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Models of Self-Governance and Workplace Democracy:
A Comparison of Select Orchestras in Germany, the U.S., and U.K.

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Acknowledgements

"No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed it has been said that democracy is *the worst* form of government <u>except</u> for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time in this world of ours."[1] (Winston S. Churchill, 1947).

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For the past several years, I have been carrying around the above quotation, knowing that one day my dissertation would be finished and I could finally print out Churchill's famous words. I would have completed my personal quest to learn about the inner workings of self-governing orchestras *and* about that ever fallible-yet-formidable form of governance: democracy. This I have now done.

In what has been a very long journey, I have been aided enormously by the hundreds of musicians, managers, trustees, union officials, trade association members, industry observers and other graduate students and scholars I have encountered across the U.S., overseas, and at Harvard University. All were generous in their willingness to discuss their ideas about or personal experiences with musician involvement and to debate the weaknesses and merits they saw in the self-governing model.

Of those individuals I especially want to acknowledge, I begin by thanking my advisor at City University, **Professor Patrick J. Boylan**, who has tirelessly encouraged my ideas and helped me every step of the way, for which I am most grateful. His encyclopedic knowledge of the cultural sector is surpassed only by his enthusiasm for it. **Professor J. Richard Hackman** of Harvard University has also played a key role in this endeavor. From Richard, I have received limitless opportunity (and support) to test my own ideas, as well as, to learn from his theory of self-management.

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Others to whom I am truly indebted include: **José Bergher**, cellist with the Orquesta Sinfonica Venezuela, **Julian Fifer**, founder and former president of Orpheus Chamber Orchestra, **Clive Gillinson**, managing director of the London Symphony Orchestra, **Tom Hall**, violinist of the Chicago Symphony Orchestra, **Bernhard Kerres**, consultant with Booz-Allen, Hamilton in Vienna, **David Marcou**, principal of The

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[1] Speech delivered November 11, 1947 on a Parliamentary bill defining the true purposes of democracy. In Halle, K. (1985). *The Irrepressible Churchill.* London: Robson Books, Ltd.

Declaration

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Although this study developed after and as a result of the author's work on the Harvard University-Max Planck Institute's "Cross-national Study of Professional Symphony Orchestras," the author asserts that the greater part of the research and analysis for this thesis is her original work (see Chapter 1 and Chapter 9 for further details of this).

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Models of Self-Governance and Workplace Democracy:
A Comparison of Select Orchestras in Germany, the U.S., and U.K.

ABSTRACT

This thesis is the result of the author's long-term interest in the inner workings of self-governing and other "high involvement" orchestra organizations. This interest was "sparked" by her work in the general survey of professional symphony orchestras in East and West Germany, the U.S., and U.K. conducted with Allmendinger and Hackman in the early 1990s. The findings of that research led to a general understanding of how symphony orchestras were structured, supported and led in those countries during that time period. In her own work, the author goes beyond that broad foundation in order to generate original research that illuminates how (and how well) a rare form of orchestra functions (i.e., the self-governing orchestra) and what roles musicians take within them.

After a description of the rise of concert orchestras in Germany, the United States, and Great Britain and a review of the pertinent literature, four particular orchestras are then discussed in-depth: the Colorado Symphony Orchestra (Denver, Colorado USA), the Orpheus Chamber Orchestra (NYC, NY, USA), the Berlin Philharmonic (Berlin, Germany), and the London Symphony Orchestra (London, U.K.).

For this study, the author uses a mutli-method research strategy to help her discover and analyze the most important issues of high involvement orchestra organizations. These issues are related to an orchestra's direction, structure, leadership and membership. The findings reveal the similarities and differences between the four orchestras studied and the dominant model of orchestra organization. The findings also indicate what role national context has played (that is, historical tradition, labor and tax laws, and level of public support) in the development of musician-involved orchestras.

In discussing the weaknesses of these more democratic orchestral systems, the author identifies seven "traps" or difficulties that must be dealt with in order to attain a truly functional and sustainable level of self-governance. These include: ample time to fully develop the organization's systems and structures, having the capacity to deal with financial pressures, fostering commitment (both individual and collective commitment), managing the tradeoff between broad participation versus efficiency, the need for widespread trust and technical knowledge, the ability to handle internal power struggles, and to conduct peer reviews.

In arguing the other side of the issue, the author discusses the advantages of self-governing systems. These include: a profound and widespread sense of "ownership" throughout the organization (not just in the executive offices or the board room as is the case with the dominant model) which positively affects employee commitment and motivation, less mental stress for musicians because they have a legitimate voice in

organizational affairs, a sense of common purpose that "we are all on the same team, pulling in the same direction," rewards are more collective than individual so everyone shares in the success or failure of the group, there is more participation in decision making and less hierarchy, and, finally, player job satisfaction is heightened in qualitative terms.

The author concludes that national context does matter in explaining the genesis of the four organizations under study, but finds, more importantly, that each orchestra's particular direction, structure, membership and leadership configurations are *the* critical variables to both understanding and assessing how well they will function as high involvement organizations and what role musicians will play in them.

Chapter One: Introduction

Although the symphony orchestra is an artifact of the late 18th and 19th centuries, there continues to be deep interest in this type of musical ensemble. That interest is not only with the music that is performed, the soloists who perform it or the conductors who lead them, but also with *the instrumentalists* who make up the ensemble and the *organization* of this collective artistic work. Indeed, there is a growing body of literature from practitioners, industry observers and academics alike who are intrigued by the professional lives of musicians and the structure and governance systems of orchestra organizations (see, for example, Faulkner, 1973a; Martorella, 1983; Judy, 1996). I count myself among those people.

For me, it began in 1989, when, together with my colleagues at Harvard University and the Max Planck Institute, we embarked on a study of professional symphony orchestras in four countries: East and West Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. The objective of that study was to survey how orchestras in the four countries were structured, supported and led, as well as how musicians made their careers in them (see, for example, Allmendinger, Hackman, & Lehman, 1996). This research, summarized later in Chapter 3, was the original basis for my inquiry into orchestras. It was during that project that I developed a keen interest in one particular type of orchestra model: the rare, self-governing orchestra with its unique authority structure and governance system. Since self-governing orchestras were never the main focus of the Harvard-Max Planck survey (nor were they intended to be) and, in fact, they represented a minority of the orchestras in that sample (just 5 of 78 orchestras), I had a clear opportunity to design my own study, which would allow me to delve further into this

topic leading to the development of this thesis. Whereas the Harvard-Max Planck study can be characterized as a broad "mapping" of the terrain of symphony orchestras in Great Britain, the U.S., and the former East and West Germany, my research has been an in-depth, qualitative study of four specific orchestras, which represent the spectrum of "high involvement" or self-governing orchestras one will find in existence today.

Self-governing symphony and chamber orchestras represent an anomaly in modern orchestra organization, although at one point in history they were more common (Beckerman, 1986; Shanet, 1975). Self-governing orchestras[1], as will be described in further detail, are essentially defined by the fact that the instrumentalists (also known as "the players," "musicians" or "orchestra members") constitute the majority of the organization's governing board. In effect, the musicians are responsible for managing themselves and for the overall governance of their organizations. It is the orchestra members who select and, technically, employ the conductors who lead them and the professional managers who oversee the administrative operations. This basic idea runs counter to the dominant model. (**Exhibit 1.1** indicates the number of self-governing orchestras that exist around the world today.)

The dominant model of orchestra organization worldwide is "the contract orchestra" (what some refer to as a traditional model of hierarchical or bureaucratic management). This model has been in place for well over a century, without much, if any, change in it (Fogel, 2000; Denis et. al., 1980). In contract orchestras, virtually all key decisions (both organizational and artistic) are made by the music director, chief executive and/or the board (or some combination thereof). Players have no formal role

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in decision making. Here, the chief conductor is clearly at the helm artistically and the governing board (and, on their behalf, the managing director) retains the ultimate authority for all other decision making. At the bottom of the organizational pyramid are the players who are, essentially, "hired hands." Working under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement or contract, their role is restricted. In simple terms, their role is to play the notes of the score and not to be engaged in matters of management or governance. This role stands in stark contrast to that of their counterparts in the self-governing orchestras. Musicians in self-governing orchestras have the freedom to vote and to decide on all manner of organizational and governance issues, especially who shall become a member of the ensemble and who shall conduct the orchestra. In short, the differences between the dominant model of organization (the contract orchestra) and the minority model (self-governing orchestras) are consequential—especially for players.

My interest in the self-governing model of organization was sparked by conversations with players. It was Tom Hall, a violinist with the Chicago Symphony Orchestra, who first impressed upon me the professional problems and pressures faced by symphony and opera musicians by sharing the findings of a study about musicians' self-perceptions (Hall, 1983). Hall's study pointed to problems inherent in the nature of orchestral work. Chief among the problems faced by musicians are these: anonymity and a lack of autonomy, subordination and stress, limited opportunity to advance within the ranks of an orchestra given the few vacancies that arise, and atypical schedules: musicians work while others "play". (For a complete listing of problems and perceptions as noted by Hall, see **Appendix A**). In addition to these issues, I later learned of two other critical problems of orchestra organization: the tension arising from the power

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[1] Later, in Chapter 2, I will describe the notion of self-governing orchestras. Throughout this thesis, however, it should be noted that I use the following words to refer to this system of organization: "high

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hierarchy inherent in orchestras and how power relations adversely affect the most fundamental relationship in an orchestra, that between the ensemble and the conductor (Fischer, 1994; Levine, 2001). Fischer (1994:21), for example, argues the following:

> Historically, the orchestra grew out of a culture characterized by hierarchical institutional structures. These structures are in a sense built into the score of symphonic literature and reproduced in the orchestral workplace. Yet these patterns of human relatedness stand in the way of achieving the exquisite responsiveness upon which a unified, vital performance depends...Responsiveness rests on reciprocity, not on a one way giving of instructions.

Having discussed these problems in numerous and lengthy interviews with players, managers, board members and conductors, I felt that there had to be a better way to organize orchestras--to make them vital and effective institutions while simultaneously offering players the opportunity for more professional growth and satisfaction--and that sense of reciprocity.

I was curious to learn more about how self-governing orchestras worked in contrast to the dominant model of organization which I came to see as harboring and perpetuating the problems that Hall, Fischer, and others had pointed out.[2] Indeed, I wanted to learn whether (and to what degree) did that *other* system—with its alternative leadership structures and "high involvement" practices---make a difference in the work lives of musicians and the performance outcomes of their ensembles. Of course, many factors contribute to the professional lives of musicians and the outcome of any performance and many more go into shaping the entire development and current profile of an orchestra--from its financial standing to its artistic leadership. But I had the thought that a more expansive role for the musicians within *the organization* (not just within the

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involvement", "democratic-based", "self-rule", "self-determination", "cooperative", and "participative."
[2] See also, Piperck, 1981; Freeman, 1996; and Levine & Levine, 1996.

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orchestra) might somehow lead to more engagement and commitment—to more "responsiveness."

Current organizational research and theory certainly suggests that more participative forms of management can lead to equally if not more productive and effective organizations, as well as more satisfied and committed employees (Drucker, 1988; Pfeffer, 1994, 1998; Kanter; 1983; Lawler, 1986). In point of fact, it is increasingly recognized that engaging employee commitment and motivation is essential to achieving organizational effectiveness (Drucker, 1988; Galbraith, 1995; Lawler, 1992; Lawler et. al, 1995; and Pfeffer, 1994). For example, in other types of organizations, in other industries, employees are being involved in leadership and power sharing through organizational (e.g., self-management and board membership) and financial means (e.g., stock ownership) (Fogel, 2000; Handy, 1998; Vroom & Jago, 1988). Yet, in most nonprofit or governmental organizations such as orchestras, there are no financial incentives such as profit sharing that can be used to elicit greater commitment and motivation among employees (Letts, et. al., 1999). And, governing boards have been reluctant to share power and decision making with other organizational constituencies (Carvajal, 2001; Fogel, 2000).

Among the reasons why there are so few orchestras where power is shared and/or held by the players is the simple fact that industry isomorphism has long reinforced the dominant organizational model (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Martorella, 1983). In fairness, there are issues of efficiency and expertise to be considered. More democratic or participative approaches to organization tend to be comparatively inefficient operations (Mackin,1997; Kanter, 1983) and, admittedly, few, if any, musicians are trained in matters of governance (Fogel, 2000). With their special brand of shared

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leadership and consensus orientation, self-governing orchestras simply take more time to set up and to keep running. They also require more from their members and their managers than in bureaucratic types of organization (Lawler, 1988). "Clearly, this type of organization is not for all individuals," says Lawler (1988: 206). "it takes a particular orientation...toward work, and most importantly, toward learning, growing, and developing as a human being." The dilemma, according to Fogel (2000: 21), managing director of the Chicago Symphony Orchestra, is that: "What we have set up is a structure in which various constituencies vie, in different ways, for power. What we have not set up are organizations that seek to empower everyone and bring all of these forces into alignment, moving forward in a way that will benefit the organization (and, at the same time, the people inside it)." Of course, orchestras where players *are* legitimately involved and even in control are not panaceas (Stewart, 1994). These orchestras tend to be "works in progress", as we will see in this thesis. On the other hand, their players report significantly different attitudes and levels of job satisfaction than those in the dominant contract model. And the difference is a positive one.

To explore this subject further, I decided to study the organization and management of four self-governing orchestras: the Colorado Symphony Orchestra, the Orpheus Chamber Orchestra, the Berlin Philharmonic and the London Symphony Orchestra. Each of the four orchestras, as will be explained, is at a different point on the continuum of self-governance and each is influenced by a different cultural context, be it American, German or British. My aim was to understand the origin and development of the self-governing ideas and practices in these orchestras, together with their strengths and weaknesses, the challenges they faced and what all this might indicate, not only about musician involvement and self-rule, but, more generally, about organizational

behavior and performance when people are genuinely allowed to participate, to have a voice in their professional endeavors.

My research questions, therefore, were:

1. In what ways are these self-governing orchestras structured and governed differently from the dominant model of contract orchestras? What role has national context played in how they are organized and operated?

2. In what ways do musicians' roles differ in the two models (self-governing versus contract) and across the four cases under study? How do musicians describe their roles in these types of orchestras? For example, do they perceive themselves as more motivated and committed to the organization?

3. What has been the overall outcome of these orchestras? Have they achieved "organizational alignment" (Fogel, 2000)?

4. And, finally, what can be concluded about these organizational and governance structures? Do the policies and practices of these high involvement orchestras inform other kinds of organizations and, if so, how?

Answers to these questions were sought by using multiple methods of inquiry. The research strategy (as will be discussed further in Chapter 4), went beyond the survey approach taken in the Harvard-Max Planck Study, to include other streams of data: a review and analysis of previous studies on orchestras and their findings, a review and analysis of archival documents, field research which included dozens of interviews with musicians, managers, staff and board members at these orchestras (for a complete listing, see **Appendix C**) and observations of organizational members at work and in meetings.

Organization of the Thesis

The rest of this thesis is arranged as follows: Chapter 2 provides an introduction to orchestras and, in particular, symphony orchestras as they have developed and now exist in Germany, the U.S., and Great Britain. (Note that the dominance of the *symphony* orchestra perspective throughout this thesis reflects the fact that three of the four organizations I studied were symphony orchestras; only one was a chamber orchestra. It should be noted this particular chamber orchestra was selected because, like the others, it is based on a democratic philosophy of organization). Chapter 3 presents a review of the literature on orchestras including previous research that is most relevant to my area of focus. Chapter 4 sets forth the research methods used in gathering and analyzing the data. The subsequent four chapters (Chapter 5: The Colorado Symphony Orchestra; Chapter 6: The Orpheus Chamber Orchestra; Chapter 7: The Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra, and Chapter 8: The London Symphony Orchestra) give a description of each orchestra studied and their circumstances at the time of my research. Later, in Chapter 9, a comparative discussion of all four orchestras is presented with analysis of the similarities and differences across these organizations. I also discuss the strengths and weaknesses of these forms of organizational self-governance, as well as the "traps" or difficulties of achieving a high level of self-determination. Finally, Chapter 10 sets forth the conclusions of the research and identifies problems and issues warranting further research in the future.

Exhibit 1.1

List of Self-Governing Ensembles (by date founded)

Symphony Orchestras	Home base	Founded
Vienna Philharmonic	Vienna, Austria	1842
Berlin Philharmonic	Berlin, Germany	1882
London Symphony	London, England	1904
Orquesta Sinfonica Venezuela	Caracas, Venezuela	1930
London Philharmonic	London, England	1932
Israel Philharmonic	Tel-Aviv, Israel	1936
Philharmonia Orchestra	London, England	1945
Royal Philharmonic Orchestra	London, England	1946
Japan Philharmonic	Tokyo, Japan	1962
Colorado Symphony	Denver, CO, USA	1989
Louisiana Philharmonic	New Orleans, LA, USA	1991
The Tokyo Symphony Orchestra	Tokyo, Japan	1965
The New Japan Philharmonic	Tokyo, Japan	1972

Chamber Orchestras	Home base	Founded
Prague Chamber Orchestra	Prague, Czech Republic	1951
Orpheus Chamber Orchestra	New York, NY, USA	1972
Pro Arte Chamber Orchestra	Cambridge, MA, USA	1978
Tafelmusik Baroque Orch.	Toronto, Canada	1979
Ensemble Modern	Frankfurt, Germany	1980

(Note: As will be described further in Chapter 2, symphony orchestras are essentially defined by their size and the repertoire they play. Symphony orchestras typically have at least 65 players and, on average, 100 or more. The standard repertoire for symphony orchestras has evolved from the 19th century onward with the work of such composers as Beethoven, Brahms and Mahler. Chamber orchestras, on the other hand, are typically orchestras of 25-40 musicians who perform a repertoire rooted in the late 18th century, with the works of Bach, Mozart and Beethoven.)

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Chapter Two:
The Symphony Orchestra in Germany, the U.S. and Great Britain

Before moving into a discussion of the literature related to this thesis, it may be helpful to first provide an overview of the historical development of the symphony orchestra and the organizational types and sources of support that exist in the three countries under study: in Germany, the U.S. and Great Britain. It may also be of use to set forth what conditions are *given* when referring to a professional symphony orchestra and where there is flexibility in terms of its organization and governance system. That is: what features are absolutely required and immutable in an orchestra organization versus where is there freedom to alter roles and structures? We will also review how an orchestra's by-laws and unionization affect what can and cannot be done.

The Professional Symphony Orchestra: Its Development and "Basic Rules"

The modern professional symphony orchestra has its roots in 17th century Europe although it is commonly understood to be an artifact of the late 18th and 19th centuries. Its "developmental crucible", if you will, were the courts and chambers of German and Austrian royalty and the private societies of the leading capitals of Europe—especially Paris and London (Beckerman, 1986; Montias, 1986)[1]. From that time and geographic sphere, the orchestra's main purpose evolved from providing *private* concerts for royalty and the aristocracy, as well as accompaniment for church and opera performances to a more ubiquitous role providing *public* concerts for "financial recompense" (Bekker, 1936).

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[1] Indeed, the most important cities in mid-18th century Northern Europe were: London, Paris, Berlin, and Vienna; the most important orchestras were considered to be in Dresden, Mannheim, Berlin, and Stuttgart. "Although there were a large number of orchestras in Italy...they figure little in the historical development of the orchestra ensemble," says Beckerman (1986: 100).

The orchestral form and the quality of its sound also evolved with time; this as a result of three important developments: the evolution of composers' works from simple to more complicated compositions, the technical improvement of musical instruments, and the increasing sophistication of instrumental technique (Previn, 1979). Composers of the late 18th and early 19th centuries created works that surpassed their predecessors' requirements. Put simply, more professional musicians were needed who could play more sophisticated instruments in order to perform more complex works. Amateur freelance musicians no longer sufficed. Likewise, new venues were needed to perform the larger works. According to Bekker (1936: 90), "The drawing rooms of the nobility no longer afforded the requisite resonance for an orchestral symphony concert; they were [now] reserved for solo and chamber music. Orchestral concerts became by degrees a public affair, regulated by business interests...Indeed, a new type of orchestra had grown up...to a certain extent perfected during Beethoven's life time." These developments were reinforcing of one another and, over time, resulted in the crystallization of the contemporary symphonic repertoire and orchestral form.

Inextricably intertwined with the development of the repertoire and the orchestra was its patronage.[2] (Indeed, to this very day, it is recognized that both the artistic and financial aspects of orchestras are forever intertwined (Fogel, 2000)). Concert and choral music, like theater and opera, are very labor intensive and, as such, have always required some form of subsidy, but the amount and source of that subsidy changed with time (Baumol, 1996). First supported by the Church and royalty, orchestral music eventually came to be supported by the concert-going public and the public purse (Bekker, 1936). Indeed, in the 19th and 20th centuries, the notion of patronage as the responsibility of *someone else* (be it royalty or later forms of authority) was a firmly

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rooted in European countries and, comparatively, to a much lesser extent in America. Patronage in the U.S., as is true of the early history of British orchestral music, was largely a responsibility of individuals—individuals contributing their private monies or personal talents to the establishment and support of orchestras (Montias, 1986).[3] Patronage is one feature differentiating the orchestras in the three countries under study. We turn now to a description of these national models.

The German model

The contemporary "German model" of orchestra organization can be characterized by the following key features: (1) A high density of orchestras (1: 900,000 citizens[4]) in a country of just 80 million people. Of this number, Jakoby (1997) reports that there are more than 140 so-called "*Kultur*" or independent orchestras---the dedicated concert-giving ensembles *not* directly attached to an opera house, ballet company or theater (which is the more typical form of affiliation in Germany). There are also several orchestras still operated by German radio/broadcasting companies; (2) The music director's role is quite important and organizationally very strong, as has been true historically; (3) Elected public officials take a more dominant role on orchestra governing boards in Germany, especially since state ("Lander") and local legislatures or councils heavily subsidize orchestral budgets through their annual appropriations; (4) The financial equation of a typical orchestra looks like this: On average, public subsidy reaches between 50-60% of a symphony orchestra's operating budget, with box office revenues averaging 35% and contributed income reaching just 3% (Jakoby, 1997).

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[2] Lebrecht (1991) would probably add that the development of the orchestra was also, later, a function of the great conductor, not to mention the rise of the all-powerful agent and the recording companies.
[3] For example, most American orchestras were financed in one of three ways: as for-profit endeavors by conductors (such as with the Chicago Symphony Orchestra); as cooperative ventures by musicians (e.g., the New York Philharmonic); or they were underwritten by philanthropists (as with Henry Lee Higginson's Boston Symphony Orchestra). Later, the duty of supporting the formal or "high" arts fell to the bourgeoisie and/or associations.

Orchestra foundations and boards in the American sense, where private citizens predominate and contribute significantly in financial terms, are extremely rare in Germany thus far. Moreover, German tax laws, as yet, do not fully promote such charitable giving[5]; and (5) As a result of such high levels of *public* funding, orchestral musicians' employment status is equivalent to that of any other state or municipal civil servant. Their legal status and benefits include, among other things, long-term job security and generous pension and other social security benefits, which are negotiated in a collective bargaining agreement called a "Tarivertrag" by the German Musicians' Union. This close connection to government is an important status difference between orchestral musicians in Germany and those in Britain or America, where government plays a comparatively less influential role in the affairs of orchestra organizations.

Another very important feature of the German model is: (6) legislation that allows musician involvement in organizational decision making or what is known as "co-determination." Orchestral musicians have a "voice" in organizational matters primarily through the workers' council (or "Personalrat") within their organizations. This workers' council, already well in place in other industries such as coal, iron and steel prior to the creation of the Common Market in 1957, was officially set forth in the Codetermination Act of 1976, giving all workers greater rights to organizational participation, including the right of board membership[6] (Poole, 1978). Indeed, as Markey and Jonat (1997:3) pointed out: "... work councils or similar bodies are one of the oldest forms of employee participation in decision-making within enterprises in Germany."

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[4] This is the figure noted by Allmendinger et. al. (1996).

[5] Jakoby (1997: 42) notes a change--that there were two laws passed in 1990 that promote tax concessions, tax simplification, and private cultural sponsorship. These are: The Law to Promote Art, Culture, and Foundations through Tax Concessions and The Law to Promote Societies.

[6] Such rights have been further reinforced across all European Union (EU) countries' by the EU's "Social Charter" of 1993, although the United Kingdom, uniquely, applied a Treaty Derogation (or opt-out) until 1999.

The U.S. model

In the United States, on the other hand, most symphony orchestras conform to the dominant model of organization. As one leading orchestra manager described it:

> In one form or another, American orchestras have run on this model, with only minor variations, for more than a century and with only a few exceptions...The result over time was an uneasy truce wherein the balance of power was divided among the three legs of the stool (i.e., music director, chairman of the board, and managing director) and just how it was allocated depended to some degree on the personalities involved and how they interacted (Fogel, 2000: 11, 15)).

The model can be further characterized as follows: (1) Many were established in the late 19th century as independent bodies to present stand-alone concerts, i.e., they were not created to support opera, ballet or theater companies as was the case with most German orchestras. Although there are hundreds of amateur orchestras in America, the number of professional symphony orchestras is considered to be 133, suggesting a density of orchestras to the total American population of approximately 1:2,000,000.[7] There are no longer any dedicated radio or broadcast orchestras to be found in America as there once were (and still exist in Germany and the U.K.); (2) Although most professional orchestral musicians are also union members and operate under collectively-bargained work contracts, there are no provisions for employee involvement in orchestra decision making such as with the player boards of London's self-governing orchestras or the workers councils found in Germany. There is no pending legislation in favor of this either despite Levine's (1995) hope that there could be a more widespread, national policy on employee involvement[8]; (3) Given that public subsidy is a nominal portion of most American orchestral budgets (averaging just 6%,

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[7] Source of estimate: Allmendinger, et. al. (1996).

[8] In fact, employee involvement and workplace democracy, although a popular idea in the 1970s and 1980s, has never taken root in America (Lindenfeld & Rothschild-Witt, 1982).

according to Feist (1998)), orchestras have limited obligations to and connections with local government. And players, therefore, are not accorded any special civic status. (4) As in true of the dominant model of orchestra organization, music directors have historically held a prominent, indeed, dominant role (artistically and organizationally) in their orchestras.

On the important issue of subsidy, it should be noted that: (5) tax laws facilitate philanthropy and private giving to American symphony orchestras, which are legally nonprofit or charitable organizations. In this way, orchestras receive government support, but it is largely *not* direct subvention. Rather it is in the form of an indirect subsidy via the U.S. tax code, which generously provides for tax-deductible donations to be made to nonprofit organizations from individuals, foundations, and corporations. (In fact, all major orchestras have large and effective operations aimed at maximizing both private and corporate giving). Today, most orchestras are principally supported by a mix of box office revenues (a form of mass patronage, if you will), private philanthropy (significantly more than in Europe), and increasingly through corporate funding (both sponsorship and charitable giving). Thus, tax credits have become a critical feature of orchestra finance in America. There was never a "transfer of responsibility for supporting cultural activities from private to [state] patronage when the old Maecenates could (or would) no longer carry the burden" (Montias, 1986: 295). Indeed, it was "not until a century after government support had become a regular practice in Western Europe that government at all levels in the United States came to subsidize the arts" (Montias, 1986: 296).

The British model

The British model of orchestra organization offers an interesting contrast to both the U.S. and German models because it is consistent with and different from each of the two models, in different ways.

(1) In terms of public subsidy, the British model falls somewhere between the German and American models. The numbers affirm this: Feist (1998: 42) notes that, on average, unearned income was just 9% of orchestral budgets in England in the 1990s versus 35% in America [actually unearned income in major American orchestras is much higher than this average would suggest] and 3% in Germany, whereas government support (central and local) stood at 30% in England, just 6% in the U.S, and, as earlier noted, approximately 50-60% in Germany. Since British orchestras do not enjoy the kinds of private philanthropy evidenced in the U.S. nor, on the other hand, the munificence of German local government, most operate under stringent terms[9]. The financial situation of U.K. symphony orchestras has been long debated. The pressure to spread public subsidy more widely or rationalize institutions has been a favorite topic of the media and governmental study (e.g., Tusa, 1999; BBC/ACGB, 1994). Solutions continue to be proffered (e.g. Hoffmann, 1993; Arts Council of England, 1995), but the situation has never been completely resolved.

Further on the subject of subsidy, central and local government support in Britain

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[9] In fact, although British orchestras are registered charitable organizations, most conform to the Companies Acts set forth by Parliament instead of the Charities Acts because they provide more relevant (and quite specific) guidelines as to how the orchestras should be organized and funded. The Acts also specify how to account for unsupported operating deficits, in the absence of adequate capital reserves, which may create a state of legal insolvency and require the more or less immediate closing down of the organization (Boylan, 2001). Failure to do so could place all individual board members and senior

is appropriated to orchestras (and other nonprofit arts) through a system of national and regional arts councils. At national level, there is the Arts Council of England, Northern Ireland Arts Council, the Welsh Arts Council and Scottish Arts Council (for more on the British funding system, see Chapter 8 and Ridley (1987)).[10] In England, there are ten Regional Arts Boards whose mandate it is to redirect the funding they receive from the Arts Council of England to the arts organizations in their respective regions. In addition to these sources, public subsidy also takes the form of disbursements from other quasi-governmental organizations such as the National Lottery (established in 1993), which exists mainly to support building and infrastructure needs, and special schemes of the Arts Council such as the "Stablisation Funding Scheme" (see Chapter 8). One observer of the British approach to arts funding sums it up this way: "We have been living with a very British, informal, unostentatious and decidedly half-baked system of state patronage...The British system is pure muddle" (Hewison, 1996:8)[11] This criticism cuts to the heart of the perennial debate: How best to pull together central, local, and non-direct governmental means of supporting the arts with private sector initiatives such as endowments, sponsorship, lottery partnerships (since at least half of lottery-funded projects must be from non-lottery sources), and the like?

(2)   As in the U.S., there are hundreds of small orchestras scattered about the country, but they are not considered "professional-level" ensembles in terms of budget size, subsidy or player strength.   To be accurate, there are fourteen professional

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managers at risk of serious civil and even commercial penalties. Thus, managements have to operate in what many argue are over-cautious ways.

[10] Before the introduction of this kind of "public" subsidy there was another more familiar one: classical music grew much as it did in America and even in Germany (at least for a time to bridge the transition from royalty to state subsidy (Montias, 1986)), that is, through entrepreneurial activity (e.g., promotion of the Hallé Concert Society, made up of local subscribers mainly of relatively modest income, in Manchester and the Richter Concert Series in London). These were followed by the establishment in many places of local societies (made up of numerous individual members) in support of local orchestras (Beale, 1999).

[11] Some have even argued that the U.K. should not even *have* a cultural policy per se (Boylan, 2002).

symphony orchestras in Great Britain (suggesting a comparative density rate of 1: 4,000,000), which can be sorted into three organizational types. These types are also found in Germany. They are the regional contract, broadcasting (i.e., BBC orchestras), and London self-governing orchestras.

(a) "Regional contract orchestras" are the Hallé Orchestra, Royal Liverpool Philharmonic Orchestra, City of Birmingham Symphony Orchestra, Ulster Orchestra, and Royal Scottish National Orchestra. Regional contract orchestras have similar structures to American symphony orchestras in that they have a professional administration, a governing board composed primarily of private citizens (albeit with more local government officials as board members more akin to the German model than those in the U.S.) and few, if any, musician board members. The role of the music director is a strong and dominant one within the organization.

(b) British Broadcasting Corporation orchestras are the BBC Symphony Orchestra (based in London), BBC Philharmonic (in Manchester), BBC Scottish Symphony Orchestra (in Glasgow), and BBC Welsh Symphony Orchestra (in Cardiff). BBC orchestras are similar to contract orchestras in structure, except that their primary mission is to serve the public through BBC radio and television broadcasts, and, as such, they are an integral part of the BBC operating structure. Also, board composition reflects the BBC, not the local communities in which they operate.

(c) London self-governing ensembles are the London Symphony Orchestra (LSO), London Philharmonic Orchestra, Royal Philharmonic Orchestra, and the Philharmonia. The distinction here, as previously noted, is that musicians compose the majority of the governing bodies of these orchestras. In addition, conductors and managing directors

are hired by and report to these musician-dominated governing boards. (More details about this type of orchestra are discussed below since it is the model of my inquiry).

In all three types of British orchestra, musicians are members of the Musicians' Union (or MU) and have the right to representation by it. In the case of the regional contract orchestras, the players operate under a collectively-bargained agreement which is negotiated between its board and the Musicians Union. The BBC orchestra agreements are negotiated internally, without the direct intervention of the Musicians' Union (although it must be said that other orchestra contracts and the MU wage guidelines are used as points of reference). The MU sets suggested pay scales and working conditions for the London self-governing orchestras based on other orchestra agreements, but the London orchestras are not bound by these rules. Players in London self-governing orchestras are considered "freelancers" or "self-employed." As such, they do not work under a collective bargaining agreement. As we will see, they are paid on a fee-for-service basis, often with little or no other health, pension or vacation benefits.

The London model

Although the London self-governing orchestras compete for funding from the same sources as do the regional contract orchestras (the BBC orchestras do not compete for funding with the other types of British orchestras—they are supported via funding from the BBC broadcasting license), they differ significantly from other U.K. orchestras in three important ways. First, organizational, financial, and artistic authority ultimately rests fully with the orchestra's players (not with the music director, managing director or lay board of directors) because they are the shareholders of the organization. Also, although conductorships of these orchestras are highly sought after, the chief

conductor's role is significantly circumscribed compared to that of music directors in other U.K., European and American orchestras. In London self-governing orchestras, chief conductors are called "principal conductors" and are, in effect, selected and employed by the orchestral musicians. It is not the music director who selects the musicians, which is typical in the dominant orchestra model. Thirdly, London players historically have had little job security (indeed, they are hired as independent contractors) and their incomes from orchestral work have fluctuated along with the fee-for-service nature of their orchestras. As much as employment security and income is an extremely important matter for *all* of Britain's orchestral players, it is arguably even more so for the London players because their incomes depend entirely upon the number of sessions, e.g., rehearsals, performances, tours, and recordings, in which they participate. Improving conditions for players in London's self-governing orchestras has been of paramount importance over the years and has resulted in beneficial changes for some recently (see Chapter 8). Many players rely on several other potential sources of income, including solo engagements, chamber music work, session work for recording orchestras, and conservatory-based and private teaching.

In sum, despite the fact that there are differences among orchestras in Germany, the U.S., and Great Britain---especially when it comes to public subsidy and the distribution of organizational authority (which will be discussed at greater length in the second half of this thesis)---there are signs of convergence in overall organizational circumstances. As I pointed out in my paper with Galinsky, "...previous stable distinctions are disappearing as orchestras try to find solutions to the range of [similar] challenges they face" (Galinsky & Lehman, 1995:136). And this trend continues.

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Basic Rules: The Score and Its Leadership

One thing all orchestras have in common—no matter their country of origin, organizational type or financial makeup--is the score. Artistically, the musical score dictates (almost) everything demanded by the composer or arranger —e.g., the number of players the piece requires and their configuration, as well as the tempo, balance, color, and other characteristics. Next, someone must interpret the composer's intent. Most often this is done by the conductor who, as the formal artistic leader, directs the ensemble in both rehearsal and performance, whether it be music for a chamber orchestra of 30 players or for a symphony orchestra of 108. There are, of course, exceptions to this practice: Orpheus (New York), Ensemble Modern (Frankfurt), and the Prague Chamber Orchestra, for example, play without conductors. But music for chamber or symphony orchestras always requires leadership: either some *one* or some *group* must shape the concept of a piece for the entire ensemble to follow.

Indeed, musical leadership in a symphony orchestra runs deeper and wider than the chief conductor or music director, the foremost formal leader. First, there is the role of the concertmaster (or "leader" as he or she is called in the U.K.), invariably the leader of the first violins in the normal orchestral repertoire. Then there are section leaders for each of the following traditional instrument groups: the second violins, violas, celli, basses, woodwinds, brass, and percussion/other. There are still other layers of hierarchy with titled positions such as associate and assistant principals found within each section. Within the woodwinds and brass sections, for example, there are ranked "chairs" such as the 4th horn or 2nd trumpet. The same instrumentation and sectioning exist in a chamber orchestra, and most chamber orchestras are also led by conductors. The basic

difference between a chamber orchestra and a symphony orchestra lies in the number of players and the repertoire: chamber orchestras obviously do not reach the full strength of a 108-person ensemble; they are typically two-thirds smaller (between two and three dozen players) and the repertoire reflects this size differential.

The orchestra schema, be it small-scale or the full complement, presents both a formal hierarchy and a power hierarchy of which management gurus and team theory experts have become enamored. Drucker, for example, uses the symphony orchestra as a prime model for how to manage and lead professionals in contemporary organizations (Drucker, 1988), whereas Belbin (1996) uses the orchestra conductor as his pictogram to signify the "coordinator" role within an effective team structure. More recently, however, Mintzberg (1998:147) debunks the myth of the omniscient orchestral conductor saying, "Get past the myth of the conductor in complete control and you may learn from this example what a good deal of today's managing is all about." Still others have used the string quartet as an ideal model for work groups because, among other things, "quartets are reciprocally interdependent, self-managing, and no boss is needed" (Murnighan & Conlon, 1991: 165). But this is misleading because a hierarchy frequently does exist even within a string quartet and in any case the musical score always provides a script for their admittedly intense interactions. As Hannesson who is himself a very experienced orchestral musician says: "The music itself imposes an intrinsic organizational structure and hierarchy on the players...There is a power hierarchy which, whether it is self governing or not, the orchestra has to live with. It is off the stage that one can start discussing the effects of different organizational forms" (Hannesson, 2000). Here, we should also take note of Stern's admonition: "First, remember that there is a significant difference when one is speaking about the music and *music making* aspects of orchestras versus *the business* of music or the management of this activity.

Secondly, an orchestra can have as much participation as it likes [backstage], but democracy is suspended once you are on-stage performing [there can be *only one* director there]"[12] (Stern, 2000).

Off-stage: By-Laws and Unionization

"Off stage" is, indeed, where the greatest differences between the dominant model and the self-governing model can be found. Again, according to Hannesson:

> In a word, it is the players who have the most say about and responsibility for all matters in a self-governing orchestra. Contract orchestras, or more conventionally-structured orchestras, draw a line between the authority and responsibility of three constituencies: the players, the staff, and the trustees.
>
> The musicians of the self-governing orchestras have more responsibility and say towards their own work situation than do contract orchestras. The power structure of the orchestra also changes when the orchestra is off stage. With contract orchestras, what I would call "the union types" have a bigger say in the orchestra members sphere of influence than e.g. the principal players, although in some orchestras this group (the principal players) can be pretty powerful. In the self-governing orchestras, the rules of the game are more clearly defined within the legislation of a limited company or non-profit trust, which makes the decision-making process clear and consequently the musicians are more aware of the rules of the game, what they can and cannot expect. (Hannesson, 2000).

By-Laws

In Chapters 5 through 8, we will explore in much greater detail the "rules of the game" and what musicians can and cannot expect in the orchestras selected for this study. Meanwhile, it is important to reiterate the fundamental difference between regular contract orchestras and self-governing ones. It is the "Articles of Association" or "By-Laws" of the organization which set forth exactly who governs, that is, who controls the organizational and financial decision-making power in the organization, as well as how

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[12] Of course, one could argue that democracy is not suspended when it comes to a rare ensemble such as Orpheus Chamber Orchestra which performs without a conductor. Admittedly, players select from among

that authority shall be exercised.[13] Most orchestra structures in the U.S. and Great Britain (even though it is home to London's self-governing orchestras) make them anything but self-governing because players do not share organizational authority. Whilst in Germany, the national belief in co-determination has provided for a certain amount of self-determination in all forms of organizational life, including orchestras (Stern, 2000).

In the U.S., musicians in most large ensembles can expect *not* to be involved in decision making or much else beyond playing the notes of the score. Long ago, they "traded control for financial security" says Couch (1983: 114), as in the case of America's oldest symphony orchestra -- the New York Philharmonic, which had in fact originally been founded in 1842 as a musician cooperative. Those early musicians later gave away their right to self-determination in exchange for some modicum of stability in their incomes and their work lives. In New York as elsewhere today in America, the dominant model includes a lay board of trustees composed primarily of local civic, social, and business leaders who are affluent and philanthropic (or know people who are) and they wield the most power and influence in the orchestra organization. As Fogel recounts, "Simultaneously with the development of the power of the board came the European-schooled conductor with little patience for the idea of orchestras as examples of shared power...The prevailing theory was that while an orchestra was a collective of professional musicians, musical results were only guaranteed if a single, dominant leader (the conductor) was given the power to weld these musicians into a unified whole" (Fogel, 2000: 14-15).

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their fellow musicians "a core", i.e. players who act as principals for each section and who, together, lead the rest of the group in rehearsal and performance (for more on this, see Chapter 6).

[13] Under the British charitable company structure the Memorandum of Association, setting out the organization's charitable and more general objectives may well look very similar.

Certainly, it can be argued that overseeing a major orchestra, such as the New York Philharmonic with a $35 million annual operating budget and a $233 million endowment, while also performing <u>in</u> the ensemble is beyond the reach of any player. Still, my research indicates that musicians could have a role in governance, but typically this is not the case.[14] They are merely employees who rent their services to the organization and have no formal say; they are not "member owners" as in the case of self-governing orchestras or other worker-owned enterprises (Ellerman, 1990). Exceptions to this general situation exist, but they are rare. The exceptions are the more democratic orchestra organizations discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 of my thesis, i.e., the Colorado Symphony Orchestra and the Orpheus Chamber Orchestra, where players are more heavily involved in organizational and artistic decision making. As we will see, members of these orchestras have gone to great lengths to create structures and processes whereby every player's voice is heard and taken seriously.

In the U.K., most contract orchestras are also not run as self-governing groups. Indeed, the "British model" suggested earlier is typically led by strong non-player boards. Most orchestra boards are composed of a mix of elected politicians and leading lay people reflecting the pluralistic system of funding in Great Britain. Or, in the case of the BBC orchestras, there is no separate external board of the orchestra save the overarching BBC organizational structure (and there is no evidence of orchestral issues ever getting to the BBC's Board of Governors except when closures are proposed). In vivid contrast to the majority of contract orchestras and the BBC orchestras, the London self-governing orchestra players do indeed preside over their organizations and predominate at the board level. These players are the shareholders, the member

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[14] Players have been able, at long last, to have some involvement in orchestra affairs: see Carvajal (2001) about the New York Philharmonic's selection of Lorin Maazel. But this is a very discrete example.

owners and thus empowered to select new members of the orchestra and to their own boards (i.e., worker directors). They then make all the principal organizational, financial, and policy decisions, recruit paid employees (from the chief conductor and the chief executive/general manager on downwards) or delegate those duties as they so choose.

It should be noted that the LSO and Royal Philharmonic Orchestra players in the early 20th century (those were the only two self-governing orchestra in existence at the time—The Philharmonia and London Philharmonic being established mid-century), like New York's pioneering musicians, at one point forfeited their right of self-determination to charismatic impresarios in return for financial security. But they quickly took their power back. "That they would (or could) do so reflects a difference in the situation of London and New York which can be traced to a number of factors," says Couch (1983: 115). One factor cited is that "The cooperative form of organization was helped immeasurably after WWII, when Britain entered into its program of government subsidies...[thereby shielding] cooperatives from the influence of wealthy patrons" and offering them some form of financial stability and independence in return for limited governmental interference (Couch, 1983: 116). Still, in both Britain and the United States to this day, self-governing orchestras represent a distinct minority in the overall orchestra population: they are as rare as the German concept of co-determination.

By contrast, the entire German context and culture is undeniably shaped by a strong belief in and historical practice of co-determination or "Mitbestimmung" to which every organization (public and private) subscribes. Given this fact (and the law), German orchestras guarantee certain rights to the orchestra membership, including the right to choose their own music director, the Intendant (or general manager), and their fellow players (Stern, 2000). This prerogative is not left to a board of directors; it resides

with the orchestra membership. The Berlin Philharmonic (BPhO) stands out as perhaps the best-known German ensemble with its legendary "offstage" acts of self-determination such as the fight against von Karajan's hiring of the clarinetist, Sabine Meyer (Lebrecht, 1991: 124). (The first female, a Swiss violinist, had been hired into the orchestra in 1982, without incident). In this and other disputes and actions over the years, the players have vigorously defended their sovereignty. Chapter 8 details just how the BPhO model of artistic and organizational self-governance has come to be and persisted over time in the German environment.

To reiterate, most symphony and chamber orchestras around the world are not self-governing. Instead, they are run as contract orchestras with conventional, *bureaucratic organizational structures* and bifurcated leadership (i.e., a chief conductor and a chief executive) and a circumscribed role for musicians (Martorella, 1983).

Unionization

Another common feature among orchestras in the three countries is that roughly 90% of all professional orchestral musicians are members of the national musicians' union (Broughton, 2000)—be they contract orchestra members, members of self-governing orchestras, or freelancers—and they form a collective bargaining unit within the orchestra. But it is important to note that a musicians' unions' power and influence varies by country, as do national labor laws and traditions. The range of that influence is noteworthy especially as it affects the overall organizational context (Hofstede, 1980). To capture it in a phrase, when it comes to labor's rights, there is the American approach on the one hand (reflecting that country's more individualistic, market-driven orientation) and on the other extreme, the well-entrenched German approach of Mitbestimmung

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(which reflects the predominant social welfare nature of that country). Although there is no legislative mandate for "participation," Britain appears to be in the middle, with a strong trade union and Labour tradition and, like Germany, a much more pragmatic and cooperative role played by the union in orchestra dealings. It should come as no surprise then that, generally speaking, the backdrop or context for self-governance has had a more welcoming or fertile ground in Europe than in America.

Indeed, since the late 1940s, unions have been a central feature of all organizational life in Germany, most easily seen through the presence of the Personalrat (the public sector's employees' committee or workers' council) or Betriebsrat (the private sector equivalent) in every organization. The union's role via these worker councils is rooted in the democratic principles established by the modern Federal Constitution of 1948 (but it could be argued that this largely reinstated traditions that date even further back to the mid-19th century but which had been subverted or completely suppressed in the National Socialist era, 1933-1945) (Poole, 1978). For orchestras, there is also the German Musicians' Union, Deutsche Orchestervereinigung (DOV), whose main role is to provide advice, safeguard players' rights, and negotiate a master agreement called the "Tarifvertrag für die Musiker in Kulturorchestern" or TVK, which defines the terms under which players will work. The TVK applies to each and every orchestra in Germany, with only a few exceptions (Broughton, 2000). (One exception is the Berlin Philharmonic, which instead negotiates its own contract with the Berlin Senate, its primary funder.) Otherwise, the DOV does not "interfere" with internal orchestra matters (Jakoby, 1997). In fact, there are no union stewards per se in German orchestras, unlike the case of British or American symphony orchestras. The responsibility of safeguarding player rights is left to two bodies, the Personalrat and DOV, which operate in a cooperative fashion and always for the betterment of the players' work situation.

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In Britain, as was previously noted, the principal union is the Musicians Union or "MU" as it is known.[15] The MU is represented within orchestras by the position of steward (a player elected from the orchestra membership) and outside by union representatives, mainly salaried representatives of the Union, who can be called upon to assist individuals or the entire orchestra as need be (such as with grievances or during contract negotiations). It should be noted that these contracts (or "master agreements") are decided at the organization level in Britain, not at the industry level as they are in Germany with a single TVK (Broughton, 2000). Furthermore, there are no workers' councils (in the German sense) in British orchestras (i.e., bodies which represent all types of workers, both musician and non-musician), but there are players' committees (which, among other things, bring issues of concern to players to management's attention). The laws of the nation do not go so far as to set forth rights of co-determination (although Broughton (2000) reports a flurry of related legislative activity in the past few years, including the incorporation into British law and practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, and the European Union's Social Charter.) Still, the general atmosphere in the U.K. appears to be congenial among orchestra managements, players, union representatives, and funders—more so it seems than is typically the case for their counterparts in the United States (or at least as I have observed it).

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[15] There is another British musicians' organization called the Incorporated Society of Musicians, but it does not take on the kind of role the MU does, as, for example, with negotiating orchestra contracts, regarding itself as more of a professional guild than a trade union.

American orchestral players are represented by the American Federation of Musicians or, to be more specific, two subdivisions of it: the International Conference of Symphony and Opera Musicians (ICSOM) which represents players from the larger-budget symphony orchestras and opera companies, and the Regional Orchestra Players Association (ROPA) which works on behalf of players in the smaller-budget symphony orchestras across America. There are no provisions in law for workers councils or any other form of worker participation save the right of union membership. Of course, the master agreements[16] do allow for player or orchestra committees, which, as with British orchestras, interact with management on day-to-day issues of concern to the players and during contract negotiations. But union membership and orchestra committees are not the same as having direct employee involvement or participation within the governance structure of these organizations. These are very different things. In fact, as Donahue (1997: 272) has found with numerous American companies he has surveyed, "American management today believes that worker participation can somehow be divorced from worker representation." Admittedly, my observations indicate that the comparative powerlessness of American orchestra musicians has been much improved by the actions of ICSOM and ROPA over the years and especially since the 1960s (accomplished mostly through strikes and via the triannual collective bargaining agreement, not through legislative mandate or voluntarily). Otherwise, most American orchestral players to this day remain essentially uninvolved in most orchestra decision making and uninvited to orchestra boardrooms. Again, the general climate for any kind of worker involvement remains a rather unsupported endeavor compared to that in Europe. Thus, the concept and practice of self-governance in orchestras is, indeed, a rare thing in the United States.

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[16] American master agreements are negotiated at the organizational level just as in Great Britain.

Chapter Three: Previous Research on Symphony Orchestras

In this chapter, I discuss the literature on symphony orchestras in order to develop a framework for exploring the questions set out in Chapter 1. This literature shows how far our understanding of the organizational structures of symphony orchestras and the work lives of professional musicians has come in the past few decades. It also indicates what questions have been left unanswered. The material discussed here can be divided into two parts: one part is literature that I reviewed, but did not find essential to my thesis research. The other part is literature that provides "building blocks" to my study.

Overview: Previous Research on Symphony Orchestras

Fundamentally, symphony orchestras are as much about people as they are about music. As *cultural institutions*, symphony orchestras preserve and promote the musical heritage of past, present, and future composers. As *performing arts organizations*, their raison d'etre is to give live performances of a fairly specialized, though wide, range of music to live audiences. As *social enterprises*, orchestra organizations depend on the people who work in them and who support them to carry out their purposes. Precisely because they can be classified in so many ways, symphony orchestras have been studied in a wide variety of disciplines.

As complex organizations in the performing arts, orchestras have been analyzed through the lens of musicologists and historians, but also by psychologists, sociologists, economists, and those in public policy and nonprofit management. I documented this in an article on the subject some years ago (Lehman, 1995). As I indicated then, there has

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been a noticeable growth in the literature since 1960 and, especially since 1990. The bulk of what literature exists is focused on musicological topics—composers, the repertoire, conductors and the social evolution of the orchestra. Now, however, there is a large and growing literature on philanthropy in the arts, a newer and growing interest in the literature of nonprofit management, and a continuing sociological exploration into the careers of orchestral musicians and the symphony orchestra as a social institution. By contrast, until fairly recently, much less has been written about the organizational dynamics of such workplaces.

General Literature about Musicians and Orchestras

Regarding the literature germane to the general topic of orchestral musicians and orchestras, I examined numerous studies and other works such as: Hart's (1973) overview of the American orchestral system including the development of the roles of the conductor, the union, major orchestras, and the repertoire, Lehmann's (1982) look at the problems and promise of women players in orchestras, Piperek's (1981) study of the physical and psychological stresses musicians suffer, Kemp's (1986) investigation into the temperaments of musicians, Kleeh-Tohey's (1988) study of the influence of family history and training background on a musician's occupational attainment, and Jakoby's (1997) explication of the contemporary German classical music industry, and the American Symphony Orchestra League's (1993) study of orchestral provision in the U.S. and what could be done to improve the relationships between different constituencies within them.

I also reviewed industry analyses generated by The Arts Council of Great Britain (and now of England). Its staff and a succession of ad hoc committees of inquiry have

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commissioned numerous studies and provided extensive documentation about the situation for orchestras in Great Britain (see, most recently, the BBC/Arts Council of Great Britain's (1994) *Review of National Orchestral Provision* and the Arts Council of England's (1995) *Strategy for the Support and Development of Orchestras and their Audiences*). These and other white papers and reports produced over the years (not to mention the seemingly endless debate in the press, for example, Tusa, 1999) constitute a near-complete history of the contemporary U.K. orchestral environment including its pressures, prospects and critical issues. They also underscore the fact that orchestras in both the dominant model and self-governing model will continue to require subsidy. The question remains as to how best to subsidize them and from what sources, as well as how many orchestras can be sustained through such means?

Along the same lines, the numerous Arts Council studies of London's self-governing orchestras from Cottesloe (1965) and Figgures (1978) to Hoffmann (1993) addressed the subsidy and sustainability question. Whereas the Arts Councils' most recent studies have been focused on orchestral provision throughout the entire country, these older studies sought to assess the level of orchestral provision and subsidy (and whether there could be a rearrangement of it) within the environs of London. Their findings reinforce the notion that any assessment of the London orchestras must consider the twin issues of patronage and sustainability and that, under the present system of subsidy, operating an orchestra in London will continue to be subject to debate and to keen competition for subsidies, audiences, and players. These studies did not deconstruct the self-governing model or examine the careers of musicians who played in them as has my thesis research.

Although these studies are important in their own right and represent various aspects of the orchestra literature, the net I cast is a smaller one. I am concerned with the literature about *the structures* of orchestra organizations and *the roles* (and attitudes) of musicians who play in them, especially any such study of a comparative nature.

Building Blocks to This Thesis

I have ordered the next set of studies in a chronological way in order to show the reader how our learning about orchestral musicians, orchestra structures, and, especially, cross-national comparisons has progressed over the years. (For a summary of this material, see **Exhibit 3.1** at the end of the chapter). I begin with a discussion of a few important studies from the pre-1990 period and then move quickly to the present day.

Older studies, 1960-1990

Westby (1960) was one of the first to study the attitudes of professional orchestral musicians. Westby's research focused on the career aspirations and prospects for players in one major American symphony orchestra in the late 1950s. He found that there was a schism between young players who were new to the orchestra and older permanent players. The younger ones had high ambitions and were willing to change orchestras in order to advance their careers while older musicians were resigned to staying put. This degree of mobility affected the relationship among members of the orchestra. Arian's (1971) *Bach, Beethoven and Bureaucracy: The Case of the Philadelphia Orchestra* was another early work that described the trials and tribulations of professional orchestral musicians and, in this particular organization, as it became

increasingly dependent on box office receipts and record royalties. Arian said the financial needs of the organization put pressure on artistic decisions (e.g., pressure to reduce costs and provide repertoire the public wanted) and ultimately took precedence over purely artistic goals, thus alienating much of the orchestra membership.

This line of research was picked up by Faulkner, who conducted numerous studies about professional musicians, including "Career concerns and mobility motivations of orchestral musicians" (Faulkner, 1973b). Faulkner's (1973b) study of the subjective experiences of fifty musicians in a major American symphony orchestra parallel Westby's (1960) earlier findings. Faulkner found that musicians had to manage "the disjunction between personal aspirations for success and the avenues available for their concrete realization" (Faulkner, 1973b: 347) and the fact that symphony orchestras are among "the most complex, competitive, and stratified organizational sets in existence" (Faulkner, 1973b: 334). In other words, if a musician does not advance within the ranks by a certain age or time period, then he or she must accept their lot (some perceived this as "entrapment" while others saw the benefits and opportunities of longevity within an orchestra). Faulkner discussed how players made individual adjustments as they reconciled their particular ambitions and career options with reality and how many players accepted the tradeoff between mobility and the "side benefits" of permanence (e.g., more leisure time, firmer roots in the community, more time for family and friends).

Sociologists like Faulker have been at the forefront of research on musicians and their orchestras. They have investigated the career outlooks, motivations, and horizons of the professional orchestra musician and the unique nature of orchestras as social systems. They have exposed the reasons why certain organizational structures have

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come to be and persisted over time. This is precisely what Kamerman and Martorella (1983) aimed to do in their substantial book: *Performers & Performances: The Social Organization of Artistic Work.* Chapters of particular relevance to the symphony orchestra include Faulkner's (1983) "Orchestra interaction: Communication and authority in an artistic organization" in which he describes one of the central sources of organizational conflict—the relationship between the music director and the musicians. He found that, as in other performing arts and sports organizations, "organizational success and effectiveness are closely tied to the efforts of the team leader" [in this case the conductor] and how he or she relates and communicates with their "team" [in this case the orchestra membership] (Faulkner, 1983: 82).

Martorella's chapter, "Rationality in the Artistic Management of Performing Arts Organizations," also provides important background material for this thesis. Although her focus is on all of the performing arts, her comments are applicable to orchestras. For example, she explains how leadership has been transferred from the charismatic "impresarios" of the 19th and early 20th centuries to the "rational administrator" of the mid-20th century and today. She argues that rationality in artistic management, expressed by the employment of business techniques, has resulted in routinization over innovation, a preference for efficiency over artistic goals (things that were cited by Arian in his study of the Philadelphia Orchestra noted above). She also described "the ambivalent nature of the performing arts organization, which must serve community needs and fulfill artistic goals, yet sustain itself as an organization" (Kamerman & Martorella, 1983: 93).

Another chapter in Kamerman and Martorella which relates even more closely to the focus of this thesis is that of Couch (1983) cited in Chapter 2. In "Patronage and Organizational Structure in Symphony Orchestras in London and New York," Couch

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discussed why the cooperative form of organization failed to survive in the U.S. as it did in Britain. He attributes this to the fact that "differences in the development of capitalism in England and the United States created different possibilities and constraints on the patronage support available to symphony orchestras, which in turn influenced the orchestras' organizational structures" (Couch, 1983: 115). The perpetuation of the cooperative form of organization in Britain is a result of the program of government subsidies that "served to protect the cooperatives from the influence of wealthy patrons" (who, by contrast, came to dominate the boards of American orchestras and, thereby, were allowed to "appropriate" the orchestra) (Couch, 1983: 116).

In short, this book is full of insightful studies, but it begs further research that reflects the present day and age (as well as more comparisons with other orchestras and in other countries). This is being addressed by the work of graduate students.

Graduate Student Research, 1990-2002

The findings of graduate student research has been particularly helpful to the understanding of orchestras and players' work lives largely because it is comparative and, often, cross-cultural in nature. These students have been keen on understanding such things as the role of cultural influences in the way orchestras are led or managed, how various national cultural policies differentially affect orchestras, the organizational structures of American and European orchestras, as well as various studies of player satisfaction.

Atik's (1993) thesis, for example, "The conductor and the orchestra: A study in leadership, culture, and authority," explored the relationship between conductors

(permanent and guest) and their orchestras in three different ensembles. Atik's findings include a description of the impact of cultural influences on conductors (both organizational cultures and the national culture of the conductor and the orchestra) as well as the different kinds of leadership (e.g., charismatic versus transactional) that conductors exhibit vis-à-vis musicians. Hannesson's (1998) thesis, "Symphony orchestras in Scandinavia and Britain," has made a large contribution to existing knowledge with his comparative research on arts policy in six countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Great Britain). His findings inform us about how such policies affect the operations and self-perceptions of professional symphony orchestras (and their chief executives) in those countries. Kam (2000), a violist with the Israel Philharmonic Orchestra (IPO), conducted a superficial comparative study of symphony orchestras, entitled "Different organizational structures of orchestras: Description and evaluation," as the basis for her masters degree at San Francisco State University. I say it is superficial because Kam relies heavily on secondary sources including my own writings about the Colorado, Berlin, and Orpheus orchestras. She never interviewed players or observed the orchestras she discusses, except in the case of the IPO, where she works. Still, her thesis makes interesting comparisons between several orchestras including: the New York Philharmonic, San Francisco Symphony, Colorado Symphony, Berlin Philharmonic, IPO, Milwaukee Symphony, Orpheus Chamber Orchestra, and the Louisiana Philharmonic.

Regarding player satisfaction, Pichanick (1999) generated particularly intriguing results with her research, albeit a small-scale study, about younger and older players in one regional and one major American symphony orchestra. For example, she found that players in both orchestras were equally satisfied with work-specific components of their jobs (e.g., job involvement, co-workers, etc.), but when it came to satisfaction with

objective measures such as pay and job security, major orchestra players were more satisfied (perhaps not so surprisingly). Further, with respect to emotional components of the job (e.g., growth and influence opportunities), Pichanick found that satisfaction increased with tenure for *regional* players, whereas satisfaction decreased with tenure at the major orchestra (perhaps again somewhat expected given what we already know about orchestras, but still a rather discomforting paradox). Feile (2002), himself a former principal cellist in a London self-governing orchestra, recently completed a comparative survey study of players in two London orchestras: one, the BBC Symphony Orchestra, the other a London self-governing orchestra. His findings revealed how players in two very different kinds of orchestras perceive their work, their workloads, and private lives. Feile found that the work schedule for both orchestras is irregular, but that the workload for the London self-governing orchestra is much higher than at the BBC orchestra. Feile concluded that this leads to a strain on the players' "private and family life," an inability to find balance. Overall, he found that the players in both orchestras are motivated by the enjoyment and stimulation of their profession, but that "in the setting within a symphony orchestra, they lack sufficient opportunity for personal and professional growth" (Feile, 2002: 54).

All of the above mentioned studies provide good research that begins to fill in the gaps in our understanding of life and work in symphony orchestras and players' perceptions of it. But they beg further and more comprehensive research about the work lives of contemporary professional musicians.

Of all the academic research, the most relevant to my research focus have been three studies: Maitlis' (1998) doctoral thesis, "Decision making in British Symphony Orchestras," Broughton's (2000) master's thesis, "Industrial relations and collective

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bargaining structures in symphony orchestras: A comparison of the U.K. and Germany," and the Harvard-Max Planck Cross-national Study of Symphony Orchestras (Allmendinger, et. al., 1996). These studies contribute to the subject matter of my thesis in part, not in whole: Maitlis' work is relevant because of what she learns about the differences between contract and self-governing British orchestras. Broughton's work is relevant because of her focus on the industrial relations in the symphony orchestra sector in two of the three countries in my research. The Harvard-Max Planck study overlaps mine in that research was conducted in all three countries: Germany, the U.S. and U.K. It also provides relevant data on the general views of orchestral players in these nations. But the Harvard-Max Planck study does not include an in-depth study of the self-governing orchestral form and the musicians who play in them as this thesis has done.

Maitlis' thesis involved a study of the decision-making processes of three British symphony orchestras: one, a regional contract orchestra, another, a BBC contract orchestra, and the third, a London self-governing orchestra. The research included descriptions of the different formal and informal decision making structures, information flows, and degrees of player participation. She also recorded players' satisfaction with each of the three systems of governance and decision making. The findings showed that player participation was built into the fabric of the self-governing orchestra and, there, players had the most influence on decision making. Whereas, in the regional contract orchestra, players had substantial representation on its multiple decision-making committees and subcommittees, but they were not highly influential in decision outcomes. In the BBC orchestra, "formally-staged interaction between players and management was much rarer and overall, player input was very limited" (Maitlis, 1997: 53). Maitlis went on to suggest that players' satisfaction with their orchestras' decision-

making systems was tied to the players' desire for involvement. This desire, in turn, she discovered was related to four factors: the opportunity to be involved, whether players felt they had the requisite expertise to be involved in and influence decision making, the individual personalities of key player representatives, and the perceived competence of the official decision makers. Interestingly, she found that in the London self-governing orchestra, "the players' belief in their own potential power appeared more important than the frequency with which they exercised these rights " (Maitlis, 1997: 53).

Broughton's (2000) thesis explored the collective bargaining systems in the U.K. and Germany as they relate to symphony orchestras and found that there were marked differences between the industrial relations of these two countries with respect to the collective bargaining agreements and the rights of workers. These differences, in turn, relate to the historical development of their national systems. For example, she found that, "Whereas the co-determination tradition is very strong in Germany and is underpinned by three separate bodies of legislation, there is no provision for employee involvement at the board level in the U.K. Neither is there any statutory provision for co-determination regarding the rights of works councils in the U.K." (Broughton, 2000: 2). Further, Broughton learned that whereas in Germany, the system produces binding agreements regarding pay and working conditions that can be applied across the entire orchestra industry, in the U.K., agreements are predominantly negotiated at the level of the firm. Germany has a more centralized collective bargaining system and the U.K. a more decentralized system. Indeed, she found that all orchestras in Germany are covered by the national collective agreement for the orchestra sector, with the exception of a handful of top-level orchestras such as the Berlin Philharmonic and the Munich Philharmonic.

In the U.K., Broughton notes the dichotomy that exists between the London orchestras and the rest of the country. "Individual orchestra collective bargaining agreements in the provinces are negotiated between management and union representatives, with the support of the Musicians Union and Association of British Orchestras (ABO). But the London self-governing orchestras and the BBC orchestras negotiate their own contracts without the direct assistance of the Musicians Union or ABO" (although other orchestra's agreements are often used as guidelines) (Broughton, 2000: 12). Finally, Broughton noted a distinct penchant for consensus building in both the U.K. and German orchestral sectors no matter who had the ultimate authority within the orchestra structure. "In practice, a subject would be discussed until consensus was reached, on the premise that in such a tightly-knit environment, everyone must be happy with a particular outcome" (Broughton, 2000: 22).

The Harvard-Max Planck Study of Symphony Orchestras, 1990-1996

The main findings of the Harvard-Max Planck Cross-National Study with which I was involved as a researcher back in the early 1990s have bearing on my own study. This general survey or "mapping study" of professional symphony orchestras in East and West Germany, the U.K. and the U.S. was designed to show how orchestras were structured, supported, and led in those countries and how musicians made their careers in them. The study, though general and wide in scope, encompassed subtopics, which allowed the researchers to study in more depth a few key topics such as the impact of gender on orchestra dynamics (Allmendinger & Hackman, 1995) and the changing orchestral landscape of Germany (Allmendinger & Hackman, 1994). As noted in Chapter 1, the self-governing orchestra and its inner workings was not a main subtopic of this broad research project.

The principal findings of this survey study related to player satisfaction measures and a music director's influence on the ensemble. (There were no findings that directly related to a comparison of organizational models as is done in this thesis.) Besides data from observations and interviews, the source of these findings are drawn from the player survey administered to a random sample of musicians in each of the subject orchestras. In total, 924 musicians responded (159 West German, 355 East German, 288 American, and 122 U.K. players). The 87-item survey is shown in **Appendix D** (I later used data from this survey in my own thesis analysis). The main survey results were as follows:

First, players in all four countries were generally less satisfied with their work lives and with their opportunities for personal and professional growth and development when compared to other professionals studied by Hackman (1990). (This was a finding that *The New York Times'* chief music critic thought most intriguing and he proceeded to label it, "the Federal Prison Guard effect" (Holland, 1995) because orchestral musicians ranked below federal prison guards in their satisfaction levels). What was not clear was the source of this discontent--be it in the nature of the players' work as Hall (1983) suggests in Chapter 1 or with the structure and governance of the organization. No further inquiry was made in order to determine the reasons for this outcome since it was beyond the scope of the original project.

In terms of rank order, the German orchestra players were the most generally satisfied with their work lives, followed by the players in the U.K. (with the London self-governing members reporting the highest satisfaction in that country) and then the U.S. players (no difference was found between major and regional orchestra players in this country). Again, no further research was done to illuminate the finding of general

satisfaction. In the U.S., as Pichanick (1999) later also found, regional orchestra players were more satisfied with growth opportunities than their counterparts in the major orchestras (a finding that is attributed to opportunities for mobility, as the studies of Faulkner (1973b) and Westby (1960) also suggested).

A second finding from the player survey was that, overall, players were not happy with their compensation. Most satisfied with their pay, however, were the West German and major American orchestra players and the London self-governing orchestra players. A third finding was that West German and American players reported the highest levels of job security whereas the London self-governing orchestra members reported the least amount of job security. This is consistent with the fact that players in London self-governing orchestras are paid on a fee-for-service basis with no long-term contracts. Another finding was that, in general, symphony players were not well-satisfied with the managers of their orchestra operations. The most satisfied on this dimension, however, were the London self-governing orchestra players. This may be due to the fact that the players have the right to hire and fire the managing director.

Finally, regarding aspects of orchestra structure and operations, four findings are relevant as they point to (but do not fully explain) the differences between contract and cooperative orchestras in the four countries: 1) Players in German orchestras and in the London self-governing orchestras reported the highest levels of "integrity as an ensemble." 2) Player involvement and opportunities were the highest for London self-governing orchestras and lowest for major American orchestral players and those in the BBC orchestras. 3) German and London players reported the highest levels regarding the amount of recognition and reward for excellent playing. 4) Adequacy of resources and the dominance of the conductor's role were lowest in the London self-governing

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orchestra members' reports and highest among major American orchestra players surveyed.

In conclusion, Hackman, the co-principal investigator, sums up the main theme of the overall study in a letter to an American foundation:

> A major theme of our research findings is that the artistic and organizational features of symphony orchestras are inextricably intertwined. To have a wonderful orchestral organization is nothing in the absence of an exciting and challenging artistic direction...but equally frustrating and demoralizing to orchestra players and leaders is pursuing a challenging artistic vision in the absence of the organizational means and managerial skill required to achieve it. There is a tight bind between the artistic and organizational sides of symphony orchestras. The upside is seen when an orchestra has both great artistic ideas and a well-functioning organization (Quoted in a letter to The Knight Foundation, 30 March 1996).

What this research revealed, in my view, is that the greatest challenge to symphony orchestra organizations today is related more to matters of organizational behavior than to financial concerns (although I agree that they are intertwined). Orchestras are grappling with how best to engage player involvement and commitment, how to structure roles and relationships, and, most importantly, how to attain the full potential of a musical ensemble. Answers to these challenges are addressed by current theory and practice in organizational behavior (a subject to which we turn in the next chapter) and, I would argue, in the findings of this thesis (as we will see in subsequent chapters).

Exhibit 3.1

Summary of the Relevant Literature in Chronological Order

Author	Year	# Orchestra Sites	Country	Focus and Findings
Westby	1960	one	USA	musicians' career aspirations and mobility; findings about younger vs. older players
Arian	1971	one	USA	work lives of the Philadelphia Orchestra musicians; findings about major orchestra life
Faulkner	1973b	one	USA	career concerns of musicians; findings about subjective experiences and individual adjustment
Faulkner	1983	one	USA	conductor-orchestra communication; findings about this critical relationship
Couch	1983	two	US, UK	cooperative orchestras; findings the development of this type in these countries
Atik	1993	three	UK	conductor's leadership style; findings about the conductor-orchestra relationship
Harvard-Max Planck	1996	78	UK, USA and Germany	comparison of structures and players' perceptions; findings about cross-national differences and similarities
Hannesson	1998	83	Scandanavian and UK	cultural policies and chief executives; findings about national systems and their effects; good use of surveys
Maitlis	1998	three	UK	decision making in a contract, BBC and a cooperative orchestra; findings about players' role in each structure
Pichanick	1999	two	USA	players in a major vs. minor orchestra; findings about job satisfaction

Exhibit 3.1 continued

Author	Year	# Orchestra Sites	Country	Focus and Findings
Broughton	2000	N/A	Germany and UK	national industrial relations in symphony orchestra sector; findings about collective bargaining and unionization
Kam	2000	8	USA and Israel	descriptive comparison of symphony orchestras; findings about general structural differences
Feile	2002	2	UK	work lives of a BBC and cooperative orchestra; findings about job satisfaction, workloads, and work-life balance

Chapter Four: Research Methods

This study was conducted with a specific research focus in mind: to discover how (and how well) self-governing orchestras work and what role musicians have in them. My interest, put simply, is with those orchestras which allow (and foster) the maximum amount of musician involvement in artistic, organizational, and governance matters. Findings from this study were integrated with findings from a critical review of previous research to show how the four orchestras I have studied differed from the dominant model of orchestra organization and from each other. In addition to describing how the four field sites are structured and how they operate, I also attempted to develop an understanding of their organizational effectiveness.

By organizational effectiveness for an orchestra, I mean that the organization has a compelling and distinctive artistic vision as the primary orienting focus and its business strategy is designed to support that. There is alignment within the organization, between its purpose and its structure and between its espoused goals and the roles people play in achieving them (Galbraith, 1995; Fogel, 2000). Another way to evaluate orchestra effectiveness is to analyze how the organization's *direction, structure, membership, and leadership* are handled since each serves critical, foundational needs in organizations.[1] This, I do in the presentation of each orchestra case. In this chapter, I discuss the research methods used and the framework for analyzing the findings before moving ahead in subsequent chapters to each case study.

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[1] Here, I draw on Hackman's (1986) theory of self-managing organizations and Hackman and Walton's (1986) view of leading groups in organizations.

Choice of Methods and Sites

The methods used in this research follow the approaches taken by Faulkner (1973b) and Allmendinger et. al. (1996). They are multi-method, making use of extensive semi-structured interviews, observations, review of archival materials, and the findings of player surveys. I also draw on the case study method as described by Yin who defines it as "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and in which multiple sources of methods are used" (Yin, 1984: 20). He points out that the case study's unique strength is its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence--- documents, artifacts, interviews, and observations. This thesis has relied on all that evidence and, at base, is a synthesis of a stream of research that began nearly a decade ago.

Furthermore, Eisenhardt (1989) describes the research strategy employed in the case study method as being focused on understanding the dynamics present within single or multiple settings. I have chosen multiple settings in order to make comparisons across orchestras and across countries. This study is not a retrospective or a history; it is a contemporary look into the dynamics of how a select sample of orchestras function. This study can also be characterized as longitudinal field research because in the process of trying to capture a "snapshot" of each organization, the data collection extended over a long period of time during which "organizational change emerged, developed and grew" (Huber & Van de Ven, 1995: viii). More specifically, there were clear signs, albeit to varying degrees, of adaptation, change, innovation, and redesign in the four orchestras under study during the time period that each were observed.

Choice of sites

The research sites were selected based on several criteria. First, the sites were selected to represent organizations at different life-stages. The Berlin Philharmonic and London Symphony Orchestra represent the oldest and, therefore, most sustained efforts at self-governance among the population of self-governing orchestras in existence (refer back to **Exhibit 1.1** for a complete listing). Orpheus Chamber Orchestra is but one-quarter the age of those two ensembles, and Colorado has barely started, comparatively speaking, with just 13 years of operation as an organization based on democratic principles. Secondly, they were representative of the self-governing model in their countries. Furthermore, in each case, they were the first orchestras to be self-governing. In the U.S., Orpheus Chamber Orchestra was one of the first ensembles to run on a cooperative basis and, certainly, Colorado was the first in the U.S. symphony orchestra field to try a different model of organization. Berlin is arguably the best-known German orchestra, the same might be said of the LSO, the oldest of the London self-governing orchestras.

In principle at least, if time and funds had permitted, further research would have been conducted on the full complement of self-governing orchestras around the globe. However, such a study would have resulted in a work far longer than would be acceptable as a doctoral thesis. The research for this study began with a close and independent examination of three organizations.[2] These were: the London Symphony Orchestra--one of London's four self-governing orchestras, the Colorado Symphony--not

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[2] By independent, I mean that I looked at each organization by itself, independent of the others, when I first began my research. Later on, I intentionally grouped them in order to make comparisons across the four organizations, detailing their differences and similarities. This is consistent with the qualitative research methods set forth by Straus and Corbin (1990).

a true self-governing orchestra, but still an anomaly in its early partnership model, and New York City's Orpheus Chamber Orchestra--the conductor-less ensemble. Later, the opportunity arose to extend the research to the fourth and final orchestra in this study, the Berlin Philharmonic.

These orchestras, although but a handful, reveal a wide range of democratic and self-governing approaches that musicians have taken to shape their collective musical lives in ways that harness the power of the group without stultifying the voice of the individual. To put it another way, these orchestra organizations have pushed the limit of musician involvement and "ownership" to the maximum extent possible, in stark contrast to the roles played by their counterparts in the dominant model of orchestra organization. As previously noted, research on these four organizations persisted over most of the past decade; each orchestra studied sequentially and intensively at different times: The Colorado Symphony (from 1990-2000); The London Symphony Orchestra (from 1993-1999); Orpheus Chamber Orchestra (from 1994-1999); and The Berlin Philharmonic (1997-2001).

Access to information at research sites

The observations that were made, interviews conducted, and assessments made all resulted from a different combination of formal access and opportunities afforded at each site. For example, I essentially had unlimited access to organizational members and meetings at Orpheus Chamber Orchestra, aided by the fact that the geographic distance between my home base in Boston and the orchestra's facilities in New York City was very small. At Colorado, although I might have been granted more access to meetings and other research opportunities, the fact that I conducted my research on a

part-time basis and was at a great distance from the Denver research site were both important mitigating factors. Regarding the Berlin Philharmonic and the London Symphony Orchestra (LSO), the geographic distance presented logistical difficulties, but at these sites, the more important barrier to a fuller inspection and analysis lay in the fact that access was restricted. Generally speaking, I was not allowed to attend organizational meetings or to observe other critical events (such as discussions about long-term strategy at the LSO or the choice of the future music director at the Berlin Philharmonic), although I was informed of the details of these developments later on. Further, in the case of Berlin, even if access had been granted, another barrier was language. The research that did happen was facilitated by the fact that I employed a native speaker to help with interviews (conducted in German), and that, thankfully, several Berlin players, the Intendant, and other relevant actors were willing to and spoke fluent English. In short, not being near or on-site for any great length of time made the case study research more difficult (despite the large number of telephone interviews and e-mail exchanges). However, in the end, a great deal of data and insight were gained in spite of the study's limitations.

Amount and Type of Data Collected

The methodology used for this thesis draws not only on the qualitative methods such as the case study, but also it integrates the findings of previous studies, particularly the results of the player survey administered in the Harvard-Max Planck study. Through the use of archival data, direct observations (at the orchestra's home hall, administrative offices, and, in some cases, when the orchestra was on tour), and especially unstructured interviews, I sought to triangulate on my particular set of research questions (reiterated below).

Appendix B provides an example of the documentation sent to the prospective research sites. **Appendix C** indicates the number of interviews, visits, and other sources of information collected on each orchestra. The description of the four case studies relies on these interviews and data. (Unless otherwise specified, quotes in Chapters 5 through 8 are purposely anonymous because interviewees were guaranteed confidentiality.) **Appendix D** shows the player survey (adopted from the Harvard-Max Planck study) which was administered by mail to players in the Colorado Symphony Orchestra and the Orpheus Chamber Orchestra during the 1995-96 season. I draw on an analysis of these surveys and those of the Harvard Max-Planck study (which included the same survey administered to a sample of players in the Berlin Philharmonic and the LSO, as well as 76 other orchestras) in Chapter 10. The player surveys provide another method of inquiry into the nature of orchestral work in the two models and players' perceptions of it. Another tool introduced in this research was electronic mail correspondence (see, for example, my correspondence with the Colorado Symphony Orchestra, **Appendix G**). This additional method has been an extremely helpful way of conducting research over time, for keeping in touch with key actors and abreast of important organizational developments, and for bridging the geographic distances involved. In sum, I have used the methods I thought would best "explain, describe, and explore" the organizations under study (Yin, 1984: 25).

The Research Questions

The research questions I posed in Chapter 1 were:

1. In what ways are these self-governing orchestras structured and governed differently from the dominant model of contract orchestras? What role has national context played in how they are organized and operated?

2. In what ways do musicians' roles differ in the two models (self-governing versus contract) and across the four cases under study? How do musicians describe their roles in these types of orchestras? For example, do they perceive themselves as more motivated and committed to the organization?

3. What has been the overall outcome of these orchestras (both artistically and organizationally)? Is there "organizational alignment" (Fogel, 2000)?

4. And, finally, what can be concluded about these organizational and governance structures? Do the policies and practices of these high involvement orchestras inform other kinds of organizations and, if so, how?

In gathering data about these primary research questions, I incorporated the approach to data collection by Faulkner (1973b) and Allmendinger, et. al. (1996). With respect to data analysis, I looked to the work of Hackman (1986) "The Psychology of Self-management in Organizations" and Lawler's (1986) *High Involvement Management*. I did this because their foci added additional perspectives to my own research into self-governing organizations.

For example, Hackman (1986) focused on two key aspects of self-managing organizations: 1) how authority is distributed and 2) what behaviors are exhibited within the organization. He found that people in self-managing work units were more likely to take responsibility for the outcomes of their work and felt personally accountable for their results. They continuously monitored and managed their own performance, sought guidance and resources when needed, and took initiatives to help others. This was

different from "manager-led" units where authority was not distributed and employees were less likely to exhibit such proactive behaviors. In his conclusion, Hackman described the five conditions that foster and support effective self-management. Those are: a clear and engaging direction, an enabling structure for the performing unit, a supportive organizational context, available expert coaching and consultation, and adequate material resources.

In appraising the extent and quality of "high involvement management", Lawler (1986) examined an organization's values, structure, information sharing, rewards, job designs, selection and training systems, the role of unions, trust, leadership, and power and knowledge sharing. Lawler found significant differences in these areas between traditionally-managed organizations and those based on "high involvement." For example, Lawler found that effective high involvement organizations "put power, rewards, knowledge, and an upward and downward information flow in place at the lower levels of an organization" (Lawler, 1986:43). I, therefore, looked at these same dimensions in my research and also found differences between the dominant model of orchestra organization and the self-governing model. By building on the approaches taken by Hackman and Lawler, I not only was able to generate a large volume of data but a more complete understanding of the the organizational structures and player behaviors in the orchestras I studied.

Quality control and Validity

With respect to my research design, the "unit of analysis" is quite clear: it is the orchestra. But I did not, from the outset, design a multiple-case study of self-governing ensembles and then proceed to investigate them en masse and all at once. Rather this

thesis is the result of an iterative process: an opportunity to conduct one case study arose and then another; each, in turn, leading to and informing the next case. This approach is consistent with the kind of qualitative research described by Straus and Corbin (1990). They say, "Data collection, analysis, and theory stand in reciprocal relationship with each other. One does not begin with a theory, and prove it. Rather, one begins with an area of study and what is relevant to that area is allowed to emerge" (Straus & Corbin, 1990: 23). To my benefit, each succeeding orchestra case offered distinct differences (as well as similarities) to the others studied and, therefore, helped to enrich my understanding of the overall phenomenon under investigation, as well as, improved the approach taken to subsequent cases.

I believe that this research passes the relevant quality control criteria (Yin, 1984): it has construct validity (the operational set of measures used to evaluate the organizations have been tested and validated (e.g., Hackman, 1986; Lawler, 1986) and multiple sources of evidence were used); the study has external validity (the findings have analytical generalizability to other musician-involved orchestras and to other self-managing organizations); and, finally, the study is replicable (the case study protocol and research design, albeit imperfect, would, if utilized by other investigators, provide reliable results). Moreover, I would also go so far as to say that I have generated a checklist of conditions necessary for orchestra self-governance, which is testable in future research (Eisenhardt, 1989).

The next four chapters are a discussion of the findings from my research. Each chapter provides a description of the organization at the time it was under study. Some assessment of the orchestra's structure and operations is offered in these chapters, but

the main comparative analysis of the four orchestras is reserved until Chapter 9, Discussion of the Findings of this Research.

Chapter Five: The Colorado Symphony Orchestra

Snapshot: Main period of primary research, 1990-1995, with follow-up 1997-2000

Established: 1989
Concerts/season: 42-week season
Principal venue: Boettcher Hall (in downtown Denver, Colorado)
1998-99 budget: $8.7 million
Orchestra size: 78
Conductor: Marin Alsop, music director
Executive director: Tom Bacchetti, as of 1997
Player contract type/
 Average income: Salaried with bonus based on financial targets; $30,000/year
Governing body: Board of trustees (with 1/3 player membership)

The Colorado Symphony Orchestra case is a particularly appropriate way to begin the presentation of the findings of my research. This is because the Colorado Symphony Orchestra is the most recent example of a group of players abandoning the dominant model of orchestra organization for an alternative form. And, it is the most successful *symphony* orchestra, in the U.S. thus far, to have adopted this kind of governance structure (Johnson, 1993). Other attempts at musician-led orchestras after their organizations have gone into bankruptcy have been tried, but none have succeeded for very long (ICA, 1992). As with other musician-involved orchestras that preceded it, players in Colorado literally discarded their former orchestra structure in order to start over with one that they hoped would be more vibrant artistically, more equitable in terms of rights, responsibilities, and rewards, and more stable organizationally and financially. The new structure created at the Colorado Symphony was based on principles of self-governance. What this case reveals is the difficulty of changing from one system to another (from the dominant industry model to an alternative form) and "the unbelievable persistence required to get it right," as one player said (Yeingst, 1990).

Overview

Like the London Symphony Orchestra, which will be discussed in Chapter 8, the Colorado Symphony Orchestra (CSO) was the idea of a "renegade" group of players who would no longer accept their organizational circumstances and wanted to take control over what they referred to as "their tumultuous work lives" (Abosch, 1992). This is what happened when players of the Denver Symphony Orchestra (DSO) were faced with the bankruptcy and closure of their orchestra in the 1988-89 season. Veteran DSO players, players who had lived through several other near-bankruptcies of the orchestra, had had enough. They decided to start their own orchestra. As one player said, "We have too much invested in our work together to see the orchestra completely disbanded. So a few of us took the responsibility and stuck it out" (Endsley, 1995).

At the time of the CSO's founding in 1989-90, players reported feelings of euphoria more than fear as they embarked on their new undertaking (Johnson, 1993). Years later, however, veteran orchestra members recognized that they had been overly optimistic and that several organizational problems remained unresolved. Years after the battle to reconstitute itself, some players remained optimistic, others were not so sanguine. Among this latter group's chief concerns were: how to better craft and implement a *collective* vision of the organization, how to engage all constituencies in their democratic process and to communicate information widely, how to strengthen relationships and build mutual trust, and how best to share leadership. Moreover, the CSO had evolved into a hybrid form (not a full-fledged self-governing system), what organizational members called a "partnership." With no other American self-governing *symphony* orchestras to serve as role models, players and managers at the Colorado

Symphony had to create their own policies and procedures and develop their own systems and practices. Indeed, the CSO became the forerunner of other efforts to create more high involvement orchestras in the U.S. such as the Louisiana Philharmonic Orchestra.

The CSO's History and Context

It is worth delving into the history of the Colorado Symphony Orchestra since it is the "youngest" of the four orchestras studied in this research, but, more importantly, because it shows how difficult it is to turn around and rebuild an existing organization—for them, creating a new organization from one that had gone bankrupt. According to a player-board member, "Caution is our middle name. We are more afraid of failure than mediocrity. The orchestra failed once, and that made a major impression" (Howard, 1997). Indeed, like a phoenix rising from the ashes, the CSO was born in 1989 out of the fateful circumstances of the Denver Symphony Orchestra, which had unfailingly served the community in one form or another for 55 years. In many ways, the birth of the CSO reads like a page from the history of Denver's founding:

"...[Denver was established] during the great 'Pike's Peak or Bust' gold rush of 1859 when some small flakes of gold were found where the South Platte River meets Cherry Creek. In its first few years, Denver survived a flood, several major fires, Indian attacks, and even raised an army that defeated an invading force of Confederates during the Civil War. With the discovery of more gold in the mountains, Denver became a boom town. Saloons, gambling halls and wagon trains lined the mud-filled streets and every outlaw, lawman and desperado in the West made at least one visit to the Mile High City." (Denver Tourist Handbook, 1990).

Those who created the Colorado Symphony fought no less hard than the early Denverites who battled flood, fire, Indians, and Confederates. Indeed, CSO musicians survived their own kind of civil war, convincing colleagues that it was possible to turn a

bankrupt symphony orchestra into a stable and financially-sound ensemble while running it as a "partnership."

The demise of the Denver Symphony Orchestra, like most organizational deaths, was long and protracted. Accounts of it filled the pages of *The Rocky Mountain News* and *The Denver Post* for years. It was the result of a recurring series of miscalculations, misunderstandings, and general mismanagement (see **APPENDIX E** for a chronology of the DSO's dissolution). One consulting team report summarized the troubled history:

The Denver Symphony Orchestra has had a history of labor-management difficulties and financial crises for more than the last decade. There were work stoppages in 1973, 1974, 1977, 1980, several of them accompanied by emergency fundraising efforts or special community leadership panels to find solutions to the immediate problems. In each case, these efforts were narrowly focused "survival" campaigns, directed at solving the labor crisis at hand, not as part of a long-range plan for the financial health of the organization. Particularly acute were the stoppages [strikes] of 1977 (9.5 weeks) and 1980 (11.5 weeks). (ICSOM Consulting Team, 1987).

After a lengthy and episodic period of negotiations aimed at rescuing the 1988-89 season, the debate over the DSO's ultimate fate was finally determined when the musicians unanimously rejected an offer from the board of trustees in March of that season. Veteran members of the orchestra had come to the end of their ability to stomach the vicious cycle of "three-year Olympics," as one player called the process of contract negotiations that had characterized their employment with the Denver Symphony (Yeingst, 1995). If they had to suffer a precarious existence, the musicians believed they would be better off doing so by running things themselves. That fall, by an overwhelming majority, the ex-DSO musicians voted their new cooperative orchestra into existence.

At first, their experiment was not taken very seriously. In fact, after the musicians' secession, members of the Denver Symphony Association, the parent body of the DSO, were busy working on a plan of reorganization under the bankruptcy code and calculating how to rebuild the orchestra to carry out the next season. The then-executive director wrote, "While the Association does not support the concept of the new orchestra, it is not hindering the musicians or its activities. We simply do not believe this experiment can work" (Maxwell, 1989). To some extent, he was correct. The experiment was an extraordinarily difficult undertaking. Led by a core group of veteran musicians, including Lee Yeingst (violist), David Abosch (principal oboist), Melanie Burrell (cellist), Pam Endsley (flutist) and Eric Bertoluzzi (cellist), together with the moral support of staff and even a few DSO board members, the CSO barely survived the first months of its existence.

Indeed, after the initial euphoria of striking out on their own with the help of rock promoter Barry Fey who organized their debut concert, things got progressively worse. Attendance at Boettcher Hall in downtown Denver, the orchestra's prime venue with 2,600 seats, averaged just 800 per concert; musicians' salaries were only 50% of what they had hoped for--a paltry $11,000 for the 30-week season. Reviews of the CSO by local newspaper music critics were rather negative and the comments were not optimistic about the future; and relations with Barry Fey quickly went sour. With the orchestra on the verge of collapse after only eight months, the Colorado musicians agreed to accept an offer to merge with the still-extant Denver Symphony Association. In May of 1990, the CSO formally merged with the DSA to create the Colorado Symphony Association. By this decision, the new orchestra built a bridge with its past while moving forward with its reconstituted organizational and governance structure. (It

also assured the orchestra of vital sources of funding--most notably the nearly $1 million annual allocation from Denver's Scientific Cultural Facilities District Fund, as well as other assets of the DSA.

At the time, members of the new Colorado Symphony Orchestra were under extreme pressure as they began their first full, regular season in 1990-91. Again and again in my interviews with players, they reiterated that trust had to be restored, both with external supporters and internally. Many former patrons felt "burned" by the demise of the DSO. Their ticket monies had never been refunded for cancelled concerts in the 1988-89 season, and their philanthropic contributions had gone quickly out the door to pay the creditors (with a debt load equal to 70% of the orchestra's budget at that time). The city itself was in conflict about what to do: it needed a symphony orchestra but did not want a culture war (CSO Archives). On the one hand, the governor and mayor had proclaimed the Denver Symphony Orchestra a public trust and major cultural asset for both the state and the city, but, on the other hand, quickly lent their support to the fledgling CSO. The musician-leaders of the Colorado Symphony understood the delicate situation they were in. Thus, they agreed that one of the key tenets of the CSO's operation would be fiscal responsibility. This fact they made widely known to their funders, creditors, and the general public.

"Partnership" was the other key tenet of the organization. It was based on the notion that all constituencies in the orchestra should have responsibility for and a say in decisions affecting the outcome of the orchestra. This meant that the board, the players, and the staff would have a say in and share responsibility for the administration of the orchestra and, in turn, "bear the fruits (or the burden)" of the financial outcome

each season—be it surplus or deficit. This and other operating principles made the CSO a very unusual type of orchestra organization at the time. No other orchestra in the country was governed or administered like the CSO. It was atypical in: (1) the degree to which players were actively and legitimately involved in organizational decision-making, (2) in its By-law provisions regarding fiscal policy, and (3) in the prevailing belief that things could be done differently in the classical music business and the willingness to try a different way than the dominant model.

Structure

The Core of the CSO Model

From my extensive program of observation, interviews, and analyses of CSO documentation, I have concluded that the core of the CSO's new operating philosophy was characterized by moderation, restraint, participation by all the different constituencies, and fiscal conservatism. In essence, by taking a much more measured and conservative approach, particularly with respect to any and all financial considerations, the members of the new organization believed that they could build a more sustainable enterprise than what the DSO had provided them. (**APPENDIX F** details the provisions of the new organizational structure.) One key CSO document claimed:

The Colorado Symphony Association (CSA) has successfully established a unique orchestra model based on the dual foundation of a full partnership among musicians, trustees, staff and community volunteers and a commitment to prudent fiscal management. The nature of this model provides a possible aid to other orchestras struggling with the current symphony orchestra environment (CSO, 1990).

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In addition to wider participation and an emphasis on process, the new CSO model had three four key elements (interestingly, two are financial and two are organizational):

(1) There was a promise for musicians: they would be given a base income, which though much lower than the average annual salary of $40,000 earned in the DSO era, was guaranteed, with the prospect of annual bonuses depending on whether any surplus had been generated by year end. The organization's target was to keep total musicians' compensation at a level of 50% of the operating budget. This target was called the "Musicians' Watch" and it was one of the measures used by the orchestra to evaluate its success under this model (CSO, 1990).

(2) As much as musicians would bear responsibility for the organization financially, they would also be given the right to occupy one-third of the seats on all administrative and governing committees. By this, the CSO asked musicians to accept some level of risk in their compensation and, in return, they were allowed to take on more administrative and governing authority. Players were members of the board of directors and the marketing, development, public affairs, and nominating committees. Even so, the musicians found their greatest strength in the Artistic Committee, which played the role normally held exclusively by the music director in traditional orchestra structures. This committee (that players dominated with eight of eleven seats) shared artistic decision making with Marin Alsop, the CSO's first principal conductor (an activity that Alsop found quite edifying. See, Pollack, 1996).

(3) In addition to being a full partner with their conductor in the design of each season's musical programming, the musicians also had another critical artistic role.

They were integrally involved in the selection of their principal conductor. Although theirs was not the last vote taken on the final list of candidates, CSO players, unlike most orchestral musicians around the world, were involved in each step leading up to the board's final vote taking.

(4) The organization pledged never to borrow money or to operate in the red and that all ticket and subscription sales would be escrowed until the concert was performed. Each season had to end with a balanced budget. Otherwise trustees would have to contribute even more that the minimum requirement and players and staff would have to forgo salary (as happened on at least one occasion in the past eleven years) (CSO, 1990).

The goal of these policies was to bring back some measure of security and control in what had been quite a tumultuous existence over many years, particularly for the players. Financially speaking, it also calibrated the organization to the reality of the Denver market where the CSO came up against stiff competition for both philanthropic dollars and audiences from other leading cultural institutions and other entertainment diversions such as the city's four sports teams. As one veteran player remarked, "This city has gone sports crazy with the Broncos (football), Nuggets (basketball), and Avalanches (ice hockey). All they want is sports. Our main supporters like the Boettcher and Phipps families have died out. They are gone and I've seen my salary fall from $40,000/year in the DSO down to $25,000/year in the CSO! We've undeveloped so fast, we've lost ground with our field!" (Hampson, 1995).

Hampson's remarks captured the dilemma: the CSO model advanced the orchestra in some ways, but the orchestra was falling behind in others. The early circumstances of the CSO called for draconian methods such as salary cutting, but some aspects of this model would prove a handicap once the organization achieved "lift off." For example, the lack of an endowment or an endowment campaign was a handicap to the organization as it reached stability. It needed the income from an endowment to augment its $7 million annual budget. As Hampson observed, the CSO "is operating on sand where once we stood on rock," referring to the $13 million endowment the DSO used to have and the lack of one now.

Another way to understand the uniqueness and fragility of the CSO's model is to review an organizational description written in 2000 by the CSO's then-executive director, Thomas Bacchetti, who summarized what transpired over the CSO's first decade:

Understand I'll be "making up" anything I write about the Denver Symphony as there are virtually no records surviving the transition from the Denver to Colorado Symphony. Nevertheless, it is safe to assume that the former Denver Symphony operated much like most American Orchestras - with a Board of Trustees derived from community volunteers with interest and financial resources. The responsibility of the DSO Trustees included policy decisions (based upon recommendations of the management), fundraising and advocacy - both political advocacy on behalf of the DSO and advocacy in the community to increase sales and contributions.

The failure of the DSO was a product of a significant downturn in the Denver economy (first and foremost), coupled with a misalignment (or mis-understanding) of the appropriate roles of each group - musicians, trustees, volunteers and staff - within the organization. To this day each group (of those present during the "bad times") continues to place blame on others and denies any responsibility of their own. In the late 1980s the DSO was a dysfunctional organization. The internal dysfunction - exacerbated by the depressed economy led to the bankruptcy.

No organizational charts exist from that era. Indeed, no useful or meaningful organizational chart exists today. I say this because a) I've never seen an organizational chart that truly describes how an organization works (sure, it describes "reporting relationships," but not really the way things work) and b) I'm not an advocate

of them in organizations of this relatively small size. And, this is an organization in transition - from one that threw out the traditional model and swung the pendulum as far in the other direction as possible - and is now seeking a center position. I'd describe that center position as one that preserves the best of musician participation in "governance" while eliminating the aspects of participation that are dysfunctional.

In the early days of the CSO the Trustees - especially the musician trustees - were intimately involved in the "management" of the orchestra. This led to an enormous investment of unproductive time learning how to run areas in which individuals had no training or expertise.

In our current configuration the CSO has about 40 Trustees. 27 of the 40 are "Term" trustees - each serving a three-year term (one third change each year). Of the 27 term trustees, 9 (or one-third) are musicians elected by the orchestra.

Musician trustees are most influential serving on the Artistic Committee - which sets programming: selects guest performers and conductors and determines repertoire to be performed. The Artistic Committee is comprised of the 9 musician trustees, 2 lay trustees, the music director and the executive director. In addition to musical policy/programming it also deals with musical personnel issues.

Musicians also serve on all other standing and ad hoc committees – usually representing 1/3rd of the committee membership.

The volunteers of the Colorado Symphony League are represented on the Board of Trustees by their President - and that is the extent of their standing. Legally, they are an "arm" of the Association.

At present there are 79 musicians in the orchestra. We have plans to expand that number to 82 in the coming 4 years.   (Bacchetti, 2000)

Bacchetti's summary is consistent with what I heard and saw in the organization during my research. However, he misses one important point in the Colorado story. As is true of all start-up or change operations, there was little time for research and development and little room for error in launching the new orchestra. As such, the group did not look for other models to copy, ideas got reinvented, everything had to be worked out in real time. It is true: organizational charts did not matter. It was all very much "an experiment" and a "work-in-progress" as several people reminded me in interviews. As such, its early years were full of wonderful successes and abysmal failures. One of the players who helped start the CSO said, "We have planted the

seeds, but we don't know where we will end up. We have shown that it can work, at least, artistically, if not financially" (Yeingst, 1995).

Membership

Every orchestra contains a balance between the mobile and the settled, the restless and the complacent, the novice and the veteran (Faulkner, 1973b). At the Colorado Symphony, there is both continuity and freshness in the orchestra's membership largely because there are so many DSO veterans mixed with newer and younger players arriving each season. My interviews with players and management showed that, in fact, nearly half of the musicians on the roster had played in the DSO. These veteran members provided a core ensemble, and, as important, first-hand knowledge of the organization's history and reason for being. They understood their responsibility to teach the newcomers. "We all need to help contribute, to go beyond just playing our instruments," said a CSO founding player (Endsley, 1995).

In contrast, many of the newest orchestra members were young and came straight from musical conservatory. For most, this was their first job in a professional symphony orchestra. Given this, there was two-way pressure: there was pressure on the new players to prove their ability to meld with the ensemble and to conform to the organization's structure. And there was pressure on the CSO to try to retain these young talented players or risk becoming a steppingstone or training orchestra for them. Said one veteran player, "The orchestra needs a type of player who not only can fit in with their ensemble, artistically and socially, but who is also willing to do committee work and operations—not just on a token basis. This organization is based on participation. With one-third of all committees coming from the musicians, this is no small

small requirement" (Howard, 1995). Indeed, this feature of the organization has important ramifications for personnel selection, player orientation, and retention. Like other self-governing or participative orchestras, their success depends on the quantity and quality of musician involvement as much as anything else.

The turnover rate of the orchestra membership at the time of this research was 5-10% per year. This rate reflected two facts: the retirement of veteran DSO players and the lack of a competitive compensation package. "In many cases, players love the orchestra and this town, but there is not enough money to keep us here. We can make three times as much in a major orchestra" (Hill, 1997). Musicians in the CSO did indeed earn much less than members of other major orchestras, reaching slightly more than $30,000 at the time (plus health and pension benefits). But the organization did not yet have the wherewithal to match its peers and there was also a structural limitation to achieving that (i.e., the lack of endowment or cash reserves). These facts, together with the frustrations inherent in running any kind of cooperative enterprise, colored the players' perceptions of life and work in the Colorado Symphony. "This has been a tremendous season," said one player, "Ticket sales are higher than last year, the audience is incredibly positive, but there are concerns about the budget and the ability of the orchestra to raise enough money to pay proper wages to players. Under our new structure, one good thing is that the orchestra has not had to close, but musicians have not been compensated." (Cooper, 1997).

I also observed from my many interviews over the years that progress was perceived as slow and there were persistent problems. Although orchestra members felt more involved and influential in the leadership of the organization, many felt

frustrated by the lack of significant progress in organizational, financial, and artistic areas. "No that much has changed," said one player who had been involved in many committees, "It's neither good nor bad. But my main concern is that there is a pretty huge communication gap, pretty problematic communications gap between different factions here. Our process needs to be streamlined" (Hill, 1997). Another player concurred saying, "The strength of our organizational structure is that more people can have their opinions heard but it gets bogged down because certain players expect every situation or issue to be presented to the orchestra, but that is not always possible" (Naslund, 1997). "I love what I do," said a principal player, "but I haven't seen a pay raise in a moon's age" (Araujo, 1997). Another veteran principal said, "We have to be so careful with our programming that we find our artistic and musical ambitions are often frustrated" (Yeinst, 1997).

Artistic and Administrative Leadership

When the CSO began its first full season in 1990-91, it relied on the principal flutist, David Absoch, who had volunteered to act as Artistic Director. In consultation with the board of directors, he designed the orchestra's annual schedule in terms of concert programming, guest conductors (there was no principal conductor then), and guest artists. Abosch was reportedly adept at this task, but with time it became clear that the orchestra needed a chief conductor who could take responsibility for the development of the ensemble and who could spearhead the development of each artistic season's programming.

Principal Conductor

By 1992, it was clear that a *permanent* conductor was needed. To the musicians, who had "suffered" under various inept conductors and administrations, this was a threatening proposition (Yeingst, 1990). Because of their past experiences and the special organizational circumstances that consensus-driven orchestras require, the first conductor search and recruiting process was rather time-consuming and cumbersome. By the end of it, however, the Selection Committee (made up of musicians, staff, and lay trustees) made their recommendation to the board, after consultation with the full orchestra. The board ratified that recommendation by hiring Marin Alsop, then a music director of several other orchestras including the St. Louis Symphony where she held the Creative Conductor post at the time. She accepted the CSO's offer and agreed to begin by conducting five weeks of the 1993-94 season, then asume her principal conductor duties full time with the 1994-95 season.

With Marin Alsop the orchestra took on a new identity. Much like the CSO itself, Alsop was a rarity (and somewhat of a maverick) in the orchestra world at the time. A Yale University and Juilliard School of Music graduate, Alsop was one of the world's few first-rank female conductors. Trained by Leonard Bernstein and a devotee of 20th-century American music, Alsop brought a certain attitude and artistic distinction to the post. Moreover, she understood the history of the Colorado Symphony and the difficulties of its organizational structure. Whether she would be given the freedom to set the overall artistic direction was still uncertain. In practice, concerts were planned by Alsop together with the orchestra's 11-person Artistic Committee, which musicians control with six seats. Alsop suggests a plan for each season and must negotiate the final decisions with this group. It can be a difficult process because there is no single

perspective on the orchestra's artistic vision and Alsop has just one vote. About the process, Alsop said,

I think I am very reasonable. I enjoy other's input. I like the dialogue process and being forced to think about my plan several times because it enables me to be far more convincing and far more committed. I also think I am a good negotiator. However, ultimately, I want to have the freedom to make some mistakes and take full responsibility for them. (quoted in Pollack, 1996: 46)

Some veteran members of the orchestra worried about the possibility of reverting to an all-powerful music directorship; others were more sanguine—they recognized that Alsop had been hired for her expertise and she should be allowed to exercise it. Still others felt that her ambitions for the orchestra would benefit them all. Apparently, the latter sentiment prevailed since her contract has been renewed several times over recent years. (As of this writing in 2002, Alsop is still the orchestra's chief conductor).

Denver audiences and critics seem to appreciate Alsop's brand of musicianship. They find her performances with the orchestra to be quite positive, and in my interviews, most players agree that the technical quality of the orchestra has improved under her leadership. "We are a fine orchestra under Alsop," said a principal player, "She has charisma, which a lot of conductors don't have" (Araujo, 1997). Guest conductors and guest artists who worked with the orchestra also confirmed that they find the quality of the ensemble to be very high indeed. Don Davis, composer of such scores as *When a Man Loves a Woman* and *Beauty and the Beast*, believed that the orchestra achieved an "amazing sound" in its recording of his soundtrack for the film *Warriors of Virtue* (Bradley, 1994). Jon Deak, principal bassist with the New York Philharmonic and resident composer with the CSO for three seasons, corroborated that view saying that the orchestra played to its potential and was of a very high caliber (Deak, 1994).

The Artistic Committee

Like Orpheus Chamber Orchestra, which will be discussed in the next chapter, the players of the Colorado Symphony Orchestra found their greatest power in the Artistic Committee, which as noted above controls artistic decision making in the orchestra. In contrast to Orpheus, however, it is important to note that the CSO players had greater representation on all governing bodies and orchestra committees. However, the Artistic Committee was the only organizational committee where CSO players were in the majority. As one player described it, "The Artistic Committee is the core of our orchestra. But it creates a power center which is very controversial" (Johnson, 1993: 6). Another musician concurred, "This is a very powerful way to operate and it's very stimulating" (Endsley, 1995).

But the committee is seen as controversial by many constituents in the organization because it has not been a very efficient way of designing an artistic vision or plan. "There are too many people, with too many opposing ideas," observed one board of trustees member (Sayford, 1997). "It's an imperfect science," said a player who is a member of the Artistic Committee, "But we must evolve it over time. We take great pains to balance what we offer in the season's schedule. It takes us longer to reach decisions, which is both good and bad. It's positive because the involvement of all strengthens our ownership, but some in the organization are jaded because the process takes so long. They just don't understand the kind of time it involves" (Bowles, 1995). Efforts to streamline the process and to allow the music director more influence have been tried, but with no tangible results thus far reported.

Administrative Leadership

One of the key aspects of any self-governing orchestra is leadership, particularly

administrative leadership. In my view, this was one of the CSO's weakest features. It

could not find the right executive director to lead this high involvement organization. As

Lawler said:

Leadership in a high involvement organization is a different activity than it is in a traditional workplace. In the traditional organization, leadership is based on the manager having the decision-making power, the information, the rewards, and in some *cases, the expertise...* High-involvement management requires leaders who energize people in ways that support self-motivation right [the kinds of behavior Hackman (1986) described]; leaders who help people move in positive directions, where questioning and debate is acceptable and part of the organization's search for the best answer; leaders who help the organization know the right things to do rather than helping it do things right...Traditional managerial behaviors are not needed because of the self-regulatory nature of the design. (Lawler, 1986: 209)

The problem for the nascent Colorado Symphony Orchestra was that its

governing board, in hindsight of course, kept appointing the wrong leader. To be exact,

there were seven executive directors within five years, two of whom were from the CSO

board of trustees, one was also a guest conductor, two were from industry (with no

performing arts experience), and the most effective executive director from that time

period was brought back twice: the second time, five years after his first posting, and,

again, to consult with the organization in 2001. In my research report to the board of

trustees, I stated that this lack of leadership in such a crucial position at such a crucial

time had created a game of "musical chairs" that impeded the orchestra's development

(Lehman, 1997). This was corroborated by the executive director who had been called

back into service a second time. He said, "This orchestra needs an executive director

who will be a champion of consensus building. For the first five critical years, it selected

traditional management types who all failed to inspire and motivate and lead the organization in a productive direction " (Copenhaver, 1995)

After the last executive director was fired in 1997, it took two years for the search committee to hire another. This time they selected Tom Bacchetti, former executive director of the Atlanta Symphony Orchestra, who appeared to be ready and willing to work with this uniquely collaboration-based organization. Bachetti's degree of understanding is captured in a major grant application letter he wrote (see **Appendix H**). But comprehending the organizational structure *intellectually* was very different from what happened in practice. In an interview with Bachetti not long into his tenure with the orchestra, we discussed the nature of the CSO's shared leadership model and how difficult he found it to be (Bachetti, 1998). In my view, he, along with a majority of other CSO executive directors I met, did not fundamentally believe in or adhere to principles of shared leadership. As such, it was more difficult for them to provide the four critical behaviors a high-involvement organization requires of its leader: "1) build trust and openness, 2) provide a vision and communicate it, 3) move decisions to where the relevant expertise is found, and 4) empower others" (Lawler, 1986: 212). At the CSO, many staff and players alike described to me the demotivating behavior and leadership styles of their various executive directors (Hildebrand, 1995; Yeinst, 1997). At the time of this writing, Bacchetti had left the organization and yet another executive director has been selected by the board. It is unclear whether and in what ways this individual will be any different from his predecessors.

Perspectives on the CSO's Leadership as Revealed by Email Exchanges

Getting the orchestra to reach its potential in all dimensions (i.e., organizational, financial, and artistic) has required much effort and many changes at the CSO. Much of what has transpired within the organization has been chronicled by e-mail correspondence between the author and several members of the organization (well over 250 exchanges during the latter part of this research, 1997-2000). What these messages convey is the great difficulty of running a "hybrid" organization and the persistence required to make it work. They also give insight into what is involved in trying to simultaneously redesign, stabilize, and grow an organization—while keeping "everyone on the same page." Indeed, maintaining organizational alignment has been difficult. Said one veteran player, "We believe the only way we can grow is the self-governing way, but we need to keep everyone on the same page. We are struggling with that. It has taken colossal energy to get this going and messianic zeal on the part of staff to keep it going. At this stage, we need to keep the parts that are good and get rid of the parts that are bad" (Hoeppner, 1995).

Six emails, exhibited along with others in **Appendix G,** are especially revealing: the first was written by an associate conductor with the orchestra who tells us about the organization's struggles from an artistic leadership perspective; the second is a brief report from a trustee on the frustrations inherent with the democratic system—at least the *unrefined* CSO democratic system; the third is another view by this trustee who tells us how critical *funding* is and how difficult getting to the "next level" was for the organization---without an endowment, without an acknowledgement that "we are in the entertainment industry," and without a new strategy; the next email is from a musician who participates on various committees—the concern expressed here is with other players' fears and the general lack of commitment to shared authority (even this far into

the organization's "experiment" with it); and, finally, I return to the trustee who seems to have a broad perspective on the CSO's condition vis-à-vis the rest of the world. As late as January 1999, he notes the needs of the organization that are going unaddressed, particularly how the lack of an endowment and the self-imposed financial rules were constraining the operation.

What these and many other emails show is that despite over a decade of survival for the fledgling CSO, what is happening today is that the euphoria over the CSO's early triumphs has dissipated, people are weary, and the future is not quite "clear sailing." In fact, the experience of many players, staff, and trustees has been one of extreme frustration with the process (refer again to the trustee's email in Appendix G). That process—of shared leadership and shared decision making—somehow never got adequately refined. It was never streamlined so that good decisions were getting made in a timely manner. As a result of this, some of the organization's members want to move back towards a conventional leadership model for the orchestra; others remain steadfast in their dedication to democracy-through-committees. This has created a virtual tug of war. In a sense, "the enemy" is no longer solely external—it is also internal. Said one player and former board member, "Most players don't participate in the organization. The few who do are exhausted. Since 1991, the musicians have made no progress. We are still starving. They work hard and play well, but individual members can barely make ends meet. This results in low morale. The musicians are less willing to participate in the structure of the orchestra. Now, the type of antagonism between musicians and the rest of the organization that caused Denver to fail is being recreated. There is a realization at the highest levels of the board that the organization has major problems" (Howard, 1997).

On the other hand, CSO audiences are pleased by what they hear. Patrons are willing to support this orchestra, critics are enthusiastic about its performances, and the ensemble is improving each season. Although the organization has balanced its budget ten years' running and there is widespread commitment to the organization's success, it still faces certain difficulties such as: inadequate capitalization (it has yet to embark on that much-needed endowment campaign), members' personal and professional growth and development are still an issue, and it is not clear whether the public has been *completely* won over. But the organization's leaders know this and that is why they started in earnest in February 1999 to begin a thorough review of the organization. Part of that strategic planning process involved an internal assessment of strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats, which is discussed next. This was also the basis for a major grant application (an excerpt of which follows). In short, the organization (i.e., players, staff, management, and board) has gone to great lengths to analyze, assess, and document its current condition as it prepares for the next phase of its organizational development needs.

One such analysis begins with an assertion about the orchestra's mission, which, as drafted in February 1999, reads as folllows:

> The mission of the Colorado Symphony Association is to perform and promote a broad spectrum of quality music, particularly complex music, for the enrich-ment of the Colorado community. This mission will be accomplished through musical excellence, education and outreach activities.
>
> In fulfilling its mission, the CSA will:
>
> --Achieve and maintain financial stablility;
> --Assist musicians, staff and board and volunteers to reach their highest
>   potential as individuals and as a group;
> --Seek to broaden its impact on the cultural life of the community; and,
> --Maintain open communication among and between orchestra members,
>   staff, board, volunteers, and the community.

From the perspective of this research, it is particularly interesting to note that the first objective in fulfilling the Colorado Symphony's mission as presented here is a financial one and that the artistic goal comes second---even though this is the opposite of what we would hope for in a performing arts organization. However, it makes sense for this particular orchestra in that it captures the situation the CSO has long faced: financial concerns overshadow other concerns.

Strategic Planning Committee's SWOT Analysis

Yet another perspective on the CSO's present condition is obtained by reviewing the SWOT (i.e, strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) analysis the orchestra developed in May, 1999, as the basis for developing a long-range strategic plan. These were identified by the Stategic Planning Committee as follows:

Strengths

Quality musicianship;

Marin Alsop's [the conductor's] public persona;

Volume of ticket sales;

Downtown location;

Educational investment;

Musician participation in governance;

Strong volunteer commitment;

No debt and 10 years in the black;

Tenacity and broad sense of ownership;

The Scientific and Cultural Facilities District (SCFD) funding;

Professional management; and,

Musician commitment.

Weaknesses

Financial structure;

Short-term operational focus;

Fundraising not growing;

Low subscription base;

Non-competitive wages;

Steady state versus growth mindset;

Risk averse culture;

High facility costs;

Small endowment;

Hall is too large;

Hall is acoustically spotty;

Inadequate parking;

Inadequate organizational infrastructure;

Not all music directors are accustomed to this structure;

Development-marketing disconnect;

Time-consuming "process" culture;

Inadequate communications;

No multi-year planning;

No summer venue; and,

Artistic decisions not influenced by marketing.

Opportunities

Aging baby boomers;

Intergenerational wealth transfer;

Diversified growing economy;

Event/entertainment orientation;

Population growth;

Colorado Cultural Trust;

Changing culture of giving;

Living downtown;

Growing wealth;

Music education comeback;

Market opportunities; and,

Highly educated population.

Threats

Competition for dollars and time;

Less leisure time and more casual society;

"Too-busy-crazy" world;

Government arts cutback;

Increased travel;

SCFD could "sunset" (added Tier II groups/smaller slice of the pie);

Denver Center attractions;

Colorado Cultural Trust;

Summer city concert revenue loss;

Foundation changes; and,

Declining industry.

(Source: CSO, 1999a)

The Challenges Facing the Colorado Symphony

My observations and analyses demonstrate that in many ways the CSO's challenges are common to all other kinds of orchestras. These common challenges include the need to balance artistic goals with financial realities (as in the perennial search for subsidy), the need for organizational alignment, and the need to engage every constituency's commitment to advancing the enterprise (players, managers, staff and board). The older self-governing orchestras in this study, as we will read in the following chapters, have certainly faced similar challenges and overcome them. They prove that self-governance can work, with time and effort. But many of the Colorado

Symphony's challenges are unique to its own particular circumstances, strategy and structure.

The CSO has its own particular set of circumstances to worry about. Among the most important concerns is the fact that the Colorado Symphony Orchestra's organizational structure is prone to a high degree of inefficiency. Like any complex organization, and especially one with the sheer number of people involved in the CSO's committee-based structure (especially those enterprises based on partnerships such as international accountancy, law, advertising or management consultancy practices), this is not so atypical. Although the system is built on all parties being actively involved, the organization needs to consider how to preserve the essence of this partnership while making decision making more efficient. One way to increase efficiency is to cut back on communication and information sharing (the most time-consuming requirement of this kind of structure). However, what results from a low level of information flow, however, can easily produce misunderstanding and disconnectedness. Indeed, precisely these things have been reported at the CSO. And yet, it is inevitable in any democratic work environment that some people will feel left "out of the loop" because this is precisely what is designed into an organization where authority is distributed and where decision making is delegated to elected committees and their membership. Thus, a "Catch 22" situation exists--unless policies and procedures are sound and there is trust in them.

I concluded that mutual respect and trust are critical in such systems, especially belief in the individuals who are authorized to represent the greater group (be they hired, appointed, or elected) and trust that the decisions they make make sense and steer the organization toward a better future in the short-term and long-run. For example, if a

music director has been hired for their artistic expertise, then common sense would suggest that he or she should be given some modicum of freedom to perform the job. Without some degree of autonomy, there can be no progress. If any manager, employee or committee member is not exercising his or her authority appropriately or is not suited to the job, he or she can and should be replaced. Indeed, according to one study of "great groups":

"Groups become great only when everyone in them, leaders and members alike, is free to do his or her absolute best. In today's Darwinian economy only organizations that find ways to tap the creativity of their members are likely to survive" (Bennis & Biederman, 1997: xvi)

At the same time, there is an obligation of organization members to hold and carry forward the "organizational memory," such that past mistakes are not repeated and those wary of the future are assured that, indeed, "we have learned from failure." Yet as the CSO ages, there is a clear division emerging between orchestra players who were part of the DSO-to-CSO transition, and those who never shared this experience. (A special study, launched in March 1999, to assess the CSA's governance structure acknowledges this emerging tension, see **Appendix I**). The most important thing, in my view and based on my research, is that a dynamic balance must be preserved in the quest for continuing progress: growth, yet stability; efficiency, yet inclusiveness; artistic excellence (and risk-taking), yet financial soundness. Needless to say, to achieve this balance is enormously difficult for any arts organization: traditionally-structured or not; resource-laden or not; world-class or not. We turn next to the Orpheus Chamber Orchestra, Berlin Philharmonic, and London Symphony Orchestra—three other unique organizations, which have also had to address similar organizational and strategic dilemmas.

Chapter Six: Orpheus Chamber Orchestra

9-26-02

Snapshot: Main period of original research, 1994-1996, with follow-up 1998-1999

Established:	1972
Concerts/season:	65 including domestic and foreign tours
Principal venue:	None. Various halls around the U.S. and overseas, with annual performance series at Carnegie Hall and Riverside Church (in New York City).
1997-98 budget:	$3 million
Orchestra size:	26 members of which 17 are men, 9 are women
Conductor:	None
Executive director:	Harvey Seifter (succeeded founder, Julian Fifer)
Player contract type/	
Average income:	Per service; $35,000/year
Governing body:	Board of Trustees

As with the Colorado Symphony Orchestra, when Orpheus Chamber Orchestra (OCO) was founded, members flouted conventional wisdom by taking a large step in the *opposite* direction from that of their contemporaries. They charted a different path by forming an orchestra to their own specifications in 1972. Decades later Orpheus has developed into a sterling example of artistic excellence (Mostel, 1989). For example, the demand for concert performances in Europe exceeds the number of dates the group can handle (Burden, 1988). Yet, despite its world-class status, the orchestra aspires to a level of self-governance that is not completely fulfilled. Players have full artistic authority, but the board of trustees makes the important organizational and financial decisions. In fact, players have only recently been granted a voice in such matters with three seats on the board of trustees.

History and Context

As with the Colorado Symphony, it is useful to reflect on the organization's founding and development, particularly since Orpheus' founder, Julian Fifer, was such a strong influence on the organization over the past quarter century. According to my numerous interviews with Fifer and other founding members of the orchestra, I learned the following: By the time he was set to graduate from Columbia University in 1972, it was clear to Fifer what he did and did not want to do. At age twenty-four, neither Fifer, himself a cellist trained by members of the Juilliard String Quartet, nor any of his friends wanted to take the traditional career route of winning a seat in a large string section of an established orchestra. To them, it would mean spending the entire workday--not making music collaboratively as in chamber music--but playing according to the views of the person on the podium. What Fifer preferred was an opportunity to combine two passions: his love of music and cooperative ideals. So together with a few close friends, Fifer said, "We decided to create an overgrown string quartet" (Fifer, 1996).

Fifer's idea was to create a full-scale chamber orchestra (i.e., at least a dozen or more players) in which a group of musicians would make the musical decisions democratically and without a conductor. This was quite a revolutionary idea in the classical music industry of the day but it was consistent with nearly two centuries of the string quartet method of making music. Fifer's ambition also reflected what was happening post-1968: the ethos of the time was about idealism and anything that was counter-culture. "It was a time when you did not go to college just to get a job in a Fortune 500 company," said Fifer (1996). "You were in school for your own personal

growth...and then, somehow, to go out and make the world a better place." With that kind of reasoning, Fifer believed that his experiment in musical democracy could work and that it would, in fact, be superior to other more conventional approaches. It would certainly be more gratifying to him.

Despite the group's professionalism as observed at its earliest concerts, their rehearsals turned out to be lessons in controlled chaos according to a veteran player (Purvis, 1995). Without a singular authority as music director, players would tirelessly discuss and negotiate their views since each had a say in the interpretation of the pieces to be performed. One violinist who joined the group early on recalled: "There were no real conventions as to how we were going to execute one's ideas--or as it turned out--*everybody's* ideas, how we were going to sort through everything. So for a number of years, rehearsals were pretty much a free-for-all. And since there wasn't much money to pay anybody for rehearsals or concerts, it didn't really make that much difference" (Jenner, 1995). Another veteran player recalled those frenetic early years, "We rehearsed every night... It was crazy because the pieces were actually put together at dress rehearsal because we kept changing our minds and changing players. It [was] a process of learning *how to work*, when to say something, when not, and so on" (Purvis, 1995). Yet another veteran member recalled those days, "All [we] wanted to do was make music and to play with other people. We were willing to play for very little when we first started out. Twenty-five years ago, we didn't think about or care much about money. We had a million rehearsals for one concert and we did it because we loved music--that's what we were trained to do and wanted to do" (Palma, 1995).

Direction

By the time of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Orpheus Chamber Orchestra in the 1997-98 season, the orchestra had achieved a great deal. Not only was it considered one of the world's premiere chamber orchestras, it had created something quite unique with its organizational structure and systems—*artistically* (Kozinn, 1999). Despite intermittent problems, the founding vision had been vindicated: workplace democracy was possible in a musical ensemble larger than a string quartet and, indeed, full participation *could* make a difference in the musical product. The anniversary was a time of great celebration for Orpheus' artistic and working-style achievements, but members were increasingly concerned about what would come next. The 25th anniversary coincided with a time of transition for the ensemble (just as the decade mark did at the Colorado Symphony). What would the future hold, they wondered. Issues revolved around: how to remunerate the musicians in accordance with their professional acclaim, the aging of the orchestra and associated travel and compensation issues, the question of artistic stagnation and burnout, how to broaden participation and increase flexibility in decision making, as well as what strategic direction the next phase of the orchestra's life should take. Some wondered whether it could survive into the future or whether it would wither away as so many string quartets had done quite naturally. I will examine these key questions further over the course of this chapter (and particularly in the section entitled, "Amending the Self-Governing System," on page 107).

Membership

Orpheus Chamber Orhcestra was originally designed to give players maximum control over and involvement in their work lives. According to an early brochure on the orchestra, it was designed "to provide an environment in which musical judgments of each of its members would be equally considered and respected" (Orpheus, 1978). Two main structural features of the orchestra were aimed to help unleash both the individual's and the group's artistic potential: its conductorless-ness and the expectation that all members would exhibit leadership by contributing their musical ideas in the preparation and rehearsal of the repertoire. One veteran member described the distinct advantages to Orpheus' modus operandi versus conventional approaches:

> If I am playing with people who are principally orchestral players, I find that many of them just do the job. They've spent years doing only what was demanded of them, because any more energy would be wasted energy. If that energy is not appreciated, it fails to become a part of their music and instead serves as a source of frustration. That does not stimulate them to experiment or grow as players. In Orpheus, where music is dependent upon our individual and collective creativity, we are allowed to experiment with every conceivable kind of phrasing, or articulation, or stroke, or collective group sound, and that experimentation ensures artistic growth. (Orpheus, 1994: 7).

The "Orpheus experiment," in terms of its musical product, has proven beneficial precisely because the musicians have had a chance for unbridled artistic growth--but they do so within the constraint of the score and with the guidance of those musicians who have developed the most influence on the group. The score provides the framework through which their collective discussions about a shared vision for the music evolves. And, just as new players or substitutes find out, there are certain players who, by virtue of their musical knowledge and personalities, have come to be seen as leaders of the group.

This group operates like a big family. The player-members of Orpheus represent a cohort. The majority of the members trained together at music schools, have the same formative experiences, and have been with Orpheus nearly from the beginning. People care deeply about one another and are very committed to their collective musical mission. Thus, when one member of the group leaves to pursue other professional opportunities, it has a debilitating effect on those left behind. Over the years, a few key people have accepted more lucrative and secure posts with major ensembles such as the Tokyo String Quartet, the New York City Ballet, and the New York Philharmonic. Again, these departures not only affect the ensemble's sound, but they reportedly had an adverse effect on other members of the group. It points to a weakness in Orpheus' organizational armor: despite its enviable international reputation, Orpheus is still a financially fragile organization: it cannot afford to hire its musicians on a full-time basis nor can it pay them at levels comparable to larger, well-endowed orchestras. This is a serious concern for these players who are not only getting older but are increasingly confronting the financial implications of their choice of employment. Most members are now in their forties, with families of their own to worry about, not to mention retirement and other related issues. Still, players cherish their membership in Orpheus and the opportunity to exercise artistic self-governance.

Membership in Orpheus has always been a critical issue not only because of what the orchestra aspires to musically, but because of the nature of its work methods. It is a small, intimate, and intense work group. As such, veteran members do not take the decision to extend invitations to membership lightly. Membership criteria are well-established and commonly understood. Orpheus members collectively evaluate candidates and vote on their acceptance into the group. According to a veteran

member, candidates for membership are evaluated along three criteria: (1) technical ability, (2) "fit" or compatibility with the orchestra in terms of playing style, and (3) leadership ability—or how they communicate their musical ideas to the rest of the group--a criterion that is normally not required of players in most orchestras, but is very important for membership in Orpheus (How, 1995).

Since Orpheus has a system of rotating seating for every piece, it relies on its musicians to take responsibility for the musical outcome of the orchestra. Prospective members have to be able to lead their instrument's section as well as they follow. And they have to bring ideas: "You need the young ones for their great idealism," said a player when interviewed by me in 1995, "but they have to be able to propose an idea and sell it to the group. You need to be able to persevere and say 'this really will work'" (Caplin, 1995). To find a talented player is easy, but one who is strong in ideas, yet flexible, is not. Likewise not all players, though capable technically, will fit in musically and socially with Orpheus. A veteran member similarly captured this seeming conundrum, "A lot of fantastic players haven't worked out because they were not flexible. You can't just plug anybody [into Orpheus]. It's a unique group of people. There are certain skills necessary" (Bauch, 1996). Thus, the selection process can take a very long time to complete and is extremely selective. Members admit that they are "much pickier now and almost intolerant" as they search for candidates who meet all three of the defined criteria (see above). A musician offered an example of a strong candidate for a string position: "She was highly irritating and abrasive in her manner and how she directed her comments. Is it good to stir things up or should we go for more homogeneity? We're grappling a lot with that these days. We take care in how we look at both prospective members and subs" (Meell, 1995). "You have to

remember," said another member, "that our group is terribly self-critical because there is no conductor. We are never satisfied" (Figueroa, 1995).

All in all, the membership boundaries at Orpheus are very tight. According to one violinist who had been working as a substitute player for nearly eleven years, he described how even musicians who have played with the group for years will not necessarily be considered for formal membership (Rood, 1994). "Orpheus may be a model of the just society," wrote Traub (1996: 104), "but with only twenty-six citizens, it's an exclusive one." Years ago, there was a discussion about establishing an associate category of membership. Fifer (1997) recalled it as being "a wrenching conversation" because, he said, "if we cement in place subs, we lose other, new creative talent." In the end, it was decided not to create associate memberships. In addition, it was decided not to set formal audition policies. "We are opposed to that," said one veteran member, "because our group has special needs" (Bartlett, 1996). Nevertheless, it is clear to me that this volatile issue will rear its head again as the discussion about Orpheus' long-term future continues. As current members age, the question of continuity remains: who will replace departing and (eventually) retiring members?

Structure

In keeping with the egalitarian nature of this orchestra, all members are paid the same fees per performance, rehearsal, recording session, etc. Even substitutes are paid the same as members because, as one player said when interviewed, "We believe in that notion. Moreover, subs have just as much responsibility for ensuring the integrity of our performances as we do" (Bartlett, 1996). Although it is largely understood that

members have a form of life-long tenure, there is no seniority or merit pay. The only exception is that when violinists serve as concertmasters (leaders in British terminology), 'they are paid 25% more for their services. Also, members who work on the Executive Committee or as personnel coordinator or artistic administrator also receive extra pay reflecting the extra time commitment required for this role and the diminished opportunity for taking other income-producing work. This player compensation scheme is known and accepted.

Compensation and Work Requirements

In 1997-98, players had a busy schedule as was typical of this peripatetic orchestra (see **Appendix J** for a look at their 1997-98 schedule). For Orpheus members who perform all 65 domestic concerts in a season (with associated rehearsals), they can expect to earn just $35,000 (plus a contribution to health care costs and the American Federation of Musician-sponsored pension scheme, and one week of paid vacation). Of course, members take other assignments such as special tours arranged by the orchestra, teaching assignments in area music schools, and working as a "sub" in other Manhattan-based ensembles. By comparison, musicians in The St. Paul Chamber Orchestra (St. Paul, Minnesota) earned a minimum of $44,753 per season for a 36-week season (of which three weeks were paid vacation), whereas the starting salary for members of the New York Philharmonic, on the other extreme, was $76,960 for a 52-week season (with 63 days of paid vacation annually). And, "those players don't even have leadership positions," noted Fifer (1997).

On a pro rata basis, Orpheus' compensation level pales by comparison to other groups, particularly those at the top. Orpheus cannot easily attract the finest players to

New York City because its salaries are simply not competitive. At the same time, it should be said that there was never any intention of making Orpheus into a full-time career orchestra, especially on the part of the trustees. Despite the comparative disadvantages of Orpheus' employment situation, most musicians make the necessary sacrifices (most of which are financial) for any chance to play with this ensemble (Jolley, 1995; Morelli, 1996; Danielson, 1996). Indeed, they arrange their professional schedules around Orpheus' concert season. In addition, players told me in several interviews that they believed the diversity of their experience from a mix of assignments (e.g., substituting in other orchestras, performing in chamber ensembles, teaching, etc.) enhances the collective talent, skill, and inspiration of the group. Or as veteran members described it, "All the other things we do feed our musical brains" (Jolley, 1995).

Minimum participation requirements have only recently become an issue but they are as important for Orpheus as they were for every other democratic ensemble in this study. In earlier years, members eagerly sought performance opportunities and were generally available to play any and all concerts, no matter when and where they were held. And ten to 15 years ago, administrators tried to get as much work as possible for the orchestra. "We gave over 60 concerts each season which made for a very full year because of the intensity of our rehearsals," said Fifer (1997). "That's okay when you're young, but we have families and have had to cut back and restructure the length of our tours." At one point, there was a rule adopted about how often members should play with Orpheus, but it was never enforced and members responded to it casually. With the 1994-95 season, however, the Executive Committee determined that the official minimum level of commitment should be 35% of each season's concerts and recording sessions, and that it would be enforced. (Members approved that decision by vote and

one player chose to step down.) The minimum level was set rather low because, said Fifer (1997), "We value each individual's participation more than we value the impact of their absence on Orpheus as an institution. To us, having 65-90% of Orpheus members present at performance is more preferable than 100% participation of lesser quality players." Having said that, he quickly pointed out that most members performed at least 50% of the scheduled work. Even so, one musician noted, "It is difficult to raise players' commitment because of all our other commitments. This year, [1994-95] there is more commitment to Orpheus programs because we got a pay raise...and because we have some challenging pieces, and because we have been required to choose more Orpheus work" (Purvis, 1995).

Group processes

Group processes reflect the norms and structures which have evolved within this ensemble over the years. Musical excellence, maximum say and input, and concern for the individual are the prime values of the group. My observations and interviews indicated that there is great respect for the individual and, at the same time, much is expected of players who work with the ensemble, even on a temporary basis. As one player said, "We're a democracy, but also a chamber music group. The relationship between employees is critical to survival" (Palma, 1998). Another confirmed the important nature of player relations, "People fight with each other sometimes, but after an argument, they go and have a drink together and talk it out. You hear horror stories about orchestras where somebody had a feud 27 years ago and they haven't talked to each other since. We just can't allow that. Somehow we've built up enough good will and respect towards each other as instrumentalists and colleagues, and that comes

from relating directly to each other and not through an intermediary" (Orpheus, 1994: 6). A veteran string player looks at it this way, "We have to remember that we can only get our way 1/26th of the time. Some people get more than their share, however" (Bauch, 1996).

Rehearsals are the gristmill for this ensemble's group processes. In them are revealed a host of behaviors. Mostly, they are rather serious affairs because, as one veteran member said, "we have more at stake here. We fool around some, but with no conductor, you really are responsible for what happens" (Palma, 1995). There is also pressure to get results in the shortest amount of time, more often because of scheduling conflicts than because of administrative or financial pressures. Some recording projects "such as the Charles Ives recording have so many different instrumental groupings, you need lots of rehearsal time to work it out," said a member cellist (Meell, 1995). As to what happens when the group gets stuck at times, another responded, "There is so much collective knowledge; we know each other so well, that we know how to move a person along if they're stuck or going off track in rehearsal" (Morelli, 1996). Or, from the perspective of another veteran player, "The process is more important than the decision. There is a lot of repertoire we've been doing for years and we know it. We've also evolved a way of talking to each other. For example, if Guillermo Figueroa, a member frequently selected as concertmaster, says 'articulation', we just know that he wants more" (Jenner, 1995). Then, again, she added, "It's not entirely predictable." From one concertmaster's perspective, "The best thing about the collaborative ensemble is the input. The input can be very, very good, but there will always be someone who will disagree. In the past, these things just worked out and personalities didn't come into play. But now, the group wants more musical satisfaction, so people stick to their

opinions despite the opposition" (Caplin, 1995). She continued, "As a concertmaster, I am always up for trying and doing different things. No one thing is always better than another."

At Orpheus, members recognize that--despite the fact that the organization is based on democratic ideals--not everyone is equal, that there are individual differences in talent, experience, and expertise. A veteran member described the ensemble this way:

> It is an idealistic group. The individual is important. The whole way the group functions depends on who is present. It depends on who the concertmaster is. We go through phases when certain people have spoken up too much; in essence, used up their credit. But then, some people have higher credit limits than others. You can tell when one person speaks--if we shriek "Oh, No!" or not. The issue is what do you do when the chips are down and some players don't play well or pitch in? Fortunately, most of us aren't like that. We don't want those kind of people among us. (Purvis, 1995)

When problems arise during rehearsal or on tour people for the most part stay calm. Veteran members, who have more sway with the group, generally know how others will respond to a problem or an issue--and they know how to diffuse inflamed situations, such as what happened with the misconfigured days on a 1996 Florida tour when poor scheduling together with housing and bus transportation problems caused members to become furious with frustration. "This comes at the wrong time in the season," said one veteran member. "Everyone is burned out. Between Orpheus and other gigs, I've had five-session days plus teaching for weeks now. Sunday was my only day off this spring!" (Bauch, 1996). An Exec Comm member tried to respond by putting this situation into perspective, "We would normally never have two concerts in one day with rehearsal and travel home, but it happened. There is an economic incentive to cut this tour short and I'm not even really sure how this trip got scheduled this way originally" (Bartlett, 1996). On the other hand, he said, "If we had written the

tour rules like other orchestras, so regimented, we'd never be able to do anything."

Meanwhile the orchestra manager, confessing her role in the fiasco, cautioned, "It's like

a Machiavellian democracy. You need to know how and when to pick your battles here.

Choose only those that you believe strongly in. The others, let go" (Guy, 1996).

Leadership: Artistic and Administrative

Artistic Leadership

Over the years, the orchestra has developed a representative system of democracy regarding artistic decision making. In the 1997-98 season, artistic self-determination was spearheaded by a group called the "Executive Committee." This committee should not be confused with the executive committee of the board. This committee was composed of five players elected from the orchestra membership. Its main purpose and power related to decisions regarding the orchestra's artistic plan.

Julian Fifer and Norma Hurlburt both worked with this committee at regular weekly meetings (and at other times as needed) since the Exec Comm had the authority to make all decisions, large and small, relating to the ensemble's programming, touring and recording activities, and to deal with external relations. An example of a problem encountered in the area of external relations was during a recording session with Deutsche Gramophon when some players found themselves at odds with one of their long-time working partners, a DG executive producer. According to some musicians, the producer had overstepped his bounds by telling the concertmistress (leader) for the Handel piece what to do. To some players, this did not pose a problem: "everyone was

just trying to get it right" (Caplin, 1995). To others, like one Exec Comm member, this episode was a clear violation of Orpheus' integrity: "The reason I brought this up is because I felt like we needed to at least entertain the possibility that the producer overstepped what was appropriate in terms of handling the group and getting involved with group psychology. The group has its own weird psychology which usually manages to work itself out, and he kind of started pushing things..." (Bartlett, 1996). Although this member recognized that the producer was also an expert, he felt that the producer's comments and suggestions altered the group dynamic, an important issue for many Orpheans. In the end, after a lengthy debate, the Exec Comm resolved the issue by agreeing to have Fifer say something to the producer about the incident to prevent this kind of thing from happening in the future.

The Exec Comm played another role in shaping the artistic product of Orpheus. It selected the concertmaster for each piece of repertoire that would be performed in each program. The concertmaster, in turn, selected the principal second violinist and together with the other section principals (chosen by their respective sections for each piece) formed what Orpheus called "the Core." Thus, there was a different "Core" for each piece. In rehearsals, the Core led the rest of the orchestra in the interpretation, which they had collectively decided upon. The Core decided the details of their musical interpretations in special sessions, which were scheduled before the full orchestra met. In these sessions, the Core marked the bowings and articulations, as well as planned how to use the rehearsal time, and then actually ran the rehearsals.

In the founding years, it was Fifer who had chose each principal for every program and decided which player would sit where in each section. The Core system

started to evolve seven years into Orpheus' existence. It grew out of the growing frustration with a rehearsal system where "anyone could make a comment at any time," recalled Fifer (1996). By the old method, Fifer (1996) remembered, "you would get a lot of digression in rehearsals; if someone made a point or observation (call it #1), the group would digress to point #6 and never get back to point #1. There was no natural follow-up either. It could take, seemingly, endless hours to prepare a piece." The Core system has had its own mutations, but constituted the main operational framework for artistic interpretation.[1]

Technically speaking, artistic leadership is shared by everyone since every player is expected to participate fully and to take responsibility for the musical outcome of the group, but, in practice, it is the Core group which formally provides the traditional music director's (conductor's) function. Moreover, a subtle-yet-not-written rule is that the sitting concertmaster has the most authority because "they are in the hot seat." As one veteran member said, "It is the responsibility of the Core group and concertmaster for the piece to monitor the discussion, especially when the concertmaster is bombarded with ideas from the ensemble. We have lots of self-correcting mechanisms at work; it is our responsibility to comment on things. And this level of detail is needed because during performance, everyone can then create to a higher level because they are prepared and they trust one another. Concerts are at a whole other level--*that's* what's special about Orpheus" (Clarke, 1995).

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[1] There was another stage between Fifer's and the Exec Comm's choosing of concertmasters: concertmasters used to be voted on by the membership. "It was very chaotic," said a former orchestra

Administrative leadership

From 1972 to 1990, Fifer both played in the orchestra and managed Orpheus as a business. By 1985, however, it had become apparent to him that he could not continue to carry both sets of responsibility. And yet he struggled with the decision for another five years--which duties to give up: the artistic or the administrative? A long-time friend and fellow player told Fifer, "The decision was made from the first tour in 1979" when Fifer was inundated by administrative details while on the road in Europe (Purvis, 1996). Orpheus was principally Fifer's creation. He felt a great responsibility to the board, to the players, and to the orchestra. He also reasoned that if he gave up administrative responsibility, he would give up a lot. "It was a dilemma," lamented Fifer, "because now I am sad not playing the cello or contributing in that sense artistically. But the orchestra was in a new phase of growth" (Fifer, 1997).

When Fifer made the decision in 1990 to take up administrative responsibilities full-time--whether or not it was predetermined years earlier--a separation (both in terms of proximity and psychologically) between himself and his colleagues ensued. He was no longer one of them; he was 'management' or, as a *New Yorker* article expressed it, "He is now the white-collar boss of a society of workers--a sort of musical kibbutz--and several of the musicians [think] Fifer is no longer in a position to understand their problems" (Traub, 1996: 105). Although Fifer regularly interacted and met with members of the Exec Comm, there was less daily contact with the rest of the players which led to disconnectedness and misunderstanding. As he described it to me in one of my interviews, "it has not been easy and, at times, it has been painful" (Fifer, 1997). For example, on the tour to Germany during the spring of the 1993-94 season, Fifer felt

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manager, "And it became a popularity contest instead of being based on purely a musical decision."

distanced from the group. This disaffection was captured on video by filmmaker Allan Miller who accompanied the ensemble in order to create a documentary about them.[2] Fifer was shown on the film expressing his near-grief about the souring of relations with players. He said, "Knowing why there is this separation only diminishes the pain by 5%" (Fifer, 1997).

Leadership for the administrative aspects of Orpheus (again, up until the 25th anniversary in 1997-98) rested primarily with Fifer, as founder/president, and Norma Hurlburt, long-time vice president (both of whom left the organization shortly after this research was concluded). They oversaw the operations, marketing, development, and financial management activities of a small support staff and acted as liaisons to the board of trustees and external constituencies. Players understood that not every organizational decision needed to be made collectively. In fact, some Orpheus members felt that there should be less direct democracy in the organization's decision-making efforts and even more of a representative form of governance--a kind of "bureaucratic democracy" where decision makers were defined, and empowered (and entrusted) to make decisions for the larger group. "Instead of turning every voter into a statesman," Fifer told me in one interview, "members should be encouraged to think in terms of 'Orpheus, Inc.' and not about how decisions affect individual agendas" (Fifer, 1997).

At Orpheus, there is a balance of authority between players and management that works well for the most part, but which, at times, can be rather delicate: for example, when musicians felt they were not being appropriately compensated in 1992 and a near-civil war with management and trustees ensued (see the section entitled,

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[2] That documentary, *Orpheus in the New World*, was produced by EuroArts, Germany for public TV.

"Testing the Self-Governing System"), or when Fifer's role was called into question: first, when he initially took up administrative duties full-time in 1990 instead of continuing to play in the orchestra and, more recently, concerning whether, as the founder, he had the appropriate skill set to take the orchestra further. At that time, most players agreed that the orchestra's survival depended on having Fifer at the helm.

Indeed, the orchestra's survival as a cooperative enterprise not only depended on who was at the helm, but it also depended on members' own participation. This happened quite naturally on the musical side of their work—musicians were extremely engaged by their rehearsals and concerts--but it was increasingly difficult to get these overextended and overcommitted musicians involved in time-consuming administrative functions. The 1997-98 elections for Exec Comm, for example, surfaced no new candidates and some wondered whether such duties should continue to be voluntary or, rather, be allotted by mandate or by rotation (an issue of concern to all democratically-run orchestras).

The Board of Trustees

Although the players through the Exec Comm had as much artistic authority as a music director in the dominant model of orchestra organization, they did not have the same kind of influence players in a fully self-governing orchestra would over strategic and fiduciary matters. Instead, Orpheus has a traditional board of directors, which was composed of leading business and philanthropic leaders from Manhattan. In this regard, the Orpheus Chamber Orchestra was structured like the dominant model.

The governance of the organization is the domain of the directors. In turn, the board relied on the executive director, Julian Fifer, to act on their behalf and to be the link between the board and the rest of the organization including the Exec Comm and the full orchestra. In several interviews with trustees, they impressed upon me that this was not a typical board. Each member I spoke with expressed a deep commitment to Orpheus. Some spoke of how they were enamored of Orpheus' unique approach to music making. Two veteran board members recounted how they first became involved with the group and the special connection they have with it. "We came aboard because we liked the music," said one board member, who was one of the first directors back in the early 1980s (Gladstein, 1995). "We used to hang out in a record store named Orpheus which featured some of the musicians. We met them and liked the people." A former board chair concurred, "None of us are interested in the New York Philharmonic or the Metropolitan Opera's boards, for example. That's too social. We're into the music" (Sutton, 1995). Board members reported great respect and admiration for the players and belief in the concept of Orpheus. This provides impetus for closer relations than are typically seen among trustees and employees of cultural institutions (at least as I have witnessed them). One board member articulated the distinction, "Orpheus was created by musicians who wanted to play together. The board members joined *later* because they believed in the mission of Orpheus and wanted to support it. Orpheus is very different from some of the larger musical organizations in that respect because...those organizations were formed by wealthy people who decided to fund an orchestra of their own specifications" (Sutton, 1995).

The board takes responsibility for providing fiduciary guidance to the orchestra's management. As a former board chair described it, "The board of directors' role is to

keep the orchestra going and to help them plan better"--that is, to balance their objectives with financial realities (Sutton, 1995). Directors understood that the artistic decisions were the province of the orchestra, but, for example, they would [offer advice such as] encourage foreign tours because "the fees are higher; we make money, and we need the presence" (Sutton, 1995). Although the board had been an indispensable source of counsel (and resources) for Orpheus, the formal link between the board and the players was virtually nonexistent until a major misunderstanding arose during the 1992-93 season. "Between 1980 and 1993, they didn't understand what musicians went through to put on a concert, to earn a living," asserted a veteran player and Executive Committee member (Palma, 1995). "But then, it wasn't communicated to them either," she confessed. Before 1993, Fifer and Hurlburt were the intermediaries between the board and orchestra. Now there would be two musicians from the Executive Committee who attended all board meetings and one on the finance committee.

Just as communication between the board and players was, for a long time, not well formalized, so, too, was the status of the board as a governing body. In fact, the board recognizes that they, too, must evolve. For example, board minutes from the 1995-96 season included the following agenda items: the need to discuss and formalize board composition, nomination of members, terms for board members, and the relationship between board and management. In addition, there was the question of whether "to establish a system whereby the board reviews itself, the board reviews management, and the orchestra reviews management" (Orpheus, 1996b: 5)--in order to calibrate everyone's expectations. In 1997-98, the questions for the board of trustees centered around: 'what role should it play in steering (or even redirecting) the orchestra into the future as it safeguards it financially?, and 'what kinds of decision-making

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authority should it have?' As the board becomes larger and stronger, 'how should the considerable talents of the board be used well and appropriately?' These questions impinged on the very nature of what it means for Orpheus as an artistically self-governing enterprise.

Financing the Orchestra

The Orpheus of 1997 was very different from the Orpheus of 1972. Money and reputation mattered more than it did in the beginning. And although the orchestra had a sterling reputation artistically, it continued to operate on a lean budget. Its endowment fund, only created in 1995, stood at a neglible amount. As a result, each season presented a new set of challenges: expenses depended greatly on programming and tour decisions committed to years ahead of time without any guarantee of income. And each year, the organization had to raise half of its budget to cover the unearned portion of those commitments. Often revenue projections and contributed revenue fell short of actual expenses, and trustees were known to have covered the shortfall personally at times. "The operating budget fluctuates between $2.8 million and $3 million, depending on what we do," said one trustee. "In a repertoire-building year, expenses are often quite high whereas in a Japan Tour year, (which occurs biannually) income is greatly enhanced because there is the additional opportunity to seek sponsorship monies for it. But everything else we do loses money. Even when we sell out Carnegie Hall, we lose $25,000 to $30,000" (Sutton, 1995). Thus, the financial pressure was ever-present.

Orpheus is fortunate that it can raise a significant level of *private support every* year, but it is also burdened by that need. Although the orchestra is in demand around

the world, for a year in which recording contracts are cancelled, a major corporation withdraws sponsorship or rehearsal time explodes over budget, the organization is put in jeopardy. Members and trustees, alike, fully understood the fragile nature of Orpheus' financial condition. Even Fifer realized that, "This is one of the greatest struggles that Orpheus now faces because in many ways, we have achieved our initial artistic goals, but we haven't reached the kind of financial stability and income which the musicians deserve and need, and which one would associate with the kind of artistic success and acclaim the orchestra has received" (Fifer, 1997).

Testing the Self-Governing System

Orpheus is a small group and a small organization. How well it operates depends a great deal on circumstances (external threats, opportunities, and, of course, finances), but it also depends on mutual trust and respect, and commitment to the greater cause. As Fifer's role changed from one of player-manager to full-time chief executive, the first signs of separation and mistrust became apparent. The problem according to many players I interviewed was that Fifer did not communicate openly with them. "It was as if he was holding back information or keeping secrets" (Morelli, 1996). It happened again when players felt that they were somehow being taken advantage of in 1992-93, so they formed a "Salary & Benefits Committee." They felt they were not being adequately compensated, although everyone in the orchestra was paid the same. Some players felt that the organization actually had the wherewithal to increase member pay, but were holding back for some unknown reason. This sentiment was inflamed through a series of meetings and memos, and soon, Fifer, the trustees, and the Salary & Benefits Committee were at odds.

The actual point of contention was players' interest in not only gaining competitive wages but also non-wage benefits (they had no pension or health care benefits at the time, and it had been six years since they had received a pay raise of any sort). This point was made quite salient to the membership when a few key players "voted with their feet," by taking more lucrative positions elsewhere. Unlike other professional orchestras, Orpheus had no formal contract and musicians were not represented by the local musicians' union. As the crisis escalated, all members of the orchestra agreed to sign a union recognition card, essentially forming a collective bargaining unit. When the board heard about this, they were torn about what to do: some felt that "the concept of a [union-negotiated] contract was contrary to some of the basic principles of Orpheus that attracted the musicians and has attracted the board members to support it" (Sutton, 1995). Some board members expressed that they were "not interested in employing an orchestra, but rather in *supporting artists*" (Orpheus, 1993: 2). They also resisted the idea of being constrained in their decision making by a third party and by contractual obligations. In the middle was Fifer who recognized that he had, as he told me, "tried to solve too much alone, without reaching out enough to the musicians" (Fifer, 1997).

The Salary & Benefits Committee wrote a strong and stinging letter to Fifer in late 1992 asserting their position to which Fifer and Hurlburt countered with a telling memorandum, excerpted here:

"You have addressed to us a proposal which carries the assumption that there is an entity somewhere within Orpheus (presumably the board and/or staff) which employs the orchestra and which will negotiate with you (eventually) a contract....In Orpheus, there is no such entity with which to negotiate such a contract, and therefore "a response in kind" is not possible.... The board has never been and has never considered itself to be your employer....you have profoundly misjudged the nature of the

relationships which have been cultivated over the past seventeen years to support Orpheus" (Orpheus, 1992: 3).

This episode, although not unusual in labor-management relations, pointed to a weakness in Orpheus' democratic structure. Despite the fact that this orchestra was created by and for musicians, 21 years after its founding players felt out of touch with what was happening and what decisions were being taken by Fifer and by the board. A player at a board meeting that critical year said, "Musicians' frustration stems from feeling uncomfortable communicating with the board, feeling left in the dark, and wanting to be better informed" (Morelli, 1995). Hurlburt acknowledged, at the time, that perhaps staff "focused our efforts on presenting the organization properly to the public, and [they] had fallen short on energies for internal public relations" (Hurlburt, 1997). Moreover, up until then, there was no formal channel between musicians and the board. With this matter, however, came the formalization of the player's voice by their having representatives in attendance at board meetings. Or, as the minutes of one 1993 meeting read, "The board has been derelict in appointing musician representatives to the board...This process needs to be formalized" (Orpheus, 1992: 4). This problem also exposed the fact, as expressed by one trustee, "that the musicians really could not strike in this type of organization; that the board serves the musicians; and, that the management is self-employed, in a way" (Gladstein, 1995).

Amending the self-governing system

Not many years after that tortuous Salaries & Benefit Committee test of the system, "Orpheus, Inc." became engrossed in its most wrenching self-assessment and change process yet. This process began in the fall of 1997 and was the result of a

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confluence of forces: namely, a deep and unexpected projected deficit for the 1997-98 season, the desire by musicians to have direct contact with the board as opposed to having Fifer represent them (heretofore musicians had no representation on the board), disaffection with the board chairman's way of working (it was perceived that a small oligarchy had formed), division over Orpheus's mission as exemplified by players' refusal to continue to participate in world tours in order to subsidize domestic concerts, and the players' intention to be more fully engaged in the organizational decision making processes. The board formed a special committee during the 1997-1998 season to investigate these matters and what could and should be done. I attended several of their meetings during this time and observed that, in the end, this committee (composed of trustees, players, and managers) did extensive consultation with all parties. They also deliberated long hours and with apparent difficulty about what solutions should be offered and recommended.

The recommendations they finally offered suggested potentially significant developments for the organization. They certainly pushed the organization in the direction of explicitly shared leadership. For example, the chief recommendations of this committee included the following:

--Implementation of a system of checks and balances and a system for shared responsibilities, utilizing the knowledge, expertise and functions of available personnel and resources appropriately;

--Implementation of a system that provides for an equitable participation in officially-sanctioned dialogue between all three elements, with each element representing its own responsibilities judiciously and considering fairly the mandated capacities of others.

--Musicians to carry the mantle and responsibility for the Artistic Vision, Mission, and Integrity.

--The Administration to be reorganized to function more efficiently with a reporting system conducive to the procedures of checks and balances being installed.

--Musicians to become participants in all aspects of the organization in an unprecedented manner.

--To reduce the log jams in the Board, the Administration, and the Orchestra, so that the extraordinary resources of the organization can be aptly applied to yield the desired artistic and organizational development results.

(see **APPENDIX K** for a restatement of Orpheus' vision and the complete set of recommendations made by the special taskforce committee).

What was clear from the committee's review was how Orpheus' organizational development had long been shaped by three things: opportunities and circumstance and the driving force of Julian Fifer. There was no grand scheme or master strategy, only guiding principles and underlying values. As a result, Orpheus as an organization has waxed and waned in the search for structure and clarity. One veteran member summarized it this way, "Orpheus is in a unique position. It is neither a chamber group nor a symphony orchestra. It has gone through cycles. When bureaucracy takes over because things are too loose, then we want more structure and procedures. Eventually, people resist when it becomes counterproductive and it moves the other way. Right now, the movement is toward structure" (Purvis, 1995). The decades since the creation of Orpheus can, therefore, be summarized as an ongoing effort towards artistic excellence. It has been a process of continuous experimentation and evolution. And although Orpheus' structure is definitively self-governing *artistically* speaking, this is not true of the entire organization. Only when players awoke to that reality did "democracy" start to spread to other important areas of the organization, namely the boardroom.

The Future Orpheus

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By 1999-00, the orchestra had made some significant changes: it kept "the Core" system, but replaced the Exec Comm with three elected players called Artistic Directors (i.e., the Artistic Coodinator, Program Director, and Personnel Manager). Fifer and Hurlburt have left the organization and been replaced by a new executive director, Harvey Seifter. Three musicians, elected from the orchestra, now serve on the board of directors and the finance committee. Also, the orchestra's peripatetic existence is giving way to a strategy of longer-term annual "residencies." By this, it is meant that the orchestra will select cities around the globe that it feels are important musical centers and therefore worth spending three to four weeks performing concerts there. One such place is Paris where they have already set up residency at famed conductor Pierre Boulez's "Cité de la Musique." It is also developing more engagements at home in Manhattan (specifically with its Carnegie Hall series and the Riverside Church series).

It is not certain how these developments will enhance and/or perpetuate Orpheus' existence, but the willingness to experiment and evolve is strong and is a cardinal feature of this organization. One thing is certain in my view. Orpheus will likely remain a fascinating enigma even as an arts organization. Even *The New York Times* seems bemused. In the course of one year, the *Times* first chronicled Orpheus' wrenching organizational changes on the front page of *The Arts* section (Kozinn, 1999) calling it a "bloodless revolution" and then just a month later praised it on the front of its *Business* section, which read: "Orpheus has more in common with some of America's largest companies than one might think. The group has become a living, and entertaining, microcosm of a management theory that has been transforming corporate America throughout the 1990s" (Leonhardt, 1999).

The Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra

Snapshot: Main period of study, 1997-1999, with follow-up 2000-2001

Established: 1882
Concerts/season: 100 including domestic and foreign tours
Principal venue: The Philharmonie in Berlin
1998-1999 budget: 50 million Deutsches marks
Orchestra size: 129 of which 118 are men, 11 are women
Conductor: Claudio Abbado, music director
General Manager: Dr. Elmar Weingarten
Player contract type/
   Average income: Salaried; $40,000/year (since increased due to Simon Rattle's intervention)
Governing Body: Vorstand, Fuenferrat, and Personalrat

At the same time that I was researching the Colorado Symphony Orchestra and Orpheus Chamber Orchestra, I had the opportunity to study the "grande dame" of self-governing orchestras, the Berlin Philharmonic. I call it the "grande dame" because, although the Vienna Philharmonic is older by 40 years, the Berlin Philharmonic offers a full season of concerts whereas the main job of the Vienna Philharmonic players is to provide an orchestra for the Vienna State Opera. More importantly, the Berlin Philharmonic was poised for significant organizational change when I started my research. This, as a result of the reunification of Germany and the increasing financial difficulties faced by the City of Berlin, the orchestra's principal supporter. The players of the Berlin Philharmonic were discussing how to gain more independence from the City of Berlin's Senate. Not long after, they were also beginning the search for a new chief conductor. With all this, they were willing to have an outsider take a look at how they had developed organizationally over the years--adapting their structures, roles, and responsibilities in order to minimize the downsides of self-determination and maximize its benefits—and how they might reconfigure their legal structure to capture future opportunities. In short, the Berlin Philharmonic was at the precipice of change and it was searching for a new solution when I first encountered them.

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Direction

During the period of my research from 1997-2000, the Berlin Philharmonic performed 100 concerts each season in its home, The Philharmonie, located in Potsdamer Platz on the eastern side of the Berlin's central Tiergarten. It also performed annually at the Berlin Festival, Pfingsten Festival, Salzburg Easter Festival, as well as in concerts on the Continent and overseas. In addition, the Orchestra contracted for radio and special TV broadcasts.

1999 was an eventful year for the Berlin Philharmonic. It was noteworthy not only because it was the orchestra's 117th season, but also for the extraordinary amount of media attention this world-class ensemble was attracting. The scrutiny was focused on two looming issues: the orchestra's choice for its next chief conductor and its overall future strategy. There have been only a handful of music directors in the orchestra's long history, but with Claudio Abbado, the orchestra's fifth chief conductor, announcing his decision to step down in 2002, speculation about a "new artistic titan to lead this venerable group" dominated the press (e.g., *Economist*, 1998; Connolly, 1999).

The choice of music director is a key decision in any orchestra's long-term strategy, but how this orchestra would navigate the changing cultural environment in Berlin seemed a far more critical issue. It is worth spending a few pages of this chapter describing the environment facing the Berlin Philharmonic.

With City and Senate public finances stretched more than ever before, cuts in government spending portended tough times for many sectors, including the arts. Although it had been clear since German reunification in 1989 that things would have to change, only years later, major policy changes were finally being developed and implemented. In describing

the situation, one player said, "So far, the Berlin Philharmonic is on dry land, but we must watch the rising waters closely!" (Watzel, 1999).

Context: Berlin as a Cultural Capital and City-State

Few cities in the world could lay claim to the title of "cultural capital"—perhaps London, Paris, New York, or Chicago. But Berlin was different: with its population of just 3.6 million, it had more cultural activity than other cities several times its size anywhere in the world. At the last count, there were five professional symphony orchestras, three opera companies, 32 theaters, 880 choirs, 400 independent fringe theaters and performance spaces, 14 cabarets, 149 movie theaters, and 167 museums and collections, as well as more than 250 public libraries and private galleries (McWilliam, 1999). This cultural abundance was a mixed blessing: it was remarkable to have such a panoply of offerings, but it was also expensive for city- and state-level government, which subsidized arts and culture without Federal support. With the merger of the cities of East and West Berlin, the unified Berlin's budget was perennially strained because not only had its population doubled overnight, there were now duplicate organizations in all sectors, especially in the arts. Ironically, what had made this city a world-class artistic metropolis now proved a considerable burden. Indeed, it was argued by some that there were too many theaters, too many orchestras, too many opera houses, and simply not enough funding to go around.

Berlin is a city-state. It has a Mayor (and his administration) as well as a Senate that administers the state-level political affairs of the city. In Berlin, the state Senate appropriates the bulk of funding for arts and culture, spending nearly $700 million annually, or 2.5% of its budget. Although the Berlin Senate and its Cultural Minister wielded a great deal of influence on the cultural landscape of the city, that power was circumscribed by the new political and

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economic constraints.

First, with the federal government now re-established in Berlin, the city has a heightened profile and new public relations considerations. What happens in Berlin speaks loudly both at home and abroad about the German condition; it has both a local platform and a world stage to consider. Berlin's arts and culture activities, therefore, have become even more visible and important. At the same time, Berlin is burdened by the economic constraints that are affecting all levels of government: federal, state, and city. The financial burden of reunification cannot be understated. The country's public debt has jumped twofold since 1990, tallying a staggering DM1,500 billion ($789 billion) (*Economist*, 1999). With its 1999-2000 operating deficit having ballooned to nearly 50 million D-marks, the City's Senate was forced to reconsider its heretofore generous commitment to arts and culture. Tough choices appeared imminent.

The growing concern was how to continue to support the desired high level of cultural activity in the capital. Already by 1999, several of Berlin's arts and cultural organizations had experienced reduced subsidies, mergers among institutions and even closings. "The real question in Berlin cultural politics is: Can you cut the budget?" said the Minister for Culture at the time. "In our future plan, we expect that cultural institutions should bring in more of their own income. But should this amount be 10%, 30% or 50% of their budget? We have not decided this yet. Perhaps 50% is the most you can hope for. And the Berlin Philharmonic is already doing this." He continued, "Otherwise, you must go the American way which will lead to cutting the number of concerts and increasing prices. You know, people can still get a ticket to the Berlin Philharmonic for just twenty D-marks" (Radunski, 1998).

Prospective budget cuts, of course, did not bode well for the Berlin Philharmonic since the Berlin Senate was their prime benefactor, contributing approximately half of their DM 50 million annual budget, with the other half made up by earned income. Indeed, the orchestra's entire financial equation seemed to be changing: some things it could still count on; others it could not. While the orchestra had grown accustomed to and could certainly rely on earning significant income from overseas tours (average ticket prices were $150 in New York City and in Tokyo some $400), the orchestra also depended heavily on the Berlin Senate's subsidy, which now seemed in question.

Adding to the uncertainty was the confluence of other forces. For example, the market for classical recordings had fallen off considerably in recent years due to general market saturation and the introduction of new recording formats (creating major sales opportunities among the main record companies for the sale of transfers to new formats of the back-catalogue of recordings). This was a rather serious matter since the Berlin Philharmonic had been one of the most sought after orchestras for traditional recordings in phonograph and CD formats— its catalog of work with Herbert von Karajan (the orchestra's most famous and longest tenured music director, 1954-1989) had been substantial. In turn, recording royalties flowed in, providing extra income that augmented players' regular salaries (regular salaries were negotiated directly with the Culture Minister, and through him, the Berlin Senate). Indeed, orchestra members had enjoyed generous incomes for years, but all that had changed rather suddenly. One observer joked, "Philharmoniker [Philharmonic players] of Karajan's era drove Mercedes, while the rest of them are now riding bikes." The player's economic equation was further affected by the loss of the extra monthly income that had been paid to West Berliners as compensation for living in the once-divided city. Moreover, Berliners, like other German citizens, now had to pay an additional tax to cover the costs of reunification. On top of all this,

Berlin's Minister of Culture was thinking about how to equalize the distribution of subsidies to arts and cultural organizations.

"It's a question of solidarity," said the Minister, suggesting that it was not fair to show preference to one organization over another, especially in the current environment. "There is a tradeoff: should we keep people in work at a very high price or keep more people employed for less? This is a concern we have throughout our society. Now, we are asking these [arts] institutions to deal with it too. And, I hate the discussion of the welfare state versus cultural state." The Minister continued, "Basically, and in general, we want to keep the cultural landscape of Berlin as it is. If we can just survive this period..." (Radunksi, 1999) It seemed inevitable that the Berlin Philharmonic appropriation would be cut ("but not much"). Already it had been reduced by a total of $1.62 million (DM 3 million) since 1994. In one of my interviews, one veteran player said, "We used to be the best paid orchestra in Germany. Now the government is trying to make it more equal, but we are not equal. This is not good. The pay has been flat and stagnant for some years now and it won't grow anytime soon" (Faust, 1998).

At that time there were few alternatives to government funding of nonprofit arts and cultural organizations. One realistic option on the horizon in 1999, however, was to form a private nonprofit entity called a "Stiftung". This is what several major museums had already done in Berlin. This vehicle is a type of foundation which separates the arts organization(s) from the kind of direct control and influence government could exert (e.g., over programmes, staffing, etc.) while still allowing for the receipt of public monies. In this way it was hoped the orchestra could avoid some of the vagaries of public subsidy. However, it was not clear whether under current German law a Stiftung could actually receive donations from corporate sponsorship and or individual philanthropy. Although companies are increasingly interested in

sponsorship, German tax laws are not favorable to this, and there is no tradition of individual giving in modern Germany as there is in the United States. Indeed, by comparison, contributions from these two important sources are quite nascent. For example, Deutsche Bank sponsored several of the orchestra's tours by contributing DM 400,000 per season, but in America, corporate sponsorships often reached the million-dollar level. The difference was obvious. "We want to go the American way in this regard, but we need better laws to help us," said the Minister of Culture. "Right now, donations can be made, but in our system both sides pay tax on that: the donor and the receiving institution" (Radunski, 1998). Although some had voiced interest in changing these laws, so far the new coalition government had made little progress with the current system.

Membership, Structure, and Leadership

The Berlin Philharmonic is being affected by all the developments that are reshaping its external environment. The organization has been accustomed to turmoil and change. In its long history, the Berlin Philharmonic endured a great deal of hardship and it survived the full range of German economic, social and political upheavals: two World Wars, the economic collapse of the 1920s, the Nazi era, the hardships of the post-War period and German (and Berlin) partition (for a brief listing of milestones, see **Appendix L**). Despite those triumphs, however, it was unclear whether the organization in its current form had the appropriate mechanisms for dealing with the present situation.

Membership

The Berlin Philharmonic had 129 members. The reason for this comparatively large group (most symphony orchestras ranged in size from 65 to 105 players) was to keep the

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members as rested and fresh for performance as possible since playing in a symphony orchestra is an emotionally intense and physically stressful job. The Berlin Philharmonic was considered one of the world's leading orchestras (Economist, 1998). It has a stellar reputation in the classical music industry and typically attracts the best players from Germany and around the world, as well as the best guest conductors and solo artists. In 1999, twenty percent of the members were foreigners and eight percent of the orchestra were women. (The first woman, a Swiss violinist, was hired into the orchestra in 1982.) The average age of players was 44, with retirement mandatory at age 65 (McWilliam, 1999). About half of the orchestra's membership was appointed during Abbado's tenure from 1989-2002 and many were quite young, with the rest dating from the previous era of the legendary Herbert von Karajan. There was a definitive pride attached to being a member of this orchestra. Players were members for life. As I documented in the article I published about the orchestra, even when they retired, they were still known as "Philharmoniker" and the special spirit associated with this group—both on stage and off--was well-known and often referred to as "Philharmonischer geist" (the Philharmonic spirit) (Lehman, 1999). The essence of that Philharmonic spirit came from the orchestra's few but inviolate group norms and its legal and operating structure, which I can summarize as follows in light of my interviews.

To become a member of the orchestra is no small undertaking. A candidate submits his or her application to the orchestra and roughly 5% are invited to play an audition in front of the orchestra. If the candidate then receives a majority of votes of the orchestra, he or she is invited to play with the orchestra for a "Probezeit" or probationary period. Prospective candidates are vetted through this rigorous "trial" period with the orchestra, where members scrutinize candidates' every action: both their playing and their behavior. Often, there is little support provided by fellow section members and the player-candidate has to stand on his or her own two feet, so to speak. At the end of the Probezeit, which typically can run as long as

two years but possibly earlier, the section in which the candidate will play offers a recommendation to the full orchestra membership, and the orchestra then takes a secret ballot vote on the candidate(s). The candidate must receive a two-thirds majority in order to win a permanent position. The principal conductor (who has one vote in the selection process) also has a theoretical right of veto, but it has rarely been used. Looking back on his experience, one player member said, "The audition is one thing; the Probezeit is another. Everything is friendly when you are a student, but when you become a prospective member, it is very different, very hard because everyone is looking out for you to do your best and to behave well. Other members are judging you with a critical eye" (Hunter, 1998). He continued, "It is often the case that even a new member will not last more than two years with us. But they must try hard and not fear."

Once a player becomes a full member of the orchestra, it does not take long for the special spirit of the Berlin Philharmonic to be passed on and imbue in them. This "spirit" is especially apparent during performances, when all members reportedly feel a deep sense of responsibility for the outcome of the concert. As a former Intendant wrote in his history of the BPhO, "The orchestra would never sink below a certain level, for their pride would not allow it. If conditions are unfavorable, if a guest conductor lacks the power to inspire them or cannot establish a real connection with the orchestra, it will do anything it can on its own to guarantee a good performance...It is an orchestra that intellectually participates in the solution of difficult passages, individual problems of intonation, and questions of ensemble" (Streseman, 1978: 114). This notion is palpable in players' own descriptions of their work experience as captured in my interviews with them:

> This evening will be a great performance because people give everything. It's a natural thing, too. Everyone pulls for the best. Because we're treated well and when you're treated well, you feel special and want to do well. You also think to yourself, "*This* is the Berlin Philharmonic!" You can't let any slip-ups

happen. (Laine, 1998)

This is the second time this week that I've played Beethoven's Fifth Symphony and I still get very excited and on the edge of my seat about it. Why? If we let our standard go down, it goes quickly. The more comfortable you get around people, the more comfortable it gets. But sometimes, it's very uncomfortable—especially if you don't know your part, for example. Then fellow players make comments indirectly and it hurts. It has the intended effect. (purposely anonymous)

If I died and came back to life, I'd still want to be musician in this orchestra. To be a soloist is glamorous, but lonely. Here, we are part of a big family. (Mebert, 1998)

The best years of the Berlin Philharmonic and von Karajan were the 1970s. We had a huge wide-ranging repertoire and we would do four or five different programs each tour. Karajan would rehearse the key or tough parts and leave the rest for performance. That created a great deal of tension. I remember having a record player in my hotel room—rehearsing and sweating! We never played a complete piece in rehearsal! In fact, we sometimes would ask Karajan for *more* rehearsal time! (purposely anonymous)

Who motivates me? Each player on each side of me. They are superb musicians and so they encourage me. You *want* to do well. (purposely anonymous)

Everyone of these players is of soloist quality. In fact, many of us had to make the hard choice of whether to stay principal in another orchestra or come here as a section player. The problem is that there are 18 other good ideas besides the concertmaster's. We have subjugated ourselves to the greater whole—the orchestra—and to the music, of course. We don't allow our individual agendas to take precedence or get in the way. When that happens, the group will rein in an errant player. (McWilliam, 1998)

For other orchestral players, their work is 9-5 and then there is private or family life. For us, this is our life. We have all committed completely to it. (purposely anonymous)

In addition to their work with full orchestra, players are encouraged to take part in the a total of 26 smaller ensembles, which consist of Berlin Philharmonic players but "technically" exist outside the organization. These range from the famous "12 Cellists of the Berlin Philharmonic" to the "Scharoun Ensemble Berlin" and the "Berlin Philharmonic Wind Quintet." Of course, there is always the opportunity for teaching as well, and many players give private lessons. Some players hold teaching professorships at local music schools and some are faculty of the orchestra's own Herbert von Karajan Academy. The Academy, founded by its namesake, is a small enterprise, which selects promising young musicians from around the

world to come study for a period of two years as "Fellows." The training these musicians gain is primarily through private lessons with principal players of the Berlin Philharmonic, plus opportunities to perform in concerts and on tour with the orchestra when substitutes are needed. In this way, the orchestra is developing new candidates for its own ranks and several current members of the orchestra are graduates of the Academy (Johnson, 1997).

Structure: Terms of Self-Governance

The orchestra was organized from the start, in 1882, as a self-governing entity, which meant that the players were the "shareholders" and principal stakeholders in the organization. By 1933, the orchestra was nationalized (by its own choice). The players became, in effect, civil servants and the orchestra was considered a department of the Berlin Senate. By 1952, when the German Musicians Union was formed, the BPO players were working under the terms of a conventional master agreement or "Tarifvertrag", like other German orchestras as outlined in Chapter 2, but its pay and benefits are determined by direct negotiation with its principal funder, the Berlin Senate.

As was true of the handful of other self-governing orchestras around the world, equality was essential to the functioning of this musical democracy. As such, all members of the orchestra earned the same basic salary. There were no individual negotiations for merit pay as one might find, for example, in American symphony orchestras. However, principal players earned 20% more and members with families received higher family allowances as mandated by German labor law. Retirement was mandatory at age 65 (McWilliam, 1998).

Within the master agreement, the orchestra's by-laws ("Verwaltungsordnung") set forth the rules of governance and enshrined the orchestra's historic and traditional rights. The key features of this document were as:

(1)   The orchestra chooses its permanent conductor.

(2)   The Intendant (general manager) is appointed by the Minister for Culture on behalf of the City in consultation with the orchestra, which must approve the decision. He oversees a staff responsible for financial and administrative details, as well as for managing the two concert halls in the Philharmonie. This staff is not part of the self-governing membership (which consists only of the musicians).

(3)   Every member of the orchestra has the right to vote on the candidacy of every auditionee to the orchestra. There is no separate audition committee. After completing a probationary period of up to two years, new members require a two-thirds majority vote in their favor at a secret ballot held by the general orchestra membership.

(4)   The principal governing bodies of the organization are:

The Orchestervorstand (a two-person committee) elected by the orchestra membership for three-year terms. The Vorstand have the strongest voice in all artistic and administrative decisions that are made, and they are the official spokespersons for the orchestra membership in dealing with the Berlin Senate and the public.

The Fuenferrat is a council of five players also elected from the orchestra membership for a term of three years each. This council acts as an advisory body to the Vorstand. It might be called on to advise on certain artistic matters, but its main duties have to do with such things as tour arrangements, auditions, and keeping track of player work data. Although the Vorstand are paid extra for their service, the Fuenferrat are not;

The Personalrat, as with other German companies, is an independent body which oversees issues regarding personnel and working conditions for all employees of the Berlin Philharmonic organization including the stagehands, technicians, and administrative staff of the Philharmonie hall, as well as the musicians. The Personalrat is an elected committee of seven representatives (for four-year terms) from all sectors of the organization. This committee can intervene with, or in some cases indeed even veto, decisions that negatively impact the organization's personnel. (The Personalrat is not paid extra for their service).

The principal non-governing body of the organization,[1] the Berliner Philharmoniker (GbR), is a corporate partnership composed of past and present members of the orchestra. It is the private arm of the Berlin Philharmonic which is run by a committee of two to three players elected from the orchestra for three-year terms. The GbR is responsible for marketing the orchestra's performance rights, and for negotiating and administering copyrights associated with recordings by and filming of the Berlin Philharmonic. They distribute the income from these activities to the players with a significant share also being contributed to the Intendant's

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[1] Another important non-governing body of the Berlin Philharmonic was the Kamaradschaft. This group serves as an alumni committee of sorts, linking past and present members through social events and other activities.

budget. Radio broadcast income is handled by the Intendant. One player explained the situation:

Some in the public feel that the existence of this private company is at odds with the orchestra's civil status and public purpose; that, in fact, it is a conflict of interest." He continued, "In the orchestra's defense, the public is unaware of the direct contribution made by the GbR to the general budget. Nor are they aware that private media activities by the players effectively subsidized their overall income package and relieved the Berlin government of the true cost of hiring players. Moreover, film and/or recording companies often helped to finance the costs of guest artists (McWilliam, 1998).

Despite its many advantages, the dual organizational structure could be problematic since there were, in effect, two organizations to deal with in booking concert performances and recording dates. So far, however, nothing had been done to move the organization further in either direction.

Leadership

As the organizational chart in **Exhibit 7.1** indicates, there are a number of constituencies which can influence some aspect of the Berlin Philharmonic's operation under the present structure---from the Minister for Culture who conveys the Senate's wishes and concerns (for instance, increasing the level of domestic touring in Germany) to the Personalrat if, for example, it should feel the need to intercede about workplace conditions. But the basic organizational leadership is clearly vested first and foremost in the "Vorstand" (i.e., the two elected player co-chairs). The Vorstand have to be fully apprised of, and can intercede in, issues in all areas at any time: for example, they have to agree on the artistic plan; they are responsible for the outcome of the sections' self-rostering for programs; they discuss with the chief and guest conductors the number of rehearsals needed, and they are informed of important budgetary concerns. In addition, it is important for the Vorstand to coordinate well with the player representatives of the Berliner Philharmoniker operation, even though the GbR was technically independent and beholden only to the players.

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Exhibit 7.1

Organizational Structure of the Berlin Philharmonic (through 2001*)

Key: Bold lines mean that these actors cannot operate without the cooperation of each other; Dotted lines mean that there are significant information flows between these actors.

Source: BPhO Personalrat

* Changes were made to this organizational plan as of January 1, 2002.

Organizational leadership is further extended from the Vorstand through the chief conductor and Intendant. In essence, the chief conductor is expected to spearhead the organization by designing a compelling artistic approach for the orchestra. He suggests what repertoire will be performed in the 30% of the season's programs he leads, as well as which guest conductors and solo artists should be invited during a particular season. Through a process of consultation and debate with the Vorstand and Intendant, a final programme is determined. It is up to the Intendant then to work out the arrangements. The Intendant's role is fundamentally about coordination and implementation. He and his staff have full responsibility for the organization's administration, and the Intendant acts as liaison with the Minister for Culture on matters having to do with the annual budget and quarterly accounting. But the Intendant does not enjoy the independent authority of a CEO in the traditional sense of the word. He is more of a general manager to the organization. As one player said in an interview with me, "The Intendant's main job is to serve the needs of the orchestra, not his own career goals" (Hunter, 1999).

Communication and Collaboration

In the final analysis, the day-to-day operational success of the Berlin Philharmonic turns on the relationship of these four people (the two Vorstand, the Intendant, and the Conductor) who have to be in constant contact--and agreement--with each other. The by-laws of the organization make it self-governing, but its leadership in action is based on the notion of "Mitbestimmung" or co-determination (as explained in Chapter 2, the system of joint responsibility taking for the organization by all major constituencies: the players, the Senate, the chief conductor, and the management). The working relationships and balance between these key individuals is critical for the organization. To date, there has been a clear and mutual understanding regarding the orchestra's overall strategy and operation. Members of the orchestra understood this and were keen to ensure that the organization's leaders are all

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focused on the long-term health of the organization. One member said, "As long as everything goes well, there is no question about this form of governance. It is a fascinating subject because it works so well" (Faust, 1998). A former Vorstand added, "You need two things: good people and you need the rules. But the best is when it works without the rules!" (Goessling, 1998).

Criteria for "Orchestervorstand": the Two Person-Committee

One characteristic of a good Orchestervorstand (also called the Vorstand), according to a player who had held this position, is that "He have his ear in the orchestra," meaning that the Vorstand had to know what the orchestra was thinking. They had to be in touch with the other orchestra members. But they also had the Fuenferrat to help in this regard. Key strategy and policy decisions were always vetted by the Fuenferrat and, especially, the entire orchestra membership. The Fuenferrat are important in the leadership structure because they extend the Vorstand's ability to reach and even poll the orchestra when need be, and they manage duties for which the Vorstand does not have enough time. Decision making is further facilitated by full orchestra meetings that are typically held on a bimonthly basis or as needed. With all the impending decisions in 1999, the orchestra was called to meet monthly. Handling important orchestra decisions in this way is a key operating principle of this democratic organization, but often there are sensitive issues that cannot be immediately shared with the full orchestra. As one Vorstand said, "Everything is transparent, except for the secrets" (Riegelbauer, 1998).

Other important characteristics of the Vorstand were the ability to think strategically, to plan ahead, to take responsibility, and to have "strong nerves" for the tremendous demands placed on them (there was no reduction in orchestra services or extra pay for taking on the

Vorstand position). This was burnout work. As one recently-retired Vorstand put it, "This job needs a lot of time. It is very hard. You're always working. And you can't afford to be everyone's friend: not between the conductor and the orchestra, and not between the orchestra members" (Goessling, 1998). About the leadership process, he said, "We were involved with the Intendant all the time. We were always always together talking and deciding things. We were not so involved in the budget. That's the Intendant's responsibility, but we certainly know what the problems are. The role is like one of a judge: you are always having to find compromise and then having to explain that to the orchestra," he said with the recognition of how tough that could be. "There were issues on the last tour—and not boring ones either!"

Cultivating Player-Member Participation

As to how players were developed into future leaders in this system, one former Vorstand said, "Now there is a big generation change in the orchestra. Over the last ten years, we have hired 60 new members and many of them are young. They will need more time within the orchestra before they will become interested and before they can become good orchestra leaders" (Goessling, 1998). In fact, the orchestra requires that players be members of the orchestra for five years before they can run for elected office. One had to be nominated first by at least five other members of the orchestra before running for a post. Elections were won by majority vote.

Like other democratic systems, participation was always an issue. Often there were no more than one candidate for a vacant post, yet a formal election still had to be held. For example, September, 1998 was the triannual election of the Vorstand. As it turned out, no others but the two who won indicated their interest in the position. In light of this, and concerned for the process, one of the winners initially stepped aside and encouraged two other

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players to run: a violinist and a cellist. In the end, however, the two initial candidates, both veteran orchestra members, won the two Vorstand posts. About the experience, the player, who had been in the orchestra just six years, said: "I felt a little young to be doing this, but on the other hand, I had ideas—like transforming the Philharmonie Hall into a more dynamic place—to attract people to Potsdamer Platz. We need restaurants and more modern marketing. The problem with the election is that there is no way to really share your ideas. The vote is based mostly on personal reputation" (Schaefer, 1998). In the end, this player was glad he did not win, but he was still very concerned about his orchestra and its situation: "Politically, we're all dilettantes and we're not professional managers, but the goal is to maintain this musical environment—because it's what brings out our best." As for the other candidate, he, too, was rather relieved that he did not win Vorstand. "I am a free man!" Nevertheless, this veteran player of the orchestra was also concerned about the issues confronting the orchestra and its future. "The orchestra is somewhat unsettled now. There is an impending change of conductorship. We are very concerned about our compensation. We work extremely hard, but we do it for the music. This is why you join the orchestra." (Faust, 1998).

Indeed, despite all the looming change, players appreciated their special brand of music making together. Most BPhO players agreed that they were "a bunch of strong minded individuals," as one young player put it. "But we all see music the same way! We are spiritual brethren here. It's great when you have like minded people to work with. We don't know much about management and this orchestra may not be for everyone, but it's great for us!" (Dodds, 1998). A former Vorstand reinforced this notion with a wry smile, "You know good people often have strong personalities. Sometimes it would be easier to have people who would just go along. But all we need is a majority and the other 49% can be upset. This is a democracy" (Goessling, 1998).

Choosing the Next Chief Conductor

As a review of BPhO archival documents reveals, Claudio Abbado arrived in Berlin in late 1989 on the heels of Karajan's last tumultuous year with the orchestra. It was a potentially difficult transition, but the players had chosen Abbado and they welcomed him (BPhO, 1995). The contrast between the two men was significant: by 1989 Karajan was aged and a dictator in every sense of the word whereas Abbado was youthful and forward looking. Abbado was at heart a democrat and he believed in the concept of artistic self-determination. In fact, his conducting experience was steeped in it: from his work with the Chamber Orchestra of Europe to the London Symphony Orchestra. He was an accomplished conductor: among his many appointments were music directorships of La Scala and the Vienna State Opera, as well as principal guest conductorship of the Chicago Symphony Orchestra and the artistic directorship of the Salzburg Easter Festival. His work with the Berlin Philharmonic has been substantial and critically acclaimed. Despite the productive working relationship Abbado had developed with the Berlin Philharmonic over more than a decade, he announced his decision to step down from his post as of the 2002 season in order to allow himself more time for other pursuits. This decision would be a significant one for the orchestra.

The selection of a new chief conductor was a major organizational decision. The entire orchestra membership had been discussing the matter for months. Few other orchestras in the world give the players authority to choose their own music director. For the Berlin Phil, this is expressly stated in their by-laws and is a principal tenet of the organization. There is no question that Claudio Abbado's decision to leave in 2002 precipitated a turning point for the orchestra, organizationally and artistically. As much as Abbado was celebrated for his work with the Berlin Philharmonic, he was also a living link to the past, the Romantic era. The

orchestra had to decide whether to replace him with an older, established conductor with a similar traditional approach, or a younger, perhaps less well-known individual with more forward-looking ideas. The choice was significant for the orchestra, but it would also be significant for the next music director. Said one veteran player:

> We are an obstreperous bunch. Think about it: we elect our own music director democratically and then give him enormous authority. But we may also fight him along the way. We are fiercely independent, but we tolerate our conductors. How can they live with this? It's an extremely awkward situation for them. 'Am I or am I not in charge here?' Not all conductors can deal with this. It's like the Roman consuls. They were given dictatorial power for one year and then they were out. Not many conductors can handle the dichotomy. (McWilliam, 2000)

After months of discussion and debate, the musicians reached a decision in June, 1999. The players had taken their vote and chosen Sir Simon Rattle, former music director of the City of Birmingham Symphony Orchestra (UK), and frequent guest conductor of orchestras around the world including Berlin. The decision was welcomed with great applause by both the local and international arts community (Connolly, 1999). Here, to paraphrase, was a firebrand of a conductor who could lead this obstreperous group in the next century. But there were still many other decisions to be made now that the post had been filled because in the months that followed, the Intendant had also announced his decision to step down in 2002, which would require the players to get involved in yet another significant employment search (they would make recommendations on a slate of candidates for this position). And there was a change in civic government with the fall 1999 elections. This meant that a new Minister of Culture would be appointed by the Senate and a new relationship would need to be forged.

More importantly, Simon Rattle was beginning a fight of his own with the City of Berlin. According to newspaper reports, Rattle would not agree to sign his contract with the Berlin Senate until they agreed to increase the wages of the Berlin Philharmonic orchestra players. "Sir Simon was also supporting those who were trying to turn the orchestra into an

independently-run foundation, with more say over its finances" (BBC, 2001). This came at an especially bad time for the City of Berlin and its governing body, the Berlin Senate, because the German capital was in a financial and political crisis. Yet, not wanting to jeopardize the appointment of Rattle, they conceded to his demands.

The Future Direction of the Berlin Philharmonic

Many observers of the Berlin Philharmonic were now asking a range of questions not normally posed to such a group of self-acknowledged "musical—not management--experts." The players did their best to articulate the challenges the orchestra faced and what alternatives seemed plausible. Whatever was suggested, it was clear a new organizational strategy was necessary (and with it a new governing structure that would allow it an even longer arm's length relationship with the German government):

Said one veteran player and member of the Personalrat: "Berlin remains at the seam of two worlds: at this seam there is a rupture. It's true. Culture is no longer a sacred cow in Germany. And with that comes change. Initially during Reunification, the Bonn government said that "all [arts and cultural] institutions must survive"; solidarity was strong—as long as there was enough money to support them all! Two years ago, the growing indebtedness of Berlin had peaked. Without the federal government to bail them out, there is pressure to make cuts. This is why our fantastically rich musical offering [in Berlin] is in danger" (McWilliam, 1999)

One Vorstand explained another angle of the situation: "There are still two audiences for culture in Berlin. The Berlin Philharmonic's audience is mostly West Berliners and not more than 5% from the old East Berlin side. In the music world, people keep old habits. They

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like their own concert hall. Despite this fact, our orchestra has a very high subscription rate. With 20,000 subscribers to our Philharmonie concerts, most people wait a long time to get a ticket. Ticket prices have remained fairly level, but it's still hard to get one" (Riegelbauer, 1999)

He continued, "There is a special role for the Berlin Philharmonic despite our lack of significant sponsorship and endowment. This is the civic orchestra of Berlin. We have certain duties to the state such as playing 95 concerts per season in the city. We have 2,400 seats and are playing to near 100% capacity, with over 200,000 coming to the Philharmonie during the season. It's unique in Berlin and in Germany."

The other Vorstand added: "One other issue for us is that we have not fully explored all we can do on the earned income side of our budget. (In fact, we only started using double-entry accounting in 1996. Before then, any surplus we earned was taken by the Senate. And, of course, any deficit was covered by them. There were no incentives to do better on generating revenues.) Right now, for example, our hall is essentially unused when the orchestra is out of town. The Intendant has no budget to promote other concerts at the Philharmonie yet he is the general manager of the hall and of the orchestra. This is a dilemma. Private promoters do the work for us and this only results in lower-quality orchestras playing there on occasion. This could be much improved if the Intendant had this responsibility in-house" (Watzel, 1999)

In the final analysis, the turn of the century held both promise and problems for the orchestra and its members. One overly hysterical article in the European press attempted to capture the seeming conundrum facing the orchestra: "The Berlin Philharmonic is Germany's best ambassador, said Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, but the BPO is now struggling for its

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survival" (Connolly, 1999). Besides financial considerations, Germany's flagship orchestra had to think about its future audiences. The Berlin Philharmonic had to worry about serving its own country in addition to its fans worldwide because the youth of Germany were not necessarily as ingrained in classical music as their parents had been. There were plenty of other distractions and leisure pursuits besides classical music. Rattle would need to bring to bear all his knowledge---and charisma---to bridge the music and generation gap because despite its 500-year musical heritage, Germany, like much of the world, had been thrust into the entertainment age.

For the venerable Berlin Philharmonic, this was new ground. Although it was indeed a cultural ambassador of Germany, it was no longer immune to the pressures faced by others. For an organization that never had to plan its future beyond the choice of its conductor, nor worry about compromising artistic vision and excellence because of resource constraints, this was not an insignificant turning point. The orchestra had to move out of a reactive stance into a forward thinking one and its choice of the next conductor was just one part of its overall future strategy. Moreover, that strategy would draw on the input of the orchestra membership, for this was a rare form of democracy in the musical world.

Chapter Eight: The London Symphony Orchestra[1]

Snapshot: Main period of primary research, 1993-1994, with follow-up 1997-1999

Established:	1904
Concerts/season:	95 including domestic and foreign tours
Principal venue:	The Barbican Centre, London
1998-99 budget:	9 million British pounds
Orchestra size:	107 of whom 87 are men, 20 are women
Conductor:	Sir Colin Davis, principal conductor
Managing director:	Clive Gillinson who is a former LSO cellist
Player contract type/ Average income:	Per service; $40,000/year
Governing body:	The player board with 4 external non-player members

The last of the four orchestras, the London Symphony Orchestra (LSO) provides an especially interesting look at the evolutionary process of self-governance. Perhaps the best-documented case of a self-governing orchestra, the orchestra's history and developments have long been chronicled (Foss, 1954; Pearton, 1974; Blandford, 1984; Stewart, 1994). Like the Berlin Philharmonic has done recently, the LSO has been most willing to be observed by outsiders such as music critics and academics. For me, the research began in 1993 and it continued until 1999. This rather long period of time afforded me the rare opportunity to observe an organization as it went through significant change.

History and Context

Like most organizations, the London Symphony Orchestra's direction or purpose is rooted in its historical origins. Founded in 1904, the London Symphony Orchestra is

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[1] Note that some of the research about this orchestra was conducted in concert with Adam Galinsky. This chapter also draws on our joint publication, Lehman & Galinsky (1994), for which I was the lead author.

the oldest of the four self-governing symphony orchestras in London. As such, it is a testament to a long-standing tradition of player self-rule. The catalyst for its founding was much like that of other democratic revolutions: the players believed that their individual rights and freedoms were being restricted by their membership in the Queen's Hall Orchestra which was managed by Sir Henry Wood. Wood wanted their exclusive commitment to his orchestra; the players wanted the freedom to choose--to send "deputies" or substitutes if other higher paying work came along. It was not uncommon for deputies to be almost a majority during rehearsals only to be replaced by principals, who had missed all the rehearsals, for the actual concert. Wood was not the only conductor dismayed by this London tradition.

To elicit greater commitment from his players, Wood offered them a guaranteed wage in exchange for elimination of the deputy system. But the players resisted. In fact, they reacted so strongly that they decided it would be better to run things themselves. So, forty-six orchestra members forthwith rejected Wood's offer, resigned in order to create an orchestra of their own based on principles of self-rule, and later became a limited company, owned and managed by the players (Pearton, 1974; Stewart, 1994). Nearly a century later, the LSO remains firm in its commitment to self-governance (and, interestingly enough, continues to grapple with the issue of percentage of workload to be required of members).

Today, the orchestra is governed by an orchestra-elected board of directors composed primarily of players. As will be discussed later in this chapter, two-thirds of the seats on this governing board are held by LSO member players, each elected by the full orchestra at their Annual General Meeting. This simple fact is what distinguishes it from the dominant model of orchestra organization. Most major orchestras are

governed by boards that consist mainly of corporate and community leaders, who contribute their business expertise, financial contributions, or both, and, in exchange, they control the organization. In those orchestras, players are sometimes asked for their views about organizational matters, but all consequential decisions are made by the orchestra's board, music director, and/or its managing director (Carvajal, 2001). Rarely are any players *full voting* members of orchestra governing boards. By contrast, the player-dominated board of the LSO has direct control of the entire organization--from selecting the managing director and principal conductor to deciding about the orchestra's strategic direction and its membership. Their power is rooted in the orchestra's by-laws, which were designed to keep control in the hands of the players. In an interview with Michael Tilson Thomas, former principal conductor of the London Symphony Orchestra from 1988 to 1995 and now principal guest conductor, he noted two key dimensions of the self-governing system: "In the self-governing LSO, the players bear both the direct economic consequences of [their] decisions and the burden of having to dismiss their own colleagues" (Tilson Thomas, 1993).

Direction

At the present time (2002 data), the principal activities of the LSO have expanded significantly from the time period of my research. They now include presenting 95 major concerts at the Barbican Centre (located in the City of London where the orchestra has been a resident company since 1982). The LSO also performs special concerts such as summer pops, Christmas concerts and creates its own festivals, as well as chamber and other small-ensemble performances using players in different combinations. In addition, the LSO also tours Great Britain and internationally each year and makes a number of recordings for record companies and for its own label, introduced in 2000, called "LSO Live." The orchestra also continues to engage in

contract work for motion picture and television productions, a long-standing activity of the orchestra for which it has earned many awards. In recent years, the LSO has become well-known for its recording of such film scores as the *Star Wars* series, *Raiders of the Lost Ark, Superman,* and *Braveheart* (Stewart, 1994). Although commercial work is considered tangential to the LSO's primary mission, both the orchestra collectively and the individual players count on the extra income provided by these usually very lucrative sessions. Beyond the financial and reputation benefits of commercial work, as I discovered in my research work with Galinsky, "It also provides players with confirmation of one of their special sources of pride--namely, that they are superb readers, an orchestra that usually can get a piece right the first time" (Lehman & Galinsky, 1994:10). In addition to all of these activities, the LSO recently established a residency at Lincoln Center in New York City, thus providing a foothold in the American cultural scene, and a music education center for its LSO Discovery program at St. Luke's, a restored 18th-century church close by the Barbican Centre.

Clearly, the orchestra was very busy at home in London, but it was constantly seeking additional work—and competing with other orchestras to get it. Although the competition for that work is keen in the music industry, the LSO appeared to be taking the lead among its rivals (both the London self-governing orchestras and even British orchestras) at the time of this writing (Clark, 2002). Most large cities around the world have but one major professional symphony orchestra whereas London has five: the BBC Symphony Orchestra and four self-governing orchestras—the London Philharmonic Orchestra, Philharmonia, Royal Philharmonic Orchestra, and the LSO. (To be exact, Tokyo has ten symphony orchestras and Berlin has eight as of last count). Although alliances have been made with certain guest conductors, each orchestra competes vigorously with the others not only for audiences but also for financial support,

the best players, soloists, and recording opportunities.

Back in the 1993-94 season, when the original research of this orchestra took place, the competition was especially keen among London orchestras (as well as the nine other professional symphony orchestras in England) because the British government had decided to step up its devolution of authority and grant making to the regions (BBC/Arts Council of Great Britain, 1994). At that time, it was unclear whether the national government through the Arts Council would continue to be the principal benefactor of British orchestras--or, if not, where new and sufficient support could be found to sustain them. But this was not entirely new news or an unusual development: the orchestral scene in London had long been and continued to be a virtual battlefield of potential winners and losers. This, then, was the backdrop to the organization of the LSO at the time this research was started.

Structure

As I found in my research with Galinsky, the organizational structure of the LSO has two independent, parallel streams of authority and responsibility--one looking inward, the other looking outward, and each in constant communication with the other (Lehman & Galinsky, 1994: 7). **Exhibit 8.1** conveys the organizational chart of the orchestra:

Exhibit 8.1

The LSO's Organizational Chart

KEY:
PM = personnel manager
PC = principal conductor
A = administrator
Mg Dir = managing director

Source: Lehman & Galinsky, 1994.

According to my interviews with board members and the managing director, I learned that operationally, the work of the governing board is divided as follows: the player-members of the board are directly responsible for all internal orchestral processes, including personnel decisions, discipline, and rostering. The managing director works on behalf of the board and orchestra membership to handle the various aspects of administration which includes a staff of forty people. Among the managing director's duties are the cultivation of government and corporate relations, proposing and implementing the orchestra's competitive strategy, and taking the initiative on artistic matters such as programming, tours, and recordings. The non-player or "external" board members, a role that was instituted after a severe financial crisis in 1982, are principally drawn from leading British organizations and are considered important resources to the orchestra when it comes to government, community, and

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corporate relations and for their financial and business expertise (Stewart, 1994). In marked contrast with what is usual in the traditional model of orchestra organization and current practice elsewhere, the LSO's principal conductor has no formal role in internal orchestral affairs or orchestra strategy per se. Still, the managing director and the board chair keep him closely apprised of developments and plans and solicit his counsel about matters that are consequential to its artistic future.

Membership

In the early 1990s, the London Symphony Orchestra consisted of 105 musicians ranging in age from 23 to 65. In many ways, the LSO operated like a large family. Members had generally congenial relationships, they cared about one another personally as well as professionally, and they freely exchanged information and opinions. Consistent with the spirit of self-governance, members looked out not only for their individual interests, but also for the orchestra as a whole. For example, anyone in the orchestra, regardless of instrument played or rank, could sit in on preliminary auditions of new musicians and voice an opinion at any stage of the process. A veteran LSO principal player, explained it this way: "An orchestra can easily get the wrong person by the [American] audition process and then you can't get rid of them. Here, we own the place, we run it. We want the best players, but they must fit in. There is a feeling of great camaraderie in this orchestra. There is both great individuality and brotherhood" (Martin, 1993). About the orchestra's collegiality, a young woman, hired in 1993 as principal second violinist, described her orchestra as having, "a very American get-up-and-go-for-it attitude. The typical LSO player personality is a lively, outgoing, good-for-a-laugh, kind of person--especially on tour. But it's extremely professional when it comes to performance" (Graham, 1993).

There are, nonetheless, inherent frustrations in the work lives of any orchestral player. It lies in the nature of the work as noted in Chapter 1. These frustrations have to do with several things including the power relations within an orchestra, especially between a conductor and the orchestra, the lack of autonomy and other aspects of subordination, and the physical and mental stress of performing exacting work under pressure. In addition, the conventional wisdom is that the conservatory training of musicians prepares them mainly for careers as virtuoso soloists (or at worse chamber music players), not as orchestra members.[2] The LSO, by contrast, sought to make players' jobs as engaging as possible by providing artistically challenging programming, by encouraging players to become involved in community educational programs, and by inviting a diverse set of top-notch guest conductors and soloists to play with the orchestra thereby raising the standard and challenging the members (as we will see later in this chapter). But it was still an uphill journey, as then-board chair John Lawley acknowledged in 1994: "You have to understand that with a group of 100 people, they get bored easily. On the whole, however, I can say that we have fewer days now when 'it's just a job'" (Lawley, 1994).

Player recruitment

Recruiting new players (and hence new voting members) is a time-consuming process at the LSO because it is regarded as a vital aspect of their self-governing system. Determining who plays in the orchestra is extremely important for the ensemble, for the organization, and for this social collective. Lawler (1986) reinforces the fact that, in any high involvement organization such as this, personnel selection is

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[2] It must be said, however, that music schools around the world are starting to address this issue more and more nowadays; trying to adapt their programs to offer students more choices in career directions than solely orchestral

the fact that, in any high involvement organization such as this, personnel selection is absolutely critical. According to my interviews with players and with the Personnel Office, all section members where a vacancy exists vote on which candidates to bring to the orchestra for a trial. During the trial period, which can be of short duration (a week) or longer (three weeks or more), orchestra members learn a great deal about the candidates: how well they play, as well as what their musical ideas are and how they interact socially. At the end of a trial, section members make hiring decisions along the following criteria: on the candidate's compatibility with the section and with the orchestra's overall sound, as well as on his or her competence as an instrumentalist. After a section votes on their preferred candidate, the board chair seeks corroboration from key LSO members in *other* sections, and occasionally the views of the principal conductor, before extending an offer of employment.[3] In this way, the process is designed to give greater weight to the expertise of the section in which the player will work, but also acknowledges the importance of gaining broader consensus across the orchestra membership.

The selection process is somewhat less elaborate when a principal position is at stake because candidates for these positions are almost always well-known and quite distinguished musicians. These individuals are simply invited to perform with the orchestra without preliminary auditions. If their trial goes well, the board chair first seeks the consensus of all other principal players and then can make an offer to the candidate if they so choose.

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performance (see, for example, the programs of the Eastman School of Music in Rochester, NY and the Guildhall School of Drama and Music in London, England).

[3]This process differed significantly from the selection procedures typically used by major orchestras in the United States. There, auditions are conducted "blind" (i.e., behind a screen) and candidates are judged solely on this musical

Michael Tilson Thomas, the LSO's former principal conductor from 1988-1995, praised the LSO's selection procedures but pointed to one drawback. In an interview with Tilson Thomas, he described the process itself was so painstakingly thorough that some appointments were negatively affected by it (Tilson Thomas, 1993). This kind of consensus decision making can, for example, take so long that outstanding players sometimes accepted other offers while the LSO was still deliberating. But of course, this is not always the case. Still, the important point to note is that the selection of fellow players rests principally with the orchestra members, not with the music director as is the case in most conventionally-structured orchestras. Just as self-determination means that players have the right to choose their colleagues, it is equally incumbent upon them to assess fellow players for either promotion, demotion or dismissal.

Peer evaluation, in practice, can be one of the most difficult aspects of any organization let alone one based on self-governance because it is considered easier for "a boss" or another superior to make professional judgments about workers (Peiperl, 2001). Even with a clear code for employee appraisal, the interpersonal tension that arises from evaluating one's peers is high (Argyris, 1990). Of course, LSO players know what is expected of them and members who encounter workplace performance problems are given ample warning and plenty of time and counseling to remedy them. Once a player passes their audition and is invited to a trial period, they undergo a second formal assessment in order to become a full member of the orchestra. This occurs within two years of their arrival in the orchestra. The assessment, and this is the key, is made by a committee of players from the orchestra. Thus, there is no external agent who is making the decision; it is made by colleagues from the orchestra. The only other formal assessment of a player's performance comes if they choose to put

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performance and their other work experience. The music director usually has more say in the final decision than the

themselves forth as a candidate for a vacant position within the orchestra. Otherwise, the peer evaluation I am referring to here is an ongoing, day-to-day kind where players sitting next to each other in a section make continuous judgments about their colleagues, e.g., Are they working to a high standard? Are they "giving it their all" or are they sloughing off and not doing their job as it should be? Do they exhibit drinking problems or other performance-related difficulties? In any kind of organization but especially a self-governing one, how (and how well) your fellow employees function matters.

Player contracts

Once a new musician is hired into the orchestra as a member, he or she receives from the Board chair a simple letter outlining the conditions of employment (or perhaps, more accurately, freelance engagement) (see **APPENDIX M**). The letter describes how the player will be paid, explains that all LSO members are required to accept a minimum of 85% of the work that the LSO offers, and notes that the new member needs to purchase ten LSO shares to conform with the organization's by-laws of worker-ownership. (The shares cost a nominal sum of just 1£ each). This brief letter contrasts with the very detailed and legalistic master agreements of American orchestras, some of which approach 100 pages in length. This letter of employment, characteristic of the informal style of the LSO, is also a stark reminder that all players are paid on a per-service basis and that no one, regardless of rank or tenure in the orchestra, has a guarantee of life-time employment with the LSO. In recent years, players have been afforded access to group-discounted health and pension benefits, but these benefits must be paid for from the player's individual wages.

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orchestra's players.

As has been suggested, equality is a critical tenet of this organization. The importance of equality as a core LSO value is reinforced by the orchestra's payment system. All players in a given category (e.g., section players) are paid the same. There are no exceptions to these standard rates regardless of a player's seniority, musical prowess, or "outside" market value, although it must be said that pay rates are higher for principal players (because of the extra work required to lead a section) and for some others who have special responsibilities such as board duty (which encroaches on a player's free time and may limit outside earning opportunities such as from teaching). Moreover, pay levels are throughout public knowledge and accepted by the membership of the LSO.

Leadership: The Board, the Principal Conductor and Managing Director

As with all organizations, especially those democratically-run and self-governing groups, leadership is critical to the success of the organization (Lawler, 1986). At the LSO, leadership is vested first in the player board by the full orchestra membership, then in the board chair, principal conductor, and, finally the managing director. It is important to note that the principal conductor and managing director, two critical leadership posts, serve at the discretion of the player membership and the player board. The external non-player board members, although valuable in the governing process, play a less dominant role compared to other U.K. and American orchestras and also serve at the pleasure of the orchestra, which elects them.

The Board

The LSO's board of directors consists of nine players who are elected for three-year terms by the orchestra membership at the Annual General Meeting. Four non-musician members are recruited largely from the business community (for their business expertise and contacts) and also voted on by the orchestra for similar terms. It was Gillinson who encouraged the board in 1985 to appoint outside directors (Stewart, 1994). The board, in turn, elects its own chair and vice-chair annually, who must be orchestra members. The board also hires and reviews the appointments of the managing director (who also serves on the board, ex-officio) and the principal conductor (who does not participate on the board).

During this research, player members reported that they found their service on the board to be both meaningful and rewarding but also difficult and sometimes very draining personally. From my interviews, I learned that as both key leaders in the organization as well as musicians performing the full schedule with the orchestra, board members found the dual role very demanding indeed. Formal meetings are held monthly, but much of the board's business is carried out daily and quite informally—backstage, onstage, and elsewhere. A former board member remembered her tenure this way: "Being on the board for a three-year term can wear you out. Initially it's all very exciting, but you quickly get overwhelmed by the little things" (Pendrill, 1993). She remembered how members of the board would have "huddles" backstage, on the bus, or wherever need be to deal with general orchestra issues, as well as individual orchestra member problems.

Although player discipline is formally the responsibility of the board, it is actually

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enforced primarily by the board chair in his interactions with the orchestra members (Lawley, 1994). Otherwise, the other player board members are also actively involved with the orchestra--explaining all board decisions to the membership and getting those decisions implemented. For example, certain measures called for in the three-year development plan discussed later in this chapter--such as the elimination of associate membership and the creation of fixed holiday periods--created great strain within the orchestra. According to my interviews with players, not everyone agreed on the path the orchestra's governing board had taken. Player members of the board worked tirelessly to secure their colleagues' understanding and acceptance of these changes (McKenzie, 1995).

The Board Chair

In addition to working with the managing director on key issues such as the orchestra's strategic direction and overall work schedule, the Board Chair's primary day-to-day focus is on the orchestra itself. This includes handling disciplinary matters, coordinating the selection and appointment of new players, serving as liaison between the orchestra and principal conductor, as well as guest conductors, and staying closely in touch with the Personnel Manager and other player board members about personnel matters. It should be noted that both the Board Chair and Vice Chair are elected by the 14-member board from the pool of player members on the board. Their term of duty is one year and there are no term limits. As was mentioned earlier, since two parallel streams of responsibility have emerged within the LSO structure, the duties of the Board Chair are principally about internal orchestra matters and leading the board (and its meetings), whereas external affairs such as fundraising and dealing with government have been relegated to the managing director's area of responsibility. This

division of authority has developed in an "organic" way and has not been codified in the orchestra's Articles of Association in order to allow continued flexibility and some managerial discretion (Lawley, 1994).

John Lawley, who took office as board chair in 1992, reported being pleased both with the progress the orchestra had made under the leadership of his predecessor, violinist Lenny McKenzie (who served eight years as Board Chair), and with the balance of power between the board and management. In interview, Lawley said, "This is the most wonderful system when it is working well," he said. "We've had a healthy balance [of leadership] for the past eight years" (Lawley, 1994). But he had also experienced extraordinarily difficult times when there was an imbalance of power between the Board Chair and managing director, "when lines of authority were crossed" and the orchestra, overall, exhibited less cohesiveness. For instance, Lawley recalled the experience of Peter Hemmings, managing director from 1979-1984, who was caught in a power struggle with the board chair at the time. Hemmings himself recalled: "Who was in charge was always a question. Was it Camden [the board chair]? Abbado [the music director]? Or me?" (Hemmings, 1993). He felt that the potential for a power struggle was always just below the surface, because "players are enthralled by the chimera of power." An example of that desire for power was a story retold by a musician in one of the interviews. He recalled a recording session with a guest conductor who simply couldn't get the music right. "After several frustrating hours, one of the players got up on the podium and showed the conductor how the piece should go. And, in the end, that was the take which was used on the record" (McKenzie, 1995). About the LSO Lawley said, "Ambition for power is not liked here. It's more a question of giving something back to the orchestra. Ten years ago, this orchestra

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would annihilate a bad conductor. Not now, however. The orchestra's personality has changed significantly" (Lawley, 1994).

External Board Members

The "external" members of the LSO board, like those who serve on the boards of American orchestras, provide the LSO with general business advice and useful contacts. For example, Anton Poot, chairman and managing director of Philips Electronics, was the first external board member to be elected. He brought his vast commercial and business expertise to the LSO's board-level decisions. The Rt. Hon. The Earl of Gowrie, who was formally Arts Minister in Margaret Thatcher's government and then head of Sotheby's auction house, used his connections to help the orchestra obtain the funds needed to support its educational efforts such as the *Discovery* program. In contrast to American boards, however, these board members rarely made personal philanthropic contributions to the orchestra. Moreover, LSO external board members reportedly never interfered with artistic or personnel decisions. As explained by one external board member: "We do not tell the [player members of the] board what to do or try to outvote them. We provide guidance and advice on issues of a commercial nature, not on internal management processes or artistic decisions" (Benjamin, 1993). This more "hands off" or in British parlance "arms length" approach reflects an important difference in the roles and organizational ethos that have developed in British orchestras as compared to those in the U.S.

The Principal Conductor

As suggested earlier, the role of the principal conductor at the London

Symphony Orchestra was very unlike that of music directors in most American symphony orchestras or even in other British contract orchestras or German ensembles, for that matter. In London self-governing orchestras generally, there are limits to a conductors' authority whereas in most other orchestras, the music director typically has wide-ranging authority from setting the orchestra's overall artistic direction and content to the promotion/demotion of players (although admittedly with some restraints imposed in employment matters by master agreements). At the LSO, broad artistic and personnel decisions are simply not the province of principal conductors. Rather, and especially under the present managing director, the managing director himself holds more formal artistic control since he is the one who develops and coordinates the orchestra's overall artistic plan for the season in consultation with the Board (and by soliciting input from the principal and guest conductors).

An example of this general state of affairs is the tenure of Claudio Abbado in the 1980s. At Abbado's request, the LSO board gave Abbado the title of music director. He was not, however, a music director in the classic sense (i.e., vested with broad authority and wide organizational and artistic influence). It was more of a ceremonial honor. During Abbado's tenure and afterwards, LSO players continued to firmly believed that they, not any conductor, should control their own artistic destiny. For example, when Abbado resigned in 1987, there was much internal debate about what direction the orchestra should take in selecting their next conductor. Those who argued for a strong music director saw the benefits of having one person in charge of artistic matters, but Gillinson rejected such reasoning: "We've resisted the idea of a powerful music director...[because] that can create jealousies and works against the ultimate artistic goals of the orchestra," a viewpoint and philosophy to which Gillinson adheres to this day (Gillinson, 1997). On the other hand, a single leader the public can

identify with advances the LSO's profile as it does any organization. Lawley said at the time, "the next principal conductor [had] to have qualifications which would serve the LSO strategy for artistic success; he would need a tremendous base of knowledge of the entire symphonic repertoire and have the creativity and vision necessary to employ that repertoire in a fresh, innovative, and competitive way" (Lawley, 1994). (Precisely the same argument was also weighed heavily by the Berlin Philharmonic in their music director search of 1999, refer to Chapter 7).

An example of Principal Conductor: Michael Tilson Thomas

Michael Tilson Thomas (MTT) was principal conductor of the LSO during this research. An American formally trained at the University of Southern California in piano and informally tutored by the famous American conductor and composer, Leonard Bernstein, Michael Tilson Thomas began his career as an Assistant Conductor with the Boston Symphony Orchestra, after winning the Koussevitsky Prize at Tanglewood in 1969. Later working as Principal Conductor of the Los Angeles Philharmonic, his career soon catapulted him to London when he took up his post as principal conductor of the LSO in 1988. According to one player who was on the board then, MTT was viewed as a "dynamic personality who had an extraordinary brain for music." Thomas's contract specified that he would be responsible for one-third of the 48-week orchestra season, with the remaining two-thirds of the season filled by guest conductors. The board believed this was a positive arrangement: Thomas could be relied on to give his very best to the LSO during the course of his 16 weeks with the orchestra and, in turn, the orchestra would benefit from exposure to the perspectives and skills of a diversity of other conductors to round out the season as determined by Gillinson with the approval of the board.

In an interview with Thomas, it became clear that he understood his formal authority was curtailed by the LSO's self-governing system: "On the surface I have no power: I work for them," he said. "Musical decisions are made by them. I am not engaging other conductors, or deciding about personnel or the standards of the orchestra. Yet [when] I express feelings of concern or of praise, it is a voice in the question at hand" (Tilson Thomas, 1993). MTT made the system work by creating what he called "an environment of colloquy and exchange." In fact, he felt that at times his voice was more powerful than it would had he the full authority of a traditional music director. Reflecting on other orchestra systems, Thomas noted that a music director can easily become trapped in a mediating role between players and management. But at the LSO, "there is no risk of that. It is the players' orchestra" (Tilson Thomas, 1993).

At the LSO, MTT felt that his role allowed him to focus the entirety of his attention on the music and on what he and the orchestra were seeking to achieve together artistically. In particular, he was able to focus on three musical challenges in relation to the LSO's distinctive sound and musical quality: enhancing the depth of feeling in the strings; getting the brass to play more quietly; and encouraging the musicians to listen with greater attention to themselves and especially each other as if they were a large chamber orchestra. Appraising himself, Thomas felt that he succeeded in "exerting a strong and constructive influence on what happened and what is now happening" in the LSO (Tilson Thomas, 1993). Most players interviewed agreed with that assessment (e.g., Pendrill, 1993; Lawley, 1994).

The Managing Director

Clive Gillinson became managing director of the LSO in 1984 in the midst of crisis. Although the orchestra today is recognized as a leading ensemble nationally and internationally, its history has been somewhat uneven in both artistic and business terms. In 1984, the orchestra had accumulated an operating deficit of half a million pounds (equivalent to more than its annual Arts Council grant at the time), ticket sales were not meeting projections (particularly in its recently-opened Barbican Centre home), and the previous managing director's contract had not been renewed (thus leaving a vacancy in this most important post).

A cellist with the LSO for 14 years, Gillinson was well-known and well-respected among players. He claimed to understand both what was wrong with the LSO and what was needed to fix it. As Lawley was recorded in a book about the orchestra, "We were in a big mess in 1984. It worries me that the players who are under thirty might feel that the LSO has always been successful and that the quality of work we have now is guaranteed to last forever...The LSO was within two weeks of the receivers being called in [in accordance with Britain's strict insolvency laws] during 1984. The LSO was given three years to clear its debt; without one penny extra of funding. Clive removed that in two years" (Blandford, 1984: 39). Looking back on that time, another player reported, "Clive had a dream for the LSO which turned into reality. He set his goals very high and went after them relentlessly. But his personality was like the guy next door. You felt you could trust him with your life, and we did" (Pendrill, 1994).

Technically speaking, Clive Gillinson had been hired by the Board and reported to it. But according to several interviews with players, staff and board members, it was

Gillinson who provided the impetus and ideas for the orchestra's current success and its evolving self-governing system and structure. My interviews with Gillinson over the years confirm for me Gillinson's pivotal role. He is a most ambitious man with very insightful ideas not only drawn from his own experience as a player in the orchestra, but from his interactions with leaders of other major orchestras and the international business community (Gillinson, 1997; Gillinson, 1999). On the Board and the orchestras's behalf--and supported by a comparatively small forty-person administrative staff[4]--Gillinson devises and implements the orchestra's artistic strategy and manages its relationships with such groups as the Arts Council, record companies, and corporate sponsors.

Over the years, Gillinson has developed a keen sensitivity to predicting the likely actions of competitive orchestras and to identifying emerging problems and opportunities in the ever-changing arts environment in Britain and overseas. He says he communicates incessantly with LSO board members and players, both in person (e.g., before concerts around the backstage coffee bar or in the offices) and in writing (mostly by memos) (Gillinson, 1997). Gillinson makes it standard practice to document the status of every project he is working on in weekly memos to all board members. Although the board does not get involved in day-to-day business or artistic matters, Gillinson asserts that "they always know what I am doing. The board must approve everything." Indeed, former board chair Lawley describes it this way:

A self-governing system, when it's working well, is a wonderful thing; when it goes wrong, it can be one of the most destructive ways of running an organization...The great balance we have at the moment is that Clive is allowed to manage without the board's interference, and the board is allowed to make personnel decisions concerning the orchestra itself without interference from Clive. That has become a supportive relationship, which is why I think it has worked so well.

[4] An inspection of other major symphony orchestras' administrative staffs shows that they can number up to 100 personnel, particularly in American orchestras where the fundraising or "development" staffs alone can take up half that number.

(Stewart,1994: 66)

Indeed, Gillinson reported that he felt appreciated by the orchestra and secure in his position, which is rooted in mutual respect. Previous managing directors had not necessarily felt the same way. In fact, the orchestra's old organizational culture was captured in Blandford's (1984: 39) *The LSO*: "To be a managing director of the LSO has all the security of marriage to Henry VIII. Only a fool would imagine otherwise. A self-governing body, busy with music making, needs someone to run things well. But if he runs them too well, they will fire him for encroaching on their territory; the spirit of democracy is keenly guarded." Former managing director Peter Hemmings reinforced that view: "If you are too successful, you can jeopardize your position here just as easily as if you're unsuccessful" (Blandford, 1984: 39). Lawley's remarks underscore their view, "The lessons from the LSO's history, certainly of the 1960s and 1970s, suggest that the self-governing process suffered from an over-powerful players' executive and a weak management" (Stewart,1994: 66). Today, however, it is difficult to observe any significant tensions because Gillinson has won the confidence of the players as exhibited by the fact that, in 1995, the orchestra asked him to renew his contract for another ten years, to 2005. This managerial tenure of nearly 20 years is unprecedented in recent LSO's history and speaks to the extraordinary success the Gillinson-LSO team has achieved.

It is important to note here that one might say that Gillinson's strong role in the organization is, at worst, a threat to self-governance and, at best, a result of his charismatic leadership. But in truth, the success of the Gillinson-LSO relationship is that the fact that there are rules attached to the roles played in this organization and Gillinson is clearly aware of who retains the ultimate power in this system. Or, as the

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Berlin Philarmonic player said, "You need two things: you need good people and you need the rules. But the best is when it works without the rules!" (Goessling, 1999).

Financing the Orchestra

One success that has eluded Gillinson and the orchestra, however, despite all the progress they have made together, has been obtaining the kind of financial security that would put them on par with other world-class orchestras around the globe. According to the LSO's records, although the LSO regularly filled 85% of the seats for its Barbican Centre concerts with ticket prices significantly higher than most European concert halls, revenues from those concerts still accounted for less than a third of the orchestra's annual budget. Indeed, on average, 57% of the orchestra's budget comes from ticket sales (including U.K. and overseas tours); 32% from government grants; 10% from corporate sponsorship and recording income; and less than 1% from its endowment. By comparison, a typical major symphony orchestra in the U.S., on average, earns roughly the same (51%) of its income from ticket sales and receives only 9% of its income from government grants. The remaining 40% is typically made up from the U.S. orchestra's trust and endowment income and from the annual contributions of individuals, corporations, and foundations.[5] Like other British orchestras, the London Symphony Orchestra is nowadays highly dependent on public subsidy for its survival largely due to the high labor costs of maintaining a 100-person ensemble, the fees of conductors and guest artists, as well as the administrative costs of staffs to support the operation. (By contrast, in its first half-century, the LSO could survive on box office receipts alone). The two primary sources of public subsidy for the LSO today are the Corporation of London and the Arts Council of England. Given the

importance of these two organizations, a few words will be said about each.

The Corporation of London

The Corporation of London is the local governmental authority responsible for citizens and businesses within the limits ("square mile") of the City of London (not London as a whole, which comes under the Mayor and Greater London Authority). The Corporation owns, funds, and manages the Barbican Centre. The Centre is a performing arts, exhibition, and commercial complex with separate residential properties located in northeast London was opened in 1982. The LSO is fortunate in that the Corporation of London not only provides it with a permanent home for performances and its administrative offices (the LSO has been considered "a resident company" since 1982), but it also introduced a direct annual subsidy in recognition of the Barbican residency and, from time to time when other special subsidy is deemed worthwhile (as was the case when the Corporation decided to match the subsidy in the Arts Council's Enhancement Funding scheme, discussed in the following pages). In return, the LSO guarantees a certain number of Barbican performances each season and works with Centre staff in developing programs that can be integrated into the Centre's overall artistic agenda.

The Arts Council of England

The Arts Council is the principal channel for central government funding of the arts in England. Established by Royal Charter in 1945 with a remit at the time for England, Wales and Scotland, the Council, nominally at least, had absolute discretion

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[5] For example, the Chicago Symphony Orchestra has an endowment that stands at $245 million.

over the allocation of whatever government money it receives each year to arts organizations. As such, it is "an example of a British tradition of farming out responsibility for certain fields of activity to independent bodies known as 'quangos'--quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations" (Cummings & Katz, 1987: 235). The Arts Council (the remit of which is now restricted to England, with the Arts Councils of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland responsible for the rest of Great Britain) provides annual grants and guarantees to individual arts organizations and also funds specific projects proposed by those organizations.

In the early 1990s, at the time of the original research for this study, the three principal goals of the Arts Council were stated as to develop and improve the knowledge, understanding and practice of the arts; to increase the accessibility of the arts to the public, and to advise and assist government departments, local authorities, and other organizations in funding the arts. An unstated further aim was to implement the government's wish to reduce public expenditure through greater U.S.-style involvement of private sector expertise and funding in the arts. Because the Arts Council awards several million pounds to British symphony orchestras annually, it plays a highly significant role in the orchestral scene. Even though money was tight in the early 1990s and devolution was underway, the Arts Council made it clear that it would amply support those organizations that continued to take risks and innovate, that were able to manage those risks, and that could sustain the highest quality. To do this, it developed several financing schemes. For example, the 1991-92 "Incentive Funding Program", which extended an earlier funding scheme, was designed explicitly for "those clients whose work was of a particularly high quality, who could demonstrate that financial restrictions were limiting their artistic potential, and who could indicate improvements which would result from enhanced funding" (ACGB, 1990-91). The LSO

had long been a recipient of Arts Council annual grants and historically had garnered more than its London competitors in this regard. In 1991-92, the LSO applied for, and won, significant additional funds under Enhancement Funding. The Corporation of London agreed to match the Enhancement Funding pound-for-pound. This offer enlarged the LSO's total subsidy to over two million pounds per year at that time. Later in 1997, as will be discussed, the LSO again won funding, this time under the Arts Council's "Stabilisation Funding" scheme.

The Effects of Enhancement Funding in the early 1990s

The Arts Council's Enhancement Funding Program provided a pivotal opportunity for the LSO. Clive Gillinson, LSO managing director, said at the time:

> The new money represents a quantum leap in London's music world. Now we can operate at the sort of level and with the sort of conditions that the great orchestras of Europe and America enjoy. London has been waiting for this sort of enlightened funding policy for years. Previously, funding bodies have taken the easy option and preserved the status quo, spreading too little money too thinly between too many orchestras. Now we have an Arts Council and a Corporation who have real vision and are prepared to take a few risks in the interest of elevating London's musical life (quoted in Lehman & Galinsky, 1994: 5).

The changes that the LSO proposed in its application for Enhancement Funding were to occur over a three-year period beginning April, 1991. The orchestra's progress in meeting its proposed objectives was closely monitored by both the Arts Council, Corporation of London, and the Barbican Centre who wanted the LSO to flourish and to ensure a return on their considerable financial investment in the orchestra. In many ways, the development plan and Enhancement Funding award signaled the beginning of the LSO's unequivocal commitment to artistic excellence. The development plan also aligned players with that mission: "The artistic motivation in the past drove only a few and [the orchestra as a whole had] mixed motives. [Now players] know what they

are here for, it is now why they join, they primarily believe in the artistic goal," said

Gillinson (Stewart, 1994: 65).   Indeed, achieving alignment between the players'

motivations and the goals of the organization was one of the key aspects of the

orchestra's developmental change during this time (and, indeed, is a key feature of any

high involvement organization, Lawler (1986)).

Details of the Organizational Changes

According to LSO documents, the overall objective specified in the LSO's

Enhancement Funding development plan was to develop and maintain an orchestra of

the highest international standard. With the new funding, the LSO initiated five major

changes to achieve that objective: 1) appointment of joint or equal principal players, 2)

expansion of the string sections, 3) elimination of associate orchestra membership, 4)

establishment of fixed holiday periods, and 5) improved pay for the players. Two of

those major changes are discussed next in order to show just how difficult the process

of organizational change can be and how strengthening the quality of the ensemble

must be a primary goal of any orchestra.

Elimination of Associate Membership

In the past, many "extras" or substitutes were hired to bring the orchestra to the

full strength for major works in the repertoire or during the absence of "full" members of

the LSO. Many of these regular subs played so often with the LSO that they were

known as "associate members," a title that came with no particular employment security

or voting rights except that they could count on being called *first* whenever subs were

needed. However, the development plan prompted a significant change. It specified

that in the future all musicians who played regularly with the LSO had to become full members. To implement this, while "associate members" were not required to *audition* for membership (the quality of their playing was, after all, well known to their colleagues), but they did have to be reviewed and found superior to new applicants (who did audition) before being promoted to full membership. In the end about half of the veteran associate players won permanent posts; half lost out to newcomers. Former Board Chair Lenny McKenzie--whose job it was to inform long-time colleagues who hadn't made the cut—recalled how emotional and agonizing it was. He said, "The whole orchestra was affected by this process" (McKenzie, 1993). As we will see in later chapters, the issue of membership and peer review is an especially sensitive one, yet vitally important in self-governing and democratic workplaces.

The Payment of Players

Compensation at the LSO, like that at the other self-governing orchestras in London, has always been on a fee-for-service basis. A player's total compensation therefore depends on the amount of work the orchestra takes on in addition to the regular concert schedule and the amount of income generated by that work. By 1993, the LSO had established a base level of fees for its players, which provided a modicum of financial security. Under the development plan, players were required to play in 85% of the orchestra's scheduled concerts and, in return, their basic pay, providing they reached this target, was raised by 15%. In addition, the orchestra raised the fees players were paid for concerts.

Although concerts were the most important work artistically, players were paid less for them than for (more profitable) outside work such as recordings and film

scores. Because the LSO had a reputation for outstanding sight reading of new material, it was sought out by composers, conductors, and film-makers and, therefore, commanded an especially high price compared with "sessional" ensembles requiring much more rehearsal time and expensive re-takes. Those fees created an incentive for players to emphasize work that was lucrative but not necessarily artistically significant. In short, the development plan sought to better align the orchestra's reward system with its organizational priorities. Specifically, the plan specified that the LSO would aim to "bring concert fees at least up to the level of recording fees" and, simultaneously, "ensure that performance fees and overall earnings are the best available in any U.K. orchestra" (LSO Development Plan, 1991). As of my last inquiry, the annual income for a rank-and-file LSO player who takes on all of the orchestras concert work is roughly $40,000 (Gillinson, 1999). But this figure will fluctuate based on the amount of extra work a member musician will elect to take on in addition to the mandatory concerts.

Organizational Development at the LSO

Overall, the organizational changes called for in the LSO's three-year development plan of 1991-1994 not only helped the orchestra secure increased public · funding but also contributed to its own artistic and organizational development. Although the changes did not alter the core mission or structure of the orchestra, they did tighten internal procedures, heighten player commitment, and assist in the recruitment of new players who were both superb instrumentalists (and sight readers) and personally committed to the orchestra's artistic agenda. Lawley was quoted as saying, "We had to change the attitudes of players who regarded working with a symphony orchestra as something that should fit in with their freelance activities elsewhere. That was the thing that ten years ago we were determined to change"

(Stewart,1994:66). The changes also served the interest of the Barbican Centre--namely, that London Symphony Orchestra concerts in its hall were performed by LSO musicians rather than by a mixed group of members and substitutes. As principal trombonist, Eric Crees, put it, "We're still reliant on commercial work to a certain extent, but I am sure we have made the right choice to promote eighty-five concerts at the Barbican each year. I think that is absolutely the right thing for us to do" (Stewart,1994: 65).

Looking back, it was clear to Gillinson that "obtaining the Barbican Centre residency was the most significant accomplishment of the orchestra in the 1980s. Then, in 1991, Enhancement Funding from the Arts Council and the matching funds from the Corporation of London enabled the LSO to make a second developmental leap. Gillinson recalled how the three-year plan had made the LSO more accountable to others than it had ever been before--and how the players eventually came to recognize the advantages of heightened commitment" (Gillinson, 1994). As Crees commented, "The great [orchestras] are those that deliver to a high standard, day in, day out...We don't turn up and do one-off performances, but now think as a group about how we can achieve consistency" (Stewart,1994: 65). To quote John Lawley again: "A sea change has happened in this orchestra. We've been dragged into the 20th century. We didn't want fixed holiday periods, but with increased commitment comes increased pride in our orchestra, and increased responsibility-taking for it" (Lawley, 1994).

The LSO's three-year development plan of the early 1990s was ultimately positive for the organization, although it initially generated very substantial concerns and a fairly aggressive first response from many of the players since it challenged some well-entrenched working practices such as associate membership, minimum

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concert attendance, and liberal holiday periods. Eventually, "a constructive colloquy and change in culture" evolved within the orchestra. There was no doubt that the plan, as it unfolded, helped to deepen the commitment of orchestra members and advance the overall organization in fundamental ways. But Gillinson felt there was still more work to be done to make the LSO a truly robust operation. His chief concerns had to do with the financial strength of the organization, player remuneration, and developing the audience base.

Despite its achievements in the early 1990s, the organization was still plagued by financial worries and the need for more external support to implement other ideas not covered by the original development plan. For example, although the orchestra, by now a £9 million a year operation, had an increasing presence nationally and around the world, it still did not have the kind of capital base that would have provided greater financial stability. Moreover, it was clear by 1997, that although an organizational climate had been created which fostered greater commitment to artistic excellence and to improving all facets of the orchestra's operations, Gillinson felt that the current retainer system--albeit superior to the pre-1991 system--was "not commensurate with the ultimate organizational goals of the LSO" (Gillinson, 1997). Gillinson's ideal work scheme for players would be one where all LSO members, not just principals, would have "the opportunity to define the content and balance of their musical lives and fulfil their artistic potential." Gillinson also had ideas about how the organization might further embrace and stretch its audiences through education programs.

Yet Another Funding Scheme

These were the things facing the orchestra when, in early 1997, Gillinson submitted a proposal for the Arts Council's latest funding offer, a pilot Stabilisation scheme. The aim of the scheme was to enable organizations to develop, re-focus and change artistically, not to bail out companies which have run into debt. Peter Hewitt, Chief Executive of the Arts Council of England, put it this way, "These are funds for the future--available for organizations prepared to consider fundamental change to deliver for the arts and their audiences" (Hewitt, 1997).

The LSO's strategy for procuring Stabilisation Funding involved six key objectives as outlined in **APPENDIX N)**. These six elements, it was felt, would move the organization forward by underpinning the organization's new focus and mission:

> The LSO's purpose is to perform, record and promote the appreciation
> and understanding of and participation in music, through a constantly
> developing orchestra of the highest international standard and reputation,
> dedicated to broadening the experience and enhancing the lives of the greatest
> possible number of people across every area of society. All of the LSO's
> activities are governed by its equal opportunities policy and an uncompromising
> commitment to quality, innovation, challenge, variety, new work, education and
> access.

The LSO was told that its bid was considered "one of the best of the lot and an interesting one because the organization was comparatively more stable (some applicants had huge financial problems), properly managed (one other applicant witnessed their chief executive's overnight departure) and had great potential in developmental terms" (Gillinson, 1997). "In the final analysis," said Gillinson, "The Arts Council saw that we met their two criteria: our objectives were important *and* deliverable" (Gillinson, 1997). To the Arts Council, the LSO was a prototype of an arts organization progressing both organizationally and artistically. Indeed, they saw the orchestra as not merely responding to problems of the moment, but focused on its long-term development and the future.

With the Stabilisation Funding scheme, the LSO again looked both inward towards its members and outward towards its audiences. The Stabilisation Funding allowed the LSO to create a structure that was attractive to the most talented players, but that was also responsive to the individual needs of all its members. The new plan provided an opportunity for greater creativity and artistic autonomy by letting each musician choose his or her own work activities. Gillinson was confident that the new system would allow each member to "pursue a panoply of valuable complementary interests from chamber work and solo projects to teaching and outreach work, thereby increasing the odds that personal development would lead to artistic development" (Gillinson, 1997). At the same time, the LSO also sought to more deeply and interactively connect with its audience--both in the hall and in the community. Based on a belief that everyone has a right to access to music, the LSO's *Discovery* educational program aimed to expand access to, enjoyment of, and participation in classical music through special projects and concerts with those segments of society previously excluded such as the lowest income areas of Greater London. A change in the players' fee structure facilitated the LSO's move forward on the education front. These changes reflected Gillinson's business perspective, "Unless you're unbelievably rigorous as a business, and think through your strategy with the same detail as any other successful commercial organization, you won't be able to deliver what you've set out to achieve" (Stewart, 1994: 58).

The Future of the LSO

This latest process of organizational change was yet another important strategic step for the LSO in delivering its organizational potential. It is evidence that the

orchestra is now more adaptive, more able and willing to handle change than it has been in the past. Still, the board was initially skeptical of "radical restructuring" as Gilllinson told me in an interview. The emphasis of their initial response was based on concerns regarding what the players might *lose*. As often in situations of significant change, according to Gillinson, "The board's reaction--as with the other players--was a conservative one. However, after hours of debate and direct involvement by those least in favor of the proposed changes, skepticism changed to greater receptiveness" (Gillinson, 1999). Through this process, the board and the entire orchestra have finally embraced the possibilities.

As he reflected on the results of the Stabilisation Funding strategy, Gillinson believed that any future chief executive would inherit an orchestra and an organization more willing to change and to embrace the future. Gillinson did not consider himself as indispensable, but he recognized that, despite the democratic nature of the organization, one individual had to lead. Again citing the inherent conservatism of an orchestra, Gillinson (1999) noted that "demand for change does not generally emerge from a body of people which is more concerned with retention and preservation." For Gillinson (1999), "leadership involves setting objectives and being uncompromising in pursuing them. Although other orchestras might have different objectives," he said, "they should be equally committed and dedicated to those objectives." Through the slow accumulation of trust, the kind of special trust that Lawler (1986) says is critical in a high- involvement organization, Gillinson (1999) has established his role and a clear delineation between that and the Board's responsibilities--"The board governs the orchestra in terms of appointments and discipline; they do not manage the orchestra. But," he added, "The key to the self-governing system remains--the board must still approve everything." Or as Clark observed, "Gillinson may be a shrewd

businessman—he had to be to achieve the stability the LSO now enjoys—but he has never lost the perspective of being a player. That's how he was able to sell his ideas to his shareholders—the LSO musicians" (Clark, 2002: 3).

Chapter 9: Discussion of the Findings of this Research

Introduction

The picture that emerges from the cases of the Colorado Symphony Orchestra, the Orpheus Chamber Orchestra, the Berlin Philharmonic, and the London Symphony Orchestra described in the previous chapters is that each of these orchestras is charting its own course and in doing so they are very much "works-in-progress"—ever evolving. They are not completely set or permanent institutions just as they are not completely isomorphic with their industry cohort. But one thing is clear: they have continued to challenge the dominant model (which continues to keep players in a limited role organizationally), despite their comparatively fragile financial standing.[1] These are orchestras that have, for better or worse, forged new pathways through high involvement management and self-governance. Generally speaking, their leaders and members are open to change and willing to adapt, yet, even among the four, some are more ready than others to anticipate and implement what is necessary for continued success, both in the short-term and for the long-run.

This chapter is intended to provide an analysis of what has been presented about these orchestras along the four dimensions mentioned in the methods section, Chapter 4. Put simply: an orchestra's performance, broadly defined, stems from direction, structure, membership and leadership. By assessing the orchestras against these four proposed criteria of organizational effectiveness, we can identify the main issues or themes that are unique to each organization and those that are common to all four.

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[1] Even now, American orchestra boards do not believe that it *is* possible for musicians to successfully manage themselves at self-governance and in peer review. See, for example, Tommasini (2002).

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Moreover, we can also discern what factors facilitate (or impede) organizational effectiveness. Indeed, I will argue that the presence and interaction of: (1) a clear direction, (2) an appropriate structure (both organizational and governance structures), (3) strong membership in terms of ability, commitment. and fit, and (4) distributed leadership—all these things--will differentiate the more effective self-governing systems from the rest. Moreover, these four general "ingredients" are, in a sense, mutually reinforcing.

What I mean by "mutually reinforcing" is the following. First, there needs to be a clear and engaging **direction** set for the organization (one that orients the entire institution and its membership), and it is usually the organization's formal CEO or top leadership who articulates that vision. Leadership goes beyond the single function of direction setting, however. It should be a pervasive phenomenon, not restricted to singular events or only to those individuals who hold formal roles. **Leadership** can be spearheaded or modeled by titular leaders, but when present across the entire organizational membership, the vision becomes lived and more enduring. Or as Kouzes and Posner (1995: 23) suggest in their study of leadership and its paradoxes: "..what we have discovered, and rediscovered, is that leadership is not the private reserve of a few charismatic men and women. It is a process ordinary people use when they're bringing forth the best from themselves and others. Liberate the leader in everyone, and extraordinary things happen." Indeed, they find that "the more people believe that they can influence and control the organization, the greater organizational effectiveness and member satisfaction will be" (Kouzes & Posner, 1995: 186).

How organizational and governance **structures** are designed is of primary importance because these things are the crucible through which organizational action is

channeled and organizational behavior is wrought. Effective organizational structures are ones that are clear, make sense and facilitate positive outcomes. They also enable the development of what Rosell (1999) calls a "shared framework," where free flowing information and increased interaction within an organization can lead to broader consensus building, agreement and sustainability. Likewise, governance structures designed for "learning" and which include key organizational stakeholder groups "at the table" help organizations move away from the traditional model of confrontation to a model of consultation and mutual learning (Rosell, 1999: 90). Further, **membership**, our third element, is not enough if it simply meets static functional criteria such as numbers, composition, mix of skills, etc. Other aspects of membership are vitally important to any group or organization's functioning as Arrow and McGrath (1993) have long studied and discovered: membership dynamics affect and are affected by the group's composition, structure, process, and performance. As a result, organizations should aim for *high commitment* membership--where members are given much collective authority and in turn are held accountable for that, as well as for their own individual performance. This is what separates the outstanding from the average organization (Lehman, 1999).

In short, all four elements--direction, structure, membership, and leadership (or "conditions" as Hackman (1998) calls them in his study of why teams do not work) taken together, not only shape the organizational framework but are potent and pivotal in determining the ultimate standing and outcome of an organization. Although resources (financial and material) are also vitally important, without the other elements in place, there is little that resources alone can do to engender a high performing or more effective system. I will examine the four dimensions next.

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Where the Orchestras Stand on Each Dimension

	LSO	Colorado	Orpheus	Berlin
Direction	+	+	+	+
Structure:				
Organizational	+	+/-	+/-	+
Governance	+	+/-	+/-	+/-
Membership	+	+	+	+
Leadership:				
Formal	+	+/-	+/-	+
Informal	+	+/-	+	+

Legend:
+ = currently being addressed;
- = an area that needs attention.

Direction

In terms of direction, it can be said that all four orchestras aspire to musical excellence. That aspect of the organizations' direction is clear because this is *why* they exist. But there are important differences among the four in how they go about achieving musical excellence, their purpose. The Berlin Philharmonic and Orpheus Chamber Orchestra, for example, have developed an artistic vision that focuses exclusively on performance at home but also includes heavy international touring each year. Although Orpheus has begun to offer outreach activities such as a seminar for high school students as part of some players' work agenda, they, like Berlin, have historically held to a very narrow mission. The Berlin Philharmonic does not have to play pops concerts (except the very popular annual outdoors concert at Waldbuhne in Berlin)

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or provide educational outreach. They argue that other orchestras in Berlin provide for this. The LSO and Colorado Symphony Orchestra, on the other hand, have much more extensive and ambitious aims that include not only performance of the standard repertoire and lighter fare, but they offer education programs widely, as well as other kinds of outreach activities. This is an extremely important difference because the mission of the organization makes demands on the rest of the organization: structurally and financially.

Interestingly, at the operational level, artistic direction (or vision) from season to season is crafted by different groups within these organizations, and not strictly by the music director. In London, it is Clive Gillinson, the managing director, coordinating the ideas and desires of the LSO's principal conductor (Sir Colin Davis) with the other various guest conductors who have been hired. In Berlin, the current music director Claudio Abbado's vision for his performances is incorporated into the season by coordinating with the Vorstand, the Intendant, the wishes of other guest conductors--and with the recording needs and other projects of the Berliner Philharmoniker. In Colorado, although Marin Alsop is the de facto music director (and holds that title), her ideas for the season must pass the scrutiny of the organization's artistic committee of eleven (six of whom are players who come with their *own* ideas). For Orpheus, the season is presently determined by agreement of the executive director and the three artistic directors who, as members of the orchestra, often and easily solicit ideas from the broader orchestra membership.

Structure

Designing a clear, challenging, and engaging mission or artistic vision is one thing, making it happen is another. When it comes to the strategy and structure required

to deliver artistic goals, there is again variance in this sample of four. For example, it appears that the LSO has the most tightly linked strategy and structure, but that is largely because the wrenching organizational upheavals associated with the kind of changes called for by the Arts Council's Enhancement Funding are over. The organization has already suffered through a major overhaul and that arduous effort to rework the orchestra's direction has engendered a commitment to continuous process improvement, particularly regarding overall structural and individual work design issues. Perhaps more importantly, the managing director, Clive Gillinson, now acts as the single driving (and unifying) force within the organization and is, of course, tightly linked with the board—a board that well represents the membership and is open to outside counsel via the external board members. Given the multitude of changes over the past decade and to the present, the LSO appears to be farther along than the other three orchestras studied in their organizational development strategy (see, for example, Clark, 2001). At present, the CSO, Orpheus, and Berlin are, however, all addressing fundamental issues about how best to deliver their mission and exactly how they should (and want to) do so.

For the Colorado Symphony Orchestra and Orpheus, internal disagreements over what form their respective organizational and governance structures should take has preoccupied the members and leaders of these orchestras for the past several years, and it is not completely over. In each case, a new approach is taking shape, but there has been much debate along the way, and the future is not entirely clear. Colorado's executive director talks about finding "the center," whereas Orpheus is developing a new "select residencies" strategy. What this means is that Colorado is trying to find a balance between democratic principles that work to preserve the participative nature of the organization and a more conventional setup that, they hope, will be more efficient. At Orpheus, after much time spent redesigning the organization,

musicians are finally being accepted to board membership and their desire, among other things, for a less peripatetic existence is being heard. Perhaps these kinds of developments are not so unexpected since each organization is reaching a new stage of maturity and coming to terms with the associated issues. Colorado, for example, at year 11 is making adjustments in order to streamline its processes; Orpheus at year 29 is adjusting to the changes required to take it through its next quarter century. Still, it is unclear whether their strategies are the most appropriate and/or will provide the best outcomes. And financial concerns at each orchestra are still not fully addressed or satisfied. For example, without a substantial endowment, each organization remains rather fragile. Player salaries are still not on par with the major contract orchestras and, therefore, questions of competitiveness and sustainability loom in the background.

In terms of governance structures, the Colorado Model of one-third musician representation on the board of trustees and all major committees has been a positive development. The atmosphere is one of genuine collegiality and interest in finding a better way for the organization to operate day-to-day and to ensure a future season-to-season. At Orpheus, artistic self-determination remains the core essence of what Orpheus Chamber Orchestra is all about, but players have been granted only a minority voice in the affairs of its chief governing body, the board of trustees. Ironically, members' core belief in participation is stifled at the most important level: the organization's overall governance. That being said, the current chairman of Orpheus' board has expressed his interest in musicians being active members of the board. He also recognizes that greater attention needs to be paid to general board development issues and the by-laws (Orpheus, 1996a). This serves to underscore the point made earlier that these select organizations are "works-in-progress," and we can expect to see further developments in the future.

In Berlin, the external environment is forcing members of the Berlin Philharmonic to reflect on their situation. As has happened often during the past 119 years, the economic and political changes confronting Germany are impacting the orchestra. Change without is forcing change within. To be specific, although the members have created an internal organizational structure that works very well, the current governance structure in terms of the tight link to the Berlin Senate has been both beneficial and problematic. The orchestra has enjoyed a certain special status with government and an assured stream of subsidy, but it has also been constrained by and beholden to it at the same time. Likewise, there have been advantages and disadvantages to having two organizational sides: the Berlin Philharmonisches Orchester (the public orchestra) on the one hand and the Berliner Philharmoniker (the private media arm of the orchestra) on the other. The Vorstand and other (more informal) leaders within the orchestra are focused intensively on addressing these issues and seem to be close to what they deem to be the right solution for their situation. However, despite the BPhO's high degree of self-determination, governmental politics will play a role in whatever eventual solution is reached until the orchestra's continued dependence on public funding recedes. Since this dependence is not expected to wither away any time soon, the orchestra's prospects will remain tied to the financial and economic situation of the City of Berlin and of Germany, more generally.

Membership

The one bright light shining through all four orchestras is the incredible talent and commitment of each orchestra's membership. In dozens of interviews conducted over the years, the optimism, dedication, and enthusiasm of players in these orchestras has been a constant and it has been palpable. This is not to say that there have not been

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disappointments, disagreements, or even virtual civil wars going on among players. But the prospect of finding mutual solutions to extant problems and of collectively forging a unique path has always been the uniting force. As one Orpheus member said, "..[we have] gone through cycles. When bureaucracy takes over because things are too loose, then we want more structure and procedures. Eventually, people resist when it becomes counterproductive and it moves the other way. Right now, the movement is toward structure" (Purvis, 1995). This belief in continuous experimentation and a willingness to evolve as circumstances require is the hallmark of the four orchestras under study.

There is also strong group commitment to performance excellence and members expect and encourage this of one another. For example, playing the same repertoire from the classical canon season after season can lead to a certain amount of tedium unless a fresh perspective and approach is taken each time the piece is played. Orchestra members expect a great deal from one another: there are no excuses for a poor performance or "half-baked" efforts. Group norms in all four orchestras reinforce and maintain a commitment to this. We hear it in players' remarks: "In our orchestra, the general atmosphere is influenced by everyone pulling together. One of the main points about a successful endeavor like this is that, over time, the members of an organization *think* along the same lines." Or another, "Who motivates me? Each player on each side of me. They are superb musicians and so they encourage me. You *want* to do well."

In these orchestras, members are not only expected to bring a great deal of commitment to their work, they are expected to have talent, musical ideas, and there must be a good *fit* with the rest of the group as a social unit. According to one Berlin Philharmonic player, "We have a strong sense of direction; other orchestras might not.

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For example, of two finalists for a tutti position, the guy that didn't get the job was the more brilliant player. Now he is a soloist. The other finalist's tone and way of playing fit ours. This is the most important thing: fit" (Platt, 1998). This last point is especially interesting when you compare the recruitment practices of these self-governing ensembles to other more traditionally-structured orchestras. For example, in the American system, screens are often used in preliminary and even final rounds of auditions so as to minimize the chance that bias is a factor in selection. Moreover, in the U.S., there is still greater reliance on auditions (i.e., performances of isolated excerpts of the repertoire) rather than on trials with the orchestra (where the actual day-to-day reality matters) (Holland, 1981). Of course, this protocol ensures a certain level of fairness and the voting procedures are clear, but does it make sense? The whole point of *ensemble* is unity of playing.[2] At the LSO, Berlin, and Orpheus, candidates are vetted through a more lengthy and intensive process (and not just on the virtuosity and sound quality) *before* they are hired into the ensemble and the results are reported to be worth the time and scrutiny involved. By their recruitment methods, the orchestras examined in this thesis seem to fulfill both criteria--they hire players who are talented and who fit the orchestra, not one at the expense of the other (or one to the exclusion of the other).

Leadership

Leadership is another distinguishing characteristic of the four orchestras under study. In all four orchestras, the formal leaders are strong. They understand the unique nature of democratic work and shared governance, they are committed to the success and sustainability of their organizations, they are willing to change as necessary, and they expect and appreciate the widespread involvement of all constituents in the

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[2] Diversity, which is usually a desired feature for group work, is actually detrimental when it comes to musical training in technique and style. It is a hindrance to ensemble development. But time usually

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organization. In this way, leadership is reinforcing of the other elements of the model, i.e., setting a clear and engaging direction, finding the most appropriate structures, having first-rate and committed membership, and distributing leadership broadly.

In the case of the LSO, its success has been due to many factors not least of which is its longevity and staying power. Indeed, the organization's stability and vitality is not an overnight phenomenon. It is the result of years of experimentation and adaptation, as well as careful internal analysis and market assessment, and a willingness to make tough choices and take risks. Clive Gillinson's role as managing director has been pivotal. Gillinson says there are ten elements to his orchestra's success. He says these have to do with the following set of core beliefs: 1) the music must always come first, 2) everyone should be looking at how to make things better in the organization, 3) you must know your customer, but you should always lead, 4) relationships are fundamental (we support people through thick and thin), 5) every decision must relate to the long-term plan, 6) everyone must work as a member of the team and be involved, 7) we should always disseminate the maximum amount of information within the organization, 8) always deliver more than you promised, 9) recognize the contributions of all individuals, and 10) enable *everyone* to fulfill their individual potential (Gillinson, 1999).

In Colorado, on the other hand, it has been argued that the organization has been handicapped by its "newness" (March & Simon, 1993). Technically (and comparatively) speaking, the CSO is only beginning its second decade of operation, and has a long way to go to "catch up" with the LSO, Orpheus or the Berlin Philharmonic, for example. It has also been slowed down by the lack, early on, of the *right* formal leader

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makes up for any differences among members, as was suggested earlier.

for the special kind of partnership model it was then developing. At its founding, the organization had some sense of direction, a workable structure, and a committed membership. With a succession of executive directors in the formative years of the post-bankruptcy orchestra, however, time and energies were wasted with, in hindsight, no notable benefits. This was an impediment to progress at a critical juncture in the organization's life cycle. Organization members had the determination to blaze a new path, but fell short when it came to selecting the managerial leadership required to implement the new vision, despite the hard work of trustees, players, and volunteers. On top of that, the self-imposed financial rules (e.g., no debt or borrowing and all ticket and subscription income was escrowed) unique to the CSO further handicapped the fledgling organization. Later on, there was a lack of clarity about and commitment to strengthening its unique work structure. In short, the partnership model failed to reach its promise for three key reasons: because it could not reach critical mass in its operational leadership, its financial strategy, and in streamlining the democratic decision making process. Indeed, ten years later, all parties reported frustrations with many aspects of the organization, including its committee-intensive democratic structure. Today, there is increasing pressure to move back toward the typical American symphony orchestra model.

At Orpheus, as with the Colorado Symphony Orchestra, there has been no shortage of goodwill and time invested by all constituencies (trustees, payers, managers and staff) in trying to improve the organization. Indeed, this is a hallmark of all four orchestras: people genuinely care and work long and hard to solve problems and reach solutions. At Orpheus, decisions are discussed, debated, and shared across both the formal leadership and others in the organization. People respect each other, even if they do not agree. This is a great strength of the organization.

The organizational changes that have taken place at Orpheus, however, were as wrenching for the players as were the changes at the LSO and Colorado. In hindsight, they could not have been avoided. At Orpheus, the changes were as much about the classic issue of founder transition, as they were about general organizational development. It is acknowledged that Fifer and his close friends had created something special with Orpheus in 1972. But it was inevitable that the group would grow and evolve, as when formal management was needed and Fifer gave up the cello to become the orchestra's full-time executive director. Eventually, as the group matured (and flourished), opinions diverged over what was needed for future growth, i.e., what the ensemble's new strategy and structure should be. The latest round of change in 1997-98 was precipitated by persistent financial pressures that led to dissatisfaction with Fifer's approach and proposed solutions. The system eventually ruptured when players rose up to oppose their founder. And the board, for the first time, took a more proactive role, did their due diligence, and ended up favoring the players over Fifer. And still the organization and its new leaders are "picking up the pieces", so to speak, and moving forward with yet another strategy.

In the BPhO, as with the LSO and Orpheus, the internal structure of the orchestra is the result of much experimentation, constant reworking and iteration over the years--not to mention the influence of certain strong personalities, yet things seems to be working well. Players share responsibility for the outcome of their ensemble and take enormous pride in it. Players take their responsibilities seriously, often spending as much or more time on organizational matters as own their instruments. There is great integrity in its form of shared leadership. As to the formal leaders, their roles are clear and accepted. One area of concern, however, is with information sharing or, conversely,

the need for some measure of secrecy. As a Vorstand at the Berlin Philharmonic said when asked about the degree of "openness" in the organization: "Everything is transparent, except for the secrets."[3] Although, at times, information is tightly held for strategic reasons, there appears to be no threat of an oligarchy forming at the top.[4] Overall, the Vorstand and Fuenferrat are never too many steps ahead of the membership. Just as Gillinson found with his self-governing organization, "the key is the board must approve everything," at Berlin, the full membership must be in accord with everything. Another consideration, much like at London, is how formal leaders get along as a team or work unit. When there is mutual respect and agreement amongst them, especially regarding general principles and strategy, the team functions well. But it is not unusual that objectives and even personalities will sometimes clash and alignment within the organization is not completely perfect. At these moments, the self-governing system is put to the test.

Strengths of the Self-governing System

As John Lawley, former board chair and principal oboist with the London Symphony Orchestra earlier suggested, the self-governing system is "wonderful" when it is working well, but when it is not, it can be "one of the most destructive ways of running an organization" (Stewart, 1994: 66). The self-governing model is not a panacea. This is certain. But it does offer some interesting and quite viable alternatives to traditional managerial and organizational methods—if, as Lawley suggests, one can get it running properly. There must be balance. Lawley went on to say:

The lessons from the LSO's history, certainly of the 1960s and 1970s, suggest that the self-governing process suffered from an over-powerful players' executive and a weak

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[3] I can only assume that the secrets had to do with orchestra finances and other strategic issues because the players I spoke with would not say!

[4] Although this worry is never far from the surface in self-governing organizations.

management. The great balance we have at the moment is that Clive is allowed to manage without the board's interference, and the board is allowed to make personnel decisions concerning the orchestra itself without interference from Clive. That has become a supportive relationship, which is why I think it has worked so well. (Quoted in Stewart, 1994: 66)

The advantages of self-governing systems, as exhibited in particular by the London Symphony Orchestra and Berlin Philharmonic cases, appear to be the following:

1) there is a profound and pervasive sense of player "ownership" and "say" particularly through the board (in which the players exercise their principal authority) and this, in turn, leads to increased job motivation, satisfaction, and reduced stress;

2) there is less mental stress because the orchestra is not battling management all the time nor being completely subordinated to a music director (Levine & Levine, 1996). Indeed, the players hire (and can fire) the managing director and the music director and have control over both artistic and business matters through the board;

3) there is a widespread feeling that "we are all on the same team," and therefore should be pulling in the same direction. Group norms reinforce this strongly. Members are deeply committed to these organizations;

4) everyone shares in the success (or failure) of the group;

5) certainly, there is more democracy in the workplace and less bureaucracy by the sheer volume and frequency of participation; and,

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6) the conditions are put in place where, more often than not, the players feel this is "more than just a job"--and the orchestra's performances *show* it as do music critics' reviews of them. As one Berlin Philharmonic player said, "At the Berlin Phil, everyone believes that every performance should be the best. It's an important motivating factor. It's an accepted part of life for us. It's no big deal for us to have an exceptional concert. Would you want your dentist to do a second rate job?" (Platt, 1998).

Again, returning to the LSO case again, the best-documented case of orchestral self-governance, it has been written that:

> The recent history of the LSO reflects its growing reputation for…the creation of a consistently world-class orchestra in London. Above all, the orchestra has successfully defied those who regard its self-governing system as a recipe for internal strife and the natural concomitant of short-term thinking. Changes made during the past decade to the way the LSO operates and performs could not have occurred without the general support and commitment of its members, suggesting that player-power, carefully and considerately harnessed, remains the key to the orchestra's continued development and success. (Stewart, 1994: 52).

Indeed, as Kouzes and Posner (1995:185) have said about leadership in general, "The key to unleashing the organization's potential to excel is putting that power in the hands of the people who will perform the work."

Difficulties of the Self-governing System

As much as I believe a case has been made for the inherent benefits of the kinds of self-governing and more democratic models presented in this thesis, there are equally important difficulties that must be recognized. In fact, I have concluded that there are seven potential traps related to the pursuit of self-governance, which can be identified from this study. These have to do with seven rather persistent pressures that, if not

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countered or overcome, can lead to the downfall of the self-governing way. These seven difficulties or traps have to do with:

1) time needed to achieve stability,

2) ongoing financial pressures,

3) commitment,

4) broad participation vs. efficiency, and how

5) trust and technical knowledge,

6) internal power struggles, and

7) peer review are handled within the organization.

1) *Time.* By time, I mean that it simply takes a great deal of time and much persistence to fully develop any organization, let alone a self-governing or more democratic one. Even the most enlightened and ambitious leaders cannot possibly transform *existing* organizations or an organization's philosophy overnight or by commandment, unless of course, they are creating brand new enterprises or "greenfield sites." Moreover, implementing the structures and processes of self-governance takes time---to take root and to "get it right," so to speak, as all four case studies have shown. Organization change strategies are easy to devise, but notoriously difficult to implement; it requires rearranging the workplace and the mindsets and behaviors not only of employees but of managers, as well (Dowling, 1978). In a way, success can hardly be an overnight phenomenon, particularly when we are speaking of democracies (run by varying groups of individuals), not one-man rule (by a dominant chief executive).[5] Indeed, one need only look to the longevity and organizational histories of the four orchestras to see how much determination is needed in the

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pursuit of self-determination: 119 years in the case of the Berlin Philharmonic, 97

with the LSO, 29 with Orpheus, and 11 years with the CSO. (Then, of course,

there is the Vienna Philharmonic, not included in this study, but which proclaims

a self-governing heritage of 160 years; as they describe it: "...birth of our

orchestra [in 1841], an occasion when all the principals of the "Philharmonic

Idea," still valid today, were realized for the first time."[6])

2) *Financial pressures.* Having mentioned the time and persistence needed to

achieve a truly functional form of self-governance, it goes almost without saying

that the financial hurdles that inevitably arise can also pose a significant "trap."

None of the orchestras in this study escaped the difficulties of financial

pressures. Indeed, they persisted despite that pressure to varying degrees of

success. Clive Gillinson described this issue at the LSO from his perspective:

It could have gone disastrously wrong. I could have been back in the cello
section or, more likely, there wouldn't have been an LSO cello section for me to
go back to. On the other hand, there is no such thing as safety in the arts; if
there is, it is an illusion. The illusion of safety is produced by limiting yourself
only to what you can afford, which has a habit of leaving everybody within the
organization unexcited. [And] if you can't get excited about what you're doing
yourself, then how can you expect to excite your audience, sponsors or the
funding bodies. (Stewart, 1994: 57)

As the LSO has found, it takes fortitude and considerable conviction to withstand

negative financial results, no matter the impact on the company's "bottom-line"

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[5] This is not Jack Welch's General Electric, to draw an example from American industry (Slater, 1993).
[6] This quote is an excerpt from the Stagebill printed for the Vienna Philharmonic's New York concert at
Carnegie Hall on February 27-28, 1998. The "Philharmonic Idea," according to the Vienna Philharmonic,
is strikingly similar to the four orchestras in this study and reads as follows: 1) Only a musician engaged
by the Vienna State Opera (formerly Court Opera) can be a member of the Vienna Philharmonic, 2) The
orchestra is founded on artistic, organizational, and financial self-responsibility, 3) All decisions are to be
made democratically by the main body of active members, and 4) Actual administrative work will be
carried out by a democratically elected 12-member committee.

or employee pocketbooks.[7] When financial instability persists, it does not take long for old approaches to look attractive again and the commitment to staying the course fades quickly (Argyris, 1990). This is one of the hurdles to any program of change, let alone to achieving self-governance.

3) *Commitment* is of paramount importance--individual and collective commitment, especially in terms of creating a new culture of work. There must be widespread commitment to the vision and the values of self-governance and, of course, the purpose of the organization. Often, this is not the case, which is why it represents a potential difficulty or trap. If there is not widespread and deep commitment to what the orchestra (or organization) is trying to achieve, then the organization's leaders and membership will be working at cross-purposes, to the ultimate competitive *disadvantage* of the organization. Again, in the case of the LSO, it has been noted by Gillinson:

> The only thing that really matters to me is that we remain absolutely demanding of ourselves and always willing to explore and improve. We've now changed the culture of the LSO, so that there is a tremendous commitment to our artistic goals from members of the orchestra. The type of people now attracted to join the orchestra are those who believe in that vision....If you want to belong to today's LSO, you only join in if you genuinely share in the orchestra's artistic goals. That means that we can perpetuate the values that have been established. (Stewart, 1994: 57)

Commitment has also been a significant issue in two of the four case studies in relation to the players' *time commitment*, that is what percentage of work should members be required to take during any season? Since as we have learned,

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[7] To bring an example from American industry: United Airlines, a $4 billion concern, launched a 55% employee stock ownership plan six years ago, which, among other things, put 3 employees on its 12-member board of directors (one representing pilots, one the machinists, and the third, non-contract workers). This was a bold move by management and employees. But it has not been entirely successful from a financial standpoint, despite its relatively brief existence. And doubts have been reignited among those who believe in more traditional governance forms. Source: Chandler, 1996.

membership is critical to group process and performance (Arrow & McGrath, 1993), who is present at rehearsals and concerts really does matter. The LSO and Orpheus have been working on this issue, with different solutions offered at different times. For example, Orpheus has been wrestling with instituting the *most minimum* percentage commitment (e.g., 35% vs. the LSO's 85% and now 50% rule) in order to keep their very best (and otherwise very busy) members choosing Orpheus' work first. At the Berlin Philharmonic, on the other hand, orchestra members are given free choice in this matter. They even self-roster for programs to the delight and sometimes dismay of their music director. Of course, having 128 player-members on the payroll allows for a certain degree of flexibility not necessarily achieved in most other orchestras. Still, the BPhO is purposely set up this way in order to allow their members to be able to choose for themselves, to pursue *other* musical experiences, *and* to ensure that they are well rested—since much is expected of them when they do perform with the orchestra.

4) *Broad participation versus efficiency.* Just as membership dynamics are critical for group performance, so too is participation critical in self-governing or more democratic organizations. Participation should be as widespread as possible. This is a concept that is consistent with commitment. Indeed, democracy fails when member participation dwindles or is apathetic or is less than committed to the organization's purpose or endeavors. Democratic organizations—be they orchestras, polities or other types of organizations--only succeed when there is a diversity of involvement and active engagement in the representative committee structures. Moreover, the system and the membership must continually inculcate

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this philosophy (e.g., with new recruits) in order "to perpetuate the values" of these unique organizations, as Gillison suggests above.

We see in the cases of the Berlin Philharmonic, Orpheus, and even the Colorado Symphony Orchestra, that the current membership can easily become "burned out" by the level of participation required in these democratic organizations. And yet, without widespread involvement and volunteering to participate in the various committees, on the board, and even in basic vote taking, these systems suffer. For example, in the case of Orpheus, it is vital that members be willing to run for the posts of Artistic Directors and board membership. In the case of the Berlin Philharmonic, it is understood by the formal leadership that new and younger players need to be acculturated to their roles in the orchestra and that it will take years to do so. They also know that without a steady succession of players willing to take on this responsibility, the system is ultimately weakened. Two risks seem to be that either the same players are then left to keep taking up leadership roles, which can lead to an oligarchy of sorts, or this leaves room for the lay board of trustees to gain and retain more control. Again, without widespread involvement in decision making, the democratic nature of the orchestra can atrophy; leaving choices to a small cadre of membership.

Of course, the downside to the upside of wide participation in the democratic process or system, if you will, is the potential for inefficiency; that is especially true when so many constituencies are involved in decision making. This is yet another trap to be considered--and avoided as much as possible. At Colorado, some argue that it has become burdened by its brand of committee

structure (Bowles, 1997). The committees are simply too large in number and members are not sufficiently trained or coached to participate, let alone when membership changes over. Of course, these things are easily corrected, but have not been at last report. About the orchestra in late 1997, according to one trustee who had had a conversation with others on the board:

...the four of us agree that it was the most frustrating organizational structure with which we have ever worked. It was totally inefficient, couldn't make timely decisions and often made the wrong decisions...It was felt that one of the fundamental problems was...that all committees had people that had no technical experience to allow them to make decisions pertinent to that committee. Responsibility was ill-defined and no one was ever measured against the results. Big committees were grossly inefficient and often things took five or six months which should have been resolved in less than one month. (Sayford, 1997)

5) *Trust and Technical Knowledge.* This last point made about the Colorado Symphony brings us to yet another issue or trap of the self-governing system, but it also relates to any situation of significant organizational change. Technical knowledge and trust: an organization needs to hire or train the best candidates for the work at hand and then they have to trust or allow these individuals to "run with the ball." In the case of the Colorado Symphony, even in its later development, it still suffered from a lack of trust across the organization. For example, after years of deception on the part of management in the old Denver Symphony Orchestra, to which most CSO players had belonged, there was little confidence in any new manager brought in to help develop the new organization. This was understandable. In fact, according to Ownership Associates (1998), "While trust is important in any organization, employee-ownership companies are a breed apart. Employee-ownership companies require a higher degree and quality of trust than conventional companies do." This fact, in combination with players' own inexperience with self-management and the "technical issues" as suggested by the quote, led to a rather difficult and frustrating, but not unusual

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situation. Refer back to trap #1: It takes time and a certain amount of faith to build and develop these kinds of democratic organizations. Moreover, a technical challenge will exist any time you have a situation where employees need to be trained to master the technical language of business (Mackin, 1997)--and that certainly is the case in Colorado, as it is at Orpheus.

By the same token, it takes trust and confidence on the part of *other* organizational members including the board. They must believe in this kind of system (i.e., that it is just and that it *can* work) in order to get past each necessary stage of development. Interestingly, in the case of the New York Philharmonic, which is well known to be not a very democratic orchestra, but one where recently players were allowed to participate in the selection of Lorin Maazel as the music director to succeed Kurt Masur. Here, as progressive as this gesture appeared, the board of trustees of the New York Philharmonic—or at least some of them—reportedly had difficulty letting the musicians in on such critical decision making, despite the fact that it was probably the most perfectly appropriate role for musicians to play, given their own training and expertise in artistic matters. About the situation, a *New York Times* article read:

> American musicians have a far weaker role than their counterparts abroad. In Germany, the 129-member Berlin Philharmonic is fabled for its self-rule. The players are considered principal stakeholders with far-reaching powers that include, for example, voting to choose their new music director...The resistance to power-sharing in [American] nonprofit institutions usually comes from board members 'who are afraid of inviting other people in who aren't one of them and fully on board with the management philosophy'...'they don't want dissent and they don't want people with a different view, and that's bad for decision-making.' (Carvajal, 2001: 2)

6) *Internal Power Struggles.* The previous point relates directly to the issue of internal power struggles, which are inevitable in these kinds of democratic-based,

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power-sharing organizations (or in any organization, actually). Who has ultimate control and power? Who has the legitimate authority to decide? These are not trivial matters. In the four orchestras studied, it is clear that power sharing has been problematic—and may continue to be so, depending on the leaders who are chosen or elected in each organization. For example, although the by-laws make the LSO and Berlin Phil most definitely self-governing, who is selected to lead in these venerable institutions *matters*. Gillinson has, quite obviously, turned out to be "the right person, at the right time" for the LSO. But his predecessor certainly was not (Hemmings, 1993). What about Gillinson's successor? And for that matter, what about the board chair's successor? Likewise at Berlin, the Vorstand, Fuenferrat, Intendant and Music Director are also currently "in balance" and appear to be working together well on behalf of the orchestra. What about the next combination? What about the influence of government decisions on funding the orchestra and the arts and the politics of that? Moreover, an issue of "transparency of actions and decisions" or information sharing was also brought up during this research. This is just one more tradeoff to be cognizant of in these systems, i.e., when is it strategic to disclose information? When is it a violation of players' rights if information is withheld?

7) *Peer review.* As much as formal leadership in these representative democracies is a critical issue for the organization's overall health and vitality, so too is the issue of membership. Who is selected to become a member of these orchestras is quite critical: for the ensemble and for the organization. We know that the players have the right to choose who joins these organizations, but what about evaluating fellow members, especially if there is need for corrective action,

demotion, or even dismissal? It is incumbent upon the orchestra members to evaluate one another. This is obviously no small matter. The trap here is when orchestra members fail to fulfill this important function; when they somehow cannot bring themselves to evaluate their peers. This is perhaps one of the weakest links in the chain of self-governance. As one Berlin player put it, "No one is perfect. At some point you will hear about a problem of yours. Something must be said, too, if *you* see or hear something wrong. You have that obligation. *We must be able to evaluate each other* [emphasis added]. Generally speaking, individuals are capable of accepting criticism."

It should be noted that the challenge of peer review is not unique to orchestras. In fact, it is an issue for any type of organization. Peiperl (2001) notes the popularity of, and paradoxes inherent in, peer appraisal: "360-degree feedback is all the rage in companies big and small. But it is frequently bureaucratic, politically charged, and agonizing. The good news is that understanding the four paradoxes inherent to peer appraisal...can take the pain out of the process—and get better results." Among the paradoxes described by Peiperl are: whether peer appraisal is carefully tied to appropriate and timely feedback and to appropriate rewards; whether the right measurements are used to make the appraisal; and whether the process is made known and explicit and is supported by top management. If so, then the peer appraisal system can work.

In the case of democratically-based or self-governing orchestras, the tension around peer reviews are equally politically charged and agonizing. But if the same process is used for all hires, with the same careful criteria, which is explicitly known to everyone, then the process should work, no matter how

traumatic it will be for the individual and the group. It is a simple proposition: high performance work units require high standards of conduct. Consider the obverse: what happens when individuals are "carried" by the group, instead of owning up to their lack of effort, ability, or competence? What happens to the ensemble then? (or over time?).[8]

To summarize in light of my observations and analysis, I propose the following criteria and issues as a checklist—and the basis of the elements of a theory—that can be used to evaluate any democratic or self-governing orchestra system. In each case, it is necessary to ask: (a) Do these things exist? (b) How (and how well) does the organization deal with them? and (c) Is a "dynamic balance" of these issues in place?

Important criteria:
Direction, Structure, Membership and Leadership

Advantages of the Self-Governing System:
A profound and widespread sense of "ownership"
Less mental stress for musicians
"We are all on the same team, pulling in the same direction"
Everyone shares in the success or failure of the group
More participation and democracy, less bureaucracy
Player job satisfaction is heightened

Difficulties or Hurdles associated with the Self-Governing System:
Time needed to fully develop the organization
Financial pressures
Commitment, both individual and collective commitment
Broad participation versus efficiency tradeoff
Trust and Technical Knowledge
Internal Power Struggles
Peer Review

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[8] There is plenty of literature that explores the effects. See, for example, the concept of social loafing and how to prevent it (Shephard, 1993).

Self-Governing Systems in Broader Context

In the final analysis, although self-governing systems offer an alternative approach to how an organization engages and motivates its members, as well as how it creates and adds value, this does not mean that all problems are automatically swept away or resolved (Kanter, 1983). In fact, the record on participation in organizations, let alone full self-governance, reflects the larger history of man's pursuit of political self-rule: it can be a long and hard road. On the nation-state level, for example, one need only look to the recent cases of Northern Ireland and the Middle East to see just how much patience and *determination* is needed in the pursuit of self-rule. But the movement towards devolution and "subsidiarity" (as the Europeans call it) is not a new trend, nor is it a trend limited to world politics; it has also affected whole industries and organizational life.

There is an explosion of interest in "having a say at work," particularly among the professional ranks in organizations. This is true across all types of organizations be they for-profit, governmental, or nonprofit. Employees most everywhere are demanding more mindful and meaningful work (Bouchikhi & Kimberly, 2000) and more authority over it (Hirschorn, 1997). The corporate world, although slow to respond initially, has reversed course now that it feels the full force of the dotcom revolution, global competition, and a more demanding and mobile workforce. Nonprofit or charitable organizations are also trying to find new and better ways to improve their practices and enhance their contribution to society, as well as remain relevant in an ever-changing world. As Lawler sees it,

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Many corporations are struggling to adapt their organization designs to this global era of hyper business competition...In today's competitive environment, corporations can no longer rely on a bureaucratic management approach based on nineteenth century technology and ideas. They must reinvent themselves and rebuild their organizations from the ground up to form a twenty first-century organization. (Lawler, 1996: xi)

Organizational responses to these trends have included "quality of work life" and empowerment practices such as quality circles, open book management, flattened hierarchies, self-managing teams and other concepts (concepts that McGregor (1960) understood nearly a half century ago as did Fowlett back in the 1920s (Graham, 1995)). The difference today is that we have three strong forces at work: 1) a renewed focus on (and legitimation of) the "human side of enterprise" (now that we have reached the limits of financial and other managerial mechanisms aimed at getting the maximum output from organizations), 2) a desire to transform organizations from bureaucratic, top-down operations into "lean, mean, learning machines" (Collins & Porras, 1995; Senge, 1990; Kanter, 1997; Handy, 1998), and, 3) a serious "War for Talent" going on as more and more professionals find it easier and easier to set their own career agendas without depending on corporations to do it for them (Peiperl, et al., 2000). Again, whatever the specific motivation or approaches employed, the underlying strategy aims at increasing overall organizational performance by moving "from control to commitment in the workplace" (Walton 1977; Walton 1985). Hirschorn (1997: 5) aptly summarizes: most organizations recognize that "the control systems built up over a century of industrial development are no longer useful."

The Difficulty of Organizational Change

Yet, as with attempts to democratize polities, there has been much failure and frustration across organizations in terms of creating a "21st century organization" and especially in instituting democratic practices which, in many ways, constitute a new

culture of work. Kanter (1997: xiii) who has written extensively about "liberating people to use their brainpower" is not surprised by the lack of across-the-board progress: "Just because the terms have been defined and new models established, we should not imagine that everyone has crossed the frontier into a new way of working. *The destination has not been reached just because the map has been drawn* [emphasis added]." Indeed, although alternative models now exist and most organizations seem to understand the new values espoused, this does not mean that every organization *operates this way. But the pressure is on and the challenge remains.* "Gone are the artificial rigidities and disciplines of the conventional corporation," says Hammer (1997: 27), founder of the concept of 'reengineering.' "No system that depends on segregating wisdom and decision making into a managerial class can possibly offer the speed and agility customers demand. It also means letting go of metaphors like "hands". Customers require whole human beings possessed of hands, heads, and hearts to serve them." This is, again, reinforced by Hirschorn (1997: 3) who describes the "decision-intensiveness" of daily work: "In this sense, the new enterprise does not push decision making down so much as it *creates new loci* for decision making."

Part of the challenge of moving to this way of operating in the workplace—to "new loci" and wider participation in decision making---stems from the fact that new and/or different forms of organizational governance and managerial control are more easily implanted in greenfield sites than existing institutions. Transforming an organization's extant culture and decision making processes can be extremely difficult, particularly when it involves reapportioning power or dropping age-old stereotypes and defensive routines (Dimaggio & Powell, 1991; Ganz, 2000; Argyris, 1990). Indeed, it may not be so hard to institute *one* new work practice or process in an organization, but to transform an *entire* culture or way of operating certainly is (Belbin, 2000). And we are

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not speaking about a one-time change, but rather a continuous process. Light (1998: 4) explains, "Anyone can get an organization to change once, the key is to instill a process for *continued* innovation." That alone is reason enough for the enormous frustration experienced by organizations that aspire to more progressive or even egalitarian managerial and organizational practices, but which somehow fall short. More than that, setbacks can arise from a number of exigent factors--no matter the size, age or type of organization or the motivation to change. Three of the most important roadblocks to change appear to be:

1) the strategy used to enact organizational change,

2) the genesis of the timing of change, for example: be it in crisis or long-term mode, as well as the type of change pursued—be it incremental or discontinuous (Pascale, 1990), and

3) leadership's commitment to the process (Molinsky, 1999; Lawler, 1992). Indeed, leaders must be willing not only to "talk the talk," but "walk the talk" for real change such as *decision-sharing* to occur.

Obviously, there is strong need for models that work, which can serve as guideposts. The leading business press is helping to fill this gap by raising relevant issues for discussion. For example, *The Wall Street Journal* recently featured the CEO of Seimens AG, Germany's information and telecommunications giant, lauding his open management style and belief in the benefits of broad consensus building within the company (Boston & Kempe, 2001). Self-governing orchestras (SGOs), as we have seen, offer another workable model (even if the measure of their bottom-line is different than that of the for-profit world) because like Kanter's (1997: xiii) aim, these organizations are creating "the tools and conditions that liberate people to use their brainpower to make a difference in a world of constant challenge and change." SGOs

represent a radical yet viable departure from the norm. And the longest-lived of them provide the most vivid beacons of what it means to create a high involvement, high performance organization.

Chapter Ten: Conclusions and Future Research

In concluding this thesis, I first summarize what we have learned in the preceding nine chapters. I then identify four themes that run through this research and are, in my view, the principal differences between the self-governing model and the dominant model of orchestra organization. I use findings from the Harvard-Max Planck study, which was focused principally on the dominant model, to discuss these themes and to show how, in the end, there is more than one way to run an orchestra. In conclusion, I offer my perspective on why the self-governing model is an important organizational alternative and what research remains to be done in this field.

Summary of Preceding Chapters

In the nine preceding chapters, we have discussed a range of issues faced by a select set of organizations in Germany, the U.S. and Great Britain whose leaders and members are trying to create the most appropriate democratic structures and systems in their orchestras. In the first chapter, I highlighted the reasons cited for the general malaise of professional orchestral musicians and why it is worth looking more closely at how the high involvement self-governing orchestras are structured. Chapter 2 provided the context for a study of professional orchestras by discussing features of the typical orchestra model found in Germany, the U.S., and the U.K. and the historical roots of these models. This chapter included a description of "the basic rules" of orchestra organization and how unionization and national context has shaped the role of the players. Chapter 3 reviewed the literature that is most relevant to the focus of my thesis, finding that most of the work on organizational structures and workplace dynamics is a

comparatively new area of research. Chapter 4 set forth the multiple methods used in this research and what data was collected and analyzed. With Chapters 5 through 8, a case study perspective on four specific orchestras, each at various points on the continuum of self-governance, was presented. I discussed the organizational and governance structures of the Colorado Symphony Orchestra, the Orpheus Chamber Orchestra, the Berlin Philharmonic, and the London Symphony Orchestra. Chapter 9 made sense of the wide range of issues presented in the four case studies by comparing the similarities and differences of the four orchestras, the strengths and weaknesses of self-governing systems, and then offered a "checklist" of what is required to have an effective self-governing orchestra. In addition to this inventory, other key considerations include: an orchestra's particular direction, structure, membership and leadership, how much time has been invested in the pursuit of self-determination, how the organization deals with financial pressures, the degree of commitment within the organization, the pervasiveness of participation, the level of trust and technical knowledge within the organization, how internal power struggles are handled, and, finally, how peer review is managed.

Themes from the Self-Governing versus Dominant Model Comparison

In addition to the advantages and disadvantages of the self-governing model that were discussed in Chapter 9, four main themes emerged from the data I collected and analyzed on Colorado, Orpheus, Berlin and the LSO. These themes have to do with: 1) integrity of ensemble and the conductor-ensemble relationship, 2) finances and player satisfaction, 3) "adaptive capacity" and 4) "equifinality". These themes are worth discussing here, in conclusion to this thesis research. I use the data I collected from numerous interviews, observations, archival data, and especially player surveys and the

Harvard-Max Planck survey's findings to describe the four themes that emerged from a comparison of the two models: the self-governing model and the dominant "contract orchestra" model.

The player survey data generated by the Harvard-Max Planck study (Allmendinger, et. al., 1996) shows how the self-governing orchestras in my thesis compare against the dominant model of orchestra organization along items related to the four themes above. (There were 73 dominant model orchestras in the Harvard-Max Planck sample. For a discussion of the player survey's properties, see Hackman, 1991. A copy of the survey is found in Appendix D).

Exhibit 10.1

Dominant model versus Self-Governing Model Player Surveys

(The scale used is 1 to 7, with 7 indicating strong agreement with the item.)

	Dominant Model	Colorado	Orpheus	Berlin	LSO
Work motivation	6.2	5.4	6.0	5.7	5.7
Ensemble integrity	5.0	4.6	6.3	5.9	5.4
Effective recruitment	5.3	5.2	5.6	6.6	5.9
Music Director is the					
only Boss	3.8	1.1	n/a	1.8	1.1
Adequate orchestra resources	4.2	4.0	4.7	6.4	4.5
Satisfaction with pay	3.8	2.6	5.0	5.9	4.8
General satisfaction	**5.6**	**5.6**	**6.1**	**6.2**	**4.7**
Growth satisfaction	**4.8**	**5.0**	**5.8**	**5.6**	**4.0**
Orchestra structure	4.8	4.9	5.8	5.9	5.3
Satisfaction with Management	4.3	4.3	5.5	5.5	4.6
Player Involvement	**4.1**	**4.5**	**5.9**	**5.4**	**4.9**

Source: Allmendinger, et. al., 1996; Lehman, 1997.

Theme 1: Integrity of Ensemble. Although all players in my research and in the Harvard-Max Planck survey were extremely motivated to do well in their work ("Work Motivation"), players in three of the four self-governing orchestras reported a higher integrity of ensemble than the dominant model ("Ensemble Integrity"). This was evident to me in my many interviews with and observations of players, especially those in the Orpheus Chamber Orchestra, Berlin Philharmonic and London Symphony Orchestra. They reported to me a greater sense of personal and collective responsibility for the quality of their performances than players I interviewed in the traditional or dominant model orchestras. For them, there was no abdication of responsibility, particularly in the case of Orpheus where there is no conductor to follow (or to blame). In addition, they felt that their recruiting efforts were more fair and effective ("Effective recruitment"). Certainly, players had a larger role in selecting and evaluating their peers than in the dominant model.

To underscore these points, I looked at the item: "Music Director is the only boss," which explores to what extent the music director is in charge of what happens within the orchestra. In this comparison, the means are lowest for all three self-governing orchestras, suggesting that players are more in charge of their work together. Surprisingly, players from the dominant model orchestras did not perceive their music director as the only boss, either. This is consistent with what Fischer (1994) and Faulkner (1973b) discovered about the relationship between the conductor and the orchestra, that it is a fundamental relationship in orchestras, but one that is deeply rooted and inherently filled with tension, be it in a self-governing orchestra or a traditionally-structured ensemble.

Theme 2: Finances and Satisfaction. Orchestra finances weighed heavily on all orchestra players surveyed ("Adequacy of resources"). But "satisfaction with pay" was the lowest among self-governing orchestral players, save Berlin, which as was discussed, had greater job security and benefits than the other three self-governing orchestras. Players in the four orchestras studied were concerned about their incomes and earned 50% less than their counterparts in major American orchestras. Indeed, the financial situation for all four orchestras was reported as unsatisfactory. This point is underscored by the fact that, in the most stable orchestra, the Berlin Philharmonic with its significant government subsidy, Simon Rattle had to get involved in the fight for higher player wages with the Berlin Senate. Only then, when the situation became publicized, did the Senate vote for a salary increase for the orchestra.

Despite their concern about wages, however, the self-governing orchestra players readily made the economic sacrifices for a chance to perform with these self-governing orchestras. This was evident in their interviews with me. Their orchestras' economic affairs cannot be confused with the quality and caliber of musicianship. In fact, all orchestras suffer from perennial budget concerns (see, for example, the report of the American Symphony Orchestra League, 1993). The question is which orchestras play to their potential in spite of their financial standing? Which orchestral players are most satisfied with their work and eager to play in their ensembles despite their wages?

Again, the player survey gives us another indication of the answer to these questions. In terms of general satisfaction ("General satisfaction") and satisfaction with opportunities for growth through their work ("Growth satisfaction"), the self-governing orchestras matched or exceeded the reports of all other players. This is worth noting. The one exception is the London Symphony Orchestra with a lower mean reported for

both items. I would suggest that this had to do with the massive organizational change that was occurring during the survey's administration in the 1990-1991 season. At that time, the orchestra was about to undergo the changes called for in their "Enhancement Funding Scheme" plan, which as was described in Chapter 8, was a very emotionally upsetting time for many players.

Theme 3: Adaptive Capacity. My research shows that the self-governing orchestras exhibited greater flexibility and "adaptive capacity." Adaptive capacity is what Letts, et. al. (1999) describe as the ability to know where and how to change an organization's processes and strategies so that it can more effectively deliver its mission (Letts, et. al., 1999: 23). Adaptive capacity leads to organizational learning, responsiveness, innovation, and highly motivated employees. In short, it is a sign of organizational effectiveness. Measures of this from the player survey show that players in the self-governing orchestras rated their orchestra structures more highly than those in the dominant model ("Orchestra structure"). They were also more satisfied with their managers and administrators ("Satisfaction with management"), seeing them as up to the tasks and challenges at hand.

For most orchestras, having adaptive capacity is a new concern. As I stated earlier, the orchestral form has not changed in more than a century (Fogel, 2000) and orchestras have been relatively immune to the kinds of environmental pressures faced by other kinds of organizations (Mintzberg, 1993). But as the environmental pressures continue to build (e.g., charitable giving is directed more to social causes than to culture, there is more competition from orchestras willing to work for less wages, and incomes are reduced from a decline in recordings), orchestras will need to change. Adaptive capacity will become even more important. The fact that the four orchestras under study

here have already exhibited this is a comparative advantage in my view. Their willingness to change and their experience with shared governance should also serve them (Rosell, 1999).

Theme 4: Equifinality. Finally, I must concede that, overall, the findings of my research, taken together with those of the Harvard-Max Planck survey and other studies, suggest that there is no one best way to run an orchestra. This is what is called "equifinality": there are many ways to the same end. Certainly, there are strengths to the self-governing model, particularly in the level of player involvement in organizational decision making and authority sharing ("Player involvement"). And there is greater player satisfaction, generally speaking, and with opportunities for personal and professional growth, something that addresses Tom Hall's concerns outlined in Chapter 1. But the self-governing model, like other high involvement organizations as Lawler (1986: 233) points out, is a different and difficult organization to run effectively. He says, "Overall, moving to participative management is a long, slow, somewhat chaotic process. It means following an unclear map and regularly adapting to external change and internal learning." He asks, "Is it worth it?" I think so.

"Why should we care about self-governing systems, let alone self-governing orchestras?" To me, it is the way in which these organizations go about creating systems that foster shared governance and ownership, distributed leadership, high involvement and high commitment that is appealing (Parasuraman & Nachman, 1987). While other kinds of organizations and their leaders are searching for any method to motivate their employees and harness their talent to compete in the marketplace, it is the self-managing, self-designing, self-governing systems that provide a way (Pfeffer, 1994; Lawler, 1986; Hackman, 1986). They fit the organizational needs of our time (and they

often achieve the same or better results, including financial performance (Pfeffer, 1998)). Of course, I am not suggesting that all managers or organizations adopt self-governing constitutions, but the ways in which these systems generate desirable behaviors, good work processes, and positive outcomes is worth considering, in part if not in whole.

By contrast, a de facto oligarchy exists in the dominant model of orchestra organization which constricts organizational power- and decision-sharing to a triad: i.e., the executive director, board, and the music director, while a more expansive conception of the players' role—even in artistic areas---has often been dismissed (Fogel, 2000). In practice, executive directors and boards make the strategic and business decisions, the music director dictates artistic matters, and players are left out of any decision-making equation. "Players want authority, but not the responsibility that comes with that authority"--is commonly heard as an explanation for the general lack of decision- and power-sharing in orchestras (Wichterman, 1999).

But another leading perspective sees employees as a strategic asset in organizations. How they are managed and the roles they play have important consequences for an organization's competitive advantage. According to Nadler and Tushman (1997):

> Until fairly recently, in a historically stable business environment, there were all kinds of ways in which companies could develop and maintain sources of competitive advantage. Those might have involved exclusive access to customers or capital, outstanding product lines, unique technology, unmatched production processes, or unrivaled distribution channels. No more. Information technology, global markets, and changing customer demands have changed all that...We are firmly convinced that the last remaining source of genuine competitive advantage that any organization can sustain over time is its ability to organize and motivate people in unique ways to achieve strategic objectives. (Nadler & Tushman, 1997: 226).

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Pfeffer (1994: 14) has observed that, "As other sources of competitive success have become less important, what remains as a crucial, differentiating factor is the organization, its employees, and how they work...Achieving competitive success through people involves fundamentally altering how we think about the work force and the employment relationship." Self-governing systems by definition have a different relationship with employees. Employee involvement is not compartmentalized and limited. It derives from a sense of ownership (Ellerman, 1990).

Future Research

Looking to areas of future research, several enlightened individuals urge us to rethink the present, conventional reality. Klein (1990), for one, calls for a loosening of "the rigid system under which orchestras and musicians work." Fleischmann (1989) would agree, since he has been the most vocal champion of a "community of musicians" instead of the dominant model of organization. Machover (1986), on the other hand, has examined the contributions of new technologies and new techniques to the orchestra, suggesting that the future orchestra may well be a combination of electronic and traditional instruments—or maybe not, if tradition prevails. Then again, given the economic equation of this labor intensive business (Baumol & Bowen, 1966), maybe the possibility of 21st century orchestral musicians going the way of the pit musician of the 1920s and '30s is not so hard to conceive (i.e., to be replaced by tape and other technologies) (Kraft, 1994). Unless perhaps, all orchestra employees, including the players, are more fully utilized within the organization.

Organizational research can provide a platform for the kind of discussion that needs to take place as the orchestra industry moves forward. To be specific, I would

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suggest that further comparative, cross-cultural, and longitudinal research be conducted. Certainly, I would hope to further test the findings of this thesis at other orchestras at different stages of organizational change, using the checklist of issues set forth in Chapter 9 to assess to what extent they are incorporating "high involvement" ideas and how successful they are at it. Other researchers who find this phenomenon of interest, no doubt will have their own research questions in mind. What we have here is just the beginning of a more thorough understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of a different approach to organizational and governance structures.

APPENDICES

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Professional Problems of Symphony and Opera Musicians

(Source: Hall, 1983, p. 3-4)

1. **Anonymity.** Even in the most famous orchestras few members receive individual recognition, nothing like that accorded conductors. Tutti players are eclipsed by, and may come to resent, the more famous and better-paid principals. Intra-orchestra inequities and rivalries are common.

2. **Subordination.** Orchestra players, managed professionally and subjugated musically, suffer a decided lack of autonomy, playing music written, selected, and interpreted by someone else, often participating in performances that are mediocre or worse. Despite their expertise and experience, orchestra musicians are allowed little input into the artistic and administrative decisions that affect their personal lives. Problems with conductors and managers rank high among musicians' concerns.

3. **Training deficiencies.** Music schools and conservatories prepare instrumentalists as though they will be soloists; orchestra playing is looked up on as an inferior vocation.[1] Divisiveness and animosity on campus between educators and performers and musicologists provides a model for professional life. The orchestra musician rarely gets a well-rounded education in music theory and history or a broad general education that helps to relate his profession and art to the rest of life. Personal and social development is often sacrificed during early years of intensive musical training.

4. **Public apathy.** A small percentage of the total population has any interest in the arts, classical music, or the symphony orchestra. A large segment of society seems to regard our activity as elitist, irrelevant, and peripheral in social value. Musicians may also feel that they and their art are under-appreciated when audience members are noisy and inattentive.

5. **Constant criticism.** The margin for error in our art is small indeed, and we are constantly scrutinized and criticized by conductors, journalists, audiences, our colleagues, and ourselves. We are trained to find fault, and when high standards are not attained by ourselves and our colleagues, disappointment and frustration set in.

6. **Preoccupation with detail.** Attention to the minutest detail is indispensable in the pursuit of excellence, but it is easy to lose the joy of music-making in anxiously striving for precision. Recording reinforces this mentality. It is easy to become preoccupied with the details in one part, lose any overview of the entire musical context, and become assembly-line practitioners, turning out notes faster

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[1] This is largely the case for string players, not wind or brass players for whom playing in a symphony orchestra is a perfectly acceptable profession.

or slower, louder or softer, higher or lower, placing them dispassionately on other spectra.

7. **Entrapment.** Limited opportunity for advancement within an orchestra or to another orchestra can lead to a negative and enforced stability and stagnation. A sense of economic entrapment occurs with the realization that earning power is not likely to increase significantly over the course of an orchestra career. Entry level salary does not differ substantially from that of senior members. Mobility is maintained only by sacrificing the rewards of settling down.

8. **Stress and other health hazards.** The pressure to deliver error-free performance on difficult musical instruments while having only partial control over the artistic situation makes the profession of orchestral musician one of the most stressful, an assertion confirmed by several scientific studies. Long periods of such stress can cause fatigue problems. Orchestra musicians are also exposed to high sound volume levels which can be painful and even lead to some hearing loss. Stage fright is a reality. Physical ailments, especially hand and arm problems, can arise from long years of playing certain instruments.

9. **Atypical schedules.** Musicians work while others play. Not following a 9-to-5 schedule can be a plus, but it can also play havoc with social life. Musical commitments may leave little time for activities outside music.

10. **Management-labor woes.** An historical legacy from the early 1960s, reflex militance has become entrenched and adversarial relationships among musicians and managements perpetuated and intensified. Preoccupation with extra-musical concerns about policies, procedures, and contract violations can be draining.

11. **Saturation.** In repeating a limited repertoire over many years, even masterpieces may lose their special appeal. Familiarity breeds a certain contempt, especially if it is familiarity only with a particular set of notes and not the total work of art.

APPENDIX B

Example of Project Description Sent to Prospective Research Sites

Dear xxx:

This letter is to invite your participation in a comparative study of democratic and self-governing orchestras. I am very excited about this research, which ultimately will lead to a dissertation and a Ph.D. in arts policy and management degree from City University, London, England. My objective in all this is to understand how (and how well) democratic and self-governing orchestras function and the outcomes of their particular organizational and governance structures. This research builds on recent work in the area of leadership and mobility in chamber and symphony orchestras conducted by researchers in the Psychology Department at Harvard University. Your orchestra was selected because of its age, reputation and experience with democracy in the orchestral workplace.

The research plan calls for a longitudinal study, which will include periodic interviews and observations with as many members of your organization as possible from trustees to management and, of course, musicians. In addition, I would like to have the opportunity to sit in on organizational meetings and to review archival records for any pertinent information. The goal is to create a case study of your orchestra starting with an understanding of its particular history, its organizational development, and present circumstances. At the conclusion of the study, you will receive a full report of the findings, including the implications of what has been learned.

I will telephone you in a few days to answer any questions you may have about the research, and to see if you would be willing to join in this research. I very much hope you will be able to participate.

Sincerely,

Erin V. Lehman
Doctoral Candidate
Arts Policy and Management Department
City University, London, ENGLAND

Further Background to the Objective of this Project

Self-governing orchestras

In the world of classical music today, there are very few self-governing orchestras. In fact, they are quite rare, even though once, long ago, they were more common (e.g., The New York Philharmonic). Moreover, to the lay public, the governance structure of an orchestra is less obvious and, likely, of less concern than the quality of its performances. Thus, to know that the Vienna Philharmonic, the Berlin Philharmonic, or the Israel Philharmonic orchestras are self-governing institutions is less salient than to know that these ensembles consistently deliver artistic output of the

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highest caliber. But how is it that these orchestras continue to achieve artistic excellence?

Clearly, there are many factors which contribute to the outcome of a singular performance and many more that go into shaping the entire historical development and current standing of an orchestra--from finances to artistic leadership. In this research, it is the governance and organizational structures which are of most interest. How, for instance, does the fact that players in these orchestras not only constitute "the workforce," but also function as the governors affect the degree of organizational effectiveness? By effectiveness, we mean three things: (1) that those who support, review, and/or consume the musical "product" are satisfied with it; (2) that the ensemble as a group is getting stronger over time; and, (3) that individual members of the organization feel personal and professional growth and satisfaction through their involvement in it. For the three orchestras listed above, they have achieved our criteria of organizational effectiveness: financial backers, music critics, and audiences find satisfaction in the orchestras' work; the ensembles are growing stronger over time; and, individual members find their involvement adds to their well-being and is rewarding. But, if this is in fact true, how is it so? And, what role have the governance and organizational structures played in this success?

What can be learned from your Orchestra

It is not surprising that cooperative or self-governing organizations are rare, given the history of organizational design and development where it has been found that the most efficient form of management is hierarchical and bureaucratic. Moreover, democratic approaches can be inefficient. Therefore, like their for-profit counterparts, most orchestras have grown in the bureaucratic tradition of management, but with bifurcated leadership in the managing director and the music director. Current thinking in organizational behavior and management, however, bids us away from this traditional approach. In fact, increasingly, research indicates that non-bureaucratic and non-hierarchical forms of management can, in fact, lead to more productive and more effective organizations, as well as more satisfied and committed employees (Drucker, 1988; Pfeffer, 1994, 1998; Kanter, 1993; Hackman, 1990.)

It is true that orchestras where players *are* legitimately in control are not panaceas. But it is just possible that these kinds of organizations provide a pathway or a model by which others can avoid the seemingly inherent problems of this industry and--more importantly--unleash the potential that exists within these purportedly creative, social enterprises: to not only safeguard the classical music tradition, but more consistently deliver the highest artistic product while at the same time, contributing to the increased strengthening of the ensemble and personal and professional growth of its members.

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APPENDIX C

Data Collection by Type and Frequency

The type of data collected were: semi-structured interviews (of 40 minutes to 1 hour in duration each), observations (during rehearsals, performances, backstage, at meetings, and around the offices) and archival and literature searches, as well as electronic mail correspondence. In addition, I used the player survey (Appendix D) to generate further data on the musicians' perspective at each orchestra. The list of interviews, observations, and archival searches I conducted for thesis research were as follows: (Please note that all of these interviews were conducted by the author for this thesis, except those highlighted for the LSO, which was research for the earlier work with Galinsky. Again, I was the principal interviewer for the LSO research.)

Colorado Symphony Orchestra (CSO): 1990-95, follow-up 1996-2000

Initial visit to the Colorado Symphony Orchestra, Denver, Colorado: Dec. 2-7, 1990.
Observed rehearsals and performances during this period at Boettcher Hall.
Interviews with: J. Copenhaver, P. Endsley, J. Sherwin and L. Yeingst.

Searched CSO Archives and Literature for relevant materials.

Return visit to the CSO, Denver, CO: August 22-25, 1995.
Interviews with: D. Abosch, M. Alsop, E. Bertoluzzi, S. Bowles, M. Burrell, J. Copenhaver, J. Deak, P. Endsley, C. Hampson, F. Hoeppner, M. Hoeppner, K. Howard, J. Low, B. Reed, R. Sayford, J. Sherwin, M. Switzer, and L. Yeingst.

Meeting in Denver, CO with R. Sayford, June 27, 1996.

Return visit to the CSO, Denver, CO: August 13-15, 1996.
Interviews with: D. Hesser, K. Howard, R. Sayford and J. Watt.
Player survey administered August 1996 (same instrument as Harvard project survey from 1990); Feedback report delivered June 1997.

Observed CSO board of trustees meeting, Denver, CO: June 23, 1997.
Attended CSO volunteer league board meeting, Denver, CO: June 24, 1997.
Interviews with: D. Hesser, K. Howard, W. McFarlane, A. Randolph and J. Watt.

Return visit to the CSO, Denver, CO: July 30, 1998.
Interviews with: T. Bacchetti, J. Hildebrand and R. Sayford.

Telephone interviews with: 1995: M. Alsop; 1996: R. Sayford; 1997: L. Yeingst, J. Hildebrand, G. Goble, W. Hill, M. Araujo, J. Sherwin, P. Cooper, K. Howard, P. Naslund; and 1999: T. Bacchetti.

Email exchanges from 1997-2000 with executive director, various players, and trustees.

Orpheus Chamber Orchestra (OCO): 1994-1996, follow-up 1998-99

Initial visit to Orpheus Chamber Orchestra, New York, NY: October 11-12, 1994.
Observed rehearsals, performance, and executive committee meeting.
Interviews with: E. Bartlett, M. Caplin, J. Fifer, M. Meell and R. Rood.

Interviews April 20-23, 1995 in NYC with: R. Bauch, J. Fifer, G. Figueroa, J. Gladstein, L.P. How, J. Jenner, N. Hurlburt, S. Palma, B. Purvis, E. Sutton and A. Vogel.

Third visit to OCO, April 28-29, 1995:
Interviews with: M. Caplin, S. Clarke, B. Friedland, D. Jolley, M. Meell, F. Morelli.

Observed executive committee meeting, September 25, 1995, New York, NY.
Observed board meeting, September 26, 1995, New York, NY.
Observed planning committee meeting, January 29, 1996, New York, NY.
Observed board meeting, February 8, 1996, New York, NY.

Observed OCO at the Kravis Performing Arts Center in West Palm Beach, Florida: March 25-26, 1996 in both rehearsal and performance.
Interviews with: E. Bartlett, R. Bauch, N. Danielson, J. Fifer, F. Morelli, P. Purvis and V. Guy.

Meeting with J. Fifer, NYC, December 13, 1996.
Meeting with J. Fifer, NYC, April 14, 1997.
Meeting with N. Hurlburt, NYC, April 18, 1997.

Observed planning committee meeting, NYC, March 25, 1998.
Observed planning committee meeting, NYC, April 8, 1998.
Interviews with: J. Ankney, N. Hurlburt, D. Palma and H. Seifter.
Observed Finance Committee meeting of the Board, NYC, April 13, 1998.
Interviews with: J. Brim and E. Sutton.
Interview with D. Palma, Boston, April 25, 1998.
Observed OCO Marketing Committee of the Board meeting, NYC, April 29, 1998.
Electronic mail communication with players, 1998-1999.

Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra (BPhO): 1997-1999, follow-up 2000-2001

Initial visit to the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra, Berlin, Germany: October 7-13, 1997.
Observed rehearsals.
Interviews with: S. Dodds, P. Humpel, S. Johnson, E. Weingarten and U. Wolff.

Telephone interviews: H. Stern, October 1997; F. McWilliam, June 1998.

Followed BPhO on tour in Edinburgh, Scotland and London, England, Aug. 24-28, 1998.
Interviews with: C. Gossling, M. Hunter, S. Jezierski, E. Laine, M.P., Langlamet, F. McWilliam, H. Mebert, R. Platt, P. Riegelbauer, K.B. Schmidt and E. Weingarten.

Interviews in Berlin, Germany, Aug. 31-Sept. 2, 1998: B. Dean, P. Radunski, P. Smaczny, H. Stern, R. Watzel and E. Weingarten.

Followed the orchestra to the Salzburg Festival, Salzburg, Austria: March 31-April 8, 1998.
Observed orchestra in rehearsal and performance.
Interviews with: F. McWilliam and E. Weingarten.

Followed orchestra to Carnegie Hall, New York City, October 7-10, 1998.
Observed rehearsals and performances.
Interviews with: M. Dewitte, S. Dodds, G. Faust, M. Hunter, F. McWilliam, P. Riegelbauer and H. Schaefer.

Lunch meeting in Cambridge, Massachusetts, October 22, 1999 with: H. Baumer, M. Hunter, F. McWilliam, R. Watzel and U. Wolff.
Meeting in Washington, D.C., October 16, 2000 with: M. Kratz, F. McWilliam and H. Schellenberger.
Meeting in Ft. Lauderdale, FLA, December 18, 2000 with: H. Stern.

Electronic mail communication with players, 1999-2001.

London Symphony Orchestra (LSO): 1993-94, follow-up 1999

Initial visit to the London Symphony Orchestra, London, England: January 13-23, 1993.
Observed rehearsals and performances during this period at the Barbican Centre.
Interviews with: A. Benjamin, E. Crees, C. Gillinson, J. Graham, S. Mallett, T. Martin, L. McKenzie, T. Morton, J. Lawley, C. Pendrill and P. Silverthorne.

Searched LSO Archives for relevant materials.

Observed the LSO at Florida Int'l Festival, Daytona Beach, FLA: August 13-15, 1993.
Interviews with: C.Gillinson, M. Hall, T. Martin, G. Newson, M.T. Thomas.
Observed rehearsals and performances during this period.

Follow-up telephone interviews during late 1993, early 1994 with: I. Bousfield, C. Gillinson, P. Hemmings, J. Lawley.

Observed LSO at Lincoln Center in New York City, April 22-24, 1995.
Interview with: C. Gillinson, T. Martin, L. McKenzie, F. Saunders.

Observed the LSO in rehearsals, New York City, NY: December 3-5, 1997.
Interviews with: C. Gillinson.

Extensive follow-up telephone interviews with: B. Campbell, D. Salthouse, and C. Gillinson.

Fax exchanges with C. Gillinson, 1999.

Further archival research, review of press briefings and internal documents, 1999.

APPENDIX D

Player Survey Administered to a Random Sample of Orchestra Members

SECTION ONE

Listed below are a number of statements that could describe a
symphony orchestra.

Please indicate whether each statement is an _accurate_ or
an _inaccurate_ description of _your_ orchestra.

*   *   *

Write a number in the blank beside each statement, based on
the following scale:

How accurate is the statement in describing your orchestra?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Inaccurate	Mostly Inaccurate	Slightly Inaccurate	Uncertain	Slightly Accurate	Mostly Accurate	Very Accurate

_____ 1. This orchestra operates as a real musical _ensemble_--like a team
whose members know each other well and are expert at working together.

_____ 2. What is expected of players in this orchestra sometimes changes
significantly from week to week.

_____ 3. Excellent playing pays off in this orchestra.

_____ 4. Members of our orchestra have a real "say" about decisions that affect
the orchestra and its players.

_____ 5. There is little opportunity for mobility in this orchestra: once a
player occupies a given chair, he or she stays there indefinitely.

_____ 6. Sections are a key organizational feature of this orchestra--what
happens within them is critical to our musical performance.

_____ 7. There is a great deal of room for initiative and judgment in our work.

_____ 8. Certain individuals in this orchestra are not able to work well as
members of a team.

_____ 9. Personnel changes are rare in this orchestra--it is a stable,
settled performing group.

_____ 10. The facilities where we rehearse and perform are _not_ adequate.

_____ 11. Many people in this orchestra (besides the music director and general
manager/technical director) share responsibility for its leadership.

_____ 12. Many exceptions are made to our rules about how new players are
supposed to be auditioned and selected.

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1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Inaccurate	Mostly Inaccurate	Slightly Inaccurate	Uncertain	Slightly Accurate	Mostly Accurate	Very Accurate

_____ 13. The way this orchestra operates is not all that different from a collection of free-lancers who come together for a gig and may not see one another again for a long time.

_____ 14. The work we do challenges players and stretches their skills.

_____ 15. In this orchestra, players are kept in the dark about current developments and future plans.

_____ 16. There are many opportunities to improve one's position in this orchestra.

_____ 17. Members of this orchestra have more than enough talent and experience for the kind of work we do.

_____ 18. Standards of behavior in this orchestra are vague and unclear.

_____ 19. This orchestra's recruitment and audition process is fair and effective.

_____ 20. Many members of this orchestra are so busy with other playing or teaching commitments that their orchestral work sometimes suffers.

_____ 21. This orchestra has all the resources (that is, the things we use in doing our work) that we really need.

_____ 22. In this orchestra, the music director is the only <u>real</u> boss.

_____ 23. In this orchestra, sections never meet or rehearse separately.

_____ 24. Players in this orchestra get all the information they need to plan their work and their schedules.

_____ 25. Managers in this orchestra rarely consult with players about decisions that affect us and our work.

_____ 26. Almost all individuals in this orchestra have the special skills that are needed for good <u>ensemble</u> playing.

_____ 27. A player or section that does an especially good job in this orchestra does <u>not</u> get any special rewards or recognition.

_____ 28. Lots of people let us know what they think of our performances.

_____ 29. In this orchestra, it is clear what everyone is expected to do--and they do it.

3

Here are some statements that could describe the behavior of the music director of a symphony orchestra.

For each statement, check the blank that is most accurate in describing the behavior of your music director.

	Never	Infreq-uently	Some-times	Often	Always

The music director...

1 ...takes initiatives to build a receptive audience and community support.

2 ...takes initiatives to establish strong norms of professionalism and musical excellence in the orchestra.

3 ...actively and appropriately coaches individual players.

4 ...works collaboratively with the technical director/general manager.

5 ...takes initiatives to improve the financial status of the orchestra.

6 ...shares leadership with the concertmaster and principal players.

7 ...takes initiatives to build the orchestra as an ensemble or "team"

8 ...sets a clear direction for the musical objectives of the orchestra.

9 ...is an on-going "presence" in the orchestra--someone who is frequently available, not merely at scheduled rehearsals and performances.

10 ...takes initiatives to negotiate good recording contracts, broadcasts, and tour opportunities.

	Never	Infreq- uently	Some- times	Often	Always

The music director...

11 ...takes initiatives to recruit, select, promote, and/or terminate players.

12 ...goes out of his or her way to seek players' advice and ideas.

13 ...actively works with and develops the sections of the orchestra.

14. ...takes initiatives to improve the organizational structure of the orchestra.

15 ...inspires the orchestra to stretch its level of performance and musical accomplishment.

16 ...is clear and explicit about what he or she wants and expects from us.

17 ...takes initiatives to strengthen the orchestra's governing or advisory boards.

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Here are some statements that describe what can happen in an orchestra. Please indicate how <u>accurate</u> or <u>inaccurate</u> each statement is in describing how <u>your</u> orchestra operates.

*   *   *

Write a number in the blank beside each statement, based on the following scale:

How accurate is the statement in describing your orchestra?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Inaccurate	Mostly Inaccurate	Slightly Inaccurate	Uncertain	Slightly Accurate	Mostly Accurate	Very Accurate

_____ 1. Players in this orchestra <u>care</u> a lot about it, and work together to make it one of the best.

_____ 2. Recently, our orchestra has been receiving harsher public criticism than used to be the case.

_____ 3. Our orchestra deserves to have higher quality guest conductors than we usually get.

_____ 4. Our orchestra is getting stronger and stronger financially.

_____ 5. Some players in this orchestra do not carry their fair share of the overall workload.

_____ 6. Working with the members of this orchestra is an energizing and uplifting experience.

_____ 7. Recently, our orchestra seems to be "slipping" a bit in its level level of musical accomplishment.

_____ 8. Every time someone attempts to straighten out a player whose behavior is not acceptable, things seem to get worse rather than better.

_____ 9. With each season, this orchestra is improving musically.

_____ 10. There is a lot of unpleasantness among people in this orchestra.

_____ 11. Our audiences are becoming more and more enthusiastic about our performances.

_____ 12. Guest conductors generally find this orchestra hard to work with.

_____ 13. As an <u>organization</u>, this orchestra shows signs of falling apart.

_____ 14. Players in this orchestra share their special knowledge and expertise with one another.

SECTION FOUR

Now please indicate how you _personally_ feel about your job as a
player in this orchestra.

Each of the statements below is something that a person might say
about his or her job. You are to indicate your own _feelings_ by
marking how much you agree with each of the statements.

*   *   *

Write a number in the blank for each statement, based on this scale:

How much do you agree with the statement?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Disagree Strongly	Disagree	Disagree Slightly	Neutral	Agree Slightly	Agree	Agree Strongly

_____ 1. My opinion of myself goes up when I do this job well.

_____ 2. Generally speaking, I am very satisfied with this job.

_____ 3. I feel bad and unhappy when I discover that I have performed
less well than I should have on this job.

_____ 4. I frequently think of quitting this job.

_____ 5. My own feelings generally are not affected much one way or the
other by how well I perform this job.

_____ 6. I am generally satisfied with the kind of work I do in this job.

_____ 7. I feel a great sense of personal satisfaction when I do this
job well.

_____ 8. I live, eat, and breathe my job.

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Now please indicate how _satisfied_ you are with each aspect of your job listed below. Once again, write the appropriate number in the blank beside each statement.

How satisfied are you with this aspect of your job?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Extremely Dissatisfied	Dissatisfied	Slightly Dissatisfied	Neutral	Slightly Satisfied	Satisfied	Extremely Satisfied

_____ 1. The people I talk to and work with on the job.

_____ 2. The feeling of worthwhile accomplishment I get from doing my job.

_____ 3. The amount of support and guidance I receive from orchestra management.

_____ 4. How secure things look for me in the future in this orchestra.

_____ 5. The amount of challenge in my job.

_____ 6. The chance to help other people while at work.

_____ 7. The amount of pay and fringe benefits I receive.

_____ 8. The amount of independent thought and action I can exercise in my work.

_____ 9. The degree of respect and fair treatment I receive from management.

_____ 10. The chance to get to know other people while on the job.

_____ 11. The degree to which I am fairly paid for what I contribute to this orchestra.

_____ 12. The amount of job security I have.

_____ 13. The overall quality of the management I receive in my work.

_____ 14. The amount of personal growth and development I get in doing this job.

APPENDIX E

Chronology of Events Leading to the Dissolution of the DSO

1986: Facing a $705,000 deficit, the Denver Symphony Association (DSA) studies bankruptcy. Mayor Frederico Pena offers a rental deferment for Boettcher Hall. Denver Symphony Orchestra (DSO) players are told to take a 20% pay cut or the organization will file for bankruptcy. The musicians agree to the cut. The Denver Partnership is created to build an endowment for the orchestra.

1987: $3.6 million is pledged to the Denver Partnership, with additional grant money given by IBM, the Gates Foundation, and others. The musicians agree to a 3-year contract. Philippe Entremont is named music director.

1988: A projected shortfall of $600,000 is announced in April. An agreement is reached with MCA to present summer concerts at Fidler's Green. The Denver City Council threatens to punish the orchestra for abandoning city-owned Red Rocks Ampitheater.

In September, the board announces that the cash shortage of $700,000 will force the organization to file for bankruptcy unless the musicians agree to reopen contract talks. The players refuse. A "Save-our-Symphony" drive raises $700,000 in two weeks and the season is saved. Mayor Pena forms a task force to examine the orchestra's problems. In November, voters approve the establishment of the Cultural Facilities District, creating a new source of funds. DSA board chairman Robert E. Lee resigns.

1989: In January, the mayor's task force issues its report, calling for wide-ranging changes in the structure and marketing of the orchestra. Etremont resigns, as does executive director, Chris Dunworth. Sheila Bisenius is named interim executive director, John Lowe is named board chairman.

March 20: Following a weekend fundraising campaign on KVOD radio, orchestra officials announce that the season will be curtailed the following week. On March 26, the final concert is played in Boettcher Hall.

April 12: The board announces plans for a "Comeback" season for 1989-90 with a budget of $1.5 million, including a 50% pay cut for the musicians. A series of "Symphony Sounding Board" public discussions is established. Negotiations to obtain forgiveness of $3.2 million of the orchestra's accumulated $4 million debt are begun.

August 4: DSO officials announce a $3.5 million, 21-week season to begin in January 1990, offering musicians an annual base salary of $11,000, based on forgiveness of the debts owed to the Denver City Council and the DSO Endowment Trust.

August 14: The musicians unanimously reject the proposed package of salary and benefits.

September 13: The Colorado Symphony Orchestra is voted into existence by a gathering of 50 musicians in Boettcher Hall.

October 12: The DSA votes unanimously to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.

December 21: The Cultural Facilities District Fund board votes to delay awarding approximately $400,000 in tax revenues to the bankrupt DSA in lieu of the completion of its reorganization.

1990: As the CSO continues to struggle for audiences, informal talks begin early in the year between orchestra officials and representatives of the DSA.

February 14: To encourage both sides in their reconciliation talks, Mayor Pena offers $300,000 to the CSO for free city concerts on the condition that discussions with the DSA continue.

May 1: A press conference is held announcing a merger of the DSA and CSO.

Source: Mark Schugold, "Back in Harmony," *The Rocky Mountain News*, May 6, 1990, p. 67.

Excerpts from Provisions of the Colorado Symphony Model

Source: CSO, 1990

The Colorado Symphony Association (CSA) has successfully established a unique orchestra model based on the dual foundation of a full partnership among musicians, trustees, staff and community volunteers and a commitment to prudent fiscal management. The nature of this model is presented in this document as a possible aid to other orchestras struggling with the current symphony orchestra environment.

The sections that follow highlight the key policies and operational practices which are employed to implement this new model of orchestra operations.

Section 2. Structure and Responsibilities

A. Corporate Structure. If viewed in the usual hierarchical format, the CSA appears similar to most American orchestras. There is a board of trustees, an administrative staff headed by an executive director, the musicians and a volunteer organization. Unlike most orchestras, however, this hierarchical model does not operate with the typical, unstable, "three-legged stool" model of separate groups: board and staff on one leg, musicians on another, and volunteers on yet another leg.

The CSA model is best described as an interconnected group of overlapping spheres of responsibility and influence. While each group has certain specific responsibilities, they all share in and contribute to the success of the orchestra. The necessary work for the maintenance and growth of the orchestra is not compartmentalized as in "your job/my job" areas, but rather tasks are assigned based on capability and interest.

B. Committee Structure. The CSA partnership is accomplished by structuring the various board committees with balanced representation from all sectors of the organization.

Committee	Composition	Responsibilities
Artistic .	6 musicians, 2 non-musician Trustees, Principal Conductor, Executive Director, and Artistic Director	Artistic strategy & direction Programming Musician personnel mgt. Guest artist selection
Marketing	33% each: musicians, trustees/ staff, and outside volunteers	Marketing strategy/direction Annual marketing plans Marketing goals/budget
Development	33% each: musicians, trustees/ staff, and outside volunteers	Dev. strategy & direction Annual dev. plans Dev. goals and budget

Public Affairs	33% each: musicians, trustees/ staff, and outside volunteers	Government relations strat. Oversight gov. actions that impact CSA Action plans
Nominating	33% musicians 67% trustees/staff	Board composition strategy Trustee nominations Trustee performance review

C. Artistic Committee. Because the Artistic Committee has assigned to it roles that are normally the responsibility of the traditional music director and/or administration, the committee has established sub-committees to carry out these duties and to broaden the participation by non-trustee musicians. The two key subcommittees and their duties are as follows:

Programming. This sub-committee is responsible for developing the first draft of each winter season's program and guest artist roster. The latter involves both guest conductors and soloists. In coordination with the Artistic, Marketing and Budget/Finance committees, a consensus emerges and a draft season is presented to both the orchestra and the Board for comment and reactions. After this input, the Artistic Committee finalizes the season and the budget and guest artist contracts are completed.

Personnel. This sub-committee has several key duties under the direction of the full committee, the guidance of the Board and Executive Director and the provisions of the Master Agreement. These duties include: 1) Establishing the process for and managing auditions, 2) Monitoring and coaching tenure track musicians, 3) Determining recommended tenure actions for Artistic Committee approval, 4) Monitoring tenured musician artistic proficiency levels. When problems arise, they develop remedial action including probation. Should the remedial action not correct the situation, termination action is developed and carried out, and 5) Developing or revising personnel policies.

Section 3. Operating Philosophy

A. Mission
The mission statement of the CSA is as follows: "To be Colorado's full-time, professional symphony orchestra organization, serving as the premier musical resource for the entertainment and enrichment of a broad public; to promote the highest level of musical arts, education, appreciation, performance, innovation, and musical support for Colorado's other artistic and cultural institutions."

B. Partnership Model
The major underpinning of the CSA is the partnership among musicians, trustees, staff, and the community. The foundation of this partnership is the belief that by sharing responsibility, authority, and commitment to the mission of the orchestra, ultimate success will be achieved by the players' willingness to accept fiscal responsibility in exchange for artistic control and self-governance. Inherent in this partnership is the concept that the work and duties will be shared and those with particular skills will apply them to accomplish tasks necessary for success. This concept also recognizes the worth of all tasks needing to be done

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and to give value and recognition to all who do the work. Different than many orchestras, this concept accepts that the administrative tasks such as marketing, fundraising, planning, and office administration, cannot only be done, but done effectively by musicians.

Section 4. Operating Processes

While structurally and legally the CSA looks similar to other American orchestras, its operating processes are far different. These differences reflect the partnership model and the concept of the CSA being the musicians' orchestra. Four examples are briefly described here to illustrate how this works in practice:

A. **Master Agreement.** The Master Agreement serves to establish and maintain effective operating procedures. The contract, however, is not viewed as a straitjacket but rather a working agreement covering work rules and procedures. Because it is a mutually determined document, its changes and updates are no longer "negotiated" in the traditional manner.

B. **Budget Process.** The mechanical preparation of the annual CSA budget is not different than any other budget process. However, the CSA's budget process relates to a set of very constrained financial parameters. This includes: 1) Bylaws prohibit debt. Cannot have line of credit or borrow from endowment funds; 2) All subscription income must be escrowed until performances completed; 3) Bylaws require each budget year to be balanced and debt free; 4) Financial statements on cash basis with positive cash flow at all times; and 5) Musicians' compensation augmented by a significant bonus pool. In addition, the process used to develop each year's operating budget involves musicians and trustees throughout the process.

C. **Principal Conductor Selection.** In the CSA's shared responsibility model, a key action is the selection of the principal conductor (the first selection began in 1991 and competed in March 1993). The orchestra votes on final candidates deemed acceptable and ranks their choices. The Board reviews the results of interviews, contract discussions, and the orchestra's choice. Based on this information and the recommendation of the musician trustees, the Board votes their approval of the top candidate.

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APPENDIX G ·

Emails Exchanges with Key Members of the Colorado Symphony Orchestra

---------- Forwarded message ----------

RE: An artistic leader speaks out about the problems he sees

Date: Sun, 22 Jun 1997 00:41:04 -0400 (EDT)
From: AssociateConductor@aol.com
To: symph@wjh.harvard.edu
Subject: CSO report

Dear Erin

I see two major problems in the organization that you didn't point out. One is that artistic satisfaction does not play a role in the board's activities, while artistic satisfaction is a priority for the bulk of the musicians. The lay board members control the board. This board engaged the most recent executive director, just now forced to resign, who had never attended an entire classical symphony concert in his life (and didn't bother to break with this tradition during his two-year tenure at the helm of the CSO). With the complete backing of the board, he took the orchestra on an income-earning track that ignored the basic artistic interests of the bulk of the musicians, and partly as a consequence the morale after the recent contract negotiations plummeted to an all-time low in my experience there. Of course more of the younger, stronger players are interested in auditioning for other orchestras. Also, major financial support for orchestras seems to come from wealthy people with a burning passion for music, and until the board embraces such people--if they exist in Denver--I don't hold out great hopes for the needed endowment funding...

Unfortunately [the E.D.'s] tenure was an extremely contentious one that ruptured relationships within and without the orchestra which may take years to repair.

Second, most musicians are interested in playing their instruments or in being with their families. The committees take an extraordinary amount of time and effort, for no additional compensation. They tend to attract people who want something for their efforts, and that something is power. As a result, many decisions are made not in the long-term interests of building a stronger organization but in the short-term interests of maintaining power where it lies. I'm not sure what the answer is, but maybe the other self-governing orchestras have a better handle on this.

Another minor problem is that areas of responsibility are not clearly defined. I sat in on numerous artistic committee meetings, and was regularly appalled at the amount of time spent deciding on issues that were brought to the committee but were clearly by any standard of reasoning not in its purview.

Anyway, good luck. Your work is fascinating, and if I can ever be of any assistance please don't hesitate to call on me.

RE: Frustrations of the Democratic System from a trustee and the music director

Date: Mon, 08 Dec 1997 18:56:23 -0500 (EST)
From: A trustee
To: Erin Lehman <symph@wjh.harvard.edu>
Subject: CSO

... After the formalities, we got down to discussing the CSO and its organization and the four of us agreed that it was the most frustrating organizational structure with which we had ever worked. It was totally inefficient, couldn't make timely decisions and often made wrong decisions. [xxxx]'s further view was that in reality, many symphonies had better participation by the musicians than this orchestra. It was felt that one of the fundamental problems was the artistic committee and that all committees had people that had no technical experience to allow them to make decisions pertinent to that committee. Responsibility was ill defined and no one was ever measured against the results. Big committees were grossly inefficient and often things that took five or six months should be resolved in less than one month.

So how do you like those comments? Be advised there was no alcoholic content served at the luncheon. Marin [the music director] basically felt her professional training, knowledge, experience, were not being utilized. She enumerated a number of experiences where clearly her involvement should have been critical. As I have mentioned this organization is like taking a pile of highly skilled engineers and trying to think they can run a very complex business. Another point that Marin made was that she felt the musicians were basically spending enormous amounts of time on committees and in reality the time and effort on perfecting their musical skills was being neglected. The question is what do we do now?

RE: Financial situation and needs of the Orchestra

Date: Fri, 09 Jan 1998 18:10:13 -0500 (EST)
From: A trust
To: Erin Lehman <symph@wjh.harvard.edu>

Marketing going well - tough season coming up. [The E.D.] asked for a hold on our meeting until he can figure out the other committees. (we may not meet again!)
The guideline for an endowment is it should be three times your revenue - ours is about 0.3. We must invest to turn this thing around or be damn lucky. Our sound-good financial principles would kill most any sane organization.

...The focus study said nothing encouraging - rugged competition, we are a nit (3%) of the entertainment market and that includes all tier 2, people think postively about the CSO and Marin but I think they are intimidated. A symphony is a symphony whether it is the Broomfield, Arapaho County, or the CSO. And on it goes.

Sales year to date remain on target but seats are now below last year so everything comes from the price increase - still 60 to 65% of capacity. We are clearly over supplied and don't have the $$$ to stimulate the demand.

Until I have an endowment ... I am nothing. I want a deadly realistic operating plan that shows with an endowment that reaches $15 million in three years I can build a sustainable operation. I peddle that that until I get the commitments/pledges that says its a go plan. I can sell it because I have great people assets -an orchestra that is good and will play ball until I'm funded—an excellent music director and executive director, and a good staff. I have a good product that Denver needs. I change my programs to have them more customer friendly and until I can run at 80% of capacity, I cut the number of performances.

All those positive cash, always a profit, no debt, escrowing ticket revenue, a secret little endowment, a modified accounting system - all that stuff goes.
I sell symphonic music - a great experience - not some tombstone ad for a
concert 90% have never heard of. I sell business why it is essential to support
a symphony and expect 25% of ticket sales to come from those guys that support
the Broncos, etc.
You know why it could work because it works with my high tech companies and its
more rugged in that arena. You know why it won't work -- some on the board - and an
industry that doesn't want to compete for the entertainment $$.
Why did you ask such a question and ruin my day. Regards

P.S. Do you have $15 mil?
P.P.S. New theory about your symphony industry: 2/3 of all problems are self-inflicted - whereas it's maybe 20% in other industries!

RE: Stakeholder needs from the players' perspective

Date: Wed, 23 Sep 1998 17:39:58 -0600 (MDT)
From: A musician
To: Erin Lehman <symph@wjh.harvard.edu>
Subject: Re: what's new

Hi Erin.... The piece here that seems to be tangling us up, (and I speak on a much smaller scale, just orchestra, and CSO at that), comes down to the basic compilation of the various stakeholder needs and traditional areas of dominance, and how to forge something which is not so threatening. I'm sure it's much like any other vocation would be in this way, that people are locked into certain roles and it is very scary to jar those. I think sometimes the people who have the least control are the most difficult to convince. I guess the answers are obvious, all the learned helplessness stuff, ad nauseum, but it is impressive to see the same principles getting played out in front of my face. This is of course only one piece of our situation, because we also now have leadership which is not inclined to share authority. This combined with folk who are comfortable in an older model presents us rebels out here with quite a challenge. Enough of my rambling. Would be curious to see how you would maybe define some of these issues in a more academic way which could be generalized to the industry and

even looking at the cultural/historical factors which force change. Usually economic, right?? I suspect that will ultimately be the driving force in any significant change in the structure of symphony orchestras. Sorry to blither on.

RE: The need for change is clear, but where is the leadership?

Date: Sat, 23 Jan 1999 18:12:52 -0500 (EST)
From: A trustee
To: Erin Lehman <symph@wjh.harvard.edu>
Subject: Re: Happy New Year?

Sales of seats flat or slightly down at CSO -- Are we unique or are others seeing the same thing???

On Strategic Planning Steering Committee - another committee!!! - deep down the purpose seems to be: should we make -evolve- some changes in our structure? Interesting survey of the Trustees - organization cumbersome – highest priorities are endowment and salaries but board keeps saying now is not the time - no I wasn't in the survey group.

I don't know whether it's this committee organization but the executive directors become frustrated and they start moving without the committees and then in comes tension. The decision making paths are sure long particularly when artistic controls or so much and is a cumbersome group primarily of musicians.

Having been a part of three current HBS cases - Pepperidge Farm, Amdahl and MCI. I too am contemplating a case study so watch out.
Mine would probably be only three or four pages of narrative and about six exhibits. How super good intentions but a lack of realism in sizing revenue markets for both audience and endowment and development dollars can be critical. Along with how high sounding but crazy financial objectives play havoc. Maybe a little on the need of leadership regardless of organization.

Appendix H: Grant Application

Another perspective on the organization's situation is taken from a recent grant

application (CSO, 1999b). It reads as follows:

Dear Sirs:

After broad consultation within the orchestra and across the organization, The Colorado Symphony Association, welcomes the opportunity to submit the enclosed "Case Statement" for your consideration.

As you probably are well aware, our Association is unusual, if not unique, among American orchestras. Like the Kansas City Symphony, we have at the podium a highly-accomplished maestra who is leading us in an exciting new musical direction. With Marin, we are dedicated to artistic excellence and advancing the field. We also have an enviable track record of working collaboratively as an organization, both internally and externally. Indeed, we were the first American symphony orchestra to break ranks with the conventional organizational form, unleashing our musicians and staff to work in more engaging and effective ways as a team, and with our audiences and the communities we serve. In essence, we have forged a new pathway, which is finally catching on now, ten years later.

The CSA has come to a critical turning point in its ten-year history. We are at a juncture where the [this grant] could make a significant difference to the artistic work we have already begun and the cultural change that has already taken root throughout the organization. We have come a very long way, but there is more to be done. The CSA is actively engaged in change processes, but we need help. An intervention of the sort that [your program] offers would be the exact kind of assistance the CSA needs to make another strategic leap forward.

....

Under the musical leadership of maestra, Marin Alsop, the CSA has developed a growing musical reputation. For example, we have repeatedly been recognized by ASCAP for our adventuresome programming of living composers and we have developed a special and significant relationship with our community and other cultural organizations through various on-going collaborations. Our own internal organization has been built on cooperation and collaboration, which has deepened the sense of commitment that all staff, players and trustees share.

Despite this artistic, community, and organizational success, the CSA continues to be held back by our financial situation. Although we have achieved an enviable level of fiscal stability and a greater sense of ownership (from our special by-law features), operating under stringent financial rules (no debt, no borrowing, and balanced year-end budgets) has not allowed us to take all the artistic risks we'd like, nor has it lined the pockets of our players very well.

Right now, we are mid-stream in a long-term strategic planning process through which we are inspecting each aspect of our organization and trying to figure out the best approach to further strengthening our artistic program, streamlining our operations, and leveraging our community and financial position.

This would be an ideal time to engage in a discussion with others to determine how we might improve upon what we are already doing in the six aspects outlined in your letter, i.e.:

> --further strengthening leadership at all levels within the CSA;
> --further integrating our artistic and institutional planning;
> --further improving our coordinated programming across all activities of the CSA;
> --enhancing our already lively and diversified work environment;
> --further institutionalizing our commitment to a collaborative organizational
>   climate; and,
> --deepening and further extending our strong bonds with the community.

Although the CSA is fiscally sound, we are seriously undercapitalized. Nevertheless, we remain committed to enlivening the presentation of the classical repertoire and advocating the work of living composers; significant employment of professional musicians (i.e., 79 musicians, 42 week season, 290+ services), particularly up-and-coming young musicians; and, ongoing-daresay relentless---discussion of artistic issues and emerging ideas about the orchestra's special role in the fast-growing Greater Denver community.

Convergence of Critical Issues: Our [critical issues are these]: how can we build our organizational and leadership capacity to deal with the pressing issues that we, at the CSA are grappling with, as well as, to help to advance the entire field in the process? How can we create an environment of continuous organizational learning in these kinds of performing arts organizations? How can we be more flexible and responsive to the audience, the community, and the orchestra itself, as we seek to adapt to the changing needs of the 21st century? These are heavy questions of great import. They cannot be answered in isolation.

CSA Governance Structure Study Group

Report 3/20/99

The Governance Structure Study Group "(GSSG") met once since out last meeting. A second meeting was scheduled but postponed due to last minute scheduling conflicts. A second meeting will be scheduled at the conclusion of this meeting.

The agenda for the first meeting included:

1. History of the Partnership Model
2. Determining it's Key Elements
3. Understanding the Key Elements
4. Relationship of Key Elements to Maintenance, Stability and Growth of CSA
5. Discussion of Strengths & Weakness of Key Elements in the future of the CSA
6. Ranking Importance of Key Elements in the Partnership Model
7. Review and recommend any Bylaw changes required to clarify or alter understanding of Partnership Model

History: Document search and personal recollections indicate the Partnership Model is the second stage in development of the CSO. The first stage was a musician cooperative without community involvement.

Key Elements: Document search and discussion reveal two categories of Key Elements – Statutory and Cultural (unwritten, but very powerful, nonetheless.)

<u>Statutory</u>:

1. Strong Musician Voice in Governance
   1.1. $1/3^{rd}$ of Term Trustees elected by orchestra musicians <u>from</u> orchestra musicians
   1.2. $1/3^{rd}$ of Board Committee membership to be musician trustees
2. Dominant Musician Role in Determination of Musical Product Offerings through the Artistic Committee
3. Dominant Musician Role in Musical Personnel Decisions
   3.1. Musician Tenure Decisions
   3.2. Musician Probation Decisions
   3.3. Musician Termination Decisions
4. Music Director engagement, supervision and termination decisions (Artistic Committee, while lacking absolute authority here, strongly influences outcomes.)
5. Engagement, supervision of and termination authority over Artistic Administrator position
6. Internal Contract [Master Agreement detailing terms and conditions of collective musicians employment] Review process to determine future terms and conditions
7. Association Fiscal Policy

7.1. No debt

7.2. No borrowing

7.3. Each discreet fiscal year must end in "The Black."

7.4. Advance <u>subscription</u> sales must be escrowed until event occurs

8. Musicians (and administrative staff) agreement to forego salary to assure minimum of fiscal year balanced budget

    8.1. 75% of fiscal year surpluses distributed as bonuses

9. "Firm Guideline" committing 50% of budget to Musician salary and taxes (this guideline specifically excludes from the calculation any benefits, such as medical or other insurance, provided musicians as part of their total compensation.)

10. Annual Budget Approval by the musicians of the orchestra prior to Trustee approval

Cultural

1. Musician input on decisions

    1.1. "Decisions are not made in a void – without musicians' input"

2. Inclusion

3. Trust

4. Respect

5. Communication

Discussion: During the remainder of the meeting a wide-ranging discussion ensued on a variety of related subjects. One member of the group opined that musician trustees have become isolated from the body of the orchestra – have become surrogate "them" in the "us" vs. "them" calculus of organizational dynamics.

Another member observed a general division in the orchestra between those present during the hard times and transition from the DSO to the CSO and those newer members of the CSO who do not share that experience.

A discussion on communication indicated that full Orchestra meetings are poorly attended and that, perhaps, future contracts should include a provision for mandatory periodic meetings. Someone observed this had existed but failed because the meetings did not have agendas and were believed to be a waste of time.

Next Steps: As meeting time expired, Bacchetti suggested there be another meeting at which the **Key Elements** be reviewed, ranked in importance, weighed regarding their pluses/minuses and *contribution or detriment to organizational* stability and growth. From this discussion will come recommendations to adjustments.

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APPENDIX J

Orpheus's Season Schedule, 1997-1998

1997

September 18	Easton, PA—(Martha Caplin, violin) 8pm
September 20	Montclair, NJ—(Martha Caplin, violin) 8pm
September 21	New York, NY—Riverside Church (Martha Caplin, violin) 3pm
October 16	Athens, GREECE – Chamber concert
October 18	Venice, ITALY – Chamber concert
October 20	Bratislava, SLOVAKIA – Chamber concert, 8pm
October 21	Madrid, SPAIN – Chamber concert, 7:30pm
October 23	Warsaw, POLAND – Chamber concert, 7:30pm
November 1	Amherst, MA—(Milagro Vargas, mezzo-soprano) 8pm
November 4	Easton, PA—(Milagro Vargas, mezzo-soprano) 8pm
November 8	New York, NY—Carnegie Hall (Ann Sophie von Otter, mezzo-soprano) 8pm
November 17	Hartford, CT—(Richard Goode, piano) 8pm
November 19	Ann Arbor, MI—(Richard Goode, piano) 8pm
November 20	Ithaca, NY—(Richard Goode, piano) 8pm
November 23	Boston, MA—(Richard Goode, piano) 3pm
November 24	New York, NY—Carnegie Hall, (Richard Goode) 8pm
November 30	Chicago, IL—(Richard Goode, piano) 3pm
December 1	New York, NY—Carnegie Hall (La Fenice Benefit) 8pm
December 3-4	RECORDING (Richard Goode, piano)
December 7	New York, NY—Riverside Church (Charles Rosen, piano) 3pm
December 13	Montclair, NJ—(Charles Rosen, piano) 8pm

1998

January 11-27	East Asia tour—(Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Seoul, Taejon)
February 13	Purchase, NY—(Martha Caplin, violin) 8pm
March 7	New York, NY—Carnegie Hall (Bruno Gelber, piano) 8pm
March 13	Purchase, NY—(Benita Valente, soprano) 8pm
March 14	Toronto, ONTARIO—(Benita Valente, soprano) 8pm
March 15	New York, NY—Riverside Church (Benita Valente, soprano) 3pm
March 16	Lexington, VA—(Benita Valente, soprano) 8pm
March 17	Richmond, VA—(Benita Valente, soprano) 8pm
March 21	Montclair, NJ—(Benita Valente, soprano) 8pm
March 27	Winston-Salem, NC—(Richard Goode, piano) 8pm
March 29	Washington, DC—(Richard Goode, piano) 3pm
March 31	San Francisco, CA—(Richard Goode, piano) 8pm
April 1	Costa Mesa, CA—(Richard Goode, piano) 8pm
April 3	Kansas City, MO—(Richard Goode, piano) 8pm
April 4	Atlanta, GA—(Richard Goode, piano) 8pm
April 29	Easton, PA—(Chris Gekker, trumpet) 8pm
May 1	Purchase, NY—(Gideon Kremer, violin) 8pm
May 2	New York, NY—Carnegie Hall (Gideon Kremer, violin) 8pm
May 11-24	Ljubljana, SLOVENIA, Graz, AUSTRIA, Vienna, AUSTRIA (Ann Sophie von Otter, mezzo-soprano), Prague, CZECH REPUBLIC, Bratislava, SLOVAKIA, Amsterdam, NETHERLANDS (private), Frankfurt, GERMANY (private), Paris, FRANCE, Rome, ITALY, and Seville, SPAIN.
August 18-September 4	European Tour with Richard Goode, piano (Edinburgh, London, Stresa, Lucerne, San Sebastian, Sanfander)

APPENDIX K

Orpheus's Revised Vision Statement and
Special Committee Recommendations

Vision: Orpheus aspires to create a music making community, built on mutual respect and a belief in the innate creativity of each individual, where the membership is both able to be and encouraged to be as creative as possible and can devote themselves to the highest possible artistic achievement. Orpheus aspires to create music that is so thoroughly and thoughtfully wrought that no person who hears it or has an opportunity to interact with Orpheus musicians in any way can fail to be moved by the beauty, energy and sincerity of their music. The members actively seek to identify and maximize the best qualities in each other in such a way as to maximize each member's contribution and their sense of fulfillment.

Mission: Orpheus aspires to establish a permanent home in which to continue to develop its audience and to develop its creative potential. Further, Orpheus seeks to become a permanent fixture on the musical landscape, to make a lasting contribution to the performance of classical music and to pass on the acquired and accumulated knowledge and experience of its membership to future generations of performers.

Basic Tenets: All members are equally important to the achievement of both a successful musical result and a successful career path. While members may have different strengths and may therefore exercise leadership in different areas, the direct involvement of all members is essential to the well-being of the organization.

All members share equally in the responsibilities of their section. All members are willing to serve both as principal players and as secondary players.

All members and guests are compensated equally for all rehearsal and performance activity. Extra work and extra responsibility (e.g., Executive Committee, Librarian, etc.) can be compensated with extra pay, but at no time should this be misconstrued to suggest an elevated level of importance.

Mutual respect and rules of civility must exist at all times at all levels of the organization. Everyone is subject to review and no one is above criticism, and criticism must always take place from within the context of respect.

Source: Orpheus records, November, 1998.

Orpheus Chamber Orchestra

Special Committee Recommendations

(December, 1998)

Introduction

This committee was initially formed to provide a means for musicians to be able to address matters of their concern directly to the Board of Directors and to discuss possible solutions, structural and procedural. The initial meetings brought forth specific areas of concern and dissatisfaction by the Orchestra as represented by their elected Core Directors. It was immediately determined that the convergence of issues, including the extremely serious financial status of the organization, would compel this committee to address broad organizational structural issues that involved all three elements of the organization; the Administration, the Board, and the Orchestra. The concerns for "getting out of a continual crisis mode," frustrations over lack of communications, perceptions of unilateral decisions being made without appropriate input or due diligence, feelings of potential "artistic stagnation" and lack of control over administrative operations, Artistic Vision, mission and destiny, now had far more dire implications.

What follows is a compilation of recommendations, suggestions and thoughts arrived at by this committee through an exhaustive study of meetings conducted with the Core Directors, the President, the Vice President, and board members. This committee has reviewed the issues raised by them and believes that certain actions by the organization in its entirety will contribute to a more efficient and error free operation of Orpheus and at the same time constitute a basis for seeking the necessary moral and financial support that the organization would require in the coming months and years.

The committee makes these recommendations and suggestions with progressive aspirations, so that the Orpheus Chamber Orchestra is not only satisfied with the laurels of extraordinary creative achievements gained in its first quarter century, but so that their creative achievements continue to surpass all expectations, to ensure and enhance its stellar position forever in the annals of music history.

Although substantial recommendations and suggestions are made in this report, it is the intent of this committee to improve matters. It has not been a goal of this committee to be critical, nor assign past blame, nor suggest every mechanism for future operations. The committee has accepted as genuine, statements made by the Core Directors and those in the Administration. Therefore, central in its consideration has been the Orchestra's desire to actively participate in a broad range of substantial issues. It is the hope of this committee that with these recommendations and suggestions that all participants' energies can be refocused, re-energized, and that the responsibilities, specific roles, and methods for sanctioned authority become clearly defined.

We have directly listened to and heard from a great many of the concerned participants. The committee members were tremendously impressed with every single person's dedication to Orpheus and only regret the inability to express sufficiently the remarkable devotion and love for Orpheus that was witnessed.

PREMISES

A need for structural changes in all three elements: the Administration, the Board, and the Orchestra, in order for Orpheus to progress artistically and, correspondingly, financially.

Implementation of a system of checks and balances whereby operational assessments can be made prudently and unilateral decisions concerning matters of great import to Orpheus cannot be made by any one individual.

Implementation of a system for shared responsibilities, utilizing the knowledge, expertise and functions of available personnel and resources appropriately.

Implementation of a system that provides for an equitable participation in officially sanctioned dialogue between all three elements, with each element representing its own responsibilities judiciously and considering fairly the mandated capacities of others.

A clear delineation of the responsibilities of each element to each other and to the entity as a whole, based on the acknowledgement that:

The Orchestra is entrusted with the Artistic Responsibility of maintaining Orpheus standards of excellence and of developing and carrying out the Vision and Mission; and,

The Administration is entrusted with the operational and business responsibility for the enactment of the Vision and Mission; and,

The Board is entrusted with the legal, fiduciary and business management advisory responsibilities in context with the overall governance of the organization.

Acknowledging that mutual trust and confidence must be reinforced, and in certain situations built or re-built.

Acknowledging that critical to success is for everyone involved to abide by the system and procedures ultimately endorsed by the organization.

Acknowledging that the central motivating force for everyone is the dedication to and belief in the Vision and Mission, as created by the Orchestra and endorsed by the Board and the Administration.

Acknowledging that all three elements are to conduct their responsibilities steered by the central Orphean precept and creed of community, collaboration, and consensus.

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BASIC GOALS

1. Musicians to carry the mantle and responsibility for the Artistic Vision, Mission and Integrity.

2. The Board to enforce their governance responsibility in a much more resolute and regular manner, along with their legal and fiduciary responsibilities.

3. The Administration to be re-organized to function more efficiently with a reporting system conducive to the procedures of checks and balances being installed.

4. Musicians to become participants in all aspects of the organization in an unprecedented manner.

5. Julian Fifer to be liberated from the responsibilities of daily administration to be able to concentrate on the research and development of new initiatives, ideas and
the marketing, economic growth and future developments of the Orchestra.

6. To reduce the log jams in the Board, the Administration and the Orchestra, so that the extraordinary resources of the organization can be aptly applied to yield the desired artistic and organizational development results.

BASIC RECOMMENDATIONS

That three musicians be elected by their peers to serve on the Board of Directors and simultaneously on the Executive Committee of the Orchestra.

That the President, Julian Fifer, be elected to serve on the Board of Directors.

That the titles, responsibilities, and positions of President, Chief Operating Officer and Chief Financial Officer shall not be held by the same or any one person.

That the President's office is able to devote requisite time as the New Initiative and Marketing Office, with the responsibility in financial growth, development and marketing, and to provide due diligence to all new ideas, initiatives, opportunities and activities, both financial and artistic, for the long term.

That the Vice President, Norma Hurlburt, become the Executive Director and Chief Operating Officer, with the principal responsibility to administer the daily and near term operations.

That a system of checks and balances be put in place to evaluate and regulate issues so that unilateral decisions cannot be made.

That an Executive Committee of the Board be created with the specific responsibility to monitor the business and affairs of the Company and to review the efficacy of the administration and its executives.

That a Planning Committee of the Board consist of or include a total of 6 members: 2 from the Board (including one person to chair this committee), 2 from the Administration (the President and Executive Director), and 2 from the Orchestra general membership.

That the Planning Committee becomes the joint forum to evaluate and then recommend to the Board all matters of artistic engagement including goals, plans, and initiatives.

That the Board of Directors consider renaming the Finance Committee to the Finance and Audit Committee, with the added governance responsibility to review and oversee audit and internal controls of the Company.

That the Board of Directors consider renaming the Development Committee to the Development and Marketing Committee with the added responsibility to resolutely become involved in marketing concerns.

That the Board of Directors consider renaming the Nominating Committee to the Nominations and Governance Committee, with the added governance responsibility to consider matters related to corporate and board governance.

That a musician board member be appointed by the Board chairperson to serve on the Finance and Audit Committee.

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That a musician board member be appointed by the Board chairperson to serve on the Development and Marketing Committee.

That 2 orchestra members be elected by their peers to serve on the Planning Committee.

That the Orchestra open up their membership to additional musicians by expanding their general membership to comprise two tiers referred to as tenured members and members.

That the Executive Committee of the Orchestra be reformed, strengthened, and empowered with substantial additional responsibilities and authority.

That the Board of Directors consider engaging, for a limited term, a highly regarded Special Consultant, specializing in the field of orchestra management, to provide professional advice on matters of major orchestra management and operations.

APPENDIX L

Milestones: The Berlin Philharmonic: 1882-2002[2]

1882: The orchestra was founded just as Berlin was becoming recognized as the capital of the Wilhelmine German Empire. It was started by a group of players not happy with the terms of the Bilse Orchestra in which they played. So they decided to form their own orchestra republic.

The radical nature of the musicians' decision to start their own enterprise must be emphasized. By deigning to form a democratic organization in a most unrepublican period in world history, the orchestra had created an anomaly. Moreover, as with many entrepreneurial undertakings, the newly-formed "Philharmonic Orchestra (formerly Bilse Orchestra)," as they called themselves, was not free from strife. "It staggered from one crisis to another and one never knew if it would survive." However, in time and with the instrumental help of a local impresario, Hermann Wolff, and his wife Louisa, the orchestra found success. It was Wolff's concert agency that was responsible not only for helping the nascent ensemble with concert dates, but also for discovering conductors for the group, and soliciting private contributions to help the "Philharmonic ship" stay afloat. Except for a brief period when a Philharmonic Society was established to generate dues and donations, the Philharmonic Orchestra depended on ticket sales and tours to make ends meet.

1931: Wilhelm Furtwangler became the orchestra's music director. He would be at the helm for 32 years and through the most difficult periods in the orchestra's history.

It was said that Furtwangler (who also had been proposed to the orchestra by the Wolff Concert Agency) took over the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra at a time of great change. Furtwangler's tenure at the Berlin Philharmonic would indeed witness the clash between tradition and revolution: it coincided with the "Golden" '20s, the Depression of the '30s, and, inevitably, the politics of Nazi Germany and its aftermath. His original aim was to focus on his musical ideals, but Furtwangler ended up being drawn into the turmoil of this period and into numerous battles to keep the orchestra alive and intact. Furtwangler accomplished his artistic goals and much more during his 32-year tenure as chief conductor. By the end of his life in 1954, the orchestra was a superb ensemble, one which played with great intensity and emotion.

1933: The orchestra is nationalized during the Nazi era.

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[2]This exhibit is excerpted from Stresemann (1979).

1952: The orchestra becomes a department of the Berlin Senate.

Although the musicians continue to vote on their own decisions, those decisions must be accepted by the Senator for Culture. The Vorstand, on behalf of the orchestra, must negotiate with the Senator for Culture who represents the Berlin government---for player salaries, contracts, number of musicians, and their choices of music director and Intendant. (The orchestra's status as a department of the Berlin Senate became a pivotal issue in 1999-2000.)

1954: Herbert von Karajan succeeds Furtwangler and reinforces the notion of "music director for life".

It is difficult to encapsulate in just a few paragraphs the lengthy and legendary "marriage" between Karajan and the Berlin Philharmonic (volumes have been written about the man and the subject). One thing was indisputable: Karajan brought the orchestra to a level of artistic excellence, fame, and fortune--especially in their early partnership--that few other orchestras could ever rival. They had critical acclaim, hundreds of recordings, films, TV broadcasts, international tours, the Salzburg Easter and Summer Festivals, the Pfingsten and Berlin Festivals, and increasingly generous incomes. The relationship between Karajan and the orchestra was summarized by one insider this way: "The orchestra was always together then. If they weren't performing, they were recording with Karajan. It was the glue that held them together. It was a very close and intense relationship."

1989: Herbert von Karajan steps down from the orchestra (and later that year dies).
　　　　Claudio Abbado is voted by the players to succeed Karajan.
　　　　The Berlin Wall falls that same auspicious year.

2002: Music Director Claudio Abbado is succeeded by Sir Simon Rattle.

Source: BPhO Records.

APPENDIX M

LSO Player Contract, Sample from 1993-94

13 September 1993

Dear

  I have great pleasure in conveying to you the Board's decision to offer you Full Membership of the London Symphony Orchestra as a (*position and section filled in here*). This appointment will commence on (*date*).

  The following details and conditions of membership will apply:-

1. Your fees will be as follows:-

      Concert: £
      Rehearsal: £
      Classical Gramophone Recording Session: £

2. You will be entitled to four weeks holiday pay per annum if, during the preceding year, you have accepted 85% of the work offered to you. The Orchestra has recently established fixed holiday periods for which levels of holiday pay will relate to weekly earnings. The current rate is £   per week.

  The holiday periods for 1993/94 will be:

      Summer 1993   17th August - 7th September (to be confirmed)
      Christmas 1993 Dates to be confirmed (1 week)

  For the year ending 31st March 1993, your holiday payments will be worked out proportionally from the date of your commencement. This will be one weeks holiday pay in your case.

  The Board has not yet discussed holiday pay eligibility in relation to a member's acceptance of work offered, but I felt it would be useful for you to know what the rules were in the past and I shall inform you of any changes the Board makes when the matter is discussed, in the very near future.

Holiday pay eligibility was reduced in accordance with a sliding scale if a member accepted a lower percentage of the work offered to him or her during the preceding year.

Acceptance of work	Entitlement to holiday pay
85-100%	4 weeks
75-84%.	3 weeks
65-74%	2 weeks
60-64%	1 week
Below 60%	Nil

For the year ending 31st March 1994, your holiday payments will be worked out proportionally from the date of your commencement.

3. Your membership will be subject to the Rules and Regulations for Performing and Associated Members, incorporating the relevant Articles of Association, issued by the Board and dated 5th September 1974, and is also subject to release procedures as laid down from time to time by the Board of Directors. The Board expects all members to perform in at least 85% of the major London concerts which are subsidised by the Arts Council.

    All release requests have to be accompanied by a completed release form and given to the Personnel Manager. The Release Committee's decision on this is final.

4. You will be expected to join the Ronald Moore Sickness and Benevolent Association of the London Symphony Orchestra. The Secretary, Mr. Jonathan Vaughan, will be pleased to give you further details.

5. As a member of the Orchestra, you will be required to purchase ten LSO shares for the sum of £40.

6. Membership is offered on the understanding that you are not, and will not become, a Full or Associate Member of any other symphony orchestra, or enter into a similar relationship, however described, with any other symphony orchestra, during the currency of this agreement.

7. You will be invited to join the Orchestra's private health insurance scheme, currently with Western Provident Association Ltd. Mr. Bruce Campbell will be pleased to give you further details of this.

8. The Orchestra will pay for your (instrument) to be insured worldwide with British Reserve Insurance. Mr. Andrew Pollock will discuss this with you.

9. As agreed by a unanimous vote of the players, each member of the Orchestra will be asked to covenant one Barbican concert fee per year to the LSO Endowment Trust. We will assume that signature of this letter indicates your agreement to this.

10. This agreement, if accepted by you, will be subject to three months notice, in writing, on either side.

I very much hope that you will accept this offer, and that your association with the London Symphony Orchestra will be long, happy and rewarding. I would also very much like to take this opportunity to congratulate you most sincerely on becoming a member of the Orchestra.

I should be grateful if you would confirm your acceptance of this agreement by signing and dating the enclosed copy of this letter and returning it to me.

With my very best wishes.

Yours sincerely,

John Lawley
Chairman

Signed ....

Dated ....

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APPENDIX N

Excerpt from Draft of Stabilisation Funding Strategy

1. **LSO Mission statement:**

The LSO's purpose is to perform, record and promote the appreciation and understanding of and participation in music, through a constantly developing orchestra of the highest international standard and reputation, dedicated to broadening the experience and enhancing the lives of the greatest possible number of people across every area of society. All of the LSO's activities are governed by its equal opportunities policy and an uncompromising commitment to quality, innovation, challenge, variety, new work, education and access.

2. **Objectives of the LSO Stabilisation bid:**

2.1   Radically widen access to the LSO.
2.2   Further improve the quality of the LSO.
2.3   Enhance opportunities for LSO players to fulfil their creative potential.
2.4   Develop greater long-term loyalty and increased attendance from the LSO's audience.
2.5   Enhance box office revenues.
2.6   Establish a realistic level of working capital for the LSO.

3. **Strategy for fulfilling the LSO Stabilisation bid objectives:**

3.1   Restructure the LSO non-Principal membership criteria, fee structures and holiday pay qualifications to enable the Orchestra to radically expand its education (*Discovery*) programme and provide the players with the opportunity to define the content and balance of their musical lives and fulfil their artistic potential (ref. 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3). This new structure should not only be judged on its ability to fulfil the current objectives of the Orchestra and players, but should also provide a template for the continual evolution of the LSO, ensuring the Orchestra is able to deliver a truly comprehensive, challenging and far-reaching education programme that provides access in the widest and most qualitative way and makes the LSO the natural home for top quality players who want education work to be a central part of their musical lives.

The issues that need to be addressed in creating such a structure are as follows:-

3.1.1   Membership agreements should ensure the LSO is able to attract and retain top quality players, including those who might not in the past have considered joining a symphony orchestra. To do this, the Orchestra has to provide the opportunity for its members to lead a varied and fulfilling musical life, which, as well as symphonic playing, might involve the LSO *Discovery* programme, chamber music, recitals, teaching, etc. The impact such membership criteria have had in attracting and keeping top quality international players has been fully demonstrated in recent years by the shared Principal positions in the LSO.

3.1.2   In order to radically expand the *Discovery* programme, *Discovery* projects need to be scheduled at the same time as LSO symphonic work, as well as in the gaps between symphonic work. Current fee structures and membership numbers substantially restrict *Discovery* project scheduling.

3.1.3   LSO *Discovery* work should be integrated into holiday pay qualification criteria, to ensure *Discovery* is treated as central to the LSO's mission.

3.1.4   The disincentive to undertake LSO *Discovery* work which exists under the current retainer system should be eliminated (see Appendix 1 - retainers).

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3.1.5   Section sizes should be dictated by a combination of individual players' ideal work patterns and the Board's wish to see only LSO members performing with the Orchestra.

3.1.6   The new terms of membership should ensure that the music continues to come first. Within the context of a greater overall flexibility, all work ties should still be rigorously adhered to.

3.1.7   There should be a minimum 50% symphonic commitment for membership, to ensure the Orchestra remains a homogenous musical body.

3.1.8   The new fee structures should be developed so that individual players can define the shape of their own working lives in parallel with serving the best musical interests of the Orchestra.

3.1.9   Current fee equalities and differential ratios should be maintained, although overall earnings will be determined by the total amount of work a player undertakes.

3.1.10   Any change of fee structure should ensure no player or group of players is worse off for the same workload.

3.1.11   Any new fee structure should provide for accurate and controlled budgeting, which is not always possible with the current retainer system.

3.1.12   Whilst allowing players more varied and flexible terms of membership, the new structure must enable the Orchestra to expand without the 'prohibitive increases in costs the current retainer fee system would ultimately impose.

3.1.13   Any new fee structure should reinforce the Orchestra's artistic policy, and encourage members to undertake the Orchestra's most important work - the main Barbican concerts, and tied tours and recordings.

3.1.14   The LSO's policy is that *Discovery* work should only be undertaken by players who are genuinely committed to it, so there should be no obligation on players to get involved in the *Discovery* programme.

3.2   Top quality transmission of sold-out LSO concerts into the Barbican foyer(s) (ref. 2.1).

As part of the LSO's strategy to radically widen access, the Orchestra is seeking to establish an agreement with BBC Television to transmit sold-out LSO concerts into the Barbican foyers with top quality sound and vision. This facility would also provide the opportunity to negotiate much wider access to LSO concerts, perhaps initially for hospitals and schools. In the longer term this will also provide the basis for more comprehensive broadcasting of LSO concerts, as new opportunities develop through the massive increase in television and radio channels and the development of the Internet.

3.3   We have investigated methods of developing greater loyalty and frequency of attendance from our audience by increasing the opportunities for involvement with, and access to the Orchestra (ref. 2.4 and 2.5). The broad concept is to make available to the LSO's entire concert-going audience (majority) those benefits currently reserved for Friends of the Orchestra (minority). Specific areas initially suggested at the Strategic Stocktake stage were the introduction of an LSO loyalty card, an LSO magazine and a personalised card-led LSO information line.

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