



City Research Online

City St George's, University of London

Citation: Susen, S. (2026). Senses of Time: From the Future via the Present to the Past (and Back Again). *Social Epistemology*, pp. 1-42. doi: 10.1080/02691728.2026.2669575

This is the published version of the paper.

This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. To cite this item please consult the publisher's version.

Permanent repository link: <https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/37996/>

Link to published version: <https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2026.2669575>

Copyright and Reuse: Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright holders. Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, unless otherwise indicated, provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way. For full details of reuse please refer to [City Research Online policy](#).



Social Epistemology

A Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Policy

ISSN: 0269-1728 (Print) 1464-5297 (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/tsep20

Senses of Time: From the Future via the Present to the Past (and Back Again)

Simon Susen

To cite this article: Simon Susen (20 Jul 2026): Senses of Time: From the Future via the Present to the Past (and Back Again), Social Epistemology, DOI: [10.1080/02691728.2026.2669575](https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2026.2669575)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2026.2669575>



© 2026 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.



Published online: 20 Jul 2026.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)

Senses of Time: From the Future via the Present to the Past (and Back Again)

Simon Susen 

Department of Sociology and Criminology, City St George's, University of London, London, UK

ABSTRACT

The main purpose of this paper is to reflect on the concept of 'time' in general and the concept of 'the future' in particular. To this end, the analysis focuses on central issues raised by Gerard Delanty in his recent work on competing and conflicting ideas of the future in the contemporary world. To narrow the scope of the investigation, ten key issues are examined. Each issue is addressed in two steps: first, by elucidating the problem in question; and, second, by discussing controversial matters arising from it. Rather than simply reconstructing Delanty's position, this article critically engages with the most salient limitations of his account and puts forward constructive proposals for overcoming them. Building on the principal arguments scrutinized in the course of this inquiry, the final part of the paper sketches the contours of a critical theory of time, which is organized around the antinomy between 'the timeless' and 'the temporal'. It posits that critical theory is viable only to the extent that it recognizes and explores the temporal constitution of the natural/objective, social/normative, and experiential/subjective dimensions of the human condition – and, by implication, commits to temporalizing the human condition itself.

ARTICLE HISTORY

Received 9 February 2025
Accepted 1 May 2026

KEYWORDS

Future; past; present; time

Introduction

The main purpose of this paper is to reflect on the concept of 'time' in general and the concept of 'the future' in particular.¹ To this end, the analysis focuses on central issues raised by Gerard Delanty in his recent work on competing and conflicting ideas of the future in the contemporary world.² To narrow the scope of the investigation, ten key issues are examined. Each issue is addressed in two steps: first, by elucidating the problem in question; and, second, by discussing controversial matters arising from it.

Rather than simply reconstructing Delanty's position, this article critically engages with the most salient limitations of his account and puts forward constructive proposals for overcoming them. The comments and suggestions offered are intended to be sympathetic, acknowledging that Delanty has made a valuable contribution to our understanding of the future – especially by sharpening awareness of recent trends and developments in philosophical and sociological approaches to the temporal constitution of human existence. Building on the principal arguments scrutinized in the course of this inquiry, the final part of the paper sketches the contours of a critical theory of time, which is organized around the antinomy between 'the timeless' and 'the temporal'. It posits that critical theory is viable only to the extent that it recognizes and explores the temporal constitution of

CONTACT Simon Susen  Simon.Susen@cantab.net; Simon.Susen@city.ac.uk  Department of Sociology and Criminology, School of Policy and Global Affairs, City St George's, University of London, Northampton Square, London EC1V 0HB, UK

© 2026 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. The terms on which this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent.

the natural/objective, social/normative, and experiential/subjective dimensions of the human condition – and, by implication, commits to temporalizing the human condition itself.

1. The Future as a Challenge

It is hard to deny that ‘the question of the future is one of the major problems facing contemporary societies’³. Arguably, the main reason for this peculiar historical situation, in which the future is perceived as a key reference point for individual and collective actors inhabiting the present, is the emergence of a *polycrisis*⁴ – also known as *metacrisis* or *permacrisis*.⁵ We are confronted, then, with a variety of co-existing and overlapping challenges: *environmental* (climate change and the risk of nuclear catastrophe); *economic* (the feasibility of capitalism, growing social inequalities, and future supplies of energy and raw materials); *political* (the rise of populist and authoritarian forms of governance, the instability of liberal democracy, and the polarization of politics); *military and territorial* (escalating conflicts across the world – notably the Russo-Ukrainian War, the 2026 Iran War, the Israel–Palestine conflict, the war in Sudan, and ongoing hostilities in the Middle East and in the Democratic Republic of Congo, among many others – as well as the more general risk of nuclear war); *technological* (the impact of artificial intelligence, digital technology, nanotechnology, and biotechnology); *philosophical* (the popularity of relativism, nihilism, and cynicism – whether these be epistemic, moral, cultural, political, or otherwise).

Such an intricate historical constellation is marked by a proliferation of intertwined and overlapping crises, implying that a *polycrisis* effectively reaches the more problematic status of a global *permacrisis*. In this context, the multiple ways in which individual and collective actors relate to the future may be largely shaped by ‘the permacrisis of the present’⁶. It appears, therefore, that – now more than ever – the future is not only a key reference point for those immersed in the present but also, in a more fundamental sense, ‘a way of *experiencing* the world’⁷. On this account, the future is ubiquitous in that it permeates both the conceptual and the experiential building blocks of the present:

Almost everything is now understood and experienced through the prism of the future, since this is the primary focus for the playing out of crises. The overcoming of a crisis is always in the future, but it begins in the present. We live in the present, but we are always oriented towards the future, whose shadow falls across the present.⁸

Far from representing a peripheral element of our immersion in the world, the future constitutes a central component that is always already part of the present. The more crisis-ridden the present, the more those who inhabit it are drawn into (and towards) the future. The more the present is a source of crisis, the more both its constitution and its manifestations are experienced and interpreted through the lens of the future. If, however, the present is perceived as a *permacrisis* (and, hence, as a hopeless situation), then it is likely that those immersed in it will lose faith in the future. Given the large number of serious – and, on some levels, existential – challenges, this lack of faith in the future is not completely implausible, let alone irrational. Rather, it is symptomatic of the pressing issues faced by both individuals and social groups in the 21st century, meaning that it is hard, if not impossible, to live in the present without considering the future.

First Intermediate Reflection

A critical analysis of human temporality requires recognizing the ubiquity of the future in the present (and, by extension, in the past). Such an endeavour, however, should avoid overstating the extent to which this is a new phenomenon (or a phenomenon that has been significantly exacerbated in recent years). While it is true that the future ‘is a way of experiencing the world’⁹, it is questionable whether this is the case ‘*now more than at any previous time in history*’¹⁰. Any historical condition marked by the confluence of crises (whether we are dealing with a *polycrisis*, *metacrisis*, or *permacrisis*) comprises a combination of objective, normative, and subjective factors, which, in most cases, expose the fragility of the world.¹¹ In previous decades and centuries, however, there

have been numerous sets of circumstances in which people's lifeworlds have been primarily 'understood and experienced through the prism of the future'¹².

This *future-orientedness* may be triggered not only by the emergence of different *crises* (social, cultural, environmental, economic, political, military, technological, philosophical, or otherwise) but also by the emergence of *collective imaginaries* (including ideologies), enabling its advocates to project themselves into a yet-to-come. In the context of modernity, this – collective – orientation to the future manifests itself in '*major*' *political ideologies* (such as anarchism, communism/socialism, liberalism, and fascism) and '*sub-major*' *political ideologies* (such as feminism, nationalism, and – more recently – environmentalism).¹³ Thus, the engagement with the present through the prism of the future may be not only an expression of a *specific* polycrisis, metacrisis, or permacrisis but also – in a more projective (albeit not necessarily progressive) sense – a sign of people's *general* desire to imagine the possibility of a yet-to-come, in which their individual and collective ambitions and agendas can be realized.

II. Humans as Future-Oriented Creatures

Far from being reducible to a way in which the world is experienced and/or conceptualized, the future lies at the heart of the human condition: 'humans are future-oriented beings'¹⁴. Just as the future is 'constitutive of humanity'¹⁵, it is 'constituted by humanity'¹⁶. As humans participate in the construction of historically unfolding processes, they are not only *shaped by the past* and *immersed in the present* but also *oriented towards the future*. The present is more than a theatre of *actuality*; crucially, it is a treasure of *potentiality* and *possibility*. As such, it is constantly being constructed and reconstructed by the various material and symbolic resources mobilized by actors capable of producing, reproducing, and transforming the conditions of their existence. The future, therefore, is not merely a factual continuation or temporal extension of the present and the past, let alone 'a fate that is largely [or entirely] determined'¹⁷ and can be predicted – namely, by uncovering the underlying laws and causal mechanisms that govern all occurrences.¹⁸ Rather, the future, at least in the human universe, is 'a product of foresight and willed'¹⁹ – that is, it is the result of intentional beings, capable of making decisions in accordance with a variety of cognitive (including both empirical and logical, purposive and moral, utilitarian and deontological, opportunistic and principled) considerations.

Second Intermediate Reflection

Humans are future-oriented beings. Given the existential significance of this orientation to the future, it may be regarded as a *species-constitutive* feature. This does not mean, however, that it represents a *species-distinctive* feature – that is, an attribute that is essential only to humans and, by implication, not to other species. An *anthropocentric* account of time runs the risk of overlooking the extent to which *all* living beings (and, indeed, all life forms) are *oriented towards the future*, insofar as their ultimate telos consists in survival and reproduction.

Granted, the way in which humans engage with the future is peculiar and possibly unique – not only due to their capacity for reflection, contemplation, and introspection but also due to their capacity to establish cognitive, affective, and evaluative links between different temporal horizons (within the past–present–future continuum). Moreover, we appear to be the only species for whose members 'existence' is an issue.²⁰ Since humans are meaning-seeking creatures, 'existence' is not a mere 'fact' but an ongoing *tension-laden experience* of the world, which is bound up with 'big' (that is, existential) questions and challenges, from which there is no escape during one's lifetime.²¹ Given this existential imperative, however, *other* living beings are *also* profoundly invested in the future. In fact, some of them (notably sentient beings) are also equipped with cognitive, affective, and evaluative faculties, permitting them to experience different (physical, mental, and emotional) states that are indicative of their existential investment in, relationship with, and dependence on the future. Every living entity is 'always oriented to the future'²², because its existence is intertwined with its

capacity to find a way forward (whether through survival or through reproduction, or both). In short, the future is constitutive of *all* living beings and constituted by *all* living beings.

III. Beyond Determinism

'While the future is not determined, it is also not entirely open'²³. The reason for this curious paradox may be described as follows: on the one hand, there are numerous dimensions of the world that are subject to high degrees of *determinacy*, notably those that are part of the natural world (and, hence, governed by the physical laws of the universe); on the other hand, there are numerous dimensions of the world that are subject to high degrees of *indeterminacy*, notably those that are part of the social world (and, hence, shaped by historical contingency and human agency).²⁴

Third Intermediate Reflection

Many commentators will broadly agree with the narrative 'determinacy in (and of) the natural world' vs. 'indeterminacy in (and of) the social world'. A critical theory of the future – capable of moving from a *low-resolution* account (determinism vs. nondeterminism) via a *medium-resolution* account (determinism, free will, compatibilism, and indeterminism / accidentalism) to a *high-resolution* account (see below) – requires a more differentiated understanding of the relationship between determinacy and indeterminacy.²⁵ Arguably, we are confronted with the following options:²⁶

- *Option 1 (pan-determinism)*: Everything that happens in the world is governed by universal laws and, hence, (pre)determined.
- *Option 2 (natural determinism + social contingency with human agency)*: Everything that happens in the natural world is governed by universal laws and, hence, (pre)determined. By contrast, everything that happens in the social world is subject not only to high levels of contingency but also to the agency of individual actors, who, owing to their rational capacity, are capable of exercising varying degrees of free will.
- *Option 3 (pan-indeterminism)*: Everything that happens in the world is largely accidental and, hence, fundamentally indeterminate.
- *Option 4 (natural indeterminism + social contingency with human agency)*: Everything that happens in the natural world is largely accidental and, hence, fundamentally indeterminate. By contrast, everything that happens in the social world is subject not only to high levels of contingency but also to the agency of individual actors, who, owing to their rational capacity, are capable of exercising varying degrees of free will.
- *Option 5 (natural determinism + social indeterminism)*: Everything that happens in the natural world is governed by universal laws and, hence, (pre)determined. By contrast, everything that happens in the social world is largely accidental and, hence, fundamentally indeterminate.
- *Option 6 (natural contingency with nonhuman agency + social contingency with human agency)*: Everything that happens in the world is subject not only to high levels of contingency but also to the agency of both nonhuman and human actors.
- *Option 7 (natural contingency with nonhuman agency + social determinism)*: Everything that happens in the natural world is subject not only to high levels of contingency but also to the agency of nonhuman actors. By contrast, everything that happens in the social world is governed by universal laws and, hence, (pre)determined.
- *Option 8 (natural contingency with nonhuman agency + social indeterminism)*: Everything that happens in the natural world is subject not only to high levels of contingency but also to the agency of nonhuman actors. By contrast, everything that happens in the social world is largely accidental and, hence, fundamentally indeterminate.

- *Option 9 (natural indeterminism + social determinism)*: Everything that happens in the natural world is largely accidental and, hence, fundamentally indeterminate. By contrast, everything that happens in the social world is governed by universal laws and, hence, (pre)determined.
- *Option 10 (pan-compatibilism)*: Everything that happens in the world is – in different respects – partly determined, partly indeterminate, partly accidental, partly contingent, and partly dependent on the agency of both nonhuman and human actors.

The preceding list of options is an admittedly schematic outline of the different ways in which we can make sense of the relationship between determinacy and indeterminacy. These ten options are significant because a critical theory that fails to chart the determinacy/indeterminacy space spanning 'nature' and 'culture' – understood, respectively, as 'the natural world' and 'the social world' – will struggle to apprehend the structural and agential forces that shape the temporal constitution of reality. Debates over (a) *determinism*, (b) *free will*, (c) *compatibilism*, and (d) *indeterminism / accidentalism* are as old as philosophy itself.²⁷ A more differentiated approach, however, may emerge from drawing (a) an *ontological* distinction between 'the natural world' and 'the social world', (b) a *methodological* distinction between 'the natural sciences' and 'the social sciences', and (c) an *epistemological* distinction between 'knowledge of the natural world' and 'knowledge of the social world'.

Aware of the extent to which the boundaries between 'the natural' and 'the social' are increasingly blurred, critical theorists would benefit from presenting these options in a more systematic fashion and, crucially, from assessing their respective strengths and weaknesses. It may require a second 'methodological dispute' [*Methodenstreit*]²⁸ – that is, a kind of *Methodenstreit 2.0* – to acquire an in-depth understanding of the relationship between determinacy and indeterminacy. Arguably, such a project would oblige us to rethink (a) the *ontological* boundaries between 'the natural world', 'the social world', 'the world of logic', and 'the world of culture', (b) the *methodological* boundaries between 'the natural sciences', 'the social sciences', 'the formal sciences', and 'the humanities', as well as (c) the *epistemological* boundaries between 'natural-scientific knowledge', 'social-scientific knowledge', 'formal-scientific knowledge', and 'humanistic knowledge'.

IV. From Controllability to Uncontrollability?

Arguably, we have been witnessing a transition from the modern quest for control (and belief in controllability [*Verfügbarkeit*]) to the late-modern experience of lack of control (and recognition of uncontrollability [*Unverfügbarkeit*]).²⁹ In fact, this change in perspective is tantamount to 'a seismic shift'³⁰ from the 20th-century view that the future is 'essentially under the control of the present'³¹ to the 21st-century view that the future is (largely or completely) unknown, uncertain, and unpredictable and, by implication, 'out of control'³² – or even uncontrollable and, ultimately, *unverfügbar*³³. In its extreme versions, the focus on uncontrollability may, at best, convey *pessimism* (suggesting that there is hardly any hope for 'a desirable future'³⁴) or, at worst, lead to *fatalism* (implying that 'there may not even be a future'³⁵).

Fourth Intermediate Reflection

The diagnosis of the shift from a generally optimistic and future-oriented *Zeitgeist* towards a remarkably pessimistic and future-sceptical, if not fatalistic and future-denying, *Zeitgeist* may be broadly accurate. The former is associated with modernity in general and with modernity's '*major*' *political ideologies* (such as anarchism, communism/socialism, liberalism, and – most perniciously – fascism) and '*sub-major*' *political ideologies* (such as feminism, nationalism, and – more recently – environmentalism) in particular.³⁶ The latter is associated with late modernity in general and with late modernity's tendency to turn away from teleological (including evolutionist, developmentalist, and progressivist) modes of thinking – whether these be primarily political, philosophical, economic, cultural, religious, scientific, or

otherwise. Even if one assumes that this account is correct, it is vital to question not only the dualistic framework on which it is based but also the alleged novelty of the issue in question.

The history of our species is marked by the tension-laden relationship between *our search for controllability and determinacy* (together with our pursuit of knowledge, certainty, and predictability), on the one hand, and *our experience of uncontrollability and indeterminacy* (together with our acceptance of ignorance, uncertainty, and unpredictability), on the other. Human history is pervaded by competing attitudinal forces, pulling in opposite directions: optimism vs. pessimism, idealism vs. fatalism, triumphalism vs. defeatism, progressivism vs. traditionalism, belief in the future (expressed in the search for *Verfügbarkeit*) vs. scepticism about the future (triggered by experiences of *Unverfügbarkeit*).

It may (or may not) be true that, in terms of their *Zeitgeist*, the 20th and 21st centuries are associated with two diametrically opposed temporal orientations. In any case, different epochs generate (and are generated by) different *Zeitgeister*, characterized by different attitudes towards past, present, and future. Owing to the contingencies attached to this collective journey, humans (in *any* period) can establish a meaningful relationship to the world only by accepting that their lives are shaped by varying degrees of controllability and uncontrollability (and, arguably, by varying degrees of hope and despair).

V. The Human Condition?

Over the past 200,000 years, humans have developed different – species-constitutive – capacities: on the one hand, those associated with intelligence, empathy, reason, and solidarity; on the other hand, those associated with selfishness, ruthlessness, competitiveness, and self-preservation.³⁷ The former tend to be seen in a *positive* light, insofar as they make human co-existence possible, serving as the source of individual and collective learning processes, empowerment, and progress (cognitively and normatively, technologically and morally, scientifically and ethically). The latter tend to be seen in a *negative* light, insofar as they can undermine the stability of social and political orders, thereby resulting in individual and collective unlearning processes, disempowerment, and regression (cognitively and normatively, technologically and morally, scientifically and ethically).

Fifth Intermediate Reflection

It is hard to make a persuasive case for critical theory without examining – and, possibly, defending – the concept of ‘humanity’³⁸. In recent decades, traditional accounts of ‘the human condition’³⁹, ‘human essence’⁴⁰, and ‘human nature’⁴¹ have come under attack – not least due to the influence of constructivism⁴², historicism⁴³, and perspectivism⁴⁴ (which permeate different variants of poststructuralism⁴⁵, postmodernism⁴⁶, and posthumanism⁴⁷ – among several other ‘post-isms’). And yet, at least from a neo-Kantian and Habermasian point of view, the project of critical theory is inconceivable without a differentiated understanding of humanity (and, by implication, of the species-constitutive, species-distinctive, and species-generative characteristics of our existence). Such an endeavour requires a balanced approach, capable of acknowledging that ‘human nature’ is composed of contradictory, but complementary, elements: impulsive and reflective, irrational and rational, competitive and co-operative, callous and empathetic, egoistic and altruistic, selfish and selfless, habitual and creative – to mention only a few. Humans are not a *fait accompli* but, rather, a species in flux – continuously shaped by historical contingencies and future possibilities.

The question arises, then, whether different forms of life – through the confluence of their foundational, contingent, and ephemeral dimensions⁴⁸ – reinforce (or undermine) different sets of ‘human’ characteristics. Arguably, *different dimensions of ‘the human condition’* are either strengthened or weakened by *different forms of life*.⁴⁹ In an admittedly schematic way, these forms of life may be categorized as follows: ‘collectivist’ vs. ‘individualist’, ‘simple’ vs. ‘complex’, ‘tight’ vs. ‘loose’, ‘horizontal’ vs. ‘vertical’, ‘control-based’ vs. ‘freedom-based’, ‘community-centred’ vs. ‘person-

centred', 'relatively homogeneous' vs. 'relatively heterogeneous', 'technologically backward' vs. 'technologically advanced', 'small-scale' vs. 'large-scale', 'slow-paced' vs. 'fast-paced'.⁵⁰

When reflecting on the phenomenon of *social acceleration*⁵¹, which tends to be associated not only with *modern* but also, crucially, with *late-modern* (or even *postmodern*) forms of life, questions such as the following arise: How fast is too fast? And how slow is too slow? How dynamic is too dynamic? And how static is too static? How energetic is too energetic? And how quiescent is too quiescent? Different (individual and collective) actors will give different answers to these questions in relation to different dimensions of their lives. Similar questions can be raised with respect to specific forms of life, as categorized above.

To offer a comprehensive account of the contingency of our existence, critical theory needs to explore the *impact* of these *forms of life* not only on the realization of different *human potentials* (both positive and negative) but also on our *relationship to time* in general and *to the future* in particular. Granted, such an undertaking would require serious sociological, anthropological, and historical research. It might, however, contribute to a more fine-grained (that is, cross-societal, cross-cultural, and cross-historical) understanding of the relationship between the *organization of society* and the *organization of time* (and, by implication, between *regimes of governmentality* and *regimes of temporality*).

VI. The Future as a Contested Domain

In recent years and decades, 'the future has become a contested domain'⁵², which has been, and continues to be, interpreted in radically different ways. As indicated above, these interpretations range from *optimistic* (if not idealistic) to *pessimistic* (if not fatalistic). The former convey a strong and confident – and, in many cases, technophile – trust not only in the long-term survival of the human species but also in the substantial enhancement of its conditions of existence. The latter express a gloomy and largely sceptical – and, in some cases, even cynical – attitude towards the future, which, in its apocalyptic variants, goes as far as to suggest that the complete destruction of the world is a matter of *when*, not *if*.

It is ironic that, while – in terms of their diagnoses – they are diametrically opposed, *both* positions may claim to be *scientifically motivated* (that is, empirically substantiated, methodologically rigorous, epistemologically reflexive, terminologically precise, and theoretically informed).⁵³ At the same time, *both* positions may be defended from a *non-scientific* point of view: 'common sense' may tell us that the world is coming to an end, just as 'common sense' may tell us that, for a growing number of people across the world, life conditions are gradually improving.

Sixth Intermediate Reflection

The future is an object of contention, and so is the past. Just as there are '*contested futures*', there are '*contested histories*'.⁵⁴ Furthermore, the present is an object of contention. In other words, there are – so to speak – '*contested presents*' (even though, when referring to 'the now' or 'nowness', the noun 'present' is not commonly used in the plural). A fundamental difference between '*contested pasts*', '*contested presents*', and '*contested futures*', however, may be described as follows: the past and the present *can* – in principle – be studied on the basis of (more or less well established) 'facts', 'events', and 'states of affairs'; the future, by contrast, *cannot* be 'studied' (in a strict sense). Rather than examining the future in terms of *actualities*, we can speculate about what lies ahead in terms of *potentialities* and *possibilities*. Granted, the future *can* be studied insofar as it is regarded as 'the future of the past' or as 'the past of the future' (that is, as something that – having emerged from a historical horizon of potentialities and possibilities – *has* happened as a 'past future'). The future *itself* cannot be 'studied', however, if it is defined as the '*not-yet*' of the present.

If 'the past', 'the present', and 'the future' are objects of contestation, then their respective *ontologies* may require specific *terminologies*, *theories*, *epistemologies*, and *methodologies* to account for their distinctiveness. We cannot study the past in the way we study the present

(or ‘study’ the future); we cannot study the present in the way we study the past (or ‘study’ the future); and we cannot ‘study’ the future in the way we study the past and/or the present.

It is no coincidence that academic disciplines and subdisciplines that focus on studying *the past* (notably history, archaeology, palaeontology, classics, historical anthropology, historical sociology, historical linguistics, geology, evolutionary biology, etc.) are – in terms of their terminologies, theories, epistemologies, and methodologies – fundamentally different from those that focus on studying *the present* (such as sociology, political science, anthropology, media and communication studies, science and technology studies, legal studies, economics, psychology, epidemiology, etc.), not to mention those that grapple with *the future* (such as futurology or any field of study – including some of the previous ones – in which researchers make predictions or at least speculate about future developments).

As objects of inquiry, different types of temporality must be understood as different ontologies, which require different interpretive (that is, terminological, theoretical, epistemological, and methodological) tools to shed light on their irreducible qualities. Identifying this challenge is relatively straightforward; addressing and resolving it, however, could hardly be more difficult.

VII. The Future as a Political Issue

Most (if not all) conceptions of the future have a political character.⁵⁵ *The control of the future is intimately interrelated with the future of control*: artificial intelligence, big data, space travel, and the quest for eternal life (on earth and/or on different planets) – all of these (and other) matters stand for transhumanist and accelerationist attempts at overcoming the limits (and limitations) of the present by conquering the limitless horizon of the future.⁵⁶ This ambition may be summarized in the slogan ‘more and more, wider and wider, deeper and deeper, faster and faster, better and better’⁵⁷.

When comparing and contrasting prevalent conceptions of time over the past two centuries or so, one may distinguish three ‘regimes of historicity’⁵⁸: (a) ‘past-oriented’, (b) ‘present-oriented’, and (c) ‘future-oriented’. Different historical circumstances will generate and sustain different regimes of historicity. The 20th century is known for having replaced ‘past-oriented’ regimes with ‘future-oriented’ ones, as illustrated in the impact of communism/socialism, liberalism, and fascism on world history. The question of whether the 21st century is marked by the dominance of presentist or futurist outlooks is open to debate⁵⁹; arguably, it is shaped not only by the contradictory combination of presentism and futurism but also by a persistent longing for the past (as expressed in the revival of conservative modes of thinking, concerned with ‘the recovery of something lost’⁶⁰).

Seventh Intermediate Reflection

It is true that conservative (and neoconservative) approaches – whether these be primarily social, cultural, political, or economic – tend to make a case for restoring key elements of the past (including those of past futures). Even if one disagrees with their (retrograde) outlook, however, one needs to acknowledge that conservative (and neoconservative) perspectives *can* make a ‘positive’ case (or at least what their advocates perceive as a ‘positive’ case) for the future. Slogans such as ‘Make America Great Again!’ or ‘Take Back Control!’ are indicative of such (populist) attempts to reconquer the present by promising a better future.

Paradoxically, then, so-called progressives and/or liberals may come across as ‘conservatives’ insofar as their policies and agendas aim to re-establish a sense of ‘democratic normality’, beyond the normative parameters imposed by authoritarian and/or populist types of governance. It is ironic that conservatives can claim to be ‘the real progressives’ (for instance, as liberal posthumanist technophiles) and can accuse progressives of being ‘the real conservatives’ (and of endorsing traditionalist and humanist forms of technophobia). In this context, the view that ‘[i]ntellectuals who call themselves “progressive” *really* hate progress’⁶¹ has gained credibility, notably among liberals (à la Steven Pinker).

Critical theory can, and should, question the validity (and legitimacy) of attempts made by conservatives to present themselves as ‘the new progressives’ (and, by implication, to portray their progressive opponents as ‘the new conservatives’). Yet, critical theory needs to recognize that the boundaries between ‘progressives’ and ‘conservatives’ are blurred, not least because each side seeks to conquer the future by reclaiming the past and reinventing the present.

VIII. Towards an Action-Theoretic Approach to the Future

Human actions cannot be dissociated from their basic orientation to the future. Arguably, this is most obvious in goal-oriented and outcome-oriented actions (also known as purposive, utilitarian, and/or teleological – that is, instrumental [non-social] and strategic [social] – actions). When actors pursue the realization of specific goals⁶², they can only do so by projecting themselves (consciously or unconsciously) into the future. By doing so, they push their present situation into a not-too-distant temporal horizon within which their goals are meant to be realized. The not-yet is an integral part of the always-already.

Eighth Intermediate Reflection

While it is true that human actions cannot be dissociated from their basic orientation to the future, it would be reductive to suggest that only goal-oriented and outcome-oriented actions meet this criterion. Not only (a) purposive, utilitarian, and/or teleological – including instrumental and strategic – actions but also (b) normative, moral, and co-ordinative actions, (c) subjective, expressive, and dramaturgical actions, as well as (d) communicative actions are future-oriented.⁶³ Other typologies of action may be added to this list.

Consider, for instance, Weber’s famous differentiation between (a) traditional, (b) affectual, (c) value-rational, and (d) instrumental-rational action.⁶⁴ Even the least likely candidate – that is, traditional action – requires an orientation to the future. Even those actions that are largely shaped, if not governed, by custom, habit, and convention are – while reinforcing arrangements of the past through their reaffirmation in the present – directed towards the future. *All* actions – including those that are aimed at restoring the past (or elements of the past) – are oriented towards the future: no action can take place unless it is imbued with the past, situated in the present, and directed towards the future. The challenge, therefore, consists in proving that this confluence of past, present, and future (that is, the convergence of ‘past-ladenness’, ‘present-situatedness’, and ‘future-orientedness’) is a vital feature of *all* (that is, both human and nonhuman) actions.

If one were compelled to assign *temporal orientations* to *types of action*, one might – reluctantly – associate (a) purposive, utilitarian, and/or teleological – including instrumental and strategic – actions with one’s direction to outcomes in *the future*, (b) normative, moral, and co-ordinative actions with one’s reliance on standards, values, and habits transmitted from *the past*, (c) subjective, expressive, and dramaturgical actions with one’s immersion in the richness of *the present*, and (d) communicative actions with one’s dependence on others as experienced through *the past–present–future continuum*.

Such a schematic way of temporalizing human actions, however, is misleading insofar as it overlooks the extent to which *all* types of action are directed towards the future, shaped by the past, and realized (or potentially realizable) in the present. That said, *all* actions – including the most (a) well-informed and planned, (b) principled and considerate, (c) transparent and authentic, and (d) consensual and synchronized ones – have both intended and unintended consequences. Hence, *every* action is marked by the epistemic limitations of those who perform it. Our capacity to speak authoritatively about the past, present, and/or future is inherently restricted and coloured by our biases, presuppositions, and mental projections.

IX. Past – Present – Future (and Back Again)

It is possible to draw a distinction between two fundamentally different ways of conceptualizing time in general and the relationship between past, present, and future in particular: on the one hand, the classical (and widely accepted) scheme of '*past* → *present* → *future*'; on the other hand, the revised (and less common) model of '*future* → *present* → *past*'. In a counterintuitive move, one may propose to replace the former with the latter. This view is based on the following assumption:

The future is not something that temporally arrives after the present, but it is a part of the present and consequently may become the past when our present time comes to an end.⁶⁵

Past, present, and future are so deeply intertwined that a linear, let alone tripartite and 'separatist', conception of time is misleading. The future is integral to the present (and, by implication, to the past). Rather than portraying the present as an accumulation of pasts (and, by implication, the past as an accumulation of past pasts), here the past is interpreted as 'the accumulation of futures that are now our past'⁶⁶. Instead of suggesting that the past always has the upper hand in terms of shaping both the present and the future, here it is posited that the entire process 'can be seen in reverse, with the past – in the sense of our understanding of it – being shaped by our orientation to the future'⁶⁷. Both the present and the past are marked by people's fundamental orientation to the future.

Granted, ideas of the future are influenced by both dominant and alternative conceptions (and perceptions) of the present. This interpretive and immersive dependence on the present remains a central feature of the future. At the same time, however, 'the dominance of the past over the present – imagining the future in terms of past futures – needs to be challenged in order to give a more central place to the future'⁶⁸. Thus, it is plausible 'to offer a different account of the idea of the future from some of the dominant trends'⁶⁹ in the recent literature on this topic. In accordance with these trends, it has become common to reduce the future 'to a category that can be predicted or understood in terms of catastrophe'⁷⁰, thereby referring to what lies ahead in scientific and/or fatalistic terms.

Ninth Intermediate Reflection

The proposed change in perspective, as outlined above, contributes to a more fine-grained understanding of time in general and of the relationship between past, present, and future in particular. The validity of this paradigm shift, however, may also be questioned on several grounds:

(1) There is the notion that *the future, because it is part of the present, will become the past once the current moment has ceased to exist*. While this proposition may sound appealing, it states the obvious. Anybody who subscribes to the view that the flow of time occurs on a *past–present–future continuum* will accept that the future, far from being reducible to a constitutive element of the present, is also an integral part of the past. It is no coincidence that many languages distinguish different types of future tense (in English, for instance: simple future tense, future continuous tense, future perfect tense, future perfect continuous tense, and future in the past ['would' and 'was/were going to']). The depth of the philosophical recognition of the complexity of time is reflected in the semantic, syntactic, grammatical, and pragmatic elements of ordinary language.

(2) It is true that the approaches that focus almost exclusively on the past to understand (or even to explain) the present and the future are, at best, limited and, at worst, problematic. Even if, however, we accept that this process can be seen in reverse, with the past being shaped by our orientation to the future, we need to recognize that *the past continues to hold sway over both the present and the future*. One need not be a historicist or structuralist to appreciate the role of the past in shaping both the present and the future. Indeed, both the present and the future would not be conceivable without the past, out of which they emerge. In this context, it is worth remembering one of Marx's most famous aphorisms:

Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living.⁷¹

The relationship between *necessity* (imposed by the constraining force of historical ‘circumstances’) and *contingency* (owing to people’s own ‘making’) has been a major subject of controversy in social and political philosophy for quite some time.⁷² Inevitably, this debate touches upon ‘the global question about the “position of human beings in the world”⁷³, which – in different ways and to different degrees – has been addressed by both classical philosophies and religious worldviews.⁷⁴ Be that as it may, it would be erroneous to play temporal ideal types (notably ‘past’, ‘present’, and ‘future’) off against each other. *Just as the past is shaped by our orientation to the future, both the present and the future are shaped not only by the past itself (including our largely unconscious immersion in it) but also by our awareness of the past (including our conscious positioning in relation to it).*

(3) There is a strong case for challenging what may be described as the ‘preponderance of the past’ thesis. The same, however, applies to the ‘preponderance of the present’ thesis and the ‘preponderance of the future’ thesis. Each option is (rightly or wrongly) associated with a specific understanding of our temporal relationship to the world: first, *historicism* (or ‘pastism’); second, *presentism*; and, third, *futurism*. The notion that ‘[k]nowledge oriented towards the future should be more interesting than knowing the past’⁷⁵ and that ‘it is certainly more important’⁷⁶ is problematic: *knowledge oriented towards the past* and *knowledge oriented towards the present* can be just as interesting and important as *knowledge oriented towards the future*. If we prioritize one over the other (on epistemological, methodological, empirical, and/or theoretical grounds), then we run the risk of endorsing a reductive account of temporality, failing to grasp its multilayered constitution.

(4) Irrespective of the existential significance of both the present and the future, all forms of knowledge are *past-based*: empirical or rational, evidence-based or reason-guided, practical or theoretical, intuitive or reflective, implicit or explicit, taken-for-granted or discursive, habitual or critical, ordinary or scientific, unproblematized or problematized, untested or tested. *All forms of knowledge build upon past experiences and/or past modes of reasoning, even when they are applied to the present and/or directed towards the future.* This is not to suggest that the present and the future are irrelevant to the production of knowledge. Rather, this is to accept that *what lurks in the background of all epistemic acts is the confluence of past, present, and future.* Absent this confluence, the processual construction of all material and symbolic forms could not get off the ground.

(5) It is true that ‘[t]he idea of the future has also always been very much shaped by how the present has been understood’⁷⁷. It is also true, however, that *the idea of the present* has always been very much shaped by how *the future* has been understood (and misunderstood). A similar case can be made for the past: *the idea of the past* has always been very much shaped by how *the present* has been understood, just as the idea of *the present* has always been very much shaped by how *the past* has been understood. Moreover, this case can be made for the present: *the idea of the present* has always been very much shaped by how *the past* has been understood, just as the idea of *the past* has always been very much shaped by how *the present* has been understood. The question that arises, then, is as follows: if the relationship between past, present, and future is – both experientially and conceptually – relevant to our relationship to the world, does this mean that our perception of time (at the phenomenal level) reveals something fundamental about the ontology of time (at the noumenal level)? Even if time were an illusion, it could hardly be a more powerful one – that is, it could hardly be more ‘real’ in terms of its pervasive impact on the material and symbolic organization of social life.

X. Return to the Future

Not only in contemporary social and political thought but also, more broadly, in recent and ongoing debates and controversies about the state of the world, there has been a 'return to the future'⁷⁸. In the context of modernity and late modernity, two diametrically opposed visions of the future have been front and centre: on the one hand, the *optimistic*, and often *idealistic*, accounts prevalent in the 19th and 20th centuries, expressing 'new desires and hopes'⁷⁹ and, hence, an affirmative and positive attitude towards the future; on the other hand, the *pessimistic*, and often *fatalistic*, accounts prevalent in the 21st century, conveying 'the general drift towards the "death of the future"'⁸⁰ and, thus, a sceptical and negative attitude towards what lies ahead.

It appears, therefore, that 'in our time the present is being redefined by the future: contemporary societies are beginning to see themselves through the lens of the future'⁸¹. If this is the case, then we have been witnessing a fundamental shift in perspective: 21st-century discursive and ideological trends are 'in stark contrast to the dominant 20th-century tendency for the future to be defined by the present and the outcome of present trends that can be largely foreseen'⁸². The 20th century was characterized not only by the tendency to imagine the future through the lens of the present but also by the ambition to predict, to control, and to conquer the future by virtue of science, technology, and ideology. The 21st century, by contrast, is marked by 'the permacrisis of the present'⁸³, in which – the unprecedented potential of advanced technologies notwithstanding – our capacity to predict, to control, and to conquer the future has been called into question. In this (admittedly gloomy) context, the future seems to have been lost, and it appears increasingly difficult to reclaim it.⁸⁴

It is because of, not despite, the current permacrisis that 'our societies are being defined by the orientation to the future and not by the past as such'⁸⁵. Regardless of the type of crisis in question (environmental, economic, political, military and territorial, technological, philosophical, or otherwise), the future is fundamentally at stake in each of them:

The future has now become a problem for the present because the received ideas of the future no longer fit into the space of human experience, which has been widened to encompass responses to a range of major crises that constitute an overall *permacrisis*.⁸⁶

Arguably, this transition is tantamount to 'a possible ontological shift'⁸⁷ – not only 'in the nature of the social world'⁸⁸ but also 'in the nature of historical time'⁸⁹. As such, this transition reflects 'a shift in emphasis from the older dominance of the present to one in which the present is being reframed by the future'⁹⁰. It signals *a reinterpretation of the present through a reorientation to the future*. In this new historical context, the emergence of a 'space of experience opening up expectations of a better future'⁹¹ – which may be pursued to bring about a more desirable present – becomes increasingly unlikely. Instead of moving us closer to the possibility of individual and collective emancipation, 'new experiences are leading to the realization that expectations cannot be realized by the present'⁹² and may not be realized in the future.

The significance of the idea of the future in the contemporary age is not simply a matter of speculating about prospective 'facts', 'occurrences', and 'states of affairs'; rather, it concerns modes of knowing and experiencing the yet-to-come:

The idea of the future, pregnant with an infinity of possibilities, is thus *more fruitful than the future itself*, and this is why we find more charm in hope than in possession, in dreams than in reality.⁹³

In brief, the idea of the future is as important as (or even more important than) the future itself. At this juncture, the *philosophy of time*, *moral philosophy*, and the *philosophy of knowledge* intersect: 'the future is something we have responsibility for, to the extent of our knowledge of the world'⁹⁴. Insofar as we possess knowledge of the past and the present (and, by implication, not only of *objective*, *empirical*, and *factual* matters but also of *normative*, *moral*, and *political* issues, including different forms of social injustice), we have a certain degree of responsibility to act. The views we hold and the

decisions we make are motivated not only by the *information* available to us but also by our *values, principles, and convictions*.

In light of this responsibility (which we share both as individuals and as collectives), the paradigm shift from the 20th-century emphasis on the formula '*past* → *present* → *future*' to the 21st-century emphasis on the formula '*future* → *present* → *past*' has major implications. In the contemporary era, the main challenge consists in realizing not only (in a descriptive sense) that 'the future *is* used to understand the present'⁹⁵ but also (in a normative sense) that the former *can* and *should* be used to understand and, crucially, to shape the latter: 'rather than the present controlling the future, the shadow of the future is now shaping the present'⁹⁶. And rather than the past controlling the present and the future, the shadow of the future is now shaping both the present and the past. In a way, then, the future is *always already* a transformative part of us and our environment – that is, long *before* it happens and becomes a discernible reality.

If '[t]here is not yet a fully developed theory of the future in the human and social sciences'⁹⁷, the question arises whether it is both viable and desirable to embark on the realization of such a project. Considering the limitations of historicism (or 'pastism'), presentism, and futurism, it makes sense to embrace 'promising new developments in sociology and in related fields that emphasize possibility, the imagination, anticipation, and expectation as modalities that have a constitutive role in shaping the future'⁹⁸. Influenced by key contributions made by social phenomenology and pragmatist approaches in philosophy and sociology, these trends pave the way for a critical theory of the future, capable of avoiding the pitfalls of simplistic and linear '*past* → *present* → *future*' schemes.

Such an ambitious intellectual enterprise, however, must not overlook the vital role of '*learning mechanisms*'⁹⁹ in society in general and in temporal modalities in particular. 'The future is [...] a capacity inherent in the human condition itself'¹⁰⁰: we, as members of a knowledge-seeking species, have the capacity 'to imagine alternatives stretching into the future'¹⁰¹ – that is, a capacity for 'prospection'¹⁰². If, however, it is true that – as remarked by Wittgenstein – "[w]hat is *internal* is hidden from us"¹⁰³, then – as also noted by the Austrian philosopher – '[t]he future is hidden from us'¹⁰⁴. To uncover what is concealed behind the phenomenon of the future, one may – in accordance with Delanty's line of argument – defend the validity of the following five theses:

(1) Far from being reducible to a peripheral element of human life, 'the future is something *existential*'¹⁰⁵. As such, it is fundamental to our existence as a species and reflects, above all, an emotional relationship to the world. Its ontological significance manifests itself in different levels of the psyche, notably in key emotional states: sadness, anger, contempt, annoyance, fear, anxiety, happiness, joy, excitement, arousal, contentment, surprise, contempt, disgust, boredom, nostalgia, etc. All emotional states (including those that appear to be oriented primarily towards the past) express an existential orientation to, and projection upon, the future: emotions would not carry any weight if they were not relevant to a person's (immediate, short-term, medium-term, long-term, and/or posthumous) future. Because the future is at stake, emotions are immensely powerful in shaping our relationship to the world.

(2) Far from being reducible to a matter-of-fact element of human life, 'the future is disclosed in the form of imaginaries of desirable futures, a projection emanating from the *creative imagination* of an ideal to be pursued'¹⁰⁶. The existential centrality of the future is expressed in 'the language of expectation and anticipation'¹⁰⁷, which constitutes a universal feature of the human condition. As such, it can be found across different cultures and throughout human history. Different 'cultural models'¹⁰⁸ generate different conceptions of the future. The very idea of the future, however, represents 'a general cultural model'¹⁰⁹ and, hence, an anthropological invariant, in the sense that it serves as a key experiential and conceptual reference point in *all* forms of life. Without its purposive, projective, and imaginative capacities, the human species would not have been able to create the conditions of its existence. While these cultural models do not bring about the future, they provide valuable motivational resources 'by generating ideals

to be pursued though more specific goals'¹¹⁰ – whether these be immediate, short-term, mid-term, or long-term.

(3) Far from being reducible to an empirical, external, and value-free element of human life, 'the future is [...] shaped by *universal normative principles and structures of consciousness*, which are the basic ideas that provide direction for future thinking and action'¹¹¹. These are neither a given nor immutable; rather, they are the result of age-old processes of social evolution, stretching back to the Axial Age.¹¹² On the one hand, they are a product of the past, since they are the outcome of individual and collective learning processes, which have been taking place over millennia across different cultures, civilizations, and continents. On the other hand, they 'transcend the present in the sense that they are irreducible to cultural systems'¹¹³, insofar as they are 'abstract expressions of reason'¹¹⁴, providing cognitive and normative reference points and thereby guiding – and, effectively, regulating – social actions and interactions. Human language equips us with the capacity to express modal forms of reasoning – notably in terms of potentiality, possibility, and probability, but also in terms of evaluative spectra (such as certainty/uncertainty, clarity/ambiguity, and universality/particularity). The future, then, is not only a *reality* but also an *idea*. As such, it invites – and, indeed, requires – interpretation. To be precise, 'it opens up a field of possible interpretations'¹¹⁵, which compete with and complement each other. Rather than representing, mirroring, or echoing the future, these interpretations construct (and, by implication, shape) the future.

(4) Far from being reducible to a 'not-yet', 'still-to-occur', or 'still-to-be-realized' element of human life, 'the future is [...] *disclosed in the domain of actuality*, including the latent and unrealized potentials within the present'¹¹⁶. As such, the future is 'not entirely a rupture from the present'¹¹⁷; rather, it is *immanent* in the present. To put it tautologically, the future is always already present in the present – not only because the former is constantly *at stake* in the latter but also, more fundamentally, because the former is *inconceivable* without the latter (and vice versa). Strictly speaking, both the formula '*past → present → future*' and the formula '*future → present → past*' are accurate, in the sense that different temporal horizons (notably past–present–future) exist on a *continuum*. As long as life continues (through both – at the sociocultural level – *forms of life* and – at the elementary level – *life forms*), the unfolding of time will continue. Past, present, and future are part of each other. While they may be conceptually and experientially separable, they are ontologically inseparable.

(5) Far from being reducible to a merely ontological element of human life, 'the future is an *epistemic construct* in that it is disclosed through knowledge'¹¹⁸. There is a wide range of interpretive (that is, terminological, theoretical, epistemological, and methodological) tools to shed light on the nature of the future – 'including scientific methods of forecasting, prediction, and modelling'¹¹⁹. To be clear, the explanatory and predictive power of these scientific frameworks (developed by logic- and evidence-based approaches) should not be underestimated, let alone be relegated to the dustbin of positivist history. In fact, in many cases, they can provide useful and powerful instruments for obtaining both theoretical and practical knowledge, by means of which it becomes possible to regulate, or even to predict and to control, the future. Yet, this is only part of the story.

As illustrated in the 'methodological dispute' [*Methodenstreit*]¹²⁰, there are significant ontological differences between the natural world and the social world, just as there are profound epistemological and methodological differences between the natural sciences and the human (and social) sciences. Arguably, the onus is on the human (and social) sciences to define the specificity of their *concepts* of study (at the *epistemological* level), their *means* of study (at the *methodological* level), and their *objects* of study (at the *ontological* level). In other words, seeking to regulate, to make predictions about, and to exert a certain degree of control over the future of the natural world is one thing; seeking to accomplish this in relation to the social/human world is quite another.

Human progress¹²¹ involves not only cognitive, scientific, and technological but also normative, moral, and political learning processes, which are *open-ended*. The future, however, is a product of *both* learning *and* unlearning processes. As meaning-seeking beings, we may ask not only what the

future *will* be (or *is expected* to be) like but also what the future *should* be (or *should be expected* to be) like. A normative, moral, and/or political view of the future concerns a critical judgement not only on what *is* the case but also on what *should* be the case. The principle of hope rests on hope *in* the principle of hope¹²² – that is, in the conviction that, just as the present is imbued with hope, the future will, at least partly, be the outcome of it.

Tenth Intermediate Reflection

Recent and ongoing social developments make the case for a ‘return to the future’¹²³ more compelling. Such a case, while it may appear largely persuasive, comprises several elements that are worth examining in more detail. Part of the rationale behind the intellectual ‘return to the future’ project à la Delanty is the assumption that ‘[t]here is not yet a fully developed theory of the future in the human and social sciences’¹²⁴. While such an endeavour (which is committed to exposing the limitations of historicism, presentism, and futurism) is commendable, it appears that at least two critical remarks are warranted.

First, there are *numerous* theories of time in general and of the future in particular – not only in the natural sciences (notably physics, evolutionary biology, and astrobiology) but also in the humanities and social sciences (notably in philosophy, history, sociology, social theory, and political theory). Granted, many of these approaches, insofar as they focus on the nature of ‘time’, treat ‘the future’ as one category among others (such as ‘the past’ and ‘the present’, ‘space’ and ‘place’, etc.). It would be misleading, however, to understate the extent to which – from a multiplicity of disciplinary and subdisciplinary angles (across the humanities, the social sciences, and the natural sciences) – *nuanced* accounts of the future have been provided.

Second, even if it were the case that it is hard, if not impossible, to come across ‘a fully developed theory of the future in the human and social sciences’¹²⁵, perhaps this would not be such a bad thing. Indeed, the lack of such a comprehensive and ‘fully developed theory’¹²⁶ may be interpreted as a sign of the *complexity* of the subject matter. Any theory of the future that claims to be ‘fully developed’¹²⁷ may be, at best, a ‘nice try’ or, at worst, a deceptive attempt at reducing the intricacy of the issue to a ‘catch-all explanation’. Of course, ‘the end of big theory’ has been announced on several occasions and appears to have been corroborated by the fact that, in accordance with the widespread ‘incredulity towards metanarratives’¹²⁸, conceptual ‘system-building’ projects have gone out of fashion.¹²⁹

Finally, let us revisit the preceding five theses.

(1) Undoubtedly, ‘the future is something *existential*’¹³⁰ and, as such, fundamental to our existence as a species, reflecting an emotional relationship to the world. And yet, the same applies to most, if not all, living beings, whose survival depends on their capacity to secure their (immediate, short-term, medium-term, or long-term) future. Our orientation to the future differs from that of other living beings, however, due to our ‘human’ (that is, species-constitutive, species-distinctive, and species-generative) characteristics: culture, language, consciousness, self-awareness, selfhood, personhood, identity, agency, morality, aesthetic judgement, and reason – to mention only a few.¹³¹ The emergence, development, and role of each of these elements are contingent upon the interplay between the objective, normative, and subjective dimensions of human reality. Given their species-defining status, these anthropological foundations shape our orientation to the future in an existential sense.

(2) For humans, ‘the future is disclosed in the form of imaginaries of desirable futures, a projection emanating from the *creative imagination* of an ideal to be pursued’¹³². In this context, it is worth pointing out that our (species-constitutive, species-distinctive, and species-generative) orientation to the future is inscribed in the key functions of human language. From a Habermasian perspective, all human languages possess at least four anthropological functions:¹³³

- (a) Owing to their *assertoric* function, they permit actors to raise *constative* validity claims in relation to the *objective* dimensions of their existence.
- (b) Owing to their *regulative* function, they permit actors to raise *normative* validity claims in relation to the *intersubjective* dimensions of their existence.
- (c) Owing to their *individuative* function, they permit actors to raise *expressive* validity claims in relation to the *subjective* dimensions of their existence.
- (d) Owing to their *intelligible* function, they permit actors to raise *communicative* validity claims in relation to – in principle – *all* dimensions of their existence.

The relevance of these functions can be conveyed across different temporal modalities – that is, in relation to the past, the present, and the future. If, however, we accept the Habermasian premise that the fourth function (that is, the communicative function) is the most fundamental aspect of human language (that is, the aspect of language upon which all other aspects are based), then it becomes obvious why our orientation to the future is such a central component of our symbolically mediated relationship to the world.

If, when using language (and raising truth claims, rightness claims, and/or sincerity claims), our ultimate aim is to make ourselves understood (by raising intelligibility claims), then such an orientation can *only* be oriented towards the future, *even if* a constative, normative, or expressive speech act focuses on the present or the past. For instance, when a child addresses their parents with the words ‘I am hungry’, it raises a truth claim (objective world: an empty stomach), a rightness claim (social world: food provision), a sincerity claim (subjective world: feeling hungry), and an intelligibility claim (communication: seeking to be understood). To the extent that the parents act upon their child’s speech act, the *actual* future of the present is shaped by the *potential* future of the past.

It is worth adding a much-neglected facet of human language to the Habermasian story – all human languages possess a fifth anthropological function:

- (e) Owing to their *displacing* function, they permit actors to raise *imaginative* validity claims in relation to – in principle – *all* dimensions of their existence.

Perhaps one of the most distinctive – and existentially empowering – features of human language is that it permits subjects capable of speech and action to engage in processes of *displacement*, by means of which they can refer to states of affairs that are spatiotemporally remote from the situation or sociohistorical context in which they find themselves immersed. Arguably, nonhuman forms of language lack this (species-constitutive, species-distinctive, and species-generative) characteristic.¹³⁴

This function of language is essential to us – not only as a *story-telling species* (capable of constructing and reconstructing both fictional and nonfictional narratives) and as a *tool-making species* (capable of using both practical and theoretical knowledge to produce instruments, techniques, and technologies for reinventing and, to some degree, controlling the conditions of our existence) but also as a *longing species* (capable of projecting our wishes, desires, and hopes upon the world and capable of imagining and constructing a ‘not-yet’, beyond the ‘always-already’). A futureless language would be tantamount to a futureless world.

(3) When examining the course of human history from a teleological perspective, it appears that ‘the future is [...] shaped by *universal normative principles and structures of consciousness*, which are the basic ideas that provide direction for future thinking and action’¹³⁵. A significant limitation of this line of argument, however, is that it tends to understate the extent to which normative principles are *context-dependent* and, by implication, *historically contingent*. Even if normative principles and structures of consciousness have the capacity to *transcend* the present, they do so *from within* the historical contexts in which they are embedded. Such a context may, of course, be interpreted in different ways:

- for instance, as a 'base/superstructure' formation (Marx), a 'social whole' (Durkheim), a 'rational society' (Weber), a 'form of life' (Wittgenstein), a 'regime of power' (Foucault), a 'social field' (Bourdieu), a 'regime of action' (Boltanski), a 'lifeworld/system' configuration (Habermas), a 'social performance' (Butler), etc.

Moreover, the symbolically mediated manifestations of such a context may be interpreted in different ways:

- for instance, as an 'ideology' (Marx), a 'collective consciousness and/or representation' (Durkheim), a set of 'value spheres' (Weber), a 'language game' (Wittgenstein), a 'regime of truth' (Foucault), an '*illusio*' (Bourdieu), a 'regime of justification' (Boltanski), a 'communicative discourse' (Habermas), a 'socially constructed identity' (Butler), etc.

If we take the idea of 'detranscendentalization'¹³⁶ seriously, then we need to recognize that the universalizing force of normative principles rests on a *transcendence from within* – that is, on a *transcendence in – this world*.¹³⁷ On this account, structures of consciousness are always *social* structures of *collective* consciousness, even (and perhaps especially) when they appear to be reducible to the micro-sphere of the individual. The same is true of our understanding of time in general and our understanding of the future in particular. Different groups and different individuals will generate (and advocate) different conceptions of time (and of the future), because they inhabit *different physical worlds* (including different objective orders), *different social worlds* (including different normative orders), and *different personal worlds* (including different subjective orders).

This is not to deny that there are some 'universals' (and 'anthropological invariants'), which, by definition, are shared by *all* human beings (that is, by *all* groups, by *all* individuals, and by *all* human environments) and which, by definition, *transcend* objective (physical), normative (social), and subjective (personal) specificities. This is to acknowledge, however, that even universal and foundational elements (including normative principles and structures of consciousness) cannot transcend their immanence. Human transcendence is conceivable only as a transcendence *from within* this world – that is, *from within* the conditions of possibility to which we owe our existence.

(4) To make a convincing case for a non-reductive, multiperspectival, and holistic conception of time, it is essential to explore the various implications of the fact that '*the future is [...] disclosed in the domain of actuality*, including the latent and unrealized potentials within the present'¹³⁸. It is no less essential, however, to explore the various implications of the fact that '*the past is disclosed in the domain of actuality*, including the material and symbolic resources transmitted from previous times into the present.

The future presents itself as an existential challenge that permeates the minds and bodies of those inhabiting the present. The past – including its material and symbolic, physical and metaphysical, empirical and conceptual, behavioural and ideological, ephemeral and institutional manifestations – 'weighs like a nightmare on the brains [and, more generally, the bodies] of the living'¹³⁹. The past, therefore, *also* presents itself as an existential challenge that permeates the minds and bodies of those inhabiting the present.

Past, present, and future constitute the building blocks of the temporal continuum that pervades the objective, normative, and subjective conditions of human experience. While (in a presentist sense) all forms of being can exist only in the present, they are shaped (in a historicist sense) by the continuing presence of the past and (in a futurist sense) by their ineluctable orientation to the future. *Die Zeit entsteht nicht nur im Spiegel der Gegenwart, sondern auch im Schoße des Bisherdagewesenen und mit Blick auf das Immer-noch-und-immer-wieder-Werdende*.¹⁴⁰

(5) One need not be an epistemologist to accept that 'the future is an *epistemic construct* in that it is disclosed through knowledge'¹⁴¹. Insofar as there are different types of knowledge, these may, or may not, produce different ideas of the future: empirical or rational, evidence-based or reason-

guided, practical or theoretical, intuitive or reflective, implicit or explicit, taken-for-granted or discursive, habitual or critical, ordinary or scientific, unproblematicized or problematicized, untested or tested – to mention only a few. As mentioned above, all forms of knowledge build upon past experiences and/or past modes of reasoning, even when they are applied to the present and/or directed towards the future.

Considering recent debates on ‘actor-network theory’, ‘postmodernism’, ‘posthumanism’, and ‘post-anthropocentrism’, the question that arises is whether it is time for a new, updated, and context-sensitive ‘methodological dispute’ [*Methodenstreit*] – that is, a kind of *Methodenstreit 2.0* – capable of incorporating insights gained from cutting-edge controversies in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Such a (revived and revised) ‘methodological dispute’ would have to account for the extent to which, in the Anthropocene, the ontological differences between the natural world and the social world are increasingly blurred. Given recent technological developments associated with ‘transhumanism’ (which, in essence, reflects a radicalization of ‘posthumanism’ and ‘post-anthropocentrism’), the presuppositional grounds on which to differentiate between (a) ‘the’ physical world, (b) ‘our’ social world, and (c) ‘my’ personal world have become more porous.

If it is true that traditional (theoretical and empirical) boundaries are increasingly blurred, then we are confronted with the challenging task of having to redefine the specificity of our *concepts* of study (at the *epistemological* level), our *means* of study (at the *methodological* level), and our *objects* of study (at the *ontological* level). This, of course, applies to three main branches of inquiry – that is, the humanities, the social sciences, and the natural sciences. It is a truism to suggest that different *objects* of study (at the *ontological* level) can, and should, be examined differently from different disciplinary angles – and, hence, by virtue of different *concepts* of study (at the *epistemological* level) and different *means* of study (at the *methodological* level).

The normativity of the perspective sets the parameters for the descriptibility of the object.¹⁴² At the same time, the descriptibility of the object imposes limitations on the normativity of the perspective. If the *normative world* (of society) and the *subjective world* (of individual consciousness) are not only embedded in and contingent upon but also – in a more fundamental sense – part of, or even equivalent to, the *objective world* (of nature), then we need to develop radically new *concepts* of study (at the *epistemological* level) and *means* of study (at the *methodological* level) to grasp the existential entanglement of these three – phenomenally divisible, but noumenally indivisible – *objects* of study (at the *ontological* level).

Such a shift in perspective has radical implications for our understanding of time in general and of the future in particular. It indicates that a strict separation between ‘objectivity’, ‘normativity’, and ‘subjectivity’ (or between ‘nature’, ‘sociality’, and ‘consciousness’) – while it may *appear* to be conceptually sophisticated, methodologically rigorous, ontologically unalterable, and experientially ineluctable – is a modern fiction.

In defence of this modern imaginary, however, we may distinguish the following levels of analysis: (a) *time as an objective reality*, (b) *time as a normative reality*, and (c) *time as a subjective reality*:

- (a) When conceived of as an *objective* reality, time is regarded as an ‘external’, ‘natural’, and ‘universal’ phenomenon, which is *context-transcending*. As such, it can be studied (from a third-person perspective) in accordance with the concepts and methods developed by the formal and natural sciences.
- (b) When conceived of as a *normative* reality, time is regarded as an ‘external’, ‘social’, and ‘particular’ phenomenon, which is *historically and culturally contingent*. As such, it can be studied (from a third-person perspective) in accordance with the concepts and methods developed by the humanities and social sciences.
- (c) When conceived of as a *subjective* reality, time is regarded as an ‘internal’, ‘personal’, and ‘perspectival’ phenomenon, which is *positionally and dispositionally contingent* (and, thus,

experienced, apprehended, and projected differently by different individuals). As such, it can be studied (from a first-person perspective) in accordance with the concepts and methods developed by phenomenology and psychology – that is, by shedding light on the schemes of perception, appreciation, interpretation, and action acquired (and constantly tested and potentially adjusted) by individuals.

The challenge, therefore, consists in grasping not only the temporal constitution of the objective, normative, and subjective dimensions of our existence but also – crucially – the objective, normative, and subjective constitution of time.¹⁴³ The following reflections aim to illustrate the *confluence* of the objective, normative, and subjective dimensions of time. Arguably, such a multifaceted approach permits us to overcome the pitfalls of simplistic frameworks that reduce ‘time’ to an ‘objective fact’, a ‘normative construction’, or a ‘subjective projection’.

Reflections on the Objective, Normative, and Subjective Constitution of Time

The temporal dimensions that are part of human existence need to be understood in terms of our – *species-constitutive* – tripartite immersion in the world:

- (a) Different aspects of reality possess different *properties* of time (*objectivity*).
- (b) Different societies generate different *standards* of time (*normativity*).
- (c) Different individuals form different *perceptions* of time (*subjectivity*).

The picture becomes more complex, however, if we seek to determine which of these three spheres of existence is the decisive one for the emergence of time.

In essence, we can distinguish three positions in this respect:

- (a) Time is *built into* objects and subjects; therefore, it is *ontologically transcendental*. The fundamental properties of time are, by definition, objective.
- (b) Time is *constructed* (and *regulated*) by – culturally specific – communities; thus, it is *socially and historically contingent*. Standards of time are, by definition, normative.
- (c) Time is *projected* upon reality by individual actors; hence, it is *positionally and dispositionally contingent*. Perceptions of time are, by definition, subjective.

Seeking to figure out which of these three positions is the most convincing one, it is possible to identify strong arguments for and against each of them.

Key arguments *in favour* of each of these positions can be summarized as follows:

- (a) Since *all societies* develop standards of time and *all individuals* rely on perceptions of time, *all dimensions* of reality – although they may be interpreted differently – must have *inherent* properties of time (*temporal transcendentalism*).
- (b) Since *different societies* produce *different standards* of time, all seemingly transhistorical properties of time and all seemingly subjective perceptions of time are constructed by *socially and historically contingent* – and, hence, largely *arbitrary* – regimes of temporality (*temporal constructivism*).
- (c) Since *different actors* form *different perceptions* of time, all seemingly transhistorical properties of time and all seemingly sociohistorical constructions of time are *projected* upon the world by individuals with unique life histories, experiences, and subjectivities (*temporal subjectivism*).

Key arguments *against* each of these positions can be summarized as follows:

- (a) To the extent that criteria for the interpretation, organization, and regulation of time vary both between different societies (*temporal constructivism*) and between different individuals (*temporal subjectivism*), it is erroneous to reduce temporality to a set of universal, let alone transcendental, properties (*temporal transcendentalism*).
- (b) To the extent that the fundamental properties of time transcend the cultural specificity of a given society (*temporal transcendentalism*), and/or to the extent that criteria for the interpretation, organization, and regulation of time are projected upon reality from the perspective-laden position of subjectivity (*temporal subjectivism*), it is erroneous to reduce temporality to an expression of sociocultural contingency (*temporal constructivism*).
- (c) To the extent that the fundamental properties of time transcend the positional and dispositional specificities of individual perception (*temporal transcendentalism*), and/or to the extent that criteria for the interpretation, organization, and regulation of time are defined and established by the cultural standards shared by members of constantly evolving communities (*temporal constructivism*), it is erroneous to reduce temporality to a set of projections emanating from human subjectivity (*temporal subjectivism*).

Finally, considering the pros and cons of each of these positions on the constitution of time, one may conclude that the most sensible stance on this issue is one that is based on a *combination* of the aforementioned propositions. In other words, rather than regarding them as mutually exclusive and incompatible perspectives, one may cross-fertilize them and thereby draw upon their respective insights, while avoiding their respective pitfalls. When pursuing this strategy in relation to the preceding lines of argument, four options appear plausible:

- (i) [a/b] Time is (a) *ontologically transcendental* and (b) *socially and historically contingent*: it permeates every aspect of existence (objective, normative, and subjective); yet, criteria for the interpretation, organization, and regulation of time vary between different – culturally specific – communities, shaping their members' modes of perception, appreciation, and action (*constructivist transcendentalism* or *transcendental constructivism*).
- (ii) [a/c] Time is (a) *ontologically transcendental* and (c) *positionally and dispositionally contingent*: it permeates every aspect of existence (objective, normative, and subjective); yet, different actors develop different ways of experiencing, interpreting, and organizing time (*subjectivist transcendentalism* or *transcendental subjectivism*).
- (iii) [b/c] Time is (b) *socially and historically contingent* and (c) *positionally and dispositionally contingent*: criteria for the interpretation, organization, and regulation of time vary between different – culturally specific – communities; different actors – both within and across these communities – develop different ways of experiencing, interpreting, and organizing time (*subjectivist constructivism* or *constructivist subjectivism*).
- (iv) [a/b/c] Time is – at once – (a) *ontologically transcendental*, (b) *socially and historically contingent*, and (c) *positionally and dispositionally contingent*: it permeates every aspect of existence (objective, normative, and subjective); criteria for the interpretation, organization, and regulation of time vary between different – culturally specific – communities; different actors – both within and across these communities – develop different ways of experiencing, interpreting, and organizing time (*constructivist-subjectivist transcendentalism*, or *transcendental-subjectivist constructivism*, or *transcendental-constructivist subjectivism*).

A careful consideration of these options illustrates the complexity involved in developing a nuanced, multilayered, and nonreductive account of time.¹⁴⁴ It is about time critical theory embarked upon the journey of exploring the timelessness of time.

Competing Perspectives on Time

Over the past decades and centuries, a growing body of literature on the concept of time has emerged, covering a wide range of disciplinary angles: philosophy, sociology, anthropology, psychology, political science, history, cosmology, and physics – to mention only a few.¹⁴⁵ The convergence of philosophical and sociological approaches to time is particularly noteworthy in this respect. Unsurprisingly, there are different ways of making sense of the past–present–future continuum. In essence, we are confronted with the following options:

• Option 1:	past	→	present	→	future
• Option 2:	past	←	present	→	future
• Option 3:	past	←	present	←	future
• Option 4:	past	↔	present	↔	future
• Option 5:	no past	–	no present	–	no future

These options can be summarized as follows:

- ‘Option 1’ may be described as the *‘preponderance of the past’ thesis*, which is defended by historicist (and structuralist) approaches to time. On this account, the past is preponderant over both the present and the future – that is, both the present and the future are products of the (unchangeable) past.
- ‘Option 2’ may be described as the *‘preponderance of the present’ thesis*, which is defended by presentist approaches to time. On this account, the present (which is, experientially, at once elusive and inescapable) is preponderant over both the past and the future – that is, the present is the only ‘really existing’ time, whereas the past has ceased to exist and the future has not yet come (and may never come) into existence.
- ‘Option 3’ may be described as the *‘preponderance of the future’ thesis*, which is defended by futurist approaches to time. On this account, the future is preponderant over both the present and the past – that is, the unvarying, irreversible, and inexorable flow of time is, and can only be, directed towards the future. At a vitalist level, the yet-to-come is the ultimate existential orientation of all living beings, which, in their struggle for survival and reproduction, seek to mobilize the resources transmitted from the past into the present, when projecting themselves (intuitively or reflectively, unconsciously or consciously, unintentionally or deliberately, naturally or culturally) into the future.
- ‘Option 4’ may be described as the *‘no-preponderance’ thesis*, which is defended by eternalist approaches to time. On this account, past, present, and future are on an equal footing – that is, they are equally significant (or equally insignificant), and all existence in time is equally real. According to this ‘block time’ or ‘block universe’ theory, spacetime constitutes an unchanging four-dimensional ‘block’, thereby challenging the view of the world as a three-dimensional space modulated by the passage of time. On this account, time does not pass or flow (that is, there is no ‘arrow of time’); rather, it can be regarded as the ‘fourth dimension’, along with the three-dimensional physical space, forming a ‘space–time continuum’ (or, to be exact, a ‘spacetime continuum’).
- ‘Option 5’ may be described as the *‘no past, no present, no future’ thesis*, which is defended by projectionist-constructivist approaches to time. On this account, time is an illusion: past, present, and future exist only as mental and/or social constructs, rather than as objective realities. On this view, our (perspectival) perception and (social) construction of temporal flow do not correspond to any (physical) reality.

From a common-sense perspective, ‘time’ may be defined as *the continued sequence of existence and events occurring in an apparently unvarying, irreversible, and inexorable succession from the past,*

through the present, and into the future. Given the complex phenomenology of human experience, it seems, at best, problematic and, at worst, untenable to follow the spirit of scientism by reducing 'time' to 'a rearrangement of atoms'.¹⁴⁶ Critical theory needs to examine not only the extent to which time constitutes an objective, normative, and/or subjective reality but also the extent to which its presumably objective, normative, and/or subjective dimensions can, and should, be grasped through the lens of one of the preceding theses. Regardless of whether the evidence supports the historicist, presentist, futurist, eternalist, or projectionist-constructivist position, the existence of temporality – whether it is real or imagined (or, paradoxically, both) – will continue to permeate the temporality of our existence.

Between Timeless and Temporal Systems of Thought: Naturalism, Sociologism, Phenomenologism, and Humanism

In light of the dynamic relationship between (i) natural/objective, (ii) social/normative, and (iii) experiential/subjective dimensions, which – as species-constitutive 'realms' or 'worlds' – lie at the core of (iv) the human condition, it is possible – and, indeed, necessary – to examine the extent to which different systems of thought are based on different conceptions of time. To illustrate the significance of this insight, it makes sense to consider four competing and conflicting approaches to 'existence' in general and to 'time' in particular. These may be characterized as follows: (i) naturalism, (ii) sociologism, (iii) phenomenologism, and (iv) humanism.¹⁴⁷ As demonstrated below, each of these systems of thought can be divided into a 'timeless' and a 'temporal' variant.

In *methodological* terms, these approaches may be understood as distinct modes of addressing the antinomy between 'the timeless' and 'the temporal'. In *ontological* terms, however, they may be taken to suggest that this antinomy is inscribed in the very structure of time. Taken together, they illuminate the extent to which the (*objective*) properties of time, the (*normative*) standards by which time is socially organized, and the (*subjective*) ways in which time is experienced may – paradoxically – be both mutually reinforcing and mutually disruptive. In the theatre of human existence, these dimensions neither collapse into one another nor remain fully separate; rather, they interact in ways that shape, complicate, and enrich our understandings of what it means to live in, through, and with time.

I. Naturalism

The organizing force in human affairs is nature. The key (or, strictly speaking, the only) 'realm' or 'world' inhabited by all living beings – including human beings – is 'the natural realm' or 'the natural world'.

All that exists is 'the natural realm' or 'the natural world'. There are – strictly speaking – no separate ('non-natural') 'realms' or 'worlds' (whether these be categorized as 'social', 'cultural', 'symbolic', 'mental', 'spiritual', 'mathematical', or otherwise). Arguably, there are two main types of naturalism.¹⁴⁸

Timeless naturalism is based on the following assumptions:

- (1) Time is an *illusion*, since the universe constitutes a timeless whole.
- (2) Time is a *projection* of the *human mind*.
- (3) The laws of nature are *timeless* and *immutable* (that is, they exist *outside* and *independent* of time).
- (4) The laws of nature influence, or even determine, what happens in the universe, *but* what happens in the universe does *not* change them.
- (5) All that is real in (and true about) the universe is real (and true) *regardless* of context.
- (6) The laws of nature and the truths about nature are *timeless*, *eternal*, and *absolute* – that is, they exist *outside* time and, hence, *do not* evolve.

Temporal naturalism, by contrast, is based on the following assumptions:

- (1) Time is *real*, since the universe constitutes a temporal whole.
- (2) Time – as a natural and objective phenomenon – is the *foundation* of existence in general and ‘laws’ of nature in particular.
- (3) ‘Laws’ of nature are *temporal* and *mutable* (that is, they *evolve in* and *depend on* time).
- (4) ‘Laws’ of nature influence, or even (quasi-) determine, what happens in the universe, *but* what happens in the universe *can* and *does* change them.
- (5) All that is real in (and true about) the universe is real in (and true about) *particular* – *that is, relationally constituted, spatiotemporally contingent, and constantly evolving* – *physical constellations*.
- (6) ‘Laws’ of nature and ‘truths’ about nature are *temporal, transitory, and contingent* – that is, they *exist and evolve in time*.

II. Sociologism

The organizing force in human affairs is sociality [*Gesellschaftlichkeit*]. The key ‘realm’ or ‘world’ inhabited by human beings is ‘the social realm’ or ‘the social world’.

Most, if not all, dimensions of human existence are socially constituted – that is, they are indicative of the fact that the human universe is essentially a ‘social realm’ or a ‘social world’. Although there may be various ‘realms’ or ‘worlds’ (whether these be categorized as ‘natural’, ‘biological’, ‘chemical’, ‘physical’, ‘material’, ‘atomic’, or indeed as ‘cultural’, ‘ethical’, ‘political’, ‘economic’, ‘aesthetic’, or otherwise), in the human universe these can emerge, manifest themselves, and obtain significance – in short, exist – only as *social* ‘realms’ or ‘worlds’. Arguably, there are two main types of sociologism.

Timeless sociologism is based on the following assumptions:

- (1) Time is an *illusion*, since the social universe constitutes a whole that is shaped, or even governed, by timeless underlying forces.
- (2) Time is a (socially necessary) *projection* of *collective consciousness*.
- (3) The laws of sociality (and, by implication, the underlying forces capable of generating social phenomena – such as culture, ethics, politics, economics, aesthetics, etc.) are *timeless* and *immutable* (that is, they exist *outside* and *independent* of time).
- (4) The laws of sociality (and, by implication, the underlying forces capable of generating social phenomena) influence, or even determine, what happens in the social universe, *but* what happens in the social universe does *not* change them.
- (5) All that is real in (and true about) the underlying forces capable of generating social phenomena is real (and true) *regardless of context*.
- (6) The laws of sociality and the truths about sociality (and, by implication, the laws of and the truths about the underlying forces capable of generating social phenomena) are *timeless, eternal, and absolute* – that is, they *exist outside time* and, hence, *do not evolve*.

Temporal sociologism, by contrast, is based on the following assumptions:

- (1) Time is *real*, since the social universe constitutes a whole that is shaped, or even governed, by temporal (and, thus, constantly evolving) underlying forces – that is, time is both a producer and a product of *social* phenomena.
- (2) Time – as a social and normative phenomenon – is the *foundation* of human co-existence in general and ‘laws’ of sociality in particular.

- (3) 'Laws' of sociality (and, by implication, the underlying forces capable of generating social phenomena – such as culture, ethics, politics, economics, aesthetics, etc.) are *temporal* and *mutable* (that is, they *evolve in* and *depend on* time).
- (4) 'Laws' of sociality (and, by implication, the underlying forces capable of generating social phenomena) influence, or even (quasi-) determine, what happens in the social universe, *but* what happens in the social universe *can* and *does* change them.
- (5) All that is real in (and true about) the underlying forces capable of generating social phenomena is real in (and true about) *particular* – that is, *relationally constituted, spatiotemporally contingent, and constantly evolving* – human arrangements.
- (6) 'Laws' of sociality and 'truths' about sociality (and, by implication, 'laws' of and 'truths' about the underlying forces capable of generating social phenomena) are *temporal, transitory, and contingent* – that is, they *exist and evolve in time*.

III. Phenomenologism

The organizing force in human affairs is subjective experience (including its conscious, subconscious, and unconscious components). The key 'realm' or 'world' inhabited by human beings is 'the subjective realm' or 'the subjective world' (and, by implication, 'the experiential realm' or 'the experiential world' – in brief, 'the lifeworld').

Irrespective of whether 'other realms' or 'other worlds' exist (and whether these be categorized as 'objective', 'physical', 'normative', 'social', 'noumenal', 'real', 'independent', or otherwise), humans can experience reality only through '*their* subjective realm' or '*their* subjective world'. For humans, there are – strictly speaking – no separate ('non-subjective', 'non-experiential', or 'non-phenomenal') 'realms' or 'worlds'. Arguably, there are two main types of phenomenologism.

Timeless phenomenologism is based on the following assumptions:

- (1) Time is an *illusion*, since the universe – with or without subjectivity – constitutes a timeless whole.
- (2) Time is a *projection* of human *subjectivity*.
- (3) The laws of phenomenology (and, by implication, the laws of experience, perception, thought, memory, imagination, reason, emotion, desire, volition, the psyche, the conscious, the semi-conscious, the subconscious, the preconscious, the unconscious, etc.) are *timeless* and *immutable* (that is, they *exist outside* and *independent of* time).
- (4) The laws of phenomenology (and, by implication, the laws of experience, perception, thought, memory, imagination, reason, emotion, desire, volition, the psyche, the conscious, the semi-conscious, the subconscious, the preconscious, the unconscious, etc.) influence, or even determine, what happens in the universe of subjectivity, *but* what happens in the universe of subjectivity does *not* change them.
- (5) All that is real in (and true about) the universe of subjectivity is real (and true) *regardless of context*.
- (6) The laws of phenomenology and the truths about phenomenology (and, by implication, the laws of and the truths about experience, perception, thought, memory, imagination, reason, emotion, desire, volition, the psyche, the conscious, the semi-conscious, the subconscious, the preconscious, the unconscious, etc.) are *timeless, eternal, and absolute* – that is, they *exist outside time* and, hence, *do not evolve*.

Temporal phenomenologism, by contrast, is based on the following assumptions:

- (1) Time is *real*, not only as an *objective* and/or *normative* but also as a *subjective* phenomenon (that is, tautologically speaking, as a phenomenological phenomenon), since the universe – with or without subjectivity – constitutes a temporal whole.

- (2) Time – as an experiential and subjective phenomenon – is the *foundation* of human existence in general and ‘laws’ of phenomenology in particular.
- (3) ‘Laws’ of phenomenology (and, by implication, ‘laws’ of experience, perception, thought, memory, imagination, reason, emotion, desire, volition, the psyche, the conscious, the semi-conscious, the subconscious, the preconscious, the unconscious, etc.) are *temporal* and *mutable* (that is, they *evolve in* and *depend on* time).
- (4) ‘Laws’ of phenomenology (and, by implication, ‘laws’ of experience, perception, thought, memory, imagination, reason, emotion, desire, volition, the psyche, the conscious, the semi-conscious, the subconscious, the preconscious, the unconscious, etc.) influence, or even (quasi-) determine, what happens in the universe of subjectivity, *but* what happens in the universe of subjectivity *can* and *does* change them.
- (5) All that is *subjectively* real (and true) is *experientially* real in (and true about) *particular* – that is, *relationally constituted, spatiotemporally contingent, and constantly evolving* – *phenomenological constellations*.
- (6) ‘Laws’ of phenomenology and ‘truths’ about phenomenology (and, by implication, ‘laws’ of and ‘truths’ about experience, perception, thought, memory, imagination, reason, emotion, desire, volition, the psyche, the conscious, the semi-conscious, the subconscious, the preconscious, the unconscious, etc.) are *temporal, transitory, and contingent* – that is, they *exist and evolve in time*.

IV. Humanism

The organizing force in human affairs is human agency. The key ‘realm’ or ‘world’ inhabited by human beings is ‘the human realm’ or ‘the human world’.

The main arena that exists for us, as humans, is ‘the human realm’ or ‘the human world’. All separate (‘nonhuman’) ‘realms’ or ‘worlds’ (whether these be categorized as ‘transcendental’, ‘divine’, ‘independent’, or otherwise) exist, at best, as ‘sub-realms’ or, at worst, as ‘illusory realms’ created by our imagination. Arguably, there are two main types of humanism.

Timeless humanism is based on the following assumptions:

- (1) Time is an *illusion*, since the universe – with or without humanity – constitutes a timeless whole.
- (2) Time is a *human projection* – that is, it is projected upon the world by humans through their behavioural, ideological, and institutional modes of functioning.
- (3) The laws of the human condition (and, hence, of what makes us human) are *timeless* and *immutable* (that is, they exist *outside* and *independent of* time).
- (4) The laws of the human condition influence, or even determine, what happens in the human (that is, *simultaneously* natural/objective, social/normative, and experiential/subjective) universe, *but* what happens in the human universe does *not* change them.
- (5) All that is real in (and true about) the human universe is real (and true) *regardless of context*.
- (6) The laws of the human condition and the truths about the human condition (including both its positive and its negative aspects) are *timeless, eternal, and absolute* – that is, they *exist outside time* and, hence, *do not evolve*.

Temporal humanism, by contrast, is based on the following assumptions:

- (1) Time is *real* (as a *simultaneously* natural/objective, social/normative, and experiential/subjective phenomenon), since the universe – with or without humanity – constitutes a temporal whole.
- (2) Time – as a *simultaneously* natural/objective, social/normative, and experiential/subjective phenomenon – is the *foundation* of the human condition in general and ‘laws’ of the human condition in particular (including both its positive and its negative aspects).

- (3) 'Laws' of the human condition are *temporal* and *mutable* (that is, they *evolve in* and *depend on* time).
- (4) 'Laws' of the human condition influence, or even (quasi-) determine, what happens in the human universe (including its natural/objective, social/normative, and experiential/subjective realms), *but* what happens in the human universe *can* and *does* change them.
- (5) All that is real (and true) for and/or about *humans* is real (and true) for and/or about them in *particular* – that is, *relationally constituted, spatiotemporally contingent, and constantly evolving* – *conditions of possibility*.
- (6) 'Laws' of the human condition and 'truths' about the human condition (including both its positive and its negative aspects) are as *temporal, transitory, and contingent* as humans themselves – that is, they *exist and evolve in time*, and so do humans.

Concluding Remarks

The preceding reflections provide only a *Grundriß* – that is, a rough plan or sketch – for developing a critical theory of time. Unsympathetic readers may legitimately object that, given its speculative nature, it raises more questions than it answers. Aware of the confluence of (i) natural/objective, (ii) social/normative, and (iii) experiential/subjective dimensions underlying the construction of (iv) the human condition, however, such an ambitious endeavour – if it were to be successful – could take our understanding of time to the next level. Realizing this potential requires an alternative approach committed not only to combining and cross-fertilizing valuable insights gained from (i) naturalism, (ii) sociologism, (iii) phenomenologism, and (iv) humanism but also, more importantly, to demonstrating that the conceptual superiority of 'temporal' over 'timeless' approaches emanates from the ontological preponderance of temporality over timelessness, pervading all realms (and modes) of being – natural/objective, social/normative, experiential/subjective, and human/posthuman/transhuman/nonhuman.

Arguably, such a project is doomed to failure unless it succeeds in integrating the previous positions by converting the – *mono-paradigmatic and reductive* – 'timeless' variants of (i) naturalism, (ii) sociologism, (iii) phenomenologism, and (iv) humanism into – *interconnected and interdependent* – 'temporal' expressions of the blurred boundaries between (i) nature, (ii) sociality, (iii) phenomenology, and (iv) humanity. It is open to debate whether such a 'time-affirmative', 'time-sensitive', and 'time-literate' (rather than 'time-denialist', 'time-rejectionist', and 'time-illiterate') perspective should follow a historicist, presentist, futurist, or eternalist (rather than exclusively projectionist-constructivist) path.

There remains one issue that, while beyond the scope of the present article, deserves to be central to any further development of a critical theory of time. From a sociological perspective, time is – simultaneously – (i) a social resource, (ii) a form of capital (or, in neo-Bourdiesian parlance, 'temporal capital'), (iii) a commodity, (iv) an instrument of power (that is, a means to an end), and (v) an end in itself (one that is essential to self-realization and self-fulfilment). In stratified societies, both the disposal of time and access to it – including control over one's own time and, in hierarchical relations, over the time of others – are asymmetrically distributed: along axes of class, gender, 'race', ethnicity, culture, age, (dis)ability, and so on. This asymmetry is particularly acute in social settings in which time functions predominantly as a resource, a form of capital, a commodity, and/or an instrument of power; it has, however, major consequences for time as an end in itself, since the conditions of possibility for self-realization and self-fulfilment are themselves unequally available. A critical theory of time worthy of the name will have to grapple with these matters, especially when seeking to overcome the divide between the philosophy and physics of time, on the one hand, and the sociology and political economy of time, on the other.

Whatever the strengths and weaknesses of different explanatory frameworks, and regardless of whether time is ‘fundamental’ or ‘emergent’, critical theory is viable only to the extent that it recognizes and explores the temporal constitution of the natural/objective, social/normative, and experiential/subjective dimensions of the human condition – and, by implication, commits to temporalizing the human condition itself. It remains an open question whether the antinomy between ‘the timeless’ and ‘the temporal’ is inscribed not only in our perceptions and representations of time but also – more fundamentally – in the very structure of time. Irrespective of the answer to this question, not only will the existence of temporality continue to permeate the temporality of our existence (and do so – at once – objectively, normatively, subjectively, and species-constitutively), but the temporality of our existence will continue to permeate (and to rearrange by constantly rearranging) the existence of temporality.

Notes

1. An abridged version of this paper was presented at three events:

- as the opening keynote lecture at the workshop ‘Espacio, Tiempo, Propiedad’, Instituto de Sociología, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, Chile, 27–28 November 2024 (at the invitation of Dr Felipe Torres);
- as the closing keynote lecture at the Annual Conference on Philosophy and Social Science, Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague, Czech Republic, 14–18 May 2025 (at the invitation of Prof. Martin Saar);
- as part of the lecture series ‘Theorie und Gesellschaft’, Institut für Sozialwissenschaften, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany, 14 January 2026 (at the invitation of Prof. Andreas Reckwitz).

I wish to express my sincere gratitude to the workshop, conference, and lecture series participants for their insightful and constructive feedback on previous versions of this article. I am grateful to Gerard Delanty for prompting me to write this piece and, crucially, to Eric Kerr and Georg Theiner for encouraging me to submit my work to *Social Epistemology*. I am also deeply appreciative of the three anonymous reviewers, whose thoughtful and perceptive comments significantly improved the manuscript. Any remaining errors are entirely my own.

2. See Delanty (2024).
3. Ibid., p. 1. Cf. Outhwaite (2006).
4. See Delanty (2024), p. 1.
5. See ibid., pp. 1, 21, 193, 194, 196, and 205.
6. Ibid., p. 1.
7. Ibid., p. 1 (italics added).
8. Ibid., p. 1 (punctuation and spelling modified).
9. Ibid., p. 1. Cf. Andersson (2018) as well as Andersson and Kemp (2021).
10. Delanty (2024), p. 1 (italics added).
11. Cf. Boltanski, Rennes, and Susen (2014 [2010]).
12. Delanty (2024), p. 1.
13. See Susen (2015), pp. 192–194.
14. Delanty (2024), p. 1.
15. Ibid., p. 1 (italics added).
16. Ibid., p. 1 (italics added).
17. Ibid., p. 2.
18. Cf. Outhwaite (1987).
19. Delanty (2024), p. 2.
20. See Heidegger (1996 [1927]). See also Heidegger (1992 [1924/1989]) and Heidegger (1998 [1967/1976]). As is well known, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger (1996 [1927]) investigates the question of being through a phenomenological analysis of how temporality structures our engagement with the world. In his later writings – which diverge from, though do not entirely abandon, his earlier positions – he contends that *being is fundamentally historical*, unfolding through a succession of distinct ‘epochs’, culminating in the present technological age. Heidegger’s thought has exerted, and continues to exert, a significant influence on contemporary accounts of time, including those within different frameworks of critical theory. On this point, see, for instance: Derrida (1976 [1967]); Derrida (2016 [2013]); Habermas (1987b [1985]); Nancy (1997 [1993]); Serres (2019 [2001]); Stiegler (1998 [1994]); Stiegler (2008 [1996]); Stiegler (2011 [2001]).

21. On this point, see, for example: Baert, Morgan, and Ushiyama (2022a); Baert, Morgan, and Ushiyama (2022b); Baert, Morgan, and Ushiyama (2022c). See also Susen (2022b).
22. Delanty (2024), p. 6.
23. Ibid., p. 4.
24. On the concept of 'determinacy' (and the concepts of 'determined' and 'predetermined'), see *ibid.*, pp. 6, 33, 34, 42, 44, 55, 56, 58, 60, 67, 109, 137, and 180. On the concept of 'determinism' (and on the concept of 'deterministic'), see *ibid.*, pp. 24, 34, 36, 59–60, and 144. On the concept of 'indeterminacy', see *ibid.*, pp. v, 6, 44, 183, and 191. On the concept of 'indeterminate', see *ibid.*, pp. vi, 4, 110–111, 180, and 184.
25. For a detailed account of the relationship between determinacy and indeterminacy, see Susen (2015), esp. Chapter 4.
26. For an earlier version of this argument, see Susen (2024), pp. 203–204.
27. On this point, see, for example: Allen (2023); Bergson (2002 [1889/1910]); Bourdieu (2000 [1997]); Dennett (1984); Dennett (2004); Dennett and Caruso (2021 [1995]); Flynn (2006); Frederick (2020); Fromm (2001 [1941/1942]); Gautier (2001); Griffith (2022 [2013]); Habermas (2004); Habermas (2007); Honderich (2003 [1993]); Inglis (2013); Kane (2011 [2005]); Quiniou (1996); Sapolsky (2023); Seligman et al. (2016); Varela (1999); Williams (1980).
28. On the *Methodenstreit*, see, for instance: Lachenmann (1995); McCarthy (2001); Neemann (1993/1994). See also, for example: Susen (2011), p. 459; Susen (2013c), pp. 367–368; Susen (2013d), pp. 88, 90, and 92; Susen (2015), pp. 34, 48, and 66–67; Susen (2022a), p. 8.
29. See Rosa (2020 [2018]). See also Susen (2024).
30. Delanty (2024), p. 2.
31. Ibid., p. 2.
32. Ibid., p. 2.
33. See Rosa (2020 [2018]). See also Susen (2024). It should be noted that, from Rosa's perspective, 'uncontrollability' [*Unverfügbarkeit*] constitutes one of the four pillars of 'resonance' and, hence, may be regarded as an *emancipatory* force of human existence. On this point, see Susen (2024), esp. pp. 3–7, 83–87, and 141–155. See also Susen (2025 [2024]). Cf. Rosa (2019 [2016]) and Susen (2020b).
34. Delanty (2024), p. 2. See also *ibid.*, pp. 93, 105, 127, 128, 130, and 170.
35. Ibid., p. 2.
36. See Susen (2015), pp. 192–194.
37. See Delanty (2024), p. 2.
38. See *ibid.*, esp. Introduction and Conclusion. On the concept of 'humanity', see, for instance: Chernilo (2017); Feuerbach (1848); Fuller (2011); Fuller (2013); Graeber and Wengrow (2021); Herder (1967 [1774]); Marková (2003); Pinker (2002); Pinker (2011); Susen (2020c); Susen (2024).
39. See Delanty (2024), pp. v, vi, 1, 2, 14, 21, 23, 24, 27, 33–60, 65, 91, 92, 95, 113–117, 130, 136, 162, 174, 189, 198, and 204–205.
40. See *ibid.*, p. 202.
41. See *ibid.*, pp. 2, 24, 56, 71, 198, 200, and 202.
42. On 'constructivism', see, for instance: Barad (1996); Berger and Luckmann (1967 [1966]); Boghossian (2006); Delanty (1997); Fornel and Lemieux (2007); Jacob (1999); Lorber and Farrell (1991); Norris (1997); Petrenko (2011); Searle (1995); Shotter (1997).
43. On 'historicism', see, for instance: Delanty and Isin (2003); Dufour (2015); Evans (2002); Habermas (1987 [1968]); Jacobs (1983); Keaney (1997); McLennan (2014); Pieters (2000); Popper (2002 [1957]); Shaw (1971); Tilley (1982); Tilley (1984); Veaser (1989).
44. On 'perspectivism', see, for instance: Foucault (1980); Foucault (1986 [1984]); Foucault (1988); Foucault (2005 [2001]); Nietzsche (1967 [1930]); Nietzsche (1992 [1887]); Nietzsche (2012 [1886]); Nietzsche (2020 [1882/1901]).
45. On 'poststructuralism', see, for instance: Belsey (2002); Bohman (1996); Dillet (2017); Jay (1992); Moebius and Reckwitz (2008); Poster (1989).
46. On 'postmodernism' (and 'postmodernity'), see, for instance: Anderson (1998); Bauman (1992); Bauman (1997); Boisvert (1996); Calhoun (1995); Callinicos (1989); Delanty (2000); Doherty, Graham, and Malek (1992); Eagleton (1996); Good and Velody (1998); Goulimari (2007); Habermas (1981 [1980]); Harvey (1989); Jameson (1991); Lash (1990); Lyotard (1984 [1979]); Patton (2004); Petit (2005); Seidman and Wagner (1992); Smart (1996); Susen (2015); Turner (2006); Wellmer (1985); Welsch (2002); Wilterdink (2002).
47. On 'posthumanism', see, for instance: Alaimo (2016); Badmington (2000); Badmington (2003); Badmington (2004); Banerji and Paranjape (2016); Braidotti (2013a); Braidotti (2013b); Braidotti (2015); Braidotti (2019a); Braidotti (2019b); Braidotti and Bignall (2019); Braidotti and Fuller (2019); Braidotti and Hlavajova (2018); Clarke (2008); Clarke and Rossini (2017); Elliott (2021); Ferrando (2013); Fukuyama (2002); Herbrechter (2013 [2009]); Mahon (2017); Nayar (2014); Roden (2015); Susen (2022d); Wennemann (2013); Wolfe (2010).
48. On this point, see, for instance: Susen (2013b), p. 236n121; Susen (2013c), pp. 326, 339, 351, 359–361, 364, and 366–367; Susen (2014), pp. 762–763n568; Susen (2016b), pp. 461–463; Susen (2016c), p. 131; Susen (2017a), pp. 144 and 146; Susen (2018a), pp. 27–28; Susen (2020a), pp. 183, 194n132, 277, 350, and 350n1; Susen (2020b), p. 337; Susen (2022b), pp. 59–61; Susen (2022c), p. 300.

49. Cf. Jaeggi (2018 [2014]). Cf. also Susen (2022c).
50. See Triandis (1996), esp. pp. 408–409. (According to Triandis’s typology, the following main ‘cultural syndromes’ can be identified: tightness, cultural complexity, active–passive, honour, collectivism, individualism, and vertical and horizontal relationships.) On this point, see also, for example: Susen (2007), pp. 63–64, 214, and 290; Susen (2012), p. 309; Susen (2015), p. 140; Susen (2016a), p. 72; Susen (2016c), pp. 132–133; Susen (2022b), p. 65.
51. On the concept of ‘social acceleration’, see, for instance: Rosa (2015 [2005]); Rosa (2020 [2018]); Rosa, Dörre, and Lessenich (2017); Rosa and Scheuerman (2009). See also, for instance: Susen (2024); Torres (2016); Torres (2022); Torres (2024); Vostal (2014); Wajcman (2015).
52. Delanty (2024), p. 3.
53. On this point, see Susen (2021), pp. 125–127 and 138.
54. See Delanty (2024), p. 4.
55. See *ibid.*, pp. 9–20.
56. On this point, see Solomon (2016). Accelerationism is (still) a relatively marginal movement in contemporary philosophy. Rather than advocating for radical politics or direct opposition, accelerationism promotes the rapid advancement of society through technological innovation as a means of transcending the present. See Delanty (2024), p. 11. On accelerationism, see, for instance: Mackay and Avanesian (2017 [2014]); Noys (2014); Shaviro (2015); Srnicek and Williams (2016 [2015]).
57. On this point, see, for example: Rosa (2015 [2005]); Rosa (2020 [2018]); Rosa, Dörre, and Lessenich (2017); Rosa and Scheuerman (2009). See also, for instance: Susen (2024); Torres (2016); Torres (2022); Torres (2024); Vostal (2014); Wajcman (2015).
58. See Hartog (2015 [2003]). See also Fritzsche (2004).
59. See Hartog (2015 [2003]), esp. p. 107.
60. Delanty (2024), p. 16. On this point, see also Bauman (2017).
61. Pinker (2018), p. 39 (italics in original). See also *ibid.*, p. 362. Cf. Pinker (2011) and Pinker (2021).
62. See Delanty (2024), p. 4.
63. On this point, see, for instance: Habermas (1987a [1981]); Habermas (1987b [1981]); Habermas (2001 [1984]). See also, for example: Habermas (1985 [1984]); Haferkamp (1985); Tugendhat (1985).
64. See Weber (1978 [1922]), esp. Chapter 1 (‘Basic Sociological Concepts’). See also, for instance: Beckermann (1985); Føllesdal (1985); Seebaß and Tuomela (1985); Weiß (1985).
65. Delanty (2024), p. 2.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
71. Marx (2000 [1852/1977]), p. 329. – It is worth emphasizing that, in the original version, Marx uses the word *Menschen* (‘human beings’), rather than *Männer* (‘men’), thereby including *all* members of humanity in the sense of *Menschheit* (‘humanity’). See Marx (1972 [1852]), p. 115: ‘Die Menschen machen ihre eigene Geschichte, aber sie machen sie nicht aus freien Stücken, nicht unter selbstgewählten, sondern unter unmittelbar vorgefundenen, gegebenen und überlieferten Umständen. Die Tradition aller toten Geschlechter lastet wie ein Alp auf dem Gehirne der Lebenden.’ – On this point, see, for instance: Boltanski, Rennes, and Susen (2014 [2010]), p. 595; Susen (2015), pp. 239–240; Susen (2021 [2014]), pp. 351, 358, and 363n1; Susen (2022b), pp. 54–56.
72. For further reading on the relationship between ‘necessity’ and ‘contingency’ in Marxist thought, see Daly (1999), esp. p. 71. See also, for instance: Boltanski, Rennes, and Susen (2014 [2010]), p. 595; Susen (2015), esp. Chapter 4 and pp. 239–240; Susen (2021 [2014]), p. 351 (on ‘the historicity of social space’), p. 358 (point 11), and p. 363n1.
73. Habermas (2022a [2019]), p. 28 (my translation).
74. On this point, see *ibid.*, p. 28.
75. Delanty (2024), p. 4 (spelling modified).
76. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
77. *Ibid.*, p. 4 (italics added).
78. See Delanty (2024), esp. pp. 20–25.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
80. *Ibid.*, p. 20 (spelling modified).
81. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 21 (quotation modified).
83. See *ibid.*, pp. 1, 21, and 194.
84. On this point, see Zielonka (2023).
85. Delanty (2024), p. 21.

86. *Ibid.*, p. 21 (italics added).
87. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
88. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
89. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
90. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
91. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
92. *Ibid.*, p. 21. On this point, see also, for instance: Koselleck (1985 [1979]); Koselleck (1988 [1959]); Koselleck (2009 [2000]). In addition, see, for example: Browne and Susen (2014); Cordero (2017); Delanty (2021); Esposito (2017); Hartog (2015 [2003]); Susen (2017b); Wagner (2010).
93. Bergson (2002 [1889/1910]), p. 10 (Chapter 1) (italics added). See also Delanty (2024), p. 22.
94. Delanty (2024), p. 22.
95. *Ibid.*, p. 22 (italics added).
96. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
97. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
98. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
99. *Ibid.*, p. 23 (italics added).
100. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
101. *Ibid.*, p. 23. On this point, see also Strydom (2023).
102. Delanty (2024), p. 23. On this point, see Seligman et al. (2016).
103. Wittgenstein (2009 [1953]), p. 235n323 (italics in original). On this point, see Delanty (2024), pp. 23–24.
104. Wittgenstein (2009 [1953]), p. 235n323. On this point, see Delanty (2024), pp. 23–24.
105. Delanty (2024), p. 24 (italics added).
106. *Ibid.*, p. 24 (italics added).
107. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
108. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
109. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
110. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
111. *Ibid.*, p. 25 (italics added).
112. On this point, see, for instance: Jaspers (1932); Jaspers (1949); Jaspers (1962); Jaspers and Bultmann (1954). See also, for example: Assmann (2018); Bellah and Joas (2012); Eisenstadt (1986a); Eisenstadt (1986b); Habermas (2022a [2019]); Habermas (2022b [2019]); Kögler (2020); Mendieta (2018); Susen (2025b), esp. pp. 116 and 154; Turner (2016).
113. Delanty (2024), p. 25.
114. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
115. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
116. *Ibid.*, p. 25 (italics added).
117. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
118. *Ibid.*, p. 25 (italics added).
119. *Ibid.*, p. 25 (spelling modified).
120. On the *Methodenstreit*, see, for instance: Lachenmann (1995); McCarthy (2001); Neemann (1993/1994). See also, for example: Susen (2011), p. 459; Susen (2013c), pp. 367–368; Susen (2013d), pp. 88, 90, and 92; Susen (2015), pp. 34, 48, and 66–67; Susen (2022a), p. 8.
121. It should be noted that it is far from obvious what ‘progress’ is and, if there is such a thing as ‘progress’, how it should be studied and conceptualized. On the idea of ‘progress’, see, for instance: Allen (2016); Aron (1972 [1968]); Feenberg (2017); Kirkpatrick (2003); Kumar (1978); Owen (2002); Pinker (2018); Rorty (1998); Schäfer (1983); Susen (2020d); Susen (2025a), p. 123n241.
122. Cf. Bloch (1959).
123. See Delanty (2024), esp. pp. 20–25.
124. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
125. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
126. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
127. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
128. See Lyotard (1984 [1979]), pp. xxiii and xxiv (italics in original).
129. See Susen (2023) as well as Susen and Ortmann (2024).
130. Delanty (2024), p. 24 (italics added).
131. Cf. Susen (2020c), esp. pp. 125, 131, 137, 138, 142, 144, and 147.
132. Delanty (2024), p. 24 (italics added).
133. See Susen (2018b), p. 1279.
134. See *ibid.*, p. 1280. Cf. Susen (2013a).
135. Delanty (2024), p. 25 (italics added).
136. See Habermas (1999) and Habermas (2001b).

137. See Habermas (1992). On this point, see also Susen (2007), esp. Chapter 3.
138. Delanty (2024), p. 25 (italics added).
139. Marx (2000 [1852/1977]), p. 329.
140. A literal (and, admittedly, wooden) translation of this idea is as follows: 'Time arises not only in the mirror of the present but also in the womb of the hitherto-been and with a view to the always-still-and-always-again-becoming.'
141. Delanty (2024), p. 25 (italics added).
142. See Susen (2007), p. 167. On the (a) implicit, (b) intersubjective, (c) regulative, (d) value-laden, and (e) contestable constitution of 'normativity', see, *ibid.*, pp. 33–34.
143. For an outline of such an approach (in relation to aesthetics), see Susen (2015), pp. 101–103.
144. It should be noted that this section has *not* examined the interactions between past, present, and future. The significance of these interactions is addressed in the following section.
145. See, for instance: Abbott (2001); Adam (1990); Adam (1998); Adkins (2009); Adkins (2011); Adkins (2014); Allen (2023); Andersson (2018); Andersson and Kemp (2021); Baert (1992); Baert (2000); Bardon (2013); Baron and Miller (2019); Bauman (2007); Bennington (2001); Bergmann (1992); Bergson (2002 [1889/1910]); Birth (2012); Brand (1999); Bubner (1971); Burges and Elias (2016); Callender (2011); Castro, Fowler, and Gomes (2018); Celis Bueno (2017); Colebrook (2009); Conrad (1998); Elias (1992 [1984]); Esposito (2011); Fabian (1983); Flaherty and Fine (2001); Friese (2001); Fritzsche (2004); Fuchs (2018); Giddens (1995 [1981]); Grosz (2004); Habermas (1987a [1985]); Habermas (1987b [1985]); Habermas (2001a); Habermas (2003); Han (2017 [2014]); Hartog (2015 [2003]); Hassan (2003); Hassan and Purser (2007); Hassard (1990); Hawking (1988); Heidegger (1992 [1924/1989]); Heidegger (1996 [1927]); Helgesson and Svenungsson (2018); Holloway (2022); Hoy (2009); Husserl (1964 [1928]); Hutchings (2014); James (1890) (see Chapter 15: 'The Perception of Time'); Jancsary (2019); Kaun (2017); Koselleck (1985 [1979]); Koselleck (2009 [2000]); Krause (2019); Kumar (2017); Landes (2000 [1983]); Lash, Quick, and Roberts (1998); Laslett (2005); Le Poidevin and MacBeath (1993); Lee (2006); Lilja (2018); Lockwood (2005); Lyotard (1991 [1988]); Martins (1974); Massey (1993); May and Thrift (2001); McTaggart (1908); Muzzetto (2006); Nowotny (1992); Nowotny (1994 [1989]); O'Carroll (2008); O'Rand and Ellis (1974); Osrecki (2011); Prosser (2007); Prosser (2012); Prosser (2016); Robertson (1995); Rosa (2010); Rosa (2015 [2005]); Rosa, Dörre, and Lessenich (2017); Rosa and Scheuerman (2009); Rovelli (2018 [2017]); Selin (2008); Smolin (2013); Smolin (2015); Smolin (2019); Sorokin (1943); Strydom (2017); Szerszynski (2017); Tabboni (2001); Tallis (2017); Tamm and Olivier (2019); Torres (2016); Torres (2022); Torres (2024); Torres and Gros (2022); Turchin (2023); Turetzky (1998); Unger and Smolin (2021); Urry (1985); Vostal (2014); Wajcman (2015); Wajcman and Dodd (2016); Warf (2008); Wenzel et al. (2020); Wittmann (2016 [2012]); Zerubavel (1982); Žižek (2011 [2010]).
146. For a critique of this (arguably reductive) view, see, for example, Smolin (2013) and Tallis (2017).
147. Cf. Susen (2025b), pp. 147–150. Arguably, these four perspectives – that is, (i) naturalism, (ii) sociology, (iii) phenomenology, and (iv) humanism – provide a useful cognitive map for distinguishing between fundamentally different ways of conceptualizing 'existence' and 'time'. Such an outline highlights key methodological and ontological questions that arise when engaging with the antinomy between 'the timeless' and 'the temporal'. It should be emphasized, however, that this schematic overview cannot capture the extensive and multifaceted contributions made across different branches of knowledge – notably the natural sciences, the social sciences, philosophy, and the humanities – to our understanding of the relationship between existence and temporality.

- In the *natural sciences* (esp. *physics*), see, for instance: Campo and Gozzano (2021); Hawking (1988); Lockwood (2005); Rovelli (2018 [2017]); Rovelli (2016 [2014]); Smolin (2013); Smolin (2015); Smolin (2019); Unger and Smolin (2021).
- In the *social sciences* (esp. *social theory*), see, for instance: Abbott (2001); Adam (1990); Adam (1995); Adam (1998); Adkins (2009); Baert (1992); Baert (2000); Bauman (2007); Bergmann (1992); Elias (1992 [1984]); Hassard (1990); Martins (1974); Massey (1993); May and Thrift (2001); Nowotny (1992); Nowotny (1994 [1989]); Rosa (2015 [2005]); Rosa (2020 [2018]); Rosa, Dörre, and Lessenich (2017); Rosa and Scheuerman (2009); Torres (2022); Urry (1985); Vostal (2014); Wajcman (2015); Wajcman and Dodd (2016); Zerubavel (1982).
- In *philosophy* (esp. *phenomenology*), see, for instance: Callender (2011); Heidegger (1996 [1927]); Heidegger (1992 [1924/1989]); Heidegger (1998 [1967/1976]); Husserl (1964 [1928]); Le Poidevin and MacBeath (1993); Merleau-Ponty (1967 [1942]), esp. Section III; Merleau-Ponty (1970 [1968]); Merleau-Ponty (1983 [1964/1968]); Merleau-Ponty (2002 [1945]), esp. Part III, Chapter 2: 'Temporality' (pp. 476–503).
- In the *humanities* (esp. *humanism*), see, for instance: Bergson (2002 [1889/1910]); Ricœur (1984 [1983]); Ricœur (1985 [1984]); Ricœur (1988 [1985]); Tallis (2017).

In addition, it is important to acknowledge that the so-called '*repetition tradition*' has profoundly challenged conventional (Western) conceptions of time. This tradition frames 'futurity' as a mode of retrieval and projection – from Kierkegaard's reversal of *anamnesis*, which derives the repeatable from the future, and Nietzsche's notion of 'eternal recurrence' [*ewige Wiederkunft*] to Heidegger's existential concept of 'repetition' [*Wiederholung*], to mention only a few examples. While a detailed analysis of this line of thought lies beyond the scope of the present article, its influence on contemporary debates about 'time' – in the humanities in general and in philosophy in particular – can hardly be overstated.

On the 'repetition tradition', see, for instance: Eriksen (2000); Kierkegaard (1992 [1843]), esp. Part II; Kierkegaard (2009 [1843]); Kierkegaard (1962 [1844/1936]); Nietzsche (1987 [1883–85]); Nietzsche (2001 [1882/1887]), see esp. Book IV, §341; Nietzsche (2012 [1886]); Nietzsche (2004 [1888/1979]); Heidegger (1992 [1924/1989]); Heidegger (1996 [1927]); Heidegger (1998 [1967/1976]); Deleuze (1983 [1962]); Deleuze (1994 [1968]); Derrida (1976 [1967]); Derrida (2001 [1967]); Derrida (2016 [2013]).

148. See Smolin (2015). See also, for instance, Unger and Smolin (2021), Smolin (2013), and Smolin (2019). Cf. Outhwaite (1998).

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes on contributor

Simon Susen is Professor of Sociology at City St George's, University of London. Before joining City in 2011, he held lectureships at Birkbeck, University of London (2010–2011), Newcastle University (2008–2010), and Goldsmiths, University of London (2007–2008). He received his PhD from the University of Cambridge in 2007. Prior to that, he studied sociology, politics, and philosophy at a range of international universities and research centres – including the University of Cambridge, the University of Edinburgh, the Colegio de México, the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales in Mexico City, and the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris. He is Affiliate Professor of Sociology at the Universidad Andrés Bello in Santiago, Chile. In addition, he is Associate Member of the Bauman Institute and, together with Bryan S. Turner, Editor of the *Journal of Classical Sociology*.

ORCID

Simon Susen  <http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0643-1891>

Compliance with Ethical Standards

This article does not contain any studies with human participants or animals performed by any of the authors.

References

- Abbott, Andrew. 2001. *Time Matters: On Theory and Method*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Adam, Barbara. 1990. *Time and Social Theory*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Adam, Barbara. 1995. *Timewatch. The Social Analysis of Time*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Adam, Barbara. 1998. *Timescapes of Modernity. The Environment and Invisible Hazards*. London: Routledge.
- Adkins, Lisa. 2009. 'Sociological Futures: From Clock Time to Event Time'. *Sociological Research Online* 14 (4). <http://www.socresonline.org.uk/14/4/8.html>.
- Adkins, Lisa. 2011. 'Practice as Temporalisation: Bourdieu and Economic Crisis'. In *The Legacy of Pierre Bourdieu: Critical Essays*, edited by Simon Susen and Bryan S. Turner, 347–365. London: Anthem Press.
- Adkins, Lisa. 2014. 'Luc Boltanski and the Problem of Time: Notes towards a Pragmatic Sociology of the Future'. In *The Spirit of Luc Boltanski: Essays on the 'Pragmatic Sociology of Critique'*, edited by Simon Susen and Bryan S. Turner, 517–538. London: Anthem Press.

- Alaimo, Stacy. 2016. *Exposed: Environmental Politics and Pleasures in Posthuman Times*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Allen, Amy. 2016. *The End of Progress: Decolonizing the Normative Foundations of Critical Theory*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Allen, Barry. 2023. *Living in Time: The Philosophy of Henri Bergson*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Anderson, Perry. 1998. *The Origins of Postmodernity*. London: Verso.
- Andersson, Jenny. 2018. *The Future of the World: Futurology, Futurists, and the Struggle for the Post-Cold War Imagination*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Andersson, Jenny, and Sandra Kemp, eds. 2021. *Futures*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Aron, Raymond. 1972 [1968]. *Progress and Disillusion: The Dialectics of Modern Society*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Assmann, Jan. 2018. *Achsenzeit. Eine Archäologie der Moderne*. München: C. H. Beck.
- Badmington, Neil, ed. 2000. *Posthumanism*. Houndmills: Palgrave.
- Badmington, Neil. 2003. 'Theorizing Posthumanism'. *Cultural Critique* 53 (1): 10–27. <https://doi.org/10.1353/cul.2003.0017>.
- Badmington, Neil. 2004. *Alien Chic: Posthumanism and the Other Within*. London: Routledge.
- Baert, Patrick. 1992. *Time, Self and Social Being: Temporality within a Sociological Context*. Aldershot: Avebury.
- Baert, Patrick, ed. 2000. *Time in Contemporary Intellectual Thought*. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
- Baert, Patrick, Marcus Morgan, and Rin Ushiyama. 2022a. 'Introduction to the Special Issue on Existence Theory'. *Journal of Classical Sociology* 22 (1): 3–6. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1468795X211056079>.
- Baert, Patrick, Marcus Morgan, and Rin Ushiyama. 2022b. 'Existence Theory: Outline for a Theory of Social Behaviour'. *Journal of Classical Sociology* 22 (1): 7–29. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1468795X21998247>.
- Baert, Patrick, Marcus Morgan, and Rin Ushiyama. 2022c. 'Existence Theory Revisited: A Reply to Our Critics'. *Journal of Classical Sociology* 22 (1): 107–116. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1468795X211056080>.
- Banerji, Debashish, and Makarand R. Paranjape, eds. 2016. *Critical Posthumanism: Planetary Futures*. San Francisco, CA: Springer.
- Barad, Karen. 1996. 'Meeting the Universe Halfway: Realism and Social Constructivism without Contradiction'. In *Feminism, Science and the Philosophy of Science*, edited by Lynn Hankinson Nelson and Jack Nelson, 161–194. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
- Bardon, Adrian. 2013. *A Brief History of the Philosophy of Time*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Baron, Sam, and Kristie Miller. 2019. *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Time*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Bauman, Zygmunt. 1992. *Intimations of Postmodernity*. London: Routledge.
- Bauman, Zygmunt. 1997. *Postmodernity and Its Discontents*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Bauman, Zygmunt. 2007. *Liquid Times: Living in an Age of Uncertainty*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Bauman, Zygmunt. 2017. *Retrotopia*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Beckermann, Ansgar. 1985. 'Value-Rationality and the Distinction between Goal-Oriented and Value-Oriented Behavior in Weber'. In *Social Action*, edited by Gottfried Seebaß and Raimo Tuomela, 225–233. Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Bellah, Robert N., and Hans Joas, eds. 2012. *The Axial Age and Its Consequences*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Belsey, Catherine. 2002. *Poststructuralism: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bennington, Geoffrey. 2001. 'Is It Time?' In *The Moment: Time and Rupture in Modern Thought*, edited by Heidrun Friesse, 17–32. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
- Berger, Peter L., and Thomas Luckmann. 1967 [1966]. *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*. London: Penguin.
- Bergmann, Werner. 1992. 'The Problem of Time in Sociology: An Overview of the Literature on the State of Theory and Research on the "Sociology of Time", 1900–82'. *Time & Society* 1 (1): 81–134. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0961463X92001001007>.
- Bergson, Henri. 2002 [1889/1910]. *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness*. Translated by Frank Lubecki Pogson. London: Routledge.
- Birch, Kevin K. 2012. *Objects of Time. How Things Shape Temporality*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bloch, Ernst. 1959. *Das Prinzip Hoffnung*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Boghossian, Paul Artin. 2006. *Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Bohman, James. 1996. 'Two Versions of the Linguistic Turn: Habermas and Poststructuralism'. In *Habermas and the Unfinished Project of Modernity*, edited by Maurizio Passerin d'Entrèves and Seyla Benhabib, 197–220. Cambridge: Polity.
- Boisvert, Yves. 1996. *Le monde postmoderne : analyse du discours sur la postmodernité*. Paris: Éditions L'Harmattan.
- Boltanski, Luc, Juliette Rennes, and Simon Susen. 2014 [2010]. 'The Fragility of Reality: Luc Boltanski in Conversation with Juliette Rennes and Simon Susen'. Translated by Simon Susen. In *The Spirit of Luc Boltanski: Essays on the 'Pragmatic Sociology of Critique'*, edited by Simon Susen and Bryan S. Turner, 591–610. London: Anthem Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. 2000 [1997]. *Pascalian Meditations*. Translated by Richard Nice. Cambridge: Polity.
- Braidotti, Rosi. 2013a. *The Posthuman*. Cambridge: Polity.

- Braidotti, Rosi. 2013b. 'Posthuman Humanities'. *European Educational Research Journal* 12 (1): 1–19. <https://doi.org/10.2304/eerj.2013.12.1.1>.
- Braidotti, Rosi. 2015. 'Posthuman Feminist Theory'. In *The Oxford Handbook of Feminist Theory*, edited by Lisa Disch and Mary Hawkesworth, 673–688. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Braidotti, Rosi. 2019a. *Posthuman Knowledge*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Braidotti, Rosi. 2019b. 'A Theoretical Framework for the Critical Posthumanities'. *Theory, Culture & Society* 36 (6): 31–61. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276418771486>.
- Braidotti, Rosi, and Simone Bignall, eds. 2019. *Posthuman Ecologies: Complexity and Process after Deleuze*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Braidotti, Rosi, and Matthew Fuller. 2019. 'The Posthumanities in an Era of Unexpected Consequences'. *Theory, Culture & Society* 36 (6): 3–29. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276419860567>.
- Braidotti, Rosi, and Maria Hlavajova, eds. 2018. *Posthuman Glossary*. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
- Brand, Stewart. 1999. *The Clock of the Long Now: Time and Responsibility*. New York: Basic Books.
- Browne, Craig, and Simon Susen. 2014. 'Austerity and Its Antitheses: Practical Negations of Capitalist Legitimacy'. *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 113 (2): 217–230. <https://doi.org/10.1215/00382876-2643576>.
- Bubner, Rüdiger. 1971. '»Philosophie ist ihre Zeit, in Gedanken erfaßt«'. In *Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik*, edited by Karl-Otto Apel, 210–243. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Burges, Joel, and Amy J. Elias, eds. 2016. *Time: A Vocabulary of the Present*. New York: New York University Press.
- Calhoun, Craig. 1995. 'Postmodernism as Pseudohistory: The Trivialization of Epochal Change'. In Craig Calhoun, *Critical Social Theory*, 97–131. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Callender, Craig, ed. 2011. *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Callinicos, Alex. 1989. *Against Postmodernism: A Marxist Critique*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Campo, Alessandra, and Simone Gozzano, eds. 2021. *Einstein vs. Bergson: An Enduring Quarrel on Time*. Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Castro, José Esteban, Bridget Fowler, and Luís Gomes, eds. 2018. *Time, Science and the Critique of Technological Reason: Essays in Honour of Herminio Martins*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Celis Bueno, Claudio. 2017. *The Attention Economy: Labour, Time and Power in Cognitive Capitalism*. London: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Chernilo, Daniel. 2017. *Debating Humanity. Towards a Philosophical Sociology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Clarke, Bruce. 2008. *Posthuman Metamorphosis: Narrative and Systems*. New York: Fordham University Press.
- Clarke, Bruce, and Manuela Rossini, eds. 2017. *The Cambridge Companion to Literature and the Posthuman*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Colebrook, Claire. 2009. 'Stratigraphic Time, Women's Time'. *Australian Feminist Studies* 24 (59): 11–16. <https://doi.org/10.1080/08164640802645125>.
- Conrad, Peter. 1998. *Modern Times, Modern Places*. London: Thames & Hudson.
- Cordero, Rodrigo. 2017. *Crisis and Critique: On the Fragile Foundations of Social Life*. London: Routledge.
- Daly, Glyn. 1999. 'Marxism and Postmodernity'. In *Marxism and Social Science*, edited by Andrew Gamble, David Marsh, and Tony Tant, 61–84. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Delanty, Gerard. 1997. *Social Science: Beyond Constructivism and Realism*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Delanty, Gerard. 2000. *Modernity and Postmodernity: Knowledge, Power and the Self*. London: SAGE.
- Delanty, Gerard. 2021. 'Imagining the Future: Social Struggles, the Post-National Domain and Major Contemporary Social Transformations'. *Journal of Sociology* 57 (1): 27–46. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1440783320969860>.
- Delanty, Gerard. 2024. *Senses of the Future: Conflicting Ideas of the Future in the World Today*. Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Delanty, Gerard, and Engin F. Isin, eds. 2003. *Handbook of Historical Sociology*. London: SAGE.
- Deleuze, Gilles. 1994 [1968]. *Difference and Repetition*. Translated by Paul Patton. London: Athlone.
- Deleuze, Gilles. 1983 [1962]. *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. Translated by Hugh Tomlinson. London: Athlone.
- Dennett, Daniel C. 1984. *Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Dennett, Daniel C. 2004. *Freedom Evolves*. London: Penguin.
- Dennett, Daniel C., and Gregg D. Caruso. 2021 [1995]. *Just Deserts: Debating Free Will*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Derrida, Jacques. 2001 [1967]. *Writing and Difference*. Translated, with an introduction and additional notes, by Alan Bass. London: Routledge.
- Derrida, Jacques. 1976 [1967]. *Of Grammatology*. Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Derrida, Jacques. 2016 [2013]. *Heidegger: The Question of Being and History*. Translated by Geoffrey Bennington. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Dillet, Benoît. 2017. 'What Is Poststructuralism?' *Political Studies Review* 15 (4): 516–527. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1478929917712931>.
- Doherty, Joe, Elspeth Graham, and Mohammed H. Malek, eds. 1992. *Postmodernism and the Social Sciences*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Dufour, Frédéric Guillaume. 2015. *La sociologie historique. Traditions, trajectoires et débats*. Québec: Presses de l'Université du Québec.

- Eagleton, Terry. 1996. *The Illusions of Postmodernism*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Eisenstadt, Shmuel Noah, ed. 1986a. *The Origins and Diversity of Axial Age Civilizations*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Eisenstadt, Shmuel Noah. 1986b. 'Introduction: The Axial Age Breakthroughs – Their Characteristics and Origins'. In *The Origins and Diversity of Axial Age Civilizations*, edited by Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt, 1–28. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Elias, Norbert. 1992 [1984]. *Time: An Essay*. Translated by Edmund Jephcott. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Elliott, Anthony. 2021. 'Posthumanism'. In *Routledge Handbook of Social and Cultural Theory*, edited by Anthony Elliott, 367–381. 2nd Edition. London: Routledge.
- Eriksen, Niels Nymann. 2000. *Kierkegaard's Category of Repetition: A Reconstruction*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
- Esposito, Elena. 2011. *The Future of Futures: The Time of Money in Financing and Society*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Esposito, Elena. 2017. 'Critique without Crisis: Systems Theory as a Critical Sociology'. *Thesis Eleven* 143 (1): 18–27. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0725513617740966>.
- Evans, Richard J. 2002. 'From Historicism to Postmodernism: Historiography in the Twentieth Century'. *History & Theory* 41 (1): 79–87. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2303.00192>.
- Fabian, Johannes. 1983. *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Feenberg, Andrew. 2017. *Technosystem: The Social Life of Reason*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Ferrando, Francesca. 2013. 'Posthumanism, Transhumanism, Antihumanism, Metahumanism, and New Materialisms: Differences and Relations'. *Existenz: An International Journal in Philosophy, Religion, Politics, and the Arts* 8 (2): 26–32.
- Feuerbach, Ludwig. 1848. *Pierre Bayle. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Menschheit*. 2. umg. und verm. Auflage. Leipzig: O. Wigand.
- Flaherty, Michael G., and Gary Alan Fine. 2001. 'Present, Past, and Future'. *Time & Society* 10 (2–3): 147–161. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0961463X01010002001>.
- Flynn, Thomas. 2006. *Existentialism: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Føllesdal, Dagfinn. 1985. 'Value-Rationality in Weber. Comments on Johannes Weiß: "Max Weber's Distinction between Means-End Rationality and Value-Rationality – Rationale, Scope, Difficulties"'. In *Social Action*, edited by Gottfried Seebaß and Raimo Tuomela, 235–241. Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Fornel, Michel de, and Cyril Lemieux, eds. 2007. *Naturalisme versus constructivisme*. Paris: Éditions de l'EHESS.
- Foucault, Michel. 1986 [1984]. 'What Is Enlightenment?' In *The Foucault Reader*. Translated by Catherine Porter, edited by Paul Rabinow, 32–50. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Foucault, Michel. 1988. *Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 1977–1984*. Edited with an introduction by Lawrence D. Kritzman. Translated by Alan Sheridan and others. London: Routledge.
- Foucault, Michel. 2005 [2001]. *The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1981–1982*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Foucault, Michel. 1980. *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977*. Edited by Colin Gordon. Translated by Colin Gordon et al. Brighton: Harvester Press.
- Frederick, Danny. 2020. *Freedom, Indeterminism, and Fallibilism*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Friese, Heidrun, ed. 2001. *The Moment: Time and Rupture in Modern Thought*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
- Fritzsche, Peter. 2004. *Stranded in the Present: Modern Time and the Melancholy of History*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Fromm, Erich. 2001 [1941/1942]. *The Fear of Freedom*. London: Routledge.
- Fuchs, Thomas. 2018. 'The Cyclical Time of the Body and Its Relation to Linear Time'. *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 25 (7–8): 47–65.
- Fukuyama, Francis. 2002. *Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution*. London: Profile.
- Fuller, Steve. 2011. *Humanity 2.0: What It Means to Be Human Past, Present and Future*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Fuller, Steve. 2013. *Preparing for Life in Humanity 2.0*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Gautier, Claude. 2001. 'La sociologie de l'accord. Justification contre déterminisme et domination'. *Politix* 54: 197–220. <https://doi.org/10.3406/polix.2001.1164>.
- Giddens, Anthony. 1995 [1981]. 'Time-Space Distanciation and the Generation of Power'. In Anthony Giddens, *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*, 90–108. 2nd Edition. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Good, James, and Irving Velody, eds. 1998. *The Politics of Postmodernity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Goulimari, Pelagia, ed. 2007. *Postmodernism. What Moment?* Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Graeber, David, and David Wengrow. 2021. *The Dawn of Everything: A New History of Humanity*. London: Penguin.
- Griffith, Meghan. 2022 [2013]. *Free Will: The Basics*. 2nd Edition. London: Routledge.
- Grosz, Elizabeth. 2004. *The Nick of Time: Politics, Evolution and the Untimely*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Habermas, Jürgen. 1981 [1980]. 'Modernity versus Postmodernity'. Translated by Seyla Ben-Habib. *New German Critique* 22: 3–14. <https://doi.org/10.2307/487859>.
- Habermas, Jürgen. 1987a [1981]. *The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society*. Translated by Thomas McCarthy. Cambridge: Polity.
- Habermas, Jürgen. 1987b [1981]. *The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason*. Translated by Thomas McCarthy. Cambridge: Polity.

- Habermas, Jürgen. 1985 [1984]. 'Remarks on the Concept of Communicative Action'. Translated by Ruth Stanley. In *Social Action*, edited by Gottfried Seebaß and Raimo Tuomela, 151–178. Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Habermas, Jürgen. 2001 [1984]. *On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction: Preliminary Studies in the Theory of Communicative Action*. Translated by Barbara Fultner. Cambridge: Polity.
- Habermas, Jürgen. 1987a [1985]. 'Modernity's Consciousness of Time and Its Need for Self-Reassurance'. Translated by Frederick Lawrence. In Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, 1–22. Cambridge: Polity.
- Habermas, Jürgen. 1987b [1985]. 'Beyond a Temporalized Philosophy of Origins: Jacques Derrida's Critique of Phonocentrism'. Translated by Frederick Lawrence. In Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, 161–184. Cambridge: Polity.
- Habermas, Jürgen. 1987 [1968]. 'Positivism, Pragmatism, Historicism'. In Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, edited by Jeremy J. Shapiro, 65–69. Cambridge: Polity.
- Habermas, Jürgen. 1992. 'Transcendence from within, Transcendence in this World'. In *Habermas, Modernity, and Public Theology*, edited by Don S. Browning and Francis Schüssler Fiorenza, 226–250. New York: Crossroad.
- Habermas, Jürgen. 1999. 'From Kant to Hegel and Back Again – The Move towards Detranscendentalization'. *European Journal of Philosophy* 7 (2): 129–157. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0378.00077>.
- Habermas, Jürgen. 2001a. *Zeit der Übergänge*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Habermas, Jürgen. 2001b. *Kommunikatives Handeln und detranszendentalisierte Vernunft*. Stuttgart: Reclam, Ditzingen.
- Habermas, Jürgen. 2003. *Zeitdiagnosen: Zwölf Essays (1980–2001)*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Habermas, Jürgen. 2004. 'Freiheit und Determinismus'. *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 52 (6): 871–890. <https://doi.org/10.1524/dzph.2004.52.6.871>.
- Habermas, Jürgen. 2007. 'The Language Game of Responsible Agency and the Problem of Free Will: How Can Epistemic Dualism Be Reconciled with Ontological Monism?' *Philosophical Explorations* 10 (1): 13–50. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13869790601170128>.
- Habermas, Jürgen. 2022a [2019]. *Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie. Band 1: Die okzidentale Konstellation von Glauben und Wissen*. Taschenbuchausgabe, Berlin: Suhrkamp.
- Habermas, Jürgen. 2022b [2019]. *Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie. Band 2: Vernünftige Freiheit. Spuren des Diskurses über Glauben und Wissen*. Taschenbuchausgabe, Berlin: Suhrkamp.
- Haferkamp, Hans. 1985. 'Critique of Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action'. In *Social Action*, edited by Gottfried Seebaß and Raimo Tuomela, 197–205. Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Han, Byung-Chul. 2017 [2014]. *The Scent of Time: A Philosophical Essay on the Art of Lingerin*g. Translated by Daniel Steuer. Cambridge: Polity.
- Hartog, François. 2015 [2003]. *Regimes of Historicity: Presentism and Experiences of Time*. Translated by Saskia Brown. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Harvey, David. 1989. *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Hassan, Robert. 2003. 'Network Time and the New Knowledge Epoch'. *Time & Society* 12 (2–3): 225–241. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0961463X030122004>.
- Hassan, Robert, and Ronald E. Purser, eds. 2007. *24/7: Time and Temporality in the Network Society*. Stanford, CA: Stanford Business Books.
- Hassard, John, ed. 1990. *The Sociology of Time*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Hawking, Stephen W. 1988. *A Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang to Black Holes*. London: Bantam.
- Heidegger, Martin. 1992 [1924/1989]. *The Concept of Time*. Translated by William McNeill. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Heidegger, Martin. 1996 [1927]. *Being and Time*. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Heidegger, Martin. 1998 [1967/1976]. *Pathmarks*. Edited by William McNeill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Helgesson, Stefan, and Jayne Svenungsson, eds. 2018. *The Ethos of History: Time and Responsibility*. New York: Berghahn.
- Herbrechter, Stefan. 2013 [2009]. *Posthumanism. A Critical Analysis*. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
- Herder, Johann Gottfried. 1967 [1774]. *Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit*. Nachwort von Hans-Georg Gadamer. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Holloway, John. 2022. *Hope in Hopeless Times*. London: Pluto Press.
- Honderich, Ted. 2003 [1993]. *How Free Are You? The Determinism Problem*. 2nd Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hoy, David Couzens. 2009. *The Time of Our Lives: A Critical History of Temporality*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Husserl, Edmund. 1964 [1928]. *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*. Edited by Martin Heidegger. Translated by James S. Churchill. Introduction by Calvin O. Schrag. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Hutchings, Kimberly. 2014. 'Time, Politics, and Critique: Rethinking the "When" Question'. In *Transnationalizing the Public Sphere*, edited by Kate Nash, 98–111. Cambridge: Polity.
- Inglis, David. 2013. 'Bourdieu, Language and "Determinism": A Reply to Simon Susen'. *Social Epistemology* 27 (3–4): 315–322. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2013.818742>.
- Jacob, Margaret C. 1999. 'Science Studies after Social Construction: The Turn toward the Comparative and the Global'. In *Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture*, edited by Victoria E. Bonnell, Lynn Hunt, and Richard Biernacki, 95–120. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

- Jacobs, Struan. 1983. 'Tilley and Popper's Alleged Historicism'. *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 13 (2): 203–205. <https://doi.org/10.1177/004839318301300206>.
- Jaeggi, Rahel. 2018 [2014]. *Critique of Forms of Life*. Translated by Ciaran Cronin. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- James, William. 1890. *The Principles of Psychology*. Volume 1. New York: Henry Holt.
- Jameson, Fredric. 1991. *Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*. London: Verso.
- Jancsary, Jonathan. 2019. 'The Future as an Undefined and Open Time: A Bergsonian Approach'. *Axiomathes* 29 (1): 61–80. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-017-9364-0>.
- Jaspers, Karl. 1932. *Philosophie*. 3 Bände. Berlin: Springer.
- Jaspers, Karl. 1949. *Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte*. München: R. Piper & Co. Verlag.
- Jaspers, Karl. 1962. *Der philosophische Glaube angesichts der christlichen Offenbarung*. München: Piper.
- Jaspers, Karl, and Rudolf Bultmann. 1954. *Die Frage der Entmythologisierung*. München: Piper.
- Jay, Martin. 1992. 'The Debate over Performative Contradiction: Habermas versus the Poststructuralists'. In *Philosophical Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment*, edited by Axel Honneth, Thomas McCarthy, Claus Offe, and Albrecht Wellmer, 261–279. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Kane, Robert, ed. 2011 [2005]. *The Oxford Handbook of Free Will*. 2nd Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kaun, Anne. 2017. '"Our Time to Act Has Come": Desynchronization, Social Media Time and Protest Movements'. *Media, Culture & Society* 39 (4): 469–486. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443716646178>.
- Keaney, Michael. 1997. 'The Poverty of Rhetoricism: Popper, Mises and the Riches of Historicism'. *History of the Human Sciences* 10 (1): 1–22. <https://doi.org/10.1177/095269519701000101>.
- Kierkegaard, Søren. 2009 [1843]. *Repetition and Philosophical Crumbs*. Translated by M. G. Piety, with an introduction by Edward F. Mooney and notes by Edward F. Mooney and M. G. Piety. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kierkegaard, Søren. 1962 [1844/1936]. *Philosophical Fragments or a Fragment of Philosophy*. 2nd Edition, originally translated and introduced by David F. Swenson, new introduction and commentary by Niels Thulstrup, translation revised and commentary by Howard V. Hong. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Kierkegaard, Søren. 1992 [1843]. *Either/Or: A Fragment of Life*. Edited by Victor Eremita. Abridged, translated, and with an introduction and notes by Alastair Hannay. London: Penguin.
- Kirkpatrick, Graeme. 2003. 'Evolution or Progress? A (Critical) Defence of Habermas's Theory of Social Development'. *Thesis Eleven* 72 (1): 91–112. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0725513603072001135>.
- Kögler, Hans-Herbert. 2020. 'A Genealogy of Faith and Freedom'. *Theory, Culture & Society* 37 (7–8): 37–46. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276420957735>.
- Koselleck, Reinhart. 1985 [1979]. *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*. Translated by Keith Tribe. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Koselleck, Reinhart. 1988 [1959]. *Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society*. Oxford: Berg.
- Koselleck, Reinhart. 2009 [2000]. 'Is There an Acceleration of History?' In *High-Speed Society: Social Acceleration, Power, and Modernity*, edited by Hartmut Rosa and William E. Scheuerman, 113–134. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Krause, Monika. 2019. 'What Is Zeitgeist? Examining Period-Specific Cultural Patterns'. *Poetics* 76: 101352. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.poetic.2019.02.003>.
- Kumar, Krishan. 1978. *Prophecy and Progress: The Sociology of Industrial and Post-Industrial Society*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Kumar, Krishan. 2017. 'The Time of Empire: Temporality and Genealogy in the Development of European Empires'. *Thesis Eleven* 139 (1): 113–128. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0725513617701919>.
- Lachenmann, Gudrun. 1995. '"Methodenstreit" in der Entwicklungssoziologie'. Working Paper, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, Forschungsschwerpunkt Entwicklungssoziologie, Issue 241.
- Landes, David S. 2000 [1983]. *Revolution in Time: Clocks and the Making of the Modern World*. Revised and Enlarged Edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Lash, Scott. 1990. *Sociology of Postmodernism*. London: Routledge.
- Lash, Scott, Andrew Quick, and Richard H. Roberts, eds. 1998. *Time and Value*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Laslett, Peter. 2005. 'Interconnections over Time: Critique of the Concept of Generation'. *Journal of Classical Sociology* 5 (2): 205–213. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1468795X05053492>.
- Lee, Pamela M. 2006. *Chronophobia: On Time in the Art of the 1960s*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Le Poidevin, Robin, and Murray MacBeath, eds. 1993. *The Philosophy of Time*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lilja, Mona. 2018. 'The Politics of Time and Temporality in Foucault's Theorisation of Resistance: Ruptures, Time-Lags and Decelerations'. *Journal of Political Power* 11 (3): 419–432. <https://doi.org/10.1080/2158379X.2018.1523319>.
- Lockwood, Michael. 2005. *The Labyrinth of Time: Introducing the Universe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lorber, Judith, and Susan A. Farrell, eds. 1991. *The Social Construction of Gender*. London: SAGE.
- Lyotard, Jean-François. 1984 [1979]. *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*. Translated by Geoffrey Bennington and Brian Massumi, foreword by Fredric Jameson. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Lyotard, Jean-François. 1991 [1988]. *The Inhuman: Reflections on Time*. Translated by Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby. Cambridge: Polity.

- Mackay, Robin, and Armen Avanesian, eds. 2017 [2014]. *#Accelerate#*. 2nd Edition. Falmouth: Urbanomic Media Ltd.
- Mahon, Peter. 2017. *Posthumanism. A Guide for the Perplexed*. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
- Marková, Ivana. 2003. 'Dialogicality as an Ontology of Humanity'. In *Rethinking Communicative Interaction: New Interdisciplinary Horizons*, edited by Colin B. Grant, 29–51. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins.
- Martins, Herminio. 1974. 'Time and Theory in Sociology'. In *Approaches to Sociology. An Introduction to Major Trends in British Sociology*, edited by John Rex, 194–246. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Marx, Karl. 1972 [1852]. 'Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte'. In Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Marx-Engels-Werke (MEW)*, 115–123. Band 8. Berlin: Dietz Verlag.
- Marx, Karl. 2000 [1852/1977]. 'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte'. In *Karl Marx: Selected Writings*, edited by David McLellan, 329–355. 2nd Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Massey, Doreen. 1993. 'Politics and Space/Time'. In *Place and the Politics of Identity*, edited by Michael Keith and Steve Pile, 141–161. London: Routledge.
- May, Jon, and Nigel Thrift, eds. 2001. *Timespace: Geographies of Temporality*. London: Routledge.
- McCarthy, George E. 2001. *Objectivity and the Silence of Reason: Weber, Habermas, and the Methodological Disputes in German Sociology*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
- McLennan, Gregor. 2014. 'Complicity, Complexity, Historicism: Problems of Postcolonial Sociology'. *Postcolonial Studies* 17 (4): 451–464. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13688790.2014.966421>.
- McTaggart, J. Ellis. 1908. 'The Unreality of Time'. *Mind* 17 (68): 457–474.
- Mendieta, Eduardo. 2018. 'The Axial Age, Social Evolution, and Postsecular Consciousness'. *Critical Research on Religion* 6 (3): 289–308. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2050303218800379>.
- Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1967 [1942]. *The Structure of Behavior*. Translated by Alden L. Fisher. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1970 [1968]. *Themes from the Lectures at the Collège de France, 1952–1960*. Translated by John O'Neill. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
- Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1983 [1964/1968]. *The Visible and the Invisible*. Edited by Claude Lefort. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
- Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 2002 [1945]. *Phenomenology of Perception*. Translated by Colin Smith. London: Routledge.
- Moebius, Stephan, and Andreas Reckwitz, eds. 2008. *Poststrukturalistische Sozialwissenschaften*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Muzzetto, Luigi. 2006. 'Time and Meaning in Alfred Schütz'. *Time & Society* 15 (1): 5–31. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0961463X06061334>.
- Nancy, Jean-Luc. 1997 [1993]. *The Sense of the World*. Translated by Jeffrey S. Librett. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Nayar, Pramod K. 2014. *Posthumanism*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Neemann, Ursula. 1993/1994. *Gegensätze und Syntheseversuche im Methodenstreit der Neuzeit*. 2 Bände. Hildesheim: Olms.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. 1992 [1887]. *Zur Genealogie der Moral: Eine Streitschrift*. Mit einem Nachwort, einer Zeittafel zu Nietzsche, Anmerkungen und bibliographischen Hinweisen von Peter Pütz. 3. Auflage. München: Goldmann Verlag.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. 1967 [1930]. *The Will to Power*. Edited by Walter Kaufmann. Translated by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New York: Random House.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. 1987 [1883–85]. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Translated by R. J. Hollingdale. London: Penguin.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. 2001 [1882/1887]. *The Gay Science*. Edited by Bernard Williams. Translated by Josefine Nauckhoff. Poems translated by Adrian Del Caro. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. 2004 [1888/1979]. *Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is*. Translated by R. J. Hollingdale. Introduction by Michael Tanner. London: Penguin Books.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. 2012 [1886]. *Beyond Good and Evil*. Translated by Helen Zimmern. Luton: AUK Classics.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. 2020 [1882/1901]. *God Is Dead, God Remains Dead, and We Have Killed Him*. Translated by R. Kevin Hill and Michael A. Scarpitti. London: Penguin Classics.
- Norris, Christopher. 1997. *Against Relativism: Philosophy of Science, Deconstruction and Critical Theory*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Nowotny, Helga. 1992. 'Time and Social Theory: Towards a Social Theory of Time'. *Time & Society* 1 (3): 421–454. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0961463X92001003006>.
- Nowotny, Helga. 1994 [1989]. *Time: The Modern and Postmodern Experience*. Translated by Neville Plaipe. Cambridge: Polity.
- Noys, Benjamin. 2014. *Malign Velocities: Accelerationism and Capitalism*. Winchester: Zero Books.
- O'Carroll, Aileen. 2008. 'Fuzzy Holes and Intangible Time: Time in a Knowledge Industry'. *Time & Society* 17 (2–3): 179–193. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0961463X08093421>.
- O'Rand, Angela, and Robert A. Ellis. 1974. 'Social Class and Social Time Perspective'. *Social Forces* 53 (1): 53–62. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2576837>.
- Osrecki, Fran. 2011. *Die Diagnosegesellschaft: Zeitdiagnostik zwischen Soziologie und medialer Popularität*. Bielefeld: Transcript.

- Outhwaite, William. 1987. 'Laws and Explanation in Sociology'. In *Classic Disputes in Sociology*, edited by R. J. Anderson, J. A. Hughes, and W. W. Sharrock, 157–183. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Outhwaite, William. 1998. 'Naturalisms and Antinaturalisms'. In *Knowing the Social World*, edited by Tim May and Malcolm Williams, 22–36. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Outhwaite, William. 2006. *The Future of Society*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Owen, David S. 2002. *Between Reason and History: Habermas and the Idea of Progress*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Patton, Paul. 2004. 'Postmodernism: Philosophical Aspects'. *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*: 11872–11877.
- Petit, Jean-François. 2005. *Penser après les postmodernes*. Paris: Buchet-Chastel.
- Petrenko, V. F. 2011. 'Constructivism as New Paradigm in Human Sciences'. *Voprosy Filosofii* 6: 75–81.
- Pieters, Jürgen. 2000. 'New Historicism: Postmodern Historiography between Narrativism and Heterology'. *History & Theory* 39 (1): 21–38. <https://doi.org/10.1111/0018-2656.00111>.
- Pinker, Steven. 2002. *The Blank Slate. The Modern Denial of Human Nature*. London: Allen Lane.
- Pinker, Steven. 2011. *The Better Angels of Our Nature. A History of Violence and Humanity*. London: Penguin.
- Pinker, Steven. 2018. *Enlightenment Now. The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism and Progress*. London: Allen Lane.
- Pinker, Steven. 2021. *Rationality: What It Is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters*. London: Allen Lane.
- Popper, Karl. 2002 [1957]. *The Poverty of Historicism*. 2nd Edition. London: Routledge.
- Poster, Mark. 1989. *Critical Theory and Poststructuralism: In Search of a Context*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Prosser, Simon. 2007. 'Could We Experience the Passage of Time?' *Ratio* 20 (1): 75–90. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2007.00348.x>.
- Prosser, Simon. 2012. 'Why Does Time Seem to Pass?' *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 85 (1): 92–116. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00445.x>.
- Prosser, Simon. 2016. *Experiencing Time*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Quiniou, Yvon. 1996. 'Des classes à l'Idéologie : déterminisme, matérialisme et émancipation chez P. Bourdieu'. *Actuel Marx* 20 (2): Deuxième Semestre: 117–134. <https://doi.org/10.3917/amx.020.0117>.
- Ricoeur, Paul. 1984 [1983]. *Time and Narrative. Volume 1*. Translated by Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Ricoeur, Paul. 1985 [1984]. *Time and Narrative. Volume 2*. Translated by Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Ricoeur, Paul. 1988 [1985]. *Time and Narrative. Volume 3*. Translated by Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Robertson, Roland. 1995. 'Glocalization: Time–Space and Homogeneity–Heterogeneity'. In *Global Modernities*, edited by Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash, and Roland Robertson, 25–44. London: SAGE.
- Roden, David. 2015. *Posthuman Life: Philosophy at the Edge of the Human*. London: Routledge.
- Rorty, Richard. 1998. *Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers*. Volume 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rosa, Hartmut. 2010. *Alienation and Acceleration. Towards a Critical Theory of Late-Modern Temporality*. Malmö: NSU Press.
- Rosa, Hartmut. 2015 [2005]. *Social Acceleration. A New Theory of Modernity*. Translated by Jonathan Trejo-Mathys. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Rosa, Hartmut. 2019 [2016]. *Resonance: A Sociology of Our Relationship to the World*. Translated by James C. Wagner. Cambridge: Polity.
- Rosa, Hartmut. 2020 [2018]. *The Uncontrollability of the World*. Translated by James C. Wagner. Cambridge: Polity.
- Rosa, Hartmut, Klaus Dörre, and Stephan Lessenich. 2017. 'Appropriation, Activation and Acceleration: The Escalatory Logics of Capitalist Modernity and the Crises of Dynamic Stabilization'. *Theory, Culture & Society* 34 (1): 53–73. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276416657600>.
- Rosa, Hartmut, and William E. Scheuerman, eds. 2009. *High-Speed Society: Social Acceleration, Power, and Modernity*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Rovelli, Carlo. 2016 [2014]. *Reality Is Not What It Seems*. London: Allen Lane.
- Rovelli, Carlo. 2018 [2017]. *The Order of Time*. Translated by Erica Segre and Simon Carnell. London: Penguin.
- Sapolsky, Robert M. 2023. *Determined: A Science of Life Without Free Will*. New York: Penguin.
- Schäfer, Wolf. 1983. *Finalization in Science: The Social Orientation of Scientific Progress*. Dordrecht: Reidel.
- Searle, John R. 1995. *The Construction of Social Reality*. New York: Free Press.
- Seebaß, Gottfried, and Raimo Tuomela, eds. 1985. *Social Action*. Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Seidman, Steven, and David G. Wagner, eds. 1992. *Postmodernism and Social Theory: The Debate over General Theory*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
- Seligman, Martin E. P., Peter Railton, Roy F. Baumeister, and Chandra Sripada. 2016. *Homo Prospectus*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Selin, Cynthia. 2008. 'The Sociology of the Future: Tracing Stories of Technology and Time'. *Sociology Compass* 2 (6): 1878–1895. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9020.2008.00147.x>.

- Serres, Michel. 2019 [2001]. *Hominescence*. Translated by Randolph Burks. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
- Shaviro, Steven. 2015. *No Speed Limit: Three Essays on Accelerationism*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Shaw, P. D. 1971. 'Popper, Historicism, and the Remaking of Society'. *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 1 (2): 299–308. <https://doi.org/10.1177/004839317100100210>.
- Shotter, John. 1997. 'The Social Construction of Our Inner Selves'. *Journal of Constructionist Psychology* 10 (1): 7–24. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10720539708404609>.
- Smart, Barry. 1996. 'Postmodern Social Theory'. In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Theory*, edited by Bryan S. Turner, 447–480. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Smolin, Lee. 2013. *Time Reborn: From the Crisis in Physics to the Future of the Universe*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
- Smolin, Lee. 2015. 'Temporal Naturalism'. *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics* 52: 86–102. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2015.03.005>.
- Smolin, Lee. 2019. *Einstein's Unfinished Revolution: The Search for What Lies Beyond the Quantum*. New York: Penguin.
- Solomon, Scott. 2016. *Future Humans: Inside the Science of Our Continuing Evolution*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Sorokin, Pitirim Aleksandrovich. 1943. *Sociocultural Causality, Space, Time. A Study of Referential Principles of Sociology and Social Science*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Srnicek, Nick, and Alex Williams. 2016 [2015]. *Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work*. Revised and Updated Edition. London: Verso.
- Stiegler, Bernard. 1998 [1994]. *Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus*. Translated by Richard Beardsworth and George Collins. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Stiegler, Bernard. 2008 [1996]. *Technics and Time, 2: Disorientation*. Translated by Stephen F. Barker. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Stiegler, Bernard. 2011 [2001]. *Technics and Time, 3: Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise*. Translated by Stephen F. Barker. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Strydom, Piet. 2017. 'The Sociocultural Self-Creation of a Natural Category: Social-Theoretical Reflections on Human Agency under the Temporal Conditions of the Anthropocene'. *European Journal of Social Theory* 20 (1): 61–79. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1368431016643330>.
- Strydom, Piet. 2023. 'The Critical Theory of Society: From Its Young-Hegelian Core to Its Key Concept of Possibility'. *European Journal of Social Theory* 26 (2): 153–179. <https://doi.org/10.1177/13684310221130914>.
- Susen, Simon. 2007. *The Foundations of the Social: Between Critical Theory and Reflexive Sociology*. Oxford: Bardwell Press.
- Susen, Simon. 2011. 'Kritische Gesellschaftstheorie or kritische Gesellschaftspraxis? Robin Celikates, Kritik als soziale Praxis. Gesellschaftliche Selbstverständigung und kritische Theorie (Frankfurt am Main, Campus Verlag, 2009)'. *Archives Européennes de Sociologie / European Journal of Sociology* 52 (3): 447–463. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003975611000488>.
- Susen, Simon. 2012. "'Open Marxism" against and beyond the "Great Enclosure"? Reflections on How (Not) to Crack Capitalism'. *Journal of Classical Sociology* 12 (2): 281–331. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1468795X12443547>.
- Susen, Simon, ed. 2013a. *Bourdieu and Language*. Special Issue of *Social Epistemology* 27 (3–4): 195–393.
- Susen, Simon. 2013b. 'Bourdiesian Reflections on Language: Unavoidable Conditions of the Real Speech Situation'. *Social Epistemology* 27 (3–4): 199–246. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2013.818733>.
- Susen, Simon. 2013c. 'A Reply to My Critics: The Critical Spirit of Bourdieusian Language'. *Social Epistemology* 27 (3–4): 323–393. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2013.824646>.
- Susen, Simon. 2013d. 'Comments on Patrick Baert and Filipe Carreira da Silva's *Social Theory in the Twentieth Century and Beyond* – Towards a "Hermeneutics-Inspired Pragmatism"?'. *Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory* 14 (1): 80–101. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1600910X.2012.690772>.
- Susen, Simon. 2014. 'Luc Boltanski and His Critics: An Afterword'. In *The Spirit of Luc Boltanski: Essays on the 'Pragmatic Sociology of Critique'*, edited by Simon Susen and Bryan S. Turner, 613–801. London: Anthem Press.
- Susen, Simon. 2015. *The 'Postmodern Turn' in the Social Sciences*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Susen, Simon. 2016a. *Pierre Bourdieu et la distinction sociale. Un essai philosophique*. Oxford: Peter Lang.
- Susen, Simon. 2016b. 'Scattered Remarks on the Concept of Engagement: A Socio-Philosophical Approach'. *Philosophy and Society* 27 (2): 459–463. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2784199>.
- Susen, Simon. 2016c. 'Reconstructing the Self: A Goffmanian Perspective'. In *Reconstructing Social Theory, History and Practice*, Book Series: *Current Perspectives in Social Theory*, edited by Harry F. Dahms and Eric R. Lybeck, 111–143. Volume 35. Bingley: Emerald.
- Susen, Simon. 2017a. 'Hermeneutic Bourdieu'. In *Bourdiesian Prospects*, edited by Lisa Adkins, Caragh Brosnan, and Steven Threadgold, 132–159. London: Routledge.
- Susen, Simon. 2017b. 'Between Crisis and Critique: The Fragile Foundations of Social Life à la Rodrigo Cordero'. *Distinktion: Journal of Social Theory* 18 (1): 95–124. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1600910X.2017.1302354>.
- Susen, Simon. 2018a. 'The Seductive Force of "Noumenal Power": A New Path (or Impasse) for Critical Theory?'. *Journal of Political Power* 11 (1): 4–45. <https://doi.org/10.1080/2158379X.2017.1362734>.

- Susen, Simon. 2018b. 'Language'. In *The Wiley Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social Theory*. Volume III, edited by Bryan S. Turner, Chang Kyung-Sup, Cynthia F. Epstein, Peter Kivisto, William Outhwaite, and J. Michael Ryan, 1278–1290. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.
- Susen, Simon. 2020a. *Sociology in the Twenty-First Century: Key Trends, Debates, and Challenges*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Susen, Simon. 2020b. 'The Resonance of Resonance: Critical Theory as a Sociology of World-Relations?' *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 33 (3): 309–344. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10767-019-9313-6>.
- Susen, Simon. 2020c. 'Intimations of Humanity and the Case for a Philosophical Sociology'. *Journal of Political Power* 13 (1): 123–160. <https://doi.org/10.1080/2158379X.2019.1701822>.
- Susen, Simon. 2020d. 'No Escape from the Technosystem?' *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 46 (6): 734–782. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453719866239>.
- Susen, Simon. 2021. 'Contemporary Social Theory'. In *An Introduction to Sociology*, edited by Karim Murji, Sarah Neal, and John Solomos, 121–141. London: SAGE.
- Susen, Simon. 2021 [2014]. 'The Place of Space in Social and Cultural Theory'. In *Routledge Handbook of Social and Cultural Theory*, edited by Anthony Elliott, 341–366. 2nd Edition. London: Routledge.
- Susen, Simon. 2022a. 'The Case for a Critical Hermeneutics: From the Understanding of Power to the Power of Understanding'. In *Hans-Herbert Kögler's Critical Hermeneutics*, edited by Ľubomír Dunaj and Kurt C. M. Mertel, 7–69. London: Bloomsbury.
- Susen, Simon. 2022b. 'Critical Remarks on Existence Theory: Between Existentialism and Phenomenology'. *Journal of Classical Sociology* 22 (1): 49–84. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1468795X211051514>.
- Susen, Simon. 2022c. 'Between Forms of Life and Immanent Criticism: Towards a New Critical Theory?' *Journal of Political Power* 15 (2): 279–336. <https://doi.org/10.1080/2158379X.2022.2055279>.
- Susen, Simon. 2022d. 'Reflections on the (Post-)Human Condition: Towards New Forms of Engagement with the World?' *Social Epistemology* 36 (1): 63–94. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2021.1893859>.
- Susen, Simon. 2023. 'The End of Big Theory? A Rejoinder to Strand'. *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective* 12 (11): 54–73.
- Susen, Simon. 2024. *Humanity and Uncontrollability: Reflections on Hartmut Rosa's Critical Theory*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Susen, Simon. 2025 [2024]. 'Rosas vier Säulen der Resonanz: Affizierung, Selbstwirksamkeit, Anverwandlung und Unverfügbarkeit'. Translated by Stephan Elkins (and revised by Simon Susen). In *Resonanz und Kritik: Perspektiven auf eine Soziologie der Weltbeziehungen*, edited by Bettina Hollstein and Jörg Oberthür, 40–49. Berlin: Suhrkamp.
- Susen, Simon. 2025a. 'Knowledge and Human Interests: Epistemology as Social Theory?' In *The Elgar Companion to Habermas*, edited by William Outhwaite and Larry Ray, 90–139. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Susen, Simon. 2025b. 'Habermas and the Tasks of Contemporary Philosophy'. In *Habermas and the Transformations of Critical Theory: Faces of Critique*, edited by Amirhosein Khandizaji and James J. Chriss, 87–197. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Susen, Simon, and Marc Ortman. 2024. 'Das Ende der großen Theorien: Simon Susen im Gespräch mit Marc Ortman'. *Soziopolis: Gesellschaft beobachten*. <https://www.sozipolis.de/das-ende-der-grossen-theorien.html>.
- Szerszynski, Bronislaw. 2017. 'The Anthropocene Monument: On Relating Geological and Human Time'. *European Journal of Social Theory* 20 (1): 111–131. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1368431016666087>.
- Tabboni, Simonetta. 2001. 'The Idea of Social Time in Norbert Elias'. *Time & Society* 10 (1): 5–27. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0961463X01010001001>.
- Tallis, Raymond. 2017. *Of Time and Lamentation: Reflections on Transience*. Newcastle upon Tyne: Agenda Publishing.
- Tamm, Marek, and Laurent Olivier, eds. 2019. *Rethinking Historical Time: New Approaches to Presentism*. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
- Tilley, Nicholas. 1982. 'Popper, Historicism and Emergence'. *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 12 (1): 59–67. <https://doi.org/10.1177/004839318201200104>.
- Tilley, Nicholas. 1984. 'Periodization, Holism and Historicism: A Reply to Jacobs'. *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 14 (3): 393–395. <https://doi.org/10.1177/004839318401400309>.
- Torres, Felipe. 2016. 'A Secular Acceleration: Theological Foundations of the Sociological Concept "Social Acceleration"'. *Time & Society* 25 (3): 429–449. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0961463X15622395>.
- Torres, Felipe. 2022. *Temporal Regimes: Materiality, Politics, Technology*. London: Routledge.
- Torres, Felipe. 2024. 'Historical Time and Acceleration. A Constitutive Bond'. *International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity* 12 (1): 27–48. <https://doi.org/10.1163/22130624-20230012>.
- Torres, Felipe, and Alexis Gros. 2022. 'Slowing Down Society? Theoretical Reflections on Social Deceleration in Pandemic Times (and Beyond)'. *Kronoscope* 22 (1): 3–29. <https://doi.org/10.1163/15685241-20221505>.
- Triandis, Harry C. 1996. 'The Psychological Measurement of Cultural Syndromes'. *The American Psychologist* 51 (4): 407–415. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.51.4.407>.

- Tugendhat, Ernst. 1985. 'Habermas on Communicative Action'. In *Social Action*, edited by Gottfried Seebaß and Raimo Tuomela, 179–186. Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Turchin, Peter. 2023. *End Times: Elites, Counter-Elites, and the Path of Political Disintegration*. New York: Penguin Press.
- Turetzky, Philip. 1998. *Time*. London: Routledge.
- Turner, Bryan S. 2006. *Vulnerability and Human Rights*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Turner, Bryan S. 2016. 'Ritual, Belief and Habituation: Religion and Religions from the Axial Age to the Anthropocene'. *European Journal of Social Theory* 20 (1): 132–145. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1368431016645355>.
- Unger, Roberto Mangabeira, and Lee Smolin. 2021. *The Singular Universe and the Reality of Time: A Proposal in Natural Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Urry, John. 1985. 'Social Relations, Space and Time'. In *Social Relations and Spatial Structures*, edited by Derek Gregory and John Urry, 20–48. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Varela, Charles R. 1999. 'Determinism and the Recovery of Human Agency: The Embodying of Persons'. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour* 29 (4): 385–402. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5914.00109>.
- Veeser, H. Aram, ed. 1989. *The New Historicism*. London: Routledge.
- Vostal, Filip. 2014. 'Towards a Social Theory of Acceleration: Time, Modernity, Critique'. *Revue Européenne des Sciences Sociales* 52 (2): 235–249. <https://doi.org/10.4000/ress.2893>.
- Wagner, Peter. 2010. 'Critique and Crisis Reconsidered: Reflections on Luc Boltanski's *De la critique* (Paris: Gallimard, 2009)'. *Archives Européennes de Sociologie / European Journal of Sociology* 51 (3): 473–478. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003975610000342>.
- Wajcman, Judy. 2015. *Pressed for Time: The Acceleration of Life in Digital Capitalism*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Wajcman, Judy, and Nigel Dodd, eds. 2016. *The Sociology of Speed: Digital, Organizational, and Social Temporalities*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Warf, Barney. 2008. *Time-Space Compression: Historical Geographies*. London: Routledge.
- Weber, Max. 1978 [1922]. *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. Edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Weiß, Johannes. 1985. 'Max Weber's Distinction between Means-End Rationality and Value-Rationality – Rationale, Scope, Difficulties'. In *Social Action*, edited by Gottfried Seebaß and Raimo Tuomela, 207–223. Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Wellmer, Albrecht. 1985. *Zur Dialektik von Moderne und Postmoderne: Vernunftkritik nach Adorno*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Welsch, Wolfgang. 2002. *Unsere postmoderne Moderne*. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
- Wennemann, Daryl J. 2013. *Posthuman Personhood*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
- Wenzel, Matthias, Hannes Krämer, Jochen Koch, and Andreas Reckwitz. 2020. 'Future and Organization Studies: On the Rediscovery of a Problematic Temporal Category in Organizations'. *Organization Studies* 41 (10): 1441–1455. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840620912977>.
- Williams, Clifford. 1980. *Free Will and Determinism: A Dialogue*. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
- Wilterdink, Nico A. 2002. 'The Sociogenesis of Postmodernism'. *Archives Européennes de Sociologie / European Journal of Sociology* 43 (2): 190–216. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003975602001078>.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 2009 [1953]. *Philosophical Investigations*. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte, Revised 4th Edition, by P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Wittmann, Marc. 2016 [2012]. *Felt Time: The Psychology of How We Perceive Time*. Translated by Erik Butler. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Wolfe, Cary. 2010. *What Is Posthumanism?* Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Zerubavel, Eviatar. 1982. 'The Standardization of Time: A Sociohistorical Perspective'. *The American Journal of Sociology* 88 (1): 1–23. <https://doi.org/10.1086/227631>.
- Zielonka, Jan. 2023. *The Lost Future: And How to Reclaim It*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Žižek, Slavoj. 2011 [2010]. *Living in the End Times*. Revised Updated Edition. London: Verso.