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Framing of nationalism in climate reporting in the Global South: The case of India

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Abstract

Climate change and nationalism have traditionally been viewed as opposing forces because nationalism is often territorially bounded, while climate change transcends borders. This study examines the intersection of climate reporting and three forms of nationalism – that is, economic, resource and green nationalism – in India by analysing the coverage of Conference of the Parties (COP) summits in *The Hindu* and *The Times of India* before and after the Narendra Modi government's rise in 2014. The findings show a shift from economic nationalism to green nationalism during the Modi regime, supported by the frames of leadership, sustainability and cultural superiority. Simultaneously, resource nationalism remained strong, highlighting the tensions emerging out of development priorities and climate action.

Keywords

climate change, COP, Global South, green nationalism, nationalism

Introduction

The Stockholm Convention of 1972 was a landmark event as it laid out the framework for global cooperation and negotiations on environmental issues (Chasek and Downie, 2020). Apart from being remembered as the first global platform for cooperation on

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climate change, the meeting marked the genesis of the ‘environment vs development’ debate (Rao, 2022) in global forums. In her ‘ground-breaking’ speech, Indira Gandhi, the third prime minister of India and the only head of state who attended the Stockholm Convention, linked environmental conservation with poverty reduction (United Nations, 2022): ‘We do not wish to impoverish the environment any further and yet we cannot for a moment forget the grim poverty of large numbers of people’ (Mathiesen, 2014: 6). Gandhi was one of the last leaders in independent India, who, despite several limitations, brought in the views of naturalists, scientists and activists in the development strategy of India (Rangarajan, 2006). However, over the years, the development trajectory followed by India was influenced by nationalism, shaped by anti-colonialism, the need for poverty alleviation and, more importantly, by the political ideologies of the ruling government. In the process, while acknowledging the importance of ‘sustainable development’, development policies largely focused on economic goals, with the environment, along with its intersection with social justice, taking a back seat (Sharma, 2021: 118).

The relationship between climate change and nationalism, a key consideration in development strategies, is complex, although it is often studied through the lens of binaries such as good or bad and Left or Right (Conversi, 2020; Kashwan et al., 2023). Moreover, nationalism itself has various shades, oscillating between Left-liberalism and far-Right (Conversi and Friis Hau, 2021; Halikiopoulou et al., 2012). It often cuts across ideological divisions, as both Left and Right parties associate themselves with nationalism in different capacities (Halikiopoulou et al., 2012). In the Right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) era, nationalism took the shape of Hindu nationalism, rooted in the principles of cultural hegemony and singular religious identity (Balasubramanian, 2022). This led to a multidimensional relationship between environment and development, which may also be termed authoritarian environmentalism, a non-participatory approach to policymaking in the face of environmental challenges (Gilley, 2012). At the same time, India, which represents nearly 18 per cent of the global population (Worldometer, 2025), has emerged as an important voice in climate talks, playing a lead role in making global discussions on climate talks inclusive, a departure from the Western-dominated narrative (Rizzo and Pouget-Abadie, 2023). India increasingly presents itself as a spokesperson for developing countries, representing the developmental needs of the Global South and seeking to assert itself as a regional hegemon (Hall, 2017). In global climate talks, climate justice has been central to India’s global position at Conference of the Parties (COP) summits (Dubash, 2013; Shukla et al., 2026). Climate justice is defined as the claims for greater equality in both the distribution of climate change impacts and among the participants in negotiations on suitable responses (Dreher and Voyer, 2015; Schmidt, 2012: 10). However, domestically, government policies do not account for the impacts of development and climate change on marginalised communities, thereby creating structures of injustice (Chu and Michael, 2019). India’s position in the global climate talks presents a complex narrative that promotes both clean energy and fossil fuels. Under the regime of the BJP prime minister, Narendra Modi, while acknowledging the need for emissions targets, coal has been ‘sacralized’, heightening sentiments of resource nationalism (Conversi, 2020; Thaker and Leiserowitz, 2014: 630).

In recent years, India has faced some of the biggest natural disasters in the world. In 2022, India experienced the hottest summer in 122 years (World Weather Attribution,

2022). India's drought-prone area increased by 57 per cent between 1997 and 2022, affecting two-thirds of the country (Rai, 2022). India's rural areas still experience an average power outage of 90 minutes per day, highlighting the gap between energy demand and production (Khanna, 2024). India's focus on renewables does not negate the importance of fossil fuels, it complements them. Coal accounts for nearly 80 per cent of power generation in India (Chandrasekhar, 2024). At the same time, India has invested heavily in renewable energy, ranking fourth in its installed capacity (Press Information Bureau, 2025).

Journalism as an institution is an outcome of social and political power structures (Kumar, 2023). This structural embeddedness of journalism in power relations is especially visible in the Indian context. In India, the government has significant influence in the media through regulation, advertisement and political pressure (Rajagopal, 2017). A report by the International Press Institute (IPI) in 2024 on climate coverage points out that editors of prominent media outlets in India are not supportive of investigative pieces on the environment. Journalists are reluctant to report on environmental violations by two of the biggest and most influential conglomerates in India, Adani Enterprise and Reliance Industries, as they control not only major media houses but also own several polluting industries, including coal mines and real estate (Trionfi and Salzenstein, 2024). State-influenced nationalism has a profound impact on the media, to the extent that divergence from popular nationalistic sentiments leads to media targeting and trials (Ansari and Riaz, 2020). For the media, presenting climate narratives that take into account the development needs of India, while detaching itself from politically-motivated nationalism and corporate interests, remains a key challenge (Gambhir and Kumar, 2013; Sahana, 2025).

Notably, the Indian media has traditionally adopted a nationalistic approach to climate reporting (Kalyango et al., 2017). However, the scholarship on how the heightened nationalism post-2014 influenced climate reporting remains sparse. By comparing pre- and post-2014 coverage of COP summits in Indian newspapers, this study fills a crucial research gap by providing a longitudinal analysis of how nationalism is reflected in the English print media. By zooming into the manifestation of nationalism in its different forms, including economic, resource and green nationalism in newspapers in India, this study presents granular perspectives on the intersection of media, climate reporting and nationalism in India.

Nationalism and climate change

In the study of nationalism, Anderson's notion of 'imagined community' (1983) has had a profound impact on the social sciences, especially media studies (Castelló, 2016). It provides a framework for construing a sense of belonging as an important factor in the development of a state (Munro, 2022). The concept of 'imagined community' is similar to the idea of 'collective consciousness', as defined by sociologist Emile Durkheim, who viewed societal consciousness as the 'totality of beliefs and sentiments' common to an average member of society (Durkheim, 1893: 168). The existing literature on the relationship between nationalism and climate change suggests that the imagined collective consciousness of nations centres around the issues of economic interests, resource

extraction and the need to protect the environment as part of a country's territorial boundaries (see Banerjee, 2012; Conversi, 2020; Elden, 2014; Peluso, 2012). The emerging literature on the connection between nationalism and climate change suggests various forms of nationalism compatible with climate action or climate-friendly policies, with overlapping forms shaping climate policies (see Anwar and Sam, 2012; Conversi, 2020). Conversi (2020) identifies two ways in which nationalism relates to climate change: resource and green nationalism. While the former often perpetuates climate denialism through its alignment with corporate interests and extra-activist agendas, the latter fosters greater environmental consciousness and mobilisation around the threats posed by climate change. Anwar and Sam (2012), in the context of climate change in Singapore, find that economic nationalism and climate-friendly policies can go hand in hand with policies designed to benefit the economy and reduce emissions. In Latin America, the mining of lithium as a raw material for renewable energy constitutes a form of 'green resource nationalism' when governments assert control over lithium as a resource in the race for renewable energy dominance (Rizky, 2025). Zuk et al., in the context of climate change, conceptualise 'energy nationalism' as part of resource nationalism, whereby nation-states use natural resources to assert their national identity, strike bargains on the international stage and pursue geopolitical gains (Žuk et al., 2024). The different forms of nationalism associated with climate-related issues broadly converge into three dominant forms of nationalism: green, resource and economic.

Resource nationalism refers to harnessing and controlling natural resources within national boundaries (Conversi, 2020). It is defined as 'various forms of state involvement in the extraction, processing, and sale of natural resources' (Pryke, 2017: 474). Examples of this form of nationalism include Saudi Arabia's dependence on oil and gas exploration to assert its economic prowess in global markets, and the UK's exploration of natural gas in the North Sea for energy security (Conversi, 2020). In developing countries, resource nationalism is often an outcome of anti-colonialism, achieved through energy self-sufficiency and resistance to global oligarchy in energy markets (Itagaki, 1973). In media frames, therefore, resource nationalism entails the justification of the use of fossil fuels, either as a resource that a country has a rightful claim to explore or as an activity conducive to its economic interests (Childs, 2016).

Green nationalism, a concoction of nationalism and environmentalism, was first proposed by Conversi (2020) in the context of substate nationalist parties in Europe that favoured pro-environmental policies as a means to restore identity and national boundaries. Lieven (2021) sees green nationalism as a force that can be harnessed to address climate change, dealt collectively with a sense of belongingness. For example, in Finland, the media narrative of national pride or superiority associated with living close to nature and preserving it has given rise to green nationalism, which in turn has imbued protecting the environment with a sense of civic duty (Ridanpää, 2022). In the Euro-American West, green nationalism has spread through grass-roots movements along a bottom-up approach, leading to the formation of green parties that shape climate change policy agendas (Cochran, 2023; Nakai, 2025). However, the relationship between green nationalism and climate change is among the most complex areas of study, as the motivation to protect the environment can shape the actions taken to defend it. In the context of China, Arantes (2024) points out that the motivation for green nationalism stems from the idea

of having a reimagined community, ‘an ecological civilisation’ that adopts climate-friendly developmental policies as a means to protect its territories from climate change (p. 66). For extreme-Right parties, green nationalism is often linked to anti-immigration and xenophobic policies, stressing radical ways of protecting and preserving the territorial environment, termed by scholars such as Macklin (2022) as eco-fascism. In the UAE, Koch (2025) observes that in the years leading up to the COP28 talks in Dubai, Emirati political elites used semiotics, including graffiti and events, to promote authoritative green nationalism. It projected the Emirati identity as responsible leadership despite the federation’s continuous reliance on fossil fuels. Koch (2025) points out that authoritative regimes can use narratives of sustainability to protect territorial boundaries from environmental challenges by leveraging their control over institutions and media.

India’s green nationalism policies qualify as authoritative, with Modi’s nationalism often termed ‘jingoistic’ and ‘muscular’, a form that requires active citizen participation in a broader project of ‘nation-building’ rooted in Hinduism (Kumar, 2024: 889). The nationalism-led development under Modi does not necessarily contradict environmentalism but presents a complex relationship of contradictions and affirmations. Climate-friendly policies like focusing on renewable energy and pollution free rivers go hand in hand with neoliberal strands that offer corporations a free hand to extract natural resources at the cost of the rights of the local communities (Choudhary, 2022; Rathore, 2024; Sharma, 2023). Pathak (2022) argues that environmentalism is a space for soft and apolitical Hindutva by linking sustainability to the tenets of Hinduism. Modi has utilised the Hindu nationalist narratives of a sustainable lifestyle for his political campaigns and international image-making through global initiatives like the launch of the International Solar Alliance in 2015 for building a transnational solar energy grid, the Climate Action Plan in COP22 for renewable energy production and the launch of Mission Lifestyle for Environment (Mission LiFe), a global mission for a sustainable lifestyle (Sharma, 2025).

Economic nationalism is an ideology that calls for bolstering and protecting the national economy in the world markets (Pryke, 2012). Resource and economic nationalism are related concepts, as both favour the exploitation of natural resources for economic prosperity; resource nationalism can be conceived as a dimension of economic nationalism (Žuk et al., 2024). Resource nationalism asserts state control and authority to exploit natural resources, while economic nationalism refers to a broad ideological orientation that prioritises local development needs in the context of global markets, which may include harnessing natural resources for optimal growth (Pryke, 2012). Nakano (2004) suggests that, as a theory, economic nationalism helps connect economic and political power, with economic development seen as amplifying a nation’s social imagery. Economic nationalism and climate action are not necessarily opposed, as ecologically grounded policies create stable economic structures, as seen in Singapore (Anwar and Sam, 2012; Pickel, 2022). In India, neoliberalism and economic nationalism coexist, with corporate expansion seen as an act of pride and the success of Indian economic nationalism (Mazumdar, 2022). While protecting the interests of the national economy, climate change presents contradictions, such as abiding by emission levels set outside national borders (Rajamani, 2017). In postcolonial societies, the external imposition of norms that impede economic self-reliance is seen as a continuation of historical inequalities between the Global North and South (Bresser-Pereira, 2018).

Climate frames and Indian media

Over the years, several studies have analysed how the Indian media frames climate issues (Billett, 2010; Broadbent et al., 2016; Engesser and Brüggemann, 2016; Kenix, 2025; Lück et al., 2018; Schmidt, 2012; Schmidt and Schäfer, 2015). Even before the Modi government came into power, climate coverage by the Indian media had been traditionally influenced by nationalism, which is in sync with the journalistic culture of developing countries of giving precedence to social intervention and national development over detached journalism (Kalyango et al., 2017). Billett (2010), in his study of climate coverage in the Indian media, points out that while Indian journalists conceive and report on climate change from a scientific point of view, their reporting is strongly influenced by nationalism and postcolonialism, with a focus on the North-South divide in climate coverage. The Worlds of Journalism Study (2018) also notes that journalists in India place high importance on supporting national development (Ramaprasad, 2016). In another study of the media coverage of COP summits in five countries, Brazil, Germany, India, South Africa and the US, Lück et al. found that the Indian media often portrayed India as a victim of climate change while highlighting the success stories of combating climate change through sustainable solutions (Lück et al., 2018). In their study of cognitive frames of climate journalists in five nations, Germany, India, Switzerland, the UK and the US, Engesser and Brüggemann (2016) noted that while Indians are reluctant to talk about the role of emerging countries in climate change, their counterparts in Anglo-Saxon countries rarely question the Western consumerist culture. At the same time, Indian journalists showed the strongest support for the sustainability frame. Examining nationalism from the prism of non-information in the top five carbon-emitting countries, Kenix (2025) found that while Indian newspapers were more likely to highlight the impact of climate change, they were less likely to mention the cause in their reporting.

Schmidt (2012), in the analysis of Indian media's coverage of climate justice, notes that it focuses on the scientific understanding and seriousness of climate change. However, it advocates justice by linking it to equitable carbon space and holding developed nations accountable for historical emissions. In a comparative study of framing climate justice in India, Germany and the US, Schmidt and Schäfer (2015) note that the Indian media construct climate justice primarily through the lenses of development rights and national sovereignty, with a strong emphasis on economic growth. In a framing analysis of newspaper reports on climate change across 17 countries, using 131 frames, Broadbent et al. concluded that countries where newspapers accepted climate science, they engaged with global politics and supported mitigation policies (Broadbent et al., 2016). Their mediated analysis revealed that India showed strong domestic ecological concern while adopting an inward approach that entailed not taking the responsibility for the ecological effects of emissions beyond its borders.

Media scholars have approached the framing of climate change in media from various perspectives, including journalists' perspectives and key issues that emerge in stories. For example, Engesser and Brüggemann (2016) studied frames based on the perception of climate journalists as 'industrialised countries' economic policies', 'sustainability', 'technological optimism', 'emerging economies', 'responsibility' and 'global ecological discourse' (p. 9). O'Neill et al. (2015) identified issue-specific frames including 'settled

science” ‘political or ideological struggle’, ‘role of science’, ‘uncertain science’, ‘disaster’, ‘security’, ‘morality and ethics’, ‘health’, ‘economic’, and ‘opportunity’ (2). In their analysis of climate change reporting in Dutch and French media, Dirikx and Gelders (2010) used generic frames like the five outlined by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000), including ‘conflict’, ‘human interest’, ‘responsibility’, ‘morality’ and ‘economic consequences’ to find out the dominant frames (pp. 740–741). Media frames in climate change are shaped by ‘values and ideological cultures’ in a society (Carvalho and Burgess, 2005: 1467). Overall, there are marked differences in the way media in different countries cover the issues of climate change, especially in the Global North and South. As the focus of this paper is on investigating frames related to nationalism in media coverage, frames that represent a nationalistic point of view are most pertinent to this study. Drawing on framing theory and the existing literature on nationalism and climate coverage by the Indian media, this study examines how the Indian media constructs and presents narratives surrounding international climate negotiations through the following RQs.

RQ1. What are the dominant nationalism frames in the Indian media coverage of climate talks?

RQ2. What are the dominant climate frames in the Indian media coverage of climate talks?

RQ3. Which types of nationalism relate to which types of climate talk frames?

Methodology

We analysed the coverage of climate-related issues during COP summits by two prominent news dailies in India, *The Times of India (TOI)* and *The Hindu*, through framing analysis. The two publications were selected because of their diverse geographical reach and political leanings. According to the India Readership Survey 2019,¹ among English dailies, *TOI* had the highest average issue readership (defined as the number of people who had read or looked at an average issue of a publication) of 5.82 million and *The Hindu* had the third highest average issue readership of 1.87 million (The Times of India, 2019). While *TOI* is considered a Right-centre-leaning news outlet, with wide circulation in North India, *The Hindu* is considered a Left-centre-leaning newspaper, with wide circulation in South India (Helios, 2020). The political leanings of the newspapers were ascertained through assessments by Media Bias/Fact Check (MBFC), an independent website that promotes media awareness (Media Bias, 2021).

Since the study is focused on how the newspapers cover climate talks, we selected COP summits every alternate year since 2007. With 2007 as the starting point, we could analyse the coverage of four COP summits before and four after Modi’s ascendancy in 2014. The time frame helped us to understand how the coverage has changed after the Modi government came to power in 2014. The sample included reports from the years 2007, 2009, 2011 and 2013 (representing the pre-Modi period), as well as reports from 2015, 2019 and 2022 (representing the post-Modi period). As no COP summit took place in 2020, news items from 2022 were included in the sample to represent the post-2020

period. To search the articles, we used Factiva with the keywords 'COP (the number of the summit)' and 'climate change' for both *TOI* and *The Hindu*. In the searches before 2010, the phrase 'climate summit' was added to the search as the search words 'COP' or 'climate change' did not result in inclusive results related to COP summits. The time frame of the story selection was from 1 day prior to the summit to 1 day after the summit. This was done keeping in mind the time zone difference in reporting and to include possible pre- or post-summit reporting.

We arrived at a sample size of 216, with 108 articles each for *TOI* and *The Hindu*. At first, a framing analysis was conducted based on the two broad themes of climate change and nationalism. The study identified frames both deductively and inductively by looking at the text or wording of the reports and drawing frames from existing studies in the field of mediated climate change studies and nationalism, respectively. For inductive frames, initially, the news articles were read to familiarise us with common patterns, content and themes. In the deductive part, the frames of 'blame' and 'sustainability' were drawn from studies by Engesser and Brüggemann (2016), Lück et al. (2018) and Billett (2010). Overall, based on the literature review and a pre-reading of the sample, we identified the following frames: blame/opposition, sustainability, climate disaster/damage, leadership, cultural superiority and climate justice. Under the nationalism frame, we studied three forms of nationalism: resource, economic and green as well as stories without any nationalism frames. Next, the articles were tested for both the climate and nationalism frames. The coding was based on the central idea conveyed by the opening paragraphs and headline. For example, if the first paragraph said, 'PM Modi said that the world urgently needs a paradigm shift from "mindless and destructive consumption to mindful and deliberate utilization" of resources and appealed to every nation to undertake a collective journey to deal with the global problem', the article was coded under the category of 'sustainability'. One article could be coded for more than one climate, nationalism frame or both frames. For both nationalism and climate frames, when no frames emerged, we tagged them as 'no frames'.

Initially, we did a year-wise frequency analysis of the frames for each newspaper to arrive at the aggregate percentage of each frame year-wise as well as newspaper-wise. The analysis was done on the following counts: overall, before 2014, after 2014, overall newspaper-wise, newspaper-wise before 2014 and newspaper-wise after 2014. This way, we could ascertain how the frequency of climate and nationalism frames changed before and after the ascendancy of the Modi government. Next, we did a two-sample t-test to ascertain if the frequency of frames saw a significant rise or fall from the pre- to post-Modi period. While nationalism and climate frames are initially analysed independently for methodological clarity, their relationship is studied through bivariate analysis and chi-square test before and after the Modi regime's ascendancy to power.

Two separate coders coded 10 per cent of the sample stories, with Cohen's Kappa ($k=0.59$), which is considered moderate agreement. Finally, two separate coders coded another 10 per cent of the final sample stories, with an average Cohen's Kappa ($k=0.60$), which is considered moderate agreement. A total agreement was found for the variables of leadership ($k=1$) and blame ($k=1$). Excellent agreement was observed in the case of the following variables: resource nationalism ($k=0.78$), and apocalypse/ environmental damage ($k=0.90$).

Table 1. Frequency of nationalism frames, before and after 2014.

Nationalism Frames	Before 2014 (%)	After 2014 (%)
Economic nationalism	50.5	46.20
Resource nationalism	0	18.8
Green nationalism	3	17.90
No nationalism	46.5	47.90

N = 216.

Table 2. Publication-wise frequency of nationalism frames, before and after 2014.

Nationalism Frames	Before 2014: <i>TOI</i> (%)	After 2014: <i>TOI</i> (%)	Before 2014: <i>The Hindu</i> (%)	After 2014: <i>The Hindu</i> (%)
Economic nationalism	40.4	57.4	59.6	33.9
Resource nationalism	0	23	0	14.3
Green nationalism	4.3	16.4	1.9	19.6
No nationalism	55.3	41	38.5	55.4

N = 216.

Results

Dominant nationalism frames

Economic nationalism dominated the nationalism frames both before and after 2014, although after 2014, its frequency reduced slightly from 50 per cent to 46 per cent, which is not a statistically significant reduction.² The media outlets used rhetorical language to present India's position in the global climate talks, highlighting the divide between the developed and developing nations over the issue of historical emissions. Post-2014, we noticed that the newspapers, especially *TOI*, increasingly used dichotomous words such as 'fair' and 'unfair' as they presented India's official viewpoints in strongly worded headlines. 'India, China force rich nations to agree on pre-2020 actions' (Mohan, 2017). Another headline read, 'India, China urge rich world to fulfill their commitment to green fund, not dodge it' (Mohan, 2015a) (Tables 1 and 2).

The frequency of resource nationalism increased from nil ($M=0$, $SD=0$, $N=99$) before 2014 to 18 per cent after 2014 ($M=0.19$, $SD=0.38$, $N=117$); $t(116.00)=5.18$, $p<0.001$, indicating a significant increase. The absence of resource nationalism prior to 2014 can be partly attributed to the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015, leading to stories focused on emission limits. Prior to 2014, we noticed that economic nationalism was linked to the overall development narrative without direct reference to coal or fossil fuels in the opening paragraphs. The media reports primarily highlighted the failure of the developed countries to meet their Kyoto Protocol emission targets, the global inequalities in policymaking or inadequate support to the developing countries on account of historical emissions by the developed nations. For example, prior to 2014, we saw

stories with headlines like, ‘I am less optimistic than before about the Durban climate meet: Natarajan’ (Sethi, 2011) or ‘India tells rich nations not to treat climate issues for providing market to domestic companies (Mohan, 2013). Post-2014, we noticed that the frames of economic and resource nationalism converged as economic interests were tied to the use of fossil fuels for development by the media. A subsequent bivariate analysis also shows a strong correlation between economic and resource nationalism under the Modi regime (see Tables 3 and 4). Post-2014, we find the use of a more assertive language in the media, with direct reference to coal and fossil fuels, connecting economic interests with the right to use fossil fuels. Examples include headlines like ‘Don’t make coal lone villain, India asserts at climate meet’ (Mohan, 2022a) and ‘India thwarts coal heat at Paris meet’ (Mohan, 2015b).

The frequency of green nationalism increased from 3 per cent before 2014 ($M=0.03$, $SD=0.17$, $N=99$) to 18 per cent after 2014 ($M=0.17$, $SD=0.38$, $N=117$); $t(166)=-3.54$, $p<0.05$. Green nationalism, expressed through a language that conveys national pride or leading by example, found its way into media narratives texts such as ‘Making a strong pitch for sustainable lifestyle as a tool to combat climate change, India on Tuesday said the world urgently needs a paradigm shift from “mindless and destructive consumption”’ (Mohan, 2022b). The use of an assertive language with phrases like ‘strong pitch’ and homogenising Indian lifestyle undermined the diversity of Indian culture and lifestyle, leading to an authoritarian form of green nationalism. The media coverage around COP22 particularly emphasised green nationalism, as India was projected as a global leader through initiatives like Mission LiFE and the International Solar Alliance. The Indian government’s Mission LiFE advocates individual- and community-driven behavioural changes to promote a sustainable lifestyle, framing environmentalism as a civic duty (Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, Government of India (MoEFCC), n.d.). All forms of nationalism, except for economic nationalism in *The Hindu*, increased significantly in both newspapers. In *The Hindu*, the frequency of economic nationalism reduced significantly from 60 per cent in the pre-Modi period to 34 per cent in the Modi era.³ In summary, while the percentage of stories without nationalism frames remained almost the same, there was a clear shift like mediated nationalist discourse, with economic nationalism declining marginally and new forms such as green and resource nationalism becoming more prominent after 2014.

Climate and nationalism frames cannot be studied in isolation. For example, the climate frame of ‘blame’ reinforces economic and resource nationalism, as India is positioned in media narratives as a victim of historical emissions by the Global North and a defender of its developmental rights and the use of fossil fuels. Similarly, the climate frames of ‘sustainability’ and ‘cultural superiority’ constitute green nationalism when expressed as matters of national pride, authoritatively positioning a homogenous lifestyle, disregarding diversity, as an exemplary model of climate conscious behaviour. In the next section, we study the climate frames that dominated media reports during the COP summits under review.

Table 3. Correlation of nationalism and climate frames before 2014.

	Resource nationalism	Green nationalism	No nationalism	Economic nationalism	Blame/ Opposition	Sustainability	Climate disaster/ Environment damage	Cultural superiority	Leadership	Climate justice
<i>Resource nationalism</i>										
Pearson correlation	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a	a
Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
N	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99
<i>Green nationalism</i>										
Pearson correlation	a	1	-0.165	-0.179	-0.206*	0.115	-0.052	0.571**	-0.094	-0.018
Sig. (2-tailed)	.	0.103	0.077	0.041	0.257	0.606	<0.001	0.352	0.861	
N	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99
<i>No nationalism</i>										
Pearson correlation	a	-0.165	1	-0.941**	-0.389**	0.275*	0.021	-0.094	-0.352**	0.108
Sig. (2-tailed)	.	0.103	.	<0.001	<0.001	0.006	0.836	0.354	<0.001	0.285
N	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99
<i>Economic nationalism</i>										
Pearson correlation	a	-0.179	-0.941**	1	0.458**	-0.313**	-0.003	-0.102	0.383**	-0.102
Sig. (2-tailed)	.	0.077	<0.001	.	0.001	0.002	0.977	0.315	<0.001	0.315
N	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99
<i>Blame/Opposition</i>										
Pearson correlation	a	-0.206*	-0.389**	0.458**	1	-0.370**	0.030	-0.118	0.262**	-0.118
Sig. (2-tailed)	.	0.041	<0.001	<0.001	.	<0.001	0.772	0.246	0.009	0.246
N	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99
<i>Sustainability</i>										
Pearson correlation	a	0.115	0.275*	-0.313**	-0.370**	1	-0.110	-0.038	-0.124	-0.038
Sig. (2-tailed)	.	0.257	0.006	0.002	<0.001	.	0.278	0.712	0.221	0.712
N	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99
<i>Climate disaster/Environment damage</i>										
Pearson correlation	a	-0.052	0.021	-0.003	0.030	-0.110	1	-0.030	-0.158	-0.030
Sig. (2-tailed)	.	0.606	0.836	0.977	0.772	0.278	.	0.769	0.117	0.769
N	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99

(continued)

Table 3. (continued)

	Resource nationalism	Green nationalism	No nationalism	Economic nationalism	Blame/ Opposition	Sustainability	Climate disaster/ Environment damage	Cultural superiority	Leadership	Climate justice
<i>Cultural superiority</i>										
Pearson Correlation	a	0.571**	-0.094	-0.102	-0.118	-0.038	-0.030	1	-0.054	-0.010
Sig. (2-tailed)	.	<0.001	0.354	0.315	0.246	0.712	0.769	.	0.596	0.920
N	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99
<i>Leadership</i>										
Pearson Correlation	a	-0.094	-0.352**	0.383**	0.262**	-0.124	-0.158	-0.054	1	-0.054
Sig. (2-tailed)	.	0.352	<0.001	<0.001	0.009	0.221	0.117	0.596	.	0.596
N	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99
<i>Climate justice</i>										
Pearson correlation	a	-0.018	0.108	-0.102	-0.118	-0.038	-0.030	-0.010	-0.054	1
Sig. (2-tailed)	.	0.861	0.285	0.315	0.246	0.712	0.769	0.920	0.596	.
N	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99

aCannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant.

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 4. Correlation of nationalism and climate frames after 2014.

	Resource nationalism	Green nationalism	No nationalism	Economic nationalism	Blame/ Opposition	Sustainability	Climate disaster/ Environment damage	Cultural superiority	Leadership	Climate Justice
<i>Resource nationalism</i>										
Pearson correlation	1	0.117	-0.417**	0.432**	0.190*	0.078	-0.082	0.160	0.390**	-0.044
Sig. (2-tailed)	0.209	<0.001	<0.001	0.040	0.403	0.378	0.086	<0.001	0.640	
N	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117
<i>Green nationalism</i>										
Pearson correlation	0.117	1	-0.404**	0.192*	0.084	0.419**	0.082	0.582**	0.461**	-0.038
Sig. (2-tailed)	0.209	<0.001	0.038	0.371	<0.001	0.377	<0.001	<0.001	0.681	
N	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117
<i>No nationalism</i>										
Pearson correlation	-0.417**	-0.404**	1	-0.887**	-0.537**	-0.143	0.182*	-0.353**	-0.571**	0.147
Sig. (2-tailed)	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	0.123	0.050	<0.001	<0.001	0.113	
N	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117
<i>Economic nationalism</i>										
Pearson correlation	0.432**	0.192*	-0.887**	1	0.597**	0.025	-0.230*	0.240**	0.500**	-0.183*
Sig. (2-tailed)	<0.001	0.038	<0.001	<0.001	0.793	0.013	0.009	<0.001	0.048	
N	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117
<i>Blame/Opposition</i>										
Pearson correlation	0.190*	0.084	-0.537**	0.597**	1	-0.188*	-0.231*	0.136	0.383**	-0.152
Sig. (2-tailed)	0.040	0.371	<0.001	<0.001	0.042	0.012	0.143	<0.001	0.102	
N	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117
<i>Sustainability</i>										
Pearson correlation	0.078	0.419**	-0.143	0.025	-0.188*	1	-0.052	0.094	0.235*	-0.001
Sig. (2-tailed)	0.403	<0.001	0.123	0.793	0.042	0.579	0.312	0.011	0.995	
N	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117

(continued)

Table 4. (continued)

	Resource nationalism	Green nationalism	No nationalism	Economic nationalism	Blame/ Opposition	Sustainability	Climate disaster/ Environment damage	Cultural superiority	Leadership	Climate Justice
<i>Climate disaster/Environment damage</i>										
Pearson correlation	-0.082	0.082	0.182*	-0.230*	-0.231*	-0.052	I	0.025	-0.102	0.306**
Sig. (2-tailed)	0.378	0.377	0.050	0.013	0.012	0.579	0.791	0.275	<0.001	
N	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117
<i>Cultural superiority</i>										
Pearson correlation	0.160	0.582**	-0.353**	0.240**	0.136	0.094	0.025	I	0.381**	-0.100
Sig. (2-tailed)	0.086	<0.001	<0.001	0.009	0.143	0.312	0.791	<0.001	0.284	
N	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117
<i>Leadership</i>										
Pearson correlation	0.390**	0.461**	-0.571**	0.500**	0.383**	0.235*	-0.102	0.381**	I	-0.161
Sig. (2-tailed)	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	0.011	0.275	<0.001	0.082	
N	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117
<i>Climate justice</i>										
Pearson correlation	-0.044	-0.038	0.147	-0.183*	-0.152	-0.001	0.306**	-0.100	-0.161	I
Sig. (2-tailed)	0.640	0.681	0.113	0.048	0.102	0.995	<0.001	0.284	0.082	
N	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117	117

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 5. Frequency of climate frames, before & after 2014.

Climate frames	Before 2014 (%)	After 2014 (%)
Blame game/opposition/victory	58	53
Sustainability	12	38
Apocalypse/environmental damage	8	26
Cultural superiority	1	12
Leadership	22	42
Climate justice	1	7
None of the frames	11	3
Total	100	100

N = 216.

Dominant climate frames in the Indian media coverage of climate talks

‘Blame’ was found to be the dominant climate frame both before and after 2014. Nevertheless, there was a slight decrease in its frequency during the post-Modi period, dropping from 58 per cent to 53 per cent, which is not a statistically significant drop.⁴ In narratives related to India’s global negotiations, words like ‘fight’ or ‘blame’ were frequently employed to express strong opposition to developed nations. An example: ‘In 2021, India fought to ensure that the text adopted at the last COP in Glasgow altered “phase out” to “phase down” with regard to the use of coal’ (Koshy, 2022). Moreover, as noted in the frames of nationalism, the tone of blame became more aggressive in the Modi era (Tables 5 and 6).

The frame of ‘leadership’ saw an increase in frequency after 2014, rising from approximately 22 per cent ($M=0.23$, $SD=0.43$) to 42 per cent ($M=0.41$, $SD=0.49$), which is a significant increase, $t(214)=3.16$, $p<0.01$. Post-2014, media narratives portrayed Modi as a world leader and a formidable voice for developing countries while justifying the use of fossil fuels, often linking India’s energy security to climate negotiations. An example: ‘Energy security of developing countries can’t be ignored: Delhi sets the tone for negotiations’. (Mohan, 2022c). This is in sync with the rise of resource nationalism after 2014, as noted in the earlier section. The frames of sustainability increased from nearly 12 per cent before 2014 ($M=0.12$, $SD=0.33$) to 38 per cent after 2014 ($M=0.38$, $SD=0.49$); $t(204)=4.57$, $p<0.001$, a highly statistically significant increase.

‘Cultural superiority’ emerged as a notable frame, increasing from 1 per cent before 2014 ($M=0.01$, $SD=0.1$) to 12 per cent after 2014 ($M=0.12$, $SD=0.33$); $t(141.42)=3.45$, $p<0.001$, which is a highly statistically significant increase. Post-2014, media narratives frequently linked the Indian way of life to climate change mitigation, as seen in headlines like ‘Indians eat less meat, do yoga, are eco-friendly are eco-friendly’ (Ananthakrishnan, 2015).

The frame of climate disasters increased from about 8 per cent before 2014 ($M=0.08$, $SD=0.28$) to 20 per cent after 2014 ($M=0.26$, $SD=0.43$); $t(197.85)=3.58$, $p<0.001$, a statistically highly significant increase, mostly due to the increased frequency of climate-related disasters. Notably, the frames of climate justice remained marginal, 1 per cent

Table 6. Publication-wise frequency of climate frames, before and after 2014.

Climate frames	TOI B 2014	TOI A 2014	The Hindu B 2014	The Hindu A 2014
Blame	60	62	56	43
Sustainability	13	39	11	36
Leadership	32	54	13	27
Climate disaster	4	29	11	21
Cultural superiority	2	15	0	9
Climate justice	0	10	2	4
None of the frames	19	5	4	0

Note. B: before; A: after; N=216.

before Modi, rising to 7 per cent after Modi. If we analyse the frames in the pre-2014 and post-2014 periods, we find a statistically significant increase in climate justice framing ($\chi^2(1, N=216)=4.57, p=0.033$).

In summary, there was a higher frequency of the ‘leadership’, ‘sustainability’ and ‘cultural superiority’ frames post-2014, a trend also reflected in individual newspapers after 2014.⁵ Modi’s leadership was often portrayed through the promotion of a sustainable lifestyle rooted in Indian traditions. The frame of ‘blame’ remains dominant even though it saw a marginal reduction in the period after 2014. The frames of ‘climate disasters’ and ‘climate justice’ has also been significant in the Modi era, partly attributable to the rising number of climate-related disasters.

The relationship between the ‘nationalism’ and ‘climate’ frames

Our analysis reveals a consistent relationship between climate and nationalism across both pre-2014 and post-2014 periods. Economic nationalism was associated with the frames of ‘blame’ and ‘leadership’, indicating that economic nationalism was tied to political leadership or state-driven narratives that held developed nations responsible for climate change and the resultant unequal burden of its impact. While, before 2014, resource nationalism was a non-existent frame, in the Modi era, we find that resource and economic nationalisms intersect as economic interests get tied to the issue of fossil fuels ($\phi=0.432, \chi^2(1, N=117)=21.84, p<0.001$). As noticed in the frequency analysis, the mediated discourse on climate issues shifted from the stance of apathy of the developed nations for the developing nations to a more decisive position that advocated the use of fossil fuels in developing nations, with headlines such as ‘Don’t make coal lone villain, India asserts at climate meet’ (Mohan, 2022d).

Post-2014, we observe a significant association between the frames of ‘resource nationalism’ and ‘leadership’, suggesting a top-down approach related to fossil fuel usage in the mediated discourse ($\phi=0.390, \chi^2(1, N=52)=17.75, p<0.001$). Examples include headlines such as ‘Modi pitches for peace and unrestricted energy supply’ (Parashar, 2022). Another finding suggests that No Nationalism was negatively correlated with the frames of ‘blame’ for both before and after 2014, suggesting that when an article avoided a nationalist frame, it was also less likely to include

a tone of blame, which remained strongly associated with the frame of ‘economic nationalism’.

We find that after 2014, a robust relationship emerges between the frames of ‘green nationalism’ and ‘cultural superiority’ ($\phi=0.582$, $\chi^2(1, N=117)=39.685$, $p<0.001$), ‘leadership’ ($\phi=0.461$, $\chi^2(1, N=117)=24.83$, $p<0.001$) and ‘sustainability’ ($\phi=0.419$, $\chi^2(1, N=117)=20.94$, $p<0.001$). Examples of this kind of framing can be seen in the text, ‘Making a strong pitch for lifestyle changes, India stressed. . .’ (Mohan, 2022b: para. 1), or phrases like ‘Modi said he was confident that when the G20 meets in the “holy land of Buddha and Gandhi” next year. . .’ (Parashar, 2022: para. 3).

While sustainable development became a state- or national-identity narrative, it was associated with a notion of cultural pride rooted in Indian traditions, driven by Modi’s top-down approach to climate policies. Notably, in both periods, before and after 2014, the climate frames of apocalypse and climate justice did not figure in any mediated nationalistic discourse, suggesting media reporting separated political or national identity debates from environmental damage or issues of climate justice within the national boundaries. Post-2014, we find a significant association between the frames of climate justice and climate disasters ($\phi=0.306$, $\chi^2(1, N=117)=10.97$, $p<0.001$). The presence of the ‘climate justice’ frame only in concurrence with climate disasters suggests that the ground-level impact of climate-related issues figures only in relation to climate disasters, while being absent from the policy-level discourses in the global climate talks.

Discussion

In our analysis of the media coverage of COP summits before and after Modi’s ascendancy to power, we find subtle shifts in the nationalistic discourse. Our mediated analysis highlights that the tensions arising from normatively incompatible ideals of resource and green nationalism are obscured by state actors seeking both economic and environmental credibility (Koch and Perreault, 2019). Notably, green nationalism is often studied in the context of smaller political parties and substate actors in Europe across the Left and Right political ideologies (Schaller and Carius, 2019). With India as a case study, this study highlights how culturally embedded nationalistic notions lead to the emergence of green nationalism. While this is not a comparative study of green nationalism in the Global North and South, it hints at some traits of the nature and evolution of green nationalism in India, a major geopolitical player in the Global South. In India, green nationalism is partly influenced by the existing postcolonial narrative in the media and a pro-development journalistic culture, reinforced by the strong influence of the state on the media. Unlike Europe, where substate actors and smaller political parties propagate green nationalism, in India, green nationalism is driven by the biggest political party led by Modi and his persona, projected in the media as a towering leader on the world stage, rather than an organised movement. Our study shows that post-2014, the frames of green nationalism are shaped by the rhetoric of a unified cultural identity as Hinduism. It portrays a sustainable lifestyle as a natural extension of the Hindu traditions. This narrative tends to homogenise diverse cultural and religious traditions, including variations within Hindu practices, by linking sustainability to an idealised vision of ancient Indian culture. Modi’s climate initiatives, most prominently the International Solar Alliance and the

Lifestyle for Environment (LiFE) mission, have become artefacts of India's ancient cultural wisdom and civilisational continuity. Within this framing, Modi is positioned as a strong and decisive leader. The findings are consistent with scholarship on green nationalism by Sharma (2025) that points out that in climate politics under the Hindu nationalist leadership of Modi, cultural and political notions are blurred. Green nationalism, as manifested in the media reports in India, exhibits characteristics that are common to non-Western contexts, including China and the UAE, which use climate action as a means to assert territorial control (see Gilley, 2012; Koch, 2025), suggesting scope for future comparative study. In India, green nationalism is seen more as a means to assert political control by linking identity politics with climate action.

Green nationalism, as manifested on the international stage, is closely linked to the climate frames of leadership. Earlier, India was seen more as a collaborator than a leader in the collective representation of the Global South in climate talks, while other developing countries often referred to as 'like-minded nations'. Additionally, prior to 2014, we could also find references to the viewpoints of African and island countries in media reports. Post-2014, the coverage of global climate talks has become more India-centric. During the Modi era, we find India is increasingly projected as a persuasive voice and leader of the Global South. The variation mirrors a broader pattern in how the Indian media has portrayed Modi and his predecessor, Dr Manmohan Singh. Whereas Modi has been projected as a strong, assertive figure as 'Brand Modi' (Erdem, 2019), Singh was consistently framed as a weak and reticent leader (Denyer, 2012).

Analysing the shifts in different forms of nationalisms as reflected in the media, we find subtle changes in the nature of the mediated nationalistic discourse. In particular, we find economic nationalism giving way to resource nationalism. The Indian media's broadly nationalist orientation in climate reporting, as documented in earlier scholarship (Billett, 2010; Engesser and Brüggemann, 2016; Kenix, 2025), is corroborated by this study. However, post-2014, nationalism as reflected in COP reporting by the media turned more assertive and aligned to the government's policy orientation. Earlier, economic nationalism focused on the apathy of the developed nations in ignoring the demands of the developing ones and the need for broader economic development. However, post-2014, economic development was linked to the need and right to use fossil fuels, blurring economic and resource nationalisms. This insistent position could also be due to the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015, and ensuing disagreement over emission targets. Interestingly, in *The Hindu*, which is largely seen as Left-oriented and critical of the government, while the frequency of frames of economic nationalism declined during the Modi era, we saw the rise of resource and green nationalism.

A nuanced difference in the Indian media reporting on COP relates to the nature of 'blame' as a climate frame. Post-2014, the Indian media's framing of climate talks moved from a tone of despair to a more pivotal and partisan form of reporting. For example, prior to 2014, words like 'urged', 'accepted' and 'requested' were more common in reports relating to India's position in climate talks. In the Modi era, stronger phrases like 'fight', 'assert', 'demand' and 'flag' are being used to represent India's position. This lexical shift reflects a discursive repositioning of India from a reactive participant to an assertive leader. Therefore, the antagonistic language used to represent India's position

in climate negotiations is consistent with, or can be seen as an extension of, the broader media construction of 'Brand Modi'.

This study also highlights how climate justice is placed in the Indian media. Rather than featuring as a sustained framework for understanding climate change, climate justice appears sporadically in media reporting. This finding also resonates with a study by Kenix (2025) on media coverage of climate change across countries, including India, which asserts that 'noninformation' is a form of nationalism by omitting responsibility while focusing on the effects of climate change. The absence of climate justice as a topic of discussion at the local level, including how rural or deprived communities are disproportionately affected by climate change within India, indicates that the notion of climate justice is based on different yardsticks at the local and international levels in the media. While at the international level, the talk of climate finance and loss and damage are inherently linked to the disproportionate impact of historic emissions on developing nations, the same debate involving the privileged and deprived communities within India fails to address the differentiated impact of climate change across communities.

In understanding the intersection of mediated climate discourse and nationalism in India, Anderson's (1983) notion of imagined community and Durkheim's (1893) notion of collective consciousness still provide a useful framework to understand how the vision of India as united not merely by political boundaries or developmental aspirations, but by a shared cultural and ecological heritage, constructs dominant climate narratives. The change of the media discourse on climate reporting post-2014 is akin to a move to a more defined nationalism from 'banal nationalism', a term coined by Michael Billig in the book, *Banal Nationalism*, in 1995, which talks about everyday, unnoticed acts of nationalism that are ingrained in society. For Billig, the everyday use of words like 'we' and 'us' in the media represented in the mundane reference to the collective consciousness of a nation, supporting the government's action (Vico, 2018). Nationalism, particularly the need for economic development, largely influenced the Indian media and was born out of the anti-colonial movement during the Indian freedom struggle in the late 19th century. However, even so, the Indian media always had the autonomy to criticise the government (see Thussu and Kumar, 2023). The rising population burden in India, the need to lift millions out of poverty and postcolonialism rooted in historic inequalities in wealth distribution among nations contribute to a journalistic culture in India that has historically prioritised economic development (see Hanitzsch et al., 2011; Ramaprasad, 2016). Almost 129 million Indians still live in extreme poverty (Rajora, 2024). However, the strong currents of partisanship, corporatization and press censorship under Modi have substantially curtailed the ability of the media to remain critical while being an actor in development discourse.

Conclusion

This study examined how nationalism frames evolved in Indian English-language newspaper coverage of COP summits across the pre- and post-2014 periods. The central finding is that the Modi era marked a qualitative shift in mediated climate discourse towards emerging forms of nationalism. First, this study shows the rise of green nationalism, foregrounded in cultural and leadership frames. Modi's climate initiatives, most

prominently the International Solar Alliance and the Lifestyle for Environment (LiFE) mission, were mediated as artefacts of India's ancient civilisational wisdom. Second, economic nationalism, the long-dominant nationalism frame across both periods, underwent a transformation in character rather than simply in frequency. Before 2014, economic nationalism in media coverage was largely reactionary. India's position in climate talks was framed in terms of postcolonial discourse, foregrounding the apathy of developed nations towards the developmental needs of the Global South. After 2014, economic nationalism became more assertive, directly invoking India's right to fossil fuel use as a developmental necessity. This shift also produced a convergence of economic and resource nationalism in the post-2014 period, as the defence of coal and fossil fuels became intertwined with broader arguments about national economic sovereignty. Third, the treatment of climate justice in media coverage reveals a significant structural gap. Despite its centrality to India's formal international position in climate talks, climate justice as a frame that highlighted the climatic vulnerability of the marginalised remained marginal throughout the study period, appearing almost exclusively in the context of natural disasters. The appearance of climate justice frames only during natural calamities further points to a gap in climate reporting in India. Other findings of this study include uncritical reproduction of the positions of political leadership in the media during the COP summits.

However, the study comes with limitations. While the two organisations in our sample, *The Times of India* and *The Hindu*, represent diversity in views, the analysis of more newspapers could have led to a better understanding of how nationalism is reflected in climate reporting in India. Another limitation of this study is the moderate intercoder reliability in coding articles.

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Notes

1. The Indian Readership Survey has been suspended since 2020.
2. An independent sample test was conducted to compare the frequency of economic nationalism between the pre-2014 ($M=0.51$, $SD=0.50$, $N=99$) and post-2014 ($M=0.46$, $SD=0.50$, $N=117$) periods. The analysis indicated that the difference in frequency was not statistically significant, $t(207.87)=-0.64$, $p=0.526$.
3. At *The Hindu*, the frequency of economic nationalism reduced from about 60 per cent ($M=0.6$, $SD=0.5$) before 2014 to nearly 34 per cent ($M=0.34$, $SD=0.48$) after Modi came to power, with $t(104.71)=2.74$, $p<0.01$, indicating a significant decrease. Resource nationalism

- rose from nil ($M=0$, $SD=0$) to 14 per cent ($M=0.14$, $SD=0.35$), with $t(55)=-2.92$, $p<0.01$, indicating a significant increase. Green nationalism increased from 2 per cent ($M=0.02$, $SD=0.14$) to 20 per cent ($M=0.20$, $SD=0.40$), $t(68.86)=-3.02$, $p<0.01$, indicating a significant increase. At *TOI*, economic nationalism increased from about 40 per cent ($M=0.4$, $SD=0.5$) in the pre-Modi era to 57 per cent ($M=0.57$, $SD=0.49$), with $t(99.34)=-1.76$, $p=0.82$, indicating a not significant increase. Resource nationalism increased from nil ($M=0$, $SD=0$) to 23 per cent ($M=0.23$, $SD=0.42$), with $t(60)=-3.71$, $p<0.01$, indicating a significant rise. Green nationalism increased from 4 per cent ($M=0.04$, $SD=0.21$) to 16 per cent ($M=0.16$, $SD=0.37$), with $t(96.60)=-2.01$, $p<0.05$, indicating a significant increase.
4. From 58 percent before 2014 ($M=0.58$, $SD=0.25$) to 53 per cent after 2014 ($M=0.53$, $SD=0.25$; $t(208.72)=0.67$, $p>0.05$), which is not statistically significant.
 5. When examining individual newspapers, in *TOI*, the 'leadership' frame increased significantly from approximately 32 per cent before 2014 ($M=0.32$, $SD=0.22$) to 54 per cent after 2014 ($M=0.54$, $SD=0.25$); $t(106)=2.34$, $p<0.05$. In *The Hindu*, it increased from 14 per cent before 2014 ($M=0.13$, $SD=0.12$) to 29 per cent after 2014 ($M=0.29$, $SD=0.21$), a significant increase ($t(106)=1.93$, $p<0.05$). The 'sustainability' frame also increased significantly in *TOI*, rising from 13 per cent before 2014 ($M=0.13$, $SD=0.11$) to 39 per cent after 2014 ($M=0.39$, $SD=0.24$); $t(106)=3.17$, $p<0.05$. In *The Hindu*, the 'sustainability' frame increased from 11 per cent before 2014 ($M=0.12$, $SD=0.1$) to 36 per cent after 2014 ($M=0.36$, $SD=0.23$), a significant increase ($t(106)=3.03$, $p<0.05$). Finally, in *TOI*, the frame of 'cultural superiority' increased from 2 per cent before 2014 ($M=0.02$, $SD=0.02$) to 15 per cent after 2014 ($M=0.15$, $SD=0.13$), a significant increase ($t(106)=2.28$, $p<0.05$). In *The Hindu*, the frequency of the 'cultural superiority' frame increased significantly from nil ($M=0$, $SD=0$) to 9 per cent ($M=0.09$, $SD=0.09$), another significant increase ($t(106)=2.24$, $p<0.05$).

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