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## Legacies of neutrality

### The propaganda battle and the Greek 'National Schism' at the local level

Georgios Giannakopoulos and Zinovia Lialiouti

The outbreak of the First World War turned Greece into one of the key hot spots of the Eastern Front. The question of neutrality became a contested concept in the Greek political debate and ruptured the country's political system. In the Council of Ministers session on 6 August 1914 the royalist Minister of Foreign Affairs, Georgios Streit, favoured a 'lasting' neutrality for Greece, while Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos opted for a 'temporary' neutrality. Venizelos believed that Greek neutrality should be terminated if Bulgaria entered the war or in the case of advantageous proposals by the Entente which would lead to the territorial expansion of the Greek state.<sup>1</sup> The seeds of a lasting division between the country's royalist camp and the anti-royalist opposition led by Venizelos had been sown. In the following days, Venizelos offered Greece's alliance to the Entente without the consensus of the King or the country's Foreign Minister. But the offer was rejected. At the time the Entente favoured Greek neutrality prioritizing a delicate balance with Bulgaria and Romania in the Balkan front.<sup>2</sup>

In the early stages of the conflict the Greek press praised neutrality as the best available course of action. Greek newspapers regarded the conflict as a 'European War' – a conflict reserved only for the 'Great Nations'.<sup>3</sup> A section of the press argued that neutrality as a concept and a political goal was multilayered and should be perceived through the prism of Greece's national interests and territorial aspirations. This line of reasoning also reveals how parts of the Greek elite understood the country's relationship to the so-called 'great powers', namely Great Britain, France and the German Empire. For instance, the Venizelist newspaper *Patris* [translating as 'Homeland'] associated Greek neutrality with the actions of Greece's neighbours, while also warning that the 'claims of third parties' – implying the Central Powers – on a lasting neutrality for Greece should not 'transcend the boundaries of reason and justice'. The papers' editorial offered a lengthy account of the transformation of the concept of neutrality after the outbreak of war. According to *Patris*, neutrality was no longer 'a holy and inviolable condition'; as the conflict transformed into a 'general war', lasting neutrality seemed utopian. *Patris* concluded that 'it would be absurd and unfair if any claim from

any of the belligerent nations asked Greece to suffer damage related to her interests, just because it is in their interests to demand Greece remains neutral as if she were a Hestia Virgin.<sup>4</sup>

The debate on neutrality was also interwoven with cultural predispositions and representations of the great powers and their imagined or perceived historical links to Greece. In this respect, the idea of neutrality comprised a rather complex web of ideological and cultural features. In August 1914, the royalist newspaper *Scrip* argued that although the forces of the Entente pursued a just cause, the war was 'a punishment for the mighty European nations' caused by their indifference to the sufferings of the Christian nations in the Orient. *Scrip* also emphasized the German emperor's family ties to Greek King Constantine and expressed the 'gratitude' of the Greek nation for the Kaiser's protective stance towards Greece. The newspaper concluded that 'small Greece' should not 'violate' its 'reasoned equality' towards the fighting 'colossi'.<sup>5</sup>

The banner of neutrality held together different and contradictory visions of Greece's place in a world immersed into conflict. And as the hopes for a short war started fading by 1915, the Allied attempt to lure Greece into the Entente in exchange for territorial concessions instilled in the country a long-lasting political divide. The rupture brought the country to the brink of civil war and gave rise to two rival camps, the Venizelist (liberal) and the so-called anti-Venizelist, royalist camp.<sup>6</sup> The two faces of the division were the King and liberal Prime Minister Venizelos. The royalist camp sought to maintain a pro-German neutrality, a policy option that after Bulgaria's entry to the war in 1915 became even more unattainable.<sup>7</sup> The situation was further complicated by Venizelos' invitation (in September 1915) to the French and the British governments to have troops stationed in Thessaloniki as a move to strengthen Serbia's position. In the following months, the presence of Entente troops in Greece and their control over strategic infrastructure evolved into a powerful pressure mechanism against the King and triggered negative attitudes towards the Entente in Greek society; the conduct of Entente troops on Greek territory was perceived by many as undermining Greek sovereignty.<sup>8</sup>

Beyond the fractured world of Greek politics, there is evidence to suggest that the policy of neutrality retained its popularity in the eyes of the Greek public.<sup>9</sup> This is due to several factors beyond the 'Germano-philia' of a considerable section of the Greek military and political elite. Prominent among them was a widespread feeling of war fatigue as Greece had been engaged in wars in the Balkans since 1912 and a widespread feeling of puzzlement regarding the great powers involved.<sup>10</sup> In any event, the so-called 'National Schism' that emerged in 1915 over Greece's neutrality was essentially a crisis of national ideology and national integration.<sup>11</sup> It reflected a wider strategic question about Greece's role in the world which in turn connected with competing varieties of Greek nationalism and expansionist visions. The pressure and interventions from the belligerent countries touched on the issue of Greece's sovereignty and the country's subservience to its so-called Protective Powers – a vague political term that had designated Greece's relation to Great Britain and France since the emergence of an independent Greek state during the nineteenth century.<sup>12</sup>

While the 'Great War' was turning global in 1916, Greece was increasingly becoming a propaganda battleground for Britain, France and Germany.<sup>13</sup> The British

writer and intelligence officer stationed in Greece at the time, Compton Mackenzie, described the situation as one of 'armed neutrality'.<sup>14</sup> Following regional developments such as Bulgaria's military advances and Romania's entry in the war on the side of the Entente, the political ruptures in Greece crystallized into two rival state formations: a pro-Entente breakaway entity under Venizelos in northern Greece with Thessaloniki as its capital, and a pro-neutrality royalist government in Athens.<sup>15</sup> By the autumn of 1916 the deterioration of the relations between the Athens-based government and the Entente laid the ground for an Anglo-French intervention. This took the form of a military intervention in Athens followed by a naval blockade. The blockade created an acute humanitarian crisis. Although the blockade was designed to undermine popular support for the King, it reinforced sentiments of hostility towards the Entente and created fertile ground for anti-war and royalist propaganda.<sup>16</sup>

The idea of neutrality became the main question in the design of foreign competing propagandas. The means employed by Germany, France and Britain were far-reaching and controversial. For instance, in the autumn of 1916 French intelligence officers staged an attack at the French Embassy in Athens designed to appear as an act of royalist retribution.<sup>17</sup> This episode, in turn, triggered violent conflicts in the Greek capital between the Entente military forces and the Greek royalist army.<sup>18</sup> On the other hand, the German authorities lavishly funded a network of journalists and politicians coordinated by Baron Karl Freiherr von Schenck and high-rank officials in the German Embassy.<sup>19</sup> Schenck had settled in Greece under the official capacity of the representative of the Krupp firm; in essence he was in charge of German propaganda in the country. He had been most successful in the recruitment of several Athens-based and local newspapers to disseminate pro-German propaganda.<sup>20</sup>

As far as British propaganda is concerned, existing scholarship has explored the role of diplomats and prominent intellectuals, such as Joannes Gennadius and Ronald Burrows. The focus has been on the creation of a range of Anglo-Hellenic (i.e. Anglo-Greek) networks which provided political support for Venizelos and contributed to the crafting of his reputation as a leading international statesman.<sup>21</sup> Scholars have also partially examined the role of the British Archaeological School as a site for intelligence and propaganda activities in close collaboration with members of the British intelligence services.<sup>22</sup> Finally, cases of influential individuals invested in British propaganda, such as the industrialist and arms dealer Basil Zaharoff, have been brought to light.<sup>23</sup>

Despite the instructive questions that these studies raise, the full scope of British anti-German propaganda and, crucially, its day-to-day implementation has not yet been fully explored. This is attributed in part to the scarcity of records and the disorderly nature of existing archival entries. This chapter is part of a larger research project which aspires to cover a gap in the study of British First World War propaganda in Greece by exploring the mid-level of bureaucracy as well as the interaction between general propaganda themes and goals, and those which had a more general focus. It should be stressed that the regional dimensions of the propaganda battle are important when it comes to states in flux, such as Greece which involved territorial expansion in the early twentieth century. During the two Balkan wars (1912–13) Greece almost doubled its territory and increased its population by approximately 80 per cent.<sup>24</sup> The

'National Schism' further complicated the challenge of integrating heterogeneous populations into a singular state. The new cleavages that emerged in this context gave rise to a regional political divide between 'Old' and 'New Greece'. 'Old Greece' involved the regions which belonged to the Greek state before 1912 (Attica, Peloponnese, etc.) while the term 'New Greece' referred to the newly acquired territories (Macedonia, Epirus, Crete and islands in the Northern and Eastern Aegean Sea such as Lemnos, Lesvos, Thasos, Samothraki, Chios, Samos and Ikaria). Crucially, the 'Old' versus 'New Greece' divide served as an interpretive key for the shaping of British propaganda in the country.

The ensuing analysis uses the Greek city of Patras in the Peloponnese as a case study in the evolution of British propaganda, its function and working assumptions. It is argued that for sections of the Greek public the idea of neutrality challenged the main tenets of British propaganda. This prompted the British authorities to prioritize anti-German propaganda content and to differentiate regionally the British propaganda aims depending on the political and sociocultural profile of each region. Our analysis focuses on propaganda shaped by government institutions and officials. In this chapter, propaganda has been defined in line with Philip M. Taylor's definition, as 'the deliberate attempt to persuade people to think and behave in a desired way'. This conceptualization of propaganda is oriented to 'the conscious, methodical and planned decisions to employ techniques of persuasion designed to achieve specific goals that are intended to benefit those organizing the process'.<sup>25</sup>

## The 'German Enemy' and the legacy of the 'National Schism'

In June 1917, King Constantine fled from Greece to Italy and ultimately Switzerland, after submitting to an ultimatum by France and Great Britain which demanded the King's abdication as precondition for the termination of the blockade. Even though Constantine was succeeded to the throne by his second son Alexander, he never officially abdicated.<sup>26</sup> In the weeks that followed the King's forced exile from the country and Venizelos' return to the capital, the British Foreign Office opted for a 'better organization' of British propaganda across mainland and island Greece.<sup>27</sup> What becomes clear when digging into the British propaganda records is an acute sense of urgency and insecurity regarding the popularity of the Entente cause in the country. Even after the King's departure and the country's formal entry to war in the summer of 1917, British officials were worried about the reach of German propaganda. Greek society would remain throughout the war as a 'divided' nation, while the lasting economic and social crisis aggravated the situation and nurtured anti-war sentiments. The Venizelos government was unable to contain pro-German or pro-neutrality propaganda, which grew after the end of the Allied blockade.<sup>28</sup> Failure in the government's recruitment campaign and the rise of desertions in 1917 and early 1918 became a measure for the strength of pro-neutrality sentiments and of the success of anti-Venizelist and anti-Entente propaganda. In this context, the Venizelos government was forced to proclaim 'partial mobilization' in January 1918.<sup>29</sup>

Anti-Venizelist and anti-Entente propaganda was particularly strong in the region of the Peloponnese in southwestern mainland Greece. The port city of Patras was the most important commercial centre of the region. The city had significant economic ties with Germany since the mid-nineteenth century and was home to a German community. During the war British officials recast the city's German population as an 'enemy alien' community. This attitude was in line with anti-German campaigns targeted at the civilian population which had been in practice in the British state during the war and involved, among other measures, the incarceration of 'enemy aliens'.<sup>30</sup> In the case of Patras, British intelligence regarded pre-existing economic and cultural ties between Greece and the German Empire as potential security threats. Crucially, the city was believed to be a royalist stronghold and it was the hometown of Dimitrios Gounaris, leader of the anti-Venizelist camp. The presence of a sizeable group of 'Reservists' [*Epistratoi*] was also alarming. The Reservists were a royalist paramilitary group which had been formed in the summer of 1916 after the Greek government fulfilled the Entente's demand for demobilization of the Greek army.<sup>31</sup> More than 1,400 people were reported to have been present at the Reservists' inaugural meeting in Patras.<sup>32</sup> Moreover, Patras' distance from Athens rendered it a critical outpost for the dissemination of pro-German propaganda. Taking all the above into consideration, British intelligence agents in Patras were increasingly wary of the 'the quantity of false news' circulating in the city. A report stated: 'German propaganda had everything in its favour, and as a result there are hundreds of Greeks, who having been thoroughly contaminated by the pernicious activities of German propagandists are today ardent Germano-philes'.<sup>33</sup>

The perceptions of the 'German enemy' presence in Patras and in the Peloponnese area were interwoven with cultural stereotypes involving Greece as an 'incomplete state'. These stereotypes were reinforced by the implications of the 'National Schism' and the problems arising in the reconstruction of the Greek state mechanism. The following security concerns raised by British officials can also be seen under this prism. Thus, towards the end of 1917 British intelligence repeatedly criticized 'the incapacity of Police authorities' to curb German propaganda as well as the 'absence of any special legislation, in the nature of our Defence of the Realm Act, which is particularly necessary in this country'.<sup>34</sup> On the other hand, the British were satisfied by the actions of the so-called National Defence Armed Forces [*Stratevmata Ethnikis Amynis*] – voluntary military corps who were loyal to Venizelos. Nevertheless, they feared that German propaganda had taken action to target this group and undermine its loyalty. In essence, the assessment of the British intelligence agents on the ground was that '[t]he Hellenic [i.e. Greek] authorities can only act energetically if properly directed by us but left to themselves are no better than ordinary amateurs'.<sup>35</sup>

Turning to the local public sphere of Patras, an analysis of the editorials of the local press in the beginning of 1917 showcases the extent of the pro-neutrality discourse. One of the leading regional newspapers, *Neologos* [translating roughly as 'New Discourse'] covered British Prime Minister David Lloyd George's speech at the Guildhall in London on 11 January 1917,<sup>36</sup> where he had argued that Britain had secured the 'increasing trust' of the Allies and predicted victory in the following terms:

What we previously noted on the intimate mood in England [*sic*] and on her motivations in the present war, has been manifested in the most official way in the last speech delivered by her new Prime Minister. Whether in the midst of an intoxication of lyricism, which characterized that speech, or caught in his overweening arrogance, Mr. Lloyd George went as far as to state that only the star of England [*sic*] is high in the Allies' sky and that her benign friends, financially – and perhaps even morally – weakened, are no more than offshoots in the great stem that gives them life. This verifies what we had already predicted: that England [*sic*] has set out not only to ruin Germany, but also to turn her Allied into vassals.<sup>37</sup>

The coverage of US President Woodrow Wilson's speech to Congress on 22 January 1917 (The 'A World League for Peace' Speech or 'Peace without Victory' Speech)<sup>38</sup> was more positive, though regarded as 'overly optimistic'. The newspaper argued that Wilson's post-war vision was destined to fail due to the irreconcilable nature of British and German interests.<sup>39</sup> At the same time, the newspaper's front pages often featured articles emphasizing the German military achievements and innovations, while raising the question whether Britain should be still considered the only major naval power. In this context, German submarine warfare was presented as a proof of German effectiveness and decisiveness: 'Germans do not just say things. They speak with their acts.'<sup>40</sup> This stood in contrast to the anti-German propagandist framing of submarine warfare as a proof of Germany's barbarism.<sup>41</sup>

The Greek national and regional press became a key mechanism in consolidating the new lines of political division<sup>42</sup> and an important asset for the organization of foreign propaganda.<sup>43</sup> Although in principle the British were reluctant to imitate the German propaganda methods, research has shown that in the Greek case – as well as in other neutral countries – British propaganda decided to subsidize Greek newspapers for the dissemination of its arguments.<sup>44</sup> In parallel, the extent of German cultural influence was a principal area of concern for British intelligence. This question prompted more ambitious and long-term plans to gradually substitute propaganda activities with a comprehensive cultural diplomacy effort that would serve Britain's commercial and economic aspirations in south-eastern Europe.<sup>45</sup> However, during the war the priority lay with countering German cultural influence, especially when the latter was associated with pro-German propaganda.

In the case of the Peloponnese, apart from the existing German communities in the area, the British were concerned about the 'excess of liberty' given to German, Austrian and Ottoman prisoners of war. This created a situation, the British intelligence officers noted, where 'the better educated amongst these prisoners have been giving lessons to many Greeks, and indoctrinating them no doubt, with the "Kultur" theories of their Fatherland'.<sup>46</sup> From the British perspective, the solution to this problem would be the Greek authorities to hand the prisoners over to the French or the British themselves or to have them deported to an island 'away from the district which they have thoroughly contaminated'.<sup>47</sup> It is worth commenting on the discourse employed by British officials in relation to German cultural influence; the metaphor of an infectious disease underlies the argumentation.

The case of Patras serves to illustrate the role of British consulates as propaganda agents in their interaction with the local press and networks of individuals. British consulates were nodes for counterintelligence and propaganda activities in neutral countries – and Greece was no exception in this respect.<sup>48</sup> Key in this process was the identification of selected individuals as propaganda agents of the enemy and undermining their activities. In Patras, the British Consulate had a particularly active role in this respect. In March 1916, two Germans had been arrested by Entente soldiers on the accusation of espionage. In 1917, as the country shifted from neutral to belligerent, consular authorities repeatedly raised the issue of pro-German propaganda activities by foreign and Greek citizens in Patras. Their suspicions revolved mainly around people with ties to the consulates of neutral countries and were either Germans or originating from friendly countries to the German Empire, such as Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria or the Ottoman Empire.

A number of cases are worth mentioning in detail. Firstly, Herman Stoltenhoff, Vice-Consul of Norway, but of German origin, was among many Germans and Austrians who avoided expulsion by obtaining Greek citizenship. Nevertheless, according to British intelligence reports in July 1917, he was regarded as the ‘most dangerous man’ in Patras and the ‘centre of the German propagandist movement’. He was affiliated with the Stoltenhoff and Lucas Company, a firm placed on the Statutory Black List, and was believed to be gathering intelligence on the French fleet sailing in the Greek seas and to having developed ‘some means of communicating with enemy submarines’.<sup>49</sup> Emma Müller, daughter of the consul of Switzerland, and also of German origin, was similarly described as a ‘most dangerous and unscrupulous individual’. The British were alarmed by her purported capability to conduct anti-Entente and pro-German propaganda among the upper social strata of Patras.<sup>50</sup> The British Consul’s character analysis of Müller is an instructive case study of how nationality, class and gender can be mobilized to construct an enemy:

Being a clever and attractive young woman and constantly seen in the company of the Prefect and the General in Command, these rumours (spread by Emma Müller) carry a considerable weight. I think that some action should be taken in this matter, as many of the upper circles in Patras have Royalist sympathies and are carrying an active propaganda of which Miss Emma Müller is one of the principal agitators.<sup>51</sup>

Another group of individuals that raised British eyebrows were local Greek commentators or traders with pro-German commercial interests. Such was the case of Aristides Stavropoulos, a naval agent and editor of the local newspaper *Ethniki* [‘National’]. Stavropoulos was described as one of the worst enemies – a ‘German spy’. The author of the intelligence report expressed the wish that Stavropoulos together with other anti-Venizelist agitators ought to be ‘hanged as they are no Greek but pure Germans’.<sup>52</sup>

A final case worth highlighting is that of George Diamantopoulos, which showcases the lack of British trust in the Greek security mechanisms. Diamantopoulos had been employed as secretary and translator at the Austrian Consulate in Patras and was

believed to be a high-ranking member of the Austro-German propaganda network. Even more, Diamantopoulos was, according to British intelligence, a leading member of the 'Reservists' movement and he was able to provide significant financial support to them. Following Venizelos' return to political power in Athens (in June 1917), Diamantopoulos had been exiled. However, following the intervention of 'influential political friends' he was set free and returned to Patras a few months later. British intelligence was convinced that Diamantopoulos returned to 'work in favour of his former protectors' and that he had significant economic resources at his disposal drawing from his affiliation with the insurance company Reunione Adriatica of Trieste. This prompted the British intelligence officers to attempt tracing the flow of money between Reunione Adriatica and other companies of German or Austrian ownership.<sup>53</sup> They appeared confident that the 'funds accumulated' by Reunione Adriatica and two Austrian insurance companies 'have been used for pro-German and reactionary propaganda'.<sup>54</sup>

The extent of British propaganda in Patras is not only reducible from intelligence reports. Since the autumn of 1917 British officials were actively promoting cinematographic propaganda across the Greek territory. Local conditions were an important factor in this endeavour as available facilities, resources, distribution system and audience size varied greatly between the capital and other regions. Patras had two active cinema theatres and the British Consul, C. B. Wood, ensured the screening of pro-Entente propaganda films. Wood was quick to realize that the initial plan to have the films rented directly to the cinema owners at a fixed price imposed on the latter undue burdens. Instead, he argued that the British Legation should use central distributing agencies in Athens who would in turn make the necessary arrangements for the distribution of films in other regions at much lower cost.<sup>55</sup>

As far as the geographical distribution of film propaganda is concerned, setting apart the capital area – which was of obvious importance – Patras was prioritized alongside with Ioannina (Epirus), Volos and Larissa (Thessaly), as target regions based on the 'old' versus 'new Greece' divide. British officials felt that 'old Greece, and more especially the Peloponnese has more need for propaganda'.<sup>56</sup> Even though some economic turnover was considered desirable, British officials were willing to accept that the distribution of propaganda films in certain parts of Greece would necessarily have to be cost-free. Among the factors that had to be accounted for, British officials included 'competition from French and Italian propaganda' who distributed propaganda war films entirely without fee.<sup>57</sup> The consuls were encouraged to secure the following ratio as a fee for the films distributed: 2.5 cents per metre for Larissa, 4 cents for Patras, 3 cents for Ioannina and gratis for Volos. By comparison, it is worth mentioning that the ratio for the Athens cinema was fixed at sixty cents per metre.<sup>58</sup> The variation in the fee charges can be seen as an index for the different prospects for the promotion of British film propaganda between the capital area and the periphery.

The British Consulate managed to have two British propaganda films displayed in Patras in January 1918, the *Battle of Peronne* and the *Capture of Messines*.<sup>59</sup> Although the Vice-Consul reported that the films had a 'very good reception', he suggested that future films selected for distribution 'should be of more interest to the Greeks' and suggested the 'taking of prisoners' and 'movements of naval life' as possible themes. The

turnover from the exhibition of these films was meagre: 29.40 drachmas in contrast to the 1,320 drachmas that was the turnover from their exhibition in Athens. Following their exhibition in Patras, the consulate was to distribute the propaganda films in Corfu.<sup>60</sup> Moreover, the Consulate exploited the competition between the city's two theatre cinemas as one of them changed ownership status in 1918 and was controlled by Pathé Brothers. The Consulate supplied film material without charge to the *Idéal Pathé* cinema and the latter organized a lavish 'soirée de gala' for Greek and Allied officials in February 1918. This special event featured the French 1916 melodrama *Mme Tallien*, the propaganda films *The British Tanks in Action* and *Mr Venizelos' Reception* in Paris as well as a concert by the city's military band.<sup>61</sup>

In the following weeks, the British Consulate arranged for the exhibition of the films *Sons of the Empire* and *German Prisoners at Dorchester*.<sup>62</sup> According to British perceptions, these films were more appealing to audiences than the previous ones. The *German Prisoners*, in particular, was thought to be an 'interesting clear film proving good treatment of prisoners.'<sup>63</sup> The exhibition, however, proved somewhat controversial. Both the British Consulate and the French intelligence officers found particularly disturbing the negative comments made by the Prefect of Patras on the *German Prisoners* film. The Prefect expressed the view that it was 'bad taste to exhibit so many German prisoners' and he argued that 'there were many people in Patras who objected to this exhibition.' The report also noted that the Prefect was in the company of Emma Müller at the film exhibition.<sup>64</sup> The last propaganda films received by the British Consulate were the *Battle of Arras*, *Drifters*, *British Facts* and *German Fiction* in June 1918, but they were unable to be exhibited as there were no open-air cinema facilities in the city, and the indoor cinemas were unsuitable in the hot Greek summer.<sup>65</sup>

## Conclusion

The study of the regional evolution of propaganda in Patras sheds light on a persistent inconsistency regarding the overall aims of British wartime propaganda. The general direction of British propaganda in neutral countries during the First World War rested on the existence of unified national identities. The task that laid upon the British was to manipulate those identities by either inciting support and mobilization for the Entente by fostering positive self-images or to provoking negative reactions against the perceived enemy by employing negative cultural stereotypes. However, this model did not work in a deeply divided country like Greece where regional and ideological identities were in competition with the state-sponsored national ideology. This feature made the shaping and implementation of foreign propaganda in Greece a particularly challenging enterprise.

By bringing to light new archival material, the chapter has offered an overview of British anti-German activities in Greece while the First World War reached its most dramatic moment. It has shown how the idea of neutrality and the responses to it not only cast a long shadow on Greece's politics but also shaped the efforts of foreign propaganda in the country. Despite the existence of overarching studies of Allied and 'enemy' propaganda, the regional dimension of propaganda activities remains

relatively understudied. To address this gap, this chapter discussed intelligence reports and consular correspondence from one of the important regional sites of propaganda – the port city of Patras in southern Greece.

When the news of the Allied victory reached Greece, the reaction did not mirror the unperturbed enthusiasm witnessed across the Allied countries. Foreign observers remarked that no popular celebrations took place in ‘Old Greece’; ‘general apathy’ seemed to be the prevailing mood.<sup>66</sup> For all the success of the Allies in pushing Greece from neutrality to active participation in the war, Allied and British propaganda was not able to win the hearts and minds of the peoples of a divided and heterogeneous state like Greece. The case study presented here highlights the legacy of neutrality; the latter was inextricably linked to the ideological cleavage produced by the ‘National Schism’ and to the formulation of Greek national identity in the context of the anti-Venizelist, royalist camp. British propaganda proved unable to contain the widespread pro-neutrality sentiments in the country. It nonetheless succeeded in amplifying the beliefs of the Venizelist, pro-Entente group. Thus, British propagandists were mistaken in arguing that it is ‘not of much propagandist value to show films to those already friendly, except as a means of drawing others, the point being to get at waverers, neutrals and actual enemies.’<sup>67</sup> As scholarship in propaganda and communication research has shown since the early 1950s, a principal function of propaganda is not to alter opinions, attitudes or behaviours, but to reinforce pre-existing trends by providing people with information and narratives to sustain their existing ideas.<sup>68</sup>

## Notes

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- 1 George B. Leon, *Greece and the Great Powers 1914–1917* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1974), 32.
- 2 *Ibid.*, 35–8.
- 3 *Anagennisis* [translating as ‘Rebirth’], 25 June 1916, 1 [8 July on the Gregorian calendar hereafter ‘GC’. Greece used the Julian calendar until 1923].
- 4 *Patris*, 22 July 1914, 1 [4 August GC]. Translation from the Greek here and for later quotations by the authors.
- 5 *Scrip*, 2 August 1914, 1 [15 August GC]. The newspaper name ‘Scrip’ was short for ‘subscription’ and it was meant as a sarcastic reference to much despised – in Greece – public loan of 1893.
- 6 Leon, *Greece and the Great Powers 1914–1917*, 98–132.
- 7 Georgios Mavrogordatos, 1915. *O Ethnikos Dichasmos* (Athens: Patakis, 2015); Sotiris Rizas, *Venizelismos ke antivenizelimos* (Athens: Psychogios, 2019).
- 8 Mavrogordatos, 1915. *O Ethnikos Dichasmos*, 62–4.
- 9 Leon, *Greece and the Great Powers 1914–1917*; Rizas, *Venizelismos ke antivenizelimos*.
- 10 Rizas, *Venizelismos ke antivenizelimos*, 54–5.
- 11 Mavrogordatos, 1915. *O Ethnikos Dichasmos*, 189–233.

- 12 Katerina Gardika, *Prostasia kai eggisyseis: Stadia kai mythoi tes hellenikes ethnikes olokleroses (1821–1920)* (Thessaloniki: Vanias, 1999).
- 13 Elli Lemonidou, 'Propaganda and Mobilizations in Greece during the First World War', in *Propaganda and the First World War*, ed. Troy Paddock (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 273–91.
- 14 Compton Mackenzie, *Greek Memories* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1939), xxii.
- 15 Leon, *Greece and the Great Powers 1914–1917*, 384–437.
- 16 Mavrogordatos, 1915. *O Ethnikos Dichasmos*, 103–7; Georgios B. Leontaritis, *He Ellada ston A Pagkosmio Polemo 1917–1918* (Athens: National Bank of Greece Cultural Foundation, 2005), 172–6.
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