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of a *Star Trek* movie (Schatner 1989) from the perspective of ingroup–outgroup psychology and accounting analytically for the experience of the ecstatic in contemporary Gospel music. What rich, communicative learning existed in these exchanges. In the process of engaging with those students, I open myself to new aural vistas and potentially new analytical approaches to repertoires both familiar and strange. The next iteration of first-year students then benefits from my recent learning.

I imagine some might think that an older, white, classically trained scholar like me should send the students just described to the best qualified people to supervise them and, never fear, where appropriate I always do. But here's my point. The real challenge for teachers of analysis today is, in my view, to be as versatile as our students would like us to be. As someone who started her tertiary training at a conservatoire, I would love to feel more confident in the analysis of jazz and popular music. The non-classical repertoire of the 1970s onwards exists for me somatically, in my bones and memory, as the soundtrack to my youth, but not in my academic training. I wish it were easier to engage with it now as a teacher and practitioner, rather than feeling an imposter in a vernacular which is not, technically, my own. In any case, it surely requires far greater intrinsic musicianship to engage with some less 'literate' musics than with only 'canonical' repertoires. I'm thinking here of a wonderful Afro-jazz singing student, with little background in music theory, who eventually opted for their techniques paper to write a passage of plainchant in preference to a pop song, on the grounds that the former was easier to notate.

In summary, and bearing in mind some of the issues outlined here, music pedagogues have a choice about what music they teach at university, how they do so and what ideologies they offer students or suggest they might subscribe to. Students are largely passionate, enquiring and engaged, and will absorb and debate what we offer. Rather than bemoaning the death of analysis, for so long as there is a sliver of time in the curriculum to teach it, I advocate teaching it enthusiastically, confidently and engagingly – and in ways which are as relevant to our students (our 'consumers' some would say) – as we can manage. To do so enhances their lives and ours and creates vigour in the discipline. Even entertaining the idea that analysis must be brought back from the dead may turn out to be something of an own goal.

## **Territorial Disputes, Analysis and Performance and Redefining the 'Surplus'**

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Julian Horton's article constitutes a cogent and pertinent argument for the central importance of musical analysis, framed in terms of the necessity of the

technically autonomous dimensions of music, which as he demonstrates via the finale of Bach's Brandenburg Concerto No. 4, could never be accounted for in purely historicist or contextual terms, nor through the type of 'immediate' response lionised by Carolyn Abbate (2004). I feel, however, it is a shame that this article needed to be written and wonder if the defensive position forced on analysts militates against wider interactions between diverse subdisciplinary tendencies (see Donn and Pace 2023 on the troubling position of theory and analysis in UK curricula).

As Horton demonstrates, many of the critiques are of straw targets, often ignoring major contributions to the field, which was heterogeneous at the time of the article as it is today; earlier events such as the fall of communism or the credit crunch can be argued to have equal significance for an academic discipline such as music analysis as those examples cited by Kofi Agawu in his contribution to this forum. Critics employ exaggerated rhetoric and stentorian, denunciatory language, charging the rather innocuous discipline of music analysis with complicity with colonial domination (as might have surprised Frantz Fanon) as a means of fighting what are ultimately territorial struggles in a beleaguered academic field in which student numbers are falling, in part because of lessening provision of primary and secondary education such as provides a route into more demanding music for young people. Consequently, academic jobs can become increasingly scarce.

Few mainstream analysts feel the need to denounce other musicological fields, or even alternative approaches to analysis, in anything like the extreme manner of Nicholas Cook (1999 and 2013), Gary Tomlinson (2003), Christopher Small (1998), Abbate (2004, at odds with many of her other writings) and others. That their preferred approaches to scholarship are necessarily an improvement, or any less prescriptive, is far from clear to me. More to the point, their wider disdainful attitudes are resolutely *anti-pluralist*, disallowing the possibility of multiple musicological methods, strategies and priorities which can coexist. I doubt many analysts (perhaps Schenker, but few others) would have claimed their work constituted a comprehensive theory of everything of consequence about music, nor seek to dismiss most other approaches preceding or contemporary with them. And many have demonstrated how some of the tools supplied by Schenker can be fruitfully applied without subscribing to the more unpalatable aspects of his thought and world view. But the situation may be different if one presumes instead to present major theories about culture, humans, and so on, leading to grand pronouncements on many musics and associated academic fields (regardless of specialised knowledge of individual cases), often rendered as trivial or sinister in comparison.

Many academics in popular music studies, ethnomusicology, the new musicology, cultural studies and, more recently, sound studies have long resented music theory and analysis, which are the *primary skills which distinguish musicology from other disciplines*. Without these, musicology is reduced to a position on the margins of sociology, anthropology, cultural history, and so

forth, voided of the types of musicianship common among the best practising musicians (in whichever genre), and thus distant from their own everyday concerns. To reframe Henry Stobart's claims below, some such scholars, including ethnomusicologists, whose work can involve little or no engagement with sounding music, may feel insulated from some of the dilemmas and challenges faced by analysts and other musicologists. The net result is to render musicology an even more marginal presence than it might have been otherwise, in ways which are increasingly evident in large sections of UK academia today. Esther Cavett believes university managers and politicians do not distinguish music from the wider humanities, but my experience has rather been of attempts to render it further from these towards primarily practical study, but at a much lower level than that in specialist conservatoires (see Pace 2023). This process will swallow up and erase most musicology, including ethnomusicology. Furthermore, there is no intrinsic reason why popular music studies should be any less rigorous than any other area of musical enquiry, but it may be a struggle to reconcile such with student demands. I have seen from some students and performance teachers the very opposite of an embracing of analysis, or for that matter sociological and cultural theory, and as such cannot believe that Simon Zagorski-Thomas's proposals in his contribution to this forum can easily be adopted in such a context.

Abbate's neoprimitivist view, akin to those expressed elsewhere by Cook (2013, p. 246, citing Leech-Wilkinson 2012, paragraph 4.11) and in an ethnographic context by Stephen Cottrell (2004, p. 4), or in Susan McClary's alarming construction of the 'mind/body split' (1989, p. 80), turn an ideal of untutored, unreflective performance, listening or thinking into a fetish, dismissing expertise as contemptuously as do some politicians (see Nichols 2017). In a sense, they implicitly deny the value of education at all (except perhaps their own and that they teach) – for why spoil the authentic experiences of such imaginary figures through critical reflection? Stobart argues that music literacy (a term for which, in general, Alexandra Monchick's definition is most suitable) in colonial Latin America was 'largely restricted to elite groups' and 'tended to confirm and reinforce racial and class hierarchies'. However, I believe this could be said of most educated skills in various contexts, and so the view of skills as 'tools and processes of colonialism' comes close to the perspective of Abbate and others in a broader sense (see also J. P. E. Harper-Scott 2012, pp. 186–96, for a parallel critique).

From this perspective, the scholar's task seems primarily to be to flatter others simply for being themselves, rather than trying to teach them anything concrete, a process I have seen grow in recent decades in music education. A redirection of arguments about colonialism may not be out of order; Abbate's listeners, Cook's performers and Cottrell's participants are all constructed as noble savages, exoticised 'others' to academic experts, mirroring the views of colonisers and racial ideologues towards non-Western peoples. All such groups are denied critical intellectual agency of their own.

When Wallace Berry (1989) or Eugene Narmour (1988) express a preference for certain approaches to performance, they are doing nothing worse than anyone else who valorises different approaches. I would suggest that most listeners fall into this category, with the exception of Cook and some ethnomusicologists for whom value judgement constitutes an original sin.

I am a performer and listener as well as a scholar, and from these former perspectives simply love reading (as well as writing) music analysis, including of the type above; as such, I cannot share the view Gurminder Bhogal expresses above of this as an ‘ivory tower’ activity. I do not always necessarily agree with or adopt the approaches proffered, just as I do not always accept at face value the conclusions of other scholarly work. But these contribute to the type of discursive space made possible by Habermas’s communicative rationality, where they can be debated and contested, as I can do for myself based on other knowledge.

I maintain that many performers of notated music (at least soloists and conductors) undertake a type of analysis just by performing, making many critical decisions when rendering a score in sonic terms, reflecting their insights into that score. But this does not make the work of the non-practitioner analyst redundant. The writings of James Hepokoski and Warren Darcy (2006) on Viennese Classical works, of Horton himself on Bruckner and Brahms (2004 and 2017), of Mark DeVoto (2004) and Hepokoski (1984 and 2010) on Debussy, to name just a few, employ systematic techniques and huge reserves of knowledge of repertoire and context, facilitating insights unlikely to be available otherwise to many performers. The technical language employed (*pace* both Stobart and Cavett) is at best no more redundant than that in many scientific disciplines and facilitates precision and concision.

It would be unproductive to hold up performers’ work to criticism for falling short of representing such insights, if imagined to reflect ‘definitive performances’ of a musical text. Rather, such analytical work represents a contribution to a discursive space of interpretation, to be brought into dialogue with other insights from composers, performers and listeners. There is no more reason to assume that Performer X might not find valuable and applicable insights in the work of Analyst Y than that Analyst Y might not also learn from Performer X. For a meaningful dialogue between scholars and other musicians, scholars must be allowed to bring something of their own (as outlined by Monchick) to the discourse.

The more difficult question I would suggest, in response to some fellow respondents making the ‘worthy’ case for pluralism, is whether a regular interaction between theory/scholarship and music-making, as has existed for some time in the Western literate tradition, has the same importance for some other traditions (how many popular musicians engage with popular music studies?). And following from this, do those latter warrant an equally prominent place in academia? Zagorski-Thomas’s claims below about domination of research culture require evidence (and it is relatively meaningless to measure parity between ‘popular’ and ‘Western art’ music, considering the vastly differing

periods encompassed – a comparison between research funding of popular and Baroque music would make more sense). It is much harder to justify to university managers, as evoked by Boghal and Cavett, realms of activity which have little currency outside academia.

Nonetheless, the performative critique of analysis cannot be easily dismissed. Notated scores may contain elements which remain largely invariant in performance, such as Horton's example of canons, but there is plenty of music which, as *heard*, is equally informed by specifics of instrumental or vocal timbre, approaches to vibrato or pedalling, agogics, flexibility of rhythm and tempo and other aspects of performers' creative contributions. This is not to mention production in the case of recordings or works with a studio element, and sometimes wider opportunities for ornamentation, diminution, various types of improvisation, and so on.

Although making a strong case for analysis centred on performance-invariant elements, Horton does not register the growth of a substantial body of analytical work on performance and recordings of notated works (for example Philip 1992; Day 2000; Fabian 2003; Leech-Wilkinson 2009; Volioti 2012; Peres da Costa 2012; and Moreda Rodriguez and Stanovic 2023), itself a more systematic rendition of what record critics and presenters have done for longer. Music analysis as a field remains overwhelmingly of the broad types discussed by Horton. Timbre in particular remains on the margins, although there are difficulties in integrating it into analysis in ways which are neither blandly descriptive nor super-scientific in ways which might crowd out considerations of other parameters.

I welcome a growth in work in which rigorous score-based work is married to performance analysis (as in brilliant examples such as Llorens 2021), and perhaps potentially to cognitive scholarship, which is so often related to musical generalities rather than specifics. Tonally or harmonically ambiguous music can be rendered in very different ways by performers, and I believe some supposedly neutral analyses of such repertoire actually amount to those of a particular imagined performance, because of the musical hierarchies entailed (see my critique of the analysis of Michael Finnissy by Richard Beaudoin in Pace 2019).

Horton's most distinctive line of argument has origins in the thought of Max Weber ([1921] 1958), Theodor W. Adorno ([1969] 1982 and [1932] 2002) and Jürgen Habermas ([1981] 1984), arguing the need for analysis to discern those aspects of music which are *surplus* to instrumentalisation, linked to familiar critiques of postmodernism's essential relationship to neoliberalism from Frederic Jameson (1991), Pierre Bourdieu (1996, 1998) and others. I doubt this would prove persuasive to Cook, Tomlinson, or others including McClary and Georgina Born, who have all been explicit in their advocacy of varieties of neoliberalism, in Tomlinson's case denying other economic possibilities for culture, or in Cook's associating these latter with Nazi ideology (see Tomlinson 1992, pp. 82–3; McClary 2000, pp. 1285–6; Cook 2003, p. 257; and Born 2013, p. 64). The critique is also distinct from that alleged by Stobart,



although I find the latter's indifference to questions of commercialism, and especially to any attempts to distinguish art from commerce, as problematic as Bhogal's and Cavett's equation of students with 'consumers'. Zagorski-Thomas has a few critical words to say about market economics but sees the only alternative force as being 'privilege and power', a phrase he uses twice, as if that were the only reason Bach's Brandenburg Concertos still speak to many almost 300 years after their composition. In common with some of the above commentators, this artificially conflates real attempts to modify the market in the name of wider artistic ends (from a social democratic perspective, which barely exists in US political life and musicological discourse, the latter of which dominates the Anglosphere) with simple assertion of neo-feudal privilege. For Stobart, Zagorski-Thomas, Tomlinson, McClary, Cook and Born, it is as if Margaret Thatcher's statement 'There is no alternative' (TINA; Moncrieff 2013) to the rule of the market is a truism (see also Pace et al. [2016] for more on this subject in response to Zagorski-Thomas).

But there is another way to conceive surplus, as a force beyond the boundaries of rationalisation, which brings the concept somewhat closer to Georges Bataille's *part maudite* (Bataille [1949] 1991). Analysis unearths many technical aspects of music and its relationship to conventions. If this were the music's essence, the process might be undertaken in reverse (possibly employing AI) to create a passable example of the body of work to which the original belonged. With highly generic works this can sometimes be done, but I believe most who have thus attempted to 'create' a work which could pass as Monteverdi, Palestrina, Mozart or others will have come to grief. The musical 'surplus' then amounts to those musical aspects which *frustrate* attempts to account for them in analytical terms and distinguish truly memorable and individual works from those standing in more recognisable relations to genres. An approach to analysis which can distinguish Beethoven from Stamitz or Wölfl in the content *resistant* to analysis can also play an important role.

## Horton Hears *The Who*

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I was asked to contribute to the original forum as a voice from the world of popular music studies in this discussion – therefore the rather childish Dr Seuss wordplay in my title – but it has increasingly become clear to me that the things I want to say about this stem just as much from being a voice from the world of vocational education. Horton mentions that 'recent public debates about music's declining position in Britain's education system [...] produce a potent cocktail of cultural-political justifications for analysis's curricular irrelevance' (Horton 2020, p. 2). I agree completely about 'music's declining position' but my