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Protest as a relational field: An analysis of brokerage positions within and across contentious episodes and the individuals occupying them

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ABSTRACT

This paper analyses participation in multiple protest episodes to explore the potential for people to broker relations between same-issue and different-issue episodes. Through an analysis of original survey data from six European countries, we map two-mode networks of individuals and protest episodes in each country to identify protesters in two brokerage positions: coordinators that can broker relations *via* same-issue contentious episodes and boundary spanners, that can broker relations *via* different-issue episodes. Combining network and regression analysis, we identify the individuals occupying such positions and characterize their protest participation. We find that embeddedness in different types of activist networks is the most important predictor of brokerage positions. However, the two brokerage positions are associated with different types of embeddedness. By fleshing out the importance of individuals in shaping contentious fields, we offer a unique insight into protest networks, thus advancing the sociological understanding of collective action with an innovative mixed-methods design.

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Introduction

When former deputy leader of the left party “die Linke” Sarah Wagenknecht and renowned feminist Alice Schwarzer organized the “uprising for peace” (Aufstand für Frieden) demonstration in Berlin in February 2023, they attracted a crowd of more than 13,000 protesters, even by conservative counts. While this might not be remarkable in and of itself, the diversity of protesters was: supporters of the Left party joined ranks with far-right AfD politicians, feminists protested alongside Russia-supporters, and the white dove of peace could be seen next to Ukrainian flags. This experience of group identity and the exchange of opinions and tactics through joint protest participation may well lay the foundation for new alliances in civil society. Some of those who shouted for peace together in the sleet of a winter day might go on to act as brokers connecting old and new social circles.

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The purpose of this vignette is to exemplify the core theoretical interest of our paper in the potential of individuals to broker new alliances through their participation in different protest events. Traditionally, social movement scholarship has foregrounded the role that organizations play as movement brokers; the realization that individuals may play a similar yet less well-understood part is a more recent one (Crossley and Diani 2018; Knoke et al. 2021). However, individuals, by virtue of their repeated engagement in contentious collective action, “reinforce specific value systems or collective identifications” (Knoke et al. 2021:135). Their agency in forming “protest communities” that become the organizational fabric of a collective action field (Diani 2009) must therefore not be neglected. In that vein, Knoke and colleagues argue that individuals “create links between the events in which they participate [...], thus weaving them into broader action campaigns and ultimately in large-scale social movements” (Knoke et al. 2021:135). Hence, social movement scholars attribute not only movement-building but also the generation of lasting social capital to the shared experience of protest participation, as “involvement in collective action creates new solidarities which often persist even when protest activities fade away” (Diani 1997:135). As these authors identify individual agency beyond organizational attachment to be associated with protest choices, understanding protesters’ individual traits in relation to their specific positions within collective action fields becomes a crucial exigency for movement scholarship.

In other words, to return to our example above, the question of whether a peace protest might or might not become aligned with a far-right movement crucially depends on the individuals attending and hence connecting multiple protest events. To better understand these processes and phenomena hence requires an integration of relational (focussed on the interactions and connections of individuals, events, or organizations) and aggregational (focussed on properties thereof) approaches (Diani 2015), to learn who the people are that link multiple events in different ways, and hence shape relational fields through contentious interactions. These insights motivate us to plug this knowledge gap by asking whether

RQ1a. We can identify individuals in brokerage positions that can connect networks of protesters and protest episodes;

RQ1b. How prevalent distinct brokerage positions are;

RQ2. How these positions shape networks in relational fields;

RQ3a. What distinguishes protesters who occupy brokerage positions from other protesters;

RQ3b. And, likewise, what sets occupants of different brokerage positions apart?

To explicate the reasoning behind our research questions, we first lay out the theoretical groundwork for our analysis, rooted in field, social network, and social movement theory. On this basis, we discuss how individual participation in multiple protest events, within and across issue boundaries, translates into the distinct brokerage positions of coordinator and boundary spanner (Gould and Fernandez 1989; Jasny and Lubell 2015) whose occupants we then examine with original cross-national survey data on protest participation in Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Romania and the UK.

First, we use field theory to argue that alongside organizations, individuals and various activities in which they participate—such as protest events, in the case of social movements—are instrumental to the formation of relations that make up a field (Zietsma et al. 2017; Diani and Pilati 2011). Second, to probe this relational process, we turn to social network analysis and introduce the concept of brokerage as the capacity to connect actors who would be unable to associate without the intermediary position of a broker (Gould and Fernandez 1989). In this vein, we refer to individuals who participate in multiple protest episodes as occupying brokerage positions. As these protesters connect distinct instances of mobilization, they have the capacity - through their participation patterns - to broker connections to other individuals who are connected to either mobilization (Knoke et al. 2021). The idea that structural positions are defined by an actor's constellation of relationships and that different positions afford their holders more or less capacity to wield influence is a core tenet of relational approaches to social movement studies which investigate “the preconditions of success, i.e. the structural position occupied by movement actors” (Diani 1997: 135). How people act on the opportunity that is afforded by this position is a question that flows from this analysis and needs to be addressed in future research.

Third, informed by this theory, we examine the prevalence of individual brokerage positions in two-mode networks of protesters and protest events, also by means of network analysis. We further differentiate brokerage *via* aggregating protest events to contentious episodes that are similar or heterogeneous with respect to policy issues, thus distinguishing *coordinator* from *boundary spanner* brokerage positions. We then consider the significance of brokerage for the collective action fields we observed, by illustrating how brokers connect contentious episodes, linking them into a relational field that straddles multiple policy issues. Fourth, in line with our aim to understand who individuals in brokerage positions are, we draw on the literature on protest participation (Klandermans and Oegema 1987; McAdam 1986; Beyerlein and Hipp 2006; Corrigan-Brown 2012; Boulianne, Koc-Michalska, and Bimber 2020; Valenzuela 2013) to contrast protesters in brokerage positions with other protesters. We examine a set of individual-level variables associated with protest participation in a series of binary logistic regression analyses and explore which of these independent variables help distinguish the boundary spanner from the coordinator brokerage position. We conclude with a theoretical discussion of these findings and the implications for brokerage in the analysis of relations between organizations, events and individuals.

Theoretical framework

Relational fields

To begin with, we locate individual participation in protest events within the broader framework of field theory. We do so to emphasize that individuals can act as pivotal agents connecting various entities—organizations, activist groups, and other individuals—from different corners of a relational field. Given the wide use of the concept, however, we should first note that field theory spans multiple areas and levels of enquiry (Zietsma et al. 2017), while the use of network analysis to illuminate fields has been decried as by and large a descriptive “technique for modelling various aspects of the

relationships between actors within a field” and as such one that is unable to capture “dynamics that shape fields” (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 29).

Indeed, field theory has been prominently deployed at higher levels of abstraction, in the sociological analysis of Pierre Bourdieu. The French scholar conceived of fields as “sites of struggle” wherein actors are defined by asymmetries of power and capital over which they compete (Crossley 2003:44). In this interpretation, a field is a space of positions (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) and the analytical focus rests on *objective relations* among field positions as determined by accumulations of power and capital. Conversely, it has been argued that the study of such objective relations produces maps of static positions and in that way fails to account for interactions among actors that are generative of the culture and networks that come to define a field (Bottero and Crossley 2011). Social network analysis, however, lends itself precisely to studying differential association—the process of developing and maintaining social ties with others who are “socially similar”—and is therefore revealing of interactions that generate “distinctive milieux (social worlds or fields)” (Bottero and Crossley 2011:102). This perspective is a departure from the organizational study of relational fields that regards organizations as the lynchpins of institutional fields, scrutinizing social relations among actors as a reflection of their objective positions (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992); or which considers them as dynamic but inscrutable to network analysis because of its limited capacity to explain the strategic action by actors that produces observed network effects (Fligstein and McAdam 2012).

By contrast, the approach we adopt in this article is predicated on the idea that fields emerge through interactions around a core issue, are a site for negotiations among opposing actors with competing interests and are transformed by “triggering events” (Hoffman 1999:351). In this outlook, individuals are not simply members of organizations that embed them in a shared culture. They are also agents who can actively establish “connections between different organizations, facilitating the circulation of information and the creation of shared understandings of reality and shared identities” (Crossley and Diani 2018:158). Fields are thus “sets of actors characterized by high relational density and actors’ reciprocal recognition” (Diani and Pilati 2011:265), where relations between a variety of actors become the very fabric of fields while field membership relies on mutual acceptance.

A range of activities including protest events are fertile ground for individuals to form links, nurture cultural affinities, and build solidarity that connects actors in a field—including organizations (Diani 2009). Protests can thus act as “critical junctures” (della Porta 2020) or “triggering events” that may “cause a reconfiguration of field membership and/or interaction patterns” (Hoffman 1999:351). Below, we propose that the seminal nexus for fields, between events and social links, is in fact observable—including at the level of strategic action—with a combination of network and statistical analyses.

Protest events and contentious episodes

Protest events can offer the “possibility of transformation not only in the social and political contexts in which movements take shape but also in the very means by which activists express their grievances and even in the content of their grievances” (Wang,

Piazza, and Soule 2018:168). The term—protest event—is used synoptically, in social movement studies, to capture a contentious action repertoire ranging from petitions to public demonstrations (Hutter 2014). Gathering at a protest event and sharing the experience of social struggle can be a formative experience as protests are venues for interaction among different groups and individuals, with various expertise, resources, beliefs and tactics. Protests offer an opportunity to exchange and develop arguments on the nature of a grievance and policy solutions, forge bonds of solidarity and firm up collective identity, exchange tactical repertoires of action, and thus increase individuals’ “political skills” (Knoke et al. 2021). Such processes of growth and enrichment rely on brokering that happens through interpersonal exchange by “individuals who inhabit brokerage roles between SMOs” (Social Movement Organizations, Wang, Piazza, and Soule 2018:174).

Single protest events can sometimes be amalgamated into contentious episodes (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001) if they are one of several related interactions between challengers, governments, and third parties that involve collective coordinated action and claim-making (Tilly and Tarrow 2007). Thus, such episodes—as a “stream of contention”—allow one to examine public participation over several instances of collective action; to contrast “routine social life” with “contention-connected social interaction” that may help to contextualize and elucidate the former (Tilly 2008:9). For example, a vast array of singular events has been staged under the banner “Fridays for Future”, united by similarity in their claims, the choice of action repertoire, and—in some instances—the individuals partaking in them (Schürmann 2024). In our analysis below, we investigate individual participation in several such contentious episodes and scrutinize individuals’ network brokerage positions that hold the capacity to *coordinate* between episodes related to similar issues, or to *span issue boundaries* separating contentious episodes in a collective action field.

Social movement brokers

An emphasis on SMOs and a focus on interorganisational exchange by social movement scholarship (Diani 2015) has rendered individual agency an often-overlooked empirical element of collective action networks (Knoke et al. 2021). As such, the focus on organizations in the brokerage literature has produced a research gap that we address in this paper. Actors who engage in protest activities on multiple issues, on several occasions—in the course of contentious episodes—can both generate social capital and activate that capital to mobilize others to partake in the risky activity of protest, on other occasions. In this way, actors connect different protest events, “thus weaving them into broader action campaigns and ultimately in large-scale social movements” (Knoke et al. 2021; cf. Diani 2015). Such actors are brokers whose social capital stems from a powerful structural position that affords them the capacity to serve as an intermediary between otherwise unconnected actors (Diani 1997; Becker and Bodin 2022; Burt 1995; Tindall 2015).

In social network analysis, brokers are credited with the ability to create and use social capital that helps bridge structural holes (Burt 1995, 2005). Brokers’ “most crucial property lies in their capacity to connect actors who are not communicating because of some specific political or social barrier” (Diani 2003:107). Occupying such a position

puts one at a competitive advantage over those who may be densely connected to a group of peers, yet unable to reach out to other subgroups in a network. Brokers can thus play an instrumental role in overcoming barriers between organizations or individuals—a crucial process in the formation of coordination and mobilization networks seeking to bring about social change (Diani 2015). Social movement scholarship has used co-participation in protest events to define brokers (Platek 2024), highlighting that relational perspectives illustrate how actors are “interdependent, rather than independent” (Pirro et al. 2021:25).

Brokers are especially important when it comes to attracting new protesters or organizational members as they possess the “bridging capital” to transfer innovation (Berardo 2014) and hold the social ties through which “individuals learn about movement events and issues” (Tindall 2015:256). Research on policy networks further elucidates that engaging in collective action outside one’s core interests requires trust and reputation. These are two elements of social capital, which potential brokers possess, but need to accumulate at the cost of engaging with multiple issues themselves (Brandenberger et al. 2022).

Ultimately, the interplay between individuals, organizations, and events that we consider in this article invites researchers to overcome a reductionist interest in any single one of these categories, and, instead, to approach the topic from a multimodal perspective. From this vantage point, brokerage also needs to be placed in a multimodal setting, in which connections exist between two (or more) different sets of nodes, as Jasny and Lubell note:

“The underlying theoretical perspective, that brokers receive some type of benefits from their position in the network, still applies in a two-mode network. Potential benefits include access to resources, reinforcement of reputation, learning new information, and controlling information flow between groups” (Jasny and Lubell 2015:38).

Two-mode brokerage

Both conceptually and methodologically, two-mode brokerage takes up the triangular approach to defining different brokerage roles developed by Gould and Fernandez (1989), wherein a second set of nodes—e.g. events—occupies the intermediary position in a brokerage chain between individuals (Jasny and Lubell 2015). Based on this formalization of brokerage positions, these authors advise conceptualizing, on the hand, *coordinators*—i.e. brokers facilitating connections between protesters attending more protest events associated with contentious episodes that relate to a similar issue – e.g. two environmental contentious episodes. These invest a different amount and quality of social capital in their brokerage activity than *boundary-spanners*, on the other hand, whose successful brokerage depends on their capacity to convince other actors to cross a boundary—e.g. through protesting on two discrete issues like immigration and environment. In light of these considerations, we begin our inquiry by asking whether we can identify individuals’ brokerage positions in two-mode networks of individuals and protest episodes (**RQ1a**) and how prevalent brokerage positions are (**RQ1b**). In turn, we enquire how these positions shape networks in relational fields (**RQ2**) by discussing two-mode networks of individuals and protest episodes. It is important to emphasize that the positional analysis in this article investigates a potential that individuals

occupying brokerage positions have – one that places them in a position of power over others. If and how they make use of the strategic advantage derived from these privileged positions is a question beyond the capabilities and scope of this study. We present our operationalization of brokerage positions in the following section.

Next, to develop an understanding of whether and how the individuals who occupy distinct brokerage positions differ from other protesters, we reprise the literature explicating protest participation. Pertinently, it proposes that protest goers are embedded in networks of social relations—with individuals or organizations, such as by virtue of their membership—that can incentivize their participation (e.g. with social or material incentives, Klandermans and Oegema 1987; McAdam 1986). In the contemporary media environment, such network embeddedness can be visible on social media (Uldam 2018). While protest participation was shown to be associated with retrieving political information online, it was likewise related to expressing one's views online (Valenzuela 2013). More specifically, protest participants were especially likely to post messages about protest events on social media (Boulianne, Koc-Michalska, and Bimber 2020).

Equally, protest participants were likely to exhibit political interest (Giugni and Grasso 2019) and social trust (Bernhagen and Marsh 2007) as well as biographical availability (Corrigall-Brown 2012). In particular, protest participants were described by Corrigall-Brown (2012) as more likely to be single than in a relationship. At the same time, while caring duties (e.g. child-rearing or looking after elderly relatives) and employment status were more likely to inhibit the willingness to participate than actual participation (Beyerlein and Hipp 2006), we explore whether these indicators of biographical availability can help distinguish potential brokers from protesters. Ideologically, finally, the latter were shown as more likely to be left-leaning in Western Europe and more right-wing in Eastern Europe (Bernhagen and Marsh 2007).

Notably, these accounts of participation have largely overlooked the role of brokerage in protests. The exceptions, to our knowledge, have relied on single-case ethnographic research (Bräuchler 2019; Lockwood 2022). Our aim, therefore, is to advance this scholarship by investigating what distinguishes protesters who occupy brokerage positions from other protesters who do not hold that role (**RQ3a**). Following on, we investigate what sets apart the two different brokerage positions of coordinator and boundary spanner (**RQ3b**). We use binary logistic regressions to inquire what sets demonstrators who occupy brokerage positions apart from their fellow protest-goers, and what delineates those individuals who connect protest episodes around similar issues from those who connect protest episodes around more heterogeneous topics.

Data and methods

To explore how different protest episodes are connected through joint participation in them, we employ nationally representative survey data from Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Romania, and the United Kingdom. We selected country cases following the diverse case selection method (Seawright and Gerring 2008:297). Beyond the geographical diversity, our country cases encapsulate a variety of policy issues as well as

substantial ideological differences within similar political families or with regards to government (Sitter 2002).

Together with the public opinion company YouGov, we fielded online panel surveys in each country. Further details about fieldwork, sampling and survey weights can be found in Appendix Part I. While some authors have raised concerns about the representativity of online panel surveys (Elliott and Valliant 2017; Ferri-García and Rueda 2020), others have shown that high quality pollsters using this method, such as YouGov, are able to provide an accurate picture of societal attitudes (Miratrix et al. 2018). An important reason for this difference is YouGov's "active sampling" methodology, through which they continuously adjust their sampling strategy to correct for the over/under-sampling of key social groups. Our final sample comprised 10,347 respondents (1001 in Denmark, 2024 in Germany, 2051 in Hungary, 2101 in Italy, 946 in Romania, and 2224 in the UK). Differences in sample sizes originate from YouGov's strategy for obtaining nationally representative samples for their online panels, in each country. Despite the variation in national sample sizes, YouGov ensured that the final samples are representative of the key demographics of the adult population of each country through post-stratification weighting.

Moreover, when setting up the survey, we used an English-language master copy of the questionnaire that YouGov then translated into the relevant languages using its in-house team. The translations were later revised by native speakers with academic and social scientific backgrounds, to be fully confident that questions and response items were as similar as possible across countries. This approach enabled the research team to integrate the national data seamlessly into the analysis and to maintain the quality of the research instrument used in all of the countries. For the formal education and income variables, we standardized them prior to merging the data, so that they represent similar categories across country contexts (i.e. low, medium and high formal education, and respondents' equivalent income percentile).

As part of the survey, we asked respondents about their participation in a number of different contentious episodes (see description of variables in Appendix Part IV). Together with experts for each country case, we selected the most prominent protest episodes in each country between 2015 and 2021 and asked respondents the following question: "Let us think back to the period between 2015 and 2021. Did you participate in any of the following demonstrations?" Respondents were able to select one answer among the following: "Yes, more than once"; "Yes, once"; "I did not participate in its street protests but I supported the demonstration online"; "I did not participate in the demonstration but I agree with the ideas it defended"; "No, never"; "Never heard of this protest"; "I don't know".

While it is important to note that protest episodes differ in length and are unequally distributed over time, we observed that individuals' choices for participation were not systematically biased by these factors¹. These behavioral choices around (non)participation, over a range of prominent protest episodes, accumulate into distinct participation patterns. We probed these patterns with a multifaceted analytical lens, which allows for both a relational perspective that investigates how fields are shaped by individual actions; and an aggregative perspective that investigates the commonalities and distinctions among individuals who occupy different positions in a network.

To qualify the brokerage positions of *coordinator* and *boundary spanner*, we developed a categorization of protest episodes by policy issue. The issue categories and the contentious episodes they comprise, in each country, as well as our reasoning for the classification is provided in Appendix Part II. This abstraction facilitates two important tasks. On the one hand, it allows us to identify within-country relations among protesters and policy issues beyond individual protests. On the other hand, it provides an opportunity to inductively build cross-country generalizations about the complex issue preferences of protest participants. In this way, we are able to identify unexpected choices of concomitant participation in support of policies that would, a priori, not be part of coherent pre-defined ideological divisions.

Finally, in addition to data about respondents' protest participation, we use a set of other variables to explore how individuals' demographic characteristics, socio-political attitudes, and embeddedness in different types of networks correlate with occupying a brokerage position. First, regarding socio-demographics, we include information about characteristics that previous scholarship has highlighted as correlating to protest behavior, such as age (Dalton 2017), gender (Grasso and Smith 2022), level of formal education (Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996), and income (Verba, Lehman Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Additionally, we include data on whether respondents care for a dependent member of their family (children or elderly people), their marital status and the number of hours they work to account for "biographical availability" (Beyerlein and Hipp 2006; McAdam 1986), as we expect that personal commitments to which people need to dedicate time beyond their involvement in activism will have an effect on their capacity to participate in more than one protest. Second, in relation to respondents' socio-political attitudes, we explore the impact of variables scholars have shown to be good predictors of protest participation such as political interest (Schussman and Soule 2005), social trust (Hooghe and Marien 2013), and ideology (Borbáth and Gessler 2020), which we measure both in relation to respondents' cultural liberalism as well as their left-right self-placement. Third, to explore how embeddedness into different types of networks relates to brokerage positions, we account for whether individuals are members of a civil society organization, have friends who participate in protests or are part of activist organizations, as well as whether they contribute to activist debates online by having written on the Internet about protests. Fourth, we also control for country differences.

At this point, it should be noted that while our different methods imply distinct assumptions about the (inter-)dependence of observations, we apply them to different analytical levels. First, we used network analyses to identify positions in bipartite networks of episodes and individuals. In these analyses, we do not make any a priori assumptions about the independence or interdependence of observations. Rather, the connections among protest episodes are a finding of our analysis. Second, we use logistic regression analyses to study individual characteristics of protest participants and of brokers, more specifically. The inferential statistical techniques we use assume independence across observations, which the random sampling strategy used in all our surveys ensures. Having clarified these methodological aspects, we detail our operationalization of brokerage positions.

Operationalization of brokerage positions

Our operationalization of brokerage positions in two-mode protest networks is based on a social network analysis of individuals' self-reported participation in protest events subsumed to contentious episodes. We conceive of potential brokers as individuals who attend protest events in different contentious episodes, who thus gain the opportunity to interact with individuals mobilized in each episode. This definition does not negate the distinction between forms of brokerage that span boundaries (be it of place, time, identity, tactics, issues) and those that facilitate the coordination of connections within the confines of a boundary (Friedman and Podolny 1992; Gould and Fernandez 1989). In network terms, moreover, understanding each respondent as a node that can potentially be connected to any contentious episode results in a two-mode network, in which ties can only exist across, but never within the two sets of nodes, i.e. of individuals and contentious episodes. The resulting network is thus equal in size to the sum of protesters and contentious episodes in each country.

Since, by design, ties can only exist from protester to episode, we treat the network as undirected, as reciprocity is impossible and degree scores always equal indegree for episodes and outdegree for protesters. Next, we rely on the seminal formalization of brokerage positions by Gould and Fernandez (1989)—of *coordinator*, *itinerant broker*, *gatekeeper*, *representative* and *liaison*—based on triangular configurations in directed one-mode networks, to benefit from the additional information of a two-mode network. We adopt Jasny and Lubell's (2015) translation of brokerage roles into two-mode *brokerage chains* in which an individual can broker relations between two other individuals through the intermediary of a contentious episode. Given that we observe similarities and differences in the issue categorization of episodes, for protesters, our case allows us to identify *coordinator* positions, defined as adjacent to two episodes of the same issue; *boundary-spanner* positions defined as adjacent to two episodes of different issues; and *pendants* (Jasny and Lubell 2015:41), defined as adjacent to only one episode. Figure 1 illustrates the two different brokerage positions of individuals (center circle), which can broker relations to other individuals (left and right circles) via two similar-issue protest episodes (solid rectangles), or via two different-issue protest episodes (solid and shaded rectangles).

Following this characterization and identification of brokerage positions, we explore their attributes and how they differ from the rest of the protesters through logistic




Figure 1. Schematic display of two-mode brokerage chains. Top: Coordinator; bottom: Boundary spanner.

regression analyses. We make use of the individual-level survey data to characterize individuals who occupy these positions and, subsequently, to reflect on their meaning for the collective action fields we observed. The following section discusses our findings.

Results

We begin our analysis with an overview of the distribution of the number of protest episodes in which individuals in our sample have participated. [Table 1](#) displays the frequencies and proportions of individuals by the number of protest episodes they joined. We inquired about participation in nine protest episodes in Denmark, Italy, and the United Kingdom, eight in Germany and Hungary, and seven in Romania. Participation in a single protest episode is the most common category across countries, representing the majority of protesters in Denmark, Germany, Hungary, and the United Kingdom, and a plurality in Italy and Romania. It is also interesting to note that, with the exception of Denmark, in the rest of the countries at least one in five protesters joined three or more demonstrations.

Looking into the row totals, we note, in line with other studies (e.g. Borbáth and Gessler 2020), what appear to be different protest cultures across European regions. While citizens in northwestern European countries—such as Denmark and the United Kingdom—seem to be less prone to participating in protests, numbers are greater in southern European countries, such as Italy. Central European countries such as Germany and Hungary stand in the middle. Romania's large figure may seem surprising, but we relate it to the fact that, in our survey, we inquired about the #rezist protests, which represented the largest mobilization in the country's democratic history (Mercea 2022).

We next move to exploring individuals' brokerage positions with an inspection of the networks that result from participation in each country's major protest episodes. We classified the episodes as outlined above and subsequently applied measures pertaining to coordination and boundary-spanning positions. [Table 2](#) provides an overview of network properties by country. It is important to note that node and edge totals must be interpreted in light of the smaller sample sizes in Denmark and Romania (see above). Thus, the nodes (i.e. the sum of protesters and contentious episodes) in Denmark are

Table 1. Distribution of protesters by number of protest episodes individuals joined.

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	TOTAL (% of population)
Denmark	Freq.	33	14	4	0	2	0	0	1	1	55
	Percent.	60.00%	25.45%	7.27%	0.00%	3.64%	0.00%	0.00%	1.82%	1.82%	5.49%
Germany	Freq.	153	71	26	11	7	5	1	5	–	279
	Percent.	54.84%	25.45%	9.32%	3.94%	2.51%	1.79%	0.36%	1.79%	–	13.78%
Hungary	Freq.	145	47	14	19	18	8	6	3	–	260
	Percent.	55.77%	18.08%	5.38%	7.31%	6.92%	3.08%	2.31%	1.15%	–	12.68%
Italy	Freq.	192	91	51	21	15	15	4	5	7	401
	Percent.	47.88%	22.69%	12.72%	5.24%	3.74%	3.74%	1.00%	1.25%	1.75%	19.09%
Romania	Freq.	107	48	26	19	13	6	11	–	–	230
	Percent.	46.52%	20.87%	11.30%	8.26%	5.65%	2.61%	4.78%	–	–	24.31%
United Kingdom	Freq.	79	21	18	9	3	2	0	2	3	137
	Percent.	57.66%	15.33%	13.14%	6.57%	2.19%	1.46%	0.00%	1.46%	2.19%	6.16%

Table 2. Properties of two-mode networks across countries.

	DK	GER	HU	IT	RO	UK
Nodes	64	286	268	410	237	146
Edges	100	529	561	907	535	281
Density	.05	.01	.02	.01	.02	.03
Pendants N (% of all protesters)	33 (60%)	153 (55%)	145 (56%)	192 (48%)	107 (47%)	79 (58%)
Brokers N (% of all protesters)	22 (40%)	126 (45%)	115 (44%)	209 (52%)	123 (53%)	58 (42%)
• Coordinators N (%)	8 (15%)	47 (17%)	82 (32%)	64 (16%)	68 (30%)	10 (7%)
• Boundary Spanners N (%)	20 (36%)	111 (40%)	96 (40%)	195 (49%)	98 (43%)	55 (40%)

fewer than in the other countries in part because of the smaller sample size. In contrast, despite this limiting factor, the number of nodes in Romania surpasses the UK and falls only slightly behind Germany and Hungary. On the one hand, we take this result as an indication of an active civil society relatively engaged in protest activities over the period observed. On the other hand, it shows that countries differ in regard to the number of people who engaged in each country's major protest episodes². In respect to RQ1, then, which queries the existence and prevalence of brokerage positions, we can identify such positions in each of the countries. While the individuals occupying them remain a minority as opposed to pendants, who participated in only one contentious episode, in Denmark (40%), Germany (45%), Hungary (44%), and the UK (42%), brokerage positions are more prevalent than pendant positions in Italy (52%) and Romania (55%). This illustrates that from an individual perspective, protest participation in multiple episodes is a common practice across all surveyed countries.

From the perspective of relational fields, we can ask how occupying different structural positions shapes networks of protesters and contentious episodes. [Figure 2](#) presents a visualization of two-mode networks, including a break-down by individuals' network positions. We do not discuss all six countries here³. Instead, we restrict ourselves to the exemplary discussion of results from Romania (top) and Germany (bottom).

The Romanian example illustrates how all the different episodes are connected in one component, meaning that brokerage is present between each one of them. More specifically, the three episodes that tackle the issue of democracy are closely linked by a number of coordinators who attended events in several pro-democracy episodes. Equally, we find individuals at once in both boundary-spanning and coordinator positions, i.e. who attended several pro-democracy episodes as well as protests related to other issues; and, finally, boundary spanners who attended one pro-democracy episode and one or more of the other protests. This means that the Romanian protest network is characterized by remarkable diversity of individual roles. While the many pendants attended event(s) of only one episode, coordination positions, boundary-spanning positions (and the two combined) are also frequently present. This shows that, for a good proportion of protesters, no major contentious episode happened in isolation from others. Instead, potential brokerage and hence an exchange of tactics, values, and ideas among a collective action field were common.

[Figure 2](#) also visualizes the German collective action field. Again, we observe a field populated by protest episodes and individuals in various pendant and brokerage positions. Since the layout attempts to minimize distances between nodes according to their Euclidean distance, episodes with a higher co-attendance are placed closer to each other. This is reflected in the proximity of anti-fascist and alter-globalization episodes, which




Figure 2. Two-mode network of protesters and protest episodes in Romania and Germany.

tend to be united by a left-wing political stance. Similarly, both environmental episodes stand apart from other episodes and are connected to each other through a set of individuals in coordinator positions. The fact that anti-Covid-19 containment protests drew diverse crowds from different ideological backgrounds is reflected in the episodes' many ties with protesters in boundary spanner positions who connect it to far right, environmental, antifascist, and alter-globalization protests.

Notwithstanding the country-specific aspects visible in [Figure 2](#), which would warrant an in-depth discussion of each country's collective action field, we restrict our investigation to the core observation of the existence of relational fields in which individuals occupy distinct and crucial brokerage positions. This naturally leads us to a discussion of who these actors are and what individual characteristics might be associated with their positions (RQ3). Prior to our regression analyses, we employed multiple imputation (Rubin 1987) to replace incomplete data originating from some respondents' non-responses to survey items. We ran five imputations to predict multiple values for replacing the missing information while at the same time accounting for the uncertainty of estimating the original missing results. We calculated the estimates for each dataset using binary logistic regression, employing survey weights and clustering our data by country. We also examined the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for all the independent variables. The mean VIF scores, derived from the five multiple imputations, fell between 1 to 2.02. An acceptable score range (Chatterjee and Hadi 2006), it allowed us to proceed with our intended analysis. We report the odds ratios of the pooled results in [Tables 3](#) and [4](#).

The first regression model ([Table 3](#)) explores which characteristics statistically predict occupying a brokerage position, as opposed to a pendant position (RQ3a). First, looking at our demographic predictors, we find that the likelihood of being a potential broker decreases with income and being female. In other words, being among the richest group in the population reduces the odds of occupying a brokerage position by half, as compared to those in the poorest group. Similarly, being a woman reduces the odds of occupying such a position by about a third. Second, our predictors accounting for

Table 3. Binary logistic regression analysis of brokerage position.

Dependent variable		Brokerage Position (Reference: Pendant)
Demographics		
	Age	1.13
	Female	0.63***
	Education	1.01
	Income	0.53*
Biographical availability		
	Care	1.16
	Partner	1.19
	Work	1.16
Socio-political attitudes		
	Political interest	1.49
	Social trust	1.36
	Liberal	1.99
	Right-wing	0.83
Network embeddedness		
	Member	1.43*
	Friends	5.68***
	Wrote online about protests	1.95***
Country controls		
	Denmark	0.89
	Hungary	0.85
	Italy	1.05
	Romania	1.24
	UK	0.68

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 4. Binary logistic regression analysis of coordinator and boundary spanner positions.

	Dependent variable		
	Coordinator Position (Reference: rest of protesters)	Boundary Spanner Position (Reference: rest of protesters)	Coordinator Position (Reference: boundary spanner)
Demographics			
Age	1.26	0.85	1.2
Female	0.7*	0.63**	1
Education	0.78	1.23	0.79
Income	0.59	0.53*	0.63
Biographical availability			
Care	1.42	1.29	1.59*
Partner	0.99	1.27	0.77
Work	1.24	1.05	1.23
Socio-political attitudes			
Political interest	2.32*	1.57	2.46*
Social trust	0.72	1.74	0.63
Liberal	3.18*	1.43	1.35
Right-wing	1.27	0.64	2.36
Network embeddedness			
Member	1.08	1.63***	0.72*
Friends	2.96**	3.99***	1.08
Wrote online about protests	2.56***	1.83***	2.34***
Country controls			
Denmark	0.59	0.92	0.47
Hungary	1.97*	0.83	4.35***
Italy	0.76	1.08	0.67
Romania	1.58	1.09	1.48
UK	0.25*	0.79	0.28**

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

biographical availability and socio-political attitudes do not show a statistically significant effect in our analysis.

Finally, network embeddedness seems to be a key correlate of attending several protests. Being immersed in networks of different kinds significantly increases the probability that somebody has participated in several protests. Being a member of an organization increases the odds of being a potential broker by a factor of 1.4 while having friends who have either participated in a protest or who are involved in a social or activist organization increase the odds of occupying a broker position by a factor of 5.7. Finally, having written online about protests increases the odds of it by a factor of 2. Altogether, our analysis indicates that individuals in brokerage positions play an important role in protest networks. Not only do they show greater protest activity than the rest of the population, but they also have more formalized and non-formalized connections to protest networks through their membership of organizations, and the friendships they build, presumably through their participation. Moreover, potential brokers act as bridges between offline and online participation, as their active protest participation on the streets is matched by their productivity writing online about the topic.

Turning to the analysis of specific brokerage positions (RQ3b), we can observe interesting similarities and differences in Table 4. Focusing on the alignments between coordinators and boundary spanners, being a woman decreases the odds of being both in a coordinator and a boundary spanner position by around a third, while income decreases the odds significantly only for the boundary spanner position. Both political interest and a liberal attitude, on the other hand, have significant predictor effects on the

coordinator position only, increasing the odds by factors of 2.3 and 3.2, respectively. Also, network embeddedness increases the odds of being in either position, but the types of networks that are significant and their magnitudes show interesting divergences. For both coordinators and boundary spanners, having friends in activist circles and writing online about protests increase the odds of occupying either of the two positions. However, being a member of a civil society organization increases the odds of being in a boundary spanner position by a factor of 1.6, while it has no significant effect on being in a coordinator position. Focusing on the coefficients, having friends in activist circles increases the odds of being in a boundary spanner position around a third more than it does of being in a coordinator position. In the case of contributing to online debates about protests, despite the variable being significant for both coordinator and boundary spanner positions, the magnitude of the coefficient is larger for the former compared to the latter.

The final model in [Table 4](#) illustrates the differences between the coordinator and boundary spanner positions. Coordinators stand out from boundary spanners through their biographical availability, their socio-political attitudes, and their network embeddedness. Caring for a dependent significantly increases the odds of being in a coordinator rather than a boundary spanner position by a factor of 1.6. Being very interested in politics, as opposed to not being interested at all, increases the odds of being a coordinator as opposed to a boundary spanner by a factor of 2.5. Focusing on the differences in relation to their network embeddedness, the abovementioned differential finding regarding civil society organization membership is supported; membership decreases the odds of being in a coordinator, as opposed to a boundary spanner position, by a quarter. While having activist friends does not significantly distinguish the two brokerage positions, writing online about protests increases the odds of holding a coordinator position by a factor of 2.3.

In sum, the results from these regression models point to the importance of gender, network embeddedness, and political interest for understanding key positions in protest networks. First, men are more likely than women to attend protest episodes, both within an issue category and spanning multiple issues. Second, while high network embeddedness is a defining characteristic of both brokerage positions, different types of networks influence different results. Of particular interest is the fact that organizational membership increases the likelihood of being a boundary spanner but not of being a coordinator. One possible explanation for these results is that members of organizations may be more encouraged to build alliances across issues and, hence, attend a wider variety of events. Despite not being more likely to be members of organizations, those in a coordinator position seem to be more interested in politics.

Discussion

Individuals are the lynchpin between different protests and contentious episodes. Within a relational field, interactions among individual actors generate networks, organizations, cultures and struggles among groups. Despite individuals being at the heart of such interactions, field theory has tended to focus on organizations as foundations of institutional fields. In this paper, we explored the role individual protest participants

play in brokering connections in contentious episodes and the characteristics distinguishing those who help establish links among people, at various protests. By so doing, we contribute to recent debates emphasizing that social movement relational fields are composed of a plurality of actors, including groups, organizations, and individuals (Crossley and Diani 2018).

Our study shows that the integration of relational and aggregative approaches (Diani 2015), when done systematically, affords researchers crucial insights both into the different positions that individuals occupy in relational fields, and what individual characteristics are associated with these positions. We used original, nationally representative, survey data from six European countries and a combination of social network and regression analyses to understand whether we can identify individuals in different *brokerage* positions that have the potential to connect networks of protesters and protest episodes (RQ1a), how prevalent these positions are (RQ1b) and how they shape relational fields (RQ2). Further, we investigated whether occupying these brokerage positions is linked to specific individual characteristics associated with protest participation and showed what these characteristics are (RQ3a, b). Our surveys inquired about respondents' participation in the major contentious episodes that took place in each country between 2015 and 2021. From this data, we created a two-mode network of individuals and protest episodes in each country through which we were able to identify several structural positions among protest participants: a pendant position, occupied by those who partook in one and only one protest episode, and two brokerage positions, occupied by those who attended protests in more than one episode.

Our network analysis revealed that among the general population, most protest participants in the six countries would not be in a position to build bridges among protesters, as they occupy a pendant position, which is only connected to other contentious episodes (and their protesters) *via* brokers. Nonetheless, participation in multiple contentious episodes is common across European countries, as potential brokers represent above 40% of protest participants in all our country cases (RQ1a/b). These brokers' influential position ultimately flows precisely from the potential to facilitate linkages between different groups of pendants. Note, however, that this is a statistical examination of network positions and their occupants, and that based on our data, we cannot determine whether people in brokerage positions acted out that role. In other words, of those who are in a structural position to broker relations among protesters across issues, by virtue of their participation in multiple contentious episodes, not all may actively pursue that role. From the perspective of relational fields (RQ2), brokerage processes influence the relative position of a contentious episode vis-a-vis other episodes and hence provide individuals with access to ideas, issues, and tactical repertoires that are otherwise beyond reach (Wang, Piazza, and Soule 2018). For nascent protests like those centered around government responses to the Covid-19 pandemic, which were often heterogeneous and open to different ideologies (Hunger, Hutter, and Kanol 2023), the question of who can broker these protesters and with whom, is crucial in shaping the episode, and for example, aligning it with other more clearcut left- or right-wing issues. Furthermore, brokers may not only help to link people across contentious episodes but also to sustain the protests themselves (cf. Saunders

et al. 2012) by showing a commitment to this form of non-electoral political action through their repeated participation.

Our analysis further illuminated what characteristics distinguish individuals in brokerage positions among protest participants (RQ3a). Embeddedness in different types of networks was the largest predictor of participation in multiple mobilizations. Potential brokers are more likely to be members of a civil society organization, have more friends in activist circles, and contribute to online debates about protests. In addition, these individuals actively connect with other activists on different levels, ranging from more formalized organizational affinities to personal friendships, and these connections take place both on- and offline. Our findings thus caution that despite a *personalization* of mobilization and participation through digital communication (Bennett and Segerberg 2012) individuals' embeddedness in organizational settings makes them more likely to occupy powerful positions that in turn give shape to relational fields (Diani 2003; Diani and Pilati 2011). Crucially, the finding that individuals in a position to bridge issue boundaries are more likely to be members of social movement organizations sheds light on the importance of the interplay between individuals and organizations and calls for further research into the multimodality of networks of individuals, organizations, and events (Knoke et al. 2021).

By categorizing contentious episodes through policy issues, we differentiated coordinator positions, who may broker connections within the same policy issue, from boundary spanner positions, who can broker connections across episodes around diverging policy issues. Subsequently, when considering the individual characteristics of protesters in these two brokerage positions (RQ3b), we found that both those in coordinator and boundary spanner positions stand out for their activist friendship networks as well as for their active participation in online communication about protests. While gender may no longer be a key predictor of protest participation (Smets and van Ham 2013), our results show that women are less likely to find themselves in brokerage positions, which by definition require repeated protest participation. This finding invites further, explanatory, research.

Taking stock of these findings, we recall that relational perspectives on collective action link brokerage positions to social capital (Tindall 2015), especially when these positions allow one to bridge issue or identity boundaries (Wang, Piazza, and Soule 2018). From that perspective, our study helped explore who holds the power and influence that are associated with a brokerage position (Burt 2005; González-Bailón and Wang 2016) by virtue of affording one the ability to overcome barriers – a crucial element of movement building (Diani 2003). Our finding that individual agency, organizational and interpersonal embeddedness are strongly associated with specific positions in relational fields—and especially to the potential to overcome issue boundaries—is a distinct contribution to scholarship. It complements recent research on the multimodality of individuals, organizations, and events (Knoke et al. 2021).

Our key insight that crucial positions in relational fields—in our case, collective action fields—are occupied by specific types of individuals is proof of how hitherto siloed research on interorganizational networks and examinations of individuals' attributes can be fruitfully crosspollinated. As such, we have answered the call for a

multimodal perspective on collective action networks (Knoke et al. 2021) that looks at events and individuals simultaneously. In addition, the ability or inability to broker ties across boundaries is an important antecedent to movement outcomes in terms of mobilization, scope, and policy change (Wang, Piazza, and Soule 2018). Additionally, our findings have notable implications for research on relational outcomes of protest (Bosi and Uba 2021; Steinhilper and Hoffmann 2024). When powerful positions in relational fields are occupied by individuals with distinct traits, their agency in shaping these fields and hence influencing “substantive goals, values and ideas” (Bosi and Uba 2021:992) of movements must not be overlooked. Rather, it should be scrutinized alongside an investigation into the interplay between organizational and individual actions. In this light, we argue that brokers are remarkable in three ways: first, for their commitment to protest; second, for their capacity to draw participants together and, third, for being able to sustain contentious episodes through their participation and that of the people they connect.

Conclusion

Altogether, this paper contributes to debates in social movement field theory and social networks. It emphasizes the role that individuals play in creating the relations that make up a field and in connecting otherwise seemingly separate contentious episodes. These connections may act as mechanisms for the diffusion of protest repertoires or as sites of struggle among competing worldviews. Moreover, we have shown that individuals in brokerage positions are central to protest networks for more reasons than their participation in different mobilizations. Brokers can help bridge the multiple networks in which they are involved through their organizational membership and friendships within activist circles in ways that connect various entities horizontally as well as vertically, within and across contentious episodes.

Our exploration of brokerage positions is intended as an invitation to further research the role of individuals in the creation and evolution of collective action fields and networks. Individuals in these positions have the opportunity to engage in brokerage behavior, i.e. to employ their structural advantage to broker new connections. A systematic study of the extent to which such behavior comes to pass is an important continuation of the investigation we presented in this article. Likewise, is an in-depth study of the motivations to engage in brokerage behavior, which has the potential to reveal why they take on this role. In addition, we explicitly invite scholars to address the temporal dynamics of participation choices and the way these may lead to either association or disconnection among protest episodes. Furthermore, future research may investigate how policy issues relate to reasons for brokerage and any strategic or tactical decisions by brokers to act as coordinators, boundary spanners or both.

Notes

1. For a description on the temporal distribution of protest episodes and instances of multiple participation, see Appendix Part V.
2. Note that this measure is also sensitive to the selection of protest episodes that were asked in the survey. In other words, a more dispersed protest landscape driven rather by smaller events and less by major episodes could lead to different numbers.

3. See Appendix Part III for descriptions of the remaining countries' networks.

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Appendix A

Part I: Details about survey methodology

Fieldwork languages and dates

Country	Language(s)	Fieldwork Dates
United Kingdom	English	21/02/22–28/02/22
Denmark	Danish	21/02/22–23/02/22
Germany	German	21/02/22–02/03/22
Hungary	Hungarian	21/02/22–03/03/22
Romania	Romanian, Hungarian	21/02/22–01/03/22
Italy	Italian	21/02/22–11/03/22

YouGov's sampling method

For each of our country cases (UK, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Romania, Italy) YouGov used its 'Active Sampling' methodology to draw a targeted sample from its panel of registered users in these countries. At the time of registration, each new panel participant must complete a detailed questionnaire about themselves. From this initial questionnaire, YouGov selects a representative sample of respondents to take part in a survey online, based on the following quotas (variables united by a '+' symbol denote an intersection among them, columns ',' denote a separation between sampling variables):

- UK: gender + education level + age, social grade, political attention, political party member, past vote 2019 + region
- Germany: gender + education level + age, past vote 2021 + region, 2019 EU parliament past vote, urban/rural, political interest + past vote 2021
- Denmark: region, age + gender + education level, past vote 2019, political interest
- Hungary: age + gender, region, education level, monitoring past vote 2018
- Romania: age + gender, region, education level, monitoring past vote 2020
- Italy: past vote 2018 + region, 2019 EU parliament past vote, education level + age + gender, political interest

YouGov's fully automated sampling system invites respondents, *via* an email invitation, to complete a survey by assigning eligible respondents to the best matching survey (according to demographic characteristics) once a respondent clicks on the invitation link. In those specific sampling groups where the response rates are slightly lower or higher, the sampling is adjusted accordingly. When invited to participate in a survey *via* email, panelists are not aware of the topic of the survey, which minimizes a skew toward politically engaged respondents.

Demographics and targets used for each country

United Kingdom

Age by Gender by Education	UK
Men Over 65	10.6
Men 50–65 High	3.2
Men 50–65 Mid	4.6
Men 50–65 Low	4.1
Men 25–49 High	8.1
Men 25–49 Mid	7.4
Men 25–49 Low	5.2
Men 18–24 High	0.9
Men 18–24 Mid & Low	4.6
Women Over 65	12.6
Women 50–65 High	3
Women 50–65 Mid	5.2
Women 50–65 Low	4.1
Women 25–49 High	8.6
Women 25–49 Mid	7.8
Women 25–49 Low	4.6
Women 18–24 High	1.1
Women 18–24 Mid & Low	4.3
Social Grade	UK
AB	28
C1	29
C2	21
DE	22
Political Attention	UK
Low (0,1,2)	19
Medium (3–7)	60
High (8,9,10)	21
Past vote by Region	UK
North Con	6.8
North Lab	7.4
North LD	1.4
North BP	0.9
North Oth	0.7
North DNV	6.2
Midlands Con	6.4
Midlands Lab	3.9
Midlands LD	0.9
Midlands BP	0.2
Midlands Oth	0.5
Midlands DNV	4.5
London Con	2.8
London Lab	4.3
London LD	1.3
London BP	0.1
London Oth	0.3
London DNV	2.8
South Con	13.9
South Lab	5.9
South LD	4.3
South BP	0.1
South Oth	1.3
South DNV	7.2
Wales Con	1.3
Wales Lab	1.5
Wales LD	0.2
Wales PC	0.4
Wales BP	0.2
Wales Oth DNV	1.4
Scotland Con	1.6
Scotland Lab	1.2
Scotland LD	0.6
Scotland SNP	2.9
Scotland Oth DNV	2.0
NI Voted	1.9
NI DNV	0.7
EU Referendum Vote	UK
Remain	37.1
Leave	39.3
DK/DNV	23.6

Denmark

Age by Gender by Education	DK
Female 18–29 Low/Med	7.1
Female 18–29 High	2.2
Female 30–44 Low/Med	5.7
Female 30–44 High	5.8
Female 45–59 Low/Med	8.4
Female 45–59 High	4.8
Female 60–74 Low/Med	8.1
Female 60–74 High	3.0
Female 75+ Low/Med	4.2
Female 75+ High	1.6
Male 18–29 Low/Med	8.2
Male 18–29 High	1.5
Male 30–44 Low/Med	7.3
Male 30–44 High	4.2
Male 45–59 Low/Med	9.5
Male 45–59 High	3.8
Male 60–74 Low/Med	7.8
Male 60–74 High	2.8
Male 75+ Low/Med	3.0
Male 75+ High	1.0
Political Interest	DK
Very/Meget	19.2
Quite/Noget	46.6
Not very/Kun	29.2
Not at all/Slet Ikke/PNTS	5.0
Region	DK
Hovedstaden	32.0
Sjælland	15.0
Syddanmark	21.0
Midtjylland	22.0
Nordjylland	10.0
Past vote 2019	DK
Socialdemokraterne	23.2
Radikale Venstre	7.7
Det Konservative Folkeparti	5.9
Socialistisk Folkeparti	6.9
Liberal Alliance	2.1
Dansk Folkeparti	7.9
Venstre	21.0
Enhedslisten	6.2
Nye Borlige	2.1
Alternativet	2.7
Other – K, E, P, other	3.9
DNV/voted blank – stemme ikke/blankt	5.2
PNTS/DK – vil/husker ikke	5.2

Germany

Age by Gender by Education	DE
Male, 18–29 yrs, Lo	2.2
Male, 18–29 yrs, Mid	2.3
Male, 18–29 yrs, Hi	3.9
Male, 30–39 yrs, Lo	2.1
Male, 30–39 yrs, Mid	2.2
Male, 30–39 yrs, Hi	3.5
Male, 40–49 yrs, Lo	2.3
Male, 40–49 yrs, Mid	2.6
Male, 40–49 yrs, Hi	2.9
Male, 50–59 yrs, Lo	3.4
Male, 50–59 yrs, Mid	3.4
Male, 50–59 yrs, Hi	3.1
Male, 60+ yrs, Lo	7.7
Male, 60+ yrs, Mid	4.0
Male, 60+ yrs, Hi	3.5
Female, 18–29 yrs, Lo	1.5
Female, 18–29 yrs, Mid	2.1
Female, 18–29 yrs, Hi	4.1
Female, 30–39 yrs, Lo	1.4
Female, 30–39 yrs, Mid	2.4
Female, 30–39 yrs, Hi	3.7
Female, 40–49 yrs, Lo	1.8
Female, 40–49 yrs, Mid	3.0
Female, 40–49 yrs, Hi	2.9
Female, 50–59 yrs, Lo	2.8
Female, 50–59 yrs, Mid	4.2
Female, 50–59 yrs, Hi	2.8
Female, 60+ yrs, Lo	10.3
Female, 60+ yrs, Mid	5.1
Female, 60+ yrs, Hi	2.7
EU Parliament vote 2019	DE
CDU/CSU	20.1
Bundnis 90/Die Grunen	13.3
SPD	10.9
AfD	6.8
Die Linke	3.7
FDP	3.8
Kann mich nicht erinnern	5.0
Sonstige	6.8
Nichtwähler	27.2
Nicht wahlberechtigt	2.3
Area type	DE
Städtisch	39.5
Vorstädtisch	40.3
Ländlich	20.2
Past vote 2021 by political interest	DE
Established, Lo	12.2
Established, Med	19.6
Established, Hi	17.1
Challenger, Lo	4.7
Challenger, Med	12.4
Challenger, Hi	13.9
NV, Lo	7.8
NV, Med	5.4
NV, Hi	2.3
Ineligible	5.0
Past vote 2021 by region	DE
East.CDU/CSU	2.1
East.SPD	3.0
East.Linke	1.2
East.Grunen	1.0

(continued)

Germany Continued.

Age by Gender by Education	DE
East.FDP	1.2
East.AfD	2.6
East.Sonstige	1.1
East.DK/DNV	4.4
West.CDU/CSU	9.9
West.SPD	12.4
West.Linke	1.9
West.Grunen	6.9
West.FDP	4.8
West.AfD	3.2
West.Sonstige	2.9
West.DK/DNV	13.3
South.CDU/CSU	6.4
South.SPD	4.4
South.Linke	0.7
South.Grunen	3.4
South.FDP	2.8
South.AfD	2.1
South.Sonstige	2.5
South.DK/DNV	6.0

Hungary

Region	HU
Southern Great Plain	13.1
Southern Transdanubia	9.4
Northern Great Plain	15.0
Northern Hungary	12.1
Central Transdanubia	10.9
Central Hungary	29.7
Western Transdanubia	9.9
Age by Gender	HU
Male 18–24	5.0
Male 25–34	7.6
Male 35–44	8.7
Male 45–54	7.8
Male 55+	18.5
Female 18–24	4.8
Female 25–34	7.4
Female 35–44	8.6
Female 45–54	8.0
Female 55+	23.6
Past vote 2018	HU
Fidesz–KDNP Party Alliance/Fidesz–KDNP pártszövetség	39.5
Movement for a Better Hungary/Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom	15.3
Dialogue for Hungary/Párbeszéd Magyarországért	9.5
LMP – Hungary’s Green Party/LMP – Magyarország Zöld Pártja	5.7
Democratic Coalition/Demokratikus Koalíció, DK	4.3
Momentum Movement/Momentum Mozgalom	2.5
Other	3.3
Don’t know/Did not vote	19.9
Education level	HU
Primary + Below (Low)	20.8
Upper + Post Secondary (Med)	57.3
Tertiary + (High)	21.9

Romania

Age by Gender	RO
Male 18–24	4.6
Male 25–34	8.7
Male 35–44	10.3
Male 45–54	9.3
Male 55+ (NET)	15.2
Female 18–24	4.4
Female 25–34	8.3
Female 35–44	9.9
Female 45–54	9.3
Female 55+ (NET)	20.0
Education level	RO
Low	23.7
Medium	60.1
High	16.2
Region	RO
Bucharest-Ilfov	11.3
Center	11.7
North-East	16.4
North-West	12.9
South-East	12.7
South-Muntenia	15.6
South-West Oltenia	10.3
West	9.1
Past vote 2018	RO
Partidul Social Democrat (PSD)	15.8
Partidul Național Liberal (PNL)	13.8
Alianța 2020 USR-PLUS	8.4
Alianța pentru Unirea Românilor (AUR)	5.0
Româniai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség (RMDSZ)	3.1
Partidul Mișcarea Populară (PMP)	2.6
PRO România (PRO)	2.2
Other	3.7
DK/DNV	45.4

Male 18–24	4.6
Male 25–34	8.7
Male 35–44	10.3
Male 45–54	9.3
Male 55+ (NET)	15.2
Female 18–24	4.4
Female 25–34	8.3
Female 35–44	9.9
Female 45–54	9.3
Female 55+ (NET)	20.0
Education level	RO
Low	23.7
Medium	60.1
High	16.2
Region	RO
Bucharest-Ilfov	11.3
Center	11.7
North-East	16.4
North-West	12.9
South-East	12.7
South-Muntenia	15.6
South-West Oltenia	10.3
West	9.1
Past vote 2018	RO
Partidul Social Democrat (PSD)	15.8
Partidul Național Liberal (PNL)	13.8
Alianța 2020 USR-PLUS	8.4
Alianța pentru Unirea Românilor (AUR)	5.0
Româniai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség (RMDSZ)	3.1
Partidul Mișcarea Populară (PMP)	2.6
PRO România (PRO)	2.2
Other	3.7
DK/DNV	45.4

Italy

Past vote 2018	IT
M5S	22.8
Lega	15.7
Forza Italia	10.6
Fratelli d'Italia	5.2
Partito Democratico	16.8
Plus Europa	2.0
Liberi e Uguali	1.9
Other	6.5
Abstain	18.5
Vote by Region	IT
M5S North East and North West	8.0
M5S Central	4.3
M5S South and Islands	10.5
Lega North East and North West	11.0
Lega Central	2.8
Lega South and Islands	1.9
Forza Italia North East and North West	4.3
Forza Italia Central	1.8
Forza Italia South and Islands	4.5
Fratelli d'Italia North East and North West	2.2
Fratelli d'Italia Central	1.5
Fratelli d'Italia South and Islands	1.5
Partito Democratico North East and North West	8.7
Partito Democratico Central	4.2
Partito Democratico South and Islands	3.9
Other North East and North West	5.1
Other Central	2.2
Other South and Islands	3.1
Abstain North East and North West	7.2
Abstain Central	3.3
Abstain South and Islands	8.0
EU Parliament vote 2019	IT
LN	22.2
M5S	9.3
PD	14.9
FI	5.2
FdL	4.8
Other	6.7
Abstain	36.9
Age by Gender by Education	IT
Male 18–29 Low	2.4
Male 18–29 Mid	4.5
Male 18–29 High	0.8
Male 30–39 Low	3.0
Male 30–39 Mid	3.9
Male 30–39 High	1.5
Male 40–49 Low	4.4
Male 40–49 Mid	3.9
Male 40–49 High	1.3
Male 50–59 Low	3.8
Male 50–59 Mid	2.9
Male 50–59 High	1.0
Male 60+ Low	10.3
Male 60+ Mid	2.8
Male 60+ High	1.2
Female 18–29 Low	1.7
Female 18–29 Mid	4.4
Female 18–29 High	1.3
Female 30–39 Low	2.3
Female 30–39 Mid	4.0
Female 30–39 High	2.2
Female 40–49 Low	3.9

(continued)

Italy Continued.

Past vote 2018	IT
Female 40–49 Mid	4.3
Female 40–49 High	1.6
Female 50–59 Low	4.2
Female 50–59 Mid	3.0
Female 50–59 High	1.0
Female 60+ Low	15.0
Female 60+ Mid	2.5
Female 60+ High	0.9
Political Interest	IT
Very interesting	5.8
Rather interesting	25.8
Not really interesting	39.1
Not interested at all	29.4
Region (grouped)	IT
North West and North East	46.6
Central	20.2
South and Islands	33.2

Weight methodology

YouGov provided weights seeking to readjust the sample to be representative of all adults aged over 18 in each country – including those without internet access. Targets for the weighted data are drawn from national censuses, mid-year population estimates, and the most recent national election (and where applicable the 2019 European Parliament election) results.

In each of the markets YouGov achieved the following weight range:

Market	Lowest Weight	Highest Weight
UK	0.3	3.35
Germany	0.08	4.97
Denmark	0.3	9.6
Hungary	0.32	4.21
Romania	0.32	4.51
Italy	0.13	11.39

Part II: issue categorization of contentious episodes

Organizing protest events into contentious episodes, as McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001, p. 30) advise, is a decision reflecting observations made by, for example, participants in them or commentators. Accordingly, scholars need to consider the aspects that are foregrounded or otherwise by that delineation. We do so below while noting that, in our case, the research instrument we relied upon to record protest participation enquired into the involvement of survey respondents, over the six preceding years, in demonstrations associated with the same set of claims and main actors.

First, from the protest events included in our data, we categorized the 2015 and 2017 protests against the G7 and G20 meetings held in Germany, the 2015–2016 mobilizations against the free trade agreement between the European Union and the United States (TTIP) and the free trade agreement between the European Union and Canada (CETA) in Germany and the 2019 protests in London against President Trump's visit to the UK.

The movement for global justice refers to a series of groups and protests critical of economic globalization, neoliberalism and their impact on democratic institutions and global inequalities. These protests have been often associated to the autonomous movement and anarchist organizations (Flesher Fominaya 2010; Juris & Pleyers 2009). Some of the most visible actions of the movement were protest events and counter-summits organized around the meetings of the major

international bodies such as the World Trade Organization, the World Economic Forum and the G7/G8/G20, as well as against Free Trade Agreements among major economic players among others (Pleyers 2010).

In our case, the first two mobilizations we included are some of the most iconic actions of the global justice movement in the recent years, we decided to include the protests against Trump in this category, as they took place in the context of the negotiations of the free trade agreement between the UK and the US, following Britain's decision to leave the European Union.

Second, from the events contained in our data, we classified the Danish 2019–2021 *Where is an adult?* demonstrations for minimum standards in day care institutions, the 2020–2021 “Priority to Schools” protests in Italy, and the 2016–2021 anti-austerity protests in the UK as anti-austerity and workers' rights protests.

Following the collapse of the international financial system in 2008 and the economic crisis that unfolded, governments across the world decided to implement drastic austerity measures consisting of a combination of cuts to government spending and tax increases that sought to reduce public budget deficits (Alesina et al. 2019). Together with these measures, they also approved laws seeking to lower labor standards (Heyes 2013). Despite the economic recovery after the crisis, many public institutions are still suffering from the impact of austerity measures nowadays (Jones et al. 2016; Stuckler et al. 2017), triggering social coalitions often led by trade unions and left of the center forces (Della Porta 2015) to call for mobilizations demanding governments to redress the underfunding of public institutions.

Under this second heading we further catalogued the 2016 Hungarian teacher's strike and protests against the reform of the education system, the 2018 protests in Hungary against the ‘Slave law’ – a law that raised the yearly cap on overtime from 250 to 400 h and gave companies three years to pay for this extra working time, as well as the 2021 trade union protests in Romania.

Third, the radicalization, rise in presence and policy influence of far-right organizations during the recent years (Castelli Gattinara & Pirro 2019; Golder 2016) has led to social mobilizations to oppose these groups. From among the protests included in our study, we incorporate in this category the counter-mobilizations against the far-right that have been taken place in Germany since 2015, as well as the #Unteilbar demonstrations that took place between 2018 and 2021, which mobilized an alliance of organizations, trade unions and political parties defending and open and free society against racism and discrimination. Moreover, we also include the 2019 Sardine protests that were organized around Italy following the leader of the right-wing Lega Party, Matteo Salvini, during his public speeches during the campaign of the 2020 regional elections in the country.

Fourth, the campaign surrounding the 2016 United Kingdom European Union membership referendum, commonly known as Brexit, and the controversies of the implementation of Britain's exit of the European Union, mobilized thousands of individuals in support and against this policy. Given the specificity of this policy issue, we do not include these protests in any category. Instead, we have simply differentiated the mobilizations in favor and against Brexit.

Fifth, another grouping—civic rights and pro-migration protests—included protests related to transgressions against the principle of equal standing in the face of the law regardless of sex, race or religion. In Italy, our data includes participation in the 2016 protests against gender-based violence. We also categorize demonstrations in support of migrants and refugees in Italy and Denmark between 2015 and 2021 into this group. Additionally, we include the 2018 mobilizations in Denmark against the burka ban, as well as those against the so-called ghetto list and ghetto law in the country. Finally, we also categorize the 2020 Black Lives Matter demonstrations in Denmark and the UK under the civil rights label.

Sixth, the lockdown and social distancing measures implemented by governments across the world to tame the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic motivated many to show their opposition through protests during 2020 and 2021. Our analysis contains data about this type of mobilizations in Denmark, Germany, Romania and the UK. Additionally, we also included the 2020–2021 anti-vax protests that took place in Italy in opposition to the vaccines against COVID-19 and the measures taken to encourage vaccination.

Table A1. Categorization of protest episodes by policy issue.

Issue Category	Country	Protest Episode
Anti-austerity & workers' rights	Denmark	2019–2021 Where is an Adult? demonstrations for minimum standards in day care institutions.
Anti-austerity & workers' rights	Hungary	2016 protests against the reform of the education system (including the teacher's strike)
Anti-austerity & workers' rights	Hungary	2018 protests against the overtime law
Anti-austerity & workers' rights	Italy	2020–2021 Priority to Schools protests
Anti-austerity & workers' rights	Romania	2021 trade union protests
Anti-austerity & workers' rights	UK	2016–2021 anti-austerity protests
Antifascism	Germany	2015–2021 protest against the far-right
Antifascism	Germany	2018–2021 #Unteilbar protests
Antifascism	Italy	2019 Sardine movement protests
Brexit (against)	UK	2016–2019 marches against Brexit
Brexit (in favor)	UK	2016–2019 marches in support of Brexit
Civil rights & pro-migration	Denmark	2015–2021 refugees welcome demonstrations
Civil rights & pro-migration	Denmark	2018–2020 demonstrations against the ghetto list and the ghetto law
Civil rights & pro-migration	Denmark	2018 demonstrations against the burka ban
Civil rights & pro-migration	Denmark	2020 Black Lives Matter demonstrations
Civil rights & pro-migration	Italy	2015–2021 protests in support of migrants
Civil rights & pro-migration	Italy	Protests against gender violence and violence against women since 2016
Civil rights & pro-migration	UK	2020 Black Lives Matter protests
COVID-19	Denmark	2020–2021 protest against COVID-19 restrictions
COVID-19	Germany	2020–2021 protest against COVID-19 restrictions
COVID-19	Italy	2020–2021 protest against COVID-19 restrictions
COVID-19	Italy	2020–2021 anti-vax protests
COVID-19	Romania	2020–2021 protest against COVID-19 restrictions
COVID-19	UK	2020–2021 protest against COVID-19 restrictions
Democracy	Hungary	2016 protests against the shutdown of Népszabadság
Democracy	Hungary	2017 protests against Lex CEU law and the expulsion of the university from Budapest
Democracy	Hungary	2017 protests against the NGO law
Democracy	Hungary	2018 demonstrations We are the Majority, organized after Fidesz won a 2/3 majority in the general elections
Democracy	Hungary	2020 protests against the privatization and reorganization of University of Theater and Film Arts (SZFE)
Democracy	Romania	2015 anti-corruption protests after the The Colectiv nightclub fire
Democracy	Romania	2017 #Rezist anti-corruption protests
Democracy	Romania	Diaspora at Home and We Won't Leave Until You Leave protests
Environment	Denmark	2018–2020 Fridays for Future (Strike for Climate) protests calling for action on climate change
Environment	Denmark	2019–2021 Extinction Rebellion mobilizations calling for action on climate change
Environment	Germany	2018–2021 Fridays for Future (Strike for Climate) protests calling for action on climate change
Environment	Germany	2019–2021 Extinction Rebellion mobilizations calling for action on climate change
Environment	Italy	2018–2020 Fridays for Future (Strike for Climate) protests calling for action on climate change
Environment	Italy	2018 No-TAV protests
Environment	UK	2018–2020 Fridays for Future (Strike for Climate) protests calling for action on climate change
Environment	UK	2019–2021 Extinction Rebellion mobilizations calling for action on climate change
Far-right	Denmark	2015–2016 demonstrations against islamization
Far-right	Germany	2015–2021 protests against migration
Far-right	Italy	2015–2021 protests against migration
Far-right	Romania	2016 Coalition for Family petition asking for a referendum to strengthen the protection of the traditional family in Romania's constitution
Far-right	UK	

(continued)

Table A1. Continued.

Issue Category	Country	Protest Episode
Global justice	Germany	2020 Defend Our Memorials protests to protect symbols of British history from being torn down
Global justice	Germany	2015–2016 Protests against the free trade agreement between the European Union and the United States (TTIP) and the free trade agreement between the European Union and Canada (CETA)
Global justice	Germany	2015 and 2017 Protests against the G7 and G20 meetings
Global justice	UK	2019 protests against President Trump
Pro-government	Hungary	2018 Peace Rally in support of Viktor Orbán's government prior to the general elections
Pro-government	Romania	2018 protests in support of the Social Democratic government and against the abuses by anti-corruption prosecutors

Seventh, in some EU countries, particularly Central and Eastern European ones, democracy and rule of law issues are at the core of the political agenda. Among our country cases, some of the largest mobilizations in Hungary and Romania have been inspired by concerns with these matters. In Hungary, our data includes the 2016 protests against the shutdown of the Népszabadság, a year after a media company owned by circles close to Hungary's PM Viktor Orbán bought the majority of its shares. Additionally, this category includes the 2017 protests against the so-called Lex CEU, a piece of legislation that de facto expelled the Central European University from the country, as well as the mobilizations against another law that sought to crack down on NGOs during the same period. In the case of Romania, we include the 2015 anti-corruption protests sparked by a fire at the Colectiv nightclub in Bucharest, which received its license without the permission of the fire department. We also include the 2017 #Rezist anti-corruption protests as well as the anti-corruption mobilizations organized by the Romanian diaspora thereafter.

Eighth, we clustered the 2018–2020 Fridays for Future protests that took place in Denmark, Germany, Italy and the UK, among other countries under the heading environmental protests. Moreover, this category also incorporates the Extinction Rebellion mobilizations in Denmark, Germany and the UK, which began in 2019. Finally, we also include the 2015 and 2018 protests in Italy against the construction of a high-speed line connecting Turin and Lyon, which had environmental concerns at the center of its grievances.

Ninth, during the last decade, far-right parties and movements have increase in importance across Europe (Castelli Gattinara & Pirro 2019; Golder 2016). Their growth has also translated in some of the largest protests in some of our case countries. Under this label, we categorize the 2015–2016 demonstrations against islamization in Denmark as well as anti-migration protests in Germany and Italy since 2015. We also include in this category Romania's 2016 mobilizations in relation to the Coalition for Family petition asking for a referendum to strengthen the protection of the traditional family in Romania's constitution. Finally, the 2020 'Defend our Memorials' protests that appeared as a reaction to the Black Lives Matter protests in the UK and that sought to protect symbols of British history from being torn down.

Finally, in 2018, Hungary and Romania had distinct demonstrations in support of their sitting governments. In the case of Hungary, the Peace Rally was a demonstration organized by the Fidesz party in support of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, prior to the 2018 general elections in the country. IN the case of Romania, the protest was organized in support of the Social Democratic government, in the face of anti-corruption prosecutors pressing charges against them. A summary of our classification is provided in [Table 1](#).

Part III: network interpretation guidelines

United Kingdom

In the UK collective action field, we observe a proximity of episodes dealing with anti-austerity and workers' rights, as well as global justice. The UK-specific against Brexit episode seems closely related to these two, being connected through a number of boundary spanners. On the other side

of the protest field, the pro Brexit protest episode and the Covid-related episode are connected by boundary spanners to each other, and to the far-right episode. Both environmental episodes stand apart from these clusters and are connected to each other through a set of coordinator brokers, and to other episodes through a set of individuals who hold both brokerage positions.

Italy

The Italian collective action field produces a comparatively dense network, in which on fo the environmental episodes (Fridays for Future) stands out from two clusters of closely related episodes, one with strong overlaps between the two Covid-related episodes, the second environmental episode (no TAV protests) and the far-right episode. Interestingly, anti austerity protests sit between these and the more left-leaning antifascist, civil rights, and pro-migration episodes.

Hungary

The most striking visual interpretation of the Hungarian collective action field is due to the special place of the pro-government (i.e. pro-Orban) episode, which seems to be comparatively less connected to other episodes and thus is placed remote from other episodes in the network visualization algorithm. The fact that one of the anti-austerity episodes is closer to the different democracy episodes than the other, illustrates that issues alone are not deterministic predictors of the place of an episode in the protest field.

Denmark

The Danish collective action field is comparatively small, due to both the low number of protesters in Denmark and the smaller sample size. We should therefore treat an interpretation of the positioning of the various episodes vis-a-vis each other with care.




Figure A1. Two-mode network of protesters and protest episodes across countries.

Part IV: survey questions used to construct model variables

Age

How old are you?

Female

Sex recorded by YouGov during panellist's recruitment.

Education

Which is the highest level of education or work-related qualification you achieved? [Country-specific answer options recoded to low, medium, high].

Income

Net household income is the combined income of all earners in a household from all sources, including wages, salaries, or rents and after tax deductions. What is your net household income? [country specific answer options, depending on income distribution in each country].

Care

Do you have any family member—either young or old—in your care? [Yes; No; I don't know]. you?

Partner

What is your current marital or relationship status? [Married; Civil partnership; Separated but still legally married or in a civil partnership; Living with a partner but neither married nor in a civil partnership; In a relationship, but not living together; Single; Divorced; Widowed; Other; Prefer not to say].

Work

Which of these applies to you? [Working full time (30 or more hours per week); Working part time (8–29 h a week); Working part time (Less than 8 h a week); Full time student; Retired; Unemployed; Not working; Other].

Political interest

How interested, if at all, would you say you are in politics – are you ... [very interested; quite interested; hardly interested; or not at all interested?; I don't know].

Social trust

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that one can never be too careful in dealing with people? On a scale of 0–10, where 0 means you can't be too careful, and 10 means that most people can be trusted, where would you say you fall on this scale?

Cultural liberalism

How would you place your views on this scale? 0 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between [0–10, I don't know, I prefer not to answer].

- People coming to live in [COUNTRY] from other countries make [COUNTRY] a worse place to live VS. People coming to live in [COUNTRY] from other countries make [COUNTRY] a better place to live.
- A woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled VS. A woman can be fulfilled through her professional career.

- Children should be taught to obey authority VS. Children should be encouraged to have an independent judgment.
- People who break the law should get stiffer sentences VS. Stiffer sentences do not contribute to reducing criminality.
- Homosexual couples should not be allowed to adopt children under any circumstances VS. Homosexual couples should be able to adopt children.

Right wing

Some people talk about ‘left’ and ‘right’ to describe parties and politicians. With this in mind, where would you place yourself on this scale? [Very left-wing; Fairly left-wing; Slightly left-of-center; Center; Slightly right-of-center; Fairly right-wing; Very right-wing; Don’t know]

Member

In the last 2 years, including the period before the pandemic, have you been involved in any of the following types of organizations? Please indicate whether you have been a member, a supporter (without being a member of the organization), or neither. [member; supporter; neither supporter nor member; I don’t know].

- Political party
- Church or religious organization
- Trade union or professional association
- Women’s organization
- Sports or cultural organization
- Environmental organization
- LGBTQ+ rights organization
- Community or neighborhood association
- Charity or humanitarian organization
- Human or civil rights organization
- Volunteer organization
- Youth club
- Social center/squat
- Internet-based activist group

Friends

As far as you know, how many people from among your friends and family... [none; some; most; all; I don’t know].

- Have ever participated in a protest?
- Are involved in a social or activist organization?

Wrote online about protests

Various political activities are carried out *via* the internet. From among the political activities listed below, please indicate whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it [Have done once; have done more than once; might do; would never do; I don’t know].

- Wrote anything about a protest on social media (e.g. Facebook, Instagram, Reddit, Twitter, Youtube) or to groups on messaging apps (e.g. WhatsApp, Signal, Viber, Telegram ...)?

Part V: additional descriptives on temporal dynamics in multiple protest participation

Our data on participation in protest episodes spans six countries, numerous policy issues and a timeframe from 2015 to 2021. While temporal dynamics are not the core interest of our examination into individuals in specific brokerage positions, we nonetheless are able to show the distribution over time of protest episodes and instances of multiple participation therein (which enable individuals to occupy brokerage positions). As some episodes span several years, while others are limited to shorter timeframes, we undertake this inspection with a measure of distance in years between each pair of protest episodes, in each country. When an episode comprised protest events held over several consecutive years, we use the median point in time for that episode as a proxy. That way, we can investigate how many instances of multiple participation occurred between protest episodes that are temporally closer or more distant. Thus, we can assess whether temporal dynamics might drive behavior, e.g. if multiple instances of protest participation only occur between episodes that happened within a year from each other. In [Table A2](#), we illustrate the number of instances of multiple participation in two protest episodes by temporal distance, ranging from episodes that were less than a year apart, between a year and less than two years, etc., up to the maximum possible distance of more than six years. To put these raw counts into perspective, we also add a measure of the number of combinations between episodes that were subject to multiple participation, to account for the fact that “supply” in protesting opportunities is not equally spaced across time. Finally, to allow for relative comparisons between episode combinations and instances of multiple participation, we add row percentages to both scores.

What the table illuminates is that multiple participation happened both between protest episodes that were nearly simultaneous, and between those that were further apart. Comparing the percentages between episode combinations and instances of multiple participation instances reveals that they are nearly identical. Put differently, in our data, individuals realizing their protest opportunities was not associated with the temporal distance between protest episodes. In turn, we expected no significant distortion in our subsequent analysis of brokerage positions by temporal patterns.

Table A2. Temporal distance of protest episode combinations and multiple participation instances.

Observations	Distance below 1 year	Distance \geq 1 and $<$ 2 years	Distance \geq 2 and $<$ 3 years	Distance \geq 3 and $<$ 4 years	Distance \geq 4 and $<$ 5 years	Distance \geq 5 and $<$ 6 years	Distance \geq 6 and $<$ 7 years	Total
Observed episode combinations	42	62	51	14	11	4	1	185
in %	23%	34%	28%	8%	6%	2%	1%	100
Multiple participation instances	881	1110	1003	268	219	98	33	3612
in %	24%	31%	28%	7%	6%	3%	1%	100