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Citation: Lawson, G. & Mulich, J. (2023). Global History and International Relations. In: Bukovansky, M., Keene, E., Reus-Smit, C. & Spanu, M. (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of History and International Relations. (79-C6P155). Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780191986468 doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198873457.013.6

This is the accepted version of the paper.

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Permanent repository link: https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/32269/

Link to published version: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198873457.013.6

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Global History and International Relations

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For The Oxford Handbook of History and International Relations

From Fish and Chips to Global History

What could be more British than fish and chips? It is the cornerstone of 'British cuisine',[1] a gift from Britain to the rest of the world. Yet, on closer inspection, things are less clear-cut. Potatoes are not indigenous to the British Isles. In fact, they're not even indigenous to Europe. Potatoes were part of the wave of imports that arrived in Europe as a result of the colonisation of the Americas during the 15th and 16th centuries. The French and Belgians responded by cutting potatoes into slices and frying them. At some point, this technique found its way to Britain. The fish part of the ensemble was also an import. Battering fish was a Jewish custom that crossed from Portugal and Spain to Britain. It was only in 1860 that these two imports were combined by a British Jew, Joseph Malin, who opened the country's first fish and chip shop in the east end of London. Some half a century later, fish and chips had become Britain's national dish – an exemplary case of a national tradition being derived from a global process. Today, the majority of fish and chips shops in Britain are owned and run by immigrants. And fish and chips can be found around the world, including, as one of us discovered in the summer of 2019, at a German pub in Changchun, the capital of Jilin Province in northeast China.

The story of fish and chips is, therefore, a global process, enabled by flows of imperialism, capital, and migration, which became nationalised before becoming re-globalised. It is not a one-off. Similar dynamics lie behind not just cuisines and cultural artefacts, but also institutions and forms of governance. The promise of global history lies in unravelling the entanglements between these artefacts and institutions, denaturalising national histories and demonstrating the ways in which the modern world has emerged through connections, entanglements, and flows of multiple kinds and various intensities.

[1] Readers are invited to insert their own jokes here.

The first task of this chapter is to outline the ways in which Global History can contribute to International Relations (IR). Its second task is to show that this contribution is, as yet, unfulfilled. In part, this is because IR has been slow at exploring the richness of global history, including what it adds to the two themes that animate this volume: modernity and granularity. In part, the contribution is unfulfilled because global history has been slow to fully explore what it can bring to IR. While IR remains in large measure a state-centric, Eurocentric discipline dominated by national histories, global history has not done enough to theorise its narratives of entanglements. We first outline the multiple forms that global history – or histories – takes. We then examine the ways in which IR has engaged with these histories. The third section outlines two possibilities for how engagement between IR and global history can be further developed: a minimalist vision premised on the generation of synthetic historical-theoretical work, and a maximalist vision based on the construction of new, non-Eurocentric histories of transboundary encounters and entanglements.

Global Histories

In 2004, the British historian Christopher Bayly (2004: 469) noted that "all historians are world historians now, though many have not yet realized it". A decade and a half later, Bayly's statement holds up remarkably well. The global turn has fundamentally challenged the way history is written and has reshaped much of the discipline, well beyond those who would self-identify as global or world historians. And yet there are still vigorous debates about the premise and potential of the global history project (see Drayton and Motadel, 2018 and the replies by Bell and Adelman). One of the reasons why these debates carry on, and why criticisms are still being levelled at global history, is that the field is at once hard to pin down and, at the same time, often painted as a unified and clearly demarcated entity. Global history does not, in fact, represent a single historical or methodological approach. Rather, it is a term that covers a range of approaches and perspectives, which are united by an interest in transboundary movements of different kinds, allied to a critique of scholarship that is confined by nation or geography.

The confusion of terms alone should alert readers to the fact that global history is not a single thing. Asking a non-historian to successfully navigate the terrain of world, global, and transnational history is hard enough, and that is before introducing closely related concepts like Sanjay Subrahmanyam's (1997, 2007) "connected histories" or the French notion of *histoire croisée* (Werner and Zimmermann, 2006). There are certainly distinctions to be made between these approaches, but there are arguably more things binding them together than pulling them apart. Perhaps the most important unifying factor is a shared critique of the 19th century approach to thinking about history through national containers, which still characterizes the way history is organized as an academic field. Each of these approaches thus emphasizes the fact that a different frame of reference is needed to understand not only what took place within these geographically bounded containers, but also what took place between and across them.

Crucially, by decentering the nation-state as the primary unit of analysis, all of these approaches seek to move beyond the Eurocentrism that has been an ingrained part of the modern discipline of history (O'Brien, 2006; Zemon-Davis, 2011). The methodological approach to achieving this aim might be comparative, as has often been the case within world history, but global history has in part been seen as distinct due to its focus on connections and entanglements rather than discrete comparisons.[2] Global history is also typically differentiated from transnational history, in this case because transnational history presupposes the presence of some type of national unit, which global historians have argued was absent from much of the world before the late 19th century, at the earliest. Finally, global history has been singled out as different from

[2] There are other factors differentiating world and global history, many of which are more institutional than substantial. World history emerged as a subfield primarily at universities in the United States, especially the University of Hawai'i, while global history primarily gained ground in the United Kingdom, specifically at the University of Oxford and the London School of Economics (LSE) – and later at the University of Warwick. The two major publications of the field – the *Journal of World History* and the *Journal of Global History* – are housed at the University of Hawai'i and at the LSE respectively. World history has long been taught at the undergraduate level in the US as a substitute for, or supplement to, older Western Civilization courses, while global history has more typically been taught at the postgraduate level. In very broad terms, world history might be said to emphasize encounters and comparisons, while global history tends to emphasize networks and flows. In chronological terms, world history often deals with the *longue durée*, including ancient and medieval history, while global history has tended to focus on the past three or four centuries. But the distinction between the two is not a hard and fast one, and it is telling that pioneering work in the 1990s tended to use the terms interchangeably (e.g. Bentley, 1990).

related fields due to its emergence in the 1990s as a historiographical response to the concerns of the time, namely globalization (Geyer and Bright, 1995; Hopkins, 2000). While global history is much more than simply the history of globalization, and indeed many global historians today are skeptical of globalization as a concept, global history is concerned with the role and effect of a variety of global forces. In this sense global history is only rarely the history of the globe in its entirety. Rather, it is the history of the impact or development of particular global processes, including those that led to the creation of national units. There are thus a wide variety of approaches to global history. That said, four clusters of issues can be said to have shaped the field: globalization and modernity, space and scale, flows and connectivity, and the spread of ideas. We look at each in turn.

The first and most enduring topic of research in global history has, unsurprisingly, concerned the origins and course of globalization. Pioneering work in the field set out the stakes of this debate, most famously with Kenneth Pomeranz's (2000) notion of a 'great divergence' taking place between Western Europe, or Britain more specifically, and the rest of the world, particularly China (see also Wong, 1997). This great divergence caused European imperial powers to pull ahead of other world regions at some point in the late 18th or early 19th centuries, the argument goes, but not before then. What exactly caused the divergence has been the topic of much debate, one that has sustained almost two decades of research, as different factors have been highlighted, new regions have been brought into the discussion, and the timeline has been pushed back and forth (Parthasarathi, 2011; Rosenthal and Wong, 2011). The central claim of the great divergence literature – that Europe and Asia were essentially equal in terms of prosperity prior to the era of high imperialism – is important for a range of debates, most notably the origins of modernity. As global historians have traced globalizing processes back in time and looked at regional globalizations in the early modern period, discussions of how to think about modernity have followed (Hopkins, 2002; Brook, 2007). Some historians have taken up the sociological notion of 'multiple modernities' to explain how different regions developed parallel but distinct notions of modernity, including variations on the standard elements of state bureaucratization and market (or merchant) capitalism (e.g. Washbrook, 1997; 1998). Others have pushed back against this agenda, either because it is seen as diluting the

analytical value of the concept of modernity, or because it inadvertently reproduces the Eurocentrism of modernity as a historical concept (van der Veer, 1998; Cooper, 2005).

Second are issues of scale and space. As noted previously, global histories rarely treat the global as a single unit of analysis, and issues of scale and space have continued to drive debate in the field. Indeed, histories that attempt to tackle the entirety of the globe over the long-term have more often fallen under the remit of neighboring subfields like 'Big History' or 'Deep History', characterized as much by the natural sciences as by traditional historical methods (e.g. Christian, 2004; Smail, 2007). But below the planetary level of analysis is a host of other possibilities. Given the grand ambition of illuminating global processes, one might ask how small is too small to still be global? One of the major approaches within the field has been global microhistory, an adaptation of traditional Italian microhistory that seeks to illuminate wider issues through granular studies of the "exceptional normal" (Grendi, 1977: 512; Trivellato, 2011). A range of works in this genre have traced the journeys of boundary-crossing individuals in order to demonstrate the types of connectivity and mobility that operated in the early modern period (Zemon-Davis, 2006; Colley, 2007; Andrade, 2011). A related approach has been more concerned with spaces and communities than extraordinary individuals. Perhaps the best example is Donald Wright's (2010) global history of the territory of Niumi in West Africa, which traces a geographically anchored community across several centuries of global economic, social, and political transformation by applying a particular version of world systems analysis.

Between the level of the global and the local is a burgeoning literature on the relationship between global and regional histories. While regional histories and area studies have long offered an alternative to traditional national histories, these approaches run the risk of providing new and equally arbitrary constraints, preventing historians from placing their areas of study in conversation with events and processes taking place beyond their borders. The global turn has in this way called for a history of regions *in* the world, rather than as worlds unto themselves (Middel and Naumann, 2010; Vaughan, 2013). The study of Atlantic history is a good example of this move, as Atlantic historians have increasingly been receptive to the criticism of exceptionalism and insularity coming from global history (Coclanis, 2002; 2006), and have instead

sought to place work on their region within broader themes and trajectories, including the formation of trans-oceanic networks, migration flows between regions, and the rise of global empires (Games, 2006; Vidal, 2012; Prior, 2014). A different type of spatiality has more recently entered the conversation with the emergence of global urban history, first championed in pioneering works by Michael Goebel (2015) and Joseph Ben Prestel (2017) and then, in 2019, with a series of monographs expressly dedicated to the field: Cambridge Elements in Global Urban History.

The third issue-area within global history, and perhaps its most prominent, is concerned with connectivity and movement. Works on the flows and circulations of people, goods, and information have flourished and shaped much of the field, adding depth and granularity to more abstract analysis of globalization. Here, migration has been a key concern, with global historians paying particular attention to the enduring networks fostered by migratory movements and the effects of regional and global diasporas (Ward, 2009; Huber, 2013; Amrith, 2013; Arsan, 2014). Commodity histories, a pioneering genre in world history (i.e. Mintz, 1985; Schmitz, 1986), have returned to the fore in recent years with scholars analyzing the trans-regional histories of goods from cotton to guano, often using particular commodities as windows into the emergence of global capitalism (Berg, 2004; Cushman, 2013; Beckert, 2014). This preoccupation with flows and circulations has been criticized for ignoring those places that are either sparsely connected or not connected at all, as well as those people whose mobility is limited. In the words of Frederick Cooper (2001: 190), “the world (…) is filled with lumps, places where power coalesces surrounded by those where it does not, where social relations become dense amidst others that are diffuse”. Such criticisms have prompted attention to separations as well as connections, and to blockages and gaps as well as flows and movements, the most prominent example of which is Adam McKeown’s (2008) pioneering work on borders and passports (see also Singaravélou, 2017). At the same time, there has been renewed attention to the rise and role of the state, both as a consequence of global forces and as a driver of these forces (Bayly, 1998; Thompson, 2010; Yun-Casalilla and O’Brien, 2012; Adelman, 2015).

Finally, in recent years, the global turn has increasingly affected subfields that have otherwise been largely absent from debates over globalization, movement, and

migration. New approaches have emerged, including global legal history, global intellectual history, and global histories of science and technology – all of which are fundamentally concerned with the spread and entanglement of ideas. Legal historians have studied the spread of legal concepts and the gradual emergence of a global legal order in the context of early modern imperial expansion (Benton, 2010) as well as the more recent rise of international law as a global process (Becker Lorca, 2014; Donaldson, 2019). Intellectual historians have studied shifting notions of the global and the international across time and place (Armitage, 2012; Rosenboim, 2017; Slobodian, 2018) and have engaged in sustained discussions of global intellectual history as a historiographical and methodological project (Moyn and Sartori, 2013). They have also done much to decenter Eurocentric narratives of the emergence and spread of political ideologies, including nationalism and radicalism (Karl, 2002; Khuri-Makdisi, 2010; Hofmeyr, 2013). Most recently, historians of science and technology have begun their own global turn, with important works challenging the Eurocentric foundations of the subfield and illustrating the global development of scientific ideas in the 19th and 20th centuries (Ogle, 2015; Poskett, 2019).

Global history is, therefore, alive and well, having done much to destabilize the enduring Eurocentrism and methodological nationalism of history as a field of enquiry. But the global turn is far from a *fait accompli* and there are still several things missing from its compass. First is a more rigorous *theorizing* of entanglements. Identifying the fact that historical processes are boundary-crossing and that events in one region have major ramifications for other regions is the first step towards understanding these entanglements. But with some notable exceptions (e.g. Benton, 2002; Benton and Mulich, 2015), global historians have been reluctant to theorize these entanglements as structured patterns of transboundary interaction. A related issue is the lack of attention given to the links between different levels of analysis. As mentioned above, global historians have been comfortable working at macro, micro, and regional levels, but relatively little work has explored how these levels interact and intersect. Global history provides the ideal opportunity for this type of work, focusing on the relationship between local, regional, and global processes. But, to date, too much scholarship treats global forces as something that acts unilaterally upon the local or as a backdrop to locally anchored events.

The second major gap relates to the preponderance of power asymmetries in history. In many ways, the Cooper critique that global historians are obsessed with flows and connections at the cost of blockages and separations no longer stands. If there remains a certain penchant for flows and networks, most scholars are now well aware of the historical moments when links broke or when global integration either stopped or reversed (Osterhammel, 2014). But it is not enough to look at such moments as examples of the changing tide of globalization without grappling seriously with the power asymmetries present at *both* moments of integration and disintegration. In other words, global historians need to consider more seriously hierarchical nature of connections and the implications of these assymetries for historical development. Historians are too often content with simply pointing out power imbalances, without exploring what such hierarchical relations might mean for the nature and dynamic of global processes.

International Relations and Global Histories

International Relations has a long association with global history, or at least with work that would now be called global history. The origins of IR in imperial world order projects meant that studying parts of the world outside the white West was central to its mission (Bell, 2007). In Britain, for example, figures like Arnold Toynbee and E.H. Carr worked in both disciplines. Despite similar origins in inter-imperial rivalry, race theory, and colonial administration (Vitalis, 2015), the relationship between IR and History worked differently in the United States. Here, the positioning of IR as a branch of Political Science led it towards a thin sense of history as a technique or resource rather than as a fully integrated part of the discipline. Although American IR tested, and continues to test, its arguments in history, History is rarely seen as a site of conceptual development. To be sure, a wide range of US-based scholarship works on the frontiers of IR and History, including prominent Realists (e.g. Jervis, 1976; Gilpin, 1981; Snyder, 1991; Mearsheimer, 2003; Eckstein, 2006; Gunitsky, 2017), Liberals (e.g. Ikenberry, 2000; 2020), and Constructivists (e.g. Ruggie, 1986; Bukovanksy, 2002; Finnemore, 2003; Nexon, 2009; Reus-Smit, 2013; Spruyt, 2020). And much of this work extends its historical compass well beyond the experience of the modern West (e.g. Hui, 2005; Kang, 2010; Spruyt, 2020). But the close association between positivism and US Political

Science means that there is only occasional understanding of History as a doubly interpretative enterprise: first, in its choice and assessment of primary sources; and second as historiographies that are continually being assessed, refined and re-evaluated. Although *history* as a point of data collection is present in these accounts, *historicism* – a commitment to historically locating practices and dynamics, a concern for the contingent, disruptive, constitutive impact of historical events, and the study of contextualised rationalities and inter-subjectivities – is rarer. Most mainstream approaches use history as a means of coding findings, mining data, or as a source of *post factum* explanations (Lawson, 2012).

Given this, it is no surprise that the closest relationships between IR and global history have been constructed outside the United States. In parts of Asia, particularly Japan and China, the links between IR and History are strong. In Japan, this is largely oriented around the relationship between IR and Diplomatic History; in China, Liu Debin and his colleagues at Jilin University have developed centres, programmes and journals premised on the rich connections between world history and IR. Similar traditions can be found in Latin America, Africa and Europe. In Germany, for example, a range of projects have explored the space between global history and IR (see, most recently, Albert and Werron eds., 2020). Norway has been a particularly prominent site in the generation of a distinctly *Historical* IR (e.g. Carvalho and Leira eds., 2015). The English School of International Relations stands, perhaps, as the vanguard of historical studies of the world beyond the modern West. The institutional font of the English School, the British Committee on the Theory of International Affairs, explored a wide range of historical international orders (e.g. Butterfield and Wight eds., 1966; Bull and Watson eds., 1984). More recently, figures such as Barry Buzan (e.g. Buzan and Little, 2000; Buzan and Lawson, 2015; Buzan and Goh, 2020) have produced work that significantly extends IR's historical compass. For their part, Edward Keene (2002, 2008), Shogo Suzuki (2005), and Iver Neumann (e.g. Neumann and Wigen, 2019) have forged a space in-between the English School and global history to theorise the forms of hierarchy, such as the 'standard of civilization' and practices of 'stigmatisation', that structure international order.

Early work on historical international orders tended to follow a 'vanguardist-diffusionist' model of historical development in which modern history emanates in and spreads from the West (e.g. Wight, 1977). This model, so the story goes, diffused around the world through a mixture of coercion and consent, forming a global order that is to all intents and purposes made in, and for, the West (for a recent statement along these lines, see Linklater, 2017). Contemporary scholarship informed by global history has fostered two critiques of this work: first, its Eurocentrism; and second, its view of international orders as unitary, bounded units constituted by distinct cultures. Because, as the previous section outlined, global history emerged as a critique of similar tendencies within History, it provides a number of insights that can be mobilised against both assumptions.

Global historians have done much to make clear the ways in which containers of various kinds, most obviously nation-states, but also civilisations and societies, are not bounded, but forged through transboundary encounters. The example of fish and chips that opened this chapter is one amongst many such examples. Traits seen as a quintessential part of a national, regional or civilisational DNA are, once subjected to global historical enquiry, shown to be the result of encounters between peoples, places, ideas and institutions. The building blocks of cultures – languages, rituals, cuisines, flags, public places – are transboundary fusions. Take the capital of the United Kingdom (itself an amalgam), London, and its central public space: Trafalgar Square. This square, home to the National Gallery (supported by transnational capital, curated by art historians from all over the world, and showcasing art from many countries) is named after a conflict that took place off the coast of Spain and Portugal in 1805: The Battle of Trafalgar. The battle takes its name from Cape Trafalgar, which in turn derives its name from the Arabic term, *Taraf al-Gharb*, meaning 'edge of the West'. In this way, the most national of symbols has its origins in a transboundary encounter. Global historical enquiry shows how taken-for-granted cultural formations are forged from entangled histories.

Global histories, therefore, deploy dynamics of incorporation and adaptation rather than diffusion. Proponents argue that it has not been European historical experience that has diffused around the world, but interactions between peoples and places that

have driven the emergence of modern international order. In this way, modernity was not self-generated through the unfolding of specifically European economic practices (such as double entry bookkeeping), institutions (such as representative governance), or symbolic schemas (such as the Enlightenment). Rather, modernity was forged through the co-constitution of local and transnational, and its core vectors were transboundary in character, from capitalist expansion to imperialism. From the 16th to the 19th centuries, a relatively thin international system sustained forms of interaction that were crucial to the development of modernity. In their interactions with European polities, the Ottomans and Chinese thought of themselves as the culturally and politically superior party. In Africa and the Americas, Europeans engaged in diplomacy and made treaties with local peoples and polities. When they moved into the Indian Ocean, the Europeans found a well-developed international society in place. Grotius' 17th century argument that Europeans should accept the principle that the high seas constituted international territory was based on the precedent provided by the Indian Ocean states-system (Alexandrowicz, 1967), just as trade between Britain and India helped to form Adam Smith's ideas about free trade (Erikson, 2014), and utilitarian thought was forged in the imperial encounters between Britain and the sub-continent (Chatterjee, 2012). From the 19th century onwards, global interactions became more unbalanced as a major power gap opened up between the European (and later American and Japanese) 'leading-edge' and most other polities (Buzan and Lawson, 2015). These dynamics eventually allowed a small number of mostly Western states to project their power around the world. But this power projection did not produce a world of homogeneous social orders. Rather, it led to diverse amalgams of old and new, and of indigenous and foreign (Anievas and Nisancioglu, 2015). Peoples and places were intensely locked together, even as their entwining fuelled a stark unevenness in terms of power distribution and in terms of how social orders were constituted. Modernity was a global process in *origins* as well as outcomes.

Any narrative of Western civilizational resources diffusing outwards misses the to-and-fro of these interactions, the power asymmetries that fuelled them, and the ways in which this combination of entanglement and power spurred historical development. History is not unidirectional, but an interactive series of events and experiences that generate multilinear developmental pathways. This is one of the key insights of global

history. And it has yet to be mainstreamed by IR scholars, including many of those who work in historical International Relations.

The Eurocentrism of much historical IR, and the use of insights from global history to critique it, is matched by a second link between IR and global history: the former's tendency towards internalism and boundedness, and once again, the latter's critique of these tendencies. Against the view that international orders are endogenously produced units that can be differentiated from other societies by cultural traits, from belief to language (e.g. Wight 1966, 1977), recent work has illustrated how culture is not a coherent whole that is unified and bounded, but a diverse web of symbols and rituals that are negotiated, contested and subject to diverse interpretations (Reus-Smit, 2017; also see Swidler, 1986). International orders regulate cultural diversity by authorising forms of cultural difference and tying these to political units: states and religion, empires and civilisation, etc. In other words, cultural heterogeneity is a *requirement* of enduring order. Many of the most durable historical international societies have been culturally plural and geographically dispersed. The British imperial web, for example, encompassed China, Argentina, Fiji, Australia, Afghanistan, India, Egypt, Nigeria, Cyprus, and Ireland. This scattered geography was not maintained through the enforcement of cultural similitude, but through symbolic amalgams that regulated unequal recognition. The legal structure of the British Empire was a layered, 'lumpy' fusion of imperial and indigenous (Benton, 2010). The penal code of the Raj blended British and Indian jurisprudence, and it was this blend that was exported to many of Britain's imperial territories in South East Asia and East Africa (Metcalf, 2008). Where British imperialism was successful, it relied on establishing close, if asymmetrical, partnerships with local power brokers: the Straits Chinese, the Krio of West Africa, the 'teak-wallahs' of Burma, the Chettiar of South India, and others.

Civilisations, therefore, are better seen as constituted *by* transboundary encounters than as bounded units that subsequently interact with other blocs. Civilisations are the products rather than the producers of cultural flows – they are 'hybrid amalgams' rather than 'self-constituting entities' (Katzenstein ed., 2009; Hobson, 2017). These hybrid amalgams encompass an array of ideas, inventions and institutions, from cosmologies to productive techniques. Major religions do not just cross borders, but are

constituted in novel blends of indigenous and transnational; technologies and strategies of warfare are emulated and fused with existing capacities; cartographic techniques used to map colonial spaces serve as the basis for territorial claims within metropoles (Branch, 2012). In other words, history is not Western first and 'other' second; it is global all the way down. Any narrative that focuses on a dualistic logic between inside and outside cannot tell the story of the West any more than it can tell the history of any other part of the world. To take one prominent example: the contemporary human rights regime is not a Western invention that has been subsequently exported around the world, but the product of negotiations between northern and southern states in which histories of race and decolonisation played leading roles (Jensen, 2016).

In this way, global history musters a powerful critique of tendencies within historically-informed IR towards Eurocentrism and its related assumption of boundedness. It also provides the outlines of an approach that overcomes these tendencies through attention to entanglements, connections and flows on the one hand, and power asymmetries on the other. Over the past two decades or so, work associated with global history has challenged the vanguardist-diffusionist model of international expansion, demonstrating the ways in which international orders are produced by interactive, if asymmetrical, relations between peoples and polities (e.g. Keene, 2002; Hobson, 2004; Zarakol, 2011; Buzan and Lawson, 2015; Phillips and Sharman, 2015, 2020; Rosenberg, 2016; Barkawi, 2017; Dunne and Reus-Smit eds., 2018). Much of this work builds on insights from historical sociology. Historical sociology is a long-established interdisciplinary field concerned with incorporating temporality in the analysis of social processes. In its most recent iteration, global historical sociology (Go and Lawson eds., 2017), the approach concentrates on the multifaceted, multi-linear character of historical development, and the necessarily co-constitutive relationship between north-south, colony-metropole, and core-periphery. Global historical sociology rejects narratives of unidirectional metropolitan diffusion, seeing the global as emerging *from* decentred interactions rather than as the *result* of the reified logic of the metropole. In this way, global history allies with various modes of theoretical work to shed light on debates ranging from the rise of the West to how imperialism has shaped the contours of contemporary world order.

A shared agenda

Global history and IR therefore share a potentially rich agenda. This agenda has three components: first, writing new, non-Eurocentric histories of transboundary encounters and entanglements; second, demonstrating how these encounters are structured through power asymmetries; and third, theorising these structured entanglements. No convincing account of global historical development can be constructed as 'West first, then global', just as no such enterprise can proceed from the standpoint of bounded units defined by the cultural attributes they share, or lack. Rather, global history points IR towards the relational, incorporative character of historical development (Phillips, 2016, 2017). In this sense, the 'foreign' and the 'domestic', the 'East' and the 'West', 'metropole' and 'colony', are neither analytically separable, nor empirically discrete (Go and Lawson eds., 2017). Places, regions, institutions, peoples and ideas are entangled all the way down. And the patterns generated by these entanglements forge international orders, orders that are sustained and challenged by power asymmetries.

There are two variants of this shared agenda. The first, more minimalist, variant is largely synthetic in character. It draws on global histories in order to foster novel accounts of the emergence, spread and contestation of international orders (e.g. Zarakol, 2011; Reus-Smit, 2013; Anievas and Nisancioglu, 2015; Buzan and Lawson, 2015; Phillips and Sharman, 2015; Sharman, 2019). If disciplinary History is doubly embedded in primary and secondary sources, this approach tends to use the latter more than the former in making arguments that are oriented *primarily* at International Relations. The second variant offers a more maximalist vision, one that engages not just existing historiography, but also provides a first cut at writing history in its own right. Based more on primary source research than the synthetic approach outlined above, scholars operating in this register produce work that is more likely to be recognized as 'proper' history by disciplinary historians, while retaining an anchor in IR concerns and debates (e.g. Bayly, 2016; Barkawi, 2017; Getachew, 2019; Mulich, 2020). On a methodological level, this approach seeks to avoid some of the issues of relying on existing historiography, including the fact that authors of this historiography have often not been interested in the same questions or topics as the IR scholars drawing on their work. This approach also makes it possible to generate research questions *from* the

archives, in a hermeneutic sense, rather than relying on *a priori* questions applied to an existing body of work (Mulich, 2021).

Both approaches have much to offer. And, like all forms of scholarship, both have shortcomings. If the minimalist approach can rely too much on existing historiography, the maximalist approach can struggle to tackle big picture, global, *longue durée* topics, not least because of the logistical and linguistic challenges associated with multi-archival work. Not only do both approaches offer trade-offs between breadth and depth, both provide different takes on the relationship between global history and IR. Where minimalists are more concerned with what historical IR can learn from global history, maximalists are more interested in what global history can learn from historical IR. Whatever approach is taken, both point the way to a series of rich, ongoing encounters between IR and global history in years to come.

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