settled in Palestine in the 1880s under Ottoman rule" (Lenman and Boyd, 1994: 462). In addition, due to the "rise of religious and racist anti-Semitism.... in Europe", Jewish immigration to the area was further accelerated (Davis, 1989: 3).

From the start of the 19<sup>th</sup> century until the end of World War I, the Ottoman Empire was in a process of steady disintegration. With the conclusion of the war in 1919 and as a result of the understandings among Britain, France, Russia and Italy, known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, Britain landed control over most of the area, including Palestine and Transjordan (Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, 1991: 7-10).

In 1917, as a consequence of "Zionist lobbying" and personal friendship (Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, 1991: 16), Britain issued the Balfour Declaration, which stated that "His Majesty's Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best

endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object” (Davis, 1989: 4; see also Lenman and Boyd, 1994: 1006). However, “this never materialized under the British Mandate (1918-1947)” (Lenman and Boyd, 1994: 462-3). Nevertheless, “Jewish immigration in the 1930s and 1940s increased greatly due to Nazi persecution” (Lenman and Boyd, 1994: 462-3) despite British restriction on the numbers of Jews coming to Palestine (Davis, 1989: 7).

Yet, Arab immigration to Palestine between the two world wars was also considerable (Davis, 1989: 7) as Winston Churchill observed that, “...far from being persecuted, the Arabs have crowded into the country and multiplied till their population has increased more than even all world Jewry could lift up the Jewish population”(Winston Churchill as cited in Gilbert, 1976: 1072). Indeed, according to the *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, 1937, the Arab population rose by 75.2 percent (the Palestine Royal Commission, 1937, p. 279 as cited in Davis, 1989: 7).

The large influx of people resulted in growing tensions between the Jewish and Arab communities of Palestine, and brought about the 1947’s UN declaration of its support for “the formation of two states in Palestine, one Jewish and the other Arab” (Lenman and Boyd, 1994: 462-3).

Though the Arab nations rejected the UN’s partition plan of Palestine, the Jewish population accepted it, and the creation of the State of Israel was announced on 14 May 1948 (Lenman and Boyd, 1994). The newly established country was “immediately invaded by its Arab neighbours” (Lenman and Boyd, 1994: 704-5). Further wars took place in 1956, 1967, 1973 and 1982 (Lenman and Boyd, 1994: 462-3).

As a result of these wars “over 700,000 Arab refugees left the Israeli-occupied areas” (Lenman and Boyd, 1994: 704-5), and Israel gained control over “the so-called ‘occupied territories’: the Golan Heights, West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip” (Lenman and Boyd, 1994: 462).

The Arab refugees’ fate, the land captured by Israel through four wars of self- defence (Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, 1991: 109-112), and the destiny of the people of these lands remain to this day at the centre conflict between Israel and the Arab countries and the Arab-Palestinian people’s conflict with Israel.

Related to the core of these conflicts are numerous and contentious issues which have not yet been settled. These include dilemmas such as: historically, to whom does the land called Palestine belong? Do Jews have historical rights/connection to the land and, if so, how much? Or, do Palestinian-Arabs have

rights to the land? Should Israel have a right to exist as a Jewish nation? Or, should the Arab countries expel Israel from the Arab-Muslim Middle East?

More recently, should the Arab nations accept Israel's existence in their midst after 50 years of existence? Should Israel relinquish territories to allow an independent Palestinian state on its borders? Will it be a peaceful neighbour, or will it establish a new border of conflict?<sup>41</sup>

## 5.1 Introduction

An overview of Japan's relations with the countries of the Middle East can take one of two main approaches. One approach sees the relations within the bigger framework of US – Japan relations, while the other concentrate on Japan's relations with the Middle East *per se*. It is undeniable that Japan's alliance with the US, has been the most important part of Japan's foreign policy in the post – war era, and the US does exert influence on Japan's relations with the Middle East, particularly, Israel. However, due to the numerous differing positions on the subject (see for example Sugihara and Allan, 1993; Shulman, 1984; Medzini, 1972; Licklider, 1985; Stern, 1988; Radke, 1988; Yoshitsu, 1984a; Kuroda, 1984), and because of the limitations of this thesis, the main approach taken here is the latter one.

Notwithstanding; however, to capture the evolvement of Japan's relations with the Middle East since the end of WWII, the development of the Middle East section in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) from a mere desk, to a two – divisions department within the ministry, is illuminating evidence of the changing attitudes within the political establishment, towards that region. Chiba Kazuo, who was Japan's ambassador to the UK between 1988 and 1991, as well as the Director – General of the Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 1978 and 1980, tells the story of the development of the Middle Eastern section. While in 1948 there was no Middle East

---

<sup>41</sup> For the interested reader, there are countless books and articles that discuss the Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli conflicts from different perspectives. Each source offers further reading on the subject see for example: Lewis, B. (1995) *The Middle East*, Weidenfeld&Nicolson, London.

Said, E. (1994) *The Politics of Dispossession*, Chatto&Windus, London.

Said, E. (1979) *Orientalism*, Vintage House, New York.

Gilbert, M. (1998) *Israel, A History*, Doubleday, London.

Gerner, J. D. (1994) *One Land, Two People*, Westview Press, Boulder.

Smith, D. C. (1992) *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, St. Martin's Press, New York.

Hirayama, K. (1992) *Erusaremu wa dare no mono ka (Who does Jerusalem Belong to?)*, NHK Shuppan, Tokyo.

Nakaoka, S. (1991) *Arabu Kingendaishi (Modern Arab History)*, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo..

division at all, in 1956, following the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956, “we were forcibly made aware of oil through its shortages” (Chiba, 1993: 146). This event triggered the establishment of “a subsection called the Middle Eastern Room, not even a division. It was a very small room and there was the chief, not a very senior man sitting at the head of the long table, and there were some young men sitting around, with a girl who served tea...The genesis of our Middle Eastern policy began in this room” (Chiba, 1993: 146). Together with the growing importance of oil exports for Japan’s economic development came Japan’s involvement with the politics of the Middle East. The evolution of Japan’s relations with the area has been reflected most vividly in the continuous enlargement of that section within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As Chiba (1993) writes: “The Middle Eastern Room had become a Middle Eastern Section, and later divided into two: the present First Middle Eastern Division, which deals with the Arab – Israeli dispute and the main protagonist countries, and the Second Middle Eastern Division, which deals with the rest including the main oil producers” (Chiba, 1993: 146-147). Chiba (1993) also reflects amusingly on the attitudes toward the Middle East Section, in its earlier days, within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Once, as a Deputy Director of the Middle Eastern Section, Chiba’s (1993) request for further funds for his section was rejected with the response: “what do you need more funds for, we do not have any Middle Eastern policy except oil” (Chiba, 1993: 147).

## **5.2 Japan–Middle Eastern relations from the end of WWII until the 1973 First Oil Crisis**

### **5.2.1 The Political Dimension**

During the years immediately following WWII, Japan was so preoccupied with physical survival and national reconstruction that it did not pay much attention to the Middle East. However, with the conclusion of the formal peace treaty in 1951, Japan began rebuilding its pre-war network of foreign ties as part of a long-term policy designed to rehabilitate its international image and develop overseas trade (Shulman, 1984: 33). Between May 15<sup>th</sup> 1952 and August 1955, Japan renewed its diplomatic relations with Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Iran, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel and Iraq (Medzini, 1972: 28).

However, despite the existence of Japan – Middle East relations previous to WWII as well as having renewed diplomatic relations with countries in the region, in essence, Japan practically did not have any meaningful connection with the Middle East, or with the Arab–Israeli dispute. It had no colonial links with the area, and it was not involved in the Holocaust. It also does not have Jewish or Muslim/Arab community of its own. This lack of ties makes it unique among the developed countries (Licklider, 1985: 23). Unlike the US, Japan was not pulled into Middle Eastern affairs as the result of the Cold War<sup>42</sup> and unlike Britain, it was not tied by any long-term treaty obligations or defence commitments (Shulman, 1984: 39).

All in all, to most observers, it seems, that “the United States has been the prime mover behind Tokyo’s diplomacy in the post – WWII era. Dependence on Washington for strategic protection and economic development led Japan to take a strong pro – American posture in foreign policy in the 1950s and 1960s” (Yoshitsu, 1984a: 57; see also Ikeda, 1993). Consequently, Japan’s seemingly favourable disposition toward Israel was also related to its adherence to the US’s foreign policy, and to Japan’s awareness that Israel was important to the American government as well as to the American public (Shillony, 1984: 83).

With respect to the subsequent era, there is a general agreement among scholars that there was an alteration of Japan’s overall neutral foreign policy towards the Middle East to a pro – Arab one, though they disagree as to the exact timing of this shift. One view asserts that there was a major policy shift in 1973, as a consequence of the ‘First Oil Crisis’. This opinion holds that “Japan’s pro – Arab tilt was signalled by Chief Cabinet Secretary Nikaido Susumu in a statement in November 22, 1973” (Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995: 213). Thus, for this group of scholars, the statement which became to be known as the Nikaido Declaration<sup>43</sup> came to embody this change of policy (e.g. Stern, 1988; Radke, 1988; Kuroda, 1984; Yoshitsu, 1984a).

However, the other opinion maintains that already in 1967, prior to the crisis, changes took place (Shillony, 1984; Licklider, 1985; Medzini, 1972; Shulman, 1984). According to Michael Yoshitsu (1984), a Virginia University professor, prior to 1973, Japan had a Middle Eastern policy based on the “Twin Pillars” of two UN resolutions, Resolution 242 and Resolution 2628, but no diplomacy to implement it (Yoshitsu, 1984a, 1984b). Japan had helped draft the UN Security Council Resolution 242 in 1967<sup>44</sup>, when it chaired

---

<sup>42</sup> At least not until 1967, and even then, it was not as a result of the Cold War.

<sup>43</sup> See Appendix 2, Nikaido Declaration.

<sup>44</sup> See Appendix 3, UN Resolution 242.

the Security Council (Licklider, 1985). Ben-Ami Shilony (1984) of the Hebrew University, asserts that this resolution can be seen as the beginning of the shift in Japan's policy toward the Middle East (Shilony, 1984: 83). Roy Licklider (1985), a Rutgers University professor, adds that since Japan remained strongly committed to Resolution 242, it "set the tone for the limited role Japan took" (Licklider, 1985: 23). The other and less known was the 1970 General Assembly Resolution 2628, which asserted that "respect for the rights of the Palestinians is an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East"<sup>45</sup>. Japan voted with the UN majority on Resolution 2628, though the only Western countries to do so were France, Greece and Spain. For a country that supposedly refused to take the lead in foreign policy, this was rather daring. Moreover, on May 23<sup>rd</sup>, 1971, the Japanese government referred to the "lawful rights" of the Palestinians during a visit by King Faisal<sup>46</sup>. Commenting on this, Licklider (1985) writes that "Japan was well in advance of other industrial states in the West" in supporting self-determination for the Palestinians. However, it was so quiet about its policy that it failed to reap any political benefits during the ensuing oil crisis (Licklider, 1985: 24).

All in all, it seems plausible that both views are correct since the first view addresses Japan's formal policy as epitomised by the Nikaido Declaration, while the latter focuses on practical steps Japan took. Linking the two views together, it appears that Japan's foreign policy towards the Middle East until 1973 had two layers, a formal pro – US foreign policy, and an invisible, independent as well as increasingly pro – Arab one. Correspondingly, in 1967, there was the beginning of a change, albeit quiet, while in 1973, the continuation of the shift in policy became visible and pronounced, when it was advocated officially by the government of Japan.

This point can be illustrated by Kuroda's (1984) assessment of Japan's reaction to the 1972 terror attack on passengers at the Israeli airport of Lod, by the Japanese Red Army:

The Japanese were shocked by the 1972 attack on tourists at Lod (Tel Aviv) Airport by three Japanese nationals from the Japanese Red Army. The Japanese Prime Minister immediately offered his apologies and financial compensation for the victims. Meanwhile, the Israeli premier, Golda Meir, accused the PLO and Lebanon of the attack. The Japanese government sensed negative reactions from Arab countries, so it sent a special emissary to the Arabs to apologise for the Japanese Prime Minister's apology to Israel (Kuroda, 1984: 43).

For Prof. Kuroda, this incident "indicated Japan's understanding of international affairs and Middle

---

<sup>45</sup> See Appendix 4, UN Resolution 2628.

<sup>46</sup> See Appendix 5.

Eastern tensions in particular” (Kuroda, 1984: 43). However, more than showing “understanding” of Middle Eastern affairs, the incident demonstrates Japan’s policy. On the one hand it did what was expected from it by the US. On the other hand, Japan tried to appear friendly to the Arab nations.

Despite these efforts to keep a dual policy, or in other words, to maintain good relations with both the US and the Arabs, “there were sharp differences (between Japan and the US) regarding security and trade, and they could be tolerated as long as national survival was assured. After 1973, however, these differences became intolerable” (Yoshitsu, 1984b: 53).

### **5.2.2 The Economic Dimension**

On Japan’s economic relations in the immediate post – war era, Licklider (1985) writes that, “As a result of the traumas of WWII and its level of economic dependence, Japan has generally stressed economic relations in its foreign policy and has tried to stay out of political controversies” (Licklider, 1985). As one observer remarked, Japan’s foreign policy was based on ‘being friendly with everybody, or at least not making serious enemies anywhere” (Licklider, 1985: 23).

Thus, it can be said that most of Japan’s efforts in the immediate post – war era were devoted to promotion and expansion of its international trade (Medzini, 1972: 28).

While Japan’s relations with its closest neighbours, and its pre – war trading partners faced difficulties due to the war experience, and also as a result of the Communist assumption of power, the US and Canada became increasingly important trading partners for Japan. At the same time, Japan was looking for new markets to expand into, which it found also in the Middle East (Shulman, 1984: 35). During the 1950s and 1960s, Japan gradually became a major exporter of textile, heavy industry and chemical products, and later transportation equipment and other capital goods, to the Middle Eastern countries (Shulman, 1984: 35). Even more significant to these developing relations were Japan’s imports from that region. In terms of both oil consumption and total refinery capacity, Japan soon became the most important nation in the world, after the US and the Soviet Union (Medzini, 1972: 33-34). Japan’s import of crude oil escalated as its economic life accelerated and soon imports of crude oil became the single largest drain on Japan’s foreign exchange reserves (Medzini, 1972: 34). Japan became the OECD country most dependent on Middle Eastern oil. While in 1960 imported oil supplied 37% of Japan’s energy needs, in 1970 it grew to 71%, and

in 1978 it reached 76% (Licklider, 1985: 23). Throughout the 1950s, Saudi Arabia was Japan's leading supplier of crude oil, but Kuwait assumed the lead in 1959 and in turn was succeeded by Iran in the early 1960s (Shulman, 1984: 36).

A few factors contributed to the rapid increase in Japan's dependence on Middle Eastern oil. These included the existence of vast petroleum reserves throughout the Persian region, production costs that were relatively low, and price reduction during the 1950s and 1960s – including large-scale discounts extended to Japanese purchasers, all made Middle Eastern oil-exports competitive on the Japanese market. But the most significant factor was the close ties between the leading Japanese oil refineries and the major Western-owned Middle Eastern oil-producing companies (Shulman, 1984: 37).

While Japan purchased most of its oil from the Middle East through American, British and Dutch controlled companies in the late 1950s and 1960s, it also tried to bypass these companies in order to secure a diversified and stable supply of inexpensive crude (Shulman, 1984: 38). However, despite these efforts, in 1970, , as already noted above, Japan purchased slightly less the three quarter of its oil from the Middle East, half of it from Iran. The Japanese consciously sought to minimise the negative impact of any future Arab–Israeli conflict by buying increasing amount of oil from Iran, which was not a member of OAPEC<sup>47</sup> (Licklider, 1985: 23). Unfortunately, this did not preclude Japan from being adversely affected by the 'Oil Shocks' of the 1970s, because Iran played a key role in dramatically raising world market crude oil prices (Shulman, 1984: 38).

## **5.3 Japan and the Oil Crisis of 1973**

### **5.3.1 Introduction**

The 1973-4 Arab oil boycott that occurred in the wake of renewed conflict in the Middle East, brought home the reality that Japan was heavily dependent on the Persian Gulf region for its oil supplies. Not only did the 'Oil Shock' prompt the Japanese government to re-examine and officially alter its relationship both

---

<sup>47</sup> The Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries.

with Israel and the Arab World, but Japanese journalists, economists and political analysts also began paying much closer attention to Middle Eastern developments in general (Shulman, 1984: 33).

As noted before, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Tokyo developed close links to Middle Eastern oil suppliers without becoming entangled in the region's diplomatic and political problems. In 1971, however, Arab states made their first attempt to convince the Japanese government to break off diplomatic relations with Israel. This was put bluntly by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia while visiting Japan. King Faisal warned Japan that adherence to US policy in the Middle East could have serious consequences (Kuroda, 1984: 43; see also Stern, 1988). However, at the time of King Faisal's visit the 'twin pillars' policy existed already, and, as an answer to the Saudi threat, "Tokyo planners informed King Faisal of their views on an Israeli withdrawal and the Palestinians", but as he was the only one to be informed of this policy, "the Arab countries remained largely unaware of Japan's recognition of the legitimate rights of Palestinians for self-determination" (the quotation is from Yoshitsu's personal interview with "a high – ranking Japanese official as cited in Yoshitsu, 1984b: 1; see also Licklider, 1985: 24). To the outside world, and more specifically, to the Arab world, it seemed like Japan had refused their 'offer', largely out of fear of alienating the US (Stern, 1988: 47).

King Faisal's warning became reality in the October War in 1973, which resulted in the Arab oil embargo. At that point "The Japanese government found itself caught in a no-win situation; how could Japan secure its oil supply without adopting policies that ran counter to US interests in the region?" (Stern, 1988: 48)

### **5.3.2 The 1973 Oil Crisis: Chronology**

#### ***October 6***

Outbreak of the fourth Arab – Israel war.

#### ***October 17***

The Arab oil producing countries embargoed oil shipments to the US and the Netherlands and reduced their total oil exports. They also linked shipments to other countries to their government's positions on the Arab -

Israeli conflict. "Japan's initial response was to reiterate its support for Resolution 242 and to express its hopes for peace" (Licklider, 1985).

#### ***October 24***

The major Japanese oil – producing company, The Arabian Oil Company, was ordered to reduce production by 10%. This was twice the 'normal' cut imposed on other companies. BP, Gulf, and Exxon all announced that they cut their shipments to Japan significantly<sup>48</sup> (Licklider, 1985: 24).

#### ***November 4***

The Arab position became clearer with the declaration that production would be cut by 25%, escalating 5% per month, and that countries "would have to take more specifically positive attitude toward the Arab cause" in order to be classified as 'friendly' (Yoshitsu, 1984b: 1).

#### ***November 6***

The European Economic Community (EEC) issued a statement in Brussels calling for Israel to end "the territorial occupation" resulting from the 1967 war. It also asserted that the "legitimate rights of the Palestinians" should be taken into account in any peace settlement in the Middle East<sup>49</sup> (Licklider, 1985: 24).

On the same day, the Chief Secretary of the Japanese Cabinet, Nikaïdo Susumu, issued a statement reiterating the government's previous position, which was very similar to that of the EEC, but with an additional part that specified that Japan supported the right of self – determination and equality for the Palestinians as set forth in the UN Resolution<sup>50</sup>.

#### ***November 18***

The OAPEC oil ministers announced in Vienna that the EEC would be exempted from the 5% cuts; the Japanese were pointedly not given the same favourable treatment<sup>51</sup>.

---

<sup>48</sup> According to Licklider (1985) "This apparently caught Japan by surprise". See: Licklider, R. (1985) Arab Oil and Japanese Foreign Policy, *Middle East Review*, XVIII.

<sup>49</sup> This statement left the ambiguity of Resolution 242 of whether Israel should withdraw from all the territories or not, unresolved. It also did not specify which "legitimate rights", Ibid..

<sup>50</sup> Presumably Resolution 2628, since Resolution 242 does not address this issue (See Appendix 3 and 4).

<sup>51</sup> Thus, the Japanese statement did not help Japan as the EEC one helped Europe. In addition, a series of additional demands were requested of Japan which, although were never formally acknowledged, were widely known. These demands included to 1. Break diplomatic relations with Israel. 2. Severe all economic ties with Israel. 3. Provide military assistance to the Arabs. 4. Exert pressure on the U.S. to change its policy towards the Arab – Israeli dispute, Licklider, R. (1985) Arab Oil and Japanese Foreign Policy,

### ***November 22***

Nikaido issued a three part statement, which included: 1. Support of the UN resolution 242 as well as the resolution concerning the rights of the Palestinian people for self-determination. 2. The withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the territories occupied in the 1967 war<sup>52</sup>. 3. The Japanese government would reconsider its policy toward Israel if Israel did not accept these preconditions (See Appendix 2, Nikaido Declaration).

### ***November 28***

Japan was exempted from the 5% cuts scheduled for December, but the earlier cuts remained in effect<sup>53</sup>.

### ***December 10***

As Miki Takeo, the Deputy Prime Minister, was preparing to go to the region as the government's special envoy to the Middle East, the Arabs announced another 5% cut for January for the EEC and Japan.

### ***December 25***

Japan was formally reclassified as a 'friendly country' by the OAPEC, while Miki was still in the Middle East.

### ***Post December 25***

While in the Middle East, the Deputy Prime Minister, had promised \$127 million to help rebuild the Suez Canal and \$100 million additional aid to Egypt. Miki was followed to the Middle East by Nakasone Yasuhiro, the Minister of International Trade and Industry, in January 1974 and a number of other Japanese government leaders later "each of whom promised more money. One source estimated the total amount of Japanese credits pledged during the crisis at \$3.3 billion" (Licklider, 1985: 25; see also Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995: 214).

---

*Middle East Review*, XVIII. Interestingly, two mainstream newspapers, the *Mainichi* and *Yomiuri* refer to these demands in their editorials (for example, *Mainichi*: 14/11/73, 21/11/73, *Yomiuri* editorial: 23/7/73 ).

<sup>52</sup> Thus, regarding the 'territories', Japan went further than the EEC declaration, which was deliberately vague on this issue, *Ibid*. Accordingly, it also modified its support of Resolution 242 Double Standard (2002) Double Standard, Special Report: Iraq, Israel, and the UN, *The Economist*, October 12th - 18th, 23-25.

<sup>53</sup> It was not clear at this stage whether the Nikaido Declaration of the November 22 was sufficient.

### 5.3.3 The Oil Crisis: Analysis

The conventional wisdom of the oil – consuming countries during 1973-4 was based on at least three basic assumptions. The first was that by far the greatest bargaining power was held by the oil – producing countries. The second was that the problem of energy security, Middle East instability, and the Arab – Israeli conflict, were more or less, interrelated. The third was about a broad relationship between supply and demand of oil, which assumed that at times of high demand for oil, there are shortages in supplies. Yet, since the early 1970s, each of these assumptions proved to be inaccurate, despite their overwhelming acceptance at that time (Lieber, 1984: 65). In considering Japan specifically, according to Lieber (1984), of Georgetown University, it is clear that the country is, of course, very dependent on Middle Eastern oil. All the same, it is not as nearly as vulnerable as it was thought during the crisis. Nevertheless, it is essential to separate the concept of dependence from that of sense of vulnerability. That is, dependence simply designates the quantity, or percentage of oil which a country imports. And it can be quite different from the sense of vulnerability, which concerns the expected damage in the event oil supply is interrupted (Lieber, 1984: 67).

This sense of vulnerability which Japan felt very much at the time, made Japan, as Dawaisha (1984) indicates, an easy target for “political blackmail” (Dawaisha, 1984: 29). To many observers of Japan’s behaviour during the crisis, it seems as though Nikaido Declaration<sup>54</sup>, which was stronger than anything issued by the US, or Europe, marked the shift from Japan’s relative neutral position on the Arab – Israeli conflict, to one sympathetic to the Arab side (e.g. Kuroda, 1984; Stern, 1988; Shillony, 1984), while some Japanese even joked that Japan’s Pro – Arab policy was actually pro-oil policy (Shillony, 1984: 18).

But was there actually a major shift in Japan’s policy towards the Middle East at this time? “Rhetorically, Japan went further than any other industrial country in supporting the Arab position on Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and threatening to “reconsider” its policy towards Israel” (Licklider, 1985: 26). Economically, the Japanese government “promised huge amounts of financial assistance to Middle Eastern countries” (Licklider, 1985: 26 ; see also Sugihara and Allan, 1993).

Consequently, these actions were to a large extent “seen as Japan’s capitulation to Arab pressure, readily explained by the ‘supply theory’ of economic sanctions since Japan is more dependent on Middle East oil

---

<sup>54</sup> See Appendix 2. Nikaido Declaration.

than any other country” (Licklider, 1985: 26). However, in fact, the Japan did not comply with most of the Arab demands. It did not break diplomatic relations or economic relations with Israel “even though this would have been merely a rhetorical gesture without any substantive impact whatsoever” (Licklider, 1985) since economic as well as diplomatic relations between the two countries were not substantial. Japan also explained it could not supply weapon to the Arabs due to its constitution, and indeed, did not supply. It also did not seem to have tried to pressure the U.S. to change its Middle East policy (Licklider, 1985: 25).

On balance, it appears to Professor Radke (1988) of Leiden University that, despite what seemed to be Japan’s capitulation to Arab demands as a result of the oil embargo “Japan was able to avoid significant damage to its oil supplies by offering verbal concessions, in addition to some financial contributions, but, these acts were not followed by sustained major policy changes (Radke, 1988: 528).

In fact, continuity seems to be more appropriate to describe Japan’s Middle Eastern policy for in the pre – 1973 Oil Crisis Japan had a dual foreign policy of formally supporting US position regarding the region while at the same time, invisibly, having an independent and increasingly pro – Arab one. In the 1973’s crisis, the covert policy had become the new formal line as epitomised in the Nikaido Declaration.

### ***The Lesson***

According to Licklider (1985), no lessons had to be learnt:

The oil weapon did not really ‘teach’ the Japanese anything new. The Japanese knew that they were dangerously dependent on Middle East oil, and they had already taken steps, albeit very quietly, to rectify this situation, by diplomatic gestures. The oil crisis had major short – term effects on Japan, but in the longer run it seems to have merely confirmed to the Japanese the wisdom of their earlier strategy which was to have a pro – Arab policy (Licklider, 1985: 28).

However, one “lesson” learned by the Japanese elites from the crisis was that they had an enormous stake in the Middle East, while the Middle East had no equivalent stake in Japan (Licklider, 1985: 26).

Another lesson was that, in the Middle East, economics does not go before politics.

## 5.4 Japan and the Middle East Since 1973

### 5.4.1 Political Dimension

To reassure the Arabs that Japan was their friend, and therefore entitled to uninterrupted oil supplies in any future emergency, Japanese political leaders and government officials were dispatched to the Arab countries with promises of aid and investment. Numerous prominent political figures such as ministers from the International Trade and Industry Ministry and the Foreign Ministry as well as the Deputy Prime Minister, toured the Arab world with offers of technical aid and economic co – operation (Shillony, 1985/6; see also Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995: 214). In September 1978, the Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo visited Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE. “It was the first time that a Japanese Prime Minister had ever visited the region” (Shillony, 1985/6: 19). Other Prime Ministers followed as well (Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995: 214).

The Arab states demanded that Japan recognise the PLO and grant its delegate diplomatic status (Shillony, 1985/6: 19). In April 1976, Faruk Kaddoumi, head of the political department of the PLO, visited Japan at the invitation of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, and held meetings with Japanese leaders including the then Prime Minister, Miki Takeo, and Foreign Minister Miyazawa Keiichi. On that occasion, it was agreed to establish a PLO office in Tokyo subject to mutually agreed understanding such as non – diplomatic status of the office. The information office was actually opened in February 1977 (MOFA, 1980: 10-11). In 1980, “invitations to visit Japan had been extended to the leader of the PLO by the Parliamentarian’s League for the Japanese – Palestine Friendship” (MOFA, 1980: 13), a supra – party organisation of the Japanese Diet members. Arafat’s visit to Japan was ostensibly a ‘private visit’, but “the Arab envoys in Tokyo demanded that he nevertheless be granted official audiences. The solution was that, though Arafat was received by Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko and Foreign Minister Sunoda Sunao”, he was introduced to them to them in their ‘private capacity’ (Shillony, 1985/6: 18).

Notwithstanding, Japan in 1981 became the first among the developed countries to have talks with the PLO. According to foreign policy analyst, Osanai Takayuki, the Japanese courtship of the PLO was mainly

based on the mistaken assumption that there was a link between stable oil supplies from the Middle East and support for the PLO (Osanai, 1983, p. 232, as cited in Radke, 1988: 529).

In contrast to the flow of Japanese dignitaries to Arab countries and the flow of Arab dignitaries to Japan, no Japanese cabinet minister had visited Israel until 1988. On the 22<sup>nd</sup> of June, 1988, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Uno Sosuke, visited west Asia. "His visit was particularly significant as he became the first Japanese foreign minister to include an official visit to Israel" (Kuroda, 1989: 15). However, what may be more significant is the fact that "he spent more time with Palestinians than with Israelis during the short visit" (Kuroda, 1989: 16).

Visits of high ranking Israeli officials have taken place, but they have all been termed 'private' (Shillony, 1985/6: 19; Radke, 1988: 534).

Japan's foreign policy toward the Arab countries of the Middle East as well as Israel in the post – 1973 'Oil Shock' period was also reflected in Japan's voting patterns in the UN, as Stein (1982) found. In her analysis of UN voting patterns on Arab – Israel issues, Stein (1982) distinguished three different coalitions in 1974, just after the crisis. The U.S. opposed acknowledging Palestinian rights while all of its allies, including Japan, abstained. The U.S. was joined by most of its European allies in opposing recognition of the PLO; France, Italy and Japan abstained. All US allies voted against a resolution condemning Zionism and racism except Japan, which abstained. Thus, Japan, according to Stein (1982), remained the most pro – Arab industrial country (Stein, 1982: 57-59). In a similar vein, Hook et al (2001) write that Japan voted in favour of many pro-Palestinians, pro-Arab resolutions (Hook et al., 2001: 310), or in Kuroda's (1984) words: "Japan did not vote against the 'Arab-cause' resolutions from 1970 through 1980" (Kuroda, 1984: 45).

Meanwhile, towards the end of the 1980s, some visible improvement seemed to have taken place in Japan's relations with Israel. The advancement of the relations had been manifested in the increased frequency of formal visits by parliamentary dignitaries, on both sides (Radke, 1988: 534), with the visit of the then Deputy Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, to Japan in 1985, seen as a sort of a breakthrough in the relations (Radke, 1988: 534-5). However, the real turning point in the relations was, according to Ikeda (1993), of the Institute of Developing Economics, Tokyo, Prime Minister Kaifu's declaration, during his U.S. visit in April 1991, regarding Japan's relations with Israel. He "implied for the first time the

possibility of improving bilateral relations regardless of the Arab – Israeli conflict” (Ikeda, 1993: 155).

Moreover, as if testifying for this change of heart, by the middle of the same month, one week after Kaifu – Bush’ s meeting, Japan’s largest automobile manufacturer, Toyota Motor Co, decided “to cancel their trade embargo with Israel” and to start exporting directly to Israel (Ikeda, 1993: 155, 179). Many major Japanese companies followed suit since then (Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995).

Various reasons have contributed to changes in Japan’s policy toward the Middle East in general, and toward Israel in particular. One factor has been the decline of the economic power yielded by Arab nations as the oil prices has fallen. The oil-producing nations of the Middle East have seen their political influence wane in recent years, and this has been accompanied by a decline in their income and purchasing power (Nobuo, 1991). Another factor is that the share of oil imported from Arab and other Middle Eastern sources has fallen (Nobuo, 1991). This trend is expected to continue, “although the prominence of the Middle East as a source of energy resources for Japan remains unchanged” (Radke, 1988: 526; Stern, 1988: 51). The third reason was that up to the outbreak of the war between Iran and Iraq (1980 – 1989), it was assumed that Israel and/or the unresolved Palestinian problem were at the core of Middle East instability (MOFA, 1980: 4; see also Nobuo, 1991). However, since then it became obvious that the sources of Middle Eastern instability are more extensive and enduring than the Arab – Israeli conflict. They encompass the severe strains of modernisation, religion and Islamic fundamentalism, border problems, ethnic disputes, the radical – conservative divisions, and numerous national rivalries (Lieber, 1984: 68). Another, and most crucial factor that had a major influence on Japanese–Middle Eastern relations was Japan– U.S., relations, which were at rock bottom during the 1980s, especially due to severe trade friction (e.g.Prestowitz, 1988) . A number of researchers assert that in order to appease the U.S., especially when Japan – U.S. relations are not good, Japan offer gestures to Israel (for example Kuroda, 1989; Ikeda, 1993; Nobuo, 1991).

#### **5.4.2 Economic Dimension**

Prof. Adeed Dawaisha summarised Japan’s economic relations with the Arab states of the Middle East most vividly, as follows:

In the economic area, Japan ranks highly in Middle Eastern perceptions. Japan is seen as an economic superpower that participates fully in Middle Eastern development. Indeed, Japan's involvement in the Middle East has made dramatic leaps since the October War of 1973. Japanese firms, particularly construction and petrochemicals, pervade the Middle East today. Japanese watches, cars, electrical goods and computers dominate showroom and shop windows. Thousands of Japanese salesmen, engineers, and technicians work in the Middle East on development projects. These activities have left a mark on the Middle East psyche. Japan, once considered a distant and inconsequential entity, is now seen as an important actor able to touch people's lives (Dawaisha, 1984: 30).

This private entrepreneurial activity coincided with the expansion of involvement of the Japanese government with the Arab countries of the Middle East. The manifestation of the increased involvement of the government was expressed through the Official Development Assistance, and also through various other economic endeavours including numerous amounts and types of loans, joint – ventures, development programs and so on, all of which increased significantly following the 1973 'Oil Shock' (Sugihara and Allan, 1993).

With Israel the case was very much the opposite, with the cause seen to a large extent as due to Japan's compliance with the Arab Boycott of Israel. The issue of Japan's compliance with the Arab boycott is too large to be discussed here. However, a few points should be stressed, since they are vital for understanding post – 1973 Japan – Israel economic relations (for discussion on Japanese compliance with the Arab boycott, see for example Lerman, 1991; Licklider, 1985; Shillony, 1985/6; Stern, 1988; Yoshitsu, 1984b).

To put the Arab boycott of Israel in context, it started in the 1920s, when while under the British Mandate, Arab groups tried to use economic coercion against Jewish settlers in Palestine. The boycott of 'Zionist goods' became a formal aim of the Arab League when it was founded in 1945. To facilitate the administration of the boycott and to co-ordinate its expanding influence, the Arab League Council the Central Office of the Boycott of Israel (CBO) was created in 1951, with its headquarters in Damascus (Lerman, 1991: 5).

The Arab boycott has three basic forms; the *Primary*, *Secondary* and *Tertiary* or *Voluntary Boycotts*. The *Primary Boycott*, forbids a country's nationals and residents to trade with another country and its national and residents. This form of boycott is almost universally acknowledged as a legitimate exercise of sovereign authority. The *Secondary Boycott* entails a blacklisting of firms outside the Middle East. This blacklisting is designed to stop Arab nations and companies from dealing with these firms. The *Tertiary* or *Voluntary Boycott* involves companies outside the Middle East which, out of fears of the boycott, real or

imagined, refuse to buy from companies which are on the Arab blacklist, and from Jewish owned firms, even though they themselves do not trade with Israel (Lerman, 1991: 4).

With respect to the psychological effects of the Arab boycott, Radke (1988) explains: "As with other forms of blackmail, the effectiveness of the boycott threat is closely linked to the psychological attitude of the victims. An absence of thorough knowledge about the effectiveness with which a threat may actually be carried out, coupled with vague fears, usually increases a victim's readiness to comply with a threat" (Radke, 1988: 532). On Japan's compliance with the Arab boycott, Lerman (1991) writes that "Of the three basic forms that the boycott takes, Japan has been deeply involved in two of them, the *Secondary* and *Tertiary Boycotts*" (Lerman, 1991: 4, italic added). Thus, by complying with these two forms, Lerman (1991) explains, "the boycotting country has exceeded most of the commonly accepted notion of territorial jurisdiction" (Lerman, 1991)<sup>55</sup>.

Officially, the Japanese government continually stated that it did not discriminate against particular countries for political reasons, and that its trade policy is conducted according to the principles of free trade. According to a spokesman of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), "Japanese companies make their own decisions on whether to promote trade in any part of the world, and the government does not interfere with their decision unless some specific problem arises" (Lerman, 1991: 9). But this official stance contradicts what is known about the links between government and industry in Japan. One feature of these relations is what is widely known as the system of 'administrative guidance' (e.g. Johnson, 1995; van Wolferen, 1989; Goodman and Refsing, 1992; Vogel, 1985; Prestowitz, 1988). The authority of the 'administrative guidance' was explained by the *Wall Street Journal*: "The Ministry of Finance's awe – inspiring influence is exercised through what is known here (in Tokyo) as administrative guidance, a kind of executive fiat tantamount to law" (the Wall Street Journal, December 20, 1985, as cited in Lerman, 1991: 9). Accordingly, through 'administrative guidance' the Japanese government directs economic organisations to comply with the Arab boycott: "The powerful Ministry of International Trade and Industry plays a very significant role in this system, informing companies how to operate within the confines of the boycott regulation. In addition, the Finance Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, and a number of

---

<sup>55</sup> The U.S. Anti – boycott laws of 1976 and 1977 were enacted to strike at the *Secondary* and *Tertiary Boycotts*.

economic organisation, including the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, advise Japanese firms on boycott questions” (Lerman, 1991: 9).

Though Japan fought hard to accede to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1955, stressing its right to compete in the world market under fair conditions, in order to sustain and expand its economy, it does not apply this right to Israel (Lerman, 1991: 9).

The consequences of Japan’s adherence to the Arab boycott on Israel are numerous. *The Economist* summarised the situation most vividly: “Talk about trade with Israel is taboo in Japan. South Africa is considered far more respectable” (The Economist, May 21, 1988, as cited in Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995: 215, the reference is to South Africa under the apartheid regime). In practice it meant that the big Japanese companies, with their substantial markets in the Arab countries, have yielded to the Arab boycott and refused to trade with Israel. Unlike the big Western companies, which maintain branches in Israel, no Japanese company had opened branch there prior to 1991, and those companies who sold their products in Israel up to the beginning of the 1990s, did so through their European subsidiaries. Therefore, Israelis at that time could buy Subaru and Daihatsu, but could not buy Toyotas, Nissans, Hondas, or Mazdas. Japan airlines also consistently refused to fly to Israel, and El Al, the main Israeli air line, has not been granted landing rights in Japan until 1992. Since no Japanese shipping lines serve Israeli ports, trade with Israel is carried on by Israeli ships which regularly call on Japanese ports (Shillony, 1985/6: 20; see also Lerman, 1991; Stern, 1988).

In sum, according to Radke (1988), of Leiden University, despite the fact that boycott practices are “a clear violation of the principle of free trade, moral reasoning against blackmail is not always sufficient” (Radke, 1988: 532). Thus, though other obstacles like language, mentality and geographical distance, are hindering Israel – Japan trade, the Arab boycott was and remained the largest single factor (Stern, 1988: 52). Moreover, adherence to the Arab boycott obstruct the development of relations in numerous other areas as well, such as academic and technical co-operation (Stern, 1988: 52-53).

Some researchers point to the fact that since the end of the 1980s, and especially since the beginning of the 1990s, changes in Japan’s policy towards the Middle East, particularly towards Israel, became somewhat evident (Ikeda, 1993; see also Nobuo, 1991; Kuroda, 1989), though, they are slow and cautious (Nobuo, 1991). However, with respect to the ‘Gulf Crisis’ of 1990 – 1991, continuity seems more

appropriate in describing Japan's foreign affairs' conduct at the time. In a research report to the Institute of Jewish Affairs, the institute's co-director, Anthony Lerman (1991) wrote: "In mid – January, as war was about the break out in the Gulf, Japan included Israel in its general Middle East trade cut – off, thus bringing to a standstill almost all trade relations between the two countries. Furthermore, although compensation to offset costs incurred as a result of the Gulf War was offered by Japan to some countries, Israel was not included" (Lerman, 1991: 1). The *Financial Times* of 13<sup>th</sup> February, 1991, which reported Israel's protests about Japan's policy, wrote that no other country acted in a similar way. While the Japanese government presented seemingly justified explanations to its policy, such as not granting aid to Israel, since it is a developed country (Lerman, 1991: 3), the *Jerusalem Post* leader from February 24, 1991, according to Lerman (1991) "put it more bluntly, probably summing up the real sentiments behind..." (Lerman, 1991: 3) by relating Japan's Middle East policy during the 'Gulf Crisis' to its continued compliance with the Arab boycott:

Unfortunately, Japan's conduct cannot be described as an aberration, attributable to the pressures of uncertainty and war. It follows a pattern of surrender to the Arab boycott and unbounded support for the PLO...In its pursuit of Arab markets it has displayed cynicism unmatched even by the European countries whose dependence on Arab oil is almost as great (Lerman, 1991: 5).

## 5.5 Japanese images and views of the Jewish People and Israel

The extent of influence of mental perceptions are difficult to measure, however, the following overview of the sources as well as the evolvement of the Japanese images and views of the Jewish people and Israel, will add a perceptual/psychological dimension to the overall understanding of the myriad factors which may/do participate in the shaping of Japan – Israel relations, and consequently, the Japanese mainstream newspapers' coverage of Israel.

In a historical perspective, a few events contributed to construction of the Jewish image in Japan. While in 1854 Jews were undistinguished from other foreigners who came to Japan as visitors and merchants, at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Shakespeare's *The Merchant of Venice* was translated and introduced to Japan,

to become basis for one of the major constructs for the image of Jews in the Japanese mind (Goodman and Refsing, 1992). Later, with the drop of the prohibition on Christianity since 1873 (Reischauer, 1991: 212), together with translation of the *Old and New Testaments*, the images of Jews were influenced by Christianity and the translated texts (Kowner, 1997: 2). After the end of WWI, in 1919, the first translation of the 'bible of anti-Semitism' – "The Protocols of the Elders of Zion", appeared in Japanese. This fabricated text introduced as fact by Czarist Russia, delineates the Jewish conspiracy to control the world, and is widely accepted as authoritative source even at present (Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995: 76). During WWII, with the Axis Pact with Nazi Germany, and especially following the break out of hostilities from 1941, there was an outburst of anti-Semitic literature being circulated in Japan, which triggered the first wave of anti-Jewish race hatred in the country (Kowner, 1997). Thus, already somewhat saturated with anti-Jewish literature, the close relations between Japan and Germany at the time contributed to these outbursts, in addition to the uses of anti-Jewish propaganda for domestic nationalist use (Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995).

Following a quiet era in terms of anti-Jewish sentiments for nearly thirty years, in 1971, the publication of the best-seller, *The Jews and the Japanese*, by a Japanese writer disguised as a Jew, marked the beginning of a new era of anti-Semitic literature which spans since that year all through the 1970s and 1980s (Kowner, 1997: 3). As of 1987, "nearly a hundred books which carried the word "Jew" in their titles were in circulation and many large bookstores displayed them in a special 'Jewish Corner'." (Kowner, 1997: 3). On March 12 of the same year the extent of this new increase in anti-Jewish writing in Japan triggered the *New York Times* to report that "flagrantly anti-Semitic books had become sensational best-sellers in Japan" (Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995: 1). The main theme of many of these books was modern day *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. Consequently, many of the books published in Japan during the 70s and 80s, are reiterations of this theme. For example, among the titles were: *The Jewish Plot to Control the World*; *The Secret of Jewish Power that Moves the World*; *If You Understand the Jews, You Understand the World*, and so on. Included in this theme were the 'facts' that Jews control all the "major banks, media, and business corporation in America" (Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995: 1), and consequently also the U.S. government, and America at large. While these books may be regarded as absurdity and insanity, the fact that these books were endorsed by the mainstream Japanese media, rang the

alarm bell (Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995: 1-3). Accordingly, in the late 1980s, owing to this proliferation “there was a resurrection of negative Jewish images” (Kowner, 1997: 1). This second wave of anti – Semitism in Japan seems to have been continuing up to and including the Gulf Crisis, as reflected by Weisman Steve’s (1991) article “*Anti – Semitic Books Still Hold Allure for Japanese Readers*”, that was published by the *New York Times* writer and reproduced by the *International Herald Tribune*, on the 20<sup>th</sup> February 1991.

What are the motives for such a vast literature on Jewish subjects, in a country with no historical links with the Jewish people, nor a substantial Jewish population? Moreover, why there are so many anti – Semitic books?

Many researchers have tried to explain this phenomena (for example Ikeda, 1993; Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995; Stern, 1988; Sugihara and Allan, 1993). Most of the interpretation can be divided into two main groups. One group of explanations interprets Japanese anti – Semitism as due to the fact that Jews is the reflection of the ‘other’. By using the image of Jews to reflect the ‘other’, the Japanese: displace their frustration toward the West; displace the xenophobic feelings toward foreigners; or, is a reflection of Israel’s image and Japan’s stance toward the Arab world (Kowner, 1997). Another major explanation is that the image of Jews “is used to facilitate internal needs” (Kowner, 1997: 5). As such, it reinforces Japanese sense of uniqueness; explains Japan’s economic difficulties; or, it acts as “warning and negative model for Japan” (Kowner, 1997: 5).

Whereas so far, the sources as well as the reasoning for the images of Jews have been linked to anti – Jewish writings in Japan, there is another important source for the construct of Jews, Israelis and Israel’s images in the Japanese mind, which comes from left – leaning ideological convictions.

Following their exploration into *Jews in the Japanese Mind* (1995), in their chapter “Socialism of the Fools” (Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995: 183-219), Professors Miyazawa of Doshisha University and Goodman of the University of Illinois, delineate the development of attitudes towards Israel since the formal inception of the idea of a Jewish state as adopted by the Balfour Declaration of 1919. They write that beginning in the 1920s, “Marxism was virtually synonymous with social sciences in Japan” (Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995: 103 - 105). However, although the Japanese left was fascinated and supported Nasser’s campaign against Western imperialism during the 1950s, on the whole, the Middle East as a

region, did not receive much attention at the time. Following the 1960 renewal of the U.S. – Japan Mutual Security Treaty which was signed amid large – scale anti – Treaty protests that paralysed Japan, the country embarked on an economic plan to double Japan’s national income within ten years. With preference clearly to the capitalist path, the left had become considerably weaker (Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995: 186-189). With respect to the Japanese left, it never regained its pre – treaty power, however, it did find a new direction for its activity. Among the Japanese left’s objectives for support, the Palestinian struggle against Israel became “second in importance only to the struggle of the Viet Cong against the United States” (Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995: 192 ).

Japanese Marxists adopted Lenin and Stalin’s view of repudiating the Jews as people, and therefore negating their right for a homeland. However, since 1967, and especially following the 1973 Oil Crisis, this view was gradually adopted into the mainstream political discourse (Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995: 192). Consequently, “ From 1973 on, the notion that the Jews were not a people, that ‘Jewish nationalism’ was somehow oxymoron, and that every – thing Israel did was thus inherently suspect, became widely accepted in Japan” (Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995: 194). Various prominent academics and journalists helped diffuse these ideas throughout, though analysis of their ideas indicate that they were all duplication of Communist, as well as Arab, mainly Palestinian sources. For example, the ideas as espoused by the Palestinian National Charter stating that Israel is a “racist – imperialist” state, that Judaism is inherently intolerant religion, the Jews as “Nazis”, among other ideas, “came to be integrated into the reservoir of Japanese images of the Jews” (Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995: 211).

Thus, although the left had been systematically marginalized throughout the post – Treaty era (see for example Sugimoto and Mouer, 1989; Mouer and Sugimoto, 1986), the Oil Crisis of 1973 presented a golden opportunity for both the left and the right to co – operate on a single cause, though for different reasons (Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995: 217). Goodman and Miyazawa explain the convergence: “Where the left supported the Palestinians as a means to repudiate capitalist imperialism, the government supported the Palestinians to ensure that Japan would continue unhindered to develop as a capitalist power” (Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995: 217). Consequently, the villainisation of Israel, and the “persistent, categorical denigration of Jewish peoplehood, history, and culture” by the Japanese left, had bequeathed an enduring legacy (Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995: 219).

Partially echoing Goodman and Miyazawa's views on the left – right co – operation on the issue of Israel, Ikeda (1993), a researcher at the Institute for Development Economics, Tokyo, states that there are three groups which are the most influential on Japan–Israel relations. The first is the government, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry for International Trade and Industry. The second group is the Japanese businesses – epitomised by Keidanren, the Federation of Economic Organisations, which “has tried to exercise much of its influence over the government on Japan's Middle East policy very energetically since 1973, in striking contrast to the preceding period. And the third is the ‘Middle East intellectuals’. This group includes “the non-governmental experts– the retired ambassadors, professors, journalists and ‘think tank’ researchers” (Ikeda, 1993: 160). Ikeda (1993) however, explains the left – right co – operation differently from Goodman and Miyazawa (1995). He states that the ‘Middle East intellectuals’ ideas and studies are used “as guides for the future direction of Japan's Middle East diplomacy”, or “as camouflage or smoke-screen by the politicians and bureaucrats who might not always be happy to expose real intentions and motivations behind decisions they make” (Ikeda, 1993: 160).

Ikeda (1993) also further expands on the co-operation between the left and the right, and explains that this co-operation stems from an additional source, namely the concern of preserving Japanese national identity. Whereas intellectuals on the left see the world as dichotomous, as the struggle against imperialism of the West, nationalist on the right see the “Arab propaganda on the history of Palestine “ as acceptable Palestinian nationalism, “which is in turn seen as an integral part of modern Asian nationalism” (Ikeda, 1993: 160). For the right, Japan should help the Arabs against Israel, as “a leader of Asia, and protector of oriental values”, while the left’s argument of “international class struggle, and togetherness, with the oppressed masses of the Arabs against Europe-centric neo–colonialism, lie on almost the same track” (Ikeda, 1993: 161). Both the left and the right according to Ikeda (1993), are concerned with preserving Japan’s national identity (Ikeda, 1993: 161). This insight is consequently related directly to the discussions on Japaneseness, or *Nihonjinron*, elaborated on in Chapter One.

With the main sources identified, in the following, the consequences of the diffusion of anti – Jewish as well as left – leaning ideological literature, are explored.

What are Japanese images of Jews, Israelis, and Israel, and are these images related? Early researches into Japanese attitudes toward Jews were conducted in 1962, 1963, 1965, and 1988 (Kowner, 1997). While

the first two surveys produced clearly negative images of Jews, the 1965 findings contained somewhat better attitudes (Kowner, 1997).

In 1988, disturbed by the renewed wave of anti – Jewish writings, and with a twenty years gap in exploration of Japanese attitudes toward Jews, the Anti Defamation League (ADL)'s of B'nai Brith conducted a research on Japanese attitudes and perception of various groups, to assess the impact of this wave of anti – Jewish writings. The survey produced a somewhat mixed image of Jews. On the whole, the findings were summarised as follows: "Jews tended to be seen as greedy and unfriendly, and to a lesser extent unclean and deceitful. At the same time they were assessed more often than not as brave, hard – working, intelligent, and spiritual. Jews were consistently ranked below Christians and Buddhist, and often were clustered together with Muslims, Arabs, and Blacks" (Kowner, 1997: 6).

In the same ADL survey, it was also found that: "The State of Israel 'ranked at or near the low point in perceptions held of its trustworthiness, commitment to peace, straightforwardness in business dealings, generosity to other nations, and level of economic advancement'. Significantly, the survey found that the college educated, affluent, and younger respondents were more likely to harbour such negative views than others" (Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995: 4). However, this research did not explore the relations between attitudes and perceptions toward Jews and Israelis.

Nearly ten years after the ADL research, in his 1997's research, Kowner (1997) of the Hebrew University concludes in his findings that Japanese images of Jews contain both negative and positive images. Moreover, he also discovered that there was a "high correlation between the image of Jews and Israelis" (Kowner, 1997: 30). The high correlation between Jews and Israelis, according to Kowner (1997), "suggest some association between the image of the two groups and that the Middle East conflict affects the current image in general" (Kowner, 1997: 19).

Notwithstanding, Kowner (1997) points out that the most alarming findings of the data however were, in the Japanese attitudes toward Jews. He writes: "Although Jews are not perceived as an evil power conspiring to demolish Japan, our respondents expressed apprehension over contact with Jews. Such fear cannot be measured in absolute terms, yet compared with other out-groups, a certain level of repulsion is indisputable" (Kowner, 1997: 31).

In his interpretation of “Japanese Attitudes toward Jews in International perspective”, Kowner (1997) writes that, on the whole, in Japan, there is characteristically aversive racism where there is reluctance on the part of the Japanese to engage in any kind of intimacy with out-group members, and rejection of contact with them. However, the findings regarding attitudes toward Jews were alarming since the respondents of the survey did not have ever any contact with Jews (Kowner, 1997: 33).

As to a comparison between the image of Israeli, and Arabs, it was found in the research that while the images of Israelis and Arabs were negative, there were a few differences: “Arabs were also perceived as quarrelsome, enthusiastic, self – confident, temperamental, and independent, but they did not have the asocial image Israelis did. Their image contained some positive aspects similar to that of foreigners and Westerners, such as being bold, cheerful, and frank” (Kowner, 1997: 11). Compared with the ADL survey of 1988, which found that in most cases Arabs and Israelis were grouped together, at the bottom scale in terms of favourable image, Kowner’s (1997) data reveals deterioration of Israelis’ image, when compared to the image of Arabs, in Japan. Nevertheless, it becomes abundantly clear from consecutive surveys, that the image of Jews, Israel, and the Israelis is rather negative in Japan.

All in all, as could be seen from this short introduction to the issue of Japanese images and perceptions of Jews, Israelis, and Israel, it is clear that there are various sources to the construct of these images. There is also evidence for the widespread diffusion of these images among the public, as was apparent from the findings of the various surveys.

To what extent the media is influenced by these sources or conversely, to what degree, if at all, the media is a vehicle for the diffusion of these ideas, needs still to be researched. However, Goodman and Miyazawa (1995) have already found substantial evidence for the influence of the left, in mainstream Japanese newspapers such as the *Mainichi* and *Asahi* newspapers, in addition to prominent magazines. Especially striking were their findings concerning the imprints of Communist anti – Semitic ideology in the coverage of Israel, particularly after the 1973 Oil Crisis (Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995). Since this thesis focuses on that period as well, though not the objective of this paper *per se*, the extent of influence of the various sources which contributed to the construct of the images of Jews, Israelis, and Israel, in Japan as reflected in newspapers’ content, will probably become clearer.

## **CHAPTER SIX: RESEARCH DESIGN**

## 6.1 Introduction

The Middle East conflict is one of the most enduring conflicts in modern history (Gerner, 1994; Lewis, 1995). Moreover, though it is one of the most volatile areas of the world, it is also a major source of world's energy. With regards to media coverage of the region, much of the world's media focuses on the Arab/ Palestinian conflict with Israel as the core of the region's instability (e.g., Ibrahim, 2003; Kamhawi, 2002; Nawawy, 2001; Zelizer et al., 2002).

Consequently, the issue of foreign media's coverage of the region is of a major concern to the relevant countries, due to the media's potential power to affect their home country's policymakers as well as public opinion. Within this concern, both sides of the conflict claim the media to be biased and favour the other (Zelizer et al., 2002).

While the Israeli side asserts that the western media favours the Arab/Palestinian side in their reporting, the Arab/Palestinian side says it is just the other way around (Zelizer et al., 2002).

Numerous researchers, especially on US media, uncovered evidence of negative and stereotypical reporting on the Arabs/Palestinians as partially derived from the west's views of Islamic/Arab societies (see for example Barsamian, 2001, Lind and Danwoski, 1998, Liebes, 1992, as cited by Moody-Hall, 2002). Accordingly, numerous researches have shown the US media to appear pro-Israel and anti-Arab/Palestinian (Adas, 2001, as cited by Moody-Hall, 2002; Ibrahim, 2003; Nawawy, 2001). Still, some others have shown the case to be just the opposite (CAMERA, 2001; FairReporting, 2004; HonestReporting, 2004; MiddleEastTruth, 2004; Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995; van Wolferen, 1989).

As for Japan, which has no historical links to the region and which has no historical Israeli /Jewish nor Arab/Palestinian population, the case of its media's reporting on the Middle East makes it a unique case study of reporting on the Middle East.

Moreover, the fact that the Japanese mainstream media and, consequently, their reporting had been demonstrated to be conditioned and influenced to a large extent by different contexts, that is by its Japanese-eastern contexts, adds to its unique quality among case studies investigating Middle East coverage.

Thus, the main objective of the present research is to explore the Japanese media's reporting on the Middle East, particularly Israel, during the two decades, from the beginning of the 1970s, prior to the Oil Crisis, until the end of the Gulf Crisis of 1990 - 1991. The rationale for the focus on these two decades is elaborated on, below.

Based on the previous chapters' findings, a brief theoretical proposition as to the evolution of the mainstream Japanese media's coverage of the Middle East, and particularly, Israel, during the selected period will be presented, followed by the present study's research construct.

Although an Oil Crisis was already brewing since the beginning of the 1970s, the threat of the use of 'Oil as weapon' (Hanai, 1976: 104) was dormant, and as such, did not emerge as an issue influencing the reporting on the Middle East. However, subsequent to the break-out of the 4<sup>th</sup> Middle East War, and the declaration as well as the implementation, by the oil producing countries of their intention to use oil as a political bargaining tool, it dawned on the Japanese political establishment that they have to respond to the unfolding new reality.

Following recognition by the Japanese political establishment that Japan's national interests in terms of oil supplies, and hence economic growth that was deemed top-priority since the end of WWII, is under perilous threat, and the realisation, as had been elucidated by the Arab demands, that positive relations with Israel are impediments to Japan's oil supplies, the official foreign policy line towards Israel and its neighbours was reviewed and a new, pro-Arab foreign policy was adopted and declared. The new policy was officially inaugurated and epitomised by the Nikaido Declaration of the 22<sup>nd</sup> November, 1973.

The unfolding situation and its severity were explained and have been continuously fed to the media through the various established channels such as the Journalists Clubs, as well as the *shingikai* and *keiretsu*. The media reported the crisis and modified their coverage to accommodate the official foreign policy line (as they have also done in regards to Japanese policy towards Russia, China, the US and so on). Moreover, the mainstream media have retained on the whole, their anti-Israel and pro-Arab/Palestinian line ever since then. They have been in accord with the official Japanese government line, which has not been dramatically altered during the period under study (Lerman, 1991: 6).

While the above is the theoretical proposition as to the evolution of Japan's relations with the Middle East, as well as the Japanese media's coverage of the region, it is worth mentioning that some researchers

view the processes delineated above, somewhat differently. Notably, Goodman and Miyazawa (1995), Licklider (1985), as well as Takigawa (2002)<sup>56</sup>, view the shift of Japan's foreign policy as having changed slowly since the Six Days War, in 1967 and coverage to have been starting to change since the 1972 terrorist attack on the Israeli airport of Lod, where Japanese terrorists who together with Palestinian Arabs involved in the attack, were glorified by mainstream media and not only by the fringe (Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995).

Though clearly a substantiated view, with regards to the media's reporting, the present research sees the Japanese government's public announcement of its change of policy, the Nikaido Declaration of 22<sup>nd</sup> November, 1973, as the most significant formal statement regarding the alteration of its official policy towards the Middle East. That is, making a public pronouncement of an alteration of the governmental foreign policy that was in fact, already settling in place, albeit quietly.

## 6.2 Research Construct

While the major intent of the research design is to assess the validity of the above, it also aims at the larger picture, that is, appraising whether the findings of the previous chapters regarding the Japanese mainstream media's international reporting are indeed enduring. Therefore, the present research aims to answer the subsequent two questions:

1. How did the Japanese media's reporting on the Middle East during the two decades from the beginning of the 1970s until the end of the Gulf Crisis evolve and were the changes in accord with government foreign policy toward the Middle East?
2. Is there substantial evidence to attest that the findings in Chapters Three and Four regarding the Japanese mainstream media foreign news reporting are indeed lasting?

To answer these questions, research questions and related hypotheses have been formulated and are introduced. In addition, the rationale for the selected samples as reflected by the hypotheses will be

---

<sup>56</sup> Personal e-mail interview with Takigawa Yoshito, a lecturer at Kyoto University of Foreign Studies, and an employee of the Israeli embassy in Tokyo since 1968. The views aired are his personal views, and should not be taken in conjunction with the embassy's.

explained below. Following the elaboration on the samples, the research techniques to be used are explained and reasoned, as well as final details as to the actual construct of the research.

### **6.2.1 Research Questions and Hypotheses**

To address the first question of this paper is to examine how did the mainstream Japanese media respond to the changing foreign policy of its government toward the Middle East. Therefore, the first research question is:

**RQ1:** Is the evolvement of the Japanese mainstream media reporting on Israel in accord with the changes in the Japanese foreign policy toward the Middle East?

Based on Chapters Three, Four and Five of this thesis, the following hypotheses have been formulated.

H1: The pre – Oil Crisis sample (S1) will present a relatively low level of interest in news concerned with Israel, and reporting will be inconsistent among the three newspapers.

H2: The Oil Crisis sample (S2+ S3) will present a massive as well as negative reporting on Israel to coincide with the Oil Crisis.

H3: Within the Oil Crisis sample, the influence of the Nikaido Declaration of 22<sup>nd</sup> November regarding the Japanese government's change of policy toward the Middle East will be evident in the reporting on Israel (S2, S3).

H4: Coverage during the quiet period of January-July 1985 (S4) will present, on the whole, low level of interest as well as negative tone of reporting on Israel .

H5: Coverage during the Gulf Crisis, from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 until the end of the Gulf War in February 1991(S5) will present a mixed picture of Israel where on the one hand Israel is portrayed as a victim of Iraqi missile attacks, and on the other hand, especially through the linkage thesis, will be portrayed negatively as an aggressor whose withdrawal is part of the solution to the crisis.

**RQ2:** Is the evolvement of the Japanese mainstream media reporting on the Arab countries of the Middle East and the Palestinian people in accord with the changes in the Japanese foreign policy toward the Middle East?

Based on Chapters Three, Four and Five of this thesis, the following hypotheses have been formulated.

H6: The pre – Oil Crisis sample (S1) will present a relatively low level of interest in news concerned with the Arab countries of the Middle East, as well as the Palestinian people, and reporting on these subjects will be inconsistent among the three newspapers.

H7: The Oil Crisis sample (S2+S3) will present a massive along with positive reporting on the Arab countries of the Middle East and, albeit to a lesser extent, positive reporting on the Palestinian people, in response to the Oil Crisis and the policy changes it ensued.

H8: Coverage during the quiet period of January-July 1985 (S4) will present on the whole low a level of interest as well as positive coverage of the Arab countries and the Palestinian people.

H9.1: Coverage during the Gulf Crisis, from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 until the end of the Gulf War in February 1991(S5) will present, on the whole, a somewhat more negative picture of the Arab world. A negative coverage is projected to reflect the inter-Arab conflict in addition to the fundamental divisions within the Arab world which had been epitomised by the pro-Iraq vis-à-vis anti-Iraq Arab coalitions (Nobuo, 1991: 415; Ikeda, 1993; Radke, 1988). However, tilt toward the Arab side will be evident, to be in accord with Japan's official foreign policy during the crisis, which was reluctantly and ambivalently pro-US (Ikeda, 1993; Nobuo, 1991).

H9.2: Coverage of the Palestinian people during the Gulf Crisis will be on the whole, positive, as a result of the linkage thesis (the linkage thesis linked Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait with Israel's withdrawal from the disputed territories, see Double Standard, 2002).

The following questions and hypotheses address the second primary aim of this research, i.e., to verify whether there is substantial evidence to attest that Chapter Three and Four's findings regarding the Japanese mainstream media's foreign news reporting are indeed enduring.

**RQ3:** While contexts are conspicuous at all times, in what distinct ways did the Japanese contexts come into the interplay in terms of the reporting on the Middle East?

Based on Chapter One to Five, the following hypotheses have been formulated:

H10: The Japanese newspapers will present conformity in their content of reporting on Israel in terms of the selection of news frames to portray Israel. That is, there will be no clear distinction among the left-leaning or right-leaning newspapers in their selection of frames.

H11: The Japanese newspapers will present conformity in their reporting on the Arabs and Palestinians in terms of the selection of news frames to portray the Arabs and Palestinians. That is, there will be no clear distinction among the left-leaning or right-leaning newspapers in their selection of frames.

H12: The differing manner of treatment given to Israel, as compared with the one conferred to the Arabs and the Palestinians will testify and present evidence for the application of double standards.

H13: Evidence for Japanese mainstream media's disregard for major Western journalistic norms will emerge.

Finally, and as a continuation of the probe into the influences of contexts on the reporting, the last object of interest is the manner with which Japan was covered by the mainstream Japanese media, in relation to the Middle East. Taking into consideration the findings of Chapters Three and Four, the following questions and hypotheses were formulated.

**RQ4:** While it can be assumed that the Middle East coverage during the two decades under analysis will not involve Japan most of the time since Japan was not actively involved in the region, when it did, how was Japan / Japanese foreign policy portrayed?

H14: The Japanese mainstream media will strongly support their country's national interests and consequently the Japanese government's foreign policy changes towards the Middle East during the Oil Crisis. Thus, the mainstream Japanese media will portray the foreign policy changes as the only sensible way (Pan and Kosicki, 1993: 58).

H15: While supporting their government (H14), the nationalistic, as well as cultural nationalistic traits of the Japanese mainstream media will become evident, regardless of the political inclination of the media involved. That is, while demarcating the boundaries between 'us' and 'them', the media will retort to framing Japan as the victim, as well as portraying their country as "a small country with no resources...(and therefore) must react as a whole if it is to survive" (Mouer and Sugimoto, 1986: 234; Yoshino, 2000).

### 6.3.1 Methodology

#### *Sample*

In the subsequent section, the selection of the newspapers, the sample of periods, as well as the sample units and their types, are introduced and elaborated on.

#### *Newspapers Samples:*

Three newspapers were selected for this analysis, the *Asahi*, *Yomiuri*, and the *Mainichi*. The *Yomiuri*, is the newspaper with the highest circulation in the world. The *Asahi* comes second in the world in terms of circulation and the *Mainichi* third (Cooper-Chen, 1997b: 54). In terms of political leaning, the *Asahi* and *Mainichi* stand close to the “leftist opposition parties” (Ito, 1993 as cited by Cooper-Chen, 1997b: 36), while *Yomiuri* is closer to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (Cooper-Chen, 1997b: 36).

Moreover, *Asahi*, among the three, is considered the most politically influential newspaper in Japan (Feldman, 1993: 43,137). It is also the most influential newspaper among policymakers, the Japanese Diet (parliament) members, of whom 43.8% of them read it on a constant basis. Following the *Asahi*, Japanese Diet members chose the *Nikkei*, the Japanese economic news newspaper, as their second preferred newspaper, with 19.9% readership. The *Yomiuri* comes much lower, with 11.4% readership and lastly, the *Mainichi*, even further below with 5.7% readership among Diet members (Feldman, 1993: 156). Moreover, as to the influential position of the *Asahi* and *Nikkei*, “more than 60 percent of the Diet members read only these two newspapers” (Feldman, 1993: 156). Thus, Diet members’ preferred newspaper was not based solely on its circulation. The rationale of Diet members preferred newspaper is that the *Asahi* is considered “the most prestigious daily newspaper in Japan” with its “diversified political and economic information” (Feldman, 1993: 156).

#### *Periods Samples*

The following sample periods were selected with the intention of uncovering when and in what ways the Japanese media’s coverage of the Middle East in general, and of Israel in particular, have changed to accommodate and reflect the changes in the Japanese government’s Middle East policies.

The first sample selected is from January until July 1973, as a period of pre-Oil Crisis coverage. This sample is called henceforth, Sample One (S1).

The second period selected is from October 1973 until April 1974, the Oil Crisis period. This period is further split into pre-Nikaido Declaration and post-Nikaido Declaration. The pre-Nikaido Declaration period is called from now on, Sample Two (S2), while post-Nikaido Declaration is termed Sample Three (S3).

The third period is from January until July 1985, to represent a relatively peaceful period. This period is called Sample Four (S4).

Finally, the fourth sample, the Gulf Crisis sample, is from August 1990 until February 1991, from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait until the end of the Gulf war, and is termed Sample Five (S5).

### ***Sample Units and Types***

The selection of articles for this research was based on a search through newspapers' indexes. All Japanese main newspapers are reproduced into monthly editions. Each such edition contains the copy of all the newspapers published during that month. All articles that were reported by the indexes to be related to Israel were selected. However, this search produced a vast number of articles and it was unrealistic to seek to analyse them all. Therefore, three types of articles were selected among all the articles related to Israel: front page articles, editorials, and all inner pages articles that fulfilled one of the following criteria: in-depth analysis, feature articles, opinion pieces, any other special endeavours by the newspaper such as the newspaper's foreign correspondents' symposium where the newspaper reports in one article and on a single topic, views from a number of foreign correspondents in different locations.

Front page articles are usually perceived as the most important news of the day (Zelizer et al., 2002), so for this research they represent the main sample of hard news. In contrast, editorials are usually accepted as the legitimate ground where the paper can establish its own position on a subject (Hindman, 1999: 503). Finally, all the other articles considered in this research represent an array of articles whose common denominator is extra endeavours on the part of the newspaper. This group of articles represents a type which may be considered as equivalent to newspaper's editorial board efforts at accentuating particular

aspects (Zelizer et al., 2002), attempts at explanation of events, and all that is in addition to hard news reporting.

All in all, a total of 1004 articles fulfilled one of the criteria delineated above, and were consequently analysed.

### ***Coding Schemes***

Using SPSS for Windows, the following details have been recorded for each article: newspaper name, selected sample, page, type of article, size of article, journalist location, sources nationality and ranks, main frames, and lower-level frames for Israel, Arabs, Palestinians and Japan. Regarding the reasoning and details of the main frames and lower-level frames, an explanation is given below.

### ***Analytical Techniques***

To answer the research questions, two main research techniques have been employed, and will be used concurrently. One procedure is frame analysis that will be measured quantitatively. The other is the established qualitative content analysis, based on the manifest content of the selected media. While most of the data will be analysed using frame analysis due to the procedure's capacity to assess large amount of data, qualitative content analysis will be used as well, specifically for analysing the editorials.

### ***Why Frame Analysis ?***

A number of reasons contributed to the selection of frame analysis as the main analytical technique to be used in this research. One impetus was since frame analysis meshes well with Gramsci's 'Hegemony Theory' (Moody-Hall, 2002), thus corresponds to Parts Three and Four's findings. Further, it has been selected as it allows an exploration beyond traditional quantitative and qualitative content analysis, to unveil myriad added insights as evidenced in media content, which have been overlooked by content analysis.

Entman (1993) discussed the failings of content analyses saying that "They neglect to measure the salience of elements in the text, and fail to gauge the relationships of the most salient clusters of messages

(the frames) to audience's schemata" (Entman, 1993: 57). Entman (1993) further stressed that, in fact, content analyses findings might even mislead, since "content analysis may often yield data that misrepresent the media messages that most audience members are actually picking up" (Entman, 1993: 57). The failings of traditional content analyses are particularly true for the Japanese media, a factor that was an additional major stimulus for selecting frame analysis. As was shown in Parts One and Two, one of the major Japanese shared values is the art of 'gut reading' (*haragei*), or, non-verbal communication, a value which by itself encompasses a variety of other Japanese values as well. The implication of *haragei* on the performance of the Japanese media are numerous and discussed already at length in the above chapters. However, it is worth recalling that the major manifestations of *haragei* are that the language is often uniformed, vague, ambiguous, and avoids conflict (see for example Matsumoto, 1989; Cooper-Chen, 1997b; Sherman, 1990). Furthermore, Japanese communication style relies to a large extent on ellipsis, that is, omission of words, which linguistically means that "people can complete the missing parts from the context" (Donahue, 1998: 165). As a result of the Japanese style of communication, Japanese newspapers writing style had been described as "Tempura" style, in reference to fish fried in batter. The intent of this analogy is to contend that "superfluous batter must be removed before the content can be known" (Donahue, 1998: 243). The disparity with western style of communication had been elucidated by a researcher, who demonstrated that "the lead for the English article developed largely from the final clause of the Japanese one" (Donahue, 1998: 244). Thus, a traditional quantitative content analysis intending on quantitatively aggregating adjectives for example, will be, on the whole, meaningless, since the communication style implies avoidance of direct and evaluative speech. On the other hand, to analyse a large quantity of data, qualitative content analysis, is infeasible.

The major added value of identifying frames in news is explained by Jakubowics (2002) who reminds us that media content is a product of negotiated reality that results in the 'pictures in our heads', and not of an objective reality: "The media are active participants in the selection and framing of the world, transforming this selectivity through cultural practices, which then deliver meaning-rich experiences to audiences" (Jakubowics and Palmer, 2002: 200). As such, the systematic and particular selection and portrayal that is involved in the process of framing is conditioned by a variety of factors to reproduce a picture of reality which is meaningful for its audience. Hence,

frames are thus reflective not of the reality being reported, but rather of the assumed reality of the reception environment. The audiences are embedded in their own cultural words, and the narratives to which they are exposed have to be constructed in terms that fit with their assumptions about the way in which the world works (Jakubowics and Palmer, 2002).

In this way, framing tell us something both on the producers and consumers of media content.

Moreover, frame analysis, in addition to informing us about news producers and their audiences, can also tell us something about the power structure in society:

In Zaller's (1992) account, framing appears to be a central power in the democratic process, for political elites control the framing of issues. These frames can determine just what 'public opinion' is - a different frame, according to Zaller, and survey evidence and even voting can indicate a different public opinion. His theory, along with that of Kahneman and Tversky, seems to raise radical doubts about democracy itself. If by shaping frames elites can determine the major manifestations of 'true' public opinion that are available to government (via polls or voting), what can true public opinion be? (Entman, 1993: 57).

### ***What are News Frames***

News frames are conceptual tools that "convey, interpret and evaluate information" (Neuman et al, 1992, p. 60, as cited by Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000: 94). By systematically selecting, emphasising, and excluding information, frames set the delimiters for the discussions of public issues by the citizens. That is, they "narrow the available political alternatives" (Tuchman, 1978, p.156, as cited by Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000: 94 ), and they help the audience to "locate, perceive, identify, and label' the flow of information around them" (Goffman, 1974, p.21, as cited by Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000: 94), regarding those available alternatives.

News frames may also be called themes. Pan (1993) explains that, due to their capabilities of restricting the available perspectives, as well as directing attention, they have a structuring function, and as such "a theme is also called a frame" (Pan and Kosicki, 1993: 59).

### ***What is Framing?***

To frame is:

*to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communication text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described. Typically frames diagnose, evaluate, and prescribe a point... (Entman, 1993: 52, italic in origin).*

In other words, framing refers to “how event is packaged and presented in the media” (Severin and Tankard, 2001, p.15, as cited by Lasorsa, 2002: 277).

Therefore, if one compares two similar media narratives, which have been reproduced differently, one can uncover media frames through the systematic and differential selection, omissions, accentuation etc of aspects, which otherwise should have been the same. The importance of comparing similar news narrative lies in the fact that frame analysis will reveal the “critical textual choices that framed the story but would otherwise remain submerged in an undifferentiated text” (Entman, 1991: 6). If media narratives are not compared, frames are difficult to uncover since “many of the framing devices can appear as ‘natural’, unremarkable choices of words or images” (Entman, 1991: 6). Thus, a comparison of two similar narratives will testify to the reality that lexical choices reveal that they “are not inevitable or unproblematic but rather are central to the way news frames helps establish the literally ‘common sense’ (i.e., widespread) interpretation of events” (Entman, 1991: 6). So, “if the media defines an overseas civil conflict in terms of a Communist threat rather than ,say, as an internal economic struggle, then the public comes to perceive the conflict that way” (Lasorsa, 2002).

### ***Location and the Working of Frames***

Frames work as follows:

By providing, repeating, and thereby reinforcing words and visual images that reference some ideas but not others, frames work to make some ideas more salient in the text, others less so - and others entirely invisible...through repetition, placement, and reinforcing associations with each other, the words and images that comprise the frame render one basic interpretation more readily discernible, comprehensible, and memorable than others (Entman, 1991: 7).

However, it should always be kept in mind that “Most frames are defined by what they omit as well as include and the omissions of potential problem definitions, explanations, evaluations, and recommendations may be as critical as the inclusions in guiding the audience” (Entman, 1993: 54).

### ***Functions of Frames:***

According to Entman (1993), frames have four main functions:

1. Frames define problems: by defining a problem, the frame determines “what a causal agent is doing with what costs and benefits, usually measured in terms of common cultural values”

2. Frames diagnose causes: by identifying “the forces creating the problem”
3. Frames make a moral judgement: by evaluating “causal agents and their effects”
4. Frames suggest remedies: by offering and justifying “treatments for the problems and predict their likely effects” (Entman, 1993: 52).

In addition, Graber (1980) distinguished four additional functions for news: (1) The interpretation and linkage function: “news events are interpreted from a given point of view or placed in a given context”. (2) The function of projecting to the future and past “The historical perspective outlines historical lines and background information and uses them to make predictions about the future”. (3) The agenda-setting function: where “the tone of the article implies that more attention should be directed towards a certain subject or that it should be placed on the (political) agenda”. (4) The action stimulation function: which “means that the media suggests the need for taking action” (Graber, 1980, p. 187, as cited by d'Haenens and Verleest, 2002).

As to the various functions' compatibility, Entman (1993) elaborates that while one sentence may represent one or more of these functions, many sentences in texts do not perform any of these functions at all (Entman, 1993: 52).

### ***What is Frame Analysis:***

Frame analysis should be confined and set in the following manner:

The frame must include only those elements of the message that are critical to its presumed impacts on information processing; otherwise there would be no distinction between frame and text. The analytical goal should be to determine which of a narrative's words and images are components of the frame and which are not...the frame analysis should emphasise what is politically important in news texts, given then-current policy agendas and disputes (Entman, 1991: 8).

### ***Two Main Approaches to Frame Analysis***

There are two major ways to approach frame analysis, the deductive and the inductive approaches. The deductive approach analyses the occurrence of certain pre-defined frames. This approach demands that the researcher performing the search should have a clear idea of the possible frames likely to be encountered, because those frames that are not defined may be overlooked (Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000).

Conversely, the inductive approach involves analysing a news story in an open-ended style to reveal an

array of conceivable frames. This approach identifies relevant frames, but is laborious and therefore requires a small sample (Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000).

### *Types of Frames*

Iyenagar (1993) identified two over-arching frames, the episodic and thematic. The episodic frames, as the name implies, centre on isolated, specific incidents, events, individuals, or public issues in a case-specific manner, without past or future. For example, they will focus on an unemployed person, a victim of some incident and so on. Thematic frames conversely depict an issue in an in-depth way, where background and contexts of an issue are presented to produce a broader understanding of issues (Iyenagar and Simon, 1993: 369).

In addition, recurring frames in international news were found to exist and identified. The most recurrent frames are: the conflict frame, responsibility frame, human-interest frame, morality frame and the economic consequence frame (Iyenagar and Simon, 1993; Kamhawi, 2002; Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000). The conflict frame emphasises conflict between parties (Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000). The responsibility frame attributes responsibility, credit, or blame, on individuals or institutions (Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000). Iyenagar (1993) further divides the responsibility into two dimensions: the causal and treatment responsibility. While the causal responsibility focuses on the origin of an issue or problem, the treatment responsibility centres on “who or what has the power either to alleviate or to forestall alleviation of the issue” (Iyenagar and Simon, 1993: 369). The human-interest frame focuses on individuals and emotions. Moreover, it focuses on the individual and highlights that individual’s emotions in relation to an issue, event, or a problem. Personalization of an issue helps concretise an abstract issue, or conflict, and thus, facilitates “the assignment of blame and agency” (Zelizer et al., 2002: 291). Consequently, personalisation, and the related emotions it generates, dramatize the news narrative “to capture and hold the audience's attention (Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000; d'Haenens and Verlest, 2002). The Morality frame “adds a religious or moral charge to an event, problem, or subject. Because professional journalistic standards require objectivity, journalists often refer indirectly to this morality frame. In other words, by quoting someone they can include a moral message or describe a specific code of behaviour in their story” (Semetko, 2000 as cited by d'Haenens and Verlest, 2002 ). And, finally, the economic consequence frame

focuses on the economic consequences that any event will have on the audience (Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000). By highlighting the economic impact an event might have on individuals, institutions etc, who are among, or, who are the audience, the economic frame concretises an issue or event, adds to its news value, and makes the issue relevant to its audience. (Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000; d'Haenens and Verleest, 2002).

Additional frames that were identified and defined by their functions include the diagnostic frame, the prognostic frame (Gerhards & Ruchet, 1992, as cited by Kamhawi, 2002), as well as the implication frame. The diagnostic frame focuses on "an explanation of the background, causes and consequences" of a problem, while the prognostic frame stresses and "seeks to detail solution to the problem" (Gerhards & Ruchet, 1992, as cited by Kamhawi, 2002). Finally, the implication frame intends to uncover how an action, or event will affect future developments (Gerhards & Ruchet, 1992, as cited by Kamhawi, 2002).

### ***Framing Devices***

Entman (1991) identified a few salient aspects of text, namely; volume and prominence of coverage, establishment of agency, generalisation, categorisation and identification (Entman, 1991). On volume and prominence, Entman (1993) states that they are fundamental since they convey importance and/or legitimacy through their volume.

Pan and Kosicki (1993) distinguished four structural dimensions of news discourse that function as framing devices: the syntactical structure, the script structure, the thematic structure and the rhetoric structure (Pan and Kosicki, 1993: 56). Within these framing devices, the most relevant for the present study are the thematic and rhetoric ones. As to thematic structure, they elaborate in the following, insightful manner:

Not all news stories are action or event oriented. Some news consists of so-called issue stories that focus on one issue or topic at a time and report several events, actions, or statements related to the issue. A story of this kind contains certain hypothesis-testing features: Events are cited, sources are quoted, and propositions are pronounced; all function as logical support for the hypothesis. Even the action-oriented stories very often contain certain hypothesis-testing elements: a theme is presented or implied, and evidence in the forms of journalists' observations of actions or quotations of a source is presented to support the hypothesis. We call this hypothesis - testing (or research finding) aspect of news discourse 'thematic structure' (Pan and Kosicki, 1993: 60).

Thus, the thematic structure, whether action story or issue oriented, is an hierarchy of numerous layers and sub-themes, but with one dominant or central theme that connects the whole structure (Pan and Kosicki, 1993: 61). As to the rhetorical structure dimension, or framing device, it is explained as the "stylistic choices made by journalists in relation to their intended effects"(Pan and Kosicki, 1993: 61). In fact, what Pan and Kosicki (1993) call the rhetorical structure, is precisely what Entman (1993) defined as the actual act of framing process, described above. Journalists have a vast repertoire to choose from, and by selecting certain denominators rather than others, they exercise their choice. Hence, if the Nicaraguan antigovernment rebels are labelled as 'freedom fighters', rather than terrorists for example, a clear ideological orientation is presented. Thus, "choosing a particular designator, then, is a clear and sometimes powerful cue signifying an underlying frame" (Pan and Kosicki, 1993: 63-64).

### ***Importance and Implications of Frames***

According to Gitlin (1980) and Tucman (1978), story frames assist journalists organize their stories, and thus appear "as persistent patterns of presentations" (Gitlin,1980, and Tucman,1978 as cited by Wanta and Hu, 1993: 251).

For policymakers, as well as audiences, news frames exert influence since "Choices of words and their organization into news stories are not trivial matters. They hold great power in setting the context for debate, defining issues under consideration, summoning a variety of mental representations, and providing the basic tools to discuss the issues at hand" (Pan and Kosicki, 1993: 70).

Indeed, in numerous cases it is clear that news frames not only set the agenda, but also shape and direct public opinion in certain ways. Increased exposure in the media on an issue can result in measurable prediction as opinion about that issue (Wanta and Hu, 1993: 252).

Moreover, experiments where lexical choices were altered proved capable of changing the direction of public opinion (Entman, 1993: 57).

Within news narratives, stories involving conflict were found to have the strongest agenda-setting influence (Wanta and Hu, 1993: 259), and "stories involving concrete issues will produce stronger agenda-setting effects" than abstract ones (Wanta and Hu, 1993: 259).

However, who gets to select, define, delimit the choice of frames?

The media are a competition ground for competing actors who want to dominate this framing process in order to establish the definition of social reality, as they see it. Consequently, framing in the political context reflects the ongoing power struggle, as Entman (1993) elucidated: "Framing in this light plays a major role in the exertion of political power, and the frame in a news text is really the imprint of power - it registers the identity of actors or interests that competed to dominate the text" (Entman, 1993: 55). Thus, the framing process involves also the competition among unequal competitors, where some are profiled as acceptable, and legitimate, while others are presented as unimportant, illegitimate, or/and inappropriate (Lasorsa, 2002: 44).

Following the establishment of the rationale for selecting frame analysis, in the subsequent part, frames that will be used for the analysis of the research's data, are introduced.

### ***The Selection of Frames***

As was mentioned earlier, there are two major ways to approach frame analysis, the deductive and the inductive approaches. The present research uses the deductive approach, which analyses the occurrence of certain pre-defined frames (Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000). This approach demands that the researcher be familiar with the selected samples, in order to pre-define the frames (Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000). To achieve this end, two processes took place concurrently: a brief review of the selected articles and an inquiry into a array of sources relevant to the period.

Two main guidelines were used for the detection of recurrent frames. One is Pan and Kosicki's (1993) definition of frames as themes (Pan and Kosicki, 1993: 59). The other is based on Entman's (1991) emphasis that the detection of frames should focus on "*what is politically important in news texts, given then-current policy agendas and disputes*" (Entman, 1991: 8, italics added for emphasis).

Moreover, detection of recurrent frames was further divided into detection of over-arching frames and lower-level frames, for the reasons explained below. Thus, in the analysis, the appearance and frequencies of two types of frames were probed: over-arching frames and lower-level frames.

The intent of the search for the over-arching frames was to capture the general packaging of the news items (Severin and Tankard, 2001, p.15, as cited by Lasorsa, 2002: 277). The frames selected within this category were those recurring frames of international news as introduced above, and also some other ones,

to correspond and reflect the period and its relevant issues (Iyenagar and Simon, 1993: 371). Consequently, the selected over-arching frames are as follows: responsibility frame, morality frame, conflict frame, human-interest frame, economic consequence frame, implication frame, cold war frame, peace-process frame, history frame, linkage frame, issue-specific frame, diagnostic frame, prognostic frame, diagnostic and prognostic frame.

As to the lower-level frames, they are the ones deemed most important for the present research, since it was assumed that due to the characteristics of the Japanese style of communication, meaningful political messages will be hard to detect.

In accord with the above, four groups of lower-level frames have been formulated to reflect the research questions and, consequently, to assess the coverage on Israel, as well as the Arabs, the Palestinians and Japan.

Regarding the formulation of the lower-level frames, as was stated above, their formulation was based on the review of the material along with other sources. In the case of Japan, the lower-level frames are based on the review of the selected samples as well as the preceding chapters of this paper and their findings. As to the other three groups' lower level frames, in addition to the selected samples' review, numerous sources were consulted and assisted in their formulation (CAMERA, 2004; FairReporting, 2004; HonestReporting, 2004; MiddleEastTruth, 2004; Gilbert, 1998; Rubin, 1993; Davis, 1989; Double Standard, 2002).

While the Japanese lower-level frames are mostly, but not exclusively, dichotomous pairs of frames, the other three groups of lower-level frames reflect complete pairs of dichotomies, to mirror the nature and characteristics of the Middle East conflict (Zelizer et al., 2002: 283), where on every single issue there are usually two main views, the Arab view and the Israeli view<sup>57</sup>. Consequently, these dichotomous lower-level frames, due to their meaning as well as far-reaching implications, are used to assess the content and tone of the reporting on each of the three peoples, the Arabs, the Israelis, and the Palestinians. Thus, regarding tone for example, it will be possible to say that reporting is on the whole negative on/for Israel, if the majority of the lower-level frames used to report on it are based on the Arab view of events.

---

<sup>57</sup> The only exception is frame 23 for Israel, where Israel is portrayed as a victim. This frame is not dichotomous. It had been introduced especially with reference to the Gulf Crisis, to assist in the analysis of the data, as will be seen in the following chapter.

Conversely, a negative tone of reporting on Arabs will result, if most of the reporting is based on the Israeli view of the events.

When reporting reflected more than one view in a single article, the lower-level frame to be selected was defined as 'another mixture', hence, implying neutral/balanced reporting. Finally, as to the lower-level frame termed 'none of these', it was used when no existing frames could be applied to the reporting. Due to the exhaustive nature of the lower-level frames formulation, this frame was used principally for cases where the subject under scrutiny was only briefly mentioned in the article and no substantial nor valuable information regarding the subject could be gathered. In the presentation of the findings, articles that were assigned the 'none of these' frame are, therefore, eliminated altogether.

The four groups and their assigned lower-level frames are as follows:

#### ***Japan: Lower-Level Frames***

1. Japan is a small country with no resources
2. Japan is a rich and powerful country
3. Japan must be pro-Arab if it is to survive
4. Japan must work together with the west against Arab pressure
5. It is commonsense for Japan to be pro-Arab
6. Japan is part of the west
7. Japan is part of Asia, together with the Arabs
8. Japan is a unique country with unique circumstances
9. More than one message among 2, 4, 6.
10. More than one message among 1,3,5,7,8.
11. None of these messages
12. Another mixture
13. Japan doesn't appear in the article.

#### ***Israel: Lower-Level Frames***

1. Israel is built on the land of Palestine, an ancient Arab country

2. Israel is a re-established Jewish state of ancient origins.
3. Zionism / Israel is expansionist/ aggressive / racist / imperialist / arrogant / inflexible / with intolerant religion.
4. Zionism / Israel is the fulfilment of Jewish history / nationalism / response to persecution.
5. Israel is an artificial state / has shallow foundation / divided society / unstable country
6. Israel is a Jewish state with multi-cultural / vibrant / healthy democracy, which fights for its self-defence
7. Jewish people's immigration to Israel is for the Judaisation of Palestinian territories.
8. Jewish people's immigration to Israel is to their sole / legitimate / ancient home-country
9. UN Resolutions: Israel must leave all the occupied territories
10. UN Resolutions: Withdrawal to be based on negotiations, recognition and security
11. Jewish power is strong in the US and other countries
12. Jewish power is not stronger than Arabs / Muslims, or others, to influence the US, or other countries
13. The US controls / has great influence over Israel
14. Israel is an independent country and a close ally of the US
15. Linkage: Both Israel and Iraq must withdraw – must comply with similar UN Resolutions
16. Linkage: UN's Iraq Resolution is different from Israel's UN Resolutions
17. Israel does not genuinely want peace
18. Israel genuinely wants peace
19. More than one of the following messages: 2,4,6,8,10,12,14,16,18 (strong positive)
20. More the one of the following messages: 1,3,5,7,9,11,13,15,17 (strong negative)
21. Other mixture
22. None of these messages
23. Israel is a victim of aggression

***Arabs: Lower-Level Frames***

1. The Arab world is united
2. The Arab world is divided

3. Moral is on the Arabs side
4. Moral is not on the Arab side
5. The Arab world is powerful / strong because of its oil
6. The Arab world is not so strong despite its oil, since it is divided.
7. The Arabs genuinely want peace
8. The Arabs do not genuinely want peace
9. UN Resolutions: The Arabs comply, Israel's non-compliance is the problem
10. UN Resolutions: Both the Arabs and Israel must comply with UN Resolution
11. More than one of the following messages: 1,3,5,7,9 (strong positive)
12. More than one of the following messages: 2,4,6,8,10 (strong negative)
13. Another mixture
14. None of these messages
15. Arabs do not appear in the article

***Palestinians: Lower-Level Frames***

1. The Palestinians are victims / victims like the Jewish people used to be
2. The Palestinians are aggressors / attack innocent men, women, and children
3. The Palestinians lost their country due to Israel's establishment
4. The Palestinians rejected the 1947 UN Resolution for the Partition of Palestine to two states, Israel and (Arab) Palestine.
5. The Palestinians genuinely want peace
6. The Palestinians do not genuinely want peace
7. The Palestinians want to establish a secular, democratic state for all people
8. The Palestinians do not recognise Israel and aim at its destruction
9. More than one of the following messages: 1,3,5,7 (strong positive)
10. More than one of the following messages: 2,4,6,8 (strong negative)
11. None of these messages
12. Another mixture

13. Palestinians do not appear in the article.

### ***Intercoder Reliability***

“Reproducibility reliability is the extent to which coding decisions can be replicated by different researchers. In principle, the use of multiple independent coders applying the same rules in the same way assures that categorised content does not represent the bias of one coder” (Lacy and Riffe, 1996: 963). According to Lacy and Riffe (1996), if the assumed level of agreement is to be at least 90%, there is a need for a sample of 92 test units taken from 1000 study units (Lacy and Riffe, 1996: 968). However, “an acceptable level of intercoder reliability should reflect the nature and difficulty of categories and content” (Lacy and Riffe, 1996: 966; see also Krippendorff, 1980: 129). Hence, “If the variables involve coding meanings of content, such as political leaning of news stories, take the assumed agreement level of 85% among the study units” (Lacy and Riffe, 1996). Accordingly, for the present research, a total of 104 articles were used for intercoder reliability test.

However, this test was the major failing of the research. Insufficient training of the coders seems to have caused intercoders’ reliability problem. Here again, contexts seem to have interfered in the analysis, and were detrimental. The problem at hand seems to have been that the first coder who had to analyse the whole data, appears to have reached a state where she did not wish to attribute any further negative messages to Israel, and thus, to somewhat exonerate the performance of the mainstream Japanese media. It seems this undertaking occurred following the Oil Crisis sample, which was the largest, as well as the most negative on Israel, and conversely, the most positive regarding the Arabs and the Palestinians. As a result, the coder took a more flexible approach, interpreting the data in a more lenient manner, thus balancing the coverage on the different subject matters.

When the second coder approached the analysis, having to analyse only around ten percent of the data, she approached it without any inclination, and as a result, the second coder’s analysis’ outcome was more distinct, and in fact, further lend validity to the verity of the hypotheses.

It must be stressed here that both coders’ analyses results were not contradictory in nature. On the contrary, they presented similar content’ characteristics, though they differed in degrees.

Therefore, it is recommended that future researches on Japanese content, employing Japanese nationals, allow sufficient time to train coders extensively, though it remains unclear to what extent training can minimise, if not eliminate, the influences of contexts.

## **CHAPTER SEVEN: RESEARCH FINDINGS**

## 7.1 Findings

### 7.1.1 General Findings

Prior to answering the research questions, a general overview of the changes in the volume of Israel-mentioned articles across the samples is presented in Chart 1. with the intent of providing an imprint as to the quantitative nature of the reporting during the four samples under investigation. In addition, in Chart 2., statistics of the number of editorials across the samples is introduced as well to get a grasp of the three newspapers' special efforts to present their position on Israel-related issues during each of the four selected periods under study.




**Chart 1.** Total number of articles per newspaper per sample

As can be seen from Chart 1., reporting during the pre-Oil Crisis was relatively low level for all the three newspapers, with a total of 92 articles (9.1%). The total number of articles from samples 2+3 together, the Oil Crisis period sample (S2+3), stands on 540 articles (53.8%), an increase of 5.8 times compared with the previous period. Within the Oil Crisis sample, reporting prior to the Nikaido Declaration (S2) on the change of foreign policy toward the Middle East, clearly exceeds reporting in the post-Nikaido declaration (S3), especially for the *Mainichi* and *Yomiuri*. Thus, reporting level was higher in volume in the pre-declaration period, than in the post-declaration one. As to 1985 sample (S4), the 'quiet period' sample, the total number of articles is 105 (10.4%), slightly more than the first sample, and dramatically less than the previous sample. Finally, regarding the Gulf Crisis sample, the total number of articles is 265 (26.4%), slightly more than half of the Oil Crisis period.

Regarding each individual newspaper, among the three, the *Mainichi* paid the highest attention to articles related to Israel with a total of 358 articles, the *Asahi* comes second with 339 articles, and the *Yomiuri* third with 302 articles.

All in all, it can be said that Israel-related coverage in the Japanese mainstream media peaked during the Oil Crisis first, and then again, to a much lesser extent during the Gulf Crisis. Additionally, the ‘quiet period’ sample reflects a slight increase in Israel-related articles for the *Asahi*, and *Yomiuri* when compared with the pre-Oil Crisis sample, though for *Mainichi* it was the reverse.




Chart 2 Total number of editorials per newspaper per sample

As to editorials, a somewhat different pattern emerged. Regarding the *Yomiuri* and *Mainichi*, editorial coverage does correspond to a large extent to the general quantitative patterns revealed in Chart 1, though the extent of the second peak, the Gulf Crisis is much smaller in terms of editorials when compared to the number of articles of that sample (S5). Hence, while the number of articles during the Gulf Crisis (S5) was slightly above half of the Oil Crisis (S2+3), the ratio for editorials during the Gulf Crisis (S5) was as low as less than a third when compared with the Oil Crisis period (S2+3), betraying a lower interest in terms of editorials.

As for the *Asahi*, its editorial coverage challenges both, Chart 1. data as well as the theorised involvement of reporting on the Middle East, as had been delineated in the previous chapter. It contests Chart 1. data in a number of ways. While in its general quantitative coverage patterns of Israel-related articles it is in accord with the other two newspapers, in its editorial coverage it is an outlier. First, it does not follow Chart 1 patterns as the *Yomiuri* and *Mainichi* do. While the general coverage of the three newspapers peaked during the Oil Crisis, and the editorials of the *Yomiuri* and *Mainichi* peaked during that time as well, *Asahi*’s editorials peaked during the Gulf Crisis. Second, it also had a much lower number of

editorials in terms of ratio, when compared to its general coverage, as well as the other two newspapers' number of editorials. Thus, the *Yomiuri* and *Mainichi* had a total of 29 and 34 editorials respectively, while the *Asahi* had a total of only 16 editorials. Hence, in general, the *Asahi* reveals a much lower level of interest in the subject in terms of editorials.

All in all, the *Asahi* reveals a contradictory behaviour when its general coverage is compared to the number of editorials. *Asahi* editorial figures also challenge the theorised involvement of the reporting on the Middle East as delineated in the previous chapter, and assumed a peak of reporting during the Oil Crisis, in Israel-related articles.

How can these disparities be explained? It is often said that regarding media content, what is not said is as important, if not more important than what is said (see for example Entman, 1993: 54). It is clear from Chart 1. that *Asahi*'s attention to Israel-related articles is as extensive as the other two newspapers, however, its editorials reveal that a relatively low number of editorials had the key word Israel in them. One conceivable explanation can be that, on the whole, *Asahi* refrained from using the word Israel in its editorials. If this conjecture is indeed correct, then it is a reiteration of the same newspaper's director, Director C's inclination, as revealed by his interview discussed in Chapter Four. Director C did not mention the name of Israel even once, even when discussing Middle East coverage. Consequently, Director C's predisposition was attributed in that chapter to his predilection towards the Palestinian position of denying the existence of Israel, a position that had been elucidated by the former editor of *The Sunday Times*, and *The Times*, Harold Evans in the article: "The anti-Semitic lies that threaten all of us" (Evans, 2002). If this supposition is indeed correct, it brings up another query: Is the *Asahi* the most pro – Arab/ Palestinian, among the three selected newspapers?

Coming to the research questions and their hypotheses, in the following sections, the findings are presented in accordance with and in order of the research questions and their hypotheses, as introduced in the previous chapter. Therefore, they are divided into four groups of findings, reflecting the four research questions. The first group of findings addresses RQ1, which is concerned with the Japanese mainstream media's coverage of Israel. The second group of findings addresses RQ2, thus, focusing on the coverage of the Arabs and the Palestinians. The third group of findings intends at answering RQ3, hence, aims at the assessment of the effects of contexts on the general reporting of the Japanese mainstream media. Lastly, the

fourth group of findings centres on RQ4 that is designed at uncovering the Japanese mainstream media’s coverage of Japan.

7.1.2 RQ1: Findings

**RQ1:** Is the evolvement of the Japanese mainstream media’s reporting on Israel in accord with the changes in the Japanese foreign policy toward the Middle East? To answer this question, and consequently, to examine the validity of its related hypotheses, the results of the lower-level frame analysis for Israel have been aggregated and summarised. Thus, the frequencies of all the negative, positive, as well as neutral frames, were aggregated separately to stand for negative, positive, and neutral tones of reporting. All the articles that came under the lower-level frame ‘none of these’, thus, only mentioned briefly the subject, were eliminated.

*Hypothesis 1 (H1)*

Regarding H1, which states that the first sample, that is the pre-Oil Crisis sample, will present a relatively low level of interest in news concerned with Israel, and reporting on Israel will be inconsistent among the three newspapers, findings are summed up in Chart 1.1.




**Chart 1.1.** Distribution of articles and their tones on Israel during the pre – Oil Crisis period

As could have been seen already from Chart 1.the three newspapers’ pre- Oil Crisis coverage indicates a relatively low level of attention to articles concerned with Israel. As to Chart 1.1, tone direction of reporting regarding Israel is similar for *Asahi*, and *Mainichi*, though *Yomiuri* stands out among the three.

The common denominator among them is that all three newspapers had more negative toned articles when compared to the positive toned articles, in their Israel-related reporting. Among the three, the pro-establishment *Yomiuri* had more than three times more negative articles when compared to the positive ones. As for the *Asahi* and *Mainichi*, the negative toned articles were more than double the positive ones.

Another divergence among the three is regarding neutral articles. Here again the *Yomiuri* stands out with only 10% of its articles neutral when compared to the *Asahi* and *Mainichi*, which had around half of their articles neutral.

An examination of the editorials during the pre-Oil Crisis will further contribute to assessing the above findings. In terms of volume, the *Asahi* and *Yomiuri* had two editorials each, while the *Mainichi* had four Israel-related editorials.

The two *Asahi*'s editorials addressed two separate cases of terrorist<sup>58</sup> attacks, though they were not defined as such. The first, (4/3/1973), addressed the 'Khartoum Incident', where western diplomats in Sudan were taken hostages, and eventually some, notably, the US ambassador, were killed. The other editorial (22/7/1973) was about a 'Japan Air Lines (JAL) hijack', where a Japanese airlines' plane was hijacked and made to land in Dubai with 140 passengers while negotiations were taking place. Both of these incidents, which were carried out by Palestinians, with the JAL hijack also involving Japanese terrorists, were blamed on Israel. In the first incident, the *Asahi* writes "it can be said that what triggered the guerrilla motivation for the Khartoum incident was Israel's almost reckless shooting down of the Libyan civil plane"<sup>59</sup>. In addition, on this occasion, *Asahi* also attempts at delegitimizing Israel's right of existence by quoting Isaac Deutscher, who "despite the fact that he was a Jew," in fact, "denied Zionism", and said that "there is a dynamite in the corner stone of Israel". Thus, the whole 'Khartoum Incident' is somehow or another, attributed to Israel and its existence.

As to the JAL hijack incident, *Asahi* explains the terrorists' motive by quoting the Munich Olympics terrorist words "we will keep on taking the same actions in order to tell of Israel's injustice to the world".

---

<sup>58</sup> Terrorism is defined here as the systematic use of violence and intimidation as a matter of policy in order to achieve some goal, see Sinclair, J. M. (Ed.) (1994) *Collins English Dictionary*, Harpers Collins, Glasgow.. Therefore, in accord with Munich Olympics terror' perpetrators own words, as will be seen blow.

<sup>59</sup> According to the Israeli media, on the 21.2.73, a Libyan plane entered Israel's territory, and failed to respond to all communication attempts, and therefore, consequently was shot down with 105 dead as a result, see details in Schifh, Y. and Dor, D. (Eds.) (1997) *Israel 50 (Israel at 50)*, Alfa Tikshoret (Alfa Communication), Israel..

Moreover, while at the time of the editorial's writing, the fate of the 140 mainly Japanese hostages was still unknown, the *Asahi* already warns its readers that if demands will be made towards Israel, the situation will be "difficult" because of Israel's "hard-line attitude during the Olympic terror", that was reiterated again, by Dayan, the then Defence Minister stating "we do not comply with any of the guerrilla demands".

The *Mainichi* and *Yomiuri* also addressed these two incidents in their editorials. Regarding the 'Khartoum Incident', the *Mainichi*'s editorial (4/3/73) emphasised that the terrorists' demands were justified regarding "the land snatched by Israel during the 1967 war", though, "the problem is their methods". It also partially attributes the incident to the Israeli shooting down of the Libyan airplane incident saying "it is possible to imagine that it is also a retaliation to the recent incident of the shooting down". Similarly, the *Yomiuri* (6/3/73) ascribes blame to Israel by stressing the Palestinians' state of mind who "believe that they were robbed of their motherland and homes in the Palestinian war in 1948". In addition, the *Yomiuri*, as the *Asahi*, quotes the Munich terrorists words, accentuating they "have nothing to lose".

As to the JAL incident, the *Yomiuri* (26/7/73) also relates the incident to Israel by repeating, as in its previous editorial (6/3/73), the perpetrators' motive as the Palestinians' believe that they were robbed of their country. In addition, it stereotypically portrays Israel as a country interested in "only pursuing power". The *Mainichi* (22/7/73) focuses mostly on the JAL hijack' perpetrators and only indirectly refers to Israel by implying that Israel took their country: "if their behaviours are expression of their desire to go back to Palestine...".

As to the remaining two *Mainichi* editorials, one editorial (25/7/73) focuses on the terrorists who committed the JAL hijack, and Israel is only briefly mentioned. The other (6/6/73) discusses a UN Security Council meeting starting on that day concerning the Middle East conflict. In this editorial Israel is portrayed stereotypically as a "hard-line" country that "almost does not take into consideration world opinion" as can be seen "from Israeli attitudes toward previous UN Security Council resolutions".

In sum, regarding H1, in terms of articles, it was only partially confirmed since though a relatively low-level of coverage is obvious, the coverage was not all, inconsistent. There are clear similarities in terms of tone's patterns among the three newspapers, though *Yomiuri* stands out with a much higher level of negative toned articles and much lower level of neutrally toned articles. Similarly, though a low number of

editorials is obvious, the negative stance towards Israel common to the three newspapers is apparent. All three newspapers exerted efforts in presenting the Palestinians’ view as well as in understanding their possible motivations without letting the other side of the equation, Israel, be equally heard. Furthermore, among the three, in addition to the negative portrayal of Israel, *Asahi* challenges Israel’s right of existence as well.

Thus, H1 findings seem to be a confirmation of the view expressed by some observers (Takigawa, 2002; Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995; Licklider, 1985; LeTendre, 1994) that Israel’s image has been negative already before the Oil Crisis.

**Hypothesis 2 (H2)**

H2 states that the second sample, the Oil Crisis sample, will present a massive as well as negative reporting on Israel to coincide with the Oil Crisis.

As Chart 1.2. reveals, H2 is verified beyond doubt. The level of coverage is indeed massive and the tone of the reporting is obviously dominated by a negative one. In addition, identical patterns of coverage by the three newspapers emerged. Though the *Yomiuri* still had the highest ratio of negative reporting, they all had a strikingly higher level of negatively toned articles when compared to the positive ones and they all had a much lower level of neutrally toned articles. Thus, a convergence of reporting patterns seems to have occurred.




**Chart 1.2** Distribution of articles and their tones on Israel during the Oil Crisis period

Regarding the editorials of the period, while *Asahi* had only two, the *Yomiuri* had 19 and the *Mainichi* had a total of 20 editorials during the Oil Crisis. Additionally, as can be seen from Chart 2., they all had

more editorials in the pre-Nikaido Declaration period (S2) when compared with the post-Nikaido Declaration period (S3).

Starting with the *Asahi*, it had its first Israel-mentioned editorial (24/10/73) regarding the October War/Yom Kippur War only on the occasion of the newly established cease-fire between Israel and Egypt, 18 days after the break-out of hostilities. Thus while interpreting the evolvement of war, the *Asahi* poses a question to Israel “can’t it withdraw from its one way logic, which says that it is necessary for its security (to keep these territories), after snatching away other countries territories”. In addition and despite the good news of the cease-fire, *Asahi* again attempts at challenging Israel’s right to exist by quoting Isaac Deutscher’s words on “the dynamite in the corner stone of Israel’s existence”. Interestingly, *Asahi* asserts that “if this dynamite will not be removed, and their (the Palestinian people) rights not regained, there will be no true peace”. Does *Asahi* imply that Israel has to be removed in order to get a lasting peace?

The other Israel-mentioned editorial in this sample is titled “The Framework for the Formation of a Palestinian State”(4/11/73). The *Asahi* discusses in it the details of the framework for such a country, including its borders and UN membership. Regarding the new nation, the *Asahi* writes:

Even though its land is no more than a part of former Palestine, once it will be recognised as a member of the UN by the world, the recovery of the Palestinian people’s rights will be fulfilled for the time being (*translator’s interpretation of the nuance*-fulfilled but not completely satisfactory). And as a result, the cause of the Arab-Israel conflict will naturally expire.

The editorial continues by stating that “big compromises” will have to be made, including that “the PLO will have to give up the complete return of the lost land”. Thus, though the editorial refrains from mentioning Israel often in the editorial, its underlying thread all through is that Israel is built on a land which originally was Palestinian. However, contrary to *Asahi*’s underlying message, in *The Times Guide to the Middle East* (1991), there is no mention that such a defined Palestinian entity ever existed (Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, 1991). In fact, according to the same book, the history of the Palestinian people starts only in 1948, together with the establishment of the state of Israel (Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, 1991: 209).

From the above analysis, it is evident that both editorials are in accord with the general tone of reporting, though the number of editorials is surprisingly low, especially if one is reminded of the fact that the *Asahi* sample of this period had a total of 190 articles.

Two further aspects emerged. One is the peculiar fact that Japan does not appear in Israel-mentioned

editorials. The second and converse aspect is that all the editorials discussing the Oil Crisis and the relations between Japan and the Arab countries of the Middle East, did not mention Israel. As will be seen from the analysis of the *Yomiuri* and *Mainichi*, these two aspects are unique to the *Asahi*. As to the meaning of it, it seems likely that by distancing Japan from Israel-mentioned editorials, the *Asahi* could stress a moral argument of the Palestinians people, devoid of the Oil Crisis context, on the one hand, while discussing separately Japan's *real politic* regarding the Arab use of 'oil as weapon', on the other. Moreover through this separate mental cognition, the *Asahi* denies that there are direct relations between the use of 'oil as weapon', and Japan's altered foreign policy, which recognised the Palestinian people's 'just cause' (12/12/73).

Regarding the *Yomiuri*, it had a total of 19 editorials. Among the 19 editorials, only one (23/10/73) presented a relatively balanced picture of reality by presenting both sides of the argument and their reasoning. In all the remaining editorials, though cardinal, Israel is a passive actor.

Within the 18 editorials, Israel has been repeatedly portrayed as a stubborn, hard-line country (8/10/73, 16/10/73, 18/10/73, 30/11/73, 20/12/73). This characteristic of Israel, the *Yomiuri* tells its readers, is not temporary, but a lasting one, since Israel always takes a hard-line stance, as the paper stresses "the hard-line position which Israel in general takes" (8/10/73). This Israel's hard-line attitude, in fact arouses "a substantial mood of criticism around the world" (8/10/73). Thus, it is not only the *Yomiuri*'s, there is a world's public opinion to support this view.

As to its morality, this hard-line position that Israel usually takes is also "unfair", thus, morally unjustified (18/10/73). Therefore, for the Arabs, to solve the situation "there is no other way but taking every possible measure to push back Israel" (16/10/73). And regarding the specifics of these necessary measures, "we have understood the Arab oil producing countries' cuts are inevitable as tactics towards Israel" (25/12/73).

With regards to the peaceful solution for the Middle East conflict, there is only one indisputable way to solve it. That is, to achieve a peaceful and just solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israel's full compliance with UN resolutions is an imperative. And as to the details of the compliance, *Yomiuri* stresses Israel's immediate and full withdrawal from all the Arab territories it occupies (16/10/73, 11/11/73, 15/11/73, 20/11/73, 23/11/73, 30/11/73, 20/12/73, 19/1/73). It specifies Israel-occupied territories as of

belonging to three Arab countries (23/11/73). Thus, the Palestinian issue is not relevant for the *Yomiuri*'s just and peaceful solution, as they appeared only briefly three times (11/11/73, 19/1/73, 3/1/73).

Concerning the peace-brokers, mainly the US, and its Secretary of State, Kissinger, the *Yomiuri* tells its readers that it is reasonable they cannot be trusted by the Arab side, since they are pro-Israel and consequently unjust towards the Arabs (20/12/73). Thus, "it is possible to say that trying to achieve a just peace in the Middle East, centred on the realistic line of the Egyptian President, Sadat, and the Saudi Arabian King, Faisal's, is itself fair, if you look at the complicated situation of the Middle East" (20/12/73). For *Yomiuri* it is just to follow the Arab side, though it forgets to mention that this proposal is in fact, a one-sided Arab demand on Israel for a complete withdrawal from the territories (*Mainichi* editorial, 18/10/73).

As to the last editorial of the Oil Crisis sample, the *Yomiuri* discusses in it the prospects for peace in the Middle East. It states that while the efforts by Egyptian President, Sadat, have contributed to the peace process "as everybody knows", Israel's grave internal instability poses a threat to it (23/4/73).

And about the discernment that Japan's change of policy towards the Middle East is directly related to the Arabs' use of 'oil as weapon,' the *Yomiuri*, in contrast to the *Asahi*, repeatedly makes this mental association. It does so by addressing - the Middle East conflict - 'oil as weapon' issue/or oil supplies - Japan's Middle East foreign policy change, in the same editorials (19/10/73, 27/10/73, 14/11/73, 15/11/73, 20/11/73, 29/12/73, 31/12/73).

Henceforth, *Mainichi*'s editorials for the Oil Crisis are the object of the subsequent analysis. The *Mainichi* had a total of 20 editorials during this period. Among them, similarly to the *Yomiuri*, the *Mainichi* often repeated the image of Israel as a hard-line, uncompromising country (8/10/73, 18/10/73, 23/10/73, 21/12/73, 20/1/73, 24/4/73). It also described Israel at one time, not as an independent country, but a Middle Eastern branch of the US "there is the existence of Israel, which the US has the responsibility for its survival" (27/10/73), alluding to the imperialist/expansionist thesis (Rubin, 1993).

Regarding the solution for the Middle East conflict, the *Mainichi*, as the *Yomiuri*, repeatedly demanded Israel's withdrawal from all the territories as the sole necessary step (14/10/73, 18/10/73, 21/11/73, 25/11/73, 30/11/73, 20/1/73).

However, the evolvement of *Mainichi*'s peace-solution advocacy from the beginning of the sample's editorial until its end is interesting in its own right.

The first editorial (14/10/73) touching on the issue explains "if the Arab side will be cornered into a miserable defeat in the war", the 'oil weapon' will be used. Therefore, "it is urgent for the concerned countries to take countermeasures rather than squeeze the Arabs into a corner". Does it mean that all the concerned countries should make sure Israel is defeated? And does the *Mainichi* consider alternately what defeat means to Israel? Though it clearly says what Israel's winning will mean for "the concerned countries". Additionally, *Mainichi* stresses that "hard-line" Israel and the US must change their positions because they "must take into consideration the fact that the global flow and energy affairs are changing" (*translators addition on nuance-they need to bend*).

In the following editorial (18/10/73), it appears somehow enigmatic to the *Mainichi* that despite Egypt's positive gesture towards peace, Israel refuses to cooperate. The *Mainichi* writes that Egypt's proposes "an instant cease-fire based on the condition of Israel's complete withdrawal from the territories", however, "it seems that Sadat's proposal has an unacceptable point to Israel".

In the next editorial (23/10/73), the *Mainichi* remarks in one breadth that while Israel accepted UN Resolution 242, it "will never let off" the area it occupies. For the unfamiliar eye, acceptance of UN Resolution necessitates withdrawal, thus a stark contradiction. As to the consequences to Israel's hard-line attitude "international opinion also may part from Israel".

With the increased pressure of the Oil Crisis, *Mainichi* reporting has also changed. The *Mainichi* gradually started exhibiting pacifistic, altruistic as well as moralistic views at the same breadth together with *real politic*. In addition, it often borrowed 'world opinion' to support its position.

Eleven days prior to Nikaido's Declaration, the *Mainichi* calls on Japan to "express clearly, openly and independently the injustice of Israel's occupation since the 67 Middle East War, from the stance of international peace maintenance" (14/11/73). As to the remaining Arab demands in exchange for oil, such as Japan's cutting off relations with Israel, the *Mainichi* asserts Japan could not agree to these Arab demands since they "ignore reality", as they "betrays (Japan's) the spirit of peace diplomacy" as well as lack "considerable reason".

However, Arab demand for Japan to cut off relations with Israel appear to have become realistic within a week (21/11/73). The *Mainichi* stated that, "from the view of international order maintenance, no country should endlessly ignore the natural demand to withdraw from other countries' territories that were occupied by the use of force". Thus, consequently "based on global opinion, and depending on the case, it can be effective to warn that sanction measures would be considered". Hence, the *Mainichi* is alluding to Arab's demands of cutting relations, which is a foremost option among possible "sanction measures" considering the scope of Japan-Israel relations.

Following two editorials where *Mainichi* calls for Israel's total withdrawal, with the warning to Israel that world opinion supports this withdrawal (30/11/73), and non-compliance will mean the world will be against it (25/11/73), the *Mainichi* returns again to the global moralistic view (9/12/73). In the subsequent editorial (9/12/73), the *Mainichi* implores on Japan to adjust its positions to Arab demands to prevent "misunderstanding". Within this adjustment, the *Mainichi* also includes the possibility of "re-examination of policies towards Israel" with a hint of breaking-off relations. It goes on to stress its views as well as to justify its position:

If Israel rejects the implementation of a complete withdrawal, Japan should persuade the Israeli government, (should) condemn it publicly in the UN, and (should) demand the US to persuade (Israel) in its daily diplomatic effort. This does not spoil justice and faith. On the contrary, it is a peaceful effort for the achievement of international justice (9/12/73).

In its last moral argument of this sample (21/12/73), the *Mainichi* asserts that the Middle East peace hasn't been achieved so far partially due to the fact that "the US did not make enough efforts to accuse the unjustified occupation of Arab lands by Israel". However, now, that the US is "more enthusiastic than expected" and also as a result of the fact "that each country's attitude regarding the Middle East affairs, and the Middle East, have changed" these changes "will bring about the establishment of a Middle East peace".

As to its last editorial of the sample (24/4/74), similarly to the *Yomiuri*, the *Mainichi* discusses Israel's instability and its increasingly hard-line position as "fatal to the Middle East peace".

This last editorial also has two additional revealing aspects. It mentions briefly a terrorist attack, targeting mainly women and children in their homes, where 16 were killed/murdered and 15 injured (Schifh and Dor, 1997), in the condensed sentence "a Palestinian guerrilla's attack on a town". Hence,

ignoring the nature of the attack as a terrorist one intently targeting civilians, especially women and children, as well as downplaying the magnitude of carnage.

Another and more peculiar revelation is that Syria's insistence on "Israel's complete withdrawal from all the occupied territories from the 1967 war as a precondition for establishing peace" suddenly, after all its advocacy in previous editorials, seems to the *Mainichi* to be an obstacle for peace (24/4/74).

Regarding the Palestinian issue, it is mentioned in seven editorials, all in the post-Nikaido Declaration. Thus, the Palestinian issue within this sample gained recognition by *Mainichi* as a result of the Arab use of 'oil as weapon'.

On the cognitive association among --'oil as weapon' issue/oil supplies --the Middle East conflict-- Japan's foreign policy change, the *Mainichi*, as the *Yomiuri*, makes this mental correlation. Out of a total of 20 editorials, eight discuss concurrently Japan's foreign policy change towards the Middle East and especially, towards Israel as associated with the Arab's use of 'oil as weapon' (14/10/73, 19/10/73, 26/10/73, 10/11/73, 14/11/73, 16/11/73, 9/12/73, 29/12/73). Further references on the issue will be made within RQ4's findings.

In sum, both the frame analysis as well as the editorials' analysis confirm H2 beyond doubt.

### Hypothesis 3 (H3)

H3: Within the Oil Crisis sample, the influence of the Nikaido declaration of 22<sup>nd</sup> November regarding the Japanese government's change of policy toward the Middle East, will be evident in the reporting on Israel.




Chart 1.3.1 Distribution of articles and their tones in the pre (S2) and post (S3) Nikaido Declaration

As can be seen from Chart 1.3.1, all three newspapers had more articles in the pre-Nikaido Declaration (S2) than in the post-Nikaido Declaration (S3) despite the fact that the pre-Declaration era amounted to around 52 days, while the post-Declaration period to approximately 158 days. Thus, reporting was much more extensive in the pre-Declaration period.

As to the changes in tone, negative reporting tone' share during the post-Nikaido Declaration period had grown larger for all the three newspapers. For the *Asahi*, while S2 had 53% of its articles negatively toned, in S3 it increased to 68%. Similarly, negative toned articles ratio increased from 59% (S2) to 65% (S3) for the *Mainichi* and from 69% (S2) to 81% (S3) for the *Yomiuri*. Among the three, the *Yomiuri* had the highest ratio of negatively toned articles related to Israel followed by the *Mainichi* and *Asahi*. Both the *Yomiuri* and *Asahi* had an increase of 12% and 15% in their negative toned articles respectively. Conversely, all the three newspapers presented a substantial decrease of positively toned articles on Israel. The positively toned' articles ratio decreased from 38.6% (S2) to 14% (S3) for the *Asahi*, from 37.7% (S2) to 25.5% (S3) for the *Mainichi*, and from 21.5% (S2) to 13.6% (S3) for the *Yomiuri*. The most substantial decrease was for the *Asahi* (24.6%), followed by a decrease to lesser degree for the *Mainichi* (12.2%) and the *Yomiuri* (7.9%).

In terms of the number of editorials in the pre and post Declaration period, as can be seen from




**Chart 1.3.2** Distribution of editorials in the pre (S2) and post (S3) Nikaido Declaration.

Chart 1.3.2, similar to chart 1.3.1, though to a much lesser extent, post-Nikaido Declaration saw less editorials when compared to the pre-Declaration period. As to the editorials content, though their content had been extensively discussed above, in addition to the frequency decrease, there were some other changes when S2 and S3 were compared.

As Chart 1.3.2, testifies *Asahi* did not have any editorials in S3 period, thus, it entirely refrained from using the word Israel in its editorials despite having at least 64 articles of which 68% were negative on Israel during the same period.

As for the *Yomiuri*, in terms of content, the major changes in the post as compared to pre-Declaration period were that while in the pre-Declaration period the paper focused on advocating and understanding the Arab side (8 editorials), condemning Israel's occupation coupled with demands for withdrawal (six editorials), relating Japan's change of policy towards the Middle East (five editorials), and clearly preparing the public for this change (one editorial), the post-Declaration revealed different interest. It focused especially on demands for Israel's withdrawal (seven editorials), and miscellaneous subjects each appearing only once: the success of Japan's 'oil diplomacy', Israel's internal instability, history of the Middle East, and the difficult year that the Japanese had experienced, all related one way or another to the Middle East. Thus, the single most dominant topic for this period was the demands made towards Israel in order to achieve a just and peaceful solution for the Middle East conflict.

Concerning *Mainichi*'s editorials, in the pre-Declaration period *Mainichi*'s editorial focus was on a number of themes: Israel as a hard-line country (five editorials), the world as against Israel due to its hard-line stance (four editorials), solving the Middle East problem based on Israel's withdrawal is imperative for global stability/justice/peace (two editorials), and the need for Japan to adjust its position in exchange for oil (five editorials).

Regarding the post-Declaration period, the attention had somewhat changed and became more focused. Two subjects dominated, demands towards Israel and the Palestinian people's rights. Six out of nine editorials repeated/advocated/justified demands made towards Israel, mainly withdrawal from the territories, with five of them discussing the Palestinian people's right. Especially concerning the Palestinian issue, from non-existence in the pre-Declaration period, it became a rather important subject in the post-Declaration period. Other isolated themes mentioned once only were the US must adjust to new international realities and move away from Israel, the need for Japan to press the US to exert influence on Israel, a Palestinian 'guerrilla tactics', and internal instability in Israel.

All in all, it can confidently be said that H3 has been verified, that is, the Nikaido Declaration from the 22<sup>nd</sup> November exerted influence on the reporting on Israel and changes between the post and pre-

Declaration period have been identified. Both in terms of number of articles as well as editorials, the pre-Nikaido Declaration’ findings reflect a more extensive coverage when compared to the post-Declaration period. Additionally, reporting tone in the post-Nikaido Declaration had become further negative, with negative tones far exceeding the ratio of neutral, or positively toned articles. Similarly, editorials’ analysis revealed that the focus on demands towards Israel had become further concentrated for both the *Yomiuri* and *Mainichi* in the post-Declaration period, with the issue of Japan’s relations with the Middle East taking a somewhat back stage. Additionally, for the *Mainichi*, the Palestinian issue appeared to have become an important topic, often concurrently with discussions on demands towards Israel.

**Hypothesis 4 (H4)**

H4: Coverage during the period of January-July 1985, will present on the whole, low level of interest as well as negative tone of reporting on Israel.

Coverage during the 1985, the ‘quiet period’, indeed reflects a much-reduced level of interest. *Asahi*’s number of articles dropped from 152 articles to 36, *Mainichi* from 141 to 19 and *Yomiuri* from 123 to 26 articles. As to the tone of the reporting, when positive and negative tones are compared, the striking negative tone of *Asahi*’s reporting is evident, with a total of 52% of its articles negatively toned compared with 22.2% for positively toned articles. As to the other two, the negative and positive toned’ articles were balanced for the *Yomiuri*, and slightly more negative for the *Mainichi*. In terms of interest, the *Asahi* reflected the highest, followed by the *Yomiuri* and lastly by the *Mainichi*.




**Chart 1.4** Reporting on Israel: Distribution of articles and their tones during 1985, the ‘quiet period’

Putting these findings into context, two points are pertinent. Concerning *Asahi*'s scale and tone of reporting, it should be mentioned that during this sample period *Asahi* happened to have had a series of articles, 14 in total, on "Present Day Israel", from the 20<sup>th</sup> May 1985 until 2<sup>nd</sup> June 1985. These were classical examples for "issue-stories" where there is a focus on a single issue or subject and there is a certain theme, or, hypothesis-testing. Thus "Events are cited, sources are quoted, and propositions are pronounced; all function as logical support for the hypothesis" (Pan and Kosicki, 1993: 61). The main themes were the villainisation and/or delegitimisation of Israel and Judaism. Among the topics discussed were Israel's internal instability, aspects of religious intolerance, racism, and so on. As to the sources of these ideas, every single one of these ideas is a reproduction of PLO sources and views (see for example Rubin, 1993; Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995).

Regarding the *Yomiuri* and *Mainichi*, the positively toned articles may possibly be attributed to the extensive discussion on Israel's release of prisoners, especially the Japanese terrorist, Okamoto Kozo, who in conjunction and solidarity with Palestinians, committed a terror attack in Israel's Lod airport in 1972 (Shillony, 1985/6). Debates on the appropriateness of his release stimulated discussions on the Japanese Red Army, of whom Okamoto was a member, as well as brought back memories of his atrocity, which evoked anger and a sense of shame<sup>60</sup>, on the part of the Japanese. Though Israel was a relatively minor subject in these articles, it was mostly seen as the victim of Okamoto's attack and was not positively viewed in its own right. Therefore, to assess further the validity of H4 an analysis of the editorials may be useful.

As was the case with the articles, there were also considerably fewer editorials during this period. In fact, as Chart 2 illustrates, the *Mainichi* had four editorials and the *Yomiuri* and *Asahi* had three editorials each. Three events dominated these editorials. They were the US-USSR conference in Vienna and its reference to the Middle East conflict, Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon and the release of Okamoto Kozo, discussed above.

As for *Asahi*, its first Israel-mentioned editorial discussed "The new impulse to the Middle East peace this year" (7/1/85). While most of the editorial spells out recommendation for the Arab countries as to what

---

<sup>60</sup> On shame and its role in Japanese society and cultures, see for example: Benedict, R. (1991) *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, Charles Tuttle Company, Tokyo.  
Henshall, K., G. (1999) *Dimensions of Japanese Society, Gender, Margins and Mainstream*, Macmillan Press Ltd, New York and London..

they should do regarding Israel, in reference to Israel, *Asahi* discusses its “illegal occupation in a neutral country that should not be accepted internationally”. Additionally, it tells readers that because of the invasion to Lebanon Israel worsened its relations with Egypt, as well as suffered “a huge expense”. Finally, the *Asahi* asserts that if “Israel desires peace seriously, it should withdraw from Lebanon first of all” hinting conversely, that so far Israel did not want peace seriously.

In the following editorial (21/2/85), the *Asahi* reviewed again the Middle East peace process and its prospects. With reference to Israel, it tells its readers in detail that the reasons for Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon are due only to its enormous financial and human losses, and nothing else. However, as a result, the chances for peace increased. Owing to these circumstances, the *Asahi* writes that “it is a natural process that the Arab side will think that Israel’s degree of dependence on US’ aid has increased further, and it is now easier for the US to put pressure on Israel all the more”.

Finally, in its last editorial (27/5/85), on the occasion of Israel’s release of prisoners, *Asahi* on the whole ignores the release, including that of the Japanese one, Okamoto Kozo, but discusses the PLO delegation for peace negotiation. In it, regarding Israel, the *Asahi* writes “although the Arab side has been positive about achieving peace since the end of last year, Israel has not changed its hard-line attitude of not recognising the PLO”. The paper repeats twice in its editorial that as a result of Israel’s hard-line attitude peace cannot be achieved. Thus, Israel is the singular block to Middle East peace. Towards the end of the editorial, the *Asahi* repeats again that “Israel should take more flexible attitude and respond to the increasingly positive Arab attitudes towards peace”. It also appeals to the US: “we would like to expect the US to persuade Israel even more actively”. Thus, US’s power of influence over Israel is rather substantial in *Asahi*’s views.

Regarding *Mainichi*, which had four editorials during this sample, its first one (18/1/85) elaborates on Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon. In it, the *Mainichi* echoes *Asahi*’s words, that Israel’s withdrawal is only due to its enormous losses, nothing else. It also gives some numerical idea as to the financial cost of Israel’s invasion. Additionally, the *Mainichi* recommends Israel to “admit their fault and failure of their invasion honestly” to save the situation. The *Mainichi* gives some faint clues regarding the context to Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, such as Israel’s concerns for its northern border, but it does not elaborate on the attacks by Palestinians based in South Lebanon (Gilbert, 1998: 504), which preceded the invasion. Lastly,

regarding Israel's concerns for its northern border as well as Lebanon's demand for Israel's total withdrawal, the *Mainichi* writes that these two countries should not be "particular" about UN mediation, criticising their insistence on 'details' as impediment.

The topic of the next editorial (23/2/85) is, as in the *Asahi*, the Middle East peace. While the issue is mostly discussed without mentioning Israel, two substantial references to Israel are made. In one of them, the *Mainichi* tells its readers that "the presence of the Israeli army in Lebanon has been the biggest obstacle" to the Middle East peace. The second reference concerns Syria where the *Mainichi* implores on the US to include Syria and its demand for Israel's withdrawal from the Golan Heights in the new peace framework, since "the Middle East peace ought to be achieved only by advancing frameworks based on the realities of the Middle East, with fair consideration of the local powers' conditions".

In its succeeding editorial (22/5/85) the *Mainichi* writes about the release of the Japanese Okamoto Kozo due to exchange of prisoners. While most of the editorial focuses on the Japanese Red Army that the above was a member in, the *Mainichi* condemns Israel for three things; for its hypocrisy of releasing prisoners despite its standard rejection of complying with "guerrilla" demands during past hijacks. It also calls Israel arrogant regarding its behaviour following the Six Days War, as well as accusing it of being unethical, therefore cannot object to the prisoners' release. With regards to the first accusation, what crucially the *Mainichi* fails to mention, and in fact implies otherwise is, that the exchange was not due to terrorist demands within the context of a terrorist attack, but as a result of lengthy negotiations as well as politically motivated decision (e.g. Gilbert, 1998: 518).

In its final editorial of the 1985's sample (8/6/85), the *Mainichi* again brings up Israel's invasion and subsequent withdrawal from Lebanon. In it, on the occasion of the third anniversary of Israel's invasion to Lebanon, the *Mainichi*, though touches briefly on Israel's security concerns, confidently assures its readers that Israel's ulterior motive in Lebanon was to install a pro-Israel puppet regime, but this has failed. Additionally, it explains that the reasons for Lebanon's internal conflict are partially attributed to Israel and its establishment, since "the root of the issues regarding the Palestinian people exists in the foundation of the Israeli nation". Echoing Isaac Deutscher's words, it asserts that Israel's establishment is the root of the troubles. Finally, it tells readers that Israel's uncompromising and aggressive behaviour will bring it nowhere. It consequently repeats four times its calls for Israel to show "flexibility...positive

attitude...understanding” and the withdrawal from Lebanon is indeed “a golden opportunity” for Israel to change its ways.

As to the *Yomiuri*, it had three Israel-mentioned editorials during this sample. Its first editorial (19/2/85) discussed the US-USSR conference in Vienna with Israel appearance relatively minor. In it, the *Yomiuri* does bring up some context as it mentions that Israel’s first aim in the invasion was to safeguard its northern border, an aim that had been achieved. However, as the *Mainichi*, it also accused Israel of having ulterior motive in its invasion of Lebanon, which is, trying to install a puppet regime in Lebanon.

As to Okamoto’s release, this editorial (22/5/85) mostly focused on criticising the Japanese Red Army, but minor reference to Israel is made as well. While first accusing Israel of hypocrisy, as the *Mainichi* did (22/5/85), the *Yomiuri* does mention that his release is possibly due to the fact that his mental condition made him unfit as a terror threat.

Finally, *Yomiuri*’s last editorial (9/6/85) discusses “The Middle East confusion and Israel’s responsibility.” While claiming that Israel had achieved its invasion’s first aim of securing its northern border, the paper blames Israel for the “practical collapse of Lebanon as a state”. Additionally, following assertion that the Israeli administration and people had a change of heart when they realised that “after all, peace cannot be won by force”, the *Yomiuri* recommends Israel that it takes “a decisive advance to comprehensive peace” which conversely translates it hadn’t done so, so far.

All in all, regarding H4, which says that coverage during the period of January-July 1985, will present on the whole a low level of interest as well as negative tone of reporting on Israel, it has been confirmed within the editorials’ analysis, though the articles’ analysis has produced a somewhat different picture for the *Mainichi* and *Yomiuri*.

#### ***Hypothesis 5 (H5)***

H5: Coverage during the Gulf Crisis, from August 1990, the invasion to Kuwait by Iraq until the end of the Gulf Crisis, February 1991, will present a mixed picture of Israel where on the one hand Israel will be portrayed as a victim of Iraqi missile attacks, and on the other hand, especially through the linkage thesis, will be portrayed negatively as an aggressor whose withdrawal is part of the solution to the crisis.

Prior to the data analysis, it should be mentioned that on the 8<sup>th</sup> October, 1990, 21 Palestinians were killed and numerous others injured by Israeli police near the Temple Mount, Jerusalem (Schifh and Dor, 1997). This occurrence, created ‘noise’ or, in other words, somewhat blurred the distinction between the negative portrayal of Israel as due to the linkage thesis and the one due to this incident. However, the editorial analysis, with its chronology will surely unravel this disarray.

Regarding H5, as can be seen from Chart 1.5, overall reporting on Israel during the Gulf Crisis (S5) indicates that for the *Mainichi* and *Yomiuri*, the positively toned articles clearly outnumber the negative ones. For the *Asahi*, the case is opposite, though the difference is not major. However, when frame 23 is controlled a different picture emerges where negatively toned articles far exceed the positive ones for all the three newspapers. Hence, H5 is confirmed within tone analysis.




Chart 1.5 Reporting on Israel: distribution of articles and their tones during the Gulf Crisis<sup>61</sup>

Regarding H5, as can be seen from Chart 1.5, overall reporting on Israel during the Gulf Crisis (S5) indicates that for the *Mainichi* and *Yomiuri*, the positively toned articles clearly outnumber the negative ones. For the *Asahi*, the case is opposite, though the difference is not major. However, when frame 23 is controlled a different picture emerges where negatively toned articles far exceed the positive ones for all the three newspapers. Hence, H5 is confirmed within tone analysis.

As to this sample’s editorials, this period saw an increase in the number of editorials, as could be seen from Chart 2, where the *Asahi* had nine editorials, the *Mainichi* six, and *Yomiuri* five.

Additionally, for the *Asahi*, this sample had the highest number of editorials among all the four samples, reflecting high interest in the Gulf Crisis.

<sup>61</sup> S5 (-23) is to denote the Gulf Crisis tones of reporting, with frame 23, that is, Israel as a victim of Iraqi aggression/attacks, being controlled to illuminate particularly the strength of the linkage thesis.

Starting with *Asahi*'s editorials, in its first one (14/8/90), the *Asahi* discusses Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and Israel is mentioned briefly in conjunction to Iraq's conditions for its withdrawal.

The following editorial (11/1/90) brings up the Temple Mount incident referred to above which took place three days earlier. It calls the situation "the worst since 1967". It goes on to justify Palestinian's action as due to the fact that "Jewish radicals have been indicating they have a plan to construct a new Jewish temple at the place where the Mosque is...the Palestinians were gathering with the aim of preventing this aim". Thus, *Asahi* tells its readers that a rumour circulating (Schifh and Dor, 1997), was in fact the ultimate truth. It goes on to discuss Israel's hard-line policy including the refusal to return the territories. This attitude of Israel, the *Asahi* asserts, is blocking the way to a peaceful solution for the Middle East. Lastly, it says that accommodating Saddam's demands will achieve two ends: it will reduce tensions in the Gulf: "The comprehensive peaceful solution for the Middle East will cool down the fire of the Gulf Crisis". And also it will satisfy the Arabs, because "The main reason for the support for Iraq amongst the Arab people is that... the solution for the Middle East conflict has not been found almost after half a century since its start". It is worth highlighting here that in contradiction to *Asahi*'s statement, Iraq's actions were, in fact, condemned by the majority of the Arab countries who supported the US-led coalition (Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, 1991: 103). Additionally, *Asahi* reiterates its position of seeing the core and source of the Middle East conflict not in any occupied territories, but in Israel's establishment.

In its following editorial (25/10/90), echoing the linkage thesis, the *Asahi* asserts that "the important thing is the solution for the Palestinian" who are under Israel's "oppression". The solution for their suffering is linked to the Middle East conflict's source, i.e., Israel's establishment. A conflict which "has been going on for over forty years". And therefore, accommodating to Saddam Hussein's demands towards Israel, is the best way "for the peaceful solution for the Gulf Crisis".

On the occasion of UN's condemnation of Israel regarding the Temple Mount shooting, the *Asahi* publishes its next editorial (24/12/90). In it, it reminds its readers twice of "the Palestinian people who are suffering from the oppression under Israel's occupation". Additionally, with the repudiation of Saddam Hussein's linkage attempts by the UN, the *Asahi* expresses its disappointment "we wanted more positive attitude from them" since "the Middle East conflict, has at its core the Palestinian problem, which requires comprehensive and sweeping solution".

Following the expiry of UN ultimatum to Iraq, the *Asahi* published another editorial (17/1/91), which focused on the break out of the Gulf War. While references to Israel were scant, the *Asahi* still, despite its failure, goes back to the linkage thesis. It writes that among three options, “the best possible way” is “aiming at a solution in the process of linking (the Middle East conflict and the Gulf Crisis)” since “the Israeli occupation of Arab territory has been continuing for decades and the Palestinian people are oppressed event at this second”.

The last four editorials (18/1/91, 19/1/91, 31/1/91, 1/2/91) discuss mainly the war in Iraq and Israel is only briefly mentioned. The main points of reference in relation to Israel are as follows: one, though indirect reference, is regarding the paper’s exasperation that the linkage thesis did not work: “the uselessness of the superpowers and the UN, which could not take any effective measures for the fair solution” (18/1/91). The next reference is concerned with the Iraqi missile attacks on Israel, were Israel is encouraged to self-restraint since the problem with Israel is that “Israel always retaliated when attacked by Palestinian guerrilla and so forth”(19/1/91). Additionally, in the same editorial the *Asahi* elaborates on the qualitative nature of Israel-US relations, saying that Israel did not retaliate in the first attacks since “it was headed-off by the US”. Consequently, due to its ultimate control over Israel, the paper appeals to the US “to regulate Israel also from now on”. In continued reference to Iraqi missile attacks, the next editorial (1/2/91) tells its readers that the worst possible scenario will be if Israel retaliates to the continued Iraqi attacks. There is no mention of Israel’s right for self-defence, but only the scenario that will spoil the situation.

As to *Mainichi*’s four editorials, its first Israel-mentioned editorial (16/10/90) was regarding the Temple Mount shooting incident, which the *Mainichi* dubbed “the Israeli authorities’ massacre of Palestinians”. In addition to telling the readers that Israel is under US control, and as such, is silent for the moment, it also echoes in relations the “common Arab view” that “the US is taking a position of safeguarding Israel”. Regarding the linkage, the *Mainichi* explains their support for Saddam Hussein’s linkage in relation to the Temple Mount incident, as follows: “we now recognise that the Gulf Crisis will not be solved if the Palestinian problem is set aside from sight completely”.

In the following editorial (1/11/90) the *Mainichi* supports the linkage but this time due to a different reason. It asserts that Iraq should be made to withdraw “without losing face”, which can be done by

“flavouring” its withdrawal. More precisely, “as for the ingredients for it, there are things such as...the opening of the Middle East international conference, which is loosely combined with the problem of Israel’s occupation of Palestine”. With the fall of the linkage thesis, and to coincide with the beginning of Iraqi attacks on Israel, the *Mainichi* publishes its subsequent editorial (19/1/91). In it, although it asserts Israel’s right to defend itself as well as praising its self-restraint, which it relates to “US demands”, it appeals to Israel for continued self restraint even if a chemical attack takes place.

In the last three editorials (28/1/91, 16/2/91, 23/2/91), references to Israel are brief, however, two interesting points are worth mentioning regarding the same editorial (16/2/91). The first is that the *Mainichi* admits “it was a big miscalculation” on their part for not thinking that Iraq will resist withdrawing from Kuwait. The other and bewildering aspect is *Mainichi* claiming in one sentence that though “Iraq’s condition could have never been accepted by the international society” on the one hand, on the other “there is no doubt that Iraq offered a chance for peace”. Needless to say, as in this last sentence as well as in its previous editorials, the *Mainichi* supported the linkage, but here, within the same editorial (16/2/91) the linkage suddenly becomes unacceptable. It makes one wonder whether *Mainichi*’s writers truly understand the contradictions in these statements.

Concerning *Yomiuri*, it had a total of five editorials altogether during the Gulf Crisis. While in its first editorial (9/19/90) Israel had only a minor appearance, its subsequent one (14/10/90) addressed the Temple Mount shooting incident on the occasion of UN Security Council’s condemnation of Israel. In it, the *Yomiuri* tells its readers how sorry the newspaper is for the casualties as well as for the fact that “Israeli occupation...has not been solved for 20 years”. It also asserts its position on the matter: “we would like to make clear again that we think continuous Israeli occupation...is unjustified, and Israel should withdraw from there as early as possible”. Additionally, regarding the incident, the *Yomiuri* summarises the world’s reaction including “even the biggest supporter of Israel”. It says they all condemned Israel regarding the shooting. On Israel’s investigation into this incident, the *Yomiuri* writes that due to the “necessity of a just investigation” the UN should have its own, implying Israel’s inability to conduct a just investigation. Finally, with reference again to the necessity of Israel’s withdrawal, the paper blames Israel for lack of peace in the Middle East: “there will be no peace in the Middle East as long as Israel turns its back on this diplomatic efforts”. Interestingly, though the *Yomiuri* writes specifically that the linkage thesis is a

“perversion”, everything else it writes within this editorial tells its readers otherwise. It is possible to explain this contradiction in the following way; since the *Yomiuri* is politically a pro-establishment paper, it had to stand by the government’s position of rejecting the linkage (Ikeda, 1993; Nobuo, 1991), however, its ulterior position was, in fact, supportive of the linkage.

In its following editorial (17/1/91) on the occasion of the expiry of UN’s ultimatum to Iraq, the *Yomiuri* reiterates its official rejection of the linkage by stating that Iraq’s use of the “Palestine” issue was in fact a “disadvantage for the movement of liberating Palestine”.

In the editorial titled “Israel, Don’t take the provocation” (19/1/91), the *Yomiuri* appeals to Israel’s continued self-restraint. Though it praises Israel’s conduct so far in its response to Iraqi missile attacks, it repeatedly stresses that Israel’s behaviour is a result of US influence/control. As to the last editorial (3/2/91), it refers to Israel only briefly, discussing mainly Saddam Hussein’s failed strategy.

All in all, from its editorials, *Yomiuri*’s position seems contradictory. However, when reporting tone on Israel during the Gulf Crisis is taken into account (Chart 1.5), that is, where there were nearly four times more negatively toned articles compared to the positive ones, and combined with the frame analysis’ results that indicated the ‘linkage frame’ as the overarching frame in 26.8% of articles, *Yomiuri*’s practical support of the linkage thesis is apparent, though officially it rejected it. Hence, despite the incongruity regarding *Yomiuri*’s editorials, the results of the articles’ tone analysis, in unison with the editorials’ analysis, on the whole, support H5. Chart 1.6 summarises RQ1 findings: Reporting on Israel




**Chart 1.6** Reporting on Israel-summary: distribution of articles and their tones across the samples (Pos=Positive, Neg=Negative, Neu=Neutral, S3-1=S2+S3, S5-1=S5 without frame 23)

### 7.1.3 RQ2: Findings

The second and related question is based on the underlying view of this research, i.e., activated by the Oil Crisis, the Japanese media's reporting on the Middle East followed a zero sum course, where negative reporting on Israel is conjoined with positive reporting on the Arabs and the Palestinian people, to be in accord with Japan's foreign policy.

Due to the limits of this paper, findings for this question will be presented in the most concise manner possible, with attention exclusively paid to verifying the hypotheses, regardless of the large scale of evidence.

**R2:** Is the evolvement of the Japanese mainstream media reporting on the Arab countries of the Middle East, and the Palestinian people, in accord with the changes in the Japanese foreign policy toward the Middle East?

To answer this question and, consequently, to examine the validity of its related hypotheses, the results of the lower-level frame analysis for the Arabs as well as the Palestinians have been aggregated and summarised. Thus, the frequencies of all the negative, positive as well as neutral frames, were aggregated separately to stand for negative, positive, and neutral tones of reporting. All the articles that came under the lower-level frame 'none of these', thus, only mentioned briefly the subject, were eliminated.

Based on Chapters Three, Four and Five of this paper and their conclusions, the following hypotheses have been formulated.

#### ***Hypothesis 6 (H6)***

H6: The first sample, that is the pre-Oil Crisis sample, will present a relatively low level of interest in news concerned with the Arabs of the Middle East as well as the Palestinian people and reporting on these subjects will be inconsistent among the three newspapers.

As can be seen from Chart 2.6.1, reporting on the Arabs is relatively low level with a total of 15 articles for *Asahi*, 28 for *Mainichi* and 27 for *Yomiuri*. While for the *Yomiuri* positively' toned articles dominate, for the *Mainichi* and *Asahi* the reverse is the case.




**Chart 2.6.1** Reporting on Arabs: distribution of articles and their tones during the pre-Oil Crisis period

Similarly, regarding the Palestinians, as is illustrated in Chart 2.6.2, the level of attention is rather low as well as inconsistent among the three newspapers. The *Asahi* had only three articles, while the *Mainichi* 23 and the *Yomiuri* 20 in all. Inconsistency in reporting tone is evident also with *Asahi* having no negative articles while the *Yomiuri* having more positive than negative, and finally *Mainichi* with clearly a dominant negative reporting on the Palestinians.




**Chart 2.6.2** Reporting on the Palestinians: distribution of articles and their tones during the pre-Oil Crisis period

Regarding editorials on the Arabs during this sample (S1), both the *Asahi* and *Yomiuri* make non-substantial references while the *Mainichi* tells its readers that, though both Israel and the Arabs are “hard-liners”, the Arabs’ intention of using the strategy of ‘oil as weapon’, is in fact their “primary factor for advancing peace” (6/6/73).

The three newspapers’ editorial stance on the Palestinians was already illustrated in RQ1’s findings and was on the whole apologetic regarding the two terror incidents with the *Asahi* as the forerunner. However, two details are worth mentioning. The first is that, even if apologetic, the *Mainichi* and *Yomiuri* condemned these acts as well. The *Mainichi* criticised “their methods”, and both papers mentioned their aim as “the extinction of the country called Israel” (*Mainichi* 22/7/73), although the *Yomiuri* was much more blurred saying, “Middle East peace will not be achieved by neglecting Israel’s existence” (26/7/73). However,

more interesting was the shift in the denomination of the perpetrators. When Japan Airline plane was hijacked and where a large number of Japanese were hostages, the habitually called “Palestinian Guerrilla” suddenly became “criminals” for all the three newspapers (*Mainichi* 22/7/73, 25/7/73, *Yomiuri* 26/7/73, *Asahi* 22/7/73). *Asahi* defended this shift in labelling by asserting that the “criminals” were “extreme left group in the Palestinian Liberation movement” (22/7/73). The *Yomiuri*, similarly, distanced the “Palestinian Guerrilla leadership” from this incident by repeating the leadership denial of relation to these “criminals” (26/7/73), with only the *Mainichi* condemning the “Palestinian guerrilla” as a group (22/7/73, 25/7/73).

All in all, with regards to the articles as well as the editorial’s analyses, H6 has been confirmed for both, the Arabs and the Palestinians. In addition to low-level coverage, there were inconsistencies among the newspapers as well as between the editorials and articles tones regarding the Arabs and the Palestinians.

#### Hypothesis 7 (H7)

H7: The second sample, the Oil Crisis sample, will present a massive as well as positive reporting on the Arab countries of the Middle East and, albeit to a lesser extent, positive reporting on the Palestinian people,




**Chart 2.7.1** Reporting on Arabs: distribution of articles and their tones during the Oil Crisis period




**Chart 2.7.2** Reporting on the Palestinians: distribution of articles and their tones during the Oil Crisis period

in response to the Oil Crisis and the policy changes it ensued.

As can be seen from the above charts (Chart 2.7.1, and Chart 2.7.2), H7 is confirmed beyond doubt. Massive as well as dominantly positively’ toned articles in the reporting on the Arabs is apparent as well as similar trend, though to a lesser degree, is evident in reporting on the Palestinians.

**Hypothesis 8 (H8)**

H8: Coverage during the quiet period of January-July 1985 will present on the whole a low level of interest as well as positive coverage of the Arab countries and the Palestinian people.




**Chart 2.8.1** Reporting on Arabs: distribution of articles and their tones during 1985, the ‘quiet period’




**Chart 2.8.2** Reporting on the Palestinians: distribution of articles and their tones during 1985, the ‘quiet period’

Looking at the above charts (Charts 2.8.1 and 2.8.2), it seems that H8 is only partially confirmed. Though low level of coverage is clearly evident, the tone of coverage is not clearly positive nor is it consistent among the newspapers.

Recalling once more, a substantial number of articles during this sample were related to the release of the Japanese terrorist, Okamoto Kozo. This fact may have assisted in producing these patterns, especially

regarding the Palestinians. Additionally, inter-Arab as well as inter-Palestinian divisions contributed as well.

In order to assess the strength of these trends, a look at the editorials of the period may be useful. In *Asahi's* three editorials of the period (7/1/85, 21/2/85, 27/5/85), it repeatedly appeals for the Arabs and the PLO to unite, implying deep cracks in Arab unity as well as within the PLO. In fact, the *Asahi* is entirely immersed in the Arabs and Palestinians, calling for Arab unity in order to overcome Israel, saying: "we desire the solidarity and unity within the Arab side...should put the strengthening of solidarity amongst the Arabs as a priority (since) three arrows are stronger than one" (7/1/85). Likewise, both the *Mainichi* and *Yomiuri* discuss inter-Arab and inter-Palestinians divisions (*Mainichi* 23/2/85, *Yomiuri* 19/2/85). Additionally, both newspapers, as the *Asahi*, call for Arabs and Palestinians to unite in order to present a united front (*Mainichi* 8/6/85, *Yomiuri* 19/2/85). Interestingly, though both the *Yomiuri* and *Mainichi* in their discussions of Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon blame Israel's invasion as a foreign invasion of the country, both newspapers welcome Syrian "presence" in Lebanon (*Mainichi* 18/1/85, 8/6/85, *Yomiuri* 9/6/85). They do not call it invasion nor do they see the issue of Lebanon's sovereignty a problem, thus, reiterating the Arab view of the Arab world as a border-less one (Rubin, 1993).

Finally, among all these editorials, the only criticism towards the Arabs and the Palestinians was expressed by the *Yomiuri*, in a guarded and indirect manner, relying largely on ellipsis (Donahue, 1998: 165), that is, omission of words, to express its position. The *Yomiuri* appealed to the Syrian and the Palestinians to abandon their aim of exterminating Israel, and to recognise its right of existence saying they "(should) change the principle and give up the extinction of Israel as a nation by force, and (should) determine to recognise (Israel's existence) indirectly..." (19/2/85).

Thus, with regards to hypotheses H8, it has not been confirmed. However, the three newspapers' immersion in the Arab and Palestinian stance is, on the whole evident, and as such seems supportive of the Arab and Palestinian side rather than critical. Hence, H6 cannot be entirely rejected as unfounded.

**Hypothesis 9.1 (H9.1)**

H9.1: Coverage during the Gulf Crisis, from August 1990, the invasion to Kuwait by Iraq until the end of the Gulf War in February 1991, will present on the whole, a somewhat more negative picture of the Arab world.

A negative coverage is projected to reflect the inter-Arab conflict in addition to the fundamental divisions within the Arab world which had been epitomised by the pro-Iraq vis-à-vis anti - Iraq Arab coalitions (Nobuo, 1991: 415; Ikeda, 1993). However, tilt towards the Arab side will be evident. That is, the newspapers' position will be in accord with Japan's ambiguous and reluctant pro-US stance, which came about only following pressure, and to coincide with the Arabs' support for the pro-US-led coalition and UN resolution regarding Iraq (Ikeda, 1993; Nobuo, 1991).

Overwhelming negative coverage is indeed evident from Chart 2.9.1. Thus, in their articles, the three newspapers have portrayed negatively the Arab countries, which were involved both in an inter-Arab war, as well as division between supporters of Iraq and supporters of the US-led coalition. However, in their editorials, the position of the three newspapers reflects more continuity in their pro-Arab stance rather than alteration, especially in their treatment of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.




**Chart 2.9.1** Reporting on Arabs: distribution of articles and their tones during the Gulf Crisis

As was already indicated in RQ1's findings, both the *Asahi* and *Mainichi* clearly supported the linkage, hence, were supportive of Iraq's demands to link its withdrawal from Kuwait with Israel's withdrawal. Consequently their attitude towards Iraq reveals sympathy rather than criticism. The *Asahi* repeatedly supported the linkage thesis (11/10/90, 25/10/90, 24/12/90, 17/1/90), and told its readers that Iraq indicates genuine intention for a peaceful solution (25/10/90). As to the US, the *Asahi* criticised its hard-line stance towards Iraq (18/1/91).

However, with the consolidation of the Arab countries' support for the US-led coalition together with the UN Security Council's resolution's endorsement, the *Asahi* had had a U-turn. All of a sudden Iraq's behaviour became a "barbarous military invasion", and the coalition force's intervention is not criticised, but welcomed: "we have been insisting that the multinational forces with the US as its core, should have acted with bigger ability (force), even when they follow UN resolution" (31/1/91).

In a likewise manner, the *Mainichi* supported the linkage and called it "inevitable" (16/9/90). It also told its readers that there are reasons for optimism since Iraq shows real intentions to solve the deadlock in a peaceful manner (16/9/90, 1/11/90). And then, just one day earlier than *Asahi*, the *Mainichi* had its change of heart (28/1/91), although it later publicly admitted its mistake as "miscalculation (16/2/91). Similarly to the *Asahi*, once it became clear that Iraq had no ulterior peaceful intention, as they expected, as well as the overwhelming global support for war, the *Mainichi* fully endorsed the US-led coalition (28/1/91). Additionally, like for the *Asahi*, contrary to its previous position, suddenly Iraq's linkage pre-conditions "could have never been accepted by the international society". However, despite its endorsement, it was still clinging to Iraq's side and the linkage, "there is no doubt that Iraq offered a chance to peace" (16/2/91). Interestingly, in its following editorial (23/2/91), the *Mainichi* interprets UN resolution 660 in a flexible manner to accommodate Iraq and at the same time criticises President Bush for demanding Iraq fulfils "100%" of its obligation under UN resolution, presenting US demands as hard-line/ obstinate (23/2/91).

As to the *Yomiuri*, it was already stated that it rejected the linkage as the Japanese government reluctantly did (Nobuo, 1991; Ikeda, 1993). However, regarding Iraq, it retorted to stating dry facts as well as explaining repeatedly Iraq's strategy in employing the linkage (14/10/90, 19/1/91, 3/2/91). It only started openly condemning Iraq after war broke out and following the Arab side consolidating their support for the US-led coalition and the UN resolution. Once war broke out, Iraq's conduct could be openly criticised: Iraq became a "hard-line" country (19/1/91), whose hostage-taking dubbed "national terrorism", and its invasion termed "unjustified" (17/1/91). In its last editorial of this sample the *Yomiuri* discusses the total failure of Iraq's strategy, as well as severely attacking Iraq's conduct (3/2/91). It pours barrage of criticism, labelling Saddam Hussein's regime an "autocracy" (3/2/91) that broke the rules of the international community, used "human shields" and, consequently, terrorised the world, damaged the environment, and so on (3/2/91).

In summary, it can be said that H9.1 has been confirmed. Thus, articles’ analysis have shown high proportion of negatively toned articles. However, editorials’ position clearly showed a tilt towards Iraq’s position, especially in *Mainichi* and *Asahi*’s cases, with the *Yomiuri* in a more guarded manner. Additionally, they all changed their position, particularly, the *Asahi* and *Mainichi*, to an unreserved support for US-led coalition and rejection of Saddam Hussein’s demands together with the Arab countries’ endorsement of the US and UN resolution.

**H9.2 (H9.2)**

Coverage of the Palestinian people will be on the whole, positive, as a result of the linkage thesis.

As is evident from Chart 2.9.2, all the three newspapers clearly supported the linkage thesis as demanded by Iraq’s Hussein. The *Asahi* and *Mainichi*, as noted in RQ1’s findings, overtly supported it also in their editorials, though the *Yomiuri* only covertly. The *Yomiuri* refrained in its editorial from stating clearly its support for the linkage, however, its support is evident from its articles’ analysis as well as the frequent framing (26.8%) of the Gulf Crisis in the ‘linkage frame’.




**Chart 2.9.2** Reporting on the Palestinians: distribution of articles and their tones during the Gulf Crisis

As a summary for RQ2, Chart 2.10.1, and 2.10.2, illustrate the evolvement of the three newspapers’ coverage on the Arabs as well as the Palestinian people during the periods under study. As can be clearly seen, though to differing degrees, the three newspaper present entire conformity in their reporting both on the Arabs as well as the Palestinian people.




**Chart 2.10.1** Reporting on Arabs-Summary: distribution of articles and their tones across the samples (Pos=Positive, Neg=Negative)




**Chart 2.10.2** Reporting on the Palestinians-Summary: distribution of articles and their tones across the samples (Pos=Positive, Neg=Negative)

### 7.1.4 RQ3: Findings

The following questions and hypotheses address the second prominent objective of this research, that is, is there substantial evidence to attest that Chapters Three and Four’s findings regarding the Japanese mainstream media’s foreign news reporting, are indeed enduring?

**RQ3:** While contexts are conspicuous at all times, in what distinct ways did the Japanese contexts come into the interplay in terms of the reporting on the Middle East?

Based on Chapter One to Five, the following hypotheses have been formulated:

### Hypothesis 10 (H10)

H10: The Japanese newspapers will present conformity in their content of reporting on Israel in terms of their selection of news-frames to portray Israel. That is, there will be no clear distinction among the left-leaning or right-leaning newspapers, in their selection of frames.

While high level of conformity in reporting' tone among the three newspapers was evident already from the summary charts (for Israel Chart 1.6, for the Arabs Chart 2.10.1, and for the Palestinians Chart 2.10.2), Charts 3.10.1-5 illustrate a large extent of conformity also in content. The content of the three newspapers' reporting on Israel was similar, hence, no clear distinction emerged between the two left-leaning newspapers, the *Asahi* and *Mainichi*, and the conservative, establishment leaning, the *Yomiuri*. Therefore, H10 is confirmed.

As to the selected frames, the critical implication of frame selection has been already established in the previous chapter. Which aspect or view of reality is constantly emphasised and to what extent, and which one is ignored through the selection of frames, is of crucial importance as to its consequences.




Chart 3.10.1 Reporting on Israel: Number of articles and their frames' selection during the pre-Oil Crisis period




Chart 3.10.2 Reporting on Israel: Number of articles and their frames' selection during the Oil Crisis period




**Chart 3.10.3** Reporting on Israel: Number of articles and their frames' selection during 1985, the 'quiet period'




**Chart 3.10.4** Reporting on Israel: Number of articles and their frames' selection during the Gulf Crisis period




**Chart 3.10.5** Reporting on Israel: Percentage of articles and their frames' selection during the Gulf Crisis period (frame 23, Israel as a victim, is controlled)

Taking for example frame 2, that 'Israel is a re-established Jewish state of ancient origins'. The three respected newspapers have never acknowledged this important aspect, which is an important part of the Jewish people's history as well as their legitimacy to Israel. With respect to this, all three newspapers indicate the adoption of the Arab/PLO view, which denies the Jewish people's historic links to Israel (Rubin, 1993). In fact, the example of frame 2 is symptomatic of the general coverage on Israel, as can be seen from the selection of frames, where Israel's view is systematically down played or neglected altogether.

### Hypothesis 11 (H11)

H11: The Japanese newspapers will present conformity in their reporting on the Arabs and Palestinians in terms of the selection of news frames to portray the Arabs and Palestinians. That is, there will be no clear distinction among the left-leaning or right-leaning newspapers, in their selection of frames.




Chart 3.11.1 Reporting on Arabs: Number of articles and their frames' selection during the pre-Oil Crisis period




Chart 3.11.2 Reporting on Arabs: Number of articles and their frames' selection during the Oil Crisis period

As can be seen from Charts 3.11.1-4, with regards to reporting on the Arabs, H11 is confirmed. No distinction can be drawn among the three newspapers. Following the pre-Oil Crisis confusion, Chart 3.11.2, indicates the Japanese newspapers' preoccupation with a single frame, frame 5; 'the Arab world is powerful because of its oil'. The 1985 sample (Chart 3.11.3) highlights the dominance of frame 2, that 'the Arab world is divided', while the last sample, the Gulf Crisis (Chart 3.11.4) indicates the dominance of multiple negative messages among the three newspapers.




**Chart 3.11.3** Reporting on Arabs: Number of articles and their frames' selection during 1985, the 'quiet period'




**Chart 3.11.4** Reporting on Arabs: Number of articles and their frames' selection during the Gulf Crisis period

As to the three newspapers' selection of frames in their reporting on the Palestinians, as can be seen from Charts 3.11.5-8, on the whole, there is conformity in their reporting' content, thus H11 is supported in reporting on the Palestinians as well.

Also here the least conformity in reporting among the three newspapers was during the time of the pre-Oil Crisis period (Chart 3.11.5). However, coinciding with the Oil Crisis, convergence in reporting occurred. Due to the passionate reporting to either side, which produced alternately multiple negative (Chart 3.11.7), or multiple positive messages (Chart 3.11.6, Chart 3.11.8), dissection of frames is difficult. However, the editorial analysis conducted all through, particularly with regards to RQ2 and RQ3's findings indicated time and again the essence of these messages, which repeatedly stress the Arab and Palestinians stance. This will be additionally, fully elaborated on in RQ4's discussion of its findings.

Regarding Chart 3.11.6, negative reporting can be to a large extent due to two reasons. The release of Okamoto Kozo, the Japanese terrorist who operated together with Palestinian groups, a topic that captured substantial part of the period's attention. And to the disunity among the Palestinians, as was evident from




**Chart 3.11.5** Reporting on the Palestinians: Number of articles and their frames' selection during the pre Oil Crisis period




**Chart 3.11.6** Reporting on the Palestinians: Number of articles and their frames' selection during the Oil Crisis period




**Chart 3.11.7** Reporting on the Palestinians: Number of articles and their frames' selection during 1985, the 'quiet period'




**Chart 3.11.8** Reporting on the Palestinians: Number of articles and their frames' selection during the Gulf Crisis period

the editorials' analysis. As to the multiple positive messages, both the 'Oil Crisis' sample as well as the 'Gulf Crisis' sample had similar messages regarding the Palestinians. These messages are in accord with the Nikaido Declaration as well as the Arab / Palestinian views (Rubin, 1993), as will be discussed below, in H13's findings.

### ***Hypothesis 12 (H12)***

H12: The differing manner of treatment given to Israel, as compared with the one conferred on the Arabs and the Palestinians will testify, and present evidence for the application of double standards.

On the whole, H12, in fact, has been already proved in the findings discussed so far, not only in terms of the articles' reporting' tone, but also in the editorials.

The differing manner as well as the different standards applied to Israel when compared to the treatment of the Arabs and the Palestinians has been illustrated time and again in RQ1 and RQ2's findings. In RQ1's findings it became apparent that whatever Israel did or said during the selected periods, it was typically portrayed as a peace-rejecting 'hard-line' country, as the main source of the Middle East conflict, and consequently, the main hindrance to peace in the Middle East. Additionally, it was portrayed as a country whose status as an independent country, i.e. not a US protégé, as well as its right to exist, are/should be in doubt.

As to the three newspapers' treatment of the Arabs and the Palestinians, it was just the opposite, mainly from the Oil Crisis onward, and in accord with the altered Japanese foreign policy.

The extensive as well as positive coverage bestowed upon the Arabs during the 'Oil Crisis' was already seen in RQ2's findings. As to the other two samples, the newspapers general pro-Arab position was evident as well. Specifically, in the editorials the Arabs were repeatedly portrayed as having a 'just cause,' and as positively working towards achieving peace for the Middle East. Additionally, the newspapers exerted efforts in understanding as well as conveying the Arab's views and stances. This could have been seen already in RQ2's findings regarding the Gulf Crisis. It will be further illustrated also in RQ4's findings.

As to the Palestinians, starting with the first sample, Palestinian terrorism was rationalised and even sympathised with. Later samples, especially the 'Oil Crisis' as well as the 'Gulf Crisis', echoed repeatedly

the Palestinians' view as had been handed down in the Nikaido Declaration, where the Palestinians are seen constantly as victims who lost their country and whose rights and lands should be recovered.

Thus, on the whole, and as was clearly exemplified in RQ1 and RQ2's findings, the three newspapers' tone and content of reporting on the Arabs and Palestinians was fluctuating between strong positive support and moderate positive support, but always supportive. Overt critical and negative stance regarding the Arabs and the Palestinians was hard to find, especially when measured against the general negative as well as the critical reporting on Israel.

Additionally, though not in direct relations to this hypothesis, but with relations to the application of various standards, as were depicted in Chapter Three's summary, it became apparent from RQ2's H6's findings, that most of the time when Palestinians committed a terror attack, they were termed 'guerrilla attacks', and not terror. However, when Japanese were involved as in the Japan Airlines plane's hijack, all the three newspapers labelled the perpetrators as "criminal" (*Asahi* 22/7/73 *Mainichi* 22/7/73, 25/7/73, *Yomiuri* 26/7/73). Thus, attacking anybody else but Japanese received some sort of legitimacy, while attacking Japanese becomes a 'criminal act'.

### ***Hypothesis 13 (H13)***

H13: Evidence for Japanese mainstream media's disregard for major Western journalistic norms (Gurevitch and Blumler, 2000; Shoemaker and Reese, 1996) will emerge.

Indeed numerous examples to prove H13 have emerged during the articles and editorials' analyses. The most vivid ones are from the 'Oil Crisis,' though by no means the only ones.

The validation of this hypothesis will focus on three aspects; the subjective nature of Japanese' journalist's reporting, the biased/one-sided/pro-Arab and Palestinian stance taken by the newspapers, and the related and symptomatic disregard of truth.

Starting with the subjective nature of Japanese' journalists' reporting, as Chart 3.13.1 indicates, a large ratio of Israel-mentioned articles in fact do not have sources at all, with the worst instances reaching 45% of articles without sources (*Yomiuri* S4, *Asahi* S5).

As to the tone of the source-less articles in their reporting on Israel, these articles were measured up against articles with Japanese sources to assess whether their inclination is similar.




**Chart 3.13.1** Percentage of articles with sources as compared to percentage of articles without sources (A=Asahi, M=Mainichi, Y=Yomiuri, No Sources=Articles without sources, With Sources=Articles with sources).




**Chart 3.13.2** Reporting on Israel: Comparison of the number of articles with Japanese sources and no sources articles - tone tendencies (A = Asahi, M = Mainichi, Y = Yomiuri, Jap = Japanese sources, Pos = positive tone, Neg = negative tone, NoSo = No sources).

As Chart 3.13.2 clearly reveals, Japanese sources were mostly employed during the ‘Oil Crisis’ with their appearance minor during the other three samples.

Regarding the similarities between source-less articles and articles with Japanese sources, the most salient relationship is obviously during the ‘Oil Crisis’ where both source-less articles and articles with Japanese sources were far more negative regarding Israel, than positive. As to all other samples, with the notable exception of S5, when frame 23, ‘Israel as a victim’ is not controlled, on the whole, source-less articles were more negative than positive in their reporting on Israel. Thus, even without the employment of sources, negative reporting on Israel exceeds the positive one, indicating the Japanese journalists’ internalisation of the Japanese government’s pro-Arab foreign policy, regardless of circumstances as well as their political inclination.

As to the relations between the tone of reporting on Israel and journalist's location, some conformity among the three newspapers is evident as can be seen in Charts 3.13.3-5.




**Chart 3.13.3** *Asahi*: Journalists' location and negative tone of reporting on Israel




**Chart 3.13.4** *Yomiuri*: Journalists' location and negative tone of reporting on Israel




**Chart 3.13.5** *Mainichi*: Journalists' location and negative tone of reporting on Israel

For all three newspapers, the highest number, as well as the highest frequency of negative articles originated in Japan during the 'Oil Crisis'. Hence, during the crisis, the largest number of negative articles were written at home, close to the political establishment.

As to the second, and much less important peak, reporting during the 'Gulf Crisis' reflects some divergence concerning the origin of the largest number of negative articles. For the *Asahi*, the home based journalists were still the source of the highest number of negative articles, while for the *Yomiuri* it was Israel, and for the *Mainichi* it was the US, from UN headquarters as was found during the analysis.

In sum, as the charts above illustrate, the subjective as well as on the whole negative tone of source-less articles is apparent. Moreover, though during the Oil Crisis the majority of source-less negative articles originated at home, the second peak's articles, i.e., the Gulf Crisis's negatively-toned' articles originated in a number of places. Thus, indicating that no matter where the journalists are, the tone prevails.

Interestingly, and contrary to expectation, either geographical bias nor preference for Arab/Palestinians sources as compared to Israelis could be found. However, and similar to journalists' location, no matter who were the sources, the tone remained unchanged. This is especially evident from *Asahi*'s S4's findings where the highest negatively-toned' articles originated in Israel.

Indeed, these findings are in contrast, for example, to Zelizer et al's (2002) findings where geographical bias as well as preference for one side's sources over the others was evident and consequently attributed to the specific newspaper's inclination (Zelizer et al., 2002).

As to other instances of the three Japanese newspapers' disregard for journalistic norms, the following will focus on the biased/one-sided/pro-Arab and Palestinian stance taken by the newspapers and the related and symptomatic disregard of truth. Here, two main components are taken up to further illustrate the validity of H13. These two aspects are: the labelling as well as the definitions of events and the interpretation of UN resolutions.

Starting with labelling, all through the editorials the Palestinians and their activities are defined as 'guerrillas' and 'guerrilla's activities'. For example, the three newspapers labelled the Munich Olympics' terror (Schifh and Dor, 1997), where defenceless Israeli athletes were murdered in the Munich Olympic village, as 'guerrilla attack' (*Asahi* 22/7/73, *Mainichi* 4/3/73, *Yomiuri* 6/3/73).

This definition is in itself incorrect if one inquires into the nature, and purpose of guerrilla warfare, which is "to win positive control over successively larger portion of the civilian population while simultaneously alienating the population from the regime in power (Holsti, 1988: 263). On the contrary, the Palestinians' activities mentioned in S1 and discussed previously have indicated that the target of their offensives were defenceless civilians, be they Israelis, Japanese, or Americans, thus befitting the definition of terrorists' activities (Sinclair, 1994).

As to the aims of this labelling, it functions both as a legitimising agent of the act as well as disguising its essence, namely, targeting innocent people for political ends.

Regarding definitions of events, all the three newspapers used mostly Arab and Palestinians definitions and views of events. Though evidence for this inclination is abundant through all the editorials, a few examples are introduced below.

Starting with the most elementary aspect, on Israel's right to exist, the former Israeli ambassador to the UN, Abba Eban's, stated;

nobody does Israel any service by proclaiming 'its right to exist'...Israel's right to exist, like that of the United States, Saudi Arabia...is axiomatic and unreserved...There is certainly no other state, big or small, young or old, that would consider mere recognition of 'its right to exist' a favour, or a negotiable concession (former Israeli ambassador to the UN, Eban Abba, NYT, November 15, as quoted in Davis, 1989: 1).

However, the three Japanese newspapers did challenge this basic right. All three newspapers subscribed one time or another to the anti-Zionist view, which sees Israel's existence as unjustified and consequently made attempts at delegitimising its existence in three main ways. One is through the assertion that Israel's establishment is at the core of the Middle East conflict (*Asahi* 4/3/73, 24/10/73, 25/10/90, 11/1/90 *Mainichi* 8/6/85, *Yomiuri* 30/11/73). A second method is through references to the contentious issue of the "captured territories" (Double Standard, 2002). All three newspapers accepted and consequently labelled overtly or at times suggested that the "captured territories" are in fact territories of what formerly was Arab Palestine (*Asahi* 4/11/73, 11/10/90, *Mainichi* 22/7/73, 21/11/73, 25/11/73, 30/11/73, 1/11/90, 16/2/91, *Yomiuri* 6/3/73, 17/1/91). This view is in accord with the Arab/Palestinian' labelling of the lands, and as such, also indicates the newspapers' internalisation of Arab/Palestinians' revisionism of history, since no independent Palestinian state ever existed in these lands (e.g. Davis, 1989; Rubin, 1993; Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, 1991). The third method is through the claim of "international Conspiracy Theories" (Rubin, 1993). Here

one can distinguish between the Palestinian Muslim fundamentalists' view, which sees Israel's creation as due to Jewish dominance, alluding to the 'Protocols of the Elders of Zion' discussed in Chapter Five, and the Marxist/anti-Imperialist' PLO's view, which sees Israel "as a tool of U.S. or Western imperialism" (Rubin, 1993). Though the prominence of books on the 'Jewish conspiracy' in Japan is apparent, as was discussed in Chapter Five (e.g. Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995; Kowner, 1997), all the selected newspapers seem to subscribe to the Marxist/ anti-imperialist' PLO view, including even the pro-establishment, conservative *Yomiuri* (*Asahi* 1/1/74, 21/2/85, 27/5/85, 19/1/91, *Mainichi* 27/10/73, 19/1/91, *Yomiuri* 19/1/91). This view was elucidated vividly by the *Asahi*, as follows, "Japan has gone out of its way to accommodate the State of Israel, which the United States created" (Goodman and Refsing, 1992: 216).

To stress these anti-Zionist views, all the three newspapers employed renowned non-Japanese anti-Zionist such as the British historian Arnold Toynbee (*Asahi* 17/12/73, *Yomiuri* 17/10/73) and Isaac Deutscher, Stalin and Troski's biographer (*Asahi* 22/7/73, *Mainichi* 8/6/85) as well as the most prominent Japanese anti-Zionists such as Itagaki Juzo of Tokyo University (*Yomiuri* 23/10/73) (for numerous more examples see Goodman and Refsing, 1992).

Finally, with specific regards to the 'Oil Crisis', two aspects emerged. First, all the three newspapers accepted the Arab view that using the 'Oil as Weapon' is the ultimate way to bring peace to the Middle East (*Asahi* 12/12/73, *Mainichi* 6/6/73, *Yomiuri* 29/12/73, 3/1/74, 28/1/73). Moreover, as Goodman and Miyazawa (1995) wrote "The liberal media not only supported but idealised the tilt toward the Arab side" describing the oil embargo "as a latter-day version of storming of the Bastille" (Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995: 216). Not only was the oil embargo aimed at bringing peace, in fact, the use of 'oil as weapon' was a turning point in history. *Asahi* explained on 27<sup>th</sup> December, 1973, that although "there are certain inconsistencies...we should not lose sight of the fact that with this, the Third World has succeeded in using the weapon of natural resources as a means to inaugurate it own liberation movement" (Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995: 216 ). On this point, Goodman and Miyazawa (1995) commented: *Asahi* clarified that "Arab actions were representative of a major historical shift that its importance transcended any minor ethical problems with the embargo itself" (Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995: 216). However, this view was not held only by the "liberal media", as Goodman and Miyazawa (1995) assert, but also by the conservative *Yomiuri* as well (3/1/74, 28/1/74).

As to the other aspect of the three Japanese newspapers' disregard for journalistic norms, it is concerned with the renowned UN Resolution 242 adopted following the 1967's Six Days War. The Japanese government, as made clear by the Nikaido Declaration (see Appendix 2, see also Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995: 213) as well as the three newspapers, accepted and advocated the Arab/Palestinian view of the resolution (Double Standard, 2002), which calls on Israel to withdraw from all the "occupied territories" (see for example: *Asahi* 4/11/73, *Mainichi* 14/10/73, 18/10/73, *Yomiuri* 20/11/73, 23/11/73, 29/12/73).

What is surprising here is that the newspapers went even further than the government in accommodating the Arab/Palestinian view. The Nikaido Declaration calls for "respect for the integrity and security of the territories of all the countries in the area, and the need of guarantee to that end", hence, to some extent, alluding to Resolution 242 regarding the surrounding countries' obligations as well. However, the newspapers exclusively reverberated the Arab/Palestinian demands on Israel, with utter disregard for the content of UN Resolution 242 (Double Standard, 2002).

Thereupon, the disregard for UN Resolution 242's content is related not only to one-sided acceptance of the Arab/Palestinian interpretation, but also to the inherent disregard for truth that was symptomatic for all three newspapers. Numerous instances of disrespect for facts were detected, though the distortion of Resolution 242 was by far the most important and as such is the main example here.

Contrary to the three newspapers' assertions as to the content of Resolution 242, *The Economist* (2002) explains that the resolution "does not instruct Israel to withdraw unilaterally from the territories it occupied in 1967. It does not condemn Israel's conquest...It calls for a negotiated settlement based on the principle of exchanging land for peace" (Double Standard, 2002). Moreover, "Resolution 242 cannot be implemented unilaterally even if Israel wanted to do so" (Double Standard, 2002). And finally, regarding the withdrawal, *The Economist* writes, "some of the diplomats who drafted Resolution 242 said...they intended to allow for some changes in the armistic lines that separated Israel and its neighbours before 1967" (Double Standard, 2002). Thus, although "the Arabs maintain that the resolution requires complete withdrawal from every inch. But even if this were so, the resolution cannot be implemented without arriving at a negotiated agreement" (Double Standard, 2002). Based on the close relations between the media and the establishment, as depicted in Chapters Two and Three, the Japanese should have known

better than others as to the reasoning behind 242 as well as its implications, since Japan helped draft it as well as chaired the Security Council when Resolution 242 was drafted (Licklider, 1985: 23).

Additionally, concerning the systematic negative portrayal of Israel, and the positive portrayal of the Arabs/Palestinian, as became apparent in RQ1 and RQ2's findings, it not only reflects one-sided view coupled with the application of double standards, but disregard for truth as well.

In response to the wide scale misconception among the public, *The Economist* (2002) summarised recently the Middle East conflict and the stalemate in the peace process as follows:

In 1967, it was the Arabs who rejected Resolution 242. They certainly did not accept Israel's new post-war borders, but nor did they recognise its pre-war borders. They did not, in fact, acknowledge Israel's right to exist at all. This posture persisted for a dozen years after 1967, until Egypt alone made peace. The Palestinians, pledging to 'liberate' all Palestine and dissolve the Jewish state, waited longer. ... When the Palestinians decided that they were no longer bent on its extirpation, Israel responded (Double Standard, 2002).

Thus, *The Economist*, despite its record in reporting on Israel (see for example DFME, 2003; Stephens, 2003), encapsulates here possibly for the first time, what numerous sources have been saying all along ( for example Davis, 1989; Rubin, 1993; Schiff and Dor, 1997; Gilbert, 1998).

Consequently, the above depiction by *The Economist* is in sharp contrast to the picture that emerged out of the Japanese newspaper covering the same period. These discrepancies indicate that the Japanese media was involved not only in disinformation, it also did not tell its readers the whole story. Consequently, the Japanese public was only exposed to the Arab/Palestinian view of events, to be in accord with Japan's foreign policy, and as such, was systematically betrayed by its media. While Freeman (1996) discussed the media's betrayal with regards especially to the domestic reporting (Freeman, 1996), Goodman and Miyazawa (1995) referred to this betrayal of the public from the aspect of the media's international reporting. They depicted the implications as follows: "Their provincialism, moral obtuseness, and historical myopia have left their compatriots vulnerable to the distortions of dedicated ideologues and have impaired the Japanese ability to deal effectively with the world around them in crisis situation like the Gulf War" (Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995: 251).

To sum up H13, it can be said that the hypothesis was proved beyond doubt since evidence for Japanese mainstream media's disregard for major Western journalistic norms (Gurevitch and Blumler, 2000; Shoemaker and Reese, 1996), did emerge, and was identified.

7.1.5 RQ4: Findings

Finally, and as a continuation of the probe into the influences of contexts on the reporting, the last object of interest is the manner with which Japan was covered by the mainstream Japanese media, in relation to the Middle East. Taking into consideration Chapter Three and Four Findings, the following question and hypotheses were formulated.

**RQ4:** While it can be assumed that the Middle East coverage during the three decades under analysis will not involve Japan most of the time since Japan was not actively involved in the region, when it did, how was Japan / Japanese foreign policy portrayed?

Hypothesis 14 (H14)

H14: The Japanese mainstream media will strongly support their government’s foreign policy changes towards the Middle East, and will portray the changes as the only sensible way.




Chart 4.14.1 Reporting on Japan: Number of articles and their frames’ selection during the ‘Oil Crisis’

As is evident from Chart 4.14.1, the *Mainichi* and *Yomiuri* strongly supported Japan’s change of policy. As to the *Asahi*, though it also supported such change, the extent of the support seems much lower when compared to the other two newspapers, if one looks only at the above chart.

Suggestions as to the low-level of support were already made in RQ1’s findings, which indicated that the *Asahi* purposefully avoided the mental association between the Oil Crisis and Japan’s altered foreign policy in order to amplify the moral arguments regarding the Palestinians. Consequently, it refrained from

mentioning Israel and Japan in the same editorials. Therefore, since all the editorials were selected based on the appearance of Israel in them, Japan did not loom large in *Asahi*'s selected editorials.

However, based on the findings so far, which indicated that the *Asahi* was constantly the most outspoken supporter of the Arab/Palestinian view together with the analysis of two editorials, including one where Israel is not mentioned, makes clear that *Asahi* supported the change of policy, and in fact waited long for this change (e.g. 12/12/73).

In its Israel-mentioned editorial (22/7/73), the *Asahi* writes in the context of the JAL hijack as well as the looming Oil Crisis, that Japan "is dependent on the Arab countries" because it is "dependent on oil as energy source, which is the base of economic superpower" and as such, it has to take sides with the Arabs in view of the fact that "the previous neutral policies, will not work anymore".

In its editorial titled "Is Japan pro-Arab" (12/12/73), the *Asahi* writes "Japan finally formed a new Middle East policy due to the supreme order (necessity) of sustaining stable oil supply, and it seems that Japan, which is fluctuating between hope and despair, is expecting the Arab side's favourable response".

Thus, according to the *Asahi*, Japan is expecting reciprocal relations, alluding to the Japanese values discussed in Chapter One. And since it accommodated to Arab demands due to its "supreme order", now Japan expects the Arabs to fulfil their indebtedness (*giri*) and pay for their part with a "favourable response".

As to the *Mainichi*, it writes that the "Middle East oil is a factor of life and death for Japan" (14/11/73). Therefore for Japan, "there is no other way than showing whole hearted sincerity and increase friendly co-operation. Stable friendly relations are the basis for stable resource supplies and economic relations" (9/12/73). Moreover, Japan should adjust all its positions regarding the Middle East with Arab demands "not to leave ambiguity which cause misunderstanding" (9/12/73).

As to concrete support for the government, in its editorial titled "The results and issues regarding Miki, the Special Envoy's diplomacy," the *Mainichi* writes, "his role was to report our country's stance and policies regarding the Middle East peace, however, more than that (we) would like to praise his continual efforts, which brought about real results (of Japan being treated) as friendly nation" (29/12/73).

In a similar vein, the *Yomiuri* calls for Japan to activate its "oil diplomacy" (15/11/73). Like the *Mainichi*, it also calls on Japan to entirely adopt Arab positions, "Japan (has to) check the Arab side's true

meaning from every aspect...(Japan) should establish the position of Arab diplomacy in Japanese diplomacy, and advance policies to correspond to the Arab diplomacy's position"(20/11/73).

With regards to the Nikaido Declaration, formally inaugurated the previous day, the *Yomiuri* writes, "it is natural to translate it (Resolution 242) as withdrawal from all the occupied territories, and we would like to praise the government for establishing such attitude, although it was rather late" (23/7/73). As to the success of Miki's visit to the Middle East, which secured Japan being treated as "friendly nation", the *Yomiuri* writes "above all, we would like to consider Miki, the Special Envoy's efforts as great. As everybody knows...our country will be treated as a friendly country, and be excluded from oil reduction" (29/12/73).

Though numerous more examples exist, suffice is to say, that the three newspapers strongly supported their government's alteration of its Middle East policy, and therefore, H14 is supported.

#### ***Hypothesis 15 (H15)***

H15: While supporting their government (H14), the nationalistic as well as cultural nationalistic traits of the Japanese mainstream media will become evident, regardless of the political inclination of the media involved. That is, while demarcating the boundaries between 'us' and 'them', the media will retort to framing Japan as the victim, as well as portraying their country as "a small country with no resources...(and therefore) must react as a whole if it is to survive" (Mouer and Sugimoto, 1986: 234; Yoshino, 2000).

Evidence for nationalistic as well as cultural nationalistic views were apparent in all three newspapers, regardless of their political inclination, especially from the editorials' analysis.

Here again, to illustrate *Asahi*'s views, editorials without Israel have been selected, since *Asahi* did not refer to Japan in Israel-mentioned articles. In its editorial "Is Japan pro-Arab?" (12/12/73), the *Asahi* refers to the invitation of the Special Arab envoy to the Journalists' Club's press conference, in the following: "It seems that the press conference, which has invited a foreigner as a guest, was the biggest success in the history of the Kisha Club". The alien nature of inviting a foreign national is clear from its emphasis, although it is applauded.

As to nationalist references demarcating the boundaries between 'us' and 'them' as well as cultural nationalism where Japan is portrayed as a 'victim' and 'as a small country without resources,' they were evident as well. In its editorial titled "Calmly dealing with oil prices' hike" (25/12/73), the *Asahi* refers six times to 'our country'. It refers to "our country's prime energy", "our country's case", "our country's imported oil", and so on. In the same editorial it tells its readers "among all the developed countries, our country will be the most severely influenced" and "in our country's case, it seems the changes of international markets have particularly influenced (Japan)". Thus, Japan is portrayed as the single biggest victim of the Oil Crisis among the developed nations of the world.

In another, though Israel-mentioned editorial from the last sample, the *Asahi* publishes an editorial titled "Advance the solution mainly by the UN" (14/8/90) in reference to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Here also the *Asahi* refers eight times to 'our country'. The newspaper writes: "There is no other way for our country than to implement the economic sanctions and keep up with the activities of the UN". It reminds its readers that Japan "is largely dependent on the Middle East oil" and therefore should do all it can "for both, world peace, and our country's economy and national life". Thus, the *Asahi* explains that Japan has good reasons to co-operate with the rest of the world on two grounds, the abstract "world peace" and the concrete Japanese "economy and national life" (14/8/90).

As to the other two newspapers, it is evident from Chart 4.14.1 that both newspapers exhibited cultural nationalistic views (frames 1,3,8, 10). Additionally, in their editorials numerous nationalistic as well as cultural nationalistic references were detected. Accordingly, reference to 'our country' demarcating Japan vis-à-vis the 'outside world,' depictions of Japan as the "biggest/worst victim" of the oil crisis, as well as the *Nihonjinron*'s mantra stressing "Japan is a small country without resources" were made in both the *Mainichi* and the *Yomiuri*'s editorials on numerous occasions (*Mainichi* 18/10/73, 19/10/73, 26/10/73, 14/11/73, 21/11/73, 9/12/73, 29/12/73 *Yomiuri* 19/10/73, 27/10/73, 14/11/73, 15/11/73, 20/11/73, 23/11/73, 28/11/73, 30/11/73, 25/12/73, 29/12/73).

Furthermore, the two respective newspapers made additional revealing references as well. Paying attention first to the *Mainichi*, it disclosed its paternalistic as well as participatory and educational role, with regards to the public, stating that "it is important to enlighten the people on the reality and characteristics of the oil crisis and its influence on the Japanese economy. This is because of the fact that

voluntary co-operation of the people cannot be expected without correct recognition of the real situation of the crisis". It stressed that though "the people's awareness of the energy crisis in general is still not enough" they started to understand "the weakness of a GNP superpower without any resources" (16/11/73).

In the same editorial, the *Mainichi* discusses the Japanese context of "an industrial superpower, which has no resources" and whose products "are imported all over the world" but its economy "sways each time there is an impact from foreign countries". In reference to the Japanese context, the *Mainichi* writes that despite these problems,

it is impossible for Japan to get out of the frame of international mutual dependence and stand on its legs, because it hardly has any resources in which it can be self-sufficient. Accordingly, there is no other way for our country than to remain in the frame of international mutual dependency, and to live by alleviating its (the dependency) influence as much as possible (16/11/73).

Thus, remaining part of the international society is not natural, but indispensable and is in response to Japan's needs.

Another illuminating editorial was in reference to Palestinian terror, carried out together with the Japanese Red Army. On this incident and with respect to Japan's involvement in attempts to solve the incident, the *Mainichi* writes: "It is probably true that co-operation beyond nation and race is necessary in order to solve international conflict and to establish peace" (8/2/74). Here also, Japan's co-operation with the outside world seems to be in response to or derived from its needs. By highlighting the occasions of Japan's co-operation with the 'outside', the newspaper reveals that co-operation with the 'outside' is seen as the exception, rather than the rule.

Nearly twenty years later, during the Gulf Crisis, the *Mainichi* discusses Japan and the world again (10/9/90), this time from a position of an economically very powerful Japan. It writes that Japan "has the second largest GNP and is the biggest creditor in the world" however, its diplomacy is criticised as "free-rider and selfish". On this criticism, it writes that this is the "international cliché of criticising Japan". However, to "gain international appraisal" Japan must be ready to offer a "symbolic act of sacrificing its high prosperity to some extent". Regarding the sacrifice, the *Mainichi* prepares/alarms its readers that though support for the US-led coalition is inevitable, it "will affect our standard of living as well as be accompanied by self-sacrifice which spoils our prosperity" (10/9/90).

Finally, as in *Asahi's* case, the *Mainichi* had numerous instances alluding to the Japanese values discussed in Chapter One. The *Mainichi* calls for Japan to dispel its image among the Arab countries as

'unfriendly nation' (26/10/73). It appeals to Japan to sincerely show it is honestly pro-Arab, otherwise, the Arabs will not trust Japan (14/11/73, 21/11/73, 9/12/73). Thus, it has to express "whole hearted " sincerity (9/12/73).

Following Miki's visit, which brought "real results" to Japan, the *Mainichi* calls on Japan "to get rid of this feeling of distrust" and to do this, "the government's first duty is to honour all the bills (promises)" (29/12/73). That is, Japan has to fulfil its part of the bargain (*giri*), to repay the Arabs for re-labelling Japan as a 'friendly nation'.

As to the *Yomiuri*, explicit references to indebtedness were made as well. In the first instance, like the *Asahi*, it is with regards to Arab's indebtedness towards Japan. The day after the Nikaido Declaration (23/11/73) the *Yomiuri* writes that now that "the government made clear the new policies", the newspaper "would like the Arab side's justified evaluation, and at the same time, their understanding of Japan's efforts in this situation (with the US), that express (Japan's) Middle East policies, which obviously follow the Arab moral/justice, as the Arabs see it". On another occasion, and in a likewise manner as the *Mainichi*, the *Yomiuri* writes that now it's Japan's turn to repay. It stresses that due to Miki's success, the suspicion of the Arabs towards Japan's sincerity were somewhat removed, however, the problem lies with the "steady strengthening of co-operative relations and trust with the Arabs" (29/12/73). As a result of Miki's success, "our country's responsibilities have increased. From now on Japan has to fulfil Arab's expectation towards our country and should never be accused again of paying lip service diplomacy" (29/12/73).

Additionally, though not an Israel-mentioned, the following editorial (24/2/74) discusses two issues. It talks of Japan's lack of resources, and therefore, its attributable need to co-operate with the world. Thus, similarly to the *Asahi* and *Mainichi*, the *Yomiuri* stresses that Japan needs to co-operate because of its needs. It further elaborates on the need for direct as well as explicit communication with other countries as derived from mutual dependence. On the communication style, the *Yomiuri* writes "it is not a case for *umu aitsuzuru*" (meaning: understanding one another with or without verbal communication, see Nelson, 1988). Thus, the *Yomiuri* is actually saying that while in communication among Japanese, non-verbal communication (*haragei*) is natural, when dealing with 'others' one must use explicit language to make his stance clear.

In its last two editorials from the Gulf Crisis, the *Yomiuri* again discusses Japan and the world. In the first instance (17/1/91), immediately following the break-up of hostilities with the expiration of the ultimatum to Iraq, the *Yomiuri* tells its readers that the present situation poses “a significant trial for Japan”. It further says that Japan has to support the US-led coalition for a number of reasons. Among these, the *Yomiuri* enlists the need to maintain global order, which is “a concrete issue regarding Japan’s survival”. Additionally, “in a case of military clash, (Japanese) national life will be hit by the rise of oil prices”. It concludes the editorial saying “the stage when (Japan) could escape only by advocating peace co-operation had passed”.

In the subsequent case (3/2/91) the *Yomiuri* praises the international society for courage and solidarity. As to Japan, the *Yomiuri* writes “regarding such international efforts, it is natural for Japan to support it as much as possible, since (Japan) wants to get a prestigious position in the international society”. Hence, here also Japan should support international efforts in order to get something it wants.

Correspondingly, for all three newspapers co-operation with the outside ‘other’ seems unnatural, but as required by Japan’s circumstances.

All in all, H15 was supported since nationalistic as well as cultural nationalistic views were found in all three newspapers. Demarcation of the boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’, framing Japan as the victim as well using the phrase of Japan as “a small country with no resources”, were evident. Though evidence for these characteristics was especially prevalent in *Yomiuri* and *Mainichi*’s articles, the *Asahi* exhibited them as well.

## 7.2 Summary

In an effort to answer the two main research questions:

1. How did the Japanese reporting on the Middle East during the two decades from the beginning of the 1970s until the end of the Gulf Crisis evolve, and were the changes in accord with the government’s foreign policy towards the Middle East?
2. Is there substantial evidence to attest that Chapter Three and Four’s findings regarding the Japanese mainstream media’s foreign news reporting are indeed enduring?

the validity of the research's 15 hypotheses were examined. Following the analyses it became evident that out of the 15 hypotheses, 13 were clearly validated while the remaining two were partially validated.

Consequently, by corroborating to a large extent the validity of these hypotheses, the endurance of the previous chapters' findings and conclusions as to the nature and characteristics of the Japanese media's international reporting as well as the pervasiveness conditioning of this reporting by the Japanese contexts, had been reconfirmed.

Needless to say, these findings also reassert the validity of the often-aired solicitation of this research, that the Japanese mainstream media is not a western-modelled media, and therefore should not be examined by western-made theories.

## **CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS**

From the outset of this thesis and all through, continuous efforts were made to uncover the ways with which Japanese culture, in the perception that culture “consists of whatever it is one has to know or believe in order to operate in a manner acceptable to its members” (Ward Goodenough as cited by Geertz, 2000: 11), overwhelms the Japanese media and its international reporting.

Through extensive introduction of the Japanese contexts, an endeavour was made to somewhat clarify what is the “historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which human communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes towards life” (Geertz, 2000: 89).

Once culture and its omnipresence in a variety of critically important contexts was explained as well as illustrated, its influence on the working of the mainstream media was analysed and followed by a case study using frame and qualitative content analyses.

With particular view to reporting on Japan, the frame analysis revealed, as Entman (1993) asserted, that frames are indeed related to culture with the view that “culture is the stock of commonly invoked frames” (Entman, 1993: 53).

Furthermore, by empirically uncovering and quantifying the recurrent frames, the frame analysis informed “us about producers and their audiences” and also told “us something about the power structure in society” (Entman, 1993: 53).

With regards to the implication of frame analysis, Entman (1993) comments that it is “an insight that poses challenge to democracy itself” (Entman, 1993: 53).

Indeed, it may be recalled that one impetus for using frame analysis was because it meshes well with Gramsci’s ‘Hegemony Theory’ (Moody-Hall, 2002), hence, corresponding to Parts Three and Four’s findings.

Entman (1993)’s fear, as well as Moody-Hall (2002)’s assertion, did prove to be correct. Gramsci (1971) defined ‘hegemony theory’ as “the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to maintain the active consent over whom it rules” (Gramsci, 1971, as cited by Holborn and Haralambos, 2000: 615). This definition was endorsed as reflecting the media as part of the ‘state’ and thus, incorporated into the conjectured evolution of the Japanese media’s reporting on Israel, which proved to be true. The validity of this

proposition was further strengthened when during the data's scrutiny, two articles have disclosed that indeed, the Japanese Prime Minister at the time, Kakuei Tanaka, have had several meetings with the various branches of the mainstream media. Although already past the peak days of the 'Oil Crisis,' the Prime Minister is asking the print (*Mainichi* 13/2/74) and broadcast media (*Asahi* 20/2/74), to co-operate with the government by supporting its policies regarding the economic situation and persuading the public. Consequently, the "media world...promises to co-operate and exert efforts in persuading the people" (*Mainichi* 13/2/74).

All in all, the appropriateness of using frame analysis to explore the Japanese media's content was apparent. Likewise, regarding the Japanese media's content, it should be once more stressed that frame analysis is deemed particularly well suited for uncovering the overt and covert meanings of Japanese texts, which characteristically follow *haragei* rules, and as such are ambiguous, indirect as well as based on elipsis, where "people can complete the missing parts from the context" (Donahue, 1998: 165).

Consequently, as Entman (1993) asserted, frame analysis yielded a wealth of information beyond the capacity of a normative quantitative analysis (Entman, 1993).

Concerning reporting on the Middle East, frame analysis revealed that the Japanese media acted as the mouthpiece of Arab/Palestinian views. It became transparent that triggered by the Oil Crisis, the Japanese media became and remained thereafter, in fact, a sounding board for Arab and Palestinian propaganda. First, the Japanese mainstream media's position on the Middle East conflict became on the whole, indistinguishable from Arab and Palestinians' stance (see for example Rubin, 1993). Second, the media relied, as in definitions of propaganda, "on selection of facts, partial explanations and predetermined answers" in order to "maximize persuasiveness" (Holsti, 1988: 193-194).

By advocating the Arab/Palestinian views, the Japanese mainstream media also exhibited overt as well as covert anti-Semitism (Rubin, 1993; Wistrich, 1992: 222-239), thus reconfirming Goodman and Miyazawa's assertions (Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995).

As to the frames' implication, Kowner (1997)'s findings regarding the movement of Japanese public opinion on Israelis and Jews (Kowner, 1997) in all likelihood reconfirmed the inherent capacity of news frames to facilitate public opinion not only with tone, but with content as well (Entman, 1993; Pan and Kosicki, 1993; Wanta and Hu, 1993).

With regards to the qualitative editorial analysis, it complemented frame analysis by unveiling the ubiquity of Japanese values and related morals and their disparities with western ones. This incompatibility was apparent in numerous instances.

Conceivably, one of the most conspicuous insights was the irrelevance of the selected newspapers' political inclination, when it comes to international reporting. All through the analysis, it became evident that contexts have overwhelmed political inclination. Hence, the *Asahi*, and even more so, the *Mainichi*, exhibited nationalistic as well as cultural nationalistic views, while the *Yomiuri* adopted left-leaning arguments. Thus, it is plausible that political leaning may be the formal (*tatema*) countenance of the newspapers, as contrasted with the real emotions/the inner feelings/ opinions (*honne*) as were disclosed by the content.

Another aspect which became apparent was concerning law, hence the use of UN Resolution, as well as the Japanese constitution as mere "treasured sword(s)" (Gibney, 1996: 68). All through the editorials it became plain that UN Resolutions were used in as much as they served the national interest. When they served it, they were the main arguments for adopting a certain stance, as was the case during the Gulf Crisis when hostilities broke out. When they did not serve the national interest, they were ignored as was illustrated during the Oil Crisis. Though one-sided concessions concerning the interpretation of UN Resolution 242 has been revealed to be shared by the west as well, as the *Economist* recently disclosed (Double Standard, 2002), an inherent flexible attitude regarding law was similarly evident by the rigid interpretation as well as utilization of the Japanese constitution, which was used to delay co-operation with the US-led coalition during the Gulf Crisis, though almost instantly compromised when crisis looms (Struck, 2003; see also Gibney, 1996; Herzog, 1993; Matsumoto, 1989).

However, the Japanese media's use of UN Resolutions as well as the Japanese constitution reflect in fact, underlining culturally shared conditioned moral principle. While it became evident that Japan does not share western morals, or principles as to what is right, or wrong, the predominate principle that was apparent all through the editorials was that of 'good/right is what is in Japan's interest/good for Japan', and therefore, should be pursued. This was manifested in a number of ways and instances. For example, so long as the terror groups attacked others (S1), they were lent some legitimacy by being labelled "guerrillas", but when they attacked Japanese they became "criminals". Another case for this parameter was the three

newspapers' endeavours to persuade the public that it is good for Japan to co-operate with the rest of the world, since it is for the country's benefit in terms of its needs and aspirations, but not from any shared purpose, or values.

Additionally, the dominance of Japanese cultural values became evident as well, in numerous instances. Seeing the world through Japanese, rather than universal values was evident in association, for example, with Japan's alteration of its foreign policy. Following the change, the Japanese government, as well as the newspapers, expected the Arab's renaming their country, a "friendly nation," while at the same time stressing that Japan has to continuously pursue Japan's new foreign policies "honestly and sincerely", because otherwise, it will not be trusted, hence, alluding to indebtedness and reciprocity.

As to the consequence, a final note regarding the selected newspapers, particularly the *Asahi* and its position in Japan in general and among Japanese lawmakers, is required. While the presumed power of the media in Japan had been discussed at length, as may be recalled, similarly to the public, the *Asahi* was selected as the leading newspaper by the lawmakers, since it is considered "the most prestigious daily newspaper in Japan", as well as having a "diversified political and economic information" (Feldman, 1993: 156).

Thus, it may dismay one to know that the lawmakers of the second largest economy in the world rely for their "diversified political and economic information", including international news, on a newspaper that appeared to be not only the most one-sided and biased among the selected three, but also the newspaper where distortion of the truth was the most consistently prevalent.

Taking into consideration all that has been said so far, together with the disclosure that Japan has reached a degree of self-sufficiency in terms of global news net, it became plain that western theories of the media are not adjusted to analysing the Japanese media's international reporting.

Furthermore, analysis of two decades coverage of Israel-mentioned articles by the mainstream Japanese media reaffirmed the predominance of two main contingencies. One, that reporting on countries deemed important to Japan is filtered through the national interests of Japan. Two, that of the omnipresent influence of contexts on the Japanese mainstream media, particularly for this research, contexts ascendancy on foreign news reporting. However, only repeated research will testify to the endurance of these findings.

Nevertheless, making use of the present thesis' findings, future research on the Japanese media's international reporting may be assisted by paying attention to the following recommendations;

1. As a first step, a distinction should be made as to whether a country is deemed important to Japan, or not. If the country is assessed as insignificant to Japan, then further research should explore the nature and characteristics of Japanese mainstream reporting on a country of this category. It is possible that in such cases, the Japanese mainstream media's reporting will follow the western patterns (Rampal, 1995; van Ginneken, 1998; Sreberny-Mohammadi et al., 1997). However, if the country in question is considered significant, then the degree of importance should be assessed. Evaluation should be conducted based on that country's overall relations with Japan.
2. Once relations are appraised, a further judgement should be carried out regarding that country's political and media systems.
3. When the above two factors (1,2) are taken into account, it will be possible to hypothesise about the nature and characteristics of the Japanese mainstream media's reporting on that country.
4. Tentative assumptions should be based on Chapters Three and Four's conclusions, as were reconfirmed in Chapter Seven's findings.
5. Finally, propositions concerning the Japanese mainstream media's reporting on a particular country should be flexible to reflect and be in accord with changes in the Japanese foreign policy regarding that country.

## **Appendix 1----Interviews' Questionnaires**

### **Interviews' Questionnaire: Director-Generals**

#### ***Personal Details***

1. Age
2. Place of Birth
3. Higher education (university's name, department, degree obtained)
4. Working career up to the present

#### ***Work Routine***

1. What is the essence of the interviewee's job in terms of responsibilities as a Director-General?
2. What are the main activities the Director-General is involved with?

#### ***Working Relations with the Newspaper's Japan's Headquarter***

1. How often do you have contact with the main office?
2. For what purpose?
3. Are you involved in anyway with the coverage of the areas under your responsibility, in terms of topics and content, for example? If yes, in what ways?
4. Is there any focus/particular issues in the reporting regarding the areas under your responsibility? Are there any specific issues to be covered?

#### ***General: In Your Opinion***

1. What is the role of a foreign correspondent?
2. What do you think about the relations between foreign correspondent's news reporting and the correspondent's own country's national interests?"
3. To what extent do media companies' editorial line regarding reporting affect their own foreign correspondents' reporting on foreign countries?
4. What do you know about media relations with *shingikai* and/or other political/governmental organisations?

## **Interviews' Questionnaire: Foreign Correspondents**

### ***Personal Details***

1. Age
2. Place of Birth
3. Higher education (university's name, department, degree obtained)
4. Working career up to the present

### ***Work Routine***

1. What are the geographical areas covered by the foreign correspondent?
2. What is the main focus of the foreign correspondent's coverage? (economics, politics etc)
3. What is the daily routine of the journalist? (including news-gathering venues, methods, news sources)
4. What kinds of news stories are sent to Japan (main themes/topics), how many stories? How many are eventually published?

### ***Working Relations with other journalists***

1. Do you work alone, or, do you work with other journalists on a daily basis? If you do meet other journalists, are they from your own company, and/or, other Japanese media companies?
2. What sort of interaction do you have with other Japanese journalists?
3. Do you meet also non-Japanese journalists? If yes, is it on a daily basis? For what purpose?

### ***Working Relations with the newspaper' Japan Headquarter***

1. How often do you have contact with the main office? For what purpose?
2. How do you become aware of editorial policy of the paper about the issues you are covering?
3. Do you get special requests for specific types of articles? If yes, what are they?
4. Do you agree with the requests? Do you comply with the requests?
5. What kind of articles will almost always will make it to the newspaper?

### ***General: In Your Opinion***

1. What is the role of a foreign correspondent?

2. What do you think about the relations between foreign correspondent's news reporting and the correspondent's own country's national interests?
3. To what extent do media companies' editorial line regarding reporting affect their own foreign correspondents' reporting on foreign countries?
4. What do you know about media relations with *shingikai* and/or other political/governmental organisations?

## **Appendix 2----Nikaido Declaration (November 22, 1973)**

1. The Japanese government has consistently hoped that a just and lasting peace in the Middle east will be achieved through the prompt and complete implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 and has continued to request the efforts of the parties and countries concerned. It has been prompt in supporting the United Nations General Assembly Resolution concerning the rights of the Palestinian people for self-determination.
2. The Government of Japan is of the view that following the principles should be adhered to in achieving a peace settlement:
  - (1) The inadmissibility of acquisition and occupation of territories by use of force;
  - (2) The withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the territories occupied in the 1967 war.
  - (3) The respect for the integrity and security of the territories of all the countries in the area and the need of guarantees to that end; and
  - (4) The recognition of and for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations in bringing about a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.
3. The Government of Japan urges that every possible effort be made to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East in compliance with the above-mentioned principles. Needless to say, it is the intention of the Government of Japan to make as much contribution as possible towards that end. The Government of Japan, deploring Israel's continued occupation of Arab territories, urges Israel to comply with these principles. The Government of Japan will continue to observe the situation in the Middle East with grave concern and, depending on future developments, may have to reconsider its policy toward Israel.

(Source: Maruyama, *Japan's Middle Eastern Policy in Dilemma*, pp. 273-74, as cited by Goodman and Miyazawa, 1995, p. 213)

## **Appendix 3----United Nations Resolution 242**

### ***Text of Security Council Resolution 242, Nov.22, 1967***

*The Security Council,*

*Expressing* its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

*Emphasizing* the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in security,

*Emphasizing further* that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. *Affirms* that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:
  - (i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
  - (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
2. *Affirms* further the necessity
  - (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
  - (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
  - (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones.;
3. *Requests* the Secretary General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the states concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;
4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

## Appendix 4----Security Council Resolution 2628

2628 (XXV). The Situation in the Middle East

1896th plenary meeting, 4 November 1970.

*The General Assembly,*

*Seriously concerned* that the continuation of the present grave and deteriorating situation in the Middle East constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security,

*Reaffirming* that no territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized,

*Deploing* the continued occupation of the Arab territories since 5 June 1967,

*Seriously concerned* that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, which was unanimously adopted and which provides for a peaceful settlement of the situation in the Middle East, has not yet been implemented,

*Having considered* the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East",

1. *Reaffirms* that the acquisition of territories by force is inadmissible and that, consequently, territories thus occupied must be restored;
2. *Reaffirms* that the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East should include the application of both the following principles:
  - (a) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict.
  - (b) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and its right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
3. *Recognizes* that respect for the rights of the Palestinians is an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;
4. *Urges* the speedy implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967), which provides for the peaceful settlement of the situation in the Middle East, in all its parts;
5. *Calls upon* the parties directly concerned to instruct their representatives to resume contact with the

Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East in order to enable him to carry out, at the earliest possible date, his mandate for the implementation of the Security Council resolution in all its parts;

6. *Recommends* to the parties that they extend the cease-fire for a period of three months in order that they may enter into talks under the auspices of the Special Representative with a view to giving effect to Security Council resolution 242 (1967);
7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within a period of two months, and to the General Assembly as appropriate, on the efforts of the Special Representative and on the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967);
8. *Requests* the Security Council to consider, if necessary, making arrangements, under the relevant articles of the Charter of the United Nations, to ensure the implementation of this resolution.

1896th plenary meeting.

4 November 1970.

## **Appendix 5----Joint Communiqué Issued on the Occasion of the Official Visit to Japan of H.M. King Faisal Ibn Abdul Aziz Al Saud (excerpt)**

*May 25, 1971*

(At the invitation of the Government of Japan, His Majesty King Faisal Ibn Abdul Aziz Al Saud, King of Saudi Arabia, paid a state visit to Japan from 20 Rabi'I to Rabi'I, 1391 A.H. corresponding to May 20 to May 25, 1971, A.D.)

3...His Majesty the King explained in general the Arab point of view regarding the Palestine problem and the injustice and privations suffered by the people of Palestine as a result of the Zionist expansionist policy.

H.E. the Prime Minister expressed his hope that a just and lasting peace will be brought about in the Middle East as soon as possible in conformity with the resolution adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations on November 22, 1967. H.E. the Prime Minister believed that the problem of Palestine should be solved on the basis of rightfulness and justice and that the people concerned should be entitled to their lawful rights, so that peace and stability would prevail in this sensitive part of the world...

## Glossary

*Amakudari*: Often translated as “Descent from heaven” is the practice where retired bureaucrats move on to prestigious jobs in the private sector

*Dango*: Bid-rigging

*Gaiatsu*: External pressure

*Gaman*: Self-restraint

*Giri*: It is the protocol that controls the interaction, a duty to a specific person, whom one has relation with

*Haragei*: Non-verbal communication, roughly translated as ‘gut-reading’

*Honne*: Inner feelings

*Ie*: House, home, family system

*Jinja*: Shrine Shinto

*Kami, Okami*: god, deity

*Kata*: Way (of doing things)

*Keiretsu*: Affiliation system

*Kisha Clubs*: journalist clubs, or press clubs

*Ko*: Child

*Kohai*: Junior

*Kondan*: Off-the-record briefings

*Koshitsu Shinto*: Shinto of the Imperial House

*Kyoha Shinto*: Sect Shinto

*Minkan Shinto*: Folk Shinto

*Nakama*: friend, insider

*Nemawashi*: Consensual decision-making

*Nihonjinron*: Theories of Japaneseness

*Nihon Shimbun Kyokai* (NSK): Japan Newspaper Editors and Publishers Association

*Ninjo*: Human/spontaneous emotions/behaviour

*Nippon Hoso Kyokai* (NHK): Japan Broadcasting Corporation

*On*: Indebtedness for a favour given, or kindness shown

*Oya*: Parent

*Seishin*: Spirit

*Sempai*: Senior

*Shakaijin*: Society/mature person

*Shimbun*: Newspaper

*Shingikai*: Government advisory bodies/deliberation councils

*Shinyo*: Trust, confidence in someone

*Soto*: Outside, which means literally outside the home as well as outside the domains one deems to be *uchi*, the outer group

*Tatemaie*: Formal/proper behaviour

*Tsukiai*: Social obligation

*Uchi*: Means inside, home, but also my company/school, the inner group.

*Wa*: Harmony

*Wagamama*: Selfish

*Yuzuriai*: Reciprocal dependence, or reciprocity

## Bibliography

- Abe, H., Shindo, M. and Kawato, S. (1994) *The Government and Politics of Japan*, University of Tokyo Press, Tokyo.
- Abegglen, J. C. and Stalk, G., Jr. (1990) *Kaisha, The Japanese Corporation*, Charles E. Tuttle Company, Tokyo.
- Acosta-Alzuru, C. and Lester-Roushazmir, P. E. (2000) All You Will See is the One You Once Knew: Portrayals from the Falklands/Malvinas War in U.S. and Latin American Newspapers, *Journalism Communication Monographs*, 1, 303-354.
- Akhavan-Majid, R. (1990) The Press as an Elite Power Group in Japan, *Journalism Quarterly*, 67, 1006-1014.
- Akuto, H. (1996) In *Media and politics in Japan* (Eds, Krauss, E., S. and Pharr, S., J.) University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, pp. 313-338.
- Allan, J. G. (2000) *The Blackwell Dictionary of Sociology*, Blackwell Publishers Inc., Malden, Massachusetts.
- Andereasen, E. (1993) In *Japanese Religions: Past and Present* (Eds, Reader, I., Andereasen, E. and Stefansson, F.) Japan Library, Kent, pp. 33-43.
- Asahi Shimbun (2002) *The Asahi Shimbun Almanac*, Toppan Printing, Tokyo.
- Atwood, L. E. (1987) News of U.S. and Japan in Each Other's Paper, *Gazette*, 39, 73-89.
- Azuma, H. (1986) In *Child Development and Education in Japan* (Eds, Stevenson, H., Azuma, H. and Hakuta, K.) W.H. Freeman and Company, New York, pp. 3-12.
- Becker, B. L. (1977) Foreign Policy and Press Performance, *Journalism Quarterly*, 54, 364-368.
- Beer, W. L. (1993) In *Japanese Constitutional Law* (Eds, Luney, R. P., Jr. and Kazuyuki, T.) Tokyo University Press, Tokyo, pp. 221-254.
- Befu, H. (1983) *Japan, An Anthropological Introduction*, Charles E. Tuttle Company, Tokyo.
- Befu, H. (1986) In *Japanese Culture and Behavior, Selected Reading* (Eds, Lebra, W., P and Lebra, S., Takie) University of Hawaii Press, Hawaii, US, pp. 158-170.
- Befu, H. (1991) In *Transcending Stereotypes, Discovering Japanese Culture and Education* (Eds, Finkelstein, B., Imamura, A., E. and Tobin, J., J.) Intercultural Press, INC, Yarmouth, Maine, US, pp. 12-16.
- Befu, H. (1992) In *Ideology and Practice in Modern Japan* (Eds, Goodman, R. and Refsing, K.) Routledge Publications, London and New York, pp. 26-46.
- Benedict, R. (1991) *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, Charles Tuttle Company, Tokyo.
- Boyd-Barrett, O. (1997) In *Media in Global Context* (Eds, Sreberny-Mohammadi, A., Winseck, D., McKenna, J. and Boyd-Barrett, O.) Arnold, London, pp. 131-160.
- Brislin, T. (1996) David and Godzilla: Anti-Semitism and Seppuku in Japanese Publishing, *AEJMC Annual Conference*, Anaheim California.
- Brislin, T. (1997) An Update on Journalism Ethics in Asia: Values and Practices as Context for Meaning in Japan, China and Korea, *Association for Practical and Professional Ethics Annual Meeting*, March 6-8, Washington, D.C.
- Buruma, I. (1984) *Behind the Mask*, Meridian Printing, New York.
- CAMERA (2001), *A Record of Bias, National Public Radio Coverage of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, September 26-November 26, 2000*, [Online source], Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America, Available from: <wysiwyg://100/http://63.209.164.40/index.asp?x\_context=20&x\_article=75> [January 23].
- CAMERA (2004), *Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America*, [online source], Available from: <http://www.camera.org>.
- Carr, S. (1989) Deal with the Japanese Media, *Public Relations Journal*, 27-28.
- Carrier, R. (1998) In *News Media & Foreign Relations* (Ed, Malek, A.) Ablex Publishing Corporation, Norwood, New Jersey, pp. 177-194.
- Cassara, C. (1998) In *News Media & Foreign Relations* (Ed, Malek, A.) Ablex Publishing Corporation, Norwood, New Jersey, pp. 161-175.
- Chiba, K. (1993) In *Japan in the Contemporary Middle East* (Eds, Sugihara, K. and Allan, J. A.) Routledge, London, pp. 144-154.

- Cho, H. and Lacy, S. (2000) International Conflict Coverage in Japanese Local Daily Newspapers, *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*, 77, 830-845.
- Christopher, C. R. (1993) *The Japanese Mind, The Goliath Explained*, Charles E. Tuttle Company, Tokyo.
- Clausen, L. (2001) 'Global' Images, International Formats and Local Meaning, A Study of Micro Processes in the Production of International News - A Japanese Case, *15th Nordic Conference on Media and Communication Research*, August 10-13, Reykjavik, Iceland.
- Cohen, C. B. (1993) *The press and Foreign Policy*, Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California,, Berkely.
- Cooper-Chen, A. (1992) A Week of World News: TV Gatekeeping in Japan, the United States, Jamaica, Sri Lanka and Colombia, *Keio Communication Review*, 14, 69-84.
- Cooper-Chen, A. (1995) Japan's Clouded Window: News on NHK and TBS Television, 1993., *AEJMC, ICD Annual Convention Paper*, 1995, August 9-12, Washington, D.C.
- Cooper-Chen, A. (1997a) Japan's Great Daily: Editorials in the Asahi Shimbun During a Year of Political Change, *Keio Communication Review*, 19, 67-84.
- Cooper-Chen, A. (1997b) *Mass Communication in Japan*, Iowa State University, Ames.
- Cooper-Chen, A. (1999) *Praising, Bashing, Passing: Newsmagazines Coverage of Japan, 1965-1994*, [Internet], AEJMC, Available from: <<http://list.msu.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind9909b&L=aejmc&F=&S=&P=2131>> [24/9/1999].
- Cooper-Chen, A. (2001) The Death of Diana: A Multi-Nation Study of Values and Practices, *International Communication Bulletin*, 36, 2-15.
- Cortazzi, H. (2000), *Mori Does No Favors*, [News on line], The Japan Times On Line, Available from: <<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/egi-bin/getasarticle.pl5?eo200000529hc.htm>> [15th February].
- CULCON, U. (1995), *US-Japan Cooperation in Public Affairs Broadcasting*, [Internet], US CULCON Media Seminars, Available from: <<http://www.dgggsys.com/~jusfc/usculcon/pubbbroad.html>> [13/6/2000].
- Cunningham, P. (1995) Wei Jingsheng, A Talk with China's Silenced Champion of Freedom, *The Japan Times*, December 20.
- Curtis, G. (Ed.) (1993) *Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War, Coping With Change*, M.E. Sharpe, New York.
- Curtis, G. (1999) *The Logic of Japanese Politics, Leaders, Institutions, and the Limits of Change*, Columbia University Press, New York.
- Daimon, S. and Kitazume, T. (1993) Politicians Change Face of Reporting, *The Japan Times*, September 7<sup>th</sup>, 1993.
- Dale, N. P. (1990) *The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness*, Routledge, London.
- Davis, B. (1989) *Myths and Facts*, Near East Research, Inc., Washington D.C.
- Dawaisha, A. (1984) Middle Eastern Images of Japan, Admiration for an Inconsequential Giant, *The Asia program*,,, Wilson Center.
- De Mente, B., Lafayette (1993) *Behind the Japanese Bow, An In-depth Guide to Understanding and Predicting Japanese Behaviour*, Passport Books, a division of NTC Publishing Group, Lincolnwood, Illinois.
- De Vos, G. (1986) In *Child Development and Education in Japan* (Eds, Stevenson, H., Azuma, H. and Hakuta, K.) W. H. Freeman and Company, New York.
- DFME (2003), *The Economist and Israel*, [media on-line], Available from: <<http://broadscapventures.com/weblog/dfme/archives/000351.html>> [10/3/2003].
- d'Haenens, L. and Verlest, C. (2002) Editorial Mediating Conflict: The Case of Indonesia.; Inside and Outside Media Perspectives on the Indonesian Reform Movement, *Gazette*, 64, 183-197.
- Doi, T. (1986) *The Anatomy of Self*, Kodansha International, Tokyo.
- Donahue, T. R. (1998) *Japanese Culture and Communication*, University Press of America, Lanham, Maryland.
- Double Standard (2002) Double Standard, Special Report: Iraq, Israel, and the UN, *The Economist*, October 12th - 18th, 23-25.
- Earhart, B., H. (1982) *Japanese Religions, Unity and Diversity*, Wadsworth Publishing Company, Belmont, California.
- ELJ (1997), *The Role of Law in Japanese Society*, [Electronic Law Journals], University of Warwick, Available [26th February].

- Ellwood, R., S. and Pilgrim, R. (1985) *Japanese Religion, a Cultural Perspective*, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J.
- Entman, R. M. (1991) Framing U.S. Coverage of International News: Contrasts in Narratives of the KAL and Iran Air Incidents, *Journal of Communication*, 41, 6-27.
- Entman, R. M. (1993) Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm, *Journal of Communication*, 43, 51-58.
- Eriksen, H., Thomas (1993) *Ethnicity and Nationalism, Anthropological Perspectives*, Pluto Press, London.
- Evans, H. (2002), *The anti-Semitic lies that threaten all of us*, [Times Online], The Times, Available from: <wysiwyg://73/http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,7-339866,00.html> [24th October].
- FairReporting (2004), *Bias Documentation*, [online source], Available from: <http://www.fair-reporting.com>.
- Farley, M. (1996) In *Media and Politics in Japan* (Eds, Pharr, S., J. and Krauss, E., S.) University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, pp. 133-163.
- Feldman, O. (1989) Media Politics in Japan, *39th Annual Conference of the International Communication Association*, 25th-29th May, San Francisco.
- Feldman, O. (1993) *Politics and the News Media in Japan*, The University of Michigan press, Ann Arbor.
- Finkelstein, B., Imamura, A., E. and Tobin, J., J. (Eds.) (1991) *Transcending Stereotypes, Discovering Japanese Culture and Education*, Intercultural Press, INC., Yarmouth, Maine, US.
- Flangan, C. S. (1993) In *Media and Politics in Japan* (Eds, Pharr, S., J. and Krauss, E., S.) University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, pp. 277-312.
- Foreign Press Centre (1990) *Japan's Mass Media*, Foreign Press Center, Tokyo.
- Freeman, L., A. (1996), *Japan's Press Clubs as Information Cartels*, [Internet], Japan Policy Research Institute, Available from: <http://jpri.org/public/wp18.html> [13/06/2000].
- Freeman, L., A. (2000) *Closing the Shop, Information Cartels and Japan's Mass Media*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey.
- Frei, M. (2001), *Japan's New Face of Politics*, [News on line], BBC News, Available from: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/...acific/newsid\_1399000/1399029.stm> [25th June].
- Fukue, H. (1991) In *Transcending Stereotypes, Discovering Japanese Culture and Education* (Eds, Finkelstein, B., Imamura, A., E. and Tobin, J., J.) Intercultural press, Yarmout, Maine, US, pp. 66-73.
- Fukunaga, H. (1993) Ducks, Sumo and Japanese Journalism, *Tokyo Business Today*, 1993, April.
- Fuse, K. and Mueller, E. J. (1996) In *ICD, AEJMC Markham Competition*, Coral Gables, Florida, pp. 18.
- Galtung, J. and Ruge, H., Mari (1965) The Structure of Foreign News, *Journal of Peace Research*, 64-91.
- Geertz, C. (2000) *The Interpretation of Cultures*, Basic Books, New York.
- Gerner, J. D. (1994) *One Land, Two People*, Westview Press, Boulder.
- Gibney, F. (1996) *Japan, The Fragile Superpower*, Charles E. Tuttle Company, Tokyo.
- Gilbert, M. (1976) *Winston. S. Churchill, Vol. 5. The Prophet of Truth, 1922-1939*, Henemann, London.
- Gilbert, M. (1998) *Israel, A History*, Doubleday, London.
- Goodman, G. D. and Miyazawa, M. (1995) *The Jews in the Japanese Mind, The History of Cultural Stereotypes*, The Free Press, New York.
- Goodman, R. and Refsing, K. (Eds.) (1992) *Ideology and Practice in Modern Japan*, Routledge Publications, London and New York.
- Gross, T. (2002), *Jeningrad*, [Online news], National Review Online, Available [5/12/2002].
- Grosswiler, P. (1998) In *News Media & Foreign Policy* (Ed, Malek, A.) Ablex Publishing Corporation, Norwood, New Jersey, pp. 195-210.
- Groth, D., E. (1996) In *Media and Politics in Japan* (Eds, Krauss, E., S. and Pharr, S., J.) University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, pp. 213-242.
- Gunaratne, A. S. (1999) The Media in Asia, An Overview, *Gazette*, 61, 197-223.
- Gurevitch, M. and Blumler, G. G. (2000) In *Media Power in Politics* (Ed, Graber, A. D.) Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington D.C., pp. 24-35.
- Hackett, A. R. (1998) In *News Media & Foreign Relations* (Ed, Malek, A.) Ablex Publishing Corporation, Norwood, New Jersey, pp. 141-160.
- Hadfield, P. (1991) Japan: Keeping in With the Club, *Index on Censorship*, 7, 15-17.
- Hall, I., P. (1998) *Cartels of the Mind, Japan's Intellectual Closed Shop*, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., New York, US.

- Hallin, C. D. (1994) *We Keep America on Top of the World, Television Journalism and the Public Sphere*, Routledge, London.
- Hanai, H. (1976) *Nihon no seiji fuudo to gaikou (Japan's political Environment and Diplomacy)*, Tokyo.
- Hara, T. (1992) *Atarashii Jourunaristo tachi He (To the New Journalists)*, Banseisha, Tokyo.
- Hay, C. (1995) Photographers Rap Limited Access, *The Japan Times*, November 19.
- Hayano, T. (2001), *Interview/ Yasuhiro Nakasone: U.S. Should Learn to Respect Other Cultures*, Asahi Shimbun, Available from: <<http://asahi.com/english/ooop-ed/k2001103100609.html>> [31 October].
- Hendry, J. (1986) *Becoming Japanese, The World of the Pre-School Child*, Manchester University Press, Manchester.
- Hendry, J. (1998) *Understanding Japanese Society*, Routledge Publications, London and New York.
- Hendry, J. (1999) *An Anthropologist in Japan*, Routledge, London.
- Henshall, K., G. (1999) *Dimensions of Japanese Society, Gender, Margins and Mainstream*, Macmillan Press Ltd, New York and London.
- Hertog, K. J. (2000) Elite Press Coverage of the 1986 U.S. - Libya Conflict: A Case Study of Tactical and Strategic Critique., *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*, 77, 612-627.
- Herzog, P., J (1993) *Japan's Pseudo-Democracy*, Japan Library, Sandgate, Folkstone, Kent.
- Hess, S. (1996) *International News and Foreign Correspondents*, Brookings Institute Press, Washington D.C.
- Hibino, M. (1997) *Gendai no Kokusaikankei to Masu - Media (Present day International Relations and Mass media)*, Tamagawa Daigaku Shuppansha, Tokyo.
- Hindman, B., Elizabeth (1999) "Lynch-Mob Journalism" vs. "Compelling Human Drama": Editorial Responses to Coverage of the Pretrial of the O.J. Simpson Case, *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*, 76, 499-515.
- Hirayama, K. (1992) *Erusaremu wa dare no mono ka (Who does Jerusalem Belong to?)*, NHK Shuppan, Tokyo.
- Hisama, T. (1994) Are the Japanese children really smarter than their counterparts in the United States, *The Journal of Intercultural Studies*, 21, 16-21.
- Holborn, M. and Haralambos, M. (2000) *Sociology, Themes and Perspectives*, Harper Collins Publishers, London.
- Holsti, K. J. (1988) *International Politics, A Framework for Analysis*, Prentice-Hall International, London.
- Holtom, D. (1993) In *Japanese Religions: Past and Present* (Eds, Reader, I., Andreasen, E. and Stefansson, F.) Japan Library, Kent, pp. 77-79.
- HonestReporting (2004), *Media Critiques*, [online source], Available from: <<http://www.honestreporting.com>>.
- Hook, D. G., Gilson, J., Hughes, W. C. and Dobson, H. (2001) *Japan's International Relations, Politics, Economics and Security*, Routledge, London.
- Hornby, A., S. (1974), Oxford University Press, London, pp. 1054.
- Horvat, A. (1990), *Media and PR in Japan*, [Internet], Pacific Region Forum, David See Chai Lam Centre for International Communication, Available from: <<http://www.cic.sfu.ca/forum/horvat-1.html>> [12/6/2000].
- Horvit, B. (1996) Agenda-Setting in Japan: A Framework for Studying the Media and Politics, *AEJMC*, April.
- Horvit, B. (1997) Getting the News: How Japanese and American International Correspondents Choose Sources, *AEJMC Conference*, April, 1997.
- Ibrahim, D. (2003) Individual Perceptions of International Correspondents in the Middle East, *Gazette*, 65, 87-101.
- Iio, J. (2002), *Voters 'shikataganai' attitude won't cut the mustard any more*, [news on line], Yomiuri Shimbun, Available from: <<http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/index-e.htm>> [26th February].
- Ikeda, A. (1993) In *Japan in the Contemporary Middle East* Eds, Sugihara, K. and Allan, J. A.) Routledge, London, pp. 155-169.
- Ikuta, M. (1980) An Institutional Analysis of the Distortion of Foreign News in the Japanese Press, *Keio Communication Review*, 61-71.
- Inagaki, T. (1986) In *Child Development and Education in Japan* (Eds, Stevenson, H., Azuma, H. and Hakuta, K.) W. H. Freeman and Company, New York, pp. 75-92.
- Inoue, N. (1996) In *Religion in Japanese Culture* (Eds, Tamaru, N. and Reid, D.) Kodansha International, London, pp. 137-155.

- Inoue, Y. (1999) Television News Impact on Images and Attitudes Towards the United States, *AEJMC Conference*, 3rd October, US.
- Ivy, M. (1988) Tradition and Differences in the Japanese Mass Media, *Public Culture Bulletin*, 1, 21-29.
- Iyenagar, S. and Simon, A. (1993) News Coverage of the Gulf Crisis and Public Opinion, A Study of Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing, *Communication Research*, 20, 365-383.
- Jakubowics, A. and Palmer, R. (2002) Framing Suharto, *Gazette*, 64, 199-213.
- Jameson, S. (1997), *A Veteran American Journalist Looks at the Japanese Media*, [Internet], Japan Policy Research Institute, Available from: <<http://www.jpri.org/public/wp40.html>> [23/06/2000].
- Japan Must Overcome the Past and Look Ahead (2000), [News On Line], Asahi News, Available from: <<http://www.asahi.com/english/asahi/0628/asahi062812.html>> [28th June].
- Japan Not Ready to Accept Bill that Legalises Euthanasia (2000), *Editorial*, [News On Line], Asahi News, Available [4th December].
- Japan Textbook Angers Neighbours (2001), [News on line], BBC News, Available from: <[http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/...acific/newsid\\_1257000/1257835.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/...acific/newsid_1257000/1257835.stm)> [4th April].
- Japanese Civilization, a. C. (2001), *Japanese 3209: Civilization and Culture*, [Internet], University of North Carolina, Available from: <<http://www.uncc.edu/~medomoto/3209/Culture/values1.html>> [5/4/2001].
- JIMPOREN 3 (1999), (3) *III. Flaws in the Mainstream Media. A. The Crime of reporting Crime*, [Internet], The Liaison Committee on Human Rights and Mass Media Conduct (JIMPOREN), Available from: <<http://www.jca.ax.apc.org/~jimporen/mission03.html>> [June 23].
- JIMPOREN 4 (1999), (4) *III. Flaws in the Japanese media. B. A profession of Unprofessionalism*, [Internet], The Liaison Committee on Human Rights and Mass Media Conduct, Available from: <<http://www.jca.ax.apc.org/~jimporen/mission04.html>> [June 23].
- JIMPOREN 7 (1999), (7) *V. Tabloid Horror. B. A History of Collusion and Abuse*, [Internet], The Liaison Committee on Human Rights and Mass Media Conduct, Available from: <<http://www.jca.ax.apc.org/~jimporen/mission07.html>> [June 23].
- JIMPOREN 9 (1999), (9) *V. Road to Reform. A. Overview*, [Internet], The Liaison Committee on Human Rights and Mass Media Conduct (JIMPOREN), Available from: <<http://www.jca.ax.apc.org/~jimporen/mission09.html>> [June 23].
- JIMPOREN 11 (1999), (11) *V. Road to Reform. C. The Need for Systematic Reforms*, [Internet], The Liaison Committee on Human Rights and Mass Media Conduct, Available from: <<http://www.jca.ax.apc.org/~jimporen/mission11.html>> [June 23].
- Jo, T. (2000), *Rights Issues Torment Policy-Makers*, [News on line], Asahi News, Available from: <<http://www.asahi.com/english/asahi/0211/asahi021101.html>> [11th February].
- Johnson, C. (1995) *Japan: Who Governs?*, W.W.Norton&Company, New York.
- Johnston, E. (2000) Breaking Down the Doors of Japan's Discriminatory Press Clubs, *The Japan Times*, March 23.
- Kamhawi, R. (2002) Television News and the Palestinian Israeli Conflict: An Analysis of Visual and Verbal Framing, *AEJMC Annual Conference*, 26th March, Miami Beach, Florida.
- Kato, K. and Kiuchi, H. (1984) *Shimbunkisha (Newspapers' journalists)*, Godo Shuppan, Tokyo.
- Kenrick, D. M. (1991) *Where Communism Work*, Charles E. Tuttle Co., Tokyo.
- Kerbo, H. and McKinsty, J., A (1995) *Who Rules Japan? The Inner Circles of Economic and Political Power*, Praeger, Westport, Connecticut.
- Kim, C. Y. (1981) *Japanese Journalists and Their World*, University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, US.
- Kissinger, H. (1995) *Diplomacy*, Simon&Schuster, London.
- Kitazume, T. (1990) 'Moral Education' is at Center of Debate, *The Japan Times*, 7<sup>th</sup> November 1990.
- Klaehn, J. (2002) Corporate Hegemony, A Critical Review of the *Globe and Mail's* News Coverage of Near - Genocide in Occupied East Timor 1975-1980, *Gazette*, 64, 301-322.
- Kowner, R. (1997), *On Ignorance, Respect and Suspicion: Current Japanese Attitudes toward Jews*, [Internet], The Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Available [8th December, 2000].
- Krauss, E., S. (1996) In *Media and Politics in Japan* (Eds, Pharr, S., J. and Krauss, E., S.) University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, pp. 243-273.
- Krauss, E., S. (1996) In *Media and Politics in Japan* (Eds, Krauss, E., S. and Pharr, S., J.) University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, pp. 89-129.

- Krauss, E., S. (2001) Personal Interview, 1st October, Warwick University.
- Krauss, E., S. and Budner, S. (1995) Newspaper coverage of U.S. - Japan frictions: Balance and Objectivity, *Asian Survey*, XXXV, 336-356.
- Krippendorff, K. (1980) *Content Analysis, An Introduction to its Methodology*, Sage Publication, Beverly Hills.
- Kumagai, F. (1996) *Unmasking Japan Today, The Impact of Traditional Values on Modern Japanese Society*, Praeger, Westport, Connecticut.
- Kuroda, Y. (1984) Japanese perception of the Arab world, their nature and scope, *i*, November 16th, Wilson Center.
- Kuroda, Y. (1989) Japan, the Arab World, and Israel, *American Arab Affairs*, Spring.
- Lacy, S. and Riffe, D. (1996) Sampling Error and Selecting intercoder Reliability Samples For Nominal Content Categories, *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*, 73, 963-973.
- Lasorsa, D. L. (2002) Agenda Setting, Media Framing and Status Conferral: A Theoretical Synthesis, *AEJMC Annual Conference*, 26th March, Miami Beach, Florida.
- Lebra, S., Takie and Lebra, W., P. (Eds.) (1986) *Japanese Culture and Behavior, Selected Reading*, University of Hawaii Press, Hawaii, US.
- Lee, B., Jung (1985) *The Political Character of Japanese Press*, Seoul National University Press, Seoul.
- Lee, C.-C. and Yang, J. (1995) Foreign News and National Interest: Comparing U.S. and Japanese Coverage of a Chinese Movement, *Gazette*, 56, 1-18.
- Lenman, P. B. and Boyd, K. (Eds.) (1994) *Dictionary of World History*, Chambers, Edinburgh.
- Lerman, A. (1991), Institute of Jewish Affairs, New York, pp. 1-17.
- LeTendre, G. (1994) Guiding Them: Teaching, Hierarchy, and Social organization in Japanese Middle Schools, *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, 20, 37-59.
- Lewis, B. (1995) *The Middle East*, Weidenfeld&Nicolson, London.
- Li, X. (1999) National Interest and Coverage of U.S. - China Relations: A Content Analysis of The New York Times & People's Daily 1987-1996, *AEJMC Annual Convention*, August 1999, New Orleans.
- Licklider, R. (1985) Arab Oil and Japanese Foreign Policy, *Middle East Review*, XVIII.
- Lieber, R. (1984) Japan and the Middle East: Implication of the European Experience, *The Asia Program*, Wilson Center.
- Lloyd, P., Richard (1996) A Wall of Silence on Sumitomo, *The Independent*, June 24.
- Luney, R. P., Jr. (1993) In *Japanese Constitutional Law* (Eds, Luney, R. P., Jr. and Kazuyuki, T.) Tokyo University Press, Tokyo, pp. 123-149.
- Luney, R. P., Jr. and Kazuyuki, T. (Eds.) (1993) *Japanese Constitutional Law*, Tokyo University Press, Tokyo.
- Macgregor, H., E. (1995) Female Reporters Encouraged to Put Up with Harassment, *The Japan Times* (article from the Los Angeles Times).
- Maeda, T. (2000) Election 2000: VOX POPULI, Dailies Helping Bureaucrats Keep Status-Quo: Van Wolferen, *The Japan Times*, June 23.
- Malek, A. (Ed.) (1998) *News Media & Foreign Relations*, Ablex Publishing Corporation, Norwood, New Jersey.
- Malek, A. and Wigand, E. K. (1998) In *News Media and Foreign Policy* (Ed, Malek, A.) Ablex Publishing Corporation, Norwood, New Jersey, pp. 3-27.
- Mannari, H. and Befe, H. (1991) In *Transcending Stereotypes, Discovering Japanese Culture and Education* (Eds, Finkelstein, B., Imamura, A., E. and Tobin, J., J.) Intercultural Press, Yarmouth, Maine, US, pp. 32-39.
- March, R. (1989) Japanese TV News Reporting - Japan Through the Looking Glass, *Intermedia*, 17, 21-23.
- Massey, L. B. and Chang, A. (2000) Locating Asian Values in Asian Journalism: A Content Analysis of Web Newspapers, *AEJMC Conference*, August 2000, Phoenix.
- Matsumoto, M. (1989) *The Unspoken Way, Haragei: Silence in Japanese Business and Society*, Kodansha International, Tokyo.
- Matsumoto, S. (1996) In *Religion in Japanese Culture, Where Living Traditions Meet a Changing World* (Eds, Tamaru, N. and Reid, D.) Kodansha International, Tokyo.
- Mauney, C. (1991) The Judicial System and Court Management in Japan, *Current Politics and Economics of Japan*, 1, 3-11.
- McCormack, G. (1996) *The Emptiness of Japanese Affluence*, M. E. Sharpe, Inc., New York.

- McQuail, D. (1991) *Mass Communication Theory*, Sage Publication, London.
- Media Disagree Over merit of News Blackout (1993), *Asahi Evening News*, June 4.
- Medzini, M. (1972) 'Yapan ve hamizrach hachadash' (Japan and the Middle East), *New Middle East Journal of the Israel Oriental Society*.
- MiddleEastTruth (2004), *Middle East Truth, Beyond the Facts*, [online source], Available from: <<http://www.mideasttruth.com>>.
- Miller, J. (1994) Broadcast News in Japan: NHK and NTV, *Keio Communication Review*, 16, 77-103.
- Miyamoto, M. (1995a) Bullying Endemic to Japan, *The Japan Times*, 17th January, 1995.
- Miyamoto, M. (1995b) Japan, Inc. Survives on a Mix of Bullying and Envy, *The Japan Times*, 18<sup>th</sup> January 1995.
- Miyamoto, M. (1995c) The Neurosis that is Japan, *The Japan Times*, 25th July, 1995.
- Moeran, B. (1986) In *Japanese Culture and Behavior, Selected Reading* (Eds, Lebra, S., Takie and Lebra, W., P.) University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, Hawaii, pp. 62-79.
- MOFA (1980), Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, pp. 10-11.
- Mollenkoepf, E. J. and Brendlinger, N. (1996) Comparing Canadian and U.S. Press Coverage of the Gulf Crisis: The Effects of Ideology in an International Context, *AEJMC Annual Conference*, August 1996, Anaheim, California.
- Moody-Hall, M. (2002) British vs. U.S. Newspaper Framing of Arabs in Coverage of the Middle - Eastern Conflict Pre and Post Sept. 11: A Case Study, *AEJMC Annual Conference*, Aug. 8, Miami Beach, Florida.
- Moro, N. (2002) National Security V. Civil Liberties: The Newspapers' position, A Content Analysis of Editorials, *AEJMC*, September 16th, 2002.
- Morrison, E. D. and Tumber, H. (1985) The Foreign Correspondent: date-line London, *Media, Culture and Society*, 7, 445-470.
- Mouer, R. and Sugimoto, Y. (1986) *Images of Japanese Society*, KPI, London.
- Mullins, M., R., Susumu, S. and Swanson, P., L. (Eds.) (1993) *Religion and Society in Modern Japan*, Asian Humanities Press, Berkeley, California.
- Murphy, V. (2001), *Japan's Controversial War Shrine*, [BBC Online], BBC Online, Available from: <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1330223.stm>> [14th January].
- Nakane, C. (1986) In *Japanese Culture and behavior, Selected Reading* (Eds, Lebra, S., Takie and Lebra, P.) University of Hawaii Press, Hawaii, US.
- Nakaoka, S. (1991) *Arabu Kingendaishi (Modern Arab History)*, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo.
- Nakasa, H. (1987) Scandal VS. Social Responsibility, The Growing Criticism of Journalism in Japan, *Studies of Broadcasting*, 23, 27-49.
- Nawawy, M. (2001) Culture and Conflict in the Middle East: Western Correspondents' Perceptions of the Egyptian and Israeli Cultures, *Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution*, 4.
- Nelson, A., Nl. (1988) *Japanese-English Character Dictionary*, Charles E. Tuttle, Tokyo.
- Nobuo, A. (1991) Walking a Tightrope in the Middle East, *Japan Quarterly*, 407- 415.
- NSK (1990) *The Japanese Press*, Nihon Shinbun Kyokai, Tokyo.
- NSK (2001) *The Japanese Press*, Nihon Shinbun Kyokai, Tokyo.
- NSK, N. R. I. (1994a) A Portrait of Present Day Journalists, Part I, *Shinbun Kenkyu (Newspaper Research)*, 48-96.
- NSK, N. R. I. (1994b) A Portrait of Present Day Journalists, Part II, *Shinbun Kenkyu (Newspaper Research)*, 52-72.
- Oblas, P. (1995) *Perspective on Race and Culture in Japanese Society, the Mass media and Ethnicity*, The Edwin Mellen Press, New York.
- Oda, H. (1999) *Japanese Law*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Okudaira, Y. (1993) In *Japanese Constitutional Law* (Eds, Luney, R. P., Jr. and Kazuyuki, T.) Tokyo University Press, Tokyo, pp. 1-38.
- Otani, A. (1987) *Shimbunkisha ga abunai (Newspaper Journalists are Dangerous)*, Asahisonorama, Tokyo.
- Pan, Z. and Kosicki, G. M. (1993) Framing Analysis: An Approach to News Discourse, *political Communication*, 10, 55-75.
- Pascale, T. R. and Athos, G. A. (1984) *The Art of Japanese Management*, Penguin Books, Middlesex, England.
- Passin, H. (1982) *Society and Education in Japan*, Kodansha International Ltd, Tokyo, Japan.

- Peterson, S. (1979) Foreign Gatekeepers and Criteria of Newsworthiness, *Journalism Quarterly*, 56, 116-125.
- Pharr, S., J. (1996) In *Media and Politics in Japan* (Eds, Krauss, E., S. and Pharr, S., J.) University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, pp. 1-17.
- Pharr, S., J. (1996) In *Media and Politics in Japan* (Eds, Krauss, E., S. and Pharr, S., J.) University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, pp. 19-44.
- Pharr, S., J. and Krauss, E., S. (Eds.) (1996) *Media and Politics in Japan*, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu.
- Powers, D. (2000), *Japan: A Divine Country?*, [News on line], BBC News, Available from: <[http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/asia-pacific/newsid\\_750000/750529.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/asia-pacific/newsid_750000/750529.stm)> [18th May].
- Powers, D. (2001) Personal Interview, 16 November, London.
- Prestowitz, C., V. Jr. (1988) *Trading Places*, Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, New York.
- Radke, K. (1988) Japan-Israel relations in the Eighties, *Asian Survey*, XXVIII, 526-540.
- Rampal, R. K. (1995) In *Global Journalism, Survey of International Communication* (Ed, Merrill, C. J.) Longman Publishers USA, New York, pp. 35-52.
- Read, R. S. (1993) *Making Common Sense of Japan*, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, USA.
- Reader, I. (1991) *Religion in Contemporary Japan*, Macmillan, London.
- Reader, I. (1993) In *Religion & Society in Modern Japan* (Eds, Mullins, M., R., Susumu, S. and Swanson, P., L.) Asian Humanities Press, Berkeley, California, pp. 139-156.
- Reid, T., R. (1995) Dramatic and Distant Views of the Quake, *The Japan Times*, February 4<sup>th</sup>, 1995.
- Reid, T., R. (1999) *Confucius Lives Next Door*, Random House, New York.
- Reischauer, E., O. (1991) *The Japanese Today*, Tuttle Company, Tokyo.
- Rivenburgh, K. N. (1998) In *News Media & Foreign Relations* (Ed, Malek, A.) Ablex Publishing Corporation, Norwood, New Jersey, pp. 79-91.
- Rohlen, T., P. (1986) In *Japanese Culture and Behavior, Selected Reading* (Eds, Lebra, S., Takie and Lebra, W., P.) University Of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, Hawaii, pp. 307-335.
- Rubin, B. (1993), The Vidal Sassoon Center for the Study of Antisemitism, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, pp. 1-27.
- Said, E. (1979) *Orientalism*, Vintage House, New York.
- Said, E. (1994) *The Politics of Dispossession*, Chatto & Windus, London.
- Saito, S. (2000) In *Handbook of the Media in Asia* (Ed, Gunaratne, A. S.) Sage Publications, New Delhi, London, pp. 561-585.
- Sato, K. (1993) 'Kisha' Clubs Opening Up, *The Japan Times*, July 10<sup>th</sup>, 1993.
- Sato, K. (1995a) Gender Equality Still Considered a Frontline Postwar Battle, *The Japan Times*.
- Sato, Y. (1995b) Japan's Preception Gaps with the US and Asia, *ASPAC Conference*, 16-18 June, 1995, Pacific University, Forest Grove, Oregon.
- Schiff, Y. and Dor, D. (Eds.) (1997) *Israel 50 (Israel at 50)*, Alfa Tikshoret (Alfa Communication), Israel.
- Semetko, H. A. and Valkenburg, P. M. (2000) Framing European Politics: A Content Analysis of Press and Television News, *Journal of Communication*, 50, 93-109.
- Sherman, S. (1990) 'Pack Journalism' Japanese Style, *Columbia Journalism Review*.
- Sherman, S. (1994) East Meets West in the Newsroom, *Columbia Journalism Review*.
- Shillony, B. A. (1985/6) Japan and Israel, The Relationship that Withood Pressures, *Middle East Review*, XVIII, 17-24.
- Shillony, B.-A. (1984) Japan and Israel, A Special Relationship, *Japan and the Middle East*, November 16th, Wilson Center, Washington.
- Shinmura, I. (Ed.) (1990) *Extensive Dictionary (koujien)*, Iwanami Publishing, Tokyo.
- Shoemaker, J. P. and Reese, D. S. (1996) *Mediating the Message, Theories of Influences on Mass Media Content*, Longman Publishers, USA.
- Shukanasahi (1975) *Gaikokujintokuhain no Me (Foreign Correspondents' View)*, Asahisonorama, Tokyo.
- Shulman, J. F. (1984) Japanese Middle Eastern Economic Relations before the first Oil Shock, *The Asia Program*, November 16th, Wilson Center.
- Simon Wiesenthal Center (2001), *SWC Urges Removal of Japanese TV Commentator for Alleging Jews are Target of Anthrax Attacks Because "They Control U.S. Media"*, Simon Wiesenthal Center, Available from: <[http://www.wiesenthal.com/social/press/pr\\_print.cfm?ItemId=4406](http://www.wiesenthal.com/social/press/pr_print.cfm?ItemId=4406)> [21 November].

- Sinclair, J. M. (Ed.) (1994) *Collins English Dictionary*, Harpers Collins, Glasgow.
- Sluglett, P. and Farouk-Sluglett, M. (Eds.) (1991) *The Times Guide to The Middle East, The Arab World and Its Neighbours*, Times Books.
- Smith, D. C. (1992) *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, St. Martin's Press, New York.
- Sreberny-Mohammadi, A., Winseck, D., McKenna, J. and Boyd-Barrett, O. (Eds.) (1997) *Media in Global Context*, Arnold, London.
- Stein, J. (1982) In *The Middle East and the Western Alliance*(Ed, Spiegel, S.) Unwin, London.
- Stephens, B. (2003), *Eye on the Media*, by Bret Stephens: *Odds and Ends*, [news on-line], Jerusalem Post, Available from:<wysiwyg://149/http://www.jpost.com/ser...PArticle/printerFull&cid=10455109968355> [17/2/2003].
- Stern, W. (1988) Japan;a willing participant in the Arab boycott of Israel, *Middle East Review*, XXI, 47-53.
- Struck, D. (2000), *Japanese Panel Advises a Move to the West*, [Newspaper on line], The Washington Post On Line, Available from:<wysiwyg://39/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A2255-2000Jan19.html> [20th January].
- Struck, D. (2003), *U.S. Ties Help Japan's Leader Weather Trouble*, [news online], Washington Post, Available [21st May, 2003].
- Sugihara, K. and Allan, J. A. (Eds.) (1993) *Japan in the Contemporary Middle East*, Routledge, London.
- Sugimoto, Y. (1997) *An Introduction to Japanese Society*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
- Sugimoto, Y. and Mouer, R. (1989) *Constructs for Understanding Japan*, Kegan Paul International, London.
- Suzuki, K. (1993) *Nichibei [kiki] to Hodo (The US-Japan Crisis and Reporting)*, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo.
- Swyngedouw, J. (1993) In *Religion and Society in Modern Japan* (Eds, Mullins, M., R., Susumu, S. and Swanson, P., L.) Asian Humanities Press, Berkeley, California, pp. 49-72.
- Takayama, P., K. (1993) In *Religion and Society in Modern Japan* (Eds, Mullins, M., R., Susumu, S. and Swanson, P., L.) Asian Humanities press, Berkeley, California, pp. 105-120.
- Takenaka, H. (1991) *Nichibeimasatsu no keizaigaku (The Economics of US-Japan Friction)*, Nihonkeizaishimbunsha, Tokyo.
- Takigawa, Y. (2002) E-Mail Interview, 22 August.
- Tamaru, N. and Reid, D. (Eds.) (1996) *Religion in Japanese Culture, Where Living Traditions Meet a Changing World*, Kodansha International, Tokyo.
- Tase, Y. (1994) *Seiji Jarunarisumu no Tsumi to Batsu (The Crime and Punishment of Politics' Journalism)*, Shinchousha, Tokyo.
- Tasker, P. (1987) *Inside Japan*, Penguin Books, London, UK.
- Tasker, P. (1998) In *Dimensions of Contemporary Japan, Japanese society Since 1945*(Ed, Beauchamp, E.) Garland Publishing, New York, pp. 76-99.
- Textbooks Gain Approval (2001), The Asahi Shimbun, Available from:<http://www.asahi.com/english/0404/asahi040402.html> [4th April].
- Thayer, N., B. (1985) In *Modern Japanese Organizations and Decision Making* (Ed, Vogel, F. E.) Charles E. Tuttle Company, Inc., Tokyo.
- Timeout Project (2003), *Media Communication Timeout Project 3*, [electronic journal], Meijigakuin University, Available from:<http://webmail1.meijigakuin.ac.jp/~seward/3002/timeout03.PDF> [6th February].
- Tomeki, K. (1984) *Shimbun o Utagae (Distrust the Newspapers)*, Kodansha, Tokyo.
- U.S. Department of Education (1991) In *Transcending Stereotypes, Discovering Japanese Culture and Education*(Eds, Finkelstein, B., Imamura, A., E. and Tobin, J., J.) Intercultural Press, INC., Yarmouth, Maine, US, pp. 221.
- Uchikawa, Y. and Arai, T. (1991) *Nihon no Jarunarisumu (Japanese Journalism)*, Yuhikaku, Tokyo.
- Ueda, K. (1996) In *Religion in Japanese Culture*(Eds, Tamaru, N. and Reid, D.) Kodansha International, London, pp. 27-4.
- UN Says No Massacre in Jenin (2002), [News online], BBC News Online, Available from:<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle\_east/2165272.stm> [21st January].
- Urabe, N. (1993) In *Japanese Constitutional Law* Eds, Luney, R. P., Jr. and Kazuyuki, T.) Tokyo University Press, Tokyo, pp. 173-186.
- van Ginneken, J. (1998) *Understanding Global News, A Critical Introduction*, Sage Publication, London.
- van Wolferen, K. (1989) *The Enigma of Japanese Power*, Macmillan London, London.

- van Wolferen, K. (1993) Japan's Non-Revolution, *Foreign Affairs*, 72, 54-65.
- Vogel, F. E. (1980) *Japan as No. 1, Lessons for America*, Charles E. Tuttle Co, Tokyo.
- Vogel, F. E. (Ed.) (1985) *Modern Japanese Organization and Decision - Making*, Charles E. Tuttle Company, Inc., Tokyo.
- Wanta, W. and Hu, Y.-W. (1993) The Agenda-Setting Effects of International News Coverage: An Examination of Different News Frames, *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 5, 550-569.
- Watanabe, T. (1996), *Japan's Media at Present*, [Internet], Takesato Watanabe, Doshisha University, Japan, Available from: <<http://www1.doshisha.ac.jp/~twatanabe/english/japan.html>> [9/6/2000].
- Watts, J. (2000) Dare to Be Different, Japanese are Urged, *The Guardian*, January 19th.
- Westney, E., D. (1996) In *Media and Politics in Japan* (Eds, Krauss, E., S. and Pharr, S., J.) University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, pp. 47-88.
- White, M. (1987) *The Japanese Educational Challenge, A Commitment to Children*, Kodansha International, Tokyo, Japan.
- Wistrich, S. R. (1992) *Anti-Semitism, The Longest Hatred*, Thames Mandarins, London.
- Woronoff, J. (1996) *Japan as Anything but Number One*, Macmillan Press Ltd, London.
- Yamamoto, T. (1994) *Shimbun to minshu (Newspapers and the People*, Kinokunya Shoten, Tokyo.
- Yamazaki, A *Horde of Dashing Young Reporters*, Available from: <[http://www.zorro-me.com/MIYAZAKI\\_ENG/toppa\\_eng/top\\_ptl\\_.html](http://www.zorro-me.com/MIYAZAKI_ENG/toppa_eng/top_ptl_.html)> [5/4/2001].
- Yokota, K. (1993) In *Japanese Constitutional Law* (Eds, Luney, R. P., Jr. and Kazuyuki, T.) Tokyo UNiversity Press, Tokyo, pp. 205-220.
- Yomiuri (1999), *Government Screening of Textbooks Remains Rigid*, [News on line], The Daily Yomiuri, Available from: <<http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/newse/0629so14.htm>> [29th June].
- Yoshino, K. (2000) *Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan, A sociological enquiry*, Routledge Publication, London&New York.
- Yoshitsu, M. (1984a) The strategic costs of oil dependence, *The Asia Program*, November 16th, Wilson Center.
- Yoshitsu, M. (1984b) *Caught in the Middle East, Japan's Diplomacy in Transition*, Heath & Co, Lexington, Massachusetts, D.C.
- Young, C. (1996) In *Tokyo Weekender*, Vol. 27.
- Zelizer, B., Park, D. and Gudelunas, D. (2002) How Bias Shapes the News, Challenging *The New York Times'* Status as a Newspaper of Record on the Middle East, *Journalism*, 3, 283-307.