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Corporate Social Responsibility *versus* Shareholder Value Maximization: Through the Lens of Hard and Soft Law

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Abstract

Even with a significant increase in the number of firms around the world engaging in corporate social responsibility (CSR), many people still perceive CSR as a voluntary commitment and shareholder value maximization (SVM) as a mandatory requirement. This paper borrows the concept of hard law and soft law in terms of coerciveness and overturns the stereotype that SVM is a hard-law constraint and CSR a soft-law constraint. The paper first demonstrates that directors of the board are not obliged to maximize shareholder value even in the Anglo-American jurisdictions where shareholder primacy culture is more dominant. Next, the paper critically discusses an enforceable regulatory regime for CSR. After studying various countries' practices, this paper highlights three main forms of the hard-law approach for CSR: namely through (i) enacting mandatory CSR laws to directly promote socially responsible behavior; (ii) defining minimum standards for corporate behavior to deter socially irresponsible behavior, and/or (iii) mandatory disclosure of CSR-related issues. The conventional (economic) justification for CSR is subsequently challenged, *i.e.*, why should we align CSR with SVM after the above misunderstandings are corrected. More importantly, in addition to overcoming the weakness of soft law's non-coerciveness, the hard-law approach will also provide additional grounds for furthering CSR.

Keywords

Corporate social responsibility; CSR; Disclosure; Hard law; Mandatory; Regulation; Shareholder value; Soft law; Voluntary

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I. INTRODUCTION

Corporations have vast power on our daily life — from consumption to entertainment — and, to a great extent, the ability to exercise social decision-making power.¹ Their responsibility should thereby not be limited to generating wealth for shareholders. In effect, increasingly more firms around the world have been engaging in corporate social responsibility (CSR). The popularity of contemporary CSR has spread to the world scene.² The consensus among various

¹See JOHN E. PARKINSON, CORPORATE POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY: ISSUES IN THE THEORY OF COMPANY LAW 22 (1993); see also RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 23-25 (1976).

² Archie B. Carroll & Kareem M. Shabana, *The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibility: A Review of Concepts, Research and Practice*, 12 INT’L J. MGMT. REV. 85, 86 (2010).

frameworks/definitions offered by academics and institutions is to conceptualize CSR as voluntary corporate commitments, either to meet a responsibility towards society and the environment, or to exceed society's expectations of conventional corporate behavior and improve community wellbeing and life of relevant stakeholders through discretionary business practices and contributions of corporate resources.³

However, the mainstream view of law and economic scholars in Anglo-American countries remains that corporate directors, who collectively act as the human organ of corporations, owe a legal duty to maximize shareholder interests,⁴ and failing to do so amounts to breach of directors' duty,⁵ leading to disqualification and fines as well as other adverse legal consequences. While CSR is perceived as voluntary actions that businesses can take to meet a responsibility over and above compliance with minimum legal obligations, shareholder primacy or shareholder value maximization (SVM)⁶ is perceived as a hard-law constraint on directors of the board. When the

³ For example, *see generally* PHILLIP KOTLER & NANCY LEE, *CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: DOING THE MOST GOOD FOR YOUR COMPANY AND YOUR CAUSE* (2005); *see also* Oliver Falck & Stephan Hebllich, *Corporate Social Responsibility: Doing Well by Doing Good* 50 *BUS. HORIZONS* 247, 247 (2007); Similarly, *see* Word Bank's definition of CSR (2004): "the commitment of businesses to behave ethically and to contribute to sustainable economic development by working with all relevant stakeholders to improve their lives in ways that are good for business, the sustainable development agenda, and society at large" HALINA WARD, *PUBLIC SECTOR ROLES IN STRENGTHENING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: TAKING STOCK* 3 (2004).

⁴ *See* Michael C. Jensen, *Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function* 7 *J. APPLIED CORP. FIN.* 8, 8–9 (2001); *see also* PAUL L. DAVIES & SARAH WORTHINGTON, *PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW* 502–503 (Sweet & Maxwell 10th ed. 2016). It is nevertheless noteworthy that the universal standards on best corporate governance practice developed by OECD and World Bank all seek to embed the shareholder-oriented model around the world. Paddy Ireland & Renginee G. Pillay, *Corporate Social Responsibility in a Neoliberal Age* in 91 *CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATORY GOVERNANCE* (Peter Utting & Jose Carlos Marques ed., 2010). Professors Hansmann and Kraakman also famously claim "there is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value", meaning the Anglo-American model of corporation had triumphed over its more stakeholder-oriented German, French and Japanese models. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, *The End of History for Corporate Law* 89 *Geo. L.J.* 439, 468 (2001).

⁵ *See, e.g.*, Doreen McBarnet, *Corporate Social Responsibility Beyond Law, Thorough Law and For Law*, University of Edinburgh School of Law Working Paper No. 2009/03, 19 (2009) available at <<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1369305P30>> (accessed 1 October 2019).

⁶ According to Professor Bainbridge, shareholder primacy is not exactly the same as SVM. In his mind, SVM just means the corporate objective, whilst shareholder primacy also requires the ultimate control of the company resting in the hands of the shareholders in addition to shareholder value maximization; STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, *THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE* 8-10 (Oxford University Press 2008). However, as the ultimate purpose of shareholder primacy is to maximize shareholder value, this paper is not going to distinguish these two terms unless the context explicitly indicates.

mandatory constraint with binding force clashes with the optional constraint in terms of compliance, the former will undoubtedly prevail.

A paradigm of hard law and soft law may help to explain such choice as well as potential conflicts between CSR and SVM,⁷ though the concept of hard/soft law is traditionally associated with public international law. Soft law usually refers to “any international instrument other than a treaty containing principles, norms, standards or other statements of expected behavior.”⁸ Its main features include “lack of precision, open-endedness, lack of enforceability, as well as the type of actors that engage in norm generation.”⁹ Soft law is also now used to cover rules of conduct that have no legally binding force.¹⁰ Hard Law, by contrast, refers to the binding law and instruments that create precise and uniform rules with a clear and predictable enforcement mechanism.¹¹ Rather than discussing their definitions or scopes, this paper utilizes the distinction between “hard law” and “soft law” in terms of their coercive power to explore their roles in constraining corporate behavior.¹²

CSR rules and codes of conduct, which provide corporations normative guidance, are generally non-binding and lack formal sanctions for transgression or non-compliance. This means that these rules cannot be enforced when corporations fall short of the expected standard. Even

⁷ If corporations were mandatorily required to consider all relevant stakeholders’ interest, shareholder primacy would inevitably be challenged. Min Yan, *The Corporate Objective Revisited* 38 BUS. L. REV. 14, 15 (2017).

⁸ Dinah Shelton, *International Law and Relative Normativity*, in 141 INTERNATIONAL LAW 165 (Malcom D. Evans ed., 2010).

⁹ Jean D’Aspremont & Tanja Aalberts, *Symposium on Soft Law* 25 LEIDEN J. INT’L. L. 309, 309 (2012).

¹⁰ See Francis Snyder, *Soft Law and Institutional Practice in the European Community*, in 197 THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 198 (Stephen Martin ed. 1994). For instance, UK Corporate Governance Code can be perceived as soft law due to its ‘comply or explain’ principle. In other words, the non-compliance or transgression can be justified by ‘explain’, which is different from the hard law as discussed below in Section IV.

¹¹ See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, *Hard and Soft Law in International Governance*, 54 INT’L. ORG. 421, 421 (2000).

¹² Indeed, both approaches are tightly linked. On the one hand, soft law may become hard law once state interferes to claim regulatory control; on the other the coerce power of the regulator is essential generating voluntary compliance for soft law.

Carroll, who incorporated legal responsibility into his pyramid of CSR,¹³ would also agree with the voluntary nature of CSR. He admits “the essence of CSR and what it really refers to” are “the ethical and philanthropic obligations of the corporation towards society,”¹⁴ which obviously extends beyond the mere legal responsibilities. Following the hard/soft law distinction, contemporary CSR is best to be categorized as a soft-law constraint as its defining characteristic. On the contrary, SVM is deemed by many as a mandatory constraint due to the coerciveness of directors’ legal duties and punishments for non-compliance, at least in Anglo-American jurisdictions. It is argued that shareholders could enforce SVM against directors if directors fail to do so, and formal sanctions would be imposed for any non-compliance. Hence, SVM could be categorized as a hard-law constraint. And it is hardly surprising to see that when engaging in CSR clashes with SVM, directors will choose to comply with hard law over soft law.¹⁵ In other words, directors would only engage in CSR if it can be reconciled with shareholder interests.

The first main contribution of this paper is, therefore, to overturn the stereotype that SVM is required by hard law. A doctrinal approach is employed to clear up misunderstandings by examining both case law and statutory law in the U.S. and U.K. as liberal market economies.¹⁶ Directors do owe legal obligations and fiduciary duties to the corporation to promote its success,

¹³ Archie B. Carroll, *A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Performance*, 4 *ACAD. MGMT. REV.* 497-505 (1979); Archie B. Carroll, *The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward the Moral Management of Organizational Stakeholders*, 34 *BUS. HORIZONS* 39-48 (1991).

¹⁴ Archie B. Carroll & Kareem M. Shabana, *The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibility: A Review of Concepts, Research and Practice*, 12 *INT’L J. MGMT. REV.* 85, 90 (2010).

¹⁵ In Ireland and Pillay’s words, when ‘soft’ law meets ‘hard’ law, the latter is likely to prevail. Paddy Ireland & Renginee G. Pillay, *Corporate Social Responsibility in a Neoliberal Age*, in *CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATORY GOVERNANCE: TOWARDS INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT?* 77, 94 (Peter Utting & José Carlos Marques eds., 2010).

¹⁶ Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, *VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE* (Oxford University Press 2001). Another main argument is that in liberal market economics, CSR should be regulated by market forces rather than mandatory regulatory initiatives.

but that is very different from maximizing shareholder value as long as we can correctly distinguish corporate interests from shareholder interests in the context of shareholder heterogeneity.¹⁷

The other main contribution is to overturn the stereotype that CSR is, or ought to be, a soft-law constraint from an institutional/regulatory aspect. This is in contrast to the existing research focusing primarily on the business perspective (*e.g.*, self-regulation). After looking into various salient examples of countries' practices in mandating CSR, this paper summarizes three key forms of the hard-law approach to hold corporations accountable. The most radical form is to enact mandatory CSR law to mandate corporations to do more (*e.g.*, CSR spending) for society and act towards a socially desirable end. The second form is to use other bodies of law such as consumer protection law, employment law, anti-discrimination law, environmental protection law, and alike to regulate corporate behavior by setting or elevating the minimum obligations for the purpose of deterring designated socially irresponsible behavior. The third form is to introduce mandatory reporting on social and environmental performance, which could not only stimulate and strengthen public pressure but also make assessment and monitoring possible. The mandatory disclosure on CSR-related information can be used either discretely or together with other forms of the hard-law approach to help build more socially responsible corporations. In short, this paper endeavors to identify effective and enforceable approaches to promote, and implement CSR more accurately, rather than explore new perspectives in theorizing on CSR.

When SVM was perceived as a hard-law constraint, the effort to justify contemporary CSR through its role in advancing SVM is understandable as the former is at best ameliorative in nature. This perhaps also explains why contemporary CSR has largely been endorsed and promoted from

¹⁷ Min Yan, *Agency Theory Re-Examined: An Agency Relationship and Residual Claimant Perspective*, 26 INT'L CO. & COM. L. REV. 139, 143 (2015).

its positive correlation with shareholder value.¹⁸ However, after clarifying that SVM is not required by hard law, the conventional (namely, economic) justification for CSR, *i.e.*, through a business case,¹⁹ can subsequently be challenged. The lopsided emphasis on the reconciliation of interests between shareholders and other groups should also be reconsidered as conflicts of interests are not always reconcilable. On the other hand, the hard-law approach for CSR may itself provide further grounds for combating socially irresponsible conduct of business and help promote more responsible corporate behavior.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II critically discusses the rise of SVM as well as its impact on the understanding of corporate function. Some of the inherent problems in SVM, especially the short-termism and inability to lead social welfare maximization, are also examined in this section. Section III argues that SVM is not a hard-law constraint and demonstrates that directors and their executives are not obliged to maximize shareholder value even in Anglo-American jurisdictions. Section IV critically explores room for CSR to take a hard-law approach. Section V discusses the implications of the new understanding of CSR and SVM in regard to the conventional rationale for contemporary CSR as well as the danger of its business case reasoning. Then, the limitations of hard-law approaches for CSR and the suggestions for future research are discussed in Section VI. Section VII proffers the concluding remark.

¹⁸ See, *e.g.*, KEVIN T. JACKSON, *BUILDING REPUTATIONAL CAPITAL: STRATEGIES FOR INTEGRITY AND FAIR PLAY THAT IMPROVE THE BOTTOM LINE* (Oxford University Press 2004); CHRIS LASZLO, *THE SUSTAINABLE COMPANY: HOW TO CREATE LASTING VALUE THROUGH SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE* (Island Press 2003); SANDRA WADDOCK, *LEADING CORPORATE CITIZENS: VISION, VALUES, VALUE ADDED* (McGraw-Hill 2002); Connie Van der Byl & Natalie Slawinski, *Embracing Tensions in Corporate Sustainability: A Review of Research From Win-Wins and Trade-Offs to Paradoxes and Beyond*, 28 *ORG. & ENV'T* 54-79 (2015).

¹⁹ Michael L. Barnett, *Stakeholder Influence Capacity and the Variability of Financial Returns to Corporate Social Responsibility*, 32 *ACAD. MGMT. REV.* 794-816 (2007); Paul Min-Dong Lee, *Review of the Theories of Corporate Social Responsibility: Its Evolutionary Path and the Road Ahead*, 10 *INT'L J. MGMT. REV.* 53-73 (2008); David J. Vogel, *Is There a Market for Virtue? The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibility*, 47 *CAL. MGMT. REV.* 19-45 (2005)

II. THE RISE OF SVM

Corporations were not born with a shareholder primacy. In the early days, corporations were seen as an artificial entity that owed its existence to “the positive law of the state.”²⁰ In addition to the power to grant charters for incorporation, the power of the state to forfeit the charter further justified state intervention in corporate activities.²¹ Dependence on state action and demand of governmental concurrence determined that corporations must carry out some public or social function. Indeed, prior to general incorporation, incorporation purely for private interests was rare. In the U.K., the first trading companies with legal personality created in the 16th century by royal charters were mainly used for overseas trading, exploration, and colonization. In the U.S., incorporation depended on the state’s concession through special acts by the state legislature and was usually for public utility, such as public transport, financial institutions, and local public services between the late-18th century and mid-19th century.

The concession for incorporation was based on the special regulatory provisions put into corporate charters in order to protect the public from abusive practices. Typical provisions included “operations begin within some specified time,” “works kept in good order and not abandoned,” “tolls to be within set minimum and maximum levels,” “minimum capital paid in,” among many others.²² In other words, the privilege of incorporation was largely legitimized on the basis that corporations would serve the public good rather than simply private benefits. All of these

²⁰ David Millon, *Theories of the Corporation*, 39 DUKE L. J. 201, 206 (1990).

²¹ For example, English courts by prerogative judicial writs of *quo warranto* and *scire facias* could dissolve unauthorized corporation or forfeit the abused charter. See Ron Harris, *The English East India Company and the History of Company Law*, in VOC 1602-2002 400 YEARS OF COMPANY LAW 217 (Ella Gepken-Jager et. al. eds., 2005). The US Supreme Court also confirmed that corporation created by the special act of state legislature may lose its franchise “by a misuser or nonuser of them, and they may be resumed by the government under a judicial judgment upon a *quo warranto* to ascertain and enforce the forfeiture” in the case *Terret v. Taylor*, 13 U.S. 43, 51 (1815).

²² JAMES W. HURST, *THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970* 39 (University of Virginia Press 1970).

considerations led corporations to be viewed as socially useful instruments to carry out public policy goals.²³

With the advent of general incorporation law, almost all major restrictions around corporate activities were removed. Incorporation became a simple matter of registration. Individuals who intended to incorporate only had to comply with a few requirements set by law. On the ground that any lawful business was allowed since the late-19th century, the state incrementally lost the authority to require corporations to serve public interests. The validity of the concession theory was challenged, and corporations became to be perceived as creatures of private initiatives instead of the state power. The change implied the trend to emphasize individual incorporators' initiatives and hence, their private benefits. The role of corporate law was consequently reoriented from public law regulating social/economic problems caused by corporations to private law focusing on internal corporate governance problems.²⁴ Corporate law lost much of its public character, and corporations lost much of their public function at the same time. The corporation's traditional obligations to the state or public were disregarded. Restrictions on accumulating economic interests for private individuals were altogether removed. In short, the public and social function of corporations faded, and social welfare became an irrelevant concept.

After the separation of ownership and control,²⁵ questions as how to best check managerial deviation and ensure accountability have centered on the corporate law and corporate governance discourses. Among others, the agency theory,²⁶ which developed from contractarianism that

²³ Anant K. Sundaram & Andrew C. Inkpen, *The Corporate Objective Revisited*, 15 ORG. SCI. 350, 351 (2004).

²⁴ David Millon, *Theories of the Corporation*, 39 DUKE L.J. 201, 213 (1990).

²⁵ ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, *THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY* (Transaction Publishers 1932).

²⁶ Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, *Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure*, 3 J. OF FIN. ECON. 305, 305 (1976).

regarded corporation as a nexus of contracts,²⁷ provided the momentum for SVM for the last half-century. Emphases have thereafter been placed on aligning the managerial interests with shareholder interests in order to control agency costs. The essence of the argument is that directors and their executives are appointed to run the corporation on behalf of and for the benefit of shareholders.

The shareholder primacy position rejects corporations' function to further public welfare unless it is relevant to increase of shareholder value. The internal relationship between shareholders and directors/managers have replaced relationships between business and society to become the primary concern. Today, in order to tackle the agency problem and ensure managerial accountability, SVM remains as the primary, if not the sole, corporate objective at least in the U.S. and U.K.²⁸

A. Revisiting SVM

Shareholder primacy requires corporations to be run in a way to maximize shareholder value after satisfying all other corporate constituencies' contractual or statutory claims. The board of directors and its delegates of daily management (*i.e.*, executive officers) are therefore expected to follow this guideline, which is praised by supporters as a singular objective to enforce and monitor.²⁹ Despite it being recognized that the preferences of different shareholders are not identical, the argument is that in a given corporation at a given time, most shareholders are a reasonably homogeneous group with an analogous objective.³⁰

²⁷ Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, *Production, Information Cost, and Economic Organization*, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 777-795 (1972).

²⁸ Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, *The End of History for Corporate Law*, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001); PAUL L. DAVIES & SARAH WORTHINGTON, *PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW* 542 (Sweet & Maxwell 10th ed. 2016).

²⁹ Michael C. Jensen, *Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function*, 7 J. OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE 8, 11 (2001).

³⁰ FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHER, *THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW* 70 (Harvard University Press 1991).

However, the essential premise for SVM — shareholder homogeneity is largely a false promise.³¹ The divergence among shareholders can be very significant and therefore, should not be ignored. First of all, shareholders may have different expected holding periods. Although theoretically, the current share price should reflect the future value in a perfect market, practically the share price is not immune to manipulation owing to the failure of the efficient capital market hypothesis. Short-term shareholders tend to focus on immediate profits from fluctuations in the market by buying and selling shares with high frequency. In contrast, typical long-term shareholders tend to focus on long-term development by buying and holding shares regardless of the rise and fall of share prices. Thus, shareholders with different expected holding periods would unavoidably have heterogenous preferences over corporate decision-making. The former may be more likely to pressure directors to adopt policies, such as axing employees, reducing research and development (R&D) expenses, or selling corporate assets, in order to maximize short-term profits, whilst the latter may sacrifice immediate profits for long-term development.³²

Second, the level of diversification determines differing risk preferences. Diversified shareholders care much less about firm-specific risks than undiversified shareholders. For instance, shareholders who invest in a given corporation without also diversifying would be sensitive to such risks. Not surprisingly, undiversified shareholders, opposite to fully diversified shareholders, may pursue projects with lower returns for reduced risks. The different expectations between inside and outside shareholders, hedged and unhedged, also demonstrate shareholders may have heterogenous interests, thereby making it logically impossible to maximize all of them at the same

³¹ See, e.g., Grant Hayden & Matthew Bodie, *One Share, One Vote and the False Promise of Shareholder Homogeneity*, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 452-460 (2008).

³² Short-term and long-term interests are indeed difficult to reconcile as shown in the following subsection. Suffice it to say here, long-term development, by training employees, investing in technology and improving customer service for example, requires non-neglectable upfront costs, which would be considered a negative factor under short-termism because the immediate profits would be impaired.

time.³³

Except for the general idea of maximizing shareholder interests, there is a lack of clear guidance for directors when different shareholder interests need to be balanced (*i.e.*, lack of precision). In the business world, SVM is not infrequently interpreted to be maximizing share price, and failure to meet quarterly earnings targets are seen as a sign of managerial incompetence, which may lead to a career-threatening dismissal in the worst scenario.³⁴ Despite, in theory, SVM meaning more than maximizing quarterly earnings, the essence of SVM remains to prioritize shareholder interests under all circumstances — even at the expense of others. For the sake of facilitating the following arguments, this paper adopts the slightly broader definition of SVM.

B. Could SVM Increase Social Welfare?

One main reason to equate fulfilling profit-making responsibility in whole or in part to CSR is based upon the argument that maximizing shareholder value could ultimately increase social welfare. If SVM could maximize social welfare, SVM could be justified even if it is no longer a hard-law constraint. Those who believe SVM is in society's interest are largely founded on the agency theory.³⁵ The argument is that shareholders as residual claimants *reap the marginal dollar* of the corporate profits and *suffer the marginal dollar* of any corporate losses. Such gain allocation rule allows shareholders to receive whatever is left from the income stream after

³³ For example, inside shareholders like directors with shares may be more concerned about job security and prefer to maintain the *status quo* when facing a hostile takeover, even though the offer may be in the best interests of those outside shareholders in the sense of pushing up the return on shares. Or in the context of golden parachutes, inside shareholders who happen to be directors would have greater incentive to facilitate the merger even it is not in the best interests of outside shareholders. Iman Anabtawi, *Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power*, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 583-593 (2006).

³⁴ Alfred Rappaport, *The Economics of Short-term Performance Obsession*, 61 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 65, 69 (2005).

³⁵ See, e.g., Simon Deakin, *The Coming Transformation of Shareholder Value*, 13 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT'L REV. 11, 13 (2005).

satisfying fixed claimants and thereby ties their benefits to the corporate performance. The wealth of residual claimants would be maximized in the event that corporate wealth is maximized.³⁶

However, the residual claimant argument is problematic. Shareholders in solvent corporations are not normally entitled to claim dividends or any profits. It is, in fact, the board of directors that have the sole disposal and decide where the ‘residual’ goes. Today, boards of directors in most jurisdictions have the right to decide not to pay shareholder dividends,³⁷ and instead, deliver the ‘residual’ to non-shareholding stakeholders by retaining the profits for future business, increasing employee benefits, improving customer service, and expanding R&D, among others. Due to the separate legal personality of the corporation, shareholders are not able to direct corporations, including forcing the board to declare dividends and cannot receive anything, at least directly, unless the board decides to distribute dividends. Rules empowering directors with the right to determine how to utilize and allocate assets in all major jurisdictions rebut the argument that shareholders are the residual claimants entitled to “every penny of profit left over after the firm’s contractual obligations to creditors, suppliers, and employees have been met.”³⁸

Besides, stakeholders such as employees who have made firm-specific investments — *i.e.*, those skills or assets that cannot be redeployed to alternative use without a loss of value — could also be treated as the residual claimants and residual risk bearers. This is true because they could equally be incentivized to go the extra mile in order to be better off, *e.g.*, by receiving bonuses on top of the fixed claims in the form of monthly wages. Indeed, multiple residual owners exist with

³⁶ As residual owners, shareholders will obtain higher dividends and share value when the corporation is run well, and less or even losing all their investment if the corporation is run badly. Given such residual nature of shareholders, corporate wealth is maximized when shareholder value is maximized; and society as whole will be better off when all corporations’ wealth is enhanced.

³⁷ Min Yan, *Agency Theory Re-examined: An Agency Relationship and Residual Claimant Perspective*, 26 INT’L COMPANY AND COMMERCIAL L. REV. 139, 142 (2015).

³⁸ Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, *Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies in Corporate Law*, 31 J. OF CORP. L. 719, 728 (2006).

differing priority levels.³⁹ Moreover, shareholders are not the only group that undertakes residual risks, although financial economists often assert this as if it were a self-evident fact.⁴⁰

With the collapse of the residual claimant argument, the correlation between generating maximum value for shareholders and increasing overall welfare no longer exists. By the same token, the argument that monitoring directors is in the best interests of shareholders from the perspective of lowering agency costs and maximizing corporate wealth becomes untenable. In effect, shareholder interests are not always in line with corporate interests. For example, a corporation is vulnerable to both idiosyncratic and systematic risks, whilst shareholders can be insulated from idiosyncratic risk by adopting diversified portfolios.⁴¹ Therefore, when acting in the interests of shareholders, directors only have to take systematic risk into account, which may hurt corporate interests. In other words, maximizing corporate wealth does not necessarily increase shareholder value; and vice versa.

Corporations can indisputably provide value to more than just shareholders. Interests to creditors, salaries to employees, goods and services to customers, tax revenues to governments, and stability to communities are all values provided by the corporation. In this sense, by its nature firm value will exceed shareholder value. Unfortunately, any value provided to non-shareholding stakeholders is explicitly excluded from the shareholder-oriented concept of corporate value.⁴² Nevertheless, society includes not only shareholders but also other corporate constituencies. The

³⁹ Lynn M. LoPucki, *The Myth of the Residual Owner: An Empirical Study*, 82 WASHINGTON U. L. Q. 1341, 1354-5 (2004).

⁴⁰ MARY O'SULLIVAN, *CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY* 50 (Oxford University Press 2001).

⁴¹ See John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, *Systematic Harms and Shareholder Value*, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 35, 36 (2014).

⁴² Jill E. Fisch, *Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy*, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 644 (2006).

implication of enlarging social welfare could be re-interpreted as the aggregate wealth of all stakeholders in the corporate context.⁴³

The crucial issue is, apart from distributive injustice and difficulty in wealth redistribution,⁴⁴ is that shareholders may externalize losses to other stakeholders, which would, in turn, lead to higher transaction costs and lower incentives for other stakeholders to contribute. To maximize shareholder value, directors of the board could be pressed to siphon value from other corporate constituencies.⁴⁵ For example, Wal-Mart maintains low employee wages, which could be seen as transferring benefit from employees to shareholders. So, despite the situation of making the pie bigger, another potential tactic to obtain more benefits is to take other stakeholders' portions. There are indeed many alternative ways besides enhanced corporate earnings, such as lowering labor costs or cutting R&D expenditures, to achieve the goal of increased dividends and capital appreciation. It is also possible to externalize excessive risks from shareholders to stakeholders. Thanks to the limited liability rule, shareholders will only suffer a fraction of the costs caused by the failure of risky programs, but they will obtain high returns if the "gamble" succeeds. Although most advocates of the shareholder model would agree that SVM should ideally be achieved through increasing corporate value rather than redistributing interests from stakeholders to shareholders, such a possibility should not be dismissed.⁴⁶

⁴³ REINIER KRAAKMAN et al., *THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH* 22-23 (Oxford University Press 3d ed. 2017).

⁴⁴ Social psychologists have found that people are not only concerned about the fairness of the final outcome but also care about the fairness of the distribution process itself. Research shows people are more accepting of a poorer outcome as long as the procedure for distribution could be perceived as fair. *See, e.g.*, E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, *THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE* (Plenum Press 1988).

⁴⁵ *See* Kent Greenfield, *New Principles for Corporate Law*, 1 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 87, 101 (2005); Andrew Keay, *Ascertaining the Corporate Objective: An Entity Maximisation and Sustainability Model*, 71 MOD. L. REV. 663, 671 (2008).

⁴⁶ Indeed, these situations are not uncommon to happen. *See* Joseph Heath, *Business Ethics without Stakeholders*, 16 BUS. ETHICS Q. 533, 542 (2006).

Partly for this reason, Dodd concludes that a corporation run for shareholder interests does not automatically create value for other stakeholder groups or society.⁴⁷ On the one hand, shareholder value could be maximized by extracting value from other stakeholders without increasing corporate value; and on the other, the emphasis on the superior position of shareholders may impair the willingness and incentive of other stakeholders to contribute firm-specific investment. This will ultimately lead to lower productivity, harming the society as a whole.

One may suggest a long-term view of SVM. However, it would be difficult in practice, as short-termism appears far more “attractive” compared to long-termism. The preference of corporate liquidity, the pressure of relative performance (namely, to surpass competitors), performance-based remuneration, and the quarterly report will all contribute to a short-term orientation. More importantly, people are impatient. Such behavioral biases — *i.e.*, present-biased preferences determine that people would prefer to engage reward activities first and to delay immediate cost activities until later.⁴⁸ Therefore, when immediate costs (with delayed rewards, *i.e.*, long-termism) are juxtaposed to immediate rewards (with delayed costs, *i.e.*, short-termism), the latter will be favored.

It will be equally difficult to distinguish whether the inflated earnings are based on long-term or short-term strategy; and whether the decline of profits is based on long-term strategy or bad management. As Greenfield correctly points out, it is easy to show the numbers, but difficult for most investors to determine the reason for such numbers.⁴⁹ It would not be surprising at all to see manipulation in the business world. For example, camouflaging a short-term behavior as a long-term one until the bubble is burst. On the other side, long-term behavior *e.g.*, sacrificing immediate

⁴⁷ See E. Merrick Jr. Dodd, *For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees*, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1152–53 (1932).

⁴⁸ Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, *Doing It Now or Later*, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 103, 109 (1999).

⁴⁹ Kent Greenfield, *The Puzzle of Short-Termism*, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627, 636 (2011).

profits for long-term development might not be readily recognized by the market. Decision making focusing on long-term can be easily confused with, or thought of as, the result of incompetent management. And practically, it would also be difficult to quantify the long-term benefits in a precise way whilst the short-term costs are much easier to measure or “feel.” This could further result in long-termism being less attractive.

In short, on the ground that shareholders are not the exclusive residual claimants/risk-bearers and have heterogenous interests, sometimes distinct from that of the corporation, it will not be convincing to argue that social welfare, which includes the interests of both shareholders and non-shareholders, can be maximized by virtue of maximizing shareholder value, let alone the quarterly share prices.⁵⁰ As a result, the possible justification for SVM relies upon its hard-law nature as critically examined below.

III. CHALLENGING SVM AS HARD-LAW CONSTRAINT

The term ‘law’ is broadly used in this paper to include rules, civil regulations, and code of conducts, among others. One of the most fundamental and elementary functions of law in general is to prevent undesired behavior and secure desired behavior.⁵¹ However, not all “laws” can be regarded as coercive. This is why we have to distinguish hard law, which is legally binding and

⁵⁰ Consequently, time is ripe to seriously reconsider what is the fundamental purpose of the corporations in today’s age. In particular, most shareholders, including institutional investors, only put an insignificant amount of their money into any individual corporation in terms of a diversified portfolio strategy, and they do not commit to a corporation in either moral or practical sense. See Ronald M. Green, *Shareholders as Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of Corporate Governance*, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1409, 1414 (1993). The role of equity issues and physical capital in investment “is much less important than it was” in modern public companies at present. See JOHN KAY, *THE KAY REVIEW OF UK EQUITY MARKETS AND LONG-TERM DECISION MAKING* 24 (2012). Shareholder investment by way of purchasing stock does not contribute savings to a corporation or undertakes the residual risk of a new/increased economic operation. This is exactly why Deakin argues that net contribution of new equity to the corporate sector has become negative. By contrast, stakeholders’ firm-specific investment might be much greater and more valuable than the financial investment. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine this question in detail. Simon Deakin, *The Coming Transformation of Shareholder Value*, 13 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV. 11, 15 (2005); see also MIN YAN, *BEYOND SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMISATION* (Routledge 1st ed. 2018).

⁵¹ JOSEPH RAZ, *THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY* 169 (Oxford University Press 1979).

enforceable, from soft law, which has no legally binding force but aspirational goals or best practices expected. The coerciveness, as explained in the introduction above determines whether non-compliance will lead to formal sanctions.

A. Overview of Hard-Law Approaches

Hard law can be referred to as the legal framework that is legally binding and enforceable through the courts, which include domestic legislations and international treaties. Typical examples are criminal law and law of torts where murder, assault, libel, and alike are prohibited whilst duties of care are required when engaging in certain types of activities. In terms of corporations, hard law could equally prohibit certain forms of conduct such as harmful disposal of waste (*e.g.*, by *UK Environmental Protection Act 1990*), or require certain forms of conduct such as filing accounts and reports with the registrar (*e.g.*, by *UK Companies Act 2006*). Hard law compels corporations to do something it would not otherwise want to do or refrain from doing something it would otherwise do.

Complying with the law, for example, to change the way of waste disposal or prepare annual reports will normally require corporations to alter their original conduct of business and incur costs (or lose expected profits).⁵² Fear of the potential sanctions may justify such compliance even if compliance would incur a financial loss. Hard law largely relies upon the punitive mechanism to secure compliance. It threatens firms to alter their original behavior and adhere to their duties fixed by law. Formal sanctions will be imposed on corporations if they have done what the law prohibits (*e.g.*, illegally deposit harmful waste) or fail to do what the law requires (*e.g.*, failing to file accounts). In sum, fines and imprisonment brought by sanctions for violating the law will normally

⁵² Another good example is the holiday shopping legislation, which restricts shops' opening time. According to the *Sunday Trading Act 1994*, large shops in England and Wales must close on certain holidays and open only for 6 consecutive hours between 10am and 6pm on Sundays. *Sunday Trading Act, 1994, c. 20 (U.K.)*.

outweigh the financial loss/cost incurred by altering corporations' original conducts of behavior. And it is always possible for legislators to adjust the punishment to make it more appropriate. Thus, even from a purely economic and cost-benefit perspective, there are incentives for corporations to comply with the law in order to avoid adverse legal consequences.

Of course, there must be some conscious businesses willing to do good regardless of costs, who will actively comply with the law and engage in voluntary activities beyond the legal requirement. External rules and regulations will regress to mere reference if corporations could discipline self-behavior genuinely. Indeed, there is no need to regulate their conduct of business since performing desired behavior and getting rid of the undesired behavior is perfectly in line with their own initiative. Law has less effect on these types of corporations, and compliance is more like a matter of social learning and understandings of the core ideas expressed by such law.⁵³ By contrast, most corporations would see legal requirements as constraints, and these corporations are the main subjects of this paper.

Thus, our first main question is whether SVM is a hard-law constraint. Just like employment law mainly concerns employee protection and consumer protection law concerns consumer-related issues, corporate law, as discussed above, is considered to be the law primarily dealing with shareholder-director relationships and concerning shareholder interests. Corporate law protects shareholders amongst others by spelling out directors' legal duties and liabilities for non-compliance. So, when directors breach their duty, it could lead to both civil and criminal consequences. Assuming that SVM is required by hard law, directors would breach their legal obligations by failing to maximize shareholder value.

B. The U.S.

⁵³ William C. Frederick, *The Moral Authority of Transnational Corporate Codes*, 10 J. BUS. ETHICS 165, 173 (1991).

Proponents of SVM often refer to the decision of the Michigan Supreme Court in *Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.* to demonstrate that generating maximal value for shareholders is enshrined in hard law.⁵⁴ Leo Strine, the Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, also wrote: “The corporate law requires directors, as a matter of their duty of loyalty, to pursue a good faith strategy to maximize profits for the stockholders.”⁵⁵

A closer examination may, however, find SVM to be required neither by statutory nor case law in the U.S. To begin with, the classic *Dodge* case mainly dealt with the relationship between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders in a closely held corporation.⁵⁶ The actual holding is that Mr. Ford, as the controlling shareholder and CEO, cannot stop the Dodge brothers as the minority shareholders from “demand[ing] proper dividends upon the stock they own.”⁵⁷ The argument that a business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the shareholders, *i.e.*, SVM, is therefore merely *judicial dicta*. Stout argues that the court thought this case was mainly about the controlling shareholder breaching his fiduciary duties to the minority

⁵⁴ Mr. Ford, the CEO and controlling shareholder of the Ford Motor Co., announced a plan to stop paying out special dividends to shareholders, and instead take the profits and reinvest them in order to employ more workers and build more factories, which was aimed at employing more people and cutting the costs of the cars to make them affordable to more people. The Dodge brothers, as minority shareholders, sued to stop Ford’s plans as they thought the purpose of the corporation was to maximise shareholder value.

The Michigan Supreme Court held that:

There should be no confusion of the duties which Mr. Ford conceives that he and the stockholders owe to the general public and the duties which in law he and his codirectors owe to protesting, minority stockholders. *A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.* The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.

Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (emphasis added).

⁵⁵ Leo E. Strine Jr., *Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea That For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit*, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 155 (2012).

⁵⁶ Lynn A. Stout, *Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford*, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163, 167 (2008).

⁵⁷ *Dodge*, 170 N.W. at 685.

shareholders.⁵⁸ This is not inconsistent with the viewpoint to categorize this case as a minority oppression case.⁵⁹

In effect, the court in *Shlensky v. Wrigley* upheld the directors' decision to protect the interests of the community — *i.e.*, to keep the neighborhood from deteriorating — by not installing lights for night baseball games at Wrigley Field.⁶⁰ Despite night games earning the club, and arguably its shareholders, greater profits by increasing attendance, the court refused to hold the directors liable simply because they failed to maximize shareholder interests by pursuing additional revenues. The court instead supported the directors' consideration for the interests of local residents over shareholders. More recently, in *Burwell v. Hobby Lobby*, the U.S. Supreme Court perceived the corporation as a form of organization to provide protection for human beings and to achieve desired ends.⁶¹ The duties of those who run the corporation, therefore, extend beyond assuring a return to investors.

With regard to statutes — another important source for hard law — corporate law codes in the U.S. do not mandatorily require SVM either. Under the *Delaware General Corporate Law*, the most representative and important corporate law in the U.S., any lawful business purpose is permitted. Moreover, a large number of states enact a “constituency statute,” which explicitly authorizes corporate boards of directors to consider the interest of constituencies other than shareholders;⁶² and in states without such constituency statutes, case law on takeover also

⁵⁸ Stout, *supra* note 56.

⁵⁹ See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith, *The Shareholder Primacy Norm*, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 320 (1998).

⁶⁰ *Shlensky v. Wrigley*, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. 1968).

⁶¹ The Supreme Court held:

While it is certainly true that a central objective of for-profit corporations is to make money, modern corporate law does not require for-profit corporations to pursue profit at the expense of everything else, and many do not do so. For-profit corporations, with ownership approval support a wide variety of charitable causes, and it is not at all uncommon for such corporations to further humanitarian and other altruistic objectives.

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014).

⁶² Lawrence E. Mitchell, *Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes*, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 579-580 (1992).

seriously takes into account the impact on non-shareholding stakeholders.⁶³ This clearly shows the interests of customers, suppliers, employees, creditors, and alike should all be considered during the decision-making.

Further, the *business judgment rule* as a shield provides directors nearly irrevocable discretion to act in the best interests of the corporation, even if this means to sacrifice shareholder interests such as rejecting a lucrative hostile takeover offer. For example, in *Air Products, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc.*,⁶⁴ Airgas' board refused to sell the company to Air Products, Inc. despite being able to bring its shareholders a hefty profit. The business judgment rule provides directors (*e.g.*, as those in Airgas, Inc.) with the shield for pursuing goals other than SVM, as long as no self-interest is involved.⁶⁵

C. The U.K.

It is equally difficult to find any case law directly stating directors are required to maximize shareholder value in the U.K. Directors are only required to run a corporation for the best interests of the corporation as such. Whilst corporate interests are sometimes interpreted as the financial well-being of shareholders as a whole,⁶⁶ according to *Re BSB Holdings Ltd (No. 2)*, English law “does not require the interests of the company to be sacrificed in the particular interests of a group of shareholders.”⁶⁷ This implies the U.K. corporate law also acknowledges the difference between shareholder interests and corporate interests. If corporate interests are in conflict with shareholder interests, the former should be given preference.⁶⁸

In *Fulham Football Club Ltd v. Cabra Estates*, the court held that “the duties owed by the

⁶³ Martin Gelter, *The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence: Managerial Autonomy and Stakeholder Orientation in Comparative Corporate Governance*, 50 HARV INT'L L.J. 129, 145 (2009).

⁶⁴ *Air Prods. & Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc.*, 16 A.3d 48 (Del. 2011).

⁶⁵ LYNN STOUT, *THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH* 30 (Berrett-Koehler Publishers 2012).

⁶⁶ *See, e.g.*, THOMAS CLARKE, *INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH* 281 (2007).

⁶⁷ *Re BSB Holdings Ltd (No. 2)* [1996] 1 BCLC 155, 251 (Eng.).

⁶⁸ GEOFFREY MORSE, *PALMER'S COMPANY LAW: VOLUME 2* para 8. 2605 (Sweet & Maxwell 2014).

directors are to the company and the company is more than just the sum total of its members.”⁶⁹ Accordingly, requiring directors to run a corporation in its best interest is not equivalent to maximizing shareholder interests, let alone maximizing share prices. The Canadian case *People’s Department Stores v. Wise* may shed further light on the distinction between the two types of interests.⁷⁰ The Canadian Supreme Court held that the interests of the corporation should not be confused with the interests of the shareholders or any other individual stakeholder groups; the interests of shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, consumers, governments, and the environment should all be taken into account when acting in the best interests of the corporation.⁷¹

Consideration for other stakeholders is formally acknowledged by tying it to the success of the corporation in s.172 of the UK *Companies Act 2006*. Directors are now required to have regard to a wider range of stakeholder groups in order to discharge their overriding duty to promote corporate success. The legitimate interests of stakeholders are not allowed to be frustrated simply for SVM. Rather, directors must also act in a *bona fide* way that they consider to be in the interests of these stakeholders.⁷² At the very least, directors seeking to consider stakeholder interests when making corporate decisions will be provided protection by the corporate law legislation.

Besides, Chapter 4A “Strategic Report” of Part 12 of the *Companies Act 2006*, in replacing § 417 “Directors’ Report,” requires directors to prepare a strategic report including information relating to environmental matters and employee matters. In the case of listed corporations, further information about social, community, and human rights issues, as well as any policies of the corporation in relation and effectiveness to these matters, is required to be disclosed as stated in §

⁶⁹ *Fulham Football Club Ltd v. Cabra Estates* [1994] 1 BCLC 363, 379 (Eng.).

⁷⁰ *People’s Dep’t Stores v. Wise*, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461 (Can.).

⁷¹ *Id.*

⁷² Sarah Worthington, *Shares and Shareholders: Property, Power and Entitlement: Part 2*, 22 COMPANY LAW. 307, 309-310 (2001).

414C. The increasing requirement for disclosure of stakeholder-related information has the potential to nudge directors to consider more stakeholders' interests and any possible impacts in practice. Though presently, stakeholders other than shareholders have no additional rights to be involved in corporate governance or to take action to challenge directors' ignorance of their interests, setting out such a non-exhaustive list of specific factors requiring consideration can "expand the grounds for judicial review of directors' decision-making."⁷³

In a nutshell, while directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation to promote its best interest, maximizing shareholder value is not the directors' legal obligation at all. No statutory or case law forces directors of the board, or their executives, to maximize shareholder value regardless of any other issues, even in the U.S. and U.K. where shareholder primacy culture is more dominant. In contrast, as already discussed, it is legitimate for directors to sacrifice shareholders' financial interests for the interest of other stakeholders. Directors are only forbidden to exercise their power in bad faith or for irrelevant motivations — *e.g.*, for their self-interest — so as to defeat shareholder interests. As a result, SVM is not a hard-law constraint as conventionally believed.

IV. HARD-LAW APPROACH FOR CSR

Corporations have to comply with their legal responsibility to operate. Mandatory legal obligations such as paying taxes, honoring contracts, complying with the minimum wage requirement, and banning child labor are set out by hard law as the bottom lines for conducting business. There is no flexibility for non-compliance. Obeying the law is essential, though not sufficient, premise to be socially responsible. Take tax avoidance, for example. Although one can

⁷³ GEOFFREY MORSE, PALMER'S COMPANY LAW: VOLUME 2 para 8. 2613 (Sweet & Maxwell 2014).

evade taxes by illegal methods such as not disclosing assets, there are also lawful ways to avoid taxes or gain tax advantages by using artificial transactions and the like. These methods may go against the spirit of the law but do not necessarily break the letter of the law. From the perspective of the enormous social impacts of today's corporations, merely requiring them to comply with the bottom lines set out by the hard law sounds far from adequate.

The legal constraints may be seen as barriers to overcome, and it would be unavoidable for certain corporations to proactively seek loopholes of the law in order to take advantage of them. Businesses are, in fact, extremely good at circumventing such legal constraints by the so-called creative compliance.⁷⁴ Consequently, apart from complying with the minimum legal requirement, corporations are also required to meet social expectations, including both explicit and implicit obligations.⁷⁵ In other words, corporations are expected to exceed the minimum legal obligations by integrating social, environmental, and other concerns into their business operations.

A. Overview of Soft-Law Approaches

Corporate self-regulations and codes of conduct in relation to CSR are essentially voluntary and legally non-binding, which implies the lack of sanction for non-compliance.⁷⁶ Following the preceding discussion on the distinction between hard and soft law, CSR may best be categorized as a soft-law constraint. Undeniably, soft law plays an important role in regulating corporate behavior by offering many of the advantages of hard law and avoiding some of the costs of hard law.⁷⁷ For instance, hard law normally lags behind social development, including both rapidly

⁷⁴ Doreen McBarnet, *Law, Policy and Legal Avoidance: Can Law Effectively Implement Egalitarian Policies*, 15 J. L. & SOC'Y 113, 114-115 (1988).

⁷⁵ Oliver Falck & Stephan Hebllich, *Corporate Social Responsibility: Doing Well by Doing Good*, 50(3) BUS. HORIZONS 247, 247 (2007).

⁷⁶ Andreas G. Scherer & Guido Palazzo, *The New Political Role of Business in a Globalized World: A Review of a New Perspective on CSR and its Implications for the Firm, Governance, and Democracy*, 48 J. OF MGMT. STUD. 899, 907 (2011).

⁷⁷ See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, *Hard and Soft Law in International Governance*, 54 INT'L ORG. 421, 423 (2000).

developing technology and evolving social norms, but soft law could provide more timely action.⁷⁸ Hard law is fundamentally reactive and will only be adopted to “regulate behavior that has offended changing societal expectations to such an extent that political forces mobilize to enact new legally binding standards.”⁷⁹ In contrast, soft law — due to its very nature — could be comparatively timelier, more active, and perhaps also more flexible in dealing with new emerging issues.

Further, soft law in the form of civil regulations can bypass ongoing conflicts about state sovereignty, which have often restricted western governments from using trade policies to affect the domestic regulations of developing countries.⁸⁰ For example, the World Trade Organization (WTO) typically does not permit market access to be linked to domestic labor or environmental standards since they would be perceived as trade barriers; but soft law in the form of civil regulations would not, as they do not fall under the WTO’s jurisdiction.⁸¹

Apart from the ethical and moral forces,⁸² corporate reputational capital may potentially provide additional ground for soft law. Reputational capital can be interpreted as long-term strategic assets that are operationally and financially valuable to corporations.⁸³ Corporations would suffer reputational harm when breaking the rule of social contract between business and society.⁸⁴ Even though non-compliance of soft law would not be followed by adverse legal/formal

⁷⁸ David Vogel, *Private Global Business Regulation*, 11 ANN. REV. OF POL. SCI. 261, 264 (2008).

⁷⁹ JOHN M. KLINE, *ETHICS FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: DECISION MAKING IN A GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY* 13 (Routledge 2010).

⁸⁰ David Vogel, *Private Global Business Regulation*, 11 ANN. REV. OF POL. SCI. 261, 265 (2008).

⁸¹ Steven Bernstein & Erin Hannah, *Non-State Global Standard Setting and the WTO: Legitimacy and the Need for Regulatory Space*, 11 J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 575, 577 (2008).

⁸² William C. Frederick, *The Moral Authority of Transnational Corporate Codes*, 10 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 165, 173 (1991).

⁸³ Kevin T. Jackson, *Global Corporate Governance: Soft Law and Reputational Accountability*, 35 BROOKLYN J. OF INT’L L. 43, 67 (2010); *see also* GRAHAME DOWLING, *CREATING CORPORATE REPUTATIONS: IDENTITY, IMAGE, AND PERFORMANCE* (Oxford University Press 2001).

⁸⁴ THOMAS DONALDSON & THOMAS W. DUNFEE, *TIES THAT BIND: A SOCIAL CONTRACTS APPROACH TO BUSINESS ETHICS* 233-236 (Harvard Business School Press 1999); Thomas Donaldson, “*Ethical Blowback*”: *The Missing Piece*

consequences, the reputational sanctions may still to some degree, pressure corporations to comply. While hard law provides incentives/disincentives through the threat of liability, soft law might use reputational capital to incentivize the compliance. Corporations could be rewarded through reputational gain for complying with the soft law or penalized through reputation loss for non-compliance.⁸⁵

Soft law is not legally coercive, and there is no formal punitive mechanism for transgression. This determines that compliance with soft law largely depends on voluntarism, *i.e.*, through the voluntarily supplied participation, resources, and consensual actions, along with market forces. The instruments and mechanisms in soft law also implicate some form of normative commitment because it is equally the objective of soft law to prevent undesired behavior as well as secure desired behavior. But the defining distinction between soft and hard law is “coerciveness,” namely whether binding rules and formal sanctions are relied upon. As non-legally binding normative content, soft law cannot be enforced through the courts. The lack of such deterrent effects means soft law cannot be relied upon as a general basis for enforcement or sanction to ensure the accountability of corporations to society.⁸⁶

Of course, the role of soft law should not be rashly dismissed due to its voluntarism or inadequate punishment for transgression. The rule of reputational capital may make up the missing link between voluntarism and accountability.⁸⁷ Market participants such as consumers, employees,

in the Corporate Governance Puzzle — The Risks to a Company which Fails to Understand and Respect Its Social Contract, 7 CORP. GOVERNANCE 534, 536 (2007).

⁸⁵ Similarly, it is argued that soft law could provide “official credibility and impetus” for CSR development. JENNIFER A. ZERK, MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 70-71 (Cambridge University Press 2006).

⁸⁶ For example, it is argued voluntary rules that are not directly binding make it difficult for companies to comply with them. Birgitte Egelund Olsen and Karsten Engsig Sorensen, *Strengthening the Enforcement of CSR Guidelines: Finding a New Balance between Hard Law and Soft Law*, 41 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 9, 10 (2014).

⁸⁷ In particular, social, environmental and ethical issues are now seen as key sources of reputation risk. See Doreen McBarnet, *Corporate Social Responsibility Beyond Law, Thorough Law and For Law* (U. of Edinburgh, Sch. of L. Working Paper No. 2009/03), <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1369305P30>.

suppliers, as well as the far-reaching and decentralized modern media can all be perceived as enforcement agents for soft law. The cruel reality is, however, that quite a few corporations are non-consumer-oriented or with monopolistic powers, which implies the mechanism of reputation sanction/reward may not work well for them. Even for those corporations who are subject to the rule of reputation and other public pressure, conventional product attributes such as quality and value of money remain far more important determinants of purchasing behavior.⁸⁸ The risk of opportunism cannot be ignored either.⁸⁹ As noted, it would not be unlikely for corporations to use CSR cosmetically to catch potential customers' eyes rather than genuinely engaging in CSR activities.

There are potentially four different types of firms we should take into account. The first group are those that know the law and are willing to comply with it; the second group are those that do not know the law but would like to be law-abiding; the third group are those that know the law and do not wish to comply with it; and the fourth group are those that do not know the law and do not wish to be law-abiding.⁹⁰ Corporations in the first group are the least concern as they are exactly the conscious businesses that would comply on intrinsic grounds. The non-binding soft law will also be effective for corporations in the second group. In this case, the educational purpose served by soft law is in line with Frederick's argument regarding social learning of the core ideas expressed by such law.⁹¹ The limits of CSR rules in the form of soft law are, however, apparent when dealing with corporations in the third and fourth groups. Lack of coerciveness or adequate legal threats through formal sanctions will not effectively ensure their accountability or prevent

⁸⁸ John Parkinson, *Disclosure and Corporate Social and Environmental Performance: Competitiveness and Enterprise in a Broader Social Frame*, 3 J. OF CORP. L. STUDIES 3, 12 (2003).

⁸⁹ The question here is why there remains a large number of companies aren't engaging in CSR activities if it is economically rational to do so.

⁹⁰ See, e.g., ROBERT BALDWIN ET AL., UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE (Oxford University Press 2nd ed. 2012).

⁹¹ William C. Frederick, *The Moral Authority of Transnational Corporate Codes*, 10 J. BUS. ETHICS 165, 173 (1991).

them from externalizing costs to society. This is problematic as for some corporations, it may be perfectly acceptable to conduct unethical practices to maximize profits as long as the letter of the law is not breached.⁹²

As a result, we see that the presence of hard law is essential, especially when the risks of opportunism are high and compliance is difficult to monitor.⁹³ The compliance literature also shows sanctions are essential for corporations' willingness to comply.⁹⁴ The most radical form for adopting a hard-law approach is to legislate CSR law and make it mandatory in order to compel corporations to act towards a more socially desirable end, especially for the third and fourth groups above. The assumption is that mandatory CSR could more effectively secure desired behavior as enforceability is assured by legal sanctions and/or threats. In addition, other bodies of hard law could also be utilized to elevate the bottom lines for corporations, and mandatory CSR disclosure may further nudge corporations to be more socially responsible. The remaining part of this section critically explores these three different forms of hard-law approaches toward CSR.

B. Legislating CSR Laws

The hard-law approach, in contrast to soft-law, is to change the voluntary character of CSR. Rather than preventing corporations from doing certain behaviors by focusing on the negative duties, mandatory CSR laws are designed to promote more socially responsible behavior by setting positive legal obligations for corporations to meet. While quite a few countries have incorporated CSR duties into their national law, from the perspective of precision and sanction as discussed in

⁹² See, e.g., Albert Z. Carr, *Is Business Bluffing Ethical?* 46 HARV. BUS. REV. 143, 143-53 (1968).

⁹³ In other words, the likelihood of optimism by firms would dramatically increase in competitive markets without credible sanctions. Thomas McInerney, *Putting Regulation before Responsibility: Towards Binding Norms of Corporate Social Responsibility*, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 171, 186 (2007).

⁹⁴ IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, *RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE* 39 (Oxford University Press 1992).

the hard/soft law distinction, only the Mauritian and Indian approaches can be categorized as a “real” hard-law approach.

The common goal for both Mauritius and India is to spell out a certain percentage of profits to spend on CSR activities safeguarded by formal sanctions for non-compliance. In Mauritius, CSR clauses were inserted into the *Income Tax Act* in 2009,⁹⁵ under which, every corporation, subject to a few exceptions, shall in every year set up a CSR Fund equivalent to 2 percent of its book profit derived during the preceding year.⁹⁶ The fund should be used to implement CSR activities in accordance with its own CSR framework.⁹⁷ The *CSR Guidelines* further clarify certain types of activities such as contribution for religious activities, contribution to trade unions, political parties, and staff welfare costs, that cannot be classified as eligible CSR activities.⁹⁸ Among other sanctions, corporations that fail to comply are subject to compulsory deregistration.

Perhaps more famously, India’s *Companies Act, 2013* specifies the mandatory contribution of a percentage of corporate profits to CSR activities. According to § 135, corporations in India having a net worth of 5 billion rupees (circa \$78 million, £60 million) or more, or turnover of 10 billion rupees or more, or a net profit of 50 million rupees or more during any financial year shall constitute a CSR Committee of the Board and ensure the corporation spends, in every financial year, at least 2 percent of the average net profits of the corporation made during the three immediately preceding financial years in CSR activities. A range of recognized CSR activities, from eradicating extreme hunger and poverty to promoting gender equality and ensuring environmental sustainability, are provided in Schedule VII of the *Act*.⁹⁹ Non-compliance without

⁹⁵ See FINANCE (MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS) ACT 2009 § 21(d) (Mauritius).

⁹⁶ Book profit is now replaced by the chargeable income since 2012.

⁹⁷ INCOME TAX ACT 1995 § 50L (Mauritius).

⁹⁸ RENGINEE PILLAY, *THE CHANGING NATURE OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY* 248 (Routledge 2015).

⁹⁹ It includes, “(i) eradicating extreme hunger and poverty; (ii) promotion of education; (iii) promoting gender equality and empowering women; (iv) reducing child mortality and improving maternal health; (v) combating human

a justifiable explanation will lead to fines up to 2.5 million rupees against corporations and/or responsible corporate officers. In addition, corporate officers who are in default could face imprisonment for a term up to three years.

Both countries' CSR requirements are precise in specifying what amounts to eligible CSR activities in the eyes of the law. The coerciveness is easy to identify. Penalty, deregistration, and imprisonment, among other sanctions, will be imposed on corporations and/or responsible persons in case of non-compliance. The main advantage of this form of hard-law approach is to force all subjected corporations to adhere to the CSR requirements by overcoming the weakness of the non-binding soft law. In effect, after the mandatory CSR law, there are significant increases in CSR activities and CSR spending among the subjected firms.¹⁰⁰

Nevertheless, for those corporations that see legal constraints as barriers to circumvent, it is possible for them to act in accordance with law by spending the minimum percentage of profits on prescribed CSR programs, but pay little regard to the underlying purpose (and continue carrying out socially irresponsible behavior). For instance, they may use profits obtained in a socially irresponsible manner to engage in CSR. It is equally controversial regarding whether CSR spending is the best proxy for responsible behavior. As noted by Gopalan and Kamalnath, many meaningful activities such as reducing the price of cancer medication, use of sustainable

immunodeficiency virus, acquired immune deficiency syndrome, malaria and other diseases; (vi) ensuring environmental sustainability; (vii) employment enhancing vocational skills; (viii) social business projects; (ix) contribution to the Prime Minister's National Relief Fund or any other fund set up by the Central Government or the State Governments for socio-economic development and relief and funds for the welfare of the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes, other backward classes, minorities and women; and (x) such other matters as may be prescribed." Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 (India).

¹⁰⁰ Dhammika Dharmapala & Vikramaditya S. Khanna, *The Impact of Mandated Corporate Social Responsibility: Evidence from India's Companies Act of 2013* 4 (Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series L. & Econ., Working Paper No.783, 2016).

technologies, and others are not counted as CSR under the India *Companies Act* due to the restrictive nature of the CSR provision.¹⁰¹

It is worth noting that while mandatory CSR laws as a hard-law approach are different from traditional hard law as the former focuses more on positive duties in order to directly promote good behavior, once the CSR spending, for example, becomes a mandatory legal requirement, technically speaking it will form a new bottom line for corporations. Put differently, when spending 2 percent of net profits becomes the new bottom line for all of those subjected corporations under India *Companies Act* to meet,¹⁰² any individual corporation can do more but cannot spend less than this obligatory minimum. It is unclear about the effectiveness of such a new bottom line for eliciting more positive behavior or promoting higher standards, such as spending more on CSR or engaging in more costly CSR without proportional (reputational or/and economic) benefits. Moreover, as soon as this mandatory CSR spending is mandated by law, it will be more appropriate to categorize it into legal responsibility rather than social responsibility from a narrow interpretation. Such obligatory duty, in other words, may no longer be treated as CSR initiatives, though this has no material effect on the intended outcome as such.¹⁰³

Countries, such as China and Indonesia that introduce CSR duty into their national law can at best be perceived as a middle course between soft-law and hard-law approaches, because of the lack of precision (namely, clear guidance) or punitive mechanism for non-compliance. Take China,

¹⁰¹ Sandeep Gopalan & Akshaya Kamalnath, *Mandatory Corporate Social Responsibility as a Vehicle for Reducing Inequality: An Indian Solution for Piketty and the Millennials*, 10 *Nw. J. L. & SOC. POL'Y* 34, 85-86 (2015).

¹⁰² Unless they have a legitimate reason. In practice, however, it is highly unlikely for corporations to repeat their reason in the following years, so it is important to have to make the required contribution to CSR activities.

¹⁰³ However, it is important to note the subtle change of the definition of CSR. For example, consider the European Commission. It changes the definition of CSR from “social and environmental activities that companies adopt on a voluntary basis” to “the responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on society,” which, as noted by Knudsen and Moon, provides room for mandatory regulation to be included in the CSR. JETTE STEEN KNUDSEN & JEREMY MOON, *VISIBLE HANDS: GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN GLOBAL BUSINESS* (Cambridge University Press 2017).

for example. Although it incorporated CSR into company law as early as 2005, its CSR clause — *i.e.*, art. 5 lacks detailed contents or explicit guidelines for corporate conduct, as well as sanctions for transgression.¹⁰⁴ The sanction element of the CSR provisions in Indonesia *Company Law 2007* and *Capital Investment Law 2007* is clearer, encompassing from limiting business activities (and/or investment facilities) to freezing or even closing the business activities (and/or investment facilities); but it remains vague as to which activities amount to fulfill the required CSR duties as the Indonesian Law itself does not define CSR activities, the means of implementation, or alike.¹⁰⁵ However, introducing CSR into corporate law legislations can be more than exhortatory or educational, which is important in itself. On the one hand, it could provide corporate boards legitimacy in considering non-shareholder interests,¹⁰⁶ and on the other hand, room for potential judiciary intervention in the future.

It should also be kept in mind that there are strong objections against mandatory CSR laws, particularly in the West. Besides the deregulation movement, to ward off more direct government intervention or regulations is often cited as one of the main explanations for corporations to voluntarily engage in CSR. While the existence of mandatory CSR laws is unquestionable, it is not the main purpose of this paper to propagandize them. However, the potential of hard law as complementary to soft law in regulating CSR domains should be rightfully acknowledged. As the case in Mauritius and India, or the middle course in China and Indonesia show, there is definitely room for mandatory laws to prompt CSR.

C. Laws on Non-Financial Bottom Lines

¹⁰⁴ Article 5 of *Chinese Company Law* merely stipulates: “in its operational activities, a company shall [among other things] assume social responsibility.”

¹⁰⁵ These issues are intentionally left to local governments as each provisional government has authority to manage its own province

¹⁰⁶ See Jingchen Zhao, *Promoting More Socially Responsible Corporations through a Corporate Law Regulatory Framework*, 37 *LEGAL STUD.* 103, 123 (2017).

Other than legislating CSR to directly mandate positive legal obligations, the second form of hard-law approach is through using other bodies of law to set or elevate the social and environmental bottom lines for corporations to deter corporate irresponsibility. This form is not unfamiliar at all. The above-mentioned consumer protection laws, employment laws, anti-discrimination laws, environmental protection laws, among others can all be categorized into this form. Simply speaking, these laws tell corporations not to do harm to society by defining the minimum standards for certain behavior.¹⁰⁷ In particular, when soft law cannot effectively control the irresponsible conduct of business, the role of hard law to use its coerciveness through legal sanctions becomes more salient.

For example, overseas corruption and using forced labor are two of the most visible forms of unacceptable corporate behavior nowadays. First, corporations engaging in corruptive activities can gain competitive advantage and secure certain favorable action by a foreign government, but unfortunately, there are few effective anti-corruption legal instruments in many emerging economies. Considering the negative impact of corruption on economic development and society,¹⁰⁸ even if corporations engaging in such activities for maximizing the earnings per share do not directly violate any local law in a given jurisdiction, they are far from socially responsible. Secondly, using forced labor is also socially irresponsible and has long been discouraged by social norms. Although it is well acknowledged that many corporations are already taking actions to promote ethical business practices and policies that protect workers from being abused and

¹⁰⁷ It is argued that CSR is mainly about how companies make profits rather than about how they give them away. Doreen McBarnet, *Corporate Social Responsibility Beyond Law, Through Law and for Law* (U. Edinburgh Sch. L. Working Paper Series, No. 2009/03, 2009), <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1369305>. Therefore, it would be important to ensure companies could make their profits in a responsible manner by referencing the minimum standards.

¹⁰⁸ Indira Carr & Opi Outhwaite, *Controlling Corruption Through Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Governance: Theory and Practice*, 11 J. CORP. L. STUD. 299, 300 (2011).

exploited in their organizations, forced or compulsory labors are still in use, particularly in global supply chains.

Hard law can be used as a tool to deter and control these socially irresponsible behaviors. This subsection chooses the *Bribery Act 2010* and the *Modern Slavery Act 2015* in the U.K. as two recent examples to illustrate the role of hard law in shaping CSR by combating overseas corruption and forced labor. To start with, due to the damages of corruption and the incompetence of self-regulation in this area, the *Bribery Act 2010* was passed to help deal with international bribery and prevent transgressions. The *Act* applies not only to large multinational corporations but also to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) exporting goods overseas. It defines what amounts to corruptive activities and makes it clear that such activities are strictly prohibited. Prosecution and other criminal consequences will be imposed if corporations or responsible persons fail to comply.¹⁰⁹

In addition to the person who is directly involved in the corruptive activities, the corporation will also be subject to prosecution if an associated person bribes another person intending to obtain or retain business or an advantage in the conduct of business for that corporation.¹¹⁰ As a result, corporations will not only be deterred from proactively proceeding corruptive activities but also pressured to put in place adequate bribery prevention procedures to prevent associated persons from undertaking such conduct. In order to mitigate bribery risks, it is now common for corporations to proactively adopt “adequate procedures” as a full defense to a charge under § 7 of the *Bribery Act*.¹¹¹ This could ultimately promote a higher standard for the conduct of business by explicitly prohibiting this socially irresponsible behavior.

¹⁰⁹ In other words, great legal deterrence is used to decrease the number of non-compliance.

¹¹⁰ Bribery Act 2010, § 7 (UK).

¹¹¹ For example, a 2015 survey commissioned by the UK Ministry of Justice and then Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, shows even for SMEs, a large number (42% of 500 SME surveyed) stated that they had already

Thanks to globalization, outsourcing workforce to countries with cheap labor costs has become increasingly popular and easier. It may not necessarily be the corporations themselves using forced labor, but other businesses in their supply chains doing so. Instead of purely relying on the corporations' own initiative, the *Modern Slavery Act* was introduced in 2015 to make sure that those they do business with are not exploiting vulnerable people. In particular – § 54 of the *Act*, the transparency in supply chains clause, mandatorily requires businesses with a global turnover of £36 million or more and supplies goods/services in the U.K. to produce and publish an annual slavery and trafficking statement. These corporations have to disclose each year the actions they have taken to ensure that both their business and supply chains are slavery-free. Failure to comply with the requirement to publish slavery disclosures among others will lead to potentially an unlimited fine.¹¹² Again, the coerciveness of hard law ensures adequate compliance, helping to mitigate the employment of forced labor across the supply chains.

There are many more regulatory initiatives to ensure corporations operate responsibly. One more recent example is the *EU Regulation 2017/821*, which specifies supply chain due diligence obligations for importers of *tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold* originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas, where minerals are mined in conditions of armed conflict. These so-called conflict minerals are sold or traded to finance armed groups and security forces, fuel forced labor, and other human rights abuses. More than merely encouraging corporations' trading minerals from conflict zones such as Democratic Republic of Congo and adjoining

put bribery prevention procedures in place. See Rob Warren, Alice Large & Mark Tweddle, *Insight into Awareness and Impact of the Bribery Act 2010: Among Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs)*, 24 (2015) available at <<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/impact-of-the-bribery-act-2010-on-smes>> (accessed 1 October 2019). The impact on the larger firms is of course more salient.

¹¹² For example, the Modern Slavery Act has been used to prosecute 285 defendants and convict 38 offenders between 2015 and 2017. INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE MODERN SLAVERY ACT 2015: FINAL REPORT 61 (2019) available at <<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/independent-review-of-the-modern-slavery-act-final-report>> (accessed 1 October 2019).

countries to be socially, economically and environmentally responsible, the *Regulation* is enacted to force the E.U. smelters and refiners of these minerals and metal to act responsibly by adhering to its rules and procedures. In order to comply with supply chain due diligence obligations and disclosure obligations, smelting and refining firms sourcing from the conflict-affected and high-risk areas are mandatorily required to check that what they buy is sourced responsibly and does not contribute to conflict or other related illegal activities. These corporations have to put in place systems and processes to make sure they are able to identify, manage, and report on risks in their supply chain based on *OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas*.¹¹³ Again, the minimum standard is elevated by hard law here to prevent potentially irresponsible behavior.

While it is too soon to know specifically how effective these hard-law approaches are to discourage corporate irresponsibility or stimulate actions towards a more socially desirable end, they have at least proved once again that it is not rare to adopt regulatory tools to promote CSR. Setting or elevating the minimum mandatory obligations of corporations to society and providing incentives/disincentives through the threat of liability can fill the governance void. As a result, regardless whether they act proactively or reactively, corporations have to change their original conduct of business to be less irresponsible. Though the mandatory minimum standards may account for only a small part of the total set of mechanisms to ensure socially responsible behavior, they are undoubtedly the core of the overall framework of control.

D. Mandatory CSR Disclosure

The third form of the hard law approach is the mandatory disclosure of CSR-related matters. Unlike the legal mandated financial reporting, the non-financial reporting, which usually covers

¹¹³ This *Regulation* will come into full force on January 1, 2021, and detailed sanctions for non-compliance are left to individual member states to lay down.

environmental, social, and governance information, has long been voluntary. In fact, as mentioned above, the market force on CSR will be less effective without this information on a transparent and unbiased basis. One way to ensure adequate CSR disclosure and overcome the low take-up of the voluntary reporting initiatives is to require corporations to disclose CSR-related information mandatorily.

In effect, an increasing number of countries have already mandated the disclosure of CSR-related information following the increased social pressure and demands for more transparency and accountability. France is the first country to mandate a triple bottom line (*i.e.*, financial, environmental, and social) reporting for its largest corporations by art. 116 of *Nouvelles Régulations Economiques 2001*, a broad-ranging update of French corporate law.¹¹⁴ The legal obligation for reporting social and environmental activities can be seen as a means of encouraging firms to promote CSR. Sufficiently detailed, precise, and comprehensive information regarding human resources, community involvement, and the environment are required to be disclosed in order to adhere to the mandatory requirement. For example, recruiting processes; use of subcontracting/outsourcing; rationales for recruitment; layoffs/redundancies; length of workday/work hours and their rationales; amount of overtime; efforts to mitigate effects of corporate restructuring; history of pay rates; health and safety conditions; social benefits; integration into the local community; contacts with NGOs, consumer groups, educational institutions, and impacted populations; consumption of water, energy, raw materials/natural resources; use of land; use of renewable energy; initiatives for energy efficiency; emissions of

¹¹⁴ Mary L. Egan, Fabrice Mauleon, Dominique Wolff & Marc Bendick Jr, *France's Mandatory "Triple Bottom Line" Reporting: Promoting Sustainable Development Through Informational Regulation*, 5 INT'L J. ENVTL., CULTURAL, ECON. AND SOC. SUSTAINABILITY 27, 34 (2009).

wastes into air, water, and land; emissions of odor and noise; and environmental management. In other words, it is difficult for corporations to do selective reporting under such a disclosure scheme.

This is followed by Denmark, where large businesses are required to report on CSR in their annual report by the *Act amending the Danish Financial Statement Act (Accounting for CSR in large businesses)* in 2008. The law forces large corporations in Denmark meeting any two of the three criteria namely: (i) total assets/liabilities of EUR of 19.2 million, (ii) net revenue of EUR of 38.3 million, (iii) an average of 250 full-time employees, to account for their work on CSR including their CSR policies, and how the corporation translates its CSR policies into action. A further requirement is introduced in the law making it mandatory to report policies for respecting human rights and for reducing climate impact since 2013. Similarly, in the U.K., as discussed in the preceding section, directors of the board are now under a duty to produce a “strategic report.” The mandatory disclosure is required to include information relating to the environment and employees. Further information regarding social, community, and human rights issues, as well as any policies of the corporation in relation to these matters and the effectiveness of those policies, are required to be disclosed for the listed corporations. Moreover, in 2014, *Directive 2014/95/EU* laid down the rules on disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by large public-interest companies with more than 500 employees across the E.U.¹¹⁵ These large companies are mandatorily required to include information in relation to environmental protection; social responsibility and treatment of employees; respect for human rights; anti-corruption and bribery; and diversity on corporate boards in their annual reports since 2018.¹¹⁶ And many more countries

¹¹⁵ It covers approximately 6,000 large companies and groups affected across the E.U., mainly including listed companies, banks, insurance companies, and other companies designated by national authorities as public-interest entities.

¹¹⁶ EU Directive 2014/95/EU on Disclosure of Non-Financial and Diversity Information by Certain Large Undertakings and Groups, available at <<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014L0095>> (accessed 1 October 2019).

have mandated CSR disclosure through their stock exchange's listing rules, such as China (Hong Kong Stock Exchange), Singapore (Singapore Exchange), South Africa (Johannesburg Stock Exchange), and Malaysia (Bursa Malaysia).¹¹⁷

Contrary to mandatory CSR laws which prescribe a change in the underlying behavior and force corporations to engage in CSR activities directly, mandatory CSR disclosure is mainly about disclosing corporations' CSR policies and activities, if any. The problem is that corporations may choose not to work on CSR and thereby disclose that they have not engaged in any CSR-related activity, which is lawfully allowed *e.g.*, in Denmark. The mandatory CSR disclosure is not to mandate corporations to adopt CSR policies or to engage in CSR activities. Such a duty is discharged as long as corporations honestly disclose any CSR-related information, even if this means no CSR activities at all.

However, a clearly defined mandatory CSR reporting framework would at least prevent corporations from providing selective information that concentrates on positive aspects. Apart from stimulating and strengthening the public pressure on corporations to improve their social and environmental performance, the so-called greenwashing or window-dressing risk can also be mitigated. This is because customers and other members of society can more readily assess and compare corporate social performance based on the increased transparency and comprehensiveness of the information disclosed. The mandatory disclosure could also help establish an atmosphere allowing businesses to pay more attention to their impact on the environment, society, and others. After establishing such a reporting framework, directors and

¹¹⁷ See *e.g.*, Felicia H. M. Liu, David Demeritt & Samuel Tang, *Accounting for Sustainability in Asia: Stock Market Regulation and Reporting in Hong Kong and Singapore*, 95 *ECON. GEOGRAPHY* 362, 365-366 (2019).

managers that have better information about the impacts of their corporate activities might then, of their own accord, adopt higher standards.¹¹⁸

From a regulatory perspective, it will certainly be more effective to combine mandatory disclosure with other forms of the hard-law approach, *e.g.*, mandatory CSR duties, as the disclosures should make it easier to assess whether such duties are fulfilled. The transparency, coupled with the comprehensiveness provided by the mandatory disclosures, could help the monitoring and hence the enforcement of the CSR-related duties. In fact, other forms of the hard-law approach discussed above often rely upon disclosure to ensure compliance such as the mandatory CSR law in India and anti-slavery duty in the U.K. Therefore, mandatory CSR disclosure can be either used independently or together with other hard-law approaches.

V. RE-THINKING THE RATIONALE FOR CONTEMPORARY CSR

When SVM is perceived as a hard-law constraint, it is hardly surprising to see that all corporate activities are pressed to be in line with it. Premised on the principle of shareholder primacy, contemporary CSR is not aimed at unsettling the mainstream view that the company is private and a shareholder-oriented institution.¹¹⁹ Thus, contemporary CSR is ameliorative in nature, and its main objective is to “temper the effects of the increasingly ruthless corporate pursuit of ‘shareholder value,’” without challenging or unsettling the shareholder primacy principle.¹²⁰ Although corporate directors can engage in CSR beyond contractual or legal requirements, such as installing an unmandated pollution control device to deal with some of negative corporate externalities, they have to justify how this extra spending can be aligned with maximizing residual

¹¹⁸ See John Parkinson, *Disclosure and Corporate Social and Environmental Performance: Competitiveness and Enterprise in a Broader Social Frame*, 3 J. CORP. L. STUD. 3, 4 (2003).

¹¹⁹ Paddy Ireland & Renginee G. Pillay, *Corporate Social Responsibility in a Neoliberal Age*, in CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATORY GOVERNANCE 94 (Peter Utting & Jose Carlos Marques eds., 2010).

¹²⁰ *Id.* at 78.

profits of the corporation under SVM. In other words, they must align their social interests with shareholder interests. This is also why managers have an overall tendency to interpret CSR in a manner consistent with SVM.¹²¹

A. Business Case for CSR

The business case reasoning is perhaps a perfect reflection of such alignment. By providing corporations with an economic rationale,¹²² the business case reasoning aims to justify CSR from its instrumental function to increase corporate residual profits and shareholder value. Put differently, in order to comply with shareholder primacy or SVM as a hard-law constraint, CSR has been endorsed and promoted on the basis of its positive correlation with enhancing long-term shareholder economic gain.

The focus on CSR's organizational-level effect on profits rather than its macro-social effects causes the normative orientation of the research to be overlooked. Emphases are disproportionately placed on the correlation between CSR and corporate financial performance.¹²³ Despite a significant body of empirical studies attempting to find a conclusive answer, results on the relationship between CSR and corporate financial performance are far from consistent. Existing research shows a very mixed picture; some claim the relation between the two are positive,¹²⁴

¹²¹ See, e.g., Brendan O'Dwyer, *Managerial Perceptions of Corporate Social Disclosure: An Irish Story*, 15 ACCT., AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 406, 419 (2002); Christopher Marquis & Cuili Qian, *Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting in China: Symbol or Substance?* 25 ORG. SCI. 127, 131 (2014). Or considering the economic responsibility to pursue profitability is more important than responsibility relating to environment, social, and other issues. See, e.g., Lei Wang & Heikki Juslin, *The Impact of Chinese Culture on Corporate Social Responsibility: The Harmony Approach*, 88 J. BUS. ETHICS 433, 434 (2009).

¹²² Shelley L. Brickson, *Organizational Identity Orientation: The Genesis of the Role of the Firm and Distinct Forms of Social Value*, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 864, 864 (2007).

¹²³ David J. Vogel, *Is There a Market for Virtue? The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibility*, 47 CALIF. MGMT. REV. 19, 19-45 (2005); Michael L. Barnett, *Stakeholder Influence Capacity and the Variability of Financial Returns to Corporate Social Responsibility*, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 794, 794-816 (2007); Min-Dong P. Lee, *Review of the Theories of Corporate Social Responsibility: Its Evolutionary Path and the Road Ahead*, 10 INT'L J. MGMT. REV. 53, 53-73 (2008).

¹²⁴ Sandra A. Waddock & Samuel B. Graves, *The Corporate Social Performance-Financial Performance Link*, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 303, 314 (1997); Marc Orlitzky, Frank L. Schmidt & Sara L. Rynes, *Corporate Social and Financial Performance: A Meta-analysis*, 24 ORG. STUD. 403, 403 (2003).

while others claim it to be negative.¹²⁵ Apart from this weakness, the underlying question is whether firms should engage in CSR if it is to their financial detriment. Many fear that the pressure to improve social performance would be outweighed if engaging in CSR clashes with SVM.¹²⁶ Even many expenditures may redound to the long-term benefit one way or another; the dilemma is inevitable, particularly in the context of hostile takeover and change of corporate control.¹²⁷

The essence of business case reasoning remains enlightened self-interest and emphasizes what businesses get out of CSR or how they can tangibly benefit from engaging in CSR.¹²⁸ This reflects a fundamental distinction between SVM and CSR, namely whether the ultimate goal is for shareholders only or whether CSR is also in shareholders' interests. If engaging in CSR arises from a profit motive, then undercutting CSR for ultimately higher corporate financial performance and shareholder gain becomes justifiable. In other words, when seeing CSR activities and initiatives as an investment, a positive relationship must be established in order to justify the so-called business case.

¹²⁵ See, e.g., Joshua D. Margolis & James P. Walsh, *Misery Loves Companies: Social Initiatives by Business*, 48 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 268, 274 (2003); Peter Wright & Stephen P. Ferris, *Agency Conflict and Corporate Strategy: The Effect of Divestment on Corporate Value*, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 77, 77. (1997). Moreover, the inconsistent evidence may even imply that no correlation exists between CSR and corporate financial performance at all. See, e.g., Abigail McWilliams & Donald Siegel, *Corporate Social Responsibility: A Theory of the Firm Perspective*, 26 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 117, 117-18 (2001); Abigail McWilliams & Donald Siegel, *Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial Performance: Correlation or Misspecification?*, 21 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 603, 603 (2000). The mixed picture is not difficult to understand when we come back to the real business world. If engaging in CSR could guarantee better corporate performance, why do many corporations remain unwilling to do it?

¹²⁶ Carroll and Shabana distinguish a broad interpretation from a narrow interpretation regarding the business case for CSR, and they hope to utilize such a broad view to increase the acceptance of the business case for CSR even when only an indirect or unclear link between CSR and corporate financial performance exist. The question, however, remains even adopting their broad view. Archie B. Carroll & Kareem M. Shabana, *The Business Case for Corporate Social Responsibility: A Review of Concepts, Research and Practice*, 12 INT'L J. MGMT. REV. 85, 93 (2010).

¹²⁷ William T. Allen, *Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation*, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 264 (1992).

¹²⁸ There are numerous studies searching the benefits of engaging in CSR, and these benefits can be summarized into: (1) creating positive moral capital by increasing employees' moral, productivity, and retention; (2) creating public goodwill which may provide a form of protection or insurance to shareholder wealth; (3) developing inimitable resources from the resource-based view; (4) lowering transaction cost by increasing companies' trustworthiness. Paul K. Shum & Sharon L. Yam, *Ethics and Law: Guiding the Invisible Hand to Correct Corporate Social Responsibility Externalities*, 98 J. BUS. ETHICS 549, 549-50 (2011).

B. The Danger

The real danger of aligning CSR with SVM is to render CSR a mere instrument to further shareholder value, which tends to overlook its intrinsic, normative value. Relying upon a business case to justify the do-good behavior may, in other words, lead to confusion between means and end, particularly when the business case weakens or disappears.¹²⁹ Moreover, contemporary CSR, which is ameliorative in nature, always tends to downplay the irreconcilability of the interests between shareholders and other groups. However, sometimes the clash of interests is inevitable, and if the business case is the guiding star under such a context, then the choice may be pursuing the immediate and perhaps lucrative business opportunities and comprising the CSR standards.¹³⁰

Indeed, activities only with profit-maximizing motivation should not be defined as CSR.¹³¹ As pointed out by Walters, social responsibility refers to corporate goals, not corporate strategies — to ends, not means.¹³² The business case does, however, overemphasize the instrumentality and treat CSR as a means, not an end. The impact of social performance on financial performance will then be the limit of their interest in social performance.¹³³

Overcoming the stereotype that SVM is a hard-law constraint, however, allows us to reconsider the necessity of the so-called business reasoning. Advantages brought by increased efficiency can be diminished by the negative externalities and unchecked social costs caused by

¹²⁹ In other words, social and environmental performance are not seen as an end but as a means to increase corporate profits, for instance, through increased competitive advantage.

¹³⁰ The question is: if improving corporate social performance caused financial detriment, is there any incentive for companies to engage in CSR under the conventional wisdom?

¹³¹ Kenneth J. Arrow, *Social Responsibility and Economic Efficiency*, 21 PUB. POL'Y 26, 27 (1973); Jerry L. Mashaw, *Corporate Social Responsibility: Comments on the Legal and Economic Context of a Continuing Debate*, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 114, 115 (1984).

¹³² Kenneth D. Walters, *Corporate Social Responsibility and Political Ideology*, 19 CALIF. MGMT. REV. 40, 41 (1977).

¹³³ Another related issue is about publicizing CSR activities for achieving the intended outcome such as increasing reputation and goodwill. However, it would not be impossible for a corporation to emphasize an action or product in advertising instead of disclosing the total effect that corporation has on the environment. For example, a corporation that fails to deal with its pollution performance may choose to only provide information on the positive aspects of its social and environmental performance such as involvement with environmental charities without mentioning the pollution at all.

pursuing SVM. The narrowly defined efficiency makes all benefits to society or stakeholders other than shareholders as costs. But our world cannot be just about pecuniary outcome or efficiency. Privatizing interest at the expense of the larger good is not consistent with fundamental human values, which should be furthered and enhanced by corporations in addition to wealth generation. CSR must reflect responsibility for the wider societal good¹³⁴ and further humanitarian and other altruistic objectives, highlighted in the *Burwell v. Hobby Lobby* case in 2014, which is fundamentally different from profit-maximizing behavior. Hence, CSR should be an end rather than a means.

Moreover, if corporate directors no longer see SVM as a hard-law constraint, they will be free from the pressure to maximize shareholder value. It will be more likely that these directors find a better way to serve the best interest of the company and society as a whole, especially considering SVM is not the best means to maximize social welfare, due to the collapse of the residual claimant argument as explicated above in Section II. While public pressure and market forces could be good reasons for engaging in CSR, the significant impact of corporations on society and the environment are more fundamental to the call for corporate responsibility. When pressed to choose between financial goals and societal goals, a more integrated and balanced approach must be adopted. It should become possible to expend corporate resources for socially beneficial purposes without any profit motive.

Apart from the normative case for CSR, the robust regulatory regimes provide further grounds for deterring undesired behavior while securing desired behavior. For example, when CSR is required by hard law, engaging in CSR will become the starting point. The hard versus soft law

¹³⁴ Dirk Matten & Jeremy Moon, *Implicit and Explicit CSR: A Conceptual Framework for a Comparative Understanding of Corporate Social Responsibility*, 33 *ACAD. MGMT. REV.* 404, 405 (2008).

lens used in this paper could also allow researchers to move away from aligning CSR with SVM and provide a new battleground for future CSR debate and research.

VI. LIMITATION OF HARD-LAW APPROACH AND IMPLICATION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

As is well-established, one size does not fit for all. While there are many successful cases to introduce mandatory CSR, there are also unsuccessful ones such as Nigeria's *Corporate Social Responsibility Bill* introduced in 2007, which sought to establish a CSR commission "to collect a compulsory 3.5 percent CSR spend from corporations" on cultural and educational activities. Similar to the Indonesian case, where business communities fiercely opposed the introduction of a mandatory CSR provision by citing its negative effect on corporate costs, this Nigerian *Bill* also faced formidable opposition.¹³⁵ Not as lucky as Article 74 of the *Indonesia Company law*, which was finally passed in 2007 after narrowing down the scope from all companies to just companies that have an impact on natural resources, the proposed Nigerian *Bill* was never passed in the Nigerian National Assembly.

The mandatory CSR that compels corporations to spend a percentage of corporate profits for CSR initiatives and programs is perceived as another form of corporate tax. Opponents of mandatory CSR laws find the mandatory CSR spending is meant to lessen the government's responsibility to the social welfare or shift the government's job to corporations. Worse, forcing corporations to tackle tasks beyond its specialization will cause damage to itself as well as

¹³⁵ Nojeem Amodu, *Regulation and Enforcement of Corporate Social Responsibility in Corporate Nigeria*, 61 J. AFRICAN L. 105, 113 (2017).

society.¹³⁶ It is believed that corporations are better placed to decide where to spend the CSR funds and use them in a more effective way than the government is.¹³⁷

Although we have demonstrated both the possibility and necessity to adopt hard-law approaches on regulating and promoting CSR beyond strengthening external market pressure on corporations to improve their social performance, this paper is by no means proposing to replace the soft-law approach with the hard-law approach altogether.¹³⁸ The benefits of the soft-law approach and disadvantages of the hard-law approach, as discussed above, shall be rightfully acknowledged. In addition to the increased enforceability brought by the hard law, the compliance costs (*e.g.*, minimum spending on CSR, reporting costs, etc.) and limitations (*e.g.*, under-inclusive and over-inclusive regulations) are not ignorable. Thus, the hard law should supplement, not supplant, soft law.¹³⁹ With the credible sanctions provided by hard law or the coercive power in general, voluntary compliance for soft law may also be commensurately strengthened.

Interestingly, the case examples analyzed in Section IV show that developing countries are more likely to adopt more radical form of the hard-law approach, namely legislating CSR laws, while Western countries prefer using other bodies of law as side-constraints or mandatory disclosure to push corporations to act towards more socially desirable ends. This may partly be related to the fact that Western countries with more developed market mechanisms are

¹³⁶ PETER F. DRUCKER, *POST-CAPITALIST SOCIETY* (Butterworth-Heinemann 1st ed. 1993).

¹³⁷ A further subtle distinction between the Nigerian approach and Mauritian and Indian approach is how to spend corporate revenue on CSR activities. While the Nigerian Bill proposes to establish a public CSR commission to regulate corporations' CSR activities, the Mauritian and Indian approach allows more room for corporations to decide their own CSR activities rather than solely relying on the external regulator. External regulators normally have insufficient knowledge of internal working of individual corporations, let alone to use the CSR activities to build competitive advantage. Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, *The Link Between Competitive Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility*, 84 HARV. BUS. REV. 78, 78 (2006); JANET DINE, *THE GOVERNANCE OF CORPORATE GROUPS* (Cambridge University Press 2000).

¹³⁸ Like only relying upon the soft law approach is problematic, solely relying upon the hard law approach would be equally problematic.

¹³⁹ Similarly, while the soft law approach is valuable to promote more responsible corporate behavior, it can hardly work alone without any support from the hard law approach.

comparatively easier to enforce soft-law constraints than developing countries without such mature market mechanisms.¹⁴⁰ In other words, when the market force cannot discipline corporate behaviour effectively, governmental and regulatory forces may then play a larger role and become the dominant drive for CSR development. Hence, future empirical research may study: (i) which form of the hard-law approach is more effective in relation to promoting socially responsible behavior; (ii) which form of the hard-law approach fits for a particular type of country's or institution's frameworks, and (iii) how to best balance the hard-law and soft-law approaches in achieving the optimal effectiveness and efficiency.

However, any empirical work on examining the effectiveness of either the hard-law or mixed approaches may find difficulties in choosing a means of measurement. It seems we still tend to keep using corporate financial performance as the only proxy for effectiveness. For example, Schwartz and Carroll still suggest using long-term financial performance to verify their new *Value-Balance-Accountability* model empirically.¹⁴¹ But one of the central arguments of this paper is about the irreconcilable aspect of the relation between CSR and SVM. As a consequence, if we continue to use corporate performance or share prices as the proxy to evaluate the effectiveness of the hard-law approach, then we may again fall into the old deadlock.¹⁴² Corporations, and their directors must deal with contradictory yet interrelated demands, and should no longer avoid tension by a lopsided focus on profitability. A more inclusive evaluation system (e.g., encompassing employment rate, success on product markets, corporate growth, etc.) rather than a

¹⁴⁰ See, e.g., Min Yan, *The Role of Government and Regulation in Corporate Social Responsibility — The Case of China*, Queen Mary Sch. of L. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 321/2019, 28-29 (2019) available at <<http://ssrn.com/abstract=3462622>> (accessed 1 October 2019).

¹⁴¹ Mark S. Schwartz & Archie B. Carroll, *Integrating and Unifying Competing and Complimentary Frameworks: The Search for a Common Core in the Business and Society Field*, 47 BUS. & SOC'Y 148, 173 (2008).

¹⁴² For example, by using the conventional corporate accounting practice at present, only the value provided to shareholders accounts for corporate value, whilst value to other stakeholders is regarded as expenditure or cost to the firm. Nevertheless, as repeatedly emphasized in Section II and Section III above, shareholder interests are far from the only positive value to the corporation, let alone to society as a whole.

simplified economic model needs to be designed for any credible, empirical surveys of this type in the future.

VII. CONCLUSION

Just as corporations' social and public functions had faded since the late 19th century,¹⁴³ the function of today's corporations is changing again. At the very least, directors of the board should be advised that there is no hard law forcing them to focus solely on shareholder interests, but instead, even in the United States and the United Kingdom with a strong shareholder primacy culture, they are not only allowed but also required to run their corporations for both shareholders and stakeholders.

More importantly, CSR must not be merely ameliorative but should stand to challenge shareholder primacy. As we currently see in India and Mauritius, perhaps in the future engaging in CSR initiatives or spending on CSR activities will be the new bottom lines for corporations. Apart from mandatory CSR laws, other bodies of law can also be employed to elevate the bottom lines for corporate behavior continuously. Mandatory CSR disclosure as another viable way could be used either independently or together with the other approaches to help nudge corporations into behaving more socially responsible. There are, of course, legitimate reasons to keep encouraging corporations to take their own initiatives to act more responsibly through their discretionary business practices. It is, however, time for us to squarely face the regulatory power in the hard law and flexibility in the soft law to explore the best approach to promote CSR and constrain social irresponsibility.

¹⁴³ Akant K. Sundaram & Andrew C. Inkpen, *The Corporate Objective Revisited*, 15 *ORG. SCI.* 350, 351 (2004).