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Race and Local Governance: Theoretical Reflections and Examination of Two Case Studies in the United Kingdom and South Africa

or

"Who said we weren't interested in justice, equality, democracy and freedom?". Emancipation in the ushering dusk of Black politics as white boys try to switch off the Enlightenment.

Research submission by Neville John Adams in fulfilment for a Ph.D. to City University, Department of Sociology in May 2002
Chapter 11
Race and Local Governance – the case of the ‘Target Borough’

Given the prospective organisation of the empirical data outlined earlier in this chapter and the template provided by my brief overview of the initiation and development of race equality initiatives in Lambeth, I want to try to systematise the information on the target borough in terms of: an overview of the borough, inclusive of the seventies experience of race; an overview of the development of race equality in what I have described as the period of the positive racialisation of local governance; and on the bases of these, an interrogation of key episodes. This will seek to contextualise situate the main facets of the social reality correlates summarised in Chapter 9.

11.1 Target Borough Overview

11.2 Demographically

The local authority was created through the reorganisation of London local government sanctioned by the Local Government Act, 1963 drawing together under one geographical and political boundary that which had previously been three independent political units. Despite being classified as an ‘inner London borough’, its claim to being included in that category, defined commonly according not only to geography but also indices of social deprivation, rests largely on its northern area. This on its east and west sides is co-terminus with other two London boroughs, and on its north side with the Thames river. The recognised dividing line in the south of this area is a main arterial route which runs through four, including the target one, boroughs. The rest of the authority is very much an admixture of owner occupied suburbs of varying wealth and status, interspersed with large post war council housing estates. The concentration of industry, mainly medium to light, is in the northern area, as is the concentration of what could be termed high rise and heavy density council estates. As is common with most inner London local authorities, the borough’s industrial base had experienced over the sixties, seventies and early eighties a significant degree of shrinkage. By the time of the development of the race equality programmes, the two largest, and thus main employers, in the borough were the National Health Service, in the shape of a large, but local, hospital, and the local authority itself. In terms of population, there has been a steady decrease from the figure of about 300,000 at the authority’s formal inception, to just under 250,000 at the time of the take off of the race equality programmes. This is in line with the profile of London’s overall population changes for the same time period. However, as experienced by other London authorities, post second world war saw a steady increase in the Black population, mainly Afro-Caribbean and Asian, including in the aftermath of the Vietnamese conflict, a large Vietnamese community.
say ‘increase’ because a Black presence of some sort could actually be traced back to sixteenth century Elizabethan days when the riverside area in the north boasted both port and ship building facilities. By the early eighties the proportion of the population which could be classified as ‘Black’ stood at eighteen percent. Its geographical spread in the borough exemplified the negative racialisation of the housing process both in the borough and in the country as a whole. The main concentrations of Black people were to be found in the north of the borough, and in a small area in the middle. In the north the large presence of Black people were due to number of inter-related reasons – the social exclusionary processes preventing access to the better parts of the borough, including the council’s housing processes; the related main, restricted access, therefore, to run down, cheaper properties; and, over the years, the gradual and, on the part of the council, grudging access to the more decrepit, hard-to-let, housing stock in the north. In the middle this concentration was influenced mainly by the availability of cheap, multiple occupancy, private dwellings for rent.

11.3 Politically

Politically the borough had always been Labour; that is apart from the 1970 local government ‘blip’ when many local authorities, traditionally Labour run, lost control to the Conservatives. Power was regained in 1974 by the Labour party in that set of local government elections. The profile of the Labour Party in the target borough was slightly different to that of Lambeth, showing then in the seventies a greater emphasis towards middle class members. In part this was due to the suburban nature of much of the borough, and unsurprisingly, in relation to elected members, there was a high proportion who originated from the north of the country. The local party was not immune, however, from the changes being reflected in other inner city local Labour Party constituencies, manifested in an influx of university educated, some with community or trade union activist backgrounds, members. The result of the 1982 elections, therefore, showed a sizeable number of elected members who could be, and often would themselves agreed to be, classified as ‘left wing’. Unlike Lambeth, however, this group was not large enough to control the leadership. Spanning this group in terms of the subject area they either positioned themselves in, or were so placed, if not in terms of their own political convictions, were a group of five Black elected council members. It would be true to say, at this point, that there was amongst them a fragile unity brittle cohered through a general belief in some form of race equality, but often undermined through being ‘suckered’ by the system, a term I’ll explicate later on. There were, however, characteristics of the Labour councillor group which were common to most, manifesting themselves mainly in the allegiance of sub-groups to inter or intra-institutional networks and/or collectivities. The first, and most common, was the pull of the traditional working class, in this case
white working class, constituency that defined traditional Labour which expressed itself in the displays of protection, rationale defying loyalty, by certain Labour councillors towards the manual and craft unions in the council. This was to be a particular communicative blockage restraining the introduction and development of the equality policies and changes in the council, initiatives which, at the outset, appeared to be an anathema to those unions. The second, and here this appeared to be specific to the target borough, was the politically unhealthy overlap between the grant funded voluntary sector in the borough, a funded voluntary sector which by the late seventies and early eighties was predominantly white, and the Labour Party. Many of the leading figures in the voluntary sector were also prominent in the local Labour Party. This was not helped by an evolved practice in the borough whereby it was expected that local councillors would also become members of the managing committees of council grant funded voluntary organisations. This resulted in the existence of grey areas surrounding decision making, which should have been transparently accountable, especially in relation to those decisions affecting the awarding of grant monies. There were, however, also decision making short circuits in areas like the appointments to key positions in the council administration, and in the selection of candidates for local elections. This fusion of the local Labour party and the voluntary sector was referred to by one of the prominent officials in the council’s community development sections in terms of the voluntary sector being the Labour Party out of hours, and, by another, as the voluntary sector being the local Labour Party’s fifth estate. More details of this intertwining of the Labour party and local voluntary sector will be provided in the section after this which attempts to frame the late seventies and early eighties development of race in the borough. One of the pivotal consequences of this was that the Black voluntary sector was badly under funded, not only in terms of financial resources, but also in terms of the communicative access it had to the political decision making for a in the borough. Compared, say, to Lambeth, its impact on the polity was small, and often ignored. The Black communities’ redemptive claims were thus made for, and on behalf of community, sometimes without their knowledge, through mediations of Black councillors, often claiming they represented a constituency which has not directly elected them, or to which they are directly accountable, and through colonial institutions, like the local CRC. This had the effect of rendering the Black communities invisible because the communicative processes were not direct, but shunted through contingent access points which, in themselves, often distorted their voices. This was not helped by the physical site of the borough’s town hall, comprising the political decision making chambers and core administrative functions, in the middle, bordering on the south, part. Unlike Lambeth where there was a literal visible presence of Black people which could be seen from the windows of the town hall, this town hall appeared to see and speak to the white suburban and council dormitories of the southern area of
the borough. The building itself faced southwards, towards the counties' 'verdant pastures' just over the horizon.

### 11.4 Administratively

Earlier I had described this particular authority’s approach to the implementation of the Radcliffe-Muade’s proposals on local government, as ‘inchoate’. These proposals envisaged a more private sector oriented managerialisation of local government as one of the main means to ensure that local government as ‘big business’ became more efficient. By the early eighties, the time of the introduction of formal race equality structures in the council, the borough’s political and administrative structures and processes represented more of an admixture of traditional, orthodox administration with some of the proposals grafted on, mainly to the corporate centre, where tradition is used in the sense that Dearlove does, as I explained in the previous chapter. It was backed up by a view of structures and processes which saw the basic personnel being elected members and officers, multiple committees, because members did not have enough time to consider all matters of the council, and a policy process whereby policy initiatives stemmed from service departments and were ratified two-foldly via their respective service committees and the full council. Overall the role of the local council was seen narrowly as that of administering a collection of services. Attempts had been made in the seventies to try and move away from this perception and operation of local government. A Chief Executive’s Department, with responsibility for both overall management of the council and development of appropriate corporate processes, was created. In the early eighties a new Chief Executive with a remit to ‘modernise’ the council, was recruited. Overlaying this traditional local government structure, primarily at the senior management level, therefore, were the beginnings of a corporate structure, exemplified through managerial structures, like a Chief Officers’ Team, and processes like Team Briefing sessions for different sections in the council. The extent, however, to which this initial phase of the explicit managerialisation of local government, actually permeated the whole of target borough X, proved to be very limited, as the unfurling of the subsequent race equality programme was to demonstrate. The actual structure of the council and disposition of service and council committee responsibilities is set out in the following diagram.
Target Borough Structures

Council Meeting

P&R Committee

Service Committees

Race Relations Committee

Women's Committee

Race Equality Unit

Women's Equality Unit

11 Support and Service Departments
The Chief Executive’s Department was very much the corporate, information and policy centre of the council, involving, as well, the employment functions of the council through the Personnel Division. Within it, in pursuit of its policy responsibilities, was a large central policy unit. In terms of political accountability it fed, via the relevant chief officers, of which, apart from the highest manager, the Chief Executive, there were quite a few, directly into the Policy and Resources Committee, the Personnel Sub-Committee, the full Council Meeting, and various other working parties. Included in the latter were, in the seventies and early eighties, the Voluntary Sector Joint Working party and the Race Relations Working Party, about which more will be said later. The largest service departments were those of Housing and Social Services. In practice a distinction was made between what was regarded as ‘front-line’ services, such as housing, and those required to help the departments provide those services better, which were termed ‘support’ services, e.g. Personnel. It is clear that the Chief Executive’s Department provided both the key infra-structural support services to the council, and, at the same time, services which occupied an ambiguous role for those more rigidly financially minded where ‘frontline’ would always have priority over ‘support’. Overall, however, it can be said that the council provided a range of services all of which inter-locked to contribute to the welfare of its inhabitants, and thus contributed significantly to the extent to which such inhabitants were able to become participative citizens. This notion of ‘welfare’, as I have argued earlier, is wider than that envisaged in welfare specific texts, which tend to concentrate on financial benefits and the more discernible elements of services, like social services. It is derived from a perspective which looks holistically at the impact of multiple services, including the mundane, such as refuse collection, on people, especially where these services are refracted through the prism of race. What this does is to both deconstruct and thus contextualise those services into a political framework that focuses on the core, substantive principles of local governance because it poses questions about how and why such services are provided. Part of this questioning, because it relates to the quality of staff mediating those services, raises issues about the nature of the formalised hierarchy underpinning the council administrative system. This has evolved since the second world war through a process of intellectual symbiosis with the example of the Civil Service – and here regard must be given to the structure of the civil service and the indebtedness to its colonial antecedents – and the use of this framework in the negotiating processes over the years with the local government trade unions. In fact it would be fairer to say that the structure and conditions of the white collar side of local government owes more to the civil service structure. The craft and manual worker side of conditions and structure evolved separately. By the early eighties, however, the employee hierarchy could be represented as shown in appendix...... It represents the
hierarchy associated with the traditional notion of bureaucracy with the apex of chief officer gradually broadening out through principal officer, senior officer, administrative officer and clerical officer. Underlying this was a squashed hierarchy of craft and manual workers. The question now is how and why 'race' came to enter on to the agenda of this particular local authority.

11.5 Race and the Colonial in the Target Borough – late seventies to early eighties

Race has been ever present in the socio-, political culture of this country for centuries, but makes itself explicit in the differentiating practices experienced by Black people. The issues and contextualisations raised earlier with regard to Lambeth apply equally, at the general level, to the target borough. That is to say that the broad sweep of then contemporary issues – education, ‘sus’, housing, extreme right wing activity etc. – were part of the fabric of race in the borough. Two episodes in the late seventies and early eighties exemplify this, and are also highlighted elements in the annals of anti-racist history in the UK. The first relates to a decision by ILEA to hire out a local school hall to one of the extreme right wing parties. This resulted in a well documented anti-racist counter demonstration and eventual violent clash between the two sets of supporters. The second stems from a fire at a house in the northern part of the borough resulting in the deaths of a number of young Black people attending a party there at the time. The strong suspicion in the Black community, against the official findings of the police, was that this was the result of a right wing arson attack. One of the immediate consequences was a march, the like of which had never been seen before, involving thousands of Black people from not only other parts of London, but other parts of the country as well, from the north of the borough, through the city of London, and on to Hyde Park. This was a visible protest against the violence of racism, as well as against the perceived indifference shown by the then national government and institutions.

Looking at local government within the theoretical context of the state, and situating that within the Habermassian notion of the state as a potential resolver and reconciler of socio-integrative problems, the question has to asked where this particular borough was in all of this?

Target borough X was not immune in the seventies from the range of problems raised by the Black communities about their invisibility vis-à-vis a positive involvement in the affairs of local governance and about their extreme visibility when it came to racially differentiating practices. Key amongst the latter concerns were the Housing and Social services, and the important issue of the lack of apparent employment of Black people by the council, especially since it was one of the two largest employers in the borough. The council, however, like Lambeth was already involved in
what has been described as the management of race through acting as
steward and conduit for a number of government level urban initiatives.
These, such as the urban programme and section 11, were, as I argue earlier,
both racialised, in so far as they stemmed from the racial fear of American
style urban race ‘riots’, and, at the same time, marginalised and
marginalising. Intertwined with this was the council’s overt local foray into
matters of race as expressed through their part funding of a local CRC, and
their use of this particular body throughout the seventies and early eighties as
their main advisory and consultative resource on issues of race, including,
formal contact with the Black community. Again, as with Lambeth, the
Labour Party’s explicit entry into ‘race’ locally, was as much to do with the
good intentions of some, as with the more strategic considerations, given the
volatile context of race in the seventies, with that of political legitimation,
especially as throughout the late seventies and early eighties the number of
Black Labour party members in the local branch, grew. The CRC itself was
created in 1968, like Lambeth’s; and like Lambeth underwent the period of
transition through mainly white liberal involvement to, by the late seventies,
mainly Black involvement. What distinguished the two, however, was the
calibre and nature of the CRO from the mid seventies onwards. Whilst in
Lambeth this person was responsible for spearheading the creation of
Lambeth’s internal race structures as well as allowing the CRC to play a key
co-ordinating and facilitative role for garnishing disparate Black groups into
a fairly cohesive consortium, the same could not be said of the one in the
target borough. If anything the concern here, to judge from the comments
provided by others in the Black community and from his attritional legacy
vis-à-vis the target borough’s own Race Unit, once that was established, was
with consolidating the power and influence of his own position and
organisation. The strategy pursued was very much that which fell within
what I have labelled the orthodox race relations one, even down to the
apparent tactical insistence that the assistant CRO should be white. One
line of argumentation was that this reflected their own formal political
allegiances, which was the British Communist Party. Locally, however,
amongst some of the more critical members of Black organisations in the
target borough, they came to be known as ‘Ebony and Ivory’, an eponymous
reference to the dire musical and lyrical collaboration on matters of race by
Paul McCartney and Stevie Wonder which was in the pop charts at that
time. The relationship with the borough in the seventies, brokered on
what has been described as the “enlightened” approach of the then Leader of
the Council, a description to which I shall return, was, on the part of the
CRC, a mixture public facadism and ‘behind-closed-doors’ compromise.
That is to say that the CRC sometimes engaged in public condemnatory
utterances against the council for failing to deliver on their race equality
responsibilities, whilst at the same time maintaining a fairly cosy relationship
on a day to day basis. This was especially so when in the mid to late
seventies this relationship was formalised into a Working Party on Race
Relations comprised of certain politicians and the CRC, and serviced by the council's Central Policy Unit. Its broad remit was to establish and develop initiatives on race relations in the council and wider borough. Despite its 'working party' status, inferring a greater degree of openness than with other formal council committees, access to the working party seemed to be tightly controlled. On the council side this was limited to a few politicians and officers, whilst on the other Black groups' entry to the forum could only be achieved via the gatekeeper role assigned to, or appropriated by, the CRC. The potential that existed for developing a wide ranging communicatively discursive forum on race intra- and inter- the council power relationships involving as many of the Black community as possible, seems not to have been pursued. Yet the working party served a 'greater' totemic cause for both the local CRC and council. It was cited in a 1982 CRE publication on CRCs as a good example of what CRCs could do locally. For the council it enabled some politicians and senior officers to not only hold it up publicly as evidence of the good work on race relations being carried out by that institution, but also use it as an alternative to ward off attempts to create a Lambeth style internal structure. Ouseley notes that at the turn of the seventies/eighties decade this particular borough was extolling the positive virtues of their sort of arrangement because it meant, as they claimed, that race was very much part of the corporate agenda; no doubt because the actual pursuit of any race relations recommendations from that working party had to be carried out by the Central Policy Unit. The reality was somewhat different. Over the same period, 1978 to 1982, the achievements of this working party, when placed against that of Lambeth's internal race structures, were minuscule. There were no council wide equality systems or processes. Corporately the Central Policy Unit, an all white section at the time, could only devote half a policy officer to the issue of race. Its approach to race, both from the head of that unit and the personnel therein, was very much within the mould of a liberal, orthodox race relations model. To judge by the final report of the working party, the primary resource of the unit would appear to be the 1976 Race Relations Act, and not the experiences of Black people. Two approaches to the implementation of that piece of anti-discriminatory legislation were by then emerging. The first was for institutions to adopt a reactive stand, only ever responding when complaints of discrimination were made. The second was to look proactively at the legislation with the view to pushing its normative parameters to the limit, knowing full well that these still had to be tested in case law. That unit's approach could be seen to fall somewhere in between. A nascent, emerging strand of this race relations model, confirmed by one of the constituent activists of the CRC, was that of promoting what Phillips has termed the politics of presence. That is to say the race equality benchmark, if you like, was to be established in the proportionality of Black people in and active within the institutions of local governance. It was clear from the activist that at that time more substantive questions about
racially inclusive democratisation and the associated changes to the institutions of local governance, were not part of the considerations in any shape or form. Race equality resources, in the shape of specific posts, were limited to two advisers, one each in the Housing and Social Services departments, and a smattering of section 11 funded service specific posts scattered mainly throughout the Social Services and Housing Departments. These, in any case, owed more to departmental specific initiatives, rather than that of the working party. The marginality of these posts can be gauged by examining the job descriptions, institutional configuration and functioning of the two adviser posts. The content of both job descriptions shows that there was an expectation that the relevant post holders would be providing advice on “ethnic matters and communities” to the respective Departments, but with no guarantee that such advice would be listened to, or even implemented. The main remit of the posts was a concentration on service issues. The posts thus reported to the second tier of senior management, in this case Assistant Directors, with no automatic access to the departmental senior management team. Advice to those quarters was dependent upon the conduit of that particular assistant Director. Any reports written by the advisers had to be cleared first by that same person, including those destined to the service committees, or even the Race Relations Working Party. There was, in fact, a tight managerial control exerted over the working and output of the advisers. It is no surprise then to find that in both cases an inordinate amount of time was spent on one off projects which had a tangential effect on the workings of that department, e.g. the production of a booklet on anti-racist practice for under-5 services. Further the posts were excluded from formal participation in key systemic processes and procedures in the council, such as those pertaining to the employment responsibilities. This latter occlusion has to be contrasted with the desire expressed by the working party, and exemplified by the council in its description of itself as an equal opportunities employer, for more Black people to be employed by the council. In actuality the life time of the working party had not seen any significant increase in the level of Black people employed by the council, nor, not surprisingly, had there been the development of any equality based employment systems and procedures, for example monitoring. The list could go on.

It is more germane to return to the argument raised in relation to Lambeth’s CRC structures and council relationships that these could be described as ‘colonial’. If that is the case with what was in Lambeth an informal relationship, it is even more the case in this target borough with what, to judge also by the participatory activities and results, was a formalised arrangement. The issues of race and racism was quite adeptly managed by the two larger parties to this arrangement within the orthodoxies of a race relations model and within the unspoken mutual strategic benefits, such as status, accruing from what I would describe as maintaining a relationship of
force in the structures of communication. The only recognisable discursive communicative space for Black people was possibly the Working Party. There was no guarantee of a discursive journey for the claims raised by Black people which allowed for equal consideration of those claims. In most cases claims raised ended in a discursive cul de sac. Thus, for example, with the inception of the new race equality structures, the race equality Unit soon picked up on a number of race discriminatory complaints from the few Black employees in the organisation which had become mired without any hope of resolution. The break up of this arrangement owed itself to a development and alignment of forces involving certain councillors, Black community organisations and activists, and the examples being set by other boroughs, such as Lambeth. Before detailing those, it would be apposite to illustrate the actual limited impact of the working party and the consciously employed boundaries of envisaged change employed by some of those on the working party. In the early stages of the commencement of the post working party race equality programme initiated by the then fairly new Race Equality Unit and Race Relations Committee, a strongly argued debate was taking place at one of the committees between members and Race Advisers over a race related employment change, which in some other boroughs was fairly standard. One of the members concerned was the previous Leader who has been credited with starting the working party and who, as I pointed out earlier, had been called ‘enlightened’. During a toilet break with other members he was overheard to say something which encapsulated the borderlines many Labour members had placed on the change possibilities in relation to race. The person who overheard it, and who was not seen by the member concerned, was a Black Zambian political refugee who worked in a section called the ‘Members’ Support Unit’ as an administrative officer. He, by way of more background information, but also as a tangential comment on the lack of real change achieved by that working party, had worked in Zambia for one of the large mining concerns in charge of their personnel functions. He found that this experience was not recognised by the target borough and that his attempts to find professional level work in their personnel sections were unsuccessful. Speaking to the Head of the Race Unit, and principal researcher for this piece of work, after the meeting he related that that particular member had said: “I’m do not know why they (a reference to the Race Advisers) are pushing this so hard. In this council this is as far as they are going to get.”

The decision to establish in-house equality structures in the target borough occurred in the early eighties, overlapping with the 1982 local government election cycle. By this time the pressure from examples set in other boroughs, including direct neighbouring ones was building. There was, as well the establishment of similar structures at the GLC level after the 1982 GLC elections. In many of the London Labour controlled boroughs the
move to develop and establish internal equality changes was being
implemented. At that time the London level Labour Party’s co-ordinating
mechanism was predominantly left wing and sympathetically directly
supportive of these sorts of changes at the local level. Within the target
borough itself there was a loose alliance of councillors who wished to see
both women’s and race equality structures created in the council. The
support for the latter included most of the nascent group of Black councillors
on the Labour group, including one who, later to become the first Chair of
the Race relations Committee, already worked in a north London council as a
Principal Race Relations Adviser. He had also gained a regional and
national profile through other race related activities which involved, as well,
attempting to gain a Labour candidacy for national elections, not something
open to many Black people at that time. All of these added to the
influential status of the person concerned, as well as imbuing him with a
realpolitik appreciation of what could be done; not necessarily a ‘virtue’ the
principal researcher, as his lead officer, in another role, agreed with. His
‘realpolitik’ shibboleth type response later on to blockages in the institution
which, in the view of the Race Advisers could be overcome, was that
“politics was the art of the possible.” Nevertheless it is clear that he, as the
prime mover for the establishment of internal race structures, used regional
networks to help increase the pressure on the local Labour Party in order that
this might be achieved. Within the council the incestuous network of
Labour Party members and/or councillors securing key policy type posts in
other Labour councils, where it is clear that their political affiliations were
primary contributing sub-, yet unspoken, criteria for those jobs, ironically
also helped secure the creation of these structures. An influential few of
the senior management within the Chief Executives Department, including
one who was an actual councillor in the local authority where the
aforementioned Black councillor was a Principal Race Adviser, were
arriving at the conclusion that the Working Party arrangement and the
operation of the local CRC within that arrangement, and in itself, was
damaging to the further positive development of race relations in the
borough. In fact this person, and his post, would turn out to be the manager
for the central equality sections, and, as emerged in the course of this
organisational management, there was a perception that there were many
career kudos to be earned from including these areas in one’s CV.
However, this critical view of the CRC was bolstered by the antipathy of a
growing number of Black organisations in the borough and individuals,
including council employees, towards what was seen increasingly as an
unjustified position of pre-eminence and domination on matter of race by the
local CRC. In this the views of many in the Black community were similar
to the late seventies perception of the Lambeth CRC by its local community.
In the target borough this actually went further. There was a growing
anger and critical awareness on the part of many Black activists and smaller
Black organisations in the borough in the early part of the eighties, especially
when it became known that the council intended to create its own race
equality structures, at what was viewed as a debilitating, excluding
domination of the relationship between the council and the supposed Black
community by the local CRC. The fear was that these internal structures
would also come under the influence of that body. Already the internal
processes and requisites for the proposed posts, since they were section 11
funded, had gone through a consultative exercise involving mainly the CRC.
The CRC had by now, in trying to copy the Lambeth experience, fronted and
facilitated the creation of an umbrella structure for some Black groups.
Called a “Federation of Ethnic Minority Groups”, the actual title was larger
than its membership. Whilst this Lambeth solidaristic experience amongst
diverse Black groups reflected an attempt to forge a political alliance in
which the individual claims to ‘ethnic’ authenticity could not displace the
overall aims of the umbrella organisation, the attempts at federated ethnic
politics by the local CRC in the target borough appeared to actually celebrate
the claims to mutually separate ethnic group identities. Underpinning this,
as will be shown later, was a view from the CRC that the needs of the Afro-
Caribbean community in that borough were mainly expressed through their
cultural backgrounds, traceable all the way back to the different Caribbean
islands and countries. To that extent only a person of Afro-Caribbean origin
would be a genuine appointment to the council’s proposed post of Principal
Race Relations Adviser. Apropos this the appointment of first head of the
council’s Race Equality Unit, who happened to be a Black South African,
was post scriptively posted as a “white South African”, a rumour later
successfully tracked back to the local CRC. In some ways these moves can
be viewed as that of the CRC trying to anticipate the disengagement of the
local council from its purview of influence by establishing its radical
credentials through tactics like setting up a front organisation, or de-
‘nigrating’ and de-‘colourizing’ its perceived rivals. From another related
perspective this anticipation probably acknowledged, as well, that both
because of the likely race equality programme, and because of the council’s
urban programme requirements, that there would be a need for consultative
initiatives involving the Black community. In direct opposition to these
moves, therefore, other Black groups, and activists, mainly young Black
workers in the voluntary sector in the borough, came together to form an
organisation called the Black People’s Forum, including, as its first
secretary, one, Kobena Mercer. The BPF, as it came to be abbreviated to,
had an inaugural conference in 1983 at the Town Hall to which leading
councillors were invited, including the ‘enlightened leader’. Their demands
and recommendations arising from that meeting were simple – an end to the
limited, nepotistic relationship with the CRC, and a recognition that they
were the new voice of the Black community. It was at one and the same
time a critique of the amoebic, grey relationship between the local Labour
party and the voluntary sector which had given rise to a form of patronage
favouring the larger white voluntary organisations in the borough. For
example, at the time there was an umbrella voluntary organisation in the borough, funded in the main by the council, which played a resource and coordinating role. It was known informally as the "Labour Party in the voluntary sector". The formal relationship with the council was brokered via a Voluntary Sector Committee, which in itself, oversaw the development of the council’s grant funding and voluntary sector development activities. In the early eighties part of the changes accompanying the introduction of new equality structures a new post with senior responsibility for community affairs was also created. The expectation, then, from those in the 'know', was that this was going to go to the person running the umbrella organisation, who was also in a relationship with a Labour councillor. However, the appointment had to go to an external Black candidate who, on the day, according to both councillors and officers on the appointment’s panel, was outstanding. The then head of community affairs, a section in the Chief Executive’s Department which covered the voluntary sector, commented that not only did the councillors concerned in the appointment not have any choice, but that they had also “never seen a Black person in a senior position.” At another level it attests to the importance for the public sphere of the relationship between civil society, and the organisations therein. At this local level it is clear that the public sphere was skewedly conflated with the Labour Party to the exclusionary detriment of the Black community. There is, as well, a subordinate issue about the nature of the conditions attached to state grant funding and the affect this has on the balance between system and lifeworld in civil society organisations. However, it is clear, that the emergence of different voices through differing race equality discourses at this time, also confirms not only the egression of subaltern public spheres, but also the way in which such issuances are tied to the politics of mal-recognition. As I shall show the appointment of not only a Black senior person in community affairs, but also one who was prepared to push on race equality, created a discursive space for Black organisations in the blurry boundaries between the local governance political institution and local public spheres. As it was, the relationship between the white voluntary sector and the council, even though exclusionary, pointed to the potential for future possibilities about the discursive inter-face between local public spheres and the political and administrative systems of local governance. At a later conference one of the leading lights of the BPF was to refer to the CRC and its satellites as the “Black bourgeoisie” who lived off the Black community. The politicians response to these demands was a partial accession in so far as they promised that the BPF would be one of the umbrella groups brought into the consultative fold, but not the only one. The reaction from the CRC can be gleaned from an interview with one of the then members of their management committee, and someone active in one of the Federation’s constituent groups. Their view was that these people were upstarts who did not show enough respect for those who had been involved in the borough for a longer time. Further they also held the suspicion that
the BPF had been encouraged by the Black councillor mentioned earlier because of his own career aspirations. Whether or not that was true, this actual fracturing of the dominance of the CRC vis-à-vis the council on matters of race, helped pave the way for the creation of internal race structures in the council.

In a sense then the coalition of forces giving rise to the creation of the race structures in the target borough are similar to those in Lambeth in the late seventies. The major difference is that the configuration of key influences within that coalition differs. It is thus both right and wrong when Ouseley notes that across the key London Labour boroughs in south London the creation of race relations structures had specific histories. What they had were similar confluences of major influences as local governance political institutions reacted to the acknowledgement of race as an explicit social justice issue within the domain of their responsibilities, but differing configurations of those influences rendering a patina of specificities. In this particular case the fractured appearance of the forces – it appears almost by chance that the decision to establish race equality structures slipped through – seems to illustrate further my argument about the colonial nature of state race structures and about the decolonising potential released by the move of race equality initiatives into the local democratic domain. One can argue further about my racialisation of Habermas’ notion of lifeworld colonisation and the linkage, thus, between de-colonisation and post conventionalisation, and, by so doing, attempt to read off the specific forces ranged for and against the achievement of that. In pursuit, then, of my earlier arguments in this chapter about deriving social reality correlates through reference to evidence of technical learning for domination, one can derive, to borrow a term very much in vogue in current local governance managerialising, benchmark indices of discursiveness through highlighting the extent to which Black people and race were still marginalised in that borough at that time. Within wider concerns about democracy and difference and my arguments about the ‘colonial’, this can be situated within Phillips’ notion of the ‘politics of presence’ which is based on the notion that the liberal capitalist order can be “reformed from within to better accommodate difference” through ensuring “the presence of members of disadvantaged groups in the institutions of liberal democracy.” Such an analytical schema would not only have to measure the proportion of Black people in the institutions, but also the processes which prevent or enable their access to be achieved. Because the limits of the thinking behind this notion of difference, in Dryzek’s terms, do not countenance a “radical resistance to the liberal capitalist order”, it attunes with the overall aims of the liberal race relations model. On these bases then it possible to summarise the key empirical pointers to the state of race in the borough in the late seventies and early eighties: a few Black representatives in the form of Black councillors, not all of whom saw themselves as representing Black
communities; a local civil society and public sphere exclusively skewed to pursue a white Labour Party's view of social justice; a marginalised structure, the Race Relations Working Party, with a marginalised constituent membership to oversee the development of ameliorative measures against race discrimination; a still-born race relations infra-structure with limited to no discursive redemptive features; few Black employees with no avenue for resolving racial justice claims; a dominant white approach to services with a few race specific projects grafted on to some services; more, importantly, a local governance structure in which, what I have termed 'the discursive journey', for Black people often end in a cul de sac.

I would situate, therefore, the attempts to open up and/or reconfigure the communicative forces in local governance so that Black people can, on an equal basis, discursively redeem their claims, indicated by the initiatives of groups, like the BPF, within the argumentative realm of social learning because it brings into the area of contestation that of the conditions for deliberative democracy in a multi-racial society. On the other hand, with reference to what I have described as the shadowing technical learning processes of domination, thrown into sharp relief by race, one can point to the strategies of communicative closure exemplified by the tactics of race management, e.g., pre-emptively boundarying the potential for change, status prioritisation, and the non-redemptible rhetoric of ethnic group needs, all used a means of maintaining the status quo, a situation I describe as the 'colonial'. Outlining the argumentative context like this points to the fact that the new race equality structures inherited a situation riven by differing discourses - an issue I enlarge upon in the following section - bearing in mind my previous distinction between the "constraining" 'diskourse' and "enabling" 'discourse', each of which exerted a differing, sometimes contradictory, pull on the issue of race. The result very often, and was certainly the case with the target borough, was that a de facto policy lacuna existed in which the intent and direction of the new race structures were tentatively sculpted out of the orthodox race relations model reflecting both weakly the aspirations of those wanting real change, and, more strongly, those desiring a greater degree of race management. However, as Ouseley has identified, very often the driving force behind the race equality programmes in the local government context were to be the Black community, and the occupants of those very same race structures, including the councillor level structures, where they existed. What can be said pre-emptively is that the intention to, and emphasis of, the operation of the new structures, on the part of the then incoming head of the corporately based Race Equality Unit, was to be very much in favouring the expansion of the political area of representation so that the cardinal issues of race and deliberation entered, not only the realm traditionally held to encompass the political, but also the held to be necessary expanded realm of the administration and political systems.
11.6 Overview of Race Equality Structures, Processes and Initiatives

Throughout the eighties and into the nineties, evaluation of what I have termed the positive racialisation of local governance has seldom, if ever, questioned, or posed alternatives to, the model of liberal democracy underlying the institutions in which such programmes were undertaken; even from those who nodded in the direction of a transformative politics. In other words the normative model implicit in those evaluative assessments and critiques looked to extend liberal democracy at the local level, but never transform it. By the time of the near inception of the race programmes in the target borough, 1983, Ouseley could write about race and local governance in terms that alluded to a form of socialism, but one that did not involve the radical transformation of the political and administrative institutions of local government. 849 This particular contribution to a collection of papers on local socialism, embraced a general yearning for radical change at this level of governance, but, like other interventions in the arena of local socialism, and as illustrated with reference to Lambeth’s left wing councillors, proffered solutions which amounted to no more than fine tuning the organisation. There is, with reference to Ouseley, for example, an analysis of local government power structures which concludes that these are in the control of the white middle classes. The solution, if one reads the next sections on what local authorities should be doing with regard to race, is not to deconstruct those power relationships, but to displace the white middle class occupants and replace them with black post holders. Little wonder then that his analysis of the functioning of the race advisers, though acknowledged generally as relatively innovatory in orthodox local government terms, in relation to contingent Black collectivities, such as Black workers groups, is structured in terms of psychological support to minimise their isolation. What amounts then to a bracketing out of the administrative system from radical critique and radical alternatives, as opposed to a representative ‘colour’ wash of the institutions as a solution, comes into play again five years later in the then growing wake of the beginning of the dismantling of race structures in some London boroughs. At a conference for race workers called to discuss that issue, Ouseley, later confirmed in a letter to a national newspaper, blames race advisers for an act of felo-de-se because they, in his view, are too confrontational. 850 In a retrospective look at race and local governance in the eighties from an early nineties perspective, Solomos and also separately Fitzgerald, blame the retreat from race equality in local government mainly on national government initiatives which have effectively centralised many key local decisions affecting key service areas of responsibilities, like those contained in the then CCT legislation. 831 They are joined in this assessment, by others, like Young, who goes on to implicitly criticise the “simple concept of an identity of interest among all ethnic minority citizens, attributing to them a
shared black experience regardless of their actual communal, religious or political affiliations". For him the politics of race in the nineties are less to do with programmes and more to do with language, concepts and individual identity formation processes. Again, as with Ouseley, there is a reluctance to engage with thinking that attempts to go beyond the taken for granted boundaries of the polity and its institutions, in this case liberal democracy. These analyses of eighties equality initiatives at the local governance level, though they on the whole tend to offer a positive valorisation of those endeavours and a general conclusion that race will continue to play a part in this sphere of governance, provide only partial reasons for their attenuation and downgrading. These revolve around different dimensions of local government being ‘victimized’ because of others’ actions. Thus it is argued that either local government was effectively mugged by national government, or, as in the tendentious arguments of Ouseley, local government was mugged by ‘stroppy’ race advisers, or, as Solomos and Fitzgerald contend, local government was mugged by the Labour party’s legitimating concerns with increasing the white vote. These, even if they are valid separately or inter-relatedly, are what I have termed secondary order ones. None of the commentators mentioned raise primary level issues to do with the substantive nature of modern capitalist society’s institutions at the level of local governance. In so doing they unwittingly contribute to the ongoing marginalisation of race both generally and at the level of local governance, because race, in the logic of their argument, transcends the local context only in relation to strategic fine tuning of institutions contextualised within a specific time period. It succours the empirically challenged and theoretically wanting argument expressed in terms of the ‘end of municipal anti-racism’. This premature tendentiousness reflects what appears to be a conflational, unholy alliance between supposed universalists, like Gilroy, the neo-conservative technicists of modernising new Labour, and the Bauman inspired post modernist speculations of Silverman, all of whom have tried to freeze dry eighties anti-racism as a temporally located epiphenomenon fixated on outdated meta-narratives. At best, then, if one looks at the examples of Ouseley, Solomos, Fitzgerald and Young, there is a tentative nod in the direction of what Dryzek has analysed as the deliberative opportunities in liberal institutions, particularly with regard to any general recommendations calling for more Black involvement in the consultative processes of local government. But, as Dryzek correctly argues, those who uphold liberal democracy, even by default, as the above commentators appear to do and give it a façade of deliberation, fail to appreciate the extent to which deliberation is undermined by material forces, discourses and their intertwining. In fact this should, in my opinion, be read rather as the forces structuring material and discursive inequality, where the latter would include what I have defined as ‘diskourse’.
I want to, therefore, provide the overview to the race equality initiatives in the target borough with particular reference to a discourse of discursive democracy which was either the active template for certain initiatives, or the normative template for others. It can be said that, as a general philosophical and political resource, Habermas, and the trailing pantheon of the Frankfurt School, were brought into the borough by the primary researcher operating then in the role of first head of the Race Equality Unit in the council. That particular philosophical context had been the reference background, since the early seventies, to research done on under development in Africa, and to practical policy interventions in the area of race and local government elsewhere. At that point, the early eighties, the Habermassian framework, an implicit rather than explicit context, was expressed in the general belief that greater substantive democracy, where the latter was taken to mean a communicative action based more participatory process, was an integral part of achieving the race equality changes envisaged. Cross referenced with race, this critical theoretical approach was explicitly summarised from the outset in terms of the overall aim of the race equality programmes within that sphere of local governance as being that of ensuring that the Black communities had a determining and, where appropriate, determinant say over resources which had a material effect on the quality of their everyday lives. This was underpinned by the rhetorical and symbolic use of two operational principles: that the solutions to racism were often the cutting edge pointers to substantive local government changes necessary for the wider community, and, counter-pointedly, that if local government was not meeting the needs of the most oppressed sector of the local communities, i.e. the Black communities, then it is likely it was not meeting properly the needs of the rest of the communities. It must be stressed that Habermas was, and is, not used, something he rigorously warns against, as some sort of theoretical blue-print. Rather his work was used as a general reference context for exploring and pursuing real-world policy interventions within the arena of local governance aimed at securing the substantive involvement of Black people therein. Unlike other race equality programmes in other boroughs, there was, in this one, the attempt to link macro-level concerns with meta-theoretical thinking on democracy in the local polity. This goes beyond, but does not erase, Mason and Jewson's mid eighties differentiation between equality policies in different authorities on the basis of whether or not they are liberal or radical, the former referring to a liberal, individualist emphasis of fairness, the latter to a collectivist emphasis of equality of outcome. With the benefit of current work being undertaken to use Habermas' theoretical insights in everyday practice, for example the work of Forester and Bohman in the States, both of whom, in differing administrative institutional contexts, explore what it means for making public bureaucracies more deliberative in order to redeem validity claims, it can be said that those sorts of concerns underpinned the Race Equality Unit's evolving discourse on the necessary race equality
programmes. The term ‘these sorts of concerns’ can be given a firmer meta-theoretical grounding by referring to McCarthy’s introduction to Habermas’ “The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity” because it captures succinctly the thinking behind the general intent of the programmes, even if, at the time, they were not, or could not, be expressed in those precise terms. This is not the fanciful theoretical speculation afforded by the luxury of retrospection. A few years prior to that, in the very early eighties, as an example of the way in which grand theories, even those which deny their own ‘grande’ narrative framework, enter into, and affect everyday institutional practice, the primary researcher, then working in Lambeth on a research project on Black Children in Care, and also heavily involved in developing a trade union based Black Workers Group, was engaged in a heated discussion with another researcher. Both the latter areas of work mentioned assumed, implicitly or explicitly, an ‘ought’ contained in the immanence of practice and underlying norms. The other researcher, relatively fresh from a Foucauldian emphasised post graduate course at Essex university put forward the argument that this was a nonsense since, to use his words, “there just is”. This approach was carried over into his work which presented itself as standard empiricism, and into his political choices which saw, therefore, the Labour party as the only viable alternative. One can see, hence, why this form of ‘presentism’, what I have termed ‘WYSIWYG’, and ‘cryptonormativism’ can be described, as Habermas does, as young conservatism. This illustratory slight digression with its two examples of the counter-discourse of modernity in practice serves to return to McCarthy’s introduction, in which he correctly sketches out the main points of Habermas’ counter discourse. He uses the metaphor of ‘crossroads’ which I want to appropriate later because it captures as well the choices facing local government in the eighties in relation to the substantive inclusion of Black people. The ‘essential’ basis of Habermas’ counter discourse is, unlike the ‘posties’, that the Enlightenment is characterised by too little reason. That is there is an “ambiguity of rationalisation processes that has to be captured, the undeniable achievements as well as the palpable distortions...(which)...calls for a reconstructed dialectic of enlightenment rather than a totalised critique of it.” This approach therefore signposts two related crossroads containing paths opened but not pursued. The first is “the construal of reason in terms of non-coercive inter-subjectivity of mutual understanding and reciprocal recognition”. The second is that “philosophy must become practical, that its rational content has to be mobilised in practice....(in which)....social reason is viewed as social interaction...(and)...the potential of reason has to be realised in the communicative practice of everyday life.” In opposition, then, to the ‘posties’ wish to eliminate the subject, Habermas proposes a decentred subject immersed in “social inter-action mediated by language”, where language use is “oriented to validity claims” which “can in the end be redeemed only through inter-subjective recognition brought about by the
unforced force of reason." Such validity claims are, at one and the same time, both 'immanent' and 'transcendent' because "they transcend any local context; at the same time they have to be raised here and now and be de facto recognised... (so that)... the transcendent moment of universal validity bursts every provinciality asunder; the obligatory moment of accepted validity claims renders them carriers of a context bound everyday practice... a moment of unconditionality is built into factual processes of mutual understanding – the validity laid claim to is distinguished from the social currency of a de facto established practice and yet serves it as the foundation of an existing consensus."  

I want to claim, therefore, and illustrate through the outline of the race equality initiatives in the target borough, that these programmes attempted to create the communicative conditions under which Black people could make validity claims for racial justice within the arena of local governance. These programmes sought to remove, or attenuate, certain forces in the structure of communication so that Black people, could on an equal basis, engage in the social inter-action of "mutual understanding and reciprocal recognition", and, in so doing help realise the "potential for reason in everyday communicative practice"; in this case 'reason' being the unconstrained consensus formation on the issue at hand. For Habermas language has inherent three universal validity components: those that attest to truth, normativity and truthfulness. Only the first two can be discursively redeemed. The third relates to the genuineness of the 'speaker', which, in my opinion, I want to re-classify as the authenticity or not of the speaker. The structure and process of racism is such that for Black people claims for racial justice are frequently undercut by the inherent logic of that discourse. In other words, if you are not human, how can you be authentic. One of the key aims of the programmes, then, was to try to ground the authenticity of the Black experience as a given so that the other components of the claims could be redeemed. For example, training courses on introducing the race programmes to staff were prefaced with giving notice that the reality of racism was not up for discussion. Other examples include the battles in and around the establishment of a racial harassment complaints procedure in that particular council in which the genuineness of the complainant was to be taken as given. It is only now that this principle, which I regard as crucial to communicative claims' redemption, has been given a degree of 'universal' acceptance through the recommendations of the Macpherson Report. Too often the truthfulness of Black people making claims for racial justice, as we shall show in the case of the above mentioned complaints procedure, are destabilised through the implicit, or even explicit, racist assumptions, such as those that structure race explicit claims as being symptomatic of the 'chip-on-the-shoulder' syndrome, or worse, as an exercise in maliciousness. It is this sort of force in the structure of communication which needs to be addressed, for if one of the three universal validity components, that which
must be accepted from the outset because it cannot be discursively redeemed, is de facto continually denied to one of the participants, no genuine communicative discourse can take place.

11.7 Contextualising the Race Equality Discourse

Cross referencing the practice based concreteness of these race equality initiatives with the overall project of Habermas releases the concerns I have attempted to deal with in Chapter...under what I have termed the racialisation of Habermas’ theory, i.e. the democracy of difference without erasing difference. The micro-concerns of the pursuit of this race equality programme illustrate, providing inclinations of, the necessary developments in Habermas’ theory if it is to deal with the issues of difference and reason raised by Young, and co-opted by a commenting Foucauldian as a genealogy, are to be dealt with. Of course there were other discourses, not only of race and race equality and local governance, but also of those wishing to control or do away with any notions of race equality which might have been critically substantive. The attritional spaces opened up by the intersection of these often release the social reality correlates I outlined earlier in this chapter, often in the form of counter-factual statements or arguments. Discourses do not, in this piece of work, enmesh and mug participants from behind so that they are left with a minor emancipatory interest reduced to merely weak resistance. Constraint, within the context of discourses, is, I would contrapuntally contend, dependent upon the extent to which discursive democratic practice can take place. The degree to which participants in discourse can structure that process, rather than be structured by it, varies from socio-political context to context. In this I agree, then, with Reisigl and Wodak’s late entry into a critical theoretic based analysis of the discourse of racism where ‘discourse is taken to mean “a dialectical relationship between particular discursive practices and specific fields of action( including situations, institutional frames and social structures) in which they are embedded”’. Contextualised like this discourses “as linguistic social practices can be seen as constituting non-discursive and discursive social practices and, at the same time, being constituted by them.” In other words ‘diskourse’ can become discourse, and vice versa. Discourses, especially in a setting like that of the institutions of local governance, ‘relate’ to each other, even if, as will be shown, they are sometimes forcibly separated and made to run parallel with each other. That is to say their relationship can be conflictual, or ‘inter-discursive’. Either way a measure of discursive change occurs. There is a convergence here with my argument so far and Dryzek’s most recent foray into the field of deliberative democracy. In this he argues for a distinction between deliberative democracy as a general activity, which is too easily appropriated by liberal constitutionalists, and discursive democracy which has the more radical agenda of wanting to change the state. But, it is his
definition and use of the concept of ‘discourse’ that is important. Similar to mine and Reisigl’s and Wodak’s, his is that “discourse is a shared means of making sense of the world embedded in language”, thereby generating a shared term of reference which enables “those who subscribe to a particular discourse to perceive and compile sensory information into coherent stories or accounts that can be communicated in inter-subjectively meaningful ways.”

Discourse, thus, to use his metaphor can be regarded as institutional ‘software’, compared with the emphasis on the formal rules of constitutions, which can be likened to the ‘hardware’. Within the context of his critique of Habermas, which I have outlined earlier, amounting to a view that Habermas, in his BFN, has allied himself too closely to the liberal constitutional state, Dryzek highlights the process of democratisation. This is not the extension of liberal democracy, which would appear to be the limits of change perceived by those in the Labour Party and which, as I shall show, occurs throughout the race equality programme in the target borough, but, rather, the extension and expansion of democracy in three dimensions. These are the franchise, i.e. who can participate in collective decision making; the scope, i.e. bringing more areas of life under democratic control; and the authenticity of control, i.e. “the degree to which democratic control is engaged through communication that encourages reflection upon preferences without coercion.”

Within this three principled expansion of democratisation, Dryzek examines the cardinal issue of discourse and the arguments against deliberative democracy by what he terms the proponents of ‘difference democracy.’ Because he focusses on Young, these arguments are similar to the issues raised in chapter..., and so do not need repeating. Dryzek argues, correctly, in my view, that a discursive democracy would, similarly to my arguments for a transformative practice in deliberation, deliberate across difference, but without eliminating difference. He thus admits story telling etc. as valid forms of language use, but only if they meet two criteria. These are that they do not involve any form of coercion, and that they link the particular to the general. The latter is important because it ties in with my argument about the problem/solution categorisation of racism, and the solidaristic device and still present saliency, of using ‘Black’. Against someone like Young’s ‘genealogy’ of the discourse of democracy, Dryzek argues that what is required is “an account of democracy that can address difference across repressive and emancipatory identities and discourses....(so that difference democracy can now discursively be recast as the) contestation across discourses rather than engagement across identities, and so establish a link to discursive democracy as opposed to liberal constitutionalist deliberative democracy.”

Further, as opposed to the hard line Foucauldian, such as Hindess, who argues that discourse is both hegemonic and all, thus constituting as well competing views, Dryzek argues that there is more to life and politics than discourse, for example collective action. If difference democracy within the context of a discursive reading of deliberation can be thought of as the contestation
of discourses, the question that this prompts is what accounts for discursive shift. That is to say, more pertinently, how do emancipatory discourses supplant repressive ones. To answer this, briefly at this time, requires a more refined analysis of discourse than that provided by Dryzek. A more refined analysis can be found in someone like Fairclough's interpretation of discourse change and displacement.\textsuperscript{870} In particular his notion that, following on from Habermas' conceptualisation of 'colonisation', that this process of domination is partially constituted by "'colonisations' in the societal order of discourse" where the latter 'order' is "particular structuring of constituent institutional orders of discourse."\textsuperscript{871} These may be destructured as a result of social struggle. Fairclough, whose definition of discourse attempts to syncretise insights gleaned from Foucault's account of discourse with a more hermeneutic approach, where the latter also nods appreciatively in the direction of Habermas, notes that contemporary discourse order is "complex, heterogeneous and contradictory". Nevertheless he attempts to make sense of this by writing into his analysis a transitive element that is not over powered by the hegemonic dimension. Three tendencies are discerned which at the categorical level he labels democratisation, commodification and technologisation. These are useful because, by and large, they coincide with the two broad categories of 'emancipation' and 'repression' used earlier. even if his usage is tied more to empirical observation. Democratisation, then, refers to the "removal of inequalities and asymmetries in the discursive and linguistic rights, obligations and prestige of groups of people."\textsuperscript{872} Commodification, on the other hand, is concerned with the process "whereby social domains and institutions (like the public sector) whose concern is not producing commodities in the narrow economic sense of goods for sale, come nevertheless to be organised and conceptualised in terms of commodity production, distribution and consumption."\textsuperscript{873} One can see this in the discourse of consumerism which has replaced democratisation in the arena of the relationship between local government and the public. Technologisation, which Fairclough interprets in line with Habermas' theory of the colonisation of the lifeworld by systems of state and economy, can be seen in those techniques which seek to consciously structure discourse practice in order to obtain a desired control result, for example in counselling or interviewing techniques. Fairclough views these as transcontextual, which is to say that they can be strategically used in a variety of contexts. I would rather describe the context as being reductively framed in line with what he identifies as commodification, so that the contexts are, in substance, not that different from each other. However, more importantly, technologisation requires experts, rather in the way that Habermas identifies the trend of the 'expertisation of cultures' to consciously weld together the connection between language knowledge and power with the aim of bringing about "discursive change through conscious design". Moreover, Fairclough is correct in identifying that this aspect of discourse requires the
simulation "for instrumental or strategic purposes of interpersonal meanings and discursive practices." That is to say the simulation of inter-subjective communicative practices so that, as I identified earlier in my preliminary analysis of what I called virtual reality equality opportunity, a façade of participatory processes is presented without any substantive yielding of power.

Whilst, then Fairclough's work goes some way towards filling in the gaps in someone like Dryzek's use of discourse, it still does not answer fully the question about how discourses are transformed and/or displaced. This is pertinent if, as I and Dryzek have done, discourses are broadly classified into emancipatory and repressive ones. Whilst one can accept at a general level the complex, heterogeneous nature of the order of discourses, this does not justify the theoretical lacuna, and for that matter action lacuna, disguised by analyses which attempt to discuss discourse in terms of articulation and hegemony. One is invariably left with action that can only rise to the level of describing discourses, as Howarth does, and as someone like Norval achieves in her attempt to provide a Foucauldian based discourses analysis of South Africa. Instead, in supporting Dryzek's notion of difference democracy as the contestation of discourses, I want to propose that 'diskourses' are maintained as hegemonic through the closure, or maintenance of control over, discursive spaces. Intertwined in such oppressive and repressive discourses are, obviously, the configurations of power and material realities which, in themselves, can be severe inhibitors to discursive practices. Nevertheless struggles to open up discursive spaces in the structures of communication, through the processes of will and opinion formation, and, which in the case of race, as I argue, can also transform those processes, provide the means to transform and/or dislodge such discourses in the polity. The introduction of the theoretical device of 'discourse', provides the refinement necessary for framing the relaying and interpreting the empirical details within the context of highlighting the social reality correlates and relating those to the meta-theoretical concerns identified earlier in this chapter.

The outline of the development and implementation of the race equality programme in the target borough will show how discursive spaces for Black people were opened up where none had existed before, and how these were closed down through various strategies of 'de'-communication tied ultimately to the legitimation claims of the Labour Party to the white electorate. I have already attempted to frame the discussion of race and local governance within tentative articulation of two broader discourses - that of colonisation, or re-colonisation, and that of de-colonisation. Re-colonisation, which I have argued can be seen in the re-imposition of direct political/administrative rule in the inner cities is tied very much with the closure of discursive spaces for Black people and their replacement with
technologised practices and devices. This is legitimated through the growing discourse of naturalisation which re-emerges in modern guise. It can be argued, for example, that the notorious 'third way' of new right Labour is a simulation of giving meaning to a supposedly new politics which in reality sanctions the inequalities and practices of capitalist globalisation. Within this the fiction is perpetuated that political nation states, including those of the metropole, can achieve little through political action. There is then an acceptance of the 'natural' order of reality. Help for those in the global order who are less fortunate includes, in all but name, as can be seen by the interventions in Sierra Leone and the analysis of some, re-colonisation. I have made mention before of the view of certain proto-modernising councillors in the target borough in the eighties who, because they viewed racism as something that will always be there, felt that not much could be done in the short term.

At this point we can re-introduce the imagery of 'crossroads' because just as Habermas points to the crossroads of more enlightenment, as a counter-discourse to the skewed reason of capitalist modernisation, or less enlightenment favoured by the theoretical predecessors of the post modernists, so I would contend that the period of the late seventies and eighties highlighted a cross roads for local governance. The first could have led to the vision of a positively racialised form of local governance I outlined in Chapter..., because it has as its cutting edge questions about fulfilling modernity. The other, the choice actively made by those in power, leads not only to an entrenchment of capitalist modernity, as epitomised by new right Labour's conflation of capitalist modernisation with modernity, but also, I would argue, to the bolstering of this entrenchment through the inherent political bankruptcy of action which is the legacy of post modernism as a 'theory'.

Finally, like myself, Reisigl and Wodal identify a deliberative, discursive model of democracy, in line with Habermas' and Benhabib's models, as that which offers the best hope for combating politically the increase in racism in Western Europe. But their vision is till too general, paying insufficient attention to the detail of that which is necessary to achieve a deliberative democratic society from one which is heavily unjustly racialised and multi-racial, a situation which is becoming the norm not just for the UK, but Europe as well. To that extent they underestimate the extent to which Habermas' model, and Benhabib's variation on that, might prove not radical enough. My argument, and this stems from not only the reading necessary to sustain it, but also, the actual experience of attempting to pursue the vision of this argument under concrete conditions, is closer to Dryzek's. The following quote not only summarises this position, but also serves as a useful opener to the outline of the race equality initiatives in the target borough.
I will argue that a defensible theory of deliberative democracy must be critical in its orientation to established power structures, including those that operate beneath the constitutional surface of the liberal state, and so insurgent in relation to established institutions. I refer to this more critical strand of deliberative democracy as discursive democracy, which (contrary to much current usage, which tends to use 'deliberative' and 'discursive' interchangeably) I distinguish from a model confined to politics in the vicinity of liberal constitutionalism. I will ... argue that discursive democracy should be pluralistic in embracing the necessity to communicate across difference without erasing difference, reflexive in its questioning orientation to established traditions (including the tradition of deliberative democracy itself), transnational in its capacity to extend across state boundaries into settings where there is no constitutional framework... and dynamic in its openness to ever changing constraints upon and opportunities for democratisation. Unfortunately critical theory has itself become too compromised by an ever closer association with liberalism and its state. The critical edge needs to be re-sharpened. One way to do this is to ground deliberative democracy in a strong critical theory of communicative action, and to re-emphasise oppositional civil society and public spheres as sources of democratic critique and renewal. 

11.8 Race and the Target Borough 1984-1989 – Key Features

This section will attempt to provide a key feature overview of the race equality programme for the above period in order that the background reference markers in the in-depth interrogations of certain aspects of the argument, which are to come, are intelligible. One of the important features of this period is the use of the appellation 'race equality programme', which contains within it the notion that the activities to be described were planned systematically, as well as serving to distinguish those activities from that which had gone before under the banner of 'race relations'. The action on race, up to the start of the programme, under the joint stewardship of the council and the local CRC, appeared to be very much ad hoc, disjointed and dependent upon seemingly unconnected projects in different Directorates. It was marked, as well, by its controlled inclusivity vis-à-vis the Black constituency, an excluding practice I link to the coloniality syndrome associated with CRCs. Despite its inception in the mid seventies, this relationship between the council and its race relations structures, can be described as one of marginalisation, a term I’ll refer and return to later. The lack of meaningful progress can be contrasted with the programmatic progress made by boroughs like Lambeth which had introduced new race equality structures in the late seventies. There is thus a basis upon which to differentiate out the beginning of the above period with that which had gone before. Whilst, then boroughs like Lambeth, provided the evidential means to claim that more was possible, this claim was to be substantiated in the new orientation of the newly created central Race Equality Unit.
11.9 The Unit

The origins of this unit have been outlined earlier. Suffice to say that there was a degree of indeterminacy surrounding the proposed workings of the unit. There were only three posts in the unit; the head, a Black Community’s liaison post, the primary task of which was to administer a grants budget attached to Race Relations Committee, and an administrative post. The unit was small compared with other existing centrally based race units in other boroughs. The state of indeterminacy was as much to do with the unknown, as it was to do with defined expectations arising from specific discourses. For example it became clear within the first few months of the start of the programme that there were roughly five expectations of the new unit: The key managers concerned, i.e. those within the Chief executive’s department and other Chief Officers across the council, and certain leading councillors, mainly those I have come to label the proto-modernisers, wanted a unit subordinate to managerial control and discretion; council members more sympathetic to race equality, wanted a unit to pursue such a programme, but within the protocols of existing practice; Black employees, on the bases of their experiences in the institution were open in their hope for an up-front, dynamic unit not shackled by convention; the Black community’s approach seemed ambivalent because its relationship with the unit was to be mediated by that unit’s administrative control over a race equality focussed grants budget; finally the local CRC, still clinging to its past influence in the Working Party arrangement, expected the unit to take its policy and practice cues from them. Yet that air of indeterminacy was also to prove the new unit’s strength because the competing discourses, whether weakly or strongly expressed in voiced or alluded expectations, effectively cancelled themselves out thereby allowing the new unit and its solidaristic resources to develop a race equality programme, as opposed to a race relations one, built on rights secured through opening up discursive spaces for Black people. This notion of indeterminacy and its potential strength for the race equality action, is illustrated by reference to the recruitment and selection procedure adopted for the appointment of the head of the unit. The person appointed, and the principal researcher, was then working as Race Advisor covering employment in Lambeth council when he was ‘head hunted’ by the target borough and invited to apply. Unbeknown to him, but made clear on the day of the interview, was an additional requirement that candidates sit a written test supposedly linked to the criteria for the job. The ‘test’ situation was devised by the managers in the Chief Executive’s Department on the basis of the expressed view that the person concerned should be able to deal competently with a high level of written policy work. The councillors involved in this appointment went along with the proposal. However, the principal researcher refused to undertake the test, arguing cogently that there were serious race equality implications.
which had not been considered, and that both the appointment itself and the very nature of the work would be compromised if the test entered into the considerations. The bases of the objections were contextualised within the experiences in the United States where the legacy of the civil rights movement in employment was effectively undermined by the introduction of written tests by employers as a supposedly ‘objective’ means of choosing candidates. Evidence existed to show that these tests discriminated against Black candidates. Further, within the context of this particular recruitment and selection procedure, the very minimum that would need to be expected was that the organisation had undertaken some form of validation tests, as advised by the then ‘august’ body on race relations, the Commission for Racial Equality, to ensure that that specific written test was not racially discriminatory. Reactions to both the refusal and justificatory arguments varied. The managers were of the opinion that the principal researcher’s application should be thrown out, whilst the councillors, swayed by the arguments, wanted to continue considering the issue. The compromise was that the researcher was invited to another interview, this time without a test. The appointment was confirmed at the end of that interview. What was clear was that if the recruitment decision had fallen solely within the purviews of managerial fiat, then it is likely that the appointment would have gone to someone more amenable to managerial diktat. What occurred, however, was that the indeterminacy, carried over into the recruitment and selection procedure by the two main concerned parties, managers and councillors, allowed for a discursive space to open up involving all concerned parties, thereby permitting arguments to be made against certain elements of that procedure. Within that process, the approach of the head of the unit to be was also clearly laid out and underscored by that person’s claim within the interview that he, if appointed, was not going to be the institution’s “house nigger”. Dramatic as that turn of phrase was then, the fact of its utterance, its meaning, and the action of refusing the test, served both to give notice that the approach was to be radically different from that expected, as well as using the appointment by councillors to politically validate that approach. There is an underlying trope which has to do with the control and management of race in local governance through a strategy of marginalisation, a discursive space denying process I’ll examine in more detail in one of the following sections, and exemplified in the approach from management to the appointment process.

This emerging discourse can be further illustrated two foldly by reference to the way in which the appointments to the heads of race units in the boroughs immediately flanking the target borough were handled, and to the way in which physical siting and location of the central race unit in the target borough was handled by managers. Both were Labour run boroughs and both, like so many in London at that time, established central race units. In the one to the west of the target borough, Black community activists had
taken a prominent role in pushing the council to create internal race structures. Appointment to the head of the new unit was expected to go to one of these activists. Instead an the appointment went to a candidate from the north of the country, someone with little experience of local government and community work. Much of the work of that unit, in those early days, became mired in the politics surrounding that particular appointment and in the resultant bias of the appointees to want to work on community issues. The internal workings of the council were, for the most part, ignored. In the borough to the east, two heads of unit were appointed, one to cover the ‘Asian community’, and the other to cover the ‘Afro-Caribbean community’. Again the focus of the work of that unit was not trained on the workings of the council because of the unnecessary essentialising and problematising of the two main sections of the Black community, a strategy encouraged and pursued by that borough’s local CRC. Race work in the borough was marked by ad hoc project work, exemplified by one of the heads of unit devoting a lot of time to an undertaking seeking to expose the racism contained in the representations of Black people through the use of the specific image of the ‘Golliwog’. It was to be another eight years before any substantive race equality work was to be achieved in that council itself.

In the target borough, despite being aware for some six months before new appointees took up their posts, that new central equality and community development units were going to be created, managers, for whatever reason, had not sorted out the accommodation for those units by the time they came on stream. At the time it was deemed extremely important by those working in the field and those who ‘sponsored’ such initiatives, that visible support for equality action should be seen to be given by senior managers. In the initial period of their inception, making use of the bureaucratic hierarchy of status and being an integral part of the Chief Executive’s Department in order to promote the message that these were council priorities, as examples of rhetorical devices, was seen as important by those coming into the new posts in those units. Since attenuating the hostility and isolation that goes with work of this sort would be key in the initial stages of the units’ programmes, it was critical that the council’s equality initiatives, especially race equality, should not be seen as being marginalised by the institution. It was with extreme ironic annoyance and scepticism at the accompanying excuses about lack of office space, that the principal researcher upon taking up the post of head of unit, found that the new Race Unit was initially to be accommodated in the ‘lofty’ attic regions of the Town Hall building in what had been the caretaker’s flat. To make matters worse, the proposed relocation of all the new units, some two months later, was not to be on the same floor as the Central Policy Unit, within walking and shouting distance of both the Chief Executive’s and Leader of the Council’s offices, but half a mile down the high road in a residential establishment previously used as a children’s home. The Central Policy
Unit is brought into the equation as a comparator because of its then influential role as the council’s and leading Labour members’ strategy clearing house. It was part of, and had the ear of, the institution’s internal elite. Over the next few years an almost doubling of its staff, equivalent to the staff numbers employed in the new units, did not result in a move from the Town Hall, as logic might dictate, if the reasons for moving those units out were to be believed, but a sideways extension into adjoining offices, where, miraculously, additionally space was found. Yet, this patent and blatant, visible marginalisation of the new equality and community development units through, in a sense, ‘de-accommodating’ them, cutting them adrift from the Town Hall, also contained hidden benefits for those units. That moment of indeterminacy contained within marginalisation whereby if you push away you also at the same time lose a vital part of surveillant control, was exploited to the full by the new units, particularly the Race Unit. It helped permit the development of an approach to race equality which avoided being side tracked by the petty politics of bureaucracy and which placed a premium on locating and developing those key discursive spaces in the organisation, because in a real physical sense, placing all of the new units together in one isolated location also had within it the potential for the creation of a discursive space. Thus throwing new ‘outsiders’ all together in a cramped building space also created the ambience within which problems perceived took on a similar dominating shape and solutions could be easily sought in the everyday joint networking and discussions that took place. Unlike in other boroughs, therefore, where equality units tended to work in isolation from each other, even in conflict with each other, a strong ethos of working together developed between the Race and Women’s Units in the target borough. At another level being both inside the organisation, yet in a physical sense, outside of it, actually increased the scrutinising ability of the Race Unit, a quality vital for the proper working of units such as these. Additionally the physical site of the new units away from the Town Hall saw it become a resource for Black people both within and outside of the council because its location offered a degree of anonymity and confidentiality which would not have been achieved if those units had been located in the Town Hall itself.

Having argued, thus, that the commencement of the new race unit was marked by an indeterminacy which allowed for a forceful, and, I’ll argue, unique programme of race equality to develop, certainly when compared with other boroughs, the key features to what would turn out to be a five year programme can now be outlined. There are roughly eight elements to this. These are outlined as the back cloth to further critical interrogations of key aspects. What can be said prefatorily, however, is that the use of the term ‘programme’ denotes a conscious effort at the time to map out a planned course of action covering not just the whole council, but also the ‘whole council’ within the transitivised context of a racially inclusive form of local
governance. This programme was developed within the legal context of the then anti-discriminatory legislation, and framed pro-actively so as to establish and extend the concrete rights and normative potential contained therein. It had, for example, annual work programmes setting out the key objectives and outlining the means of achieving these, together with the accountability, review and evaluation mechanisms necessary to track these proposed changes. Whilst, what is given as an example above, might today seem commonplace in public institutions, in the early eighties in an organisation like the target borough which still operated, by and large, through the processual medium of what I have called ‘traditional administration’, this received mixed reactions ranging from the negative ‘it-will-not-work’, through ‘it-is-too-radical’, to qualified support. What might, thus, today be categorised under the general rubric of ‘strategy’, because ‘strategy’, a term for all seasons used in most commonplace way as a means to boost the pseudo-importance of any policy initiative, was not recognised as such then. ‘Strategy’, as a management technique and device, was a stranger to the managerial processes of the target borough then. In fact the term ‘strategy’ was hardly ever used by the Race Unit or associated Race Advisers, even though the framing of the programme might lend itself to that interpretation. This is because the programme was much more than just being concerned with the strategic, in the sense of action, issue of efficiency, which the common sense use of the term in the public sector has come to mean. Rather the programme had an overt political, with a small ‘p’ sense, dimension which was injected into everyday managerial decisions on race equality.. Suffice to say here that when, from a race equality perspective, it was claimed that much of the advice on institutional changes to achieve that objective was in fact ‘good management practice’, it also carried with it the consequence that it was good political practice. The programme, then, was built upon the following elements.

11.10 The Programme

11.11 Redefining the Problematic

The first overall element was that the race problematic, which the creation of this new unit was to spearhead, was re-interpreted and re-titled by the new head of unit from that of being ‘race relations’ to ‘race equality’. Thus what had previously been termed ‘Race Relations Unit’ and Principal Race Relations Adviser’, which reflected both the influence of the CRC and the perceived need to meet the criteria for Section 11 funding, then became the ‘Race Equality Unit’ and Principal Race Equality Adviser’. Because of the indeterminacy surrounding the functioning of these units at that time, there was space to develop and get accepted the argument that the problem was not that of the relations between ‘races’, but that this relation was already
prescriptively structured by inequality processes of oppression and exploitation. The state of 'race equality' was taken to mean an overall objective, that is a normative template, achievable through the development of appropriate anti-racist action. ‘Race equality’ was also taken to mean the pursuit, within the widest interpretation of the responsibilities of the council, of a social, and within that, racial justice programme. This was grounded in developing and securing the rights contained within the relevant anti-discriminatory legislation, both national and international, particularly the 1976 Race Relations Act. Weak as the latter was, compared with the task at hand, even if, at the time, it was the strongest piece of anti-race discriminatory legislation in Europe, the pro-active potential of that law was still to be realised. As indicative of the way in which this particular discourse of race equality was being structured at the time, a discourse which will be dilated as the empirical details unfold, it attests to the way in which ‘moral’ questions were brought into the everyday functioning of local government from the formal political level to the lowest reaches of the administrative level. It was recognised that there were basically two approaches to legislation, like the '76 Race Relations Act and the '75 Sex Discrimination Act. The first was to do the minimum and only react to complaints of discrimination. The other, the approach adopted by the unit, was to explore the normative potential of the Act, and then devise means to secure that. There were two main areas of potential. The first, mindful that much of the employment and service aspects of the legislation was still to be settled through case law, was to explore the furthest dimensions of possible interpretations. The second aspect of exploiting this aspect of indeterminacy, was to extend the latency of Section 71 of the '76 Race Relations Act through constant re-iteration and through innovative interpretations of that section. Basically Section 71 places a duty upon local authorities to eliminate unlawful racial discrimination and to promote equality of opportunity and good relations between persons of different racial groups. This was not drafted as a statutory duty which was enforceable, but rather as an obligation which local authorities should follow. Nevertheless, even within its obvious legislative weakness there was strength because it permitted the Unit to ‘marry’ that section with the local Labour party’s own race equality sections of their local elections manifesto in order to create a legitimating platform for a variety of race equality action across the whole sphere of council activities. Securing these was obviously dependent upon the extent to which race as one of the political priorities could be maintained. Framing it as a racial justice problem, within wider concerns of social justice, also addressed three aspects of marginalisation which appeared to inhere in those late seventies race programmes in other boroughs. The first is that the race programme was not devised as a stand alone one affecting only Black people, a common enough reactive interpretation in the ‘white’ bureaucracy. Rather it was interpreted and implemented as one that was the sharp cutting edge to wider changes affecting other sections of the
community. This was exemplified in one of the operational principles derived and noted earlier, viz. that if the council was not meeting the needs of the most exploited sector of the local community, it is likely that it was failing as well in meeting properly the needs of the wider community. Secondly the race equality programme also pointed out structural failings in the way the council dealt with other issues. It had, if you like, the status of a barium meal because it exposed all the hidden workings of the council. Thirdly allied to the previous two, the race equality programme, with the emphasis this time on 'equality', addressed the issue of material discourses and democracy, a leit motiv which re-surfaces every time the welfare state is debated. For example one of the other operational principles supporting the programme was that which stated that the race equality programme was about giving Black people a determinant say over resources which often had a pivotal material effect on their everyday lives. Thirdly addressing validity claims of racial justice not only brought into the equation the key moral question, but, because the programme was aimed at all dimensions of the council's activities, ensured that this moral question entered into both the political and everyday administrative processes of the council. It was certainly more than just a 'corporate' issue. For example one of the first tasks undertaken by the new unit was to change the language of race in the council. By this is meant the way in which race generally and Black people in particular were talked and written about in the council. This is important because it begins to tackle the issue of conventionalisation, i.e. my earlier arguments about racism entailing only the 'you', 'he', 'she' and 'it' identification of Black people and not the 'we' of inter-subjective solidarity. The language of race in institutions, as part of the structures of communication, can, therefore, either under gird further conventionalisation or facilitate its deconstruction. At the time, in the absence of any guidelines there appeared to be two levels at which the language of race operated. For the 'elite' surrounding the previous Working Party on Race Relations, and the establishment of the new race structures, the language was limited to that of what I would describe as the ethnicity of race. That is to say the accepted terminology on race, through custom and practice, including the identification and description of Black people, revolved around the usage of the term 'ethnic minority'. For the rest of the organisation there appeared to be an open house with a proliferation of terms in use, including that of 'coloured'. As a slight digression, but one that supports this point, as well as my argument about recursive racism and re-colonisation, the new Chief Executive, appointed to Lambeth Council in 2001 by what can be described as Blairite modernising Labour councillors now running the borough, in a talk to managers from across the council, referred to Black people, here meaning 'Afro-Caribbean', as 'coloured people'. Tackling that sort of distorted communication, in the target borough, meant in the short term, because the medium term would require the development of appropriate training programmes, targeting the institution's formal organisational
protocol machinery. This was to be found in the Committee Section housed in the Borough Secretary’s Department; a department largely charged with providing the council’s legal services. The Committee Section, as their name suggests, not only administered the running of the council’s formal political committees, it also produced and controlled the communicative administrative protocols of the council, known in that borough as ‘administrative circulars’. There was, for example, one on the structure and content of committee reports. A new circular was prepared by the head of unit covering appropriate, as well as inappropriate, race language in the council. The recommended language revolved around two inter-linked elements: self identification, and the use of the term ‘Black’, in its general signifying political sense of ‘wrongs done to’, to describe those previously deemed ‘ethnic minorities’ by the organisation. The latter was derived not simply from the inclination the Race Unit, but from the nascent wishes of the existing Black employees in that council, the experiences in and around anti-racist organisations, especially those in the trade union movement, and from the subaltern public spheres on racism at that time, many of them with a large Black constituency. The debate with the managerial elite, which included the then Borough Secretary, who was also head of the council’s legal services, declaring that, “his Turkish friends would draw their (sic) scimitars if they were described as ‘Black’”, whilst not exactly productive, was eventually won in favour of formally changing the race language in the council. This was done at the level of the Chief Officers’ Team meeting, a bi-weekly forum of all the directors of the council’s departments and the Chief Executive to which the head of the Race Unit had equal access and participatory rights. In one sense it can be argued that begins to pertain to the idea of equal communicative access and participation and the force of the better argument winning. But this can only be sustained, as I shall show in the details surrounding the demise of the programme, if one remembers that at that time the communicative equality of the head of unit derived from the supporting force of the fact that race was still a very visible political priority and from the initial sense of indeterminacy. Additionally, and also importantly, at the same time the administrative circular on reports was amended to ensure that all committee reports included a paragraph on the race equality considerations of the matter in hand as well as the race implications for the council. In this way it can be seen that the communicative structures were being changed in the council to open up discursive spaces so that at the very minimum considerations of race equality had to enter into the formal decision making processes.
11.12 The Programme’s Scope

The second element relates to the overall scope of the race equality programme. Up to the entry of specific inequalities as a formal dimension of the council, the focus of the activities of that institution were, largely, introspective, concerned with the minutiae of everyday public sector administrative bureaucracies; a state they have, today, by and large returned to. The race equality programme, and this was stated in the first work programme produced for the Race Relations Committee, later re-iterated in every other one, needed to operate at four levels: a local one, a regional one, a national one and an international one. It was, at one and the same time, a translation of the spatial and temporal vectors of racism into the latent possibilities of local governance. Thus acknowledging and acting on the globalisation of race before ‘globalisation’ alludes to my previous allegory of Black people as time travellers, as well as further informing the operational principle of race as the sharp cutting edge to what is to come. Whilst awareness of today’s late discovery of globalisation is often encapsulated in the maxim, “think global, act local,” which in itself can be constraining, introducing to this the dimension of race, in the context as set out, actually leads to a spectrum of action with the above maxim at one end and the other captured by “think local, act global”. Both are inter-relatedly embedded in the response from Black people to racist opposition to ‘our’ presence, to ever becoming part of the ‘we’, viz., “we are here because you were there.” Additionally it is possible to see how the argument about subaltern public spheres can be sustained. In terms of local subaltern public spheres pertaining to race and anti-racism, these are, in fact, as Negt and Kluge argue, part of an imbrication of public spheres developed around local, regional, national and international institutions of governance. This can be illustrated with reference to part of the work at the regional level. Prior to the commencement of the work of the new unit, the council had already agreed to participate in the Greater London Council’s Anti-Racist year activities. In 1982 a new left labour administration took over the GLC following the elections for such regional political bodies. Following the lead of Lambeth the GLC established its own in-house race equality structures focussed through what they termed an Ethnic Minorities Unit and Ethnic Minorities Committee. Their work led to the GLC declaring that 1984 in London would be ‘anti-racist year’. The range of activities for that year, both through the GLC and through the participating local authorities drew on constituencies across all four levels. For example in the target borough an Anti-Racist Year Working Party was established as a sub-group of the Race Relations Committee with the head of the race unit as the lead officer, comprising councillors, cross council officers, and members of the local communities. Through these structures a range of informing and initiating anti-racist activities was organised involving the council, local community organisations and participants from all over the world. The
latter included a festival featuring an Aboriginal rock group from Australia. More mundanely, it involved, as an example of the way in which race can deconstruct seemingly neutral processes and reconstruct a multi-‘identified’, multi-dimensional ones, the council’s Borough Engineer’s Department beginning to examine for the first time how their burial and crematoria services could respond properly to the needs of different religions, especially those associated with different sectors of the local Black community. At the level of the local civil society, a temporary Anti-Racist Year Co-ordinator was appointed, working to the head of the Race Unit, with the brief to try and develop anti-racist networks in the community as a complementary strategy to the Unit’s work in the council. The intention, even if the success of the venture was patchy, because of the short term funding for the post, was to try to create the seed bed for a local public sphere on anti-racism not only focussed on the council, but also on de-colonising and reconstructing the local CRC into the form of a proper anti-racist organisation. The key point is that the example of some of the work at the regional level shows the way in which race, as an explicit consideration at the level of local governance, generates deliberations across other spatial dimensions not then normally associated with local government. There are examples of work done at the national and international levels, the details of which will be explored in other sections. Suffice to say at this point one of the key examples, at the national level was the work done by the Unit on ensuring that the target borough did not, at that time, become a secondary agency of the country’s immigration service. This locks into my arguments about the need for a racially inclusive local governance to be a principled bulwark against racism on the part of the state. It also, at the meta-level, illustrates part of the potential contained in the sphere of local governance for resolving these types of problems of social integration. At the international level there is the example of the work undertaken by the Unit and the Anti-Apartheid Working Party, a formal sub-group of the Race Relations Committee. Whilst illustrating my contention that race and globalisation gives rise as well to the apopthegm, “think local, act global”, it was also fraught with other contradictory difficulties which perhaps lay at the core of the Labour Party’s stance on race. It was always easier for Labour councillors to rally to the cause of anti-racism, provided it was six thousand miles away. Connecting that ‘distant reality’ with that of racism a few hundred yards away in the Town Hall, or a mile away in the borough itself, eluded many of their consciousness. It also enabled some of them to erect a hierarchy of oppression in which some Black people, i.e. the distant reality, were more deserving of help than others, i.e. the local reality.
11.13 Race Equality Structures

11.14 Race Equality Advisers

The third element addresses the problematic of the development of the race equality structures in the target borough. It should be more accurately stated as the race equality structures and processes because these structures, like other organisational ones, were embedded in processes of human action. What made these unique can be answered briefly by reference to their counterfactual realities at the time of the inception of the new programme. I have argued that the inherited race structures in the target borough, and the way in which the then proposed enlargement, via the creation of a central race unit, was conceived very much in terms of a race relations discourse. This is evident not only when one examines the job description for the post of head of the unit, which is littered with references to 'promoting good race relations' and 'ethnic communities', but also when one looks at the actual structure and preferred management processes envisaged for that unit. These are set out in the diagram labelled 'Race Relations Structure'.

It can be seen that the relationship between the Race Unit and committees of the council was to be brokered via a senior manager in the Chief Executive's Department. There was no stated relationship foreseen between the Directorate Race Advisers and the unit. Further those advisers' structural position in the organisation, i.e. directly managed by a senior manager, was to remain. This was very much a structure in which the balance of control was given over to managers and in which advice proffered by those advisers would have to run a managerial gauntlet before it reached the political level. Certainly the workings of the two then existing advisers in the Housing and Social Services Directorates seemed to have been taken as the operational model for the then new central unit. In terms of the development of race equality, these structures and processes can be interpreted as ones in which that goal would be marginalised because of what can be read as the instrumentalisation of racial justice claims. In one of the previous chapters I had traced the development of orthodox management via its Italian etymological origins of the word 'manage', meaning to control horses, to its current usage where, despite developments from a more humanistic perspective, the ultimate aim of such discourses is still about using organisational power to get others, i.e. employees to enact on behalf of that organisation with the minimum of resistance. That in itself can be read as a sub-text leit motiv of the aim of the managerialist changes implemented in the public sector since the mid eighties where the 'public' component is simplistically reduced to a limited number of values - a direct aping of multi-national practices - so as to focus and more efficiently control employee action through financial management accounting systems. As was to emerge later on, a more managerialist approach to the control of the unit and advisers came to be very much the option of those councillors I
have described as proto-modernisers. This was a direct response to the changes in the structural location and operational processes of the central unit, advisers and other race workers developed and put into place by the new head of unit. The intention of these changes was intentionally the opposite of those contained in the ‘management’ perspective. These sought, paradoxically if taken at face value, the mainstreaming of the race equality dimension through the creation of new structures and processes more germane to the achievement of the organisation’s equality aims, as well as providing an innovative bases for re-examining the institutional relationships between administrative employees and the formal political sphere, administrative employees and local communities, and the formal political sphere and local communities. If one refers back to my previous arguments about critical management, a process which puts a premium on ‘de-hierarchalising’ and a discursive communicative approach to solidaristic based decision making as the groundings for tackling emancipative concerns at that level, then the proposed changes to the structures and processes of race advisers and workers can be seen in that light.

There were two immediate separate policies developed by the then new head of unit, in consultation with the other advisers, and implemented which addressed respectively the Central Race Unit and Race Equality Advisers, and the other race equality workers. Before addressing those, it is as well to give a brief outline of the policy process in local government, as was. The theory underpinning council policy development, which still holds true today, is that the elected representatives are responsible for setting the policy framework, usually reflected schematically in local election manifestos, and the administrative officers responsible for developing them. This dichotomy of responsibility is also reflected in the next stage where final decisions on policy are the ‘bailiwick’ of councillors and its implementation that of officers. In reality, however, the process is far more fuzzy and porous than that set out above. For example, very often the professional core of senior managers and subordinate policy corps both initiate and develop council policies, with political members almost playing a rubber stamping role. A variation on that would be the informal groupings of senior managers and senior councillors of the apposite service committee who are the drivers for certain policies. Up to that point in time, what is clear, is that the communities, especially Black communities, hardly had a role in the initiation and development of council policies in the target borough, apart from the few walk on roles relegated to fora such as the Working Party on Race Relations, and the Voluntary Sector Committee where input was marginalisingly limited to the organisation’s perception of what was relevant for those communities. Nevertheless, for those within the organisation working in and around policy matters, there was a degree of indeterminacy over ultimate policy ownership, an indeterminacy which was amplified with regard to race, especially in the early days of the new unit’s
working. Yet, as I have shown above, this ambiguous, nebulous state had its own strengths because it allowed for changes to be pursued which otherwise would not have seen the light of day if the policy process was extremely controlled and water tight. Drafting the policy under those circumstances was not a problem; nor getting it accepted at the Race Relations Committee stage of the political decision making processes. At the officer stage draft committee reports were normally circulated to relevant departments and officers internal to the initiating department for comments before being submitted to committee. Under normal circumstances the manager of the report writer, or the eventual lead officer for that issue, would submit the report to the relevant senior manager for committee clearance. However, under the circumstances of uncertainty pertaining to the new unit, the initial reports to the Race Relations Committee were not altered by senior managers, but allowed through with any relevant observations appended to the report. The Race Relations Committee, however, was an advisory committee. Its terms of reference mirrored the role envisaged for the race advisers. As such its recommendations to other committees could be ignored. The status of that committee and structural relationship to the rest of the council’s political decision making fora was to be a continuing topic of recommended change from the unit for the duration of that unit’s existence. As I shall show and argue later, this possibly facadic status of the committee, i.e. it could be argued that despite its formal position as a committee of the council its role was tantamount to a glorified talking shop, also contained certain communicative potential which could be harnessed in pursuit of racial justice. Nevertheless, for a policy to be accepted as council policy, and therefore binding upon the council, it had to be passed by the powerful Policy and Resources Committee. At that stage most councils had an equivalent or similar committee whose responsibilities, as the title suggests, was to provide a final decision and resource overview to the council. In the target borough its membership consisted of the chairs and vice chairs of all the other committees and it was chaired by the Leader of the council. It had various sub-committees, all powerful in their own rights, the most influential of which, in employment terms was the Personnel Sub-Committee. Altogether this committee and attendant sub-committees represented the acme of powerful decision making over the crucial areas of the council’s corporate direction and responsibilities.

Returning to the two key policies, the first addressed the structural relationship of the Race Advisers and the central race unit via the head of the unit, to the political and managerial levels of the council, as well as the relationship between the central race unit and the other advisers in the council. The changes proposed in that policy report were not altogether new because the basis of the structural relationships already existed elsewhere in the way the Lambeth race equality framework was established. In that the advice and proposed changes from race advisers could go straight
to committee without being changed by management, although they could obviously comment on them. The thinking behind this was that it was important that the political representatives, whose manifesto priority it was, should receive those proposed changes in full without interference from managers. It was an attempt to avoid the marginalisation of race in that council. However, the relationship between the central Principal Race Adviser and the Directorate based advisers was still that which relied on the hierarchy. That is to say the Principal Adviser was formally recognisable as the one at the top replete with the traditional command level of authority and power associated with this sort of bureaucratic set up. Underpinning this were internally generated processes from the central unit which supported that state of affairs. Thus internal meetings between the Principal and the other advisers excluded the other race equality workers who were not advisers. They were, so to speak, down the pecking order in the hierarchy. Further the relationship between the advisers and the council members were mediated by two particular aspects of commonality which seemed to militate against too radical a stance against the accepted powers. The first was the informal agreement brokered by the incoming labour administration in 1978 and the Black communities in which there was a 'trade off' between the establishment of the race structures and Black support for the Labour Party. The then Principal Adviser was the key instrument in this in his previous role as Principal Community Relations Officer. The second was the formal political membership of most of the key advisers to the Labour Party, a factor which was instrumental in their appointment. These factors were, perhaps, responsible for what could be read as an almost 'softly, softly' approach by the advisers towards councillors over certain issues which would have warranted a more forthright one. In the target borough, however, these sub-textual issues were not there because of the conservative role played by the local CRC and because all of the advisers appointed were from outside the borough; and certainly, not formally affiliated to any political party. Additionally the intellectual thrust of the changes to the structure and functioning of the advisers were premised upon opening up the communicative potential on race. This was to be achieved by grounding these changes in practices and processes which actively discouraged the negative use of the administrative hierarchy and emphasised the solidaristic practices furthering the achievement of rights underpinning the successful validation of claims to racial justice. Thus the policy recommended that the race advisers' and the central race unit's advice and recommended changes could not be altered by management, but should go unaltered to the political level for consideration. Further the reporting line of all the race advisers should be switched to the most senior officer in that directorate on day to day administrative issues, for example annual leave requirements. Backing up the recommended changes to the functioning of the advisers was another recommendation that advisers were to be given full and equal membership of their respective senior management teams in those particular directorates.
The practice up to then was to call them into senior management team meetings as and when required; a ‘stepinfetchit’ role which had to change. In terms of the relationship with the central race unit, a formal functional link was recommended, the purpose of which was to ensure that the overall thrust to the council’s race equality programme could be properly developed and co-ordinated. These would be underpinned by annual work programmes. There was the principled argument that this would help create the institutional space for advisers to come together to deliberate issues of race equality, in so doing laying the bases for mutual support and development, without the threat of organisational sanction, as well as the linked tactical thinking that race equality resources could be pooled and focussed on problem areas in the council where that need was perceived. The Race Advisers were also given formal access to the Race Relations Committee. Written into the policy was a clear operational principle that the advisers were not to be regarded as a dumping ground for all Black issues, a tendency which had developed previously and which managers saw as fitting practice because it absolved them from facing up to their responsibilities. Rather the advisers were there to provide the strategic overview and direction to the directorate race equality initiatives and programmes backed up by targeted interventions in key processes. The idea was to create the conditions for discursive spaces in which race equality issues could be deliberatively discussed and resolved, as opposed to the previous practice of race advice being given which was then subject to managerial fiat. This modification to the role of the race adviser was also intended to clarify the role of the adviser and manager in the processes of race equality deliberation and decision so that it became clear that the discharge of executive responsibilities by managers had to, with the advisers’ help, have a race dimension, where that was warranted. The restructuring proposal was accepted by the first Race Relations Committee and passed on to the Policy and Resources Committee for ratification as council policy. At that the relevant meeting of that committee, the Chair of the personnel Sub-Committee, one of the proto-modernisers and also ‘member’ of the northern school of Labourism, attempted to speak against it. However, one of the new left councillors quickly stepped in with an impassioned plea for accepting the proposed changes as a positive indication that the council was serious on race equality. At that point in time none of the Labour councillors present, especially after the latter speech, wanted to be seen to be opposing race initiatives. It went through, another victory to indeterminacy.

Alvesson and Willmott provide a critical template against which to assess whether or not organisations are critical. By critical is meant that organisations are structures of communicative interaction in which distortion is either minimised or absent altogether. This is a step removed from the neo-Marxist perspective from some one like Marcuse, where there is the essentialised assumption of human autonomy which is “frustrated and
deformed by the demands of oppressive organisational structures." Rather the "focus upon communication side-steps the question of what is essential to human nature in favour of an understanding of the fundamental conditions of human communication ...(and)... the critical issue then becomes whether particular structures of communication allow these fundamental conditions to be fully realised; or whether relations of power — in the form of capitalism, technocracy, consumerism, sexism, racism etc. — systematically impede this possibility by, for example, representing such impediments as natural or functional rather than social and enslaving." Within the context of organisations they go on to identify strong and weak versions of Habermassian type analyses. The strong version suggests that "the truth, legitimacy, sincerity and clarity of statements can be decisively tested through a process of critical scrutiny." On the other hand the weak version tries not to get rid of all communicative distortions or attempt to arrive at an ideal speech situation, but attempts "to open up space for increased communicative action with regard to beliefs, consent, trust, thereby challenging and reversing the tendency of work organisations to devalue, corrode or appropriate the values of the lifeworld." With the substantive issue of racial justice being prefigured as a moral question, the way in which this piece of research approaches these two organisational paradigms is to argue that the first is very much a keep in the forefront normative goal with respect to racist distortions to the type of pragmatic, everyday communicative changes represented by the latter.

But the formal restructuring of the race advisers' role and functioning also pivoted on changes to the processes associated with the relationship between the central unit and other race equality staff, and to changes in the formal operational procedures race advisers were to become involved in. In terms of processes this largely turned on ensuring that the central unit became an institutional space, both literally and metaphorically, which could be used and accessed by race equality staff for their support and development. It also, thus, became a key discursive space for such workers. For example there were formal bi-weekly meetings co-ordinated by the central unit open not only to race advisers, but also all other race equality workers. This was a different practice to other boroughs where such forms of co-ordination were restricted to the race equality 'elite' of advisers. Participation in the meetings was grounded on guaranteeing equal access and partaking rights for all members. The former was secured through a brief 'firefight' between managers and senior officers, and the head of the unit since this was in advance of the formal policy affecting other race equality staff. The latter evolved through the participatory principles that came to characterise deliberative activities by, and in, the unit. But, it was not only meetings that took place. There were, as well, training and other support activities arranged, including work exchange initiatives with other countries. The unit became a repository and conduit for race equality information and resources.
such as a small library, which could be accessed by race workers. Procedurally, the head of the unit ensured, through properly drafted and accepted practice codes, that the advisers were guaranteed involvement and participation in crucial operational processes, for example recruitment and selection, grievance and disciplinaries, formal service investigations. Involvement in this was based on, and illustrates my arguments for, the principle of non-closure. That is if decisions reached by managers were not within the parameters of the council's own race equality policies and principles, despite advice from advisers, then that decision could not be implemented but had to be referred to a higher level of decision making, right up to member level. This, as I shall argue in more detail in the next section, had the affect of opening up communicative spaces on race in certain key administrative procedures normally only subject to individual managerial discretionary decision making. Underpinning this race equality staff relational processes and formal involvement in council procedures and processes were seven linked operational principles. These, as shall be shown later, lubricated the enlargement of institutional interstices to create communicative spaces around key elements of claims for racial justice. The first was that the head of unit, in particular, but also other race advisory staff would use their formal position in the hierarchy to support race equality action where there might be protocol based conflict. For example there were occasions when directorate based race advisers' reports were rejected in part or full by their respective service committee. The head of unit would then place these, and take responsibility for that action, on the agenda of the race Relations Committee so that the report would go back to that particular service committee, only this time as a formal recommendation from the race Relations Committee. The second was that dealing with race equality required, on behalf of those involved, a high degree of honesty and transparency, recognising that dealing with race often meant cutting across institutional and subject areas boundaries and borders thereby linking spheres previously categorically and ontologically separated. It can be said that equalities work in the public sector was one of the first real, yet not acknowledged, primary sources for 'joined-up' thinking and action. For example the head of the unit was clear that items raised at the Chief Officers Team meetings which had a bearing on race equality in the council and its responsibilities, even if that forum wanted to keep it confidential, should and would be made available to other race workers and relevant people. Towards the end of the programme the Chief Executive, to counter this, was reduced to holding informal team meetings in his office to which only invited senior managers could attend. The head of the unit was never invited to these. The third operational principle was that 'being liked' was never to be a criterion for successful working in the institution. No area or subject was to be immune from examination from a race equality perspective. Being 'disliked' and/or running the risk of being subject to formal disciplinary action came with the territory. A saying amongst
advisers was that they worked daily with their P45s in their pockets. The fourth related to the clear view that the work being undertaken in furtherance of race equality was political, in a sense that this dimension cut across the existing distinctions between the administrative system and formal political sphere. The pursuit of racial justice in both formally separated categories of action raised questions about power, resources, exclusion, exploitation and oppression. They could not simply be reduced to that the technical question of what good management practice was. In this, remedial action was taken explicitly to mean anti-racist action, the aim of which was race equality. Relatedly the fifth principle turned on clarifying, and making sure the institution came to realise, that the race advisers and race workers were not there as representatives of the whole, or particular Black community and communities. Race equality staff would not be put in the position of playing racial or cultural intermediaries. Some boroughs' race staff appeared to operate on those bases, which effectively relieved the organisation of having to communicate directly with sections of their own communities. This gave rise to an almost dialectical relationship between those race equality staff and certain Black organisations and individuals in which the reciprocal expectation from the latter was to express declarations of ownership over those staff. This often resulted in decisions, often those relating to resource allocation, the reasons for which were mired in aspects of unaccountable group loyalties. Apart from which that would arrogate to such race staff the role of being actual representatives of those communities. In terms of the target borough, the central unit's relationship was to some extent mediated through the grant giving function of the Race Relations Committee. These were not large, capital resourcing grants, but small, one off type grants, covering small scale projects. At one level this allowed for a critical distance to be developed between the unit and Black organisations because the unit was clear that the criteria for awarding grants had to be clearly defined and strictly adhered to. The way in which the criteria were restructured in anti-racist terms and the way in which these grants were then tied into using them as a leverage for Black groups to gain access to mainstream grants will be discussed in the next section. Instead the task of these race workers in this particular important area of discursiveness, was defined as being that of opening up the organisation so that Black people in the community could put their demands directly to those who made decisions daily, on their behalf. For example a social work team in one of the designated social services districts contacted the unit saying that they wanted to improve their liaison and consultation with the local Black populace, and could the unit help by contacting relevant Black organisations. The response from the unit was that it could provide them with a list of relevant Black organisations and individuals, advise them on certain ground rules, but that they would have to actually pick up the telephone, ring those contacts and make all the necessary arrangements. It was only in those instances when the institution, often for political reasons which adversely affected
their own race equality priorities, was reluctant to allow itself to be opened up to public involvement, that the unit, frequently in conjunction with the Women’s Equality Unit, would take the initiative and launch a consultative programme. The sixth principle was that, given the overall principled belief that race was the sharp cutting edge to wider concerns, then advisers, but the unit in particular as the lead and support to other race workers, had to ensure that its advice was contextualised within a wider and sharper understanding of the particular area worked on, and not just on action which would ‘Bantustan’ race. For example advice on the equality implications of compulsorily competitive tendering for council services, an initiative foisted on local government by the Thatcher government, required the unit and advisers to over acquaint themselves with the legal and political context. It was both, at one and the same time, a deconstruction of the ‘expertisation’ of this area attempted by the council’s legal and other policy sections, i.e. they were in the ‘know’ and therefore organisationally ‘powerful’, as well as confirming the reality of two Black experience adages, viz., having to be “twice as good” and “keeping two steps ahead of ‘whitey’”. Finally the seventh principle was that the race equality programme was not going to be defined or actioned in terms of ethnicity. Rather ‘Black’ as an overarching political signifier of the need to address firstly ‘wrongs done to’ was to be the framework for opening up the institution, and the framework within which questions of ethnicity, especially where these were in the form of demands for resources, could be addressed. The main criticisms of this approach came not from the Black employees or, majority of Black organisations, apart from the local CRC and its acolytic satellites, but post 1986, from two Black councillors whose political outlooks on race were firmly mis-focussed through ‘representational’ ethnic lenses on essentialised notions of the Asian and Afro-Caribbean communities. This generated an antipathy not only towards the Race Unit, but also against each other’s perspectives, so much so that the two of them came to blows in the council car-park after one fractious committee meeting.

11.15 Black Workers

The penultimate part of the race equality structures and processes that need to be addressed is that of Black employees in the organisation. In the inadequate and small amount of academic literature on this subject, the role and organisations of Black workers is little recognised or acknowledged. Indeed this dimension, if one examines Young’s tendentious piece on the ‘proper’ recommended role of race advisers, is absent because it does not fit in with the ‘professional’, management hand holding, non-confrontational, hierarchical conformist, capacity he advocates for this type of staff. However organised collectivities of Black workers are, and were, a crucial part of the race equality structure in the target borough, supporting and illustrating the second operational principle outlined above. Black people
entered institutions formally as employees, and, yet, often because of racism, which itself also cuts across the categorical borders in organisations, came to utilise, as a defensive, and offensive, strategy, other latent roles. In terms of my interpretation, this had the effect of actually opening up a number of communicative channels. In the target borough a number of Black employee groups were formed, some of them with the senior management’s support, and even prompting, the purpose of which was to enable such staff to have a support resource in the directorate through which issues of concern could be raised directly with the relevant chief officer. There was a guaranteed access to that particular senior manager. The race equality staff were part of these for a, in some cases, also servicing them. Whilst these were helpful, their effectiveness did depend on the good will of the particular member of senior management concerned. Some Black employees dismissed these as a facade managerial device the purpose of which was to create a safety valve talking shop thereby enabling Black employees with complaints and grievances to let off steam. Far more potent and, in a sense useful, was the Black Workers’ Group that came to be formed in the local branch of the main officer union, then called the National Association of Local Government Officers, or NALGO for short. At the time of the start of the then new unit the local branch of NALGO had something called an “Ethnic Minorities Group”. This not only had no formal relationship with the branch executive, or other structures in the union, but, to the horror of the head of unit, had its meetings serviced by the white branch secretary who took the minutes and acted as a final arbiter on what was and was not possible. The influx of race equality staff to the council and membership of the union, and thus membership of that group, soon changed that colonial set up. Within a few weeks the group voted to change its name to a Black Workers Group, exclude the Branch Secretary, and to seek formal ratification from the branch for its existence and right to have its representatives on the Branch Executive, a constitutional change requiring a two thirds majority vote at a full branch meeting. With assiduous organising on behalf of the Black Workers’ Group, this was achieved. The existence of the Group enabled yet another channel to be opened, this time via the trade unions, for claims to racial justice to be resolved. In reality, for example, what this meant, is that another solidarity constituency, not only just comprised of Black people, but also, because of its union milieu, and because of the need thus to secure wider branch agreement for key negotiating action, of people supportive of race equality, was created. For example policy changes, especially those on employment, put forward by the race equality staff which had to be negotiated with the trade unions, could now be guaranteed that the largest and main union, would have the views of its Black members formally and equally heard in the deliberations. Certainly over the five years of the existence of the official race equality programme in that council, many crucial race equality based employment policy changes, such as the Race Equality Targets’ Policy, were, because of
this communicative channel in that union, ratified by NALGO, much to the
chagrin, the race workers suspect, of certain management who might have
been hoping and expecting that these would be blocked by the trade unions.
The Black Workers Group also became the site from which a more critical
commentary on the actions of the council could be launched, certainly more
critical than the communicative protocol of the council would have allowed
the race equality staff to voice.

11.16 Race Equality Workers

The final element to the race equality structures concerns that relating to
what I have described as the race equality workers, as a categorical contra-
distinction to Race Equality Advisers. These staff were, for the most part,
further down the bureaucratic hierarchy occupying posts which were
individual service specific. For example there were two 'ethnic minority'
specialist posts in the libraries' section of the Leisure Services Department
whose brief was to ensure that that section met the needs of the Black
communities in that borough. Like all the other race posts in that council,
including the race Adviser posts, these were Section 11 funded. Section 11
refers to that specifically numbered paragraph of the 1966 Local
Government Act which permitted local authorities to claim from the
government up to 75% of the cost of posts which were oriented towards
helping the children of new commonwealth immigrants, for this read Black,
learn English. As the contents of that paragraph suggests, the bulk of the
funding claimed by local authorities up to the late seventies went into
education. There were attendant problems, key aspects of which carried
over into the way in which local authorities used such monies in other areas
of the councils' services. The first was that education authorities tended to
allocate the monies non-specifically in their budgets, thereby effectively
subsidising the main education budget. This was compounded by weak
monitoring of grant use by the Home Office, the government department
responsible for administering that budget. The second was that even where
specific teaching posts were funded, these were often not formally specified,
another form of subsidy. There was an underlying problem which was to
surface more clearly in the late seventies and eighties when posts funded this
way took on a more race equality role both in education and elsewhere in
local authorities, which was that they came to be held by white people not
fully tuned in to the substantive issues of the black experience and racism.
The third aspect was that these posts, when they were race specific, even in
their 'teaching English as a second language' guise, were often separated
from the rest of the services' main activities and planning. All of these,
together with the actual assimilationist basis to the funding, contributed to
the strong marginalisation of the actual work undertaken by those posts so
funded. Over the years, whilst the actual legislation remained intact on
the statute books, the interpretation of the criteria governing the
administration of this fund by the Home Office adapted to the changing circumstances thrown up by the increasing longevity of the Black communities in British society. This was because both in that government department, and in local authorities, it became recognised that this was the only form of government funding which could thought of as race specific. Thus, for example, in the aftermath of the Brixton disturbances of 1981, the principal researcher then working in Lambeth council as a race equality adviser covering management and employment, met with the relevant civil servants in the Home Office. Whilst reluctant to provide any assurances in writing, they were prepared to give oral guarantees that all forms of race equality projects involving race specific posts, even ones with an explicit anti-racist content, would be considered. In that particular local authority a phalanx of race specific posts were create in their Housing Directorate and sited in the various and many neighbourhood and district offices spread over Lambeth. But these, like the many similarly funded posts in other local authorities, including the target borough, were very much what could be described as 'bolt-on' structures. In the many conferences throughout the eighties convened on the specific issue of Section 11 funding, a number of critical marginalising themes emerge. These were also detected by the new head of unit in the target borough in that council's race equality posts in his initial assessment of what needs to be done. These were, and they echo the fault lines in the way section 11 was used in the educational field, firstly that service specific workers were often seen and treated as dumping grounds for all the matters pertaining to Black people in that particular section. This could also mean being seen as the person, or persons, who would provide the service to Black users. Secondly, and linked, there were no structural communicative relationships which would enable the expertise of these post holders to inform and change the work practices of their colleagues in those specific services, and/or allow that expertise to filter up the hierarchy or outside to other departments. Thirdly workers in these type of posts often isolated and alienated from the rest of their section and fellow employees. Fourthly managers of these posts were often ignorant of the full dimension to the proper use of them, and/or unsympathetic to that potential, compounding the marginalisation felt by the workers, and in many cases giving rise to managerial practices bordering on, even crossing over into, harassment. Traces of all of these problems, some more amplified than others, can be seen in the way in which the race advisers were structured pre-unit. In other boroughs, such as a north London one famed for, and at that time proud of, being labelled, a 'socialist republic', these problems were reiterated by some of their race advisers in relevant cross London fora.

In order to tackle these, and further ground the changes to the race advisers' structures and functioning in the target borough, the head of the race unit developed a policy covering Section 11 funded posts in the council. There were four points to this, all of which were collectively geared towards
arresting and turning around the almost inherent marginalisation of these posts. The first of these addressed a key communicative element to section 11 funding, one which was either overlooked by applying authorities, or short changed in some other way. This was that applying authorities had to show that they had consulted with the relevant black communities about the proposed posts. In the target borough consultation had previously for the most part consisted of passing the proposed package to the local CRC for comment. This was now changed to a proper consultation exercise which was to be co-ordinated by the Race Adviser and central unit, involving the principle of non-closure should there be objections from the relevant Black communities. The pre-structuring of the proposal also had to involve the relevant Race Adviser. Finally the post consultation proposal then had to secure the approval of the Race Relations Committee as well. The second key change was that relating to the functioning of these race posts. It was proposed that they were not to become dumping grounds for all race issues, but a resource for that particular section whose use would be oriented towards changing service practices by fellow work colleagues so that the whole section would be responsible for delivering to the Black communities. Thirdly their reporting line, where this was not already so, would have to be to the highest level of management in that service area. Fourthly these workers were to be given guaranteed access to Race Relations Committee and to their respective race Advisers, where such posts exist, as well as to the central unit. The key intention of the changes was to upgrade the race equality functioning of these posts by maximising their access to discursive spaces which could influence and/or change the institution. The status of these changes was proposed in the form of a Code of Practice, aimed, as in the case of the employment codes proposed by the unit which will be detailed later, at minimising managerial discretion, by official organisational sanction, if necessary, to discriminate through marginalisation. In an unintended surfacing of subliminal race undertones, one of the chief officers, whose department was one of the worst offenders in misusing such workers, formally commented on the report that it looked as if the head of the unit was trying to ‘empire build’, (sic).

Unlike other race structures in other councils which, to all intents and purposes, amounted to tenuously grafted on configurations whose primary aim appeared to be tackling racial inequality through quantifiably changing the hue of the council, those in the target borough had a more radical objective. These, to re-iterate the imagery used by the head of unit then, were to be attached to the central nervous system of the council and to infect it with the instinctual drive for race equality. The race structures and programme were constructed to be transformative and not just additive.
11.17 Main Focus of the Race Equality Programme

The fourth element concentrates on the main foci of the race equality programme for the defined five year period. These are distributed amongst five inter-linked areas of local governance responsibilities, which are employment, services, democritisation, extra-organisational negotiation, and pursuing the transformative potential. Whilst then it can be said that the outline of element two provided the spatial dimension to the programme along a vertical axis, the details of element four provide categories of action along a horizontal axis to complete a matrix of race equality activities. The information relating to the race equality structures are part of the work pertaining to what I have termed the transformative potential. At the time of the start of the equality programmes in the target borough local government was thought of by senior managers and councillors very much in terms of orthodox notions of local governance. Even in that era of the supposed new left take over of many London borough town halls, radical political intent by local Labour parties, as was shown in Lambeth, was hardly ever translated into substantive transformation of the administrative and political process content of local government. This argument holds even more for the target borough where the new left could be said to be in a balanced tri-partite segmentation of Labour group power, with the other two segments being filled by proto-modernisers on the one hand, and out right old style Labour right wingers and non-classifiables, on the other. Within this arrangement the Black councillors tended to sprawl across the former two. To define the race equality programme in this way, an argument which holds as well for the women’s equality programme which developed alongside the race one, raised issues for consideration at the time which some key managers and councillors thought beyond the province of the advisers and their respective committees. Yet, some fifteen years on, as if to emphasise the pathfinder role of the pursuit of substantive equality, as opposed to facadic equality, many of the categories raised above are now common items on the agenda of local government, e.g. democratisation and community consultation, de-and re-construction of services. Built into the race equality programme, then, was a temporal framework, implicit in the two operational principles underpinning the programme, and explicitly stated in certain policy documents in the following terms. The first phase was seen in as ‘fine-tuning’ the organisation. This is very much the limit of the additive type programmes which gives rise to the fallacy, espoused by leading race lights, like Ouseley, of what I have labelled the BBOS approach, i.e. Black Bums on Seats. That is to say that the mere presence of enough Black people in the organisation, whether in employment or in relation to service use, is enough to counter racism in local government. Whilst not discounting this aim, the race equality programme in the target borough sought to in a linked transformative context triggered by the real limits to that former approach. Thus the points of resistance and supposed
natural limits to the additive type programme, i.e. the constructions, for example in employment, of 'there are not enough qualified Black people', as a response to the failure to recruit, could be taken as the catalyst for considering the de- and re-construction of that work area. For example in a report on the race dimension to reorganisations, the head of unit wrote:

“Temporally it was, and still is, envisaged that there were two steps to this (i.e. the race programme). The first is a matter of "fine tuning" the organisation, or gearing it up to ensure that its policies, practices and systems do not racially discriminate against, oppress or exploit Black people. The second is to begin to look at restructuring as one of the means to tackling the fundamental reasons for race inequality at the local authority level. Race equality therefore is not just about the number of Black Chief Officers; or Black children in day nurseries; or the number of Black co-optees on committees. It is as well about how things are run. This in turn touches upon the complexities of real change at this level. One of the dangerous fallacies therefore this council has to disabuse itself of is that which maintains that race equality can only be achieved by substantial additional growth.”

One of the key contextualising struts to the overall frame of reference for the race equality programme, one that was used to constantly remind managers and councillors about the enormity of the manifesto commitment to race equality, was that the programme sought to turn around, and in cases over turn, a hundred years plus of municipal development in the UK. This was a history, which up to that point, had not consciously sought to move beyond the unspoken white, male norm discourses guiding their everyday way of doing things. It was also a counter factual based argument in support of a race programme which required that sufficient time and space be allowed in order that it might properly develop. This is contrary to the approach argued by others in the race field, such as Ouseley, whose opinion was that the changes brought about by additive type initiatives would be enough to secure the framework for ending racism in local government. To that extent then current race structures were temporary, only needed to kick start the organisation. This was an argument seized upon by managers and councillors who sought, marginalisingly, firstly to keep all race posts section 11 funded because that type of funding was time limited, and secondly, two years after the start of the race programme, to argue, as a means of ending it, that enough had already been achieved. This will be expanded upon in the section on discourse contestation.

11.18 Employment

Within those types of contextual arguments, the issue of employment in the target borough prior to the start of the race programme, showed characteristics which, in some parts were similar to other boroughs, like Lambeth before the commencement of their race equality initiatives. The
similarities were four fold: the local authority as one of the largest employers in that area; high Black unemployment levels; a Black population proportionately younger than the white one; a low level of Black employment in the council; and, not surprisingly, concomitant employment policies, procedures and practices which were not equality focussed. The process and systems which maintained that particular status quo came to be described by the advisers being those promoting the positive discrimination of white males. Further, unlike Lambeth which had an overt, dynamic managerial context to their employment functions and processes, as concretised in their Directorate of Management Services, the target borough still had an old style personnel function. This was executed through an administrative based central Personnel Division, structured as a sub-department of the Chief Executive’s department. It can be best defined then as sclerotic and ossified. Nevertheless it was formally linked to, and fed into, the Personnel Sub-Committee, one of the key powerful committees of the council, as future struggles over the development of the employment sphere of the race equality programme would show.

There were four prefacing categories of deliberation to the development of the employment component: the initial environment of indeterminacy, the legal framework, the intended status of the employment changes, and the envisaged role of the personnel division and its workings. Whilst the Personnel Division and leading members of the Personnel Sub-Committee viewed the establishment and initial output of the Race Unit with wariness, to judge by their reactions, it is likely they neither voiced nor indicated any form of overt opposition because in those early days it was not politically expedient to do so. Certainly, this aspect of indeterminacy was useful to, and used by the unit and Race Relations Committee to put through a raft of employment changes in a relatively short space of time. The legal framework centred on, and was grounded in, a reading of the 1976 Race Relations Act by the Race Advisers and workers, which looked to accentuate the most positive interpretation of its normative potential. This often put them in conflict with the organisation’s internal legal resources who preferred a narrow legalistic interpretation. However, as indicated earlier, the process of taking apart this form of ‘expertisation’ led to the opening up, and use, of thitherto unknown communicative channels resulting in a slowing down of executive decision making in favour of a more deliberative approach. Therein too, lies part of the technicised reasons marshalled later against the race programme. In terms of the relevant internal features of the ’76 Race Relations Act, there were two broad areas of focus. The first related to the prohibition of direct and indirect discrimination in employment. The second related to the permitting of certain forms of positive action in recognition of the cumulative effects of past discrimination. Taking account of race under the positive action provisions of that act, meant trying to equalise conditions applying to Black
participants in any employment process. It did not mean that decisions taken at the point of selection for employment could use race as the sole or main determining criterion. That would be positive discrimination. There was a tendency for both managers and councillors to view the arena of positive action as being the requisite one to address the employment needs of Black people. This was to some extent reinforced by the pronouncements of then certain race ‘experts’ and by the development in race pioneer boroughs, like Lambeth, of ‘Positive Action Programmes’ to address institutional race inequalities in employment. This was not helped by the GLC’s race employment initiatives which placed a high premium on establishing positive action trainee schemes. The view of the unit was that this tended to relegate, representationally and stereotypically, Black people’s employment experiences to being the victims of ‘disadvantage’. Concomitantly Black people entering organisations as employees were blanketed under the need for additional training before they could progress up the hierarchy. The view of the unit, and this is reflected in its policy and practice interventions, was that organisations, like the target borough, could do far more to ensure that there was no, or little, direct and indirect discrimination in the employment field before considering the option of positive action. The emphasis was therefore on the first broad area of focus of the ’76 Act’s employment provisions, with positive action very much being a last resort once it could be demonstrated that action in the organisation under the first part had actually exhausted all employment possibilities for Black people. This also helped counter the tendency for other employees in the organisation to conflate, in the particular commonsensical tendentious way that this occurs, the idea of positive action with positive discrimination as the un-intellectual groundings for the sotto voce behind-the-back comments of “she/he is has only been given the job because she/he is Black.”

The use of the ’76 Act in this way also helped underpin the expressed view of the head of the unit that the employment changes outlined in the policy recommendations were not to be ‘sticky plastered’ on to the main edifice of employment responsibilities, but should be the core of a reconstructed equality focussed employment outlook. This required scrutinising and changing existing polices, procedures and practices. Above all it required a fundamental change to the way in which the employment responsibilities of the council were carried out. This meant that the orientation of the personnel Division had to change from a reactive, administrative one, to a pro-active (and here I cross myself for using that term), environment sensitive, processual, and consultative one. This would then help secure the equality changes as the norm, and not the exception, only there for women and Black people. What was avoided was the use of the term ‘human resources’ to describe the changes required. It was argued that the then newly emerging arena of human resources owed much to the new forms of
internal organisational control emerging in the multi-nationals, substantively premissed on by passing and destroying trade unions. Whilst the equality approach being developed overlapped in certain aspects with what could be termed the human resources approach, i.e. a positive, pro-active evaluation of employees as the organisation’s most valuable resource, underpinned therefore by learning and development programmes, there was a critical grounding to the equality based employment initiatives which had the potential to allow for substantive ‘empowerment’, as opposed to the facadic ‘empowerment’ deriving from the human resources school.

The start of the race equality intervention into the employment responsibilities of the target borough were heralded in the first ever report produced by the unit. One of the tasks awaiting the then new head of unit was to draft a formal council response to the CRE Code of Practice on Employment, a document which attempted to set out the necessary good practice standards for employers to follow to ensure they did not directly or indirectly discriminate on the grounds of race. The legal status of this type of code is that whilst it is not legally mandatory upon employers, failure to comply can be used as evidence in an industrial tribunal. It was, of course, a heralding stalked by vulturine shaped shadows keen to see whether or not the new unit could surpass that which had gone before, like the local crc which had representation on the Race Relations Committee as a co-opted member. The response to the Code of Practice by the head of the unit, race advisers and race workers, was to use that and the, as yet, unmeasured categorisation of the unit, as the bases for establishing the framework for a new equality focussed employment approach. The CRE Code of Practice, which covered every main aspect of an employer’s employment responsibilities from attracting prospective employees, through to their recruitment and selection and treatment in the organisation, to their eventual departure from the organisation as an employee, was dis-aggregated into a number of codes of practices. Thus there were proposals for one covering recruitment and selection, training, grievance and disciplinary, conditions of service, etc. These were to be the main core procedures governing the employment functions of the council. Each was to be developed jointly by the Personnel Division and equality advisers, ensuring there was the relevant involvement and participation of employees through the relevant fora. The status of these within the organisation was that they were mandatory for managers to follow. In so doing it was hoped that anti-discriminatory rights for all employees, particularly Black employees and women, would be ensured by limiting the arena of managerial discretion in these crucial employment areas. This limitation, as shall be shown later on, involved not only the implied threat of organisational sanction, but also the opening up communicative spaces in key stages of each procedure. These recommendations were accepted by both the Race Relations Committee and Personnel Sub-Committee, the latter effectively confirming their status in the
organisation as council policy. Whilst policies require implementation, and the absence of the latter could be read as reducing the respective policy to window dressing, nevertheless attaining the stature of 'council policy' should not be underestimated. It legitimated, for example, the organisational, some of them legally enshrined, rights of employees, particularly Black employees, to make claims for racial justice, as well as delineating the normative potential for those claims to be resolved. In this particular instance the target borough's recruitment and selection code of practice, which flowed from that policy report, provides a good example of why and how managerial power, in this particular area of employment responsibilities, was made accountable to race equality principles. The communicative spaces generated in this de- and reconstruction of what had previously been an administrative task, the province of managerial, and in the case of senior posts, councillor, discretion and subjectivity, will be detailed in the interrogative section on race equality spaces. This will illustrate how important they are in meeting the overall criterion that 'all who are affected should be involved.'

The second critical intervention, one that sought to define an overall short to medium term goal for the above changes to the equality employment reorientation of the council, was to develop and establish a race equality targets policy. This also came to mark the beginning of the overt opposition to, ostensibly, certain aspects of the proposed race equality changes, by the what I have come to describe as the proto-modernisers amongst the Labour group of councillors. These, primarily in the shape of the Chair of the Personnel Sub-Committee and many of her fellow councillors there on, cited the opposition of the manual trade unions to the proposals as reasons for not so much not agreeing to targets, as ones for slowing down the process by a year or so. This would have had the actual effect of killing the idea. Added to this deliberate misreading of the intention of the targets proposal was the intervention of a newly appointed Chief Personnel Officer. Entering the organisation in a blaze of publicly stated liberal intentions vis-à-vis the race equality priorities, including an 'I'm-with-you-all-the-way' meeting with the head of the race unit, his commitment soon waned over the issue of the Race Adviser post in his division which had responsibility for employment. Despite the then new council policy on the changed reporting and functional structures for race advisers both he and the Chair of the Personnel Sub-Committee, constantly attempted to impose a strict managerialist regime on the post holder. Above all, the Chair wanted him to control the level and content of the race equality changes being put up to that committee. These events were occurring about eight months into the start of the race programme. The details of the use by some councillors and managers of a combination of Labourism, as a dimension of the social labour perspective, and gut managerial prerogative to try to close down emerging race equality spaces,
will be provided in the interrogative section on discourse contestation. Suffice to say that the particulars provided above give a flavour of the attritional struggles for race equality space underscoring the final race equality targets’ policy accepted by the council.

The policy itself, building on those that had already been agreed in boroughs, like Lambeth, and by regional bodies, like the GLC, sought to achieve a number of aims: clearly defining the concept of ‘targets’; disabusing potential critics of the notion that this was anything to do with ‘quotas’; establishing the necessary operational principles. The idea of ‘targets’, at that time not even a recommendation from the CRE, was therefore rooted in the 1976 Race Relations Act definition of ‘under representation’ which was taken to mean the proportion of Black people in the organisation is under represented if it is lower than the proportion of Black people in the communities from which the organisation recruits. Targets were something, therefore, for the organisation to aim at. Above all, within that borough, it was made clear that targets were not an end in themselves, but merely the numerical expression of the short to medium term objectives arising from the equality changes being pursued in employment. It was stressed that they were not quotas, but minimum expected levels of prospective Black employees in the organisation, and thus these levels could be exceeded. As a refinement on the way in which the numerical target was derived in other bodies, like Lambeth and the GLC where it was defined, in the former, in relation to the proportion of Black people in the borough and in the latter in relation to the proportion of Black people in London, in the borough under examination, it was defined in relation to the proportion of economically active people in the local Black communities. This was because not only would that be the age band of people from which an organisation would draw its employees, but also because, given that the Black population is proportionately younger, that age band is larger than the actual overall proportion of Black people in the local communities, thereby releasing a higher target number. Overall targets were therefore set at 21% achievable by the end of five years across all levels of the council’s bureaucracy. However, cognisance was taken of the differing employment patterns in the different directorates by using the overall target framework as the context within which individual directorates could, given the specificities of their employment histories, derive, on an annual basis, more achievable targets. This latter refinement was the result of what I have referred to above as the ‘attritional struggle’ underpinning this policy. For the Chief Officers of the council this degree of local determinacy represented a ‘compromise’ from the perceived Stalinist’ intentions of the Race Relations Committee and the unit and their ‘five year targets’ plan’. However, the additional information which the Directorates had to release in order to derive their interim targets also permitted the unit, on the bases of previous appointment rates, to work out for every section the number of Black people.
needed to be employed for that section to meet its targets. This was a concrete number managers, and Advisers, where they were involved, therefore took with them into any recruitment and selection process for a vacancy. The target’s policy was, therefore, at that time, unique in being both ‘global’ and ‘local’ with a defined relationship between the two spheres. In fact one of the later Black councillors, someone who came on to the council some two years after the policy was developed and who became one of the unit’s ‘ethnicised’, (dare one say it) ‘bete noirs’, worked, at the time the policy was being agreed, in a neighbouring borough in the local CRC. He obtained a copy of the policy, ‘tippexed’ out the target borough’s name, inserted his local borough’s name, and presented it to that council’s Race Relations Committee. This was accepted and agreed through that council’s cycle of committees so that there was an additional dimension of uniqueness deriving from the fact that two adjacent boroughs, unbeknown then to either, had identical equality targets’ policies. However, what was important was the level of changes to the configuration of employment responsibilities in the different directorates, in line with the equality recommendations, supporting the increasing level of Black appointments.

Whilst the three components of the employment race equality changes described above, re-orienting the Personnel Division, the codes of practice and the equality targets’ policy, marked the global dimension to the envisaged transfigurations, there was a need as well for a commensurate accountability system tying these into local managerial and administrative processes at the directorate level. More over the nature of the relationship between expressed equality changes in employment and what effectively is their micro-implementation within the different directorates had to, because of the principles guiding those changes, be critically different to the orthodoxies of command and control. These, therefore, had to involve the emancipatory practice of opening up managerial decisions to scrutiny, particularly by Black people, as well as ensuring their involvement in the various stages of the changes. That did not mean, however, that the systemic use of power to control resources had to be ignored, for that would have turned the race initiatives into parallel ‘talking shops’. Instead those systems had to be prised open to communicative influence and possible transformation. To achieve this the unit developed and got accepted as council policy, again after an excoriating series of altercations with the proto-modernisers, a directorate level framework for carrying forward the progress and implementation of anti-racist work. A similar framework had been established in Lambeth. This, however, was entirely employment based, and, rather marginalisingly, was called ‘positive action programmes’. These, on an annual bases, detailed the action being undertaken by Lambeth Directorates in furtherance of their employment equality targets. In the case of the target borough the framework developed
by the unit and race workers was more substantive. This was called 'anti-racist programmes for departments', and rather than simply concentrating on management action in the sphere of employment, sought instead to provide an inter-locked accountability process across employment, services and democratisation, termed in the base document as 'Black community access to decision making'.

Thus:

"Anti-racist Programmes provide the structural and procedural framework which enables Departments to translate the Equal Opportunities Policy and concomitant policy backed race equality strategies into concrete action. One of the visible affects of this will be to increase the level of black participation throughout all spheres of the Departments remit. The programme provides the basis for Departments to adopt a systematic approach to institutional discrimination and within which anti-racist strategies are developed and which have as their objective race equality. Whilst a categorical distinction is made between the main elements to such programmes, the programmes are premised upon a homogenous approach, including positive action based employment initiatives, in recognition of the fact that all areas of a Department's responsibilities are interlocked when it comes to tackling institutional discrimination. Anti-Racist Programmes, as the last word implies, are keyed into targets and timetables. As such they must be an integral part of the Departments' other responsibilities. Reprogramming at regular intervals is therefore essential. This must be locked into the annual budgeting process and it follows therefore that Anti-Racist Programmes should be re-done at the same time."

For each of the then eleven council departments, the antiracist programme policy initiative yielded a series of annual employment and service and democratisation action sub-plans:

The policy required the relevant management, in the first instance, to devise the plans with the involvement of the race advisers and race equality workers, and also with the requisite Black employee for a and Black community involvement actions. It also recommended the establishment of an anti-racist forum in each department which would be comprised of representatives from all sectors of that department's remit, including the trade unions, so that there would be the structural communicative means to influence and evaluate the programme on a rolling basis. Both as a global recommended change across the council, but also re-iterated in this policy, were the recommendations for developing and fully establishing the nascent employment monitoring system. Unlike other attempts at monitoring in other boroughs where monitoring per se appeared to become the consuming passion, this one was structured within the parameters of the race equality programme's anti-racist principles. Thus, for example:
The emphasis of any monitoring system will be on the sharp cutting edge to discrimination already recognised in the Council's priorities. Monitoring will therefore provide the quantitative information on the effects of racism and sexism in the Council's employment practices and on the effect's of the action taken to remedy this.

The last key element of the employment considerations were those relating to training in which two areas were highlighted. Firstly training resources earmarked for employee development, including career progression, had to be targeted at Black employees where there was evidence of under representation. Secondly sufficient overall training resources had to be allocated to programmes aimed at training managers and employees in the nature of, and responsibilities arising out of, the race equality programme. The then current early eighties vogue for local authorities to buy in the attitudinal based 'Racism Awareness Training' was rejected by the unit. Again this involved, as will be touched upon in a further section, an attritional discourse clash with a local voluntary group selling RAT type services, primarily to the council, which also had network overlaps with the then leadership of the Labour Group. Instead training which emphasised, in the short and medium term, behavioural changes, was favoured, with the race equality spaces being highlighted as the discursive arenas for possible attitudinal changes. The main reasoning behind this was that individual attitudes are structured by historical and everyday distorting communicative forces which were often beyond the control of employing organisations, except in the matter of expected behaviour from employees. Apart from which, the experience of those employees in the council who had undergone the awareness type training was anything but positive. There were, as well, complementary strategies aimed at changing the outlook of employees towards the equality programmes. For example, key elements of the recruitment and selection process, such as those affecting the job descriptions and person specifications, had an explicit race equality dimension built in so that prospective employees would then be 'tested' through the communicative process of the interview about their knowledge of, and commitment to, equality issues, both in relation to the specific post being applied for, and more generally.

Whilst, then, what I have termed above the 'accountability process', can be seen to be represented in the three action plan components of Departments' anti-racist programmes, there were key communicative moments in this which need to be highlighted. In relation to employment there was a range of 'opening out' actions structuring and influencing managerial episodes in employment, which had not been there before the establishment of the race equality programme. For example in recruitment and selection this started with the action undertaken by the council to ensure its advertised jobs and its then new intentions on race equality were properly communicated to the Black communities both in the borough and wider country, including in the
former circulating on a weekly basis the council’s vacancies to local Black organisations. It moved on to the involvement of Race Advisers in the recruitment and selection process proper itself, bearing in mind the principle of non-closure. Prefacing actions affecting that particular vacancy could have included the scrutiny of the department’s Black employee forum, or might even have been subject to the influence of the other communicative channel of the union based Black Workers’ Group. Finally, because it was an explicit recommendation in the policy report on anti-racist programmes, all summarised action, as represented in the anti-racist action plans, had to, on a six weekly basis, be reported to the Race Relations Committee. This would ensure that the programmes and affiliate action plans would become public documents. The reactions of certain Chief Officers and senior management to the latter was interesting. Bearing in mind that those chief officers were answerable to their own service committees and the uncritical near ubiquity today of ‘performance management’ in local government, together with a multiplicity of targets and actions plans, albeit a managerially technicised form of ‘performance’ evaluation, those members of senior management resented being called to account before a Race Relations Committee. Whilst they had less objections to the plans being put before their own respective service committees, there was a fear, as in ‘racial fear’, expressed, to use their own terminology, that they would be subject to a ‘Star Chamber’ type ‘interrogation’ by the Race Relations Committee.

11.19 Services

The service responsibilities of local government at that time were enormous. An audit undertaken by the unit as part of a race equality service monitoring project revealed over a hundred different types of services and sub-services. These could be categorised under three broad headings: those universally available, like street lighting and refuse collection; those with universal criteria if you knew about them, or they ‘accessed’ you, like child care services; and those which were discretionary, like housing. Running throughout all of these was, however, a discretionary dimension which pertained to the needs of Black people and women. Local government in the UK was, then, a major component of the welfare state, providing a wide tranche of services which had an ideological and material bearing on the capability of large sectors of local people to perform substantively as citizens. To that extent this contextualisation of welfare services, which simply makes explicit the normative potential of the social labour utopia guiding the original post second world war establishment of the welfare state, strengthens as well the moral case surrounding the race equality employment changes. Writing in explicit core considerations of racism and race, and not marginal, as the unit then intended, meant trying to create a programme that systematically de- and reconstructs services with race and women as major considerations. By way of a retrospective framing, the
head of the unit, in a policy document on race and reorganisations, could write a few years later that:

In the absence of any overall policy and/or guidance on re-organisation, individual departments have evolved ad hoc practices in this area. Whilst in many instances "the provision of better services" (my emphasis) has been put forward as the justification for such reorganisations, there has been very little explanation precisely about how this was to be achieved; or more pertinently, within the context of this report, how the Black community would exactly benefit. It is hard not to conclude that reorganisation has become an unwritten charter in many cases for departments to lengthen bureaucratic hierarchies; upgrade existing managers, "empire" build, and entrench further professionalisation in the council. 906

Up to that point, both within the target borough and in other councils, work on race and services had been marginalisingly ad hoc as well as mired in essentialised notions of ethnic group needs. The neighbouring borough's dual Afro-Caribbean and Asian race structures exemplify this. In the target borough an 'etnik' project, brokered by the local CRC, involved establishing a day centre for the Afro-Caribbean elderly. This project, which was jointly run by the CRC and the Social Services Department and staffed by Section 11 funded workers, was also the highlight of that department’s race equality initiatives. However, its geographical, service and political distance from the rest of the Department also meant that its impact on the rest of the department’s services to the elderly, was minimally marginal. Therein lay the limitations to the thinking and action on race and services at that time.

The unit's and race workers' solution, bearing in mind the limited race resources available through the infra-structure and the baying presence at the door of opposing discourses' jackals, was to establish through the anti-racist programme framework, a cross council, systematic minimum baseline for action. Action was built upon and around the establishment of service good practice guides. These, as I have indicated earlier, were the bases for de- and reconstructing services around the axis of explicit race considerations. Two, linked, material and qualitative aims underpinned this conceptualisation; "non discriminatory access to resources", and "anti-discriminatory delivery of services". The guides built upon the observation by the unit that there was "a gap between commitment to non discrimination and the actual achievement of this." They would, therefore, "minimise the chances of discriminatory service delivery", whilst being "encompassing enough to allow for flexibility of individual client circumstances, but explicit enough to disallow or minimise discriminatory action on the part of employees involved in service delivery." The creation of the guides had to involve "the Black community, specialist race equality workers, Black and white field workers, and relevant
management. The guides would form the substantive framework within which to develop a number of related facets: the service monitoring system; proper assessment of the Black community's needs as the lynchpin to wider objective criteria, thereby eschewing a pathological model; fair systems for resource allocation and re-allocation; work related anti-racist training; involvement and participation of those normally only on the receiving end of services in developing and planning such services; widest possible advertising of services. In pursuit of the latter the guides were also to be "public documents" forming "part of the accountability process". The main conceptual thrust behind the recommendations on services from the unit was to begin to wrest away from the council the evolved system of bureaucratic and professionalised fortification of services and open these up to countervailing communicative forces from the people for whom these services were intended. This attempt at a substantive review of services, albeit from a race perspective, prefigured councils' later concerns with developing and providing 'quality' services, which then evolved into the current new right Labour's Best Value legislation and instruments for local government. The anti-racist programmes raised similar issues, but from a substantively different perspective which emphasised democratisation of services, as opposed to 'customer' focussed consumerisation of services, which was, and is, the participant action limit to quality type initiatives. This bifurcation into different routes in the improvement of services is, in my view, another social reality correlate flickeringly illuminating the Habermassian imagery used earlier of choices made at the crossroads.

11.20 Democratisation

Whilst the third area of focus to the race equality programme is termed 'democratisation', that is not the word used at that time in the development of the programme. Yet the intent of the programme's architect, and the intellectual impetus for work done in previous authorities, are derived from, and cover, a democratic impulse built upon the experiential realisation that the achievement of race equality is restricted by the limitations of representative democracy. At that stage a generalised commitment to participatory democracy, which brings into the democratic fold of action the bureaucracy of local government, underpinned the changes envisaged by the race programme in the target borough. This approach was entitled "Black community access to decision making." Whilst one can perceive such sentiments as being part of the late seventies municipal new left in London boroughs, expressed in the various decentralisation schemes that emerged, these, and I include Islington which implemented the most comprehensive neighbourhood decentralisation scheme of all the London boroughs, were never intended to alter substantively the centralist control afforded by representative democracy. In the target borough, which had one of the
weaker decentralisation impulses, work by the Race and Women's Units on a more participatory approach involving Black people and women, was viewed with deep suspicion by segments of the ruling Labour Group, particularly those I have identified as the proto-modernisers. Part of this suspicion was fuelled by the intellectual and political circumscriptions surrounding the attempts at consultation of, and involvement by, the Black community undertaken by the then recognised leading boroughs. In Lambeth the participation was limited to those informing and supporting the Race Advisers, and thus communicating with the organisation through those advisory posts. For example the one covering employment co-ordinated a forum of relevant Black organisations which 'spoke' to the organisation through that post. The exception to these activities was the work undertaken by the principal researcher, whilst working in the Social Services research section, on Black children in care and which resulted in the direct alteration of child care services through a participatory mechanism involving Black community organisations talking and debating face-to-face with Social Service managers. This principle of getting the organisation to talk directly with the Black community and not see the Race Unit and race equality workers as either representatives or ethnic/cultural intermediaries, was carried over into the thinking and action which I have termed 'democratisation'. This was aimed at trying to open up the organisation to the Black community so that they could make their claims directly. At the day to day operational level in Departments, the action required was contained in the key recommendations of the Anti-Racist Programme policy document. This was encapsulated as:

Black community access to decision making: This recognises that the Black community has been denied systematically access to institutional power. Whilst structurally local government at the moment prevents all groups who suffer social discrimination from an effective role in decision making, even where some local authorities have arrived at consultative arrangements, nevertheless there is still much that can be done to ensure that local government and in particular, on a day to day basis, that Departments' decisions take account of the full parameters of The target borough Council's race equality policies. This will devolve upon Departments establishing as part of the Anti-Racist Programme mechanisms to achieve:

♦ Regular consultation with Black community
♦ Effective use of Black-staff forums.

For both areas consultation and the actions that follow have to be substantive within the framework of the race equality policies. That is to say that where Departments decide to disregard advice and/or recommendations from the Black community and/or Black staff forums, this can only be done on the basis that the Department's course of action is more likely to further the stated race equality objectives. The way in which this will be achieved must be clearly spelt out.910
One can see the attempt to build into these, though for obvious reasons not explicitly acknowledged then, the practical arrangements arising from the discursive principle of 'the force of the better argument', and my complementary non-closure principle. The work by the unit on democratisation included and extended beyond the above. For example two of the first participatory actions undertaken by the unit was to organise separate conferences with the then existing Black employees and with the Black community organisations and activists. In both care was taken to ensure that, respectively, senior managers and relevant councillors fronted the meeting. For example the one with employees had all the relevant Chief Officers from the respective departments, present. For many of the Chief Officers, all white and male, this was the first time that had been confronted with, and had to speak to, a hall full of Black people. Their nervousness was palpable. The tone had been set by a four page overview produced by the unit of the race equality intent behind the programme sent out to all Black employees, not all of whom were enamoured with the idea of such a conference. One of the, admittedly few, dissenting voices, via an anonymous note identifying themselves as Black, wanted to know if the unit was trying to "start World War Three", indicative perhaps of the pressure felt by some Black workers from their white colleagues. The extreme expression of that came in the form of anonymous notes to the unit through the organisation's internal mail system threatening death, and other unpleasanteries. Nevertheless what was useful was the communicative space that opened up in that forum allowing for the first time a range of employees, who were normally on the receiving end of decisions made by managers for whom there was only ever a remote name, to question and counter-claim against their perceived wisdom. For example when the Chief Officer responsible for the architectural services lamented the total absence of Black architects in the council because, as he thought, they were not coming through the educational system and/or lacked the experience, he was immediately challenged by Black Afro-Caribbean women working in the manual sectors of Social Services, recognised as the lowest rungs of the bureaucracy in terms of pay, work experience and working conditions. Their response was that many houses in the Caribbean were designed and built by lay persons, so to speak, to a specification that could withstand hurricanes, and thus they could not understand where this notion of 'lack of experience' came from. Not only that, but these counter claims were made in 'voices' and languages excluded from the arid standard language which was the communicative norm of the bureaucracy. It was not so much that this marked the emergence of perspectives which senior managers had not been aware of before, as the fact that these were perspectives which senior managers now had to consider. It can be said that what was termed 'Black community access to decision making', and which I have latterly labelled 'democratisation', spanned over the four year period of the programme a number of initiatives which ranged across the administrative and political
systems in the target borough, including in the former the deconstructing and spatially extending work done by race workers in key managerial processes and procedures. A key example of work in the formal political system is the arrangements developed and put into effect to decide who were to be the co-optees and observers on the Race Relations Committee. At that point in time local councils were permitted to appoint a number of co-optees and observers on to their committees from the local community. Co-optees had the same voting and speaking powers as councillors, whilst observers could participate in the discussions, but not vote. The Race Relations Committee, given its status as an advisory committee could actually appoint more than the other committees of the council. It was recognised as potentially an important element in bringing more Black people into the decision making for a of the council. However, up to that point the system of making co-optee and observer appointments was also one prone to patronage and cronyism in which the formal political affiliations of the potential co-optee appeared to be a decisive factor. In terms of the Race Relations Committee, the position of the co-optees and observers was further complicated by three factors: the colonising dead weight of the CRC's previous involvement in the council's race structures, the differing alliances of Black organisations and their respective constituents, and the fact that the Race relations Committee also had grant making funds and powers. The relevance of the last factor can be demonstrated by the actions of a Black councillor a few years on. He, prior to election, had been a leading official of a local Black voluntary group, a position he continued to hold when elected to the council. Using both positions and his membership of the Race Relations Committee he attempted fraudulently to obtain a grant from the same committee. Money often instrumentalises ethical considerations. Whilst council members of the committee would have gone along with a variation of the old system which would have involved the Chair and Vice Chair taking a decision on who would be co-opted, the unit put forward and developed a range of options which were grounded in some sort of democratic accountability. In the other London boroughs co-optees and observers from the Black communities continued to be organised through informal, unaccountable networks which often gave rise to the claim from critics in the Black communities that they were unrepresentative. Very often these arrangements were put into the hands of the local CRC. In the case of the target borough the unit had already developed an anti-racist framework to what could be described as the local civil society. Arising out of the participation by the target borough in the GLC's anti-racist year programme, a key report by the head of the unit argued that there was a need for a complementary anti-racist approach to be fostered in the local civil society which could be facilitated through a structural mechanism involving key actors and organisations in the sphere of local governance and overlapping and/or inter-locking spheres. The unit thus put forward options for deciding the co-options and observers to the Race Relations
Committee with that recommended context in mind. Most of the options focused on the need for their to be an explicit accountability process underpinning such co-optees. Thus “the process of co-options would need to recognise Black autonomy in determining the co-optees and observers and the accountability of such to the Black community.”

Examples of the types of options put forward were “the Council apports the co-optee and observer places between the two main umbrella groups and asks them to put forward nominated representatives”, or, “a public meeting apports the Co-optee and observer places between the two main umbrella groups and asks them to put forward nominated representatives”, or, “all Black organisations are asked to make nominations for the available places, those people meet and that meeting decides which people are to be chosen”, or, “an annual public meeting to which all Black residents in the Borough are invited. Nominations for co-optees and observers are taken at this and elections held”. In the end the third option was chosen resulting in a packed and densely argued meeting. The importance of this is that it demonstrated that it is possible to move away from the often conflation of rhetorical claims for racial justice by those seeking “leadership” in the Black constituencies, and that of representation of collective Black needs through developing democratic processes which involve a greater degree of participative deliberation than that associated with representative democracy. As I shall argue later, this conflation is often catalysed when those leadership claims of the Black community are directed through the major political parties, especially the Labour Party.

11.21 Extra-organisational Negotiating Role

The final part of the programme’s focus relates to what I have termed the ‘extra organisational negotiating’ role of a local authority. This sought no more than to radicalise and extend the last two elements of the early eighties advice to local authorities from the CRE that “their role in combating racial disadvantage is vitally important... (because they)... provide the bulk of services in our society, are often the major employers in any area, leaders of public opinion and generally the major financers of the voluntary sector.” This area of work aimed to galvanise and focus the rhetorical weight of local government in its claims made for race equality to other organisations which might enter its sphere of influence. At the meta-level this builds upon Habermas’ theorisation of the evolution of the state as the resolver of social integration problems, as does the whole of the race equality programme, and in so doing brings it back into everyday consideration. As it will be seen it illuminates partially the restructuring of local governance institutions necessary to achieve the normative potential released by explicitly taking on board race equality, especially that contained in my arguments about the liminal local state’s role vis-à-vis the national state. The work undertaken by the unit over the four years therefore covered a number of areas in which
the council engaged in formal relations with other external organisations, including the national state. Some of the key areas were those of grant funding, the anti-apartheid initiatives, contract compliance, the position of the council towards the extreme right, and the response of the authority towards the increasingly racist nationality and immigration legislation of the government. To illustrate this a brief overview of two areas of work will be provided. I argued earlier that grant funding by the council had resulted in the evolution of a networked system of allocation closely allied to membership of the Labour Party which had resulted in the bulk of local authority funding going to established white groups. A practice had also grown up whereby local councillors were also members of the management committees of local groups, especially those who were the major recipients of council funding. Some of the Black groups who had, against the odds received a degree of funding, found themselves caught in this double bind of ‘networking’ which usually boiled down to not wanting to bite the hand that fed them. This potential conflict of interest, when pointed out by the unit, especially within the context of the council’s own race equality commitments, was not well received. The unit, working in conjunction with the community affairs unit devised a three strand anti-racist strategy which tied in the small amount of grants the Race Relations Committee controlled, amounting to £100,000 a year, with the major grant funds of the rest of the council, totalling £...Firstly the criteria for Race Relations Committee grants were restructured along anti-racist principles. Secondly these principles were then used as the bases for introducing an explicit equality and anti-racist component to the council’s main grant funding criteria. This amounted to ensuring that those groups funded by the council for capital and employee costs developed and adhered to an explicit equality infra-structure. Thirdly an overall race equality framework to the voluntary sector and grant funding was devised in which Black and women’s groups were made priorities for funding, and which required that all groups are rigorously monitored and evaluated against the new criteria. Fourthly grant funding by the Race Relations Committee, because it could be no more than non-capital, one off project funding, was designated as ‘seed corn’ funding which should be considered as staging priorities later on for main stream funding. By using the rhetorical and leverage power of the council it was possible to open up large voluntary groups which previously had been ‘all white’ to access, and participation by, Black people. This was framed in a set of rights both legally enshrined through the anti-discriminatory legislation and, and through the explicit expectations of the council as the main funder. Backing up the development of what amounts to an anti-racist infra-structure in the voluntary sector were the three new units in the council to which the groups had access. However, achieving this major re-orientation of grant funding and local non-statutory organisations’ working proved far more difficult in the short time space of the race programme because, in a sense, it involved the concrete taking apart of what was
perceived to be and practised as an integral part of the local Labour Party’s legitimation processes. For example, in interviewing the person who was to become head of the Community Affairs Unit, mentioned earlier as one of the new corps of Black appointees which included the Race Unit staff, he was clear that right up to the late nineties, when he eventually had to leave the council after a succession of redundancy threatening re-organisations, no voluntary organisation funded by the target borough which had breached the equality component of the grant criteria had ever had its funding stopped. This apparent failure does not, however, diminish the normative potential that exists for the local state in its negotiating role for race equality with other organisations.

The other example of work in this area which should be mentioned because it ties in with the comparative work on South Africa and because, at the same time, begins both to elucidate the limitations of what the Labour Party is prepared to accept in relation to race and sketch out what appears to be a mirror image, liberal notion of race by the ANC. The level of support for anti-apartheid initiatives by the target council appeared to be greater than that afforded to its own race equality programme. Unlike other London boroughs, this one had established an Anti-Apartheid Working Party comprised of Labour Councillors and relevant officers. It was serviced and advised by the Race Unit. Its aim was to develop a programme of initiatives the council could undertake which would help undermine apartheid in South Africa. Over the four year period the sort of action prepared by the unit and undertaken by the council ranged from dis-investment of council resources in companies, particularly banks, which had interests in South Africa, ensuring that the council did not purchase from companies with such links, staging publicity and cultural events, and developing and launching the council’s own anti-apartheid declaration. What is interesting is that these sorts of race equality initiatives experienced very little opposition or obstruction from either senior management or from councillors. In fact the key councillors concerned expressed and showed through action, like picketing local Shell petrol stations, far more emotional investment in this part of the race equality programme, than they did for those components which were aimed at changing the political institution they sat on. There were a number of reasons for this. Firstly the presentation of the problem by both the ANC and the UK’s Anti-Apartheid Movement was that of a denial of political and social rights for Black people which would enable full participation in South African society. The solution which was read off from this was the creation and development of rights which mirrored those in the UK. It certainly was not about the substantive transformation of society. This certainly established the mind set that the priority for action was South Africa and that the work on race equality in the UK amounted to embellishment. Secondly it confirmed the view, expressed by one of the ex-Leaders of the Labour Group that this, i.e. the status quo, was as far as the
race programme would get. Thirdly it accorded more closely with the ANC's version of race relations which was expressed in terms of 'non-racialism', and which viewed expressions of Black solidarity against racism, such as Black Workers' Groups, as racist. All three approaches contributed to an unspoken liberal political framework underpinning the anti-apartheid initiatives which facilitated the impression that for some a hierarchy of oppression existed with those Black people in South Africa being more deserving. This liberal accord tying in the ANC with the Labour Party on the limits to race equality, began to unravel as soon as initiatives were put forward which were more radical. For example one of the outcomes of the GLC's anti-racist initiatives was the development of local government anti-apartheid declarations, primarily amongst Labour run authorities, which committed those authorities to an anti-apartheid intent. Up to that point the ones so developed had cited the ANC as the only recognised political opponent to the apartheid state. In the target borough the unit developed an anti-apartheid declaration which was more inclusive in its recognition of those opposed to the apartheid state. A range of oppositional organisations were therefore included, including those of the Black Consciousness Movement. This was more in keeping with the range of opinions expressed to the unit by both Black South African exiles in London and by local Black communities. At another level one could argue that it also harmonises more with the participatory principle, the 'involvement of all who are effected'. Whilst the target borough had to accept the declaration, because it was grounded more inclusively, the ANC refused to acknowledge it and boycotted the launch ceremony. With the Labour party, and with the ANC, as I shall argue in the section on South Africa, there is a convergence around a notion of race that is ultimately 'manageable'. These, in terms of their respective trajectories, represent, on the part of Labour, a disavowal of what they perceive to be too radical a version of anti-racism, and, on the part of the ANC, an opposition to racist apartheid through a denegation of 'race'. Both the disavowal and denegation are the symptomatic effects of communicative exclusionary practices on the part of both political parties aimed at seeking an instrumentalised legitimation in the polity; a legitimation that is increasingly simultaneously local, national and global. For the racially inclusive liminal local state, however, legitimation can only be communicatively inclusive, this the flickering aim of the unit's work in the eighties in the area of the local authority's negotiating role.

11.22 Equality Alliances

The fifth element of the race equality programme relates to its relationship to other areas of equalities' work in the target borough. Both the Race and Women's Units were established and came on stream at the same time. Both, were, as well, marginalisingly physically located in the same building away from the Town Hall. From the outset, however, both units
consciously took the decision to work together on issues of relevance, support each other, cross-tabulate mutual appurtenances in any policy or practice processes, and support each other politically. Towards the end of the race programme’s time period, the relationship could be summarised in one of many discursive, deconstructive responses the race unit had to produce to counter the attempts by the Leadership of the Labour group to unilaterally and ‘uni-communicatively’ scrap the Race and Women’s Units in favour of a broad based equalities’ unit. Thus:

It is obvious that a broad based equalities approach either in the form of a committee or unit, would marginalise the achievement of race equality as a council objective Any anti-racist strategy mapped out to do so has to be based on the clear understanding that:

♦ racism cannot be conflated simply with racial discrimination
♦ race inequality is structured continually in this society

Any strategy adopted to fight this has to be done so within the political dynamics of Black people’s struggles. Common goals of equality can only be forged therefore on the basis of political alliances and not through the subsumption and/or reduction of one form of equality into and/or to another

All the Race Advisers and workers recognise that it will be necessary at times to work co-ordinately on broad equality issues. This is done at the moment on the two resourced areas, i.e. race and women’s equality. However this work is done on the clear understanding that:

♦ race and women’s equality require differing strategies
♦ co-ordinated areas are therefore mapped out distinct from the main race equality strategy

Using the Race Unit’s anti-racist programme framework, the Women’s Unit and advisers developed parallel and complementary women’s equality programmes and action plans for each directorate. The differing, but supportive strategies could be seen particularly in the area of employment where, for example, the emphasis of the women’s programme was not so much on recruitment and selection, because half of the council’s workforce was female, but on career and retention issues. Interventions in the areas, therefore, like a safe working environment, key to retention of women employees, dissolved the traditional technically focussed boundaries of health and safety at work to include the socio-political dimension of sexual harassment, as well as racial harassment. Out of this was derived a specific sexual and racial harassment complaints procedure which, on the bases primarily of the women’s advisers, argued the genuineness of all complainants. The implementation of this was delayed by the position of the council’s legal department who were more concerned with the rights of employees complained against, especially white males. Both sets of
advisers ensured that spaces were opened up within and without the organisation to communicatively pursue the achievement of that procedure, including, as can be seen from the above quote, a forthright exchange of views with council members. However, the curve of the Women's Unit and its staff, through the period of its existence in the council – the same time period as the race Unit – stands as exemplifying the racial fear propelling much of the negative feelings towards the race programme from certain councillors. At the Women's Unit inception, it comprised three members of staff, two joint heads, who were white, and one Black administrator. One of the two joint heads also happened to be an active member of the Labour party in another inner London borough, as well as a co-opted member of one of that borough's committees. Criticism of that unit from members was muted. Three years later, with money from the GLC's demise, the unit was in a position to expand. The two original heads of unit decided to pursue alternative careers in various policy roles elsewhere in the council. Seven new staff were recruited, three of whom were Black including a Black head of unit. Thereafter criticism from senior managers and members increased dramatically. In another rebuttal of councillors attempts to form a broad based equality unit, the head of the race unit wrote to the Leader of the council that, "it is strange now that the Council has a Black head of the Women's Equality Unit, that suddenly members are complaining about 'beastly' advisers....(something which)...never occurred when there was a white head of the WEU." It can be argued that in relation to race and women's equality common interests coagulated around the experiences of Black women. The divergence between the two broad areas of inequality and equality actions, when it did occur, came about because the communicative space closing, time compressing, vector of 'racial fear', ensured that a mono-chromatic women's equality programme, much as that would be wished for by some councillors, senior managers, and the then crystallising new right Labour, paradoxically could never happen. Ultimately it was not the advisers, both women's and race, who separated as the fact that a conflationary, convergence focused discourse was enacted by councillors and senior managers with the express aim of both closing the communicative spaces developed by the two separate units and constituencies in favour of a broad based, equal variable, interchangeable interpretation of differing equality struggles. At the end, with the eventual demise of the Race and Women's Units in 1989, all of the staff in the two units had to leave the council, by one means or the other. The white, Labour Party activist ex-head of the Women's Unit, then in the Central Policy Unit, became firstly, Head of the new Equality Unit, then, in an organisational sleight of hand, Assistant Chief Executive. In other boroughs, particularly in London, with the visible scaling down of race equality that mirrored what had happened in the target borough, most of the race advisers concerned had to leave the relevant councils. For example, when looking at the four London boroughs adjacent to each other which
established race infra-structures at about the same time, including the target borough, only one out of all the race equality staff spanning the four boroughs still works for a local authority. However, many of the white women’s equality advisers went on to other equivalent jobs, pay and status wise, in the council, including four who became chief executives of local councils. The Black ex-head of the women’s unit in the target borough, after a succession of lower paid jobs in the voluntary sector, a deliberate choice because her experience in local government had made her abjure any future employment in that sector, at last contact, taught English as a foreign language in Cuba.

11.23 Evaluation

Given the brief architectonic of race equality in a particular local governance context provided above, the question is how one is supposed to evaluate it. The race equality and women’s equality programmes did not experience a natural organisational death. They were, after all, and that experience was mirrored in a few other local authorities, wrenched from that organisation. There was a period of accelerating discord between equality advisers and senior councillors towards the end culminating in a ‘blood-and-snot-on-the-walls’ aftermath of a serious discourse clash which concluded with the closure of the two units. In the previous chapter I had argued for using a four element construct of validity: triangulation at a meta-theoretical level, construct, ‘face’ and emancipatory validity. This would be very much in line with the sort of evaluation demanded by the overall aims of the equality discourse evolved, developed and actioned by the advisers and concomitant constituencies. On the other hand, as the development of the race equality programme gained momentum, senior councillors, those mainly whom I have identified as the proto-modernisers, became increasingly vociferous about the need to ‘managerially control’ the race equality advisers, in particular. This use of the discourse medium of control and domination gave rise as well to a repeated call over the four years for there to be a review of equality work and infra-structures in the organisation. This call for an evaluation and assessment was never made in public, or posed openly to the equality staff, or, more importantly, to the relevant constituencies of Black people and women both within and outside the council. Rather it was posed in the communicatively exclusionary meetings of the local Labour Group on the council and actioned via senior managers. Evaluation, under these circumstances, was never posed so nakedly as simply that of reining in the ‘pesky’ equality staff. Instead it was ‘facaded’ as the desire to expand the scope of equality priorities to include age, disability, gay men and lesbians etc., not, however, on the bases of more resources, but on the redistribution of the already low level of then existing equality resources. The nature of the evaluation both, in the way decisions about an evaluation omitted those directly involved, and in the linked criteria for assessing
"success" or "failure," was markedly different to that which the equality staff would have used. These attempts by councillors to initiate a review is what I have termed in the previous chapter as an 'instrumentalised evaluation'.

On the equality workers part such calls by councillors for 'reviews' were met robustly with counter claims of lack of political will and lack of respect and recognition. We can treat these calls and counter claims as the visible and vocal symptoms of a discourse clash about equalities and the place, or not, of Black people and women in local governance. At another level it is as well about my conceptualisation of race equality in that period of local governance as being akin to periods of de-colonisation and re-colonisation; about, thus, 'hue'-manising Habermas' thesis on lifeworld colonisation. Its contours mark out the atritional borderlines between social and systemic integrations and the relationship between the two, oscillating over the four year period between glimpses of de-colonisation and the re-imposition of colonisation. The nature of this pursuit of two differing ideas of local governance, one emancipatorily inclusive of race, the other dominatingly managing race, will be the subject of the next section which will trace the 'discourse wars' surrounding equality in that specific local authority, bringing in more closely the theoretical constructs. We can prefatorily contextualise this by citing what was to be the equality advisers last piece of written evaluation work for the Labour politicians of the council, a critical commentary on the real reasons for disbanding the two units, and also by reference to some of the key facts about the race equality infra-structure and outputs over that four year period.

Thus:

..... the draft report, written by the Assistant Chief Executive, that we have been asked to comment on is not the result of a professionally constructed review process, but seemingly the subjective opinion of one officer. The previous Labour Group report on the subject (5.12.88), written by the then Chief Executive, was also a subjective opinion, with no attempt made to research or consult on the contents. Indeed, attempts were made to keep those contents secret from us and other interested parties. We view these actions as appalling practice and in direct conflict with the stated core values of this Authority..... Paragraph 4.1. of the draft report introduces the issue of the Council's commitment to other "disadvantaged Groups", as well as to black people and women. It goes on to cost an additional resource to cover lesbians and gays, pensioners and disabled people (one officer each - again no justification for this minimal number of posts) to be £82,000. However, it is clearly not a serious option or proposal for committee to consider, as we are told that, this "is not. a practical proposition in the current financial climate". In other words, the needs of pensioners, the disabled and lesbians and gays do not warrant the expenditure of £82,000 to finance a central resource in a climate of financial cuts. The financing of such a resource unit, must come from the deletion of women's and race adviser posts. **Why is this proposal presented as though it were the only option? What**
are the other options for consideration by committee?  How is it that £200,000 was 'miraculously' found to finance expansion in the Environmental Services Direct Labour Organisation in December, even though the Director of Finance informed Policy and Resources Committee that there was no provision for such expenditure, but not for meeting the needs of pensioners, lesbian and gay men and the disabled, without wiping out the posts and positive work of the Council's women's and race advisers. However, money was found from the "contingency provision" (for Environmental services). Could not the Council, if it had so wished, dipped into this "contingency" fund to finance central provision for pensioners, the disabled, lesbians and gay men without having to abolish the Women's and Race Equality Units and the Advisers in Personnel?......In our view, the report is seriously flawed in that it does not deal with the real issues of the best possible way for ... (target borough X) ... to go about implementing equal opportunities policies in a climate of financial and political restrictions. It merely concocts a new structure, with no analysis of the successes and failures of the current structure and no reference to the real reasons (political, as opposed to financial) for this idiosyncratic proposal. Further, there has been no attempt to consult with staff who currently work on race and women's equality issues. We have been presented with a fait accompli. Indeed, the original report that went to the Labour Group of 5th December 1988 was kept secret from us by the Leadership and the then Chief Executive. This is no way to treat staff or the issues. We have no confidence that the proposed new structure will work, for all the reasons stated above. Structures do not have a life of their own; they are dependant on people, resources and commitment. We believe that the political commitment to the real issues faced by women, black people, pensioners, the disabled (and their carers), lesbians and gay men is seriously lacking in The target borough - and that is the issue. We also believe, that because we have had the courage and integrity to confront this issue, whilst being faithful to our job descriptions, some of us are being abolished and others marginalised, and a new structure, virtually set up to fail, has been concocted (without research or analysis) by officers who know little about the issues and dynamics of equal opportunity work.  

Key facts about the race equality programme and structure therefore gain a greater pertinency because it back clothes the disagreements between the equality workers and the politicians, especially over the respective evaluations of the programmes; the very same political group who were the main decision makers originally in the appointments of those staff employed to develop the manifesto commitments on race and women's equality. These facts then are not simply the social construct of those who experienced the waxing and waning of the race priorities in that borough. They, paradoxically, emerged as a direct result of the many attempts by certain councillors to review the equality structures. Comparisons with other local authorities had to be made, structures costed etc. In this process, even though the equality workers were very often excluded, i.e. they 'were done to', they themselves had to put together information packages for those councillors supportive of and sympathetic to the causes of race and women's
equality. In one sense the very starkness of some of the facts, in a comparative context, speak for themselves, whilst at another level they confirm in a real, everyday concrete sense, the progress made; progress which can be said to be towards emancipation.

All of the race equality posts in the council were established between 1981 and 1984. Thereafter attempts by the Race Unit and Race Relations Committee to expand the complement were thrown out by politicians. The Race Unit comprised three substantive posts during the course of its existence, and one 'borrowed' post for a period of two years. The rest of the race equality posts numbered fourteen. All of these posts were Section 11 funded, meaning that the council only had to find 25% of their costs. Out of all the inner London Labour boroughs, and some of the outer, the target borough was the lowest resourced in race equality terms. Between 1984 and 1989 the number of employees in the council ranged between 9,000 to 7,000. The total budget of the council in 1988 was £214,000,000. The total cost of the race equality infra-structure was £225,000. As shall be shown in the next section, these figures were to be a useful weapon in the fight against the proto-Blairite modernisers who attempted to construct an argument around the 'major cost' of equality structures.

In terms of work output the race advisers, and to a lesser extent, the race equality workers in specific service areas, spanned a range of responsibilities and tasks ranging from the highest level policy work in the council to critical interventions in key everyday operational procedures and practices, not to mention the training aspect of the role or the community development element that was required. Whilst in the target borough the unit and advisers attempted to develop a case for the recognition of those types of responsibilities within the race equality context arguing that these were pathfinder portents of revising roles for local government workers, this was not forthcoming from the organisation. Instead race advisers and workers were continually constrained by the deliberate orthodox organisational assessment interpretation placed on their work. For example the value of jobs in the council was at that stage determined by a nationally agreed job evaluation scheme which did allow some room for local flexibility; a flexibility the organisation felt more comfortable exercising over the issue of women's responsibilities in local government. Thus there were steps taken to review and revise the scheme to take on board traditional areas of women's work in local government, such as social care, and to try and recognise this more appropriately. The issue of race, however, was divisively ignored. Nevertheless work undertaken by the then Local Government Training Board specifically on Race Equality Advisers, later to become the Local Government Management Board, an organisation funded by local governments with the remit for catalysing the improvement of the human resource aspect of local government, derived a list of over fifty key
employment attributes thought necessary for the job to be carried out properly. This was reflected in the extremely heavy workload equality workers in the target borough developed or had foisted on them. For example, the unit had to service two committees of the council ensuring that the four meetings held in every municipal year had a full and proper agenda, often made up of reports on policy or evaluation topics they themselves had to initiate. This is to be contrasted with the other service and major committees of the council which had the full resources of their respective departments at their disposal; a resource numbering anything from a few hundred employees to over a thousand. Added to the work dimension of the equality advisers was the political dimension that not only was this the first time local government had tried to introduce a programme of social justice to change its own internal workings and external relations, but being the first these programmes and associated staff had to battle against a hundred plus years of evolved local governance orthodoxy. Thus over the four years each Race Relations Committee had at least one major, substantive policy or evaluatory report on its agenda with council wide implications. In addition underpinning this were the everyday interventions, critically targeted, in operational procedures, such as recruitment and selection, disciplinary and grievance procedures, or investigations into service transgressions with a race dimension. The one fed the other, and vice versa. If one bears in mind the matrix constructed from the cross tabulation of the major levels to the race equality programme with the key elements, then each box contained a potential admixture of work ranging from policy development and advice on implementation to critical interventions in procedures and practices. In turn each of these were made up of differentiated levels of tasks which might include advising a Black member of the community on a related complaint to arguing face-to-face with councillors about the related policy implications or action the organisation should take.

Despite, then, the minuscule resources dedicated to catalysing the pursuit of race equality, the target borough had, within two years, developed a comprehensive race equality infra-structure which, in the potential it had even if the actual implementation over the council was patchy, could provide the framework for jump starting the idealised racially inclusive form of local governance outlined earlier. In fact the infra-structure was acknowledgedly copied by two other authorities, one an inner London borough which in the mid eighties had created an actual ethnic minorities directorate, the other a northern metropolitan authority. Interestingly, and related to the comparative dimension, it was cited in a United Nations study, undertaken by a prominent South African exile, as an example that could be copied in South Africa should, at that stage, changes occur in that country.
In terms of actual output which can be directly attributable to the race programmes, the visible increase in the numbers of Black people involved in the council can be seen from the figures relating to both employment and services over that period. As the diagram below shows, the overall level of Black employees in the council increased from 12% in 1984 to 20% in 1988. As a direct result of the antiracist programmes explicit service developments and interventions on the part of the different departments increased from two to twenty. Not included in the latter is the unit initiated development of a comprehensive service race monitoring system. Allied to this were, during the period of the race programme, a number of formal consultative, and/or participatory initiatives undertaken by the different departments with sectors of the Black communities. In fact across all the levels of work identified, local, regional, national and international, it can be said that for the four years of the programme, race, in the sense of the positive racialisation of communicative intercourse understood as the opening up of spaces for making and resolving claims of racial justice either there and now, or as normative markers for future action, featured explicitly. For example race equality was a standing item on most management team meetings, especially those of senior management either by conscious ‘pro-active’ decision, or through the presence by right of the relevant race equality adviser. Citing the ‘numbers’ of the race equality programme serves the purpose of demonstrating that something in the organisation was going on; an activity to do with change. It is far more than Lansley’s – ex Chair of Lambeth’s Community Affairs Committee, and thus political tutelar of that council’s race programmes in the early nineteen eighties – retrospective, apostate, dismissive swipe of race equality initiatives in local government as resulting in only slightly more than the revamping of the recruitment and selection processes. However much certain of the councillors in the target borough would have liked to have been able to make claims of ‘under performing’ against the equality advisers, the actual evidence of work via committees and through their involvement in operational procedures, not to mention the recognition afforded by other local authorities, meant that that particular avenue of criticism could not be made.

But perhaps the evaluation of the race equality programme should examine other forms of indicators which might attest to the scale of change in the organisation evidenced through the irritant value of that programme and structures. The ‘perverse’ indicators are implicit in the operational principles informing the equality workers’ activities in the organisation, such as, for example, those of maintaining utmost honesty and transparency on matters of race, or going about the everyday work with the metaphorical P45 in the back pocket. They can be seen in totality in relation to the major influence on the council, disproportionate to its size and level of resources, the unit and complementary race equality structure had, and, in the constituent components revealed, for example, by the high level of
disagreements with councillors over the way in which certain decisions, and the substance of those decisions, were taken. Compared with the neighbouring two boroughs where access to the ruling Labour group by the equality advisers of councillors was more restricted and more governed by the unwritten status protocol of “me-councillor-you-officer”, the level of open disagreements in the target borough was higher. It marked, as well, the fractious cross over points of two differing discourses about race equality, the one, in the case of the councillors in the target borough, but also evident in the muddled thinking of some race units and programmes, tied to a management of race through a modified race relations model emerging as a sub-creation of two incorporatist discourses, viz. labourism and neo-managerialism, and the other to an emancipatory programme focussed on racial justice. In a union newsletter devoted post 1989 to the demise of the race and women’s units, the then former head of the Race Unit could comment that councillors “were too immersed in the process of defining Race workers as the council’s ‘niggers in the woodpile’. ... (and)... that if the Race Unit had indulged in race relations type activities, i.e. irrelevant public events with ‘ethnic’ food, a steel band in the corner and a public platform for senior figures after a few rum punches, to demonstrate their acceptance of Black folk and their ‘ways’, we would probably still be in business because that poses no threat to the status quo in the council....(instead because)... we chose deliberately to concentrate on ‘bread and butter’ issues – employment, services, the access Black people have to decision making, the treatment of Black employees in the council, the way in which resources are allocated etc. – meant that we would always be at the heart of decision making.”

11.25 Border Wars: Razzias, Raids, Refutations and Transformations

The outline of the race equality programme provided in the previous section served the purpose of providing a ‘quick-reference’ back drop against which the contours of the shifting terrain of the ‘discourse contestation’ shaping the race equality programme can be detailed. The development and establishment of the race programme was not, as could be possibly interpreted from the back drop outline, a painless process. It rose and, not so much fell, as was torn down, the result of a disputation between groups of actors pursued and influenced by differing discourses within the overall sphere of local governance, and within the specific milieu of the target borough. This bears on Dryzek’s observation, made earlier in this chapter, that difference democracy is the contestation of discourses, but also Fairclough’s idea about colonisation, the structuring of institutional orders of discourse and de-structuring. In saying that I am re-emphasising the claim that the period of the race equality programme, and its preceding period, was the beginning of a form of difference democracy which, contrary to Habermas’ fluctuating position towards radical change of the administrative
and political systems, but now apparently hardened towards a de facto acceptance of those as only being amenable to small scale reform because of the complexity of modern society, transformed those categorical boundaries and the contents therein that were so surrounded. McCarthy then is right in his criticism of Habermas’ capitulation to the almost impossibility of systems being transformed by communicative reason, pointing out that organisations are subject internally towards all sorts of communicative pressures. I prefer Alvesson’s conceptualisation of organisations, or for that matter any other forms of systemic manifestation, as communicative structures. This accords with my own views that such structures represent a mixture of ossified and active communicative spaces in which the latter can act as a catalyst for ‘re-booting’ the former into life. By the same token then the boundary line between the administrative system and the political system can become blurred and even dissolve. It is this form of transformation which the discourse of race equality in the target borough sought, whilst on the other hand, the discourse/diskourse of managerialism, associated with the perspective of senior managers, and the discourse/diskourse of Labourism, associated with those I have termed the proto-modernisers, sought to accentuate and harden that boundary line as one of the principal means of depoliticising and neutralising the race programme. I shall expand later on the content of the latter two discourses. Above all it is worth re-iterating that I view discourses not primarily as objective or all pervasive forces the presence of which can only be involuntarily experienced, the mugging from behind syndrome; but as being initiated, acted upon, developed, and used by people within particular contexts. The following section then, in using the outline of the race equality programme as the referenced backdrop, will argue that the race equality discourse developed in the target borough, premised as it was on a radical democratisation solution to substantive racial inclusion within the sphere of local governance, clashed with the emerging discourses of managerialism and the transformation, a facadic transformation, of Labourism into new right labour modernisation. Both the latter were agreed on one crucial point, which was that good local governance was to be equated reductively with a narrow management accounting notion of effective and efficient use of local resources. In this process the administrative system had to be redefined strongly as a politically neutral environment, neutral not so much in the party political sense, but in the more substantive sense that the only permissible ideology was that of managerialism. Further the only political action arena was to be that inhabited by the key actors, in this case the councillors. In so doing political legitimation could be more strictly controlled and its contents once again limited to a modernising re-invention of the fifties vision of local government as simply that of providing services. It was, as children are wont to describe the colouration of the past pre-dating their birth and experience, a return to the “black and white” years. I shall argue, as well, that this, in a sense ‘post-modernisation’ of new right Labour’s
modernisation of local government is substantively based on the imaginary puissance of ‘racial fear’ showing how the de-emancipation of the race programme was substantively tied to the drive to recast political legitimation in a way that appeared to accord with the more baser instincts of the white electorate. It was, in Dryzek’s terms, a replacement of an enabling discourse with a disabling discourse; or, as I have neologised, replacing ‘discourse’ with ‘diskourse’. This would tie in then with my recasting of the argument in terms of de- and re-colonisation, with the obvious preface to both being simply the state of colonisation.

In framing the overall argument in broad Habermassian terms of communicative power, bearing in mind that Habermas was brought into the target borough, so to speak, even if reconstructed to take account of race, and the implication therein of the emancipatory power of the rationality so released, there is the potential for the accusation of naïve idealism in the face of the reality of power within the structures of local governance. For example, Flyvbjerg, in a critical evaluation of a Danish local government framed urban regeneration project, concludes that the asymmetrical relationship between power and rationality means that the latter will always be subordinated to the former. At another level Flyvbjerg is also evaluating the relative practical relevancy of Foucault and Habermas in everyday local government politics in Denmark. The project, in his terms, was “comprehensive, coherent and innovative, and it was based on rational, democratic argument.” His conclusion, which leans more towards Foucault, also repeats the Foucauldian erroneous conflation of power with domination. Thus:

“In sum while power produces rationality and rationality produces power, their relationship is asymmetrical. Power has a clear tendency to dominate rationality in the dynamic and overlapping relationship between the two. Paraphrasing Pascal, one could say that power has a rationality that rationality does not know. Rationality, on the other hand, does not have a power that power does not know.”

In advancing an emancipatory, transformative notion of power, power is not simply that of domination, but the expression, as Stewart puts forward, of “concerted action.” Using Fraser he asks the same questions, ones that are germane to the cardinal issue in this project of race equality: “Why is struggle preferable to submission? Why ought domination be resisted? Only with the introduction of normative notions of some kind could Foucault begin to answer such questions.” But, as Stewart points out power can only be discussed if the issue of ‘interest’ is properly addressed. In emancipatory struggles as Stewart, using Benton, observes, there is the question “of the relationship between evaluative judgements and normative judgements: that is, between competing conceptions of the good society, on the one hand, and judgements about justice and its implementation, on the
The strength of communicative power in resolving this tension lies in "the agent's claim to rationality in disputes about proposed collective arrangements and how that claim makes him/her intersubjectively responsible to others"...(conditions which)...require that in generating the power of concerted action, agents cultivate their capacity to think reflexively about their interests and the underlying values and needs from which such interests derive."934 Whilst the main weakness of Habermas' theory, particularly his conceptualisation of transformative politics, which is the answer he tries to provide to the question "of the relationship between intersubjective, concerted power and domination", leads me to prefer a reconstructed variant of the recognition model, based on the resolution of race as the unfulfilled condition of modernity, it is the latter point in the preceding sentence which is of importance now to the unfurling of the discourse contestation. In practice, and this is true of the marshalling of race equality solidaristic resources in the target borough, Flyvbjerg, despite his Foucauldian tendencies, notes that "democratic progress is chiefly achieved not by constitutional and institutional reform alone but by facing the mechanisms of power and the practices of class and privilege more directly, often head on: if you want to participate in politics but find the possibilities for doing so constricting, then you team up with like minded people and you fight for what you want, utilising that work in your context to undermine those who try to limit participation."935 Linking thus White's Habermassian level conditions with Flyvbjerg's 'real-politiking' rules provides us with a framework within which to start looking at the array and inter-action of discourses in the target borough; particularly how those conditions are met by the race equality discourse and how Flyvbjerg's 'rules' appear to describe the action context to its incursions and forays against dominating discourses and their, in turn, counter-offensives and razzias. As Fairclough aptly summarises the eighties and early nineties, "the increasing salience of discourse in social transformations is being matched...by a concern to control discourse: to bring about changes in discourse practices as part of the engineering of social and cultural change.....a 'technologization of discourse'936. This instrumentalisation of communicative practices, which the latter part refers to, is more than just the unconscious distortion of communication. Rather it is, over and above that, the deliberate adaptation and use of second hand, out of date, knowledge technologies in contexts, in this case local governance, substantively different to those for which they originally developed, i.e. the private sector. One can begin to see the simulation and hear the echoes of the dominating processes of colonisation in this.

So far, in outlining the race equality programme in the target borough, we have sought to place its discourse under, but not necessarily conflating with, the broad rubric meta- and meso-level umbrellas of 'emancipatory' and 'de-colonisation', seeking to encapsulate its intent by referring to the opening up
of communicative spaces for Black people in that particular sphere of local governance. The question now is whether or not there is an adequate summary of this discourse. To that end, attached as an appendix, is a response to one of the Councillors’ razzia style forays into trying to ‘review’ the equality structures, written in 1987 by the principal researcher. The vast majority of it is till germane because it includes an overview of the aims of the race programme, how it should be pursued, its reception in that particular borough, the attitude and role of the polity, and, more over, the race equality discourse’s distinctiveness and emancipatory advantages over those second hand, controlling ones then being introduced by the political Leadership. It is marked by an open and frank style of language and argumentation, together with a clearly stated intention of “not adhering to the normal local authority protocol practice that operates between officers and members; a protocol which in the context of race equality has often been used to define out of debate questions about racism and majority group decisions.”

It was, in effect, a ‘discipline me and be damned’ response as well. At another level it captures also the unequivocal, transparent, and honest way in which the advisers attempted to communicate with both councillors and members on the issue of race equality. Its introduction at this point is as a quick reference device which does away with the need to regurgitate large quotation ‘chunks’. The report was circulated to all members, particularly the Leadership; and re-issued a year later when a new Leadership was elected. There was no response from any of the members.

This discourse of race equality was not simply the creation of one unit, but, as I shall argue, was the outcome of a nascent Black public sphere, or counter public, not just surrounding, but also prising open the communicative spaces of local governance in the eighties. In a book on the Black public sphere in the United States, where ‘Black’ is used to refer solely to the African American people, - a biological reduction which does not detract from the saliency of their points —the Black Public Sphere Collective define such a phenomenon, in a critical adaptation of Habermas’ original concept, as, “a trans-national space whose violent birth and diasporic conditions of life provide a counter narrative to the exclusionary national narratives of Europe, the United States, the Caribbean and Africa....(and)...is one critical space where new democratic forms and emergent diasporic movements can enrich and question one another....as a critical social imaginary...(drawing)...energy from the vernacular practices of street talk and new musics, radio shows and church voices, entrepreneurship and circulation, ...(all with the task of marking)...a wider sphere of critical practice and visionary politics in which intellectuals can join with the energies of the street, the school, the church and the city to constitute a challenge to the exclusionary violence of much public sphere in the United States.” With certain refinements and modifications to reflect the British race context within the specific milieu of local governance,
the above definition can serve as a framework to my claims about the public sphere from whence the race equality discourse emerged. Further I have argued, and this is supported by Stewart, that the public sphere cannot solely be a place/space for inter-subjective communication. Habermas’ “conservative position as far as the democratisation of democracy is concerned,”, and as reflected in his contention about the limits of action in the public sphere must be extended to involve, as well, “an active model of citizenship...tied to contexts not only of communication, but also of decision making.”

What is required now is a brief corralling of the relevant information from the section on the race programme in order to flesh out how the communicative power of this particular discourse of race equality was based on agents being able to “cultivate their capacity to think reflexively about their interests and the underlying values and needs from which such interests derive.” Further, as well, how this in real time experience included “facing the mechanisms of power and the practices of class and privilege...headed on ......(teaming)... up with like minded people and ......(fighting) for what....(was wanted)...., utilising that work in .... context to undermine those who try to limit participation.” Thus in the early eighties if Habermas was brought into the borough, he was brought in distilled via the experiences of the principal researcher; experiences which up to that point included being involved in the initiation and development of Black workers’ groups in different branches of a particular trade union, as well as in the creation of a national inter-union Black workers organisation. The other dimension of the work experience was that of being an employee in local government, mainly in the race equality field. During that time period of the mid seventies to early eighties it can be argued that there was a nascent Black counter public which, given the location of Black people, was largely urban. It comprised, in a shadowing of the description above of the Black public sphere in the United States, intellectuals, academic/activist organisations, like the Institute of Race Relations, the emerging Black media, academic media, Black community groups, including Black women’s groups, Black worker organisations. Arising out of this, and therefore drawn into it, was the increasing numbers of local authorities setting up internal race structures. By the early eighties, then there was already the beginnings of associative practices and groupings of race equality workers in local government. Within the London region this was given greater impetus by the co-ordinating role played by the GLC. Whatever criticism there might be about the details of the GLC’s race equality programme’s, notably its unfortunate promotion and use of the term ‘ethnic minorities’, the overall effect, within its short time of existence, was to provide a communicative space for Black people at the London level across a range of dimensions impacting directly on Black life worlds. The writer Meer Syal’s remembrance of this period as, in a counter point to those who
critiqued initiatives like these on the bases of ‘PC’ censorship, being grateful for the space it provided for her to be able to express herself, sums it up. To talk about the Black counter public like this is also to talk about its rhetorical force because of the explicit and implicit moral claims emerging from it, and also because the resolution of these claims in some areas like local governance, crossed over, without obstruction, into contexts “of decision making.” In the target borough itself, whereas up to the early eighties the Black public sphere’s ‘force of argument’ was channelled and censored through the gate-keeper that was the Working Party on Race Relations, thereafter the institution was opened up to the panoply of influences, as well as developing within the organisation localised communicative spaces. The use of the term ‘Black public sphere’ is a necessary catch-all to describe what was in reality a number of counter public spheres, all of them arising in and around the area of ‘race’. There were differences and divergences over both the defining of the problem and the proffered solutions. For example, as has been shown earlier, some local authority race programmes, including the GLC’s, became mired in various shades of an ethnically defined problem and solution. Even amongst the burgeoning race equality worker associations there were differences. One of them, the London Wide Race Workers Forum defined themselves clearly in opposition to the perceived elitism of another association as well as to the elision of borders between that association and the Labour Party.

Within the reality of the local civil society in and around the target borough, the internal race equality structures were viewed with suspicion by some in the Black community. The local CRC’s intrigues were par for the course, given their previous involvement. However, amongst the ‘radical’ wing of the Black organisations and activists, there was the professed dubiety in what was regarded as the bureaucratisation of race equality, together with, or running alongside the belief that the race workers should be directly accountable to them. But these differences were never of the sort that could be described as fracturing the Black public sphere. As one race worker succinctly put it in a letter to her manager in the aftermath of the destruction of the Race and Women’s Units, “...I did not always agree with the strategies employed by other staff in seeking to further race equality internally and externally.....but such disagreements never reached crisis proportions...because in the broad sweep of things there were no conflicts of interests...”

One of the key architectonics holding up that commonality of interests in the target borough was the use, and insistence of that as the main frame of reference usage, of the term ‘Black’. This was a contingent, inclusive defining of the problem as that of being racism and in the conjoining of experiences, an implicit invitation to jointly working out the solutions. Part
of the impetus for refining and maintaining an open ended 'Black', recognised then as having derived from the experiences of racism in the seventies UK, were the experiences of the principal researcher in helping to create and develop Black Worker groups in trade unions. One of them, established on a pan union basis, the Black Trades Unionists Solidarity Movement, was split asunder because a Turkish worker, who defined herself as 'Black', was refused entry to their national conference by some who held on to the belief that 'Black' could only ever be 'black', that is biologically reduced to anthropometric features. In that borough, however, 'Black' served as a catalyst for bringing together and focussing differing voices which otherwise might have been speaking at odds with each other. For example the NALGO based Black Workers Group was extremely successful in providing the communicative space for Black employees from a range of backgrounds and across a span of the hierarchy. This space was maintained by the inclusive nature of its criteria for membership, i.e. it was open to all employees who defined themselves as 'Black' on the bases of their experiences of racism; by its internal discursive rules, i.e. no sexism or 'ethnicism' was allowed; and by its minimising of the power of hierarchy to stifle debate and participation, i.e. there was no hierarchy, apart from a co-ordinator, and all representatives on the branch executive were accountable to the meetings of the Group and subject to immediate recall and replacement, or rotation. The importance of what I would describe as maintaining the conditions for maximum discursive power, which the use of 'Black' in its contingent mode helps allow, can be emphasised by briefly examining the fate of Lambeth's Black worker group. Having been established on similar lines to the target borough's in the early eighties and with the original participants having moved on by the mid eighties, certain members decided that it would be best to erect a hierarchy in the group which mirrored that of the wider union branch. A number of formal positions, such as 'secretary' and 'chair' were created, as well as a mini executive. The reasoning behind this was so that the 'business' of the group could be more efficiently dealt with. What it in fact created was a concentration of executive power and diminution of discursive power allowing for individual post holders to pursue, without mandate, closer compromising alliances and decisions with the branch leadership. The changes were also premised, though this only emerged later, on the notion that the group needed 'leaders'. By the late eighties and early nineties a situation was reached within the group in which there were factions vying for control of the leadership machinery, some of these being constituted on distinctive 'etnikfied' grounds. By the early nineties, then, the Group, exemplified by its new logo which sported an Afro-centric outline, transmogrified itself into one that accepted 'black' only in strictly biological terms. In other words the Group had effectively 'golliwogged' itself. By the mid nineties, in the face of major restructuring and redundancies in the
council the Group debased itself further by publicly accusing the council of favouring, as they put it, “Asian people” over ‘black’ people. 944

11.26 The Griot

If, as I argue Habermas was brought into the target borough distilled through race, part of this distillation process included Fanon, an author read by the principal researcher long before Marx. Certainly in excavating the intellectual lineage of the pursuit of ‘leaderless’ struggles, one consciously adopted in establishing the two Groups, Fanon’s excoriation of the ‘leader’ syndrome in anti-colonial struggles formed a substantive part of the thinking. This ‘internalisation’ of the colonising system gives rise to unaccountable leaders. For Fanon, leaders can only be legitimate if they arise from and are accountable to the ‘assembly’ of people. Returning, however, to the issue of the public sphere, in the last part of the eighties there was, within the main public sector union, NALGO, a well developed Black Workers’ Group movement, with regional and national structures, as well as communicative channels. The substantive part of these was based on the use of an open, contingent ‘Black’, whilst the structures were far more inclined towards a participative, rather than representative, involvement milieu. Within the overlapping contexts of the public sector unions and the Labour Party generally, and as it was reproduced in the target borough, the outcomes of this discursive space for Black people ran the gamut from that of being able to influence decisions to being involved in decisions, where that involvement entailed raising questions and claims of racial justice and having them validated within the communicative assemblies of the union.

We can inscribe a similar pattern of overlapping contexts and communicative fora for the development of the race equality structures in the target borough. Earlier I had described the scope, content and nature of these structures. These were based on five operational principles which sought to ensure that communicative spaces for black people opened up within the organisation and that these extended, without bureaucratic interference, up to the formal political assembly. Overlapping with these structures were a number of contexts and, within the overall Black counter public, a number of sub-counter publics. A clear example is that of the Black Workers Group movement. These also allowed the race equality workers to move in and out of a number of roles and scenarios within which the same claims could be raised again, even if their form differed slightly. Two elements are key in this: the way in which the Black public sphere did not recognise the boundaries of the administration and formal political system, and the way in which the deliberative spaces and moments both extended the formal political assembly in some aspects, as well as reduced it
in others. It can be argued that Black people, by their very experiences both outside of and within the organisation, bring in the Black public sphere in their immediate memories, and, as is the case now in many local authorities, it remains at that level. In the case of the race equality workers, especially the advisers, in the target borough, there was the institutional guarantee of being able to ‘enable’ that experience; to use it as the background and foreground for securing the conditions for Black people to raise claims of justice, or, in rare cases, to raise those claims themselves. Arising out of this, because it was integral to it, was the requirement, therefore, to ensure that such claims were validated where they were raised and not carried over into another phase unresolved. This process of non-closure was both formalised, through amending or developing specific procedures, and contingent, because advisers, in the latter case, were prepared to short circuit managerial authority by raising directly, on an issue basis, specific matters with politicians and senior managers. In the case of the target borough the role of the advisers during the period of the race programme was never that of being or wanting to be a representative of the Black communities. Rather they were there to identify the institutional blockages giving rise to ‘wrongs done to’ and articulate remedies so that those who experience such racism could make claims for themselves. Their role was, in one sense, rhetorical in the way Mayhew uses the concept. In this case, though, not so much to raise claims which were still to be resolved, but upon which action can be pre-taken, as to raise claims about the inequitable conditions surrounding the ability of oppressed people to make claims for themselves, and thus those conditions are the bases upon which action should be taken. Unlike the propagandist view put out by certain councillors and senior managers, not just in the target borough, that advisers were too conflictual and too prone to labelling people as racist, the advisers were careful in the target borough to contextualise the advice within the parameters of the anti-discriminatory law and within the best action which could achieve the politicians own manifesto commitment to race equality, as evidenced in the official race equality policy reports emanating from that group of employees. They worked, therefore, within a normative framework, one that councillors themselves often forgot existed. By so working, for the first time political matters were being explicitly considered within the administration in everyday processes. Prior to this managerial authority had been afforded an almost divine prerogative character by councillors either because those politicians adhered to the notion of the bureaucracy being neutral, or because the later ‘new left’ councillors found it expedient to do so. Managerial authority now had to undergo a deliberative scrutiny within the parameters of racial justice. An examination of the role of race advisers in the disciplinary procedure will help illuminate further this point.
The disciplinary procedure represents the ultimate in organisational violence that can be experienced by an employee. Because it is initiated by management, it often pits the full weight of the organisation against the lone employee, even where he/she has union representation. Despite clear guidelines from organisations like ACAS and good practice advice from professional bodies, such as the Institute for Personnel Development, the administration of natural justice within many organisations not only ignores the dimension of social justice, it conflates and fuses the levels, which should be kept separate, of the former. In the target borough, prior to the development of the role of the race adviser, employees could find themselves being disciplined and having their case heard by managers from within the same departmental division; that despite the arguments, mainly from unions, that there is an informal network often inclusive of all managers in that division, or section, which makes such practice flout the principles of natural justice. Contextually the head of the race unit and the other advisers, based on the experience and changes pursued in Lambeth, argued that the target borough’s practice of having one manager hearing the case and deciding the outcome also diluted the principles of natural justice, especially in cases with a race dimension. The recommendations made for change were for there to be a minimum of a three person panel so that a greater communicative deliberative dimension could be brought to bear, as well as, if managers were brought in from other divisions, ensuring more impartiality. It also allowed for the recommendation to be made that where there was a case with a race dimension, then one of the panel members should be Black. Similar arguments could be, and were, made, for those cases where there was a gender dimension. Returning, however, to the issue of the race advisers role in this, the following is the role created and developed by the head of the race unit. This was operational throughout the period of the race programme.

Role of Race Equality Advisers in the disciplinary procedure.

Race Equality Advisers will have the right to be involved in all disciplinary cases that have race dimension. But this is meant any disciplinary case involving Black employee or an employee where the alleged offence is racism.

All such disciplinary cases must be brought to the attention of the Department based Race Equality Adviser and there is no such post the Race Equality Adviser (Employment). The involvement of Race Equality Adviser has to be sought through the Department’s staffing section; who will also ensure that the Race Equality Unit is kept informed on a monthly basis of all such cases in that relevant Department. The Race Equality Adviser will also be involved where:

(i) The employee asks for a Race Equality Adviser.
(ii) Management asks for a Race Equality Adviser.
(iii) The Trade Union/representative asks for a Race Equality Adviser.

In any event it is strongly recommended that managers seek the advice of the Race Equality Adviser prior to the decision to initiate the disciplinary procedure.

The role of the Race Equality Adviser throughout the whole of the procedure will be strictly advisory. He/she will ensure through advice that the manager/panel explores fully the race dimensions to the case. He/she will be able therefore to ask clarifying questions during the proceedings and to proffer advice during the proceedings. The Adviser will not take part in the decision making, but will be present throughout the deliberations of the manager/panel. In all events the advice and recommendation of the Adviser should be recorded, explicitly and separately. Where the adviser feels that the conduct of the hearing and/or the decision of the manager/panel has not been held and/or reached in accordance with the Equal Opportunities Policy and/or race equality policies, then this advice has to be made available to the employee.

Black employees will have the right to discuss the general issues relating to alleged offence before the hearing. The formal notification of the disciplinary hearing must contain this statement. The Race Equality Adviser will not, however, represent the employee in a professional capacity. Any such action can only be done in a personal capacity. Where this does occur, that Adviser cannot act in any Advisory capacity for that case.94

It is clear from this that the adviser’s role was that of ensuring the proceedings had sufficient communicative space to enable the fullest aspect of racial justice to be considered. This was an interpreting, prodding, rather than fully interrogative, though that would occur if the manager ‘opted’ out, and advisory role. Whilst this role was bitterly opposed by certain manual worker unions, especially where the case involved an accusation of racism against one of their members, for the most part the role endured throughout the race programme period; endured in the sense that senior managers and members in the leadership were ambivalent about its continuance. Towards the end of the race programme this became strongly voiced because the intervention of the race adviser was cast in terms of it impeding managers getting on with management. This was very much within the context of the explicit emergence of neo-managerialism in the target borough. The then Chief executive favoured a post facto accountability, arguing that if managers transgressed the equality policies and procedures, they would be reckoned with after the event. For the head of unit and advisers this was tantamount to allowing racism to occur, and then dealing with it post event with accountability systems which had shown itself notoriously weak when it came to dealing with managers’ actions. Instead they argued for a continuation and extension of the principles of the
accountability process, such as the role of race advisers, built into procedures, like disciplinary, because these were pre-facto and both, at the same time, present-facto and trans-facto. It was changing management as it was practised in everyday work.

Whilst the existence of race specific posts or ones with some remit for race — and in the lead up to the race programme in the target borough these had invariably been ones created in the race relations mode — in local government was not new, what distinguished the race posts in the race equality programme period was their catalytic role which attempted to ride the tension between the Scylla of populism and the Charybdis of being a management ‘tool’. This tertiary way, I would argue, as well, not only provided the outline of an alternative to the function of local government employees to that of being the object of managerial prerogative and prescription, which is the current case, it also, at another level, was part of a democratising process which extended and changed the limits of representative democracy. To unravel this further requires that make use of the colonising — de-colonising analogy via another sortie into Sekyi-Otu’s emancipatory reclamation of Fanon. Earlier in chapter 7 in attempting to describe the characteristics of colonial society in preparation for the analogous framework with which to examine the thesis of the re-colonisation of local governance, I deliberately omitted Fanon, not because he was not relevant, but because I would argue that his saliency lies more in the arguments, and structure of those arguments, he advances with regard to the process of de-colonisation. In using Fanon to frame this particular aspect of re- and de-colonisation, I am wary of ascribing to race equality workers the same level of historical importance which Fanon does to those involved in anti-colonial struggles within a very concrete and bitter historical process of colonisation. Yet, analogies can be drawn, and where, in some instances, this might be deemed too much of an inflation of the role of race equality workers, Fanon’s narrative can operate as an allegory. On the other hand, Fanon himself regarded racism as being indivisible — either there is racism or there isn’t. There certainly aren’t gradations of racism, or for that matter, hierarchies of racial oppression. Just as there are various ways of dying, at the end of it you are either dead, or you are not.

In running the analogy, I am drawing on Sekyi-Otu’s interpretation of Fanon’s views of the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie. There is some overlap here with the position of Black managers in local government at the time of the race programme who entered the organisation because of the anti-discriminatory framework of the race equality programme and who frequently espoused an overt commitment to some form of race equality. Overlapping this contextually, as well, was, and is, the view that the race equality workers, particularly the advisers, and this can be found in one seminal piece on race advisers by Young, that they are members of
management and should be accountable to, and part of the managerial process.\textsuperscript{947} Ironically, this notion is expressed in another form by those on the self-professed radical wing of the community who viewed the race advisers as part of a new race bureaucracy staffed by race managers. There, was perhaps, in certain local authorities some justification for the latter assessment because of the way in which the race structures were set up and because of the way in which those appointed either unquestioningly operated within that framework, or because those appointed actively sought such a role. The case of Islington’s first race structures conforms to this. But there is another aspect of analogy which can be drawn, and that is in relation to the substance of race equality change envisaged by many race equality programmes, staff and Black managers. This was limited to variations on the politics of presence thesis; that is that the mere presence of Black people, in this case employees, especially in the senior levels would be sufficient to guarantee race equality change. This limited evaluation of the possibilities of race equality change was also the context within which Black managers could pursue a career through the bureaucracy which involved increasingly internalising the organisation” values, particularly those of white management, whilst at the same time using their presence, and allowing their presence to be used, as evidence of commitment to race equality. This instrumentalisation of the Black experience led to an over internalisation of managerialism to the extent that when the going got tough, the ‘tough’ Black managers, as previously cited, in one borough formed their own Black managers’ group, proclaiming in one meeting that the only way to get ahead was to forget equal opportunities and to be as corrupt as ‘they’ are. This goes to the heart of my arguments about race being the lynchpin to the unfulfilled tasks of modernity because being repeated in that target borough, and being played out in other authorities, were scenarios which echoed the critical comments Fanon made about the “awesome task” he “enjoins upon postcolonial humanity”.\textsuperscript{948} Based upon the experiences of the principal researcher in local authorities and other cross linking and overlapping institutions, as well as the theoretical back grounding in critical studies, it was postulated in one of the earlier chapters that a new Black politics requires a ‘Black cathexis’ which is that Black anti-racist politics’ “changes must contribute to the development of collective learning processes reflexively within the "collectivity" of Black, and also in the redefining of "we" ...(and therefore)... has to be better than that which maintains racialised force in the structures of communication”. This echoes Seki-Otu’s interpretation of Fanon on this matter, viz. the “awesome task” is to wrest “from the West the monopolistic stewardship of the ‘human condition’ in its concrete instance as the modern project.”\textsuperscript{949} There, instead, has to be “a radical re-ordering of the ends and instruments of a now irreversible modernity in the service of a ‘new humanity’” if this “obsequious mimicry and neurotic atavism” are to be avoided.\textsuperscript{950} The history of the race programme in the target borough, as well as in other local authorities, is
littered with the apostatical race equality husks of Black managers who were ‘suckered’ by the system. This was not the case in the target borough where race equality change was envisaged by the race equality workers more substantively in terms of a dialectical relationship between ends and means. Sekyi-Otu’s interpretation of Fanon’s views of the reformist nature of the national bourgeoisie’s political programme is apt. He writes:

“Bourgeois anti-colonial nationalism is accommodationist and reformist in deed to the extent that it is formal and bereft of substantive content in word. It names the nation as a simple and immediate union of racial subjects asserting a collective to independence from empire. The cost of this formal universality is a calculated silence concerning social and political ends. It is the mission of a radical anti-imperialist discourse to break this spell of form, this indeterminate invocation of a unity which is given by racial membership. A radical anti-imperialist commitment is precisely one that regards the national universal as a project to be achieved by virtue of substantive disputation and social interlocutors....(insisting)...on the ‘internal pluralism’ of contestable ends and means.”

In fact Fanon was excoriatingly scathing about the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie whom he regarded as a “farcical version of a detestable archetype,” and only able to come into their own if they, metaphorically, committed national suicide. There were certainly elements of Fanon’s desired thanototic character for the national bourgeoisie in the way in which the race advisers operated in the target borough; ways which put them in a position of organisational suicide. As one manager gleefully said of the demise of the race equality structures, “What did they expect? They bit the hand that fed them.” I don’t want to belabour this point to much, but certainly the head of the race unit, and advisers, were clear that they were not part of management, in the orthodox, controlling, subservient way. There was potential, where that latter role was misappropriated by, or forced upon, some advisory structures, for the development of the ‘leader’ trope. This was apparent in those authorities where the key race advisory staff were also prominent in the Labour Party. Episodes of Lambeth’s race equality programme appear to exhibit this characteristic. Sekyi-Otu comments that Fanon argues for the repudiation of “linguistic conventions which sanction authoritarian rule” The ‘leader’ is one of them. Thus, “the driver, the shepherd of people no longer exists today....(because)...the people ...do not need to be driven.” On the other hand they did not conform to the picture painted by Fanon of the “intellectual turned maquisard” who is ready to “disavow his claim to rational knowledge”, “embracing populism ...(and becoming)......a sort of yes-man who nods assent at every word coming from the people, which he interprets as considered judgements.”

Elements of the latter view with regard to the race advisers could be discerned amongst certain Black members, particularly those who professed

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and pursued a biologically essentialist and racially hierarchical notion of 'Black', and amongst some Black organisations in the community.

If there is to be an analogous role vis-à-vis the race equality workers to be derived from Fanon's writings on the de-colonising process, then it is that which he outlines for what he refers to as the radical "native intelligentsia". These form part of a Fanonian neologism, the 'illegalists'956; those who are critical of and/or expelled from the mainstream nationalist parties. The Advisers in the target borough, unlike some prominent ones in other local authorities always refused to be drawn into, or be seen to be part of, the main political parties. Their allegiance, if one could term it that, was not to a party political line, but to the principled achievement of race equality. In the counter razzia, by the principal researcher, attached as an appendix, it can be seen that the race advisers were viewed with hostile suspicion by councillors in the leadership.

Certainly the almost daily transgression of the informal 'ethical' framework to expected behaviour from local government employees at that time - and in the wake of the race equality period in local government, this informal framework has been formally codified into a behavioural straitjacket of a 'code of conduct' by many local authorities, breach of which could lead to dismissal - led many race workers to feel that within the organisation, they were the 'illegalists'. Fanon identifies the role of the intelligentsia as that of "interpreters" who mediate the interface between not only colonial, but also reformist anti-colonial, discourses and the people. Sekyi-Out's description of this role is thus:

"To put it another way: the post colonial subject's education in communicative responsibility and autonomy is to be enabled by the work of that figure of mediation we may call the modern griot......the modern griot would be......the harbinger of a new cultural knowledge and action yet to be planted and harvested....(who is)....the 'incarnated voice' of popular national requirements rather than the servant of the ruling class."957

The griot has a key role to play in the process of de-colonising democratisation because they enable, as Sekyi-Otu correctly theorises, the following:

"In the dialectical ordering of the emancipatory process and of post colonial society, hegemony does not belong, metonymically, to a privileged part, the space of the collective subject promoted to a representative status by the extremity of its abjection or exclusion or suffering. But neither does it belong to a whole that exacts unanimity in defiance of manifest differences and discord. The outcome of the 'meeting' is to be neither the reign of an undivided truth nor the disarray
of particular wills and local knowledges, but the generation of a common
vocabulary of disputation and concerted action: universal understandings
of contestable claims. It is to this common vocabulary this emergent
structure, rather than to a paramount subject...that hegemony belongs."}

Moreover the griot does not operate or speak from a position of 'epistemic
privilege', which is the case of an historical subject, but, as I rather contend,
of locational privilege which has "to be derived from the consent, the inter-
subjective agreement of the assembled people." In the sense used,
'locational' derives from the ability to manipulate three variables - space,
time and place - to prise open the interstices of the organisational structure,
culture, processes and power configuration, thus enabling Black people to
speak. If there was no epistemic privilege, in the sense of an essentialised
subject, there was an element of epistemological standpoint; one which made
use of 'Black' in its signifying sense as the context to the experience of
racism. If one compares the above with the description of the
epistemological structure and positioning of the race equality programme,
both in relation to the wider problems of local governance and to the Black
'constituency', and also compares it with the operational principles guiding
the work of the race equality staff, then there are distinct overlaps. The race
equality advisers and workers attempted to work as transformative
interpreters of the discourses of racism, i.e. the racialised forces in the
structures of communication, as well as the discourses of anti-racism, in their
broadest sense, trying to use the creative tension between racialised populism
and unacceptable race reform to open up this particular institution of local
governance. In so doing, as far as was possible, their everyday action was
grounded in the discursive practices of the Black counter-publics and the
fora therein. Habermas appears not to have written much about the role of
'leaders' or 'the intelligentsia', apart from his critique in TCA of
'expertisation'. Even then his latest work, BFN, seems, as other critics
have pointed out as well, to cede too much to the 'complexity' of modern
societies, and thus almost brackets out large sectors of society, such as
management within the administrative system, as being beyond practical
democratic control. But if one is to get a glimpse of the modern interpretive
griot in practice, then his own role in the German public sphere stands out; a
practice which belies his implied pessimism in BFN. He has been
extremely influential in interpreting and translating across the arcane public
spheres of the philosophical debates grounding the overlapping contexts of
modernism, post modernism and socialism into the more mundane spheres of
everyday political and social change. This analogy is used not to try and
equate his practice with that of the race equality workers, but simply to
illustrate that even at the lowly level of a local government worker, the
interpreting, translating, transmuting role; one which is important in opening
up the political system to wider democratising forces, is potentially there.
I would argue that this overlap which can be read as an analogy, or even where the imagination is too stretched, allegorically, is far from being a simple coincidence. In terms of a theoretical underpinning to the critical assessment of local governance informing the race equality work in the target borough, Habermas and the Frankfurt tradition was far more overtly situated in the consciousness of the principal researcher than that of Fanon. Yet Fanon had featured in the early seventies readings of racism and colonialism, and had been part of the theoretical framing of the first university research, together with Habermas, on Tanzania; especially the former theorist’s revalorisation and humanisation of the peasantry. It is possible that sub-conscious remembrance of previous theoretical interrogations informed the work in the target borough. However, it is more likely that two other scenarios have greater weight. The first is Sekyi-Otu’s discursive communicative reading and interpretation of Fanon which contends cogently for re-situating Fanon within the pantheon of those who argue for an emancipatory universalism which is neither relativist or skewedly modernising. There are, thus, within this particular reading theoretical nodal points through which linkages with Habermas’ theory can be made. This is particularly so in relation to both theorists’ central concern with the linguistic bases to a discursive democratising emancipation under colonising conditions. In other words the links were already there, awaiting excavation, during the period of the race equality programme.

The other scenario, of course, is that my theorisation of this period as encompassing a process of de-colonisation is valid and that, thus, what is being modestly evidenced in the target borough confirms Fanon’s and Habermas’ theorisation of colonisation and de-colonisation in their linked but differing contexts; not as a universal truth, but as a provisional prognostication fallibilistically subject to empirical validation.

The question now is how exactly can it be argued that the race equality structures enlarged and extended the formal system of representative democracy? The answer to this brings into the sphere of consideration the cardinal issue of emancipation. The argument to date has, as a brief summary, linked at one level unresolved problems of race and unfinished modernity, and at another unresolved problems of race and local governance, with the resolution of increasing democratisation. Within this can be inferred a process of emancipation, though that in itself has not, as yet, been fully defined. In Habermas there is a discursive grounding to emancipation arising out of the arresting and/or over turning of the colonisation of the lifeworld through discourse. Swindal’s interpretation of Habermas on this is that a distinction can be made between ‘communicative action’, which involves any exchange of meaning, and ‘discourse’ which the communication that discursively verifies propositions or norms.”

There is a difference in the orientation of the actors, as well, in the two scenarios. In the former the actor understands her/himself as one in a group of concrete
interactions with others, whilst in the latter each agrees “on the reversibility of her/his perspective relative to all other possible participants.....(so that they)...allow the ‘unforced’ power of the better argument...to motivate their internal change of attitude relative to the claim in question.”\textsuperscript{960} Because, therefore, discourse “extends the context bound nature of communicative action beyond the limit of one’s individual form of life”, discourse permits communication to achieve its full “rational and emancipatory power.”\textsuperscript{961} This interpretation appears to omit, however, from the equation the question of the power which determines the ability of actors to participate equally in discourse. These are forces, like racism and sexism, or for that matter too Euro-centric a definition of rational power, which circumscribes the freedom of certain people to participate discursively. Attaining the freedom to act is as important as the act which that freedom then allows. If that sounds too Foucauldian, even if it is the later Foucault, then it can be rescued by the normative qualification that this is not a freedom which can be purchased through the unfreedom of others. This has already been expressed in my elaboration of the two principles’ procedural device of non-closure which essentially ensures that the freedom to engage in communicative discourse cannot bring into claims for the unjust exclusion of others. In terms of the concept of emancipation being put forward, the two elements – the freedom to act as well as acting – are ineluctably linked. The struggle for recognition against the unjustly forced collectivisation, which is ‘wrongs done to’, is, as I have argued before, comprised of two elements – that of identifying the problem and that of defining the solution. One can overlay this template on the two fold schemata indicated above, viz. attaining the freedom to act, as well as the act itself, where the latter can be seen to refer to that of discourse. However engaging in the first part of the emancipatory process is no guarantee that the second part will be successfully traversed. There is no guarantee that responses to the increasing colonisation of the lifeworld, and in the real sense colonisation was just that, a violent penetration and sequestration of the colonised lifeworld, will result in the further rationalisation of the lifeworld. The outcome is contingently framed and might equally, therefore, be some form of indigenisation, such as is exemplified by the ‘etnikly’ formed Afro-centric perspective. It is within this action nexus and lag between the two stages that the role of the griot, the organisational trickster, or as one Labour leader in the target borough, with reference to one of the heads of the two equality units, put it, ‘a loose cannon’, assumes some importance because she/he can act as an earthing bridge which can help prevent unfortunate short circuiting.

Within the colonisation/de-colonisation/re-colonisation conceptual framework we can turn again, by way of analogy, to Fanon’s articulation of an emancipatory process which the colonised undergoes, and this is not, as some commentators have unfortunately read him, the therapeutic closure brought about through cleansing violence. Rather this arises out of what I
have termed the Black cathexis, what Sekyi-Otu reads in Fanon as the ‘awesome task’ he ‘enjoins upon post colonial humanity’. It is the “appropriation of a historical legacy not of our own choosing.” The process of ‘appropriation’ is the answer to question “how is an autonomous relationship to the consequences of an invasive modernity possible?” It supersedes the ambiguous, ambivalent outcome of an emancipatory process sans the race dimension because it is “an activity of coming into one’s own when there is no primal self to return to, no inviolate native essences to recapture.” In an earlier chapter I had outlined how the appropriation of the coloniser’s language has, as an emancipatory process, overlaps with Habermas’ language pragmatics, which, in turn, if read through Fanon, has overlaps with my critique of Habermas and counter proffering of translatability and transmutability, especially in Fanon’s vision of converting the coloniser’s language in the service a radically “new world of perception.” One of the problems addressed and posed by this episode of appropriation is how to generate common meaning in the face of social and political fragmentation. Within the target borough this was addressed through the use of the signifying, inclusive ‘Black’ epistemological and on tological framework to a public sphere and its constituents. It is analogous to Sekyi-Otu’s conceptualisation of the counter hegemonic communicative action institution whose role is “to create a narrative and political space in which the local freely bespeaks the national-universal.”

Yet, Sekyi-Otu reasons that because Fanon’s attempt to read the process of appropriation can be possibly empirically refuted, that these narratives should be read not so much as accounts of “processes of democratic entry into modernity, but rather of their historical and normative conditions of possibility,” i.e. as counterfactualities. But this is the sense in which a distinction can be made between communicative action and discourse, and, apart from which, the evidence from the target borough would seem to suggest that appropriation can be read as a democratic process. Earlier I had argued that the race equality programme, catalysed through the race equality workers, opened up communicative spaces where none had existed before so that claims for racial justice could be made. The redemption of these claims, even if the actual process itself did not always meet these standards, attempted to be based on the principles of discourse as outlined above. During the period of the race equality programme, Black people, whether employees or members of the public, were emboldened to speak, to make claims, where previously they had only been spoken to, and to keep open that communicative space in the face of instrumental closure by making reference to the council’s race commitments and/or utilising the presence of the race adviser in that particular encounter. In numerous everyday interactions across the council, such as the job interview, the supervision session between manager and Black employee, the service user and employee encounter, the disagreement between Race Adviser and councillor
at committee meeting, the process of appropriation as a democratic process was either occurring, or the potential for it to occur was there. The term ‘appropriation’ is apt because it captures the feeling of taking and reconfiguring. There is in this the ‘freedom’ to act, as well as the action then arising out of that freed act. Garber, in an article exploring the city as a heroic public sphere, i.e. one in which the project of modernity can still be pursued, argues that there is within the urban space four types of public sphere. The first is that from which people act because their identities, interests etc are materially intertwined with that space. The second is the one where people act on space because they want to own and shape it. The third is where people want to act in space, such as pursuing an agenda for free speech in local governance. Finally the fourth public sphere is where people make space, i.e. the “expansion or multiplication of the public sphere itself.” All four can be said to apply to the situations described above in local governance involving appropriation in which Black people act from, in, on, and create space. But it is not just space, because one of the key control vectors in racism is that of creating a temporal lag which has at its core the trope of progress from sub-humanity to humanity. This can be seen over and over again in the marginalising responses from state institutions to issues of race inequality where pathologisation through constructions of ‘racial disadvantage’ feed solutions sought through measures like ‘positive action traineeships’. Harmonising the time difference is as important as space in the process of appropriation. For this reason, positive action was always held by the race advisers to be the very last resort. Because that latter action of appropriation has an inherent moral component, as I argue the claims for racial justice have, this is far more likely to lead to discursive communicative action. But, even if appropriation supersedes the conceptualisation of discourse put forward by Swindal, there is still no cast iron guarantee that these sorts of discursive communicative practices will occur.

11.27 Appropriation and Emancipation

Finally one can loop back to complement and support the earlier argument through the notion of appropriation that instrumental action can be seen as ossified communicative action. Appropriation, because, as Fanon theorised, it involves a revaluation of ends and means, takes and revivifies parts of instrumental action systems bringing them back into communicative action; and, within the specific context of race, does so in ways that are more likely to be discursive. We have already seen how, through examples of the recruitment and selections process and the disciplinary process, previous areas of managerial sole discretion were at key points in their processes, opened up to communicative action; not just from within the formal organisation, but also from overlapping parallel institutions, like the trade union, through the fora of Black Workers Groups. Within these processes, with the catalytic agent of the griot, the common vocabulary of the discourse
of race equality, as developed in the target borough, vies for hegemony with other discourses as expressed and pursued through the formal political party and senior managers. As can be seen in the appended report establishing race equality as a dominant discourse was not easy. It could not rely on the top-down authority of the politicians and senior managers striking the right public pose, the orthodox mantra of official race equality institutions, such as the CRE. Whilst, in the stages of the inception of the programme public support from those quarters is obviously important in creating the initial conditions for dealing with internal organisational opposition, it can never be the only form of momentum for any race equality programme. What is given by way of succour from an authorising power can easily be taken back. In the target borough the race equality discourse was sustained through ensuring that the race equality infra-structure and programme became the catalytic means for opening up communicative spaces, and trying to maintaining these, across the full range of local governance responsibilities.

Returning to Habermas, appropriation imbricates with one of Habermas’ categorical distinctions between two idealised forms of citizenships. Stewart draws attention to these in terms of citizenship as received membership, or as achieved membership, distinguishable as well as ‘power over’ and ‘power to’. In sum the distinction between the two is that in “this latter organisational model, ultimately isolated individuals are subject to surveillance within a contractual relationship which regulates an exchange of benefits for functionally specified contributions .... (whilst) ...... the ... imminent .. model emphasises in contrast that political autonomy – as an irreducibly relational phenomenon – ‘is a purpose in itself, to be realised not by single persons in the private pursuit of their particular interests but rather by all together in an inter-subjectively shared praxis ...(where)... citizen status is constituted by a web of egalitarian relations of mutual recognition’”. The difference between the two theorists, and this is a difference which stems, I contend, from Habermas’ misconceptualisation of race, racism and culture, is that “Habermas’ concern with the possible erosion of liberal procedures in the face of irrationalist movements of traditionalist nostalgia leads him to an overly conservative position as far as the democratisation of democracy is concerned.” I would argue, then, that the race equality discourse pursued in the target borough sought to extend the radical implications of Habermas’ conceptualisation of achieved citizenship, ironically, as the only way, within the context of race, to ensure that irrationalist forces do not predominate. This radicalised version of active citizenship is more in keeping with the notion of appropriation. On the other hand it can be, and will be, argued that the notion of received membership citizenship accords with the way in which the organisation through the proto-Blairite councillors and many senior managers sought to frame the acceptable limits of employee, particularly Black employee and those within the specific race equality field, participation in decision making.
But there are other democratising implications which arise from this as well. Stewart accuses Habermas of politically promoting no more than a refurbished liberalism because of the conservative brake he puts on drawing too radical an implication from his own theories. In this Stewart echoes the criticisms of McCarthy, and my own, regarding Habermas seemingly over infatuation with systems theories. However, there is another dimension to Stewart’s critique which is germane to this research project. This concerns the point I raised above to with attaining the freedom to act as well as the act itself. For Stewart “political struggle focussed on emancipatory norms is not confined to border wars between systems imperatives and lifeworlds but is a pervasive aspect of structural hierarchies.”

He goes on to argue that Habermas’ restriction of the possible parameters of radical democracy to the appropriate relationship between civil society and the state via the cumulative impact of weak public spheres, is too limiting. Habermas’ line of reasoning remains too caught up in the particular history of the emergence of modernity in Western Europe, and thus does not recognise the “enormous asymmetries of power which characterise the political configurations of late modernity.” To that extent there is a need for the “conceptualisation of the structuring of both domination and resistance and of the diverse struggles for empowerment arising therefrom.”

On these bases Stewart, using Blaug and Spinosa et al — and at this stage we have to rely on his interpretation of those theorists — argues that Habermas’ theory is incapable of dealing with ‘democratic breakouts’ which characterise the experience based real politics of ordinary people trying to constitute the ‘power to’. This is the notion that “real democracy is not an ideal but an empirically real phenomenon ‘that occasionally breaks out among people in particular situations.’” For Blaug what is then required are the skills to sustain the reproduction of empowerment, and thus the democratic movement. Thus, in line with the criteria of fallibilism and contingency, any written constitution which is genuinely democratic cannot “replace ongoing discursive capacity.”

For Spinosa et al this argument is extended through their observation that the public sphere type framing actually contributes to the loss of practical expertise by people engaged in democratising. For them the highest form of political discourse, rather than being communicative rational argumentation, is what they term interpretive speaking which is “rooted in the concrete experience of the lifeworld.” The genesis of the idea of interpretive speaking appears to be very much similar to my thinking about the race limitations of Habermas and my arguments about translatability and transmutability. This can be seen in Spinosa et al’s three part substantiation of interpretive speaking as being significant because it “forces people to remain true to the concrete experience of their sub-worlds, acknowledge and respect the different experiences in their sub-worlds, and seek opportunities for cross-appropriating practices from other sub-worlds.”
These criticisms of Habermas are valid, not because they identify major fault lines in his theory – indeed a radical reading of Habermas’ could conceivably still arrive at the point Blaug et al do – but because Habermas’ appears to have chosen, on practical grounds, the ‘softly-softly’ range in the possible spectrum of interpretations to his own conceptualisations. For example Blaug’s point about the need for skills in maintaining and sustaining the democratic momentum is underlined by the experience I have recounted of the Black workers group in Lambeth. On the other hand it also highlights Habermas’ meta-concern about the contingency of the outcomes of increasing rationalisation, and my more prosaic point about the need to distinguish between the defining of the problem and proffering of solutions. Freedom to act does not guarantee freedom as an outcome from the act itself. Even if Blaug et al’s concerns derive in part from acknowledging that in an era of globalisation, defining the parameters of radical democracy in relation to the nation state becomes increasingly irrelevant, that does not rule out the state per se. The state as a communicative structure which arises to resolve increasingly complex problems of social integration, need not be locationally imprisoned in historical definitions. In fact globalisation might, as Magnusson and Isin et al have argued, re-invigorate and re-emphasise the importance of the polity in the form of the city state. I have argued that because the communicative conditions for race equality is inextricably tied up with eradicating and attenuating distorting forces which are one and the same time historically unresolved social constructions and material, that the state, as an important resource site for the resolution of such social integrative problems, will continue to play an important role. Thus the relationships between lifeworlds, civil society and the state, mediated through public spheres, where no presumption is put on the limits of action within those public spheres, still have a high valency for race equality. The concern then of the race equality discourse in the target borough was not so much with democratic break outs, though such an interpretation could be placed on democratising moments like the Black worker group movement, but, because the discourse aimed at changing the institutions of local governance, including the trade unions therein, so that they could be substantively racially inclusive, was concerned with democratic break ins. These were the substance of the border wars and counter razzias framing the hegemonic struggles between the race equality discourse, aimed at tying in contexts of communicative action with decision making, and the de-democratising discourses, aimed at closing down communicative spaces and limiting decision making, that eventually came to predominate.

One can provide a graphical illustration of the contestation across the major elements of the race equality programme between the discourse of race equality and those that sought to limit or do away with race equality as a political project, such as that below.
e-map on discourse contestation

Main areas of discourse contestation

- Politics of presence
- Transformation
- Systematising AR props
- Support systems
- Deconstructing services
- New forms of accountability
- Democratic resource usage
- Race, difference, identity and services
- Public sphere, subalterns and administrative change
- Rebranding services
- Consumerising services
- PSO

Beyond politics of presence
- Substantive democratisation
- Creating discursive spaces
- Committee arrangements
- Consultative exercises
- Bringing in communities and employees
- Advancing the RE rhetorical power of IG
- Catalysic/discursive role of RE workers
- Participation exercises
- Democratic reconfiguring of user/service interface

- Liminal state
- Difference democracy
- Transformational democracy
- All as components of discursive democracy
- Representative democracy as all
- Facading other forms of involvement
- Consumerisation
- Management accounting accountability

- LG as vehicle for Labour policy
- Convergence with state
- Local state as manager

- State and socio-integrative problems
- Theorisation
- Local state and national relationship
- The moral and norms

- Key discourses
- Practical scope of initiatives
- Local ones: regional/national ones: international ones
- LG as RE rhetorician
- Challenging/exceding with state
- Think local, act global
- Influencing/changing partner insts.

Key aims
- Transformation of employment
- Targets
- AR programmes
- New forms of accountability
- Support systems

- Alternative to neo-managerialism
- Possibility of new forms of worker-employer relationship
- Administrative systems and praxis

- Labourism as universalism
- Black people present but no presence
- Managerialism and neo-managerialist control systems
- Only fine tuning administration

- Upholding/making RE rights
- Key discourses
These are very much categorical distinctions. What is not being implied is that these were the outcome of vast conspiracies, though in the eventual case of the conscious decision to downgrade the race equality programme a large degree of 'behind-closed-doors' deliberation and decision making did take place. Rather ideas and values received prominence, primarily through the power arising from hierarchical positions which enabled the communicative and information agenda to be instrumentally controlled, thus facilitating the emergence and sustaining of certain discourses/diskourses. As indicated earlier I want to concentrate on two, that of 'labourism' and that of 'neo-managerialism', because these are identified as those from within which the legitimation for opposition to, and eventual displacement of, the race equality discourse, came. I shall argue that these did not promote or contain expressions of, or values which could be construed as, overt racial and racist hostility, except on the odd occasions around the fringes in a few skirmishes with the manual trade unions. Rather they encouraged and promoted action which, in regard to race, sought to close down communicative spaces recently excavated through the race equality programme, and/or control those spaces, and/or prevented the emergence of further spaces, thereby de-politicising race. Further this choice of discourse, where active choice is more evident in neo-managerialism, did not coincidentally incorporate and 'neutralise' race. Instead I shall argue that it was largely adopted because of a perceived need to control and manage race, which became increasingly viewed, especially after the Labour Party's debacle in the 1987 election defeat, as a threat both to electoral legitimation and to the legitimation within the organisation of formal political power. This enabled race to be moved out of the formal public political arena of legitimation and to be subsumed within larger concerns of management and at first a broad, all encompassing let's-accord-equal-value-to-all-oppressions equalities approach, then more latterly, the even more distant social exclusion.

11.28 Labourism and the attempt to silence race

At the inception of the race equality programme the main obstacles to its development and implementation arose from the opposition emerging from what could be called the main promoters of the Labourist tradition, a mixture of Labour party councillors and mainly local branches of the manual trade unions. Towards the end of the period of the race programme the bases of the opposition to race could be seen to be emerging from the growing dominance within the organisation of the neo-managerialist discourse. From 1984 to 1989 there was not so much a switch in discourse/diskourse from Labourism to neo-managerialism as a change in emphasis. In many ways Labourism came to be subsumed in neo-managerialism.
The way in which 'labourism' is used here differs from its usage in other studies of labourism and/or labourism and race. There are no orthodox Marxist pejorative undertones expressing a 'sighed' disapproval of the Labour Party's betrayal of the working class, or, as a variation on that counterpoising the failure of 'labourism' with a notion of socialism still to be achieved. Rather 'labourism' is used in this research study to denote a variant of a social labour based social evolution of society type political theory in which class, as the primordial grounding for social integrative problems, is still the main pivot for social and political action. Because, in this version, the social learning evolution of society is still reduced to the development of social labour, the working class still retains a subject-of-history status, even if it is now in a constrained, attenuated form requiring not so much emancipation as controlled nurturing. It has a vision of socialism, but one formed within what is recognised as the social democratic mould. It thus renounces any attempt to overthrow the capitalist relations of production, but seeks instead to reform and control them through the democratic capture and exercise of political power. The utopia from this form of social labour is concretely expressed in the establishment and development of welfarism which seeks to attenuate and compensate for the social and material ravages of capitalism. It is the working classes' pay off. This has a conceptualisation of social justice which is both, to use Fraser's categorisation, redistribution and recognition based; the latter being a taken-for-granted, subliminal rather than overt expression. Redistribution is achieved primarily through the edifice of the welfare state. Recognition, on the other hand, applies only to the common background values of the lifeworlds of the white working class. Whilst these values are maintained to some extent by those they exclude – the 'other' – they, more pertinently in the realities of a racist multi-racial society, are succoured through an assimilationist and incorporatist approach to recognition claims by other social groups; especially where these are intertwined with redistributive claims as well. Assimilationism is the communicative silencing of appropriation. In the UK this social labour variant came to be embodied in the Labour Party, trades' unions and the institutionalisation of their mutual relationship. But there is no simple conflation of those two identified protagonists and their interplay with 'labourism', because the values they came to exemplify, and the action they sanctioned, came to imbue the background social democratic value fabric of the welfare state and public sector. The intellectual analyses of both spheres, the Labour party and the trades unions as well as the welfare public sector, have been marked up to now by the almost absence of any systematic reference to race by way of trying to situate it within the histories of the evolution of those spheres. The way in which race has been, and is being,
expunged from the explicit parameters of the change debate within the current Labour Party’s fast evolving stance on local government, as well as wider national concerns, means that this omission is more than just over sight. The question then is if New Right Labour has a vision and programme of action which will attain no more than a society which is a refurbished version of neo-liberalism, how far off from that is Habermas’ version of a refurbished liberalism? Moreover is the logic of Habermas’ “emphasis upon the need for self restraint on the part of those participating in a range of public spheres” because of his fear of “the possible erosion of liberal procedures in the face of irrationalist movements of traditionalist nostalgia”, a more sophisticated restatement of New Right Labour’s communitarian framed fear and expunging of race from legitimation concerns?

In the target borough the ‘labourist’ approach has been identified with a group of councillors whom I have categorised as later becoming the proto-Blairites. These, at the start of the race equality programme, held influential positions in the leadership of the Labour Group on council as well as holding the chairs of certain important committees, such as the Personnel Sub-Committee and the Direct Labour Committee. The latter two were the formal political conduit through which control of all of the employment policies affecting the workforce was exercised. The formal agreement by these committees to any action sanctioning the institution to reconfigure the employee-employer contractual relationship, would be key. There were, then, certain characteristics of this group of councillors which are interesting. All were white. All had northern, working class backgrounds even if their then current educational levels and work placed them more in the middle class bracket. That, coupled with their relative newness to London meant that their own personal experience of Black people, other than the Black councillors was extremely limited. These limitations applied as well to their exposure to race equality arguments, and even where they were exposed, as was the case with that borough’s own race programme, to the sympathy with which they greeted such arguments. For example one of the leading councillors, Chair of the DLO committee at the start of the race programme, who also became leader of the council, described the equality advisers at a conference, some three years into the race programme, for local authority direct labour organisations, as “the misfits.” On another occasion in discussion with the advisers he was quite adamant that any kind of notion of a politics of a ‘rainbow coalition’ would not be tolerated. A few of these councillors had also, in their student years, been members of Trotskyist political parties, such as the SWP. But these other political framings also permitted those councillors to try to claim the moral high ground:
This prioritisation of the lifeworld values of the working class, as envisioned in the heroic ‘Northern’ sense, as the seed bed for the local discourse of labourism, was affected not just through the formal positions of the councillors concerned, but, as well, through the traditions of the manual workers’ unions in the public sector all of whom in the boroughs which had started on developing race programmes, displayed varying degrees of atavistic working class hostility to what they perceived as a form of “foreigners-taking-our-jobs.” These traditions were sustained through the network of councillors, certain senior managers in the Direct Labour Organisation, local trade union officials and local Labour party, and informally cemented daily in the leisure fora of the local public houses, the trades councils and the local Labour Club. A similar pattern of relationships could be observed the in the neighbouring borough to the west, where, as I shall show, it resulted in a blatant over expression of racism on the part of the trades unions concerned. In both boroughs, and too some extent in Lambeth as well, there was a connection that could be made between the membership of the manual unions in local government, residency in traditional white working class local areas and the electability of councillors from that area. In the target borough not only was the DLO headquarters physically sited in the southern part of the borough, that part of the borough was also the hinterland for large swathes of council estates in which few Black residents were brooked. As in Lambeth at the start of the race initiatives, large sectors of the manual and craft workforce had almost a dynastic dimension with members and friends of families finding work through word-of-mouth recruiting. It is little wonder that in 1984 the percentage of Black people in the DLO stood at just over 5%.979

I want to outline, briefly, how this discourse of labourism, sustained in the target borough by the positioning of key councillors, certain senior managers and trade union officials and the closed off – to Black people and the race equality discourse – communicative channels of the network, as described above, exerted a negative drag on the implementation of the race equality programme. This was not just an attempt to delay the implementation of the race equality programme. There was, consciously underpinning the reluctance to act, an explicit attempt to displace the race equality discourse with one more amenable to the discourse of labourism. However, as shall be shown, this was not done in a manner of communicative transparency so that claims made could be deliberated upon by all concerned. Rather, as with the sustaining of the labourist discourse, it was surreptitiously and clandestinely nurtured behind the closed doors of institutional power trying, in so doing, to avoid any possible interstices which would afford appropriation by Black people. I want to outline this arena of discourse contestation by reference to the creation and development of the Equal Opportunities Working Party in the target borough.
Whilst I have made a categorical distinction between the race equality discourse and the labourist discourse, for heuristic considerations, it cannot be inferred that the race equality discourse and its proponents were unsympathetic to the trade union movement, or at a contextually more substantive level, uninterested in the intersection of class with race and thus with the influence of social labour on emancipatory concerns. The race equality discourse in the target borough was, after all, partially sustained through the communicative spaces opened up in one of the trade union branches through the development of the Black Workers Group. The issues of class as well as women were part of the everyday considerations of that group, especially as those related to black women. What the Group and race workers were opposed to were the Noachic expressions of hostility and, at times, outright racism from certain trade unions and their officials towards the race equality initiatives and Black people. Often this was exemplified in the mediating language of interaction, when that occurred. Time and space distancing conventionalising terminology, maintaining the 'he, she' it’ “othering” was common, exemplified in the favoured use of 'coloured' to refer to Black people, especially those of an Afro-Caribbean background. These were mainly the craft and manual trade unions. Both sets of unions had, in the tradition which had grown up in local government, exercised an almost joint and equal supervision of their members with managers. For example, the institution relied, in many cases, on their trade unions to convey information to its employees which had originated from the organisation itself. Their relationship with the largest trade union in local government, then called NALGO, can be gleaned from the differing interpretations placed upon the common description of it as a ‘white collar’ union. To many in the craft and manual unions it was a class distinction between those who sat behind desks and those who did ‘real’ work. Whilst the title ‘National Association of Local Government Officers’ reflected the original civil service model which had been imposed on the developing local government, it also captured a real distinction between those deemed ‘officers’ and those who were not. This was reflected materially in differing terms and conditions for the two sets of employees which saw the ‘officers’ with the much better pay and conditions structures. Despite this the seventies expansion of local government, in a development which mirrored the changing membership of inner city Labour Party branches, created an influx of people from universities, many of them committed to the public sector within a socialist vision. The end result was a radicalisation of NALGO in those inner city branches from what had been a rather comfortable, middle of the road form of ‘officer associations’. Contrary to the demonisation of these radical changes as evidence of Trotskyist ‘entryism’ into local government, though many activists were quite open about their membership of such political parties, the majority of branch officials in the changing boroughs, were Labour Party members. However this obvious developing split between a widening vision of local government
and socialism, as exemplified in many NALGO branches in inner city local government institutions, and the more traditional labourist versions, as expressed by the manual and craft unions, exacerbated the differences which had existed before. For the latter unions it was further evidence of the middle class nature of NALGO. There was one thing upon which the manual and craft unions and the more Trotskyist influenced activists in NALGO were agreed, and that was in their macho, working class epithet dismissal of NALGO as a "mickey mouse" union. However, it was primarily through NALGO that the collective claims of previously neglected groups, like Black workers and women, could be made to the council.

Further, as I have shown before, through the existence formally such group structures, NALGO was supportive of the race equality programme, and in many cases ahead of the council in that support. But this was indicative of a wider approach by branches like this to any form of retrenchment of the public sector, whether this be because of that individual council’s decision or because of national government initiatives. For many councillors, in the target borough, NALGO was a headache; a power structure that had to be broken. For all of these reasons then, the councillors I have identified as being key in perpetuating the labourist discourse, were therefore happier wanting to develop closer relations with the manual and craft unions. One can see variations of the above context applying to the boroughs, such as Lambeth and the two immediately adjoining the target borough on either side.

Within this scenario the initiation and development of the race equality programme by the Race Unit had from the outset the explicit parameters of wanting to involve all of the trade unions. For example the first policy report from the unit, which, by de- and reconstructing the CRE Code of Practice, laid out the framework for the approach to race equality and employment contextualised it thus:

The Code addresses itself in part 3 to the responsibilities of Trades Unions. There are two areas of action:

(a) to ensure that individual employees of the Council are aware of these
(b) to ensure that employees engaged in Equal Opportunities negotiations with unions are aware of these.

Both should be covered in the section meetings. In addition, however with the latter it is recommended that management engaged in such negotiations should make clear in such the dual responsibilities placed upon both employers and unions. In the former, employees should be encouraged to raise in their unions the expectations and lawful requirements of the Code.

It is expected that many of the employment issues raised and recommendations made, will have to be looked at in terms of Equal Opportunities initiatives i.e. race, gender, class, people with disabilities, sexual orientation. In all, the dimension of Black women will be an explicit component.\textsuperscript{980}
In order to give concrete expression to these sentiments the report recommended that because the council should have the structure to "(a) include the trade unions in the equal opportunities process, and (b) regularly examine and review existing policies, procedures and criteria.", that the following should be established:

A review/monitoring committee be established on a joint management/union basis to help monitor and develop the policy; with this committee, (i.e. Race relations Committee) to be comprised of representatives of all the unions; the Personnel Division; the specialist advisers; Black and Women's Staff Forums members. This should be seen as complementary to, but not part of, the established consultation and negotiating machinery.

Whilst similar review/monitoring committees had been established with varying degrees of success in other boroughs, including the GLC, none of them had representatives from the organised groups of Black and women employees. The thinking behind what was to become the Equal Opportunities Working Party differed as well from the other boroughs. In this case it was very much attempting to develop within the organisation, the structural space for a mini-public sphere which could influence the formal action areas, like the negotiating machinery, but within which actors could cast off the shackles of their formal roles and engage in claims and debates. It was envisaged that a structure like this would not only last the duration of the equality programmes, but would provide a working model of new organisational communicative forms which sought to develop an active consensual mode and de-hierarchical mode of working. These hopes, however, reckoned without the discourse of labourism.

The recommendation to establish the Equal Opportunities Forum went through the relevant committees in the middle part of 1984 without any sign of action until towards the end of that year. The advisers were informed informally through the Chairs of the Race and Women’s Committees that the leading councillors, identified as undergirding the labourist discourse, had decided to form a similar body with only themselves and the trades unions as members. Further, the terms of reference of this would include: the identification of all possible areas of discrimination, viz. class, gender, race, age, sexual orientation, disability, marital status, pay etc., the review of equality measures being undertaken by the council, the development of a comprehensive programme of action, revising the equal opportunities policy, the identification of the means by which the council and trades unions can review the effectiveness of the action, and to report back to the majority group for approval any action undertaken in pursuit of the terms of reference. What this effectively proposed was to remove the responsibility for the equality programme from the remit of the Race and Women’s committees.
and the equality workers, and to re-position it within the closed circuit of communication and power of the selected councillors, trades unions and the majority group. In so proposing it also envisaged a role for the Equal Opportunities Working Party which in assuming responsibilities for developmental action and negotiation, was far removed from that put forward by the Race Unit. The original proposal that was accepted by Race Relations Committee did not see a role for members at that level because their role could be exercised through the formal political and negotiating structures of the council. This attempt to suck in the equality initiative and control it behind closed doors was reflected, as well, in the implied “service fodder for the working party” role for equality advisers and in the total silencing omission of any reference to having representatives from the Black Workers Group or Women’s Group. A senior manager commenting on the proposal to include members from the race and women constituent groups commented that this was unlikely to be accepted by the trade unions because “they, the trade unions were the only recognised representative bodies for all staff and…..they were capable of looking after their Black and female members.”

In a letter to the relevant Labour members all the equality advisers that they were “extremely disturbed” by the establishment of such a body, pointing out that they had not been formally informed and that there was a deep concern that “this group will be making proposals for the development of equal opportunities and yet we will not be represented at the working party.” The letter went on to highlight the confusing and potentially damaging role the proposed working party would play.

“We have made it clear to members in the past that we consider it essential to establish a broad based equal opportunities forum. The experience of other Councils, notably the G.L.C. has been that such a group is vital to the development of equal opportunities. We have proposed that such a body should consist of representatives from the Trade Unions, equality workers and representatives from the departmental black staff forums and women’s groups. We therefore wish to re-state our advice that such a broad based group, which should be a non-negotiating body, is essential if the Council’s commitment to equality is to be effectively put into practice. Such a body is essential to develop a co-ordinated approach to equal opportunities. The constitution of the present working party effectively silences the equality workers. We are not prepared to service a body at which we have no representation and therefore no right to speak. We have not even been formally notified of the working party’s existence, its terms of reference or matters discussed so far. We consider that the limited composition of the equal opportunities working party, can only serve to confuse the development of equality policies and practices. It is not clear to us what the status of the new group is and how it relates to the
The response from members, primarily because the letter had the support of the Chair of the Race relations Committee and the tacit support of the then Chief Executive, was to agree to allow the equality advisers to participate. Even then, however, over the next six months there were numerous flash points between the advisers and members, primarily over the way in which the latter allowed the more reactionary tendencies in the trade unions to dictate the agenda of the day and the pace of events. It became clear that certain trade unions representatives, from the craft and manual workers' unions primarily, were intent on using the working party as a stalling mechanism. It was apparent that members were prepared to go along with this, and, further, to confirm to those unions that the equality advisers had a marginalised role. It did not help that these same members persisted in holding up the limited equality practices of Wandsworth, then the Conservative Party's 'flagship' borough exemplifying the new right changes in local governance.

This fractious context, one in which councillors and trades unions were happier looking to Conservative models of equality practice, whatever that was, rather than those being developed in other Labour run boroughs, was very much the way in which the working party had, by mid 1985, developed, primarily because members and trade unions attempted to create their own ownership and leadership role for equalities through that structure through a reconfiguring of the equality discourse. This strategic and instrumentalised insertion of power into that forum distorted and disrupted the communicative relationships and effectively prevented a proper deliberative process to burgeon. The networks of labourism also allowed for the working party to be bypassed, thereby further reducing its formal role and capacity to that of a facade. For example despite having ongoing discussions in the working party about the need for a proper monitoring system which would include a mandatory headcount, seen as essential if a proper base number of Black and white employees was to be established, the councillors, under pressure from the trade unions, outside of the environs of the working party agreed to a number of measures which effectively put back the implementation of monitoring by a year. In late 1984 a proposal to go ahead with the headcount part of the monitoring system was supposed to be implemented. Without warning the members, all of them identified with the labourist discourse decided to postpone it the night before the survey at the behest of certain of the trades unions. Their views had already been made clear in the working party. They regarded such initiatives as a waste of time and money, warning that their members were hostile to it. In a veiled threat to councillors which sought to link their membership with the possible fate of the Labour Party in the local elections, their written comments concluded:
"In deciding to impose monitoring on an unwilling workforce the Council took a political gamble of much greater magnitude than that resulting from the breakdown of individual relations in the borough. The fact is that the vast majority of the workforce, particularly, among the manual workers, also live in the borough. As such they reflect the views of the electorate as well as being important opinion makers in their own Community. So it is more than likely that the suspicions and concerns of the members towards ethnic monitoring which the trade union leaders in the borough attempted to pass on to you were equally the views of many voters in the local communities. We hope you were better at winning the voters to the ideas behind ethnic monitoring than you were with your own workforce." (My emphasis)

In another sense this confirmed the gut feeling amongst the advisers at the time that for a number of reasons, especially the expedient one of electoral advantage, the councillors were happier cultivating the white working class constituencies. At another level it helps evidence the existence of the labourist discourse. The response from the advisers to what was seen as a capitulation to racism was equally forthright. In an exercise of counter discourse both the race and women’s advisers wrote to the councillors concerned as follows:

“We have received notification that the proposed second monitoring head count of the target borough employees has been postponed. As equality advisers employed to advise the Council on the means to achieving race and women’s equality, we wish to register our strongest objections to this move. Monitoring, of which this proposed exercise is but part, is one of the basic planks to achieving genuine Equality Opportunities. This particular exercise is doubly important too because it is the first to include questions on gender. We are well aware that the leadership of certain local unions opposes vehemently the whole issue of Equal Opportunities. We are also aware too that these very same unions do not represent the views of their Black and women members. Within the context therefore that one of the other planks to a successful Equal Opportunities Policy is the commitment of members to their lawful, and principled responsibilities, we are appalled that, over such a basic issue as monitoring, their appears to be an appeasement with bodies that are institutionally racist and sexist. We are aware that the manner in which this decision was reached, including the timing, has damaged the work already begin on Equal Opportunities, and we would urge therefore that the decision is rescinded and the proposed survey carried out as soon as possible."
because they did not like either the advice or the way in which it was proffered. However, as another reality correlate, the then Chief Executive was so appalled by the decision to postpone that he wrote as follows to the councillors:

This morning I heard that at a meeting on Friday night it was agreed to defer the second monitoring exercise.

Leaving aside the problems caused by attempting to defer an exercise like this at such a late stage, I am writing to place on record my strong disappointment and anxiety at such a move.

The Council decided many years ago before I arrived that surveys of the racial composition of the workforce should be undertaken. I won't rehearse here the reasons why management information of this nature is crucial to an Equal Opportunities Policy as I am sure you are familiar with the arguments. Some unions have steadfastly maintained their opposition to any monitoring. As a concessions to this it was agreed that the method used should be a management head count, and the first monitoring survey was completed earlier this year. The arrangements for the second exercise have all been made and monitoring was due to start today. I can see no reason why it should not have been successfully concluded.

I feel that to postpone it at this late stage is not only very disruptive to the exercise but also will give the appearance of completely undermining the Council's commitment to race equality. If exercises such as this which are fundamental to race equality and where substantial concessions have already been made to the union, can be reversed at this late stage it will give the impression that the Council is not serious about equal opportunities and that the implementation of policies in this field is a voluntary activity. The implications of this will be, in any view, serious and far reaching.

I would therefore ask that urgent consideration be given to the exercise to continue as soon as possible.986

Six months later, in the borough to the west of the target borough a similar monitoring proposal was racistically and crudely lampooned by the manual unions in the form of questionnaire which asked questions such as:

"If American Indian, please state your tribe: Apache/Blackfoot/Cheyenne/Sioux?

And,

"Are you of mixed race: Father black, Mother white/Mother black, Father white/Father brown etc."987
This questionnaire was distributed with a covering letter which came from their own Equal Opportunities Working party. The Labour run council, which in terms of demographic make up, distribution and the evolved political power structures was even more in thrall to the yet to be tested threat of manual worker employees translating their opposition to council employment equality initiatives into borough electoral political choices, decided that the racist questionnaire was a basis for negotiation. The Black Workers Group, in that council, and the race advisers issued strong letters condemning such a move.

We can see, therefore, that at the beginning of the race equality programme in the target borough, and in others, which includes Lambeth where only the direct intervention of Ted Knight prevented a similar scenario taking place, the discourse of labourism provided the value means to try and subvert, prevent, or, in the case being examined, re-write the race equality discourse.

In the target borough this attempt at ‘palimpsesting’ the race equality discourse is exemplified in two episodes. The first relates to the issue of race equality targets. There was opposition to these, overtly from the trades unions, and covertly from the labourist councillors. The recommended policy on targets contextualised the issue as follows:

There is often a confusion in people's mind between quotas and targets. Apart from being unlawful, quotas are rooted in the "fair shares" approach to race equality. The basis to this is to leave discriminatory systems intact, and to employ black people in preference to white. This process is known as positive discrimination. Thus for example, if a quota of 25% black employees is set, organisations simply have to meet this by employing through positive discrimination, up to the proportion set. Quotas, therefore do not have to be exceeded. Such a course of action is reactionary because:

* it sets a maximum ceiling
* it does not address discriminatory systems and therefore institutional racism
* it leads to tokenism.

To summarise therefore targets are not about:

* quotas
* positive discrimination
* tokenistic action.

However targets are about:

* quantifying the desired outcome of the race equality strategy
* setting this quantification within set time periods
* basing this quantification upon minimum levels i.e., they can be exceeded
* being the concrete outcome of a strategy which seeks to dismantle racially discriminatory systems and erect racially and socially fair ones.
Despite this very clear situating of targets within a context of tackling discriminatory systems and not simply that of being tokenistic positive discriminatory action, unions continued to represent the initiative as one of quotas and getting Black people in through dubious means. Whilst the councillors did not support these views, they did regard the targeting policy as being too 'hard'. They preferred a more pliable, vague, less determinate policy which would be open to managerial and member level interpretation. That would be a means, in their view, to appease the unions. As one councillor put it at a joint Race Relations, Women's and Personnel Committees' meeting, specially convened to agree a number of equality measures of which targets was one, "We don't want advice that feels as if we have been struck by an axe in the middle of the forehead." This ambivalence and indeterminacy permitted the unions to continue making disparaging and communicative distorting claims about the equality programme whilst participating in a forum supposedly set up to clarify issues. Earlier I had highlighted the opposition to the race equality discourse from the then Chief Personnel Officer and Chair of the Personnel Committee, one of the key movers in the sustaining of the labourist discourse. During this period of the Equal Opportunities Working Party, one in which previously Race Relations Committee agreed employment policies had to be fought for in order for it to be accepted as council policy, primarily because of the countervailing claims of the labourist discourse, courses of action agreed within the context of that working party, were often undermined or overturned through councillors pursuing hidden agendas via other channels of power. At a stage, then, when it appeared the targets policy was, at long last, going to get council approval, the Chief Personnel officer, under instruction, as he later claimed, from the Chair of the Personnel sub-committee, wrote a paper for the Labour Group meeting proposing a wholly new targeting policy, one which was vague in terms of expected levels of Black employees, generous in terms of the implementation time table, and non-specific in relation to accountability lines and processes. It only came to the head of the Race Unit's notice, on the day of the meeting, because that senior manager had inadvertently left a key page in the photo-copier. A Black employee who found it and recognised the significance handed it in to the Race Unit. Within the space of an afternoon counter briefing papers had to be prepared by the Race Unit, one for the whole body of the Labour group, the other for the Black councillors. In the latter the unit emphasised the point that:

"It seems yet again that some members are prepared to give the expediency of a cosy relationship with reactionary branches of certain trade unions a higher priority than that of their supposed principled commitment to race equality. Targets are not, as they claim, some new radical idea. Both conceptually and in practice they have been around for some time. For example it is good management practice to set objectives, and to establish some means of evaluating whether or not after a set time they have been
achieved. Targets in employment are an extension of that. Employment targets are an integral part of the U.S.A. experience in Equal Opportunities—a country not known for its socialist politics. In Britain the idea of employment targets has been around since the mid seventies and ironically has come through personnel consultants working with private industry. One of them writing about targets in the seventies says:

"Target setting and timetables should not be used as a justification for delay in taking action. To quibble about the target or timetable would be to waste time when most organisations have not even begun to move in the right direction. Targets which can be renewed are the aim, not quotas."

The question then is why supposed socialist members are indulging in putting forward institutional blockages when other organisations such as, for example, American multinationals, which are hardly "socialist", have gone further. It is clear from the above that the employment targets recommended for the target borough are not that radical. They are only the beginning. If these are watered down, the target borough will be even further behind.

The result of this last minute intervention by the unit was that the Labour group agreed not to proceed with the report by the Chief Personnel Officer. Instead he, through the relevant line management structure, was instructed to work with the head of the unit on taking the targets policy forward. One interpretation which can be placed upon this turn of events is that the 'force of the better argument' won. However, the circumstances regarding this discourse clash could hardly be described as conforming to Habermas' vision of an 'ideal speech' situation. The griot had to make the interpretive intervention in absentia, relying on the interpretive force of the literally textualised argument and on the transient communicative solidarity of a small group of Black councillors who, under other circumstances, often pursued disparate agendas. On the other hand, this course of action, directly making claims to the Labour councillors, would not have been possible without the changes to the communicative structures, affecting the relationship between the advisers and members, introduced by the head of the unit. The action undertaken by the labourist councillors, albeit through the surrogated writings of a senior manager, sought to close down these communicative channels through strategic stealth, and in so doing, post a visible marker that, for these labourist councillors, Race Relations Committee, and all it represented, was one that could be treated with non-recognising disrespect. However, this episode begins to illustrate, as well, how and why the race equality discourse, grounded in the promise of the emancipatory force of communicative action, had a fragile hegemony in the target borough. It also shows, using the Labour Group as the example because that forum, only open to Labour Party members, was, in many respects, the important policy decision making body in the arena of local governance, that de-colonising acts of appropriation within hierarchies of power are also concerned with democratic break ins.
The other episodic example of key actors within the labourist discourse, and those at their beck and call, striving to rewrite, in this case literally, the race equality discourse, relates to a draft equality strategy produced by the then Chief Personnel Officer. Again this came with the post facto disclaimer by that manager that he was “acting under instructions form the Chair of the Personnel Committee.” In reading the document it became clear to the advisers, and some other senior managers, that, far from being the output of a single author, it appeared, rather, to be the ghosted reproduction of quite a few labourist voices being channelled through a single narrator. Its importance lies not in the impact it had on the race equality and women’s equality discourses, because it had none, effectively being dealt with at a joint meeting between the advisers and the report’s author at which, because of the arguments marshalled against him, he had to withdraw large parts of it, and by that senior manager’s own line manager who, because he thought it factually inaccurate, misleading and vexatious, ordered it to be withdrawn, but in the committing to paper of what can only be described as the labourist version of equalities. Like the other strategic interventions which sought to capture control of the equality initiatives, this one was produced and intercalated into the discursive processes surrounding the equality discourses without warning. As with discourses of this type it drew its primary strength from the ‘denigration’ of the ‘other’, in this case the conventionalisation of the race equality discourse and its key actors. Despite that, it proffered glimpses of an alternative which are interesting because, at that stage, they prefigured what was to become the bases for a full blown assault on the race equality and women’s equality initiatives.

In briefly outlining this ‘neo-equality’ discourse, one which can be almost described as a proto new right Labour equality discourse, attention will be drawn to the main elements, inserting where appropriate a critical counter commentary. It is clear from the start of the paper that its main protagonist, despite using the generic term ‘equal opportunities’ in the title, is the race equality discourse. Thus the author writes that his main area of address is “that of racial discrimination” and that of the concomitant “highly procedural approach to the problem so far.” The paper was actually written in mid 1985, one year after the inception of the race equality programme. At that stage there were race equality policies in various positions of agreement and implementation, some of which were premised upon the development of employment procedures. However, these procedures were envisaged in those areas of employment managerial action where none existed before. They were based upon the positive embedding of rights and control of potential distorting communicative forces. Perhaps the author was unwittingly providing an early echo of Jay’s criticism of Habermas that his utopia was that of a utopia of procedures. Nevertheless the paper goes on to describe race equality as simply another organisational goal which has to “compete for resources ..with other goals, especially the
need to maintain a good working relationship with the manual trade unions who have goals and agendas of their own." This, in a nutshell, was the marginalising conceptualisation of race by the labourist councillors, as one amongst a multiplicity of goals. The Race Relations Committee, the central Race Unit and other advisers had, on the other hand, been clear from the outset that race equality should be considered as the core and sharp cutting edge around which, and from which, the organisational substance of local governance are de- and reconstructed. To conclude the introductory part of the paper, five motivational drivers are identified as the reason for the council pursuing action on equalities. Three stand out. In the first which compounds the marginalisation, the paper identifies as a motivation and then goes on to belittle the anti-discriminatory legislation describing it as favouring a "gradualist approach to change as positive or reverse discrimination." As the senior manager charged with interpreting and applying of employment legislation in the council, this egregious misreading of the anti-discriminatory legislation was, for the advisers, worrying. The second identifies "an implicit moral obligation in the socialist philosophy underpinning the approach of the majority group in the council...(which in this context)...means equality of treatment between races and sexes." As the advisers were quick to point out it actually is an explicit moral obligation in terms of the legislation, socialist or not, and that in terms of socialism, the explicit moral component relating to equality had an implicit nuance on whether or not race and gender should be explicitly acknowledged. In the light of the arguments and debates both generally in and around socialism, and more specifically within the political institution of the Labour Party, attempting to maintain that as an implicit consideration was, for the advisers, and even his own senior manager, a serving labour councillor in another borough, totally disingenuous. The third aspect of motivational drivers that stands out is the way in which the pressure from the Black communities was acknowledged. Both as an example of marginalising conceptualisation and functionalist reasoning the author opines that "from the point of view of the political realities, its perceived contribution to the avoidance of social unrest (as experienced in Brixton) is perhaps one of the strongest motivators of the target borough’s policies." This was certainly not the motivational inspiration for the Race Advisers, Race Relations Committee, and other key public sphere participants in the race equality discourse whose prime stimulus could be said to be the redemption of the moral claims of racial justice. Within such a framework of instrumental reasoning, as demonstrated by what I have taken to be a textualised example of labourism, it is perhaps clear why race equality should only be warranted an implicit moral obligation within the pantheon of socialism subscribed to.

It is at this stage that the author of the paper indulges in a wild, caricatured representation of the race advisers, the race equality discourse and the supposed definition of racism it adheres to, as well as the analysis of British
society it supporting it. The term ‘British’ is brought in because it is used by the report’s author, but used in a way that seeks to distinguish the real situation of Britishness, inclusive of a common lifeworld values’ interpretation of British society, which he and the labourist councillors have, and which those ‘outsiders’, i.e. the race advisers, obviously lack. Notes at the time by the head of the Race Unit reveal that he viewed this particular part of the report as “offensive” and “paranoid,” summarising it metaphorically as the attempt “to create a badly fired clay Frankenstein so that it can be shattered with an air gun pellet.” In the report the claim is made that the race and women’s advisers ‘naturally, came from the ‘voluntary sector’ with either a ‘bitter experience of the prejudice they are fighting or at least a strong personal involvement.’ Consequently these lead to difficulties within the organisation because their supposed inexperience in local government causes frustration and despair at the slow pace of change. Organisations, as well, are “not used to dealing with activists inside who not only do not accept the conventions and protocol of the organisation but...in many instances wish to overthrow them.”

Another Race Adviser summed up this position as strongly implying that “anti-racists equal anarchists”. One detects in this pasquinade, of course, a variation of racial stereotypes caused by the conflation of two anthropophagii, viz. the noble savage and the savage with the chip on the shoulder, both of whom, in this instance, are welded together to create the naïve, inexperienced, nobly intentioned savage frustrated by her/his inability to come to terms with the complexity of modern local government institutions, and thus railing and flailing with her/his clubs against the civilising conventions that seek to bind him/her. The reality, however, was quite the opposite. All of the race advisers had had on average five years previous local government experience in other authorities prior to the job they then currently held. If anyone displayed a lack of local government experience, it was the report’s author who had been recruited direct from the National Health Service where he had spent the major part of his career up to that point. Further the labourist councillors, most of whom held jobs in the tertiary educational sector or voluntary sector, had their primary experience of local government through their political office, and that went back, for many of them, to 1982 when they were first elected.

Because of this purported background context to the advisers, the report then goes on to speculate, they operate with a flawed analyses of British society which is then projected on to the target borough. This analysis of British society is derived from their analysis of racism in which power is concentrated in a few white hands who try to keep other racial groups out of power. In fact what was being attributed to the Race Advisers as their definition of racism, and thus their view of British society, was a version of the Racism Awareness Training analytical schema. In this racism is reduced to an equation like “prejudice plus power”, a position only attainable by
white people. Thus, the false reasoning displayed by the paper's author goes, the only way to change societies is “to seize the centres of power....and rigidly enforce the hierarchical authority ... to new ends.”

This alien view is wrong because “British society is a liberal pluralist democracy underpinned by conventions of acceptance of dissent and opposition... and the target borough is far more plural than most parts of this society!” But it is not only the advisers who are guilty of not understanding or wanting to accept the British way of doing things because “Black people may rightly feel that the wait for progress has been too long already...(but)...this past delay has mainly been caused by their lack of willingness to overcome objections and resistance by discussion and argument with all concerned.” The advisers’ response to this, at the meeting convened to discuss the report with its author, was that this was yet again an attempt to pathologise Black people’s response to racism by blaming them for the failings of this “liberal democracy.”

At another level the reduction by the report’s author of the argument to a nationalistic one, as an exclusionary differentiating technique, goes to the heart of my critique of the unnecessary ambivalence in Habermas’ notion of “constitutional patriotism’, and the counter need to talk only of the principles of constitutionalism.

This representationed, risible pastiche of the advisers’ views and the interchanging of advisers with Black people as a homogenous whole, so as to blame them all for the lack of progress because they are, essentially, not rational enough, has important communicative insights. Firstly, because the point about Black people not being patient or rational enough emerged at later points from the then Chair of the Direct Labour Committee in discussion with other councillors, it is clear that some Labour labourist councillors were talking here at this point. Secondly none of the councillors or manager concerned had actually bothered, despite the fact that they had more power to do so, to open a communicative channel with the advisers about their views and analyses of racism and the wider society. This is exemplified by the fact that it was the advisers who had to call for a meeting to discuss his own report. Thirdly, at another level it demonstrates how easy it can be for Habermas’ original construction, which is one without the full consideration of the race dimension, of the conditions for rational discussion and the substance of that rationality, to be suborned to support a racially exclusive monologue. That is to say that making a claim for all concerned to be involved, as the report later goes on to do, without the proper communicative procedural safeguards which prevent racism taking place during the deliberations, or as a continuing outcome of those deliberations, is not sufficient to satisfy the claims of racial justice.

Certainly both the way in which this labourist argument was constructed, and the way in which it was brought forward as a claim, are redolent of communicative closure. They breach one of the two principles I theorised
earlier relating to the procedural device of non-closure, i.e. "such communicative processes cannot close if the outcome disadvantages those participants in question and contributes at that or some future point to the breaching of the principles of communicative discourse."

But this sort of closure is precisely what the report, in representing the discourse of labourism, goes on to advocate. In the final section an alternative equality strategy is outlined which is then recommended as the one to replace the race equality programme, and, ipso facto, the communicative shut down of the race equality discourse. This has four main recommendations which are based on a brief hagiography of the main labourist councillors, with their modus operandi serving as the 'philosophical' bases to those recommendations. Thus it is related that the approach of the then Chair and Vice-Chair of the Personnel Committee – and in the latter case that vice chair was also chair of the Direct Labour Committee – has been the most successful in involving all the employees because it has involved all the unions. The manual unions, in particular, had always argued that they had been left off the equality agenda, and the councillors, recognising the 'pluralist nature' of power in the target borough were including them. In fact the manual workers local branches had been consulted about the earlier attempts at equality initiatives, such as the first head count monitoring exercise. Further their own unions had begun to tackle the issue of equalities nationally through the appointment of specialist equality advisers and the development of policies. Nevertheless this involvement of all people was premised upon Black people not displaying a 'lack of willingness to overcome objections and resistance by discussion and argument.' To that end the strategy would be based upon:

♦ Having the Equal Opportunities Working Party, as set up by the labourist councillors, as "the major focus for improvements towards equality in employment."

♦ Arguing, by allowing the inference to be drawn, for the Black and Women's groups in the departments to be shut down because "there is some evidence that these groups lead to resentment and feelings of special treatment being afforded ...(by, amongst others)...white males."

♦ Ending the development of more equality policies

♦ Concentrating the equality resources on the Direct Labour Organisation

Despite the supposed commitment to having 'all involved', all this strategy would have achieved would have been the hi-jacking of the equality programmes, re-routing them through personnel and Direct Labour, and shifting the control likewise. In so doing all of the other multiple
communicative points of entry into the race equality discourse— the Race Relations Committee, the Black worker groups, the Black communities, the Race Advisers, the actors and developments in the public sphere supporting the race equality discourse, would effectively be sealed off. It is clear that that discourse, and those primarily making claims for and through it, i.e. Black people, were seen as disruptive, threatening perhaps the renewal of a legitimating constituency for the labourist councillors. Both from these councillors, and from the senior manager who ‘authored’ the above quoted report, came a strongly voiced sentiment the race equality programme, and the advisers, had to be more strongly controlled. Over that first year those same labourist councillors, on a number of occasions, usually at the same time that requests were being made for the head of the race unit to be disciplined, also made requests to the senior managers concerned for the race equality programme to be more ‘effectively managed and controlled.’ Those managers were, at those junctures, quick to point out that they, i.e. the Labour councillors, had agreed to the policy whereby the Race Advisers could open a direct, managerially uninterrupted communicative interface with the politicians. These same councillors associated with the labourist discourse, despite having been party to the decision affecting the communicative structural location of the race equality workers, then pursued a parallel strategy—and this was conveyed back to the Race Advisers via the then Chair of the Race Relations Committee—in the Labour Group of seeking to have a review of the Race Unit and its work instituted on the basis that ‘it was not delivering’. It can be said, as part of the evidence of my claim that the race equality discourse had a fragile hegemony, that from late 1985 onwards the Race Equality Unit, Advisers, Black workers, certain Black councillors, and others in the race equality discourse’s public sphere had to fight a number of rearguard battles at attempts, primarily through calls for a review launched in the communicative closed forum that was the Labour group in the target borough, to close down the race equality programme. Within that same Labour Group, by the end of 1985, the efforts of the labourist councillors to re-write and control the race equality discourse had failed primarily because the communicative force of the spaces and channels opened up in the institution, including the griot like interventions by the race advisers into the political domain of the Group, prevented that discourse’s attenuation.

By the end of 1985, and in the run up to the April/May 1986 local government elections affecting London boroughs, it can be said that the race equality discourse in the target borough had, therefore, managed to attain a degree of organisational hegemony. It can be argued that the discourse of labourism’s key participants attempted to make claims for racial justice on behalf of Black people in trying to write an equality strategy and implement it, but because “the relationship between evaluative judgements and normative judgements, that is, between competing conceptions of the good
society, on the one hand, and judgements about justice and its implementation, on the other" was effectively conflated with a paternalistic ‘shepherding’ of white working class interests, their “claim to rationality in this dispute about proposed collective arrangements” failed. It did so because the claim, in that form did not make them intersubjectively responsible to all others, but only partially so. One can contrast the ‘democratic break-in’ approach to communicative participation which arose from the race equality discourse with the ‘democratic limitation’ mode of labourism, that despite their facadic claims to want to involve all. Further the implied new way of ‘doing administrative things’ which is flagged up by their ostensible recognition of a plurality of power in the target borough and of wanting to involve the trade unions, is contradicted by their pursuit of traditional, hierarchical power configurations so that institutional violence, in the shape of the employment disciplinary process, can be meted out to some Race Advisers because those councillors did not like being told that certain courses of action they wished to pursue would be an abrogation of their stated race equality responsibilities. Values, means and ends is a substantive issue which resurfaces again in the emergence of neo-managerialism in the target borough. By May 1986, the time of the local elections, some one and a half to two years after the initial policy and procedure recommendations were first accepted by the race relations committee, and despite labourist attempts to subvert these, the crucial elements to the race equality programme had been accepted as overall council policy and were being implemented. This included the supposed vexed question of implementing the equality targets’ and associated monitoring systems and processes. Despite being finally ‘imposed’ on the local leadership of the manual worker unions, their promised countervailing threat of electoral damage, did not emerge. Instead the Labour party was returned with an increased number of councillors in the 1986 elections. The Equal Opportunities Working Party was quietly wound up, not by the advisers who still wished for a forum in its original conception, but by the councillors who no longer saw any strategic merit in trying to control the race equality discourse through such a body.

11.29 Neo-managerialism and race: attempting to reconstruct the discourse of sameness

The immediate post 1985 period saw the consolidation of the race equality discourse and programme in the target borough. Partially this was because the communicative openings developed within the administrative and political systems allowed the force of moral claims for racial justice to be made across multiple points and sites. This evolving framework for facilitating acts of appropriation also ensured that the arguments for agreeing the initial phase of the race equality programme was won against the counter arguments and instrumentalised tactics of those pursuing the labourist
However the 1986 local elections' and the subsequent 1987 national elections' processes caused a strategic hiatus to develop in the attention Labour councillors could give to the race equality programme because much of their time was spent on trying to ensure Labour dominance in both. In terms of the 1986 local elections, the race equality programme and discourse was further strengthened by the request of the Chair and vice Chair of the Race Relations Committee, in the run up to those elections, for the head of the Race Unit and some of the Race Advisers to assist, informally, in the drafting of the relevant section of the manifesto of the local Labour Party relating to race equality. Without claiming any cause and effect relationship, it is interesting to note that Labour was returned with an increased number of councillors, including a few more Black councillors. One of the reasons for the communicative shut down threats on the part of the labourist councillors, i.e. that race would prove to be an electoral disadvantage, was shown, therefore, probably to be wrong.

However, this does not mean that at this time in the target borough, the aftermath of the local elections, that the discourse of labourism’s actors and arguments against the developing race equality discourse disappeared. In fact the 1986 intake of Labour councillors showed an increase in the number of those who could be described as labourist. The post 1986 local elections leadership of the Labour Group reflected this with the previous Chair of the Direct Labour Committee, and a prominent councillor in the labourist discourse, became Leader. Other labourist councillors either retained their previous positions, as with the Chair of the Personnel Committee, or assumed the Chairships of key council committees. There was as well a few prominent councillors, all of whom were supportive of the race equality programme, who did not stand again. This included the Chair of the Race Relations Committee who can be credited with being the main force behind the creation of the central Race Unit and Race Committee. Whilst there were an increased number of Black councillors, not all of these were sympathetic to the race equality programme or structures. For example one, in a previous role as head of a local ethnic based voluntary organisation, had been involved in dubious practices relating to an application for grant money from the Race Relations Committee. The subsequent refusal of his application did not endear him to the Race Unit. Another, despite being involved in the plagiarisation of the Unit’s Equality Target’s Policy for another local authority, pursued a biologically reductionist interpretation of ‘Black’, in this case conflating it solely with Afro-Caribbean, as a basis for hostility towards the Unit’s members of staff who were regarded as not being Black enough. A third had been a previous member of a Militant type Trotskyist political organisation and still harboured a plethoric hostility towards what he regarded as the elevation of race above the primordial location of societal change, i.e. class. Unlike the previous group of Black councillors, with whom the equality advisers and the Black workers had
been able to develop episodes of temporary participatory and decisionistic action based on the solidaristic, inter-subjective framework of ‘Black’ as a cognitive signifier, such forms of action was to prove more difficult with the new group of Black councillors. Black councillors faced a number of contradictory pressures, not least of which is being prefixed with the identifier ‘Black’. Some, and there were a few in the target borough, eschewed such categorisations preferring to be thought of simply as a councillor. Those who appropriated the identification of ‘Black’ made claims at the same time about having a constituency over and above that of the members of the electoral ward who elected them. These other constituents who were also represented were those of the Black communities. These were, in many cases, rhetorical constituencies because few of these councillors had bothered to develop supplemental accountability structures and processes with these other constituents. Formal accountability remained firmly with the political party of which they were members and which was the actual organisational body that got elected. Apart, then, from the first Chair of the Race Relations Committee in the target borough, none of the Black councillors had either a prominent community profile, prior to being elected, or any kind of activist base in the local Black communities. Any degree of community conspicuousness was attained as a result of becoming a Labour councillor. The reference above to temporary episodes of solidarity is an acknowledgement that the communicative force of action under the umbrella of ‘Black’ could be easily subverted by the instrumentalised force of political party career advancement, or discipline. There were Black councillors, in the second wave, whose initial support of the race equality programme, expressed also in the frequent contact with the Race Advisers, waned with the offer, and subsequent acceptance, of vice Chair and Chair positions of various council committees. Often this manifested itself in the interposing of the communicative hierarchicalising and distancing protocol device of “me-member-you-officer” The advisers used to refer to this process, whereby the initial enthusiastic support for race equality, often loudly voiced by new Black councillors, tails off during and after the political market deals surrounding the appointment of committee positions, as “being sucked by the system.” With the new Black councillors, then, there was a greater chance of solidaristic work with other key participants in the local Black public sphere being disrupted through de-legitimating tactics. For example, the councillor of Trotskyist persuasion, mentioned above, who had also had a long running political dispute in the local Labour Party with the previous Chair of the Race Relations Committee, was quite prepared to enter an unholy alliance with the labourist councillors to support, as a ‘Black councillor’, calls for a review of the Race Equality Unit and Race Relations Committee. The formal political context then to the race equality programme in the wake of those local elections was not as conducive to the support of the race equality initiatives, even if the momentum for opening up
of communicative spaces in the interstices of the organisation was developing as a result of that programme.

I want to argue, now, that the discourse of labourism did not go away, especially its attempt to incorporate the race equality discourse. Rather it was absorbed by the discourse of neo-managerialism, and, in turn, transformed by that absorption, into a skewed universalising, depoliticising discourse. In so doing it represented a new response by a social democratic political party to the utopia of welfarism, which had been the traditional post second world war emancipatory compromise to the harm inflicted on the working class by the capitalist system. It also represented, equally, a renewed attempt to de-utopianise the claims of racial justice. In the target borough the threat of racial fear was as important, if not more important, in the attempts to reconfigure the relationship between the formal political sphere, the administrative system, and local civil society. The development of this discourse was explicit and conscious, involving the deliberate choice of a course of action over and above others which were considered. Included in these others were a radical variant of the social labour argument, and those represented by the race and women's equality discourses. The reasons for this choice, I shall argue, focussed primarily on the most effective and expedient means to enhance and secure secondary level legitimation for the local Labour Party in the target borough. These considerations extended, however, only to the Labour Group. Any consultation that did take place with others who had a concern, occurred post facto; and then only with those within the labourist public sphere, like the manual and craft unions. This communicatively closing and limiting form of political decision making did not involve Black people, other than the Black councillors, or seek to use the communicative networks established through the race equality discourse in any kind of attempt to secure the equal participation of a wider group of Black people in the deliberations. Rather this new universalising discourse at first ran parallel with the equality ones, and then sought to absorb them. This, I shall argue, was part of a calculated move, on the part of the Labour Party at this local level, which 'reasoned' that maintaining the white vote was far more important than that of trying to bring in Black people on a full, equal and inclusive basis. In my summary of the key theoretical complements at the beginning of this chapter I portrayed this as recasting "the configuration of consensus formation by calculating that the marginalised could be excluded without much damage to the government's acceptance."

The nomenclature "neo-managerialism" is used to distinguish that process from what can be termed the traditional, public sector form of management. As I argued in the overview, management has, since the sixties, been a recurring issue within the sphere of local governance. This issue has always been framed in terms of a distinction between the management
processes in local government, cast as bad according to changing criteria, and that of the private sector, cast as good and dynamic, and thus for the need to 'managerialise' local government in line with the latter. This has resulted in the periodic importation of private sector management techniques into local government, as evidenced by the corporate management ideology of the seventies, and highlighted in Cockburn's analyses of Lambeth. However, there were two characteristics which distinguishes the early attempts to 'managerialise' local government, and the period I have described as neo-managerialism. The first is that the solution of management to perceived problems of local government had, up to the mid eighties, always been proffered by national government. Management, as an explicit issue, was hardly ever taken up by local politicians. Certainly, as I have shown, in the radical boroughs of the early eighties there were no attempts to de- and reconstruct management from any kind of socialist viewpoint. Rather, as Dearlove argues, management was a means to an end, i.e. furthering the "cause of the proletariat." There are elements of this justification in the discourse of labourism pursued in the target borough. Secondly the introduction of new management techniques was piecemeal, reflecting perhaps, the lack of local political will, and permitting, instead, the exercise of the discretionary prerogative of key senior managers in having the surrogate power to introduce different systems. Within the target borough, at the beginning of the race equality initiative, I had described the state of management as being inchoate and still mired in the practices of traditional management. This reflects Dearlove's description of such management as, "incrementalism; muddling through; satisficing; fragmentation; specialist management; professionalism; vagueness of objectives and the failure to make policies explicit; the limited analysis of alternatives; short term planning; the absence of monitoring and review of performance." 1008

The period of 'neo-managerialism' within the context of local governance in the target borough, on the other hand, has, I contend, a number of key distinguishing characteristics. Firstly it was introduced by and received the full stewardship of the local politicians running the council. Secondly it was introduced as a technical solution to what was a perceived political problem, i.e. the recouping of legitimation costs seen to be accruing from the national government onslaught on local government and from the race equality programme. Thirdly its internal universalist assumptions are explicitly championed as being universally applicable to all areas, including equalities. Fourthly a related part of this explicitness is the overt presentation of this process as "neutral", and the best means to achieve the goals of efficiency, efficacy and economy. Fifthly this universalisation of management gives rise to process of the 'management of management' whereby managerialism, as a discourse, through a panoply of training and vocational interventions, including the explicit validation of 'manager'
through academic type qualifications. Sixthly this universalisation of neo-managerialism punishes the "pursuit of competing agendas", counter pursuing, instead, a limited, reductionist range of techniques and forms of 'expertisation' which are deemed suitable for all types of occasions. All six characteristics give rise to the discourse, including the actors therein, becoming conscious of itself as management. Managers in local government are no longer recognised as such simply because they hold hierarchical positions of power over people and resources. Instead competency and capability have to be explicitly demonstrated through the claim to, if not the demonstration of, knowledge and experience of particular managerial techniques, e.g. performance management.

The introduction and pursuit of the race equality programme in the target borough through the race equality discourse was not done without any reference to management. In fact it can be argued, and shown, that the race equality programme was the basis for both first bringing into focus the pertinent issue of management, especially in relation to the achievement of equality objectives, and for introducing, through its anti-racist programmes and allied policies, a systemised, explicit form of management. This required a 'pro-active' stance, as well as means of evaluating and reviewing action all of which had to be inclusive of the participation of Black people. It was a form of performance management, but one in which accountability was not tied to a management accounting system, but to deliberative fora. In this it pre-dated Alvesson and Willmott's articulation of the aim of critical theory vis-à-vis management, which is not "to indulge in the Utopian project of eliminating hierarchy... or the separation of management from from other forms of work", but, ".. to foster the development of organisations in which communications .. are progressively less distorted by socially oppressive, asymmetrical relations of power." Additionally there is the dimension brought to - if one temporarily brackets out 'management' - 'getting things done' which is exemplified in the processes and practices of the race equality structures. Thus, for example, at the end of the municipal year in 1985 the Head of the Race Unit produced a review of the previous year's work and progress on race equality in the target borough. This, prefaced, the section on departmental progress with the observation that the "problems facing the implementation of ...race equality in Departments are a combination of those immanent in the management structure and institutional racism....(where)..the former is a good breeding ground for the latter." It went on to diagnose a "lack of good basic management skills necessary to deal effectively with the issue of race equality", and that the target borough "appears still to be operating in the 1960's...and not that expected of an avowed progressive local authority of the 1980's." Solutions were offered to the identified problems in terms of both developing the appropriate policy and review systems as well as the need to "make management more accountable to council policy...more specifically
to those who suffer from racism; giving access to those who experience racism to the decision making forums with power; and ensuring that resource allocation is built into those decisions involving the participation of Black people.

Within the context of the race equality discourse and the operational principles outlined guiding the practice of the Race Advisers, it can be seen that appropriating interventions in management practice and structures were very much part of work. These interventions attempted to achieve a number of aims. These were to: uphold the legal and organisational rights of employees, especially Black employees, emphasise and reinforce that ‘management’, generally and specifically within the target borough, have particular social and political histories; undermine, therefore, the shibboleth that managers have a ‘divine right to manage’; initiate and sustain communicative deliberative fora around the axis of racial justice in key parts of management procedures and decision making processes; contextualise, therefore, and diminish managerial discretion in the to want to discriminate; and be the catalyst for alternative political forms of accountability of managers. Under the aegis of the race equality programme appropriate equality training packages were also designed for managers and other employees. Taken together, this race equality focussed attempt to reconstruct management strived to situate managers as human actors in the real social and political environments of local governance where race equality was a priority. This meant rethinking their power relationship with the employees they managed, and with the communities they were employed to ‘serve’. At the time the unit coined a neologism to try to describe the managerial transformation being attempted. This was that just as ‘cyborgs’ could be described as technologically enhanced organisms, so the aim was to develop ‘equorgs’, or equality enhanced managers. Backing this up was the example being shown by the new patterns of working and new relationships of organisational power usage and negotiation being shown by the race equality structures. This has been outlined earlier in the section on the overview of the race equality programme, and in my arguments surrounding the use of the ‘griot’ analogy to situate the race advisers. Gauging the success or not of these attempts at managerial transformation could prove difficult if one went by the conventional organisational means of measurement. The Race Advisers, because of the nature of the work and the way in which that was operationalised in the target borough, were always under attack. Whilst the quality of the work was grudgingly recognised by senior managers in the centre, the way in which the further development in the organisation was pursued by that group of workers was deemed “unsmiling.” This latter term is used to exemplify the more general feeling which was essentialised in the complaint by one senior manager that the Head of the Race Unit “never smiled.” This perhaps expressed the intimated, but unvoiced feeling that Race Advisers would be primarily
engaged in hand holding race relations type exercises with management. On the other hand it attests, as well, to the way in which the recursive anthropophagii, in this case ‘too much attitude’, mal-structures any potential inter-subjective relationship through casting doubt on one or more of the three validity claims underpinning speech acts. For the advisers, and other race equality workers, the measure of success, however, was to be evaluated by the extent to which Black people felt able to launch their own acts of appropriation. Thus, within the organisation, the increase in the number of grievance complaints, or harassment complaints, or group complaints by Black employees, was taken as a sign that those employees felt confident enough to embark on courses of action which previously would have been seen, and dealt with, as acts of institutional suicide. Externally the increase in the number of Black people and their organisations making representations to the council over matters of racial justice, or resources, or both, were taken as signs that the discretionary powers of the organisation, devolved through their managers, to discriminate in any way, was being broken down.

I want to show now, by reference to key documents, how the discourse/diskourse of neo-managerialism was consciously introduced into the target borough as a means to renew the legitimation bases of the local Labour Party vis-à-vis local governance. The process of this renewal would involve the depoliticisation of the administrative system through the over valorization of ‘managerialism’ as the only recognised value context therein, and the linked re-emphasis of the formal political system as the only one which can act politically. Whilst the ostensible reason for this move was portrayed as a pragmatic response to the increasing attempts by the Conservative national government to control and restructure further local government, allied documents show clearly that the racial fear of losing the white vote played an equal, if not greater, part. In many ways the introduction of the discourse of neo-managerialism into the target borough conforms to Fairclough’s thinking about the way in which organisations and institutions displayed the transparent need to control discourses at the close of the eighties, i.e. “to bring about changes in discourse practices as part of the engineering of social and cultural change.....a ‘technologization of discourse’”. The documents referred to were the crucial policy papers drafted by the then Leader of the ruling Labour group on the council in response to the then perceived ‘crisis’, and the counter discursive responses from the central Race Unit and other participants in the local Black public sphere, like the Black Workers Group. This particular councillor was a key player in the labourist discourse, and one of the prime movers at the ‘behind closed doors’ attempts to rein in the race equality programme. What was unusual, at this time, in the target borough, was the willingness of the Leader of the Labour Group to commit ideas to paper. Whilst some senior managers, like the Chief Executive, or other senior managers who might
have dual Labour Party membership/council officer hats, might be involved in the consultation and drafting of such papers, normally the restricted and closed communicative channels within which such papers are drafted and developed were maintained. It was equally unusual, therefore, for a critical commentary to be provided by what was no more than a third tier officer, i.e. one who was the third from top ‘managerial’ rung in the hierarchy, and, further more, for that commentary to be circulated to the whole Labour Group in an attempt to persuade them otherwise. But this is precisely the basis upon which the head of the Race Unit, utilising the communicative channels opened through the race equality structures, tried to counter the diskourse razzias with repulsing acts of discursive appropriation. As far as possible, I will allow the papers and counter discourses to speak for themselves; or, more relevantly within the theoretical context of this research project, to speak to each other.

The production of these policy papers, which set the framework for the introduction of a technologised neo-managerialist discourse into the target borough, and their discursive, antithetic rebuttal, through the ability of the race equality advisers to engage in acts of communicative appropriation, requires further contextualisation. At one level, as the drama is unfolded, it provides a glimpse into the emancipatory possibilities of a fully fledged discursively framed democracy of difference, as envisaged by Dryzek. Further contextualisation of that time, the period of the mid eighties up to 1987, will provide a brief overview of the pressures for change being brought to bear on local government.

11.30 Neo-managerialist Context

As I have argued in Chapter 5, the Conservative national government of the time had distinct plans with regard to the welfare state, and inter alia, local government which was still a major controller of, and provider of welfare services. Whilst ostensibly portrayed as rolling back and cutting the costs of the welfare state, and making the individual more responsible for her/his welfare, the substantial intention can be read at two complementary levels. The first was the transfer of legitimation costs of local governance to the national level thereby bringing it within the control and remit of national government. Legitimation was reconfigured in terms of ‘good housekeeping’ which for local government was epitomised in the core management accounting aims written for them, i.e. the three ‘E’s’, economy, efficiency and effectiveness.

The second complementary level is a shadowing one of technical learning for dominance and has to do with racial fear as a motivator for wanting to depoliticise local governance. It is re-colonisation through the displacement and replacement of political spaces with administrative
systems. Whilst, at this time, the national government appeared quite happy to sponsor, and even indulge in, attacks on the 'profligacy' and 'lunacy' of Labour run councils' equality initiatives, it was also happy, in a quieter way, to direct state funds towards 'on the ground' race initiatives. For example, the principal researcher whilst working in Lambeth, had to deal with the officials administering the Section 11 fund in the Home Office. They were very clear, especially in the aftermath of 1981, that, despite the 1966 legislation's restricting criteria, the money could be spent on a variety of race related posts, including those with an anti-racist remit. There was encouragement, as well, through the CRE, for local CRCs. However, given the marginalising, intermediary construction of section 11 and community relations councils, it is reasonable to suppose that a substantial element of "indirect rule through 'native' structures" type thinking lay behind this twin strategy with the appearance of mutual incompatibility.

This process of the nationalisation, if you like, of local government legitimation through depoliticisation, presented itself in a number of government initiated strategies, many of them legislatively backed. There was the reduction of funds available to local government through both decreasing the amount of government grant available and at the same time limiting the amount that could be raised through local rates. There was the 'quangoisation' of welfare services whereby services previously under the control of a political body was shifted to one made up of government appointees. Many of the GLC's services ended up with this arrangement post abolition. There was the opting out scenario whereby, for example, if local residents of a local government housing estate so voted, they could transfer control to a housing association. There was the privatisation process exemplified in the compulsory competitive tendering legislation (CCT) whereby, on a rolling programme basis determined by national government, tranches of local government services have to be put out to tender in competition with potential private sector providers. However, there was, as well, another aspect to government intervention which sought, again, to re-focus and restructure the managerial content of local government.

There were two overlapping strategies to this refocussing and restructuring, both of them based in private sector managerial ideologies. The first was to establish as the quintessence of local government management a management accounting base in which resource usage is solely evaluated through the three 'E's' - economy, efficiency and effectiveness. The second was to support this through wrapping it in a number of managerial initiatives aimed at securing a value and culture change both within the organisation and managers themselves. In the early to mid eighties this part of the government's interventions in local governance was spearheaded by the Audit Commission. In terms of its own description of its activities:
The Audit Commission was established in 1983 to appoint and regulate the external auditors of local authorities in England and Wales. District Auditors were first appointed in the 1840s to inspect the accounts of authorities administering the Poor Law. Auditors ensured that safeguards were in place against fraud and corruption and that local rates were being used for the purposes intended. The founding principles remain as relevant today as they were 150 years ago. Public funds need to be used wisely, as well as in accordance with the law. The task of today’s auditors is to assess expenditure, not just for probity and regularity, but for value for money as well. 1017

It is the added ‘value for money’ element of the remit that provides the grounding for the Commission’s management accounting focussed managerial interventions into local governance. There are other parts of this statement which are value laden, yet pose as commonsensical, taken-for-granted ‘facts’, such as “public funds need to be used wisely”. This begs the question about who decides the criteria for defining ‘wisely, and, more importantly, how those criteria are developed. That is, it elides the issue of democracy. One of the first managerialist forays into local governance launched by the Audit Commission in 1984, was to promote uncritically the findings of the then newly published American management book, “In Search of Excellence,” as the managerial discernments to be followed by local government. This was picked up by the Local Government Training Board, (LGTB), later to become the Local Government Management Board, (LGMB), a body funded by local authorities and whose brief was to devise appropriate practise improvement interventions for local authorities. In a joint venture with John Stewart of the Birmingham University based Institute for Local Government Studies (INLOGOV), a series of seminars for senior managers in local government was organised. These, in a mild criticism of the Audit Commission, attempted to make “In Search of Excellence” more palatable and relevant for the public sector, especially local government. It was an attempt to reach a pragmatic compromise between an American managerial solution and a UK localist version of local government. The result, contained in the LGTB publication, “Excellence and Local Government”, unfortunately owed a greater intellectual debt to ‘Excellence’, than to Stewart’s then nascent attempts to develop a localist paradigm for local governance. 1019 This bears on Dearlove’s criticism of university based local governance bodies, like INLOGOV and its leading acolyte Stewart, whom he describes as acting as if they are limply the “servants of power”. 1020

11.31 Neo-managerialism in the Target Borough

In the target borough ‘Excellence’ formally entered the considerations of managers through the training section of the Personnel Division, which circulated the LGTB document referred to above, and through the
intervention of the then Leader in the Chief Officers' Team Meeting. This was the labourist oriented councillor described above. At one of the meetings in early 1987 he was invited to speak about the managerial direction he wanted the council to go in. This, he achieved by comparing the content of two books. The first, which he misrepresented by caricature, was a slim volume entitled, “What a Way to Run a Railroad”. 102 This was a critique, from the left, of the organisational mistakes arising from too simplistic an interpretation and application of collective based working in organisations. Whilst highly critical of the ‘excellence’ school of management, it did not dismiss management tout court, but put forward the view that management should not be defined as “crude power or authority, but as relative authority which is needed if complex tasks are to be carried out…. (and which should be)... accountable to the whole.”1022 It was portrayed, by the then Leader however, as being a statement about the need for collective working. The other book was “In Search of Excellence.” The latter was held up as the way forward. In terms of the audience, all the Chief Officers and the two heads of the two equality units, it was only the heads of the two equality units who criticised the approach, pointing out that his misrepresentation had created a straw dog which could be easily torched. Further, it was also pointed out, there were other sources of local government renewal, more amenable to an avowed socialist local authority, which could be accessed, like Hogget, and even Stewart. Finally ‘Excellence’ was heavily criticised by the heads of the Race and Women’s Units for its complete lack of any kind of equality dimension. At this point the beginnings of an overt discourse clash over neo-managerialism in the target borough were starting to emerge, with the leadership and senior management, on the one hand, and the equality advisers and key participants in the local public spheres, on the other.

“In Search of Excellence” is the distillation of key findings of a late seventies research into the top American companies undertaken by the authors, Peters and Waterman. In a near sycophantic summary of the key interrogative question, Stewart, in the LGTB paper, says that the “question posed...is beautifully simple.” This is “what do excellent run corporations have in common which distinguishes them from less well run corporations? What is the secret of their excellence?”1023 The answer comes down to eight key attributes. These are:

1. Bias for Action i.e. do it, fix it, try it.
2. Closeness to the Customer i.e. listen intently and regularly to the customer and provide quality, service and reliability in response to the customer need
3. Autonomy and Entrepreneurship i.e. innovation and risk taking as en expected way of doing things rather than conformity and conversation.
4. Productivity through People i.e. employees are seen as the source of quality and productivity

5. Hands-on, value drivers i.e. the basic philosophy of the organisation is well-defined and articulated

6. Stick to the Knitting i.e. Stay close to what you can do well

7. Single form lean staff i.e. structural arrangements and systems’ are simple with small headquarters staff

8. Simultaneous loose-tight properties i.e. centralised control of values, but operational decentralisation.

As Stewart summarises, the implications of these attributes are, “a central feature of excellent business corporations are the component beliefs and shared values within its cultures.”

The role then of managers is the management of culture. This involves, opines Stewart, “revolutionary change in the way most local government officers define their own role.”

This ‘revolutionary change’ applies only, initially to senior managers. From amongst these will be identified a “strong leader” who, in the initial stages will, “provide the drive and determination and the core values and strategic vision which give meaning to the company’s activities.” But that is only part of the ‘Excellence’ equation. These ideas and values have to be built into “the organisation’s structures and information systems, into its recruitment and socialisation systems, into its reward and incentive systems.”

Taken together, and they have to be taken together, these two features present a holistic solution to developing ‘excellence’ in organisations. The advisers were quick to point out that at a time when, for the first time in its history, the institutions of local governance were being opened up to a multiplicity of values from the local communities, that an attempt to artificially create, control and reduce the internal value base of what is a political organisation, smacks of crypto-fascism. In addition whilst the cultural value base of a private sector organisation could be reduced to a single number of inter-related variables because, at the end of the day, there was only one dominant value, i.e. profit, the same could not be said about a local democratically based organisation, like local government.

However, it was the NALGO Black Workers Group in the target borough which produced the most trenchant critique of the ‘Excellence’ paradigm. The issue of management, particularly what was regarded as the insinuation of the ‘Excellence’ model into the target borough, had been debated in the group. A small research project was undertaken looking into the background of the companies listed in the book, which included ones like Boeing, Hewlett Packard and Macdonalds. The outcome of this is reproduced in appendix 3: It contextualises ‘Excellence’ from both a socialist and race equality perspective. It emerged from the local Black public sphere and entered the wider local sphere of local governance. This was a counter appropriating claim for a ‘way of doing things’ more relevant
to that of race equality. In a spoof of the LGTB paper’s cover, this one was entitled, “Looking for Excellence and Finding Excrement”.

At about the same time, and unbeknown to the BWG, Silver in a critique of Excellence as an example of Reaganite neo-conservatism, was coming to the same conclusion. Pointing out that Excellence was derived from the same school of the Hawthorne Experiment inspired managerial progeny of human relations, but with one important difference. Whilst this school of thought, devoted to showing that improving the quality of life of employees in work increased productivity placed a high premium on participation, Excellence abandons this. Instead it is “the attention to employees, not work conditions per se that has the dominant impact on production.” It relies for this on the creation of ersatz values in order to try and instil meaning in employees working lives. Thus, as Silver notes, “the intent is to change workers’ attitudes – and thus to ‘unleash the forces of entrepreneurialism’, the ‘psychological means of production’ – without changing the nature of the job, without...increasing worker participation.” Temporally it accords with Reaganism which “seeks to roll back the post war gains of working people.”

It is difficult to say whether or not this counter critique of ‘Excellence’ both by the Race Advisers and the Black Workers Group had a bearing on subsequent developments, but, in the target borough, the preferred managerial changes were not thereafter proffered in so crass a way as that contained in the “In Search of Excellence” literature. Instead a similar form of neo-managerialism was advocated by both the political leadership and senior managers. This took the form of ‘Public Service Orientation’, (PSO). PSO emerged from INLOGOV via its chief architect, Stewart, at about the same time that ‘Excellence’ was conceptually being brokered with select authorities. It is clear from the intellectual architectonic of PSO that it owes a large cognitive obligation to the key ideas contained in ‘Excellence’. It can be argued that it represents Stewart’s attempt to make ‘Excellence’ more conformable and germane to the public sector, particularly local government. There is the concentration on the creation and nurturing of what can be described as an ersatz culture within the organisation; the defining of a core purpose supported by key essential values; the focussing on embedding this purpose and values through ‘strong leaders’ and value inculcation via selection and socialisation processes; the identification of the need to develop a closer relationship with the customer.

For Stewart PSO is “based on three simple ideas”:

1. Local authorities exist to provide services for the public.
2. A local authority succeeds or fails by the quality of service it provides.
3. Quality of service demands closeness to the public - as client, customer and citizen.  

The purpose of local government is then redefined and, in so doing, contracted by Stewart.

The justification for local government is that it provides a public service and that it is close to its public in so doing.

PSO is then put forward as a local government panacea.

PSO can help to provide purpose to the workings of local authorities but only if ideas are turned into action. PSO is an orientation a guiding philosophy or vision.  

PSO is based upon providing services for the public and not to the public. In the latter the authority knows best, whilst in the former the authority has to develop a closer relationship with the ‘client’ or ‘customer’. It can do this by adopting the following:

- hold regular surveys to establish public attitudes to service received
- invite and encourage the public in a variety of ways to suggest how services can be changed or improved - or new services provided

This relationship with the public is the key to developing better quality services. Thus:

But the authority can learn and find out if it is close to the public

As client and customer - for the public are entitled to good service

as citizen - for the public are electors, entitled to judge the authority

The public as client and customer has:-

- the right to a good service which is geared to their needs
- the right to convenient and easy access to services and buildings
- the right to helpful reception arrangements
- the right to be listened to and heard
- the right to information and explanation - about the nature and level of services in general and about the treatment of their own individual case.
The public as citizen is entitled to more than just a good service. The local authority should show by its actions that it regards clients and customers not merely as such but also as citizens who have rights as partners in the government of the community:

- the citizen has the right to know why and what decisions are made
- the citizen is entitled to be met with fairness, equity and justice
- citizens have the right to know what services they are entitled to
- citizens are entitled to know their rights and how they can enforce them.

The rights and entitlements of the citizen reinforce the values of service to the customer and client.

Concern for the customer and client as a citizen requires that:

- the practices and procedures of the local authority place emphasis on the citizens rights and entitlements
- staff training emphasises that customers - the people who wait at the reception desk - are electors and as such are the people to whom all officers and councillors are ultimately responsible.
- the authority accepts the same obligations in relation to its staff that it expects its staff to show the public. Staff cannot explain unless they are given an explanation. ¹⁰³⁴

Finally PSO as a strategy can be achieved if the following is developed.

PSO is about changing the organisation. It requires strategy for change, which should include:

- a commitment by key actors in the authority (from the concillors and chief officers downwards).
- an understanding of the organisation and of the barriers to service to the public.
- an understanding of the culture.
- an analysis of services.
- an action plan.
- a capacity to learn from action.¹⁰³⁵

There was nothing radical or new in the content of PSO. In borrowing from ‘Excellence’ it displaced ‘profit’ with ‘services’ and erected around that the need for local government to develop a set of limited values. One of these, again mirroring ‘Excellence’, was that about getting closer to the
customer. The way in which this relationship was constructed did not address the substantial issue of the power inequalities between service users and the organisations of local governance. Instead it opted for a refurbishment of that which already existed limiting the role of the citizen to a passive recipient of rights who can only exercise the political element through the ballot box. In Chapter 4 I had critiqued this localist position as being ‘facadic’ because it offered “a form of democracy that in terms of a content which can participatively include Black people and women non-conventionalisedly, is little different from what’s available now”. Further “it does not offer a ‘re-invention’ of what is, but merely a fine tuning.” It can be argued, as well, as the equality advisers did at the time, that local government is not just about providing services, because if that were the case, then the next question would be to ask why other forms of organisation, like the private sector ones, couldn’t provide them. This reduction in the role and scope of what is a political organisation to one of simply being a service provider, seemed, at the time, to be an attempt to recreate the fifties image of local government, one that was untroubled and untrammeled by the ‘disruptive’ influences of race equality.

11.32 Neo-managerialism and Labourist Councillors

Within the contextualisation provided above, we are now in a position to examine the defining set of policy papers drafted by the then labourist Labour leader which effectively set the seal on the introduction of a form of neo-managerialism into the council. The control and absorption of race equality as just another variable in a greater universalising cause, i.e. management, was a sub-text to the two main papers, only emerging explicitly in a third paper which, though involving all the departments in the council, was surreptitiously and clandestinely prepared without the participation of the equality advisers or committees.

In the first paper the issue of management in the target borough is formally raised in response to, if not critique of, the Audit Commission paper on the management of London local government. It begins with an analysis of the problem. Thus:

Over the last few years there has been a clear expansion of the services that we provide and a proliferation of new policies. It has become increasingly obvious that as an organisation we are poorly equipped to implement policies so far agreed let alone adopt yet further policy initiatives. In essence, the Council ..... has suffered from a serious failure to invest in the infrastructure so necessary to put policy into practice. I am referring here to the appalling state of our management and financial information systems, telecommunications, staff accommodation and our incredibly cumbersome decision making processes. Without doubt if any progress is to be made in transforming the performance of the Council in meeting community needs then urgent and consistent action must be taken. There is nothing intrinsically socialist in inefficiency, waste, or incompetence.....(and
therefore)....a great deal still remains to be done to change the organisation into one that becomes a vehicle for local socialist policies and practice at a local level. .... In effect, we are suffering from the failure to invest in infrastructure services in the 1960s and 1970s and we are now faced with making good that loss. 1036

There is a resonance with some of the analysis of the problem with that undertaken by the head of the Race Unit in his 1985 review of race equality progress in the target borough. In fact the same councillor was part of the preliminary meetings about the review with the former Chair of the Race Relations Committee. However, there is a resonance in parts of the analysis, as well, with another document. The part of not really wanting more new policies echoes with the Chief Personnel Officer's 1985 paper discussed earlier in which he argued – or, in reality, as this councillor had argued – that there were sufficient equality policies, that no more should be produced, and that emphasis should switch to implementation.

According to this councillor's paper, this version of local socialism was to be attained through recognising that nothing can be achieved "without an effective management cadre and a recognition by members and officers that management is not a necessary evil but an absolutely necessary instrument to achieve policy and service objectives." 1037 Management is then inclusively and exclusively defined as follows:

Management is simply getting things done. There is nothing new in managing. It is our reluctance in power nationally and locally to consider seriously issues of management change, or policy implementation which has opened our policies and our practice to criticism. The issue of management has nothing whatsoever to do with ideology or philosophy. All ideologies and philosophies have to be implemented in an effective way. Since time began, humans have been 'managing'. The construction of the pyramids, landing on the moon and World War II are classic feats of management. The problem with many socialists' views are that they assume that somehow the need to manage can be replaced by a version of workers' control or industrial democracy. However, the ultimate in industrial democracy still requires that decisions taken by the workers have to be co-ordinated and organised by the managers. 1038

The fact of the matter is that it is not so much the failure to get to grips with management, as the failure to begin to consider the full parameters to, and implications of, what a socialist form of 'management' would be. Again the specious tactic of erecting a badly constructed edifice so that it can be easily torn down, is done in his brief reference to, and dismissal of 'industrial democracy' as a solution. We are left then with management simply being a 'neutral' activity. A need is then identified to transform the authority managerially because "this is a very working class part of London....(and) ....not to use our communities' money well is nothing less than a rip off." 1039
In effect what is being raised and defined there is the issue of political legitimation defined solely through the potential response of the white working class community.

The paper then goes on to repeat, and recommend uncritically, the thinking behind, and courses of action identified in, “In Search of Excellence.” Thus he writes that “change cannot be achieved by desire alone but-through a determined and consistent effort to transform the culture of ...the Council”.

And this comes down to adopting the eight attributes of ‘excellent’ organisations identified in the book.

Whilst this was more of a Group discussion paper, the subsequent paper contained a set or recommendations which, if agreed, tied the group, and the council, to a neo-managerialist solution very similar to the one outlined in the first paper. What is noticeable in the second is that the emphasis on ‘excellence’ is now replaced with an endorsement of PSO as the way forward. It is worth repeating that in the intervening period the only critical commentary of the ‘excellence’ model was to be heard from the advisers and the Black Workers Group. This second paper was prepared in June 1987 in the immediate aftermath of the then general election. The paper attempted to portray a crisis in the target borough, not only because of the Labour defeat nationally, but also because of the Conservative government’s renewed interventions in local government. These hinged on pursuing the details of their strategy of nationalisation of local government legitimation concerns, detailed above. At the hub of the crisis facing the target borough at the time, according to the paper, is the precarious financial position of the council. Thus he wrote that there, “is absolutely no possibility that we can survive the current year and immediate budget making process, let alone the next five years, without the penalty of surcharge unless spending is reduced and income increased.”

Taken together with the national government interventions the solutions to the problems do not include bringing the community into a wider campaign. Any such strategy is caricaturedly dismissed. Thus, despite in his previous paper, portraying the borough as a working class enclave, he dismisses their likely support against the government.

“This is not scare talk, it is the reality we face. There is, of course, an alternative. We could choose to ignore that reality, or to depict it as a fantastic creation of the capitalist state designed to deflect us from our steady progress to the socialist millenium. We could offer ourselves in sacrifice, martyrs to the cause of defending jobs and services in the interest of "the class". We would, of course, expect and require "the class" to rise up in our support and defend us from the common foe and, together, we would come through victorious, kick the Tories out, and continue on unhindered. Such a strategy may have a remote foundation in the concrete reality and/or assessment of the balance of forces in, say, parts of Scotland,
but what does such an objective analysis tell us about the current situation here in The target borough?"  

The answer to the last question is, despite the fact that Labour won the local 1986 elections with an increased majority, very unlikely. One can see again the instrumentalist communicative tactic of erecting a straw person so as to easily torch it, at work here. The fact was that there were a plethora of alternative options involving the local communities which could have been considered, and not just that which reads as if it were lifted from an orthodox Marxist primer on class warfare. To support this dismissal of that supposed radical alternative, an admiring comparison is drawn with Wandsworth where, it is opined, the determined pursuit of Conservative local government policies has resulted in an increased level of support for that party, so much so that they, “have virtually succeeded in turning Wandsworth into a Tory borough as we have failed to turn the target borough into a Labour borough.” To support this sophistry attention is drawn to a survey commissioned by the target borough which examined people’s perceptions of the council services. The poll, undertaken by one of the national companies usually highlighted at times of national elections, did not include any particular equality components, other than being weighted to ensure Black people were part. The Head of the Race Unit attempted, in the preparations and planning for the survey, to have included a section on equalities and to widen the brief away from the sole services focus. This was unsuccessful. What is interesting is not the overall results, because they showed the council to be ‘middling’ in terms of support from the community, but the way in which paper’s author selectively uses some of the findings. Thus one of the unsatisfactory items he accentuates, together with the obvious findings that people did not like high rates, is one that is categorised thus:

Waste money/do not spend on right things/
too much spent on minorities

Further on, in response to the survey question, “Are there any other groups of people you think the Council should be doing more for?”, the top and most prominent answer category relates to Black people where only 3% of the sample think that more should be done for that community. This broke down into 1% of white people and 11% of Black people thinking that. There is a similar breakdown for women. Finally, in answer to a specific question about political party loyalties, there were 30% who did not know.

The interpretation placed on this by that councillor is that this indicates a profound legitimation crisis for the local Labour Party. Hence:

“The prospect is such that, unless the government is deeply unpopular in 1990, and if we remain on an unchanged course, we will experience great difficulty in holding control of the Council. For certain, if we do hold on, the
majority of electors will not be voting for us but against the government, and if we do not, I fear that we may never regain power locally."

This potential crisis was occurring despite the fact that the target borough has not been slow "to adopt the equivalent socialist local government policies to Wandsworth's Tory ones." In what was the first overt indication of support and praise for the work undertaken by the equality workers, including the prioritisation of equalities, he goes on to highlight the fact that, "The target borough has been in the forefront in promoting equal opportunities policies in recruitment and services, in establishing employment initiatives, and expanding direct labour and other areas of the Council's workforce." That laudatory outburst, when examined in retrospect in the light of the third paper, which will be discussed later, was rather like the Chair of a football club's public expression of support for the manager. The problem, as analysed by the paper's author, was that despite adopting socialist policies the actual implementation was difficult because of an administrative sclerosis of action. The result, in a repeat of the earlier paper's diagnoses, is a surfeit of policy and deficit of action. Again one can see the attempt to link equalities with policy excesses and gumming up the works. The way forward must ensure that "we must have made sufficient progress to have won the level of positive support to ensure Labour victories in both East and West The target borough." This will involve the following:

"The only way we will have a chance of achieving this in the face of an ideological and clearly directed attack, given our weakness in terms of resources, our current lack of support and the shortcomings of our service delivery is for us to agree upon a clear and relatively simple strategy that we can all identify with and adopt, Members, officers, craft and manual workers. That strategy, which will serve us both for the short term and also as it develops for the foreseeable future would have three major elements. Firstly, a thorough restructuring of the budget; secondly, a bias for action within the organisation on the part of Members and employees; and finally a definite orientation towards public service."

The paper then goes on to recommend, as this key strategy, the formal adoption of PSO as the means to "produce results and earn support." The target borough was then committed, word for word to Stewart’s version of PSO. Hence:

1. The target borough Council exists to provide services FOR THE PUBLIC.

2. As a local authority, The target borough succeeds or fails by the QUALITY OF SERVICE it provides.

3. Quality of service demands CLOSENESS TO THE PUBLIC - as client, customer and citizen.
Finally, in an effort, like the Conservative national government's to re-nationalise the legitimacy of local governance, a tactic of political convergence which will echo some ten years later when Labour finally achieves an election victory, he concludes that:

The strategy outlined above provides us with a prospect for survival but also far more than that. We have a window of opportunity over this next period to re-establish local government at the core of socialist activity and to play our full part in achieving national political power for our Party and our beliefs. 1048

Apart from the self congratulatory pat on the back with regard to equalities - an almost one handed clapping exercise given the actual obstruction to race equality this and other labourist councillors had indulged in – there is no mention of Black people and women in this strategy. This is a particularly glaring omission in the constituencies identified as the Labour party’s legitimating bases, and in those with whom they want to consult over the proposals. Further the everyday relationship with local communities was not so much to be politically redefined, as more explicitly confirmed, through PSO, as that of being no more than a client, customer or citizen with liberal democratic negative rights. Whilst earlier I had identified the theoretical and action lacunae over the issue of administration being shown by the new left in local governance, in this case local socialism was being equated not with a radical deconstruction and reconstruction of ‘management’, but with a private sector originated and oriented refurbishment of management centred on ‘service improvement’. A political problem was being communicatively ossified through adopting a solution of technical management. Some fifteen plus years later, in an article on why French intellectuals are deserting the Socialist party, one commentator wrote that “politicians don’t need philosophers any more....(because)...politics today was a matter of management.”1049

The omission of Black people and women was deliberate, a conclusion arrived at by the equality advisers and workers in the light of the third paper by the Labour leader in the target borough, one which also purported to deal with the ‘crisis’. This one was entitled “Major Achievements in Equal Opportunities”, a title which belied the way in which the report was produced, as well the contents. 1050 This was to be the specific backwash in the target borough to the national Labour Party leadership’s accusations that the ‘London effect’ had damaged the party’s chances in the London region. This was a not so subtle code for actually referring to the equality initiatives, particularly race equality ones, pioneered by London boroughs. In fact the reference was not so much to the initiatives themselves, as to the right wing media interpretation and distortion of these. The report, as the response from the equality advisers shows, was done in secret without consulting the equality workers or respective committees. Because it attempted to provide
a financial breakdown of what was spent on equalities within individual departments, it must have involved the relevant senior managers in those departments, but, deliberately excluded the race advisers. It was only some two weeks later, after the report went to a particular group meeting, that the advisers caught sight of it. Fortunately it was, at that stage a draft report, awaiting comments from the rest of the local Labour party.

The report's recommendations attempt to tie in the new service prioritisation with the identified ‘need’ to curtail any further equalities’ expenditure. Thus:

♦ That Members recognise that in view of the general election result and the restrictions now placed on resources, hard choices will need to be made if this Council is to survive the next 3 years and win the next local elections,

♦ That Members agree that the provision of services should be our priority for the future and that equal opportunities should be an integral part of service delivery.

♦ That Members recognise that an effective equal opportunity policy rests upon the commitment, time and effort of management as much as it does financial resources and given the restrictions on financial resources Members are asked to agree that there should be no financial growth in provision for equal opportunity but a more effective use of existing resources. (My emphasis)

By way of background justification the report's author goes on to reason as follows:

♦ This Council was elected on a Manifesto committed to a policy of equal opportunity both as an employer and as a provider of services to the community. The Race Relations Committee and Women's Committee have established specialist units to work towards meeting the needs of women and black people both as employees and in the community.

♦ This Council has also allocated substantial resources to ensure implementation of its equal opportunity policy throughout those services provided by departments and those provided by the voluntary sector through funding

♦ A socialist equal opportunity policy has often been seen as wasting money by the tabloid press and Tory opposition and indeed in the run up to the general election it became associated with what has become known as the "London Effect" which has seen traditional Labour Party support deserting the Labour Party for the SDP and even the Tory party as was shown in the Downham by-election and the General Election result.

The report then went on, using the information provided by departments, to try to create a picture of immense spending on equalities. In so doing the report’s author either deliberately twisted and misused the information, or totally misunderstood the nature of the equality initiatives being undertaken.
in the target borough. For example the Social Services Department, because many of its service users come from the most ‘disadvantaged’ sectors of the local community, is cited as intentional spending on equality. Within this distortion the position of Black service users is totally over estimated. Thus:

“A large proportion of services provided by the Social Services Department will be for black people, women, people with disabilities or gays and lesbians.”

The race equality advisers and workers had to formulate a reply within a day or so. This was drafted by the head of the Race Unit after consultation with the equality workers. Again, using the communicative spaces opened through the structuring of the race equality infra-structure, the reply was circulated to all Labour members. Much of this reply is reproduced in appendix 4 because it attempts to contextualise the strategy being adopted then by the Labour party, how this was, in large part, an attempt to silence ‘race’ and what exactly the race equality programme and discourse were about. In sum the response argued that it represented a racist misuse of information; that after over a hundred years of local government and only three years of explicit equality initiatives it was extremely premature to conclude that enough has been done; that “race equality .... is about how Black people at the local level can have a determinant say in the allocation and reallocation of resources which have a material effect on their everyday lives”, and that “if a management is "neutral" or simply about "doing things" then the greatest feat of management was processing the twelve to eighteen million Jews and other nationals through the gas chambers over a five year period.”

The response from the Race Advisers then went on to deconstruct the councillor’s misuse of information, demonstrating that at that stage in the development of the equality programme, just under three years since it was started, not much was spent on either the equality infra-structure or planned equality initiatives. Two elements of race equality spending were identified.

◆ Initiatory race equality resources - that is spending on race equality such as specialist posts and structures whose purpose is to initiate change.
◆ Overt and planned allocation and re-allocation of resources to race equality - that is spending on race equality which is planned with that objective in mind and which more than likely comes about because of the initiatory resources.  

Information, it was argued, on the last element was difficult to ascertain because of the lack of adequate information systems. However, the development of the anti-racist programmes were a suitable framework within which to work out, for example, the amount of time spent on race equality.
With regard to the former, it was shown that at the time the overall council budget was £214,000,000, whilst the money spent on the race equality infrastructure was merely £225,000. The conclusion reached was that:

In conclusion therefore the actual spending on race equality according to the information available is minuscule. It will be a few years yet before we can do the type of exercise Cllr. “X” is attempting. Any attempts now therefore which aims to prove major spending on equality opportunities will be premature, misleading and totally tendentious.

The response had the desired effect. As reported back by the then Chair of Race Relations Committee to the head of the Race Unit, the councillor “X”’s draft report, because of the response which had been circulated to all Labour members, was withdrawn.

It is clear from the key policy reports developed and agreed by the Labour Group in the target borough in 1987 that the discourse of labourism came to embrace and be replaced by a discourse of neo-managerialism. This was undertaken as a strategy to retain and develop a legitimation base in the local communities. A substantial part of this involved trying to assuage racial fear through curtailing the development of race equality in that council. In so doing it was hoped to absorb and limit the profile of race equality through a new universalism of better services for everyone. It was, in another sense, the prototype ‘modernisation’ of the Labour Party’s labourism. This was a conscious decision made against a backcloth of competing political options. The race equality discourse and programme were public knowledge, involving as well the circulation of the appendixed paper. There was, as well, one other radical alternative which was circulated to the Labour Group at the time, by the same councillor in his role as leader. These were two specially commissioned papers by Paul Hoggett. That is to say that the nascent mid eighties post Fordist analysis of the problems of local government and the likely solutions were also part of the deliberations of the Labour Group.

11.33 Rejecting the Post-Fordist Option

In reading the two papers by Hoggett, it is clear that councillor “X” adopted a ‘pic-n-mix’ approach to these. There are, for example, key phrases taken word for word from the two papers, yet used in the councillor’s ruminations in a way that is totally out of context with Hoggett’s intentions. But, there is another reason for finding these earlier papers interesting. That is that despite Hoggett’s attempts at applying to local government the sort of analysis which sees it, at that time, still mimicking the Fordist scale of production, he also attempts an analysis of ‘ends and means’ based on the Frankfurt school of thought. Whilst there is within the papers a certain
ambivalence and ambiguity with regard to the issues of 'organisational culture' and 'management', weaknesses which might facilitate selective eclecticism on the part of others, there is an identification of a problem, the main points of which overlap with my diagnoses. Leaving aside the post Fordist attempt to read off organisational forms of local governance directly from analysed changes in the capitalist economy, which I have already critiqued in Chapter 3, the nub of the problem he identifies that Labour in general, and its variant local socialism have tried to apply administrative solutions to political problems, is one I agree with. It was obviously one dismissed by the Labour leader in the target borough at the time.

Thus, for example, Hoggett's mid eighties prognosis is that "local government lumbers on, aware that its previous methods of mass production (viz council estates, comprehensive schools, etc) have brought standardised improvements at the cost of much consumer disenchantment, but not able to bring itself to conceive of how it needs to change to become more modern"; and thus the "problem is that the logic of welfare combined with the logic of mass production produced a local government which was not just centralist but massified, not just bureaucratic but Byzantine." There is a convergence with other theorists that something has to be done. For example Habermas provides a more substantive critique of the welfare state. On the other hand at the more prosaic level of local government in the UK, Stewart also conceives of a similar problem. On one thing Hoggett is clear, though, attempting, at the time, to do a 'Wandsworth' on any of the putative local socialist oriented authorities is not acceptable. Whilst the changes in the then Tory flagship council were radical, they were not the sort of radicalism socialists should imitate because, "Conservative initiatives have been greatly facilitated by the fact that it's easier to dismantle or abolish a disagreeable institution than it is to transform it." The difference then, as he argues, is that a combination of Thatcherism and local socialism have served to re-politicise local government. Re-politicisation I agree with and have argued for previously. However the de-colonising struggles of local Black communities have been as much a contributor to the re-politicisation of local governance as other factors. Hoggett's arguments then that administrative solutions are not enough gain greater saliency. The heart of the problem with this course of action lies within Labour's tradition of technologising politics. Thus, "for Labour's activists it is but a short step from talking about the 'party machine' to the 'machinery of local government'." What this then leads to is a situation in which, for example prior to the Livingstone period of power in the GLC, Labour's thoughts on how it should be run "were confined to the pursuit of 'sound administration', that is, to demonstrate that Labour could run London as soundly as the party of business and commerce." Hoggett sees this as the failure to view organisations a systems of living culture. There is some agreement with this because of my analysis of organisations as
communicative structures. However, his failure to develop further this aspect of his argument means that it is open to conflation, as councillor "X" obviously did, with Peters and Waterman's 'excellence' conception of culture. Hoggett's solution, and here he draws heavily on the Frankfurt school, is for there to be a re-evaluation and re-moralisation of 'ends' and 'means'. That is to say, in a severing of the linkage in Labour's thinking and practice which up to then had made a political virtue of the socialist ends justifying the means. He is thus very clear that dipping into and borrowing from the over stocked private sector school of management is unacceptable.

"A number of 'realist' left Labour councils now realise that if socialists cannot run a local council by 'leaving it to the experts', neither can they do so through bypassing or undermining them. The danger is that they reach out for help from the 'progressive end' of management and in the process inevitably end up misrecognising themselves and the problems they face........This split also finds structural expression in an absurd division of labour within the welfare state itself in which 'ends' become the domain of politicians and 'means' the domain of managers and technocrats. As a result Labourism has colluded with and reinforced the technocratic impulse to exclude questions of values (ie moral questions) from its agenda.....But we would be mistaken to think that this problem boils down to the supposed 'political neutrality' of the state functionary. The issue is not simply the espoused political ideology of state officials (and hence the need to populate state institutions with 'our people') for we need to challenge the deep and often unconscious technocratic values which inform the practice of socialist and conservative functionaries alike."\(^{1060}\)

The answer then lies in the re-introduction by Labour of the moral into the political and administrative systems so that there is "an interest in means and a language, which is neither of administration nor management, in which it can discover its own concern for how things are done...(and)...realise that questions of value, purpose and objective (i.e. of 'ends'), far from being its own prerogative, must also become a vital concern for those who work within the welfare state."\(^{1061}\) Organisationally and politically this can find expression in substantive decentralisation, so that there is a bottom up approach top policy development, and in continuing and developing the blurring between the executive and legislative. In terms of the latter it means moving beyond packing the sensitive upper reaches of management with 'our people', i.e. Labour Party members. I have already argued that the re-politicisation and de-colonisation of local governance requires a fuzziness between the relationships between the political system and the administrative system and between the administrative system and civil society. These separations, under new right Labour and under the proto new labour administration, in the target borough then, were re-enforced through the development of strict boundary lines. For example in the target borough, and later on in Lambeth - and in the latter case these changes were put forward by the then Chief Executive, Herman Ouseley - it became a
disciplinary offence for any employee to initiate contact with an elected member other than through the strict management line of authority. Finally, in what amounts to a plea for more substantive democratisation through decentralisation Hoggett addresses the opposition of councillors, like the Labourist ones.

"Some councillors believe that this will undermine their power to set policy. All I can say in reply is that it is better to share ownership of policies that have a chance of being implemented than to retain exclusive possession of sacraments that do no more than scratch reality's surface."

Whilst Hoggett did not address the issues of race or women's equality in his papers, and in fact on the basis of a separate article could be accused of misunderstanding those issues at the local government level, the vision of local governance outlined in his two articles referred to above is one which is communicatively more open than that adopted in the target borough. The notions of the politicisation of the administration, of the moralisation of ends and means, of bottom up democratisation have a greater resonance with the aims of the race equality discourse. There are, however, as I have argued earlier, still racially exclusive fault lines in the post Fordist argument.

Nevertheless the conscious decision to introduce a neo-managerialist discourse/diskourse into the target borough as the instrumentalised means to ensure that a narrow form of political legitimation is preserved, brought with it an accentuation and augmentation of forms of unjust domination in the organisation. Strategic and instrumentalised action, as Cooke argues, raises only one of the three validity claims of the speech act. It is, in other words a communicative silencing. Defining management as being 'neutral' is an attempt to immunise those practices from its moralisation and thus to confirm that the technologisation of management is an unquestionable absolute. The rupture of the relationship between ends and means is further accelerated and the gap between the two lengthened by what Fairclough identifies as the "technologisation of discourse" associated with the way in which this course of action was adopted; what could be described as a double technologisation.

11.34 Pursuing Neo-managerialism

In the target borough from the late 1987 onwards a deliberate programme of neo-managerialism was developed and implemented. The resources allocated to this, and the high profile level of political will displayed by the leading councillors and Labour group has to be contrasted with the sporadic and contradictory "mood swing" approach afforded race equality. This new diskourse renovated existing patterns of authorial control within the organisation so that managers were there to manage, unquestionably, and
even when questioned, especially in relation to equality issues, only post facto, whilst politicians were invested in the only recognisable political authority. Externally the relationship with the communities, particularly those who used council services, was to be reconfigured through a customer/consumerist model in which rights extend only so far as that of having a good service, and not that of being involved in the way that service is structured and delivered. This new consumerisation of the council was exemplified in the decision to rebrand the council through devising a new logo and set of corporate colours. This in effect meant reprinting the council’s stationery, repainting the council’s vehicles and signs, and repainting other visible signs of being within the geographical boundaries of the authority, such as lamp posts. When the race advisers pointed out that the enormous costs of such a dubious exercise could have been better spent furthering the race equality programme, they in turn were rebranded as being ‘negative.’ The beginning of an accelerated drive to closed own the communicative spaces opened up by the race equality programme began. This was evidenced in the increasing number of conflicts and clashes between race equality workers and management and/or council members. In one case it resulted in a Race Adviser pursuing a complaint of race discrimination against the Chair of the Personnel Sub-committee.\textsuperscript{1064} Between the end of 1987 and the end of 1988 three other race equality workers found themselves on disciplinary charges directly as a result of differences with management.

Internally the council adopted a limiting range of six ‘core values’ which were to be the new, explicit value base of the authority. These were not derived from any consultative or participative processes involving employees and communities. Rather they were decided by senior managers and leading councillors. They were also to be the values around which action was to be clustered. Equalities, whilst it featured in this cluster of values, was reduced to that of ‘equal opportunities’.\textsuperscript{1065} As shall be shown, equalities came to be recast in a way that excluded the existing equality workers. One year later, a NALGO newsletter could comment that “a very narrow set of values has been imposed on the organisation, that employees’ views are subject to loyalty tests against these, and that a very insidious form of censorship is now the norm.”\textsuperscript{1066} In that same year a member of the public and parent had written to the local paper complaining that the consultation exercise undertaken by the authority over the transfer of educational responsibilities enacted under the Ceausescu regime in Romania\textsuperscript{1067}; a far cry from the core value of being ‘closer to the public’. One could almost argue that the changes being put into place amounted to the Stalinisation of the administrative and political systems. By the beginning of 1988 the first batch of service initiatives developed under the PSO programme were agreed. This was also about the time that the first round of council wide department by department anti-racist
service action plans were being brought to committees for approval. These were detailed plans aimed at redirecting and/or reconstructing major tranches of services within the race equality programme's parameters. They had taken two years to develop, being the joint work of the race equality workers, the unit and the individual departments. The relative ease and celerity of the appearance of the PSO initiatives were as much to do with the political backing they enjoyed as with the superficiality of their content. These concentrated on the action that needed to be undertaken in order to improve the service reception areas of the council's departments. They amplified the 'skin deep' criticism made by Hoggett of the 'administrating' of political problems by Labour.

However, a greater problem was being identified by the head of the Race Unit. This was that the PSO initiatives and work undertaken on the anti-racist service programmes were being undertaken, deliberately, by departments as separate areas of action. Six months earlier the Race Equality Adviser with responsibility for employment had written to the then Chief Executive warning about the way in which PSO was being implemented, in particular the training aspect.

The process to achieve excellence is too simplistic and crude to really meet the complex issues, needs and processes which operate in a local authority. Bias for Action, with its emphasis on the end product rather than the process cannot be translated into the work of a local authority. The emphasis on new management has always been at the centre of anti-racist work. The need to consult the black community and the need to consult black workers forums and black employees on service delivery and employment issues has always been paramount. In employment e.g. it is essential for a new management style which ensures that equality issues are an integral to good management and employment practice. The new priority seems to be to create managers who are 'winners', who will inevitably be white and male. Which race are we supposed to be winning? Recent discussions in various departments have highlighted the lack of commitment to race and women's equality, especially as it is perceived as being a low priority of council members. I understand the course (A training course in PSO for all managers) will be run for middle managers in the PO range (who will be in the main, white and male) by two white trainers from the North East London Polytechnic. Are the needs of the black community again going to be discussed by white people and how will this course relate to current policies and practices on race and women's equality. My information is that it will not address these issues. It is interesting to note that I have been consulted again at a very late stage, where the only course I have left is a reactive approach, which I believe is being interpreted as being negative. I am unhappy that having been put in this position that it will be a purely tokenistic gesture to participate now in discussions with the trainers.

In fact the PSO was being allocated more departmental time and resources. In one of the final briefing notes to key members, the Head of the Unit
argued for a change in direction away from the neo-conservatively constructed PSO. In essence it argued as follows:

It is clear that the politicisation of local government is no more than that of attempts to reconstitute this level of government as one that is about democracy and local choice and control over resources. It is certainly within this framework that the problems of race and women’s inequality have been tackled. That is, if one can attempt to summarise these initiatives in one sentence, to try to restructure the power relationships in local government in a way which allows Black people and women a determinant say in the control of resource usage to meet their needs. Certainly solutions to race and women’s inequality have not been seen in terms simply of being an administratively technically one in which management is somehow "neutral". Instead "means" and "ends" have been seen as part of a process of change; a process that is rooted in the key values of socialism, democracy, the public sector and community needs.

11.35 The Displacement of Race and Women’s Equality

In April 1988 a new leader of the council’s Labour group was elected, but one in the same political mould as the last. The process of organisational disengagement from the race equality programme continued. There were renewed calls for a review of the Race Unit and Race Relations Committee from the labourist councillors on the group. In a related move, but without consulting the Chair of Race Relations, the then leader proposed that the meetings of the Race and Women’s Committees be cut from four to two a year. The policy paper that went to group proposing this also brought into it the issue of a review of equality work in the council. However it was the events leading up to the latter action, and the subsequent way in which it was rationalised by the report’s author, which are interesting. It was clear, that unbeknown to the equality advisers, and particularly the race advisers, that the process of disengagement from the race equality programme was being assiduously pursued by some councillors. Thus the paper notes in its introduction the following:

Three distinct aspects of the Council’s equalities work have come to Group in recent months. First the question of a review of the work of the Race Equality Unit. Second the question of the frequency of committee meetings and thirdly the unwillingness of Members to serve on the "equalities" committees as presently constituted. The second and third items have not been dealt with in any structured or rational way largely because they have been seized on for use in political points scoring exercises. However the paper circulated by Councillor “Z” in respect to the first issue has raised much more fundamental questions which Group need to respond to. I have given a great deal of thought to these points and the very last one has weighed most heavily with me. I cannot see a justification for reviewing our work in the area of race in isolation. I am therefore recommending a much wider review which will deal with all our equalities work and encompass all three of the areas of concern to Group.
The paper referred to in the above paragraph was one the head of the race Unit had to do outlining, yet again, the work undertaken by that unit and the Race Relations Committee. These were all committee agreed policy and practice reports, and so should have been common knowledge to Group members, all of whom had been subject to a briefing session by the Unit when they were first elected some one and a half years back. It is clear from the response from the then leader that the call to review the work of the unit had other undertones and agendas other than a supposed interest in the quality of the work. However, later on in the paper, whilst admitting that "the British Labour Party is a racist Party", he goes on to argue that "we have shied away from difficult debates .... because of a misguided deference to members of oppressed groups - this cannot continue - simply being black does not mean being right". Whilst this was symptomatic of what I have termed the de-moral-is-ing of race equality - and in this particular instance it is the racist atavism of pathologising Black people's interpretation of their experiences -, it was also contrary to the council's own then existing policy and procedures on racism. In other words, once again the authenticity of Black people's claims are called into question, placing them in the sub-human category. The council had adopted, not without a major debate with the equality advisers, a racial and sexual harassment complaints policy and procedure in which the allegation of racism or sexism had to be taken at face value and treated accordingly. In other words it mirrored, some fifteen years earlier, the recommendations on this issue of the Macpherson Report. In a confirmation of the de-politicising and de-democratising way in which the formal political institutions of local government was viewed, and in a way which begins to explain the current democratic deficit operating in the Mayor and Executive Committee structure being advocated by new right labour, a speciously argued justification for reducing the number of race and women's equality committee meetings is put forward. This same councillor went on to do a joint project with INLOGOV and the LGMB which proposed and advocated the adoption of an American style Mayor structure and the creation of one Executive Committee in the council as the main decision making committee. Thus:

One of the most empty arguments between socialists must surely be about Committee structures and I find attempts to gauge the degree of commitment of individuals to fighting oppression from their views on a particular structure quite untenable. Council Committee structures are merely vehicles for giving some formal agreement to political decision. What matters is the policies decided by the Party and the Group, and the degree to which we provide staff and resources to implement them. To a large extent the committee structure should be a reflection of the Officer structure.
With regard to the proposed review of equalities' work in the council, the recommendation was to bring in outside consultants so that "an objective" picture could be obtained.

Again it was left to the Race and Women's Advisers to provide a formal response to the proposals. Both the Race and Women's Advisers rejected the notion of outside consultants arguing that:

To speak of bringing in consultants "to obtain a maximum degree of objectivity" is not only insulting, it is also passing the buck. The Race and Women's equality Advisers do not and have never provided advice on shortfalls and appropriate structural changes......in terms of our experience, knowledge base and compared with like in other Local Authorities or so called experts in the field, then this Council has some of the best advisers in the country and that is an objective assessment. It would be extremely difficult, therefore, to contemplate working with or recommending so called outside consultants. Apart from being a waste of rate payers money, the opposite is true i.e. we are asked for our advice by outside bodies and this we give freely. We do not believe in privatising the race equality struggle. At the end of the day it does not matter which structure you have, or how well resourced it is, if members are not committed or held accountable to their own manifesto commitments, then the problems will persist.1073

The race advisers, in responding to the two other key issues raised above, made the following points:

Black people and women experience not only oppression, but exploitation which is at the societal level structurally determined. The experiences which arise from this are different to other groups which suffer oppression. To lump everything under "oppression" is another way of trying to reduce different experiences to one definable variable...... The statement that "simply being Black, does not mean being right", is dangerous. Black people have a history of experiences encompassing, the racism of oppression and, exploitation and the accompanying liberation of political struggle. Thus at the individual level a Black person's political socialisation will mediate that experience. The "truth" that emerges out of any dialogue with a White person will be a complex process which will depend on the White person's own political appreciation of racism, the linguistic and organisational safeguards to ensure that "rigorous debate" can take place without downgrading the Black person's experience, but addressing the political veracity of what he or she is saying. Very often, however, "truth" is determined by those in power. If the systems existed which allowed for the proper truth determination of Black peoples experiences existed in The Target Borough, we would not be in the position we are today. Apart from which the way in which Cllr. "Y"s paper came about, the drafting of it and that simple statement itself belie the existence of such systems....... Such arguments (about committee meetings) are only empty if running alongside the downgrading of committee meetings is a process of participative democracy which aims to give the Black community a determinant say over decisions effecting resource usage. This is obviously not happening in The Target Borough. Thus like it or not committee meetings are
"substantive" in helping to implement and monitor policy decisions. They are also, in the absence of any other democratic process, a visible sign that the Council still holds race equality as a priority.\textsuperscript{1074}

These comments had part of the desired effect because the Group did not agree to the use of external consultants, but did agree to a review coordinated by the Chief Executive.

By October 1988 the increasingly obvious disengagement by the Labour politicians from both the race and women's equality initiatives was plain for all to see. The work could not be progressed. A joint letter from both the Race and Women's Equality Units, and signed by all of the equality staff was sent to all Labour members. It speaks for itself.

As Race and Women's Equality Advisers and service specialists working for The target borough Council, we have taken the step of writing to-you collectively because of the extent to which this council appears to be retreating from its equality commitment and responsibilities. Over the past year it is our considered view, given our area of expertise that there has been a rapid deterioration in the commitment towards and implementation of the council's equality policies. This has been compounded as well by the rumours and counter rumours surrounding the reasons for, and decisions about the proposed "Equalities Review." We feel very strongly that the purported justification for the review is specious; that it is falsely structured; and is thus totally unnecessary. It has to be asked therefore why senior equality advisers were not consulted about the review, and why, when these officers recommended that they take the lead in conducting that part of the review pertaining to Race and Women's equality (the Chief Executive having declined to do so) this was rejected by the Leader. Instead it has been proposed that rate-payers money will be wasted on employing external consultants to perform a review which the council's own staff are far better equipped to carry out.

We reject totally the ideas that somehow there are problems in equalities work in the Council because of inadequate equality structures, "negative oppositionism" and the "personalities" of individual equality workers. If there is a problem surrounding equalities in the Council, then it is that of the lack of political will and courage necessary to carry through such a programme which by its very nature entails unpopular decisions being taken. We contend strongly, however, that the proposed review is signalling an increasing ambivalence on the part of members towards equalities' work at a time when the most oppressed and exploited in the community are suffering severely from the effects of central government legislation.

This has been exemplified in some instances by the unwarranted personalised attacks on some equality advisers by some members at open committee meeting, and which is, therefore, contributing rapidly to a situation in which equality advisers feel that they can no longer function according to the job descriptions to which they were appointed.

Whilst we recognise fully that it is members' political prerogative to decide which policies are to be carried forward and that this is being made more
difficult by the enormous pressures on local government now and in the foreseeable future, nevertheless it is our opinion that the action to date is reneging by default on manifesto commitments made to Black people and women in the Borough; and is creating an offensively unacceptable working environment for equality advisers and workers who, apart from having a personal, professional and political commitment to equality, were appointed to advise the Council on how best to achieve those very same manifesto commitments. As things stand now it would be preferable if there were a clear political decision which said: "No: We no longer wish to pursue programmes of race and women's equality."
Consequently because of the seriousness with which we view this situation and because there is a need for an open solution, we shall be seeking an urgent meeting with the Leadership.

The proposed meeting with the Leadership did not occur because the politicians concerned suddenly developed 'full diaries'. No review took place, but a report recommending the closure of the two equality units and its replacement with a broad equalities focussed one was written by the then Assistant Chief Executive. As the Adviser's commented at the time;

On July 25th, 1988 The target borough Labour Group threw out a proposal put forward by Cllr. 'B' that a consultant be brought in to undertake a review of equalities issues, but agreed that a Council wide review should take place and that the Chief Executive should co-ordinate this review. No such review has taken place. Thus, the draft report, written by the Assistant Chief Executive, that we have been asked to comment on is not the result of a professionally constructed review process, but seemingly the subjective opinion of one officer. The previous Labour Group report on the subject (5.12.88), written by the then Chief Executive, was also a subjective opinion, with no attempt made to research or consult on the contents. Indeed, attempts were made to keep those contents secret from us and other interested parties. We view these actions as appalling practice and in direct conflict with the stated core values of this Authority.

Both the senior managers concerned claimed that were acting under instruction from the Labour Group. But, as the advisers were quick to point out, under the conditions of employment and protocols of the council, the Labour Group is an outside body and cannot instruct employees to do anything. However, what is important at this stage, is to situate what was happening within my overall contention that the communicative force of the race equality discourse was blunted by the closing down of the deliberative communicative spaces it had previously opened up in the organisation. This pattern of re-asserting dominance through ossification is, in part, demonstrated again by the way in which this report recommending closure was prepared, i.e. in a way which prevented the equality advisers from placing counter critiques and proposals to the Group, as well in the future siting of equalities within the overall fold of neo-managerialism. It is evidenced, further in the direction recommended in the report for equalities
to continue in the council, and in the background to the chief actors made responsible for carrying this out.

The Assistant Chief Executive, at the time, had, nine months previously, been a lowly policy officer in the Central Policy Unit of the target borough. However he had also been a Labour councillor in a neighbouring borough up to the mid eighties. His entry into the council as a policy officer also post dated the two heads of the equality units. His sudden elevation through the ranks from policy officer to Assistant Chief Executive was questioned at the time by the equality advisers as being further evidence of the still prevailing hidden system of positive discrimination for white males. At the time the equality advisers were of the view that his Labour Party connections were responsible for his promotion, just as they were convinced that these were the same reasons for him taking on the responsibility for the report, and for the recommendations that followed.

In effect the report recommended scrapping the Race and Women's Units, and the two equality adviser posts in Personnel; and demoting the two race adviser posts in Housing and Social Services so that they now reported to a lower tier of management and lost the access to members. In the place of the two central units would be one equality unit which, on the same level of resources as the Race and Women's Units would cover race, women, gay men and lesbians, pensioners and disability areas of inequality. There would be a head of unit which would not have automatic access to members, but would have to go through the line management. Further, the remit of the unit and other advisers in the two departments, would only be services. The equality staff would not be allowed to work on employment, or deal with individual employee or community complaints. It was, thus, an actual diminution in the real and communicative resources previously available to race equality, especially given the fact that the work of the authority had almost doubled in size with the assumption of education responsibilities in that same year. It was, in effect, an edifice based on communicative closure in which the political system is kept sterile, away from any direct claims to racial justice, and administrative system contains and controls the work on equalities, thereby preventing any such claims from arising from within that system as well. Work, then, on equalities was firmly sited within the overall council neo-managerialist discourse, and the specific element relating to PSO. In Chapter 5 I had argued that the moral status of equalities in local government post what I have termed the period of positive racialisation, was that of being a virtual reality entity. The transmogrification of equalities in the target borough achieved just that; a form of race equality which was communicatively closed off from the people it was supposed to 'benefit'. It became a technical problem, amenable to managerial solutions, and thus, only ever able to make one of the three validity claims. This was made symbolically, as a legitimating gesture that the council was still interested in
equalities, but without any substance. This trend towards communicative closure – re-asserting bureaucratic hierarchical control, erecting a cordon sanitaire around politicians from direct communicative claims, neo-managerialising equalities, putting ‘our people’ into key posts – continued with the appointment of the first head of the new equalities’ unit. This was an internal appointment, in the end. The new head was a Labour Party member and had been, in another local authority, a co-opted member of a committee. She had worked in the Central Policy Unit of the target borough and had been given the responsibility for developing the PSO programme. A NALGO newsletter issued just before the new head was appointed, made the critical point that there was a climate in the council in which that post was advertised in the neo-managerialist “nu-speak” of “equality through quality….hands on experience…and fast track management….but, then this is also a climate in which recruitment to ‘fast track’ management posts appear to have a number of hidden selection criteria, such as being a member of the Labour Party, preferably in some previous capacity as a councillor, or co-optee and/or being a personal friend of members or senior manager.”

11.36 Conclusion

The fate which befell the race equality programme, structures and discourse in the target borough was unique only in the way in which it was played out. Between the late eighties and mid nineties, similar processes of de-establishing race equality occurred in other local authorities. In 1987, at the initiation of the head of the race unit in the target borough together with other race advisers and workers in the target borough and other local authorities, attempts were made, using the nascent public sphere around race and local governance, to develop more solidaristic responses from race equality workers in other local authorities to what appeared to be happening in their and other councils. A briefing note, as an introduction to the subject at hand, as well as being an invitation to a meeting to discuss the issues, was circulated.

This Conservative government has already announced its intention to continue the onslaught on Labour run inner city authorities. This onslaught will be directed at those very two areas which underpin our work: viz. curtailing the process of democratisation at the local government level and curtailing the level of resources available. Whilst not denying the reality of the crisis, this is being compounded by the Labour Party’s accommodationist response as opposed to confronting the attacks on its own terms. Their national election strategy of trying to refind the white working class is echoing loudly at the local authority level as Labour councillors look to the forthcoming local elections. There is a conscious attempt now by many of these inner city Labour groups to produce a sanitized non "loony left", non profligate image of the councils they run. To do so requires scaling down their commitment to race equality on the assumption that something as vague as "equal opportunities" is easier to sell electorally. Thus for example in Birmingham the blame for losing
five Labour seats at the May 87 local elections is being laid at the doors of the Race and Women's committees. These have now been abolished and replaced with a Personnel and Equalities committee whilst plans are afoot to do likewise with their Race and Women's Units. In Camden there were plans discussed before the national election to the effect that if Labour lost the general election then some of the first posts to go would be a number of the Race, Women's and other equality advisers' leaving a small rump which would be formed into an equal opportunities unit. Similar discussions are now taking place in a number of other, inner London boroughs. In addition measures are also being considered which will have a disastrous effect on many race equality initiatives being undertaken. In sum the reactionary side to the pressures on our work is going to be given the green light in a way which will reduce our role to that of Bantustan functionaries.  

That was written in 1987. By the early to mid nineties, of the eight inner London Labour run boroughs which had established some form of race equality infra-structure, including a central unit, only one still had that intact. All of the rest had either wholly or substantially disestablished their internal structures. At most a broad based equalities rump was left in the centre. Out of the five outer London Labour run boroughs, which had also erected similar structures, all, bar one, had extirpated them. This is presented to show that what was happening to race equality in the target borough was not some form of aberration; a claim which is redolent in the justifications made by the councillors primarily responsible for its destruction. Thus, for example, in a dramatic volte face, councillors, who previously could not find fault with the work of the two equality units, even though they did not like the operational style, were briefing the media to the effect that the changes were forced upon them because the units 'were not delivering', and/or the advisers were 'too beastly'. Yet, in all of the other boroughs mentioned above, a similar process of marginalisation and eventual expulsion from the organisation, was being enacted. Whilst each of these had differing structures, race discourse and operational styles, they all eventually suffered the same fate. What was being witnessed here was not a collection of coincidences, but the implementation of a strategy which had many similar ingredients as those in the target borough. This is not to shout 'conspiracy' so much, as to indicate a set of changing circumstances which facilitated those actions. What makes the target borough stand out, apart from the nature of the discursive discourse underpinning the race equality programme and the razzia like diskourses it encountered, is the fact that these contestations appeared to be taking place ahead of the other boroughs. At the meta level the outcome was the rejection of the limited utopia of welfare compromise, which included the labourist consensus, as well as the closing down of the race and women's equality utopias. At the macro level it was the neo-managerialisation of a political problem which had these utopias at its heart. At the micro level it was what occurred in the target borough. Thus it moved from a brief period of repoliticisation and decolonisation, in which glimpses of a racially inclusive form of local governance could be
gleaned, to an administrative re-assertion of party control through depoliticisation and recolonisation. What occurred in that target borough can be seen to be replicated at national level in the new government.

One and a half years after the destruction of the race and women’s equality programmes in the target borough, the Independent ran a praising article entitled, “The Borough Where Labour is Working.” This noted that the council had cut its workforce by some 2000, including its refuse collection workforce which went from 160 to 60 “forcing the dustmen to work so hard that residents are treated to the sight of men stripping to the waist literally running round the borough emptying the council’s new wheelie bins.”

The then Leader, the same who posed the need for a permanent question mark over Black people’s interpretation of their experiences, response to this was that, after thinking hard about it, he had come to the conclusion that “making our dustmen work four times as hard is a socialist act.” In this dislocation of means and ends, the echoes of ‘freedom through work’ and ‘Gulag(ing)’ for the motherland resonate.

11.37 Epilogue – Post 1990

The de-politicising and re-colonising trends identified in the research above – a communicative closing, silencing of race, a neo-managerialist medium for promoting ‘better services’ as the new universalism bonding all communities, a virtual reality façade of technical good governance as a substitute for critical democratisation, equalities cut off from its communicative base and thus existing as an instrumentalised sign – continues. In one of his more prescient observations, Ouseley described the situation, vis-à-vis race equality in local government in the mid nineties, as having regressed to the situation in the seventies. This much is true of the way in which equalities, particularly race equality, retroceded in the target borough in the nineties. This can be briefly outlined with regard to four facets: the race equality infra-structure, which had been theorised as being a key catalyst for opening up the communicative spaces; the entrenchment of neo-managerialism as the new power coagulating agent for councillors; the reality of the changes so loudly announced by the wearing of the ‘new clothes’; and the fate of Black people within and outside of the organisation.

The structure of the new central equalities set up was already characterised by the distorting forces re-imposed over its operation, viz. the scaling down of its respective equality components, its re-insertion into a formal managerial hierarchy, the ligaturing of its communicative channels with its supposed constituencies. There were, as well, other aspects. For example, Race Relations Committee was reduced to two meetings a year. Its agenda, which once had always been substantive covering a multi-levelled scope, as
outlined in the earlier sections, was substantially reduced. Non-voting co-optees, in the mid nineties, now consisted of members of the manual trade unions, the CRO from the local CRC and a representative from the Pensioner’s Forum.\textsuperscript{1085} The ex-Race Advisers noted that if they had produced so meagre an agenda, they would have run the serious risk of formal censure.\textsuperscript{1086} In terms of content, one that was now limited to service issues and grant funding, the former had relapsed into project mode, one that was intermittent. Whereas the anti-racist service programmes, which were now discarded, were created within a cross council framework which promised substantive changes, services were back again in the vein of ad hoc, one off projects. Responsibility for generating the race equality dimension to employment fell to the Personnel Division. One of their first acts was to put back the time period for the achievement of the employment targets. The result was that by 1994 the target of achieving 21% Black employees still stood.\textsuperscript{1087} The original recommendation from the now defunct Race Unit was the achievement of the same target by 1988. The anti-racist employment programmes and action plans were rewritten, and ‘ameliorated’, into positive action plans. In these the primary sorts of action appeared to be training ones, particularly for Black managers. The detailed action of the previous plans, which addressed substantial organisational change, were omitted. Action and evaluation were now limited to monitoring and praise for departments. Above all the language of race went back to the seventies. The term ‘ethnic minorities’ replaced ‘Black’. In terms of the infra-structure, the race adviser post in Social Services became vacant in 1989. It was never refilled. By 1994 the Equalities Development Unit, which had replaced the Race and Women’s Units, had merged with the Central Policy Unit to become the Central Policy and Equalities Unit.\textsuperscript{1088} The head of the equalities Unit also became the head of the new unit. By 1998 it had reverted to the generic Central Policy Unit, losing all aspects of an explicit equalities dimension. In the early nineties the council had decided to refocus and re-fête the local crc, including the public awarding of a council ‘honour’ to the CRO, the very same who had dominated the Working Party and tried to sabotage the new Race Unit. By 1999 the crc was closed because the council had withdrawn funding.\textsuperscript{1089} On the council website, in 1998, the then Leader of the council, the very same who had pushed through the neo-managerialist changes, could boast that at long last they had rid themselves of the equality structures.\textsuperscript{1090}

In the nineties a plethora of neo-managerialist sub-diskourses and associated techniques were introduced into the running of the target borough: quality techniques; performance management; the displacement of ‘personnel’ by ‘human resources’; appraisal and supervision procedures; business planning. In this the target borough was being matched by other local authorities as more and more introduced similar programmes of controlling the administrative systems of local governance. For example, in a three year
time lag, Lambeth introduced the same type of managerialist programmes together with a complete erasure of their internal equality structures. As with the target borough there was a heavy investment in managerial training. These changes in other boroughs reflected, as well, the internal changes in the Labour Party nationally with its adoption of the 'new' preface, distinguishing it from its old, bad past, which were, at that time being played out in the local parties. In Lambeth, for example, from the mid nineties onwards control of the local Labour Party was firmly in the hands of new Labour supporters. This, in turn, was manifested in the political outlook and calibre of Labour councillors running the council. There were similar changes in the local authority directly to the west of the target borough. In all, but particularly the target borough where these managerialist restructuring had been in operation the longest, the relationship with the local populace was now mediated through the publication of visible signs that the council was performing. This took the form of performance targets, measures and evaluations of how the council was achieving those goals. All this expressed, at the technical signifying level, was that, as with the nationalisation of legitimisation processes, there were hidden costs. Both the neo-managerialisation of a political problem and one aspect of that problem, viz. privatisation, whilst premised on the three 'Es' of resources as a solution, actually cost more than the resources they were supposed to be saving. For example, in the target borough, new managerial accounting systems had to be developed, paid for, and implemented. These, in terms of the amount of time afforded to employee and financial control, increased significantly. This extension of the boundaries of managerial action and expected competence were built on the devolution of previously centrally controlled responsibilities, such as human resources and finance and on the technologisation of management as a discourse/diskourse. Privatisation of certain local government services, such as refuse collection, did not remove the cost of those services from local government, or, as was claimed, make those services cheaper to run. Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) was introduced by the 1988 Local Government Act specifying a rolling programme of local government services which had to be put out to tender.\textsuperscript{1091} The first batch affected areas, such as cleaning, catering, refuse collection etc., in fact all those in which the majority of workers were manual. It also introduced a quasi-market based organisational split whereby that part of the organisation concerned with specifying the context to, level and quality of service was called the commissioner, and that part concerned with providing the service, the contractor. With regard to the services mentioned the contracting side was referred to as the Direct Service Organisation (DSO) which, along with outside contractors had to bid for the tender. Apart from the ethically dubious practices which now grew up around public sector contracts, such as loss leaders, or bribes, the council was still responsible for the services, even though a private firm might have been bought in to run it. This meant that the local authority had to invest
heavily in the creation of a ‘shadow’ bureaucracy whose function was to monitor and evaluate the way in which the contract was being executed by the contractor. Thus, for example, a contract for cutting the grass in public parks required, as part of the specification, a clear indication of the height of grass expected. This had to be measured and checked by council evaluators. What stands out in the target borough, however, is the extent to which privatisation was embraced, both in relation to the import of managerial techniques previously the sole domain of the private sector, and in relation to actually privatising what were regarded as constituency fodder services. By the latter is meant those services which were viewed by labourist councillors as being significant in the political legitimisation battles. Most of the staff in these services were, what was classified in local government terms as, ‘manual workers’. The strategem of “work them harder for socialism” was taken to its next stage with the use of the privatisation legislation and climate by certain councillors and senior managers to establish a private company, i.e. not a DSO, which then won the tender to provide key council services, like the refuse collection service. The main councillor concerned was the ex-Leader who had been mainly instrumental in bringing in the neo-managerialist changes. As then directors of the new company the senior managers had to resign from the council. The company was successful in subsequently winning a number of other councils’ contracts in these service areas. The councillor concerned, however, remained in his political post causing senior staff in the legal department and the then chief executive to advise of the potential dangers of a conflict of interest and the harm that would do to the council’s image. Whilst the councillor concerned did eventually resign, in the late nineties he was back as a councillor, Leader and now putative mayor of the borough. This is not just a rupturing of the welfarist utopia; it’s a jettisoning of it and replacement by a totally different relationship which does not rely on any notion of compromise or consensus. In the phoney war surrounding the announced intention to introduce privatisation in the mid eighties, the labour movement, including those in the Leadership of the target borough, were part of an information network dedicated to demonstrating how bad it would be for workers under a privatised regime. It is ironic, therefore, that those same warning indicators identified, such as worse employment conditions and contexts, lower pay, longer hours, increased chances of discrimination, are, under this new labourist transmogrification, used as indices of being able to provide cheaper services. In fact in the mid nineties work by academics, the EOC1092 and the LGMB1093, confirmed those earlier warnings of worse conditions, more discrimination and the likelihood of worse pay for workers caught up in the CCT form of privatisation. But there is another dimension to this, which is that it presaged a now common belief in bringing in the private sector to running local government on a formal acknowledged basis. This partnership with the private sector is informally negotiated through explicit networks, such as the new local government network, and
involves politicians, local and national, key new, modernising local government academics and private sector organisations. It is a partnership in a trade which, in 2001, could yield the private sector £30 billion extra revenue a year. A critical member of Labour’s national executive commented in a recent article that one of the academics “Corrigan shares an interest with the putative mayor of the target borough, Councillor “X”, a former director of local government contractors Ab, in promoting the idea of elected mayors and local cabinet style government....(which)...has its provenance in yellowing think pieces by the late, and aridly Thatcherite, former minister Nicholas Ridley.” This convergence of right and left over local government, far from being a ‘third way’ reflects the recursive notion of local government as simply being that of municipal services.

Thus:

“The fusing of business with government may still confuse Labour supporters. They may find themselves thrown by the management gobbledegook that is the network’s stock in trade. By now it may be dawning on some that any notion of ‘conflict in interest’ is as old fashioned as clause four of the Labour Party constitution. They may conclude that private greed has simply replaced public need as the new, yet also very old, ideology.”

At another level it could be argued that this makes formally respectable and acceptable the informal corporatism of the seventies between the public and private sectors evinced by the activities of the Poulsons and T. Dan Smiths of the time.

These instrumentalised changes required, and generated, a dynamic branding and re-branding visibility with which the council mediated its interface with the public. The local communities now have to negotiate glossy media productions to learn about, or even, interact with target borough, a trend very much evident in other local authorities. But this is symptomatic of, and feeds into, a growing specific oeuvre of ‘public sector management’ mirrored at different levels in society, from the knowledge categorisation of this at university levels, including associated qualifications, to the numerous publications dedicated to this subject and that tendency’s recognition in the separate labelled bookshelves in academic bookshops. There are even sub-disciplines within this, one of which concerns itself with the ‘marketing’ of local government. This ‘public relationing’ of local governance derives from the decisions taken to reconfigure a political relationship with the local communities into one that is consumerised. This new relationship is given de-democratising sanction in the new political structures being pursued by some, as the target borough, and being pushed through in the form of legislation, by the national government. Cabinet style government and elected mayors removes a substantial deliberative component from local government which existed in the old style committees. But this form of critique was already there in the early eighties and late seventies when
Dearlove, correctly, identified that those calling for an abolition of the committee structure for being "too slow and cumbersome" did so on the flimsiest of reasons. Further this form of reductionist restructuring simply replaced what had been a comparatively horizontal form of control through multiple decision sites, with a single hierarchically structured decision and access point. Thus those multiple democratic access points to local government have been reduced to one. Even within that solitary all encompassing committee, decisions taken are merely the rubber stamping of decisionistic action of previous groupings, not open to the public, such as scrutiny committees which are attached to the new cabinet. The means of ensuring that the Black communities were present, visible and even participating at service, or other committee meetings, where important policies were to be discussed and decisions taken, as happened previously, have disappeared. Important public political spaces have been closed down and replaced with virtual reality 'signs of progress'. Yet, despite this refurbishing, revamping and renovating of the organisation to create a more visually palatable product so that the consumers, at the local election, can 'buy', the end results are still minimal. In a scenario of being hoist with their own petard, the Audit Commission's annual release of local authority league tables showing how they have performed against a variety of performance indicators reveals that the target borough, with Lambeth propping up the bottom, is till very much in the lowest rungs. A recent, this millennium, report showed that its refuse services, still being run by the same private company mentioned above, is in trouble because it is not meeting agreed targets. One likely outcome is that more resources will have to be invested in the neo-managerial infra-structure, as well as the marketing of 'what-we-have-done-to-resolve-the-problem.' There is an overlap here with Habermas' arguments about the public relations exercises displacing communicative democratising impulses and Debord's notion of the 'spectacle'.

My contention is that this attests to a wider political problem of democratisation not amenable to, yet postponed by, a technicisation of the solution, just as racism attests to trans-epochal unresolved communicative problems whose solutions are key to fulfilling modernity.

The fate of Black people in the target borough, and other local authorities in the nineties, was being sculpted as a process presenting itself as the town halls 're-whitewashing' themselves. The sub-text to this, as exemplified in the redefinition of equalities by the target borough, was to present the period of the eighties as the profligate excesses of equal opportunities. Problems encountered in the nineties, as often happened in Lambeth, were portrayed as a legacy of the eighties. In this borough, from the mid nineties onwards, there appeared to be an assiduous programme of ridding the organisation of people, especially managers, who were too closely associated with the eighties, either in terms of having worked then, or in terms of support for the
equality policies pursued then. One Black manager interviewed, swears at having seen at the centre in the then Chief Executive’s office, a list of ‘suspect’ managers, many of whom were Black. Whether true or not, the fact is that in this authority most of the Black managers appointed in the eighties and early nineties had, through one means or another, left by the mid to late nineties. In one Directorate, which had been very successful in appointing Black employees throughout every level of the hierarchy, over a three year period, lost most of their Black managers through processes of redundancy, resignation or disciplinary action. There were a few who simply resigned because of the changes occurring, without having another job to go to. There was a very strong atmosphere generated by the organisation through what was done and said, felt by Black employees, that those appointed under the equalities period, were suspect in terms of their suitability for the job. Reorganisations of work areas managed by Black people and their displacement were common. Their replacements, for the most part, were white. In the target borough, just as I had argued previously that an increase in complaints of racism by Black people can be read at one level as a sign of confidence in appropriation, so an increase in the disciplining of Black people is an indication of silencing. By the mid nineties, according to their own internal monitoring figures, over 30% of those being disciplined were Black. The appointment rate for Black people showed, at that same time, a marked decrease from the period when the two separate equality units existed, so much so that their own monitoring report concluded that it is not sufficient “for the council to meet its targets in the foreseeable future.”

But the fate of Black people in the organisation can be best represented through the experiences and testimonies of Black people themselves. Earlier in this chapter, I had drawn attention to the appointment of a senior Black manager to run the section dealing with voluntary sector grants at about the same time the two equality units came on stream. Regarded as very competent, as well as being liked, by both members and management, his career trajectory through the organisation can be contrasted with the white head of the Women’s Unit appointed at the same time. The latter, as shown above, went on to head the replacement equalities set up at the centre, then the Central Policy Unit, and then ended up as assistant Chief Executive. The last two promotions were through re-organisational sleight of hands and were not subject to any equal opportunity considerations of advertising externally and inviting applications. One Black employee, who worked covering one of the new race posts at the time the new equality unit merged with the Central Policy Unit, openly questioned her equality credentials given the way in which she then came to acquire the enhanced management post of head of Central Policy and Equalities. Under the previous equality arrangements this sort of critical interrogation was part of the job, as shown by the ex-head of the Race Unit’s questioning of the appointment
process and decision for the then Assistant Chief Executive. He, on the other hand, was disciplined and issued with a final written warning, i.e. any further organisational transgression would result in dismissal. However, over this same period of the nineties, the Black head of community affairs found himself, despite showing and performing well according to the organisation's own 'performance indicators' subject to various re-organisation which resulted in himself and his section being moved to two other separate departments, and in the process, effectively being demoted. Eventually, in the late nineties, a final re-organisation made him redundant. He was able to confirm a growing pattern, in the nineties of Black voluntary groups having their funding withdrawn by the council. In fact no new Black group was funded in the sixteen years that he worked for the council. He highlighted a growing culture of not accepting criticism by the council, both internally and externally. Organisations in the voluntary sector were told, informally, that when visitors are shown around that it would not be wise to complain to them that there is not enough grant from the council. Further, with the advent of the executive style structure and decision making, spending decisions were delegated to groups not accessible to the public. His professional assessment, was that a significant factor in deciding who gets funded is the evaluation by these members of those who support the political mainstream. Thus whilst no groups have ever had their funding withdrawn for not upholding their equality conditions of grant, criticism of the council now would qualify them for such action. This, as the local law centre found to their cost, is nu-speak entitled 'reprovisioning', i.e. shifting the provision of those services to new organisations, which might be private ones. This critical, but essential long term service in the local community, has been cut, and its services advertised under reprovisioning. It had been a means locally for enabling local people to claim their rights, even those of appropriation against the council. In Croydon, as another example, the private provision of race equality services was being considered, much against the wishes of local Black groups, as a means of re-constituting the local CRC. His view is that there is a convergence based, "modernising agenda which is to make them look like team new Labour."

Another Black manager, working in "X" Social Services in the nineties resigned, without a new job, stating that she would rather work washing dishes etc. than carry on. Her observations were that the target borough was extremely good at promoting itself through factitious representations, like brochures, and other media forms, but that the reality of working in the organisation as a Black person was intolerable. She too noted that the vast majority of appointments to other management positions were white.

There are other testimonies, as well. The key point is that the details of these draw attention to the technical learning for dominance trends identified
in the body of this chapter. These are to do with the depoliticisation and re-colonisation of the sphere of local governance, one of the main impetuses for which was that of 'racial fear'. Under the changes identified above in relation to the voluntary sector can be seen the authoritarian attempt to close down the local public spheres, particularly the subaltern ones, so that the active citizenship, identified by new Labour as important in the new arrangements, is constituted one dimensionally in accordance with new right Labour’s protocol of what is good participation. We are back in the anthropophagii territories of “house and field niggers.”
Chapter 12

Race and Local Governance – The Case of Cape Town in South Africa

12.1 Introduction – Making the Connections

The meta-, meso- and micro-level contextualisation of empirical data prefacing the chapter on the UK is very much that which will be applied to the information on the South African case study. Thus in the section on ‘methodology’ I argued that because “race ‘internationalises’ the core issue” it “tests the main theoretical explanatory framework, i.e. Habermas’ theory, both at the ‘real’ level of global application, and given its universalist principle, the ‘norm’ level”, a comparison is made with a local authority in South Africa. It is still the case, as it was for the chapter on the UK that: “the data, and organisation thereof, thus seeks to support a critical, multi-level epistemological frame of reference which can be expressed in the sense of outwardly flowing concentric circles covering the following categories: race, local governance, race and local governance, the state and multi-racial society, the meta-theoretical considerations to these mediated through Habermas and the arguments with post-modernism, and finally, Habermas and race.” However, as argued in the chapter on methodology, because of the time and spatial disjunctures wrought by racism, there is not a time synchronicity between the two international cases. Rather the comparison is based on the similarities between the types of race equality problems and proffered solution changes at the local governance level being pursued in the two countries in differing time periods. The emergence of this at in different time zones attests not only to the uneven development of racism as a global phenomenon, but also to the need to make this more explicit normatively in Habermas’ model of societal evolution, especially given my contention that unresolved problems of race are the touchstone to the substantive completion of modernity. In both scenarios, that between a ‘developed’ country and that between a ‘developing’ one, progress is measured not according to a foundationalist teleological notion of progress, but rather that of progress towards a deracialised post conventionalisation. This framework moves beyond, though it also includes a consideration of, the orthodox comparative model which examines states, societies and policies.

The details of the theoretical complements to key social reality correlates provided in the UK chapter are relevant as well in this one. However, there is one major qualitative difference. Whilst the empirical data in the UK section had large component derived from a ‘researcher in situ’ component,
the same can not be said for South Africa. Instead data was collected from a number of field trips combined with the marshalling of relevant secondary sources in both countries. As such this chapter is not as comprehensive as the last one, being more concerned, because of those practical considerations, with providing the outlined bases upon which a comparison can be made as pointers to being able to draw certain conclusions. There is, as well, another consideration, which is that the changes referred to are still unfurling in South Africa. There is, in anticipation of a later argument, another scenario of a crossroads being confronted, with the decision about which route to take still being debated.

12.2 Key Contextualisation Issues

Whilst the framework employed in this chapter includes, without repeating, the theoretical components to key social reality correlates, it will, as well, briefly examine both the history of the South African state and the major progressive theoretical frameworks of the state, including, thus, either directly, or by implication, the local state, available as the knowledge base to the emancipatorily oriented part of the change spectrum. This is done, in acknowledgement, that the similar exercise undertaken in Chapters 9, 10 and 11 were oriented more to the UK experience. On the other hand, as shall be shown, the overlaps and similarities in the nature of the theoretical constructions begin to strengthen the argument that a comparison and convergent conclusion is possible, as well as denoting the figuring of arguments about the nature of globalisation. Further these paradigms were, and are, part of the reservoir of knowledge available to those concerned with working through the changes in South Africa at the moment. There are a number of obvious, but important, prefacing questions which can be put, the answers to which are outlined or indicated in the different frameworks. Hence:

♦ Is there, in South Africa, a trans-epochal unresolved problem of race?
♦ Is this reflected in the history of the state and in the role of the state as the resolver of socio-integrative problems?
♦ In the late, positive attempt to fulfil this role, is there an immanent model of a substantively racially inclusive state?
♦ Is there, therefore, an identified period of a cross roads in which the opposite route, i.e. that of technical learning for increased dominance, is also visible?

Whilst the framework I am going to briefly outline is derived from one source, many of its multiple references I already have, or have accessed. The framework, derived primarily, though not exclusively from O'Meara’s
epistemological framing of the key recent theoretical debates of the apartheid state is convenient mainly because he uses the same meta-level categorised matrix as I do. Thus he “focuses on three aspects .... the ontological, the epistemological and the normative.” There is another similarity with my structuring of the argument in Chapter 4 which is that O'Meara reflects his analysis of the key theoretical debates off the mirror of the weaknesses of the orthodox Marxist interpretations of the South African polity which emerged in the 1970's. The differences with mine, however, are twofold: the first is that my argument was shaped within the context of the Habermassian contentions about the limitations to the universals of human development posed by the social labour, not a term he uses, variant; and the second is that race is not, despite the actual real situation, an explicit consideration. I shall therefore use some, not all, of his identified trends, and supplement these with some of my own. In the 1970s among white academics in South African universities a vigorous debate ensued between a “disparate group of Marxist scholars”, not to mention amongst themselves as well, and their protagonists who were those who upheld the liberal thesis on South Africa. I use the qualifying ‘white’ description not as a form of disparagement, but as a statement of fact. This ‘fact’ attests to the reality that, in the seventies, those universities locked into the Anglophone international knowledge and human resource networks were almost exclusively white. A number of these radical revisionists of the up to then dominant liberal historiography were able to complete their research studies in the metropolitan countries through this network. One of the first is in fact a Canadian. At the same time it attests to the reality that those Black, university educated, and sometimes sited, South African Marxists were, by not being part of this network and because of the institutional racism of academia, in South Africa and the Anglophone centres, effectively excluded from this debate. O'Meara’s own work of that period, whilst critical even then of the omissions by structural Marxists, is oriented towards the state and the key players. There is, as Saunders points out, not a history or analysis of Black actors in this context. But this exemplifies the peculiarity of the status and situating of ‘race’ in the theoretical construction of alternatives by these progressives whereby ‘race’ and ‘racism’, as I have argued in Chapter 1, are treated as epiphenomenal to more substantive societal determining forces. In the case of the Marxists mentioned, this is the reduction of societal development to the universals of social labour. Whilst O'Meara is critical of their reductionism as well, this criticism does not include the reductionism associated with the subsumption of race. He is right, however, in identifying three reductionist fault lines in their arguments: treating apartheid as being functional to the capitalist system; instrumentalising the state as a vast monolithic, uni-dimensional entity; and reducing actors to that of being agents of specific classes or fractions of those classes. O'Meara identifies a later eighties and nineties group of South African state theorists the aim of whose work is primarily concerned
with the democratisation of the state. Here again, to prefatorily flag up this issue, the resolution of the problem of democratisation and race is reduced to that of the achievement of a universal, unqualified, non discriminatory franchise. But then this accords with the African National Congress’ approach to race and racism which is to wish it away through their doctrine of ‘non-racialism’. At one level such a response is understandable because the enormity and obvious ‘in-your-face’, everyday reality of racism and the oppressing racist state provokes a counter replication of race and racism as a masking smoke screen. However, ‘non-racialism’ is just that; doing nothing about race and racism. It is the communicative disaffirmation of race which, in effect, says “I am not going to talk about race.” As such, despite O’Meara’s criticism of the liberal paradigm which basically argues that race and racism were, and are, some aberration foisted upon South African society by misinformed and bad faith actors, in this case the Afrikaaners, he, the Marxists and state democratisers he identifies, actually end up doing the same. That is they treat race as a by product which can be resolved once the solution to the deeper cause is found. In the case of liberals the market, unfettered by the shackles of ‘apartheid’ are the key. In the case of the Marxists, who argue that the rise of capitalism in South Africa is intertwined with the creation of state systems of racial dominance, oppression and exploitation, seizure of the state as a means of controlling the means of production through a class war in which Black people are synonymous with the working class, or the Black and white working classes ‘unite and fight’, is the answer to the democratisation of both the state and the economy. O’Meara’s later arguments, which are a Gramscian sophistication on the Marxist analyses, and thus not so simplistic in the solution he sees, will be dealt with in the examination of the main theoretical arguments.

12.3 Origins of the South African State

In detailing the origins of the South African state most of the commentators –historians, sociologists, political theorists – start with the systemic edifice introduced by the European colonists. In part this is due to the reasoning from both liberals and Marxist radicals that racism developed after the state and economy did, only really taking off with the start of mineral exploitation and incipient industrialisation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Very few start the analysis by reasoning that this was an artifice foisted upon the then existing indigenous means of resolving socio-integrative problems. I have argued earlier in this research piece that “I see this process as that of a wedge….of new systemic and social integrative actions in which there is a sharper bifurcation between white and Black at the socio-integrative level…. (whilst)… systemically new structures of economic and administrative power were imposed on these societies which ruptured and realigned some of the traditional systems according to priorities.
determined by a dynamic located elsewhere, social integrative institutions and processes were disrupted as well not just by the penetration of new forms of systemic action, but by the imposition of social integrative action that consensualised norms hierarchicalising white over Black, which were instrumentally applied, and therefore experienced, and therefore experienced as direct domination." The same process can be seen to have applied in the South African case. In examining colonial South Africa and the origins of the racial order, Keegan argues as follows:

"In a European dominated world in which race came to permeate the social orders established by colonial regimes, it is superfluous to argue about the origins of the South African racial order. Racial hierarchies were present from the beginnings of settlement at the Cape. European colonisers brought with them stereotypes and prejudices which did not amount to a racial ideology so much as an inherent ethnocentrism. These were activated into a social system of racial hierarchy by the struggle for control of resources against native peoples, and by the labour systems, based on coercion, on which the colonisers came to depend."108

This accords with my arguments about the nature of trans-epochal unresolved problems of race. It is thus with this contextualisation of the racialising process in which the state comes to be defined as the resolver of white socio-and systemic-integrative problems, one of the key strands to which is the exclusion of Black peoples, that I want to outline briefly the evolution of the South African state – from imposed colonial systems to the state of democratic constitutionalism.

The South African state, that is a political entity with political authority over the geographical span known as South Africa and peoples therein, was created, under the legal auspices of the 1909 South Africa Act, from the merger in 1910 of the then four self governing settler colonies: the Cape, Natal, Transvaal and the Orange Free state. The state became known from that date as the ‘Union of South Africa’. Klug argues that what this created was a bifurcated state because “the Union Constitution granted the white minority parliamentary democracy, while on the other it subjugated the majority of Black South Africans to autocratic administrative rule.”109

There were contained in the 1909 Act defined “differential spheres of citizenship for ‘European’ and ‘Native’ populations within one territory.”110

The latter together with their lands and where they were to live were to be the subject of the exercise of authority by the ‘Governor general in council’. Up to 1931 with the passing of the Statute of Westminster by the British parliament, the sovereignty of the Union’s parliament was restricted by legislation tying it to the British state. Thereafter, even with ‘full sovereignty’ being granted in theory, the dominion parliament of South Africa remained procedurally bound by the entrenched clauses of the Union Constitution. Two of the important entrenched clauses, the outcome of compromises between the four colonies participating in the original
conference giving rise to the 1909 Act related to the Cape franchise and the legal parity of English and Dutch (later Afrikaans). Repeal or change of any of these would require a two thirds majority of the parliament. In effect the constitution could be subject to judicial review. In 1961 the Union became a republic when it left the Commonwealth. In terms of the “western derived constitutional arrangements” this change was not the simple replacement of the Governor general with a President, as presented by O’Meara. Rather, as Klug argues, it reflected the end of a long term struggle by the National Government of the time for parliamentary sovereignty over the judiciary. The four settler colonies which came together to form the South African state had differing and different constitutional arrangements and influences. In the Cape and Natal, with the influence of English constitutionalism, a qualified, supposedly non-racial franchise had been introduced based on property rights. This, as Klug shows, was, in a context of encouragement for European immigration, subject to constant manipulation with regard to Black people. In the Cape, for example, in the late nineteenth century, allocation of individual plots to African families was, through legislation, divorced from the criteria for the franchise. In Natal the different conditions attached to the franchise meant that in 1907 99% of registered voters were white. In the Cape the franchise, whilst giving the majority of white adult males (and later in the 1920s) females the vote, also enfranchised a growing number of Coloured people. This Cape Franchise was constitutionally entrenched. In the former Boer republics the franchise, despite being constitutionally defined as all males equal before the law, and thus unqualified, was constitutionally restricted to white adult males. At another level this reflects the difference between, what was to become a folkloric remembrance and retelling of, English and Afrikaaner racism. Despite this constitutional guarantee of limited Black political participation through the ballot box, from 1910 onwards the parliament assiduously attempted to remove this limited franchise. In this the battle between the courts and parliament for sovereignty was played out. In the 1950s legislative attempts to remove Coloured voters from the roll by allowing a simple majority vote in the parliament, was struck out by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional. From there on the government resorted to a number of strategies which included legislation allowing them to pack the Appellate court with their sympathisers and culminated in the South Africa Amendment Act of 1956 which excluded the jurisdiction of the courts and reinstated the 1951 Separate Representation of Voters Act which allowed for the removal of Black voters from the common roll. Key paragraphs of that 1956 Act relating to the sovereignty of parliament over the courts were included.\textsuperscript{1111}

It can be argued that challenges to the legitimation of the state’s authority through pursuing to its logical conclusion the limited normative potential of the Constitution was one strategy employed by Black people. For example
the legal challenge to the 1951 Act was launched by four ‘Coloured’ voters, each of them active in their own right in the subaltern public sphere of ‘Coloured politics’. On the other hand it mirrored, as well, the then government’s need to control its legitimation base, in this case by expelling potential opponents because of their race. The concern with legitimation means that whilst, as O’Meara describes it, the South African state post 1910 “enjoyed a long notoriety as the incarnation of constitutionally entrenched racism”, this constitutional entrenchment did not give rise to a dismissal of the requirement for legitimation amongst the Black populations; the corollary of which is outright repression. Rather legitimation requirements and strategies covered three ‘constituencies: the white electorate, amongst whom support for the Nationalist Party was divided, and certainly not monolithic; the Black populations whose political and economic aspirations had to be controlled through means other than just repression; and, related to this, the international community whose growing repugnance of and hostility towards the racistically violent excesses of apartheid threatened the economic clientalist status of the country.

The relevance of the above is that it had a direct bearing on the post Second world war evolution of the South African state. Thus, in 1959 and continued rapidly apace after 1961, the Promotion of Bantu Self Government Act was passed. This “took the logic of land reservation a step by setting aside those same reserved lands which the Union Constitution cast as islands of ‘tribal’ governance as the areas in which Africans would in future exercise their political aspirations... as foreign citizens exercising full political rights outside of the South African constitutional framework.” In other words the start of ‘Bantustanization’. The position of other formally designated population groups, like the ‘Coloureds’ remained on the legitimating political agenda. Whilst different government commissions, set up to look into this, rejected the notion of a separate ‘homeland’, a potential answer was proffered in the 1984 constitution.

The 1984 constitution abandoned the Westminster model. It was the direct result of changes in the legitimating strategies of the Nationalist government of the time, reflecting the changing scenes both within and outside the country. The constitutional changes and the constitution itself were portrayed in a new technocratic language of expertise and professionalisation, and even, with regard to local government, talked about ‘participatory democracy’. Though the latter’s meaning under the Nationalist party nu-speak was entirely different to common notions about participation and democracy. O’Meara describes the new constitution as “a highly centralised and complex presidential regime built around an executive presidency, a racially defined tri-cameral legislature and a nebulous advisory body with limited powers known as the President’s Council.” Additionally the Provincial Councils, which had allowed for a limited degree
of federalised autonomy, were done away with and the powers of those assumed by the President. The racially segregated tri-cameral component represented the attempt by the apartheid regime to bring into the national government fold the ‘Coloured’ and Indian peoples through allowing those groups to elect their own MPs to their own separate chambers in the new set up. The elections for these were boycotted by the different groups.

Finally the new constitution of South Africa, finalised in 1996, allows for a quasi-federalist presidential government in which the previous four provinces have been expanded to nine. This is a two house legislature elected on a mixture of proportional and regional representation. What is important is that parliament does not have sole sovereignty. Instead the constitution has established a constitutional court to ‘watch over’ the constitution. Rather than there being a democratic constitutional state, there should be, so the theory goes, a state of democratic constitutionalism. The details of this will be broached later with regard to local government.

12.4 Recent Theories of the South African State

O’Meara identifies six broad tendencies in the new literature on the South African state and the change potentials associated with these. I want to concentrate on four, including his own, which I regard as being more germane to this study. However, I want to add one other which is hinted at, but missing from O’Meara’s study. In addition in summarising his ‘summary’, I want to re-examine, briefly, his meta-level critique through the interrogator of ‘race’, which he does not do. In fact a reader would be hard pressed to understand how ‘race’ and ‘racism’ feature in the analyses he looks at, other than the obvious statements, here and there, that this was a racist state. But this is not that surprising given that the references for the book, as well as the ones he examines, have very few devoted to either race or racism.

In the trends he identifies O’Meara deals with the South African variant of post-Fordism. Since the criticisms he voices are similar to mine – functionalist and economically determinist – I am not going to include that. The implied dimension of race within the post Fordist explanation of societal change which I outlined in Chapter... applies even more in the context of South Africa. The key question is what does it mean for the Black person at the colonising interface between her/his lifeworld and the economic and political systems – emancipatory action or absorption “into the generalities of the exploitation contained within the valorisation of labour.” This, however, is a question which can be put to all of O’Meara’s identified tendencies.
These analyses provide a more sophisticated examination of the way in which power is garnered and used within the state apparatus; that is it is not reduced to an almost automatic reflex of capital. For O’Meara this approach has merit because it takes real politics seriously allowing for an examination of the real politics of the apartheid state rather than the imposition on these politics of the “abstract logic of the author’s own theoretical model.” However the weakness of this approach is that it accords, and comes close to the liberal school of politics, too much power to individual actors. This perhaps lies in the concomitant weakness of the main theoretical source, Theda Skocpol. Skocpol breaks with what O’Meara describes as explanations of the state as manifestations of social relations between collective actors. Instead there are three principles guiding her conception of the state: a non-voluntarist structural perspective, the geopolitical framework of state action, and the potential autonomy of the state. The weaknesses relate firstly to her adoption uncritically of the neo-Hobbsian, ahistorical realist school of thinking on the state and international relations. In this there is an “anarchic international system in which egotistical states are locked in a deadly struggle for survival and power.” Within this realist perspective this system is absolutely autonomous from social actors outside. In terms of O’Meara’s ontological and epistemological interrogations, he comes to the conclusion that with regard to the former, that such an approach has not adequately theorised the supposed autonomy of politics within the state because, as can be demonstrated under apartheid, autonomy is relative, rather than potentially absolute. With regard to the latter, because analyses are only ever post facto retrospective, Skocpol unwittingly appears to subscribe to the rational Policy Model of explanation whereby state policy permutations are “more or less the purposive acts of unified governments.”

Be this as it may, the insights O’Meara garners from the state-centric approach and his critique offer little by way of advancing the questions about the conditions for realising a racially inclusive form of governance, which obviously includes the associated areas of democratisation and political institutions. In the racially bifurcated state there was the deliberate social construction and hierarchicalisation of two ontologies and epistemologies, that of white people and that of Black people, begging the normative question of how the manufactured differences could be resolved. The most obvious criticism that can be made of the state-centric approach is that it cut itself off from the experiences of subjugated Black to the state and how the state responded to this. This response was not just physically violent, as for example in the case of the state’s reaction to the 1976 student boycott of and demonstrations against the Afrikaanerisation of school lessons, but also involved a range of long term, violent colonising intrusions
into the lifeworlds of Black people, including those of reformist based political legitimating strategies designed to accommodate Black people to racial domination. Counter responses to conventionalisation cannot, as I have argued before, be predicted, and thus cover a range of possibilities, including post-conventionalisation.

12.6 Discourse Analysis

O'Meara’s categorisation of this trend testifies to the growing, yet still very small, group of social theorists who have drawn on the ‘linguistic turn’ to try to analyses the South African condition. As he observes the category he identifies “is by far the most disparate and difficult to categorise.” Part of this confusion derives from his own misunderstanding of the key theoretical influences. He thus lumps together post structuralists, post modernists, post Marxists and critical theorists, and concludes that they share a consistent epistemological orientation with a paradigm that privileges discourse and symbolic rituals. In terms of the singular most important theoretical source, this lies in the work of Foucault. However, as I have argued in other chapters there is discourse and discourse, and there is Habermas and there is Foucault, and whilst the twain do meet, it displays an ignorance of their differences and thus of the conditions under which they do overlap, to try and simply merge them together. As I shall show and argue in my own category, there is a critical theoretic version of the South African state, based on, but not exclusively, Habermas and other influenced theorists. These, then, need to be extracted from O'Meara’s messy inclusion. In terms of his critique of Foucault there is much I agree with: the over determining and constituting powers of discourse, i.e. the experience of a mugging from behind, the consequent absence of space for a politics of change, and, a point he does not make, the related impossibility of a normative perspective. However, not all of the Foucauldian derived insights can be dismissed out of hand as not resonating “with a real sense, or feel for what politics (or life) was like under apartheid.” His was, after all, a privileged white experience of life. Norval, who does attempt a grand scale Foucauldian based analysis of apartheid discourse, argues, with an eye on the post 1990 developments, that a radical notion of the democratic politics of difference “would refuse to resign itself unambiguously to limits imposed by the structural requirements of any particular order.” There are, within this, echoes of my point about resolving the on tological and epistemological antinomies of the bifurcated state, as well as the earlier arguments about the principle of constitutionalism rather than that of constitutional patriotism.

12.7 O'Meara’s “non-deterministic, materialist theory of politics.”

At one level there is much in O'Meara’s attempt to derive a non-deterministic theory of politics and the state to recommend it. There are,
within the various schematic elements key moments which echo the earlier concerns of critical theorists, like Habermas, when he must have grappled with the theoretical legacy of historical materialism. However, O’Meara’s insistence on signing off with what amounts to classical historical materialism still poses a question mark over the position and role of Black people in his analysis. The materialist aspect of his analysis relates to his insistence that before discussion, i.e. communication, human beings need to clothe and feed themselves, and that, various ways in which human beings organise themselves “to ensure the production and reproduction of these...necessary goods shapes the conditions under which they live their lives, develop ideologies, engage in politics.”

On the bases of this, then, specific answers to specific questions about specific historically contextualised political situations, such as the South African state circa the late 1980s, for example, cannot be theoretically pre-given, but can only be “arrived at through detailed empirical analysis.” But, on the other hand, theories, whilst they are not an answer by themselves, can help in showing us where to look for the answers.

There then follows an exposition of the four key constituent elements to his reworked theory of the state. These will be very briefly summarised because it is not so much their details which are in question, as the overall theoretical framework. The first is the historical specificity of the modern state in general, and, within that framework, the specificity of individual states. The second relates to the structure and autonomy of the state. This is tied to the first element because they will influence, for each state, the “complex, evolving, inter-dependent inter determinate totality” from which for respective states the “structural limits of state power and autonomy can be read. The third element is to do with the processes of agency, power and representation. In this O’Meara, in an attempt to situate change away from the over determinism of structural accounts of the capitalist state, reasons that the relationship between the state and civil society and the different types of power the two sectors can mobilise, are crucial to understanding change. Within this the socio-political and socio-economic action areas of bureaucracy and class have to be investigated empirically. The final element concerns itself with the notions of crisis and change. The term ‘crisis’ needs to be carefully thought out and applied if the problem, he identifies in some analysts, of circular reasoning, i.e. the chicken and egg conundrum, is to be avoided. To that end he opts for a Gramscian bi-differentiation of crisis as being separately organic and conjunctural. The first calls into question “the overall structure of society, the state and economy, whilst the second relates to the “incessant and persistent efforts to overcome these structural contradictions and to conserve or defend...the existing order.”
I am not going to repeat the critiques, put forward in earlier chapters, of Marx’s historical materialism and its universalist base, social labour, especially as these relate to race. Sufficient to say that these apply as well to O’Meara’s historical materialist framed theoretical outline. Ultimately there is a teleology of progress hidden within this in which change relates to a philosophy of consciousness based ‘enlightenment’ of historical subjects, even if these are empirically defined. In the crucial arena of emancipatory change, then, which I assume from his work relates to democratisation – and the question of whether or not this is still solely state focussed remains to be answered – how, within the key parameters of his paradigm, is the question of what constitutes a racially inclusive form of local governance in South Africa, to be answered? My view is that the “objectivating attempt to ground …… governance in a productivist teleology which ultimately has immense difficulty in reconciling the subjectivist experiences of those participating in this playing out of deeper level determining forces …(still has gaps through which)….. Black people fall..” The answer to this problematic lies in the last theory of the South African state which is a critical theoretic one.

### 12.8 A Critical Theory of the South African State

The previous theory of politics and the state in South Africa reads as if it is on the verge of falling over into a form of post modernism or succumbing to the temptations of out right empiricism. Holding it theoretical cohesion together is an admixture of ‘autonomy’ and specifically defined specific episodes of ‘empiricism’. That is because what is required is a move to another level of abstraction. Habermas’ attempt to reconstruct historical materialism, and his theory of the modern capitalist state based on a linguistically framed bi-action abstraction, is one. This I have used, as set out in chapters 1, 5, 6, 7, and 11, to re-examine the UK state and local government, as well as re-think the structuring of colonialism. The strengths of a Habermassian approach, despite the criticisms of the contrary, is that “he has outlined a detailed theory that attempts to link individual, and, under certain circumstances, collective agency, with wider structures and forces.” As I interpret it, from life world to system. Within this his conceptualisation of power as being either authorial power or dominating power allows for a bottom up approach to analyses in which the possibility of Black people falling through the theoretical gaps is less likely. His theorisation of the inadequacies of social labour, and its organisational form, the ‘mode of production’ in explaining social evolution, and thus the need for a complementary theorisation of social interaction, is key because it foregrounds his social integration-system integration, communicative action –purposive rational action, type distinctions. The relationship between the two arenas of action are not pre-determinant. However, because this is posed at another level of abstraction from historical materialism, but one that

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privileges communicative action, it does mean that theoretical outlines are even more accountable to empirical fallibilism. My reading of this, as I try to outline in the methodology chapter, is that this calls for a critical form of empiricism, one in which the claims of ‘emancipatees’, so to speak, are built in. Within the limitations, therefore, of this project, whilst this will be but a theoretical outline subject to further empirical validation, it is one the democratic potential of which will be used, as was done with the UK, as a comparative reference point to South African state developments and to their interpretations. The key question I posed in the Introduction, regarding the bases for complementarity and which is more eloquently put by Amy Gutman, is again relevant to South Africa’s past and present, providing of course we also consider my rider of the unjustly differentiated society.

“What does it mean for citizens with different cultural identities, often based on ethnicity, race, gender or religion to recognise ourselves as equals in the way we are treated in politics?”

The key arguments raised in the chapters quoted above can be briefly summarised as a basis to tentatively outline a critical theory of the South African state. Firstly with regard to Habermas’ theory of the state he argues that the modern capitalist state can be understood in relation to internal and external aspects where internally the modern state is the “result of the economic differentiation of an economic system which regulates the production process through the market...(and)...organises the conditions under which the citizens as competing and strategically acting private persons carry on the production process.” The state thus vouches safe the conditions - civil law, money system etc. - for the continuing existence of a depoliticised economic process free from moral norms and use value orientations. Externally, because of the nature of the evolution of the European state, the political autonomy of the state “is based on a reciprocal recognition that is sanctioned by the threat of military force...despite the agreement of international law...” The core problem for the state is that of legitimacy which is “the worthiness of the political order to be recognised.” This devolves upon the state being able to secure its social integrative responsibilities at the same time that it guarantees systemic integration.

Colonialism I have theorised as being a socio- and systemic integrative wedge, whose dynamics reside in the metropolitan country, forcefully and invasively thrust into other societies. This results in a number of possible deleterious socio-integrative outcomes for the indigenous societies from total collapse to a spectrum of socio-integrative displacements. This invasive process takes the form of a socio-political organisation, the ‘colony’ which oversees and mediates a dominating, exploitative relationship between the metropole and that society, the ‘colonial relationship’. This, for indigenous
people, is played out through a mixture of depoliticised, bureaucratic administrative means and the naked violence of military superiority. Where a degree of autonomy is delegated to the colony, in terms of direct dominating rule, and/or a degree of internal democracy through a conditional, qualified franchise, then the conditions exist for the development of a colonial state. This globalisation of racial dominance, one of the first forms of globalism, represents the underbelly, shadow learning processes of technical dominance, the expansion of productive forces which is overseen by the development of new forms of social learning in the metropole’s political, social and cultural spheres, but one’s which are disabled by the exclusionary processes of the former. This is exemplified in the position of white citizens of ‘empire’ but Black subjects. Finally this colonial colonisation of the lifeworld is racially mediated involving a colour coded, hierarchical, forced re-alignment of socio- and systemic integrative processes. There is a range of possible outcomes: intra-psychic implosion and acquiescence, internalised assimilation, defensive ethnic consolidating preservation, as in indirect rule, offensive ethnic counter assaults, coventionalised nationalism, ‘etnikfied’ claims, coventionalised social movements, post conventional social movements.

The beginning of this critical theoretic outline of the South African state starts with the early nineties version that was replaced with the transitional one after the 1994 elections. This I describe as a colonial state. Keegan has argued that whilst the origins of the hierarchies of racial order came with the white colonisers, these did not remain, over the evolution of South African societies, in their atavistic state. Rather they changed with the intertwining of the development of capitalism and the South African state. My argument would be that whilst the form in which such racism was presented, changed, their recursive character means that the core themes can be traced back. So it is as well with the colonial state thesis. The argument can be constructed as follows. The dominant political order of the capitalist state, because of the latter’s dual, yet contradictory socio- and systemic integrative tasks, develops legitimating strategies in order to remain in power. The evolution of the capitalist state from the sixteenth century onwards goes hand in hand with the evolution of a world system in which Black people are exploited and dominated with the periphery of the metropolitan state being situated, over time, in the form of the colony. This dominating rule is sanctioned by the interplay between a social learning process in which the potential of white humans are developed whilst at the same time the technical learning, productivist learning processes are the ones to which Black people are subjugated. The colony’s value orientation and systemic alignment is towards the metropole. The relationship between the socio-political organisation in this ‘foreign’ land and the indigenous society, which is classed as sub-human, where human denotes the ‘civilised west is
defined by the capitalist's state's demand for recognition, sanctioned by a
range of violent forces, and thus ultimately military force. Even where the
colony develops into a colonial state with a degree of internal democratic
processes and institutions, these are reserved for white people with the
relationship with the Black people still being defined in accordance with the
violent principle of recognition the metropolitan state demands of external
nations. In other words Black people are foreigners in their own lands.
They are subject to rule, and do not have the status of being participants in
the defining of governance of that society, or for that matter the metropolitan
society. Vestiges of that relationship continue today whereby citizens of
white British descent living overseas, who retained their citizenship, can cast
their vote in British national elections yet certain Black people resident in the
UK cannot participate. From the experience and view of Black people in
South Africa, the relationship between them and the South African state,
right up to 1994, can be described, therefore, as colonial. Further this, if
combined with Habermas' thesis of life world colonisation, is a double
edged colonial relationship. The growing subjugation of Black people in
South Africa, reaching its acme under the formal apartheid years with the
extreme bureaucratisation of race as the mediating experience between them
and the state, means that this can be interpreted as a conscious attempt by the
state to colonise their life world. Whereas in the evolution of the capitalist
state the separation out of the steering sub-media of money and power occurs
almost just beyond the conscious threshold of participants and against a
value background which is mostly homogenous, the growing imposition of
the colonial state is a visible forced entry into Black people's life worlds.
This is a racially and racistically mediated violent transposition and relocation of
systemic integrative processes on to an 'alien' socio-integrative process.
Violent, in some case because of the physical force involved, but violently
always because of the intra-psychic damage inflicted. The forcible removal
from traditional lands and catapulting into an indentured and/or wage labour
system, the bureaucratically steered location in a racially segregated job
market, the racially defined, bureaucratically managed progress through
second and third rate educational systems, were socio-integratively
consensual for many white people in South Africa who believed that this is
natural and right. For Black people the reaction can be that from amongst a
range set out above. Whilst indigenous socio-integrative value systems do
not, obviously, remain intact, they are not subject to the constant attack from
system imperatives which come clothed in the same background values.
Hence the strong possibility of ethnic or etnik mobilisation against such
systemic pressure is always there.

Keegan's analysis of the origins of the racial order in South Africa which
focuses on the Cape Colony, is interesting because his indepth historical
study provides many pointers which help to illustrate my argument. The
colony, and then nascent colonial state with, first the delegation of powers
through a gubernatorial office, and then, combined with that a limited
franchise and assembly, pursued the racial subjugation of black people for
capitalist gain through a number of techniques, e.g. military, indirect rule,
forced labour etc. Habermas’ identified the tasks of the modern capitalist
state as being that of “shaping a business policy that ensures growth,
influencing the structure of production in a manner oriented to collective
needs, and correcting the pattern of social inequality.” In its mid
nineteenth century form the colonial state in the Cape could be seen to be
grappling with the first two. The last one, on terms of being key to
legitimation strategies focussing on the evaluation of the electorate on
whether or not the political order is worthy of being recognised, comes to
play a growing important question amongst the increasingly economically
stratified white constituency. It’s resolution lies in the growing economical
and psychological benefits accruing to those at the bottom of the white class
hierarchy from the racial segregation of the economy. I am here using
pointers from the nineteenth century as a base from which to extrapolate into
the twentieth century, simply because of project limitations. But there is a
cardinal point contained in this. This is that with the growth of the white
polity and the development into the twentieth century of a complex, fairly
sophisticated state institutional arrangements replete with a developed
economic infra-structure and a mass public sphere serviced by national
media, meant that legitimating strategies for the various political orders of
the South African state played an increasing important role. The simple
idea of maintaining a racially unjust order for private gain required
increasingly complex legitimating interventions. There are three aspects to
this. Internally the class and cultural cleavage of white South African
society meant that legitimation had to serve not a homogenous society, but
one with differing notions about how to maintain the racial order. The
history of the internal differences between the Afrikaaner communities and
the Anglophone white communities, not to mention the sub-differences
within those, and of the dominant classes within that arrangement, testify to
that. Externally there are two dimensions, one outward looking, the other
internal. Externally the original linkage with the colonising metropolitan
country and the need to legitimate the colonial state with that external
constituency becomes displaced over time into the developing arena of
international law. Thus that relating to racial discrimination post second
world war, and the international institutions, such as the United Nations, do
exert some influence. Nearer to home the recognising sanction of military
violence is used, as in the case of Angola. But this is but an extension of
the second dimension which relates to the fact that the Black people in the
country are effectively ‘foreigners’ in their own country. The height of this
logic is contained in the creation of the Bantustans which facades democracy
for certain ‘culturally’ distinct ‘African’ peoples through formally
designating them foreigners to the South African state. Whilst recognition
is sanctioned through violence, this cannot be the only strategy for pragmatic
reasons. Others are put in place which attempt to seek from Black people the recognition of the white South African state, not as citizens, but outside subjects. The fact that the state seeks to try to legitimate itself as being fit to rule with Black people does not mean that Black people accept the political order as being legitimate, a conflationary based criticism made by historical materialists of other attempts to create a legitimating explanatory paradigm of the South African state. One can see such legitimating attempts in the action of the South African political order in developing and implementing their “Total Strategy” of the late seventies and eighties. Encased in a technocratic, supposedly neutral language, it attempted to portray changes, such as the 1984 constitution, with its racial tricameral structure, in a progressive light to a potential audience which included the Black population.

In many ways the planning and implementation of that strategy would fit in with Fairclough’s description of the technologisation of discourse. These political differences, then, within the white polity and against the white polity, and their pursuit can be examined in terms of the concept of ‘discourse’ as used in the previous chapter. That is ‘discourse’, unlike the Foucauldians, is not all, but is subject to change and reflexive distancing by, and on the part of, participants. There were, thus, various discourses supporting the unjust racialisation and domination of the Black populace, as well as ones, from within the liberal perspective, advocating change. There were, as well, ranged against them, ‘discourses, of emancipation, such as those pursued by the ANC or the Black Consciousness Movement. Within these were the potential to develop a discursive model, as conceptualised previously, even if at the time it was not articulated in that way. Differing discourses of race management within the South African context of the political order of the state are evident in the fact that the South African government, from the inception of the Union in 1910, was Afrikaaner led culminating in fifty six years of Nationalist Party rule. The discourse of the latter was apartheid, self consciously described by that party as “the Afrikaaner’s divine mission in Africa.” What is very evident in applying this form of theorisation to the South African state, an interpretation which supports the contention originally put forward in chapter..., is that these discourses, particularly that of the National Party government, remained hegemonic because the state was increasingly adept at keeping close, or shutting down those that opened or had the potential to enlarge, communicative discursive spaces in the polity from which a challenge to that hegemony could be enlarged. The most obvious example is the assiduous pursuit, even to the point of constitutional crisis, post Second World War, of the limited number of Black people who still had, under the qualified franchise, the right to vote. The white opposition was limited, by legal proscription, to that pursuing a very narrow form of liberalism. It is possible to talk about a public sphere in the white polity, and even subaltern
public spheres for those espousing change within the parameters accepted by the government. In terms of the latter, exemplified concretely in examples like the liberal press, such as the Rand Daily Mail, their subaltern nature meant running the risk of closure and/or contraction because of state interference. However, there is another dimension to the public sphere which relates to those who have to operate outside of the repressive legal framework of the state, and which involved often, an international dimension. This impinged more on the legitimating aspects of the state which derived from the accountability to international law and approval. It also helped provide the discursive amniotic fluid within which post or trans apartheid alternatives could be raised. To this is given the term ‘samzidat’ public sphere. Difference democracy, within the milieu of apartheid South Africa, then takes on a different hue to that outlined in Chapter... This is one that does not deliberate across difference, but instead talks about essentialised differences. On the other hand within the normative vision of the liberal opposition, and for that matter the ANC, as well as the Marxist and neo-Marxist theorising about the South African state, is a version of democracy that deliberates across difference by eliminating differences.

Within the formal white polity of South African society it is still possible to talk about secondary and primary level legitimation, as was done for the UK, where the former refers to the recognition of the political order of the day, and the latter to the recognition of the principles of the political institutions and their organisation. There was, within apartheid South Africa, a modicum of the uneven development of secondary level legitimation, as evidenced in the conflicts between Cape Town City council and the national government over the implementation of certain pieces of apartheid legislation, as well as the notion of ‘the liberal tradition’ in Cape Town. However the management of race, as a legitimating strategy for the white constituency and sectors of the economy, with its requisite over bureaucratisation – three parallel administrative structures for each of the ‘non-white’ population groups – as well as the over militarisation to sanction internally and externally the recognition of ‘foreigners’, induces crises tendencies. This is because of the burdensome cost to the state and because those strategies, in turn, are responsible for motivational cries amongst the Black populace leading, again, to reactions which require further state intervention. It can be argued that the changes in the early nineties were not brought about because of primary level motivational crises amongst the white constituencies, but the acme of secondary level ones which had as the solution the liberal reform of the South African state, leaving the economy still mainly in white hands. Amongst the radical opposition, as opposed to the liberal opposition, could be discerned an alternative proposal which spoke of a degree of primary level motivational crises. This alternative was structured in some form of socialist state and society conceived very much along orthodox lines, as evinced by the ANC’s nascent proposals.
Habermas has argued that legitimation can either be technocratic or participative. It can be said that the legitimating strategies of the South African state, given its racial divide from the outset of those who should bestow recognition of the political order, was technocratic, not only because of the 'techniques' employed, but also because it sought, as Greenberg argues, to legitimate the illegitimate. The crises provoking the changes post 1990 therefore had within its purviews the option for considering a deracialising reconstruction of the state, and thus local government. This window of opportunity marked the cross roads in the South African context. Whether or not, and this is germane to the post 1996 South Africa, there was the conception, therefore, not so much of a post-colonial society but of a trans-colonial society, remains to be seen because the latter would require thinking about deliberative democracy across differences without eliminating them.

In conclusion, then, this very brief outline of what a critical theoretic approach to the South African state would cover, tries to show that it is possible to theorise from life world to system, and back again without resorting to notions of autonomy. To do so is to bring the Black experiences into play as a central consideration, something the state down approaches of the Marxists and neo-Marxists do not do, other than in the way of attempting to postulate the importance of the Black proletariat. However, other theorists have attempted to construct a legitimation based analysis of South Africa, using, in differing degrees, Habermas. But, apart from Ray, the failure to inquire more deeply into the theoretical bases to Habermas' work means that the resulting analyses have tended exhibit a degree of functionalism in which the key actors are those within the white polity. This preliminary piece of work is not a functional blue print. At this level it can only map out areas for further consideration, bearing in mind the empirical fallibilism qualification, but always attempts to provide markers to how systemic domination and shadowing of communicative action contains within it the normative outline of changes possible. One of these areas, given that under apartheid the systemic-life world interface was often with the national state, rather than with local government, is to show how local governance content and structures offer a form of political mediation in which racially inclusive politics and governance can be better realised. Atkinson's summary of the situation as follows, is therefore correct.

"There is no strong tradition of city based politics in South Africa. National political issues since 1910 have concerned the central structures of government and the ethnic ownership of the state. Until the mid 1980s, city residents were too concerned with their identity within nation wide movements to give their identity as city dwellers much thought."

The following section therefore looks at the history and context to local governance in the Western Cape, focussing particularly on Cape Town.
12.9 The Context to and Specificity of Race and Local Governance in the Western Cape

The Western Cape, and Cape Town in particular, are apposite choices for examination because this geographical area marks the entry point for white colonialist penetration into South Africa. It was here that the socio-political structure of the colony was first erected, which then developed into the nascent colonial state in the Cape in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Within this the political sub units of municipal governance were also created. The creation of this state and early forms of municipal governance cannot be separated from the race and the way in which it permeated the development of that state and social order. This is to be expected because the advancement of both was predicated upon the racial subjugation of Black people.

12.10 Origins of Local Government in the Cape

In the late seventeenth century, the Dutch East India Company through which the first white colonial occupation of the Cape was exercised, established a 'landdrost' and 'heemraden' system which was to form the basis of a rural system of local government in the Cape. These, thus, later evolved into the Divisional Councils which existed up to the demise of formal apartheid. In 1867, under the auspices of British colonial rule, Cape Town was the first local authority to be granted full municipal status. At that time the geographical span of the new Cape Town City Council covered the area immediately surrounding the harbour and up to the foot of Table Mountain. Over the following thirty years separate municipalities were established in a series of consecutive settlements running along the peninsular and to the west of Cape Town. However, by 1927 these were amalgamated under Cape Town City Council. In later years separate municipalities were created to the north of the city either in reaction to the high property rates or the more liberal political stance of the Council. In terms of the greater Cape Town, by the mid eighties a fragmented system of local government existed with different parts of what should have been one city administered by the City Council, Divisional Council, and smaller local authorities.1130

12.11 The 1910 Settlement and Local Governance

Heymans summarises the legal status of local government in South Africa, and relationship with other tiers of government in between 1910, the formal incorporation of the four separate colonies into a unitary state, and 1983 as follows:
From 1910 until 1983 the de jure relationship between the various tiers of government was as follows: acts of parliament promulgated what power; provincial councils had. Provincial ordinances created local authorities and defined the scope of their legal jurisdiction. The regulation and control of municipal affairs occurred through such provincial ordinances. Local authorities could make laws only within the parameters of this legislation. The doctrine of ultra vires was strictly applied; viz. that local authorities may perform a statute only if it is specifically authorised by a higher tier of government. This doctrine existed to prevent local authorities from exceeding their powers or from spending money without authority. No court of law was competent to pass judgement on the nature of powers that had been devolved down to local authorities. This applied equally to acts of parliament and provincial ordinances.

Unlike certain countries such as West Germany, where the rights of local government are enshrined in the constitution, the South African system of local government has never had any form of constitutional safeguards. Neither the South Africa Act of 1909 nor the 1961 Constitution made reference to the right of local government to exist.

Different provinces were delegated different powers leading to differing local government forms. In the Cape, however, the Provincial administrator had a number of powers over the local authority. He/she had to approve all municipal by-laws; fixed the monthly allowances of councillors; controlled authorities ability to lend money or allocate grants; determined the pay of the town clerk; could dictate to a council to pass a by-law which if not done, would be promulgated by the province. In Cape Town, for example, in 1981 the Provincial Council passed a by-law taking away from the CTCC the right to appoint their own staff. The Province assumed the power to appoint the Chair of the Manpower Service Commission, the CTCC's personnel body. Subsequently a government supporter was appointed. This measure was taken as a direct result of the CTCC's perceived anti-apartheid stance. This overall picture of a parliamentary sovereign, strong state, intervening and directing local government has been compared, by some commentators, as resembling the situation in the UK.

In terms of structures councils either developed or adopted the management committee, which had the aforesaid as the main decision making committee of the council, or a multiple committee structure in which there were numerous committees, each one coinciding with a specific area and service section of the bureaucracy. Up to the mid sixties CTCC had a multiple committee structure. Thereafter it was forced, under protest, to adopt the management committee set up at the direction of the provincial council.

In terms of finance white local authorities had to be largely self financing, with the their income being derived from taxes on fixed properties, sale of services and goods, such as electricity and water, licensing, fines and rental.
12.12 Cape Specificities and Post 1910, Pre 1948 Developments

Historically there are three areas, two contextual to local governance in the Cape, and the third the inter meshing of those two with the process of governance, which require brief detailing. They are relevant to the way in which the change options post 1990 were posed and pursued. These areas are the history of the political discourse of Cape liberalism, the history and contours of the local Black politics, i.e. those of the 'Coloured' people, and the way in which the two aforementioned areas interacted with, and influenced the growth of racial segregation in the Cape.

Up to 1990 one can speak of a political discourse of Cape liberalism which had a direct impact on the direction of Cape Town City Council. Within the context of white apartheid politics it occupied the acceptable limits to what was regarded as the 'opposition'. Even fairly orthodox Marxist analyses of local governance in the Cape acknowledge the influence of such a political 'ideology', without being able to theorise it properly within the overall logic of their thinking. However the description of 'acceptable opposition' under apartheid implies, as there actually was, a fundamental contradiction at the heart of this discourse.

Davenport, in a text examining the immediate contextualising milieu of South African liberalism, one that arose out of an academically focussed reaction to Marxist criticisms of liberalism, outlines a framework for understanding Cape liberalism, which he regards as a unique political form. 1132 The argument is that whilst there are European origins in the four basic elements of liberalism – access to justice, freedom of speech, economic freedom and political rights – these acquired a particular trajectory in the Cape.

The period of Dutch colonial rule up to 1795 was marked by an overt racial order in the centre based on slavery, not only of indigenous peoples, but also imported slaves, primarily from the Dutch East Indies. At the periphery it was characterised by the attempt to forcibly subjugate Black people it came into contact with. The changes brought by the assumption of British colonial rule can be seen, according to the Liberal argument, in the four elements. Thus there was the early nineteenth century abolition of, firstly the slave trade, and then the actual emancipation of the Khoikhoi, followed by the slaves. This contributed to ensuring that the principle of access to justice was there for all the people. Equality before the law proved altogether different because the freed slaves found themselves in a highly disadvantaged socio-economic and political situation. For Davenport the humanitarian solidaristic resources and impulses to liberalism were provide by the presence and activities of the evangelical missionaries in the Cape at that time. In terms of freedom of speech, this was certainly a principle and
practice open to white members of Cape society, and exemplified in the
growing number of periodical and journal publications by the close of the
nineteenth century. Economic liberation, by which Davenport means
freedom of trade, was achieved by 1860 in the Cape. In the twenty years
after that the Cape government actively promoted Black entrepreneurial
activity “especially if it was linked with the erosion of pre-colonial political
structures then deemed to endanger the security of the white community.”
Representative government was granted to the Cape in 1853 based then on a
qualified franchise linked to property rights. Whilst there is some argument
about the extent to which race featured in the original calculations, the actual
distribution of electoral power lay overwhelmingly with the white
community. Further, with the incorporation of two densely ‘African’
populated areas in the eastern Cape some ten to thirty years later – the Ciskei
and Transkei – the level of qualification was progressively raised so as to
exclude effectively ‘African’ representation. By the turn of the century,
with the re-emergence of Dutch/Afrikaaner political power in the Cape, the
Black franchise, both ‘African’ and ‘Coloured’, increasingly became the
pawn of the jockeying for power of the two white communities. In 1909,
when the Cape Assembly, was debating the South Africa bill (the draft 1910
constitution) the liberal political bloc spoke in its entirety for it, so much so
that even Davenport could conclude that the “liberals were more concerned
in the final resort to preserve the dignity of the Cape in its relations with
other colonies than the rights of blacks.”

Keegan, however, provides a differing assessment of Cape liberalism
arguing that there was an ambiguity reflected in its “rhetorical commitment
to equality and freedom” and yet “its fundamental compatibility with cultural
imperialism, class domination…and racial subjugation.” His study shows
how, for example, the London Missionary Society “the seedbed of
humanitarian thought” in the 1820s and 1830s in the Cape, had, by the 1850s
become “infected with racial sentiment.” His conclusion is that “the
humanitarian vision of a society in which indigenous peoples were free of
oppression was always a pipe dream in a colony in which a substantial white
population had already established itself as a dominant class, with control
over resources and dispossessed labour.”

If there is, then, to be a distinctive colouring to Cape liberalism, one that was
certainly apparent right up to 1990 when the political and spiritual heirs to
Cape liberalism had control of Cape Town City Council, it is the
ambivalence shown towards the full granting of political rights to Black
people within the context of the fundamental political principles they
espouse. This has been exemplified in the compromises and
accommodations they have had to reach with a system of extreme racial
subjugation.
The largest population group in the Western Cape are the so called ‘Coloureds’, a term devised by and applied by the South African state and its colonial predecessors. It refers to a disparately heterogeneous group of people descended from the original Khoisan people in the Cape, the east and West African, Madagascan and Dutch East Indian (an area roughly equivalent to modern day Indonesia) slaves, as well as the miscegenated offspring of the relationships with white colonists and slave owners. Lewis, in his study of ‘Coloured’ politics defines them, using another commentator’s observations, as “a heterogeneous collection of individuals ‘lumped together for administrative purposes’ by a white supremacist state.”

Two government commissions, one in the 1930s and the other under the auspices of the apartheid state in the seventies, failed to agree on a definition of a ‘Coloured’. The problem of definition for a racially segregated state was knowing where, in the case of the heterogeneous make up of the community, ‘white’ ended and ‘African’ began. The 1950 Population Registration Act which attempted to divide up the population into defined ‘racial’ groups, confirmed through the mandatory racially coded identity card, could only define the group in question by reference to physical appearance. The now near mythical, bureaucratically Kafkaesque ‘pencil test’ whereby those in the twilight zone between ‘Coloured’ and ‘white’ would have a pencil put in their hair by state officials to see if the pencil fell, out, i.e. ‘white’, or stayed in, i.e. ‘Coloured’, has some basis in reality.

If the term ‘Coloured’ exists as an ersatz creation of the South African and colonial states, is it possible to talk about community and identity? The answer is only in the sense that community and identity are not fixed essentialised entities, but contingent, moving contents and forms dependent upon the socio-political and economic historical contexts. At that level such an observation sounds obvious. However, at the meta-level, the use, abuse and ownership of the term ‘Coloured’ provides an almost perfect case model for demonstrating the relevance of Habermas’ life world colonisation thesis. Lewis describes the value history and base of so called ‘Coloureds’ as that of being acculturalised. This, however, was no simple case of assimilation of white values. Rather my contention that within colonising contexts it is possible to talk about socio-integrative displacement, which is a better way of explaining the situation. Within a history of state forcible differentiating interventions based on racialised conventionalisation and associated socio-economic differentiating strategies, there was a swell a range of socio-integrative displacement and appropriation reactions. Some of these had religious groundings. For example whilst many within the ‘Coloured’ ‘community’ became Christians of every conceivable denomination, there was also a sizeable Muslim community at whose core were those descendants from the slaves imported from the old Dutch East Indies. The Dutch in the east Indies had a tendency to enslave and export to
the Cape those who opposed their colonial rule. This is still known as the Cape Malay community. The history of the political reaction to this process of colonisation both prior to, and in the subsequent period of the formation of the South African state, is thus as varied, ranging from the innovatory to outright conservatism. This in effect mirrors what I would describe as the first political attempts to go beyond increasing official boundaries being defined for so called ‘Coloureds’ to try to forge a greater Black collectivity, to ones that accepted the strategic need for a ‘Coloured’ ethnic tag, and thus accommodation with the racist state. These two tendencies, and the range of ‘moderate’ options in between them characterise the history of ‘Coloured’ politics in South Africa. This is the summary context to the observation made by other commentators that the term ‘Coloured’ is detested and hated by most, but not all, of that identified group of people.137 The detailed history of this is beyond the scope of this project. This has been more than adequately covered in two recent historical endeavours. Lewis provides a detailed historical analysis of the politics and organisations thrown up, whilst Goldin focusses on the history of the political and economic contexts to the creation of the ‘Coloured’ identity. I want to use these as the bases for briefly sketching out the contours of the development of Black politics in the Cape up to 1948, with particular emphasis on its relationship with the local state.

The first Black political organisation in the Cape, the African People’s Organisation (APO) founded in 1902, reflected the dual tendencies identified above. In the mid to late nineteenth century in the Cape the term ‘coloured’, as Goldin shows, was used generically to refer to all people who were not ‘European’. In this it reflected the American usage of that term. Yet a combination of state interventions in the political spheres of franchise and rights and economy, together with the rise of Social Darwinism in government thinking as a justification for segregationist policies, had by the turn of the century accelerated the conflation of ‘coloured’ with ‘Coloured’ and thus the exclusion of ‘African’ from that category. For example the colonial state and the British government had made great efforts to elicit the support of ‘Coloureds’ to their cause during the Boer war with the promise of greater enfranchisement. This promise was not kept because the terms of the settlement of that conflict left such matters undecided, and in fact the implications were that the white society would benefit more politically and economically. With this as the brief background, the founding of the APO, and its founding principles, reflect the changing circumstances affecting the ‘Coloured’ ‘community’, as well as holding out hope of a greater ‘coloured’ constituency. Those principles both talk about promoting the “unity between coloured races”, as well as defending the “Coloured People’s social, political and civil rights.”138 In effect its political aims were to pursue the normative vision of political rights, justice and economic liberties contained within the promise of Cape liberalism. Over the next thirty years the APO
pursued its aims through the immediate political institutions, such as the City Council, and through attempting to link up with other emerging Black political organisations, such as the ANC. This, because of the 'Coloured' focus of the APO and the Africanist perspective of the then ANC proved fruitless. Unfortunately it is in its dealings with the state that the interests of the 'Coloured' 'community' were either promoted or secured, above those of the 'African' people. This was either consciously done, or compromisingly attained as the outcome of their interceding in the attempts by the state to impose some form of blanket segregation. Thus for example, their first intervention in municipal matters was against attempts by the Cape Town City Council, influenced by Social Darwinist type stereotyping of criminal and diseased people's, i.e. those who were not European, to introduce residential segregation. At this time the APO could use as a bargaining chip the enfranchised 'Coloured' voters. They secured the promise from the authorities that the segregation was intended for 'Africans' and not the 'Coloureds'.

Whilst this limited franchise was sufficient to secure the APO five councillors on the Cape Town council by the 1920s, the pattern of the state preferring to adopt social engineering interventions in the economy to secure the white community's recognition continued. This was particularly apparent in the aftermath of the ending of the First World War, and in the long decline of the world economy right up to the beginning of the Second World War. Thus, for example, in the 1920s there were a series of legislative acts which in effect excluded 'Coloureds' from employment whilst at the same time reserving those job areas for whites. After the passage of one of these acts in 1924 the percentage of 'Coloured' and 'African' workers in the public sector, including the council, fell dramatically, whilst the percentage of white workers rose equally dramatically. Throughout this increasing period of state sponsored segregation the role of the APO became more and more that of trying to protect the little political and economic gains secured by the 'Coloureds'. Its tactic was to ally itself with the dominant liberal white political party in an attempt to influence change from that position. It was, as Lewis observes, an acceptance of white racism, but one that tried to extract concessions. By the mid thirties, however, the rising Afrikaaner nationalism fuelling the growing racial segregation in all walks of life together with the worsening economic position of the 'Coloured' community meant that the APO's relevance was coming increasingly under question.

Those most vociferous in their questioning were a group of young radicals, like the leadership of the APO, drawn from the 'Coloured' elite. They had not grown up in the pre 1910 era of Cape liberalism, but in the growing atmosphere and reality of racial segregation. Most of them were drawn from what Lewis describes as "the upper echelons of the Coloured
October 1936, when the APO adopted the policy of non-violent resistance to “apartheid” in Cape Town”; at that time primarily from the ranks of teachers, with many of them being graduates. In summary the difference between their political aims and the APO were that the latter’s “choice between evils smacked of collusion in preserving white privilege at the expense of the interests of all blacks”, whilst the former aimed at “complete social, political and economic equality for non-Europeans with Europeans.”

These new radicals founded an organisation called the National Liberation League. Their intellectual outlook was influenced by the wider socialist debates occurring elsewhere, and with in the organisation itself two factions emerged. The one favoured a more theoretical approach, influenced in the main by the writings of Trotsky. The other had a more pragmatic outlook evidenced by their working alliance with the Communist Party of South Africa and their willingness to adopt a series of practical interventions in the South African polity. These included the pursuit of political office, such as council member and even member of parliament. The important point, however, is that the politics espoused by the NLL marked a change from the previous period. Underpinning this was a series of political principles which not only marked out the nature of the change, but were also the reason for factional differences within the League. The first was the championing of full democratic rights for all irrespective of race and without any ‘civilising’ conditions. The second was the insistence on the membership being open to all races. The third was the principle of non-collaboration with racist state structures whilst racial segregation was still in place and/or being promoted. In and around this were conducted a number of secondary debates feeding into political practice, such as the call by the pragmatic section for unity between the white and black working classes, and the insistence by one element of the radical wing that leadership of the League should be in Black hands. The upshot of this realignment in ‘Coloured’ politics was that the interventions in the polity took on another dimension which included that of trade union organisation and the new one of withdrawing from racially segregated political institutions. All of this was set against a back ground in which the government had introduced increasingly stringent controls over the influx of ‘Africans’ into the western cape, thereby establishing an almost de facto ‘Coloured’ preference policy. One of the highlights of the League’s existence was its ability in the late thirties to organise mass opposition to Nationalist Party inspired Provincial attempts to issue an ordinance forcing local authorities to segregate by race their residential areas. Part of this programme of opposition included persuading the Cape Town City council to vote against the ordinance.

However, throughout the war years and into the immediate follow up of that conflict the United Party government, introduced an increasing number of economic and social segregational measures which, such as the segregation of beaches, might have amounted to what has been described as petty apartheid, but also compounded significantly the acts of humiliation daily
experienced by ‘Coloured’ people, especially those in the intellectual elite. In 1943 the UP government announced the intention to separate off that part of the administration dealing with Coloured people and to establish a Coloured affairs department, and a nominated Coloured Advisory Council which would advise the government accordingly. Initiated as a gesture of thanks to the ‘Coloured’ people for what was regarded as their support and loyalty during the Second World war, it actually enraged many in that ‘community’. This was seen as further evidence of the state’s segregationist intent with regard to ‘Coloureds’. Two organisations were formed, primarily from amongst those who had come through the NLL, to fight this move. These were the Anti-Coloured Affairs Department and the Non European Unity Movement. By 1944, according to Goldin, the “Anti-CAD had penetrated virtually every Coloured community and claimed the support of the majority of Coloured people.”\textsuperscript{1140} The NEUM had a more radical programme of seeking to “forge a black united against all segregatory measures” by trying “to draw the community into struggle, prepare the masses for a direct onslaught against oppression and ally them in the fight for liberation.”\textsuperscript{1141} In this the ‘Coloured’ identity would be submerged in a greater Black one. On the other hand there were also moderate members of the community, again drawn from amongst the ranks of teachers who opted for a strategy of engagement with the reality of the CAD and its allied body the Coloured Advisory Council. In so doing these people, who the former organisations denounced as ‘quislings’ and ‘collaborators’, in effect accepted the identity of ‘Coloured’ being moulded by the state.

These two tendencies within ‘Coloured’ political reactions to state sponsored racial segregation, the one seeking to move beyond the manufactured notion of ‘Coloured’ through action which rejected the racially tinged ballot box, or any form of proxy representation; and the other seeking to confirm that identity through engagement with the ‘dummy’ institutions, comes to characterise the nature of opposition to segregation right up to the mid eighties. In effect, because the Anti-CAD focussed on an issue of sole concern to the Coloured community and because the NEUM was unable to translate its commitment to a united front of Indians, Africans and ‘Coloureds’ into reality, and thus largely mobilised ‘Coloureds’, Goldin argues that both contributed unintentionally also to heighten the notion of a ‘Coloured’ identity. Further its membership and strata from which it drew its activists were, on the whole, from the enlarging middle professional class in the ‘Coloured’ community – primarily graduate teachers, but also doctors and lawyers. Its ability to mobilise a wider cross section of the community was sporadically effective with the CAD campaign probably being the last successful garnering of cross community support it could muster. Irrespective of that, the political aims of the organisation at least had within its normative vision a wider Black collectivity. At the time its analysis, mobilisation of people against specific government measures, praxis
principle and concomitant tactics employed were certainly more radical than that of the ANC. In terms of the local council, however, apart from the presence of a few Black councillors, the increasing state and provincial direction of local authorities with regard to racial segregation initiatives, neutralised the political power the community could wield locally to ward off or attenuate such racism. By 1948 all that was effectively left was the limited, qualified franchise. Even the worth and merit of this was, by the late forties, coming under attack from political organisations like the NEUM who argued that participation in this racially based truncation of full political rights as simply another form of collaboration. It can be argued that the CTCC, through its differentiated response to state racism vis-a-vis the 'Coloureds' and 'Africans', and through its own initiative measures, such as the creation of municipal housing schemes for lower income 'Coloureds' only, contributed as well to the notion of a 'Coloured community' as a distinct ethnic group.

There is another level of argument which highlights the secondary level growing legitimation crisis facing the UP in government through the thirties and forties. The increasing enlargement of the white constituency eligible to vote, increasing pressure from the growing Afrikaaner nationalist movement, the perceived need to protect white people over and above Black people from the deleterious effects of the depression, are factors which when considered within the overall context of the South African racialisation of rationalisation meant increasing state intervention in the affairs of local governance. This was especially so in regions, like the Cape, where the local Black community had managed to organise some degree of local influence over the council so that the normative potential of the liberalism of the ruling political party could be realised in relation to some of their needs. We have a situation here where again in relation to race, legitimation costs are transferred to the national level so that political problems, such as full democratic rights for Black people, can be 'solved' through administrative prescriptions.

12.13 Post 1948 Developments

The Nationalist Party came into power in 1948 with racial identity as its leitmotiv, in particular the divine right of the Afrikaaners to rule and their divine mission to determine a racially shaped fate for Black people in South Africa. More strategically, however, it also came to power with only a five seat majority. The 'Coloured' vote, limited as it was, was seen as being key in seven seats. Furthermore these votes invariably went to the then opposition party, the UP. With regard to the 'Coloured' people, the strategy was threefold: disenfranchisement, fixing the ersatz 'Coloured' identity through legislatively backed geographical, social, welfare and biologically restrictive measures, as well as economic differentiating ones,
and seeking recognition through a mixture of repression and political placebos. Disenfranchisement was achieved in relation to national elections by 1956, and in relation to municipal elections only by 1971; a comment in itself on the extent to which the state was able to control local government. With regard to the attempt to fix the 'Coloured' population in an ethnic framework, the intention of the Nationalist Party was not to undo the previous government's racial segregational measures, but to extend them. In this regard key to their strategy was to control the residency and movement of Black people into urban areas. For 'Coloured' people this was to be achieved primarily not through pass controls, which was to be reserved solely for 'Africans', but the Group Areas Act which codified the racial segregation of urban areas. There were other racially restrictive measures affecting all aspects of life, like access to education, public transport, leisure etc. Fixing the biological boundaries of the 'Coloured' population, i.e. the movement 'up' to whites, or 'down' to Africans, was to be achieved through the legislative means of the Population Registration Act, Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, and the Immorality Act. Securing the recognition of the political order was to be accomplished through a mix increasing the repressive powers of the state and courses of action designed to buy off economically 'Coloured' people from 'African' people, but within a context preferential job segregation for whites. Generally this was disparagingly referred to as the 'amper baas' (almost boss) strategy. Key amongst these sorts of action was the legislation defining in the 1950s a Coloured labour preference policy in the Western Cape together with state ordinances which restricted severely the influx and residency of 'Africans' in that same area. Politically the Group Areas Act envisaged, against a Nationalist party ideological back cloth which was toying with the idea of a 'Coloured' homeland, that those residential areas designated for 'Coloureds' only would become the geographical sites for 'Coloured' specific local government structures in the future.

The reaction from the local Black population to this barrage of racist segregational action by the state in the late forties and fifties split along ideological grounds. The NEUM stuck to its principle of non-collaboration and its weapon of choice the boycott arguing that that form of action denied the state the means to target participants. The ANC and CPSA attempted to organise broad front ad hoc campaigns against specific measures. This was marginally successful in mobilising the community against the disenfranchisement moves on the part of the state. By the sixties, however, most of their leading activists were either banned or arrested or had fled into exile. The NEUM was largely unaffected by such repressive measures, a vindication of their strategy, or condemnation of their political ineffectiveness. However, taken together with the ANC's decision in the late fifties to concentrate their campaigning efforts on the pass laws, thereby by passing the immediate concerns of the 'Coloured' people, it meant that
the NEUM, up to the mid eighties, became the de facto leading oppositional political group in the Western Cape.

In relation to local government in the Cape, three themes emerge which characterise the period up to the mid eighties. The growing political disengagement of the local state from the Black population both as a result of the state’s attempt’s to create a white’s only democratic legitimation basis, and the political focus of Black political organisation, is one theme. The second is the nature of the state’s parallel, ‘dummy’ local government institutions for ‘Coloured’ people and their almost total rejection of these. The third is the role of the official, liberal political order in the local governance of Cape Town. Taken all together they added up to a substantive problem of legitimacy for both the state sponsored ‘Blacks only’ local government structures, as well as the ‘liberal’ Cape Town City council.

The 1962 Group Areas Amendment Act set out how local government structures in ‘Coloured’ residential areas were to be developed from consultative committees to partially representative and later full representative management committees, finally becoming full representative municipal councils. Whilst the approach of the CTCC was to oppose the substantive Group Areas Act and its amendment through dragging its feet over its implementation, the fact of the matter is that by the mid sixties Cape Town was totally segregated residentially as the act intended. Todes and Watson are right to describe the attitude of the council towards segregation of its functions as ‘ambivalent’. However, they put too much store by the opposition resulting from the liberal stance of the councillors. In many cases opposition was overcome by the expediency of the Province or state simply assuming the relevant powers in order to implement different aspects of the apartheid strategy. The parallel local government structures became moribund because of the rejection of these by the local people in those areas, something acknowledged by the low actual percentage of eligible voters both registered and taking part in the elections for the management committees under the jurisdiction of the CTCC, and by different government commissions looking into the ‘Coloured question’ in the mid seventies.

There is a similar trajectory of advisory and then partially representative urban council structures which were established for ‘Africans’, though within a different time frame. The full historical details of this are beyond this project, other than noting, as part of the overall context to local government in South Africa post Second World War, that they too were totally rejected. For example the 1982 Black Local Authorities Act transferred administrative authority and financial responsibility to ‘African’ local authorities. However the absence of a sufficient commercial and industrial tax base meant that they were almost entirely dependent on service charges and rent for income. This, together with their inherent unpopularity
because they were viewed as part of the apartheid structures, ensured that they had very little legitimacy in the ‘African’ urban areas.

The effect of all of this was that white local authorities, which provided services to Black communities via these ‘dummy’ structures, as well as the proxy administration of sections of the apartheid strategy, were, in terms of political structures, disengaged from those communities. This was a colonial relationship of indirect rule and, at the same time, a political space waiting to be filled.

12.14 Post 1980’s Developments

The 1976 uprisings and subsequent state repression of that set in motion three chains of events which have a bearing on local government in South Africa which are, in parts, still germane to the changes in local governance occurring there. These are, not in any order of priority, the impetus for constitutional reform of the apartheid state by the Nationalist Party, including local government; the emergence of the ‘Civic Movement’ in Black urban areas; and allowing in the eighties the environment to develop in which radical alternative proposals for local government change could be made.

Taken together, the government’s surprise at the scale of the 1976 uprisings, the repression of that and the international condemnation, the development of Black Consciousness, and the alignment of many ‘Coloured’ people with the latter movement, caused a major strategic shift in the thinking of the Nationalist Party. This emerged as the ‘Total Strategy’, one of the key aims of which included a substantial commitment to domestic reform of the legitimating processes of white rule. Thus:

Through policies that substantially altered the apartheid edifice—what government referred to as its commitment to reform—Pretoria pursued four primary objectives (1) to free the economy from the bottlenecks imposed by apartheid; (2) to black socioeconomic strata with material and status interests that would be threatened by radical transformation; (3) to co-opt a significant segment of the black population into the existing framework of power by making available opportunities for black economic and social advancement and by ameliorating living conditions of the urban black townships; and (4) to "normalize" South Africa's status internationally by bringing its domestic sociopolitical arrangements into line with international standards.144

The 1983 new Constitution with its tricameral, consociational arrangements for the three racial groups of ‘white’, ‘Coloured’ and ‘Indian’, can be seen to be directly derived from that earlier vision of ‘domestic reform.’ Invested in that reform is a notion of group rights stemming from the Nationalist Party re-intellectualising South Africa in the 80s as a society of minorities. This
brings to mind Habermas' rejection of group rights as essentialising and conservative. However, contained within the whole package of constitutional reform was a substantial reworking local government based on the devolution of administrative functions. The cornerstone of this was the establishment of Regional Service Councils at the metropolitan level which would take over twenty one key services then controlled by local authorities. Government justification at the time turned on the need "to achieve economies of scale and increase efficiency by reducing the duplication of services by providing them on a joint basis to improve the infrastructure in Black communities and to facilitate multi-racial decision making." Other commentators, however, concluded that they were "an elaborate system of control whereby power holders at central level will gain crucial influence at local level...(relying on)... co-opting subordinate elites into new multi-racial decision making structures."

What is important is not the details of the then new constitutional reform of government, because by 1990 when real change appeared on the horizon, RSC's were not fully implemented. Apart from which Black people effectively boycotted any substantial participation in those structures. The importance lies in the fact that these changes provided the climate in which other commentators could both critique the proposals and proffer more democratic alternatives. These are considered later on.

Feeding into that expressed need for alternatives was the development of the Civic Movement in South Africa. Murray traces the development of the Civic Movement to the immediate aftermath of the Black Consciousness Movement with their emphasis "on inward looking strategies of community development...(which)... crystallised in a flowering of 'self help' grassroots organisations at township level". Three of the early, and most prominent, were established in Soweto, Port Elizabeth and the Cape. In the last location this was the Cape Housing Action Committee. Again, Murray sees these local movements as making popular "the idea of non partisan popular organisations representing the interests of ordinary people on matters that directly affect their lives."

The 1984-'86 uprisings pushed the civics into the middle of the political agenda because many of them affiliated to the United Democratic Front (UDF). In the Cape rejection of the parallel municipal strategy of the state and the tricameral constitution helped fuel the 1984-'86 uprisings. Not only was there a branch of the UDF, but also another "mass based Black unity alliance, the National Forum. The UDF, the larger of the two, broadly followed the lines of the ANC Charter. It contained a broad range of ideological viewpoints, which, convened around the central tenet of 'non-racialism', actively sought white support and participation. It also pulled into its membership the burgeoning Black trade union movement. Its aims, modestly framed, were for a 'free, democratic South Africa'. The National Forum, on the other hand, pursued
a more Black Consciousness line which excluded whites from positions of leadership. It was opposed to “ethnic divisions amongst Blacks, and suspicious of the collaborative tendencies of the black middle class.” It rejected outright the new constitution, as well as capitalism and apartheid which it saw as inextricably intertwined. It proposed the “establishment of a democratic anti-racist worker republic in Azania”, its name for South Africa. One can see in the Cape how the two major tendencies in radical opposition to the racist South African state also manifested itself in the civic movement. One cannot draw a straight genealogical line from the NEUM to the New Forum, but simply point to the overlaps in similar political outlook; that is apart from the use of the term ‘Azania’.

The importance of the civic movement is threefold. Firstly, as Murray persuasively argues, civic associations were social movements, a definition which can be justified according to three criteria. Their executives were elected and directly accountable to their local members and supporters. Their organisational structures were based on active grassroots participation by their membership whilst their resources were derived directly from voluntary help and donations. Lastly “they alone possessed the capacity to define local grievances and assume sole responsibility for deciding which strategies and actions were appropriate to the local context.” Further, whilst these associations organised around local, specific issues, such as services, rent, etc., they also had to transpose these demands on to a wider political plane linked to the changing of the apartheid regime; a task facilitated through co-ordinating organisations like the UDF and NF. The second area of importance is that these civics came to assume much of the responsibilities abandoned by the de-legitimated apartheid municipal structures put in place by the state. These covered a range of administrative, representative, decision making, policing and judicial functions. They were, then as Murray concludes, a local government in waiting. The third important element is that from within the civic movement, based on their experiences, came a radically different vision of local government, one which carried over into the nineties. For example in interviewing local government planners in the Cape who had had contact with the civics they were clear that two versions of local government were on the table: the one from the ANC favoured a larger metropolitan structure governed through the orthodox liberal democratic representative process; whilst the other, from the civic movement, favoured smaller local government structures governed through a participatory form of democracy where representatives would be directly accountable to the people and subject to immediate recall should they not perform as mandated. This dichotomy will be expanded upon in the following sections on options for local government change.
In the immediate period in the run up to the turn of the above decade there was not so much a new secondary level legitimation crisis for the Nationalist Party’s political order, as a heightening of that which gave rise to the ‘Total Strategy’. There was, as two commentators have put it, “a beleaguered siege economy” under pressure externally from the international community, and internally from the near ungovernability of the Black urban areas. In addition those who had previously leant powerful legitimating support for the government, those controlling Afrikaaner capital, were now also clamouring for change. As a result of those key factors there was a shift in strategy, not a sea change, in which “the ruling group opted for an inclusive ideology”. This would see, and has seen, political power pass into Black hands whilst economic, bureaucratic and military power is either still in white hands, or does, and will, rely heavily on that community for some time. In many ways it echoes the experience in many American cities in the medium term aftermath of the civil rights movement which saw the advent of Black mayors and other senior city officials whilst the economic power still remained under white control. This in itself is, and was, a resonance from the formal de-colonising experience in African countries whereby assumption of political power did not guarantee control over economic power. To that extent it can be argued that the colonial analogy used to describe the relationship between the state and Black people internally continues during and after the “negotiated revolution”. This time, however, it is apposite to talk about a neo-colonial relationship, one in which dominance and oppression are mediated through a Black elite controlled polity, and in which therefore, the old racial divisions still largely exist as an unresolved problem. There is thus an opportune question which begs the answer to who exactly won out in the negotiated settlement of the early nineties.

With regard to local government and race equality in South Africa the prospect and promise of political changes, highlighted in the early nineties, provided a window of opportunity far greater than that in the UK in the similar late seventies period. In South Africa the effective delegitimation of the whole state apparatus by those opposed to apartheid, especially Black people, offered the real possibility of a radical restructuring within a relatively short space of time, something, which because of the dead weight of orthodoxy and tradition, simply was not possible in the UK. Even allowing for the inertial drag of the limited continuance of white privilege which was built into the negotiated settlement, the possibility of creating a racially inclusive form of local governance was still there to be realised. Forms of this possibility are hinted at, or are implicit, in some of the options for local government change which emerged during this period. Other change options, however, because of the racial enormity of apartheid, were
satisfied with a liberal democratic re-jigging of the apartheid state. Both, however, are limited by their under theorisation of ‘race’ and the underestimation of the extent to which the racial legacy would endure post-apartheid, and by their lack of critical attention to the instrumentalising processes of local government. Given the extent to which the ‘neutralisation’ of the latter has, and does, contribute(d) to the maintenance of colonial relations in the sphere of local governance in the UK, it can be asked whether or not this would also be true of South Africa in its period of change.

12.16 Cape Town City Council at the Turn of the Decade – Key Contextual Issues

In relation, therefore, to local governance, and particularly that of Cape Town City Council, in the period being considered, it reflected the local reality of the consequences of a racially structured siege economy. A study of the Cape Town area in the latter part of the eighties concluded that “the quality of life experienced by a large proportion of Cape Town’s population is extremely poor, and in the short term, at least, is worsening.”\(^{1133}\) Given the deteriorating trend of the South African economy through the nineties it can be argued that those aspects of the quality of life relating to economic hardship have continued. The study referred to above identified three major development problems for the Cape Town metropolitan area: increasing unemployment and poverty, housing supply, and spatial inequalities.

In terms of unemployment in the immediate period leading up to the nineties, this was increasing amongst the Black population. The primary cause of this the study puts down to the weak economic base of the city, the result of being predominantly service industry focused, in itself the legacy of a mixture of historical development and interventions by the apartheid state. The key facts at that time, were however, that there was evidence of extensive poverty amongst the ‘African’ and ‘Coloured’ populations. Thus “some 97% of ‘African’ and 74% of ‘Coloured’ heads of household received incomes below a poverty datum line.”\(^{1154}\)

Like other metropolitan areas in South Africa, Cape Town’s Black populations experienced severe housing problems. There were two dimensions to this: actual housing shortages, and conditions affecting then existing housing. Housing shortages were a direct result of the apartheid policies, particularly the Group Areas Act which gave rise to the destruction of significant levels of ‘Coloured’ housing stock, and to the attempt by the state to control the levels of Black population in the Cape through restricting housing resources. The actual cost of running such housing is proportionately very high. This, in terms of actual rent paid and the fact that
the majority of ‘Coloured’ and ‘African’ housing schemes were, as a result of apartheid policies, located on the periphery of the Cape Town City area, meant that the infra-structural costs, such as transport to work etc., were actually high.

Cape Town’s urban structure in the late eighties, a structure which endures today is characterised by a high degree of spatial racialised inequality “which imposes significant costs on the lower income groups”\textsuperscript{1135}, i.e. Black people. This is the result of a combination of four factors: the state’s apartheid policies of residential segregation and industrial de-concentration, so as to discourage the influx of Black workers; the urban land market; and the legacy of a history of town planning practices which favoured a multiple suburban, as opposed to a one city, approach. Consequently large tracts of the city, mainly those for Black people, are, in effect, dormitory areas which are separate and distant from areas of work, leisure and shopping, and poorly served in terms of public transport. On the other hand the white areas “are well located in relation to work opportunities, general facilities and major transport routes.”\textsuperscript{1156} The ever increasing reliance on the private motor car and the well developed motorway system linking these white areas to key sites of work, leisure and major transport terminals, like the airport, means that those differences are even more exacerbated. The effects of this state sponsored creation of racial ghettos is to reinforce racial differences, not only across the socio-economic spectrum, which the study referred to concentrates on, but also across the socio-psychological divide and within the ‘camps’ so established. In the areas differentiated out and marked by racial criteria, there is a proportionate reproduction, and thus reduction, in terms of allocated resources and quality of key services ranging downwards from white to ‘African’. These are education, health and other welfare services.
By the late eighties this reality of urban racial segregation and concomitant deleterious socio-economic consequences, was aggravated by Black people’s de-legitimation of racialised local government structures the government attempted to put in place. Despite its liberally inclined political stance, Cape Town City Council was effectively disestablished from its ‘Coloured’ and ‘African’ communities, garnering its legitimation resources only from the white population. Thus, although the council had publicly announced its opposition to key elements of the state’s apartheid policies, like the Group Areas Act, Separate Amenities Act, the removal of ‘Coloured’ voters from the roll, etc., thereby challenging the colonial relationship local government had to have with its Black communities which was being foisted upon them, the reality was that this relationship could, under the apartheid system, only ever progress to being ‘paternal’. That state of affairs had to change.

By the turn of that decade Cape Town City Council’s formal political structure was based upon a seventeen ward division of the city, each with two councillors. The political administration of the city devolved upon an executive committee under which were four standing committees each covering a range of relevantly grouped services under the administrative control of a senior manager. The structure is represented below diagramatically.
In addition tacked on to the structure was the ‘Management Committee’ set up for four ‘Coloured’ areas.

The council employed over 15,000 employees. Racially there was a sharp division between the white collar administrative staff and the manual worker sections. The former was predominantly white, especially in the management echelons, whilst the latter was almost 100% Black, with the largest grouping under that category being ‘Coloured’. Certainly in terms of the white collar side, the fact that recruitment was under the control of the Manpower Services Commission was an inhibitory factor in employing more Black people.

The services, as is evident from the detail of the diagram, were mainly ‘technical’ ones, as opposed to ‘human’ services. This represented a mix of statutory ones and discretionary services. Despite this technical slant, many of these services, if contextualised within a developmental framework, can be seen to be essential to the overall welfare of local citizens, and, in the South African case, subjects.

In sum, by the end of that decade, allowing for the racialised structuring of local governance as outlined to date, the key resultant problems facing Cape Town local government can be briefly bullet pointed as follows:

♦ Across the wider metropolitan area of Cape Town, a structure of fragmented local authorities separated by political complexion and race
♦ Effective delegitimation of all of these structures by Black people
♦ Fragmentation of services across local authorities and different tiers of government, as well as racially differential access to, or receipt of, such services
♦ Core principle of self sufficiency to municipal authorities means racially parallel Black ones would never achieve that status, whilst smaller separate white ones were unable to benefit from larger, more financially sound ones, like Cape Town City Council.
♦ Democratically unhealthy powers of intervention in local government held by the central and provincial levels of the state.
♦ A potential Black constituency in which race is denied, either through organisations like the UDF where race is ‘non-race’, or through organisations like the National Forum where race is universalised through a class analysis.
12.17 Change Options at the Turn of the Decade

In 1988 an academic commentator on local government could put the problem of local government in South Africa concisely in terms of "here" and "there". Here was:

- the existence of separate, racially defined local authorities;
- the lack of political legitimacy accorded to the black local authorities by most black residents of townships—this is shown by low voting polls, attacks on the persons and property of councillors, rent boycotts, the collapse of several black town and city councils, and the establishment of alternative organisations to represent the political aspirations of black communities;
- unstable, inexperienced, ineffective and financially deprived black municipalities;
- coloured and Indian management committees, reluctant to accept autonomous municipal status, but prevented from assimilating with the nearby white municipalities;
- white municipalities, who face a problem of popular apathy, financial difficulties and an inability to respond appropriately to the political pressures emanating from the nearby townships;
- vast disparities in wealth and standard of living between the different racially defined communities; and
- a lack of communication, comprehension, co-ordination and cooperation within each town, due to the existence of totally separate local institutions.1160

On the other hand "there" would be:

- Political legitimacy: any government depends on the willing cooperation, and if possible, the enthusiastic participation of its subjects. The experience of black local authorities has amply demonstrated the difficulties caused by popular frustration and apathy.
- Democracy: local governments cannot satisfy the needs of residents unless councillors and administrators know what those needs are. Nor can local rulers' actions be constrained unless they are accountable to their constituency. Furthermore, in the context of 20th century political values, democracy is a sine qua non for governmental legitimacy.
- A minimum of political stability, ensured by the ability of strong, legitimate and accessible local institutions to deal with conflict quickly and effectively, without disagreements erupting into violence, civil disobedience or passive resistance.
- The decentralisation of political power and administrative control, to allow greater community participation in the shaping of local institutions.
and decision-making. This may also help to ensure stability, as it would expedite the resolution of conflict. Issues would not have to filter through the bureaucratic empires of the central government.

- The removal of racial discrimination in local government, according to a constitutional formula acceptable to the majority of local inhabitants. Again, the context of generally accepted political values in the western world today rules out legally imposed discrimination of any kind.

- A minimum of administrative efficiency and financial effectiveness, and the elimination of duplication, waste and red tape. This implies the dismantling of racially defined municipal institutions, which are expensive to maintain.

- Redistribution of wealth, to ensure a reasonable standard of living to underprivileged communities. This would enable those communities to make a more sophisticated contribution to the political, social and economic life of towns. 1161

Whilst the 'negatives' of the 'here' characteristics accord with my assessment of local government in the Cape towards the end of the eighties decade, the general framework provided by this version of the 'fact' and 'norm' of local governance also summarises the parameters of change then envisioned. Similar frameworks, but with differing political emphases, can be identified for different sets of participants in the general debate. Thus we can briefly look at some academic studies, the ANC’s vision of local governance at this time and the position of the civics on a new form of local governance. This will be the contextual precursor to examining Cape Town City Council's own response to the emerging change agenda in the late eighties, through the interregnum period of the negotiations, and up to 1996, the year in which the first 'non-racial' local elections occurred.

At the academic level Watson's approach, at that time, bears highlighting because of the proposals for change she outlines and because her empirical work was done on the Cape. 1162 Whilst her analysis is Marxist in origin—in a class based society local government serves to maintain capitalist social relations which can change if the working class capture that level of state power—her solutions, which do not necessarily follow from the logic of her theoretical underpinning, are interesting. There are two aspects to her vision of change. The first is that in a developmental situation, which applies to South Africa, local government can play a critical role in trying to ensure that there is a local framework for socio-economic and political justice, the former through redistributive measures and the latter through substantive democratisation. Achieving this will turn on changes to the systems of local government representation and financing, as well as the need to define properly the apposite geographical level of local government. What she terms ‘representation’ covers in fact both the internal structure and processes of local government as well as the way in which political control is to be exercised. In the latter she favours a more participatory, non-hierarchical
form of representation, which is immediately accountable to a range of
groups, which in turn exercise executive control through the full council,
rather than through any kind of intermediary management committee. For
this she draws primarily on the immediate post war Yugoslavian experience
of local governance as "a body of self managing community", but also on the
emerging organisation forms of the civics. Under the former model services
were organised as self managing entities run by committees of producers, i.e.
the workers themselves, and those who use the services. The key point to
this was to have a form of local governance in which the citizen's
participation is paramount, rather than that of the political representative. In
terms of local government finance, whilst not having specific proposals for
change, the principle is spelt out that "the local authority should be able to
facilitate a redistribution of resources"1163. This links into the final aspect
which is to do with the appropriate geographical and political level of local
government. Thus, though acknowledging that re-organisation into larger
units is not a solution in itself and is inimical to greater democratisation and
autonomy, the metropolitan level of local government can be favoured for
some functions, like the financial base, with smaller first tier authorities
covering other areas.

The last point, given the more radical participatory elements of her proposals
is puzzling. However it is clear that in interviewing her in 1990 that at that
time many of the emerging debates on local government changes in South
Africa were being done with an eye on, and with the hope of catching the ear
of, the ANC which was recognised as likely to be the main political force in
the changing South Africa. During the eighties the ANC favoured a
metropolitan structure, not only because of the disparate local authority
structures and systems had to be rationalised, but also because it was
regarded as a suitably sized vehicle for local transformation. At that point,
1990, the ANC as a political organisation emerging into political legitimacy
in South Africa because of the `unbanning', but with leading figures who
had spent a considerable time in exile, had a wary eye on the civics with their
demands for a more participatory form of local governance. Nevertheless
the ANC had to recognise the internal power of and support for the civics, as
represented in organisations like the UDF. This rapprochement can be seen
in the first conference on local government organised by the ANC in 1990.
Participants in this conference included the academic commentators referred
to above, as well as the civics. The first formal recommendations for local
government changes to emerge from the ANC in the new political climate
were therefore framed very similarly to those outlined above.1164

At this time the resolutions for change, as with all of the options being
considered, included the precondition of the ending of all racial
discrimination as a sine qua non. I want to concentrate on those concerning
democratisation, finance and levels of local government structures. In terms
of democratisation, which was pre-conditioned to the principle of ‘non-racialism’, this was to be based on the ‘one person, one vote’ principle of universal suffrage. Further that, whilst a balance should be maintained between local and national governments, local issues should be delegated to local authorities. Added into the recommendations on democratisation was one which committed the ANC to programmes of affirmative action in that sphere of government. It remained to be seen whether or not ‘affirmative action’ as a political elements of democratisation was to be realised, or whether it would emerge as a technical, managerial activity. The interesting section relates to the role of, and relationship with, the civics. There were three recommendations. These set out that: civics should be autonomous independent of local government, but could enter into political alliances with political organisations on issues that seek to improve the life of the community; they should act, on behalf of communities, as watchdogs over local government; and People’s Assemblies should be established as open forums outside of local state institutions to facilitate public participation on policy development and implementation. It was clear from this that the role of civics was seen as being outside of the direct power configurations affecting decision making which was to be left to the political party in power. Participation was limited effectively to consultation. In this the proposals were even less democratically substantive than Watson’s. Yet some of the workshops in the conference opted for what they termed a three tier model in which local government representatives are elected from civics, and from local government will emerge central government representatives. In this way accountability lines run from the civics via local government, to national government, and back. The recommendations on city finance were general, calling for a single tax base, better public scrutiny of such finances, and for subsidies from national government. In relation to the desired structural level of local government, the metropolitan level was put forward. This was because it could “accommodate urban growth, reintegrate urban communities, facilitate redistribution, co-ordinate and be responsible for city wide services and allow for democratic control over broader development decisions.”

The best context against which to compare the ANC’s initial local government change proposals, its normative yardstick, so to speak, is that of its own Freedom Charter. Adopted in 1955 at a Congress of People, “it concretised authoritatively for the first time in South African history the belief in a nation united in a unitary, non-racial, democratic South Africa.” It was taken as the founding principles for the new South Africa in the early nineties. Six core principles are identified: that of representative democracy; that of participatory democracy; that of a pluralist society; that of equality and affirmative action; that of human rights and the rule of law; and that of social democracy. Against these benchmarks, it can be argued that the local government proposals appear to be meeting the
principles of participatory democracy and pluralism, where pluralism here refers to the “plurality and autonomy of democratic organs of self-government, trade unions, collective bodies and community enterprises”\textsuperscript{1168}, only superficially. The extent to which this early apparent schism between the perceived need to have in place political structures of control over local urban areas and the expressed desire for participatory recognition by local constituent citizens, is real can be gauged by the proposals emanating from the civics and the reaction to these from the ANC throughout the nineties.

The civics marked not only a new chapter in the history of opposition to segregation and apartheid in South Africa, they also, within the specific context of the Cape, added a different dimension. In the Cape the political opposition to apartheid from the ‘Coloured’ community, as Lewis identifies, came mainly from the ‘middle classes’. This was true for both the ANC centred opposition and the NEUM focussed ones. The rise of the civics marked the emergence into the spotlight on the formal oppositional political arena of the ordinary working classes. There was, as well, the other political arena of the independent trade unions whose sphere merged at the boundaries with that of the civics. In the mid eighties in Atlantis, one of the Cape Town periphery dormitory areas created for lower income ‘Coloured’ people by the South African state, at a rally organised by the National Forum, the principal researcher was able to witness the testimony of ordinary ‘Coloured’ people, those whose voices in the past were normally silent. By the early nineties this movement of civic organisations, involving for the most part ordinary Black people, had developed a national co-ordinating structure, the South African National Civic Organisation, (SANCO). This was to play a key part in the negotiating process affecting local government changes in the nineties. Murray outlined three possible future scenarios in the mid nineties in the face of the then likely development of parliamentary democracy: on the bases of a coherent development and democracy programme to remain outside of local government acting as a watchdog; to enter into strategic alliances with politically similar parties; or to remain unaffiliated to any political party and to enter candidates themselves for local government elections.\textsuperscript{1169} Both Murray and Fine, who identify the new interest in the theory and practice of the discourse of civil society in the changing society of South Africa, describe that three option likely future of the civics in terms of a ‘cleft stick’ dilemma. Murray asks how this approach, which might be fine under the ‘framework of liberal theories of democratic rights’ can be “reconciled with not only the deeply entrenched realities of class and institutional power but also the challenge of forging diverse and sometimes rival interest groups into a common socialist project.”\textsuperscript{1170} The question betrays, certainly in Fine’s case, the limitations of the orthodox Marxist, etatist privileging approach, as well as the universalisation of social labour which is its theoretical bases. The answer of course is that all three options, or a combination of them, is possible. This
is certainly true if the communicative discursive potential of the civics is to be realised. This would have direct implications for the form and content of democracy, ones which move beyond the limitations of parliamentary democracy as conceived of by the ANC. To this end, Mayekiso, first chair of SANCO and a leading activist in Johannesburg’s Alexandra Township civic, points to many civics’ participants calling for the establishment of a workers party, along the lines of the Brazilian one. This occurred because of the perceived concessions then being made by the ANC in negotiations and because the ability of the South African Communist to achieve that was questionable. New forms of political organisation were needed because of the need to secure the “development of a vast network of democratic organs of popular participation in both the economy and the political system and the leadership of the working class.”

Whilst there is a similarity in the key aspects of local governance identified as those which need to be changed, even if within the approaches outlined above, there are differences in emphases accorded to specific elements or combinations of these, there is one overall aspect which appears to be the same. This is that which applies to the notion of ‘race’ employed in all three approaches. Race is not so much dealt with, as also dealt away with, by the qualifying sine qua non used in all three, that non-discrimination will be the norm, a moral framework which allows for the specifying of ‘non-racial’ municipalities. Simply stating that racism and race will not be determining forces in the new local governance, and substituting a new universalism of the state of being ‘non-racial’, or even brokering this through the subject of the ‘worker’, as some of the civics did, appears to be sufficient. No recognition of racism and racialised group identification as an ongoing problem, or analyses of how to move beyond that, is provided. Yet, as can be seen with the ‘Coloured’ people in the Cape, and will be shown later, this is an ongoing issue which cannot be wished away by the simple declaration that South Africa is ‘non-racial’. At one level, it can be argued, this sounds too much like a renovation of the colour blind approach. To that extent the absence of an anti-racist and anti-discriminatory mode in thinking and ‘doing’ about race, which has the advantage of transitivising the here and now to the object of the norm of ‘non-racial’, also betokens the lack of the dimension of recognition in the local government options for change. All three approaches are concerned primarily with the powers of redistribution local government can have at its disposal, and with the democratic means to achieve this. But, building in the dimension of recognition should be essential because, whether they like it or not, claims for racial justice by ordinary people will be mediated in the short to medium term, through the racialised identities of the South African milieu. This calls for a form of local governance in which the communicative discursive spaces are maximised. This would allow for a process of consensually based legitimation in which ethnic and etnik claims can be discursively dealt
with. We can see now the extent to which Cape Town City Council's responses in the nineties to the change agenda, and the national framework to local governance, put in place by the 1994 ANC dominated government of 'national unity', actually met those conditions.

12.18 Cape Town City Council in the Interregnum

The 'liberal' political tradition in the Cape, which has been examined earlier, was a phenomenon made great play of by the white liberal political parties which came to control the Cape Town City Council. By 1990 this was in the form of the Democratic Party. In a politically sanctioned 'fact-finding' city tour of the UK and the USA in 1989 by two of the leading managers, a series of resulting proposals were adopted to try “to meet and accept the challenges of re-integration in a post-apartheid Cape Town.” These included the need for the council to continue to promote its 'non-discriminatory' stance and to develop the role of moral leader in relation to non-discrimination. Public council promotional publications of the time placed a premium on portraying an almost unbroken history of opposition to racial segregation by the council from its earliest days to the then present. As has been shown, this is only partially true, with Watson describing the council’s approach to apartheid over the years as being at best 'ambivalent'. However, by 1990 the council had “firmly believed that the only acceptable and workable form of local government is direct representation of all its citizens on the present City Council irrespective of their race, and without discrimination of any kind.”

However, interviews with two of the leading white councillors at the time, one an alderman, ex-mayor and independent liberal, and the other the then current mayor and member of the Democratic Party, reveal a slightly different complexion to their concept of non discrimination. There was a commitment to the free market as a force in ending racial discrimination to the extent that they opposed the tactic of economic sanctions. Further, in relation to the emergence in South Africa and the Cape of 'affirmative action' as one of the strategies to redress past social ills, they stressed the need for this to be, at its core, meritocratically, based, and not to have any elements of reverse discrimination. But, in terms of carrying forward their intentions on non racial local government, the impression was gained that the DP was awaiting its cue from the ANC.

The interregnum period, from the onset of negotiations in 1990 through the 1994 first national 'non-racial' election and the sanctioning of an interim government of national unity, through to the first 'non-racial' municipal elections in 1996 for interim councils, was seen by the main actors in CTCC as the preparation period for 'non-racial' local governance. Within this period legislation was enacted to oversee the interim arrangements for local
government. This included ensuring that there were elected councillors from the Black communities previously disenfranchised. Given, however, temporary nature of that set up, there was still a great degree of questioning of the legitimacy of those political structures and arrangements. The overall aim of the council then, as stated in one of the council’s key documents at the time, was to develop amongst all the people in its constituency boundaries, the legitimacy of the council. To this end, given also the watchful eye being kept on the ANC, there were three main elements to this programme of legitimacy. These were the development of a strategy of engagement with the civics, the development of an affirmative action programme in the council, and evolution of a position towards, and proposals for, a metropolitan level of local government in the Cape. Complementing this, and influencing it at key moments, were a series of national developments stemming from the ANC. These were the new constitution of South Africa, the emergence of the equality and anti-discriminatory legislation, the quick evolution of a radical programme of developmental reform, and the development and concretisation of the ANC’s position on local government. There were, and still are, certain elements of the national level programme, like the constitution, equality legislative components, and the developmental programme which provide a normative backdrop against which to measure the changes to local government.

Achieving progress on the new legitimacy for Cape Town City Council was dependent on the interplay between the new forces in South Africa, which were the civics and the ANC, and the old establishment, in this case the DP and the council’s bureaucracy. Apropos the bureaucracy, the Cape region branch of the South African Municipal Workers’ Union described the situation there, and elsewhere, as well as its position, as follows:

SAMWU, as the largest Union in the municipal sector, has a very special interest in the restructuring of municipal administrations. The seizure of political power has in fact meant nothing to the masses because the old bureaucracies remained virtually intact and were able to frustrate the political good intentions of the new ruling party. At the same time as SAMWU and the rest of the democratic movement are starting to debate these issues, the existing authorities are busy restructuring the internal administrations. This obviously cannot be allowed to continue and it will require a massive push by both the progressive trade union movement and other democratic forces to halt this process. Let us address this on two levels viz. staffing policies/practices and decision making/control. The working conditions of our members throughout South Africa range from absolutely horrendous to fairly acceptable. The wage gap and other conditions of employment between black and white local authorities, rural and urban local authorities and differently graded municipalities all contribute to a very confusing but definitely unacceptable situation. Add to this the very archaic labour relations practices and you have a situation crying
out for drastic restructuring.........In respect of the structure, the
traditional form of administration is highly bureaucratised with an
extremely fragmented job classification(designation) and a very sharp
grading pyramid. The Town Clerk is the central power in this system
with Heads of Department having almost equal power within their
own domains. Empire building is not an uncommon feature within
local authorities. This bureaucracy determines the goals and the
service products on it's own. Skills enhancement, participation- in
decision making, advancements are almost non-existent for the
majority of local authority workers. The treasury is also centralised
and exercises a major influence over the activities of the different
departments.\textsuperscript{1176}

There is a real sense in which the criticisms voiced above echo those made
by the Race Advisers of the bureaucracy in the target borough in the UK.
Yet, just as in the UK case study, there were in Cape Town City council also
key people with the communicative space to act. Whilst the upper
echelons of the bureaucracy were almost entirely white, there was one Black
person, in charge of a small policy and research function, who used the space
available to exercise a great degree of catalytic power. Whilst not a
member of the ANC, he described himself as an independent socialist with
leanings towards the NF position. Additionally there was the planning
department which, with its job requirements to consult the public, attracted a
number of politicised planners who primarily emerged from the university of
Cape Town's planning department. The latter had conducted a number of
influential studies of Cape Town City council and the options for change,
including the one referred to earlier. One of the key staff in the council's
planning department was also a prominent member of the local ANC branch,
as well as being its representative on the One City Forum, a body set up by
the council to involve relevant parties in the discussions about the future of
local governance. This is mentioned to show how the growing public
sphere around 'non-racial' local government overlapped with the local state.
In some ways this was similar to that which occurred in the UK over race
and local government. These people identified above came to play an
almost griot like role in interpreting, and mediating between the council and
local people's organisations over the proposals for change and how these
were to be implemented. They were also critical members of important
internal working parties and committees set up to develop the council's own
position on 'non-racial' local government, i.e. on how the council was to
establish its legitimacy with Black people.

12.19 Engagement with the Civics

In the eighties CTCC's political leadership still made claims for legitimacy
which sought to involve all of the people, based on the limited franchise for
certain sections of the 'Coloured' people and on its opposition to some
legislative aspects of apartheid. Despite this then, as Todes and Watson
point out, it had done very little to nothing about establishing new forms of contact with the ‘Coloured’ and ‘African’ communities. In the rapidly changing scenario of South Africa in the late eighties this was acknowledged by the white politicians as an oversight which needed to be changed urgently. In pursuit of that a consultant was engaged to both begin establishing the process of constructive dialogue with the civics in the Cape and to advise the council of the changes necessary. The consultant, who was white, had worked as a political journalist and in organisations like the Black Sash. Her work, which had begun when the eighties state of emergency was still in place, initially came up against the twin difficulties of the fact that some key organisations were banned and the strong non-collaboration culture of ‘Coloured’ political struggles in the Cape. Whilst the local white politicians displayed a lot of good will, there was little politicisation. As a result of both the factors above, a lot of ‘toing’ and ‘froing’ negotiations took place between the civics and the council mediated through the consultant, resulting in a gradual thaw as the change events nationally began to unfold at the turn of that decade. The importance of this work is that it resulted in the first formal structures being established between the civics and the council, such as the internal Constitutional Sub-Committee, and in terms of an external focus the ‘One City Forum’, as well as a number of other initiatives. Above all the message that came out of the civics and seemed to be accepted by the politicians at the time, was that this process of engagement had to be participatory.

One of the key subsequent developments was the decision to establish a Community Liaison Unit in the council in 1993. This was very much the initiative of the senior Black officer mentioned above, drawing together the strands of other linked initiatives, such as the work of the consultant. This was developed in line with the council’s view that it perceived “liaison with the broader community to be of importance, especially during the transition period to an integrated City.” However it was acknowledged that the main thrust of the Unit’s work would be directed to those sectors of society which, under previous governments, had been systematically excluded from governance, i.e. Black communities. What is noticeable is that the justificatory report omits the race dimension, but talks about “working class areas.” However it was initially only created on a temporary basis. The strategy underpinning the unit had three core elements: public involvement, a communication campaign, and a sub-strategy to make Council services more ‘customer’ oriented. In reality, as the review outlined below showed, the work devolved upon a range of activities: capacity building, facilitating public participation, conflict resolution, liaison between civics and council officials, research for both the latter, co-ordinating needs’ analyses.

Three years on, in 1996, a formal review and evaluation of the unit’s work was undertaken. The review’s framework acknowledged firstly that the
challenge facing civil society at that time in South Africa was how to make an impact on the “formal political system and to ensure that demands are met through channels of government, particularly local government.” Secondly with regard to the latter, local government needed to strengthen the “organs of civil society” and both needed to “work towards creating a space where communities can impact on the functioning of local government.”

Thirdly the framework whilst acknowledging the inherited problems from the apartheid era local governments were facing, ‘dead wood’ in ‘dead’ bureaucracies and the racially based spatial ‘mal-structuring’ of cities, situated the main goal of community participation as being that of transferring power to disadvantaged groups. The evaluation of the CLU should, therefore, be seen in terms of the extent to which it had succeeded in trying “to remove power from politicians and bureaucrats and place it in the hands of communities.” Thus because “elected representatives cannot, or do not, adequately serve communities, another goal of community participation is to foster a gradual shift from representative democracy to participatory democracy.”

The details of the review are both interesting and important. There are issues which are identified which have a strong resonance with the critical ones raised through the attempt to develop a race equality discourse programme in the target borough in the UK. This is not so surprising because the CLU in CTCC was very much involved in trying to open up communicative spaces in the council so that local Black people could make claims for racial justice which would be both redistributive and recognition based. The one key difference is that, unlike in the UK, there was no strong internal policy framing those interventions. Both, however, see a merging of civil society and the administrative and political systems at the boundaries to give a new form of democratisation. Thus overall the review concludes that the CLU had come to win the trust and support of the communities, and were able to work with the community. They were seen by the communities as “a facilitator of community participation in civil society, and ... a change agent within local government.” The contentious issues, ones which had to be worked through with the constituencies appear to very similar to those that emerged in the UK. Firstly there was the need to ‘unromanticise’ the community. The Black communities were diverse, presenting a number of potential obstacles: the lack of representivity of certain civics; self appointed ‘leaders’ acting as gatekeepers; conflicts arising out of party politics; crooks, thieves and vagabonds targeting what was seen as a doorway to state resources.

Secondly there was the issue of the relationship between the CLU and the council. Again the trope of ‘biting the hand that feeds you’ emerged. As the review states, “the CLU exists within the council but acts on behalf of the communities.... (and this)... often places them in the precarious position
of criticising their employer, the council.\textsuperscript{1186} There were two aspects to
this: that pertaining to their relationship with the bureaucracy and that to
their relationship with councillors. With the bureaucracy the litany of
critical factors relating to the administrative system seem very familiar. The
CLU was seen as a threat because the boundaries and content of the
administrators’ accountability was being changed. The council was
physically inaccessible. Officials in the council were too conservative, still
living in the old South Africa, and thus ignorant of the parameters to change
then being pursued. There was as well the problem of professionalism and
territorialism, leading to the criticism of the CLU’s employees as not being
“technically qualified in a whole range of professions in which they
operate.”\textsuperscript{1187} Finally the CLU was perceived to lack status in the
organisation, especially one in which there was a rigid hierarchical pecking
order. This was not helped by the temporary status of the employees in the
unit.

The review identified the main difficulty with the then elected councillors as
the fact that “the CLU seeks to extend participatory democracy while we
have a representative democratic democracy in place.”\textsuperscript{1188} Achieving the
former would mean that accountability for councillors would be a continuous
process. There were thus similar issues. For example new councillors were
‘suckered’ by the system and viewed the CLU as troublesome because their
work exposed those who failed to link effectively with the community.
Civics identified that where the councillor failed to link with the
communities, the CLU, through providing effective information, filled that
gap.

In conclusion the review argued for an expansion in the role of the CLU to
take as well an overview of the budgetting process, equality and race
equality, and work with the councillors to transform the bureaucracy so that
it does not “run government irrespective of elected councillors.”

There is a final dimension to the state of play with the civics by 1996, the
time of the first, proper non racial municipal elections in the Cape. This is
to do with the development and adoption by the 1994 government of the
Reconstruction and Redevelopment Programme, (RDP). Marais notes that
the “RDP emerged as the most concerted attempt yet to devise a set of social,
economic and political policies and practices that could transform South
Africa into a more just and equal society....(which) .....aimed at completely
re-ordering politics, the economy and society.”\textsuperscript{1189} There were to this, five
sub-programmes: Meeting basic Needs; Developing Human Resources;
Building the Economy; Democratising the State, and Implementing the RDP.
The RDP originated from the trade union movement, building in, as it
evolved, the civics. It was adopted by the ANC as its core framework for
overcoming the legacies of apartheid shortly before the 1994 election. In
the Cape ANC canvassers were issued with leaflet size guidelines to the RDP. Saul, cited by Marais, notes that the RDP changed from being the programme of the democratic forces to becoming a policy framework for national government. In so doing the programme became “less what it is, than what it might become.” In other words despite the compromises forced on the RDP through ‘governmentality’, it still had enormous normative potential. As Marais summarises, “…the base document (of the RDP) remains both relevant and valuable, not as a blueprint but as a complex of development benchmarks that arose from a consultative process and which, in many respects, distilled the ideals that had propelled the struggle against apartheid.” Further, in an area which represents my arguments about the democratising overlap between the local public spheres, civil society and the local state, which is also contra the conservative interpretation of Habermas, he concludes that approaches from below, i.e. those from civil society have “to penetrate and build alliances with the state…. (because)... a schema that strictly counter-poses (progressive) civil society to the state is theoretically bankrupt and practically self defeating.” The implementation of the RDP at the local level relied on the establishment of RDP forums which drew directly from the civics.

In the interregnum period in the Cape when the council embarked on its programme of legitimacy, especially through the work of the CLU, local RDP forums were the prime mediating organisations for council access to communities and vice versa. These, in the Cape, ranged across both ‘Coloured’ and ‘African’ communities, including those of Cross Roads and Khayelitsa, the unofficial squatter camps. In concluding this section on the civics and CTCC in the period up to 1996, it can be argued that the beginnings of a process of democratisation of the local state had begun. More particularly the search for new and better forms of legitimacy had resulted in the development new communicative fora for Black people and the linkage of these to the communicative channels influencing the local state. The arguments around participatory democracy both locally and societally in South Africa, through programmes such as the RDP, assumed that this form of democratisation would shift the relationship from ‘influence’ to actual ‘change’. Whilst there is no explicit mention of deliberative democracy as part of this democratising change, the discursive potential of that, I would argue, resides in the notion of participatory democracy, and is evident in the examples of engagement with the civics.

12.20 Affirmative Action and CTCC

‘Affirmative action’ entered the lexicon, policy and practice of South African local government through a number of routes, some of them interconnected. Access to the global available knowledge of race remedial measures undertaken in the USA and GB were available to politicians,
unions, and the ANC. Its potential in helping to restructure a changed South Africa was being mooted by the ANC in the eighties. In terms of local government the development of anti-apartheid declarations, policies and practices by UK, but mainly London local authorities, within the overall race equality programmes of those councils, fed into the visions of the alternatives being developed by the ANC. In the case of Durban City Council, returning ANC activists who had been exiled in the UK, assisted local trade unions in brokering an affirmative action policy with that council. In that case the policy actually read like a UK local government equality policy, replete with word for word adoption of parts of the UK’s 1976 Race Relations Act. 1195

In relation to CTCC the drive for an affirmative action policy derived as much from the white liberal politicians search for new forms of legitimacy, as it did from the largely Black municipal trade union, SAMWU. There was another union, the South African Association of Municipal Employees, (SAAME) which served only the white employees, and which was particularly silent over this. However the facts of the legacy of apartheid spoke for themselves. The bureaucracy of CTCC was divided into seven hierarchical bands, which when defined in terms of pay, showed that 94% of those in the two lower bands were Black, whilst 100% of the highest band and 95% of the second highest band were white. 1196 The late eighties visit by key senior managers to the UK and USA came back with specific recommendations on establishing an affirmative action policy. By the turn of the decade the one major institutional obstacle to establishing such a policy was overcome with the CTCC regaining the control over their recruitment and selection decisions from the Manpower services Commission. To affect the creation of an affirmative action policy, consultants were employed both to research the subject area and come up with proposals. 1197 On the basis of this CTCC agreed an Equal Employment Opportunity and Affirmative Action Policy in 1991, with a commitment to negotiate this with the trade unions; a negotiated agreement only secured in 1994. 1198

The policy is telling, both by the limitation of its application and by the similarities with those developed in the UK. The EEO and AA policy applied only to recruitment and selection, and employee development. It identified three target ‘disadvantaged’ groups, where ‘disadvantage’ was defined in terms of those “deprived of rights, career, … inadequate schooling… or subject to past discrimination on the grounds of race, gender or disability.” 1199 The EEO meant ‘equity in employment through actively prohibiting discrimination’, whilst AA is aimed at temporary measures to redress past discrimination and improve the representativeness of employees in CTCC according to race and gender. At the heart of this policy was the incorporation of the concept of ‘merit’, which meant “the capacity or
competency to meet the requirements of the job.”

The implementation of the policy was to be sought through the establishment of an Affirmative Action Board comprised of equal numbers of relevant managers and representatives from the trade unions, whose function would be to oversee the development of the policy; the appointment of a specialist ‘Affirmative Action Officer’, based in the Personnel department; and the creation of targeting evaluation and monitoring system.

There are two major problems with the EEO and AA policy, the first of which is the fact that it has uncritically borrowed from other national experiences in this field. The second is that it was developed without any reference to wider political considerations and changes being pursued. Apropos this last point one of those interviewed in the council criticised it for its apolitical foundation and purported technical character. As the changes in South Africa unfurled in the nineties it became awash with consultants both internally and from other parts of the world. The ANC in the eighties was as unprepared for governance as the Nationalist party was for relinquishing power. The net result was that there was, in the preparation for changes, and still is, a heavy degree of uncritical application of second hand knowledge technologies. The notion of ‘affirmative action’, as evolving in South Africa is one of those. A critical commentary on the Durban policy, but which is equally applicable to the CTCC one, described it as “inadequately thought out...and disempowering”; this in contradistinction to policies which should be underpinned by three ‘E’s’—empowerment, emancipation and enablement.”

What was described as “Mynah bird” policy development would prove disabling in the South African context. Pointing out that similar policies developed in the UK and USA “are about fine tuning large bureaucracies so that racial minorities of Black people (in the widest possible sense of the term "Black") can compete on equal, or near equal, terms with White people for jobs... (and)... whether or not it is relevant to racial majorities of Black people who are so treated is another matter... (because there is)... the question .... whether or not this particular type of change will simply entrench the rights of a historically privileged White minority community.”

It goes on to to identify the marginalising conceptual apparatus and practice of ‘affirmative action’ in the UK and USA, and asks why that should be unquestioningly transposed on to the South African context. Thus use of terms, such as ‘disadvantaged’, ‘merit’, ‘affirmative action’, etc. all give the impression that what exists in terms of human resource policy and practice, and in terms of the bureaucratic structure, are normal, requiring only a few tweaks, here and there, in order to accommodate Black people. Further the language of the affirmative action policies drafted up to that date unwittingly pathologise and ‘victim’ Black people so that, for example, the inference can be drawn that Black people thus require ‘additional training’ before they can work in such administrative set ups. There were additional problems, as well, in so far as
there was an unquestioning adoption and implementation of a race monitoring system which relied on the apartheid racial categories, a move which had the potential to entrench further conventionalised identification.

Those sorts of criticisms set out above actually speak of a greater problem, which is the way in which the EEO and AA appears to be divorced from the wider changes, such as the RDP. One of the weaknesses identified by the review of the CLU was that it was not properly contextualised and structurally situated in an equalities environment tackling the whole council. The same can be said of the EEO and AA policy, viz. that it does not seek to change the conditions of inequitable and unjust employment policies, practices and structures, but rather fine tune them. In other words equality based employment policies and practices should become the norm, not the added on exception. It's answer to racism is the BBOS approach which, whilst desirable, can never be the solution. Post 1996 there are thus important questions to be asked of the EEO and AA, especially in the light of the country's constitutional and equality legislative developments.

12.21 Pursuing the Metropolitan Option

The metropolitan level of local government, by which is meant deciding on the degree of amalgamation of the many, fractured local authority structures generated by the apartheid years into one, was favoured by the ANC and, in their preliminary deliberations, CTCC as a vehicle for legitimacy. In this case legitimacy arose mainly out of the ability of such a structure to play a substantial developmental role. The extent to which the civics, the only real organisational base of Black people at that time, actually supported that is questionable. To that extent the proposals put forward by CTCC in the first part of the nineties have to be assessed in relation to its democratising proposals for it would be through those processes that legitimation involving the communicative participation of all concerned, would be enacted.

The actual proposals emerging from CTCC covered four main areas: the number of tiers in the new set up; the democratic form and content; the services, and the financial systems and framework. I want to concentrate on the first two. In terms of the number of levels to the metropolitan structure, the recommendation was for there to be two tiers comprised of primary local authorities and a metropolitan level which would have a co-ordinating role and responsibility for certain services. The degree of devolution or decentralisation would the outcome of negotiations. Above all, with regard to the relationship, the CTCC came down to concluding that “because of the perceived need that accountable and participatory local government works at its optimum when it is constructed around coherent community clusterings, there is a strong case for the retention of primary local authorities in the metropolitan area.” In terms
of the democratisation of the new local government arrangements, three forms of democracy were considered: representative democracy, participatory democracy and delegate democracy. The last one, used at that time in the Witswatersrand metropolitan area, requires that delegates are in continuous communication with their constituents before articulating a response to policies. CTCC recommended that "democratic practice would be best served by a combination of all three models....in a public culture which maximises public participation and accountability." Likewise a 'hybrid' of electoral systems was recommended comprised of a fifty-fifty split of candidates being elected through a first-past-the-post mode, and proportional representation. Accountability of those mandated would be secured through a number of possible mechanisms: recall elections, plebiscitary petitions, referenda, a code of ethics for elected officials, 'open government' laws, the existence of an ombudsman. This would be complemented through action to support the council's belief that "if civil society is to play a meaningful role in a participatory democracy, it will be necessary to build the organisational capacity of communities and leadership."

The extent to which these very radical proposals – radical in relation to what existed before, and radical when considered in the light of the UK experience – were actually actioned in the Cape in the local government negotiating processes affecting the interim period in the South African polity, is debatable. There is no evidence, for example, that the CLU’s work programme and actual detail, included the issue of the future metropolitan structure. Yet this would have been an ideal vehicle for pursuing that agenda. Whilst there were other forums, like the One City Forum which involved the civics, the actual substantive negotiating forum was that of the Cape Metropolitan Negotiating Forum. This was established under the instructed legal auspices of the 1993 Local Government Transition Act which set the legislative framework to the work of unification of the fragmented structures. Part of this unification work allowed for the establishment of interim councils for which there would be 'non-racial' elections in 1996 in the Cape. The act allowed for other local governments and organisations and observers to participate in the forums, including civic associations, residents' associations and the local structures of political parties. In the Cape, apart from the participation of local political parties, inclusion of the other organisations was variable. Bond is less sanguine about his characterisation of that period. He notes that "because national ANC negotiators were wary of grassroots democratic instincts", they adopted the code of 'building trust' to "justify the highly circumscribed character of elite municipal transition." The interim arrangements, as set out in the legislation, were designed "to force together powerbrokers from white conservative and radical camps, straitjacketed for five years into unsatisfying compromises."
By 1996, the time of the first ‘non-racial’ local elections in the Cape, even if the structure of local governance was still to be determined, it can be argued that there was in place, in terms of a framework of intent, locally and nationally, and in terms of the incipient practices evolving, the bases for a legitimization of local government the discursive inclusion of those affected. To that extent the voice of CTCC, if not the actual practice, was speaking about a totally new form of legitimization. Given the history of the Cape in relation to the growth and separations of racialized populations, as well as the concomitant political responses from these populations, this discursive inclusion would have to involve questions of recognition and how these related to questions of redistribution. It is not only the issue of posing such questions, but also having them heard and resolved. For example, one of the contributors to the CLU evalative process, who was from a local RDP forum based in an ‘African’ area, stated that: “you get poor whites, poor coloureds and poor blacks, but the most disadvantaged was the poor blacks... (and)... therefore government needs to focus on the basic needs of the most disadvantaged black areas.”¹² Here was an example of how the collectivity of “Black”, in the sense that I develop it, in signifying wrongs done to, at the same time invites the discursive resolution of identity claims of those who are the constituents. It is in this sense that the de-colonisation of the ‘colonial’ relationship between the state and Black subjects, which I existed under the apartheid state and earlier, can be discursively deconstructed; a process democratically more substantive than mere participation in elections for representative political officials.

12.22 Post 1996 – Beyond the Crossroads?

With the advent of the first ‘non-racial’ local government elections in the Cape in 1996 for a local government which had the potential for a discursive legitimization as outlined above, it would be expected that the direction taken at the crossroads would towards communicative enhancement. However this was not to be the case. The window of opportunity presented by not having to be imprisoned by the tradition of local governance, as in the case of the UK, and as confirmed by the developments in civil society, was actually closing post 1996. The answer to why this occurred lies in the political developments in the ANC nationally which came to over shadow the route taken by CTCC.

12.23 National Developments

Bonds, and separately Marais, provide a well argued charting of the ANC’s downward spiral into the arms of economic neo-liberalism. Bond argues that “macro-economic management during the 1989-1993 late apartheid
depression became a model for post-apartheid policy.\textsuperscript{1211} Part of the reason for this is because "when the ANC was unbanned in 1990, it had no economic policy, a peculiar situation for an eight decade old liberation organisation despite the efforts internationally to train a cadre of ANC exile economists."\textsuperscript{1212} Its initial economic response was contained in the mantra 'growth through redistribution', reflecting the influence at that time of the SACP and COSATU. However, into this economic vacuum stepped the surrogate priests of neo-liberal economic orthodoxy: the economists of South African corporate business, the World Bank and the IMF. The extent to which this vacuum was filled can be gauged by Kentridge's conclusion, quoted by Marais, that by late 1993 "the language and tone [of ANC and business policy documents] are so similar that at times they appear interchangeable".\textsuperscript{1213} Whilst Marais is unsure of the factors that led to the ANC's apostasy and fall into neo-liberalism, Bond locates this as residing primarily in the post 1990 unleashing of a "plethora of corporate scenario planning exercises" by the leading South African business conglomerates.\textsuperscript{1214} These, according to Bond, "reflected the desire of the masters to and carefully hand picked participants to come up with a deal -- rather than a good analysis."\textsuperscript{1215} Their prime concerns were to get accepted: the "shared demand that economic policy had to become grounded in relationships of trust, negotiation and consensus building..."; "the need for macro-economic stringency, restraint in efforts at social restructuring, an outward oriented economy and a facilitating (as opposed to regulating) state..."; the economic Ishmael status of "any attempt to ground economic future policy in the mutually reinforcing dynamic of growth and redistribution."\textsuperscript{1216} My argument would be that this reflected another variation of the "being suckered by the system" syndrome. In situations of power, which the ANC found itself in, which are underscored by a legitimating process of 'leader' popularity, but not discursive popularity, the form and nature of the peer group, and its mutual accountability, changes. This was facilitated by the largely ex-exile make up of the ANC's leadership. For those more used to the comradeship of activists in the seventies and eighties apartheid South Africa who were drafted into the negotiating set up, the transmogrification was that much greater. The peer group changed from that characterised by 'jeans' to that characterised by 'suits'. Likewise legitimation from that new peer group assumed a greater and greater degree of importance. That transformation is that much more highlighted where access to state power leads to increased economic privilege and wealth. This was exemplified by a business journal report of the funeral of a one time Robben Island prisoner, turned merchant banker: "Once Andrew Mapheto's comrades would have arrived in jeans, T-shirts and Indian print dresses. Now they watched silently behind ray bans in dark suits and twin sets. A phalanx of BMWs and Mercedes stood on the cemetery verge."\textsuperscript{1217} A former activist attending is quoted: "I am a good capitalist precisely because I was such a good communist."\textsuperscript{1218} Adam et al note that the elite of the ANC "borrowed the
definition of equality from the whites... anything less than a white bourgeois lifestyle ...(was)... unequal.” 1219 This phenomenon of the imitative and simulated equality appeared as well in the period of the race initiatives in the UK when criticisms from Black workers about race advisers chasing higher salaries was met with the response from one of the best known that no one complained when white managers obtained more money. Bonds sums up this transformation by reference to Fanon: “In its beginnings, the national bourgeoisie of the colonial country identifies itself with the decadence of the bourgeoisie of the West. We need not think that it is jumping ahead; it is in fact beginning at the end. It is already senile before it has come to know the petulance, the fearlessness, or the will to succeed of youth.” 1220

The ANC had, belatedly, set up the Macro-Economic Research Group, (MERGE), in 1991 to develop a more relevant model for South Africa in line with the party’s then thinking. By the time ‘Making Democracy Work’ was delivered in 1993, much of the ANC’s leadership had already been seduced by the blandishments of corporate neo-liberal South African business, and this died an unnatural death. In 1996, as if to confirm that the only growth in the South African economy was the increase of acronyms, the government published its own macro-economic strategy, “drawn up by a coterie of mainstream economists.” 1221 This was called ‘Growth, Employment and Redistribution’, (GEAR). It was drawn up, however, without any consultation in the party, or with allies, such as COSATU, outside of the party. It was, despite government attempts to fudge the issue, a neo-liberal strategy, not dissimilar to the previous apartheid regime’s late eighties, early nineties proposals. The plan hinged on major private investment, and thus concomitantly a reduction in state spending. Some of the core elements more relevant to this research were, therefore, to drastically cut state spending, to encourage wage restraint by workers, to create a more ‘flexible’ job market, and to speed up privatisation. However, more importantly, the effect on the development and implementation of the RDP was to saddle it with a macro-economic contextual brake. The government’s 1994 RDP white paper, which, as a dilution of the base document, epitomised this, was summarised in a critical commentary as, “...disfigured, .. incoherent and fragmented.” 1222 Marais argues that in the government’s “RDP’s post 1994 theory and practice was a perspective that predicated reconstruction and development on liberalisation, free markets and the cultivation of investor confidence..... (and that).... development and reconstruction would occur in terms of those priorities.” 1223

There were, then, two versions of equality developing in the new South Africa of the nineties – the one redistributive based and centred on the RDP, and the other, ‘white equality’, as other commentators have labelled it, based on the classical liberal notion of equality. Whilst both fail to take in properly the other core component of equality, recognition, the tensions
between the two equality versions are reflected in the main equality legislation enacted by the South African government in the nineties. At the centre of this stands the 1996 new constitution of South Africa. In many ways this is a remarkable, radical constitution. Its founding provisions include the recognition of eleven official languages, establishing as well an institution to develop these together with the Khoi, San and sign languages. It also calls for the promotion and respect of other named community languages, such as Hindi, Arabic and Hebrew. The cornerstone of the constitution, and democracy, is the inclusion of a Bill of Rights. This has direct applicability to some 25+ different areas. I want to concentrate on two sections. Firstly its specific equality component defines equality in relation to the law, enjoyment of defined rights, and the rights not to be discriminated against on a number of grounds, including race. The only caveat to the last one is where discrimination is in the form of measures to redress past or present unfair discriminatory practices. Secondly, whilst local government and its powers, duties, membership, terms etc are clearly defined in the constitution, as crucially is its autonomy vis-à-vis the provincial and national levels of government, the important element relating to participation by citizens is disappointingly restricted. Thus, local government should only “encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the matters of local government.”

Post 1996, and up to 1998, there were two further excursions by the South African government into the arena of anti-discriminatory legislation. Both reflected an intention to pursue affirmative action remedies in the private and public sectors. The intellectual architectonics of both, however, owe a great debt to the British consultants brought over through the auspices of the British government to co-ordinate and help with their drafting. The first was the Employment Equity Act of 1998. This act requires that employers actively promote equal opportunities by eliminating unfair discrimination. Those employers with over 50 employees and a turnover that exceeds the defined threshold, are subject to affirmative action. The latter is structured within a targeting framework as the basis for the development of measures to ensure that suitably qualified employees from Black communities, where the act defines ‘Black’ as those from the African, Coloured or Indian communities, have equal opportunities and are equitably represented at all levels. The second was a 1998 government White Paper on Affirmative Action in the Public Service. That paper sets out the need for affirmative action in the public service, defined almost solely in terms of representivity, as well as providing a detailed framework for developing and implementing affirmative action strategies and plans. Two key aspects are telling. Firstly the justification for affirmative action is cast in business terms. Thus “the case for affirmative action must be firmly rooted in the department’s core business goals... (which will require) sustained effective marketing and communication... (to enable) staff to see
affirmative action as a positive tool for achieving the organisation’s core business goals. Secondly the intellectual content, language and remedial prescriptions read like a bought off the shelf solution from the UK. In this case a solution which is framed in terms of the technicised ‘business case’ for equal opportunities. Further, in an indication of the way in which a neo-managerialist solution to inequality appeared to being proffered in government prescriptions, the implementation of affirmative action was situated within firstly a ‘human resources’ framework, and within that a ‘performance management one. It has to be questioned, whether or no, equality initiatives developed in the UK and the USA, which in their framing and implementation had to ride the contradictory tension of marginalisation whilst trying to become mainstream, should be so uncritically applied to a situation where there was the opportunity for establishing equality policies as the norm, and not the exception. To that extent, it can be argued that these equality initiatives were additive, and not transformative. The ‘BBOS’ solution did not envisage a transformation of employment and bureaucracies. There was no linkage, for example, with the RDP. Equality, in this case, came down to the right of individuals to be selected solely on the grounds of merit for employment. In this the equality measures did not go any further than the CTCC equal opportunities and affirmative action policy of the early nineties.


By 1998 the potential for reconstructing a more inclusive form of local governance which had been evidenced in 1996, appeared to have all but disappeared. Interviews with those I had tentatively identified as playing a similar griot type role within CTCC in interpreting and developing alternatives to local governance, revealed a drastically changed situation in 1998. There were three key, inter-linked dimensions to what can be described as a retrograde transformation of ‘transformation’, all of them characterised, in some way, as being imported from other national and private sector contexts, and applied uncritically to the then current milieu of local governance in the Cape. These three dimensions were the rise of neo-managerialism, the decline of democratising complements or alternatives to party based representative democracy, and the persisting denial of ‘race’ through the adoption of diversity conceptualisations.

The senior Black manager, mentioned earlier, who had been involved at the core of the CTCC initiatives post 1990 aimed at creating a new legitimacy, including being responsible for establishing the CLU, described the 1998 situation in that council as being a form of benign Thatcherism, the result, as he analysed it, of the negotiations between “the oppressed elite and the elite of the oppressors.” A number of key changes were highlighted. What had been the City Administrator post, equivalent to the Chief
Executive in the UK, had been changed by the new incumbent into a ‘City Manager’ post. He was described as white, and an ‘ANC man’. He was also the person responsible for drafting and negotiating the local government chapter in the new constitution. The change in emphasis was exemplified by his insistence on ‘outcomes’, that the ‘talking was now over’, and that ‘inputs’ were therefore less important. This approach to ‘doing things’, ‘getting things done’ strikes a ten year echo with the ‘management is neutral’ arguments of the leading councillor in the target borough in the UK. There, again, that approach was predicated on the contestable assumption that there were/was enough policies/talking, and all that was required was action oriented towards ‘doing’. A new tranche of senior departmental managers had been recruited, all of them from outside of local government. These were retitled and rebranded as ‘executive directors’, where the prefix was meant to emphasise the action/doing orientation. Again similar changes were pursued in early nineties Lambeth when the directors associated with the ‘old, bad, equality era’ Lambeth were displaced and replaced with ‘executive directors’, on vastly increased salaries, but also with enhanced, neo-managerial powers to ‘manage/do’. Many of these Lambeth changes, including the new Chief executive who misrecognised Black people as ‘coloured’, came from outside local government. In CTCC, at that time, the form of neo-managerialism was being framed generally in terms of moving from a ‘centralised, regulationist’ approach to one that would be ‘interactive and flexible’. One sees in this form of problem analysis and derived solution the direct influence of post-Fordism, which, as Bond argues, arrived in South Africa in 1990 with and when Raphael Kaplinsky of Sussex University came to co-direct COSATU’s Industrial Strategy Project. Thereafter the South African version of post Fordism, in which apartheid was re-analysed as ‘racial Fordism’, came to play a prominent part in ANC post-apartheid thinking. There was an over emphasis on ‘global competitiveness’ and a concomitant fascination with the hallmarks of the post-Fordist era, i.e. product quality, facaded (my term) workplace democracy, such as ‘quality circles’, and Japanese style production and inventory control techniques, such as ‘Just-in-Time’. In the target borough in the UK, at the time when the neo-managerial discourse was gathering momentum in the mid eighties, these sorts of techniques were being introduced and pushed through the DLO, the leading councillor’s power base. Within the South African context, and the specific one of CTCC at that time, an emancipative gloss was given to these sorts of managerial changes through the labelling of them as ‘transformational skills’, with the ‘executive directors identified above, being categorised as well, in differing managerial scenarios as ‘transformational managers’. This was very much in the mode of Peters mis appropriation of the term ‘liberation’ to describe the form of management he was then extolling and advocating. As Alvesson argues this makes use of a mystification metaphor, in this case ‘liberation’, and ‘creativity’ to make promises that those ideas being pushed
can "'liberate' managers and employees from the drudgery of traditional patterns of work... (yet)... in effect these ideas impose a new set of disciplines upon employees who are encouraged to equate processes of liberation and creativity with unequivocal dedication to corporate values and objectives as they induce employees to regard their fellow workers as customers." Certainly in CTCC the new language and 'nu-speak' was evident, from mission statements, core values, to the displacement of 'users' by 'customers', both internal and external. This trend was given extra impetus by the employment of a consultant recruited direct from IBM to oversee the departmental and managerial restructuring CTCC at that time. Her approach, as described in her interview, was through a project management structure, to 'unbundle' the old set up and reconstitute the new CTCC organisation via 'clusters' of areas of responsibilities. This was not a transformation of a hierarchical bureaucracy into something more democratic, but a reconfiguration of departmental and inter-departmental power relationships into a new hierarchy. Underpinning these changes as the overt expression of the CTCC's policy planning and implementation framework, was the adoption of the 'business planning' model. One can see again the parallels with the UK experiences where the business planning model is now de rigueur with most local authorities.

Despite the stated intention to want to move away from centralisation to a more flexible, creative structure, the cult of the manager as 'leader' was identified as emerging. The new City manager was seen to be over keen to want to centralise decision making, quoting favourably the status of the city manager in New Zealand cities where a great deal of power is invested in their hands. The Black manager concerned described this as a variant of the 'super surveillant state'; one in which the 'speculative freedom' associated with his role in the planning for the post apartheid local government in the early to mid nineties was now severely curtailed. His own assessment of his then current situation, unfortunately to be realised one year later, was that he was being forced out of the organisation. There are parallels again with the target borough, and others, in the UK, not so much with the specific posts of 'Race Advisers' as with those who come to play a catalytic, irritant role in such organisations.

However, it is with the area of substantive democratic enhancement, as outlined in the proposals for metropolitan government adopted by the CTCC of the mid nineties, that the most significant retreat had occurred. These had the potential, I contend, for not only influencing the steering of local government, but also, as Dryzek generally argues the need for, actually steering local government through the deliberative participation of local communities. The local RDP forums, very active in 1996, had by 1998 been allowed to stagnate. The expressed attitude and opinion of the city manager was that it was time to stop talking about participation and to start...
‘doing’.

This was backed up by the argument that because the constitutional defining of local government had not included the RDP and spoke only of ‘encouraging participation’, a definition he had had a hand in, the RDP, or for that matter wider forms of political participation, could not be considered as ‘core business’. Even where participation was raised formally through the policy process, this was effectively strangled in its implementation stage because it had to be force fed through the neo-managerial processes then in hand. For example the senior Black manager had developed a policy paper on public participation, structuring it very much in the light of previous RDP type initiatives. This had been approved by the council. Yet, in having to translate the into the then current ‘actionese’ of a business plan, it had emerged, as he himself described it, as a piece of gobbledegook. Thus:

The Development Facilitation Unit (DFU) is meant to support the Community Development Cluster in achieving its Mission/Objectives in terms of the Organizing Principles and Core Values that inform the Cluster’s purpose. The DFU constitutes the "glue" that holds the Cluster together. The Community Development Cluster (intra cluster) and Council (inter cluster) as a corporate entity requires a functional means/mechanism to ensure that its responses to the various dimensions of city life maintain an internal coherence. The DFU as facilitating agent ought to perform such a role. This role has been defined by the workshops and discussions that produced the Interim Strategic Development Framework. It must be emphasized that the DFU’s role as facilitator apropos the comments from the Institutional Transformation Managers on 1997-06-27 must be seen as being supportive of line functionaries and not as an encroachment on their duties and obligations and certainly not as "gate keepers vis-a-vis communities".

This approach had been reinforced by the new councillors, who the Black manager mentioned, and other Black employees interviewed, thought not to be of a ‘high calibre’. In their assessment the new councillors, apart from one or two, appeared not to be interested in democracy. This was not helped by the remuneration system whereby councillors were actually paid. They were, thus to all intents and purposes, employees of the local state, earning some R10,000 a month. At that time, in mid 1998, they had also awarded themselves car allowances. In the early nineties critical commentary on nascent South African equal opportunity policies mentioned earlier, the author had warned that political difficulties would emerge between catalysts type posts and the political system, not then, but with the election of councillors through a one person, one vote system. This was proving to be true. A growing schism was identified, by that Black manager, between those who had been elected through the party system, and between those who had been, and were then still, active in the civics and RDP. In many cases the former were unknown to the latter. Generally, as Marais identifies, if there was any siphoning off of civics key personnel, it
was towards the paid sector in the public services. One can see again the similar problem emerging in a representative democratic set up whereby those Black people selected through the party system, and eventually elected, as occurred, and occurs, in the UK, can, at best, only make rhetorical claims to represent the Black communities. Consequently their accountability to those communities is always mediated through the potential side tracking processes of being ‘suckered by the system’.

By 1998 it was clear that the EEO and AA policy had been “ineffectually implemented.” The sporadic progress was due to a number of reasons. Firstly, as the critical commentary mentioned earlier had warned against, establishing unquestioningly Affirmative Action Posts, a direct copy from the UK experience, would lead to those posts being dumped with the responsibility of actually implementing the policy. This certainly occurred in CTCC where a combination of managers not wanting to assume responsibility for equality and the post being vacant for two years, had resulted in the lack of progress. Secondly, as the IBM consultant, to whom the responsibility for that policy had been passed, had confessed, equalities had been ‘put on the backburner’ because the priorities over the previous two years had been the absorption of six previous local authorities, including the two ‘African’ ones, into the CTCC structure. The policy, and new post holder, were to be integrated into the new project management systems. But, there was another dimension to the policy, and to race generally, which presented itself. This was that both were being subsumed under the ‘management of diversity’ category; a category that was far from being properly defined. The term ‘management of diversity’ appeared in government white papers and acts on equality, under the catch-all of ‘South Africa is a diverse society’. It was, as one of the interviewees put it, being promoted by the then Deputy President, Mbeki. In interrogating this concept with the consultant and the new Affirmative Action post holder, pointing out that this variation on the ‘appreciation of different cultures’ sounded too much like the old apartheid ideology, and, further that if all is diverse then there is no diversity, it was clear that, from their answers, this concept was another one that was being uncritically borrowed from other contexts.

This was confirmed by the solution sought to a problem which had manifested itself in the council. Tension ridden differences between ‘Coloured’ workers and ‘African’ workers were beginning to emerge. In answer to this potential problem, training courses on ‘valuing diversity’ were bought in from external consultants, who, as their course content revealed, had brought and bought in the training content from the USA. Their core recommendation, far from addressing racism, the apartheid legacy and the enduring identities of South Africa, concluded that “participants had a general lack of personal and cultural information about one another.”

Yet, there were other solutions to this problem which were, at that time, being explored. In an earlier interview one of the Black employees had
voiced the opinion that racism was never openly discussed, and that the issue was ‘skirted around’. Another, who worked as a training officer in the human resources department, was of the opinion that the new regime, nationally and locally in the council, had ‘fudged’ the issue of race and racism. In trying to address that, and using the communicative space she had through the union and her own post, she was using the dimension of gender to address racism by attempting to establish a Black women’s group. This was seen as the best means of discursively addressing the apartheid legacy socially constructed differences between ‘Coloured’ and ‘African’ women, as well as providing a solidaristic bases from which to engage with the organisation. In sum, in talking to those responsible for the EEO and AA policy it was clear that ‘valuing diversity’ provided a means, one fully co-terminus with a neo-managerialist approach, to forge a common organisational identity for CTCC employees. In so doing it was a logical progression from the ‘non-racial’ conceptualisation of a post-apartheid society employed by the ANC because both assume an absence of, or deny, racism, and underestimate the deleterious legacy of its offspring of group identities heavily influenced by the history of South African racialisation.

Yet the equality legislative and constitutional framework to South Africa, and associated programmes, such as the RDP, provide a normative framework against which the government can, and should be made accountable, as well as rallying principles for civil society. In relation to local governance in 1998, the government published its white paper on local government. The intent of the white paper was described by the Institute for Democratic Alternatives in South Africa as, “local government in all regions of the country must have the administrative and financial capacity to effectively meet its constitutional obligation of social justice through the practice of good governance.” It defined developmental local government in terms of its redistributive and capacity building role, where the latter referred to both socio-economic and community dimensions. More importantly, in relation to democratisation, it stresses “that councils must actively promote democracy and participation by marginalised groups, especially women.” To back this up it makes mention of both the RDP and GEAR. As if to play out the tension between these two documents, the democratic power of local government is assigned almost totally to the form of representative democracy, whilst the internal processes of local government are to be structured through ‘performance management’ and through developing key ‘performance indicators’. The question then is which way will local governance in South Africa develop: towards instrumentalised systemic steering, or communicative systemic steering, as promised in the normative framework.
12.25 Conclusion

In assessing the radical interpretation of the trajectory of race through South African history, especially over the last decade, it can be argued that the orthodox Marxist position has silenced race both through the social labour based universalisation, and thus tactically as a response to the oppressive racialisation of the South African state. There has been another silencing as well, which relates to the latter analyses' inability to predict the changes that occurred, and seemingly 'omerta' over subsequent developments. One Black academic has charged some of the once leading Marxist academic critics of apartheid of becoming apostate policy 'wonks' for the ANC’s neo-liberal embrace, either because of their work for the government, or because their reticence over criticising the ANC is, in his view, inexcusable. 1244

With that in mind, and my previous criticisms of the Marxist approach, especially in relation to its faulty theorisation, and inclusion of race, I want to argue that the empirical analysis provided above supports a Habermassian type theory as the better interpretive framework, both specifically vis-à-vis the UK and South Africa, and comparatively. This Habermassian type theory is the variation I have tried to develop which is fully inclusive of race so that resolution of that problem is tied in explicitly and centrally with a discursive modernity still to run its full path.

The three inter-linked part analysis of the UK experience of race and local governance in the eighties whereby I argued for a colonisation, de-colonisation and re-colonisation framework, is similarly applicable to the scenario of race and local governance in the Cape in South Africa. This is a 'colourisation' of the extent to which 'race' negatively or positively can steer the system. Under colonisation there is a direct, negative racialisation of steering mechanisms; under de-colonisation, a positive, discursive steering or influencing of the system, whilst under re-colonisation, the discursive part is silenced and there is a facadic positive influencing of the system. The differences between the two geographical scenarios lie in the temporal arc of the different phases. Thus up to the late eighties it can be argued that there was an extended phase of colonisation of Black people in South Africa. From the late eighties to roughly the mid nineties, there was a period of de-colonisation in which in which previously oppositional civil society, and the previously samzidat and/or subaltern public spheres were in a position to begin the continuous process of the discursive engagement with and transformation of the local state through a discourse which had the potential for a discursive democratisation. Within the potential of this, I would argue, lay the potential discursive resolution of 'race' in South Africa. The period of re-colonisation, which is still forming, refers to the mid nineties onwards implementation of neo-liberalism, and its technicised progeny, neo-managerialism. This sees not only the withdrawal of the state from key areas of potential discursive control and its abandonment to the economic
system, but also the narrowing of democratisation to that of representative
democracy. Within the latter process participation, which still commands
mention in official government literature, is reduced to consultative
influence. Across the discursive gaps caused by this communicative closure
is thrown the accountability bridge of neo-managerialist financial
accountability discourses and systems. Legitimation comes not be based
on a discursively grounded consensus, but on various instrumentalised
strategies and tactics, including ‘diversity management’.

The ANC’s embrace of neo-liberalism, and the Fukuyama model of
modernity, has not been without the severest criticism from within and
outside the party. Yet its claims for legitimation amongst Black people, i.e.
to be recognised, can still draw on the high credit levels accrued during the
apartheid years. But the importance it attaches to its legitimation seeking
from the South African corporate sector, the international financial
institutions, Western governments, like the USA and UK, and its elite peer
group, is publicly exhibited in the high levels of clientalism, corruption,
hyper sensitivity to public criticism and ‘bling, bling’ displays of wealth.1245

There is a question mark, then, about the extent to which the ‘enjoyment’ of
this particular configuration of state power can over ride the calls for more
state control and intervention in the economic system, especially if the lack
of heed to these calls results in a re-animation of those extra parliamentary
forces mobilised in the eighties against the apartheid state. The ANC is in
danger of using up a large part of this credit because the legitimation tactics
rest on the homogenising strategy adopted whereby ‘non-racial’, exemplified
in the appeals made to the generic ‘oppressed’, ‘people’ and ‘community’,
has inscribed in it “the very categories that it sought to transcend.” This
has not only been shown in the Cape, as Marais contends, because of the
supposed explicit tensions between ‘Coloureds and ‘Africans, but also in
relation to the ‘African’ people where the ANC has tended to treat them as
an undifferentiated mass. What has been expressed in the Cape, with a
large number of ‘Coloureds’ supporting the Nationalist Party or Democratic
Party, was simply the historical reality of differences which were present in
the process of the social construction of races and identities in the Cape. In
terms, then, of the political profile, there would have been many ‘Coloureds’
also, who, in the tradition of non-collaboration and left of ANC positions,
such as the senior Black manager mentioned above, who would have
abstained, or voted for a minority left party. Suppressing these differences
through communicative closure, and increasing the facilitation of lifeworld
colonisation, can lead to more civil society mobilisation, as Marais and Bond
hope for, because the Black communities’ and those who fought against
apartheid memories of that are still fresh. On the other hand it could also
lead to increased etnik, modernity averring claims, as in the political
responses of Inkatha, or those certain sectors of the Muslim community in
the Cape, or to the continuation of racism, or, paradoxically to claims of

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racism as a facadic rallying point. Thus, within an article which contextually backgrounds the silence over the killings in the early nineties of Black hostel dwellers in Natal by Inkatha impis as racist, Heywood makes the following observations about the ANC government:

“When the ANC and its allies fought apartheid and turned it into a global struggle against racism, it fought for every life, tried to highlight every indignity. ....But before the current champions against racism, particularly those in our government and the plethora of human rights commissions jump up and agree: read on. Particularly tragic is the way in which the new political and economic elite, no longer a ‘whites only’ domain, which does have the power to both prevent and repair, seems to have internalised racism – or transmuted it into a callousness towards poor people- that is little different in its consequences. By default it now mimics the actions of its predecessors.”1246

On the other hand, a Bishop, who had been active in the churches anti-apartheid struggles, excoriates the current government for “being too ready to pull out the race card when criticised, when making a mess of things....(and that)....whilst it has been customary to describe the relationship between the government and the church as one of ‘critical solidarity’, ... it would be more theologically appropriate... to speak rather of our critical solidarity, not with the government, but with the poor.”1247 Finally Seepe, concludes a similar line of criticism of the ANC government by quoting from Cornel West:

Moral and logical reasoning is required if we are to liberate ourselves from the racial guilt of opposing morally dubious black leadership. Such an approach will lead to ‘a framework that encourages moral assessment of a variety of the perspectives held by black people and selects those views based on black dignity and decency that eschew putting any group of people or culture on a pedestal or in the gutter. Instead of a closing-ranks mentality, a prophetic framework encourages a coalition strategy that solicits genuine solidarity with those deeply committed to anti-racist struggle’. (Cornel West on The Pitfalls of Racial Reasoning).1248

In sum then, in response to Alexander’s identification of a solution lying in the forging of a substantive citizenship, as the West quote above also talks of, Marais approvingly recommends Habermas’ communicative refinement on citizenship that:

...the nation of citizens does not derive its identity from some common ethnic and cultural properties, but rather from the praxis of citizens who actively exercise their civil rights.”1249
Chapter 13

Conclusion

Reflexively looping back to the “Introduction”, this ‘conclusion’ can be crystallized around the two key features of that initial exploratory section. The first relates to the key stone question about the bases for complementarity and commonality between the claims to differing forms of social life that are racialised, and the second flows from the answers to that, which, following Habermas, should be “structurally related to possible emancipation.” There are, in terms of this thesis, three parts to those answers. These are a gutting and refurbishing of key parts of Habermas’ theory from a perspective which puts race centre stage, thereby critically examining the inclusiveness of his universality; an exploration of the institutional implications of the insights gained in which a substantively racially inclusive form of local governance is postulated as a crucial means to realise the communicative programming of the centre from the periphery; and, ‘testing’ of these new validity claims in the empirical, real life, experiences of two case studies of race and local governance, separated by distance, time and history.

In a sense then the more prosaic aspects of ‘conclusions’ write themselves, in this case. The theoretical insights gained from a ‘racialised’ theorisation of Habermas, garnered as the theoretical complements to key social reality correlates, and the institutional implications for local governance have already been set out in Chapter 9, as a prelude to the two case studies. The exploration of the two concrete case studies has not diminished those theoretical contentions. If anything they have reinforced and under girded them in outlining the real life playing out of counterfactualities, whether they be those of learning for social domination, or those of learning for emancipation, within the context of race equality and local governance. Moreover they have supported, and not detracted from my claim for a trans-colonial modernity based on my contention that the resolution of ‘race’, as a trans-epochal unresolved problem, is the touchstone to the proper completion of modernity. Further the conclusion to the South African case study argues that the colonising, de-colonising, and re-colonising paradigm developed from the racialisation of Habermas’ work, can be applied as a comparator framework to local governance situations of change some six thousand miles apart, even if these were occurring in different time periods. There are, however, two additional theoretical areas which had to be, respectively, enhanced and developed in the course of examining the empirical evidence.
The first relates to the brief enhancing excursus on 'discourse' and 'diskourse', a shorthand neologism I use to distinguish between enabling and constraining discourses. Within the contexts of Dryzek's notion of discursive difference democracy being about the contestation of discourses and Bohman's imagining of a reflexive administration, it was shown that in both case study scenarios these battles took place. These were around the core idea of what race equality and local governance means, and about whether or not this was ultimately emancipatively enhancing or dominatantly constraining. Further the dialectical relationship between 'discourse' and 'diskourse' is exemplified when the 'discourse' of race equality in the eighties, becomes the 'diskourse' of diversity in the nineties, i.e. essentialised differences shorn of rights. This transmogrification, as opposed to transformation, occurs because the communicative spaces opened by pursuit of discourse of equality, which allowed those principally affected to participate substantively in the debate, are closed down. This was certainly the case in the UK in relation to race equality and local government, and, with regard to South Africa, there appears to be a similar scenario now being enacted. As a catch all, I have described this ossification of discursive action as the 'MBA convergence'. Thus in both contexts, separated geographically by some six thousand miles, the re-imagining, or refantasising of good local governance, where 'good' is in some measure, racially inclusive, is limited to that of the 'audit society' in which a transforming democratic accountability is substituted by the technocratic means of neo-managerialist controlled financial accounting systems. The distinction between the development and dominance of this 'orthodoxy' in local governance and previous ones, as outlined in Chapter 11, is that this all embracing 'way of doing things' is politically sanctioned and driven, both as a means of advancing such changes, but also as a means of silencing alternatives. There is a real sense in which the public sector, once an area in which it was legitimate to develop a repository of knowledge and practices which were distinct from the private sector, and which, in terms of its value base, held out the hope of a more democratic accountability to its citizens, is being totalitarianally colonised by that private sector. In South Africa the displacement of the public sector ethos is metal wrenchingly that more louder because radical alternatives to apartheid are sheared off as change options are shoe horned into a limited neo-liberal paradigm. As an example of this phenomenon of globalised reduction, the policy and planning processes in both scenarios of local governance are now limitingly framed within the national governments' sanctioned 'business planning model'. It reinforces the incompatibility between democracy and capitalism which can only be resolved by the absorptive steering of one by the other. Moreover, in both the UK and South Africa there is an official underestimation of the extent to which the subliminal diskourse of 'racial fear', where in each scenario this was, in their own ways, a reaction to the fear of the process of emancipation from racialised communicative forces,
played a key motivating force in initiating and/or accelerating this conflationary, communicative space closing process. Both converge into common strategies of race management which find their expression in the neo-conservative notion of ‘diversity’.

The second has to do with the introduction and development of the term ‘griot’ to describe the role of the equality workers in the sphere of local governance, where the ‘griot’ are interpreters “who mediate the interface between not only colonial, but also reformist anti-colonial, discourses and the people”, and helps generate “generation of a common vocabulary of disputation and concerted action: universal understandings of contestable claims”. This is the antithesis of the elitist notion of leader, whether in its national political context, or, as is now being assiduously developed in the ‘modernising’ debate about the means of control in the public sector, in its neo-managerialist context. It is also different to the attempts to ‘feminise’ the discourse of managerial leadership into the acknowledgement and acceptance of more intuitive ways of ‘leading’. Both examples omit from their perspectives the cardinal emancipative issue of democratised authorial power. In the UK case study, whilst the term ‘griot’ was used in relation to the equality workers, this was in no way a reserved, exclusive role. There were other workers in the organisation, many Black, who, if not by dint of formal job description, but by means of being able to excavate communicative space, managed to play similar roles in pursuit of race equality. This type of activity bears on Beck’s contention that in the individualised society each person has to be responsible for his or her actions consciously, so as to avoid disadvantage, and that the equalities and freedoms which potentially inhere in this individualisation can be realised if there is an orientation towards a solidarity, especially that which emerges from sub- and counter-politics. In Cape Town City council it can be seen that one of the key Black managers, whose experiences throughout the nineties was used as a change tracking device, found himself caught up in comparatively similar circumstances of being a ‘griot’. We can see the flickering development of this in the activities of individuals, all white, in their Town Planning department, who in the eighties’ apartheid years, pursued the normative potential inhering in the consultative requirements of their work, to put on the agenda a more racially inclusive form of local governance. It echoes, as well, in the attempts by the Black training manager to establish a Black women’s group, as a communicative discursive means of overcoming the continuing legacy of apartheid’s racialised conventionalisation. But these are not the preserved activities of the essentialised collective subject, as I have argued. Therefore, perhaps, more importantly, bearing in mind the need for an inclusive modernity’s journey, as opposed to a ‘modernising’ trip, it brings into focus the counter factual role of those in the administration of a discursively democratised local government. The contours of this ‘reflexive’ form of local governance and
administration, one that is racially inclusive, is briefly sketched out in Chapter 7. This stands in contrast to the 'modernised' role being mapped out for the public sector employee which appears to be curtailed to that of being the over audited cipher, as part of the legitimation fodder for national government. Within this 'equality' becomes 'diversity', becomes simply 'good for business'.

The question then is whether or not these escalating social reality correlates of technical learning for dominance prove Habermas' conservative stance when it comes to the issue of transforming democratically the administration, even if this conservatism is one of pragmatism and not principle. After all in both situations, but particularly in the UK, the democratic pursuit of race equality was dislodged from the institution and systemic steering strengthened. The answer to this must be "no". If one examines the paltry resources committed to race equality, the disproportionate impact these had on the institution, and the way in which it took the full weight of the establishment to re-assert the status quo, then within this de- and re-colonising process can be seen emancipative counter factualities. These can be realised by a regeneration and realignment of solidaristic resources, and if a racially inclusive modernity is the aim, 'must' be realised. This stressed obligation gains greater saliency when the 'colonial' paradigm I developed in the course of this work in the nineties, is 'measured' against the playing out of recent global events. My argument is that a globalisation, before it became 'fashionable', has long been part of Black people's experiences because of the time, place and space vectoring forces of racism. This globalisation has found its concrete expression in colonialism, imperialism, forced migrations, and in the learning techniques and technologies sustaining those practices. The 'new' globalisation, new only in the sense that it is now consciously foremost in the Western consciousness, whilst it is triumphantly celebrated, or simply pragmatically acknowledged as 'fact', appears to be not that 'new', but a re-inscription of old globalisations, all of them structured in some way through race. Both pre- and post the 11th September, 2001, commentators on the international politics of the new Labour government have used the term 'colonial' pejoratively to describe the pursuit of a communitarian based vision of a new world order in which the 'moral' is not discursively derived, but imposed – particularly on third world countries. Calling a 'spade' a 'spade, a senior foreign policy adviser to the new Labour government has come out openly in advocating a new colonialism as the answer to ensure world stability. In this "what is needed is a new form of imperialism, one compatible with human rights and cosmopolitan values." Of course this is not new, because such rights in the West have always gone hand in hand with colonial domination. What is being consciously occluded in the re-iteration of a lop sided modernity is the fact that "occidental rationalism also produced the cognitive positions that allows us to take a self-critical attitude towards Eurocentrism."
Internally this modernising modernity is replicated in the government's moralistic interventions on questions of citizenship, refugees and criminality without deliberative recourse to those so affected. This, as I argue, is part of the process of recolonisation. Thus it is that "the geographical and racial lines of oppression and exploitation that were established in the era of colonialism and imperialism have in many respects not declined but increased exponentially." Given that I have argued that this reinscription of domination owes a debt to the technical learning derived from the era of colonialism, it is pertinent to ask, and in so doing also contend, to what extent learning to manage Black people at the level of local governance in the UK, helps inform the new international colonial alignments. At the level of general description, I agree then with Bhattacharyya et al.'s summation of the current state of play vis-à-vis global racism.

"Globalisation has reconfigured social relations and there have been some losers as a result, but whiteness in its new global guise remains powerfully intact. Some of the old codes associated with privilege may have been questioned, (e.g. around language and dress) but many of the mechanisms of white privilege remain." The façade of 'equality' to this 'mechanism of white privilege', often expressed as 'diversity', as a counter legitimating foil to accusations of racism or colonialism, is maintained through the control and closure of communicative spaces and resources. Hardt and Negri voice a similar conclusion when they write that "the imperial machine lives by producing a context of equilibria and/or reducing complexities, pretending to put forward a project of universal citizenship and toward this end intensifying the effectiveness of its intervention over every element of the communicative relationship." (My emphasis) In relation, more pertinently to local governance, a recent UK census of councillors by the successor body to the Local Government Management Board, found that modern councils were "old, white, male, and irrelevant". Its findings showed that the proportion of Black councillors and those with caring responsibilities had fallen, whilst the proportion of white male councillors had increased to 71%. Further the Local Government Association had warned that "even those councils who managed to attract female and ethnic minority councillors have trouble keeping them... (because)... the aggressive nature of politics and the perception that racism and sexism have increased under the new political structures were the culprits." All of this within a context in which the government of the day in the UK, but applicable also in South Africa where similar changes are being pursued, 'public relations' the new, in my opinion de-democratised, local government political structures of streamlined executive committees and elected mayors as improving local democracy, promoting citizenship, and valuing diversity.
However, the question of democratisation and what it means both globally and locally, or locally and globally, should be an inherent and explicit part of any response to the recursive expression of the old anthropohagii. Unacceptable as these new forms of old dominating practices are, it is simply not enough to counter accuse with charges of racism and colonialism, dragging in with these the reprise of the victimed, collective subject. In other words, it is not just a 'white problem'. One cannot strive against conventionalisation by upholding a mirror image conventionalised subject. Thus, for example, whilst the criticism of Zimbabwe by the West contains vestiges of the old colonialism, it is not sufficient to leave those opposing interventions at that level of critique.1261 There are substantive issues of democratisation which have to be addressed within that particular context of despotism in which all of those affected have to participate. Likewise in the UK, colonially crass as the interventions are by the government into the arena of citizenship, race and religion, there are, as well, substantive issues of democratisation, identity and participation which Black communities have to address. These, for example, find expression now in the claims and counter claims around religion and criminality affecting two particular 'communities'.1262 What these speak to, both locally and globally, is a process of post conventionalisation in which the answer to the question of whether or not it will be dominantly incorporative, is still being fought out. In both case studies, in the UK and South Africa, others have referenced their acknowledgement of the problem via a recourse to Habermas, indicative of the need for a recourse to universality, whether on the grounds of principle, or pragmatism in the face of the reality of global interconnectedness. Marais' posing of the problem of the process of defining South African citizenship through Habermas concluded the chapter on South Africa. In the UK a recent extended examination of the future of race concluded, with regard to the issue of politics and representation, but equally I would argue with regard to the other areas it looked at, that there was on the part of national and local governments a "district commissioner" mentality towards Black communities in which there is "the approach of the colonial officer who favours men rather than women, elders rather than the young and tradition rather than development... It offered, as a solution, a Habermassian referenced enriching of democracy as follows:

"Genuine deliberation involves acknowledging the realities of such mistrust and taking conscious steps to reduce it. Democracy is more than just system for organising the election of governments. It is also a theory that all citizens are of intrinsically equal worth and that all should be able to participate in the making of decisions that affect them."

Edifying, as that is, a racially inclusive, non incorporative form of post conventionalisation, linked to a keep-in-the-forefront trans-colonial modernity, requires, as I argue from my theorisation and research, a more radical de- and reconstruction of the conditions for the proper discursive
inclusion of the other. This will need to be built upon a critical research programme, one, as the term ‘critical’ implies, and as this research attempts to do, builds in the political practical intent, but also qualifies it through empirical fallibilism. In particular the following areas can be highlighted:

♦ The contingent collective subject, for which I would still argue the relevance of the term ‘Black’, as a basis for identifying collective unjustly racialised ‘wrongs done to’ and as a discursive resource in the public sphere.

♦ Linked to this the active pursuit of race and gender inclusive procedures, practices and structures in the sphere of governance and the public sector which reinforce the aim of a discursive democratisation, not managerialisation, in the administration, political structures, and in the relationship between the two.

♦ The development, therefore, of subaltern public spheres ‘joining up’ sectors of civil society, academia and activists to explore democratic alternatives to the technicised, auditing accountability of governance being presented as the only way forward.

♦ In a racialised world order, examining the conditions for developing counter discursive solidarity resources as part of the struggle for an inclusive, substantive democratised global governance.

These are modest proposals towards practically realising a deracialised trans-colonial modernity the fleeting radicalness of which is captured in Habermas’ reflections, and to whom the last word is given.

“My reflections point towards the thesis that the unity of reason only remains perceptible in the plurality of its voices – as the possibility in principle of passing from one language to another – a passage that, no matter how occasional, is still comprehensible. This possibility of mutual understanding, which is now guaranteed only procedurally, and is realised only transitorily, forms the background for the existing diversity of those who encounter one another – even when they fail to understand each other.”

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Appendix 1

Response by Race Equality Advisers to First Attempts by Members to Review Equality Structures

RACISM, THE REVIEW AND RACE EQUALITY STRUCTURES IN THE TARGET BOROUGH,

1. Introduction

The seemingly innocuously entitled "Review of Race Equality Advisory Posts" belies the substantial issue of racism and how the target borough, and in particular the majority group, are committed to tackling it. Indeed the review has been constructed on a falsely grounded "objectivity" which has been the hallmark: of white institutional responses to perceived so-called "race problems". Such a review therefore goes beyond a simple administrative exercise, but, instead poses serious questions about this council's intentions on race equality.

This is therefore written as an open response to this initiative—open in the sense of not adhering to the normal local authority protocol practice that operates between officers and members; a protocol which in the context of race equality has often been used to define out of debate questions about racism and majority group polices. It is, therefore, germane to pose a number of questions about the origins of this exercise. Thus:

♦ Why only two and a half years after the establishment of the central race and women's equality units is such a review necessary. (Especially given the fact that the target borough was one of the later boroughs to establish such units)

♦ Why is this taking place at the same time that rumours are circulating about the establishment of an all embracing equality based Equal Opportunity Unit.

♦ Why was this decision taken without reference to the Race Equality Unit, Race Equality Advisers, or, more importantly, Race Relations Committee.

♦ Why has responsibility for the review been placed in the hands of management who are not qualified to handle this?
Why have the arrangements for the review been framed in such a way that minimises the input of the Race Equality Advisers? Why on such a crucial issue of race equality are all and sundry, i.e. people not qualified to comment, being consulted?

The answers in general point to this exercise not being divorced from the wider socio-political context of the British Labour Party political responses to racism and within that the local majority group's stance. On the other hand the answers in particular point to this being a calculated exercise in institutional racism.

2. The wider context of the Labour Party and racism

The Labour Party's response to racism has been late, and in most cases too little, in being formulated. This is despite, or more aptly, because of Britain's colonial and imperial past. Previous Labour governments' records on race equality have been abysmal with the one positive legacy, limited as it is, being the 1976 Race Relation's Act. The parameters of the debate can be characterised by a three point matrix:

- keep the numbers down
- assimilate., or at best appreciate cultural uniqueness
- assuage possible social problems caused by structural inequalities through "race relations" exercises e.g. Urban Aid

These have been and still are the parameters of "acceptable racism" or as has been stated even at the target borough level, "at least the Labour party is less racist than others". Gradations of racism as an option has become part of the Labour political process. But then it is only of late i.e. the mid seventies onwards that "racism" both conceptually and as a political ideology in practice has forced its way into the considerations of the Labour party. Forced insofar as the debate has been set by the struggles of the Black community at the local level (No Saul-on-the-road-to-Damascus-conversion on was this!) Having been forced out of the national political scene post 1979 it is only at the local political level and in inner city urban areas that the Labour Party has been politically active. The struggles of Black: workers against both bosses and the racist responses of the trade unions, the incursion of Black activists into the Labour Party, and, more importantly, the uprisings in the
Black: community have tattooed the problem of racism on to Labour's political agenda.

Whilst it is true that post 1979 has seen the debate about socialism and socialist practice emerge into the open in the Labour party and that this has been reflected in particular at the local authority level, it is the particular political milieu described above which has seen race equality being defined over the past six years or so as a political priority in many inner city local authorities. In so doing the experiences of Black people have been brought into the equation; experiences which are forged daily in the fight against racism. There is a twofold but interconnected, level to this - that of Third world struggles and the way in which Black peoples struggles in the Metropolitan countries have used this as their framework: As such there is a history of radical politics which differs to that of white working class politics. By bringing this into the labour movement Black people have helped re-radicalise its vision of socialism to meet their needs.

The response of the Labour Party on the other hand has been to re-define the problem, to accommodate it within its traditional parameters of race. In essence to attempt to ligature the defining of the problem by Black people and by so doing to try to sanitize the necessary solution.

The latest variant hovers between white academic derived ethnicity - not to mention that amorphous stepchild "the ethnic minority" - and swamping race inequality in a horizontal spectrum of equal value inequalities. Common interests are then prescribed for all through the reductionist and political sophistry of "discrimination". Firstly, ethnicity within this framework promotes a means of articulating the Black presence in a way which does not address the issue of a structural inequality which is systematically maintained. Secondly a broad equality approach provides a neat and superficial attractive means to reconcile the demands of Black: people with traditional, often reactionary interests of the white working class whilst at the same time allowing other interest groups, who might suffer discrimination (but not exploitation) the means to ride the coat tails of Black peoples fight for equality. Thirdly "discrimination" allows the exploitation and oppression of Black people to be reduced simply to one of perceived difference. What is misunderstood, deliberately in some case, is that racial discrimination is but one of the effects of an exploitative racial capitalism; that Black people's struggles against this have a history and dynamic of its own; that the strategies derived from this differ to those arising out of, for example, the disabled, white women, or gay men and lesbians, precisely because the reasons for racial discrimination differ substantively. Finally
in no way can this forced collectivisation of discriminations be justified under the banner of "socialism".

Catchwords as a formulaic response to substantive political issues is a common and lazy failing of the white British left. Thus whilst a full blown discourse on socialism is not appropriate for this issue, if, on the other hand, elements of socialist political practice are to be highlighted, as a justification for this ill thought out move, then the banner cannot be unfurled on the wrong ones, or for that matter, wrong ones that are misconceived as well. If we are to spotlight that which would summarise socialism, then it is that which is about the oppressed and exploited having control over society in a democratic way that satisfies their individual group's collective needs for equality. If therefore such socialist practice effectively denies Black struggles and aspirations, it will be no more than another version of a Militant Tendency type prolet-Aryan solution. In an era of designer socialism what we are seeing is the conventional white male working class struggle being repackaged to bring into the fold on a falsely constructed consensual basis not only Black people and white women, but post-modern liberal "Yuppies", and groups who suffer varying degrees of discrimination but not exploitation. However such an assortment can only voice common interests on the basis of political alliances which recognises the mutual right to differing strategies because of differing needs which derive from particular struggles. This is a far cry from collectivisation on the basis of discrimination. Otherwise the idea of such a misconceived all welcoming equalities approach is a strategy for manipulating and managing Black people; and for ensuring that the international in the Internationale remains skewedly Eurocentric.

3. Local context

It is pertinent therefore to look at the dynamics of race equality structures at the local authority level and in particular the target borough within this... The experiences of race equality advisers, and especially the Black race advisers and workers, are key. These can be charitably be characterised by an inability on the part of the majority group and organisation to come to terms with its broad commitment to race equality and the detailed implications arising out of this. As far is possible Black race workers have sought to define the solution in terms of an anti-racist approach to race equality and which is derived from the political experiences of Black people to racism.

The response from the majority group and the organisation has been to attempt to redefine this into acceptable and unacceptable racism and conversely acceptable and unacceptable strategies; or more pointedly
"good" and "bad niggers". (For Black people however racism like death is indivisible) Key to this response have been the attempts to manage some race workers through behavioural practices bordering on, and, in some cases crossing over into, harassment. Whilst race workers have on the agenda freedom from oppression, the organisational response seems to be acceptably managing oppression. The talk therefore of a broad based equality unit and committee must bows seen as the latest move to control the thrust of race equality by blunting its political edge. Such a move would not only be politically backward, but also institutionally racist. Race inequality would therefore become not only one inequality in a pot-pourri of other "equal value" inequalities, but also, as previous experience has shown, a deprincipled and depoliticised negotiating element. "O.K. I'll trade you good industrial relations for an equalities package sans race equality". Not only will this cut off race equality from Black people's political experiences, it will remove the moral precept of "non-negotiable" which the minimum parameters of social justice demands. On the other hand this could simply be a pre-emptory and cynical move on the part of the majority group to set in motion the process, disguised as this review, to cut back: on the level of resources to race and women's equality in the event of the Labour Party losing the general election. This is not as conspiratorially far fetched as it sounds given that Camden has already prepared document to that effect.

With the run-up to the national election this tendency within the Labour Party will be exacerbated. Oft quoted Kinnock's new realism means just that; a reality void of conflict. Hatches will be battened down. Readily identified excrescences (no McGoldrick's here) lopped off and individual parliamentary careers launched or earmarked. And if the Black vote is delivered, it will have worked. But it will work: only if the mistaken and racist assumption is made that Black people are little children waiting to be led.

An equality unit will be seen therefore for what it is – a cynical and racist attempt to manipulate and manage race equality within a way that is acceptable to white society. The way in which the group and the organisation has gone about it simply confirms this. There must be a serious question mark placed over the ability of white managers to carry out such a review in a way that addresses substantively or furthers the cause of anti-racism; and therefore over the legitimacy of such a review. In fact it has to be seen for what it is – an institutionally racist response to the political struggles of Black people.

4. Race Equality Structures in the target borough

(a) Background
In the target borough Race Equality Advisers have not been "welcomed" into the organisation. Any influence and structural location of significance, significant insofar as it is able to influence decision making in the organisation has had to be bitterly fought for. Prior to the establishment of the Race Equality Unit and additional race worker posts, and apart from the two previous lone Race Adviser posts in Housing and Social Services, the maximum acceptance afforded the issue of race equality was bounded by the Labour Group and senior management's tolerance of it, provided of course it did not threaten their workings. Such a framework therefore generated expectations of not only a race equality strategy subordinate to expediency, but also of race equality workers who would subordinate their experiences of, and expertise on, racism to the pragmatic considerations of members and management. The fact that Race Equality Advisers and workers have not been prepared to mortgage their principles for nothing more than an easy life and regular "pay cheques" has given rise to a situation in which advisers are subject at times to treatment from both members and management which is institutionalised racial harassment. If one posits as a working definition of institutional racism the structures, policies, practices and procedures of an organisation which oppress, exploit, harass and discriminate against Black people, whether intentionally or not, then the behaviour of certain Labour members towards race equality issues -issues which manifesto backed - shows that the fight against institutional racism has to be taken into the Labour group itself. This behaviour has been characterised by a cynical exercise of power which attempts to thwart deliberately the development and pace of race equality in the council. Examples of this over the past three years have been:

- deliberately under-resourcing race equality structures in terms of staff and budgets.

- stalling on implementing policy advice from Race Relations Committee

- deliberately manipulating council structures and procedures, such as council committee meetings to secure decisions which prevent the open discussion of race equality issues.

The effects of such actions against Black workers, who are Race Advisers too, actions which other senior white management are not subject to, constitute clear racial harassment and oppression.

The Labour group seems unable to realise that it cannot cut itself off from the local authority as an institution (if we are addressing the issue of
institutional racism) on the assumption that it is disinfected by its socialist intent, because the group itself is an integral part of that institution.

It is not surprising therefore that the approach from some members, in particular those in the Leadership, Personnel, and Direct Labour committees and management has been characterised by its deliberate lack of imagination. Thus despite the perceived pronouncement about the socialist nirvana, members have been quite content to allow managers to operate under the shibboleth of their "divine right to manage" and in so doing have displayed their own preoccupation with short term issues rather than pursuing the detailed goal of new management structures and practices which the equality priorities demand.

(b) New Management

The concept of "new management" has arisen over the past 5 to 10 years out of the realisation by both relevant higher educational establishments and forward thinking local government practitioners that the nature, role and functions of local government have over the past 10 years plus undergone and are still undergoing a far reaching change. Whilst the reasons for the change are derived from the interplay of national and local states and the economic system, what is important for the purposes of this paper, is the awareness that such changes demand a view form sand content to local government: management. The scope and content is such that books can and are being written about it. Suffice therefore for the purposes of this report to point out that the role, structure and functioning of Race Equality Advisers falls within this paradigm. "New management" as opposed to traditional local government is based on the need to cope with the following realities:

- greater degree of uncertainty
- financial constraints due to :Little or zero growth growing state centralisation
- increasing unemployment and poverty
- greater pressure on the political system from oppressed groups e.g. Black community
- greater politicisation therefore of the local government context
There is, in summary, a new polity in which choices cannot be solved by the easy option of growth, but instead, solutions have to be proffered on the basis of political decisions about the reallocation of existing resources. Nowhere is this more pertinent than to the issue of race equality. Such a management arises out of the realisation that local government is a public sector and NOT market based organisation, and therefore management has to express the values of a local government in a changing environment. These changes cannot be confined to past organisational limits and culture.

Traditional management is incapable of doing this because it is based on the passive politics of consensus grounded as they are in structures geared to hierarchical control through a false universalism of "professional expertise and knowledge". The key operational principles are that of organisational control through hierarchical bureaucracy and therefore fitting problems to a functional framework of thinking. Such an organisation prevents the learning and flexibility necessary to deal with a situation in which there are no clear certainties for local government. The new management is based on ensuring that the agenda is set in terms of the following objectives:

♦ to breach powerful traditional organisational walls
♦ to bypass hierarchies which will or cannot learn
♦ to open up therefore countervailing channels of communication
♦ to treat politics as the policy directive
♦ to recognise therefore the politicisation of the structure
♦ above all that new priorities give rise to new tasks which have to be tackled through new organisational forms..

It is true that the organisation has recognised that there is a problem about management; and that what is necessary has yet to be achieved. However this necessity has not been defined in a way which seeks a continuity between organisational change and the long term objective of local socialism; but rather has been framed in a reactive way which seeks a quick short term solution to the problem of electoral popularity in a period of government led criticisms. It is not surprising therefore that the reaction to the recent Audit Commission report on local authorities has been such that it accommodated rather than confronted Tory ideology. If the prescription for management is therefore being sought
through an American based study of dubious intellectual pedigree. "In Search of Excellence" is an American book which arose out of a survey of the most successful firms in America; and what exactly contributed to their success. (These included MacDonalds and Disneyworld!) The fact that solutions are being sought through Reaganite management is lamentable. The fact that the conclusion of the book-which incidentally is characterised by its complete lack of reference to equality, equal-opportunities, Black people and women- is that the most successful companies are those whose management practices come, closest to the Japanese, should be worrying. (Unless "working for the community" now means obtaining such a common goal through an imposed consensus, neo-fascist mentality and all.) Marks and Spencers and MacDonalds might be good at a cleverly designed marketing of their wares, but this is at the cost of an industrial relationship in which unions are non existent and in which organisational norms are generated and maintained through an authoritarian paternalism. Take us to your Leader post industrial action assumes a new meaning altogether. This is a dangerous shortcut. The target borough is not only a public sector authority, it also supposed to be a socialist led one. Solutions to problems, even management ones, have to be defined in those terms. It is cheap sophistry to try to dismiss this as impracticable on they basis of a comic book, anarcho-syndicalist style.

It is within the context of new management that the Race Equality Unit has sought to establish and redirect the race equality structures in the council. In other words not as some alien entity grafted on to the body local government, but as the precursor to the new organisational forms and managerial content necessary to meet the council's priority of race equality. The marginalising and racist actions which have greeted these attempts at restructuring, speak not only volumes for the superficiality of members' and management's commitment to race equality, but also about the crude racist assumptions made about the reasons for advisers pushing such restructuring. These assumptions have been based on not wanting to engage with the issue in a substantive political way, but instead have reduced the issue to that of personality traits of individual advisers - a variation on the " uppity-nigger - with-the-chip-on – the shoulder" syndrome. Perhaps that is because there is the subliminal premise that Black people are incapable of rationalising their demands in the fight against racism in a way which not only addresses the political agenda of socialism, but also the specific context of local government in Britain today.

(c:) Basis to race structures
The key features to the race equality structures can be summarised as follow:

- All race equality workers to have a crucial catalytic role for race equality change
- Race advisers to have direct access to members
- Race workers (other than Advisers) to have a direct managerial link: to the highest point of management and direct access to DMTs
- Race equality workers to determine their work priorities
- The Race Unit to have a co-ordinating link: with race workers

These have been done with the following objectives in mind:

- Race Advisers achieving a critical/independent role to management
- Race advisers being able to bypass blockages
- Race workers being able together to articulate a political strategy to race equality in the council which is based on the political aspirations of the Black community
- To be able to scrutinise every aspect of the organisation's functioning
- To be able to advise accordingly
- To ensure the organisation delivers
- To secure therefore the political priority of race through the necessary structural, procedural and policy changes
- To bring into the decision making process therefore a politically articulated Black presence

In the absence of any precedence such structures have given rise to post holders needing a range, and level of skills and to carrying out a range of tasks which are unmatched in any other posts. The actual problem of the development of race equality structures has been recognised by those in the field i.e. the DAMN race workers themselves. Work has been done by Race Equality Advisers across the county (and in which The target borough was formally represented) together with the Local Government Training Board on this issue. Quote "the role will need to be developed
by the post holder according to her or his experience and the issues, and context analysed. This is to be expected in a changing environment in which such posts are by their nature developmental. It is a pity therefore, that some members wish to curtail deliberately that development because of the expediency of short term political interests which are to do with the advantage of placating a largely white electorate and trade union set up. The decisions that have been prematurely and racistically put about race equality structures have been done in a way which will elicit a response likely to regress the advances so far made. It is likely that the council will end up with race equality structures and a level of resources so low that it is bound to fail and achieve nothing more than a flag wave in the gestural politics of the Labour group. This will be a new neo-colonial set up designed to manage and assuage the demands of Black people. The irony of the situation is that those who trumpet the left wing cause of the group - the guardians of the socialist conscience - have, on this issue, done so in a way which places them in an unholy alliance with the real-politik moderate activists. Both call for to broad based equalities approach; both have devised a strategy which will not empower Black people, but manage them.

5. The Way Forward (See Appendix for further details)

The structure and terms of reference of the review effectively prevent an open and honest assessment of the best means to strengthen the race equality structures in the council. If race equality at the local authority level is about redirecting resources to the Black community then the organisational changes initiated to secure the above have to be done on the basis of a clearly thought out anti-racist strategy and not, as is the case now, on the basis of either an ad hoc adaptive response to national government initiatives or as a basis to securing localised coalitions of power in the Labour group. THESE ARE BLACK PEOPLES LIVES THE ORGANISATION IS PLAYING WITH.

For the purpose therefore of strengthening the race equality structures in the council immediate action should be (indeed as advised it should have been taken a long time ago) taken in the following areas:

♦ Making Race Relations Committee a full subcommittee of Policy and Resources with the equivalent powers of Personnel Subcommittee
♦ Increasing the executive powers of Race Relations Committee by
  - allocating a budget sufficient to initiate action
  - expanding its terms of reference to include powers to demand reports from departments and to summon Chief Officers to account
♦ Strengthening and increasing the level of Race Advisers in the council; as advised

♦ Strengthening and increasing the level of Race workers in the council as advised.

♦ Allocating initiatory budgets for all race workers

♦ Member led backing for race initiatives and staff which create a framework for trip non harassment of such workers..

♦ Reaffirmation of race and women's equality as THE equality priorities

It is within this framework that a review should be mounted; with consultation targeted on existing race workers, Black employees and the Black community. RACE EQUALITY WAS PUT ON THE AGENDA OF THE COUNCIL BY BLACK PEOPLES’ STRUGGLES: IT ISN'T THE LABOUR GROUP'S OR MANAGEMENT'S RIGHT TO TAKE IT OFF.

(This report has the support and help of other- Race Advisers in the council.
3rd February, 1987.)
Appendix 2

Key Memoranda from Equality Advisers to Labour Members on Equal Opportunities Working Party

1. “We have made it clear to members in the past that we consider it essential to establish a broad based equal opportunities forum. The experience of other Councils, notably the G.L.C. has been that such a group is vital to the development of equal opportunities. We have proposed that such a body should consist of representatives from the Trade Unions, equality workers and representatives from the departmental black staff forums and women's groups. We therefore wish to re-state our advice that such a broad based group, which should be a non-negotiating body, is essential if the Council's commitment to equality is to be effectively put into practice. Such a body is essential to develop a co-ordinated approach to equal opportunities. The constitution of the present working party effectively silences the equality workers. We are not prepared to service a body at which we have no representation and therefore no right to speak. We have not even been formally notified of the working party's existence, its terms of reference or matters discussed so far. We consider that the limited composition of the equal opportunities working party, can only serve to confuse the development of equality policies and practices. It is not clear to us what the status of the new group is and how it relates to the established committee structure or existing trade union negotiating machinery.”

2. “There are however a number of crucial points arising out of the meeting of the E.O.W.P. on the 4th March, which need to be considered within the context of this council's own political commitment to race equality.
1) Questionnaire 1 do not agree that the question on race should be shifted to the penultimate slot. The point isn't simply to elicit the information; of equal importance is the way in which it is done. As pointed out in our report on monitoring the questionnaire should reflect the Council's priorities i.e. race and gender. It doesn't help therefore if key members publicly confirm to certain unions apparatchiks their prejudices that in
their minds race, and for that matter race equality, is a controversial question. I must advise therefore that the position of the question must remain as set out in the draft questionnaire. In tackling racism the council cannot afford to operate on the basis of hidden agenda for to do so would be compound the politics of institutional racism. Strategically therefore the continual holding up of a certain Conservative borough's E.O. practices as good practice by some members is not conducive to arriving at that which would be regarded as appropriate for The target borough The equal opportunity strategies of that borough reflect very much the political context in which those strategies now have to be developed. As a Labour authority, and therefore presumably in terms of Socialist political practice, the experiences of other Labour authorities in this area are of more relevance; if it is felt necessary to hold up good models of Equal Opportunities Policies and Practices.

2) Priorities: In ensuring that the Equal Opportunities Working Party works properly as originally advised, members will need to remember that they ultimately are responsible for the successful implementation of the Council's race equality strategy. Within a forum such as the E.O.W.P. members will need to play a leading role in determining the pace and outcome of the business of such meetings. This will depend upon, however, the following:

♦ members having a clear idea about the priorities in terms of race equality and women's equality.
♦ members having a clear idea about the strategies being developed to achieve these.
♦ members having a clear commitment to a timetable and target dates therein for achieving these objectives.

This would be a far better framework within which to assess and respond to ad hoc proposal that came from unions at such meetings. The race equality advisers and the R.E.U. are already working within such a framework, the back bone of which is the report on the CRE Code of Practice. It does help prevent a keen jerk response to union requests for reports etc. Where such reports are necessary, these should therefore be the clear responsibility of the Personnel Department. Where such reports have or demand a clear race equality dimension, the race equality advisers will have a strategic role in advising the
Personnel Department on achieving that: but not in actually doing all of it, lock stock and barrel.”
Appendix 3

Response from Target Borough’s NALGO Black Workers Group to Council’s ‘Excellence’ Initiative

RUMOURS OF EXCELLENCE

Local authorities are under attack in a way which threatens to eliminate the politics of local choice which government at this level is, or at least should be, all about. Self proclaimed socialist councils operate therefore under a twofold tension: that generated from external pressures, and that generated from what should be the principled action which the logic of their political commitment dictates. What is one therefore to say of such "principles" or "logic" or "commitment", let alone "politics" when, having diagnosed a problem of "management" the solution is sought in what amounts to a valedictory song for American multinational capitalism. Perhaps that it is the same old story of the Labour Party reeling under the blows of the right-wing shadow boxing, seeking desperately to accommodate the ideological hot air of "loony left" and the audit commission rather than confronting these in a way which seeks a continuity between socialist principles and socialist practice. However such an abrogation of political responsibility by Labour councillors means that it is us as workers who have to pick up the tab; because it is precisely us who will bear the brunt of this attempt to foist American style big private corporation management practices on the workforce.

So what exactly does this entail? Well it goes under the name of "In Search of Excellence", and it is a book done by two American management consultants. The book itself was based on a survey into the twelve most successful companies in America in an attempt to distil the key reasons for that success. A basic framework of concepts was used to diagnose an effective organisation and which-surprise! surprise! - was later uncritically used lock, stock and cliches by the Audit Commission. At a general level apart from elevating the commonplace and trite into "grand theory" the book is marked by its complete lack of reference to- and I'll put it in alphabetical order-affirmative action, Afro-American, Black people, equality, equal opportunities, race discrimination, sex discrimination, trade unions and women.

The question then is what is all the fuss about? Well these are given below. They represent the eight crucial attributes of excellent
companies. Or in sum "excellent corporations are characterised by having organisational cultures which carry and sustain sets of ideas and values necessary for excellence". One should ask therefore at this stage "Which are these excellent companies?" and "What is the evidence of their excellence?"

**Contextualising excellence**

The companies looked at included the following: Bechtel, Boeing, Caterpillar tractor, Dana, Delta Airlines, Digital Equipment, Emerson Electric, Fluor, Hewlett and Packard, IBM, Johnson and Johnson, MacDonalds

These companies share another common characteristic-apart that is from making bucks and more bucks-and that is that they are all multinationals. Excellence therefore shines out in a world economy facing its gravest economic crisis since the 1930's because such global corporations are able to shift capital resources rapidly around the globe, cut workforces while increasing output and not worry about the effects on workers consumers and others. Excellence has another side to it; the end product of those eight attributes. For example such organisations are almost unfettered by national law and countries can be chosen which offer the greatest advantages. More often than not these are Third World countries offering the advantages of a large female workforce and/or corrupt regime to keep labour in check. Above all such corporations use their mobility and international production lines to weaken national union action through:

- transferring production overseas
- threatening to move to countries with lower labour costs and a more controlled workforce
- dividing workforces in different countries
- discouraging the formation of unions in the workplace

Post industrial action therefore "In Search of Excellence" seems to be -but then perhaps that is giving the kitchen cabinet more nous than they deserve.(A reference here to council wide strike in 1987 in support of housing workers.)

If excellence goes in search of low wages and lax controls here are a few examples of how some of the listed corporations hit the news recently.

**IBM**

--- eighth largest U.S. based operation in South Africa. Even the much publicised disinvestment is no more than a sellout to the local management and in which the new company will still sell IBM wares.
placed an order through a Hong Kong firm for factories in Malaysia, then cancelled leaving both out of pocket and jobs

a major company in Guatamala where the military liquidation of trade unionists ensures a quiescent workforce
cited as being responsible for a major leak of poisonous chemicals in Silicon Valley California. In Silicon Valley 80-90% of operative and labour jobs are done by women of whom 45-50% are of Hispanic and Asian origin.

Digital Equipment

World's third largest computer manufacturer. Pushes Japanese management techniques in far east plants. Workers condemn this as attempt to divide and manipulate workforce.

Caterpillar Tractors

Plants in Scotland(1) and U.S.(2) shut down with the loss of 3000 jobs. International Metalworkers Federation condemns management incompetence

Bechtel

Overcharges South Korean government for construction of nuclear power stations by 6000,000 dollars

Construction projects in Indonesia using migrant workers but only after they were screened for trouble makers. In subsequent dispute allowed military to intervene against workers. Now laying off workers.

Boeing

forces contract which increase wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers. At same time leaked memo from U.S. Air Force Secretary says that government will make every effort to ensure that they do not pay negotiated wage settlements to weapons producers

Hewlett and Packard

In 85 closes all U.S. plants to cope with slack. In Singapore offers workers up to 6 months unpaid leave to avoid cutbacks. At the same time company wide 10% pay cut implemented

Silicone Valley producer.

The list of corporation practices on a day to day basis can go on. "Excellence" and its total irrelevance to a socialist led public sector authority can best be shown by a more detailed look at what has been described as the archetypal "In Search of Excellence" corporation-IBM.

IBM

IBM has a workforce of 405,000 and a reputation for virulent anti unionism. Its philosophy which is simple, almost naive, but which also has something of a cult status has according to a multinational
trade union study severe negative consequences for its workforce. The three basic tenets to this are
- respect for the individual
- service of the highest standard to the customer
- the attainment of excellence as the way of life

Sound familiar?

In reality as one IBM worker put it "You have to give up a little of yourself when you come in here". In other words a narrow conformity to the corporate philosophy. But then it is made clear that any worker who violates the company's ethics will be discharged regardless of position or longevity. It is a corporate culture close to the Japanese model. IBM argue that the absence of a trade union signifies worker satisfaction with the company. However wage levels are treated as a company secret so it is difficult to determine whether or not IBM pay above the going rate. Richard Hudson found this out to his cost. He was an employee for 17 years with IBM and an activist in the US IBM Black Workers Alliance. He was dismissed in 1983 for distributing confidential IBM wage guideline documents in an attempt to prove that IBM was discriminating against Black employees. There is no collective method of pay determination in IBM.

IBM claim to have a full employment philosophy. In practice this is not working out what with a vacancy freeze, retirement incentive schemes and the doing away of subcontracted labour.

IBM operate an appraisal scheme which has been described by IBM Workers United thus: "the whole point of the appraisal system is to set the tone that is intimidating, degrading, and that makes us fearful and indebted to IBM. It is made clear that if we want a good appraisal we had better play the game............when the company wants something from us IBM talks teamwork and co-operation, but when we want something then its one-to-one in the privacy of the office". Internally vacancies are not advertised but are filled through promotion based on lists of suitable people drawn up by management. Employees in IBM do not have any form of collective representation and therefore no negotiated procedures for handling grievances. Personnel policies involve close monitoring of employees, As one employee put it"... Lunch breaks are 42 minutes exactly...they are sticky about filling out time sheets and checking without written notice..."(So why all of a sudden has our own Chief Executive taken to playing the flying flexitime monitor?) Finally IBM says it is committed to an international set of principles that foster the highest standards of business conduct in each country that it has business in. The practice is different, since a number of its industrial relation practices are not in conformity with the minimum provisions of the OECD guidelines and ILO declaration on
multinational companies. As a one time corporate personnel executive put it "It was clear from the day I arrived that being union free was one of IBM's objectives." The Black Workers Alliance of IBM employees has waged a long battle against IBM's mistreatment of Black IBM workers in wages and promotions. (Perhaps that is why there is no mention of equal opportunities in the search for excellence). One of their key fights is against the company practice of "involuntary attrition" which during recession times means that Black workers are more likely to be fired than whites. This then is the concrete reality of the management and industrial relation actions arising out the eight attributes identified in "In Search of Excellence." If one strips the hype away from the rusty glove lying underneath then what is left is a management philosophy that is anti worker organisations, anti Black and women, crypto fascistly paternalistic and a good flag wave for Ronnie and Maggie's new industrial order. BUT WHAT THE HELL IS IT DOING ON THE AGENDA OF A SOCIALIST LED PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANISATION?
Appendix 4

Responses from Equality Advisers to Labour Members’ Attempts to Curtail the Equality Initiative

“Race Equality Advisers’ response to ‘Major Achievements in Equal Opportunities.’

1.0 Introduction.
1.1 As Race Equality Advisers employed to provide advice on the best means to achieve the target borough Labour Party's Manifesto bound commitment to race equality, we wish to express our profound dismay and revulsion at a travesty of a report entitled "Major Achievements in Equal Opportunities" and circulated by Cllr. “X”. It is a pity therefore that none of the equality advisers were consulted either before or after the report was completed. Indeed it is only by accident that one of the equality advisers obtained a copy of the report a week after it had been circulated to the Labour Group and Party. Given the acute implications this report has for the further development and achievement of race equality the Council and the fact that information was formally sought from departments it would be disingenuous not to conclude that the omission of the equality advisers was deliberate. This stands in stark contrast to the claims of Cllr. “X” in the latest edition "Briefing" (internal council employee journal) that he would consult openly with the staff about the financial crisis and the way forward.

1.2 The recommendations of the report rest on an inaccurate and racist misuse of information on equality initiatives in the Council; and above all a misconception of race equality within the context of local government. Comments in detail are therefore provided below and these are in two parts.

♦ on the falsely constructed assumptions to the report
♦ on the specific resource details of the report

2.0 False Assumptions:
There are four key assumptions implicit in the report. These are:
♦ that there have been major achievements on equal opportunities in the target borough
♦ that local government is simply about providing services
♦ that race equality at the local government level is just about counting Black "bums" on office seats and Black faces at public counter desks
that "loony left" equal race equality, therefore why not bury it.

2.1 Major Achievements in Equal Opportunities.
All the race equality advisers and race equality specialist workers are agreed that there have been some achievement in this area since the inception of a strategic and co-ordinated working about three years ago. But it is certainly not a situation about which it can be said that major achievements have occurred. There are four benchmarks against which such a judgement is made:
(i) Feedback from Black employees in the Council and Black Groups outside indicate a high degree of dissatisfaction with the claims the Council makes on race equality - like Cllr. "X"'s report does - and the actual reality.
(ii) We are talking about trying over the past four years to change an institution to meet the needs of the Black community. An institution which has behind it over a century of evolved tradition based on not even recognising race as an issue, In other words the work had only just begun.
(iii) Other inner London local authorities and some outer ones have achieved more because the political will has been there to ensure that there is a greater level of race equality resources and that the resultant race equality changes are implemented. The same cannot be said of the target borough.
(iv) Finally the experience of both the Race and Women's Equality Advisers to date has been such that the achievements in the target borough cannot be described as "major."

2.2 Simply the provision of services?
(i) To hold that local government is solely about providing services and, inter alia, the better our services the longer "we stay in power strategy" is to give credence to the notion that these services are commodities which can be bought off the shelf. It is to capitulate to privatisation before the cash till is rung up. Local government is much more than that. It is about how people at the local level exercise their choice of politics. On the race equality front it is about how Black people at the local level can have a determinant say in the allocation and reallocation of resources which have a material effect on their everyday lives.

To put race equality on the agenda of the local authority is to say that the issue of power is going to be addressed - the power that gives rise to institutional racism. Solutions to this have to be collectivist based on an analysis of group needs, like the Black community's. This is quite distinct from the private sector individual orientated consumerist approach. We cannot run a
public sector, socialist led organization like a private firm. So for example 30% Black children in care is not a cause for celebration of intentional spending on race equality. That is the type of logic which would argue that Black people get a good deal out of the immigration service or that Jewish people got a good deal out of the Third Reich because of all the money spent on the concentration camps. Inter alia it means that the organization and management of this is not neutral, but subject to change, that is if it is to bring into the fold of its decision making mechanisms the wealth of differing experiences - like the Black community's - in the wider community. After all if a management is "neutral" or simply about "doing things" then the greatest feat of management was processing the twelve to eighteen million Jews and other nationals through the gas chambers over a five year period: Likewise the management practices which have made the top American multinationals so rapaciously successful especially on the backs of Black people in 3rd world counties- like the anti-trade union IBM - are those out of which "In Search of Excellence" is distilled and which have now landed on our door step under the guise of "Public Service Orientation."

(ii) To get back then to Black Children in Care, a 30% figures should be a loud warning indicator that Black people are actually getting a disservice here. Remedial action would therefore require a review of that particular service from first contact with the Black family to release from care of the particular child but within the framework which involves Black groups, Black Social and residential workers, relevant management and race equality workers in the review, policy changes, resource decisions and monitoring of the remedial plan, The key objective to the remedial plan would be to reduce the proportion of Black children in care and to ensure that currently resources allocated to maintain a 30%/ proportion of Black children in care are used with a maximum level of Black participation over its use to keep Black children out of care. This type of action would qualify as intentional spending on race equality.

2.3 Is race equality at the local government level just about counting Black "bums" on office seats and Black faces at counter desks?

To a large extent the answer to the above question has already been provided in the preceding section on services. Nevertheless it is necessary to state that it is simplistic nonsense to assume that because x% of employees are Black and y% of service consumers
Black that therefore The target borough has achieved race equality. It is the type of specious, reasoning which gives rise to the statement in the report that; "The Race Relations Committee and Women's Committee have established specialist units to work towards the needs of women and Black people both as employees and in the community." This is not only wrong, it is a totally marginalising concept of race equality in which the Race Relations Committee and Unit become a "stuck on" Bantustan entity which will "meet the needs of the Black community." It is the type of logic which at another level could treat race equality as a luxury. Firstly both the Committee and Unit have been created because of the local Labour party manifesto commitment; and secondly the work of both are directed towards changing the rest of the Council so that the Council can meet the needs of the Black community. Race Equality at the local government level in inner city areas is about restructuring local authorities to meet the need of the Black community on the bases that if the Black community's needs are not being met it is more than likely that the white disadvantaged sectors of the community are not being met either. Race Equality quintessentially then is about redirecting resources equitably to the Black community and at the same time about the democratic control over that process which in itself builds on the limits of representative democracy vis-a-vis the Black community by increasing the level of Black participation in and access to decision making. This task has only just begun - especially if we put the hundred years plus of municipal government against the three years of overt recognition of race equality as priority and the pitiful resources allocated to race equality structure against the overall budget of the Council. There is no justification therefore for the smug conclusion that a lot has been spent on race equality and that therefore there should be no further growth. Likewise it is a short sighted and culpable underestimation of the problem of achieving race equality at the local government level to trumpet continually that "we have all the policies, all that is required now is the implementation." One is yet to hear that said about any other area of Council's responsibilities. The question then is why it is possible to conceive of a problem of community participation and resource control and come up with the solutions like decentralisation and yet when the same problems are posed in relation to the Black community it suddenly becomes a question of too much extra resources and/or electoral liability.
2.4 The assumption that "loony left" equals race equality, therefore why not bury it.

Paragraph 3.4. of Cllr. "X"'s paper is telling in way it illustrates how the Labour Party has not sought to engage with the right wing propaganda of "loony left," but has colluded with it. In fact the paragraph is triple coded. Firstly and secondly it talks about the London Effect: and one does not have to articulate it to know that London Effect = Loony left = stage managed anti-racism "white backlash." Thirdly the paragraph is left hanging there in the paper completely out of context, but inviting readers to draw their own conclusion about how to get back the "traditional Labour voter." This is a collusion with racism. It is also a collusion based on a mythologising of traditions past; perhaps the workerist post modernist version of the Yuppies stripped pine furniture. This is 1987 - not 1945. Attempting to set the clock back by recreating an upmarket image of the Council as a provider of municipal services is to play straight into the hands of the racist right. Within the context of the paper it gives credence to the lie that high rates = expenditure on "politically extremist" race equality. There is a way of engaging with this sort of right wing propaganda that builds on the forward looking basis to socialism and which does not compromise the principles of the manifesto bound commitment to race equality. That requires a carefully thought out strategy involving those at whom the equality initiatives are aimed. Cllr. "X"'s paper does not do that."
Appendix 5

Race Equality Unit's Briefing Paper to Members on the Incompatibilities between the Race Equality Service Initiatives and those Promoted by the Council under the PSO Initiative

1. Background to changes in local government
   (i) Local government over the past 15 years has and is undergoing profound changes. Detailed reasons for this lie in interplay of factors effecting national, local states and the economic system but which nevertheless can be crudely reduced to two key characteristics.
   * Growing politicisation of local government
   * Growing centralisation arising out of attacks on local government by national government.
   (ii) One commentator has seen this as giving rise to a move away from the bureaucratic paternalistic model of local government to three new basic models which are set out schematically below.1267
(iii) It is clear that the politicisation of local government is no more than that of attempts to reconstitute this level of government as one that is about democracy and local choice and control over resources. It is certainly within this framework that the problems of race and women's inequality have been tackled. That is, if one can attempt to summarise these initiatives in one sentence, to try to restructure the power relationships in local government in a way which allows Black people and women a determinant say in the control of resource usage to meet their needs. Certainly solutions to race and women's inequality have not been seen in terms simply of being an administratively technically one in which management is somehow "neutral". Instead "means" and "ends" have been seen as part of a process of change; a process that is rooted in the key values of socialism, democracy, the public sector and community needs.

(iv) The attacks on local government in inner city areas from government, the media and those misled by the media have threatened these initiatives not directly, but because local Labour groups are wavering in deciding the best "means" to achieve an "end" of electoral viability. There are, therefore, two basic ways forward:

* to push ahead with race and women's equality as a priority and the necessary change process. This will include tackling the "loony left" propaganda.

or

* to go for an administrative solution to achieve a perceived end of staying in power and which means that the thrust of race and women's equality work is played down.

(v) It seems clear now that The target borough with its uncritical steamrollering of "In Search of Excellence" as a management ideology and "Public Service Orientation" as a strategy for improving the image of the Council as a good provider of services has adopted the latter.

2. Background to Public Service Orientation.

(i) PSO is being treated as a new revelatory means to improve the Council's stock with the electorate. Yet the fundamental basis to race and women's equality work on services has covered the very same areas, but in a way that is substantively more in tune with a
socialist led borough than the version of PSO currently being bought in. In the target borough the baseline to work on services by the equality advisers has been the working principle that if the needs of Black people and women are not being met, then it is more than likely that the needs of other white disadvantaged sectors of the community are not either. In other words such work is the foundation of good service provision across the Council. Such work is based on meeting group needs and collectivist solutions to problems which build on greater democratization of local government.

(ii) This stands in contrast to the current version of PSO which is being so assiduously pursued in the Council. These are the problems:

(a) It derives its central tenets from "In Search of Excellence". The latter is a book done by two American consultants, the content of which derives from a survey on the reasons for the success of America's top multinationals.

A basic framework of concepts was used to diagnose an effective organisation and which - surprise: surprise: - was later uncritically used lock, stock and cliches by the audit commission. At a general level apart from elevating the commonplace and trite into "grand theory" the book is marked by its complete lack of reference to - and I’ll repeat it in alphabetical order - affirmative action, Afro-American, Black people, equality, equal opportunities, race discrimination, sex discrimination, trade unions and women.

Eight, basic attributes were arrived at, which characterised excellent companies and which in turn the authors found to mirror closely Japanese management philosophy. The companies looked at included the following: Bechtel, Boeing, Caterpillar tractor, Dana, Delta Airlines, Digital Equipment, Emerson Electirc, Fluor, Hewlett and Packard IBM Johnson and Johnson, MacDonalds. Most are multinationals which have maintained their "excellence" on the backs of Black people in Third World countries. More tellingly the activities of Caterpillar in Scotland are examples of excellence. Much research has been done into companies, like IBM, by Labour organisations and trade unions. The following has been revealed:

♦ its corporate values are very close to "In Search of Excellence"
♦ it is virulently anti-trade union
♦ its management style is authoritarianly paternalistic
Evidence suggests it discriminates against Black employees in terms of pay, promotions and who gets laid off in times of recession (there is a Black Workers Alliance of IBM employees).

The list of malpractices goes on. In sum however, this is not the type of management ideology which public sector organisations should be adopting.

(b) It gives rise to a private sector model of service provision - the consumerist model. This builds on bridging the gap between public and service provider but assumes that existing forms of organisation and management largely remain. However whilst good communication is essential to service provision this type of model:
- does not address the issue of power
- assumes that public sector consumers have the same power to change as private consumers
- cannot, cope with the needs of groups of consumers

This is in stark contrast to what race and women equality is about at the local government level.

3. Background to PSO in The target borough

There are a number of problems associated with the way in which this has come about in The target borough. These are:
(a) it is being used as a means to secure electoral victory at the next local elections at the same time that attempts are being made to curb race and women's equality initiatives.
(b) it ignores and treats as separate the work on service initiated through Race and Women's committees and which is a better and more relevant model.
(c) not surprisingly the equality advisers have been deliberately bypassed in the discussions surrounding the introduction of this version of PSO into the Council.
(d) plans - for which there are no papers but have involved the Leader, C.E., CPO and CTO - are being implemented to train all middle managers in PSO. Again equality advisers have been excluded. This will be a massive drain on training resources and will detract from the existing policies on race and women's equality training, and anti-racist action plans. There is the assumption that training equals change. Already evidence is emerging of managers using this "commitment to public services" in a way that is detrimental to equal opportunities.
(e) attempts by the Race Unit to get Departments to merge the work they are doing on PSO with the work they should be doing on the service component to their Departmental Anti-Racist Programmes, have shown that Departments are treating these as separate activities and in some cases are claiming they do not have the resources to do the action plan.

(f) to summarise, therefore, it appears that, this "brave new" PSO is going to marginalise further race and women's equality initiatives.

4. Way forward

Improving services has never been in question; but just as there is an issue of democracy and trade unions we would not adopt the Tebbit solution. There appear to be two basic options:

* to scrap the current PSO initiatives and start again

or

* more realistically if failing that to ensure that Race and Women's Committee have a determinant role in the direction and content of such initiatives which builds on the current race and women's equality work on services.
Appendix 6
Hierarchy of Employees in Target Borough in 1985

Principal Officer and above:
White: 776
Black: 52

Below Principal Officer:
White: 2653
Black: 430

Manual and Craft Workers:
White: 3697
Black: 717
Appendix 7

Interviews Conducted

Target Borough

For the 'target borough', these are interviews conducted over and above the information gleaned whilst the primary researcher was actually working for that local authority.

Ex-Race Equality Workers, including Advisers X 5
Ex-Women's Equality Advisers X 2
Black managers X 4
Race equality workers in four other boroughs, both current and ex X 5
Voluntary sector activists in target borough X 4
Councillors from three boroughs X 3

Cape Town

Mayors X 2
Alderman X 1
Chief Executive/Town Clerk X 1
Head of Human Resources X 2
Community Consultants X 3
Civic Organisations X 3
Trade Union X 1
Management consultant X 1
Black managers X 3
Affirmative Action Officer X 1
Academics X 3
Local Government specific NGO X 1
Appendix 8

**Key to Main Abbreviations Used**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APO</td>
<td>African Peoples Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBOS</td>
<td>Black-bums-on-seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCM</td>
<td>Black Consciousness Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BFN</td>
<td>Between Facts and Norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPF</td>
<td>Black Peoples Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAD</td>
<td>Coloured Affairs Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLU</td>
<td>Community Liaison Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSATU</td>
<td>Congress of South African Trades Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPSA</td>
<td>Communist Party of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Community relations Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRE</td>
<td>Commission for Race equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTCC</td>
<td>Cape Town City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLO</td>
<td>Direct Labour Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEAR</td>
<td>Growth, Employment and Redistribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLC</td>
<td>Greater London Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILEA</td>
<td>Inner London Education Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>LBMB</td>
<td>Local Government Management Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGTB</td>
<td>Local Government Training Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MERGE</td>
<td>Macro-Economic Research Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NALGO</td>
<td>National Association of Local Government Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEUM</td>
<td>Non European Unity Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NF</td>
<td>National Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLL</td>
<td>National Liberation League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pF</td>
<td>Post Fordism, or Post Fordist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREA</td>
<td>Principal Race Equality Adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWEA</td>
<td>Principal Women's Equality Adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REA</td>
<td>Race Equality Adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REU</td>
<td>Race Equality Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSC</td>
<td>Regional Services Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACP</td>
<td>South African Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAMWU</td>
<td>South African Municipal Workers Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANCO</td>
<td>South African National Civic Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCA</td>
<td>Theory of Communicative Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>United Democratic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>United Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Women's Equality Unit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
WYSIWYG

What-you-see-is-what-you-get
NOTES

Notes on the ‘Introduction’, pages 1-16

1 A tongue in cheek term used by Habermas to describe collectively the phalanx of post-modernist theorists. J. Habermas, Post-Metaphysical Thinking (1992) Polity Press.


3 Adams, (1981)

4 A reworking of the question posed in White, S., The Recent Work of Jurgen Habermas, Cambridge University Press, (1988), pg. 154. White, follows Habermas in conceiving of these differences solely in terms of culture and without, apparently, giving proper weight to the way in which differences are constructed through distorting communicative forces, like racism, and thus also to the way in which the background lifeworld can become over colonised.


6 “Black” is used throughout this research in its widest political sense as a signifier of those who experience racism but from which cannot be presumed the way such people describe their cultural identity. I want to go further however and say that the use of the term "Black" by a person should be both a signifier of those who experience racism because of perceived differences of colour, and of potential heterogeneity. It is thus an invitation to engage in inclusive communicative discourse and not presume a definite identity. For example in one local authority there is a person originally from Southern Italy, who, because of her experiences as an identifiable “not white” person in the organisation defined herself as Black and was accepted by the Black Workers Group.


9 J. Habermas, Autonomy and Solidarity, (1986) Verso, pg 143

10 Situating The Self, Introduction, pg. 5

11 "Interview with J. Habermas". Interviewed by D. Horster and W. van Reijen. New German Critique 18 (Fall 1979)


13 TCA, Chapter VI, (2)

14 TCA, Chapter, VI, (1)

15 TCA, Chapter VI, (1)

16 Post-Metaphysical Thinking, Chapter 6


Term coined by Primo Levi to describe those who became totally subjected in the camps.


*Situating The Self*, Introduction, pg. 14


*Situating the Self*, Introduction, pg. 16

The Southall Black Sisters is a voluntary organisation comprised of Asian women who define themselves as Black, and which works to support women caught in the 'contentious' areas of black Asian life in Britain, such as arranged marriages, domestic violence, etc.

Guardian article on the ethnic apartheiding of an American university's dormitories - one for African Americans, one for Hispanics etc. March, 1994


Notes on Chapter 1, pgs. 17-76


An Afrikaans term meaning, "Ah! Shame!", and used in contexts of the user expressing empathy with someone's plight.
A term first used by James Baldwin as a sarcastic aside about those Black African American nationalists who were criticising his definition of himself as a writer who happened to be Black, rather than as a Black writer.

36 See Chapter.. on methodology.
37 What-you-see-is-what-you-get, (WYSIWYG)


41 Giddens, *Modernity and Self Identity*, Chapter 7

43 Ibid., page, 15.

45 Jurgen Habermas *TCA*, Chapter VIII, (3)
46 Jay *Fin de Siecle Socialism*, pg. 13


48 Quoted in a conference review article in Radical Philosophy, Summer 1993


52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.


58 Ibid.
I am well aware that Hall's position has changed from this early quoted one. However my jury is still out on whether or not a Gramscian inspired post-Marxist analysis, somewhat à la Laclau and Mouffe resolves the problem.

Robert Miles *Racism* (1989) Routledge., pg 64


Miles *Racism*, Chapter 1


Miles *Racism*, Chapter 1

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., Chapter 2

Ibid., Chapter 3, last page.

Habermas *Communication and Evolution*, Chapter 4, pg. 134.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., Chapter 4, (II)

Ibid., Chapter 4, (IV)

A suspicion which is confirmed via my late acquisition of Eder's book. See Klaus Eder *The New Politics of Class* (1993) Sage. At another level it is a suspicion which informs the "end of reason" sceptical post-modernism.

Habermas TCA, Chapter VIII, (3)

Habermas *Communication and Evolution*, Chapter 4 (III)

Ibid.

The question now in contexts which have had "an equal opportunities culture" for some time and where it can be shown that racism still flourishes, is to what extent a limit has
been set on the vision of the good life i.e. the normative boundaries of equality, which still excludes Black people's visions. This contradiction between the "promise" of the EOP and the limits of the organisational commitment/practice constitutes that immanence which might account for a recent piece of CRE research which shows that a high proportion of race related tribunal cases stem from Labour local authorities with "good" equal opportunity policies.

82 Habermas Communication and Evolution


84 Habermas Communication and Evolution, Chapter 3, (II & III)

85 Ibid.

86 Ibid.

87 David Goldberg Racist Culture (1993) Blackwell

88 Habermas Communication and Evolution, Chapter 3, (II & III)

89 Homi Bhabha The Location of Culture (1994) Routledge

90 Habermas Communication and Evolution, Chapter 3, (IV)

91 Ibid.

92 Ibid.

93 Furtado, C., Development and Underdevelopment, University of California, (1971)


95 Goldberg, Racist Culture, (1993)

96 A term originating in East Africa to describe the new Black political elite in their shining new Mercedes cars. A similar sense of humour informs the locals in Harare, Zimbabwe who have taken to describe the practice of sealing off the streets to allow the Presidential cavalcade to sweep through unimpeded with sirens blaring, as "There goes Bob Mugabe and the Wailers."

97 Arendt, H., The Origins of Totalitarianism Harvest, (1948), Chapter 5, (II)

98 The attempt to graft on past oriented ersatz values, somewhat akin to the popularly described post-modernist trend of gutting pubs and refurbishing them with an eclectic mix of '30s and victorian styles, has inherent an authoritarian strand, somewhat like the imposition of colonialist socio-integrative systems on organic ones.


102 Habermas TCA, Chapter VI


104 Ibid., pg. 91


106 Habermas TCA, Chapter VIII, (3)

107 Outhwaite, (1994), Chapter 6

Frankfurt Campus, cited in Outhwaite

109 The Collins English Dictionary

110 Honneth, A., *Conceptions of Civil Society* in Radical Philosophy Summer 1993

111 Outhwaite Habermas, Chapter 6, pg. 100

112 Habermas TCA, Chapter VIII, (2C)


114 Outhwaite Habermas, Chapter 7, pg. 119. There are some who include Foucault in the critical social theorists school. I am not so sure, despite acknowledging the added clarity his analysis of power provides, that he is not beyond the "bucket."

115 "Young-upwardly-mobile-Muslims", in Aziz Al-Azmeh *Islams and Modernities* (1994) Verso

116 Habermas TCA, Chapter VIII, (3)


121 Teun A. van Dijk *Elite Discourse and Racism* Sage, (1993)

122 David Harvey quoted in Radical Philosophy Summer 1993
From experience in the target borough.

Bhabha The Location of Culture


Habermas in C. Taylor edt. Multiculturalism


An example from the prime target borough in this piece of research
Likewise
And again
Eder, K., (1993)


Ibid., Chapter 10.

This was written some years before the “11th September”. It has an even greater saliency now.
Eder, K., (1993)


Amy Gutman Introduction to C. Taylor Edt. Multiculturalism

Habermas in Multiculturalism

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.

Cohen and Arato Civil Society, Chapter 10.

Habermas in Multiculturalism

Audrey Thompson Last Bastion Community Care 26 Jan-1 Feb., 1995

Notes on Chapter 2, pgs 77-88

What-you-see-is-what-you-get
For example quite a few of those associated with the post Fordist school of local government analyses have acted as consultants in one form or another to Labour run authorities. Stoker stands at the heart of the academic resources underpinning new Labour's thinking on, and restructuring of local government in the UK.


Ibid., page 47

Responses from councillors of the 'labourist discourse' persuasion in the main target borough for this research, who were seeking to slow down and halt the pursuit of equality measures.


Response from the white manager of the Social Services Directorate’s research section.

These are not new to the UK, having found their expression first in the 1980’s experiences of local government in New Zealand where that country’s Labour government embarked on a programme of monterist, new right liberal, ‘de-welfarisation’ of the public sector.

Response from the Black Workers Group in the target borough to the introduction of this element of the explicit neo-managerialism of that local authority’s processes.

This is best summed up in Agger’s very recent book entitled, “*Public Sociology*” in which he sets out three key sociological desiderata relating to sociological writing which must: reveal the author because ‘author present writing refuses to cleanse the text of authorial fingerprints...(but)...acknowledges that the text both constructs the world and intervenes in it deliberately; engage in self translation by ‘disclosing its animating assumptions and confessing its intellectual and social interests; and, address major public issues, ‘attempting to influence the public and policy.’ Agger, B., *Public Sociology*, Rowman and Littlefield, (2000), pg. 258.


Morrow, *Critical Theory and Methodology*, (CTM) pages 7-12


Morrow, CTM,

Ibid., pages 151-153

Ibid.

Ibid.


This is one of the ill founded critiques of theorists like Habermas by post Marxists like Laclau.

There-is-no-alternative, commonly attributed to Margaret Thatcher as her stock refrain to criticisms of her policies.

Leader of the Labour Group in the target borough in the mid to late eighties. See also Chapter 11

Morrow, CTM, chapter 2

Notes on Chapter 3, pgs 88-105

Key texts in this are Hoggett, P., *Modernisation, Political Strategy and the Welfare State, Studies in Decentralisation and Quasi-markets*, SAUS, University of Bristol,


175 Ibid.

176 Ibid.

177 Ibid.

178 Ibid.

179 Ibid.


181 Ibid.

182 Ibid.

183 L.B. Lambeth

184 Lambeth, Brent and now de rigueur in many local authorities.

185 London Borough "X"

186 Paul Hoggett’s work was influential amongst certain leading councillors in the target borough during the eighties.

187 Target borough

188 Hoggett, P., (1990)


191 Some analysts, like Pieterse, have attempted a fusion of post-Fordism and post-modernism, through pointing out the general similarities in the de-narrative metaphor underpinning both; though whether this is a syncretic endeavour or merely eclectic because both have the prefix ‘post’, is open to query. See Pieterse, J., edt., *Emancipations, Modern and Postmodern*, Sage, (1992)


197 Burns et al, (1994), Chapter 10

198 Ibid.

Notes to Chapter 4, pgs 106-124


200 Margaret Hodge, erstwhile Leader of Islington Council, and the apostasy from local socialist to local ‘realist’.


203 Cochrane, A., (1993), Chapter 2

204 Stoker, G., (1991)

Stoker it was, who referred the principal researcher on to Hoggett who, in turn, referred the researcher on to a Black researcher looking at a minor aspect of race and local government.

J. Stewart's work epitomises this.


Quote from Gaster, in discussion on quality and equality.


Cochrane, A., (1993), Chapter 4


Interview with senior Black manager in target borough.

Target borough via interview with Black manager.


For example, in addition to Lambeth and the target borough, others like Camden, have adopted 'diversity policies', within the overall context of human resources, as a displacing discourse around what used to be equalities.

Interview with relevant Black manager

Target borough and interview with senior Black manager


Relayed to principal researcher by the then Chair of Race Relations after discussion with then leader in target borough.

This is also the primary target borough for this research

Notes on Chapter 5, pgs 125-183


Ibid.

239 Ibid.

240 Ibid.

241 Ibid.

242 Ibid.

243 Ibid.

244 Outhwaite, (1996), General Introduction, pgs. 19-20


247 Ibid., pg. 50, and see also Habermas, J., *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, Polity Press, (1989)

248 Outhwaite, (1996), General Introduction, pg. 8

249 Habermas, J., TCA, Vol., (1987), Chapter VIII

250 Outhwaite, W., (1996), General Introduction, pg. 13


252 Outhwaite, W., (1996), General Introduction, pg. 18


255 Habermas, J., (1996), Rehg, W., Translator’s Introduction, pg. ix

256 Ibid., pg. xi

257 Ibid., pg. xiii

258 Ibid., pg. xix

259 Ibid., pg. xxiii

260 Ibid., pg. xix


262 Habermas, J., *Three Normative Models of Democracy*, In ‘*Democracy and Difference*’, (1996). See also Habermas, J., BFN, (1996), Chapter 7 Deliberative Politics, for a full consideration of the prime reasons why a deliberative politics is better than the liberal and republican versions. This ‘third way’ distinction occurs throughout BFN.


264 Ibid.

265 Ibid.

266 Ibid.

267 Ibid.

268 Ibid.

269 Ibid.

270 Ibid.

271 Habermas, J., BFN, (1996), Chapter 7, pg. 301

272 Ibid., Chapter 9, Paradigms of Law


278 Ibid.
279 Ibid.
282 Ibid.
283 See also Habermas, J., BFN, (1996), Chapter 9
287 Ibid.
288 Ibid.
289 Ibid.
292 Ibid.
293 Lansley et al, (1989)
295 Gamble, (1988), pg. 11
296 Ibid., pg. 29
297 Ibid., pg. 31
298 Ibid., pg. 50
299 Ibid., pg. 14
300 For example, Local Government Acts 1985 and 1988, Local Government Finance Act 1982
301 Ditto
303 For example the Housing Act 1980 and Housing Planning Act 1986 facilitated the selling off of council housing stock.
305 Leader in target borough. For more details see Chapter on Target Borough
313 Ibid.
314 Ibid.

318 A good analysis of this process of embracing, guiltlessly, capitalism by new right Labour is provided in Panitch, L., and Leys, C., *The End of Parliamentary Democracy*, Verso, (2001)


320 Ibid.

321 Ibid.

322 Ibid.

323 Ibid.

324 Comments made by councillors of both political persuasions, i.e. Labour and Conservative, at Lambeth committee meetings in the mid nineties.


328 Ibid.

329 Ted Knight's assessment of the worth of his first Principal Race Relations Adviser, Ouseley.


334 Ibid.


336 Ibid.


339 Ibid., Chapter 1


346 Ibid., Chapter 1

347 Ibid.

348 Ibid.

349 Ibid.

350 Ibid.

351 Ibid., Chapter 4


354 Ibid.

355 Ibid., Chapter 4
In the target borough the introduction of such service initiatives was preceded by training courses for senior managers in which the 'team huddle', together with 'Yowzer! Yowzer!' type exhortations were put forward as one of the ways to induce team spirit. Alvesson, M., and Willmott, H., Making Sense of Management, Sage Publications, (1996)

L.B. Lambeth


The latter was an actual defence put forward by representatives of a Black social worker who was disciplined for hitting a child in the care of that authority.

Beck, U., The Reinvention of Politics, Polity Press, (1997). In this he contends that in Western democracies, in the absence of substantive democratisation, the status quo is increasingly upheld through exercises which are no more than facades of democratic practice.

Many local authorities now have specialised marketing personnel and/or sections. See also Walsh, K., Public Services and Market Mechanisms, Macmillan, (1995)


Notes to Chapter 6, pgs. 184-276

Matustik, M., Jurgen Habermas, A Philosophical Profile, Rowman and Littlefield, (2001). Pg. 264


Dryzek, J., Discursive Democracy, Cambridge University Press, (1990), Introduction, pg. 20

Dryzek, J., Democracy in Capitalist Times, Oxford University Press, (1996), Chapter 2, pg. 34


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.

Bohman is another who draws attention to the essential difference between BFN and Legitimation Crisis. In the former, as opposed to the latter, he finds that Habermas "has abandoned the analogies between the justification of moral norms and democratic decision making.". Bohman, J., *Critical Theory and Democracy*, In Rasmussen, D., edt., *The Handbook of Critical Theory*, Blackwell, (1996)


Ibid, Chapter 2, pg. 103

Ibid., Chapter 2, pg. 105


Ibid., Chapter 4, pg. 218-219

Ibid., Chapter 4, pg. 218

Ibid., Chapter 4, pg. 219

Ibid., Chapter 4, pg. 222

Another theorist who argues similarly with regard to discourse ethics and the organisational impact on the polity is Cohen. Cohen, in line with Habermas, puts forward that existing liberties can only be defended by more democratisation and that the realisation in practice of the principle of discourse ethics is one of the key discursive processes in attaining that goal. Cohen, however, derives a useful procedural principle underlying the consensus over a norm which is that it must involve symmetry, reciprocity and reflexivity. Cohen maintains that the formalistic structure of DE means that "no single model of democratic institutions flows from the theory", to the extent that, "the principles of democratic legitimacy and the basic rights which they ground imply an open-ended plurality of democratic forms ..". Cohen maintains that the formalistic structure of DE means that "no single model of democratic institutions flows from the theory", to the extent that, "the principles of democratic legitimacy and the basic rights which they ground imply an open-ended plurality of democratic forms .. Cohen maintains that the formalistic structure of DE means that "no single model of democratic institutions flows from the theory", to the extent that, "the principles of democratic legitimacy and the basic rights which they ground imply an open-ended plurality of democratic forms. Cohen, J., *Discourse Ethics and Civil Society*, In *Universalism vs. Communitarianism*, (1995)


Habermas, J, BFN, (1996), Chapter 8


Ibid.

Ibid., Chapter 9, 9.2.3
Lazare holds that the constitution was devised "to minimise the dangers of elective government to property in general, and slaveholders in particular... (by)... elaborately dividing power between the executive, legislative and judiciary, by personalising executive power in monarchical fashion, by over-representation in the Senate and by handing crucial veto powers to the Supreme Court." Lazare, D., *The Constitution Cult*, New Left Review, 232, (Nov./Dec. 1998)


Ibid.


441 Ibid.
442 Ibid.
445 Ibid.
447 Ibid.
450 Ibid.
451 Ibid.
452 Ibid.
453 Ibid.
454 For example in Lambeth in the early eighties one of the race remedial employment programmes devised by the equality advisers, contained a recommendations of both literacy classes and the recognition of non-standard forms of English. This apparently provoked outbursts of mirth from the more cynical white managers
456 Ibid.
458 Ibid.
459 Ibid.
460 Ibid.
461 Ibid.
462 Ibid.
463 Ibid.
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In the UK the Chartered Institute of Personnel Development developed a position paper in the mid nineties in which it was explicitly argued that the 'old' equalities model was too conflictual and that a diversity approach, because it did not rely on group stereotypes, but concentrated on the individual, was a better means of realising business objectives. However, its depiction of the 'equalities' model relied on caricature and the stereotype that this was based almost solely on the pursuit of positive action. A similar pattern of creating straw peopled equality models, and then torching them, can be discerned in the development of diversity in the USA.

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