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TITLE OF THESIS : ELITIST IDEAS AND
THE EMERGENCE OF POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY BEFORE PLATO

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ABSTRACT.

The thesis is concerned with the development of elitist ideas before Plato, within the context of the emergence and sophistication of politics as a specialised activity. The significance of the intellectual rather than the strictly historical context is stressed in the introductory Chapter, and Chapters 2 and 3 are concerned with elitist ideas in the Homeric poems and in Hesiod and with developments in religious and moral sanctions which resulted from the Archaics' response to political and social pressures. Chapters 4 and 5 are concerned with the contrast between Pindar's anachronistic attempt to identify the Heroic glory attached to the victors in the Games with a divinely sanctioned ruling class, and Aeschylus' concern with the emergence of a civic morality which could hold the balance between the intellectual potential of the most gifted men and the anarchy and stasis which were threatened by the changes brought about by the activities of this elite. Chapters 6 and 7 are devoted to the problems implicit in the emphasis on the distinction of man's own special sphere of activity, in the increasing rationalisation of political relations, and in the sophistication of political thought. All these factors point towards the emergence of a systematic theoretical basis for elitist ideas. It is contended in Chapter 8, through discussion of Thucydides and Euripides, that the necessary stimulus towards this was to be found in the climate of political and moral disillusionment towards the end of, and immediately following, the Peloponnesian War. Plato thus broke away from elitist tradition in formalising the political hierarchy in terms of a moral ideal derived from a belief in the progressive transformation of human nature. In contrast to the earlier sources considered, Plato inverted the relationship of the descriptive and the normative in elitist ideas.

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ELITIST IDEAS AND THE EMERGENCE OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

BEFORE PLATO.

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CHAPTER ONE.
INTRODUCTORY.

1. Scope.

The purpose of this thesis is to consider the development of elitist ideas before Plato and especially to investigate their links with the emergence of political philosophy. Therefore, the context of the enquiry is not directly historical, although where there is an established link between elitist ideas and particular historical events it may often be helpful to discuss these.

In pursuing a study of this nature, the tools and methods of only one specific discipline are in the last resort inadequate. The subject of the thesis is inter-disciplinary in the sense that it moves between the borders of intellectual history, social, economic and political history, literature, philosophy, and to some extent those of political science and sociology. Therefore, in using methods and concepts which have been evolved in connection with a particular discipline, it is sometimes necessary to employ them in an unusual or unconventional way. I have therefore thought it best to devote a part of this introductory chapter to exposition of the methodological framework of the thesis, together with definitions of the meaning which will be attached to the most important of the terms and concepts borrowed from other disciplines. The remainder of the chapter will be concerned with isolation of the most important problems underlying an attempt to relate pre-Platonic elitist ideas to political philosophy and with the discussion of some of the difficulties involved in assessment of the sources to be used.

My interest in approaching this subject has been in examining at greater depth and in greater detail aspects of Greek thought which have tended to become clothed in the mantle of Platonic and Aristotelian studies and which when considered at all in the pre-Platonic period have been largely relegated to a synthesised introduction to political theory. For instance, Barker devotes five pages to "From Homer to Solon" (1), and this consists mainly of a summary of Solon's legislation and the interpretation of the doctrine of moderation in terms of the Aristotelian Mean. The development of thought from Hesiod to Heraclitus occupies one chapter in Sinclair (2), most of it potted biography and summary.

Forrest's study of the emergence of Greek democracy (3) is mainly concerned with the effect of events on institutions, and hardly discusses political ideas before the 5th century, while in a very different kind of work Cassirer (4) devotes eight pages to "Logos and mythos in early Greek Philosophy" as a prelude to the discussion of Plato's REPUBLIC. Professor Adkin's study, (5) though it overlaps in part with the subject of this thesis, is concerned with early Greek values primarily as a means of approaching Plato and Aristotle, and he lays great stress on moral responsibility, a concept which is of relative unimportance as far as the scope of this thesis is concerned.

It is a primary contention of this thesis that, although politics may not have become a sophisticated and formal activity until the 5th century, there exists in the discussions of the early writers a concern with problems of hierarchy, order and political values to such an extent that definite, though largely unsystematic, developments in political philosophy can be traced. Sometimes this concern is not expressed in conventionally political language, but it is clear that as far as can be judged from the extant evidence, the literary medium is the primary one for exposition of political ideas and elitist imperatives in the early period.

For this reason, therefore, as well as the difficulty in assessing the relation of values to facts, I shall not be primarily concerned with the 'facts' of the economic situation, the social structure and so on, but rather with the relation between a particular thinker's view of such situations (whether valid or fallacious) and the elitist imperatives he adopts.

To this extent, then, the methodology of the thesis is functional in a rather special way. Professor Momigliano has noted the dangers of a history of ideas which treats in a romantic or idealised way of concepts like 'spirit' and 'nation' (both potential idealogical weapons, as Professor Popper has noted) (6), - "In all these works, concrete situations, economic and juristic relationships, institutions, are left on one side" (7). Professor Momigliano went on to assert that it is through the study of just these relationships that a functional enquiry aims to understand and assess a concept. This can be developed to show how a study such as this one can draw on the ideas formed concerning these concrete relationships and institutions - to consider a particular elitist idea, one has first to take into account its relation to the thinker's view of the particular concrete situation and then its relation to the situation he desires to bring about or preserve.

This is a very different question from seeking to show an idea's direct relation to concrete events - a procedure which, even if it were possible, would have only marginal utility, because it leaves unexplained more important long term influences on the development of ideas.(8) It seems to me that this kind of approach will at the same time avoid the danger of treating ideas as a kind of rarified Hegelian 'realm apart' and yet recognise and take account of the important ways in which the study of ideas differs from that of, for example, institutions. To cite a specific example - I shall discuss in Chapter 8 the relation between Thucydides' belief in the anti-intellectualism of the demos and his political and elitist ideas. For the purpose of this thesis it will not be necessary to try to establish precisely how the Athenian Assembly worked (which would involve the consideration of evidence from many kinds of conflicting sources), but rather to identify Thucydides' own view and to ascertain why he held this opinion and how it relates to other aspects of his thought.

The stress, then, must be on an idea's functional relations. These are of two kinds - the determinant and the consequential. Ideas are consequential in the sense that they may be viewed as consequences of social, political and economic circumstances, and therefore in this sense they are always at least one step behind actual events. One aspect of this consequential function has been elaborated by Professor Galbraith when he posits the role of ideas as essentially conservative - "Ideas are essentially conservative. They yield not to the attack of other ideas but to the massive onslaught of circumstances with which they cannot contend" (9).

In an important sense this is an illuminating view in that it emphasises the potential of ideas as functions of social involvement - 'the conventional wisdom' is the fruit of a desire for intellectual orientation as much as of a desire for economic or social domination. It is also fruitful in that it suggests the way in which ideas can be used by those who wish to maintain the status quo. An extreme of this aspect is explored by Kropotkin (10) - "The history of human thought recalls the swinging of a pendulum which takes centuries to swing. After a long period of slumber comes a moment of awakening. Then thought frees herself from the chains with which those interested - rulers, lawyers, clerics - have carefully enwound her...But the inveterate enemies of thought - the government, the lawgivers and the priest - soon recover from their defeat. By degrees they gather together their

scattered forces and re-model their faith and their code of laws to adapt them to new needs. Then, profiting by the servility of thought and character which they themselves have so effectively cultivated, profiting too, by the momentary disorganisation of society, taking advantage of the laziness of some, the greed of others, the best hopes of many, they softly creep back to their work by first of all taking possession of childhood through education."

But Kropotkin's 'ideas' have an aspect lacking in Galbraith's 'conventional wisdom'. This is the first kind of function mentioned above - the determinant. By determinant I mean the capacity of ideas to break away from environmental influences, and themselves become determinants of change. Of course, when rational criteria are applied (as opposed to Kropotkin's polemic) it is not always easy to distinguish between consequential and determinant functions in a given case - to instance a later problem, how much were the political ideas of John Locke a unique liberating influence, and how much were they determined by the need to maintain and increase the political power of his patron Shaftesbury?

This thesis is particularly concerned with examining the relation between these two functions in a given context, and thus especially with the way in which ideas can become catalysts of change. Thus, if a series of ideas is analysed, it may be possible to infer a rationale of changes which actually occurred or were thought to have occurred in a society. In relation to elitist studies this raises the vital point of congruence between the elitist criteria and the requirements of a situation. Problems may arise when elitist criteria relate to a situation which has ceased to exist, or when a modified situation exists in which the criteria can no longer be fulfilled. Thus can arise what Keith Hopkins has called "status dissonance" (11).

"Status dissonance" means that the status of an elitist group and its values is no longer in balance with the requirements of the actual social or political situation, which has changed from that with which the group and its values were originally in accord. There are then two possibilities. Either the composition of the elite must be changed or the existing elite must adapt itself and its values and re-integrate into the new situation. The consequences of such adaptation and re-integration can be latent as well as manifest. The concept of status dissonance involves both of the two functions of ideas mentioned above and therefore suggests a useful method of approaching

the study of change.

2. Language.

Having set out in general terms the two kinds of functions associated with ideas and distinguished their point of intersection, it remains to set out a language of terms needed in the specific area of elitist ideas and to define these terms in accordance with the two sets of functions. The first group of terms has to do with the general system of the enquiry, the second with the details of classification.

As far as the method of enquiry to be adopted is concerned, it has at once to be recognised that there are considerable problems associated with an attempt to study an idea in this period systematically. These arise from the conflict of two necessities - the first is that of critical objectivity, the second that of clarity. The two are in conflict because clarity requires that certain categories of material to be assessed must be pre-defined, while objectivity requires that the dangers of imposing systematic thought on the Greek subjects must be guarded against. The danger is particularly great because in most of the period under review Greek thought was largely unsystematic.

One useful method of avoiding this clash does, however, suggest itself and may be of some value, arising as it does from the second of the two central motifs which have been attributed to the history of ideas by Lovejoy and others(12). (The first motif was the need for the inter-disciplinary studies, referred to above). The second motif is that of unit ideas, derived from the belief that the proper concern of the history of ideas is not with systems or 'isms' but with the elemental compounds within them, namely unit ideas. If it is accepted that these basic ideas may be limited in number and that the novelty of a system may lie in the novelty of their arrangement rather than in the addition of new requirements, and also that a unit idea may have a migratory history through philosophy, literature, politics and so on, it seems likely that the distinction may be a useful one to apply to the limited field of elitist ideas of the ancient world. Thus the elitist ideal at a given point could be broken down into its components, its 'unit sanctions', and if these were studied in their various relationships at various points and in various sources throughout the period, not only would the difficulty described above be resolved, but the problems of change could be studied without pre-supposing a "Great Chain of Being" style of development.

If the term 'unit sanction' is to be used as the counterpart to unit ideas, it is clear that just as the term 'idea' has two sets of functions, so does the term 'sanction'. In the general field of elitist studies, sanctions are normally divided into physical and non-physical. A division along these lines is obviously inappropriate here (although the idea of force does have important status as a sanction, as will be shown later). A better distinction of relations in this context would be to differentiate along precisely the same lines as was done with the word 'idea' and to distinguish between the consequential and the determinant functions of unit sanctions.

As far as classification of particular thinkers' ideas are concerned, the same method will be followed, and it is in this sense that oppositions like that of the progressive and repressive intellects must be interpreted. The absence in early Greek thought of a systematic theory of progress (pace Edelstein)(13) complicates this latter usage and I shall generally prefer to relate the particular context to the attitude adopted to change rather than progress in the strict sense.

One term which does not clearly derive from this pattern is 'adaptation'. The problems of circulation play a vital part in elitist studies, but in a discussion which is primarily concerned with ideas, the concern is less with circulation in terms of actual social mobility than with circulation in terms of changes, modifications and developments in the patterns formed by the unit sanctions. This draws attention to the fact that this kind of 'circulatory' problem may require adaptation in the existing elite (and its ideas) rather than outright changes in its composition. This has a particularly important role to play in the present study because of the particular circumstances that the Greeks did not normally enjoy a plurality of elites. Adaptation, then, becomes an intensely practical activity involving the opposition to particular moral imperatives of a generalised success ethic. This is in contrast to the normal sociological usage of the term when applied to change in institutions, usually as part of an equilibrium theory (see below and14).

The last two terms of classification to be mentioned here are those which will be used to link the implications of specific elitist ideas with the gradual development of political philosophy. These are 'equilibrium' and 'constraint', terms of which the relation to elitism has been usefully defined by R. Dahrendorff(15) - "Social stratification in the equilibrium approach expresses an objective consensus on the 'functional' importance of social positions; in the constraint approach it comes from the selective application of sanctions and thus expresses

the relationship between social positions and the ruling values". Dahrendorff's distinction, drawn here in general terms will be discussed more fully in terms of specifically Greek themes in section 3 of this chapter.

3. Some Problems.

There are a number of problems underlying the kind of investigation which is being undertaken in this thesis. To develop the implications of each would require a volume in itself, but their main characteristics will be described in this introductory chapter, partly for the sake of clarity in that their significance will not then have to be re-explained when they occur in the main text, but also to emphasise the range of the network underlying the main subject matter of the thesis. There are five main areas of particular interest and relevance. The first three are general in application; the last two relate specifically to the Greek material.

The first problem is the all-embracing one of the relation of the descriptive and the normative in elitist ideas. The problem underlies the attempt to construct a logic of relations for ideas in section 1 of this chapter. It is a primary aim of this study to look behind the polarisation of the two main kinds of elitist doctrine, both of which have their roots in Greek political history. The first, or positive doctrine maintains that influence in states or large organisations is, as a matter of fact, concentrated in the hands of a very small minority. The second, or normative doctrine asserts that the best form of government is that in which power is concentrated in the hands of the 'right minority'. The second doctrine is popularly described as Platonic, the first as Machiavellian, although its intellectual roots may be traced to the speeches in Thucydides and to the Machtpolitik of the amoralists.

The normative elitist doctrine seems to link politics closely with ethics. However, if the meaning to be given to the use of the words 'right minority' is more closely analysed, it is evident that the moral imperative may occupy a rather different position from that which is first indicated. Its criteria may be, not those of the 'philosopher-king' or 'Guardian' type of rule, but rather those of usefulness, viability or expertise in the face of a particular situation or a particular set of circumstances. In such cases the force of the moral imperative may be of a temporary or changing nature.

The first, or positive, doctrine mentioned above - that influence in states or large organisations is, as a matter of fact, concentrated in the hands of a very small minority, is, in its modern usage, fundamentally anti-Aristotelian. It questions Aristotle's framework for the foundations of political science and his scheme of categories of government, which according to this doctrine give way to categories of elites. (16). The application of the doctrine is very different in Greek studies, especially in the pre-democracy. Then, government was necessarily in the hands of a minority, while in addition there was little or no plurality of elites. This means that it is far from helpful to think of the two doctrines as polarised, or even as necessarily contrasting. Aspects of thought derived from each will, therefore, be considered as they arise.

It is no part of the intent of this thesis to try to solve Weber's problem of rationally accounting for the derivation of value from fact. What is important here is to distinguish between the positive and normative functions of elitist ideas and to be clear about the ambiguities of each. It is a central contention of the argument that while Plato's normative doctrine is admittedly unique, its uniqueness lies in the fact that it is based on the concepts of the disinterested ruler and the progressive transformation of human nature, rather than on the fact that these are expressed through moral imperatives. I shall try to indicate in the study of individual thinkers the relation of their moral and political imperatives to their own analyses of the status quo. This presupposes an emotivist approach (along Stevenson's lines) (17) to the derivation of value from fact. That this is in some sense a limited approach is readily admitted. Its suitability lies in the fact that it concentrates attention on the internal relations of the particular ideas without becoming complicated by general theory.

A second major difficulty concerns the degree to which such an approach can handle problems of change (18). In broad terms, acceptance of the status of ideas as functions of social involvement suggests that they must stand in some sort of relation to change. Sometimes this relation is indirect - it can be argued, for example, that a functionalist approach is incapable of coping with problems of change and can merely say what is necessary for the maintenance of a particular type of status quo. However, it can also be justifiably

asserted that definition of functional imperatives can indicate lines of stress and therefore lines of potential change, while in the case of historical studies, definition of functional imperatives can be an important aid to understanding of change. In the field of ideas, of course, one has to make precise distinctions between changes in ideas, and changes in the social or political situation to which they refer. It is also important to distinguish between manifest and latent changes. The main point to be made, however, is that within the terms of the two kinds of functions defined above, changes in ideas can both result from social change, and can themselves point the way to change. The precise relation, therefore, has to be established in each context.

The third, and perhaps the major general problem is that associated with the ambiguity of the word 'power'. This difficulty bedevils social theory in general and elitist studies in particular. An empirical definition involves analysis of the social, political and economic structure of a given society, but tends to ignore the ability of 'power' to control these and its self-perpetrating capabilities. Other forms of analysis tend to stress the latter at the expense of the former. A polarisation of the two approaches is seen in the contrast between equilibrium and constraint theories. In a study of ideas it seems the least complicated approach is to define the particular kind of power in question when the word is used - military power, economic power, for example, and to distinguish between this and the complex usage developed when the idea of power itself attains the status of a sanction. This is the point at which many equilibrium theories seem to collapse - in seeking to exalt harmony at the expense of constraint they omit to concede to constraint any role whatsoever in the process of securing harmony. (19).

This tendency seems most acute in modern theories. However, it does have important implications for the Greek material under review. Here attitudes to the problem are not expressed theoretically. One useful way of isolating them is through the use of imagery relating to violence and strife. It will be an important aspect of the treatment of individual thinkers to indicate the place accorded in their ideas to violence or force and to investigate whether, if these are devalued, they are replaced by any external constraint (such as the role of Zeus in Hesiod, for example). The idea of strife is associated with imagery which relates sometimes to violence, sometimes to change, sometimes to both. It is interesting that there seems

in significant thinkers concerned with what could broadly be called equilibrium theories - examples are Solon and Sophocles - a recognition of the role of force as a final sanction within the terms of an equilibrium framework. This thesis is concerned with the development of political philosophy, and is concerned with social philosophy only where it directly relates to this, but there is a further point of interest in that equilibrium theories in Greek thought do not involve the concept of a general consensus in the modern sense; they only involve a consensus of the politically significant, which brings us back to the absorption of the idea of constraint into other ideas and to the problems of defining what is meant by 'power' and its role in governing the content and arrangement of sanctions.

There is one further specifically Greek expression which is a thread of unity running through the different parts of the thesis. This is the pervading fear of στάσις. It is the peculiarly Greek articulation of the general problem of order which underlies all social and political philosophy. Its usage is complex and sometimes very ambiguous, and would repay further study. There will be no attempt here to explore its implications in any detail, but it is important to distinguish the most important shades of meaning attached to the word. It operates, in fact, on the borders of the imagery relating to strife and violence which was isolated above. It can refer to a faction (by implication formed for seditious purposes) (20), to discord (21), to action perpetrated against another faction (22). In later usage it comes to be opposed to πόλεμος (23). The important point is that it refers to strife between groups within the state rather than between states themselves. It is thus vitally linked with problems of internal good order and is an important element in the motivation and influencing of elitist ideas. In many respects it comes to be the nexus through which the political implications of the imagery associated with violence, strife and change are related to the arrangement of elitist sanctions.

4. <u>The Sources</u>.

Some of the evidence considered will be taken from inscriptions and archaeology. This will, however, be largely of a supporting nature. The bulk of the evidence will be literary in form. This is not merely because the main concern is with the development and modification of ideas. It is also because, at least before the Sophists, poetry was the main medium of communication, which has been preserved, for ethical

and educational imperatives, and for discussion of political and religious ideas. Sometimes poetry plays a directly political role, as in the case of Solon, and to some extent Pindar and Simonides. It is, in any case, through poetry that there takes place the gradual emergence and refinement of more ordered ideas about who should be the rulers of society and what qualities they should possess.

By the time of the Sophists, natural philosophy has, to some extent, come to be treated separately, but political philosophy has not yet become a systematic independent study. I have, therefore, tried to select the most relevant of the dramatists, as well as looking at the Sophists themselves, and at Thucydides' History. The drama has an important role, not only because of its importance as a central cultural experience to the Greek polis, but also because the dramatists are, in some senses even more than the Sophists, the heirs of the earlier poetic tradition of education in ethical and political values.

I have tried to avoid the dangers of looking at plays as if they were political pamphlets, and have endeavoured instead to select the most important images or groups of images through which the dramatists consider political and elitist themes which were treated by the earlier poets. Study of this kind of imagery - for example, presentation of the themes of strife and violence, of change, of relation between the religious and the human sanctions - is, I think, an important way in which literary contexts can contribute to a study of this kind, especially when the evidence to be considered is as a whole largely unsystematic and unformalised.

The importance of Thucydides' HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR is, in some respects, a refinement of this kind of relevance. It is not being studied for the present purpose as a historical <u>record</u> but rather from the point of view of extracting an intellectual historian's reaction to what he thought was happening, followed by assessment of its contribution to the positing of a systematic elitist political philosophy. This is why in the latter half of the thesis the accent is on intellectual thought - Euripides and Thucydides rather than Aristophanes or Xenophon.

There is a certain degree of Athenian bias in the selection of material. This is inevitable if the discussion is not to lose sight of the main aim and instead degenerate into a catalogue of instances. This would be the case if an attempt was made to discuss or list all the extant occurrences of the same tendency within

the development of the ideas under review. Towards the end of the chosen period, Athens, in any case, became the centre for political and philosophical thinkers (although not all of these were Athenian citizens). As far as the earlier part is concerned, it has been decided to select those examples which are considered the most important, regardless of any Athenian bias, and not to overload the text with duplicated discussion of minor examples. It is necessary to severely limit the writers who can be considered in any detail, in order to avoid the worst kind of superficiality. The selection of writers for detailed treatment is ultimately determined by my estimation of their importance in the development or modification of those aspects of elitist ideas which were the essential elements in the emergence of political philosophy.

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CHAPTER TWO.

HOMER AND HESIOD.

At first glance it may seem strange to group together Homer and Hesiod for consideration in an enquiry of this kind. There are, however, major respects in which the contrasts between the two poets complement each other in establishing the broad context within which to begin such an enquiry. There are three main contrasts between the poets which can be designated as particularly relevant.

The first contrast is in the form of the poems. On a superficial level it may be said that THE ILIAD and THE ODYSSEY are epic narratives handed down by word of mouth and possibly influenced by multiple authorship (1), while the WORKS AND DAYS and the THEOGONY (the two works of Hesiod which will be cited) are thought to be the work of a poet or school of poets to whom may be assigned at least an approximate historical date and geographical location (2). Furthermore, the WORKS AND DAYS presents a loosely constructed sequence of items of practical advice, broken up by some addresses of more incisive social import, while the THEOGONY, although rich in mythological material, lacks the narrative unity of the mature epics of Homer.

This leads on to a second and deeper contrast, which for the present purpose can be distinguished in terms of the difference in the societies presented in the poems. This is not simply a matter of difference in time or place, but in the whole conception and scope of the poems. More will be said of Homeric society later, but it is at this stage important to notice firstly that it is a limited society, composed only of gods, warriors, kings and heroes, and secondly that it has no point of reference external to the poems, that its context is in fact the art form which created it. Hesiod, on the other hand, is presenting a double perspective. In the WORKS AND DAYS he writes of day-to-day problems which have a concrete point of reference in time and space. This includes the recognition of some form of class structure which gives rise to problems of relations and order. Thus in the WORKS AND DAYS even Hesiod's 'generations', though in one sense timeless, are limited by the concrete situation which Hesiod is considering elsewhere in the poem, while in the THEOGONY there is an attempt to discuss the mythological material in terms of some kind of scheme which will bear on problems of order in the world of men. To summarise, it

may be said that while Hesiod divides the world of the gods and the world of men and gives the latter a structure of its own and a resting place in time and space, Homeric society is a society of gods and rulers only, dependent for reference not on time or place in the historical sense, but on the art form which gives it life.

From this is derived the third main contrast between Homer and Hesiod, the differing nature of the imperatives which arise in the poems. This will be treated in much more detail later in the discussion; it is necessary here merely to note the essential difference between the idealisation of certain values embodied in the concept of the Homeric heroes and the practical and moral advice given by Hesiod, together with his attempt to develop religious sanctions to social order. It is primarily by development of this third main contrast within the context of the first two that the argument of this chapter will be explained.

It will now be clear that the context within which the Homeric poems are here to be considered is a very limited one, as well as a very special one. No consideration will be given to such vexed questions as the relation of the Homeric hero to the society of the Mycenean great palaces, nor to any other pre-archaic society. Nor will problems associated with the oral tradition be considered, since it is impossible to assess the degree of distortion in relation to any genuinely historical foundation (3).

However, while making it clear that THE ILIAD and THE ODYSSEY are here being considered as creative art, it is also vital to notice that their influence on later Greeks was not limited to that of artistic factors. The poems had a considerable influence in succeeding ages, especially in the field of education, because they provided a common cultural framework which became the basis from which branched out ethical, philosophical and religious discussion. That this included some sort of sanctioning role is clear, not only from the criticisms of Xenophanes (4), but also from the introduction of the poems into political affairs. A more or less standard text of THE ILIAD and THE ODYSSEY was made and circulated in sixth century Athens, and a problem arose concerning alleged interpolation which might be judged to have been inserted to please the Athenian audience at the Pan-Hellenic festival recitations (5). The disputed lines refer to Ajax bringing twelve ships

from Salamis to join the Athenians. The Megarians, involved in a struggle with Athens for domination of the Athenian harbour through control of Salamis, said the clause was an Athenian interpolation. M.I. Finley remarks in his discussion of the lines that the dispute shows how the authenticity of Homer as 'history' and his status as an authority was recognised (6).

Plato's discussion of Homer's influence explicitly recognises the difficulties of acceptance of the sanctioning validity of a work which is essentially governed by its art form - "If so, Glaucon, when you meet with admirers of Homer who tell you that he has been the educator of Hellas and that on questions of human conduct and culture he deserves to be constantly studied as a guide by whom to regulate your whole life, it is well to give a friendly hearing to such people, as entirely well meaning according to their lights, and you may acknowledge Homer to be the first and greatest of the tragic poets, but you must be quite sure that we can admit into our commonwealth only the poetry which celebrates the praises of the gods and of good men". (7) In using Homer as the best example to illustrate "the old quarrel between philosophy and poetry", Plato not only recognises the sanctioning role which has been played by the poems in the cultural field, but also implies that the irrationality and absence of law which he attributes to them have been a factor in bringing about the moral climate against which the construction of his ideal state is a reaction.

The treatment of the Homeric poems on this chapter will attempt to search out not the "irrationality and absence of law" posited by Plato, but rather the constancy of values and status and the order of relations which are implicit in the concept of any elite. That the elite is in fact virtually the whole of the heroic 'society' presents problems of its own, including even the question as to whether elitist terminology as such is valid in that context.

In dealing with these special problems it is necessary to draw on material concerned with Homeric studies in a wider sense (8), but the point-of-view which will be argued is in no way intended to include a comprehensive analysis of all aspects of the poems. This study will concentrate on discussion of three main inter-related topics. These are, firstly, the position of Agamemnon in relation to the other heroes, secondly, (and arising from this) the more general question of the pattern of values on which relationships among the elite are based,

and thirdly the representation of the gods and operation of religious sanctions.

It will be clear from what has been said about the cultural influence of the Homeric poems in later ages that the heroes were regarded in one important sense as an elite, worthy of admiration. But apart from this limited external point of reference there is a problem concerning the position of this elite in the internal context of the poems. Because Homeric society is almost entirely limited to that of the heroes themselves, there is no point of reference for discussion of such standard questions as those concerning the development of the particular elite, or problems of circulation, or adaptation to circumstance, or the part played by other sections of society. It is true that there are references to herdsmen, carpenters, soldiers and so on, but no material is introduced which assigns to them a role in judgement or assessment of elitist criteria. Thus a central point of much importance emerges - a member of the elite enjoys his position and status, not with reference to or in comparison with non-heroes, but with other heroes.

The position of Agamemnon serves to illuminate some of the complexities of this problem. His position seems to have been somewhat more than that of a 'first among equals' - in fact, as will be shown later, the nature of the internal system of values among the elite necessarily involved certain degrees of status so that arguably the heroes could not be described as 'equals', but in any case Agamemnon's supremacy rests also on the fact that he is entitled to the homage due to the bearer of the sceptre. The importance of the sceptre is shown by the account of its descent through the house of Pelops from the original gift of Zeus and Hermes (9). Thystes left it to Agamemnon together with the right to rule over "many islands and all Argos". Thus the sceptre seems to symbolise a divine sanctioning of Agamemnon's leadership in the sense that where there is no higher authority among men to which appeal can be made, it is the gods who allocate power. The divine sanction attabhed to the sceptre is shown by its use by others who assume authority - Odysseus in preventing the retreat, Chryseis in her mission to the Acheans, the heralds when acting as arbiters, the judges in the trial scene on the shield.

But the sceptre alone is not adequate as a sanction to maintain authority - Diomedes says to Agamemnon, "The son of devious-devising Kronos has given you gifts in two ways: with the sceptre he

gave you honours beyond all, but he did not give you courage and of all powers this is the greatest" (10). Thus it is clear that it is not enough that Agamemnon is honoured by the gods. To preserve his authority he must also enjoy the status conferred by winning the admiration of the warrior heroes through his own prowess.

It is precisely this need to maintain status which brings about the initial quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilles. Agamemnon is willing to give up Chryseis only if he is suitable compensated - "Find me then some prize that shall be my own, lest I only among the Argives go without, since that were unfitting" (11). Agamemnon fears that his reputation and status will be threatened if he does not possess the outstanding prize.

The way in which the immediate conflict is resolved is significant. There is an attempt by Achilles to appeal to Agamemnon in terms of the importance of martial prowess, which is so essential to the maintenance of reputation - "No, for the present give the girl back to the God; we Acheans thrice or four times over will repay you, if ever Zeus gives into our hands the strong-walled citadel of Troy to be plundered" (12). This seeks to resolve the quarrel in terms of Agamemnon's status among men, for "This will be his glory to come, if ever the Acheans cut down the men of Troy or capture sacred Ilion. If the Acheans are slain then his will be the great sorrow" (13).

But in fact the dispute is not resolved through a decision about the respective rights and obligations of Agamemnon and Achilles. Achilles' impulse to kill Agamemnon is cut short by Athene's intervention, an intervention paralleled by Nestor's assertion that "Through the authority he derives from Zeus a sceptred king has more than ordinary claims on our respect" (14). Thus the quality which ultimately distinguishes Agamemnon from the other heroes is the sanction of Zeus; it is this, rather than courage or military prowess, which ensures his τιμή or reputation.

The uniqueness of Agamemnon is this respect points to the fact that as far as the other heroes are concerned, a man's reputation and status are based on the opinion of his fellows rather than being specially sanctioned by the gods. However, the broad framework is analagous in that reputation is assessed by standards of what is appropriate, and just as it is appropriate for Agamemnon, as the holder of the sceptre and authorised by the gods, to hold the greatest prize, so the other heroes are expected to behave in a manner appropriate to their functions within the elite (15).

The Homeric hero regarded the denial of personal honour as the greatest tragedy. In THE ILIAD, Homer is speaking of war, and reputation and status is associated to a large extent with prowess in battle, and with the function that a man is expected to fulfil in the fighting. Patroclus, for example, is entitled to less status than Achilles, but equally less is expected of him. The point is elaborated in the discussion between Sarpedon and Glaucus which emphasises the reciprocal obligations inherent in privileged status - "Glaucus, why is it you and I are honoured before others with pride of place, the choice meats and the filled wine cups in Lykia, and all other men look on us as if we were immortals...Therefore it is our duty in the forefront of the Lykians to take our stand and bear our part of the blazing of battle, so that men of the close-armoured Lykians may say of us: 'Indeed, there are no ignoble men who are lords of Lykia, these kings of ours, who feed upon the fat sheep appointed and drink the exquisite sweet wine, since indeed there is strength of valour in them, since they fight in the forefront of the Lykians' " (16).

A variation on the imperative for a man to achieve congruency between his function in society and his status is treated in the Telemachus theme in THE ODYSSEY. Telemachus says that "there are many other Achaean princes, young and old, in sea-girt Ithaka, any of whom might hold this position, now that the great Odysseus has perished" (17), indicating that he himself does not hold the necessary status, and that accession to the position will be a matter for competition among the leading ἄγαθοι. A.A. Long has put the point well (18) - "What motivates the ἀγαθος is not merely showing himself superior to the κακος , but outstripping his fellow ἀγαθοι . Hence the sensitivity of the heroes to their own τιμη . Prowess in war, status, wealth, due observation of the basic social conventions - these are the marks of τιμη and the targets of public opinion".

The fact that in the Homeric epics the term ἄριστος seems to refer to individuals and their status rather than implying a well-defined social class has been interestingly argued by G.M. Calhoun (19), and links up closely with the problems of elitist definitions discussed earlier in this chapter. Calhoun holds that there is no evidence to show there was a nobility of birth sharply set apart from the mass of people by divine descent, and asserts that desirable attributes among the heroes include prowess, wealth, wisdom, power, fame, physique, bravery, esprit, appearance, address, leadership, but not birth per se (although he does admit a few individual instances) (20). It has already been shown in the discussion of Agamemnon that the gods can play a sanctioning role which

does not necessarily involve a divine genealogy, and having established the main conventions governing the internal relations among the heroes, it is now appropriate to consider more precisely the form which this role takes.

The function of the gods in Homer is many-sided. This discussion will not be concerned with the way in which they influence physical phenomena nor with the part they play in bringing about 'chance' occurrences, nor with psychological or anthropological questions concerning the significance of the forces in the human mind which govern their representation. The relevance of the Homeric gods to the terms of the present discussion is twofold. Firstly, there is the fact that the description in the poems of the gods' lives, behaviour and motives reflects heroic society itself. Secondly, and directly arising from this, there is the question of the introduction of their authority as a sanctioning force in human action when disaster threatens or there is an apparently unresolvable dilemma.

The conception of a divine society in the form of a human one is not peculiar to the Greeks (21), but that the detail of the Homeric analogy is exceptional is widely recognised (22). The homes and possessions of the gods are mainly particularly spendid examples of the palaces, chariots and jewels and so on of the Homeric heroes. Even the occupations of the gods are those found in Homeric society - Calypso and Circe, for example, are depicted at work at their looms (23), while Hephaestus is the gods' smith and makes not only their armour, but also such objects as chairs and footstools (24). Even the social custom of the gods seem to be parallel to those of the heroes, which they thus sanction - for instance, the descriptions of the way Thetis is greeted by the gods or Hermes by Calypso (25), while in spite of their immortality the gods seem to share the human propensity to weep, sleep, become weary or even to be wounded and feel pain (26).

Even more important for this discussion is the manner in which the main motives underlying the gods' actions are the same as those which were distinguished in relation to men - the desire for honour, glory and fame, underpinned by a complexity of reciprocal obligations (27). Just as among the heroes there exists a tension between the imperative to attain τιμη, κυδος and κλεος and the definition of these in terms of a social consensus governed by concepts of obligation and of suitability which reject excess as much as deficiency (28).

So although Zeus is portrayed as the supreme ruler, there are occasions when the other gods rebel against him (29). In any case, the other gods continue to act on their own accounts and are summoned to the formal council not only to hear Zeus' decisions but also to comment on them. Zeus' difficulties in obtaining absolute support may be compared with those of Agamemnon (30). G. E. R. Lloyd has summed up the position thus - "Indeed, in its detailed complexity, the parallelism between gods and men in Homer already seems to equal the most elaborate analogies which the Greek philosophers were to construct between the microcosm and the macrocosm" (31).

Yet at the same time that he asserts the force of the Homeric analogy, Lloyd quite rightly recognises its limitations. Given that the notion of the gods forming an exclusive society follows naturally from the conception of the gods themselves in the form of man, this is not the same kind of analogy as the use of social order in the cosmological doctrines of the pre-Socratics, even though in some sense the gods may be connected or even identified with world areas or natural phenomena (32). Homeric consideration is always focussed on the particular act in relation to the exclusive values such as pursuit of τιμη , it never attempts an all-embracing framework, and it largely leaves aside biological criteria (see note 19).

The relation of the gods' sanctions to heroic society is, then, illustrated in specific instances in terms of the shared internal context of values of the poems, and not in relation to any notion of cosmological order. The main significance of the gods' intervention is to endorse a code of behaviour which can no longer be defended by the hero in question - for example, when Achilles ignores Hector's τιμη Thetis is summoned to Olympus so that Achilles may be informed that he has incurred the wrath of some of the gods and especially of Zeus (33). There is also, as was shown earlier in this chapter, a direct sanction to the authority of Agamemnon when he is threatened by Achilles - to the position of the gods as, in some sense, judges of appropriateness is added the notion of their capacity to sanction authority. Yet this is performed within the context of values shared by both gods and heroes. The conflicts are those of specific instances, not of principles; they are between individuals, not between factions. There is argument about the best way to attain ends, such as the assertion of τιμη but not about the validity of the end itself.

In conclusion then it may be said that the elitist criteria which have been described are necessarily limited both in definition and application because of the special context within which they are described. Yet, even when the limitations of this context are particularly emphasised, as has been the case in this discussion, there emerge from the compressed nucleus some significant indications as to how elitist criteria might develop in a context which, although sharing a cultural background with the Homeric form of the epic, takes as its point of reference a historical situation rather than one which can only be known to us as the timèless one created in an art-form. In a situation in which men and gods were necessarily put at a distance, and in which, as a result, the gods' spheres of influence could be rationalised in men's minds both culturally and biologically, the status of the gods might develop to include an assumption of powers of formal sanction, rather than the arbitrariness resulting from intimate contact with men and the attribution to the gods of human emotions and problems. It will be for the remaining part of this chapter to consider such possibilities in the light of the Hesiodic THEOGONY and WORKS AND DAYS.

There are two aspects of the Hesiodic poems which are of considerable relevance to the present enquiry. A consideration of these may help to answer some of the questions raised in the preceding paragraph. The first aspect concerns the nature of the didacticism of the WORKS AND DAYS and the implications behind it. The second aspect concerns the response to the problems of disorder, which is presented in the THEOGONY. It will be argued that the two are closely linked through the Ages of Men sequence in the WORKS AND DAYS.

The moral tone of the WORKS AND DAYS is set in the opening passage about the Two Strifes (34) - "So, after all, there was not one kind of Strife alone, but all over the earth there are two. As for the one, a man would praise her when he came to understand her; but the other is blameworthy: and they are wholly different in nature. For one fosters evil war and battle, being cruel: her no man loves; but perforce, through the will of the deathless gods, men pay harsh Strife her honour due. But the other is the elder daughter of dark Night, and the son of Kronos who sits above and dwells in the aether, set her in the roots of the earth: and she is far kinder to men. She stirs up even the shiftless to toil; for a man grows eager to work when he considers his neighbour, a rich man who hastens to plough and plant and put his house in good order; a neighbour vies with his neighbour

as he hurries after wealth. This Strife is wholesome for men". Thus Hesiod sets the vital distinction which is to permeate his work. It is the distinction between, on the one hand the suicidal destructive strife of factional conflict and war, and on the other the strife which a man must undertake in order to come to terms with his environment, to make his living and to perfect his skills. It is this strife which provides the impetus towards successful role-fulfilment - "and potter is angry with potter and craftsman with craftsman and beggar is jealous of beggar and minstrel of minstrel" (35).

This kind of strife is the motivation for the second section of the poem, that which shows how a man may free himself from need and misery by labour, and by cultivating the skills of agriculture and seamanship. Yet the poem is not primarily concerned with technical expertise. Thus Hesiod does not develop that part of the poem which deals with practical advice into a comprehensive discussion of details of expertise. He is rather concerned to link the need for skills with advice relating to other matters of everyday life, for he believes it is not only important to know how to make a living - the enjoyment of prosperity also depends on prudence and care in both social and home life and on attention to what is just (δικη) -

"For the son of Kronos has ordained this law for men, that fishes and beasts and winged fowls should devour one another, for right is not in them; but to mankind he gave right which proves far the best. For whoever knows the right and is ready to speak it, far-seeing Zeus gives him prosperity; but whoever deliberately lies in his witness and forswears himself, and so hurts Justice and sins beyond repair, that man's generation is left obscure thereafter" (36).

Thus behind Hesiod's seeming concern with the arete of the farmer can be seen a basic framework of moral belief which was to apply to all men. In the address to Perses (37) he refers not only to the humble man but also to the prosperous -

"But you, Perses, listen to right and do not foster violence; for violence is bad for a poor man. Even the prosperous cannot easily bear its burden, but is weighed down under it when he has fallen into delusion. The better path is to go by on the other side towards justice; for Justice beats Outrage when she comes at length to the end of the race".

But the effects of injustice are not confined to individuals, and Hesiod goes on to describe the results in society -

"There is a noise when Justice is being dragged in the way where those who devour bribes and give sentence with crooked judgements take her. And she, wrapped in mists, follows to the city and haunts of the people, weeping and bringing mischief to men, even to such as have driven her forth in that they did not deal straightly with her.

But they who give straight judgements to strangers and to the men of the land, and go not aside from what is just, their city flourishes, and the people prosper in it".

Hesiod calls on men to act with justice in order not only to achieve and maintain prosperity but to escape divine vengeance. He amplifies the religious sanction to δικη in a passage which is significantly addressed specifically to the rulers (38) -

"You princes, mark well this punishment you also; for the deathless gods are near among men and mark all those who oppress their fellows with crooked judgements, and reck not the anger of the gods. For upon the bounteous earth Zeus has thrice ten thousand spirits, watchers of mortal men, and these keep watch on judgements and deeds of wrong as they roam, clothed in mist, all over the earth....the people pay for the mad folly of their princes who, evilly minded, pervert judgement and give sentence crookedly. Keep watch against this, you princes, and make straight your judgements, you who devour bribes".

Here, Hesiod is thinking of a society as some sort of unified whole in which men are vitally affected not only by their own deeds but also by those of their rulers. His society differs from the Homeric, not only in its range, but also in the recognition given to the repercussions of an action through the whole society. Responsibility can thus be social as well as individual. The gods form a society separate from that of men in the sense that they are presented as moral arbiters and dispensers of retributive justice. In the WORKS AND DAYS, however, there is no real attempt to develop this into a cosmological principle - the move towards this will be discussed when the THEOGONY is analysed, but in the WORKS AND DAYS Hesiod is concerned only with the religious sanction for the kind of conduct which he considers desirable for society as a whole, and which he regards as essential in a worthy ruler.

There is one further point which emerges from the WORKS AND DAYS which needs to be emphasised before the THEOGONY is considered. This is an aspect of the poem which is closely linked with the distinction between the two Strifes and with the elevation of δικη. It is, in fact, the consistent devaluing of the warlike which characterises the poem and which is reflected directly in the rejection of the first Strife and in the description of the Third Generation, and indirectly in the moral imperatives analysed above. J-P. Vernant has pointed out (39) how Hesiod restructures myth in changing the pattern of the generations of men and of metals (40), and how he makes war a source of evil and not a function in society -

"Zeus the Father made a third generation of mortal men, a brazen race, sprung from ash-trees; and it was in no way equal to the silver age, but was terrible and strong. They loved the lamentable works of Ares and deeds of violence; they ate no bread, but were hard of heart like adamant, fearful men. Great was their strength and unconquerable the arms which grew from their shoulders on their strong limbs. Their armour was of bronze, and of bronze were their implements: there was no black iron. These were destroyed by their own hands and passed to the dark house of chill Hades, and left no name: terrible though they were, black Death seized them, and they left the bright light of the sun" (41).

When this passage is considered in conjunction with the rejection of the first Strife and the opposition of δικη and violence (42), it becomes clear that Hesiod is searching for a system of moral values for his society which will not rest on constraint in the sense of constraint exercised by the elite among men. In the WORKS AND DAYS he describes a religious sanction for moral values, but it is a sanction based on principles of retribution to a degree which makes it seem that the move from a society governed by constraint to one governed by a principle of social equilibrium (δικη) can only be supported by an external constraint (the action of the gods in punishing wrongdoers). It will be the purpose of the discussion of the THEOGONY to see whether this constraint is itself to be rationalised.

The difficulties of disengaging the relevant ideas from the THEOGONY are in some respects similar to those encountered in Homer. There are some problems of interpolation (43); there is also a basic inconsistency between an attempt to present some kind of system of ordered relations, whether religious or social, and the form which Hesiod uses.

The THEOGONY lacks the dramatic force and unity of the Homeric epic. Its various episodes show a pageant-like quality which in itself perhaps emphasises the paradox that the Hesiodic attempt to systemise the deities of legend is itself unsystematic. It is at least as well to guard against the danger of interpreting Hesiod as if he were speaking of the cosmology of the pre-Socratics.

Hesiod is always a poet, never a scientist. If the THEOGONY is stripped of the language and personages of myth and considered conceptually, the ideas seem at first hardly to correspond to what Kirk and Raven (44) have distinguished as the concern of the forerunners of philosophical cosmogony - "the result of a direct, empirical, non-symbolical way of thinking". However, when the poem is considered in the light of the discussion on the WORKS AND DAYS, it becomes clear that the two main aspects of interest for this discussion on the THEOGONY have already been considered in 'direct, empirical, non-symbolical' terms in the WORKS AND DAYS. The first aspect is that of moral conduct and its sanctions. The second is what might be called the biological model for accounting for how "first came into being the gods and the earth and the rivers and the immense sea....and the shining state and wide heaven above" (45). Since the WORKS AND DAYS shows interest not only in man's physical limitations but in the influence of his environment and of his struggle with the soil and the sea (46), and since it was asserted in that poem that "the gods and mortal men sprang from one source" (47), the imagery used in the THEOGONY to describe the relations of the gods and to identify them with physical phenomena, can be said to lend a new dimension to the question of moral and religious sanctions already identified, in that by suggesting some degree of structured relations among the gods it introduces a more sophisticated rationalisation of the 'external constraint' which was discussed in the context of the WORKS AND DAYS.

The concern with the biological model in the THEOGONY must then, in terms of this thesis, be with its implications for moral science rather than natural science (48). There are two major implications which can be related back to some of the ideas implicit in the WORKS AND DAYS. The first concerns the manner in which Zeus becomes ruler of the gods -

"But when the blessed gods had finished their toil and settled by force their struggle for honours with the Titans, they pressed far-seeing Olympian Zeus to reign and rule over them, by Earth's prompting. So he divided their dignities among them" (49).

It is significant that although the gods have to overcome the Titans by force, their ruler is selected by consent. Here Hesiod is showing how the gods were persuaded by Earth that Zeus was the most fitted to rule over them - the corollary was presented in the WORKS AND DAYS when Hesiod stressed the fact that a society took its tone and its fortune from the qualities of its ruler (50).

Thus, there is an extra dimension of significance to Zeus' first action, allocating the gods their status and spheres of influence. This indicates a desire for some sort of order in social relations, though the rest of the poem does not present this as a structured hierarchy in any formal sense. The question of status and function is, however, amplified in an important passage relating to the society of men -

"Next, he (Zeus) married bright Themis who bare the Horae (hours), and Eunomia (Order), Dike (Justice) and blooming Eirene (Peace) who mind the works of mortal men" (51).

Here are conceptualised the three values of society which Hesiod introduced in the WORKS AND DAYS - he rejected war and the first Strife; he replaced violence with justice in social relations and especially in the relations of ruler and ruled, and he bound these fast with the 'good order' which stemmed from the idea that each man had to concentrate on fulfilling his own appointed role successfully rather than contending with another section of the community. In the WORKS AND DAYS this social equilibrium was to be enforced by a watchful Zeus. In the THEOGONY the principles of Order, Justice and Peace have emerged from the general social utility which justified them in the WORKS AND DAYS and their elevation to divinity at once represents a sophistication of the "external constraint" of Zeus and united this with the presentation of virtues to which both men and society must aspire, and against which their actions are to be evaluated.

Hesiod has, then, taken a number of steps towards increasing the complexity of elitist ideas. Some of the steps are, as has been indicated, indirect in their form but not in their implications. Initially the impetus resulted from the increase in scope of the Hesiodic society as compared with that of the Homeric. Taken together with this, the stress on the concrete situation and the physical realities of environment meant that the qualities of the rulers were seen to have repercussions throughout society. Thus elitist criteria could not be merely a matter for the judgement of a man and his peers, they became rather the concern

of principles of social utility. In an extension of the Homeric conception of the gods as arbiters or guarantors when human agency was inadequate, Hesiod elaborates the religious sanction to the values required in the elite from one of external constraint to the point where, in the THEOGONY, it embodies the divine conceptualisation of the principles of Order, Justice and Peace which were set out in concrete terms in the WORKS AND DAYS.

Thus there has been a move from the internal constraint exercised by the values of an exclusive elite in Homer, through the idea of an external constraint exercised by the gods, towards the idea of principles of equilibrium as the determinants of relations within the elite and between the elite and other classes. Hesiod goes some way towards forging a unity between the internal equilibrium and the external constraint through the elevation to divinity of Eunomia, Dike and Eirene. If the WORKS AND DAYS and the THEOGONY could be described as variations on a theme of equilibrium, it could equally well be said that the Homeric epics are variations on a theme of internal constraint as a means to the preservation of social order.

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CHAPTER THREE.
THE ARCHAICS.

This chapter will be concerned with the study of three main groups of poems - those attributed to Alcaeus, Theognis and Solon. They have been chosen because in their political aspects they are concerned with problems about the composition and behaviour of the ruling class, while their manner of treatment of these problems reflects not only the crises in their own societies but also the interests and values of their own particular social groups.

The primary aim of the discussion will be to compare and contrast the value patterns which emerge from their writing, and it is not intended to draw conclusions about the social and political crises in Mytilene, Megara and Athens except in so far as they directly influence the poets' reactions. However, in addition to drawing out contrasts, it will also be apparent that there are certain things in common in the literary contexts of all these writers, which not only reflect profound changes in the general framework of poetic activity, but are also particularly relevant to the concerns of this analysis.

There are four main aspects to this shared context. The first is the use of a non-mythological framework. This is not to say that myth is not used to point an analogy or develop an image (although in Theognis and Solon at least, even this function is negligible), but its use is strictly ancillary - none of the poets is thinking in mythological terms. Alcaeus is the most Homeric of the three, but when he is concerned with a political subject (and only his political poems are the concern of this chapter) he write in concrete terms of the difficulties and behaviour of men, not in terms of mythology.

Secondly, and closely allied to the previous point, there is the fact that the microcosm/macrocosm structure which was discussed in the previous chapter no longer stands. It certainly no longer exists in the Homeric sense, and there is no real attempt to develop the concept of universal hierarchy hinted at in Hesiod - the concern of Theognis with the relationship of the rulers and the commons is worked out in pragmatic terms, while Solon's philosophy of non-encroachment is in itself an attempt to compensate for the lack of a structured framework.

This means that the nature and function of the religious sanction is radically altered. Human society need no longer be ordered by, and certainly does not reflect, the pattern of society of the gods

as was the case in Homer. The sanction of the gods is therefore significant at one remove - that is, a system of rewards and punishments. Both Hesiod and Theognis assert the necessity for this if order in society is not to break down. (1)

Thus emerges the third main point. Man himself has to explore means of reconciling the forces of constraint and anarchy in society. The force of men's desires - for example, for wealth, is recognised, and there begins to be exploration of ways of controlling these while translating the control into a socially acceptable formula. Thus is the philosophy of the mean given a political application by Solon. The acceptance of the need for some sort of social and political equilibrium which is not necessarily part of a religious/mythological structure means that sanctions and concepts begin to be explored intellectually in order that they may be explained and justified in the language appropriate to their use. This does not necessarily involve a radical alteration in the essence of elitist ideas, but it does imply that they may have to be recast or adapted to meet contemporary forces.

This becomes clearer when it is taken in conjunction with the fourth main point, the importance of the pressures which resulted from economic, technological, military and social change. Without attempting to consider in detail the problems of scholarship associated with these factors, which range far outside the scope of this thesis, it has to be recognised that the ascendency of the traditional ruling class was increasingly challenged because of the demands of its environment. Thus the period sees the tendency for the ruling class to split into contending oligarchic factions, associated either with traditionalism or with modes of adaptation to the requirements of the changing situation. All the poets to be considered are, in one way or another, concerned with a loss of position, actual or threatened, and with consideration of ways in which this threat can be met.

That the heroic elitist criteria analysed in Homer are now obsolete can be clearly demonstrated with reference to Tyrtaeus and the contrast he affords with the other writers to be discussed. In Tyrtaeus the limited ruling class society of Sparta has to be defended by force, and in this case semi-heroic values are to some extent still suited to a society which differs from those in the rest of Hellas.

This is because Tyrtaeus was writing of a Sparta which was fighting for existence, and whose economy and tightly knit ruling class bore some resemblance to the society of the Homeric poems.

Education and civic discipline were dedicated to the maintenance of a military caste able to enforce its position of mastery over the dispossessed helots.

Thus the situation existed in Sparta in which the values of military arete had an integral part to play in those of the restricted citizen polis, which had constantly to reassert its supremacy. Writing late in the seventh century, the aim of Tyrtaeus was to inspire the Spartans with courage against their Messenian enemies, whose endurance he himself describes - "Like asses worn by their great burdens, bringing of dire necessity to their masters the half of all the fruits the corn land bears" (2). At first the helot revolt was successful but Tyrtaeus is recorded to have inspired the Spartans with such courage that Sparta beganto recover her losses and retrieve her reputation. It was said that the warriors advanced to battle singing his "Marches" to the sound of flutes while his elegies were recited in the tents after the evening meal (3). The Spartan victory solved, by the conquest of the whole land of Messenia, land problems which had led to domestic discontent and which formed the subject of Tyrtaeus' poem EUNOMIA. The surviving fragments give us some clues to the consolidation of the Spartan polis.

Tyrtaeus' praise of the qualities essential for battle involves disparagement of other traditional virtues which had no patriotic value - "I would not say anything for a man nor take account of him for any speed of his feet or wrestling skill he might have, not if he had the size of a Cyclops and strength to go with it, not if he could outrun Boreas, the north wind of Thrace, not if he were more handsome or gracefully formed than Tithonos, and had more riches than Midas had, or Kinyras too, not if he were more of a king than Tantalid Pelops, or had the power of speech and persuasion Adrastos had, and not if he had all splendours except for a fighting spirit. For no man ever proves himself a good man in war unless he can endure to face the blood and the slaughter, go close against the enemy and fight with his hands. Here is courage, mankind's first possession, here is the noblest prize that a young man can endeavour to win, and it is a good thing his city and all the people share with him....Here is a man who proves himself to be valiant in war. With a sudden rush he turns to flight the rugged battalions of the enemy....Thus a man should endeavour to reach this high place of courage with all his heart, and, so trying, never to be backward in war" (4).

Therefore, in Tyrtaeus can be seen a good example of the adaption of elitist ideals to political and social stress. Faced with the complexity of the heroic arete the poet is forced by necessity to choose those aspects which are of greatest utility to Spartan society. Since Sparta is struggling for existence, the only relevant aspect of arete is military prowess. This insistence reflects the insecurity of Sparta, and although found in other states according to circumstances, it is characteristic of Sparta throughout the period under consideration and sharply differentiates Sparta from other states which had to resort to more complex means of maintaining order. The assertion of the military virtues when combined with an elite sustained and entrenched from the land and not dependent on moveable currency or trade, shows that the Spartan ruling class was not subject to the same kind of social, economic and political pressures which were dominant elsewhere in Greece.

The problem of order elsewhere in Greece had entirely different characteristics. Nearly everywhere the nobility was itself divided between the ruling faction and those who coveted its position, and in cases where the people were a politically viable force there is some evidence of competition between oligarchic factions to obtain its adherence, for example in the rivalry between Cleisthénes and Isagoras at Athens. Against the forces of ambition and desire to maintain status there emerges a pervading concern with ἕτκοις. This is the underlying theme in Solon and in major parts of the Theognid corpus, and even the exiled Alcaeus looks back nostalgically to the days of order and peace which preceded the bitterness of factional strife.

Such, then, are the four main aspects of the common framework within which the contributions of Alcaeus, Theognis and Solon to the development of elitist thought will be compared and contrasted.

ALCAEUS.

It is only the political poems of Alcaeus which will be the object of study here. The criteria for designation of a poem as political will be broadly those adopted by Page in his study (5) and will not be argued separately. The poems are important in terms of the scope of the present enquiry for two main reasons. The first is that they take up the great theme of Lesbian history, the feud of the leading families for supremacy (here, some interesting comparisons and contrasts with the Theognid corpus may be suggested). The second reason is the importance of some of Alcaeus' imagery, especially in the ship sequence. This can be shown to have considerable significance in the

development of political concepts and points, especially towards the emergence of the idea of the ship of state and the concept of the politician as a pilot, with the corresponding responsibilities and skills.

The Epic influences in Alcaeus have been much discussed (6), and are reflected in the description of the scene on the eve of battle (7) -

"The great house is agleam with bronze, and all the roof is full-dressed with shining helmets; white horse-hair plumes wave down from them - adornments for the heads of men. Bronze shining greaves hang round and hide the pegs - a fence against the arrows' might. Corselets of fresh linen and hollow shields lie thrown upon the floor. Beside them are blades from Chalcis, beside them many a belt and tunic. These we may not forget, since first we stood to this our task".

As Page points out, the equipment described by Alcaeus was already, by the poet's time, obsolete. Furthermore, whatever attraction heroic tradition may have held for Alcaeus, he evidently did not feel bound by its values, or so the message sent to a friend suggests - "Alcaeus is safe; his weapons of war are not. The Athenians hung them up in the temple of the grey-eyed goddess" (8). The message reflects the shift from the Homeric values - Alcaeus may still be concerned with honour and glory, but he does not set these above life itself.

The extant fragments concerned with Pittacus are largely inspired by variants on the disjunction of aristocratic aspiration and the harsh realities of political behaviour. Assuming that Alcaeus was born about 630, he lived through a period of fierce factional strife in Lesbos. He was too young to take part when his brothers helped Pittacus to overthrow the tyrant Melanchros in c.612-608, but shortly afterwards fought with Pittacus against the Athenians at Sigeum. Then the coalition broke up and Alcaeus turned against Pittacus and went into exile several times, eventually being pardoned, according to Diogenes Laertius (9).

An interesting fragment abusing Pittacus for breaking an oath to overthrow the power-holders or perish in the attempt (10), invokes the idea of a system of punishment by the gods as a bastion to the making of alliances -

"...the Lesbians founded this precinct, conspicuous and great
for all to share, and therein set altars of the blest Immortals:
And Zeus they entitled God of Suppliants; and you, the Aeolian, Illustrious
Goddess, Mother of all; and this third they named....

Dionysus, devourer of raw flesh. Come with friendly spirit
hearken to our prayer, and from these toils and grevious banishment
deliver us;
But the son of Hyrrhas let their Avenger pursue, since of old we
swore with holy covenant that....never any comrade of ours....
But either dead or wrapped in earth we would lie subdued
by the men who that way were (masters?), or else would
slay them and deliver the people from distress,
Thereof this Potbelly made no reckoning with his heart (?)
but trod his oaths underfoot without ado, and devours the
city....
Against the law (?)".

Diogenes Laertius lists further epithets that Alcaeus hurls at Pittacus (11). Alcaeus not only insults Pittacus physically and calls him a perjurer. He also accuses him of being low born (12). As Page points out (13), this is unlikely to be true, since if it were, Pittacus was unlikely to have been associated with Alcaeus' family in the first place, and in any case the στάσις at Mytilene seems to have been occasioned by factional disputes among the nobility. The references to political activities do not seem to range outside the upper class and the insults against Pittacus tell us, not about historical fact, but about the respective scales of values of the two men. For Alcaeus, the worst insult is to say Pittacus is low-born, and that his power is based on the people's materialism. As far as Pittacus is concerned, he was first allied with Alcaeus' family, next he collaborated with Myrsilus or men he had sworn to overthrow, then he married into the Penthilidae, one of the greatest of the feuding families, and finally achieved and consolidated supreme authority. Alcaeus regrets the στάσις but regrets its results even more (14) -

"Let him, since he has married into the Atridae's house, devour the city even as he did together with Myrsilus, until the War - God be pleased to turn us to our armour; this our anger may we utterly unlearn again;
Let us abate our soul-consuming strife and war with kindred, which some Olympian has aroused, bringing the people to ruin, but to Pittacus giving glory, his heart's desire".

Thus the contrast is between the quasi-heroic view of Alcaeus that the right of his faction, which he bases on birth, has to be asserted by force, and the evident success of Pittacus in successfully adapting to the opposing forces and integrating them into his own bid for power. The weakness of Alcaeus as a political force is emphasised

by the fact that he was evidently dispensable to Pittacus, and this in turn tends to point to the fact that his view point was already obsolete.

The other main aspect of Alcaeus' political poems is of greater significance in its own right. This is his use of the allegory of the ship (15). Sea-imagery was of course common, and already in Achilochus the perils of war has been described in terms of an impending storm at sea (16). Alcaeus writes (17) -

"This wave again comes (like?) the one before: it will give
us much labour to bale out, when it enteres the vessel's
( )
( ) let us fortify the ( ) with all
speed, and run into a secure harbour.
And let not unmanly hesitance take hold of any one of us:
a great ( ) is clear before us. Remember our (toils) of yesterday:
Now let each prove himself a steadfast man.
And let us not disgrace (by cowardice) our noble fathers lying
under the earth".

The image associated with baling out the boat is a fruitful one, for Alcaeus' group has been almost 'swamped' politically as well as literally. In addition the sentiments in the last line, especially when compared to the stress on ancestors in the poem abusing Pittacus (18), emphasise that Alcaeus' claim to power is based on inheritance - that it, inheritance of virtue as well as political rights.

It would be wrong, however, to assert that the political element in the allegory attains the level of a 'ship of state' image. The reference is less articulate and is probably concerned only with Alcaeus' own group or faction - Page's reference to 'party' is, I think, too politically sophisticated for describing what is only a tenuous first step towards a concept. It is interesting that Alcaeus makes no references to "trimming the sails" or other techniques which might imply political adaptation. He refers rather to "fortify", which is in accordance with his constraint approach to politics.

Thus in Alcaeus, despite the fragmented sources, it can be demonstrated that the poet is concerned with the opposition of quasi-heroic elitist criteria based on birth and implemented by constraint and the modes of adaptation practiced by Pittacus. In contrast to Theognis, Alcaeus is little concerned with economic affairs, and although lamenting στάσις is prepared to pursue his aims primarily through

physical force. The ship sequences point towards important developments in political ideas, but lack the introduction of "equilibrium" terminology as will be found in Solon.

THEOGNIS.

The sixth century problems of the maintenance of good order and the reponse of elitist ideas to the pressures of change are brought sharply into focus in the poems of the Theognid corpus. Writing at a later time, Pindar was to present a possible synthesis of the values of traditional elite and polis. Theognis wrote at a time of civil strife and saw no such hope. He could not envisage the traditional values being adopted by the commons and regarded rejection of them as leading only to chaos and anarchy. His work is almost entirely inspired by repulsion and distrust for change.

He recognises the dangerous social situation of the ruling class, but unlike Solon, for example, he does not see the class's own shortcomings, and therefore makes little attempt to recast political concepts. He asserts that it is the opponents of the aristocracy only who are responsible for the unrest and injustice which are endangering the community. Nevertheless, in spite of his protective attitude towards his class, he is forced to acknowledge that the close association of nobility with wealth has been broken down by the impoverishment (as he sees it) of some landowners and the rise of rich plebeins, and he therefore attempts to seek consolation in the assertion of the primacy of nobility of spirit, allied to a belief in the inherent virtue of noble blood.

There is a strong contrast with Alcaeus in the general tone of his writings. This arises from the fact that the poems are far more polis orientated than those of Alcaeus. Alcaeus is writing primarily about the nobles who are contending for power. Theognis, while concerned with the values and status of his own class, recognises that these are to some extent influenced by economic problems and by the political force of the δῆμος, which in his terminology appears to include the lower classes. Thus Theognis is virtually compelled to abandon the vocabulary of constraint and expresses his hopes rather in moral terms which lead eventually to an attempt to suggest a basis for equilibrium in the polis.

Before the full implications of this can be examined, however, there are certain problems of literary analysis which must be mentioned. Theognis first appears in extant literature about a

hundred years after his death and later, notably in quotations found in Xenophon, Plato, Isocrates, Aristotle and Plutarch. A considerable controversy has centred round the problem of alleged multiple authorship. Some attempts have been made to show that only poems written under the Cyrnus cipher are likely to be genuine, and other aspects have been distinguished which may be divided into pre- and post-Theognidean elements. However, critics have generally agreed that the bulk of the poems may be dated to the middle of the sixth century (19), thereby exemplifying one of the last instances of the use of elegiac poetry as a vehicle for aristocratic writers. As far as the argument of this thesis is concerned, plurality of authorship would in no way affect the points to be made, which are based on an identification of the sentiments expressed with the most entrenched traditionalist opinion among the nobility.

The poems of the corpus are characterised by a minimal use of mythology. This is because the nature of the gnomic teaching enables it to be expressed directly. It will be noted later that Solon accepts and refines the Hesiodic antinomy between hybris and dike. Theognis is the ultra-conservative, deploring hybris and opposing to it the twin virtues of gnome and aidos. On this basis he addresses to Cyrnus practical and moral advice.

The nature of the advice is governed by Theognis' educational beliefs. He believes in the nobility of innate gifts, which can be developed by a teacher. The teacher cannot, however, fundamentally alter the nature of his pupil - "To beget and breed a man is easier than to put into him good wits; none has ever devised means of making a fool wise and a bad man good. If God had given the children of Asclepius the art of healing a man's evil nature and ruinous wits, they would receive great rewards; and if thought could be made and put into us the son of a good father would never become bad, because he would be persuaded by good counsel. But by teaching you will never make a bad man good" (20).

Theognis writes with stress on education because he believes that in the ephemeral climate of the society in which he lives only the cultivation of those born with virtue can promote truly enduring values. "Many bad men, for sure, are rich, and many good men poor; yet we will not change our virtue for these men's wealth, seeing that virtue is a lasting benefit but possessions belong now to this man and now to that" (21). Theognis' desire to achieve stability through

conservation of what he himself values is reflected in his lamentation of the random way in which men breed - "Kyrnos, when we are breeding stock, we look for the best in horses, donkeys or rams for stud, to get a good strain; yet even the finest man is willing to marry a rascal's rascally daughter, if only she brings him money enough" (22). The belief that the virtues of the race were to be preserved by careful in-breeding and special training was brought to its culmination in Sparta. Both in Sparta and in the writings of Plato, this idea is refined to become part of the ideal that the state should be the breeder and educator of its citizens.

Thus is it clear that many of Theognis' moral precepts are symptomatic of his underlying awareness and resentment of the state of flux in society and the resultant crisis in values, and reflect his desire to re-establish stability by preserving what remains of the tradional elite. However, in one respect he realises that some modifications in elitist criteria are essential. Experience had shown him that wealth was no longer the pre-requisite of an elite nor the just reward for virtue, but could be attained by any man - "Possessions does heaven give, even to the wicked Kyrnos, but the gift of virtue comes to but few" (23). He also laments the social effects of the desire for wealth - "Thou shalt not find, nay, not in all the world, more than one ship's company of such as be modest of tongue and eye and are not led by lure to do what is vile" (24).

This pessimism is directly related to Theognis' attitude to the politics of the city. Any deviation from tradition involves the corruption of the demos and disaster to the city - "Never yet, Kyrnos, have good men ruined a city; but when bad men take to disorderly ways and corrupt the common folk and give judgement for the unrighteous for the sake of private gain and powers, then do not expect that city to be long quiet....Kyrnos, this city is a city still, but her people are different men who of old knew neither judgements nor laws, but wore goatskins to pieces about their sides, and had their pasture like deer outside their city; and now these are the good men, O son of Polypaus, and they that were high are now of low estate. Who can bear to witness such things? Yet they deceive one another even while they smile at one another, knowing the marks neither of the bad, nor of the good" (25).

Theognis' distrust of change and fear of civil strife is highlighted in his attitude to the demos - "Kick thou the empty headed commons, prick them with a sharp goad and put a galley yoke upon their

neck; you will not find among all the men under the sun, commons that so love their master" (26). The commons are to be returned to their rightful place. Lack of birth may no longer be synonymous with lack of wealth, but it is still, Theognis thinks, synonymous with lack of intellectual and moral worth.

One assertion of Theognis is, at first glance, startling in its unexpectedness and in its implications. He says, "The whole of virtue is summed up in DIKAIOSUNE; every man, Kyrnos, is agathos if he is dikaios" (27). The statement is discussed in some detail by Professor Adkins (28), but what is important for the present purpose is that Theognis is looking to justice as the ultimate sanction for his own elitist structure. The elevation of dikaiosune would meet both his main requirements - the return of stability and order in society, and the institution of a non-material criterion of worth which, at the same time, reinforces the social, political and spiritual distinctions implicit in Theognis' posited relationship between the elite and the demos. Thus it is not enough to say, with Professor Adkins, that justice is elevated to a position of primary importance - this is true, but a further step is needed to establish that the kind of justice Theognis has in mind is that needed to sanction the traditional order for which he yearns.

Thus the relevance of Theognis to the problems under discussion is more complex than it would at first seem. In the first place he is important because the attitudes expressed epitomise a traditionalist response to problems of social change and disorder. Secondly, in his stress on spiritual rather than material distinction, he at the same time shares some aspects of the thought of Solon, and is a remote but significant precursor of the Pindaric spiritual and idealogical synthesis of Elitist values and the pressured of the polis. Thirdly, his equation of dikaiosune with arete also points towards Solon's attempts to legislate for stability in Athens (although, of course, Solon differs from Theognis in his recognition that there is a crisis within the ruling class as well as in society as a whole), and also hints at the problems of rationalisation and definition of sanctioning concepts which were to emerge more fully in the next century.

Within the context of his own work, Theognis' elevation of dikaiosune is motivated by a desire to limit the chaos which was the result of stasis and to ensure the dominance of the moral values which he desired to find in his own class. Beneath the surface arguments there lies a barely articulated philosophy of moderation, based on the

belief that hybris and excess lead to stasis and that stability in society is inevitably dependent on the moderation and justice which is to be equated with moral excellence and resistance to radical change. This formulation bears a close resemblance to the thought of Solon and so it is in his poems that its philosophical implications will be considered.

SOLON.

Solon was the son of Execestides, a noble connected with the house of Medontids, and according to Aristotle he "was among the leading figures of his age by descent and reputation. Judged, however, by wealth and position, he is recognised as having belonged to the middle class" (29). Aristotle's terminology seems, however, to be more directly related to Solon's philosophy of the Middle Way, rather than to suggest the emergence of an influential middle class in the political or economic sense. Solon was a traveller and scholar as well as archon, and fragments of his poems have survived. These read rather like political pamphlets for the guidance of public opinion.

According to Aristotle, Solon came to power as the result of strife between the many and the few - "The masses rose against the notables. There was keen and prolonged strife between the two parties, until at length both agreed to the appointment of Solon as mediator in the capacity of Archon with extraordinary powers over the whole constitutional field". Thus Solon is in essential contrast to both Alcaeus and Theognis in that he had direct political power.

This discussion is not concerned with the details of Solon's legislation but rather with the principles which lie behind it. Unlike Alcaeus, he is not reacting to a stasis which took place within the ruling class itself, but is concerned with conflict between different sections of society. Like many poems in the Theognid corpus he is greatly concerned with economic considerations, which he associates closely with moral qualities. Indeed, according to Aristotle, he traced the roots of stasis to "avarice and an overweaning spirit". The lines in which he asks the wealthy not to be avaricious foreshadow the concern with the wise use of wealth which was to be so prominent in Pindar -

"Now you whose coffers are full, pressed down and overflowing,
Put a curb on your greedy soul; keep it at rest in subjection.
Train the proud among you to follow a humbler path;
You shall not have for ever your will, nor we for ever obey".

The lines indicate his fear of pride and the excess which causes it. They also show how he regarded moderation as involving a degree of 'subjection' or 'constraint'. The crucial aspect of Solon's thought is that which relates the concept of moderation, i.e. the self constraint necessary to avoid the dangers of hybris, for instance, to the political framework through the concept of non-encroachment. Thus Solon's principle of εὐνομία depends on the idea of 'giving each his due' in such a way that both moral and political dangers are reduced.

Thus, when Solon writes -

"I gave the people rights that are their due
Not niggard nor yet lavish of my gift
Still were the rich and mighty my fond care
That they should suffer no unseemly shame.
I stood with strong shield sheltering each host
And neither won an unjust victory"

it is clear that there are subtle differences between his concept of moderation and the dikaiosune of Theognis. The latter thinks of justice in terms of reward for the moral superiority of his own class and scorns the people. Solon, in contrast, recognises not only that there is a crisis within the ruling class, but also that the people cannot be ignored or savagely oppressed in the manner advocated by Theognis. Solon expresses this once more in terms of the philsophy of moderation -

"The people will follow its leaders best
When firmly restrained but not harshly oppressed".

Thus the Solonic elite must reject ὕβρις and the φθονος which leads to στάσις. In addition to self constraint it must apply constraint to the different classes and factions within the polis. Solon's moral concern may be compared with that of Xenophanes, who also thought that pride and jealousy lead to civil strife (30). But Solon goes much further in evolving from the initial premise that excess is a major contributory cause of stasis, a concept of law which includes within the framework of a philosophy of equilibrium or moderation, recognition of the need for constraint on both the personal and political planes (31).

Solon himself summed up the political motivation of his philosophy, the difficulties of carrying it out and his resulting unpopularity -

"You ask me why, as shepherd of the flock
I ceased to strive before I'd reached the end.
There WAS no ceasing. In the court of Time
Bear witness, mighty Mother of the Gods,
Black Earth! For from thy bosom once I tore
The mortgage-pillars planted everywhere;
And thou, erst held in bondage, now art free.
How many men to Athens I restored
(Their native city, founded from on high),
Men who in justice, or despite thereof,
Were sold abroad, or, into exile driven
By stern necessity, wandering far and wide,
No longer spake the tongue of Attica.
Those here at home reduced to slavery,
Who trembled at their master's nod, I freed.
These things - all these - by main strength have I wrought,
Fashioning force and justice into law.
Yea, I went through as I had promised you;
Enacted rules for good and bad alike,
A line of jurisdiction straight and true
Fitting to every man,
Yet, had another, villain covetous,
Grasped, as did I, the goad - what think you then:
Would he like me have held the people back?
Had I at that time yielded to my foes,
Or later to the counsel of my friends,
Athens had been bereaved of many sons.
Wherefore I stood at bay, a wolf 'mid hounds,
Fending them off on this side and on that".

The imagery of the lines, and especially that of the shepherd and the flock, serves to emphasise the responsibility and isolation of the Solonic law-giver, chosen by the criteria of moral superiority, the strength to enforce decisions and the disinterestedness not to profit personally (32). In the last resort, success seems to depend as much on the personal qualities of the lawgiver as on the principles he enacts. In this sense, Solon recognises that the dividing line between the legislator and the tyrant is a very small one -

"He'd not have checked the people, nor have stopped
Before he'd stirred the milk and drawn its fat.

But I stood as a stone in No-man's land,
A boundary stone betwixt the parties twain".

On the practical plane, Solon did not succeed in averting tyranny in Athens, perhaps because his legislation was so permeated by the desire to maintain the balance between the different sections of society that it did not take account of the possibility that radical change might sometimes be necessary (33). But on the spiritual and intellectual level his philosophy of moderation came to express an attempt to adapt traditional elitist values to a specifically political context, and his ideas were in some degree assimilated, not only (and paradoxically) by the apologists for tyranny (see the discussion of Pindar), but also by succeeding ruling classes.

When revolution broke out in Athens and Peisistratus became tyrant there took place increasing centralisation of government, some development of industry and public works, and the influencing of public opinion through cultural and religious activities.

The inauguration of the Pan-Atheniac festival also symbolised the union of Attica under the centralised leadership of Athens, and provided a magnificent chance for propoganda for the regime. Under the Peisistratids, religion could become a positive sanction in justifying and maintaining the tyranny, and together with the splendour of the cultural activities and patronage at the court, a vital influence on public opinion. This implication of the influence of religion and cultural patronage under the tyrants will be considered in more detail when Pindar is discussed.

The response of the traditional aristocracy to this serious assault on their position was diverse. Some fled and their lands were resettled. Others could not provide the money needed if they were to retain political influence; some helped the tyrants (34). The history of one family, the Alcmaeonids, is a striking example of response to the need to adapt in order to regain influential position, and provides an interesting comparison with the hints about Pittacus given by Alcaeus.

Initially, the Alcmaeonids were allied with the tyranny in Athens (Peisistratus married the younger Megacles' daughter), but they turned against Peisistratus and helped to achieve his expulsion (35). When Peisistratus returned and undertook his main period of rule, the Alcmaeonids were themselves expelled. They seem to have prospered in exile, and according to Herodotus retained much of their prestige,

maintaining and increasing their influence at Delphi, which enabled them to influence representatives of other states who came to consult the oracle, so they were well situated to organise an invasion of Attica (36).

The first two attacks on Attica, inspired by the Alcmaeonids, but using Spartan troops, failed. A third attack under the command of the Spartan king Cleomenes succeeded and the Peisistratids agreed to withdraw. The withdrawal left a power vacuum. Attica had been united under a city administration and the local allegiances broke down, yet now there was no central administration. A new struggle for power developed between Cleisthenes the Alcmaeonid and Isagoras.

Considerable light is shed on this struggle by four fragments of Pentelic marble found in the Athenian Agora (37). The list of names is taken from larger catalogues and some can be restored at once - Hippias, Cleisthenes, Miltiades, although there is uncertainty over others. The names refer to the sixth century, since it is a known fact that Miltiades held the archonship in 524/3 (38). Thus it may be concluded that the archon of 525/4 was Cleisthenes, son of Megacles of Aolpehe and a member of the Alcmaeonid family. This discovery is vital because otherwise it would be thought the Alcmaeonids were in exile from the time of their expulsion by Peisistratus until their overthrow of Hippias. The inscription suggests that a reconciliation took place, and that Hippias allowed Cleisthenes to hold the archonship in the year following his own tenure.

If the Alcmaeonid exile was shorter than previously thought, the rivalry between Cleisthenes and Isagoras takes on a new tone, since both were presumably in Athens until the second banishment of the Alcmaeonids (39). Possibly the second banishment was associated with the harsher tyranny of Hippias after the death of Hipparchus. It seems likely that Cleisthenes' faction was in any case less successful at integrating iteself with the tyranny than that of Isagoras, who is referred to by Aristotle as having "supported the tyrants" (40).

There are two accounts of Cleisthenes' eventual triumph over Isagoras in 508. Aristotle has it that Isagoras' use of Spartan troops to banish Cleisthenes turned public opinion against himself, and it was the decisive power of the urban population which recalled

Cleisthenes (41). Herodotus makes Cleisthenes more of an opportunist, achieving through an alliance with the demos a majority in the Assembly which voted on reforms before Isagoras had time to appeal to Sparta (42). Taken with the evidence of the Archon list and the diplomatic activities of the Alcmaeonids, it is clear that the family explored various means of adaptation in the light of the new power structure, and that Cleisthenes used the demos to further his own plans for defeating the rival faction, just as his family had earlier appealed to aristocratic ties outside their own polis when that seemed appropriate.

The ground covered in this chapter has, of necessity, been very wide. Thus on the one side is the stress on practical adaptation seen in the examples of Pittacus and the Alcmaeonids (an adaptation which was not as yet articulated in an intellectual form), while in the literary sources the clash of entrenched ideas with the force of circumstance was seen to produce some significant developments in elitist idealogy. It is interesting that the constraint of the tyrants does not seem to have been given an intellectual sanction at this stage. (Pindar's later attitude to the tyrants will be considered in the next chapter). The traditional form of aristocratic maintenance of status through constraint, though still expressed in Alcaeus, is shown in Theognis to be an obsolute dream, while in Solon constraint becomes a specific element within a framework of equilibrium. The developments reflect the crisis of a ruling class caught between its obsolete traditions and economic and civic threats of great magnitude. In an intellectual climate which was moving away from myth and towards man-orientated sanctions, the need was for a theoretical justification which would serve the dual purpose of quelling disorder and enabling the elite to adapt to the new status quo. Thus the move is from the religious sanction of Hesiod to Solon's philosophy of moderation, involving the emergence of the image of man as the director of political events (the pilot of Alcaeus' ship) but subject to the pitfalls and pressures of the storms of life; the idea of a justice based on civic circumstances (Theognis' dikaiosune); and the figure of the morally superior leader (Solon's shepherd), as responsible for the necessary combination of constraint with the administration of law and justice in society.

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CHAPTER FOUR.

PINDAR.

Pindar was born in 518, six years after Aeschylus, and died in 438 (1). The fact that the two men were almost exact contemporaries seems incredible in the light of the content and tone of their work, which is not so much in direct contrast as in completely different spheres. Pindar was a member of one of the noblest families in Hellas, the Aegeidae, which had branches at Thebes, Sparta and Cyrene. It also enjoyed intimate relationships with the priesthood of Apollo at Delphi. These facts may have influenced Pindar's often priestly tone and his desire to expound religious and ethical precepts, and especially his conception of the Hellenic aristocrat , his conviction that those who trace their lineage to a hero have a strain of divine blood, giving moral, intellectual and physical advantages.

Against Pindar's Pan-Hellenism, and the religious tone of his symbolism, must be set the vital factor that he depended on patronage. The patronage of Hiero in particular seems to have been an extended one. Pindar certainly went to Syracuse, probably in 476, and stayed there for two years. Hiero must have been renowned as a patron of the arts since his other guests included Simonides, Bacchylides, Epicharmus and Aeschylus. It might be argued that the tone of the composition of the poems is governed by the fact that they were composed under patronage, and certainly Pindar refers to the need for the Muse to work for silver. "But, as thou, my Muse, didst bind thyself to lend thy tongue for fee of silver, thou must needs suffer it to flit, now one way, now another, now to the father, who was victor at Pytho, now to his son, Thrasydaeus" (2). There is evidence in the Odes, however, that Pindar held a very definite view of the obligations of the poet. He does not stint the offering of advice to his patrons on such subjects as government and the need for freedom of the Greek citizens. He also introduces some of his own personal concerns into the poems. However, it is unlikely that he would have retained his position if his work had not pleased his patron.

There is one notable example of the commissioned poem where it is quite clear that the sentiments expressed are not necessarily those of the author. This is the Fourth Pythian, dedicated to Arcesilas of Cyrene, the winner in the chariot race of 462, and apparently composed at the request of Damophilus, a noble who had been exiled for taking part

in an aristocratic insurrection against the king of Cyrene, and who had been staying at Thebes. Damophilus evidently hoped to propitiate the king by offering a splendid ode to celebrate the victory. Pindar makes full use of the myth of the voyage of the Argonauts to create an atmosphere of yearning and to lead up to the proposed reconciliation introduces the allegory of the lopped oak. The king is portrayed as a healer, able with heaven's help to bring good news - the praise of Damophilus is then blended with an appeal for forgiveness, such as Zeus granted to the Titans - "The exile hopeth that the day will come, when he shall have drained to the dregs the cup of baneful woe, and shall see his home again, and near Apollo's fountain, shall betake himself to the joys of the banquet, and yield his soul, full oft, to youthful gladness, and amid fellow citizens skilled in song, shall hold in his hands his deftly carven altern, and attain to peace, doing despite to no man, and being himself unscathed by his townsmen. And haply he will tell how fair a fountain of immortal song he found Arcesilas, when lately welcomed by a friend at Thebes" (3). Here Pindar is writing in a spirit which precedes the acceptance of politics as a legitimate general activity, there is no appeal to strategy or interest, for example, the structure of the poem is symbolic. The influence of patronage makes Pindar's poems particularly relevant to this thesis because it is reasonable to infer that the language and sentiments are largely those which were acceptable to the powerful and successful men who patronised him.

It should also be mentioned that Pindar was not only concerned with what he had, of necessity, to undertake in poetry, but also with the opportunity afforded him by poetry. This distinction has been elaborated by C.M. Bowra in his study (4), and it is sufficient to notice here that Pindar believed poetry could be a means of imparting truth, and that truth will emerge from falsehood in poetry as in everything else, given time - "Time, the sole declarer of the very truth" (5). Therefore it is reasonable to suppose that although Pindar was under patronage there is no essential disunity between what he had to express in his poems and the stylistic means he chose for so doing.

The concern of this discussion will not be with the historical accuracy of the virtues he ascribes to particular heroes, nor with the question of whether Pindar really believed them to be accurate. The intention is to dissociate the ideas from any given individual he is paid to honour, and consider them rather in the

context of the high status they imply. The status of the victor was indeed very great. The Games were open solely to citizens of Greece or of the Greek colonies, and in the pre-Sophistic age the importance of training in physical pursuits among the leisured classes had been unassailed. Success required not only the ability and strength of character stressed by Pindar, but also leisure and the wealth to employ the best trainers and furnish the best horses and chariots. Victory, of necessity, implied the possession of all these things and therefore could also boost a man's prestige, whether as a tyrant, or as a member of the ruling class, in an age when political virtues themselves were undefined. The unique character of this status is emphasised by the manner in which Pindar employs the religious and heroic connotations of the tradition of the Games - this is a prime example of the use of status based on sanctions no longer directly relevant to the function required of the elite in contemporary society.

In illustrating the ideas characteristic of a spirit which precedes acceptance of practical politics as a proper sphere of general activity (the development of this will be shown in Aeschylus) there are, of course, problems of selecting relevant material which has, because of its very nature, to be discussed via the treatment of symbolic poetry. However, every effort will be made to include for discussion passages which are typical of Pindar's poetry as a whole. To this end, fragments will, as far as possible, be avoided and the standards of assessing typicality adopted by Bowra in his study will be used as a control.

Pindar's poetry is not immediately concerned with politics, except for some specially commissioned poems whose significance has been indicated above. Nevertheless, it is possible to gain some insight into his own political beliefs, and more important, to relate these to oligarchic attitudes at the time. His aristocratic birth has already been described. The Theban Aegeidae were connected by lineage with both the Cadman Thebes and with Dorian Sparta. It is therefore unlikely that Pindar, so strongly linked with the inter-state Oligarchs, would have been in sympathy with the general principles of democracy. In Pythian X Pindar says that to be well governed a state must be in the hands of the best men, and seems to equate this with a hereditary aristocracy -

> "it is in the hands of high born men that there resteth the good piloting of cities, while they pass from sire to son" (6).

Pindar also shows that he considers it is not enough to be high born in order to reach the forefront in politics. This must be combined with qualities of judgement. Indeed, he writes that "under every mode of government, a man of straightforward speech cometh to the front, whether in the tyrant's court, or where the boisterous host or where the wise have care of the state" (7). The reference to "the boisterous host" may be taken to imply the violent revolutions which convulsed Sicilian cities in the early part of the 5th century, and the reference would not be lost on Hiero, to whom the poem is addressed.

The equation of moderation with right to rule implies approval of a moderate Oligarchic constitution, for example "For of all the orders in the State, I find that the middle rank flourisheth with a more enduring prosperity, and I condemn the lot of tyrannies. I am eager for those virtues that serve the folk, but envious mischief-makers are warded off" (8). According to Thucydides (9), the government at Thebes at the time of the Persian wars had been a narrowly based oligarchy, later replaced by a more comstitutionally based oligarchy. It seems likely that this latter was the type of government of which Pindar approved - his more extravagant praises of the tyrant Hiero, for instance, refer specifically to prowess in the games, and he does not refrain from offering advice on moderate government, and praising just and wise rule on the part of his patron. Hiero is reminded of the obligation to wield the "sceptre of law" righteously, and his rule is referred to as a kind of stewardship (10).

There is no evidence that Pindar took a direct role in politics, and although some of his poems indicate his concern at contemporary political events, he seems to lack any deep political understanding or ability to analyse the underlying causes of a crisis. If his work is compared with even the few extant fragments of his contemporary Simonides, it becomes apparent that his insight into new social forces is negligible and his vision narrow and restricted. (Whether the religious aspect of his symbolism lends a greater significance to his work will be discussed later).

Pindar's lack of awareness of the forces underlying political change, and his domination by desire for aristocratic unity is shown in his attitude to the Medising of Thebes. The Persian invasion of 480-479 severely shook Pindar's rather naive view of the essential unity of the Greek oligarchies, and indeed of all the Greek states.

His first patrons, the Princes of Thessaly, joined Xerxes (11) and so did Thebes (12), and the Delphic oracle (with which Pindar's family was connected) counselled the Greeks to surrender (13). It is true that the Thebans divided and small forces went to Tempe and Thermopylae, but the prevailing policy was co-operation led by the aristocracy (14).

Pindar's reaction is shown in two fragments (15), warning against the war and apologising for those who desire peace. In the second fragment, his dread of stasis is apparent in his call for peace at Thebes. He was unable to grasp the wider significance of the Persian invasion, being totally dominated by his concern that the virtues of the aristocratic way of life should not be ruined by war and the resulting stasis. Pindar had considerable connections with Medising families, not only in Thebes but also the Aleuads of Thessaly (see above), and possibly Alexander of Macedon, for whom he is thought to have written an encomium (16).

In fact, Thebes did not avoid war, and fought on the Persian side at Plataea. After the battle the Greeks attacked Thebes and demanded the execution of its leaders. In Isthmians 3, 4 and 8, Pindar speaks of his feelings for Thebes, divided against itself and hated by Greece. Against this experience may be set Pindar's growing disillusionment with Athens, especially after 460 and the attack on Aegina (17), when he began to despair of Hellenic unity and moderation and increasingly took refuge in an idealised vision of godlike aristocracy which was all that remained to him of his early dreams. It is in the light of his failure to grasp the underlying significance of contemporary events that his treatment of the aristocrats in his poems has to be considered, for although he makes some acknowledgement of the dominant influence and status of the polis, his attitude to inter-state affairs, whether Medism, Pan-Hellenism or the power of Athens, is governed by his desire to preserve his own aristocratic ideal and never by any understanding of the urgency of political pressures or by constancy of principle.

The word 'aristocrat' is used advisedly in relation to Pindar's work in preference to 'elite' or even 'aristocracy'. This is because Pindar does not consider in any rational way the position of a ruling class or its definition. He is not, in fact, consciously writing about a class at all, since, for him, the social group from which the victor is drawn is the only group in which he is interested - it is,

in fact, his whole world, and therefore within this limited sphere he writes of outstanding individuals rather than considering a specific class. Even his attempts to link the heroic arete with the polis can hardly be described as comprising an elitist rationale, since he is unable to move away from symbolism and relate his idealised figures to concrete political activity. Nevertheless, there is a very real sense in which Pindar's victors come to represent attempts to sanction power and the very fact that he does not attempt to relate their success to the polis shows that Pindar realised that, in a time of political development, the holding of power had to be rationalised.

It is proposed, therefore, firstly to analyse the part played in Pindar's work by the traditional attributes of the aristocrat - birth, wealth, physical and intellectual prowess, and then to relate these to the sanctioning authority of Pindar's religious, social and Pan-Hellenic contexts, and to try thereby to focus on the rather unexpected light he sheds on the beginnings of the rationalisation of political philosophy.

It is significant that in the transition from the 6th century to the 5th century, wealth comes consistently to be looked upon as a means to power. One aspect of this development is shown in the Odes of Pindar in which attitudes to wealth play an important part. In the second Olympian he describes the traditional heroic view of wealth as the reward of success -

"Heracles established the Olympic festival from the spoils of war, while Theron must be proclaimed by reason of his victorious chariot with its four horses, Theron who is just in his regard for his guests, and who is the bulwark of Acragas, the choicest flower of an auspicious line of sires, whose city towers on high - those sires who, by much labours of mind, gave them a hallowed home beside the river, and were the eye of Sicily, while their allotted time drew on, bringing wealth and glory to crown their native merits" (18).

However, Pindar is well aware of the very different foundation of wealth in his own age and he draws attention to its danger - "Gold is a child of Zeus, neither moth nor rust devoureth it; but the mind of man is devoured by this supreme possession" (19). But he also tries to show the alliance between wealth and honour at its most fruitful - "Wealth adorned with virtues bringeth the fitting chance of divers boons" (20). For Pindar's values are rooted in the tradition which holds

that good reputation is a high prize - "the first of prizes is good fortune; the second falleth to fair fame; but whosoever findeth and winneth both, hath received the highest crown" (21).

Therefore, the ability to use wealth as well as to acquire it is allied to virtue and is itself a means of acquiring a good reputation - "I love not to keep much wealth buried in my hall, but of my abundance to do good to myself and to win a good name by bestowing it on my friends" (22). Pindar recognises that the wealthy man can be happy if he possesses good health and reputation (23), and says that these things are signs of the approval of the gods. In the second Paean he talks of the capacity to gain the good will of the gods towards the power and wealth gained by conquest - "They won by war a land with dower of wealth and planted prosperity firm, when they had pursued the tribes of the Paeonian warriors beyond Mount Athos, their nurse divine; but an adverse fate befell them. Yet they endured, and the gods joined at last in fulfilling their desire. For he that hath done a noble deed is illumined with praises" (24). Thus in Pindar's works there is evidence of an attempt to link the idea of wealth as a reward for aristocratic virtue with a concern for its wise use in order to gain in reputation and power and thus (by implication) to maintain the social status quo - to the glories of wealth must be added wisdom in its use. The kind of wisdom praised by Pindar is, in fact, synonymous with the sensible moderation which was discussed above. It is in no sense to be equated with intellectual sublety. In fact, Pindar specifically rejects the scientists and philosophers of his day, in spite of the possible theological background to their thought, calling them men who "pick on unripe fruit of wisdom" (25).

The glory of the efforts of the spirit as opposed to the intellect is seen by Pindar as something which possesses its own intrinsic merit. His attitude towards physical prowess sheds some light on this particular aspect of the transition in values. There are in the Odes very few descriptions of purely physical activity. The passages relating to prowess and victory strike a tone very different from those in the Homeric poems, where physical prowess is recognised on its own merits. In Pindar, physical prowess is largely subordinate to an effort of the mind which is spiritual rather than intellectual.

In fact it is not the physical difficulty of the games which is stressed, but the spiritual. The theme of toil is constantly

recurring, but it is the toil of application of mind as well as body. Oblivion from toil comes only in victory (26), and toil itself puts on trial a man's character, not merely his physical ability (27). Toil holds a vital place in the Odes because "if there be any bliss among mortal men, it doth not reveal itself without toil" (28). It is toil allied to innate genius which brings the crown of victory - "our hero hath by the blessing of heaven been born with deftness of hand and litheness of limb and with valour in his glance" (29).

There are a few passages which are concerned with athletic detail. Notably these include reference to "the cunning skill that swiftly shifts its balance but never falls" (30). Niceus who "with circling sweep of his hand excelled all others in flinging afar the weight of stone" (31), the charioteer who "amid forty drivers who were laid low, (thou) with thy fearless spirit, didst bring thy chariot through unscathed" (32), or Pindar's own "swift tongue, belie that bronze tipped spear, which releaseth the neck from the sweat of the wrestling match" (33). It is immediately apparent that even in descriptions of seemingly athletic activity, the language used unites triumph of spirit with physical success. This is because Pindar's own conception of human greatness unites exertion of the body and spirit to achieve the glory of success. For Pindar this unity forms a significant part of the universe, a universe which, for him, is heroic, idealistic, aristocratic, and a universe in which the victor triumphs because of his inborn need to display his gifts. His victory is as 'fitting' for him, in the aesthetic sense, as are the triumphs of the Homeric agathos.

But the setting for the triumph of Pindar's heroes is not the field of battle, but the field of the games. Pindar's treatment of them is infused with a spirit of co-operation among the states of Hellas, although, as was indicated earlier, he must have been to some extent disillusioned by political events. However, it is true that the games took place during periods of truce and were often the occasion for fairly considerable diplomatic activity.

But Olympia, to take one example only, was not only the political centre of a league but also a sanctuary, a sacred city. The 'altis' or sacred precinct was richly adorned with splendid works of art and was a focus of Pan-Hellenic religion. The religious implications of the challenge of the Games pervades Pindar's work. In the Odes, success is

closely associated with the gift of the gods. Pindar shows a priestly reverence towards them and refuses to indulge in the narration of unfavourable myths, an important point because it emphasises his belief in the superior and moral status of the gods. Although mortal men may rise to great heights, Pindar never allows his listeners to forget that they must never aspire to the status of gods, even the noblest man has his limits - "But, if any one tendeth his wealth in wholesome wise by being bountiful with his possessions and by winning good report, let him not seek to become a god" (34).

If success in the games is the gift of the gods, it is in the sense that it is their position in the order of the universe to endow a man with prowess; it is left to the heroic individual to labour to develop his prowess within the limits of mortal capacity. Pindar's poetry is therefore dedicated to an idea which is at once religious and social. The heroic spirit is restored in the celebrations of victory. The victory is the manifestation of the highest human arete. In this sense the victor, although addressed as an individual, is seen also as the representative of the ideal type. In Pindar the concept of arete is complete and accepted; it is not presented as a subject for intellectual discussion as in Simonides. Pindar's is the limited expression of the man who writes for the successful victor within a closed stratum of society.

Yet success in the games was highly valued, and its Pan-Hellenic influence is the cornerstone of Pindar's attempt to relate the achievements of his heroes to the demand of the polis. As Bowra points out (35), even in a harder and more realistic world than Pindar's it was possible for Thucydides to report Alcibiades as claiming his first, second and fourth places in the chariot races at Olympia in 416 greatly impressed the rest of Greece with the power of Athens (36). Pindar lays great stress on the public recognition of the victor's achievement in contrast to Solon, who tried to regularise some of the privileges, and Tyrtaeus and Xenophanes who thought other manifestations of arete had more civic utility (see preceding chapter). Pindar, however, asserted that the very nature of the triumph brings glory, not only upon the victor, but also upon his city. In the Fifth Olympian, Pindar describes the home-coming of the victor - "Psaumis, who, exalting the city, Camarina, that fostereth its people, at the greatest festivals of the gods, essayed to honour the twice six altars with the slaughter of

oxen and also with contests of games, lasting for five days, even with horses and mules and with the riding of the single steed. And, by his victory, he hath set up for thee a bright renown, and hath caused to be proclaimed by the herald his father Acron and his newly founded home" (37).

Pindar's poems were lasting memorials for a city of the victory of one of its citizens - the Ode to Diagoras the Rhodian was said to have been copied in letters of gold and deposited at the temple of Athena at Lindas in Rhodes. In the way in which Pindar brings the Greeks of all cities into sympathy by rites and cults common to all, by his exaltation of virtues honoured among all the Greeks, and his desire for his poems to circulate through all Hellas, in the very imagery and style of the poems is highlighted the desire of Pindar to cement the cultural and spiritual unity of the Hellenic aristocracy while yet linking each victor with his own polis.

In view of the political and social changes fostered by the revolutions in modes of warfare, and in land and finance which were discussed in the previous chapter, a new basis to the legitimacy of the power-holders was necessary. The religious element in Pindar's work, while it limits the powers of men as opposed to the gods, also serves to exalt the powers of the elite as opposed to other men.

The significance of Pindar's work lies, therefore, in its attempt to preserve and re-establish aristocratic values at a time of transition. The attempt is influenced not only by heroic modes of thought, but also by a limited realisation of the political and social loyalties of the polis. The reassertion of the qualities of inborn arete associated with an aristocratic elite is made in terms of religious and spiritual attitudes into which the polis could be assimilated, or so Pindar thought. The vital tension in his work is between the outstanding qualities of the hero and the limitations on fulfilment imposed by the need to avoid hybris and keep even the hero's aspiration within the limits of what is appropriate to mortal men. For as Pindar says in the seventh Nemean (38) -

"The rich man and the poor alike wend their way together to the hour of death....But the billow of Hades rolleth over all alike; that billow breaketh on the dimly known and on the famous".

There is also a social aspect to Pindar's recognition of the limitation of the capabilities of even the outstanding men. A fragment attributed

to Pindar (39) speaks of "Men who, in the cities, are too eager for ambition, or for faction, that manifest woe". That which ensures the position of cities is the goddess of Peace, Ἡσυχία. "Kindly Goddess of Peace, daughter of Justice, that makest cities great" (40). Thus in the eighth Pythian, Pindar, giving ἡσυχία parentage in the Hesiodic manner, invokes a religious sanction which not only implicitly equates the will of the goddess with the rule of hereditary aristocracy (because both make cities great (41)), but by stressing the descent of Peace as the daughter of Justice, as well as her divinity, brings together the political moderation necessary for stability in the polis and the religious apprehension of the mortal limitations of all men, however noble. However, Pindar does not develop these ideas either philosophically or in terms of practical politics. They are, it seems, intended to form a synthesis which, in its turn, becomes a framework within the limits of which Pindar can idealise his victors (42).

The manner in which Pindar attempts to relate his concept of the hero to the requirements of the political reality of the polis, masks an important transitional phase in the move from the idea of the aristocrat expressed in symbolic form towards the emergence of a rational elitest concept. Pindar does not play a vital role in the shaping of these changes, but his work is symptomatic of the need for the aristocracy to face up to two urgent problems. The first problem is that of the relevance of the outstanding individual to contemporary society, the second is that raised by the realisation that in order to play any part in ordering or shaping that society, the ambitious man must first make concessions to its requirements. Pindar's philosophy is too conservative, his insight insufficiently original to react in a truly constructive way to these difficulties. But it is enough that he feels compelled to go some way to meet contemporary concerns. His forging of an alliance between the glory of the victor in the games and that of his polis both reflects contemporary practice, and indicates the way in which he conceded that the aristocratic elite had to be sanctioned by the polis in order to survive. The survival of the aristocracy as a class from one age to the next, and the acceptance of its values as criteria for judgement depend on compromise with the values of the polis, and in asserting the individual glory of the hero or victor, Pindar is forced also to signal the decline of the importance

attached to this kind of achievement in isolation, and to insist on the link of the individual's success with that of his polis.

Thus the aristocratic ideal seeks to retain some, at least, of its status by accepting the advisability and utility of adherence to the political reality of the polis. But the ultimate sanction with which Pindar reacts divorces him to a large extent from the immediate realities of his time. He attempts to invest the qualities of spirit with the aura which surrounded the mythical figures and heroes, while virtually ignoring contemporary political and economic development. His response to threats of disorder is the assertion of a universal order resting on the relationship between gods and the outstanding individuals on whom they bestow prowess. However, Pindar's treatment of the problem is not the only possible one - his basic assumptions about universal order and the sanctioning power of religion were questioned in the work of Simonides and Herodotus, while a very different reaction from his attempt to absorb the polis into a religious and heroic order will be found in Aeschylus.

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CHAPTER FIVE.

AESCHYLUS.

In direct contrast to Pindar, Aeschylus is clearly directly concerned with the implications of contemporary political events. He himself served as a hoplite at Marathon, and in THE PERSIANS presents a vivid account of the battle of Salamis. His concern in this play, however, was not only with the Greek effort to maintain autonomy against the threat from Persia, but also with the conflicting values inherent in the Greek and Persian political systems. Aeschylus also shows sensitivity to the changes in political life at Athens, and it is against the background of radical democracy and the assassination of Ephialtes which were the culmination to a period of decline of the Areopagus, that THE EUMENIDES has to be seen.

In 487-6 the archons were, for the first time, selected by lot (1). One archon (including the secretary) was appointed by lot from each phyle, but out of five hundred candidates elected by the demes. The archons would still be men of the top two census classes (the criterion for which was wealth) but the chance of the draw deprived the office of much of its political status. It still remained an honour to be archon, but the attraction of the office for an ambitious politician diminished. As the office of chief archon declined in status so that of strategos became increasingly important. The strategoi were elected officials and could be re-elected an unlimited number of times. Thus, both in method and composition, a strong aristocratic flavour existed in a vital area of the democracy, the usual method of democratic selection now being recognised as the lot. In the reforms of 462 the Areopagus was finally stripped of its powers, retaining the right to try cases of homicide and a few other crimes thought to have religious significance. Its other functions were transferred to the Council of Five Hundred, the Assembly or the popular courts. It was claimed that the Areopagus had been originally a homicide court and had usurped its other functions. This implicitly raised the whole problem of the sanctions behind civic organisation, and it is this which is Aeschylus' concern in the trial scene.

There are two main aspects of the direct relevance of Aeschylus to the theme under consideration. The first derives from the general significance attributed to the role of the poets as teachers, especially in a pre-sophistic age. This general relevance would, on its

own, be marginal, but there exists in the case of Aeschylus evidence that ancient opinion held that he was of importance as a political teacher. In the FROGS of Aristophanes, Aeschylus and Euripides are presented as agreeing in principle that poets should be admired - "For skill and wisdom and because we make citizens better men" (2). This statement prepares the way for Aeschylus' retention of his position of supremacy among the poets, for when Dionysus is called upon by Plato to say why he has come in search of a poet, he replies:

"So the city saved may keep its choral festivals.
Whichever is likely to advise the city well, him
I intend to take back" (3).

The vital point is that Aeschylus is judged victor not for his literary merit, which is, in fact, subject to considerable criticism, but for political merit. He is considered to be a wise adviser of the polis. Taken in conjunction with the second aspect, the position of the drama in civic life, this attests to his relevance to the present study.

The passages of literary criticism in the FROGS indicate the high degree of familiarity with the tragic dramatists which Aristophanes evidently assumed in his audiences. In fact, quite apart from the question of literacy (4) and the problem of possible interpolation in FROGS 1114, it is clear that Aristophanes might reasonably have expected such familiarity, since the dramatic performances had a vital role to play, no so much in formal education as in the testing and influencing of public opinion. As religious ceremonies the dramatic festivals were under public control, but even from a secular point of view they were considered fitting subjects for the attention of statesmen, since the amusement and instruction of the people was considered one of the regular duties of government.

It is unnecessary to recount in detail the organisation of the festivals, this has been amply documented by Pickard-Cambridge (5), but certain points need to be made in connection with the present discussion. Firstly, the dramas presented had a wide audience - the theatre of Dionysus could probably hold fourteen to seventeen thousand people. Secondly, the festival of the City Dionysia (the most important) was held at the end of winter, when the sea was again navigable, and as the allies paid tribute at this time Athens was crowded with visitors. Influence, therefore, extended considerably beyond the city itself, conditions existed for the interchange of ideas in the city.

Thirdly, great importance was attached to the competitions. This is shown by the stress laid on production and the way in which the position of choregus became at once a public duty and an honour if the production was successful (6). The honour attached to victory is shown by the fact that statesmen were proud to be associated with such an example of taste and munificence, and that in addition to the elaborate records kept by the state, private monuments were erected by the victorious choregi (7). These usually took the form of marble tablets containing a painting or sculptured relief. There were also elaborate public monuments of stone erected in or near the theatre of Dionysus.

Fourthly, the elaborate procedure for the selection of the judges, and their liability to prosecution or imprisonment if their verdict was supposed to be unjust, indicates the involvement of the populace in the adjudication; in fact the despotism of the audience was later lamented by Plato (8). From Aeschylus' frequent selection to contest in the festivals it may therefore safely be assumed that he was popular and had some considerable influence in the field of political ideas. To be more precise concerning the extent of his influence is virtually impossible, since he asserted no dogma, and unlike Sophocles is not know to have been prominent politically. In addition, the obvious point can be made that the relationship between a dramatist's ideas and those of his time is usually reciprocal.

It may, however, be demonstrated that certain major themes in his work are directly relevant to the modifications taking place in elitist ideas, and in the light of the evidence summarised above may be judged to have contributed to these modifications. It has to be emphasised also that no attempt will be made to isolate or interpret more than a few of the many factors which interact in Aeschylus' work. In particular, effort will be made to avoid the worst pitfalls of a historical/social interpretation which might seek to avoid the many unresolved problems in Aeschylus, and which might lose sight of the whole fabric of a play in attempting to stretch the interpretation to fit in with contemporary political events or personalities - such an attempt is not only aesthetically objectionable but is also useless in terms of serious scholarship. It is aesthetically objectionable because it destroys the Aeschylean balance between form and content, bringing what is in itself a viable art form to the level

of a political pamphlet. What is of most importance for the present argument, however, is the second major objection to such studies - their superficiality. While Aeschylus was arguably influenced by contemporary events - and in the case of THE PERSIANS and THE EUMENIDES demonstrably so - his very treatment of them in these two plays shows conclusively that his basic concern was with their widest implications for man's self-conscious examination of his capacity in relation to the stresses of his environment.

Therefore it will be argued that in addition the relevance to general political ideas attested by Aeschylus' reputation as a wise teacher of the citizens and the central importance of the festivals to civic life, the philosophical issues in the plays play a vital role in modifying elitist ideas. The general relation of the dramatic sources to elitist thought has been outlined in the INTRODUCTION, but it is perhaps necessary to add here that Aeschylus' relevance is a unique one. His work cannot be cogently interpreted merely in terms of a moral imperative expressed through the representation of virtues needed by outstanding men. He makes little attempt (and here he is in contrast to Sophocles, for example) to develop philosophical issues in terms of character. His interest is focused on principles rather than individuals.

Yet it will be shown that there is a complex relation between Aeschylus' concern with principles and the problems of man in society. It takes a great individual, such as Prometheus, to show men their potential and in so doing to transcend the accepted order of conduct. Unfortunately we do not know how Aeschylus developed his treatment of the Myth, but the material we do have is sufficient to indicate his concern with the problems of the relation of outstanding ability and aspiration to the conventional religious, social and political order. When this is concered in conjunction with the secularisation of the dispensation of justice represented in THE EUMENIDES, it will become clear that Aeschylus' relevance to elitist ideas is basically one of a social philosopher, rather than one which is narrowly didactic. His work will therefore be considered as a modifying influence on elitist ideas because of the way in which it explores the relationship between outstanding ability and aspiration and problems of social and religious order and justice (9).

Two major lines of significance in Aeschylus' work may be distinguished in terms of the limits established above. In varying and

different perspectives these are mutually interdependent. They are the reconciliation and adaptation of the elitist ideal to the demands of the polis and the emergence of man as the prime mover of morality. Nestlé once wrote that tragedy is born when myth is seen with the citizen's eye - it is through this conflict that Aeschylus, the citizen poet, studies progress. In some respects his work tends to variations on a theme of πιθει μυθος, but in fact he is not a philosopher of progress, the persistence of conflict is always present even in apparent resolution. It is in the weighting of aspects like these that interpretations of Aeschylus' work can be so various. The present study will be concerned only with attempting to analyse textual examples within a context of awareness of these problems.

In the plays of Aeschylus, the moral, social and political themes are mutually relevant. The immediate inspiration of the extant plays is to be found in the Persian wars, in which Aeschylus took part, and in the rapidly changing political and social situation at Athens. Throughout his work there is a close relation between past and present, between prophecy and actuality, and between ideas and cultural traditions and their practical effects. His significance for the main theme can best be shown through analysis of his treatment of some of the problems of conflict and progress, wisdom and power, and above all in his treatment of the Prometheus myth and its consequences for the whole basis of the assessment of human conduct and achievement. His extant plays preserve exploration of social, political, military, moral and cultural crises. The most significant of the plays in this respect will be the PROMETHEUS BOUND and the ORESTEIA, but THE SUPPLIANTS, the SEVEN AGAINST THEBES and THE PERSIANS all provide illuminating insight into Aeschylus' basic concerns and his response to them. In particular, the two latter plays are governed by the broad framework of civic response to political crisis, while in the former there is treatment of a mythological theme through the medium of social crisis and civic resolution.

THE SUPPLIANTS contains particularly interesting examples of the development of basically mythological material when seen with the mind of the citizen poet. The moral and religious issues are closely associated with their social context. For instance, the implications of the economic basis of the law of inheritance are stressed - if a woman married a kinsman, the family's property increased because her property was retained, but this involved bondage

for the woman because she could not appeal for protection to her relatives as would be the case if she married a non-relative. The Danaids' desire to escape from bondage is intertwined with the theme of the status of Argos as a champion of freedom and refuge from tyranny, a theme with contemporary political undertones. The social themes in the play derive their tone from the emphasis given in the climax - it is significant that although the theme of pollution runs through the play, the reconciliation is prompted not by religious but by civic action -

"Take heart, my children, well are cast the people's
final vote....
The Argives have decreed
Not doubtfully, so as to change my ageing
Heart to youth again; so bristled thick
The air with hands, resolving thus the law:
Free we are to settle here, subject
Neither to seizure nor reprisal, claimed
Neither by citizen nor foreigner.
But if they turn to force, whoever rich
In lands refuses succour, shall be stripped
Of offices and banished publicly
The king persuaded.....
.....but Zeus still crowned the end" (10).

Here the forces of civic action, the persuasive power of the king and the sanction of Zeus are shown in co-operation to produce a compromise situation out of crisis. The issues raised in the play suggest that not only did Aeschylus see struggle as a means of bringing about change and concede that this could include social struggle also, but also that he regarded conflict as an essential part of the relationship between diverse social, cultural and political pressures. Only thus can the Argive king use the threat of pollution as a weapon of rhetoric in addressing a democratic assembly. Because of the nature of the conflicting elements the tensions remain, when a compromise is reached in a crisis.

In THE PERSIANS and SEVEN AGAINST THEBES, Aeschylus' subject is political rather than social crisis, but just as the treatment of the social crisis at Argos is not without its political elements, so the political crises of THE PERSIANS and the SEVEN are bounded and inspired by social factors.

THE PERSIANS comes near to historical re-enactment, including as it does a description of the battle of Salamis, which Aeschylus himself is thought to have witnessed. The theme is one of tribute to Athenian greatness and resistance to threats of slavery. Through the contrast of the Persian and Hellenic cultures, Aeschylus explores the respective merits of a system where, in time of crisis, dependence is on great individuals (and where, by implication, crisis may be engendered by them) and a system which relies on the co-operation of citizens in civic action. Queen Atossa sums up the difficulties of the Persian side of the anti-thesis -

"That dread has doubled; sums of cowardly
Wealth do court contempt, and indigence
Quenches ambition's flame, even if there's strength
Though wealth we have unstinted; yet fear
Is for mine eye, Xerxes, whose presence here
I count the palace-eye" (11).

The opulence and vulnerability to hybris of the Persians is contrasted with the solid base of Hellenic power - "As long as there are men
the city stands" (12).

The Persian house is vulnerable because it consists of one outstanding individual, the Greek polis rests on the combined stature of all its citizens, in this way it can triumph over superior numbers, as the Persian messenger says - "Had numbers counted
the barbarians' warships surely would have won" (13).

The theme of the unity of the city against external threat is elaborated in the SEVEN AGAINST THEBES. Here, however, there is a notable development. The speeches of the Chorus show that distaste for violent death is now accepted, although the co-existent need to defend the city is recognised.

"May the gods grant
good luck to our champion
since justly he comes forward
a fighter for us.
But I fear for our friends
to look upon bloodshed
of those we love, dying" (14).

Thus the hint of the change in attitude to battle given by Homer in the Hector/Andromache scene is more fully amplified. Later in the play this is related to a more complex attitude. In counselling

moderation, the Chorus asserts -

"Yet even unvaliant victory the gods hold in honour" (15).

It is conceded that there can be victory in compromise. Success is not seen in terms of 'all or nothing', even victory in battle has lost some of its aesthetic/heroic connotations. This indicates a modification in attitude from that of heroic values and points towards acceptance of a success based on skill in argument and judgement to achieve what is desired through a compromise solution rather than necessarily through force of arms of the individual. The theme introduced in THE SUPPLIANTS is thus to be refined in THE EUMENIDES.

Therefore it is clear that the issues raised in THE SUPPLIANTS, THE PERSIANS and THE SEVEN are not only closely linked, each with the other, but in raising problems concerning the significance of conflict, the nature of change and the role to be played by compromise in conjunction with civic action suggest profound changes in the role to be assigned to the leaders of society, and therefore in the qualities required of them.

It is with some of these same problems that the ORESTEIA is largely concerned. In the trilogy the house of Atreus is presented as what George Thomson has described as "the battleground of human progress" (16). However, it has to be recognised that 'progress' can be a loaded word, and it is this difficulty which perhaps accounts more than anything else for the diversity in interpretations of Aeschylus. A more suitable definition with respect to Aeschylus might be 'change arising from conflict'. The word will be used in this sense for the remainder of the discussion. This would remove some of the idealogical connotations from the word'progress' whilerretaining the tensions which Aeschylus does not seek to banish from his 'resolutions'. The kinds of change emphasised in individual plays draws their character from these tensions, and from these derives also the dual significance of the central figures - they have significance in themselves, but they also embody stages in the process of change. In this sense the symbolism of Aeschylus has a concrete base far removed from the idealism of Pindar.

Thus progress in Aeschylus is not a scientific concept, though from his symbolic thought can be filtered concrete examples. Change embraces the emergence of wisdom from ignorance, good from pain, order from anarchy. Yet the variations on πάθει μάθος bring their own problems, the central one being the relation of change to stability of values and judgements if it is accepted that change retains the tensions

which brought it about. Aeschylus' awareness of this problem, and his response to it will become apparent in the course of the discussion of his major extant works.

In the AGAMEMNON the early speeches of the Chorus introduce the underlying issues involved in the crisis caused by the apparent triumph of evil and disorder during the whole of the first part of the play. The reiterated "Cry sorrow, sorrow - yet let good prevail" indicates that through physical and spiritual tragedy the possibility of good yet exists. In the purging of the guilt of the house of Atreus, in the pains attached to the discovery of knowledge, in the crises preceding political advance, Aeschylus maintains a profound belief in the coming of progress out of conflict -

"Zeus who guided men to think,
Who has laid it down that wisdom
comes alone through suffering" (17).

The concept of creative suffering is closely allied by Aeschylus to a realisation both of man's folly and shortcomings and of his potential. Mam makes misjudgements and therefore he must suffer the consequences, but in so doing he learns greater wisdom. Out of his conflicts and orises therefore, progress can emerge. The action of Agamemnon in acting against his better judgement and giving way to hybris in spite of his earlier assertions shows in symbolic form the distinctions of which the political implications have been examined in THE PERSIANS. Agamemnon said -

"I am a mortal, a man; I cannot trample upon
These tinted splendours without fear thrown in my path,
I tell you, as a man, not god, to reverence me.
Discordant is the murmur at such treading down
of lovely things; while God's most lordly gift to man
is decency of mind" (18).

Good judgement and wisdom are even more essential for the king than for other members of society, for without them his rule will be dogged by tragedy and defeat, with consequent ruin and deprivation for his subjects.

The exploration of the concept of creative suffering is continued in THE LIBATION BEARERS where another side of the problem is reflected in the lament of Electra -

"What here is good; what escape from grief?
Can we outwrestle disaster?" (19).

Her reply is a reiteration of the Chorus' optimistic -

"Yet from such as this the god, if he will
can work out strains that are fairer.
For dirges chanted over the grave
the winner's song in the lordly house;
bring home to new arms the beloved" (20).

However, to say that Aeschylus asserts that good may arise out of pain implies more of a moral judgement than Aeschylus perhaps intended. Modern interpretations of Aeschylus sometimes make the mistake of losing sight of the Greek ideas in favour of developing the treatment of the themes of suffering and conflict in Aeschylus towards a quasi-Christian tradition. For his plays are not solely, or even primarily, concerned with personal tragedy, nor with the regeneration of an individual. The characters stand as representatives of the human race in its search for self-knowledge and for a method of relating individual qualities and actions to the realities of the human situation and its society.

The relevance of the myth of the house of Atreus to contemporary society is seen in the final play of the trilogy, THE EUMENIDES. It is significant that the verdict on Orestes is not clear-cut. Athene's casting vote is needed and this is given in favour of civic order and moderation. Athene's attitude is summed up when she describes the founding of the Areopagus (see introduction to this section) -

"If it please you, men of Attica, hear my decree
now, on this first case of bloodletting I have judged
For Aegeus' population, this forevermore
shall be the ground where justices deliberate.
.....so this rock is named
from then the Aeropagus. Here the reverence
of citizens, their fear and kindred do-no-wrong
shall hold by day and in the blessing of night alike
.....Thus
I advise my citizens to govern and to grace,
and not to cast fear utterly from your city. What
man who fears nothing at all is ever righteous? Such
be your just terrors and you may deserve and have
salvation for your citadel, your lands' defence" (21).

It is quite clear from the terms of Athene's speech that it would be quite incorrect to represent Aeschylus as merely the

voice of the progressive democracy. The speech is couched in terms which emphasise that Aeschylus is, in fact, looking back to the time of the institution of the Aeropagus, and is making political judgements in terms of the Solonic concepts of harmony and moderation. This view is supported by the fact that Aeschylus was writing at the beginning of the radical democracy under the leadership of Ephialtes, which came to power in 462. The cry of the Chorus -

"Gods of the younger generation, you have ridden down
the laws of the elder time, torn them out of my hands" (22).

further illustrates Aeschylus' awareness of the conflict between old and new sets of values. His adherence to the 'ancestral constitution' is couched in terms not of absolute morality, but of civic utility. Athene presents the rule of law as imposing good conduct by presenting fear of punishment to offenders. The role of fear in safeguarding justice is vital. The significance of this assertion lies in the fact that this fear is of civic action, not of the vengeance of the gods. Piety is also stressed, but the concern of the argument is primarily with existence in society, and it is the judgement of man as represented in the courts which is paramount. The supplanting of religious sanctions by civic regulations finds its parallel in the qualities most necessary and therefore most respected in the leaders of society. Birth and wealth lose much of their intrinsic appeal and are coveted primarily in as much as they assist a man to emerge as a candidate for leadership, a position eventually achieved only through wisdom and success in civic life. The transition from the gods to men as the guarantors of the sanction of the law governing men's conduct in society is the focus of Aeschylus' climax in THE EUMENIDES. Here, man as a self-conscious agent begins to act independently from religious forces, the tension being expressed in the form of anxious questioning of man's relation to his actions. Aeschylus' recognition, not only of this transition, but of the complexity of the problems involved, is in contrast with Pindar's attempt to endow his elite with a kind of divine aura in order for them to keep their pre-eminent position.

The question of the ultimate sanction of the power structure in any society is, however, complex. Pythagoras is reported to have said that, realising the need for justice, men assigned the same function to Themis in Heaven, Dike in Hell and Nomos on earth, so that

those who committed disobedience might appear as offenders against the whole structure of the universe. To this assertion may be compared an extant fragment of Critias -

"There was a time when the life of men was unordered, bestial and the slave of force, when there was no reward for the virtuous, and no punishment for the wicked. Then, I think men devised retributory laws, in order that Justice might be dictator and have arrogance as its slave, and if anyone sinned, he was punished. Then, when the laws forbade them to commit open crimes of violence, and they began to do them in secret, a wise and clever man invented fear (of the gods) for mortals, that there might be some means of frightening the wicked, even if they do anything or say or think it in secret. Hence, he introduced the Divine (religion), saying that there is a God flourishing with immortal life, hearing and seeing with his mind, and thinking of everything and caring about these things, and having divine nature, who will hear everything said among mortals, and will be able to see all that is done. And even if you plan anything evil in secret, you will not escape the gods in this; for they have surpassing intelligence. In saying these words, he introduced the pleasantest of teachings, covering up the truth with a false theory; and he said that the gods dwelt there where he could most frighten men by saying it, whence he knew that fears exist for mortals and rewards for the hard life: in the upper periphery, where they saw lightnings and heard the dread rumblings of thunder, and the starry-faced body of heaven, the beautiful embroidery of Time the skilled craftsman, whence come forth the bright mass of the sun, and the wet shower upon the earth. With such fears did he surround mankind, through which he well established the deity with his argument, and in a fitting place, and quenched lawlessness among men...Thus, I think, for the first time did someone persuade mortals to believe in a race of deities" (23). Unlike Critias, Aeschylus was not a power seeker, and he was not, therefore, concerned in the same way with control of men's minds and thoughts except in so far as this affected civic order. On the contrary, he recognised and wished to encourage man's intellectual abilities, and in the stress which he places on social institutions and development of man's potential he moves, despite his protestations of piety, away from the religious sanction to justice and power over men's lives, and towards the man-made sanction. He finds his resting place in a unity of elements of each, the early fifth century polis.

It is in this respect that the most profound significance of the PROMETHEUS BOUND is to be found. As in others of his tragedies, Aeschylus takes as his starting point violations of the 'nothing in excess' principle. This applies to both sides, Zeus as well as Prometheus, and has a number of aspects, both political and moral, which are developed in the course of the play.

It is significant that Aeschylus has added to the original myth in order to distinguish between two stages of punishment. The daily torture of the eagle pecking at Prometheus' liver materialises only after Prometheus has defied Zeus and refused to disclose the secret on which the stability of divine government depends. Equally Zeus has adopted tyrannical methods of crushing opposition (24). From this derives the first, or political level of significance of the play. Prometheus is portrayed as rebelling against the might of Zeus as Athens rose against the tyrants and Hellas stood in defiance against Persian tyranny.

This leads to the second level of interpretation, that of the stand of man against god (Prometheus may be a god but he has identified himself with the human race). Thirdly, there is the refinement of the culture myth. Prometheus is presented as the 'techne' hero, making possible man's rise from animal misery. In his other works, Aeschylus is often concerned with the problems of hybris - in this work hybris plays an essential part, but the other side of the coin is shown. Progress involves risks and necessitates judgements about man's actual and potential ability. Aeschylus recognises that in a sense individuals may not be worth the risk Prometheus is taking. Individuals are weak and insignificant and cannot help him. An important interpolation in the myth before the time of Aeschylus was the story of Prometheus' deliverance by Hercules with the connivance of Zeus (25). Men are too weak to stand alone but too strong to be subjected, therefore conflict is inevitable and is essential in order for change to be established.

Yet in no way is Prometheus presented as an ideal for man to copy. In fact, his shortcomings are stressed. Hermes says to him - "But you have not yet learned a wise discretion" (26). This recalls the assertion of the Chorus -

"A wise man will speak humbly and fear Nemesis" (27).

The Chorus speaks with the voice of harmony and moderation and indicates the crux of the play - that technical achievement must be balanced with wisdom and moderation before conflict can be resolved. The opening

sequence of the play draws the contrast between the principles of strength and violence, and the opposing ones of reason and achievement which are partially presented in the character of Prometheus, the "champion of the human race". The assertion of strength that "No one is free but Zeus" (28) is challenged by Prometheus' attempt to promote the freedom of man to develop according to his own ability. When man realises his potential, his judgement can be brought into play for ethical and political purposes. This is summed up in the speech of Oceanus -

"Know yourself and reform your ways to new ways,
for new is he that rules among the gods" (29).

The way for man to achieve freedom to develop in any field, whether political or ethical or cultural, lies in the alliance of wisdom and moderation. But an essential pre-requisite in bringing about change is conflict - Prometheus may have been capable of a great achievement, but there is a danger of losing its force because of his lack of prudence. Equally, it is an essential part of the philosophy of the play that although Prometheus cannot stabilise the new situation, without his single mindedness of purpose (in a sense his very lack of moderation) the impetus towards change could never have taken place. For the achievement of Prometheus was indeed great -

" I found them witless and gave them the use of their wits and made them masters of their minds.....all their doings were indeed without intelligent calculation until I showed them the rising of the stars and the settings, hard to observe. And further I discovered to them numbering, pre-eminent among subtle devices, and the combining of letters as a means of remembering all things, the Muses' mother, skilled in craft.....It was I and none other who discovered ships, the sail-driven wagons that the sea buffets. Such were the contrivances that I discovered for men" (30).

Prometheus brought technical ability and intelligence to man. The lesson of his facts as presented by Aeschylus is that to be both effective and stable these must be allied with wisdom and moderation. Aeschylus thus looks, by implication, to the alliance of qualities of intellect with the civic virtues. The emphasis is no longer on the gifts of the gods but on man's development of his own potential, based on the necessary existence of conflict. The plays of Aeschylus maintain some acknowledgement of a need for piety and respect for the gods. Should this sanction be removed or lessened in force, and Aeschylus

shows himself aware in the PROMETHEUS and in the EUMENIDES that this possibility exists, the combination of intellect and strength would open the way to a new basis for the organisation of society.

The two reactions analysed in this chapter and the last are both conservative in tone. However, one, Pindar, is reactionary, the other, Aeschylus, is progressive. Some radical reactions will be discussed in the following chapter. Pindar tries to ignore the class war and lacks understanding of the implications of political development. He tries to justify and preserve the ascendency of his patrons, the tyrants and aristocracy, by celebrating their achievements and investing them physically and spiritually with god-like aura. His adaptation to the needs of the polis is marginal, and his importance lies rather in his attempt to link the aesthetic and the religious in the heroic arete to the spiritual and physical success of the victors in the Pan-Hellenic games.

Were it not for the fact that he is writing at one remove from historical events, such as the founding of the Areopagus, Aeschylus might lay claim to be a radical. However, although he shares to some extent the radical vision of the change which may emerge from conflict, his ultimate philosophy is conservative. He does not move away from Solonic principles of moderation, but attempts to unite to the civic justice posited by Solon, the wider concept of a just recognition of the status of man and his ability to order his own life. The tyrants' attempts to make use of religious sanctions to justify their position, and Pindar's refinements of this theme, are completely overshadowed by Aeschylus' secularisation of the dispensation of justice. Thus the EUMENIDES and the PROMETHEUS complement each other.

Aeschylus' contribution is of the greatest importance in modifying the new definitions to be attached to the concept of the elite. Although he himself is basically conservative, the ideas which he presents tend to the establishment of an elite based on intellect and technical achievement. Yet Aeschylus is progressive only in the technological sense. In spite of man's capacity for intellectual and scientific achievement, human nature itself remains unrefined. Thus for Aeschylus the moral problems of his extant plays are the abiding ones. He anticipates no transformation in human nature and his plays show an awareness of the need to control man's highest potential within a framework of accepted (and therefore ultimately civic) morality. In Aeschylus these elitist qualities are allied to those of the spirit and

operate within the civic framework, but his attitude to contemporary developments show his concern lest this basis was already being eroded. He was fully aware of the implications of his philosophy of conflict. If change necessarily begets more change because of persistence of basic tensions even in reconciliation, the stabilising effects of standards of judgement disappear and anarchy results. Thus, while in this sense Aeschylus anticipates the amoralists, his awareness of these implications makes him, at the same time, seek in the Solonic principles of harmony and moderation a stabilising balance to the dynamics of conflict.

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CHAPTER SIX.

VARIATIONS ON A THEME OF ἀπραγμοσύνη

In the essential contrast between the tones of Pindar and Aeschylus lie the seeds of the problem which was to underly conflict in elitist ideas throughout the period of domination of the Athenian democracy. The fundamental contrast which has been drawn in the two preceding chapters is between different conceptions of change and the different attitudes adopted to the problems associated with it.

It was shown in Chapter Four that the political implications of Pindar's socio-religious idealisation of the heroic qualities of his victors arose from the status which these aristocrats lent to their poleis, and that it was in this limited synthesis that Pindar tried to create stability. It was also asserted that Pindar was not concerned with problems of political structure or organisation as such. It is within this perspective that another look at Pythian 8 will clarify the most vital aspects of the contrast with Aeschylus.

Pythian 8 was composed for the young Aristomenes of Aegina in 446 (1). The date is significant because only a year earlier, in 447, a small Athenian force under Tolmides was captured near Thebes, and as a ransom Athens was forced to cede Boeotia (2). In 446 the truce between Athens and Sparta ended and Athens was also beset by revolts in Megara and Euboea. In such a situation, Pindar's patrons in Aegina could also have been hoping for freedom, and the last lines of the poem explicitly refer to this -

"O mother dear, Aegina, do thou waft this city onward in her voyage of freedom with the blessing of Zeus and of king Aeacus, and of Peleus and good Telamon and Achilles" (3).

Typically, Pindar's emphasis is not on force of arms, but on the role of the religious sanction. Those who step outside the bounds of moderate conduct will bring the wrath of the gods upon themselves -

"But violence overthroweth the braggart at the last. The Cilician Typhôeus with his hundred heads did not escape thy power; no, nor the king of the Giants. They were severally overcome by the thunderbolt of Zeus, and by the bow of Apollo" (4).

Elsewhere in his work Pindar uses this kind of imagery in contexts which are primarily social and moral, and it is closely

bound up with his stress on the transience of human experience and man's obligation not to attempt to move across the limits of the human situation and grasp godlike powers. Pindar believes that the combination of aspiration to the heights of human capability and modest acceptance of its limitations provides the only permanence for which man can hope. This idea is present also in Pythian 8 -

"Short is the space of time in which the happiness of mortal men groweth up, and even so, doth it fall to the ground, when stricken down by adverse doom. Creatures of a day, what is any one? What is he not? Man is but the dream of a shadow; but, when a gleam of sunshine cometh as a gift of heaven, a radiant light resteth on men, aye and a gentle life" (5).

It is this moral and religious desire for a time of stillness and peace which is reflected in the opening lines of Pythian 8 -

"Kindly Goddess of Peace, daughter of Justice, that maketh cities great" (6).

In making ἡσυχία the daughter of δίκη, Pindar not only moves in the tradition of the Hesiodic genealogy, he also retains the Hesiodic and Solonic equation of Justice with equilibrium and non-encroachment within society. In the lines which follow, Pindar goes on to give this concept a specifically political extension - still addressing ἡσυχία he says -

" thou that holdest the master-keys of councils and of wars, receive from Aristomenos the honour due for a Pythian victory; for thou knowest with perfect fitness the secret of gentleness, both in giving and taking.

And yet, whenever any man hurleth into his heart relentless wrath, rudely confronting the strength of thine enemies, thou plungest Insolence in the brine" (7).

By implication, Pindar refers to the hybris of Athens, and by invoking ἡσυχία as the power which will defeat arrogance and destruction, opposes it to the expansionist qualities by which Athens has gained her Empire.

The problem of the scope of the word ἡσυχία in this context has been discussed by H. Wade-Gery in an interesting note (8). In fact, whether ἡσυχία is in this passage opposed to πόλεμος or στάσις or both does not alter the fact that Pindar is here invoking it as the guardian of the aristocratic qualities which he is idealising, and which he wishes to preserve in the face of discord, both external and internal.

In Pythian 8 he gives the moral and religious imperative towards the preservation of harmony and non-encroachment a political extension. The realisation that to be justified his religious ideal must be shown in its political utility is virtually the only concession Pindar makes to the active, expansionist changes in the political climate through which he lived.

This underlines Pindar's contrast with Aeschylus, whose concerns were analysed in Chapter Five. It is true that Aeschylus is still writing within a comparatively conventional religious framework, but this fact serves to make the more intense his awareness of the persistent tensions and conflicts inherent in the actions and dilemmas of men. Aeschylus does not think within the confines of Pindar's conception of the preservation of peace, harmony and aristocratic moderation. It is Promethean man who can be the agent of change, and whose nature has not the quality of retreat into quietism. Yet, as was made clear in the discussion of his plays, Aeschylus does not rest at celebrating this potential - he is as much concerned with its dangers, dangers which themselves form part of men's challenge, and in the absence of the complete Prometheus trilogy we can do no more than hazard a guess at the manner in which Aeschylus thought man could, or should have his field of activity circumscribed in the religious and metaphysical sense (as opposed to the civic sense, which is treated in the Eumenides).

Yet it would be a fatal over-simplification to present Pindaric quietism and Aeschylus' celebration of change as a straightforward antithesis. It is rather through variations deriving from each that the complexities of political elitism in the 5th century can be pursued. Pindar's uneasy alliance between moderation in the human situation, and the outstanding position of the victor, could be associated with a social and political idolatry on which, at the very least, the tyrants thrived, and which could itself lead to ὕβρις and φθονος and thence to στάσις (9).

There are, however, other sources which are not complicated by Pindaric idealisation which indicate that a modified form of quietism could attain the status of a political value in a different way. Such is the case with Pindar's elder contemporary, Simonides. Unfortunately, the surviving evidence is largely fragmentary, but from what remains it is possible to gain some interesting information. Simonides shares much of Pindar's background - his early poems celebrate victories in the Games;

he stresses the difficulties of achieving excellence and the importance of hard endeavour, and like Pindar he laments the ephemeral nature of human experience -

"For all things come to a single hideous Charybdis, even great achievements and wealth" (10).

The significant distinction between Pindar and Simonides is that while Pindar confines his attention to the aristocrat, Simonides, although motivated by a similar religious delineation of the sphere of men as opposed to the gods, turns to consideration of what the citizen ought to do within his own sphere of influence, the polis.

"Accordingly I will not seek for what is impossible and throw my share in life fruitlessly away on the vain hope of finding a man without blame...Any man suffices me who is not KAKOS nor utterly useless: and a man who knows city-benefitting justice is a sound man. I will not find fault with him" (11).

Here, the aristocratically based quietism of Pindar is adapted to a civic context.

A practical example of this usage is suggested by Thucydides when he refers to Pericles' advice to the Athenians on the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War -

"He told them to wait quietly, to pay attention to their marine, to attempt no new conquests, and to expose the city to no hazards during the war, and doing this, promised them a favourable result" (12).

The passage goes on to contrast Pericles with his successors who, according to Thucydides undertook many expeditions but remotely connected with the war, and whose over-activity committed the conduct of the war to the 'whim of the multitude'.

The passage may be contrasted with another one later in the History in which Thucydides attributes to Alcibiades a rejection of quietism and aristocratic moderation, which the latter considers will lead to the loss of the Empire (13) -

"if all were to keep quiet or to pick and choose whom they ought to assist, we should make but few new conquests, and should imperil those we have already won...we have reached a position in which we must not be content with retaining (the Empire) but must scheme to extend it, for, if we cease to rule others, we are in danger of being ruled ourselves. Nor can you look at inaction from the same point of view as others, unless you are prepared to change your habits and make them like theirs".

Aristophanes in the ACHARNIANS (14) indicates that the argument was a contemporary one and did not take place only in the mind of Thucydides, who makes pericles say at another point that since the Athenians have acquired the Empire they must hold on to it - "to take it perhaps was wrong, but to let it go is unsafe" (15).

Thus the variations on Pindar's ἡσυχία embrace what might be termed a civic quietism, concerned with the qualities of the good citizen and with the maintenance of stability at home. The variations on Aeschylus' theme of man as the agent of change can range through a Periclean concern with education and efficient administration to an obsession with action associated with the extreme democrats. The two extremes are reconciled in the Thucydidean picture of Pericles at the height of his powers.

This opposition of ἀπραγμοσύνη and πολυπραγμοσύνη plays a significant part in the tragedies of Sophocles, and it is from this angle that the implications of the plays for developments in political philosophy will be considered.

There are particular difficulties in including Sophocles in a study of this kind. Not only is it impossible to posit a definitive 'view' of Sophocles' attitude to elitist and other political problems, but also in order to study even one play in depth it is essential to consider themes which range far outside the concerns of this thesis. In addition, Sophocles' work does not fit conveniently into a clear lign of development in 5th century elitist ideas.

This is a major reason in favour of his inclusion in this thesis. It is unimportant to try to define a Sophoclean viewpoint, but it is important to observe how he treats and explores themes which are central to conflicts in 5th century ideas. In this respect his often antithetical approach is significant because it explores the implications of a concept in two directions - an obvious general example is his treatment of the possibilities both for good and for evil of men's capabilities. More specifically, this narrows down to exploration of the different facets of the "political man". Sophocles' importance is emphasised by the fact that he must have been popular (and therefore possibly influential) judging by the number of his victories, while his public career indicates that he had first-hand knowledge of problems of political power and action. For these reasons then, although he may be considered as a kind of tangent to the main lines of development of the thesis, consideration of the way in which he explores crucial political and elitist themes can illuminate the main discussion.

Sophocles was born in 497/6 at Colonus, according to Pliny "in the highest station" (16). He won his first victory in 468 with the Triptolemus (17) and in all achieved eighteen victories. His status must therefore have been very great. In addition he had a considerable career in public life. He may have been president of the imperial treasury in 443/2 (18), and in 440 was elected strategos (19). He was probably also general on other occasions, and there is a (disputed) story in Aristotle which says that Sophocles was one of the ten probouloi chosen to manage the affairs of Athens after the failure of the Sicilian expedition (20), by which time he must have been a very old man. At any rate, he cannot have been unaware of the realities of political life, and there is no reason to suppose that the ethical imperatives associated with his representation of political problems are intended to operate in an idealised vacuum (21). Nevertheless, Sophocles' claim that he created men as they ought to be (created) - in contrast to Euripides, who created them as they are (22) - suggests that philosophically, as well as dramatically, it is the qualities of the outstanding individual which interest him.

This fact presents some difficulties for the pursuit of the present study because in its dramatic context it involves problems about the development of 'character' which are not within the scope of this thesis. Some aspects of this problem have been highlighted by A.A. Long in his study of Sophoclean language and thought (23). In seeking to show that the debates in the last two plays are comparatively free from appeals to general principles, Long remarks that ethical abstracts like δικη , and αἰσχυνη and adjectives like καλον and δικαιον occur freely but are normally related to specific actions and do not make the reasoning itself abstract. He points out that in argument (as opposed to lyric) abstract nouns are not Sophocles' primary means of expressing concepts, and that especially in the last plays the characters debate with less rigidity - for instance, there is a stress on character in the change of heart of Neoptolemus and in Oedipus' rejection of Creon and Polyneices at Colonus. Thus, through his analysis of the language of the plays, Long concludes that what is used in the ANTIGONE to express political ideas and intellectual attitudes becomes in the PHILOCTETES and the OEDIPUS AT COLONUS a means of delineating character.

The distinction is an important one for the structure of this discussion. I shall be concerned with the more abstract concepts only as far as is necessary to provide a clear conceptual framework of

relevance to the thesis as a whole. The limiting framework for consideration of Sophocles must therefore be that which emerged from the discussion of Pindar and Aeschylus - that formed by the lines of intersection between celebration of man's potential and its control within a principle of order which is acceptable on both religious and political grounds. I shall illustrate some aspects of Sophocles' treatment of this general problem from two early plays - the AJAX and the ANTIGONE. The main part of the discussion will then be concerned with two crucial problems, these are 'the political man' and 'the natural elite'. I shall conclude by trying to distinguish what it is in Sophocles' treatment of these two areas which refers back to the central themes of the thesis.

The problem of the sanction to political order is at the centre of the action of the first part of the AJAX. It is central to Sophocles' treatment of this kind of problem that it cannot be divorced from its religious context. Ajax's insane rejection of stability and order is expressed in terms of a rejection of religious sanction -

" his father gave him
His good advice at parting. 'Child', he said,
'Resolve to win, but always with God's help',
but Ajax aswered with a senseless boast:
'Father, with God's help even a worthless man
Could triumph. I propose without that help,
to win my prize of fame'. In such a spirit
He boasted" (24).

When the consequences of his actions are brought before him in the slaughter of the sheep, Ajax meditates on the need for order in society as well as in the universe -

"From now on this will be my rule. Give way
to heaven and bow before the sons of Atreus.
They are our rulers and must be obeyed.
I must give way, as all dread strengths give way,
In turn and deference. Winter's hard-packed snow
Cedes and the fruitful summer, stubborn night
At last removes, for day's white steeds to shine" (25).

In other plays this principle is elaborated as part of a metaphysical order which is studied in relation to quite different problems from those presented in the AJAX. The latter play's action stems from

problems of hierarchy and the relations between members of the elite. The very fall of Ajax symbolises the downfall of that heroic arete which fails to compromise with the requirements of life in society, requirements which are sanctioned both by the gods and by the universal 'physis'.

Yet within the constraining necessities of society, Sophocles celebrates the capabilities and achievements of men -

"Many the wonders, but nothing walks stronger than man,
This thing crosses the sea in the winter's storm,
Making his path through the roaring waves" (26).

The famous chorus in the ANTIGONE goes on to admire man's technical and rational capabilities, yet his mutability is recognised, and most important of all, the potential both for good and for evil which man possesses. Like Protagoras, Sophocles recognises the insufficiency of the technical and rational abilities of the Prometheus myth when man has to live in society. Protagoras was to develop the myth by giving men a social conscience. Sophocles did not think in these conceptual terms, but words his solution in terms of moral advice backed up by a religious sanction -

"Clever beyond all dreams
the inventive craft that he has
which may drive him one time or another to well or ill
When he honours the laws of the land and the gods' sworn right
high indeed is his city; but stateless the man
who dares to dwell with dishonour" (27).

This, then, is the framework within which Sophocles' political concerns operate. Yet there is more in Sophocles than a mere use of religious or pantheistic sanctions to attempt to remedy lacunae in men's spiritual and intellectual activities. In some plays he explores more deeply the results of man's awareness of his political, intellectual and spiritual potential, although this is always against the basic framework described above with its stress on the dual potential of any capability, and the complexity and sometimes incomprehensibility of the requirements of the universal order, treated metaphysically in the Oedipus plays, but here of concern at their political level.

Within this context, however, Sophocles asks penetrating questions about what constitutes order and how it can best be achieved. In one sense, the ANTIGONE is a study of contrasting disruptions of order -

Antigone's of political authority, Creon's of principles of moderation and family duty. The Creon theme in the play suggests that a valid political order must rest on the self-restraint of the ruler. At the beginning of the play Creon recognises that the head of state must resist external constraint or pressures -

"You cannot learn of any man the soul,
the mind, and the intent until he shows
his practice of the government and law.
For I believe that who controls the state
and does not hold to the best plans of all
but locks his tongue up through some kind of fear
that he is worst of all who are or were" (28).

The irony in the development of Creon's activities in the ANTIGONE is that the more he undertakes action and decision making to support his political authority, the more he flouts order in the widest sense - he ignores the gods (29), he disrupts the order of nature by entombing Antigone (30) and he ignores his son's appeal to listen to the voice of good sense and prudence -

Haemon:
"Whoever thinks that he alone is wise,
his eloquence, his mind, above the rest,
come the unfolding, shows his emptiness.
A man, though wise, should never be ashamed
of learning more, and must unbend his mind.
Have you not seen the trees beside the torrent,
the ones that bend them saving every leaf,
while the resistant perish root and branch?
And so the ship that will not slacken sail,
the sheet drawn tight, unyielding, overturns,
She ends the voyage with her keel on top.
No, yield your wrath, allow a change of stand.
Young as I am, if I may give advice,
I'd say it would be best if men were born
perfect in wisdom, but that failing this
(which often fails) it can be no dishonour
to learn from others when they speak good sense" (31).

Thus by the end of the play Creon has resisted external pressures to such an extent that in his determination to enjoy absolute mastery he has lost any ability to regulate his own conduct. His growing obsession with the need to act boldly and strongly goes together with that

failure to exercise self-restraint which, on the part of a ruler, points to excess and tyranny -

"The man the state has put in place must have
obedient hearing to his least command
when it is right, and even when it's not" (32).

The theme of self-constraint, suggested in the ANTIGONE, in response to the Sophoclean question "what kind of order?", is an important background for consideration of Sophocles' treatment of the concepts of 'the political man' and 'the natural elite'.

Two contrasting aspects of the political man are portrayed in Odysseus in the AJAX and the PHILOCTETES. In these plays, Sophocles develops the theme of cleverness, the dangers of which were expressed in the ANTIGONE -

"Clever beyond all dreams
the inventive craft that he has
which may drive him one time or another to well or ill
When he honours the law of the land and the gods' sworn right
high indeed is his city; but stateless the man
who dares to dwell with dishonour" (33).

In the AJAX, Odysseus is portrayed as active and clever, even cunning, in his pursuit of his enemy Ajax. Athene addresses him thus -

"Odysseus! What are you looking for? Still on the trail
Of some advantage over your enemy?
Yes, I have watched you, and I watch you now
Here by the seaboard where the tent of Ajax
Guards the furthest flank of the line; I see you,
Doglike, nose to the ground, reading the tale
Of his freshly printed traces, whither they lead,
Inwards or out. You'll find him, if anyone will;
No Spartan hound has a keener scent for the chase.
He's there, the man you're looking for, his head
And hands sweating and blooded from the sword.
Leave peering and prying round the doors, and tell
What is the purpose of your anxious search" (34).

Yet, in the AJAX, the potential of Odysseus' character is developed in a different direction from that explored in the PHILOCTETES. Although his initial hatred of Ajax and desire for self-aggrandisement at his expense are emphasised, Odysseus manages to subject this to his conviction of the need for moderation and submission to religious and

social convention. Thus he urges Agamemnon to respect Ajax's corpse.

" For the love of all the gods, think twice
Before you do so rash and vile a thing,
You cannot leave this man to rot unburied.
You must not let your violent will persuade you
Into such hatred as would tread down justice.
There was a time when I too hated him;
From the time I won the armour of Achilles,
He was the bitterest enemy I had; and yet,
Such though he was, I could not bring myself
To grudge him honour, or refuse to admit
He was the bravest man I ever saw,
The best that ever came to Troy,
Save only Achilles. It is against all justice
For you to treat him with contempt. God's laws,
And not the man himself you would annihilate
Even if you hate him, it is against all justice
To lift your hand against a good man dead" (35).

In a sense, the conflict of Odysseus examines in microcosm an internalised version of Ajax's attempt to push aside the restraints of religious and social hierarchy, but Odysseus' successful resolution of his problems indicates that if cleverness if bounded by moderation and respect for religious sanctions it can attain the status of wisdom, for according to the Chorus -

"Odysseus, none but a fool would now deny
That you have shown yourself to be a man
Whom nature has endowed with wisdom" (36).

However, even if Odysseus is vindicated in the AJAX, his stature does not approach that of the great heroes. He is, as he himself admits, inferior not only to Achilles, but also to Ajax. It seems that the greatness is lacking; he is not a natural hero. His particular skills operate on a different plane and in a different dimension from the great heroes. Possibly this reveals a Sophoclean devaluation of the values represented in the figure of Odysseus, even when, as in the AJAX, they are reconciled with the aristocratic ideals of moderation and piety.

In the PHILOCTETES the other aspect of the potential of 'cleverness' is explored. Here, Odysseus is portrayed as utterly amoral, concerned only with persuading Neoptolemus to deceive Philoctetes,

"I know, young man, it is not your natural bent

to say such things nor to contrive such mischief,
But the prize of victory is pleasant to win.
Bear up; another time we shall prove honest" (37).

In this play, Odysseus is portrayed in a manner which emphasises the corrupting influence Sophocles attributes to the operation of such 'values' in society. Under Odysseus' prompting, the young Neoptolemus casts aside his natural nobility -

"The offence is here! A man betraying himself
To do such deeds as are not of his nature" (38).

Once again, although this time he is presented as evil, it is not Odysseus' character which dominates the action - he is not 'great in his evil-doing'. This is another devaluation in Sophoclean status (39).

This devaluation of the political man is important when set against the Sophoclean concept of the natural elite. Broadly speaking, the Sophoclean elite can be divided into three categories - the hero (Ajax and Neoptolemus), the politician (Odysseus and Creon) and the elect (Antigone and, to some extent, Philoctetes). Sophocles is interested in the uniqueness of nature which compels a person to choose to be isolated, whether for the sake of principle or other psychological reasons, and thus to join an elite for whom the word 'elect' seems more appropriate in that it differentiates between outstanding social or political attributes and the more spiritual or psychological qualities. This discussion has concentrated on the first two categories and especially in the point of intersection between them - the 'natural elite' epitomised in Theseus.

The qualities which Sophocles seeks to idealise are epitomised in the Athens of the OEDIPUS AT COLONUS and in her ruler, Theseus, who says to Creon -

"You come to a city-state that practices justice,
A state that rules by law, and by law only;
And yet you cast aside her authority,
Take what you please, and worse, by violence,
As if you thought there were no men among us,
Or only slaves; and as if I were nobody" (40).

Oedipus says that Theseus' nobility is plain (41), yet Theseus does not attempt to transcend the limits of man's proper activity -

"I know I am only a man; I have no more
To hope for in the end than you have" (42).

Theseus is presented as a man of action rather than words (43) - a

further contrast with the Odysseus theme in the PHILOCTETES, but his forceful intervention is a considered one and goes no further then it need to rescue Oedipus' daughters from Creon. When Theseus swears to look after them, he swears it "With such restraint as fits a noble king" (44).

This highlights the central point about the Sophoclean natural elite - it is self-regulating, rejecting hybris and self-seeking activity, and preferring action to words in a situation of crisis (45). In the OEDIPUS AT COLONUS Sophocles presents these qualities in an individual, Theseus, but in all the plays the qualities and their contraries are like a series of leitmotifs running through the action.

If the themes of the political man and the natural elite are thus juxtaposed, it is clear that what they have in common is a stress on the primacy of self-regulation, of self-constraint. From a realisation of the implications for good and for evil of man's potential, Sophocles looks for its circumscription within a framework of order acceptable on both religious and political grounds. But he is not content with generalisations. In the political field he reiterates the questions - what kind of order? How is this order brought about? On what does it depend for survival? It is in answering these questions that Sophocles' interest in individual qualities is crucial. Stability is achieved in the alliance of qualities of political wisdom and self-constraint with the figure of the natural leader. Sophocles shows his awareness of the exigencies of political necessity as well as of the dangers with which it threatens the natural elite. To this end he distinguishes between wisdom and cleverness, between firm government and activity for its own sake, and between self-restraint and tyranny over others.

Yet Sophocles'is no facile solution to the problems of good order. There is a studied contrast between the calm stillness and confidence of Theseus and the rapid transformations in situation and sufferings of the protagonists of the plays. In the protagonists' experience is reflected the strife without which, according to Aristotle, Heraclitus asserted "there would be no musical scale nor living creatures" (45). In Sophocles, in contrast to the rejection of violence in the Hesiodic tradition, Strife is the agent of change and its role is both a metaphysical one and an internal psychological one. Sophocles' mistrust of verbal and intellectual techniques of persuasion as likely to pervert the natural elite (as treated in the PHILOCTETES),

makes him reject moral compromise and any equilibrium based on expediency and seek rather the self-regulation of the individual, based on self-knowledge, within a framework of civic law and religious piety. This variation on aristocratic quietism becomes the one calm, still permanence amid the strivings and suffering of great men - a Sophoclean λογος .

Thus to the religious quietism of Pindar and the civic quietism of Simonides may be added the philosophical quietism of Sophocles. The development from Pindar's thought to Sophocles' is underpinned by a realisation of the implications of the exposure of the 'natural elite' to the Sophistic techniques necessary for success in political life. On this rests the Sophoclean devaluation of the political man, and his interests in the qualities of outstanding individuals. This interest is parallelled in the political field by Thucydides' attempt in the elevation of Pericles to oppose the role of the outstanding individual to the moral and political shortcomings of men as a whole, and to show how the balance between ἀπραγμοσυνη and πολυπραγμοσυνη could briefly be kept. But before Thucydides can be analysed, it remains to consider in some detail the work and influence of the Sophists, whose adulteration of the natural elite was the butt for the comic vision of Aristophanes as well as the bitter pessimism of Sophocles.

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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE SOPHISTS.

It is not easy to generalise about the Sophists, for they formed in no sense a unified movement, nor is their teaching to be defined as that of a particular school. There are some affinities in methods of teaching to be found among the Sophists, but their conclusions were widely diverse. Of the most important Sophists about whom some information has come down to us, the common basic concerns indicate that the efforts of the poets and early philosophers to find and state a standard of human character were now being consciously related to a cultural and political concept. The aim of the Sophists, broadly stated, became the education of the leaders of the city-state. In their concern with the leaders, not the demos, the old problem of the definition and position of the elite was re-stated in a new form. The old elitist criteria of birth and wealth had been largely overshadowed by that of spirit and wisdom and this, too, was being modified towards the ultimate stress on intellect and political achievement. This gave rise to new problems for the city-state. In a community which was at least nominally a democracy, what was to be the relation between the outstanding political brain and the society in which he lived? In the rule of Pericles, Athens found a temporary solution, but this led to the transformation of the character of the state.

In the extant fragments of the Sophists, the old problems associated with the ruling class are re-examined and re-defined in relation to the social and political situation of the day. Although it is true that the rise of the Sophists was in some ways promoted by the democracy, and that the doctrine of some are based on assumptions which tend towards democracy, most of their influence was felt among the elite. Sophistic education was for an elite who were to be trained for leadership; to this class, wealth and social background were the qualifications for admission.

The development of sophistic education, however, shows that the qualities associated with birth or wealth were in themselves still advantageous but not sufficient to promote and maintain the position of the elite when compared with the increasing requirements for leadership in organised society. The kind of civic success now needed required the activation and refinement of qualities of intellect and judgement. It was also necessary to communicate these qualities,

and this required ability in the art of persuasion. There were also motives from practical prudence as well as from ambition for cultivating powers of oratory and argument (1) - these qualities were as essential in escaping humiliating defeat as prowess in battle.

The role of the Sophists was to impart and sometimes to define these qualities and although, as has been pointed out above, their function was in some respects the result of the development of democracy, and they had a vested interest (at least in the mid 5th century) in the preservation of the established political system, their effect was largely on the already privileged classes, who could afford the money to pay their fees and had the time to pursue their courses of study - even Socrates, who charged no fees, seems to have been thought to influence the young aristocrats rather than the demos, for it was Critias and Alcibiades and their like whom he was accused of corrupting. Socrates' reply to such accusations in THE APOLOGY indicates the practices of other Sophists -

"The fact is, there is nothing in any of these charges; and if you have heard anyone say that I try to educate people and charge a fee, there is no truth in that either. I wish that there were, because I think that it is a fine thing if a man is qualified to teach, as in the case of Gorgias of Leontinie and Prodicus of Ceos and Hippias of Elis. Each one of these is perfectly capable of going into any city and actually persuading the young men to leave the company of their fellow citizens, with any of whom they can associate for nothing, and attach themselves to him, and pay money for the privilege, and to be grateful into the bargain. There is another expert too from Paros who I discovered was here on a visit. I happened to meet a man who has paid more in sophists' fees than all the rest put together - I mean Callias, the son of Hipponicus; so I asked him (he has two sons, you see) 'Callias' I said, ..."whom do you intend to get as their instructor? Who is the expert in perfecting the human and social qualities?'..... 'Evenas of Paros, Socrates', said he, 'and his fee is five minae' " (2).

This was, therefore, a time of vital change from the old Hellenic education which, being based on the poets, was in a sense accessible to everyone, and did not make the rich necessarily holders of a different form of culture, although, of course, the gymnastic and military training was exclusivly the preserve of the rich. Now the fees of the Sophists intensified the exclusion of the poor, and therefore

the barriers of birth and wealth which already existed were reinforced and transformed by the addition of new divisions of education and intellectual attainment as well as those of athletic and military training. Thus, the Sophists, in spite of the apparent basis of their influence on the increased need for education promoted by the rise of democracy, in fact had the effect of promoting an adaptation of the success morality associated with the earlier elites, the difference being that 'success' now meant success in politics and intellectual matters and therefore in the necessary techniques associated with them. Herodotus emphasised the importance of the constitution in determining the character of a state (3). The Sophists explore the corollary that the men who construct and administer that constitution must possess outstanding qualities.

There is a further link between the emergence of the Sophists and the activities of the Greek ruling classes. Greek science and philosophy, whatever their conclusions, had always been basically aristocratic in that they developed among the leisured classes, for whom the only acceptable pursuits were war, poetry, philosophy and now oratory and statecraft. In giving the Sophists their position of eminence as educators, the leisured classes showed that they had realised that they had to come to terms with the practical requirements of the more democratically based system of the polis in order to survive as a politically significant class. To move from mere survival towards success in the polis, the aristocrat had to be able to relate the intellectual exercises of speculation to the empirical requirements of political life. In the work of the Sophists is crystallised this change in emphasis.

Raymond Aron has distinguished between three categories of non-manual workers - scribes (bureaucrats), experts, and men of letters, and has pointed out that in common usage the term 'intelligentsia' does not cover all non-manual workers (4). Aron asserts that the qualities required for admission into the intellectual elite increase as the number of non-manual workers grows, i.e. in direct proportion to economic development. This argument will be considered in greater detail elsewhere (see chapter on Thucydides and the Athenian Empire), but it is worth noting here that Athenian society in the 5th century was complicated by the development of two very different kinds of elite. The economic basis of the state was one of slavery to a degree which had not existed in previous centuries, and success in wars had made

possible the creation of a sizeable slave-labour force, which, when coupled with the activities of the metics and the distaste of citizens for giving up their freedom to engage in manual labour on another's behalf (i.e. unless they were self-employed) left the citizens some freedom to engage in politics, while ensuring the economic stability of the state (5). Thus the citizen force was, by the very nature of it position, itself a kind of elite, and the qualities required to rise to a position of eminence, to join an elite within the elite, were increasingly demanding and were necessarily concerned with political ability.

It is interesting to note, however, that although Athens was, as far as is known, a leading centre of their activity, the majority of the most important Sophists were to a large extent itinerant, and were not, in fact, Athenians. They were attracted to Athens as a centre of power and culture and opportunity - Gorgias from Leontini in Sicily, Protagoras from Abdera, Prodicus from Ceon (the home of Simonides), Hippias from Elis. Hippias travelled more to Dorian cities than to Athens and most often to Sparta (6), and also to Sicily. Thus it is clear that although the influx of Sophists was perhaps most pronounced in Athens, and their teaching was particularly in demand to enable the upper classes to keep their position of prominence in democracies, there was room for educators in political skills in cities which were not democracies since politics had become generally recognised as a serious activity.

Keith Hopkins has pointed out (with reference to the Roman Empire) (7), that in any complex society there are several criteria of status. A situation of status dissonance may arise when the ruling class no longer fulfils the necessary criteria owing to a change in requirements, or when other classes are seeking to acquire status on a number of fronts. Even a non-democratic state with complex criteria of status requires some social mobility together with adaptation within the ruling class if it is to survive (see introductory chapter). In the field of inculcating political skills the Sophists, therefore, fulfilled a vital role whatever the political framework within which they existed.

Therefore it is clear that the position of the Sophists was an ambiguous one. Their very existence pre-supposes the emergence of politics as a general activity, yet the price and character of the education they offered made their influence exclusive. They were the heirs of the aristocratic speculative tradition which became modified

into the new dialectic; they were also the perpetrators of the pragmatic, political and ethical thought against which the idealist dialecticians revolted. In view of these complexities it is proposed to consider only those aspects of the Sophists' teaching, or sophistic arguments which have the greatest relevance to this thesis (8).

However, before individual Sophists can be discussed, it is necessary to explore further some reactions to the distinction between physis and nomos. The drawing of this distinction and its interpretation can have two fundamentally different implications. It can point both to a philosophic basis for democracy and to the oligarchic amoralists. The sophist Antiphon discussed some of the implications of the nomos/physis distinction (9).

"Justice consists in not transgressing any of the legal rules of the state in which one lives as a citizen. A man, therefore, would practice justice in the way most advantageous to himself if, in the presence of witnesses, he held the laws in high esteem, but in the absence of witnesses and when he was by himself, he held in high esteem the rule of nature. The reason is that the rules of the laws are adventitious while the rules of nature are inevitable; and again, that the rules of the laws are created by covenant and not produced by nature, while the rules of nature are exactly the reverse. A man, therefore, who transgresses legal rules is free from shame and punishment only when he is not observed. It is otherwise with transgressions of the rules which are innate in nature. If a man strains any of these rules beyond what it can bear, the evil consequences are none the less if he is entirely unobserved, and none the greater if he is seen of all men; and this is because the injury which he incurs is not due to man's opinion but to the facts of the case.....None of us is set apart either as a Greek or as a barbarian. We all breathe the air in through our mouths and nostrils". Antiphon assumed that all men were by nature the same, conversely it could be asserted that all men were by nature different - of Aristotle's claim that some men are slaves by nature (10). Since it could be empirically verified that all men were physiologically if not the same, at least similar, the belief that men were by nature different lent itself to the drawing of distinctions between degree of virtue and of intellect, while even if it were accepted that men enjoyed a common physis, some qualities had to be distinguished in order to identify the leaders of the various spheres of society's activities.

However, it is the implications of the first part of the quotation which are the most important for the main theme. Once it is accepted that nomos is no more than an attempt to disguise or check the assertion of natural powers, it loses much of its force as a sanction, particularly among the strong who are likely to sweep it aside as ineffectual or irrelevant. Hippias is quoted by Plato in the PROTAGORAS as saying "like is akin to like by nature, but law, which lords it over men, does frequently violence to nature" (11).

The tyrannical power exercised by the (written) law is the theme of THE CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS (The Old Oligarch). Although the Old Oligarch claims to recognise that, given the existence of democracy, the system in Athens has developed logically - "Life in Athens could not be arranged otherwise than as it is" (12), the work's analysis of democracy is intended to show that nomos is the expression of the collective will of the multitude, individually weak but strong in its united desire to realise its own interests. Although just in its way, the law in practice represents violence (13).

This resolution of law into violence is rather more cogently and forcefully exposed by Alcibiades in a conversation with Pericles in which he asks Pericles for definition of law (14). Xenophon makes Pericles reply that law is that which is decreed by the assembly. Alcibiades maintains that, whether approved by tyrant, oligarchy or demos, the law involves compulsion without persuasion to the advantage of someone, whether many or few. Therefore, nomos could have an 'absolute' value only for the class or faction for which it was made, and not for the class to whose interests it ran contrary. This irrationality of nomos is recognised explicitly also by Antiphon, Thrasymachus and Critias.

To this has to be opposed the view of such diverse men as Cleon and Socrates, who both held that while an individual law might be wrong, the collective laws of the state had an independent validity. Thucydides makes Cleon comment that bad laws are better than good laws with no authority (15), and while it could be said that he is here speaking in the interest of his class and of the successful demagogue, the speech does seem to be pervaded by a basic desire for order - "The most alarming feature of the case is the constant change of measures with which we appear to be threatened". The accusation of self-interest can hardly be levelled at Socrates, for the price of his belief is his own life. It is made quite clear in the course of

the CRITO that Socrates regards the upholding of the lawful authority of the state as of greater importance than the personal injustice of which he is the victim. This is in accordance with the evidence presented by Plato in the earliest of his dialogues, and by Xenophon that the primary purpose of the historic Socrates was to promote the capacity of men to act within a rational framework in both their private and public lives. "Throughout my life I have been consistent in any public duties that I have performed and the same also in my personal dealings: I have never countenanced any action that was incompatible with justice on the part of any person.....I have never set up as any man's teacher; but if anyone, young or old, is eager to hear me conversing and carrying out my private mission, I never grudge him the opportunity" (16).

It is clear, therefore, that the implications of the nomos/physis controversy range through the problems of order to those of sanctions, authority and power. The complexity of the controversy is such that it is an over simplification to describe it as an antithesis - however, some attempt at summing up is necessary in the interests of clarity. Nomos could include both written and unwritten laws, although both derived from man's estimation of his needs in society. It could be described as irrational and violent in that it suppressed the interests of certain factions (by Alcibiades) or as having an independent rational validity in terms of order (by Socrates). Physis tended to mark, in social and political terms, the resolution of the law of nature into unwritten law or natural right, but in its scientific sense could be put forward as a basis for democracy and the development of nomos as well as for oligarchy. Thus both terms are, in as much as this thesis is concerned, problems of precise definition within a wider concept rather than of direct philosophical significance in themselves. The concern is therefore with the way in which they were used rather than the way in which they ought to have been, or might have been, used.

Once the will to power and its relationship with the sanctions to power imposed by the ruling faction was critically recognised, the problems of power could be discussed critically and pragmatically and empirically. The central question concerned the most successful method of acquiring and holding power. In order to answer this question, attempts were made to analyse the bases of power. The enthronement of nature without acceptance of the need for coercive law in determining the holders of power had the effect of removing the individual from the educating care of the state, therefore the theories

which will be considered now do not emanate from men who are Sophists in the strict sense. In fact, with the exception of Callicles who may not in any case have been a historical character, the theories are descriptive as well as polemical. Certain difficulties are obvious in using Plato as a source, but there is no reason to suppose that the theories he used in the political dialogues did not have a historical basis - it is only necessary to look to Euripides and Thucydides for supporting evidence.

Plato devoted considerable attention to discussion of the problems arising from the apparent antithesis of nature and law. His treatment is far from objective and sometimes, as in the case of Thrasymachus, he goes out of his way to make a character put views in a less cogent manner, but if due allowance is made for this, fairly clear lines of argument can be distinguished. The three main treatments of the amoralist theme involve Callicles in the GORGIAS and Thrasymachus and Glaucon in the REPUBLIC. In the Thrasymachus episode, Plato's own view intrude considerably, but the fact remains that the difficulty raised by Thrasymachus was a serious one which Plato was forced to consider again in the Glaucon episode.

Thrasymachus does not hold that might is fundamentally right (17), but rather that right has come to be a formal enactment of might. He has certain affinities with Hobbes in that he believes that the only right is the enactment of sovereign power. Thrasymachus' view has been described as ethical nihilism, and certainly this would be the logical complement in the sphere of morality to the intellectual nihilism of Gorgias. But Thrasymachus is both descriptive and normative. It becomes clear in the course of Socrates' cross-examination of Thrasymachus that the latter regards the class conflict as a permanent feature of society, and unlike Plato and Marx does not look forward to its resolution in some ideal state. Thus Thrasymachus regards conventional morality as a by-product of the process of oppression and exploitation. Morality is, in fact, the type of behaviour exacted by the ruling class from its subjects to serve its own interests - interests which necessitate the ruling class itself adopting a different type of behaviour in which law and justice are no longer opposed to natural aspiration but are identified with its fulfilment. Justice is equated with the advantage of the stronger (the rulers).

Cross and Woozley have pointed out (18) that if justice is equated with the advantage of the stronger, Thrasymachus may be represented as maintaining that it is the duty of the weaker to help and serve the stronger. However, even if this is so, there is no evidence that any idea of altruism is involved. The imperative is of a quite different nature and becomes clearer if the idea is related to a specifically political context - the desire to maintain order and to avoid stasis. In this sense it is then quite 'just' for the ruler to promote his own interest (i.e. his continuance in power) because this ensures stability in the state. This interpretation goes some way to resolve the apparent inconsistency between Thrasymachus' equation of justice with the interests of the strong and his advocacy of a policy of injustice if this can be successfully pursued, since if this is taken to its logical conclusion the successfully unjust man will elevate himself to the position of the strongest and can then 'justly' continue to pursue his own interest.

"But when a man succeeds in robbing the whole body of citizens and reducing them to slavery, they forget these ugly names and call him happy and fortunate, as do all others who hear of his unmitigated wrongdoing. For, of course, those who abuse wrongdoing and injustice do so because they are afraid of suffering from it, not of doing it. So we see that injustice, given scope, has greater strength and freedom and power than justice; which proves what I started by saying, that justice is the interest of the stronger party, injustice the interest and profit of oneself" (19).

It is, of course, impossible to assess how far, if at all, Plato misrepresented the views of the historical Thrasymachus, but a surviving fragment of a speech composed by Thrasymachus for a client to deliver in the Assembly (Thrasymachus himself was not an Athenian citizen) does indicate his fear of stasis and his growing disillusionment with political strife motivated by ambition rather than the differences in policy - "No, the past is enough for us - that we have exchanged peace for war, reaching the present through dangers, so that we regard the past with affection and the future with fear; and that we have sacrificed concord for enmity and internal disturbance. Others are driven to excesses and civil strife through a surfeit of prosperity; but we behaved soberly in our prosperity. We were seized with madness at a time of adversity, which usually

makes others act soberly. Why then should anyone delay to say what he knows, if he happens to feel grief at the present state of affairs, and to believe that he has a means of bringing this to an end?

First of all, therefore, I shall prove in my speech that those of the orators and others who are at variance are mutually experiencing something that is bound to befall those who engage in senseless rivalry: believing that they are expressing opposite views, they fail to perceive that their actions are the same, and that the theory of the opposite party is inherent in their own theory" (20). Taken together with the scholiast to the Phaedrus' remark that "he wrote in one of his own speeches something to this effect, the gods do not see what goes on among men. If they did, they would not neglect the greatest of human goods, namely justice, yet we see men making no use of it" (21), the speech sheds light on the interpretation of Thrasymachus as "the disillusioned moralist" posited by Guthrie (22) and helps to explain the paradoxical views expressed by the Sophists. It does, of course, leave unresolved many of the philosophical problems raised in that part of the REPUBLIC, but those are not the concern of this thesis. What the Thrasymachus episode does show is the ambiguity inherent in the use of terms like 'justice' to sanction the power structure. It also signifies realisation of the importance of the power holder in rationalising the status quo and thus holding the balance of power in the state (23).

One aspect of this rationalisation is elaborated by Glaucon (24) - "What people say is that to do wrong is, in itself, a desirable thing; on the other hand, it is not at all desirable to suffer wrong, and the harm to the sufferer outweighs the advantage to the doer. Consequently, when men have had a taste of both, those who have not the power to seize the advantage and escape the harm decide that they would be better off if they made a compact neither to do wrong nor suffer it. Hence they began to make laws and covenants with one another; and whatever the law prescribed they called lawful or right. That is what right or justice is and how it came into existence; it stands half-way between the best thing of all - to do wrong with impunity - and the worst, which is to suffer wrong without the powers to retaliate. So justice is accepted as a compromise, and valued, not as good in itself, but for lack of power to do wrong".

In this statement, the realisation of man's potential and his limitations results in a voluntary contract, with the object of exchanging hope of individual success (with its attendant risks of annihiliation by a stronger man) for the relative security of co-operation. This is a security based on lip-service to justice as a moderating influence in society. Glaucon's argument, in fact, goes back to the description of the way in which justice is used as a sanctioning concept while yet being abused and flouted when it seems possible to do so successfully (25). In emphasising the greedy and envious sides of human nature, Glaucon accepts that this has to be constrained by law or convention (νομος) (26).

There is a larger dimension to the rejection of law by Callicles in the GORGIAS of Plato (27). This has difficulties in that Callicles may not have been a historical person and his doctrine is sometimes said to be Plato's own interpretation of the implications of the views of Gorgias, but the argument is important. Law is rejected for the very reason that it is the product of contracts made by the weak to defraud the strong of the just rights desired from their might and institutes a slave morality -

"The experience of suffering wrong does not happen to anyone who calls himself a man, it happens to a slave who had better die than lie, seeing that when he is wronged or insulted he cannot defend himself or anyone else for whom he cares. Conventions, on the other hand, are made, in my opinion, by the weaklings who form the majority of mankind. They establish them and apportion praise and blame with an eye to themselves and their own interests, and in an endeavour to frighten those who are stronger and capable of getting the upper hand they say that ambition is base and wrong and that wrong-doing consists of trying to gain an advantage over others; being inferior themselves, they are content no doubt, if they can stand on an equal footing with their betters.....Nature, on the other hand, herself demonstrates that it is right that the better man should prevail over the worse and the stronger over the weaker. The truth of this can be seen in a variety of examples, drawn both from the animal world and from the complex communities and races of human beings; right consists in the superior ruling over the inferior and having the upper hand".

Pressed by Socrates, Callicles goes on to define more clearly what he means by strength. He does not refer merely to physical strength but also to qualities of the mind -

"I mean people with the intelligence to know how political matters

should be handled, and not only intelligence but courage; people who have the ability to carry out their ideas and who will not shrink from doing so through faintness of heart.....They are the people who ought to rule states, and right consists in them as rulers having an advantage over the rest, who are their subjects" (28).

What Callicles in fact does, is to fling aside conventional morality ('herd morality') and posit instead a master-morality, resting on a natural right of which the basis is might - "I tell you frankly that natural good and right consists in this, that the man who is going to live as a man ought should encourage his appetites to be as strong as possible instead of repressing them and be able by means of courage and intelligence to satisfy them in all their intensity by providing them with whatever they happen to desire" (29).

Callicles' normative doctrine suggests a totally different kind of social order from that associated with the other arguments analysed above. Nowhere, perhaps, is the pessimism of the amoralists so profoundly indicated as in an extant fragment of Critias -

"There was a time when the life of men was unordered, bestial and the slave of force, when there was no reward for the virtuous and no punishment for the wicked. Then, I think, men devised retributory laws, in order that Justice might be dictator and have arrogance as its slave, and if anyone sinned, he was punished. Then, when the laws forbade them to commit open crimes of violence, and they began to do them in secret, a wise and clever man invented fear for mortals, that there might be some means of frightening the wicked, even if they do anything or say or think it in secret. Hence he introduced the Divine, saying that there is a god flourishing with immortal life, hearing and seeing with his mind, and thinking of everything and caring about these things, and having divine nature, who will hear everything said among mortals, and will be able to see all that is done. And even if you plan anything evil in secret, you will not escape the gods in this, for they have surpassing intelligence. In saying these words, he introduced the pleasantest of teachings, covering up the truth with a false theory; and he said that the gods dwelt there where he could most frighten men by saying it, whence he knew that fears exist for mortals and rewards for the hard life in the upper periphery, when they saw lightenings and heard the dread rumblings of thunder, and the starry-faced body of heaven, the beautiful embroidery of Time the skilled craftsman, whence come forth the bright mass of the sun, and the wet shower upon the earth. With such fears did he surround mankind, through which the weak established the deity with his argument,

and in a fitting place, and quenched lawlessness among men.....Thus, I think, for the first time, did someone persuade mortals to believe in a race of deities" (30). The fragments of SISYPHUS presented a concept of law as drawing its sanction from the attempts of men to persuade and coerce through the media of religious and civic pronouncements. Once it is accepted that man alone can make the law and man alone can break it, it follows that the setter of a positive ethical standard is also, by definition, its destroyer. In his crystalisation of the dissoi logoi Critias recognises the impossibility of translating nomos and physis into a rational formula. He maintains that the man who holds power through these means does so as a result of assertion of his γνωμη or powers of intellect. Thus according to Critias, individualism or elitism, though it cannot be absolute, in practice must be supreme.

While the amoralists, considered above, are concerned with justifying their exercising of power, and, in the case of Critias, discussing possible means of maintaining it, the importance of GORGIAS in the present discussion lies primarily in his contribution to the method of the exercise of power. Like Protagorus, Gorgias is credited with asking very high fees, and among his pupils were Isocrates, Critias, and possibly Pericles, Alcibiades and Thucydides.

Gorgias claimed that he had no intention of teaching arete. In the MENO Socrates asks Meno if the Sophists really teach virtue and Meno replies (31) -

"What I particularly admire about Gorgias is that you will never hear him make this claim; indeed he laughs at the others when he hears them do so. In his view his job is to make clever speakers".

Gorgias' rhetoric was based on his relativist philosophy, which is shown clearly in the HELEN (32) -

"But as it is, there is no easy way of either recollecting the past or investigating the present or divining the future, so that on most subjects most men have only opinions to offer the mind as counsellor; and opinion is slippery and insecure".

Unlike Protagoras, Gorgias does not move from the recognition of the ambivalence of experience to a rational attempt to create acceptance of a certain kind of knowledge. Gorgias held that the dissolution of all experiences into antitheses is a positive bar to knowledge. He recognised that logos is ambivalent and could not, under any circumstances reveal truth since it always split into inevitable antitheses.

Both these antitheses are thinkable, but neither can be true. However, as it was necessary to bring about the acceptance of one or other of these antitheses on a particular occasion, this was to be achieved through the medium of deception.

Gorgias moves to this position through consideration of the role of creativity in the poetical sphere -

"Tragedy, by means of legends and emotions, creates a deception in which the deceiver is more honest than the non-deceiver, and the deceived is wiser than the non-deceived" (33).

Just as poetry brings about a change in opinion so can artistic prose -

"The power of speech over the constitution of the soul can be compared with the effect of drugs on bodily state: just as drugs by driving out different humour from the body can put an end to disease or to life, so with speech: different words can induce grief, pleasure or fear; or again by means of a harmful kind of persuasion, words can drug and bewitch the soul" (34).

Thus, although logos cannot attain to truth it can, through the medium of 'deception' of prose or poetry, lead to action. That which determines the outcome of deception and constitutes the criterion of its acceptance, thus leading to action is "kairos", the right moment.

In the sphere of ethics, the power of logos and skills of deception or kairos can lead to a decision based on the idea of τὸ δέον ἐν τῷ δέοντι the right thing at the right moment. There can be no universal objective ethical prescriptions, but the will of the individual can lead to a right decision on a particular occasion.

In the sphere of politics, the skill of the orator depends on his appreciation of kairos, on the adaptation of his speech to the needs of the occasion. The ability to persuade an assembly or law-court was in Gorgias' view, indispensable to social and political success, and the highest achievement of human endeavour. Thus the philosophy of Gorgias is most relevant to the main theme for its indication of the means to power and for its suggestion of the educational means by which the rich and influential elite could ensure the attainment and holding of power. The doctrine of kairos could, of course, involve blatant opportunism, while some of the implications of Gorgias' nihilism are realised in the doctrine of Callicles and the arguments of Thrasymachus.

A more fundamental question than that of justifying the holding of power and advocating the methods through which it is exercised,

concerns the nature of the judgements involved. Such was the concern of Protagoras, one of the most important of the Sophists, both as an educator and for his contribution to theories of knowledge. He is usually associated with democratic tendencies, partly because his views were opposed by Plato and Aristotle. It is certainly true that some aspects of his philosophy are favourable to democracy, but his importance in the present discussion lies in the fact that if the implications of his philosophy as a whole are related to the extent and social background of his teaching it appears likely that, whatever his own political views, the force of his teaching was to intensify the revolution which was being made to take place in the attitudes of the ruling class.

There is considerable evidence that the fees charged by Protagoras were very high. Much of the prejudice among extreme democrats against the Sophists was the result of their acceptance of fees and is in itself further evidence that their activities were associated with the privileged classes. Protagoras' fees seem to have brought him considerable prosperity. In the MENO it is asserted that after forty six years in his profession Protagoras had amassed more money that "Phaedias and any other ten sculptors put together" (35). This evidence is supported by Diogenes Laertius' claim that Protagoras "was the first to exact a fee of 100 minae" (36), while in the PROTAGORAS Hippocrates was ready to expend all the property of himself and his friends in his determination to become a pupil (37). Thus it seems clear that Protagoras' pupils must have been drawn mainly from the wealthy upper classes. Hippocrates was the son of Apollodorus "of a great and prosperous house" (38), while if Plato is to be taken literally, the young men gathered at the house of Callias, son of Hipponicus, included Paralus and Xanthippius, sons of Pericles, and Charmides, the son of Glaucon. There are obvious drawbacks in relying too heavily on Plato as a source for consideration of the Sophists, but it seems reasonable to infer from a comparison with Xenophon's SYMPOSIUM (39), where the participants include Hermogenes the brother of Callias, Critobus the son of Crito and Plato's uncle Charmides, in addition to the host Callias, that the influence of the Sophists was almost exclusively with the upper classes. The sons of civic leaders probably formed the main body of pupils, but also included were foreigners who followed the great teacher from city to city, and a small number who were themselves studying professionally to be Sophists - of these Antimoerus of Mende was one (40). It is quite clear from the high

cost of the instruction offered by Protagoras that while as a social theorist he believed all men to be capable of benefiting from education, in practice the higher education which he imparted was available only to the elite, and was claimed and designed to enable them successfully to continue their social and political dominance.

However, Protagoras was in no sense only, or even primarily, a rhetorician. His philosophy resulted from a reaction against scientific speculation. There are three basic propositions. These are the doctrine of the two-fold argument, of the better argument and of man the measure. The first proposition asserts that about any situation it is possible to affirm two statements which are opposed to one another. Protagoras examines this problem at the empirical and the metaphysical level and can find no criterion in abstract argument by which the truth or falsity of a concept can be tested. At every stage he finds only the possibility of breaking down every concept into two contradictory propositions. What is just in one situation is not so in another, things useful to man are not so to animals, etc. It is not possible to judge in absolute terms between two statements, but only to distinguish the better and the inferior possibilities. 'Education' is necessary in order to change the lesser possibility of knowledge into the great possibility (i.e. better judgement).

Protagoras accepts the limitations of human knowledge just as Simonides accepted the limitations on moral achievement. Meaningful judgements about men are no longer made in terms of 'good' or 'bad' in the absolute sense, but in terms of 'greater', 'wiser', 'more prudent'. Protagoras' proposition of metron anthropos was put forward as a practical solution to the problem of relativity of judgements. In a sense the argument is circular since the proposition is implied in Protagoras' statement of the problems, but the essential point to be made for the purposes of this discussion is that the educational role of Protagoras was, in practice, to help the elite adapt to and take advantage of the implications of the relativity of judgements.

The assertion of the relativity of judgements, however, is far removed from the amoralism of the later Sophists. In fact, in the myth in the PROTAGORAS (41), he makes a vital addition to Aeschylus' treatment of the Prometheus myth. Protagoras ascribes to men "the qualities of respect for others and a sense of justice so as to bring order into our cities and create a bond of friendship and union".

The art of politics is accompanied by a social conscience. This is, for Protagoras, the unwritten law which underlies the written ones. Yet we are specifically told that the myth is not to be taken literally. Man's social conscience is desired, not from a gift of Zeus ushering in a new golden age, but from man's own response to the exigencies of time, experience and the urge for survival. Protagoras makes it clear he regards this experience as now part of the status quo, therefore it does not represent the kind of essential change which would make it a myth of progress. It represents rather a political development, a refinement of potential as a response to environmental stimuli (42).

For Protagoras, as for most of the Sophists, physis could not be the whole of virtue, but rather the foundation on which education must build. He knew that it was not enough to say that all men had a social conscience - from Homer onwards the realisation of the limitation of man's capabilities to the world of human affairs had been formalised in the stress on the physical and intellectual effort required to cultivate the skills required by his environment. The environment of the world of Protagoras' time was increasingly intellectual; it is these skills of judgement therefore that he wishes to cultivate in his pupils. Therefore nomos and physis are not opposed. Nomos limits physis but thereby preserves it - just as political wisdom is needed to prevent the annihilation of the human race in the myth, so in Protagoras' teaching is the implicit recognition that although the polis may limit the extent of the power of the elite because of men's social conscience, it also, by virtue of the very nature of its civic requirements, preserves that power.

The development of this section has consisted of four main stages. Firstly, it was shown that although the Sophists were in one sense directly related to the established processes of the democracy, their main sphere of influence was among the privileged classes. Secondly, it was necessary to isolate the most important implications for the main theme of the nomos/physis dilemma, and to try to define the complexities of the apparent antitheses. Thirdly, in spite of the difficulties of using Plato as a source, some of the main amoralist reactions were discussed.

It may be concluded that the response of this second generation of Sophists to the problem of the relationship of order, sanction and power, has three main characteristics. Firstly, idealogy,

except in the case of Callicles, is subordinate to the principle of utility, or the interest of an individual faction or class. Arising partly from this and partly from the scientific enlightenment in a wider field, politics tends to be analysed historically and empirically and in a tone of deep pessimism. Thirdly, the common conclusion, although expressed in different degrees and forms, was that the force needed to assert and maintain supremacy was that of intellect as well as, or even rather than, military achievement or wealth - that is, force of judgement and also the courage and strength to put this into effect at the advantageous moment of time. This response to the problem of the relationship of the will to power and the means to power could be both revolutionary in its recognition of the irrelevance of the old sanctions and reactionary in effect, in that, on both idealogical and empirical grounds, it equated right with the exactment of might.

Finally, in the discussions of the teaching of Gorgias and Protagoras appeared the vivid contrast between the pessimism of the amoralists directly concerned with the elitist will to power and methods of acquiring and exercising it, and the Protagorean belief that justice was more than a mere sanction in the class war, the result of a social conscience common to all men. Protagoras did not go on to make this belief the basis of a political theory, but his contribution is the essential bridge between the Prometheus myth, celebrating man's capabilities, and the positing of a systematic basis for man's use of these in politics and society. Protagoras' development of his idea was bound to be limited because of other aspects of his beliefs, and especially those concerning the relativity of judgements. In this sense he was, like Gorgias, the prisoner of the modes of thought of his time, governed as these were by the requirements of that contemporary political activity which they in turn served to modify.

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CHAPTER EIGHT.

THUCYDIDES.

The increasing sophistication of political and social structure has been emphasised in the preceding chapter. By the middle of the 5th century Athens was in a unique position in that not only did she have two elites, but the stability of her social structure depended upon her preservation of her imperial position. The citizens themselves formed one elite by virtue of the privileges they enjoyed, yet within the citizen elite there existed another group, the leaders in political debate and decision making. The intention of the first section of this chapter is, firstly, briefly to describe the privileges of the citizen elite, secondly to describe the qualities required in its leaders and to show that the acquisition of the necessary status pre-supposed that a politician was either well-born or rich or both, and thirdly to note the key role of the Empire in preserving this situation. It has to be emphasised that the sources used in this chapter are anti-democratic or outright oligarchic in tone. The intention is not to provide a definitive picture of the Athenian democracy but rather to indicate a framework of influence within which the elitists could operate, or thought they could operate (1).

The second section of the chapter will be concerned with political opinion within the citizen elite, and especially with elitist organisations and the means to power open to the ambitious politician. Thirdly, the major section of the chapter will be devoted to a consideration of a rationalist reaction to the Athenian political scene through an analysis of Thucydides' HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

The main non-political privilege enjoyed by the citizens and which was not granted to the other members of society, was the right to the ownership of land. Citizens thus enjoyed a virtual monopoly of the country's basic industry, agriculture, as well as the right to take up allotments of land overseas which had been acquired by Athens. These settlers, or cleruchs, were often drawn from the poorer members of the community, their labour being replaced by that of slaves and metics. The most important outlet for surplus rural labour was the ports and the fleet. In wartime there was increased scope for employment in the fleet, even to the extent of drawing off the supply of citizen labour, for pseudo-Xenophon could write "The city needs the metics for a mass of trades" (2).

Apart from political and land privileges, citizens enjoyed other advantages. They were eligible for the occasional windfall, such as the free grain distribution in 446 (3), and, more important, received pay for tenure of public offices (4) and for jury services (5). It is clear that there were increased opportunities for the poorer citizens to avoid the worst extremes of poverty, and this, combined with the broadly-based membership of the Assembly, meant there were likely to be fewer dissident elements (6). It has been described in a previous chapter how, when the office of archon was allocated by lot, greater prominence became attached to the office of strategos, for now that the traditional offices had declined in power, the ambitious politician looked to alternative means of achieving prominence. Since the strategoi were elected and were responsible to the Assembly, mastery of the Assembly was essential in order to achieve or maintain supremacy and also, of course, to oppose the entrenched political leaders.

The means of achieving and maintaining the support of the Assembly were two-fold - firstly, the Assembly had to be convinced by oratory and personal 'charisma' of a man's ability to undertake state duties; secondly, these had to be carried out successfully and the flavour of the success communicated to the Assembly. The direct confrontation of the ambitious individual with the Assembly required personal qualities very different from those associated with a representative democracy. Although there were ten strategoi, the personal nature of the communication between the leading strategos and the Assembly tended inevitably to elevate his position, and the political elite was therefore composed of outstanding individuals rather than a cohesive group. The risk which the leading figures ran of being dismissed or exiled intensified the need for a quasi-heroic image. Any ambitious politician had to be a demagogue (in the widest sense of the word). In order to survive politically in the absence of collective responsibility he had to be an orator - and as was shown in the previous chapter, the acquisition of the requisite skills was expensive. Thus even among the radical democrats of the 5th century, the leading figures are prosperous, even if not always well-born. Even at the height of the democracy, there was in the election of some officials a concession to elitist principles, as Ps-Xenophon described it, "they do not think that they ought to share by lot in the offices of general or commander of the horse for the people knows that it gains more by not holding these offices itself but allowing the leading citizens to hold them" (7).

The key to the apparent contentment of the citizens with a popularly based government within this elitist framework is to be found in the economic prosperity brought by the Empire - an Empire which had been based on a need for food and which, in glorifying the sea power which answered this need and provided employment and prosperity for the demos was caught up on a wheel of expansion which it dared not stop, even if it had been able (8).

The question of the state of political opinion within the citizen elite is extremely difficult to evaluate. The main reason for the difficulty is that the primary sources are either conservative or outright oligarchic in tone - Aristophanes for example, and the Old Oligarch. There is, it is true, additional evidence from rationalists like Euripides and Thucydides, but such testimony must of its very nature be governed by dramatic framework in the case of Euripides, and by more complex influences of the author's moral philosophy in the case of Thucydides. As far as Euripides is concerned, both the methods of argument employed and the subject matter of the plays bear witness to the diversity of political points of view, as well as the sophisticated way in which they had come to be expressed (9).

Yet in spite of the influence of the Sophists - and yet paradoxically perhaps because of their position as educators of the elite (10) - there is no evidence that a theory of democracy emerged, even at the height of the Athenian democratic political system (11). This is not to belittle the contribution of Protagoras, for example, but an idea is not the same as a theory, and his attribution of a social conscience to all men was not developed into a theory of political organisation.

In a different sphere, Xenophon's account of the conversation between Alcibiades and Pericles (12), although ostansibly concerned with discussion of the idea of law as "the will of the majority", the fact hinges on the relation between persuasion and force in the implementation of political power. In opposing persuasion to force, Pericles is not necessarily talking in terms of democracy. In their stress on equilibrium his comments could equally well be applied to a moderate oligarchy - "Whatsoever, the sovereign power in the state, after deliberation, enacts or directs to be done is known as law". Even when he specifically speaks of the majority in the Assembly - "Laws are all the rules approved and enacted by the majority in assembly, whereby they declare what ought and what ought not to be done", Pericles stresses the idea of approval and implies persuasion

by the leaders, thus retaining the stress on the activity of the elite. The inconclusive discussion and its emphasis are, perhaps, inevitable given Xenophon's characterisation of Pericles' and Alcibiades' relationship with Socrates - "Politics had brought them to Socrates and for politics they left him", and it does not seem profitable to take the passage seriously as a contribution to political theory.

A more direct discussion of democratic principles occurs in the Speech of Athenagoras at Sicily in Thucydides (13). However, the language and tone of the speech with its appeal to greed appear to be distorted by the historian's anti-demagogic prejudice - "But an oligarchy gives the many their share of the danger, and not content with the largest part takes and keeps the whole of the profit; and this is what the powerful and young among you aspire to, but in a great city cannot possibly obtain". It therefore seems unwise to elevate the passage to the status of a source for democratic theory.

This absence of political organisation both in theory and in practice will be a key assertion of the rest of this chapter, since it governs the modes of adaptation to a changed status quo between which the ambitious politician was forced to choose. It was absent not only among democrats but also among the oligarchs, as will be shown when the oligarchic clubs are discussed. The only 'organisation' of the demos was the direct democracy of the Assembly; a representative democracy would imply the existence of some form of theory of organisation, and of this there was none. Equally, the oligarchic clubs were in no sense political parties. It is therefore proposed to show how the absence of a democratic political theory and political organisation governed the response of the elite to problems of status and supremacy.

During the period of increasing political self-consciousness described in the last two chapters, although political theory as such had not developed, some political attitudes had crystallised. Idealogically, these could be divided into three main tendencies (this division is drawn for purposes of clarity rather than in attempting to reflect any schematic development as such) - the progressives accepted the basic structure of the state and the economy and believed that change was brought about by the emancipation of mind and spirit, the traditionalists held to the values of kingship, hierarchy, authority and religion. The radicals believed in the potential of political power to order or rebuild men and society. This view is raised

implicitly in Herodotus and studied by some of the Sophists. But there is a corollary. If the value judgement is taken from political radicalism - or rather as in 5th century Greece if the value judgement has not acceded to it - political power retains and even extends its force as a weapon for maintaining and maximising the interest of the power-holders.

At the beginning of the 5th century the old conservative aristocratic traditions were declining, for the reasons stated in the analyses of Theognis and Pindar. By 460 they had no more privileges left to defend, and could only carry their principles into effect by reaction - for example Cimon's desire to restore the 'aristocratic' government of Cleisthenes (14). The traditionalist groupings were scattered in 444 when Thucydides, son of Melesias, was ostracized, but their influence had been lost long before. Not until the new conditions of 411 were brought about by the collapse of democracy and its failure either to negotiate a lasting peace or to defeat Sparta, was a new upsurge of power possible.

There were a number of choices apparently open to the politically ambitious man after the decline of the conservative faction. The land interest was bound to be minimised to some extent, since in any case the successful politician had to be in the city to appear in the Assembly. The change within the elite is shown by the move from Cimon, to Pericles, to Nicias (who gained his wealth from mining), to Cleon and Hyperbolus (also wealthy, but their wealth was gained from industry and trade). The ambitious man therefore had to come to the city. He could then decide whether to support the democracy and work for supremacy through adulation and success in oratory and military and civil administration, or, if he rejected this, he had to decide what method of opposition to the democracy to adopt.

There is much evidence in Thucydides of oligarchic intrigue against the democracy (15), while both Thucydides and Aristotle point to the discontent of the rich (16). However, after the ostracism of Thucydides, son of Melesias in 444, open opposition was largely abandoned for intrigue, often within the framework of the political clubs. In Thucydides these are called συνωμοσίαι which usually meant conspiracy and adds a new dimension to the clubs' activities (17). The word ἑταῖρος is found in Homer describing men united by a relationship derived from association of those in the same age group who banqueted together. In the classical period the word can

mean partisan (18) or clubman (19). It seems likely the clubs were initially primarily organisations for wealthy young men who had done their military service together and continued their association into later life. In support of the belief that their initial purpose was social and factional rather than political in any ordered sense may be cited the reference in Aristotle's ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION (20) to inter-club rivalry between Cleisthenes and Isagoras. This shows the clubs already existed under the old aristocracy and were not founded only to oppose the demos, since, as was pointed out in Chapter 3, Cleistenes only joined the demos after his first defeat. Aristotle also says it was the Peisistratid clubs that turned the scale against the Alcmaeonids. Thus, it seems clear that even before the establishment of the democracy the clubs played an important part in the development of factional rivalry between groups of oligarchs within a common social background.

Not all the clubs necessarily had extreme political complexions - Themistocles, Pericles and Nicias all belonged - but they seem to have been an essential part of political life - Socrates describes membership of clubs as a general activity (21). The clubs flourished because they fulfilled not only social but also political functions without insisting on the rigorous formalities of party doctrine and without needing patrons and organisation.

The clubs were, however, often centres for piece-meal political action. Members often took a leading part in instigating and financing litigation which could be an important political weapon, since the accuser was free to attack any aspect of the accused's life. The success of the attack often depended on the political strength of the accuser rather than the merits of the case, and there were some opportunities to machinate justice for political ends, such as in the use of lawsuits to prevent or obstruct legislation as in the bringing of indictments alleging the proposition of illegal measures. Efforts to influence political measure could also be made through the circulation of pamphlets (such as the ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION of Ps. Xenophon), by speeches in the Assembly, and by packing assemblies with members to act in concert - for instance, when the Ecclesia adopted the constitution of the Thirty (22). The most extreme forms of political conspiracy could lead to assassination, as in the killing of Ephialtes in 462/1 and the reigns of terror in 411 and especially 404 (23), while ostracism could also be an important political weapon, often directed against the friend or lieutenant of the target as an annoyance or test of strength;

for instance Damon, the adherant of Pericles. Few details of any significance have survived, but there is one important case. According to Plutarch, in the ostracism of Hyperbolus, the intervention of the clubs of Alcibiades and Nicias was so effective that the vote turned against the popular leader himself (24).

That the clubs operated as factions of oligarchs rather than as political groupings is emphasised by the failure of the moderates to emerge as a viable political force after the decline of the traditional conservatives. The moderates rejected both the extremist oligarchic conspiries and adaption to the requirements of the democracy. They desired rather to limit the absolute powers of the people by either restricting the franchise or re-defining the powers of the Assembly and also aimed to abolish pay for state services except the army and navy. Other aspects of their 'policy' were broadly favourable to the agricultural class, but did not crystalise distinctly, and adherants tended to attach themselves to various groups rather than work together. During the first part of the Peloponnesian war these men formed the opposition peace group, but in contrast to the more extreme oligarchs they did not want 'peace at any price', including the betrayal of Athens to Sparta. In desiring to lose neither honour nor the Empire they failed to formulate a cogent alternative to pursuing the war, even when, after the death of Pericles, the opposition to the democracy was more organised under the leadership of Nicias.

Therefore it is clear that the clubs did not, and could not, become the focus of formal political alliances or participation along party lines. In addition to their position as social influences, their importance lies in their potential as a means to power and to retention of power through the various political activities mentioned above, while in a different dimension they show clearly the fragmentation to which the various oligarchic factions were subject, and their failure to produce a coherent policy of opposition to the democracy.

The alternative for the ambitious man was to work within the prevalent system. In the past the elite had adapted itself in order to take advantage of contemporary trends in politics, and to work with the ascendant regime, in the 5th century this development is the more striking because it involved mainly outstanding individuals, notably of course, Pericles. The extent to which the individual actually did become alienated from his class is, however, questionable - Thucydides reports Alcibiades as saying that he and his family sought advancement

under the democracy because it was firmly established and could not safely be altered while Athens was threatened by her enemies - "Moreover, as the city is democratic, it has been in general necessary for us to conform to circumstances.....Our family were leaders of the whole commonwealth, and we thought it right to agree in maintaining the form of government handed down to us, under which the city enjoyed the greatest power and freedom. Of course, like all men of sense, we understood democracy, and I might abuse it better than anyone, as none have suffered greater wrongs at its hands. Its folly is admitted, and there is nothing new to be said about it. It did not seem safe to change it, with you as enemies at our gates" (25). Alcibiades assumes that it was natural for a politician to subordinate his principles and, in the event, even the interests of his own city, to the pursuit of personal ambition - this emphasises implicitly the recognition of personal success as the supreme value.

Nevertheless, that a man of aristocratic birth or great wealth or both could convince the demos of his suitability for high political office required something different from the traditional resources which his class had been able to afford him. The Athenian Empire had reserves of wealth - now it needed brains as well. Thus the education developed by the Sophists fostered qualities of intellectual adroitness and public oratory which became a viable addition to birth and/or wealth as a means to political supremacy. In a society which had been shaped by the liberating forces of spirit and intelligence in the widest sense, the extra dimension of intellect as itself a means to power, and a sanction as well as a social utility, went at first largely unrecognised. In fact, to the traditional values of the polis were being grafted those of the new meritocracy.

Having therefore established that the ruling elite was drawn from an already prosperous citizen body which enjoyed political privileges as well as the material advantages accruing from the Empire, and that the status of the elite required that its members should be well born, or at least enjoy the wealth needed to purchase the Sophistic education which was necessary to ensure success in the Assembly, and further, that there was no political theory or formalised principles of political organisation, the way is open to study the working out of this situation in action in the history of Thucydides.

The place of an analysis of Thucydides in the development of this thesis is fundamental for two main reasons. The first

reason is that, in a sense, he represents a microcosm of the interaction of the different forces pressing on the rationalist political thinker, although, as will be pointed out later, this highlights one side only of his relevance. Nevertheless, the few brief details of his career which are available to us (26) emphasise the pertinence of his experience. He was an Athenian citizen and had an interest in gold mines in Thrace (27) which gave him influence in that area. The fact that he says he suffered from the plague indicates he was in Athens about 430, and in 424 he was elected strategos. He was associated with the loss of Amphipolis, and later exiled. This afforded him the opportunity for acquiring information from both sides. Thus the picture is of a soldier who was also a man of letters, who was probably of aristocratic birth - he was said to be related to Cimon (28) - and who had intimate experience of the workings of the democracy, although the nature of his personal experience warns us against possible bias in some of his opinions.

Thucydides was, therefore, in a position to gather and collate evidence concerning events, discussions and ideas about the war, which completely dominated the climate of the latter part of the 5th century. The unity and chronology of the history has been keenly debated by scholars. The interest to a historian of ideas is to be found primarily in the pre-history, the speeches, the analysis of stasis and most of book VIII. It is evident from an examination of the references to Thucydides' own career that it would not have been possible for him actually to have heard all the speeches to which he refers, although he does say he heard some of them (29), but he indicates that he is responsible for the form in which they are represented. That Thucydides admits he is responsible for the form makes it virtually impossible to distinguish between what are reported words and what is the language which the historian considered the occasion demanded of a particular speaker, or even the ideas Thucydides attributed to him. What is therefore important to the historian of ideas is that the ideas presented in the speeches should be genuinely representative of those current at the time, rather than the unique response of a philosopher/historian seeking to interpret creatively the events of the age.

It is sometimes claimed that the style of the speeches in Thucydides is anachronistic, in that although many were delivered before Gorgias came to Athens, or before his teaching can have had

much effect, they all nevertheless show traces of the influence of the art of rhetoric. From this it may be argued that if the style is anachronistic, the ideas expressed may be also. This would have a most damaging effect, not only on Thucydides' reputation for historical veracity, but also on the position of the speeches as sources in a wider field of enquiry. In part of his attempt to answer the question whether rhetoric and rationalism really flourished in Athens before 427 (the date taken to denote the commencement of the influence of Gorgias, and which is two years after the death of Pericles), J.H. Finley has made a valuable contribution to Thucydidean studies (30).

The question of style and language is outside the real concern of this thesis, but Finley's contention that if the ideas or forms of argument found in Thucydides appear also in the other writers, then it is apparent that Thucydides' speeches could have used them is of the utmost importance. From an interesting comparison with Euripides, Finley shows conclusively that such is indeed the case (31).

Having thus established the relevance of the career and background of Thucydides and indicated the likelihood that the language and ideas represented faithfully show important contemporary trends in political thought, it has to be conceded that his history cannot be entirely dispassionate, and that his own attitudes must to some extent govern his interpolations, his selection of material, the relative weight accorded to different phenomena, and his omissions.

But the most important aspect to be understood in analysing Thucydides is his tone. It is this which governs the factors mentioned above. It will be approached through discussion of four main ideas which pervade the history. These are Thucydides' definition of interest and the role he crdited to it in human affairs; his concept of change, especially in relation to technology and to human nature; his concept of stasis and its implications for both domestic and international affairs; and finally, and derived from the first three, his attitude to the relationship between the prevailing political system and the men who operate it.

Thucydides believed that the prime motive for judgements and action in human affairs was one of interest. He believed that there are no wars of races or ideas but only of interest. This, he thought, was also the case within states, hence the class war meant that the rival factions identified with the belligerents (32). Closely related to this is Thucydides' concept of change, which he associates with advances

in technology and material prosperity only. He was convinced that human nature itself did not change (33). In this belief is to be found the key to the development of Thucydides' definition of interest. Initially and especially in the Pre-history, Thucydides seems to identify interest with material advance. However, his interest is less in the trade/wealth relationship than in man's use of his skills to improve his position - the technology of navigation is an important example. This central concern with man and his motivation and skill thus opens the way for Thucydides' discussions of the qualities and characters of the individuals in positions of power, and the motivation of the political elite and the effect of its decisions on the progress of the war, and therefore on all the states.

Thus Thucydides does not stop at drawing a clear relationship between natural environment and political development - "The richest districts were most constantly changing their inhabitants; for example, the country now called Thessaly, Boeotia, the greater part of the Peloponnese with the exception of Arcadia, and all the best parts of Hellas. For the productiveness of the land increased the power of some; and this was a source of quarrels by which they were ruined, while at the same time they were more exposed to attacks from foreigners" (34). Already, therefore, it is clear that Thucydides is wanting to look behind economic causes to the lust for power which was the root cause of factional strife, and which used economic supremacy as a means to power.

He goes on to show that the development of piracy, for example, was based on economic and social need - "For in ancient times both the Hellenes and those of the barbarians whose homes were on the coast of the mainland and in islands, when they began to find their way to one another by sea, had recourse to piracy. They were commanded by powerful chiefs, who took this means of increasing their wealth and providing for their poorer followers" (35). Thucydides goes on to assert that economic necessity is used to enforce toleration of power - referring to the Trojan war he says - "The love of gain made the weaker willing to serve the stronger and incited the more powerful, who now had wealth at their command, to subjugate the lesser cities" (36).

The assertion of power is made through the inspiration of fear, and the promise of material prosperity through skill. Thucydides quotes Agamemnon as an example - "I think that Agamemnon succeeded in collecting the expedition, no so much because the suitors of Helen had bound themselves by oath to Tyndareus, as because he was the most powerful

man of his time.....And it was, as I believe, because Agamemnon inherited this power and also because he was the greatest naval potentate of his time that he was able to assemble the expedition, not so much from good will as from fear" (37).

In the international, as in the national, sphere, the consolidation of might was regarded as a necessary prelude to negotiation or discussion. This point is made in a different form by the argument put forward by Themistocles in favour of building the long walls - "They now thought it fit that their city should have a wall, and that this would be more for the advantage of both the citizens of Athens and the Hellenic confederacy; for without equal military strength it was impossible to contribute equal or fair counsel to the common interest" (38). It is clear that Thucydides had little interest in either economic or military factors in themselves. What interests him is the way in which they are used by the ambitious to their own advantage. Thus is his definition of 'interest' circumscribed - in a limited sense man's technological feats are in his own interest (i.e. they support his prosperity), but in a political society this interest rapidly becomes a tool in the hands of the most powerful men seeking to preserve their own interest, that of ambition.

Thus in Thucydides the critical attitudes of the Sophistic enlightenment are clearly seen also to involve a thorough-going conservatism in their view of human nature. It would be wrong, however, to imply that the conservatism of Thucydides is the same as that of the landed aristocracy. His conservatism is that of the technologist, using as his basis for the development of techniques a fundamental presupposition of the unchangingness of human nature. The landed aristocracy were associated with the belief that the preservation of the status quo was in their own interest. Thucydides is unconcerned with the status quo as such. He does not look for constancy in situation or organisation but deduces from empirical evidence that, given that human nature is unchanging, certain responses will be given in certain circumstances.

His conservatism is, therefore, associated with a utilitarian system of ethics and a pragmatic approach to politics - success in administration seems to be his criterion of good government, rather than adherance to any one political basis. The conservatism of Thucydides is, therefore, extremely radical. There are considerable affinities with the amoralists, although his pessimism is not expressed in the

same way as that of Gorgias and Critias. He makes a deeper and more urgent study of the bases of political society and the motivation of human conduct, and then accepts these as the framework within which men live their lives, distasteful though this might sometimes be to his moral conscience.

Thucydides' analysis of human motivation means that he appreciates the tensions and dangers inherent in any material advance or technological or intellectual capacity. His reporting of the speech of Alcibiades advocating the Sicilian expedition (39) underlines his realisation that greatness of its very nature carries the seeds of decadence ; "We cannot regulate at pleasure the extent of our empire; in our position it is necessary for us, while not relaxing our hold on our subjects, to plan attacks on the rest, for if we do not ourselves rule over others, we should be in danger of falling under their rule".

When this belief is related to domestic politics it is clear that, by definition, stability is impossible. This is amplified in Thucydides' analysis of the causes and effects of revolutions (40). Stasis was in the event suicidal because it consumed the accumulated material prosperity and the prominent men (both a leading part of the contention) and exposed both sides to the danger of extinction, particularly in the face of threats from an external enemy. It is for these general reasons that Thucydides is concerned with stasis. Particular manifestations hold little interest for him once he has analysed the first stasis.

In his analysis he writes - "The cause of all these evils was the love of power, originating in avarice and ambition; hence, once engaged in the struggles, men were unsparing of their efforts. The leaders on either side in the cities used specious catchwords; one party preferred 'a fair share of political rights for the masses', the other 'the good sense of government by the best men'; they professed devotion to the public interest but rewarded themselves at the public cost. They stopped at nothing in their struggle for victory.....In this crisis the life of the city was in utter disorder; and human nature which is accustomed to do wrong, even in defiance of the laws, now trampled them underfoot and delighted to show that it is ungovernable in passion, uncontrollable by justice and hostile to all superiors. For they would not have set revenge above religion and profit above innocence, if envy had not exercised a fatal power. In revenging themselves on others, men claim the right to annul

in advance those common laws of humanity to which every man trusts for his own hope of deliverance from calamities, and to leave no recourse against the day when he may be in danger and in need of their support".

In this passage, Thucydides gives voice to traditional fears. With the emphasis on the values of the community and kinship, hierarchy, authority and religion goes his fear of social chaos surmounted only by absolute power once individuals are wrenched from the context of these values - he laments the fact that "even blood becomes a weaker tie than faction" and that society and institutions lose their moderating influence. Irony is lent to the analysis in that, although Thucydides uses the techniques of the enlightenment, and although his field of enquiry is defined by advances in rational thought, when he does permit himself a moral, as opposed to a scholarly comment, it should be couched in apparently traditionalist language. But beneath the surface conservatism is a profound pessimism based on his apprehension of the unchangingness of human nature and its inevitable lust for power. Ironically, it is these same qualities which make possible men's increasing control over his physical and intellectual environment, thus contributing directly to stasis.

Having thus established Thucydides' appreciation of man's qualities and motivation, and his pessimism, especially with regard to the apparent inevitability of stasis, the way is open to turn to his consideration of the system and the men who might avert stasis. This part of the discussion divides itself into three main parts - his attitude to the Empire, his attitude to Pericles, and his attitude to the other demagogues and the demos.

Thucydides' attitude to the Empire is based on the belief that the assertion of power is based on interest, and especially the interest of the strong to whom the weak yield; a judgement resulting from his own analysis of the facts of human and governmental behaviour. However, Thucydides in no way formulates this in terms of natural law, with the corresponding moral or teleological implications. Some expositions of theories of natural law can be interpreted as attempts to impose some degree of stability on political relationships. Thucydides does not attempt this, in fact his analysis of stasis indicated that he did not think that this was possible. He does, however, devote considerable attention to the role played in argument by theories

of natural law.

The speech of the Athenian envoys in Book I is a prime example of apology for Empire. The envoys recognise the inevitable unpopularity of imperial policies but assert - "It follows that it is not a very wonderful action or contrary to the common practice of mankind, if we did accept an empire that was offered to us, and refused to give it up under the pressure of three of the strongest motives, fear, honour and interest. And it was not we who set the example, for it has always been the law that the weaker should be subject to the stronger" (41). The attitude of Thucydides to these assertions is not expressly given, but from the passages quoted earlier, it may be deduced that he accepts that it is a fact that men and states act from motives of interest and fear, and it is in practice in the interests of the weak to accept the domination of the strong, provided that the strong excel in certain merits. However, there is no evidence that he supported the erection of a universal law on the basis of these facts - to do so would have posited might as a sanction in itself; Thucydides seeks to define more closely what constitutes might and how it may be used. In fact, as far as power itself is concerned, Thucydides recognises that there is no moral sanction to its acquisition. He merely distinguishes the ways in which men and nations actually behave, and unlike Thrasymachus but like Critias, he sees through this to its self-destructive conclusion.

For these reasons, therefore, Thucydides seems constantly to be attempting to reconcile his admiration for certain aspects of the (Periclean) Empire with his distaste for the amorality of empire in general, which he considered self-destructive. A comparison between the Melian dialogue and the Funeral Oration and the Last Speech of Pericles will underline this point. Elsewhere in the HISTORY, Thucydides seems to accept that might is a fact of life from which it is impossible to escape, and that whatever the moral implications, men do, in fact, act in what they consider to be their own interest. In the Melian dialogue, the Athenian delegates base their argument on an extreme version of the natural law theory - "We both alike know that in human reckoning the question of justice only enters where there is equal power to enforce it and that the powerful exact what they can and the weak grant what they must" (42).

Later in the dialogue a further extension of the application of belief and principles of natural law occurs when the Athenians

introduce the will of the gods as the ultimate sanction - "For we believe of the gods by repute and of men by clear evidence that by a necessity of nature, wherever they have the power, they will rule. This law was not made by us and we are not the first who have acted upon it; we did but inherit it, and shall bequeath it to all time; we obey it in the knowledge that you and all mankind, with our strength would act like us. So much for the gods; we have no reason to fear any lack of their favour" (43). The words of the Athenians in this dialogue strike the highest pitch in the HISTORY'S illustrations of the unity of fear and strength in the forging and maintaining of Empire. Empire is presented as virtually an automatic phenomen, for the continued existence of which individuals are not really responsible.

There are similar undertones of necessity in Pericles' Last Speech - "Neither can you any longer resign your power if, at this crisis, any timorous spirit is for playing the peace lover and the honest man. For by this time your empire has become a despotism, which it is thought unjust to acquire but unsafe to surrender" (44). Once this is recognised, necessity can become virtue and Empire can be presented as a matter of positive and glorious choice - "The love of peace is secure only in association with the spirit of action in an imperial city it is of no use, but it is suited to subjects who enjoy safety and servitude".

The Funeral Oration goes further in suggesting a moral justification of the holding of Empire. Pericles praises the history of Athens and the nobility of her institutions. She is held up as a model for Hellas, not only on the political and economic plane, but also on the cultural - "To sum up, I say that the whole city is an education for Hellas and that each individual in our society would seem to be capable of the greatest self-reliance and of the utmost dexterity and grace in the widest range of activities. This is no passing boast in a speech, but truth and fact, and verified by the actual power of the city which we have won by this way of life. For when put to the test, Athens alone among her contemporaries is superior to report. No enemy who comes up against her is indignant at the reverses which he sustains at the hands of such men; no subject complains that his masters do not deserve to rule" (45).

Thus in admiring the Periclean Empire for cultural as well as political distinction, Thucydides appears to find in its civilising influence a justification for its existence. The evidence in support of this interpretation consists not only of the speeches quoted above

but of Thucydides' open approval of Pericles' administration and his contrasting condemnation of the radical democrats, for example, with respect to the policies of Cleon put forward in the Mytilenian episode.

Cleon's speech is vital to an understanding of the reasons for Thucydides' antagonism towards the demos. One passage is particularly significant - "But it is worst of all if we do not stand firm by any of our decisions and fail to recognise that a state in which the laws, though imperfect, are always observed, is better than one where they are good but ineffective, that it is more useful to have a little learning but sound sense than to be clever and undisciplined, and that the simpler sort of men generally administer cities better than the more astute" (46). It is instructive to compare the offence such sentiments caused Thucydides' critical sense with his praise of Pericles (47), where the natural brilliance of one man is contrasted with the stupidity of the demos - "In the conduct of public affairs they took his advice.... yet as individuals they felt their sufferings keenly; the common people had been deprived even of the little which they possessed, while the upper classes had lost fine estates in the country with all their houses and rich furniture. Worst of all, instead of enjoying peace, they were now at war. The universal indignation was not pacified until they had fined Pericles, but, soon afterwards, with the usual fickleness of the masses, they elected him general and committed all their affairs to his charge. Their domestic sorrows were beginning to be less acutely felt, and for the needs of the city as a whole they thought that there was no man like him. During the peace while he was at the head of affairs he showed moderation as a leader; he kept Athens safe, and she also reached the height of her greatness in his time. When the war began he showed here, too, his foresight in estimating Athenian power. He survived two years and six months, and, after his death, his prescience regarding the war was even better appreciated. For he told the Athenians that if they were not restless, and would attend to their navy, and not seek to enlarge their dominion while the war was going on, nor imperil the existence of the city, they would come through.....he was powerful in mind and public esteem and a man of most transparent integrity, and he controlled the people in a free spirit; he led them himself rather than followed them; for, not seeking power by dishonest practices, he did not speak to gratify the people, but possessing power based on his high character, he would oppose them and even provoke their anger. Whenever he saw them inopportunely elated or arrogant, he would, by his speeches, strike them with

fear and alarm; and when they were unreasonably apprehensive, he would re-animate their confidence. Thus Athens, though in name a democracy, was, in fact, coming to be ruled by her first citizen. But his successors were more on an equality with one another; as each was struggling to be first himself, they came to sacrifice the whole conduct of affairs to the gratification of the people. As was natural in a great and imperial city, this led to many errors".

Thucydides seems not to have realised, or have chosen to ignore, that in fact Pericles gained power in the same way as other demagogues. That he did so is clear from the discussion of Pericles by Aristotle in both the CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS (48) and the POLITICS (49), in which it is stated that Pericles rose to power in the popular party by appealing to the demos, first by his prosecution of Cimon and then by introducing pay for jury service (50). That Thucydides did not wish to associate Pericles with the demagogues is presumably because he wished only to make the point that once having achieved power, Pericles used it wisely.

One of the ways in which Thucydides considered Pericles used power wisely was by gaining mastery of the demos and making the democracy 'government by the first citizen'. It is apparent from the way in which he says this that Thucydides felt considerable scorn for the demos. This is primarily because he associated it with irrational decisions and anti-intellectualism. This is apparent from passages such as those referring to Nicias' conduct being motivated by fears of the irrationality of the demos - "The men upon whose votes their fate would depend would not, like themselves, have seen with their own eyes the state of affairs; they would only have heard the criticisms of others, and would be convinced by any accusations which a clever speaker might bring forward. Indeed many, or most, of the very soldiers who were now crying out that their case was desperate, would raise the opposite cry when they reached home, and would say that the generals were traitors, and had been bribed to depart. Therefore, knowing the character of the Athenians, for his own part he would rather fall, if he must, by his own decision, at the post of danger and by the hands of the enemy, than die unjustly on a dishonourable charge at the hands of the Athenians" (51).

It is clear that the strategoi were liable to prosecution on almost any grounds, and after the outbreak of the war there was an increase in the number of trials, which included that of Pericles.

In addition to combating the enemy, the strategoi had to combat the prevailing mood of the Assembly, and the dangers of returning after an unsuccessful expedition were considerable, especially if the strategos was primarily a military man and lacked political power - Demosthenes, for example.

Thucydides further condemns the demos when referring to the Sicilian defeat - "Acting as a populace will, the Athenians were ready, in their immediate panic, to submit to discipline" (52), while the basis of his criticism is underlined in the reference to Antiphon - "A man inferior in virtue to none of his contemporaries and unexcelled in forming plans and in expounding his views. He did not like to come forward in the assembly or in any other public arena; he was suspect to the masses because of his reputation for cleverness" (53).

In fact, most of Thucydides' judgements about individuals are couched in terms relating to intellectual and political ability. To Pericles, Antiphon and Theramenes (53) may be added those referring to Theseus, Brasidas, the Peisistradids, Hermocrates and especially Themistocles (55) - "Themistocles was a man who exhibited the most indubitable signs of genius; indeed in this capacity he has a claim on our administration quite extraordinary and unparalleled. By his own native capacity, alike unformed and unsupplemented by study, he was at once the best judge in those sudden crises which admit of little or no deliberation, and the best prophet of the future, even to its most distant possibilities. An able theoretical expositer of all that came within the sphere of his practice, he was not without the power of passing an adequate judgement in matters in which he had no experience. He could also excellently divine the good or evil which lay hid in the unseen future. In fine, whether we consider the extent of his natural powers, or the slightness of his application, this extraordinary man must be allowed to have surpassed all others in the faculty of intuitively meeting an emergency". When this judgement is taken together with Thucydides' praise of Pericles, his hostility to the demos and to the warring factions of oligarchs, it is apparent that Thucydides' criterion of good government was successful administration based on high intellectual qualities and natural genius.

The relevance of Thucydides to the main theme is, therefore, profound and complex. His rational approach to history is in the tradition of the sophistic enlightenment. This is combined with a technologist's conservatism concerning human nature, and with an even

more thoroughgoing fear of the political and social chaos which would arise when men were uprooted from social, moral and political tradition. At the same time he recognised that, because of the constant underlying motive of interest in power, stasis would inevitably arise, and in this sense chaos was self-perpetrating, just as on a different level Empire fulfilled a self-impelled momentum in leading to its own downfall.

In such a situation the only aristocrat who mattered was one like Pericles who could, by the force of his personality, intellect and civic ability, unite the state's warring classes and factions, who could, in fact, rationalise the irrationality of the demos. To the Thucydidean interpretation of the supremacy of Pericles, an interpretation which has its roots not primarily in the cult of the individual as Westlake would have us believe (56), but rather in the historians' attempt to offset his pessimism by eulogy of a past Golden Age, may be compared what Dodds has called the "systematic irrationalism" of Euripides (57), when in THE BACCHAE he asserts that emotion, not reason, determines human conduct. The reaction of the dramatist and that of the historian may be traced to a common pessimism rooted in disillusionment with the failure of rationalism to (in the case of Euripides) arrive at a complete and lasting truth, and to (in the case of Thucydides) reconcile the warring factions and avoid stasis. Thucydides' analysis of the events of his time is itself a profoundly pessimistic comment on man's propensity to self-annihilation. The only way of arresting this lay in the accession to power of men of unique intellectual and personal qualities. For Thucydides these were the qualities fostered by the Sophistic education, but they had to belong to the aristocrat who must also hold the social status to enforce them, while ensuring that he was not corrupted by the means the political system had forced him to use. When he eulogises these qualities in Pericles, Thucydides demonstrates the impact of the sophistic revolution on the actual and claimed values of 5th century society at the same time that he interprets and illuminates the constancy of the underlying human motivation.

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CHAPTER NINE.

EPILOGUE.

Throughout the material which has been analysed, the relationship between the two primary branches of elitist ideas, the positive or descriptive and the normative or imperative, is a very complex one. Not only does the degree of inter-dependence vary from writer to writer, but their spatial relationship also varies, being considerably influenced by the form in which the writers' thoughts are being expressed.

If the conclusions which have been drawn in individual sections of the discussion are analysed, it is at once apparent that there is no direct line of idealogical development to be traced through the abstract material. Changes and developments are rather the result of a two-way process of interaction. A writer draws on his experiences of his environment, or of the environment about which he is writing or thinking, and this forms the basis of the descriptive aspect of his work. But his interpretation is influenced not only by his experiences in the narrow sense, but by his personality, aspirations, and by the received ideas and interpretations of others. Thus in terms of this discussion, his understanding may have little historical validity in the strict sense - what it does have is validity in terms of motivation of the second or normative aspect of his thought.

Thus the discussion has not been primarily concerned with the justifiability of the particular interpretation of an existing status quo in the strictly historical sense - it is, for example, immaterial whether Theognis was writing of the Mainland or of the Sicilian Megara, but rather with the reasons for the individual thinking as he did, especially if what he thought can be shown to be typical or particularly influential, and the implications of his thought for modifying the existing framework of elitist ideas.

Therefore, the term 'moral imperative' which may be adduced to this second, or normative aspect, has to be understood in the context of the first aspect. Because it is based on the implicit judgements made about the qualities most essential to the preservation of the form of society desired by the particular thinker, it embraces the analysis, conscious or unconscious, made of the situation of society and the manner in which the thinker describes it to himself.

The moral imperative may take a number of different forms according to the medium through which it is to be expressed. It may take the form of an appeal to the imagination through mythology or poetic transformation, it may take the form of gnomic advice or of the propoganda poem, it may be implied in a historian's selectivity or tone, it may be embodied in a dramatic composition concerned with general problems about the human condition. What is clear, however, is that not until the 5th century do the necessary components of elitist ideas begin to be formally recognised - that is, the need to make judgements about the needs of a society and the necessity of justifying the response to these in terms of a congruent arrangement of non-physical sanctions and concrete actuality.

It is the gradual move towards this which emerges from the re-arrangement of the unit sanctions which takes place in the earlier reactions. From the product of the inter-action between those ideas and the political, economic and social environment is derived the impetus towards a new dimension in political thought. From a summary of the changes in the relationship of the descriptive and normative aspects through the main body of the material which has been discussed, it can be shown that this impetus, although not responsible for a direct and untrammelled line of development, nevertheless involved certain key stages which were essential to the eventual sophistication of elitist thought.

In the heroic poems of Homer, the poet is speaking through a medium which, in describing a society not the poet's own, places great strain on attempts to define the context of the imperatives. Yet the imperatives themselves, and especially the urge to find and proclaim a standard of conduct and achievement fitting for the ruling class while at the same time recognising the need to establish an objective criterion for justice other than the whim of anthropomorphic gods or the potentially self-destructive resort to force, indicate an intellectual context in which such problems can be abstracted from descriptive narrative in order to form the basis of further episodes even if the framework does not exist for relating them directly to political forms.

In Hesiod was seen the rejection of Strife and Violence and the attempt to achieve a state of Equilibrium within the community, upheld by religious sanctions. This was the ancestor of the philosophies of moderation hinted at by Theognis and developed by Solon.

Theognis laments the re-arrangement of unit sanctions which he considers has taken place, and in so doing takes the vital step of relating his arrangement of them to stability through the linking idea of justice, an attempt elaborated by Solon in the poems justifying his legislation. Thus a new dimension of thought is introduced in which an abstract idea can be defined in a chosen way (for instance in terms of the arrangement of unit sanctions in the Theognid corpus or in terms of Solonic harmony and moderation) in order to meet a desired social and political end - in the case of Theognis a return to an earlier situation, in the case of Solon the prevention of stasis. Against this philosophical elitism was set the practical exploration of modes of adaptation, discussed by Alcaeus and practised by Pittacus and the Alcmaeonids.

When the contrasting influences and ideas of Pindar and Aeschylus were discussed, it immediately became clear that considerable influence was exerted by the fact that politics was becoming a generally recognised and accepted activity. Even the idealised victors of Pindar had to be linked with the glory attaching to the polis, while the work of Aeschylus shows direct concern with political organisations and values. Pindar's thought was seen to be regressive yet important for its attempt to justify outmoded values in terms of religious sanctions. This is in direct contrast to the potential dynamics of the celebration of man's ability which is one side of the tightly drawn Aeschylean structure of tensions, characterised, again in contrast to Pindar, by close attention to contemporary political developments, not in a narrowly didactic sense, but rather in the sense of cutting through them to a consideration of the fundamental conflicts implicit in human affairs and in attempts to order them in society.

Aeschylus is unique in that for all his concern with the capabilities of man he never loses sight of the complexities of the relationships of men, not only with each other, but also with the forces of a universal context. This is an aspect which looms large in Sophocles who was considered here primarily for his relation of this to a political context in his variations on a theme of ἀπραγμοσύνη.

Sophocles, however, was shown to be somewhat at a tangent to the main stream of 5th century political concern, which was very much governed by consideration of man's capabilities within his own sphere of activity, and dominated by rejection of the Hesiodic moral tradition and the regeneration of the influence of the concepts of strife and violence.

Thus the ground was prepared for the work of the Sophists and the beginnings of a systematic relation of man's sphere of activity to his capacity for dominating it.

In the position of the Sophists in society was expressed the realisation of the ruling class that there had to be congruence between the requirements of the political organisation of a society and its own ability and achievements if its position and status was to be safeguarded. In the elevation of Sophistic education was recognised the re-structuring of the framework of unit sanctions which itself now expressed the assimilation to the status of sanction of the need to justify criteria of excellence.

Thus one aspect of the intellect, the repressive, was elevated at the expense of that celebrated by Aeschylus in the more optimistic passages of the PROMETHEUS BOUND. In Thucydides' HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR was studied the working out of this development in action. Man's growing ability to control his environment, to undertake technological and navigational advance, remains always subservient to what Thucydides describes as the constant characteristics of human nature - fear and greed. In Thucydides' profoundly pessimistic study the interdependence of the descriptive and normative is total, yet his moral imperative is pervaded by the same pessimism and takes its roots from the projected glories of a by-gone age, the Periclean democracy.

The Sophistic stress on intellectual adroitness is shown in Thucydides to be unable, even in its repressive form, to contain the threat of stasis. An example of the progressive intellect, navigation, becomes the tool of imperialism and then of naked greed. Thucydides' pessimism does not extend as far as the total disillusionment with rationalism which seems to be Euripides' response in THE BACCHAE, yet in a sense he admits the defeat of his hopes just as graphically when he looks back to the glories of the Periclean Golden Age.

Thus the elitist criteria in the period from Homer to Thucydides passed through three crucial developments in attitude. The first was the early stage at which attitudes to the relation of the rulers to society became articulate. This was further refined when politics became a recognised and accepted, and thus self-conscious, activity. Then the way was open for a systematic relation of man and his capabilities to the sphere of his activity. The realisation of this was impeded by two vital problems.

The first problem was the pervading concern with stasis, which had governed the arrangement of the unit sanctions and had coloured these with the tone of the repressive intellect. The progressive intellect, although hinted at by Aeschylus, was a concept undeveloped by the Greeks except in the technological sense. The intellect had, in the political field, been made into a means for rationalising power politics. With Thucydides' pessimism, disillusionment with rationalism seemd imminent. Concern with stasis could not be discarded, but Thucydides had discredited the repressive intellect. Thus the alternative to retreat in memories of a Golden Age, or in adulation of the Irrational, seemed to be a systematic progressive intellectual response to the problems of social and political stability.

The attempt to develop such a system was itself not without its problems. The anti-intellectualism of the demos, charted by Thucydides, and culminating in the trial and execution of Socrates, and coupled with it the failure of the democratic social ideas of Protagoras to be developed into a political theory, served as a stimulus to Plato to develop his own elitist theory. However, Plato was not alone in being so motivated, and a comparison with Isocrates is illuminating in a number of respects.

Isocrates' tracts proved a very interesting example of the reaction of a thinker who could not transcend the limitations of his own experience and temperament. His vision is therefore ultimately a backward rather than a forward looking one. His reaction is rooted in an idealised memory of the time when, or so he thinks, a politically moderate Athens was moving to the height of her cultural prowess at a time when her imperialism had not yet caused her to degenerate morally and socially into the eventual troughs of defeat by Sparta. It has to be emphasised that Isocrates is not a historian and his rhetoric has little value in these terms, but what is of importance here is the reactions of a mind. He adopts the Thucydidean disillusionment with

the downfall of Athens, coupled with the distrust of the moral aspects of imperialism and, like Thucydides, looks back to an idealised Golden Age.

Isocrates is enough of a social thinker to realise that there must be an impetus if regeneration is to take place. But the limits of his mind force him to seek this in historical terms. Thus for him Pan-Hellenism is a moralised utilitarian answer to the problems of rationalist disillusionment and stasis. He turns to the time when the Greeks stood temporarily united in the face of the threat of Persian dominance, and invests this with the aura of cultural edification, political stability and moral rectitude. Like the Old Oligarch, he attributes decadence to the Sea-Empire's influence and seeks to avert it by recreating in modified form his Golden Age.

However unsatisfactory Isocrate's attempt may be, it does highlight both the political and social concerns with which a thinker had to grapple, and indicate the fact that solutions rooted in adherance to the past could add no new dimension to political achievement. In the field of ideas, however, Isocrates does elaborate the concept of a cultural elite - this is not the same as an intellectual elite, since it is based on racial divisions and developed in terms of conservation of the traditional. As a secondary thinker, however, Isocrates is totally unable to systemise his ideal into something which can have a constructive future, in that it can take the present instead of the past as its starting point.

Thus the ways in which Isocrates is unable to think beyond the limits of his time and background throw into relief what is unique in Plato. There is no need to be concerned with a discussion of Plato's philosophy, or even his political theories as such - the central point in relation to the ideas which have been discussed in this thesis is that Plato's intention was to build a political system based on the idea of progress towards a utopian situation, and that in order to try and achieve this he performed what Isocrates had been unable to realise and based the system of his polis on ethical values. It may well be argued that Plato, too, failed to liberate himself from the dominating influence of the past, in that he could not move outside the vision of a polis which was dominated by the social mores of the Dorian aristocracy, but the fact remains that he is the first of the Greek elitist thinkers to systemise his ideas and present them in a form governed by the concept of a future transformation. For whatever may

be said of Plato's Guardians, it is laid down that they do not act in their own interest. Adeimantus remarks upon this -

"Socrates, how would you meet the objection that you are not making these people particularly happy? It is their own fault too if they are not; for they are really masters of the state and yet they get no good out of it as other rulers do, who own lands, build themselves fine houses with handsome furniture, offer private sacrifices to the gods and entertain visitors from abroad" (1).

Socrates replies in terms which emphasise the contrast with Thucydidean pessimism -

"Though it would not be surprising if even these people were perfectly happy under such conditions, our aim in founding the commonwealth was not to make any one class specially happy, but to secure the greatest possible happiness for the community as a whole. .....For the moment, we are constructing, as we believe, the state which will be happy as a whole, not trying to secure the well-being of a select few". This is the progressive aspect of Plato's state.

Nevertheless, it is certainly so that in Plato the progressive intellect forms an uneasy alliance with the repressive. His class of Guardians are to perpetrate their ascendancy through control of ideas and education. Kropotkin could have been echoing this when he wrote, (2) -

"The history of human thought recalls the swinging of a pendulum which takes centuries to swing. After a long period of slumber comes a moment of awakening. Then thought frees herself from the chains with which those interested - rulers, lawyers, clerics - have carefully enwound her..... But the inveterate enemies of thought - the government, the lawgivers and the priest - soon recover from their defeat. By degrees they gather together their scattered forces and remodel their faith and their code of laws to adapt them to new needs. Then, profiting by the servility of thought and character which they themselves have so effectively cultivated; profiting too, by the momentary disorganisation of society, taking advantage of the laziness of some, the greed of others, the best hopes of many, they softly creep back to their work by first of all taking possession of childhood through education".

In Plato's REPUBLIC there is precisely that use of the repressive intellect which Kropotkin describes. The essential difference is that for the first time in Greek thought this is being used,

not to justify an existing situation, but to create an idealised situation in the future.

The history of elitist ideas from Homer to Thucydides has been largely the history of the relation of unit sanctions to the pattern of a desired status quo with a broad framework of conflict between elements of constraint and equilibrium in which the developing rationalisation of criteria for membership of the ruling elite is based on political requirements. Thucydides drew the conclusion that it was in turn unchanging qualities in human nature which determined political requirements. This realisation, combined with his apprehension of anti-intellectualism and his dread of stasis, govern his pessimisn, but in it lies also the stimulus for Plato to seek to refine a human nature on which political activity could ideally be based.

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NOTES FOR CHAPTER ONE.

1. E. Barker. GREEK POLITICAL THEORY ch. 3.
2. T. Sinclair. HISTORY OF GREEK POLITICAL THOUGHT ch. 2.
3. W. Forrest. THE EMERGENCE OF GREEK DEMOCRACY 6h. 10 - "The great debate".
4. E. Cassirer. THE MYTH OF THE STATE ch. 5.
5. A. Adkins. MERIT AND RESPONSIBILITY pp. 1-2.
6. K. Popper. THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES vo. 1. ch. 1.
7. A. Momigliano. TERZO CONTRIBUTO ALLA STORIA DEGLI STUDI CLASSICI E DEL MONDO ANTICO p. 300 (quoted in published translation of A. Momigliano, STUDIES IN HISTORIOGRAPHY by M.I. Finley, Review Essay, HISTORY AND THEORY 1968 p. 358).
8. c.f. Mannheim's assumption that concepts represent interpretative responses to given situations and his distinction of four interdependent variables:-
   a) the situation, e.g. community, nation, revolution, class.
   b) the individual involved and his forming of an image of the situation according to his occupational aims, political aspirations, kinship ties, economic rivalries and alliances.
   c) the imagery adopted by individuals or groups.
   d) the audience to which the image is conveyed, including its peculiar understandings, symbols to which it attaches meaning and vocabulary to which it responds.
   (The breakdown of Mannheim's study of ideas as functions of social involvement is drawn from IDEALOGY AND UTOPIA and ESSAYS ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF CULTURE).
9. J.K. Galbraith. THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY p. 45.
10. P. Kropotkin. ANARCHIST MORALITY (KROPOTKIN'S REVOLUTIONARY PAMPHLETS ed. R.N. Baldwin p. 80).
11. K. Hopkins. "Elite Mobility in the Roman Empire"(PAST AND PRESENT 32 pp. 12-26).
12. see M. Mandelbaum. "The history of ideas, intellectual history and the history of philosophy" (HISTORY AND THEORY BEIHEFT 5 pp. 33-66).

13. L. Edelstein. THE IDEA OF PROGRESS IN CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY.

14. There is a good discussion of this usage in THE SOCIAL THEORIES OF TALCOTT PARSONS (ed. Max Black).

15. R. Dahrendorff. "In praise of Thrasymachus" (ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF SOCIETY p.140).

16. e.g. G. Mosca. THE RULING CLASS p. 51-2.

17. C.L. Stevenson. "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms" (MIND vol. XLVI Jan. 1937).

18. The precise meaning attached to different concepts of change will be discussed later.

19. For example, the determination of Parsons that an adequate theory of social action must be 'voluntaristic'. This is discussed critically by C. Wright-Mills in THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION pp. 37 ff.

20. e.g. Theognis 51; Herodotus Bk. 1, 59, 60, 173; Thucydides Bk. 4, 71.

21. Theognis 781; Solon fr. 4, 19; Thucydides Bk. 2,65.

22. Isocrates 4, 79.

23. Plato, REPUBLIC 470b; Aristotle POLITICS 1296 a 8.

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NOTES FOR CHAPTER TWO.

1. The complexities of the authorship of the epics are not directly relevant to this enquiry. The problem is treated by D.L. Page in HOMER AND THE HOMERIC ILIAD and THE ODYSSEY OF HOMER.

2. For a discussion of the historical context of Hesiod, see A.R. Burn, THE WORLD OF HESIOD and THE THEOGNY, edited and with commentary by M.L. West.

3. This is pointedout by A.A. Long, MORALS AND VALUES IN HOMER (J.H.S. 1970 p. 122) - "In fact, of course, our knowledge of Homeric values is not extended by any sound evidence independent of the ILIAD and ODYSSEY. Inferences drawn purely from Homer about ethical language cannot be assumed as historical axioms".

4. Xenophanes. Fr. 2.

5. ILIAD Bk. 2. 557-8, attributed to Peisistratus or sometimes to Solon.

6. M.I. Finley. THE WORLD OF ODYSSEUS ch. 1.

7. Plato. THE REPUBLIC 606E-607.

8. Particular mention has to be made of the studies of A.W.H. Adkins, MERIT AND RESPONSIBILITY; E.R. Dodds, THE GREEKS AND THE IRRATIONAL, and M.I. Finley, THE WORLD OF ODYSSEUS.

9. ILIAD Bk. 2. 100-108.

10. ILIAD Bk. 9. 37.

11. ILIAD Bk. 1. 117.

12. ILIAD Bk. 1. 127.

13. ILIAD Bk. 4. 416.

14. ILIAD Bk. 1. 277-279.

15. This point is elaborated by A.A. Long, op. cit. p.135.

16. ILIAD Bk. 12. 310.

17. ODYSSEY Bk. 1. 394-6.

18. A.A. Long. op. cit. p. 138.

19. G.M. Calhoun. CLASSES AND MASSES IN HOMER (Cl. Philol.1934), and c.f. W.F. Donlan A NOTE ON ἄριστος AS A CLASS TERM (Philologus 113 - 1969).

20. Calhoun says that the epithet ἄριστος is used of a few heroes, chiefly Odysseus, Ajax and Patroclus, but describes its use as "conventional and formal". (op.cit. pp 192 ff.)

21. This is discussed by E. Frankfort BEFORE PHILOSOPHY pp 137 ff, with reference to Mesopotamia.

22. W. Guthrie. THE GREEKS AND THEIR GODS pp 117 ff; M.I. Finley, op.cit. pp 142 ff.

23. ODYSSEY Bk. 5 61 ff; Bk. 10 220 ff.

24. ILIAD Bk. 14 238 ff.

25. ILIAD Bk. 24 97 ff. ODYSSEY Bk. 5 85 ff.

26. Ares, at ILIAD Bk. 5 855 ff.

27. Poseidon's stress on fame and honour at ILIAD Bk. 7 451 ff; bk. 15 185 ff; ODYSSEY Bk. 13 128 ff.

28. This is elaborated by A.A. Long, op.cit. p 129.

29. e.g. the revolt of Hera and Athena (ILIAD Bk. 8 350 ff), and Poseidon's reluctance at ILIAD Bk. 15 184 ff.

30. ILIAD Bk. 1 518 ff; Bk. 5 893.

31. G.E.R. Lloyd. POLARITY AND ANALOGY p. 195.

32. e.g. ILIAD Bk. 15 185 ff.

33. ILIAD Bk. 24 133-137.

34. WORKS AND DAYS 11 ff.

35. WORKS AND DAYS 25-6.

36. WORKS AND DAYS 276 ff.

37. WORKS AND DAYS 213 ff.

38. WORKS AND DAYS 248 ff.

39. J-P. Vernant. MYTHE ET PENSEE CHEZ LES GRECS. ch. 1.

40. WORKS AND DAYS 106 ff.

41. WORKS AND DAYS 142 ff.

42. WORKS AND DAYS 213.

43. e.g. 726-819 on Night, discussed by Kirk and Raven, THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHERS ch. 1.

44. ibid. ch. 1 p.8.

45. WORKS AND DAYS 108 ff.

46. e.g. 383 ff.

47. WORKS AND DAYS 108.

48. For discussion of the latter see Kirk and Raven op.cit. ch. 1; G. Lloyd op.cit. ch. 3.

49. THEOGONY 881-885.

50. WORKS AND DAYS 258 ff.

51. THEOGONY 901 ff.

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NOTES FOR CHAPTER THREE.

1.		cf. Hesiod WORKS AND DAYS 270 ff and Theognis 197-208.
2.		Tyrtaeus in Pausanias 4.14.5.
3.		Lycurgus, AGAINST LEOCRATES (c.330).
4.		Tyrtaeus in Stobaius' ANTHOLOGY 51.1.
5.	D.L. Page.	SAPPHO AND ALCAEUS pp 149-243.
6.	D.L. Page.	op.cit. pp 209 ff.
	C.M. Bowra.	GREEK LYRIC POETRY ch. 4.
7.		Alcaeus Z 34.
8.		Alcaeus Z 105(b).
9.		Diogenes Laertius 1.76.
10.		Alcaeus G 1.
11.		Diogenes Laertius 1.81.
12.		e.g. Z 24.
13.	D.L. Page.	op.cit. pp 170, 176.
14.		Alcaeus D 12.
15.		The two fragments which will be considered in this context are A 6 and Z 2. D 15 is omitted, since even if genuine it adds nothing to the others for the present purpose. (c.f. Page, op. cit. pp 193 ff).
16.		Archilochus Fr. 56 (Diehl).
17.		Alcaeus A 6.
18.		Alcaeus G 1.
19.	cf. E. Harrison.	STUDIES IN THEOGNIS, and B. van Groningen, THEOGNIS (le premier livre).
20.		Theognis 429 ff.
21.		Theognis 315-8. The lines are usually attributed to Solon.
22.		Theognis 183 ff.
23.		Theognis 149-50. cf. Bacchylides fr. 23 and Solon 4, 9-12.
24.		Theognis 83 ff.
25.		Theognis 43 ff.
26.		Theognis 847 ff.
27.		Theognis 147 ff.
28.	A.W.H. Adkins.	op.cit. p 78.

29. Aristotle, CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS 5-12. The quotations from Solon's poems are also taken from this passage. Therefore the reference will not be repeated.

30. The point is discussed by C.M. Bowra in his analysis of Xenophanes "Xenophanes and the Olympian Games" in PROBLEMS IN GREEK POETRY pp 15-38.

31. cf. G. Vlastos on the dominant role of political experience in furnishing the conceptual pattern of the pre-Socratics,"Isonomia" AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY 74, 1953, p 361 ff.

32. In fact, Solon was accused of corruption. Aristotle, CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS 6.

33. G. Vlastos. (op.cit) discusses the defeat of the demos in the land question.

34. For a detailed discussion see A. Andrewes, THE GREEK TYRANTS, especially ch. 1, 7, 9.

35. Herodotus Bk. 1, 59-61.

36. Herodotus Bk. 5, 62-73; 90-1.

37. R. Meiggs and D. Lewis. HISTORICAL INSCRIPTIONS, no. 6.

38. Dion. Hal., ANT. ROM. 7, 3.

39. This is supported by reference in Aristotle to inter-club rivalry between them (CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS 20. 1.)

40. Aristotle, CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS. 20. 1.

41. Aristotle, CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS. 20.

42. Herodotus Bk. 5, 70. 72-3. 74 ff. This is discussed by C. Mossé, LES INSTITUTIONS GREQUES ch. 1.

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NOTES FOR CHAPTER FOUR.

1. C.M. Bowra. PINDAR - Appendix 2 "Pindaric Chronology".
2. Pythian 11, 41 ff.
3. Pythian 4, 293 ff.
4. C.M. Bowra. op.cit. ch. 1. especially pp 13 ff.
5. Olympian 10, 53-55.
6. Pythian 10, 71-72.
7. Pythian 2 86 ff.
8. Pythian 11, 52-4.
9. Thucydides 3. 62.
10. Olympian 1 and Pythian 1.
11. Herodotus 7. 6. 2; 2.130, 3; 8. 34. 1. See Bowra, op.cit. ch. 3.
12. Herodotus 7. 132. 2.
13. Herodotus 7. 139. 6; 7. 220. 4.
14. Thucydides 3. 62. 3.
15. Fr. 99a Bo. (110 Sn.)
16. Fr. 106 Bo. (120-1 Sn.)
17. Isthmian 7. 42. Pythian 8. For further treatment see Bowra, op.cit. ch. 9.
18. Olympian 2, 3-12.
19. Fr. 222 Bo.
20. Olympian 2, 53-4.
21. Pythian 1, 99-100.
22. Nemean 1, 31-33.
23. Isthmean 5, 10-11.
24. Paean 2, 59 ff.
25. Fr. 197 Bo. (209 Sn.)
26. Nemean 10, 25.
27. Nemean 3, 4.
28. Pythian 12, 25.
29. Olympian 9, 101 ff.
30. Olympian 9, 91.
31. Olympian 10, 72.
32. Pythian 5, 49.
33. Nemean 7, 72.
34. Olympian 5, 23-5.
35. C.M. Bowra. op.cit. ch. 4.

36. Thucydides 6.16.2.

37. Olympian 5, 2 ff.

38. Nemean 7, 19-20, 30-31.

39. Fr. 210 Bo. (229 Sn.)

40. Pythian 8, 1-2 and cf. Olympian 13, 8 ff.

41. Pythian 8, 1-2 and Pythian 10, 70-72.

42. Some further implications will, however, be considered in contrast with Aeschylus (ch. 6.)

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NOTES FOR CHAPTER FIVE.

1. Aristotle CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS, 22.
2. Aristophanes FROGS, 944.
3. FROGS, 1260-3.
4. see F.D. Harvey. LITERACY IN THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE (Revue des Etudes Greques vol. 79, 1966, pp 585-635).
5. A. Pickard-Cambridge. THE DRAMATIC FESTIVALS OF ATHENS (2nd edition).
6. Lysias XXI.
7. Plutarch THEMISTOCLES 114C.
8. LAWS 700 C. 701 A. 659 A - C.
9. The relation of Aeschylus to the conflict between different elitist ideals in Athens will be further discussed in Chapter 6. The present basic discussion of his works is essential if the complexity of this conflict is to become clear.
10. SUPPLIANTS, 600 ff.
11. PERSIANS 165 ff.
12. PERSIANS 349.
13. PERSIANS 338-9.
14. SEVEN AGAINST THEBES, 416 ff.
15. SEVEN AGAINST THEBES 716.
16. G. Thomson. AESCHYLUS AND ATHENS p 317 ff.
17. AGAMEMNON 176 ff.
18. AGAMEMNON 923 ff.
19. THE LIBATION BEARERS 338-9.
20. THE LIBATION BEARERS 340-4.
21. THE EUMENIDES 681 ff.
22. THE EUMENIDES 778-9.
23. Critias, SISYPHUS.
24. For an analysis, see G. Thomson "Note on Prometheus Bound" (CLASSICAL REVIEW 43, 1929 p 3-5).
25. See Hesiod, THEOGONY 526 ff. discussed by F. Solmsen, HESIOD AND AESCHYLUS p 124 ff.
26. PROMETHEUS BOUND 982.
27. PROMETHEUS BOUND 936.
28. PROMETHEUS BOUND 50.
29. PROMETHEUS BOUND 311-12.
30. PROMETHEUS BOUND 441 ff.

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NOTES FOR CHAPTER SIX.

1. The background to the poem is discussed in C.M. Bowra, PINDAR p. 156.
2. Thucydides 1.113.3; 3.62.5; 3.67.3; 4.92.6; Diod. 12.6-7; Plutarch, PERICLES 18.2-3.
3. Pythian 8, 98-100.
4. Pythian 8, 15 ff.
5. Pythian 8, 92-97.
6. Pythian 8, 1-2.
7. Pythian 8, 3-12.
8. H. Wade-Gery. THUCYDIDES THE SON OF MELESIAS (J.H.S. 1932 pp. 205 ff and especially Appendix D pp. 224 ff).
9. Discussed in connection with Xenophon's criticisms of athletics by C.M. Bowra in PROBLEMS IN GREEK POETRY ch. 4.
10. Simonides, Fr. 6 (D).
11. Simonides, Fr. 5 (B).
12. Thucydides 2.65.
13. Thucydides 6.18.2.
14. Aristophanes, ACHARNIANS l 703 ff; 679 ff.
15. Thucydides 2.63.2.
16. Pliny, N.H. 37.40.
17. Plutarch, CIMON 8.
18. SUPPL. EPIGR. GRAECUM 5 (1931) 12.36.
19. Thucydides 1.116.1; Plutarch, PERICLES 26; and for fuller discussion of evidence see T.B. Webster, INTRODUCTION TO SOPHOCLES ch. 1.
20. Aristotle, RHET. 3. 1419a25.
21. For the general relevance of the dramatists to political life, see the discussion in ch. 4 about Aristophanes' FROGS and Aeschylus. B. Knox has argued in THE HEROIC TEMPER ch. 1. that Sophocles' heroes operate in a self imposed vacuum, independent of time and space. Whatever the merits of his case, it has to be stressed that the characters who are of most concern for the present discussion are those in the second rank of dramatic interest, and whose political conduct is much influenced by just those exigencies.

22. Aristotoe, POETICS 1460 b 33.

23. A. A. Long. LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT IN SOPHOCLES, esp. pp 159 ff.

24. AJAX, 763 ff.

25. AJAX, 665 ff.

26. ANTIGONE, 331-3.

27. ANTIGONE, 362 ff.

28. ANTIGONE, 175-189.

29. ANTIGONE, 280 ff.

30. ANTIGONE, 999 ff.

31. ANTIGONE, 730-4.

32. ANTIGONE, 665-7.

33. ANTIGONE, 362 ff.

34. AJAX, 1-12.

35. AJAX, 1360-1377.

36. AJAX, 1403-6.

37. PHILOCTETES, 79-82.

38. PHILOCTETES, 927-8.

39. Such a devaluation is implicit also in the comic treatment of the themes of meddling and cleverness in Aristophanes' plays, notably CLOUDS 1007-1024; BIRDS 37-50; 1318-1322; ACHARNIANS 971-8; and especially in the association of Sophistic activity and techniques of argument with adulteration from the natural state.

40. OEDIPUS AT COLONUS,913-918.

41. OEDIPUS AT COLONUS, 569.

42. OEDIPUS AT COLONUS, 567-8.

43. OEDIPUS AT COLONUS, 1142-4.

44. OEDIPUS AT COLONUS, L 1637 and cf 1126-7.

45. OEDIPUS AT COLONUS,898 ff, 1142-4.

46. Aristotle, EUD. ETH. H 1,1235 a 25.
"Heraclitus rebukes the author of the line 'would that strife might be destroyed from among gods and men'; for there would be no musical scale unless high and low existed, nor living creatures without female and male, which are opposites". (Kirk and Raven p. 216).

Sophocles' exploration of the complexities of moral and psychological dilemmas draws much on his assimilation of the idea of strife and conflict as essential elements not only in change as such but in all human affairs. This is the great contrast between Sophocles and earlier writers in the religious/aristocratic tradition.

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NOTES FOR CHAPTER SEVEN.

1.		Aristotle RHETORIC 1. 1. 3. cf Callicles, GORGIAS 91 (486 B).
2.		Plato, APOLOGY 19 D.
3.		Herodotus Bk. 3, 80 ff (The debate on government).
4.		See R. Aron, THE OPIUM OF THE INTELLECTUALS pp 203-4.
5.		For treatment of the debate on slavery, see M.I. Finley (ed.) SLAVERY IN CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY.
6.		Plato, HIPP. MAJ. 281 b. 282 c.
7.	K. Hopkins.	"Elite Mobility in the Roman Empire" (PAST AND PRESENT 32 pp 12-26).
8.		For individual discussion of the Sophists, see W.K.C. Guthrie, HISTORY OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY vol. 3.
9.		Antiphon, ON TRUTH.
10.		Aristotle, POLITICS 1254 a.
11.		Plato, PROTAGORAS 337 d.
12.		Ps. Xenophon, THE CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS 3, 8.
13.		cf. Xenophon, MEM. 1 ii 40-6 and Thucydides 6.39.1.
14.		Xenophon, MEM. 1 ii 40-6.
15.		Thucydides, 3. 37.
16.		Plato, APOLOGY 33 B.
17.		Plato, REPUBLIC 337 ff.
18.	R.C. Cross and A.D. Woozley.	PLATO'S REPUBLIC pp 38-41.
19.		Plato, REPUBLIC 344 C.
20.		Thrasymachus, Fr. 1.
21.		Hermias. Thrasymachus Fr. 8.
22.	W.K.C. Guthrie.	op. cit. p 97.
23.		See Chapter 1.
24.		Plato, REPUBLIC 358A-359A.
25.		Plato, REPUBLIC 363 ff.
26.		Plato, REPUBLIC 359 C.
27.		Plato, GORGIAS 482 ff.
28.		Plato, GORGIAS 491.
29.		Plato, GORGIAS 492.
30.		Critias, SISYPHUS.
31.		Plato, MENO 95 C.

32. Gorgias, HELEN 11.

33. Gorgias, Fr. 23.

34. Gorgias, Fr. 11 (14).

35. Plato, MENO 91.

36. Diogenes Laertius 9. 58.

37. Plato, PROTAGORAS 313.

38. Plato, PROTAGORAS 316.

39. Xenophon, SYMPOSIUM 1. 1.

40. Plato, PROTAGORAS 315a.

41. Plato, PROTAGORAS 320d ff.

42. This has been elaborated by G.B. Kerferd in "Protagoras' doctrine of justice and virtue in the Protagoras of Plato" (JOURNAL OF HELLENIC STUDIES 1953, pp 42-5). Kerferd has rightly pointed out that although Protagoras equates aidos and dike with political virtue he does not imply that all men share in this equally, or that they share in it by nature. The reason that all men share in political virtue is, because they are all taught it . Thus, at 323c 3-8 Protagoras says "these then are the reasons I give why they rightly allow every man to offer his advice regarding matters involving this (political) virtue, because they believe that every man has a share in it, but they consider it to be not by nature nor of spontaneous growth, but in whomsoever it is present, the result of teaching or practice, this I will next endeavour to demonstrate".

If it is not claimed that men are by nature endowed with a social or political conscience, then it is not contradictory to claim that the best men shall rule, nor for the elitist educators to train them for this task.

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NOTES FOR CHAPTER EIGHT.

1. For a balanced discussion of pro- and anti-democratic sources see A.H.M. Jones, THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS pp 41-72. Jones uses some 4th century democratic sources which are largely ignored here because this discussion is naturally concerned with the views of the Old Oligarch and Thucydides (whether true or false) rather than with those of Demosthenes and Lysias

2. Ps. Xenophon, THE CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS I. 12.

3. Philochorus F Gr. H 328 F 119.

4. Ps. Xenophon 1, 3; Thucydides 8. 67. 3; Aristotle, THE CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS 24, 3; 29. 5. Also see the discussion of A.H.M. Jones (op.cit.)

5. Aristotle, THE CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS 27. 3.

6. See J. Buchanan. THEORIKA p. 14 ff. for discussion of evidence concerning 5th century and 4th century payments, especially the limitations of the former.

7. Ps. Xenophon, THECONSTITUTION OF ATHENS 1. 3.

8. The link between sea power, wealth and democracy in Athens id discussed by A. Momigliano in an essay which stresses the uniqueness of Athens in this respect. "Sea Power in Greek Thought" (CLASSICAL REVIEW 1944 pp 1-7).

9. For one treatment of this fact see G. Zuntz - THE POLITICAL PLAYS OF EURIPIDES and cf. R. Goossens EURIPIDES ET ATHENES (Mem. Ac. Roy. Belg. LV no. 4 1962).
It is also clear from Plato ION 533 that Euripides was widely known and seriously considered among intellectual circles.

10. cf. Havelock's failure in THE LIBERAL TEMPER IN GREEK POLITICS to take into account the position of the Sophists in society.

11. This is conceded by Jones (op.cit. p 41.)

12. Xenophon MEM. I ii 40-6 and cf. the discussion in Chapter 7.

13. Thucydides 6. 39. 1.

14. Plutarch, CIMON 15.

15. Thucydides 8, 407-8; 1, 63. 5;
Xenophon HELL 2. 4. 40.

16. Thucydides 3. 45; Aristotle POLITICS 1295 b 13, 1303 b 6.

17. See Thucydides 8. 54.4. on the Persians and 8. 48. on the emissaries from Samos. A full list of sources may be found in G.M. Calhoun, ATHENIAN CLUBS IN POLITICS AND LITIGATION.

18. Plato GORGIAS 510a. APOL. 21a.

19. Lysias. 12. 43. Plutarch SOLON 12.
Aristotle KNIGHTS 257. 452. 628. 862.
WASPS. 345. 483. 488. 507. 953.

20. Aristotle THE CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS 20. 1.

21. APOL. 36b.

22. Lysias 12. 72-5. 6.

23. Aristotle THE CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS 254.
Plutarch PERICLES 10.

24. Plutarch NICIAS II. ALC. 13. ARISTOTLE 7.

25. Thucydides 6. 89.

26.)
27.) Thucydides 1. 1. 5. 26. 4. 104. 2. 48.

28. The question of relationship is a vexed one resting on the identity of the name of Thucydides' father Oloros and the maternal grandfather of Cimon, King Oloros of Thrace.
Plutarch CIMON 4. Thucydides 4. 104.
Pausianias 1. 23. 9.

29. Thucydides 1. 22.

30. J.H. Finley. ESSAYS ON THUCYDIDES, especially "Euripides and Thucydides".

31. J.H. Finley's assertions are based on close textual comparison: e.g. Euripides in ARCHELAUS (fr.261) expresses the fundamental idea of the Archeology, that the strong control the weak for their mutual advantage.
cf. the speech of Corcyreans (1. 32-6) and Creon in MEDEA (349-51) - it is a weakness to be turned from material interests by moral scruples.

31. cont.

Finley also cites: a) Discussions of relative influence of training and native powers, e.g. IPH ON AULIS 558 - 72, HECUBA 592 - 602, PHOENIX fr. 810.

b) the conception of oratory as involving use of words to deceive (c.f. Cleon and Jason.)

c) the theme in Euripides that education, despite good qualities, can harm its possessor, e.g. MEDEA 291-305, HECLD. 458, HIPP. 955 - 7, HER. 299 - 301, ELECTRA 294 - 6. Finley compares this with softening influence attached by Cleon to intellect (3. 37. 3.) and his repudiation of the Periclean ideal of intelligent debate.

d) three main forms of argument - from likelihood (εἰκος) profit (το συμφερον) and right (το δικαιον) which are common in Euripides and familiar to pseudo-Xenophon.

32. Thucydides 3, 82.

33. Thucydides 1, 2, 4-9, 22, 84; 3, 82. 8, 96.

34. Thucydides 1, 2.

35. Thucydides 1. 5.

36. Thucydides 1, 8.

37. Thucydides 1, 9.

38. Thucydides 1, 92.

39. Thucydides 6. 18. 7.

40. Thucydides 3, 82-4.

41. Thucydides 1, 76.

42. Thucydides 5, 89.

43. Thucydides 5, 105.

44. Thucydides 2, 60-4.

45. Thucydides 2, 35 ff.

46. Thucydides 3, 37.

47. Thucydides 2, 65 ff.

48. Aristotle, THE CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS 27-8.

49. Aristotle, POLITICS 1274a3 - 10.

50. This point has been amplified by M.I. Finley in his discussion of the Athenian demagogues "Athenian Demagogues" (PAST AND PRESENT No. 21 (1962) pp 3-24.

51. Thucydides 7, 48.

52. Thucydides 8, 1.

53. Thucydides 8, 68;

54. Thucydides 8, 68.

55. Thucydides 1, 138, 3. 2, 15, 2. 4, 81, 1-3. 6, 554-5.

56. H.D. Westlake. INDIVIDUALS IN THUCYDIDES. Ch. 16.

57. E.R. Dodds. "Euripides the Irrationalist". (CLASSICAL REVIEW 1929 pp 97-104).
Dodds also discusses the point in his introduction to THE BACCHAE.

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NOTES FOR CHAPTER NINE.

1. Plato REPUBLIC Bk. 4. 420.

2. P. Kropotkin. ANARCHIST MORALITY. (Kropotkin's Revolutionary pamphlets ed. R.N. Baldwin p 80.)

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TRANSLATIONS on which quoted texts are based. (I have not hesitated to alter key words or passages for the sake of clarity of exposition).

Homer.	THE ILIAD (tr. R. Lattimore).
	THE ODYSSEY (tr. R. Lattimore).
Hesiod.	Loeb edition (tr. H.G. Evelyn-White).
Xenophanes.	K. Freeman.
Tyrtaeus.	in STOBAEUS (tr. Lattimore in GREEK LYRICS)
	in Pausanias, Loeb edition.
Theognis.	Budé edition (J. Carrière 1948).
	In GREEK LYRICS (tr. R. Lattimore).
Solon.	in Aristotle's CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS.
	POLITICS (J. Warrington).
Pindar.	Loeb (J. Sandys).
Aeschylus.	Chicago translation.
Simonides.	in GREEK LYRIC POETRY (tr. C.M Bowra).
Herodotus.	G. Rawlinson, ed. W. Forrest.
Sophocles.	Chicago edition.
Sophists.	K. Freeman.
	Thrasymachus etc., in Plato's REPUBLIC (tr. F. Cornford)
	PROTAGORAS (tr. W.K.G. Guthrie).
Thucydides.	B. Jowett revised Brunt.
Euripides.	Chicago.
Aristophanes.	D. Lucas. P. Dickinson.

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PINDAR (Oxford 1964).
SOPHOCLEAN TRAGEDY (Oxford 1965).

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