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THIRD PARTY DECISION-MAKING IN RESPONSE TO CONFLICT:
THE WESTERN CONTACT GROUP AS INTERMEDIARY IN THE
CONFLICT OVER NAMIBIA

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Thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International
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DEPARTMENT OF SYSTEMS SCIENCE
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ABSTRACT

This study presents an analytic framework for the study of third party decision-making in response to conflict and concerns third parties which take up the intermediary role. The case-study used is the intervention of the Western Contact Group, which included the governments of the United States, United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, France, and Canada, as a coalition of intermediaries in the conflict over Namibia.

The research has centred on three inter-related questions regarding third party responses to conflict. Firstly, the initial choice of the intermediary role in response to conflict; secondly, the third party's tactical decisions during involvement as intermediary in the conflict situation; and thirdly, the third party's re-evaluation of its continued involvement as intermediary leading to the abandonment of the role prior to the achievement of a settlement of the conflict in which it is involved.

The devised analytic framework points to factors which may influence third party decisions at each of these three phases of third party responses to conflict. The application of the analytic framework to the Western Contact Group suggested that apart from the dynamics of the conflict itself, other factors influencing third party decisions include the third party's interests in the conflict and in the process of mediation, its resources, and, at times, its constituency. The use of the Western Contact Group has also shown that the coalition factor is important in that it influenced the initial decision of the member governments to take up an active role in the Namibian dispute. It has also shown that the relationships within the coalition influenced the choice of tactics in interaction with the conflict system.

It is argued that the involvement of an interested third party as intermediary is best analysed by considering the third party as forming part of (at least) a three-cornered negotiation system, with the third party being one of the negotiators.

Application of the analytic framework to the case-study has also pointed to indicators which may improve the framework and has raised a number of questions regarding intermediary involvement in conflict.

ABBREVIATIONS

AKTUR	Action Front for the Retention of Turnhalle Principles
ANC	African National Congress
CDU	Christian Democratic Union
CSU	Christian Social Union
DTA	Democratic Turnhalle Alliance
ESCOM	Electricity Supply Commission
FLS	Front-Line States
FNLA	National Front for the Liberation of Angola
FRELIMO	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
HNP	Herstigste Nasionale Party
IDC	Industrial Development Corporation
MNR	Mozambique National Resistance
MPC	Multi-Party Conference
MPLA	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NP	National Party
NPSWA	National Party of South West Africa
NSSM 39	National Security Study Memorandum 39
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
PLAN	People's Liberation Army of Namibia
RTZ	Rio Tinto Zinc
SADCC	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SADF	South African Defence Force
SASOL	South African Coal, Oil, and Gas Corporation
SWANU	South West Africa National Union
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organisation
SWAPO-D	South West Africa People's Organisation-Democrats
SWATF	South West Africa Territorial Force
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
WCG	Western Contact Group

CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION

The growth of interest in the role of third parties in the peaceful settlement of disputes, manifest in theoretical and empirical research, coupled with the increasing use of such techniques at all levels of societal interaction, from the interpersonal(1), to the community(2), to the industrial relations(3), to the international level(4), has by no means been paralleled by any systematic research on the third party's own decision-making processes leading to their responses to conflict situations.

The present study focusses on this neglected aspect of the mediation process. Its objective is to contribute to our understanding of the processes involved in third party responses to conflict and it focusses on three inter-related questions. Firstly, the third party's choice of the intermediary role in response to conflict; secondly, the third party's tactical choice decisions during involvement as intermediary in the conflict situation; and thirdly, the third party's re-evaluation of its continued involvement as intermediary prior to the achievement of a settlement of the conflict in which it is involved. The emphasis is, therefore, on the initial response to the conflict and on the third party's tactical decisions during the interaction process with the conflict system. The study provides an analytic framework for the analysis of third party decision-making in response to conflict. The framework will be applied to the involvement

of the Western Contact Group in the conflict over Namibia.

1.1- Research Questions

The existing literature on the mediation process and the qualities of intermediaries points to both the variety of types of third parties that take up the intermediary role and the varied patterns of interaction that make up the mediation process. The types of third parties taking up the role of intermediaries range from the International Commission of the Red Cross to Quaker peace missions and ultimately, to the United States Secretary of State. A look at the differences in the forms of interaction that make up the mediation process involving these different types of third parties raises a question of the validity of placing all these under the rubric of "mediation". Analyses of third party involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, such as those of Dr. Kissinger and President Carter(5), and the Anglo-American mediation between Italy and Yugoslavia over Trieste(6) have raised important questions relating to assumptions made in theoretical and empirical work on mediation and mediator qualities. The assumption of impartiality and disinterest, originally seen as prerequisites for the intermediary role(7) is questioned by these examples. The common theme underlying these works is that the intermediaries involved were neither disinterested third parties, nor were they

impartial. In the terms used in this study, they were "interested intermediaries".

Once the move is made away from the assumption that third parties acting as intermediaries are necessarily disinterested in the substantive content of the conflict and may even be biased towards one of the parties, the focus of attention is drawn to the third party's own decision-making processes. Questions arise about the third party's motives for taking up the role of intermediary and the ensuing pattern of interaction between such a third party and the conflict system. For example, how do third parties' own interests in the conflict affect their decision to take up the role of intermediary? Can third parties have motives other than, and in addition to, seeking a settlement to the conflict? Can third parties perceive interests deriving from occupation of the role itself, regardless of any outcome to the conflict? Do third parties consider how they may influence the course of the conflict or its outcome prior to making a choice as to the best strategy to adopt, or response to make? All these questions may be aggregated into one analytic question, namely:

Is it possible to point to factors which influence a third party's decision to take up the role of intermediary? One of the primary aims of this study is to provide such a framework for the analysis of third party decision-making concerning the choice of the intermediary role in response

to a conflict situation.

The involvement of interested third parties in a conflict situation also raises questions about the pattern of interaction between such a third party and the conflict system. The first relates to any possibility of making a general statement about third party tactics during interaction with the conflict system. Specifically, do different types of third party adopt different mediation tactics when interacting with the conflict system? Can one point to differences in mediating behaviour between, for example, Quaker mediators or the World Council of Churches on the one hand and Dr. Kissinger on the other? Previous analyses of both suggest a wide variation of tactics used by such different types of third parties taking up the role of intermediary. Another aim of this study is to conceptualise intermediary behaviour in order that the full range of tactics may be illuminated. It is only once this is achieved that a framework may be constructed suggesting factors which influence a third party's choice of tactics during interaction with the conflict system and indicating the limits on a third party's choice of tactics. The second major question in the present study is, therefore:

Can we construct a framework to point to factors which commonly influence a third party's tactical decisions during interaction with the conflict system?

Given that conflicts are dynamic processes often

involving changes in the issues in conflict, the parties, and other third parties, the intermediary's own interests may change with the changing circumstances of the conflict and the third party's own evaluative processes. The possibility, therefore, arises that, if a third party takes its own interests into account when making the initial decision to intervene, it is reasonable to assume that, at some point during its involvement in the conflict, it may well re-evaluate its initial response to the conflict. Such re-evaluation may lead: [1] to the maintenance of the role in anticipation of success; or for other reasons, [2] to the abandonment of active involvement altogether; or [3] to a change in role, as when the third party becomes an ally to one of the parties in conflict. The third major question addressed in this study relates to such re-evaluation and seeks to build this dynamic feature of third party responses within the framework. The third question is, therefore:

What are the factors which influence a third party's decision to quit the role of intermediary prior to the achievement of a settlement, even when the third party remains acceptable within the role?

Given that language used in the social sciences generally (and in conflict research in particular) is language often used in everyday social interaction, and also that language and the way in which concepts are used often imply underlying assumptions, it is essential to

provide definitions of the central concepts used in this study. These include conflict, third party, and mediation. The concepts used in the analytic framework will be defined later in Chapter 3.

1.2- Conceptual Definitions

1.2.1- What is Conflict?

The first assumption in the use of the term, conflict, is that conflict has features that are common at all levels of social interaction. As such, it is possible to make general statements about this form of human interaction across societal levels. This implies that there are similarities between conflict at the inter-personal level for example, and conflict involving large organisations and governments. As such, conflict research is not merely confined to the study of war, but treats this as one manifestation of "social conflict"(8). This is a fundamental assumption within conflict research generally and in this study in particular. Thus, although the case-study used is a case of international conflict, the construction of the analytic framework has made use of studies within conflict literature involving conflicts at other levels of social interaction, as will be apparent in the review in the next chapter.

A second clarification required relates to the

recognition of the existence of a state of conflict when no outward signs of a condition are discernible. The main ambiguity about the term, conflict, is that it is often used to denote the occurrence of an outward manifestation of conflict; for example, the existence of violence between two parties. However, conflict does occur in the absence of any overt behaviour, including physical violence.

If conflict is not necessarily a condition of overt behaviour, how does an analyst conceptualise or even recognise its existence? There are two schools of thought within conflict research regarding the question of awareness on the part of the parties that they are in conflict. The "objective" school of thought argues that a conflict may exist even when one or both parties are not aware of its existence (the happy slave syndrome). The assertion here is that a conflict situation may exist without the necessity of the parties being aware of such a relationship. The idea is that the analyst recognises the "objective" incompatibility of interests even when the parties do not, citing "false consciousness" as one of the factors(9). Examples of such objective conflicts arise from cases of social stratification, such as class conflict(10).

The second school of thought, the "subjective" school, suggests that conflicts exist when "the parties

are aware that they are in contention" (11). While it is recognised that conflict may have objective elements, the present study assumes that a conflict situation arises when parties perceive a situation of goal incompatibility with one or more other parties. It recognises, however, that conflict must be conceived as a dynamic process whereby there may well be a situation of objective conflict which, for a variety of reasons, has not developed into a situation where the parties recognise a situation of goal incompatibility. As pointed out by Kriesberg, "Situations that an observer assesses as conflicting, are not social conflicts. We refer to such situations as objective, potential or latent conflicts. If the parties come to believe that they have incompatible goals, however, a social conflict has emerged." (12) To concentrate merely on objective conflict necessarily precludes any understanding of processes involved in the emergence of conflict, and in its development towards the use of some form of overt behaviour. Thus, to have a definition of conflict which merely concentrates on the awareness of the parties that they are in conflict also precludes other manifestations of conflict such as the behaviour which accompanies the condition of being in conflict.

The above discussion suggests that conflict is a dynamic phenomenon and that it has various elements. A definition is required, therefore, which encompasses the

various aspects of conflict. As pointed out by Kelman, "an understanding of conflict requires a focus on the ways in which interactions between the parties at different levels create the conditions for conflict, and help to feed, escalate and perpetuate it." (13) The emphasis is on the interactional nature of conflict and necessitates a definition which takes this into account. One such definition is provided by Mitchell (1981) who suggests a "multiple definition" (14) of conflict. This proposes that conflict is composed of inter-related components which are connected but which should, for analytical purposes, be distinct. Any conflict may, therefore, be composed of the following components:

- i) A conflict situation.
- ii) Conflict behaviour.
- iii) Conflict attitudes and perceptions.

A conflict situation is defined as "Any situation in which two or more social entities or 'parties'..perceive that they possess mutually incompatible goals." (15) A conflict situation may develop into the use of conflict behaviour by the parties and this is defined as "Actions undertaken by one party in any situation of conflict aimed at the opposing party with the intention of making that opponent abandon or modify its goals" (16). Conflict behaviour and the state of being in a conflict situation exerts an impact on conflict attitudes, which are "the psychological states or conditions that accompany (and frequently exacerbate) both conflict situations and the resultant

conflict behaviour" (17). The dynamic nature of conflict means that in any particular conflict, the conflict situation is subject to the effects and perceptions of the parties with regard to the issues in conflict and the adversary; these are in turn affected by the conflict behaviour of the parties, possibly generating new issues, or affecting attitudes. The interaction between the three components of conflict is illustrated in Figure 1.1.




Figure 1.1- The Structure of Conflict
(Mitchell, 1981, p.16)

The need for a multiple definition of conflict arises from a recognition that conflict is a dynamic, interactive process. This points to the nature of the processes involved in the life-cycle of a conflict and its development. Kriesberg (18) provides a theoretical framework for the study of the development of conflict. This begins with the existence of objective conflict which emerges into a social conflict with the development of awareness of goal incompatibility; the pursuit of conflict

goals (conflict behaviour); the escalation of conflict; its de-escalation, and its termination. The framework also points to the influence, on the various stages, of factors internal to the adversary (for example, the group's decision-making processes) and those factors which are part of the environment or external to the parties in conflict. The emphasis is again on the interactional nature of conflict. The value of Kriesberg's theoretical framework (illustrated in Figure 1.2) is that it points to the factors which contribute to the dynamism of a conflict situation. It also recognises that conflicts may involve a number of different parties, and that while the analyst may *focus upon* centralise one conflict (the "focal" conflict) this is often interlinked with other conflicts which may promote the focal conflict's escalation or de-escalation. Moreover, conflicts also have a "social context" (19) which includes "non-focal" parties, including allies, constituencies, intermediaries and other interested groups. Non-focal parties or, in the terms used in this study, third parties may influence the parties' goals, their mode of conflict behaviour, as well as their perceptions and attitudes. The focal parties may, in turn, shape their behaviour with third parties as targets; for example, with the aim of coalition formation or as a means of combating the main adversary more effectively (20).

Third parties may have a number of roles in relation to the focal conflict. The following provides a definition




Figure 1.2- The Cyclical Nature of Conflict
 Kriesberg, L., Social Conflicts,
 (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs,
 NJ, 1982), p. 19

of the concept of third party as used in the present study, and a classification scheme for third party roles, the eventual aim being to focus on the intermediary role.

1.2.2- A Typology of Third Party Roles

Before considering the various ways in which third parties may be involved in conflict, it is important to consider the concept of "third party" and its various uses in the literature.

1.2.2.1- The Concept of Third Party

The concept is often defined in terms of the role of the third party in relation to the conflict. Bercovitch, for example, defines a third party as "someone who is external to a certain conflict and who interposes between the conflict parties in order to help them with their conflict management efforts" (21). This is, however, more a definition of a third party as conflict manager, or even intermediary than it is of third party. It seems to imply that all third parties are conflict managers. The question is, therefore, can we usefully use the term, "third party", without confusing it with specific third party roles, which in themselves require definition?

An essential first step towards a definition of third

party, is to consider the third party as an offshoot of a pre-existing relationship between at least two others. As pointed out by Rubin, the third party is "...spawned by the relationship between the other two" (22).

Another important consideration in the definition of the concept of third party is that even if we reject the notion that a third party is necessarily external to the dispute (23), it has to be recognised that the relationship that the third party has with the conflict parties is, in some way, different from the basic relationship between the adversaries. As pointed out by Rubin, "...should the third party become centrally involved in the relationship between the two principals, thereby transforming a dyad into a triad, the basis of the third party's involvement is necessarily different from that of the disputants" (24).

A third important consideration with regard to the definition of the concept of third party derives, by implication, from the above two. To suggest that the third party is an offshoot of a pre-existing relationship between at least two others is to state that the third party may influence this relationship. A condition, therefore, of any particular party being a third party in a conflict is that it has an input into the conflict and is itself affected by the conflict.

The above three considerations suggest that a definition of "third party" has three essential elements:

[1] The existence of the third party suggests a pre-existing relationship between at least two others.

[2] The relationship of the third parties to the conflict parties is different from the basic relationship between the disputants.

[3] The third party may influence the conflict and/or is itself influenced or affected by the conflict.

1.2.2.2- Third Party Roles in Conflict

As Kriesberg points out, all conflicts occur within a "social context" which includes "...other parties audiences, political allies, adversaries, judges of the means and ends of the parties to the conflict, and potential beneficiaries of the losses suffered by both parties in the fight" (25). While this provides an indication of the range and variety of third parties in a conflict, it does not indicate a means of classifying third party types.

The essential first step towards the formulation of a typology of third parties is to distinguish between [i] those which have an active role in relation to the conflict; that is, those which actively intervene in a conflict "...with the objective of influencing the conflict in a direction the intervener defines as desirable" (26) and [ii] those who prefer to remain passive in relation to the conflict. The recent crisis in the Gulf created by the

Iran-Iraq war provides an excellent example of the importance of this distinction, where the US government decided to take an active role in response to the crisis while that of Japan, whose oil supplies were also affected, remained passive. Mitchell suggests that passive third parties may be divided into those which are audiences and those which are "affected others" (27).

A look at the negotiation literature provides indications of the variety of "passive" third parties; although in this context, these are usually referred to as "audiences" (28). Audiences are defined as those who are "...observing the negotiation process, informed of its results and/or affected by its outcomes" (29). The types of audiences suggested include those which are "team members"; that is, members of the negotiation team, the "constituency", "whose interests, demands, or priorities the negotiator is representing" (30), and finally the "bystanders", who may be affected by the negotiations and the disruptions of the dispute; for example, another trade union or the general public which may be inconvenienced by a strike. Passive third parties may, at certain points decide to intervene in a conflict in a more active manner, and the roles they may adopt are also varied.

When third parties do play an active role in a conflict, there are a range of possibilities. In an early paper, Young distinguishes between two types of third

parties, namely intermediaries and interventionists. The intermediaries were here defined as those third parties "...adopting a more impartial stance with regard to the opposing sides in a crisis" (31), while the interventionists are third parties "...motivated by some combination of independent interests and partisan interests favouring either of the opposing sides" (32). This is basically a distinction between third parties which enter a dispute as partisans on one side of the conflict and those which have the aim of aiding the parties in reaching a settlement to their conflict.

In a later paper, Young suggests three types of activity by third parties; namely imposition, intermediary and interventionist or "expansion" (33). This three-way distinction is also made by Mitchell (1981). The distinction is made between: [1] third parties which impose a settlement on the parties; examples being, binding arbitration, judicial settlement, a powerful third party imposing a cessation of conflict behaviour on the parties; [2] third parties who intervene "...with the primary intention of achieving some compromise settlement of the issues at stake between the parties.." (34); and [3] third parties intervening "...with the predominant motive of helping one of the original players to achieve an improved outcome or a payoff" (35) - in other words, third parties entering the conflict as allies of one party or another.

From the above discussion of active interveners in conflict, it seems useful to divide this category of third parties into enforcers, intermediaries, and allies(36). Figure 1.3 provides a classification scheme of third party types(37). The scheme suggests that intermediaries may be further divided into the professional third parties and those which take up the role on an ad hoc basis.

It is often difficult in specific empirical situations to draw a clear-cut distinction between these three types of third party activity, (especially in the case of, for example, government representatives mediating a dispute in which they have a specific substantive interest), since the roles often overlap in such situations. However, it is still analytically useful to distinguish between these three types of third party activity. It has to be recognised, however, that the three roles more often than not overlap and may even form a continuum of third party activity, as discussed in Chapter 3.

While a definition of third parties taking up the intermediary role has already been provided in the above typology, the following section provides a discussion of the type of activity which distinguishes mediation from other settlement processes.




Figure 1.3- Classification Scheme of Third Party Types modified from:
 Mitchell, C.R., "Motives for Mediation",
 in: Mitchell, C.R. and K. Webb, New Approaches to International Mediation,
 (Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1988).

1.2.3- Intermediaries and Mediator Functions

As indicated above, intermediaries are third parties who intervene, or are invited to intervene, with the stated objective of achieving a settlement between the conflicting parties. They are also acceptable in such a role by the parties(38). The intermediary's functions include the facilitation of communication between the parties and influencing parties towards changing their positions in order to make agreement possible. The intermediary may facilitate concessions from the parties by clarifying the issues in conflict, by helping the parties withdraw from commitments and by reducing the cost of concessions; that is, generally providing incentives for concession-making. The mediator may offer compromise formulae and substantive proposals(39).

By defining the intermediary as a third party involved in a bargaining context or negotiation(40), the assumption is made that the third party is necessarily an outsider to the basic conflict. This leads to the underlying assumption made in traditional mediation literature, that in order for a third party to occupy an intermediary role, the necessary prerequisites for such a role are impartiality, defined as "having nothing to gain from aiding either protagonist"(41) as perceived by the parties in conflict; and disinterest in the substantive content of the conflict.

Analyses of such interventions as that of Dr. Kissinger and President Carter in the Arab-Israeli conflict have questioned assumptions of impartiality and disinterest as prerequisites for the intermediary role. Another observation which questions the "third party as outsider" assumption is that often, in multilateral negotiations, one or more of the parties will take up an intermediary role to mediate a disagreement or a conflict between other participants. In this case, it can hardly be said that the intermediary or the participant who takes up this role is disinterested in the substantive content of the conflict.

It is, therefore, recognised in this study that third parties taking up the intermediary role may be interested in the substantive content of the conflict and may even be biased towards one of the parties. The essential characteristics which distinguish an intermediary from other third parties are that its primary aim is the settlement of the conflict and it is acceptable to both parties in the conflict. Another important feature of intermediary intervention is that such intervention transforms a basically dyadic bargaining situation into a three-cornered relationship, or a triad, where the third party can no longer be assumed to be an outsider. As well as carrying out intermediary functions, the third party may also bargain with the parties both to gain concessions facilitating agreement and/or to promote the third party's

own interests(42). This is an essential feature of the analytic framework (discussed in Chapter 3) for the systematic study of third party decision-making about both the initial response to the conflict and the later choice of tactics in interaction with the conflict system.

1.3- Outline of the Study

In this present work, an analytic framework is constructed with the aim of providing a systematic means of investigating third party decision-making in response to conflict. The applicability of the framework is then explored using the intervention of the Western Contact Group (WCG) as coalition intermediary in the conflict over Namibia. Before providing a chapter by chapter outline of the study, however, it is important to provide some justification of the methods used in this study, a word on epistemology being a prerequisite of any social scientific research, given the debates that preoccupy the field.

1.3.1- Methodology

The position taken in this study is that qualitative research based on a theoretical structure or construct composed of propositions suggesting the inter-relationship between variables forms a valuable input into our gradual

understanding of conflict as a form of human behaviour.

This study, moreover, does not reject quantitative analyses and mathematical modelling in the study of social phenomena. It does, however, reject the idea that methodology and the need for precise statistical analyses should be the determining factor in the questions posed and analyses formulated. While some research questions are amenable to statistical analyses- and these are valuable to the progress of theory- our quest for understanding conflict should not be restricted by the constraints of rigorous statistical testing. This is especially emphasised by the fact that data is not always available at a level necessary for statistical analysis. They are, furthermore, not always comparable.

Apart from providing a constraint on the questions open to investigation, there are a number of difficulties associated with seeking to make exact quantifiable propositions or hypotheses and subjecting these to rigorous testing. The main difficulty is that, as suggested by Burton(43), world society is composed of numerous overlapping and interlocking systems composed of relationships between actors, governmental and non-governmental, open to influences from other systems and therefore, from the environment. Social systems are, therefore, "open" systems and as such are subject to feedback, material and informational, from the surrounding environment. The implication is that "Because so 'many

different outcomes can arise out of basically similar conditions,' and vice versa, it is difficult to decide which 'causal' chain is correct"(44). Precise one-to-one, cause-effect relationships are, therefore, difficult to make given the openness and changeability of social systems. Does this mean, therefore, that social systems are not amenable to scientific investigation and predictability of patterns of interactions? Are there patterns, or is social interaction a completely random process?

It is the position of this study that we can make cause-effect propositions and thus hypothesise about patterns in human behaviour. At the same time, we must recognise that such statements and propositions are not determinist in that some element of unpredictability and openness remains(45). This assertion recognises the usefulness of determinism, as a starting point towards the formulation of theory and the making of testable propositions. As pointed out by North and Willard, "For purposes of theory formulation and testing, the determinist position does have certain advantages, even in the social sciences. There are important uses for the inelastic tool- the yardstick, the assumption of rational decision, the deterministic model"(46). Thus, if we do not assume some pattern in human behaviour, we would not even begin to attempt to explain it.

What of the testability of propositions or hypotheses? Is a proposition discarded if it is seen to be contradicted by empirical investigation? The position in this study is that while the proposition may not hold in the case under investigation, it may well hold in another situation. Moreover, if a proposition does hold true, this does not mean that it does so under all circumstances.

The use of case-studies in conflict research in general and in mediation in particular provides an opportunity of relating theoretical propositions, which in themselves derive from observation of empirical events and (at times) intuition, to a situation of reality. Moreover, the process of relating propositions to empirical events provides the opportunity of continual adjustment and readjustment of propositions in the gradual progress of our understanding of social phenomena. The aim is to be "theoretically progressive" (47), that is to provide more content and further questions regarding third party intervention in conflict. Another value in the use of case studies for the testing of propositions is that the case-study itself generates further insights and further propositions.

This study, therefore, provides an analytic framework(48), defining the factors which may explain third party decision-making in response to conflict, and makes a number of propositions regarding the relationships between them. The aim is to ensure systematic

investigation and understanding of the decision-making processes involved in a third party's initial choice of the intermediary role, through to the tactics used in the mediation process, and the decision relating to the ending of the mediation initiative as opposed to its continuation.

The Western Contact Group is used as case-study for several reasons. The participants were interested third parties in the conflict- as such this provided an opportunity of applying an analytic framework to a systematic investigation of such interventions. The fact that the Group was composed of five governments provided a potential for comparison of the applicability of the propositions formulated in the analytic framework. Moreover, the coalition nature of the initiative provided a further opportunity of investigating the relationship between the coalition as a whole and the individual participants' decision-making processes.

Because of the fact that the intervention of the Contact Group is a relatively recent occurrence, and one involving a controversial region of the globe, the research has necessarily relied on interviews of the actual participants in the Group as far as they were available. A number of the individuals interviewed were reluctant to be quoted directly, especially those still holding office. I have also made use of official

publications of the five governments where available, as well as the extensive United Nations documentation of the conflict over Namibia. Given the contemporary nature of the intervention, media sources have also been of great value in the conduct of this research. Secondary sources relating both to the WCG specifically and those concerning the conflict over southern Africa have also been of value.

1.3.2- A Chapter Outline

This study is organised so that previous research on the subject investigated is first reviewed, concentrating on that part of the literature which has been of value in the construction of the analytic framework. This also fulfills the aim of research discussed above; progress in theory building, and placing the present research within an ongoing process. The literature review is provided in Chapter 2. The analytic framework follows in Chapter 3.

The case-study itself starts in Chapter 4, where the characteristics of the conflict over Namibia are outlined to provide the context within which the Contact Group intervened. Chapter 5 investigates the way in which the five governments which came to form the WCG were, in fact, part of the conflict environment and as such were interested third parties in the conflict. Using the framework, Chapter 6 provides an analysis of the initial decision by the five governments to intervene in a

collective intermediary response to the conflict.

The Contact Group's pattern of interaction with the conflict system and its subsequent tactical decisions are the subject of analysis in Chapter 8. The analytic framework is used to investigate the tactical decisions made by the Group in its interaction with the conflict system. Prior to this, in Chapter 7, the long negotiation process (1977-1985) is outlined in order to highlight the main features of the negotiations and to provide the background material for Chapter 8.

The fact that the mediation attempt did not succeed in achieving a settlement of the dispute provides an opportunity of investigating the third issue in the study, namely, the third party's re-evaluation of continuing as opposed to abandoning the intermediary role. This is carried out in Chapter 9. The conclusion will indicate the applicability (or otherwise) of the propositions made in the analytic framework and points to questions which have arisen in this study.

Introduction- Notes

1- Koopman, E.J., "Family Mediation: A Developmental Perspective on the Field", in: Sandole, D.J.D. and I Sandole-Staroste, Conflict Management and Problem Solving, (Frances Pinter, London, 1987).

2- Alper, B.S., and L.T. Nichols, Beyond the Courtroom, (Lexington Books, Lexington, Mass., Toronto, 1981).
Concerned with projects which remove interpersonal and community conflict from the judicial system. Chapter 9 is concerned with mediation.

3- Douglas, A., Industrial Peacemaking, (Columbia University Press, New York, 1972).

4- Fisher, R., and Ury, W., Getting to 'Yes', (London, Hutchinson, and New York, Penguin, 1983).

5- Touval, S., The Peace Brokers, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1982).

6- Campbell, J.C., (ed.), Successful Negotiation: Trieste, 1954, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1976).

7- Young suggests that, "To the extent that an intervening party is perceived as partial to one side or the other, it loses its status as a true third party. . ."
Young, O.R., The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1967), p. 81.

8- Kriesberg uses as case studies industrial, university, gender, race, internal conflict or revolution, and international conflicts to illustrate his theoretical framework on "social conflicts" as a whole.
See Kriesberg, L., Social Conflicts, (Prentice Hall Inc, Englewood Cliffs, NJ,, 1982).

9- For example, Schmid suggests that "in an objective model of conflict . . . conflict is seen as built into a structure and as determined by this structure. Behaviour and attitudes are but symptoms of the conflict which is independent of what the actors think or do." See:

Schmid, H., "Peace Research and Politics" Journal of Peace Research, Volume 5, No. 3, 1968, p. 217.

10- The "objective" school of thought refers to "false consciousness" as a reason for groups not recognising a situation of conflict. As pointed out by Kriesberg, false consciousness may arise because of fear of the consequences of recognising a conflict situation; it may also arise because one or more of the objectively antagonistic groups "believe in the legitimacy of the

situation, even if they are "oppressed" in it, and therefore fail to recognise their interests".
Kriesberg, op. cit., p.4.

11- Kriesberg, *ibid*, p.3.

12- *Ibid*, p.18.

13- Kelman, H.C., "An Interactional Approach to Conflict Resolution and Its Application to Israeli-Palestinian Relations", International Interactions, Vol. VI, 1979, pp. 99-122.

14- Mitchell, C.R., The Structure of International Conflict, (Macmillan Press Ltd., London and Basingstoke, 1981).

15- *Ibid*, p. 17.

16- *Ibid*, p. 29.
Mitchell also points out that conflict behaviour may range from violent conflict to persuasion to reward. It may include all tacit bargaining behaviour. *Ibid.*, p. 125.

17- *Ibid*. p. 25.

18- Kriesberg, op. cit., p. 15.

19- *Ibid*, p. 327.

20- For example, the South African policy of military incursion into the FLS is mainly aimed at persuading their governments into denying the Southern African Liberation Movement bases, and sanctuary.

21- Bercovitch, J., Social Conflicts and Third Parties, (Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1984), p. 13.

22- Rubin, J.Z., Dynamics of Third Party Intervention: Kissinger in the Middle East, (Prager, New York, 1981), p.5.

23- For example, a third party acting as intermediary may be an ally to one of the parties.

24- Rubin, op. cit., p. 5.

25- Kriesberg, op. cit., p. 327.

26- Laue, J., "The Emergence and Institutionalization of Third Party Roles in Conflict", in: Sandole and Sandole-Staroste, op. cit., p. 20.

27- Mitchell, C.R., "The Motives for Mediation", in: Mitchell, C.R. and K. Webb, New Approaches to

International Mediation, (Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1988).

28- See: Rubin, J.Z. and B.R. Brown, The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation, (Academic Press, New York, 1975), and

Lewicki, R.J. and J.A. Litterer, Negotiation, (Irwin, Homewood, Il, 1985).

29- Lewicki and Litterer, *ibid*, p. 215.

30- *ibid*.

31- Young, O.R., "Intermediaries and Interventionists: Third Parties in the Middle East Crisis", International Journal, Vol. 23, (1967), p. 52.

32- *Ibid*.

33- Young, O.R., "Intermediaries: Additional Thoughts on Third Parties." Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1972, p. 52.

34- Mitchell (1981), *op. cit.*, p. 275.

35- Young (1972), *op. cit.*, p. 52.

36- Laue and Cormick suggest that third party roles include those of the "activist", the "advocate", the "mediator", the "researcher", and the "enforcer".

Laue, J.H. and G. Cormick, "The Ethics of Intervention in Community Disputes", in: Barmant, G., H. Kelman, and D. Warwick (eds), The Ethics of Social Intervention, (Halsted Press, New York, 1978), discussed in Laue, *op. cit.*, pp. 26- 28.

37- This scheme is modified from Mitchell (1988), *op. cit.*

38- Touval, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

39- For a general review of mediator techniques, see: Wall, J.A., Jr., "Mediation: An Analysis, Review and Proposed Research", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 25, No. 1, March 81, pp. 157-180.

40- It is important to distinguish between negotiation and bargaining. The negotiation process includes bargaining between the parties, but also any positions taken outside the negotiation chamber. Gulliver makes this distinction in stating that: "The narrower process of bargaining occurs within that comprehensive framework of negotiation". Thus bargaining is defined as that process which "consists of the presentation and exchange of more or less specific proposals for the terms of agreement on particular issues... the process of demand, offer, bid,

and their counters... relating to settlement points on items in the dispute". See:
Gulliver, P.H., Disputes and Negotiations: A Cross Cultural Perspective, (Academic Press, New York, 1979), p. 71.

41- Young (1967), Intermediaries, op. cit., p. 81.

42- A triadic or multi-party situation raises the possibility of coalition formation. Both the threat that a biased mediator will join in a coalition and actual participation in one provides the mediator with bargaining power. As pointed out by Touval the influence of the "biased" mediator derives from its bargaining position within the triadic bargaining situation.
Touval, op. cit., p. 15.

43- Burton, J.W., World Society, (Cambridge University Press, London and New York, 1972).

44- North, R.C., and M.R. Willard, "The Post Behavioural Debate: Indeterminism, Probabilism, and the Interaction of Data and Theory" in: Banks, M. (ed.), Conflict in World Society, (Wheatsheaf Books Ltd., Brighton, Sussex, 1984) p. 29.

45- Popper made a useful distinction between "clocks" (closed systems) and "clouds" (open systems, ie those open to a degree of chance) and suggested that in acquiring knowledge we needed something "between perfect chance and perfect determinism - something intermediate between perfect clouds and perfect clocks". See:
Popper, K.R., Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972), p.208.

46- North and Willard, op. cit., p. 34.

47- According to Imre Lakatos, "...a series of theories is theoretically progressive...if each new theory has some excess empirical content over its predecessor, that is, if it predicts some novel, hitherto unexpected fact."
Lakatos, I, and A. Musgrave, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, 1970) p. 119.

48- An analytic framework implies the organisation of a set of variables and their relationships with each other, presented as explanatory factors in the explanation of a depended variable; in this case, the 3 phases of third party decision-making in response to conflict.

CHAPTER 2- THIRD PARTY DECISION-MAKING IN RESPONSE TO CONFLICT: A REVIEW OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH

This chapter focuses on that part of the literature which has been relevant in the formulation of an analytic framework which may be used in a systematic look at third party decision-making in response to conflict. The literature which will be reviewed, therefore, is that which has been useful in addressing three issues of interest to the present study, namely, [1] third party choice of the role of intermediary in response to conflict; [2] third party tactical choices during involvement as intermediary; and [3] third party reevaluation of the role leading to its abandonment prior to the achievement of a successful outcome. Given that the case-study used in this particular study concerns a coalition intermediary, the relevant literature will also be considered.

2.1- Third Party Decision-Making in Response to Conflict

This section will consider the relevant literature and previous research which has been of value in the construction of an analytic framework for the systematic study of third party decision-making in response to conflict. Since the third party activity of interest is intermediary activity, the main focus of this review will be on studies related to intermediaries, although work related to other third party responses has also been

useful and will be considered where appropriate. This section is divided into three parts, based on the three phases of third party decision-making of interest to the present study; [1] the third party's choice of the role of intermediary, [2] the tactical choice decisions made during involvement, and [3] third party re-evaluation of the role.

2.1.1- Third Party Choice of the Intermediary Role in Response to Conflict

There is a distinct lack of any systematic research on the question of third parties' decision-making regarding their response to a conflict situation. This is especially the case in relation to third parties which decide to take up the intermediary role.

There has, however, been theoretical and empirical consideration of the factors which may lead third parties to take sides in response to a conflict situation, and these have, to a limited extent, been useful in the present study. There is, for example, a vast array of literature on coalition formation which provides an insight into "taking sides" as a third party reaction to conflict. Evert van de Vliert(1) makes use of theories of coalition formation in an investigation of siding as a reaction to conflict. The primary usefulness of coalition theories is for predicting the side chosen by the third

party, based on relative strengths(2) and proximity of values and goals(3). As pointed out by de Vliert, however, "not a single coalition theory gives (the third party) the possibility to compromise or to resolve the conflict.."(4). However, de Vliert is himself interested in siding as a reaction, and suggests that it is the most likely reaction, thereby avoiding explanation of why third parties react to a conflict by taking up an intermediary role(5).

Another study concerned with "Choosing Sides in Wars" is that of Altfeld and de Mesquita(6). Using expected utility theory, they consider how third parties choose sides or remain "neutral" in a war situation. The mathematical model based on expected utility theory is determinist and limited in a number of ways. With regard to the conflict itself, it assumes that this is made up of two sides, assumed to be monolithic, who are characterised purely in terms of "military capability". Outcomes to the conflict are conceived as either side winning or losing, based on military capability. Moreover, the choices available to the third party are siding with the "stronger" party, the "weaker" party, or remaining neutral. This study is useful in that it points to factors which make up the third party's "calculus" about taking sides or remaining neutral, such as utility derived from outcomes to the conflict and a separate utility derived from the strategy adopted, regardless of

outcome (7).

A look at the mediation literature points to the variety of third parties that have occupied the role of intermediary in response to conflicts at all levels of social interaction. The immediate question which arises, therefore, concerns the motives such diverse third parties have in taking up the intermediary role.

The lack of any systematic research or coherent theoretic consideration of the question of what makes third parties choose the role of intermediary in response to conflict is primarily due to the fact that most of the literature on mediation concerns itself with the effectiveness of specific mediation techniques and intermediary qualities. That is, they are concerned mainly with outcomes to a mediation effort. The most comprehensive review of the state of the art concerns itself with this question(8). The focus of attention is thereby shifted from the third party's decision-making processes to the outcomes of particular mediation efforts.

The use of the term "choice" in considering third party decision-making about taking up the role of intermediary implies that a third party makes a cost/benefit evaluation in considering a response to a conflict. Young(9) addresses this question in considering "third party incentives" for taking up the intermediary

role. He suggests that "...it is important to assess the incentive structure of the intermediary by identifying the principal benefits and costs that may accrue to the intermediary"(10). This implies that the intermediary acts in a "self-centered, as well as rational fashion"(11) in making this calculation prior to intervention. This is a useful starting point in the analysis of any choice behaviour(12), and in this particular context, allows the analyst to point to factors that influence the third party's choice.

The assumption that third parties are rational actors making cost/benefit evaluations raises the question of the applicability of formal rational choice models in considering third party choice of the intermediary role. The work of Altfeld and de Mesquita(13) on third party decision-making leading to taking sides in conflict is of relevance here. The authors use an expected utility approach in devising a "calculus" which third parties are presumed to make before their response to conflict. Apart from the problems discussed above, other limitations indicate why the approach is inappropriate for application to third parties choosing to mediate in conflict. For example, the probability calculation is far more complex than these authors and traditional rational actor approaches would suggest. The probability of success or failure on the part of the intermediary will always be difficult to calculate. Moreover, as pointed out by Young,

"..there is considerable scope for variations in the calculations of different third parties concerning the profitability of assuming the role of intermediary"(14). Different third parties are likely to put a different value to such intangible benefits as prestige or reputation and other benefits and costs related with the role.

The assumption that third parties are self-centred, rational decision-makers who make a cost/benefit evaluation of the alternatives available prior to taking up the role of intermediary raises next the question of the types of benefits and the likely costs that may accrue from the role. This question is also addressed by Young in the same article. He suggests that apart from "salaried professionals", who benefit from a regular income, there are benefits which are dependent on success or failure, including, for example, incentive pay, advances in political careers, and such intangible benefits as personal satisfaction and prestige(15).

Again, as with benefits associated with the intermediary role, the losses are considered by Young(16) in terms of loss of time and energy, (that is opportunity costs), on the one hand, and those which are dependent on success or failure of the mission on the other. The latter costs include frustration, the expenditure of political capital, such as political favours and debts,

and thirdly, the fact that failure may affect the third party's ability to play the role again in the future because of a lack of credibility in the role.

Young's typology of costs and benefits ignores the likely situation where the third party actually has a substantive interest in the conflict, as has been shown to be the case in recent analyses of such third parties as Dr. Kissinger or President Carter in the Arab-Israeli conflict(17), and in a multilateral negotiating situation where one of the negotiators takes up the role of intermediary to facilitate a settlement between two or more disputing parties(18). This literature points to the fact that an interested third party and even a blatantly "biased" one(19) may take up the role of intermediary. Examples of interested or biased mediation also exist in conflicts at other levels of social interaction. Gulliver(20) points to examples of interested mediation at the village community level, and Bacow and Wheeler(21) to such mediation in environmental disputes. An example at the industrial relations level was the recurrent attempts by the TUC to resolve the "Wapping dispute" (involving the print unions and News International) and attempts by the Labour spokesperson on energy, Stan Orme, to resolve the 1984 miners' dispute in Britain. The analytical implications of the move away from the "third party as outsider" assumption (and the realisation that intermediaries may well be interested and even biased) are

that other factors can influence the third party's calculations in taking up an intermediary role, such as interests in the substantive content of the conflict and in the relationship of the third party to the adversaries and others in the conflict, such as patrons.

Rubin's volume(22) on Kissinger's intervention in the Arab-Israeli conflict, for example, is valuable in pointing to the range of motives which prompted such intervention by the US Administration, including interest in continuing oil supplies, maintaining relations with Israel, and a prospect of gaining influence with Egypt and preventing the USSR from furthering its gains in the region. Such interests in the conflict itself, in terms of the relationship with the adversaries, allies, and other interested third parties, including the mediator's own constituency, provide an indication of the location of the third party's interests and motives for intervention. Such interests are quite apart from Kissinger's own personal interests in gaining prestige and reputation for success in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The value of Touval's work(23) on "biased" mediators also lies in the analysis of various interventions by third parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict and in considering for each the interests which led to such intervention. Thus, although these works are by no means systematic works on third party decision-making about a response to conflict, they do provide valuable source

material for a more systematic attempt at tackling this question.

Touval and Zartman(24), suggest two kinds of interests that prompt the choice of mediation. The first occurs when "...conflict between two actors threatens the mediators interests" (25). The primary aim here is damage limitation as in, for example, settling a dispute between two members of an alliance or preventing a rival power from extending its influence by moving in. A second kind of interest is "the desire to extend and increase one's influence" (26) with the parties.

The most systematic treatment of the question of motives for mediation is provided by Mitchell(27). As the discussion of Kissinger's intervention in the Arab-Isaeli conflict and Young's typology of third party interests indicate, it would seem useful to distinguish between interests which are personal to the mediator and those which derive from the fact that the mediator is a representative of an interested organisation or government. This would differentiate Kissinger's interest in gaining prestige, for example, and US interests in maintaining oil supplies, or keeping the USSR out of the Middle East. Mitchell suggests a distinction between "individual" as opposed to "institutional" motives for intervention. Another useful distinction relates to the "arenas" of the conflict which potentially would provide

rewards for the third party; for example, the parties to the conflict, their allies, their constituencies or other interested third parties in the conflict. While the previously mentioned theorists consider what may be termed outcome-related rewards, Mitchell suggests that the third party may gain from the process of being mediator regardless of any outcome to the conflict(28). The avoidance of having to take sides is an example of such a motive.

Thus, a combination of relevant literature suggests that third parties which take up the role of intermediary firstly make a rough cost/benefit evaluation prior to responding in such a way, and assess the likely benefits that may accrue from such a role and the likely costs. As far as analysis of third party decision-making, therefore, an analyst must decipher the incentive structure of the third party and realise that the benefits are not only outcome-related, but are also linked to the process of being involved in the role regardless of outcome. This approach is also useful in a consideration of third party decisions about tactical choices as well as in considering the factors which lead to third parties abandoning the role prior to the achievement of a settlement to the conflict.

2.1.2- Third Party Tactical Choice Decisions

There is a plethora of published material on tactics used by third parties functioning as intermediaries. Given the diversity of third parties as well as situations where mediation is used does mediator handling of conflict lend itself to any systematic analysis? The common strands identified in the literature concerning intermediary activity, coupled with the differences that are apparent in the handling of disputes by such diverse third parties as Kissinger and Quaker Peace Missions, point to several factors which may influence third party choice of tactics in interaction with the conflict system.

Most of this material refers to "functions" that intermediaries fulfill in carrying out their role(29). Others talk of mediator "techniques"(30) and mediator activities(31). Intermediary activity ranges from the provision of information to the parties and the clarification of issues to the provision of a face-saving device for a conceding party(32). A common strand in this work relates to specific functions traditionally associated with intermediary activity which may be summarised as:

- The facilitation of communication between the parties,
- The formulation of proposals,
- The inducement of concessions. (33)

A useful conception of the intermediary role is the

degree of involvement by the third party in the negotiation process. Burton's presentation of third party settlement activity is according to the degree of "third party coercion and intervention" in the process(34). Touval adopts this approach in distinguishing intermediaries involved in good offices, conciliation and mediation. Thus, intermediaries who confine their activities "mainly to the technical aspects of helping the adversaries to communicate with each other, such as providing a meeting place or transmitting messages, are described as performing good offices"(35). If third parties are also engaged in trying to "modify the parties' images of each other and to influence them to make concessions by clarifying to each his opponent's views, and the bargaining situation that both face"(36), they are engaged in "conciliation". Mediation is taken to subsume the functions of good offices and conciliation and presents further intervention by the third party in the decision-making process, since the intermediary here may "make suggestions pertaining to the substance of the conflict, and seek to influence the parties to make concessions by exerting pressures and offering incentives"(37). Gulliver also suggests that intermediary activity may be conceptualised in terms of a continuum of intervention. The continuum runs from "virtual passivity, to 'chairman', to 'enunciator', to 'prompter', to 'leader', to virtual arbitrator"(38).

The intermediary role is, in fact, best conceptualised in terms of a spectrum of activity ranging from the overtly bargaining activity exemplified by Dr. Kissinger's involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict(39) to the conciliation activity undertaken by Quaker mediators in the Nigerian civil war(40), or the World Council of Churches in the Sudanese civil war(41). This suggests that it may be useful to consider third party activity in terms of a spectrum of activity ranging from the bargaining, where the third party uses bargaining tactics to obtain concessions, to the facilitative, where the third party's activity is confined to facilitating communication and clarification. An early work by Kressler(42), who considers mediator activity in terms of those which are facilitative and those which are "directive" has been useful in this conceptualisation.

Despite the wide interest in mediation reviewed above, there has been little in the form of systematic attempts at the analysis of third party decisions about tactical choices. A key question is: Can we formulate a framework to point to factors which commonly influence a third party's tactical choices in interaction with the conflict system? The literature has seldom dealt with this important question, and where it does it remains anecdotal and unsystematic. However, the case-study material, especially that which has looked at the activity of such third parties as Dr. Kissinger, has been of value in

building up this part of the analytic framework, as has Touval's work and Rubin's edited volume on the dynamics of third party intervention(43).

Touval's work on "biased" mediators has been important in pointing to two main factors which influence third party tactics, namely third party self-interest coupled with the third party's bargaining power. This suggests that the intervention of an interested third party into a dyadic bargaining situation transforms it into a three-cornered relationship or a triad. Looking to coalition theory(44), Touval suggests that the bargaining power of the mediator is enhanced by the prospect of coalition formation between the mediator and one adversary against another. The biased mediator's bargaining power is also enhanced by its already existing relationship with one of the adversaries; witness the United States and Israel. These two aspects of mediator qualities; that is, interest and coercive potential, have already been emphasised by other analysts as influencing third party activity(45).

Touval's emphasis on the three-cornered bargaining relationship has been of great value in attempting to outline factors which influence third party behaviour. The central premise of the analytic framework presented in the next chapter is, in fact, that the third party, (especially the interested third party) is functioning within a triadic bargaining situation, with the third party

being one of the negotiators or bargainers. This conceptualisation immediately implies the utility of the bargaining and negotiation literature. This has been of value in determining the factors which influence bargaining behaviour, although the focus in this sector of the literature is on the bargaining behaviour of parties in conflict and not on mediators. A useful conception of the negotiation process derived from Zartman(46) is that it is a joint decision-making process. The most useful of this theoretical and empirical work on negotiation has been that of Gulliver(47), who emphasises the dynamic aspect of the negotiation process. This has pointed to the idea that, as with parties in any negotiation system, the third party's tactical decisions in interaction with the conflict system must involve a process of adjustment and readjustment to the dynamic conditions of that system.

The third party does not, however, only interact with the parties in conflict. The context within which the third party functions has been explicated most usefully by Wall in his detailed definition of the "mediation paradigm" outlining at the same time the range of mediation techniques used by third parties in their interaction within the "mediated negotiation system" and its "environment". The former consists of the "...mediator, the two negotiators, and the relationships among them", while their environment includes "...the negotiators' constituents, the mediators constituents, the third

parties who affect or are affected by the process and outcomes of the mediated negotiation" (48). This suggests, therefore, that the third party's activity is directed at and influenced by, not only the immediate parties to the conflict, but also by the various constituents, of the mediator itself, and of the negotiators as well as by other third parties in the conflict environment. Wall's review is also useful in pointing to the "contextual" factors which may influence third party techniques, such as the relative experience of the negotiators, whom the negotiators represent, and their stake in the negotiation. Works concerned with the analysis of bargaining and negotiation (such as those of Druckman; Strauss; and Raiffa(49)), have been useful in defining the negotiation context within which the third party functions. It is useful in defining the negotiation context and how this influences the third party's tactical choice decisions within the dynamic and changing conditions of the negotiations and the third party's involvement therein.

Apart from the negotiation context having an impact on third party activity, the characteristics of the conflict, (including the issues in conflict, the nature of the relationship between the parties, and the existence of patrons) are important influence factors on the third party's behaviour. Conceptualisation of the conflict characteristics has made use of Kriesberg's work on social

conflicts.

2.1.3- Third Party Re-evaluation of the Role and the decision to Quit

This is perhaps the most under-researched aspect of third party involvement in conflict. The question put forward here is: What are the factors which influence a third party's decision to quit the role prior to the achievement of a settlement, and where the third party is still acceptable within the role?

The assumption made in the section which dealt with third party choice of the intermediary role suggested that the third party is likely to act in a rational manner in evaluating the costs and benefits of taking up the role. This is also useful in pointing to the factors which influence the third party's decision to quit, suggesting that the third party quits when the costs of involvement begin to outweigh the benefits. However, contrary to conventional rational choice theory, the third party may not, in fact, quit when it seems to an external analyst that it should.

A useful early work by Levine(50) considers the question of when one mediation effort ends and another begins in building up a "universe" of mediation efforts. It does not, however, consider the third parties' decision-making processes leading to the ending of a

mediation effort.

The most useful part of the literature which has been helpful in formulating a framework for the analysis of this aspect of third party decision-making has been that dealing with conflict termination; that is, the decision by parties in conflict to quit and go for settlement as opposed to continuing conflict behaviour. This is not to suggest that conflict parties behave in a similar manner to the third party, but that there are commonalities in terms of decision-making processes in social interaction generally(51).

For example, it is conceivable that a situation of stalemate in the negotiations and seeming lack of success on the part of the third party to change the parties' positions may lead to the third party beginning to question the value of its continued involvement as mediator. The impact of stalemate on adversaries's decisions to quit has been discussed by Edmead(52). Just as parties in conflict may decide between investing more in the dispute or quitting while the going is good, so the same rationalisation may apply to a third party's evaluation of a stalemate situation in a negotiation.

While traditional rational choice theory might suggest that the third party quits when the costs outweigh the benefits, decision-makers often invest more in a particular course of action, even when the costs mount.

The literature dealing with entrapment theory, especially work by Teger(53) and Rubin(54), has been of value here, although these authors do not discuss third party decision-making nor do they consider the question of a third party's re-evaluation of its role as intermediary. In a situation, for example, where the third party has risked its reputation on the role, it is conceivable that it would invest more in the role to retrieve the resources (reputation) already expended in the role.

Another issue related to the above which traditional rational choice theory ignores, is that particular benefits and particular costs, may not retain the same value over time. In relation to adversaries conflict termination decisions, Mitchell has referred to the "worth" of outcomes(55). This may be applied to third party decision-making in quitting the role and contributes to a conceptualisation of third party involvement in conflict as a continuous and dynamic situation where the third party continues to evaluate the costs and benefits of involvement.

Another criticism which has been made of rational actor theory and the way it has been applied to the end or termination of conflict relates to the fact that the parties are taken to be monolithic entities, an assumption made by de Mesquita(56). Mitchell and Nicholson's work(57) on this aspect of parties' decisions to quit has been

useful, although these studies have not been applied to third party decision-making. This factor would conceivably be important in a third party which is representing a wider organisation such as a trade union or a government, where the mediator her/himself may well have a different evaluation of continuing the role as opposed to quitting compared to the decision-makers "back home". This factor would be doubly important when the third party is a coalition of third parties acting as intermediaries, as is the case in this present study.

2.2- Coalition Mediation

The existence of a coalition intermediary in this study has made it necessary to look at material on such intermediaries and at the factors which influence their activity. However, as with the three aspects of third party decision-making discussed above, the literature is based on descriptions of particular interventions and lacks systematic treatment.

These have, however, been useful in pointing to particular characteristics of team or coalition intermediaries. This has usually been discussed in terms of the advantages and disadvantages of collective interventions. One of the useful works here has been that of Campbell(58) which discusses one successful team mediation, that of the Anglo-American intervention over

Trieste. This case study is useful in that it points to features of this particular initiative which contributed to its success; one such factor being the high level of agreement between the two third parties.

Other team efforts have, however, been beset with problems, such as a lack of cohesion among the participants. The OAU's intervention in the Arab-Israeli conflict is one such example and has been reviewed and analysed by Touval(59). Another such example is the Palestine Conciliation Commission(60).

Rubin(61) also discusses the advantages and disadvantages of collective intervention and points to an additional advantage of such interventions as providing the pooled resources as well as the differential influence that the members of the coalition may bring to the mediation. These studies collectively have been useful in pointing to what I shall call "intra-coalition factors" which may affect third party activity. They are also useful in deciphering the motives for coalition intervention, one such motive being the spread of costs and increasing of bargaining power.

2.3- Conclusion

The above review indicates that there is a general lack of theoretic and empirical work concerning third party decision-making in response to conflict. It has focussed,

however, on particular works which have been of value in building up the analytic framework presented in the following chapter. As indicated, some of these works do not necessarily deal with the questions of immediate concern here, but have been of value in providing insights into the three phases of third party decision-making in response to conflict.

1. The literature on Carter's theory of coalition formation is that it usually considers power resources as the determining factor in coalition formation. It is important, however, that parties may consider that the particular issue they are most concerned with before making a choice of allies. For example, see the following work by the author and others in their review of coalition formation in political parties.

Cartwright, S. F., & V. J. Packer, eds. C. Leifer, ed. (1977). *The Theory of Coalition Formation: International Development and the Case of East Germany*. Ohio State University Press, Columbus, Ohio, 1977.

2. For a review of the literature on coalition formation in political parties, see the following work by the author and others.

Cartwright, S. F., & V. J. Packer, eds. (1977). *The Theory of Coalition Formation: International Development and the Case of East Germany*. Ohio State University Press, Columbus, Ohio, 1977.

3. For a review of the literature on coalition formation in political parties, see the following work by the author and others.

Cartwright, S. F., & V. J. Packer, eds. (1977). *The Theory of Coalition Formation: International Development and the Case of East Germany*. Ohio State University Press, Columbus, Ohio, 1977.

4. For a review of the literature on coalition formation in political parties, see the following work by the author and others.

CHAPTER 2- NOTES

1- Van de Vliert, E., "Siding and Other Reactions to a Conflict", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 25, no. 3, Sept. 1981, pp. 495-520.

2- Caplow's theory of coalition formation is concerned with the "minimal winning coalition" and is based on the distribution of "power" resources within a triad. For example, if A is stronger than B, B is equal to C, but B and C together are stronger than A, then the likely coalition is BC against A.

See Caplow, T., Two Against One: Coalitions in Triads, (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1968).

3- The limitation of Caplow's theory of coalition formation is that it mainly considers power resources as the determining factor in coalition formation. It is conceivable, however, that parties may consider that the particular ties that connect them to each party before making a choice of sides. Groennings et al consider this aspect of coalition formation in their review of coalition behaviour applied to political parties.

Groennings, S.E., E.W. Kelley, and M. Leiserson (eds.), The Study of Coalition Behaviour: Theoretical Perspectives and Cases from Four Continents, (Holt, Rinehart, and Weston, New York, 1970).

4- Van de Vliert, op. cit., p. 500.

5- Van de Vliert suggests that:

(i) in order for a third party to resolve its own role conflict (due to pressure from side A and B), its first reaction (to resolve its own role conflict) would be to gather information about the situation. Such information would only come from sides A and B.

(ii) the information collected will be one-sided, thus increasing the pressure to choose one side.

(iii) assumption that "Western culture...tends to think in contrasts" (p. 503).

6- Altfeld M.F. and B. Bueno de Mesquita, "Choosing Sides in Wars", International Studies Quarterly, Vol 23, No. 1, 1979, pp. 87-112.

7- Altfeld and de Mesquita's work is also useful in that it considers (as part of a third party's calculus) expected utility derived from outcome of a war being a function of both the utility for each of the possible outcomes and the third party's ability to influence that outcome.

8- Wall, J.A. Jr., "Mediation: An Analysis, Review and Proposed Research", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.

- 25, No.1, March 1981, pp.157-180.
- 9- Young, O.R., "Intermediaries: Additional Thoughts on Third Parties", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 16, No. , pp.51-65.
- 10- Ibid, p.60.
- 11- Ibid.
- 12- Riker and Ordeshook emphasize the usefulness of the assumption of rationality as a starting point to the study of choice behaviour. See:
Riker, W.H. and P.C. Ordeshook, An Introduction to Positive Political Theory, (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1973), pp.8-12.
- 13- Altfeld and de Mesquita, op. cit.
- 14- Young, op. cit., p.61.
- 15- Ibid.
- 16- Ibid.
- 17- For comprehensive analysis of the involvement of Dr. Kissinger, see:
Rubin, J.Z., Dynamics of Third Party Intervention: Kissinger in the Middle East, (Praeger, New York, 1981), and for an analysis of the involvement of both Dr. Kissinger and President Carter, see:
Touval, S., The Peace Brokers, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1982), Chapters 9 and 10.
- 18- Stenelo considers multilateral disarmament conferences as case-studies when a number of the delegates, especially from the Scandinavian and Non-Aligned countries form coalitions to mediate between the two blocs. See:
Stenelo, L.G., Mediation in International Negotiation, (Studentlitteratur, Sweden, 1972).
- 19- Touval, S., "Biased Intermediaries: Theoretical and Historical Considerations", Jerusalem Journal of International Studies, Vol 1, No., 1, 1975, pp.50-69.
- 20- Gulliver, P.H., Disputes and Negotiations. A Cross-Cultural Perspective, (Academic press, New York, 1979).
- 21- Bacow, L.S. and M. Wheeler, Environmental Dispute Resolution, (Plenum Press, New York and London, 1984). 1984.
- 22- Rubin, op. cit.
- 23- Touval, op. cit.

- 24- Touval, S. and I.W. Zartman, "Introduction: Mediation in Theory", in: Touval S. and I.W. Zartman (eds), International Mediation in Theory and Practice, (Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1984), pp.7-17.
- 25- Ibid, p.8.
- 26- Ibid, p.9.
- 27- Mitchell, C.R., "The Motives for Mediation", in: Mitchell C.R. and K. Webb, New Approaches in International Mediation, (Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1988).
- 28- Mitchell distinguishes three types of rewards deriving from the intermediary role; "process rewards", "achievement rewards", and "settlement rewards". Ibid.
- 29- Young, op. cit., and, Mitchell, C.R., The Structure of International Conflict, (Macmillan, London, 1981), Chapter 12.
- 30- Wall, op. cit.
- 31- Kriesberg, L., Social Conflicts, (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1982).
- 32- For a comprehensive review of mediator activities and functions, see: Wall, op. cit.
- 33- A review of intermediary activities at the international level emphasising these three aspects of intermediary activity is provided by Bercovitch. See: Bercovitch, J., Social Conflicts and Third Parties, (Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1984).
- 34- Burton, J.W., Conflict and Communication, (MacMillan, London, 1969), pp.150-157.
- 35- Touval, (1982), op. cit., p.4.
- 36- Ibid.
- 37- Ibid.,
- 38- Gulliver, op.cit., p.220.
- 39- Touval, 1982, op. cit.
- 40- Yarrow, C.H., Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation, (Yale University Press, New Haven, CT and London, 1978).
- 41- See Assefa, H., "World Council of Churches Mediation and the Sudan Civil War", in Mitchell and Webb, op. cit.

- 42- Kressler, K., Labor Mediation: An Exploratory Survey, (New York: Association of Labor Mediation Agencies, 1972).
- 43- Touval, 1982, op. cit.; Rubin, op. cit.
- 44- Touval (1982) suggests that "Both the threat that he(the mediator) will join in a coalition with the adversary and the actual participation in a coalition provides the mediator with bargaining power", op. cit., p.15.
- 45- Mitchell (1981) suggests a classification scheme of third parties along the two dimensions of coercive potential and stake in outcome, op. cit., p.297.
- 46- Zartman, I.W., "Negotiation as a Joint Decision-Making Process", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. XXI, No. 4, 1977, p.620.
- 47- Gulliver, op. cit.
- 48- Wall, op. cit., p.158.
- 49- See: Druckman, D., Human Factors in International Negotiations, (Sage, Beverley Hills, CA and London, 1973); Strauss, A., Negotiations, (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA, 1978); and, Raiffa, H., The Art and Science of Negotiation, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA and London, 1982).
- 50- Levine, E.P., "Mediation in International Politics: A Universe and Some Observations", Peace Research Society Papers, Vol. XVIII, 1971, pp. 23-43.
- 51- That there are commonalities in decision-making processes generally pointed to research in Policy Studies on processes of policy termination. This research points to the fact that decision-makers do not necessary terminate a policy on the basis of an evaluation of the effectiveness and the costs and benefits of that policy, but may do so on purely ideological grounds. These studies also point to the fact that the decision to terminate a policy does not necessarily occur at one specific time point but may be a prolonged process. See: Bardach, E., "Policy Termination as a Political Process", Policy Sciences, Vol. 7, 1976, pp. 123-131.
- 52- Edmead uses the term "sunk costs" to refer to resources already spent by a party in conflict as a factor influencing greater investment in the pursuit of goals. See: Edmead, F., Analysis and Prediction in International

Mediation, (UNITAR, New York, 1971).

53- Teger, A., Too Much Invested to Quit, (Pergamon Press, Oxford and New York, 1979).

54- Rubin, J.Z., "Psychological Traps", Psychology Today, (March) 1981, pp. 52-63.

55- Mitchell, C.R., "Ending Conflicts: The Use of Non-Rational Decision Models", (City University Mimeograph, 1982).

56- Bueno de Mesquita, B., The War Trap, (Yale University Press, New Haven, CT and London, 1981).

57- Mitchell, C.R. and M. Nicholson, "Rational Models and the Ending of Wars", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 27, No. 3, 1983, pp. 495-520.

58- Campbell, J.C., Successful Negotiation: Trieste, 1954, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1982).

59- Touval, 1982, op. cit., Chapter 8.

60- Forsythe, D.P., United Nations Peacemaking: The Conciliation Commission for Palestine, (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1972).

61- Rubin, 1981, op. cit., pp. 9-11.

CHAPTER 3- THE ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK

In the following Chapter, an analytic framework is devised which is used to study third party decision-making in response to conflict. Three phases of third party responses are distinguished. The first is the initial decision to intervene in the conflict within a particular role; the present study concentrates on the choice of the intermediary role as a response to conflict. The second phase involves the third party's tactical choices as intermediary during involvement in the conflict. The third phase relates to the third party's re-evaluation of the initial response to the conflict leading to a change in role or the abandonment of active involvement in the conflict. The framework identifies the components which make up the three decision processes and the factors which influence third party choices or responses at each phase. A number of assumptions underly the analytic framework; these are discussed in the following section.

3.1- Assumptions

The foremost assumption underlying the framework is that third parties which may occupy the role of intermediary do not necessarily have to be outsiders to the conflict and may well have interests in the substantive content of the conflict. This rejects the notion that impartiality and disinterest are necessary prerequisites for the occupation

of the intermediary role(1).

This first assumption suggests the second which underlies the framework; that third parties roughly evaluate the costs and benefits involved in becoming actively involved in the conflict and choose the alternative which best suits this evaluation in the initial response to the conflict. This does not, however, imply that the third party makes a rigid calculation of all alternatives and consequences prior to selection of a role in response to the conflict as would be suggested by traditional, rational actor approaches with their assumptions of static and consistent preference orderings(2). This latter approach would suggest that the third party is precise about all possible outcomes to the conflict and about the probabilities that it may influence this outcome or that particular outcomes may be attained.

There are a number of problems which indicate that traditional rational actor approaches are inapplicable in the present context. Firstly, within an interactive and dynamic setting, such as a negotiation system, the third party cannot realistically have precise preferences for each possible outcome to the conflict or calculations of the probabilities of particular outcomes being attained. This ambiguity is amplified by the complexity of most conflict situations with multiple issues and parties as

well as overlapped conflicts. Moreover, the third party cannot be assumed to have precise expectations regarding the protagonists' preferences and/or their relative strengths. This dilemma is complicated by difficulties in assessing other third parties' preferences and influences.

What is suggested here is that the third party does have preferences for outcomes, and does have some rough notion of the "likelihoods" of outcomes and being able to influence them(3). Such estimates of preferences and probabilities would be sufficient to allow the third party to make a choice of a role in response to the conflict.

This recognition that third party decision-making is a dynamic process occurring within the dynamic conditions of the conflict and its environment implies that factors which are not relevant at the initial response acquire significance at a later stage during the third party's involvement. These factors may include changing circumstances within the conflict itself and/or changes in the third party's evaluative criteria(4). The third party's evaluation of the costs and benefits involved in its response to the conflict does not, therefore, remain constant throughout involvement in the conflict. Moreover, such evaluation may be made at different time points. Also, factors which are important at the initial response may not necessarily be important throughout the third party's involvement.

3.2- Three Phases of Third Party Decision-Making in Response to Conflict

As stated above, three phases of third party decision-making in response to conflict are distinguished. These include firstly, the initial choice of role in response to the conflict (in this case that of intermediary), secondly, the third party's tactical decisions during involvement as intermediary, and thirdly, the third party's decision process leading to a major re-evaluation of its role. These three related decision phases are illustrated in Figure 3.1.




Figure 3.1- Three phases of third party responses to conflict.

As can be seen from Figure 3.1, third parties of interest to this study are those who are already interested in the conflict in having a stake in the conflict and being in some way affected by it.

The framework outlined below identifies the components which make up the three decision processes and

the factors likely to influence these.

3.2.1- Third Party Choice of the Intermediary Role

3.2.1.1- Choice of the Intermediary Role as Dependent Variable

A third party's choice of the intermediary role forms the first dependent variable in the framework. This decision essentially comprises the third party's evaluation of the benefits which may derive from taking up the role of intermediary in the conflict and the possible costs that could accrue from such a role. The third party will take up the intermediary role when the perceived benefits outweigh the perceived costs. Another component of the third party's decision to take up an active role in response to the conflict relates to the third party's estimations of the likelihood that it may influence the outcome to the conflict. The following summarises the probable components of the third party's decision considerations concerning an intermediary response to the conflict:

- 1- The value attached to currently perceived possible outcomes to the conflict.
- 2- The likelihood that the third party could influence the outcome to the conflict.
- 3- The likelihood that the third party could influence the outcome best by taking up one role; (for

example, that of intermediary), as compared with other strategies available to it.

4- The value the third party attaches to the role itself as opposed to any costs that may derive from it.

All four components of the third party's decision calculation are subject to change due to the altering circumstances and conditions of the conflict and the third party's own evaluative criteria. Any analysis of third party decision-making about taking up the role of intermediary must, therefore, point to factors which are relevant to this decision and which influence it. These form the independent variables.

3.2.1.2- The Independent Variables

This section points to factors which influence a third party's decision to take up the role of intermediary.

These may be summarised as follows:

- [1] The conflict characteristics.
- [2] The pre-negotiation conditions.
- [3] The third party's conflict-related interests.
- [4] The third party's process-related interests.
- [5] The third party's set of preferred outcomes to the conflict.
- [6] Third party constituency.
- [7] Third party influence potential.
- [8] Motives for coalition mediation (if collective

intervention is a possible option).

These factors do not necessarily act individually but may provide a modifying influence on each other. Such modification may be a result of a reinforcing effect or a diminishing effect. For example, the coalition factor reinforces each individual third party's influence potential. Moreover, the third party's constituency may influence its interest priorities in the conflict. Each of these sets of factors will now be considered in turn.

3.2.1.2.1- Conflict Characteristics

Third party intervention occurs within the context of the conflict itself. This context must first be defined in the form of the conflict characteristics which do not remain constant throughout the life-cycle of the conflict, but contribute to its dynamic features. The conflict characteristics which define the conflict at the time of the third party's intervention must, therefore, be taken into account. These are defined in terms of the following aspects of the conflict:

- The issues and parties in the conflict.
- The relationship between the parties.
- The existence of intra-party factions.
- Patron input.
- Overlapping conflicts.

The issues in conflict are the "...inter-related goal incompatibilities of adversaries" (5), suggesting that

they are defined or determined by the parties to the conflict. Analysis of the issues in conflict must therefore include the parties' definition of these. The importance of considering the parties' definition of the issues is emphasised by the fact that the issues may be defined differently by the analyst and by third parties in the conflict(6). It is also important to point out that issues in conflict may change with time by the parties modifying their original goals. There may also be a change in the parties in that new parties may join the conflict (escalation) or some parties in conflict may decide to go for settlement as opposed to continued conflict.

The relationship between the parties defines the nature of interaction between them in terms of the mode used in pursuit of conflict goals, or "conflict behaviour"(7). Such behaviour may range from peaceful attempts to achieve a compromise outcome to violent coercion. Another aspect of this relationship is the intensity of conflict behaviour. The intensity of conflict behaviour is the degree to which parties seek to harm each other by using more or less severe forms of coercion(8). Intensity, therefore applies to the coercive form of conflict behaviour.

Another feature of conflict may be the existence of factions, (that is, groupings within the parties involved) which are organised and which have their own preferences,

possibly conflicting with those of the leadership. This is an important feature since the actions of the leadership of a party are often directed more at intra-party factions than at the adversary.

Another conflict characteristic is the input of allies; that is, the nature of support given by the ally to its client party. Allies vary according to the nature of their input to the conflict party and its pursuit of conflict goals. They may provide, for example, mere verbal support at one end of the continuum; limited resource backing, such as the provision of advisers; and full resource (for example, military) backing at the other end of the continuum. This is an important feature of conflict in that the parties may be under pressure from allies to concede, a feature relevant to third party decisions regarding means of influencing the adversaries.

A final suggested characteristic of conflict is the way in which it is overlapped or interlinked with other conflicts. Conflicts overlap, for example, when the adversaries coalesce as allies against other adversaries. They overlap when issues are linked. Conflicts may also be overlapped when the parties are involved in two conflicts concurrently; that is, when a party in one conflict is involved in another with a different adversary(9). This is an important feature of a conflict as far as third parties are concerned since they may have interests in overlapped conflicts.

3.2.1.2.2- Pre-Negotiations Conditions

Another set of variables which makes up the context within which the third party intervenes relates to the readiness or willingness of the parties to go for a settlement as opposed to a continuation of overt conflict behaviour. This set of variables are labelled pre-negotiation conditions(10). The third party's perception of its ability to influence the conflict parties will be affected by its reading of the likelihood that the adversaries will take part in the negotiation process and their acceptance of the mediation initiative. Factors relevant to the adversaries' decision to go for settlement may be categorised as in Mitchell(11):

- Inter-party factors.
- Intra-party factors.
- Intra-ally factors.

The resources available to each party, the balance of advantage between them, and the likely costs to each party of continuing the conflict are relevant factors at the inter-party level. Parties themselves also consider the implication of going for a settlement in terms of intra-party factors including the level of support for the leadership and the balance of forces within the party. Parties in conflict also consider the impact of their decisions in terms of ally pressure and continued

support. Thus, factors that are relevant at this level include the level of support and commitment of the ally coupled with the ally's own vulnerability to pressure from the adversary.

Both the conflict characteristics and the pre-negotiation conditions form the context for third party intervention. The third party's reading of both will influence its decision to intervene as intermediary in the conflict in that both contribute to the third party's perception of the likelihood that it will successfully influence the conflict outcome and that its initiative will be acceptable to the parties at the time of intervention.

3.2.1.2.3- Conflict-Related Interests

While the conflict characteristics and the pre-negotiation conditions form the context within which the third party intervenes, its decisions regarding the value of particular outcomes to the conflict and the value of the strategies available to it are influenced by the third party's conflict-related interests. These may be related to any of the following aspects of the conflict:

- 1- The issues and parties in the conflict.
- 2- The issues and parties in overlapping conflicts.
- 3- Relationship with other interested third parties in the conflict environment, (for example, patrons).

4- Relationship with intra-party groups or factions.

Any of the above categories may define the location of the third party's interests. The location and interest priorities of the third party may change with time. These must, therefore, be defined according to what they are at the time of the third party's intervention. They may, moreover, change during the third party's involvement in the conflict, possibly leading to a re-evaluation of the value of maintaining the role. The third party's conflict-related interests at the time of intervention define its relationship to the conflict. They also influence the third party's preference for a particular outcome (the third party's set of preferred outcomes to the conflict) and the likely benefits it may derive from occupying the role regardless of any outcome to the conflict. The latter will be discussed first.

3.2.1.2.4- Process-Related Interests

The value third parties derive from occupying the intermediary role in a particular conflict situation is operationalised as the third party's process-related interests, which also influence the third party's decision to intervene as intermediary. The third party's conflict-related interest priorities have an impact on its process-related interests. If, for example, the priority is to maintain relations with, and promote its

influence on one of the adversaries' allies in the conflict, the third party would choose the role which would best promote this. Third parties may derive benefits from the occupation of the intermediary role regardless of any outcome to the conflict. One such benefit is to promote their own influence with the conflicting parties while keeping rivals' influence out. For example, a primary factor contributing to the Nixon Administration's involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict was the wish to combat Soviet influence in the Middle East(12). Another example of process-related interest is provided by the US Administration's involvement in the Falklands/Malvinas dispute. It initially acted as intermediary in the conflict in order to avoid taking sides in the dispute. When, within a few weeks, the Administration decided to change roles, the new benefit derived from a show of commitment to a NATO ally, whose support it may need in future actions. Any third party reaction to conflict, therefore, comes after an evaluation of interests related to the actual role as well as to the substantive content of the conflict. Mitchell(13) suggests that benefits derived from the role of intermediary may derive from any of the conflict "arenas", such as the parties, their allies, constituencies, and other interested third parties in the conflict. A third party's process-related interests may consist of any of the following:

- To avoid other, undesired reactions, (for example, taking sides).

- To influence the settlement process.
- To gain future influence with the parties/their patrons/their constituencies.
- To exclude other third parties' influence or to compete with it.
- To gain credibility for related actions.
- To gain prestige and approval for actions.
- To go along with one's allies (important if a collective intervention is made).

3.2.1.2.5- The Third Party's Set of Preferred Outcomes

Both the conflict-related and the process-related interests influence a third party's set of preferred outcomes to the conflict, which forms another factor (or independent variable) influencing the third party's choice of the intermediary role. For example, a third party's regional interests may influence its position on specific issues in the conflict and the outcomes sought. Thus, the third party may intervene to influence the move towards its preferred outcome to the conflict. The third party may not have a specific preference for any outcome at the outset or at the time of intervention but may formulate this during its involvement. As will be seen in the next section, the third party's set of preferred outcomes to the conflict forms an important factor in the third party's tactical decisions during involvement as

intermediary.

3.2.1.2.6- Constituency Input

A third party's constituency may or may not be interested in the conflict in which its representatives are involved. When the constituency, or groups within it, are interested, then these become interested third parties in the conflict environment and may form an important input into the third party's choice of a response to the conflict. The third party may, for example, seek the approval of its constituency by showing that it is "doing something" about the conflict and by presenting itself as peacemaker. Another case might involve a situation where the conflict threatens the credibility of the third party in the eyes of the constituency⁽¹⁴⁾. A constituency and its various parts may become interested at any time during its representative's involvement in the conflict. On the other hand, it may be interested prior to its representative's active intervention in the conflict. Although the question of how and when a constituency and its various parts become interested in the conflict is an interesting one in itself, it is outside the scope of this study. The important point to emphasise is that an interested constituency forms an important influence on the third party's calculations about its response to the conflict. It does so by providing a modifying influence on the third party's conflict and process-related interests

and may also influence the third party's preference for a particular outcome to the conflict.

3.2.1.2.7- Third Party's Potential for Influence

As discussed earlier, a third party will consider the likelihood that it can influence the outcome to the conflict. The third party's influence potential is, therefore, another explanatory factor for a third party's reaction to conflict. It may derive from all or any of the following resources:

- Material resources.
- Status resources.
- Relations with adversary and/or other third parties such as allies (that is, having access to and influence with the adversary).
- Personnel-specific resources.

Material resources may include possession of technical resources for the conduct of the mediation process, such as facilities for communication. They may also include resources valued by the adversaries such as economic or military aid. Status resources relate to the third party's authoritative base; for example, having the veto power at the Security Council, being village elder or head of the Catholic Church. A third party may also derive its influence from the relationship it has with an adversary or its allies. As pointed out by Touval, this influence

derives from the third party's ability to form a coalition with one or other of the parties, or the threat to do so(15). A third party's personnel-specific resources include, for example, those of skill and knowledge(16). Any third party's influence potential is contingent upon the value attached to its resources by the parties in conflict and/or their allies which implies that the value attached to the third party's resources may change with time, as may the third party's own evaluation of its influence.

3.2.1.2.8- Motives for Coalition Mediation

The third party's influence potential is modified if the intervention occurs within the framework of a coalition. When the third party intervenes as part of a coalition mediation initiative, it must be assumed that its considerations take into account the fact of the coalition. Being part of a wider coalition adds to the third party's resources in that the different members of the group may have differential resources, influence, and credibility with the parties and/or their allies. The motives for coalition mediation must, therefore, be considered as another independent variable in the framework. Collective intervention may have the effect of both [i] reducing the costs for each individual member, as this is spread out as opposed to being concentrated and [ii] adding to the collective influence. The different

members of the group may also contribute to the credibility and acceptability of the initiative. A further positive factor is that any failure can either be shared out or attributed to a particular member of the coalition.

A final, additional factor which may be added to the framework is third party related action at the time of intervention. Related behaviour may contribute to the credibility of the third party in the mediation initiative, and may, therefore add to its influence potential.


3.2.2- Third Party Choice of Tactics as Intermediary

The third party's tactical decisions during involvement as intermediary in the conflict form the second set of dependent variables in the overall framework. This part of the analytic framework delineates factors which influence the third party's choice of tactics in its functioning within the "mediated negotiation system" (illustrated in Figure 3.2)(17). It is important first of all to outline the range of tactics which may be adopted by an intermediary.

Figure 3.2- The Mediation Paradigm
Wall, J.A., "Mediation", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 159

Mediator's Constituents

Third Parties



Negotiator's Constituents

Opposing Negotiator's Constituents

Figure 3.2- The Mediation Paradigm
Wall, J.A., "Mediation..", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 159.

conflict.

The variety of third party activity represented by the overtly bargaining activity of Dr. Kissinger in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the largely facilitative role of the World Council of Churches in the Sudanese civil war suggests that it is useful to consider the intermediary "role" in terms of a spectrum of activity ranging from the bargaining to the facilitative(21). Table 3.1 illustrates the behaviour that defines the facilitative and bargaining range of the spectrum of third party activity.

A third party may start an initiative adopting a facilitative approach. It may, on the other hand, enter the negotiations using bargaining tactics. Moreover, the third party may move from one strategy to the next depending on feedback processes from the negotiation. A number of factors may influence a third party's tactical choice decisions during involvement as intermediary. The following section will define and discuss the factors (or independent variables) which may influence a third party's tactical choices during this interaction process.

3.2.2.2- Factors Influencing Third Party Choice of Tactics

As suggested by Touval, the intervention of a "biased" (22) (or in the terms used in this study, interested) third party as intermediary into a dyadic bargaining situation

Bargaining

- 1-The mediator intervenes with a stated commitment to a particular outcome to the conflict.
- 2-The mediator intervenes with a specific framework for the settlement process.
- 3-Communication between the parties is not necessarily the priority; emphasis being on communication between third party and protagonists.
- 4-The mediator has almost total control of proposal formulation. The proposals may reflect the mediator's own standpoint on particular outcomes.
- 5-The mediator may specify conditions of acceptance of a particular outcome.
- 6-The mediator can have his/her own positions on particular issues in the negotiations.
- 7-The mediator may bargain on specific issues.
- 8-The mediator uses threat and reward tactics to induce concessions leading to a settlement and/or the acceptance of the third party's stance.

Facilitative

- 1-The mediator intervenes with the stated objective of promoting a settlement acceptable to the parties.
- 2-The process is open-ended; the mediator allowing the parties to build up the framework.
- 3-The mediator acts more or less as a go-between and seeks to promote communication between the parties.
- 4-The mediator helps the parties reach a compromise outcome and seeks to build up proposals based on the parties' positions.
- 5-The mediator does not specify the terms of acceptance of an outcome.
- 6-The mediator does not express a position on specific issues.
- 7-Bargaining only takes place between the parties.
- 8-The mediator aims to affect the outcome through persuasion and the clarification of the issues and consequences of continued conflict.

Table 3.1- Spectrum of Intermediary Behaviour

transforms this into a three-cornered relationship or a triad. This is the central premise in the analysis presented below. It suggests that a third party becomes one of the negotiators in a multilateral negotiation system. Thus, as well as carrying out functions traditionally associated with intermediaries, such as facilitating communication between the parties, and clarifying issues, the third party may also bargain with the parties both to gain concessions facilitating agreement and/or to promote the third party's own interests. Moreover, as with parties in any negotiation system, the third party's tactical decisions must be a process of adjustment and readjustment to the dynamic conditions of the conflict and the negotiation process(23). For example, the third party's set of preferred outcomes to the conflict at time [A] may well have changed at time [B] when the third party has considered the negotiating positions of the parties and the situation with regard to the conflict environment. This dynamic aspect of the interactional process between third party and conflict system must be taken into account in an analysis of intermediary choice of tactics.

I have suggested earlier that there are eight sets of factors likely to influence a third party's decision about becoming an intermediary in the first place. These factors continue to influence the third party's later decisions about tactics during the mediation process. They

are:

- [1] The conflict characteristics.
- [2] The negotiation system.
- [3] The third party's conflict-related interests.
- [4] The third party's process-related interests.
- [5] The third party's "preference set" (24), or set of preferred outcomes to the conflict.
- [6] The third party's influence potential.
- [7] Third party constituency input.
- [8] The intra-coalition situation (if third party is a coalition).

cf p 72

All eight sets of factors may change during the third party's involvement in the conflict. Moreover, not all these are necessarily applicable at all time points during the negotiation process. The conflict characteristics form the context and provide the boundary within which the third party functions. As was pointed out in the discussion on the initial choice of role, the conflict characteristics do not remain constant but may change throughout the third party's involvement. For example, other parties may become involved as the conflict escalates and new issues may be introduced into the conflict. The conflict characteristics may thus have a modifying influence on the negotiation process and the functioning of the third party therein.

The negotiation system is the source of informational input from the parties and the conflict environment, which consists of factions, allies and other interested third

parties(25). The negotiation system is defined in terms of factors relevant to the inter-party relationship, the intra-party relationship, and the relationship between the parties and their allies, or the party-patron relationship. The inter-party factors within the negotiation system include the following:

- Each party's set of preferred outcomes to the conflict.
- The balance of relative advantage between the parties.
- The parties' options of discontinuing the negotiations.
- The parties' respective stakes in the negotiation process.
- The degree of communication between the parties.

These form a continuous and often changing input into a third party's decisions relating to tactics. For example, any change in the parties' set of preferred outcomes would have a direct impact on the third party's formulation of proposals, their content, and any influence tactics that may be used to induce concessions. Any change in the negotiators' stake in the negotiations would also influence the third party's influence tactics. As will be seen below, other factors are also important. An example to illustrate the way in which the negotiation system forms a feedback influence on the tactics used by the third party would be provided by any situation where, if

the influence tactics used do not change one or both of the adversaries' position or stake in the negotiations, the third party may adjust its tactics in order to achieve such change.

Intra-party factors also form a feedback input into the third party's tactical decisions. These include the following:

- Whom the negotiators represent.
- The level of support for the negotiating party.
- The position of dominant factions with regard to the negotiation process.

When a third party perceives a difference in commitment to the settlement process between the negotiating party and its constituency, it may act to influence the party via its constituency or dominant factions within it.

The third set of factors within the negotiation system which form an input to the third party's tactical decisions relate to the party-patron relationship. These include:

- A patron's set of preferred outcomes to the conflict.
- A patron's stake in the negotiation process.
- A patron's level of support and commitment to its client.

A patron's position with respect to the negotiation process is important for an intermediary in that it may need to attempt to influence the adversaries via their patrons.

Each level of the negotiation system forms an informational input into the third party's tactical decisions so that it may re-evaluate and readjust its position during the negotiation process in response to this input. All three levels are subject to change during the interactive process with the third party. Thus, at the start of the third party's initiative, both parties may perceive an equal stake in the settlement process. This perception may change, however, when one or both of the parties decide that other strategic options would bring greater benefits than continued participation in the negotiation process. The third party takes such changes into account when reconsidering tactics in its interaction with the parties.

A third party's conflict-related and process-related interests are also important factors influencing tactical decisions during involvement, since both sets of factors have a modifying influence on the third party's preference set, or position on specific issues in the negotiation. Although the processes which lead to changes in the conflict-related interest priorities and process-related interests are little understood and somewhat beyond the scope of this study, it is essential to point out that any such changes will have a modifying effect on a third party's set of preferred outcomes at any point in time during its involvement as intermediary. For example, a

third party's interests in a particular region would influence its preferences for outcomes to a conflict in that region.

A third party's set of preferred outcomes to the conflict is also modified by its resources, and therefore, its influence potential. As in any negotiation process, the resources of the negotiators form an important part of their bargaining positions. A third party's influence potential is dependent on the value attached to the third party's resources by the parties as well as the third party's willingness to use these resources. Both aspects of the third party's influence potential are subject to change during the third party's involvement as intermediary. Thus, a third party may threaten, and even impose a negative sanction at the start of the initiative, but may not be willing to do so at a later stage for several reasons, such a perceived increase in the cost of the action and/ a decline in its potential effectiveness. During the interaction process between the third party and the negotiation system, the third party communicates to the parties the influence potential or resources available to it so that they may adjust their perceptions of the costs of non-compliance, their stance and strategy. Influence tactics used by a third party may be countered by the parties using their own influence with the third party so that the reaction of one or both of the parties may induce a reconsideration by the third party

and possibly a modification of tactics and approach. For example, in a situation where a third party needs the continuation and successful outcome of the settlement process more than the adversaries, then a threat by any party to abandon that process is likely to influence the third party's tactics. This underlines the fact that, as with a third party's preferences for outcomes, its influence potential is also subject to change and readjustment in response to input from the negotiation system and the interaction process between this and the third party.

As mentioned in connection with a third party's initial decision to become involved, a constituency may or may not be interested in the conflict with which its representatives are involved. When the constituency or groups within are interested, however, these could form an important input both in the initial decision and during the third party's involvement as intermediary. As Wall points out, the "mediator-mediator constituency relationship" (26) may influence a third party's choice of tactics in its interaction with the parties in conflict. The constituency and its various parts may become interested at any time before and/or during its representatives' involvement in the conflict. The intermediary's constituency may exert a modifying influence on the third party's set of preferred outcomes and on its influence potential. The constituency may, for

example, influence the third party's ability to provide the material back-up for threats or rewards used to attain concessions from the parties. President Carter's ability to promise the Egyptian President future US aid would have required Congressional approval. The question remains as to the extent to which the third party consults with the constituency "back home" (which, in the case of representative third parties, includes the government "back home") on the promises and threats used during the interaction process.

The intra-coalition situation is an important set of factors when the third party is a coalition of third parties acting as intermediaries. Since the intra-coalition situation is only applicable in such cases, it will be dealt with separately.

3.2.2.3- Coalition Intermediaries and the Intra-Coalition Situation

A coalition intermediary usually brings greater resources and influence potential to the negotiation process than an individual third party. Different members of the coalition may be more acceptable than others to the parties in conflict and their patrons. Also, different members of the coalition may have differential influence with the parties(27). A collective stance by a coalition third party may mean greater bargaining power with the parties in conflict. Another important characteristic in coalition

mediation is that the parties in conflict may attempt to form alignments with individual members of the coalition if they perceive a difference in approach among its participants.

Coalition third parties will also differ from a single representative third party in being susceptible to problems inherent in team mediation. One of these is the potentially cumbersome process of consultation and joint decision-making. This problem may be alleviated if each member of the coalition is highly individualised (that is, if one representative of a government rather than a group of representatives is involved in the mediation process). This seems to have been the case in the Anglo-American mediation between Italy and Yugoslavia over Trieste in 1954 (28). The process of consultation can be more time consuming and cumbersome when different levels of the policy-making machinery are involved. Another problem concerns the coordination of policies and attitudes towards the conflict. Different interests may lead to division and lack of coordination in functioning. Divergent interests may lead to the diminution of third party credibility and therefore influence potential.

These are important aspects to consider in an analysis of the functioning of coalition intermediaries. They also suggest several intra-coalition factors which may have an influence on the tactical decisions made by

the coalition and its members. The intra-coalition situation may be defined in terms of three factors:

- The level of intra-coalition cohesion.
- The distribution of influence potential.
- The degree of communication and consultation among the members.

The level of cohesion within a coalition is a reflection of the members' level of agreement on their preferred outcomes to the conflict, as well as the tactics to be used in order to attain the preferred outcome. There may be agreement on the proposals to be presented to the parties and disagreement on the influence tactics to be applied in order to gain concessions towards these proposals.

The distribution of influence within a coalition is also an important factor to consider in an analysis of tactics adopted by coalition intermediaries and their participants. This is defined as "who has what, in relation to whom?" in the conflict. As suggested earlier, participants of a coalition may have differential influence with the parties and/or the latter's patrons, who may value different resources from each member of the coalition. It may also influence the bargaining behaviour of the parties with individual members of the coalition.

The degree of communication between the members of the coalition is defined by the extent to which members function individually in their interaction within the

negotiation process as opposed to the coalition acting collectively.

It should be pointed out that these intra-coalition factors can have a modifying influence on the individual members' sets of preferred outcomes to the conflict and their perception of their influence potential. Such factors also influence the bargaining process between the adversaries and the members of a coalition. The relationships within the coalition, as with the other factors discussed above, may change during the coalition's involvement as intermediary. For example, there may be changes in the level of cohesion within the coalition as the sets of preferred outcomes and perceptions of the effectiveness of tactics change. As will be seen in the analysis of the Western Contact Group's tactical decisions during its involvement in the negotiations over Namibia, changes occurred in all three of the factors discussed here.

Factors influencing the initial choice of the intermediary role and tactical decisions during involvement are illustrated in Figure 3.3 and defined in Table 3.2. The main feature of this second part of the analytic framework is that a third party's tactical decisions are made within a dynamic, interactive process where feedback from the negotiation system may result in changes and adjustment of tactics used.




Figure 3.3- The Analytic Framework Influences on Third Party Tactical Decisions.

Table 3.2- Factors Influencing Third Party Tactical Decisions

(1) Conflict Characteristics

- The issues in conflict.
- Relationship between the parties.
- The presence of factions.
- Patron input.
- Overlapping conflicts.

(2) The Negotiation System

Inter-party factors:

- Each party's set of preferred outcomes.
- Balance of relative advantage between the parties.
- The parties' options of discontinuing the negotiations.
- The parties' respective stakes in the negotiation process.
- The degree of communication between the parties.

Intra-party factors:

- Whom the negotiators represent.
- The position of dominant factions in relation to the negotiation process.
- Level of support for the negotiating party.

Party-patron factors:

- A patron's set of preferred outcomes.
- A patron's stake in the negotiation process.
- A patron's level of support and commitment to its client.

(3) The Third Party's Conflict-Related Interests

These may be linked to any of the following dimensions of the conflict:

- The issues and parties in the conflict.
- Issues and parties in overlapping conflicts.
- Relationship with other third parties in the conflict environment; e.g. patrons.
- Relationship with intra-party groups or factions.

(4) Third Party Process-Related Interests

These define the benefits which may derive from the occupation of the intermediary role.

- To avoid other reactions (e.g. taking sides).
- To influence the outcome to the conflict.
- To ensure own control over the settlement process.
- To gain future influence with the parties/their patrons.
- To exclude other third parties' influence or to compete with it.
- To gain credibility for related actions.
- To gain prestige and approval for actions.
- To go along with one's allies.

(5) Third Party's Set of Preferred Outcomes

This refers to the third party's preferences for outcomes to the conflict and position on specific issues in the negotiation.

(6) Third Party Influence Potential

- Material resources.
- Status resources (e.g. veto at the UN Security Council; village elder).
- Relationship with adversary and other third parties in the conflict.
- Personnel-specific resources (e.g. skill or knowledge of the conflict).

(7) Third Party Constituency Input

This becomes relevant if the third party's constituency or groups within it are interested in the conflict in which its representatives are involved.

(8) The Intra-Coalition Situation

- The level of intra-coalition cohesion.
- The distribution of influence potential.
- The degree of communication and consultation among the members.

3.2.3- Third Party Re-evaluation of the Role and a Decision to Quit

This part of the analytic framework points to factors which influence a third party's decision to quit the intermediary role before the achievement of any settlement, and where the third party is still acceptable within the role.

As stated earlier, one of the assumptions which underlies the framework is that third parties continue to evaluate the costs and benefits associated with the intermediary role. Benefits and costs perceived to accrue from the role may be evaluated differently at different stages of a third party's involvement in the conflict. Thus, from the time that the third party decides to intervene as intermediary to the time that the decision is made to quit, there may have been changes in the components which made up the initial decision towards involvement. Changes might, therefore, have occurred in the following:

- 1- The value attached to particular outcomes to the conflict.
- 2- The likelihood that the third party could influence the outcome to the conflict.
- 3- The likelihood that the third party could influence the outcome best by occupying the intermediary role.
- 4- The value the third party attaches to the role itself as opposed to any costs deriving from it.

It is conceivable that any change in the considerations or

calculation which went into the initial decision has been influenced by changes in the factors which influenced this decision. For example, the process-related interests which contributed to the initial decision may no-longer be relevant or diminish in value at a later stage in the third party's involvement. Similarly, changes could also occur in the third party's influence potential such that it is no-longer capable of influencing the outcome of the conflict. Although such changes may contribute to the third party's decision to quit, they do not wholly explain why the third party decides to quit at a specific point in time before a settlement to the conflict is reached and before the third party's original objectives are met.

3.2.3.1- Factors Influencing a Third Party's Decision to Quit

Any third party will begin to re-evaluate its occupation of the role of intermediary once the costs begin to outweigh the originally perceived gains. Changes in the conflict-related interest priorities and process-related interests will contribute to the value attached to the role. However, it is conceivable that the third party's conflict-related interests may not have changed but that interests related to role itself, such as ensuring own influence in the settlement process or acquiring prestige, are no longer relevant to the third party.

Once a third party perceives an increase in

costs relative to the potential gains, therefore, it may either withdraw immediately, invest more in the role, or start a process of gradual withdrawal. The time lag between the third party's realisation that the costs are beginning to outweigh the benefits results from several factors including "sunk-costs", the intra-third party situation, and the condition of simply "muddling through".

In a situation of stalemate, a third party may decide either to invest more in the role or to start a process of withdrawal, which may be sudden or gradual. If the third party has risked its reputation on the role, for example, it may decide to invest more in the role in order to retrieve some of the resources (reputation) already expended despite the increasing costs of doing so. This is the influence of "sunk costs" (29).

The intra-third party situation refers to the level of cohesion within the third party and, therefore, the degree of compatibility between the decision-makers involved. Government representatives acting as intermediaries may conflict with other decision-makers "back home" as to the merits of maintaining the intermediary role. Division within a third party may be further pronounced if the third party in question is a coalition. In this case, the intra-coalition situation must be taken into account.

Another contributing factor to the time-lag between

the third party's re-evaluation of its role and its actually quitting is the common process of "muddling through". In this situation, by maintaining a low level of activity, the third party will conceivably not expend as much resources as it would during full activity. It would, at the same time, benefit from appearing to be involved as peacemaker. In this situation, the third party's process-related interests would still be fulfilled.

Another factor which may determine a third party's timing of quitting the intermediary role is its perceived need to quit "while the going is good"; that is, to preserve any successes already achieved. If, due to several factors, such as feedback from the negotiation system, a third party decides that further successes in terms of concessions from the parties are unlikely, it would tend to preserve the outcome already achieved in order to claim this to its credit. Dr. Kissinger, for example, saw no benefits to be gained in continuing as intermediary to achieve an overall settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, but was content to terminate his role at the disengagement accords.

Another option available to third parties when the costs begin to outweigh the benefits is to seek the involvement of other third parties in the settlement process. The motives here would be to spread the costs while maintaining some degree of involvement in the


settlement process.

The above section has suggested a number of factors which may be relevant in the third party's re-evaluation of the intermediary role and the decision to quit. A diagrammatic representation of this process is provided in Figure 3.4.

3.3- Conclusion

The analytic framework discussed above can be used in any study of third party decision-making in response to a conflict, and focuses on third parties which take up the intermediary role. It suggests that third party responses may be divided into three related but analytically separate phases. The first comprises the initial decision to become involved as intermediary. The second concerns intermediary choice of tactics during involvement. The third relates to a third party's decision to abandon the role before the achievement of any settlement. The main feature of the analytic framework is that the third party's decision-making occurs within the dynamic and interactive processes of the conflict and the negotiation system.

In Part II of this study, the analytic framework is used to analyse the involvement of the Western Contact Group in the conflict over Namibia.



Moves toward settlement: Third party invests in the process.

Stalemate: Costs begin to outweigh benefits.

Third party invests more (reputation and credibility at stake).
Or:

Gradual withdrawal (lessening of activity and/or involvement of other parties.

Figure 3.4- Third Party Re-evaluation of the Intermediary Role.

Chapter 3- Notes

- 1- As shown by Levine, 79% of all mediation initiatives in the 19th century were undertaken by "major powers". See: Levine, E.P., "Mediation in International Politics: A Universe and Some Observations", Peace Research Society Papers, Vol. XVIII, The London Conference, 1971, p. 33.
- 2- Conventional rational actor approach as espoused by utility theory suggests that decision-makers have consistent and transitive preferences and precise estimates of probabilities. See: Luce, R.D. and H. Raiffa, Games and Decisions, (Wiley, New York, 1957).
- 3- Instead of a party making precise probabilities, it is more conceivable that a party considers "likelihoods", or "reliable rough indications". This is suggested by Ellsberg (1975) and Mitchell (1982). See: Ellsberg, D., "The Theory and Practice of Blackmail", in: Young, O.R. (ed.), Bargaining, (University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1975); and, Mitchell, C.R., "Ending Conflicts: The Use of Non-rational Decision Models", (City University mimeograph, 1982).
- 4- With reference to conflict termination decisions, Mitchell (1982) suggests two types of dynamism, namely, "situational dynamism" where change occurs in the "circumstances of the conflict", and "evaluative dynamism", reflecting change in the decision-makers' evaluations of outcomes. Ibid, pp. 7-8.
- 5- Mitchell, C.R., The Structure of International Conflict, (Macmillan, London, 1981), p.41.
- 6- An example of third parties' definition of issues differing from that of adversaries is illustrated by the Arab-Israeli conflict where the issue of a Palestinian homeland has, until recently, been interpreted as a "refugee" problem (as reflected in Security Council Resolution 242).
- 7- Mitchell (1981), op.cit., p.120.
- 8- Kriesberg suggests that the intensity of conflict consists of both the intensity of "feeling" and the intensity of "behavior". See: Kriesberg, L., Social Conflicts, (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1982), p. 115.
- 9- Ibid, p.27.
- 10- Stephens, J.B., "The Entry Problem", in: Mitchell C.R. and K. Webb, New Approaches to International Mediation,

(Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1988). Refers to pre-negotiation conditions as a component of adversaries' acceptance of a mediation initiative.

11- Mitchell (1982), op.cit., p.11.

12- Dr. Kissinger's involvement as intermediary in the Arab-Israeli conflict is analysed in Rubin, J. (ed.), Dynamics of Third Party Intervention: Kissinger in the Middle East, (Praeger, New York, 1981).

13- Mitchell, "Motives for Mediation", in Mitchell and Webb, op. cit.

14- An illustration of a situation where a conflict threatens the credibility of the third party is an example quoted by Wall on President Eisenhower's intervention in an industrial dispute in 1956. The president instructed Vice-President Nixon to mediate the steel dispute as he feared that a prolonged strike could have imperilled the credibility of the "peace and prosperity" slogan used in the election campaign. See:

Wall, J.A., "Mediation: An Analysis, Review and Proposed Research", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1981, p.168.

15- Touval emphasises a mediator's relationship with the adversaries as a source of influence. See:

Touval, S., The Peace Brokers, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1982), p.10-16.

16- Young, O.R., The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1967), p. 87.

17- Wall, op.cit., p. 159.

18- An example of the manipulation of information by an intermediary is provided by Dr. Kissinger in his involvement in the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe negotiations in 1976. See: Martin, D. and P. Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe, (Faber and Faber, London, 1981).

19- Touval emphasises the bargaining aspect of a third party's influence. Touval, op.cit.

20- Persuasion refers to means of influence through argument. Coercion refers to a party "...trying to make the other side to yield by reason of fear or actual injury" Rewards are inducements offered on condition of compliance by the other side. Definitions derived from Kriesberg, op.cit., p. 116.

21- The "facilitative" and "directive" classification of third party activity was suggested by K. Kressler, in:

Labor Mediation: An Exploratory Survey, (Association of Labour Mediation Agencies, New York, 1972).

22- Touval, op.cit., pp. 14-16.

23- Gulliver emphasises the "exchange of information" in his model of the negotiation process. In: Gulliver, P.H. Disputes and Negotiations: A Cross-Cultural Perspective, (Academic Press, New York, 1979), pp. 83-88.

24- Gulliver uses the term "preference set" to refer to a negotiator's "...ordered evaluations of issues and conceivable outcomes", and points to the problems that negotiators may confront in having precise preference sets. Ibid, p. 88.

25- Wall refers to a set of factors within the "negotiation context" which may influence mediator activity. Wall, op.cit., 175-177.

26- Ibid, pp. 168-169.

27- Rubin, op.cit., p. 10.

28- For an account of the Anglo-American mediation in Trieste, see: Campbell, J.C., Successful Negotiation: Trieste, 1954, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1982).

29- Edmead, F., Analysis and Prediction in International Mediation, (UNITAR, New York, 1971). Also discussed in Mitchell(1982), in relation to conflict termination, op. cit.

CHAPTER 4- A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW of the CONFLICT and its CHARACTERISTICS

As emphasised in the analytic framework, conflict characteristics comprise an important input into a third party's decision-making process concerning the choice of the intermediary role. They also provide the context within which the third party functions during involvement as intermediary. This chapter will discuss the historical background to the Namibian conflict and highlight the conflict characteristics which provided the context within which the intervention of the Western Contact Group took place in 1977.

As outlined in the analytic framework, conflict characteristics are analysed according to the issues in conflict, the relationship between the parties, intra-party factions, patron input, and overlapping conflicts. The first part of the chapter will provide a historical overview of the conflict as it has evolved from the South African occupation of the territory in 1915 to 1977, when the Western Contact Group intervention took place. The second part of the chapter will arrange the case material according to the above definition of the conflict characteristics. This discussion will argue that the conflict over Namibia, as with most conflicts within present day world society, is not a simple bilateral conflict, but involves a number of interested parties involved as allies, interested audiences, and

constituencies. The discussion will also highlight the fact that conflict characteristics do not remain constant throughout the life cycle of a conflict but change with time.

4.1- Background to the Conflict(1)

4.1.1- South Africa's Occupation of Namibia

Namibia, formerly South West Africa(2), came under South African occupation in 1915, before which it had been a German colony(3). The League of Nations, against South African wishes to annex the territory, placed it within the mandate system(4) whereby it was conferred as a Class "C" mandate in terms of Article 22, Part 1, of the Covenant of the League of Nations. During the League period, the South African government came increasingly under criticism from the League's Permanent Mandates Commission for its treatment of the indigenous population in violation of its mandatory obligations(5).

When the General Assembly of the newly formed United Nations recommended that Namibia be placed under the trusteeship system(6), the South African government refused, preferring instead to incorporate the territory into South Africa(7). When the National Party came to power in 1948, the new government informed the United Nations that it would no longer submit reports on its administration of the territory(8) and took steps to

incorporate Namibia into South Africa(9). In 1950, an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice established that South Africa was not under an obligation to place the territory under the Trusteeship Council, but that the international status of the territory remained intact. In 1955, the General Assembly was authorised to receive petitions and reports from the inhabitants of Namibia on the treatment of the population by the South African authorities(10). 3 ✓

The increasing impetus for decolonisation from the late 1950s led to a change in the General Assembly's approach to Namibia. From 1960, instead of calling for Namibia to be placed into trusteeship, the General Assembly began calling for Namibian independence(11). This new approach culminated in the revocation of South Africa's mandate in General Assembly Resolution 2145(XXI) in October 1966; a decision which was endorsed by the Security Council in 1968(12). In 1971, an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice upheld these decisions(13). On revoking the mandate, the General Assembly placed Namibia under its direct responsibility by creating the UN Council for Namibia to administer the territory until independence(14).

While the UN became a primary arena for waging the conflict against the South African government, it also served as a starting base for the leaders of the new

Namibian nationalist movements, namely the South West Africa People's Union (SWANU) and the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO). As will be seen below, SWAPO became the dominant Namibian nationalist movement.

1974 saw a major increase in pressure brought against the South African government both regionally and at the UN. The Portuguese coup in April set the stage for the collapse of Portuguese rule in southern Africa. The unanimous vote for Security Council Resolution 366 on 17 Dec 1974 emphasised the increasing pressure brought on the South African government regarding Namibia, and the setting of another deadline for South African compliance meant further Western involvement in the conflict. It also enhanced the role of the UN in the process of bringing about Namibian independence by calling for the transfer of power to the Namibian people with the assistance of the UN. This formed the basis for Security Council Resolution 385 of 30 January 1976 which defined an internationally acceptable process for Namibian independence.

The South African government's response was to escalate the move towards separate development for the separately defined ethnic groups in the territory⁽¹⁵⁾. In response to pressure from Western governments, however, it started a process which culminated in the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference which was convened on 24 September, 1975 ⁽¹⁶⁾. The Turnhalle delegates represented eleven ethnic groups, according to the South African

division of the Namibian population. While the South African government claimed this to be an internal Namibian process, evidence indicates that they were in direct control of the proceedings(17). By the beginning of 1977, a draft constitution was completed proposing a three-tier system of government, each ethnically based. This, to be further discussed below, formed the basis for the "internal settlement" in Namibia.

The above discussion shows that the UN was a major forum for the conflict over Namibia. This brought the involvement of governments having close links with the South African government; an involvement which led to active intervention, first by Dr. Kissinger in 1976, and then by the five members of the Contact Group. Apart from developments at the UN, the period discussed above also saw the entrenchment of National Party influence among the white electorate in Namibia. It also saw the rise of Namibian nationalism.

4.1.2- White Political Organisation in Namibia

The South West Africa Constitution Act, No 24 of 1925 ensured the political development of the white population in Namibia. This provided for an all-white Legislative Assembly consisting of 18 members, 12 of whom were elected by the white electorate and six appointed by the Administrator. The major features of white politics at

this stage was the initial division of the whites according to the German-Afrikaans divide and attempts at reconciliation. Another was the seeming consensus for incorporation into the Union of South Africa.

In 1924, the whites became divided along party lines reflecting the German-non-German ethnic divide. The National Party of South West Africa was formed which sought incorporation and direct representation in the South African Parliament. Its policies were almost entirely those of its South African counterpart(18). The Union Party was formed in September 1924 and renamed the South West Party in 1926. This party also stood for incorporation(19).

The German community was represented by the Deutscher Bund formed in 1923 and supported by the majority of German nationals. This party was opposed to incorporation and accused the other parties of practicing ethnic politics(20). Given that the German community at this stage formed 50% of the white population, the Deutscher Bund held the majority of seats in the Legislative Assembly in the elections of May 1926(21). Encouragement of Union farmers to settle in Namibia and stricter naturalisation laws meant that by 1929, the German community came to constitute only one third of the white population. This change was reflected in the 1929 elections when the new coalition of the NPSWA and the

South West Party (the Verenigde Nasionale Suidwes Party or VNSWP) polled a 2/3 majority(22). The elections of October 1934 showed the extent of white realignment in Namibia with the majority of the white electorate now supporting incorporation(23).

German-Afrikaner reconciliation was facilitated by the formation of the National Party of South West Africa in July 1939. According to Du Pisani, factors contributing to this were the decision by the National Party in South Africa supporting non-participation in the 1939-1945 war and policies of deliberate Afrikaner-German reconciliation made by the same party. The National Party in Namibia called for incorporation; and the founding of a Republic of South Africa, policies reflecting the close ties between the National Party in Namibia and its counterpart in the Union(24). From this point, the National Party in Namibia would become the paramount force representing the white population in the territory.

The National Party victory in the Union in 1948 gave substantial impetus to the National Party in Namibia. This became evident in the elections of August 1950, the first to be held in terms of the South West Africa Affairs Amendment Act, No 23 of 1949, which gave white Namibians representation in the South African Parliament. The party supported the policy of selective white immigration into the territory and voiced pro-Republican sentiments as did the National Party in South Africa(25). The National Party

held all six seats in the South African Parliament in 1950 and 1953 (26) and came to control the Legislative Assembly completely in 1960 (27). The domination of the National Party has been reflected by its total domination of white representation in the South African Parliament until such representation was revoked in 1977. This domination was reflected at the onset of the Turnhalle conference, when the NP was the only party representing the whites(28).

4.1.3- The Rise of Namibian Nationalism(29)

Namibian resistance to colonial rule started with the Herero and Nama wars of 1904-1907 against the German rulers(30). The Herero appealed to the Ovambo in the north for assistance when they started the rebellion(31). According to SWAPO, "Traditional leaders, especially amongst the Herero, provided an invaluable link between the early resistance to colonisation and the rise of the national liberation movement." (32)

A number of African leaders opposed South African moves towards incorporation when these were intensified in 1946. Tribal chiefs, among them, Chief Hosea Kutako of the Herero, and David Witbooi of the Nama, expressed their opposition through the Reverend Michael Scott whose memorandum to the UN Fourth Committee showed the extent of black Namibian opposition to incorporation(33).

As a result of their protests to the UN, Kutako and other leading Herero formed the Council of Chiefs. This was primarily a Herero organ, although links were made with other traditional leaders, including Hendrik Witbooi(34). African protest was mainly manifest through petitions to the UN(35). These also served as training ground for the new leaders of the nationalist movement.

The formation of black political movements also started among Namibian students and workers. The African Improvement Society was established in the late 40's by a group of students returning home from South Africa. In 1952, a group of these organised themselves into the South West Africa Student Body. By 1956, this was reconstituted as the South West Africa Progressive Association (SWAPA). One of the main objectives of this group was to improve educational facilities for blacks and to advise black students on admissions to schools in South Africa. In 1959, SWAPA started a black newspaper in English and Afrikaans. It carried reports of struggles for independence in other parts of the world and in Africa. The paper sought to foster the growth of nationalism in urban black youth and was banned in 1960 (36).

Namibian contract workers also formed an organisational base for Namibian political and nationalist movements. The Ovamboland People's Congress was established by Herman Toivo ja Toivo and Andreas Shipanga

in 1958 among Ovambo workers in Cape Town. One of its most important demands was the ending of the contract labour system(37). The OPC was renamed the Ovamboland People's Organisation in April 1959 after advice from Murumba Kerina (who had appeared as petitioner at the UN) to found a country-wide political organisation(38). The OPO worked closely with other opposition black groups, such as the Council of Chiefs and SWANU, the latter being formed in Windhoek by some elements from SWAPA in 1959(39). Toivo ja Toivo and Kozonguizi of SWAPA had discussed the formation of a national political movement, ideas which were materialised in 1959 in the founding of SWANU. Initially SWANU was closely allied to the OPO and the Council of Chiefs.

An interesting aspect of the development of Namibian nationalism was the role played by external leaders of OPO and SWANU in both focussing world attention on South Africa's administration of Namibia and in providing directives for the local leadership. Kerina urged the formation of a national movement based on the model of the ANC in South Africa(40). This culminated in the formation of the South West Africa People's Organisation (or SWAPO) in 1959. Kozonguizi and Kerina were the first two black petitioners at the UN. Kerina joined forces with Ja Toivo and Sam Nujoma of the OPO in the formation of SWAPO. Nujoma and Kozonguizi had, in fact, urged the merger of the OPO and SWANU. However, Kerina's view prevailed since

SWANU, which was largely of the Herero, was encountering opposition from the Council of Chiefs(41).

It has been suggested that the main difference between SWANU and SWAPO is that SWAPO relied heavily on petitions as a form of protest while SWANU felt that "...the people of the territory should themselves work to secure their ambitions"(42). Both movements urged the immediate termination of the mandate, but differed on the future of the territory(43). The conflict between SWAPO and SWANU was later aggravated when SWAPO took up the guerrilla struggle and gained recognition from the OAU Liberation Committee.

The activities of SWAPO in the early 1960's were "...mostly characterised by politics of protest. Numerous petitions were sent to the UN, expressing the hope that it would intervene in Namibia to secure the country's independence"(44). The failure of such protest led to the decision in 1962 that such activity should be paralleled by military activity against the South African occupation(45). When the International Court of Justice announced its decision rejecting the credentials of Ethiopia and Liberia in 1966, SWAPO initiated armed confrontation with South African forces in August 1966, almost immediately after the I.C.J. decision. In a statement issued by SWAPO in Dar-es-Salaam on July 18, 1966, SWAPO declared that the Court's refusal to act "would relieve Namibians..from any illusions which they

may have harboured about the UN as some kind of saviour in their plight..we have no alternative but to rise in arms and bring about our liberation" (46). The OAU recognised SWAPO as the sole representative of the Namibian people in 1968 and the UN followed in 1973. It was granted observer status to the UN in 1976.

As will be seen below SWAPO became the main party in the conflict with the South African government. Its domination of black Namibian politics also led to conflict with other groups in the territory. With this brief historical background, the following section will now discuss the conflict characteristics as these were prevalent at the time of the Western Contact Group intervention in 1977.

4.2- Conflict Characteristics

4.2.1- The Issues in Conflict

The issues in conflict at the beginning of 1977 centred around the South African government's intentions to impose an "internal settlement" for Namibia as manifest in the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference. This was contrary to a UN-defined process for Namibian independence, outlined in Security Council Resolution 385 of 30 January 1976. The overriding issue had been, since the definition of the territory as a Class C mandate under South African

administration, that of Namibian decolonisation from South African rule. Given the long-standing nature of the conflict, however, the issues had focused on the details of the process leading to decolonisation and the nature of Namibian self-determination. The broad issue of Namibian decolonisation had also come to encompass the issues of: [1] the illegality of the South African occupation of the territory; [2] the application to Namibia of racially discriminatory policies operative in South Africa; and [3] the application of separate development in the creation of "bantustans" for the black population, which had been divided by the South African government into 10 separate ethnic groups. A further issue related to the territorial integrity of Namibia was that of the status of Walvis Bay.

The South African government's position, as seen in the historical background discussion, had evolved from a wish to annex the territory to the imposition of a form of "internal settlement" based on an ethnic division of the black population and the maintenance of centralised control with the South African government itself. The overall objective of the South African government was to prevent the establishment of a hostile government in an independent Namibia. According to Zartman, "the conflict has not been over a country as much as over a boundary-not as a simple borderline but as a determination of whether the southern African battleline will be on the Orange or on the Cunene and Cubango rivers, along southern and

northern Namibia respectively, and whether the territory between the two will be a boundary-in-depth (buffer state) or will fall to one side or the other." (47) The primary aim of the South African government had been to create a settlement in Namibia whereby it would be ruled by a friendly government which would not challenge the status quo in the territory.

As discussed above, the South African government's preference for racial separation and the ethnic fragmentation of the black population of Namibia was apparent as early as 1922 when it established the system of "native reserves" through the Native Administration Proclamation Act of 1922. With the coming to power of the National Party in South Africa in 1948, the South African government sought to apply to Namibia the policy of "separate development" with the creation of bantustans or homelands for the black population. The South African government formally imposed this policy in 1964 following recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry into South West Africa, appointed in 1962. The Odendaal Plan (illustrated in Appendix I), as the report became known, suggested dividing Namibians into 12 "population groups", namely, whites, Coloureds, Rehoboth Basters, Namas, Damaras, Hereros, Kaokovelders, Ovambos, Kavangos, Caprivians, Tswanas and Bushmen. It proposed that each black group occupy a "homeland" with the exception of the Coloureds. In 1975, Bryan O'Linn, leader of the Federal

Party in Namibia said of the Report, "The plan provided for a total area for all the Blacks and Basters of about 33-million hectares and about 40-million hectares as the white controlled area. The greatest part of the Namib Desert and the coastline is not included in the said 40-million hectares, even though it is planned as the white-controlled area. According to the 1970 census, the non-White population totalled about 640,000 against 91,000 Whites, giving a population ratio of about 7 to 1 and a land allocation of 54 hectares per capita for Blacks and Basters, 444 hectares per capita for Whites and nil for Coloureds." (48) To put the Odendaal recommendations into effect, the South African government passed the Development of Self-government for Native Nations in South West Africa Act No 54 of 1968 which provided for the creation of "homelands" for each of the six main ethnic groups referred to as "native nations" (49). At the end of 1975, the Odendaal Plan was regarded by the South African government as the only solution to the South West Africa problem. Extensive amendments to the Act were made by the Development of Self-Government for Native Nations Amendment Act No. 20 of 1973 which enabled "homelands" to become "self-governing" as a transitional phase prior to independence (50).

The South African government's position on Namibia's future in 1977 was based on an internal settlement in the form of proposals emanating from the Turnhalle

Constitutional Conference. As discussed in the brief historical outline above, the Turnhalle process was based on an ethnic division of the black population. The whites represented a single group rather than a three-way division between German, English and Afrikaner. As seen earlier, the South African government was in direct control of the proceedings and opposed any fundamental change in the basic pattern of apartheid in the territory. The eventual proposals by the Turnhalle Constitutional Committee illustrated that the intentions of the South African government had moved from annexation of Namibia as South Africa's fifth province towards a variation of the separate development policy applied in South Africa. While accepting Namibia as a single political entity, the three-tier government proposed by Turnhalle was entirely based on ethnic and racial separation. The ethnic basis of the conference was further emphasised by the fact that political parties representing the Namibian black population, such as SWAPO and SWANU, were not allowed to take part in the Turnhalle proceedings, despite calls from the majority of black delegates for this. As pointed out by Du Pisani, the basis of the Turnhalle process ensured that the "essential tenets of policy - group autonomy, geo-political partition and white economic hegemony - were left untouched." (51)

SWAPO rejected the Turnhalle process because it was based on an ethnic division of the population. It stated

that the conference was a "gathering of stooges and misguided people" (52). The executive of SWAPO stated that the South African government was "attempting a desperate sleight of hand in Namibia. It hopes to present its divisive and tribalist scheme for our country-which we have already condemned as 'Bantustans' masquerading as federalism-as somehow allowing for Namibia's independence as a single entity" (53).

In its "Political Programme", adopted in Lusaka in July 1976, SWAPO stated its aims as being:

- The liberation and independence for the people of Namibia, by all possible means, and the establishment of a democratic people's government.
- The realisation of genuine and total independence of Namibia in the spheres of politics, economy, defence, social and cultural affairs" (54).

The programme stated that SWAPO would continue the armed struggle until the South African government accepted the following conditions:

- South Africa must accept the right of Namibian people to independence and national sovereignty.
- South Africa must announce that Namibian territorial integrity is absolute and not negotiable.
- All political prisoners must be released.
- All political exiles must be allowed to return freely.
- South Africa must make a commitment for the removal

of police and army and stop using Namibia as a base for aggression against neighbouring independent African countries.

- Any constitutional talks on the future of Namibia must take place under UN supervision, and should aim at the holding of free elections under UN supervision and control (55).

The Programme went on to state that "SWAPO shall under no circumstances accept the South African plan to impose on our people a weak and fearful confederation which will be incapable of contradicting neo-colonial orders from Pretoria." (56)

SWAPO's position on Namibian self-determination, was, therefore based on universal franchise under UN supervision and control. The position of SWAPO and the Front-line States was expressed earlier in January 1976, in the 25-point "Declaration of Dakar", which was the culmination of a conference on Namibia and Human Rights held in Dakar and organised by the Institute for Human Rights in Strasbourg and the International Commission of Jurists in Geneva. The Action Programme urged a follow up to Resolution 366 of 17 December 1974, which had demanded South African withdrawal from Namibia and the transfer of power to the Namibian people with the assistance of the UN. The Action Programme also urged the Security Council to determine under Chapter VII of the Charter that South African actions in Namibia constituted a threat to

international peace and security. This would open the way to the imposition of sanctions against South Africa. The Declaration of Dakar and the Programme of Action were designed to "guide future international action on Namibia." (57) As pointed out by Serfontein, "Notwithstanding the conference subject, the feeling was that there was little point in discussing human rights while South Africa remained in control of the Territory. The main purpose of the Conference, therefore, was to suggest ways and means of obtaining South Africa's withdrawal." (58)

Resolution 385 was a compromise outcome mainly because it did not determine that the South African occupation was a threat to international peace and security. The Resolution outlined the process by which Namibian independence could be achieved. It has become the blue-print for further negotiations on Namibia and formed the basis of the Western approach to the negotiations in 1977. Resolution 385 called for free elections to be held under UN supervision and control, and for adequate time (to be determined by the Security Council) "for the purpose of enabling the UN to establish the necessary machinery within Namibia to supervise and control such elections." The Resolution also called for complete South African withdrawal to be replaced by a transitory UN presence and called on the South African government, pending the transfer of power, to:

- Comply fully with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- Release all Namibian political prisoners;
- Abolish all apartheid laws, particularly the "bantustans" and "homelands";
- Allow the return of all Namibian exiles.

As indicated by the above discussion, it is apparent that the broad issues in the conflict of Namibian self-determination and independence, also encompassed the issue of racial discrimination in the territory and the treatment of political dissent.

A further issue relating to the territorial integrity of Namibia, (apart from the bantustanisation of the territory by the South African government) was that of Walvis Bay, Namibia's only deep water port. This became an important issue during negotiations. Walvis Bay was annexed by Britain in 1878 and administered by the Cape Colony from 1884. When Namibia became a mandate, the South African government decided that the territory would be administered as if it were an integral part of South Africa(59). This was the case until 1975 and the onset of the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference, when the South African government changed its position on the port. Moorsom points out that "the purpose of this change appeared to be to further ensure the continued economic and political dependence of an 'independent' internal government on South Africa." (60) South African intentions

on Walvis Bay became clear when, in a revised Shipping Board Act of May 1976, the South African government defined Walvis Bay as a "South African port" (61). In August 1977, the South African government announced its annexation of the port.

SWAPO's position on Walvis Bay was that it was an integral part of Namibia. This position was stated in SWAPO's draft constitutional proposals of August 1975 (62). When the South African government annexed the port, SWAPO's Central Committee condemned the action as "an aggressive violation of Namibia's territorial integrity." (63)

The position taken by the General Assembly of the UN was that Walvis Bay is an integral part of Namibia; a position consistently expressed in its resolutions on Namibia. It condemned the annexation as illegal (64). As will be seen in the later discussion of the negotiations with the involvement of the Western Contact Group, the issue became important in those negotiations and the tactics adopted by the Group. This was especially apparent in the process leading to the adoption of Security Council Resolution 432 which declared Walvis Bay to be an integral part of Namibia.

The South African government's racial policies were a major issue in the conflict from the League of Nations period to the present. From the outset of its

administration, the South African government placed the interests of the white population above those of the indigenous population. White immigration was promoted and limited self-government was conferred on the white population by the South West Africa Constitution Act, No. 24 of 1925. While this provided for the political development of the white population, the black population (in marked contrast) was confined to a system of "native reserves" on largely unsuitable land, thus ensuring the perpetuation of subsistence economies and the migrant labour system(65).

The South African government's racial policies in Namibia were manifest in the exclusion of the black population from political participation; the institutional and administrative separation of the races coupled with the ethnic divide of the black population; the economic differentiation manifest in the wage structure and the division of labour; and the discrepancy in the provision of educational and health services between the white population and the indigenous black population(66).

4.2.2- The Parties and their Relationship

This was defined in the analytic framework as the nature of the interaction between the parties in terms of the mode used in pursuit of conflict goals. Another aspect of this relationship is the intensity of interaction between

the parties. The nature of the interaction between the South African government and SWAPO is multi-faceted while being primarily coercive. The South African government maintains its occupation via a vast military and police presence, and SWAPO opposes this occupation through a guerrilla struggle.

It was at a National Congress held in Windhoek in 1961, that SWAPO resolved that political and military activity were complementary and should be pursued simultaneously(67). A four-fold strategy has since been adopted based on:

- Mass organisation and mobilisation inside Namibia.
- The armed struggle through its military wing, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia(PLAN).
- International campaigns to gain support.
- Negotiation with the South African government through third parties (namely the WCG) and bilaterally (1984).

As discussed earlier, SWAPO's military campaign was launched on 26th August 1966, mainly in response to the ICJ's technical ruling in July 1966, that neither Liberia nor Ethiopia had the credentials to bring the South West Africa case before it. In the early years of the war, PLAN guerrillas faced serious supply shortages and communication problems. Fighting units had to operate from bases inside Zambia. During the first nine years, therefore, fighting was restricted to the north-eastern region of Namibia(68). Angolan independence in February

1976 brought about a new phase in the war between SWAPO and the SADF. As SWAPO's Political Programme points out, "this brought about a new dimension to the Namibian liberation struggle. It has made it possible for thousands of our people to move across the Angola/Namibia frontiers to the rear base of our struggle to obtain both the skill and tools of armed struggle." (69) 1976 saw a sharp increase in guerrilla activities, with scores of reported skirmishes between PLAN and the SADF (70). Although it is difficult to estimate the intensity of the war in Namibia, mainly because of the conflicting reports from the two sides over the years, the indications of the escalating conflict are the sharp increase in the SADF presence in Namibia and the numbers of South African incursions into Namibia since 1976. Table 4.1 gives an indication of the numbers of PLAN operations in Namibia (71):

Year	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
Contacts and Ambushes	260	180	324	644	545	297	299	307
Mine incidents	211	190	245	327	349	311	188	169
Sabotage	0	30	59	84	37	46	41	96

Table 4.1- PLAN Operations in Namibia
 Source: Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Review, June 1985; quoted in: Cawthra, G., Brutal Force: The Apartheid War Machine, (IDAF, London, 1986), p. 279.

Table 4.1 shows that SWAPO initiated at least one incident per day on average and that 1980 saw a sharp increase in guerilla activity, but a marked decline from 1981, possibly due to increased South African raids into Angola during this period. PLAN is estimated to number 8,900(72).

The South African government could be said to have a six-fold strategy in Namibia:

- Repression against SWAPO activists inside Namibia.
- War against PLAN guerrillas.
- Intervention against the FLS.
- Military support for insurgent movements in the FLS.
- Gaining support for internal settlement.
- Taking part in negotiations via third parties (WCG).

Since 1975, when South Africa used Namibia as a springboard for the invasion of Angola, the SADF presence in Namibia has increased sharply. During the invasion, South Africa established several bases inside Namibia. By 1977, South Africa had established some 20 military bases there. South African troops remained in Namibia after their withdrawal from Angola. The UN Commissioner for Namibia estimated in 1976 that South Africa had a total of 45,000 troops in Namibia(73). In 1981, South African troop levels in Namibia were estimated at 80,000(74).

More recently, the SADF has set up tribal armies, and introduced in January 1981 conscription to all Namibians aged between 16-25. It has been estimated that since 1978, when the South African government began registering voters

for the internal elections, Namibians have been crossing the border at the rate of 550/week(75).

It is evident that the relationship between the parties in conflict, namely the South African government and SWAPO is mainly based around the war, which has intensified following Angolan independence. The two sides are also involved in a political struggle inside Namibia.

4.2.3- Intra-Party Factions

Although the main parties in the conflict are the South African government and SWAPO, and were so defined by the Western Contact Group, there are a number of "internal" parties in Namibia which either opposed or supported the internal settlement process, the major dividing factor between these being the question of participation in the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference. Table 4.2 illustrates the range of political parties existing in Namibia at the time of the conference in September 1975(76):

As can be seen from Table 4.2, the conference groups included traditional leaders and tribal groups, some allegedly created by the South African authorities in order to take part in the conference, for example, the DUF(77). An alliance which was initially opposed to the South African government's policies, but moved towards supporting the Turnhalle process was the National

<u>Party</u>	<u>Tribal/ ethnic base</u>	<u>Position on Turnhalle</u>	<u>Member of alliance</u>
SWAPO	Originally Ovambo/ national	Against	Namibia National Convention (NNC)
DEMCOF	Ovambo	Against	NNC
Ovambo Independence Party (DIP)	Ovambo	For	-
NAPDO	Nama/ Damara	Against	NNC
NUDO	Herero/ some Nama	For	National Convention for Namibia
Voice of the People	Nama/ Damara	Against	Okahandja Summit
Nama United Council (NUC)	Nama	For	-
Damara Advisory Council (DAC)	Damara	Against	Okahandja
Damara Tribal Executive (DTE)	Damara	Against	NNC/ Okahandja
Damara United Front (DUF)	Damara	For	-
Caprivi National Union (CANU)	Caprivi	Against	-
Volksparty	Rehoboth	Against	NNC
Baster- vereniging	Rehoboth	For	-
Labour Party	Coloured	For	-
Nat. Ind.P. (NIP)	Coloured	For	-

Table 4.2- Internal Alliances in Namibia

Convention of Namibia, formerly, the National Convention of Freedom Parties. This was formed in 1971 and came to represent nine political parties opposed to the South African government's policies. These included, SWAPO, NUDO (led by Clemens Kapuuo), SWANU, the Volksparty, the Namib African People's Democratic Party (NAPDO), the Herero Chiefs' Council, the Damara Tribal Executive and DEMKOP. This coalition objected to apartheid and the creation of bantustans and sought a role for the UN towards independence of a united Namibia(78). In February 1975, SWAPO resigned from Kapuuo's National Convention(79).

Conflict within the National Convention led to the formation of the Namibia National Convention(NNC) which included SWAPO and SWANU, the Volksparty, Demcop, Napdo and some members of the Damara Executive Committee. The NNC was opposed to the South African government's policies of ethnic fragmentation, but unlike its predecessor, did not seek recognition from the UN and the OAU, since SWAPO was an important constituent member(80) and SWANU had already lost such recognition from the OAU. The NNC's composition meant that it had the widest support in Namibia(81). Another alliance opposed to the Turnhalle Conference consisted of participants of the the Okahandja Summit(82).

Despite attempts at coalition-building, SWAPO and SWANU have remained rival groupings. Two main factors have contributed to this division. SWANU is not involved in the

guerrilla struggle and does not organise externally. (SWANU was recognised by the OAU between 1963 and 1965). Moreover, it does not enjoy the level of support inside the territory that SWAPO has, given that SWAPO is largely made up of the Ovambo, who form the majority grouping, but also enjoy wider support nationally. After SWAPO's withdrawal from the NNC in 1976 (due to increasing conflict with SWANU), another coalition was formed, the Namibia National Front, in April 1977, by eight parties and tribal groupings including SWANU. In its manifesto, the NNF declared that it sought national unity rather than ethnic identity(83).

The other major political party which became important during the Contact Group period was the SWAPO-Democrats or SWAPO-D led by Andreas Shipanga, former SWAPO Information Secretary. Shipanga announced the formation of SWAPO-D in 1978. Shipanga was among a number of SWAPO members arrested in Zambia in 1976, after having reportedly challenged the leadership of Sam Nujoma(84). SWAPO-D refused to participate in the National Assembly set up as a result of the Turnhalle process and were in favour of UN-supervised elections. During the period of the WCG involvement in the conflict, certain interested observers in the conflict, such as Rio Tinto Zinc(RTZ) attempted to build up SWAPO-D as a credible alternative to SWAPO(85).

During the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference, a number of groups joined SWAPO. Four breakaway groups of the Namas announced in October 1976 that they had unanimously decided to reject Turhalle and join SWAPO. NAPDO dissolved the party in November 1976 to join SWAPO and the Association for the Preservation of the Tjamuaha Maherero Royal House, representing more than 17,000 Herero royalists, pledged, on 15 April 1977, to support SWAPO in opposition to Chief Kapuuo(86).

Among the parties which supported either continued South African occupation or the internal settlement process, the one which has the closest links to Pretoria is the National Party of South West Africa. This dominated white Namibian politics from 1950-1977, when all Namibian representatives in the South African Parliament were National Party members. The National Party which was led during the Turnhalle conference by A.H. du Plessis, strongly opposed any proposals aimed at removing apartheid policies in the territory. It was also strongly opposed to any agreement with the WCG, as will be seen later.

In 1977, after the start of the WCG-led negotiations, the National Party split after Dirk Mudge broke away to form the Republic Party. Mudge formed the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance later in 1977; this also included Chief Clemens Kapuuo. As this became an important force during the Western Contact Group's involvement, it will be discussed as part of the conflict characteristics in the

later discussion of the negotiations and the impact of the conflict characteristics therein. It is important to point out at this stage that the formation of the DTA was an important factor in the conflict, as was the opposing group, which came to be known as the Action Front for the Retention of the Turnhalle Principles (AKTUR). This consisted of National Party members, including du Plessis, who were opposed to Mudge. AKTUR's position on any proposed settlement was important for the South African government as they could provoke strong internal opposition by the Verkrampste in the National Party of South Africa. The latter were already critical when Vorster agreed to abandon Turhalle after persuasion from the Contact Group.

4.2.4- Patron Input

As will be seen in the discussion of the decision-making process which led to the formation of the Western Contact Group, the allies in the conflict had a more significant influence on the decisions by the five governments to take up the role of intermediary than the parties themselves. They also had a major role during the involvement of the Contact Group. The most important patron input for SWAPO came from the Front-Line States (FLS), the OAU and the UN. SWAPO also has bilateral aid from donor governments, mostly of the Eastern bloc and certain Scandinavian

countries. Another important source of support derives from solidarity groups based in Western countries.

Regionally, the FLS provide military bases for PLAN guerrillas from which they could launch attacks inside Namibia against the South African occupation. As was discussed earlier, during the first nine years of the guerrilla struggle, SWAPO operated from Zambia. This meant that its activities were mainly confined to the north-eastern region of Namibia. After the MPLA victory in Angola, SWAPO acquired a major new ally in Agostinho Neto and a logistically more suitable base from which to launch its guerrilla activities. Cooperation between the MPLA and SWAPO was formally agreed in February 1976 when Angola achieved independence and recognition by the OAU(87). The FLS also provide material aid for Namibian refugee camps.

The Presidents of the Front-Line States have pursued a dual strategy of diplomacy and a commitment to the armed struggle for the liberation of southern Africa from white domination. The Front Line Presidents' "Strategy for Southern Africa's Liberation", adopted by the OAU in 1975(88) linked Namibia and Rhodesia as immediate targets for liberation; the last target being South Africa itself. The Presidents of the FLS decided unanimously to support the armed struggle at the Quelimane meeting in Mozambique in February 1976. At the same time, they made consistent calls on Western governments, especially those of the United Kingdom and the United States, to initiate

negotiations with the South African government and the Smith government. Pressure from the Front Line States was a major factor in the Lancaster House negotiations which led to final agreement by the Patriotic Front. The WCG used the FLS as an influence route to SWAPO.

Nigeria is another important patron, both in material and in diplomatic terms. In 1976, President Obasanjo of Nigeria promised Sam Nujoma "considerable Nigerian aid" (89) as part of the new Nigerian policy which initiated OAU recognition of the MPLA government in Angola. Nigeria is also an important patron via the OAU Liberation Committee.

The OAU Liberation Committee makes substantial contributions to SWAPO. In 1967, the Liberation Committee allocated \$6,000 to SWAPO. By 1977, this had increased to \$350,000 and by 1979 to \$450,000 (90). As pointed out by Amate, these contributions "enabled SWAPO to step up its pressure on Vorster's government of South Africa both in the military and in the diplomatic fields.." (91)

SWAPO also obtains military and humanitarian aid from countries of the Eastern Bloc and Cuba. Some Western European countries, foremost among them Sweden, also provide bilateral material aid to SWAPO. Anti-apartheid constituencies also raise funds and pressure their governments into supporting the movement.

The UN is also an important forum for SWAPO support, where the Namibia issue remains high on the agenda. In 1973, the General Assembly recognised SWAPO as the "sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people" in Resolution 3111 of 12 December 1973 and was granted observer status in 1976 by Resolution 31/146. Assistance to SWAPO also comes from the UN Council for Namibia within which it participates and which has acted as a pressure group within the UN and outside. Material aid to SWAPO also goes through the UN Fund for Namibia. The UN Council for Namibia, which is responsible for the administration of the fund, has stated that in the implementation of General Assembly resolutions regarding the fund, there is "close cooperation between the Council, its Committee on the Fund and the Commissioner. In this respect, there is also close consultation with SWAPO" (92). Overall the UN has been an important forum in which countries of the third world have called for Namibian independence and exerted pressure for the application of mandatory sanctions against South Africa.

Certain Western governments, including those involved in the WCG, are perceived by SWAPO and its supporters, as allies to the South African government (93). This is due to the extensive economic, diplomatic and military links between the countries represented in the WCG and South Africa. Does this mean that the governments of the WCG should be viewed as allies to the South African

government?

It is essential to distinguish analytically between interested third parties as opposed to allies, whose declared intention is the support of one side in the conflict. A comparison between United States support for Israel and the relationship of the five governments which formed the WCG with South Africa illustrates this point. Whereas the US openly declares support for Israel in the form of defence pacts and aid programmes, there is no such relationship between the five and the South African government. In the military sphere, the five have, to varying degrees upheld the arms embargo. Moreover, the five also contribute to the UN Fund for Namibia which works in close consultation with SWAPO. It is, however, relevant to state that the five have an extensive relationship with the South African government.

4.2.5- Overlapping Conflicts

The interactional nature of conflict and the fact that conflicts are almost always linked with others is most starkly illustrated by the conflicts in southern Africa. As will be seen later, the fact that the conflict over Namibia is linked with others in the region was an important factor in the formation of the Contact Group, and has been, since 1977, in its functioning.

The conflict over Namibia is interlocked with others

in the region in a number of ways. The most significant of these is the fact that adversaries in the various conflicts broadly form two opposing coalitions constituting the minority white government in South Africa on the one hand and the liberation movements and their allies in the FLS on the other. The National Party government is the main adversary in South Africa and Namibia and was a major ally to the Smith regime in Rhodesia and the Portuguese rulers in Angola and Mozambique prior to independence. South Africa is also a major adversary of Angola and provides substantial aid to the insurgent movements, UNITA and the MNR, in Angola and Mozambique respectively(94).

The fact that the South African government is the major adversary in the conflicts in southern Africa has implications for the issues in the conflict over Namibia. The apartheid system in South Africa is also imposed in Namibia. The conflict in Namibia is also linked to the conflict in Angola. The SADF uses Namibia for its regular incursions into Angola and trains members of UNITA within Namibia. In the later stages of the functioning of the Contact Group, Namibian independence was linked to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

4.3- Conclusion

This chapter has provided a historical background to the conflict as it evolved at the UN, in Namibia and regionally. The historical discussion has shown that while the conflict was mainly manifest between the South African government and the UN, this situation changed during the late forties and early fifties with the rise of the Namibian nationalist movement. It is evident, however, that the former provided the impetus for the latter. The historical discussion also showed a change in the issues in the conflict. Whereas the original aim of the General Assembly was trusteeship for Namibia, this shifted to independence from 1960 with the rise of the decolonisation movement. The historical discussion also illustrated how conflict characteristics can change through the life cycle of a conflict.

The chapter has also highlighted the main conflict characteristics of the conflict over Namibia which were prevalent at the time of the Western Contact Group intervention in 1977. These provided the context within which this intervention took place and therefore had an impact on the Contact Group members' decision-making about the choice of the intermediary role in response to the conflict as well as the Group's functioning as a coalition of intermediaries. The discussion of the conflict characteristics illustrates that the WCG intervened in a conflict which was not a simple bilateral situation, but

involved, apart from the major adversaries, a number of other interested third parties, including allies, factions, constituencies and interested observers. This has been an important factor in the functioning of the Contact Group, as has the fact the conflict is interlocked with others in southern Africa. The discussion showed that the UN has been a major forum of opposition to the South African occupation; a fact which was central to the intervention of the Contact Group and its mode of functioning. The following chapter provides a discussion of the location of interests of the governments which became involved as intermediaries in the conflict over Namibia. It will indicate that they formed part of the conflict environment prior to active intervention in April 1977.

Chapter 4- Notes

1- Selected sources on the history of the conflict:

Africa Contemporary Record, 1976-1985

Dugard, J., The South West Africa/Namibia Dispute, (University of California Press, Berkeley, LA and London, 1973).

First, R., South West Africa, (Penguin, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1963).

Green, R.H., K. Kiljunin, and M.L. Kiljunin, Namibia: The Last Colony, (Longman, Harlow, Essex, 1981).

International Defence and Aid Fund, Namibia: The Facts, (IDAF, London 1980).

Moleah, A.T., Namibia: The Struggle for Liberation, (Disa Press, Wilmington, DE, 1983)

Du Pisani, A., SWA/Namibia: The Politics of Continuity and Change, (Jonathan Ball, Johannesburg, 1986).

Rocha, G.M., In Search of Namibian Independence, (Westview, Boulder, CO and London, 1984)

Serfontein, J.H.P., Namibia?, (Focus Suid, Randburg, 1976)

2- South West Africa was renamed Namibia by General Assembly Resolution 2372 (XXII) of 12 June 1968. It will be referred to as Namibia in the present study, with the exception of direct quotations.

3- German rule ended in July 1915, when German forces surrendered to the defence forces of the Union of South Africa, which were sent into the territory under the leadership of the Prime Minister, Louis Botha, on behalf of the British government.

4- It became evident that the Union government sought annexation of the territory when General Smuts suggested a system of mandates for the territories formerly possessed by Russia, Turkey, Australia and Hungary, excluding the ex-German colonies. Proposal put forward by General Smuts reprinted in Dugard, op.cit., pp 28-31.

5- The South African government's creation of a system of "native reserves, starting in 1922, was condemned by the Permanent Mandates Commission. By 1939, 17 reserves for the indigenous population had been established, based on a division of the population into separate ethnic or

tribal groups, with some groups, such as the Herero, being further divided into separate reserves.
Du Pisani, op.cit., p.62.

6- The Trusteeship system was created by Chapters XII and XIII of the Charter, while Chapter XI provided for international accountability in respect of non-self-governing territories. The basic objectives of the system were laid out in Article 76, under Chapter XII; Chapter XIII defined the composition and functions of the Trusteeship Council.

7- The South African government presented to the General Assembly a "Memorandum on the administration of South West Africa and the wishes of its peoples as to the future status of the mandated territory presented by the government of the Union of South Africa in the name of and on behalf of the peoples of South West Africa"- General Assembly Official Records(GAOR, 1st session, 2nd part, Fourth Committee, pp.199-235, 1946, Document A/123. Quoted in Dugard, op. cit., p. 104-111.

8- GAOR, 4th Session, Fourth Committee, Annex to the summary records of meetings of 1949, pp. 7-8, Doc. A/929; quoted in *ibid.*, p. 119.

9- In 1949, The National Party government introduced the South West Africa Amendment Act No 23, which provided for white Namibian representation in the South African Parliament. Du Pisani, op.cit., p.122.

10- Before granting oral hearings to petitioners, the General Assembly sought the opinion of the ICJ, which handed down its opinion on the "Admissability of Hearings to Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa" in which it upheld the GA's request. For dissenting judgements, see Dugard, op.cit., p.192.

11- With the increasing impetus towards decolonisation from 1960, culminating in the passing of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples as General Assembly Resolution 1514(XV) of 14 December 1960, the primary objective of the General Assembly was no longer trusteeship but independence. This change was reflected in General Assembly Resolution 1702(XVI) of 1961 which proclaimed the "inalienable right of the people of South West Africa to independence and national sovereignty". See Dugard, op.cit., pp. 227-228.

12- The involvement of the Security Council in the question of Namibia came after the arrest of 37 Namibians by the South African government under the Terrorism Act of 1967. The Security Council, in Resolution 245(1968), adopted on 25th January, "took note" of General Assembly Resolution 2145 which revoked the mandate and called on

the South African government to discontinue with the trial as it was "being held under arbitrary laws whose application has been illegally extended to the Territory of SWA in defiance of General Assembly resolutions". As pointed out by Dugard, the importance of this resolution was in the fact that the Security Council endorsed the revocation of the mandate, although such endorsement was "tacit". Dugard, op. cit., p.422.

13- The Security Council, by Resolution 284 of July 1970, sent the dispute back to the I.C.J. with the question: "What are the legal consequences for states of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia?" The I.C.J. handed down its opinion on 21 June 1971 stating that the South African government was under obligation to withdraw from Namibia and that members of the UN were under obligation to recognise the illegality of the South African presence and to refrain from any acts which would imply recognition. For a detailed analysis of the Opinion, see *ibid.*, pp 447-505.

14- The General Assembly adopted Resolution 2248(S-V) in 1967 by which it established an 11-member UN Council for South West Africa (later renamed UN Council for Namibia) to administer the territory until independence. General Assembly Official Records, Fifth Special Session, Document A/PV/1518.

15- Namibia's population figures (1983)

<u>Population Group</u>		<u>% Total</u>
Ovambo	526,385	50.1
Kavango peoples	97,808	9.3
Herero	77,826	7.4
Dama	76,774	7.3
Whites	75,722	7.2
Nama	49,430	4.7
Coloureds	43,120	4.1
Caprivians	39,965	3.8
San (Bushmen)	29,448	2.8
Basters (Rehobothers)	26,293	2.5
Tswana	6,310	0.6
Others	11,569	1.1
Total	1,150,650	

Source: Supplied by the Department of Manpower in Windhoek; quoted by Du Pisani, op.cit., p.11.

It will be noticed that the white population is not divided by the South African administration in Namibia into German-Afrikan-English, reflecting the South African emphasis on the ethnic division of the black population.

- 16- On 24 September 1974, A.H. du Plessis, leader of the National Party in Namibia, acting under a directive from Pretoria, issued a written statement declaring that the NP had decided that "the time was opportune for the whites in the territory to take positive action to hold talks with members of other population groups with a view to reaching agreement as to the political future". The statement added that "all options would be open". This did not, however, mean that black political parties would be able to participate, as indicated by Mr Dirk Mudge in November 1974 to the all-white Legislative Assembly. Totemeyer G. and J. Seiler, "South West Africa/Namibia, A study in Polarisation and Confrontation", in: Seiler, J. (ed.), South Africa Since the Portuguese Coup, (Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1980), p.87. For the Mudge statement, see Du Pisani, op.cit., p.283.
- 17- Prime Minister Vorster kept in touch with the proceedings of the Turnhalle conference through the conference secretary, Billy Marais, who had been Vorster's personal secretary in Namibia before his appointment to Turnhalle. Another indication of Vorster's control of the proceedings was that in November 1975, he decided to send A.H. du Plessis to Widhoek to take the leadership of the white delegation from Dirk Mudge, who seemed too conciliatory to the black delegates. See Totemeyer and Seiler, op.cit., p.88.
- 18- Du Pisani, op.cit., p.71.
- 19- Smaller interest groups were also formed. One of the prominent was the Economic Party. This called for equal rights for the three nationalities, Afrikaner, German and English, and more administrative control until the territory was "ripe" for self-government. The Economic Party was disbanded after the formation of the VNSWP. See Du Pisani, op. cit., p.72.
- 20- Ibid.
- 21- Ibid., p.73.
- 22- Ibid., p.75.
- 23- Ibid., p.79.
- 24- Serfontein, op.cit., pp.123-125.
- 25- Du Pisani, op. cit., p.141.
- 26- Ibid.
- 27- Du Pisani, op.cit., p. 144.

- 28- Totemeyer and Seiler, op. cit., p.86.
- 29- Selected references on the rise of Namibian nationalism:
First, op.cit.; Green, et. al., op. cit.; Moleah, op. cit.; Du Pisani, op. cit.; Serfontein, op. cit.; and SWAPO, To Be Born A Nation, (Zed Press, London, 1984).
- 30- For Herero and Nama wars, see:
Drechsler, H., Let Us Die Fighting, (Akademie-Verlag, Berlin, 1986).
- 31- Totemeyer, G., Namibia Old and New: Traditional and Modern Leaders in Ovamboland, (Hurst and Company, London, 1978), p.41.
- 32- SWAPO, op. cit., p.167.
- 33- Memorandum of Reverend Michael Scott in:
GAOR, 2nd Session, 4th Committee, pp139-193, Doc A/C 4/95.
Quoted in Dugard, op. cit., p. 110.
- 34- First, op. cit., p.31.
- 35- Moleah, op. cit., p.96.
- 36- Du Pisani, op. cit., p.146.
- 37- Totemeyer, op. cit., p.192.
- 38- Ibid., p.192.
- 39- Serfontein, op. cit., p.175.
- 40- Letters from Kerina to Sam Nujoma and other nationalist leaders (while Kerina was in New York as petitioner) are reprinted in Du Pisani, op. cit., pp.149-149.
- 41- Nujoma of the OPO and Kozonguizi of SWANU had preferred the merging of these two organisations. This suggestion was, however, rejected by Kerina, who recommended that the OPO become a national organisation. Two reasons for this difference are suggested, mainly the increasing division and rivalry between SWANU and the Herero Chief's Council and possible rivalry between Kerina and Kozonguizi. Ibid., p. 151.
- 42- Dugard, op. cit., p. 219.
- 43- Ibid.
- 44- Totemeyer, op. cit., p. 193.

- 45- SWAPO, op. cit., p. 176.
- 46- Ibid.
- 47- Zartman, I.W., Ripe for Resolution, (Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1985), p.158.
- 48- Quoted in Serfontein, op. cit., p.59.
- 49- Ibid., p.61.
- 50- A "self-governing" area has a "cabinet" consisting of a chief minister and other ministers drawn from the legislative council. See: IDAF, op. cit., p.16.
- 51- Du Pisani, op. cit., p. 285.
- 52- Quoted in Totemeyer and Seiler, op. cit., p.88.
- 53- Quoted in Du Pisani, op. cit., p.290.
- 54- SWAPO, Political Programme, (Lusaka, 1976), p.8.
- 55- Ibid.
- 56- Ibid.
- 57- Serfontein reprints this in op. cit., pp.338-340.
- 58- Ibid., p.338.
- 59- Moorsom, R., Walvis Bay: Namibia's Port, (IDAF, London, 1984), p.15.
- 60- Ibid, p.14.
- 61- In a speech given to Parliament on 23 April 1976, Prime Minister Vorster announced that he was considering repealing the 1922 Act which made Walvis Bay part of Namibia administratively, and administering the port as part of South Africa's Cape Province. Ibid., p.15.
- 62- SWAPO, SWAPO Discussion Paper on the Constitution of an Independent Namibia, Windhoek, August 1975, Section 42; Reprinted in Serfontein, op. cit., pp. 385-398.
- 63- Quoted in Moorsom, op. cit., p.19.
- 64- By Resolution 32/9(D), Section 6-8, 4 November, 1977.
- 65- Moorsom, R. and W.G. Clarence-Smith, "Underdevelopment and Class Formation in Ovamboland, 1845-1915", Journal of African History, Vol XVI, No 3., 1975, pp.365-381.
- 66- In education, for example, expenditure on education in

- 1975/76 amounted to 615 Rand per white pupil and 68 Rand per black pupil. See: Thomas, W.H., Economic Development in Namibia, (Kaiser, Grunewald, Munich, 1978), as quoted in Green, et al, op. cit., p.108.
- 67- SWAPO, To Be Born A Nation, p. 176.
- 68- IDAF, op. cit., p.52.
- 69- SWAPO, Political Programme, op. cit.
- 70- IDAF, op. cit., p.52.
Also, Africa Confidential, 5th March 1976 for reports of PLAN shooting down a South African helicopter and reconnaissance aircraft inside Namibia.
- 71- Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Review, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, June 1985 quoting SADF figures of incidents involving SWAPO; quoted in: Cawthra, G., Brutal Force: The Apartheid War Machine, (IDAF, London, 1986), p. 279.
- 72- International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Military Balance, 1986-87, p.136.
Military Balance, 1987-1988, p.138.
- 73- UN Council for Namibia, The Military Situation in and Relating to Namibia, (United Nations, New York, 1983).
- 74- IDAF, Apartheid's Army in Namibia, Fact Paper on Southern Africa, No. 10, (IDAF, London, 1982), p.15.
- 75- IDAF, Namibia: The Facts, op. cit., p. 58.
- 76- Sources used to construct Table 4.2 include Du Pisani, op. cit., and Serfontein, op. cit.
- 77- For a detailed account of the conflict between the various Dama factions over the question of participation in the Turnhalle conference, see: Du Pisani, op. cit., pp. 290-292.
- 78- The divisions which led to the fragmentation of the National Convention for Namibia (NCN) are extensively discussed in Serfontein, op. cit., pp.176-182.
- 79- Conflict arose mainly between SWANU and Kapuuo's followers.
- 80- Du Pisani, op. cit., p. 260.
- 81- Ibid, p.262.
- 82- The composition of the Okahandja Summit was : Damara Tribal Executive, the Damara Council and several Nama factions. See Du Pisani, op. cit., p.299.

83- The Namibia National Front was formed in April 1977 and involved the factions which made up the Namibia National Convention excluding SWAPO. See *ibid.*, pp.333-334.

84- IDAF, Namibia: The Facts, *op. cit.*, p. 47. The announcement on the formation of SWAPO-D was made in June 1978.

85- Interview with David Stephen (Political Adviser to Dr. David Owen, 1977-1979), London, 12th February 1986.

86- Africa Contemporary Record, 1976-77, p. B773.

87- Africa Confidential, 5 March 1976.

88- Africa Contemporary Record, 1975-76, p.C71.

89- Africa Confidential, *op. cit.*

90- These figures were over and above military contributions. See: Amate, C.O.C., Inside the OAU, (Macmillan, London 1986), p.301.

91- *Ibid.*, p.302.

92- GAOR, Thirty-Third Session, Supplement No 24, A/33/24, p.23. Also confirmed by Mr. Thomas Dube, UN Council for Namibia interviewed in New York (United Nations), 24th June 1987.

93- SWAPO states its conviction that the "Five are allies of apartheid South Africa" in referring to the Contact Group. Namibia Today, Vol 6, February 1982, p. 7.

94- For South Africa's policy of destabilisation see: Hanlon, J., Beggar Your Neighbours, (Catholic Institute for International Relations, London, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana, 1986).

CHAPTER 5- THE WESTERN CONTACT GROUP AS A COALITION OF INTERESTED THIRD PARTIES

This chapter argues that the five governments which became participants in the Western Contact Group (WCG) initiative were interested third parties in the conflict over Namibia. Moreover, they formed part of the conflict environment prior to active intervention in the conflict as a coalition of intermediaries in 1977. The Chapter seeks to identify the conflict-related interests for each of the five members of the group. In the present context, the aim is to identify the location and content of such interests. The next Chapter, which concerns the formation of the Group in 1977, will consider the interest priorities of the Five at the time of intervention, as this forms an important factor in third party decision processes in response to conflict.

5.1- The Governments of Britain, France, the United States, West Germany, and Canada as Interested Third Parties

The conflict-related interests of the Contact Group members are integral to their relationship with the conflict. This relationship involves overlapping systems of interaction which involve the governments, inter-governmental organisations, and non-governmental organisations. Figure 5.1 places the WCG members within a complex network of relationships which define the focal conflict (in this case, Namibia) and its social context.



Figure 5.1- The WCG as Part of Conflict Environment

The diagram indicates that, apart from direct links between the governments of the WCG and those in the southern African region (those of South Africa and the Front-Line States), the WCG governments may also interact indirectly via a transnational organisation such as BP, or an international governmental organisation (IGO), such as the Commonwealth. Britain's economic links with South Africa, for example, do not simply involve the governments of the respective countries, but also (and more importantly), a number of Transnational Corporations (TNCs) with subsidiaries in both Namibia and South Africa. As far as economic relations are concerned, the governments may be involved in a number of ways: These include having shares in the corporations involved or

promoting trade through export guarantees, and by the introduction and monitoring of "codes of conduct" for companies operating in Namibia and South Africa. As Barber points out in relation to Britain's relationship with South Africa, "The government's main role in (economic) relations has been to create a climate for economic activity - by easing or intensifying political pressure, by being more or less helpful in export guarantees, by organising trade fairs, by encouraging or discouraging overseas investment, and by forming advisory bodies of government officials and business interests." (1) As a result, decision-making concerning economic relations takes place not only at the governmental level, but also at the level of the private companies and local subsidiaries(2). It is important, therefore, to recognise that units other than governments are involved within the social context of the conflict and may influence the third party's decision-making.

The remainder of the Chapter will apply the definition of "third party conflict-related interests" (outlined in the analytic framework) in an analysis of the interests of the governments which became members of the WCG. It will illustrate that the five formed part of the conflict environment prior to active intervention in the conflict. It will also provide background material for the next Chapter which considers, as one factor affecting the decision to form the Group in an intermediary initiative

in 1977, the conflict-related interest priorities of the five members of the WCG.

5.2- The Conflict-Related Interests of the Five

5.2.1- The Issues and Parties in the Conflict Over Namibia

The five members of the WCG have, to varying degrees, both economic and strategic interests in Namibia; these interests being located primarily in the exploitation of Namibia's natural resources. The five members of the Contact Group also have a relationship with the parties in conflict.

5.2.1.1- The Issues in Conflict

The involvement of the five members of the WCG and corporations within the five countries in the exploitation of Namibia's resources places their interests in conflict with those of SWAPO, the UN Council for Namibia, and with resolutions taken by the UN General Assembly and Security Council. The two issues in the conflict having implications for these interests are: [1] the pronounced illegality of the South African occupation of the territory and [2] the depletion of Namibia's natural resources prior to independence.

The major implication of the five's involvement in the exploitation of Namibia's resources, [which include

raw materials such as base metals (e.g. tin, zinc, lead, vanadium; Namibia is estimated to be the 4th largest in Africa and 17th in the world), diamonds and uranium] is that this exploitation is carried out through the South African government whose mandate over Namibia was revoked by the General Assembly in Resolution 2145 in October 1966. The issues which place parties involved in the Namibian economy in conflict with the UN position are apparent from subsequent Security Council resolutions, which called for the cessation of such activity(3).

The responses of the governments of the five members of the Group to involvement in the Namibian economy will be discussed below. At this stage, it is sufficient to point out that the above UN decisions formed a precedent for later UN action which had a direct bearing on the interests of the Five in Namibia and the factors which determined their response to the conflict in 1977. Within this context, any involvement in the Namibian economy became a primary focus of interest at the UN, which became the forum for the exertion of pressure on those Western governments involved.

The second issue with which the involvement of the Five in the Namibian economy comes into conflict concerns the depletion of Namibia's natural resources prior to independence. With the establishment of the UN Council for Namibia (General Assembly Resolution 2248(S-V) of 19 May

1967) as the legal administering authority for Namibia, external actors involved in the exploitation of Namibia's resources came into direct conflict with this authority when it issued Decree No. 1 on the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia. (Adopted by the General Assembly in Resolution 3295 (XXIX) on 13 December 1974). The Council for Namibia states that "Conscious of its responsibility to protect the natural resources of the people of Namibia and of ensuring that these natural resources are not exploited to the detriment of Namibia.. " it decreed that "No person or entity, whether a body corporate or unincorporated, may search for, prospect for, take, extract, mine, process, refine, use, sell, export, or distribute any natural resource, whether animal or mineral, situated or found to be situated within the territorial limits of Namibia without the consent and permission of the United Nations Council for Namibia or any person authorised to act on its behalf for the purpose of giving such permission or such consent." The Decree continued that "Any person, entity or corporation which contravenes the present decree in respect of Namibia may be held liable in damages by the future government of an independent Namibia." (4).

The five Contact Group governments have not recognised the UN Council for Namibia or its authority over the territory. Corporations from the five countries as well as the governments have, to varying degrees, been

involved in the Namibian economy. The governments have been interested actors in these activities. This involvement has placed them in conflict with the majority of the UN, as well as with SWAPO, the other major actor in the conflict over Namibia. This continued involvement in the Namibian economy is interpreted at the UN as collusion with the occupying South African government. The remaining part of this section will point to the location of economic and strategic interests in Namibia and provide an indication of how these interests have been perceived both by the governments in the WCG and by parties in the conflict system opposed to such involvement.

A recent survey carried out by the UN Commission on Transnational Corporations shows the extent of Western involvement in the Namibian economy. The numbers of companies from the five are: the United Kingdom, 49; the United States, 25, the FRG and Canada, 4 each; and France, 3(5). The main activity is located within the mining sector, specifically in the mining of diamonds, base metals and uranium(6). All three products have industrial and strategic importance to Western countries.

The United Kingdom had the greatest economic and strategic interest in the Namibian economy, mainly because of the uranium contract, where the uranium is thought to be used in the British nuclear weapons industry(7). United Kingdom-based companies operate in a variety of sectors

including mining, banking, petroleum and insurance. The largest single investment is that of RTZ followed by Barclays Bank (which withdrew in 1987) (8). Namibia's main export markets are the United Kingdom (diamonds, sold in London by the Central Selling Organisation- a de Beers controlled monopoly; uranium; and karakul pelts, which are auctioned in London); West Germany (uranium and blister copper); France (uranium); and the United States (blister copper, other base minerals and rock lobster) (9).

The interdependence of diverse interests involving the South African government, Western-based TNCs, and Western governments, is most clearly illustrated by considering the exploitation of Namibian uranium, which also indicates the scope and extent of interests in the Namibian conflict by the members of the WCG. The uranium is mined at Rossing open-pit mine near Swakopmund in western Namibia by Rossing Uranium Ltd, which is said to be the largest producer of uranium in the world (10). RTZ holds 46.5% of the equity capital, of which 10% is held through its Canadian subsidiary, Rio Algom Ltd. The South African government owned Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) holds 13.2% and the South African company, General Mining and Finance Corporation (GMFC) holds 6.3%. Other interests include Total-Compagnie Miniere et Nucleaire of France, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Compagnie Francaise des Petroles (CFP), which is state-owned, with 10%; and Urangesellschaft of the FRG with 5%. The Federal

Government has a 40% shareholding in Veba AG, a company which controls Urangessellschaft in a consortium with Metallgesellschaft AG and Steinkohlem-Elektizitats AG(11). The French share was arranged in return for a long-term contract for a "substantial quantity" of uranium concentrates during the 80s. As pointed out by Barbara Rogers, the initial raising of the capital for Rossing was "contingent on securing adequate forward purchasing contracts by RTZ." These were provided by the United Kingdom's Atomic Energy Authority and the French government's Total(12).

The extracted uranium from Rossing is exported to the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, the United States and Japan. The most important contract for Namibian uranium was held (until recently) by British Nuclear Fuels Ltd. (BNFL) which is said to depend on Namibian uranium for 42% of its imports(13).

The FRG has not disclosed how much uranium it is purchasing from Namibia. Various independent reports, however, point to the fact that Namibian uranium is imported in large quantities by the FRG and, as with the United Kingdom, involving the Federal government. As mentioned above, Urangessellschaft, mbH has a 5% stake in Rossing. It has been revealed that this company, together with Veba AG had contracted to buy 6,140 metric tons of Namibian uranium between 1975 and 1986(14). The West

German government is also involved in URENCO, a British-Dutch-German consortium involved in the enrichment of uranium(15).

France also receives substantial quantities of Namibian uranium, with the French government involved in Rossing, with the 10% holding for Total, as well as in prospecting for Namibian uranium independently of Rossing. It is estimated that 51% of French uranium imports come from Namibia(16). French companies and parastatals are heavily involved in prospecting for uranium in Namibia(16).

It has been reported that Namibian uranium destined for Japan is processed in the United States, and there are also a number of United States companies involved in prospecting for uranium in Namibia. The most important of these are the Newmont Mining Corporation and Union Carbide Corporation(17). The Canadian company, Falconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd. is also engaged in prospecting for uranium. Rio Algom, 51% owned by RTZ, has a 10% equity share in Rossing Uranium Ltd(18).

The above account of involvement in the mining of Namibian uranium, its purchase, transport and enrichment indicates the complex interdependence which links the governments participating in the WCG, either directly or through state owned companies as well as MNCs, to the South African government's occupation of Namibia. It

points to the fact that units other than governments are involved in the social context of the conflict and may influence governmental decision-making(19).

Governmental attitudes to continued involvement in the Namibian economy have been characterised by involvement by the governments concerned and by official statements of discouragement. The responses of the five governments involved in the WCG have varied. In 1966, the United States government voted in favour of General Assembly Resolution 2145 which revoked the South African mandate over Namibia. It also accepted the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 1971. However, it abstained on General Assembly Resolution 2248(S-V) which created the UN Council for Namibia and has, therefore, not accepted Decree No. 1. Donald B. Easum, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, stated in 1974 that the "United States government discourages United States investment in Namibia and has made clear that it will not intervene on behalf of the interests of any American investor who engaged himself in Namibia after October 1966."(20) Under this policy, the United States officially discourages new investment in Namibia, and Export-Import Bank credit guarantees are not available for trade with Namibia(21). As pointed out by Gail Hovey, "The Department of Commerce makes it clear that the policy is not a prohibition on investment. It is not illegal to invest, and individual corporations are free to make their own decisions."(22) When Representative

Patricia Schroeder introduced a Bill in the House of Representatives (H.R. 2589) "To prohibit the exploitation of any natural resources from the territory of Namibia without the permission of the UN Council for Namibia", Dr. Chester Crocker (Under-Secretary of State for African Affairs, 1981-present) and the State Department were opposed to the introduction of this Bill (23).

The United Kingdom's position over a number of governments has been one of opposition to interference with private companies operating in Namibia and has not involved any form of official discouragement. The government of the United Kingdom has taken the position that it was not bound by Security Council resolutions 283 (1970) and 301 (1971) since it had abstained in the voting on them. When the Labour government was returned in 1974, the then Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Mr. James Callaghan, stated in December 1974 that "South Africa remains the de facto Administering Authority. However, in the circumstances, there is an obligation on states not to recognise any right of South Africa to continue to administer the Territory. But there is no obligation, in the absence of appropriate decisions under Chapter VII of the Charter, to take measures which are in the nature of sanctions. It follows that we do not accept an obligation to take active measures of pressure to limit or stop commercial or industrial relations of our nationals with the South

African administration of Namibia." (24) The United Kingdom government's position on the I.C.J. Opinion was repeated in 1976 by Mr. Rowlands, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in a written answer parliamentary question referred to the statement made by Mr. Callaghan of Dec. 1974 on the Southern African Policy Review and stated that "there are certain elements of the Advisory Opinion which we do not accept." (25) The position on the uranium contract was outlined in May 1978 by Mr. Rowlands: "It is not our policy to interfere with this contract. There is no evidence that it has impeded progress towards an independent Namibia." (26). In 1980, the Conservative Government's position was that "Her Majesty's Government do not intend to cancel the contract between British Nucleur Fuels Ltd. and Rossing Uranium Ltd. for the purchase of uranium. The Rossing uranium mine is making an increasing contribution to the development of Namibia's economy." (27) Tax concessions are also available to British companies involved in trade with Namibia (28). The United Kingdom government's position is that the cutting off of trade with Namibia would constitute a form of economic sanction against South Africa and that there was no Security Council mandate for such a measure (29).

The Canadian government accepted the 1971 Advisory Opinion of the ICJ. However, it also abstained on Resolution 2248 of the General Assembly which created the UN Council for Namibia and has not accepted Decree No. 1.

The position of the Canadian government was stated in the House of Commons in December 1977. The Minister for External Affairs referred to the government's concern about the activities of Canadian companies operating in Namibia and stated "We have asked the officials at the Department of Finance and others to look into all the implications of possible tax concessions being provided and the like which these companies may be obtaining and which are being provided by what is essentially an illegal regime in Namibia." (30) Canadian companies have continued operating in Namibia, paying taxes to the South African administration, and securing tax credits for these in Canada. In a reply to the UN Secretary General in November 1983, the Canadian government stated that potential Canadian investors were informed that the usual range of government services were unavailable in Namibia owing to Canada's non-recognition of the illegal South African administration. However, the Government allows Canadian companies operating in Namibia to deduct as a business expense taxes paid to the South African administration (31). The Canadian government's position has been that this would not be amenable to implementation (32).

The government of West Germany has also adopted the "official discouragement" line by withdrawing all tax incentives available to German companies operating in Namibia, including export credits or investment

guarantees. The government maintains, however, that it does not possess the legal means to stop or restrain private companies from doing business in Namibia(33). As noted earlier, the government itself is involved in the exploitation of Namibian uranium through Veba.

The government of France, like that of the United Kingdom, has not accepted the Advisory Opinion of the I.C.J. and abstained on Resolutions 283(1970) and 301(1971) on the activities of foreign economic interests in Namibia. It abstained on General Assembly Resolution 2248 which established the UN Council for Namibia and has not accepted Decree No. 1. It stated in 1983 that it was discouraging French companies from operating in Namibia(34). As seen earlier, however, the French government obtains uranium from Namibia with the direct involvement of the government in the companies operating in Namibia(35). Table 5.1 provides a summary of the positions of the five countries represented in the WCG on major issues related to Namibia. It illustrates the similarity of their responses to the conflict.

The involvement of external actors in the Namibian economy has placed them in conflict with SWAPO, the UN Council for Namibia and the majority membership of the UN, as well as the anti-apartheid constituencies in the countries involved. SWAPO has stated that "foreign investment in Namibia is one of the major factors contributing to the continuing presence of South Africa's

	<u>U.S.A.</u>	<u>U.K.</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>FRG</u>	<u>Canada</u>
Revocation of Mandate; General Assembly R. 2145 (XXI), 27 Oct. 1966	For	Abs.	Abs.	-	For
Recognition of UN Council for Namibia; General Assembly R. 2248 (S-V), 19 May 1967	Abs.	Abs.	Abs.	-	Abs.
Recognition of SWAPO; General Assembly R. 3111 (XXVIII), 12 Dec. 1973	Abs.	Abs.	Abs.	Abs.	Abs.
Decree No. 1; General Assembly R. 3295 (XXIX), 13 Dec. 1974	Abs.	Abs.	Abs.	Abs.	Abs.
SWAPO conferred Observer status; General Assembly R. 31/146, 20 Dec. 1976	Against	Against	Against	Against	Abs.
Action regarding companies operating in Namibia	Official Discour- agement Ex-Im guaran- tees not avail- able	Credits tax conce- ssions avail- able	Official Discour- agement	Official Discour- agement No export credits available	Official Discour- agement since Dec. 1977

Table 5.1- The Positions of the Five on the Conflict over Namibia prior to 1977

illegally occupying forces.." (36). The UK's interest in Rossing was also criticised at the UN Security Council debate on Namibia in January 1976 (37). The UN Council for Namibia stated in a recent report, "In complete disregard for the relevant resolutions and decisions of the United Nations and the world-wide campaign against South African and other foreign economic interests operating illegally in Namibia, certain Western nations continue to maintain their wide-ranging economic interests in Namibia and South Africa. Moreover, the unwillingness on the part of these countries to prevent the activities of transnational corporations and their subsidiaries operating in Namibia has contributed to their unscrupulous illegal exploitation of the Territory's natural and human resources." (38) It is evident, therefore, that interest in the exploitation of Namibian uranium as well as wider interests in the Namibian economy are linked by SWAPO and its allies at the UN, to the South African occupation. As will be seen in the next chapter, this has affected their perceptions of the role of the WCG in the conflict.

The connection between the above interests and the actual policy of the five member governments of the WCG is difficult to make unambiguously, although it will be argued in the next Chapter that it was an important influence on the decision to take up the role of intermediary as opposed to agreeing on sanctions. Dependency on Namibian resources is difficult to assess

for a number of reasons especially because any form of comparison for the five members of the WCG would require uniform information and statistics regarding the levels of importation of, for example, uranium or base metals (these are the most important Namibian resources for Western economic and strategic interests). Such information is not uniformly available(39). Moreover, the element of secrecy, especially with regard to the exploitation of Namibian uranium, adds to this difficulty. Another problem with regard to assessing the influence of interests in the Namibian economy on policy is that such a connection is rarely made by the policy makers themselves. While the extent of relations and economic interests with South Africa itself are openly accepted as a prime reason for the reluctance to impose sanctions against the South African government, this connection is not acknowledged with regard to Namibia(40).

The above suggests that economic and strategic interests in Namibia, specifically the dependence on Namibian uranium, are important interests for members of the Contact Group. It was argued that such interests are in conflict with those of SWAPO, the UN Council for Namibia and the majority membership of the UN in that they relate to two main issues in the conflict, namely the illegality of the South African occupation and the depletion of Namibian natural resources prior to independence. Involvement in the Namibian economy is

carried out via the South African government, which is a major adversary in the conflict. The Namibian issue is perceived and often evaluated by Western governments in the context of increasing demands for sanctions against South Africa. This is so because UN action on Namibia is often accompanied by such calls which have the effect of exerting pressure on those governments involved as well promoting the visibility of their involvement. Involvement in Namibia forms part of, and is integral to, their overall relationship with South Africa. This is an extensive relationship and a major influence upon Western governmental responses to conflicts in southern Africa as a whole and to the conflict over Namibia in particular. This relationship forms the subject for the following section of this Chapter.

5.2.1.2- Relationship with the Parties

This section will examine the nature of the relationship between the governments of the WCG and the two major parties in the dispute, namely the South African government and SWAPO.

5.2.1.2.1- Relationship with SWAPO

The basic relationship between the five governments which came to form the WCG and SWAPO was one of conflicting

interests. As discussed above, this was primarily due to the Five's involvement in the Namibian economy. This involvement was perceived by SWAPO as conferring recognition on the South African occupation of the territory and participation with the South African government in the depletion of Namibia's natural resources and, therefore, the exploitation of the Namibian population. SWAPO has, therefore, perceived the governments of the WCG as allies to the South African government. As will be seen in the next Chapter, this had an impact on SWAPO's mistrust of the Group at the start of the initiative and throughout the negotiations.

While it would be inappropriate to make a direct comparison of the Five's relationship with SWAPO and the South African government (the former being a non-governmental organisation, and as such, not in a position to allow access to the territory, confer licensing arrangements and so on), it is relevant to consider the question of recognition of the movement and the degree and nature of support, material or otherwise, provided by the Five.

The question of recognition of an NGO is an important one in that it implies the conferment of legitimacy to the organisation. In this regard, the UN has played a major role in the recognition and, therefore, the legitimisation of national liberation movements. As pointed out by

Shepherd, "Deliberations in the United Nations.. have become a major legitimizing process for national revolutions over the thirty years of its existence." (41) Moreover, the move from illegitimacy to legitimacy is a "psychological one of acceptance as opposed to rejection, the emergence of an internationally accepted reality which governments interact with and recognize as a political authority." (42)

This process of legitimisation by the UN has been consistently opposed by certain Western members of the UN. Those which came to form the WCG have opposed this process as it has applied to SWAPO. They have either abstained or voted against resolutions conferring such recognition to the Namibian movement. The five governments of the WCG abstained on General Assembly Resolution 3111 (XXVIII) of 12 December 1973, which recognised SWAPO as the "authentic representative of the Namibian people." (43) Another important General Assembly decision regarding SWAPO's diplomatic recognition came in Resolution 31/146 of 20 December 1976 which conferred observer status on SWAPO; supported the armed struggle; and stated that any independence talks must be between the South African government and SWAPO. The governments of the United States, United Kingdom, France, and West Germany voted against this resolution while that of Canada abstained (44).

Despite the fact that the five governments which came

to form the WCG have not formally recognised SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people, they have recognised the movement as a a major party in the conflict and in the negotiations over the territory. As outlined by Ambassador Donald McHenry (United States Deputy Ambassador to the UN, 1977-1979; Ambassador to the UN 1979-1981): "The five..recognised that in order for a settlement to be meaningful and lasting it would have to be accepted by the two parties engaged in the armed conflict - the South African government; and SWAPO, which enjoyed substantial support within Namibia and internationally." (45) When the issue of UN bias toward SWAPO was introduced into the negotiations by the South African government and the Namibian internal parties in 1979, the WCG emphasised that the Security Council had not endorsed General Assembly decisions.

Apart from diplomatic support and legitimacy conferred by UN recognition, another aspect of this legitimisation process is the provision of assistance to the movements directly or to refugees from the colonised territories and South Africa. The five governments of the Contact Group have, to varying degrees, contributed to such programmes established by the UN, specifically the UN Fund for Namibia and the Southern African Trust Fund. While it is not possible to trace the details of the contributions of these funds directly to the movements concerned, it is clear that, as pointed out in Chapter 4,

these programmes (and in particular the UN Fund For Namibia) are administered and distributed in close consultation with SWAPO(46).

The UN Fund For Namibia finances the UN Institute for Namibia "To undertake research, training, planning and related activities with special reference to the struggle for freedom of the Namibians and the establishment of an independent State of Namibia." (47).

To varying degrees, the five governments of the Contact Group have contributed to the UN Fund for Namibia, with the major part being allocated to the Institute for Namibia(48). Despite calls from the anti-apartheid constituency for direct governmental aid to the southern African liberation movements (as provided by the Swedish government), the five governments have been opposed to such direct aid(49).

5.2.1.2.2- Relationship of the Members of the WCG with South Africa

There is a vast array of literature describing the extent and range of Western ties with South Africa. These include official statements and policy reviews(50), analytic studies of foreign policy towards South Africa(51), and extensive information about Western relations with South Africa produced by pressure groups opposed to such ties(52). The pro-South African lobby also produces its

own interpretations of the implications of this relationship(53). Although there are differences throughout the literature on the implications of these extensive ties, there is broad agreement as to the location of Western interests in this relationship. This section provides a broad outline of the network of exchanges and relations which tie the five member governments of the Contact Group to the South African government. Official and semi-official statements(54) are used as starting points towards the identification of the location of interests in this relationship.

A major official statement providing an indication of perceived interests in southern Africa as a whole is the National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) No. 39 written under Dr. Kissinger's tutelage in 1969. This suggests that "...policy positions on Southern African issues affect a range of United States interests." (55) These are divided into four distinct categories, including, 1) political, 2) economic, 3) defence and 4) scientific interests. While economic, defence, and scientific interests refer to relations with South Africa, political interests are defined in this study in terms of the costs to relations with black African countries which may accrue from continued relations with white regimes in southern Africa, which included at the time those in South Africa and Namibia, Rhodesia, and the Portuguese colonies. NSSM 39 states that "...policy towards the White regimes in

Southern Africa affects, though it may not necessarily govern (U.S.) standing with African and other states on issues in the UN and bilaterally." (56) This statement suggests that relations with the white regimes in southern Africa have consistently been weighed against relations with black African states. (The latter will be further discussed under a separate heading). This is merely to point out that such a weighting does exist and is an important factor in the decision-making calculation about a response to the conflict.

A more recent Study Commission (South Africa: Time Running Out, Report of the Study Commission on United States Policy Towards Southern Africa) reviewing United States policy options towards the conflict in southern Africa (57) suggests the following as constituting "US interests" in the region:

- [1] Protecting US military/strategic interests and minimizing Soviet influence.
- [2] Ensuring adequate supplies of key minerals.
- [3] Advancing political freedoms and civil liberties.
- [4] Maintaining satisfactory diplomatic and commercial relations with other African countries.
- [5] Maintaining commercial relations with South Africa.

The Study Commission concluded that these interests are and will be affected by the conflict in southern Africa. Thus, "Political instability and armed conflicts in the region have been acknowledged as the greatest direct

threats to United States interests." (58)

While the NSSM No 39 recognised an emerging congressional interest in southern Africa where "...a definite linkage of the southern Africa issue with the civil rights problem in the United States" (59) was being made, the Study Commission placed greater emphasis on the ramifications of South Africa's apartheid policies and United States policy therein on race relations in the United States (60). A still more recent report produced by the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on "A U.S. Policy Toward South Africa" states that "Americans have a significant stake in South Africa because of the serious domestic ramifications that a bitter and bloody race war there could have within the United States." (61) Constituency interest will be discussed in later chapters. However, it suffices to point out that this is a recognised interest for the United States.

Although the above discussion has centred on official and semi-official statements of United States interests in southern Africa, there is some overlap with interests for the other four governments which became participants in the Contact Group. The overlap is mainly in the existence of economic interests, and minerals dependency, although there are other interests which are more relevant to some members of the group.

Given the broad range of interests which tie the five

Contact Group governments and South Africa, and the fact of variations between the Five in the scope and extent of such ties, it is useful to categorise such ties under three main headings:

[A] Economic interests and mineral dependency.

[B] Military and strategic interests.

[C] Ties of "Kith and Kin" and the "colonial legacy".

There is wide variation among the Contact Group members in the extent or degree of interest under each category. It is also important to point out that, while for certain interests, it is possible to make precise quantitative comparison of the degree of interest manifest in the relationship with South Africa (as, for example, is the case in comparing trade links), this is not possible in other interests. This is because of lack of complete data, as in the cases of minerals dependency or levels of direct (and indirect) investment in South Africa.

A- Economic Ties

The five WCG governments and organisations based in the five respective countries have extensive economic ties with South Africa. These have been widely researched, especially in the context of the debate on the imposition of mandatory economic sanctions against the South African government. They are also perceived by opponents of the South African regime as the hallmark of the partnership between certain Western governments and South Africa. This

section will outline the extent and scope of economic ties which link the five with South Africa. The objective is to point to economic links as a "location of interest" for the five in so far as it influences their responses to the conflicts in southern Africa.

Economic interests between the Five and South Africa are long-established and manifest in trade, investment, and the transfer of skilled labour and technology. According to Blumenfeld, "...a complex pattern of international economic interrelationships, involving exchange of goods and services (visible and invisible trade), capital flows (foreign loans and investments) and the transfers of labour and technology, was already firmly established over half a century ago." (62) Although British capital and institutions were the first to become involved in the South African economy, important links have been developed with the United States and several Western European countries, including West Germany and France. While there have been fluctuations in the relationship, such as the capital transfers associated with the Sharpeville Massacre in 1960 and the Soweto Riots in 1976, the basic economic links have remained relatively unchanged (63).

Thus, the long-standing nature of economic links with South Africa is characteristic of the relationship. Another characteristic is that the relationship

constitutes a complex network of exchanges or interactions making up a system where the units are not necessarily governments, although pressure from opponents of apartheid is often directed at governments(64). As in the case of economic interests in Namibia, TNCs and anti-sanctions pressure groups are also important in the relationship.

The five members of the Contact Group are widely, though not equally, involved in trade relations with South Africa. Britain's share of the South African market in 1981-82 stood at around 20% and the United States and West Germany have nearly reached this level. Canada had a share of 4% of the South African market during the 1950s. This subsequently stagnated to around 2%. Blumenfeld suggests that this decline is probably due to increasing opposition to such links. The French share of the South African market increased throughout the 1970s and peaked in 1981 to stand at 5% of South Africa's total(65).

There are varying opinions as to the importance of the South African market on the Western economies involved. One suggestion is that the importance of the South African market lies in the fact that exports to South Africa consist of industrial goods such as computers. A recent Memorandum to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee stated, "Industries particularly sensitive to any rupture in trade with South Africa include heavy capital goods and high technology sectors employing skilled workers with a high value added content.

Such manufacturers face strong international competition ; it would not be easy to find alternative export markets." (66). The impact of the loss of the South African market on levels of resultant unemployment in Britain is estimated differently according the source of the estimate. The most pessimistic estimate has been made by the United Kingdom-South Africa Trade Association (UKSATA) and stands at an immediate loss of 70,000(67). The UKSATA pamphlet further suggests that the loss of vital mineral supplies would have a multiplier effect on levels of unemployment which would rise to 180,000 above the immediate 70,000(68). Another estimate made by Rivers and Bailey, two members of the anti-apartheid constituency, argues that the maximum figure made unemployed as a result of severing trade links with South Africa is 20,000 and this would inevitably decline with the relocation of markets(69).

Foreign investment in South Africa also illustrates the extent and pervasiveness of Western involvement in the South African economy. Both direct and indirect(70) investment are crucial to the relationship which ties the South African economy to Western interests. Another characteristic of Western investment in the South African economy is that it extends over a number of areas including the motor industry, electronics and computers, the chemicals industry and mining, banking and insurance. Moreover, Western investment is not confined to the

private sector, but has become increasingly involved in the South African public sector. The role of governments has involved being the actual investor; actively facilitating investment; standing by; and introducing "codes of conduct" (71).

Reliable and comparable data on a country-by-country basis for levels of investment are not available for several reasons, including secrecy on South African investments; uncertainties about the different forms that investment takes; and difficulties in making valuations on assumed market prices (72). It is, therefore, essential to use a number of sources, both official and unofficial, in finding the relevant data. One estimate is that about 10% of all British direct investment overseas is in South Africa and direct and indirect British investments constitute a majority of South Africa's foreign investment (73). According to a recent survey carried out by the UN Commission on Transnational Corporations, there were 364 British-based TNCs operating in South Africa in 1984 (74). According to one study, British direct investment at the end of 1976, excluding oil, banking and insurance, stood at £1,263 million, while indirect investment, including oil, banking and insurance, stood at £3,554 million (75). By 1981, direct investment for Britain was officially estimated at £2,826 million, while unofficial estimates by the British Industry Committee on South Africa suggest that the total value of the United

Kingdom's direct and indirect investment stood at £6 billion, representing 40 to 45% of total foreign investment in South Africa(76). The British Anti-Apartheid Movement estimates total British investment in South Africa to be at £11 billion(77).

Investments from the United States are the second largest in the South African economy. In 1983, there were a total of 406 United States companies operating in South Africa(78). The United States Department of Commerce estimated in 1982 that the United States-owned direct investment in South Africa amounted to \$2.6 billion(79). According to research done by the United States Consulate in Johannesburg (and leaked to the pressure group, TransAfrica), total United States investment is estimated at \$14.6 billion of which direct investment accounted for \$5 billion(80). While British investment represented 10% of its total, United States direct investment represented 1% of its total worldwide(81).

United States indirect investment in South Africa has consisted mainly of bank loans. By 1976, United States financial institutions had over \$2 billion in outstanding debts to South Africa and as with British banks, these have been involved in financing strategic projects including the Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM)(82).

The West Germans are the third largest investors in South Africa. German-based or owned TNCs were estimated

to number 142 in 1984(83). According to the Study Commission, West German direct investment in the RSA stood at \$336 million, making it the third largest investor in South Africa(84).

German banks have been heavily involved in South African governmental borrowing on the international money markets. According to a report published by the UN Centre Against Apartheid, South Africa raised 158 public sector loans of the value of \$5,500 million from 1972-1978; 72 of these originated in West Germany. South African public sector enterprises such as ESCOM have benefited from these loans(85).

French investment in South Africa is significantly lower than that of Britain, the United States and West Germany. There are few French companies with operations in South Africa; according to the UN Centre for Transnational Corporations, amounting to 20 in 1984(86). The Centre Francais du Commerce Exterieur(CFCE) estimated French total investment in South Africa in 1975 at R736, or 4.5% of total foreign investment there, of which R139 was direct and R597 million indirect. The French Anti-Apartheid Movement estimated French investment at 6% of South Africa's total(87). Between 1972-1978, loans to South Africa from French banks totalled nearly \$2 billion(88).

Canadian direct investment in Africa stood at \$259

million for the year 1978, \$151 million or 58% of which, was in South Africa. However, this constituted only 0.09% of Canada's total foreign investment(89). According to the UN Centre for Transnational Corporations, Canadian direct investment in South Africa is held by a small number of companies, amounting to 21 in 1984(90). Canadian banks have also been involved in financing South Africa's borrowing needs(91).

The British government is involved in other ways apart from being a direct investor in the South African economy(92). The Export Credit Guarantee Department works closely with banks and insurance companies to provide insurance and credit assistance to British exporters. This Department has provided export credit for the South African Coal, Oil, and Gas Corporation (SASOL) contracts and it is thought to be involved in the contracts given to British companies for the development of the Electricity Supply Commission's (ESCOM) power stations(93). British governments have consistently perceived Britain's financial involvement in South Africa as a major priority in its responses to the conflict and has been reluctant to agree on economic sanctions against the South African government. This reluctance will be discussed in the next chapter, when I consider the factors which were relevant to the five governments' decision-making calculations in 1977 in their reaction to the conflict over Namibia.

According to the 1981 Study Commission, United States government credit agencies, namely, the Export-Import Bank and the Department of Agriculture Commodity Credit Corporation, have not done business with South Africa since 1978(94). In 1978, the United States Congress passed the Evans Amendment which prohibited any Ex-Im financing for exports to the South African government or agencies until the United States Secretary of State had determined that "significant progress toward the elimination of apartheid had been made." (95).

The West German government has consistently been opposed to the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa. As stated by Hill, "German economic purposes are to maintain and extend trade, to safeguard investment and, above all, to ensure the continuing supply of essential minerals." (96) While the last interest location as regards the relationship with South Africa will be discussed more fully below, it is important to point out that German economic interests in South Africa have strongly influenced the opposition of the Federal Government towards sanctions. Economic interests in South Africa are also linked to the Federal Government's reluctance to act in an individual capacity in southern Africa and its perception of limited influence in the region.

There seems to be agreement among researchers and commentators that the French government did not regard

policy towards South Africa as an issue of high priority, at least until 1981, when the Socialist Party of Francois Mitterand came to power(97). In 1976, the French government gave its approval for the involvement of the French engineering consortium, Framatome, in the building of two nuclear power plants at Koeberg(98).

The Canadian government has also been opposed to the use of mandatory economic sanctions as a response to the conflict in southern Africa and a form of influence against the South African government. As with the other four members of the Contact Group, the Canadian government has been "anxious not to take any action which might be detrimental to Canadian-South African trade relations because South Africa is a valuable if small market for Canadian fabricated goods, and Canada depends on South Africa for its supply of certain strategic metals not readily available elsewhere."(99) According to one analyst, Canadian economic relations with South Africa have not been affected by measures taken in December 1977 and 1979 to limit Canadian economic involvement in South Africa(100).

The reluctance to impose sanctions against the South African government is also linked to Western reliance on certain South African minerals which are said to be of economic and strategic value. There are wide differences of opinion on the question of Western dependence on

mineral supplies from South Africa. There are a number of reasons for this discrepancy, which also present a problem in making a direct, quantitative comparison of the relative dependency of the five WCG governments and institutions within the five countries(101). The following discussion provides a brief outline of Western dependence on South African minerals, using sources which have considered this issue in greater detail.

South Africa has a vast mineral wealth, Western reliance on which straddles both economic and strategic interests. This reliance varies from country to country. The main variation is the degree of dependence on the South African source. This is mainly due to differences in efforts by the governments to build up stockpiles and diversify the sources of supply. There does, however, seem to be consensus on the importance of this interest in Western relations with South Africa. Table 5.2 indicates the importance of the South African source of supply of key minerals(102):

The importance of South Africa's mineral wealth to South Africa is suggested by the fact that in 1980, minerals accounted for 76% of South Africa's \$26 billion foreign exchange earnings, with gold accounting for 50% of this total(103).

The level of reliance on South African minerals differs from country to country depending on the

<u>Mineral</u>	<u>USA%</u>	<u>South Africa%</u>	<u>USSR%</u>	<u>Other%</u>
Chromium Production	-	33.0	24.5	Turkey (7.1) Zimbabwe (6.2) Philippines (5.7) Other (23.6)
Reserves	-	66.4	2.9	Zimbabwe (29.3) Other (1.6)
Manganese: Production	-	20.9	45.8	Gabon (8.3) India (7.5) Australia (5.8) Brazil (5.0) Other (6.7)
Reserves	-	37.2	50.7	Australia (5.6) Gabon (2.8) Brazil (1.6) Other (2.1)
Vanadium: Production	17.6	42.3	27.9	Chile (2.1) Other (10.2)
Reserves	0.7	49.4	45.9	Australia (1.1) Other (2.9)
Platinum Group: Production	0.1	47.5	47.5	Canada (3.7) Other (1.0)
Reserves	0.1	73.2	25.1	Canada (1.1) Other (0.5)

Table 5.2- 1979 World Mine Production and Reserves of Four Key Minerals

Source: U.S. Bureau of Mines, Mineral Commodity Summaries, 1980. Quoted in Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa, TimeRunning Out, (University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1981), p. 312.

availability of stockpiles and alternative sources of supply. These differences seem to be mostly due to the different responses by the governments to the need for diversification of supply away from South Africa. The United Kingdom is seen to be the most vulnerable and potentially the most dependent on South Africa. This dependence is considered due to a lack of an attempt at diversification(104). In 1978, 47.5% of the United Kingdom's manganese ore came from South Africa(105). The United States relied for 15% of its manganese imports on South Africa and over 58% of its ferro-manganese imports(106). The FRG reduced its import of manganese from South Africa from 77% in 1978 to 52% in 1979(107). While the United Kingdom has not conducted a study of vulnerability to minerals shortages, the FRG, in contrast, set up a State Secretaries Committee for Resource Issues in 1973 and reported its findings in 1978. This came to the conclusion that the South African source was essential for the short term, though in the long-term, dependence could be reduced by recycling, substitution, and diversification of supply. The report emphasised that this decision should not be seen as a prelude to sanctions, but as an indication that in the long-term South Africa represented a political risk(108).

France is also thought to be in a more favourable position than Britain and the FRG. The French government decided to establish a stockpile of key minerals in 1975

and its links with Francophone Africa reduce its reliance on the South African source. For example, France obtains 25% of its chromium from South Africa(109) compared to the United States with 46%, and the FRG at 48%(110).

The United States government has also expended greater effort on encouraging recycling, the replacement of metals with more easily accessible ones, and on the diversification of supply. However, the United States is currently thought to be still vulnerable to a South African cut-off in its South African source for the key minerals, including chromium, manganese, vanadium and platinum(111).

Despite the differences in levels of dependence and vulnerability on South Africa for certain key minerals and in levels of preparedness in the event of a cut-off in this source, it is evident that this is an important and readily admitted interest in Western relations with South Africa(112). The recent Advisory Committee on South Africa set up by Secretary of State Schultz, stated that, "we are agreed that a minerals cutoff (either by counter-sanctions or by a breakdown of the South African economy and infra-structure) would have undeniable impact on the United States. In some cases we could be forced to increase imports from the Soviet Union. But we have concluded that the potential impact of such a denial is not sufficient cause to determine United States policy toward South Africa."(113). The prospect of greater

reliance on the Soviet bloc for certain key minerals is also pointed to by the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee in stating, "While temporary shortages of these minerals as a result of all-out sanctions against the present regime might be ameliorated by recycling, substitution and resort to stockpiles, the United Kingdom and other Western countries have a longer-term interest in avoiding the danger of greater dependence on supplies from the Soviet Union and her allies. This is accordingly an additional incentive for the West to cultivate the emergence of a stable regime in South Africa which is not under the dominance of the Soviet Union." (114). As with economic relations with South Africa generally, the reliance on South African minerals as part of this relationship adds to the reluctance to impose sanctions against the South African regime. According to the British Foreign Office, "Although alternative sources could doubtless be found for most imports, prices would probably be higher - certainly so in the case of strategic minerals where the number of suppliers is severely restricted. This too could in turn have implications for employment in a wide range of industries in the United Kingdom." (115). While with other South African minerals, it is possible potentially to point to the effects of shortfalls of specific minerals, the effects of the loss of gold from South Africa are not as predictable, given the role of gold in the international monetary system. Although the

South African government has attempted to use gold to influence Western governments(116), it could be used as a bargaining counter by Western governments against the South African government, given the role of gold in South Africa's own economy (forming 40-50% of its foreign exchange earnings)(117). The possibility that Western governments could use gold as a bargaining counter against the South African government was pointed out by the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, which stated that "South Africa's own dependence on gold exports..is an important bargaining card in the hands of the industrialised nations."(118).

Although it is difficult to substantiate the role played by gold prices at any particular point in time on South African behaviour, it is interesting in the present context to note that, at one crucial stage during the Contact Group negotiations, the South African government reverted to a hardline position on previous agreements, resulting in stalemate of the negotiations throughout 1979 and 1980. At this time, the price of gold reached a new height of \$850 per ounce in January 1980. This increase may have influenced the South African government's bargaining position vis-a-vis the Contact Group(119).

B- Military and Strategic Interests

The NSSM No.39 stated in 1969 that "Southern Africa is geographically important for the United States and its allies, particularly with the closing of the Suez Canal and the increased Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean." (120). It is often claimed, specifically in NATO circles, that the target for Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean is the supply route of oil and other strategic materials to the West around the Cape of Good Hope. This is often singled out as the main geostrategic interest to the Western alliance.

It has always been the aim of South African governments to persuade the West of its critical position and the necessity of its acceptance within Western defence strategy and cooperation. As pointed out by Geldenhuys, the South African attempts to use its strategic position and its anti-communist orientation as "selling points" in its relations with the West and did so in the negotiations with the Contact Group, alluding to the potential dangers of a "communist" regime in Windhoek - in a clear reference to SWAPO(121).

As pointed out by Spence, however, the South African government has failed in its efforts to become incorporated into the Western defence system, mainly because such cooperation would have been too costly in terms of international opposition(122). Cooperation has,

however, been considered in the past in NATO circles. where two of the options mooted were for the establishment of the South Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the inclusion of South Africa in cooperation with NATO in monitoring Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean(123).

Despite the fact that the South African government tends to exaggerate the strategic importance of the Cape Route and its continued existence as central to Western strategic interests, there is certainly no consensus in the West or within NATO on the salience of this interest. Some decision-makers and military advisers share the South African viewpoint, while others believe that the costs of collaboration with South Africa in the protection of the Cape Route would outweigh the possible rewards. Yet another view is that the Soviet threat is a political rather than a military one(124). It is evident, therefore, that whether or not this interest is important in the overall relationship with South Africa, is very much dependent on the specific decision-maker involved. There seems to be no coherent view on the salience and even the existence of a strategic interest in the West's relationship with South Africa. This is in contrast to the relative consensus which exists on economic interests which tie the West (or certain Western governments) to South Africa.

C- Ties of Kith and Kin and the "Colonial Legacy"

This is an interest that is most applicable to the United Kingdom and West Germany given their colonial involvement in South Africa and Namibia respectively.

Historical ties with Britain and consistent emigration to South Africa has resulted in about 40-50% of the white population there being of British descent. Since the end of World War II, the United Kingdom has been South Africa's main source of immigrants. Some of these are transferred from companies in the United Kingdom to their subsidiaries in South Africa(125). The United Kingdom government estimated the number of British passport holders in South Africa to be 300,000, while a further 500,000 could be eligible for a British passport and the right of abode(126).

The next main source of South Africa's immigrants is West Germany. There are an estimated 40,000 Germans in South Africa and close to 18,000 in Namibia, of which 6,400 are West German citizens(127). A substantial number of Namibian Germans hold dual German-South African nationality. That this relatively high proportion of the Namibian population being German has influenced West German policy towards the Namibian conflict is evidenced by a statement made by Willy Brandt in 1973. In a letter to the then South African Prime Minister, John Vorster, the former Chancellor to the Federal Republic wrote: "We

are following the discussion about South West Africa with special attention, because in this former German protectorate are living numerous people of German origin including many German citizens. The obligation towards these people has induced us to keep the German consulate operating." (128). There still remains a high degree of contact between the German community in Namibia and the Federal Government in West Germany. As will be seen in later chapters, this interest was important in the German decision to take part in the Contact Group initiative and in the tactics adopted by the Federal Government as a member of the Group. In this connection, it is also relevant that pressure groups in West Germany have close ties with the German community and sought to promote certain political parties in Namibia, specifically the DTA.

Unlike the West German situation, where it is evident that the presence of a substantial German population has influenced policy calculations, this is not so for the other four members of the Contact Group. The colonial legacy is important for the German and British governments; this is not the case for the French, Canadian, and United States governments.

5.2.2- Interests in Overlapping Conflicts

As pointed out by Kriesberg, "each fight is embedded within a larger set of interlocking conflicts." (129) As was discussed in Chapter 4, this is most starkly illustrated by the conflicts in southern Africa. The conflict over Namibia is interlocked with others in the region, namely that in South Africa, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, Angola, and the regional conflict as a whole.

Interest in interlocked conflicts may be of importance in the third party's initial decision calculation about a reaction to the conflict; it may also be of significance in the actual functioning of the third party during involvement as intermediary. Interest in overlapped conflicts was significant in the formation and functioning of the Contact Group, as will be seen in later chapters.

Official statements on policy almost invariably link the conflicts in southern Africa. The NSSM No.39 and the recent Study Commission on United States policy towards Southern Africa recognise the overlapping nature of the conflicts in the region. Policy options in both are considered with reference to the whole region (130). The close relationship with South Africa points to the conflict over apartheid as a major focus of interest to the governments involved in the WCG. This relationship has implications in other related conflicts in the region. The

overlapping conflicts in Angola and Rhodesia (prior to independence) were also of importance in the formation and functioning of the Contact Group.

The United States government has been the most heavily involved in the Angolan conflict. United States involvement in the conflict started in 1973 when the CIA supplied aid to the FNLA who were rivals to the MPLA. The conflict in Angola constituted a struggle for power between the MPLA, the FNLA and UNITA, which was placed firmly within the cold war framework by the fact that the MPLA was supported by Cuba and the Soviet Union while the FNLA and UNITA were aided by the United States. The Nixon Administration, specifically Dr. Kissinger viewed a possible MPLA victory as a potential for Soviet influence in the region. Covert CIA action was initiated, with Dr. Kissinger's approval, to bolster the positions of the FNLA and UNITA forces politically and militarily(131). United States aid to the FNLA and UNITA continued secretly until operations were disclosed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. As a result the United States Congress voted overwhelmingly for the Clark Amendment which prohibited the further supply of United States military aid to UNITA and the FNLA(132).

Despite the Clark Amendment, the United States government continued to be involved in the Angolan conflict. The Carter Administration did not officially recognise the MPLA government in Angola, an issue which,

as will be seen later in the study, became a point of conflict within the Administration. However, while the Carter Administration, specifically through Secretary of State Vance and Ambassador Young, established a cooperative relationship with the MPLA government, specifically in the Namibian negotiations, the Reagan Administration proclaimed its support for UNITA on accession to power and succeeded in repealing the Clark Amendment in 1985. It also introduced the issue of "linkage" of Namibian independence to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. This interest has, therefore, of major importance to the functioning of the United States government within the Contact Group.

Differences in the degree of involvement in overlapping conflicts was also evident in the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe conflict where the United Kingdom government and United States administration were among the main third parties involved. The United Kingdom government's interest in this conflict influenced its decisions during the functioning of the Contact Group in the negotiations over Namibia.

It is, therefore, of relevance that this interest in overlapping conflicts, existed for members of the Contact Group, and formed an important input into the formation of the Group and its functioning as a coalition intermediary.

5.2.3- Relationship with other Third Parties in the Conflict

When there are other interested third parties in the conflict environment (such as allies and interested audiences), the interaction between these and the third party acting as intermediary inevitably influences the latter's behaviour in relation to the focal conflict. For example, a third party which decides to intervene actively by taking up the role of intermediary may be more concerned with its relations to other interested third parties, such as one of the adversaries' allies, than the issues and parties in the conflict itself. The relationship with other third parties may, therefore, influence the initial decision about an appropriate reaction to the conflict. Other interested third parties may also influence the behaviour of the intermediary after intervention. An intermediary may, for example, utilise a patron's influence in order to gain concessions from one of the parties in conflict.

As mentioned in the earlier discussion on the relationship between South Africa and the governments which became members of the Contact Group, relations with white minority regime are often weighed against relations with the independent African countries. This cost/benefit approach is clearly pronounced in the NSSM No 39, where United States interests at the UN are perceived in a zero-sum relationship with ties to South Africa. Thus, "the

main United States interest in Southern African issues at the UN is to keep these issues manageable. On the other hand, we seek to maintain a credible stance on racial questions in the eyes of the Black African nations, while on the other we attempt to discourage the adoption of unrealistic measures which would damage other United States interests in the area."(133). Of the five policy options suggested in the study, Dr. Kissinger is said to have preferred Option 2, which envisaged the bettering of relations with South Africa as a means of persuasion; Option 2 also indicated a recognition of the risks involved in terms of relations with Black African states(134).

The increasing economic importance of black African countries, especially Nigeria, has become more evident in recent years and has been openly acknowledged by policy-makers, such as Dr. Owen, the British Foreign Secretary, and Andrew Young, the United States Ambassador to the UN. The Study Commission on Southern Africa stated that "Nigeria is particularly significant as the United States's second largest foreign oil supplier and a leading African opponent of apartheid."(135). It also pointed out that "United States policy towards South Africa and the actions and statements taken to implement it are closely watched by other African governments."(136) It was, therefore, felt that continued cooperation with South Africa may produce retaliation from other African

countries, as occurred in 1979 when the Nigerian government nationalised BP(137). The importance of Nigerian endorsement of a United States role in southern Africa was acknowledged by Andrew Young shortly before the onset of the Contact Group initiative.

As will be seen in the next Chapter, relations with the independent African countries acquired higher priority for the incoming Carter Administration in 1977 and were an important factor in the initial decision to take up an active involvement in the settlement process in southern Africa generally and in Namibia in particular. This was also the case for the other four members of the Contact Group. In early 1977, an important fact within this context was the increasing pressure from the UN in the form of calls for sanctions related to the Namibian issue. Thus, increasing pressure from the UN and the Commonwealth, where southern African issues remain high on the agenda, was an important interest for Western governments which had close relations with South Africa. There was, however, variation in the degree of importance of this interest to the five members of the group. For example, while the "Commonwealth dimension" (138) was important to the United Kingdom and Canada, it is non-existent for the other members of the WCG.

5.3- Conclusion

This Chapter has indicated that the governments which came to form the Western Contact Group were interested third parties in the conflict over Namibia. As such, they formed part of the conflict environment prior to active intervention as a coalition of intermediaries. The five's conflict-related interests formed an important input into the initial decision to take up the intermediary role as a response to the conflict. The variations in interests discussed in this chapter were significant highlighting factors which contributed to each government's separate decision to join the Contact Group initiative while the commonalities indicated the motives for intervention as a coalition. These points are discussed in detail in the next chapter.

Chapter 5- Notes

- 1- Barber, J., The Uneasy Relationship: Britain and South Africa, (Heinemann for the RIIA, London, 1983), p.29.
- 2- The violation of the Rhodesian oil sanctions illustrates the point that decision-making is not confined merely to the level of governments. See: Bailey, M., Oilgate, (Coronet Books, London, 1979).
- 3- Security Council Resolutions 264 of 20 March 1969; 269 of 12 August 1969; 276 of 30 January 1970; and 283 of 29 July 1970. Resolution 283 indicates the conflict between interests involved in Namibia and the UN position in the conflict by calling on states to cease all diplomatic and economic links with Namibia implying recognition of the South African occupation.
- 4- UN Decree No. 1. of the UN Council for Namibia (UN Commissioner for Namibia).
- 5- United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Transnational Corporations in South Africa and Namibia, Commission on Transnational Corporations, Document E/C.10/1985/7, 30 January 1985.
- 6- Catholic Institute for International Affairs, Mines and Independence, (CIIR, London, 1983).
- 7- Rogers, B., "Namibia's Uranium: Implications for the South African Occupation Regime", (Unpublished paper, 1975).
- 8- UK imports from Namibia amounted to a value of £63.4-million in 1983 and were down to £6.8-million in 1986 due to the completion of the uranium contract. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile-Namibia, 1987-88.
- 9- Ibid.
- 10- United Nations, Council for Namibia, Activities of Foreign Economic Interests Operating in Namibia, Report of Standing Committee II of the UN Council for Namibia, (United Nations, New York, 1984).
- 11- Although RTZ controls 46.5% of the ordinary equity, it owns only 26% of the voting capital. The South African state-owned Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) controls the voting equity. Ibid, p.11.
- 12- Rogers, op. cit., p.4.
- 13- According to the UN Council for Namibia, the UK is the only country which openly admitted to importing

Namibian uranium. The UK contract provided for the delivery of 7,500 metric tons of uranium oxide from 1976-1982. Ibid.

In 1983 (January), the UK government announced that the existing contract for the supply of the above 7,500 tons of uranium would not be renewed when it expired in 1984. The UK government does not disclose the actual quantities of uranium imported. See: Quarterly Economic Review, No. 4, 1984, p.23.

14- UN Council for Namibia, 1984, op. cit., p.13.

15- URENCO consists of Uranit of the FRG, Ultra-Centrifuge Nederland of the Netherlands, and British Nuclear Fuels. It was established by an inter-governmental agreement in 1970 for the purpose of uranium enrichment. GAOR, 35th Session, Supplement No. 24(A/35/24), Vol.III.

16- Hill, C.R., "French and West German Relations with South Africa", Appendix in: Barber, op. cit., p.125.

17- UN Council for Namibia, 1984, op. cit., p.14.

18- Ibid.

19- The UK-Rossing contract points to the fact that bureaucratic decision-making has an impact on the final decision output. See: Roberts, A., The Rossing File, (CANUC, London, 1980).

20- Easum, D.B., "Southern Africa Five Years After the Lusaka Manifesto", Department of State Bulletin, Vol LXXI, No. 1851, 16th December 1974.

21- UN Centre on Transnational Corporations, Activities of Transnational Corporations in South Africa and Namibia and the Responsibilities of the Home Countries with respect to their Operations in this Area, (United Nations, New York, 1986), p.29.

22- Hovey, G., Namibia's Stolen Wealth: North American Investment and South African Occupation, (The Africa Fund, New York, 1986), p.46.

23- H.R. 2589 introduced by Representative Pat Schroeder. For the Hearing on this Bill, see: United States, Congress, "Namibia: The Exploitation of Natural Resources", Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 29 October 1985.

24- Hansard, 4 December 1974, c1556.

25- Hansard, 27 May 1976, Vol 912, c370 (written answer).

- 26- Hansard, Vol. 950, 23 May 1978, c512(written answer).
- 27- Hansard, Vol. 982, 2 April 1980, c284(written answer).
- 28- In a written answer to Mr. Frank Dobson regarding the double taxation agreement with South Africa and the question of its applicability to Namibia, the Minister of State for the Treasury stated "There are two double taxation agreements currently in force with South Africa for the purpose of avoidance of double taxation, one with respect to capital transfer tax and one with respect to taxes on income and capital gains. Neither of these agreements includes Namibia. An income tax convention with South Africa was concluded in 1962 and extended to South West Africa in that year, and the 1967 protocol to the extension was similarly extended. This convention and protocol . . . remain in force in respect of Namibia".
Hansard, Vol 990, 6 August 1980, c157(written answer).
- 29- GAOR, 35th Session, Supplement No. 24(A/35/24), Vol I, Paragraph 184.
- 30- Jamieson, D., "Canada's Policy Towards South Africa", Statements and Speeches, (Department of External Affairs), No. 77/23, 19 December 1977.
- 31- GAOR, 35th Session, Supplement No. 24(A/35/24) Vol I, para 249.
- 32- Task Force on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility. Notes on the Meeting with the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of State for Trade, July 1981, Ottawa.
- 33- UN Centre on Transnational Corporations, 1986, op. cit., p.29.
- 34- Ibid., p.29.
- 35- The Namibian source for uranium is free of the "peaceful safeguards" imposed by some other uranium-rich countries, such as Canada. Rogers, op. cit.
- 36- SWAPO called on the British government to terminate the Rossing uranium contract. See:
SWAPO, To Be Born A Nation, (Zed Press, London, 1981), p.147.
- 37- For example, the statement by Mr. Ramphul, the Ambassador for Mauritius. Security Council Official Records, 31st Year, 1880th Meeting, 27 January 1976, S/PV.1880, pp. 11-12.
- 38- UN Council for Namibia, "Activities of Foreign

Economic Interests Operating in Namibia", 1984, op. cit., p.24.

39- The only countries which produce figures on imports from Namibia are the United Kingdom and the United States.

40- There are different opinions among analysts as to the effect of economic interests in Namibia on Western governmental policy. Moorsom argues that Western countries are reluctant to achieve Namibian independence due to the lack of any success in promoting a neo-colonial settlement in Namibia. See:

Moorsom, R., "Namibia in the Front-Line: The Political Economy of Destabilisation in South Africa's Colony", Review of African Political Economy, No. 17, (January-April) 1980, pp. 71-82.

Zartman, on the other hand, argues that the size of economic interests in the territory (for the United States, this amounts to 1% of the total in Africa) suggest that this interest does not affect policy. See:

Zartman, I.W., Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa, (Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1985), p.163-164.

41- Shepherd, G.W., Jr., Anti-Apartheid: Transnational Conflict and Western Policy in the Liberation of South Africa, (Greenwood Press, Westport, CT., 1977), p.16.

42- Ibid, p. 16.

43- United Nations, Namibia: A Unique UN Responsibility: Highlights of United Nations Action in Support of Freedom and Independence for Namibia, (New York, UN, 1984); General Assembly Resolution 3111(XXVIII), p. 15.

44- Yearbook of the UN, Vol. 30, 1976, p. 784.

45- McHenry, D.F., "United Nations: Namibia", Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 7 May 1979. Also recorded in Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 79, No. 2031, October 1979, p. 57.

46- Interview with Mr. Thomas Dube, UN Council for Namibia, New York, United Nations HQ, 24 June 1987.

47- GAOR, 33rd Session, Supplement No. 24, A/33/24), p.16.

48- The following contributions were made by the five

countries represented in the WCG to UN Fund for Namibia in 1977:

U.S.A	\$250,000	(UNIN)
U.K.	85,000	(UNIN)
F.R.G.	50,000	(UNIN)
France	29,464	(UNIN)
Canada	94,090	(Fund)

Total contributions received in 1977- \$1,020,486.

Source: General Assembly Official Record, 33rd Session, Supplement No. 24, (A/33/24).

The United Kingdom government made its last contribution to the Fund in 1977. Interview with Dr. Y.K. Shamapande (Economic Affairs Officer, Office of the UN Commissioner for Namibia), New York, 24 June 1987.

49- Direct aid to SWAPO is, for example, provided by the Swedish government. In 1976/77, for example, the Swedish government provided 5.4-million Swedish Crowns to SWAPO, the highest for the liberation movements. See:

Leys, R., "Scandinavian Aid to the 'Victims of Apartheid'", in: Anglin, D., T. Shaw and C. Widstrand, Canada, Scandinavia and Southern Africa, (Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1978), p.65.

50- Cohen, B. and M.A. El Khawas (eds), The Kissinger Study on Southern Africa, (Spokesman Books, Nottingham, 1975), reprints the National Study Security Study Memorandum No. 39 on Southern Africa.

51- For example, Barber, op. cit.

52- Anti-Apartheid Movement, "A Tiny Little Bit", (AAM, London, 1986).

53- United Kingdom-South Africa Trade Association, "British Trade with South Africa: A Question of national Interest", (UKSATA, London, 1978).

54- "official" refers to government sources; "semi-official" refers to sources which are not wholly governmental but have a governmental contribution.

55- NSSM No. 39, op. cit., p.48.

56- Ibid.

57- Study Commission on United States Policy Towards Southern Africa, South Africa: Time Running Out, (University of California press, Berkeley, CA, 1981); this will be referred to as Study Commission.

58- Ibid, p.391.

59- NSSM No. 39, op. cit., p.113.

- 60- Study Commission, op. cit., p. 393. This states that "South Africa's racial policies...stir special concern because they could eventually lead to a race war that could have serious ramifications in the United States".
- 61- United States, Department of State, U.S. Policy Toward South Africa. The Report of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa, (US Department of State, Washington D.C., January 1987), p.3.
- 62- Barber, J., J. Blumenfeld and C.R. Hill, The West And South Africa, Chatham House Paper No. 14, (RIIA, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1982), p.38.
- 63- Ibid., pp. 38-39.
- 64- More recently, anti-apartheid activity has been directed against companies involved in South Africa and Namibia in the disinvestment and divestment campaign. See: Love, J., The US Anti-Apartheid Movement: Local Activism in Global Politics, (Praeger, New York, 1985).
- 65- Barber et al., op. cit., p.42.
- 66- United Kingdom, House of Commons, Sixth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Vol I, 1986, p.xxxv. This report is from now on referred to as FAC (I).
- 67- Barber, op. cit., p.62.
- 68- Ibid.
- 69- Ibid, quoting Rivers, B. and M. Bailey, British Economic Links with South Africa, (Christian Concern for Southern Africa, London, 1979).
- 70- Direct investment occurs when a company uses its own capital to establish a branch or subsidiary in South Africa. Indirect investment includes both foreign purchases of stocks and shares in South African companies and foreign lending, both long and short term, to the public and private sectors. Indirect investment in South Africa has increased at the expense of direct investment in recent years amounting to 50-60% of total foreign investment.
- Child, C., "Apartheid, Economic Collaboration", Notes and Documents, UN Centre Against Apartheid, 1984, p.25.
- 71- The Sullivan Principles for US Corporations based in South Africa and Namibia and the EEC Code of Conduct. A criticism of these is provided by Barbara Rogers, "A Code for Misconduct", (Christian Concern for Southern Africa, London, 1980).
- 72- Barber, op. cit., p.32.

- 73- Study Commission, op. cit., p.302.
- 74- United Nations, Centre on Transnational Corporations, op. cit., p.10.
- 75- Barber, op. cit., p.33.
- 76- FAC(I), op. cit., p.viii.
- 77- Child, op. cit., p.32.
- 78- UN Centre on Transnational Corporations, op. cit, p.10.
- 79- Ibid.
- 80- Child, op. cit., p.33.
An earlier estimate for 1978 placed United States direct investment in South Africa at \$1.665-billion comprising 17% of all foreign direct investment in South Africa. See: Litvak, L., et. al., South Africa: Foreign Investment and Apartheid, (Institute for Policy Studies, Washington D.C., 1978), p.43.
- 81- Study Commission, op. cit., p.134.
- 82- Klein, B., "Bricks in the Wall", Notes and Documents, UN Centre Against Apartheid, 1982, p.17.
Klein points out that United States firms were also involved in the SASOL project.
- 83- UN Centre for Transnational Corporations, op. cit., p.10.
- 84- Study Commission, op. cit., p.304.
- 85- Klein, op. cit., pp. 10-12.
- 86- UN Centre for Transnational Corporations, op. cit., p.10.
- 87- Hill, op. cit., p.120.
- 88- Study Commission, op. cit, p.305.
- 89- Tennyson, B.D., Canadian Relations with South Africa: A Diplomatic History, (University Press of America, Washington D.C., 1982). p. 210.
- 90- UN Centre for Transnational Corporations, op. cit., p.10.
- 91- Klein, op. cit., p. 17.
- 92- BP, until recently, a state-owned company, together

- with Shell provide 40% of South Africa's petroleum. Study Commission, op. cit., p.303.
- 93- Klein, op. cit., p. 17.
- 94- Study Commission, op. cit., p. 135.
- 95- The Evans Amendment prohibited the Export-Import Bank from granting financial guarantees or credits to the South African government or its agencies. It also applied to private purchasers "unless the Secretary of State certified that the buyer had endorsed and was carrying out the goals of non-segregation", Love, op. cit., p.82 quoting, D. Hauck, M. Vorhees and G. Goldberg, Two Decades of Debate: The Controversy over US Companies in South Africa, (Investor Responsibility Research Center, Washington D.C., 1983), p.37.
- 96- Hill, op. cit., p.118.
- 97- Study Commission, op. cit., p.305.
- 98- Hill, op. cit., p.121.
- 99- Tennyson, op. cit., p.183.
- 100- Keensleyside, T.A., "Canada-South Africa Commercial Relations: 1977-1982: Business as Usual?", Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol. 17, No. 3, 1983, pp. 449-467.
- 101- A quantitative calculation on dependency would require data on levels of stockpiles. Such information is largely unavailable due to the strategic nature of certain key minerals, including some derived from South Africa. Another data source not amenable to quantitative comparison is the capacity to adjust to other minerals in strategic industries, and the ability to find and adjust to alternative sources of supply. Again due to strategic reasons, the sources of certain minerals is not available. See: Warnecke, S.J., "Stockpiling of Critical Raw Materials", Chatham House Paper No. 5, (RIIA, London, 1980).
- 102- Study Commission, op. cit., p.312.
- 103- Ibid.
- 104- Barber, op. cit., p.37.
- 105- Warnecke, op. cit., p. 20.
- 106- Study Commission, op. cit., p.311.
- 107- Hill, op. cit., p.111.

- 108- A report published by the Federal Minister of Economics in 1979 says that "Owing to political developments in South Africa" Germany had for some years been making efforts for the diversification of its supply of chromium and other minerals acquired from South Africa. In June 1979, the West German Cabinet approved a programme of limited stockpiling of key minerals, including chromium, manganese, blue asbestos, cobalt, and vanadium. As pointed out by Warnecke, the minerals targetted showed that the threats to supplies from Zaire (cobalt), South Africa (chromium, vanadium, manganese), and Zimbabwe (chromium) were uppermost in the government's mind. Warnecke, op. cit., p. 7.
- 109- Ibid., p. 9.
- 110- Study Commission, op. cit., p.311.
- 111- Study Commission, op. cit., p.321.
- 112- Barber, et. al., op. cit., p.64.
- 113- Report of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa, op. cit., p.3.
- 114- FAC(I), op. cit., p.viii.
- 115- Ibid, p.xxxv.
- 116- Berridge has argued that South Africa used its position as exporter of gold and uranium to pressure the British government during the Simonstown negotiations and in 1967 when the British government was about to lift the arms embargo. See:
Berridge, G., Economic Power in Anglo-South African Diplomacy, (Macmillan, London, 1981).
- 117- Johnson has argued that the fall in the price of gold between 1975-1976, when it fell from \$200 in January 1975 to \$139 in January 1976, was due to attempts by the US government to pressure the South African government into accepting Kissinger's initiative in the region. See:
Johnson, R.W., How Long Will South Africa Survive?, (Macmillan, London, 1977), p.216.
- 118- FAC(I), op. cit., p.ix.
- 119- Interview with Charles William Maynes (Assistant Secretary of State for International Organisation Affairs in the Carter Administration), 11 June 1987, Washington D.C.
- 120- NSSM No. 39, op. cit., p.49.

- 121- Geldehuys, D., The Diplomacy of Isolation, (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1984), p.223.
- 122- Spence, J., "South Africa, The World Powers, and Southern Africa", in: Callaghy, T.M., South Africa in Southern Africa: The Intensifying Vortex of Violence, (Praeger, New York, 1983), p.110.
- 123- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Southern Africa: The Escalation of a Conflict, (Praeger, New York, 1976), pp. 50-51.
- 124- Expressed by Dennis Healey, Hansard, Vol. 821, c.654, 22 July 1970.
- 125- Child, C., "The Emigration of skilled Personnel to South Africa", Notes and Documents, UN Centre Against Apartheid, 1983.
- 126- FAC(I), op. cit., p.ix.
- 127- Hill, op. cit., p.100. This source gives figures for the end of 1977.
- 128- This was the main reason for the continued presence of the German consulate in Windhoek until 1977 when it was withdrawn.
- 129- Kriesberg, L., Social Conflicts, (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ., 1982), p. 27.
- 130- The Study Commission, for example, refers to "minimizing Soviet influence" as a major United States interest in the region. op. cit., Part III.
- 131- Stockwell, J., In Search of Enemies, (W.W. Norton, New York, 1978), p.54.
- 132- Legum, C., "Foreign Intervention in Angola", Africa Contemporary Record, 1976-77, p.A20.
- 133- NSSM No 39, op. cit., p. 93.
- 134- Ibid, p.68.
- 135- Study Commission, op. cit., p.394.
- 136- Ibid.
- 137- During the 1979 Commonwealth Lusaka conference, Lord Carrington accused the Nigerian government of taking action against BP that was a crude attempt to pressure the British government on its policy on Rhodesia. Barber, op. cit., p. 20
- 138- FAC(I), op. cit., p.x.

Chapter 6- THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN CONTACT GROUP: THE INITIAL DECISION TO INTERVENE AS A COALITION OF INTERMEDIARIES

The previous Chapter argued that the governments which formed the WCG were interested third parties in the conflict over Namibia and formed part of the conflict environment. This Chapter will analyse the initial decision by the governments of the United States, United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, France and Canada to intervene in the conflict as a coalition of intermediaries. In the terms used in the analytic framework, it concerns the first phase of third party responses to conflict. The analytic framework is used in considering factors relevant to the decision. The first part of the Chapter concerns the formation of the WCG in early 1977, its stated objectives and its acceptability to the parties in conflict. The second, using the analytic framework, considers the factors which influenced each member government to become part of the Contact Group initiative.

6.1- The Formation of the WCG and its Acceptance as Intermediary

6.1.1- Formation of the WCG

This section will highlight the main events which led to the Contact Group initiative, its formation and its objectives as perceived by members of the Group and the

parties in conflict. It will show that the Group was formed for a collective mediation initiative and that it was accepted in such a role by the parties in conflict, despite the fact that, (as argued in chapter 5) the governments involved were perceived by SWAPO and its allies, to be allies of the South African government.

It will be recalled from the discussion of the conflict characteristics in Chapter 4 that in early 1977, prior to the intervention of the WCG, the issues in the conflict over Namibia centred on the implementation of an internal settlement based on the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference(1). Such moves were opposed by SWAPO and the UN, which called (in Security Council Resolution 385), for UN supervised elections. Other features of the conflict were [1] that it overlapped with others in the region and [2] that the FLS and Nigeria are important patrons to SWAPO.

The governments of the United States, France and the United Kingdom had already made their opposition to the internal settlement known by voting for Security Council Resolution 385 in January 1976(2). Members of the European Community, acting within the framework of European political cooperation, had also expressed their opposition to Turnhalle(3), as had the Canadian government, which called for an internationally-based settlement(4).

It is, therefore, evident that when in January 1977,

President Carter's Administration came to power, with its commitment to greater United States involvement in southern Africa, Western opposition to the Turnhalle process had already been clearly expressed. While the position of the Carter Administration on southern Africa will be discussed fully in the second part of this Chapter, it is important to point out that even during the election campaign and prior to coming to office, the Carter State Department "team" was composed of individuals, led by Cyrus Vance, having a commitment to the problems of southern Africa and seeking an active role for the United States in the settlement process(5).

The Carter Administration clearly initiated the collective Western response to the conflict over Namibia. There are several versions of its origins. According to the former United States Ambassador to the UN, Donald McHenry, some attribute the idea to Gerry Helman, then in the State Department, "who had the clearest idea on what needed to be done." Others attribute the idea to Andrew Young, while others attributed it to Don McHenry himself(6). According to Andrew Young, who became the United States Ambassador to the UN under President Carter, the idea was not discussed during the Carter election campaign and had, in fact, been raised in Tanzania, whence Young was invited in January 1977. President Julius Nyerere called for a Western initiative on Namibia. According to Young, President Nyerere stated,

"We can take care of Rhodesia by ourselves, but we are not ready for South Africa. If America wants to be helpful, they would start discussing the question of Namibia with the South African government and use their influence to get South Africa to withdraw." (7)

The initiative on Namibia became a collective one when Ambassador Young first consulted with the West German Ambassador to the UN, Rudiger von Wechmar, in February 1977 emphasising that "probably for many years to come, we have an ideal combination of five Western countries on the Security Council, rather strong, with interest in the southern part of Africa" and asking if something should be done about Namibia while the West Germans were on the Security Council(8). A number of key WCG participants interviewed in the course of this study (including Secretary of State Vance, and Ambassadors Young, McHenry, and Wechmar) have emphasised that it was the combination of five Western countries on the Security Council, having close ties to the South African government, that determined the composition of the Group; and that it was the ideal combination to bring pressure to bear on the South African government. The initial consultations occurred at the UN level(9) lasting for two weeks in February 1977. The aim was to attain a consensus on the general objectives, which were: [1] eventually achieve a Security Council Resolution on the implementation of Resolution 385; and [2] to decide on the parties to

involve in the negotiations, and [3] a timetable(10).

After the initial "informal exchanges"(11), the five formed a "contact group" comprising officials from the foreign ministries and/or representatives from the UN missions. The UN representatives of the five became the "working group" of the Contact Group responsible for the drafting of proposals and communicating with the parties both at the UN and in the capitals in southern Africa(12). As the negotiations progressed, the UN Contact Group was paralleled by Contact Groups comprising the five's ambassadors in Pretoria, the Front-line States (FLS), and Nigeria. The five's foreign secretaries and ministers were involved in the negotiations on important occasions, a procedure further discussed in Chapter 7.

The Group made three decisions from the outset. The first was that the initiative would be based at the UN and would work within the UN framework for Namibian independence. The second was to include both SWAPO and the South African government in the negotiations. The third was a decision to work in close cooperation with the FLS. It was also decided that the five would use their collective influence in order to gain concessions from the South African government.

According to Ambassador McHenry, the decision was made to centre the initiative at the UN because Namibia was a "UN-centred question" and that it was "time to have

a policy on Security Council Resolution 385" (13). This was communicated to the South African government, via their ambassadors in Pretoria, in the form of an aide memoire expressing the Group's "belief in the necessity for a Namibian settlement in keeping with Resolution 385 and thereby acceptable to the international community." (14)

Another decision dealt with the matter of which parties to involve in the negotiations. Initial contacts were with representatives of the FLS. These were followed by contacts with the South African government's representative at the UN, and these, in turn, were followed by contacts with SWAPO (15). As pointed out by McHenry, the five "recognised that in order for a settlement to be meaningful and lasting it would have to be accepted by the two parties engaged in the armed conflict- the South African government and SWAPO, which enjoyed substantial support within Namibia and internationally." (16) Primary importance was also given to working in close consultation and cooperation with the FLS and Nigeria, both to gain acceptance in the UN and as a vehicle for influence with SWAPO (17).

Another initial decision by the five, also discussed in the next two Chapters, was to use their collective influence to gain concessions from the South African government (18). The composition of the Group was determined largely by their membership of the Security Council, with Canada and West Germany having been elected

for a two year period. According to Young, this was an "ideal combination" comprising South Africa's major economic partners and as such being "better placed" to discuss the Namibian issue with the South African government (19).

The above account of the formation and objectives of the Group suggests that the Group's intention was to gain a settlement of the Namibian conflict in consultation with the parties, and with the use of influence tactics to gain concessions towards an agreement. The question which arises, therefore, is: Did the Group intend to mediate? This is an important question at this stage, since the Chapter concerns the factors which led to this decision, and assumes that the Group's response to the conflict in early 1977 was to take up the role of intermediary.

As will be recalled from the Introduction to this study, the main distinguishing functions of an intermediary or mediator are the following:

- [1] The promotion of communication between the parties where this may not necessarily be face-to-face.
- [2] The promotion of concessions from the parties; tactics may include threats, persuasion and reward.
- [3] Making concrete, substantive proposals towards a settlement of the conflict.

Another distinguishing feature of the intermediary is acceptance of the third party within this role by the

parties in conflict(20).

It seems clear that the overall objective of the WCG was to gain agreement based on Security Council Resolution 385 and to do so by involving the South African government, SWAPO and the FLS in discussions, not initially in direct face-to-face contact(21), but by presenting each group with a series of proposals leading to agreement which would, consequently, be placed before the Security Council for approval(22). Asked if the group saw themselves as mediators, McHenry stated, "We didn't look upon ourselves as mediators, but as trying to find the best way of implementing Security Council Resolution 385, and as putting together a proposal, which we did, and present it to the parties, and maneuvered them into accepting." McHenry agreed that they did not see themselves as "traditional" mediators and added that at different points, both SWAPO and the South African government had accused them of being one sided(23). However, as indicated in the Introduction and in the analytic framework, a third party does not have to be perceived as impartial or disinterested in order for it to take up the intermediary role. When Andrew Young was asked the same question, he agreed that mediation was the intention(24). It is clear, therefore, that from the outset the five were seeking agreement on the basis of Resolution 385 and that they did so by consulting with the parties and by putting forward proposals to them.

Moreover, they were willing, from a very early stage to use influence tactics with the parties in order to gain a settlement.

6.1.2- The Acceptance of the Initiative

In order for the WCG to function as intermediary, it had to be accepted by the parties in conflict, namely the South African government and SWAPO. Both parties viewed the Western initiative with a degree of mistrust; SWAPO because of Western relations with South Africa, and the South Africans because the initiative was based on a UN framework for Namibian independence(25).

As will be seen in Chapters 7 and 8, both parties followed, as Ambassador McHenry stated early in the negotiations, a "dual track" strategy(26); that is, they took part in the negotiations while pursuing original conflict strategies for attaining their conflict goals. The South African government continued the implementation of the internal settlement while at the same time escalating the war both in terms of the number of South African troops in Namibia and in terms of intervention into the Front-line States(27). SWAPO maintained its commitment to the guerrilla struggle and expressed this throughout its involvement in the negotiations. Both parties, therefore, accepted the WCG as intermediary, but did not abandon their original conflict strategies.

The South African government's agreement to take part in the negotiations was due to the collective Western onslaught, and the fact that the initiative was carried out by governments having the closest association with it and therefore the capacity to impose or threaten sanctions(28). However, the South African government may also have accepted the initiative in order to "buy time" for the putting in place of the internal settlement. It, therefore, ensured that its options in Namibia remained open by pursuing the internal settlement throughout its involvement in the negotiations with the WCG(29). While the South African government's preferences will be discussed in the next Chapters, it is relevant to indicate that they accepted the initiative mainly due to the nature of the third party and its composition.

As will be seen later, SWAPO also pursued a dual track strategy by maintaining PLAN operations inside Namibia while taking part in the negotiations. Despite this, however, taking part in the negotiations provided a number of benefits for the movement. Firstly, it had a less costly chance of achieving victory at UN-supervised elections(30). The negotiations also provided SWAPO with the opportunity of visibility on the international stage(31), and as such promoted its legitimacy as a future government of Namibia. SWAPO, therefore, had more of a stake in the negotiations. Moreover, its preference for a an outcome was closer to that of the WCG than was

South Africa's (SWAPO having accepted Resolution 385 as a basis for Namibian independence)(32). However, SWAPO's acceptance of the initiative was also a result of the position taken by the governments of the FLS who had already expressed their acceptance of the initiative and, as indicated above, were involved in calling for it(33).

The primary factor for the FLS decision to accept the Western initiative also concerned the WCG's relationship with an adversary; that is, with the South African government. The FLS were also vulnerable to South African pressure and, as such, preferred a settlement as opposed to continued conflict(34).

6.2- The Decision-making Calculations Leading to the Formation of the WCG

This section discusses factors which influenced the decisions by the five participant governments of the WCG to become involved in a collective intermediary response to the conflict over Namibia. It will consider the relevance of the factors suggested in the analytic framework as those which may have an impact on a third party's initial response to a conflict situation.

The five governments which formed the WCG were faced with increasing pressure at the UN for the imposition of a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa and calls for an end to new loans and investment in the country. The

five governments' positions on this issue were especially visible during the Security Council meeting of 21-26 March 1977 on the "Question of South Africa" which was called by the Africa Group in connection with the Soweto Riots and the South African government's reaction to the uprising(35). The overlapping nature of the conflicts in the region meant that this pressure for sanctions in response to the situation in South Africa had an impact on the conflict over Namibia as well as Rhodesia(36). The five Western members of the Security Council led by Andrew Young drafted a "Declaration of Principles" requiring the South African government to make a commitment to end apartheid, grant independence to Namibia and end support for the Smith regime in Rhodesia.

The conflict at this stage was characterised by issues relating to the internal settlement in contravention of Resolution 385; increasing calls for sanctions at the UN; and an escalation of the conflict regionally(38). The five Western members of the Security Council were, therefore confronted with the choice of imposing the veto at the Security Council (in the case of France, Britain, and the United States) or voting against sanctions resolutions (FRG and Canada); or initiating a process, the declared intention of which would be to promote a settlement of the conflicts in the region.

6.2.1- Decision-makers and Interest Priorities

An important factor in a third party's initial decision to take up the intermediary role is its conflict-related interest priorities. As indicated in the analytic framework, both the nature of interests and interest priorities may change with time. An analyst must, therefore, consider the decision-makers' own interest priorities at the time of intervention.

As seen in the last Chapter, the five governments which came to form the Contact Group had extensive relations with South African especially in the economic sphere, and therefore, shared an opposition to sanctions against the South African government. They also shared an interest in improving and cultivating relations with important African countries, especially Nigeria and the Front-Line States. This was especially the case for the incoming Carter Administration as well as for the governments of the United Kingdom, the FRG and Canada.

6.2.1.1- The United States Government

For the Carter Administration, there was "an intense interest in the problems of southern Africa, including Namibia" (39). This interest was shared by Carter's State Department team, where Cyrus Vance ensured that the team was composed of individuals sympathetic to the new approach (40). Thus, Andrew Young became United States

Ambassador to the UN and Donald McHenry was made his deputy. The shared outlook between Young and Vance on the UN as an institution for conflict settlement and on southern Africa as well as that between Richard Moose (who became Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs), William Maynes (appointed Assistant Secretary of State for International Organisation Affairs) and Donald McHenry (appointed Deputy to Ambassador Young at the UN) meant that there was a close relationship between Young's staff at the UN and the Bureau of International Organisation Affairs and the Bureau of African Affairs in the State Department (41).

The Carter Administration, especially those involved in the State Department perceived black nationalism as the paramount force in southern Africa and took the conflict out of the "cold war" framework in which it had been approached previously. With this evaluation of the situation came a new evaluation of the priorities of conflict-related interests in the region. The priority was placed on the United States relationship with the majority-ruled states in southern Africa as well as with Nigeria. This took predominance over the relationship with South Africa (42).

As mentioned in the last Chapter, relations with South Africa have consistently been weighed against relations with the rest of Africa. The fact that relations

with black African countries acquired priority meant that the relationship with the latter was subordinated. This was manifest more in style than in any substantive change in the relationship with the South African government, although, from the outset, sanctions were considered an option open to the Administration(43). Another change from the previous Administration was that Namibia and Rhodesia would not be considered as secondary to apartheid in South Africa, but the Administration would react to all three situations. Thus, when Vice President Mondale met Prime Minister Vorster in May 1977, the focus was not only on Namibia and Rhodesia but also on South Africa itself(44). The South African reaction was that "relations between South Africa and the United States have reached an all-time low"(45).

Relations with other third parties in the conflict, in this case the rest of Africa (specifically Nigeria and the FLS) acquired a primacy which they had not enjoyed previously. For the Carter Administration, relations with Third World countries generally and the United States position in the UN became a prime priority(46). The Administration recognised that any United States involvement in the region would require the close cooperation of the important African countries, mainly the FLS and Nigeria. The emphasis was on promoting "African solutions to African problems" with the aim of avoiding "situations which make Africa an arena for great power

rivalry, as happened in Angola." (47)

The first step towards the reinforcement of the relationship with Africa was the repeal of the Byrd Amendment on 18th March 1977 prior to the Security Council debate on South Africa (48). This policy measure was perceived by the Carter Administration as having created an atmosphere of "trust and free-flowing exchange of information" (49) between the United States and African countries (Young suggests that the Zimbabwe settlement would not have occurred without this relationship) (50).

Relations with the FLS were also developed. The Administration recognised the importance of Angola's cooperation in the settlement process. Some individuals in the Administration, including Young and Vance, sought to recognise the MPLA government. They did not, however, succeed in persuading other members of the Administration who feared a right wing backlash in Congress (51). The relationship with the FLS was also cultivated through an increased aid programme to the countries in the region (52).

A recognition of Nigeria's role in the settlement process in southern Africa was voiced by both the Carter Administration and the Labour Government in the United Kingdom. The Africa Bureau of the State Department emphasised the growth of Nigeria's economic power. In 1973, Nigeria had surpassed South Africa in total trade

with the United States and in the rate of new United States investment(53). Nigeria also became the second largest supplier of crude oil to the United States. Closer government-to-government relations were also emphasised as part of this relationship(53).

The above discussion has pointed to the fact that the Carter Administration's interest priorities leading up to the intervention in Namibia was dominated by an emphasis on cultivating relations with other third parties in the conflict, including (especially) Nigeria and the FLS while the relationship with South Africa was re-evaluated leading to a change in style which was communicated to the South African government.

6.2.1.2- The Government of the United Kingdom

As with the Carter Administration, the change in Britain of the Foreign Secretary following Anthony Crosland's death in February 1977 and the appointment of Dr. David Owen brought about a visible change of style in dealing with southern African issues. Whereas Crosland was a reluctant actor on the southern African stage(55), David Owen placed a high priority on southern Africa within the agenda of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Owen was also committed to a review of British governmental responses to conflicts in southern Africa as a whole, including Namibia, and a review of the United Kingdom's

relations with South Africa. When the Contact Group mediation process was in progress, he maintained a high involvement in the negotiations and, contrary to usual practice at the FCO, received all communications dealing with Namibia at first hand(56). Shortly after his appointment to the FCO, Owen announced his intention to visit southern Africa on a "familiarisation tour" and stated that Britain and the United States would work together towards peaceful settlements in Rhodesia and Namibia(57). Owen's preference for a more active role for the United Kingdom in southern African issues must be contrasted with other views in Cabinet, such as Prime Minister Callaghan's, who was reluctant to become involved in southern Africa(58).

As with the Carter Administration, Owen and other colleagues in Cabinet, such as Denis Healey, sought to re-evaluate the close economic relationship with South Africa in terms of the costs and long-term implications that such a relationship might have(59). In his speech to the Young Fabians in October 1977 entitled "Britain's new Course in Africa", Dr. Owen, in comparing Britain's economic relations with South Africa with the rest of Africa (including Nigeria), stated that "the overall balance of advantage must lie with black Africa"(60). Evidence of this reassessment also came from Dennis Healey who stated in the House of Commons on 10 November 1977, "I give the assurance that the government intend to discourage

investment by British industry in South Africa..that view is shared by all members of the UN" (61). Another indication of Owen's intention of reducing relations with South Africa is that he ordered a study, for the first time, into means of reducing Britain's dependence on South African minerals(62).

Despite the apparent reassessment, however, there was no change in the economic relationship(63). The only evident change was the EEC's Code of Conduct, aimed at the employment practices of European firms operating in South Africa(64). A major change, however, was the vote for the mandatory arms embargo imposed by the Security Council in Resolution 418.

The relationship with South Africa was weighed against the relationship, diplomatic and economic, with the rest of Africa. Nigeria had become Britain's largest trading partner in Africa and had already demonstrated its economic muscle through the nationalisation of Barclays Bank in 1976 because of its operations in South Africa(65). The Nigerian Representative to the UN, Mr. Joseph Garba referred to this threat at the March 1977 Security Council debate on South Africa by stating, "We are all aware of the magnitude of the investments made by some countries in racist South Africa. We are equally aware of the magnitude of investments of the same countries in black Africa. I must say without hesitation that the latter are greater. The time has come when we in

Africa, and especially my country, have seriously to consider which way we must go in this matter...We cannot continue to have establishments in our midst which, while they profess certain principles in their dealings with us, also cater to and sustain a regime that holds our brothers and sisters in ..slavery, in complete disregard of those principles." (66)

Economic relations with South Africa were also weighed against the impact such relations might have on diplomatic relations with the rest of Africa, specifically, Nigeria and the Front Line States. The most important fora for the expression of such relations were the UN and the Commonwealth, where calls for majority rule in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa remained high on the agenda. According to James Barber, "The international difficulties created for Britain by the South African connection are nowhere more clearly illustrated than in the Commonwealth." (67) Moreover, if the United Kingdom government was to become involved in the Rhodesian situation, the cooperation of the FLS would be essential. The settlement of the Rhodesian conflict was a high priority interest at this time, especially for Dr. Owen, since he was willing to accept a role for the United Kingdom in an interim arrangement (68).

The above suggests that at the time of the WCG initiative, the interest priorities were based on a

reassessment of relations with South Africa while domestic economic repercussions remained a primary concern. There was no change in the substantive relationship, with the exception of the arms embargo. The reassessment was mainly due to the considerations of the costs such relations might incur vis-a-vis the rest of Africa, specifically Nigeria, and the diplomatic relationship with the FLS and Nigeria. Involvement in an overlapped conflict, namely that of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe was a primary interest for Owen at this time. Given that the FLS had sought the involvement of the United Kingdom in Rhodesia and Namibia, involvement in a settlement process in Namibia presented greater benefits.

6.2.1.3- The West German Government

The West German government was faced with the choice of either joining with its Western partners in the Namibia settlement process or leaving the process to them without having a direct input(69).

The main actors involved in the decision to join the WCG were firstly Rudiger von Wechmar, West Germany's Representative to the UN, who was the first to be consulted by Young, and in the Foreign Ministry, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who had been Foreign Minister since 1974. Genscher, unlike the Chancellor, Herr Schmidt, consistently emphasised the importance for the FRG of

being involved in the settlement of third world conflicts(70).

A major interest category not shared by the other members of the WCG was the existence of a large German community in Namibia(71). This meant that Namibia received greater attention from the West German government and research foundations sponsored by the government than the rest of southern Africa(72). The West German government was seen as primarily responsible for the 18,000 Germans residing in Namibia, 6,400 of whom are West German citizens(73).

The Federal Government, like those of the United States and the United Kingdom, was reluctant to interfere with the extensive economic relationship with South Africa. However, it also sought to improve relations with black African countries. Until 1977, South Africa remained the FRG's largest export market in Africa, although exports to the rest of Africa were also increasing until Nigeria surpassed South Africa in 1977. The main priority was to maintain and safeguard trade, investment and the supply of vital minerals while at the same time seeming to adopt an acceptable policy towards South Africa.

The adoption of an acceptable policy towards southern Africa was especially important in that the West German government had come under increasing criticism from African governments for its military and nuclear

collaboration with South Africa. The FRG's response was to establish credibility in Africa through a bilateral aid programme. In 1977, after a call by President Kaunda on the West German government to use "its enormous economic and technological resources" (74) to influence South Africa, Herr Genscher stated "If West Germany were to gain the confidence of Black Africa, it could no longer appear as a friend of South Africa" (75).

The Federal Government, therefore, shared with the British and United States governments an interest in promoting relations with other third parties in the conflict, namely the majority ruled states in southern Africa. Its main interest and priority in joining the Western initiative was, however, the "colonial legacy" and, therefore, the presence of a large German community in Namibia, for which the Federal Government was perceived as being responsible.

6.2.1.4- The French Government

Unlike the Carter Administration and the British government which made involvement in the settlement processes in southern Africa a priority, and the German government which had an immediate interest in the German community in Namibia, the French government prior to 1981 did not perceive southern Africa as a high priority region in its Africa policy. Like the other members of the Group,

it did have economic interests in South Africa and Namibia; although this interest was not as vital for the French government, given alternative sources of supply of key minerals, from the Francophone African countries(76). As indicated in Chapter 5, French trade with South Africa had the highest rate of increase throughout the seventies and there was a reluctance to impose sanctions against the South African government.

French policy in southern Africa had been most visible in military and nuclear contracts signed with the South African government. Major military and nuclear contracts were signed in May and June of 1976(77) and became the subject of increasing criticism from the FLS and during the Security Council debate of March 1977(78). That France was responsive to such criticism was indicated by the announcement by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs in the General Assembly in November 1976 that France had placed a ban on any further contracts or sales of arms to South Africa; an announcement which was repeated during the March Security Council debate(79). In February 1977, the French President announced that France would tighten its arms embargo against South Africa. but that naval equipment would still be sold(80).

However, the countries with which France has close links, the Francophone countries of central and West Africa, unlike the Commonwealth, were less critical of French policies in its relations with South Africa. An

indication of this was that the 1976 Francophone summit was better attended than the 1975 summit despite the highly visible military and nuclear contracts signed with South Africa(81).

The French government was, however, responsive when Francophone African countries were critical of a policy. This was evident over Angola and the French government's support for UNITA. This support was, however, overturned when the OAU, including Francophone states recognised the MPLA in February 1976. The French government issued its recognition almost immediately, despite intentions for a joint European recognition within the EPC framework(82).

The above discussion of the French government's interest priorities suggests that the French government did not, unlike the previous three governments, have an immediate interest in southern Africa. It indicated, however, that it was sensitive to criticism from African countries.

6.2.1.5- The Canadian Government

Canada, like the FRG, was elected to the Security Council in 1977. The Canadian representative, William Barton, was, therefore, among the Ambassadors consulted by Andrew Young in February 1977. The choice for the Canadian government was one of joining the Contact Group initiative or

remaining outside the process.

The Canadian decision-makers involved in the decision to become involved in the Contact Group initiative were the Canadian Permanent Representative to the UN, William Barton, and the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Don Jamieson. The Prime Minister himself had sought an active Canadian role in issues relating to the third world(83).

Despite the (relatively) much lower level of economic relationship with South Africa, Canada, like the other four WCG governments, was also opposed to the imposition of sanctions against South Africa. The Canadian government's position on sanctions was stated by Ambassador William Barton at the March 1977 debate on South Africa. He stated that Canadian policy was to "trade in peaceful goods with all countries even those with whose policies we are in profound disagreement." (84) Given the relatively low level of trade and investment by Canada in South Africa, however, the imposition of sanctions by that country would be less costly than for the other four members of the Contact Group(85).

The major link between Canada and southern Africa was and is through the Commonwealth. Given the relatively low economic interests in South Africa compared to the other members of the WCG and the lack of historic ties to the region, the fora which have contributed to Canadian

interest in southern Africa are the Commonwealth and the UN, the two fora which contributed to the Canadian process-related interest of participation in the WCG.

Canada, unlike Britain and the United States was not involved in an overlapping conflict, such as Rhodesia or Angola. This interest dimension was therefore absent for the Canadian government, as indicated by the fact that Secretary of State Jamieson characterised Canada's involvement in the Rhodesian situation as "peripheral" and suggested that a possible future role during the transition period would be within a Commonwealth framework(86).

6.2.2- Process-Related Interests

The third party's conflict-related interests are a factor in any third party's decision-making calculation both independently and as a modifying influence on the third party's process-related interests which define the benefits a third party may derive from the role itself. This section of Chapter 6 will outline the process-related interests which contributed to the five governments' decisions to respond to the conflict as collective intermediaries. As indicated in the analytic framework, an important process-related interest linked to the choice of mediation is that of avoiding other reactions, such as taking sides. The five Western members of the Security

Council were confronted with the choice of either allowing the adoption of sanctions resolutions or of vetoing such measures. The exercise of the veto would have been perceived by the African and Non-Aligned groups as the West taking sides with South Africa.

6.2.2.1- The United States Government

The implication of casting a veto at the March 1977 debate would have been especially costly to the Carter Administration. It would have jeopardised the new rapport with the leaders of the FLS and Nigeria, a rapport largely achieved through Andrew Young (87) who was President of the Security Council during the March debate. As pointed out by the Study Commission on United States Policy towards Southern Africa, the veto "would have been particularly embarrassing for the United States, whose new permanent representative would, by luck of rotation, have been in the chair" (88). A veto would have greatly diminished the credibility of the Administration's announced intentions to seek solutions to the conflicts over Namibia and Rhodesia with the aid of Nigeria and the FLS. The importance of the credibility of the Carter Administration with African leaders was especially emphasised by the fact that African leaders had approved and even called for such a role from the new Administration. However, the United States government was also not willing to adopt mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa. As pointed out by

McHenry, "In the absence of an initiative, there would have been proposals which the United States and others would not have wanted to go along with" (89).

Another process-related interest for third parties taking up the role of intermediary is that of ensuring influence over the settlement process and the outcome to the conflict. It has been suggested that Western involvement in the process seeking the independence of Namibia and Zimbabwe was an attempt to increase control over the actual outcomes to the conflicts and ultimately to create friendly future governments in the region. SWAPO has stated that "the Western powers felt that by intervening in and becoming party to the resolution of these conflicts, they would be in a better position to shape the character of the states which would emerge in Zimbabwe and Namibia." (90) Professor Austen suggests that because the West found it had little or no influence in the decolonisation of the Portuguese territories-processes which led to victories by the Marxist MPLA and Frelimo- " This may have convinced them of the need to create a situation in which they would have more control.." (91). While this assertion may be applicable to the involvement of the Group after 1981, as will be further discussed later, the initial intention of the Group was to obtain a settlement to the conflict over Namibia in accordance to Resolution 385, where SWAPO would have been one among a number of contenders in UN-

supervised elections. This may be contrasted with the approach adopted by the Group after 1981, when proposals were put forward to introduce a constitution prior to an election; an electoral system to ensure limitation of the impact of a SWAPO victory; and the linkage of Cuban troop withdrawal as a precondition to Namibian independence.

Two interlinked process-related interests that may derive from the role of intermediary are to increase the third party's own influence while reducing the influence of other third parties. For the Carter Administration, involvement in the settlement process in southern Africa provided an opportunity for limiting Soviet involvement and influence. Soviet and Cuban involvement in the Angolan civil war contributed to this perception. Although the Carter Administration did not place as much emphasis on the Cold War as did the previous Administration, competition for influence remained a relevant factor in its approach to southern Africa. The attitude to this competition was, however, different from that of the Nixon and Ford Administrations. Thus, rather than make it the prime motive for intervention, the Carter Administration's approach was to resolve local disputes in order to prevent conditions arising which might lead to Soviet involvement. As Cyrus Vance emphasised "...the heart of our strategy must be to combine diplomacy, negotiations, concerted Western actions and the powerful forces of African nationalism to resolve local disputes, and to remove

ostensible justification for Soviet involvement." (92) President Kaunda of Zambia used the threat of Soviet influence in southern Africa as a means of persuading the West to take a more active role in the region at a time when the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe negotiations had reached a stalemate after the breakdown of the Geneva conference (93).

Another process-related interest which was a factor in the Carter Administration's decision to take up the role of intermediary was that of gaining support and establishing credibility for related actions taken at the time. Both the governments of the United States and United Kingdom were involved in the settlement process in Rhodesia. It is conceivable that their credibility in both was mutually beneficial. One of the factors which contributed to the lack of credibility of the Kissinger initiative of 1976 was the fact that the United States Secretary of State seemed to be more interested in Zimbabwe than in Namibia and was even willing to bargain with the latter (94). Active involvement in the settlement of conflicts in southern Africa also contributed to Carter's human rights stance, as the issues of human rights and apartheid were often linked. According to Ambassador Young, the Carter Administration's involvement in southern Africa, the Middle East and Panama was viewed "favourably around the world because it was based upon the protection of human rights" (95).

For the Carter Administration, the process-related interest of "going along" with allies does not seem to have been an important factor since it was responsible for starting the initiative, although, as will be argued later, the motive for mediating as part of a coalition was an important factor for the Administration.

The above discussion suggests that the Carter Administration derived several benefits from the intermediary role itself. The main process-related interests relevant were avoiding other, costly options in the region, gaining influence while excluding others' influence, and acquiring credibility for related actions. This does not imply that the Administration was not interested in a settlement of the conflict per se, but it indicates that it derived benefits, regardless of eventual outcome, from the process of being involved as intermediary, that is, from the process of settlement.

6.2.2.2- The Government of the United Kingdom

A major motive for the British government's joining the Western initiative was the avoidance of sanctions(96). There was also a reluctance to cast the veto in opposition to sanctions calls at the start of the initiative, when the British government might have found itself isolated in so doing. The British government was, in fact, concerned

that the Carter Administration was willing to impose sanctions and vote for UN resolutions calling for sanctions(97).

Another process-related interest can concern future relations with parties and/or their patrons, in this case, relations with a future SWAPO government in Namibia. As was indicated in Chapter 5, the British government had a major interest in the Rossing uranium mine. Involvement in the process leading to Namibian independence could have been an insurance for the continuation of uranium supplies from an independent Namibia(98).

A third important, process-related interest for the government of the United Kingdom was to gain credibility for related actions, namely involvement in the Rhodesian settlement process. This was the highest priority issue for Dr. David Owen(99). The FLS placed special emphasis on the role of the British government in the settlement of the Rhodesian issue. Any such role, which Owen was determined to take, would have lost credibility if at the same time the United Kingdom remained passive over Namibia and continued to exercise the veto against sanctions calls at the Security Council. The question which remains, however, is whether the British government would have become involved if the United States had not started the initiative. As will be argued below, even the Rhodesia negotiations would not have been actively taken up without United States participation. This emphasises the point

made in the analytic framework, that factors influencing third party decision-making do not act separately but in an inter-active manner.

A fourth especially important process-related interest for Dr. Owen was that of involvement with the Carter Administration in the settlement processes in southern Africa. United Kingdom-United States cooperation was important in Owen's strategy for Rhodesia. Cooperation over Namibia, given United States determination for involvement, might have seemed a natural extension of this strategy.

For the government of the United Kingdom, therefore, process-related interests and benefits deriving from involvement in the settlement process concerned the avoidance of other actions, namely the imposition of sanctions. Involvement in Namibia also contributed to the credibility of related actions in Rhodesia. Another process-related interest derived from being involved in a joint response with the Carter Administration, whose cooperation over Rhodesia was of prime importance.

6.2.2.3- The West German Government

While not being in a position to block sanctions resolutions at the Security Council, the Federal Government was faced with the choice of either going along with its Western partners in a collective intermediary

response or not taking part in the process. It is conceivable that the latter course would have had costly ramifications both at home and abroad. The links with the German community in Namibia have meant that the FRG was seen as responsible for this community. Choosing not to be part of the initiative would also have incurred diplomatic costs, given the FRG's relationship with South Africa and the increasing criticism from African leaders(100).

A second process-related interest was to ensure future relations with any future SWAPO government. This would ensure the dual benefits of continued supplies of minerals(101) as well as the welfare of the German community. Evidence for this derives from later Federal Government action during the negotiation process when, as will be seen in Chapter 8, it promoted communication between SWAPO and the representatives of the German community.

The process-related interest of excluding other third parties' influence, or competing with such influence, was also relevant for the Federal Government in that it sought to counter the influence of the GDR (perceived to be already a danger). The main input by the GDR which has contributed to its credibility in Africa is its relationship, mainly military, with the liberation movements of southern Africa. The contrast in credibility between the two countries is illustrated by the OAU's

responses to both. The OAU is highly critical of West Germany because of evidence indicating military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa. In contrast, it welcomes the GDR's contributions to the liberation movements(102). Indications that the Foreign Ministry in Bonn maintains a close watch on GDR activities in Africa are that Herr Genscher drew on the advice of his two close associates, Helmut Schafer and Jurgun Molleman, both members of the Bundestag. Molleman, who was on the Bundestag's Defence Committee, closely followed GDR activities in Africa. Moreover, the Ministry of Inter-German Relations in the FRG also keeps a close watch on the activities of the GDR in Africa(103).

As stated earlier, Herr Genscher sought a role for the FRG in the settlement of conflicts in the Third World. The Contact Group initiative provided such an opportunity within the global arena. Although the motives for coalition mediation are considered more fully in a separate section, the collective nature of the initiative added to this process-related interest of seeking a global role for the FRG. The Federal Government could use the Contact Group as a way of potentially enhancing its role in international diplomacy. This is comparable to the West German emphasis on European Political Cooperation as a means of acquiring such a position and role(104).

6.2.2.4- The French Government

As with the other four members of the Contact Group, the process-related interest of sanctions avoidance was important for the French government's participation with the Group(105). Given the increasing criticism from black African countries of French military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa, the Contact Group initiative provided the French government with an opportunity to display a certain contiguity of interest with black African countries given the opposition to sanctions.

The fact that southern Africa was a low priority foreign policy issue for the French government meant that the French took a generally less active role in the Contact Group and were often a reluctant participant(106). As pointed out by Hill, France followed a policy of "intelligent inactivity" in the WCG(107).

Despite this low priority, it would have been difficult for the French government not to go along with a major international initiative, especially given that the Contact Group initiative was, at the time, the major diplomatic activity at the UN(108). Thus, standing by while the other Western governments were involved in a major initiative would have imposed diplomatic costs on the French government; costs which would have been exacerbated given French relations with South Africa.

Moreover, at the time of the Contact Group initiative, President Giscard D'Estaing sought a more active French role in Africa, through a proposal for an Africa Promotion Fund and the North-South Dialogue(109).

The above review suggests that benefits accrued from participation in the Contact Group initiative for the French government and derived from the avoidance of sanctions; acquiring credibility while allaying criticism for policies in southern Africa; and from joining a collective Western initiative.

6.2.2.5- Canada's Process-related Interests

Despite its relatively small links with South Africa, the Canadian government was also opposed to the imposition of sanction against South Africa. However, this small degree of involvement had meant that the Canadian government was not as subject to criticism from African countries as its Western partners. Thus, although it is difficult to make a quantifiable comparison in level of credibility enjoyed by the five governments which joined the Contact Group, it is reasonable to state that the Canadian government, through its extensive aid programme and its contributions to SWAPO(110). enjoyed greater credibility than the other members of the Contact Group. The Canadian government, however, had other particular process-related interests influencing its decision to join the initiative. This is

especially the case in relation to Canada's reputation as intermediary.

Canada's reputation as an intermediary, which contributed significantly to its resources, was an important factor in its involvement in the WCG, in that such involvement would have served to enhance its reputation as intermediary. This reputation has been built up primarily in the Commonwealth, but it has also been earned in other international fora, including the UN. Canadian Prime Ministers have functioned as intermediaries in the Commonwealth summits between the British governments and the Afro-Asian membership(111). Within the UN framework, the Canadian government had often participated in peacekeeping operations(112).

Canada's election to the Security Council for a two-year term beginning in January 1977 meant that the Canadian government's policies on southern African issues, especially apartheid in South Africa and the Namibian issue, gained the visibility that might not have been otherwise apparent. Moreover, like the government of the FRG, the Canadian government was confronted with a choice of either going along with the initiative or not taking part in the process. Given the Canadian government's reluctance to impose economic sanctions against the South African government, the latter course of action would have meant taking a "stand-by" position while refusing to accept calls from the Africa Group and the Non-Aligned

members for the imposition of an arms embargo and an end to new investments in South Africa. While such a stand-by position may not have been as visible if Canada was not a member of the Security Council, being a member of that body had the effect of "giving a higher 'profile'" to Canadian policies in southern Africa(113).

Moreover, to stand-by in reaction to a southern African issue would have been especially costly given the fact that key decision-makers within the Canadian government sought an active part or role for Canada during its term on the Security Council. In a speech given by Secretary of State Jamieson entitled, "Canada's International Responsibilities", one of the subject matters referred to as a "challenge" was that of southern Africa, including South Africa, Rhodesia and Namibia. It represented a situation of "great intricacy and is going to call for a great deal of skill and, in some respects perhaps, a great deal of courage, on the part of the members of the Security Council, including Canada."(114)

The emphasis on the UN, and a Canadian role therein, was similar to the perception of the UN by the new Carter Administration and the new British Foreign Secretary, David Owen. As with the latter two, the aim of the Canadian government has been and was then to enhance and contribute to the role of the UN in conflict settlement. This aspect was also emphasised by William Barton,

Canada's Permanent Representative at the UN at the time of the WCG initiative. Ambassador Barton saw the UN and Canada's role therein as being aimed at the "management of change", a process which "demanded active and constructive involvement" (115). Jamieson stated in 1979 that "Canada's experience on the Security Council in 1977 and 1978 convinced us that the Security Council and the General Assembly need to become more actively involved in promoting solutions and solving the political problems underlying various conflicts. Our membership in the Group of Five dealing with Namibia and the joint Canada-United States-Britain initiative of late 1978 designed to facilitate the resumption of intercommunal negotiations in Cyprus are imaginative examples of how Canada is attempting to encourage the UN to move in this direction." (116)

As with the FRG, the collective nature of a coalition initiative had an impact on Canada's process-related interests, in that the interest of "going along" with one's allies was also important. The Canadian government has always sought to cooperate with its allies, especially Britain and the United States. Tennyson argues that Canada supported the Contact Group approach "believing that it would establish a climate in which multilateral initiatives could be characterised less by rhetoric and more by realistic proposals. It was also believed that Canada's participation in the initiative could enhance

Canada's relations with the other western governments involved by the close and frequent high level contacts necessitated by the initiative's essentially political nature." (117)

6.2.3- Influence Potential

As with the analyses of conflict and process-related interests, the analysis of a third party's influence potential forming part of any decision about an appropriate response to a conflict must be based on the decision-makers' own evaluation of its influence potential and not on the evaluation of any observer. This is especially so in the present study, since it concerns a third party's own evaluations regarding the choice of the intermediary role. The necessity for such an approach is especially illustrated in the case of the West's influence with South Africa. Advocates of a sanctions policy suggest that the relationship which exists between the West and South Africa provides the West with the necessary leverage to force the minority government into change. Opponents of a sanctions policy tend to minimise the West's leverage with South Africa. It is therefore pertinent to investigate the evaluation of the Contact Group participants regarding their influence potential. The analyst can, however, point to the sources of the third party's influence, and then consider if this source was considered by the decision-makers to be of potential value

on the decision to act as intermediary. This approach, therefore, acknowledges that different decision-makers may have differing perception of their government's influence potential.

The analytic framework suggested that the third party's influence potential may derive from the following resources:

- [1] Material resources.
- [2] Status resources.
- [3] Relations with the adversary and other third parties.
- [4] Personal resources.

This section will analyse influence potential as a factor forming part of the five government's considerations in their response to the conflict as a collective intermediary. The modifying influence of the coalition nature of the Contact Group on the individual governments' influence potential will be discussed later in the section on motives for coalition mediation.

6.2.3.1- The United States Government

The United States government undoubtedly had the necessary material and technical resources to carry out the role of an intermediary. Given that the process involved multilateral diplomacy, this was especially important. As pointed out by McHenry, "The negotiation process itself has been unique and extraordinarily complex; it could not

have been undertaken without modern communications" (118). Access to such communications facilities was, therefore, important, not only for the United States, but also for the other members of the Group. It is conceivable that smaller countries which have limited diplomatic representation, could not have carried out such a process. McHenry's description serves to elaborate on this complexity: "Five nations have operated as one negotiating team. Each step has required careful coordination among our missions in New York, our capitals, our embassies in the front-line states and Nigeria and our embassies in South Africa" (119). The fact that the "working group" functioned from New York added to the United States representatives resources in that the Bureau of International Organisation Affairs was closely involved in the functioning of the Group, especially in the the drafting of proposals (120).

The five governments of the WCG had the material resources which could potentially be used to induce concessions from the parties. The Carter Administration was willing both to threaten the South African government with sanctions and, in a limited sense, to apply them. When the Carter Administration came to power, there was greater communication to the South African government of intentions to adopt stronger action if there was no progress in southern Africa. Vance points out that sanctions against South Africa formed "an option that I

and the United States felt was a real option that we should be prepared to exercise" (121). This was a point of view advocated by Andrew Young and McHenry (122). Although there were differences of perception within the Administration regarding United States influence with South Africa (123), the decision-makers involved in the decision to become involved in the settlement process estimated that the United States had the influence vis-a-vis the South African government to induce it to make concessions (124). Moreover, the United States communicated its willingness to use such influence to the South African government, even prior to the start of the initiative (125). and continued to do so during the functioning of the Group. (For example during Vice President Mondale's meeting with Prime Minister Vorster in May 1977, the message was that the United States was willing to take "strong action" in the absence of progress on Rhodesia, Namibia and apartheid in South Africa (126)).

The Carter Administration was also willing to implement, to an extent, the threats directed against the South African government. Although these came during the functioning of the Group, such as the arms embargo in November 1977 and the Evans Amendment which restricted Export-Import Bank credit guarantees to United States business trading with South Africa, in November 1978 (127), they do indicate a perception that the United States could potentially exert pressure on the South African

government.

The fact that the United States has the veto in the Security Council is a status resource. The Carter Administration used the threat of withdrawing the veto if the South African government did not comply with proposals for a Namibia settlement. This threat was, in fact, used three times before the final proposals of April 1978. (This will be discussed in Chapter 8 as a Contact Group tactic). Here, it is merely pointed out that this resource was perceived as a source of influence with the South African government.

The extensive relationship between members of the Contact Group and the South African government contributed to their acceptability as intermediaries in the Namibian conflict. As indicated earlier, the Presidents of the FLS referred to this relationship when calling for greater Western involvement in the conflicts in the region as the only source of influence upon the South African government. As suggested by Touval, the intermediary's relationship with the adversary contributes to the third party's acceptability and influence. The FLS were, therefore, willing to cooperate with the Group in exerting pressure on SWAPO. As will be seen later, this was a major tactic used by the Contact Group.

The fact that Andrew Young and Don McHenry built up a personal rapport with leaders of important African states,

including FLS and Nigeria, contributed to the acceptability and therefore, influence potential of the Carter Administration and the Group as a whole(128).

The Carter Administration's influence potential was modified by the coalition nature of the initiative. Although the coalition's impact on influence will be discussed below, it is sufficient to point out that collective action both had a modifying influence on the participating governments' influence potentials and affected their perception of such influence.

6.2.3.2- The Government of the United Kingdom

As far as influence potential deriving from material resources is concerned, the questions to be considered are [1] whether the British government was willing to recognise these as a source of influence with the parties, especially with the South African government, and [2] whether it was willing to use these as threat/reward resources and to implement such rewards or threats.

All indications are that the British government did not perceive its economic relationship with South Africa as a source of influence upon the government of that country, and if it did, it was unwilling to use that relationship. Dr. Owen argued that Britain's domestic economy ruled out support for economic sanctions against

South Africa. Moreover, sanctions were not perceived as an effective means of influence with the South African government(129). The United Kingdom joined other members of the Contact Group in voting against the Security Council Resolution calling for mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa in October 1977. It did, however, vote for an arms embargo in November(130).

As far as status resources were concerned, the British government was willing to use its position in the Security Council as a potential for influence with the South African government. As will be seen later, this threat was often used during the functioning of the Group.

The main feature of David Owen's evaluation of influence potential with regard to action in southern Africa was the value attached to collective action, both with the Carter Administration and within the framework of European Political Cooperation. It will be argued that collective action had a major modifying effect on the United Kingdom's influence potential.

6.2.3.3- The West German Government

West Germany, like the United States and the United Kingdom, had the material resources both to carry out the functions of an intermediary and (potentially) to use its economic relations with South Africa and the FLS. While there was a reluctance to impose full economic sanctions

against South Africa, Herr Genscher was willing to use selective sanctions as a means of persuading the South African government into accepting the Contact Group's plan for Namibian independence(131). The Federal Government also voted for the arms embargo.

As far as the West German government's status resources were concerned, unlike Britain, the United States and France, it did not hold the privileged veto position in the Security Council and was, therefore, in no position to use this as a source of influence with the South African government. The Federal Government acquired its status on the international arena through its functioning within the framework of European Cooperation, a process which Genscher has promoted(132). However, the fact that the FRG was an elected member to the Security Council at the time of intervention added to its influence potential.

Like the government of the United Kingdom, the collective nature of the initiative added to the Federal Government's influence potential and was a major factor in its decision for involvement.

6.2.3.4- The French Government

It was indicated earlier that the main motive for the French government's decision to join the Western initiative was that it was a major diplomatic effort and

gave France the opportunity to avoid sanctions, while at the same time, acquiring a certain degree of credibility for involvement in the settlement process in southern Africa.

The fact that the French government was not willing to take an active part in the Western initiative, coupled with the lack of significant ties with the region, suggests that the influence potential of the French government was far less than that of its Western partners. With regard to the use of its relationship with South Africa as a source of influence, the French Foreign Minister, M. Jean Francois-Poncet, expressed scepticism about sanctions similar to that from Dr. Owen(132).

6.2.3.5- The Canadian Government

Canada's influence potential derived mainly from its credibility with African countries. Its role in the Commonwealth and its lack of a colonial past have contributed to this(134).

With respect to influence upon the South African government, Canadian decision-makers' perception was that "Canada could have no real influence on South African policies regardless of whether or not it backed up criticism with economic sanctions"(135).

However, the Canadian government did initiate limited

economic measures by ending all government support for commercial relations with South Africa, a move announced in December, 1977(136). These measures were in response to South African bans imposed on the Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa. This does not, however, provide any indication of the Canadian government's influence vis-a-vis the South African government. As far as Canadian policy-makers were concerned, any influence on the South African government had to derive from collective Western action, as indicated by Ambassador Barton during the Security Council March debate(137).

6.2.4- The Constituency Input

In order to assess the impact of constituency groups on the five governments' initial decision to respond as intermediaries in the conflict over Namibia, it is necessary to establish first the presence of an interested constituency and secondly to show whether this was a factor in the actual decision to join the Group. The analytic framework suggested that a constituency, or groups within it, may influence a third party's decision to take up an intermediary role. The following analysis will argue that while it is a relatively simple task to point to an interested constituency in each of the five countries in relation to issues relating to southern Africa, their input into the actual choice of this particular response to the conflict over Namibia is far

more difficult to establish.

A quantitative approach to this problem would require precise information not only on the relative size of the constituencies but also precise data on the access of the different groups which make up the interested constituency to the decision-makers and the leverage they might exert on them. It is highly improbable that such data would be available in precise quantifiable levels. Moreover, decision-makers are not prone to admitting that they are under the influence of any political organisation, a problem that is especially relevant in relation to policies in southern Africa, given the emotive nature of the problems involved.

Another problem specific to the present case-study, relates to the short time span involved in actually making the decision to join the Contact Group initiative. As indicated in the discussion on the start of the initiative, a mere two weeks in February-March 1977 were used by the representatives at the UN to consult with their governments "back home" and to gain approval for the start of the initiative(138). This section will, therefore locate the interested constituency and show whether it had any impact by examining statements and actions made by the decision-makers themselves where this was available. Where direct access to the decision-makers was not possible, the influence of the constituency will

be examined in a more indirect way by examining the impact of constituencies generally on foreign policy and southern Africa.

The five members of the Contact Group had interested constituencies in relation with the conflicts in southern Africa generally as well as those interested specifically with the conflict over Namibia. This analysis is not meant to be a comprehensive study of all pressure groups concerned with issues relating to southern Africa; such a study is outside the scope of this work(139). The more modest aim is to locate the existence of an interested constituency and to investigate whether it had any impact on the decision by the governments to intervene in the conflict in an intermediary response.

The interested constituency in the five countries represented in the WCG were concerned with a number of different but related issues. They might be concerned solely with the question of Namibia, the nature of its independence, and the process leading towards it. They might also be concerned with the broader conflict in southern Africa, specifically the question of apartheid. Other groups might, however, be interested in the wider issues related to the conflict in the region, namely the East-West conflict. Given the fact that Namibia involves the South African government, the constituency may also span the sanctions debate. These groups are not exclusive of each other, but may overlap- for example, those

interested in the anti-apartheid campaign may also take up the Namibia question.

Parts of the constituencies concerned with Namibia includes those which favour an internationally acceptable settlement and a SWAPO victory on the one hand, and those which prefer the status quo, namely continued South African occupation leading to an internal settlement on the other. The former includes such groups as the Namibia Support Committee in the United Kingdom as a single issue group(140) or wider groups such as the British Council of Churches(141). An example of the latter, favouring South African policies in Namibia is the Christian Democratic Party in the FRG, which has favoured an internal settlement.

Groups interested in the wider conflict in the region, specifically those involved in the struggle against apartheid have also taken up the Namibian issue given the overlapped nature of the conflicts in the region. For example, the British AAM campaigns for SWAPO and calls for sanctions related to the Namibia issue(142). These groups are, therefore also concerned with the debate over sanctions against South Africa. They are confronted with those who have opposed the imposition of sanctions, such as UKSATA(143).

Groups within the constituency may be interested in the East-West conflict and the ramifications of local

conflicts, such as that in southern Africa, on this confrontation. Such groups perceive a SWAPO victory as another step in furthering "communist" expansion in the region. An example within this category is the Heritage Foundation in the United States(144).

The above categories of the constituency may involve pressure groups, legislators, and members of the government whose representatives become involved in the mediation process.

The question of concern is whether such groups had an impact on the decision to respond to the conflict by taking up the role of intermediary. It is relevant to point out that a constituency's input may not be a direct one, but through having a modifying influence on the third party's conflict-related interests.

6.2.4.1- The United States Government

There is a substantial anti-apartheid constituency in the United States which has taken up the issue of Namibian independence. It ranges from those groups whose primary focus is anti-apartheid work, such as the American Committee on Africa, to groups such as the Congressional Black Caucus whose concern for wider issues includes anti-apartheid work(145).

The Carter Administration recognised the importance

of the anti-apartheid lobby and the black community in its policies in southern Africa. It has been suggested that Carter "apparently saw his Africa initiative as not only wise on foreign policy grounds, but also politically advantageous in relation to Black Americans." (146). Although it may be difficult to establish a significant correlation between Carter's policies on southern Africa and gaining black support on any precise cause-effect basis, it is significant that the decision-makers involved in the Administration's policies in southern Africa, including Cyrus Vance and Andrew Young acknowledge this linkage (147). Young has referred to the "consolidation of a new American constituency for African affairs" as a major factor in what he terms the "African-American equation" (148).

While the decision-makers involved in the Carter Administration point to the importance of the anti-apartheid constituency, including the black community as a factor in Carter's policies in southern Africa, it is more difficult to establish the constituency factor as being important in the decision to initiate the mediation process. According to Donald McHenry it was not a factor in the thinking about the initiative and furthermore there would have been no domestic costs if no action was taken. Vance, however, suggested that it was important in the general thrust of policy (149).

There were also those opposed to Carter's policies in southern Africa. They did not approve of the United States taking an active part in the settlement process, and sought for example, to curtail Soviet influence in the region. On 3rd October, 1977, for example, seven Republicans and two Democrats introduced a resolution in Congress calling for Young's impeachment for his support, as they alleged, for "Marxist, communist, and terrorist leaders" in Africa(150). There were also those in Congress who preferred inactivity and non-interference. This approach was favoured by William Schauffele who was until June 1977, Secretary of State for African Affairs until he was replaced by Richard Moose(151).

That Congressional concern over Soviet influence in southern Africa was a factor in the Carter's Administration's policies, was evident over the issue of recognition of the MPLA government in Angola. Despite a preference for recognition by Young and Vance, the Administration did not implement this policy, which was thought as an important bridge-building device with the government of Aghostino Neto, whose cooperation in southern Africa was seen as essential(152).

Thus, while it is possible to link the constituency factor in the general thrust of policy in southern Africa, such a connection cannot be made with regard to the initial United States decision to mediate in the conflict. It may be concluded, however, that the specific proposal

The discrepancy between the Labour Party and Owen to become involved in the settlement process cannot be separated from the general thrust of policy and that it was integral to it.

6.2.4.2- The Government of the United Kingdom

Nor can a one-to-one relationship between the constituency (or groups within it) and the decision to become involved in the Contact Group initiative be established in the United Kingdom. The difficulty in establishing a clear link between constituency and the response to the Namibia conflict is especially emphasised by the fact that Owen himself sought an active role for Britain in the settlement processes in southern Africa. He was, however, confronted with a preference for inactivity from other members of the British Cabinet, as indicated above.

While the anti-apartheid constituency was a factor in the general thrust of the Carter Administration's policy in southern Africa, no such link may be made with regard to the British anti-apartheid constituency despite a close relationship between the British Anti-Apartheid Movement and the Labour Party(153). The Anti-Apartheid Movement has been critical of Labour governments whose policies have not been seen as differing significantly from those of Conservative governments(154).

The discrepancy between the Labour Party and Labour Governments is also revealed by the difference in approach of the National Executive Committee of the Party and the Government. In a statement on Namibia published in 1976, the NEC declared that it did not believe that government policy placed them "clearly and unequivocally on the side of those who are seeking liberation" (155) and called on the Labour Government to join the UN Council for Namibia and to end the Rossing contract.

The Labour Government's constituency in the extra-parliamentary Labour party called for a policy of sanctions against South Africa as the only means by which it could be persuaded to withdraw from Namibia (156). Mr Frank Hooley, a prominent anti-apartheid campaigner in Parliament, called for sanctions to ensure South African withdrawal from Namibia at the start of the Contact Group initiative (157).

While no direct relationship may be made between the constituency factor and decision to join the Contact Group initiative, the benefits of achieving Namibian independence without imposing sanctions on the South African government included the lessening of such pressure domestically. Domestic sources were, however, important in the British government's opposition to sanctions. Members of the opposition Conservative Party perceived any recognition of SWAPO and an independent Namibia as a source of increased Soviet influence in the region (158).

6.2.4.3- The West German Government

As in the case of Britain and the United States , there is in the FRG an interested constituency which attempts to influence government policy in southern Africa. The question is, however, whether the constituency (or groups within it) influenced the West German decision to join the Contact Group initiative.

As was indicated in the discussion on the conflict-related and process-related interests of the Federal Government, a major interest in the conflict for the Federal Government was the existence of a substantial German community in Namibia. It was also indicated that not taking part in a major Western initiative on Namibia would have incurred both international and domestic costs, given that the German community was seen as a West German responsibility. Standing by, therefore, on a conflict in which the West German government and research foundations had major interest would have costly ramifications.

Like the Labour Government in Britain, the SPD/FDP coalition had a constituency within the parties which called for closer contact with the southern African liberation movements and the adoption of policies against South Africa. The Federal Minister for Development Aid, for example, sought to provide aid directly to the liberation movements and not, as was government policy, to provide aid for refugees through international

organisations and through the host African countries(159). This proposal was rejected by the Foreign Ministry, although it acknowledged the importance of the liberation movements in African politics(160).

Opposition to the policies of the Federal Government of the SPD/FDP coalition regarding Namibia came mainly from the CDU/CSU coalition. This was opposed to the Contact Group initiative and saw the Federal Government's involvement in it as a "recipe to sell out Namibia and the Germans who live there to communism"(161). The Contact Group initiative was perceived by the Christian Democrat opposition as a means of promoting SWAPO whose victory in Namibia would lead to increased Soviet influence in the region. The Konrad Adenaur Stiftung of the CSU had close contacts with the German community and sought to promote the DTA in the internal elections of 1978(162). The political opposition and the business community were also opposed to any sanctions against South Africa(163).

The above suggests that the constituency factor was important in the Federal Government's decision to become involved in the Western intermediary initiative. This was mainly due to the existence of the German community in Namibia. The above discussion also indicates substantial opposition to the Federal Government's involvement in the WCG.

6.2.4.4- The French Government

It is unlikely that any constituency group had any influence on the French government's decision to join the Contact Group initiative. While there is an anti-apartheid constituency and the opposition Socialist Party sought stronger action against South Africa, according to Hill, "the pool of South African expertise in Paris is both small and relatively new" (164) because of the lack of historical ties with the area.

Unlike the other four members of the Contact Group, which were all, at the start of the initiative, liberal and democratic socialists, the RPR coalition of President Giscard D'Estaing was the only government of the Right. It did not, therefore, have a constituency within the coalition calling for stronger action against South Africa.

Another more general indication suggesting that the constituency factor was not relevant for the French government is that it is generally thought that French foreign policy decision-making does not lend itself to constituency influence, including parliamentary influence. However, according to Marie Claude Smouts, business circles do have close contacts with decision-making circles. As she points out, "Employers' organisations and management circles have permanent contacts with government departments and are well informed about daily

international exchanges." (165) When the French government agreed to the EEC Code of Conduct of September 1977, it did so reluctantly- the main French employers' organisation, Patronat, clashed over the code with the Foreign Ministry (as, in fact, had the CBI in the United Kingdom) (166).

6.2.4.5- The Canadian Government

As with the other four members of the WCG, there is in Canada a portion of the constituency which is active in promoting the anti-apartheid cause, and this ranges from specific groups such as Canadians Concerned about Southern Africa (167), to Church coalitions such as the Task Force on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility (168). In Parliament, there is both cross-party support for stronger action against South Africa and those within the right who expressed support for the Turnhalle process.

The anti-apartheid constituency has sought Canadian support for mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa and the withdrawal of all Canadian involvement in both Namibia and South Africa. This was repeated throughout Canada's involvement in the Contact Group (169). Anglin points out that "While an organised, active and enlightened 'Africa Constituency' exists, it is too weak in numbers and resources to make a serious impact on the ignorance and apathy of a majority of comfortable

Canadians. Nor is it able to compete with the entrenched power of corporate interests whose concerns in Africa are considerable but, in the last analysis, profit-oriented." (170)

In the Canadian Parliament, there has been considerable cross-party support for stronger action. For example, in March 1977, Mr. David Macdonald of the opposition Progressive Conservative Party called in the House of Commons for a "Canadian declaration of its strong opposition to the support of Canadian business enterprises for South African involvement in Namibia." (171) He also called for an enquiry to "ensure that no tax concessions are provided to Canadian companies operating in Namibia (172). This did not, however, reflect the opinion of the PC as a whole. Mr. Howard Johnston of the PC, for example, demanded under Standing Order No 43 "that the government of Canada withdraw its representative from the five-nation committee endeavouring through negotiations with South Africa to reduce South West Africa to the same state of oppression existing in Angola." (173)

Another sector of the Canadian constituency is composed of corporate interests which are thought to have more contact with decision-makers than the anti-apartheid constituency. According to Tennyson, these are represented in such organisations as the Export Development Corporation, a government body; and in official Canadian delegations; and in the promotion of trade. Even here,

however, according to Matthews and Pratt, it is not the lobbying success that counts but the already existent ideology of the members of government(174).

6.2.5- Motives for Mediating as a Coalition

The proposed coalition structure of the initiative influenced each participant's considerations about its appropriate response to the conflict. The analytic framework suggested that it should be considered as a significant explanatory factor in any third party's decision to intervene in conflict as an intermediary. The "coalition factor" had a modifying effect on each of the participants' potential for influence and on their process-related interests. Possible motives for undertaking coalition mediation generally were discussed in Chapter 3. It was suggested that a major motive for setting up a coalition as an intermediary is to attain greater effectiveness than would be possible with a single third party. A coalition may increase the acceptability of the initiative and may even confer acceptance. It also adds to the potential influence of each of the participants. Thus, different members may bring differing credibility levels to the initiative. A collective response may also be more credible because of the combined resources that a coalition brings to the situation. Differential acceptability and potential influence that

each of the participants brings to the initiative are important considerations for parties contemplating coalition mediation.

Another motivating factor for coalition mediation relates to the spread of costs within the group as well as blame for failure. Moreover, unpopular proposals may be accredited to another member of the coalition.

As pointed out in the first section of this Chapter, the collective response was aimed at exerting the highest diplomatic pressure on South Africa. When asked about the source of the Group's influence, all those interviewed pointed to the collective Western onslaught as the source of such influence upon the South African government.

This section will consider the coalition nature of the initiative as a factor in each participant's decision to respond to the conflict in such a way.

6.2.5.1- The United States Government

The Carter Administration emphasised collective action in southern Africa(175) including Namibia and Rhodesia, which added to the resources and influence potential of the United States government vis-a-vis the South African government. It avoided a situation whereby differences among the Western members of the Security Council could be exploited and thus lead to the lessening of credibility of

any sanctions threats(176).

Collective action also enhanced the acceptability of the United States Administration in its involvement in the conflicts of southern Africa to important African countries including Nigeria and the FLS. Individual intervention could have been perceived as a continuation of Dr. Kissinger's diplomacy, which had lacked credibility. Collective intervention was especially important for gaining acceptance with the MPLA government in Angola, given previous United States involvement in the civil war there.

The coalition nature of the initiative, therefore, provided a reinforcing effect on the Carter Administration's potential influence.

6.2.5.2- The Government of the United Kingdom

The main feature of Dr. Owen's evaluation of the British government's influence potential with regard to action in southern Africa was the value attached to collective action, both with the Carter Administration and within the EPC framework.

In his speech to the Young Fabians in October 1977, Owen stated that, in relation to an active response in Rhodesia, "without the weight of American support, a political settlement is impossible"(177). Collective

action with the United States government would add to the credibility of the action and would strengthen any influence and leverage with the South African government. With regard to Namibia concerted action was also seen as the only means of exerting such influence. The Foreign Minister stated in Parliament shortly after the first Contact Group meeting with the South African government, "...this unprecedented demarche of the five Western Security Council Powers is one of the best ways of bringing the collective strength of the Western democracies to bear on South Africa, and I am hopeful that it will produce some results." (178)

Consensus over southern African issues within the EEC was also perceived as adding to the individual members' influence. The European Code of Conduct was one such example of cooperation. The European countries had also adopted a common stance on Namibia, and communicated their preference for an international settlement within the framework of European Political Cooperation, as indicated earlier (179).

Collective action, therefore, provided a reinforcing effect on the British government's potential influence by adding to it. It also formed a concerted strategy to "spread the load" (180) or dilute the costs of any action in southern Africa. The coalition nature of the initiative also influenced the British government's process-related interests in taking part in the Contact Group initiative.

Working with the Carter Administration on Namibia contributed to United States-United Kingdom cooperation on Rhodesia, an issue which was of higher salience to the British government.

6.2.5.3- The West German Government

The collective nature of the initiative was a primary factor in the decision by the Federal Government to take an active part in the settlement process in Namibia.

The coalition structure contributed to the FRG's influence potential in material and status terms, as well as in terms of relations with the parties and their patrons; that is, the South African government and the FLS. The FRG did not, for example, have the same status resource in having the veto at the Security Council that was available to the United States, UK, and France. However, like the UK and France, its emphasis was on collective action, especially within the OPEC framework(181).

The coalition nature of the initiative also influenced the Federal Government's process-related interests. This suggests that it derived benefits from the collective nature of the intervention. The WCG provided the West German government with the opportunity to respond actively to a conflict where it had a direct interest, namely the existence of the German community in Namibia.

It also provided the opportunity to implement Herr Genscher's goal of establishing a role for the FRG in the diplomatic arena and in the settlement of third world conflicts.

6.2.5.4- The French Government

It was argued earlier that the main motive for French participation in the Contact Group initiative was the process-related interest of "going along" with allies. The coalition factor, therefore, was relevant in exerting a modifying influence on the French government's process-related interests.

The coalition also provided the French government with the opportunity of joining a major initiative on a region of Africa with which it did not have any historical connection, and where the links that existed between the French government and that of South Africa had gained criticism from the southern African countries. The Group, therefore, provided the French with an opportunity to gain credibility in Anglo-phone Africa.

The group nature of the initiative also meant that the French could take a less active role in the actual functioning of the Group, while benefiting from being associated with a major initiative in African settlement processes and in avoiding undesirable sanctions against the South African government. The group nature of the

initiative allowed the French government to take a less active role and to allow others, especially Britain and the United States to lead in the negotiations.

6.2.5.5- The Canadian Government

As was indicated in the discussion on the Canadian government's process-related interests, multilateral diplomacy has consistently been the preferred course of action for the Canadian government, especially on issues relating to southern Africa and given its active membership of the Commonwealth. Given the Canadian government's relatively minor involvement in the region, especially in its relation with South Africa, it did not perceive that it could influence changes in the South African government's behaviour, a point consistently made by Secretary of State Jamieson(182). The group nature of the initiative provided the Canadian government, which, unlike the French, did seek an active role in the settlement process, with the opportunity of involvement in the region. Therefore, it was relevant in contributing to the Canadian government's perception of the probability that it could influence the conflict and its settlement.

The coalition nature of the initiative also provided the Canadian government with the opportunity to work in close association with the governments of the United States and the UK, which in itself brought benefits along

with the role.

6.3- Conclusion

This Chapter has used the first part of the analytic framework to point to factors which were important in the decisions by the five governments which came to form the Contact Group to intervene in the conflict over Namibia in a collective intermediary response.

The above discussion has shown that a major factor in this decision was the conflict-related interest priorities of the Five, and especially of the incoming Carter Administration which initiated the process. The discussion showed that the main interest priority for the Carter Administration was to promote relations between the United States and important African countries, especially Nigeria and the FLS. Involvement in the settlement process was perceived as a means of achieving such a relationship. For the Carter Administration, the process-related interest of avoiding sanctions was also an important factor. It was also pointed out that while there was an interested constituency, no direct influence could be attributed to it in relation to the decision to intervene in the Namibia conflict as intermediary. The constituency factor was, however, important in influencing the Carter Administration's interest priorities.

For the other four members of the Group, the process-

The following Chapter provides an outline of the related interest of avoiding sanctions was also an important factor in the decision to join the collective intermediary response. As with the decision of the United States government to initiate the process, the constituency factor was also not a direct input into the decisions of the other four members of the Group to join the initiative. As was indicated in the discussion of the decision of the West German government to join the initiative, however, the constituency factor was important in that failure to join the initiative would have had costly ramifications at home, given the existence of a substantial German community in Namibia.

While the analytic framework suggested that a third party's influence potential is an important factor in its decision to take up the role of intermediary, analysis of the formation of the Contact Group has shown that the coalition factor provided a reinforcing influence on each of the member's influence potentials. The coalition factor was, therefore, of vital importance to the decisions of the five governments to intervene in the conflict as intermediaries. The discussion also illustrated that the coalition factor influenced the process-related interests of the other four members of the Group. For the United Kingdom government, for example, cooperation with the Carter Administration on Namibia was perceived as reinforcing such cooperation on the more vital issue of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe.

Chapter 6- Notes

- 1- By March 1977, the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference had set up a Constitutional Committee consisting of one member from the each of the 11 ethnic delegations, under the chairmanship of Dirk Mudge. See: Du Pisani, A., SWA/Namibia: The Politics of Continuity and Change, (Jonathan Ball, Johannesburg, 1987).
- 2- Dr Kissinger had expressed concern that South Africa "...continues to deny the United Nations its proper role in establishing a free and independent Namibia" in his speech in Lusaka in April 1976. Reprinted in: Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIV, No. 1927, 31 May 1976, p.676.
- 3- Members of the EEC conveyed their opposition to Turnhalle as early as January 1976, as indicated by Mr Ennals, the British **Minister** of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. Hansard, Vol. 907, 10 March 1976, c.421.

This was repeated in February 1977, "because of reports that some form of internal self-government might shortly be established in Namibia, based on the recommendations of the Turnhalle conference". Statement by Mr. Edward Rowlands, Minister of State at the FCO on 17 May 1977 to the Maputo-held International Conference on Rhodesia and Namibia. Reprinted in: European Political Cooperation, (FRG Press and Information Office, Bonn, 4th edition, 1982), p.105.
- 4- The Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Don Jamieson, expressed the Canadian government's position on Namibia on the 3rd of December 1976, reiterating Canada's position on the illegality of South Africa's occupation. Jamieson, D., "Canada's International Responsibilities", Statements and Speeches, (Department of External Affairs, Canada), No. 76/32, 3 December 1976.
- 5- Interview with Cyrus Vance, (President Carter's Secretary of State, 1977-1980), New York, 13/7/87.
- 6- Interview with Ambassador McHenry conducted by C.R. Mitchell, questions devised by V.Jabri, Washington D.C., 11/6/86.
- 7- Interview with Mayor Young, US Ambassador to the UN (1977-1979), Atlanta, Georgia, 28/7/87.
- 8- Interview with Ambassador Rudiger von Wechmar, West German Ambassador to the UN(1974-1981), London, 10/12/86.
- 9- The representatives of the UK, France, and West Germany consulted with their foreign ministries prior to agreement

on joining the initiative. Wechmar interview, *ibid.*

10- *Ibid.*

11- Statement by Foreign Secretary Jamieson to the UN General Assembly Ninth Special Session on Namibia, April 25, 1978, on behalf of the Contact Group. Reproduced in: Department of State Bulletin, Vol.78, No.2015, June 1978, p.50.

12- Interview by telephone (Washington-New York) with Henry Miller, Assistant to Ambassador McHenry in the working group, 29/7/87.

13- Interview with Ambassador McHenry, 11/6/86, *op.cit.*

14- Jamieson statement to the 9th Special Session, Department of State Bulletin, *op. cit.*, p.50.

15- According to Ambassador Wechmar, the Soviet and Chinese representatives were also informed of the WCG initiative by Ambassador Young. Wechmar, Interview, *op. cit.*

16- McHenry, D., Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, May 7, 1979. Reproduced in: Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 79, No.2031, p.57.

17- Interview Cyrus Vance, *op. cit.*

18- Mr. Vance indicated that the Group worked on the assumption that the South African Government would be more difficult to deliver. *Ibid.*

19- Interview Andrew Young, *op. cit.*

20- Wall provides a review of the techniques used by intermediaries. See: Wall, J.A., "Mediation: An Analysis, Review and Proposed Research", Journal of Conflict Research, Vol. 25, No.1, 1981, pp. 157-180.

21- The lack of emphasis on face-to-face contact between the parties may be contrasted with Kissinger's approach which was to promote a multilateral conference on Namibia which would have included the South African Government, SWAPO, the FLS and the UN. Ambassador Scranton, Dec.2 1976, USUN Press Release; reproduced in Department of State Bulletin, Vol LXXV, No.1960, 17 Jan 1977, p.43.

22- Interview with Ambassador Wechmar, *op. cit.*

23- Interview with Ambassador McHenry, 1986, *op. cit.*

24- Interview with Mayor Young, *op. cit.*

25- The WCG recognised the mistrust of the parties toward each others' motives and those of the WCG as a delaying factor in the negotiations. McHenry, Department of State Bulletin, op. cit., p.58.

26- Don McHenry interviewed on Voice of America, 18 November 1977; quoted in Legum, C., The Western Crisis over Southern Africa, (Africana Publishing Company, New York, London, 1979), p.16.

27- South African intervention into the FLS is manifest both directly and through military aid to the MNR and UNITA in Angola and Mozambique. As will be seen later, this policy was escalated in 1981. See: Hanlon, J., Beggar Your Neighbours, (Catholic Institute for International Affairs, with James Currey Ltd., and Indiana University Press, 1986). Chapter 4, pp.27-35.

28- As pointed out by Geldenhuys, "The fact that the contact group consists of Western powers, of which three are moreover permanent Security Council members, in South African eyes adds weight to the importance of the initiative." in: Geldenhuys, D., Diplomacy of Isolation, (St. Martin's Press, New York, 1984), p.222.

29- Spicer points out that Prime Minister Vorster agreed to "set aside" the Turnhalle proposals to avoid sanctions. The South African government did however "...keep its options on the territory's future open". Spicer, M., "Namibia-Elusive Independence", World Today, October, 1980, p.409.

30- Evidence indicates that SWAPO, whose support comes predominantly from the Ovambo, would win UN-supervised elections. A Study by the National Intelligence Service in 1980 calculated that under free elections, SWAPO would win 80% of the vote. New Statesman, 22/8/1980. Quoted in: Cawthra, G., Brutal Force: The Apartheid War Machine, (International Defence and Aid Fund, London, 1986).

31- Interview with Dr. Peter Katjavivi, SWAPO's Information Secretary for Western Europe during the negotiations. Dr. Katjavivi stated that the negotiations gave SWAPO the opportunity to show that it could negotiate in a "statesman-like" manner. Interview, Oxford, 7/4/1987.

That this was an important benefit for SWAPO could also be concluded by contrasting its opportunity to take part in diplomacy denied to other movements including the ANC and the PLO.

32- SWAPO states in its Political Programme that any constitutional talks on the future of Namibia should be

held under UN auspices and should aim at the holding of elections under UN supervision and control.

SWAPO, Political Programme of the South West Africa People's Organisation, July 28-August 1st 1976, Lusaka, Zambia, p.8.

33- President Kaunda called on the Carter Administration to "take the lead" in solving the problems of Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa.

New York Times, 6th February 1977, p.5:1.

General Obasanjo of Nigeria stated after meeting Ambassador Young in February 1977, "Generally we agreed on what should be done, our courses of action..and our tactics"; quoted in Legum, op. cit., p.22.

34- The FLS agreed to pursue diplomatic means in parallel with support for the armed struggle in their statement, "Strategy for Southern African Liberation", adopted by the OAU in 1975. Reprinted in Africa Contemporary Record, 1975-1976, p.C71.

35- The Security Council meeting, "The Question of South Africa" was in response to a request made by the Africa Group in a letter by the Permanent Representative of Nigeria, acting as Chairman of the Africa Group; (Security Council Document S/12295 of 9, March 1977. The meeting was in connection with the "Situation in South Africa: Killings and Violence by the Apartheid Regime in Soweto and Other Areas"

Security Council Official Records, 32nd Year, 1988th meeting, 21st March 1977, S/PV.1988.

36- The conflicts over Namibia, Rhodesia and South Africa were linked by various speakers during the March debate in the Security Council; for example, Joseph Garba of Nigeria. Ibid., S/PV.1989, 22March 1977.

37- On Namibia, the Five called on the termination of South African rule; a definite date for independence, UN supervision of the transition; and the right of all political groups to participate in the preparation for independence. Statement by the West German to the UN, Rudiger von Wechmar. Ibid., S/PV.1998, p.9.

An indication that the Africa Group accepted the Western approach as indicated in the Declaration of Principles, is that the four draft resolutions on sanctions prepared for the March Security Council debate were not put to the vote.

S/12309; S/12310; S/12311; and S/12312 of 30 March 1977, 1998th meeting. Ibid., Document S/PV.1998.

38- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Southern Africa: The Escalation of a Conflict, (Praeger,

New York and London, 1976).

39- Vance interview, op. cit.

40- Vance revealed that William Schaufele was replaced by Richard Moose as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs because of the need for a new approach on southern Africa. Interview, ibid.

41- Interview with William Maynes, op. cit.

42- The objective of re-evaluating the relationship with South Africa and the priority for US-African relations is indicated in the Democratic Party Platform of 1976. Reprinted in: Africa Contemporary Record, 1976-1977, p. C163.

43- Interview with Cyrus Vance, op. cit. Also, in his Senate Confirmation speech, Young had suggested that "a rather hard-line policy might be necessary to make South Africa move internally". Quoted in Study Commission on United States Policy Towards Southern Africa, South Africa: Time Running Out, (University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1981), p. 357.

44- The deteriorating diplomatic relationship between the United States and South Africa was illustrated by the US Administration's cooperation with the USSR over South African intentions to test a nuclear device. This change of style was further illustrated and communicated to the South African government through changes implemented in US representation in Pretoria where the US Ambassador met with Black dissidents and sent observers to political trials. Study Commission, ibid, p.359.

45- Ibid, p.357.

46- Interview, Charles William Maynes, op. cit.

47- Philip Habib, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXVI, No. 1971, April 1977, p.319.

48- Testifying before the Senate Sub-Committee on Africa, Vance mentioned the importance which President Carter placed on the repeal of the Byrd Amendment. In ibid, p.318.

49- Young, A., "The United States and Africa: Victory for Diplomacy", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 59, No.3, 1980, p.649.

50- Interview with Andrew Young, op. cit.

51- Vance indicated that Congress had been "sounded" on reaction to possible recognition of the MPLA government and that there was evidence that there would not have been

a back-lash against the Carter Administration.
Interview, op. cit.

52- Libby, R.T., Towards an Africanized U.S. Policy for Southern Africa: A Strategy for Increasing Political Leverage, (Institute for International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, CA, 1980).

53- Study Commission, op. cit., p.357.

54- This was the new United States strategy of developing close ties with regionally influential countries; Nigeria being such a country in Africa. This was espoused in Presidential Decision D-18, prepared by National Security Adviser, Brzezinski. Libby, op. cit., p.86.

55- As evidenced by Crosland's reluctance to chair the Geneva conference on Rhodesia; which was, instead, chaired by Ivor Richard. The UK Ambassador to South Africa states, "One can well understand why Mr. Crosland did not want to become too closely or personally involved; but without his authority the conference was a lost cause anyway."
Scott, D., Ambassador in Black and White, (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1981), p.192.

56- Interview with David Stephen, (Political Adviser to Dr. David Owen, 1977-1979), London, 12/2/86.

57- Times, 15 March 1977.

58- Colin Legum points out that Mr. Callaghan favoured a policy of "disinvolvement" or "passivity" rather than taking active responsibility for the affairs of southern Africa. See:

C. Legum, "Britain's Year in Africa", Africa Contemporary Record, 1977-1978, p. A84.

59- Anthony Crosland had pursued a policy of greater investment in South Africa as a continuation of policy when he was at the Board of Trade. Ibid, p.A84.

60- The Observer, London, 9 October, 1977. Referred to as Owen's speech below.

61- Hansard, 10 November 1977, c.830.

62- David Stephen Interview, op. cit.

63- Counter Information Services, "Buying Time for South Africa", (London, 1978). Pointed out that the Labour government had failed to honour a pledge in the 1974 manifesto to cancel the Rossing contract for Namibian uranium, was still promoting trade trips to South Africa and was involved directly through the National Enterprise Board, in ICL's sale of computers to the South African

government. Quoted in: Legum, M, J. Little, R. Roy, and D. Stephen, "Against All Reason: Britain and South Africa in the Eighties", A Fabian Group Fabian Tract, No. 478, (November) 1981.

64- The absence of enforcement measures for the implementation of the Code of Conduct has brought it under criticism as a mere gesture. See: Rogers, B., "A Code for Misconduct", (Christians Concerned for Southern Africa, London, 1980).

65- The Nigerian government withdrew all its deposits from Barclays and ordered two-thirds of the expatriate staff to be withdrawn. This was in response to the news in December 1976 that Barclays had purchased South African bonds to help finance the war against SWAPO and the ANC.

Barber, J., The Uneasy Relationship: Britain and South Africa, (Heinemann for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1983), p.20.

66- Security Council Official Records, 32nd Year, 22 March 1977, S/PV.1989, p.3.

67- Barber, op. cit., p.10.

68- Sir David Scott states, "Within days of his appointment Dr. David Owen had taken a firm personal grip on the Rhodesian situation. In particular, he secured the agreement of the new United States Administration to reopen a joint peace initiative in Rhodesia". Op. cit., p.193.

69- The latter choice assumes that the other members of the Group would have formed the Group without FRG participation.

70- H.D. Genscher, Deutsche Aussenpolitik, 1977. Referred to by C.R. Hill, Appendix in Barber, op. cit., p.135.

71- Interview with Ambassador Wechmar, op. cit.

72- Hill, in Barber, op. cit.

73- Sean McBride, UN Commissioner for Namibia called on the West German government to make plans for the re-accomodation of the German community.

74- Cervenka, Z., "West Germany's Role in Africa in 1977: An Economic Superpower on the Move", Africa Contemporary Record, 1977-1978, p.A77.

75- Ibid, p.A120.

76- Hull, G., "The French Connection in Africa: Zaire and South Africa", Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol.

- 5, April 1979, pp.220-233. Argues that French interests in South Africa are defined in terms of access to minerals.
- 77- The French government sold the licences for the production of the Mirage F-1 fighter bomber and Panhard armoured cars. Legum, 1979, op. cit., p.129.
- 78- Mr. Abdul Minty of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement had been invited to the March 1977 Security Council debate on South Africa. He referred to France as a "major supplier" of military hardware to South Africa. Mr. Lecompte, French representative at the Security Council debate was opposed to Mr. Minty's participation in the debate of the Security Council "...whose debates ..concern states". Security Council Document S/PV.1992, p.13 and p.18.
- 79- Ibid.
- 80- Financial Times, 16 February 1977; and Africa Contemporary Record, 76-77, p.B851.
- 81- Africa Contemporary Record, Ibid.
- 82- While other members were preparing for a joint EEC declaration after consultation with the US Administration, the French declared their recognition of the MPLA Government in Angola on 17th February 1976. Van Praag, N., "European Political Cooperation and Southern Africa", Ch.10, in: Allen, D., R. Rummel, and W. Wessels (eds), European Political Cooperation, (Butterworth, London, 1982).
- 83- Trudeau has been characterised as an "active" Prime Minister in that during his term of office, he took a number of major foreign policy initiatives, including more recently on the North-South Dialogue and arms control. Nossal, K., The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1985), pp. 95-96.
- 84- Jamieson, Statements and Speeches, No. 76/32, op. cit.
- 85- Blouin, G., "Canadian Policy Toward South Africa: The Decision-making Process", In: D.Anglin, T. Shaw, and C. Widstrand (eds.), Canada, Scandinavia, and Southern Africa, (Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1978), p.161.
- 86- Jamieson, Statements and Speeches, No 76/32, op. cit., p.3.
- 87- Mr. L. Harriman, Chairman of the Africa Group at the UN stated at the start of the March 1977 debate on South Africa while addressing Andrew Young (President of the Council for the month), "...in many of our countries your

personality and prestige have had some bearing on or view of the new Administration, which you represent..This has gone some way towards changing the image of the United States in several..countries in Africa, even before we became aware of the policies of the new Administration".
Security Council Official Records, 32nd Year, 1988th meeting, 21 March 1977, S/PV.1988.

88- Study Commission, op. cit., p.363.

89- Interview with Ambassador McHenry, Washington D.C., 15, June, 1987.

90- Namibia Today, Official Organ of SWAPO, Vol. 6, February 1982, p.7.

91- Austen, R., "Namibia and Zimbabwe, in: Current Legal Problems, 1982, p.210.

92- Vance, C., Hard Choices, (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1983), p. 85.

93- In March 1977, President Podgorny of the USSR visited Zambia, Tanzania, and Mozambique while President Castro was visiting Angola. This was interpreted by Western diplomats as part of a major effort by the USSR to seize the diplomatic initiative in southern Africa.
New York Times, 27 March 1977, p.6:1.

President Kaunda stated on 31 March 1977, "If the West is afraid that the visits of Presidents Podgorny and Dr. Castro are going to end up in southern Africa being communist influenced, it is the West that is to blame"
Times, 1 April 1977.

94- Interview with Ambassador McHenry, 15 June 1987, op. cit.

The Nigerian representative to the UN, Mr. L.Harriman, criticised Dr. Kissinger's diplomacy in southern Africa as having sought to gain support from South Africa in the settlement of the Rhodesian issue. He stated that African leaders did not understand why Kissinger was more interested in the fate of Rhodesia than in Namibia.
New York Times, 21st January, 1977, p.2:6.

95- Interview with Andrew Young, op. cit.

96- Interview with Dr. David Owen by Dr. Peter Katjvivi.
Interview with Dr. Katjavivi, op. cit.

97- Interview with Sir James Murray, former UK Ambassador to the UN, New York, 13, July 1987.

98- See Chapter 5 for a discussion of the UK government's

interest in Namibian uranium.

99- Interview with Cyrus Vance, op. cit.

100- In January 1977, in response to increasing criticism from the OAU, the Federal Government circulated a memorandum to African ambassadors denying any military and nuclear links with South Africa. Herr Genscher stated that if the FRG wished to gain the confidence of black Africa, it could no longer appear as a friend of South Africa. Cervenka, Africa Contemporary Record, 1977-1978, op. cit., p. A117.

101- According to Hill, the French government suspected that this was the prime motive for West German participation in the WCG. In: Barber, op. cit., p.103.

102- In a welcoming speech to Herr Honecker in November 1979, The OAU Secretary General stated "This is the place to pay tribute to the GDR for its valuable contribution to the liberation struggle in Africa..and the effort made in order to support the OAU Liberation Committee.." quoted by Cervenka, Z. and M.R. Dederichs, "The Two Germanies in Africa: Eastern Advances and Western Isolation", Africa Contemporary Record, 1979-1980, p. A155.

103- Ibid, p. A149.

104- Rummel, R. and W. Wessels, "Federal Republic of Germany: New Responsibilities, Old Constraints", Chapter 3, in: Hill, C.R. (ed), National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation, (Allen and Unwin for the RIIA, London, 1983).

105- Interview with Ambassador McHenry, 1986, op. cit.

106- That French participation in the WCG was relatively less active than the other four members of the Group was confirmed by both Cyrus Vance and Andrew Young. Interviews, op. cit.

107- Hill, in Barber, op. cit., p.103.

108- Interview with Ambassador McHenry, 1986, op. cit.

109- Wauthier, C., "France's Year in Africa", Africa Contemporary Record, 1977-1978, p. A93.

110- George Blouin, Assistant Under-Secretary, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, states "We believe that Canada is perceived in Africa as being one of the more progressive of Western nations. We have no colonial past; and it is useful in this context that our two official languages are those understood by many Africans", In Anglin et.al., op. cit., p.161.

- 111- Nossal, op. cit., pp. 81-82.
- 112- Canada has taken part in UNEF in Egypt and UNDOF in the Golan Heights.
- 113- Blouin, in Anglin et. al., op cit., p.159.
- 114- Jamieson, Statements and Speeches, No 76/32, op. cit., p.5.
- 115- Barton, W.H., "Canada at the United Nations", Statements and Speeches, (Department of External Affairs, Canada), No. 77/8, p.5.
- 116- Jamieson, D., "Current Issues in Canadian Foreign Policy", Statements and Speeches, (Department of External Affairs, Canada), No.79/5, p.2.
- 117- Tennyson, B.D., Canadian Relations with South Africa: A Diplomatic History, (University Press of America, Washington D.C., 1982), p.116.
- 118- McHenry, D., Statement before the Sub-Committee on Africa, Department of State Bulletin, op. cit., p.57.
- 119- Ibid.
- 120- Interview with Charles William Maynes op. cit.
- 121- Interview with Cyrus Vance, op. cit.
- 122- Interviews with Ambassadors Young and McHenry, op. cit.
- 123- Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's National Security Adviser, stated in a memorandum to the Congressional Black caucus in answer to their sanctions recommendation that "US influence and leverage with South Africa are limited". Quoted in Legum, The Western Crisis over Southern Africa, op. cit., p.25.
- 124- Young's assumption was that the Portuguese coup and the independence of Angola and Mozambique as well as the Soweto riots of September 1976 suggested that there was limited time for South Africa itself. He therefore supported limited sanctions which were "carefully framed and targetted at specific ends"; Foreign Affairs, op. cit., p.662.
- 125- On a visit to South Africa, Senator Dick Clark then Chairman of the Senate Sub Committee on African Affairs, in December 1976 stated that Washington would find it difficult to have friendly relations with South Africa if apartheid is maintained. He also stated that the time had

passed when the United States would come to the aid of oppressive regimes simply in order to combat communism. Africa Confidential, 17th December 1976.

126- Study Commission, op. cit., p.358.

127- Will also be discussed in relation to functioning of Group in Chapter 8.

128- Interview with Young, op. cit.

129- Dr. Owen stated in the House of Commons that sanctions would force the South African government into a "laager mentality". Hansard, Vol. 931, 4 May 1977, c.428.

130- On 31 October 1977, the US, UK, and France vetoed a draft resolution (S/12310/Rev.1, put forward by Benin, Libya, and Mauritius) on sanctions against South Africa; Yearbook of the UN, Vol. 31, 1977, p. 161.

131- Hill, in Barber, op. cit., p.102.

132- Rummel and Wessels, op. cit., pp34-56.

133- Hill, in Barber, op. cit., p.105.

134- Blouin, in Anglin et al., op. cit., p.161.

135- Quoted in Tennyson, op. cit., p.185.

136- Canadian measures against South Africa pronounced in Parliament by Don Jamieson. Statements and Speeches, (Department of External Affairs, Canada), No. 77/23.

137- Ambassador William Barton stated during the March Security Council debate: "The Canadian government believes it is essential, at this stage, to take full advantage and to make constructive use of any influence which can be brought to bear on the Government of South Africa by those countries which maintain relations with it. In that group of countries...the United States is pre-eminent, and we are impressed by the resolve expressed by the new administration to use its best efforts to achieve our common purpose". Security Council Official Records, 32nd Year, Document S/PV.1998, p.3.

138- The question arises: Does the government "back home" constitute part of the constituency? As indicated earlier in the analytic framework, these may be considered as part of the representative's constituency.

139- There is no single comprehensive source on pressure groups interested in the southern African conflict. The following are useful sources:

- Barber, op. cit., pp. 58-82;
- Love, J., The U.S. Anti-Apartheid Movement, (Praeger, New York, 1985).
- Shepherd, G.W. Jr., Anti-Apartheid: Transnational Conflict and Western Policy in the Liberation of South Africa, (Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1977).
- 140- The Namibia Support Committee works in close relationship with SWAPO; it produces the monthly bulletin, Action on Namibia.
- 141- The British Council of Churches, in a resolution adopted in October 1975, condemned British interests in the Namibian mining sector and called on the Government to recognise Decree No. 1 of the UN Council for Namibia. Statement reproduced in: Catholic Institute for International Relations, Mines and Independence, (CIIR, London, 1983), p.127.
- 142- Annual Reports of the Anti-Apartheid Movement.
- 143- The business community is represented in Britain, for example, by groups such as the United Kingdom-South Africa Trade Association. Barber, op. cit., pp. 71-74.
- 144- The Heritage Foundation coordinated the lobbying of Congress for the repeal of the Clark Amendment, thereby allowing the resumption of US military assistance to UNITA. See: Baker, P.H., "United States Policy in Southern Africa", Current History, Vol. 86, No. 520., May 1987, p. 195.
- 145- Love, op. cit., p.19.
- 146- Oudes, B., "The United States Year in Africa", Africa Contemporary Record, 1977-1978, p.A67.
- 147- Interviews op. cit.
- 148- Young, Foreign Affairs, op. cit., p. 649.
- 149- Interviews with Cyrus Vance and Don McHenry, op. cit.
- 150- Oudes, op. cit., p. A68.
- 151- Mr Vance stated that William Schauffele was replaced by Richard Moose because "new thinking" was needed in the State Department and a "break from the past". Interview, op. cit.
- 152- The State Department carried out a survey of leading figures in Congress and found that it was "much more

- positive towards recognition than had been the conventional wisdom". Interview with Cyrus Vance, op. cit.
- 153- Prominant Labour figures included Barabara Castle, Joan Lester and John Ennals as members of the Anti-Apartheid Movement. Barber, op. cit., p.62.
- 154- That the anti-apatheid constituency has not been considered as a salient interest by previous Labour governments is revealed by statements of leading Labour figures. For example, Richard Crossman, referring to the arms embargo stated, "Our policy of banning arms sales to South Africa is very unpopular in the country and, in my view we have in this respect been a puritanical, prim government."
Crossman, R., Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 3., (Hamilton, London, 1977). Quoted in: Legum, et. al., Against All Reason, a Fabian Group Fabian Tract, No. 478, p. 30.
- 155- Statement by the National Executive Committee, Namibia, (Labour Party, 1976), p.2.
- 156- Ibid., p.9.
- 157- Hansard, Vol. 931, c.428, 4 May 1977.
- 158- Mr. Cyril Townsend, MP, referred in Parliament to SWAPO's links with Moscow and the "Marxists in Angola" in calling on the Government to "reconsider giving educational and financial aid to SWAPO".
Hansard, Vol. 919, 17 Nov 1976, c.1319.
- Mr. Patrick Wall, MP., stated that if "South Africa removed its military forces (from Namibia), the MPLA and the Cubans would walk in tomorrow".
Hansard, Vol 933, 15 June 1977, c.373.
- 159- Cervenka, 1977, op. cit., p.A123.
- 160- Ibid.
- 161- Kuhn, von Lowis, W., "The Role of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Namibian Conflict", Beitrag zur Konfliktforschung, Vol. 13, No. 1, 1983, pp. 89-93.
- 162- Melber, H., "Focus Federal Republic of Germany-Namibia", prepared for the International Conference in Solidarity with the People of Namibia (organised by UNESCO), Paris 1980.
- 163- Hill, in Barber, op. cit., p.112.
- 164- Ibid., p.122.

- 165- Smouts, Marie-Claude, "French Foreign Policy: The Domestic Debate", International Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 1, January 1977., p.43.
- 166- Legum, The Western Crisis in Southern Africa, op. cit., p.128.
- 167- Canadians Concerned About Southern Africa presented a paper to the International Conference in Solidarity with the People of Namibia entitled "Canadian Complicity in Namibia", referring to Canadian economic interests in Namibia and Canada's participation in the Contact Group.
- 168- The Task Force is an inter-denominational group concerned with Canada's involvement in Namibia and South Africa. Produced the report, "Investment in Oppression", Toronto, 1979.
- 169- Canadians Concerned about Southern Africa, op. cit.
- 170- Anglin, D.G., "Canada and Africa: The Trudeau Years", Africa Contemporary Record, 1983-1984, p.178.
- 171- Canada, House of Commons Debates, Vol. IV, 8 March 1977, c.3743.
- 172- This was made under Standing Order No. 43 of the Canadian Parliament. It requires a unanimous vote; this was not forthcoming.
- 173- Canada, House of Commons Debates, Vol. IV, 7 April 1978., c.4235.
- 174- Matthews, R. and C. Pratt, "Canadian Policy Towards Southern Africa", in Anglin et. al., op. cit., p. 175.
- 175- Interview with Cyrus Vance, op. cit.
- 176- Interview Andrew Young, op. cit.
- 177- Dr. Owen's speech to the Young Fabians, op. cit.
- 178- Hansard, Vol. 931, 4 May 1977, c.428.
- 179- Dr. Owen also supported an initiative to get the EEC to consider possibilities of preventing South Africa from raising new loans on the European market, and to encourage a collective European approach in its relations with South Africa.
Legum, C., "Britain's Year in Africa", Africa Contemporary Record, 1977-1978, p.A85.
- 180- Hill, in Barber, op. cit., p.98.
- 181- Genscher has especially encouraged the EPC framework

with a view to increasing the role of the FRG on the international stage.

Rummel and Wessels, op. cit., pp. 34-56.

182- Tennyson, op. cit., p.187.

after more than a year of intensive negotiations, which
through bilateral contact involving the South African
government, the governments of the Front Line States,
Nigeria and OAU, agreement was reached which shortly
afterwards involved the implementation of the
agreement. The negotiations finally broke down over
issues relating to an overlapping conflict. To facilitate
the analysis which follows in Chapter 3, the following
review of the negotiations will be divided into two
parts. The first covers the period from April 1975 to
January 1981 and the conclusion of the Geneva pre-
liminary agreement. The second part covers the
period following this agreement to the suspension of the
negotiations in 1983. In order to provide a background of
the way in which the army functioned, the first section
of the chapter will describe the structure and functioning
of the group.

The Structure and Disposition of the FRG

After the first consultations initiated by General Young at
the UN, the five governments decided that there would be a
group meet at the UN level involving all officials and
representatives from the UN members. This would involve
the thinking group. It was agreed that members of the

CHAPTER 7- THE MEDIATION PROCESS

The Contact Group initiative started in April 1977, and after more than a year of intensive negotiations, mainly through bilateral contact involving the South African government, the governments of the Front-Line States, Nigeria and SWAPO, agreement was reached which shortly afterwards foundered on disagreements regarding implementation. The negotiations finally broke down over issues relating to an overlapping conflict. To facilitate the analysis which follows in Chapter 8, the following review of the negotiations will be divided into two parts(1). The first covers the period from April 1977 to January 1981 and the breakdown of the Geneva pre-implementation conference. The second part covers the period following this breakdown to the suspension of the negotiations in 1985. In order to provide an indication of the way in which the Group functioned, the first section of the chapter will describe the structure and functioning of the Group.

7.1- Structure and Functioning of the WCG

After the first consultations initiated by Andrew Young at the UN, the five governments decided that there would be a group based at the UN and consisting of officials and representatives from the UN missions. This became known as the "working group"(2). It was agreed that members of the

working group would communicate summaries of decisions made at each meeting to the foreign ministries back home. Minutes of meetings were not taken and the summaries of the meetings sent back are, according to Ambassador McHenry, classified(3). This means that any picture of the debates between the participants had to be gained through interviews with the actual participants, where possible. As will be seen in the account of the negotiations given below, some accounts differed according to the individual interviewed. Where this arises, both accounts are included.

The intensity of the functioning of the Group is illustrated by the fact that the UN working group met every day in "conference" rooms at the UN in New York (according to Sir James Murray, the former United Kingdom Ambassador to the UN, this was Ambassador McHenry's idea)(4). The members of the working group rarely received written instructions from their foreign ministries except on major changes or policy decisions. The most active members of the group were Ambassador McHenry for the United States and Sir James Murray for the United Kingdom, although Paul Le Pointe for Canada was also active(5).

Once the group was established, all decisions were carried out on a consensus basis, and all formulations of proposals were executed collectively. According to Ambassador McHenry, all actions would "come out on a piece

of paper" whereby a member of the group would produce a draft, which would be collectively examined prior to any final decision. The individual drafting of initial proposals would be rotated. However, language often dictated that the United States, United Kingdom and Canadian representatives were most involved in this process(6).

When the Group met with the parties (for example, the South African government), the initial draft would be revised prior to presentation in order to ensure that the Group had its "talking points" ready(7). The actual presentation was rotated among the Group members(8). The Group did not have a chairperson or leader, but it did come to have a "spokesman". This was an ad hoc decision due to the requirements of a media challenge(9). As the negotiations evolved, however, the United States, and McHenry in particular, came to occupy the central role. Apart from McHenry's own intensive involvement (he attended every meeting until he was appointed ambassador)(10) this was due to the fact that the Group was based in the United States(11). Moreover, the Bureau of International Organisation Affairs in the State Department was closely involved in the drafting of proposals during the first part of the negotiations. This is to be contrasted with with the functioning of the Group during the Reagan Administration, when the Namibia issue was moved back to the Bureau of African Affairs(12).

Missions to southern Africa included the New York working group as well as an official from each of the five's foreign ministries. McHenry points out in relation to this practice, "You were able to speak with the voice of your government." (13) Asked whether conflict arose between the New York Contact Group and the officials assigned to these missions, McHenry pointed out that at times this occurred but mainly due to the fact that the working group had more knowledge and experience of the negotiations. On such missions, the Group was joined by the five's ambassadors.

The structure of the Group, therefore, consisted of the New York representatives and officials from the UN missions- this level comprised the "working group", who met daily and formulated proposals. They also communicated with their foreign ministries. Parallel Contact Groups of the five's ambassadors existed in South Africa, the Front-Line States and Nigeria. According to McHenry, "the only place where the Contact Group concept did not work was in our own capitals..we did not feel it was necessary" (14). The Foreign Secretaries of the five governments only became involved on crucial occasions during the negotiations, as a pressure tactic against the South African government (15).

The above description suggests that the Contact Group was functioning at several levels, although it was

centralised at the UN. According to McHenry, this was not a cumbersome process (a disadvantage associated with team mediation) since all levels at the end of the day knew of decisions arrived at in the meetings of the working group(16). Moreover, prior to the onset of negotiations in southern Africa, any proposals were advanced to the ambassadors in order to ensure coordination of activity and positions in the negotiations(17). Another problem associated with team mediation mentioned in Chapter 3, was that of communication. This, however, did not prove to be a problem in the functioning of the WCG. McHenry revealed that "There was not a single time when the Ambassador in Pretoria did not know as much as I did- he was not in the 4 hour meeting in New York, but that was not important"(18).

Apart from the missions to southern Africa, where the parties consulted included the South African government, the governments of the FLS, and SWAPO, the Group also developed the idea of "proximity talks". The procedure involved inviting the parties to one city to enable them to meet separately with the WCG. These meetings did not, therefore, involve face-to-face communication between the parties. The prime objective was to quicken the pace of the negotiations. "You cannot carry out negotiations indefinitely by flying around, you get a much faster turnaround"(19). Figure 7.1 is a presentation of the structure of the Contact Group:

Foreign Secretaries




Figure 7.1- Structure of the Western Contact Group

7.2- The Negotiations

As indicated earlier, the outline of the negotiations will be divided into two phases. The first started in April 1977 and led to the acceptance of Security Council Resolution 435, which was based on the WCG proposals for Namibian independence. Negotiations towards the implementation of the Western proposals involved the WCG acting in parallel with the UN Secretary General and his staff. This period culminated in the Geneva pre-implementation meeting of January 1981. The second phase describes the process from this point to the suspension of the talks in mid 1985. This phase saw a renewed attempt at negotiations, which increasingly came to concern an overlapping conflict, namely the situation in Angola.

7.2.1- Phase One: Towards a Settlement Plan for Namibia- and Breakdown

The issues around which the negotiations centred during this phase of the negotiations were the abandonment by the South African government of the Turnhalle process and agreement on UN supervised elections. Once the South African government agreed to forego Turnhalle and take part in the negotiations, these came to involve detailed issues concerning the transition period including the nature of the interim authority prior to the election process, the details of the UN presence and South African

withdrawal, and the location and monitoring of South African and SWAPO bases. Another issue which became dominant during this phase was that of the status of Walvis Bay, Namibia's only deep-water port.

The WCG carried out its mediation functions in separate sessions with the parties and no face-to-face contact occurred until the pre-implementation meeting of January 1981. Parties included in the negotiations were the South African government, SWAPO, the governments of the FLS and Nigeria, and (on occasion) the Namibian internal parties. The UN Secretary General and his staff became involved as intermediaries functioning in parallel with the WCG from July 1978, after the acceptance of the WCG proposals for Namibian independence by the Security Council.

Although the tactics adopted by the WCG and the analysis of its tactical decisions will follow in Chapter 8, it is relevant to point to the features of the interaction process which will be highlighted in this discussion. The first is the multilateral aspect of the process. It was not a simple bilateral negotiation process; the WCG interacted with a number of parties, including the focal parties in the conflict, as well as non-focal parties, including allies and interested others. The second major feature of the process was that both parties followed dual track strategies in taking part in the negotiations while pursuing original conflict

strategies. The main implication in the negotiations was that the parties sought concessions from the Contact Group and made it the focus of their bargaining behaviour. This was the primary feature of the WCG's involvement in the negotiations and underlines the assumption made in the analytic framework, that an interested third party comes to form part of the negotiation system.

The objective of the WCG was, on intervention, to persuade the South African government to abandon its plans for the implementation of the Turnhalle proposals and move towards an internationally acceptable process for Namibian independence based on Resolution 385. This was communicated to the South African Prime Minister, John Vorster, when the ambassadors of the five presented an aide-memoire expressing the group's "belief in the necessity for a Namibian settlement in keeping with resolution 385 and thereby acceptable to the international community" (20). The message stated that the activities of the Turnhalle conference did not meet with internationally accepted conditions and informed the South African government that "in the absence of an early South African agreement..the five would be obligated to consider very seriously the measures to be taken." (21) Resolution 385 called on the South African government to:

- Comply with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
- Release all Namibian political prisoners.
- Abolish all apartheid laws.

- Allow the return of exiles.

The Resolution also called for free elections to be held under UN "supervision and control" and that there should be adequate time to be determined by the Security Council, "for the purpose of enabling the UN to establish the necessary machinery within Namibia to supervise and control such elections" (22). The resolution also called for the the complete withdrawal of South African troops to be replaced by a transitional UN presence.

The South African government's response was that it was "prepared to sit down at conference table with other interested parties to discuss the future of SWA" (23), but that it would not abandon Turnhalle. After this initial response from the South African government, it was decided by the five to "form a contact group and to embark upon more detailed discussions with South Africa on the possibilities of moving towards the stated objectives" (24). The first such talks between the South African government and the WCG took place between April 27-29, 1977, when senior officials from the five and representatives from the New York missions (25) went to South Africa to discuss "most of the issues associated with the Namibia question and of the elements embodied in Resolution 385" (26). At the conclusion of these talks (27), the South African government agreed to forego Turnhalle, and instead to establish a central administrative authority and to hold elections under UN supervision for a

constituent assembly whose task would be to draw up a constitution for an independent Namibia(28). Its position on the nature of the "central administrative authority" differed, however, from that of the WCG. It proposed that this should consist of 17 members, eleven to be drawn from the ethnic groups represented in Turnhalle, the remaining ones to be chosen from unspecified groups. The outcome of the talks was communicated to SWAPO by the United Kingdom Ambassador to the UN, Ambassador Murray. According to an aide-memoire of this meeting, "the five powers emphasised that these proposals were not acceptable to them, and that they were incompatible with UN principles"(29). This position was reiterated by Vice President Walter Mondale in his May meeting with Prime Minister Vorster in Vienna, warning of "strong action" if the South African government did not comply with the international negotiations(30).

The nature of the central administrative authority was the main issue in talks held in Cape Town between 8-10 June 1977 involving the WCG and the South African government. At the end of these talks, the South African government agreed to [1] the appointment of an "Administrator General"(31) who would be closely advised by a UN Special Representative until the holding of UN-supervised elections and [2] a gradual South African troop withdrawal(32). The South African position had, therefore, shifted from a commitment to the Turnhalle process to acceptance of a UN presence during the transition period.

It, however, reiterated its position on Walvis Bay(33).

When the WCG communicated the results of the June talks to SWAPO and the FLS, SWAPO did not agree to the gradual South African withdrawal, insisting on full withdrawal, and that the UN Special Representative should have superior authority to the Administrator General(34). The FLS persuaded SWAPO's Sam Nujoma to meet with the WCG in New York on the 8th of August in order to discuss the differences on these issues. Prior to SWAPO's scheduled meeting with the WCG, President Nyerere of Tanzania while meeting with President Carter on the 5th of August, was presented with the WCG proposals to be put to SWAPO(35).

On the issue of the relationship between the Special Representative and the Administrator General, the WCG suggested that the Special Representative would not have the powers of approval or disapproval over actions of the Administrator General, but that he would have to be "satisfied" with all the arrangements for the election(36). McHenry, in presenting these proposals to President Nyerere, stated that, as far as the WCG was concerned, this gave the Special Representative the right to reject anything he considered to be partial or unfair. President Nyerere's response was that the UN role should be enhanced and that it should provide a "substantial" peacekeeping force. He agreed to a small South African military presence during the transition, but insisted that

SWAPO should eventually take over from the UN and not from South Africa(37). This is an example of the WCG using a leader from the FLS as an influence route towards SWAPO, a tactic which will be further discussed in the next Chapter.

When SWAPO met with the WCG in August, it agreed to the appointment of an Administrator General, but refused to accept a residual South African military presence during the transition and insisted that the Special Representative's authority should be superior to that of the Administrator General. Sam Nujoma stated, however, that the WCG's proposals would be accepted "in principle" on condition that the UN provide a large peacekeeping force and a detailed plan for South African withdrawal(38). This indicates that SWAPO's position had shifted as a result of pressure from President Nyerere.

Prior to reaching agreement on the date of the appointment of an Administrator General with the WCG(39), the South African government named Judge Marthinus Steyn as Administrator General with effect from 31 August 1977(40). Prime Minister Vorster also stated that Walvis Bay and the 12 Penguin Islands were outside the terms of the WCG proposals(41). When the WCG met with the South African government between 22-26 September(42) the latter's position on South African withdrawal was that South African troops should be reduced to 4,000 by independence day. Mr. Vorster rejected the proposal for a

UN peacekeeping force, suggesting instead, UN observers to monitor the elections(43).

As a result of the September talks, the South African government issued, on 30th September 1977, Proclamation 264, under the terms of which white Namibians lost direct representation in the South African Parliament(44). As a result, the National Party of South West Africa decided to break its links with the National Party of South Africa. This led to a split within the NPSWA itself when, at its annual congress, Dirk Mudge challenged A.H. du Plessis for the leadership. After being defeated, Mudge led 75 delegates in a walk-out and later (21 October 1977) formed the Republic Party(45). In November 1977, this entered an alliance with 10 Turnhalle delegations to form the Turnhalle Democratic Alliance (DTA)(46).

At the end of October, the WCG offered the parties compromise proposals on the two remaining issues, South African troop withdrawal and the UN presence during the transition. The South African position was that there should be 4,000 South African troops remaining and the UN presence should consist of observers to monitor the elections. SWAPO's position demanded total South African withdrawal prior to the start of the election campaign. The WCG proposals suggested a remaining South African force of 1,500, to be confined to a single base monitored by the UN until independence. The UN military presence

would consist of some 2,000 men. It was suggested that the issue of Walvis Bay be deferred to negotiations after independence(47).

Both parties rejected the proposals; the South African government objected to the size of the UN military presence and SWAPO to the residual South African presence(48). In order to hasten the negotiations, the parties were invited to "proximity talks"(49) for February 1978, where it was decided that the WCG Foreign Ministers would act as intermediaries(50).

The proximity talks illustrated the multilateral aspect of the negotiations. At the ministerial level meetings, the South African government was represented by R.F. Botha, the Foreign Minister, and SWAPO by its President, Sam Nujoma. Ministerial level meetings also took place with the UN Secretary General and the Foreign Ministers of the Front-Line States and their ambassadors at the UN. Officials of the WCG also met with the Namibian internal parties(51).

At the proximity talks, Sam Nujoma withdrew the demand that the UN Special Representative should have superior authority to the Administrator General and agreed to the residual presence of 1,500 South African troops during the transition. He insisted, however, that SWAPO be confined to bases under UN supervision inside Namibia (an issue which proved contentious later); and that the

residual South African force be confined to a single base in Karasburg, in the south of Namibia. He also called for a UN peacekeeping force of 5,000(52). The talks broke down after the sudden withdrawal of Pik Botha, following a warning from Hans Dietrich Genscher that sanctions would be unavoidable if Pretoria was not more forthcoming(53).

According to Cyrus Vance, after the failure of the proximity talks the WCG agreed that there should be no further delay in the settlement process. They presented the South African government with a new set of proposals in March 1978 with the warning that in case of non-acceptance, the WCG members would not veto sanctions resolutions at the Security Council(54). The aim was to present the proposals to the Security Council on 10th April(55). The WCG may have wished to accelerate the rate of the negotiations in order to demonstrate progress at the Ninth General Assembly Special Session on Namibia which was due to take place on the 24th of April. In this new set of proposals, the WCG "had made a major effort to meet South African concerns"(56).

Before gaining acceptance from either party, the Contact Group distributed their new proposals at the UN as Security Council Document S/12636 of 10th April 1978(57). In keeping with the Group's initial aim of gaining a Security Council Resolution based on their proposals, the document called for a Security Council resolution "requesting the Secretary General to appoint a United

Nations Special Representative whose central task will be to make sure that conditions are established which will allow free and fair elections.." (58) The election would result in the formation of a constituent assembly which would draw up a constitution for an independent Namibia. This was to be achieved by 31 December 1978. The proposal will be analysed in detail in the next Chapter, but the main elements were that it [1] called for the establishment of a UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) to be composed of civilian and military units, the establishment of which was made the responsibility of the UN Secretary General; [2] set out in detail, the duties of the Special Representative; [3] outlined the conditions for free and fair elections; and [4] the implementation of a ceasefire. The proposals did not mention Walvis Bay, but in a covering note, the Group proposed that this issue should be the subject of negotiation between the South African government and the government of an independent Namibia (59).

On the 25th of April, while the General Assembly Special Session was still in progress, Prime Minister Vorster accepted the Western proposals, despite reports of opposition within the South African Cabinet (60). Vorster stated that he had found it possible to agree to the Western proposals after assurances from the WCG [1] that there would be no withdrawal of South African troops until the cessation of all hostilities; [2] on Walvis Bay; and

[3] the right of the Administrator General to remain at the head of the civilian administration during the transition period(61). The intra-party divisions within the South African government became significant later in the negotiations.

SWAPO's position was expressed by its President, Sam Nujoma, at the Special Session. He stated that by presenting their proposals to the Session, the five were aiming to give the false impression that a settlement was at hand. This was "despite an agreement between them and SWAPO that this should not be done until there was an agreement regarding the areas of disagreement" (62). These included the status of Walvis Bay and the location of the remaining South African forces. The Western proposals had indicated that the latter would be stationed at Oshivello and Grootfontein, while SWAPO desired them to be stationed at Karasburg(63).

The WCG, therefore, faced the task of persuading SWAPO to accept their proposals. As previously stated, SWAPO's allies were used to gain such acceptance. McHenry and Vance met with Sam Nujoma and the Nigerian Foreign Minister, Joseph Garba, in New York on the 27th of April. Nujoma argued that the WCG had conceded to South Africa on the superior position of the Administrator General and asserted that, in return for SWAPO's acceptance of the residual South African presence, these should be stationed

in the south of the territory. He also insisted that the WCG accept SWAPO's position on Walvis Bay, which should be included in the proposals(64). SWAPO was, therefore, accusing the WCG of siding with the South African government(65) and calling for concessions from the WCG on the issue of Walvis Bay and the location of the residual South African military presence(66). The talks were broken off "indefinitely" by SWAPO after the South African raid on Kassinga on 4th May(67).

The raid, which was condemned by the Security Council, placed in doubt South African motives in the negotiations. As stated by Vance, "The larger question on my mind was whether South Africa was sincere about trying to negotiate an acceptable settlement. Given the size of the attack and the prior intelligence work and military planning required, it seemed that Pretoria must have been preparing the raid even as Vorster was agreeing to our clarified proposal"(68).

The FLS again acted as intermediaries between SWAPO and the WCG. On the issue of Walvis Bay, President Nyerere proposed a compromise whereby a Security Council resolution supporting SWAPO's claim that Walvis Bay was an integral part of Namibia would be put forward although it would not endorse SWAPO's definition of the legal status of the port. Nyerere urged the WCG to persuade the South African government about the location of its troops and then persuaded SWAPO to meet once again with the WCG to

resolve the two outstanding issues. The South African government warned the WCG that if it changed its position on Walvis Bay, the South African government would withdraw from the negotiations(69).

The importance placed by the WCG on the role of the FLS is illustrated by McHenry meeting with the Angola's President Neto in Luanda prior to the scheduled WCG-SWAPO meeting(70). Moreover, apart from using the FLS, the WCG also bargained with SWAPO. The WCG offered to support a Security Council resolution on Walvis Bay. On the issue of South African bases, the Group informed SWAPO that negotiations on this would not be reopened, but that the Secretary General would be asked to augment the strength of the UN peacekeeping force(71). SWAPO stated that they accepted these proposals after assurances from the WCG on the status of Walvis Bay(72). However, they could have accepted the proposals, after pressure from the FLS(73). As will be indicated in the next Chapter, SWAPO's delay in accepting the proposals may have been due to intra-party divisions.

The WCG submitted their proposals to the Security Council and they were incorporated in Resolution 431 on 27 July 1978. This Resolution took note of the WCG proposals and requested the Secretary General to appoint a Special Representative for Namibia and to submit a report with recommendations for the implementation of the proposals.

At the same meeting, Resolution 432 was adopted which proclaimed Walvis Bay to be an integral part of Namibia. The WCG vote for the latter was condemned by the South African government(74).

From this point in the negotiations the WCG operated in parallel with the UN Secretary General and his staff. On 30th August, the Secretary General submitted his report to the Security Council(75), based on a visit by Matti Ahtisaari, the Special Representative, to southern Africa. The South African government rejected the Waldheim proposal on the ground that the size of UNTAG, [7,500 men] was unacceptable. It insisted on 31 December 1978 as election date and stated that it had not been consulted on the precise numbers of the UN force(76).

It became evident at this stage of the negotiations, that the South African government's preference was for an internal settlement. On announcing his resignation, Mr. Vorster stated that the South African government would hold elections in Namibia for a constituent assembly scheduled for December. The reaction of the Security Council was the endorsement of the Secretary General's report in Resolution 435 on 29th September 1978(77). This became the basis for an internationally acceptable process for Namibian independence and remains so today. The Resolution called on the Secretary General to report back on the implementation on the 23rd of October 1978(78).

As indicated earlier, the WCG and the UN Secretariat came to function in parallel to achieve implementation of Resolution 435. While the WCG's aim was to gain South African agreement to return to the negotiating table, the function of the UN Secretariat was to negotiate the details of the UN presence during the transition period in terms of the numbers and location of the military contingent, as well as the numbers, location, and monitoring of SWAPO and South African bases.

On assuming power, the incoming South African Prime Minister, P.W. Botha, confirmed that elections would be held in Namibia on the 4th of December 1978. The DTA and Aktur(79) agreed to take part in the elections, while SWAPO and the NNF(80) refused to do so(81). At this point, the aim of the WCG was similar to their original aim on intervention; to persuade the South African government to abandon the internal settlement and to pursue an international settlement.

Given that the WCG had continuously threatened the South African government with sanctions, the dilemma faced at this stage was whether these should be implemented. As pointed out by Vance, "We were now faced with the decision we had hoped to avoid. Should the United States support mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa and call upon our Western partners to fulfill the declaration we made jointly in Cape Town in April 1977?"(82). The Contact Group Foreign Ministers agreed to meet the new

South African Prime Minister in October. They also decided that their staff should "work on..plans for those talks" and what should be done "...in the event of failure" (83). The aim was to draw up a list of sanctions, their costs and effectiveness (84). No action would be taken on these, however, until the outcome of the scheduled Pretoria talks was known (85).

The WCG Foreign Ministers (the French sent their Deputy) met in Pretoria on the 16th of October, after a visit to Windhoek by Dr. Owen, Don Jamieson, and Hans Dietrich Genscher (86). The objective was to persuade the South African Prime Minister and Foreign Minister not to proceed with the December elections and to continue negotiations on the implementation of Resolution 435 (87). The three-day secret meetings excluded the five's ambassadors and their officials from the UN (88). The discussions ended with Dr Owen stating that there would be no question of either the WCG or the UN negotiating with whichever party won the December election and that any election outside the UN framework would be considered "null and void" (89). Despite this, however, a last minute meeting between R.F. Botha and Cyrus Vance produced agreement for continued talks between the UN Special Representative Martti Ahtisaari and the new representatives. A joint communique was issued which stated that the elections would go ahead but that talks would continue between the newly elected leaders, the

Administrator General and the UN Special Representative(90). P.W. Botha stated that the decision to proceed with the elections would counterbalance UN attitudes towards SWAPO and would show that there were other alternative leaders in Namibia(91), an issue which became dominant later. In response to a South African statement stating that SWAPO could hold off the UN elections indefinitely by not abiding by a ceasefire, the WCG issued a statement which committed the Group to the provision of a small observer force in Windhoek "to ensure the implementation of the proposals leading to elections on the agreed date"(92). This indicated that the WCG was willing to commit resources towards the implementation of 435(93).

SWAPO rejected the joint WCG-South African statement. It called for the imposition of sanctions against South Africa(94), and on 31st October, this demand was backed by key African countries(95). According to Vance, Young and McHenry attempted to persuade African states to postpone presenting a "harshly worded resolution"(96). On the 13th of November, however, a resolution calling for sanctions in the absence of implementation of 435 was put to the vote in the Security Council and adopted in Security Council Resolution 439, with the WCG members abstaining. The position of the WCG was that their proposals were "still alive"(97). In an attempt to "demonstrate the administration's seriousness"(98) President Carter signed

the Evans Amendment on the 10th of November restricting the Export-Import financing of trade with South Africa. According to Vance, however, the abstentions in the Security Council had already damaged Western credibility with the FLS(99).

Another attempt at persuading the South African government to comply with Resolution 435 was made when President Carter and Cyrus Vance met with Pik Botha between 27-29 November in Washington. Carter warned that failure to implement the UN plan would lead to sanctions and offered to receive P.W. Botha if South Africa indicated its willingness to comply. Carter had also underlined the growing risks of Soviet involvement in the absence of agreement(100). According to Vance, the warnings worked because Pik Botha informed the Secretary General on the 29th of November that the South African government would "recommend strongly" to the victors of the December elections that the latter should accept Resolution 435 and agree to new elections seven months after the introduction of UNTAG(101). Botha also declared that South Africa would retain full authority in Namibia, meaning that the constituent assembly would not, as yet, form an interim government(102). The combination of WCG tactics at this stage seemed to emphasise persuasion, conditional reward of improved United States-South African relations, and (again) implied threat. While the WCG tactics through October and November 1978 will be analysed

in the next chapter, it is sufficient to point out at this stage that there was a shift in emphasis from the use of threats to the less costly tactics of persuasion and conditional reward.

After an address to the newly elected constituent assembly(103) by the South African Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, a number of conditions were put forward for continued negotiations with the UN Special Representative. These were that there should be further consultation on the size and composition of UNTAG; that SWAPO bases in neighbouring countries should be monitored; that maintenance of law and order should be the responsibility of the existing police force; and that the Administrator General would exercise legislative and administrative authority during the transition period(104).

The UN Special Representative visited Namibia and South Africa between 12-13 January 1979, according to Ambassador Scott, "After considerable hesitation..based on doubts whether the South Africans were genuinely committed to a solution.." (105). The Secretary General produced a report in February 1979 based on consultations carried out by the Special Representative for Namibia, Mr. Martti Ahtisaari(106). The South African government rejected the new proposals, objecting specifically to two paragraphs (11 and 12), which stated respectively that SWAPO armed

forces in Namibia at the time of the ceasefire would be "restricted to base at designated locations inside Namibia" (107) and that SWAPO bases in neighbouring countries would not be monitored by UNTAG (108). The South African government insisted that SWAPO be confined to bases outside Namibia and that these be monitored by UNTAG (109). P.W. Botha accused the WCG of "scheming behind the scenes" in supporting the establishment of SWAPO bases inside Namibia, bases which it did not achieve through war (110).

The question, therefore, remains of what the WCG had originally meant by referring to troops of SWAPO and South Africa being "confined to base" (111). The evidence gathered by the present researcher indicates conflicting viewpoints among the dominant members of the WCG, both on the assumptions which had underlined the original draft and in terms of their reading of the South African government's motives at this stage of the negotiations. Since these are related to the functioning of the Group and the tactics it adopted, they will be discussed in the next Chapter. At this stage, it is sufficient to point out, however, that the British negotiators did not assume that SWAPO had bases inside Namibia, while those representing the United States, including McHenry assumed that SWAPO had a presence, or "temporary bases" inside the territory (112).

The problems which arose at this stage of the

negotiations were indicative of the difficulties which may arise, firstly, when there are a number of decision-makers involved, and secondly when the implementation of proposals originally drafted by one third party, (in this case the WCG) are transferred for implementation to another (the UN Secretariat). All those interviewed agreed that this had been a mistake and that it had been done because the UN had to be involved in accordance with Resolution 385(113). The problems which arose are indicative of this. For example, the South African government would refer to documents drafted by General Philipp, (Commander of UNTAG) and General Geldenhuys, as evidence of agreement on implementation, while the Secretary General would point out that the said document had been discussed on the return of his representatives but that it had been rejected(114).

The Contact Group Foreign Ministers attempted to halt the near breakdown of the negotiations by holding proximity talks in New York on 19-20 March 1979. The objective was to persuade the South African government that the Waldheim proposals did not differ from the original WCG proposals which the South African government had accepted(115). The South African government's preference for the internal settlement became evident, however, when Pik Botha ended the talks stating that any further negotiations should be held with the "representative political leaders" of Namibia(116). The

escalation of the war at this stage of the negotiations and the conversion of the Constituent Assembly into a National Assembly must have contributed to WCG doubts on South African intentions(117). The stalemate also contributed to doubts being expressed at the UN about the role of the WCG(118).

At this stage of the negotiations, the new Conservative Government in the United Kingdom took over the key role of communicating with the South African government. The South African government agreed to return to the negotiating table after a meeting had taken place between the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington and Pik Botha in June 1979, and the visit to Pretoria of the Minister of State, Richard Luce(119). In August, a new proposal aimed at countering South African demands for UN monitoring of SWAPO bases in Angola and Zambia was presented to the South African government by the former British Ambassador to the UN, Sir James Murray, acting as Special Envoy for the WCG(120). The new proposal, which had arisen during a meeting between Ambassador McHenry and President Neto(121), suggested the creation of a demilitarised zone (DMZ) to cover 30 miles on either side of the Namibia-Angola border. SWAPO guerrillas who did not return to Namibia would be confined to bases supervised by Angolan authorities; there would be a UN presence inside the DMZ but they would not be involved in monitoring SWAPO bases(122).

The South African government's rejection of the proposals led to the convening in Geneva of "high level simultaneous consultations on Namibia" called by the UN Secretary General for 17-18 November 1979, and chaired by the Under-Secretary General, Brian Urquhart(123). The South African government sought agreement on the numbers of South African bases inside the DMZ and for the monitoring of SWAPO bases in the FLS(124). Representatives of the FLS informed Urquhart that they would influence SWAPO to accept the DMZ proposals if South Africa was forthcoming(125).

A major change in the conflict characteristics occurred with Robert Mugabe's victory in Zimbabwe in March 1980, acquiring for SWAPO a major new ally in the region. This had a significant impact on South Africa's negotiating behaviour, further discussed in Chapter 8. The South African government responded to UN proposals with additional conditions, often about issues previously agreed (126), or the introduction of new issues to the negotiations.

At the time of Mugabe's victory in Zimbabwe, a UN delegation was in South Africa for discussions of the DMZ proposals. The South African government requested 20 locations for the SADF inside the DMZ and further clarifications from the governments of Angola and Zambia regarding the monitoring of SWAPO bases. Under Secretary

General, Brian Urquhart, urged the South African government to reconsider the number of locations requested(127).

The main issue which arose at this stage, however, was that of UN impartiality. R.F. Botha called for a termination of all UN funding for SWAPO, derecognition of SWAPO as sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people, and equal treatment for internal parties. He also insisted on 20 SADF bases inside the DMZ and consultations with Jonas Savimbi of UNITA regarding the DMZ in Angola(128). In the meantime, the internal settlement was further enhanced through the creation of the Council of Ministers(129) and the conflict saw a major escalation when the SADF launched "Operation Smokeshell" into Angola in June 1980, an operation which lasted three weeks(130).

In June 1980, SWAPO conceded to South African demands for 20 SADF bases inside the DMZ. This concession was communicated to the South African government by the Secretary General(131). Given these concessions on the DMZ proposals, the issue which became dominant at this stage was that of UN impartiality(132). This issue was, therefore, the main focus of discussions in Pretoria led by Brian Urquhart between 20-25 October 1980. Urquhart pointed out that the issue of impartiality was "an impossible concept to discuss", and therefore to negotiate over(133). The South African government called for a face-

to-face meeting between SWAPO and the internal parties. Urquhart expressed the view that this proposal could be "sold" to the FLS and SWAPO only on condition that the internal parties were part of a South African delegation and an agreement on a "time-frame" for the implementation of Resolution 435 for March 1981(134).

The idea for a face-to-face meeting had already been discussed between the Angolan and South African governments in September 1980, prior to the UN mission to South Africa. The WCG and Brian Urquhart had reservations regarding this proposition(135). The WCG informed the Angolan government that if such a meeting went ahead, it should be held under UN auspices. Thus, on the insistence of the WCG, the FLS and the Secretary General, the face-to-face meeting took place in Geneva as the "pre-implementation meeting" between 7-15 January 1981.

The context for the meeting was Ronald Reagan's election victory in the United States. The UN conference, which was convened by Brian Urquhart, broke down on the 15th when Dirk Mudge and Dannie Hough, the new Administrator General, stated that the timing for Namibian independence was not "opportune" pointing to UN bias for SWAPO as the reason(136).

There are indications, however, which point to the fact that the South African government was unwilling to accept an international settlement and that impartiality

was used as a delaying tactic. These indications were revealed by Brian Urquhart, who chaired the meeting, and Donald McHenry, who was present. The main indication was that Urquhart made a proposal on UN impartiality which would have removed this as an issue. He suggested that a "declaration of intent" be signed by the South African government and SWAPO for a ceasefire which would be confirmed by 10th of February. In return for this, the General Assembly would make a statement that SWAPO was simply one of the contending parties in the proposed elections. The leaders of the FLS had already indicated to Urquhart that they would ensure the passage of such a proposal through the General Assembly. According to Urquhart, "this gave the South Africans everything they wanted". However, Brand Fourie, the South African Director General for Foreign Affairs pleaded with Urquhart that he not present him with the proposal(137). According to Ambassador McHenry, there were indications that the South African government used the conference as a propaganda exercise(138).

As seen from the above account of the negotiations up to the breakdown of the Geneva conference, the main features of the mediation process were that the WCG was functioning within a negotiation system where both the South African government and SWAPO were pursuing a dual-track strategy and where non-focal parties played a major role rendering the process a multilateral negotiation

process. It has also shown that the WCG functioned as a group in the formulation of proposals and in communication with the parties. This phase also saw the WCG functioning in parallel with the UN Secretariat which became primarily responsible for the implementation of proposals originally drafted by the WCG. The tactics used in this phase will be discussed and analysed in the next Chapter. The next phase of the negotiations saw major changes in the functioning of the Group as such and in the substantive content of the negotiations.

7.2.2- Phase Two- From Resolution 435 to "Linkage"

The Reagan victory in the United States elections was a contributing factor in the breakdown of the Geneva conference, although not the only factor. The Geneva conference was merely a culmination of a process that had begun in October 1978, when the South African government's preferred choice seemed to be for the internal settlement. This was further entrenched with Robert Mugabe's victory in Zimbabwe in October 1980. The Reagan Administration's new approach to southern Africa came to dominate the negotiations over Namibian independence during this second phase of the negotiations.

A sympathetic administration in Washington with its already declared intentions of improving United States-South African relations meant that this pressure point no-

longer played a part in the South African government's calculations vis-a-vis continued participation in the negotiations and acceptance of an international settlement for Namibia. This phase, therefore, saw continued implementation of the internal settlement, the "Namibianisation" of the occupation through the creation of the South West Africa Territorial Force(139) and compulsory conscription for all Namibians, and an escalation of the armed conflict against SWAPO and the FLS. South African destabilisation of its neighbours included direct military intervention as in "Operation Protea" launched into Angola in August 1981, "Operation Daisy" in October 1981, and "Operation Super" in March 1982. The last was followed by SWAPO's biggest operation inside Namibia in April 1982(140). South African military destabilisation of its neighbours also included military support for the rebel movements, UNITA, the MNR, and the LLA in Angola, Mozambique, and Lesotho respectively(141). Economic destabilisation also took place, with the main targets being the railways and road communication between Zimbabwe and the nearest port in Mozambique; and the oil pipelines and installations at Beira(142). The WCG continued to function but within an escalating conflict situation.

This phase saw major changes in both the functioning of the WCG as a coalition intermediary and in the substantive content of the negotiations. The change was

primarily due to changes implemented and sought by the Reagan Administration. The focal point for the Group was no longer the UN as it had been previously, since the Namibia negotiations were removed from the Bureau of International Organisation Affairs in the State Department and became the responsibility of the Africa Bureau, where the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr. Chester Crocker, became the prime negotiator(143).

The first substantive change introduced by the new administration was in seeking a constitution prior to UN-supervised elections. The new Administration let its preference for such an arrangement be known at the UN when the United States Ambassador to the UN, Mrs. Jean Kirkpatrick, circulated a document entitled "Proposed Declaration of Intent" which called for "broad guidelines for the constitutional future of the territory"(144). The document suggested that the constitution should contain a Bill of Rights; a Constitutional Court with power to enforce its judgements; the principle of no nationalisation without compensation; an independent judiciary and the maintenance of a multi-party democracy. It also required that the interim constituent assembly be required to make changes to the constitution only through a two-thirds majority. President Reagan confirmed this approach when he stated in March 1981 that elections in Namibia "should follow the adoption of a constitution that guarantees equal rights to all people in that

country" (145). Dr. Crocker declared his preference for this approach on the eve of his first visit to southern Africa on the 8th of April and communicated to the South African government on his visit to Pretoria on 15/16 in April 1981 (146).

The other four members of the group rejected this Zimbabwe style approach to Namibian independence. Dr. Crocker did not seek a conference but a panel which would be responsible for the construction of a constitution. He stated, "We believe a Lancaster type conference won't work. We see a panel of experts, consulting all parties, writing a constitution, and then selling it through the Contact Group." (147) When the WCG met on the 22 of April, however, the other four members of the Group took note of the new United States position. While the Zimbabwe model was dropped, the final WCG communique reiterated the five's commitment to Resolution 435, but added that "possibilities for strengthening the existing plan existed" (148).

The Contact Group was, however, united in its opposition to sanctions. This was evident when four sanctions draft resolutions were vetoed by the United States, United Kingdom, and France, at the Security Council on 22nd April (149). The position taken by the Western Permanent Members was that sanctions would impede negotiations with South Africa on the question of Namibia (150). SWAPO accused the Western states of

colluding with the South African government in its occupation of Namibia(151).

By May 1981, the United States government had abandoned its preference for a Zimbabwe style settlement for Namibia due to opposition from the other four members of the WCG. The Group did, however, accept a compromise formula whereby "safeguards" would be introduced which would protect the rights of losing parties in an election. This was reiterated at the end of the WCG meeting in May 1981(152). The Group had discussed various alternatives defining such safeguards. Dr Crocker's proposals suggested that the election should be run by a panel chaired by the WCG and representatives from the FLS and the UN; that the WCG, the FLS and South Africa should act as guarantors for the actions of the new government regarding its keeping to the constitution. He agreed that a "Lancaster House" type of conference for drawing up a constitution be shelved. The UK government sought binding guidelines before the election; guarantees that Namibia would remain a multi-party state; no expropriation of property; Bill of Rights to be entrenched in the constitution and representation in Parliament for the 110,000 whites in Namibia. It also proposed that the future government give an undertaking not to allow Namibia to be used by "any group hostile to any neighbouring state". The FRG's proposals were that no departure should be made from Resolution 435, but that there was a need for its strengthening(153). This

indicated that the other members of the WCG took account of the new United States position that Resolution 435 was a "dead letter" (154). The statement issued by the WCG at the end of their meeting on the 3rd of May 1981 stated that there was a "need to establish understanding among all parties about the shape of the future independent Namibia.." Accordingly, they had instructed "officials to develop proposals encompassing measures, including constitutional arrangements, with the aim of enhancing a negotiated settlement." (155).

Officials of the Contact Group met on the 12th of May, when the other four members of the Group emphasised that the new approach should emphasise their efforts to "complement" rather than to "change" Resolution 435 (156). The other four were also reluctant to agree to become involved in drawing up a full constitution (157).

SWAPO condemned this departure from Resolution 435, and accused the five of seeking to install a neo-colonial government in Namibia which could serve their political, economic and strategic interests (158).

While the other members of the WCG came to accept the preference of the United States government that constitutional guarantees to be established prior to the holding of elections, they did not accept the linkage of Namibian independence to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The Reagan Administration's preference for

this approach was expressed in a State Department Memorandum dated 7th February 1981(159). This stated that "African leaders would have no basis for resisting the Angola-Namibia linkage once they are made to realise that they can only get a Namibia settlement through us and that we are serious about getting such a settlement"(160). As will be further discussed in Chapter 8, this indicated the use of the intermediary role by an interested third party to promote its own interests. It is sufficient to point out at this stage that this initiated a shift in emphasis from Namibia to an overlapping conflict, that in Angola. This became a major stumbling block in the achievement of a settlement in Namibia and induced division within the Group itself(161).

The other four members of the WCG refused to accept the "linkage" issue as an integral part of the Namibia negotiations, and insisted that this should, instead, be dealt with as a separate foreign policy objective(162). Despite this rejection, however, the issue had already been introduced into the negotiations by Chester Crocker in his talks in Pretoria on 15/16 April 1981, prior to the first full WCG meeting after the Reagan victory, which took place on the 22nd of April(163). This suggests that on two major new issues introduced by the new Administration (a constitution prior to an election and linkage) there was no prior consultation with the other members of the WCG. This lack of consultation contrasts

sharply with the previous functioning of the group, where the five would work jointly on the preparation of proposals which were then jointly presented to the other parties.

The position of the United States government on linkage as stated by Secretary of State Haig on the 29th of May was that "there is an empirical relationship between the ultimate independence of Namibia and the continuing Soviet and Cuban presence in Angola" (164). Earlier in May (14th), the Secretary of State and Dr. Crocker met with a South African delegation led by Pik Botha, where the aim was to discover whether the South African government was prepared to accept an international settlement based on a revised Resolution 435 (165). The aim was also to "make clear to the South Africans that we see United States/South African cooperation in resolving the Namibian problem as the crucial first phase of our new relationship and that we are willing to work with them toward an internationally acceptable settlement which will safeguard their interests and reflect our mutual desire to foreclose Soviet gains in southern Africa." (166) The objective of the talks was also to define the substance of the new "constructive" relationship between the United States and South Africa (167). The talks ended with a call from the United States for the South African government to make a statement indicating a commitment to cooperate on Namibia (168). The WCG was briefed on these talks on 21 May

1981, when the purpose was to formulate constitutional arrangements as a means of strengthening Resolution 435(169).

The Angolan government's response to "linkage" was expressed by Angolan Foreign Minister, Paulo Jorge, at the Security Council. He stated, "When Namibia will be independent, and the aggression from South Africa finished, then we will say to the Cubans: Thank you very much, you can go home now" (170). Jorge also warned that any United States aid to UNITA would endanger United States interests in Angola worth \$200m(171) illustrating the point made earlier, that parties in a negotiation system which includes the involvement of an interested third party also bargain with the third party.

The position of the United States on linkage made it the prime target of attack at the OAU Summit in June 1981, when the Reagan Administration was accused of introducing the linkage issue to the Namibian settlement process(172). As indicated in the analytic framework, parties in conflict may attempt to influence a member of a coalition intermediary via other, more sympathetic members. The Angolan government attempted to influence the United States's position on linkage by going through the other members of the WCG when the Angolan Deputy Foreign Minister, Venancio de Moura, met with French, British, and West German diplomats in Luanda and urged them to persuade

the United States to honour its agreement on Resolution 435 and to refrain from interfering in Angola's international affairs(173).

Throughout July, the WCG continued in its attempts at formulating proposals concerning constitutional guarantees in order to gain the return of the South African government to the negotiating table. They were, however, anxious to reiterate that they had not departed from Resolution 435. This was evident after the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the WCG at the Economic Summit in Ottawa between 10-21 July 1981. Their communique stated their agreement in seeking to bring about Namibian independence in accordance with Resolution 435 and indicated that the Foreign Ministers had considered measures "which would complement and strengthen the existing UN plan and provide the confidence necessary for all parties to proceed"(174). This suggests that a compromise was reached between the initial United States preference for a constitution before an election and the other members' commitment to Resolution 435.

However, divisions within the WCG were apparent again at the UN, the main forum for open response to South African actions. This was the case in terms of reaction to South African incursions into Angola and policies in Namibia. At a time when the WCG sought resumed negotiations, the SADF launched, on 25th August, "Operation Protea" (which was the largest it had launched

since the 1975 invasion of Angola(175). This brought condemnation at the Security Council which was vetoed by the United States(176), the United States representative blaming the presence of Cuban troops in Angola as the primary cause of violence(177). On August 31, the Security Council voted on a draft resolution which condemned the armed invasion of Angola and the South African use of Namibia as a springboard for attack against Angola(178). This received 13 votes, with the United States casting its veto and the UK abstaining. The French representative, now acting for the new Socialist Government of President Francois Mitterand, strongly condemned South Africa's conduct(179). The FRG and Canada condemned the attack and the UK government conveyed a sharp warning to the South African Ambassador in London(180). The European members of the WCG, acting within the framework of EPC, also condemned continued South African implementation of the internal settlement in Namibia(181). Moreover, in contrast to assumptions underlying the United States policy of "constructive engagement", Lord Carrington attacked South Africa's internal policies where he said "virtually none of the expectations of worthwhile change in recent years have been fulfilled"(182). The WCG was, however, still united in its opposition to sanctions(183).

The increasing pressure at the UN added to the urgency for the resumption of the negotiations(184). The United States Administration had taken responsibility for

persuading the South African government to return to the negotiating table. When the South African Foreign Minister announced in September that his government was prepared to accept Resolution 435 and the accompanying constitutional guarantees as a basis for the restart of the negotiations(185), the WCG Foreign Ministers agreed that a new set of proposals be launched in October to restart the negotiations(186).

The WCG's new initiative was based on a document entitled "Principles Concerning The Constituent Assembly and the Constitution for an Independent Namibia"(187). It set out a number of constitutional guarantees such as the constitution being adopted by a two-thirds majority; "fair representation..to different political groups representing the people of Namibia"; and system of government with three branches- an elected executive branch responsible to the legislative branch, the latter to be elected by "universal and equal suffrage", responsible for the passage of all laws and an independent judicial branch. The proposals suggested a choice for the electoral system of proportional representation, a constituency system, or a "combination of both". As will be seen below, this new proposal led to problems in the ensuing negotiations. The guarantees also provided for a bill of rights(188). The five also presented another document which proposed that Namibia be a non-aligned country and that it should not allow "organised activities within its territory directed

towards the commission of any act of aggression..against any other state"(189). The content of these proposals suggested that they were primarily aimed at gaining South African acceptance(190).

The new proposals were communicated to the Nigerian government first, followed by those of the FLS, as well the South African government and the Namibian internal parties(191). SWAPO, the FLS and Nigeria accepted the proposals in December(192), while the South African government complained of the absence of a specific mention of Cuban troop withdrawal as a precondition to the implementation of Resolution 435. However, it declared its acceptance of the proposals(193). The National Party of South West Africa were, however, opposed to the acceptance of the proposals, especially to the proposed one person one vote elections, under UN supervision, threatening a white exodus if the proposals were accepted(194). This indicated major intra-party opposition which was a vital factor in the negotiation system.

Since the October proposals had left a choice of electoral systems, on the 17th of December, the Contact Group proposed proportional representation whereby each person would have two votes. Half of the constituent assembly seats would be elected by proportional representation and the other half on the basis of single-member constituencies(195). This system was proposed by

the West German government(196). SWAPO and the FLS rejected the system on the basis that it was complicated and favoured pro-South African groupings(197) while the South African government declared its acceptance. The WCG had not expected that this would create opposition(198).

When the WCG officials met again in Bonn between 25-26 January 1982, there was apparent conflict when Dr. Crocker insisted that there was no question of reopening the negotiations on phase one of the proposals, that is the constitutional guarantees and the electoral system(199). The Group did revise its proposal, however, and in April 1982 suggesting a single vote to be counted twice, once under PR and once on a constituency basis(200). SWAPO rejected this stating that the Contact Group had failed to give "justifications for their insistence on the choice of electoral method based on double standards" and that its only motives were "to create special circumstances under which SWAPO could be deprived ..of gaining two-thirds majority..in the Constituent Assembly required to adopt Namibia's independence constitution". SWAPO also criticised the phased approach to the negotiations, stating that "apart from an illusion of momentum, nothing is actually being achieved"(201). The FLS endorsed SWAPO's position when they met in Dar es Salaam on 5th May 1982(202). This rejection by the FLS and SWAPO led to the decision by the WCG to shelve the issue(203).

While the negotiations stalled over the electoral system(204), President Reagan appointed General Vernon A. Walters and Frank Wisner to work with Crocker on Namibia. This appointment was interpreted as a tactic by the White House to exert influence on Dr. Crocker's handling of the negotiations and to ensure that linkage was still an issue in them(205). When WCG officials went to the FLS to gain general agreement on issues relating to phase two, General Walters and Frank Wisner held separate talks in Angola, Tanzania and Zambia on the issue of Cuban troop withdrawal(206). It is evident that the Cuban troop withdrawal issue was being pursued by United States negotiators while the WCG as a whole continued negotiations on the details of the transition period.

The two sets of negotiations became inextricably linked, however, despite efforts by other members of the WCG to separate them. On the 17th of June, speaking at the Oshivello military base in Namibia, Prime Minister Botha stated that he accepted the Western plan for a settlement on condition that Cuban troops leave Angola at the same time as South African troops moved to their bases in Namibia(207).

The issue of Cuban linkage was included for the first time in an official WCG document circulated to all the parties in June 1982, and discussed with the parties in July(208). This stated that the constitutional principles,

with the exception of the electoral system, could now be "considered settled" (209). It stated that the previous proposal for a mixed electoral system "will not be pursued further"; that the upper limit of 7,500 UNTAG force remained intact; that "concurrence is needed on UNTAG monitoring of the restriction of SWAPO personnel to base in Angola and Zambia", and that such monitoring would eliminate the DMZ proposal. The document also dealt with the issue of impartiality by proposing that the Security Council would reaffirm its impartiality (210) and by an agreement between the South African Government, SWAPO, the WCG and FLS that UN activities contrary to Resolution 435 would not continue, while speakers at the Security Council and General Assembly sessions held to authorise the funding of UNTAG would be restricted to exclude those parties taking part in elections. Coming under the heading of "Other Regional Issues", the document stated, "These issues do not fall under Security Council Resolution 435, nor are they part of the mandate of the five. But the governments of the five individually share the view that action on these problems could do much to advance and facilitate a settlement of Namibia" (211). While the four still remained outside the negotiations over linkage, by this text, they had accepted the issue in a collective WCG document. However, as later statements indicated, this was by no means an acceptance of the linkage issue.

The above proposals indicated that of particular

importance was acceptance of the monitoring of SWAPO bases in Angola and Zambia(212). SWAPO, Angola and Zambia agreed to this almost immediately, and Mr. Hidipu Hamutenya, SWAPO's Secretary for Information stated in New York, that the formula for UN impartiality was also acceptable(213).

By September 1982, it became clear that the only outstanding issue in the negotiations was that of linkage(214). On the basis of this information, the Secretariat held consultations with the FLS and South Africa on the military component of UNTAG and on its administrative and logistic requirements.

While Dr. Crocker denied that his administration was making linkage a precondition to Namibian independence, he spoke of a chance of an "overall regional solution" if Angola agreed to Cuban withdrawal(215). Differences on the linkage issue between the members of the WCG and the fact that this was now the major obstacle to South African acceptance of the Western proposals, had an impact on the functioning of the WCG. The Group was now functioning less as a coalition and more independently in their involvement in the negotiations(216). The United States negotiators, namely Chester Crocker, Frank Wisner and General Walters, were conducting bilateral negotiations with the governments of Angola and South Africa concerning the modalities of Cuban withdrawal from Angola and South African withdrawal from Angola and Namibia in a parallel fashion. The United States negotiators expanded the

interested third parties to include Portugal, the Soviet Union and Cuba(217). The other members of the Group were not involved in these negotiations. The French government attempted to solve the impasse in September 1982, when the Head of the French Foreign Ministry's Africa Department held talks in Havana on the issue of Cuban withdrawal and denied in October that France had offered to replace the Cuban troops(218). The French Foreign Minister, M. Claude Cheysson, expressed the view on 11th October 1982, that the WCG had "finished its work" and that the present stagnation over the Cuban issue lay outside its competence(219). From this stage onwards, the French government began re-evaluating its role in the WCG. (This is the subject of Chapter 9.) In the meantime, the Federal Government of West Germany continued its efforts of establishing links between SWAPO and the German community in Namibia(220).

In May 1983, the Security Council requested the Secretary General to "undertake consultations with the parties ..with a view to securing the speedy implementation of Security Council resolution 435"(221). The WCG informed the Secretary General that agreements previously reached on phase 1 and 2 were still in force. Sr. Perez de Cuellar, therefore, informed the parties that the only remaining outstanding issues were those of the electoral system and the final problems relating to UNTAG and its composition(222) When the UN delegation met with

the South African government, the latter insisted the only issue was that of Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola(223). The Security Council again mandated the Secretary General to hold consultations with the parties on the electoral system in Resolution 539 of 28 October 1983(224). On the 29th of October, the South African government stated in a letter to the Secretary General:"The question of the choice to be made between proportional representation and the constituency system is not of great importance, and this aspect should not cause unnecessary problems. What is important, however, is that no settlement plan can be implemented unless a firm agreement is reached on Cuban withdrawal from Angola"(225). When the Secretary General insisted on a South African response to paragraph 8 of Security Council Resolution 539(1983), it did not make a firm response(226).

1984 saw continuation of the negotiations involving the United States and the governments of Angola and South Africa on the issue ^{of} Cuban withdrawal from Angola in a parallel framework to South African withdrawal from Angola and Namibia. This occurred in the context of another escalation of the conflict when the SADF launched "Operation Askari" between December 1983 and January 1984(227). This stage also saw the involvement of President Kaunda in the negotiations as intermediary. It also became increasingly clear that the Angolan government no longer perceived the United States government as

intermediary in the negotiations. President Kaunda's role began in Lusaka in February 1984, in a conference involving delegations from Angola, South Africa, and the United States which was led by Dr. Crocker. The outcome of these talks was the creation of a South African-Angolan "Joint Monitoring Commission" to monitor the disengagement process in Angola and participation of United States representatives to monitor the JMC at the request of the parties(228). However, the Angolan government refused to allow United States representatives to be stationed in Angola but accepted that they could be stationed in Namibia(229).

President Kaunda again acted as intermediary in hosting a multilateral conference on Namibia in Lusaka in May 1984 in which the South African Administrator General, SWAPO(230) and the new coalition in Namibia, the Multi-Party Conference (MPC) took part in face-to-face discussions. The talks broke down, however, over the issue of Cuban linkage after a number of delegates from the MPC defected to SWAPO(231). This, however, was not a WCG initiative.

It was clear that from this point the Contact Group was not functioning as a group in the negotiations, the last Contact Group meeting having taken place prior to the withdrawal of the French government in December 1983. The United States government acted unilaterally until the

suspension of the talks, when the Reagan Administration began to openly supply arms to UNITA (a policy opposed by Dr. Crocker, the chief United States negotiator) (232).

7.3- Conclusion

This second phase of the negotiation thus saw changes in the functioning of the WCG, changes which were mainly due to the introduction of new issues to the negotiations, especially that of "linkage". The fact that each member of any coalition is a bargainer in their own right has been illustrated by the division which ensued as a result of the introduction of the linkage issue by the Reagan Administration. This division was manifest in the conduct of the negotiations and in responses to the South African government's actions expressed at the UN.

The following Chapter will discuss the tactics adopted by the Contact Group using the facilitative-bargaining spectrum of third party activity outlined in Chapter 3. These tactics are then analysed using the general analytic framework to point to factors which influenced the Contact Group's choice of tactics in its interaction with the conflict system. This Chapter has provided the background material necessary for such an analysis.

Chapter 7- Notes

- 1- Zartman divides the negotiations into 7 phases.
Zartman, I.W., Ripe for Resolution, (Oxford University Press, New York, 1985), Chapter 5.
- 2- Interview with Henry Miller, assistant to Don McHenry on the working group of the Contact Group, telephone (Washington D.C. - New York) 29/7/87.
- 3- Interview with Ambassador McHenry, Washington D.C., 15/6/87.
- 4- Murray, J., "Namibia", February 1983 (unpublished paper); presented to V. Jabri by the author.
- 5- Interview with Henry Miller, op. cit.
- 6- Interview with Ambassador McHenry, op. cit.
- 7- Ibid.
- 8- Interview with Ambassador McHenry, conducted by C.R. Mitchell, questions prepared by V. Jabri, Washington D.C., 11/6/86.
- 9- Ibid.
- 10- Interview with Ambassador McHenry, 1987, op. cit.
- 11- Interview with Ambassador McHenry, 1986, op. cit.
- 12- Interview with Charles William Maynes, President Carter's Assistant Secretary of State for International Organisation Affairs, Washington D.C., 11/6/87.
- 13- Interview with Ambassador McHenry, 1986, op. cit.
- 14- Ibid.
- 15- Interview with Cyrus Vance, President Carter's Secretary of State, New York, 13/7/87.
- 16- Interview with Ambassador McHenry, 1987, op. cit.
- 17- Interview with Sir David Scott, British Ambassador to South Africa (1976-1979), London, 27/11/86.
- 18- Interview with Ambassador McHenry, 1987, op. cit.
- 19- Ibid.
- 20- Jamieson, D., "United Nations: Namibia", Statement at the UN General Assembly Ninth Special Session on Namibia on behalf of the WCG, 25 April 1978, Department of State

- Bulletin, Vol 78, No. 2015, p.50.
- 21- Ibid.; and Times 7/4/77, p.1b.
- 22- Resolution 385.
- 23- Times, 9/4/77.
- 24- Jamieson, op. cit., p.51.
- 25- New York Contact Group representatives included McHenry for the U.S., Jack Schrick for France, James Murray for the UK, Paul le Pointe for Canada, and Hans Vergau for the FRG.
- 26- Jamieson, op. cit.
- 27- It is significant that the WCG considered the South African government as being the party to the conflict rather than the Turnhalle delegates, which the South African government wished to promote as being ultimately responsible for the future of Namibia.
- 28- Jamieson, op. cit., p.51.
- 29- Legum, C., The Western Crisis over Southern Africa, (Africana Publishing Company, New York, London, 1979), p.254.
- 30- Ibid, p.249; reproduces statement made by Vice President Mondale after his meeting with Mr. Vorster in May 1977.
- 31- The UK Ambassador to the UN, Sir James Murray, informed SWAPO that the idea for the appointment of an Administrator General had come from the WCG and not from the South African government or the Turnhalle delegates. Legum, op. cit.
- 32- On 10th June 1977, Prime Mnister Vorster stated in the House of Assembly that the Turnhalle Committee had agreed not to proceed with plans for an interim government and that it had agreed to the appointment of a Special Representative of the UN Secretary General to observe elections. Moreover, the Administrator General would hold office until the formation of a government who would be closely advised by the UN Representative until the holding of UN-supervised elections. Times, 11/6/77.
- 33- Ibid.
- 34- Vance, C., Hard Choices, (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1983), p.280.

- 35- Ibid.
- 36- Ibid; and,
Interview with Sir James Murray, UK Ambassador to the UN and member of the New York Contact Group, New York, 13/7/87. Sir James indicated that the word "satisfied" was aimed at diluting the terms used in Security Council Resolution 385; that is, UN "supervision and control", due to South African mistrust of the UN. Also indicated that Paul Le Pointe of Canada had suggested the term "satisfied".
- 37- Vance, op. cit., p.280.
- 38- Ibid.
- 39- Ambassador McHenry revealed that the South African government appointed the Administrator General prior to agreement or consent of the WCG. Interview, 1987, op. cit.
- 40- The Administrator General was provided with power, subject to the ultimate authority of the State President, to repeal or amend existing South African legislation in Namibia as well as to assume responsibility for a range of activities controlled by ministries in Pretoria since 1969. See:
International Defence and Aid Fund, Namibia: The Facts, (IDAF, London, 1980), p.61.
- 41- On 31 August 1977, Walvis Bay was formally annexed by Proclamation No.202 issued in the Government Gazette. This provided for Walvis Bay to be administered as part of the Cape Province of the Republic of South Africa.
Ibid.
- 42- The impact of the overlapping conflict in South Africa was felt at this stage by the death in custody of Steve Biko, leader of the Black Consciousness Movement, which nearly resulted in the breakdown of the talks in September 1977, with Ambassador McHenry threatening to abandon the negotiations.
Interview with Sir David Scott, op. cit.
- 43- Vance suggests that the new demands made by the South African government were due to the South African elections, where the main issue was that of Namibia and the stand against international pressure. Op. cit., p. 283.
- 44- For the first time since 1949, the whites in Namibia did not take part in the elections for the South African Parliament. Sir David Scott suggests that this was a direct result of the talks with the WCG.
Scott, op. cit., p.206.

- 45- Africa Contemporary Record, 1977-1978, p.B771.
- 46- The composition of the DTA was:
- National Unity Democratic Organisation or NUDO(C. Kapuuo).
 - National Democratic Party(Pastor C. Ndjoba).
 - Republic Party(D.F. Mudge).
 - SWA People's Democratic United Front or SWAPDUF(E.H.L. Christy).
 - Labour Party(A.J.F. Kloppers).
 - Rehoboth Baster Association((Dr. B.J. Africa).
 - Caprivi Alliance(Kaptein M. Mamili).
 - Tswana Alliance(P. Tibinyani).
 - Bushman Alliance(G. Kashe).
 - Kavango Alliance(A. Majavero).
 - Nama Alliance(D. Luipert).
- Source: Legum, op. cit., p.185.
- 47- Vance, op. cit., p.283.
- 48- Ibid.
- 49- Interview with Ambassador McHenry, 1986, op. cit.
- 50- Vance points out "To add political weight it was agreed the Western Foreign Ministers would act as intermediaries", op. cit., p.302.
- 51- Interview with Ambassador Wechmar, West German Ambassador to the UN 1977-1981, London, 10/12/86.
- 52- Vance, op. cit., p.303; and SWAPO, To Be Born A Nation, (Zed Press, London, 1981), p.241.
- 53- Vance, op. cit., p.303. According to statements made by Pik Botha at the time, however, his withdrawal was due to an impression that the WCG was willing to side with SWAPO on the issue of Walvis Bay. Legum, op. cit., p.182.
- 54- Geldenhuys, D., The Diplomacy of Isolation, (St. Martins Press, New York, 1984), p.223. Points out that between 1977 and April 1978, the WCG warned South Africa on at least three occasions that they would not veto sanctions at the UN.
- 55- Vance, op. cit., p.304.
- 56- Ibid.
- 57- Security Council Document S/12636, reproduced in Appendix II.
- 58- Ibid., S/12636, p.2.

- 59- Vance, op. cit.
- 60- Opposition came from P.W. Botha, then the Defence Minister, Connie Mulder, the Minister for Plural Affairs and Information. Legum, op. cit., p.183.
- 61- Vorster's claim that the 1,500 troops would be allowed to remain in Namibia after the election of the Constituent Assembly was denied by representatives of the WCG. Ibid.
- 62- General Assembly Document A/S.9/PV.10, 28th April 1978, pp.23-25. Quoted in Rocha, G.M., In Search of Namibian Independence: The Limitations of the United Nations, (Westview Press, Boulder, CO and London, 1984), p. 106.
- 63- Legum, op. cit., p. 183.
- 64- Vance, op. cit., p.304.
- 65- Sam Nujoma informed the WCG that they "had unfairly boxed SWAPO in by presenting the proposals to the Security Council and getting South Africa to accept it before obtaining SWAPO's full concurrence", *ibid.*
- 66- According to Vance (1983), Garba attempted to persuade Nujoma to help the WCG "place South Africa in a position where it would have to say yes or no to a fair Western proposal", op. cit., p.304.
- 67- SWAPO, To Be Born A Nation, op. cit., p.242.
- 68- Vance, op. cit., p.305.
- 69- Ibid.
- 70- Secretary of State Vance had also sent a personal letter to the Angolan Foreign Minister; *Ibid.*
- 71- *Ibid.*, p.306.
- 72- SWAPO, op. cit., p.242.
- 73- SWAPO's acceptance of the WCG proposals may also have been due to the release of Andreas Shipanga, SWAPO dissident arrested in Zambia in April 1976. His release may have been a pressure tactic by President Nyerere. Spicer, M., "Namibia: Elusive Independence", World Today, October 1980, p.410.
- 74- Totemeyer, G. and J. Seiler, "South West Africa/Namibia, a Study in Polarisation and Confrontation", in: Seiler, J. (ed.), South Africa since the Portuguese Coup, (Westview Press, Boulder, CO., 1980),

p. 92.

75- The Secretary General recommended that UNTAG should consist of 7,500 troops and 2,000 civilians and that elections should be held seven months after acceptance of his report. Security Council Document S/12827, 29 August 1978.

76- Security Council Document S/12836 of 6 September 1978.

77- S/12841 of 8 September 1978, SWAPO letter to the Secretary General accepting his proposals.

78- The Resolution called on the South African government to cooperate in its implementation and declared that "all unilateral measures taken by the illegal administration in Namibia in relation to the electoral process, including unilateral registration of voters...would be considered null and void"

79- Aktur or the Action Front for the Retention of Turhalle Principles. Formed by National Party members opposed to the DTA.

80- NNF- Namibia National Front, considered a "left-of centre" alliance was formed in April 1977 and consisted of the following political groupings:

- The Damara Council (Mr Justus Garoeb).
- The Federal Party (Adv. B. O'Linn).
- The Mbanderu Council (Chief Munjuku Nguvuva II).
- The National Independence Party (NIP) (Charles Hartung) (NIP left in 1980).
- The South West Africa National Union (Gerson Vei).
- The progressive Party of Namibia.
- SWAPO-Democrats (Andreas Shipanga).

Du Pisani, A., SWA/Namibia: The Politics of Continuity and Change, (Jonathan Ball Publishers, Johannesburg, 1987), p.333.

81- Africa Contemporary Record, 1978-1979, p. B827.

82- Vance, op. cit., p.308.

83- Ibid.

84- Interview with Ambassador McHenry, 1987, op. cit.

85- Ibid.

86- Owen, Genscher, and Jamieson held talks with SWAPO, SWAPO-D, the NNF, the DTA and Aktur. The objective was to gain the opinions of the internal parties on the forthcoming internal elections and to convince them of the merits of an international settlement. The DTA informed the Foreign Ministers that it was committed to the

internal elections. The NNF, SWAPO and SWAPO-D reaffirmed their commitment to Resolution 435 and their rejection of the internal elections.

Times, 12/10/78, p.1h; Times 16/10/78, p.1b.

87- The Foreign Ministers discussed two documents with the South African government. One was for agreement on the holding of two elections whereby the internal one would not be recognised by them and would be followed by UN-supervised elections in June 1979, as proposed by the Secretary General. The second document stated that the two sides had agreed to differ. Times, 18/10/78, p.8e.

88- According to Vance, their exclusion was to "minimise the chances of a stalemate over details", op. cit., p.309.

According to Ambassador Scott, however, this was in order to avoid pressure from the officials for a harder stand with the South African government, Scott Interview, op. cit.

Staff members of the WCG had, in fact, expressed uneasiness over the accommodation the Foreign Ministers displayed in the meeting with the South African government. Washington Post, 19/10/78, p.1.

89- Times, 19/10/78, p.1c.

90- The joint WCG-South African communique which resulted from the Pretoria talks; specifically the last minute discussions between Vance and Pik Botha, committed the South African government only to "using its best efforts" to persuade the locally-elected leaders "seriously to consider ways and means of achieving international recognition" through the good offices of Ahtisaari and the Administrator General. Washington Post, 20/10/78, p.8d.

91- Washington Post, 20/10/78, p.3.

92- Africa Contemporary Record, 78-79, p.C75.

93- Mitchell points to the function of mediators during the implementation stage.
Mitchell, C.R., The Structure of International Conflict, (Macmillan, London, 1981), p.300.

94- Africa Contemporary Record, 78-79, p.C75, op. cit.

95- Ibid.

96- Vance, op. cit., p.310.

97- Ibid.

- 98- Ibid.
- 99- Ibid.
- 100- Ibid, p.311.
- 101- Ibid.
- 102- New York Times, 3-4/12/78.
- 103- Africa Contemporary Record, 78-79, p.B826.
- 104- Security Council Document S/12983, 22 December 1978; letter from R.F. Botha to the Secretary General.
- 105- Scott, op. cit., p.231.
- 106- Report of the Secretary General in Security Council Document, S/13120 of 26th February 1979. Reprinted in: United Nations, Council for Namibia, Compendium of Major Resolutions, Decisions, and other Documents Relating to Namibia, Document A/AC.131/1984/CRP.17.
- 107- Ibid, p.3.
- 108- Ibid.
- 109- R.F. Botha had, prior to the Secretary General's report indicated that the "emplacement of UNTAG would be out of the question" if SWAPO bases were set up inside Namibia. He referred to SWAPO demands for the establishment of five bases inside Namibia, complete South African withdrawal and the refusal to place SWAPO bases under UN monitoring.
Security Council Document S/13105 of 20 February 1979, p.2.
- 110- Statement delivered to the House of Assembly by P.W. Botha, Cape Town, 6 March 1979, reproduced as annex to Security Council Document S/13148, 7 March 1979, p.6.
- 111- Original WCG proposals, S/12636.
- 112- Interviews with Henry Miller and Sir James Murray, op. cit.
- 113- Interviews Murray, McHenry(1987), Vance and Young, op. cit.
- 114- This occurred, for example, over a document entitled "Operational Implementation Plan" drafted by General Philipp (Commander of UNTAG) and General Geldenhuys of the South African Defence Force. As pointed out by Sir James Murray, this document was rejected by the Secretary General and the WCG. Interview, op. cit.

- 115- McHenry, D., "United Nations: Namibia", Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 7 May 1979. Also reproduced in: Department of State Bulletin, October 1979, Vol. 79., No. 2031,
- 116- Africa Contemporary Record, 1978-1979, p. B829.
- 117- Ibid, quoting the Star 24/3/79.
- 118- The General Assembly was reconvened to discuss the situation in Namibia in May 1979. The Chairman of the Committee of 24, Salim Ahmed Salim, of Tanzania stated that South Africa, "had shown its contempt for the UN and for those Western governments that undertook the initiative that culminated in the adoption of Security Council Resolution 435.." General Assembly Document A/33/PV.97, 23rd May 1979, p.23.
- Sam Nujoma questioned the role of the WCG and called on them to impose sanctions against South Africa. Ibid, p.37.
- The General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for sanctions; the WCG abstained.
- 119- Africa Contemporary Record, 79-80, p.B749.
- 120- Sir James Murray states that the new Conservative government was of the view that they would have greater credibility with the South African government. Murray, "Namibia", unpublished paper, op. cit.
- 121- Interview with Ambassador McHenry, 1987, op. cit.
- 122- Murray, unpublished paper, op. cit.
- 123- Interview with Sir Brian Urquhart (Under-Secretary General to the UN, 1974-1986), New York, 24/6/87.
- 124- Africa Contemporary Record, 79-80, p.B749.
- 125- Interview with Sir Brian Urquhart, op. cit.
- 126- Geldenhuys, op. cit., p.226.
- 127- The details for the implementation of the DMZ proposals were discussed with the South African government in February and March 1980 in talks which included Lieutenant-General Prem Chand as Commander of the military component of UNTAG and Brian Urquhart. Security Council Document S/13862 of 31/3/1980.
- 128- Security Council Document S/13935 of 12 May 1980, letter from R.F. Botha to the Secretary General.

- 129- Catholic Institute for International Relations, Namibia in the 80s, (CIIR, London, 1981), p.29.
- 130- The Permanent Representative of Angola, in a letter to the Secretary General, requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council. This met on 27 June 1980 and adopted Resolution 475 which condemned the South African invasion of Angola and called for immediate withdrawal.
- 131- SC Document S/14011 of 20th June 1980.
- 132- By September 1980, the Secretary General, Dr. Kurt Waldheim, believed that it was possible to proceed with a "time-frame" for the implementation of Resolution 435 and sent another mission to Pretoria led by Brian Urquhart. S/14184 of 19 September 1980, letter from the Secretary General to Pik Botha.
- 133- Interview with Sir Brian Urquhart, op. cit.
- 134- Ibid.
- 135- Ibid and interview with Ambassador McHenry, 1987, op. cit.
- 136- New York Times, 11,12,14/1/81. Ibid.
- 137- Interview with Sir Brian Urquhart, op. cit.
- 138- McHenry stated that indications were that the "South Africans were up to no good", Interview, 1987, op. cit.
- 139- International Defence and Aid Fund, Apartheid Army in Namibia, (IDAF, London, 1981), p.33-34.
- 140- Africa Contemporary Record, 81-82, p.A9.
- 141- ibid.
- 142- Africa Contemporary Record, 82-83, p.A9.
- 143- Interview with Charles William Maynes, Washington D.C., 11/6/87.
- 144- Africa Contemporary Record, 81-82, p.A14.
- 145- Ibid.
- 146- Guardian 2/4/81.
- 147- "The Crocker Documents", Memorandum of Conversation between Dr. Crocker, Pik Botha and Magnus Malan, Pretoria 15/16 April 1981. Leaked to the press and reproduced in: Leonard, R., South Africa at War, (Lawrence Hill and Co.,

- Westport, CT., 1983, p. 252.
- 148- Financial Times 24/4/81.
- 149- Security Council debate on Namibia was called by the Africa Group. Security Council Document S/14434 of 10/4/81.
- 150- The French representative stated "We believe the adoption of such measures would run counter to the goal we seek, which is the resumption and intensification of negotiations designed to ensure that Namibia accedes peacefully to independence", SC Document S/PV.2277 of 30 April 1981. Quoted in:
Rocha, G.M., In Search of Namibian Independence: The Limitations of the United Nations, (Westview Press, Boulder, CO, London, 1984), p.127.
- 151- Times 2/5/81.
- 152- Guardian 4/5/81.
- 153- Rand Daily Mail, 29/4/81.
- 154- Times 2/5/81.
- 155- Guardian 4/5/81, op. cit.
- 156- The Crocker Documents, Memorandum from Paul Hare to Chester Crocker, 13 May 1981, reproduced in Leonard, op. cit., p.256.
- 157- The Canadian representatives on the Contact Group were especially reluctant to draw up a full constitution. Ibid.
- 158- Press Statement issued by the National Executive Committee of SWAPO, Luanda, 2/5/81; in: SWAPO Information and Comment, Vol. 3, No. 3, April-May 1981.
- 159- This was leaked to the press by the anti-apartheid pressure group, TransAfrica.
- 160- Africa Contemporary Record, 81-82, p. A156.
- 161- The first sign of division came as early as January 1981 when the US cast its veto in a resolution condemning the South African invasion of Angola which began on the last day of the pre-implementation meeting.
- 162- Times 4/5/81.
- 163- The Crocker Documents, in Leonard, op. cit., p.250; Africa Contemporary Record, 81-82, p.A16.

- 164- Africa Contemporary Record, 81-82, p.A17.
- 165- The Crocker Documents, Memorandum from Chester Crocker to the Secretary of State, Al Haig, prior to the latter's meeting with Pik Botha, 14 May 1981. Crocker suggests that the Secretary of State inform Botha that the US needed "to begin shaping revised proposals. Our credibility is on the line", in Leonard, op. cit., p.260.
- 166- Ibid., p.259.
- 167- Ibid.
- 168- Times 22/5/81.
- 169- The WCG met in the State Department. Times 22/5/81. This was a departure from previous practice, where the UN was the focus of activity.
- 170- Washington Post, 25/4/81.
- 171- Ibid.
- 172- The final Declaration of the OAU Summit condemned the "unholy alliance between Pretoria and Washington characterised by their baseless hostility against Angola and their collusion to ..misrepresent the nature of the colonial conflict in Namibia as one of global strategic consideration." The declaration also expressed dismay as regards the "unwillingness by the contact group to carry on with the implementation process..and exert the necessary pressure on the racist Pretoria regime to force it to comply with Security Council Resolutions 435 and 439." BEC Summary of World Broadcasts, Nairobi Home Service 27/6/81, 29/6/81.
- 173- Africa Contemporary Record, 81-82, p.A18.
- 174- Africa Contemporary Record, 81-82, p.A19.
- 175- Ibid, p. A7.
- 176- Africa Research Bulletin, Vol. 18., No. 7, 1981, p.6121.
- 177- The US representative stated that Angola had "large elements of foreign advisers and substantial supplies of foreign arms have been shipped into Angola to supply..elements of SWAPO..We deplore the recent South African action just as we deplore any other escalation of violence from any quarter and, I indeed, have been prepared...to vote for a resolution so based".
US Embassy, Information and Communication Agency, London.
- 178- Sponsored by Uganda, Mexico, Niger, Panama,

Philippines and Tunisia. Original draft- S/14664 contained calls for sanctions, which was dropped to avoid the veto. Rocha, op. cit., p.131.

179- The French Ambassador to the UN, Jacque Leprette declared South Africa's action "inadmissible". Security Council Document S/PV.2300 of 30 August 1981, p.18.

180- Africa Contemporary Record, 81-82, p.A20.

181- At the September General Assembly debate on Namibia, Sir Anthony Parsons, UK Ambassador to the UN, speaking on behalf of the EEC, condemned the South African government for its policies inside Namibia, especially the extension of conscription to all Namibians, the enlargement of the powers of the Council of Ministers, and the introduction of second tier elections as a further implementation of the internal settlement. Times, 9/9/81.

182- Daily Telegraph 23/9/81. This was in sharp contrast to the main premise of "constructive engagement", as pursued by the US Administration, which was that reform in South Africa was taking place. On constructive engagement and its assumptions see: Crocker, C., "South Africa: Strategy for Change", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 2, Winter 1980.

183- The WCG's opposition to sanctions was indicated at the UN Special Session on Namibia taking place in September, when the WCG abstained on a resolution calling for comprehensive mandatory sanctions on the grounds that sanctions would impede progress in the negotiations. New York Times, 15/9/81.

184- The Crocker Documents, Memorandum from Chester Crocker to the Secretary of State, in Leonard, op. cit., p.260.

185- The South African decision was a result of bilateral talks held in Washington between Al Haig and Pik Botha. New York Times, 5/9/81.

At the same time, however, the South African government was pursuing the internal settlement by increasing the powers of the Council of Ministers and the holding of internal elections for the second tier authorities. New York Times, 5/9/81.

186- The decision to restart the negotiations was based on another set of bilateral talks between Pik Botha and Chester Crocker in Zurich on 21 of September 1981. New York Times, 21/9/81.

187- Reproduced in Africa Contemporary Record, 1981-1982, pp. A56-57.

188- Times 27/10/81.

189- Africa Contemporary Record, 1981-1982, p.A57.

190- Sir Leonard Allinson, the British delegate in the WCG, stated that the new set of proposals were designed to end the deadlock resulting from South Africa's intransigence after the Geneva conference. Times 27/10/81.

191- Ibid.

192- Africa Contemporary Record, 1981-1982, p. A24-25.

193- Ibid., p.A24.

194- The National Party's proposals were to divide the territory into two, the Ovambo region for those wanting a unitary state and a second area to accommodate ethnic self-determination. The Star(Johannesbourg), 20/2/82.

Census figures showed that the white population had dropped by 21% since 1970, from 90,658 to 71,530. Guardian, 3/4/82.

195- Africa Research Bulletin, Vol. 18, No. 12, 15th January 1982, p.6293.

196- Interview with official from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 17/9/87.

197- New York Times, 27/1/82.

198- Interview Foreign Office official, op. cit.

199- The French and West German delegates were reported to have left one session but Herr Genscher had prevented the meeting from breaking up. ACR, 81-82, p. A27, quoting from Rand Daily Mail 27/1/82.

200- Ibid.

201- SWAPO Information and Comment, Vol 4, No. 2, February-May 1982.

202- The meeting of the FLS was attended by Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Kenya and Angola, Tanzania and SWAPO. The communique of the Foreign Ministers stated that they "shared SWAPO's deep disenchantment with the current protracted and sterile phased approach to a negotiated solution", Times, 6/5/82.

- 203- Africa Contemporary Record, 1981-1982, p. A28.
- 204- The South African government was suspected by British diplomatic sources of leaking reports that it had already accepted phase two, on ceasefire arrangements and the composition of UNTAG, when these had not been tabled as yet. Times 19/5/82; Rand Daily Mail, 20/5/82.
- 205- Interview with Pauline Baker, Senior Associate, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., 7 July 1987.
- 206- Africa Contemporary Record, 1981-1982, p. A31.
- 207- Times 18/6/81.
- 208- Financial Times 7/7/82.
- 209- The WCG informed the UN Secretary General of this progress in Security Council Document S/15287 of 12/7/82.
- 210- Instead of a General Assembly resolution as had been suggested by Brian Urquhart in the Geneva pre-implementation meeting. Interview with Sir Brian Urquhart op. cit.
- 211- Financial Times, 7/7/82, op. cit.
- 212- Ibid.
- 213- Ibid.
- 214- The WCG confirmed to the Secretary General that the "South African Government had confirmed its agreement to those points which related to its responsibilities under the settlement plan", Security Council Document S/15776 of 19 May 1983.
- 215- Dr. Crocker declared that the issue of Cuban troop withdrawal is not "part of the UN mandate for the Western Contact Group on Namibia. In those discussions with the Angolan Government, the US was saying: 'As a matter of your own national interest, as a sovereign government, here is a possibility for a brighter future..No one is dictating, and there are no preconditions". Africa Contemporary Record, 1981-1982, p.A32.
- 216- Interview with Foreign Office Official, op. cit.
- 217- Crocker met with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister on 20th September 1982 and again in Moscow on 13th November 1982.
- 218- Africa Contemporary Record, 1982-1983, p.A27.

- 219- Ibid.
- 220- As will be discussed further in the next chapter.
- 221- Resolution 532 of 31 May 1983.
- 222- Brand Fourie, South African Ambassador to the U.S., assured the Secretary General, Peres de Cuellar, that issues agreed upon would not be reopened. Report of the Secretary General Concerning the Implementation of Security Council Resolutions 435(1978) and 439(1978) Concerning the Question of Namibia, Security Council Document, S/15943 of 29 August 1983, paragraph 8.
- 223- Ibid.
- 224- Ibid, paragraph 8.
- 225- Letter from Pik Botha to the Secretary General, S/16106 of 29 October 1983; quoted in the Secretary General's report S/16237 of 29 December 1983, paragraph 4.
- 226- Paragraph 9, from Ibid.
- 227- Hanlon, op. cit., p. 159.
- 228- Ibid, p.A9.
- 229- Ibid, p. A10.
The fact that President Kaunda was intermediary in this conference indicated that the Angolan government did not regard the US government as mediator.
- 230- SWAPO was represented by its founder Herman Toivo ja Toivo, who was released by the South African government in March 1984, after serving an 18-year sentence on Robben Island. Du Pisani, op. cit., p.489.
- 231- The MPC was formed as an anti-SWAPO front in August 1983 and consisted of the DTA, SWAPO-D, SWANU, Damara Council, the National Party, Rehoboth Liberation Front, and the Namibia People's Liberation Front. The Damara Council, headed by Justus Garoeb, joined SWAPO at the Lusaka conference. Ibid., pp. 485-489.
- 232- According to a US Embassy official in London, US aid had already been supplied covertly to UNITA, Interview, London, 9/10/86.

CHAPTER 8- TACTICAL DECISIONS OF THE WCG

This Chapter concerns the second dependent variable which, as defined in the analytic framework, consists of the third party's tactical decisions during involvement in the conflict as intermediary. Its objective is to use the general framework in an analysis of the WCG's conduct of the negotiations during its involvement as an interested, coalition intermediary in the conflict over Namibia. Firstly, the WCG is used to illustrate the tactics which may be adopted by an interested third party functioning as intermediary; and, secondly, the case is used to indicate factors which influence such a third party's choice of tactics.

It will be argued that the involvement of an interested third party as intermediary is best analysed by considering the third party as forming part of (at least) a three-cornered negotiation system, with the third party being one of the negotiators. This focusses attention on a third party's own decision-making processes when in interaction with the conflict system. This analysis will emphasise the difficulty of distinguishing firstly, between third parties which become involved as intermediaries and those which are interveners; and secondly, between a third party and the parties already in the negotiation process. It will emphasise the argument that third parties may occupy a number of overlapping roles when involved in a conflict situation.

The first part of the Chapter uses the material outlined in Chapter 7 regarding the negotiations and the WCG's involvement therein to discuss the range of tactics adopted by the WCG. For this purpose, our spectrum of third party activity (described in chapter 3) will be used. Our aim is to locate the activities of the WCG along this spectrum. The second part of the Chapter provides an analysis of the tactical decisions made by the Group using the analytic framework to point to factors which influenced such decisions.

8.1- The Tactics of the WCG

As pointed out in Chapter 3, the intermediary "role" represents a spectrum of behaviour ranging from the bargaining to the facilitative mode of activity. Table 3.1 illustrated the behaviour that defines the facilitative and bargaining range of the spectrum of third party activity. It was also pointed out that a third party may start the initiative by adopting a facilitative approach. On the other hand, it may start in a directive/bargaining manner having a specific commitment to an outcome and a framework for the settlement process. Moreover, the third party may move from one strategy to the next depending on feedback processes from the negotiation and other factors which influence the tactical decisions.

As we described in the last Chapter, the Contact Group initiative started in April 1977 and after more than a year of intensive negotiations (mainly through bilateral contact involving the South African government, the governments of the Front-Line States, Nigeria, and SWAPO), agreement was reached which shortly afterwards foundered on disagreements regarding implementation. The negotiations finally broke down, however, over issues relating to an overlapping conflict. We now undertake a review of the tactics adopted by the Contact Group, which will be divided into sections parallel to the two phases of the negotiations outlined in Chapter 7, the first phase covering the period between April 1977 and January 1981 and the breakdown of the Geneva pre-implementation conference; and the second phase from this point to the suspension of the negotiations in 1985. This review of the tactics adopted by the Contact Group will illustrate that the Group adopted behaviour which fell predominantly within the bargaining sector of our spectrum of third party activity illustrated in Table 3.1.

8.1.1- The Tactics of the WCG During Phase One

The first two characteristics identified in Table 3.1 as illustrating bargaining behaviour by a third party were that the third party intervenes with a commitment to a specific outcome to the conflict and a specific framework for the settlement process. The Contact Group started the

initiative with a commitment to the implementation of Security Council Resolution 385, and therefore, an outcome to the conflict based on provisions made in this Resolution, namely the achievement of free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the UN. The Group also had a specific framework for the settlement process. Thus, it broadly adhered to the UN-defined framework for Namibian independence, ensuring that the proposals put forward to the parties provided for a specific UN role during any transition period and elections leading to the formation of a constituent assembly which would devise a constitution for an independent Namibia. As will be seen in the analysis of the Group's tactics, the proposals gradually changed during the first year of the negotiations so that the transition period and elections came to be under the joint control of the UN and the South African administration as opposed to sole UN control as envisaged in Security Council Resolution 385.

Another manifestation of the Group's functioning within the UN framework was its insistence that the UN Secretariat was constantly informed and consulted throughout the negotiations. It also shifted the responsibility for the implementation of the settlement plan to the Secretary General and his staff. This meant that details of the implementation of the proposals regarding UNTAG and issues of troop withdrawal and

monitoring were negotiated by the UN Secretary General, his Under-Secretary, Brian Urquhart and his Special Representative, Martti Ahtisaari.

Another feature of the Contact Group's involvement, characteristic of the bargaining/directive sector of the spectrum, is that the Group did not seek to promote face-to-face communication between the parties. Emphasis was placed on communication between the Group and the protagonists. This was carried out through missions of the Five to southern Africa and through holding "proximity talks" as described in Chapter 7. This procedure ensured that the Group had almost total control of the communication process between the parties. When this control was violated, as occurred in September 1980, when the Angolan government met with the South African government in order to arrange for a multilateral conference and a face-to-face meeting between SWAPO and the internal Namibian parties, this was opposed by the Group. According to Ambassador McHenry, the Group (specifically the United States government) had information which indicated that the South African government wished to use this opportunity in order to promote the parties to the internal settlement(1). As was revealed by McHenry, the South African government sought to achieve this objective not only by insisting on the participation of the internal parties, but also by insisting at the start of the conference on a seating

arrangement which would have placed SWAPO and the internal parties on opposite sides of the table while the South African delegation wished to seat itself with the WCG. The effect of this would have been to suggest that the primary protagonists to the conflict over Namibia were SWAPO and the internal parties, while it would have placed the South African delegation itself in a role more comparable to that of the WCG - that is, of an intermediary. However, this plan was prevented by the WCG(2).

Regarding proposals formulation, Table 3.1 suggests that the the mediator has almost total control of proposals formulation, the proposals reflecting the mediator's own standpoint on particular outcomes. The facilitative sector of the spectrum regarding proposals formulation suggests that the mediator helps the parties reach compromise and seeks to build up proposals based on the parties' positions. The Contact Group, during this first phase of the negotiations, was initially in total control of proposals formulation, whereby the Group formulated the proposals and communicated these to the protagonists. However, during the course of the negotiations, the Group sought to incorporate the parties's positions into the proposals, suggesting an overlap of facilitative and directive behaviour. Ambassador McHenry's description of this process was that the parties were presented with "ideas" to which they were requested to respond. He rejected the suggestion that

these amounted to proposals, since the latter implied a certain formality and finality. McHenry stated, "We constantly gave the parties ideas and got reactions from them. The proposal (S/12636 of April 1978) we gave to the parties and made public at the end." (3). The aim of the Group in so doing was to prevent any party from having "the right to veto a proposal" (4). Thus, the directive aspect in this process derived from the fact that the proposals were formulated within a framework preferred by the third party, while the facilitative aspect came from the fact that these were altered in response to feedback from the protagonists. The impact of this feedback process from the negotiation system to the third party's tactics will be discussed below.

Another directive feature of the Contact Group's tactics was that the Group had its own position on specific issues in the conflict and bargained with the protagonists over these. In fact, the bargaining process between the Group and the parties dominated the entire process. This occurred with the South African government over the transition arrangements, where the South African government preferred a Turnhalle-based and therefore, an ethnically-based interim authority, which the Contact Group rejected because it was based on an ethnic division of the black population of Namibia, and, as such "lacked neutrality" (5). The bargaining process between the WCG and the South African government also occurred with the

appointment of the Administrator General. As discussed in Chapter 7, this issue had arisen at the first meeting of the Group with the South African government in April 1977 since the South African government, because the idea of Turnhalle for the transition was rejected by the five, sought to have an Administrator General in the Territory to work in conjunction with the Special Representative of the UN. The South African government installed the Administrator General prior to the consent of the WCG. The Contact Group's perception of this was that "It showed us that the South Africans still had their own strategies and objectives. That, any negotiator knows. It was not a surprising activity since we still did not have an agreement with them." (6).

The Group also bargained with SWAPO, specifically over the issue of Walvis Bay. When the WCG presented its first set of proposals to the parties in October 1977, it suggested the issue of Walvis Bay be deferred to negotiations between the South African government and the future government of an independent Namibia. SWAPO, on the other hand, insisted that the Group make a specific pronouncement on this issue, proclaiming the port an integral part of Namibia. The Contact Group, despite this insistence by SWAPO, presented their proposals to the Ninth Special Session on Namibia as Security Council Document S/12636 on 10th April 1978. It will be recalled that SWAPO rejected these proposals and postponed the

negotiations indefinitely following the South African raid on Kassinga on 4th May 1978. One of the factors which led to SWAPO's eventual acceptance of the proposals in July 1978 was the offer made by the WCG that they would support a Security Council Resolution on Walvis Bay stating that it was an integral part of Namibia(7). This culminated in their vote for Security Council Resolution 432 which proclaimed Walvis Bay an integral part of Namibia(8).

One of the bargaining tactics used by the Contact Group was that of issue linkage(9). This tactic may be considered in terms of the third party's perceptions of the protagonists' high priority goals, and making the attainment of these conditional upon a protagonist's acceptance of other, seemingly lesser goals. This tactic was in evidence at the Vorster-Mondale meeting in May 1977. Mondale presented the WCG's position on the negotiations over Namibia, but issues that were equally under discussion were those of Rhodesia and majority rule in South Africa itself, the last being the issue of highest salience to the South African government. According to Mondale's statement, the message to Vorster was, "progress on all three categories"(10) was needed for improved United States-South African relations. Vorster's reaction to this was that it constituted "strangulation with finesse"(11). As described below, issue linkage became a primary tactic during the second phase of the Contact Group's involvement in the conflict.

The use of threat and reward tactics was also evident in the functioning of the WCG during the first phase of the negotiations. One of the main threat tactics used by the WCG against the South African government was the threat of the withdrawal of ^{the} veto at the Security Council in response to sanctions resolutions. This was used by the WCG at least three times until the presentation of their proposals to the UN in April 1978. The initiative started with a warning to the South African government that in the absence of a move towards an internationally acceptable settlement, the five would have to take the "necessary measures" (12). This initial threat was aimed at securing the South African government's participation in the negotiation process. The threat of sanctions was again repeated by the WCG during their talks with the South African government in April 1977; this threat was aimed at persuading the South African government into abandoning Turnhalle. At the end of these talks, the South African government agreed to forego implementation of the Turnhalle proposals. According to Secretary of State Vance, the South African change of position was due to the threat of sanctions made by the WCG. He states, "The South Africans' changed attitude was, in the judgement of many, due to the united Western assertion that we would no longer prevent sanctions unless they began seriously negotiating for Namibian independence under international supervision." (13) It has been suggested that the South

African government took note of these threats and participated in the process because of them(14).

When the test of implementation of the threat of sanctions came in October 1978, however, the five were not willing to do so for reasons discussed later. Sanctions were, however, contemplated. This was in response to P.W. Botha's announcement on coming to power that the South African government would go ahead with internal elections in Namibia scheduled for December 1978. Foreign Ministers of the five met in September 1978 to discuss strategy and decided on setting up a working group which would draw up a list of sanctions, their effectiveness and costs. The group was comprised of Ambassador McHenry and officials from the other four members' Foreign Ministries. McHenry was the only participant from the WCG, and the aim was deliberately to keep this separate from the WCG(15). The function of the group was to provide the information to the Foreign Ministers "on what sanctions would be effective if they decided to use them."(16) If the governments decided to impose sanctions, they would choose from the list drawn up(17). The objective was to have these as background information when consideration had to be given as to what action the Group could take if the South African government did not comply after the October 1978 discussions with the WCG Foreign Ministers.

The prepared list of sanctions included restrictions

on landing rights for South African Airways; visa restrictions for South African visitors to WCG countries; and the restriction of South Africa's access to Western export financing(18). None of the Group members favoured a total economic embargo against South Africa. The sanctions were to be selective and specific to the Namibia problem. The Group did not, however, make any decision on these(19). It is important to point out that, while the respective governments were opposed to the imposition of limited sanctions and did not wish to table these, their officials, (specifically some of those involved in the WCG) were for tabling the list to the South African government during the October 1978 meetings in Pretoria. It became evident to the WCG that the South African government was determined to go-ahead with internal elections on 30th September 1978. The decision to draw up the sanctions package was made on 6th October when President Carter convened the National Security Council. The Foreign Ministers meeting in Pretoria was scheduled for 16 October 1978. It is clear that Ambassadors McHenry and Young favoured the imposition of selective sanctions against South Africa, both as a tactic to attain compliance and as a means of maintaining credibility with the African governments(20). Vance states, "My advisers strongly urged that we seek a decision from the President that the United States be prepared to support and initiate sanctions if necessary. Failure to do so..could destroy our successful efforts to rebuild the American position in

black Africa." (21) However, staff members of the Foreign Ministers were excluded from the Pretoria talks in order to avoid criticism and expressed unease at the Foreign Ministers' accommodation of the South African position (22).

While the Group was not willing to implement threats of sanctions made throughout the initiative, President Carter as a consequence took the less costly options of offering the South African government better relations if it continued taking part in the negotiations. This offer of a reward was carried out through personal letter from President Carter to P.W. Botha which offered an invitation to the new South African Prime Minister to visit Washington if agreement were reached on the cancellation of the Namibian elections. Carter also offered a reduction of the proposed 7,500 UNTAG force to 3,500 and implied that the United States would not bring the international pressure it has used on Namibia to bear on South Africa's internal racial policies (23). This letter was presented at a last minute meeting between Vance and P.W. Botha. It resulted in the issuing of the joint WCG-South African communique which in effect, allowed the elections to go ahead while the South African promised to persuade the internal parties to co-operate with the UN. The Foreign Secretaries' approach had (reportedly) concentrated on pointing out to P.W. Botha the probability of increased Soviet involvement in southern Africa.

Third parties also use the leverage that other third parties (including allies) can bring to the main parties in conflict. The WCG used the leverage of the Front-Line States in its dealings with SWAPO. The FLS, in fact, often acted as intermediaries between the WCG and SWAPO, underlining the fact that the Contact Group itself was another negotiator in a multilateral negotiation system(24).

Following the Kassinga raid in May 1978, SWAPO postponed negotiations with the WCG indefinitely. Ambassador McHenry held bilateral talks with President Neto of Angola in order to arrange the resumption of the negotiations with SWAPO. The main issues of contention between SWAPO and the WCG concerned the status of Walvis Bay and the location of the residual South African force during the transition period. As discussed earlier, President Nyerere's proposal on Walvis Bay and his influence with SWAPO were used to gain SWAPO's return to the negotiating table to meet with the WCG to resolve the outstanding issues(25). As described earlier, SWAPO accepted the Western proposals of April 1978 (S/12636) after receiving assurances from the WCG that they intended to accept the President Nyerere's proposal on Walvis Bay. As Douglas(26) and Wall(27) have pointed out, a third party may bring ultimata from allies to the parties, which can include tacit threats, promises or

rewards. While the WCG did not specifically present ultimatums to SWAPO from the FLS, it is clear that the FLS were used as a pressure route to SWAPO. Secretary Vance noted that the WCG developed a close working relationship with the FLS, in that it was "very important in dealing with SWAPO, to have the FLS as a political grouping that could exert a positive influence with SWAPO and move it towards a position which would be the basis for a satisfactory negotiation." (28) It is reasonable to assume that a third party's ability to persuade a protagonist is enhanced when the proposals suggested actually come from an important ally, as for example, the proposal for a demilitarised zone on the Namibia-Angola border, which came from President Neto after talks with Ambassador McHenry in 1979 (29).

8.1.2- The WCG's Tactics During Phase Two

As indicated earlier, this phase starts from the end of the Geneva pre-implementation meeting in January 1981 and the coming to power of the Reagan Administration and ends in 1985 when the negotiations were suspended by the Angolan government as a result of the resumption of United States arms supplies to the Angolan rebel movement, UNITA (30). The tactics used by the WCG during this phase also reflect a predominantly bargaining mode of activity. A major difference from the previous approach, however, was the introduction of new issues to the

negotiations by the third party, specifically the Reagan Administration, as well as making the outcome to the conflict conditional upon the acceptance of these.

Prior to the change in Administration in the United States (that is, prior to January 1981), the Group sought to influence the process by which the conflict outcome may be achieved (free and fair elections under UN supervision), but the new Administration sought to influence the outcome to the election and the nature of a future Namibia. The Reagan Administration entered the negotiations with a declared preference for arriving at a constitution for Namibia prior to the holding of elections; that is, a "Lancaster-House" model for Namibian independence. The new Administration let its preference for such an arrangement be known at the UN when the new United States Ambassador, Jean Kirkpatrick, circulated a document at the UN entitled "Proposed Declaration of Intent" which called for "broad guidelines for the constitutional future of the territory" (31). This preference for a Zimbabwe model for Namibian independence was rejected by the Front-Line States, SWAPO, and the other four members of the Group. The Group did, however, accommodate the United States position on this issue by declaring that "possibilities for strengthening the existing plan existed" (32). The result of this accommodation was in the introduction of constitutional guarantees being accepted prior to the holding of

elections. Another change indicating that the Group aimed at shaping the nature of government in an independent Namibia was evident in June 1982, when new WCG proposals indicated that Namibia would hold Non-Aligned status and would not allow insurgency groups to operate in the territory, (a clear reference to the ANC). This proposal has been interpreted as a reward tactic vis-a-vis the South African government(33).

Another issue introduced to the negotiations by the Reagan Administration (and the subject of bargaining) was the linkage of Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola to Namibian independence. The introduction of this issue was a clear example of a third party using its role as intermediary to obtain concessions towards its own commitment to specific issues. This issue was taken up by the South African government after its introduction by the Reagan Administration(34). The new United States Administration used issue linkage (Namibian independence to Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola) as a bargaining tactic to achieve the latter. It has been suggested that Elliot Abrahams, then Assistant Secretary for Human Rights, introduced this idea to the new Administration(35), which made it a priority goal in southern Africa(36). The emphasis had moved from Namibia to an overlapping conflict, namely that in Angola. The linkage precondition was taken up by the South African government as soon as it was publicly introduced to the

negotiations by Chester Crocker in April 1981 on his first visit to Angola. It remained a precondition for Namibian independence when all other outstanding issues in the negotiations were resolved. The linkage issue became the main stumbling bloc in the negotiations despite the fact that it was rejected by the other members of the Group. Despite this rejection, however, the other members of the Group did agree to the inclusion of linkage for the first time in June 1982 in an official text of the Contact Group under the general heading of "Other Regional Issues". The Group did not become involved in negotiations over linkage, these being conducted by the United States government, specifically by Chester Crocker. As will be seen later, the French government attempted to resolve this issue prior to announcing its withdrawal from the Group.

While the start of the WCG initiative was marked by the use of threats to gain South African compliance and participation in the negotiations, the second phase of the negotiations is marked by the Reagan Administration's use of rewards as part of its policy of "constructive engagement". The general aim of this policy, as conceived by Chester Crocker, was to promote the United States-South Africa relations as recognition for any reform brought about by the South African government. In terms of the relations with the black population, Crocker maintained that their bargaining power could be increased by

3.2- Analysis of the UN Tactics

increasing economic and educational opportunities and actively encouraging United States private interests to engage in this process(37). Dr. Crocker believed that the South African government was undergoing "constructive change" and that this had to be encouraged and recognised by the United States government. Based on this policy, therefore, the Reagan Administration provided substantive rewards, mainly in the military sphere(38) and consistent diplomatic support for the South Africans at the UN(39), without, however, making these conditional upon any specific action taken by the South African government. This may be contrasted with the offer of improved United State-South African relations made by President Carter on the condition that the South African Government did not go ahead with internal elections in December 1978.

Constructive engagement had its implications for the behaviour of the United States negotiators (specifically, Chester Crocker) in the Namibia negotiations. The South African position was consistently stressed and included in the proposals. Concessions to the South African government came in the constitutional proposals as well as the the introduction of a dual vote electoral system aimed at reducing the impact of an anticipated SWAPO victory in elections held under UN supervision.

8.2- Analysis of the WCG Tactics

This section uses the second part of the analytic framework to illuminate factors relevant to the tactical choice decisions made by the WCG during its involvement in the conflict as intermediary. It will be recalled that eight sets of factors were suggested which might jointly explain a third party's tactical decisions at any specific time during the interaction process. These were:

- 1- The conflict characteristics.
- 2- The negotiation system.
- 3- The third party's conflict-related interests.
- 4- The third party's process-related interests.
- 5- The third party's set of preferred outcomes.
- 6- The third party's influence potential.
- 7- Third party constituency input.
- 8- The intra-coalition situation (if third party is a coalition).

It was emphasised that all eight sets of factors might change during a third party's involvement in the conflict. Moreover, not all factors are necessarily applicable at all points during the mediation process. For example, a constituency may not have an input into the detailed formulation of proposals presented by the third party. It may, however, have an impact on the overall approach and on the issues introduced to the negotiations.

Another important feature of the analytic framework outlined in Chapter 3 was that, as with parties in any

negotiation system, a third party's tactical decisions must involve a process of adjustment and readjustment to the dynamic conditions of the conflict and to the negotiation process itself. For example, the third party's set of preferred outcomes at time (A) may well have changed at time (B) when the third party has considered the negotiating positions of the parties and the situation with regard to the conflict environment. The negotiation system is the source of informational feedback from the overall conflict system to the third party so that the latter may re-evaluate and readjust its position during the negotiation process in response to this input and to any changes. This dynamic aspect of the interaction process between third party and conflict system must be taken into account in an analysis of third party choice of tactics as an intermediary.

This section illustrates the way in which factors shown in Table 3.2 may explain the tactics adopted by the WCG during Phase One and Phase Two of the negotiations. As was argued in the previous section, these tactics fell predominantly within the bargaining sector of our spectrum of third party activity, especially in the commitment of the WCG to specific outcomes for the conflict, the introduction of issues salient to members of the Contact Group, and the use of bargaining tactics to attain such goals.

The factors outlined in Table 3.2 are discussed individually. However, this does not imply that they act independently or in an individual manner. They are, in fact, interlinked, having a reinforcing influence on each other. For example, the third party's preferred outcome is modified by its perception of its influence potential, which in turn, is modified by feedback from the negotiation system. Moreover, discussing the impact of each factor separately does not imply that the WCG itself (or any other third party) considers each factor prior to making its tactical choice. No third party can be assumed to have perfect information and an accurate perception of the consequences of each action. It can, however, be assumed that these factors act in an interlinked manner in influencing a third party's tactical decisions.

8.2.1- Influences on WCG Tactics During Phase One

The WCG started the initiative with a stated commitment to an outcome and a framework for the settlement process. The outcome sought was based on Security Council Resolution 385 which outlined the framework for Namibian independence. The Group also made the decision to back up this commitment with the threat to the South African government of impending sanctions if it did not forego implementation of the Turnhalle-based internal settlement and agree to work towards a settlement based on Security Council Resolution 385. The Group succeeded in persuading

the South African government to take part in the negotiations, but when the latter decided to hold internal elections scheduled for December 1978 under Turnhalle, sanctions were considered but were not presented to the South African government. Instead, the Group sought South Africa's continued participation in the negotiations, which (up to the Geneva pre-implementation meeting in January 1981) centred on the details of implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 of 29 September 1978. This Resolution encompassed the Secretary General's proposals for implementation of the WCG plan for Namibian independence earlier accepted in the Security Council in Resolution 431.

8.2.1.1- The Conflict Characteristics

These form the background to a negotiation process and may change during any third party's involvement in the conflict. This is especially the case in a long drawn out conflict such as that over Namibia.

A major characteristic of the conflict concerned the relationship between the protagonists, namely the South African government and SWAPO. As indicated in Chapter 4, this relationship was based on coercive conflict behaviour between the parties, manifest in a guerrilla war conducted by SWAPO against the South African occupation; in South African incursions into the Front-Line States; and in the

treatment of SWAPO sympathisers inside Namibia. This characteristic of the conflict had an impact on the Five's proposals, in that they had to consider issues related to peacekeeping operations; the monitoring of SADF and SWAPO bases; and the release of political prisoners. Given the nature of the South African Administration in Namibia, the Group's proposals also called for the dismantling of apartheid laws.

Apart from the issues in conflict, the other important characteristic influencing the WCG's tactical decisions was the fact that the conflict also involved third parties including the FLS and Nigeria as patrons to SWAPO. Moreover, the role of the UN in the conflict was manifest in support for SWAPO and in the increasing calls for sanctions against the South African government. This meant that the Contact Group functioned within a multilateral negotiation system. It continually consulted with the FLS and maintained a role for the UN in the implementation of its proposals.

The fact that the conflict over Namibia overlapped with others in the region also had an impact on the Contact Group's tactics. Members of the Group had conflict-related interests located in these overlapping conflicts. This interest was especially relevant during the first phase of the negotiations in the case of the British government which had an immediate concern in the

Rhodesia/Zimbabwe settlement process. A major change during this phase of the negotiation was Robert Mugabe's victory in the Zimbabwe election of 1980. For SWAPO, this produced a major new ally in the region, and had an impact on the South African government's calculations regarding the future of Namibia.

8.2.1.2- The Negotiation System

This system provides a feedback influence on a third party's choice of tactics so that it may adjust any proposals put forward and tactics used, in response to a continuous input. The analytic framework suggested that the negotiation system consists of factors at the inter-party, the intra-party, and the party-patron levels.

At the inter-party level, both the South African government and SWAPO were pursuing a dual-track strategy whereby they took part in the negotiations while maintaining original strategies. As pointed out in the analytic framework, the involvement of an interested third party as intermediary converts the situation into a multilateral negotiation system whereby the third party becomes one of the negotiators and may be the focus of the parties' bargaining behaviour. This was the situation in the process involving the WCG on the one hand and SWAPO and the South African government on the other. Both parties realised that the settlement process itself and

the Contact Group's involvement therein was of value to the Group. Their prime bargaining counter with the Group was the threat of withdrawal from the international negotiations.

As will be recalled from the outline of the negotiations, the South African government initially agreed to shelve the Turnhalle process and to participate in the negotiations mediated by the WCG. During this first phase of the negotiations, the South African government negotiated with the WCG while maintaining options with regard to the internal settlement. It accepted the WCG's proposals in April 1978, but in September 1978, stated that the UN Secretary General's proposals for implementation were unacceptable due to the proposed UNTAG force numbers and insisted that internal elections would take place in December 1978. South Africa's strategy up to the Geneva pre-implementation conference had been to raise new issues (such as that of UN impartiality) or exaggerate existing ones just as others had been resolved. Geldenhuys points out that, "South Africa is notably skillful in playing for time, encouraged by the knowledge that the Western powers are reluctant to give up on their settlement initiative and are unwilling to impose sanctions." (40)

The South African government preferred the internal settlement option, and its taking part in the negotiations was due to pressure from the WCG. This preference is

illustrated by the fact that it kept the Turnhalle process apace with the negotiations and escalated its military occupation of the territory(41). Spicer points out that the South African government ensured that its options in Namibia remained open by pursuing the internal settlement option while taking part in the negotiations(42).

The Contact Group recognised that the internal process was South Africa's preferred option. Secretary Vance commented that, "By pressing forward with Turnhalle, South Africa created an instrument that gave it tactical flexibility in dealing with the contact group." (43) That the internal process was the South African government's preferred option had an impact on the tactics adopted by the Contact Group in its interaction with the South African government. The Group's emphasis was on continued South African participation in the process. Tactics used to achieve this were centred on the use of pressure throughout the first year of the initiative. It was also reflected in the proposals formulated by the Group and the concessions made to the South African government. The WCG accepted a major role for the South African Administrator General during the transition period, and diluted Resolution 385 to accommodate South Africa's position from UN "supervision and control" to stating that the UN Special Representative had to "satisfy himself" that the elections and the transition arrangements were in keeping with the WCG plan(44). They also accepted a residual force

of South African troops of 1,500 to be stationed at Grootfontein and Oshivello thus constituting another shift from Resolution 385. Moreover, in response to South African demands for the monitoring of SWAPO bases in the FLS, the DMZ proposals were introduced into the negotiations, and the South African government's position on the question of 20 SADF bases inside the DMZ accepted. When SWAPO and the FLS accepted this position, the issue of UN impartiality was brought to the fore. When a major proposal was offered to the South African government on this particular issue, as seen in the outline to the negotiations in Chapter 7, this was not accepted. Geldenhuys points out that the standpoint taken by the South African government was that it was up to the WCG to make concessions and not up to itself(45). That is, the WCG was made the target of bargaining.

South Africa's commitment to the internal settlement became more entrenched when P.W. Botha came to power in October 1978 and announced that the South African government would proceed with internal elections for December 1978. Even prior to Vorster's resignation, it was P.W. Botha, as Minister of Defence, who decided that the Waldheim plan of September 1978 for the implementation of the WCG proposals was not acceptable(46). While Vorster was willing to keep both options open, Botha stressed the internal settlement and enhanced its implementation.

The South African government's emphasis on an internal settlement and the promotion of the internal parties, specifically the DTA, as viable alternatives to SWAPO was especially evident throughout 1979 and up ^{to} the Geneva pre-implentation conference. Given the overlapping nature of the conflicts in the region, South Africa's options in the Namibia negotiations must be analysed in terms of its preferred options regionally. The fact that the Botha government adopted a policy of promoting the internal parties was in keeping with P.W. Botha's revival of the idea of a "constellation of states" or Consas in southern Africa at the end of 1979(47). While the objective of Consas was to be an economic organisation in southern Africa led by South Africa, it also aimed at gaining international recognition for the "bantustans", as well as for the internal settlements in Rhodesia and Namibia, which were to be part of the "constellation". Another objective was to complete non-aggression pacts between the FLS and South Africa. The overall aim, according to P.W. Botha, was for the countries in the region to develop a "common approach in the security field, the economic field, and the political field."(48) The promotion of an internal settlement was, therefore, in keeping with South Africa's preferred options regionally.

The policy of building up a constellation of states received a major setback with Robert Mugabe's victory in the Zimbabwe elections on 4th March 1980. It no longer

seemed plausible that an internal party would win a free election in Namibia, especially given the fact that South Africa's preferred party in Zimbabwe, that of Bishop Muzorewa, was heavily defeated in the election. The parallel in Namibia made a SWAPO victory imminent in UN-supervised elections(49).

Another setback for South Africa's regional strategy was the founding of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) on 1st April 1980(50). The creation of SADCC and its objectives(51) negated the main assumptions underlining South Africa's strategy of a constellation of States, namely that there were African governments willing to cooperate with it regionally (Malawi's decision to join SADCC underlined this). In relation to Namibia, SADCC invited SWAPO participation and has called for Namibia's participation after independence(52). This seemed to negate another assumption underlying Consas; that moderate black states were equally opposed to a SWAPO victory in Namibia(53).

South Africa's preferences in Namibia must also be analysed in terms of domestic policy. In the terms used in this study, these constituted intra-party factors. The extreme Right in the National Party of South Africa was opposed to any concessions on Namibia, and more importantly for P.W. Botha, to the instigation of internal reforms in South Africa. Andreas Treurnicht's rise to power in 1979 as the leader of the Transvaal National

Party meant that in National Party terms, he had become the second most powerful man in South African politics(54). Concessions on Namibia, therefore, would have major ramifications in South Africa itself. This was especially important in that ties exist between the Afrikaner population in Namibia and that in South Africa. One of the main parties opposed to the WCG proposals in Namibia, the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP), stressed the existence of these ties by linking the fate of the whites in Namibia to that of those in South Africa(55). Thus, P.W. Botha was reluctant to make concessions on Namibia and his preference for an internal settlement was also influenced by internal factors. Spence argues, "We may conclude that he was influenced by the threat of a right-wing backlash within his own party exposing his government to the accusation that 'appeasement' over Namibia could only be a prelude to greater pressures in due course on the more crucial and fundamental issue of apartheid." (56)

In Namibia itself, opposition to acceptance of the Western proposals had already started in 1977 when the National Party of South West Africa split with the defection of Dirk Mudge to form the Republic Party, which later became part of the DTA. In opposition, the leaders of the National Party formed Aktur (Action Front for the Retention of Turnhalle Principles) which was opposed to any reforms in apartheid laws in the territory. Aktur won

the election for the all-white Legislative Assembly in the second-tier ethnic elections of November 1980, an indication of the degree of the white constituency's opposition to the international settlement process.

That the above intra-party factors were important in South Africa's position on Namibia meant that one option open to third parties, that of appealing to internal factions and constituencies within one party(57) could not be adopted by the WCG. The Contact Group did, in fact, attempt this approach in October 1978, when the Foreign Ministers first went to Namibia prior to their meeting with P.W. Botha in Pretoria, and again during the pre-implementation meeting, when the German representatives on the WCG brought SWAPO and representatives of the German community together(58).

SWAPO also pursued a dual-track strategy by maintaining and even escalating PLAN operations inside Namibia (with guerilla attacks inside the territory averaging once per day(59)), while taking part in the negotiations. SWAPO stated throughout the negotiations that it would maintain its actions until Namibian independence and that, in accepting the WCG's offer of mediation, it "proceeded from the premise that political, diplomatic and military aspects of the struggle are not contradictory but complementary; and as such, they can be pursued concurrently."(60) SWAPO's dual track strategy was

not only a result of its mistrust of South African motives, but also of those of the Contact Group. Thus, it stated, "In the process of hammering out Resolution 435, SWAPO stood firm in rejecting attempts by the Five to make things easy for Pretoria. For instance, SWAPO rejected efforts by the Five to convince us that there was no need for the UN to have any military and large civilian presence in Namibia during the proposed transitional period; and that there was also no need for SWAPO to continue with the armed struggle after the negotiations had started." (61)

Although SWAPO kept up its operations, taking part in the negotiations meant that it had a less costly chance of achieving victory at UN-supervised elections. SWAPO, therefore, had more of a stake in the negotiations, especially because its preferred outcome was closer to that of the WCG than was the case as far as the South African government was concerned. This was because SWAPO had accepted Resolution 385 as a basis for Namibian independence.

As with the South African government, however, intra-party factors were important in the course of the negotiations. SWAPO's rejection of the Western proposals in April 1978 was due to intra-SWAPO opposition, apart from the nature of the proposals on the South African military presence and Walvis Bay. Prior to SWAPO's acceptance of the proposals in July 1978, a powerful

minority within the Executive Committee, including Peter Muesihange, SWAPO's Secretary for Foreign Affairs, were pressing for the abandonment of the negotiations and a commitment to all-out armed struggle. On the other hand, SWAPO's Representative at the UN, Theo Ben-Gurirab, and its Information Secretary for Western Europe, Peter Katjavivi, wished SWAPO to be more forthcoming in the negotiations(62). It is evident, therefore, that intra-party factors produced delays in the functioning of the WCG.

Thus, while the pursuit of original conflict strategies was a reflection of the inter-party relationship between the South African government and SWAPO, it was also for internal consumption. This was recognised to be a problem by the WCG. Ambassador McHenry noted that, "neither South Africa nor SWAPO is monolithic, though, publicly at least, each projects such an image of itself and of the other. Both sides have factions with differing views..which make decision-making processes on each side delicate and frequently time-consuming"(63). McHenry points out that this prompted intransigence on both sides during the negotiations.

The fact that both parties pursued dual-track strategies had implications for the pattern of interaction within the negotiation process. The main implication was that the parties sought concessions from the WCG and made

this the focus of their bargaining behaviour; a process which was enhanced by the fact that no face-to-face communication occurred between the parties, at least until the pre-implementation meeting in Geneva. The South African government sought concessions from the WCG on limiting the role of the UN Special Representative and enhancing the role of the Administrator General during the transition period. SWAPO sought concessions on the location of the residual South African presence and on Walvis Bay. Change in the position of the Contact Group on these issues, more clearly reflected in the Group's agreement to accept President Nyerere's compromise proposal on Walvis Bay, is a reflection of the influence of the negotiation system and bargaining posture taken by the parties on the third party's adjustment of tactics.

The negotiation system also consists of the party-patron relationship and this was defined, in Chapter 3, as the patron's set of preferred outcomes to the conflict; a patron's stake in the negotiation process; and a patron's level of support and commitment to its client. The relationship of the FLS to SWAPO and the means by which these provide support to the movement was discussed in Chapter 4. It is, however, important to point out that the acceptance of the WCG's role by the Presidents of the FLS was of major importance to the functioning of the Group, especially in its interaction with SWAPO. The FLS had a stake in the negotiation process and ensured SWAPO'S

cooperation. They acted as intermediaries between SWAPO and the WCG in suggesting compromise proposals (on Walvis Bay for example). They also had an impact on the proposals of the Five; the insistence on the necessity of a large UN peacekeeping force during the transition led to its inclusion in the April 1978 proposals for Namibian independence.

The WCG recognised the fact that the South African government would be more difficult to persuade than SWAPO, where great reliance could be placed on the FLS(64). As McHenry pointed out to the House Sub-Committee on Africa in May 1979, "SWAPO is now prepared to proceed with this settlement. So are the five..South Africa has not agreed and has said that it must consult with other Namibian political groups before it makes its decision. We recognise South Africa's desire to hold these consultations. But it is the South African government which must determine whether or not it will cooperate with the United Nations..that responsibility cannot be passed off to others." (65) This recognition also contributed to the WCG's decision not to comply with South African demands that SWAPO bases in the FLS be monitored by UNTAG. This was communicated to the South African government at the March 1979 proximity talks in New York, when they informed Pik Botha that the "Secretary General's report was consistent with the original proposal which South Africa had accepted." (66)

8.2.1.3- The Third Party's Conflict and Process Related Interests

Both the conflict-related and process-related interests of a third party influence the tactics adopted during interaction with the conflict system. They have an impact on the proposals formulated, the influence tactics used in order to gain concessions, and on decisions related to communication with the parties and between them. They also exert a modifying influence on the third party's set of preferred outcomes to the conflict.

As discussed in Chapter 6, the Contact Group members shared the conflict-related interests of maintaining economic links with South Africa, while promoting the relationship with the majority-ruled states in southern Africa and with Nigeria, whose economic significance to the West was increasingly recognised. It will also be recollected that the British government, in particular, had an interest in the overlapping conflict in Rhodesia and was involved with the United States government in promoting a settlement there. Moreover, West German government had the additional interest related to the presence of a substantial German community in Namibia.

The Group's priorities at the start of the initiative thus had a modifying influence on the members' process-related interests. The Group shared an interest in seeking to avoid the imposition of mandatory sanctions against

South Africa, while at the same time seeking to promote their relationship with the majority-ruled states and black Africa generally. For the Carter Administration it was especially important to acquire credibility in this region and to maintain credibility for the related action of the promotion of human rights generally. The intermediary role was, therefore, of value to members of the group.

In terms of the substantive proposals put forward by the Group, it ensured that these remained within the UN-framework in order to gain acceptance by the FLS and Nigeria, as well as the majority membership of the UN. Moreover, the British government's interest in an overlapping conflict, namely that over Rhodesia, had an implication on the language used in the proposals, the British representatives being more sensitive to South African demands and anxious not to alienate the South African government given that their influence with the Smith regime was required to gain any settlement of that conflict(67).

In order to maintain the negotiations and the participation of the South African government, the Group used pressure tactics against the South African government and worked in close cooperation with the FLS in order to gain concessions from SWAPO. However, when the time for implementing earlier threats against the South African government came in October 1978, the conflict-related

interest of maintaining the extensive economic relationship with the South African and other aspects of the relationship with South Africa acquired a higher priority. For example, the British government's recognition and cognisance of the extensive ties of kith and kin between Great Britain and the Republic led it to reject one of the items on the prepared sanctions list, that of requiring visa restrictions from South African visitors to Britain(68).

Apart from having a direct influence on the tactics adopted by the Group, the conflict and process-related interests of any third party also exert a modifying influence on the set of preferred outcomes to the conflict and on the third party's perceived influence potential.

8.2.1.4- Third Party Set of Preferred Outcomes

As suggested above and in the analytic framework, third party conflict-related and process-related interests have a modifying influence on the third party's preferred outcome to the conflict and its position on specific issues in the negotiations. These may change in response to the dynamic conditions of the conflict.

The Contact Group entered the negotiations with a commitment to a specific outcome to the conflict and a framework for the settlement process- based on Security

Council Resolution 385. This was essential for the credibility of the Western initiative and its acceptance by the FLS, the UN and SWAPO. This preference was evident in the Group's proposals which ensured a role for the UN during the transition period and in its rejection of South African preference for a Turnhalle-based arrangement. The Group's preference was also evident in its continued consultations with the UN Secretary General and in giving a primary role for the UN in the implementation negotiations(69).

It was also pointed out in the analytic framework that the negotiation system exerts a feedback influence on the third party's preference set and position on specific issues in the negotiations, so that the third party may change its position on specific issues and outcomes in response to such feedback. Thus, the Group's proposals responded to the demand for a large UN peacekeeping force, as demanded by the FLS and SWAPO. Such feedback was also evident in the Group's change of position on Walvis Bay, from a preference for "shelving" the issue to a public statement that it should be incorporated as an integral part of Namibia.

In its interaction with the South African government, the Group's preference set, apart from being evident in its final proposals of April 1978 (S/12636), was also important in its bargaining posture on specific issues during the negotiations. This was especially the case in

its refusal to accept the Turnhalle arrangements for the transition period. This was the main issue of the negotiations in June 1977, when Ambassador McHenry pointed out that the Turnhalle structure was unacceptable because it was based on an ethnic division of the population. The impact of a feedback influence from the negotiation system to the Group's position on specific issues was evident in October 1978 and its response to the South African government's decision to go ahead with internal elections. The Group was opposed to the elections, but agreed at the end of talks with the South African government on a joint statement which indicated that the Group had agreed that the elections would go ahead and that the South African government would then persuade the resultant Constituent Assembly to cooperate with the UN Special Representative.

As well as being subject to immediate influence from the negotiation system, particularly the position taken by the South African government, the Group members' preference sets were also modified by their conflict and process-related interests. Thus, while the Five still preferred Security Council Resolution 435 as a basis for Namibian independence, there was a reluctance to impose sanctions against South Africa and as much of an interest in avoiding calls for sanctions at the UN. At the end of the October 1978 talks in Pretoria, when the joint WCG-South African communique was issued, the Canadian Secretary for External Affairs, Don Jamieson, stated that

the real objective of the compromise formula was to avert UN sanctions against trade with South Africa. Jamieson disclosed that the five foreign ministers regarded this "agreement" with South Africa as "sufficient progress" to postpone both a Security Council debate as well as Security Council action against South Africa. He acknowledged that no agreement had been reached on either of the central objectives sought by the five; postponement or dilution of the December election(70). The importance of averting calls for sanctions at the scheduled Security Council debate in November 1978 is also indicated by the fact that Ambassadors Young and McHenry had attempted to persuade the African governments not to put forward a resolution calling for sanctions in case of South African non-compliance on Security Council Resolution 435(71). In the event, the Resolution (439 of 13 November 1978) was put forward and the five abstained. In order to regain Western credibility, President Carter signed legislation (the Evans Amendment) restricting Export-Import Bank financing for trade to South Africa on 10th November; before the Security Council debate. As Cyrus Vance states, however, "Western credibility with the African states was damaged by this vote." (72)

The above discussion has shown that a third party's preference set is an important factor in its choice of tactics and that this factor is subject to change as a result of a feedback from the negotiation system (for

example, in the form of an informational feedback from the bargaining posture taken by the parties in conflict). It was also argued that the third party's preference set may also be influenced by its conflict-related interests as well as by its process-related interests. However, a third party's position on issues in the negotiation (preference set) and tactics used are also affected by its influence potential.

8.2.1.5- Third Party Influence Potential

As defined in the analytic framework, any third party's influence potential derives from the resources which a third party possesses and which are [i] valued by the parties in conflict and/or their allies and [ii] may be used by the third party in an attempt at changing the parties' evaluations of the benefits of compliance as opposed to the costs of non-compliance. A third party's influence has direct impact on the tactical decisions made in the course of its functioning as intermediary. The parallel was made that as in any negotiation system, the resources of the negotiators form an important part of their bargaining positions.

As indicated in the discussion of the Group's tactics, the WCG used the threat of withdrawal of their veto at the Security Council to influence the South African government into concessions and continued

participation in the negotiations. The Contact Group relied mainly on its members' extensive relationship with South Africa, on the collective nature of the initiative, and on the fact that three of the members had the resource of the veto at the Security Council. During the first year of the negotiations, the WCG threatened the South African government with the withdrawal of the veto at the Security Council in response to sanctions resolutions if compliance in the international negotiations was not forthcoming. The South African government took note of these threats by agreeing to take part in the negotiations despite the fact that it did not abandon its plans for the internal settlement. As Geldenhuys points out, "while there might have been some element of 'bluff-calling' in South Africa's conduct, it is unlikely that Pretoria always dismissed sanctions talk as Western sabre-rattling." (73)

Participants in the Contact Group saw their influence potential with South Africa as deriving primarily from the collective nature of the initiative and the fact that all five had a close relationship with South Africa. As stated by Ambassador McHenry, the joint Western initiative meant greater pressure could be imposed on the South African government which could not rely on any divisions within the Western camp on sanctions (74). The coalition factor, therefore, contributed to the Group's perception of its influence potential.

Differences in the willingness of the member governments to impose limited sanctions did, however, arise in October 1978. The credibility of the Western threat was completely diminished at this stage when the five Foreign Ministers made an unsuccessful attempt to gain South Africa's cancellation of the internal elections scheduled for December 1978. Opposition to the implementation of the sanctions threat came from the British government(75), although British members of the Contact Group denied that this was the case(76). There were also differences of opinion as to the effectiveness of such measures on the South African government. Vance points out that the "British in particular doubted that any measures the group's political leadership would be willing to adopt would have much effect on South Africa." (77) Members of the United States government, specifically Andrew Young and Don McHenry believed that stronger pressure should have been imposed in October 1978. Young especially believed that the negotiations would be futile without the back-up of sanctions(78). However, sanctions were the preferred source of influence not only vis-a-vis the South African government, but also to maintain credibility with the UN and the FLS, whose cooperation was of value to the Group and its dealing with SWAPO. Thus, the Group's relationship with South Africa was not only a source of influence with the South African government, but also with the FLS and SWAPO(79). The latter perceived the Western governments as the only

parties capable of influencing the South African government and the only ones maintaining communication between the two sides(80).

While the Group's relationship with South Africa was an important source of influence both with the South African government and the FLS and SWAPO, the Group's relationship with the FLS was an essential influence route to SWAPO. It was, however, also important in dealing with "those countries which normally would have moved on some kind of action at the UN" (81). Don McHenry revealed that the FLS were helpful in persuading such actors as Algeria and the UN Council for Namibia not to call for action which would undermine the initiative(82).

As indicated in Chapter 6, the Contact Group members had the access to communications facilities which enabled them to carry out such a complex, multilateral mediation initiative. Such access was, however, also uniquely valuable in terms of intelligence information on the activities of the parties, specifically the South African government. Ambassador McHenry revealed that, with the exception of the Kassinga raid on 4 May 1978(83), the United States government was aware of South African military operations against the FLS. The South African government was warned not to take action on several occasions when they prepared military incursions into the FLS. Access to intelligence information was also used

prior to the holding of the Geneva pre-implementation meeting in January 1981. The WCG was opposed to this meeting because the United States had vital information which indicated that the South African government was intent on using it for propaganda purposes(84). This information enabled the WCG to warn the FLS and SWAPO that the meeting was not a genuine attempt at a settlement and made them insist that if it did take place, it should be under UN auspices(85). It is unlikely that such resources would be available to non-official mediators.

The Contact Group also had available the personal skill of Don McHenry and James Murray who tended to be the most active participants in the Group(86) and were involved in its work in a day-to-day basis. This meant that the momentum of the negotiations could be kept up, thereby increasing the pressure on the South African government(87).

8.2.1.6- Third Party Constituency Input

The analytic framework suggested that constituency groups (or even members of the governments "back home") may have an impact on a third party's choice of tactics. It was also suggested that this input may not be continuous but may influence major decisions during the negotiations, as opposed to the day-to-day formulation of proposals. This section examines whether this was an important factor in

the functioning of the Contact Group in its intermediary role. It will show that while constituencies of the five did attempt to have an input into the tactical decisions of the WCG, the impact of this on the actual decisions is not easily identified.

In the United States, for example, the Black Caucus was kept informed of the state of the negotiations but, according to Young, "trusted" his judgement and that of McHenry in the negotiations(88). One part of the overall constituency which was very important, however, was that centred around Dr. Brzezinski. As stated in Chapter 6, Brzezinski, as National Security Adviser, had a different approach from Mr. Vance and the State Department to global problems in general and to African problems in particular. The former emphasised the East-West conflict while the latter sought local solutions to local problems. The first manifestation of this conflict came during the Shaba crises in 1978 and the crises in the Horn of Africa(89), when Brzezinski favoured more direct intervention by the United States(90). He also favoured a more public stance made by the Carter Administration to the effect that they were countering Soviet expansion in Africa. However, Vance stated that, while differences existed between the NSC and the State Department, they did not spill over into policies on the settlement processes in the Middle East and southern Africa(91). The cold war view did, however, begin to prevail from late 1978 to the end of the Carter

Administration. Thus, with regard to insisting on sanctions in 1978 when the South African government decided on internal elections, the Carter Administration became reluctant to do so. According to Young, at this stage there was a right-wing backlash and, therefore, "the climate was not right even for the United States to press ahead on sanctions" (92).

That members of the Carter Administration were aware of possible Congressional opposition to policy in southern Africa was also indicated with regard to the issue of the recognition of Angola. This did not go ahead, despite insistence from Vance and State Department (93).

Constituency pressure was also evident in the FRG. Groups within West Germany which had direct links with the German community in Namibia attempted to influence the Federal Government during the negotiations. The pro-DTA lobby in West Germany condemned the position taken by the Federal Government in insisting on UN-supervised elections, which these organisations saw as a clear path to a SWAPO victory in Namibia and a "selling out" of the German community. This position was mainly taken by the pro-DTA Christian Social Union, who condemned the position taken by the Government as being in support of a "communist" and "terrorist" take-over of Namibia (94). According to the then West German Ambassador to the UN, however, such opposition was voiced to the Foreign Ministry but was not influential in the stance taken

during the negotiations(95).

During the negotiations, the British Anti-Apartheid Movement attempted to change the stance taken by the Contact Group on the issue of Walvis Bay(96). The final decision taken by the Group on this issue, however, seems to have been more a result of President Nyerere's proposal for a compromise Security Council Resolution than a result of constituency pressure.

Constituency pressure may also come from the third party's government "back home". This was an important factor in Dr. Owen's reluctance to impose limited sanctions against South Africa in October 1978. Indications are that Owen himself was not opposed, but that other members of the Cabinet were(97).

As with the West German opposition political parties, opposition to participation in the Contact Group and its support of Resolution 435 was also voiced by opposition members in the Canadian Parliament, namely the Progressive Conservatives. This was not, however, a unanimous position on the part of the opposition(98).

The link between the French constituency and the behaviour of the French government in the WCG is difficult to ascertain given the inactivity of the French government in the mediation process during the first phase of the negotiations. In September 1980, this inactivity did come

under criticism, however, when the Gaullist leader, Jacques Chirac, accused the Government of President Giscard d'Estaing of not having an Africa policy and suggested that he would take personal charge of a new conference on Namibia(99).

8.2.1.7- The Intra-Coalition Situation

Relationships within a coalition intermediary are another important input into the tactical decisions made by a coalition third party and its members. The main intra-coalition factors to consider are [i] the level of cohesion within a coalition; [ii] the distribution of influence potential; and [iii] the degree of communication and consultation among the members. All three factors can be subject to change during a coalition third party's involvement in a conflict.

During Phase 1 of the Namibian negotiations, the level of cohesion within the WCG was high, especially at the start of the initiative. There was general agreement on the preferred outcome to the conflict and on the tactics to be used. All five agreed on the necessity of an internationally recognised outcome and were opposed to the Turnhalle process. They also shared opposition to the imposition of mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa. The five supported UN Security Council Resolution 418 which imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa and were united in condemning the South African

raid on Kassinga on 4 May 1978(100).

According to Ambassador McHenry, there were no significant disagreements on the proposals put forward during the negotiations when he was involved in the WCG up to 1979(101). There was, however, disagreement on the issue of SWAPO bases inside Namibia, which, as seen in the outline to the negotiations, became a major issue after the proposals put forward by the Secretary General in February 1979. The South African government stated that this allowed SWAPO to gain bases in Namibia which it did not possess. McHenry maintained that this was a provision for those SWAPO fighters already in the territory at the time of the ceasefire declaration(102). British opinion, namely that of James Murray, was that SWAPO did not have bases inside Namibia and should not, therefore, be allowed to gain through the UN what it had failed to achieve through war(103). This seemed to be an example of the British negotiators being more sensitive to the South African position than their United States counterparts(104).

British sensitivity to the South African government's position was tied to the fact that their primary conflict-related interest lay in an overlapped conflict, namely that of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and the settlement process therein. This apparently led the British government to see a "Rhodesia implication" in tactics adopted by the Group

over Namibia(105). This difference in approach and priorities in the region was manifest in the language used in the proposals and, at one point in the negotiations, in the timing of presentation of proposals(106). When, for example, the WCG was seeking agreement from SWAPO on the interim arrangements in 1977(107), Dr. Owen insisted, according to Cyrus Vance's account, that the Contact Group should not wait until they had resolved all SWAPO's problems and that it should present the parties with a comprehensive list of proposals. According to Vance, Dr. Owen was "deeply concerned with the interaction of the Rhodesia and Namibian negotiations. The Contact Group, he argued, should not push the Namibia negotiations with South Africa so hard that Pretoria withdrew from the process. If they did the Western powers would have no means for avoiding sanctions and 'our strategy for dealing with the more urgent Rhodesia issue could be damaged'"(108). Dr. Owen's position was taken into account and the proposals were presented in October 1977 despite the fact that agreement had not been reached on the details of the UN role during the transition period, the issue of South African troop withdrawal and the status of Walvis Bay. This indicates that other members of the Group were willing to accommodate an individual participant's interests when these arose. In this case, the conflict-related interest of one of the participants of the coalition had an impact on the timing of the presentation of proposals to the parties. Moreover, when

the October proposals were rejected, the British and French governments "seemed tempted to go along with an internal settlement"(109). They were persuaded into another round of talks, the proximity talks of February 1978(110).

Group cohesion again had an impact on tactics in October 1978 when the Group decided not to table the sanctions list prepared by its officials. Vance suggested that this was due to British opposition(111). Indications are, however, that the United States government was also reluctant to impose sanctions at this stage, especially due to Congressional defeats for Carter.

The distribution of influence, defined in the analytic framework as "who has what in relation to whom" also had an impact on the choice of tactics by the WCG and slightly changed during this phase of the negotiations. At the start of the initiative, the close relationship which was built up between McHenry and Young and Angola's President Neto was of vital importance to the functioning of the Group and continued cooperation by the FLS. According to the former British Ambassador to South Africa, Sir David Scott, the United States in the person of Don McHenry was the dominant member among the New York Contact Group while among the Ambassadors in Pretoria, Scott had the greatest access to the South African government(112). Contact Group sessions were still carried

out collectively, with presentation of proposals being rotated among the Group members, as will be recalled from Chapter 7.

A change occurred in the distribution of influence vis-a-vis the South African government when the Conservative Party came to power in Britain in May 1979. The new British Government believed that it had more influence with the South African government and became the main communicator with the South African government(113). Thus, during the stalemate which characterised 1979 over the issue of SWAPO bases inside Namibia and their monitoring in the FLS, the task of communicating the DMZ proposals to the South African government was carried out by Sir James Murray, who was appointed envoy to the Group(114).

During the first phase of the Contact Group's functioning, there was a high degree of communication and consultation between the members of the Group. Thus, it acted collectively in the formulation of proposals and in communicating with the parties. The main focus of activity, as discussed earlier, was at the UN where the Group formulated proposals, and the group nature of the initiative was enhanced through rotating members' presentation of these to the parties. This process changed during the second phase of the negotiations.

8.2.2- Analysis of the WCG Tactics During Phase Two

This phase saw major changes in the tactics adopted by the Group and the nature of the coalition. The main factor contributing to the change was the Reagan Administration's interest priorities in the region, its process-related interests and its preference set. This had an impact on the functioning of the Group as a coalition and on the tactics adopted.

8.2.2.1- The Conflict Characteristics

While the underlying features of the conflict remained unchanged (in terms of the issues in the conflict and the parties), this period saw an escalation of the conflict, especially as regards South African incursions into the FLS.

The fact that the conflict over Namibia overlapped with others in the region became of critical importance to the functioning of the Group. This specifically related to the Reagan Administration's conflict-related interest priorities in the region. As a result, Angola became the main focus of the negotiations.

New issues were also introduced into the negotiations while the broad issue in the conflict was that of Namibian independence as opposed to an internal settlement. The new issues related to the constitution of an independent

Namibia and the form of the electoral system. Moreover, the issues in the conflict over Namibia became inextricably linked to issues in the Angolan conflict situation particularly those of the Cuban presence and UNITA.

8.2.2.2- The Negotiation System

The negotiation system formed an important feedback influence on the Contact Group's choice of tactics during this phase of the negotiations as was especially evident in the parties' bargaining positions on issues introduced into the negotiations by the third party. The negotiation system also had a modifying influence on the preference sets of the individual members of the WCG and on the intra-coalition situation.

As with the analysis of the negotiation system in the first phase of the negotiations, South Africa's preferences in Namibia must be analysed within the broader context of its policies regionally and in South Africa itself. Regionally, the policy of destabilisation of the FLS acquired dominance, with the ultimate aim being to gain non-aggression pacts, especially with Angola and Mozambique(115). The aim was to deny SWAPO and the ANC sanctuary in the neighbouring states. This policy culminated in the Nkomati Accord of 1984(116) and the agreement between Angola and South Africa after the Lusaka conference of February 1984, setting up a joint commission

(JMC) to monitor the border with Namibia. South Africa's policy of regional destabilisation was linked to P.W. Botha's position internally. The right-wing backlash in South Africa, culminating in the split in the National Party and the creation of the Conservative Party under Dr. Treurnicht in 1982, endangered P.W. Botha's policies internally. Thus, Botha's preference for an internal settlement in Namibia was further entrenched because of the splits in the National Party in South Africa(117). This indicates that the negotiation system is subject to feedback from the mediation process.

P.W. Botha's preferences internally and regionally were recognised and supported by Chester Crocker. Such recognition underlined the policy of "constructive engagement" which he promoted(118). The impact on tactics over Namibia was to offer the South Africans concessions related to their opposition to a SWAPO victory in Namibia. The initial introduction of the proposal for a constitution prior to an election, was aimed at gaining South Africa's return to the negotiations(119). This was also aimed at gaining white Namibian approval for the settlement of the conflict(120). This was also the case in relation to the issue of the dual-vote system.

Even when the South African government claimed acceptance of the Western proposals (at times before these were tabled by the WCG), indications were that it was not

willing to settle the conflict according to Resolution 435. At the inter-party level, SWAPO's ability to win a UN-supervised election was recognised by the South African government. Moreover, at the war front, South Africa's claims of defeating the guerrilla organisation after major operations such as "Operation Askari" seemed to lack credibility given continued SWAPO infiltration(121). The South African preference, therefore, was to maintain Namibia as a buffer zone against the perceived "total onslaught" from the north. The South African occupation of Namibia meant that the frontier was pushed up 1,800 Km from the Orange to the Cunene river(122). What factors would influence the South African government to withdraw? The cost of the Namibian occupation amounted to R1,000-million/year and with gold prices down by half, this was a heavy economic burden(123). Secondly, the Reagan Administration, wanted a Namibia settlement as a means of gaining credibility for the Administration in African eyes(124). If South Africa sought friendly relations with the United States, it would concede on Namibia. This cost, however, disappeared when it appeared that the Reagan Administration was willing to make Cuban withdrawal a priority and continue cooperative relations with South Africa in the absence of any such concessions(125).

At the intra-party level, the South African government faced a Right-wing backlash at home and white opposition in Namibia itself. As indicated above, the

National Party in Namibia was opposed to any international settlement. Moreover, the South African government's hope was that the DTA may win such elections. However, the DTA's ability to succeed where Bishop Muzorewa had failed seemed unlikely, given that it continued to espouse ethnic separation as advocated by the South African government. The DTA's credibility amongst the black Namibian population was further damaged with the breakaway, in February 1982, of the DTA president, Mr. Peter Kalangula, who represented the Ovambo, forming 48% of the population(126). This would indicate, therefore, that in any UN-supervised election, SWAPO would seem to be the certain victor.

South Africa's regional policy and the Reagan Administration's emphasis on South Africa's "security needs" (127) was also a factor in the introduction to the negotiations of the issue of linkage of Namibian independence to Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola and in the promotion of peace pacts between South Africa and the FLS. This was a manifestation of the collusion of interests between the South African government and the Reagan Administration.

Adjustment of tactics in response to feedback from the negotiation system was also evident during this phase of the negotiations. The proposal of a constitution before an election was rejected by both SWAPO and the FLS. This led to an adjustment of the Group's proposals to the more

limited constitutional guarantees for the white minority prior to an election. The Contact Group also readjusted its position on the proposal for a dual vote system, which was abandoned in response to opposition from SWAPO and the FLS.

8.2.2.3- Third Party Conflict and Process Related Interests

A major factor which led to a change in the conduct of the negotiations by the Group was the change in the interest priorities of the incoming Reagan Administration. With the Cold War gaining primacy as a general approach to foreign policy, the Angolan conflict, specifically the presence of Cuban troops and the future of UNITA, became the central focus of the Reagan Administration's policy in the region(128). Thus, linkage became a priority and finally led to open military support for UNITA, following the repeal of the Clark Amendment(129). As seen earlier, this became the main issue in the negotiations. A primary process-related interest was to combat Cuban and Soviet influence in southern Africa.

The relationship between third party conflict-related interests and tactics is also illustrated by the activities of the Federal Government in the negotiations. The main interest for the FRG continued to be the presence in Namibia of^a substantial German community. As will be

recalled, this interest contributed to the West German government's initial decision to participate in the Contact Group. It also explained the activism of the West German negotiators, including the Foreign Minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher, in the formulation of the proposal for an electoral system in Namibia based on the German model of proportional representation and support for the proposal of a Bill of Rights to replace the Reagan Administration's preference for a full constitution prior to an election(130). This interest was also a factor in the West German government's high level contacts with SWAPO. Sam Nujoma was officially invited to Bonn by the Foreign Minister in June 1982, and the latter also attempted to act as intermediary between Nujoma and Chester Crocker in arranging a meeting between the two during the former's visit(131). The Foreign Minister also emphasised the importance of developing a relationship between the German community and SWAPO. The aim of this policy was to ensure a level of trust between a future SWAPO government and the German community. Thus, the Foreign Ministry arranged a meeting between SWAPO and the Interessengemeinschaft Sudwester (Common Interest Association of German-speaking South West African or IG), the main German speaking interest group in Namibia at the Geneva pre-implementation meeting in January 1981 and again in 1983 when an IG delegation visited Harare(132).

8.2.2.4- Third Party Set of Preferred Outcomes

As suggested in the analytic framework, the third party's preference set is modified by its conflict and process-related interests as well as by the feedback influence of the negotiation system. The major factor which led to changes in the functioning of the Contact Group during this phase of the process was the Reagan Administration's interest priorities, with its emphasis being on combating Soviet and Cuban influence in the region. This influenced the Reagan Administration's preference for the proposal for attaining a constitution prior to the holding of elections in order to limit the impact of a SWAPO victory in any UN supervised elections. A factor in this preference set was also, as indicated above, the South African government's fears of a SWAPO victory. This new proposal for Namibian independence emanated from the Reagan Administration prior to consultations with the other members of the Group. As will be discussed below, it was partly the intra-coalition situation which led to changes in this proposal. It is sufficient to state here that the Reagan Administration's preference set was the major factor which led to the introduction of changes in the original approach to Namibian independence. Feedback from the intra-coalition situation (opposition from other members of the WCG) and the negotiation system (in the form of opposition from SWAPO and the FLS) led to changes in this preference from a full constitution to the

introduction of constitutional guarantees.

The introduction of linkage was also due to the Reagan Administration's interests in the region. Cuban withdrawal and the modalities of Cuban withdrawal in parallel to South African withdrawal formed part of the Reagan Administration's preference set in the negotiation process. In this case, however, opposition from the coalition members and from the negotiation system (SWAPO, Angola and the FLS) did not lead to any abandonment of this preference due primarily to constituency factors, as will be indicated below. It is important to point out at this stage that this commitment to linkage had a major impact on the functioning of the Group as coalition intermediary. This was manifest in the fact that the other four members of the Group did not become involved in the negotiations over this issue.

The Reagan Administration's preference for linkage meant that the United States government's role within the WCG was also being used to attain its own interests in the region. This emphasises a point made earlier, that the role of an interested third party acting as intermediary is difficult to distinguish from the role of a negotiator. It reinforces the assertion made in the analytic framework that it is best to consider an interested third party as a negotiator in its own right, having its own bargaining position and being, itself, a focus of the parties' bargaining behaviour.

While linkage formed part of the Reagan Administration's preference set, this was not the case for the other four members of the Group. They were, however, persuaded to include the issue in a collective set of proposals in June 1982 under the general heading of "other regional issues". This indicates an adjustment of tactics due to influence from a coalition member as well as from the the negotiation system, in that by this stage the South African government was citing Cuban withdrawal as a major precondition for progress towards implementation of Resolution 435(133). The fact that the Group accepted inclusion of the issue in an official text of the WCG, it did not indicate that the other four members of the Group had accepted the issue, as statements later indicated(134).

The other four members' preferred outcome, based on Resolution 435, meant that they had to persuade the US Administration to abandon a "Zimbabwe model" for Namibian independence. Their preference sets, therefore, were important in attaining changes in the United States Administration's approach and in gaining a compromise proposal for constitutional guarantees as opposed to a full constitution prior to the holding of an election for a Constituent Assembly.

8.2.2.5- Constituency Input

The constituency factor was an important input into Under-Secretary Crocker's conduct of the negotiations. According to several sources(135), the main factor in the maintenance of the linkage issue was White House influence, although Secretary of State Haig also considered this to be of overriding priority(136). Apparently, Crocker would have accepted Namibian independence prior to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola(137). White House influence on the negotiations was ensured through the involvement first, of William Clark, a personal friend of the President, and then of Vernon Walters and Frank Wisner, both of the National Security Council. Right wing lobby groups, such as the Heritage Foundation, formed an important constituency for the Reagan Administration(138). These dominated constituency influence over those opposed to the linkage issue.

The position of the constituency opposed to linkage was best elaborated by Representative Howard Wolpe (Democrat), then chairperson of the House Subcommittee on Africa. He stated in Congress, "...the moment we offered up the linkage, we essentially complicated the process and gave those elements of the South African government that wanted a reason to continue to delay and to continue to pursue a Namibia policy on two tracks...I would argue that the policy of constructive engagement was essentially announcing in advance a series of diplomatic carrots, and

also...that there is nothing that we can really contemplate that South Africa might do internally, in the region, and on Namibia, that will prompt any kind of real pressure or sanction by the United States." (139)

The main constituency which opposed the West German Foreign Minister's stance came from the CSU which formed a coalition government with the CDU and the Federal Party in 1982. Despite the change of government, however, there was continuity in approach given the fact that Herr Genscher, as leader of the Federal Party, maintained his position as Foreign Minister. This meant that key positions within the Africa Department of the Foreign Ministry remained unchanged(140). Herr Franz-Josef Strauss, leader of the CSU, was opposed to Genscher's preference for Resolution 435 and his promotion of relations between SWAPO and the German community in Namibia. Strauss demanded full recognition and support for the DTA, to which his party contributed substantial funding(141); the withdrawal of support from Resolution 435; and the reopening of the German consulate in Windhoek(142). Despite continuing efforts to change government policy, however, this was not effective(143). Strauss did, however, attempt to have an impact on the negotiations by communicating with the Reagan Administration on the Namibia issue, since he perceived a commonality of interest(144). Despite the fact that it was claimed that this constituency factor had no impact on the West German government's contribution to

the WCG initiative, it may have contributed to West German activism on the formulation of constitutional guarantees to supplement Resolution 435.

In the United Kingdom, while there were those who sought greater pressure on the South African government in order to gain compliance to Resolution 435(145), there were also those, within the Conservative Party, who praised the internal settlement process(146).

8.2.2.6- Influence Potential

The five members of the WCG maintained their opposition to sanctions as a form of influence with the South African government. The Reagan Administration used "constructive engagement" as a policy of reward to gain South African concessions on Namibia. The introduction by the Reagan Administration of the proposal for a constitution prior to an election was one such tactic. The promotion of relations between the United States Administration and the South African government was defended by the Reagan Administration as being an influence tactic to gain South African trust for United States policy in southern Africa(147). While the previous Administration used the extensive relationship to threaten the South African government into abandoning the internal settlement for an internationally recognisable process, the present Administration used the same relationship to reward the

South African government. Although the Carter Administration used reward tactics, these were limited to diplomatic relations and were, moreover, conditional. The Reagan Administration refused to make reward conditional upon South African concessions(148). This was manifest in the promotion of military cooperation between the two countries(149).

The fact that the Reagan Administration did not make reward conditional has prompted suggestions that the policy of "constructive engagement" amounted to collusion with the South African government rather than a tactical means of acquiring influence with the Pretoria regime(150). The fact that the South African government continued its policy of carrying out major SADF operations into the FLS while the US vetoed condemnation of such action at the Security Council seems to corroborate this interpretation of constructive engagement(151).

As far as influence with the FLS and SWAPO was concerned, the Administration felt that constitutional proposals and the linkage issue could be introduced into the negotiations since the US was seen as the only party which could deliver the South African government. This was indicated by Dr. Crocker as early as February 1981 and repeated subsequently(152).

8.2.2.7- The Intra-Coalition Situation

The intra-coalition situation provided a major influence on the conduct of the negotiations by the WCG. Division within the Group was at its highest level since the start of the initiative. The distribution of influence was mainly skewed in favour of the US participants and the level of consultation between the members was at its lowest since 1977. Division within the Group led to changes in the proposals formulated by the USA for a constitution prior to an election and to the fact that the negotiations on linkage were conducted "in parallel", rather being integral to the Namibia negotiations.

As indicated in the discussion of the tactics adopted by the WCG, the Reagan Administration introduced the issues of linkage and constitutional guarantees without prior consultation with its coalition partners. Both issues created division within the Group. The linkage issue was not endorsed by the other four members who publicly dissociated themselves from it, despite their agreement to place the issue in an official WCG document in June 1982. The fact that there was no specific mention of the issue of Cuban withdrawal from Angola, but a reference to "other regional issues" may be an indication of attempts within the Group to find a compromise formula between the US stance on this and the position taken by

the other four. It is clear, however, that because the other four members of the Group chose to dissociate themselves from the linkage issue, the US Administration was the only member involved in bilateral negotiations with the governments of Angola and South Africa specifically on this issue.

Division within the WCG on the issue of Cuban linkage led to the other members of the coalition taking up the role of intermediary between the US negotiators and the parties within the negotiation system. The French government promoted discussions between Dr. Crocker and the Angolan Foreign Minister, Paulo Jorge, in January 1982, and Herr Genscher promoted discussions between Crocker and Sam Nujoma in June 1982. This illustrates the point that third parties may occupy a number of roles when involved in a conflict. In this case, the French and West German governments were involved as members of the coalition WCG; they were also acting as intermediaries between their coalition partner and parties in the conflict. The FLS, (specifically Angola) attempted to use the other members of the WCG as such in order to influence the Reagan Administration to abandon the linkage issue as a precondition to Namibian independence.

As mentioned earlier, the level of consultation between the members, specifically between the US contingent and the other four, had also diminished during Phase II of the negotiations. The US Administration

introduced new issues to the process, (including the issue of a constitution prior to an election and linkage) prior to consultation with other members of the Group. Compared to Phase I of the negotiations, this was a major departure from previous practice, a point confirmed by the former West German Ambassador to the UN and a British participant in the Group(153).

Given the improved relationship between the new US Administration and the South African government under the policy of "constructive engagement", the distribution of influence within the coalition also changed, with the US negotiators communicating mostly with the South African government and the other members of the WCG communicating with SWAPO and the FLS. Since the US negotiators were the prime movers during this phase of the negotiations, this meant that the FLS governments attempted to influence the US Administration through the European members of the Group.

8.3- Conclusion

The above analysis of the Contact Group's conduct of the negotiations since April 1977 to the breakdown of the negotiations over the linkage issue illustrated major changes between the first and second Phases of the negotiations. The change in the US Administration and the Reagan Administration's new interest priorities in the

region had a major impact on the functioning of the Group and on the substantive content of the negotiations.

The objective of this Chapter has been firstly to illustrate the range of tactics used by an interested third party functioning as intermediary; and, secondly, to indicate factors which influence a third party's choice of tactics during its interaction with the parties in conflict.

Our discussion of the Contact Group's tactics has shown that the involvement of an interested third party in a conflict as intermediary is best analysed by considering the third party as bargainer in its own right and forming part of a multilateral negotiation system. Thus, the WCG used bargaining tactics throughout its involvement in the negotiations and was itself the target of bargaining by the parties in conflict. However, the Contact Group has also carried out functions traditionally associated with mediators, including the communication of the parties' positions and the formulation of proposals. Apart from bargaining with the parties on specific issues (for example, Walvis Bay in the first phase and linkage in the second), the Group has also used influence tactics which ranged from persuasion to threat to reward. (The last was specifically used by the Reagan Administration under its policy of "constructive engagement"). The directive nature of the Group's tactics has pointed to the problem of

making a clear-cut distinction between third parties which function as intermediaries and those which are interveners, a distinction originally suggested by Oran Young.

The assumption that an interested third party is also a negotiator in its own right has aided in proposing a number of factors which could (jointly) influence third party choice of tactics in interaction with the conflict system. Thus it was shown that the third party's own interests in the conflict, as well as interests in holding the intermediary role itself, influence its preferences in the negotiations, and therefore, the tactics adopted. It was also indicated that a third party's tactics may be influenced by its constituency. The interactive nature of the process also meant that the Group's tactics were subject to feedback influence from the negotiation system. (The abandonment of the dual vote electoral system was due to opposition from SWAPO and the FLS, for example). The intra-coalition situation is also an important factor in the functioning and behavioural output of any coalition third party. The fact that each member of a coalition is a bargainer in its own right has implications on the functioning of the group as a whole and its pattern of interaction with the conflict system.

While the analysis of the WCG's conduct of the negotiations has pointed to several factors as being influential in an interested third party's choice of

tactics, it has also pointed to problems of assuming a one-to-one relationship between each of the factors suggested and the tactics adopted by the third party. Given the interactive nature of the process, however, it is safe to conclude that these factors jointly influence third party behaviour at any specific time during its interaction with the conflict system.

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1973, p. 117.

1- Interview with Ambassador Wilton, op. cit.

2- GARDNER, D. G. D. & HALL, J. (1961). The Peace Process. London, 1961, p. 142.

3- VANCE, WALTER. What the UN sought to avoid the issue of... (1963) p. 273.

4- Fisher refers to Lewis-Edwards as a "hard bargaining" leader within the "negotiation game". See Fisher, R. J. "Playing the Peace Game", in: Fisher, J. E. (ed.) - Crossroads of Third Party Intervention and Mediation in the Middle East. Praeger, New York, 1967, p. 117.

5- VANCE'S statement after meeting with Prime Minister... (1970), p. 242-243.

6- Ibid.

7- JACOBSON, D. "United Nations: Analysis", Statement at the US General Assembly World Council Meeting on Middle East April 1976, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 94, No. 2018, p. 86.

8- Vance, op. cit. p. 242.

9- Goldhamer, G. The Dynamics of Indignity. (1971) p. 103.

10- Interview with... (1976) p. 103.

11- Interview with... (1976) p. 103.

Chapter 8- Notes

- 1- Interview with Ambassador McHenry, Washington D.C., 15/6/87.
- 2- Ibid.
- 3- Ibid.
- 4- Ibid.
- 5- McHenry, D., Statement before the Cape Town Press Club, Cape Town, South Africa, 1 May 1978, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 78, No. 2015, June 1978, p.55.
- 6- Interview with Ambassador McHenry, op. cit.
- 7- SWAPO, To Be Born A Nation, (Zed Press, London, 1981), p.242.
- 8- Vance states that the WCG sought to avoid the issue of Walvis Bay since it was based on legal interpretation. Vance, C., Hard Choices, (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1983), p. 279.
- 9- Fisher refers to issue-linkage as a "hard bargaining" tactic within the "negotiation game". See: Fisher, R., "'Playing the Wrong Game?", in: Rubin, J.Z. (ed.), Dynamics of Third Party Intervention: Kissinger in the Middle East, (Praeger, New York, 1981), p.117.
- 10- Mondale's statement after meeting with Prime Minister Vorster, reproduced in Legum, C., The Western Crisis over Southern Africa, (Africana Publishing Company, New York, London, 1979), p. 249-253.
- 11- Ibid.
- 12- Jamieson, D., "United Nations: Namibia", Statement at the UN General Assembly Ninth Special Session on Namibia, 25 April 1978, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 78, No. 2015, p.50.
- 13- Vance, op. cit., p.277.
- 14- Geldenhuys, D., The Diplomacy of Isolation, (St. Martins Press, New York, 1984), p. 222.
- 15- Interview with Sir James Murray, former UK Ambassador to the UN and member of the New York Contact Group, New York, 13/7/87.
- 16- Interview with Ambassador McHenry, op. cit.

17- Ibid.

18- Interview with David Stephen, political adviser to David Owen(1977-1979), London, 12/2/86.

19- Interview with Ambassador McHenry, op. cit.

20- Young, A., "The US and Africa: Victory for Diplomacy", Foreign Affairs, Vol 59, No. 3, 1980.

21- Vance, op. cit., p.308.

22- As indicated in Chapter 7.

23- Washington Post, 19/10/78, p.1.

24- As indicated in the introduction and the analytic framework, a predominant feature of multilateral negotiations is that one or more of the parties act as intermediaries to resolve a dispute between other participants.

25- Vance, op. cit., p. 305.

26- Douglas, A., Industrial Peacemaking, (Columbia University Press, New York, 1972).

27- Wall, J.A. Jr., "Mediation: An Analysis, Review and Proposed Research", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp.167-168.

28- Interview with Cyrus Vance, President Carter's Secretary of State, New York, 13/7/87.

29- Interview with Ambassador McHenry, op. cit.

30- The talks between the US Government and the Angolan Government were recently resumed again focussing on the issue of Cuban troop withdrawal.

31- Referred to in Chapter 7.

32- Ibid.

33- As pointed out by Zartman, this was a concession to the South African government. See: Zartman, Ripe for Resolution, (Oxford University Press, New York, 1985), p.187.

34- As was indicated in the last Chapter, the linkage issue became part of the Reagan Administration's preference from February 1981.

35- Interview with Pauline Baker, Senior Associate, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington

D.C., 7/7/87.

36- Interview with official from the State Department Policy Planning Staff, Washington D.C., 22/6/87.

37- Crocker, C., "South Africa: Strategy for Change", Foreign Affairs, Vol 59, No. 2, Winter 1980, pp. 323-351.

38- In 1982, dual purpose military goods were sold to the South African government in contravention of the UN arms embargo. In January 1984, 29 export licences with military capability were granted to South Africa by the State Department Office of Munitions Control.
Oudes, B., "The United States in Africa", Africa Contemporary Record, 1981-1982, p.A160.

Brown, E., "The United States and Africa in 1983: Continuity and Great Expectations", Africa Contemporary Record, 1983-1984, p.A278.

39- For example, the US was the only Western country in the Security Council which vetoed a resolution condemning South African incursion into Angola in September 1981.

40- Geldenhuys, op. cit., p.226.

41- Between 1977 and 1981, the numbers of SADF in Namibia went from approximately 50,000 to 80,000.
International Defence and Aid Fund, Apartheid's Army in Namibia, Fact Paper on Southern Africa, No. 10, (IDAF, London, 1982), p. 15.

42- Spicer, M., "Namibia: Elusive Independence", World Today, October 1980, p.409.

43- Vance, op. cit., p.277.

44- Interview with Sir James Murray, op. cit.

45- Geldenhuys, op. cit., p. 224.

46- Speaking at a National Party Congress in Bloemfontein on 6th September 1978, P.W. Botha said that a UN military contingent of 7,500 would amount to a UN take-over of the territory. He stated that this would allow South Africa's Marxist enemies to then establish a hostile state on South Africa's borders through SWAPO. Quoted by :
Libby, R.T., Towards an Africanised United States Policy for Southern Africa: A Strategy for Increasing Political Leverage, (University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1980), p.20.

47- The proposal for a "constellation of states" originated in the 1977 Defence White Paper which called for "economic action" and "action in relation to transport

services, , distribution and telecommunications" with the aim of promoting "political and economic collaboration among the states of southern Africa"; quoted in: Hanlon, J., Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa, (Catholic Institute for International Relations, James Currey, Indiana University Press, 1986), p.14.

48- Quoted in Hanlon, *ibid.*, p.15.

49- As indicated in Chapter 6, the South African National Intelligence Service estimated that SWAPO would win 80% of a free vote under UN supervision.

50- The FLS began planning SADCC in 1978, and the first formal meeting was in Arusha, Tanzania, in July 1979. and included the then five FLS, development banks, the US, UK, and Scandinavian countries. At the founding meeting on 1st April 1980, the FLS of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho, Malawi, and Swaziland joined SADCC. Hanlon, *op. cit.*, p.17 and 308.

51- The Lusaka Declaration of the founding members of SADCC, stated the aim of SADCC as being, "to liberate our economies from their dependence on the Republic of South Africa, to overcome the imposed economic fragmentation, and to coordinate our efforts toward regional and national self-development".

"Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation, A Declaration by the Governments of Independent States of Southern Africa made at Lusaka on the 1st of April 1980"; quoted in Hanlon, *op. cit.*, p.19.

52- *Ibid*, p. 308.

53- Geldenhuys, *op. cit.*, p.227.

54- Since the Transvaal National Party provides half of the National Party Parliamentary caucus, which select the Prime Minister by ballot. Libby, *op. cit.*, p.23.

55- Geldenhuys, *op. cit.*, p.225.

56- Spence, J.E., "South Africa, The World Powers, and Southern Africa", in: T.M. Callaghy, South Africa in Southern Africa, (Praeger, New York, 1983), p. 116.

57- Wall, *op. cit.*

58- Interview with Ambassador Rudiger von Wechmar, former West German Ambassador to the UN, London, 10/12/86.

59- Chapter 4 in this study.

- 60- Namibia Today, official organ of the South West Africa People's Organisation, Vol 6, February 1982, p. 7.
- 61- Ibid.
- 62- Africa Confidential, Vol. 19, No. 13, 23 June 1978, p.1. Also indicates that SWAPO's internal wing was also in favour of the need for SWAPO to be more forthcoming in the negotiations.
- 63- McHenry, 1979, op. cit.
- 64- Interview with Cyrus Vance, op. cit.
- 65- McHenry, 1979, p. 60.
- 66- Ibid.
- 67- Interview with Cyrus Vance and Don McHenry, op. cit. Both revealed that this was the priority for the UK government.
- 68- Interview with David Stephen, op. cit.
- 69- Interview with Ambassador Wechmar, op. cit. and Interview with Ambassador McHenry, op. cit.
- 70- Washington Post, 20/10/78, p.1.
- 71- Vance(1983), op. cit, p.310.
- 72- Ibid.
- 73- Geldenhuys, op. cit., p. 223.
- 74- Interview with Ambassador McHenry conducted by C.R. Mitchell, questions prepared by V.Jabri, Washington D.C., 11/6/86.
- 75- Interview with Cyrus Vance, op. cit.
- 76- Interview with official from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 17/9/87. Sir James Murrey revealed that the British government was convinced that the Carter Administration was willing to impose sanctions. Interview, op. cit.
- 77- Vance, op. cit, p. 309.
- 78- Interview with Andrew Young, US Ambassador to the UN(1977-1979), Atlanta, Georgia, 28/7/87.
- 79- The Group's acceptability to SWAPO and the FLS derived from their existing relationship with the South African government, as indicated in Chapter 6 of this study.

80- McHenry, 1979, op. cit., p.55. Indicates that the FLS leaders had informed Andrew Young that the Western governments were the only ones maintaining communication between the two sides.

81- Interview with Ambassador McHenry, 1987, op. cit.

82- Interview with Ambassador McHenry, 1986, op. cit.

83- McHenry revealed that the South Africans "caught us flat-footed" when they staged the raid on Kassinga. Interview, 1987, op. cit.

84- Ambassador McHenry refused to reveal the information that was available to the US Government, Interview, 1987, op. cit.

85- The South African government had not wanted UN participation. Interview with McHenry, 1987, Ibid.

86- Interview with Henry Miller, assistant to Don McHenry in the working group of the Contact Group, Washington-New York, 29/7/87.

87- The departure of McHenry and Murray as the main negotiators in 1979 must have reduced this pressure on the South African government. Despite the fact that the UN Secretariat, including Brian Urquhart and Matti Ahtisaari maintained the negotiations, they lacked the potential influence of the WCG. It is reasonable to assume that a consistent bombardment of proposals from the WCG would have had a greater impact on the South African government than the same proposals coming at an equal frequency from the UN.

88- Interview with Andrew Young, op. cit. Confirmed by Ferrin Mitchell, until 1986, member of the Congressional Black Caucus. Interview, Washington D.C., 18/6/87.

89- The Shaba crisis occurred when Katangese rebels moved into Zaire from Angola.

90- Interview with Cyrus Vance, op. cit.

91- Ibid.

92- Interview with Andrew Young, op. cit. Revealed that the Right-wing backlash was centred around the Panama Canal issue which contributed to the loss of Dick Clark from Congress.

93- Interview with Cyrus Vance, op. cit.

94- Kuhne, W., "The Role of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Namibian Conflict", Beitr. Konflikt, Vol. 13, No. 1, 1983, pp. 89-93.

95- Interview with Ambassador Wechmar, op. cit.

96- In a letter sent to Dr. Owen, the chairman of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, the Labour MP, Robert Hughes, pointed out that Walvis Bay should be considered an integral part of Namibia. He stated "We are strongly of the opinion that Britain should insist that Western proposals should be amended to include Walvis Bay within Namibia". Africa Confidential, Vol. 19., No. 11, 26 May, 1978, p.8.

97- Interview with David Stephen, op. cit. Opposition came especially from the Home Office which was opposed in particular to the imposition of visa requirements for South African citizens; this was one of the sanctions measures contemplated.

98- Howard Johnson, a member of the Progressive Conservative Party, demanded in Parliament that "the government of Canada withdraw its representatives from the five-nation committee (WCG) endeavouring through negotiations with South Africa to reduce South West Africa to the same state of oppression existing in Angola". Canada, House of Commons Debates, Vol IV, 7th April 1978, c.4235.

Some members of Parliament expressed concern over any prospect of Canadian provision of a peacekeeping force for the transition period.

Canada, House of Commons Debates, Vol V, 25th April 1978, c.4942.

99- Windhoek Advertiser, 22/9/1980.

100- Security Council Resolution 428(1978) of 6 May 1978.

101- Interview with Ambassador McHenry, 1986, op. cit. McHenry became Ambassador to the U.S. in August 1979, from whence his participation in the working group lessened, due to pressure of other issues including the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

102- McHenry, D., Testimony to the Sub-Committee on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 96th Congress, 7 May 1979.

103- Interview with Sir James Murray, op. cit.

104- Interview with Henry Miller, op. cit.

105- Ambassador McHenry stated that this was rarely a problem in the functioning of the Group. Interview, 1987,

op. cit.

106- Ibid.

107- Agreement was sought on the issue of the relationship between the Administrator General and the Special Representative. SWAPO demanded that the latter be superior to the former.

108- Vance, op. cit., p.283.

109- Ibid, p. 302.

110- According to Vance(1983), McHenry and Richard Moose urged him to persuade Owen and other members to push ahead with another round of talks with the parties. Ibid.

111- Interview with Cyrus Vance, op. cit.

112- Interview with Sir David Scott, British Ambassador to South Africa(1977-1979), London, 27/11/86.

113- According to Ambassador McHenry, the WCG lost about six months after the Conservative victory in the British elections in 1979 due to the new Government's perception that it had greater credibility with the South African government.

Pik Botha had, in fact, informed David Owen at the end of the March 1979 proximity talks, that the imminent Conservative victory in the near future was in South Africa's favour.

Interview with David Stephen, op. cit.

114- Sir James Murray, "Nambia", (Unpublished paper, 1983).

115- The South African Government also attempted persuading the Government of Lesotho to sign an Nkomati-type pact, through direct intervention (on Maseru in December 1982); support for the Lesotho Liberation Army; and the imposition of a border blockade against the territory. See:

Hanlon, op. cit., pp. 113-115.

116- Mozambique was the first country to sign a peace treaty with South Africa (Swaziland had signed one secretly). Ibid., p.142.

117- Professor Giliomee of the University of Stellenbosch, stated in May 1982 that the South African government could not agree to a UN settlement in Namibia and move ahead with reform internally, since this would provoke a Right-wing backlash in South Africa. Rand Daily Mail, 1/5/81.

- 118- Crocker(1980), op. cit.
- 119- "The Crocker Documents on South Africa", Memorandum of Conversation between Dr. Crocker and Pik Botha and Magnus Malan, Pretoria April 15/16 1981; leaked to the New York Times by TransAfrica. Reprinted in: Leonard, R., South Africa At War, (Lawrence Hill and Co., Westport, CT., 1983), p.250.
- 120- Ibid.
- 121- Rand Daily Mail 19/4/82.
- 122- As pointed out by the Deputy editor of the Rand Daily Mail, "Over the years, a string of fortresses has been created in the north of Namibia; if South Africa intended in the near future retreating to the Orange River, it would be building up a new defence line. It is not doing so." Benjamin Pogrund, Rand Daily Mail 19/4/82.
- 123- Ibid.
- 124- "The Crocker Documents", Memorandum from Crocker to Secretary of State Haig; in Leonard op. cit., p.259.
- 125- As concluded by Pogrund, "South Africa stands to lose too much by quitting South West Africa", Rand Daily Mail, 19/4/82.
- 126- Rand Daily Mail, 24/2/82.
- 127- "The Crocker Documents", Memorandum of Conversation, indicates that Crocker informed the South African Government in April 1981 that the US government "assumes Soviet/Cuban presence is one of ..concerns" of the South African government preventing it from settlement in Namibia. In: Leonard, op. cit., p.250.
- 128- Interview with State Department official, op. cit.
- 129- Chester Crocker was opposed to the repeal of the Clark Amendment as it would have impeded negotiations on linkage and Namibian independence.
Interview with Pauline Baker, op. cit.
- 130- As indicated in the last Chapter.
- 131- Legum, C., "The Southern African Crisis: Darkness at the End of the Tunnel", Africa Contemporary Record, 1981-1982, p. A31.
This was, in fact, the first meeting between Crocker and Nujoma.

On the fact that Chester Crocker had not met with SWAPO, Don McHenry stated "We always believed that it was

necessary to have discussions with all parties. Crocker said they have talked with internal SWAPO - which has been decimated by South Africa. This is hardly the way to get SWAPO's views. I don't see how you can negotiate without talking to all the parties". Statement to Hearing on Namibia before the Sub-Committee on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 17 June 1981.

132- Hofmeier, R., "West Germany's Policy in Africa", Africa Contemporary Record, 1983-1984, p.A236.

133- As indicated in the last chapter, the South African government complained that the October proposals lacked a reference to linkage.

134- The British Government's stand on linkage has been "While Britain for its part does not accept that Namibian independence should be linked to the Cuban issue (since this forms no part of the UN plan), we recognise the political reality that an arrangement on Cubans will be necessary if South Africa is to agree to implement the settlement proposal. Withdrawal of all foreign troops (Cuban troops from Angola and South African troops from Namibia) from countries in the region would also contribute to regional stability".

Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Briefing Paper on Namibia, presented to V. Jabri by official in the southern Africa Department of the FCO.

135- Interviews with Pauline Baker and State Department official. op. cit.

136- Interview with US Embassy official, London, 9/10/86.

137- Ibid.

138- Interview with Pauline Baker, op. cit.

139- United States, Congress, "Namibia: Internal Repression and United States Diplomacy", Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 99th Congress, 21 February 1985, p.29.

140- The CSU complained specifically about the appointment of personnel to the Africa Department of the Foreign Ministry.

Hofmeier, op. cit.

141- Henning Melber(ed.), West German Anti-Apartheid Movement, "Focus FRG-Namibia", paper presented to the International Conference in Solidarity with the People of Namibia, organised by UNESCO, Paris, 1980.

142- Hofmeier, op. cit., p. A235.

- 143- Interview with Ambassador Wechmar, op. cit.
- 144- Herr Strauss stated when on a visit to Namibia in April 1982 that he had held talks with General Haig and Chester Crocker and that they had agreed that "We dont want a Marxist-Leninist development in this country." He held talks with the DTA, SWAPO-D, SWANU and members of the Interessengemeinschaft(IG), and Kosie Pretorius of the National Party.
Windhoek Observer, 3/4/82.
- 145- A parliamentary delegation visiting Namibia expressed the wish for greater pressure on the South African Government. These included Mr. Donald Anderson (Labour), Mr. Rhodes James (Conservative), and Lord Kennet (Social Democratic Party). Namibia Communications Centre, 1 April 1985.
- 146- A group of Conservative MPs visited Namibia in January 1985 under the auspices of the pro-South African lobby group, the Namibia Information Service. These praised the South African Government's policies in Namibia. See:
United Kingdom, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Background Brief Series, March 1985.
- 147- "The Crocker Documents", Memorandum of Conversation, which indicates that Chester Crocker informed the South African government that the new US Government's objective was to "increase [the] South African Government's confidence". In: Leonard, op. cit., p.249.
- 148- "The Crocker Documents", Memorandum of Conversation. Ibid. Crocker pointed out to the South African Government that improved relations were not conditional upon internal change, but that Namibia stood in the way of such improved relations, because it was a thorny issue in relations with European partners and rest of Africa.
- 149- A indicated in Chapter 7.
- 150- Congressional recognition of the failure of constructive engagement came in the form of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act passed in October 1986 overriding the presidential veto.
- 151- Ambassador McHenry pointed out, "I fear that the South Africans will take the atmosphere now created as a blank cheque to do what they like. This Administration is extremely short-sighted. It will succeed in isolating the United States not only from the rest of Africa, but also from our allies in Europe".
McHenry, D., New Africa, October 1981, p.11; quoted in Rocha, op. cit., p. 132.

CHAPTER 9- THIRD PARTY RE-EVALUATION OF THE INTERMEDIARY
ROLE: DID THE WCG INITIATIVE COME TO AN END?

The aim of this Chapter is to consider the third phase of third party decision-making in response to conflict; third party re-evaluation of its continued involvement in the role as opposed to abandonment of the role prior to the achievement of a settlement. The first section of the Chapter will consider the question of when a mediation effort comes to an end and seeks to determine whether the Contact Group initiative did, in fact, come to an end. The second section of the Chapter considers the French government's announced decision to withdraw from the Contact Group.

As was apparent in Chapter 7, the last WCG mediation attempt came in the form of the collective proposals of June 1982 aimed at gaining agreement [i] on constitutional guarantees; [ii] on the issue of impartiality; and [iii] on the monitoring of SWAPO bases in Angola and Zambia. These proposals also called for the solution of "other regional issues" as a means of facilitating agreement on the implementation of Resolution 435. Agreement was reached on the first three sets of issues, and the subsequent involvement of the UN Secretary General (as mandated in Security Council Resolution 532) on the issue of the electoral system in Namibia showed that the main outstanding issue preventing progress towards implementation of Resolution 435 was that of Cuban troop

withdrawal from Angola. The United States government became involved in negotiations between the South African government and the government of Angola about the achievement of Cuban troop withdrawal in a parallel framework to the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola and Namibia. This set of negotiations broke down after the repeal of the Clark Amendment and the resumption of the supply of military assistance by the United States government to the Angolan rebel movement UNITA. The other members of the Group did not accept the principle of linkage and, as such were not involved in the negotiations. Apart from the French government, they did not announce the termination of the Contact Group process, although the Group ceased functioning as a collective intermediary after the announcement of the French withdrawal in December 1983. Three questions are considered in the analysis which follows below: Firstly, did the WCG initiative come to an end? Secondly, did the role of the US change when it began the supply of arms to UNITA? And thirdly, what were the factors which influenced the French government's decision to withdraw from the Group?

9.1- Terminating Mediation Initiatives

9.1.1- When Does a Mediation Effort End?

This question has not been considered in any systematic manner by the mediation literature. One exception is,

however, provided by Levine(1) who, in building up a "universe" of mediation cases, has to consider the question of when does one mediation effort begin and another end. He provides several useful criteria in answer to the question. These will be reviewed and the criteria used in the present study indicated.

The first criterion suggested by Levine is that whenever war breaks out or is resumed between the disputants, a mediation effort is deemed over, due to the changed circumstances. The same third party continuing to mediate after the breakdown of the negotiations is considered to constitute a different mediation effort. This is not, however, a useful criterion in that a mediation process may occur, even if conflict behaviour has not been terminated. This was the case in the negotiations over Namibia, where both parties followed dual track strategies, one track involving military force.

The second criterion suggested by Levine states that the use of force by a third party ends its mediation effort- although a new effort in the same case could be started. As indicated in Chapter 8, the Angolan government suspended the negotiations with South Africa and the United States when the latter repealed the Clark Amendment and began the supply of military aid to UNITA. However, it is the contention of this study that interested third parties, even those who are allied to one of the disputants, may take up the intermediary role- and may,

thus, have overlapping roles in the conflict. This criterion is, therefore, modified to include the condition of acceptability. As long as a third party is acceptable to both sides in a dispute, it may still function as intermediary. This takes the burden of judgement of a third party's actions away from the analyst to the protagonists themselves. The Angolan government has recently indicated its interest in negotiating Cuban troop withdrawal, opening the negotiations with the involvement of the United States government as intermediary between Angola and South Africa; this is despite the fact that the United States is an ally to UNITA.

The third criterion is that a change in the nature of the mediatory body is treated as the beginning of a new mediation effort. A mere change of personnel is included within the original mediation effort. This third criterion is useful in that it separates different mediation efforts (which may occur within one conflict) from simple changes in personnel involved in one mediation effort. This criterion is especially useful in the case of governments acting as intermediaries, where governments may change (as was the case during the functioning of the WCG), as well as civil servants functioning in foreign ministries.

The fourth criterion states that concurrent or sequential mediations by different states or

organisations, if uncoordinated, are treated as separate mediation cases. The WCG mediation was a coordinated one and is, therefore, considered as one mediation effort. The question arises, however, of whether the United States mediation over the issue of "linkage" between the Angolan government and the government of South Africa can be considered as part of WCG activity. The latter point will be considered further below.

The problem of determining the end of a mediation effort is made more complex by the fact that mediation is not always a continuous process. As pointed out by Levine, "...there are lulls and resurgences, interruptions and changing circumstances" (2). Thus, a lull may either be the case of an "unannounced demise of a mediation effort or it may be ascribed to other factors slowing the pace of interaction" (3).

Using the above criteria, the following section considers whether the WCG mediation effort in the conflict over Namibia actually came to an end.

9.1.2- Did the WCG Initiative Come to an End?

As indicated earlier, the last set of proposals emanating from the Contact Group were the June 1982 proposals presented to the parties and the subject of proximity talks in New York in July 1982. While the Group met with the FLS and SWAPO in August 1982, and visited Windhoek in

the same month, and the Foreign Ministers of the Group met in New York in October 1982, no proposals emerged. SWAPO President Sam Nujoma, in a memo to the Franco-African summit in Kinshasa on the 8th of October, stated that the process "to lead Namibia to independence through a negotiated solution is now at a standstill"(4), indicating that no new proposals had been presented to the parties. Moreover, M. Claude Cheysson, French Foreign Minister stated on the 11th of October that the WCG had "finished its work" and that the "present stagnation" over linkage lay outside its competence(5). WCG representatives met again during the General Assembly debate on Namibia in December 1982. However, no proposals were made at this stage. When M. Cheysson again reiterated that the WCG had "ended its labours" in April 1983, the State Department responded by stating that all that remained for the Contact Group was to achieve agreement on the electoral procedure and the composition of UNTAG and stated that the "United States was working very hard to achieve success in our separate discussions with Angola, and we have had the full support of our Contact Group partners to that end"(6). As indicated earlier, on the outstanding issues of the electoral procedure and the composition of UNTAG, the UN Secretary General was mandated to negotiate with the parties on the two issues. His discussions resulted in the Secretary General's conclusion that the only remaining obstacle to the implementation of Resolution 435 was the

linkage issue. Unlike the earlier involvement of the UN Secretariat in the negotiations in Phase one, when the Contact Group continued its involvement, this second involvement by the Secretary General, starting in May 1983, was not accompanied by any WCG action. Thus, apart from the separate negotiations conducted by the United States government over linkage, the WCG process had, in fact, come to a standstill.

The fact that the other members of the Group did not become involved in the negotiations over linkage suggests that this was a separate process from that of the Contact Group. Despite the fact that the Reagan Administration informed other members of the Group on the progress of these negotiations, the Group itself was not involved in any mediatory activity of [i] communication between the parties; [ii] proposals formulation; or [iii] of using influence tactics to gain concessions. Indications were, however, that the other members of the Group would be willing to resume their role in the negotiations about the implementation of Resolution 435 when the linkage issue was no longer an obstacle in the negotiations(7).

The fact that the other four members of the Group were not involved in the negotiations over linkage, coupled with the fact that they were not involved with the Secretary General over the two outstanding issues of the electoral procedure and the composition of UNTAG, suggests that their role had, in fact, come to an end. Thus, the

linkage negotiations were deliberately maintained separate from the WCG process; indicating that activity concerning the issue of Cuban troop withdrawal was not coordinated by the members of the Group. Moreover, despite the fact that Namibia continued to be discussed collectively among the Africa Directors of the EEC countries and the United States, it was not the only issue in such meetings(8).

It has to be concluded, therefore, that the Contact Group process did, in fact, come to an end. In Levine's terms, it was a case of an "unannounced demise of a mediation effort". For the other members of the Group, to have accepted linkage as an issue in the Contact Group process would have placed in jeopardy all that had been achieved in the previous years, including a Security Council Resolution accepting WCG proposals for Namibian independence.

While the Contact Group as such had ceased to function as an intermediary, the United States Administration continued to be involved in the negotiations over the linkage issue involving the South African government and Angola. By February 1984, when President Kaunda chaired the Lusaka meeting involving delegations from the United States, Angola and South Africa, it became clear that the Angolan government no longer accepted the United States as mediator in the process, but as a protagonist. This Angolan perception is

further indicated by the fact that the Angolan government did not accept the stationing of US personnel on Angolan soil in their role as part of the Joint Monitoring Commission set up as a result of the Lusaka Conference. The repeal of the Clark Amendment in 1985 (a decision opposed by Dr. Crocker) led to the announcement on Angola's official radio that this amounted to an open declaration of war against the Angolan government. Until recently (July 1987, and February 1988), all contact between the Angolan government and the US administration had remained broken (On February 18th 1986, the Reagan Administration confirmed that it was going ahead with a \$15-million programme of military aid to UNITA, (9)). Thus, the fact ^{was} that the United States was no longer acceptable to a major party in the conflict over the linkage issue, an issue which remained the obstacle to Namibian independence. P.W. Botha announced on March 4, 1986 that August 1st could be a new deadline for implementation of Resolution 435 on condition of Cuban withdrawal. This announcement came after instigation from the Reagan Administration(10). It had, therefore, according to the criteria discussed above, forfeited its role as intermediary in the negotiations. While the US Administration's role as intermediary was placed in question when it became a military ally to UNITA, it was the end of its acceptance as mediator by the Angolan government which ended its role as such.

The primary factor which led to this change in role of the United States Government was the primacy of the cold war as a foreign policy issue for the Reagan Administration. Thus, while the main negotiator over Namibian independence, Dr. Crocker, recognised that the repeal of the Clark Amendment would jeopardise the role of the United States as mediator, the Administration, with the backing of Congress, placed a higher priority on the perceived Soviet threat in southern Africa and globally.

9.2- The French Government's Withdrawal from the WCG

As indicated in part 3 of the analytic framework, a third party may re-evaluate the costs and benefits deriving from its occupation of the intermediary role. Changes in the factors which originally formed part of the calculation about joining the WCG initiative contributed to a changed evaluation of the benefits deriving from continued participation in the process. While President Mitterand's Government made this re-evaluation as early as the period preceding the election victory in May 1981, it did not withdraw until December 1983. The first part of the following analysis points to factors which contributed to this re-evaluation of the role. The second will propose an explanation of the time lag between such re-evaluation and the actual withdrawal.

9.2.1- The French Government's Re-Evaluation of its Continued Membership of the WCG

The first factor contributing to the re-evaluation of continued participation in the WCG was a change in the Mitterand Government's interest priorities. The Government came to power in May 1981 with the stated intention of changed priorities in southern Africa. This was clearly outlined by Francois Mitterand on 10th May 1981: "A new policy towards South Africa must consist of two parts: On the one hand, economic sanctions against this regime, notably a total cessation of all state and parastatal French investment and of all support for private investment. On the other hand, development and security aid to the Front-Line States and political support to the liberation movements as well as assistance in the economic and training sectors." (11) This indicated that the priority for the new government was to build up relations with black African countries in southern Africa and to promote recognition of the southern African liberation movements. The decision-makers involved in the new government emphasised this priority. M. Claude Cheysson became the French Minister for External Affairs. His credentials with African leaders added to the credibility of the new French Government in black Africa.

An illustration of changing priorities in the region came in the new government's relations with the MPLA Government in Angola and the Frelimo Government in

Mozambique. Cooperation agreements were signed between the French government and Mozambique in December 1981, and with Angola in July 1982. The French government also supplied armed helicopters to the Angolan armed forces for anti-guerrilla operations; a move denounced by UNITA(12). This may be contrasted with the Reagan Administration's policy of support for UNITA and illustrates the differences in conflict-related interests between the two governments.

That the French government also intended re-evaluating its relationship with the South African government was indicated in May 1981, when the Secretary of the Socialist Party, Lionel Jospin, stated that his party favoured ending all trade with Namibia, including the import of uranium; the reduction of French raw material imports from South Africa; the cessation of all public investment and public support for private investment in South Africa; a total arms embargo; and political, diplomatic and humanitarian aid to the liberation movements(13). When Claude Cheysson attended the UN-OAU sponsored conference on sanctions against South Africa (held at the UNESCO headquarters in Paris in May 1981), he stated that the Third World would have France on its side in future debates in the General Assembly and Security Council. While not making a commitment on sanctions against South Africa, he confirmed Jospin's statement on support for the liberation movements(14).

This new policy was welcomed by SWAPO and African leaders. SWAPO's UN spokesman, Theo Ben Gurirab, stated that he looked forward to close cooperation with France, and the Chairman of the UN Centre Against Apartheid (active in publicising French violations of the arms embargo), Mr. Akporode Clark, stated, "We are confident that the cause of justice and freedom in Africa, particularly, South Africa, has a new leadership in France" (15). Another indication of this confidence in the French government was that the Franco-African summit of November 1981 attracted more heads of state than any of the previous seven (16). In contrast to this African reaction to M. Mitterand's victory in France, white reaction in Namibia, as expressed by Dirk Mudge of the DTA, A.H. du Plessis of the National Party and Serel Becker of the HNP, was that it was "trouble for SWA" (17).

It is clear, therefore, that on coming to power, the new French government announced a determination to reevaluate its relationship with South Africa while promoting its relations with black African countries and the liberation movements. This had an immediate impact on the French government's evaluation of its continued participation in the Contact Group.

The process-related interests which had contributed to the French government's initial decision to join the WCG in 1977, namely the avoidance of sanctions and the

benefits of involvement in a collective Western initiative were no longer relevant. The Government of President Giscard D'Estaing had become involved in a collective initiative with the Carter administration which enjoyed high credibility at the UN and with major African leaders. In contrast, the Socialist Government of Francois Mitterand was confronted with the option of joining an initiative with the Reagan Administration which was perceived by African leaders as having impeded Namibian independence. The costs of joining the initiative, in terms of relations with black African countries were, therefore, higher than for the previous government which had lacked the credibility enjoyed by the new government. Moreover, the motives for coalition mediation, a factor relevant for the previous government, was no longer applicable to the new Government. The new government, soon after gaining power, came into conflict with the Reagan Administration over the linkage issue as well as reaction to South African incursions into Angola (as occurred in September 1981).

Another major factor leading to a re-evaluation of continued French participation in the WCG was that of the constituency, which had not been an important factor in the previous government's decision to join the initiative. Although southern Africa was not a high priority issue in French foreign policy (emphasis being on Francophone Africa) the Mitterand Government had an immediate

constituency in the Socialist party. The latter sought sanctions against South Africa and close ties with African countries in southern Africa and the southern African liberation movements, as indicated by Lionel Jospin at the sanctions conference in Paris in May 1981. The Socialist Party's policy on Africa was elaborated in a policy document, Projet Africaine, which called for an end to the extensive French ties with South Africa. It stated, "A left-wing government must take immediate decisions to stop supporting the Pretoria regime through its financial and technical contributions. It will impose a ban on all public or semi-public investments in South Africa and in occupied Namibia. It will associate itself with economic sanctions decided upon by the United Nations. It will reduce in the shortest possible period, in view of technical difficulties, its imports from South Africa..the United Nations is the only legitimate authority in Namibia. A left-wing government would implement its resolutions, and would in particular, stop all uranium imports from that country" (18).

However, the Socialist Party soon came into conflict with the Socialist Government due to continued opposition to the imposition of sanctions against South Africa(19). This conflict was also evident within the government itself, and was manifest between "those who feel that the French foreign trade deficit comes before any other consideration (the ministers of Finance, Commerce, and

Research and Industry) and those who are conscious of the serious threat to French-African relations posed by continued French economic and nuclear collaboration with South Africa" (20). This division became manifest when, in 1982, the South African government approached the French government to build a second nuclear reactor (the contract for the first South African power plant at Koeberg was signed in 1976). The French Cabinet was reportedly deeply divided on the issue, with some ministers wanting to accept the contract for the creation of French employment, while M. Cheysson made his opposition public in a letter to the French Anti-Apartheid Movement (21).

It is, therefore, evident that a number of factors contributed to the French government's re-evaluation of continued participation in the Group. These were primarily [i] the changed conflict-related interest priorities; [ii] changed process-related interests; [iii] motives for coalition intervention; and [iv] a new constituency factor in the form of the Socialist Party. This re-evaluation started on President Mitterand's coming to power, when the original intention had been to withdraw from the Group (Mitterand revealed this in his opening speech to the 32-state Franco-African summit in November 1981) (22). Despite this re-evaluation, however, the French government did not announce withdrawal until December 1983. The following discussion considers this time lag between initial re-evaluation and final withdrawal.

9.2.2- The Process of French Withdrawal from the WCG

As pointed out in the analytic framework, once a third party perceives an increase in costs relative to the potential gains associated with the occupation of the role of intermediary, it may withdraw immediately, invest more in the role, or start a process of gradual withdrawal. The above discussion indicated that the French government began re-evaluating continued French participation in the WCG almost immediately on coming to power. It did not withdraw immediately but, instead, it adopted a strategy of investing more in the role until it announced its withdrawal in December 1983.

Unlike the previous French government, the new government became an active participant in the WCG. It contributed to proposals formulation, especially in promoting the proposal for a Bill of Rights instead of the Reagan Administration's preference for a full constitution prior to the holding of elections. M. Guy Penne, President Mitterand's African affairs adviser, stated after meeting Sam Nujoma in Lusaka on 24 November 1981, that France would be a driving force within the WCG(23). The French government also insisted on a time-table for Namibian independence to be achieved at the end of 1982. The pressure exerted by the French government to achieve this aim was through the threat of withdrawal from the Group. The French position, as voiced by M. Mitterand, was that

French membership should not be used as a cover for "interminable negotiations" (24). On the linkage issue, Mitterand stated, "Let us solve the Namibian question and you will see the Cubans leave southern Africa" (25). The French government's position arose from its conviction that the South African government's aim was to stretch the negotiations indefinitely (26). Within the WCG, French rejection of linkage was the most vociferous. As early as October 1982, M. Cheysson was declaring that the WCG had "ended its labours" and stating his government's rejection of linkage (27).

Another indication of the French government's willingness to invest more in the role prior to withdrawal came in September 1982, when the head of the Africa department of the Quai D'Orsay, M. Jean Ausseil, held talks in Havana on the issue of Cuban withdrawal. He denied, however, that the French government had offered to replace the Cuban troops (28). The most vehement condemnation of the policy of linkage as promoted by the Reagan Administration came in April 1983 in a speech by Claude Cheysson. This was made at the International Conference in Solidarity with the People of Namibia in Paris. The French Foreign Minister stated that everything was "ready to implement Security Council Resolution 435 and the settlement plan". He stated that this was not the case, however, "since other problems, other requirements, other pretexts had been put forward". Cheysson stated that

"France does not underestimate the legitimate concern of every southern African country with ensuring its security. We are surprised to see, however, that in some quarters the subject is considered only from the point of view of the security of the strongest, richest and best armed state in the region..we also find it surprising that, in the same circles, practically all the talk in this security contest is about the presence of foreign armed forces in Angola, a country hundreds of kilometres away. It shocks us that, on this basis, some people should be asking for an undertaking that these forces will be withdrawn as a precondition for Namibia's independence." (29) This was an obvious condemnation of US policy in making linkage a precondition for Namibian independence.

When Cheysson made his statement announcing French withdrawal from the group, he stated that France had remained in the Group "at the repeated request of African friends" but that since then "the situation has changed especially because the Angolan government has recently informed us that they thought that the Contact Group does not serve any useful purpose. The French government has then decided that it will no longer participate in the work of the Contact Group. This group should be disbanded because it has no will power to honestly exercise the mandate that was conferred to it" (30). Cheysson stated, however, that the French government was not withdrawing

from the Group, merely that the Group should be "put to sleep". Indications were also that the French government would have withdrawn earlier but postponed this because of an attempt by Nigeria at the 1983 Commonwealth Conference to seek support for a peacekeeping force in Angola to replace the Cuban troops(31). The United States Administration insisted that they had assurances from the French government that they had neither withdrawn or called for the disbandment of the Group, while British officials in Brussels stated that the Group remained in existence but that "there was no frenzied desire on the part of anyone to meet at the moment"(32). Cheysson informed Foreign Ministers at NATO that France was not advocating abolition of the WCG but that there was no point in meeting at present. Western officials indicated that it was unlikely that the Group would be reactivated until the Cuban troop issue had been resolved(33).

It is evident from the above discussion that the French government had started re-evaluation of its continued participation in the Group as early as May 1981. An immediate withdrawal would have placed the French government in a position of having destroyed any chance of gaining a Namibian settlement. When it became evident that the South African government was not willing to accept UN supervised elections both for regional and domestic reasons (Professor David Welsh of the Department of Southern African Studies at the University of Cape Town

stated that "the French appeared to have realised that the South African government felt no pressure to settle in South West Africa and was reluctant to do so because of regional security interests, as well as domestic political considerations") (34), the costs of continued membership of the Group, when the only remaining issue seemed to be that of Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola, outweighed the potential benefits. Given that the French government had already lost the credibility it enjoyed on coming to power due to continued opposition (for domestic economic and strategic reasons) to the imposition of sanctions, withdrawal from the discredited Contact Group provided an opportunity of regaining some credibility in the perception of African leaders. This was confirmed by Angolan praise for the French decision (Luanda Radio reported the Angolan President's praise for France's "very positive attitude" within the WCG) (35). The fact that the French government continued to import uranium from Namibia, where the state-owned company, Minatome, still held a 10% share, placed French pronouncements on Namibia in question. That the aim of withdrawal was to regain credibility for the French government is further corroborated by the fact that the decision to withdraw had been the personal decision of Claude Cheysson, who was continuously conscious of the credibility factor in French dealings with African states (36).

9.3-Conclusion

The above discussion of the end of the WCG initiative illustrates the assumption underlying the analytic framework, that is, that third parties continuously re-evaluate the costs and benefits associated with the occupation of an intermediary role. It also indicates that as long as a third party perceives gains to be derived from the role, it would continue to maintain the role, regardless of the possibility of achieving a settlement. This was the case for the governments of the UK, the FRG, Canada, and the US. When the costs outweigh the benefits, however, continued occupation of the role is perceived as a liability. This occurred for the French government.

Part III of this study considers the conclusions that may be drawn and the questions arising from the application of the analytic framework to the WCG intervention in Namibia.

Chapter 9- Notes

- 1- Levine, E.P., "Mediation in International Politics: A Universe and Some Observations", Peace Research Society Papers, XVIII, The London Conference, 1971.
- 2- Ibid., p.28.
- 3- Ibid, p. 29.
- 4- Legum, L., "The Southern African Crisis: The Makings of a Second Middle East", Africa Contemporary Record, 1982-1983, p.A27.
- 5- Ibid.
- 6- Ibid, p.A30.
- 7- Interview with member of the UN Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany, New York, 25/6/87.
- 8- Interview with official from the Southern Africa Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London.
- 9- Baker, P.H., "United States Policy in Southern Africa", Current History, Vol. 86, No. 520, May 1987, p.195.
- 10- Ibid.
- 11- Le Continent, 23/4/81; quoted in: Marchand, J., "Namibia and the Government of France", Africa Today, Vol 30, No. 1-2, 1983, pp. 45-50.
- 12- Haski, P., "Socialist France and the Frontline", Africa Report, January-February 1985, p. 24.
- 13- Guardian 21/5/81.
- 14- Guardian 26/5/81.
- 15- Rand Daily Mail, 20/5/81.
- 16- Financial Times, 6/11/81.
- 17- Windhoek Advertiser 11/5/81.
- 18- Haski, op. cit. p. 22; Africa Confidential, Vol 22, No. 12, 3 June 1981, p.1.
- 19- Marchand lists examples of economic relations between French Government and the South African Government, including the provision of a nuclear reactor for Matimba power plant. Marchand op. cit., p.48.

- 20- Ibid., p. 50.
- 21- Haski, op. cit., p.25.
- 22- Rand Daily Mail, 4/11/81.
- 23- Windhoek Advertiser, 25/11/81.
- 24- Rand Daily Mail 4/11/81, op. cit.; quotes Mitterand interview from Le Monde.
- 25- Ibid.
- 26- French diplomats revealed this at the Franco-African Summit. Christian Science Monitor, 5/11/81.
- 27- New York Times, 13/10/82.
- 28- Legum in Africa Contemporary Record, 1982-1983, op. cit., p.A27.
- 29- Ibid., p.A30.
- 30- Financial Times, 9/12/83 - statement made in French Parliament by Claude Cheysson.
- 31- Guardian 9/12/83.
- 32- Times 9/12/83.
- 33- International Herald Tribune 11/12/83.
- 34- Rand Daily Mail 9/12/83.
- 35- BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, from Luanda Radio, 21/11/83.
- 36- Haski, op. cit.
The fact that M. Cheysson was conscious of his personal credibility vis-a-vis African countries may also be concluded from his credentials in decolonisation and development. He was involved in the decolonisation of Tunisia and Morocco in the French government of 1955. He then became involved in the Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa (CCTA) by which he established contacts with Anglo-phone Africa. In 1973, he became EEC Development Commissioner and was one of the architects of the Lome Convention. He also established personal relationships with Presidents Kaunda and Nyerere. See: Africa Confidential, Vol. 22, No. 12, 3 June 1981, p. 1.

PART II- CONCLUSION

This study has provided an analytic framework for the systematic investigation of third party intervention in response to a conflict. Specifically, it has demonstrated the potential for third party intervention in the role of intermediary. Three intervention patterns by third party response to conflict have been investigated. If the initial nature of the intervention role, if the nature of the relationship between the intervenor and the parties during intervention as intermediary, and if the motivation of the intervenor are taken as the independent variables, the nature of the response to conflict or the nature of the relationship between the parties will be determined.

PART III- CONCLUSION

The study has used the involvement of the Western Contact Group in the conflict over Bosnia as an illustrative case to demonstrate the applicability of the analytic framework to the actual decisions by the five governments to intervene during a conflict. The study has demonstrated the potential for third party intervention in the role of intermediary. The nature of the response to conflict and the nature of the relationship between the parties during intervention as intermediary, and if the motivation of the intervenor are taken as the independent variables, the nature of the response to conflict or the nature of the relationship between the parties will be determined. The study has provided an analytic framework for the systematic investigation of third party intervention in response to a conflict. Specifically, it has demonstrated the potential for third party intervention in the role of intermediary. Three intervention patterns by third party response to conflict have been investigated. If the initial nature of the intervention role, if the nature of the relationship between the intervenor and the parties during intervention as intermediary, and if the motivation of the intervenor are taken as the independent variables, the nature of the response to conflict or the nature of the relationship between the parties will be determined.

CHAPTER 10- CONCLUSION

This study has presented an analytic framework for the systematic investigation of third party decision-making in response to a conflict. Specifically, it has concentrated on interested third parties taking up the role of intermediary. Three inter-related phases of third party responses to conflict have been investigated: 1) the initial choice of the intermediary role; 2) the tactical decisions during involvement as intermediary; and 3) the re-evaluation of the initial response leading to the maintenance or abandonment of the role before the successful achievement of a settlement.

The study has used the involvement of the Western Contact Group in the conflict over Namibia as an illustrative case. It investigated the applicability of the analytic framework to the initial decisions by the five governments to intervene through a "collective intermediary" response to the conflict; and the functioning of the Group and its tactical decisions during interaction with the conflict system. The lack of a Namibian settlement enabled an investigation of the factors contributing to a re-evaluation of the role of intermediary by the third party. The fact that the WCG was an example of coalition mediation allowed investigation of the influence of the coalition structure on the three decision phases.

This Chapter will consider the usefulness of the analytic framework as illustrated by the case-study. It will also consider the general applicability of the framework to other types of third parties. Finally, the Chapter will consider questions which have arisen from applying the analytic framework to a case-study, and whether the framework requires modification or refinement as a result of insights gained from the case-study. The discussion will also highlight the limitations of the present study.

The analytic framework was based on the assumption that an interested third party may take up the role of intermediary and that third parties make a rough cost/benefit evaluation prior to taking up the role. The objective in devising the analytic framework was to provide a systematic means by which the intervention of interested third parties may be investigated. It pointed to factors suggested as being influential in a third party's responses to a conflict at the three decision points selected.

10.1- The Initial Response: Choice of the Intermediary Role

The framework was based on the assumption that the involvement of an interested third party in a conflict is best analysed by considering the third party as forming part of a trilateral (or multilateral) negotiation system,

the third party being one of the negotiators. As in the analysis of negotiations, therefore, the focus was on factors relating primarily to the third party's own evaluative processes. However, there was also a recognition that the third party was intervening in an interactive, dynamic process of conflict and was, therefore, subject to the latter's influences just as the third party's actions and decisions formed an influence on the conflict. In order to be valid, therefore, the analytic framework had to reflect this interactive and, therefore, dynamic process between third party and conflict system.

Firstly, in terms of the third party's own evaluative processes concerning an initial decision to intervene as intermediary, the analytic framework suggested that the third party's own interests in the conflict (conflict-related interests) provided a major input into its calculations about taking up the role. It was suggested that the conflict-related interest priorities of a third party do not alone explain the third party's decision to mediate, but affect that third party's process-related interests. For example, the West German government's main interest in the conflict arose from the presence of a large German community in Namibia. This in itself, formed a direct input into the decision to join the WCG initiative. It was, however, coupled with interests associated with the role itself, such as prevention of

conflict escalation or working in the international arena. Moreover, to have left the process to Western governments would have had costly ramifications both at home and abroad. This indicates the way in which conflict and process-related interests may have a reinforcing influence on each other.

A third party's decision to take up the intermediary role is also affected by its calculation that it may be able to influence the process of the conflict and its settlement. The analytic framework suggested that another explanatory factor affecting a third party's decision to take up mediation was its influence potential, that is, the resources which were available to carry out the functions of mediation. It seemed reasonable to assume that the third party, despite having interests in the conflict and the process of mediation, would not take up the intermediary role without considering whether it could carry out the role. Influence potential was therefore suggested as another explanatory variable.

The case-study showed that the coalition nature of the intervention had a major modifying influence on the influence potential of the individual participants and on their evaluation of such influence. However, the individual members also had resources which were not shared by the other members of the Group. The Canadian government, for example, had the resources of credibility

within the Commonwealth, and its reputation as mediator in such settings. The question which arises, therefore, is: Would such individually-based resources have been adequate had each participant decided to intervene individually? As was indicated in the case-study, this is necessarily a question for empirical investigation. The analytic framework simply states [i] that the third party's influence potential is an important explanatory factor in a decision to take up mediation and [ii] that if the third party is part of a coalition, then this has an impact (usually positive) on the third party's evaluation of its own influence potential.

The analytic framework also suggested that any third party's constituency may also be an important factor in the initial decision to intervene as an intermediary. It was suggested that the constituency (or groups within it) exerts a modifying influence on the third party's conflict and process-related interests. The question arises, however, of whether the constituency has a direct input into that initial decision. The position taken at this point is that the constituency may well have a direct input, but that this was not so in the WCG case-study. In other words, there is no constituency for the representatives' intervention as mediators in southern Africa. The interested constituency was based on the pro and anti-sanctions debate; issues relating to the East-West conflict; and the status quo versus Namibian

independence. This is to be compared with Quaker mediation, for example, where the constituency (other Quakers) may well form a direct constituency for mediation.

In the WCG case-study, however, the constituency factor was an important indirect input, in that it exerted a modifying influence on some of the participants' conflict and process-related interests. For the Carter Administration, the anti-apartheid constituency as well as the black constituency (which overlapped) were important factors in the process-related interest of avoiding other actions; specifically seeming to side with South Africa by imposing the veto at the Security Council. This would have jeopardised the Administration's credibility on the broader issues of human rights, which was a the hallmark of the Administration. Even here, however, the decision-makers directly involved seemed to differ in their evaluation of the importance of the constituency on Carter's southern Africa policy. Such different evaluations within a government raised the possibility that factors contributing to the decision to take up mediation may differ according to the policy-makers concerned. Thus, just as the case study showed that different members of an organisation (in this case, a government) whose representatives become involved as intermediaries, may have different evaluative criteria regarding influence with the parties in conflict; this may

also be the case in terms of [i] the interest priorities and [ii] the importance of various constituency groups.

The analytic framework also suggested that a constituency may have a modifying influence on the third party's influence potential, as for example, in the provision of support and resources to enable its representative to carry out the functions of mediation.

As indicated above, the motives for coalition mediation form an important reinforcing effect on the influence potential of the individual participants. This was seen to be the case in the WCG. The framework also pointed to the possibility that the coalition factor may influence the individual participants' process-related interests. That is, the third party may derive rewards from the mere participation in the coalition. While this was seen to apply to the Carter Administration, it was more of an important factor for the other four members of the Group. For the United Kingdom, the coalition was important in that it served United States-United Kingdom cooperation over the more urgent problem of Rhodesia. For the FRG, the coalition was a means of enhancing the role of the FRG in global diplomacy as was the case for the Canadian government which sought an active role during its two-year membership of the Security Council. The French government also benefited from the collective nature of the initiative. It may be concluded, therefore that the third party may derive benefits from actual participation

in a coalition mediation attempt.

The question which arises relating to this part of the analytic framework is: Does the framework assume that the third party is a monolithic entity? In the analysis of the case-study, it was recognised that this is by no means the case in governmental decision-making and that intra-governmental conflict occurs and has an impact on decisions. This recognition ensured that the investigation of the factors suggested as influencing the third party's decision to intervene took such conflict into account. Thus, the evaluations of the policy-makers concerned were taken into account and differing evaluations within a government were pointed to and their impact on decisions investigated. The case-study, therefore, suggested that there is a need for refinement of the analytic framework to include factors which reflect the intra-third party situation (in the case of the members of the WCG, factors within each government), such as the balance of influence within the third party at the time of intervention and throughout the third party's involvement as intermediary. Such balance may change over time, and may lead to a change in role (as was the case in the Reagan Administration's decision to repeal the Clark Amendment). The case study has, therefore, generated questions and provided insights leading to a refinement of the analytic framework.

Finally, the analytic framework also indicated that factors related to the conflict influence a third party's decision to take up the intermediary role. Two sets of factors were suggested, including the conflict characteristics and the pre-negotiation conditions. These provide the context within which the third party intervenes and affect the third party's interests and potential for influence. It was seen, for example, that the interlinked nature of the conflicts in southern Africa had an impact on the British government's decision to join the Contact Group, given its interest in Rhodesia. The pre-negotiation conditions affect the acceptability of the third party and therefore, its ability to take up the role. In the WCG case, it was seen that the parties pursued dual-track strategies, and the main acceptance of the Group derived from the Front-Line States. The fact that the UN was an important forum for the conflict meant that the members of the WCG were confronted with pressure to impose undesirable sanctions. The Group was, in part, reacting to this pressure.

10.2- Tactical Decisions

The assumption that the interested third party forms part of a multilateral negotiation system was also useful in pointing to factors which might influence a third party's tactical decisions in its interaction with the conflict system. The WCG was first used to illustrate the range of

tactics which may be used by an interested third party then the tactical decisions of the WCG were analysed.

10.2.1- The Tactics of the WCG

It was suggested that a third party might adopt facilitative tactics where the aim is to promote communication between the parties and where emphasis is on the parties' own decision-making and control of the interaction. In contrast, at the bargaining end of the spectrum the third party has primary control over communication; the priority being on contact between the third party and the protagonists rather than on communication between them. Moreover, the third party might have its own commitment to specific issues in the conflict and may introduce new issues to the negotiations. The bargaining range of the spectrum indicates the difficulty of distinguishing an interested intermediary from the negotiators themselves.

Analysis of tactics adopted by the Contact Group showed that the Group adopted tactics primarily at the bargaining end of the spectrum. The initiative started with a commitment to a specific framework for the settlement process and outcome to the conflict. The Group had almost total control over the communication process, where the emphasis was on communication between the Group and the parties in conflict. No face-to-face contact

occurred until the pre-implementation meeting in January 1981, and such contact was not encouraged by the Group. The Group also had control over proposals formulation which often reflected its own standpoint on specific issues in the conflict. The WCG also bargained with the parties and the protagonists bargained with the Group over specific issues and made the Group the focus of their bargaining behaviour. Bargaining with the WCG was further promoted by the fact that both parties were following dual-track strategies and did not expect concessions from each other as much as from the WCG.

The WCG also used threat and reward tactics in order to gain concession from the parties. Phase I of the negotiations saw a reliance on the use of threat tactics to induce concessions from the South African government. When the Group was confronted with the choice of implementing these in October 1978, it did not do so due to factors outlined above. The Group, instead, came to rely mainly on the less costly tactics of persuasion and the promise of rewards in the form of improved South African-United States relations if the former agreed to continue participating in the international negotiations. Phase II of the negotiations saw the use of reward as a primary tactic by the United States government in the form of concessions to the South African government in substantive proposals and the implementation of the policy of "constructive engagement" through increased

cooperation in the military, nuclear, and diplomatic fields.

The question which arises from the discussion of the tactics used by the Contact Group during the first and second phases of the negotiations is: Did the Group's tactics fall equally within the bargaining range of the spectrum during the two phases? That is, was the Group equally directive during the two phases? A precise answer to this question would require indicators of the degree of bargaining and facilitative behaviour. Since the spectrum suggests a diffuse process where there may be overlap between bargaining behaviour and facilitative behaviour, such precise indicators would not be helpful. However, it may be possible to define indicators of the degree of control over communication and proposals formulation and the degree of coercion used to induce concessions. This may well merely suggest a "more or less" approach. However, such an approach may prove useful in comparing third parties' behaviour. Moreover, as was indicated in the body of this study, a third party may move along the spectrum. Thus, it may start the initiative by adopting facilitative tactics and move gradually towards the bargaining end of the spectrum. It may, on the other hand, start the initiative in the bargaining range (as did the WCG) and move towards a more facilitative approach depending on a variety of influential factors.

It may safely be said that while the Group adopted primarily bargaining tactics throughout its involvement in the conflict, and was itself made the focus of bargaining by the parties, the second phase of the negotiations saw the intensification of bargaining behaviour. This phase saw the introduction by the third party (the Reagan Administration) of issues that were salient to it. The linkage issue became a pre-condition for the implementation of Resolution 435. The third party used the intermediary role to promote its own commitment to an issue.

10.2.2- Analysis of the WCG's Tactical Decisions

The assumption that a third party forms part of a multilateral negotiation system, with the third party being one of the negotiators underlined the fact that the third party's tactical decisions involve a process of adjustment and readjustment in response to inputs from the negotiation process. The analytic framework, therefore, has to take into account the dynamic aspect of the process between third party and conflict system in pointing to factors influencing the third party's tactical decisions.

The framework suggested that factors relevant to the initial decision were also applicable to the third party's tactical decisions. It was also emphasised that these were subject to change during the third party's involvement in

the conflict. The conflict characteristics continue to provide the background to the negotiations, and any changes in these may influence the negotiation. For example, Robert Mugabe's victory in Zimbabwe had a major implication for the Namibia negotiations, given the overlapping nature of the conflicts in southern Africa. It had an impact on the negotiation system in that it entrenched the South African government's preference for an internal settlement for Namibia.

The fact that the conflict over Namibia overlapped with the Angolan conflict had major implications for the functioning of the WCG, especially during the second phase of the negotiations. Moreover, the fact that the conflict over Namibia also overlaps with the conflict in South Africa again had a modifying influence on the negotiation system, specifically at the intra-party level, where concessions over Namibia would have had costly ramifications for the Botha Government at home.

The second set of factors providing an input, therefore, was the negotiation system. This set of factors formed a source of feedback to the third party, and was itself responsive to the third party's tactics. It was suggested that each level of the negotiation system may form an input into the third party's tactical decisions so that it may re-evaluate and readjust its tactics during the negotiation process.

The negotiation system was of vital importance in the tactics adopted by the WCG. This was so in relation to the broad approach to the negotiations as well as on specific issues. The negotiation system had an impact on the WCG's tactics in the recognition by the Group of the parties' preferences and their difficulties regarding intra-party division. The fact that important allies in the conflict, namely the FLS, sought agreement also meant that the FLS could be used as a source of legitimacy at the UN and as a source of pressure on SWAPO. The case-study also showed that a third party adjusts its tactics in response to feedback from this input. For example, the Group changed its position on the proposed dual vote system in response to opposition from SWAPO and the FLS. At the intra-party level, opposition to a settlement from the white population in Namibia prompted a change in the original proposals to include constitutional guarantees prior to the holding of elections. Dr. Crocker initially suggested a "Lancaster House" type of settlement for Namibia. Feedback from the negotiation system, in the form of opposition from SWAPO and the FLS (as well as from the intra-coalition situation; that is, opposition from other members of the WCG) prompted a readjustment of this proposal to the more palatable (for the FLS, SWAPO and other members of the WCG) constitutional guarantees prior to the holding of elections.

The question which arises is whether the negotiation

system is always an important factor in the way an intermediary functions. It may reasonably be assumed that the third party continuously adjusts its tactics in response to feedback from the negotiation system. What cannot be predicted, however, is the degree to which the third party is willing to readjust its tactics in response to this feedback. The Reagan Administration was not willing to abandon its preference for linkage despite opposition from the negotiation system and the intra-coalition situation. This indicated that other factors determined this position. Another such instance where the WCG did not respond to feedback from the negotiation system arose during the first phase of the negotiations, when the WCG did not interfere in the controversy which arose between the South African government and the UN Secretary General over the issue of SWAPO bases in Namibia. This was due to the Group's unwillingness to undermine the credibility of the Secretary General and his representatives. The Group, (especially Don McHenry) was also suspicious of South African motives at this stage of the negotiations. These examples from the case study suggest that the negotiation system does not always lead to a readjustment of tactics by a third party. Other factors are also important, and may prevent such readjustment.

The analysis showed that the third party's conflict and process-related interests continue to influence a

third party's tactical decisions. They do so primarily by influencing the third party's set of preferred outcomes to the conflict and its position on specific issues in the negotiation. The Group's set of preferred outcomes was an important factor in that the Group's preference sets were reflected in the proposals formulated and tactics used in bargaining with the parties. The analysis also indicated that the third party's preference set is subject to change during its involvement due to feedback from various factors including the negotiation system, the constituency "back home" and the intra-coalition situation (if the third party is a coalition).

A question thus arises of whether this is a factor specific to interested third parties acting as intermediaries. Do third parties which do not have any substantive interest in the conflict develop their own preferences for outcomes and positions on specific issues during the mediation process? This is a question for further empirical investigation.

The analytic framework also suggested influence potential as a factor in the tactical decisions of a third party. The case-study indicated, however, that the same resources may produce different tactics. This was evident in comparing the tactics used by the Carter and Reagan Administrations in dealing with the South African government. The former used the extensive relationship

between the United States and South Africa to threaten the South African government with sanctions, while the latter used the relationship to offer rewards. This problem indicates that consideration of the influence potential must not only include a third party's resources, but also its willingness to use them in threat or reward tactics, as well as the third party's perception of the effectiveness of its resources. Thus, while the analytic framework can go as far as stating that a third party's influence potential- (that is, those resources that may be used in the prosecution of intermediary functions, including the inducement of concessions) affects the tactical decisions made, the decision to use these resources either for threat or reward cannot be explained by merely considering the third party's influence potential. Other factors, including the third party's own interests, its reading of the negotiation system (as an indication of potential effectiveness); and the possible reaction of its constituency, exert an effect on the third party's influence potential and the tactics used.

The framework also suggested that a third party's tactics may be influenced by its constituency, both directly and by its exerting a modifying influence on the third party's preference set and influence potential. The case-study showed that the constituency does not necessarily provide a continuous input into the third party's tactical decisions, but may have an influence at

specific points during the third party's involvement. It was found that the constituency factor was an important input into the Carter Administration's reluctance to push for sanctions in October 1978 due to Congressional losses suffered by the Democratic Party at that period. It was also an important influence on the functioning of Dr. Crocker in the negotiations, in that White House influence ensured the maintenance of linkage as an issue in the negotiations. The case-study also indicated that when a constituency attempts to influence its representative's tactics, it does not necessarily succeed. This was seen to be the case in the functioning of the West German participants in the Group. Despite opposition from the pro-DTA lobby- in the form of the CDU/CSU coalition, the Foreign Minister, Herr Genscher continued to have a preference for Resolution 435 and to promote contact between SWAPO and the German community in Namibia, even when the CDU/CSU coalition were in government. The question which arises is: When is a constituency (or groups within it) an important factor in the third party's tactical decisions? While the analytic framework indicated that constituency groups may have an impact and partly explain a third party's tactics, it does not indicate when this becomes a salient factor for the third party.

The importance of the coalition nature of an intervention to the initial decision is also reflected in its functioning. The analytic framework suggested that the

intra-coalition situation (defined as the level of intra-coalition cohesion , the distribution of influence potential, and the degree of communication and consultation between the members), influences the tactics used by participants in the coalition and by the coalition as a whole. It was also suggested that the intra-coalition situation is itself subject to feedback from the tactics adopted by the members of the coalition. The case-study showed that the intra-coalition situation may also influence the preference sets of the individual participants. For example, the Reagan Administration's preference for a Lancaster House type settlement was altered due, in part, to differences within the coalition. The case-study also illustrated that the intra-coalition situation does not remain static but the three components may change with time.

The analytic framework suggested that the intra-coalition situation may be subject to a modifying influence from the negotiation system. For example, changes in the protagonists' preference sets may result in division within the coalition as to the readjustment of tactics. The framework does not indicate, however, how the protagonists in conflict may use different members of the coalition as intermediaries or sources of influence with an intransigent member. The case-study indicated that protagonists in conflict may attempt to influence an influential member of a coalition intermediary through

other members of that coalition. Was this specific to this case or is it a general feature of coalition mediation? Moreover, is this likely to occur if the participants of the coalition are not interested third parties in the conflict and act mainly at the facilitative end of the spectrum of third party activity?

10.3- Role Re-Evaluation

The assumption made in the analytic framework, namely that the third party makes a rough cost/benefit evaluation prior to taking up the role, suggested that the third party may, with changing circumstances in the conflict and the third party's own evaluative criteria, re-evaluate its initial response to the conflict. Such re-evaluation may lead to withdrawal from the role or its maintenance.

The case study showed that changes in the factors which were important in the first decision to intervene contribute to its re-evaluation, such that the role may become too costly and a liability. This was seen to be the case in the French government's decision to withdraw from the Group. Continued participation in the Contact Group became costly in terms of that government's credibility with African countries. However, while indicating that re-evaluation may occur and suggesting the factors which contribute to this, the analytic framework does not indicate the timing of "quitting", given that there may be

a time-lag between actual re-evaluation and abandonment of the role.

The case study indicated that the abandonment of the role of intermediary or the change of role (for example to become an ally to one side in the conflict, as occurred in the case of the United States government when it repealed the Clark Amendment), may result from a changing balance of forces within the third party. This was the case in the Reagan Administration's decision to provide military support for the Angolan movement, UNITA. While the State Department, which was largely responsible for the negotiations over Namibia and over the linkage issue, was opposed to such a role (since it would jeopardise their role as intermediaries), the White House and the Right wing lobbies won the case in Congress for the repeal of the Clark Amendment.

The case-study, therefore, highlighted a weakness in the framework alluded to earlier, that is, its lack of consideration for the intra-third party situation. In this particular case-study, this meant factors internal to the decision-making processes of each member of the coalition as well as the intra-coalition situation.

10.4- The Utility of the Western Contact Group as Case-Study

While the WCG as case-study has highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of the analytic framework and has generated questions relating to the analysis of third party decision-making in response to conflict, the fact that this particular intervention is a relatively recent occurrence generated a number of difficulties in the research process.

A primary research problem was access to the decision-makers involved in the Contact Group process. Moreover, once access was achieved, another problem was the reluctance of decision-makers to reveal important aspects of the negotiations which would have enriched the study. A further difficulty which arose once access was achieved was that different decision-makers at times gave different responses to particular questions. This occurred, for example, in response to the question of constituency influence on the decisions made during the mediation process.

The problems arising from the recency of the Contact Group intervention are also evident in that other analysts which have investigated the WCG intervention while the present research was being conducted have, at times, provided different accounts of the process. Such differences may arise from interviews carried out with different decision-makers(1). A pertinent illustration of

this problem was evident from an interview with Ambassador McHenry. Zartman's account states that by April 1978, McHenry "estimated that agreement by both parties was attainable within a week". Ambassador McHenry indicated, however, that he had not made this estimation and that he, in fact, challenged Zartman for verification(3).

Another problem related to the recency of this particular intervention was that while the United States has a relatively open form of government - a fact which enabled access to decision-makers and detailed official documents, such access was by no means as easily available for the other members of the WCG.

Overall, however, the utility of the WCG as case-study arose from its use in investigating the explanatory utility of the analytic framework. As indicated above, it has generated questions and provided new insights related to third party decision-making in response to conflict, and has provided the opportunity of investigating, in particular, the intervention of interested intermediaries in a conflict situation.

The use of the WCG was also an advantage in that it provided an opportunity to investigate coalition mediation as a form of intervention. Such interventions have become the preferred mode of mediation in recent years (for example, the Contadora Group or the Eminent Persons Group). As suggested in the body of this work, a major

advantage of collective intervention is that it enables a spread of costs. It also provides a reinforcing influence on each participant's resources.

10.5- A Summary of Questions Arising from this Study

The following is a listing of questions discussed in this chapter regarding the analytic framework generally and those suggested by the case-study:

[1] Given the difficulty of distinguishing interested intermediaries from the negotiators themselves, are we justified in placing the interventions of such diverse third parties as the WCG and Quaker mediators under the rubric of "mediation"?

[2] Can we overcome the above problem by considering mediation as a spectrum of activity, from the facilitative to the bargaining, whereby different third parties may be located along different positions along the spectrum?

[3] Do third parties which are disinterested in the substantive content of the conflict use bargaining tactics?

[4] What are the factors which influence any third party's move along the spectrum during its involvement as intermediary?

[5] Can we formulate indicators of facilitative and bargaining behaviour which may be used to classify third parties along the spectrum, or to investigate the degree of shift along the spectrum during one third party's involvement?

[6] Given that third parties derive benefits from the intermediary role itself, and that this is a major factor to intervene as intermediary, what factors would make mediation a more attractive policy option in response to conflict?

[7] What are the factors, at the intra-third party level (in this case, intra-governmental) which influence the decision to intervene via an intermediary response?

[8] When is the coalition factor the decisive factor in a third party's decision to intervene as intermediary?

[9] Can coalition mediation alleviate the reluctance of individual governments to intervene as mediators?

[10] When does coalition mediation, or the factor of the coalition, become a liability in the success of an initiative?

[11] Is coalition mediation the most effective form of intervention in situations of asymmetric conflict such as that which exists in southern Africa?

[12] Is the constituency factor ever important as a direct influence on a third party's decision to intervene as intermediary? Is it only important as such in the case of organisations where mediation is part of the ideological framework, as, for example, is the case among the Quakers?

[13] The above question raises another important question, namely, can a constituency for mediation be built up?

[14] Is the third party's set of preferred outcomes a factor specific to interested third parties' tactical decisions? Do disinterested intermediaries develop their own preferences for outcomes during the course of their intervention?

[15] Would a disinterested third party developing such preferences be less acceptable than an interested third party which is expected by the protagonists to have its own interests and preferences?

[16] Is impartiality a more important factor for the acceptability of the disinterested third party?

[17] Is the negotiation system always an important feedback influence on a third party's tactical decisions? Are third parties which do not have a substantive interest in the conflict more responsive to the negotiation system during the mediation process?

[18] When does a third party's constituency become a salient factor in its tactical decisions?

A number of these have partly been answered in the present study. It will be apparent from the above discussion, however, that while this study has provided a systematic framework by which third party decision-making in response to conflict may be investigated, this has by no means exhausted questions regarding our understanding of the mediation process. This investigation has, however, furthered our understanding of the factors which influence an interested third party's decision-making in response to conflict.

CHAPTER 10- THE CONTACT GROUP


Chapter 10- Notes

1- See, for example,
Zartman, I.W., Ripe for Resolution, (Oxford University
Press, New York and Oxford, 1985), Chapter 5.

Karns, M.P., "Ad Hoc Multilateral Diplomacy: The United
States, the Contact Group and Namibia", International
Organisation, Vol. 41, No. 1, (Winter) 1987, pp. 93-124.


2- Zartman, op. cit., p. 175.

3- Interview with Ambassador Donald McHenry, (United
States Ambassador to the UN, 1979-1981), Washington D.C.,
15 June 1987.




Source: International Organisation, Vol. 41, No. 1, (Winter) 1987, pp. 93-124.
Source: International Organisation, Vol. 41, No. 1, (Winter) 1987, pp. 93-124.
Source: International Organisation, Vol. 41, No. 1, (Winter) 1987, pp. 93-124.

APPENDIX IA- THE ODENDAAL PLAN




African 'homelands' according to the Odendaal Plan
Source: Green, et al, Namibia: The Last Colony,
(Longman, Harlow, Essex, 1981), p. 95.

APPENDIX IB-
MILITARY MAP
OF NAMIBIA



The Military Situation in Namibia
Source: Green et al, 1981, p.162



Source: UN Council for Namibia, The Military Situation in and Relating to Namibia, (1983).

**Appendix XI~ Proposal for a Settlement of the
Namibian Situation: Security Council Document**

S/ 12636 of 10 April 1978

(p. 513-518)

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**Appendix XXX~ Chronological Outline of
Western Contact Group Activity in the
Conflict over Namibia (p.515-525)
removed for copyright reasons**

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