



# **Journalism and political democracy in Brazil (1984-2002)**

Carolina Oliveira Matos

Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy  
of the University of London

Department of Media and Communications  
Goldsmiths College  
University of London  
September 2006

## Abstract

In the aftermath of the dictatorship (1964-1985), Brazil shifted away from the state to embrace market liberal democracy and global capitalism. The mainstream press in the last 18 years since the end of the military regime has experienced the tensions of attending to the public interest in response to the country's democratisation whilst maximising consumerism approaches to news due to market pressures. The media acquired more credibility amid the growth of press freedom. Public debate and independence from the state also increased and liberal journalism cultures of professionalism and objectivity expanded in newsrooms to the detriment of partisanship routines. Worries concerning the media's adherence to the public interest and the limits imposed on the enhancement of debate are growing though in the light of the continuous predominance of the market in the communication sector. This thesis discusses these realms of conflict by focusing on key historical and political events which contributed to re-shape power structures in Brazil. It debates the role assumed by the press and journalists in the democratisation process (1984-2002).

This research has focused on four case studies which include: a) the 1984 direct elections campaign (*Diretas Já*); b) the first presidential elections of 1989 followed by the 1992 impeachment; c) the elections of 1994, which occurred amid the launch of the *real* stabilization plan, and d) the 2002 contest which elected the first left-wing government in Brazil since the 1964 military coup. This thesis questions to what extent the press in general – or certain media vehicles in particular – contributed to promote social and political change in the last two decades. Textual and content analysis have been used here to examine news material from national newspapers and elite magazines, while in-depth interviews with key journalists were conducted in order to discuss news production practices and editorial judgments.

## **Declarations and acknowledgements**

I would like to thank all the journalists and academics in Brazil who took time off their own work to participate in this research and to contribute as much as they did. I would like to thank colleagues from *Folha*, *O Globo* and *JB* and the various librarians and technical staff from the National Library and the federal universities in RJ and SP. I also want to especially thank Professor James Curran and Goldsmiths College for their support, generosity and believe in my work. I am very grateful to David Humphrey for having proof read my thesis. I also want to thank my journalist, scholar friends and family members Heliana Oliveira and Marcelo Teixeira who were very supportive, and who helped me cope and got me through the hardest moments of the past four years.

## Table of Contents

Title	2
Abstract	3
Declaration and Acknowledgements	4
Table of Contents	5
Abbreviations	9

### PART I

#### Defining frameworks

##### Chapter 1 - *The Brazilian media in the spotlight: setting up a working agenda*

1.1. Introduction	10
1.2. Frameworks on the Brazilian media and on political economy theories	12
a) Discussing hypotheses	12
b) International perspectives: US/UK liberal media theories	14
c) Brazilian academic debates: radical and liberal critiques	17
1.3. Journalism identity: a profile of the Brazilian media	22
a) The American connection: professionalism and commercialisation	22
b) The imperialism debate and the commercial versus the public media	24
c) Brazilian journalism: literary and political influences	26
1.4. Media concentration and social exclusion in the Brazilian media	28
<b>II – Debates on theory and methods</b>	<b>33</b>
a) Methodological issues	33
b) Theoretical influences	41
c) Thesis outline	43

### PART II

#### Civil democracy transition and the struggle with the State

##### Chapter 2 – *Market-driven journalism in the pursuit of democracy: an analysis of “Folha de Sao Paulo” and the coverage of the Diretas Já!*

2.1. Introduction	46
2.2. “I want to vote for president”: deconstructing the <i>Diretas Já</i>	49
2.3. <i>FSP</i> : history and identity	53
2.3. Militant journalism and democracy in <i>FSP</i> : an examination of the <i>Diretas Já</i> ! coverage	56
a) The initial phase: the campaign hits the streets	58
b) Engagement and mobilization: the peak of the movement	61
c) A nation frustrated: the rejection of Dante’s bill	64
2.5. Officialdom and late militancy: discussing reactions of the	

mainstream press	66
2.6. The 1984 <i>Folha</i> project: the shift from “revolutionary” to commercial journalism	73
2.7. Conclusion	80

## PART III

### The 90’s: the consolidation of a free-market press

#### **Chapter 3** – *Ideological campaigns and the watchdog role of the press: the media coverage of the 1989 elections and the 1992 impeachment*

3.1. Introduction	82
3.2. “Chose the tongue-tied or the second-rate film star!”: ideological polarization in the 1989 elections	85
a) 1989: a year of turmoil	85
b) The initial construction of the myth of the nation’s saviour	86
c) The marketing candidate wins the media: the consolidation phase	93
d) Hysteria and ideological anxiety: the second round	96
e) Collor’s victory and the PT defeat	100
3.3. The (initial) awakening of the press: the <i>FSP</i> versus Collor dispute	102
3.4. Between hysterical students and a barking media: the 1992 impeachment	104
a) The watchdog function	104
b) The decline of the Collor myth and <i>denuncismo</i> journalism	107
c) “Resign!” say <i>ESP</i> and <i>FSP</i>	111
d) Black flags rise: students protest and public opinion pressures for impeachment	112
3.5. Conclusion	116

#### **Chapter 4** – *National politics in a global economic world: a case study of the 1994 presidential elections*

4.1. Introduction	119
4.2. The economic context of the post-dictatorship and economic journalism	121
4.3. The <i>real</i> as marketing tool and FHC: the media coverage of the 1994 elections	124
a) A general perspective on the campaign	124
b) The “positive” and “negative” stories on Lula and FHC	125
c) A campaign of a single issue: the dominance of the economic agenda	134
d) The launch of the <i>real</i> and FHC in the press	137
e) Ricupero’s satellite dish and the PT versus the PSDB tug-of-war	142
f) Lula versus <i>Isto É</i> : partisan routines or professional journalism?	145
4.4. PSDB and the possibility of a “third way”: the significance of the FHC victory	149
4.5. Conclusion	151

## PART IV

### Social-democracy and the rise of center-left wing politics

#### Chapter 5 – *Market constraints and social democracy: the media coverage of the 2002 elections*

5.1. Introduction	154
5.2. The FHC legacy and the 1998 elections	156
5.3. The role of the media during the Cardoso era	158
5.4. The PT's transformation and the British Labour Party	161
5.5. Market constraints and social agendas: conflicts in the media coverage of the 2002 elections	162
a) A general overview: the publication of positive and balanced stories on Lula/PT	162
b) Journalists and the 2002 elections	167
c) Lula and the market forces: the wooing of the business world and the <i>Veja</i> stories	170
d) Lula in the general press: towards a “humanistic” capitalism	175
e) The dispute for the center-left space: who is the ‘new’ anti-Lula?	177
5.6. The final phase and the significance of the Lula victory	181
a) Temperatures rise: between PT “radicalism” and “economic terrorism”	181
b) Lula in the newspapers as president	184
5.7. Conclusion	188

## PART V

### Journalism and political democracy

#### Chapter 6 - *Partisanship versus professionalism: the role of the journalist in the democratization process*

6.1. Introduction	191
6.2. Balance and fairness in Brazilian journalism: the partisanship versus professionalism debate	194
a) International perspectives on objectivity	196
b) In between two journalisms: militant/romantic journalism versus professionalism	202
c) Objectivity and information in <i>FSP</i> and <i>O Globo</i>	206
d) The importance of objectivity and professionalism to journalism	211
6.3. Journalism and democracy: the contribution of journalists to the democratisation process	213
6.4. Professionalism and journalism autonomy: the future role of the journalist	217
6.5. Conclusion	220

## CONCLUSION

### **Chapter 7 – *Media and democracy in Brazil: towards a ‘realistic’ settlement***

7.1. Introduction	223
7.2. The Brazilian press and democracy: debates on public intervention, freedom of the market, civil society and journalism	225
a) General perspectives	225
b) The market and the media	228
c) The media and the state	231
d) Civil society and the media	235
e) The media and journalism	237
7.3. Conclusion	241

<b>Bibliography</b>	243
---------------------	-----

<b>Appendices</b>	266
Appendix 1: Additional information on methodology	266
Appendix 2: Appendices of chapters – Chapter 2	276
Appendix 3: Chapter 3	281
Appendix 4: Chapter 4	287
Appendix 5: Chapter 5	292
Appendix 6: Chronology of the Collor era (1989-1992)	298
Appendix 7: Chronology of the 1994 elections and FHC’s governments	300
Appendix 8: Chronology of the 2002 elections	301
Appendix 9: Key facts of Brazilian history	302
Appendix 10: Brazilian party system and presidential elections	303
Appendix 11: Media ownership in Brazil	305
Appendix 12: Newspaper circulation numbers	306
Appendix 13: Further information on television and newspaper market	307
Appendix 14: Interviews with journalists	310
Appendix 15: Profile of Interviewees	311



## **List of Abbreviations**

**ABI** – Brazilian Press Association  
**ACM** - Antonio Carlos Magalhães  
**Brizola** – Leonel Brizola  
**CBN** – National Center of News  
**Ciro** – Ciro Gomes  
**CNBB** – National Confederation of Bishops of Brazil  
**CUT** – Central Union of Workers  
**ESP** – Estado de São Paulo  
**FGV** – Getúlio Vargas Foundation  
**FSP** – Folha de São Paulo  
**FHC** – Fernando Henrique Cardoso  
**GUMG** – Glasgow University Media Group  
**Iuperj** – University Institute of Research of the State of Rio de Janeiro  
**JB** – Jornal do Brasil  
**Lula** – Luis Inácio Lula da Silva  
**MST** – Landless movement of Brazil  
**OAB** – Order of Lawyers from Brazil  
**PUC** – Pontific Catholic University  
**RJ** – Rio de Janeiro  
**Serra** – José Serra  
**SP** – São Paulo  
**UFRJ** – Federal University of the State of RJ  
**UNE** – National Students Union  
**USP** - University of the State of São Paulo

## **Chapter 1 – The Brazilian media in the spotlight: setting up a working agenda**

### **I. Introduction**

Many South American countries in the last two decades experienced significant political and social changes, embracing representative liberal democracy and global market free-trade after having lived through relatively long dictatorship periods. After escaping from the tentacles of the military generals, which kept the country tied to an old economic model of state intervention and to a weak form of political institutionalisation with fragile freedom of expression, Brazil reduced the role of the state and dived into the waters of the market. At a first glance, the contemporary scenario seems to invite only optimism: the market has permitted stronger governmental accountability and a means of safeguarding citizens from corruption. Political democracy has been consolidated, with full competitive and free elections being held regularly. Certain civil society players and unprivileged members of Brazilian society have been included in the mainstream arena and a relative degree of press independence and freedom has been achieved due to political democratisation and market expansion. The contemporary years nonetheless have been highly contradictory. The slow and gradual consolidation of political democracy has been problematic, with market, the state and the various societal spheres of the country being overwhelmed in tensions. Media systems have been shaped by both market expansion and the newly (re)gained political and civil freedoms which (re)emerged with liberal political democracy. The state and the market have thus been forces for advancement as much as they have placed political and economic constraints on the media's contribution to the democratisation process.

The media industry has had a vital role in re-shaping the power structures of Brazilian society and has functioned as a crucial site for social, political and ideological struggles. In the aftermath of the dictatorship, the press has also had to redefine its role and relationship to democracy. It assumed other functions which went beyond being either a mere mouthpiece of governmental decisions or a vehicle of political resistance to the military regime. Public interest commitments for instance were expanded in the media as a consequence of increasing political democratisation. This occurred in a scenario of growing media commercialisation and wider consumerism pressures. The market thus paved the way for the opening of new spaces in the mainstream media, extending the representation in this

arena to the interests of 'new publics'. The post-dictatorship years saw also wider spaces for public debate and scrutiny of state activities being created in the media pages whilst market pressures were maximised and consumerism approaches to news-making became the norm. Market excesses however placed limits again on the proliferation of public debate. This resulted in struggles being fought in newsrooms concerning multiple journalism identities, with tensions emerging in a context of growing media concentration and penetration of international interests in the communication sector.

This new chapter in Brazil's history started to give roots, if only slowly and in contradictory ways, to new forms of thinking and approaches regarding the relationship between politics, democracy and the media. The anchoring of the media in the waters of the market without a doubt permitted crucial improvements to journalism practice, which gained in professionalism and balance. The voicing of the agendas of the opposition and of civil society, the articulation of various debates and the discussion of more social and controversial issues were among some of the positive developments detected in the coverage of the political and presidential elections of the post-dictatorship period, as we shall see. Growing market pressures, however, imposed limits on public debate. News during the 1990's became much more commercialised. In its urge to give in to the desires of a multiplicity of new publics, the press succumbed at times to sensationalism practices and *denuncismo* journalism to sell newspapers and feed avid readers. Market pressures thus placed restrictions on quality debate, requiring simplifications of media messages to reach wider audiences.

After the re-democratisation period (1985-1989) and especially after 1989, the state was seen as a potential force towards social inclusion and wealth distribution. These sentiments were manifested mostly during the presidential elections held after the dictatorship (1964-1985), which is one of the main reasons that these political campaigns and elections have been included as core case studies here. As we shall see, the state was the object of both excessive elite attacks because of its authoritarian roots and nepotism practices as much as it began to emerge as a source of hope for millions of Brazilians for a more just society. Thus I believe studying the major social and political transformations of the last two decades through the media pages is of essential importance if we aim to construct a more democratic and representative press. It is thus necessary to understand better how the press contributed to steer Brazilian society in specific directions in opposition to others, and also how its practices and editorial judgements were influenced by changes that were occurring in Brazilian society.

Due to growing media concentration and the exclusion of segments of the population as media publics, this research defends the strengthening of a complex media system which can permit the existence of a greater balance between the commercial and the public media sectors, advocating a case for the fortification of the latter space so that it can be a counterweight to the predominance of the former in the communication field. I also make an argument in favour of the enhancement of liberal journalism routines in the commercial press as a means of expanding the democratic potentials of news organisations, thus safeguarding journalism from both political and/or economic internal and external constraints.

## **1.2. Frameworks on the Brazilian media and on political economy theories**

### *a) Discussing hypotheses*

This research has looked at political and presidential campaigns from 1984 to 2002 in order to investigate the ways in which the mainstream press contributed to advance political and social change. Did journalism mediate public debate, offering spaces for opposing stances and including less privileged groups in the media's public sphere? Did it work to scrutinize state activities and defend democratic values, restraining from merely reproducing official viewpoints, avoiding bias or did it succumb to sensationalism practices? How did journalists influence these political events? Was it through professionalism and objectivity or through militant partisanship? These are the main questions that this research explores in the following chapters.

This present media critique – which I prefer to call a *media analysis* given the negative connotation still attached to the word “criticism” - does not endorse the view of the Brazilian media as being a mere “propaganda” vehicle of a single elitist discourse which serves to reinforce the ideologies of the status quo. I have strived to avoid radical pessimism as well as naïve market optimism. Rather, this research draws its frameworks from what academics like Hallin have identified as the media's flexibility and adaptability in a context where political systems have become more dynamic, governed not by a single ruling class but by rotating elites drawn from different parties and factions (quoted in McNair, 1995, 66). Brazil arguably saw elite divisions emerge in the wake of the re-democratization period. The traditional elite structures more associated with previous military regime circles and oligarchic politicians had their powers weakened amid the

growth of the center political field (center-right and left). The contemporary period thus witnessed different social groups (i.e. CNBB, CUT) and parties, mainly the PT (Worker's Party) and the PSDB (Brazilian Social-Democratic Party), engage in acrid political battles in the media regarding the future direction of Brazil.

As stated by Peter Dahlgren (1996), citizenship should be seen as a form of participating and mostly of *belonging* to certain communities, in other words, of being not only politically but also socially included. According to Keane (1989, x), Bobbio defines democracy as comprising "procedures for arriving at collective decisions in a way which secures the fullest possible participation of interested parties". Thus democracy is about the expansion of political rights to wider groups and the liberty given to citizens to participate in political life and to scrutinise power so that it can be used in favour of the public interest. The democratisation of a given society, or its democratic development, can be understood as the occupation of new political and social spaces by new groups and values. The framework that is applied here understands democracy as being tightly linked to wider social and political inclusion as well as the reduction of economic inequalities. In this sense, a mature democratic state is one which does not repress or marginalize dissent, but legitimises conflict and works out its divisions, extending whenever possible various forms of rights to the new groups that require them.

The media have thus a central role to play by mediating and promoting public debate, enabling the public to participate in political and decision-making processes and creating a more informed citizenry who will know how to exercise his/her political rights. Media democracy nonetheless goes beyond this. It refers also to the inclusion of more players in the public sphere; the democratisation of media discourses and journalistic practices; the proliferation of diverse communication channels and the access of broader segments of the population to both quality information and the means of production. Thus this research's main questions can be summarized as follows:

- 1) How and in what way (s) did the press contribute to advance democracy ?;
- 2) What role was played by journalists? ;
- 3) Who was included in the mainstream media arena ?

These are not easy questions to answer. This research strives to understand the connections between the Brazilian democratisation process and the effects it had on news organisations and vice-versa. It examines the advancements made by the press by taking

into consideration the main democratic functions demanded of media systems by Western liberal theory. It then situates such practices in the particular Brazilian social, political, economic and historical context. The analysis of the contributions made by journalists is also fundamental here. The hypothesis that I put forward is one which aims to investigate the ways in which professional journalism routines contributed for better media performance. I also examine various forms of political and economic constraints, including media biases and political-ideological prejudices as well as market pressures to simplify debates and produce sensationalist stories or corruption scandals.

Due to these pressures on journalism, I advocate a case for advancing professionalism and objectivity in the Brazilian media as a whole. For if we understand that there is inequality in the presentation of views, that certain positions are perceived as more dominant than others, then working with balance is essential for representing conflicting interests. This is not the same as making a case against journalism opinion-making and interpretation, which must exist, but which should work within an ideal of objectivity. Forms of militant journalism thus can coexist with professionalism and can be incorporated into the mainstream at particular times, as was the case of *FSP* with the *Diretas Já* campaign, as we shall see in Chapter 1. They can also be utilised by social and political groups in civic and alternative media channels in the pursuit of particular causes and campaigns. Firstly though, before engaging in the analysis of these competing journalism identities in the Brazilian media, it is necessary to situate such a debate more internationally.

*b) International perspectives: US/UK liberal media theories*

Communication systems are seen as essential for the exercise of full citizenship rights in liberal democracies. In the context of the growth of transnational conglomerates, increase of media concentration worldwide and demands placed on communication vehicles to maximise profits to reach wider audiences, the capacity of the national media to continue to commit to the public interest has been cast into doubt. Concerns have grown in relation to ownership power abuses, the suffocation of small to medium scale media businesses due to unhealthy market competition and the restrictions that are being placed again on the media's capacity to produce quality information and debate. Liberal media theory for instance has elected certain democratic ideals as vital for the correct functioning of the media in capitalist societies. Many of these derive from the social responsibility theory and

the requirements stipulated by the 1947 Commission on the Freedom of the Press. Among the main purposes demanded of media systems are: a) to inform citizens and the diverse interests groups in society with 'objective' information; b) to exercise critical surveillance over the activities of the state or carry out the watchdog function; c) to stimulate an arena of meaningful and quality public debate on policies which will affect society and d) to serve as platforms of access for groups and politicians to put their positions forward, as well as educational and cultural tools for citizens to have knowledge about their nation and the world (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995, 97).

Although the press in advanced democracies is seen as reflecting the influences of these liberal democratic values, both radical and critical liberal critics have highlighted obstacles which impede the full functioning of such ideals in these societies. Worried about the growth of media concentration and economic power, even the Commission of the Freedom of the Press back in the 1950's acknowledged the difficulties of the press of living up to these standards. It indicated back then that the forms of government intervention to secure democratic deliberation were limited (Siebert and Peterson, 1956). Blumler and Gurevitch (1995, 97-106) have further contrasted these liberal media ideals with actual practices, listing four main impediments: a) the tensions between giving the public what it wants with what it needs to know; b) the gap which exists between the elite political world that is portrayed by the media and the problems of access and participation for ordinary citizens; c) the implication that a democratic media must serve both a politically interested public and an increasingly apolitical one and d) the media's ability to pursue democratic values is restricted because this is usually compatible with the socio-political and economic environment in which it operates (1995, 98).

Brazilian news organisations have lived through all these tensions in the past decades, as we shall see. The recognition of such restraints nonetheless should not serve as a reason for dismissing the validity and importance (still) of liberal media requirements, including the watchdog function and professionalism. In the case of fledgling democracies like the Brazilian one, it is important to pressure media systems to continue to fulfil these claims of media performance, which have their roots in US and European progressive liberal thinking of the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries. It is not the watchdog function or the objectivity regime which poses risks to the public commitments of news organisations, contributing for the decline in civic engagement, but rather excessive commercialisation and political authoritarianism. Many academics have thus heavily criticised liberal media theory, linking the incapacity of many communication vehicles of living up to these ideals to implied

intentions of media industries and journalists of using such values to serve the needs of the status quo (i.e. Schudson, 1992; Hackett and Zhao, 1998). Many seem to take democratic liberalism too much for granted, associating it with (the evils of) capitalism, and not seeing that often the latter is in constant clash with both liberalism and democracy, as has been the case of Brazil, as we shall see. Arguably, if used appropriately, these liberal ideals can deepen more the current restricted democratic spaces of debate in the media.

Other media academics (Curran, 2000; Baker, 2002) have acknowledged the importance of the media's watchdog role and scrutinising of corrupt state activities. Scholars have argued nonetheless that the watchdog thesis tends to undermine all other forms of democratic functions, situating power abuse as being something confined to the governmental sphere (Curran, 2000). Nevertheless, the watchdog function and critique of government are still important media aims, especially in the Brazilian case where the media shifted from being passive and docile towards authority during the dictatorship to being more critical vis-à-vis the state. As Baker states (2002), media scrutiny of governmental actions is one of the main contributions that the media can make to democracy. As we shall see, the consolidation of these democratic tools in Brazilian journalism gave new credibility and legitimacy to the press, although marketing pressures and later financial crises faced by the industries culminated in declines in readership numbers and quality standards. The increase in the publication of political scandals during this period, or of what is known negatively as *denuncismo* journalism ("journalism of denunciation"), can be seen also as a consequence of a combination of factors which include political democratisation, market expansion, the growth of the power of the Judiciary and the personal desire of journalists for professional prestige.

I have adopted a framework here which sees media institutions and journalism as sites of conflict, places in which neither owners, shareholders, governments or advertisers assume total control. The assessment of the contributions made by the Brazilian media has thus been carried out by taking into account these frictions. This analysis will show that the contemporary period has seen the main national dailies fulfil some of the liberal democratic ideals highlighted by Blumler and Gurevitch (1995). There has been a growth in surveillance of state activities, an expansion of the social responsibility ethos, wider critique of authority and greater dialogue across a range of viewpoints. Left-wing positions were also incorporated in the media's public sphere as legitimate and authoritative agendas as well as newsworthy sources. Nonetheless, as we shall see, journalists and the media



operated within important boundaries that reflected the political and economic environment in which they were immersed.

Thus a previous repressive Brazilian state led the way for the market to occupy a more predominant and dynamic role, producing shifts from political authoritarianism to economic constraints. Waisbord (2000, 65) has pointed to the possibility that the growing ascendancy of the market in Latin American countries in the post-dictatorship period could contribute to disentangle more the connections between the press and federal governments, opening more opportunities for press scrutiny of governmental actions. However, for the free press/liberal market theory to really work media industries must enjoy a relatively good degree of economic independence from the state. Although the Brazilian press obtained a certain level of independence in relation to the state, especially after Collor's impeachment in 1992, as we shall see, political parties and governments still exercised degrees of (indirect) and sometimes direct constraint on political reporting. The state during these years nonetheless moved away from authoritarianism to social democracy, assuming more a participatory and distributional role in Brazilian society and in economic life and also interfering less with the press.

The market exercised also a series of negative consequences on journalism and media systems as much as it permitted positive advancements. The period covered here was one of increasing commercialization of the Brazilian communication industry and of financial media crises which imposed restraints on the press' commitments to liberal ideals and further contributions to the democratization process. It is thus important to acknowledge that certain democratic responsibilities cannot be taken up exclusively by the commercial sector, and that a complex media system with different journalism identities and roles would be better placed to meet all these demands. In order though to comprehend more the years of absence of a democratic culture in Brazilian news organizations and the slow progresses that are being made, it is necessary to examine the main academic debates on the Brazilian media.

### *c) Brazilian academic debates: radical and liberal critiques*

Brazilian academic media research started to expand in the decades of the 1970's and 1980's. Communication research would start to be institutionalised however in the 1990's. Brazil emerged during the decade amongst the top countries with a high volume of scientific research, appearing alongside countries like the UK, Canada and France. This fact

reflected the dynamism of the Brazilian media sector, which has television, magazines and newspapers of good technical quality. More than 50% of the research on communication was conducted between 1990 and 1995, contributing to expand media departments and to afford them greater status (Marques de Melo, 2003, 77-174). It is problematic, however, to speak of a unified Brazilian media studies school. Firstly, Brazilian media studies research is still a relatively new field. Secondly, the period from the 1970's onwards has seen the proliferation of a series of research interests. This has made the Brazilian academia a highly fragmented field embedded in antagonism (Marques de Melo, 2003), and which is supported by few competitive national research institutions. This is also a result of the late development of research and the oppressive regime imposed by the military generals on the academia during the dictatorship.

Fortunately, a diversity of solid communication research has been produced in the last couple of years. With the decline of the influence of the ideas' of the Frankfurt School, a series of new research trends emerged, ranging from semiotics studies to psychoanalysis and post-modernism, Althusserian and neo-Gramscian perspectives on the media and political economy research traditions. Marques de Melo (2003) has identified two main camps that influenced Brazilian intellectuals in the 1970's: the dependency theory and the liberation theology. In communication research, such theories were associated with the works of (Mattelart (Chile); Barbero (Colombia); Lins da Silva, Marques de Melo, Fadul (Brazil)). Marques de Melo's (1985) and Lins da Silva (1982), for instance, focused on the lack of economic independence of the Brazilian journalism sector, and on how it depended on revenue from both the state and from private advertising.

Marques de Melo (2003) has stressed that the political dimension of communication research has been favoured over other fields. He has identified certain key research trends, including historical memory studies (Bahia, 1990; Werneck Sodré, 1999); "war" or class conflict communication research (Marques de Melo, 1980; Lins da Silva, 1982; Marcondes Filho; 1982); utopianism, democratic change and press liberty studies (Caparelli, 1980, 1999; Paiva, 1982) and utility communications, which includes work on media and elections, agenda-setting, regional resistances and citizenship (Kucinski, 1998; Rubim, 1999; Marcondes Filho, 1985; Lattman-Weltman, 1994; Ortiz, 1994; Martins da Silva, 2002). Other research interests have explored issues of journalism and power, news techniques, journalism ethics, media and social exclusion (Lage, 1990; Bucci, 2000, Arbex Jr., 2001, Gonzaga Motta, 2002; Kucinski, 1998), media history and politics, reform of media industries and media concentration (Dines; 1974; Werneck Sodré, 1998, Seabra,

2002; Alves de Abreu, 2002; Lima, 1996) and identities, racism, popular culture, television, soap-operas and advertising (Muniz Sodré, 2000; Everardo Rocha, 1995; Mattos, 2000; Leal Filho, 1988).

Media studies research today is more concerned with exploring the contradictions of media systems and of the relationship between the media, society and politics. It is less interested in producing simplistic readings of the media which pay lip service to the idea of the “dominant discourse”, avoiding also an understanding of the Brazilian communication system through mainly imperialism theory perspectives. Such positions nonetheless still mark various radical lines of research in the field. Lins da Silva (1982) was a pioneering voice in academia in the 1980’s, pointing to the importance of the production of media research which could investigate conflict in media systems. According to Lins da Silva, studies should stop short from engaging exclusively in mechanistic examinations of the media, an argument that can be understood also as an attempt to move communications research away from pessimistic readings influenced by Frankfurt School theories or Althusserian perspectives. Although media studies has expanded considerably, there is still a dominant tendency among some researchers to adopt a pessimistic take on contemporary journalism, comparing these journalism routines to a previous nostalgic “non-commercial” and intellectual militant era of the 1970’s (i.e. Kucinski, 1998). These arguments are cast in black and white terms: they tend to undermine the problems of the Brazilian media in the 1970’s and to downplay the changes that have occurred in the communication sector in the past decades.

As Hallin (1994) notes, Habermas has advanced the critique made by the Frankfurt School theorists in relation to contemporary capitalism and how it has produced an ideological consensus in the media, leaving little room for resistance. Habermas has argued that liberal capitalist societies are actually “susceptible to conflict...precisely in the sphere of ideology and culture” (Hallin, 1994, 20). Like Adorno (1972,1991), Habermas has also stated that the capitalist form of production responsible for the creation of the public sphere restricts its development, impeding society from engaging fully in the process of dialoguing as promised by liberal institutions (in Hallin, 1994, 18). Hallin (1994) also adopts a neo-Gramscian reading of the media which he contrasts to the propaganda model advanced by Chomsky (1988, 2002). According to Hallin (1994,12), the hegemonic perspective differs from the propaganda model, which sees the media as a “simple mouthpiece for a unified elite”. Here he criticizes Herman and Chomsky’s (1988, 2002) dismissal of the ideology of journalism and the theory that the media’s main purpose is to back dominant views of the

political world: “..they have other functions...including providing information which elites use to make decisions and to serve as a forum for debate amongst elites.” (Hallin, 1994, 13).

The hegemonic perspective versus the propaganda model debate outlined above is somewhat similar to the discussions pursued by Lins da Silva (1982) and Kucinski (1998) on the political economy of the Brazilian media. Radical critics (i.e. Kucinski, 1998; Arbex Jr., 2001; Carta, 2003) have adopted a slightly non-historical view of the media, seeing the Brazilian communication sector as elitist and a mere reproducer of the ideologies of the establishment. They have tended to see two rigidly defined scenarios: one of highly engaged militant journalists who had their ‘golden days’ in the 1970’s and another of alienated and conformist journalists of the 1990’s with their excessive marketing practices. From a critical liberal position, Lins da Silva (1985) drew from a neo-Gramscian stance to stress the struggle for hegemony that takes place between the subordinated and dominant groups of Brazilian society, situating the media as being a ‘battlefield’ where such a struggle takes place daily. According to this view, the concept of resistance and conflict are at the core of the counter-discourses introduced in the media daily, thus enabling journalism action in favour of the working-classes or the unprivileged groups of Brazilian society: “...in the communication systems, in the cultural sphere there are contradictions, there is fight between classes, there is the possibility of the construction of a new historical block and the search for a new hegemony” (Lins da Silva; 1982, 18).

Writing a couple of years later, Kucinski (1998, 72-79) criticised Lins da Silva’s work on *FSP*’s 1984 reforms, which shifted the daily towards professional commercial journalism, as we shall see in Chapter 2. Influenced by the Althusserian concept of the ideological apparatus, Kucinski minimised the existence of conflict in media organisations and classified the media as a “bourgeoisie” press that merely reproduced dominant ideologies. Borrowing from the concept of “filter” elaborated by Chomsky (1988) in his discussion of the role of the American media in the US, Kucinski (1998, 21-23) argued that modern media practices stimulated the formation of a passive “consensus” in Brazilian society, although he admitted a growth in media pluralism. Kucinski (1998) affirmed however that certain strategic issues situated in the political and economic field continue to be sites of social control. This oppressive scenario, as the argument goes, reflects the authoritative legacy of Brazil’s colonial historical past and the vices inherited from the dictatorship.

These radical arguments are only partially correct. Lins da Silva's view of the media as being a "battlefield" is more coherent than a stance which seems to suggest that such spaces are totally controlled by press barons and business elites. Business and governmental elites arguably *do* have wider access to the media and can influence more news agendas than ordinary citizens. In an era of maximisation of media profits worldwide, news has become highly entertainment-driven. Strategies have been adopted to avoid the dissemination of controversial or sensitive issues which do not appeal to a wider (and generally conservative) middle-class public who constitute the core readers of the quality dailies. This does not mean to say that mainstream commercial journalism cannot engage with public debate. Brazilian journalism of the contemporary period for instance *has* addressed citizenship concerns and has explored more controversial social, political and economic issues, with a trend seen in newspapers in favour of watchdog journalism and more professional political reporting that has incorporated a wider range of views. That said, marketing pressures, political-ideological biases, class prejudices and fears of left-wing politics *did* influence and impose constraints, as we shall see.

Although some of his insights into the inequalities and injustices of the media system and Brazilian society are lucid, Kucinski assumes too readily a functionalist slant, seeing little room for conflict and not recognising the capacity of contemporary journalists, and even media publishers, to make a difference. Kucinski's critique is in line with other radical positions which have adopted a pessimistic stance in relation to the Brazilian media. Actually, I believe a pessimistic attitude one can perhaps have in regards to the slow progresses that have occurred in Brazilian society in the past decades. This includes the continuity still of both private and state clientelism, corrupt practices independently of governmental ideology (be it left or right-wing) and the prevalence of economic inequalities and some authoritarianism. Despite all its faults, I believe that the Brazilian media is actually slightly above (better) than some of these practices. Thus attacks that situate the functioning of conflict only within the marginal realm, and not within mainstream society and the media, are missing the point. As we shall see, the national dailies served during this period as sites of struggle of diverse agendas put forward by different social and political groups. They did not serve as a mere platform for the dissemination of conservative discourses.

Such radical attacks are connected to the excesses of critical political economy thinking in relation to the media. These stances tend to view news organisations as being corporate evil right-wing enterprises that want to maximise profits, control passive journalists and a

conformist public. Radical critics have also argued that the Brazilian media have been reluctant to take on fully a more public role, preferring to maximise profits by addressing the audience and readers as consumers (i.e. Moretzsohn, 2002; Kucinski, 1998; Arbex Jr., 2001). As this research will show, given the absence of a strong public media in Brazil, the commercial press functioned as influential mediators of public debate amongst mainly divided elites, having nonetheless been confined to the limits established by a market-driven environment.

Thus these radical critiques have been valid due to the emphasis placed on the injustices of media systems and the influence of elites in news-making. On the other hand, they have been erroneous because they have tended to see the media's relation to politics and society in a simplistic and non-historical way, indicating also a certain hostility towards the market. Lins da Silva's view of the importance of acknowledging struggles within media systems is still today a coherent way of approaching any study on the press and democracy. What one needs to avoid nonetheless is the extreme opposite position, the excessive and naive celebration of the "powers of the market" which seems to refuse to admit that the market is *not* capable of attending to *all* of the needs of complex societies. Finally, to understand more the role assumed by the mainstream media in the past decades one needs to examine the different journalism cultures that have influenced Brazilian news organisations and journalism.

### **1.3- Journalism identity – a profile of the Brazilian media**

#### *a) The American connection: professionalism and commercialisation*

Most of the Latin American media has been shaped by the Anglo-American popular commercial press model. These are countries that do not share a similar strong tradition of public service broadcasting (PSB) like the UK and other European nations. Until the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, international influences on Brazilian journalism came mainly from European countries, such as France and the UK. After the First World War however, the American influence grew. The US journalism model, with its favouring of a commercial logic approach to news and neutral professional journalistic routines, was embraced more fully in the late 1980's and 1990's. It was during this period that the modernization of the Brazilian media and print press was consolidated. Changes included the substitution of typing machines by computers, the entry in the media market of new technologies and the

blurring of the boundaries between commercial departments and newsrooms. Graphics and other visual style techniques used by the American media were also widely adopted by Brazilian newspapers and TV. Nevertheless, the consolidation of a US journalism style in Brazilian newsrooms did not occur without conflicts. To start with, there has been an absence of a consensus as to what the role of the Brazilian press is and what the governing norms of journalistic practice are. These factors actually reflect the ideological divisions that exist in the field (Anne-Marie Smith, 1997, quoted in Waisbord, 2000).

The incorporation of a US journalism style by the Latin American media happened differently, with each country moving away from partisanship to commercialism in their own pace (Lins da Silva, 1990; Taschner, 1992, quoted in Waisbord, 2000). Hallin (1994) has pointed out how studies have shown that the emergence of a political consensus was the driving force behind the development of American professional journalism. This has not been the case in Latin American countries or in Brazil, where journalism has been caught up in a highly politicised scenario since the end of the dictatorship, making agreements on objectivity problematic. In his study on watchdog journalism in South America, Waisbord (2000) has argued how the entry of South American countries into the realm of market democracy facilitated the means for the proliferation of the watchdog function and of investigative reporting. Waisbord (2000) has also shown that some consensus around journalism liberal principles did exist, with Brazil placing a particular emphasis on facticity and professionalism, but showing more suspicion of objectivity and impartiality.

Professionalism thus expanded in Brazil in the 1990's. It is still relatively low though in the whole media industry, having been developed both in connection and in tension with commercialisation and with political democratisation. Journalists during the years covered here have sought to assert their journalistic professionalism against market pressures and political constraints. Brazilian contemporary journalism has thus favoured fact gathering and professional values over ideological ones, although partisanship is still very present, as we shall see. That said, Brazil today is the main country in Latin American which awards its journalists professional prestige. This is done mainly in the form of journalism prizes, which include the Esso Journalism Award, the Vladimir Herzog prize and the Líbero Badaró, given by the magazine *Imprensa* and sponsored by ABI (Brazilian Press Association).

It is problematic though to speak of a unified media system or of a full consolidation of the American commercial model due to the strong national particularities of Brazilian news organisations. This can to a certain extent be seen as being a positive factor amid the threat

posed on media systems worldwide of homogenisation of their journalism routines and of “Americanization”. I will argue that the adoption of professional liberal values by Brazilian journalism has been something positive, and cannot be viewed as being merely a process of homogenisation and of importation of Anglo-American journalism formats to Brazil within a US imperialist line. Liberal professionalism nonetheless has clashed with militant journalism styles, debates which are further developed in Chapter 6. Multiple journalism identities have thus marked Brazilian mainstream newsrooms, something which is a consequence also of the diversity of the national communication sector, which includes the more commercial Southern national media and the more partisan organisations of the North. Struggles in the journalism field over diverse readings of professionalism have thus been a reflection of the clashes carried out in Brazilian society between various political-economic projects for the country, which have been defended by different groups with often conflicting interests.

*b) The imperialism debate and the commercial versus the public media*

North America started to have a major economic and political role in Latin America from the First World War onwards (Lins da Silva, 1982; Marques de Melo, 1980), with the American influence on media systems intensifying after World War II (Thussu, 2000; Tunstall, 1977). The US Department of State, which promoted the conception of press freedom around the world (Hallin and Mancini, 2004; 255-256), began to consequently give rise to a global culture of communications. Our current new communication era in has thus seen the increase of media concentration, formation of transnational conglomerates worldwide and the dissemination of the commercial and liberal journalism ideology by American and British news agencies, like CNN and Reuters (Thussu, 2000). The origins of a market-oriented US style press in Latin America can however be traced to the years when South American economies were beginning to enter the industrial order (Lins da Silva, 1990; Waisbord, 2000). It was during the 1990’s though that attempts to consolidate this US commercial journalism model began to grow. However, there have been many problems. The low readership levels of the Brazilian population for instance have made it difficult for communication sectors to operate as fully independent economic ventures. The weakness of the functioning of most Brazilian media industries as capitalist enterprises and the instability of the capitalist economy has thus made the media traditionally cultivate a



close relationship of compromise with the state<sup>1</sup> (Lins da Silva, 1990; Marques de Mello, 1990; Dines, 1986; Waisbord, 2000).

Cultural imperialism theories of the 1970's and 1980's argued that the media in developing countries imported not only foreign news and cultural formats, but also values of consumption. These theories were critical of the modernization arguments, which claimed that Anglo-American media were capable of promoting the "modernization" of developing countries (Mattelart, 1978; Thussu, 2000). Dependence theory argued that these economic relations worked within an exploitative dependency model that promoted American capitalist mentality in developing countries in a relationship that secured the continuity of this dependence (Mattelart, 1982). These views came under attack from the 1980's onwards by a series of media theorists (Tracy, 1985; Fejes, 1981, quoted in Reeves, 1993) due to their "narrow empiricism and theoretical deficiencies" (Reeves, 1993: 53). They were also criticised due to their reluctance in proposing a new model capable of acknowledging other traffic flows which went beyond the rigidity of one-way flows from First to Third World countries. Key media imperialism theses thus affirmed that external factors such as the expansion of transnational corporations and the agenda of the US government shaped the historical evolution of broadcasting systems in Latin American countries (Waisbord, 1995, 201).

However, with the emergence of strong regional programming and the decline of the popularity of US television shows in Latin America, studies questioned the previous idea of one-way flows (i.e. Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi, 1994; Straubhaar, 1991). Television channels like Globo TV for instance have reversed the flows from Third to First World countries through the exportation of successful soap-opera programmes, in spite of the fact that the station has been heavily influenced by American commercial formats. Similarly, as we shall see, the Brazilian press has also a strong national character despite the influence of US professional journalism.

The commercial model nonetheless has dominated the Brazilian media. The public media is practically non-existent and has been generally constructed in the modes of a "state" media more than anything else. Public media channels address a restricted audience

---

<sup>1</sup> The state is still the biggest advertiser, participating in around 7,13% of all advertising investment, which is approximately US\$ 493.136 million (Lima, 1996, 99). In 1994, government advertising totaled US\$ 210 million, with the total expenditures being US\$ 6.6 billion in 1994 and US\$ 8.5 billion in 1995 (Waisbord, 2000, 66).

and are widely used by politicians in the pursuit of their own personal interests.<sup>2</sup> The BBC (PSB), which relies on public funding obtained through the payment of a licence fee and is seen as a communication vehicle which stands as a counter-force to commodified media (Garnham, 1990; Curran and Seaton, 1991; Golding and Murdock, 1991; 157), is a model which does not exist in Brazil. Notwithstanding the decline of the PBS system in many European countries in a context of maximization of the commercial activities of public broadcasting stations like the BBC, it seems to me that the PSB model remains an ideal for countries like Brazil who are currently discussing forms of enhancing their current weak and partisan public media. Before the current dominance of the commercial sector in the Brazilian media market and the influence of US journalism formats however, Brazilian journalism was marked by various other national and international literary and political identities.

*c) Brazilian journalism: literary and political influences*

Brazilian journalism has also been shaped by literary European and partisan influences. In contrast to the US and to many European countries, which saw journalism expand already in the 18 and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, journalism arrived in Brazil with a period of deficiency of 200 years. The press emerged in conjunction with the establishment of the royal Portuguese family in 1808. The first Brazilian newspaper was *Correio Braziliense*. It came out in 1808 and was edited by Hipolito José da Costa in London due to the restrictions imposed by the royal family on the publication and circulation of dailies in Brazil. Between 1808 and 1822, the only newspaper that was allowed to be published was the government's official publication, the *Gazeta do Povo* (Seabra, 2002; 33). After Brazil's independence from Portugal in 1822, when the press was authorized to operate freely, a series of radical political newspapers started to appear. This phase was later known by media academics as the ideological period, as it combined a more interpretative and polemic discourse with literary influences, reflecting the particular historical moment that the country was living. The emergent press was seen as a form of 'extended tribune', to use the words of one of the founders of the Brazilian Republic, Benjamin Constant.

---

<sup>2</sup> Created in 1967 by the São Paulo government, TV Cultura is the main Brazilian public television station. It enjoys a reasonably good reputation as being a station of high quality but which however has a very low audience. It struggles also with little resources. It is controlled by the private foundation Fundação Padre Anchieta and includes two radio stations, Cultura AM and FM, funded by a combination of public and private resources.

According to the scarce media literature available on this period, Brazilian journalism started to define itself at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Breguez (2000) pointed to three main phases of Brazilian print journalism: a) the ideological and opinionated first phase (1900-1920); b) the informative style and the trend of the journalism manuals (1920-1945) and c) interpretative journalism (1945-1980). Amid competition from radio and television, the interpretative phase was considered the modern period of journalism, when traditional journalism techniques such as the classical lead were relaxed and more personal styles appeared. It was during the 1950's that Brazilian journalism was eventually constructed as a commercial enterprise, although the press was still heavily partisan and would remain so for some time. This phase also saw the proliferation of more interpretative journalism styles that today have become fully consolidated, including in-depth analyses and investigative journalism.

Drawing from Breguez's (2000) description of the main phases of Brazilian journalism, Roberto Seabra (2002, 32-45) identified five stages of its development. These include: a) the literary journalism period, which begins with the emergence of the press and goes until the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century; b) the aesthetic informative phase, which consists of the transition period between the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century until the end of the First World War; c) the informative utility phase (1950-1960); d) the interpretative journalism one (1970-1990) and e) plural journalism, which is the current contemporary model. The plural phase started in the 1970's and is characterised by a diversity of journalism styles, reflecting the influences of mediums like the Internet and entertainment genres (i.e. infotainment) on journalism. This research focuses on this last phase.

Similar to European newspapers, dailies in Brazil have also had a strong political tradition. Veteran journalist like Alberto Dines and Mino Carta, former chief-editors of *Jornal do Brasil* and *Veja* during the early 1970's, respectively, elected the more militant active journalism style that resisted the military regime as being superior to the current commercial US model. As we shall see, the alternative press during the dictatorship functioned as a sort of political and literary sphere (Kucinski, 1991; Waisbord, 2000). It flourished during the dark years of the regime in Rio and São Paulo, with most of these papers ceasing to exist after the end of the dictatorship. Because of fears of censorship, the mainstream dailies encountered difficulties in conducting critical reporting, with resistance in newsrooms being more restricted to certain periods of the dictatorship. Militant activism was however present in many mainstream newsrooms, with military generals eventually pressuring for the dismissal of heavyweight journalists like Cláudio Abramo from *FSP* and

Mino Carta from *Veja*, issues which are examined in more detail in Chapter 6. With the collapse of the dictatorship, press exposés on corruption and abuses of power left the domain of alternative newspapers and were incorporated by the mainstream media as a major trend of contemporary journalism (Waisbord, 2000).

Newsrooms lived with competing journalism identities from the 1980's onwards, as we shall see. Journalists were thus not totally dismissive of militant or citizenship forms of journalism. Most of the mainstream media though, after having claimed adherence to the objectivity regime, did not explicitly assume any alignments with political parties in the post-dictatorship phase and in general strived to adopt a neutral stance during presidential election campaigns. However, as we shall see, partisanship and sympathies in relation to the PSDB and further conflicts with the PT regarding the country's main dilemmas produced acrid political battles in the newspaper pages. All these factors have made Brazilian journalism have a distinctively national identity. Thus it has not been a copy-cat model of American or European journalism, and in many ways it has managed to maintain and cultivate a strong national identity. It can be said though that Brazilian journalism lies somewhere in between the liberal North American model and the more partisan European journalism style, resembling on one hand Southern European media systems as well as striving to reflect more sharply US commercial liberal ideology (Hallin and Mancini, 2004; Hallin and Papathanassopoulos, 2002). The last two decades have nonetheless seen a tilt towards the latter model, with debates on the exclusion of segments of the population as consumers of media products arising in the midst of a further growth in media concentration.

#### **1.4. Media concentration and social exclusion in the Brazilian media**

One of the characteristics of the Brazilian media system is ownership concentration. Television is the biggest form of access to information and is basically the only medium that has a mass public. The vast majority of the Brazilian population obtain their perceptions of politics through commercial broadcasting. Newspapers have a small circulation and are generally elite-oriented, although the last few years have seen the expansion of popular dailies (i.e. *O Dia* and *Extra*) addressed to broader publics. Certain segments of the population are however still excluded from the readership of newspapers due to economic inequalities and low educational levels. Roberto Amaral (2002) has stated how media concentration reflects inequalities of Brazilian society, which has inherited an

authoritative colonial legacy that excludes segments of the country from participating as active citizens/consumers of the media.

The 1990's though has witnessed various changes in the media sector, with media concentration expanding at the same time that new mediums attending to different tastes and political positions have proliferated. This has made academics (Seabra; 2002, Breguez, 2000; Kucinski, 1998) talk of a certain democratisation of the media market from the mid-90's onwards as a result of both political democratisation and market competition. This has also worked to undermine slightly the negative impact of media concentration. This trend has been detected mainly in the emergence of plural journalism genres (i.e. blogging) and in the development of regional media vehicles (i.e. community radio) and media channels (i.e. magazines like *Carta Capital*) directed to a variety of audiences.

Media firms invested in the 1990's, with little profit in return, in the privatisation of the telecommunications system and in new technologies. This culminated in cuts in editorial investments, in journalism unemployment and publicity loses. Newspapers saw a certain decline in their circulation, a trend which was slightly reversed in the last couple of years. Brazil was also affected by the Internet boom of the 1990's, seeing wider mergers between media companies (i.e. synergy trends). Cable and satellite television stations also grew rapidly following the approval of deregulation broadcasting laws. Newspapers aligned with Internet providers and international and national telecommunication companies. Thus in spite of the financial media crises, the 1990's in general created a more dynamic and profitable communication market for the Brazilian media, one that still needs though to become more democratic.

A limited number of families own the Brazilian mainstream media. The Marinho family own Globo Organizations (Globo TV, the newspapers *O Globo*, *Extra* and *Valor Econômico*, *Rádio Globo* and *CBN*, the publisher Editora Globo, the magazine *Época*, the web portal Globo.com, the cable TV Net and a number of shares in non-media firms); the Civitas the main publishing magazine company, the Abril group, which publishes *Veja* and a total of 90 entertainment and lifestyle magazines; the Mesquitas (*Estado de São Paulo*, *Agência Estado*, *Estado.com*); the Frias (*Folha de Sao Paulo*, the web portal *UOL*, *Agência Folha*, *Diário Popular*, *Valor Econômico* (with Globo); Nascimento Brito and Nelson Tarnure (the former owned *Jornal do Brasil* and sold it to the latter) and Silvo Santos (SBT TV). Lima (1996) has talked about five main media groups which are: a) Civita (Abril); b) Mesquita (*ESP*); c) Frias (*FSP*); d) Martinez (*CNT*) and Levy (*Gazeta Mercantil*). The other eight major families in the radio and television sector are: *national* - a) Marinho (Globo); b)

Saad (Bandeirantes); c) Abravanel (SBT) and *regional* – a) Sirotsky (RBS), in Porto Alegre; b) Daou (TV Amazonas); c) Jereissati (TV Verdes Mares), in Ceará; d) Zahran (Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul) and e) Câmara (TV Anhangüera). Brazil has approximately ten main national newspapers aimed at the middle and upper-classes – two from SP (*Folha de São Paulo* and *Estado de São Paulo*); two from RJ (*O Globo* and *Jornal do Brasil*), two popular newspapers (*O Dia* and *Extra*); one from Brasília (*Correio Brasiliense*); Porto Alegre (*Zero Hora*) and two financial dailies (*Gazeta Mercantil* and *Valor Econômico*).

According to Lima (1996, 104), the financial media crisis forced media family groups to reorganise themselves, with the style of the family-run businesses being downplayed in favour of the “professionalization” of the top functions. However, the mainstream media are still in the hands of Brazilian families and have not suffered yet from “denationalisation” due to the recent entry of international media interests mainly in the cable and satellite television market. There are clear disparities and differences however when one compares the mainstream commercial media with the regional communication vehicles in the country. The latter are heavily subject to political control. This is the case for instance of the media in Bahia, controlled by the group of the politician Antônio Carlos Magalhães, by José Sarney in Maranhão and by Collor de Mello’s family in Alagoas. In comparison to these, the national mainstream media operate with relatively good degrees of political and economic independence.

*Veja* and *Isto É* are addressed to elite decision-making publics. The open television channels are TV Globo, SBT, TVE, Band Rio, CNT, Rede TV and Record, with the groups Net Brasil and TVA dominating 80% of the market of paid subscriptions. Net Brasil is TV Globo’s operator of cable channels and TVA is owned by the Abril group, which sold roughly 1 million copies per edition in the first eight months of 2003, according to the Institute of Circulation Verifier (IVC). It is considered to be the leader in the magazine market, having a 59,1% share of the total. It is followed by the Globo group, which has 16,5% and publishes *Época*, and Editora Três, which has 9,9% of the market and publishes *Isto É* (see appendix 11). Globo TV, the fourth biggest television network in the world and the biggest communications conglomerate in Brazil and in Latin America, reaches 99,7% of the population. This makes TV in Brazil be a major institution of the public sphere, deserving an isolated study on the impact of its political news on audiences. Brazilian television however is highly entertainment-driven, attracting more attention to its

*telenovelas* (soap-operas) than its current affairs programmes, which have nonetheless gained in quality in the last couple of years.

Scholars (Bucci, 2000; Conti, 1999; Lima, 1996; Kucinski, 1998) have discussed widely the role that TV Globo played in the coverage of the presidential elections and key political events of the post-dictatorship phase. Globo TV was accused of undermining popular movements and left-wing aspirations in episodes such as the 1984 *Diretas Já* campaign and the 1989 presidential elections, issues which are debated in the forthcoming chapters in relation to the press' coverage of the elections. Evidently, media owners have a complex relationship with their news organisations. Media owners can advance positions and contribute for the expansion of public debate, but they can also create constraints or use media vehicles to promote their own personal or commercial interests. Golding and Murdock (1991, 2000; 160) have argued that owners of newspaper chains like Pulitzer and Hearst in the US and Northcliffe in the UK used their enterprises to 'promote their political causes or to designate positions and people they disagreed with'. The role of ownership is explored further in the case studies of this research.

Thus television and radio can be seen at first as being more "democratic" than newspapers due to the dissemination of their information to a mass public. However, it is in the spaces of the quality newspapers that public debates on political issues are actually carried out. These dailies address decision-making publics and function as the main sources for elites to engage in discussions on public affairs. They are thus active institutions of the public sphere, which is the reason why this research has chosen to examine the national upmarket mainstream newspapers and not television (see [Table 1](#) and appendices).

**Table 1 – Mainstream national media**

<b>Newspapers</b> (529)	<b>Magazines</b> (1.485)	<b>Television stations</b> (281)	<b>Online</b> (14 million users)	<b>Cable &amp; Satellite</b> (3.5 million users paid TV)
<i>FSP</i> – 311.000	<i>Veja</i> (1.1. million)	<i>TV Globo</i>	<i>UOL</i>	<i>Net Brasil</i>
<i>Globo</i> (250.000)	<i>Reader's Digest</i> (508.000)	<i>SBT</i>	<i>AOL</i>	<i>TVA</i>

<i>ESP</i> - 238.000	<i>Época</i> (420.000)	<i>Record</i>	<i>IG</i>	<i>Sky 7 Direc TV</i>
<i>Extra</i> (227.000)	<i>Superinteressante</i> (394.000)	<i>Rede TV!</i>	<i>Globo.com</i>	
<i>O Dia</i> (196.000)	<i>Cláudia</i> (385.000)			
<i>JB</i> (100.000)	<i>Isto É</i> (362.000)	<i>CNT</i>		

Source: Institute of Circulation Verifier (IVC) until 2003, National Association of Newspapers (ANJ)(2002) and Pay TV Survey (PTS) (2001)

According to ANJ (National Association of Newspapers), which is formed by 126 journalism societies and represents the media industries, out of a total number of 2.464 newspapers, 529 are published daily. In 2002, the circulation was of 6,9 million papers per day, a small amount if we consider that Brazil has approximately 180 million people. This fact has made many critics claim that Brazil is a country that does not read newspapers. Although he wrote in the mid-80's, journalist Alberto Dines (1974, 1985) remarked that the production of newspapers, magazines and books together reached little more than 20 million people, a number inferior to other products in Brazil, which can reach 50 million. Furthermore, only 12 dailies surpass the average of 100.000 copies per edition, selling less than 500.000 on weekends. The relatively low circulation of national dailies has evidently stalled entrepreneur urges to expand the circulation of newspapers. Architect of the *FSP* project, Lins da Silva sees little room for increases in newspaper circulation, and defends that dailies should stick to a demanding reader: "The newspaper needs to address the intellectual elite... The circulations will not grow anymore. This can be different...if the elites grow a lot, which I do not believe will happen. So it is not viable to expand more the circulation. In the attempt of expanding the circulation in the 1990's, promotions were distributed and people threw away the paper. To conquer this public, the quality of the papers fell. And with that, the newspapers lost a good part of their sophisticated public. The possibility is that you maintain a circulation that is at least faithful, and which permits in some way that the newspapers survive."

Brazilian newspapers have never been highly profitable businesses like their American counter-parts, although groups like *Folha*, *Globo* and the Abril group do make reasonably good profits. According to ANJ, after four years of relative growth in circulation, Brazilian newspapers experienced a fall of 2,7% in 2001. In 2002, the average circulation fell again to 9,1%, although it saw a slight increase of 5% during 2004 and 2005. The reduction of the readership of newspapers however has been a worldwide phenomenon which has deep roots



in the inauguration of television in the 1950's. Speaking from a US context, Hallin (2000; 221) has identified the stockholder and readership theories as major schools of debate on this issue. He has highlighted how American newspapers chose to deal with the decline of readership of dailies by investing in shorter stories, graphics and colours, thus moving news away from public affairs to entertainment. Arguments that support this theory point to the fact that people are working more and have less time to read newspapers. The stockholder premise puts the blame on the dailies, affirming that the media's pursuit of short-term profits has cut quality and raised prices, alienating the common reader in their search for a more affluent readership (Hallin, 2000; 223). Between 1967 and 1991, the percentage of American adults saying they read a newspaper every day declined from 73 to 51 (Kurtz, 1993b: 62, quoted in Hallin, 2000, 222). In the UK, by the end of 2004 less than half the population was reading a national newspaper daily (*The Guardian*, 11/09/05), with many predicting the end of the broadsheet and the transference of dailies to electronic formats to attract younger consumers.

However, the Brazilian situation is complex and different from other developed countries. Contrary to what is happening in the UK and in the US, it can be argued that democratisation, the inclusion of wider players in the media and the recent proliferation of new communication outlets are factors which point to a possible future amplification in circulation numbers. Thus in spite of the financial crises and the expansion of media concentration, the media market that has emerged in the 1990's is one which has more democratic potential than before. It needs nonetheless to be strengthened and improved so that the Brazilian media system can live up more fully to wider democratic demands. The question is thus *how* to democratise further these new spaces, creating mechanisms which can correct market failures and guarantee wider diversity and more debate in the media arena. Evidently, the exclusion of some publics as readers of quality newspapers due to low economic power and educational levels are factors which the media by itself cannot correct. This can only be reversed if Brazil manages to reduce more economic inequalities and boost educational inclusion. The media can thus only address a fully well-informed (mass) public if there are significant increases in educational, economic and social levels which can permit the inclusion of broader segments of the population in a proper mass market. Thus the media can contribute here by mediating public debate and pressuring more for the advancement of the democratisation process, striving to live up more fully to liberal democratic demands and gaining more independence, issues developed throughout this research.

## II - Debates on theory and methods

### *a) Methodological issues*

The study of the relationship between the media and political democracy is not a straightforward task. There are various ways of approaching the subject. Traditional social science might prefer an exclusively quantitative analysis of voters' perceptions of media messages and their impact on voting behaviour whereas a more qualitative analysis might favour the interaction of media discourses with production practices. This research has chosen to engage with the latter. This historical and comparative research has been primarily concerned with studying past events in order to understand better the present. It has compared the Brazilian media system to the liberal Anglo-American model, producing a qualitative in-depth analysis that aims to capture the complexities of the relationship between Brazilian history, politics and the media. It has interwoven journalism textual and non-textual practices with wider macro-political events that have shaped the current Brazilian power structures since the end of the dictatorship.

This thesis has favoured the empirical paradigm, interconnecting media discourses with journalistic practices and situating these within the realm of the dominant ideas which circulated in Brazilian society during the 18 year period covered by this research (1984-2002). The political and presidential campaigns discussed here have thus been: a) the 1984 direct elections (*Diretas Já*) campaign which demanded an end to the dictatorship; b) the 1989 elections, the first after the end of the military regime, and the 1992 impeachment process that followed; c) the 1994 elections, which saw the sociologist Fernando Henrique Cardoso elected and d) the 2002 dispute, which swore into power the centre-left wing government of former union worker Luis Inácio Lula da Silva. I have investigated here *how* the press shaped the outcome of these political events, and the ways in which it was also constrained by the socio-economic and political reality of its time.

This research has adopted a primarily qualitative methodology with a limited focus on quantification to establish better generalizations and to identify certain thematic and political trends. Spicer (2004) has stressed the similarities that exist between the qualitative and quantitative methods, affirming that one can complement rather than exclude the other. Many feminist scholars have also begun to defend the use of combined methods as a means of affording greater status to research and of pressuring for the advancement of specific

policy issues (Spicer, 2004, 296). I do not wish though to broach further the debate over which research method (qualitative or quantitative) is “better”. Given the complexities of this research’s subject matter, I have chosen to favour qualitative methodology, intertwining discourse analysis of media texts with participant observation of the media industries and with journalistic production practices. I have thus strived to discuss the social and political changes that occurred in Brazilian society by going beyond the traditional linguistic analysis of lexical terms in media texts. Texts cannot be examined in isolation from societal and external influences. I have thus adopted a much more complex approach to the analyse of media texts, going beyond the investigation of how words express certain values, norms or prejudices. Rather, I have interconnected the analyses of words, phrases, headlines and arguments to story lines, journalists’ editorial judgements and socio-economic and political contexts.

I have thus made use of quantitative content analysis methodology in a particular case study as a means of exploring the shifting of discourses away from the political field to the economic in the light of the impact that this had on the outcome of the 1994 elections. Quantitative content analysis however has been limitedly used. This method has permitted me though to identify political campaign trends and themes stressed by the media in the 1994 campaign (i.e. *real*, poverty, strikes) as well as to spot instances of ideological media biases. The categories of “negative”, “positive” and “neutral” have also been limitedly adopted to investigate mainly the latter issue. I have further maintained a critical view of these terms. Firstly, I believe a “neutral” discourse can be understood as the absence of the negative and the positive. It can be seen as a space which includes phrases that do not carry within them degrees of partisanship, are low in ideological commitments and manage somehow to balance information from opposing interest groups. This is a contrast to the positive and negative discourses, which rely more on personal and on political-ideological alignments and sympathies.

Thus if both these categories (positive and negative) as well as neutral discourses are utilised by the dailies in a somewhat equal manner when a debate emerges on a political candidate or party, it is possible to say that an equilibrium or balance in the coverage has been attempted or even achieved. That said, given the ambiguity of media discourses and the subjectivity that is inherent in the act of placing certain texts in particular categories, the content analysis carried out here was not without its problems concerning the reliability of the process of applying judgements to semantic units. Due to the polysemic character of media texts and the difficulties of defining what exactly constitutes a “neutral” discourse, in

some cases I found myself making a second interpretation of the unit of analysis after a brief period of interval. However, the validity of my content analysis must be judged not against a “truer reading” of the texts or in terms of low reliability factors but rather in its grounding in my core research questions.

In regards to the theoretical influences that have shaped my view of discourse analysis, my sympathies lie with certain aspects of the Foucauldian perspective, such as the emphasis placed on the close ties between power and language. I am also in debt to Fairclough’s focus on the relationship that exists between language and ideology as well to the discourse analysis methodological approach associated to the work done by the Glasgow University Media Group (GUMG). My comprehension of discourse analysis is that it is a method committed to challenging common-sense thinking. It is critical of taken-for-granted knowledge and argues that the ways in which we view the world are historically specific and socially constructed. Discourse analysis is thus an interpretation warranted by detailed attention to the material studied (see appendix for further debate on this). The GUMG have used Fiske’s (1987: 14) view of discourse as being a system of representation which serves the interests of certain sections of society. As Fairclough (1995, 184) further points out, Bourdieu (1991) has described *political discourse* as being a site of external and internal struggle: one to sustain a coherent political discourse within an internal structure and another to constitute a political public and a base of support for the political discourse, individuals and institutions associated with it. I will show in the case studies of this research that political struggles over discourse were carried out by diverse groups of Brazilian society throughout the years, and how certain perspectives and discourses (i.e. the necessity for wider political participation and social inclusion) began to be legitimised from election to election, achieving wider acceptability.

I have used some of Foucault’s ideas (1972) on the importance of historicizing discourse, seeing a relationship between discourse, representation and knowledge in a way which ‘truth’ is said to only mean something within a specific historical context. I thus believe that discourses and forms of knowledge are produced in certain periods, and that they differ from one phase to another with no necessary continuity between them. This seems to be the case of the 18 year period covered here, which has not always seen the development of progressive ideas. Cases of corruption in Lula’s government for instance emerged in 2005, indicating that such practises are still ingrained in Brazilian structures independently of political ideology and that many have not been buried with Brazil’s authoritarian past. Thus although apparently a pattern of continuity between events seems

to spring up here, the fact of the matter is that the period investigated in this research was overwhelmed by constant returns to old vices as well as to ideological biases.

Fairclough (1992) sees a close relationship between change and discourse. He defends the democratisation of media discourses, a position that I endorse. I see this albeit as being less of a linguistic problem and more a factor which is related to the type of discourse practices assumed by the media on a daily basis. I view this as a need of placing emphasis on the re-articulation of media actions, which could be done by favouring more professional practices and journalism autonomy for instance to the detriment of excessive politicisation and commercialisation. Similar though to the GUMG, I am critical of the highly text-based approach of Fairclough's work and the little emphasis placed on production and reception processes. I am also wary of the act of aiming to merely unwrap discourses that are being oppressed by "dominant discourses" which are supposedly embedded in all texts. Arguably, different variations of discourse exist in the media. One cannot assume a simplistic divide between a "dominant ideology" versus an "alternative" one. Ideology is a highly contested term which I do not wish to intellectually discuss here. I have preferred to use the word *discourse*. That said, it is important to state that ideology can be viewed as being a set of values which are either taken for granted or not, appearing as either fact or opinion (i.e. women are physically weaker than men). These can be articulated in the media through complex and competing textual strategies, in other words, through various forms of *discourse*.

My discourse analysis approach has thus not been exclusively text-based. I have examined *contradictory* discourses present in particular socio-economic and political settings in Brazil, relating these to different social interests and identifying *how* they were articulated in the media's public sphere. I have also looked at what is absent and present in a text and the impact of external factors like professional journalistic ideologies on media discourses. Due to a lack of time and resources and the extensive amount of work employed in this research, I did not look at the reception of these political texts by the public, something which I think can be the object of future studies on this research's topic. Similar though to the discourse analysis approach adopted by the GUMG, I investigated a range of discourses present in Brazilian society on issues of politics, economics, social movements and culture. In their examination of the Middle Eastern conflict for instance, the Glasgow media academics (Philo, Glasgow University Group, 2004) adopted a thematic analysis. They stated that a series of assumptions shared by a group about a particular event competed with various other ideas from other groups. They argued further that certain

values of a particular group seek to explain the world while justifying their own position within it in contrast to others that seek to understand the world differently. This conceptual framework has guided me in this research. I have looked at a diversity of social accounts on Brazilian politics and read extensively on Brazilian history and sociology, situating my research findings in the context of the competing discourses which prevailed in Brazil in the past decades.

Thus much of the literature discussed here is American and European, but the empirical work is strictly focused on Brazil. It is a result of an intensive six to eight month period of fieldwork in the country and was carried out mainly between December 2003 and June 2004. It includes research into national historical archives, where I collected newspaper articles and media material on the political campaigns and presidential elections. The core of this research has come from media texts extracted from four national Brazilian dailies and two magazines located in the RJ-SP-Brasília axis (*FSP*, *ESP*, *O Globo*, *JB* and *Veja* and *Isto É*), which are seen in [Table 1](#). I produced a cluster sample of each case study, using random sampling techniques to select the material. I collected newspaper articles from the dailies everyday during the campaign periods covered, determining the pieces which were important and disregarding media material considered little relevant to the issues debated in each campaign. I gave importance not to the size of the sample or the need to collect a similar average amount of texts from each daily but rather to the theme dealt in the text and the impact that the issue had in each political event covered. The samples of each case study thus comprise stories of various lengths and different news formats and genres (i.e. reportage, interviews, commentary, analysis, editorials, short factual stories, headlines). Issues selected included the articulation of party politics; political debates and campaign proposals; the rallies and demonstrations organised and the official campaign events and the attacks exchanged between rival politicians (see appendix for an example).

This research also examined how the stories were framed. I selected the stories which were considered more “objective” and balanced as opposed to those that could be seen as more ideologically biased. My comprehension of bias is that it is a notion which refers to a distortion in favour of particular interests. This applies to the media when they misrepresent or ignore alternative viewpoints (McQueen, 2003, 105). Contrary to Schudson (2004) though, I have seen bias here less as something embedded in professional news routines but more as a result of internal institutional constraints, social and cultural influences on journalists and external economic and political restrictions. Bias can undoubtedly though be

detected in various spheres, including in the structure of institutions, in news selection procedures as well as in the personal values of journalists.

The criteria that I applied to select the “better” and more accurate journalism texts on the political and presidential campaigns has thus been one which has favoured: a) stories with facts; b) the publication of opposing viewpoints and beliefs which aim to present a fairer or more complex picture of the situation in question or which strives to be a coherent critical interpretation of the event; c) features where there is an absence of clichés, “common sense” ideas or highly charged ideological language (i.e. the reds) and d) stories with a tone of rational-critical debate in opposition to highly emotional and passionate discourses. That said, I have not totally disregarded the validity of passionate discourses, and have highlighted the significance of more militant journalism styles aimed at pressuring for the advancement of democracy and the correction of social and economic injustices.

Chapters 2 to 5 contain the core of the empirical research. Chapter 6 is a theoretical debate on the role that journalists played in the advancement of democracy whilst Chapter 7 is the thesis’ conclusion. Chapter 6 fuses interview material with an analysis of *O Globo*’s reforms, a daily which had a significant role in constructing contemporary Brazilian journalism. All the empirical chapters include appendices with further stories on each case study. I have looked at a large samples of stories here, including an average of 900 pieces for each campaign. I examined though in more detail approximately 40% to 50% of this amount, whilst the other stories served as supporting evidence or background material for my analyses. Chapter 2 investigates the role that the press and *FSP* played during the coverage of the 1984 *Diretas Já* which demanded a return to civil democracy. A total of 871 stories were analysed, of which more than half were from *FSP*. The focus was the intense six month period of the campaign, which started in November 1983 and ended in April 1984. Particular attention was placed on the portrayal of the demonstrations and the articulation of the movement, with *Folha* being chosen due to its leading role in endorsing the campaign and also because of its impact in shaping contemporary Brazilian journalism.

Chapter 3 explores two different periods: the 1989 presidential elections and the subsequent impeachment of Fernando Collor in 1992. Critical textual analysis explored a total of 1.013 stories of the 1989 campaign and the 1992 impeachment coverage. This included a six month period that started in June and ended in December 1989 as well as the crucial moments of the 1992 impeachment process, which went from May until mainly October. Textual analysis was used to investigate the press’ construction of Collor’s image followed by his downfall in 1992 amid the rise of watchdog journalism. It juxtaposed

Collor’s 1989 campaign discourses with the ones that circulated in the press during that year and in 1992, including the need to privatise and combat inflation and the consolidation of the entry of Brazil into the global market. Chapter 4 looked at 1.256 stories on both the *real* and on Cardoso’s election in order to debate the shift from political forms of constraints to economic ones in the light of the expansion of a market press in Brazil.

Chapter 5 examined 1.237 stories of the 2002 elections, which saw the first left-wing government be sworn into power since 1964. It explored the sway of elite business forces towards the capital-labour alliance orchestrated by Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, examining further how the press managed to produce a more balanced coverage in spite of financial market constraints. This was the result of a series of reasons which included the wider consolidation of liberal journalism values in newsrooms as well as the enhancement of political pluralism. The total number of stories of each case study is thus shown in Table 2:

**Table 2 – Newspaper campaign stories**

<b>Chapter 2</b>	871
<b>Chapter 3</b>	1.013
<b>Chapter 4</b>	1.256
<b>Chapter 5</b>	1.237
<b>Total number of stories</b>	<b>4.377</b>

I conducted 30 in-depth interviews with a range of journalists involved professionally with these political events. Informal and anonymous interviews were also carried out with 8 less established journalists who provided supporting material for analyses. Most of the journalists interviewed here though are well-established professionals who have had a significant role in defining Brazilian journalism as well as influencing political and social life both in the contemporary years as well as during the dictatorship. Many journalists worked as political correspondents, newsroom directors and columnists during the presidential campaigns while others as governmental press officers and public relations practitioners. Most belong to a privileged group of high-profile elite professionals. They are representative of the Brazilian media system given their personal, professional prestige and influence on the country’s decision-making elites. These journalists were also more willing



to participate, in contrast to others who occupy a more subordinated role in the media hierarchy and who generally felt constrained or unable to talk.

The interviews were generally held in the interviewees' work place. One hundred per cent were "on the record". The space between the initial contact and the interview was in general of a couple of weeks or months. Only seven of the total amount of 38 interviews was done by e-mail due to the difficulties of combining the agenda of the researcher with that of the interviewee. The questions were prepared taking into consideration their professional experiences. Most of the interviews had the median length of 120 minutes and were recorded, resulting in a total of 178 typed pages. The journalists were approached either formally by e-mail or phone or informally through the collaboration of other journalists. Most of the interviews were conducted between December 2003 and July 2004, with the last interviews taking place in December 2004, January 2005 and August 2005. A synthetic summary of the interviewees' profile and the dates of the interviews are provided in the appendices. These journalists contributed because they shed light into the particularities of the press' coverage of the campaigns, having debated also the future perspectives for the Brazilian media and the role that they played in the democratisation process. Table 3 shows the number of journalists interviewed and Table 4 the percentage of interviews conducted:

**Table 3 – The interviews**

<b>Editors-in-chief</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>Press Officers</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Columnists</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>Academics</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Reporters</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Total number</b>	<b>38</b>

**Table 4 - Journalists' responses**

<b>Interviewed</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>81%</b>
--------------------	-----------	------------

Refused	0	0%
No reply	9	19 %
<b>Total</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>100%</b>

*b) Theoretical influences*

A diverse range of Anglo-American and Brazilian literature has influenced this research. My main sympathies lie both with the liberal-pluralist view of the media as well as with critical political economy. I am critical though of political economy's economic determinism and the stress placed on class conflict above everything else. My analysis here has been done more within a framework which favours competing international political economy debates. Classical political economy theory for instance endorses the assumption that market forces should be given the widest possible freedom of operation. Critical political economy points to the inequalities of media systems, arguing that these inefficiencies can only be rectified by public intervention. Critical political economy is also concerned with the autonomy of media professionals and how their daily activities can influence society. Journalists *do* operate within certain degrees of editorial autonomy. Thus the *nature* of the limits imposed on journalism activities and how they can be overcome in order to advance change is worth studying. This research is mainly concerned with precisely this.

Critical political economy thought is correct in underlining the importance of analysing the *economic* dimensions of media systems and their inequalities. Assuming however a more critical liberal-pluralist stance, I defend the validity of applying still classic liberal values to journalism and do not consider them to be flawed. That said, I acknowledge that limitations on journalism autonomy constitutes much of the current reality of Western media systems. As mentioned earlier, I recognise also that the prevailing socio-political and economic consensus of a given society can work to constrain or impede the full functioning of the media's democratic ideals. However, I do not believe that this is reason enough to dismiss the validity of these liberal democratic media values. I have been practically concerned here with problems of contestation and reaffirmation of the prevailing ideas of the society in question and with issues of distribution of political and economic resources within them. I have placed a particular emphasis on the *ways* in which news organisations

can and did contribute to social and political change and the role assumed by journalists in such a process.

This research thus forces me to position myself in relation to my own “objectivity”. Evidently, the examination that I have conducted here is not a disinterested act. Nonetheless, I have strived to diminish my own “subjectivity” so that I could explore the complexities of this reality in the most accurate way possible, acknowledging the various interests at stake and making a case more in favour of a social democratic centre-left wing project for Brazil than an explicit defence of partisanship. For to be politically motivated or aware does not necessarily mean that the researcher is assuming a partisan stance or a position of affiliation with a party. Politics thus should be understood not as something which is reserved exclusively for parties, but rather as a macro field of struggle in which competing groups fight to put across their views in the name of the collective good. That said, it is also important to discuss the impact that parties such as the PT and the PSDB had in Brazilian society and politics in the last decades and their relationship with the mainstream media. Thus my academic interest in this theme is closely related to my own desire as a citizen and journalist for a more inclusive democracy in Brazil, the desire to see a system unfold which favours the improvement of the practice of Brazilian politics as well as a wish to see a media sector which can respond more to democratic demands.

I am thus ultimately interested in relations of power, mainly between the macro, socio-political consensus of the specific periods in question with the micro levels of journalism activity. A series of theorists have influenced my political economy perspective. Certain aspects of Foucault’s (1975, 1980) and Habermas’ work (1992, 1997) have been of use as well as the work of political economy scholars like Hallin (2004), Waisbord (2000), Curran (2001) and Baker (2002). In terms of Brazilian literature, I have engaged with the work of Lins da Silva, Marques de Melo, Roberto Da Matta, Bernardo Kucinski and Eugenio Bucci. This research aims to contribute to the scarce international literature on non Anglo-American media systems and to the work carried out by scholars like Waisbord (2000) and Hallin (2002), who have discussed Latin American media systems. This thesis can also contribute to various schools of Brazilian thought, such as the citizenship debate and the media and elections research field.

Thus the deliberation over the extent or not that the press fulfilled democratic ideals remains a vital issue to engage with considering that the media are embedded in a country that has only recently begun to enhance its democratic character, and still needs to tackle more fully problems of social and economic inequality as much as political corruption. It

seems essential then to debate until what extent the Brazilian press contributed to advance democracy, and most importantly *how* this was done and *what* type of contributions were made, thus underscoring the points that need strengthening in the pursuit of a freer, more independent and representative press.

*c) Thesis outline*

This thesis is broken down into seven chapters grouped in five parts. The first part includes Chapter 1, which discussed the main issues investigated in this research as well as its methodological approach. The second focuses on the re-democratisation phase and the initial shift away from the state; the third explores the expansion of the market press; the fourth the struggle between economic liberalism and centre-left wing social democratic politics and the fifth debates the relationship between journalism and political democracy. Parts II, III and IV contain the case studies. Part II addresses the struggle of civil society and the market with a repressive state and the pressures made for a return to civil democracy. Chapter 2 asks how, and in what ways, did the coverage of the *Diretas Já* campaign by *FSP* and by other dailies contribute to a return to political representative democracy. It concludes that, in spite of the limitations imposed by the military regime and the slow support given by the mainstream media to the campaign, *FSP*, within a market-led perspective, did manage to contribute to advance the democratisation of Brazilian politics and society through the inclusion of previously marginalized voices in the media's public sphere.

Part III concentrates on the 1990's and the move away from the state to the market. In the light of the consolidation of the commercial character of the mainstream media, this part explores the entry of Brazil in the global market. Chapter 3 debates the ways in which the press benefited Collor's campaign in 1989 but then contributed for his impeachment in the context of the expansion in journalism of investigative reporting techniques and wider critique of authority on one side as well as sensationalism routines on another. These latter practices can be seen as being a reflection of the impact of market journalism on Brazilian reality as well as being a result of the media's newly regained freedom from state control. This chapter concludes that not only had the media a crucial role in shaping events, but that it worked between advancing some of its own positions in 1989 and reflecting public opinion in 1992. Chapter 4 intertwines the 1994 election campaign with the economic plan created by Cardoso. It investigates the discourses of the necessity of giving continuity to the

project of immersing Brazil in the global market as well as the idea that the *real* was boosting consumerism and creating a mass market. It examines the effects that economic constraints had on the 1994 elections, pointing to the decline of political-ideological restrictions and concluding that the media euphoria with the *real* contributed to limit public debate. However, in comparison to the press' 1989 coverage, in 1994 liberal journalism values were more ingrained in mainstream newsrooms, culminating in fairer and more conscientious political reporting.

Part IV debates the attempts to construct a more social-democratic project for Brazil. Chapter 5 dissects the 2002 elections campaign, questioning the ways in which the press' coverage contributed to advance political representation. It contrasts journalistic practices undertaken during the 2002 elections with the 1989 and 1994 presidential campaigns. It concludes that the press produced a more adequate portrait of the political process than in 1989, and that liberal journalism cultures contributed to this. This chapter however underlines cases of ideological media biases and of constraints indirectly imposed on media output by sectors of the financial market. Such factors indicate that the period covered here has been characterised by discontinuity and regression of certain advancements, both in Brazilian society, politics and in the media, and less by strict linear developments. Part V engages in the theoretical discussion of the relationship that exists between journalism and political democracy. Chapter 6 probes the question of the role assumed by journalists in the pursuit of change. It assesses the conquests and regressions of contemporary journalism and the ways in which both professionalism and partisanship contributed to political and social change at different times in Brazilian history. It concludes that journalism autonomy, and the formation in vital sectors of the media of a social responsibility ethos, played a key role in shaping these political events. Thus the reinforcement of professional practices in newsrooms, the strengthening of ethical practices and diminishing of biases are among essential elements which improved Brazilian journalism throughout the years.

Chapter 7 makes a critical summary of this research's main findings. It establishes a link with the questions set out in this introductory chapter, concluding that the commercial press in general advanced democracy but within limits imposed by the socio-economic and political environment in which they operated. These constraints emerged because of excessive media commercialisation and political authoritarianism. The mainstream press was thus subject to various tensions from diverse spheres throughout this period, having addressed the public as consumers as well as serving as mediators of public debate. This research will argue nonetheless that the progresses made were far from enough, and that the

wider democratisation of Brazilian society and the media is still an ongoing project. The last chapter thus defends the need of creating a working agenda which can boost the democratic functions of various media sectors in order for them to become more representative of the diverse interests of Brazilian society.

## Chapter 2 - Market-driven journalism in the pursuit of democracy: an analysis of *Folha de São Paulo* and the coverage of the *Diretas Já!*

### 2.1. Introduction

The 1984 *Diretas Já!* campaign marked contemporary Brazilian history. This was less due to the fact that the civic movement was unsuccessful in its demand for a return to civil representative democracy, but more because it offered an unquestionable challenge to the continuity of the military dictatorship (1964-1985), serving as a catalyst to end the decaying authoritarian regime. Massive civic demonstrations demanding “direct elections now” (*Diretas Já!*) occupied the streets of Brazil’s main capitals during the last months of 1983 and the beginning of 1984. These marches had the main aim of pressuring MPs to approve in Congress on the 25<sup>th</sup> of April, 1984, Dante de Oliveira’s constitutional emendation on the re-establishment of direct elections for president. The bill was rejected, leaving significant segments of the Brazilian population and civil society representatives frustrated. However, the direct elections campaign can be seen as a major movement in the various struggles undertaken to accelerate the downfall of the military regime. Many sectors of Brazilian society thus awoke from their long sleep during the early months of 1984 to demand an end to the dictatorship.

Although it had been officially uplifted, state censorship of the media was still used. The government of general Ernesto Geisel (1974-1979) was responsible for removing the censorship laws imposed on the press as well as the repressive measures of the Fifth Institutional Act of 1968, the AI-5, created on the year which inaugurated the so-called dark phase of repression of the dictatorship. Thus in 1984 it seemed that censorship was in fact a shadow that was lurking in every corner of the newsroom. Most of the mainstream press thus engaged initially timidly in the *Diretas Já!* movement, tending to reproduce the views of the regime and to stick to official governmental discourses. It endorsed the civic movement basically in the last months.

The national daily *Folha de São Paulo* (FSP) emerged as the first mainstream newspaper to explicitly lift the flag in favour of the cause for direct elections, embarking on a militant and active journalism stance which stood out in relation to other papers due to its more aggressive criticism of the military establishment. Other mainstream media vehicles

like the newspapers *ESP* and *O Globo* were more hesitant, deciding to support the direct elections cause slightly before the vote in Congress. Like *FSP* but with less avidity, magazines like *Veja* and *Isto É* endorsed the action in their endeavour to cut ties with the military dictatorship. *FSP* saw in the support an opportunity to capitalize journalistically. Combining market pragmatism with political and economic interests, *FSP* explored the vacuum left in the mainstream public sphere, which had been previously occupied mainly by traditional military and business sources. *Folha* thus began to present itself as a type of mouthpiece for Brazil's intelligentsia.

In competition with its more conservative rival *ESP*, who during the end of the 1970's had emerged as the main paper in Brazil, despite having enthusiastically supported the 1964 coup, *FSP* decided to abandon its passive stance in relation to the dictatorship. From the mid-70's onwards, it began to assume a confrontational editorial line. This stance was put forward by the daily amid the regime's self-professed commitment to promote a gradual and slow transition back to civil democracy. This opening however happened amid tensions between hardliners who feared the rise of the opposition and the more moderate sectors who were in favour of accelerating the return to democracy, as was the case of general Golbery Couto e Silva, who was considered as being one of the intellectual strategists behind the 1964 military coup and ten years later was known also for being the architect of the military plan for a "gradual" transition back to democracy.

In such a context, *FSP's* coverage of the *Diretas Já!* marked the peak of the paper's engagement with militant political journalism. From then onwards, *Folha* was able to pave the way to consolidate fully its position as the most influential political daily in Brazil. *FSP*, like most of the mainstream media, gave support to the 1964 military coup and the deposition of the then president João Goulart, a controversial and populist politician who had been planning to adopt sharper social reforms. Goulart was vice-president of Jânio Quadros, elected president in 1960, and was eventually sworn into power in 1961 following the political instability created by the government of Quadros. The dictatorship years thus saw the alignment of much of the media with the regime, with the alternative press functioning as sites of militant resistance (Alzira de Abreu, 2003; Waisbord, 2000). However, the mainstream media also struggled with censorship and did clash with the generals throughout the years, as we shall see in Chapter 6.

Thus even though censorship in 1984 had been removed and the country was in a transition phase, fears of a return to these practices were a reality. Journalists' actions were thus restricted by self-censorship routines. Thus many journalists were either engaging in



journalism militancy or were reproducing official views which reaffirmed the generals' fears of a rapid return to democracy. Others however saw the opportunity to use the media pages to pressure for change. This chapter examines the print press' coverage of the *Diretas Já!* in the light of such a framework. It takes the *FSP* coverage as a case study, exploring critically the six months period held prior to the rejection of Dante's bill on the 25<sup>th</sup> of April 1984. Critical textual analysis has been conducted here of 871 stories on the campaign, including 378 pieces from the newspapers *FSP*, 342 from *O Globo*, 74 from *ESP*, 70 from *JB* and 15 from the magazines *Veja* and 12 from *Isto É* (see [Table 1](#)). It covers the period from November 1983 to April 1984 and concentrates mainly on the last phase of the campaign:

**Table 1 – Direct elections stories**

<b>Media</b>	<b>Stories</b>
<i>FSP</i>	378
<i>O Globo</i>	342
<i>ESP</i>	74
<i>JB</i>	70
<i>Veja</i>	15
<i>Isto É</i>	12
<b>Total</b>	<b>871</b>

This chapter investigates the extent to which the mainstream press, and *FSP's* coverage in particular, contributed to advance democracy, deliberating further upon the impact of *Folha's* 1984 reforms on contemporary Brazilian journalism. There has been wide controversy in relation to *FSP's* contributions. Radical critiques (Carta, 1988: Arbex Jr., 2001; Kucinski, 1998) have suggested that the *FSP* coverage was a pure marketing strategy, a “democratic project for the market”. This thesis will argue that this was only partially true, and that the issue is more complex. A more thorough analysis must go beyond market bias, taking into account historical, social, economic and political influences as well as competing journalism cultures with their different democratic projects. Admittedly, *Folha* capitalized on the divisions that were emerging amongst elites in Brazilian society. Certain groups, which included intellectuals and left-wing politicians, civil society members, unions, some sectors of the business world as well as segments of a disillusioned middle-

class, perceived that the military regime cycle was ending. *FSP* also thought that change was necessary, and soon perceived that the paper would only fully prosper in an advanced capitalist society immersed in the liberal market logic (Lins da Silva, 1988; Novelli, 2002).

I begin by working on the reconstruction of the campaign, examining the different phases of the movement and the ambiguous position assumed by the military generals. The second half of this chapter looks at *FSP*'s coverage. This is interwoven with a critical analysis of the particularities of *Folha*'s opinionated journalism model in the context of the paper's commitment to the 1974 editorial project. This is followed by a debate on the 1984 pro-market reforms which, as we shall see, did not represent a total break with the past. After the *diretas*, *FSP* shifted its more opinionated journalism style to attend to market demands and began to slowly consolidate the commercial journalism US model. The success of the coverage boosted the circulation of the daily, attracting new groups of readers amongst wider sectors of Brazilian society. Readership was thus expanded, going beyond organized civil society representatives, intellectual, military and business elites.

In an analogy with Habermas' (1962, 1997) argument of the decline of the public sphere amid the rise of the commercial press, it can be said that the changes that occurred in *FSP* were a reflection of both the evolution of the press and of the public sphere at that particular point in Brazil. Similarly to Hallin's (1994) discussion on the transformation of the American press from vehicles of political debate in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries to commercial enterprises, a fact which paradoxically democratised the market for newspapers, the 1984 *FSP* reforms had a double function. They "democratised" the access to quality newspapers, but at the same time they also indicated that a threat could be posed in relation to the expansion of citizenship values in journalism. Before this debate is explored further however it is necessary to first evaluate the significance of the *Diretas Já!* movement in order to understand more fully the reasons why *Folha* gained from supporting the cause.

## **2.2. "I want to vote for president!": deconstructing the *Diretas Já!***

Brazilian historians and sociologists have argued that the *Diretas Já!* campaign represented the initial awakening of contemporary Brazilian civil society and public opinion after a relatively long period of silence. Certain famous protests, such as the "Demonstration of 100.000 people", which reunited artists and intellectuals in Rio in March 1968, broke sporadically with the relative immobility which had predominated during most

of the dictatorship years. The *Diretas Já!* thus contributed, together with the indirect election of Tancredo Neves for president soon afterwards in 1985, to put a definite end to the military regime (Alzira de Abreu, 2003; Lamounier, 1990). The movement gained momentum after an organized and conscious civil society united as equals, leaving their differences aside to form a supra-partisan platform which favoured a return to political representative democracy and wider social, political and economic change. From November 1983 onwards until April 1984, Brazil's capitals were transformed into stages for civic participation roles with approximately 4.7 million people taking to the streets during these months to demand direct elections for president (Tosi Rodrigues, 2003).

The *Diretas Já!* were a result of earlier struggles, like the 1979 Amnesty movement which culminated in the signing of a law by president João Figueiredo (1979-1985) authorizing the return to Brazil of exiled political activists. Figueiredo was known for advancing the opening strategy articulated by the military regime, and which had started during Geisel's government in 1974. Direct elections for State governors had been established in 1980, although these measures irritated military hardliners, who started conducting kidnapping campaigns and bombing news agencies that sold alternative newspapers. The *Diretas Já* in 1984 thus reflected the growth of the political influence of the PMDB opposition party, who since 1972 declared its intention to fight for the liberation of political prisoners, the establishment of a Constitution and the return to representative civil democracy.<sup>3</sup> The direct elections movement acquired strength due to the elite divisions that were growing in the country regarding the continuity of the dictatorship. On one side stood authoritarian traditional oligarchic politicians, a military elite and conservative businessmen and on the other a younger and more progressive generation composed of politicians, entrepreneurs, union leaders and students as well as a middle-class disappointed with the regime's economic miracle. These groups predicted the collapse of the dictatorship and were avidly conducting articulations to accelerate the return to civil democracy.

Vast segments of the middle-classes were disappointed with the decline of the "economic miracle" (1967-1973), which had been based on a formula that culminated in rising foreign debt and strict control of workers' salaries. The military regime had created a statist economic model that relied on import substitution as well as state subsidization. The decline of the "economic miracle" in 1973 thus started to prompt attacks on the regime's

---

<sup>3</sup> The system of two parties – the official party ARENA and the authorized opposition MDB – was imposed by the military regime in 1965. This was transformed in 1979 into a multi-party system. New electoral rules permitted the existence of five parties (PT, PDT, PTB, PMDB and PDS): the first two occupied the space of the left, the PTB and PMDB, the center and center-left, and the PDS, the former ARENA, the right.

policies and practices. The two oil crises (of 1973 and 1979) for instance multiplied the prices of petroleum. The industrial countries were also experiencing increasing inflation. In Brazil in 1983, inflation was around 211%. It was during the “economic miracle” years that governmental repression was tougher, with the cracking down on various resistance movements. Although the dictatorial institutional act AI-5 had been suppressed by Geisel in 1978, the National Law of Security was maintained, allowing the confiscation of printed material.

Thus 1977 was a year of tension still. On one side, repressive measures dictated by Geisel, such as the April package, were implemented to impede the strengthening of the opposition. The April 1977 package promoted the reform of the Justice system, changed the presidential mandate to six years and created the indirect election for a third of the Senate, strengthening the seats of the less developed States. Thus it guaranteed a good representation of Arena politicians, which was the main party of the military generals, from the North and Northeast in Congress, maintaining also the indirect governor State elections. On the other, organized civil society groups and unions pressured for change. The union movement made its voice heard for the first time since 1964, with Luis Inácio Lula da Silva appearing as a new leader of the strikes organized in 1978 and 1979 by a group of metalworkers from São Bernardo and Diadema, in São Paulo.

The direct elections campaign was orchestrated as a political strategy at the beginning of 1983. In March 1983 the National Congress re-opened, balancing MPs from the opposition with governmental ones. Shortly afterwards, the Dante de Oliveira draft law was approved amongst PMDB MPs, with the party launching the campaign on the 15<sup>th</sup> of June. Eight opposition governors decided to endorse the campaign fully in October, producing propaganda material and organizing meetings with civil society representatives to prepare for the protests. Civic mobilizations in the capital cities of SP, Rio and Porto Alegre were attended initially by small numbers of people, of around 20.000. The first national demonstration held at the Charles Miller Square on the 27<sup>th</sup> of November, 1983, in Pacaembu, São Paulo, was an example. Numbers later varied from 250.000 to almost one million people in April in 1984, a month which was seen as marking the climax of the movement’s strength and acceptability amongst diverse sectors of Brazilian society.

From January 1984 onwards, the *diretas* left the realms of party politics to take to the streets. Representatives of around 70 civil society groups, including progressive sectors of the church and bishops from the CNBB (National Confederation of Bishops from Brazil), the OAB (Order of Lawyers of Brazil), the student movement UNE (National Student

Union), communist parties seeking legalization (PC do B and PCB) and union leaders represented by CUT (Worker's Central Union) endorsed the campaign. The PT and PMDB parties and their leaders Lula, Ulysses Guimarães, Tancredo Neves, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Franco Montoro acquired at the time national visibility, stimulating mobilization and working to unite various groups. The reaction of the military generals to these civic demonstrations however soon switched from an initial stance of negotiation to one of anger and repression. Initially, key players in the military circle had not ruled out the possibility of direct elections for president, vaguely confirming a possible voting session for 1988 or 1990. On the 16<sup>th</sup> of November, Figueiredo gave an interview stating that he defended direct presidential elections, but considered that his PDS party would not approve of it. PDS politicians such as Paulo Maluf, Mario Andreazza and the vice-president Aurelián Chaves were candidates of the regime who were competing for Figueiredo's place in the indirect elections voting scheme, although the latter eventually indicated some support for the movement, as we shall see.

The approval of Dante's bill in Congress was thus thwarted by the military generals. Many PDS MPs abstained from voting. A presidential project was later presented for approval at the same time as Dante's draft law, proposing direct elections for 1988. Figueiredo also imposed repressive measures in the Federal District from 18<sup>th</sup> April onwards, impeding the videotaping of the capital Brasília without governmental authorization. Thus throughout the whole *Diretas Já* action, the government stimulated a climate of anxiety and fear in the Brazilian population. They condemned the participation in the movement, stating that those who were part of it were a bunch of "losers and communists". The military regime feared a quick return to democracy and a rise of left-wing politics, which could lead to possible reprisals for deeds committed during the dictatorship. The rejection of Dante's bill thus legitimised the indirect elections plan, securing the next phase of "cordial" negotiations between the more moderate segments of the opposition with the more moderate players of the regime, something which was criticised by *Folha* and by many others due to the marginalization of the wider population from these (elite) decisions.

The indirect elections thesis thus divided the opposition. Particular national idiosyncrasies marked the negotiations to the transition back to civil democracy. The name of the moderate politician Tancredo Neves began to appear as the only figure capable of pleasing both military sectors and the opposition, being eventually used to consolidate the slow transition back to democracy. On the 15<sup>th</sup> of January 1985, Tancredo Neves was the

first president since the beginning of the dictatorship in 1964 to be elected indirectly by Congress. In a decision that has been highly criticized, the Worker's Party (PT) voted against the indirect election of Neves. In what seemed to be an irony of destiny, Neves died on the 21<sup>st</sup> of April 1985 before being sworn into government. The vice-president, José Sarney, a PDS politician who had served as a negotiator, and who represented in the alliance the continuity of the regime's interests, occupied Neves' place. This made the return to civil democracy be in the end a controlled one, just as had been imagined by the military strategists. Brazilians would thus still have to wait a few more years - until 1989 - before they could finally vote for president.

A long cycle of oppression and absence of political and civil rights had finally come to an end with the collapse of the dictatorship in 1985. Nonetheless, the hopes of many Brazilians of seeing the country advance political representation and tackle its social and economic problems more fully were shattered by this slow process back to democracy. The redemocratization period, which began in 1985 and went until 1989, followed afterwards and was seen as a transition phase from the dictatorship to a civil representative democracy. The *Diretas Já!* movement in the end was defeated. The campaign however was far from having been in vain, with the battle for social inclusion and the re-establishment of civil rights being eventually transferred to the arena of the 1988 Constitution. Here different social movements and groups interests engaged again in battles for constitutional rights. The 1988 Constitution managed to afford power to the public ministry body of Justice, an act that ended up empowering society with tools to exercise full scrutiny over various members of government, as we shall see in the discussion of the 1992 impeachment campaign.

The *Diretas Já* thus reflected the conflict between democratic and authoritarian projects for Brazil as well as the multiple positions which began to emerge in the wake of the regime's collapse. These multiple interests were unified in favour of political participation and social and economic inclusion, thus representing a challenge to the military authoritarian order as well as to its statist economic model. And *Folha* appeared in this context as the media vehicle which was economically independent enough to assume a position of actively mobilizing segments of Brazilian society, contributing to both mould and reflect public opinion and capitalizing for its own commercial benefits and personal political interests on the acceleration to the return to civil democracy.

### 2.3. FSP: history and identity

Rebellious and highly critical have been among the main adjectives that journalists and academics have used to describe *Folha*, the mainstream up-market daily that has lived through the contradictions of the journalism cultures of militancy and commercialism. *FSP* started to occupy a significant place in Brazilian society and politics mainly from the 1970's onwards. Today it is considered one of the most influential Brazilian newspapers. Rival of the RJ daily *O Globo* and of *ESP*, *Folha* built its reputation during the 1970's and 1980's as a liberal daily that supposedly exemplified good modern capitalism in practice. It attempted to distance itself from other enterprises which could be considered more pre-industrial establishments that worked within a more provincial mentality, and which reflected Brazil's authoritarianism.<sup>4</sup> It proclaimed a special sensitivity towards the needs of Brazilians, indicating that it was aware of social injustices and that it wanted to respond to the aspirations of progressive sectors of Brazilian society. At the same time nonetheless it stood out as a daily which celebrated the powers of the market and of advanced capitalism.

Two major reforms defined *Folha's* current identity: the 1974 editorial one, which resulted in more aggressive questioning of the authoritarian regime, and the 1984 *Folha* project, which adopted more consumer-orientated approaches to news-making. Elements of both reforms nonetheless are still present today and are very much at the core of *Folha's* success as well as its contradictions. The 1984 editorial reforms marked the conversion of the paper from a more pre-industrial phase of opinionated political journalism, which was in line with the critical editorial stance introduced by the 1974 reforms, to the current American popular commercial journalism ideal. The 1974 reforms culminated in the paper's endorsement of the direct elections, seen as a last breath of auteur journalism before the engagement in the mid-80's with commercialism.

Nonetheless, it is wrong to see these reforms as being so clear cut. In 1977, for instance, the newspaper began to be pressured by military hardlines due to an article considered offensive to a military figure. This was a moment when hardliners linked to the minister of the Armed Forces, Sylvio Frota, were clashing with the Geisel government and

---

<sup>4</sup> The 1978 *FSP* document stressed the paper's editorial line, defending: "better living conditions for most of the population through the organization of a democratic regime, liberty of information, strengthening of civil society..., more equal distribution of the national income, support to private enterprise, submission of the economy to the social interest and preservation of the national...culture (Lins da Silva, 1988, 46). This document must be put in the context of *FSP's* 1970's reforms, although the 1985 text also highlighted that *FSP's* aim was to "fight for structural reforms...capable of contributing to make society less unfair...and more developed" (quoted in Novelli, 2002, 197).

indicating a move in favour of the radicalisation of the continuity of the dictatorship. Geisel eventually fired Frota, paving the way for him to elect his successor, João Figueiredo, as he had previously wished. *FSP*, like *ESP*, was one of the newspapers that was caught up in the middle of such confrontations, with military generals identifying “subversives” amongst *Folha*’s staff and threatening to sue the paper under the National Law of Security. Such pressures culminated in the daily’s dismissal of the director of the newsroom, Cláudio Abramo. *FSP*’s backing of the direct elections years afterwards was thus seen by some critics (i.e. Conti, 1999) as an advancement in relation to the Abramo event and also as a reversal of the paper’s previous passivity and docility in relation to the regime.

Thus both the *Diretas Já!* coverage and the *Folha* 1984 project which came afterwards contributed to consolidate the daily’s identity and to boost circulation numbers. *Folha* had a circulation of approximately 120.000 papers in April 1984. This grew to around 200.000 in February 1987 and to over 300.000 copies by the end of 1990 (Lins da Silva, 1988, 29; Arbex Jr., 2001, 141). *Folha* in 1995 reached the 150<sup>th</sup> position amongst the 500 largest Brazilian businesses (Waisbord, 2000, 72). According to the National Association of Newspapers (ANJ) in 2001, *FSP* was the widest read national daily in Brazil, reaching a public of approximately 500.000 people on weekdays and nearly 1 million on Sundays. In 2003, however, the newspaper saw a fall in its circulation, selling around 350.000 papers during the week and 430.000 on Sundays, a fact which is related to the financial crisis faced by media industries which started in the mid-90’s. Nonetheless, the US\$ 120 million printing centre building, which is considered as one of the most sophisticated in Latin America, is an indication of the paper’s solid economic health (Costa, 1997, quoted in Waisbord, 2002, 72).

In the 1970’s, the daily began to distance itself from its previous officialdom image. Seeing that *ESP*<sup>5</sup> did not have enough economic independence to confront fully the regime, *Folha* started to take on this role. According to Abreu (2003), the need for *Folha* to change was perceived in influential military circles, who saw the daily as the one which could help them mediate the transition back to democracy. *FSP* was also conscious that its further expansion depended on a return to a market economy. “*Folha* understood the equation between the advancement of democracy and the transformation of an incipient capitalism into a modern one”, wrote veteran journalist Mino Carta in Lins da Silva (1988; 215).

---

<sup>5</sup> *ESP* had mainly a predominant role during the 1970’s, when the paper was more critical to the regime. It published a series of stories about the privileges of public servants and politicians in Brasília by journalists Clóvis Rossi and Ricardo Kostcho, who later on went to work for *Folha*. *FSP* managed to take the lead from the mid-70’s to the 1980’s onwards.



Abramo was responsible for implementing the reforms in the daily from mainly 1975 to 1977, introducing certain practices more identified with the alternative press, such as the inclusion in the newspaper in 1976 of two pages of debates (the “Tendency/debates section). These functioned as spaces for opponents of the regime and segments of civil society to have their voices heard. The tendency and debate pages are amongst the elements signalled by Lins da Silva (1998; 47) as being examples of the creation of an “opinionated” voice in the paper. In 1978, the invitation was made to sectors of civil society to participate in *FSP*’s editorial commission. The newspaper was also at the time working with many left-wing journalists and others with public service ideals, including Abramo himself, Alberto Dines, Mino Carta, Ricardo Kotscho, André Singer and Clóvis Rossi. These journalists took advantage of the green light given by the regime and the daily, and decided to engage enthusiastically in the use of the paper’s pages to fight against the dictatorship.

The Brazilian military establishment thus would have an indirect role in stimulating the 1974 *Folha* reforms, although it did not dictate or control them, as the clashes between *FSP* left-wing journalists with the regime soon showed. The general Golbery do Couto e Silva had a meeting with the owner of *FSP*, Octavio Frias de Oliveira, in the beginning of 1974. In this meeting, he argued that the State of São Paulo needed another influential political paper that could compete with *ESP* (Abreu, 2003). Otavio Frias Filho, current head of *FSP* newsroom and son of Frias de Oliveira, admitted that his father had a meeting with Couto e Silva, who underscored the government’s interest in having two strong papers in SP. Frias Filho stressed that the talk resumed to this fact only: “Golbery did not propose anything to my father. This (meeting) was not the cause of the reforms of *FSP* and it did not determine them. He pointed to them, and my father understood that they wanted to promote the opening. And thus this helped give impetus to the changes in *FSP*’s editorial line.... It was a favourable signal of the political context of the time.”

Newspapers thus had difficulties in conducting political reporting during the early 1980’s. Journalism cultures of professionalism and balance were weak in newsrooms, with newspapers acting mostly in accordance with the political and economic line dictated by government. Militant journalism was also more associated with the alternative press and was more restricted in the mainstream media. *ESP* for instance started to position itself more in the oppositional field from 1968 onwards, mixing some critiques with praise and calling for a return of Brazil to its “liberal traditions” (FGV, 2001). *Veja*, launched in 1968 by Mino Carta, functioned during its early years as a vehicle of sporadic resistance, publishing stories like the torture of dissidents by military forces (10/12/69). Carta was

eventually fired in 1976 due to military pressures. Veteran journalist Alberto Dines was also forced out of *JB's* newsroom in 1978, after having disobeyed orders from military censors regarding the publication of sensitive stories.

Carta, who also worked for *FSP* but was director of *Senhor* magazine in 1984, talked about how some journalists like himself participated in the organization of the *Diretas Já!* campaign: “Montoro (SP governor) was organizing a big protest and came to talk to me about the grand demonstration of the 25th. He said that I had a good relationship with Lula, that I should speak to him and also with Ulysses. I had lunch with Lula in a restaurant in Alameda Santos (SP) and said to him: ‘The guys want your participation’. The demonstration of São Paulo was well prepared...” said Carta. Such a militant stance was also taken on by various influential journalists who worked in mainstream newsrooms. This was a contrast to other media sectors who were still held back by constraints, with many not having the economic strength to confront the regime. “*Folha...* became the vanguard of the mass media in the defence of the pro-democracy movement that had sprung up in the country, reaching its zenith during the 1984 direct elections campaign” wrote Tascher (1992, 16: quoted in Waisbord, 2000, 74). The *Diretas Já!* coverage can thus be seen as having been a natural continuity to *FSP's* 1974 reforms, and in many ways it also represented the last moments of it.

#### **2.4. Militant journalism and democracy in *FSP*: an examination of the *Diretas Já!* coverage**

*FSP's* coverage of the *Diretas Já!* was a unique blend of militant and auteur journalism, with the paper initiating a construction of a loyalty pact with its readers. Without a doubt, the disenchantment of segments of the Brazilian population with the regime served as extra fuel for *FSP's* commitment to the campaign. Research carried out by the Gallup Institute, and published by *FSP* on the 17<sup>th</sup> of July, 1983, indicated that 76,2% of Brazilians wanted the government and the opposition to discuss ways of solving the crisis, and that 40,8% thought that the best way of doing this was through direct elections. *FSP* began to publish times and places of meetings, articles and opinion of intellectuals and opponents of the regime as well as giving in-depth coverage of the main civic demonstrations held throughout Brazil.<sup>6</sup> As we shall see, most of the mainstream

---

<sup>6</sup> See appendix for main stories.

press, with perhaps the exception of *Isto É*, adopted a more official reporting tone, with some indicating support for direct elections mostly in the final months (*ESP* and *O Globo*), whilst others stood by the cause but many times engaged in the theme through the military regime's point-of-view (*Veja*). Thus there would be enormous space for *FSP* to explore militant journalism for its own purposes.

The *FSP* stories selected here for a more detailed analysis were taken from key moments of the campaign and they include: a) the official launch of the movement in São Paulo on the 27<sup>th</sup> of November; b) the defense of the cause by *FSP* on the 1<sup>st</sup> of January, 1984; c) the protest held at the Sé Cathedral in SP on the 25<sup>th</sup> of January; d) the demonstration in Candelária Cathedral in Rio on the 10<sup>th</sup> of April and e) the rejection of Dante's bill in Congress on the 25<sup>th</sup>. On the 27<sup>th</sup> of March, 1983, *FSP* published an editorial declaring for the first time that it would stand by the direct elections. The story "Support of the direct elections campaign widens the political prestige of the paper", written by the then journalist and former spokesman of the Lula government (2003), André Singer, was included in the material prepared by *FSP* to celebrate its 80<sup>th</sup> anniversary. The text stated that Frias Filho came up with the idea of lifting the campaign in the media during a meeting held in the paper in the end of November. Frias Filho, who studied law at the State University of São Paulo (USP) and was influenced by the student movement, did not confirm or deny this information.

Journalist Ricardo Kotscho, who was former press officer of the Lula government, had also a major role in the campaign. Kotscho was working for *FSP* at the time and defended the paper's involvement: "*FSP* had a major role ...because it was the first newspaper to embrace the *Diretas* at the end of 1983. The new thing at the time was the fact that a big newspaper was embarking on a campaign... For the story of the press has been one of...impartiality, which did not occur in that case. Since the beginning it gave total support...The suggestion was mine. I presented it in the end of 1983 to my direct boss, Adilson Laranjeira, and he took it to Octavio Frias de Oliveira (owner), who agreed....", said Kotscho, author of a book on the coverage that he conducted for *FSP*.

*Folha's* decision has not been immune from criticism. Some critics have accused it of having been merely a marketing strategy designed to boost the paper's image as the main daily who contributed to advance democracy (Arbex Jr. 2001; Kucinski, 1998; Dines, 2003). They also criticized what has been seen as an ideological ambiguity of the daily, which posed as a mediator between civil society and the government whilst also defending market dictums. There is actually no ambiguity here. As Keane has stated, what exists is a

mutual dependence between markets and civil society. As I argued earlier, the movement emerged as a consequence of the elite divisions concerning the future of the military regime. It thus represented the beginning of the formation of an elite consensus that the dictatorship was finally coming to an end. It is simplistic though to assume that *FSP*'s intentions were merely market-based, although evidently they were in part. But I see the endorsement of the direct elections cause being above all a political project, if we consider the proximity of *FSP* with emerging opposition leaders like the sociologist and intellectual Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who would be a future president, and also with some sectors of the PT. As we shall see, these ideological leanings would be reflected in the future disputes seen in the daily between journalists who were more sympathetic to the PSDB or the PT, despite the decline of militant journalism in *FSP*'s newsroom in the 1990's.

For both political and economic reasons, *Folha* wanted to operate in a more democratic capitalist liberal society and not endorse a socialist agenda, as perhaps some journalists thought that it was pursuing during various moments of the campaign. Thus the extent to which *FSP* contributed during this period must be assessed by taking into consideration these historical, political and economic factors, rather than adopting a merely market-biased point-of-view. It is difficult though to underestimate the role that the daily had in the history of Brazilian journalism and the fact that it was a newspaper that embodied the tensions between militant journalism and commercialization in the light of the disputes that were occurring in Brazilian society between different democratic projects. It also engaged in a courageous form of journalism at a time when political constraints were still relatively strong. Finally, the movement was a moment of militancy in favour of a stance which it is hard to be against: that of universal democratic values and return of civil rights. It is here that lies the main reason for the daily's success in the coverage as well as afterwards.

*a) The initial phase: the campaign hits the streets*

The passion and commitment demonstrated by the paper in its editorials and reporting gave impetus and legitimization to the civic mobilizations occurring throughout Brazil. The newspaper did this through a conscious adoption of an aggressive stance, publishing strong and supportive headlines as well as stressing verbs of action when opposition leaders and civil society representatives were mentioned. It thus stimulated the engagement of wider segments of society in the movement by publishing the dates of the meetings to organize

future protests.<sup>7</sup> In comparison to the other papers, *FSP* offered more militant and in-depth analyses on the campaign and its significance to Brazil. Stories like “United, civil society urges for direct elections now” (24/04/84) indicated the centrality of the place that opposition political leaders and civil society players were beginning to occupy in the paper. The feature “Return of the *Diretas* polarizes further the political debate” (6/11/83), exemplified a critical journalistic piece that attempted to discuss the importance of the direct elections, highlighting further how the Brazilian political world had suddenly started to talk about a taboo subject which it had kept in the dark for 19 years.

The Charles Miller square protest started the agitation of the movement in the streets. The governor of São Paulo, Franco Montoro of the PMDB, was backing the *diretas*. *FSP* published the official governmental launch of the campaign in SP, which received the name of “Speak Brazil” but soon turned into *Diretas Já!*. A document was launched arguing for direct elections for president as the only way out of the crisis. In preparation for the protest, the paper published the headline “Direct election is the way” (27/11/83) followed by a picture of a meeting held by Montoro with six other PMDB governors. The editorial *To the citizens* emphasised the right of self-government, with the daily stating that it hoped that the demonstration would reflect the wishes of most Brazilians for direct elections. It said: “*Folha* gives importance to the protest.... We hope that the mature, strong and peaceful presence of the citizens of São Paulo can translate the desire of all the Brazilian people....” Nonetheless, only a group of 15.000 people showed up in the Charles Miller square, including Cardoso and Lula. *FSP* recognized the passivity of the movement, and soon began to pressure for more civic participation through the publication of a series of editorials which criticised the government and its position in relation to the campaign.<sup>8</sup>

Mainly from November 1983 onwards, the paper defended more explicitly the *diretas*. *Folha's* new year message in 1984 particularly stressed the necessity for direct elections. The story “Elections, the biggest hope in ‘84” (01/01/84) is an example of a lyrical piece of *FSP* writing. A Brazilian poem by Haroldo dos Campos was placed on top of the front page and below a reference was made to George Orwell’s 1984 book (“1984 year number 1, era of Orwell”). Here a link was made between the undemocratic situation of Brazil with Orwell’s prophecy. Next to the poem a picture was shown of a group of working-class women preparing balls of rice in SP’s neighbourhood of Liberdade. This photograph

---

<sup>7</sup> (“Week of the *Diretas*”; “Campaign for direct elections has started” (12/11/83); “Direct elections mobilizes the country from North to South” (22/01/84) and “Population engages in a party not seen before” (26/01/84)).

<sup>8</sup> (I.e. “*Diretas Já* in the streets” (28/11/83); “Yellow, yes” (12/02/84) and “Annul the national will” (07/03/84)).

seemed to emphasise the daily fight of certain segments of the population for survival. A story on a debate conducted by *FSP* with intellectuals, entrepreneurs and other members of Brazilian society on the country's future was also published on the front cover. Most of these interviewees defended direct elections as a way out of the economic crisis. The editorial *The right to the Diretas* (08/01/84), published a few days afterwards, clearly showed the paper's commitment by stating that the daily backed "...the peaceful and resolute march of society in their quest for the recovery of a necessary right. To try to silence the public's request...that would be provocative..”

A couple of weeks later, the hope for the recovery of political and civil rights was expressed in the historic demonstration held at Sé Cathedral. All the other newspapers and magazines covered the protest.<sup>9</sup> *Veja* and *Isto É* offered more in-depth and enthusiastic coverage of the civic mobilization at Sé than the other dailies. *O Globo* published a big story which was included in a box on the subject. An editorial further criticised the “hysterical” behaviour of the opposition leaders. *JB* dedicated a couple of paragraphs with small pictures to the topic whilst *ESP* published a one page story on the protests followed by an editorial which questioned the opposition's intentions. “Those who yearn for democracy, desiring to see its evolution with security, will not be disturbed by screams and the enormous propaganda material of the defenders of immediate elections”, said *O Globo* (*The Sé demonstration*, 27/01/84).

The *Folha* coverage was an example of opinionated journalism reporting, with reporters not assuming a “detached” and objective slant but joining in themselves with the euphoric crowd. *FSP's* dedicated five pages to the act. The editorial *After the square* reinforced the paper's support, with the headline on the front page reading “300.000 in the streets for the *Diretas*”. It included an enormous picture that occupied three quarters of the page, possibly taken from a helicopter. A long-shot looked down on the crowd in the square from the top of the cathedral, thus giving a general view of the number of people present. This picture emphasised the involvement of the whole city in the civic mobilization. The frame chosen favoured a view which showed thousands of people peacefully demanding a return to a civil government. One had a sense from the picture that the movement was powerful and was worth being taken seriously. Thus from the legitimacy that it had gained in Montoro's office in November, it was finally conquering the people in the streets.

---

<sup>9</sup> (I.e. “Demonstration for the direct elections reunites a crowd during four hours in São Paulo” (*JB*, 26/01/84); “Crowd goes to Sé to ask for direct elections” (*ESP*); “Protest for direct elections takes crowd to Sé Square” (*O Globo*); “*Diretas, diretas, diretas*” (*Isto É*, 01/02/84) and “I want to vote for president” (*Veja*, 01/02/84).

The feature written by reporter Carlos Brickmann underlined how this act was the biggest one held in the streets of SP since the 1964 “March of the Family with God in the name of Liberty”, a protest organised by conservative sectors of the middle-classes against the government of Goulart and in favour of his dismissal in the wake of the military coup. Brickmann’s article admitted that there was no agreement as to the correct number of people present – officials had affirmed that the place had only capacity for 100.000 people. The story pointed out that Montoro had argued that the numbers were irrelevant. In the end, according to him, the demonstration was representing the anxieties of 130 million Brazilians. Drawing upon the idea of the myth of the hero, the text questioned further the extent to which Montoro was the hero of the day, ending up intelligently distancing itself from the focus on this particular politician to stress the non-partisan character of the demonstration in the separate article “In the square that is yours, the *paulista* was non-partisan”.

The story “In Sé, a high-pitched cry for the direct elections”, written by Ricardo Kotscho, was yet another example of combative *FSP* journalism. Kotscho had previously written the stories on the 1979 ABC *paulista* strikes for *Folha*, with the paper having shown opposition against the intervention in the unions and the imprisonment of Lula by the Federal Police. Highly charged with lyricism, Kotscho’s piece on Sé said that the cry that had been caught in the throats of many Brazilians for 20 years had finally come out in the square. “Four hours of speeches were summarised in one, mainly that we have had enough of this regime, we want Brazil back so that the Brazilians can decide their own destiny...,” wrote the reporter. Kotscho underscored the singing of the Brazilian National Hymn during the demonstration: “I heard from Ipiranga the placid margins. The thundering shout of a heroic people..”. The article mingled passionate discourses with action verbs in order to criticise the regime.

The *FSP* editorial, *Lessons from Sé*, published the next day, maintained this euphoric tone. It applauded the mobilization, adding how the non-partisan character of the campaign contributed to its success. It criticised also the arrogance of the federal government, stating that “if it continues to pretend that it is deaf to the anxieties of civil society, then the PDS will run a terminal risk in the medium term...”. *Folha*’s coverage explored narratives about how many people left their homes to come to the capitals by bus to participate in the protests, how public servants were allowed to leave work to go to the protests, how celebrities were giving support and how communist groups were disputing with their rivals

for better places at the rallies. Thus from the Sé demonstration onwards, the campaign began to overwhelm the whole country.<sup>10</sup>

*b) Engagement and mobilization: the peak of the movement*

After the grandiosity of the Sé protest, the movement grew in importance in the media as well as amongst wider sectors of Brazilian society. The months of February, March and April marked the peak of the civic mobilizations. On the 12<sup>th</sup> of February, *FSP* published the editorial *Yes, yellow* inviting citizens to use the colour in support of the *diretas*. It also published the slogan “Wear yellow for the *diretas*!” on the front page above the main headline from the 18<sup>th</sup> of April onwards. The coverage also celebrated the festivity expressed in the demonstrations, and contrasted these lively and political acts to the previous civic silence seen during most of the dictatorship. Other stories examined how the cause was receiving a wider support across Brazil, and how it was slowly becoming a national mania which was even contaminating Carnival events.<sup>11</sup>

There was also strong civic involvement of journalists who were covering the campaign. Many journalists from other vehicles also began to slowly join in the movement. Newspapers published lists of professional categories who were demanding direct elections, with the journalist profession being one of them.<sup>12</sup> Frias Filho mentioned how the enthusiasm of *FSP* journalists who covered the protests affected the reporting on the number of people present at the civic mobilizations, which was usually inflated. *FSP* columnists like Janio de Freitas, Alberto Dines (“If not now, when?” 01/01/84) and Tarso de Castro wrote daily critical articles in *FSP* demanding direct elections. *FSP* columnist Clóvis Rossi confirmed the militancy of *Folha* journalists: “It was a rare moment of pamphlet journalism in our recent history. *Folha* ...editorialised the coverage as rarely happens today. The fact that its journalists had the same desires and urges made everyone vibrate with the coverage as if they were owners of the campaign, of the newspaper and, by extension, of the defeat. Maybe because of our involvement, we produced one of the best pieces of Brazilian journalism of all time. Alive, pulsating, engaged (which is not always a quality), but faithful to facts. We did not invent

---

<sup>10</sup> (I.e. “Sé square continues to speak, says Ulisses” (16/02/84) and “The impact of the direct elections protests changes the country” (15/04/84).

<sup>11</sup> (I.e. “*Diretas Já* generate a new marketing” (12/01/84); “Party for the *Diretas* opens Carnival” (13/02/84) and “Political festivity invades the streets” (06/03/84)).

<sup>12</sup> (I.e. “Journalists wear the colour (yellow) of the *Diretas*” (*ESP*, 23/04/84)).



anything so that the bill could be approved, and we did not tear up papers...because the stories would tell anyway the history of our defeat..”

The Candelária demonstration in early April was the heyday of the *Diretas Já!* movement. One million people took to the streets. By then, practically all of the media showed enthusiastic support.<sup>13</sup> Still in contrast to its rivals though, *FSP* deepened its passionate tone, continuing to pursue a more combative stance. The paper included an enormous long-shot photo that occupied half of the front page under the headline that read “In Rio, more than 1 million ask for the *diretas*” (11/04/84). It showed from above a crowd along the whole of President Vargas Avenue in Rio’s centre. The feature emphasised the festivity of the march and the fact that it was bigger than the last demonstration of the 2<sup>nd</sup> of April 1964, which celebrated the fall of Goulart’s government. A map was published in the middle of the page, showing the enormous space occupied by the congregation of protestors. The newspaper published four pages on the demonstration, including the stories “Rio makes the biggest demonstration in the history of Brazil” and Kotscho’s article “The big country re-encounters its nation”. “More than one million people held in Rio...a concentration of people without precedents in Brazilian history, occupying 1,2 km of President Vargas Av.....Emotion was the mark of the demonstration..”, read the main text.

This reinforcement of the grandiosity of these civic mobilizations was again seen in the protest held on the 16<sup>th</sup> of April in the Anhangabaú Valley. The story “São Paulo makes the biggest political demonstration in the country” (17/04/84) was another powerful journalistic piece. *FSP* journalists Clóvis Rossi and Ricardo Kotscho wrote the main stories. The front page included four photographs: two long-shot pictures taken from above the crowd and other two medium close-ups of the people present, including politicians and artists. The peaceful character of the demonstrations was underlined in the texts and the event was given a fully-detailed coverage of six pages. An emphasis was placed on the arguments of those present concerning the defence of the *diretas*. The feature “All of them knew where they were going to”, written by Kotscho, was an example. *FSP* shortly afterwards also self-positioned itself as the main media vehicle which was representing organised civil society in the article “United, civil society is anxious for direct elections now” (24/04/84). A picture was published of civil society representatives on top of the *Folha* building in a sign of unity and pressure for the approval of Dante’s bill. “The ninth floor of the *Folha* building was transformed yesterday in a grand stage, where Brazilian

---

<sup>13</sup> (I.e. “*Diretas*: march goes from Candelária to Cinelândia” (*O Globo*, 11/04/84); “Rio talked to the whole of Brazil” (*Isto É*, 18/04/84) and “The Candelária shout” (*Veja*, 18/04/84).

society was represented according to their legitimate leaders, all defending direct elections now....”, said the daily.

This climate of intense mobilization continued throughout April. André Singer’s article “The impact of the protests in favour of direct elections changes the country” (15/04/84) discussed the power that these protests were having in mobilizing Brazilian society. “The first change is the most evident: today Brazil is a country where demonstrations are held. When no one believed anymore in the possibility of grand street protests... What was exceptional has turned into routine...,” wrote Singer. The story published on the side “Entrepreneurs have ambivalent stance” indicated the cautious position still shared by the more conservative sectors of Brazilian society in relation to the cause. *FSP* also published on the 22<sup>nd</sup> the names and telephone numbers of Congressional MPs, so that the population could communicate with them and exercise pressure during the voting of the direct elections proposal. Although the absence of various governmental MPs did lead to the bill’s rejection in Congress, the massive mobilization of sectors of Brazilian society in the end had a symbolic significance and an importance of its own. Consequently, the *Diretas Já!* went down in Brazilian history as having been one of the main catalysts of the downfall of the military dictatorship.

*c) A nation frustrated: the rejection of Dante’s bill*

The article published by *FSP* on the 26<sup>th</sup> of April on the obstruction of Dante de Oliveira’s constitutional emendation by the military establishment is perhaps one of the most important pieces to date in the history of the daily. It exemplifies a peak in *Folha*’s prestige. The story “The Nation Frustrated – Although there was a majority of 298 votes, 22 more were needed to approve the direct elections” (26/04/84) was a powerful example of good militant journalism in practice. The daily substituted the yellow *Diretas* slogan, which it had been using in the past weeks, for “Use black for the National Congress”. It published also a list of MP’s who were responsible for blocking the approval of Dante’s draft law (“20 PDS MPs did not stick to their promise” (26/04/84, p. 6). The editorial *The project falls, not us* gave voice to the frustration of millions of Brazilians, stressing how a ‘bunch of public men, fossils of the dictatorship’, had said no to the proposal. “The expectation of millions has been frustrated. A minority of bad MPs said no to the wishes of their own people, who were able to express themselves with transparency, firmness and order. Never had the Brazilian society stood up with so much force...” began the editorial.

The stories written by Kotscho and Rossi (“Without the support of the PDS, the direct elections emendation is rejected”, p. 5 and “Night of the absentees, the day of the end of hope”, p. 8) reflected in a poetic and angry tone the misery felt by millions. “It was the night of shame: shame in the gestures of the PDS MPs who were absent or who decided not to vote...Shame because of the scandalous police repression scheme held outside Congress...”, wrote Rossi in the first piece. Next to this main feature, the paper published a box with the name of 20 politicians from the PDS who did not vote in favour of the bill. “From the 76 votes which were needed of the PDS for the approval of Dante de Oliveira’s emendation, there were only 55”, highlighted the text. A story on the side, “Opposition starts to evaluate the consequences”, underlined how the opposition would continue to negotiate. In “Night of the absentees...”, Kotscho used poetry again to underscore the deceptions of Brazilians. “On top of the carpeted floor of the Federal Chamber, when everything was over, the representatives of the people defeated in their biggest hope stepped on the petals of the yellow chrysanthemums which all these months symbolised a fight, a dream ...the cry for liberty of this humiliated nation” wrote the reporter. Kotscho criticised also governmental hardliners. “It is obvious that Paulo Maluf did not even show up...The journalists seemed more excited than some MPs. Even Reale Jr, correspondent of *ESP* in Paris, could not take it and took the first plane here to follow the session closely...”.

As we shall see, in the last months a prior to the voting session, newspapers such as *ESP*, *JB* and *O Globo* started to defend the direct elections more, attacking the government and the adoption of repressive security measures around Congress.<sup>14</sup> Sectors of the mainstream press also reacted against the imposition of censorship orders on radio and television stations during the voting session. However, the reaction was not overly confrontational, with many not condemning fully the repressive measures. The *Veja* 12 page story on the topic, “*Diretas – The blockage of the government*”, included the article *The government reacts – the president finally enters the fight*. This focused on Figueiredo’s “return to the battlefield” and on his strength. It was not that overly critical of the governmental repression. “Figueiredo last week showed commitment ...to make more difficult the consummation of the definitive coup – the approval of the Dante bill...Figueiredo installed measures of emergency in Brasília...forming a ring of security around deputies and senators..”, said *Veja*. Criticisms of the measures were made more by leaders of the opposition, like Ulysses Guimarães. According to Ulysses, the “act was

---

<sup>14</sup> (I.e. “Figueiredo offers the *Diretas*. Only in 88” and “And the people repeat in São Paulo: elections now!” (*ESP*, 17/04/04) and “In Brasilia, repression with prisons and shots” (*O Globo*, 20/04/84).

brutal, typical of a dictatorship. The emergence measures do not protect the Congress and only humiliate it”.

*FSP* had been critical of the military’s intentions since the discussions first emerged. Closer to the day of the voting session, *Folha* published the editorials *Tancredo, the precipitation* and *Everyone in favour of the direct elections* (24/04/84), criticising Neves’s intentions of negotiation in a moment of unity towards the approval of the direct elections bill in Congress. It classified Brasília’s repressive measures as “authoritarian”. “When authoritarianism moved by despair shows its more lamented effects in Brasília – with arbitrary prisons and information censorship...., the awareness of certain basic values must support the unity...of the pro-*diretas* front”, affirmed the second editorial. The government was thus attempting to control the voting of Dante’s proposal by not permitting direct transmissions of the session in Congress,<sup>15</sup> making it harder for sectors of Brazilian society to exercise pressures on the MPs who were going to vote. Thus the direct elections bill was eventually rejected, with *FSP* and practically all of the mainstream media expressing disgust and sympathising with the frustrations felt by millions of Brazilians.<sup>16</sup> This defeat would stimulate disillusionment with the whole re-democratisation process (1985-1989), a fact which had important political consequences in the 1989 first presidential elections, as we shall see in Chapter 3.

## **2.5. Officialdom and late militancy: discussing reactions of the mainstream press**

A critical analysis of the other mainstream papers from the end of 1983 to early 1984 indicates a predominance in the press of discourses that endorsed the official government line, thus reaffirming in many ways the military generals’ point-of-view concerning the succession of president João Figueiredo and the necessity of a gradual transition back to civil democracy. There was a tendency to endorse, be it in the reporting and/or the editorials, the anxieties felt by the generals concerning the election process and the possibility of the rise of the left to power. An examination of the papers *JB*, *ESP* and *O Globo* in the last few months of 1983 to February 1984 reveals that official government voices occupied the headlines constantly in contrast to the opposition players. Media

---

<sup>15</sup> (I.e. “Radio and TV forbidden to identify the voters” (*FSP*, 26/04/84).

<sup>16</sup> (I.e. “Congress rejects the *Diretas*” (*JB*, 26/04/84) and “Not enough votes for the *Diretas Já*” (*ESP*, 26/04/84)).

support came mainly after the Sé protest. The stories of the demonstrations thus began to leave the bottom pages of the dailies, reaching the headlines and occupying the top right of the pages. They began to compete for the attention of the reader with the official stories on the political negotiations taking place in Congress.<sup>17</sup>

*ESP* was the first to show more support, praising the civic movement in editorials after the January protests. *O Estadão* was a newspaper that supported the military coup at first in 1964, beginning however to mingle criticisms of the regime with applause for the intentions manifested by its more moderate players of promoting a gradual return back to democracy. It also supported the regime's economic model, which it saw as being a successful one. Censorship however started to be imposed on the newspaper from 1968 onwards in the context of the more repressive phase initiated by the military generals. *ESP* was censored from the government of general Emílio Médici (1969-1974) until April 1975, when censorship was finally suspended during Geisel's administration. The newspaper also clashed with the regime during the opening phase, with a journalist who covered the presidency having his press credentials taken from him in November 1978.<sup>18</sup>

As mentioned before, *ESP* had initially expressed caution, tending to stick to the regime's point-of-view.<sup>19</sup> The *ESP* editorial after the Sé mobilization, *Lessons from the demonstration at Sé*, (27/01/84), adopted a more critical slant in relation to the government, although the daily had previously criticised the opposition. This text was similar to the *FSP* editorial *Lessons from Sé*. The word "Lesson" was used to refer to some of the "teachings" learned from the protests. Both editorials applauded Lula's intervention and the organisation of the demonstration by Montoro. *ESP* affirmed: "No one doubts that the immense majority of the population want direct elections...Various facts show that the government, in the defence of the indirect election, is speaking by itself....The administration of Figueiredo will pass in history as being the...most disastrous..." This position also reflected the growing interest in entrepreneur circles in the candidature of the

---

<sup>17</sup> (I.e. "Crowd fills Sé square during demonstration for the direct elections" (*JB*, 26/01/84, p. 3); "PDS now waits for presidential decision" (*ESP*, 26/01/84) and "Maluf suggests that Figueiredo postpones his message" (*O Globo*, 22/03/84), see appendix for more).

<sup>18</sup> *ESP* also defended a proper investigation into the bombing that occurred in Riocentro in Rio de Janeiro on the 30<sup>th</sup> of April, 1981. Military right-wing groups who wanted to impede the advancement of the political strategy of opening of the regime planned this attack in order to put the blame on left-wing sectors. The bomb however ended up exploding on the lap of one of the generals. In the end of 1983, *ESP* also suffered an attack from right-wing groups.

<sup>19</sup> (i.e. "Radicals irritate Montoro" (*ESP*, 11/02/84) and "Socialism is not the solution", said cardinal Josef Glomp" (*ESP*, 02/03/84)).

vice-president Aureliano Chaves, a politician who was viewed as a moderate figure capable of succeeding Figueiredo.<sup>20</sup>

*Veja* and *Isto É*, especially the latter, also began to stand by the cause. The magazine *Isto É* resembled *Folha* in its support of the campaign from November 1983 onwards. Like *Veja*, *Isto É* was also launched by the journalist Mino Carta in 1976, having always had a tendency to be more inclined towards the left than *Veja* in the last decades, although its ideological position has remained quite ambiguous in the last years given the shifts in its ownership and management, as we shall see. At the time of the *Diretas*, *Isto É* published the article, *Everyone for the Diretas* (30/11/83), in defense of the movement. This was accompanied by a picture of the newsroom showing all the journalists militantly engaged in the campaign. It included a sub-title underneath which said “*Isto É’s* newsroom also wants the direct elections”. The front cover of the magazine read “For the direct elections – the whole country lifts up the flag”. The headline was placed alongside a drawing of a man dressed in soldier clothes, lifting up a flag for direct elections. Here it seemed that a clear link was being made between the importance of the campaign and the battles fought in the world for liberty.

The editorialised article *Everyone for...* took advantage of Figueiredo’s acknowledgment of the regime’s intention of allowing a return to democracy. It argued that the president’s support could boost the campaign: “A country that has suddenly come to terms with the fact that the president’s words...were the signal that was lacking. The flames that Figueiredo lit with his words has put the country on fire...” It seemed here that the editorial defended direct elections in the context of the permissive stance assumed suddenly by the president, thus not questioning his position more. The editorial published in the December edition (07/12/83), *The time of the streets*, was more explicit, pushing for more participation: “The first popular mobilization rehearsal of the 27<sup>th</sup> in São Paulo was still timid, certainly badly organized..”, pointed out the editorial.

Rival of *Isto É*, *Veja* also stood by the proposal. The magazine however did not publish a specific editorial on the subject, but its coverage in the last months tended to be slightly more critical of the military regime.<sup>21</sup> In November 1983, journalist Mario Sérgio Conti wrote the article *The direct elections against the ruin* in the opinion page of *Veja* (09/11/83). Conti, who would be later editor-in-chief of the magazine, affirmed that *Veja*

---

<sup>20</sup> (I.e. “Entrepreneurs start to articulate a pro-Aureliano scheme” (*FSP*, 22/02/84) and “Aureliano affirms that his candidature is consolidated” (*ESP*, 4/03/84)).

<sup>21</sup> (I.e. “The direct elections against ruin” (9/11/83); “A direct figure in the PDS” (23/11/83); “Letter to the reader” and “I want to vote for president” (01/02/84)).

did not explicitly back the movement, but was supportive of it: “When I wrote that article, I was political editor. It was not my idea, but Elio Gaspari’s, who was my boss. The idea was that the reader could read the article and have another motive to be in favour of the thesis. During the whole campaign, it (*Veja*) was sympathetic. We gave a whole cover on the Sé square demonstration. In fact it was the same as *Isto É* magazine.... And it was a cover that was very editorialised: the headline was ‘I want to vote for president’. The magazine was sort of saying these words”, said the journalist.

Conti’s article made the case for direct elections as the only way out of the Brazilian crisis. “More than good and defensible in themselves, the direct elections for president is necessary for the country to debate openly and to discuss its option for the future”, affirmed Conti in the text. Interviewed for this research, Conti explained *Veja*’s role: “It was important for the magazine to have presented the coverage because it had an image which was closely tied to the dictatorship. The enthusiastic form with which it engaged in the coverage was sort of saying ‘Look, we are distancing ourselves from all this. We think that the democratic path is better than dictatorship.’ But there is no doubt that the vehicle that covered the campaign, and used it to reaffirm itself journalistically, was *Folha*...”.

*Veja* was launched in 1968 by radical journalist Mino Carta in the midst of the growth of the opposition against the dictatorship. During its early years, with journalists like Augusto Nunes, Elio Gaspari and Bernardo Kucinski working in the newsroom, the magazine took on a bit of a political role, functioning as a restricted site of resistance to the military regime. From the beginning of Geisel’s government in 1974 and during the first years of his administration, the magazine started to suffer systematic cuts in its pages (FGV, 2001), having had to publish stories on angels and demons to indicate to the reader that it was being censored. Similar to *FSP*, it also was immersed in the tensions fought between the Geisel group and the military hardliners, with the magazine having been pressured to abandon its critical editorial line which had so characterised it during the early years. From then onwards however it would still occasionally criticise the regime. Political pressures thus culminated in the dismissal of Carta from the newsroom in February 1976.

Thus *Veja*, which during the 70’s turned into the most important national magazine in the country, ended up defending the *Diretas Já* more clearly in February 1984 after the Sé rally. *The Letter to the Reader*, an initial paragraph section included at the beginning of the magazine which gives comments in an editorialised tone on important themes of the week, criticized the government’s attitude in relation to the Sé mobilization: “It is comprehensible that the government does not like such a protest...But what is intriguing is to see the

government argue that people went to see an artistic show...That shows a refusal to see reality...if the facts do not combine with what is wanted, the way out is to annul them..." Another letter published ahead of the voting of Dante's bill underlined the significance of the campaign: "The direct elections protest held in Rio last week were another mark on the evolution of this extraordinary movement, which has seen enormous mobilization and popular support around a political idea.." (Veja, 18/04/84).

*O Globo's* coverage was more hesitant. The newspaper gave total support to the 1964 military coup and in comparison to the other national dailies, *O Globo* gradually became known as the most official newspaper of all the mainstream ones. *O Globo* defended the "combat of subversion" articulated by the generals at the same time that it praised the opening of the regime and condemned the acts of terrorism practiced by right-wing military sectors (FGV, 2001)<sup>22</sup>. Thus when the negotiations for the *Diretas Já* campaign began, the paper chose to emphasize more the political articulations taking place in 1983 in the corridors of Congress between PDS politicians, stressing their fears concerning the succession process. During the early months of the *Diretas Já!* movement, *O Globo* conducted a more official coverage, publishing short stories on the protests and on some of the behind-the-scenes negotiations of the opposition. It started to give more weight to the issue when the larger demonstrations occurred, such as the Sé Cathedral and the Candelária.<sup>23</sup> In some of the stories published by *O Globo*, such as "Sarney: indirect elections are not negotiable for the PDS" and "Delfim thinks it is absurd for the PDS to let go of the indirect elections" (8/12/83), the point-of-view which predominated was the regime's one. Official governmental stories had privileged spaces, with opposition leaders occupying a secondary position. The exception was Neves, who received legitimacy from the regime and appeared as the key representative of the opposition to the detriment of Ulysses and Lula.<sup>24</sup>

Editorials published in the newspaper confirm this analysis, such as *Element of Hope* (7/12/83) and *Succession without haste* (9/12/83). The former stressed the centrality of the position of Neves as representative of the consensus proposal. It stated: "The approval of

---

<sup>22</sup> The *Globo's* story on the Riocentro bombing highlighted that a second bomb had exploded half an hour after the first, thus contradicting the official version that the generals were victims and not participants in the act (FGV, 2001).

<sup>23</sup> (I.e. "Mobilization for direct elections takes crowd to Sé square" (26/01/84); "Mobilization in favour of the *Diretas* takes place calmly and reunites millions in Rio" (10/02/84); "It was the biggest political concentration in the history of the city" and "Emotion, the tone of the speeches. And of the participation of the artists" (11/4/84) and "Demonstration in SP is bigger than act in Rio" (17/04/84)).

<sup>24</sup> (I.e. "Tancredo: Figueiredo spoke short and on time"(9/12/83) and "Tancredo: opposition must invest in infidelity" (18/12/83)).



the new National Security Law, well received by all sectors, represented an important step in the opening of the regime...The moderate group led by governor Neves prevailed in the National Convention of the PMDB, which tends to secure the continuity... of the negotiations between the Government and the Opposition...” The latter editorial backed the gradual transition back to democracy. It stated: “...president Figueiredo made official...his rejection of the pressures to accelerate the opening of the regime..., of the immediate re-establishment of direct elections for president. The question of the succession itself emerged in a hasty way...”. The overall language used by the paper created an initial dichotomy between the “Government” (us) and the “Opposition” (them), with these two words appearing in capital letters as shown here. Moreover, the opposition was often portrayed by the daily as being too insistent on the direct elections as well as being somewhat inactive and a bit apologetic.<sup>25</sup>

As will be argued in Chapter 6, *O Globo*'s emphasis on official reporting was gradually diluted with the reinforcement of professional journalism values, with more importance being placed on the reporting of facts and on the realization of a balanced coverage. These changes occurred mainly from the mid-80's onwards, and especially in the 1990's. Thus in 1984, Globo Organizations, and this includes *O Globo*, were still very much plunged in the particular political constraints of the time. Its *Diretas Já!* coverage would inevitably reflect this more pro-government slant, thus slightly endorsing in its editorial line the regime's general suspicion of the opposition. *Globo TV* for instance was the main media vehicle accused by journalists and academics of having downplayed the political impact of some of the demonstrations (Leonelli and Oliveira, 2004; Abreu, 2002; Bucci, 2000; Conti, 1999). According to Conti (1999, 37-38), military ministers managed to convince TV Globo that the campaign was bad for Figueiredo's government. Former vice-president José Bonifácio de Oliveira Sobrinho, known popularly as Boni, gave an interview to TV Cultura in January 2006 claiming that Roberto Marinho censored the coverage of the Sé demonstration.<sup>26</sup> Conti (1999) argues that Boni fought for it to appear, managing to get a reporter to go and cover it, although the journalist would have to say that the protest was an artistic show held because of the 430<sup>th</sup> anniversary of SP. From then onwards, Globo Organisations started to cover the protests more fully, but it still faced various pressures from the military regime.

---

<sup>25</sup>(I.e. “PMDB wants to get out of immobility with direct elections campaign” (20/05/83); “Ulysses insists on going to Sarney for the direct elections” (27/12/83) and “Tancredo says that the movement of the opposition is not revenge” (20/02/84)).

<sup>26</sup>“Boni: “Globo censored *Diretas Já*”” in *FSP* (03/01/2006).

On the 34<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the news programme *Jornal Nacional* (JN) in October 2003, the head of *TV Globo*'s newsroom, Ali Kamel, wrote an article in *O Globo* defending JN from the accusation of not having covered the *diretas*. Interviewed for this research, Kamel underlined the cautious position assumed by *Globo*: "What happens is that people look at the *Diretas Já!* with the eyes of 2001 when it was in 1983, when censorship still existed. *TV Globo* did put on air a story of three minutes in which two thirds were dedicated to the demonstration at Sé Cathedral and the rest to SP's anniversary. Imagine if *TV Globo* dedicated all JN or 10 minutes of it to the campaign, something which is equivalent to 30 pages of newspaper pages, imagine the scandal! For there were even sectors of the country that considered themselves democrats who thought that Brazil was not prepared for democracy, and that transition was necessary.." Although this research has not aimed to investigate the role assumed by television in the coverage of Brazilian politics in the last decades, Kamel's quote is however quite indicative of the tensions which did prevail in elite circles in relation to the production or not of a more in-depth coverage of the *Diretas Já!* movement.

The *ISTO É* story, "The giant that awakes" in *Diretas, Diretas, Diretas* (1/02/84), stated that MP Ulysses had dinner with *TV Globo*'s Roberto Marinho in an attempt of winning his support ahead of the Sé Cathedral act. The story read: "The president of PMDB... was able to guarantee Marinho that the atmosphere in the demonstrations was calmer than in *TV Globo*'s journalism department, where "a feeling of guilt was prevalent", according to a veteran editor... ". According also to another article published by *Veja*, "Diretas on video" (18/04/84), *TV Globo* dedicated only 45 seconds to the Sé rally in JN. It placed more weight on the Candelária protest afterwards, putting on air almost a one hour programme during the whole day. "The (Candelária) coverage started with early flashes, then it entered "*Jornal Nacional*" and nearly invaded the eight o'clock soap-opera... *Globo* certainly did not decide to endorse the campaign. What happened was the recognition by the station of the journalistic importance of the fact and simultaneously, the perception that staying out of it would do much damage..."", affirmed the magazine.

Thus *O Globo* was not the only newspaper which tended to stick to the government's official line. The critical analysis of the stories published by *JB* indicated that, not only was the daily cautious at first, but it actually published editorials against the direct elections, showing support only in the last moments. It advocated a stance in favour of the legitimacy of the military's indirect voting scheme. The *Call to Reason* (16/02/84) editorial for instance highlighted that: "The direct elections, in the way the personal interests are being imposed, would not be just a coup against the electoral process, but a treason to the electors

that went to the voting polls in 1982 to elect a Congress and National Assembly that gave the electors the future president...”. The editorial *Latent risks* (27/01/84), published by *JB* after the Sé demonstration, defended the creation of a new constitution, criticizing further what it saw as being an act of opportunism of the opposition: “The seduction of the campaign for the direct elections satisfies emotionally, but political reason points to the creation of a new Constitution...The direct elections argument just for the sake of it is a sign of oppositional imprudence...”, said the paper.

The newspaper *Jornal do Brasil*, which was reformed by veteran journalists Jânio de Freitas and Alberto Dines, with the latter editing *JB* from 1961 until 1973, was in fact occupying an important position as an influential political daily in Rio de Janeiro. The newspaper had given credit to the government of João Goulart and did take on a progressive position in relation to the agrarian reform, although it did eventually break with his administration due to its left-wing ideological leanings (FGV, 2001). *JB* would also become critical of some of the more repressive measures of the dictatorship, publishing some articles attacking the government, although the general editorial line adopted by the institution was of support<sup>27</sup>. The daily thus began to experience internal conflicts over the *diretas*. *JB* columnists like Elio Gaspari, of *Veja*, and Villas Boas-Corrêa assumed a more critical slant. Veteran journalist Elio Gaspari wrote a critical piece in the opinion page of the daily, *Where the real radicalism is* (*JB*, 17/02/84). According to him in this article, “radicalism” was not in the opposition, but lay elsewhere: mainly in the corridors of Congress.

In spite of the growing approval that the direct elections proposal was receiving by the mainstream press, *FSP*'s coverage still stood out more in many ways because its combative stance in favour of the thesis was present since the beginning until the end of the campaign. *FSP* did thus offer a contribution to the advancement of democracy because it functioned at the time as a mobilizing communication vehicle in the context of a relatively passive mainstream media. It engaged more in militant journalism routines than the other dailies did, giving detailed analyses of both the political negotiations concerning the direct elections as well as the demonstrations which called for a return to democracy. Taking advantage of the lack of space given to the opposition in the general mainstream media, it voiced the concerns of the regime's opponents, stimulating direct political participation and

---

<sup>27</sup> A group of journalists from *JB* managed to stress the contradictions that existed in the military police report on the case, pointing to the falseness of the accusations which stated that the terrorist act had been practiced by left-wing groups (FGV, 2001).

civic mobilization from its readers through various editorials, stories and articles. In comparison to other newspapers, *FSP* reflected more the divisions of the elite in Brazilian society concerning the future of the military dictatorship.

Thus the urge of journalists to publish facts regarding the mobilization of Brazilian society and the dissatisfaction of many with the regime, as journalist Clóvis Rossi affirmed in his discussion of the *Folha* coverage, was combined with journalists' own political agendas and desire for change. These sentiments were in line with the paper's own political and commercial interests in using the campaign to boost the daily's prestige. *FSP's* coverage thus stimulated intellectual debate, direct citizen surveillance of the government and wider desire for participation in the future political arena. As we have seen, professionalism was still relatively weak in the newsroom, with papers oscillating between reproducing official governmental views or engaging more in explicit journalism militancy, as was mainly the case of *Folha* but also of other newspapers and magazines, like *Isto É* and *Veja*, during certain moments of the campaign. The use of journalism militancy in favour of universal democratic values and the re-establishment of civil and political rights, which had been lost during the dictatorship, was thus not only valid at the time but it was also legitimate. In other words, the (active) use of the journalism profession to inflict a certain interpretation of the world on the public, to persuade others that the regime had come to an end and that democracy was necessary, was acceptable given the particular moment that the country was living and the (positive) ways in which journalists dealt with journalistic militancy. In this sense it can be said that the daily was a balancing force in the midst of the general official coverage assumed by most sectors of the mainstream media.

There were however limits to these contributions. Some critics (Dines, 2003; Arbex Jr., 2001; Kucinski, 1998) attacked the market-driven intentions of *FSP*. Some (Dines, 2003) stated for instance that the paper could have incorporated more voices in its pages, and that it tended to favour organized groups of Brazilian society. Firstly, it is usually the case that the more organized groups have wider access to the media. However, the growing inclusion in the mainstream press of these groups and of others situated more in the margins is a long process which depends on the wider democratisation of Brazilian society. During the epoch of the direct elections, many simply did not have access to the media, and the slight opening that *FSP* did offer was thus celebrated. Secondly, it seems clear also that *FSP* was moved by market considerations, and it would be naïve to suppose otherwise. As I stated before, this does not mean that *Folha* did not also have political intentions, as other media vehicles also had (i.e. *Veja* and *Isto É*).

I have argued that both market aspirations and political democratic representation are actually two sides of the same coin in capitalist societies given the fact that liberal democracies are basically *grounded* on the idea of the free market, and thus do not aim to function (naturally) in a statist authoritarian political model. Finally, all these critiques should not undermine the unquestionable significance of the *FSP* campaign to Brazilian society and to journalism at that particular moment in time. However, it seemed evident that such a high-pitched militant style of journalism would not survive after the fall of the dictatorship. For the persistence of such a model should not even be considered desirable of mainstream communication vehicles that have so much social and political power. Thus the shifts in journalism cultures in *FSP* after the *Diretas Já!* can be seen as the paper's own strive to downplay the excessive politicisation of its journalism.

## **2.6. The 1984 Folha project: the shift from “revolutionary” to commercial journalism**

The *Folha* 1984 reforms had the prime intention of immersing the paper in the logic of the market forces (Arbex, 2001; Novelli, 2001; Lins da Silva 1988). Like the case of newspapers from Mediterranean countries, like *Público* in Portugal, *La Republica* in Italy and *El País* in Spain, who in the 1970's and 1980's tilted towards a more market-oriented approach to journalism (Hallin, 2004, 96), *Folha* began attempts to expand circulations by blending strong political reporting with consumerism understandings of news. The intellectual architect of the 1984 *FSP* project was former USP professor and journalist Carlos Eduardo Lins da Silva. It was implemented by Otavio Frias Filho amid his rise to the direction of *FSP*'s newsroom following the end of the *Diretas Já!* coverage. Frias Filho, who had worked as a journalist in *Folha* during the campaign, took over as director in May 1984, shortly after Dante's bill was foiled in Congress.

Marketed initially as “*Folha* after the *Diretas Já!* campaign”, the 1984 reforms were introduced as a dynamic and aggressive look at journalism practice in the context of the re-democratisation. These reforms transformed many of the changes introduced by Cláudio Abramo since 1974, and which had created an opinionated style in the paper. It thus consolidated the paper's critical nerve. Among *FSP*'s main objectives were the creation of “a critical, non-partisan and plural” form of journalism which decided to address the reader more as a consumer than a citizen. The document further defended political pluralism and

the need for Brazilian journalism to raise debates and controversies concerning Brazil's main dilemmas.

Like the rise of the commercial media in the US, which began in the 1830s, the consolidation of the commercial character of the Brazilian media proved to be paradoxical. As Hallin has argued (1994, 23-24), the rise of the commercial press in the US democratised the market for newspapers. However, political communication was thus centralized with large corporations, causing the "atrophy of the mobilizing roles previously fulfilled by the newspaper". As Habermas has argued in his discussion of the rise of the capitalist press in Europe during the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, the legitimacy given to the political public sphere liberated the press from its exclusive critical functions, offering it the opportunity to assume its profit motive (Novelli, 2002, 185). For Habermas (1962, 1997), the previous opinionated press was more worried about its critical function, with profit coming only in second place. In Brazil, *FSP* was considered a pioneering media vehicle that shifted from militant journalism towards a more commercial and professional journalism model amid the collapse of the dictatorship. However, this does not mean to say that before newspapers were not commercial. As highlighted in Chapter 1 in my examination of the different phases of Brazilian journalism, by the 1950's the commercial model had already been established in the country. The commercial phase however was perceived more clearly with the re-establishment of representative liberal democracy in the mid-80's, and with the legitimacy given to the new players that emerged as a consequence of this.

Habermas (1962, 1997) has examined in *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* the emergence of a bourgeoisie public sphere in Europe followed by its subsequent decline in the 20<sup>th</sup> century due to the formation of a mass culture society. Habermas argued that the formation of a bourgeois state with a legalized public sphere was a necessary first step before the press could take on its commercial function. Hallin (1994, 3) has further stressed the validity still of the core of Habermas' concept of the public sphere. He has nonetheless been critical of Habermas' lament of the substitution of the elite public sphere of the 18<sup>th</sup> century by mass culture. "If one compares oranges with oranges – the elite 18<sup>th</sup> newspaper...with the *New York Times* ...it is by no means clear that the latter are less 'rational' or less public" (1994, 3). In a parallel with Habermas' theory, it can perhaps be said that *FSP* during the mid-70's and the *Diretas Já!* campaign was attending to the needs of a more "bourgeoisie" or elitist public sphere, and that after this it assumed its commercial function, beginning to address an emerging "mass public" of the post-

dictatorship phase who formed a less politicised public sphere, but who were not necessarily a less rational or a totally politically disengaged one either.

As Hallin (1994) has noted, Habermas is wrong to examine the history of journalism as being one of decline from a “golden age” of rational and critical debate. Critics (Hallin, 1994; Fraser, 1997) have highlighted how the public sphere of the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries was restricted to a small segment of the population, and that papers were primarily read by commercial and political elites. In his revised version of the public sphere, defined as a ‘network for communicating information and points of view’ (1997; 362), Habermas however talked about the workings of democracy as a system in which the institutions of the government (i.e. Parliament, Judiciary, etc) are at the centre and the periphery is made of different organizations (i.e. regulatory agencies, business associations, labour unions, private organizations, social movements, etc) which influence the core. As Curran (2000, 136) correctly points out, this public sphere is more differentiated and pluralistic, with the activists being “public interest groups and radical professionals...who draw attention to and interpret social problems and propose solutions”. Their interventions can lead, with the aid of the press, to “critical debate coalescing into ‘topically specified public opinions’ (Habermas, 1996: 360), as well as to pressures for a response from the political system (Curran, 2000, 136).

This analysis is arguably much more optimistic than the first, acknowledging the capacity of civil society players to influence powerful institutions and stressing also the willingness of the mainstream press to engage in meaningful debate. Although Curran (2000) goes on to highlight some of the limitations of this interpretation, pointing out however that Habermas’ (1992) presentation of the public sphere is defined as being a complex network where multiple arenas (i.e. international, national) overlap, it is worth making a parallel between this revised version of the public sphere with the pressures placed by social and civil society Brazilian groups, with the aid of media professionals, on the core centre of the Brazilian military government during the epoch of the *Diretas Já*. Thus Habermas’ view of the complexity of the relationship between the periphery groups and the core centre seems to me to be a more appropriate way of understanding the workings of civil society, certain sectors of the media and the government in 1984.

Along the lines of what Hallin has said in relation to the *New York Times*, it is not correct to say that *FSP* today is less rational or political than it was before 1984. The case studies of this research and the existence of competing journalism cultures in Brazilian newsrooms point to the contrary, as we shall see. Of the main mainstream dailies, *FSP* was

the first to have sensed what John Keane (1998) has defined as a relationship of mutual dependence between civil society and the market and vice-versa. “Where there are no markets, civil society finds it impossible to survive. Where there is no civil society, there can be no markets” (1998, 19) states Keane, emphasising also the destructive character that market forces can have on the plurality of media voices. *Folha* could thus only develop fully through the emancipation of civil society in relation to the state and the entry of Brazil back into a market democracy.

This is a similar argument that I make in response to those academics and journalists (i.e. Carta, 1988; Kucinski, 1998; Arbex Jr., 2001; Novelli, 2002) who attacked *FSP*'s 1984 reforms on the grounds that it opened the way for the decline of the paper's previous “golden” era of political journalism. Veteran journalist and academic Bernardo Kucinski sees *Folha* today as being a “post-modern” medium: “*FSP* is a marketing project. It is a provocative type of journalism. It had great impact because of this youngish position..., and in that respect it is an interesting newspaper. However, it has a post-modern ideology, and that is necessarily cynical..” These critiques attacked what they saw as a distancing of the paper from some of the citizenship principles established by Abramo. Nonetheless, one should not idealise too much the existence of a supposedly wide “debating media public” during the 1970's in Brazil, given the fact that the mainstream media during most of the dictatorship was relatively passive and suffered because of censorship. Many media vehicles during that time were more mouthpieces of government than enlightened spheres of debate, issues which are explored more in Chapter 6.

Thus I do not believe that the move towards a more commercial journalism model diminished debate or even that *FSP* was a better newspaper prior to 1984. Habermas is arguably right when he states that now more than ever the “logics of commodity production and state power intrude into the production of news” (Hallin, 1994, 6). As we shall see, forms of political and economic pressures *do* constrain news, and they have done so considerably during the period that is covered in this research. These factors are the main cause of concern today. One should thus not lament the fall of a supposedly ‘golden age’ of journalism that actually never really existed. As we shall see in the case studies here and in Chapter 6, public debate actually expanded, although it was more simplified to a certain extent and was not necessarily as intellectual and active as it had been in the (restricted arena) of the 1970's. However, in contrast to the US experience with the commercial media, newspapers in Brazil have continued to be political in a context of growing



democratisation and debate in the media between different groups concerning Brazil's main problems.

Although newspapers still have a low circulation, a fact which makes it difficult to speak of a "mass public", dailies however have reached wider publics in the 1990's in comparison to the dictatorship years, when they were read by an even smaller number of military, business and intellectual elites. Member of *FSP*'s editorial commission, Luis Nassif confirmed that *Folha* simplified the debate in the aftermath of the *Diretas Já*: "The 90's are actually very opinionated... This thirst for opinion assumes even fascist characteristics. This is an angry reader.. And *Folha* and the newspapers start to cater to this new reader, to use market research...to give the reader what he wants." Thus *FSP* during the past ten years constructed a critical tone in its pages in order to mould public opinion. This reached its peak with the success of the *Diretas Já!* coverage. Nonetheless, the continuity of such a militant stance in the long run would probably alienate the wider publics it had attracted. Even before the *diretas*, there was already a concern with the commercial logic. A document launched in 1981 entitled "*Folha* and some steps which must be taken" emphasized the importance of factual information instead of politicised journalism. *Folha*'s need to adhere to the new international and national market logic was thus juxtaposed to different ways of engaging with citizenship concerns. The paper thus simplified the previous rational "bourgeoisie public sphere" of debate that existed during the *diretas*, extending the access to its pages to multiple publics as well as to some actors who considered it in their right *not* to be interested in politics.

Lins da Silva (1988, 100) defended the notion of pluralism and non-partisanship as essential elements of the 1984 reforms. This allowed the newspaper to represent different views of the world. Lins da Silva underlined that the daily continued to prioritise politics: "The *Diretas Já!* campaign and the Neves indirect elections made the situation less one-sided than the last 20 years had been. That already caused a certain confusion in society, which was not divided anymore between democrats and authoritarians. This demanded a new approach... You had a series of economic and social factors at that moment,...a middle class which was growing, ...a demand for more sophisticated products.....Although it was a process that had evolved since Abramo, ...the 1984 project was very different from the principles of 1974. Before things were done with improvisation. Although in certain ways it was a continuation, it was also a rupture.... What *FSP* tried to do was take away the editorialisation of the daily. What certain people thought it was doing was taking away the politics...'"

Thus the 1984 reforms paved the way for the consolidation in the daily of a more clearly US-inspired commercial form of journalism which attempted to dissociate itself from party politics and advocate independence vis-à-vis the state. The paper's new graphic design drew from European and North-American journalism practices, mainly from the dailies *USA Today* and to a lesser extent, from *El País*. The reforms emphasized the production of shorter stories, culminating in changes in the tone of writing of *Folha's* journalists. There was a move away from the more erudite commentary and poetic auteur style that had marked the *Diretas Já!* towards a more telegraphic informational mode, but still with some opinion. *FSP* also reinforced the adoption of the Anglo-American liberal journalism values of professionalism, seen as a means of dwindling the paper's militant character and the partisan routines that had become common. Thus for many journalists accustomed to the old practices, the reforms were like an attack on their freedom and on creative writing. Editorial independence in the future would thus become a privilege of mainly columnists and other high-profile journalists.

The implementation of the 1984 *Folha* project created conflict in the newsroom. Ricardo Kotscho found it difficult to adapt to this model: "The *Folha* project served as a model for other newspapers. In fact, it was modelled on American journalism, on *USA Today*, which aimed to transfer the language of television to newspapers. Short stories, a lot of graphics... The stories got smaller...and the industrial process was reinforced. Before that romantic journalism prevailed, there was no definite time for the newspaper to be ready for print...I think there were two extremes: the romantic phase where there were no rules, where everything happened without control, and the opposite, the total control of the newsroom...I think there must be discipline, but also there must be liberty of creation..". Academic and former *FSP* journalist, José Arbex Jr. entered the daily in 1984 and experienced the changes that took place in *Folha*. Arbex Jr. also underlined the difficulties that some journalists encountered: "The 1984 reforms were very difficult... Many did not adapt to these new times and left *Folha*; others accepted them with enthusiasm and others stayed in the middle. I include myself in the last category. I left the newsroom in 1992..."

Some critics also argue that *FSP* had to adopt a more non-partisan stance to control its own ideological character and to kill-off the growing *petismo* of journalists. "Many *FSP* journalists were militants or were sympathetic to the PT...and were attracted to the newspaper because of its "rebellious" look...But the honeymoon ended with the end of the military regime... Slowly, *Folha* started to change...its discourse..."(Arbex. Jr., 2001; 152-153). Arbex Jr. (2001, 164) has also criticized the limits of the *Folha* project. According to

him, these lie mainly in the paper's attempt of trying to apply liberalism to an authoritarian Brazilian reality. These limits are arguably part of the whole journalism experience in Brazil, and of other national dailies that attempt to endorse journalism liberal values, as we shall see, but which nonetheless operate immersed within political and economic confinements. Precisely because of this, the applicability of liberal values to journalism is essential. *Folha* is perhaps the main daily in Brazil that has embodied these contradictions most clearly, backing militant journalism stances and then swaying towards professionalism. It is a media vehicle that has lived the tensions between adopting diverse forms of democratic projects (militant and professional) to a (still) somewhat authoritarian Brazilian reality.

The arguments outlined above however offer only a partial view of the picture. They place little importance on historical change and on how the entry of Brazil into a new realm of market liberal democracy forced newspapers like *FSP* to adapt to a new market reality of multiple publics. Readership expansion in the post-dictatorship phase was crucial because of the increased access of wider segments of the population to a mainstream quality daily. The need of *FSP* to attend to this was more important than the desire to “suffocate *petismo*”. In spite of internal political clashes in the newsroom regarding ideological commitments, something which continued in the years to come, the Brazilian media have always worked with left-wing journalists. Interviewed for this research, Frias Filho admitted that his generation was influenced by both the PSDB and the PT parties, and that *Folha* today tries to balance these forces in its pages, although this has not been always an easy process and has been in fact characterised by various conflicts, as we shall see.

Critiques (i.e. Novelli, 2002; 193) have also pointed to the contradictions of *FSP*'s project, mainly in its continuous shifting from assuming a role of forming public opinion whilst still attending to the interests of readers. These clashes between citizenship and consumerism rationales, however, are at the very heart of the tensions faced by contemporary mainstream journalism in its reporting of politics. Thus there seems to exist a simplistic (radical) line of reasoning that portrays media firms like *FSP* as pure profit-seeking media moguls. These critiques give little importance to the tensions that prevail within these communication organisations, including both external, social, political and economic pressures as well as journalism's autonomy and its commitment to public service ideals. Little credit is placed on transformations that can occur in mainstream media systems due to historical change, societal pressures and even the political and democratic projects of owners and journalists, like the *Diretas Já!* campaign has shown. Nonetheless,

these radical critiques (i.e. Novelli, 2002) have made important contributions, raising concerns over the continuity of the print press' commitment to moulding public opinion and promoting more in-depth political debate in a context of increasing market pressures and media concentration.

Thus both *Folha* and much of contemporary Brazilian journalism has not seen a total rupture with the partisan/militant practices of the past, as we shall see. *Folha* continued to address both the citizen and the consumer, as well as maintaining much of its opinionated journalism style in certain sections of the paper, mainly the debate pages 2 and 3. The figure of the internal media ombudsman or media critic was also launched by the daily in 1989. *FSP* thus reworked the free market/media liberal theory in the newsroom, reaffirming its compromise with the market and claiming independence in relation to the state, thus paving the way for the consolidation in the 1990's of its watchdog journalism role. As we shall see, this resulted in better investigative reporting, wider surveillance of state structures, inclusion of different discourses in the media pages and greater criticism of politicians, elements that were also adopted in other mainstream newspapers, culminating in improvements in media performance. The 1984 *Folha* reforms were thus an adaptation to both international and national market journalism trends. They attempted to maximize profits as well as to place the newspaper in the new complex paradigm of multiple players of the post-dictatorship phase. Thus citizenship rationales were not abandoned. Rather, new ways of engaging with these conceptions emerged, as we shall see.

This chapter has highlighted also the main attacks made against some of the practices of contemporary journalism, which were present in *Folha*'s new journalism model. Thus if the news agenda was democratised and public debate expanded from the late 1980's onwards, in many ways journalism was also trivialised, seeing the growth of infotainment news, human interest stories and celebrity culture gossip in a climate of intense competition from cable TV and the Internet. Pressures grew for media industries to "dumb down" to satisfy non-demanding readers. What thus needs to be discussed now is the forms of boosting both readership levels and the access of (quality) information and debate to wider segments of Brazilian society. The last chapter debates the idea of strengthening other media sectors and the public media to serve as a counterweight to the predominance of the commercial sector in the communication field in an era of increasing pressures being placed on commercial quality journalism to lower standards and maximise profits.

The acknowledgement of the essentiality of journalism pluralism, and the adoption of objectivity and balance by *FSP* from 1984 onwards, were advancements made at a time

when professionalism was still weak in newsrooms and the reproduction of official discourses prevailed in political reporting. *FSP* was also responsible for having triggered changes in the perceptions of the journalism profession, promoting debates on the competing cultures of journalism and their relevance to democracy. The *Folha* project wanted to continue to offer quality journalism, but within the restrictions of the market. Thus if the *Folha* 1984 reforms had deficiencies concerning excessive approaches to marketing trends, they also had many ground-breaking elements in their favouring of liberal journalism values in the production of news, and in the courting of multiple publics which had emerged in the wake of the collapse of the dictatorship, and which demanded to be heard.

## **2.7. Conclusion**

Although the direct elections bill was blocked in Congress by the military regime, the mobilization of the *Diretas Já!* campaign helped accelerate the return to civil democracy, paving the way for the re-democratization phase which ended with the presidential election of Fernando Collor in 1989. The *FSP* coverage was thus a moment when militant journalism and political idealism were working side by side with commercial concerns and with the growing emergence in the press of marketing approaches to news-making. For much of civil society, it was a call for a return to political representative democracy as much as it was also a pressure for wider economic and social inclusion. As we have seen, during the campaign the state still resorted to censorship to control the media. Lance Bennett (2002, 34) has identified certain elements which constitute the kind of news that better serves democracy. These include the adoption of more independent news in the daily agenda; the emphasis on the media's representation of diversity; the depiction of more detailed analyses of how institutions and political groups operate and the use of political activists' statements. *FSP* adopted some of these strategies – such as the inclusion in its pages of dates of demonstrations and more in-depth political coverage – and in this sense did offer valid contributions. It included in the media arena the multiple growing interests of a much more complex public sphere.

Regardless of market and personal political interests, it seems clear that the *FSP Diretas Já!* coverage endorsed the pressures to accelerate the return to a civil government and thus moulded public opinion to be in favour of this particular cause. What remains to be debated nonetheless is *how* more advancements can be made to widen the still restricted

access to the mainstream media of less privileged groups of Brazilian society, issues pursued throughout this thesis. Both *FSP*'s support of the direct elections and its introduction of the 1984 project were thus more two sides of the same coin than necessarily opposite dimensions. Both were driven by similar market and political interests and ideologies, being attempts to reflect and advance the discussions that were occurring in the country at that particular moment. These clearly seem to be some of the reasons for *Folha*'s success. In short, if on one hand *FSP* did include in its editorial judgement a different approach to citizenship in the aftermath of the *diretas*, reflecting marketing demands, on the other it did not abandon its recognition that the press would still have a role in shaping public debate in the future, as it did. However, this role did lose some of its highly politicised character.

The re-democratisation phase that followed afterwards, or the New Republic which started in March 1985 with José Sarney being sworn in as president, was thus characterized by a new revaluation of the media and of its position in Brazilian society. As we shall see, the press' coverage of the presidential elections that followed did raise public debate and encourage political involvement, in spite of the influence of the more commercial Anglo-American model on Brazilian journalism, and in many ways precisely because of this. Thus the Brazilian press did not go down the exclusive path of journalism technique, cool "objective" detachment and total disengagement from politics. Its political role would be maintained in the years to come, having nonetheless to live with the contradictions of the favouring of commercial concerns in news-making, the increase in media concentration on a national and international level and the growing formation of transnational conglomerates worldwide. Hopes for inclusion in the political, economic and social realm of Brazilian society were thus transferred from the direct elections campaign to the first presidential elections after the dictatorship in 1989, a debate examined in the next chapter.

## Chapter 3 – Ideological campaigns and the watchdog role of the press: the media coverage of the 1989 elections and the 1992 impeachment

### 3.1. Introduction

Brazilians had their first opportunity to directly elect a president after 20 years of dictatorship in 1989. Disillusionment with politics was high in the aftermath of the *Diretas Já* defeat. As we have seen, many Brazilians saw their hopes of seeing the country return to political representative democracy shatter with the rejection of Dante's bill in Congress. They found themselves chasing yet another mirage when the social and political laws approved by the 1988 Constitutional Assembly were not capable of addressing fully the inequalities and injustices of the Brazilian reality. Furthermore, the government of José Sarney did not live up to expectations. Corruption claims marked his turbulent administration, with the economic Cruzado plan failing to combat inflation. In such a turbulent scenario of weak political institutions and a civil society who had retreated into the private world after a period of relative agitation in 1984, Brazilians seemed set to be waiting for a saviour of the nation. The figure chosen was Fernando Collor de Mello, son of a typical provincial politician of the Northeast who emerged as a new politician who strived to disassociate himself from the world of corruption and political authoritarianism.

The 1989 elections inaugurated what has been called by some sociologists and historians as a *democratic massification* era (Lamounier, 1991). Illiterate citizens voted for the first time, with wider segments of the population being incorporated in the country's political life through the electoral process and through the media (Lattman-Weltman, Dias Carneiro & Abreu Ramos, 1994). Collor emerged in 1989 set to win the votes of the *descamisados* ("those without shirts"), the disillusioned and depoliticised middle-classes and many sectors of the entrepreneur elite who dreamed of entering the global free market economy. Similarly to other Latin American countries, the decade of the mid-80's to the early 90's saw the country engage in the global free market trend, adopting liberal economy policies which included the need to privatise public firms and telecommunication systems, to reduce taxes on imported goods, promote cuts in public spending and introduce mechanisms to decrease inflation rates. Although he was impeached from office in 1992 due to political corruption, Collor was the symbol of the first contemporary president who paved the way for the country's entry into this new free market reality.

This research examines the contradictory role assumed by the press in the 1989 elections coverage and the 1992 impeachment that followed. It debates the reasons why the press shifted between advancing and regressing democracy and situates this within a wider historical context that makes a link between a series of political events from the re-democratisation phase. It goes on to interweave this discussion with the discourses that were circulating amongst elite circles concerning the entry of Brazil in the global market economy and the competing journalism routines of strong partisanship and weak professionalism that existed in newsrooms at the time. This chapter thus argues that the lack of solid liberal journalistic values in the media impeded a more balanced coverage of the first presidential elections of the post-dictatorship. Similar to the socio-economic and political environment of 1984, most of the press were still influenced and shaped by Brazil's authoritarian political and social culture, encountering difficulties in dealing with political pluralism and being overwhelmed by political-ideological constraints. The mainstream press in 1989 did present itself as being non-partisan and commercial. Much of the political reporting of that time however was weak in professionalism: it mingled partisan "militant" journalism practices with official reporting that endorsed the establishment's views. In comparison to 1984 though, the opposition candidates were given more space in the mainstream media, although they were still stigmatised as dissidents.

Thus the circumstances in 1989 were different to 1984. There was no dictatorship and no strictly defined division between an authoritarian and a democratic project for Brazil. However, both periods carried similarities between them given the *nature* of the political-ideological restrictions that prevailed, which was mainly the fear of left-wing politics. In 1984, as we have seen, journalism militancy was used in favour of universal democratic values, having had an important role in accelerating the end of the military regime. In 1989, the coverage produced by the mainstream press tended to endorse the views of the political establishment. Partisanship practices thus invaded most of the newsrooms in 1989, serving at the time as regressive forces that impeded further advancements to the democratisation process.

In spite of the excesses of the impeachment coverage and the emergence of sensationalist journalism, in 1992 the national press began to consolidate in its structures the free market/watchdog function theory, barking at corrupt politicians and making use of its new found freedom to demand greater transparency and ethical practices in politics. Having learned from the errors of both 1989 and 1992, journalism began to improve its operations from this period onwards, as we shall see in the next chapters, with a growth in



media professionalism, something which would become more present in the 1994 elections. Journalism from 1989 onwards however began to be more subject to wider economic and marketing pressures, with ideological biases tending to decrease, as we shall see.

Textual analysis has been done here of a total of 1.013 stories from the 1989 presidential elections and the 1992 impeachment coverage (Table 1). This includes 372 features from *O Globo*, 256 from *FSP*, 187 (*ESP*), 140 (*JB*), 31 (*Veja*) and 27 (*Isto É*). This analysis consists of a six month period that begins in June 1989 and ends in December, although the construction of the Collor persona compromises a larger period which started in 1987, when Collor was sworn in as governor of Alagoas. The magazines, especially *Veja*, are explored more in detail due to their role in the image-making of Collor and in the investigations which culminated in the 1992 impeachment. *Veja* is targeted to a decision-making readership and, as we shall see throughout this research, has tended to reaffirm elite prejudices in relation to left-wing politics and the unprivileged groups of Brazilian society.

**Table 1 – The Collor stories (1989 and 1992)**

<i>O Globo</i>	372
<i>FSP</i>	256
<i>ESP</i>	187
<i>JB</i>	140
<i>Veja</i>	31
<i>Isto É</i>	27
<b>Total number</b>	<b>1.013</b>

Thus the textual analysis conducted here includes an investigation into the initial phase of the construction of the Collor myth followed by the consolidation of his image in the media and his subsequent victory in 1989. The impeachment coverage contains stories which were published from May 1992, the month of the *Veja* denunciation article, until September, when Congress voted for Collor's impeachment. The selection consists of features on personality and image-making as well as articles on the acrid political battle fought between Collor and Lula in the media pages. These are juxtaposed to the socio-political and economic contexts of the year of 1989, debates examined in the next sections.

### **3.2. “Chose the tongue-tied or the second-rate film star!”: ideological polarization in the 1989 elections**

#### *a) 1989: a year of turmoil*

Brazil was experiencing social and economic turmoil in 1989. At the end of 1988, inflation had reached 933% a year. The country seemed to be in the midst of a financial collapse: people were more impoverished and the value of salaries was falling sharply. Sarney's administration was also caught in a proliferation of claims of governmental corruption. Accusations were made concerning the distribution of radio and television station concessions by the government to MPs in exchange for their vote on the extension of Sarney's presidential mandate. All these factors began to favour the strengthening of the left, who in 1988 won municipal seats in various states (Singer, 1999).

This first run for the presidency saw 24 candidates lining up to compete, a contrast to the restricted number of politicians that were indirectly elected by the military generals during the dictatorship years. Traditional politicians however were occupying the centre or centre-left political fields: Mario Covas from the PSDB and Ulysses Guimarães (PDMB) were at the centre and Leonel Brizola (PDT) and Lula (PT) were on the left. The centre-right space was taken by previous figures associated to the military regime, like Aurelino Chaves (PFL), Afif Domingos, Paulo Maluf (PDS) and Fernando Collor of the expressionless PRN, a new party with no ties to politicians in Congress.

Since he was sworn into office after the death of Neves in 1985, José Sarney jumped from leading the most popular government in Brazil's history because of the initial success of the Cruzado plan (1986) to being the leader of a disastrous administration swamped by corruption and insensitive to workers' needs. Much of the hostility towards the government was a result also of the defeat of the second Cruzado plan in 1988. High inflation was producing social tension, resulting in the explosion of strikes and in the government's inability to negotiate with unions and workers. In October 1986, a strike of peasant workers in a city in the interior of SP was treated by the government as a criminal act. The negotiation between the government and the workers came eventually to a halt after a protest in Brasília ended in a violent public demonstration.

Disillusionment with traditional political authorities was thus very high. Many desired an authoritative and strong voice to show angry indignation against the state of things, someone who was capable of “standing up against everything that was out there” in an

attempt to put order in the place of chaos. Although he could be placed on the right side of the political spectrum, Collor did also represent at the time the ideological ambiguity and confusion in which Brazil was in. He thus shifted agitatedly between centre-left and right-wing discourses, posing as someone who was not involved with traditional “dirty politics” or was part of backward elite circles. Collor perceived that there was a wide vacuum in the political arena, and that there was a search for someone to “save the nation”. Collor thus pandered to the public’s wishes of wanting to be incorporated as consumers of the global market order, and presented himself to the media as the only person capable of changing Brazil.

*b) The initial construction of the myth of the nation’s saviour*

Brazilian sociologists, anthropologists and journalists (Lamounier; 1991; Lattman-Weltman, Dias Carneiro & Abreu Ramos, 1994; Velho, 1994; Conti, 1999; Singer, 1999) have examined the Collor phenomena by focusing on the construction/deconstruction of the Collor myth in the media, having contributed to shed light on the nature of his relationship with communication industries, journalists and with various other sectors of Brazilian society. Many like the anthropologist Velho (1994; 71-76) saw in the 1989 dispute a quintessence of the hierarchical culture of Brazilian society (Da Matta; 1979) due to the polarization that was made between the “superior” elite Brazilian citizen (Collor, of a rich family from the Northeast) with the “inferior” uneducated working-class man (Lula). These studies investigated the reasons for the formation of a consensus around Collor in the 1989 elections.

As we shall see, the general pattern of the press coverage of the 1989 elections was high in political-ideological bias and low in professionalism, although on one side also it was an engaging and dynamic coverage that reflected to a certain extent the political agitation of the time. The critical analysis of the coverage of the 1989 elections carried out by Lattmen-Weltman, Dias Carneiro and Abreu Ramos, researchers from Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV, 1994), revealed that the four national dailies adopted a similar editorial line on the presidential campaign. The newspaper *FSP* and the magazine *Isto É* appeared as the main news organisations which produced a more critical coverage. The examination of 1.013 stories for this research, followed by the interviews with journalists, has at first come to similar conclusions. It has identified *Folha* and *Isto É* as the vehicles which engaged in a more even, but not neutral, coverage.

The Lattman-Weltman (1994, 44) study pointed out also that the opposition did receive media coverage, but left-wing candidates like Lula and Brizola, with the exception of *FSP* and *Isto É*, were criticised more often, having their political platforms and opinions more subject to media scrutiny than other politicians.<sup>28</sup> “With the exception of certain episodes...in general the media tried to act with a minimum of impartiality in the journalistic treatment of the candidatures considered to be on the left. This does not mean that the media were sympathetic towards these candidates...While the programmes, or lack of them, of Brizola and Lula were submitted to the harshest of analyses, which could be deemed perfectly reasonable, the floor from which flourished the speeches of Collor was examined superficially” (Lattman-Weltamn, Dias Carneiro and Abreu Ramos: 1994; 43-44).

In contrast to the FGV study, which indicated a general “impartiality” of the print press in the coverage due mainly to the space given to the opposition candidates, this research has preferred to stress the ambiguities and contradictions contained in the attempts made by news organisations and journalists to conduct a more equivoque coverage. This thesis has gone further by including in its analysis the notion of conflict and giving it due importance. It has thus debated the positioning of ownership and media management in relation to the political coverage of the 1989 presidential campaign through the conduction of in-depth discussions of journalists’ editorial judgements and the tensions that they encountered in newsrooms. The divisive ideological context of the time culminated in the rise of militant journalism positions and partisanship from both sides of the political spectrum (left and right), with the Lula versus Collor dispute thus invading newsrooms.

The FGV study (1994) also pointed out that the ideas of modernization defended by Collor struck a chord with those supported by the media, which embarked daily on the criticism of the size of the state. The examination of the 1989 presidential agenda - which focused on the period that started in August 1988 and went until August 1989 - indicated support also in the media of certain social-liberal policies, such as the importance of state austerity and the necessity of reducing inflation rates. In another analysis of the appearance of Collor in the press from November 1986 to February 1989, the FGV research detected a tendency in the media of backing the politician’s ideas. “Impossible not to recognise in various titles a clear intention of endorsing the energetic and eloquent Northeast governor

---

<sup>28</sup> (I.e. “Lula does not surrender and gives total support to strikes” (*O Globo*, 12/05/89); “Party (PT) at a dead spot” (*Veja*, 2/08/89); “PT wants Lula with a radical discourse” (*O Globo*, 30/08/89) and “Reforms in the East bypass the PT” (*ESP*, 06/12/89), see appendix).

in the sense of permitting the circulation of opinions and stances which were those of the newspaper itself” (Lattman-Weltman, Dias Carneiro and Abreu Ramos, 1994; 3). The study came to the conclusion that the politician was “much more an efficient project of marketing politics...than a result of political factors”, adding that Collor represented a “typical product of the emerging mass political Brazilian society” (1994; 11-13).

Thus themes concerning the expansion of consumer possibilities, the fear of communism, the privatisation of public sectors and the disillusionment with the traditional game of politics gave the impetus for Collor’s name to grow as the only one capable of combating everything that “was out there”. The privatisation of public firms and the opening of the market to foreign capital were policies unanimously defended in elite circles, which saw in them a response to the years of state intervention in the economy which had stamped the dictatorship period. The proximities of Collor’s economic agenda to those of the then prime-minister of the UK, Margaret Thatcher, seemed obvious, with media sectors making these associations. The *Globo* editorial *Structural changes* (17/06/89) for instance underscored the need to combat the absence of control in public spending, pointing to the success of the Thatcher privatisation policies as a model worth adopting.

In February of 1989, Collor announced that he was leaving the governorship of Alagoas to run for president. Between March and May, Collor started to woo more the press in a bid to be taken more seriously as a presidential candidate. According to the research polls, in May Collor had 32% of the votes, more than the double of Brizola, who had 15%, and nearly three times more than Lula (11%). Between 1987 and the initial months of 1989, Collor was presented in the papers as an innovative and athletic Alagoas governor who opposed Sarney’s government and who was “revolutionising” his state due to the crackdown on the fat cats of the civil service (Lattman-Weltman, Dias Carneiro and Abreu Ramos, 1994). According to the FGV study (1994) and to Conti (1999), *JB* was one of the first national newspapers to promote Collor’s image. “Hurricane Collor” (*JB*, 5/04/87) for example was a story which started to construct the image of Collor as a modern and talented administrator in the national press. Other early features also portrayed Collor in a similar way.<sup>29</sup>

In his book on the relationship of media professionals with Collor, Conti (1999) declared that many did not like Collor and that some journalists knew of his illicit

---

<sup>29</sup> (I.e. “Collor says that country is in a game without a judge” (*JB*, 7/04/87); “Collor condemns super salaries of deputies” (*O Globo*, 7/06/87) and “Collor launches himself as president against the old ones” (*ESP*, 26/01/88)(FGV, 1994).

transactions, but did not have enough strength to denounce them due to the political constraints of the time and other media management pressures. It can be argued that the Collor myth was constructed in key elite circles and consolidated later in the lower ranks of Brazilian society, with media vehicles like *Veja*, *TV Globo* and *ESP* being the ones which identified most with the politician. *Veja* throughout the campaign indicated in its pages a clear empathy with Collor and identification with his economic liberal policies, publishing for instance interviews with entrepreneurs who stressed the importance of the opening of the country to foreign capital, a policy defended by the politician. *TV Globo* also showed a clear enthusiasm for Collor, interviewing the governor of Alagoas for the famous *Fantástico* programme ahead of the launch of his candidature.<sup>30</sup> The former deceased owner of Globo Organizations, Roberto Marinho, also publicly admitted his backing of the Collor candidature (FGV, 2001; Conti, 1999).<sup>31</sup>

The newspaper *FSP* on the other hand attempted to balance the coverage, defending the privatization policies but also publishing denunciations involving Collor's government in Alagoas, as we shall see, and maintaining also a critical distance of the Lula candidature. *Folha* praised the Collor economic plan, although it did criticise its interventionist character, having been however supportive of his liberal economic policies. Nonetheless, the invasion of the newspaper by the Federal Police one month after Collor was sworn into the presidency initiated definitive clashes between the daily and the PRN politician, and would eventually contribute for his fall from grace. As we shall see, this act was interpreted by the paper as an attitude of revenge due to the investigative and critical coverage conducted by *Folha* of Collor's political campaign and public life.

Thus in 1989 the fact of the matter was that Brazilian journalists and the general press had little experience of covering a national presidential election. Journalistic enthusiasm and militancy started to live side by side with growing preoccupations with accuracy as well as with the applicability of marketing strategies to news. Similar to the *Diretas* coverage, many journalists were excited by the 1989 elections. Head of the *BBC* Brazilian Service, Americo Martins worked for *Folha* in the 1989 campaign as a junior reporter. He remembers calling up former military president Ernesto Geisel to ask him about his vote: "It was an exciting coverage. Although there were some veterans in the newsroom, it was a young

---

<sup>30</sup> The partiality of the television coverage of the 1989 elections culminated in the creation of a law that forced the TV stations in the next elections to afford the same amount of time in the news to all the candidates.

<sup>31</sup> "Roberto Marinho makes explicit his support of Collor" (*FSP*, 27/07/89).

team. No one had ever covered a national election....It was an enormous operation... I was asked to call up Geisel and he, like a good general, said that the vote was secret...’’

*Veja* thus appeared as the epitome of the print media vehicle which would contribute to lift the image of Collor nationally, at the same time that it later led much of the press in the corruption investigations against him in 1992. *Veja*'s sympathetic coverage of the *Diretas Já*, as we have seen, was pointed out as a way of diluting its links with the dictatorship (Conti, 2004). The magazine nonetheless had a crucial role in the construction of the Collor myth, publishing two early stories that highlighted Collor's "special qualities". The interview "I will finish with the fat cats" (22/04/87), however, revealed how sectors of the elite were still suspicious of Collor, although the story did praise him. Collor was interviewed for *Veja*'s yellow pages, the initial section of the magazine which consists of a space dedicated to important public personalities. The first paragraph used expressions which in the future became associated with the politician's persona, including a "successful lawyer" who "distributed (karate) kicks against imaginary targets". Some of the questions asked by the reporter on Collor's biography, such as why he hired 3.000 new employees in 1982 in one week, indicated suspicion. However, the introductory text was flattering: "Grandson of a minister of Labour....In less than five minutes of talk, he states clearly where he wants to go with what he says....There is no doubt that he has started well."

The second story which launched Collor's name in the national limelight was "Hunter of *marajás*" ("Hunter of civil servant fat cats")(23/03/88). *Veja* dedicated seven pages to the politician who had "conquered the empathy of the people from Alagoas....and who figured among...the most acclaimed governors of the country...It so happens that he was the one to have first discovered and used better the political impact that rises from a good hunt of civil servant fat cats." Governor Collor at the time was refusing to pay the salary privileges of state civil servants, legalised by local law. The story drew attention to his ambitious streak, treating however his dream of running as a presidential candidate as a realistic possibility. It left little room for contradiction and for the opinion of rivals, dedicating more than two pages to discuss the situation of the public service and its *marajás*, which are actually a small category of well-paid people in relation to the badly paid majority. In the third paragraph, the feature broached the subject of Collor's candidature by including a statement from a PMDB senator of Alagoas who said that, if federal intervention were to be used to guarantee the salaries of the local fat cats, Collor

could be voted the next president. Other articles in the initial months of 1989 focused on the theme of the necessity of cuts in public spending.<sup>32</sup>

Ricardo Kotscho, who worked with Lula during the 1989 campaign and was his press officer briefly after Lula's election in 2003, elected the *Veja* "hunter of *marajás*" story as being a key piece which helped construct the Collor myth: "In 1989, all the mainstream press backed Collor against Lula. They created the Collor myth. The hunter of civil service fat cats was on the cover of *Veja* and resulted in one Globo Reporter ( a *TV Globo* special feature programme). It was something constructed to be an opposition to Lula. There was a problem then.. the only means of dialogue was with the journalists on a daily basis. But not the media barons... Lula and I perceived this. That is why we decided to change our strategy in the next campaign..." Lins da Silva emphasised the "hysterical" media support of the Collor candidature: "All of the newspapers, with the exception of *Folha*, made an almost hysterical alignment against Lula. That in my view was a historical error. *FSP* was impartial during the coverage. It decided not to be after the police invaded it..".

However, the formation of a consensus around Collor's name did not mean that the voicing of dissent was not ripe in the newspaper pages. Arguably, elite divisions permeated the 1989 campaign. This was reflected in political battles fought in the media pages mainly between journalists and media management. In 1984, as we have seen, authoritarian and democratic projects divided elites. In 1989, a struggle between opposing political projects (left and right) took place, with a hegemony being constructed by segments of the business and oligarchic elites around the Collor candidature and the centre-right wing field. Thus there was a tendency in 1989 to undermine alternatives and to reinforce left-wing prejudices. Occasional stories published in the newspapers though underlined the contradiction which existed between Collor's speech and his practices, such as the corruption charges and the ambiguities of his discourse. With exceptions, these stories occupied less physical space in the dailies, with many appearing in a couple of columns.<sup>33</sup>

Many newsrooms were thus sites of struggle to control left-wing journalists. Conti (1999; 174) stated that the Collor voters were a minority of the 260 journalists who worked for *ESP*: "The newsroom was not only full of PT journalists, but also of inexperienced journalists, because no one had covered a presidential election before." According to him, the former director of *ESP* newsroom, Augusto Nunes, not only impeded the dismissal of PT

---

<sup>32</sup> (I.e. "Congress is the winner in hiring relatives" (*JB*, 19/02/89); "Civil servants: the reaction to abuse" and "Ghosts and protected relatives start to irritate the country" (*Veja*, 1/03/89) and "Frauds in social security increase" (*FSP*, 23/04/89)).

<sup>33</sup> "Alagoas goes against Collor" (*ESP*, 02/06/89); "State pension accuses the candidate" (*O Globo*, 17/08/89) and "Contracts proof nepotism" (*JB*, 05/12/89).



journalists, but also published the article *It is necessary to detain the militia* (30/11/89). Here he criticized the clashes between the PT and Collor sympathizers which occurred during a rally in the South of the country as a means of signalling to the owners of *ESP* that he was controlling left-wing politics in the daily.

Architect of the paper's reform in the 1990's, Nunes admitted that conflict overwhelmed the daily: "*ESP* was always a partisan newspaper... With much more clarity than *O Globo*, it was a right-wing newspaper. *ESP* transformed itself into a schizophrenic daily in 1989. I was obliged frequently to change headlines, to minimize the titles and make them less PT, because the text was a speech. Dr. Julio (Mesquita, owner of *ESP*) asked me for the heads of political correspondents all the time and I had to use practical arguments to avoid this. If you fire them, it will come out in the PT programme, it will help your adversary. I had to argue by using his language (Nunes' emphasis)... If I argued on the basis of press liberty then everyone would be fired....and that went for me too. The biggest sin committed by journalists, and I include myself in this, was that we did not investigate who Collor was. The reporters wanted to write political speeches against Collor. But if we had investigated, we could have shown that he was a fraud. Everyone knew about the rumours in Alagoas...The country continued, as before, to be divided between good and evil. Brazil could not get rid of this dichotomy, and this had strong consequences on journalism."

*Folha* assumed a more equal stance by publishing investigative pieces and more detailed stories on Collor's past administration in Alagoas.<sup>34</sup> This was even perceived by readers. A Datafolha research poll indicated that 58% of its readers considered *FSP*'s coverage impartial, 20% thought it was pro-Lula and 12%, pro-Collor.<sup>35</sup> Marcelo Beraba, ombudsman of *FSP* and current director of Abraje (Brazilian Association of Investigative Journalism), was former editor of politics in 1989. He guaranteed that the paper investigated Collor: "*FSP* did do an intensive investigation and published everything. All the big cases of 1989 concerning the secret money for the sugar cane entrepreneurs and the deal with them; the irregular hiring of staff; the use of public servants in his campaign; irregularities in Zélia's firms, who was PC Farias...many things that the other papers did not know, but mainly did not have the resources and the capacity of doing..."

However, these stories could be considered as being minor corruption charges given the extent of political corruption in Brazil. These also appeared generally unnoticed in the dailies amid a series of enthusiastic pieces written on Collor. Such articles however did not

---

<sup>34</sup> I.e. "Collor's contract with sugar-cane businessmen favours senators" (*FSP*, 25/05/89) and "Collor used US\$ 550.000 for 'general spending'" (*FSP*, 30/05/89).

<sup>35</sup> "Readers think that *Folha* does not support anyone" (13/12/89).

have enough force to shift public opinion. It can be said also that journalists eschewed from digging up the full dirt on Collor. More in-depth investigations would eventually occur in 1992 after segments of the elite fell out with Collor and it became clear that his corruption scheme touched on various governmental spheres. Thus if papers like *ESP* and *O Globo* did manage at times to offer some conflicting views of the 1989 elections, the fact of the matter is that the media in general portrayed a black and white vision of the world. The presidential race was transformed into a class struggle (boss versus employee), a commodity dispute (a good versus a bad product) and/or a personal political rivalry (Lula versus Collor).

At a moment when there was still hesitation in relation to the Collor candidature, the *Isto É* story *The Brizula spectrum* (combination of the words Brizola and Lula) – *either Janio or Quércia ?* (22/03/89) emphasised the lack of options for the right-wing field, which was divided in its support of some of the possible anti-“Brizula” candidates (Domingos, Chaves, Maluf or Covas). The magazine produced a sophisticated analysis which pointed to the political vacuum that existed at the time as a result of a growing disillusionment with politics provoked by the frustrations with the *diretas*. The “anti-Brizula” feature also engaged in irony to criticise the lack of perspective for the Brazilian right, examining the difficulties that the candidates would face in the future and offering tips on how to overcome obstacles. Collor was portrayed as being an enigma. The story indicated that his chances would still be contingent on the results of the Gallup opinion polls. “The traditional right is not used to democratic electoral processes. Extreme right, right...all fit into the same expression “we”. We don’t literally know what to do”, stated the text, playing ironically with the idea that “we” (entrepreneurs, etc) agree with “you” (the public, middle-class liberal professionals), or with the disillusioned population. The first paragraph read: “The spectrum of Brizula frightens them. A frightening entity that switches from the face of Brizola to that of Lula...the Brizula puts at risk a hegemony that dates back to 1889....Be it with Lula or Brizola, the left have a historic opportunity to win ..”

Carta, who was then head of *Isto É*’s newsroom, guaranteed that the magazine did produce a fair coverage. Nonetheless, Carta did resort to journalistic militancy. This happened in spite of Domingos Alzugaray’s preference for Collor and his ties with his brother, Leopoldo: “In the beginning, the idea was to create a distance between the many candidates. But Domingos had a good connection with Fernando (Collor)... then he wanted me to pull the string in favour of Collor, and there was a bit of an initial shock, but nothing serious.

Eventually the coverage that I gave Lula was better than the one I gave Collor....Then I started to write editorials against Collor and Domingos was never shocked with me because of this. I even published a negative story on Collor, and he did not say anything...Anyway, our relationship started to deteriorate and, in August, 1993, I left *Isto É...*”

Thus both Nunes’ and Carta’s quotes indicate the difficulties that journalists encountered with ownership and the defence of their interests. Nunes mentioned how a focus on a more factual investigative or objective reporting style could have exposed Collor. Carta pointed to the owner’s preference for Collor and to his own attempts to favour Lula. Admittedly, some media owners did explicitly defend Collor, as was the case with Marinho of Globo Organisations. However, the head of TV Globo’s newsroom, Ali Kamel, guaranteed to this researcher that personal ownership interests never interfered with the news coverage. Kamel rejects the idea that media management engaged consciously in attempts to undermine Lula in the re-editing of the last live television debate organized by Globo on the 14<sup>th</sup> of December, 1989, as critics claim. The accusations are that a team of journalists who had prepared an edition of the previous television debate to go on air the following day in *Jornal Nacional* were forced to make a new copy which included specific sections. The final result favoured Collor, who appeared in his best moments and won one minute and 12 seconds more than Lula (FGV, 2001; Conti, 1999).

Kamel acknowledged though that TV Globo’s political journalism has improved since 1989 after a reinforcement of professional practices: “TV Globo has always been the same. But in 1989, the nation was divided. We had a highly polarised and passionate election and there was a low level of education from the part of the politicians. It was a correct decision to edit the debate nearest to what really happened (Collor had done better in the debate than Lula). We lived in a dictatorship and no newspaper could print certain facts. I think that the journalism that we did in the past was good and I think we will do better in the future, as we are already doing at present. I am breaking my head here with Carlos Henrique Schroeder (executive-director of the newsroom) so that the elections of 2004 introduces new things, so that it can be better... In 2006, I will do the same thing. I need to improve...”

Arguably, the TV Globo television debate held between Lula and Collor in the second round of the elections provoked a plethora of complaints of editorial manipulation in favour of Collor (Conti, 1999). However, the role that television played in the 1989 elections is something which is still the subject of a lot of controversy between academics and journalists (Conti, 1999, Bucci, 2000), and would be better explored in a different study. The last phase of the 1989 presidential campaign thus saw temperatures rise significantly,

with ideological radicalisation reaching its peak and Collor beginning to adopt a sharp anti-communist rhetoric in order to win.

*c) The marketing candidate wins the media: the consolidation phase*

The communal style of practicing politics, which had its heyday during the *Diretas Já!*, was less palpable in 1989, when marketing strategies and research polls began to invade the world of politics. In 1989, opinion polls showed that voters wanted a certain type of politician. According to research conducted by the Vox Populi Institute, responsible for the Collor campaign, many Brazilian voters thought that the fight against the *marajás* was a crucial point to tackle. Collor thus worked on his own image by stressing particular characteristics which echoed the sentiments that elite circles and certain segments of the public deemed important. Writing on the agenda-setting functions of the media, McCombs and Shaw (1972) have stated that “the issues emphasized in the news media influence the issues the voters regard as important. Determining what to select and what to ignore among a number of existing issues means determining the perspective you apply to view the political world..” (Takeshita; 1997, 20-22). Thus it is the attributes of a candidate’s character selected by journalists that will help voters make judgements, with the public depending on the media to have more knowledge about the candidates. The initial stories on Collor, as we have seen, favoured certain qualities which made it clear to the public that particular attributes were worth looking out for (i.e. young politician, hunter of civil servant fat cats).

May was the month when Collor’s candidature began to rise. His growth in the opinion polls meant that he was being taken more seriously by previously hesitant elite groups. Collor started to appear almost daily in the papers, with special features on him becoming more common.<sup>36</sup> Collor self-promoted himself and paid for adverts about his past administration in the SP and Rio newspapers. He broadcasted also three PRN party publicity programmes on national television which were successful in reaching and gaining the support of the *descamisados*. Singer (1999) claimed that Collor obtained first the support of the most affluent segments of the population. Only in July did he win the votes of the less wealthy, when television public propaganda made him known to the wider majority.

---

<sup>36</sup> I.e. “Gallup exclusive – Collor in first” (*Isto É*, 26/04/89); “The pre-campaign phenomena” (*JB*, 14/05/89); “The star takes off” (*Veja*, 17/05/89) and “Collor near the absolute majority” (*O Globo*, 11/06/89).

The *JB* story, “The pre-campaign phenomena” (14/05/89), was a piece which legitimised Collor’s candidature nationally. This feature included a picture of Collor smiling widely out of a car window to photographers and making the sign of victory with his thumb. The text accentuated the growth of his public support in 12 States, adopting in overall a certain moralistic tone to praise the Collor candidature. The piece began by mentioning a meeting of a PSDB MP and a peasant pulling a cow’s trolley in the middle of the road in the interior of Minas Gerais. The MP went to help the peasant with problems that he was having with his trolley. “The man...had decided. Even living in that nowhere land, he had already heard of the cute man who wanted to clean Brasília, enemy of the corrupt and author of the amazing task.... of standing up to the perverse fat cats of the civil service. His vote for president was already decided: Fernando Collor de Mello”, reported the story.

*JB* nonetheless also tried to present an equivoque coverage of the election, publishing some sparse contradictory stories that exposed the inconsistency of the PRN politician.<sup>37</sup> At this particular point, however, the Collor candidature was gaining legitimacy. The few contradictory voices that did appear were not strong enough to damage his campaign. As Nunes mentioned above, *ESP*’s coverage was also overwhelmed by political tensions. Thus the stories which portrayed Lula and/or the Worker’s Party in a more positive light, or which criticised Collor, were also published. Such pieces included the *ESP* stories “Lula does a ‘check up’ and challenges his rivals” (25/05/89) and “Profile of Collor reveals an explosive personality”, which was followed by the side text “The construction of the image” (*ESP*, 10/09/89). Both were critical of Collor and pointed to a constructed, aggressive and almost messianic personality. The latter two included a caricature of the future president with his hair on fire, looking at a spaghetti plate in front of him. The story emphasised some embarrassing moments in his life, such as a curious incident when Collor threw a plate of spaghetti in the face of his maid because he found a piece of hair in it. It also mentioned how he destroyed a club in Brasilia with karate kicks and how, already governor in 1988, he threatened to hit a civil servant with a microphone which was not working. Nonetheless, although these character traits were presented here as negative, certain aspects of his authoritative personality were soon considered positive. Collor’s moralistic and loud stance of indignation, which included thumping his fist on the table and

---

<sup>37</sup> I.e. “Biography of Collor is marked by contradiction” (14/05/89); “Lula wins in the São Vicente de Paula (school) and “A student (Collor) with a record of absences” (28/06/89) and “Collor goes to the government, accuses and is accused of corruption” (25/07/89).

slamming doors, ended up being represented in the media as individualistic expressions of his strong will to change “everything that was out there”.

In the story *The star takes off*, published in May in *Veja* (17/05/89), Collor is shown to be a “star” politician, an obvious allusion to the PT, whose party symbol is a red star. Here was a key moment for the consolidation of the Collor presidential image as a product, with some of the faults or negative traits mentioned above being transformed into positive qualities worth “buying”. This feature for instance highlighted how Collor did not have a proper party, a negative fact at first, but which was considered positive as it distanced him from the traditional game of “dirty” politics. The seven pages article read: “His party, known as the PRN, the National Reconstruction Party, was founded less than two months ago..., it has no office... and only five deputies in Congress...and its votes are worth less than a third of those of Lula’s PT. With only six months before the elections, Collor is in the first place...The Collor candidature has managed to put in evidence the arrogance of a segment of Brazilian politicians who like to present themselves as owners of elected personalities...”. Statements of political adversaries and a box with five denunciations against Collor were included in the piece. These occupied a minor position in the overall enthusiastic tone assumed by the text: “Collor is a product of the dictatorship”, stated Brizola; “He is a conservative politician”, added Lula, two declarations which were closely followed by a sentence that pointed out that around Collor “a choir was singing: ‘he has already won’.”

Another *Veja* story, *The fat cat of the ratings has a party* (31/05/89), published two weeks later, adopted a similar slant. The Ibope institute showed Collor with 32% of the intended votes, Brizola with 15% and Lula, 11%. This four pages feature underlined how “the young former governor of Alagoas” had obtained support from every side of the country. “While the others lose time, Collor goes round the country in his jet, doing speeches and collecting applause”. Here the text took for granted that Collor was flying in a jet plane, not inquiring where exactly the money for his campaign was coming from. It affirmed: “Most of the candidates have not started to draft the financial scheme of their campaigns...but for Collor there are left over jets and planes, which are used in his peregrination through the country..” The article focused again on Collor’s “attributes”, such as his lack of ties with traditional politicians. It also endorsed his sentimental phrases (“I am the candidate of civil society. Do not leave me alone”, said Collor). This sentence, according to the story, was received by an “avalanche of applause”.

*O Globo* also provided Collor with a generally favourable coverage.<sup>38</sup> In the story “Collor creates a campaign with the image of success”, a picture of workers at Collor’s campaign office is followed by a sentence that underlines his qualities, nonetheless making the reader/electorate self-conscious about the marketing strategies responsible for the creation of his political persona. It said: “The structure of the campaign is being created so that the electorate associates the candidate with the image of quality and success. A yuppie candidate.” Other favourable sentences included “Collor, 39 years old, wants to print the mark of innovation, the modern and the efficient to his candidature....”.

The newspaper *O Globo* did however publish features which explored the ambiguities of Collor’s political platform, such as “The hunter of *marajás* cannot hit the hunted” (14/05/89). This particular story examined how Collor had acquired some problems as governor of Alagoas, and pointed out how he had not managed to fire 6 thousand civil servants as he had intended. However, in contrast to the epoch of the *Diretas Já!*, when opposition figures were stigmatised in *O Globo*, in 1989 the paper strived to balance the coverage, offering more space to the opposition players and to their political agendas.<sup>39</sup> Collor’s image as a commodity which was worth buying by disillusioned voters eager to enter the First World was thus being finally legitimised, making it difficult for opposing discourses to break the growing elite consensus which was forming around his name. In September, things eventually did heat up, with ideological polarization invading the 1989 campaign.

#### *d) Hysteria and ideological anxiety: the second round*

On the 15<sup>th</sup> of November, Collor won the first round with 20 million votes. He went to the second round with Lula, who obtained 12 million votes and took Brizola’s place. The election in the second round was fought with a small margin of difference between the two: Collor won with 35 million votes, which represented 50% of the population, against 30 million given to Lula, or 44%. In his study on the 1989 and 1994 elections, Singer (1999) argued that the Brazilian voter, similarly to Europeans and Americans, does manage to identify the ideological character of the parties. In 1989, the voter positioned himself

---

<sup>38</sup> I.e. “Collor thinks it is possible to be elected in the first round” (11/05/89); “Collor creates a campaign with the image of success” (16/05/89) and “Support is such that it escapes control” (28/05/89).

<sup>39</sup> I.e. “PSDB tries to show itself on TV as a viable option” (12/05/89); “Newton wants Quércio coordinator of the campaign” (10/08/89) and “Ulysses promises to end hunger in the country” (14/08/89).

ideologically, with much of the Brazilian electorate choosing a right-wing candidate, or one that represented such values (Singer, 1999).

The period from August/September to early December was engulfed by ideological radicalisation, with Collor stepping back from his ambiguous “social-democrat” position to assume fully an anti-communist “terrorist” rhetoric. Collor exploited fears of conservative segments of the population concerning the possibility of the invasion of middle class homes by the hungry in case of a left-wing victory. Miriam Cordeiro, a former girlfriend of Lula, went on air during a PRN political propaganda slot to accuse the PT candidate of having forced her to have an abortion. Many political events in this last phase were expressions of these ideological tensions, like the clashes with Brizola militants during a Collor demonstration in Rio; the threat of some entrepreneurs to leave Brazil in case of a victory of the left and the false accusations made against the PT regarding the kidnapping of the businessman Albinio Diniz. In November, the PSDB stated its support of the Lula candidature after Mario Covas’ “shock of capitalism” speech failed to convince entrepreneurs of his economic liberal intentions.

The *Veja* story *The hypothesis of Lula – the candidate of the PT divides the electorate with his economic proposals and lights up the discussion about the directions of capitalism* (29/11/89) is an example of a piece that seems to instigate class conflict, although it strived to discuss the PT’s economic discourse. The cover read: “Lula and capitalism – the changes that the PT promises divides the country”. In seven pages, the article investigated the real possibility of Lula winning the election, stressing the anxieties concerning what would happen to “liberal professionals who had managed to save up some money and had small proprieties”. It also aired worries about the possibility of “liberal professionals losing their jobs or their promotions” in a context where “employers feared that a Lula government would create a climate of hostility towards profit...”. The story listed five factors which troubled entrepreneurs, including the control of prices and the taxation of profit. Issues considered problematic were the expropriation of large estates, the increase of the minimum wage, the reduction of the margin of firms’ profit and the lack of a privatisation programme. The deterioration of the relationship between employers and workers was also emphasised. The story did give though credit to the PT’s social principals. (“The number of citizens who do not like Lula exactly for what he says he will do...is certainly high...the fact is that everyone is in favour of everything that Lula announces..., such as salary raise...What is feared is the PT’s methodology to reach such aims, so desired by everyone.”)



This feature thus probed the fears concerning the possibility of a PT president of stimulating conflict with capital. A picture of an outdoor ad of the *petista* campaign, which was put in front of a small church by a priest, was published on page 58. The ad's text underlined a supposed hostility of the PT to power structures ("When voting, stop and think: are you a boss or employee? Of the presidential candidates, who is boss and who is a worker? Are you going to vote for the worker or for the boss?). It thus appeared here as proof of the tone of class conflict which was permeating the campaign, from both sides of the dispute. An image of Lula talking to a massive crowd in front of a factory is juxtaposed to seven pictures of entrepreneurs commenting on the PT. These interviewees expressed their fears in relation to Lula (i.e. "The president of Phillips...believes that the PT economic plan can frighten the multinationals interested in investing in the country"). Few said anything different (i.e. "Lula is a negotiator with integrity", said the president of the union responsible for car industry spares").

Again there is a contrast between the collective forces represented in the picture of Lula and the workers and the isolation or individualism shown in the photos of the entrepreneurs inside their offices/factories. A clear positioning of where the worker stands – outside in the factory, with his workers' friends – is juxtaposed to the employers inside their establishments. There is thus a sense of the need to preserve the social order, a key theme to centre-right thinking in Brazil (Singer, 1999). This stance implicitly equates the streets with chaos and the home with safeness, echoing Da Matta's (1979) theory of one of the main characteristics of Brazilian society, which is the contrast between the lawless and cruelty of the streets with the warmth of the middle-class homes.

This story differs from others published by *Veja*. Among the more accurate portraits of what Lula and the PT stood for at the time was the *Veja* story *A worker goes to work in the succession – Lula intensifies his campaign and tries to show that he is the candidate of the majority* (06/09/89). This was published before the final phase of the campaign. Here Lula and the PT were praised: "...the PT has a clear programme of social change. Its internal workings are highly democratic, something unknown to its rivals, and none of its members have been accused, until now, of corruption". The picture published showed Lula in a less negative light. He appeared at ease in a shantytown amongst a family. The sub-title was somewhat ironic though when it referred to the candidate as having the "biography of a hero of an eight o'clock soap-opera, with the smallest financial wealth...". In the six-page piece, Lula was constructed as being a contradictory self-made man. The story stated: "...the most left-wing of all candidates, in his personal life he is a Brazilian with conservative

habits”. Although it was critical towards the PT, the *Veja* piece “Party at a dead end” (02/07/89) acknowledged that the party did not defend a “radical”, but rather a “moderate” political platform. These two more accurate stories make the November one sound overly hysterical. All of them nonetheless are examples of the prejudices entrenched in the Brazilian middle-class psyche, including the idea that the working-classes must be kept at bay.

Mario Sérgio Conti, former head of *Veja* newsroom between 1983 and 1998, confirmed that *Veja* identified with Collor: “I was assistant director in 1989, but I was not responsible for the political coverage... The director...was (José Roberto) Guzzo and the other assistant director was Tales Alvarenga. Guzzo and Roberto Civita had a natural empathy with Collor. They were openly hostile and critical towards Lula and Brizola. That explains why the magazine indicated a clear tendency for Collor. If you read the stories and do an analysis in terms of objectivity, you can sense that. The overall coverage...however did give space to all the candidates... But this sympathy was manifested, for example, in the Collor and Lula coverage in the second round: you had three sentences for each, three positive ones for Collor and two negative ones for Lula<sup>40</sup>. The letter to the reader before the elections endorsed Collor’s ideas, but it did not defend his candidature. It is not a journalistic tradition of *Veja* to defend a candidate...The 1989 coverage was bad... The fear of Lula, of Covas, of the left. The vehicle that acted most was *Folha*, who sent journalists to Alagoas to investigate, not *Isto É*. Mino Carta likes to say that *Isto É* was against Collor..., but the magazine was supported by Quércia, and there is nothing more backward than that..”

Conti’s quote reveals the preoccupation that journalists had with producing an accurate coverage. As we have seen, many *Veja* stories did endorse Collor’s political policies. The feature “Collor plays hard on the offensive”, (9/08/89) argued in six pages how Collor was the enemy of everything wrong that existed in Brazilian society. “The research polls indicate...that the voter is sick and tired of politics..., Collor ...does not have anything to do with the figure that people have been tired of seeing during the last years”. Other politicians were said to be in a difficult position, struggling to keep up with Collor, the “Mike Tyson” candidate. “The PMDB... is a rusty machine that does not move to carry Ulysses....PFL has fallen and is submitting its candidate, Aureliano Chaves, to a

---

<sup>40</sup> Conti referred to the cover story “The Last Battle to Change Brazil”(13/12/89). A picture of both candidates was published with a sentence underneath that read: “What can change in the country with Lula or Collor”. Pictures of both candidates were put on opposite sides, with these sentences: 1) Collor – a) combat against privileges in the governmental administration; b) the attempt of opening the economy; c) the promise to privatize public firms and d) the growth of the cake and the division of wealth; 2) Lula – a) the belief in the role of the state to improve the life of the poor; b) the trust in the action of state firms; c) the belief in the refusal to pay the external debt and d) the agrarian reform from 500 hectares onwards.

humiliation.. In the PSDB, the “shock of capitalism” speech defended by senator Mario Covas lost a lot of its impact..”, read the text.

Contrary to the other candidates, Lula was being considered the only serious rival. In the last month of the second round, in December, the duel between Collor and Lula reached fever pitch during two TV debates. Research polls showed that the TV dispute did little to change the minds of voters who had already opted for Lula or for Collor. The media coverage of the debates was nonetheless permeated by the ‘anti-communist’ rhetoric that was contaminating the whole campaign. Lula was accused by Collor of wanting to incite land invasion, having had his image also associated to that of the figure of the radical union strike leader. This image had sprung up in the beginning of the campaign in the midst of the articulation of the debate on the strikes organized by civil servants.<sup>41</sup> Thus all these attacks seemed to already indicate that Lula was going to lose and that Collor would eventually win.

*e) Collor’s victory and the PT defeat*

On the 17<sup>th</sup> of December, Collor won the presidency, with his victory being celebrated in practically all of the newspaper headlines.<sup>42</sup> The daily *JB* received the news with optimism, stating that Collor’s election ended a troubled period of high inflation in the history of the country. The newspaper *O Globo*, which had defended Collor after the final debate affirming that the vote should go to the PRN politician given his superior “leadership capacities”, gave a positive evaluation of his victory: “He preaches the reestablishment of the efficiency of the State...as the only way to reach social justice...and intends to find solutions...through the insertion of the country in the community of the big economic powers.” (FGV, 2001)

The *Veja* story, *The day of the hunter* (24/12/89), applauded Collor’s election. The main picture of the piece of nine pages showed Collor standing alone on a platform above the rest of the population, making the sign of victory with his two hands and surrounded by shredded paper. The picture seemed to exalt his superior qualities over those of his rivals. Again there was an emphasis on how Collor beat classic rivals who had dismissed him at first (“Badly treated by the PMDB...After counting the votes last week, it became clear that

---

<sup>41</sup> I.e. “Actions of CUT and strikes take away Lula’s votes” (*JB*, 30/04/89) and “Ibope: Strikes can impede democracy” (*O Globo*, 07/05/89, p. 12), see appendix.

<sup>42</sup> I.e. “Collor celebrates: ‘We destroyed the PT’” (*O Globo*, 19/12/89) and “The Day of the Hunter” (*Veja*, 24/12/89), see appendix.

Collor did not sink, that his ideas were the most consistent...Collor ...had the last laugh). The text explored Collor's multi-functional personality: he was shown swimming and relaxing with his family. Close-ups on his expensive clothes and karate steps were juxtaposed with sentences that stressed his tough management skills ("He is a meticulous and organized administrator...it can be said that he is not constrained in cutting the throats of auxiliaries that do not correspond to his expectations").

The 1989 elections thus can be placed within the context of the fall of the Berlin Wall and of the dismantling of socialist utopias that followed soon afterwards. Right-wing thinking was challenging left-wing political ideals throughout the world. Post-socialist groups were being forced to rethink their agendas and to find ways of accommodating capitalism to left-wing politics. Collor's acceptability occurred in this particular international context, which was also seeing neo-liberal doctrines and policies invade many Latin American countries. On a national level, Collor's election happened in the new environment of an expanding mass political democracy which was seeing the rise of marketing dictums in political campaigns and in the media. In Brazil, the left at the time were struggling to create a more consistent political and economic project in both a post-dictatorship and post-Berlin context. This more pro-socialist platform at the time gave little credit to the premise of negotiation with the market forces, a sector "demonised" by many of these groups. This was eventually reversed in the 2002 elections with the formation of the Lula/PT labour-capital alliance, as we shall see. Thus Collor seemed for many to be the only one ready to deal with the growing powers of the national Brazilian market and the emergent global international economy whilst still maintaining the aggressive personality trait very much ingrained in the authoritarian Brazilian culture.

Collor became the first president to be elected by the direct vote after the end of the military regime. He was sworn in on the 15<sup>th</sup> of March, 1990. Having vowed to combat inflation, which had reached 80% a month, Collor's initial administration was marked by wide euphoria in relation to the Collor plan, which did initially reduce inflation rates. After having accused his (left-wing) rivals during the campaign of aiming to do this when elected, Collor announced an economic plan which interfered in private propriety. His economic programme also boosted imports, stimulated international investment and the privatisation of public firms, making cuts also on public expenditure. The Collor plan received massive support from the elite establishment and the media. However, it soon proved to be a recessive one which only initially strengthened the Brazilian currency. Thus the identification of elite circles with Collor's political and economic policies impeded

sharper journalistic investigation and critique of his political persona, something which in the long run became impossible to ignore.

### **3.3. The (initial) awakening of the press: the *FSP* versus Collor dispute**

The invasion of *FSF* by Federal policemen was an event which was symbolic of the initial difficult relationship that Collor would begin to experience with the mainstream media a few weeks after being sworn in as president. According to Conti (1999), Collor had more affinity with the media in Rio and considered the press in São Paulo to be more hostile to him. As we have seen, *FSP* had advocated in the mid-80's media independence within the structures of the market forces, and had expanded investigative journalism and the critique of authority figures. Such an editorial line soon clashed with Collor's desire for a more domesticated press. According to Conti (1999: 179), the reason for the collision between the paper and Collor was the sequence of six stories published by the daily during the 1989 campaign denouncing the signing of a contract by the state of Alagoas with proprietors of sugar-cane firms. The deal culminated in the state of Alagoas suffering financially.

Collor's hostility towards *FSP* grew during the 1989 elections due to the publication by the paper of facts concerning his administration in Alagoas. Former *FSP* political journalist and current columnist, Gilberto Dimenstein, stated that his name was one of those included in Collor's "hate list" because of these corruption stories. Dimenstein claimed that Collor was too close to the establishment, a fact which impeded wider critique of the politician even after the *Folha* invasion: "There was a big seminar held in *Folha* about the 1989 elections. ...I mentioned how I had met Collor as a teenager when I was in Brasilia, a playboy that liked wild parties... And so we got to the conclusion that he should be investigated, because he did not seem consistent. And so *Folha* back then, in isolation, did a critique of Collor. Afterwards, he even started taking things personally with *Folha*. He or his press officer even said that, as soon as he was elected, he would create a special revenge secretary. Myself, Clóvis (Rossi) and Otavio (Frias Filho) would be the first names on the list. Afterwards, he attempted to invade the newspaper, but the daily could not start a campaign against him. It needed to maintain an equilibrium in its relationship with the president. But when Pedro started denouncing things through *Veja*, *Folha* decided to take it on. For *Folha* did not want to assume that role. It wanted to be a critical paper

with everyone. It did not want to cause the downfall of the president. I think *Folha* contributed to create a new vision in relation to the Collor government. The invasion of *Folha* left the elites...worried about what Collor could be capable of.”

On the 24<sup>th</sup> of March of 1990, practically 10 days after Collor was sworn in as president, *FSP* reported that the Federal Police had invaded *Folha*, justifying the incident on tax problems. Next to the story about the invasion, the paper offered its response: the editorial *The fascist uprising*, written by journalist Marcelo Coelho. It compared the Collor episode, somewhat exaggeratedly, with the censorship practices conducted against dailies during the dictatorship: “Assassins of the judicial order, announcers of an emerging fascist turbulence in Brazilian society, elements of a dictatorship still without name – “Collor era?”, “New Brazil?” – invaded *FSP* yesterday. This fact is the culmination of a series of aggressive actions and violence which, in the name of combating inflation, creates a climate of state terrorism only comparable to the worst and most shameful periods of Brazilian history.” *FSP* continued its sharp attacks during a sequence of 4 days, appearing to have begun an opposition movement against Collor.

On the 25<sup>th</sup> *FSP* published a controversial story which compared Collor to the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, *Whatever resemblance is not mere coincidence*. Pictures of Collor’s staring expression were juxtaposed to Mussolini’s face. There was also a focus on Collor’s gestures with his hands and fists, mannerisms which were associated to those of the Italian dictator. “A determined leader that impresses by his self-confidence and capacity of communication with the masses is taken to power at the age of 39... His turbulent personality was constructed by the propaganda machine that helped him be sworn into power...”. On that same day, *FSP* columnists published articles on the importance of resisting the governments’ pressures. “Resistance is necessary” wrote Janio de Freitas. Clóvis Rossi talked of a moral crisis that had hit Brazil, which had permitted the election of Collor. “The problem is that few people, except for the PT, condemned the lack of ethics in the Miriam Cordeiro episode. The crisis in Brazil is not only economic...it is a moral crisis”, wrote the journalist.

Coelho nonetheless admitted that there were affinities between Collor and *Folha* in terms of a programmatic agenda for the country. He added however that the paper ended up contributing to expose the “farce that Collor represented”: “*Folha* had an important role until more or less September 1989. Everyone was enchanted with Collor and the newspaper was the one who printed more material in relation to the *marajás*... there was a moment when we were exclusively talking bad of Collor, while with Lula there was less to say except for the more common

things, does not have a proposal, etc. There was a moment in the press of a realization of an investigative competition, of who was going to find out more things about Collor. At the same time, from the point-of-view of the political discussion....everyone was in favour of Collor ideologically....*Folha* was not neutral, although it made more claims against Collor...and put itself clearly against Collor in the beginning of the government, but...there was an affinity of programmes between what Collor said was important for the country and what *Folha* thought was important..”.

*FSP*'s exaltation thus soon died down. The editorial *Return to an equilibrium* (28/03/90) was published in an effort to avoid the daily's entry into opposition. However, Collor's image as a product that had been constructed through political marketing had become more clearly exposed. *FSP* predicted that such a product would be made disposable by the propaganda machine that had built it up: “These messianic and self-sufficient leaders, of which Mussolini is a paradigm of this century, are the blind games of history that uses them and afterwards throws them away without mercy...” Clashes between *FSP* and Collor, however, would soon to occur in the future.

On the 25<sup>th</sup> of April, 1991, the director of the newsroom, Otavio Frias Filho, confronted Collor publicly by publishing an open letter on the front page addressed to him. “What is at stake now is the discussion over the possibility of a newspaper like this one existing in a country like ours...We shall see. I am on the plain, you are in your castle...I fight for liberty, you for a hurt vanity...”. The letter went on to affirm the compatibilities which existed between the policies defended by the paper with Collor's economic and political programme, underlining points like privatization, the reduction of the state and the fight against social inequality as similar positions advocated by both. “The problem is the abyss that opens between what you say and what your government does, between liberal rhetoric and the wildness of the action...”, said the daily.

Once again *FSP* capitalized on a political event for its own journalistic purposes. However, the Collor dispute made evident the growing powers of the free market press in the post-dictatorship phase, indicating an initial rise of media sectors who were clearly assuming a role as a vehicle of the Fourth Estate. The *FSP* invasion turned out to be an isolated event, happening in a moment when many were still fascinated by Collor and not ready to fire him yet. The disillusionment of the elite establishment with Collor nonetheless would soon begin to grow, culminating eventually in the historical 1992 impeachment process.

### 3.4. Between hysterical students and a barking media: the 1992 impeachment

#### a) *The watchdog function*

Classical liberal media theory states that the primary democratic role of the media in a liberal democracy is to act as a public watchdog. In Brazil, the media's attempt of (re)affirming its political independence vis-à-vis the state in the aftermath of the post-dictatorship started to gain strength mainly during the 1992 impeachment coverage. The return of Brazil to liberal market democracy witnessed the growth from 1980's onwards in investigative reporting and in the watchdog function (Waisbord, 2002). As debated in Chapter 2, the Brazilian media in the mid-80's maintained high degrees of political dependence in relation to government in the context of the weak democratization of the country's institutions and of a fragile commercial journalism model. As we have seen, the 1989 elections were politically constrained, with the media contributing to shape a particular economic-political process for the country and selecting a specific leader to take on this task.

The press in 1992 however began to publish more political critiques of the government, something which was very much a result of the outrage provoked in elite sectors with the scale of Collor's corruption as well as with the disenchantment caused in middle-class circles due to his interventionist and recessive economic plan. Elites were eventually irritated with Collor's navel-gazing. Thus in contrast to 1989, a campaign which was marked by confrontation, in 1992 the media began to recover from its shattered journalistic credibility by proving that it had enough guts to bark at the structures of power, and that it could question the corruption practices of politicians. Thus the president's downfall was orchestrated by a disillusioned elite establishment in conjunction with organised sectors of civil society, the PT, politicians from the opposition and students, many who had actually participated in the *Diretas Já* campaign and/or had voted for Lula in 1989.

If the *Diretas Já!* happened in a socio-political context of a strong state, Collor's impeachment occurred when the press had regained its editorial freedom, with the market consolidating this process in the post-dictatorship phase. In such a framework, journalists found space to feed an "angry" public - who had recently acquired a new freedom of opinion - with both serious investigative pieces but also with sensationalist stories or obscure forms of investigative journalism (the so-called *denuncismo* journalism). *FSP's* ombudsman Marcelo Beraba confirmed that the impeachment marked an initial



consolidation of a relative degree of media independence vis-à-vis the state: “I would say definitely that the impeachment reinforced the press’ independence in relation to the state. You have the decades of the 1960’s and 1970’s and you have a controlled press....When censorship was dropped, the newspapers start to do more investigative reporting of the government, and then you have the Ricardo Kotscho story published in *ESP* about the *mordomias* (privileges) in 1976.. And then you have a period of intense journalistic activity. Newspapers like *O Globo* and *JB* covered acts of (right-wing) terrorism, like the Riocentro episode. You have there an attempt of leaving the controlled journalism arena to enter a more free and investigative one. In 1989, *FSP* was the vehicle which had more capacity to investigate Collor. What happens in the impeachment is that....the newspapers...start to let go and disassociate themselves from compromises. You have all the newspapers doing some sort of investigation....Here again the limits of the press’ investigative work became clear... how it had little resources, which has improved since then, but mainly how it depended on the work of the parliamentary commission...”

Beraba pointed here to the difficulties encountered by journalists in conducting investigative reporting. During the period of transition from the dictatorship to liberal democracy, as Beraba noted, the press oscillated between maintaining its links with the state - and continuing to produce official reporting - to experiencing the contradictions of either embarking upon competent investigative reporting or engaging in superficial denunciations that seemed to be less worried about governmental wrongdoing and power abuse, and more preoccupied with press competition or with attacking individual politicians (Waisbord, 2000, 105). The case of the latter was clear in the publication of certain stories concerning Collor’s alleged cocaine taking and other unconfirmed sensationalist reports of misbehaviour. Admittedly, the media’s exercise of its watchdog function was slightly constrained by the fact that had supported Collor in 1989. The main denunciations that came out in the magazines *Veja* and *Isto É* in May and June in 1992 were thus a combination of willingness of some key players to speak out in public with the conduction of thorough investigative journalism work.

Denunciations against Collor’s government had come out in the press during Collor’s administration, starting mainly from June 1990. *FSP* and *ESP* accused Collor of having hired without public competition firms for a program of road rebuilding. *Folha* also accused Collor in August 1990 of hiring publicity agencies who had worked in his previous campaign. Collor reacted by suing four *FSP* journalists. A more detailed story on PC Farias’ misdeeds in the government was written by Bob Fernandes and published in the magazine *Isto É* (19/10/90). The story ”He complicates the life of the government”

denounced obscure links of PC Farias, a type of non-official Treasury Secretary, with Collor. It pointed to fraud in the election in Alagoas (Conti, 1999; 426-428). *ESP* also published soon afterwards a piece on PC's role in the government<sup>43</sup> and *O Globo* in October of 1991 denounced an inflated acquisition of uniforms by the Federal Army.

None of these stories initiated any press or public movement capable of seriously questioning the presidency. Carta lamented that the press only picked up on these facts one year and six months after Fernandes' story, mainly after the publication of Pedro's interview in *Veja*. *FSP* columnist, Janio de Freitas, who was critical of Collor, affirmed that the press showed reluctance in criticising his administration: "The media seemed reluctant at first...to expose what type of government it really was because of personal involvements and interests. This was not the case of *FSP*. Although there was some collaboration from the media, the fact of the matter is that the press would very much get on the parliamentary commission's bandwagon ...". Arguably, this research has noted that most of the stories published at the time concerning denunciations of governmental corruption *did* in fact come from the parliamentary commission. Furthermore, some of the stories published between May and July did evidence a certain reluctance of the general press, independently of the vehicle, in admitting official wrongdoing.<sup>44</sup> This situation eventually changed amid the increase of attacks against Collor's administration, which were beginning to come from various sectors of Brazilian society.

#### *b) The decline of the Collor myth and "denuncismo" journalism*

Collor's image as an exceptional politician who would take Brazil to the First World began to be deconstructed mainly after the publication by *Veja* in May 1992 of a denunciation of a corrupt scheme set up by PC Farias in the government. Collor's initial decline from grace started during this period and went until his final downfall in December. Newspapers reflected both the excitement as well as the turbulence of this phase. A series of denunciations against the PRN administration reached the headlines; the parliamentary commission was installed in Congress (CPI) to investigate the accusations; civil society representatives pressured harder for Collor's dismissal and students soon took to the streets in organised demonstrations against the government and in favour of more ethics and

---

<sup>43</sup> "PC nominates, fires and receives accusations" (21/10/90).

<sup>44</sup> "I.e. Governors recommend prudence" (*ESP*, 21/05/92); "Opposition insists on a parliamentary commission about PC" (*ESP*, 22/05/92) and "Collor gets irritated with denunciation and asks not to be left alone" (*JB*, 22/06/92).

transparency in politics.<sup>45</sup> In the months before the impeachment process in September, there was a consolidation in the media pages of the portrait of an aggressive, defensive and hysterical president<sup>46</sup>, a contrast to the previous energetic image presented in 1989.

On the 13<sup>th</sup> of May, *Veja* published the first part of the denunciation. Collor's brother Pedro accused Farias of enriching illicitly. Pedro, who tipped off *Veja* by giving it documents on Farias' illegal financial transactions, accused Collor in the second story *Pedro Collor tells everything – "PC is the figure-head of Fernando"* (27/05/92) of having a corrupt scheme with Farias. Both were accused of taking big commissions from business interactions involving the state. Pedro's accusations were directed towards the presidency, a fact which pointed to Collor's direct involvement. Press officers of the president tried to impede the publication of the story by calling up journalist Mario Sergio Conti and the owner of the magazine, Roberto Civita, whilst ministers of the government the following month threatened to pursue an investigation into the firm's bills in the national bank, *Banco do Brasil* (FGV, 2001). Collor tried to defend himself in public announcements on radio and TV. Conti (1999; 550-554) noted that the documents passed on by Pedro were given to the PT MP, José Dirceu, in order to make them public. Pedro is said to have decided to come out in public to attack his brother after Farias started invading the media market in Alagoas, thus appearing as a natural competitor to the Arnon de Mello Media Organizations firm owned by Collor's family, and run by Pedro.

Conti (1999) added that the Pedro *Veja* issue sold 836.000 copies, opening a political crisis in the country. Conti stressed how *Veja's* newsroom atmosphere created the means for the magazine to publish these accusations: "Why does *Veja* assume the leading role? Mainly, we were a young team, with young and ambitious reporters who had no vices. On the micro side, I was a young head of the newsroom, with only 17 years of journalism practice and my intellectual formation was different to Guzzo's, I was more entitled to take risks. On the macro level, the Brazilian bourgeoisie went as far as possible with Collor. There came a moment when it noticed that it could not support him anymore, and then all the press began to attack him..." *Veja* at the time seemed to be the only media vehicle leading the way in the investigation. It was followed afterwards by its competitor *Isto É*, who published a piece with Collor's driver, Eriberto França, who confirmed that PC Farias paid the president's private bills ("Collor

---

<sup>45</sup> I.e. "In SP, 43% want the removal of Collor" (*FSP*, 26/05/92); "It has reached the Planalto" (*Veja*, 27/05/92); and "Rio makes a big manifestation for the impeachment; Collor uses Caixa in the war on colors" (*FSP*, 15/08/92), see appendix.

<sup>46</sup> I.e. "Isolated by the Collorgate, president tries to save his mandate today on TV" (*FSP*, 30/06/92); "The implausible Collor" (*Isto É*, 01/07/92) and "Sarney: Collor is expelled from history" (*O Globo*, 19/09/92).

exclusive” and “CPI – a key-witness appears”, 27/06/92). In what was interpreted by the opposition as a revenge of the *descamisados* against Collor, who had defeated Lula, the simple working-class driver gathered strength to come out in public to confirm that Collor’s private secretary, Ana Acioli, used to call PC’s secretary to ask for money. Thus a witness appeared for the first time claiming that PC paid Collor’s bills. Until then, what was known about Farias was the fact that he defended private interests in the government.

In the next feature, “Eriberto, a Brazilian” (8/7/92), *Isto É* did a profile on the driver, pointing to the pressures that he suffered from MPs’ linked to Collor during his testimony in Congress. Carta stated that this story determined the end of Collor: “The *Isto É* story of 1990 said everything that afterwards Pedro Collor said to *Veja* one year and a half later....no media organisation gave continuity to Fernandes’ story. When *Veja* did..., a CPI was formed. My version is that Collor started to really irritate those in power. Because...he wanted everything for himself. He wanted 40% on top of every deal. But what determines his end is the driver because if he did not show up, the denunciations would end up in nothing....”

Some journalists (i.e. Dines, Nassif) have criticised the *denuncismo* aspect of the impeachment coverage, the procedure of shooting first and asking questions later. They affirmed that the work of the press in 1992 was less investigative and more opinionated, reflecting mainly elite interests in Collor’s downfall. Dines criticized for instance the emphasis given to Pedro’s words, someone who was not considered a reliable source, and also the fact that Collor was not heard by *Veja*: “The downfall of Collor had its negative and positive aspects. You cannot put a crazy guy like Pedro on the front cover of *Veja* without hearing the president. There was no double-checking. ...Journalism only happened with Eriberto in *Isto É*. Journalism of the *denuncismo* type is anti-journalism...There is no room anymore for a press to make and undo a president. Collor was the last one.”

Critical also of the coverage’s excesses and absence of thorough investigative work, *FSP* columnist Luis Nassif highlighted the journalist’s lack of maturity during the time: “It (the coverage) was journalisticly important because it ended with the idea of impunity for the actions of the president...To denounce until Collor’s government was a risk. With the impeachment two things happen: the journalist tastes the blood of the denunciation and in line with the competition amongst the papers, he eliminates the criterion of checking fully the facts. Thus I would say that the impeachment campaign is also a shame from a journalistic point-of-view. The Pedro Collor story is anti-journalism. You cannot give someone who shows mortal hatred and little equilibrium all the space in the world. The *Isto É* story was also not that relevant. Collor had heavy schemes...But these denunciations demand thorough investigative work. Then *Folha* entered the competition, then the others.. The only format that people were using for the growth in circulation

was the fabrication of scandals....The impeachment campaign happened at a time when the press had power without having yet gained in maturity...”

On the 25<sup>th</sup> of May, the Federal Police opened an inquiry to investigate PC’s activities, with the Congress installing the CPI to initiate these investigations. This was received with a certain hostility by important segments of the press, such as the newspaper *JB*, which only decided to stand by the impeachment campaign near the very end, as we shall see. In the editorial *In the Name of Truth* (19/05/92), published before the *Veja* story of the 27<sup>th</sup> of May, the daily attacked the CPI and warned of a possible coup: “Coups feed off popular discredit.... The temptation to condemn a government legitimised by 35 million votes seems irresistible, mostly from those who do not conform to democratic practices....” The Lattman-Weltman study (1994) has also shown that *JB* clashed in its own pages over the Collor episode. The paper did cover the works of the CPI<sup>47</sup> though and many famous columnists, like Villas Boas Corrêa and Millor Fernandes, criticised openly the president in its pages. However, the editorials defended the government until nearly the very end.<sup>48</sup> *JB* also offered Collor sufficient space, publishing stories which endorsed his speeches and point-of-view:<sup>49</sup>“The president repeated many times that he will make use of the Justice system to defend himself...” stated the first article by Etevaldo Dias (23/06/92), which detailed Collor’s strategy to maintain governance.

Conti confirmed *JB*’s resistance: “*JB* was in serious financial difficulties at that time. Etevaldo Dias (former executive-editor of *JB* in Brasilia) covered the impeachment stories. At night, he was negotiating a loan for *JB* with Lafaeite Coutinho (director) of Banco do Brasil. And soon afterwards he went on to become Collor’s press officer...” Merval Perreira, columnist of *O Globo* and former chief-editor of *JB* during the Collor impeachment, highlighted the difficulties faced due to political ownership constraints: “In 1992, I went to be chief-editor in *JB*. They told me as soon as I arrived that PC Farias was very close do Dr. Brito (Nascimento Brito, the former owner). Already many things were coming out in the press, and *JB* was too discrete. Then we had to focus on giving the news that was available. But it was very complicated to convince Dr. Brito that the news had to go to the headlines, that the other newspapers would be giving this information...” Like *JB*, *O Globo* also resisted embarking fully in the campaign, having only chosen to address more the issue in its editorials in the wake of the *cara-*

---

<sup>47</sup> I.e. “Collor and PC Farias escaped the Cruzado blockage in 1990” (22/08/92); “PT presents secretary who accuses Vieira of arranging a fraud” (30/07/92) and “CPI weakens the government and paves the way for the impeachment” (25/08/92).

<sup>48</sup> I.e. “*Will not Pass* (26/06/92); *The wind blew away* (28/06/92) and *Obscure Game* (25/07/92).

<sup>49</sup> I.e. “Collor says that he will finish his mandate” (23/06/92) and “Collor attacks accusations and condemns ‘intrigue’” (1/07/92).

*pintada* student demonstrations. *O Globo* however did publish also the corruption denunciations and, contrary to *JB*, it did not attack the CPI or the opposition as fully as the latter did. *O Globo*'s editorial, *What the nation demands* (06/07/92), for instance underlined that there was no interest in impeding the works of the CPI (Lattman-Weltman, 1994).

Thus Nassif's, Conti's and Merval's quotes indicate that journalists were placed within the pressures of either abiding by the codes of journalistic professionalism, and thus producing a more sound and interpretative coverage, or giving in to the reproduction of the official stance that actually hid ideological positions and a partisan pro-Collor slant. Furthermore, as emphasised by Nassif, the growing pressures of the market also imposed limits on the realization of more thorough investigative journalism work, contributing to stimulate the publication of political scandals by ambitious and opportunistic journalists. However, both these magazine stories had a role at the time in contributing to balance the previous overwhelmingly enthusiastic coverage done on Collor since 1989 which, as we have seen, showed little complexity and critique. It tended to dismiss dissent and to downplay the discourses of the opposition. In this sense these 1992 features functioned to voice dissatisfaction and to underscore the problems with Collor's administration, stories which had been relatively untold until then and for which there was an enormous pressure for them to come out. Such articles thus intensified the critiques that were being made towards the government, with the impeachment argument soon beginning to be widely discussed amongst sectors of public opinion and of the media.

c) "*Resign!*" say *ESP* and *FSP*

From May to August of 1992, the mainstream press shifted from an initial cautious stance around how to proceed with the *Veja* and *Isto É* denunciations towards a more critical attitude in relation to the Collor government as a response to growing demands from public opinion. Some papers embarked straight away on a more adversarial role, such as *FSP*<sup>50</sup>, while others chose to maintain a more prudent position, such as *ESP*, *O Globo* and mainly *JB*. However, the fire had been lit. New facts on Collor's deeds started to appear, with the press going after them daily.<sup>51</sup> After the publication of the *Isto É* story in June, both *FSP* and *ESP* published the first editorials at the end of the month asking for Collor's resignation. According to *Folha*, the decision was taken due to the "incapacity of Collor to

---

<sup>50</sup> I.e. "Pedro Collor returns to the attack" (24/05/92), see appendix for more.

<sup>51</sup> I.e. "Goldemberg (minister of Education) denounces extortion" (*ESP*, 15/08/92), see appendix.

govern”. *FSP* published the editorial *Resign now* under a headline which emphasised the desperate situation that the president was living: “Isolated by the Collorgate, president tries to save mandate today on TV”. This was accompanied by a picture of Collor looking vaguely above. The editorial stated that this request was not linked with the problems that Collor had had with *FSP*: “The clashes that occurred between *Folha* and the president are not ignored. But what is being put in this instant is something much higher than conjectural differences. What is at stake is the capacity to govern the country... Collor cannot govern any more. Then he must resign”, asserted *Folha*.

Engaging in a more active form of journalism that echoed the *Diretas Já!* campaign, *FSP* opted once again to reflect the main urges of public opinion, assuming clearly an anti-Collor slant. It started to publish in August a box with the positioning of MPs concerning the impeachment cause called the “Impeachment scoreboard”. It also began to publish the number of votes needed for this.<sup>52</sup> Throughout the Collor coverage, the politician was portrayed in *FSP*’s pages as a deceitful, hesitant and aggressive president, with the paper using the expression “Collorgate” - an allusion to the US’s Watergate scandal - to talk about the Collor investigations.<sup>53</sup> The first story, “Collor attacks ‘union coup’”, in which “union” was used by Collor in a reference to the PT, showed a picture of the politician looking embarrassed and hesitant, gazing slightly sideways. His shadow was reflected in the back. The text next to the picture stated that he tried to defend himself by coming up with a Ibope research which indicated that 67% of the population were on his side.

The particular case of *ESP* and its request for Collor’s resignation was more revealing given the total identification that the newspaper had had with Collor. Six months before, according to Conti (1999; 612-615), Collor and Ruy Mesquita had exchanged letters, with the former thanking the owner of the paper for the praise he received in the daily. Mesquita answered: “It would be better to talk about a total identification between this newspaper and the philosophical orientation of your government defended by your Excellency the day you were sworn in. This deserved, from our part, the editorial with the highest praise that we ever wrote in our lives as journalists”. On the 30<sup>th</sup> of June, on the same day as *FSP*, *ESP* wrote: “The renouncing of the president is the only point at which there is no turning back. The well-being of the country demands that Collor makes...this last sacrifice..”. However, although *ESP* and *FSP* had asked for Collor’s resignation, most elite circles were still

---

<sup>52</sup> I.e. “Opposition can already approve impeachment” (30/07/92) and “There are still 12 votes to go for the impeachment” (28/08/92).

<sup>53</sup> I.e. “Collor tries on TV to say ‘that’s enough’ to the denunciations” (22/06/92); “Most people think that Collor acted with PC” (25/06/92) and “Collor attacks coup union” (3/07/92).

hesitant, with newspapers like *JB* still standing up for the president. From then onwards, a proliferation of stories dismantling the 1989 myth of the “saviour of the nation” began to proliferate in the dailies, with the month of August witnessing a series of student protests demanding Collor’s immediate impeachment.

*d) Black flags rise: students protest and public opinion pressure for impeachment*

The role that the student movement played in the downfall of Collor has been the subject of much debate. Some journalists have afforded students a secondary and passive role, summing up the participation in the protests to the mere influences of media hype (Dines, 2004; Carta, 2004). Others pointed to the students’ active participation in the whole process (Leitão, 2003; Ventura, 2004). In the same way as the *Diretas* rallies contributed to exercise pressure on the military regime to accelerate the return to democracy, the impeachment demonstrations organized by UNE students and civil society groups, such as OAB, had a role in contributing to shake the power structures of Brazilian society. This was regardless of the fact that these mobilizations were less ideologically motivated and more a reflection of the media frenzy that was being created against Collor at the time.

Author of a book on the 1968 Brazilian generation of intellectuals and artists, *O Globo* columnist Zuenir Ventura underlined the importance of the 1992 protests, arguing how they posed little physical risk in comparison to the dictatorship period. Influenced by the TV Globo programme “Anos Rebeldes” (*Rebel Years*) shown in July 1992, a series which reconstructed for the first time on prime-time television the Brazilian youth of the 1970’s who had confronted the dictatorship, students painted their faces with the colours of the flag and occupied the streets of Brazil’s capitals in August.<sup>54</sup> These students started to exercise significant stress on important segments of the establishment, adding weight to the denunciations made by the Congress’ investigative work.

Certain military generals expressed concerns that the UNE acts would eventually “radicalise” (i.e. “Military minister condemns ‘radicalism’”, *ESP*, 20/08/92). In this particular story, the minister of Air Force, Socrates Monteiro, affirmed that the presidency should be preserved. Conti reiterated that the student rallies did contribute to shake more reluctant elite circles, adding that they were a turning point for Collor’s fate: “There was a gigantic demonstration in Rio (14th of August) and I had just gone to Brasília. I was in Sarney’s

---

<sup>54</sup> I.e. “Happiness, Happiness” (*Veja*, 19/08/92) and “Impeachment generation” (*Veja*, 7/10/92).



house (former president and senator of the PMDB), who was against Collor, and politicians such as Jader Barbalho started to arrive. And they were transmitting everything live on TV. And they started to get really afraid....They saw a popular movement take to the streets and they thought that they needed to control it....a movement against the president, something bound to radicalise. I saw it, the bourgeoisie...and so did the press. This was very clear...it was from the demonstrations onwards that it started.”

The newspapers engaged enthusiastically in the coverage of the protests, dedicating many pages to the civic mobilizations and deliberating upon the new type of politics that was emerging, organized by a generation which had been born in the end of the military regime and was considered in general apolitical.<sup>55</sup> *Folha* again made reference to the *diretas* coverage by urging its readers to participate in the demonstrations. On 16<sup>th</sup>, *FSP* published a Datafolha research poll that indicated a growing support for the impeachment. Above the headline “70% think that Congress should approve Collor’s impeachment”, it wrote “Use black in protest”, an expression which not only echoed the “Use Yellow for the *Diretas*” slogan but also played with Collor’s request a few days before that people should back him by wearing the colours of the flag.<sup>56</sup> On the 15<sup>th</sup>, *FSP* published a black slogan under the headline “Rio holds the biggest protest in favour of impeachment”. It also published the editorial *Mourning*, which affirmed: “...we declare the sentiment which we feel in this instant: mourning. Mourning for the destruction of the most elementary standards of administration ethics; mourning because the Republic is in the hands of opportunists...”

*Veja*, who had triggered the investigations against Collor, published its very first political editorial in the history of the magazine asking for the president’s renunciation in September (*The president must leave*, 2/09/92). The editorial said that Collor had “betrayed the trust of Brazilians, lost moral authority and has no credibility to govern....He must be substituted by the vice-president”. On the 30<sup>th</sup> of September, in its letter to the reader entitled *Lesson of democracy*, the magazine published all the covers that it had dedicated to Collor. It self-congratulated itself for having “well informed” its readers, stating however that the press did not exist to “organise political campaigns, attack people and overthrow presidents”. It noted also how *Veja* was very proud “to have been at the centre of the crisis”. Arguably, the role that *Veja* assumed in the impeachment coverage was recognized

---

<sup>55</sup> I.e. “Rebel years – students go to the streets for the impeachment” (*FSP*, 12/08/92) and “Students take to the streets with new ideas” and “Gap separates ‘68 from the painted faces of ‘92” (*ESP*, 24/08/92), see appendix.

<sup>56</sup> “I.e. Collor asks people to use green and yellow” (*JB*, 14/08/92).

internationally, with Mario Sergio Conti receiving a prize from the World Press Review in 1993 (FGV, 2001). *Veja* stopped short however of embarking on a self-critique of the role it had in the 1989 elections, pointing to the importance of maintaining the economic liberal plan: “Since Fernando Collor has been sworn in, the terrible social problems of the country have gotten worse....now he leaves the presidency in a worse situation... It is Itamar Franco (vice) who will have to stick to the program that elected him...that defends the opening....to the international market...”, said *Veja*.

After some reluctance, *JB* decided to endorse Collor’s dismissal. In the editorial *Reasons for yes*, published on the 29<sup>th</sup> of September, day of the approval of Collor’s impeachment in Congress, the paper explained the endorsement of an argument that until recently it had highly repudiated. An editorial published one month earlier on the front cover of the paper, *There is no more time to lose* (30/08/92), emphasised the essentiality of Collor’s economic-liberal policies. Nonetheless, it started to condemn governmental corruption: “Brazil feels embarrassed after a long period of revelation... Each new revelation deepens the sentiment of national indignation...The agenda of the CPI – of moralization of the public space...must continue.” The September editorial mentioned the reasons that the president had let the country down by stating: “The support that *JB* gave to the president since he was sworn in March 1990 was inspired by political, economic and moral reasons.. ..We supported the project of a market economy...Collor never represented the beginning of a new phase...He finishes a cycle of degradation of democratic values”, said the daily. On the 1<sup>st</sup> of September, *O Globo* published a similar editorial, *What does not change*, defending the economic programme. It stated that Brazil could not “turn its back on the significant advancements that we already made in the direction of a modern country....”. This editorial came out in a moment when Roberto Marinho had ceased to stand by Collor.<sup>57</sup>

On the 25<sup>th</sup> of August, the newspapers published the final result of the CPI, which proved the ties between Collor and PC Farias and suggested punishment for the president. The papers began to proclaim Collor’s decline from power.<sup>58</sup> With 441 votes against 38, 105 more than the 336 necessary, Congress approved Collor’s impeachment in a historical session. Collor stepped down from the presidency and the vice-president, Itamar Franco, took over. Collor alleged innocence and maintained the hope of being sworn back to

---

<sup>57</sup> I.e. “Trust in Collor is shaken, affirms Marinho” (*FSP*, 12/09/92).

<sup>58</sup> I.e. “CPI concludes that Collor dishonors the presidency and suggests impeachment” (*FSP*, 25/08/92) and “CPI approves document, Collor loses parliamentary support and is nearly alone” (*ESP*, 27/08/92).

government, but the Congress' decision opened the path for the politician to be judged. The newspapers all celebrated the vote, publishing special features of more than 20 pages which proclaimed the end of the Collor era.<sup>59</sup> Most of the stories adopted a similar pattern which included the examination of Collor's self-marketing strategies and how these contributed to his meteoric rise to power, although none of the newspapers analysed in greater detail the role assumed by the media in the whole process.

*O Globo's* headline "Collor is out of power" (30/09/92) was perhaps the least emotive. This was accompanied by the editorial *Renounce, now*, which read: "In this moment, Fernando Collor still has the last opportunity to, in a gesture that starts and finishes with his personal will, to do something for his country and to make the decision for which he will be remembered for. The time has come for the most politically intelligent act...of demonstration of infinite patriotism: the renunciation". *O Globo* dedicated an edition of 25 pages on the Collor phenomena, including a page on the population applauding his decline ("Country celebrates the yes with Carnival"). This feature curiously focused on a statement of a protester who affirmed that the "cry had been stuck in the throats of Brazilians since the *Diretas Já*".

*JB* put a big "yes" on its front cover, adopting an emotional tone by putting a picture below this headline of people partying in the streets. The headline read: "People celebrate, Collor prepares his transition and Itamar has Ministry"). The editorial *The time of the Brazilians* (30/09/92) defended Collor's economic programme: "Franco will have to...guarantee the continuity of the modernization projects, like the fiscal reform...". *ESP's* headline "Collor out" assumed a more rational stance, although the whole front page was occupied by the publication of the names of MPs who voted for the impeachment thesis. *FSP*, on the other hand, opted for a more political slant, publishing the word "impeachment" in big letters and with an exclamation mark. This was placed under the phrase "victory for democracy", which appeared in black to emphasis how the whole impeachment process was a historical one, and how the paper was in tune with the sentiments of the whole country.

The positive attributes which the media had associated with Collor, such as the fact of him being a "young and energetic" president who exercised and read books, were gone

---

<sup>59</sup> "Victory of Democracy (in black) – Impeachment! Collor is taken down by Chamber in historical session; president accepts the decision of Itamar and assumes today" (*FSP*, 30/09/92); "Yes – 441 versus 38 – People party, Collor prepares his transition and Itamar has Ministry"(*JB*); "Chamber approves the impeachment by 441 votes against 38– Collor is out of power" (*O Globo*) and "Collor out" (*ESP*).

altogether from the newspaper pages. This indicated that the myth of the saviour of the nation had collapsed, with the Collor era coming to an end and the “product” finally going out of fashion. The *O Globo* stories “A president that does thousands of things at the same time”, “Jogging with sub-titles: the new way of doing politics” and “A brand that is out of fashion” (30/09/92) are examples of pieces that consolidated the deconstruction of Collor’s image, which began mainly in May 1992. In the *O Globo* story, “The clan started with the Dinda”, Collor is shown wearing many shirts with proverbs and is made to look pathetic. Thus finally on the 29<sup>th</sup> of December, Collor renounced the presidency in the middle of the approval of the impeachment process in the Federal Senate, which prohibited him to run for any governmental function until the year 2000.

### 3.5. Conclusion

This chapter has investigated the journalism role assumed by the press in the coverage of the 1989 elections and the 1992 impeachment, exploring the complexities of the construction/deconstruction of the Collor myth and juxtaposing this to the analysis of the contributions made by journalism and journalists in that particular historical period. As noted in Chapter 1, this research has avoided a mere endorsement of conspiracy media theories and the belief in the media’s dissemination of “dominant discourses” in opposition to counter-agendas. That said though, it seems evident that much of the Brazilian media *did* not only contribute to elect Collor, but after an initial hesitation phase it *wanted* him to be elected so as to impede the rise of left-wing politics or the “Brizula” spectrum (Lattman-Weltman, FGV, 1994). This was something pointed out by the journalists interviewed here and also evident in my analysis of the patchy coverage of the 1989 campaign. Thus in the same way that the *diretas* movement represented the struggle between the forces of change and those that represented continuity, the duel fought between Lula and Collor epitomised the clashes between certain core political-economic values defended by opposing groups concerning the direction that Brazil should take in the 1990’s. In other words, of either consolidating the global market economy stance or securing a more leftist social-democratic position.

Contrary to the FGV (1994) study, this research has examined journalistic conflict with ownership and has not considered the 1989 coverage to have been neutral, in spite of journalists’ efforts to achieve balance and the spaces afforded in the media for the voicing of counter-agendas. This study has emphasised the weakness of the presence of journalistic

liberal values like objectivity in political reporting. In contrast to the *Diretas*, in 1989 sectors of the media did not embark on a militant coverage in favour of universal democratic ideals but rather in smaller disputes and rivalries which highlighted the sharp ideological divisions that existed between candidates who presented opposing agendas for Brazil. In such a framework a more balanced press coverage would have been better, legitimising the media's credibility and maturity in a context of a newly regained freedom of expression and liberty of thought, although at the same time running the risk of taking away some of the creativity and heat of the 1989 coverage.

Above or of equal importance to the class conflict dictum that was reflected in the media pages was the socio-political context that Brazil was living at the time, a country in which a disillusioned population and an unequal society not particularly used to dealing with conflict, and recently out of a 20 year dictatorship period, was trying desperately to fit into the new globalisation reality of advanced capitalist societies. Collor was a political marketing product of the emergent mass political Brazilian society, a type of politician who could adapt to the growing consumerism demands of both 1990's political marketing and contemporary journalism, presenting himself to the media and the public as a disposable product who was all about style, but who lacked in consistency. The fact that he was created and then devoured by the media also forced the press to engage in a future self-critique of the positive and negative factors of the coverage of the Collor phenomena. This included the ways in which the media were distancing themselves from the state and engaging in wider critiques of politics, something which was also followed by a tendency towards cynicism and the publication of political scandals and sensationalist stories to the detriment of more serious political news and investigative features.

The 1989 presidential elections were the first since the collapse of the dictatorship. This evidently exposed the weaknesses of the media who, judging from the interviews conducted here, seemed not to know how to deal with the complexities and conflicts of liberal pluralism. As we have seen, newspapers still reproduced official discourses, with a tendency to favour the views of the candidates of the establishment. If the media coverage of the 1989 elections in the class conflict/consumerism paradigm pointed to a retrocession in the efforts made to advance democracy, in a sharp contrast to the *Diretas Já*, the coverage of the 1992 impeachment evidenced certain advancements and more critical positioning of the press in relation to authority figures and politicians who represented traditional Brazilian values. It thus reaffirmed the commercial character of the media and its relative degree of political independence, legitimising the public watchdog/free market

dictum as the main guideline of contemporary Brazilian journalism. Here was a moment when the powers of the market in opposition to the state became evident, with the media consolidating a position away from the previous high degree of state dependence that had characterised the dictatorship years.

Finally, the errors and mistakes of both 1989 and 1992 forced most of the press to conduct more professional political reporting in future elections. In 1994 however, as we shall see, the economic stabilisation plan overwhelmed the presidential coverage, with clashes between citizen and consumerism rationales in the news continuing to be a source of tension for both political and economic journalism, debates which are pursued in the following chapters.

## **Chapter 4 – National politics in a global economic world: a case study of the 1994 presidential elections**

### **4.1. Introduction**

The 1994 presidential elections took place amid much euphoria concerning the possibility of the *real* stabilising the economy after the long period of low production and little economic growth which characterised much of the re-democratisation phase. In the aftermath of 1989, a mass political society had been formed. In 1994, 94.768.404 million Brazilians – 60% of the population, which amounted to an increase of 15.47% in the size of the electorate since 1989 – chose not only the next president, but state governors, senators and MPs.<sup>60</sup> Political rights by 1994 had thus been finally consolidated, with the presidential elections occurring in a different socio-political context to 1989 but in a similar economic one. In 1994, the time had come for both the Brazilian elite establishment and the lower classes to request their (economic) inclusion in the national and international free market. Elite discussions concerning the ways of giving continuity to Collor's policies and the debate on the feasibility of the *real* of promoting economic growth and wealth distribution were the cornerstones of the 1994 presidential elections. Economic concerns thus pervaded the political field at a time when the social-democratic model of a strong nation-state and welfare system was declining throughout Europe amid the rise of neo-liberal thinking and of policies which favoured state restructuring and the wider integration of national enterprises into the global market.

As we have seen in Chapters 2 and 3, the press from the mid-80's onwards started to reinforce the commodity character of news in response to the increasing commercialization of Brazilian journalism. It consolidated more the democratic aspects of the Western media system, including the professional model which, according to academics, has begun to be undermined in advanced capitalist societies (Hackett and Zhao, 2005; 23). Political reporting in 1994 was thus higher in balanced debate and lower in ideological bias than was the case in 1989. Journalists interviewed here have confirmed the strengthening of fairness in political reporting, but have highlighted also the strong impact of economic constraints on the 1994 elections. Media coverage in 1994 thus reflected a more critical view of

---

<sup>60</sup> See appendix for information on the Brazilian party system.

governmental politics than it did in 1989, with the opposition emerging with more force in the aftermath of Collor's defeat.

The textual and content analysis conducted here reveals wider balance in the news, with an average of 50% of neutral stories published by the press on the 1994 elections. It was in the realm of the 'neutral' features that the opposition candidates were better represented in contrast to the more 'negative' or biased pieces of 1989, which however still persisted occasionally in 1994 and continued to do so in 2002, as we shall see. Contrary to 1984 and 1989, a shift was seen in 1994 from political-ideological restrictions to economic ones. Thus the crux of my argument here is that the main source of tension in 1994 was less the predominance of *ideological-political* discourses or fears in relation to the rise of unprivileged segments of Brazilian society to power, but more economic anxieties which imposed on all candidates an obligation to articulate their own agendas in *relation to* or *against* the *real*. As we shall see, this was very much a response also to the priority given by the media to the *real*, with the candidates constructing their discourses around the economic plan and the public beginning to want to judge the candidates' ability of governance by their abilities in managing the currency and guaranteeing future stability.

In 1994, it was not possible to say anymore that the state or the government was *directly* controlling free speech, for media industries were operating with liberal journalism values grounded in the principles of the Fourth Estate. Thus if advancements were made in this coverage in relation to 1989 because of more professionalism, the fact is that, with the launch of the *real* in July 1994, economic elements dominated political reporting, the political campaign and the speeches of the candidates, leaving little room for alternative viewpoints due to the elite consensus that was being formed around the candidature of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC).

This chapter focuses on the final three month phase of the political campaign, which started on the 1<sup>st</sup> of July, 1994, with the launch of the *real*, and ended a few days after the 3<sup>rd</sup> of October, when Cardoso won. Critical textual and content analysis has been carried out here of 1.256 stories, editorials and headlines, including 417 features from *ESP*, 458 from *JB*, 255 (*FSP*), 48 (*O Globo*), 22 (*Veja*) and 27 (*Isto É*). Content analysis has also been used to examine the political platforms of the candidates and to identify campaign trends and themes in an attempt to understand the importance of the *real* to the 1994 presidential elections. This chapter has been divided into three main parts: the first is an initial deliberation on the penetration of economic discourses in Brazilian society and in journalism in the last three decades; the second is an investigation of the background of the



1994 dispute and the last is the engagement in the content and textual analysis of the press' coverage of the presidential elections.

#### **4.2. The economic context of the post-dictatorship and economic journalism**

As discussed earlier, Brazil experienced a slow transition away from political authoritarianism towards a gradual consolidation of representative liberal market democracy in the years before and after 1994. Mainly since the epoch of the “economic miracle” of the military regime years, economic plans have played a key part in the maintenance of governments, serving to legitimize authoritarian regimes and contributing to sustain the popularity of a government in the public's eye independently of its ideological inclinations or its political authoritarianism. As we have seen, the “economic miracle” years (1967-1973) were responsible for stimulating wider investments in diverse sectors, reducing the role of the public sector whilst boosting the private (Abreu, 2001). These years saw the expansion in capital, propriety and income concentration followed by the weakening of the negotiation power between unions and employees due to the limitations imposed on the right to go on strike. Such policies soon created an inflated economy. The spiraling inflation, which oscillated between 20 and 25%, the 1973 oil crisis, the increase in external borrowing and the negative impacts that these economic principles were having on social indicators enhanced widespread criticisms of the regime.

In Latin America, the model of substituting imports for domestic goods created international debts and was responsible for much of the economic stagnation of the 1980's. As we have seen, the Cruzado plan was only initially successful. Thus there was a lot of expectations in relation to the capacity of the *real* of combating inflation and for some, of actually redistributing wealth. The *real* currency was tied to the dollar and was launched amid a propaganda campaign that contrasted this plan to previous ones, such as the failed Cruzado and the Collor II packages. Economic analysts who examined the *real*'s legacy have emphasized how it brought economic stability to Brazil but at a cost of recession and loss of initial social gains. In the first two years of the plan, it was largely successful due to the drastic reduction of inflation that it had caused, interrupting the whole hyperinflation process of the last 30 years. The lower classes began to be included for the first time in Brazil's emergent “mass market” as consumers, with the *real* having an initial impact on the reduction of poverty.

According to a study done on the 10 years of the plan by the Dieese (Department of Inter-union of Statistics and Socio-economic Studies) Institute, the first phase of prosperity of the *real* was interrupted because of the impact on Brazil of international crises, such as the Mexican one in 1995 and the Asian turmoil of 1997. The fight against inflation was maintained, but growth began to decline and unemployment rose. During these 10 years, the public debt jumped from 30% of the GNP to 56,8%, a factor pointed out as having been the price that the government had to pay to maintain the currency's stability. In 1999, the *real* was de-valuated after an agreement between the federal government and other state municipalities that it was necessary to make a fiscal sacrifice so as to secure its worth. The consequence was the continuity of high interest rates and the signing of another accord with the IMF, who initiated a program of recovery in Brazil. However, between 1995 and 2002, approximately 2.6 million vacancies in the Brazilian market place were lost.

The rise of a liberal free market economy in Brazil resulted in the development of the prestige of economic journalism. Kucinski (2000) has remarked that, since the monetary disorder of the 1970's and expansion of the dollar culture, economic journalism has received a boost, becoming the main news theme in this century and leaving politics to occupy a secondary role. According also to Abreu (2003), the conditions for the emergence of economic journalism in Brazil - which modelled itself on the North American experience and had the goal of covering the financial market and the business world - happened when the country started to see a steep rise in its economy during the 1970's. "Economic journalism was used as an instrument for the launch of the military regime's economic policies" wrote Abreu (2001; 25). Economic journalism trends were strengthened though more in the 1990's amid the expansion of a series of market dynamics in newsrooms. An example is the so-called "service journalism" that acquired prestige in the last decade (Nassif, 2003), and which basically consists of discussions in the newspaper pages of the quality of products and the publication of consumers' complaints concerning both commercial and public services.

In comparison to political reporting, economic news in Brazil has tended to be less critical and contradictory, favouring governmental and big-business sources and endorsing the economic liberal agenda. They thus reflect more these opinions than those of critical economic experts and unions (Nassif, 2003). In contrast still to political reporting, there seems to be less space for conflict in the coverage of economic news. This does not mean to say that economic journalism disengages political debate, and that it has not had an important (political) role even in the advancement of democracy in Brazil. Abreu (2001,

16) noted that it was in the pages of some financial supplements, such as the economic pages of *O Globo*, that journalists started to resist the dictatorship by questioning aspects of the economy. This was because most of the political pages were the ones subject to censorship and state surveillance. This resulted in a decline in the coverage of political issues in contrast to the expansion of economic themes, which were deemed to be safer to tackle than the more sensitive political ones, such as the lack of civil rights and freedom of expression.

Due to the shift from the powers of the state to those of the market in the late 1980's, there was a transition from forms of political constraints to economic motives. *FSP* columnist Janio de Freitas has argued that political power in Brazil has learned to live better with press liberty than business has: "Journalism is an exercise which is badly tolerated by the economic and social power., including the political power. I think also that the political power has been more affected by press liberty, but it is the one which has learned to live with journalism better. The economic power does not tolerate this...". As we shall see, concerns of the business and financial world regarding how 'the market' would react to the possibility of the PT being sworn into power in 1994 and in 2002, and the type of political decisions which could be made because of this, such as an abandonment of the privatisation programme, the rise of the minimum wage or the reluctance in signing a new deal with the IMF (International Monetary Fund), were essential factors constraining the coverage of these elections.

Member of *FSP*'s editorial commission, Luis Nassif, a certified heavyweight journalist who implemented the financial news coverage and service journalism in newspapers, has asserted that financial journalism is subordinated to market views. Similarly to Janio, Nassif is critical of the economic orthodoxy: "After 94/95, you see how financial journalism has been subordinated to the clichés of the market in a scandalous form. Who are the winners of this model, which was in place mainly from 1994 and 1998, but which continues? It is a model of globalisation with social exclusion...You see big national and international groups which consolidated in this period, on top of the small and medium firms. When some journalists went to ask questions to Gustavo Franco (former president of the Central Bank) in a seminar in Rio, the answer was that the market does not allow it...how do you construct such a model of subordination of the country to the market?"

Thus, if on one hand the market functioned as a liberating force in the post-dictatorship period, guaranteeing wider press freedom and exercising the watchdog role, on the other hand it also imposed limits on the consolidation of political democracy and on the wider democratisation of Brazilian society. These tensions overwhelmed the 1994 presidential

elections, which epitomised the moment of Brazil's full embracement of neo-liberal policies and its definite entry in the global free market era.

#### **4.3. The *Real* as marketing tool and FHC: the media coverage of the 1994 elections**

##### *a) A general perspective on the campaign*

The early 1990's were years of struggle for both political and economic stability. This decade saw a strengthening of the role of the presidency, with high expectations being placed by the population on individual politicians and presidents regarding the chances that they could actually reduce social inequality levels and boost economic growth. Lamounier (1998; 119) adopted a Weberian analysis in his identification of three Brazilian utopias or visions concerning the directions that Brazil would take in the 90's, pointing to the presidential-referendum as being the first one. Such an institutional organization is thus centered on the figure of the presidency, which carries with it an almost messianic responsibility regarding the applicability of reforms (i.e. social and tributary) aimed at developing the country. The result was the formation of a pattern of political reporting which favoured direct tug-of-wars between candidates, reflecting aspects of Brazilian culture with its cult of *personalism* and authority figures (Da Matta, 1979). The content and critical textual analysis conducted here has shown that, similar to 1989, the 1994 elections were actually very much "individualized" around the personalities, personal ambitions and qualities of the main candidates. This was the case in relation to the two main political players of the 1990's (Lula and Cardoso), who sometimes had their personalities more subjected to debate by the media than their political and economic programmes.

Like Lula but in different circumstances, Cardoso gained national visibility in the 1970's and 1980's as an opponent of the dictatorship and key negotiator in the *diretas*. Both Lula and Cardoso were political allies in the past. The former was even well viewed by segments of the intelligentsia in the 1980's and during the *diretas*, as we have seen. The 1994 elections would end up exposing their political-economic divisions. From 1989 to 1993, both Lula's PT and Fernando Henrique's PSDB started to take on different directions. The attempts made of proximity between the two (Singer, 1999) were in overall frustrated due to the parties' divergence on vital issues such as the agrarian reform and the

economic models of development for the country. The PT was also reluctant to lose the leading position in a possible future political alliance with the PSDB as well as its more clearly-defined left-wing stance in contrast to the *tucano*'s more centrist mentality. FHC began to court traditional oligarchic Northeast representatives, presenting himself as the future voice of new capitalism. He thus occupied more the centre-right field in opposition to Lula, wooing certain left-wingers sectors and thus managing to maintain some of their votes in 1994. Lula was situated more within the left but less so than in 1989, indicating timidly that he could compromise with businessmen.<sup>61</sup>

Thus Cardoso vied with Lula for the left-wing vote, and during the campaign straddled between the left and the right whilst Lula secured his ground more in the former position. In comparison to Collor, however, FHC was also more intellectually prepared, a respected politician and internationally known academic who was willing to negotiate with conservative segments of Brazilian society, and to integrate the country in the global economic market at a moment when the PT showed hesitation and reluctance. Cardoso was thus the more 'natural' candidate of the establishment and therefore the ideal 'anti-Lula'.

*b) The "positive" and "negative" stories on Lula and FHC*

The critical textual and content analysis conducted of the final three months of the 1994 presidential elections has shown that most of the press strived to produce an even coverage in spite of the existence in many news organisations of partisanship routines. Firstly, an examination of a sample of 1.256 stories published from the 1<sup>st</sup> of July until the end of the 1994 campaign in October reveals a much lower level of ideological and political bias than the one identified in 1989. Media spaces in 1994 were not so overwhelmed with ideological conflict: there were fewer references made to the anti-communist rhetoric that was seen in the 1989 campaign and to the set of discourses concerning the risks of the PT invading land and middle-class homes in case of a victory. Although Cardoso and the PSDB received a clearly more sympathetic coverage than opposition candidates like Lula or Brizola did, with most of the media showing support for the economic plan, in general the print press aspired to produce an accurate and professional coverage.

In comparison to 1989, in 1994 the press were more critical of FHC than they were of Collor. Cardoso's use of the *real* as a marketing tool was discussed and criticised by some

---

<sup>61</sup>I.e. "Entrepreneurs launch pro-Lula booklet" (*ESP*, 20/07/94) and "Petistas entrepreneurs are booed at in front of the stock market" (*FSP*, 01/10/94).

media sectors, with his links to government being made evident. FHC was also criticised for having allied with the centre-right wing PFL party. Moreover, in 1994 Lula and the PT started to move away from the margins of mainstream politics. The direct consequence of this was that Lula's agenda was better received in 1994 in some mainstream circles than it was in 1989. The tone of stories like "Party (PT) at a dead spot" (*Veja*, 2/08/89) and "PT wants Lula with a radical discourse" (*O Globo*, 30/08/89) for instance were rarely seen in 1994. More "positive" stories like "PT shines but also arouses fear" (*Veja*, 15/07/94) were published instead. Cardoso was also not afforded the same kind of uncritical emotional coverage that Collor was given in 1989.<sup>62</sup> Despite these factors though, the last phase of the campaign saw temperatures escalate: the PT accused the elections of being a fraud due to governmental backing of the PSDB candidature. Furthermore, the organisation of strikes by CUT also put Lula and Cardoso on opposing ideological camps.<sup>63</sup>

The newspaper sample stories included in both Tables 1 and 2 were selected daily during a period of three months, starting from the 1<sup>st</sup> of July and ended on the 10<sup>th</sup> of October, after the victory of Cardoso at the polls. This content analysis ranges from headlines to stories, editorials, articles and features from magazines selected on a weekly basis. *O Globo* has not been included in the content analysis because the number of samples examined has not matched the average amount of the other dailies. However, the paper's stories are discussed in this chapter's general textual analysis. Table 2 records the proportion of the coverage devoted to the economic plan in the news during the elections' final phase. Table 1 points to high levels of "negative" stories on Lula and the PT, with percentages varying from 16% to 33%. These emerge in contrast to the lower quantity of "negative" stories about Cardoso, which amount to an average of 7%. Research conducted by the communication firm Deadline showed similar results. It revealed that in July the seven national newspapers published 66% of "negative" news on Lula and only 9% in favour, whilst FHC had 40% "positive" pieces and only 20% "negative". On television, Lula had 61% of "negative" texts and Cardoso, 18%.<sup>64</sup>

---

<sup>62</sup> Contrast stories like "The pre-campaign phenomena" (*JB*, 14/05/89) and "Collor organizes the campaign with the image of success" (*O Globo*, 16/05/89) to the more rational pieces like "FH promises government of consensus" (*O Globo*, 29/07/94), positive ones like "Cardoso finds his style and the politician bypasses the academic" (*ESP*, 24/07/94) and to some critical texts (i.e. "For FHC opponents, *Real* will break the country" (*FSP*, 17/07/94).

<sup>63</sup> I.e. "Lula challenges FH to go to factories" (*O Globo*, 09/08/94); "Lula says that FH uses fascist discourse, of the extreme-right" (*O Globo*, 14/09/94) and "PT considers election a fraud" (*O Globo*, 22/09/94).

<sup>64</sup> I.e. "Pages of the campaign – research reveals that newspapers and TVs like to talk more about Lula than FH – but usually to speak bad of " (*Veja*, 27/09/94). A Datafolha research on the neutral, positive and negative stories published in the dailies in August indicated that *ESP* (26%) was the paper that afforded more

Table 1 indicates a predominance of “neutral” stories published in the press. Percentages varied from 48% to 53%. The higher percentage of “positive” features written on Cardoso conveys that news organisations saw FHC’s candidature more favourably than the other candidates. The amount of positive stories given to FHC and Lula are shown in Table 1 in the first and third column; the negative stories in the second and fourth and the total average of neutral texts published on both appears in the fifth. In Chapter 1, I defined the concepts of “neutral”, “positive” and “negative”, underlining that “neutral” can be seen as being the absence of the positive and the negative. Foucault (1972) suggests that there is no such thing as a “neutral” discourse, that all discourses have built into them some kind of hierarchy. Thus by “neutral” I mean a discourse which does not make a priori any political judgements of parties and politicians (i.e. “communist” Lula), but tends towards an equilibrium between competing values and ideas and/or strives to portray reality in a more complex, and even contradictory light.

“Neutral” should thus not be confused with “impartial”, a word that seems to take away any notion of power relations from a discourse. The category of “neutral” stories selected in this content analysis consists of general events and daily campaign activities, such as party announcements and visits to communities, debates between candidates and stories on research polls, as well as reactions to publicised speeches and breaking news events.<sup>65</sup> As Table 1 indicates, Cardoso received more “positive” articles than Lula (Columns 1 and 3), who was given more “negative” features (Columns 4 and 2). This means that the latter rather than the former had to rely more on the “neutral” texts to put forward his political platform. Table 1 shows that it was in the neutral spaces (Column 5) that balance was achieved, with stories being written on Lula and FHC which highlighted aspects of their campaign and a priori made little or no ideological judgements.<sup>66</sup>

---

space to Cardoso, publishing more positive stories. It was followed by *O Globo* (15.6%) and *FSP* (12.3%). *FSP* and *JB* were more critical, publishing more negative pieces on all of the presidential candidates, with *O Globo* appearing as the daily that gave more space to Lula (37.5%).

<sup>65</sup> I.e. “Most people approve the *real* plan in São Paulo” (*FSP*, 02/07/94); “Cardoso reaches 30% and is in a tie with Lula” (*ESP*, 22/07/94) and “Duel between PT and PSDB puts friends in rival camps” (*JB*, 14/08/94).

<sup>66</sup> I.e. “Lula and FHC prepare war of numbers” (*FSP*, 5/07/94).

Table 1 - Neutral, positive and negative stories published in the press (1/07/94-10/10/94)

Media	Total	1 Positive FHC	2 Negative FHC	3 Positive Lula	4 Negative Lula	5 Neutral
<i>FSP</i>	255	17%	7%	12%	11%	53%
<i>ESP</i>	417	25%	6%	7%	13%	49%
<i>JB</i>	458	24%	7%	9%	12%	49%
<i>Veja</i>	22	18%	6%	9%	16%	51%
<i>Isto É</i>	27	30%	5%	7%	33%	25%
	<b>1.208</b>					

It is however too simplistic though to see a media conspiracy at work against Lula/PT compared to a blind endorsement of Cardoso. Most of the journalists interviewed here have argued that the media coverage in 1994 was more accurate, but that biases still existed in relation to candidates from the opposition like Lula and Brizola. They also confirmed that the media were more sympathetic to Cardoso because of the high expectations in relation to the *real*, and also due to the identification of media management and ownership with FHC's political and academic persona.

Mario Sérgio Conti, head of *Veja*'s newsroom in 1994, confirmed that the magazine's coverage was fairer in 1994 than it was in 1989. Conti nonetheless pointed to "an organic relationship" which existed between the mainstream press and Cardoso, something which Collor was not lucky to have had: "...when Fernando Henrique assumed the ministry of Economy, there was inflation. After that, it went away.....and this was perceived as an enormous victory. And this was identified with FHC, who received all the credit from the Brazilian bourgeoisie...That changes the nature of the elections and it was impossible for Lula to win. The polarization does not happen because they knew that the PT would not win. Then it is easy for everyone to pretend that they are impartial...Then the media has in general an uncritical attitude because the identification with Fernando Henrique and the values of the *tucanos* is profound and organic. It is different for the Brazilian bourgeoisie to support Collor, an adventurous playboy from the Northeast. They do not feel represented. It is another thing to have Fernando Henrique, who is respected and admired by them, and who has personal relations with the big media families, the Marinhos, Mesquitas, Frias...."

Member of *FSP*'s editorial commission, Marcelo Coelho underscored the inevitability of the FHC victory: "...FHC of course was a dream Collor, a person well viewed by the intellectuals, who were in fact divided between Lula and Fernando Henrique. The press was very sympathetic to Cardoso because Lula also appeared without a discourse, and then there was the Washington consensus and privatisation. It was what everyone believed in... To combat inflation



and open the economy, this was a consumerism dream of many people...The critique that Lula was articulating was not valid...because the utopianism of the time was linked to neo-liberalism ..Thus Lula seemed to offer little as an answer...The press did not suffocate any debate. People simply did not want to hear anything else..” *FSP* columnist, Gilberto Dimenstein, has identified similarities between *Folha*’s values and those shared by the *tucanos*. According to him, “the cosmopolitan PSDB is the face of *Folha*, Fernando Henrique is the face of *Folha*, and so is Covas (former deceased centrist politician)”.

Head of *Folha*’s newsroom, Otavio Frias Filho, admitted that both *FSP* and the media were influenced by the *real*, although he guaranteed that the daily did not favour Cardoso: “It (*Real* plan) had an enormous impact in terms of making the (FHC) candidature feasible in electoral terms, and it also had an impact on the press... But *Folha*’s attitude was, as far as I can judge it, relatively equidistant in relation to all this because it was important for the newspaper to present a non-partisan coverage... I believe that *Folha*’s attitude was different from other vehicles, who supported explicitly the FHC candidature....” Evidently, the issue of ownership support is a problematic and controversial one. Media management or ownership backing of specific candidates should not be a cause of concern except when personal preferences are permitted to invade political reporting, interfering with news and constraining it to favour a particular politician and/or his view of the world.

Thus it can be argued that the strong incidents of political control detected in the 1989 elections diminished in 1994, with the latter coverage being subject to less manipulation. This is not the same as saying that in 1994 there was political neutrality, which obviously does not exist. Furthermore, the higher incidences of “neutral” stories given to (all) the candidates in 1994 can be interpreted as having been a “positive” factor which functioned to undermine and *neutralise* personal ownership preferences.

Journalists also emphasised the existence of contradictions in news reporting, pointing to the difficulties that were still experienced by the press in producing a coverage that could accurately represent Brazil’s complexities. August Nunes, former editor-in-chief of *JB* and architect of the *ESP*’s reforms, affirmed that in 1994 Brazil was a more ‘normal’ country than it was in 1989: “In 1994, the country started to be a more “real” one...You did not have to deal with the previous dichotomy of good and evil, which we dealt with during the dictatorship and with Collor... And this started to impose a greater challenge on the press, which started to live with a reality of two candidates of the left, two of the right...And then it gets more complicated, and you discover that you live in a country that has elections every four years. And you start seeing that you are living in a country which, in spite of many things, is beginning to be more ‘normal’...” Nunes’,

Conti's and Coelho's assertions notably typify the troubles that the press had in dealing with political pluralism in the aftermath of the 1989 elections and in a post-dictatorship context.

The "positive" stories on the Lula candidature stressed the expansion of the party and its wider acceptance in diverse circles of Brazilian society, as well as the spontaneous political militancy that it stimulated from its members. These pieces accentuated the importance that the PT placed on social issues, the initial change of Lula's image and his attempts of shifting more towards the social-democratic field. Praise was also given in the press for Lula's efforts in travelling around the country with the PT's Caravan of Citizenship, which took place between 1993 and 1994.<sup>67</sup> The "negative" stories explored how the PT had also engaged in similar unethical practices like other parties, that it did not have an alternative economic agenda to offer and that Lula made use of a populist political speech. Other articles also suggested that a PT government would result in chaos, and that the party was pervaded by radicals who complicated Lula's aims of making a coalition with centre-right-wing forces.<sup>68</sup>

The more critical stories on FHC deliberated on the ethics and the transparency of the support that Cardoso was receiving from government. Articles criticised the political use of the *real* and expressed concerns over the future of the plan after October.<sup>69</sup> Many features pointed to short term effects, ceasing also to engage in a sharper questioning of the future consequences of the *real*, such as its capacity to promote wealth distribution. The consensus around the *real* was thus the final discourse which prevailed.<sup>70</sup> The "negative" texts on FHC were more related to criticisms of his campaign and questioning of his alliance with the PFL as well as the extent or not that state structures were being used to back his candidature. The "negative" features on Lula were done more on ideological grounds, including discourses which underscored the "loss of direction" of the party as well as the existence of "radicals" in it. Table 1 showed how both *FSP* and *Veja* registered an average of 52% of "neutral" news coverage, with the dailies *ESP* and *JB* and the magazine *Isto É*

---

<sup>67</sup> I.e. "Lula completes 40 thousand kilometres of travel" (*ESP*, 10/07/94); "PT shines but also arouses fear" (*Veja*, 15/07/94) and "Lula wants the PT with a unified speech on television" (*JB*, 09/08/94).

<sup>68</sup> I.e. "Lula has to deal with protest and boos in Minas" (*JB*, 07/07/94); "Lula feels the attack" (*Isto É*, 13/07/94) and "PT knew of accusations before choosing the vice-president candidate" (*FSP*, 14/07/94).

<sup>69</sup> I.e. "Workers enter *real* with a loss of 9%" (*ESP*, 01/07/94); "Crisis threatens success of the *real* and of FH" (*O Globo*, 10/07/94); "*Tucano* listens to attacks on the *real*" (*JB*, 16/07/94) and "Economic plan is only for the elections, says Fiesp" (*FSP*, 27/07/94).

<sup>70</sup> I.e. "For Brazilianist, FHC ignores poverty" (*FSP*, 05/07/94); "Poverty is a challenge for future president" (*O Globo*, 10/07/94); "Ricupero says that plan is not to distribute income" (*ESP*, 13/08/94) and "*Real* opened an era of consensus in Brazil" (*O Globo*, 09/10/94).

assuming more clearly a pro-FH stance. Like *FSP* and *Veja*, *O Globo* also attempted to conduct a more balanced coverage. *Isto É* nonetheless appears in [Table 1](#) as producing 33% “negative” stories on Lula/PT, and less than this amount, 30%, of “positive” texts on FHC. This more biased coverage of *Isto É* was criticised even by its readers, as we shall see.

As I have mentioned above, the concepts of “neutral”, “negative” and “positive” can have their limitations. The particular case of the media’s reporting of Cardoso’s economic platform is an example of the problems that arise in defining what can be interpreted as being a “neutral” or a “positive” piece. FHC for instance articulated a political discourse of being the “father” of the *real* during the 1994 campaign. Many of the stories published on the economic plan per se in the political pages thus ended up being “positive” to Fernando Henrique, functioning to (indirectly) benefit his campaign because of their praise of the *real*. A quick analysis of them, however, would have one situate such articles as being exclusively “neutral” texts which were merely debating an economic programme. Another “neutral” story like “Cardoso reaches 30% and is in a tie with Lula” (*ESP*, 22/07/94) could be seen perhaps as being a “celebration” by the daily of the fact that FHC managed to catch up with Lula in the polls. Thus the results of the content analysis carried out here must be examined critically and situated in the context of the ambiguities that exist in defining what exactly constitutes a “neutral” discourse.

[Table 1](#) reveals that FHC’s candidature benefited not only from “positive” pieces on his campaign and political persona, with high percentages such as 27.5% and 30% , but also from “neutral” texts. The “positive” stories comprise journalistic texts which accentuated Cardoso’s authority and credibility by having him speak in the name of the *real*, emphasising also his intellectual capacity, administrative experience and his role in the re-democratisation process.<sup>71</sup> Furthermore, although this research has not conducted a content analysis of the *real* in the economic supplements, the critical examination carried out here of stories published in the financial segment has shown that the press, in the same way as much of Brazilian society, associated the *real* to Cardoso. Research polls pointed out how the link (FHC and *real*) was apparent for most readers.<sup>72</sup>

A close look at these “positive” features on Fernando Henrique shows how these pieces afforded public legitimacy to the *real*, endorsing FHC’s political role as the creator

---

<sup>71</sup> I.e. “Cardoso promises to create a new capitalism” (*JB*, 27/06/94); “Cardoso finds his style and the politician bypasses the academic” (*ESP*, 24/07/94) and “Courtesans’ launch FHC candidate to the Brazilian throne” (*FSP*, 02/08/94).

<sup>72</sup> I.e. “Cardoso speaks as the father of the *real*” (*JB*, 29/07/94); “Number of those who think that the *Real* is an electoral tool grow” (*ESP*, 14/08/94) and “For the electorate, *real* on television helps *tucano*” (*JB*, 11/09/94).

of the currency and main spokesman of it. Fernando Henrique reacted against attacks on the plan in the story “FH calls the rivals of the real ‘crooks’” (*O Globo*, 13/07/94), which was published 13 days after the official launch of the coin. This text evoked ideas of the inevitability of the *real*. Next to the PFL senator Antonio Carlos Magalhães, FHC spoke in the first rally of the PSDB coalition in Bahia, responding to questions concerning the intentions of two steel metal unions in SP of going on strike because of the URV, the *real*'s system of money conversion. Cardoso defended the plan, leaving little room for debates on alternatives economic agendas, and thus contributing to promote a disengagement from a wider discussion of its future impact. Here a simplistic polarization began to emerge between those who were against the *real*, and therefore against lower inflation, and others who were in favour of it, and who should thus vote for Cardoso.<sup>73</sup>

As [Table 1](#) has shown, the level of negativity and ideological bias associated with the Lula candidature was still high. “Negative” stories ranged from 12% to 33%. Similar to 1989, although less exacerbated, elite fears concerning the rise to power of less privileged segments of the population, or the vague threat of “the people”, still existed in 1994. In the article *The PT and prejudice* (17/08/94), *FSP* columnist Clóvis Rossi provided a thorough analysis of the reasons for this at the time, stating how the “hate of the bourgeoisie” had more to do with the party’s virtues than its faults. “The PT was responsible for having included in the political game a segment of the population which once were either excluded pure and simple, or were treated like clients..”, wrote Rossi. Contrary to 1989, in 1994 Lula was seen in a more favourable light by the business class, although critiques were still articulated towards radical PT sectors. In the *O Globo* story “Entrepreneurs praise Lula in Fiesp but criticise the PT” (20/09/94), a businessman affirmed that the problem was less with Lula, but more with the “party’s militants and MPs who adopt a discourse of aggressive confrontation...” Businessmen also questioned the PT’s commitment to a long-term stabilization plan.

Admittedly, the persistence of bias in relation to Lula and the PT was confirmed by many journalists. Former political correspondent of *FSP* and *JB*, Américo Martins stated that many media professionals thought that the 1994 elections would be a *dejá vú* of 1989. According to Martins, journalists also talked about the prejudices in relation to Lula’s lack of formal education and working-class background: “In 1994, I was working for *Folha* and my role was to be a hanger-on Lula with three other reporters. There were four journalists for Lula and

---

<sup>73</sup> “I.e. “FH challenges PT to see who is with the people”( *O Globo*, 08/08/94), see appendix for more.

for FHC, the two main ones. I remember that, in the beginning, the newspaper was not betting on a polarization between Lula and FHC... I remember writing a lot of profiles and of having dug up the life of Quéricia. I think that professionally we were more prepared. The coverage of the Collor impeachment permitted this... All Brazilian journalism started becoming more critical. But even Lula's press officers knew that there still was an enormous prejudice... One that was very strong was the fact of him having no diploma...It was more than the ideological thing of 800.000 businessmen leaving the country...as was said in 1989. That had gone in 1994.. I remember having lunch with people from *Folha* and *ESP*. We discussed a possible Lula government.. Our interpretation was that it would be a chaotic government because he did not have major support from society, and because there were still ideological factors such as the fact that he was a man from the left..."

Director of *O Globo's* newsroom, Rodolfo Fernandes said that the media during the last few years has strived to reflect the divisions that exist in Brazilian society: "There existed at the time a critique made by the PT that the press exaggerated the *real* ....Afterwards there was the confirmation that the plan was the one with the best chances of going well. Lula's candidature did suffer a loss with the initial coverage of the electoral campaign. If you talk to any *petista*, they are the first to admit that the PT was not ready to reach power at that stage.. Yes, the press coverage was better in 1994 than it was in 1989, and again so in 1998 than it was in 1994. I myself have talked to Mercadante (PT senator, vice-presidential candidate in '94) about this. There was not a moment in *O Globo's* coverage that it did not put a picture of FH next to one of Lula... I think that after that the media gets more mature, in the sense that you do not need to conduct a coverage by measuring the centimetres. You can debate the ideas and expose the candidate's programs. I think that the dissolution of conflicts in Brazilian society favours the media in this sense. People saw in the media the division that existed in society..."

Journalists in 1994 were thus better resourced and more experienced than they were in 1989, having gained more political independence *vis-à-vis* the state. In the aftermath of the 1992 impeachment, there was the perception that journalists did have power and could contribute to overthrow governments. The shadow of the excesses of the 1992 coverage thus served as proof that journalists could abuse some of their newly (re)gained power out of personal ambition or in response to market or political pressures. That said, the critical textual and content analysis carried out here and the interviews conducted with journalists indicate that many did actually aim for fairness. Nonetheless, the opposition was still viewed by mainstream society as well as by many journalists through the general lens of ideological bias. Singer (1999), who was official spokesman of Lula in his first presidential mandate (2003-2007), has argued that the *real* did play a significant part in the citizens'

voting decision, but it was not the only reason for Cardoso's victory. Singer (1999: 93) pointed how Lula benefited from Collor's impeachment, attracting wider sympathy from public opinion, a fact which culminated in Lula's growth in the polls as the main leader of the opposition until the launch of the *real*.

Former press officer of Lula, Ricardo Kotscho said that the difficulties that Lula had with the press were noticed in 1989, and that this was followed by the recognition that there was a need to change the nature of these relationships. Kotscho confirmed the hypothesis of this research: mainly that the 1994 campaign was slightly more civilized than it was in 1989, and that the economic issue was the main factor for FHC's success: "In 1993 and 1994, we did the citizen caravans and started to create a means of dialogue with the mainstream press.... I had one or two good ideas in life, and the citizenship caravans was one of them. When I returned to work with Lula in the 1989 campaign, we arranged that we would have to work with the mainstream media for two reasons: first, to neutralise the *anti-petismo* that existed and second to remove the prejudice towards Lula in case he won. The caravans were a form of Lula making contact with the population... He would go to places and listen to people, to their feelings. And our objective was to put this on our electoral TV programme. But then our rivals were quick and they changed the electoral legislation prohibiting the use of external images in 1994...because they knew that we had this material. And that was bad for the campaign because Lula was locked in a studio... And these were two things which we did in the campaign which changed our relation with the press and with society. And then the *real* arrived.. In spite of the press having supported FHC, in this election it was not that much the fear of Lula, but the neo-liberal issue. The relationship was thus much more civilized.." Thus, as I have argued, it was less political bias that inflicted constraints in the 1994 elections and more the increasing powers of the market and the rise of neo-liberal thinking in Brazil, which had in the *real* one of its key symbols.

*c) A campaign of a single issue: the dominance of the economic agenda*

As various scholars have pointed out, numerous studies have confirmed the agenda-setting influences of the media. It is the media that inform people and tell them which issues and activities are the most significant and which deserve to be included in the public agenda (Graber, 2005; 163). In Chapter 3, I argued how the media emphasised certain points (i.e. cuts in public spending) and selected in Collor's persona particular qualities and attributes worth looking out for, issues which ended up being the main topics of debate of the 1989 elections, as we have seen. In relation to the 1994 elections, it seems to me to be the case that priming theory also had a strong impact. According to

Iyengar and Kinder (1987; 63), priming “refers to changes in the standards that people use to make political evaluations.” Television viewers who are shown stories about a particular problem for instance tend to give more weight to the president’s performance on that problem when making an evaluation of his overall performance in office. Thus, if television news becomes preoccupied with the economy, citizens begin to be also, and start to evaluate the president by his success in maintaining prosperity (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; 63-66).

Priming theory is thus valid when we aim to analyse news as a molder of public opinion. Nonetheless, I was not able in this study to test the effects that priming theory had on Brazilian voters in the 1994 elections. This would demand a different research, which would include interviews with members of the public to assess the extent to which the issues selected by the media in 1994 influenced the voting behaviour of the population.<sup>74</sup> I do think though that it is essential to retain the fact that the emphasis given to the *real* by the press contributed for the public – as well as the candidates – to see this as being the most important thing in the elections, and as *the one* issue by which they should judge the politicians and use to decide upon their vote.

A quick look at [Table 2](#) for instance reveals how debates on the *real* engulfed the reporting of the last three months of the 1994 campaign. On average, the percentage of stories published daily on the economic theme in the political supplement of the papers varied from 27.5% to 31.5%. One could argue that a third of the space in the political supplement might not seem that much given the extent of the novelty of the plan. These stories nonetheless must be placed next to the pieces on the *real* which were published also in the economic papers, which this research did not manage to investigate due to lack of time and space. If one considers though that a similar amount of approximately 20% to 30% of stories on the *real* were published in the economic pages, this means that, including both the political and the economic pages, between 30% to 60% of the newspaper coverage was exclusively on the economic plan. Thus the large amount of coverage on the *real* in the dailies reflected the growing intensity of the importance given to the theme by the establishment, with the plan thus being the kernel of the political and

---

<sup>74</sup> As mentioned before, Singer’s (2002) study on the 1989 and 1994 elections did stress that there was a transference of expectations, and then votes, from Lula to FHC following the launch of the *real* plan. Meneguello (1994) is quoted in Singer’s research for having pointed out that the less educated voters and the ones who lived in smaller towns showed a tendency to vote on Cardoso in contrast to the more educated and metropolitan citizens. For him, these differences were due to the fact that the first group had been exposed to less in-depth information and had been more influenced by television, which gave the *real* a sympathetic coverage.

economic media coverage of the 1994 presidential campaign. That said, as Iyengar and Kinder (1987; 86-87) note, priming depends not only on the *amount* of coverage given to an issue but also on the *nature* of such a coverage.

Table 2 comprises stories published during the final phase of the campaign on the main themes of the 1994 elections (*real*; daily campaigns/other; polls; agrarian reform/poverty; health/education and strikes). The statistical sampling that I did here permitted me to draw conclusions from the whole collection of texts selected, and thus to define specific campaign trends. *FSP* dedicated approximately 27% of its stories on issues about the *real* or directly related to it, whilst the daily *JB* produced 29% stories and *ESP*, 31.5%.<sup>75</sup> The political features analysed here include pseudo-events and daily campaign rallies, such as visits to communities; meetings with representatives of civil society, the business class and political leaders; the campaigns' marketing strategies on television as well as the participation of candidates in TV debates. These stories totalled an average of 42% in each publication. Articles on opinion polls, the reactions to the campaign and social themes (i.e. poverty) were also chosen. I have also included some stories on the *real* from the economic supplement as a means of comparison to the ones published in the political pages.

**Table 2** - Main topics of the 1994 campaign in the political and economic supplements (1/07/94-10/10/94)

Medium	Total	Real Plan	Events/daily Campaign/other	Polls/reactions	Agrarian reform/poverty	Health/Education	Strike
<i>FSP</i>	255	27.5%	45%	24%	1.5%	1.5%	0.5%
<i>ESP</i>	417	31.5%	41%	25%	1%	1%	0.5%
<i>JB</i>	458	29%	42.5%	25%	1%	1.5%	1%
<i>Total</i>	<b>1.130</b>						

Table 2 underlines how issues of health and education, poverty, agrarian reform and strikes occupied a smaller space in the newspaper pages. This content analysis shows that an average of approximately 2% of the stories published in each daily during the last three months of the campaign were on social issues, in opposition to the material on the *real*, which amounted to an average of approximately 27% of the features published in the

<sup>75</sup> I.e. "Plan conquers the majority of the population" and "Number of those who think that the *Real* is an electoral tool grow" (*ESP*, 14/08/94) and "80% of the electorate think that the *real* plan is good" (*FSP*, 06/09/94).



political pages alone. Evidently, the accentuation placed on the economic agenda in both the political and economic supplements contributed to undermine other debates on important political and social concerns. The political programs of the candidates also occupied a secondary role compared to the *real*.<sup>76</sup> The success of the *real*, the discussions on the decline of inflation; the decrease of prices and how the lower Brazilian classes were being integrated in the country's emerging mass market as consumers were the main type of stories published in the pages of the economic supplements.<sup>77</sup>

The *JB* piece “*Real* makes consumerism grow in the periphery” (14/08/94) stated how families with low incomes, who had until recently been marginalized by the market because of high inflation, were beginning to consume. “Families with a monthly wage of R\$ 260 (55 pounds)...are returning to consume. In all the supermarket stores in the suburbs, the numbers point to growth. There is already a movement of change of old household appliances for newer models...”, started the text. This feature included interviews with workers and housewives, such as Rita de Cassia Valadares, who waited for the launch of the *real* to buy a new coloured television. Many stories also emphasised how the plan facilitated the management of bills and allowed more time to search for cheaper products.

There is little doubt that the *real* did change the lives of many Brazilians in 1994, that it did control inflation and expand consumer possibilities. Political scientist Bolivar Lamounier (1996: 26) has argued that the vicious circle of economic instability and political turmoil that characterised the country during the re-democratization process began only to really break loose with the launch of the *real* and the presidential elections of 1994. According to the statistics provided by Fipe-USP, inflation fell from 50.75% to 6.95% in July and 1.95% in August (Singer, 1999, 98). Consumption of disposable and non-disposable products grew from August onwards and continued in September and October. This is why Singer (1999) has stated that there was transference of expectations from Lula to FHC concerning who would not only bring stability to Brazil, but guarantee a means of distributing wealth.

The fact of the matter is that the *real* was explored in a slightly uncritical manner, with little discussion on its possible impact on wealth distribution and its capacity to

---

<sup>76</sup> I.e. “*Real* is the permanent theme” (*JB*, 16/06/94) and “Poverty is a challenge for future president” (*O Globo*, 10/07/94).

<sup>77</sup> I.e. “*Real* makes consumerism grow in the periphery” (*JB*, 14/08/94, Economy supplement); “More poor people improve the quality of consumerism” (*ESP*, 22/08/94, Economy supplement); “Inflation of 1.5% is the smallest since the Cruzado” (*ESP*, 28/09/94) and “Inflation rate is the smallest since ‘73” (*ESP*, 07/10/94).

improve the quality of life of wider segments of the population. Evidently, only an expansion of consumer possibilities would not be enough in the long run. Nassif confirmed that reporters were uncritical of the *real*: "...in July 1994 I did publish some columns talking about the disaster that was bound to come. In April and May 1995, I wrote 30 columns highlighting their mistakes, everything which is confirmed now. What made everyone persist in this error? You have the political aspect and other interests too...Now these discussions hardly go in...The reporter who covers economics prefers the source who talks about predictable things...You have market economists, sophisticated, with critical thought, who do not have space in the media..."

This does not mean to say that the candidates did not have any proposals on social themes or refused to debate them. It is difficult to judge though to what extent the parties put these issues aside in order to focus on the economic plan to feed avid journalists, demanding spin doctors and market strategists, as well as a population who wanted desperately to understand more about the *real* and its 'revolution' in consumerist habits. Hence the press did publish stories questioning the ambiguity of the candidates' social platform. The *JB* story "Candidates have vague proposals for poverty" (29/07/94) exemplifies my point. This piece was on a debate organised by CNBB (National Confederation of Bishops of Brazil) in which attempts were made to synthesize the social agendas of the candidates. According to the story, the politicians gave unclear responses concerning their positions on combating hunger, emphasising the "need to invest in education" and to seal an alliance of "solidarity with society". However, the differences in the political views shared by Cardoso and Lula sprung up clearly: the former stressed the need to reform the state and the latter engaged in a more emotional discourse which underscored the existence of hunger in Brazil. Thus it seemed that the priority given by the PSDB to the *real* was matched in equal measure by the other presidential candidates, who had to respond *in relation to*, or *against*, the economic agenda stipulated by the *tucanos*.<sup>78</sup>

#### *d) The launch of the real and FHC in the press*

A critical analysis of newspaper editorials, articles and stories on the 1994 campaign reveals that the economic policies which were backed by the elite establishment, and which were considered also vital to the mainstream media industries, matched also the

---

<sup>78</sup> I.e. "Caution makes Lula adopt a vague discourse" (*ESP*, 03/07/94) and "PT will distribute pamphlets against the *real* plan" (*JB*, 09/07/94).

political and economic proposals of the PSDB candidature. As signalled above by Coelho, these policies included the continuity of the opening of Brazil to foreign investment and an expansion of the privatisation programme, economic platforms which also permeated the 1989 campaign, as we have seen. My critical analysis has examined the priority given to specific stories, the ways in which certain issues were framed in key features, the type of news selection techniques employed and the editorial judgements that were made. A conclusion that can be made here straight away is that in general news organisations *did* endorse Cardoso's political-economic discourse.<sup>79</sup>

FHC's entry in the 1994 presidential campaign happened amid much media speculation over his chances of winning the elections. As we have seen, FHC's favourable image in elite circles and amongst the intelligentsia began to be constructed during the dictatorship and mainly during the *diretas*. Former Finance minister of the Franco government, Cardoso was responsible for coordinating an economic team that started to work on the *real* from May 1993 onwards. On the 2<sup>nd</sup> of April, 1994, Cardoso stepped down from the Treasury to embark on the campaign. Inflation was high, at 45%. According to Singer (1999, 95), between June 1993 and May 1994, Lula's popularity grew, with the PT candidate receiving 42% of the voters' intentions and Fernando Henrique starting the election battle with 17%, a situation which was reversed two months after the launch of the *real* in July 1994.

In May FHC officially formed the alliance with an old political enemy, the PFL party, now known as DEM (Democratic Party) and who represented oligarchic conservative segments of Brazilian society. The former PFL had been tightly associated with the dictatorship. This centre-right coalition was considered fundamental by the PSDB due to the electoral strength that the PFL held in the Northeast. This political partnership however was criticised by sectors of the left as well as by segments of the PSDB, who saw it as a sign of abandonment of the party's social-democratic principles and a confirmation of its move to the right. The PFL vice-president candidate, Marco Maciel, was a man seen as having played a powerful role in sustaining the dictatorship. Moderate PT sectors linked to Lula's group had also tried to forge alliances in 1994 with conservative sectors of Brazilian society, something which was eventually foiled by more radical party members, and would only happen in the 2002 dispute.

---

<sup>79</sup> See full appendix.

A synthetic textual analysis of the stories published when FHC was sworn in as Finance minister in 1993 shows that his name was already being discussed in elite circles as a possible future president. The *Veja* article *The Great Shot – the biggest challenge for Fernando Henrique is the last chance of Itamar Franco* (26/05/93) applauded Franco's decision of choosing Cardoso, interpreting this as the only way out for his 'disastrous' government. "The professor FHC has made the bet of his life whilst the engineer Itamar Franco plays his last card. If he beats the inflation and gives stability to the economy, then the former chancellor will have a condition to emerge as an unbeatable presidential candidate", stressed *Veja*. In the same edition, "The guardian angel of the Planalto" was a piece that examined Cardoso's profile and authority as the new voice of the economy. The feature of six pages emphasised his intellectual credentials: "Sworn in with honours which were not given to any other colleague of the government, Fernando Henrique is the first Finance minister who was banned by the AI-5 and prevented from giving classes at the university..." pointed *Veja*. Thus Cardoso began to occupy the privileged position of the future official governmental candidate.

When the plan was officially launched in July, newspaper editorials affirmed how it marked the start of a new economic era for Brazil.<sup>80</sup> The *ESP* editorial, *The challenge is the victory*, linked the success of the plan to the creator's chances of being the future president. In the *JB* editorial *Real risks* (07/07/94), the daily predicted that the plan's only destiny was "success". It pointed to the initial impacts of the *real*, including the reduction of the cost of basic products in most cities. It stated that the stabilisation programme carried with it a character of a social pact, a discourse which was also being articulated by the PSDB throughout the whole campaign. Another *JB* editorial, *The Real Era* (12/08/94), praised the economic policies of the Franco government, such as the advancements made in the privatisation process as well as Franco's "courage" in implementing the *real*.

In the *JB* story "Cardoso speaks as the father of the *real* plan" (29/07/94), FHC presented the PSDB programme entitled "The *real* and the dream" - a likely analogy perhaps with Martin Luther's King "I have a dream" speech. Here Cardoso reaffirmed his status as the government's official candidate. According to the text, Cardoso praised Franco widely, underlining his own role as the *real's* architect. FHC pandered to the public in this speech, presenting himself as a type of "teacher-candidate" and highlighting how previous attempts at combating inflation had failed. Perhaps forgetting that the PFL

---

<sup>80</sup> I.e. "The challenge is the victory" (*ESP*, 01/07/94) and "Public success" (*FSP*, 02/07/94).

were present, or in a strive to hold on to the centre-left-wing vote, Cardoso criticised the “neo-liberals” who “believe that only the equilibrium of the finances is needed” to combat inflation. A story on the side explained how the PSDB was trying to gain more votes in the D and E social classes, and how FHC was going to ‘radicalise’ the social agenda by linking his own political trajectory to social causes. The feature ended with Cardoso asserting that Brazilians would “..have a right to dream” after years of inflation, thus investing in a passionate discourse which evidently struck a chord with various sectors of Brazilian society.

In the piece published a few days later, “Collor modernised the economy, says *tucano*” (*FSP*, 11/07/9), the story compared the similarities between the political programs of Collor and FHC, such as the support given to both candidatures by the PFL and TV Globo’s Roberto Marinho and the connections which existed between the ‘neo-*tucanos*’ and the former Collor government. The *FSP* story examined further FHC’s agreement with Collor’s economic policies. ““He had an innovative economic platform. It was something which had to be done... But he also did many hasty things, including the way he opened the economy””, said Cardoso in the text. Below this article, *Folha* published another feature in which Collor criticised the *real* and Fernando Henrique for launching it “according to his personal political agenda”.

Despite the Collor-FHC rivalries though, stories like these made it clear to the public that Cardoso’s programme was one of continuity and not rupture. FHC presented himself in the *JB* piece “Cardoso promises to create a new capitalism” (27/06/94) as the candidate with the best agenda, the only one who could advance Brazilian capitalism in contrast to the PT, who only attacked the *real*. The PT’s hesitation added fuel to Cardoso’s criticisms of the party, which he classified as being “too grumpy”. Lula was also defined as the “candidate of inflation”.<sup>81</sup> FHC underscored also the importance of the state negotiating with the market, adding that his government would restructure the former but not reduce it to a minimum, a stance which clearly avoided the endorsement of a more defined right-wing path.

The opposition during the 1994 elections however lashed out quite a bit at the *real*, equating the *tucano*’s economic policies to those of the Washington consensus. Political scientist José Luis Fiori initiated an acrid battle in *FSP*’s pages in which he attacked the Cardoso candidature, accusing FHC of leading the national bourgeoisie to a condition of

---

<sup>81</sup> I.e. “FHC calls Lula the ‘candidate of inflation’” (*FSP*, 06/07/94) and “Cardoso tells Lula to call Sunab (national sector of price control)” (*JB*, 06/07/94).

being a minor and dependent player in the structure of world capitalism. Cardoso was being accused of forming a coalition which would sustain the stabilization program dictated by the IMF.<sup>82</sup> Another critical article published by *Folha*, “Underdeveloped globalisation” (31/07/94), questioned the capacity of the plan to reduce poverty and boost employment. Written by the economist professor of Unicamp, José Carlos de Souza Braga, the article emphasised a key point in relation to the *real*: “The main issue...is not the integration or not of Brazil in the world. What must be discussed is the following: is the *real* only a short term program of inflation control or is it a long-term option for a future in which internationalisation expands aggravating our under-development? Will it be able to restructure internal dynamic interests...and deal with the mass poverty of the people and of the inevitable growth of unemployment? Judging from the known experiences and the predictable results, the answer is no..”

Cardoso repelled accusations that his platform was “neo-liberal”, affirming that his agenda was a negotiation between social-democratic policies and economic liberalism. That said, it is evident that FHC’s candidature at the time was in tune with the ideals of the Washington consensus. But it is simplistic to assume that he was a candidate imposed by global capitalism only, and was thus not a result of a combination of desires, which included the elite’s wish for wider democratisation as well as further capitalist advancement. These forces can function to both correct some of Brazil’s social and economic injustices inasmuch as they can also serve as sites of oppression, as they have done.

Thus the PT accused the *real* of promoting the stagnation of salaries and the rise of prices.<sup>83</sup>In the *JB* story “PT will distribute pamphlets against the *real*” (09/07/94), the party announced how it would point out that the losses to workers’ salaries caused by the plan were bigger than the benefits. However, after the rise of acceptance of the *real* and its impact on inflation and consumerism, the PT changed its strategy, minimising the attacks.<sup>84</sup>Gradually the *real* and Cardoso’s political and economic policies, which included the stability of the currency; the realisation of partnerships between the government and the private sector; the pension reforms and the privatisation of strategic public firms, were points soon deemed as the ultimate consensus. In the *O Globo* story, “*Real* opened era of consensus in Brazil” (09/10/94), a list of issues were presented as

---

<sup>82</sup> “The false coiners” (*FSP*, 03/07/94) and “The words and things” (*FSP*, 14/08/94).

<sup>83</sup> I.e. “Lula reinforces attacks on the *real*” (*ESP*, 06/07/94); “PT militants lost direction with the *real*” (*JB*, 16/08/94) and “*Real* receives attacks from all candidates” (*JB*, 25/08/94).

<sup>84</sup> I.e. “PT will change the tone of the criticisms of the *real*” (*FSP*, 23/07/94).

being beyond questioning: the need to combat inflation, control the public debt, privatise and place Brazil in the financial capitalism world order.

The main problem that the PSDB had in 1994 was its ambiguous stance regarding the ways in which it would combine the need to restructure the state with public investments in social areas. This was identified by sectors of the media and other segments of the intelligentsia, which accused the PSDB of “sitting on the fence”, an expression which has been commonly associated to the party. *Veja* in the story “The duel on paper” (5/10/94) discussed in a solid analysis the differences between the political and economic programmes of the PSDB and the PT, questioning to what extent the platform of the former could be labelled “neo-liberal”, concluding correctly that the proposals were ambiguous. Certain sentences summarised the PSDB’s agenda, like “To expand the program to infrastructure and public services” and “To use privatisation as an instrument of industrial politics in the sense of restructuring and modernizing the industrial field”. These were correctly classified as being too vague, but they indicated though that the party would try to combine economic liberalism with social welfare state policies in government in a strive to adopt a ‘third way’ style of politics.<sup>85</sup>

Another *FSP* story also debated the connections between the two parties, concluding that their main disagreement was in the economic area. In “FHC and Lula diverge on economy” (*FSP*, 30/08/94), the feature examined the similarities and differences in the parties’ proposals, emphasising that they had similar ideas in regards to health and education. Both, however, differed on important economic points such as the “flexible” PSDB privatisation model in contrast to the “restrictive” PT position. Another point of contention was the suggestion made by the PT of strengthening the internal market by raising workers’ salaries. The PSDB preferred to focus on the necessity of de-regulating the economy to attract foreign investment.

During the World Cup that happened that year, Cardoso began to juxtapose the *real*’s success to the nation’s strive for victory and also to his own quest for the presidency.<sup>86</sup> These marketing strategies were perceived by newspapers and discussed in a series of stories. The *FSP* piece “FHC uses the fourth-championship as an electoral marketing tool” (19/07/94) for instance highlighted how Cardoso started to adopt the expression “I

---

<sup>85</sup> I.e. “*Tucano* criticised the proposal of minimum State” (*FSP*, 14/08/94); “*Tucanos* present their governmental program, Lula accuses FHC of plagiarism” (*FSP*, 26/08/94); “FHC tries to conciliate State and the market” (*FSP*, 26/08/94) and “Similarities mark the governmental programs” (*ESP*, 11/09/94).

<sup>86</sup> I.e. “Lula fears that the fourth-championship will benefit FH” (*O Globo*, 19/07/94) and “Cardoso tries to capitalise climate of optimism” (*JB*, 19/07/94).

love Brazil” and to kiss the national flag. It was reminiscent of how in 1970, during the conquest of Brazil’s third championship, the general president Emilio Medici allowed himself to be photographed with a radio listening to the games. In the one-page story “The radars that orient Cardoso’s flight” (*JB*, 28/08/94), the journalist Dora Kramer discussed how Fernando Henrique’s image was constructed for the 1994 elections to suit the needs and aspirations of the population, with segments of the electorate, who had been interviewed for the story, stating that they did not mind the alliance with the PFL, and that they did not want a “dog’s world”. This phrase can be understood as being an implicit reference to the Lula campaign.

Thus the impact of the *real* on Cardoso’s candidature eventually resulted in a significant growth of voters’ intentions in August. The research institute Datafolha gave him 41% against 24% given to Lula (21/08/94). This final campaign period was also overwhelmed by accusations made by the opposition that the PSDB was benefiting illegally from official governmental backing. This was debated mostly during the Rubens Ricupero satellite dish episode, as we shall see. Another important event of the 1994 campaign, and which was somewhat associated to the Miriam Cordeiro episode of the 1989 presidential elections, was the Najun Turner case. Here Collor’s financial agent was accused of donating money to the PT’s campaign in SP. The Turner affair however did not receive much attention from the media – the exception would be *Isto É* magazine. These issues are explored in the next sections amid the examination of the heated debates which took place in the final phase of the campaign.

*e) Ricupero’s satellite dish and the PT versus PSDB tug-of-war*

On the 1<sup>st</sup> of September, Rubens Ricupero was sworn in as Finance minister following the entry of Cardoso in the campaign. Ricupero was responsible for the implementation of the *real* and was a victim of both vanity and sincerity, something which cost him his job and initially provided a high moment for the PT candidature one month ahead of the elections. In an informal chat about inflation with a TV Globo journalist before a television studio recorded interview on the *real*, Ricupero confessed that he was “ruthless” and “hid the bad things”, showing only the good side. He mentioned further how he was Cardoso’s biggest elector, and how he was indirectly campaigning for him during interviews on the *real*. He added also that TV Globo had found in him a way of backing Cardoso indirectly. This conversation was captured by



satellite dishes in different parts of Brazil, quickly opening up a crisis in the PSDB campaign and culminating in attacks from the candidates of the opposition. Lula and Brizola rapidly began to question the legitimacy of the PSDB candidature, using irony to ask Cardoso to resign and affirming that the Ricupero imbroglio was proof that the government was standing by FHC.<sup>87</sup>

This political event, however, put in the limelight the existence of a whole world of spin in the world of politics that many Brazilians seemed unaware of. TV Globo at the time distributed an official letter rejecting Ricupero's declaration, emphasising that the television was supporting the *real* because it wanted to back any measure which could put an end to inflation. It denied any use by the PSDB of television as a marketing tool. The Ricupero event nonetheless ended up bringing a series of debates to the surface, which included the discussion of the impact of television on political campaigns, the essentiality of transparency in politics and the forces that stood by each candidate, making the *real*-FHC-Itamar connection undeniable. Many newspapers indicated though that these declarations hardly had any effect on people's votes.<sup>88</sup> The government acted quickly, accepting Ricupero's resignation. In the end, Ricupero was seen by the public as a naive victim of political spin.

The Ricupero episode added weight to the public debate of the use of state structures in favour of the FHC candidature, an issue which started to occupy the newspaper pages from mid-August onwards.<sup>89</sup> Some newspapers critically discussed Ricupero's declarations, pointing to how the scandal had reached abroad.<sup>90</sup> Some condemned the PT's reaction and eschewed from endorsing its discourse of attack of the PSDB. *ESP* was the newspaper which seemed to be least critical of the event, underlining how the government was adopting measures to combat official governmental support of political candidatures. The *ESP* editorial, *The Totalitarian face of the defeated*, put the blame on the *petistas*: "The incident which involved the Finance minister contributed to strengthen the radicals who backed the discourse of "the worse, the better". In its despair with defeat...the Worker's Party reveals its real face: the totalitarian one.....The...militants...They start to infiltrate everywhere: in public sectors...in

---

<sup>87</sup> I.e. "Ricupero admits hiding inflation" (*FSP*, 03/09/94); "Support of Cardoso makes PT accuse Ricupero" (*ESP*, 03/09/94) and "Ricupero asks to resign and shatters campaign" (*JB*, 04/09/94).

<sup>88</sup> I.e. "Difference between FHC and Lula is maintained" (*FSP*, 06/09/94) and "Research indicates that the scandal did not shake the support given to Cardoso" (*JB*, 11/09/94).

<sup>89</sup> I.e. "Justice wants Franco's ministers to explain use of the machine in favour of FHC" (*FSP*, 25/08/94) and "Lula attacks with a denunciation of the use of the 'machine'" (*JB*, 27/08/94).

<sup>90</sup> I.e. "Lula writes in international magazine that election was illegal and manipulated" (*ESP*, 21/09/94).

newspapers, television...everywhere you imagine...Seeing the defeat, the PT does everything and throws the militants in the streets to intimidate.”

The deliberation on the Cardoso candidature received an exceptionally critical treatment by *Veja*, who did not engage in 1994 in producing a similar biased coverage as it did in 1989. The amount of “neutral” pieces (51%) that *Veja* produced, according to Table 1, attests to this. *Veja* came up with a strikingly different coverage to its rival *Isto É*, a magazine which has been accused by critics (Kucinski, 1996; Conti, 1999) as having served as a propaganda machine for Orestes Quércia, a politician known for his corrupt practices during the 1990’s. In the story *The machine effect – there is a “saint alliance” that is protecting Fernando Henrique, but it has less force than the PT* (*Veja*, 14/09/94), the text affirmed that what Ricupero said off air was actually what most people thought. At the time, the electoral legislation did not permit the re-election of presidents, demanding that politicians who occupy a public function should step down so as to enter the campaign with no state links. According to the piece, Ricupero touched upon crucial issues that emerge in every election, such as the sponsorship of candidates by business tycoons or state structures and the weight that television can have in selecting candidates and defining agendas. The story also juxtaposed the forces who were directly or indirectly standing by Cardoso in the same way as other institutions, like CUT (Central of Workers) and its 2.235 unions, which represented 18 million workers, were doing so with Lula.

*Veja* asserted that these opposing “machine forces” were divided between the FHC and Lula candidatures. The former had on his side the *real*; the government; Ricupero; big business; the Catholic church and the Protestant; the IMF’s ‘positive’ attitude as well as TV Globo’s sympathetic news coverage. The latter had the support of CUT; of progressive segments of the Catholic Church; of civil servants from the federal police as well as small businessmen. The story revealed however a degree of prejudice in relation to the PT (“the string of spies from the PT are paid by the state..”), taking also for granted the idea that all politicians try to benefit from the state, and that the electorate is aware of this and does not mind. This seems to imply that all politicians are the same, and that the electorate have a cynical attitude towards politics. The strength of this piece is that, through irony, it made clear to the reader the clashes of forces that existed in the elections, thus producing a more critical portrayal of the political disputes. “Even kids from kinder-garden know that the conjunction of these forces will ride side by side with the *tucano* Fernando Henrique until the 3<sup>rd</sup> of October....For his luck, Fernando Henrique can count on a “saint alliance”...” said *Veja* ironically.

The feature also showed two boxes with the results obtained from a research conducted by the academic Venício A. Lima. The first one concerned the appearance of Ricupero on television. The text underlined how Ricupero, in the 153 days in which he occupied the Finance ministry, appeared 471 times on television, an average of three times a day. He appeared 139 times on TV Globo, 74 in Bandeirantes and in the educational channel (TVE), 64 in SBT, 60 in Manchete and in Record. The magazine criticised his unnecessary TV appearances: “From the five television stations, at least three put him on air everyday. For every 10 times that he went on television, four were to make reference to a concrete fact...three were to present promises....and the other three were pure spectacle, and in many of them, without a remote relation with his job of administrating the economy. In a day, he would appear with housewives ..”, affirmed the piece. Thus *Veja* here engaged in a more professional coverage which made it clear to the public the euphoria that sectors of the establishment were having with the FHC candidature and the ways in which different forces were aligning themselves around particular candidates and their programmes. This was a contrast to the *Isto É* coverage which, contrary to 1989, embarked upon a more partisan stance which did not reflect fully the complexities of 1994 elections.

f) *Lula versus Isto É: partisan routines or professional journalism?*

The news organisation which clashed most with the PT and Lula in 1994 was *Isto É* magazine, which published a denunciation concerning the deposit of US\$ 7.000 by a financial agent in the party’s account ahead of the São Paulo 1992 municipal elections.<sup>91</sup> This agent was previously involved in illegal transactions with Collor in the episode known as the “Uruguay operation”. The “Najun Turner” affair, as it was known at the time, did not receive much attention from the media. *Isto É* was the exception. It based its piece on declarations given by Turner, who later denied these statements. On the 28<sup>th</sup> of September, the party wrote a five page reply - which was ordered by the electoral state justice department (TRE) to be published in the magazine - questioning the alleged impartiality of the magazine and rejecting any close links of the party with Turner. The PT affirmed that the agent made the deposit as a form of revenge against the party, who had had a significant role in the 1992 impeachment process.

---

<sup>91</sup> “The PT uses Collor’s dollar agent” (*Isto É*, 21/09/94).

The denunciation was true given the fact that the cheque *was* deposited in the account, as pointed out by TRE. Regardless however of the veracity of the accusation, which in principle deserved to be published and were so by the other newspapers, what was mostly troubling was the highly biased reaction of the magazine to the justice order.<sup>92</sup> In the three page story “An aggression on information”, the magazine attacked the “violence” of having being forced to publish the PT’s response, affirming that it had performed its journalistic role by denouncing the Turner imbroglio. It complained also about the informality of the language used in the PT’s text and the material’s layout, making transparent its bias towards the party when it stated that the text “could only have been written by a “PT bureaucrat”. Here *Isto É* raised doubts in relation to its claims of producing an even coverage of the 1994 elections: “The ‘editorial’ of the magazine, published on page 21, was signed by Mr. Candido Vacarezza, president of the municipal committee of the Worker’s Party in SP who, amongst his functions of being a bureaucrat of a political party, is occasionally a gynaecologist doctor”, said the magazine. If we situate this piece in relation to others published by *Isto É* during the last three months of 1994, the biased element present in many of the stories on left-wing politics seemed highly palpable.

Table 1 has shown that, out of 27 stories published by *Isto É* from the beginning of July until October, at least 33% were against Lula and the PT, a higher number than the “neutral” pieces about the campaign. Some of these “negative” *Isto É* features were: “Lula feels the attack” (10/07/94); “Militate or not militate?” (07/09/94); “Lula compares Brazil to a Banana Republic” (28/09/94) and “Confused caravan” (05/10/94). These appeared in contrast to the highly “positive” stories written on FHC and the *real*, such as “Miracle of July” (05/10/94) and “Fernando Henrique sets the rhythm” (12/10/94). The story “Militate or not..” (07/09/94) is a feature that strived towards equilibrium. It underlined the growing professionalization of the party and the difficulties that it encountered in responding to the *real*. Stories more like “Lula feels the attack” however stated bluntly the magazine’s bias. In this feature, Lula appeared in the front cover of the magazine with a bandage on his face as if he had been hit, in an obvious analogy with the situation that the PT was said to have experienced with the launch of the *real* in July.<sup>93</sup>

Another story which followed similar lines was “Lula compares Brazil to a banana republic” (28/09/94), a feature published in the same edition which had the PT’s response

---

<sup>92</sup> “TRE gives PT the right to answer” (*FSP*, 16/08/94).

<sup>93</sup> I.e. “Magazine *Isto É* manipulates picture of PT candidate” (*FSP*, 12/07/94).

on the Turner affair. The “War of the Bananas” story criticised Lula’s reaction to the Ricupero episode: “Lula takes on a discourse which, if it were not tragic, would be comic....In an angry tone, Lula classifies the electoral process as illegitimate...and compares the country to a banana republic”, read the piece. Lula was shown in the front cover of the story receiving what seemed to be a fake crown from possibly a *petista* militant. In the same edition, FHC gave an exclusive interview in which he asserted that he was the only “possible left” in contrast to the “square” PT. This partisan stance assumed by the magazine was even criticised by some readers. In the edition following the victory of FHC at the polls, some readers attacked the *Isto É-PT* battle: “What we have seen is an exchange of fire between the PT and *Isto É* and vice-versa, when us, the readers, are in the middle of it”, said Leila Almeida from Bahia (19/10/94).

The reader Harilton Savi from the South State of Santa Catarina affirmed how during many years he thought that the “other” rival magazine (*Veja*) was the one on the “right” and not *Isto É*. “*Isto É* was the one more on the ‘left’, like most of the readers preferred to consider it. It was a good marketing strategy (19/10/94).” The magazine responded to these letters, stating that it had nothing against the PT and that it was doing critical journalism. This episode shows that *Isto É*’s political reporting in 1994 was weak in professionalism. It indicated also a certain lack of recognition of the existence of political pluralism in Brazil.

Journalist and *O Globo* columnist Zuenir Ventura, who covered the PT citizen caravans for *JB* in 1993 in the wake of the 1994 elections, has emphasised the essentiality of reinforcing professionalism in the coverage of politics: “The journalist must not wear the shirt, be it a religious one, a political party or one from the firm. This is because we end up getting involved in such a way that you cannot go to something without a previous idea in your mind of what it is going to be about. One should not confuse social responsibility with political militancy. In 1993, I was assigned to cover the PT caravans for *JB*. I remember how the party thought I would do negative stories, and the rivals that I would do favourable ones. The fact that I was not aligned to any party in the end was of benefit to me, and thus made me cover it in a calm way...”

The *Isto É* coverage of the 1994 campaign was a contrast to the more critical coverage conducted by *Veja*. An example of a good analytical piece of journalism on the PT was the *Veja* story “PT shines and also scares people” (15/06), published before the launch of the *real*, when Lula was still leading in the polls. “The hypothesis of Lula moving to the...Planalto in January of 1995 has given lots of money to the consultants...It is a natural curiosity, given the fact that never in the history of the country

a party with such a clear left-wing appearance has come so close to winning...”, asserted *Veja*. This text discussed critically the aspects of the party which “frightened” segments of the electorate, such as the idea of the country experiencing “disorder” due to a rise in social tensions. But it also explored the growth of the party in Brazil, the professionalisation of its structures and the interest of entrepreneurs in the Lula candidature. The story published interviews with many Brazilian militants and sympathisers as well as political figures, exploring the diversity of the party and also its “confusion” in relation to its ideological positioning, praising further these characteristics. “It (the party) has radicals, moderates, communists and Catholics...It has something, however, that is lacking in other parties: it has life”, said *Veja*. Such an acknowledgement perhaps would have had little room in the 1989 elections, as we have seen.

The PT candidature in 1994 was part of a wider political agenda called the *PT 2000 Project*, a document which stated the party’s intentions of staying ten years in power through re-election whilst also recognising the need of combating the “*anti-petismo*”. As Kostcho has noted, in 1994 the press were less hostile towards the party given the attempts of establishing closer relations between PT insiders with media management and ownership in the aftermath of the 1989 defeat. In the accurate *ESP* story, “Lula’s image has been forged since ‘89” (31/07/94), the text stated how the results of this project stimulated Lula to embark on the Citizenship Caravans in 1993, pursuing contacts with businessmen. “Lula ...met around 5.000 entrepreneurs and travelled 40.000 kilometres through the interior...”, affirmed the feature, which examined in two other smaller stories the PT’s connections with the European social-democrats.

Nonetheless, the month ahead of the October elections was one of tensions with the PT. The media agenda began again to be permeated by issues such as the strikes of steel workers from the *ABC paulista*. Lula and FHC were again placed in two opposing camps.<sup>94</sup> *ESP* for instance wrote an editorial attacking the strike, accusing it of having political intentions and of aiming to destabilise the *real*. The impasse however was soon solved, with the topic leaving the papers after relatively a week. Thus the way was open for Cardoso’s definite victory at the polls in October.

---

<sup>94</sup> I.e. “Cardoso criticises and Lula defends” (*ESP*, 13/09/94); “Strike puts *petista* and *tucano* in opposite sides” and “Strike is an electoral tool, says Fiesp president” (*FSP*, 13/09/94).

#### 4.4. PSDB and the possibility of a “third way”: the significance of the FHC victory

Cardoso won the elections in the first round on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of October with 54,3% of the votes against 27% cast to Lula. In his presidential speech, Cardoso affirmed that his main goal was to bypass the model of development implemented by Getúlio Vargas (1930-45; 51-54), in which the state functioned as the main investor (FGV, 2001). *ESP* and *JB* published editorials applauding Cardoso ahead of the October polls, with *FSP*, *O Globo* and *Veja* ceasing to endorse FHC explicitly. *JB*, after stressing how a Datafolha research published in *Folha* mentioned how it had conducted the most impartial campaign of all, went on to add in the editorial *The candidate of the future* (29/09/94) that the daily was prepared to recommend Cardoso “as the most well-prepared candidate to help the country reach its destiny...”. The paper considered “false” the “jealous” accusations made on the *real*. *JB* justified its reasons for backing the candidature, citing values which it implicitly indicated as being a contrast to Lula’s political persona, a candidate who had found difficulty in agglomerating various sectors of Brazilian society around him. “Experienced senator, he is a born political negotiator, a man of dialogue...He is a man who prefers the consensus...and who does not fear succumbing politically to the union of heterogeneous forces...”, said the daily.

The *JB* editorial portrayed FHC as a “convicted social-democrat” and not a “neo-liberal”: “The difference is this: Lula wants to change the country. Fernando Henrique knows how to do it”. The *ESP* editorial *Our option* (02/10/94) started by stating how its electoral vote had been “decided months earlier”. “..it was not because of the people, but because of the necessity of a program capable of...monetary stability and economic development...”, said the daily.

On the 6<sup>th</sup> of October, the newspapers published FHC’s first speech as president.<sup>95</sup> *Veja* dedicated two long analytical stories to the elections, stressing in one piece of six pages how the PT had lost due to the *real* and how, in contrast to 1989, Lula had had considerable chances in 1994. In a feature of nearly 30 pages, *Veja* coherently analysed Cardoso’s victory, tracing the politician’s trajectory from a moderate left-wing intellectual and his self-exile in Europe during the dictatorship to his entry into Brazilian politics and alliance with the conservatives. More enthusiastically, the newspaper *JB* used

---

<sup>95</sup> I.e. “Cardoso speaks today as president” (*JB*, 06/10/94) and “The force of victory” (07/10/94); “Cardoso promises to make a smooth transition” (*ESP*, 07/10/94); “Lula slipped on the currency” (*Veja*, 12/10/94) and “Fernando Henrique sets the rhythm” (*Isto É*, 12/10/94), see appendix.

the expression “The mulatto prince” (05/10/94) to make a ‘positive’ association between the phrase - used confusedly by FHC earlier during the campaign - and the fact that the *tucano* had unified differences and won the elections. The *ESP* story on Cardoso’s first speech pointed out how FHC adopted a “discourse of conciliation” in his defence of a “smooth transition” from Franco’s government to his own.

The stories on the PT’s defeat examined the *petistas*’ struggle to accept the loss and mentioned how Lula would begin to prepare the future of the party from then onwards.<sup>96</sup> The *JB* text indicated that the PT would start to form a type of “New Labour Party” (my emphasis), pointing out also how Lula was ready to begin travelling around Brazil in order to “restructure the new PT and open it up to the most varied sectors of Brazilian society” as well as to “defeat the prejudices” which existed in relation to it. In this story, Lula blamed the “culture of prejudice” as having been the main barrier to his victory, emphasising the necessity of combating biases that existed towards the more unprivileged segments of Brazilian society.

Without a doubt, Cardoso’s election was a historical moment for Brazil. A former left-wing politician and academic persecuted by the military regime, FHC was the first in such a position to be elected for the presidency since the beginning of the dictatorship, a fact which in many ways signalled a crucial move in the direction of strengthening Brazil’s political and social institutions, paving the way also for the entry of centre-left wing thinking in mainstream Brazilian politics. Cardoso’s election inaugurated a more definite start to Brazil’s slow transition to a liberal market democracy, attesting to an initial growth in political pluralism and to a definite enhancement of the market as the main force in Brazilian society in the post-dictatorship phase.

As noted by Singer (1999), the *real* was not the only factor responsible for Cardoso’s election, if we consider that 77% of the population approved the economic plan but FHC was elected with 44% of the votes. Nonetheless, similar to what happens to other advanced democracies, like the US, where the American public since Franklin Roosevelt and the Great Depression has held the president accountable for economic conditions (Ivengar and Kinder, 1987; 87), in the 1994 elections in Brazil the economic competence of the candidate ended up *defining* the vote. We have seen through the analysis of the priority given to the *real* by the media in the examination of [Table 2](#) that the press coverage of the plan functioned as a mold of public opinion, contributing both directly

---

<sup>96</sup> “I.e. *Petistas* had not assimilated the defeat yet” (*ESP*, 08/10/94) and “Lula prepares the future of the new PT” (*JB*, 09/10/94).



and indirectly to make the public perceive the new currency as being an *essential* issue which needed to be taken into account when the voter considered who to vote for. As we have seen, other social issues which received a minor press coverage, and were also less discussed by the candidates as well, thus were eventually considered as being less important points by which to judge a candidate's suitability for the presidency.

Contrary to Collor, Cardoso was not positioned totally on the right and did wave towards an agenda that could equate economic growth with social policies, thus capitalising on votes from both the right and the left. As discussed here, what differentiated him from Lula was the fact that the latter was prioritising the social agenda at the time and articulating a critique that the stabilization plan - with its implied argument that the "invisible hand" of the market, to use Adam Smith's expression, would promote economic growth and wealth distribution - could actually lead to recession and more social injustice.

FHC presented a weaker social discourse at the same time that Lula seemed to be saying that his economic programme would not submit to capitalism's international rules. Thus, due to his favouring of consumerism and the supremacy of the economic agenda, Cardoso was identified by the public as the candidate who represented the centre-right wing vote (Singer, 1999), in other words, as the candidate that occupied the space of the anti-Lula. On the other hand, because of his previous left-wing credentials and the support that he received from segments of the intelligentsia, Cardoso and the PSDB managed to associate themselves to 'third way' European political philosophy, flirting with the idea of emerging as a (new) type of Latin American version of Clinton-Blairite politics with its combination of economic pragmatism and social preoccupations. Although the 'third way' terminology was not in vogue in 1994, it would begin to mark Cardoso's government and its associations with Anglo-American politics, issues discussed in the next chapters. Thus it was Cardoso's favouring of an orthodox economic model that in the long run created little economic growth, causing the rise of unemployment and wider social inequality. This would make Cardoso lose his support at a moment when Lula/PT were moving towards the centre and compromising on key points of the liberal economic agenda, as we shall see.

#### 4.5. Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the press' coverage of the 1994 presidential elections was more professional in comparison to the ideologically charged political reporting of 1989. Advancements were made mainly in the political realm, with the recognition by the press of wider political pluralism in Brazilian society and the importance of applying journalism liberal cultures of balance and professionalism to the political coverage of an election. This was especially the case of newspapers like *FSP* and *O Globo* and *Veja* magazine. Thus progresses in 1994 in relation to 1989 included the distancing and slight criticism of the press towards official candidates (i.e. the questioning of the links of Cardoso with the Franco government; the growth of credibility given to the opposition and the reduction of bias in relation to the PT). This resulted in a coverage that had less ideological bias and which did manage to include more stories from the opposition and debates on their policy proposals, also questioning and criticising more the platforms of the candidates from the establishment. This was the case with Cardoso and the criticisms made concerning his alliance with the PFL as well as the use of the *real* to market his candidature. The 1994 coverage thus initiated the *consolidation* of a certain degree of political independence of media industries vis-à-vis the government and politicians, something which had started in the late 80's but was evident mainly in 1992. It also indicated the growing presence of market forces in political campaigns as well as in newsrooms to the detriment of the influence of the state.

As the content and textual analysis here has shown as well as the interviews with journalists, forms of constraints shifted from the *political-ideological* to the *economic* field. Thus, in spite of the press' attempts of applying fairness and accuracy to political reporting, economic concerns invaded the political world and imposed important limits. We have seen also how the media were more sympathetic to Cardoso than to any other candidate, with much of the political and economic reporting being produced in the light of a pro-Fernando Henrique stance which rested on agreements made by various elite sectors of the need to give continuity to the global economic policies of the previous administration. Perhaps because of the lessons learnt in 1989 however, the media afforded FHC a slightly more critical coverage than they did Collor. This was made evident through the research conducted here, which stressed how the economic liberal ideal played a predominant role in defining the presidential debate of 1994 and its future president. Singer has pointed to (1999) a transference of expectations from Lula to

Cardoso because of the *real*. I have also further how economic dictums overwhelmed the campaign's final phase, forcing politics, ideology and social issues to occupy a minor role. This was especially evident in the run up to the *real*'s launch on the 1<sup>st</sup> of July until Cardoso's final victory in October.

The 1994 elections thus saw another battle of political and economic interests being fought out in the media pages, with the Brazilian press at times signalling to a *déjà vu* of the 1989 scenario, and at other moments maintaining a distance from it, and engaging in coherent, interpretative and balanced political reporting. However, it is not possible to say that the nature of the 1994 competition was only shaped by non-ideological forces and constrained by the economic orthodoxy. As we have seen, liberal economic policies have been presented in Brazilian politics and society in the 1990's as unquestionable truths, and have somewhat turned into "political-ideologies" in themselves. Furthermore, fears still existed in relation to left-wing politics in 1994. Cardoso was thus able to assume in 1994 a double role of guaranteeing the national consolidation of the democratization project whilst also advancing Brazilian capitalism in the global economy. In this way it is simplistic also to presuppose that the FHC candidature was dictated exclusively by the Washington consensus. Cardoso was a political figure plunged into these discourses and practices at a moment when many Latin American countries were being pressured into submitting to these international economic relationships and reforms.

The euphoria of the media with the *real* thus impeded a wider debate on the economic agenda, functioning at the same time to indirectly benefit the PSDB candidature. Here was a moment when the consolidation of the market forces and the economic dimension in the political field can be juxtaposed to the growth of the commercial character of media industries and the reinforcement of consumerism approaches to news. On one hand, the *real* was modified throughout the years and did stabilize inflation and produce a limited economic growth, whilst on the other hand a stronger commercial and professional media did manage to reflect more and balance the various political disputes which exist in Brazil. These (new) market forces functioned however to both contribute as well as to repress the wider democratization of Brazilian society and politics, issues explored further in Chapter 5 in the examination of the 2002 elections and in Chapter 6 in the debate on the competing cultures of professionalism and partisanship that have overwhelmed Brazilian journalism.

## **Chapter 5 – Market constraints and social democracy: the media coverage of the 2002 elections**

### **5.1. Introduction**

On the 27<sup>th</sup> of October 2002, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva was elected president with 52 million votes. The 2002 elections were more grandiose still than 1994: 115 million people voted for a president, 26 State governors, 56 senators and more than a thousand MPs in the most technically advanced elections of the post-dictatorship years. Political scientists detected a series of democratic advancements in 2002, a result of the newly gained civil and political rights of the last decades. Progresses included wider liberty of expression in the party programmes, the existence of a more informed electorate, fewer exchanges of attacks between candidates and the absence of fraud in the voting system (Nicolau, 2002; Wanderley Reis, 2002). Lula's election represented not only a process of wider consolidation of political pluralism but in 2002 it also signified a slight questioning of the dominance of the neo-liberal ideals that had marked much of political thinking in the country in the 1990's, a decade characterised by an exaggerated reaction of elite sectors to the state's crisis. Such sentiments culminated in an excessive belief in the powers of the market accompanied by a tendency to downplay market failures, with the social and popular agenda being pushed to a minor role. The 2002 elections were thus a moment of hope for millions of Brazilians, combining popular demand for social inclusion and economic growth with the perception amongst elite circles of the necessity of juxtaposing economic stability with employment and fiscal austerity with wider social justice.

A cluster of reasons have been given by political scientists, journalists and academics for Lula's victory in 2002. It is only possible though to comprehend more fully the motives for the sway of elite sectors and the general public towards Lula by situating such a discussion historically, and applying a framework that takes into account political, economical and social factors. The growing disenchantment with the previous regime and its low levels of economic growth were initial crucial factors which culminated in the collapse of the consensus formed around Cardoso's name. Furthermore, Lula's move towards the centre and improvement of his political image since mainly the 1994 elections as well as the growing pressures of civil society, accompanied by increases in the press of liberal journalism values in a reality of tensions with consumerism rationales,

all played a vital role in affording (public) legitimacy to the PT politician. They also gave credibility to his key role as the main presidential candidate of 2002. Thus there was a general recognition that the continuity of the basic principles of the liberal economic consensus, such as inflation control and commitments to fiscal restraints, needed to be aligned with social concerns, which had always been the cornerstone of the PT's political philosophy.

In Chapter 4, I discussed how the 1994 elections were swamped with the debate on the *real*, which put to a minor position other problems such as the need to tackle Brazil's social debt. Chapter 4 also underlined the less biased character of the 1994 press coverage in relation to the 1989 elections. In contrast to 1989 and also 1994, political reporting in 2002 was more balanced, with the press actually providing Lula and the PT a more sympathetic coverage. Lula was presented in the media pages as being a social-democratic who promised to advance and "humanise" Brazilian capitalism.

This chapter will argue that elite divisions in relation to the Cardoso government and the growing critique of the neo-liberal consensus, but not abandonment of its core principles, resulted in the formation of an elite and popular agreement around Lula's name. The adoption of a more professional journalism stance followed by a wider disengagement from a merely ideological slant was essential for the realisation of a more equivoise coverage that did not feed into market hysteria. Thus the growth of sophistication in the press, the dwindling of partisan routines in newsrooms accompanied by the applicability of values of balance to political reporting were factors which permitted directly and indirectly the inclusion of wider players in the media's forum of public debate. This accorded wider legitimacy to the opposition and to other sectors, represented not only by the PT but by other social movements and organisations, centre and left-wing political interests, with the media voicing their positions on unemployment, economic stagnation, increase of violence and the predominance of financial capitalism over national production. Journalism cultures of objectivity thus contributed to reflect political pluralism and elite divisions concerning the country's main dilemmas.

A critical textual analysis has been carried out here of a six month period of the elections, starting from May and ending in October. Media spaces during these months were taken up by stories on daily events; commentary on research polls; the improvement in Lula's image; social and economic concerns and evaluations of Cardoso's eight year legacy. The news coverage also contained features which explored the reactions of certain sectors of the financial market to the PT's rise. Many of these sectors were fearful

of the advancement of democracy and preoccupied with the future of Brazilian capitalism in case of a left-wing victory.

May was chosen here as a starting point because it was during this month that Lula began to construct alliances, and began to be perceived by elite segments as a possible future president. Some of the stories of the 2002 elections will be contrasted to others published in 1989 and 1994 in order to debate more widely the changes detected in the press' coverage in relation to previous contests. The first part of this chapter looks at the Cardoso legacy and the 1998 elections; the second part focuses on the PT's transformation and on the party's 2002 presidential marketing campaign and the third on the press' coverage per se. The last part examines the significance of the PT's victory and the role played by the media in it, elements which are explored further on in Chapter 6 in the investigation that I pursue on the ways in which journalists contributed to the democratisation process in Brazil. Firstly, Cardoso's eight year legacy and the nature of his relationship with journalists needs to be addressed more fully before I can shift my lens to the 2002 campaign.

## **5.2. The FHC legacy and the 1998 elections**

The FHC era transformed Brazil in significant ways. As argued in Chapter 4, the *real* was a successful economic stabilization plan which contributed initially to distribute wealth. Brazil thus moved away from the old-state economic model more associated with the military regime years to embark upon an internationalization agenda which favoured global financial capitalism, boosted consumerism and only initially included millions of Brazilians in the country's emergent national "mass" market. The direct effect of the stabilization plan was that 9 million Brazilians left poverty, with the income of the group composed of 10% of the poorer segments doubling from 1993 to 1995 (Lahóz, 2002, 77). The initial social gains of the *real* however were soon lost, with Brazil experiencing little economic expansion and seeing a rise in unemployment figures and inequality levels mainly during Cardoso's second mandate in 1999.

This chapter does not aim to investigate further the achievements of FHC's administrations, but will conduct an analytical synthesis of the key debates concerning Cardoso's governments. In contrast to the diminished character that traditional politicians such as Collor, Sarney and even Franco gave to the institution of the presidency, Cardoso accorded new credibility to the presidential figure. Cardoso's intellectual caliber and

civilized approach to politics undermined old oligarchic leaderships, paving the way for the consolidation of political pluralism in 2002 through the strengthening of the country's social and political institutions. However, Cardoso's proposals, which included the restructuring of the state and the reduction of its presence in the economy, proved in the long run to have various social, political and economic consequences. The economic policies which supported the stabilization plan, such as the huge inflows of foreign capital and an overvalued currency exchange rate, remained until 1999, when the government decided to de-value the currency and to not keep the parity with the dollar anymore. Thus Cardoso's second mandate (1998-2002) was engulfed in recession, with segments of the national market, such as medium and small businesses, going bankrupt amid the rise of unemployment and the escalation of violence and social tensions in various metropolitan cities.

The FHC era was a period which saw many significant social changes occur, such as more women occupying important positions in the newsroom. The Cardoso years witnessed also the increase in levels of education of all segments of Brazilian society, with a reduction in illiteracy numbers, extensions in the inclusion of 7 to 14 year olds in schools and increases in the schooling of the middle and upper-classes (Lamounier & Figueiredo, 2002). As discussed in Chapter 4, neo-liberal ideals and commercialization were widely embraced by national elites, who saw in these solutions to the years of state control and economic stagnation. This period thus saw significant expansions in consumerism habits and in individualism. A certain "Americanization" of politics followed by a slight de-politicization of public debate due to the rise of spin doctors, marketing strategies in politics and in the media was also evident from Collor's election onwards. Contrary though to the reality of advanced capitalist societies, these years contradictorily saw also a widespread interest in politics in response to the formation of a mass political society in Brazil in the aftermath of the dictatorship.

The legislations on the monopolies of oil and of telecommunications were relaxed during the Cardoso years. The FHC government also reformed employment legislation, easing the burden of the social costs of labour to employers by introducing greater flexibility. Positive points of Cardoso's social legacy were the reduction in infant mortality and the provision of Aids treatment (Lamounier & Figueiredo, 2002). However, the government seemed forever trapped by the millstones of needing on one side to create more jobs and invest in social welfare and on the other to combat inflation and boost economic growth. In 1997, Cardoso started to conduct political alliances in Congress as a

means of guaranteeing his re-election. Supported by the same center-right coalition (PFL-PTB-PPB-PMDB-PSDB) which elected him president in 1994, FHC ran for a second time in 1998. Cardoso defeated Lula and obtained 53% of the votes against 31.7% given to his rival in what was a quick, predictable and lifeless election. Thus it was during Cardoso's second mandate that economic instability began to shake again Brazil's power structures, resulting in elite divisions emerging in relation to the FHC government and news organizations soon reflecting these tensions.

### **5.3. The role of the media during the Cardoso era**

Debates around the role that the media had in the two governments of Fernando Henrique Cardoso have dominated academic and journalistic circles, although there has not been any major research on the relationships established between FHC and journalists during these years similar to the work that has been done on Collor. We saw in Chapter 4 how media industries were sympathetic to the Cardoso candidature. Many journalists, especially the ones who occupied the higher ranks of the media hierarchy, felt that they were on equal intellectual par with Fernando Henrique. They considered his political-economic policies and intellectual persona to be laudable and worth backing. This research will address some aspects of the nature of these relationships. As noted before, the 1990's saw journalists uphold the watchdog function tradition, embarking upon a wider critique of government. This nonetheless is not the same as saying that *all* journalists were necessarily making more consistent critiques of establishment figures. Most of the journalists interviewed here mentioned that the media during the FHC governments could have been more critical, debating in more depth Cardoso's economic and social programs and investigating some of the corruption scandals which emerged, something which occurred more during Lula's government.

Conti pointed to the existence of a close relationship established between Cardoso and media management during his administrations: "There was a total identification...Here and there were some negative stories, but in general, the mainstream press has in FH its natural representative. What Fernando Henrique was doing was the right thing, what was necessary... It was...contemporary...So in this identification, a regression in the mainstream media occurs....Everyone fell in the neo-liberal mentality up to their necks. The de-valuation of the currency...only later was it criticized. Gustavo Franco (president of the Central Bank) was



considered a God....Fernando Henrique is the natural candidate of the bourgeoisie and of capital in Brazil. That is why there was all that tension in 1994, 1998. It was only Fernando Henrique, *uber-alles*.” Former editor of opinion of *FSP*, Rogério Simões, currently editor-in-chief of the BBC Brazilian Service, underlined a certain lack of debate which prevailed during the Cardoso governments: “It was a difficult period for journalists. There was a sensation that the country was going in the right direction....The PT was discredited and Lula was run down by the 1998 elections. I remember in 1997, when *Folha* published an editorial in the first page about the ‘Provão’ (national educational test for universities). It was the only grand national newsworthy debate at that moment because the government....managed to convince everyone that everything was...marvellous. There were things that were not discussed in more depth, such as the *real*. And when they were, they were seen as complaints of dissidents...”

*FSP* columnist Jânio de Freitas, a heavyweight investigative journalist, was a rare critical voice of both governments, a professional stance which he assumed and which was even attacked by other colleagues: “It was common for colleagues in *FSP* to refer to my articles as being my ‘bad humour’...for criticizing FHC. I am calm to know that some of the things that I wrote at the time today are consensus views... People criticized me...for having stated these things...But why did newspapers support FH if it wasn’t for the economic plan? Did it do well for the country? From what we know of, no. It can only be for a political reason...But is a newspaper a political party or a newspaper? If we are going to do journalism, we must politically disengage ourselves because journalism has no political links. When I noticed the type of line that the Lula government was going to adopt, I started to criticize him too. That is my function....Sometimes it looks like the newspapers are partisan vehicles. There is a difficulty of understanding this business, the newspapers do not understand...It is not only the readers..”

The importance of professionalism in political reporting will be explored more in Chapter 6. As underlined by Freitas and Simões, critiques of the Cardoso government were rarely found in the newspapers. Head of *FSP*’s newsroom, Otavio Frias Filho nonetheless asserted that *Folha* did criticize the government: “I was reading the other day an interview that FH gave to *Veja* in...2002, in which he stated that *Folha* during one time seemed to have tried to impeach him. The story that Fernando Rodrigues (*FSP*) came up with concerning the claims that the reelection votes had been bought, the Cayman documents... People forget that *FSP* was also hard with FH...” It was during Cardoso’s second mandate nonetheless, mainly after the de-valuation of the *real* in 1999, that the *tucano* started slowly to loose support, beginning to be viewed more critically by journalists and the press in what was a reflection of the increasing dissatisfactions of industrial sectors, middle-class liberal professionals, unions and social movements with the rise of unemployment.

One should avoid though painting a simplistic divisive scenario of journalists that are either all *petistas* or are all *tucanos*, or another portrait of media management standing on one side in favour of Cardoso against the average PT journalist. However, taking into consideration Conti's assertion, one could argue that there *is* an identification of media management with Cardoso. That said, this does not mean to say that there are no *petista* journalists, Brizola voters or even many apolitical or undecided media professionals that could contribute to make a difference irrespective of their ideological affinities. Thus, from Cardoso's second mandate onwards, and especially since 2002, such divisive political camps and their support in the media became much more complicated and blurred.

*FSP* columnist Luís Nassif affirmed that the FHC years saw many journalists from both sides (the PT and PSDB) engage in political battles in the media pages, something which I stressed in previous chapters. Nassif states that the consensus around FHC lasted basically until 1999: "When you look at the coverage of the FHC governments, you had two very defined groups: you had one which whatever the government did was good, and the other that said that whatever the government did was bad. Partisanship was thus not exclusive of the Fernando Henrique group. Until 1998, however, few voices spoke out against Fernando Henrique. From 1999 onwards, you had few voices that defended FHC. In both situations, I had discussions with colleagues about the investigations of the parliamentary commission.. When the change of currency happened in 1999....you saw some of the publications which used to speak well begin not to do so.. But then a competition started and the insinuations began even to be terrible...So if you, for instance, criticize the interest rate policies of FHC and tomorrow defend his honour, this twists the head of the medium reader. That is why you have people there who were militantly in favour of FH and others who were against.."

Thus dissent had little space in the media coverage during Cardoso's first mandate. If wider critiques were articulated in the media mainly from 1999 onwards, the fact was that divisions in Brazilian society concerning Cardoso's policies were already present in the first FHC government. In June 1996, a poll conducted by *Isto É/Brasmarket* and published in *Isto É* magazine revealed that nearly 40% of the surveyed rated Cardoso's government "bad" and "terrible" (17% and 22%), with only 17% viewing it as "good" or "excellent" and a large majority stating that he had not kept his campaign promises (Oxhorn and Starr, 1999). Social groups started also to show signs of discontent and even business leaders, led by the National Industry Confederation (CNI) and the Federation of

Industries of São Paulo (Fiesp), called on unions to join them in a symbolic strike (Kingstone, 1999) and in demands for new levels of economic growth.

However, the approval of the FHC administration in spite of these dissatisfactions remained stable. Cardoso was thus re-elected in the first round in 1998 with 53,06% of the votes, even though the country was registering record levels of unemployment at the time (Oliveira, 2002, 100). FHC managed to maintain his political prestige as a key PSDB politician and architect of the liquidation of inflation plan. Divisions in elite sectors, however, were evident throughout the whole of the Cardoso administrations, pointing to potential future difficulties that FHC could find in electing a successor. Thus similar to 1994, the PT and the PSDB in 2002 engaged again in a direct tug of war, with the Worker's Party promoting significant transformations in their agendas to woo the centre and the more reluctant business world.

#### **5.4. The PT's transformation and the British Labour Party**

The UK 1997 elections are tantamount in some ways to the 2002 dispute in Brazil regarding the struggle of Lula and the Worker's Party to transform their agenda, minimizing points such as state intervention in the economy so as to seduce the business world. In the 1997 UK elections, New Labour had already eliminated their socialist ideals, having transformed their "old" labour left-wing politics into a 'new' labour model, a political strategy which was an attempt to adapt left-wing politics to the rules of financial capitalism and which resulted in a definite shift to the centre (Budge, Greve, McKay and Newton; 1998). In Brazil, the PT in the 1990's was being confronted with various new challenges, such as the reality of being government and finding ways of appealing to the middle-classes. As Castañeda (1994) has noted, the main dilemma that the left has faced in Latin America has been an eternal one of balancing economic growth with wealth distribution. In 2002, there was a widespread perception by many that the economic stability so sought after had not contributed for a decrease in inequality levels. Brazilians were urging for more government intervention, placing their hopes for more employment and social inclusion on the state and seeing in Lula the main leader of such ideals.

After Lula's third defeat in 1998, the PT embarked on a profound identity crisis and in a re-valuation of its socialist principles. Lula and the party's moderate leaders initiated a battle with *petista* radicals, with the moderates slowly expanding their leadership from

1994 onwards. During the party's national conference in December 2001, the PT wrote the themes of Lula's political programme entitled "The Necessary Break", underlining the need to cut ties with the IMF. In June 2002, at the height of the 2002 campaign, the PT decided to change its political document, removing expressions such as "economic rupture" from its text. This was seen as a definite move away from its earlier and more radical roots. In 2002, Lula was also given total liberty to conduct the campaign as he wished, and was heavily criticized by many *petistas* for conducting alliances with conservative segments who had been previously political enemies. This issue emerged again during Lula's time in office when it was revealed that the PT's 2002 marketing campaign had cost a fortune, with the party producing extra cash in 2002 as well as having bought political support in order to form future governing alliances.<sup>97</sup>

In order to communicate better with a wider public, the PT invested heavily in marketing, hiring an expensive spin doctor, Duda Mendonça, who was responsible for orchestrating Lula's 2002 campaign and "selling" the "Lula peace and love" image package to the population. For in 2002 the PT was still seen as a threat to the very functioning of Brazil's capitalism system. In order to ease tensions and avoid any possibility of a coup, Lula proposed an alliance of capital with labour which was exemplified by the association of his candidature with that of his vice-presidential candidate, the industrial entrepreneur José de Alencar of the conservative PL party. This alliance and the PT's compromise with the economic liberal platform functioned to suffocate the resistance of segments of the market forces, who in 2002 were fearful of the rise of left-wing social-democratic politics in Brazil.

### **5.5. Market constraints and social agendas: conflicts in the media coverage of the 2002 elections**

#### *a) A general overview: the publication of positive and balanced stories on Lula/PT*

A critical analysis of a period of six months of the 2002 elections underlines certain changes in tone and discourse in relation to left-wing politics in comparison to the press'

---

<sup>97</sup> Corruption claims concerning monthly stipends paid by the PT to political allies emerged in 2005, undermining the PT's exclusive hold of the ethical political agenda and raising calls for Lula's impeachment. Former respected left-wing guerrilla leader, José Dirceu, second man in Lula's government, was forced to resign in May 2005 after being accused of leading a corruption scheme to buy support of rival parties and secure funds for PT campaigns.

coverage of other elections like 1989 and 1994. This research has examined a total of 1.237 stories published in newspapers and magazines (see [Table 1](#)) from the 24<sup>th</sup> of April until the 30<sup>th</sup> of October. Contrary to previous elections, in 2002 Lula was given more “positive” texts in the papers than the *tucano* José Serra, thus depending less on the “neutral” pieces as before. We have seen in Chapter 4 how Lula had more “negative” stories than “positive” ones, relying on the attempts made by news organizations of conducting a more equal coverage. In 2002, the situation was quite the reverse. The fact that Lula was running for the fourth time, had consolidated his oppositional leadership since 1989, minimizing his radical stance and gaining more respect from wider sectors of Brazilian society, as well as having approached journalists and media management, were actions seen as fundamental in explaining why the PT candidate was being taken more seriously by the media in 2002.

**Table 1 – Campaign stories (24/04/02- 30/10/02)**

<b>Media</b>	<b>Total</b>
<i>ESP</i>	458
<i>FSP</i>	332
<i>JB</i>	282
<i>O Globo</i>	73
<i>Veja</i>	68
<i>Isto É</i>	24
<b>Total number</b>	<b>1.237</b>

Having gained from the experiences of other elections, the mainstream press produced an equivoque coverage in 2002. It can be said that the coverage was a little bit more inclined towards the PT, with some journalists even showing enthusiasm for Lula’s candidature. However, the media did not officially back the PT candidature. More so than 1994, and certainly much more than in 1989, the opposition candidates (Ciro, Garotinho and Lula, all from the left or centre-left) were seen as legitimate players, and were less marginalized or downplayed as dissidents. At the same time, the official candidate José Serra of the PSDB was subject to wider criticism than was the case of previous years with Collor or FHC. If in 1989 Lula was ‘demonized’ by elite sectors and by much of the press, and in 1994 the euphoria with the *real* suffocated other important debates, in 2002

Lula was portrayed more as a legitimate and serious social-democrat who was an advocate for social reform combined with economic pragmatism.

The strengthening of Brazil's institutions as a result of the democratization process, the disenchantment with the Cardoso government, the fact that public opinion and the opposition were pressuring for a social agenda and media industries were indicating wider commitments to fairness and accuracy resulted in a coverage with many improvements. These included: 1) the publication of a wider range of issues on the candidates' campaigns in contrast to focuses on particular themes, like the *real* in 1994 (i.e. in 2002 this included analyses on Cardoso's economic legacy, Brazil's social debt, unemployment and the reaction of the market); 2) the growth of more "positive" pieces on Lula/PT and the wider publication of "neutral" stories; 3) the diminishing of the use of ideological phrases in relation to left-wing politics (i.e. "the reds") and 4) the clearer positioning of journalists as *mediators* of political debates, and less as reproducers of official dominant views or advocates of elite prejudices. These progresses have made journalists like Augusto Nunes state that the errors of the 2002 coverage were less a result of ideological biases, but more related to difficulties that the media found in conducting in-depth reporting of the candidates' agendas: "The press improved significantly in relation to prejudices, and mainly the owners of the newspapers. But we repeated a historical error: we did not show more clearly what each candidate thought. We did not ask elementary questions as where is the money coming from to create 10 million jobs...I think we are not very American here, not very hard in that type of thing...I think the press is still learning how to deal with the debate.."

Similarly to the 1994 elections, economic concerns also dominated public debate in 2002, although the opposition candidates articulated discourses which juxtaposed social proposals with commitments to economic austerity.<sup>98</sup> Serra, former Management minister in the Cardoso government, vied with Lula to take on this agenda. Former UNE student leader put in exile during the dictatorship, Serra was more situated towards the left of the PSDB, having also been a critical voice of the economic model during the FHC governments. Thus like 1994, restraints in 2002 were less imposed on the political-ideological discourse of fear of left-wing politics, and were much more present in the economic realm. It was in this (economic) sphere that "ideological discourses" appeared concerning the stability and advancement of Brazilian capitalism, with certain segments

---

<sup>98</sup> I.e. "Programs put social agenda subordinated to the economy" (*ESP*, 22/09/02); "Lula says that he wants a social BC (Central Bank)" (*O Globo*, 01/10/02) and "Economy will not be an all powerful God" (*ESP*, 08/10/02).

of the financial market embarking in the final phase of the 2002 elections on an “economic terror” rhetoric campaign against the opposition. With exceptions, the media did not add much weight to these attacks. The coverage conducted by *Veja* and *ESP* however typifies the case of the existence of a left-wing or working-class skew in the media, although the latter did strive more than the former to maintain a certain equilibrium in its daily coverage.<sup>99</sup> Certain examples are explored here as a means of elucidating some of the difficulties that still exist in Brazilian newsrooms regarding the reporting of political pluralism.

The Iuperj research institute (University Institute of Research of Rio de Janeiro) collected press material from seven newspapers, including the national dailies *FSP*, *ESP* and *O Globo*, from the 20<sup>th</sup> of February to the 17<sup>th</sup> of September.<sup>100</sup> It highlighted oscillations in the media coverage, affirming though that the press coverage was in overall fair. *ESP* was seen as the least “neutral” paper due to its declared support for Serra. The findings of the Iuperj research also showed that Lula in general received more sympathetic treatment from the press than the other candidates, being afforded more “positive” articles on his candidature than “negative” ones, especially in *O Globo*. The latter was pointed out as having published “positive” features since the start of the dispute, a result perhaps of the proximity sought by Lula with the Marinho family in 2002. *Folha* had a predominance of “neutral” stories, with a higher proportion of “negative” material given to Lula’s rivals, Serra and Ciro, than to the PT candidate. *ESP* reversed the more “negative” articles published on Lula from July onwards, with “positive” stories overtaking the “negative” ones.

The results of the Iuperj institute are taken here as a means of comparison to my research. I have advanced the discussions by situating the 2002 contest in a historical context, placing the political-economic discourses that prevailed in Brazilian society at the time in a wider national and international framework, contrasting also the work conducted by the press to the media coverage of the 1989 and 1994 elections. Furthermore, I believe that the “numerical” acknowledgement that Lula received more “positive” stories than Serra in 2002 does not fully explain the reasons for Lula’s sympathetic coverage and why elites defected to his candidature. At a first glance, one would think that the press (implicitly) backed Lula in 2002 as it (supposedly) did FHC in

---

<sup>99</sup> I.e. “Ciro passes Serra and *tucano* campaign enters in crisis” (*ESP*, 17/07/02); “Why Lula frightens the market” (*Veja*, 22/05/02) and “Even the PT is frightened” (*Veja*, 19/06/02).

<sup>100</sup> “Newspapers oscillated throughout the campaign” (*FSP*, 27/09/02).

1994. This was not exactly the case though. One cannot take in isolation a quantitative analysis that highlights the amount of “positive” stories done on Lula in 2002, assuming that this alone explains the whole political process of that election. This research has examined this campaign by taking into account a series of factors, relating political and economic concerns dominant in elite sectors at the time to the stories published by the press in 2002 and to the type of journalism practices and editorial judgments that were made. My research has shown that in general *FSP*, *JB* and *O Globo* produced a coverage which underscored fairness and pluralism and which, with exceptions, did not indicate signs of endorsement of the “economic terror” rhetoric.<sup>101</sup>

*ESP* publicly announced that it was supporting Serra in June and *Veja* later on admitted that it stood by the PSDB candidature. Throughout the campaign, many of its editorials were sharp critiques of the PT and showed little recognition of the legitimacy of the party.<sup>102</sup> Contrary to the editorials, however, the *ESP* stories were less biased than previous years due to the growth of professionalism in the media as well as in its own newsroom. This resulted in the paper printing more “neutral” and “positive” articles. Certain *ESP* stories stressed the market hysteria, a fact which *did* however exist in 2002.<sup>103</sup> Other stories examined ideological divisions, with social chaos being attributed to a possible PT victory in contrast to Serra’s rationality.<sup>104</sup> The paper’s editorials further attacked the PT. *The ultra-light ethics of the PT* (30/08/02) for instance criticised what it saw as a hypocritical ‘moral superiority’ stance assumed by the party due to the alliances that it was forming with traditional oligarchic politicians. It lashed out at this by arguing that the party was not being faithful to its own principles, a critique that was also orchestrated by disappointed left-wing radicals for evidently different ideological reasons.

In comparison to 1994, the political agendas of the 2002 presidential campaign accentuated more social themes, with the main dailies publishing stories on poverty, health and on Cardoso’s legacy.<sup>105</sup> *O Globo*, *ESP* and *Folha* also invited candidates to

---

<sup>101</sup> I.e. “CNI and Fiesp: resistance towards Lula has diminished” (*O Globo*, 24/04/02); “In Fiesp, Lula attacks Ciro and passivity of businessmen” (*FSP*, 31/07/02); “Electorate links Lula to jobs and Serra to health” (*FSP*, 04/08/02) and “Malan: ‘market is ignorant’” (*JB*, 27/09/02).

<sup>102</sup> I.e. “The ultra-light ethics of the PT” (30/08/02); “The presumption of a victory for Lula” (19/09/02) and “The inopportunity of Lula’s arrogance” (02/10/02).

<sup>103</sup> I.e. “*Petista* does not frighten Fiesp, but does not convince” (31/07/02) and “Turbulence comes back to the market with political fears” (10/08/02).

<sup>104</sup> I.e. “*Tucano* bets on ‘loyalty and companionship’ (18/07/02); “*Tucano* accuses rival of cowardice and of supporting the dictatorship” (01/09/02) and “‘If PT wins, MST will invade’, says Roriz” (22/10/02).

<sup>105</sup> I.e. “Plans expose social challenge greater than solutions” (*ESP*, 14/07/02); “Country has 800.000 families waiting for the agrarian reform” (*O Globo*, 22/09/02) and “FHC’s country concentrates wealth; social spending inhibits more poverty” (*FSP*, 17/10/02).



debate their political programmes with readers in the newspapers' auditoriums. *O Globo* published also stories on the market's reaction to the PT, but avoided backing the market hysteria.<sup>106</sup> These more coherent features published in *O Globo* were different to some of the 1989 material, when texts stressed the "radicalism" of Lula and the PT and thus reflected the wider tensions which prevailed at the time.<sup>107</sup>

*FSP* took on a more critical tone, having produced also in overall a professional coverage.<sup>108</sup> The fact that Lula was shifting between discourses to attract the business community whilst keeping the votes of faithful militants was examined in the *FSP* piece "The two discourses of Lula" (02/09/02). This feature utilised irony to point out how the PT candidate was courting bankers at the same time that he was still investing in a discourse against the "perverted Brazilian elite", a criticism widely voiced by both PT sympathisers as well as political rivals. The story highlighted the ambiguity of the PT's discourse: "In front of the masses he refers to the same economic elite that he is trying to approach in order to win, using an aggressive speech which is praised by *petista* militants..", affirmed the text.

The *JB* editorials on the other hand did not attack the PT as harshly as *ESP* did.<sup>109</sup> The *Fear and Equilibrium* (19/09/02) editorial mentioned how the PT had committed few mistakes in the campaign, underlining also the exaggerated reactions of the market: "In the hypothesis of a victory, if the same equilibrium is confirmed in the presidency of the Republic, it is possible that the fears of the financial market will show themselves to be utterly unjustified. The market is flexible. It adapts to circumstances..". Thus despite demonstrations of personal and political preferences of owners in many editorials, the press coverage in 2002 favoured accuracy and interpretation, with journalists in general functioning more as mediators of a political debate than mere reproducers of the views of the establishment or advocates of media management's interests.

---

<sup>106</sup> I.e. "CNI and Fiesp: resistance towards Lula has diminished" (*O Globo*, 24/04/02); "FH and opposition react to Soros who says that, for the market, it is either Serra or chaos" (*O Globo*, 09/06/02) and "We do not fear the opposition in power, says businessmen" (*O Globo*, 13/06/02).

<sup>107</sup> I.e. "PT wants Lula with a radical discourse" (*O Globo*, 30/08/89), see Chapter 3.

<sup>108</sup> I.e. "Lula supports accord with the IMF, but blames the government for the crisis" (08/08/02); "Lula uses lack of diploma to criticise FHC" (05/09/02); "Serra invests against 'Little Lula peace and love'" (10/09/02) and "Lula's discourse is not left-wing, says MST" (16/09/02).

<sup>109</sup> I.e. "Fear and Equilibrium" (19/09/02); "More Transparency" (11/10/02) and "Hope without fear" (29/10/02).

## *b) Journalists and the 2002 elections*

Most journalists have praised the role of the media in the 2002 presidential elections, underscoring the growth in fairness in political reporting and the professional maturity of journalists. Although many have argued that the media were more sympathetic to Lula than they had been in previous elections, balancing more in the media realm the diversity of interests and disputes which existed in Brazilian society, this fact cannot be seen as being synonymous with a media endorsement of the PT candidature. Singer has asserted that the PT's coalition with the center contributed to reduce elite fears: "In general terms the press covered the 2002 elections with some neutrality. The alliance with the center...helped to calm the disbeliefs...this factor contributed to create an adequate environment.... Lula won because he managed to attract a significant segment of the center electorate who was unhappy with the government of Fernando Henrique, and who thought it was time to give the new a chance..."

*FSP* columnist Luis Nassif argued that the media acted with responsibility, despite the reproduction of the "market terrorism rhetoric": "When you see the 2002 elections, the press succumbing to some of the market terrorism discourse, you see also that in general the coverage was the more neutral one that we had had in the last few years. There were no major scandals. In this sense the press is much more responsible, the *denuncismo* of before is not there anymore. In that sense you see in the 1990's an important growth of maturity and the newspapers concerned with quality..." Ricardo Kotscho, Lula's former press officer, highlighted that journalistic professionalism was essential: "The relationship with the press was more civilised in 1994, 1998 and 2002. In 2002, we had a campaign in which, for the first time, the mainstream press did not have a candidate against all the others. It was a professional coverage. It was not neutral because that does not exist, but it was closer to this. And only two vehicles supported openly candidates: *ESP* supported Serra and *Carta Capital* (small to medium scale analytical magazine), Lula". Speaking from a more radical position, Bernardo Kucinski, also a former senior press officer, affirmed that the press accepted the 'inevitability' of Lula's election: "The press did not support Lula. They mentioned many times how his 30% of votes was falling. The question was who was going to defeat Lula. That is why there was a concentration of forces on him, and he was smart and did alliances... He hired the best marketer (Duda Mendonça) in the country...and made a campaign to win..."

TV Globo's media coverage was also applauded by academics and journalists like Alberto Dines, Nilson Lage and Eugênio Bucci because of the seriousness of its political

reporting. Lage (2002)<sup>110</sup> argued that elite dissatisfaction with how the privatisation programmes were conducted in the Cardoso administrations and the enhanced intellectual training of journalists led to a better TV coverage. The media were thus able to understand some previous mistakes, such as the TV debate of 1989, and therefore engage more in strives to expand professionalism. Veteran journalist Alberto Dines highlighted how the press gained in maturity in 2002: “The press knew that it had to behave correctly because society had learned how to observe it. TV Globo did a debate with a surgeons’ rigour that even made the coverage become boring. But an election is not a spectacle. In a way, it has to be boring. The last election was self-contained...”

Some journalists have criticised the more neutral and technical coverage of the 2002 elections in contrast to the more passionate and heated political reporting of the *Diretas Já* campaign and the 1989 elections. *FSP* columnist, Marcelo Coelho, who wrote the *Folha* editorial attacking Collor, saw little innovation in 2002: “Regarding Lula, the utopian stance that existed in 2002 was less the one on the correction of social inequalities, even because of the impact on the elections of the market panic. It was the industrial development stance... I think he won with this bourgeoisie agenda, and less with a more left-wing one which he had before, and which had not elected him... In this case I think the press in 2002 did not have much to say. It was the best coverage in the sense that, in spite of the market panic, everyone sort of accepted that Lula would win. The press concentrated on daily events, and there was nothing very imaginative. With press or without press, it seemed that it would be the same thing. Time has gone by and I think that the political coverage has become less interesting...” Coelho’s quote points to the loss of creativity that can come with the investment in a more professional coverage, debates pursued further in Chapter 6.

Nonetheless, in spite of claims that the regime of objectivity in the media does not stimulate civic engagement, in 2002 public mobilization was high. Similarly to the series of demonstrations which took place during the *diretas*, in 2002 there was a lot of agitation in the streets and expectations from segments of the population that a left-wing victory could promote social and economic change. Such a climate occurred in spite of, or was independent of, militant journalism practices in newsrooms, being more a result of a series of socio-political and historical factors strictly tied to the democratization process. The press thus strived to respond to these urges through a combination of a social responsibility ethos with professionalism.

---

<sup>110</sup> “Very far from perfect” in *Lide* (December, 2002, p. 17-21).

That said, the ways in which both militant practices and professional journalistic routines contributed to advance democracy are issues which are discussed in the next chapter alongside the debate on liberal journalism cultures and their impact on social and political change. I believe the influence of the *petismo* of Brazilian journalists in 2002 had a relative effect, exercising perhaps a secondary role in the context of other external socio-political and economic factors as well as internal professional journalistic routines of objectivity. For none of these journalistic practices, either professional or militant, would have actually guaranteed any candidate's election or Lula's for that matter if the PT candidate had not negotiated a relationship of compromise with the financial market, who eventually gave the green card 'stamping' the *legitimacy* of the 2002 elections, something that no *petista* or *non-petista* journalist, spin doctor, marketing strategist, liberal professional or the unprivileged sectors of Brazilian society had the capacity of doing.

*c) Lula and the market forces: the wooing of the business world and the Veja stories*

The need for the PT and Lula to acquire elite legitimacy in order to secure their election was made evident in the media pages mainly from May onwards, when stories underscoring market fears began to be published. The *Veja* story, *Why Lula frightens the market* (22/05/02), exemplifies such tensions. The front cover showed a line called the 'Brazilian risk' factor, a type of thermometer of evaluation of Brazil's capacity of honouring its debts. It drew the line going up and clashing with another, which was on the increase of Lula's intentional votes. Under the crash of these two lines, Lula appeared in the far right of the page with his eyes looking slightly upward, as if following attentively the clashes between them and worrying about it. Two stories of four to five pages included in this edition, "Businessmen in Lula's agenda" and "What they fear in Lula", debated such conflicts. The first mentioned how Lula had the same number of intentional votes that he had in May 1994 (42%), when Cardoso started with 16%. Although Lula's votes in May 2002 were similar to the ones registered in 1994, the text emphasised how the former situation had never favoured the PT as much as it did then. The feature recalled how Lula in 1989, according to his press officers, did not have any important meetings with big business. His agenda in 1994 and 1998 included reunions with representatives of popular segments of society and trips to the Northeast. In 2002

however, leading investment banks such as Citibank and Deutsche Bank were on a waiting list to see him.

Contrary to Cardoso, who in 1994 benefited from the *real*, Serra in 2002 was not a unanimously popular name in the PFL party and had nothing substantial to present to the electorate. Serra was also placed in an uneasy position as the official candidate at a time when the disenchantment with Cardoso's government was high. According to the text, Serra was not doing well in the campaign, a fact which was leaving elites anxious. "The perception that things are not going well for the *tucano* has produced a climate of tension in the elite, which certainly does not include itself in the mass of 42% of people who are with Lula. They are entrepreneurs, bankers, investors – the so-called 'market' whose nerves get shattered at every rise of the *petista* in the polls", affirmed the magazine. Here it seems that *Veja* was backing the anxieties of the financial market, which constitutes only part of Brazil's elite and not all the other sectors of the middle and upper-classes of Brazilian society, which includes also intellectuals, industrialists and elite liberal professionals.

In 2002, in contrast to 1989 perhaps, the PT did not represent anymore a "mass population" composed only of "radical *petistas*" or representatives of the landless movement. It was also voicing the dissatisfactions of important segments of the middle-classes who urged for further democratisation, and who saw in the Lula candidature the will to conduct more changes in Brazil, as some of these sectors had also seen in the Cardoso candidature back in 1994. Thus the existence of a division in Brazilian elite groups in relation to the desire for change was, according to this story, considered not worth mentioning. It was seen as less important than the demand placed on Lula and the PT to reaffirm their commitment to national and international laws of capitalism, ideological issues stressed exaggeratedly in most of the *Veja* stories in a moment when the party's agenda was ceasing to be socialist. Nonetheless, similar to 1994, *Veja* did manage to produce a certain amount of consistent material on the 2002 dispute. However, like the May piece examined above, most of the stories published throughout the whole campaign adopted a more corporate financial stance.<sup>111</sup> Furthermore, some of the more biased *Veja* pieces of 2002 were slightly in tune with some articles published in 1989.<sup>112</sup>

---

<sup>111</sup> I.e. "It was difficult, but Lula attracted capital" (26/06/02); "Is the PT prepared for the presidency?" (25/09/02) and "They turned to Lula in the final phase" (02/10/02).

<sup>112</sup> I.e. Contrast the "The hypothesis of Lula" (*Veja*, 29/11/89) with "What the radicals of the PT want" (23/10/02).

Also in the first feature “Businessmen in Lula’s agenda”, a box on the bottom underlined the transformations inflicted on Lula’s image by showing small pictures of the PT candidate on television since 1989. It juxtaposed his radical 1989 rhetoric to what was perceived as a certain sentimentality of his new weepy ‘love all’ political persona of 2002. The second text, “What they fear in Lula”, focused on the PT’s ambiguous discourse. It mentioned how the document “The necessary rupture”, a political agenda organised by the *petista* Antonio Palocci, future Finance minister in 2003, and which advocated a break with the current economic model, was likely to be reviewed. “As the voting hour gets closer, the PT starts getting less interventionist“, said the story. Ten entrepreneurs were interviewed here. With the exception of Guido Mantega, a PT economist and the president of Gradiente, Eugenio Staub, the first big businessman to declare support for Lula, the text explored the ambiguities of the PT’s position in relation to the economy. Most pointed to the disparities that existed between what Lula was publicly guaranteeing about his compromise with the economic liberal ideal with the views of militant *petistas*, who demanded an immediate economic rupture.

This *Veja* story seemed to clearly suggest that the acceptance by the financial market of the PT candidate *was* what was needed for the politician to be legitimised also as a representative of the financial sector. This would permit the final consolidation of the elite consensus established around the Lula candidature, which was already beginning to be formed amongst certain sectors of the middle-classes. The fact that Lula was already voicing many of the dissatisfactions of these segments however was not being taken seriously by the magazine yet due to the distance that still existed between him and the financial market. This feature thus reinforced some fears at a time when the (elite) resistance towards Lula and the PT was dying down. In the *O Globo* story “CNI and Fiesp: resistance towards Lula has diminished” (24/04/02) published in April before the *Veja* May piece analysed above, the presidents of these industrial federations affirmed that resistance amongst the entrepreneur class had been reduced in the aftermath of the formation of the PT labour/capital alliance. These declarations were made in the context of the announcement of a document signed by the business class which defended the need for economic growth, demanding also the decrease of interest rates.

Ideological worries also emerged concerning the level of compromise of the opposition with the rules of Brazilian capitalism. The *Veja* story *Even the PT is afraid* (19/06/02) came out when Lula had already consolidated his leadership. In March and April, he jumped from 24% to 35% of intentional votes. In this feature, Lula appeared in

the picture next to former president Itamar Franco followed by a text that underscored how the PT candidate was searching for allies everywhere. *Veja* listed some of the problems that the PT was facing, stressing that the climate of insecurity was not restricted to investors but “even the middle classes who invest and have savings”. “It is calculated that, from 100 electors of the *petista* candidate, only one belongs to the most affluent segment of the middle class”, asserted the magazine, something which in 2002, as I argued above, was not entirely true. Like the other May article, this story seemed to ignore elite divisions and the fact that the PT’s platform was expanding amongst various social classes irrespective of the fact of people seeing themselves as “*petistas*” or not. This feature thus resembled other *Veja* stories published in 1989, like the one discussed in Chapter 3 on the entrepreneurs and their woes regarding how the “savings of the middle classes” and the “promises of job promotions” would stand in case of a Lula victory.<sup>113</sup> *Veja* stories like *Even the PT is afraid* seemed thus to revitalise the climate of the 1989 elections in 2002, signalling the depth of prejudices regarding left-wing politics and even social-democracy, despite Brazil having strengthened its democratic project during the 1990’s.

Another *Veja* piece, *It was difficult, but Lula attracted capital* (26/06/02), investigated how the PT finally managed to lure the business community through the establishment of an alliance with the industrialist entrepreneur José Alencar (PL). Lula was shown in the picture above the text with his head bent down, smiling and with his hands on his face, as if he had finally managed to solve the riddle which had been impeding his success. “For the first time in its history, Lula’s party stops being a left-wing oyster in the presidential elections. Lula gives the place of the candidate for the vice-presidency to José Alencar and embraces the Liberal Party, a party whose habit is to align with forces such as the PFL, ... The main objective of this union with the PL is to transmit to the electorate the message that Lula...has left behind the sectarian heart...”, said *Veja*. The piece pointed out that Alencar was presented in the campaign as the ‘good boss’ that Brazil needed because he offered medical and dentist health care to his “16.500 employees, besides education to their sons”. However, it stated that Alencar was not pretending to be any Saint Francis amongst the industrialists, and that his firm paid strictly market prices.

---

<sup>113</sup> I.e. *Lula and capitalism – the changes that the PT promises divides the country* (*Veja*, 29/11/89), see Chapter 3.

Conti argued that the agreement made between the government with the IMF, which happened in July, was a key moment of the 2002 campaign. From here onwards, Lula started to be legitimised by the market, not being seen anymore as a roadblock to capitalist development: “All the candidates agreed with the IMF deal. After this, Lula started to be viewed as trustworthy. But the PT was put in its place. The adaptation to social-democracy in the UK took 100 years, the PT converted in three...”, said Conti, stressing the pressures placed also on the PT at the time. Admittedly, the signing of the IMF accord was a turning point in the 2002 elections. On the 30<sup>th</sup> of July, when the dollar rose to 3.19 *reais*, then the biggest rise since January of 1999, the government de-valued the currency and initiated another financial deal with the IMF. It stipulated a liberalization of US\$ 6 billion in 2002 and US\$ 24 billion in 2003. Cardoso and Finance Minister Pedro Malan had an essential role here in securing that the opposition candidates maintained a compromise with the continuity of the economic policies, such as the need to have a surplus of 3.75 of the GDP in 2003, something which was interpreted by many as being a straightjacket on the future president’s capacity to spend in the coming year. After the agreement, the financial market again experienced nervousness with rumours concerning a possible withdrawal of the PSDB candidature, which ended up not being true. At the same time, FHC and Malan acted like firemen, ‘calming’ the market and defending Cardoso’s economic model.<sup>114</sup>

In mid-August, FHC emerged as the negotiator between the opposition candidates and the market, oscillating throughout the campaign between attacking the PT, campaigning timidly for Serra and praising Lula.<sup>115</sup> In spite of the criticisms voiced by the opposition, the IMF deal was considered inevitable due to the country’s economic instability. In the *ESP* story, “Help to country excites stocks in the USA and Europe” (09/08/02), the opposition criticised the accord. Lula adopted a moderate tone, arguing over the inevitability of the deal but pointing out the fact that the IMF austerity package, with its surplus of 3.75% of the GDP until 2005, could be a restriction for the next government. Ciro was the most critical candidate, saying that he had been ‘shocked’ by the media coverage of an agreement which could increase Brazil’s debt.<sup>116</sup>

---

<sup>114</sup> I.e. “FHC attacks markets, which he calls destructive” (*ESP*, 27/07/02) and “Greed, fear and ignorance move the market” (*ESP*, 27/09/02).

<sup>115</sup> I.e. “Brazilians can vote without fear, says FHC in Argentina” (*FSP*, 06/07/02); “Without Serra, FHC supports Lula, says PT” (*FSP*, 19/07/02) and “FHC calls candidates to discuss transition” (*ESP*, 13/08/02).

<sup>116</sup> I.e. “Deal with the IMF does not seduce opposition” (*FSP*, 30/07/02); “For Serra, negotiation with the fund is positive” and “Lula criticises, but says that the package is ‘inevitable’” (*ESP*, 09/08/02) and “Ciro: ‘country is down on its knees’” (*JB*, 19/08/02).



After the signing of the accord, Lula in August reinforced his influence in the business community. The *Veja* story *Farmers, Fiesp and Febraban – the PT candidate uninhibitedly courts the elites and is applauded by audiences who were once hostile* (28/08/02) emphasised how many entrepreneurs were going to vote on Lula, affirming that the “bearded Lula frightens less and less.” Lula, who was seen as intractable even in 1994, was being considered unfeigned by the business community in 2002. The story mentioned how an informal election had been done in a meeting of foreign bank economists: Lula won 11 votes against 4, given to Ciro. “The PT has learnt from experience that to govern is different than being always in the opposition, and to compete for the preference of the elector is not the same as inflaming a meeting of bad-humoured strikers”, said the piece, again restoring to clichés in relation to strikers. The story contrasted Lula’s 2002 image and discourse to 1994, when he “attacked the *Real*, advocated the non-payment of the external debt and affirmed that the Febraban (Federal Brazilian Banks) was one of the most retrograde sectors of society. Recently...he was well received in Fiesp, heart of business community, and in the São Paulo stock market, that place which was once demonised by the PT... Lula has also talked to farmers...Who would imagine”, continued the story ironically. Arguably, Lula did go to Fiesp in 1994 and was well received, as we have seen, although there were more fears in relation to the PT in 1994 than there were in 2002.<sup>117</sup>

Near the election day, the *Veja* story *They turned to Lula in the final phase* (02/10/02) mentioned how opportunistic entrepreneurs and politicians decided to jump on the PT’s bandwagon at the last minute. “A few days ahead of the elections, businessmen discovered a sudden affinity with the PT”, pointed the text. Nonetheless, this was perhaps the first time that the magazine acknowledged elite divisions in Brazilian society due to economic disagreements. It did not say this in these exact terms though. “In the business world, there are many reasons for the support given to Lula. One reason is common to everyone: the disillusionment with the Serra candidature...Amongst the *neopetistas* businessmen, all of them complain about the political economy of the government, especially in the industrial sector, which feels left out in favour of the financial market”, said the story.

Thus, as I have argued before, the PT in 2002 already represented the desires of a significant segment of the upper and middle-classes of Brazilian society for both change

---

<sup>117</sup> I.e. “Businessmen praise Lula in Fiesp but criticise the PT” (*O Globo*, 20/09/94), see Chapter 4.

and continuity. As these *Veja* stories indicate, the entrepreneur's support was based on the desire to see a boost in the competitiveness of the national market, which would demand the formation of alliances between capital and labour. Former *FSP* political correspondent, Gilberto Dimenstein affirmed that SP entrepreneurs with a social responsibility agenda were the main type of businessmen who stood by Lula in 2002: "What was being discussed was social responsibility...Then you put this together with the role of the State in crisis, with the perception that the businessman must complement it. This idea is nearly 100% from São Paulo. Here are the core of the entrepreneurs, who were influenced by the American Chamber of Commerce, who brought this notion from the US...There was this idea in Rio too....Xerox, Shell, Esso .... This vision...was the same shared by the businessmen who supported Lula". It was precisely this vision of Lula as a social-democrat who defended responsible but competitive capitalism which dominated many press representations of the PT candidate in the 2002 elections, debates which are developed next.

*d) Lula in the general press: towards a "humanistic" capitalism*

In their attempts to conduct a fair coverage, and also as a result of the growth of acceptability of Lula's discourse by public opinion, most of the mainstream newspapers and the magazine *Isto É* presented Lula in 2002 as being a honest politician who wanted to give capitalism a more "human" face. Some features published by *Isto É* on market tension highlighted the development of the interest of entrepreneurs in the Lula candidature.<sup>118</sup> An early *Isto É* story, *The flirtations of Lula* (01/05/02), included a statement by the president of Fiesp, Horácio Lafer Piva, who said that the main concern amongst the businessmen regarding the PT had been overcome. The feature showed also coherence in its ideological analysis, mentioning how the party had moved towards the centre, managing to break with market resistance. "The businessman who goes by Paulista Avenue ...shows himself willing to pursue a close relationship with the PT candidate... Having governed many States in big cities, the PT does not frighten international capital anymore. The voting intentions registered in recent polls, the moderation of the socio-economic political agenda and the stagnation of the official candidature of José Serra have made the *petista* a highly sought after candidate. Even historical enemies such as the traditional politicians Antônio Carlos Magalhães....are admitting that they will vote for Lula", stated *Isto É*.

---

<sup>118</sup> I.e. "Lula breaks the ice" (07/08/02) and "Lula does not frighten any more" (14/08/02).

Another *Isto É* article, *Lula does not frighten anymore* (14/08/09), was a more positive piece which defined the PT's agenda as being a proposal for a "humanistic capitalism." This feature analysed the impact of the link sealed between capital (the stock market/the boss) and labour (PT/worker). The title on the front cover read: "With the proposal of a humanistic capitalism, the *petista* candidate receives praise from the conservative international press, is approved in a debate in Rede Bandeirantes and is applauded at Fiesp and Bovespa (SP's stock market), where before he was a bearded frog hard to swallow". Lula appeared on the front cover smiling happily. Inside the magazine, a picture showed the *petista* surrounded by a group of three businessmen, all of them looking eagerly at him. One of them was Ricardo Magliano, president of Bovespa. Magliano said that Lula's visit to the institution was a historical moment. "After having been well-received by Fiesp on the 30<sup>th</sup> of July, it was the turn of the market to satisfy its curiosity.... At Bovespa, he provoked frisson... It was the first visit of a left-wing presidential candidate in 113 years of the existence of the stock market...", read the story.

A box was included on the top left side of the first page telling the tale of Lula's first boss, Miguel Serrano, who said that he would vote for Lula. "Someone who was responsible at 15 continues their whole life. I do not vote for him because I was his boss, but because I think he is a leader, a politician who fights for Brazil", explained Serrano, who guaranteed that he was not a "communist". Still immersed in the capital-labour dichotomy, another box on the bottom of the page pointed to other two capitalists, Henry Ford and Franklin D. Roosevelt. The first was defined as the 'good boss' and the second, as the 'father of the unemployed'. Another box on the next page emphasised the shift in the PT's philosophy, with the Marxism perspective being substituted by a more Keynesian approach. The story recalled how post-Second World War II Europe made use of Keynesian ideas on state economic intervention as a means of creating the Welfare State, adding further that the majority of the PT was composed of social-democrats who thought about applying these ideas to Brazil. Such discourses indicated a more solid analysis, presenting to the reader the complexity of the 2002 Brazilian left-wing dilemma, and stopping short from reproducing views which merely emphasised the removal of words like "rupture" from the political project.

As mentioned above, the newspaper *JB* also conducted a balanced coverage.<sup>119</sup> A positive *JB* story on Lula and the PT was “Lula turns into the darling of the businessmen”, which made use of irony to produce in overall a valid analysis on the role of the PT. Lula’s polished speech was underscored in this text. “It is a scene which is becoming more common...Lula...surrounded by businessmen with ties, full of PT slogans on their clothes, begging for a photo next to the new political idol..”, highlighted *JB*. Thus stories like these reveal a very different consensus formed in 2002 than the one which prevailed in 1989. In spite of the critical and correct treatment of such issues by the media, discourses of market hysteria however did emerge in more explicit forms in the “economic terrorism” rhetoric which overwhelmed the media pages in the last phase of the campaign.

*e) The dispute for the center-left space: who is the ‘new’ anti-Lula?*

Contrary to 1989 and 1994, when the ideological camp was polarised more clearly between centre-left and centre-right candidates (Lula and Collor in 1989 and Lula and Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 1994 and 1998), the 2002 elections had candidates vying to occupy the centre-left wing spectrum. Initially, the classic scenario of polarisation between Lula and an anti-Lula candidate seemed to be imposing itself again on the 2002 race. However, due to particular concerns regarding the rise of employment figures and the need to create more social justice, the 2002 contest had practically all the candidates competing for Lula’s space as the main opposition leader. This reduced the more divided ideological fields of “right” and “left” which had prevailed in the last disputes, reflecting also the electorate’s urges for change and the increasing questioning of the economic model. The Datafolha institute indicated that at least 52% of the electorate against 32% wanted a president from the opposition.<sup>120</sup>

Serra’s positioning in the dispute was somewhat ambiguous and schizophrenic: he presented himself on one side as being the official candidate and on another he strived to create a distance from the FHC government, criticising the economic orthodoxy and promising to create more jobs. He thus engaged in a direct tug-of-war with Lula, who also affirmed that he would boost employment numbers. Arguably, if the *real* was the main

---

<sup>119</sup> I.e. “Lula turns into the darling of the businessmen” (01/09/02); “PT wants to calm the market”(14/10/02) and “Inequality in Brazil is aberration” (20/10/02).

<sup>120</sup> “52% prefer an oppositional candidate to FHC” (*FSP*, 10/09/02).

debate in 1994, employment would be the main concern in the 2002 presidential elections.<sup>121</sup> The story “Scenario makes the candidates’ discourse similar” (*ESP*, 18/08/02) emphasised how all the candidates knew that they had to pose as the “responsible opposition”, defending a political programme of both change and continuity. “Most of the proposals point to a government typically of the centre-left: austerity in the fiscal policy, aggressive in the external market and more present in the social area”, read the text. Thus Lula’s and Serra’s economic-political platform was, to a certain extent, quite similar.

The six page *Veja* story, *The turn that the world took* (09/10/02), pointed out how both Lula and Serra were worried about reinforcing economic state intervention. “It is not expected that the next government will repeat...the liberal recipe of President Fernando Henrique and Minister Malan. Lula wants more interference of the state in national life...But...he does not intent to put at risk economic stability... Serra...speaks of creating an industrial programme, a proposal that the government of Fernando Henrique never took into consideration...”. The feature added further that Lula made clear his wish for a stronger state: “Lula...makes it clear that he thinks that the state is a strong entity...which guarantees social well-being. Lula proposes a transition from a “bourgeoisie democracy” to a “popular” one, whilst Serra promised to give continuity to the current government and also to advance it, assigning to the state the role of “acting like an agent of economic development...”.

Ideological confusion and ambiguity were thus elements which were not exclusive of the PT in its struggle to woo the business world whilst still maintaining its left-wing ideals. During much of the campaign, Ciro also tried to take the second place from Serra, with the media endorsing the hype around him, especially in the months of June and July. Serra and Ciro thus seemed to navigate somewhere between the left and the centre fields, defending more emphasis on the social but abiding also to national and international capitalism laws. In the 2002 *ESP* story published next to “War on jobs dominates the campaign” (13/09/02), Cardoso admitted that the *real* did not boost employment. The piece ““*Real* opened vacancies, but not in sufficient number, affirmed Cardoso”” had FHC responding to the critiques on employment, growth in income concentration and social investments. Cardoso said that jobs had been created during the *real*, but acknowledged that these had not been in sufficient number.

---

<sup>121</sup> I.e. “War on jobs dominates the campaign” (*ESP*, 13/09/02) and “Candidates promise to advance more” (*O Globo*, 22/09/02).

In an attempt to pose as the new anti-Lula but at the same time to occupy his position, Ciro adopted an ambiguous left-wing discourse. In the end of July, research polls stated that Ciro could take Lula's place.<sup>122</sup> At first, Ciro's unsteady political persona had not defined itself in the centre-left, so it seemed that there would be a repetition of the Collor phenomena (Ciro (right) versus Lula (left)). Many of the stories published in the press on Ciro actually echoed some of the media frenzy made around Collor.<sup>123</sup> Such features explored the sudden emergence of a young politician from the Northeast who combined in his political persona moral indignation with aggressiveness. The *Isto É* story "Ciro flies ahead" (31/07/02) painted a positive picture of the candidate's aggressive style. In the front cover, Ciro appeared on top of a flying rocket heading towards the skies. The title read: "Candidate of the Labour Front goes up 17 points in 45 days, gets close to Lula and provokes an earthquake in José Serra's campaign". The inside story of five pages, "Hurricane Ciro", examined in a slightly euphoric tone how the PPS candidate was a 'phenomena': "...he has turned into the only candidate capable of defeating Lula in the second round, and on a good margin: 47% to 40%." The text even used the term *furação* (hurricane), resembling the media discourses articulated about Collor when he started to grow in the polls in May 1989.

In July media hype around the PPS candidate was at its peak. The *Veja* story, *Who is going to be the anti-Lula?* (17/07/02), carried similar ideological overtones to the *Isto É* feature *The Brizola spectrum* (22/03/89). *Veja* showed a picture of Ciro and Serra side by side with an image of Lula on a faded screen in the background. The inside story of seven pages long, "The fight to be the anti-Lula", highlighted that the electoral contest pointed to a second round with Lula heading it. The big question was who had the electoral strength to beat him. The idea that the electoral outcome would be an ideological and polarised one like 1989 was emphasised: "...experts believe that the dispute will be as heated as it was in 1989, when Lula went to the second round with only 500.000 votes more than Brizola". The text then stressed how Ciro and Serra, who were vying for the second place, both came from the PSDB, although the former was seen with a certain prejudice by the "left-wingers who had converted to social-democracy, such as Fernando Henrique...and José Serra. Ciro ....is from a family who belongs to the power structures of Ceará for more than 100 years". Here it is possible to see a link being established

---

<sup>122</sup> I.e. "Ciro reaches Lula and could win in the second round" (*ESP*, 26/07/02).

<sup>123</sup> Compare stories like "The pre-campaign phenomena" (*JB*, 14/05/89) and "The star (Collor) takes off" (*Veja*, 17/05/89) to "Ciro flies ahead" (*Isto É*, 31/07/02).

between Ciro and Collor (Ciro-Collor) and the *tucano* with the Cardoso government (Serra-FHC).

From the IMF pact onwards, Ciro's political agenda began to underscore the necessity of breaking with the economic model due to the rise of unemployment.<sup>124</sup> In the *ESP* story "The market can go to hell. I will do what is in my plan" (15/08/02), Ciro is presented as a candidate with many faces. In the sub-piece "In the speeches, a Ciro for each occasion", Ciro is announced first as a candidate who criticises the market in a meeting with SP businessmen. In a conference with US market analysts nonetheless, Ciro promised to respect contracts. "An auditorium with businessmen in São Paulo and a group of US analysts heard on Tuesday two presidential candidates, both called Ciro Gomes. The first said that his rival Lula let himself be 'domesticated' by the market, and gave a guarantee that with him, this would not happen", affirmed the opening paragraph. "The second Ciro was introduced .....to US and Brazilian market analysts. He is a candidate who never thought of...altering the rules of entry and leave of foreign currency....", continued the text.

In the piece on the far right, "Ciro gets irritated with questions, and dinner with businessmen and bankers ends in quarrels", the candidate is shown as having little patience. In the house of the entrepreneur Ricardo Steinburch, of the Vicunha group, Ciro started a quarrel after having asserted that "the market can go to hell. What I have to do is in my plan." The PPS candidate said this after responding to the question: "What is necessary to pacify the market?" The story described his irritability: "The temperament of the candidate culminated in complaints throughout the room. Patricia Pillar (Ciro's girlfriend)...tried to calm him down...It was no use. Ciro felt offended and even said: I will cut my hand before signing any paper with the bankers. It was then that the public silenced..". These stories undoubtedly marked a moment when Ciro started *not* to be seen by the financial market as an alternative to Lula. According to the text, after Ciro's statement on cutting off his hand, the public present decided to vote for Lula: "And, according to many of those who were present, it was decided: between Ciro and Lula, Lula was the preferred one". Thus Ciro's attack on the financial market and his temperamental personality eventually contributed for his downfall and Lula's rise, although the final phase in September was marked by heated debates and a series of "economic terrorism" discourses due to the possibility of Lula winning the elections.

---

<sup>124</sup> I.e. "Ciro says that he will not be domesticated like Lula" (*ESP*, 14/08/02).

## 5.6. The final phase and the significance of the Lula victory

### *a) Temperatures rise: between PT “radicalism” and “economic terrorism”*

The 2002 campaign started to get quite agitated mainly in the end of September and October due to the proximity of the date of the elections. September saw newspapers publishing conflicting election scenarios on Lula’s chances of winning.<sup>125</sup> Nonetheless, on the 6<sup>th</sup> of October, Brazilians eventually chose Lula and Serra to face each other again in the second round. Temperatures began to escalate, culminating in yet another battle of ideological discourses. The *ESP* story, “Temperature of the campaign rises in the final phase” (18/10/02), stressed how politicians, artists and businessmen from both sides were engaging in direct tug-of-wars as a response to the declarations made by the famous TV Globo actress, Regina Duarte, that she feared a Lula government. This made the campaign reach a boiling point. Serra began to intensify the attacks on the PT, capitalising on the economic rhetoric of fear that existed in Brazilian society in relation to Lula for his own political purposes.<sup>126</sup>

Newspapers at this point were publishing stories underlining some of the dissatisfaction with the FHC legacy.<sup>127</sup> During September and October, Lula again made last attempts to pacify the market amid the rise of the dollar’s exchange rate to record levels, whilst Cardoso’s public statements indicated a (timid) support for Lula in case Serra did not make it.<sup>128</sup> In the *ESP* story “Lula goes to the bankers to try to calm the market” (28/09/02), the PT candidate was preparing an announcement of his future economic team: “..Lula is going to meet today with bankers and businessmen in São Paulo, in yet another attempt to calm the financial market...Lula will guarantee that, if he wins the dispute, he will announce the name of the president of the Central Bank”,

---

<sup>125</sup> I.e. “Lula one step away from the absolute majority” (*JB*, 18/09/02); “Lula falls and gets further away from winning in the first round” (*ESP*, 21/09/02) and “With 49% of the valid votes, Lula is one point away from winning in the first round” (*FSP*, 29/09/02).

<sup>126</sup> I.e. “Serra attacks and says that country can turn into a Venezuela if Lula wins” (*FSP*, 11/10/02); “Serra says that he is more left-wing than Lula” (*ESP*, 16/10/02) and “For Lula, Serra revives Arena and the ‘apology of fear’” (*ESP*, 22/10/02).

<sup>127</sup> I.e. “Approval of FHC government falls to 23%” (*FSP*, 22/09/02) and “FH admits that country grew little”, (*JB*, 24/09/02).

<sup>128</sup> I.e. “‘Presidency does not demand diploma, says FHC’” and “There is no reason for pre-electoral tension” (*ESP*, 21/09/02).



asserted *ESP*. Another piece on the side stated how Lula had turned into the ‘blue chip’ of the financial market. “...Lula does not frighten anymore the financial market....To use the common language of the stock market: from a rejected share in the elections of 1989, 1994 and 1998, he has turned into a blue chip. This is the way the investor classifies the share with the highest power..”, said the paper, adding that nine out of ten analysts of national and international financial institutions consulted by *ESP* affirmed that they thought Lula would be the future president.

Discussions in the press at this point also deliberated on the capacity of the PT to govern Brazil. The *Veja* feature, *Is the PT prepared for the presidency?* (25/09/02), examined some of the PT’s mistakes as well as similar points already mentioned in other *ESP*’s editorials, which included Lula’s previous hostility to the banking sector. The eight-page long article included in this edition, “New Christians of Capitalism”, is perhaps one of the most positive *Veja* features written on Lula and the PT. It underlined how “nobody doubts of the democratic vocation of the PT candidate”, stressing the way in which Lula “compromised...to maintain intact ..the economic stability...Everyone recognised, starting with Lula, that Brazil and the PT are more mature today.” The story also gently criticised the FHC legacy, pointing to a crisis in the Cardoso government, but stating also that during his administrations, Brazilian institutions had evolved enormously. The article asserted that a possible break with the economic liberal ideal was something unimaginable, highlighting the incapacity of the future president to change the order of things even if he wished: “None of this would be imagined in a country like Brazil of today, a country that, with all its faults, practices the universal economic rules unchangeable in the globalized world. ...the margin of manoeuvre of the president of any party to set back institutional progress in the country is minimum..”. *Veja* went on to classify the majority of the PT as being composed of social-democrats, explaining Lula’s transformations also as being an appropriate shift to the centre. It went on to state that this did not mean that the party had abandoned its old convictions.

Preoccupations with the “radicals” of the PT and the party’s “radicalism” were also expressed in this last phase, with Serra capitalising on these fears for his own political purposes and affirming that the country would succumb to ruin in case of a left-wing victory. The fact that the actress Regina Duarte went on Serra’s propaganda campaign to say that she “feared” a Lula government typified the ascendancy in the final phase of these ideological discourses. In the *ESP* stories “For Lula, Serra revives Arena and ‘apology of fear’” and “It is a right-wing and moralistic campaign, says Dirceu”

(22/10/02), Lula and former PT president, José Dirceu, accused Serra of stimulating the emergence of the type of fear that existed during the dictatorship, when the military generals pressured the population to support only the authorised opposition party, the MDB. According to Lula in the piece, Serra's propaganda strategy was not "contributing to democracy or for the politicisation of Brazilian society". The article also looked at Serra's propaganda campaign, pointing out how the new slogan talked about the "green and yellow wave, not the red one". The second text had Dirceu classifying the attacks as a 'moralistic right-wing' campaign, with Brizola stating that Lula's rise to the presidency was "a dream" for many Brazilians.

*Veja* also published a story about elite concerns in relation to *petista* radicals. In the seven-page story *What the radicals of the PT want* (23/10/02), the text warned that these groups, which comprised 30% of the party, had remained silent throughout the campaign in order to stand by Lula. They would possibly demand to be heard in the future government on issues such as "the expropriation of private property of the bourgeoisie; the transformation of private firms into public ones; the silencing of the press (understood through the euphemism 'social control of the communication vehicles'); the final abolition of the market...". This feature also included an interview with radical former PT senator Heloisa Helena. The title of the piece read: "The recent conversion of Lula to the rules of capitalism sounds like an unforgivable heresy to these apostles of socialism." In the earlier story *Lula's road to power* (09/10/02), the text warned also of possible demands that could be made by such radical segments of the PT in case Lula won: "...it is possible that they will demand that the president compromises with some historical *petista* issues, like writing off the external debt, the revision of privatisation programmes and the combat of American imperialism....", stressed the magazine.

These concerns seemed to be somewhat exaggerated and indicative of the prejudices which existed in relation to what the Lula and the PT stood for politically in 2002. Such views nonetheless seem not to recognise that a truly healthy democracy is based on political pluralism, which requires and needs narrow interest groups who can function as critical nerves, questioning the problem of social injustice when necessary. These groups are in general subsumed in the broader political process by more compromising, moderate dominant leaders and parties. Thus a healthy democracy that stimulates debate needs to function with diverse and competing interests, aiming to find points of equilibrium between the more sectional groups and other dominant leaders whose job it is to represent the needs of a series of smaller groups in the midst of internal and smaller conflicting

viewpoints. As we have seen though, such media market hysteria did not permeate *all* of the media coverage in 2002, with Lula having managed to consolidate his social-democratic political image, a discourse that reached its peak mainly at the point of his victory.

*b) Lula in the newspapers as president*

As expected, the victory of Lula on the 27<sup>th</sup> of October at the polls received an enthusiastic and emotional press coverage, with many of the exaggerated biases in relation to the PT dying down or disappearing altogether.<sup>129</sup> Lula was shown in the front pages of the dailies crying and emotionally moved, in much the same way as millions of Brazilians filled the main streets of the capitals to celebrate, reproducing scenes of the civic culture climate of the *Diretas Já* and to a lesser extent, of the 1989 elections.<sup>130</sup> The *FSP* story, “Lula is president”, and the *JB* piece, “Lula there”, pointed out how the PT candidate had finally made it to the presidency on the day of his 57<sup>th</sup> birthday. In the *FSP* article, “‘Brazil voted without fear of being happy’, says Lula” (28/10/02), the PT candidate made reference to the slogan of his 1989 campaign, *Without Fear of Being Happy*, as a means of accentuating the long road that he and the party had taken in order for the country to vote for them. This declaration reinforced the link with the 2002 campaign slogan, *Hope overcame Fear*, thus sealing the association made between both disputes (1989 and 2002). The political persona of Lula, his poor background and years of suffering, his leadership as a former union leader and consequent defeats in previous presidential disputes were the main themes explored by the media in a news coverage that underlined social mobility, the advancement of democracy and the proximity of capital to labour.

Many arguments were given to explain Lula’s rise to power. Director of *O Globo*’s newsroom, Rodolfo Fernandes, linked the importance of the PT’s victory in Brazilian society to possible future improvements in the media’s style of reporting: “It was the best

---

<sup>129</sup> “Country elects the inheritor of one of the biggest social debts in the world” (*JB*, 27/10/02) and “Lula there” (*JB*, 28/10/02); “Lula is president”, “*Petista* will be the first left-winger to govern the country” and “‘Brazil voted without fear of being happy’, says Lula” (*FSP*, 28/10/02); “‘It is the realisation of a dream’, celebrates Lula” (*ESP*, 28/10/02); “Emotion with the result of the polls” (*O Globo*, 28/10/02) and “Lula changes history in the opposition” and “The reds reach power” (*Veja*, 30/10/02).

<sup>130</sup> I.e. “*Petistas* take to the streets to celebrate victory” (*FSP*, 28/10/02); “Brasil da Silva - The capital gets closer to labour”, (*JB*, 28/10/02); “‘I was elected by the PT, but I will be the president of all Brazilians” (*ESP*, 28/10/02) and “Families and press officers cry of joy for victory waited for during 13 years” (*O Globo*, 28/10/02).

thing that could have happened...because it institutionalised the participation of the PT in Brazilian democracy. So the PT, who was a force that stayed very much as an outsider in the political process, denouncing everything, had to begin to participate in the political game, and that included the relationship with the press. And for the press this was excellent because it forced it to debate more and more. It can go deeper into the political coverage, it can discuss more the proposals..." I share Fernandes' analysis and of other academics and journalists on the consolidation of democracy through Lula's election. However, some Brazilian newspapers were quick to downplay the consolidation of political pluralism in 2002 by highlighting that the result could be more attributed to Lula's persona than to the PT, a fact which was true in numerical terms, but which actually worked to diminish the argument that Lula won also because of, and not in spite of, his party and what it represented in Brazilian society during the last decade. The *ESP* story "Lula was the great winner" (29/10/02) asserted that the 53 million Brazilians who elected Lula voted exclusively on the individual, minimising the arguments concerning an ideological victory of the left. Another piece, "Brazil voted in Lula, and not in the Worker's Party" (*ESP*, 29/10/2002), presented numbers to point out that the Worker's Party did not do so well at the polls throughout the country, electing 91 federal MPs, a number equivalent to its 18% of national representation.

Another *ESP* editorial published on the same day entitled *There was no red wave* affirmed that the PT had increased their numbers in the Chamber of Deputies, being the biggest party there, but had not managed to obtain a large majority in Parliament. This meant that they would depend on alliances with the opposition forces to approve their own projects, a factor which later would have significant political consequences in Lula's future government, resulting in the *mensalão* (monthly stipends) denunciations regarding the "buying" of support of rival MPs by the PT.

Other newspapers, however, wrote enthusiastic editorials, such as the *JB* piece *The rose of the people* (27/10/02). This underlined the difficulties that Lula had to overcome in life, criticising the elite's reluctance in accepting him. However, it also mentioned how the politician was bigger than his PT party, which would have to behave itself: "Part of the elite insists in not recognising the merits of Lula. How dare a man who was not born in a good family and has no diploma govern the country!....The radical segments of the PT should not fall into an illusion: Lula continues to be bigger than his party. The left should behave itself according to the importance of the historical moment and not mess up...the future government..", said *JB*. Other *JB* editorials praised FHC's legacy and his

role in the transition process. *The Great Forgotten* (29/09/02) for instance affirmed that Fernando Henrique's legacy had been in general a positive one, emphasising the affinity which existed between the paper and Cardoso: "He put at the disposition of whoever was going to be elected all the information that the successor considered relevant....And mobilised federal forces to guarantee the integrity of the dispute...Before the voting begins, it is possible to point to a great winner of the 2002 elections: Fernando Henrique Cardoso."

As we have seen, Lula's victory cannot be attributed exclusively to himself or to the PT but to a series of socio-political and historical factors. Lula however depended on the party to win and on the internal controversial transformations conducted by the PT, which permitted it to move towards the centre and conquer more reluctant sectors. The *Veja* eight-page feature, *Lula changes history in the opposition*, (30/10/02) was a consistent analytical article on Lula's trajectory as leader of the opposition since the 1970's. It focused on the importance of the change of power structures in Brazilian society, mentioning Lula's upbringing in the Northeast and highlighting his personal qualities, such as his difficulty in accepting criticism. "Lula president is a demonstration for the world that democracy in Brazil, and by extension in Latin America, is not exercised only to safe-guard the appearances of elites who go in and out of power ....Brazil affirmed itself as a nation with an extraordinary social mobility....The country's democracy is sufficiently mature enough to elect a president from a party not linked to the traditional spheres of power...", stated *Veja*, adding that the PT had chosen to dismantle its previous anti-capitalist project.

Another highly ideological *Veja* feature, *The reds reach power* (30/10/02), examined how the PT had won in a moment of crisis for the left worldwide. It said that the last left-wing government that the country had had was in 1964 with Joao Goulart, the president defeated by the military dictatorship. In eight pages, the text discussed the transformations that European left-wing parties went through, shifting to the centre and compromising with economic liberalism. "In the last decade in Europe, there were many examples of left-wing and centre-left-wing parties who tore their old manuals...and...adapted to reality, to reach power...it is possible that the PT will make a prudent government like Tony Blair and Massimo D'Alema ..", affirmed *Veja*. The story downplayed the PT's left-wing credentials, analysing the relationship it had with its radicals. "The *petista* discourse...did not come accompanied by a clear revised doctrine as was the case of the British Worker's party. The PT maintains its believe in "socialism".

But it is clear that this mention of socialism is an ideological allegory...Is there anything less left-wing than entrepreneurs and *petistas* speaking the same language?..”, questioned the text provocatively. Despite some of these ideological biases, in general this was a coherent if not somewhat ironic analytical piece, which ended up acknowledging the wider democratisation of Brazilian society through Lula’s election: “..in less than two decades, Brazil made a rapid transition from the dictatorship to left-wing politics. It was governed by a former ally of the military regime, afterwards by an adventurer expelled from power for corruption, substituted by a traditional 50’s nationalist, followed by a sociologist that implemented liberal politics and now, by a former left-wing factory worker...”, finalised *Veja*.

Thus there was obviously no ‘red wave’ in 2002 in the sense of a revival of old-style socialism. But there was a recognition by segments of the Brazilian electorate of the importance of key values which lied in the *essence* of left-wing politics, such as social justice and the desire for more equality and wealth distribution. These ideals, followed by the urge for economic growth and industrial development, did play a role in Lula’s victory, being expressed through what both the PT and Lula stood for in Brazilian politics. Arguably, it is the political and cultural weight of the left that forces elites to concede political rights and benefits to less privileged sectors of the population. This has been so in advanced capitalist societies and it seemed that in 2002, Brazil’s time had come to include the left in mainstream Brazilian society and politics.

However, the election was also marked by concerns regarding the level of compromise of Lula’s political platform and the recognition of the fact that his government would be placed in a straightjacket. There were concerns that Lula’s alliances would impede or slow down wider social, political and economic change, with many seeing in him a slight continuity of Cardoso’s government. Evidently, Lula gave continuity and (democratic) advancement to Cardoso’s project of juxtaposing the liberal economic ideal to the need of investing more in the social, but imprinted on this agenda a more left-wing tone. Nonetheless, Lula’s compromise with economic austerity resulted later in calls during his time in office for the government to relax its economic orthodox policies, leading to accusations that his government had abandoned totally left-wing ideals to embrace fully economic liberalism.

On the 1<sup>st</sup> of January of 2003, Lula inaugurated what some hoped would be a ‘new’ social democratic era for Brazil. Arguably, it is too early to give a full evaluation of the Lula government here. At the beginning of 2006, it was possible to detect though that the

government had managed to conduct some improvements in the economic and social fronts, with the rate of poverty being reduced by 8% between 2003 and 2004 (FGV, 2006); the unemployment rate going down to 9% and the international debt being reduced to US\$ 18 billion, after having once been US\$ 125 billion. Social programs, which had begun in the Cardoso government, received a wider boost, including the funds destined to poor families (the *Bolsa Família* programme) and other political projects of eradication of hunger (*Fome Zero*), although the way that these programmes have been implemented in the Lula government has been the subject of a lot of controversy.

Lula's administration nonetheless was widely affected by political corruption denunciations, contributing to demoralize the Brazilian left-wing project and placing serious concerns over the future of such politics in the country as well as the left's capacity of truly promoting social justice and more economic equality. The PT thus lost its exclusive claim over political ethics, showing that it was also affected by sleaze and clientelism similarly to other Brazilian parties. Nevertheless, it seems evident that Lula's election was an essential victory for the left and was much needed in a country with wide wealth disparities and social injustices, and which has the potential to develop into a more democratically advanced nation. Only in due time though will it be possible to evaluate more fully the Lula legacy, and if his two administrations did in fact advance significantly social and economic change as promised.

Finally, the media in 2002 exercised a legitimate role in offering a balanced and more complex coverage of the elections than the previous years, although some publications, as we have seen, endorsed the exaggerated fears concerning a possible economic collapse in Brazil in case of a PT victory. When such discourses were articulated in the media pages, they seemed to serve more as a form of defence of economic liberalism, with its emphasis on inflation control, cuts in public spending and privatization of public firms, than as rational and analytical discourses which aimed to reflect the complexities of specific political projects that were being discussed for the country at the time. For it is the job of independent commercial news organisations to mediate and facilitate the public debate that is taking place in society, and to not endorse certain prejudices of readers or hysteria of particular groups, thus producing a professional coverage which can do justice to the diverse political disputes that exist in Brazil.

## **5.7. Conclusion**

Lula's election thus produced significant changes in the power structures of Brazilian society at the same time that it gave continuity and advanced Cardoso's previous political and economic policies. It strengthened the democratisation process which had been ongoing since 1984, consolidating political pluralism and challenging the previous dominance of extreme right and centre-right wing forces which had been occupying the various power structures of Brazilian society for centuries. It also contributed to weaken some of the power of traditional Northeast oligarchic politicians which had prevailed throughout Brazilian history. Lula's and the PT's victory in 2002 therefore *legitimised* conflict and the diverse interests of multiple groups of Brazilian society, placing the worker and the common Brazilian man in the spotlight of Brazilian politics and society for the first time, as well as having opened up some spaces for radical politics and democracy.

Similarly to 1994, the political and social platforms of the 2002 elections were subordinated to the economic ideal, although employment marked more the agenda of the latter election in contrast to the *real* of the former. The market thus exercised power both in the 1994 and 2002 presidential elections. As we have seen, elite divisions were ripe, with the production capitalist sector standing opposite the financial one at one point, embracing more the PT and its programme of productivity and economic expansion. If during the *Diretas Já* campaign some segments of the market aligned with civil society, contributing to advance democracy in opposition to governmental structures who acted to impede it, in 2002 some forces of the financial market hesitated in the midst of the perspectives of a future progression of the state. Left-wing politics was thus slightly constrained, having had to adjust to a more moderate political discourse that backed some of the key aspects of economic liberalism. Nevertheless, it did aim to present a project which could be capable of creating a more social-democratic programme for the country, one which could perhaps ease some of the harshness of Brazil's capitalism system. However, the fact that Lula won at that moment in time attested to a recognition by the Brazilian population that the financial market were not the only supreme representatives of power in Brazil, and that other counter-agendas and ideas had finally reached the mainstream.

I have compared here the rise of PT in Brazil to the rise of New Labour in the UK 1997 elections. If the extent of the impact of the support of Rupert Murdoch's conservative newspaper *The Sun* on the victory of Blair at the polls has been subject to debate in the UK (Budge, Greve, McKay and Newton; 1998), in Brazil the mainstream



media in 2002 did not explicitly advocate the support of any candidate, with the exception of *ESP* and the magazine *Carta Capital* and to a certain extent, also *Veja*. I have shown here however that the role assumed by the press was much more a professional one, and that this contributed to produce a coverage which voiced the concerns of the main political players of the contest. The PT candidate was accorded more sympathetic treatment by the media than the previous elections of 1989 and 1994, with Lula's image as a social-democratic politician being widely represented in contrast to the market hysteria and the prejudices that did occasionally arise throughout the campaign.

Fairness in political reporting thus contributed to diminish partisanship practices and alignments of the media industry to particular candidates. As we have seen, journalists and the press improved many aspects of political reporting, including the examination of a wider range of themes beyond the economic, such as employment and social issues; the publication of similar neutral stories like the 1994 elections but also more positive pieces on Lula/PT; the avoidance of embarking upon market hysteria or reproducing biased ideological discourses to explain the disputes and the journalists' positioning in the campaign as *mediators* and *facilitators* of public debate. The media thus exercised a role of not only defining which agendas to debate, which campaign issues to make transparent and the power connections at stake in the elections, but it also promoted dialogue between politicians and Brazilian society, voicing important aspects of the programmes of the opposition.

The 2002 media coverage however was far from perfect. Problems included the excessive focus on political personalities and political marketing strategies in contrast to the realisation of more in-depth discussions of Brazil's key problems, which would have culminated in the construction of a more politicised debate that could have stimulated the public to participate more in the political process, thus helping people form sounder political judgments. I believe that only part of this was achieved in 2002. Thus we have seen a certain (restricted) expansion of public debate in spite of the rise of marketing strategies in politics and despite also of the increase in infotainment techniques in journalism, as well as the existence still of partisan routines in newsrooms. Nonetheless, in general terms the 2002 coverage has been one in which political disputes were carried out in the media with coherent degrees of balance and fairness, with journalists assuming a social responsibility ethos and functioning as mediators of public debate, issues examined further in Chapter 6.

## **Chapter 6 – Partisanship versus professionalism: the role of the journalist in the democratisation process**

### **6.1. Introduction**

Journalism in Brazil in the last two decades has been immersed in the contradictions of the consolidation of political representative democracy since 1985 and the effect of the entry of the country into the global free market. Many South American countries which left authoritarian regimes in the 1980's struggled in the 1990's to endorse fully the tradition of US classic liberal journalism with its values of objectivity and professionalism. Waisbord (2000) has argued that the print press during this period maintained its close-knit ties to the state in a reality which saw the continuity of the highly politicised nature of many of Brazil's institutions. The press in the contemporary years was plunged into the conflicts concerning citizenship and consumerism rationales: on one hand it functioned as a restricted arena of public debate in response to growing democratisation and popular political participation, on the other it had to attend to increasing marketing demands. Such tensions were a result of the strengthening of political civil democracy and the need of markets to expand. This forced the mainstream press to represent wider views, to criticise authority and to engage in critical surveillance over the activities of the state. Market liberal democracy thus gave the media capacity to modernise its practices and to invest in professionalization procedures, with newsrooms seeing the decline of partisan routines and the proliferation of the objectivity regime.

The shift from the practice of militant journalism to a commercial model notably shaped Brazilian journalism significantly in the last decades. The development and industrialization of Brazil from the 1970's onwards ran parallel to the creation of a wider and more sophisticated consumerist society (Nassif, 2003), one which demanded the attention of markets. The rise of professionalism and objectivity in the Brazilian newsroom was part of the whole process of professionalization and modernization of Brazilian media industries, such as *Globo Organisations*, the publisher magazine group *Abril* and the newspaper *Folha*. In journalism, this was exemplified mainly by the 1984 *FSP* reforms and the emphasis place by the daily on an understanding of news as a

product and of the role of journalists as objective professionals, a debate examined in Chapter 2. However, the transformation that journalism experienced in the last years did not result in a total break with the journalistic militant practices of the past. Journalism continued to be shaped by both the different interests of news organizations as well as by the political and economic environment in which it was immersed, thus remaining ambiguously defined in the contemporary phase.

Given the favouring of the professional and objective journalism style over partisanship in the decades of the 1980's and 1990's, one might ask how did journalists manage to contribute to advance democracy and promote social and political change if they relied mainly on instrumental tools (professionalism) rather than idealistic ones (militancy)? Was any contribution possible if newsrooms had substituted idealistic and political concerns for more technical worries regarding new-making, such as catchy headlines, human interest stories and the use of journalism routines of objectivity and accuracy? The critical examination of the press' coverage of the presidential elections from 1989 to 2002 pursued here has indicated that professionalism and objectivity in contradictory ways grew from the coverage of one election to the next, and that this contributed for a fairer and complex portrayal of Brazilian politics and society. Contrary to what one might imagine at first, these liberal journalism values were crucial for the incorporation of wider debates in the mainstream media, and for the treatment of counter-discourses and left-wing aspirations as democratic and legitimate. Naturally, this was a result of the ongoing democratization of Brazil and a consequence also of the pressures placed by members of the population, civil society representatives and new political leaders on the media system in opposition to the influence of traditional business and oligarchic political elites, who previously had most of the attention of the communication vehicles. Thus through balance the media were able to reflect more the (elite) divisions and political disputes that were occurring in Brazilian society over the direction that Brazil should take in the post-dictatorship phase.

This chapter will argue that journalists *did* make contributions to the democratisation process through the use of multiple journalism identities. In the contemporary years, however, these contributions were mainly made possible through journalists' commitment to progressive readings of professionalism and social responsibility. The limits imposed on these contributions were less related to issues of the use or not of liberal journalism values of objectivity, and were more a consequence of political and economic (market) pressures. This chapter will argue that the professional model and objective regime are

not flawed, and that they actually did contribute to a more mature and advanced discussion of Brazilian politics and representation of its multiple interests in the last two decades. If the dictatorship period saw the functioning of wider political constraints, the contemporary phase was perhaps more dominated by economic limits although, as we have seen, political interests did and still do pose a series of threats on journalism practice. The cases of journalism bias which I highlighted in the textual analysis done on news stories of the presidential elections were examples of the reflection on media messages of the partisanship practices that still exist in newsrooms as well as the politicised nature of news organisations, in spite of alleged commitments to objectivity. This is why some radical critiques (i.e. Kucinski, 1998) attacked the mainstream press, accusing the professional model of being flawed and media industries of having favoured candidates who represented the views of the establishment.

Objectivity and balance are thus crucial elements in journalists' attempts to explain an increasingly complex world which goes beyond one-sided arguments, rigid ideological or class conflict maximums (Lichtenberg, 2000). Thus I defend here a continuous strengthening of professional journalism practices combined with public service commitments and social responsibility ideals. This chapter engages in international debates concerning the cultures of liberal journalism before focusing on the particular case of Brazilian contemporary journalism, supporting the argument that in fact both journalism cultures co-existed during the contemporary phase. Interpretative journalism and commentary analysis has also seen a significant expansion in Brazil, with new technologies and the Internet facilitating the emergence of political blogs in mainstream newspapers.

Thus the tradition of opinionated journalism has maintained its influence, although interpretative journalism has functioned very much within the ideals of objectivity. The evidence gathered here suggests that in general the Brazilian press was at its best when it produced an equipoise coverage which gave rise to professionalism over ideological biases or sensationalism. Exceptions go to the direct elections campaign or other moments such as the Collor impeachment process, when journalists were not "objective" but rather assumed a non-partisan stance in favour of universal democratic ideals, having produced nonetheless a solid press coverage that contributed to pressure for change. Thus the competing journalism cultures of objectivity and partisanship, and their relevance to Brazilian journalism, is the core debate investigated in this chapter.

## 6.2. Balance and fairness in Brazilian journalism: the partisanship versus professionalism debate

Academics and historians (i.e. Schudson, 1978; Curran, 1985, Hallin, 2000) have examined the changes in the American and European press from the 18<sup>th</sup>/19<sup>th</sup> centuries onwards, addressing the impacts that these modifications had in the transformation of news into a commodity in the 20<sup>th</sup> century and examining the decline of the partisanship press amid the development of the current commercial ideal. In Chapter 1, I examined how Brazilian journalism was transformed during the two centuries of its existence (Seabra, 2002). We saw the emergence of the Brazilian press in the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century until the plural and final phase, which began around the 1970's. Waisbord (2000; 124) has argued that the model of commercial journalism gained presence in South America around the 1920's and 1930's, with the proliferation of a consumer market and the rise of a middle class with increasing economic and political influence. By the 1950's the Brazilian media were thus considered to be commercial enterprises. However, the industrial character of the Brazilian media was maximized mainly from the 1970's and 1980's onwards in the light of the slow transition to democracy and the entry of the country back in the realm of market liberalism.

Critics and academics (Alzira de Abreu, 2003) have argued how the mainstream media during the military dictatorship period tended to stick more to officialdom practices, rarely engaging in cases of political criticism in opposition to the more explicit militant journalism style practiced by the alternative press. The later bloomed because of its engagement with watchdog journalism and the cases of human rights abuse, assuming a political dissident role under the authoritarian military regime (1964-1984) (Kucinski, 1991; Waisbord, 2002)<sup>131</sup>. It soon disappeared however amid the return of the country to civil democracy, and also as a consequence of the suffocation imposed on these dailies by the generals throughout the dictatorship years. However, journalists and the mainstream media would have a significant role in the pressures to accelerate the return to civil democracy (Nassif, 2003; Alzira de Abreu, 2001; Conti, 1999), with the particular case of the *FSP* coverage of the direct elections campaign being an emblem of such efforts. As we have seen, a last breath of *auteur* journalism and militancy was felt in the *FSP*

---

<sup>131</sup> Titles of the alternative press included *O Pasquim*, *Opinião*, *Movimento*, *Politika*, *Resistência* and *Crítica*.

coverage during this movement, with the daily soon afterwards embracing commercialization and the free market/watchdog journalism theory. Thus conflicts between professionalism and objectivity versus partisanship in the context of the decline of militant journalism practices in newsrooms were debates which dominated the last two decades. Newspapers jiggled between consumerism and citizenship rationales, with journalists assuming both public service ideals as well as commitments to an understanding of news as a commodity.

Journalists interviewed for this research have positioned themselves differently in relation to the role that the press had in the process of contribution to political and social change. Some journalists endorsed a radical position which was somewhat nostalgic of the type of journalism conducted during the military regime years. These were seen as being part of a 'golden era' of rational and intelligent journalism militancy. Such critiques dismissed the contemporary years as being too market-driven, not acknowledging an expansion in professionalism and in the public debate that occurred in the mainstream media during this phase. These years have thus been seen by critics as having been dominated by conservative thinking (Carta, 2003; Arbex Jr., 1999; Kucinski, 1998). They practically did not recognise, or minimised, the contributions that journalists and contemporary journalism made to the democratisation process following the end of the dictatorship. Others painted a more 'realistic' and complex picture, recognizing both improvements as well as regressions (i.e. Coelho, Lins da Silva, Nassif, Freitas, Ventura), although some have opted to celebrate the powers of the market. As discussed in Chapter 2, the mainstream press during the dictatorship was very much allied with the regime, engaging in little resistance to it. Exceptions included the cases of the publication of poems by *ESP*, the *Veja* stories of human rights abuse and other political pieces done through the hands of the then newsroom director Mino Carta, responsible for launching the magazine (Alzira de Abreu, 2003). These facts make romantic views of a 'golden' era of journalism and rational public debate problematic.

Consequently, contemporary journalism and liberal journalism values of objectivity have been considered by some of these radical critiques as contributing to the decline of journalism's embracement of democratic ideals. General worries have been expressed in relation to the limits imposed on the extension of public debate because of the favouring of consumerism and marketing strategies by media firms, with liberal journalism values being seen as working to support the structures of the status quo, thus disengaging public service ideals in journalism. I consider this a partial and limited reading of the whole

picture. Discussions on these classic journalism principles, such as why balance and professionalism are still valid to journalism today, must be explored first in order to set the Brazilian case in a clearer context.

*a) International perspectives on objectivity*

According to US historians, journalists and academics (Waisbord, 2002; Tumber, 1999; Schudson, 1978), a more sophisticated reading of the ideal of objectivity gained strength amongst American journalists because of their continuous questioning of their own subjectivity. Beliefs that human beings cannot be objective started to grow. Subjectivity was seen as needing to be subjected to standard methods and practices. Historians and journalists have arguably linked the rise of objectivity in journalism in the 1920's, and its transformation into a liberal journalism consensus, to various causes. These include the development of the dominance of scientific thought in Western civilizations and of social sciences and philosophy in the light of journalists' own questioning of the validity of facts. Objectivity was also seen as vital for publishers and their needs to move away from highly politicized publications that could alienate audiences. It also began to be considered a necessity by journalists who wanted their work to be taken seriously and to be valued professionally, and in this way be less subject to attacks of bias and misrepresentation (Tumber, 1999; Merritt, 1995; Schudson, 1978; Tuchman, 1972).

The introduction of the electric telegraph in the 1840's has also been mentioned as a crucial factor associated to the emergence of news objectivity as a professional ideal, with the wire service reporting helping to secure the codification of objectivity as a normative standard (Stuart Allan, 1997; 306). The model of "information" and factual journalism, for instance, was mainly represented by the success of the *New York Times* since the 1890's. According to Schudson, journalists had a naïve empirical understanding of objectivity then. After the First World War, a more sophisticated reading of objectivity emerged, one in which facts were taken to be not aspects of the world, but validated statements about it (Schudson, 1978, 194). By the 1960's, both critics of the press and defenders of objectivity saw this value as being an emblem of American journalism, standing in contrast to the more sensationalism and party-press style of journalism practiced in Europe (Schudson, 1978; Tumber, 1999).

Critics have argued how objectivity serves as a defense system for journalists and news organizations to repudiate charges of bias (Tuchman, 1972, 1999). Tuchman (1972) has stated that professional norms produce stories that support the existing order. She has examined the newsman's notion of objectivity by focusing on some standard journalism practices, such as the presentation of all sides of a story during a period of time (the balance criteria) and use of quotation marks to include opinions of interviewees, procedures which guarantee ways of the journalist defending his work. Journalists can thus claim that their material is "objective", and that the positions are not theirs but that of other people. Nonetheless, journalists are admitting more and more that institutional and personal values can intervene in news selection, and that partisan distortions can be inevitable (Waisbord, 2000; 150). This is why academics and historians (i.e. Schudson, 1978, Merritt, 1995; Baker, 2002) have attacked objectivity, stating further that such a principle does not exist and serves only to maintain the structures of the establishment. It thus limits discussion and promotes public passivity.

Scholars however disagree on what should be put in the place of the objectivity regime. Some favour the substitution of objectivity for more mobilizing journalism formats capable of engaging wider publics, but differ in the ideological ways and practices of doing this (i.e. Merritt, 1995; Baker, 2002). Balance is also accused by some critiques as being a centrist ideology, a mere balancing of opinion of elite groups, something which eventually restricts journalism's commitment to the public sphere. In his defense of the centrality of the existence of partisan media, which can be controlled by groups who engage in civic mobilization, Baker (2002, 201-202) condemns balance as being "the last thing that mobilizing media need".

The detachment stance associated to objectivity has also come under heavy attack from segments of the US public journalism school. Worried about the retreat of the Americans into private life and their disinterest in public affairs, Merritt (1995) states that "telling the news" is not enough. He argues that the professions' own means of survival is dependent on the revitalization of public life. Merritt (1995, 365) views objectivity as stimulating journalists' detachment from reality. He sees balance as the presentation of issues by journalists in extreme opposing ways, all of which contribute to disengage debate. Nonetheless, I believe that the creation of public debate can be achieved through a critical engagement with the notion of balance and the realization of a critical dialogue between the press and its society. Civic journalism however has also come under attack by critiques of liberal journalism values, and has been considered by some (i.e. Baker,



2002) as mere good intentions of market liberals. In his criticism of the practice of civic journalism in some newspapers in the US, Baker (2002, 160-161) notes the differences between social responsibility and civic journalism, undermining the latter as being a “refined technique for legitimizing the existing order without challenging major...structures of domination”.

Such critiques are missing the point. They are placing too much the blame for the decline of public life and the worldwide journalism crisis on liberal journalism cultures. The issue of the decrease of interest in public affairs runs much deeper. It can be argued – but this again can be open to debate – that it is strictly related to the decline of the modernist project, the increase in relativism, rise in cynicism and fall of ideologies. Hallin (1994; 11) has argued that the problems with political life in the US are political and not just journalistic problems, and that their solution lies in part with political parties and social movements, although he stresses that some initiative from journalism is also essential. Journalism worldwide is thus reflecting this decline of civic commitment because an increasing part of society *is* actually uninterested in politics and public life. This is especially so in the advanced capitalist societies of the West, which have seen the rise of public relations professionals and professional politicians who are strictly involved in public affairs, and who alienate the wider public. The latter are slowly retreating into the private sphere because of this.

This is also not a new phenomenon of the post-60’s ‘post-modern’ period. Lippmann (1922) in the 1920’s had already detected the little amount of time that most people spend with informing themselves on public affairs, and how most people have confused ideas in their heads in relation to politics and to other interests which transcend their small circle of friends. Thus the decline of interest in politics is a complex phenomenon which I do not aim to explore here. Nonetheless, it can be argued that in the case of Brazil, the ongoing democratization process in the last two decades has produced actually the opposite, mainly a rise in political mobilization, especially in the context of the presidential elections, as we have seen. However, such sentiments have co-existed with disillusionment and apathy of various segments of the population, especially in the last years with the disappointments caused by the governments of Cardoso and Lula.

Arguably, certain aspects of the professional model – such as journalism’s hostility to politics and the blind endorsement of some reporters of technical issues – can contribute to undermine public engagement. But I believe that the *essence* of the professional and objective regime does not. For it is important that journalists put aside their own personal

prejudices to produce honest reporting which includes contending interpretations of political issues (Hackett and Zhao, 1998, 230). As Hallin (1994, 7) argues, the best journalism combines professional commitment, accuracy and balance with a sense of compassion. The main attacks on objectivity, according to Lichtenberg (2000, 238), come from critics who say that the media have misrepresented their views. This implies that fairness can be achieved somehow. Lichtenberg (2000) argues further that most critics state mainly that journalism is not, cannot and should not be objective. These charges are grounded on relativism and post-modern beliefs which consider reality to be socially constructed and the “truth” to be impossible to achieve:

“We cannot coherently abandon the ideal of objectivity and, whatever they may think, objectivity critics do not abandon it either. To claim that a piece of journalism piece is not objective is to say that it fails to provide the truth.. How do we know that American news accounts on the Gulf War are partial, except by comparison with some other actual or possible accounts? We know how to distinguish between better and worse, more or less accurate accounts...” (Lichtenberg, 2000; 241-242).

Thus I wish here to pursue a defense of objectivity, endorsing Lichtenberg’s (2000) point of view that we must not abandon this ideal if we aim to take journalism seriously, judging its standards on the basis of which readings of the world are more accurate than others. As we have seen in the case studies of this research, this was exactly the core of the complaints posed by center-left wing politicians during mainly the first presidential elections held after the post-dictatorship and also afterwards. They argued that the press was not producing a balanced coverage, one capable of representing their views in equal light. In my research I contrasted the more objective stories in opposition to the biased articles, stressing the accounts which were considered “better” or presented a more coherent picture of the contradictory Brazilian reality. As we have seen, ideological biases produced one-sided arguments, contributing for the continuity of an uncritical stance in relation to official candidates (see appendix of Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5).

Evidently, the balance regime hides a social and political struggle over media access. As Hackett and Zhao (1998, 88) state, the objectivity regime persists precisely because “it does offer openings, however unequal, to different social and cultural groups”. But then what should we make of the accusations that news professionalism (Tuchman, 1972, 1999) can also be seen as an effective means of controlling journalists’ behaviour ?

Professionalism, as discussed in Chapter 1, is a double-edged sword. It can be empowering for journalists because it can afford them more editorial autonomy, safeguarding them from both internal and external pressures from media management, government and shareholders (Hallin, 2000). Professionalism can also mean many different things to different people, and journalists often have a vague understanding of it. Curran notes (1996, 101) rightly that journalists are not given the credentials and regulatory controls of other professions, which leaves journalists with an ambiguous status which can both weaken their vocation as well as create confusions. Soloski (1989, 1999; 310) has observed also that news professionalism controls journalists through the setting of standards, norms of behaviour and the reward and punishment systems. Soloski correctly points to how this control is not total because professionalism “provides journalists with an independent power base” while also affording journalists “too much freedom”, with news organizations adopting procedures again to limit this same professionalism.

Hallin (2000) is in favour of retaining the philosophy of professionalism as a means of safeguarding journalism practice from economic and political pressures. I endorse this view. Hallin (2000) laments that in the US professionalism has declined in the newsroom due to marketing pressures. He points out that the events which followed the Cold War consensus war, such as Vietnam, Watergate and the pressures of civil rights movements, diminished ‘objective journalism’ in the US, opening the way for the trend towards interpretative journalism and subjectivity, which has been taken up by much of the media in Europe as well. I tend to disagree here on this last point, as I do not necessarily see these trends as opposites. An analytical journalism stance should not be seen as opposite to objectivity, for it seems evident that a certain ideal of objectivity can be maintained in more interpretative and creative accounts of the world.

In his analysis of the media coverage of the Vietnam War, Hallin affirmed how the changing political environment led to modifications in news reporting. Objectivity permitted certain views to be treated as acceptable, when before they were not. He concluded that backing or critique of policies depends on the degree of consensus that these enjoy amongst the political establishment (Tumber, 1999, 288). When consensus is strong, the media plays a relatively passive role and tends to reinforce official power. Nonetheless, when political elites are divided, they become more active. For Hallin, objectivity and balance reign in the middle region, which he calls the sphere of legitimate controversy. This stands in between the spheres of consensus and of deviance. It is in the

sphere of controversy that electoral contests and legislative debates take place (Hallin, 1986, 1999; 331).

Professionalism was consolidated in the US in the mid-40's, having had its roots in the 'information' journalism model led in part by *The New York Times* (Hallin, 2000; Schudson, 1978). The notion that the press should serve the public derives from the values of professionalism of the Progressive Era in the US (Hallin, 2000). Journalism developed an ethic of public service grounded on the assumption that journalists should serve the public, and not particular partisan or commercial interests. This was tied to the endorsement of the social responsibility model defended by the Commission on Freedom of the Press, which was already then identifying an expanding trend in media ownership and commercialization, and was worried that this could work against the public interest, undermining responsible reporting.

The Hutchins Commission report thus articulated the "social responsibility" theory of the press, which had deep roots in the American liberal tradition (Hallin, 2000). It identified five responsibilities for the press, such as 1) to provide an intelligent account of the days events by a commitment to objective reporting; 2) to serve as a forum for the exchange of criticisms; 3) to represent the diverse groups in society; 4) to present the goals of the society and 5) to serve the public's right to be informed. Media scholars have stated that this report and its reassessment in the Cold War classic, *Four Theories of the Press*, would become the universal model for journalism practice worldwide (Baker, 2002, 154). Nonetheless, the "social responsibility" role of journalists, and the points set out by the commission, have been criticized by those who demand that the media in capitalist societies adhere more to democratic interests (i.e. Baker, 2002).

As discussed in the last chapters, the consolidation of balance in Brazilian journalism, and the favouring of a professional and, to a certain extent, a social responsibility role of journalists permitted the views from non-elite players to be treated as legitimate. In the last chapter we saw how the press maintained objectivity standards, rarely having succumbed to the partisan pressures of segments of the financial market. We also saw how the Cardoso era was marked by a consensus amongst certain elite groups, with little media critique emerging until 1999. After that, the media started to reflect more the divisions in Brazilian society concerning his administration. I also discussed how this process of incorporation of social positions and counter-discourses in the media pages was something that happened gradually, having started in the post-dictatorship phase with the *diretas*. Thus liberal journalistic principles such as objectivity and social

responsibility have remained important tools for journalism in its relation to democracy. These should not be underestimated by those who sometimes place excessive and unrealistic demands on media systems and journalists. The contemporary years in Brazil combined multiple and diverse readings of such liberal journalism values, with certain journalists focusing on social responsibility and public service ideals whilst others emphasized objective detachment.

*b) In between two journalisms: militant/romantic journalism versus professionalism*

Market liberalism thus paved the way for the media to embark on the free market press/watchdog thesis, expanding watchdog and investigative reporting, increasing professionalism and improving its political coverage. In such a context the values of romanticism and idealism, associated with the type of militant journalism which was practiced more in newsrooms of the 1970's, gave way in the 1990's to pragmatism and to less creative journalism routines. As the case studies of this research have shown, a total rupture with the values of the past was not made in the aftermath of the dictatorship. Conflicts arose in relation to different understandings of the role of the journalist due to the tensions that exist between politicized Brazilian institutions and increasing marketing demands. Journalists in the last two decades thus switched in sometimes contradictory ways between different journalism identities, assuming either a militant, detached and objective stance whilst others opted for a more libertarian view of journalism and others still for a more socially responsible one. Journalists thus might not have embraced fully impartiality or objectivity (Lins da Silva, 1991), but they showed wider commitments to facticity (Waisbord, 2000), professionalism, balance and social responsibility.

Many journalists interviewed here work today for the mainstream media and have been veteran journalists, experiencing the shifts between the two journalisms. These journalists adapted social responsibility and public service ideals to the demands of a more market-driven media environment. Two opposing camps were formed: one which favours a return to partisan forms of journalism or to more militant or citizenship understandings of news (Dines, 2003, Kucinski, 1998), while another which defends objectivity combined with social responsibility concerns, but immersed within a market logic. Veteran journalist Bernardo Kucinski, who has written on the role of the alternative press during the dictatorship, practically denies the existence in mainstream newsrooms of centre to left-leaning journalists, be them sympathetic to the Worker's Party or not. He

sees current journalism as too market-driven and journalists as passive professionals working in conservative environments. “You cannot say that there are *petistas* in the newsroom. It must have been a very short period when there were *petistas* in some newsrooms, actually when most were so, the students, the professors. Now you look at the papers – *ESP*, most are not, *JB*, no, *Globo*, now, and then there is *Folha*. It was in *Folha* that this thesis was developed..”.

This is a somewhat simplistic view of the whole picture. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the mainstream media during the dictatorship period was heavily censored, with few cases of resistance of journalists in comparison to the alternative press. The mainstream vehicles which were the most censored were *Estado de São Paulo*, *Veja* and the newspapers *Jornal do Brasil* and *Folha de São Paulo*, but in different periods and contexts (Alzira de Abreu, 2003; Carta, 2003). *Veja*, which was launched supported on a strong political and interpretive editorial line envisioned by Mino Carta, was one of the main mainstream vehicles that faced problems with censors. According to Carta, *Veja* was censored until 1976, when military pressure forced him out of the newsroom so that censorship could be uplifted (Alzira de Abreu, 2003). Notably, the control of the media was practically high after the establishment of the AI-5 in 1968. During the 70’s, preliminary censorship was introduced, with newspaper editions being read by censors who highlighted the themes which were considered unacceptable, threatening also to apprehend editions which published prohibited subjects. *ESP* for instance published poems of Camões in the place reserved for stories which had been censored. Other forms of control included the direct intimidation of media firms and journalists, calls to newspaper owners and the handing over of lists to newsrooms of the forbidden topics of the day.

*FSP* columnist and veteran journalist, Janio de Freitas, emphasized how the climate of fear predominated in newsrooms during the 1970’s. According to him, this culminated in journalists being told to leave newspapers and go home. Freitas has put in a more realistic perspective the nostalgic heroism that has been created around the period by some journalists: “The behaviour of the media was of total alliance with the regime. During most of the dictatorship years, I did not work in newspapers. I was part of the group of journalists who was not wanted by the regime. I did not work from 1964 to 1966. In 1967, in the beginning of the opening of the regime during the government of Costa and Silva, I was directing the newspaper *Última Hora*. This half liberty was maintained in reasonable conditions for journalism

practice....The problem was that the regime wanted more from the mainstream press, and introduced censorship one more time...”

Concerns in regards to objectivity were a part also of the discussions of the dictatorship phase. Writing in the context of the repression of the military years, and worried about the “manipulation” of facts, the Brazilian academic and journalist Nilson Lage (1979, 24) made a case in favour of objectivity: “..the proposal of a language absolutely transparent, behind which the intact fact presents itself so that the reader can make his own judgment, led the journalists to a questioning attitude and gave them, in certain circumstances, the power of searching for their own equilibrium point..”(quoted in Moretzsohn, 2002, 203). Writing during the re-democratization years about the influences of the American model on Brazilian journalism, Lins da Silva (1990) also pointed out the distance between the recognition of a liberal democratic theory of the press and the activity of putting it in actual practice, tensions which prevailed throughout the 1990’s: “...in Brazil everyone says that they are objective but nearly no one is. ...this is in the sense of being very partisan in the coverage, with editorialized titles of stories and a clear preference for one political tendency or ideology, intentional distortion of facts to favour one particular view of the world” (1990, 101).

In this sense claims to objectivity have been always problematic in Brazil, a country pervaded by politicized institutions. Nonetheless, a sense of social responsibility towards Brazilian society and its problems has remained, functioning alongside professional values but in opposition to journalism partisan or party militancy, which have been downplayed. Advocate of the importance of seeing the role of journalism as being embedded in public service values, *O Globo’s* columnist and veteran journalist Zuenir Ventura has stressed that this value should not be confused with “political militancy”: “I do not know if it is possible to speak of a generation that looks at journalism differently. We live in a moment in the country when a journalist can hardly chose to live without a social preoccupation because this is something so present in our lives. The social reality of Rio.. you trip on kids sniffing cocaine.. Any citizen from Rio or from any other city has to be very insensitive to this. You cannot confuse though the social responsibility role with political militancy. You cannot wear the shirt of any religion, party or firm....you have to go to a situation without pre-judgments.”

Zuenir’s reading of professionalism as social responsibility is one that many Brazilian elite journalists share, although others place more emphasis on the role of the press as mediator or transmitter of information in the model of a Fourth Estate. The

editor-in-chief of *Reuters*, Mario de Andrada e Silva, underlines an “informational” role of the press, arguing that the function of the media is to “inform society about everything that it does not know and would like or needs to know”. Bucci (2000), who has written widely on journalism ethics, affirms that in order for a journalist to be a good professional he must be a democrat by nature. These sentiments signal to the existence of links between instrumental liberal journalism practices and the need to serve the interests of the public, thus exemplifying what journalism should – and in many ways does - stand for.

Citizenship rationales and the need to serve the public are thus not exclusive of journalism militant cultures or of the “old” generation of journalists of the 1970’s, as some radical critics have implied. It is not only elite journalists who favour social responsibility ideals either. Contrary to what it might seem at first, a certain segment of the journalists from the younger generation, like former *Globo Online* reporter Juliana Braga, have defended that the press should endorse more its role as a social mediator amid the intensification of the commercial pressures being placed on news organisations: “Journalism must have a social role, calling attention to the irregularities that exist in society and highlighting more the works of people who really contribute for the development of the country. I don’t believe the media has total freedom...But I think we have advanced more in relation to other historical periods in Brazil. Maybe the Brazilian media still do not know yet how to make total use of their new liberty..., which now is constrained more than ever by commercial interests...”.

Admittedly, the new generation of journalists who entered journalism in the post-dictatorship phase engaged in the profession equipped with different understandings of their role. Not all of them embraced public service ideals. These journalists were influenced by the US tradition of careerism, were more skeptical about party politics and less influenced by ideological dictums (Dimenstein, 1996; Kucinski, 1998). The ideology of professionalism is best exemplified by factors such as the rise in the educational levels of journalists, with the entrance in the field of college-trained reporters such as Braga, the creation of mechanisms of regulation of the profession and the opening of possibilities for journalists to pursue careers. Journalists can now be rewarded with prestigious prizes for their work.<sup>132</sup>

---

<sup>132</sup> The market for professional journalists is highly regulated. The constitution demands that only those with a journalism diploma, registered in the Labour Ministry, can be journalists. There is a minimum wage for the profession and hourly paid extra hours, although recently there has been some flexibility, with firms not paying them or offering other advantages. The increase of remuneration for journalists nonetheless has



This entry of a whole new generation of journalists is a reflection and consequence of the increasing professionalization of Brazilian journalism since the 1970's, with college diplomas functioning as a dividing line between professional and nonprofessional reporting. A contrast to the old days, when journalist's passion and creative talent were considered more important than college education. Newsrooms of the past were crowded with bohemian reporters, struggling poets and aspiring politicians in contrast to the more computer-driven Internet generation of the 1990's. Thus on one hand if the expansion of professionalism gave new credibility and seriousness to the journalism profession, on the other hand it put the journalist on a similar level to other liberal professionals.

Journalist and academic José Arbex Jr. has evaluated this shift in the profession in the context of the discussion of the *FSP* 1984 reforms: "The 1984 reforms were difficult and hard. They had a lot of importance though because they consolidated the idea that journalism is a profession, and because of this it is subject to norms which must be respected like any other profession. This was very positive because it helped take the ideology out of Brazilian journalism and it created standards of excellence. It was also negative because it apparently transformed the journalism "product" in a product like any other, like a shirt or a shoe, for instance." In Chapter 2, I discussed how journalists like Arbex Jr, who wrote about *Folha* and its reforms, encountered difficulties in continuing to work in mainstream newsrooms with the rise of such values. Some of the things they found most problematic included the excessive marketing pressures placed on news and also the high individualism detected in the younger generation of journalists.

Former press officer of Lula, veteran journalist Ricardo Kostcho who worked for both periods, has hinted to the possibility of combining the best of the two models: "I think that romantic journalism was much more than a type of behaviour. For example, everyone used to smoke in the newsroom... The meeting to discuss news turned into something more bureaucratic which was held at 9 o'clock, when before it was at night, when each journalist used to go out, find their bosses and agree on something which would be done the next day. There was not much discipline. In this sense I say that there were extremes. I think it is necessary to have discipline and time, but I think there must be liberty of creation and especially style". I endorse Kostcho's idea of the possibility of combining the best elements of both worlds, a debate which is pursued in the conclusion of this thesis, where I defend the need to promote a complex media system that can attend more to the diverse interests of Brazilian groups, thus

---

not meant a rise in employment. The financial crisis that has hit the media industries in the mid-90's has seen an expansion in job instability and unemployment.

functioning with multiple journalism identities. That said, I believe that the objectivity ideal was a crucial journalism culture which mainstream newspapers like *Folha* and *O Globo* needed to incorporate, being elements which contributed to raise quality standards and diminish partisanship, guaranteeing equilibrium in the coverage of the presidential elections of the democratic period.

c) *Objectivity and information journalism in FSP and O Globo*

As stated before, the national mainstream *Folha* can be seen as standing for the emblem of the shifts between the two forms of journalism discussed above: the romantic/militant one of the 1970's to the current professional model of contemporary journalism. Critics from a more radical position have attacked *Folha*'s reforms, as well as the objective stance on the grounds that it serves dominant conservative interests, stimulating passivity and conformity amongst journalists (Moretzsohn, 2002; Arbex Jr., 1999; Kucinski, 1998; 17). In her discussion of objectivity, Moretzsohn (2002) opposes professionalism to militancy, implying that the former automatically impedes the functioning of journalistic critique, considered inherent to the latter. Moretzsohn elects the newspaper *Folha* as a good example to discuss the shifts between these two journalism forms, the militant having had its peak during the *Diretas Já* campaign and the professional standard emerging through the 1984 *FSP* reforms.

Arguably, *Folha* does admit in its 2001 editorial guideline (last version) that "there is no objectivity in journalism". It also recognizes the existence of a plurality of opinions and interpretations, notes the impact of subjectivity in the various procedures of the news production process but states that the journalist should try to be "the most objective possible." According to the manual, this means dealing with facts with "a certain distance and coldness", which does not mean "apathy or indifference." One could thus say that *Folha*'s reading of objectivity is somewhat in tune with the critical or sophisticated understanding of the term that Schudson referred to in his discussion of its rise and transformation in the US since the 1920's. It also is defined somewhat along the lines depicted by Lichtenberg's analysis.

However, in much the same way as the rest of the press in the contemporary phase, *Folha* also encountered difficulties in sticking to the model that it itself advocated because of the political disputes that overwhelmed Brazil in the post-dictatorship phase. Radical critics (i.e. Kucinski, 1998) accused the press of partiality, and of having

defended the candidates of the establishment as well as having showed reluctance in engaging with social issues. As this research has shown, this was not exactly the case. Although Otavio Frias Filho, director of *FSP* newsroom and inheritor of the *Folha* group, admitted that owners tended to back the PSDB and journalists the PT, this research has argued that balance contributed to neutralize or diminish partisanship in newsrooms, with not all media vehicles explicitly endorsing the *tucano* agenda, and with critiques being articulated in the media pages on the candidates who represented the status quo. Moreover, dissent and contradiction were high in the media pages, with counter-discourses being legitimized eventually by the mainstream press whilst multiple groups were incorporated into market representations and dynamics.

Brazilian journalists who have worked with the objective ideal in contemporary journalism have also detected some limitations in relation to its use or some negative implications. *FSP* journalist Marcelo Coelho compared in Chapter 5 the more even press coverage of the 2002 elections to other forms of engaged political reporting, like *FSP*'s coverage of the *diretas*, considered a positive example of journalism militancy. Coelho thinks that the passion which existed in political reporting before decreased in the coverage of the last presidential elections. This exemplifies the worries of many journalists that excessive preoccupations with objectivity can undermine creativity. Asked about *Folha*'s objective model, Frias Filho, made a defense of a critical understanding of the concept, pointing also to some of its negative impacts: "I do not believe in absolute objectivity. There are techniques which are disposable for journalism to turn it into something more objective. There are certain stories which are more objective than others. I think that a more opinionated and militant form can exist in parallel, like in the blogs. But I think that, within the practice of journalism, we must search for the ideal objectivity. In the 1980's and 1990's, this objective model is the one that advanced more in Brazil. The Brazilian press today is more objective than it was 15 years ago. But I think that there are negative aspects as well. The consequence is that the newspapers are all very alike, they cease to have identity. But it is very different than what it was in the 1950's, when they were clearly partisan papers linked to political parties...It was a more militant form of journalism with less objectivity, but the vehicles had more personality and were different."

Journalism cultures of professionalism and objectivity advanced in newsrooms as a result of the professionalization process of the Brazilian media industries, something which was taken up mainly after the dictatorship. As highlighted by Alzira de Abreu (2003), the modernization of the media system was considered a political strategy by the

military generals, and was embedded in authoritarian notions of national security. “The press, radio and TV already depended on publicity to survive and the biggest ads were from public firms and governmental institutions. They (military generals) censored, but they also financed the modernization of most of the newspapers that are still in the market today..” (Alzira de Abreu, 2003; 24-25). Thus after the fall of the dictatorship, newspapers were confronted with a multiplicity of publics and interests, and with the need of adapting to a much more complex reality in contrast to the simplistic black/white dichotomy (i.e. military generals versus civil society) of the dictatorship period. Professionalism was thus a necessity of market liberalism. Newspapers like *O Globo*, which were seen as closely tied with the military regime, conducted reforms to minimize the paper’s officialdom character, opening it up to a wider public and thus conquering new readers. Like *Folha*, the daily opted to invest in an informational journalism style and has been widely successful because of it. The reforms of *O Globo* were thus carried out in attempts of diminishing the paper’s image as being a mouthpiece of the authoritarian military government, having also had the purpose of adapting the daily to the new demands of the market.

When the director of the newsroom, Evandro Carlos de Andrade, took over *O Globo*’s newsroom in 1972, the paper began to slowly pursue these changes, targeting more a younger public in a strive to make the newspaper compete with the national Rio daily *JB* (Alzira de Abreu, 2003). The reforms however did not really start to take off until the mid-90’s. *O Globo*, like *Folha*, attempted to adopt a similar strategy to *The New York Times*, which in 1896 began to climb to its leading position by stressing an ‘information’ model rather than a story telling one (Schudson, 1978). According to *O Globo* columnist and former director of the newsroom, Merval Perreira, Evandro’s strategy was to focus the newspaper on news. This was a strive to dwindle accusations that the daily was favouring the dictatorship: “*O Globo* was marked during the dictatorship by two characteristics: it was a newspaper that supported the military government and was accused of manipulating news, and the second characteristic which was done on purpose by Evandro in order to neutralize these critiques was to make a newspaper which was strictly news based. It published everything, was very newsworthy, and so it turned into a newspaper that was indispensable to read. This was the way that Evandro managed to compensate the action of *O Globo*, which was very much an official one.”

The second generation of the Marinho’s started to take on positions of command of the organizations’ newspaper, TV and radio stations mainly in the 1990’s. Shifts in

generational ownership gave a new, more refreshing and inclusive dimension to Globo Organisations, elements pointed out by journalists interviewed here. In the mid-90's, *O Globo* engaged in yet another reform which would definitely have more impact on the paper's editorial policy. Chiarini (2002, 168) has noted that initially it was intended to be an aesthetic one, but from 1992 to 1995, the project gained editorial backing. The idea of investing in a more interpretative journalism style encountered ground against the former practice of publishing everything. The current director of *Globo's* newsroom, Rodolfo Fernandes, emphasised that the professionalization of the newspaper was one of the key motivations for these changes: "The *Globo* reform had another intention, of going more in-depth in the news....The face of a newspaper does not change from one day to the other...But I would like to say that the idea that *O Globo* had to show a new face already existed before 1985 when Merval (Perreira) took over...What I mean by professionalization is that the shareholders of *O Globo* decided to leave the newsroom and hand over the command of the paper to media professionals..."

Perreira pointed out how *O Globo's* political coverage changed in the last few years through a reinforcement of professional standards. He added that the paper opened up more to new voices after the second generation of owners took over: "I started to work here (*O Globo*) in 1968. It was a newspaper very much linked with the official discourse, and to the government in many ways. You did not have a very professional scheme and people were badly paid. The newspaper started to become more professional when Evandro entered the paper in 1971.... With Collor's impeachment, the media began to be more independent in relation to the state. But there still was a lot of influence of the government and of political pressures. As I told you, the process was gradual and slow...We gained space little by little. It was a work of patience. ...and João Roberto (son of Roberto Marinho) had an important role here. ....He was always a present figure, interceding in the sense of opening spaces... Even during the time of the dictatorship, with the opening that began in Geisel's government, *O Globo* started to advance more in the political coverage. We published many factual important stories ahead of others. One example was the amnesty decree. It was published on the day that the amnesty project was signed.."

Thus the inclusion of liberal journalism principles such as balance and the focus on facts permitted the daily to expand the representation of voices in its pages, with discourses articulated by NGOs, liberal professionals and centre-left wing representatives beginning to be considered as newsworthy in the same way as big business and traditional political elite sources also were. The columnist of *O Globo* and creator of the opinion pages, Luiz Garcia, stressed concerns of the daily with balance: "We had in the beginning of

the 1970's the transference of Globo Organisations to the second generation. João Roberto Marinho took over *O Globo*. I believe there is a change in mentality. The opinion page was something that had a lot to do with me. When I entered *O Globo*, there were four columnists writing on Sundays: Andre Melchoir, Otto Lara Rezende, Roberto Campos and another, all of more or less conservative tendencies, with the exception of Otto. The editorial part was born out of the idea of the open page....In the same scheme that you have in the *NY Times* and in other American newspapers.....We made an enormous effort to attract left-wing thinking to *O Globo*. And we managed to such an extent that today we had to look for a right-winger who writes well and who could write for the paper....and so we stayed with Olavo de Carvalho, and we regret that a bit...All the left have access to *O Globo*: Elio Gaspari, Zuenir Ventura, Verissimo...And also the activists...the NGOs. We are doing something balanced.”

*FSP* columnist Janio de Freitas, who participated in the graphic reforms of the daily *JB* in the 1960's, has argued that the changes in *O Globo*'s content happened as a competitive response to *Folha*'s success: “I think that it has not been valued yet the role that *Folha* played in the scenario of Brazilian journalism. As I told you, the newspapers (during the dictatorship) were in a situation of compromise and proximity...*Folha* ...mostly after the launch of the page 3, which published different tendencies of debate, starts to publish articles with contradictory lines. ....Besides all the qualities of this initiative there is the courage to start to practice them during the dictatorship...*Folha* published an article of Luis Carlos Prestes, of people notoriously from the left.... But I think this was important because it contaminated other newspapers. *O Globo*, for instance, is a newspaper that has opened. ...This was the notorious influence of the perception that the new generation of Marinhos brought to the paper, also as a result of *Folha*'s success. There was a moment in which what *Folha* was doing was innovative and courageous...Because of the institutional scenario in which we live since 1985', this does not demand political courage anymore...”

Freitas has signalled out correctly how Brazilian newspapers began to look alike in the post-dictatorship phase, a point that was emphasized by many journalists interviewed here. This can be seen also, to a certain extent, as being a negative consequence of the rise of the informational and objective journalism model, with papers having lost in creativity and positive militancy precisely because of this. Such contradictions thus obliges us to reassess the relevance or not of the objectivity regime and of professionalism still to contemporary journalism.

*d) The importance of objectivity and professionalism to journalism*

In what way then is objectivity still important to journalism and why should we defend it if we recognize that it has limitations? Do such values actually contribute to disengage readers? I believe not. The current journalism crisis has been less related to the favouring of objectivity in journalism, and more to a series of political and economic constraints which include increases in media concentration and the lowering of certain standards to reach wider audiences. As stated by Lichtenberg, objectivity should still be a guiding line for journalism if one aims to try and portray a complex world without resorting to ideological biases and personal prejudices. Lippmann (1922) has been, according to critics like Schudson (1978), one of the most forceful spokesmen for the principle of objectivity. “As our minds become more deeply aware of their own subjectivism, we find zest in objective method that is not otherwise there”, wrote Lippmann. For him, virtue was the refusal to credit one’s own tastes and desires as the basis for understanding the world, and detachment, disinterestedness and maturity were some of the marks of morality (quoted in Schudson, 1978; 155). Lippmann (1922; 126) also pointed out how one tends to belief in the absolutism of one’s own views. “For while men are willing to admit that there are two sides to a “question”, they do not believe that there are two sides to what they regard as a “fact.””

Admittedly, a slightly naïve reading of objectivity, or a blind understanding of what a fact is, has marked some journalists’ comprehension of what journalism should be in Brazilian society. Some have stuck to an overly detached understanding of objectivity (i.e. “I am objective, can’t you see?”). It is as if this is what they (un) consciously believe is demanded of them by current market-oriented journalism. Such positioning has prompted radicals to criticize liberal journalism values, considering them as flawed and inefficient. Journalists that engage in such detached readings of objectivity do not see that the concept should not mean cool indifference or an overemphasis on technical approaches to news. There should be no need to stick only to official sources and to a rigid use of language, or either to fall into the trap of believing that every argument must have an immediate counter-argument. This inevitably results in lack of creativity, personality and dynamism, as Coelho, Frias Filho and Kotscho have pointed out. In this way a critical commitment to social responsibility ideals and a progressive reading of professionalism is fundamental to impede a mechanic and even hypocritical endorsement of objectivity. For it is the system as a whole that must strive to represent the conflicting

views of the society that they are immersed in. In spite of the ambiguities in relation to journalism identities, the case studies of this thesis have shown that a widely mechanic reading of objectivity was present but did not prevail in the last two decades.

Given the recognition that total objectivity is unattainable, and that subjectivity plays a high part in the values and judgments that are made by journalists on a daily basis, one should aim at securing some sort of equilibrium by looking at the facts from different points of view and multiple angles in order to achieve the most accurate interpretation possible. Objectivity then should not mean a lack of questioning of authority figures, but commitments to engage in serious attempts of portraying the whole complexity of the situation. The case studies of this research have pointed out how both left-wing and centre-right-wing projects for the country have suffered from excesses, with the administrations of Cardoso and Lula producing positive aspects as well as causing disappointments. In this sense a more thorough and non-partisan journalistic analysis of these administrations is, in my view, considered “better” for an understanding of the complexity of the Brazilian reality under such governments than a partisanship stance, which would tend to downplay their errors.

Classic liberal thought already raised the importance of the continuous questioning of assumptions and ideas that are taken for granted. For as J. S. Mill argued (in Keane: 1991;19), even if an opinion is the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, it will soon degenerate into prejudice, so mankind should still continue thinking over what is that it has started to take as a fact. This is difficult to do if one insists on partisan or militant arguments, which rarely take into consideration the complex nature of problems. This does not mean to say that objectivity cannot co-exist with forms of militant journalism. Evidently, a complex media system requires the existence of multiple journalistic identities to attend to different publics, with group identity politics being stimulated to struggle to overcome their oppression and limitations (Baker, 2002) through civic and alternative media sectors that are partisan.

A strong mainstream media which promotes public debate thus should not work with partisanship. It must favour balance and professionalism as the wider public must have access to as many sides of the problem as possible. Arguably, the clientelistic relationships that still exist in Brazilian society both in the private and public sectors are factors which inhibit the further strengthening of professionalism. Journalists tend to be intergrated to clientele networks, and their ties to parties, owners or other patrons weaken professional solidarity. That said, the issue of how journalists nonetheless managed to



contribute to advance democracy in the contemporary years through commitments to these liberal journalism values is a crucial debate to engage with in any discussion on the relationship between the Brazilian media and the democratization process.

### **6.3. Journalism and democracy: the contribution of journalists to the democratisation process**

How then have journalists contributed to the advancement of democracy amid the growth of instrumental and professional concerns in comparison to idealistic ones? In the section above, I highlighted the shift from the militant journalism style more associated to the alternative press of the dictatorship years to professionalism and commercialisation. One can say that the alternative and the mainstream press performed two different roles in different periods: the former functioned during the dictatorship period more as a vehicle of resistance, whilst the commercial press in the free market era performed a double function of attending to the public interest and endorsing also the view of news as a commodity. This does not mean to say that journalists and mainstream journalism did not have a role in the collapse of the military regime and the return to civil democracy.

Cases like the *FSP* coverage of the 1984 direct elections campaign, the publication of stories of human rights abuse by *Veja* during the 1970's and the role played by some economic journalists of *O Globo* (Alzira de Abreu, 2003) are examples of mainstream press contributions to the process of acceleration of the downfall of the regime. Waisbord (2000) has also talked about press contributions from the contemporary phase, mainly the media's watchdog function and the increase in investigative journalism, underlining as some examples Caco Barcellos' *TV Globo* stories on police violence and Gilberto Dimenstein's *Folha* pieces on child prostitution in the Amazon.

Journalists thus performed different roles in the different phases of the country's history. In the last two decades, journalists contributed to the advancement of democracy through professional journalism standards. They also performed the Fourth Estate role and the watchdog function, endorsing social responsibility values, investing in professionalism and applying balance in the coverage of politics. Contributions however had their limits. These have their roots mainly in the dependency still of the mainstream media on state advertising and on other forms of subsidies, as well as the promiscuous relations that still exist between some journalists and politicians, a fact which contributed for the weakening of the watchdog function thesis (Waisbord, 2002, Janio de Freitas,

2004). Prejudices in relation to left-wing politics also occurred. However, it was the dependency on the structures of the state that produced wider political constraints. We have seen also how the press were reluctant to criticise the Collor government, a similar accusation which was made of the media in general in relation to the denunciations of cases of corruption in the eight-year government of Cardoso, and further more in the corruption schemes conducted during Lula's administration.

As we have seen, the contemporary phase has seen opposing debates in relation to the role that journalists played in promoting social and political change. As stated in Chapter 1 and discussed in the arguments made against objectivity, radical critiques (i.e. Kucinski, 1998; Moretzsohn, 2002) have lamented the decline of romantic journalism, placing the blame for the lack of public engagement with politics of the younger generation of journalists on the rise of professionalism. Influenced by Althusserian readings of the media and grounded in a-historical views which see media industries as static enterprises functioning to reproduce the dominant ideology, these critiques have played down the contributions made in the contemporary years. They are pessimistic about contemporary journalism, stating that this more market-driven model of the current era leaves no room for change. This is a simplistic reading of the media which does not acknowledge that media systems change as a result of external historical, political, social and economic influences. It also ignores the generational differences of the "old" journalists in relation to the "new" ones, assuming too quickly that the latter are totally alienated and deprived of any sense or understanding of politics or capable of applying progressive readings of professionalism to news. Thus these radical critiques ignore a series of influences, such as the double functioning of market forces, which served at different times both to liberate and to oppress, the authoritarian tendencies of the state as well as its liberating function and the fact that contemporary contributions in political reporting were later possible precisely *because* of liberal journalism values.

Waisbord (2000; 185) has stated that news organizations and journalists do harbour political goals, but journalists rarely spend considerable time thinking about them. According to him, they tend to care about professional matters, such as accuracy and beating headlines, rather than the grand democratic ideals that analysts assign to the press. According to this argument, journalists tend to be more concerned with the newsworthiness of a story and the opinion of editors than with its outcome. This is, however, only a partial way of looking at the functioning of journalism in contemporary

societies. Arguably, journalism instrumental values *do* work to favour newsworthiness and standard routines that can diminish creativity and limit debates. However, this is not a reason to dismiss efforts to continue to pursue the ideal of objectivity, which must not be seen as an opposite element to interpretative and analytical journalism, but rather as the other side of the same coin. I have argued here that many journalists do harbour critical readings of these values. Furthermore, such liberal journalism ideals can function *indirectly* to serve democracy, in contrast to the explicitness of militant practices. My research has shown that these journalism principles were essential for the improvement of political reporting in the mainstream press. In this sense I defend that it was precisely *because* of the rise of fairness in political coverage and wider attentions given to balance and accuracy that journalists managed to contribute to represent in a more mature and critical light the Brazilian experience, being able to see beyond ideological biases and repudiating whenever possible political and/or economic constraints.

Thus the contemporary years saw journalists assume a role of facilitator and promoter of public debate in spite of the ambiguities around journalistic identity and the pressures of market journalism to de-politicise political discussions. The case studies conducted here have shown positive conquests as well as regressive tendencies in the press' coverage of the presidential elections (see appendix of Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5). Advancements thus included promotion of dialogue in the media pages with left-wing voices and other social movements; the rise of the watchdog function and professionalism, and the critique of the structures of the state and of political candidates who represented the status quo. Regressions included some of the market sensationalist tendencies and *denuncismo* practices emphasized by journalists (Nassif, 2003; Dines, 2003) in the media coverage of the 1992 Collor impeachment, as discussed in Chapter 3, as well as political-ideological (left-wing) biases, class prejudices and misrepresentations detected in the news coverage throughout the period (see appendices).

Some radical critics have thus tended to see the dictatorship period as the only moment when journalists exercised real influence and political criticism, be it in the alternative press or in parts of the mainstream media. During the 1960's and 1970's, many journalists were listed as 'subversive', with influential journalists being removed from their journalistic positions because of pressures from the military forces due to their left-wing sympathies or democratic ideals (i.e. Abramo from *FSP* in 1979; Dines from *JB* in 1978 and Carta from *Veja* in 1976). The case of the deceased media-magnate Roberto Marinho concerning this issue has become notorious in academic (Abreu, 2003) and

media circles, with unnamed sources affirming that the entrepreneur was pressured to fire ‘communist journalists’ from his staff. He is said to have responded angrily by saying that he was ‘capable of taking care of his own communists’. Marinho made this remark because *O Globo* is said to have protected journalists from persecution (Dines, 1993, quoted in Waisbord, 2000; 182).

Nonetheless, many journalists feared being censored or imprisoned for futile or unclear reasons, or more plainly for being left-wing. Zuenir Ventura for instance spent three months in prison. He found out recently that his name had been included in a governmental document dating from 1975 as being the person who had coordinated the “communism scheme” in the press.<sup>133</sup> “This was a totally absurd accusation, I was never member of the Communist Party”, said Zuenir.

The contemporary years were thus quite different from the dictatorship period. Journalists of different ideologies populated the newspapers, with the growth in professionalism permitting the entry of a younger generation of journalists who contributed to reduce ideological engagements with news. Political pressures were diminished in the post-dictatorship phase, with the removal of direct censorship from newspapers and the decrease of self-censorship practices. Thus market liberalism has permitted the professionalization and modernization of newsrooms, bringing general improvements to journalism’s work with the expansion of objectivity dictums and culminating also in a wider engagement of readers with the media. The new found freedom of the press, however, has been relative, with both political and economic restrictions still persisting. The latter force, for instance, has impeded wider critiques of the structures of power, wealth concentration and social inequality in Brazil. Journalists have also felt compelled by market pressures to simplify or “depoliticise” public debates to appeal to wider audiences and not to alienate or scare advertisers.

Thus journalists in Brazil have managed to contribute in the last two decades by mainly jiggling journalism values of social responsibility and public service commitments with commercial principles, or through a militant democratic stance in contrast to the

---

<sup>133</sup> Tales of assassination of journalists were scarce, but not of imprisonment and repression. TV Cultura’s journalist Wladimir Herzog was found dead in his cell in 1975 after having been arrested by military forces. Veteran journalist Alberto Dines, pioneer of media criticism in Brazil, remembers clearly the start of the censorship in *JB*’s newsroom: “I was hired in 1962 to give continuity to the reform, but until 1968, I had no political action in the newspaper. In 1968, with the imposition of the AI-5 law, I already saw the censors come into my room, and from then on I decided to make it clear that we were under censorship. Afterwards, there was a negotiation with the censors that censorship would be dropped and self-censorship would be put in its place..”.

strictly partisan position more associated with the dictatorship years. That said, we have seen how the strengthening of a genuine free press in Brazil is still an ongoing process which goes hand in hand with the full consolidation of the democratic project. In this way it goes beyond the power that journalists can have in their arena of work. Thus improvements in Brazilian society, in economic equality levels and the continuous expansion of the political public sphere are essential if journalism is to become more democratic. Nonetheless, the question of how journalists can increase their contributions to such a process is still a vital debate to pursue.

#### **6.4. Professionalism and journalism autonomy: the future role of the journalist**

How can journalists contribute more in the future and strengthen press liberty in Brazil? If the romantic period is over, how can journalism still continue to promote the values of democracy in our current “pragmatic” era? These are questions which are difficult to answer. As examined in Chapter 1, the financial crisis of the Brazilian media culminated in staff cuts and in the increase of job instability in the newsroom. This had an evident impact on journalism practices. The result was a general growth in conformity amongst journalists and a fear of taking risks in reporting. Many have argued that the problems that the Brazilian media have been facing since the mid-90’s onwards are a result of a combination of factors, which include the influence of the current international journalism crisis; the specific process of the ongoing democratization of Brazilian society and the financial difficulties faced by the media industries due to the economic instability of the country. Naturally, the redundancy of journalists and their decline in prestige as well as the fall in quality standards of some national dailies places the endorsement of professionalism and the pursuit of media independency in a tight spot. In the context of international debates (i.e. Bardoel, 1996) concerning the redundancy of journalism activity due to the rise of new technologies and the wider access of citizens to journalists’ sources without the intermediation of journalists, I argue that journalists still have a key role to play in the ongoing democratisation project.

In articles where he expressed concerns over journalists becoming redundant amid the impact of new technologies on traditional jobs and the changing work environment, Bardoel (1996; 386-387) sees journalists as continuing to play a part in recruiting and processing relevant issues. “Journalism will not, as in the era of the mass media, control public debate, but it will take the lead in directing and defining it” (Bardoel, 1996; 387).

Due to the social and economic inequalities that still exist in Brazilian society, which is also not yet as media-saturated as perhaps the US and the UK are, the individualization of communications has not occurred there yet. In recent years, however, there has been a wide increase in Internet sites and political blogs of elite journalists in mainstream newspapers. However, the role of the Brazilian press as a promoter of public debate, and the relevance that a strong mainstream media still has in the forging of Brazil's common and civic culture, has not diminished.

The special correspondent of *FSP*, Sérgio Davila, who won the Esso journalism prize for his coverage of the Iraq war, emphasised that journalism analysis will be the future role for the Brazilian journalist: "Yes, in the current situation, I think that I am part of a species in danger of extinction (the special reporter). But I agree with you when you say that the (new) function of a newspaper will be to do analysis, to engage in the historical context of the stories and the memory of what the reader has seen during 24 hours on television and on the Internet. And here the special correspondent is going to have a crucial role....".

Arguably, the adoption of a more analytical journalism model by the quality dailies depends on a wider intellectual training of contemporary journalists. The ambiguities that still exist in relation to journalism identities evidently oblige us to define better the position of the contemporary journalist. Academic studies from diverse positions (Lins da Silva, 1990; Kucinski, 1998; Arbex Jr., 2001) have depicted some of the vices of the new generation of journalists who embraced uncritically market journalism dictums. Among some of the major vices of journalists has been excessive corporatism; the reluctance to accept criticism and the tendency towards anti-intellectualism; the arrogant approach towards objectivity and the resistance to engage in ethical discussions and in new professional ideas (Lins da Silva, 1990; Bucci, 2000). Critics have highlighted also how contemporary journalists have been more preoccupied with personal prestige than anything else, without a desire to improve their own professional conduct with the aim of influencing and acting upon reality.

Thus concerns arise as to possible limitations and regressions in the journalism field in the light of the progresses that have occurred in the last years. The capacity of the individual journalist to make a difference, for instance, is becoming more and more difficult and perhaps a distant dream to many in the face of excessive pressures from various spheres. Former director of *Veja* newsroom, Mario Sergio Conti considers that the Brazilian media regressed because of the financial crisis: "Unemployment is the big problem in Brazil. ...the regressive aspect of capitalism there, the dynamic of capitalism there

is...financial capitalism. From the press' point-of-view, I think there was a regression. The magazines that were launched during the period, like *Epoca* (by Globo Organizations to compete with *Veja*), did not contribute in anything. The newspapers are losing relevance in terms of social identification. In this way, the journalist does not risk himself for fear of losing his job..." Former director of *JB* newsroom and architect of the *ESP* reforms, Augusto Nunes, also expressed similar worries: "I did not see improvement in the press in the last few years, I saw it get worse. If you look at *Veja* when I started, in 1973, 1974 (I was there until '86)...For instance in the international segment...only big names worked with me. They were established writers. Now you have a very low standard of quality which has been provoked by the low salaries, by the reduction of demands and by the financial crisis...I think the newspaper of the future will be more solid. The readers will be more faithful. They will be readers which are very similar to...the readers of books, which are a small number in Brazil. But the tendency is for this to expand.."

Nassif (2003) has also stated that the Brazilian journalist of the future will need to be more sophisticated and professional, mastering better both analytical and critical skills and running away from the tendency to endorse "common sense" ideas in their urge to identify themselves with the average reader. Critical of what he classifies as "fast-food" journalism, Nassif's arguments are along the lines of the ones articulated by Bardoel (1996). This view is also in line with my defence of the importance of objectivity to journalism and the centrality of the increase of professional standards, for it is such values, when used correctly, which guarantee an engagement with the complexity of the problems of our current confusing reality. Baker (2002) has also advocated assigning more power to journalists, for it is these "people in control that can be crucial in an industry that struggles with a tension between profit maximization and ...creative professional and public values" (Baker, 100). I endorse this view of the need to maximise journalistic autonomy, but see this mainly as linked to the expansion of professionalism in newsrooms, with wider editorial independence being afforded to journalists as a means of permitting them to react against various forms of control.

The last years have also seen improvements in the intellectual skills of journalists, a fact which is not only related to university training courses. Journalists, especially from the younger generation, have from the decade of the mid-90's onwards become more interested in discussing journalism issues and ethics, feeling also less constrained to do so. Media websites like *Comunique-se* and *Observatório da Imprensa* have contributed to stimulate debates amongst journalists and society on press activities. Dines (2003)

emphasised how media websites like *Observatório da Imprensa* ([www.observatoriodaimprensa.com.br](http://www.observatoriodaimprensa.com.br)), launched by him in the 1990's, contributed to train the population and journalists to observe better the media. Such media websites also opened up a tradition amongst journalists of informal and chatty criticism on issues related to journalism practice, ethics and politics.

Thus the positive achievements of the contemporary years, such as the improvements in political reporting and the wider media awareness amongst journalists, have been somewhat shaken by the financial crisis of the media sectors in the last years, but they are not at risk. Brazilian journalism and journalists have managed to maintain relative professional standards of quality in spite of crises. Evidently, journalists still have a crucial role to play in the strengthening of the ongoing democratisation process, and can continue to contribute more through commitments to public service ideals, combining these with liberal journalism cultures in the reporting of political and current affairs. Journalists however should avoid blind endorsements of objectivity, and the implied safety or easiness of clinging to “fast food” journalism formats and excessive market-driven journalism maxims (Nassif, 2003).

Amid increases in media concentration, formation of international conglomerates and dependencies on governmental advertising or loans, journalists' contributions might continue to be made within certain constraints. In order however for this situation to change, other transformations must occur in the country. Thus journalists' contributions are in many ways related both to the improvements in the performance of media systems as a whole inasmuch as they are interlinked with the strengthening of core democratic principles in Brazilian society, in other words, they are dependent on the wider democratisation of the political and socio-economic context of the whole country.

## **6.5. Conclusion**

This research has shown how the press' performance in the coverage of presidential elections campaigns developed throughout the years. Conflicts and contradictions nonetheless prevailed in the last years in relation to different understandings of journalism cultures and identities. The case studies of this research have indicated that professionalism and objectivity played an important role in the establishment of standards of quality for political reporting. Liberal journalistic principles were thus used by journalists as a means of portraying a more complex and contradictory picture of



Brazilian society, giving legitimacy to counter-discourses and to the incorporation of different identities and political players in the media arena. This, as we have seen, was a process which was also very much a natural consequence of the expansion of representative democracy in the country and of the proliferation of markets in the post-dictatorship years.

This chapter discussed the opposing debates (Nassif, 2003; Bucci, 2000; Kucinski, 1998; Lins da Silva, 1990) in relation to the contributions that journalists and journalism made to the general enhancement of the media and the democratic political system. It examined the shifts from the romantic style of journalism to the consolidation of the current commercial and professional model, highlighting the clashes between the radical and liberal debates in relation to the contributions made by journalists in the dictatorship and contemporary years. Liberals have also varied their understandings of the current problems of the Brazilian press and the future role reserved for journalists. Conti (2004) and Nunes (2004) have underscored regressions because of the impact of the financial media crisis on journalism productivity; Nassif has pointed to market excesses of the so-called journalism of the 1990's whilst Bucci has underlined the strengthening of democratic ideals in the media as well as the growth in maturity of journalists. In the context of external pressures from the state or from shareholders, of increasing mergers and fusions between national and transnational groups, such elements of journalism culture should not be considered flawed, but rather essential for the continuity of a minimum good quality standard of journalism which endorses public interest rationales. Professionalism thus works in political reporting as a weapon against forms of political and economic control.

I have also examined briefly some of the debates in relation to the impact that the financial media crisis and the changing international and national media scenario are having on the journalism profession as a whole. Market excesses have tended to lower journalism standards, promoting the emergence of "marketing" journalists with their uncritical understandings of objectivity. Other problems of the last years have been increases in journalism redundancies and cuts in staff, facts which have stimulated worries over the maintenance of quality standards and of the capacity of the media and the press to continue to serve as a vehicle of the Fourth Estate. Nonetheless, the Brazilian press in the last years has recovered slightly and has managed to maintain certain standards, such as professionalism in political reporting, balance and political critique. These elements are not at risk. Furthermore, market competition has permitted the

proliferation of media websites on journalism and other related topics, stimulating debates on journalism practices and ethics by media professionals. Journalists have also stated their interests in developing their own intellectual and practical skills, a factor which could also contribute to strengthen in the future the media system in Brazil, issues articulated in the coming conclusion of this research.

## CONCLUSION

### Chapter 7 – *Media and democracy in Brazil: towards a 'realistic' settlement*

#### 7.1. Introduction

The core conclusion of this research is that the mainstream press did make contributions to the advancement of democracy in the last two decades. Liberal institutions began to be consolidated in the 1980's. Brazil during the 1990's expanded further its entry in the global market, embracing neo-liberalism thinking like various other Latin American countries. Parallel to this, political pluralism was fortified in the country and the influence of social-democratic values increased even as a natural consequence of the democratization process. The media thus began to experience a series of transformations which went beyond the lifting of editorial censorship, the engagement with the coverage of direct elections for president and the introduction of market dictums in newsrooms. In the aftermath of the dictatorship, the commercial press managed to act as a restricted but influential elite forum of public debate, mediating political discussions between different sectors of the establishment, including civil society representatives, the state and the market.

The press thus gradually began to reflect the political divisions that existed in Brazilian society, which resulted in a wider consolidation in Brazilian newsrooms of democratic liberal values. Advancements included the growth in professionalism, the promotion of more dialogue between politicians, the voicing of concerns of civil society, in contrast to the previous exclusive attention given to official sources, and the wider legitimacy given to counter-discourses of the opposition. Wider spaces were afforded to more critical, conscientious and fairer reporting of political affairs, with the media gaining greater political independence vis-à-vis the state in contrast to the dictatorship years. Brazil during the period covered here was however plunged in the current globalisation order, with the country soon emerging as a stronger global player and a powerful voice for democracy and change in Latin America.

This thesis has focused on four lines of inquiry in its investigation of how the press changed. These have been: a) the nature of the relationship which exists between the media and the state; b) the media and the market; c) the media and civil society and d) the media and journalism. The market for instance served as a force for inclusion of new

citizens in the media's restricted public arena of debate, permitting also the emergence of new "mass" consumers of different media products. Commercialization was also accompanied by professionalism and by the expansion of public debate. New media spaces were thus opened very much because of market competition, which also permitted the representation of wider groups in the mainstream media and the proliferation of new and diverse communication channels.

Market excesses nonetheless resulted in ideological biases, simplifications of debate and a limited inclusion of these new publics. Commercialization also resulted in more media concentration. Restrictions were thus placed again on the press' role as a vehicle of the Fourth Estate (Waisbord, 2000 in Hafez, 205, 148), and doubts were cast on the media's capacity to deepen diversity and political pluralism. The state on the other hand during this period moved away from authoritarianism to being seen as a depository of hope for millions of Brazilians for wider social and political inclusion. Civil society also struggled between the market and the state, using the media to voice its agendas and engaging in a relationship of negotiation with the former as well as seeing in the latter a vehicle for broader social justice and economic distribution.

Are there risks being posed to the strengthening of public debate due to the continuous incorporation of Western journalism cultures in Brazilian newsrooms or even the maximization of the market logic? This is a discussion that is raised when we attempt to envision a more democratic future scenario for the Brazilian media. I have argued here that the consolidation of journalism's liberal ideals and commercialization have been in general positive for the Brazilian media, and that it is simplistic to see the press as a mere defender of the conservative status quo and the media arena as an exclusive space of class struggle. Journalism organizations have benefited during this phase both from political pluralism *and* from economic expansion inasmuch as they were constrained by these same forces. The Brazilian media nonetheless encountered difficulties in living up to the Western liberal ideal of a free press due to state ties and the fact that it is subject to the instability of Brazilian capitalism. Improvements in media performance were thus a consequence of stronger market competition aligned with wider political democratisation.

Nonetheless, I have shown here also how there were constant tensions between political democracy and market liberalism. As we have seen, the Brazilian media were heavily influenced by consumerist approaches to news and by international journalism trends, which included infotainment journalism techniques and human interest stories to the detriment of more in-depth political debate. The media oscillated on one side between

paying lip service to the Anglo-American commercial model, consolidating professionalism and investing more in the creation of an emerging “mass market”, to articulating on another democratic political concerns in response to various societal pressures for wider political and social inclusion. Thus due to the specific historical and cultural particularities of the Brazilian media system, multiple journalism identities proliferated in newsrooms. These were very much also a result of the conflicts taking place in these spaces concerning competing democratic projects for Brazil.

This chapter examines the main questions raised in Chapter 1 and deliberates on the findings of this research. Taking into consideration the problems of the Brazilian media, I defend the importance of creating a complex media system that works with different types of journalism, all of which can serve diverse publics with multiple and often conflicting needs. In order to enhance the democratic potentials of the newspaper market, I also advocate the reinforcement of liberal journalism cultures in newsrooms and the strengthening of the professional and analytical skills of journalists so that they can be better equipped to portray the complexities of the Brazilian reality. The strengthening of the public media sector grounded on public service commitments would also be a must. This would serve as a counter-balance to the predominance of the commercial sector (Curran, 1991, 2000). In an international era of increasing media commercialization and growth of political authoritarianism in Western nation-states, such mechanisms would function to safeguard journalism from both external and internal economic and/or political pressures. Thus only a more complex and democratic media system can do justice to the representation of the multiple interests of the Brazilian population.

## **7.2. The Brazilian press and democracy: debates on public intervention, freedom of the market, civil society and journalism**

### *a) General perspectives*

In what way has the press reflected, advanced, impeded or contributed for change? To what extent did it challenge dominant positions or did it reflect trends in public opinion? What role was played by journalists here? These were some of the questions raised in Chapter 1, which examined the international liberal and radical debates on the relationship between the media and democracy in developed societies as well as academic theories on the Brazilian media and the role that it has assumed in the democratization

procedures of the last two decades. This research has shown how the press evolved during these years, and how this was often a contradictory process that went beyond simplistic arguments which view communication systems as merely reflecting public opinion trends or impeding change. I have historicized this debate, underlining the point that media systems are complex cultural institutions that are not static elite entities immune to various pressures. We have seen how in different periods, news organisations acted differently according to particular historical, social, economic and political influences.

Thus a series of forces propelled the changes in the Brazilian press. These included the demands made for universal democratic information by new social groups in contrast to forms of either journalism advocacy or official reporting; the pressures placed on markets to expand and the wider democratisation of the country's social and political institutions. The market undoubtedly gave new strength to the media, having functioned however as a double-edged sword. More press independence and the development in sophistication in political reporting practices were attained on one side as well as simplifications of debate and rise of infotainment techniques on the other. Hence the main conclusions of this research can be summarised in four main points: 1) the commercial media (market press) contributed to advance democracy, functioning as a mediator of public debate and as an instrument of political struggle in spite of a series of political and economic factors having impeded further progresses; 2) journalists contributed in different ways, taking on either a social responsibility role, a progressive professional one or engaging in democratic militancy; 3) there was inclusion in the media's public sphere of interests of segments of the population (civil society), but this still needs to be deepened and expanded to include less privileged sectors and 4) the state shifted from authoritarianism to social liberal democracy, releasing its hold of the press and showing greater potential for the exercise of a more inclusive and public service oriented role in its relationship with the media and with Brazilian society. All these points are articulated in more detail in this conclusion.

I have endorsed Hallin's (1994, 12) Gramscian understanding of the media as being a cultural institution that reproduces a worldview compatible with the power structures in society, and that this process is open to disruptions. I have contrasted also Hallin's critique of Chomsky's propaganda model and his defense of the hegemonic perspective to Kucinski's (1998) argument of the elitist character of the Brazilian media and Lins da Silva's (1984) emphasis on conflict within media structures, debates developed in Chapter 1. As we have seen, media spaces in Brazil were overwhelmed by elite divisions

concerning the ways of advancing the democratization process, with the media serving as a (restricted) forum of debate amongst various elite groups. Oxhorn and Starr (1999, 135) have stated that technocratic elites in Latin America in the 1980's dismantled the "institutional foundations of import substitution, populism and patronage", putting neo-liberalism in its place. Pure neo-liberalism nonetheless soon showed its limitations, generating only a "narrow distribution of the benefits" and leading to the "collapse of neo-liberal coalitions in the 1990's" (1999, 136). As we have seen, the slow transition back to democracy was conducted through a series of elite pacts born out of negotiations that followed after the defeat of the *Diretas Já*. Soon afterwards, the increasing disillusionment with the rigidity of the neo-liberal project led to the strengthening of the opposition and a consensus being formed around the need of combining economic liberal principles with social democratic ideals.

As examined in Chapters 1 and 6, some academics and journalists have been overly optimistic about the widening of market competition whilst others have been pessimistic about the extent to which the media became in fact more representative. Radical critiques (i.e. Arbex Jr., 2004; Kucinski, 1998) stressed the elitist character of the Brazilian media, seeing little room for contradiction. Others who identified more with a critical pluralist liberal position, like Bucci (2000) and Nassif (2003), embarked, like me, upon an investigation of the media that situates such a debate within historical, economic and political contexts. They underlined market limitations whilst also recognizing progresses. In this research I have rejected looking at media organizations as being mere (evil) profit-seeking enterprises whose ultimate goal is to enrich shareholders. These positions are conceptually inadequate frameworks to explore the complexities of the relationship which exist between communication vehicles, politics and democracy.

I have thus been critical here of the excesses of critical political economy thinking, having nonetheless eschewed the tendency of liberal theory to celebrate the "free exchange of ideas" in the marketplace. This qualitative historical and comparative research has carved out a more sophisticated debate, engaging in an in-depth study of the ways in which the press changed and the forces that exercised impact on media systems in the last 20 years. I have thus not portrayed a linear story of press progress but rather a contradictory one of advancement and disruption, with historical institutional patterns of political clientelism and media partisanship for instance persisting and influencing the present. Progresses thus did not follow a straight line, with the years investigated here

being marked by discontinuities and returns to old practices and vices, such as governmental corruption and ideological media biases.

As argued in Chapter 1, “democracy” is a problematic term to define and has become a bit of an empty word. Nonetheless, the term is still relevant today and has been understood here as meaning the expansion of political rights, including the right to participate in political life. I have regarded democracy as being more than that, as a means of *belonging* and *influencing* a given community. For to democratize the Brazilian media is not simply to eliminate state interference, but to render media institutions more accessible, accountable and participatory, opening up new spaces of access for new players. It is also to further democratize media discourses and journalism routines, diminishing ideological prejudices and expanding professionalism. It is to inform better the public and to guarantee a wider role for communication vehicles (both private and public) in the construction of a more equal society. If journalism’s main *raison d’être* is the existence of a democratic public sphere, then the expansion of democratic processes throughout media systems are of crucial importance as a means of enhancing the democratic character of the whole of Brazilian society and of its institutions. Thus in order to understand how the press was transformed and the ways in which it contributed to change, and how certain positive progresses of the contemporary years can be improved, it is necessary to highlight more clearly how different spheres (market, state, civil society and journalism) influenced the Brazilian media in the last decades.

*b) The market and the media*

Much of the dilemma in Latin American countries has been whether market-base economic reforms would boost or hinder democracy. Economic liberalism until the end of the dictatorship was arguably antidemocratic, with social and political exclusion being viewed as essential for economic success (Oxhorn and Starr, 1999, 19). With the end of the dictatorship though, the market was seen as a liberating force from previous state oppression. Economic liberalism was to a certain extent inclusive because of the emergence of a wider consumerist market and society created through the stabilisation of the economy in the mid-90’s. Market liberalism created the means for the incorporation of broader segments of civil society as legitimate members of the country’s public sphere and as consumers. However, excessive commercialisation culminated in wider media concentration, with economic liberalism proving incapable of producing wealth



distribution. This raised calls for more state intervention in the economy. Market liberalism thus permitted improvements in media performance, culminating also in the modernization of newspapers, which were forced to open themselves up more in strives to conquer new publics. Thus the most democratic aspects of the Western media system, such as the objectivity regime, professionalism and the watchdog function (Waisbord, 2000), were further consolidated in Brazilian newsrooms at a time when these values were being undermined in advanced capitalist societies and attacked by radical critics (Zhao and Hackett, 2005, 23).

Chapters 2 to 5 discussed the complexities of the role that the market played in the political campaigns, its relationship with civil society and the media. We have seen how the market at times functioned as a roadblock to the full consolidation of political diversity. Economic pressures submitted political debate to market laws in political campaigns and commercial interests in the media produced clashes in journalism between public interest concerns and consumerism demands. In Chapters 2 and 3, we saw how segments of the market united with civil society to advance political democratisation. In Chapter 3, I examined also how the market press, after an initial regression in 1989, when it produced an ideologically charged coverage, exercised with growing impetus the watchdog function in 1992 and reaffirmed a certain degree of media independence vis-à-vis the state in spite of the excesses of *denuncismo* journalism. During the period covered, we saw also how the market forces began to have an important impact in defining political campaigns through the adoption of a series of marketing strategies by politicians. One of the first politicians to have made use of political marketing techniques, Fernando Collor constructed his image of the angry apolitical “saviour of the nation” with the help of the Vox Populi institute, marking the beginning of a whole new world of spin and use of political marketing tools in presidential elections.

Economic constraints thus began to pervade the presidential campaigns of 1994 and 2002, forcing political and social agendas to comply with market laws. Market sectors attempted to subordinate political discourses to the interests of business, a fact which functioned to diminish or weaken the representation of political diversity in the press. However, liberal journalism values and pressures from Brazilian society did culminate in the press managing to produce a more balanced coverage in 1994 and 2002 than 1989. Fernando Henrique’s presidential campaign in 1994 had been structured around five main points which were represented by the five figures of his hand: health, education, security, housing and agriculture. In the end, as we have seen, the economic agenda of the *real* was

the one which prevailed above all others, imposing constraints on the articulation of other debates which included inquiries on the long-term effects of the plan and its capacity to reduce poverty. As we have seen, the state ended up succumbing also to the interests of the market, with minister Ricupero articulating his agenda to that of the *real*. The Ricupero imbroglio nonetheless showed how the media, and especially television, are not all powerful: his dismissal from the ministry after the TV Globo episode did not result in loss of votes for Cardoso, who had his election guaranteed anyway following on the early success of his economic plan.

In contrast again to both 1989 and 1994, the 2002 elections witnessed a sway movement of elite sectors towards Lula's capital-labour alliance in a dispute which was marked by the PT candidate's courting of the market forces. Here was a proof that liberal journalism values can serve in political reporting to give legitimacy to counter-discourses and to the opposition's agenda, which in the 2002 presidential elections was accorded more positive treatment than previous disputes, with less room for endorsements of financial market fears and left-wing prejudices. This would not be the case of the next 2006 presidential elections, which has not been discussed in this research and would in fact be the subject of a further study on the relationship between media and politics. Lula won another presidential mandate in October 2006 after conducting a campaign which resembled the 1989 elections due to the hysterical polarization that had been formed between the candidates who represented the poor against those who stood by the rich.

As explored in Chapter 1, the mainstream media during this period became also more concentrated and more heavily skewed toward the market. As I mentioned earlier, one of the key problems of the Brazilian media is financial instability, a factor which places pressures on news organizations to maximize profits. In Chapter 1, I argued how the Brazilian media crisis was a result of national and international factors, including the influence of the dot.com crash and the retreat from the convergence ideal. The Brazilian communication system experienced an expansion and then economic crisis following the investments made in the extension of cable and satellite television, which resulted in little profit.

Media concentration and synergy trends also grew during this phase whilst the advancement of the market created the means of production of segmented media outlets and community vehicles for specific publics (i.e. the left-wing magazine *Carta Capital* and Internet media sites). The increase of market competition thus contributed to broaden media diversity. New mediums began to address a variety of political interests and tastes,

thus weakening the more negative impacts of media concentration. Financial crises in the mainstream media nonetheless forced firms to cut down on investments, producing consequences on journalism production and on employment. Newspapers lost advertising and readers as a result of a decline in overall standards of quality.

Market liberalization and the growth of (de)regulation trends in the 1990's, especially in relation to cable television and the entry of international interests in the Brazilian media market, have diminished the role of the state as regulator and controller of the media. As discussed in Chapter 1, few public obligations have ever been imposed on broadcasting and the media, with little restrictions being placed on monopoly formation and commercialization. The market has thus been allowed to develop somewhat freely. Public interest commitments however have been acknowledged by the newspaper industry, and are stronger than in the weak and generally partisan public media. The ANJ 2005 annual report on the increase of 5% of newspaper circulation for instance underlined how Brazilian dailies had still a vital role “.. in the construction of citizenship and in the strengthening of democracy”, considered to be “the biggest contribution that the medium could make to the country..”

However, as I have shown, the market has not managed to attend to *all* of the needs of Brazilians. In his discussion of how the US First Amendment exists to protect democratic deliberation and not “freedom of the marketplace”, Schudson (2003, 201) has noted that market censorship is reduced in countries with “strong state trusteeship of an independent media”, like the UK with its public service broadcasting (PSB) and the Scandinavian nations, where the state subsidizes minority newspapers. Thus the ways in which the Brazilian state can correct market failures and strengthen public service commitments of the current public media is a vital discussion to engage with in the light of the debates of how it can assume a more public interest role in relation to the whole communication sector.

### *c) The media and the state*

Democratic concerns have grown in the 20<sup>th</sup> century in relation to increasing media concentration and commercialisation and the risks that this can pose on the fortification of plural democratic debate. Liberal and radical international critiques of the media have tended to articulate opposing arguments in regards to the ways in which public

intervention and regulation can secure the media industry's adherence to the public interest. They have disagreed on what constitutes press freedom and on how to set about correcting market failures (i.e. Hackett and Zhao, 2005; Schudson, 2003; Hallin, 2000). The upholders of the liberal tradition (i.e. Lichtenberg, 1990) favour self-regulatory over statutory interference to protect media freedom, raising objections to regulatory interference which may have effects on freedom of expression (Hardy, 2004; pg. 318). Market apostles view arguments on the need for public intervention as impeding full competition and putting press liberty at risk whilst critics of market liberty defend the strengthening of state powers as a means of safeguarding the public interest. Due to the late development of liberalism in Brazil, liberal and radical debates on public intervention have only recently gained in importance, with an increase of the pressures for media reform and the betterment of the public media sector (i.e. Bucci, 2004), one of the proposals that I have outlined here.

Liberal press theory has its roots in US classic liberal thinking, mainly in a democratic tradition which held the state under suspicion of authoritarianism and of attempting to suffocate the press. We have seen how the Brazilian state shifted from an authoritarian tradition, present during the 1984 *Diretas Já!* campaign, when sectors of the press were still fighting for freedom of expression, to a weak and corrupt structure during the Collor era (1989-1992) and to a more democratic institution in the FHC and Lula governments. This occurred in spite of the expansion of market liberalism with its ideology of minimum state interference. In Chapters 2 and 3, we saw how the press covered the political and presidential campaigns of 1984 and 1989 under high degrees of political constraint, factors which were weakened from the mid-90's onwards, with the 1994 and 2002 elections moving away from *political-ideological* restrictions (the state) to *economic limitations* (the market).

Thus the state during the last two decades has had a conflicting relationship with the media, abandoning a stance of total censorship and control to one of little interference, although the media are still relatively dependent on the state. Nonetheless, news organisations began to exercise a more powerful political role in Brazilian society and politics in the post-dictatorship phase. Due to its patronage and clientelistic practices which favoured privileged sectors of Brazilian society, the state has also been subject to attacks from elites who have been influenced by neo-liberalism thinking and its critique of state structures. As we have seen, this was exemplified in the candidatures of the centre-right wing field.

The relationship between the media and the state has nonetheless been one of relative dependence still. As argued in Chapter 1, the Brazilian state - especially during the dictatorship but also afterwards - was a prime contributor to the development of the newspaper market and the modernization of television (Abreu, 2002; Lins da Silva, 1984). The Brazilian broadcasting media has nonetheless had to comply with public interest commitments defined by the 1988 Federal Constitution, although these have not been strictly reinforced. State interventionism has been characterized by a mixture of clientelistic practices, censorship control, funding and regulation and less by concerns with the public interest. The ties with the state were thus weakened but maintained in the 1990's. Certain legislations that were of interest of the media market for instance were approved in the last few years by federal governments, including legislation on cable TV, the privatization of the telecommunications system and the permission for the participation of foreign capital in the national market. Furthermore, the importance that the media gave to the presidential elections are factors which by themselves attest to the expanding power of the state still in Brazilian society and its influence on news organisations. In 2002 for instance, representatives of the media industries told the presidential candidates of their sharp financial crisis, which left the sector with accumulated debts in the region of US\$ 4 billion.

Waisbord (2000) has highlighted that state intervention in South America has had the main aim of reinforcing governmental powers rather than promoting democratic forms of communication. Broadcasting regulation has been under control of the Ministry of Communication, with presidents using the distribution of radio and television licenses as a form of political patronage. In contrast to the Rio and São Paulo dailies, which have gained more political and economic independence, the regional and local media have continued to be partisan. Oligarchic politicians and Church interests control radio and television stations, thus dominating the public media sector. Waisbord (2000, 16) has also argued that, in spite of the US style of journalism, government subsidies and loans have been indispensable for the survival of Brazilian newspapers, with few exceptions. Despite yearly variations, critics have pointed out also how the state has been the main advertiser for the print media (Salwen and Garrison 1991; Heuvel and Dennis, 1995, quoted in Waisbord, 2000; Lima, 1996). Governments have also controlled decisions to import machinery, to declare tax exemptions and to forgive debts with state-owned banks, with disputes over newsprint being used by the government, especially in the 1980's, as a form of cultivating a lapdog media (Lins da Silva, 1986; Waisbord, 2000).

The Brazilian state has thus had quite a different history than the European and American one, with the former being marked by a tradition of more activism in contrast to the latter. As Hallin and Mancini sustain (2004; 49) in their comparisons of different media systems in the Western world, the European state is expected to mediate disputes between labour and capital as well as intervene in media markets to secure collective goals, such as political pluralism. In the media sphere, it has combined authoritarianism and paternalism with participatory elements. Hallin and Papathanassopoulos (2002; 3) have pointed to the similarities that exist between the Latin American media and Southern European systems, although the last decades saw an expansion of the US liberal model in Brazilian news organizations. Among common characteristics are: 1) the low circulation of newspapers; 2) a tradition of advocacy reporting; 3) instrumentalization (political use) of privately-owned media; 4) politicization of broadcasting and regulation and 5) limited development of journalism autonomy. As we have seen, *all* of these points can be detected in the Brazilian communication system. As this research has argued though, it is problematic and simplistic to merely place the Brazilian media under these five categories. As we have seen, the system has changed significantly during the last decades, with professionalism expanding and advocacy reporting falling.

Academics have interpreted the recent changes that occurred in European media systems as a move towards the full adoption of the American commercialisation model (Hallin and Mancini, 2004; Curran and Seaton, 1997). This has been known as the threat posed by the “Americanization” of communication systems worldwide in accordance with economic and media globalisation strategies (Blumler and Gurevitch, 2001). In spite of commercial pressures however, the UK government for instance has maintained its recognition of the importance of PSB for deliberative democracy.<sup>134</sup> In Brazil, the incorporation and consolidation of Anglo-American journalism models in the last few decades, as we have seen, has had in general a benign function and less an “imperialist” one, with the Brazilian media having managed to maintain a strong national and cultural character whilst blending the objectivity regime and citizenship concerns with commercialisation.

Brazil’s history of political authoritarianism and state patronage though has added fuel to the vogue for market solutions, producing the counter effect of a blind celebration of market powers, something which has characterised much of Brazilian thinking in the

---

<sup>134</sup> In September 2004, New Labour defended the continuation of the licence fee for the next ten years, stating the importance of the BBC remaining the pre-eminent public broadcaster.

1990's. Nevertheless, as I have shown here, both the market *and* the state can pose a series of threats on press liberty as much as they can function as liberating forces. Journalism can be constrained by either political authoritarianism or by unrestrained commercialism or by both. An ideal democratic media system is thus one in which various sectors, including the state, the market, civic and alternative divisions, are fully represented and have a participatory and active role.

Curran (1991, 2000: 142-149) has envisioned an alternative model for a complex media system which attempts to reside in being a third way between liberalism and Marxism. It combines both market and statist practices, advocating a complex relation to media power (Hardy, 2004, 340). As Curran states, the model does not exist in any single country, but draws from different practices of European nations and is designed to create spaces for the communication of opposing viewpoints. It has at its core the public service TV, with private enterprise, the social, civic and the professional sectors surrounding it (1991, 2000; 140-148). The civic sector is composed of mainly political parties, social movements and interest groups; the professional sector is controlled by professional communicators; the private is more responsive to popular pleasures and can also act out the watchdog function whilst the social market represents minority media interests.

I make a case here for the enhancement of the Brazilian media system along similar lines, although I place the commercial media at the core of the example discussed above instead of the public sector because of the particularities of the Brazilian experience. I believe that the public sector should counterbalance the commercial one and not take its place, and that an advanced and truly democratic media system must work with diverse and competing journalism models. Arguably, there is space now for the state to deepen the commitment to the public interest, stimulating market competition but also allocating resources to other civic and alternative sectors as a means of improving the *quality* and *diversity* of the country's public sphere. A working agenda on these vital issues should be pursued more widely and with more enthusiasm, with further debates on the type of measures that need to be adopted so that the democratisation process can be strengthened. Concomitantly, the role that civil society can play here is also of crucial importance.

#### *d) Civil society and the media*

Civil society and public opinion have had an influential role in Brazilian politics in the past decades. As I have argued, the expansion in social awareness, political

organization and perception of various sectors of the Brazilian population that change was necessary forced media systems to reform in order to respond better to a series of new demands and different publics. The period covered here has seen changes in the correlation of forces and in the power structures of Brazilian society, with the inclusion in the mainstream media, public sphere and political decision-making arena of new center and left-wing politicians, social movements (i.e. MST), civil society representatives (i.e. ABI, CNBB), union leaders (i.e. CUT), artists, intellectuals, university teachers and students (UNE). The increase in political awareness, cognizance and more sophistication of the lower and middle-classes culminated in demands for wider participation in mainstream society and politics.

Various movements and political interests thus competed during these years for power and influence in the public sphere. These social groups were institutionalized in the 1990's (Cardoso, 1994), with the press incorporating them as legitimate newsworthy sources and active players in the political stage. However, the voicing of these players and their agendas in the media was often done amid a lot of conflict and stigma, with many of these groups not being fully included in the mainstream arena. These movements and interests nonetheless functioned during the period covered here as important opinion-forming associations (Keane, 1991), influencing Brazil's elite public opinion and exercising pressures on media systems in diverse ways according to the particular historical moment in question. The agenda of state oppression for instance emerged during the *Diretas Já* movement as did that of governmental corruption in 1992. These groups thus brought into mainstream society and politics a series of values, including ethics in politics, cultural humanism and the necessity of responsible capitalism. During the presidential elections, these civil society players, in connection with the parties, were responsible for articulating social agendas in the media on issues ranging from unemployment to economic inequality and violence.

Thus the extent to which civil society was actually fortified and fully included in the mainstream is nonetheless a subject which is still open to debate. Social movements have expanded and have conquered new spaces, but their influence on power structures is not particularly strong, a fact which is reflected on the still limited coverage that is given to certain movements and issues. Arbex Jr. (2004) has talked about media bias towards the MST (Landless Movement), something which is partially refuted by other radical journalists. Veteran journalist Alberto Dines (2003) stressed that certain efforts were made by the press to cover social movements like the MST in a more sympathetic light,



but that this was a contradictory process which mixed support from public opinion with periods of hostility of segments of the population and the media due to the errors committed by this movement.

As we have seen, civil society groups were reasonably politically active during the whole period covered here. In Chapter 2 for instance, I examined how groups equipped with better resources explored strategically the relationship with news organisations like *Folha* to put forward their agendas. Ahead of the voting of the Dante bill in Congress, social movements and organizations, including the *Pro-Diretas* National Committee, the ABI, OAB, CUT and sectors of the opposition organized a series of manifestations and a civic march to follow the voting session in Parliament. In 1989, many took to the streets in the ideologically disputed elections fought between Lula and Collor and in 1992, students began to occupy the centre stage in the requests made for the impeachment of the PRN politician. The 2002 elections saw again civil society groups unite in favour of further democratization, the progression of the State as well as wider social justice.

Although from 1989 onwards political pluralism and multiple party systems grew, with various parties competing in Congress, ideological differences tended to weaken. In contrast to the dictatorship years, when opposing ideologies and camps were sharp and evident (a weak left and a strong right), the years covered here have seen an expansion of the left and a weakness of the right, with both sectors nonetheless walking towards the centre field amid the decrease of ideological positions and identities. The boost to political pluralism was however evident in the first presidential elections of 1989 following the end of the dictatorship, when Collor attempted to beat in the campaign another 24 candidates, including Aureliano Chaves (PFL), Leonel Brizola (PDT), Mario Covas (PSDB), Roberto Freire (Brazilian Communist Party) and Ulisses Guimarães (PDMB).

However, contrary to the trend of decline of traditional mass parties detected in the US and UK, Brazil has not seen a fall in interest in politics but rather a proliferation of political parties and civic mobilization. Similarly to other developed societies though, marketing strategies and political professionalization has invaded Brazilian politics, with grassroots movements being substituted by lifestyle and identity politics. This was particularly evident in the 2002 elections amid the gigantic marketing scheme organised for the PT's campaign. This clearly signified a shift away from the more communal style of politics practiced during the 1984 *Diretas Já* movement. Politics in Brazil today is thus a heavily market-driven enterprise, with the system of formation of political coalitions to

secure governing alliances in Congress stimulating financial corruption, state patronage and political clientelism.

A contemporary reading of Habermas' concept of the public sphere is thus still an important way of evaluating the relationship between the media and democracy, especially in the case of fledgling democracies like the Brazilian one. As Hallin notes (1994, 3), for Habermas, the public sphere is a realm that stands between the state and the private interests of the marketplace, needing to be kept autonomous of both. Thus if we examine the role that civil society played in Brazil in the contemporary years from a Habermasian perspective, noting the influence that the periphery can have on the core power centres, it can be said that civil society in spite of its weakness did form a slightly more organised public sphere, managing to influence mainstream media spaces with new ideas and values. It stood in between the market and the state, collapsing into one or the other in different historical periods in response to the interests of specific groups at particular moments in question (i.e. the market during the *Diretas* and the state in the 2002 elections). Thus the ways in which journalism was shaped by these various forces, and how it reacted to them, is also a fundamental issue to examine in the light of the deliberation on *how* Brazilian journalism contributed to social and political change.

#### *e) The media and journalism*

We have seen in this research how there was a rise in professional journalism routines, with wider preoccupations with balance in political reporting in spite of the persistence of partisan practices in some newsrooms and commercial pressures. Chapters 2 to 5 have shown how the press, much more than television, which has remained more entertainment-driven, has experienced the tensions of switching between fulfilling democratic demands and intensifying marketing practices. We have seen how the consolidation of the ideology of professionalism in the 1990's was important for the Brazilian media, which had been aligned with the military regime and had produced in general official reporting during the dictatorship years. Professionalism resulted in journalists influencing and mediating public debate during the coverage of the presidential elections, combining journalism techniques with strategies to raise certain issues for discussion. Thus both militant journalism and professionalism had their role in the construction of the Brazilian democratic project in different periods of Brazilian history. Journalists acted either heroically, using militancy in the struggle against state

oppression, as was the case with the *diretas*, or through the endorsement of a more coherent approach to news capable of reflecting political disputes, like the 2002 elections and, to a lesser extent, also 1994.

During the dictatorship, journalism was heavily dependent on military and business news sources. As we have seen, there were sporadic cases of journalism resistance, with militancy being more restricted to the alternative press. Similar to the emergence of the objectivity regime in the US during the 1920's, which was seen as a progressive ideology that undermined the partisan media, professionalism permitted the Brazilian press to be more inclusive and sophisticated, although this still needs to be fortified much more. Arguably, this was a result of both political pluralism and democratisation as well as of market competition. Nonetheless, competing journalism identities prevailed in newsrooms, including cool detachment and public service ideals. Many journalists though assumed more a social responsibility ethos than a militant or a passive role, taking on a critical professional stance which in many ways was in tune with public opinion, but which also rested on journalists' own democratic aspirations. Journalists thus become more assertive in relation to elites and authority figures and more aggressive and powerful. The public media also acquired a new ethos, with a growing awareness amongst journalists who worked for these institutions of the need to adhere to the public interest. Media publics also became more critical, wanting the media to address them both as consumers and/or as citizens.

Journalist and academic Eugenio Bucci has emphasized this absence of a democratic culture in the public sector in the country, stressing that this factor is an obstacle to the creation of a genuine media truly committed to the public interest: "What exists is an appropriation by those who occupy positions in public institutions that focus on communication activity... It is very different to the UK... Also the common perception in Brazil is not that the system is public, but that it is commercial. The democratisation of the country in recent years has not produced changes in terms of law, what we have seen are some changes in terms of content and behaviour in the organisation of these firms. With the improvement of the behaviour of the commercial press in terms of independency and accuracy, as a result of the democratisation of Brazilian society, there was a change in journalism culture. And that put pressure on the public institutions, who started to feel inhibited by acting as mouthpieces of the state. The average audience of public television is of 2%, when we try to be kind. TV Cultura, the main public television in the country, has a budget of US\$ 120 million per year, which is less in 30 times the one of Globo TV. It also has commercial ads, another thing which we must discuss... Thus we have a public media which has a non-democratic tradition in general, with exceptions here and

there, but with an enormous need for change...“ The issue of the expansion of the public media in Brazil, as Bucci notes, has been the subject of a lot of controversy. In 2007, the debate gained in strength, with the Lula government announcing the destination of funds for the launch of a particular public television station in the following year alongside the digital TV.

As argued earlier, media industries can use professionalism to control the behaviour of journalists. Brazilian news organizations have notably remained politicized institutions. Journalism autonomy is still limited, with journalists facing pressures from management in relation to certain political stories as well as having to simplify political debates and lower standards in response to market demands. However, the case studies of this research have shown how the Brazilian media were not only subject to the wishes of their owners and shareholders, but how they were also used by journalists, politicians, civil society and others as instruments of political and social change as well as for the advancement of the ideology of economic liberalism.

We have also seen how the liberal ethos of the press has expanded, with more spaces being created for the articulation of center-left-wing views in the realm of a mainstream media which until recently was perceived as being highly conservative and resistant to change. As I have shown here, transformations occurred due to various reasons, with journalism benefiting both from (positive) political militancy in favour of universal democratic values as well as from professionalism *and* objectivity. Newspapers like *FSP*, *JB* and to a lesser extent *O Globo* and the magazine *Isto É* flirted more with the left and included wider publics in their arena than *Veja* and *ESP* did for instance. Similar to what happens in the US, Brazilian right-wing sectors have now begun to accuse the media, especially from 2002 onwards, of having a left liberal bias, claiming that most journalists are *petistas*, a reverse of the traditional argument made by radical critics (Kucinski, 1998) of the elitist character of the Brazilian media.

This period has also not seen a decline of political coverage due to the maximization of commercialisation. However, a certain de-politicisation of debate has occurred. Newspapers dedicated at least 4 pages daily to the presidential campaigns, with special supplements being produced during the peak months. Political reports strived to be more independent in relation to the state, more critical and sophisticated and less partisan. The professionalization of the media industries and the balance criteria also resulted in the creation of a network of connections of journalists and management with various parties and social groups. Lula and the PT gradually constructed influential relations with media

management whilst other social movements also built relationships to exchange information and generate support. Newspapers like *Folha* and *O Globo* distanced themselves from connections with only conservative sectors, opening up their pages to wider groups of Brazilian society, and thus blurring their own political identity in the pursuit of more readers and in the search to become more influential in Brazilian society.

Contrary to countries like the UK and the US, who built their communication systems under a strong liberal tradition of media independence, we have seen how the Brazilian media have encountered difficulties in consolidating the Anglo-American commercial model. As argued earlier also, Brazilian newspapers have a small circulation and have often suffered from economic instability. We have seen also how the development of press freedom arrived late in the country and is still being fortified. The Brazilian media have also been heavily influenced by international journalism trends of infotainment, witnessing a rise in the publication of corruption scandals and an increase in cynicism in political reporting. Liberal market democracy thus opened up the path for the reaffirmation of confrontational reporting and for the emergence of *denuncismo* journalism.

Speaking from a US perspective, Schudson (2003) has identified certain international journalistic trends. He has underlined the escalation of negative coverage in politics, the obsession with insider information and the proliferation of intimate reporting styles. Schudson is worried that there is too much criticism of politics in the American media whereas my concern here has been the ways in which such criticism can contribute to enhance democratization. As I have argued, the growth of aggressive political reporting, of the watchdog function and critique of authority can be seen as being important democratic journalism tools for societies that until recently were highly submissive towards government. The side effect of this is that cynicism towards politics tends to increase. However, it cannot be argued that this cynicism is similar to the apathy identified by critics in developed countries, and in many ways it is very different. Admittedly, Brazilian journalism of the 1990's did engage in aggressive attacks against politicians. This however was very much a direct consequence of the newly regained freedom of the press and the desire of many Brazilians for more ethics in politics.

Brazilian politics and journalism is probably destined to become more cynical. As I argued in Chapter 6, I do not believe that the current dissatisfaction with politics should be blamed on the objectivity regime. Contrary perhaps to the wider consumerism practices of media-saturated countries like the US/UK, in Brazil citizenship concerns are

still articulated in the media pages, with this research indicating a slight development of public debate, although perhaps not in such an intellectual manner as before, as well as increases in the discussions of the candidates' agendas. This has occurred in the light of the emphasis placed also on political entertainment techniques (i.e. focus on the personality traits of Lula and Cardoso) which were very much a result of marketing pressures and practices.

In Chapter 2 I defended the shift that occurred in Brazilian journalism towards a more professional model, highlighting how various democratic advancements were made precisely because of commercialisation. Both *O Globo* and *Folha*'s adoption of a more information-oriented journalism format for instance reflected this, as argued in Chapters 2 and 6. However, although social and left-wing agendas were addressed more in the press, both political and economic pressures culminated in the emergence of biased news in relation to these same issues. The media biases identified here have thus included: a) *institutional biases*, which reflected the conservative mentality of some news organizations and the gradual slow process of opening up more spaces in these areas for new voices and ideas; b) *social and cultural biases*, which can be seen as a reflection of the authoritarian and hierarchical Brazilian culture and c) *individual biases*. As I have shown, these biases were produced as a consequence of the imposition of commercial and political restrictions on the proliferation of counter-discourses in the media. But journalistic professionalism, civil society pressures, political organization and democratic market values functioned to undermine- although not eliminate fully - all of these.

Thus contrary again to Schudson (2003, 48), I believe that biases in the Brazilian media are much less a result of organizational journalism routines – such liberal journalism cultures can actually be improved to diminish these exact same biases - and are more a reflection of media ownership preferences, cultural influences, individual attitudes and economic and political confinements. Biases nevertheless were reduced from coverage of one presidential election to the next amid the growth of balance and the pressures of the public for a less partisan press, although these elements have not disappeared altogether, with the 2006 elections seeing the return again of some of these ideological media biases.

Despite all of its faults however, the media provide Brazilians today with more sophisticated, analytical and critical information than before, with less representation of politics in strictly partisan terms or simplistic portrayals of Brazil's conflicting interests. There are more accounts in the mainstream media of conscientious and fair political

debate. Balance thus functioned to impede the publication of false news and prejudices that could serve to maintain privileges. As I have argued also, the media to a certain extent also regressed, suffering from the (negative) impact of international journalism trends of infotainment and witnessing an expansion in media concentration due to excessive commercialization. These factors raise concerns in relation to the limits that can be placed again on the strengthening of the public debate arena, which has been constructed with a lot of struggle throughout the years, as we have seen. That said, I think it is wrong to discuss improvements in the quality of the public sphere by either being nostalgic of militant journalism and the functioning of news organizations in the 1970's or also condemning rapidly the rise of entertainment in the 1990's. As I have shown, the Brazilian media today is much better than it was in the past and still has a vital role to play in the process of fortifying democracy, even in a scenario where media concentration is expanding and social exclusion of segments of the population as media publics is still a reality.

### **7.3. Conclusion**

This research has dissected the role of the press and of journalists in the advancement of social and political change in Brazil in the last two decades, highlighting developments in media performance as well as pointing to particular clashes with political and economic interests. I have shown how the press served as a mediator of public debate, encountering tensions in attempting to address the public both as consumers and as citizens in a process which has been marked by contradictions, reaffirmations and disruptions of dominant discourses. One should ask though where would Brazilian society be in terms of transparency, public debate and political representative democracy if it were not for ground-breaking stories and campaigns published by the press, ranging from stories on torture published by *Veja* in the 1970's to the practices of the contemporary period studied here, including the 1984 *Diretas Já* campaign, the press' coverage of the 1992 impeachment and the 2002 elections, to name the main ones.

The democratisation process in Brazil is an ongoing project, with democracy still being relatively fragile. Threats still emerge occasionally in relation to the continuity of governments. Brazil has also not come fully to terms with the excesses committed during the dictatorship; social groups still have a restricted influence and business and traditional elites still play a powerful role in Brazilian politics. Social and economic inequalities

remain key problems demanding urgent solutions, although the last few years have seen the reduction in economic inequality levels and wider social inclusion and growth in educational indicators. Civil society has also gotten stronger and the state is slowly assuming more of a participatory democratic role, in spite of the persistence still of wide corruption and clientelistic practices. Arguably, a stronger state and civil society and a market more preoccupied with the public interest can help lay the foundations for a more representative and advanced democratic society, with the media contributing to this.

A complex media system thus needs to be enhanced so as to represent better the needs of various segments of Brazilian society. I have defended a wider role for the public media so that it can serve as a counterpoise to the commercial sector, underlining also the essentiality of reinforcing liberal values in commercial journalism as a guarantee of more balanced information and quality debate. At a point in time when Latin American countries are fortifying their democracies, it is crucial to examine working agendas that can boost the democratic character of communication systems and journalism so that they can respond more to the demands of wider social and economic inclusion as well as political representation.



## Bibliography

### Primary Sources

Fundação Biblioteca Nacional  
Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV)  
USP (Universidade de São Paulo)  
UFRJ (Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro)  
Iuperj (Instituto Universitário do Estado do Rio de Janeiro)  
ABI (Associação Brasileira de Imprensa)

### Newspapers

*O Globo*  
*Jornal do Brasil*  
*Estado de São Paulo*  
*Folha de São Paulo*  
*O Dia*

### Magazines

*Veja*  
*Isto É*  
*Carta Capital*  
*Revista Imprensa*

### Television and series

*TV Globo*  
*TV Cultura*  
“Anos Rebeldes” (*TV Globo*)  
“Ernesto Varela” (*Olhar Eletrônico*)

### Internet

*Observatório da Imprensa* ([www.observatoriodaimprensa.com.br](http://www.observatoriodaimprensa.com.br))  
*Comunique-se* ([www.comunique-se.com.br](http://www.comunique-se.com.br))  
*Agência Carta Maior* ([www.cartamaior.com.br](http://www.cartamaior.com.br))

### Newspaper Editorial Guides

*Folha de São Paulo* (2001), *PubliFolha*  
*O Globo*

## Secondary Sources

- Abramo, Cláudio (1988) *A Regra do Jogo – o Jornalismo e a Ética do Marceneiro*, SP: Companhia das Letras
- Abreu, Alzira Alves de, Lattman-Weltman, Fernando and Kornis, Mônica Almeida (2003) *Mídia e Política no Brasil – Jornalismo e Ficção*, Rio de Janeiro: FGV editora, p. 7-75, 129-183
- , Alzira Alvez de, Lattman-Weltman, Fernando, Rocha, Dora (2003) *Eles Mudaram a Imprensa – Depoimentos ao CPDOC*, RJ: FGV
- , Alzira Alves (2003) “Jornalismo Cidadão” em *Estudos Históricos*, RJ, n. 31, p. 25-40
- , Alzira (2002) *A Modernização da Imprensa (1970-2000)*, RJ: Jorge Zahar Editora
- , Alzira Alves de, Israel Beloch, Fernando Lattman-Weltman e Sérgio Tadeu de Niemeyer Lamarão (orgs.) (2001) *Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico Brasileiro pós-1930*, Rio de Janeiro: FGV
- Adghirni, Zélia Leal (2002) “Jornalismo Online e Identidade Profissional do Jornalista” em Gonzaga Motta, Luiz (org.) *Imprensa e Poder*, Brasília: Universidade de Brasília, p. 151-167
- Adorno, Theodor and Horkheimer, Max (1985) *Dialectics of Enlightenment*, London: Verso
- , Theodor (1972,1991) *The Cultural Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture*, London: Routledge, p. 29-131, 187-203
- Alasuutari, Pertti (1995) *Researching Culture – Qualitative Method and Cultural Studies*, London: Sage
- Allan, Stuart (2005) (ed.) *Journalism: Critical Issues*, Berkshire: Open University Press
- , Stuart (1997) “News and the Public Sphere: Towards a History of Objectivity and Impartiality” in Bromley, Michael and O’Malley, Tom (eds.) *A Journalism Reader*, London: Routledge, p. 296-329
- Althusser, Louis (1971) “Ideology and the ideological apparatuses” in Althusser, L. *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, NY: Monthly Review Press, p. 127-189
- Amaral, Roberto (2002) “Imprensa e Controle da Opinião Pública (informação e representação no mundo globalizado)” em Gonzaga Motta, Luiz (org.) *Imprensa e Poder*, Brasília: Universidade de Brasília, p. 75-103

- Amaral, Roberto and Guimarães, C. (1994) "Media Monopoly in Brazil" in *Journal of Communication*, 44, Autumn, no. 4. p. 26-38
- Anderson, Benedict (1983) *Imagined Communities*, London: Verso
- Arbex Jr., José (2001) *Showrnlismo – a Notícia como Espetáculo*, São Paulo: Casa Amarela, p. 139-171
- , José (2003) "Uma Outra Comunicação é Possível" em Moraes, Denis (org.) *Por uma Outra Comunicação – Mídia, Mundialização Cultural e Poder*, RJ/SP: Editora Record, p. 385-401
- Bagdikian, Ben (1997) "The Media Monopoly (excerpt)" in Tumber, Howard (1999) (ed.) *News: A Reader*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 148-155
- Bahia, Juarez (1990) *Jornal, História e Teoria – História da Imprensa Brasileira*, São Paulo: Ática, 4ed, p. 318-398
- Baker, C. Edwin (2002) *Media, Markets and Democracy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Bantz, Charles R. (1985) "News Organizations: Conflict as a Crafted Cultural Norm" in Tumber, Howard (eds.) (1999) *News: A Reader*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 134-142
- Bardoel, Jo (1996) "Beyond Journalism: A Profession Between Information Society and Civil Society" in Tumber, Howard (ed.) *News: A Reader*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 379-393
- Basile, Sidnei (2002) *Elementos do Jornalismo Econômico*, RJ: Campus
- Bell, Allan and Garrett, Peter (eds.) (2005) *Approaches to Media Discourse*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing
- Benitez, José A. (1989) "Imperialismo, Subdesenvolvimento, Dívida Externa" em *Comunicação na América Latina – Desenvolvimento e Crise*, São Paulo, Papyrus, p. 39-47
- Bennett, W. Lance (2002) *News – The Politics of Illusion*, US: Longman Classics, p. 4-49
- Berger, Arthur Asa (1982, 1991) *Media Analysing Techniques*, London: Sage
- Bignell, Jonathan (1997) *Media Semiotics – An Introduction*, Manchester: Manchester University Press
- Blumler, Jay G. and Gurevitch, Michael (2000) "Rethinking the study of political communication" in Curran, James and Gurevitch, Michael (eds.) *Mass Media and Society*, London: Arnold: p. 155-172

- , Jay G. and Gurevitch, Michael (1995) *The Crisis of Public Communication*, London: Routledge, p. 97-111
- Bobbio, Norberto (1989) *Democracy and Dictatorship*, Cambridge: Polity Press, p. vii-22, 133-167
- Bonfim, João Bosco Bezerra (2002) “Ideologia no Discurso da Mídia – o Poder das Palavras e as Palavras do Poder” em Gonzaga Motta, Luiz (org.) *Imprensa e Poder*, Brasília: UnB, p. 327-343
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1991) “On Symbolic Power” in *Language and Symbolic Power*, Cambridge, Harvard: Harvard University Press, p. 163-170
- Bourdieu, P. (1983) “A Opinião Pública não Existe” em *Questões de Sociologia*, Rio de Janeiro: Editora Marco Zero Limitada, p. 173-183
- , P. (1979) *Distinction – A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste*, London: Routledge, p. 9-208, 260-386, 466-491
- , P. (1997) *Sobre a Televisão*, RJ: Jorge Zahar Editora
- Boyd-Barrett, Oliver and Newbold, C. (eds.) *Approaches to Media: A Reader*, London: Edward Arnold
- , Oliver (1977) “Media imperialism: Towards an International Framework for the Analysis of Media Systems” in Curran, James, Gurevitch, Michael and Woolcott, Janet (eds.) *Mass Communication and Society*, London: Edward Arnold and Open University, p. 116-134
- Brandford, Sue and Kucinski, Bernardo (1995) *Brazil – Carnival of the Oppressed*, Nottingham: Russel Press
- , Sue and Kucinski, Bernardo (2003) *Politics Transformed: Lula and the Worker’s Party in Brazil*, London: Latin American Bureau
- Branston, Gill and Stafford, Roy (1999, 2003) *The Media Student’s Book*, London: Routledge
- Breed, Warren (1995) “Social Control in the Newsroom: A Functional Analysis” in Tumber, Howard (eds.) *News: A reader*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 79-85
- Bressan, Silvio (2002) “Reforma Administrativa” em Lamounier, Bolívar & Figueiredo, Rubens (orgs.) *A Era FHC – Um Balanço*, São Paulo: Cultura Editores Associados, p. 369-395
- Bromley, Michael and O’Malley, Tom (1997) (eds.) *A Journalism Reader*, London: Routledge
- Bucci, Eugênio (2000) *Sobre Ética e Imprensa*, SP: Companhia das Letras

- Budge, Ian, Crewe, Ivor, McKay, David and Newton, Ken (1998) *The New British Politics*, Essex: Longman, p. 304-341, 586-630, 647-678
- Bulmer, Martin and Rees, Anthony M. (1996) *Citizenship Today – The Contemporary Relevance of T. H. Marshall*, Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 1-25, 66-80, 269-278
- Burch, Martin and Moran, Michael (1979) (eds.) *British Politics: A Reader*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, p. 85-91, 157-167
- Caldas, Álvaro (2002) *Deu no Jornal – O Jornalismo Impresso na Era da Internet*, SP: Edições Loyola
- Calhoun, Craig (eds.) (1997) *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: MIT Press, p. 1-50, 73-143, 359-402
- Canclini, Nestor (1999) *Consumidores e Cidadãos – Conflitos Multiculturais da Globalização*, Rio de Janeiro: Editora UFRJ.
- Caparelli, Sergio (1982) *Televisão e Capitalismo no Brasil*, Porto Alegre: L&PM, p. 9-93, 115-185
- Cardoso, Fernando Henrique (2001) *Charting a New Course – The Politics of Globalization and Social Transformation*, New York and Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, p. 96-122, 162-172
- , Fernando Henrique (1993) “Communication for a New World”, in Melo, José Marques de (org) *Communication for a New World – Brazilian Perspectives*, São Paulo, ECA: USP, p. 9-19
- Cardoso, Ruth (1994) “A Trajetória dos Movimentos Sociais” in *Anos 90: Política e Sociedade no Brasil*, SP: Brasiliense, p. 81-114
- , Ruth (1985) “Sociedade Civil e Meios de Comunicação no Brasil” em Melo, José Marques de (org) *Comunicação e Transição Democrática*, Porto Alegre: Mercado Aberto/Intercom, p. 118-128
- Carneiro, Alan Dias; Lattman, Fernando, & Ramos, Plínio de Abreu (1994) *A Imprensa Faz e Desfaz um Presidente*, RJ: Nova Fronteira
- Carvalho, José Murilo de Carvalho (2001) *Cidadania no Brasil – O Longo Caminho*, Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, p. 197-231
- Castañeda, Jorge G. (1994) *Utopia Desarmada – Intrigas, Dilemas e Promessas da Esquerda Latino-Americana*, São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, p. 325-395
- Chiarini, Adriana (2002) “As Reformas de *O Globo* e do *Correio Braziliense*” em Gonzaga Motta, Luiz (orgs) *Imprensa e Poder*, Brasília: UnB, p. 167-181

- Conti, Mario Sérgio (1999) *Notícias do Planalto - A Imprensa e Fernando Collor*, São Paulo: Companhia das Letras
- Cook, Timothy E. (1998) *Governing with the News: The News Media as a Political Institution*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 61-117
- Curran, James (2002) "Media and Democracy: The Third Way" in *Media and Power*, London: Routledge, p. 217-248
- , James (eds.) (2000) *Media Organizations in Society*, London: Arnold, p. 107- 126, 151-173
- , James and Park, Myung-Jin (eds.) (2000) *De-Westernizing Media Studies*, London: Routledge
- , James (2000) "Rethinking Media and Democracy" in Curran, James and Gurevitch, Michael (ed.) *Mass Media and Society*, London: Arnold, p. 120-155
- , James (1998) "Newspapers: Beyond Political Economy" in Briggs, Adam (eds.) *The Media: An Introduction*, New York: Longman, p. 81-97
- , James and Seaton, Jean (1997) *Power without Responsibility – The Press and Broadcasting in Britain*, London: Routledge, p. 5-128, 161-173, 209-302, 358-372
- , James (1991) "Rethinking the Media as a Public Sphere" in Dahlgren, P. and Sparks, C. (eds.) *Communications and Citizenship – Journalism and the Public Sphere*, London: Routledge, p. 1-27
- , James, Gurevitch, Michael and Woollacott, Janet (1987) "The Study of the Media: Theoretical Approaches" in Boyd-Barrett, Oliver and Braham, Peter (eds.) *Media, Knowledge and Power*, London: Routledge, p. 57-80
- Dagnino, Evelina (1994) *Anos 90: Política e Sociedade no Brasil*, SP: Brasiliense
- , Evelina (1994) "Os Movimentos Sociais e a Emergência de uma Nova Noção de Cidadania" em *Anos 90: Política e Sociedade no Brasil*, SP: Brasiliense, p. 103-119
- Dahlgren, Peter (2000) "Media, Citizenship and Civic Culture" in Curran, James and Gurevitch, Michael *Mass Media and Society*, p. 310-329
- , Peter and Sparks, Colin (1996) *Journalism and Popular Culture*, London: Sage, p. 1-96
- , Peter (1995) *Television and the Public Sphere – Citizenship, Democracy and the Media*, London: Sage Publications, p. 1-24, 71-158
- , Peter and Sparks, Colin (1991) *Communications and Citizenship – Journalism and the Public Sphere in the New Media Age*, London: Routledge, p. 1-58

- Da Matta, Roberto, Moreas, António Ermírio e outros (orgs.) (1992) *Brasileiro: Cidadão?*, São Paulo: Cultura Editores Associados
- , Roberto (1991) *Carnival, Rogues and Heroes – An Interpretation of the Brazilian Dilemma*, London: University of Notre Dame Press
- , Roberto (1985) *A Casa e a Rua – Espaço, Cidadania, Mulher e Morte no Brasil*, São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, p. 25-81
- Davis, Aeron (2002) *Public Relations Democracy – Public Relations, Politics and the Mass Media in Britain*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, p. 3-60, 109-150, 171-183
- Deacon, David, Pickering, Michael, Golding, Peter and Murdock, Graham (1999) *Researching Communications – A Practical Guide to Methods in Media and Cultural Analysis*, London: Arnold
- , David and Golding, Peter (1994) *Taxation and Representation – The Media, Political Communication and The Poll Tax*, London: John Libbey, p. 1-21, 21-149
- Diani, Mario (1992) “The Concept of Social Movement” in *The Sociological Review* 40, p. 1-25
- Dimenstein, Gilberto & Souza, Josias de (1994) *A História Real*, São Paulo, Editora Ática
- Dines, Alberto (1986) *O Papel do Jornal – Uma Releitura*, São Paulo: Summus, 4.ed
- , Alberto, Fernandes, Florestan Jr. & Salomão, Nelma (orgs.) *Histórias do Poder – 100 anos de Política No Brasil, vol 1: Militares, Igreja e Sociedade Civil*, São Paulo: Editora 34, p. 243-261, 375-393
- , Alberto (1982) “Media Criticism – Um Espaço Mal-dito” em Silva, Carlos Eduardo Lins da *Comunicação, Hegemonia e Contra-informação*, São Paulo, Cortez Editora, p. 147-154
- Dizard, Wilson Jr. (2000) *A Nova Mídia – a Comunicação de Massa na Era da Informação*, RJ: Jorge Zahar Editora
- Downing, John, Mohammadi, Ali and Sreberny-Mohammadi, Annabelle (eds.) (1995) *Questioning the Media*, London: Sage
- During, Simon (ed.) (1993) *The Cultural Studies Reader*, London: Routledge
- Eagleton, Terry (1991) *Ideology: An Introduction*, London: Verso, p. 193-220
- Epstein, Isaac (1989) “Conquistando o Bem-Estar Social: Dimensões para o Novo Desenvolvimento” em *Comunicação na América Latina – Desenvolvimento e Crise*, São Paulo, Papirus, p. 53-60

- Fairclough, Norman (2005) "Political Discourse in the Media: an Analytical Framework" in Bell, Allan and Garrett, Peter (eds.) (2005) *Approaches to Media Discourse*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, p. 142-163
- , Norman (1998) *Discourse and Social Change*, Cambridge: Polity Press
- , Norman (1995) *Media Discourse*, London: Arnold, p. 1-20, 53-74, 176-204
- , Norman (1989) *Language and Power*, London: Longman
- Faleiros, Vicente de Paula (2004) "A Reforma do Estado no Período FHC e as Propostas do Governo Lula" em Rocha, Denise & Bernardo, Maristela (orgs.) *A Era FHC e o Governo Lula: Transição?*, Brasília: INES, p. 33-64
- Fallows, James (1996) *Breaking the News – How the News Media Undermine American Democracy*, New York: Pantheon Books
- Faoro, Raymundo (1994) *Existe um Pensamento Político Brasileiro?*, RJ/SP: Editora Ática, p. 19-85
- Fejes, F. (1981) "Media Imperialism: An Assessment", in *Media, Culture and Society* 3, p. 281-289
- Ferreira, Soraya Viegas (1996) "A Imagem de Collor nas Capas da Revista Veja – Construção, Consolidação e Queda de um Mito", Rio de Janeiro, UFRJ (mimeo)
- Fiske, John (1987) *Television Culture*, London: Routledge
- , John and Hartley, John (1978, 2003) *Reading Television*, London: Routledge
- Forgacs, David (ed.) *A Gramsci Reader – Selected Writings 1916-1935*, London: Lawrence and Wishart, p. 304-369
- Foucault, Michel (1972) *The Archeology of Knowledge*, London: Verso, p. 21-76, 79-88, 141-148, 166-177
- Fraser, Nancy (1997) "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy" in Calhoun, Craig (ed.) *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: MIT Press, p. 109-143
- Garnham, Nicholas (1997) "The Media and the Public Sphere" in Calhoun, Craig (eds.) *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: MIT Press, p. 359-377
- , Nicholas (1986) "Contribution to a Political Economy of Mass Communication" in Collins, Richard, Curran, James, Garnham, Nicholas, Scannell, Paddy, Schlesinger, Philip and Sparks, Colin (eds.) *Media Culture and Society: A Critical Reader*, London: Sage Publications, p. 9-33
- Giddens, Anthony (2000) *The Third Way and its Critics*, London: Polity Press, p. 1-55



-----, Anthony (1994) *Modernity and Self-Identity*, Cambridge: Polity Press, p.70-98

-----, Anthony (1994) *Beyond Left and Right – The Future of Radical Politics*, London: Polity Press

-----, Anthony (1990) *The Consequences of Modernity*, London: Polity Press

Godoy, Marcelo (2000) “Direitos Humanos e Violência” em Lamounier, Bolívar & Figueiredo, Rubens (orgs.) *A Era FHC – Um Balanço*, São Paulo: Cultura Editores Associados, p. 421-455

Golding, Peter and Elliott, Philip in Marris, Paul and Thornham, Sue (eds.) (1996) “News and News Production” in *Media Studies: A Reader*, Edinburgh University Press, p. 632-644

-----, Peter and Murdock, Graham (1991) “Culture, Commercialism and Political Economy” in Curran, James and Gurevitch, Michael (eds.) *Mass Media and Society*, London: Arnold, p. 11-31

-----, Peter and Murdock, Graham and P. Schlesinger (1986) (eds.) *Communicating Politics: Mass Communication and the Political Process*, New York: p. 37-53

-----, Peter and Middleton, Sue (1982) *Images of Welfare – Press and Public Attitudes to Poverty*, Oxford: Martin Robertson, p. 112-159, 205-249

-----, Peter (1977) “Media Professionalism in the Third World: the Transfer of an Ideology” in Curran, James, Gurevitch, Michael and Woolacott, Janet (eds.) *Mass Communication and Society*, London: Edward Arnold and Open University, p. 219-314

Gonzaga Motta, Luiz (org) *Imprensa e Poder*, Brasília: UnB

Gurevitch, Micheal, Bennett, Tony, Curran, James and Woollacott, Janet (eds.) (1982) *Culture, Society and the Media*, London: Routledge, p.5-91, 113-174

Habermas, Jurgen (1997) *Between Facts and Norms*, Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 287-388

-----, Jurgen (1997) “Further Reflections on the Public Sphere” and “Concluding Remarks” in Calhoun, Craig (eds.) *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: MIT Press, p. 421-479

-----, Jurgen (1994) “The Emergence of the Public Sphere” in *The Polity Reader in Cultural Theory*, Cambridge: Polity Press, pg. 81-90

-----, Jurgen (1962) *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, Cambridge: Polity Press

Hackett, Robert A. and Zhao, Yuezhi (eds.) (2005) *Democratizing Global Media – One World, Many Struggles*, Lanham, New York and Oxford: Rowman & Little Field Publishers, Inc., p. 1-37

- , Robert A. and Zhao, Yuezhi (1998) *Sustaining Democracy? Journalism and the Politics of Objectivity*, Toronto: Garamond Press, p. 82-107, 136-239
- Hall, Stuart (ed.) (1997) "Representation, Meaning and Language" in Hall, Stuart *Representation, Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices*, London: Sage, p. 15-29
- , Stuart (1984) "The Crisis of Labourism" in Curran, James (ed.) *The Future of the Left*, Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 23-39
- , Stuart (1980) "Encoding/Decoding" in Hall, S., Hobson, Dorothy, Lowe, Andrew and Willis, Paul (eds.) *Culture, Media, Language*, London: Hutchinson, p. 128-139
- , Stuart (1977) "Culture, the media and the 'ideological effect'" in Curran, James, Gurevitch, Michael and Woolacott, Janet (eds.) *Mass Communication and Society*, London: Edward Arnold and Open University, p. 315-348
- Hallin, Daniel C. and Mancini, Paolo (2004) *Comparing Media Systems – Three Models of Media and Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 1-17, 21-86, 251-306
- , Daniel C. and Papathanassopoulos, Stylianos (2002) "Political Clientelism and the Media: Southern Europe and Latin America in Comparative Perspective" in *Media, Society and Culture*, vol. 24, nr. 2, Sage Publications, p. 175-195
- , Daniel C. (2000) "Commercialism and Professionalism in the American News Media" in Curran, James and Gurevitch, Micheal (eds.) *Mass Media and Society*, London: Arnold, p. 218-238
- , Daniel C. (1994) *We Keep America on Top of the World – Television Journalism and the Public Sphere*, London: Routledge, p. 1-58, 170-181
- , Daniel C. (1986) "The "Uncensored War": The Media and Vietnam" in Tumber, Howard (ed.) (1999) *News: A Reader*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 329-339
- Hardy, Jonathan (2004) *Convergence and commercial speech: a study of the dynamics and the regulation of cross-media promotion in the UK media* (thesis)
- Harrie, Eva (2003) "The Newspaper Market" in Harrie, Eva (org.) *Nordicom - The Nordic Media Market: Media Companies and Business Activities, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden*, Göteborg University Press, p. 29-49
- Herman, Edward S. and Chomsky, Noam (2002) *Manufacturing Consent – The Political Economy of the Mass Media*, New York: Pantheon Books, p. 1-37, 87-143
- , Edward S. (1999) *The Myth of the Liberal Media*, New York: Lang, p. 1-23, 31-43, 55-71, 131-155, 257-317
- Holanda, Sergio Buarque de (1979) *Raízes do Brasil*, Livraria Jose Olympio Editora

- Holmes Stephen (1990) “Liberal Constraints on Private Power?: Reflections on the Origins and Rationale of Access Regulation” in Lichtenberg, Judith (1990) (ed.) *Democracy and the Mass Media*, NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 21-55
- Holub, Renate (1992) *Antonio Gramsci – Beyond Marxism and Postmodernism*, London: Routledge, p. 69-117, 151-191
- Hutchison, David (1999) *Media Policy: An Introduction*, Oxford: Blackwell, p. 1-27
- Ianni, Octavio (1994) *Imperialismo na América Latina*, Civilização Brasileira, p. 149-207
- Jaguaribe, Helio, Iglesias, Francisco, Santos, Wanderley Guilherme, Chacon, Vamireh & Comparato, Fábio (1985) *Brasil, sociedade democrática*, RJ: José Olympio Editora, p. 224-330
- Jameson, Frederic (1991) *Postmodernism or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, Durham: Duke University Press, p. 1-67, 260-279
- Jorge, Vladimyr Lombardo (2003) “A Cobertura do Congresso Nacional pelos Jornais Brasileiros (1985-1990)”, *Estudos Históricos*, Rio de Janeiro, nr. 31, p. 64-81
- Keane, John (1998) *Civil society – Old Images, New Versions*, Cambridge: Polity
- , John (1991) *The Media and Democracy*, Cambridge: Polity Press, p.12-53, 95-181
- , John (1989) “Introduction: Democracy and the Decline of the Left” in Bobbio, Norberto *Democracy and Dictatorship*, Cambridge: Polity Press, p. vii-xxix
- Kelley, David and Donway, Roger (1990) “Liberalism and Free Speech” in Lichtenberg, Judith (ed.) *Democracy and the Mass Media*, NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 66-102
- Krippendorff, Klaus (1980) *Content Analysis – An Introduction to its Methodology*, London: Sage
- Kucinski, Bernardo (2002) “A Primeira Vítima: A Autocensura Durante o Regime Militar”, em Carneiro, Maria Luiza Tucai *Minorias Silenciadas: História da Censura no Brasil*, SP: IMESP/FHPES/EDUSP, p. 531-551
- , Bernardo (2000) *Jornalismo Econômico*, São Paulo: Edusp, p. 11-29, 167-192
- , Bernardo (1998) *A Síndrome da Antena Parabólica – Ética no Jornalismo Brasileiro*, São Paulo: Fundação Perseu Abramo
- Lahóz, André (2002) “Renda e Consumo” em Lamounier, Bolívar & Figueiredo, Rubens (orgs.) *A Era FHC – Um Balanço*, São Paulo: Cultura Editores Associados, p. 71-99
- Lamounier, Bolívar & Figueiredo, Rubens (2002) (orgs.) *A Era FHC – Um Balanço*, São Paulo: Cultura Editores Associados
- , Bolívar (1991) *Partidos e Utopias: o Brasil no Limiar dos Anos 90*, São Paulo: Edições Loyola, p. 127-150

- , Bolívar (1990) *De Geisel a Collor – O Balanço da Transição*, São Paulo, Idesp-Sumaré
- , Bolívar (1986) *Partidos Políticos e Consolidação Democrática – O Caso Brasileiro*, Brasília: Editora Brasilense, p. 80-116
- Leon, Osvaldo (2003) “Para Uma Agenda Social em Comunicação” em Moraes, Denis (org.) *Por Uma Outra Comunicação – Mídia, Mundialização Cultural e Poder*, RJ/SP: Editora Record, p. 401-414
- Leonelli, Domingos e Oliveira, Dante (2004) *Diretas Já – 15 meses que Abalaram a Ditadura*, Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record
- Leys, Colin (2001) *Market-driven Politics – Neo-liberal Democracy and the Public Interest*, London: Verso, p. 1-29, 81-122
- Lichtenberg, Judith (1991) “In Defence of Objectivity Revisited” in Curran, James and Gurevitch, Michael (eds.) *Mass Media and Society*, Arnold: London, p. 238-255
- , Judith (1990) (ed.) *Democracy and the Mass Media*, NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 1-128
- , Judith (1990) “Foundations and Limits of Freedom of the Press” in *Democracy and the Mass Media*, NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 102-136
- Lima, Venício A. de (1996) *Mídia – Teoria e Política*, SP: Fundação Perseu Abramo, p. 17-53, 89-251
- Linhares, Maria Yedda (org.) *História Geral do Brasil*, Rio de Janeiro: Editora Campus
- Lins da Silva, Carlos Eduardo (2002) “Política e Comércio Exterior” em Lamounier, Bolívar & Figueiredo, Rubens (orgs.) *A Era FHC – Um Balanço*, São Paulo: Cultura Editores Associados, p. 295-331
- , Carlos Eduardo (1990) *O Adiantado da Hora: A Influência Americana Sobre o Jornalismo Brasileiro*, SP: Summus
- , Carlos Eduardo (1988) *Mil Dias – Os Bastidores de uma Revolução em um Grande Jornal*, SP: Trajetória Cultural
- , Carlos Eduardo (1985) *Muito Além do Jardim Botânico – um Estudo Sobre a Audiência do Jornal Nacional da Globo entre Trabalhadores*, São Paulo: Summus, p. 13-46
- , Carlos Eduardo (org) (1982) *Comunicação, Hegemonia e Contra-Infomação*, São Paulo, Cortez Editora, p. 17-23
- Lippman, Walter (1922, 1998) *Public Opinion*, US: Transaction Publishers, p. 3-170, 253-293, 317-369

- Llobera, Josep (1998) "Historical and Comparative Research" in Seale, Clive (ed.) *Researching Society and Culture*, London: Sage, p. 72-80
- Lyotard, Jean-Francois (1984) *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p.3-23
- Manning, Paul (2001) *News and the News Sources – A Critical Introduction*, London: Sage Publications, p. 1-171
- Marcondes Filho, Ciro (2000) *A Saga dos Cães Perdidos*, São Paulo, Hacker Editoras
- , Ciro (1993) *Jornalismo Fin-de-Siècle*, São Paulo: Scritta, p. 83-149
- , Ciro (1986) *O Capital da Notícia*, São Paulo: Editora Ática
- Marcuse, Herbert (1964) *One-Dimensional Man*, London: Routledge
- Marques de Melo, José (2003) *História do Pensamento Comunicacional*, SP: Paulus
- , José (1993) (ed.) *Communication for a New World – Brazilian Perspectives*, São Paulo, ECA: USP
- , José (1989) (org.) "Comunicação na América Latina: A Conjuntura Pós-Desenvolvimentista" em *Comunicação na América Latina – Desenvolvimento e Crise*, São Paulo, Papirus, p. 13-38
- Marris, Paul and Thornham, Sue (eds.) (1996) *Media Studies – A Reader*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press
- Martin-Barbero, Jean (1993) *Communication, Culture and Hegemony – From the Media to Mediations*, London: Sage Publications, p. 6-85, 149-187
- Martins da Silva, Luiz (2002) "Imprensa e Cidadania: Possibilidades e Contradições" in Motta, Luiz Gonzaga (org.) *Imprensa e Poder*, Brasília: UnB, p. 47-75
- Mattelart, Armand (1982) "Comunicação, Hegemonia e Novas Tecnologias na América Latina" em Lins da Silva, Carlos Eduardo *Comunicação, Hegemonia e Contra-informação*, São Paulo, Cortez Editora, p. 98-105
- McChesney, Robert W. and Hackett, Robert (2005) "Beyond Wiggle Room: American Corporate Media's Democratic Deficit, its Global Implications and Prospects for Reform" in Hackett, R. A. and Zhao, Yuezhi (eds.) *Democratizing Global Media – One World, Many Struggles*, Lanham, New York and Oxford: Rowman & Little Field Publishers, Inc., p. 225-245
- , Robert W. (1999) *Rich Media, Poor Media – Communication Politics in Dubious Times*, Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, p. 1-15
- , Robert W. (1997) *Corporate Media and the Threat to Democracy*, New York: Seven Stories Press, p. 5-74

- McLuhan, Marshall (1964, 1997) *Understanding Media – The Extension of Man*, London: Routledge, p. 3-33
- McManus, John H. (1994) “Market Drive Journalism: Let the Citizen Beware” (excerpt) in Tumber, Howard (ed.) (1999) *News: A Reader*, Oxford: University of Oxford, p. 180-191
- McNair, Brian (1999) *News and Journalism in the UK: A Textbook*, London: Routledge, p. 3-47
- , Brian (1995) *An Introduction to Political Communication*, London and New York: Routledge, p. 3-66
- Merritt, David (1995) “Why Telling the News is Not Enough” in Tumber, Howard (ed.) (1999) *News: A Reader*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 365-379
- Mill, J. S. (1859) “Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion” in Bromley, Michael and O’Malley, Tom (eds.) (1997) *Journalism: A Reader*, London: Routledge, p. 22-28
- Mill, James (1811) “Liberty of the Press” in *Journalism: A Reader*, London: Routledge, p. 16-21
- Milner, Henry (1989) *Sweden: Social Democracy in Practice*, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 1-101
- Moraes, Denis (2003) (org.) *Por Uma Outra Comunicação – Mídia, Mundialização Cultural e Poder*, Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record
- , Denis, Vilches, Lorenzo, Sodré, Muniz, Ramos, Murilo César, Dreifuss, René Armand & Brasil, Sérgio de Souza (orgs.) (1997) *Globalização, Mídia e Cultura Contemporânea*, Campo Grande: Letra Livre
- Moretzsohn, Sylvia (2002) “”Professionalismo” e “Objetividade”: o Jornalismo na Contramão da Política” em Gonzaga Motta, Luiz (org.) *Imprensa e Poder*, Brasília: UnB, p. 199-217
- Morley, David (2000) *Home Territories: Media, Mobility and Identity*, London/New York: Routledge
- , David (1995) *Spaces of Identity: Global Media, Electronic Landscapes and Cultural Boundaries*, London/New York: Routledge
- , David (1980) “Texts, readers, subjects” in Hall, S., Hobson, Dorothy, Lowe, Andrew and Willis, Paul (eds.) *Culture, Media, Language*, London: Hutchinson, p. 163-177
- Nassif, Luiz (2003) *O Jornalismo dos Anos 90*, São Paulo: Futura

- , Luís (2002) “Política Macroeconômica e Ajuste Fiscal” em Lamounier, Bolívar & Figueiredo, Rubens (orgs.) *A Era FHC – Um Balanço*, São Paulo: Cultura Editores Associados, p. 39-71
- Negrine, Ralph (1989) *Politics and the Mass Media in Britain*, London and New York: Routledge, p. 1-20, 152-179
- Neto, Antônio Fausto (1994) “Vozes do Impeachment” em Matos, Heloísa (org.) *Mídia, Eleições e Democracia*, São Paulo: Página Aberta, p. 159-189
- Nicolau, Jairo (2002) “Do Regime Militar à Democracia Atual (1964-2000)” em Nicolau, Jairo *História do Voto no Brasil*, Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Editor, p. 55-72
- , Jairo (1996) *Multipartidarismo e Democracia*, RJ: FGV
- Novelli, Ana Lucia (2002) “O Projeto *Folha* e a Negação do Quatro Poder” em Gonzaga Motta, Luiz (org) *Imprensa e Poder*, Brasília: UnB, p. 181-199
- Oliveira, Ribamar (2002) “Emprego” em Lamounier, Bolívar & Figueiredo, Rubens (orgs.) *A Era FHC – Um Balanço*, São Paulo: Cultura Editores Associados, p. 99-137
- Orwell, George (1946) “The Prevention of Literature” in Bromley, Michael and O’Malley, Tom (1997) (eds.) *Journalism: A Reader*, London: Routledge, p. 159-165
- O’Sullivan, Tim, Dutton, Brian and Rayner, Philip (1994, 1998) *Studying the Media*, London: Arnold
- , Tim and Jewkes, Yvonne (eds.) (1997) *The Media Studies Reader*, London: Arnold
- Oxhorn, Philip and Starr, Pamela K. (1999) *Markets and Democracy in Latin America – Conflict or Convergence?*, Colorado: Lynne Rinner Publishers, p. 2-38, 103-154
- Paiva, Raquel (org.) *Ética, Cidadania e Imprensa*, Rio de Janeiro: Mauad
- Park, Robert E. (1940) “News as a form of knowledge: a chapter in the sociology of knowledge” in Tumber, Howard (ed.) (1999) *News: A Reader*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 11-16
- Pedro, Antônio (1987) *História do Brasil*, São Paulo: Editora FTD
- Peres, Liege Socorro Albuquerque (1998) “O Período Collor – Análise da Cobertura das Revistas *Veja* e *Isto É* de antes da Eleição Presidencial até o Impeachment”, São Paulo, USP (mimeo.)
- Philo, Greg & Miller, David (2001) *Market Killing – What the Free Market Does and What Social Scientists Can do About It*, London: Londgman, p. 3-79
- , Greg and Berry, Mike (2004) *Bad News from Israel*, Glasgow University Media Group, London: Pluto Press, p. 91-103

- Pinsky, Jaime & Pinsky Bassanezi, Carla (2003) *História da Cidadania*, São Paulo: Contexto
- Power, Timothy J. (2000) *The Political Right in Postauthoritarian Brazil – Elites, Institutions and Democratisation*, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, p. 204-234
- Protzel, Javier (2005) “Changing Political Cultures and Media under Globalism in Latin America” in Hackett, Robert A. and Zhao, Yuezhi (eds.) (2005) *Democratizing Global Media – One world, Many Struggles*, Lanham, New York and Oxford: Rowman & Little Field Publishers, Inc., p. 101-121
- Ramos, Murilo Cesar (1985) “O papel dos meios de comunicação de massa na abertura política brasileira” em Melo, José Marques (org.) *Comunicação e Transição Democrática*, Porto Alegre: Mercado Aberto, p. 246-263
- Reeves, Geoffrey (1993) *Communications and the ‘Third World’*, London: Routledge, p. 1-70, 101-126
- Rodrigues, Alberto Tosi (2003) *Diretas Já, o Grito Preso na Garganta*, Fundação Perseu Abramo
- Rodrigues, Malena Rehbein (2002) “Agendando o Congresso Nacional: do Agenda-Setting à crise da Democracia Representativa” em *Imprensa e Poder*, Brasília: UnB, p. 103-125
- Rosen, Jay (1999) *What are Journalists For?*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, p. 1-16, 19-80, 177-248, 262-300
- Rubim, Antonio Albino Canelas (2002) “Das Visibilidades das Eleições de 2002: uma Reflexão Acerca dos Enlaces entre Política, Mídia e Cultura” em *Comunicação e Política*, v. IX, n. 3, p. 189-207
- Schudson, Michael (2003) *The Sociology of News*, New York & London: W.W. Norton & Company, p. 11-114, 197-213
- Schudson, Michael (1997) “Was there Ever a Public Sphere? If so, when? Reflections on the American case” in Calhoun, Craig (ed.) (1993) *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: MIT Press, p. 143-164
- Schudson, Michael (1992) “The Sociology of News Production Revisited” in Curran, James and Gurevitch, Michael (eds.) *Mass Media and Society*, New York: Edward Arnold, p. 141-159
- , Michael (1978) *Discovering the News – A Social History of American Newspapers*, NY: Basic Books, p. 3-61, 121-164, 176-194



- Scott, Alan (1990) *Ideology and The New Social Movements*, London: Unwin Heyman, p.13-80
- Seabra, Roberto (2002) “Dois Séculos de Imprensa no Brasil: do Jornalismo Literário a era da Internet” em Gonzaga Motta, Luiz (org.) *Imprensa e Poder*, Brasília: UnB, p. 31-47
- Seale, Clive (1998) *Researching Society and Culture*, London: Sage Publication
- , Clive (1999) *The Quality of Qualitative Research*, London: Sage Publications, p.2-7, 32-49, 106-109,140-177
- Shohat, E. and Stam, Robert (1994) *Unthinking Eurocentrism*, London: Routledge
- Siebert, Fred S., Peterson, Theodore & Schramm, Wilbur (1956) *Four Theories of the Press*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, p. 1-103
- Silva, Francisco Carlos Teixeira da (2000) “Brasil, em Direção ao Século XXI” em Linhares, Maria
- Yedda (org.) *História Geral do Brasil*, Rio de Janeiro: Campus, p. 385-445
- , Francisco Carlos Teixeira da (2000) “A Modernização Autoritária: do Golpe Militar à Redemocratização 1964/1984” em Linhares, Maria Yedda (org.) *História Geral do Brasil*, Rio de Janeiro: Campus, p. 351-385
- Silverman, David (2000) *Doing Qualitative Research – a Practical Handbook*, London: Sage
- Sinclair, John (1999) *Latin America Television: a global view*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 63-92
- Singer, André (2002) “Saúde” em Lamounier, Bolívar & Figueiredo, Rubens (orgs.) *A Era FHC – Um Balanço*, São Paulo: Cultura Editores Associados, p. 501-537
- , André (1999) *Esquerda e Direita no Eleitorado Brasileiro – As Eleições Presidenciais de 1989 e 1994*, São Paulo: Edusp
- Skidmore, Thomas E. (1999) *Brazil – Five centuries of Change*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 189-234
- Slater, Don (1998) “Analysing Cultural Objects: Content Analysis and Semiotics” in Seale, Clive (ed.) *Researching Society and Culture*, London: Sage, p. 233-244
- Sodré, Muniz (1999) *Claros e Escuros – Identidade, Povo e Mídia no Brasil*, Rio de Janeiro: Vozes
- Soloski, John (1989) “News Reporting and Professionalism: Some Constraints on the Reporting of the News” in Tumber, Howard (ed.) (1999) *News: A Reader*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 308-320

- Sorj, Bernardo (2001) “Fernando Henrique Cardoso, o Sociólogo e Político” em *A Construção Intelectual do Brasil Contemporâneo: da Resistência à Ditadura ao Governo FHC*, Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Editora, p. 115-125
- Spicer, Neil (2004) “Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Methods” in Seale, Clive (ed.) *Researching Society and Culture*, London: Sage, p. 294-303
- Splichal, Slavko (1999) *Public Opinion – Developments and Controversies in the Twentieth Century*, New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, p. 4-85, 167-312
- Sreberny, Annabelle (2000) “The Global and the Local in International Communications” in Curran, James and Gurevitch, Michael (eds.) *Mass Media and Society*, London: Arnold, p. 93-119
- Staffan, Sundin (2003) “Trends in Media Ownership in the Nordic Countries” in Harrie, Eva (org.) *Nordicom - The Nordic Media Market: Media Companies and Business Activities, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden*, Göteborg University Press, p. 13- 19
- Straubhaar, Joseph (2001) “Brazil: the Role of the State in World TV” in Morris, Nancy and Waisbord, Silvio (eds.) *Media and Globalisation – Why the State Matters*, Oxford/New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, p. 133-153
- Straubhaar, Joseph D. (1996) “The Electronic Media in Brazil” in Cole, Richard R. (ed.) *Communication in Latin America: Journalism, Mass Media and Society*, USA: Scholarly Resources Inc, p. 217-245
- Street, John (2001) *Mass Media, Politics and Democracy*, New York: Palgrave
- Strinati, Dominic (1995) *An Introduction to Theories of Popular Culture*, London: Routledge
- Takehita, Toshio “Exploring the Media’s Role in Defining Reality: from Issue Agenda-Setting to Attribute Agenda-Setting” in McCombs, Maxwell Shaw, Donald L and Weaver, David (eds.) (1997) *Communication and Democracy – Exploring the Intellectual Frontiers in Agenda-Setting Theory*, London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, p. 15-27
- Tavares, José Nilo (1989) “Desenvolvimento na Nova República: Contradições da Transição Política” em *Comunicação na América Latina – Desenvolvimento e Crise*, São Paulo, Papyrus, p. 49-52
- Telles, Vera da Silva (1994) “Sociedade Civil e a Construção de Espaços Públicos” em *Anos 90: Política e Sociedade no Brasil*, SP: Brasiliense, p. 91-103
- Thompson, John B. (1995) *Ideologia e Cultura Moderna*, Petrópolis: Vozes

- , John (1994) “The Theory of the Public Sphere: a Critical Appraisal” in *The Polity Reader in Cultural Theory*, Cambridge: Polity Press, pg. 91-99
- Thussu, Daya Kishan (2000) *International Communication – Continuity and Change*, London: Arnold, p. 11-21, 53-82
- Traquina, Nelson e Mesquita, Mario (2003) *Jornalismo Cívico*, Lisboa: Livros Horizonte
- Travancas, Isabel Siqueira (1993) *O Mundo dos Jornalistas*, São Paulo: Summus, 2 ed., p. 81-100
- Tuchman, Gaye (1972) “Objectivity as a Strategic Ritual: an Examination of Newsmen’s Notions of Objectivity” in Tumber, Howard (ed.) (1999) *News: A Reader*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 297-308
- Tumber, Howard (ed.) (1999) *News: A Reader*, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Tunstall, Jeremy and Machin, David (1999) *The Anglo-American Media Connection*, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- , Jeremy (1993) *Television Producers*, London: Routledge, p 157-226
- Ungar, Sanford J. (1990) “The Role of the Press in Strengthening Democracy” in Lichtenberg, Judith (1990) (ed.) *Democracy and the Mass Media*, NY: Cambridge University Press, p. 368-396
- Van Dijk, Teun A. (2005) “Opinions and Ideologies in the Press” in Bell, Allan and Garrett, Peter (eds.) (2005) *Approaches to Media Discourse*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, p. 21-64
- Velho, Gilberto (1994) “A Vitória de Collor” em *Projeto e Metamorfose – Antropologia das Sociedades Complexas*, Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Editora, p. 71-76
- Vieira, Liszt (2000) *Cidadania e Globalização*, Rio de Janeiro: Record
- Villas-Bôas Corrêa (2002) *Conversa com a Memória – A História de Meio Século de Jornalismo Político*, Rio de Janeiro: Objetiva
- Vogel, Luiz Henrique (2003) “Mídia e Democracia: o Pluralismo Regulado como Arranjo Institucional” em *Estudos Históricos*, n. 31, p. 106-126
- Waisbord, Silvio (2000) “Media in South America – Between the Rock and the Hard Place of the Market” in Curran, James and Park, Myung-Jim (eds.) *De-Westernising Media Studies*, London: Routledge p. 50-63
- , Silvio (2000) *Watchdog Journalism in South America: News, Accountability and Democracy*, NY: Columbia
- , Silvio (1995) “Leviathan Dreams: State and Broadcasting in South America” in *The Communication Review*, 1 (2), p. 201-221

Weber, Max (1968) *On Charisma and Institution Building*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Weber, Maria Helena (2000) “Mídia e Eleições” Relações (Mal)ditas” em *Comunicação e espetáculo da política*, Porto Alegre: Ed. Universidade/UFRGS, p. 47-67

-----, Maria Helena (2000) “A Cara Pintada da Política Brasileira” em *Comunicação e Espectáculo da Política*, Porto Alegre: Ed. Universidade/UFRGS, p. 81- 96

Werneck, Nelson Sodre (1998) *História da Imprensa no Brasil*, Rio de Janeiro: Mauad

### **Newspapers and Internet articles**

Alves, Ivson (2002) “Globo Adere ao Lula Já” em *Comunique-se* ([www.comunique-se.com.br](http://www.comunique-se.com.br), 01/10/02)

-----, Ivson (2003) “O Governo Lula na Arena da Comunicação” em *Comunique-se* (04/02/03)

Arbex Jr., José (2005) “Os assinantes pagam, *Veja* mente” em *Brasil de Fato* (17/03/05)

Asthana, Anushka (2005) “Tories Attack ‘Left-wing Intellectuals’ at the BBC over Miners Drama” in *The Guardian* (27/02/2005)

Besserman, Sérgio (2005) “Pobreza, Desigualdade e Democracia” em *O Globo* (15/07/05)

“BBC licence fee secure for the next 10 years at least” in *Scotsman.com News* (05/06/04)

“Brasil: mídia é mais confiável que governo” em *O Globo* (05/05/06)

Brasil, Antônio (2003) “O Fim de Uma Era” em *Comunique-se.com.br* (12/10/2003)

Breguez, Sebastião (2000) “O Jornalismo no Final do Século XX”, in *Sala de Prensa*, junho, ano III

Campos, Pedro Celso (2002) “Comunicação, a chave para o novo mundo” em *Observatório da Imprensa* ([www.observatoriodaimprensa.com.br](http://www.observatoriodaimprensa.com.br) , 01/10/02)

Cantanhêde, Eliane (1999) “Coalizão das Diretas-Já se desfez rápido” em *FSP* (19/04/99)

Coelho da Graça, Milton (2004) “Papai Faz uma Coisa, Filho diz Outra” em *Comunique-se* (23/08/04)

Conti, Mario Sérgio (2000) “TV brasileira, 50 anos - O Dono do Mundo” em *FSP* (16/09/00)

Costa, Luciano Martins (2005) “Jornais de Papel – Imprensa entre o Tsunami e a Glaciação” em *Observatório da Imprensa* (22/03/05)

-----, Luciano Martins (2003) “Senhoras e Senhores, Encolhemos a Imprensa” em *Observatório da Imprensa* (30/09/03)

-----, Luciano Martins (2003) “Mídia, BNDES e a Crise – Os Perigos da Intimidade com o Poder” em *Observatório da Imprensa* (11/11/03)

Dines, Alberto (2005) “De ‘fenômeno midiático’ à guerrilha contra a mídia” em *Observatório da Imprensa* (10/08/05)

-----, Alberto (2005) “O que Fazer Para Sair do Buraco” em *Observatório da Imprensa/TVE Brasil* (15/03/05)

-----, Alberto (2005) “20 Anos de Democracia” em *Observatório da Imprensa* (3/03/2005)

-----, Alberto (2004) “CFJ – Chegou a Hora de Discutir o Mérito” em *Observatório da Imprensa* (20/09/04)

-----, Alberto (2003) “Roberto Marinho - Globo e globalização, eis a questão” em *Observatório da Imprensa* (14/08/2003)

-----, Alberto (2003) “Lula Faz Gols, Mídia Engole Frangos” em *Observatório da Imprensa* (03/07/03)

Domingos, João (2004) “Ancinav Combaterá o Fascismo da Mídia, diz Gil” em *ESP* (14/09/04)

Doria, Pedro (2004) “O Conselho Obsoleto” em *No Mínimo* ([www.ibestnominimo.com.br](http://www.ibestnominimo.com.br), 26/08/04)

Escóssia, Fernanda de & Freire, Flávio (2005) “Minorias: a luta contra as outras formas de mandar calar a boca” em *O Globo* (15/07/05)

Felix, Jorge (2003) “O governo quer a mídia de joelhos” em *AOL Online* (21/10/2003)

“Folha e UOL se Unem para Abrir Capital” em *FSP* (04/01/2005)

Fraga, Plínio (2003) “Primeiro comício das diretas uniu Lula e FHC” em *FSP* (23/11/03)

Galhardo, Ricardo (2005) “Partidos de esquerda se deslocam para o centro” em *O Globo* (15/07/2005)

Garcia, Luiz (2004) “CFJ em Debate” em *Observatório da Imprensa* (07/09/04)

Genoíno, José (2004) “Viés Autoritário de Quem?” em *ESP* (28/08/04)

Hashizume, Maurício (2004) “BNDES Reserva R\$ 2 bilhões para Socorrer Empresa com Dívida” em *Agência Carta Maior* (<http://www.agenciacartamaior.uol.com.br>, 01/06/04)

Herscovitz, Heloiza Golbspan (2000) “O que Pensam os Jornalistas”, *Monitor da Imprensa* em *Observatório da Imprensa* (20/06/00)

“A imprensa julgada” em *Veja* (11/04/84)

“Jornalistas acham desempenho pessoal de Lula ruim” em *Comunique-se* (03/01/06)

“Jornalistas Discordam da Criação de Conselho” em *O Globo* (26/08/04)

Konder, Leandro (2006) “Esquerda e Direita no Brasil, hoje” em *FSP* (13/04/06)

Kostcho, Ricardo (2004) “Que se Passa?” em *FSP* (14/09/04)

Kucinski, Bernardo (2003) “Uma Nova Ética Para uma Nova Modernidade” em *Observatório da Imprensa* (19/01/03)

*Lei de Imprensa* (9 de Fevereiro de 1967)

Lima, Venício A. de (2003) “Existe Concentração na Mídia Brasileira? Sim” em *Observatório da Imprensa* (01/07/03)

-----, Venício A. de e Guazina, Liziane (2005) “Imprensa no Limite da Credibilidade” em *Observatório da Imprensa* (22/03/05)

“Lula Ironiza Falta de Apoio de Jornalistas ao CFJ” em *O Globo* (17/08/04)

“A Mídia e o BNDES” em *ESP* (26/11/03)

Nicolau, Jairo (2005) “Vinte Anos de Avanços Institucionais” em *O Globo* (15/07/05)

Nunes, Augusto (2003) “Confidências da lenda numa tarde de agosto” em *Jornal do Brasil* (08/08/03)

Pilagallo, Oscar (2003) “Defesa das diretas fixou identidade da Folha” em *FSP* (23/11/03)

Pompeu de Toledo, Roberto (2003) “Roberto Marinho – Rosebud!” em *Veja* (13/08/03)

Preston, Peter (2005) “Are Newspapers Burnt Out? “ in *The Guardian* (21/11/2004)

*Projetos Editoriais Folha de São Paulo* (1981, 1984, 1985, 1986-1987, 1988-1989 & 1997) em *Folha Online* ([www.folhaonline.com](http://www.folhaonline.com), 17/06/03)

*Relatório Annual de Defesa da Liberdade de Imprensa* – Associação Nacional de Jornais do Brasil, 1 de Dezembro, 2005

Ribeiro, Eduardo (2004) “A Imprensa no Divã” em *Comunique-se.com.br* (19/08/04)

“O século da desigualdade” em *O Globo* (30/09/03)

Sardinha, Edson (2005) “Câmara estuda mudança na Lei de Imprensa” em *Comunique-se* (22/09/05)

Setti, Ricardo A. (2005) “Quem Agüenta Tanto Noticiário Político?” em *Observatório da Imprensa* (3/08/05)

Siqueira, Ethevaldo (2006) “TV Cultura em Crise” em *Observatório da Imprensa* (07/03/06)

-----, Ethevaldo (2006) “TV Cultura concretiza o sonho da TV pública” em *ESP* (03/01/06)

Sosnowski, Alice (2006) “Lula eliminou a necessidade da imprensa” em *Comunique-se* (01/12/06)

Vieira, Enio & Beck, Martha (2005) “Desigualdade: brasileiros vivem melhor, mas abismo não diminui” em *O Globo* (15/07/05)

Weissheimer, Marco Aurélio (2004) “Outro Jornalismo é Possível?” em *Agência Carta Maior* (02/02/04)

“40 Anos de Emendas e Remendos Regulatórios” em *Mídia com Democracia - Revista do Fórum Nacional pela Democratização da Comunicação*, Janeiro de 2006, nr. 1

“Um Brasil Mais Justo” em *PT Notícias – Jornal do Diretório Nacional do Partido dos Trabalhadores*, ano VII, Especial, Dezembro, 2005

## Appendix 1

### *Additional information and notes on methodology and discourse analysis*

This research has not been about the effects of the political campaigns and presidential elections on the Brazilian public and how they reacted to the changes that occurred in Brazil in the past 18 years. Evidently this would demand a different study, one which would aim to focus more on the *reception* of political discourses and media messages by audiences and publics in the post-dictatorship years (1984-2002). As noted in Chapter 1, this qualitative research has not adopted an exclusively text-based approach to discourse analysis. Such an acknowledgement nonetheless should not be made as a means of dismissing the *essentiality* of the use of discourse analysis methodology in studies like this one. I have attempted here to debate change by investigating the complexities of the relationship shared between media discourses, professional journalistic ideologies and the contradictory socio-economic and political environment in which these discourses emerged and the wider systems of ideology which informed them.

In Chapter 1, I endorsed the GUMG's critique of Fairclough's favouring of the text in discourse analysis methodology. Philo (2004) has criticized Fairclough's critical discourse analysis (CDA) approach on the grounds that it is too much focused on texts. Fairclough's main aim seems to be the assessment of the ways in which dominant perspectives are legitimized through particular uses of language in media texts. Philo notes however that Fairclough does recognize the limits of textual analysis, but argues that he does not emphasize enough other factors such as the production and reception processes. Fairclough states that discourse analysis should be understood as a strive to show "systematic links between texts, discourse practices and socio-cultural practices" (1995; 17). "Textual analysis can give access to the detailed mechanism through which social contradictions evolve and are lived out, and the sometimes subtle shifts they undergo", argues Fairclough (1995; 15). Fairclough (2003; 124) thus sees discourses as representations of the relations and structures of the material world. Different discourses thus contain different perspectives on reality and can be appropriated for various reasons. Most importantly, they are sites of struggle between groups to understand the world and to apply their particular readings to it.

However, as the GUMG point out, discourse analysis must go beyond the text. It must take into consideration competing discourses and how they relate to different social



interests. It must include social accounts that are also absent from a text, judging the impact on it of professional journalistic practices as well as assessing how different audiences and publics understand media messages. Thus a qualitative analysis methodology that can go beyond text-based research is undoubtedly the most suitable for studies like the one conducted here. Such a methodology can help explain *why* certain events were covered in the way that they were in the media, and *how* certain discourses and ideas began to be slowly legitimized by mainstream society and consequently by the press.

Van Dijk and Fairclough see discourse as strictly linked to power and social interests. They are concerned with the ideological effects of discourse (Philo, 2004). As highlighted in Chapter 1, this research deals with the struggle of political discourses in the media. It explores the *ideological* assumptions and opinions created by certain groups and their positioning in relation to these ideas, which were contested, reaffirmed and repressed in the press throughout the years covered here. I have thus understood the media to be a battlefield, a place which is constantly the site of hegemonic struggle (Lins da Silva, 1984) over power, access and influence. Thus it is in the terrain of *language* that such a fight for power within media institutions and in the wider society is made evident. This points to the existence of close links between language (discourse) and ideology. This is something which is not always clear for many people, for ideological opinions are not always expressed in explicit ways. They can be implied or taken for granted.

As we shall see, particular dominant views were reaffirmed and/or marginalized in different periods of contemporary Brazilian history (i.e. the view that the *real* was the solution to all of Brazil's problems or that the PT was a party composed only of radicals). To take an example: what occurred during the dictatorship is still an ideological struggle today. Some have undermined for instance the atrocities and the repressions that occurred during the period. As we shall see, the role played by the mainstream media and the ways in which journalists and others resisted media censorship is still a contested subject. My case studies show that competing ideologies proliferated in the media pages during the contemporary years as much as they did in newsrooms, with discourses gaining in legitimacy and others losing it in accordance to the dominant views which prevailed at particular moments of Brazilian history.

I have looked at the reporting of political discourses in the media, giving a further account of the Brazilian political system and the conflicting interests which lie within them. I have also explored the gap between what the politicians said in the press and what

they actually did. Moreover, I looked at how stories were framed, analysing the types of statements made and the semantic features of a message, pointing further to the structures and the relationships which shaped the content of these texts. Furthermore, I examined the external context from which such arguments were derived, discussing the assumptions of elite circles in relation to particular political-economic themes, such as the necessity of combating inflation and privatizing state firms. Contradictions and similarities in newspaper language were also highlighted. Discussions have included contrasts between the media's positions on particular political-economic themes to the type of treatment that these issues received in the newspaper pages.

As argued in Chapter 1, I have avoided the class determinism of critical political economy. Such a framework has thus permitted me to understand ideology as being something which goes beyond the mere reproduction of class domination. I have seen ideology as consisting of values embedded in different discourses which circulate amongst diverse groups, be them dominant or subordinated. As Van Dijk argues (1998,2005: 24), “ideologies are not wrong or right, but rather more or less effective in promoting the interests of a group...many ideologies develop precisely in order to sustain, legitimate or manage group conflicts, as well as relationships of power and dominance.” As we shall see in this research, ideological and political struggles happened in the media pages in the post-dictatorship years precisely *because* elites were divided. This culminated in a variety of opinions on political-economic affairs, social issues, violence and employment being deployed in the media pages as a means of defending certain causes and securing one's own position in a particular (ideological) group structure.

Van Dijk (1998, 2005; 29) has also defined “opinion” as being “evaluative beliefs”. To him, any “belief that presupposes a value which involves a judgment about somebody or something is “evaluative.” As we shall see, Brazilian newspapers in the post-dictatorship phase opened up more spaces to express a wider variety of views, be them conservative or liberal in accordance with the issue in question. I will discuss how similar discourses circulated in diverse elite groups of Brazilian society. Different media institutions were influenced by these discourses, coming to share the common discourse practices which were prevalent in Brazilian society in diverse historical moments.

As I mentioned in Chapter 1, I have adopted a similar methodological approach to the one used by the GUMG. I have contrasted media texts with the competing discourses shared by elite groups on the issues dealt in the news material analysed, combining this with production processes and with journalists' editorial judgments and actions. Contrary

to the GUMG though, I did not have the condition to conduct focus groups and studies on *how* these media discourses were received by the public. However, civil society sentiments and public opinion trends have been juxtaposed with the analyses of professional journalistic ideologies and media messages. In Chapter 2 for instance I contrasted the language used by newspapers like *FSP* and the magazines *Veja* and *Isto É* with the discourses of sectors of the mainstream media and elite circles who showed more reluctance in supporting the direct elections campaign. I also interconnected media discourses with the position assumed by journalists who covered the *diretas*. The *FSP* story “Night of the absentees, the day of the end of hope” (26/04/84), examined in Chapter 2, is an example of a literary piece of journalism which underscored the militancy of both the paper and of the journalist who wrote it, Ricardo Kostcho:

“On top of the carpeted floor of the Federal Chamber, when everything was over, the representatives of the people defeated in their biggest hope stepped on the petals of the yellow chrysanthemums which all these months symbolized a fight, a dream...the scream for liberty of this humiliated nation....It is obvious that Paulo Maluf did not even show up...The journalists seemed more excited than some MPs.”

Here a text-based analysis of this story, and of others published by *FSP* on the 26<sup>th</sup> of April 1984, would have provided only a limited view of the various factors involved in the endorsement of the movement by *Folha* and the reasons why Kostcho was permitted to criticize governmental hardliners in such a direct way. In Chapter 2, I weave similar *FSP* stories on the *diretas* and others of various dailies with journalists’ discussions of the campaign and the ways in which they participated. Kostcho himself was interviewed, highlighting his own role in pressuring for the daily to back the movement. “The suggestion was mine. I presented it in the end of 1983 to my direct boss...”, said Kostcho. Thus stories like the one above were intermingled with the historical and socio-political context of the time, including the military repression and the slow support given to the *diretas* in mainstream society and media circles.

Ownership and media management partisanship stood out in the 1989 elections to the detriment of professionalism. These are some of the key themes explored in Chapter 3. In the *Isto É* story “The spectrum of Brizula” (22/03/89) for instance, a comparison is made between the role played by the magazine in 1989 and journalist Mino Carta’s assertion of how a certain degree of journalism autonomy permitted him to balance more the

coverage. He admits nonetheless that the reporting was slightly more sympathetic to Lula than Collor. The ideological overtones of the *Brizula* story are unquestionable though:

“The traditional right is not used to democratic electoral processes. Extreme right, right.. The spectrum of Brizula frightens them...A frightening entity that switches the face of Brizola to that of Lula...the Brizula puts at risk a hegemony that dates back to 1889...Be it with Lula or Brizola, the left have a historic opportunity to win...”

As we shall see, the 1989 elections received in general a patchy coverage from the press which was quite low in professionalism. Journalist Augusto Nunes shed light on the battles undertaken in newsrooms between media management and journalists, with many not having had enough strength to investigate Collor. “*ESP* was always a partisan newspaper. *ESP* transformed itself into a schizophrenic daily in 1989...” , said Nunes. Furthermore, the partisanship and ideological biases present in some of *Veja* stories, like “The star takes off” (17/05/89) and “The hypothesis of Lula” (29/11/89), could also be seen in some pieces done by the magazine on the 2002 campaign. The similarities between discourses like what would happen to “liberal professionals who had managed to save up money and had small properties” (29/11/89) to features like “Why Lula frightens the market” (22/05/02) and “What the radicals of the PT want” (23/10/02) are stressed in the context of discussions undertaken about the rise of the market hysteria in the 2002 elections, issues investigated in Chapter 5.

I have thus made use in this research of a complex approach to both content *and* textual analysis, striving to adopt a comparative qualitative methodology which could do justice to the contradictory Brazilian experience. Krippendorff (1980: 21) has defined content analysis as a “research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context”. “Content analysis could be characterized as a method for inquiry into symbolic meaning of messages...that do not have a single meaning that needs to be “unwrapped” (Krippendorff, 1980: 22). As Krippendorff (1980: 37) has further stated, a large body of literature in content analysis assesses various differences in how audiences are addressed as well as how diversities in news coverage can be correlated with editorial endorsements. These can also be explained in terms of ownership and political orientation. I highlighted in the content analysis conducted in Chapter 4 the *similarities* of the media messages on the *real* plan and less the *disparities* which existed in the newspapers’ coverage of the topic. I said that this was prove of the construction of a

certain elite consensus around the importance of this type of economic plan in the light of the establishment's embracement of the global free market ideology. In Chapter 2 on the other hand, I discussed the *differences* in the type of news coverage afforded to the direct elections campaign.

The content analysis carried out in Chapter 4 revealed how Lula had more “negative” stories than FHC, having had to depend more on the “neutral” features than his rival to present his views to the wider public. The content analysis also indicated that the *real* was present in all the nooks and crannies of the 1994 presidential elections coverage. As we shall see in Chapter 4, studies showed that Lula appeared a lot in the press in 1994, but that this was often done to marginalize rather than include him. This indicated that a subject matter can be covered extensively on the news, but journalists or certain discourses can be deployed to undermine these very same positions. This is one among many reasons that I did not adopt a traditional form of dealing with content analysis. Arguably, traditional content analysis studies have involved frequent counting of specific words used in media texts or the amount of newspaper coverage given to an issue. Many traditional academic Brazilian studies conducted on elections, like those of the Iuperj institute, have applied quantitative methodology to measure bias in attempts to identify the amount of time given to particular candidates during campaigns. In response to the critiques of having manipulated news to satisfy owners, *TV Globo* from the mid-90's onwards for instance started to give equal time to each candidate on national television as a way of achieving more balance in political reporting.

Director of *TV Globo's* newsroom, Ali Kamel, rejects the idea that media management engaged consciously in attempts to undermine Lula in the re-edition of the last television debate in 1989. Kamel argued that *TV Globo's* political journalism was good in 1989, but that it has improved since then due to a reinforcement of professional practices. These include giving equal time to all of the candidates: “TV Globo has always been the same. But in 1989, the nation was divided. We had a highly polarised and passionate election and there was a low level of education from the part of the politicians. It was a correct decision to edit the debate nearest to what really happened (Collor had done better in the debate than Lula). I have no complaints to make in relation to *TV Globo's* coverage in the first round. We conducted long interviews from August onwards with all of the candidates. Brizola was the most difficult one, as he went on TV to accuse *Globo TV* of benefiting Collor. In that moment we said that *he* Brizola had been benefited, as he had appeared 40 times....Everyone had one hour and he had 1 hour and 15 minutes. In the second round, we conducted a highly balanced coverage: the

time that Collor had, Lula had also. In the 2002 elections, we gave Serra and Lula equal time and in the first round, we did this with the four main candidates. But of course I cannot measure the exact minutes. One had 1.5, the other 1.65...The average was one minute ...”

In Chapter 5, *O Globo's* newsroom director Rodolfo Fernandes correctly argues that this was a rigid way of attempting to reach balance, and how from the mid-90's onwards journalists managed to transcend this in political reporting in line with their own growth in maturity and understanding of professionalism: “I can talk about the 1998 campaign. There was not a moment in *O Globo's* coverage that we did not put a photo of Fernando Henrique, who was president, next to one of Lula. There was an excessive preoccupation on our part. But the truth is, a political coverage should not be measured by centimeters. Anyway, we decided to radicalize this. Lula gave an interview praising *O Globo's* coverage in 1998. I think that from around that time onwards, the media gets more mature...to the point that you do not need to measure the coverage in centimeters.” Journalists thus began to debate political programmes more, disengaging themselves from the obligations of having to give exact equal time to candidates from different parties.

Thus I have avoided engaging in this research in a rigid quantitative methodology aimed at measuring the exact time given to each candidate and/or the number of times social issues were addressed in the press. One cannot take on the view that the amount of times an issue appears in the media is necessarily indicative of wider media support to a cause or proof of its importance in the public's eye. However, the problem that existed in Brazil in the mid-80's until the early 90's was that social issues and left-wing politics did practically *not* receive very much mainstream media coverage. Thus studies that attempted to measure this were and still are valid in their own right. However, the 18 year period covered here has seen both the inclusion of such issues in the media's public sphere as well as the stigmatization and the difficulties encountered by elites and journalists in dealing with these subject matters.

Content analysis thus has its limits. In Chapter 4, I conducted both content and textual analysis, encountering problems though in defining what can be understood as a “neutral” discourse. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, there is a certain element of “subjectivity” inherent also in this method. Thus quantitative methodology cannot be seen as being more scientific or “objective” than qualitative approaches. The reasons why I conducted content analysis in Chapter 4 and not elsewhere are mainly the difficulties that such a method would pose in the other case studies, where I had to deal with an enormous quantity of media material and a highly complex subject matter which could not be easily

explained through an exclusively quantitative methodological technique. Thus the realization of a content analysis of the short three month presidential campaign discussed in Chapter 4 suited my aim of striving to identify and trace the core political trends of the 1994 elections.

A typical example of a “neutral” story selected in Chapter 4 is “Duel between the PT and the PSDB puts friends on rival camps” (*JB*, 14/08/94). Here intellectuals and supporters from both camps were heard by journalists. The reasons why these groups were backing particular candidates was also debated. Stories based on voters’ intentions and research results, like “Cardoso reaches 30% and is in a tie with Lula” (*ESP*, 22/07/94), can also be seen as being “neutral”, although the weight that some were given by certain newspapers could also be interpreted as a way of the dailies of commemorating the fact that Cardoso was ahead in the polls. This suspicion becomes stronger when one engages with journalistic production processes. Journalists like Mario Sérgio Conti confirmed that many professionals had an “organic” relationship with FHC. Moreover, “positive” stories can also contain levels of negativity, as was the case of the more sympathetic *Veja* piece done on Lula and the Worker’s Party, “PT shines but also arouses fear” (15/97/94). Other journalistic features can also be classified as being clearly “negative” just from the headline (i.e. “Lula feels the attack”, *Isto É*, 03/07/94).

Certain stories which are apparently more “neutral” pieces can however function to indirectly benefit candidates from the opposing camp. The story “Economic plan is only for the elections, say Fiesp” (*FSP*, 27/07/94) can be used by the PT camp to criticize the FHC candidature. The interview “For Brazilianist, FHC ignores poverty” (*FSP*, 05/07/94) can also be seen as a more “negative” media text for the PSDB campaign than for Lula given the fact that the former was portrayed in the campaign as favouring economic over social reform. All these factors attest to the complexities of the analysis of the “positive”, “negative” and “neutral” categories and the limitations that arise when one focuses exclusively on texts in an attempt to investigate the connections between language, ideology and social and political change. This is why this content analysis was interwoven with debates on the nature of the relationship shared between journalists and FHC. Chapter 5 also intertwines these issues with Cardoso’s governmental legacy and the public sentiments of first attraction and then dissatisfaction with his administrations.

Furthermore, limitations arise also when one focuses exclusively on research like the one carried out by Iuperj, which underlined the media’s more sympathetic treatment of the Lula candidature in the 2002 elections. Such results are valid mainly in particular

moments in time, but they alone do not fully explain the wider aspects connected to the increase in media support of the PT candidature in 2002 and the reasons why such groups reached the political mainstream. This, as I have shown in this research, was a result of various complex factors which include the growth of the party and of center-left-wing politics in Brazil; the pressures of civil society on the media; the rise of professionalism and balance in newsrooms; the changes in the PT's image and politics and its wooing of more conservative sectors of Brazilian society, among other points.

These elements attest to the restrictions of content analysis methodology: it alone cannot explain in more depth the impact of socio-political, economical and historical causes on social and political change. Content analysis also cannot fully evaluate the extent of the political and economic constraints imposed on journalists or assess adequately their motivations. I have thus not favoured only the analysis of statistics and other “numerical” information to explain why a candidate was receiving sympathetic treatment from the press. I also did not measure bias by simply counting how many times the words “radical”, “reds” or “bureaucrats” appeared in a text when a reference to the PT was made, or even the quantity of negative stories written on social groups or on Lula and the Worker's Party. Such a strategy would underscore a limited view of the media as a site of class struggle only and a view of a political party as being immune to error. That said, ideological disputes were present in the media throughout this period, with various “negative” stories being done on left-wing politics. *Veja's* piece “Even the PT is afraid” (19/06/02), discussed in Chapter 5, had clear ideological overtones:

“It is calculated that, from 100 electors of the *petista* candidate, only one belongs to the most affluent segment of the middle class...”

As we shall see, this story made little reference to the causes that led many people to defect to the PT alliance in 2002, failing to explain or acknowledge fully the change's in the party's discourse and the dissatisfactions of the population with the then current government and the reasons why the essence of left-wing discourse was having an appeal to wider publics. One needs here to examine the collocations of the text, the words deployed and the semantic relations used in order to comprehend this issue more fully. But again it would be inadequate to examine only these textual strategies without references to other external components and influences. Van Dijk (1998: 33) has talked about an ideological strategy which consists of a polarization between “us” and “them”



which involves positive-in-group and negative-out-group descriptions. This is evident in stories like the *Veja* one which I have sketched above. Certain sentences and arguments were used to stigmatize particular groups (“them”, who do not belong to the affluent middle classes) in opposition to others (us, *Veja* readers, who do). Finally, as argued earlier, neither an exclusive textual analysis approach or a content analysis one is an adequate methodological framework that can fully explain the complexities behind social and political transformations and how these are interconnected with media institutions, ideology, texts and journalistic practices.

The GMUG are thus correct in pointing out the importance of defending a complex engagement with discourse analysis methodology. I do not believe though that a case study must necessarily contain simultaneously *all* of these three processes (production, content and reception) in its discussion of news messages, as Philo seems to suggest. Rather, these texts need to be linked to as many external factors and social interests as possible, but providing that these elements do shed more light to a better understanding of the associations made between ideological media messages and social and political change. Thus particular studies that prioritize one method over the other, be it the reception or the more exclusive textual analysis approach, should not be totally dismissed and should be judged as valid to the extent that they do address the core research questions that they set themselves out to investigate.

## Appendices of Chapters

### Appendix 2

#### Chapter 2

Selected stories

##### 1. Initial launch of the campaign (May 1983-January 1984)

1. “PMDB wants to get out of immobility with direct elections campaign” (*O Globo*, 20/05/83)
2. “The direct elections against ruin” (*Veja*, 09/11/83)
3. “Campaign for direct elections has started” (*FSP*, 12/11/83)
4. “I am in favour of the *diretas*, says Figueiredo” (*FSP*, 17/11/83)
5. “A direct one in the PDS” (*Veja*, 23/11/83)
6. “Direct elections is the way” (*FSP*, 27/11/83)
7. “*Diretas* on the streets” (*FSP*, 28/11/83)
8. “Demonstration of 15.000 demands return of direct elections” (*FSP*, 28/11/83)
9. “For the direct elections – the whole country lifts up the flag” (*Isto É*, 30/11/83)
10. “Sarney: indirect elections are not negotiable for the PDS” (*O Globo*, 03/12/83)
11. “Element of hope” (*O Globo*, 07/12/83)
12. “The time of the streets” (*Isto É*, 07/12/83)
13. “Succession without precipitation” (*O Globo*, 09/12/83)
14. “*Diretas* or consensus” (*Isto É*, 14/12/84)
15. “Ulysses insists on going to Sarney for direct elections” (*O Globo*, 7/12/83)
16. “Elections, the biggest hope in 84” (*FSP*, 01/01/84)
17. “‘Progressives’ of the Opposition define plans for the direct elections” (*O Globo*, 10/01/84)
18. “Indirect elections can take country to chaos, warns Ulysses” (*FSP*, 11/01/84)
19. “Rally in Paraná tests the direct elections” (*FSP*, 12/01/84)
20. “*Diretas Já* generates a new marketing” (*FSP*, 12/01/84)
21. “Campaign grows after act in Curitiba” (*FSP*, 14/01/84)
22. “Lula condemns the launch of candidates” (*FSP*, 15/01/84)
23. “Monster demonstration take on a supra-partisan character” (*FSP*, 15/01/84)
24. “‘Hope’ is Maluf’s slogan” (*JB*, 17/01/84)
25. “Maluf enters badly but leaves well from Planalto” (*JB*, 18/01/84)
26. “OAB leads the national manifesto for direct elections” (*FSP*, 19/01/84)
27. “Golbery gives a “white cheque” to Maluf” (*JB*, 20/01/84)
28. “Montoro guarantees tranquillity for Sé demonstration” (*FSP*, 20/01/84)
29. “Mobilization for direct elections unites country from North to South”

- (FSP, 22/01/84)
30. “Curtain of silence” (FSP, 22/01/84)
  31. “Televisions try to hide the campaign” (FSP, 22/01/84)
  32. “City lives anxious expectations to fill Sé” (FSP, 25/01/84)
  33. “Population engages in a party not seen before” (FSP, 26/01/84)
  34. “300.000 in the streets for the *Diretas*” (FSP, 26/01/84)

## 2. The first grand direct elections protests (January 1984)

35. “In Sé, a high-pitched cry for the direct elections” (FSP, 26/01/84)
36. “Crowd fills Sé square during demonstration for direct elections” (JB, 26/01/84)
37. “Mobilization for direct elections takes crowd to Sé square” (*O Globo*, 26/01/84)
38. “Crowd goes to Sé to ask for direct elections” (ESP, 26/01/84)
39. “PDS now waits for presidential decision” (ESP, 26/01/84)
40. “Sé: crowd, discourses, rain and music” (ESP, 26/01/84)
41. “Direct elections” (ESP, 26/01/84)
42. “Protest for direct elections reunites a crowd during hours in São Paulo” (JB, 26/01/84)
43. “The Sé demonstration” (*O Globo*, 27/01/84)
44. “Lessons from the demonstrations at Sé” (ESP, 27/01/84)
45. “Lessons from Sé” (FSP, 27/01/84)
46. “Tancredo: thesis of consensus impedes radicalisation” (*O Globo*, 28/01/84)

## 3. Direct elections peak (February 1984 – March 1984)

47. “The giant that awakes” in *Diretas, Diretas, Diretas* (*Isto É*, 01/02/84)
48. “I want to vote for president” (*Veja*, 01/02/84)
49. “Osmar Santos – those who cheer want to vote” (*Veja*, 01/02/84)
50. “Act of provocation” (FSP, 02/02/84)
51. “Lula wants to intensify campaign to take more than 1 million to the streets” (FSP, 03/02/84)
52. “The liberal flame, clear, but timid” (FSP, 04/84)
53. ““Ethics” against the people” (FSP, 05/02/84)
54. “Montoro will take document of the *diretas* to Congress” (FSP, 05/02/84)
55. “Brizola: Left will go, but it will not give a talk” (*O Globo*, 07/02/84)
56. “Direction of campaign will be defined today” (FSP, 07/02/84)
57. “Radicals irritate Montoro” (ESP, 11/02/84)
58. “Yes, yellow” (FSP, 12/02/84)
59. “Governors avoid challenging *Planalto*” (FSP, 12/02/84)
60. “Living with demons” (FSP, 12/02/84)
61. “Party for the *Diretas* opens Carnival” (FSP, 13/02/84)
61. “Entrepreneur Antonio Ermírio de Moraes criticises generals and asks for direct elections” (FSP, 15/02/84)
63. “Call to reason” (JB, 16/02/84)
64. “Sé square continues to speak, says Ulisses” (FSP, 16/02/84)

65. "Pro-*diretas* demonstration reunites 50.000 in the centre of Rio" (*FSP*, 17/02/84)
66. "Mobilization in favour of the *diretas* takes place calmly and reunites millions in Rio" (*O Globo*, 17/02/84)
67. "On the road to democracy" (*FSP*, 17/02/84)
68. "Where the real radicalism is" (*JB*, 17/02/84)
69. "Shake the Colégio, is Ulisses' appeal" (*FSP*, 19/02/84)
70. "Bye, bye, 64 (a trip through the caravan of the *diretas*" (*FSP*, 19/02/84)
71. "Tancredo says that the movement of the opposition is not revenge" (*O Globo*, 20/02/84)
72. "Act of provocation" (*FSP*, 21/02/84)
73. "Entrepreneurs start to articulate a pro-Aureliano scheme" (*FSP*, 22/02/84)
74. "*Diretas* has national command" (*FSP*, 23/02/84)
75. "Minas does today the big *pro-diretas* demonstration" (*FSP*, 24/02/84)
76. "Minas goes to the streets to demand direct elections" (*FSP*, 25/02/84)
77. "Ulisses only accepts dialogue organised by the voice of the streets" (*FSP*, 25/04/84)
78. "Revenge, a word that is out of the opposition's dictionary" (*FSP*, 26/02/84)
79. "The cry of the *mineiros*" (*Veja*, 29/02/84)
80. "'Socialism is not the solution'', said cardinal Josef Glemp" (*ESP*, 02/03/84)
81. "Carnival of the direct elections" (*FSP*, 04/03/84)
82. "Government acts against the *Diretas Já*" (*FSP*, 04/03/84)
83. "Political festivity invades the streets" (*FSP*, 06/03/84)
84. "O PDS and the *diretas já*" (*FSP*, 08/03/84)
85. "Government wants the indirect elections at whatever cost" (*FSP*, 10/03/84)
86. "National Committee defines *pro-diretas* demonstrations" (*FSP*, 15/03/84)
87. "Vice-president suggests to Ulysess that he should confront radicalism" (*ESP*, 16/03/84)
88. "Succession with authority" (*O Globo*, 16/03/84)
89. "Maluf suggests that Figueiredo postpones his message" (*O Globo*, 22/03/84)
90. "Rio unites 200.000 people in the streets for *diretas*" (*FSP*, 22/03/84)
91. "Brazil does not deserve it" (*FSP*, 23/03/84)
92. "Brazil lives the biggest crisis in its history" (*FSP*, 31/03/84)
93. "Twenty years later" (*FSP*, 31/03/84)

#### 4. Final phase of the campaign (April – May 1984)

94. "Figueiredo's proposal is rejected by the opposition" (*FSP*, 02/04/84)
95. "Cycle of '64 is near the end, say politicians" (*FSP*, 02/04/84)
96. "A name to observe" (*Isto É*, 04/04/84)
97. "Strike is against the *Diretas Já*" (*FSP*, 05/02/84)
98. "Research reveals that indirect leaders will not be re-elected" (*FSP*, 08/04/84)

99. “Rio is ready to unite another 1 million in a demonstration” (*FSP*, 09/04/84)
100. “Emotion, the tone of the speeches. And of the participation of the artists” (*O Globo*, 11/04/84)
101. “In Rio, more than 1 million ask for *diretas*” (*FSP*, 11/04/84)
102. “The big country re-encounters the nation” (*FSP*, 11/04/84)
103. “*Diretas*: demonstration goes from Candelária to Cinelândia” (*O Globo*, 11/04/84)
104. “It was the biggest political concentration in the history of the city” (*O Globo*, 11/04/84)
105. “The impact of the direct elections demonstrations changes the country” (*FSP*, 15/04/84)
106. “Everyone go to the protest” (*FSP*, 15/04/84)
107. “São Paulo makes the biggest political demonstration” (*FSP*, 17/04/84)
108. “Figueiredo offers the *Diretas*. Only in 88” (*ESP*, 17/04/84)
109. “Act in São Paulo bypasses protest in Rio” (*O Globo*, 17/04/84)
110. “One step away from the *Diretas Já*” (*FSP*, 17/04/84)
111. “Wear yellow for the *diretas!*” (*FSP*, 18/04/84)
112. “Rio talked to the whole of Brazil” (*Isto É*, 18/04/84)
113. “Government’s proposal changes nothing, says Ulisses” (*FSP*, 18/04/84)
114. “The shout of Candelária” (*Veja*, 18/04/84)
115. “*Diretas* on video” (*Veja*, 18/04/84)
116. “Government starts to react to ‘pressures’” (*FSP*, 18/04/84)
117. “Emergency again in Brasília” (*FSP*, 19/04/84)
118. “*Diretas Já*, answers back Ulisses” (*FSP*, 20/04/84)
119. “In Brasília, repression with prisons and shots” (*O Globo*, 20/04/84)
120. “From the ultimate to the emergency” (*O Globo*, 20/04/84)
121. “Brasília’s wall” (*FSP*, 21/04/84)
122. “To the citizen” (*FSP*, 22/04/84)
123. “Another country, ready to proclaim ‘we won’” (*FSP*, 22/04/84)
124. “Journalists wear the colour (yellow) of the *diretas*” (*ESP*, 23/04/84)
125. “Brasília, forbidden city” (*FSP*, 23/04/84)
126. “For Lula, government does not want to negotiate” (*FSP*, 23/04/84)
127. “Civil society demands direct elections, Tancredo now wants to negotiate” (*FSP*, 24/04/84)
128. “United, civil society urges for direct elections now” (*FSP*, 24/04/84)
129. “On his white horse, the executor sees the ceremony pass” (*FSP*, 24/04/84)
130. “Censorship cuts news from television stations” (*O Globo*, 25/04/84)
131. “*Diretas*: the block of the government” (*Veja*, 25/04/84)
132. “Figueiredo considers Tancredo a “reliable name” (*FSP*, 25/04/84)
133. “Voting session is today but Brasília approved yesterday the *diretas*” (*FSP*, 25/04/84)
134. “The nation frustrated – although there was a majority of 298 votes, 22 remained to approve the direct elections” (*FSP*, 26/04/84)
135. “20 PDS MPs did not stick to their compromise” (*FSP*, 26/04/84)
136. “Without the support of the PDS, the direct elections emendation is rejected” (*FSP*, 26/04/84)
137. “Radio and TV forbidden to identify the voters” (*FSP*, 26/04/84)
138. “Figueiredo threatens with more energetic measures” (*FSP*, 26/04/84)

139. “United, CUT and Conclat already articulate strikes” (*FSP*, 26/04/84)

## **5. The defeat (April/May 1984)**

140. “Deception in the twenty-fifth day” (*FSP*, 26/04/84)

141. “Congress rejects the *diretas*” (*JB*, 26/04/84)

142. “Not enough votes for the *Diretas Já*” (*ESP*, 26/04/84)

143. “Planalto says that it will not negotiate” (*FSP*, 27/04/84)

144. “The fight continues” (*Isto É*, 02/05/84)

## Appendix 3

### Chapter 3

#### 1. 1987-1988

1. "Collor says that country is in a game without a judge" (*JB*, 07/04/87)
2. "Collor demands a firm pulse of Sarney" (*ESP*, 22/04/87)
3. "I will finish with the fat cats" (*Veja*, 22/04/87)
4. "Collor condemns super salaries of deputies" (*O Globo*, 07/06/87)
5. "Collor launches himself as president against the old ones" (*ESP*, 26/01/88)
6. "Hunter of civil servant fat cats" (*Veja*, 23/03/88)
7. "Lula is ahead" (*Veja*, 23/11/88)

#### 2. 1989

##### a) Pre-campaign stories

8. "Break time is over, says Collor to civil servants" (*ESP*, 17/01/89)
9. "Blue ticket" (*Veja*, 01/02/89)
10. "Congress is the winner in hiring relatives" (*JB*, 19/02/89)
11. "Civil servants: the reaction to abuse" and "Ghosts and protected relatives start to irritate the country" (*Veja*, 01/03/89)
12. "The Brizula spectrum – "Is it Janio or Quercia?"" (*Isto É*, 22/03/89)
13. "Collor is manipulated by the right, accuses Brizola" (*Isto É*, 18/04/89)
14. "Frauds in social security increase" (*FSP*, 23/04/89)

##### b) Collor rises

15. "Gallup exclusive – Collor in first" (*Isto É*, 26/04/89)
16. "Lula says that strikes consolidate democracy" (*O Globo*, 28/04/89)
17. "Actions of CUT and strikes take away Lula's votes" (*JB*, 30/04/89)
18. "Excesses in strikes worries the PT" and "Ibope: strikes can impede democracy" (*O Globo*, 07/05/89, p. 12)
19. "Collor thinks it is possible to be elected in the first round" (*O Globo*, 11/05/89)
20. "Lula does not surrender and gives total support to strikes" (*O Globo*, 12/05/89)
21. "PSDB tries to show itself on TV as a viable option" (*O Globo*, 12/05/89)
22. "Moderates' can support either Collor or Janio" (*O Globo*, 12/05/89)
23. "Collor would win Brizola by 26% to 23% in the big cities" (*O Globo*, 13/05/89)
24. "The hunter of the fat cats cannot hit the hunted" (*O Globo*, 14/05/89)
25. "The pre-campaign phenomena" (*JB*, 14/05/89)

26. "Biography of Collor is marked by contradiction" (*JB*, 14/05/89)
27. "Collor creates a campaign with the image of success" (*O Globo*, 16/05/89)
28. "The star takes off" (*Veja*, 17/05/89)
29. "The Anti-Brizola - the right gets colored" (*Isto É*, 17/05/89)
30. "Collor admits second deal with sugar-cane businessmen but rejects critiques" (*FSP*, 21/05/89)
31. "Collor rejects the support of 'hard-liners'" (*ESP*, 24/05/89)
32. "Lula does a 'check up' and challenges rivals" (*ESP*, 25/05/89)
33. "Collor's contract with sugar-cane businessmen favours senators" (*FSP* 25/05/89)
34. "Many obstacles in Collor's way" and "Support is such that it escapes control" (*O Globo*, 28/05/89)
35. "Former governor did not abide to electoral promises" (*FSP*, 28/05/89)
36. "For Brizola, Collor is the candidate of the 'elites'" (*FSP*, 29/05/89)
37. "Collor used US\$ 550.000 for 'general spending'" (*FSP*, 30/05/89)
38. "The *marajá* of the polls parties" (*Veja*, 31/05/89)
39. "Collor: 'Pacto de Moncloa'" (*O Globo*, 01/06/89)
40. "Collor tries to explain on TV why he supported Maluf in '85" (*JB*, 01/06/89)
41. "Alagoas goes against Collor" (*ESP*, 02/06/89)
42. "Hitler provokes debate between Brizola and Collor" (*JB*, 07/06/89)
43. "Convergence: Collor, Aureliano e Afif" and "Collor is ahead because he is not from the left" (*O Globo*, 8/06/89)
44. "Platform of Collor de Mello excites *paulista* entrepreneurs" (*O Globo*, 09/06/89)
45. "Communism faces its biggest challenge" (*O Globo*, 11/06/89)
46. "Collor near the absolute majority" and "Collor leads with 43%. The rest fall" (*O Globo*, 11/06/89)
47. "Collor hired consultancy without competition" (*FSP*, 12/06/89)
48. "Structural changes" (*O Globo*, 17/06/89)
49. "Military votes: few but highly disputed" (*O Globo*, 18/06/89)
50. "Without asking permission" (*Veja*, 21/06/89)
51. "Without coup or hesitations" (*O Globo*, 25/06/89)
52. "Lula wins in São Vicente de Paulo school" and "A student (Collor) with a record of absences" (*JB*, 28/06/89)
53. "Lula stimulates land invasion" (*ESP*, 30/06/89)
54. "Collor: 'Covas does not defend liberalism with sincerity'" (*O Globo*, 2/07/89)
55. "Alagoas goes against Collor" (*ESP*, 02/07/89)
56. "Lula wants Brazil to be a leader of the Third World" (*FSP*, 03/07/89)
57. "Thatcher gives lessons in privatization" (*O Globo*, 05/07/89)
58. "Collor promises to modernize the country" (*O Globo*, 13/07/89)
59. "Roberto Marinho makes explicit support of Collor" (*FSP*, 17/07/89)
60. "Complete salad" (*Isto É*, 19/07/89)
61. "Collor goes to the government, accuses and is accused of corruption" (*JB*, 25/07/89)
62. "Disinterest in the election reaches 42%" (*FSP*, 30/07/89)

**c) August and September 1989**

63. "Party at a dead spot" (*Veja*, 2/08/89)



64. "PT accuses the press of working against Lula's presidential campaign" (*FSP*, 07/08/89)
65. "Collor plays heavy on the offensive" (*Veja*, 09/08/89)
66. "Newton wants Quércia coordinator of the campaign" (*O Globo*, 10/08/89)
67. "Collor asks rivals for a campaign of a high level" (*O Globo*, 14/08/89)
68. "Ulysses promises to end hunger in the country" (*O Globo*, 14/08/89)
69. "State pension accuses the candidate" (*O Globo*, 17/08/89)
70. "Collor goes to Bonfim and predicts wave of support throughout the country" (*O Globo*, 18/08/89)
71. "Police find bombs in Lula's offices" (*ESP*, 29/08/89)
72. "Lula accuses the right of creating instability in the country" (*FSP*, 29/08/89)
73. "PT wants Lula with a radical discourse" (*O Globo*, 30/08/89)
74. "A worker goes to fight in the succession" (*Veja*, 06/09/89)
75. "Profile of Collor reveals an explosive personality" (*ESP*, 10/09/89)
76. "Collor and Brizola: the details of the 'platform'" (*O Globo*, 10/09/89)
77. "Roberto Marinho changes position and permits debate on TV Globo" (*JB*, 13/09/89)

#### **d) Final phase**

78. "Aggressiveness makes Collor rise quickly" (*FSP*, 12/11/89)
79. "Public success" (*Veja*, 15/11/89)
80. "Agrarian reform and debt separate PSDB from the PT" (*FSP*, 19/11/89)
81. "The prodigy of the ballots" (*Veja*, 22/11/89)
82. "PT already admits taking away parts of the '13 points'" (*FSP*, 25/11/89)
83. "PSDB fears 'Union Republic' of the PT" (*O Globo*, 25/11/89)
84. "PT changes program to gain support" (*ESP*, 28/11/89)
85. "Lula admits changing party program to win wider support" (*JB*, 28/11/89)
86. "The hypothesis of Lula" (*Veja*, 29/11/89)
87. "Debt and agrarian reform are not negotiable, say Lula" (*FSP*, 29/11/89)
88. "Press stays away from the debate with the candidates" (*FSP*, 01/12/89)
89. "Collor and Lula exchange accusations on television" (*O Globo*, 04/12/89)
90. "Research points to Lula as winner of the debate" (*FSP*, 05/12/89)
91. "Debate had a big audience" (*O Globo*, 05/12/89)
92. "Datafolha: Lula wins Collor in the debate by 39% to 35%" (*O Globo*, 05/12/89)
93. "Contracts prove nepotism" (*JB*, 05/12/89)
94. "Reforms in the East bypass the PT" (*ESP*, 06/12/89)
95. "US: turbulences with Lula and Collor" (*O Globo*, 10/12/89)
96. "Economic plans of the PRN and the PT" (*ESP*, 10/12/89)
97. "Lula wants to crack down the wall of hunger" (*JB*, 12/12/89)
98. "Readers think that *Folha* does not support anyone" (*FSP*, 13/12/89)
99. "Lula uses moderate discourse as electoral tactic" (*FSP*, 15/12/89)
100. "Collor tried to maintain offensive and be more aggressive" (*FSP*, 15/12/89)
101. "If elected, Collor will have two goals: state firms and monopolies" (*O Globo*, 16/12/89)
102. "Against inflation, similar recipes" (*O Globo*, 17/12/89)
103. "Collor tries to break isolation and defines a plan to conquer civil society" (*FSP*, 19/12/89)

104. “Collor promised to be the voice of the oppressed and the beaten” (*O Globo*, 19/12/89)
105. “‘Hunter of civil cats’ was born with politics in his blood” (*O Globo*, 19/12/89)
106. “Collor celebrates: ‘we destroyed the PT’” (*O Globo*, 19/12/89)
107. “Globo forgets journalism and makes a Collor propaganda programme” (*FSP*, 21/12/89)
108. “Collor does not change his routine in the Brasília of his youth” (*O Globo*, 24/12/89)
109. “TV Globo’s president reaffirms his support for Collor” (*FSP*, 24/12/89)
110. “The day of the hunter” (*Veja*, 24/12/89)

### **3. Collor government (1990-1991)**

111. “The hunter of the lost image” (*JB*, 11/02/90)
112. “The press has found Napoleon” (*Isto É*, 14/02/90)
113. “Federal Police invade *Folha*” (*FSP*, 24/03/90)
114. “The fascist uprising” (*FSP*, 24/03/90)
115. “Whatever resemblance is not mere coincidence” (*FSP*, 25/03/90)
116. “Resistance is necessary” (*FSP*, 25/03/90)
117. “Collor’s coherence” (*FSP*, 25/03/90)
118. “Return to an equilibrium” (28/03/90)
119. “He complicates the life of the government” (*Isto É*, 19/10/90)
120. “PC nominates, fires and receives accusations” (*ESP*, 21/10/90)
121. “Open letter to the president of the Republic” (*FSP*, 25/04/91)

### **4. The pre-impeachment scenario (1992)**

122. “In the name of truth” (*JB*, 19/05/92)
123. “Governors recommend prudence” (*ESP*, 21/05/92)
124. “Opposition insist on a parliamentary commission about ‘PC’” (*ESP*, 22/05/92)
125. “Pedro Collor does an insanity test” (*ESP*, 22/05/92)
126. “Junquiera says the investigation of the accusations will not cause a crisis” (*ESP*, 22/05/92)
127. “Pedro Collor points out in video the PC scheme in the government” (*FSP*, 22/05/92)
128. “Pedro Collor returns to the attack” (*FSP*, 24/05/92)
129. “In SP, 43% want Collor’s removal” (*FSP*, 26/05/92)
130. “Firm denounced by Pedro benefited from rapid loan” (*FSP*, 27/05/92)
131. “Federal Police anticipates Pedro Collor’s testimony about the denunciations” (*FSP*, 27/05/92)
132. “It has reached the Planalto” (*Veja*, 27/05/92)
133. “Collor gets irritated with denunciation and asks not to be left alone” (*JB*, 22/06/92)
134. “Collor tries to say on TV ‘that’s enough’ to the denunciations” (*FSP*,

135. 22/06/92)
136. "Collor says that he will end his mandate" (*JB*, 23/06/92)
137. "Most people think that Collor acted with PC" (*FSP*, 25/06/92)
138. "Will not pass" (*JB*, 26/06/92)
139. "The wind blew away" (*JB*, 28/06/92)
140. "Isolated because of Collorgate, president tries to save his mandate on TV today" (*FSP*, 30/06/92)
141. "Renounce now" (*FSP*, 30/06/92)
142. "Collor attacks denunciations and condemns 'intrigue'" (*JB*, 01/07/92)
143. "The implausible Collor" (*Isto É*, 01/07/92)
144. "Collor attacks "coup union" (*FSP*, 03/07/92)
145. "Eriberto, the Brazilian" (*Isto É*, 08/07/92)
146. "Obscure game" (*JB*, 25/07/92)
147. "PT presents secretary who accuses Vieira of arranging a fraud" (*JB*, 30/07/92)
148. "Opposition can already approve impeachment" (*FSP*, 30/07/92)

## 5. Impeachment campaign, August - September 1992

149. "Rebel years – students go to the streets for the impeachment" (*FSP*, 12/08/92)
150. "Collor asks people to use green and yellow" (*JB*, 14/08/92)
151. "Use black in protest – Rio does the biggest impeachment act; Collor uses Caixa in the war of colours" (*FSP*, 15/08/92)
152. "Mourning" (*FSP*, 15/08/92)
153. "Goldemberg (minister of Education) denounces extortion" (*ESP*, 15/08/92)
154. "Use black in protest – "70% think that Congress should approve Collor's impeachment" (*FSP*, 16/08/92)
155. "Collor defeated in the test of colours" (*ESP*, 17/08/92)
156. "Indignation resurrects the student movement" (*ESP*, 17/08/92)
157. "Happiness, Happiness" (*Veja*, 19/08/92)
158. "Military minister condemns 'radicalism'" (*ESP*, 20/08/92)
159. "Collor and PC Farias escaped the Cruzado blockage in 1990" (*JB*, 22/08/92)
160. "Students take to the streets with new ideas" and "Gap separates '68 from the painted faces of '92" (*ESP*, 24/08/92)
161. "Youth asks for end of individualism" (*ESP*, 24/08/92)
162. "Text of intellectuals asks for impeachment" (*FSP*, 24/08/92)
163. "CPI weakens the government and paves the way for the impeachment" (*JB*, 25/08/92)
164. "CPI concludes that Collor dishonors the presidency and suggests impeachment" (*FSP*, 25/08/92)
165. "Hundreds of thousands ask for the impeachment in the streets" (*FSP*, 26/08/92)
166. "CPI approves document, Collor loses parliamentary support and is nearly alone" (*ESP*, 27/08/92)
167. "There are still 12 votes to go for the impeachment" (*FSP*, 28/08/92)
168. "There is no more time to lose" (*JB*, 30/08/92)

169. "Opposition can already approve impeachment" (*FSP*, 30/08/92)
170. "The president must leave" (*Veja*, 02/09/92)
171. "Trust in Collor is shaken, says Marinho" (*FSP*, 12/09/92)
172. "Sarney: 'Collor is expelled from history'" (*O Globo*, 19/09/92)
173. "Return to the streets" (*Veja*, 23/09/92)
174. "Opposition will use radios to call MPs" (*FSP*, 26/09/92)
175. "The grand lesson" (*JB*, 29/09/92)
176. "Chamber approves impeachment by 441 votes to 38 – Collor is out of power" and "Country celebrates the 'yes' with Carnival" (*O Globo*, 30/09/92)
177. "Renounce now" (*O Globo*, 30/09/92)
178. "The clan started with the Dinda" (*O Globo*, 30/09/92)
179. "A brand which is out of fashion" (*O Globo*, 30/09/92)
180. "And he stayed alone" (*O Globo*, 30/09/92)
181. "In the presidential campaign, aggressive style" (*O Globo*, 30/09/92)
182. "Cooper with sub-titles: a new way of doing politics" (*O Globo*, 30/09/92)
183. "Collor accepts the decision but does not renounce" (*O Globo*, 30/09/92)
184. "Yes – 441 X 38 – People party, Collor already prepares transition and Itamar has a Ministry" (*JB*, 30/09/92)
185. "People cry, dance and sing the National Hymn" (*JB*, 30/09/92)
186. "No limits to get to the presidency" (*JB*, 30/09/92)
187. "Victory of democracy – Impeachment! Chamber takes Collor out in historical session; president accepts the decision and Itamar assumes today" (*FSP*, 30/09/92)
188. "The time of the Brazilians" (*JB*, 30/09/92)
189. "Collor out" (*ESP*, 30/09/92)
190. "Page turned" (*Veja*, 30/09/92)

## **6. Collor's defeat: the final phase**

191. "Impeachment generation" (*Veja*, 07/10/92)
192. "Accusation compares Collor to Dorian Gray" (*JB*, 11/11/92)
193. "Dornbusch does a requiem for a cheater" (*FSP*, 16/11/92)
194. "Document that denounces Collor is approved" (*FSP*, 28/11/92)
195. "Lula wants Collor to leave the country" (*ESP*, 30/11/92)
196. "Marinho declares himself to have been responsible for the election" (*ESP*, 01/12/92)
197. "Collor is linked to 42 accusations" (*ESP*, 09/12/92)
198. "Anti-patriotic decision" (*ESP*, 22/12/92)
199. "The man and his masks" (*JB*, 24/12/92)
200. "Collor again puts himself in a position of being a victim" (*JB*, 24/12/92)
201. "Collor renounces but is incapable of obstructing the impeachment process" (*ESP*, 30/12/92)
202. "Super hero succumbed to the real Collor" (*ESP*, 30/12/92)
203. "Scandals marked the administration" (*ESP*, 30/12/92)
204. "Collor renounces three years after the victory" (*FSP*, 30/12/92)
205. "Eriberto França defends punishment for Collor and PC" (*FSP*, 30/12/92)
206. "Collor will only be able to dispute election in 2002" (*FSP*, 31/12/92)

## Appendix 4

### Chapter 4

#### 1. Early moments of the 1994 elections campaign

1. “Great choice – the biggest challenge of Fernando Henrique is Itamar Franco’s last chance”(Veja, 26/05/93, p. 18-25)
2. “Colour fruit festival – in the search for votes, Lula abandons the red and Fernando Henrique says that he is “a little mulatto” and has his foot” in the kitchen” (Veja, 8/06/94)
3. “Collor modernized the economy, says *tucano*” and “Collor criticizes Fernando Henrique” (FSP, 11/06/94)
4. “PT shines but also arouses fear – who is this party that pushes Lula’s caravan, promotes agitation and is ahead in the polls?” (Veja, 15/06/94)
5. “FH is going to say on the radio and on TV that he is the anti-Lula” (O Globo, 16/06/94)
6. “Cardoso promises to create a new capitalism” (JB, 27/06/94)

#### 2. 1<sup>st</sup> – 30<sup>th</sup> July, 1994

7. “Brazil enters the phase of the *real*” (O Globo, 01/07/94)
8. “Sales were weak ahead of the *Real*” and “Workers enter the *Real* with a loss of 9%” (ESP, Economy supplement, 1/07/94)
9. “What can impede the success of the *Real*” and “Who wins and who losses with the *Real*” (ESP, Economy supplement, 01/07/94)
10. “Lula denies that he lied about the *Real*” (JB, 1/07/94)
11. “Most of the population in SP approves the *Real*” (FSP, 2/07/94, front cover)
12. “Electorate of Lula approve the *Real* plan” (ESP, 2/07/94)
13. “FH calls Lula the prophet of chaos” (O Globo, 02/07/94)
14. “Fiesp criticizes the association of the *Real* plan with FHC” (FSP, 2/07/94)
15. “Caution makes Lula adopt a vague discourse” (ESP, 3/07/94)
16. “Cardoso defends punishment for businessmen” (ESP, 3/07/94)
17. “A coin in the way to the polls” (O Globo, 03/07/94)
18. “Cardoso bets on a rapid bipolarization” (JB, 4/07/94)
19. “PT prepares a counter-attack on the *real*” (O Globo, 04/07/94)
20. “Cardoso promises to do a fiscal revolution” (JB, 5/07/94)
21. “Lula and FHC prepare a ‘war of indices’” (FSP, 05/07/94)
22. “For Brazilianist, FHC ignores poverty” (FSP, 05/07/94)
23. “FHC calls Lula the ‘candidate of inflation’” (FSP, 06/07/94)
24. “FH: ‘Lula cheers for inflation’” (O Globo, 06/07/94)
25. “Division of waters – last research before the *real* shows a tendency for a polarization that can be accentuated with the new coin” (Isto É, 06/07/94)
26. “Cardoso tells Lula to ‘call the Sunab’” (JB, 06/07/94)
27. “Law and market will contain prices, says Cardoso” (ESP, 07/07/94)

28. "Electorate approves *Real* plan; voters' intentions on Lula fall" (*FSP*, 07/07/94)
29. "Real risks" (*JB*, 07/07/94, editorial)
30. "PT will pamphlet against the *Real* plan" (*JB*, 09/07/94)
31. "Cardoso celebrates one week of the *real*" (*JB*, 09/07/94)
32. "Lula falls in the polls after entry of the *real*" (*FSP*, 10/07/94)
33. "Crisis threatens the success of the *Real* and of FH" (*O Globo*, 10/07/94)
34. "Poverty challenges future president" (*O Globo*, 10/07/94)
35. "Magazine *Isto É* manipulates picture of PT candidate" (*FSP*, 12/07/94)
36. "The double personality of the PT" (*ESP*, 12/07/94, editorial)
37. "FH calls rivals of the *real* 'crooks'" (*O Globo*, 13/07/94)
38. "Low salary, yes sir" (*Isto É*, 13/07/94, editorial)
39. "Lula feels the blow" (*Isto É*, 13/07/94, front cover)
40. "For FHC opponents, *Real* will break the 'country'" (*FSP*, 17/07/94)
41. "PT launches booklet to try to break the resistance of entrepreneurs" (*O Globo*, 17/07/94)
42. "PT threatens to reveal documents with denunciations against FH" (*O Globo*, 18/07/94)
43. "Lula fears that Brazil's fourth championship will benefit FH" (*O Globo*, 19/07/94)
44. "FHC uses Brazil's fourth championship as an electoral marketing tool" (*FSP*, 19/07/94)
45. "Brazil's fourth championship expands businesses and faith in the *real*" (*ESP*, Economy supplement, 19/07/94)
46. "Cardoso tries to capitalize on optimistic climate" (*JB*, 19/07/94)
47. "The professor learns the lesson" (*Isto É*, 20/07/94)
48. "PT and PSDB have tried an alliance since 1991" (*ESP*, 24/07/94)
49. "Campaign pages" (*Veja*, 27/07/94)
50. "Cardoso makes a speech as the father of the *Real* plan" (*JB*, 29/07/94)
51. "*Real* campaign favours FHC, says Lula" (*FSP*, 29/07/94)
52. "FH promises government of consensus" (*O Globo*, 29/07/94)
53. "Candidates have vague proposals for poverty" (*JB*, 29/07/94)
54. "Fiesp takes out director that criticized plan" (*FSP*, 29/07/94)
55. "Growth of Cardoso heats up the elections" (*JB*, 30/07/94)
56. "*Real* plan achieves 72% of approval" (*FSP*, 31/07/94)
57. "Campaign changes direction with the *real* plan" (*ESP*, 31/07/94)
58. "Image of Lula has been forged since 1989" (*ESP*, 31/07/94)
59. "*Real* transfers votes from Lula to Cardoso" (*JB*, 31/07/94)
60. "Underdeveloped globalization" (*FSP*, 31/07/94)

### 3. 1<sup>st</sup> – 31<sup>st</sup> August, 1994

61. "*Real* accelerates dispute between FH and Lula" (*O Globo*, 01/08/94)
62. "Courtesans' launch FHC candidate to the throne of Brazil" (*FSP*, 02/08/94)
63. "Grows the identification between FHC and the *real* plan" (*FSP*, 04/08/94)
64. "Najun Turner's check is found in a PT account" (*JB*, 06/08/94)
65. "Father of the 'consensus' endorses the *real*" (*FSP*, 07/08/94)
66. "FH challenges PT to see who is with the people" (*O Globo*, 08/08/94)

67. "Lula will challenge FH to go to factories" (*O Globo*, 09/08/94)
68. "The PT in the black market" (*Isto É*, 10/08/94, editorial)
69. "Real plan makes the PT candidate lose votes in the electorate with lower income" (*ESP*, 12/08/94)
70. "The era of the Real" (*JB*, 12/08/94, editorial)
71. "Ricupero says that Real plan is not to distribute wealth" (*ESP*, 13/08/94)
72. "Duel between PT and PSDB puts friends on rival camps" (*JB*, 14/08/94)
73. "Lula will lessen the attacks on the real plan" (*JB*, 14/08/94)
74. "Plan conquers most of the population" (*ESP*, 14/08/94, Economy supplement)
75. "Lula will radicalize discourse against FH" (*O Globo*, 14/08/94)
76. "The words and things" (*FSP*, 14/08/94)
77. "Real makes sales grow in the out-skirts" (*JB*, Economy supplement, 14/08/94)
78. "Tucano criticizes the proposal of the minimum State" (*FSP*, 14/08/94)
79. "PT accuses Cardoso of aligning himself with the 'colored'" (*JB*, 16/08/94)
80. "PT militants have lost direction with the real" (*JB*, 16/08/94)
81. "We do journalism" and "PT attacks but does not explain" (*Isto É*, 17/08/94, p. 11; 18-21)
82. "FH can be elected in the first round" (*O Globo*, 20/08/94)
83. "Consumerism power of middle class diminishes" (*FSP*, 20/08/94)
84. "Caravan of the real" (*Isto É*, 24/08/94)
85. "FH says that attacks on the real will defeat the PT" (*O Globo*, 21/08/94)
86. "The real plan is being elected" (*JB*, 21/08/94)
87. "More poor people improve quality of consumerism" (*ESP*, 22/08/94)
88. "Heart and mind divide intellectuals" (*ESP*, 24/08/94)
89. "Hope in the real determines vote in 94" and "Pragmatism bypassed ideology" (*JB*, 25/08/94, front cover and p. 4)
90. "Real is attacked by all the candidates" (*JB*, 25/08/94)
91. "FHC tries to negotiate state and market" (*FSP*, 26/08/94)
92. "Tucanos reveal their governmental program; Lula accuses FHC of plagiarism" (*FSP*, 26/08/94)
93. "FH: CUT's protest was against the country" (*O Globo*, 27/08/94)
94. "Ricupero says that Real will lead to the social pact" (*JB*, 27/08/94)
95. "FHC supports tough measures pro-real" (*FSP*, 28/08/94, Special supplement on elections)
96. "The radars that orient Cardoso's flight" (*JB*, 28/08/94)
97. "Inflation of the real leaves Cardoso defensive" (*JB*, 30/08/94)
98. "FHC and Lula diverge on the economy" (*FSP*, 30/08/94)
99. "Electoral use of the inflation worries Cardoso" (*ESP*, 31/08/94)
100. "August's inflation makes PSDB expect a dispute in the second round" (*FSP*, 31/08/94, Special supplement)
101. "FHC also suffers" (*Isto É*, 31/08/94, p. 21-23)

#### 4. 1<sup>st</sup> September – 10<sup>th</sup> October, 1994

102. "Ricupero: TV's real coverage helps FH" (*O Globo*, 03/09/94)
103. "Ricupero asks to leave and puts in crisis the real and the PSDB

- campaign”(JB, 04/09/94, front cover)
104. “Ricupero asks to leave and shatters campaign” (ESP, 04/09/94)
  105. “The totalitarian face of the defeated” (ESP, 04/09/94, editorial)
  106. “FH and Lula fight a war in the TSE” (O Globo, 05/09/94)
  107. “PT plans denunciations against FHC” (FSP, 05/09/94)
  108. “Lula and Brizola unite against FHC” (FSP, 06/09/94, Special elections supplement)
  109. “PSDB reacts and associates Lula to inflation” (FSP, 06/09/94, Special elections supplement)
  110. “PT prepares protests against CUT” (O Globo, 06/09/94)
  111. “Electorate of Cardoso maintains votes” (ESP, 07/09/94, front cover)
  112. “Militate or not militate?” (Isto É, 07/09/94)
  113. “Run for votes and for money” (Veja, 07/09/94)
  114. “Knife of two sides” (JB, 07/09/94, editorial)
  115. “Tucano program favours social agendas” (ESP, 08/09/94)
  116. “FH will make development his aim” (O Globo, 08/09/94)
  117. “FHC works to win in the first round” (O Globo, 09/09/94)
  118. “Denunciations do not affect Cardoso’s campaign” (JB, 11/09/94)
  119. “For electorate, *real* on TV helps *tucano*” (JB, 11/09/94)
  120. “*Real* enters its best phase” (JB, 11/09/94)
  121. “*Real* plan maintains the confidence of 83%” (ESP, 11/09/94)
  122. “Similarities mark governmental programs” (ESP, 11/09/94)
  123. “Radicals gain more space with Tendler’s leave” (O Globo, 11/09/94)
  124. “77 thousand steel workers stop in ABC strike” (ESP, 13/09/94, front cover)
  125. “The machine effect” (Veja, 14/09/94, p. 34-40)
  126. “IMF document asks for more explanations on the plan” (FSP, 13/09/94)
  127. “The coin that came from the big shots” (Veja, 14/09/94)
  128. “FHC bets on the disintegration of the PFL and wants support from left and right” (FSP, 14/09/94)
  129. “Lula says that FH uses fascist discourse, of the extreme-right” (O Globo, 14/09/94)
  130. “Lula initiates war of information against FH” (O Globo, 16/09/94)
  131. “Maximum temperature in the campaign” (O Globo, 18/09/94)
  132. “He will be president in the first round” (ESP, 19/09/94)
  133. “Entrepreneurs praise Lula in Fiesp but criticise the PT” (O Globo, 20/09/94)
  134. “In Fiesp, Lula attacks imports” (FSP, 20/09/94)
  135. “Inflation is the same as in the height of the Cruzado” (JB, Economy supplement, 21/09/94)
  136. “Until where will the *real* go?” (Isto É, 21/09/94, p. 24-28)
  137. “PT considers election a fraud” (O Globo, 22/09/94)
  138. “Lula attacks the electoral process” (O Globo, 23/09/94)
  139. “PSDB leadership defend right to reelection” (JB, 27/09/94)
  140. “Lula bets on emotion and FH on reason” (O Globo, 27/09/94)
  141. “Getting to the end” (Veja, 28/09/94)
  142. “TSE takes a while to investigate use of the machine” (JB, 28/09/94)
  143. “FHC receives support from *pemedebista* of AL and sugar-cane entrepreneur who supported Collor ” (FSP, 28/09/94)
  144. “Lula compares Brazil to a banana republic” and “War of the Bananas” (Isto É, 28/09/94, front cover, and p. 30-32)



145. “Right of reply” and “An attack on information” (*Isto É*, 28/09/94, p 21-26; 26-28)
146. “I am the possible left. The PT is square” (*Isto É*, 28/09/94, p. 34-39)
147. “The candidate of the future” (*JB*, 29/09/94, editorial)
148. “Lula already admits collaborating with FH” (*O Globo*, 29/09/94)
149. “Prediction of victory to Cardoso favours stock market” (*JB*, 30/09/94)
150. “FHC praises Lula again, but says that he remains ‘faithful’ to PFL”(FSP, 01/10/94, Super-Election)
151. “Brizola sees dictatorship of the “economic model” (*JB*, 01/10/94)
152. “*Petista* entrepreneurs are booed at in front of stock market” (FSP, 01/10/94)
153. “Lula defends ‘rebel’ vote to win” (*JB*, 01/10/94)
154. “Our option” (ESP, 02/10/94, editorial)
155. “Poll predicts victory of Cardoso today”(ESP, 03/10/94, front cover)
156. “American investors bet on FH” (*O Globo*, 03/10/94)
157. “Lula wants to moderate PT program” (FSP, 03/10/94)
158. “Lula’s campaign started with caravans” (*JB*, 03/10/94)
159. “Polls confirm election of Cardoso in the first round” (ESP, 04/10/94, front cover)
160. “The mulatto prince” (ESP, 05/10/94, Special supplement)
161. “They have the country on top of their tongue” and “The duel on paper” (*Veja*, 05/10/94, p. 32-40 and p. 42-45)
162. “Miracle of July” (*Isto É*, 05/10/94)
163. “Cardoso speaks today as president” (*JB*, 06/10/94, front cover)
164. “For Touraine, Cardoso defeats the past” (ESP, 06/10/94)
165. “Cardoso promises to make a calm transition” (ESP, 07/10/94)
166. “Chronic of a campaign with one note” (*JB*, 07/10/94)
167. “The president - the force of victory” (*JB*, 07/10/94)
168. “Inflation rate is the smallest since 73” (*JB*, 07/10/94)
169. “PT has not assimilated the defeat yet” (ESP, 08/10/94)
170. “Cardoso wants society in the fight against injustice” (*JB*, 09/10/94)
171. “*Real* opened an era of consensus in Brazil” (*O Globo*, 09/10/94)
172. “Lula prepares the future of the new PT” (*JB*, 09/10/94)
173. “Fernando Henrique sets the rhythm” (*Isto É*, 12/10/94, p. 25-30)
174. “Lula has slipped on the currency” (*Veja*, 12/10/94, p. 64-69)

## Appendix 5

### Chapter 5

#### 1. April-June 2002

1. “CNI and Fiesp: resistance to Lula has diminished” (*O Globo*, 24/04/02)
2. “Lula’s dates” (*Isto É*, 01/05/02)
3. “Why Lula frightens the market” (*Veja*, 22/05/02)
4. “FH and opposition react to Soros to whom, for the market, it is either Serra or chaos” (*O Globo*, 09/06/02)
5. “We do not fear the opposition taking power, says businessman” (*O Globo*, 13/06/02)
6. “Plans expose social challenge greater than the solutions” (*ESP*, 14/06/02)
7. “Even the PT is afraid” (*Veja*, 19/06/02)
8. “It was difficult, but Lula attracted capital” (*Veja*, 26/06/02)

#### 2. July 2002

9. “Brazilians can vote without fear, says FHC in Argentina” (*FSP*, 06/07/02)
10. “Institute maps the coverage of the newspapers” (*FSP*, 14/07/02)
11. “Who is going to be the anti-Lula?” (*Veja*, 17/07/02)
12. “Ciro passes Serra and *tucano* campaign enters in crisis” (*ESP*, 17/07/02)
13. “*Tucano* bets on ‘loyalty and companionship’” (*ESP*, 18/07/02)
14. “Ciro: ‘country is on its knees’” (*JB*, 19/07/02)
15. “Lula wants to center debate on issue of employment” (*ESP*, 19/07/02)
16. “Without Serra, FHC supports Lula, says PT” (*FSP*, 19/07/02)
17. “Lula compares relationship with bankers to dating” (*ESP*, 23/07/02)
18. “Ciro reaches Lula and could win in the 2<sup>nd</sup> round” (*ESP*, 26/07/02)
19. “Lula laments new help to the IMF” (*ESP*, 26/07/02)
20. “FHC attacks markets, which he calls destructive” (*ESP*, 27/07/02)
21. “Serra defends a social plan based on the *real*” (*JB*, 28/07/02)
22. “Dollar reaches the heights and country sends mission to the IMF” (*ESP*, 30/07/02)
23. “Deal with the IMF does not seduce opposition” (*FSP*, 30/07/02)
24. “Ciro flies ahead” (*Isto É*, 31/07/02)
25. “Lula alicia in wonderland” (*Veja*, 31/07/02)
26. “In Fiesp, Lula attacks Ciro and passivity of businessmen” (*FSP*, 31/07/02)
27. “*Petista* does not frighten Fiesp, but does not convince” (*ESP*, 31/07/02)

#### 3. August 2002

28. “Electorate links Lula to jobs and Serra to health” (*FSP*, 04/08/02)

29. "Lula breaks the ice" (*Isto É*, 7/08/02)
30. "Serra is the leader of commercial appearances in the pre-campaign" (*FSP*, 07/08/02)
31. "Lula backs accord with IMF, but blames the government for crisis" (*FSP*, 08/08/02)
32. "Help to the country excites stock market in the US and Europe" (*ESP*, 09/08/02)
33. "For Serra, negotiation with the fund is positive" (*ESP*, 09/08/02)
34. "Ciro makes sharp critiques of the IMF's help package" (*ESP*, 09/08/02)
35. "Lula criticises, but says that the package is 'inevitable'" (*ESP*, 09/08/02)
36. "'Enough of discussing the surplus', says Lula" (*ESP*, 10/08/02)
37. "Turbulence comes back to the market with political fears" (*ESP*, 10/08/02)
38. "A civilised transition" (*ESP*, 13/08/02)
39. "FHC calls candidates to discuss transition" (*ESP*, 13/08/02)
40. "Lula does not frighten anymore" (*Isto É*, 14/08/02)
41. "Ciro says that he will not be 'domesticated' like Lula" (*ESP*, 14/08/02)
42. "'The market can go to hell. I will do what is on my plan'" (*ESP*, 15/08/02)
43. "For Lula, country needs to 'recover its self-esteem'" (*ESP*, 17/08/02)
44. "Scenario makes the discourse of the candidates similar" (*ESP*, 18/08/02)
45. "'Politics is more developed than the social and the economic'" (*O Globo*, 18/08/02)
46. "Ciro: 'country is down on its knees'" (*JB*, 19/08/02)
47. "Financial sector 'suffocates' Brazil, says FHC" (*ESP*, 21/08/02)
48. "FHC blames the market for the negative vision of the country" (*ESP*, 22/08/02)
49. "PT announces that it will preserve the projects of FHC" (*ESP*, 23/08/02)
50. "Farmers, Fiesp and Febraban" (*Veja*, 28/08/02)
51. "Lula praises economic policies of the dictatorship" (*ESP*, 30/08/02)
52. "The ultra-light ethics of the PT" (*ESP*, 30/08/02)

#### 4. September 2002

53. "Lula turns into the darling of the businessmen" (*JB*, 1/09/02)
54. "Left and Bovespa seal a strategic alliance" (*ESP*, 01/09/02)
55. "*Tucano* accuses rival of cowardice and of supporting the dictatorship" (*ESP*, 01/09/02)
56. "Lula's two discourses" (*FSP*, 02/09/02)
57. "FHC does not believe in 'witch-hunt' after election" (*ESP*, 04/09/02)
58. "For Lula, victory of the PT would change South America" (*ESP*, 04/09/02)
59. "Lula uses lack of diploma to criticise FHC" (*FSP*, 05/09/02)
60. "Opposition reacts to IMF accord and breaks truce with FHC" (*FSP*, 06/09/02)
61. "Philosopher points to the PT's lack of coherence" (*FSP*, 08/09/02)
62. "Serra invests against 'Lula peace and love'" (*FSP*, 10/09/02)
63. "52% prefer opposition candidate to FHC" (*FSP*, 10/09/02)
64. "'The sociologist did not correct the country'" (*JB*, 11/09/02)
65. "MST says that it will take to the streets to declare its support for Lula" (*FSP*, 11/09/02)

66. "War on jobs dominates campaign" (*JB*, 13/09/02)
67. "Lula appeals to nationalism and wins military" (*ESP*, 14/09/02)
68. "Lula's discourse is not left-wing, says MST" (*FSP*, 16/09/02)
69. "Serra reacts to rumors about a possible Lula victory and radicalises attacks against the PT" (*FSP*, 17/09/02)
70. "'Serra's propaganda is fascist and illegal', says Ciro" (*ESP*, 18/09/02)
71. "Lula one step away from the absolute majority" (*JB*, 18/09/02)
72. "For Dirceu, Serra is a political terrorist" (*JB*, 19/09/02)
73. "Fear and Equilibrium" (*JB*, 19/09/02)
74. "The predisposition of a victory for Lula" (*ESP*, 19/09/02)
75. "Ciro: 'Those who think we should start a fire should vote for Lula'" (*ESP*, 19/09/02)
76. "'We need continuity', defends FHC" (*ESP*, 20/09/02)
77. "PT prepares a text in conjunction with the stock market to contain market anger" (*FSP*, 20/09/02)
78. "Presidency does not demand diploma, says FHC" (*ESP*, 21/09/02)
79. "Lula falls and is further away from winning in the first round" and "Research points to a worsening of the evaluation of the FHC government" (*ESP*, 21/09/02)
80. "Way beyond the market" (*FSP*, 21/09/02)
81. "Presidency does not demand diploma" (*ESP*, 21/09/02)
82. "There is no reason for pre-electoral tension" (*ESP*, 21/09/02)
83. "Succession in the direction of everything or nothing" (*JB*, 22/09/02)
84. "Approval of FHC government falls to 23%" (*FSP*, 22/09/02)
85. "Programs put social agenda subordinated to the economy" (*ESP*, 22/09/02)
86. "Candidates promise to advance more" (*O Globo*, 22/09/02)
87. "Country has 800.000 families waiting for agrarian reform" (*O Globo*, 22/09/02)
88. "Lula frightens, but worse crisis was lived with Collor" (*JB*, 23/09/02)
89. "Historical mark" (*JB*, 23/10/02)
90. "Businessman sees Lula as a Statesman and declares vote" (*FSP*, 23/09/02)
91. "Unemployment is the biggest since 98. In São Paulo, it is the biggest in history" (*JB*, 24/09/02)
92. "FH admits that the country grew little" (*JB*, 24/09/02)
93. "Elite concedes to the PT, says 'Financial Times'" (*O Globo*, 24/09/02)
94. "The market responds to Lula" (*ESP*, 24/09/02)
95. "Dollar at R\$ 3,575 beats all the records of the *real*" (*ESP*, 24/09/02)
96. "Factor Lula pressures currency, says Loyola" (*ESP*, 25/09/02)
97. "Is the PT prepared for the presidency?" (*Veja*, 25/09/02)
98. "'Greed, fear and ignorance directs the market'" (*ESP*, 27/09/02)
99. "Malan: 'market is ignorant'" (*JB*, 27/09/02).
100. "PT admits that it is 'unrealistic' to create 10 million of formal jobs" (*FSP*, 27/09/02)
101. "Newspapers oscillated throughout the campaign" (*FSP*, 27/09/02)
102. "Lula goes to bankers to try to calm the market" (*ESP*, 28/09/02)
103. "Lula one point away from victory in the first round" (*JB*, 29/09/02)
104. "With 49% of valid votes, Lula is one point away from winning in the first round" (*FSP*, 29/09/02)
105. "PT and Jesus are victims of elite prejudice" (*ESP*, 30/09/02)
106. "Brizola waits for Lula's signal to support him" (*FSP*, 30/09/02)

107. “To evangelicals, Lula compares his story to that of Jesus Christ”(FSP, 30/09/02)

## 5. October 2002 – second round and victory

108. “Roberto Setubal: ‘Lula is the next president of Brazil’” (*O Globo*, 01/10/02)
109. “New research indicates bigger chance of second round” (*ESP*, 01/10/02)
110. “Lula says that he wants a social BC (Central Bank)” (*O Globo*, 01/10/02)
111. “*Petista* is again pointed out as a demon” (*JB*, 02/10/02)
112. “The inopportunity of Lula’s arrogance” (*ESP*, 02/10/02)
113. “They turned to Lula in the final phase” (*Veja*, 02/10/02)
114. “Lula cries in the ABC and signs victory in the first round” (*FSP*, 02/10/02)
115. “PT would implement a *real* social-democracy, says Delfim” (*FSP*, 03/10/02)
116. “Fiesp defends government of coalition and social pact” (*ESP*, 04/10/02)
117. “Lula must contain PT radicals, says Piva” (*FSP*, 04/10/02)
118. “For 38%, Lula wins the debate” (*FSP*, 05/10/02)
119. “The biggest election in history” (*JB*, 06/10/02)
120. “Brazilians go to the polls in search of change” (*ESP*, 06/10/02)
121. “Economy will not be an all powerful God” (*ESP*, 08/10/02)
122. “The turn that the world made” (*Veja*, 09/10/02)
123. “Lula wants vote even from who are ‘against change’”(FSP, 09/10/02)
124. “PT grows more than 50% to form the biggest seat in Congress” (*FSP*, 09/10/02)
125. “Serra attacks and says that country can turn into a Venezuela if Lula wins” (*FSP*, 11/10/02)
126. “More Transparency” (*JB*, 11/10/02)
127. “Lula says that the government does ‘economic terrorism’” (*ESP*, 12/10/02)
128. “‘To get worse, it is better not to change’, says FHC” (*FSP*, 12/10/02)
129. “Ciro says that Lula takes advantage of the ‘fascism’ of Serra” (*FSP*, 12/10/02)
130. “PT will not give the other face to Serra, warns Lula” (*ESP*, 13/10/02)
131. “Electorate voted for change, and not for ideology” (*ESP*, 13/10/02)
132. “PT wants to calm the market” (*JB*, 14/10/02)
133. “For businessmen, country grows with Lula or Serra” (*FSP*, 14/10/02)
134. “Serra says that he is more left-wing than Lula” (*ESP*, 16/10/02)
135. “With actresses, Lula and Serra engage in a ‘duel of fear’”(FSP, 17/10/02)
136. “FHC’s country concentrates income; social spending impedes more poverty” (*FSP*, 17/10/02)
137. “*Serristas* unify ‘chaos theory’”(FSP, 17/10/02)
138. “What causes the fear” (*ESP*, 17/10/02)
139. “Temperature of the campaign rises in the final phase” (*ESP*, 18/10/02)
140. “PT admits negotiating with the IMF more cuts in governmental spending” (*FSP*, 18/10/02)
141. “FHC years register the smallest inflation in the history of Brazil” (*FSP*, 18/10/02)
142. “PT helps to calm the market” (*JB*, 18/10/02)
143. “Social costs lost space in the spending of the FHC government” (*FSP*,

- 19/10/02)
144. "Serra's speech helps coup leaders, says Venezuela" (*FSP*, 19/10/02)
  145. "Inequality in Brazil is aberration" (*JB*, 20/10/02)
  146. "For Lula, Serra revives Arena and the 'apology of fear'" (*ESP*, 22/10/02)
  147. "'If the PT wins, MST will invade', attacks Roriz" (*ESP*, 22/10/02)
  148. "With FHC, banks profit much more than investors" (*FSP*, 22/10/02)
  149. "What the radicals of the PT want" (*Veja*, 23/10/02)
  150. "Not everyone who voted on Lula is from the PT" (*Veja*, 23/10/02)
  151. "Lula: 'I think Serra will vote for me'" (*JB*, 24/10/02)
  152. "Valued *real* creates low growth of the economy" (*FSP*, 24/10/02)
  153. "We will win, whoever wins', says FHC" (*ESP*, 25/10/02)
  154. "*Folha* maintained a distance in the second round" (*FSP*, 25/10/02)
  155. "In the TV Globo debate that ended the campaign, Lula and Serra discuss the rise of salaries" (*O Globo*, 26/10/02)
  156. "*Petista* wave is not confirmed in the States" (*O Globo*, 27/10/02)
  157. "Research polls indicate historic victory for Lula" (*ESP*, 27/10/02)
  158. "For PT, 'inheritance' is of debts and high interest rates" (*JB*, 27/10/02)
  159. "The people's rose" (*JB*, 27/10/02)
  160. "Lula's 13 challenges" (*ESP*, 27/10/02)
  161. "Lula promises to govern 'without prejudice, listening to everyone'" (*O Globo*, 27/10/02)
  162. "Lula will probably be elected today after a 13 year wait" (*O Globo*, 27/10/02)
  163. "The PT, 22 years afterwards: from radicalism to pragmatism" (*O Globo*, 27/10/02)
  164. "Country elects the inheritor of one of the biggest social debts in the world" (*JB*, 27/10/02)
  165. "Reality shock" (*JB*, 28/10/02)
  166. "I was elected by the PT, but I will be president of all Brazilians'" (*ESP*, 28/10/02)
  167. "Lula is president"; "*Petista* will be the first left-wing president of the country" and "'Brazil voted without fear of being happy', says Lula" (*FSP*, 28/10/02)
  168. "*Petistas* takes to the streets to celebrate victory" (*FSP*, 28/10/02)
  169. "Lula government starts to be constructed tomorrow" (*JB*, 28/10/02)
  170. "Lula there" (*JB*, 28/10/02)
  171. "Brasil da Silva – the capital gets closer to labour" (*JB*, 28/10/02)
  172. "'It is the realization of a dream', celebrates Lula" (*ESP*, 28/10/02)
  173. "After 22 years, Lula takes the PT to power" (*ESP*, 28/10/02)
  174. "Lula put the market of capitals in the agenda" (*ESP*, 28/10/02)
  175. "Victory reflects the hope of Latin-Americans" (*O Globo*, 28/10/02)
  176. "Lula: one of the most voted in the world" (*O Globo*, 28/10/02)
  177. "Emotion with the results of the polls" (*O Globo*, 28/10/02)
  178. "Families and press officers cry of joy for victory waited for during 13 years" (*O Globo*, 28/10/02)
  179. "The emotion of the president" (*JB*, 29/10/02)
  180. "Lula turns the combat of hunger into a priority" (*JB*, 29/10/02)
  181. "Word of the president - Hope without fear" (*JB*, 29/10/02)
  182. "Lula was the biggest winner" (*ESP*, 29/10/02)
  183. "Hope without fear" (*ESP*, 29/10/02)

184. “‘Democracy was consolidated’, says FHC” (*ESP*, 30/10/02)
185. “President inaugurates historical transition” (*ESP*, 30/10/02)
186. “Lula changes history in the opposition” (*Veja*, 30/10/02)
187. “Brazil voted for Lula, and not for the PT” (*ESP*, 30/10/02)
188. “The reds reach power” (*Veja*, 30/10/02)
189. “A historical transition” (*O Globo*, 30/10/02)

## Appendix 6

### *Chronology of the Collor era (1989-1992)*

#### **I. The 1989 elections campaign**

**April 1989** – Institute Gallup stresses that Fernando Collor is occupying the first place in the polls with 17% of the votes, followed by Leonel Brizola with 16% and Lula, 15%

**May** – Collor rises in most opinion polls, going from 5% to 32% between February and May

**August** – Roberto Marinho admits his preference for Collor

**November** – Collor wins the first round of the elections with 20 million votes and Lula comes in second place with 12 million. Brizola stays out of the second round

**December** – Candidates take part in the first television debate of the second round. Institute Datafolha of *FSP* indicates that Lula won the debate (39% and 35%).

\* In the final TV debate, however, Collor is better, having taken advantage of the worn out rival Lula, who was physically damaged by the Miriam Cordeiro story. TV Globo's *Jornal Nacional* presents the next day a version of the debate. It is accused of explicitly favoring Collor

\* Collor wins the election and obtains 35 million votes (42,75%) against the 31 million given to Lula (37,86%)

#### **II. The Collor government (1990 –1991)**

**March** – Collor is sworn in as president on the 15<sup>th</sup> of March. On the next day, he announces a series of economic measures to attack inflation

**FSP** - Invasion on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of March of *Folha* by the Federal Police, with the publication in the paper on the next day of a sharp attack of the president

**April 25<sup>th</sup>, 1991** - Publication of letter by the director of the newsroom addressed to Collor predicting an end of the government, in response to the judicial process that the paper was facing

**May, 1992** – Pedro Collor, brother of the president, denounces in a story published by *Veja* that PC Farias, the Treasury adviser of the presidential campaign, works for the



president in the intermediation of businesses with the government. The Congress installs a parliamentary commission (CPI) on the 26<sup>th</sup> to investigate the accusations.

**June** – The driver Eriberto França confirms in a story published by *Isto É* that the PC scheme paid Collor's bills.

**August** – CPI concludes that Collor received illegal economic advantages. On the 24<sup>th</sup>, the CPI points to links between Collor and PC Farias, paving the way for the impeachment process.

\* Month of the UNE student demonstrations in favor of Collor's impeachment.

**September** – On the 29<sup>th</sup>, the Chamber of Deputies approves by 441 votes against 38 the request for the impeachment of the president.

**October** – The vice-president, Itamar Franco, takes over

**December** – Collor renounces the presidency on the 29<sup>th</sup>, day of the voting of his impeachment in the Senate.

## Appendix 7

### *Chronology of the 1994 presidential elections and FHC's government*

#### **I. The launch of the Real and FHC**

- \* **April 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1994** - Fernando Henrique enters the presidential campaign
- \* **May 22<sup>nd</sup>** – PFL makes official alliance with Cardoso's PSDB
- \* **May** - Congress approves reduction of presidential mandate
- \* **July 1<sup>st</sup>** - *Real* plan is launched
- \* **July 15<sup>th</sup>** – Inflation falls and consumerism increases. Interest rates are still high
- \* **July 19<sup>th</sup>** – Cardoso tries to capitalize on the country's fourth championship
- \* **3<sup>rd</sup> of September** – Ricupero gives bombastic interview, shattering the campaign
- \* **3<sup>rd</sup> of October** – Cardoso wins the elections with 34.376.367 votes (54,3%)
- \* **1<sup>st</sup> of January, 1995** – Fernando Henrique assumes the presidency

#### **II. FHC's government and reelection**

- \* **14<sup>th</sup> of January, 1997** - Reelection emendation is approved in the Chamber of Deputies' special commission
- \* **4<sup>th</sup> of October** - FHC is elected in the first round of the elections with 36 million votes
- \* **1<sup>st</sup> of January, 1999** - Cardoso starts his second presidential mandate

## Appendix 8

### *Chronology of the 2002 elections*

#### **I. Initial phase of the 2002 campaign**

- \* **January 2002** - José Serra's candidature is launched
- \* **February** - Polls indicate that unemployment is the country's biggest problem
- \* **March** - PFL leaves the government following the Roseana Sarney episode
- \* **April** - Polls show Lula's growth
- \* **May** – Serra's campaign starts to shatter and criticisms increase in the media
- \* **24<sup>th</sup> of June** - PT makes official alliance with PL
- \* **July** - Ciro starts to pass Serra in the voters' intention polls
- \* **30<sup>th</sup> of July** – Dollar rises and government goes to IMF
  
- \* **September** – Temperatures begin to escalate. Serra attacks Lula and “economic terrorism” rhetoric starts
  
- \* **20<sup>th</sup> of September** – PT launches document on its economic plan to calm the market
  
- \* **22<sup>nd</sup> of September** - Approval of FHC's government falls to 23%
  
- \* **1<sup>st</sup> of October** – Lula is elected president with 52 million votes
  
- \* **30<sup>th</sup> of October** - Start of historical transition between FHC and Lula

## Appendix 9

### *Key facts of Brazilian history\**

- \* **31<sup>st</sup> of March, 1964** – Military coup removes João Goulart from the presidency. The dictatorship starts
- \* **1968** - The Fifth Institutional Act, AI-5, is created, initiating the most repressive phase of the dictatorship
- \* **1970** - Leftist militant movements take on weapons to fight the dictatorship
- \* **1971** - Peak of the military's "economic miracle"
- \* **1974** - MDB, the authorized opposition party, wins the Legislative elections
- \* **1978** - Strikes in the ABC in SP
- \* **1979** - The year of the Amnesty Movement
- \* **1982** - Elections of State governors
- \* **1984** - Direct elections campaign (*Diretas Já*)
- \* **1985** - Official end of the dictatorship. Indirect election and death of Tancredo Neves
- \* **1986** - Launch of the Cruzado Plan
- \* **1988** - National Constitution
- \* **1989** - Election of Fernando Collor de Mello as president
- \* **1992** - Collor's impeachment
- \* **1994** - The launch of the *real* and FHC's presidential election
- \* **1998** - Cardoso's presidential reelection
- \* **2002** - Lula is elected president

\* *Source: FGV*

## Appendix 10

### *Brazilian party system and further information on the presidential elections*

On the political front, Fernando Henrique Cardoso's election in 1994 boosted the force of what can be seen as being the center-right-wing field of Brazilian politics. The PSDB (Social-Democrat Brazilian Party) and the PFL (Liberal Front Party) parties turned into successful electoral machines. According to the political scientist Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos (2004), the parties which composed the coalition that sustained FHC managed to obtain the government of 4.157 cities in 1996 and of 4.291 in 2000, whilst the opposition then (PT, PPS, PDT, PSB and PCdoB) won in 729 and 773 cities in the same years (see list of political parties below). The Worker's Party (PT) nonetheless saw a significant growth in the last decades and various changes to its image. Despite having lost much of its ethical purity and some of its appeal amongst certain sectors of Brazilian society, the PT today is still one of the biggest and most well known Brazilian parties, alongside the PSDB and PFL. The PT conquered many municipalities, two State governorships and elected 91 State MPs in the 1998 elections. Lula also saw his votes increase from election to election, gaining 16% votes in 1989, 22% in 1994 and 26% in 1998.<sup>135</sup>

### **List of the Brazilian political party system**

#### *Military dictatorship (1964-1985)*

National Renovation Alliance (Arena)<sup>136</sup>

Democratic Movement of Brazil (MDB)

Communist Brazilian Party (PCB) (not registered)

Communist Party of Brazil (PcdoB) (not registered)

Revolutionary Communist Brazilian Party (PCBR) (not registered)

Revolutionary Movement of the 8<sup>th</sup> of October (MR-8) (not registered)

---

<sup>135</sup> Politicians have been closely tied to the media in Brazil, with many oligarchic and traditional politicians owning television and radio stations. This has been the case for instance of the media in Bahia, which is controlled by the group of the politician Antonio Carlos Magalhães (PFL), by José Sarney (PMDB, former PFL) in Maranhão and by Collor de Mello's family in Alagoas.

<sup>136</sup> After 1979, it turned into the Democratic Social Party (PDS). Many former Arena politicians went to the PFL (now DEM) party. The MDB, the authorised opposition during the dictatorship, afterwards became the current centre-right party PMDB.

## **List of main active parties**

Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB) – left-wing

Communist Brazilian Party (PCB) – left-wing

Democratic Brazilian Party (PDT) – centre-left

Liberal Front Party (former PFL, now DEM – Democratic Party) – right-wing

Liberal Party (PL) – right-wing

Party of Brazil's Democratic Movement (PMDB) – centre-right

National Mobilization Party (PMN) – right-wing

Progressive Party (PP) – right-wing

Popular Socialist Party (PPS) – centre-left

Party of the National Restoration of Order (Prona) – far right

Republican Progressive Party (PRP) – right-wing

Socialist Brazilian Party (PSB) – left-wing

Social Christian Party (PSC) – centre

Social Democratic Christian Party (PSDC) – centre

Social Democratic Brazilian Party (PSDB) – centre-right

Socialism and Liberty Party (P-SOL) – far left

Unified Socialists Workers' Party (PSTU) – far left

Worker's Party (PT) – centre-left

Brazilian Labour Party (PTB) – right-wing

Labour Party of Brazil (PTdoB) – right-wing

Green Party (PV) – centre-left

## Appendix 11

### Media ownership in Brazil

<b>Media:</b>	<b>Television</b>	<b>Newspaper</b>	<b>Internet</b>	<b>Magazines</b>	<b>Radio</b>	<b>Publishing Companies</b>
<b>Marinho</b>	Globo TV TV Net (cable)	O Globo Extra Valor Económico	Globo.com Globo Online	Época	CBN Rádio Globo	Editora Globo
<b>Civita</b>	MTV TVA (subscription)	----	Abril.com	Editora Abril Scipione	---	Veja 90 magazines
<b>Frias</b>	-----	FSP D. Popular V. Econ. (w/ Globo) ESP	UOL FSP Online Ag. Folha	-----	-----	PubliFolha Datafolha (research)
<b>Mesquita</b>	-----	Agência ESP	Estado.com	-----	----	-----
<b>Ex- Nascimento Brito/Nelson Tarnure</b>	-----	JB Gazeta Mercantil	Agência JB JB Online	Editora JB	Rádio JB	-----
<b>Domingos Alzugaray</b>	TV Sul Fluminense	-----	-----	<b>Isto É</b> <i>Isto É</i> <i>Dinheiro</i>	----	Editora Três
<b>Ary de Carvalho</b>		<i>O Dia</i> Meia Hora	O Dia Online	-----	Rádio FM Dia	-----
<b>Silvio Santos</b>	SBT	-----	-----	-----	----	-----
<b>Saad</b>	TV Bandeirantes	-----	-----	-----	Rádio Bandeirantes	-----
<b>Edir Macedo</b>	TV Record	Folha Universal	----	-----	Various Radios	----
<b>Martinez</b>	TV Manchete Rede TV	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

## Appendix 12

### *Newspaper circulation numbers*

**Table 1 – Newspaper circulation**

<b>Newspapers</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>Circulation in millions/day</b>
<i>Folha de São Paulo</i>	SP	311
<i>O Globo</i>	RJ	250
<i>O Estado de São Paulo</i>	SP	238
<i>Extra</i>	RJ	227
<i>O Dia</i>	RJ	196
<i>Correio do Povo</i>	RS	180
<i>Zero Hora</i>	RS	174
<i>Diário Gaúcho</i>	RS	123
<i>Gazeta Mercantil</i>	SP	99
<i>Agora São Paulo</i>	SP	76

*Source: IVC until September of 2003*

**Table 2 – Growth of newspapers**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Dailies</b>	<b>Non-dailies</b>
1996	380	938
1997	400	892
1998	372	1.251
1999	465	1.780
2000	465	2.020
2001	491	1.489
2002	523	2.161
2003	529	2.464

*Sources: ANJ and Brazilian Association of Representatives of Communication Vehicles (Abre)*



## Appendix 13

### *Further information on the television and newspaper market*

The expansion of TV Globo's signal to even the most remote regions of Brazil was done in strict co-operation with the military regime (1964-1984) (Lins da Silva, 1985). Its telecommunications systems and services were only modernized after the creation of a sophisticated system of micro-waves, constructed with the financial support of governmental bodies such as Embratel and the Ministry of Communications. Statistics of the Ministry of Communications of 2001 point out that Brazil has 281 TV stations and 8.740 channels of retransmission, and that women aged between 20 and 29 years old (53%) compose the biggest television audience amongst the working-classes (37%) (*Almanaque Abril*, 2001).<sup>137</sup> The FNDC (National Forum for the Democratization of the Media), an organization composed of representatives of civil society who are pressuring for media reform, highlighted in a study that out of 332 TV generators of open television in Brazil a mere 26 are of state and public origin. FNDC also pointed out that approximately 70% of the community radio stations end up in the hands of state and local politicians.

Commercial television has thus been the medium which has had the biggest participation in the total of publicity funds destined to the media – 58 % in 2002 and 60.4% in 2003, according to ANJ, and 19.9% in 2002 and 18.6% in 2003. Former president of Radiobrás and vice-president of the Brazilian Association of the Public, Educational and Cultural Stations (Abepec), Eugênio Bucci<sup>138</sup> has noted that there is no regulation in Brazil on cross-ownership and concentration of audience propriety: “The non-existence in the country of practical limits deforms the communicational space which is the public Brazilian one. You have sometimes a regional presence or national of a certain group that can reach 70% of the audience....There is not only a predominance of the commercial media, but there is a predominance of one or two groups per region. In terms of television, the presence of public television is nearly residual...”

---

<sup>137</sup> Globosat, the TV station that transmits the paid channels of Globo Organisations, has partnerships with Telecine, with Canal USA, Fox Sports, Portusat and various other international groups that constitute the Futura Channel (Castro, 1/2/1998 in Lima, 1996, 94).

<sup>138</sup> Other public televisions in 20 states of Brazil are part of Abepec. Created by the military government in 1975, Radiobrás controls a budget of US\$ 40 million a year and is composed mainly of two television stations, four radios and two press agencies on the Internet. The president and the directors are nominated directly by the Executive.

Newspapers, in the same way as magazines and cable TV, have also suffered from less private and public advertising investments in the past years. The sectors which advertised most in the daily newspapers in 2003, according to ANJ and Ibope Monitor, were the commerce, appearing with 42.89%, the estate agent market with 14.30%, consumer services (11.92%), culture, sport and leisure (10.46%), the media (4.41%) and public and social services (4.27%). In the early 1990's, however, new media vehicles and newspapers were launched, contributing to shake the media market and to lessen the impact of media concentration and the sector's financial crisis. This was the case of the launch of the financial newspaper *Valor Econômico*, an investment made by the *Folha* and *Globo* groups, and the popular daily *Extra* by Globo Organisations. The growth in influence of economic journalism was reflected in the launch of dailies like *Valor Econômico* and the restructuring of *Gazeta Mercantil*.

Dailies such as *Jornal do Brasil*, *FSP*, *ESP* and *Gazeta Mercantil*, the *Abril* group and the television network SBT during the mid-90's had to restore to cutbacks in staff in order to reduce costs and keep profits stable. The newspapers conducted cuts on investigative reporting, relying more on official press releases from government, public relation firms and on foreign news from international agencies. According to former veteran TV Globo journalist Franklin Martins (2005, 18), out of each three newspapers, two disappeared. Now there is a maximum of two to three national dailies in each metropolitan city. A couple of media groups nonetheless managed to be little affected by the crisis, maintaining profits stable, like the *Abril Group* and *Folha*. *FSP*'s US\$ 120 million printing center building for instance, tinted as the most technologically sophisticated in Latin America, attests to the paper's good economic health. Official advertising compromises only 3% of *Folha*'s annual revenue (Costa, 1997, quoted in Waisbord, 2002, 72). Between 1984-1995, the sales of the daily grew from 220.000 to 620.000, with *Folha* in 1995 reaching the 150<sup>th</sup> position amongst the 500 largest Brazilian businesses (Waisbord, 2002, 72).

Increase of market competition and fragmentation in the 1990's also resulted in the emergence of up-market magazines dedicated to political issues, like *Carta Capital* and *Caros Amigos*. Created by Alberto Dines, the *Observatório da Imprensa* ([www.observatoriodaimprensa.com.br](http://www.observatoriodaimprensa.com.br)) website for instance is an example of new technologies facilitating debates on journalism in a more democratic and open space. The media Internet site *Comunique-se* ([www.comunique-se.com.br](http://www.comunique-se.com.br)) is another example. Agência Carta Maior (<http://agenciartamaior.uol.com.br>) is an electronic publication

born on the first edition of the World Social Forum (FSM) in January, 2001, Porto Alegre. It has been responsible for the coverage of all the FSM and for producing critical analyses of political and social topics.

Media academics (Werneck Sodre, 1998; Dines, 1974, 1985) have nonetheless investigated the elements which caused the financial media crisis, such as the initial shortage of paper in the 1980's, which is still imported from Canada, the heavy costs imposed on media firms for the acquisition and payment of equipment as well as the need to adapt to new – and often expensive - technologies. Thus the 1990's financial crisis in the media sector only aggravated a crisis that already existed, and which was also tightly connected to international trends of decline of newspaper readership and quality standards of journalism (Hallin, 1996). The increase also in the mid-90's of the number of telephone lines – which jumped from 20 million to 48 million in a short period of time – resulted in the expansion of unused lines and in rises of telephone rates. This culminated in massive profit losses for telecommunication and Internet firms, which had invested in these businesses (Dantas, 2002). One of the indirect consequences was that these firms reduced their newspaper advertising.

ANJ has noted that the circulation of dailies has been falling since 2000, with the year 2003 registering a fall of 7.2%. The last couple of years however have seen a slow recovery, with newspapers managing to maintain their professional quality standards and seeing a small boost in circulation numbers (ANJ, 2005) and a return of investments. According to ANJ, in 2002 the Brazilian media showed a nominal growth of 3.4% in relation to 2001, with the newspapers beginning to breathe again, making investments and occasionally hiring staff. In 2004, ANJ pointed to a small expansion of 0.8% in circulation numbers, indicating a slight trend of economic recovery for the main national Brazilian newspapers.

## Appendix 14

### *Interviews with journalists*

Andrada e Silva, Mário (Email, September, 2003)  
Arbex Jr., José (Email, February, 2004)  
Beraba, Marcelo (10/05/2004)  
Braga, Juliana (Email, March, 2003)  
Brasil, Antonio (Email, March, 2003)  
Bucci, Eugenio (08/2005)  
Carta, Mino (07/01/2004)  
Coelho, Marcelo (16/12/2004)  
Coelho da Graça, Milton (21/01/2004)  
Conti, Mário Sérgio (11/06/2004)  
Costa, Cristiane (Email, March, 2003)  
Dávila, Sérgio (Email, November, 2004)  
Dimenstein, Gilberto (12/02/2004)  
Dines, Alberto (06/01/2004)  
Fernandes, Rodolfo (10/01/2005)  
Freitas, Jânio de (04/03/2004)  
Frias Filho, Otavio (05/01/2004 and 27/05/2004)  
Garcia, Luiz (11/02/2004)  
Kamel, Ali (29/04/2004)  
Kotscho, Ricardo (13/05/2004)  
Kucinski, Bernardo (13/05/2004)  
Lins da Silva, Carlos Eduardo (13/02/2004)  
Martins, Américo (20/05/2003)  
Nassif, Luis (15/12/2004)  
Nunes, Augusto (18/05/2004)  
Pereira, Merval (19/05/2004)  
Rossi, Clóvis (E-mail, 30/01/04)  
Simões, Rogério (03/08/2004)  
Singer, André (E-mail, January, 2005)  
Ventura, Zuenir (09/04/2004)  
Villas-Boas Corrêa (19/01/04)

## Appendix 15

### *Profile of Interviewees*

1. **Alberto Dines** – Director of the media criticism newsletter Internet site *Observatório da Imprensa* ([www.observatoriodaimprensa.com.br](http://www.observatoriodaimprensa.com.br)) and of the public television version, Dines was head of the newsroom of *Jornal do Brasil* during the dictatorship. He was responsible for giving continuity to a series of reforms conducted by the daily from the late 50's onwards. Dines also worked for *Folha de São Paulo* during the 70's and has taught in universities both in Brazil and abroad, having written also extensively on journalism. *O Papel do Jornal* is his most famous book.
2. **Ali Kamel** – Director of TV Globo's newsroom, Kamel established his reputation as a political journalist, having worked for *Rádio Jornal do Brasil* and *O Globo*, where he was until recently executive-editor before being promoted to head of *TV Globo's* newsroom.
3. **Andre Singer** - Political scientist from USP (Universidade de Sao Paulo) and former secretary of the newsroom of *Folha de Sao Paulo*, the journalist André Singer was sworn in as spokesman of president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in 2003 and is currently also head of the communications department of the government.
4. **Américo Martins** – Head of the *BBC* Brazilian service, Martins was assistant-editor of *FSP* and political coordinator of *Jornal do Brasil* in Brazil. In London, he has collaborated for various publications, such as *Estado de São Paulo*, *O Dia* and the magazines *Isto É* and *Primeira Leitura*.
5. **Antonio Brasil** - Former *TV Globo* international correspondent, Brasil concluded his post-doctorate in television in Rutgers University in the USA. Brasil is professor of Communication Studies at the State University of Rio (UERJ) and PUC (Pontífica Universidade Católica) as well as columnist of the communication newsletter Internet site, *Comunique-se* ([www.comunique-se.com.br](http://www.comunique-se.com.br)). Brasil obtained his PhD from the Federal University of Rio (UFRJ) and is the author of books on journalism and television.
6. **Augusto Nunes** – Former head of the newsroom of *Estado de São Paulo* and *Jornal do Brasil*, Nunes was responsible for conducting the reforms in the 90's in the dailies *ESP* and the Rio Grande do Sul paper, *Zero Hora*.
7. **Bernardo Kucinski** – Author of the books *A Síndrome da Antena Parabólica* and *Jornalismo Econômico*, Kucinski is a former USP teacher, having worked for the magazine *Veja* and various newspapers, as well as for the *BBC* and *The Guardian*. Kucinski is currently press officer of the Communication Secretary of the Lula government.

8. **Carlos Eduardo Lins e Silva** – Lins da Silva was a former USP professor before reforming *FSP* in 1984 and working in the paper for many years. He has also worked for dailies like *Valor Econômico*, and written many books on journalism, including *Mil dias: os bastidores da revolução de um grande jornal* (São Paulo, Trajetória), *O adiantado da hora: a influência americana sobre o jornalismo brasileiro* (São Paulo, Summus) and *Muito além do Jardim Botânico: um estudo sobre a audiência do Jornal Nacional da Globo entre trabalhadores* (São Paulo, Summus).
9. **Clóvis Rossi** – With more than 30 years of journalism, the columnist of *FSP* and member of the paper's editorial council has worked extensively with international news and political reporting for the newspapers *Estado de São Paulo* and *Folha de São Paulo*.
10. **Cristiane Costa** – Former editor of the literary supplement of *Jornal do Brasil*, Costa has a PhD from the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) and has written the book *Eu compro essa mulher* on Brazilian telenovelas. She has worked with politics and literature in *JB* and *Veja*.
11. **Eugenio Bucci** – Director of the newsroom of the State radio Radiobrás, Bucci holds a doctorate from USP and is currently a voice in favour of the public media. He has worked for *Folha de São Paulo*, *Estado de São Paulo* and *Veja*. Bucci was director of the newsroom of the magazines of the *Abril* publisher group and is author of books like *Sobre Ética na Imprensa* and *Brasil em Tempo de TV*.
12. **Gilberto Dimenstein** – Columnist of *Folha de São Paulo* and member of the paper's editorial council, Dimenstein has worked also in *Estado de São Paulo* and *O Globo*. He has won many journalism prizes. Author of *A História Real* and of various books on the situation of homeless children in Brazil, Dimenstein currently writes on education, community issues and the violation of children's rights.
13. **Ivson Alves** – With 21 years of professional journalism experience, Alves graduated from the Federal University of Niterói and worked with political reporting for *O Globo*, *Jornal do Brasil* and *Folha de São Paulo*. He currently is responsible for the media newsletter *Coleguinhas* ([www.coleguinhas.com.br](http://www.coleguinhas.com.br)) and until recently was columnist of *Comunique-se* ([www.comunique-se.com.br](http://www.comunique-se.com.br)).
14. **Janio de Freitas** – Columnist of *FSP* and member of the editorial council of the paper, Janio de Freitas has also more than 30 years journalism experience. He participated in the editorial reforms of *Jornal do Brasil* during the late 50's. Freitas spend three years without working in journalism during the dictatorship years. He has been working for *Folha de São Paulo* since the late 70's.
15. **José Arbex Jr.** – Former journalist of international news for *FSP*, Arbex Jr. also worked for the *BBC* in London, the magazine *Isto É* and for *Estado de São Paulo*. Having obtained a PhD from USP, Arbex Jr. is author of the book

*Shownarlismo* and *O Jornalismo Canalha*. He currently collaborates with the magazine *Caros Amigos* and teaches at PUC. Arbex Jr. has written extensively on the landless movement MST.

16. **Juliana Braga** - Former reporter of the Internet edition of the newspaper *O Globo*, Braga has worked for the newspaper *O Dia* and is currently press officer of the NGO *Médicos Sem Fronteiras* (MSF) (Doctors Without Borders).
17. **Luiz Garcia** – Columnist of *O Globo*, Garcia has worked for *Veja* and other mainstream Brazilian newspapers. Author of books on journalism techniques, Garcia was responsible for the implementation of the opinion page in *O Globo*. He has worked for the paper since the mid-70's.
18. **Luis Nassif** - Author of *O Jornalismo dos Anos 90*, Nassif is member of the editorial council of *Folha de São Paulo* and is widely known as the main name in economic journalism in the country. Nassif has also worked for *ESP* and *Jornal da Tarde* and is currently head of the economic news agency *Dinheiro Vivo*.
19. **Marcelo Beraba** – Director of Abraje (Brazilian Association of Investigative Journalism), Beraba is ombudsman of *Folha de São Paulo*. He was former editor of politics in 1989 and also *FSP*'s newsroom secretary.
20. **Marcelo Coelho** – Former university lecturer, Coelho is member of the editorial council of *Folha de São Paulo* and columnist of the same newspaper. Coelho is the author of many fictional books and writes about culture and politics.
21. **Mario Andrada e Silva** – Editor-in-chief of *Reuters* for Latin America, based in São Paulo, Andrada e Silva has worked as an international correspondent for the newspapers *Folha de São Paulo* and *Jornal do Brasil*.
22. **Mario Sergio Conti** – Author of the book on the relations between the press and Fernando Collor, *Notícias do Planalto*, Conti was former head of the newsroom of *Veja* and *JB*.
23. **Merval Perreira** - Columnist of *O Globo*, Merval was director of the newsroom of the newspaper during the mid-90's. He was behind the implementation of the reforms of the daily. Merval also worked for *Veja* and *JB*.
24. **Milton Coelho da Graça** – Former head of the newsroom of *O Globo* from 1979 until 1982, Coelho da Graça was tortured and arrested twice during the dictatorship. Coelho da Graça has worked for the *Abril* publisher group, the magazine *Isto É* and for illegal newspapers which were censored during the military regime, such as *Resistência* and *Notícias Censuradas*. He was also press officer of the PSDB candidature of José Serra in 2002, rival of Luis Inácio Lula da Silva. He is currently columnist of *Comunique-se*.

- 25. Mino Carta** – Author of many fictional books, Carta was responsible for the editorial reforms of *Veja* during the 60's and for having given the magazine political weight. Carta also worked for *FSP* during the 70's and was responsible for the launching of the magazine *Isto É*. Like Dines and Janio, Carta symbolizes very much the journalist's resistance to the military regime. He is currently head of the newsroom of the critical political magazine *Carta Capital*.
- 26. Otavio Frias Filho** – Head of the newsroom of *Folha de São Paulo* and son of the owner, Octavio Frias de Oliveira, Frias Filho was responsible for implementing the 1984 reforms in the paper together with Lins e Silva. Frias Filho is the author of two theatre plays and other books.
- 27. Ricardo Kotscho** – Former press officer of Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, Kotscho worked for *Folha de Sao Paulo* during the 1984 direct elections campaign, for *ESP* and for various television stations. Kotscho is the author of the books *A Aventura da Reportagem* and *Diretas Já! – Diários de uma Campanha*. He has worked on Lula's presidential campaigns since 1989.
- 28. Rodolfo Fernandes** - Fernandes is director of *O Globo's* newsroom. He worked for the newspapers *Jornal do Brasil* and *Tribuna da Imprensa*.
- 29. Rogerio Simões** – Former journalist of *FSP*, Simões is editor-in-chief of the *BBC* Brazilian section. Simões was a former correspondent of *FSP* in London and also worked with the opinion pages of the daily.
- 30. Sergio Davila** – Davila is special correspondent of *FSP* and former editor of the cultural supplement of the daily. Davila has won prizes for his reporting on the war in Iraq.
- 31. Villas Boas-Corrêa** – With more than 40 years of journalism experience, Boas-Corrêa is the oldest and most famous political reporter of the national press. Author of *Conversando com a Memória*, Boas-Corrêa has covered the structures of power since the 50's. He worked for *Estado de São Paulo* and *JB* for many years.
- 32. Zuenir Ventura** – Author of *1968 – o ano que não terminou* and *Cidade Partida*, Ventura is currently columnist of *O Globo*, the magazine *Época* and the Internet site *Nominimo* ([www.nominimo.ibest.com.br](http://www.nominimo.ibest.com.br)). Ventura worked for *Veja* and implemented many changes in *JB*. Ventura also was a professor at UFRJ during 40 years. His book *1968* was one of the pieces that inspired the *TV Globo* series on the young generation of '68, *Anos Rebeldes* (Rebel Years).