



City Research Online

City, University of London Institutional Repository

Citation: Karas, T. (2024). Cultural Criminology, Counterextremism and the Contemporary Far Right. *Crime, Media, Culture*, doi: 10.1177/17416590241279413

This is the accepted version of the paper.

This version of the publication may differ from the final published version.

Permanent repository link: <https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/33499/>

Link to published version: <https://doi.org/10.1177/17416590241279413>

Copyright: City Research Online aims to make research outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to.

Reuse: Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way.



Cultural Criminology, Counterextremism and the Contemporary Far Right

Journal:	<i>Crime, Media, Culture</i>
Manuscript ID	CMC-23-0040.R3
Manuscript Type:	Journal Article
Keywords:	cultural criminology, counter-extremism, extremism, far right, radicalization, subculture, terrorism
Abstract:	<p>This article draws together existing criminological work as well as developments from sociology, political science and media studies to argue that cultural criminology can offer a useful corrective to current 'counterextremist' thinking about the contemporary far right. The first part of the article introduces the contemporary far right, describes how it differs from previous instances, and explains that this resurgent far-right movement has to date primarily been analysed through the lens of 'counterextremism'. The second part of the article problematises the concepts of 'extremism', 'radicalisation' and 'terrorism'. The article argues that these concepts are ambiguous, imprecise and normative, and that they are freighted with ideological baggage and unsupported by empirical evidence. The third part of the article argues that cultural criminology can better inform our understanding of the contemporary far right owing to its focus on subculture and style, its attendance to networked digital media and its foregrounding of emotion and affect. The article concludes by outlining a tentative programme for cultural criminological research into the contemporary far right.</p>

SCHOLARONE™
Manuscripts

Introduction

Several scholars have begun to deploy the insights of cultural criminology to further our understanding of contemporary radicalisation and political violence (Cottee, 2020, 2021; Sunde, et al., 2021). With some notable exceptions (Castle and Parsons, 2019; Castle, et al., 2020) this emergent body of literature has largely neglected to consider the contemporary far right, although some authors have suggested this would be a productive avenue for future research (Cottee, 2020; Sunde, et al., 2021). The present article sets out to address this gap in the literature, drawing together existing criminological work as well as developments from sociology, political science and media studies.

The article proceeds in three parts. By way of introduction, the article briefly introduces the contemporary far right, explaining how it differs from earlier instances. The article explains that this resurgent far-right movement has been analysed primarily through the lens of 'counterextremism'. While the discussion of the contemporary far right and counterextremism in the present article is informed primarily from a British context, it is also illustrative of broader international trends and dynamics. The second part of the article problematises three key terms or concepts within the lexicon of counterextremism: 'extremism', 'terrorism' and 'radicalisation'. The article argues that these concepts are ambiguous, imprecise and normative – that they are freighted with ideological baggage, and unsupported by empirical evidence. The third part of the article suggests that a cultural criminological approach offers a useful corrective to counterextremist thinking. Specifically, the article considers three ways in which the insights of cultural criminology can better inform our understanding of the contemporary far right: first, cultural criminology's focus on subculture and style; second, its attendance to networked digital media; and third, its foregrounding of emotion and affect. The article concludes by suggesting some productive future directions for cultural criminological research into the contemporary far right.

The contemporary far right and counterextremism

1
2
3 The far right is undergoing an international resurgence.¹ Several commentators have
4 described this ascendent movement as the ‘new’ far right (see, for example, Larsen and
5 Jensen, 2023; Sibley, 2023). While important ideological, programmatic, organisational
6 and cultural continuities exist in parts of the movement, the contemporary far right
7 differs from previous iterations in at least four ways: its relationship with the Internet
8 and new media, its relationship with the mainstream; its internal heterogeneity and
9 diversity; and its increasingly networked or ‘post-organisational’ form.

10
11
12 A defining feature of the far right today is that it is **not only on the internet, but post-**
13 **internet** (Fielitz and Thurston, 2019; Moore and Roberts, 2021). For Moore and
14 Roberts, the post-internet is ‘not a time after the internet, but a time in which the
15 internet has receded into the background of how life appears simply to be. It is no
16 longer remarkable that politics is mediated through the internet’ (2021: 15). Within this
17 context, online activity is no longer an end in itself (as it was with the ‘alt-right’, the
18 largely online white nationalist movement that emerged in the mid-2010s), but,
19 increasingly, a means to galvanise political networking, organising and activism *offline*.
20 Today an online ecosystem of far-right content creators, livestreams, podcasts and
21 social media communities is catalysing a shift back to real-world organising.

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

¹ This article refers throughout to both the far right and fascism. The far right is an overarching term that describes a range of ideologies, encompassing both the ‘radical’ right (which is reformist in nature and seeks to use democratic means to achieve its aims) and the ‘extreme’ right, which is revolutionary in nature, anti-democratic, and sometimes supports or employs violence to achieve its aims (Ravndal & Bjørge 2018; Mudde, 2019). In practice, the boundaries between the two are often blurred. Beyond such distinctions, the far right describes a spectrum of political beliefs characterised by nationalist, nativist, racist, authoritarian and reactionary positions. Far-right ideologies, and the organisations, movements and activists that subscribe to them are often also misogynist, homophobic and transphobic. A defining characteristic of the far right is ‘A narrative of racial and/or cultural threat to a ‘native’ group arising from perceived alien groups within a society’ (Lee, 2019: 2). ‘Fascism’ is beset with definitional issues when applied in a ‘generic’ manner to phenomena outside of Mussolini’s regime in Italy between 1925 and 1943 (Griffin, 1991). Perhaps the best-known definition of fascism is that offered by Roger Griffin: a ‘palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism’ (1991: 26). Palingenesis refers to the myth of – or belief in the need for – (national) rebirth and renewal (ibid: 32). Populism, for Griffin, refers to a belief that political forces depend on the masses for legitimacy, even if led by small elite cadres or vanguards (ibid: 36-7). And ultra-nationalism differs from other nationalisms in its elevation of the nation to a “higher’ racial, historical, spiritual or organic reality... regarded as a natural order which can be contaminated by miscegenation and immigration’ (ibid: 37). The ‘conundrum’ of fascism (Robinson, 1981: 1) and how to define it was by no means settled by Griffin and the debate continues to animate scholars. Paxton, for example, sees fascism as defined by its development ‘in action’ as a movement rather than as a static ideology (2004: 18). For further discussion on defining the far right and fascism see Griffin (1991), Griffin and Feldman (2004) and Mudde (2019).

1
2
3
4
5 Far-right movements, parties and politicians, as well as commentators and ‘influencers’
6 – and their ideas, narratives and talking points – **have entered the political and cultural**
7 **mainstream** (Miller-Idriss, 2018; Mondon and Winter, 2020). Far-right parties and
8
9 politicians have enjoyed electoral successes and victories in recent years: the
10 presidencies of Trump in the United States and Bolsonaro in Brazil, the prime
11 ministerships of Orban in Hungary and Meloni in Italy, and the electoral gains of
12 National Rally in France, Vox in Spain, and the Sweden Democrats. We should also look
13 beyond electoral politics to consider the role of the media in mainstreaming the far right
14 (Mondon and Winter, 2020). Commentators have highlighted the role of elite actors in
15 setting the news media agenda in a manner that normalises and legitimates far-right
16 narratives (ibid). At the same time, the contemporary far right has consciously pursued
17 a strategy of cultural intervention or ‘metapolitics’ in an attempt to ‘disseminat[e] and
18 anchor[] a particular set of cultural ideas, attitudes, and values’, thus laying the
19 groundwork for ‘deeper political change’ (Friberg, 2015: 4).
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

31 The contemporary far right is **heterogeneous**, comprising a political milieu that
32 encompasses **diverse organisational forms, identities, ideologies and audiences**, with
33 ‘increasingly porous and permeable borders’ between them (Larsen and Jensen, 2023:
34 1). The diverse elements within the contemporary far right are also using the internet
35 and social media to prompt and catalyse offline networking, protest and political
36 violence in a variety of different ways. The lager-drenched ‘pisshead nationalists’ of the
37 far-right football hooligan scene mobilise confrontational street protests through
38 Facebook pages and WhatsApp group chats (Moore and Roberts, 2021); pseudo-
39 intellectual ‘race realist’ bloggers convene at secretive conferences; self-styled citizen
40 journalist ‘migrant hunters’ livestream from outside migrant processing facilities; and
41 accelerationist neo-fascist militants venerate mass shooters and share bomb-making
42 instructions on encrypted messaging applications.
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

54 Finally, this organisational, strategic and ideological diversity, combined with the effects
55 of the internet and social media have lent the contemporary far right a distinctly
56 **networked** character, with some commentators describing the movement as having
57 entered a ‘**post-organisational**’ phase (Allchorn, 2021; Comerford, 2020; Mulhall, 2018).
58
59
60

1
2
3 To characterise the contemporary far right in this manner is not to claim that
4 conventional organisational structures no longer exist, but rather that they are being
5 rendered increasingly irrelevant, as more and more people engaged in far-right politics
6 are able to participate in informal, semi-autonomous, networked forms of activism
7 'outside the confines of traditional, organisational structures', facilitated by the internet
8 and social media (Mulhall, 2018).²
9
10
11
12
13
14

15 The resurgence of the far right has been accompanied by renewed attention from
16 journalists, scholars and policymakers. Overwhelmingly, the contemporary far right has
17 been viewed through the lens of 'counterextremism' and framed, accordingly, as a
18 problem of 'extremism', 'radicalisation' and 'terrorism'. Counterextremism is something
19 of a paradox: a fundamentally anti-liberal project, it aims to secure and perpetuate
20 liberal democratic capitalism by mobilising both the institutions of the state and wider
21 society to combat non-liberal worldviews, (which it designates as 'extremist' regardless
22 of their political content) (Boukalas, 2019). Despite their prevalence, counterextremist
23 programmes and policies have been criticised for the racist securitisation and
24 criminalisation of (Muslim) social life (Collins, 2021; Sian, 2017; Younis, 2021) – and as
25 ineffective, and even counterproductive in their stated aim of preventing (violent)
26 'extremism' (Blakeley et al., 2019; Faure Walker, 2019a, 2019b; Skoczylis and Andrews,
27 2020). Nevertheless, counterextremist thinking continues to inform policy, both directly
28 (through lobbying efforts, and a 'revolving door' between counterextremism thinktanks,
29 academic and government policymaker roles – see CAGE, 2019) and indirectly (through
30 the moral entrepreneur's role of agenda setting in media and public discourse) – as well
31 as facilitating policy transfer internationally (Kundnani and Hayes, 2018; see Becker,
32 1963).
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

51 ² The networked character of the contemporary far right is not a new development *per se*. As
52 early as 1992, Louis Beam popularised the notion of 'leaderless resistance' to advocate for
53 decentralised, networked cell structure among far-right revolutionaries (see Kaplan, 1997).
54 Fascism scholar Roger Griffin has argued that the post-war far right has long consisted of
55 myriad, minute, ephemeral, 'highly specialized and largely autonomous grouplets' that together
56 make up an 'amorphous, leaderless and centreless cellular network' that he terms 'the
57 groupuscular right' (2003: 27). What is new today is the quantitative and qualitative
58 intensification in the volume and density of far-right actors, groups, networks and
59 interconnections between them both online and offline.
60

1
2
3 Counterextremism is predicated on a particular way of thinking about how and why
4 people become 'extremists' – through a specific ontology of 'radicalisation' – and how
5 'extremism' leads inevitably to 'terrorism'. It is this conceptual language of
6
7 counterextremism that the present article seeks to interrogate. Cultural criminologists
8
9 recognise that the language we use to interpret the social world structures our thinking:
10
11 Hallsworth and Young (2008) have, for instance, challenged attempts to interpret urban
12
13 violence through the concept of 'the gang'. Similarly, zemiological and social harm
14
15 approaches reject the discourse of 'crime' (see, for example, Davies et al., 2021).
16
17 Accordingly, the subsequent section of this article problematises three key terms within
18
19 the counterextremist lexicon: 'extremism', 'radicalisation' and 'terrorism'.
20
21

22 23 **The language of counterextremism**

24 25 26 **'Extremism'**

27
28
29
30 Although lawmakers, policymakers and academics have struggled to define 'extremism',
31
32 the term is now used widely, imprecisely and uncritically (Zedner, 2021). The British
33
34 government defines extremism as: 'vocal or active opposition to *fundamental British*
35
36 *values*, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and
37
38 tolerance of different faiths and beliefs' (HM Government, 2011, emphasis added). This
39
40 is a bizarre and expansive definition that 'defines extremism negatively not by what it
41
42 promotes but by reference to what it opposes... the word 'including' implies that the list
43
44 is not definitive' (Zedner, 2021: 62). Frequently vague and imprecise, the discourse of
45
46 'extremism' performs several interrelated functions. First and foremost, 'extremism' is
47
48 an inherently normative category, that serves to naturalise the managerial politics of
49
50 late capitalist liberal democracies, while stigmatising worldviews outside of an
51
52 increasingly narrow mainstream (Ali, 2015; Kundnani, 2014).

53
54 'Extremism' also conflates ideas, beliefs and values with violence. Faure-Walker has
55
56 found that in previous iterations of the UK government's Prevent counterextremism
57
58 strategy, the terms 'extremism' or 'extremist' always appeared alongside the term
59
60 'violent' (2019a: 81). By contrast, the strategy now targets 'extremism' itself, 'extending

1
2
3 to anyone opposing an undefined “British” value system’ (ibid: 82). Similarly, Onursal
4 and Kirkpatrick (2011) have found that distinctions between ‘extremism’ and
5 ‘terrorism’ have become increasingly blurred within British parliamentary discourse.
6 Such conflation is symptomatic of an often implied yet poorly evidenced premise that
7 ‘extremist’ ideology inevitably leads to violence. In fact, the research literature fails to
8 offer a convincing demonstration of any causal relationship between ideology and
9 violence (Kundnani, 2012).

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17 The increasingly wide-ranging application of the term ‘extremism’ is accompanied by
18 the implication that all ‘extremisms’ are alike, regardless of their political content. In
19 2011, the UK government reviewed its counterextremism strategy to include ‘all forms
20 of extremism’ (McCann, 2019). Then Home Secretary, Theresa May, declared that: ‘we
21 draw no distinction between a neo-Nazi and an Islamist extremist’ (2015). The upshot
22 of this has been a generic approach to countering ‘extremism’, largely modelled on
23 policies developed to counter Islamist radicalism and political violence – without a clear
24 understanding of far-right ‘extremism’ as a distinct phenomenon (McCann, 2019: ix-x).
25 The problem is that the worldviews of radical Islamist and far-right actors are not
26 defined by a generic opposition to ‘fundamental British values’, and that there is no one-
27 size-fits-all political solution, counterspeech narrative or other response to ‘extremism’.
28 To be able to genuinely challenge such misanthropic and harmful worldviews, we must
29 understand their (sub)cultural architectures, medial environments and emotional
30 appeals.

31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43 This issue is further complicated by the interrelationships between the state, the
44 mainstream, and the far right. We should not accept the idea that the far right is ‘just
45 another ideology for sale in the “marketplace of extremisms”’, but rather should
46 recognise it as: ‘the convergence of affinities and affiliations at the periphery and centre
47 of society’ (Fekete, 2018: 8). The blurring of boundaries between the mainstream and
48 ‘extreme’ is evidenced by far-right street movements’ appropriation of official
49 counterextremist discourse. The Democratic Football Lads Alliance, a recent incarnation
50 of the so-called ‘counter-jihad’ movement, comprised of rival football hooligan firms –
51 has marched under the slogan ‘AGAINST ALL EXTREMISM’. Writing about the English
52 Defence League (EDL)’s earlier, similar rhetoric, Kundnani has argued that:

1
2
3
4
5 it would be wrong to see the EDL's rhetoric of antiextremism as simply a mask for more
6 familiar forms of far Right politics. In fact, *its ideology stems as much from the official*
7 *antiextremist narrative of the war on terror as from the far Right tradition.* According to
8 conventional wisdom, the mobilization of far Right groups in Europe has pressured
9 centrist politicians into adopting more xenophobic positions, leading to far Right ideas
10 entering the mainstream. But the example of the EDL suggests *the flow of ideology is more*
11 *in the opposite direction.* The EDL is a movement that appropriated the culturalist and
12 reformist discourses of the official war on terror and gave them organizational form on
13 the streets. (2014: 241, emphasis added)
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

21 To summarise, then, we can say that 'extremism' is an unhelpfully vague term that
22 functions: to naturalise the status quo; to conflate drastically different worldviews while
23 ignoring their political content; and to conflate ideas with violence and terrorism.
24 Furthermore, the notion of 'extremism' obscures the interrelationship, in the case of the
25 far right, between the political periphery and the establishment.
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

33 **'Radicalisation'**

34
35
36
37 Like 'extremism', the term 'radicalisation' is now widely and uncritically used by
38 journalists, academics and laypeople. Yet the term's ubiquity belies a discourse riddled
39 with ambiguities (Heath-Kelly, 2013; Sedgwick, 2010). For instance, there is no
40 academic consensus about the basic nature of 'radicalisation' or its relationship with
41 political violence (Knefel, 2013; Schuurman and Taylor, 2018). The concept of
42 'radicalisation' is deeply contested even among mainstream (counter)terrorism
43 scholars and policymakers. Yet to understand why it is more fundamentally problematic
44 from a critical criminological perspective, it helps to understand something of the term's
45 renewed popularity. Prior to 2001, the term 'radicalisation' had been 'used informally in
46 academic literature to refer to a shift towards more radical politics' (Kundnani, 2012:
47 7). In the aftermath of 9/11, academic and journalistic use of this term skyrocketed
48 (ibid). Suddenly, it 'became very difficult to talk about the "roots of terrorism", which
49 some commentators claimed was an effort to excuse and justify the killing of innocent
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 civilians' (Neumann, 2008: 4). Within this context, 'radicalisation' became the preferred
4 term of experts and officials to describe 'what goes on before the bomb goes off' (ibid),
5 allowing them to emphasise the role played by the individual and, to some extent, the
6 ideology and the group, and to significantly downplay the wider political motivations
7 that it had become so 'difficult' to talk about (Sedgwick, 2010: 480). Kundnani writes
8 that:
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Answers to the question of what drives this radicalisation process are to exclude ascribing any causative role to the actions of western governments or their allies in other parts of the world; instead, individual psychological or theological journeys, largely removed from social and political circumstances, are claimed to be the 'root cause' of the radicalisation process. While some accounts acknowledge politics as a component of radicalisation (using euphemistic phrases, such as 'grievances against real or perceived injustices'), this is only done in the face of overwhelming empirical evidence, before quickly moving on to the more comfortable ground of psychology or theology. (2012: 5)

In this way, the new discourse of radicalisation functions to depoliticise politically motivated violence. Furthermore, in a conceptual sleight of hand, it also contributes to the depoliticisation and pathologisation of otherwise legitimate political activity, and functions to conflate such activity with terrorism. Kundnani continues:

While terrorist violence is not seen as having political causes, non-violent political activity by Muslim groups that are thought to share in the belief system of terrorists is seen as another manifestation of the same 'radicalisation' process, with roots in individual theological and/or psychological journeys (2012: 5-6; see Younis, 2021)

This discourse also postulates a specific *ontology* of radicalisation. Efforts to prevent or to counter 'radicalisation' are oriented towards stemming 'the circulation of 'extremist ideas', seen as a kind of virus, able to turn people into violent radicals' (ibid). The state and counterextremists now conceive of individuals' pathways into political violence through an 'epidemiological imaginary' of contagion, vulnerability and risk (Heath-Kelly, 2013, 2017; see, for example, HM Government, 2012). Cottee writes that:

1
2
3 Terrorism, as Prevent constructs it, isn't a form of political activism that sentient people
4 choose to engage in for reasons, however poorly conceived; rather, it's an ideological
5 contagion—a "disease," ... that afflicts the vulnerable and "risks" their safety and well-
6 being. (2015a)
7
8
9

10
11 Conceived in this way, it has become possible to speak of individual pathways into
12 radical politics in terms of 'vulnerability to exposure to extremism' (Barracosa and
13 March, 2022: 2; see also, Bouhana and Wilkstrom, 2011; Dear, 2013; See, et al., 2017).
14
15 At risk of stating the obvious, it bears pointing out here that contracting a transmissible
16 disease is very different to engaging with radical politics. 'Exposure' to a virus or some
17 other pathogen is something that happens to us unwittingly and incidentally, where the
18 exact point of infection may be unknowable – it is something that we have little to no
19 control over. This is fundamentally different from an embodied, affective, emotional,
20 social, (sub)cultural, intellectual and, ultimately, political process of personal
21 transformation. 'Radicalisation', understood in this way, denies any agency involved in
22 the adoption of worldviews and practices labelled as 'extreme' (McDonald, 2020; see,
23 for example, Coppock and McGovern, 2014). Instead, 'radicalisation' comes to be
24 understood as 'something *done to*' people who are 'vulnerable' to 'indoctrination or
25 recruitment' (McDonald, 2020: 35, emphasis in original). Such understandings,
26 premised on outmoded ideas of 'propaganda as a system of one-way communication'
27 fail to recognise the intensely social nature of processes of political transformation,
28 which almost always take place within a social milieu or subculture (ibid; see Crone,
29 2016; Sageman, 2004).
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

45 In summary, the discourse of 'radicalisation' is beset with ambiguities, functioning to
46 compound the discursive conflation of 'extreme' ideas and political violence, and often
47 implying a linear and deterministic relationship between them. This discourse often
48 functions to depoliticise political thought and activism (including political violence)
49 and, through invoking an 'epidemiological imaginary' of contagion, obscures and denies
50 motivations and agency for engaging in worldviews and practices labelled as 'extreme'.
51 Despite these issues, I continue to use the term radicalisation in the informal sense to
52 refer to a shift towards more radical politics. Elsewhere I refer to 'political journeys' – a
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 less loaded phrase and one used by contemporary far-right supporters and activists
4 themselves to describe their conversion to a far-right worldview.
5
6
7

8 **'Terrorism'** 9

10
11
12 As with 'extremism' and 'radicalisation', the notion of terrorism is beset by definitional
13 and normative issues (Ganor, 2002; Schmid, 2004). The concept has long evaded a
14 widely agreed upon definition among academics, and as critical terrorism scholars have
15 pointed out, terrorism is also a social and cultural construct (Jackson, 2011). I want to
16 argue here that terrorism is a largely unhelpful lens through which to view the
17 contemporary far right for at least two reasons. First, counterextremism's myopic focus
18 on terrorism as the inevitable end point of radicalisation functions to obfuscate other
19 harms. Terrorism and hate crime are examples of what Žižek terms 'subjective'
20 violence: that which is performed by a clearly identifiable agent (2008: 1). However,
21 Žižek exhorts us to step back from the spectacle of subjective violence in order that we
22 can 'perceive the contours of the background which generates such outbursts' (ibid).
23 This generative background assumes two forms: symbolic violence (racism, hate
24 speech, discrimination), and systemic violence (the 'catastrophic consequences of the
25 smooth functioning of our economic and political systems') (ibid: 2).
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

39 It is relatively rare that far-right supporters or activists perpetrate hate crimes – rarer
40 still that they are motivated to commit acts of mass murder. Nevertheless, the far right
41 is continually engaged in producing and sustaining myriad other symbolic and systemic
42 forms of harm. For instance, seeding far-right ideas, narratives and talking points in
43 public discourse – such as racialised tropes of non-European asylum seekers as jihadists
44 or sexual predators – functions to raise the level of ambient prejudice in society. In this
45 way the deliberate and strategic 'metapolitical' interventions of the organised far right
46 coalesce with everyday casual bigotry as well as the use of dehumanising language by
47 the press and the political establishment, contributing to a political and cultural climate
48 in which minority groups are vilified, and paving the way for the legislative erosion of
49 their human rights. Viewing the threat posed by the far right solely in terms of the
50 subjective violence of terrorism and hate crime obscures such harms.
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 None of this is to minimise the threat or horror of far-right political violence. Yet when
4 we turn to consider far-right terrorism proper, the established conceptual framework of
5 so-called 'lone wolf' terrorism is also found wanting, and functions to obscure the social,
6 symbolic and (sub)cultural connectedness of the contemporary far right. Most recent
7 high-profile far-right terrorist attacks have been perpetrated by single actors and
8 described as instances of 'lone wolf' terrorism (see, for example, Gardell, 2021; Hartleb,
9 2020). Per Hamm and Spaaij, 'lone wolf terrorism' refers to 'terrorist actions carried out
10 by lone individuals... "a person who acts on his or her own without orders from — or
11 even connections to — an organization"' (2017: 5). In today's era of livestreamed
12 terrorism, in which supporters encourage and celebrate mass murder in real time, and
13 in which perpetrators take influence and inspiration from each other, referencing prior
14 atrocities in digitally circulated screeds – while also seeking to inspire others to follow
15 in their footsteps – the notion that 'lone wolves' act alone merits problematisation.
16 While perhaps not members of any formal organisation, these individuals are immersed
17 in a shared 'cultural architecture of... propaganda and motivation' (Sunde, et al., 2021:
18 272). As Nilsson notes, although these self-proclaimed 'ethno-soldiers' have 'acted on
19 different continents, *they share the same symbolical universe*' (2022: 1, emphasis
20 added).

21
22
23 Although 'lone wolf' is a misnomer, it is also inaccurate to describe most instances of
24 single-actor far-right terrorism as the product of terroristic networks. The
25 contemporary far right is not primarily geared towards the production of political
26 violence, and its networks are not oriented towards offering logistical support for
27 terrorist attacks (although cf. Katz, 2022; Miller, 2022, on the recent emergence of the
28 'Terrorgram' network). For Berntzen and Sandberg (2014), it is important that we
29 recognise lone-actor terrorists as emerging from broader social movements. Focussing
30 on Anders Breivik's use of rhetoric and narratives drawn from the wider anti-Islamic
31 movement in Norway, they conclude that:

32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
the metaphor of lone wolves does not reflect a sufficient understanding of the social
character of the language and political narrative involved in acts of lone wolf terrorism.
Although Breivik operated alone, his ideology, world-view, and narratives emerged from
a... social movement. (ibid: 772)

1
2
3
4
5 It is striking that Berntzen and Sandberg are writing before the ‘algorithmic rise’ of the
6 alt-right (Daniels, 2018) and the current ongoing wave of chan-inspired mass
7 shootings.³ At the time of Breivik’s attacks in 2011, social media platforms and their
8 recommendation algorithms were undeveloped, and the online far right was largely
9 contained to Stormfront and other message boards (see, for example, Bowman-Grieve,
10 2009; Perry and Olsson, 2009). The contemporary far-right online subculture – and the
11 techno-social ecosystem that facilitates its ongoing reproduction and occasional violent
12 eruptions into the offline world – remained in its infancy. The implications of such
13 technological developments are explored below. For now, two related concepts are
14 worth considering: stochastic terrorism and scripted violence.
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

24 ‘Stochastic terrorism’, in its most popular formulation, refers to ‘the use of mass
25 communications to stir up random lone wolves to carry out violent or terrorist acts that
26 are *statistically predictable but individually unpredictable*’ (G2geek, 2011, emphasis in
27 original).⁴ This is what happens when the use of inflammatory rhetoric by jihadist
28 groups or American right-wing talk show hosts indirectly motivates individuals to
29 violence (ibid). Crucially, ‘The person who actually plants the bomb or assassinates the
30 public official is not the stochastic terrorist’; rather, ‘they are the “missile” set in motion
31 by the stochastic terrorist. The stochastic terrorist is the person who uses mass media
32 as their means of setting those “missiles” in motion’ (ibid). Furthermore, when people
33 are motivated to violence by their rhetoric ‘[t]he stochastic terrorist has plausible
34 deniability’ (ibid). Indeed, the stochastic terrorist may not intend to incite violence but
35 rather may do so out of negligence (ibid). First popularised outside of academia, the
36 concept of stochastic terrorism has now begun to be used more rigorously by scholars
37 (Amman and Meloy, 2021; 2022; Hamm and Spaaij, 2017; Kemper, 2022), although
38 some commentators continue to use the term imprecisely and others have criticised the
39 idea (Cottee, 2022; Kemper, 2022).
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

54 ³ ‘Chan’ here refers to a specific type of online forum: so-called ‘imageboards’, such as 4chan and
55 8chan, which share several features such as allowing anonymous posting. Several far-right mass
56 shooters’ writings have originally been shared on these forums (see Baele et al., 2021).

57 ⁴ This term appears to have first been used by Woo (2002) in a discussion of terrorist risk and
58 prediction. Woo uses the term in a ‘technical’ manner, which differs to the ‘non-technical’
59 manner which has become more prevalent (Kemper, 2022).
60

1
2
3
4
5 The concept of 'scripted violence' refers to 'coded' forms of 'rhetorical incitement'
6 (Berlet, 2014: 304). Berlet writes that:
7
8

9 The leaders of political or social movements sometimes tell their followers that a
10 specific group of 'Others' is plotting to destroy civilized society. History tells us that
11 if this message is repeated vividly enough, loudly enough, often enough and long
12 enough – it is only a matter of time before the bodies... start to turn up'. (ibid)
13
14
15
16

17 Crucially, leaders 'need not directly exhort violence to create a constituency that hears a
18 call to take action against the named enemy' (ibid). Scripted violence is what takes place
19 when a political leader or influencer 'identifies a problem, repeatedly uses inflammatory
20 and dehumanising language, and emphasises the absence of a conventional political
21 solution. They rarely, if ever, tell their followers to commit acts of violence; however,
22 their messages are read as such' (Moore and Roberts, 2021: 174).
23
24
25
26
27
28

29 The notion of scripted violence seems particularly appropriate to describe the
30 apocalyptic rhetoric surrounding the major animating narrative of the contemporary
31 ethnonationalist far right: the so-called 'Great Replacement' or 'White Genocide'
32 conspiracy theory. This is the idea that ethnically homogeneous populations in
33 European nations are being 'replaced' by people of non-European origin – and that this
34 is being deliberately orchestrated by liberal, left-wing or Jewish elites (see Ekman,
35 2022; Moses, 2019). Moses notes how the perpetrator of the 2019 Christchurch mosque
36 shootings – who published a 74-page document entitled 'The Great Replacement'
37 immediately prior to his attack – portrayed his murder of 51 people not as an act 'of
38 aggression but, as he writes, "a partisan action against an occupying force"' (2019: 203).
39 The man who murdered 11 people at a Pittsburgh synagogue in 2018, also motivated by
40 the 'White Genocide' conspiracy theory, framed his actions in similar terms, writing: 'I
41 can't sit by and watch my people get slaughtered' (US Department of Justice, 2019).
42 Apocalyptic narratives can promote violence by enabling perpetrators to justify their
43 actions as acts of 'preventative self-defence' (Moses, 2019: 203; see, Presser, 2012;
44 Presser and Sandberg, 2015; Smith, 2005). Here again we encounter the
45 interrelationship between the 'extreme' and the mainstream. As Moses notes, while
46 these ideas seem marginal when 'garbed as neo-Nazi conspiracy theories', the narrative
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 that 'Europe is being swamped by Third World migrants, and especially by Muslims, is
4 mainstream discourse' (2019: 211; see for example, Murray, 2017).
5
6
7

8
9 Scripted and stochastic terror do not necessarily describe different aetiologies of
10 violence but rather different aspects of the same phenomenon: scripted violence is
11 stochastic in nature. Berlet writes that while social science has shown that
12 demonisation and scapegoating can and does foment violence, it 'cannot... predict which
13 individual upon hearing the rhetoric of clear or coded incitement' will act upon it (2014:
14 304). Similarly for Moses:
15
16
17
18
19

20
21 Those advancing an alarmist 'decline of the West' narrative... are intellectually
22 equipping those with catastrophized subjectivities to take their proclaimed state of
23 emergency as a green light for desperate measures. If you postulate a cultural and/or
24 demographic 'war', we now know all too well that some will take your words literally
25 and arrogate to themselves the role of your words' executor: it only takes one or two.
26
27
28
29 (2019: 212)
30
31

32 To summarise, a focus on terrorism functions to obscure the myriad other harms
33 produced and perpetuated by the far right. Furthermore, 'lone wolf' terrorism is a
34 misnomer, since perpetrators of lone-actor far-right political violence emerge from a
35 shared subcultural architecture of motivation: taking influence and inspiration from
36 other 'ethno-soldiers' as well as the broader far right, and seeking to inspire others
37 through their actions. The concepts of stochastic terrorism and scripted violence
38 gesture towards the distributed nature of agency and responsibility in relation to
39 contemporary far right-inspired political violence. The picture is further complicated
40 when we consider how the contemporary far right and its harms are constituted
41 through a complex digital ecosystem of networked and 'weaponized affect' (Ganesh,
42 2020: 893) – which the second part of this article seeks to address.
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

55 **Cultural criminology and the contemporary far right**

56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 So far, this article has problematised three key concepts from the lexicon of
4 counterextremism. An alternative framework, one that can usefully inform our
5 understanding of the contemporary far right, and the media environments, beliefs,
6 values and emotions that sustain and reproduce it – and which occasionally motivate its
7 adherents to murderous violence – can be found in cultural criminology (see Ferrell et
8 al., 2004, 2008; Ilan, 2019). Cultural criminology is an approach that ‘emphasizes the
9 role of image, style, representation and meaning’ in crime, deviance and social control
10 (Ferrell, 2013: 110).⁵ Cultural criminology is uniquely suited to apprehending the
11 contemporary far right owing to its focus on subculture and style, its attendance to
12 networked digital media and its foregrounding of emotion and affect. The remainder of
13 this article considers each of these three areas in turn and how they pertain to the
14 contemporary far right and associated harms.

25 26 **Subculture and style**

27
28 An emerging body of literature from within and adjacent to cultural criminology has
29 argued that recent formations of jihadism in the West should be understood as a
30 subculture (Jensen, et al., 2021; see, for example, Conti, 2017; Cottee, 2011, 2020;
31 Hemmingsen, 2015; Sunde et al., 2020). Jensen et al., for example, note that a
32 subcultural perspective:
33
34
35
36

37
38 opens up for understanding Western jihadism as a... response to the... experience of racial
39 and Islamophobic othering and renders jihadism intelligible as opposed to a mere
40 irrational manifestation of evil grounded in religious fanaticism. Subcultural analysis also
41 allows a grasp of the aesthetic fascination and cultural pull-factor of jihadism and can be
42 helpful for understanding the styles and symbolic repertoires of Western jihadi
43 subcultures. (2021: 431)
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

53
54 ⁵Cultural criminology has responded carefully and attentively to a host of criticisms, including
55 claims that it ‘romanticizes’ crime and places too much emphasis on the ‘exotica’ of fringe
56 subcultural groupings (O’Brien, 2005; cf. Hayward and Schuilenburg, 2014), and that it is
57 insufficiently critical and material in its analysis (Hall and Winlow, 2007, cf. Hayward, 2016;
58 Ilan, 2019).
59
60

1
2
3 Hemmingsen has argued that *also* understanding jihadism as a subculture can usefully
4 compliment other perspectives. 'In addition to being a political project, a religious
5 interpretation and something justifying the use of violence', jihadism, 'is a social
6 phenomenon, an identity, a subculture, a rebellion against restricting traditions and
7 norms, and much more' (Hemmingsen, 2015: 3).
8
9
10
11
12

13
14 Other commentators including cultural criminologists have discussed the far right as a
15 subculture (see Cottee, 2021; Hamm, 1994, 2004; Larsen and Jensen, 2023; Pisiou,
16 2015), and I want to argue that the contemporary far right can be productively
17 understood as such. As with Western jihadism, an analysis of the contemporary far
18 right *as a subculture*, rather than as an irrational manifestation of 'hatred' allows for a
19 clearer understanding of its appeal. Certainly, all the distinctive features of a deviant
20 subculture are present: a value system and shared internal beliefs distinct from that of
21 mainstream culture; a specialised vocabulary; and a shared subcultural style (Muncie,
22 2001: 296).⁶ Let us consider these elements in turn.
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

31 **1. Beliefs and values different from that of mainstream culture**

32
33
34

35 The contemporary far right shares a set of internal beliefs. Most obviously there are the
36 beliefs in the biological reality and supremacy of 'the white race', and the cultural
37 superiority of 'Western civilization'. Other shared beliefs include a revisionist version of
38 history and a conspiratorial, embattled and apocalyptic worldview (see Moses, 2019;
39 Nilsson, 2022). The far right's values – white supremacy, masculinity, social
40 conservatism, nationalism, militarism – also differ from the mainstream, at least in their
41 emphasis and openness. However, following Cottee, it may be more accurate to say that
42 rather than radically opposed to the concerns of conventional society, such values
43 represent 'shadow undercurrents that co-exist within the cosmopolitan liberal order'
44 (2020: 775).
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

55 ⁶ From the beginning, cultural criminology has been influenced and inspired by subcultural
56 theory (Ferrell et al., 2008). While space precludes further discussion here, the concept of
57 subculture has been used in several different ways to describe and explain crime, deviance and
58 resistance (Blackman, 2014). Post-subcultural perspectives have also argued that the term is
59 redundant and have advanced alternative ideas such as neo-tribe, scene and lifestyle (ibid; see
60 for example, Bennett, 2011; Bennett and Kahn-Harris, 2004; Muggleton and Weinzierl, 2003)

2. A specialised vocabulary

The contemporary far right is steeped in a shared communicative repertoire comprising a distinct subcultural argot, as well as symbols, images, recurring jokes and obscure subcultural references new and old (see Salazar, 2018). This subcultural cryptography has been developed, at least in part, to provide a camouflage of incoherence, irony and plausible deniability, enabling far-right activists to avoid social censure and algorithmic censorship while espousing their worldviews online (social media platforms issue bans for the use of overt racial slurs, but rarely for their cryptic euphemisms) (see, for instance, Greene, 2019; Kennedy, 2022). Jewish people are ‘blues’, ‘you-know-whos’ or denoted by (((triple parentheses))) around their names. Other fascists and white supremacists are ‘red pill’d’, ‘based’ or ‘/our guys/’, whereas their political enemies – depicted as mindless and emasculated consumer drones – are ‘bugmen’ or ‘NPCs’ (non-playable characters – automatons). The contemporary far right’s ability to produce strange new words in a relentless, ‘frenetic churn of slurs [and] in-jokes’ is such that terms like ‘red pill’d’ (meaning the ability or willingness to see the world as it really is) have percolated into the mainstream (Lewis, 2020; Tiffany, 2021). Whereas counterextremists see this vocabulary simply as a cipher to be decoded and rendered legible, a cultural criminological perspective would recognise the performative nature of this argot and the ‘sneaky thrills’ shared by its speakers in exchanging secret or dangerous knowledge that can only be imparted through clandestine means (Katz, 1988).

3. A shared subcultural style

While the boots, braces and bomber jacket ‘skinhead’ style so often associated with the far right (Hamm, 1994; Turner-Graham, 2015) is today largely absent, many of the contemporary far right’s adherents nevertheless have specialised ways of dressing. The half skull mask is now synonymous with terroristic ‘accelerationist’ fascist groups (Hatewatch, 2017; Hummel, 2021). Meanwhile, the ‘high-and-tight’ or undercut hair style, popular in 1930s Germany, along with ‘preppy’ khakis and polo shirts – both sported by American white nationalist and alt-right figurehead, Richard Spencer – has

1
2
3 been hailed as ‘the new uniform of white supremacism’ as a new generation of racists
4 tried to eschew the militaristic style and symbolic baggage of white power skinheads
5 and the militia movement (Hesse and Zak, 2016; Williams, 2011). The far right
6 continues to engage in *bricolage*, appropriating and reconfiguring the meaning of
7 existing styles (Hebdige, 1979; see Hamm, 1994). Perhaps most well-known here is the
8 adoption by US-based fascist street gang, the Proud Boys, of black and yellow Fred Perry
9 polo shirts (see Strübel and Sklar, 2022). Today, the contemporary far right’s
10 subcultural style and *bricolage* encompasses music, artwork, propaganda, online
11 avatars and memes as well as fashion. Across this cultural ecology, the contemporary far
12 right displays a repertoire of distinctive styles – borrowing extensively from internet
13 culture, historic far-right imagery and iconography from around the world, as well as
14 new hybrid aesthetics such as ‘fashwave’ that remix existing symbols and styles,
15 ascribing them alternative coded meanings (Larsen and Jensen, 2023).
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

28 Understanding the contemporary far right as a subculture can help us make sense of
29 some of the ‘dimensions that draw people toward these milieus’, beyond their explicit
30 politics (Larsen and Jensen, 2023: 5). Such dimensions include: the seductive appeal of
31 subcultures – excitement, ‘cool’, fame; their emotionality; and their role in creating a
32 sense of collective identity (Hamm, 2004; Larsen and Jensen, 2023; Sunde et al., 2021).
33 Furthermore, if the contemporary far right constitutes a subculture, it follows that
34 ‘radicalisation’ towards it – so often conceived of in terms of vulnerability, risk and
35 contagion – is better understood as *enculturation* (see Holt et al., 2017): the process of
36 learning and adopting the worldview, values, norms, customs, argot and so on of a given
37 (sub)culture.⁷ We are dealing here with a process of profound personal transformation.
38 For Munn, writing on individuals’ online journeys into the alt-right, this transformation
39 ‘occurs at the micro-level of the individual... a slow colonization of the self, a steady
40 infiltration of heart and mind’ (2019). This process, Munn argues, recalls Foucault’s
41 writing on power as something that ‘reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches
42 their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning
43 processes and everyday lives’ (Foucault, 1980: 39). Accordingly, we might jettison
44 counterextremists’ bizarrely abstract and clinical language of ‘risk factors’ and
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

59 ⁷ Several commentators have sought to conceptualise “radicalisation” as a process of learning
60 (Lee and Knott, 2022).

1
2
3 'recruitment', and epidemic metaphors of 'exposure', in favour of a cultural
4 criminological framework and conceptual language that tends to the subjective,
5 affective, emotional, embodied, communicative, symbolic and political dimensions of
6 social life. In describing 'radicalisation' as a process of '*world-building*', McDonald
7 points the way:
8
9
10
11
12

13 [R]adicalisation is not an experience of manipulation or recruitment... Rather it is a form
14 of practice or agency best understood as *world-building*. As such, radicalisation needs to
15 be understood as an inherently political endeavour, a form of political action... The closer
16 we get to actual experiences of radicalisation the more clearly we see the extent to which
17 this involves *embodied, communicative subjectivity*, where actors produce and are
18 sustained by an 'affective fabric' that is increasingly evident in digital sociality. (2020: 47,
19 emphasis in original)
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

27 Today, this process of intimate personal transformation cannot be understood outside
28 or apart from the networked 'medial environments' in which far-right subcultures are
29 inextricably enmeshed (see Munn, 2020).
30
31
32
33
34

35 **Networked digital media**

36
37
38

39 By far the most well-known conceptual model regarding the role of the internet in
40 radicalisation – long suggested by counterextremist organisations, academics and
41 policymakers, as well as the popular news media – posits the existence of a
42 'radicalization pipeline' or 'rabbit hole' on YouTube (Ribeiro et al., 2020; see for
43 example, HM Government, 2019; Lewis, 2018; Munn, 2019; O'Callaghan et al., 2015;
44 Roose, 2019; Tufekci, 2018). The 'pipeline' thesis holds that YouTube's personalised
45 recommendation algorithm incrementally nudges users towards viewing more radical
46 content. Tufekci (2018), notes how YouTube appears to recommend more and more
47 radical content regardless of topic. The likely explanation, she concludes:
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

57 has to do with the nexus of artificial intelligence and Google's business model. (YouTube
58 is owned by Google.) For all its lofty rhetoric, Google is an advertising broker, selling our
59 attention to companies that will pay for it. The longer people stay on YouTube, the more
60

1
2
3 money Google makes... [YouTube's] algorithm seems to have concluded that people are
4 drawn to content that is more extreme than what they started with — or to incendiary
5 content in general.
6
7
8
9

10 This is an inherently difficult claim to assess, since YouTube's recommendation
11 algorithm is 'black boxed' – its complexity and technical opacity functions to obfuscate
12 its inner workings – and can therefore only be indirectly probed by analysing its inputs
13 and outputs (Diakopolous, 2014; see Pasquale, 2015). Until recently, there was little
14 substantial evidence to support this thesis; however, several recent studies have
15 produced damning conclusions (see Yesilada and Lewandowsky, 2022, for a review). In
16 an analysis of over 330,000 YouTube videos and over 72 million user comments,
17 Ribeiro et al. found that 'users consistently migrate from milder to more extreme
18 content' (2020: 131). Whittaker et al. (2021: 2) found that YouTube 'does promote
19 extreme content after interacting with far-right materials'. What is more, far-right
20 activists' self-narratives of their own political journeys often cite the importance of
21 YouTube (Evans, 2018).
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

33 That recommendation algorithms on YouTube, and likely other platforms, appear to
34 funnel receptive audiences towards far-right content should be cause for alarm.
35 However, the 'pipeline' thesis is clearly an oversimplification, implying a linear and
36 deterministic relationship between media consumption and political beliefs, denying
37 any sense of agency to internet users. Furthermore, commentary on online
38 'radicalisation' has tended to focus on these algorithmic 'persuasion architectures'
39 (Tufekci, 2017) to the neglect of a more holistic understanding of far-right social media
40 networks.
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

49 A cultural criminological perspective is well placed to remedy such shortcomings. First,
50 a cultural criminological approach can draw attention to the complexity of far-right
51 online spaces and the social networks they cultivate. Cultural criminologists have drawn
52 on the insights of the 'spatial turn' in social theory to develop sophisticated analyses of
53 an array of spaces and their interrelationships with crime, deviance and harm
54 (Campbell, 2012). Hayward (2012) has suggested that this same sensibility should be
55 brought to bear by cultural criminologists studying *online spaces*. If the far-right
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 internet does not assume the form of a linear, unidirectional pipeline, rabbit hole, or
4 funnel, with correspondingly straightforward effects on visitors' political beliefs, what
5 other conceptual models might prove useful? Baele et al.'s conceptualisation of the far-
6 right internet as an *ecosystem* is instructive here. For Baele and colleagues, the far-right
7 internet is 'dynamic and multidimensional... made of an ever-changing number of
8 different components whose natures and interconnections are in constant evolution'
9 (2020: 2). To this we might add that online spaces have a *topography*: an uneven terrain
10 of websites, platforms, servers and apps that serve different purposes, host different
11 kinds of media and interactions, and are more-or-less inward or outward facing, more-
12 or-less hostile or accommodating of far-right speech, and more-or-less secure from the
13 prying eyes of law enforcement, journalists and anti-fascist activists.
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

24 Yet a further dimension of complexity is introduced when we consider the diverse
25 online-offline interplay of far-right ideas and practices (Baele et al., 2020: 2; see Fielitz
26 and Thurston, 2019). From strategically coordinated social media campaigns intended
27 to shift the 'Overton window' of acceptable mainstream discourse (see Heikkilä, 2017;
28 Tuters and Hagen, 2019) to invite-only Telegram and Discord chats used to arrange
29 furtive fascist meetups, and from carefully choreographed publicity stunts captured on
30 video for an online audience to livestreamed street clashes and mass shootings – 'the
31 street scripts the screen and the screen scripts the street; there is no clearly linear
32 sequence, but rather a shifting interplay between the real and the virtual, the factual
33 and the fictional' (Ferrell et al., 2008: 123-4). Online spaces have been shown in some
34 circumstances to catalyse and strengthen real-world far-right organising, networking
35 and activism (see for example, Europol, 2020). Elsewhere, it has been suggested that
36 online fora may serve a cathartic function, allowing activists to vent their frustrations
37 and subsuming otherwise potentially violent tendencies (Awan, 2007; Cottee, 2020).
38 Drawing on cultural criminology, Castle and Parsons (2019) have already explored the
39 complex interrelationship between the online presence and real-world activity of far-
40 right vigilante group Soldiers of Odin Norge.
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

56 Second, a cultural criminological approach can draw attention to the *lived experience* of
57 participation in online subcultures. Cultural criminologists have examined the online
58 presence of incel (Andersen, 2022; Cottee, 2021), jihadist (Jensen et al., 2021; Sunde et
59
60

1
2
3 al., 2021) and pro-anorexia subcultures (Gailey, 2009). They have described these
4 subcultures' online lifeworlds, the beliefs, values and emotions that animate them
5 (Cottee, 2021), and how online media help to 'cement a common identity and affective
6 solidarity' through the construction of a distinct subcultural styles (Sunde et al., 2021:
7 13; see Andersen, 2022). These insights show that contrary to popular conceptions of
8 radicalisation, individuals are not 'groomed' in isolation by 'hate preachers',
9 'radicalisers' or 'extremist influencers' (Crone, 2016; see, for example, Home Office,
10 2015). Rather, radicalisation towards, and the maintenance of, a far-right worldview is
11 an intensely social phenomenon (Crone, 2016). The far-right online ecosystem is also an
12 online community: where activists hang out and make friends; watch and comment on
13 livestreams in real time; exchange jokes, memes and gossip; share in each other's rage,
14 fears and anxieties; provide emotional support; cheer on each other's activism; and
15 strategise how best to 'red pill' family members and colleagues. Accordingly, a cultural
16 criminological approach would recognise that the ecosystem described by Baele et al.
17 (2020) is also a 'subjective, affective, embodied, aesthetic, material, performative,
18 textual, symbolic and visual' landscape (Campbell, 2012: 401). Further work remains to
19 be done to investigate the extent to which the two areas described above – algorithmic
20 persuasion architectures and their affordances, and the social and emotional
21 dimensions of online subcultural communities – interact with and modulate one
22 another.⁸

23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40 In summary, cultural criminology, with its attendance to networked digital media is
41 uniquely well suited to investigate online spaces and their role in reproducing online
42 subcultures. Rather than a linear and deterministic 'pipeline' of radicalisation, existing
43 cultural criminological research suggests we might better understand the far-right
44 internet as a complex, multidimensional and dynamic ecosystem, which sustains and
45 animates an online community, and has wide-ranging implications for real-world
46 activism and organising. It is to the emotions and affects that are produced and
47 circulated in and through this online world that we now turn.

48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
⁸ Some cultural criminologists have already begun to point the way (see, for example, Goldsmith and Wall, 2022; Wood, 2017, 2021).

Emotions and weaponised affect

Mainstream journalistic, scholarly and policy discussion has tended overwhelmingly to emphasise the role of *hatred* as the animating sentiment behind the far right to the extent that 'hate' has become a reductive metonym for far-right groups and their worldview (see, for example, Collins, 2011; Hope Not Hate, 2022). Meanwhile, NGOs and policymakers lobby the government to designate speech as 'hateful extremism' and far-right organisations as 'hate groups' (Commission for Countering Extremism, 2021; Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, 2019). For its part, criminological research has tended to view the far right through the narrow lens of 'hate crime' (Jacobs and Potter, 1997; Jenness, 2001). Yet conceiving of the lifeworld of far-right activists and organisers solely in these terms only serves to flatten what is, in actuality, a far more complex, nuanced and heterogeneous emotional universe. Hatred is clearly present here, along with its cousins – anger, fear, resentment and disgust (towards racialised Others, as well as women, gender non-conforming people and non-normative sexual relationships) (Moore and Roberts, 2021). Yet many other feelings are also prominent, including the ontological insecurity and alienation of life under consumer capitalism (Kinnvall, 2019) as well as shame, (failed) masculinity and virility, inadequacy and (racialised) sexual anxieties (Moore and Roberts, 2021; see Cottee, 2021; Theweleit, 1987). Several commentators have argued that we should also look beyond 'negative' emotions to consider, for example, feelings of nostalgia, pride, community, solidarity and 'brotherhood', hope, enthusiasm and compassion (Cottee and Hayward, 2011; Doroshenko and Tu, 2022; Leser and Spissinger, 2020).

Ethnographies of the far right have highlighted the importance of emotionality (Blee, 2007; see, for example, Virchow, 2007). Recent research has also examined the interrelationship between emotions and new media ecosystems within the far right (see Marcks and Pawelz, 2020; Kistic Merino and Kinnvall, 2022). Meanwhile, cultural criminology has long sought to capture the phenomenology of crime and deviance: their lived experience, symbolic meaning and emotional intensity, their embodied and affective dimensions, as well as the interweaving of transgression, emotion and identity (Ferrell et al., 2008; see, for example, Lyng, 1990, 2004). Of particular relevance to the present discussion, cultural criminologists have explored the emotional motivations and

1
2
3 existential attractions of political violence (Cottee and Hayward, 2011; Cottee, 2021).
4
5 Cottee and Hayward hypothesise that political violence may be motivated by a desire
6
7 for excitement, meaning and glory, concluding that:
8
9

10 Terrorism... offers a solution, however partial and ultimately self-destructive, to
11 subjective feelings of existential frustration. What is meant here by 'existential
12 frustration' is *radical dissatisfaction regarding one's moral existence in the world* – an
13 emotional state marked by the feeling that one's life is meaningless, directionless, boring,
14 banal, uneventful, anodyne, soulless, aimless, passive, cowardly. Terrorist organizations...
15 not only furnish their members with an all-embracing cause and bonds of great intimacy
16 and solidarity; they also open up a world of exhilarating action, violence, intrigue and
17 drama. (2011: 978-9, emphasis in original)
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

25 More recently, Cottee (2021) has probed the miasma of negative emotions that animate
26 the (online) incel subculture and, occasionally, inspire acts of violent revenge. The incel
27 subculture, for Cottee, is one 'unrestrained in its emotionality', and which is
28 characterised by 'chronic existential misery... total abjection and abasement... relentless
29 torment and neverending trauma' caused by 'sexual frustration and loneliness' (2021:
30 99, 97). Indeed, for the young men who comprise this subculture, sexual frustration and
31 the resulting shame, resentment towards and hatred of women that together define
32 their 'inceldom' come to represent a master status – the primary source of their identity
33 (Cottee, 2021; see Merton, 1968).
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

42 For the purposes of the present article, Sunde et al.'s (2021) analysis of online
43 magazines produced by Al Qaeda and Islamic State is perhaps the most instructive
44 writing from a cultural criminological perspective to date. For Sunde and colleagues,
45 jihadists' journeys towards radicalism and political violence cannot be fully understood
46 apart from a 'complex cultural architecture of... propaganda and motivation' (ibid: 272).
47 Through a close reading of jihadist e-magazines – one part of 'a wider [online] ecology
48 of communication and propaganda' – the authors trace the entanglement of subcultural
49 style, emotional experience, identity and politics (ibid: 281). In particular, the authors
50 point to three prominent themes within the propaganda material they analyse, which
51 they argue 'may appeal particularly to socio-economic excluded youths... who perceive
52 themselves to be in a hopeless situation of continuous marginalization and
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 stigmatization' (2021: 283). First, the propaganda magazines analysed emphasise the
4 importance of brotherhood, rituals, and belonging, focussing 'on in-group feelings of
5 warmth, togetherness, and solidarity' (ibid: 276). In doing so these productions frame
6 participation in violent jihad as a 'defense of one's fictive kin' and a means of accessing
7 these affirmative sensations (ibid: 277, 278). Second, jihadist subcultural media conjure
8 and celebrate 'jihadi cool' (Cottee, 2015b) through their depiction of the masculine,
9 militaristic subcultural style of the *mujahideen*, who embody the persona of the 'badass'
10 (Katz, 1988). Importantly, the jihadi lifestyle is 'presented as well within the reach of
11 readers': the message to aspiring *mujahideen* is that 'violent acts are a route for
12 individuals to obtain recognition and status... as cool, rebellious heroes' (Sunde et al.,
13 2021: 279). Third, the e-magazines reviewed frame terroristic violence and murder as
14 transgressive, exciting, intense, self-affirming, emotionally satisfying and pleasurable
15 experiences. In doing so, they emphasise the seductive appeal of jihadism as a form of
16 'edgework': 'an attempt to achieve a semblance of control within ontologically insecure
17 social worlds' through extreme forms of voluntary risk-taking (Hayward, 2002: 86;
18 Lyng, 1990; 2004).

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33 Clearly, individuals' journeys into these radical milieus are processes of immense
34 emotional depth. While a cultural criminological approach can help us make sense of the
35 contemporary far right *as a subculture*, as well as its interrelationship with and
36 reproduction through a new media ecosystem – it is in foregrounding the role of
37 emotions, experience and identity in motivating participation in deviant subcultures,
38 crime and harm, where cultural criminology already has much to offer. Recent cultural
39 criminological work in this area can be further developed by drawing on the insights of
40 cultural, media and communication studies. Scholars from a range of disciplines have
41 begun to theorise the mediation of emotions and sensations through new forms of
42 digital communication in terms of *networked affect* (Hillis et al., 2015). The key idea
43 here is that networked online media and communications:
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

54 are not merely about storing and sharing data but also about the spread... amplification
55 and dissipation of affective intensities [...] As the capacity of bodies to affect and be
56 affected by one another... affect cuts across, and joins together, bodies human and
57 nonhuman, organic and machine, material and conceptual... These include individual
58
59
60

1
2
3 users, more or less emergent collective bodies, human and non-human and thus also
4 devices, platforms, applications, interfaces, companies, files and threads. (Paasonen,
5 2018: 283)
6
7
8
9

10 Data scientists employed by Facebook have demonstrated ‘massive-scale emotional
11 contagion through social networks’, showing that ‘emotional states can be transferred
12 to others’ via social media, ‘leading people to experience the same emotions without
13 their awareness’ (Kramer et al., 2014: 8788). It is this contagion and modulation of
14 emotions, sensations and intensities that the idea of networked affect seeks to explain.
15
16
17
18
19

20 Some scholars have already begun to utilise ideas of networked affect in theorising the
21 contemporary far right. For instance, Ganesh describes how online far-right influencers
22 make use of the ‘participatory culture of immaterial digital labour that platforms built
23 around user-generated content’ encourage, to generate and channel what he terms
24 ‘white thymos’ (2020: 900). ‘White thymos’ refers to a complex of racialised pride, rage,
25 resentment and anger generated by ‘informational and affective circuits that create the
26 perception of a loss of white entitlement’ (ibid: 894). White thymos, Ganesh argues, is
27 actively *synthesised* – cultivated – both by key influencers in the far-right online
28 ecosystem and through the participatory culture that they help construct, using several
29 strategies, including documenting instances of purported white victimisation (ibid:
30 899). Once cultivated, white-thymotic rage can be channelled and weaponised by far-
31 right influencers to advance their personal brands and political agendas through
32 coordinated ‘raids’ to boost specific narratives or through targeted harassment
33 campaigns against their political enemies (see Massanari, 2017).
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

50 Conclusion

51 The 21st Century will be defined by overlapping and escalating environmental,
52 economic and social crises, providing fertile ground for a resurgent far right. It is crucial
53 that we develop the analytical tools necessary to understand the far right’s
54 transformation and adaptation, and to challenge and disrupt its growth. Mainstream
55 analysis of the contemporary far right, viewed through the lens of counterextremism
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 and premised on a series of imprecise, ambiguous and normative concepts is abstract,
4 superficial and uncritical. The project of counterextremism is tethered to the
5 maintenance of the neoliberal status quo (Boukalas, 2019; Skoczylis and Andrews,
6 2020) at a time when what is needed is principled opposition to racism and fascism, and
7 an openness to genuinely radical political alternatives (Kundnani, 2014).
8
9
10
11
12

13
14 This article has brought together existing criminological scholarship, as well as
15 contributions from adjacent disciplines to show how a cultural criminological approach
16 can offer novel insights and better inform our understanding of the contemporary far
17 right. After briefly introducing the contemporary far right and counterextremism, the
18 article problematised the concepts of 'extremism', 'radicalisation' and 'terrorism'.
19 'Extremism' as a concept functions to naturalise the status quo while ignoring the
20 interrelationship between the mainstream and the far right. The term conflates
21 different non-liberal worldviews and equates ideas with violence. The discourse of
22 'radicalisation' further compounds this conflation of ideas and violence, and functions to
23 depoliticise and pathologise non-liberal political thought and activism (including
24 political violence). In doing so, it allows policymakers to sidestep awkward discussions
25 about the political motivations of so-called 'extremists'. A focus on terrorism (a rare
26 occurrence) obscures other commonplace and systemic harms associated with the far
27 right. 'Lone wolf' terrorism is a misnomer since lone-actor terrorists emerge from a
28 shared subcultural milieu. The concepts of stochastic terrorism and scripted violence,
29 which gesture towards the distributed nature of agency in producing contemporary far-
30 right political violence, may prove insightful.
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

45
46 Cultural criminology is uniquely well placed to furnish insights into the contemporary
47 far right owing to its focus on subculture and style, its attendance to networked digital
48 media and its foregrounding of emotion and affect. Cultural criminologists have long
49 studied deviant subcultures. An understanding of the contemporary far right as a
50 subculture can usefully compliment other perspectives, permitting an appreciation of
51 its social, stylistic and symbolic appeals. Cultural criminology's attendance to social and
52 networked media can aid us in understanding the contemporary far-right subculture as
53 one sustained and animated by a complex, multidimensional online ecosystem. Finally,
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 cultural criminology's concern with lived experience, emotion and affect can help us
4 understand the contemporary far right's emotional and existential attractions.
5
6
7

8 In concluding this article, it is worth outlining several productive directions – a tentative
9 programme – for future cultural criminological research on the contemporary far right.
10 First, there is the ongoing task of monitoring and mapping the shifting subcultural
11 terrain of the contemporary far right – both its offline presence, its online ecosystem(s)
12 and the changing strategies, tactics, dynamics and interrelationships therein. Who are
13 the key influencers, what are the main organisations or factions, where and how are
14 they mobilising, and what does this mean for the wider movement? The
15 interrelationship between online and offline organisation, ideas, practices and
16 narratives also merits further investigation – particularly as it relates to specific socio-
17 political issues, national and regional contexts, and their constituencies.
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

28 Second, cultural criminologists should examine individuals' pathways into far-right
29 politics. Routes into the far right have changed. No longer are supporters recruited into
30 an organisation – instead, many are 'incrementally nudged along... medial pathway[s]'
31 online, from reactionary videos on YouTube to overtly racist, misogynistic and violent
32 content on fringe platforms (Munn, 2019). A popular topic of discussion in far-right
33 online spaces is supporters' personal recounting of their 'political journeys' – offering a
34 rich seam of data for analysis. The subfield of narrative criminology is particularly well
35 suited to make sense of such accounts.
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

44 Third, central to the ascendance of the contemporary far right has been a narrative of
45 'White Genocide' or the 'Great Replacement' – the alleged ongoing replacement of
46 whites, orchestrated by left-wing elites and/or Jews. This narrative has directly inspired
47 multiple mass shootings around the world (Nilsson, 2022) and is simultaneously
48 creeping into mainstream discourse (Ekman, 2022). Cultural criminologists would do
49 well to interrogate the articulation, strategic dissemination, and emotional and affective
50 appeal of 'Great Replacement' theory and other animating narratives of the far right.
51 Here again, a narrative criminological framework seems relevant – since, as Presser
52 notes, '[a]ggregates as well as individuals tell, and act on the basis of, stories' (2009:
53 178).
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3
4
5 Fourth, cultural criminologists have long interrogated (sub)cultural productions
6 including music, film, television, comics and video games. The contemporary far right
7 has become adept at cranking out its own cultural productions that blur the line
8 between propaganda and entertainment, including revisionist historical documentaries
9 (Žižek, 2018), fiction and nonfiction books and publishing houses, music (Larsen and
10 Jensen, 2023), artwork and videogames (Condis, 2021) – as well as engaging in its own
11 literary and cultural criticism, publishing review essays of films and music from a far-
12 right perspective. Cultural criminology is uniquely positioned to be able to critically
13 interrogate these (sub)cultural products and furnish students of the contemporary far
14 right with a range of insights.
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

25 Bibliography

26
27
28
29 Ali, T. (2015) *The Extreme Centre: A Warning*. London: Verso.

30
31
32
33 Allchorn, D.W. (2021) 'Towards a truly post-organisational UK far right? The usefulness
34 of a newly emergent concept', GNET. Available at: [https://gnet-
35 research.org/2021/12/16/towards-a-truly-post-organisational-uk-far-right-the-
36 usefulness-of-a-newly-emergent-concept/](https://gnet-research.org/2021/12/16/towards-a-truly-post-organisational-uk-far-right-the-usefulness-of-a-newly-emergent-concept/) (Accessed: 23 January 2023).
37
38
39
40
41
42

43 Amman, M. and Meloy, J.R. (2021) 'Stochastic terrorism: A linguistic and psychological
44 analysis', *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 15(5), pp. 2–13.
45
46
47
48

49 Amman, M. and Meloy, R. (2022) 'Incitement to violence and stochastic terrorism: Legal,
50 academic, and practical parameters for researchers and investigators', *Terrorism and
51 Political Violence*, 0(0). Available at:
52 <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2022.2143352>.
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Andersen, J.C. (2022) 'The symbolic boundary work of incels: Subcultural negotiation of
4 meaning and identity online', *Deviant Behavior*, 44(7), pp. 1081–1101. Available
5 at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/01639625.2022.2142864>.
6
7
8
9

10
11 Awan, A. (2007) 'Radicalization on the internet? The virtual propagation of jihadist
12 media and its effects', *RUSI Journal*, 152(3). Available
13 at: [https://pure.royalholloway.ac.uk/en/publications/radicalization-on-the-internet-
14 the-virtual-propagation-of-jihadis](https://pure.royalholloway.ac.uk/en/publications/radicalization-on-the-internet-the-virtual-propagation-of-jihadis)
15
16
17
18
19

20
21 Baele, S. J., Brace, L. and Coan, T. G. (2020) 'Uncovering the far-right online ecosystem:
22 An analytical framework and research agenda', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 0(0), pp.
23 1–21. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2020.1862895>.
24
25
26
27

28
29 Baele, S. J., Brace, L. and Coan, T. G. (2021) 'Variations on a theme? Comparing 4chan,
30 8kun, and other chans' far-right "/pol" boards', *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 15(1), pp.
31 65–80.
32
33
34
35

36
37 Barracosa, S. and March, J. (2022) 'Dealing with radicalised youth offenders: The
38 development and implementation of a youth-specific framework', *Frontiers in
39 Psychiatry*, 12. Available
40 at: <https://www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsy.2021.773545> (Accessed: 9 June
41 2022).
42
43
44
45
46

47
48 Becker, H. (1963) *Outsiders*. New York, NY: Free Press.
49
50

51
52 Bennett, A. (2011) 'The post-subcultural turn: Some reflections 10 years on', *Journal of
53 Youth Studies*, 14(5), pp. 493–506. Available at:
54 <https://doi.org/10.1080/13676261.2011.559216>.
55
56
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 Bennett, A. and Kahn-Harris, K. (2004) (eds.) *After Subculture: Critical Studies in*
4 *Contemporary Youth Culture*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
5
6
7

8
9 Berlet, C. (2014) Heroes know which villains to kill: How coded rhetoric incites scripted
10 violence. In: Feldman, M. and Jackson, P. (eds.) *Doublespeak: The Rhetoric of the Far*
11 *Right since 1945*. Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, pp. 303 – 330.
12
13
14

15
16 Berntzen, L.E. and Sandberg, S. (2014) 'The collective nature of lone wolf terrorism:
17 Anders Behring Breivik and the anti-Islamic social movement', *Terrorism and Political*
18 *Violence*, 26(5), pp. 759–779. Available
19 at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2013.767245>.
20
21
22
23

24
25 Blackman, S. (2014) 'Subculture theory: An historical and contemporary assessment of
26 the concept for understanding deviance', *Deviant Behavior*, 35(6), pp. 496–512.
27 Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/01639625.2013.859049>.
28
29
30
31

32
33 Blakeley, R., Hayes, B., Kapor, N., Kundnani, A., Massoumi, N., Miller, D., Mills, T., Sabir, R.,
34 Sian, K. and Tufail, W. (2019) *Leaving the War on Terror*. Amsterdam: Transnational
35 Insitute.
36
37
38
39

40
41 Blee, K.M. (2007) 'Ethnographies of the far right', *Journal of Contemporary*
42 *Ethnography*, 36(2), pp. 119–128. Available
43 at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0891241606298815>.
44
45
46

47
48 Bouhana, N. and Wilkstrom, P. H. (2011) *Al Qa'ida-influenced radicalisation: A rapid*
49 *evidence assessment guided by Situational Action Theory*. London: Home Office.
50 Available
51 at: [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/atta](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/116724/occ97.pdf)
52 [chment_data/file/116724/occ97.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/116724/occ97.pdf) (Accessed: 9 June 2022).
53
54
55

56
57 Bowman-Grieve, L. (2009) 'Exploring "Stormfront": A virtual community of the radical
58 right', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 32(11), pp. 989–1007. Available
59 at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100903259951>.
60

1
2
3 CAGE (2019) *CCE Exposed*. London: CAGE. Available
4 at: <https://www.cage.ngo/product/cce-exposed-report-pdf> (Accessed: 21 August
5 2021).
6
7

8
9 Campbell, E. (2012) 'Landscapes of performance: Stalking as
10 choreography'. *Environment and Planning D*, 30(3): 400 – 417.
11
12

13
14 Castle, T. and Parsons, T. (2019) 'Vigilante or Viking? Contesting the mediated
15 constructions of Soldiers of Odin Norge', *Crime, Media, Culture*, 15(1), pp. 47–66.
16 Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1741659017731479>.
17
18

19
20 Castle, T., Kristiansen, L. and Shifflett, L. (2020) 'White racial activism and paper
21 terrorism: A case study in far-right propaganda', *Deviant Behavior*, 41(2), pp. 252–267.
22 doi: [10.1080/01639625.2018.1557380](https://doi.org/10.1080/01639625.2018.1557380).
23
24

25
26 Collins, E. (2021) 'Beyond the race-neutrality of Prevent: White Britain and the
27 racialised threat', *E-International Relations*, 20 September. Available at: [https://www.e-
28 ir.info/2021/09/20/beyond-the-race-neutrality-of-prevent-white-britain-and-the-
29 racialised-threat/](https://www.e-ir.info/2021/09/20/beyond-the-race-neutrality-of-prevent-white-britain-and-the-racialised-threat/) (Accessed: 12 October 2021).
30
31

32
33 Collins, M. (2011) *Hate: My Life in the British Far Right*. London: Biteback.
34
35

36
37 Comerford, M. (2020) 'Confronting the challenge of 'post-organisational'
38 extremism', *ORF*. Available at: [https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/confronting-
39 the-challenge-of-post-organisational-extremism/](https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/confronting-the-challenge-of-post-organisational-extremism/) (Accessed: 23 January 2023).
40
41

42
43 Commission for Countering Extremism (2021) *Operating with Impunity: Hateful
44 extremism*. Available at: [https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/operating-
45 with-impunity-legal-review](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/operating-with-impunity-legal-review) (Accessed: 24 July 2021).
46
47

48
49 Condis, M. (2021) Playing at racism: White supremacist recruitment in online video
50 game culture. In: Nilsen, S. D. and Turner, S. E. (eds.) *White Supremacy and the
51 American Media*. London: Routledge, pp. 246 - 274
52
53

54
55 Conti, U. (2017) 'Between rap and jihad: Spectacular subcultures, terrorism and
56 visuality', *Contemporary Social Science*, 12(3–4), pp.272–284.
57
58

59
60 Coppock, V. and McGovern, M. (2014) "Dangerous minds"? Deconstructing counter-
terrorism discourse, radicalisation and the "psychological vulnerability" of muslim

1
2
3 children and young people in Britain', *Children & Society*, 28(3), pp. 242–256.
4 doi:[10.1111/chso.12060](https://doi.org/10.1111/chso.12060).

5
6
7
8 Cottee, S. (2011) 'Jihadism as a subcultural response to social strain: extending Marc
9 Sageman's "bunch of guys" thesis', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 23(5), pp. 730–751.
10 Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2011.611840>.

11
12
13
14 Cottee, S. (2015a) *The Pre-Terrorists Among Us*, *The Atlantic*. Available
15 at: [https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/counterterrorism-
16 prevention-britain-isis/412603/](https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/counterterrorism-prevention-britain-isis/412603/) (Accessed: 30 June 2021).

17
18
19
20 Cottee, S. (2015b) *Jihadi Cool: Why ISIS Propaganda Is So Powerful*, *The Atlantic*.
21 Available at: [https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/12/isis-jihadi-
22 cool/421776/](https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/12/isis-jihadi-cool/421776/) (Accessed: 10 January 2023).

23
24
25
26 Cottee, S. (2020) 'The Western jihadi subculture and subterranean values', *The British
27 Journal of Criminology*, 60(3), pp. 762–781. doi: [10.1093/bjc/azz081](https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azz081).

28
29
30
31 Cottee, S. (2021) 'Incel (e)motives: Resentment, shame and revenge', *Studies in Conflict
32 & Terrorism*, 44(2), pp. 93–114. doi: [10.1080/1057610X.2020.1822589](https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2020.1822589).

33
34
35
36 Cottee, S. and Hayward, K. (2011) 'Terrorist (e)motives: The existential attractions of
37 terrorism', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 34(12), pp. 963–986. Available
38 at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2011.621116>.

39
40
41
42 Crone, M. (2016) 'Radicalization revisited: violence, politics and the skills of the body',
43 *International Affairs*, 92(3), pp. 587–604. Available at: [https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-
44 2346.12604](https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12604).

45
46
47
48 Daniels, J. (2018) 'The algorithmic rise of the "alt-right"', *Contexts*, 17(1), pp. 60–65.
49 doi:[10.1177/1536504218766547](https://doi.org/10.1177/1536504218766547).

50
51
52
53 Davies, P., Leighton, P. and Wyatt, T. (2021) *The Palgrave Handbook of Social Harm*.
54 Cham, CH: Springer International Publishing.

55
56
57
58 Dear, K.P. (2013) 'Beheading the hydra? Does killing terrorist or insurgent leaders
59 work?', *Defence Studies*, 13(3), pp. 293–337. doi:[10.1080/14702436.2013.845383](https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2013.845383).

1
2
3 Diakopolous, N. (2014) 'Algorithmic accountability: On the investigation of black
4 boxes', *Columbia Journalism Review*. Available
5 at: [https://www.cjr.org/tow_center_reports/algorithmic_accountability_on_the_investi](https://www.cjr.org/tow_center_reports/algorithmic_accountability_on_the_investigation_of_black_boxes.php/)
6 [gation_of_black_boxes.php/](https://www.cjr.org/tow_center_reports/algorithmic_accountability_on_the_investigation_of_black_boxes.php/) (Accessed: 29 November 2022).
7
8
9

10 Doroshenko, L. and Tu, F. (2022) 'Like, share, comment, and repeat: Far-right messages,
11 emotions, and amplification in social media', *Journal of Information Technology &*
12 *Politics*, 20(3), pp. 286 – 302. Available
13 at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/19331681.2022.2097358>.
14
15
16

17 Ekman, M. (2022) 'The great replacement: Strategic mainstreaming of far-right conspiracy
18 claims', *Convergence*, 28(4): 1127 - 1143. Available at:
19 <https://doi.org/10.1177/13548565221091983>.
20
21
22

23 European Commission (2020) *Commission boosts its support to Member States in their*
24 *fight against violent radicalisation*. Available at: [https://ec.europa.eu/home-](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/commission-boosts-its-support-member-states-their-fight-against-violent-radicalisation-2020-12_en)
25 [affairs/news/commission-boosts-its-support-member-states-their-fight-against-](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/commission-boosts-its-support-member-states-their-fight-against-violent-radicalisation-2020-12_en)
26 [violent-radicalisation-2020-12_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/commission-boosts-its-support-member-states-their-fight-against-violent-radicalisation-2020-12_en) (Accessed: 26 October 2021).
27
28
29

30 Europol (2020) European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend report (TE-SAT) 2020.
31 Available at: [https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-events/main-](https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-events/main-reports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2020)
32 [reports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2020](https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-events/main-reports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2020) (Accessed:
33 22 December 2022).
34
35
36

37 Evans, R. (2018) 'From memes to Infowars: How 75 fascist activists were "red-
38 pillled"', *Bellingcat*. Available
39 at: [https://www.bellingcat.com/news/americas/2018/10/11/memes-infowars-75-](https://www.bellingcat.com/news/americas/2018/10/11/memes-infowars-75-fascist-activists-red-pilled/)
40 [fascist-activists-red-pilled/](https://www.bellingcat.com/news/americas/2018/10/11/memes-infowars-75-fascist-activists-red-pilled/) (Accessed: 23 July 2021).
41
42
43

44 Faure Walker, R. (2019a) *The Emergence of 'Extremism' and 'Radicalisation': An*
45 *investigation into the discursive conditions that have enabled UK counter-terrorism*
46 *strategy to focus on 'radicalisation' and 'extremism', and a theorisation of the impact of*
47 *this focus*, PhD thesis, UCL (University of London). Available
48 at: <https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10080055/> (Accessed: 25 July 2021).
49
50
51

52 Faure Walker, R. (2019b) 'The UK's PREVENT counter-terrorism strategy appears to
53 promote rather than prevent violence', *Journal of Critical Realism*, 18(5), pp. 487–512.
54 doi:[10.1080/14767430.2019.1646095](https://doi.org/10.1080/14767430.2019.1646095).
55
56
57

58 Fekete, E. (2018) *Europe's Fault Lines: Racism and the Rise of the Right*. London: Verso.
59
60

1
2
3 Ferrell, J. (2013) Cultural criminology. In: McLaughlin, E. and Muncie, J. (eds.) *The SAGE*
4 *Dictionary of Criminology*. 3rd ed. London: SAGE, pp. 110 – 112.

5
6
7
8 Ferrell, J., Hayward, K. and Young, J. (2008) *Cultural Criminology: An Invitation*.
9 Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.

10
11
12 Ferrell, J., Hayward, K., Morrison, W. and Presdee, M. (eds) (2004) *Cultural Criminology*
13 *Unleashed*. London: GlassHouse Press.

14
15
16
17 Fielitz, M. and Thurston, N. (2019) (eds.) *Post-Digital Cultures of the Far Right: Online*
18 *Actions and Offline Consequences in Europe and the US*. Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag.
19 Available at: <https://doi.org/10.14361/9783839446706>.

20
21
22
23 Foucault, M. (1980) Prison talk. In: Gordon, C. (ed.) *Power/Knowledge: Selected*
24 *Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977*. New York: Pantheon, pp. 37–54.

25
26
27
28 Friberg, D. (2015) *The Real Right Returns*. London: Arktos.

29
30
31
32 G2geek (2011) *Stochastic Terrorism: Triggering the shooters*, *Daily Kos*. Available
33 at: <https://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/1/10/934890/>- (Accessed: 24 July 2021).

34
35
36
37 Gailey, J.A. (2009) “‘Starving is the most fun a girl can have’: The pro-ana subculture as
38 edgework”, *Critical Criminology*, 17(2), pp. 93–108. Available
39 at: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-009-9074-z>.

40
41
42
43 Ganesh, B. (2020) ‘Weaponizing white thymos: Flows of rage in the online audiences of
44 the alt-right’, *Cultural Studies*, 34(6), pp. 892–924. Available at:
45 <https://doi.org/10.1080/09502386.2020.1714687>.

46
47
48
49 Ganor, B. (2002) ‘Defining terrorism: Is one man’s terrorist another man’s freedom
50 fighter?’, *Police Practice and Research*, 3(4), pp. 287–304.
51 doi:[10.1080/1561426022000032060](https://doi.org/10.1080/1561426022000032060).

52
53
54
55 Gardell, M. (2021) *Lone Wolf Race Warriors and White Genocide*. Cambridge:
56 Cambridge University Press.

1
2
3 Goldsmith, A. and Wall, D.S. (2022) 'The seductions of cybercrime: Adolescence and the
4 thrills of digital transgression', *European Journal of Criminology*, 19(1), pp. 98–117.
5 Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1477370819887305>.
6
7

8
9 Greene, V.S. (2019) "'Deplorable" satire: Alt-right memes, white genocide tweets, and
10 redpilling normies', *Studies in American Humor*, 5(1), pp. 31–69. Available
11 at: <https://doi.org/10.5325/studamerhumor.5.1.0031>.
12
13

14
15 Griffin, R. (1991) *The Nature of Fascism*. London: Routledge.
16
17

18
19 Griffin, R. (2003) 'From slime mould to rhizome: An introduction to the groupuscular
20 right', *Patterns of Prejudice*, 37(1), pp. 27–50.
21
22

23
24 Griffin, R. and Feldman, M. (eds.) (2004) *Fascism: Critical Concepts in Political Science*.
25 London: Routledge.
26
27

28
29 Hall, S. and Winlow, S. (2007) 'Cultural criminology and primitive accumulation: A
30 formal introduction for two strangers who should really become more intimate', *Crime,
31 Media, Culture*, 3(1), pp. 82–90.
32
33

34
35 Hallsworth, S. and Young, T. (2008) 'Gang talk and gang talkers: A critique', *Crime,
36 Media, Culture*, 4(2), pp. 175–195.
37
38

39
40 Hamm, M. S. (1994) *American Skinheads: The Criminology and Control of Hate Crime*.
41 Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing.
42
43

44
45 Hamm, M. S. (2004) 'Apocalyptic violence: The seduction of terrorist
46 subcultures', *Theoretical Criminology*, 8(3), pp. 323–339.
47 doi: [10.1177/1362480604044612](https://doi.org/10.1177/1362480604044612).
48
49

50
51 Hamm, M.S. and Spaaij, R. (2017) *The Age of Lone Wolf Terrorism*. New York: Columbia
52 University Press, p. 336 Pages.
53
54

55
56 Hartleb, F. (2020) *Lone Wolves: The New Terrorism of Right-Wing Single Actors*. Cham,
57 CH: Springer.
58
59

60
61 Hatewatch (2017) *Donning the Mask: Presenting 'The Face of 21st Century
62 Fascism'*, *Southern Poverty Law Center*. Available

1
2
3 at: [https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2017/06/20/donning-mask-presenting-](https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2017/06/20/donning-mask-presenting-face-21st-century-fascism)
4 [face-21st-century-fascism](https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2017/06/20/donning-mask-presenting-face-21st-century-fascism) (Accessed: 30 September 2022).
5
6
7

8 Hayward, K., & Schuilenburg, M. B. (2014) 'To resist = to create? Some thoughts on the
9 concept of resistance in cultural criminology', *Tijdschrift Over Cultuur & Criminaliteit*,
10 4(1), 22 – 36.
11
12

13
14 Hayward, K.J. (2002) The vilification and pleasures of youthful transgression. In:
15 Muncie, J. (ed.) *Youth Justice: Critical Readings*. London: SAGE, pp. 80 – 93.
16
17

18
19 Hayward, K.J. (2016) 'Cultural criminology: Script rewrites', *Theoretical Criminology*,
20 20(3), pp. 297–321.
21
22

23
24 Heath-Kelly, C. (2013) 'Counter-terrorism and the counterfactual: Producing the
25 "radicalisation" discourse and the UK PREVENT strategy', *The British Journal of Politics*
26 *and International Relations*, 15(3), pp. 394–415. doi:[10.1111/j.1467-](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-856X.2011.00489.x)
27 [856X.2011.00489.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-856X.2011.00489.x).
28
29

30
31 Heath-Kelly, C. (2017) 'The geography of pre-criminal space: Epidemiological
32 imaginations of radicalisation risk in the UK Prevent Strategy, 2007–2017', *Critical*
33 *Studies on Terrorism*, 10(2), pp. 297–319. doi:[10.1080/17539153.2017.1327141](https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2017.1327141).
34
35

36
37 Hebdige, D. (1979) *Subculture: The Meaning of Style*. London: Methuen
38
39

40
41 Heikkilä, N. (2017) 'Online antagonism of the alt-right in the 2016 election', *European*
42 *Journal of American Studies*, 12(2). Available at: <https://doi.org/10.4000/ejas.12140>.
43
44

45
46 Hemmingsen, A-S. (2015) 'Viewing jihadism as a counterculture: Potential and
47 limitations', *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, 7(1), pp. 3-17
48
49

50
51 Hesse, M. and Zak, D. (2016) 'Does this haircut make me look like a Nazi?', *Washington*
52 *Post*, 30 November. Available at: [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/arts-and-](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/arts-and-entertainment/wp/2016/11/30/does-this-haircut-make-me-look-like-a-nazi/)
53 [entertainment/wp/2016/11/30/does-this-haircut-make-me-look-like-a-](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/arts-and-entertainment/wp/2016/11/30/does-this-haircut-make-me-look-like-a-nazi/)
54 [nazi/](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/arts-and-entertainment/wp/2016/11/30/does-this-haircut-make-me-look-like-a-nazi/) (Accessed: 30 September 2022).
55
56

57
58 Hillis, K., Paasonen, P., Petit, M. (2015) *Networked Affect*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
59
60

HM Government (2011) *Prevent Strategy*. Norwich: Home Office.

1
2
3 HM Government (2012) *Channel Duty Guidance: Protecting People Vulnerable to Being*
4 *Drawn into Terrorism*. London: Home Office.

5
6
7
8 HM Government (2019) *Online Harms White Paper*. London: The Stationary Office.
9 Available
10 at: [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/atta](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/973939/Online_Harms_White_Paper_V2.pdf)
11 [chment_data/file/973939/Online Harms White Paper V2.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/973939/Online_Harms_White_Paper_V2.pdf) (Accessed 29 November
12 2022).

13
14
15
16 Holt, T.J., Freilich, J.D. and Chermak, S.M. (2017) 'Internet-based radicalization as
17 enculturation to violent deviant subcultures', *Deviant Behavior*, 38(8), pp. 855–869.
18 Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/01639625.2016.1197704>.

19
20
21
22 Home Office (2015) *Home Secretary: We must work together to defeat*
23 *terrorism, GOV.UK*. Available at: [https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/home-](https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/home-secretary-we-must-work-together-to-defeat-terrorism)
24 [secretary-we-must-work-together-to-defeat-terrorism](https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/home-secretary-we-must-work-together-to-defeat-terrorism) (Accessed: 3 January 2023).

25
26
27
28 Hope Not Hate (2022) *State of Hate 2022: On the March Again*. London: Hope Not Hate

29
30
31
32 Hummel, K. (2021) *The Iron March Forum and the Evolution of the "Skull Mask" Neo-*
33 *Fascist Network, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point*. Available
34 at: [https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-iron-march-forum-and-the-evolution-of-the-skull-](https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-iron-march-forum-and-the-evolution-of-the-skull-mask-neo-fascist-network/)
35 [mask-neo-fascist-network/](https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-iron-march-forum-and-the-evolution-of-the-skull-mask-neo-fascist-network/) (Accessed: 30 September 2022).

36
37
38
39 Ilan, J. (2019) 'Cultural criminology: The time is now', *Critical Criminology*, 27(1), pp. 5–
40 20.

41
42
43
44 Jackson, R. (2011) 'In defence of "terrorism": Finding a way through a forest of
45 misconceptions', *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, 3(2), pp.
46 116–130. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2010.512148>.

47
48
49
50 Jacobs, J.B. and Potter, K.A. (1997) 'Hate crimes: A critical perspective', *Crime and*
51 *Justice*, 22, pp. 1–50. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1086/449259>.

52
53
54
55 Jenness, V. (2001) 'The hate crime canon and beyond: A critical assessment', *Law and*
56 *Critique*, 12(3), pp. 279–308. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1013774229732>.

1
2
3 Jensen, S.Q., Larsen, J.F. and Sandberg, S. (2021) 'Rap, Islam and jihadi cool: The
4 attractions of the Western jihadi subculture', *Crime, Media, Culture* [Preprint].
5 Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/17416590211025573>.

6
7
8
9 Kaplan, J. (1997) "Leaderless resistance", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 9(3), pp.
10 80–95. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546559708427417>.

11
12
13
14 Katz, J. (1988) *Seductions of Crime: Moral and Sensual Attractions in Doing Evil*. New
15 York: Basic Books.

16
17
18
19 Katz, R. (2022) *Saints and Soldiers: Inside Internet Age Terrorism, From Syria to the*
20 *Capitol Siege*. New York: Columbia University Press.

21
22
23
24 Kemper, B. (2022) 'AI and Stochastic Terrorism – Should it be done?', in *2022 IEEE*
25 *International Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering Workshops (ISSREW)*, pp.
26 347–356. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1109/ISSREW55968.2022.00091>.

27
28
29
30 Kennedy, D. (2022) 'Neo-Nazi uses codewords to spread hate on YouTube', *The Times*, 1
31 September. Available at: [https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/neo-nazi-uses-](https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/neo-nazi-uses-codewords-to-spread-hate-on-youtube-kqqs6lrkf)
32 [codewords-to-spread-hate-on-youtube-kqqs6lrkf](https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/neo-nazi-uses-codewords-to-spread-hate-on-youtube-kqqs6lrkf) (Accessed: 25 November 2022).

33
34
35
36 Kinnvall, C. (2019) 'Populism, ontological insecurity and Hindutva: Modi and the
37 masculinization of Indian politics', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 32(3), pp.
38 283–302. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2019.1588851>.

39
40
41
42 Kisc Merino, P. and Kinnvall, C. (2022) 'Governing emotions: Hybrid media, ontological
43 insecurity and the normalisation of far-right fantasies', *Alternatives*, 48(1), pp. 54 – 73.
44 Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/03043754221123467>.

45
46
47
48 Knefel, J. (2013) 'Everything you've been told about radicalization is wrong', *Rolling*
49 *Stone*, 6 May. Available at: [https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-](https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/everything-youve-been-told-about-radicalization-is-wrong-80445/)
50 [news/everything-youve-been-told-about-radicalization-is-wrong-80445/](https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/everything-youve-been-told-about-radicalization-is-wrong-80445/) (Accessed: 10
51 June 2022).

52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Kramer, A.D.I., Guillory, J.E. and Hancock, J.T. (2014) 'Experimental evidence of massive-
scale emotional contagion through social networks', *Proceedings of the National*
Academy of Sciences, 111(24), pp. 8788–8790. Available
at: <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1320040111>.

1
2
3 Kundnani, A. (2012) 'Radicalisation: The journey of a concept', *Race & Class*, 54(2), pp.
4 3–25. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396812454984>.

6
7
8 Kundnani, A. (2014) *The Muslims are Coming: Islamophobia, Extremism, and the*
9 *Domestic War on Terror*. London: Verso Books.

11
12 Kundnani, A. and Hayes, B. (2018) *The Globalisation of Countering Violent Extremism*
13 *Policies: Undermining Human Rights, Instrumentalising Civil Society*. Amsterdam:
14 Transnational Insitute.
15

16
17
18 Larsen, J.F. and Jensen, S.Q. (2023) 'The new far right, subcultural theory, and the
19 sociology of emotions', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 0(0), pp. 1 – 21. Available
20 at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2022.2163458>.

21
22
23
24
25 Lee, B. (2019) "Overview of the Far-Right", paper commissioned by the Commission for
26 Countering Extremism. Available at:
27 <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/overview-of-the-far-right> (Accessed 13
28 August 2024).
29

30
31
32 Lee, B. and Knott, K. (2022) 'Fascist aspirants: Fascist Forge and ideological learning in
33 the extreme-right online milieu', *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political*
34 *Aggression*, 14(3), pp. 216–240. Available
35 at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2020.1850842>.

36
37
38
39 Leser, J. and Spissinger, F. (2020) 'The functionality of affects: conceptualising far-right
40 populist politics beyond negative emotions', *Global Discourse*, 10(2), pp. 325–342.
41 Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1332/204378919X15762350844101>.

42
43
44
45 Lewis, H. (2020) 'The joke's on us', *The Atlantic*, 30 September. Available
46 at: [https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/09/how-memes-lulz-](https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/09/how-memes-lulz-and-ironic-bigotry-won-internet/616427/)
47 [and-ironic-bigotry-won-internet/616427/](https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/09/how-memes-lulz-and-ironic-bigotry-won-internet/616427/) (Accessed: 16 January 2023).
48

49
50
51 Lewis, R. (2018) *Alternative Influence: Broadcasting the Reactionary Right on YouTube*.
52 Data & Society. Available at: <https://datasociety.net/library/alternative-influence/>.

53
54
55 Lyng, S. (1990) 'Edgework: A social psychological analysis of voluntary risk taking',
56 *American Journal of Sociology*, 95(4), pp. 851–886. Available at:
57 <https://doi.org/10.1086/229379>.
58
59
60

1
2
3 Lyng, S. (2004) 'Crime, edgework and corporeal transaction', *Theoretical*
4 *Criminology*, 8(3), 359 – 375.

5
6
7
8 Marcks, H. and Pawelz, J. (2022) 'From myths of victimhood to fantasies of violence:
9 How far-right narratives of imperilment work', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 34(7),
10 pp. 1415–1432. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2020.1788544>.

11
12
13
14 Massanari, A. (2017) '#Gamergate and The Fapping: How Reddit's algorithm,
15 governance, and culture support toxic technocultures', *New Media & Society*, 19(3), pp.
16 329–346. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444815608807>.

17
18
19
20 May, T. (2015) *A Stronger Britain, Built on Our Values*, GOV.UK. Available
21 at: [https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/a-stronger-britain-built-on-our-](https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/a-stronger-britain-built-on-our-values)
22 [values](https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/a-stronger-britain-built-on-our-values) (Accessed: 21 December 2021).

23
24
25
26 McCann, C. J. J. (2019) *The Prevent Strategy and Right-wing Extremism: A Case Study of*
27 *the English Defence League*. London: Routledge.

28
29
30 McDonald, K. (2020) *Radicalization*. Cambridge: Polity.

31
32
33
34 Merton, R. K. (1968) *Social Theory and Social Structure*. New York: The Free Press.

35
36
37
38 Miller-Idriss, C. (2018) *The Extreme Gone Mainstream: Commercialization and Far*
39 *Right Youth Culture in Germany*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

40
41
42
43 Miller, C. (2022) Social Media and System Collapse: How Extremists Built an
44 International Neo-Nazi Network. In: Hubscher, M and von Mering, S. (eds.) *Antisemitism*
45 *on Social Media*. London: Routledge.

46
47
48
49 Mondon, A. and Winter, A. (2020) *Reactionary Democracy How Racism and the Populist*
50 *Far Right Became Mainstream*. London: Verso.

51
52
53
54 Moore, S. and Roberts, A. (2021) *Post-Internet Far Right: Fascism in the Age of the*
55 *Internet*. London: Dog Section Press.

56
57
58
59 Moses, A.D. (2019) "'White genocide" and the ethics of public analysis', *Journal of*
60 *Genocide Research*, 21(2), pp. 201–213. Available at:
<https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2019.1599493>.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Mudde, C. (2019) *The Far Right Today*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Muggleton, D. and Weinzierl, R. (2003) (eds.) *The Post-Subcultures Reader*. New York: Berg.

Mulhall, J. (2018) 'A post-organisational far right?', *HOPE not hate*. Available at: <https://hopenothate.org.uk/research-old/state-of-hate-2018/online-radicalisation/post-organisational-far-right/> (Accessed: 23 January 2023).

Muncie, J. (2001) Subculture. In: McLaughlin, E. and Muncie, J. (eds.) *The SAGE Dictionary of Criminology*. London: SAGE, pp. 296 - 298

Munn, L. (2019) 'Alt-right pipeline: Individual journeys to extremism online', *First Monday* 24(6). Available at: <https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v24i6.10108>.

Munn, L. (2020) 'Angry by design: Toxic communication and technical architectures', *Humanities and Social Sciences Communications*, 7(1), pp. 1–11. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-00550-7>.

Murray, D. (2017) *The Strange Death of Europe: Immigration, Identity, Islam*. London: Bloomsbury.

Neumann, P. R. (2008) Introduction. In: *Perspectives on Radicalisation and Political Violence: Papers from the First International Conference on Radicalisation and Political Violence, London 17 - 18 January 2008*. London: ICSR, pp. 3 – 7.

Nilsson, P.-E. (2022) 'Manifestos of white nationalist ethno-soldiers', *Critical Research on Religion* [Preprint]. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/20503032211044426>.

O'Brien, M. (2005) 'What is *cultural* about cultural criminology?', *British Journal of Criminology*, 45(5): 599 – 612.

O'Callaghan, D. *et al.* (2015) 'Down the (white) rabbit hole: The extreme right and online recommender systems', *Social Science Computer Review*, 33(4), pp. 459–478. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0894439314555329>.

Onursal, R. and Kirkpatrick, D. (2021) 'Is extremism the "new" terrorism? the convergence of "extremism" and "terrorism" in British parliamentary

1
2
3 discourse', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 33(5), pp. 1094–1116.
4 doi:[10.1080/09546553.2019.1598391](https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2019.1598391).

5
6
7
8 Paasonen, S. (2018) Networked affect. In: Braidotti, R. and HlavaJova, M.
9 (eds.) *Posthuman Glossary*. London: Bloomsbury, pp. 283-4.

10
11
12 Pasquale, F. (2015) *The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money*
13 *and Information*. Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press.

14
15
16
17 Paxton, R. O. (2004) *The Anatomy of Fascism*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

18
19
20
21 Perry, B. and Olsson, P. (2009) 'Cyberhate: The globalization of hate', *Information &*
22 *Communications Technology Law*, 18(2), pp. 185–199. Available
23 at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13600830902814984>.

24
25
26
27 PISOIU, D. (2015), 'Subcultural theory applied to jihadi and right-wing radicalization in
28 Germany', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 27(1), pp. 9 – 28.

29
30
31
32 Presser, L. (2009) 'The narratives of offenders', *Theoretical Criminology*, 13(2), pp.
33 177–200. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1362480609102878>.

34
35
36
37 Presser, L. (2012) 'Getting on top through mass murder: Narrative, metaphor, and violence',
38 *Crime, Media, Culture*, 8(1), pp. 3–21. Available at:
39 <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1741659011430443>.

40
41
42
43 Presser, L. and Sandberg, S. (2015) Research Strategies for Narrative Criminology. In:
44 Miller, J. and Palacios, W. R. (Eds.) *Qualitative Research in Criminology*. London:
45 Routledge, pp. 85 – 99.

46
47
48
49 Ravndal, J. A. and Bjørge, T. (2018) 'Investigating Terrorism from the Extreme Right: A
50 Review of Past and Present Research', *Perspectives on Terrorism* 12(6): 5-22.

51
52
53
54 Ribeiro, M. H. *et al.* (2020) 'Auditing radicalization pathways on YouTube', in
55 *Proceedings of the 2020 Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency.*
56 *FAT* '20: Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency*, Barcelona Spain:
57 ACM, pp. 131–141. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1145/3351095.3372879>.

58
59
60
Robinson, R. A. H. (1981) *Fascism in Europe*. London: The Historical Association.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Roose, K. (2019) 'The making of a YouTube radical', *The New York Times*, 8 June. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/06/08/technology/youtube-radical.html> (Accessed: 25 November 2022).

Sageman, M. (2004) *Understanding Terror Networks*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Salazar, P.-J. (2018) 'The alt-right as a community of discourse', *Javnost - The Public*, 25(1-2), pp. 135-143. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13183222.2018.1423947>.

Schmid, A. (2004) 'Terrorism – the definitional problem', *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law*, 36(2), p. 375.

Schuurman, B. and Taylor, M. (2018) 'Reconsidering radicalization: Fanaticism and the link between ideas and violence', *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 12(1), pp. 3-22.

Sedgwick, M. (2010) 'The concept of radicalization as a source of confusion', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 22(4), pp. 479-494. doi: [10.1080/09546553.2010.491009](https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2010.491009).

See, B.H., Gorard, S. and Siddiqui, N. (2017) 'Does participation in uniformed group activities in school improve young people's non-cognitive outcomes?', *International Journal of Educational Research*, 85, pp. 109-120. doi: [10.1016/j.ijer.2017.07.002](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijer.2017.07.002).

Sian, K. (2017) 'Born radicals? Prevent, positivism, and "race-thinking"', *Palgrave Communications*, 3(1), pp. 1-8. doi: [10.1057/s41599-017-0009-0](https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-017-0009-0).

Sibley, A. (2023) 'Behind the British new far-right's veil: Do individuals adopt strategic liberalism to appear more moderate or are they semi-liberal?', *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/13691481221148330>.

Simon Cottee (2022) *Is Tucker Carlson a 'stochastic terrorist'?*, *UnHerd*, 11 November. Available at: <https://unherd.com/the-post/is-tucker-carlson-a-stochastic-terrorist/> (Accessed: 12 July 2023).

Skoczylis, J. and Andrews, S. (2020) 'A conceptual critique of Prevent: Can Prevent be saved? No, but...', *Critical Social Policy*, 40(3), pp. 350-369. doi: [10.1177/0261018319840145](https://doi.org/10.1177/0261018319840145).

1
2
3 Smith, P (2005) *Why War? The Cultural Logic of Iraq, the Gulf War, and Suez*. Chicago,
4 IL: University of Chicago Press.
5
6

7
8 Strübel, J. and Sklar, M. (2022), Fred Perry: Polos for All. In: Conner, C.T. (ed.)
9 *Subcultures*. London: Emerald Publishing, pp. 73 – 90.
10

11
12 Sunde, H. M., Ilan, J. and Sandberg, S. (2021) 'A cultural criminology of "new" jihad:
13 Insights from propaganda magazines', *Crime, Media, Culture*, 17(2), pp. 271–287.
14 doi: [10.1177/1741659020915509](https://doi.org/10.1177/1741659020915509).
15
16

17
18 Theweleit, K. (1987) *Male Fantasies. Volume One: Women, Floods, Bodies, History*.
19 Cambridge: Blackwell Polity.
20

21
22
23 Tiffany, K. (2021) 'The alt-right has lost control of 'redpill'', *The Atlantic*. Available
24 at: [https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2021/04/red-pill-meme-alt-](https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2021/04/red-pill-meme-alt-right-twitter/618577/)
25 [right-twitter/618577/](https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2021/04/red-pill-meme-alt-right-twitter/618577/) (Accessed: 16 January 2023).
26
27

28
29 Tony Blair Institute for Global Change (2019) *Designating Hate: New Policy Responses*
30 *to Stop Hate Crime*. Available at: [https://www.institute.global/insights/geopolitics-and-](https://www.institute.global/insights/geopolitics-and-security/designating-hate-new-policy-responses-stop-hate-crime)
31 [security/designating-hate-new-policy-responses-stop-hate-crime](https://www.institute.global/insights/geopolitics-and-security/designating-hate-new-policy-responses-stop-hate-crime) (Accessed: 25 July
32 2023).
33
34

35
36 Tufekci Z (2017) We're building a dystopia just to make people click on ads. TED, 27
37 October. Available
38 at: [https://www.ted.com/talks/zeynep_tufekci_we_re_building_a_dystopia_just_to_mak](https://www.ted.com/talks/zeynep_tufekci_we_re_building_a_dystopia_just_to_make_people_click_on_ads?language=en)
39 [e_people_click_on_ads?language=en](https://www.ted.com/talks/zeynep_tufekci_we_re_building_a_dystopia_just_to_make_people_click_on_ads?language=en) (Accessed 6 December 2022)
40
41

42
43 Tufekci, Z. (2018) 'YouTube, the great radicalizer', *The New York Times*, 10 March.
44 Available at: [https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/10/opinion/sunday/youtube-](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/10/opinion/sunday/youtube-politics-radical.html)
45 [politics-radical.html](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/10/opinion/sunday/youtube-politics-radical.html) (Accessed: 25 November 2022).
46
47

48
49 Turner-Graham, E. (2015) Subcultural style: Fashion and Britain's extreme right. In:
50 Copsey, N. and Richardson, J. E. (eds.) *Cultures of Post-War British Fascism*. London:
51 Routledge, pp. 128 – 41.
52
53

54
55 Tutters, M. and Hagen, S. (2019) '(((They))) rule: Memetic antagonism and nebulous
56 othering on 4chan', *New Media & Society*, 22(12), pp. 2218–2237.
57
58
59
60

1
2
3 US Department of Justice (2019) *Additional Charges Filed in Tree of Life Synagogue*
4 *Shooting*. Available at: <https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdpa/pr/additional-charges->
5 [filed-tree-life-synagogue-shooting-0](https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdpa/pr/additional-charges-) (Accessed: 12 July 2023).
6
7

8
9 Virchow, F. (2007) 'Performance, emotion, and ideology: On the creation of "collectives
10 of emotion" and worldview in the contemporary German far right, *Journal of*
11 *Contemporary Ethnography*, 36(2), pp. 147–164. Available
12 at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0891241606298822>.
13
14

15
16 Whittaker, J., Looney, S., Reed, A. and Votta, F. (2021) 'Recommender systems and the
17 amplification of extremist content', *Internet Policy Review*, 10(2). Available
18 at: <https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/recommender-systems-and->
19 [amplification-extremist-content](https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/recommender-systems-and-) (Accessed: 29 March 2023).
20
21

22
23 Williams, A. (2011) 'A haircut returns from the 1930s', *The New York Times*, 15
24 November. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/fashion/a-haircut->
25 [returns-from-the-1930s.html](https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/fashion/a-haircut-) (Accessed: 30 September 2022).
26
27

28
29 Woo, G. (2002) 'Quantitative terrorism risk assessment', *The Journal of Risk Finance*,
30 4(1), pp. 7–14. doi: [10.1108/eb022949](https://doi.org/10.1108/eb022949).
31
32

33
34 Wood, M.A. (2017) 'Antisocial media and algorithmic deviancy amplification: Analysing
35 the id of Facebook's technological unconscious', *Theoretical Criminology*, 21(2), pp.
36 168–185. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1362480616643382>.
37
38

39
40 Wood, M.A. (2021) 'Rethinking how technologies harm', *The British Journal of*
41 *Criminology*, 61(3), pp. 627–647. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azaa074>.
42
43

44
45 Yesilada, M. and Lewandowsky, S. (2022) 'Systematic review: YouTube
46 recommendations and problematic content', *Internet Policy Review*, 11(1), pp. 1–22.
47 Available at: <https://doi.org/10.14763/2022.1.1652>.
48
49

50
51 Younis, T. (2021) 'The psychologisation of counter-extremism: unpacking
52 PREVENT', *Race & Class*, 62(3), pp. 37–60. doi: [10.1177/0306396820951055](https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396820951055).
53
54

55
56 Zedner, L. (2021) 'Countering terrorism or criminalizing curiosity? The troubled history
57 of UK responses to right-wing and other extremism', *Common Law World Review*,
58 50(1), pp. 57–75.
59
60

1
2
3 Žižek, S. (2008) *Violence*. London: Profile Books.
4
5

6
7 Žižek, S. (2018) 'Troubles with Identity', *The Philosophical Salon*, 28 May. Available
8 at: <https://thephilosophicalsalon.com/troubles-with-identity/> (Accessed: 25 January
9 2023).
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

For Peer Review