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The Role of Multistakeholder Initiatives in the Radicalization of Resistance: The Forest Stewardship Council and the Mapuche Conflict in Chile

Rajiv Maher[a], Nicolás Pedemonte-Rojas[b], Diego Gálvez[b] and Subhabrata Bobby Banerjee[c]

[a]*EGADE, Tecnologico de Monterrey;* [b]*Centro Vives, Universidad Alberto Hurtado;* [c]*City, University of London*

ABSTRACT Multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) that address sustainability concerns have grown in importance in recent years. These private governance measures involving market, state and civil society actors aim to resolve disagreements between stakeholders through stakeholder engagement practices. However, our empirical study of the Mapuche conflict in Chile shows how a multi-stakeholder initiative contributed to the radicalization of a protest movement leading to an escalation of violence that left all actors worse off. The implementation of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certification scheme, perhaps the best known MSI, exacerbated existing political discontent among the Indigenous Mapuche peoples who were resisting the expansion of industrial forest on their lands in southern Chile. Our findings indicate that MSIs cannot address the needs of marginalized stakeholders and may further undermine their interests. Our analysis enhances our understanding of the outcomes of MSIs by describing processes of radicalization as well as the role of the state in conflicts. The FSC certification scheme was incapable of addressing the key Mapuche demand for land rights. Instead, it raised false expectations, which coupled with corporate irresponsibility and state repression led to an escalation of violence. The increasing reliance on private governance measures in natural resource management, especially in countries of the so-called Global South, can further exacerbate existing conflicts and hence it is important to understand how and why MSIs lead to negative outcomes.

Keywords: multistakeholder initiatives, radical flank effect, processes of radicalization, corporate social responsibility, corporate irresponsibility, indigenous resistance

[Corrections added on 15 November 2023, after first online publication: Nicolás Pedemonte-Rojas, Diego Gálvez and Subhabrata Bobby Banerjee's affiliation details have been updated in this version.]

Address for reprints: Rajiv Maher, EGADE, Tecnologico de Monterrey, Av. Eugenio Garza Sada 2501 Sur, Tecnológico, 64849 Monterrey, N.L., Mexico (r.maher@tec.mx).

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'Pero el quejido del indio, nunca se habrá de escuchar…
Ya no son los españoles los que les hacen llorar
Hoy son los proprios chilenos los que les quitan su pan'

'But the Indian's lament will never be heard…
It is no longer the Spaniards who make them cry
Today it is the Chileans themselves who take away their bread'.
(Violeta Parra, 1962, '*Arauco tiene una pena*' (Arauco has a sorrow))

INTRODUCTION

Conflicts over land in southern Chile, a region referred to as Wallmapu by the Indigenous Mapuche people, has a long history dating back to the 1850s. The Mapuche, like all Indigenous communities, have deep spiritual relationships with their land as well as with living and non-living entities in their ancestral territory. The Mapuche philosophy of *Itro fill mogen* makes a plea for the respect of the interconnectedness of all forms of life and existence meaning that nature and land are sacrosanct and not commodities for sale (Endémico, 2017). However, for the Chilean multinational corporations who own vast expanses of property in the region, Wallmapu land can only be valued as forestry plantations. Colonial histories of dispossession that resulted in the Mapuche being corralled into small reservations which were a fraction of the size held by the forestry sector, inevitably led to conflicts and protests by Mapuche activists demanding the return of their land. These conflicts often involved acts of violence by the state and military in repressing dissent as well as by activists against the forestry industry. Since the early 1990s, forestry multinational companies operating in the region (the two largest being Celulosa Arauco y Constitución (CELCO/Arauco) and CMPC/Mininco, both Chilean owned) have attempted to improve relations with Mapuche communities by engaging in multi-stakeholder dialogue and through CSR initiatives. A key step in this process, and one designed to enhance their legitimacy, was gaining Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certification, which both companies obtained in 2013.

FSC certification is portrayed as a successful multi-stakeholder initiative (MSI) and as an exemplar of political corporate social responsibility (PCSR), which describes how corporations become political actors in responding to environmental and social challenges (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011). However, PCSR is a contested concept, especially when organizational stakeholders have divergent and at times incommensurable worldviews, such as relationships to land, water and nature, as is the case in conflicts between Indigenous communities and corporations in the extractives sector like forestry and mining (Banerjee, 2018; Banerjee et al., 2021; Ehrnström-Fuentes, 2016). Consensus through deliberation, which is the desirable outcome of MSIs and PCSR, cannot be reached when there are profound differences between Indigenous ontologies of land and corporate goals of extraction because the 'deliberative processes of governance through PCSR are unable to accommodate competing legitimacies that are often the source of conflicts over resource extraction' (Banerjee, 2018, p. 815). Moreover, in its preoccupation with generating consensus among stakeholders with divergent interests and values multi-stakeholder initiatives (and PCSR) can become hegemonic because they offer no room for political contestation and dissent (Banerjee, 2018; McCarthy, 2012; Moog et al., 2005; Whiteman and Cooper, 2016).

There is little empirical research that investigates how targeted beneficiaries react to corporate attempts to obtain consensus for extractive projects or the impact of corporate stakeholder engagement practices like MSIs on protest movements (Ehrnström-Fuentes, 2022). Protest movements tend to have both radical and moderate flanks and the assumption is that stakeholder engagement through MSIs can neutralize the radical flank by addressing the concerns of the moderate flank. Our empirical study of the Mapuche conflict in Chile contradicts this assertion by showing how the implementation of the Forest Stewardship Council certification scheme coincided with an increase in the radicalization of the Mapuche movement and escalated violence. Our study addresses a central question: why and how do MSIs aimed at improving stakeholder relations further radicalize protest movements and violence? Our findings show that MSIs contributed to the radicalization of protests by generating either a *positive radical flank effect* (RFE) whereby some demands of moderate groups were accommodated by state and market incumbents as a result of the influence of the more radical groups; or a *negative radical flank effect*, where incumbents conflated moderate and radical positions and refused to accommodate either one (Haines, 1984, 2013).

Our paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, our paper makes an empirical contribution by describing the radicalization of a protest movement arising from the implementation of a multi-stakeholder initiative in the so-called Global South, a topic that has not received much attention in the management literature. Second, we contribute to the radical flank literature by explaining how a negative radical flank effect is produced by processes that shift the initial position of moderate groups from negotiation and dialogue to radical direct action. Third, we identify the limits of market-based mechanisms for the governance of natural resources, particularly in the context of Indigenous struggles over land rights, by describing how market/state interventions further marginalize vulnerable stakeholders.

The paper is organized as follows: first, we discuss MSIs in the context of political CSR and examine the limitations of these approaches in accommodating dissent and conflict. We then introduce the literature on the radical flank effect that describes tensions between moderate and radical groups. We follow this section by describing our methods, sample, data collection, analysis and findings. We discuss the main themes that emerge from our findings and theorize narratives of dissent and conflict. We conclude by discussing the implications of our study for future research.

MULTI-STAKEHOLDER INITIATIVES AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

PCSR and MSIs have evolved as a response to perceived governance gaps in addressing social and environmental issues, particularly in regions where the regulatory environment is weak and limited (Wickert and Van Witteloostuijn, 2022). Participation in global governance is the *raison d'être* of political CSR where corporations engage with state and non-state actors to arrive at collective decisions (Scherer et al., 2016). Political CSR reflects a general shift towards market-based modes of governance where private corporations become key actors within regulatory systems. MSIs, codes of conduct, sustainability standards, anti-slavery commitments, supply chain standards are examples of market-based governance. However, conflicts and tensions arise when MSIs become a governance mechanism in regions where access to land and resources are contested and where needs and aspirations of community stakeholders are undermined by corporate activity. In these cases market and state actors often develop MSIs in an attempt to improve stakeholder relations and neutralize activities of radical groups within the community who oppose developmental projects on their lands (Banerjee, 2018; Boghossian and Marques, 2019). State responsibility for the welfare of its citizens are transferred to MSIs leading to a dilution of accountability for adverse social and environmental consequences. Moreover, most codes of conduct and standards are top-down measures developed in a transnational context and there are bound to be tensions when they are implemented in national and regional contexts especially when local communities have not been involved in the creation process, which raises questions about the legitimacy of these governance arrangements (Bartley, 2022).

It is no coincidence that MSIs have proliferated in regions where the regulatory environment is weak and where communities, states and corporations are in conflict over land use – the mining sector for example, has more than 20 MSIs currently in place (Sauer and Hiete, 2019). The 'gold standard' MSI in the mining sector is the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) involving mining companies, governments, investors and civil society organizations that promotes revenue transparency and accountability and whose member countries are required to disclose information on tax payments, licences, contracts and other information on resource extraction (EITI, 2022). However, disclosure does not necessarily translate to good practice: several studies have found that EITI not only failed to deliver on its stated goals of better natural resource management, or a reduction in corruption and conflict, but in many cases led to further marginalization of communities negatively impacted by mining thus exacerbating existing conflicts (Andrews, 2016; Haufler, 2010; Smith et al., 2012). Similar findings were reported by Levy et al. (2016) in a study of sustainability standards in coffee production where CSR practices became a series of hegemonic accommodations between corporate actors and NGOs that transformed the meaning of sustainability from a radical social and environmental vision to more instrumental goals aligned with corporate interests. While there is some doubt whether MSIs have positive outcomes on communities, not much is known about the process that leads to negative outcomes that further marginalize vulnerable stakeholders and exacerbate existing inequalities. Our study is an attempt to fill this gap.

MSIs are essentially market-driven governance measures driven by normative ideals of responsibility and moral legitimacy (Scherer et al., 2016). Its advocates claim that such private governance mechanisms reduce the 'inefficiencies' of top-down regulation and that its deliberative processes of stakeholder engagement represent 'democratic control on the public use of corporate power' (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007, p. 1109). However, as we will see in our empirical analysis of conflicts in the forestry sector this 'governance-through-responsibilization' (Shamir, 2008, p. 10) involving the restructuring of authority by market actors is not a democratic process as far as marginalized actors are concerned, and neither does it lead to positive outcomes for the community. Instead, MSIs contribute to a process of 'de-responsibilization' where 'business–government interactions progressively dissipate the adopted and enacted social responsibilities of both the government and business' (Hamann, 2019, p. 1199). Instead of promoting greater accountability MSIs create a space of legal ambiguity that diminishes corporate accountability and can exacerbate conflict.

The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) is portrayed as a prime example of the governance benefits that MSIs can offer and has been described as a 'benchmark for good practice in relation to community rights' (McCarthy, 2012, p. 1878). In regions where environmental regulation is weak the FSC may be able to fill the regulatory gap in forest protection by promoting sustainable forestry (Wickert and Risi, 2019). FSC's stated commitments include ensuring legal compliance, building good community relationships and respecting the rights of Indigenous peoples to own, use and manage their territories and resources. However, these forestry standards neither transformed commercial forestry standards nor did they reverse the trend of tropical deforestation, mainly due to power asymmetries between market actors and NGOs (Moog et al., 2015). Despite poor sustainability practices plantations were routinely certified by third-party auditors because of systematic decoupling between practices on the ground and auditing processes (Whiteman and Cooper, 2016).

Moreover, the role of the state in developing and implementing MSIs has generally been ignored. Governments can set the agenda for MSIs, devolve responsibility for governance to private actors and use state military and police to repress dissent, as we found in our study. MSIs can serve as a legitimating device for both state and market interests, for example in Chile, the FSC 'endorses the State's interpretation of territorial rights, which Mapuche activists vehemently reject' (Hale and Millaman, 2018, p. 317). Whilst existing international regulation requires recognizing Indigenous customary rights to territory, FSC guidelines offer ample opportunities for auditors to circumvent the implementation of such rights (Ehrnström-Fuentes and Kröger, 2017; Millaman et al., 2016). The vast literature on socio-environmental conflicts in the extractives sector has shown how powerful multinational corporations deploy PCSR as a divide and rule strategy to obtain a social licence to operate, obscuring damaging environmental and social impacts (Banerjee et al., 2021; Ehrnström-Fuentes, 2016; González-Parra and Simon, 2008; Kraemer et al., 2013; Maher, 2019; Maher et al., 2019; Misoczky and Böhm, 2013). In focusing on obtaining consensus MSIs provide the institutional mechanisms for neutralizing dissent and political struggles by specifying criteria for inclusion and exclusion of participants in deliberative processes that delegitimize what state and market actors consider to be 'radical' demands of some groups (Fougère and Solitander, 2020). This process can have two outcomes: the cessation of conflict when a compromise is reached with the moderate groups within protest movements; or further intensification when radical groups reject MSIs and moderate groups join the radical flank in resorting to direct action. We discuss these radical flank effects and how MSIs influence radical and moderate factions within protest movements in the next section.

RADICAL FLANK EFFECTS

Social movements rarely consist of homogeneous groups – instead, groups differ based on competing ideologies, strategies, goals and tactics (Den Hond and De Bakker, 2007;

Ellefsen, 2021). Some groups take a more radical stance demonstrated by a confrontational approach while more moderate groups prefer a more collaborative style of engagement (Haines, 1984; Schifeling and Hoffman, 2019). Radical groups call for transformational change in addressing social and environmental concerns and generally eschew dialogue with businesses or governments as a solution because they see them as being part of the problem (Den Hond and De Bakker, 2007; Snow and Cross, 2011; Zald and McCarthy, 1979), while moderate groups tend to engage with business because they recognize that corporations also need to be part of the solution (Den Hond and De Bakker, 2007).

Radicalization has both cognitive and behavioural elements where the former refers to radical attitudes and intentions held by individuals that reflect particular discursive ideologies (Neumann, 2003; Schifeling and Hoffman, 2019). Our study focuses on the behavioural aspects of radicalization that take the form of protests and direct action instead of institutional engagement to resolve grievances against corporations and the state. Radical flank behaviour involves direct action and sometimes violent protests targeting companies (Malthaner and Lindekilde, 2017). Violent protests by radical activists are generally a response to repressive actions by state police and military and as a result state repressive policies increase the likelihood of radicalization of groups (Della Porta, 1995).

Understanding the processes that produce radical flank effects, in particular how intra-group differences in protest movements between radical and moderate members emerge and are negotiated, can yield valuable insights into the direction and outcomes of social movements. As groups fragment into moderate or radical factions, group leaders can attempt to resolve tensions and retain their power by promoting a moderate approach while delaying or deflecting some of the more drastic actions demanded by the radicals (Braithwaite, 2014; Haines, 1984; Truelove and Kellogg, 2016). Radical flank effects arise when opposing groups are driven towards each other to counterbalance threats from extreme positions – for example, full co-operation and participation in deliberative processes or disengagement and direct action (McAdam et al., 2008). Typically, corporations respond to threats by radical activists by engaging with moderate groups through CSR practices and stakeholder engagement (den Hond and De Bakker, 2007; Kraemer et al., 2013; Maher, 2022; McDonnell and King, 2013; Mena et al., 2016).

Radical flanks can have both positive and negative effects. For example, during the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s, the US government increased support and funding of Black civil rights organizations because of perceived threats from the more radical Black Panther Party (Haines, 1984). This is an example of a positive radical flank, where the bargaining position of moderates was strengthened by the presence and actions of more radical groups (Baron et al., 2016). Radical flank actors can also provide legitimacy to demands once considered unreasonable and impractical because state and market incumbents faced with the threat of radical action become more accommodative to demands of the moderate group, who are now seen as practicing ‘reasonable activism’ (Haines, 1984). Radical groups however remain at the margins and do not consider hegemonic accommodation to be a positive effect: in fact they regard moderate groups as being undeserving beneficiaries or even 'parasites' that profit from their radical activism (Downey and Rohlinger, 2008; Schifeling and Hoffman, 2019).

Radical groups in the movement may also produce negative radical flank effects because their actions can create a backlash from dominant actors that jeopardizes the ability of moderate groups to negotiate their demands (Ellefsen, 2021; Haines, 1984). Violent actions or illegal forms of protest by a fringe group of activists can risk delegitimizing the whole movement (Schifeling and Hoffman, 2019). Such a negative radical flank effect occurred during protests by the climate activism group XR: Extinction Rebellion in the UK in 2019. XR had widespread support across the country until a fringe group targeted London's public transport network during rush hour causing large scale disruption. In disrupting public transport XR was seen as causing harm to London's working class population and amidst the backlash that followed XR leaders admitted their mistake and publicly stated they would 'reassess their future strategy' (Townsend, 2019).

Radical flank effect scholars have also investigated how strategic cooperation between moderate and radical flanks leads to positive RFEs as well as the risks inherent in both cooperation and confrontational strategies (Downey and Rohlinger, 2008; Ellefsen, 2021; Truelove and Kellogg, 2016). Radical flank effects in social movements also influence engagement strategies of business and the state who often deploy divide and rule strategies to exploit divisions between radicals and moderates (Downey and Rohlinger, 2008). It is important to realize however that in the context of this study the Mapuche do not consider their demand for land restitution as 'radical' but more as a path towards justice and decolonization (Rojas Pedemonte and Miranda, 2015). The means used to achieve this end can be seen as moderate or radical. For the moderates negotiation with the state and its institutional apparatus is an appropriate way to ensure their demands for land restitution are met. Direct action by physically (and illegally) occupying lands and resisting moves by the state police and army to remove protestors is seen as a more radical approach to land restitution. Thus, any framing of 'radical' resistance against forestry companies must be seen in the broader context of Mapuche demands for land restitution and addressing historical injustices. Our findings showed that FSC as a multi-stakeholder initiative created radical flank effects that enabled hegemonic state and market actors to thwart the Mapuche's proposals for land restitution, which despite being driven by calls to address historical injustices, was portrayed as 'radical'.

Thus, multi-stakeholder initiatives driven by businesses to address conflicts with particular stakeholder groups provide an ideal opportunity to study radical flank effects as well as the role of hegemonic actors and institutions in undermining resistance movements. The majority of research on CSR and MSIs has focused on its 'supply side' in describing their legitimacy generating benefits for corporations. The outcomes and impact of MSIs for target beneficiaries are ambiguous: some studies have reported marginal positive outcomes (McCarthy, 2012; Ponte, 2014); other studies indicate that MSIs did not create any positive outcomes at all (Barrientos and Smith, 2007; Selfa et al., 2014). While policy-practice decoupling can lead to these outcomes there is a need for more research to show how actors mobilize different legitimacy criteria to justify MSIs' impact particularly when there are conflicts and disagreements between actors (de Bakker et al., 2019). Our empirical study addresses this gap by describing the process of radicalization of protest movements arising from the implementation of MSIs, as well as state and corporate responses to radical dissent. Our study contributes to the literature by explaining how and why radicalization occurs as a result of MSI implementation and the conditions that shift moderates to the radical position (and vice versa). Understanding how protest movements become radicalized also highlights the incapability of market-based governance mechanisms to overcome structural barriers of disenfranchisement, loss of land, poverty, lack of representation in the corridors of power, racism and marginalization.

METHODS, DATA, AND ANALYSIS

Our methods consisted of archival research and fieldwork that allowed us to conduct a longitudinal study of radical flank effects, group dynamics and conflicts that emerged before and after MSI implementation. We conducted extensive archival data analysis of video documentaries, annual corporate/FSC reports, press reports, testimonials from activists, and accounts of violent conflict in the forestry sector between Mapuche communities, forestry companies and the Chilean state over a 30-year period beginning from 1990. Archival research deepened our understanding of historical and contemporary perspectives of the Mapuche struggle for land in the forestry sector. Field research was conducted in the two most conflict-prone provinces – Arauco and Malleco in southern Chile/Wallmapu – where FSC-certified single-crop plantations cover 32 per cent and 20 per cent of the territory, respectively (Instituto Forestal, 2018). Figure 1 shows a map of Arauco and Malleco provinces and the locations of our fieldwork, areas of forestry plantations, native forests as well as poverty levels in the two provinces, which are among the highest in Chile.

Fieldwork comprising a total of 41 days was conducted in two phases during 2015–20 and with follow-up in-person interviews in late 2022. We conducted a total of 81 formal and informal in-person interviews with a wide range of actors, including Mapuche community members, local political authorities (including a Mapuche town mayor), CSR executives from three forestry corporations, a Jesuit priest based in Tirúa who was also an active participant in the FSC certification process as well as current and former FSC-Chile directors. We also held multiple informal conversations over instant messaging services with key Mapuche informants to further clarify responses. Interviews ranged from 20 minutes to 200 minutes and were recorded. Interview transcripts, field notes, and memos totalled 540 pages.

To understand histories of violence in the forestry plantations in Wallmapu, we began reviewing the data collected by the Mapuche Data Project (Cayul et al., 2022) which recorded all events of conflict involving the Mapuche community reported by the Chilean press from 1993 to 2016. We also conducted searches of various mainstream and Mapuche activist websites and the 'Mapuche Protest Repertoires' database compiled by the authors themselves that spans from 2015 to 2021. We also drew from research published in the Chilean newspaper 'La Tercera' that detailed all episodes of violence committed against the forestry sector in 2021 (Labrín and Díaz, 2022). Table I summarizes our different data sources.

We used an open-ended and inductive analytical approach to interpret our data (Strauss and Corbin, 1997). We analysed our fieldwork and interview data by first


Laraquete
Los Alamos
Curalinahue
Collipulli
Contulmo
Ercilla
Maica Huapitrio
Lleu-Lleu
Tirua
N
0 5 10 20 30 40
Miles
Arauco-Constitucion Cellulose
Arauco MAPA Cellulose
Mininco Laja Cellulose
Mininco Santa Fe Cellulose
Mininco Pacific Plant Cellulose
Arauco Valdivia Cellulose
Legend
Forest Plantations
Native Forest
Meadows and Thickets
Agricultural Lands
Fieldwork
Poverty Levels
Malleco 31,1%
Arauco 17,3%
Source: CASEN survey 2017

Figure 1. Map of Arauco and Malleco provinces

reviewing the transcripts and searching for patterns across responses. We also wrote over 100 reflective memos that described our collective understanding of the data. We then workshopped our initial findings using a whiteboard to create visual maps. Consistent with the guidelines proposed by Gioia et al. (2012) we then manually coded the transcripts in an iterative process that helped clarify our shared interpretations of the data. Table II summarizes our data structure and the three key themes that emerged from our analysis – '*gran despertar*' or 'the great awakening'; corporate irresponsibility and state repression; and activist violence. We discuss these themes in detail in the findings section.

We organized the radical flank processes into cumulative and partly overlapping phases that reflected different group dynamics and effects and how they evolved over

Table I. Data sources

Community	*Company*	*State*	*FSC*	*Activist Organizations*	*Archival*
66 interviews in total • 10 with radical flank actors • 47 with moderate flank members who voiced grievances against the forestry firms but did not take direct action against them. • 5 respondents who held positive views of the firms' CSR efforts.	• Three interviews with managers from (CMPC/Mininco; CELCO/Arauco; and Masisa).	• Five interviews with local government representatives; state forestry agencies; Indigenous agency – Conadi for data on amount of land returned to Mapuche communities.	• Three interviews • Two international FSC documents • Three FSC-Chile reports.	• Five interviews. • Five documentaries on forestry sector – Mapuche conflict. • Six reports and multiple press releases on the forestry-Mapuche conflict.	• Mapuche Data Project (used for counting episodes of conflict). • 'Mapuche Protest Repertoires' database (authors' own elaboration). • An investigative report in La Tercera newspaper about all episodes of violence against forestry sector in 2021. • Different maps to show the growth of forestry cover in Wallmapu. • Multiple articles on forestry-Mapuche conflict

time (Reay et al., 2019). We used process analysis (Langley, 1999) to track the unfolding dynamics and interactions from 1990 to 2020 between both flanks as well as state and market actors to arrive at the underlying processes driving RFEs. We also added a temporal bracketing element (Langley, 1999) to our timeline (see Figure 2) that allowed grouping of different events and interactions, including episodes of violent resistance and dialogic engagement. In order to better contextualize our findings, we provide a brief historical account of forestry sector, beginning from the colonization of Wallmapu in the 1800s up to the early 1990s. We subsequently discuss the FSC certification initiative and the process of radicalization that ensued following its implementation.

As shown in Figure 2 episodes of resistance – both violent and nonviolent (up until 2020) – ebbed and flowed over the years. After an initial peak in the late 1990s and early 2000 coinciding with increased state repression, incidents of violent resistance declined mainly due to attempts by the state to accommodate Mapuche interests as well as corporate stakeholder engagement efforts following FSC certification. However, incidents

Table II. Data structure and themes

First order codes – illustrative quotes	*Second order themes*	*Aggregate dimensions*
'*I would see it as an awakening, of the Mapuche people, of the youth or the communities as well, because there are many communities that before, for example, did not fight against companies, did not make demands or anything. And after that, comes the Mapuche awakening. So, this issue progressed from 1993 onwards, which was the process when the contemporary Mapuche struggle begins, to put it in some way, it begins to escalate more and more into an awakening of consciousness*'. (Territorial recuperations leader, Collipulli).	Cultural identity	Great awakening
'*We had a cultural rebirth, of course, here in this place the issue of occupation was very complex, because here we had … Collipulli was a military fort, the occupation of Araucanía. So, here it was a war zone, a colonization zone, a dispossession zone, people were pushed to live in the hills and now we have come back down from the hills again to reclaim our ancestral lands*'. (Territorial recuperations leader, Collipulli)	Land rights	
'*When democracy returned, let's say, all the organizations began to organize strongly, in that it was like an awakening for us, and we also began to meet, to listen to the elders of that time, to the Machi. We began to organize, the young people began to protest*'. (Resistance leader 4, Arauco)	Resistance	
'*Mininco, back in 2015, offered work to the Licancura communtiy through me since I'm the "werkén" (a Mapuche leader). They offer very attractive false promises. They offered us 5% of the revenues they earn on the harvests. When they start cutting down the trees and one goes to remind them about their promises, what do they do? They call the cops and demand us to get off their property! My sister still has the shrapnel wounds in her legs from the last time we went to remind them about their promise*!'. (Resistance leader 1, Malleco Province)	Raising false expectations	Corporate irresponsibility
'*The forestry companies don't come here saying "we want to talk with you and get close to you because we need certification" that has never happened. They never say the word certification. Instead, they get closer to the communities. They take photos they handout some gifts and then convince them and others. They prove they have community approval* via *the famous strategy of photos with community leaders, making agreements with some locals, donations to colleges …*'. (Resistance leader 1, Arauco)	Deception	
'*Once we realized these community negotiations were not about recovering our land but about something else we told them we're not interested in this since we stand for something else our struggle is about land and for the forestry firms to pack up and leave our land. It is not for them to stay and give us money so they can continue to operate here – that's not what struggle is*!'. (Resistance leader 1, Arauco)	Shifting agendas and delaying tactics	

(Continues)

Table II. (Continued)

First order codes – illustrative quotes	*Second order themes*	*Aggregate dimensions*
'*It's worth remembering that some time ago during the recovery of territory from Mininco our brother Alex Lemún was shot dead. Indeed, due to a land reoccupation from a forestry company a brother was killed due to police repression*'. (Territorial recuperations member, Collipulli)	Physical violence and killings	State repression and intimidation by activists
'*After spending the whole day at Mininco's operations waiting to make a grievance to management we were exhausted and wanted to go back home yet the policemen there we had been chatting to all day asked us not to leave and wait a bit longer but we'd had enough and left. About 1.5 km later we see a police bus pull up and several special forces jumped out, ambushed us and shot at us. That's when Sergio who had hardly said a word all day was shot in his eye*!'. (Resistance leader 1, Malleco Province)	Arrests of activists	
'*Those Mapuche women in CSR programs are often intimidated and questioned by other Mapuches for why they collaborate with the firm*'. (Communications consultant for Forestry company)	Intimidation by activists	



Figure 2. Timeline of events

of both violent and non-violent resistance increased as frustrations mounted because of mismatched expectations and lack of progress on demands for land restitution. The radical flank effect can be seen post-2018 as incidents of violent resistance increased dramatically, especially in 2021.

Tales from the Field

It is important to acknowledge that much of our fieldwork was in a region where violence was rife given that the forestry plantations were located in areas where Mapuche communities also reside. The general climate among the Mapuche was one of mistrust, tension, fear, defensiveness, outrage and a sense of injustice, aggravated by reports of Chilean police infiltrating Mapuche communities by befriending them over social media sites (Sepúlveda, 2019). During a visit to a land occupation protest in March 2020, the first author witnessed a horrific violent assault against a Mapuche woman who, while trying to protect native and sacred trees (that were also protected by law and the FSC), was attacked by a man wielding a chainsaw. The author spent the rest of the day at the nearest hospital with the woman's family and friends. In August 2020, both these women and their children were also assaulted by police detectives during a raid on their land. This act was captured on video (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-z95GtUEtGo).

Most of the non-Mapuche/white Chileans with whom we spoke also complained about the climate of insecurity and fear in which they live. Threats to people's lives were common in these provinces, especially if they were seen to collaborate with the forestry corporations. According to one of our respondents several community members who were beneficiaries of company CSR programmes had received death threats. As a result it was difficult to obtain access to community participants of forestry companies' CSR projects. Episodes of violent conflict between police and land occupiers intensified during the final stages of our fieldwork in March 2020. In early August 2020, both provinces experienced one of their most violent confrontations when a large group of Chilean civilians, including many small business owners, stormed the municipal buildings that Mapuche protest groups had occupied. A video clip showed Chilean civilians armed with sticks assaulting Mapuche men while chanting anti-Mapuche songs. Some municipal buildings, a sacred Mapuche *Chemamüll* statue, and several vehicles belonging to Mapuches were burnt (La Tercera, 2020). A Jesuit priest in Tirúa, was physically assaulted, detained and taken away by security forces as he attempted to negotiate with the police on behalf of the Mapuche protestors.

Our findings should be read in this context of this violence as we attempt to explain the factors that led to conflicts. We describe the key protagonists in the conflict – the Mapuche protestors comprising of radical and moderate groups; and market actors (forestry companies and FSC-Chile) – whose interactions coupled with state repression ultimately resulted in a negative radical flank effect as we discuss below.

Radical and moderate flanks. Chilean police had already classified communities in Arauco Province as either 'radicals' (groups that were demanding land rights using direct action tactics) – or 'pacifists' (groups willing to negotiate with the forestry companies) (Mapuexpress, 2019). One company official stated: '*the radicals are akin to the CAM (a militant Mapuche organization), who reject all forms of dialogue. They see the situation as a conflict between their nation of Wallmapu against Chile*'. The same respondent described moderates as those who have 'assimilated well' into Chilean society (Interview, company official).

The *Coordinadora Arauco-Malleco* (CAM) is the largest and most prominent Mapuche organization that is demanding a return to the pre-1865 territorial arrangement which recognized Mapuche sovereignty over their lands. The birth of the CAM in 1998 led to the rise of a radical flank in the protest movement against forestry activity and an increase in militant activity through the deployment of Mapuche *weichafe* (warriors) (Pairicán, 2014). CAM's goals are to gain complete autonomy and territorial sovereignty for the Mapuche, which they claim can only be achieved by resisting the forestry industry and their Mapuche collaborators or *yanaconas* ('traitors' in *Mapudungun*) (Llaitúl and Arrate, 2012). Their radical stance precluded any negotiation with state or market actors unless it was about Mapuche sovereignty. Militancy was justified as a response to the state violence used in the 'pacification of Araucania' that resulted in the annexation of Mapuche territory of Wallmapu. For the CAM, armed struggle was legitimate because they claimed Wallmapu is still at war with the Chilean state (Llaitúl and Arrate, 2012).

Moderate groups shared similar goals with their radical counterparts but did not call for violence or militant direct action and instead preferred to negotiate with market and state actors. Moderate groups also demanded land restitution and while their claims conflicted with the interests of the forestry industry, these groups saw business as part of the solution and hence were willing to negotiate with them. The moderates avoided attacks against forestry firms and preferred to use non-violent direct action such as land occupation as a resistance strategy. A few moderate members also actively participated in CSR programmes with the forestry companies, though they tended to keep a low profile fearing recrimination from the radical flank.

Forestry companies and FSC-Chile. Chile's forestry market was dominated by the duopoly of CELCO/Arauco and CMPC/Mininco, both Chilean multinational corporations whose pine and eucalyptus plantations covered just under 2 million hectares in southern Chile, accounting for 80 per cent of the country's FSC-certified plantations (Millaman et al., 2016). In terms of terms of market pulp capacity CELCO/Arauco was ranked second and CMPC/Mininco fourth in the world (Arauco, 2020). In 2020 CELCO/Arauco's annual revenue was over US $5 billion and CMPC/Mininco's US $1.24 billion. Both corporations had between 19,000 and 20,000 employees worldwide. In addition, CELCO/Arauco owned nearly 1.3 million hectares of land whilst CMPC/Mininco controlled 600,000 hectares in southern Wallmapu (80 per cent of which was reserved for forestry plantations and 20 per cent for conservation as stipulated by Chilean law). CMPC/Mininco was ranked the second most 'sustainable forestry company' in the world by the Dow Jones Sustainability Index in 2020. It is worth noting that this index included a human rights component.

Obtaining FSC certification, which both these companies received in 2013, took more than 3 years because of the vast size of their plantations and onerous sustainability reporting requirements. One former FSC-Chile board member claimed that he and others had resigned in protest because certifying plantations that were on ancestral Mapuche lands was against Principle 3 (respect for Indigenous rights) of the FSC standards. Moreover, some internal board members were concerned that certification would result in greenwashing practices by the firms. Subsequent investigations revealed significant discrepancies in sustainability reports by the auditors of both the companies (Mapuexpress, 2014; Millaman et al., 2016). Since 2014 there was a steep increase in cases of reported conflicts as shown in Figure 2, which was also mentioned in the companies' annual sustainability reports. To understand how and why protests against these companies intensified despite stakeholder engagement practices as specified by the FSC we turn to our findings where we describe the dynamics of interaction between the community, the forestry sector and the state that resulted in the radicalization of the protest movement.

FINDINGS

A History of the Present: Historical Injustices and Land Dispossession

The Mapuche lived as autonomous communities in the south of Chile and Argentina and successfully fended off multiple incursions, first by the Incas, and later by Spanish conquistadors between the 16th and 19th centuries. Mapu-che ('mapu' – land; 'che' –people; thus 'people of the land') or Mapudungun is the native language which also reflects their relational ontologies of land and their relations with living and non-living entities (for example the Mapuche philosophy *Itro fill mogen*). The Spanish colonizers eventually recognized the Mapuche as a 'nation with concomitant rights to sovereignty and independence' (Gaitán-Barrera and Azeez, 2018, p. 116); however these rights were not recognized by the Chilean state when it gained independence from Spain in 1818. Chilean political leaders in the media often referred to the Mapuche as 'unintelligent, barbaric savages and animal-like people', who should be 'chained or destroyed for the good of humanity' (Millaman et al., 2016). This racist attitude towards the Mapuche people is still prevalent in much of Chile (Bresciani et al., 2019).

In 1861 the Chilean state invaded and annexed the Mapuche territory of Gulumapu though its 'pacification of Araucania' military campaign or what Chilean anthropologist Bengoa (2000) called the 'war of extermination'. By the end of this conflict, the Mapuche had lost at least 95 per cent of their land to the Chilean state and were forced to resettle on the remaining 5 per cent of land in *reducciones* or reservations, which were also the least arable lands. (Bengoa, 2000; Millaman et al., 2016). The Chilean state granted the Mapuche '*Titulos de Merced*' or 'mercy land titles' in the reservations while gifting large swathes of fertile Mapuche land to thousands of German and Swiss farmers to implement efficient and productive European farming techniques. Theft of Indigenous land and its subsequent reallocation to settlers – a hallmark of settler colonialism – was very much a state policy in 'post-colonial' Chile. The new European economic model of farming was accompanied by mass deforestation during the following decades as the new settlers began to commercialize timber from native tree species (Millaman et al., 2016).

The forestry industry in Chile was created in the 1950s following recommendations by United States and United Nations agencies to develop a single-crop forestry industry based on pine trees, given southern Chile's ideal climate conditions. The socialist government of Salvador Allende in the late 1960s introduced comprehensive land reform by enacting new laws for Indigenous peoples, which resulted in the restitution of over 152,000 hectares of land to Mapuche communities (Millaman et al., 2016). However, these gains were short-lived following a coup d'état leading to the military dictatorship of Pinochet in 1973. Influenced by the Chilean economic elite and an ideology of free-market economic liberalization, Pinochet's government reversed all the land gains made by the Mapuche by redistributing the land to settlers or selling it in auction to private buyers. In 1974, the military regime passed Decree Law (DL) 701 to encourage forestation in 'degraded' areas by giving 75 per cent state subsidies and land tax exemptions for investments in forestry plantations of exotic species (Millaman et al., 2016). State subsidization of forestry covered an area of 1.2 million hectares with more than US $600 million subsidies granted to the two largest corporations CELCO/Arauco and CMPC/Mininco (Carvajal, 2015). The forestry sector currently constitutes Chile's second-largest export industry and is dominated by these two Chilean multinationals.

Mapuche resistance to forestry expansion. Following the theft of their lands the Mapuche lived in poverty on small plots of land and the early 1960s witnessed the first signs of Mapuche resistance when some groups tried to reclaim their ancestral land by occupying small forestry plots. These attempts to resist and reclaim their land were suppressed during the dictatorship and many Mapuches migrated north to the capital city Santiago in search of opportunities. Southern Chile, with its forestry plantations that contributed 70 per cent of the region's export income, also had the highest poverty levels in the country mainly among its Mapuche residents. By the end of the dictatorship in the late 1980s, the centre-left coalition led by President Patricio Aylwin reached an agreement with Mapuche organizations: in exchange for their support the Aylwin government promised to recognize Indigenous territorial and cultural rights as advocated by the International Labour Organization (ILO), provided that the Mapuche activist groups in return, eschew direct action to voice their grievances (Bidegain, 2017; Pairicán, 2012).

However, President Aylwin was unable to garner sufficient support within his government to fully deliver his end of the bargain. In 1993, the government nonetheless created *Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena* (National Corporation of Indigenous Development, CONADI), a state agency responsible for implementing and monitoring Indigenous policies including land restitution, cultural recognition and socioeconomic development (CONADI, 2020). However, there was still no constitutional recognition of Indigenous rights and it soon became evident that CONADI was not designed to restore land rights to the Mapuche people but instead was an instrument for Indigenous social and economic welfare, thus consolidating the state's paternalistic relations with the Mapuche (Millaman et al., 2016).

The radical flank of the protest movement announced its arrival in December 1997 when Mapuche groups, disillusioned with the failure of legal and institutional channels to reclaim their lands and alienated by the forestry company's aggressive legal stance, decided occupy company property leading to violent retaliation by private security guards and police forces (Carruthers and Rodriguez, 2009). These groups also burnt down three logging trucks belonging to the CELCO/Arauco corporation (Tricot, 2013). In 2002, the conflict was exacerbated when Chilean police officers shot and killed Alex Lemun, a 17-year-old student who was collecting firewood on land owned by the CMPC/Mininco corporation. The killing mobilized the Mapuche who continued their direct action protests against the forestry firms and the Chilean state. Since the killing of Lemun more than 20 Mapuche activists have been killed by police and military forces during raids on (re)occupied forestry lands (Valdivia, 2020).

The new generation of Mapuche children that grew up alongside the expanding forestry sector witnessed large-scale logging activities and its associated environmental problems, such as drought, water pollution, widespread use of pesticides and decline of native species (Pairicán, 2014). Since the 1990s this younger generation of university-educated Mapuche had actively and collectively sought to reclaim the rights of their people. The late 1990s also saw the emergence of the most prominent militant Mapuche organization, *Coordinadora Arauco-Malleco* (CAM) which was responsible for several land occupations as well as arson attacks against logging trucks and rural estates. Most attacks have occurred in the provinces of Arauco and Malleco, where Mapuche groups conducted multiple land (re)occupations on forestry lands resulting in frequent conflicts with special police forces who had a strong presence in both provinces, which were also the central sites of our study.

Turning now to our interviews and fieldwork, our guiding question was to understand the process of radicalization and why direct action and violence against the forestry sector as well as state repression was on the rise despite CSR practices and stakeholder engagement through FSC initiatives – CMPC/Mininco, for example, spent over US $13 million on community relations and development in 2019 alone.

The Radicalization Process: From Historical Injustices to *Gran Despertar* (Great Awakening), Corporate Irresponsibility and State Repression

In our coding process described earlier we identified four themes that emerged from our analysis of archival data and interviews: historical injustices and land dispossession; what some respondents referred to as '*gran despertar*' or the 'great awakening'; corporate irresponsibility; and state repression. In the previous section we discussed the historical injustices and the expansion of the forestry sector that led to the emergence of the Mapuche resistance movement. '*Gran despertar*' or the 'great awakening' reflected increasing awareness that cultural identity was inextricably linked with land rights, which strengthened the resistance movement. The imposition of the FSC certification scheme led to increased corporate involvement with the Mapuche but rather than engage with the latter's demands for land rights corporations engaged in deceptive practices and delaying tactics while raising false expectations. Corporate irresponsibility further exacerbated tensions and coupled with state repression resulted in an accumulation of frustrations within the Mapuche community, which shifted the moderate position towards the radical flank and the acceptance of more militant forms of protest as we discuss below.

Figure 3 illustrates the process of radicalization and the themes that contributed to the shift in the repertoire of collective action from moderate to more radical forms of protest.

'El Gran Despertar' (the 'great awakening'). The 'great awakening' refers to the reclamation and revitalization of Mapuche cultural especially among the younger generation. Relations with land and nature are an integral part of Mapuche cultural identity and this revitalization of culture was enabled through traditional social gatherings where


The Radical Flank Effect
Historical Context of Injustices and Land Dispossession
Corporations
State
Radicals
Corporate Irresponsability
Repression
Pressure on moderates to refuse accomodative measures
Moderates
Radical Flank
Unmet Expectations
The Great (Cultural) Awakening
Multistakeholder Initiatives
Community Mobilization
Historical Context of Injustices and Land Dispossession

Figure 3. The radical flank effect [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

Mapuche elders imparted their knowledge and wisdom. The presence of the forestry industry on their traditional territory was seen as antithetical to Mapuche identity and culture because it undermined their reciprocal and respectful relations with the land and thus the reclaiming of land was central to the 'great awakening'.

As one Mapuche leader commented: '*There is (in general) a generation that has been willing to dialogue and reach agreements with forestry companies, this generation grew up in a dictatorship, very vulnerable from an economic and cultural standpoint. On the other hand, there is the youth, who have had the possibility of formal education and who have been exposed to the direct impacts of the forestry sector in their territories. These are a more critical and less conformist generation that has revitalized its lost history and their grandparents and great-grandparents lands. This new generation has also imposed itself on their parents and grandparents and has begun an important process of cultural revitalization. Thus, today in many Mapuche territories, after many decades we see the return of machis, werkenes, weichafes, pewmatufe, lawentuchefe* (spiritual leaders and warriors) … *This last generation does not accept the presence of forestry companies … they also have the possibility of confronting their "good neighbourhood" policies with more radical solutions, ultimately seeking to eradicate the companies from their territories*' (Email correspondence with Mapuche rights leader, 2020).

Reclaiming land ownership was a key theme in the great awakening. Encounters with Mapuche spiritual leaders triggered a greater awareness of land rights among the community. For example, two sisters from the Malleco province who were leaders of the land reclaim movement (on land legally owned by CMPC/Mininco) attributed their 'great awakening' to a meeting with a *lonkgo* (community leader). One of them commented: '*we were helped to see ourselves for what we really are by a lonkgo. We saw that we were important, that we had the rightful claim to lots of land and we shouldn't be living on just a small piece of land. It was such an eye-opening moment for us! Before we would ask Mininco 'please would you donate some firewood to us? Please could you authorize us to walk through this road?'. And then we really woke up then, just before we were shot at by the police in 2015 … while trying to claim our land back … it was obvious they were protecting Mininco and the white landowner who were working together*'.

The Mapuche mayor of Tirúa, who was in the position since 1996, asserted that the 'great awakening' for future generations can only be achieved by ending the forestry industry in Mapuche territories: '*I said (to the CEO of CMPC/Mininco), "I may agree with you, but my son will not agree with you, my grandson will not agree with you, therefore, this is a point of no return. Therefore, the best thing that can happen is that you hand over the land … the land is going to become Mapuche, today or in the future, you will never again be at peace producing here as you have done until now". And there the conversation ended*' (Mayor of Tirúa, Arauco province).

MSIs, Corporate Irresponsibility and Mismatched Expectations

Corporate irresponsibility refers to immoral, deceitful or manipulative organizational practices that can cause harm to stakeholders (Greenwood, 2007; Mena et al., 2016). Several respondents pointed to manipulative practices of forestry companies in particular raising false expectations over land restitution, deception, shifting agendas and delaying tactics in putting land reform on the dialogue agenda, all of which contributed to increased frustrations among the Mapuche community. Expectations of land restitution was why Mapuche communities had entered into dialogue in the first place; however, these turned out to be false expectations that contributed to mounting frustrations and led to increased radicalization according to a former FSC-Chile director who commented: '… *the expectations that FSC created … they were valid expectations because the FSC did come to offer a change. So yes, many people who believed in it were disappointed afterwards. Deep down, people's suffering is linked to their expectations … So, the FSC does generate, in some way, expectations that, when not met, can cause a higher degree of frustration that can lead people, from that greater frustration, to take action. It is already a setting where the government does nothing, in a context where there are no solutions, the FSC comes in to offer a solution, but then does not deliver, so perhaps it provokes communities even further*' (former FSC-Chile director).

Another respondent involved in the FSC process commented: '*I don't think the FSC made the companies more credible in fact it made them less credible … because it generated a very high expectation for change and the (forestry) model will not change … after looking at the FSC standards one thinks if the companies comply with all of this we're going to have another world! And that other world never arrived, yet the certification did arrive … well before things really change to the levels required by FSC … I am certain if someone actually audited all the plantations covered by FSC they'd find they are not all compliant … one thing I learnt from the dialogue was that the culture of a company does not change due to certification* (former head Jesuit priest, Tirúa). Non-compliance was a recurring theme in our findings: during an online seminar titled 'Does the FSC serve its purpose?' held in March 2023 FSC representatives acknowledged that some plantations were non-compliant with its standards. A Mapuche representative told the FSC officials he had filed several grievances with the FSC but to no avail.

In its attempt to be inclusive and progressive the FSC principles led to mismatched expectations. For example, Principle 3 of the FSC calls for respecting the rights of Indigenous people including the principle of Free, Prior and Informed Consent. Some Mapuche believed that not providing consent meant that forestry operations would cease and their land would be returned to them: '*There were Mapuches who thought that in order for the companies to receive FSC it would require them to leave the territory … if they can't certify you because you have conflict, from the Mapuche perspective the conflict is only resolved if you leave. But if you're Mapuche and you're told this company in order to get the certificate needs to show it doesn't have a conflict with you then of course you'd say great they're going to leave here because that's the only way they won't have conflict with us and then it turns out that they certify the company anyway and the company stays here*' (former Jesuit priest, Tirúa).

One respondent described company actions during the FSC consultations as 'performances' enacted by company executives who would make generous promises to improve local conditions by providing employment or agreeing to give land back to the community, without delivering on the promises. As one activist commented: '*A while back our community mobilised declaring we will make the company give us 20,000 hectares back to us, so they proposed dialogues but soon after the conversation turned into the idea of the community working for the company by selling it timber, and it was no longer about land "but the company will give us land back in the future" – but it's a lie. The company hasn't restituted any land so far, so how can we trust it*'? (Woman Resistance Leader 1, Arauco).

Some Mapuche leaders did pursue their land claims using existing institutional channels like FSC grievance mechanisms, and CONADI, the state agency responsible for implementing and monitoring Indigenous policies including land restitution and socio-economic development. Other Mapuche activists found that flouting CONADI's policy of not recognizing claims made through illegal land occupation actually helped them gain access to land: a community member from Arauco Province summed up this general sentiment, '*a baby that doesn't cry doesn't get breastfed*'. Taking direct action by (illegally) occupying land was seen as the last and only remaining viable resort by many activists. Two women who had (re)occupied land on CMPC/Mininco's property explained that for years the company had constantly stonewalled them in their efforts to reclaim their land. Eventually the two women grew impatient and decided to occupy company owned land, which they now claimed. We heard similar stories from most of our community and activist respondents, who were also critical of CONADI's lack of response to their claims.

Delaying tactics and shifting agendas also contributed to dialogue fatigue which contributed to community frustration given that stakeholder engagement dialogues began in 2000, a point that was acknowledged even by FSC-Chile: '*We need more true dialogue, people are tired of dialogue for the sake of it. Today it's about instrumental dialogue, meaning we invite them, we host open houses, we hold assemblies, we consult them but nothing changes afterwards. Because the standard says you have to invite them not because there is a motive or conviction that this is the way for finding solutions and having solid relations in the future*' (Head of FSC-Chile). However, the companies advocated more dialogue: in a radio interview in March 2021 about 'Mapuche terrorism' CMPC/Mininco's Chairman called for urgent 'Dialogue, Dialogue, Dialogue!' (CMPC, 2021).

Our findings indicate that in the context of MSI stakeholder engagement, dialogue becomes a weapon of the powerful because when corporations and states negotiate with communities, dialogue is structurally biased towards powerful actors (Banerjee, 2018). For marginalized stakeholders who find themselves disempowered by dialogue, dissent and activism become key defensive weapons as the following quote indicates: '*On many occasions we tried everything to achieve peace with dialogue. The company just came with lies, they asked us how much money we wanted but it was a farce because we never arrived at any agreements. We've had to expose ourselves … to recover what is ours, and that has been confrontational. Why? Because nothing has come out of dialogue* (local leader, Arauco Province).

The success of direct land occupation tactics by the radical group saw a shift in the approach of the moderate group who until that point were voicing their demands through institutional channels, with little success. Moderate groups began to mimic the radical group's tactic of forcefully occupying company lands and then negotiating with forestry companies to claim ownership. Extensive use of social media to publicize land occupation and articulate demands for Mapuche land rights also attracted the attention of the authorities and the public. One respondent mentioned how this change of tactics was a learning process for moderate groups: '*they have also seen with great anger these other groups who come over from the other side, they take land that is not theirs, putting up signs, and, moreover, they negotiate with the forestry companies. So, they* (the pacifist groups) *have adopted the same tactics, but it has not gone so well for them because they have a different logic, another reasoning, they are more peaceful, they are very passive, they are not violent, and the forestry companies know that, so they have given them the run-around a lot more for in their request for land. Different to these others, who are more violent, and who in just a couple of days have already resolved the issue*' (Municipal government official, Malleco province). Direct action through land occupation was a radical flank effect that contributed to the radicalization of the movement, which also led to increased state repression.

State Repression

State repression of the protest movement using both police and private security forces was a salient theme that emerged from our findings. Armed soldiers in armoured vehicles were a common sight during our fieldwork. While obviously MSIs and CSR initiatives do not advocate repression, state violence in suppressing dissent created animosity and anger in Mapuche communities, including among moderates. Several young Mapuche men on CMPC-Mininco's disputed lands have been killed by police (González-Hidalgo and López-Dietz, 2019). Respondents felt that engaging in dialogue with forestry companies was pointless if it was followed by assault and killings of activists. One community leader related an incident that occurred after she and her sister were returning home after a meeting with company officials: '*As we were leaving special police forces and buses arrived, the same police who were talking to us, they put on special forces suits and ambushed us, they shot us.… my sister was in hospital for a month and still has shrapnel in her leg … the cops live inside the forestry company's land to protect it … we currently have a lawsuit against Mininco and the police* (Community Leader, Malleco Province).

FSC certification of the two major forestry firms was seen as greenwashing that obscured abuse and violence: '*the FSC certifies the forestry companies' claims of good community relationships, yet to transport their timber they need military and police escorts all the time! So, for the FSC to certify this is pure greenwashing and abusive!*' (Max Reuca, Werkén Lof Purén Nagche, Malleco Province). State repression using police forces to protect forestry firms was another reason cited for the refusal to enter into dialogue with the companies, as one respondent pointed out: '*The end of dialogue is when repression starts. If there's repression, there's no dialogue. What am I going to dialogue with? With a gun pointed to my head? The only way we will sit down and dialogue with the companies is if they are willing to hand over land. Otherwise, there's no point*. (Resistance Leader 1, Arauco Province). Repression also led to the radicalization of future generations because several thousand Mapuche children grew up experiencing state repression. A former FSC-Chile director commented: '*Violence generates violence … the repression in Arauco province is very harsh and it has generated a new generation filled with hate, because children are being attacked, it's brutal. But as you can tell all of this escapes the FSC … the companies can state "well this is not in the FSC principles" but the companies could do more*' (former FSC-Chile director).

Threats of violence were also used by radical Mapuche organizations like the CAM who specifically targeted Mapuche that were beneficiaries of forestry companies' CSR projects, branding them 'traitors' because they legitimized the expansion of the forestry sector on Mapuche land. CAM members were often seen wearing balaclavas and brandishing rudimentary guns and several respondents reported that community members received death threats for collaborating with companies. One CAM activist stated: '*We sabotage the interests of capitalist investments focusing on the forestry firms … we attack their machinery and trucks but without harming people … we don't burn private homes or churches … each process of decolonization is violent therefore we can't undertake a dialogic approach*' (TVN, 2016).

In summary, we found that the radicalization process emerged from the combined effect of three factors – the great awakening, corporate irresponsibility, and state repression – which explained the radical flank effect that resulted in a negative RFE, which we argue was heightened due to mismatched expectations created by the FSC process. We argue that multistakeholder CSR initiatives like the FSC which serve as a private governance mechanism created spaces of persistent de-responsibilization whereby the responsibilities of business and government became progressively diminished leading to a lack of accountability of both market and state actors in addressing the needs of marginalized stakeholders (Hamann, 2019). Consequently, MSIs produced outcomes that were contrary to its aims of reducing conflict: in this case the implementation of sustainability certification resulted in the further radicalization of the protest movement and ultimately a negative radical flank effect. We discuss the implications of our findings in the next section.

DISCUSSION

Our study shows how MSIs led to particular processes of radicalization that produced a *negative radical flank effect* (Haines, 1984, 2013) resulting in a breakdown of negotiation and intensification of violence that left all parties worse off than before: Mapuche land claims continued to be denied; attacks against forestry companies continued unabated; the FSC's image and reputation as the 'world's most trusted sustainable forest management solution' was tarnished; state repression increased, and the socio-economic condition of the Mapuche remained unchanged, if not worse. We contend this radicalization process emerged from deeply rooted historical injustices and land dispossession that MSIs and CSR were incapable of addressing. Instead, as our findings indicate MSIs drove radicalization by raising false expectations that remained unmet and by corporate practices of deception and shifting agendas that undermined community needs and interests.

Market and state actors expected the FSC certification process to improve relations with the community and reduce conflict and that their stakeholder engagement initiatives would neutralize the radical flank by bringing them closer to the moderate position. This would represent a positive radical flank effect (at least for the forestry companies and the Chilean state). For the protest movement a positive radical flank effect would result in a strengthening of the bargaining power of the moderate groups due to the presence of the radical flank. Neither outcome was achieved in the Chilean case because the implementation of the MSI did not produce any positive radical flank effects.

Our findings make three contributions: First, our study makes an empirical contribution by describing the radicalization of protest movements and the repressive role of the state arising from implementation of MSIs in the so-called Global South, a region that has not received much attention in the mainstream management literature. Our findings indicate that MSIs and CSR initiatives produced disempowering outcomes for communities that were its supposed beneficiaries. Second, we contribute to the literature by explaining how MSIs drive radicalization processes and describe the conditions that shifted the moderate groups' initial position from negotiation and dialogue to radical direct action. Third, our study has implications for market-based mechanisms for the governance of natural resources, particularly in the context of Indigenous struggles over land rights. We elaborate on each of these contributions below.

Our study is one of the few in management studies that gives voice to Indigenous communities' struggles against business and the state. Our empirical contribution thus offers perspectives of MSIs 'from below' and provides a counternarrative to top down, market-driven approaches to MSIs, which is the dominant focus in the literature (De Bakker et al., 2019). Our findings also highlight the structural weakness of deliberative processes and the inability of MSIs to accommodate dissent: the much touted deliberative processes of stakeholder engagement broke down because 'dialogues' took place under structurally unequal conditions where the only agenda on the table was under what conditions forestry could expand rather than whether it should exist at all.

Our findings extend our theoretical understanding of both MSIs/PCSR and the radical flank effect by explaining the process of radicalization that results from implementing MSIs. CSR initiatives served to undermine Mapuche political demands for autonomy and self-determination by shifting the focus to 'development', jobs, and community welfare rather than on land rights. Our study of radical flank effects contributes to mounting criticism of PCSR because not only does it highlight the inability of PCSR to handle conflict or dissent, it shows how MSI implementation can radicalize protest movements that lead to negative outcomes for all parties. The outcome of dissent in this case was not neutralization of resistance or co-optation of the radical flank, as reported in some studies of CSR (Boghossian and Marques, 2019; Jaffee and Howard, 2010; Kraemer et al., 2013), but instead resulted in a shift from moderate to radical forms of resistance both within and outside the MSI. The weaponization of MSIs goes beyond greenwashing and can have deleterious effects on stakeholders – the killing of Mapuche activists on FSC certified plantations is certainly not 'a benchmark for good practice in relation to community rights', nor an 'environmentally appropriate, socially beneficial, and economically viable management of the world's forests', which is the stated mission of the Forest Stewardship Council (2022).

Our findings also contribute to the radical flank effect literature by identifying the boundary conditions of accommodation of moderate groups by market and state actors. An underlying assumption in the RFE literature is that there is some degree of hegemonic accommodation by moderate groups in their negotiation with state and market institutions who tend to neutralize the radical flank by vilifying their extreme direct action practices (Ellefsen, 2021; Haines, 1984; Schifeling and Hoffman, 2019). However, our findings indicate that when corporate actors adopted irresponsible practices like deception, raising false expectations and shifting agendas to undermine key demands of the protest movement (land restitution in this case), moderate groups chose to follow more radical repertoires of protest because their efforts to make their voices heard through institutional channels had failed. The shift to radicalization in the protest movement occurred when moderates began to copy the actions of the radical activists who were able to claim land ownership through forcible occupation. Radical groups also pressurized moderates not to collaborate with companies or participate in CSR initiatives. 'Resistance as negotiation' became radicalized to 'resistance as negation' because of corporate irresponsibility and false expectations raised by the MSI (Banerjee et al., 2021).

Our findings have implications for research on other social movements like the Occupy movement, the *gilets jaunes* protests and the *indignado* movement. In particular, we call for a more politicized account of these movements that focus on state and market violence and repression rather than the narratives produced by the anodyne lenses of institutional theory or framing – the 'microfoundations of framing' (Reinecke and Ansari, 2021, p. 378) that produce collective action are not politically neutral but are also outcomes of relations of power. Our findings call for more accounts of state violence and corporate complicity in repressing protests, which have not received much attention in the social movements literature at least in management and organization studies.

Our findings also point to the importance of understanding historical legacies that continue to influence relations between Indigenous communities, the state and business in settler colonies, often resulting in conflict over access to land and resources. There is a need to decolonize our understanding of CSR and MSIs by acknowledging that Indigenous struggles across the world reflect contested sovereignties and resistance to market-state colonial violence (Banerjee, 2022). Our findings highlight the difficulties of implementing MSIs within contexts of historical injustice and land dispossession that created the structurally unequal conditions of poverty and marginalization faced by Indigenous communities. As one of our respondents, a young woman Mapuche activist powerfully stated: '*The FSC is certifying a piece of timber that has blood, pain and death behind it and as such fails to acknowledge this*'. Our findings indicate that a deeper understanding of conflicts over land and resources needs to go beyond a sole focus on implementing MSIs and requires more meaningful engagement with actors outside the MSI who have a legitimate voice in governance but who are marginalized and alienated by consultative processes that privilege market and state interests. Pressurizing states and corporations to uphold principles of equity and justice in MSIs through international human rights organizations may be another avenue, although the outcomes are not guaranteed and the process is slow. Two of our respondents who were arrested in 2004 under Chile's Anti-Terrorist law for alleged use of violence in their protests against a forestry company took their case to the Inter-American Court on Human Rights. In 2019 the court absolved the Mapuche activists of all allegations of crimes and accused the Chilean state of violating their rights (Diario Constitucional, 2019).

Third, our findings also call into question the increasing reliance of private governance measures in natural resource management, especially in countries of the so-called Global South. By providing legitimacy to market-based mechanisms, political CSR and MSIs replace regulatory forms of governance and authority which are required for the welfare of communities. While MSIs and CSR can serve to delegitimize and deradicalize resistance movements and struggles for land rights and social justice (Shamir, 2004, 2008), our findings indicate the imposition of MSIs in contested areas can also lead to de-responsibilization (Hamann, 2019) or de-democratization (Wickert and Van Witteloostuijn, 2022) that undermines social responsibilities of both government and business, thus further marginalizing vulnerable stakeholders and exacerbating conflict. De-responsibilization increased the influence of the radical flank as moderates began to experience the futility of stakeholder dialogue. The question then arises under what conditions do moderates shift to the radical position (and vice versa)? What are the structural barriers that market-based governance mechanisms are unable to overcome? We argue that ongoing Indigenous struggles over land are legacies of more than 200 years of colonialism that reflect an intractable conflict between Indigenous communities and market/state institutions. State repression of Indigenous land rights is rife among Latin American countries in particular, which have the largest number of killings of Indigenous activists (McVeigh, 2022). It is difficult to see how voluntary market-based governance measures can contribute to ameliorating these conflicts given that the state plays such a key role in repressing Indigenous land rights movements. The problem is compounded in the case of Chile where there is no constitutional recognition of its Indigenous peoples, unlike some of its neighbouring countries (Bartlett, 2020).

Thus, private governance measures are simply incapable of addressing the demands for land rights because market actors do not have the authority to grant these rights. Negotiating better conditions with the Mapuche to expand forestry plantations, which is a key aim of the FSC, cannot address the former's land restitution demands. For example, Principle #3 of the FSC on Indigenous Peoples' rights states: 'The Organization shall identify and uphold indigenous peoples' legal and customary rights of ownership, use and management of land, territories and resources affected by management activities'. How can a multinational corporation 'uphold indigenous peoples' legal and customary rights of ownership' in a country that does not recognize Indigenous peoples in its constitution? The FSC is yet another meaningless instrument in the labyrinth of other pointless ratifications by states of 'agreements' like the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples or the International Labor Organization's Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention. Certifying plantations on Mapuche territory benefit only the forestry corporations and the state while denying Mapuche land rights. If corporations are committed to upholding Indigenous rights they may be better served by lobbying governments to comply with international requirements on Indigenous land rights rather than raising false expectations by engaging in dialogue with communities.

Resource extraction zones inhabited by Indigenous communities can also be described as ‘areas of limited statehood’ where states, market actors and resistance groups compete for control (Börzel and Risse, 2010; Hamann, 2019). In the face of escalating violence, the Chilean state declared a state of emergency in 2021 in four provinces in Southern Chile, with some reports claiming that the ‘Chilean state has actually lost control of much of that region’ (Newman, 2021). Initially implemented as a temporary measure, the state of emergency was renewed by the newly elected left-wing government barely two months after it assumed power in March 2022 and continues to operate as of March 2023. Despite its electoral promises of ending military action against Mapuche activists the new government again deployed the military in May 2022 to quell resistance. The ‘historic shift’ and constitutional reform promised by the new government appears to be in jeopardy. The new President Gabriel Boric called for ‘dialogue instead of violence’ but as we have seen many Mapuche activists experience dialogue *as* violence given that their key demands are consistently ignored.

Our findings point to the need for more research on how corporations address state repressive practices against local communities, in particular to understand the interplay of private and public governance in authoritarian regimes. Radical flank effects may differ if NGOs and community organizations have greater involvement in MSI implementation, particularly in repressive regimes. How do authoritarian states react to private governance measures like environmental and social standards that go beyond state regulatory requirements? What effects do these standards have on local communities? How can corporations respond to demands for political autonomy and self-determination from marginalized populations? A related area for future research is to understand the micro-level interactions within and between managers, activists, and state officials (Kourula et al., 2019). What trade-offs are made by different actors and how are they negotiated? How stable are the divisions between the moderates and the radicals in resistance movements? What corporate or state practices attenuate or intensify these divisions? Future empirical research can also bring in new voices to narratives of resistance – for example, members of the community that do not belong to activist groups or participate in CSR initiatives but whose lives are impacted by conflicts.

Perhaps the most crucial implication of our study is that it offers a normative basis for MSIs and related theories of stakeholders and CSR, especially in the context of marginalized populations. We argue that justice and human rights, not responsibility or moral legitimacy, should be the normative core of any market-state-civil society project to enhance social and environmental welfare. For without justice as a guiding principle, MSIs, CSR and stakeholder theories will serve mainly instrumental purposes, where responsibility and legitimacy tend to consolidate the interests of the powerful at the expense of the marginalized. And that is not a desirable outcome for our field.

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SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher's web site.

APPENDIX 1
Glossary of Terms

Alex Lemun	17 year old Mapuche student killed by Chilean police whilst collecting firewood on Mininco's land in 2002.
Arauco	Celulosa Arauco y Constitución, Chilean forestry company.
Mininco	Forestal Mininco part of CMPC, Chilean forestry company
CAM	Coordinadora de Arauco Malleco – An association of armed Mapuche groups fighting for the restitution of land to Mapuche people and for a sovereign independent Mapuche state.
Camilo Catrillanca	24-year old grandson of Lonko who was shot dead by Chilean military in November, 2018 whilst riding on his tractor. His family had recovered large amounts of land from settler colonials and forestry companies.
Chemamull	Wooden Mapuche statue that represents the grave of a deceased person.
CONADI	Corporación Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena (The National Corporation for Indigenous Development).
Consejo Todas las Tierras	First formalized Mapuche political party in Chile (1990).
DL701	Chilean Decree Law 701 passed in 1974 provides state subsidies of up to 75% and land tax exemptions for investments in forestry plantations of exotic species.
FSC	Forest Stewardship Council
Gulumapu	Mapuche term for ancestral Mapuche territory to the west of the Andes mountains i.e., modern day Chile.
Intendente	A regional governor designated by Chilean President.
Itro fill mogen	Mapuche ethic and philosophy on life. It demands respect for the interconnectedness of all forms of life and existence.
Lonko/Longko	Chief of several Mapuche communities.
Machi	Traditional healer and spiritual leader in Mapuche communities.
Mapuche	Indigenous inhabitants of present-day south-central Chile and southwestern Argentina
Mapudungun	Mapuche language
Masisa	Swiss forestry company with strong focus on sustainability.
Mercy Titles/ Títulos de Merced	Land on reservation sites designated by the Chilean state to the Mapuche people in 1861 after the Araucania war.
MSI	Multistakeholder Initiatives
PCSR	Political Corporate Social Responsibility
RFE	Radical Flank Effect
Weichafe	Warriors in Mapudungun
Werkén	Mapuche leader (below Lonko)
Wallmapu	Mapuche name given to ancestral territory of Mapuche people (spanning between modern day Chile and Argentina).
Yanacona	Traitors in Mapudungun
XR	Extinction Rebellion