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**Inauthenticity and Self-Deception in Heidegger's Being and
Time in relation to psychotherapy**

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Abstract

This dissertation examines and clarifies Heidegger's contribution to our understanding of the important issues of self-deception and inauthenticity in psychotherapy. After some preliminary remarks on the concepts of inauthenticity and self-deception the first part of the dissertation explores Heidegger's fundamental ontology as detailed in Being and Time. Dasein's temporal nature and its relationship to death are considered in the context of the central concept of Care (*Sorge*) and its basic structures of thrownness (*Geworfenheit*), falling (*verfallen*) and existence (*Existenz*). This leads to a discussion of the existentials of disposition (*Befindlichkeit*), anxiety (*Angst*), understanding (*verstehen*) and discourse (*Rede*).

After this preliminary exposition Heidegger's views on inauthenticity (*Uneigentlichkeit*) and authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*) are explored, with a central focus on fallenness (*verfallen*) and its manifestations of idle talk (*Gerede*), curiosity (*Neugier*), ambiguity (*Zweideutigkeit*) and self-forgetting (*selbstvergessen*). Now the scene is set for an investigation of Heidegger's views on how inauthenticity is overcome and the notion of truth (*Wahrheit*), anxiety (*Angst*), call of conscience (*Gewissenruf*) and resoluteness (*Entschluss*) are studied in some detail. This leads to a description of authentic ways of being in a situation (*Situation*), being-towards-death (*Sein zum Tode*), the moment of vision (*Augenblick*) and repetition (*Wiederholung*).

A full summary of Heidegger's ideas is given before a critique is formulated in light of Sartre's views, Fingarette's contribution and Heidegger's later work. It emerges that there is no place for a theory of self-deception in Heidegger. His descriptions of inauthenticity and forgetting show untruth to be a matter of alienation (*Entfremdung*) and closing off (*verschliessen*) rather than a matter of deceit. The thesis shows the significance of this alternative point of view.

It is argued that Heidegger's objective for Dasein is to have vision, which means to be capable of both authentic, owned and engaged ways of existing as well as inauthentic, disowned and disengaged ways of existing. In final analysis the challenge of human existence for Heidegger is about being true to life rather than being true to self. Being true to life is inevitably about the equiprimordiality and equality of both inauthentic and authentic ways of being. To be loyal to existence therefore involves increasing transparency and openness to different modes of being. The thesis' original contribution is to show that this is a sound and new objective for existential psychotherapy. At the same time Sartre's and Fingarette's perspectives on self-deception highlight Heidegger's failure to address the issue of self-deception directly. This is shown to be due mostly to Heidegger's lack of focus on ontic issues, his refusal to consider a moral and ethical dimension to his work and his replacement of a theory of self with a description of Dasein's world relations. While this is in some ways a strength and an original position that allows us to view human existence from a new perspective, it leaves doubt about what Heidegger could have made of the ontic issues raised by applying his ideas in counselling and psychotherapy. The thesis takes Heidegger's ontological theory to a new, ontic dimension and a practical and concrete application.

Heidegger himself suggested in the Zollikon seminars that his thought should be so applied and the final part of the thesis is constituted by my published work, which has been dedicated to this project. The three books in which this application is described are enclosed together with the philosophical part of the dissertation and they are each briefly discussed in light of the argument about inauthenticity and self-deception. It is shown how the ontic realities of psychotherapy place new demands on Heidegger's thinking whilst Heidegger's thinking at the same time provides a challenging basis for therapeutic clarity about human existence.

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Foreword and acknowledgements

This dissertation has been written over a long period of time and is in effect the product of some thirty years of study and nearly twenty-five years of teaching Heidegger for University courses. I have taught Heidegger to psychotherapists, counsellors, social workers, youth workers, health professionals, teachers, managers, psychologists and psychiatrists, but never to philosophers. My discourse about Heidegger has therefore been rather different and certainly more pragmatic than that which is conventional in philosophical circles. My focus in teaching has been on what Heidegger has to say about the practical business of living. There is good evidence that Heidegger himself, as he got older, was increasingly concerned about having an impact on the real world and the way in which people experienced their lives. He was willing to respond to Medard Boss' invitation to hold the Zollikon seminars for young psychiatrists, because he had become convinced that psychotherapy was a valid realm for the practical application of his ideas. No longer content with an investigation of the ontological aspects of human being he had decided that there was an appropriate place to reflect on the ontic dimension as well.

This dissertation is based on a multidisciplinary approach and considers Heidegger's views on human being and in particular on the human tendency towards inauthenticity in as far as this is relevant to the practice of psychotherapy and the understanding of human nature in action. It has been difficult to find a middle ground between the careful and guarded exposition of the scholar and the preoccupation with the pragmatic considerations of the practitioner.

My hope is that I have found such a middle position, which does justice to both sides, although I realize that it will inevitably seem too philosophical to the

practitioner and too pragmatic to the Heidegger scholar. I can only defend myself against this criticism by re-asserting my original intention to write a cross-disciplinary thesis. It seems very controversial to combine ontological and ontic considerations but I have made every effort to do justice to both and to allow each to throw light on the other.

I have been made aware that the tone I have adopted is rather more didactic than may be usual for a doctoral thesis and this must be the by-product of having had to clarify and teach these topics to students unfamiliar with philosophy and initially wary of Heidegger's complexity for so many years. It is not easy to change one's tone after such a long time and I hope it does not detract from the careful work I have done to explicate Heidegger with due respect to the philosophical tradition within which he wrote. My intent has been to elucidate the contribution that Heidegger has made in relation to the important issues of self-deception and inauthenticity and to provide an intelligible guide for the therapeutic practitioner who is struggling with such questions.

The research has been a very active and live one, since my investigations have been continuously directed and illuminated by the questions of my students and trainees and by my own therapeutic work with my clients. Psychotherapists have debated the questions addressed in this dissertation for many decades. The answers they have come up with have not been satisfactory. It is my hope that Heidegger's search will provide new clarifications and directions. My research has been extremely challenging for a variety of personal, professional and academic reasons and I sincerely hope that it will not have been in vain and may be of use to future generations of practitioners.

I would like to acknowledge the meticulous philosophical guidance provided by my supervisor Dr. Alfons Grieder, who has commented carefully on many drafts

of the text and who has taught me to stick to Heidegger's actual words when I was inclined to rush into interpretation and application.

I would also like to thank the senior staff members at City University who have encouraged me to resubmit this dissertation and who have created the conditions that made it possible for me to do so without too much loss of face.

Finally I want to express my gratitude to my husband Digby Tantam who has never lost faith in my work and who has supported me through thick and thin in completing this dissertation.

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Introduction.

Why study Heidegger's view of inauthenticity and self-deception in relation to psychotherapy?

1. Self-deception and psychotherapy.

Plato said in his *Cratylus*:

'There is nothing worse than self-deception-when the deceiver is at home and always with you'
(Plato, *Cratylus* 428d)

Self-deception is a severe obstacle to the success of psychotherapy, since it is difficult to overcome the deceit that people maintain in relation to themselves. In some cases it is even difficult to know whether or not people are deceiving themselves or not. In most cases it is equally difficult for the therapist to know whether or not she is herself in a state of self-deception or inauthenticity. In order to truly understand the process at work in self-deception we need to turn to philosophy for clarification. Psychotherapists simply do not have the tools to tackle this issue. Philosophers of all sorts of denominations continue to make significant contributions to our understanding of human beings and in particular to the notion of self-deception. The co-operation of philosophers and psychologists and systems experts in cognitive science is a case in point. A lot of the debate generated is about the extent to which as human beings we can be cognisant of the actions and mental states that together determine consciousness. The question constantly addressed is whether human beings can in fact be free, conscious and self-determining in the way that we would like to think we are.

These are important considerations for psychotherapists as it makes a big difference whether we believe that our clients are trapped and unaware victims of chance or determinism or whether we believe that they are free agents who can actively influence the course of their lives, moods and relationships. The question that needs to be addressed in relation to self-deception is whether it is actually possible for individuals to knowingly deceive themselves. How is it possible to have knowledge about something and deliberately decide to pretend that we do not have such knowledge? Different theorists within psychology, psychotherapy and philosophy have different solutions to this apparent contradiction. As we shall see, Heidegger's contribution to this debate, although often overlooked, is extremely significant, since he overcomes the usual problems and somehow manages to transcend the contradictions involved in the concept of self-deception. Heidegger does not have a concept of self and therefore the notion of self-deception is dealt with in an entirely different manner. To understand this we need to understand Heidegger's descriptions of Dasein and its ways of being in the world. This involves a re-examination of the human condition. Reductionistic or positivistic analyses cannot achieve this objective. We need to turn to existential phenomenology to achieve a satisfactory level of description to grasp the problems that we need to tackle. In this process we shall find ourselves having to study Heidegger's ontology of Being as well as his specific descriptions of inauthentic and authentic ways of being.

Existential philosophy is undoubtedly the most focused attempt within recent Western philosophy at systematically describing the human condition in order to make sense of everyday living. It is uniquely placed in its capacity for providing a new model for a kind of secular morality. Existentialism has often been known for its insistence on personal choice and responsibility and Sartre's statements that we are nothing but our actions and that hell is other people are often taken out of context. His notion of bad faith, which is a form of self-

deception, is often used to replace the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious. Such superficial appropriations of complex philosophical ideas can mislead us very easily. We shall have an opportunity to briefly consider Sartre's contribution in as far as it represents a critique of Heidegger's views, but the thesis will focus primarily on Heidegger's much more significant and less well known contribution to the debate.

Existential philosophy arguably began with the nineteenth century work of Kierkegaard (1938, 1941a, 1941b, 1959) and Nietzsche (1881, 1882, 1883, 1887, 1888, 1895, 1908). Both spoke in very different ways about the same themes of freedom, anxiety and individuality. Existential thinking then found a formal basis in phenomenology, with the work of Husserl around the turn of the century (Husserl 1970, 1913, 1977, 1960). After this the movement of phenomenological existentialism was developed most significantly with the work of Heidegger and Sartre (1939, 1943, 1943b, 1948). But there were many other theoretical contributions, such as those of Buber (1923, 1929), Tillich (1952, 1954), Jaspers (1963, 1964, 1968, 1969) and Merleau Ponty (1945, 1964, 1968). I shall not attempt to cover all these contributions, although some of them will be considered in the appended publications on existential psychotherapy, which also form a part of the present doctoral submission. In these publications there will also be reference to the work of other psychotherapeutic practitioners, such as Binswanger (1958, 1963), Boss (1957a, 1957b, 1979), May (1977, 1958, 1967, 1969a), Laing (1960, 1961, 1964, 1967) and Yalom (1974, 1980, 1989). A number of more recent contributions have followed from the early work in existential psychotherapy and all of these have made it possible to arrive at the current situation where existential psychotherapy is recognized as a mainstream approach to psychotherapy, even though it does not claim to have a specific technique (Heaton 1990, 1997, van Deurzen 1988, Spinelli 1989, Cohn 1997). I have summarized the background

and history to these developments and their relevance to psychotherapy in Everyday Mysteries (van Deurzen, 1997), which is also part of this submission.

It will be obvious from the appended texts that Heidegger's work has been particularly influential in the development of these psychotherapeutic approaches. Heidegger's direct influence on the development of Boss' Daseinsanalysis (Boss 1957a) is particularly noteworthy. His influence on Binswanger (1963) was also important. In some instances these forms of existential therapy have associated themselves with psychoanalytic forms of therapy. This is usually in order to differentiate from these, as is the case for Medard Boss, sometimes in a more or less purely psychoanalytic way such as in the work of Jacques Lacan (1977), who also claims to have his roots in Heidegger's work. Other strands of existential philosophy have influenced the creation of the humanistic psychology movement and one can find existentialist concepts particularly in Gestalt therapy, in encounter groups and in person centred therapy (O'Hara, 1986). Cognitive and behavioural approaches sometimes pride themselves in using dialectical techniques and methods of argumentation or questioning of beliefs and assumptions that are originally part of the philosopher's tool-bag and so there are also existential elements to be found in for instance Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy and in Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (van Deurzen, 1984). I shall not discuss any of these approaches, since none of them use philosophy in a full-blown manner.

A much more significant approach is that of the recent development of the movement of philosophical consultancy. Philosophers now set themselves up in private practice to give consultations to individuals or organizations on moral issues and in helping them to recognize inconsistencies in their thinking. This movement began in Germany and Holland (Achenbach 1984, Hoogendijk 1988). But other philosophers have written about the classical relevance of philosophy to the investigation of human issues and dilemmas (Vlastos 1991, Nussbaum

1994). The specific movement of philosophical consultancy often focuses on the way in which human beings are apparently able to deceive themselves (Lahav and Tillmanns 1995, Marinoff 1999, Mace 1999, le Bon 2001) and a clarification of the notion of self-deception is therefore long overdue.

This dissertation will not describe existential therapy in any detail, as I have done so in my first two books, which are appended. I shall however specifically explore how Heidegger's Sein und Zeit (1927) is a major source of understanding of psychotherapeutic issues as he has, more than anyone, done such rigorous thinking on the ontological foundations of human being. It seems to me impossible to do good therapy without addressing fundamental life issues. It tends to take a little time and experience before one is comfortable enough to see through techniques and diagnoses into a person's existential dilemmas. I like to think that existential therapy is no more or less than what should be expected of a good therapist who has a broad ranging training and who has lived life deeply, confronting many challenges and difficulties with a measure of success. To make such therapy thoroughly connected to a consistent theory we need to turn to philosophy to clarify and explore the human dilemmas in question. Heidegger's framework of thinking about Dasein is eminently suited for this purpose. His notions of authentic and inauthentic living have inspired many practitioners. Unfortunately his ideas have often been distorted and misrepresented by practitioners with insufficient philosophical knowledge to do justice to the complexity of Heidegger's thinking. It is important to go back to Heidegger's actual words in Being and Time and recover the full intensity and significance of his analysis. To investigate the way in which Heidegger construes the notion of self-deception means to look through most of his descriptions of the way in which Dasein is in an everyday manner in the world. In doing so we will find that Heidegger's contribution to an understanding of self-deception is unique and powerful and that it will change our views of what self-deception entails. This will have significant implications for the practice

of existential psychotherapy. But before we move on to our exploration of Heidegger's contribution we must first consider the overall meaning of self-deception.

2. The concept of self-deception.

What does it mean to deceive or self-deceive? To deceive, according to the Oxford Dictionary is to make a person believe what is false or to mislead purposely. It is only possible to do so therefore if we know the truth and deliberately hide this. When we deceive, we persist in putting forward something, which we know to not be true. We actively hide the truth and replace it with a falsehood.

This makes it obviously quite problematic to think clearly about the concept of self-deception. What can it possibly mean to self-deceive, i.e. to stick to an erroneous belief when we know it to be false? For this is what self-deception must be. Self-deception is the act of lying to oneself about something that one could reflect on and therefore have a true rather than a false belief about. We have to remember that it would not be enough to simply continue to hold a false belief. For this to be called self-deception there has to be awareness at some level that the belief that we hold is actually a false one. If this were not the case we would simply be wrong, or in error, but not self-deceiving. Self-deception requires a special kind of persuasion of oneself to maintain a false belief against one's knowing better. It would seem an illogical and irrational mode of operating and one may well ask why anyone would want to convince themselves of the opposite of what they know to be true.

?

Gur and Sackheim use the following definition of self-deception:

The individual holds two contradictory beliefs (p and not-p)

These two contradictory beliefs are held simultaneously

The individual is not aware of holding one of these beliefs (p or not-p)

The act that determines which belief is and which belief is not subject to awareness is a motivated act (Sackheim and Gur, 1985)

They base their work on experiments with voice recognition. Subjects are made to listen to voice recordings, some of which are of their own voice. Subjects who deny that the voice they are listening to is their own have nevertheless a galvanic skin response consistent with the recognition that they are listening to themselves. They apparently hold the belief that this voice is not theirs whilst at the same time recognizing it as their own voice. They give greater credence to the notion that it is not their voice and prefer this reality over the possibility of accepting that it is their voice. Sackheim and Gur argue, as would Sartre, that the selectivity that happens here is on the level of an intentional stance. This is an important new way of looking at self-deception, no longer dominated by a psychoanalytic model of the unconscious. It is a model highly compatible with Heidegger's views, as we shall see below.

There are a number of classic examples that illustrate common forms of self-deception in the philosophical and psychological literature (Mele, 1997). One is that of people who continue to believe that their spouse is faithful to them even though they have evidence to the contrary. Another is that of parents who maintain that their child is drug free when they are in fact faced with evidence of drug use. A third is that of people who claim that they themselves or a loved one are healthy when there is ample evidence of illness. You could equally turn these beliefs upside down and find three more examples of self-deceptive states: to believe that someone is having affairs when they are not, that they are drugged when they are not, that they are ill when they are not. In all these situations the battle between competing beliefs is settled because of the intention of achieving or maintaining a particular way of looking at the

world. This involves a more fundamental self-deception about our own ability to determine reality.

Sartre's idea of bad faith particularly focuses on this kind of self-deception with which we tell ourselves stories about the realities of our lives. He is particularly keen on the idea that people, as being-for-itself are actually empty consciousness creating the false belief in their solidity as being-in-itself. We pretend that our lives are set in stone and that our personalities are equally definite and pre-determined. Sartre shows how people manipulate the facts of their lives in order to be able to continue to believe things about themselves that are blatantly false, but that may be helpful to them. Sartre, like Heidegger before him claims that self-deception, bad faith or inauthenticity, is a way of being that is prior to the uncovering of truth or authenticity. In fact both philosophers conclude that it is impossible for people to live without self-deception. This aspect of their theories is however often ignored, with the emphasis being placed on the idea that we should be more authentic or confrontative of our bad faith. More recently research has shown how ubiquitous self-deceiving is and how it might even be a requirement for mental health. It is therefore high time to return to Heidegger's original writing on the subject and investigate what he actually said about the tensions between authenticity and inauthenticity.

Heidegger and other existential philosophers would seem to argue that although self-deception is inevitable our objective should be to eliminate it or diminish it as much as possible in order to stand a stronger chance of living in reality and truth. But we need to investigate whether this is indeed the case. Post-modern authors (Derrida 1976, Ricoeur 1974) tend to relativize the possibility of finding truth and consider that the objective can only be to have multiple versions of reality and truth, as one cannot ever achieve a unified single truth. These theories have important implications for the way in which

people should conduct their lives. It is highly relevant for psychotherapists to ask themselves what their own views on these matters are. It makes a big difference whether we urge a distressed person to find out what the truth about their life is or whether we let them persist in obviously self-deceptive behaviour. Should psychotherapy be about a pursuit of truth or about the creation of pleasant myths to live by? Our reply depends largely on whether we believe there is such a thing as truth. Even if we believe that we must live in order to find truth and that truth can be found, we may not always be able to bear truth. Some people in psychotherapy argue that life is inevitably composed of a number of deceptions and self-deceptions, since human living is not based on truth but only on the relative truth of narrative.

If life did require us to invent stories to justify reality, then the ability to self-deceive might well turn out to be a considerable asset. And indeed there is much evidence to show that self-deceivers fare well in many cases. Recent biological and evolutionary research has shown that self-deception is an indicator of adaptation and success and some philosophers are taking this on board to revise their view on self-deception (Travers 1971, Slavin and Kriegman 1992, Dennett 1995).

To illustrate just how common self-deception is it is useful to observe the following facts from a research study by Gilovich:

A survey of one million high school seniors found that 70% thought they were above average in leadership abilities and only 2% thought that they were below average. In terms of ability to get along with others, all students thought they were above average, 60% thought they were in the top 10% and 25% thought they were in the top 1%..... A survey of university professors found that 94% thought they were better at their jobs than their average colleague (Gilovich 1991:77).

Given the widespread use of the concept of self-deception it is hardly surprising that psychotherapists find themselves routinely working with this notion. Psychoanalysis was founded on the idea of the unconscious, which was a

concept created by Freud to account for those things that people did or felt which they could not explain rationally. The concept of self-deception is a good alternative candidate for such explanations and it is quite possible to replace the notion of the unconscious with the notion of self-deception as it has the great advantage of not being confined to a topological explanation. I have discussed these matters in more detail in Everyday Mysteries (1997: appendix).

3. Heidegger's contribution.

Heidegger did not use the word self-deception, but he nevertheless discusses the idea of deceiving oneself, particularly in terms of authenticity and inauthenticity and in terms of his concept of self-forgetfulness. It is useful to compare Heidegger's approach to inauthenticity and authenticity with more recent writing on self-deception because Heidegger's view does not get bogged down in the usual paradox of the reflective self, which has to decide to deceive itself whilst also deciding to forget the knowledge of this deception. We shall demonstrate that Heidegger's model is in many ways still ahead of current understanding of self-deception.

Heidegger's contribution to the notion of self-deception, or rather, to the concepts of authenticity and inauthenticity remains central to the elaboration of an alternative perspective to that of psychoanalysis. Sartre's contribution is in many ways only an application and in some other ways a distortion of Heidegger's formulations. It is because of this that our explorations will be limited to Heidegger's contribution. We will however use Sartre's ideas to critique Heidegger's perspective. We shall also consider Fingarette's contribution, since this is both compatible with Heidegger's stance and formulated very differently.

But primarily it seems important to retrace Heidegger's notion of self-deception and investigate its relevance to psychotherapeutic work because it has been so little understood, hidden as it is amongst Heidegger's complex notions of Dasein's being in the world. Psychotherapists rarely have access to Heidegger's writing and if they do they find it often impenetrable and difficult to apply to their work.

Our analysis of Heidegger's work will pertain only to Sein und Zeit, since that contains such a wealth of relevant material. Our considerations will sometimes refer to other works Heidegger wrote around 1927 purely for clarification of the issues. The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (Heidegger 1995), which is the text of Heidegger's lecture course of the years 29-30 is particularly useful in this respect as is his Basic Problems of Phenomenology (Heidegger 1982). Both of these texts will be used occasionally to illuminate aspects of Heidegger's ontology in Sein und Zeit in relation to the concepts of inauthenticity and self-deception only.

In these pages the aim will be to discuss Heidegger's views on authentic and inauthentic being in the world in order to examine them in light of the psychotherapeutic enterprise. It is clear that this investigation, as it is followed by three published books on existential psychotherapy, is aimed at a practical application. A critical examination of Heidegger's work will lead to a discussion of the therapeutic practice described in the appended published works. It will be shown how Heidegger's influence is deeply instrumental in the rethinking of the psychotherapeutic enterprise. On the one hand Heidegger's work makes us having to re-assess the way in which psychotherapy is conducted, on the other hand the practice of psychotherapy may throw up some problems in Heidegger's work. The objective of the thesis is to critically

examine Heidegger' s views of inauthenticity and self-deception in light of these considerations.

Chapter One

Heidegger's fundamental ontology and the position of Dasein.

1. Ontology versus the ontic

Heidegger's concept of self-deception needs to be examined in the context of his overall perspective on human existence. This is pinned on his analysis of Being itself. The task that Heidegger sets himself in Being and Time is to interpret the meaning of Being (Heidegger 1927:15). This leads him to an ontological investigation of the nature of Being. In this process he finds that Being is a poorly understood concept.

'It is said that 'Being' is the most universal and emptiest of concepts. As such it resists every temptation at definition'. (Heidegger 1927: 2).

The emptiness of Being makes it impossible to define it. The concept of Being is too vague, too vast to pin down. We need to approach Being in a roundabout way, through describing how it actually manifests for human beings. This is why according to Heidegger we need to begin with a description of the essential structures of human existence. Indeed a rigorous analysis of the question of Being brings us face to face with the observation that it is the inquirer into Being whose presence obscures our understanding of Being. It is only to the extent that we can make the inquirer transparent in his own Being that we have any hope in making Being itself come to light. In addition it is also through an understanding of the Being of human existence that we can begin to have some understanding of Being itself. Heidegger notes that there is no Being as such, no Being in the abstract. Being always manifests itself in the world in a particular manner.

Being is always the Being of an entity (Heidegger, 1927:9).

In order to understand Being we have to look at a specific manifestation of Being, otherwise we are only speaking of abstractions and generalities. The specific form of Being that we are best acquainted with and in a good position to investigate is that of human existence. It is in human existence that Being comes to light. It is only in as much as human existence is privileged to manifest Being that Heidegger is interested in specifying the ontological characteristics of being human. Human being, or Dasein, Being-there, is that entity with whose mode of Being humans are best acquainted. Also Dasein is special because it is itself concerned with the Being that it manifests.

Dasein is an entity that does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being that Being is an *issue* for it. (Heidegger, 1927: 12)

Being matters to Dasein, because Dasein exists. Being is an issue for Dasein, because Dasein reflects on its own existence. This makes Dasein particularly disposed to investigate Being as well as making Dasein an excellent candidate for further investigation in terms of its Being. It could be argued that there might be other entities, such as animals, for which Being is an issue, but Heidegger is not interested in such an investigation. He is committed to spelling out the qualities of Dasein in order to arrive at an understanding of Being itself. From the outset he describes Dasein as an entity that is capable of assuming its own Being or neglect it.

Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence - in terms of a possibility of itself: to be itself or not itself. Dasein has either chosen these possibilities itself, or got itself into them, or grown up in them already. Only the particular Dasein decides its existence, whether it does so by taking hold or by neglecting. (Heidegger, 1927: 12)

In other words Dasein's way of existing always involves a process of decision making about its own Being whether or not this happens deliberately. Dasein is faced with the fundamental fact of its having to exist and does this either by

being true to itself and aware of its options, attitudes and choices, or by drifting into these unaware. Right from the beginning Heidegger thus posits the essential tension between an authentic and an inauthentic mode of existing. From the start he introduces the idea of Dasein's capacity to either assume responsibility for its existence or drift into it in a neglectful letting be. This raises a number of important questions. The question that we will be focusing on is how we can distinguish between these different modes of being. We will be particularly interested in finding out whether Dasein ever attempts to wilfully deceive itself in relation to its own responsibilities, or whether it drifts into such a self-deceptive state whenever no specific efforts at authentic existing are being made. Heidegger argues that Dasein is inevitably concerned with these questions about its own existence and that to interrogate Dasein on the way it deals with its being in the world will throw light on Being as well.

The way in which Heidegger's enquiry proceeds from here is to describe Dasein's everyday mode of existence.

And this means that it is to be shown as it is *proximally and for the most part*- in its average *everydayness*. In this everydayness there are certain structures which we shall exhibit-not just accidental structures, but essential ones which, in every kind of Being that factual Dasein may possess persist as determinative for the character of its Being. (Heidegger 1927: 17)

The first task is then to study Dasein as it lives its life in an ordinary everyday manner and describe the structures of its actual way of being in the world. It must be obvious how such a project of studying human beings in their ordinary activity is highly relevant to psychotherapeutic work. Heidegger's description of human beings as they are in the world provides an excellent background for the therapeutic monitoring role of people's daily comportment and interactions.

2. Temporality and death

As soon as Heidegger's description of Dasein's existence begins, he immediately introduces the notion of temporality. This has to be the horizon against which all understanding of Being takes place, because:

Dasein's Being finds its meaning in temporality. (Heidegger, 1927:19)

Dasein's existence is made possible by its ability to historicize and build on tradition and recollection. Dasein is never just actuality. It has a history and a future and it is possibility. It is in this process of historicizing that Dasein becomes what it is.

Heidegger's analysis of Dasein sets out to show that temporality makes sense of Dasein's way of being in the world. Everything else that Dasein does or experiences is directly predicated on the fact of Dasein's temporality. Temporality is thus a key concept if we are to understand Being.

Thus the fundamental ontological task of Interpreting Being as such includes working out the *Temporality of Being*. In the exposition of the problematic of Temporality the question of the meaning of Being will first be concretely answered. (Heidegger 1927:19)

Heidegger considers that we cannot understand Dasein unless we do so in the perspective of the dimension of time. Equally temporality has to be considered in order to make sense of the meaning of Being. Although much of Heidegger's description of Dasein precedes his discussion of the essential role of time, he revisits the various elements of Dasein's existence later on in Being and Time in light of his reflections on temporality. His analysis of Dasein in part I only really considers two modes of existing of Dasein: either, what he refers to as existence in an 'undifferentiated' way, which is neither inauthentic nor authentic, or existence in an inauthentic way. It is the dimension of time that leads directly to the possibility of Dasein's capacity for change over time and thus to the notion of 'potentiality of Being' that is so essential to Dasein and that makes authenticity a possibility. Up to the point of considering the dimension of time Heidegger can only look at Dasein in a partial way.

Everydayness is precisely that Being which is 'between' birth and death. And if existence is definitive for Dasein's Being and if its essence is constituted in part by potentiality-for-Being, then, as long as Dasein exists, it must, in each case, as such a potentiality, *not yet be* something. (Heidegger 1927:233)

To not yet be something turns out to be a rather essential aspect of Dasein. It is made possible by Dasein's existence between birth and death. It is this fact of our proceeding from birth to death that makes us capable of being different tomorrow than we were yesterday. And it is this that makes us wholly what we are: i.e. potentiality. Also our potentiality for Being, our living in time, towards a future, implies another fundamental factor, namely that of our inevitable death.

According to Heidegger we can only understand human beings in light of their limited existence and the way in which they handle this fact of life. The issue of death and Dasein's Being-towards-death will be a crucial one for our understanding of authenticity and inauthenticity and it is one that we shall revisit in the next chapters.

As long as Dasein is, there is in every case something still outstanding, which Dasein can be and will be. But to that which is thus outstanding, the 'end' itself belongs. The 'end' of Being-in-the-world is death. This end, which belongs to the potentiality-for-Being - that is to say, to existence - limits and determines in every case whatever totality is possible for Dasein. (Heidegger 1927:233-234)

It is an undeniable fact that we have a future. The fact of us having a future determines Dasein as being what it is: i.e. possibility. As Dasein we are always capable of something more, something else. That is a given. However it is just as much a certainty that this possibility (which is certain) will also certainly come to an end. Existing in time means always moving forward towards a future. Existing one's temporality means that one must live with one's mortality and this means to live towards a certain death.

It is important to note that Heidegger's analysis in part I of Being and Time remains on the level of an existential analysis, whereas part II, which integrates the dimension of time is capable of making a more fundamental ontological contribution (Gelven, 1989). The move towards the more ontological analysis is made possible by the analysis of death. To be mortal is one of the indubitable characteristics of Dasein. We shall therefore find that no one could ever be authentic until they have faced up to their own mortality. It will thus be essential for us to revisit the notion of temporality and death at a later stage, once we have seen what other fundamental characteristics are part of Dasein's mode of being.

3. Mineness and potentiality for Being

Heidegger states that:

The essence of Dasein lies in its existence (Heidegger 1927:42)

Therefore any of the characteristics of Dasein are to be seen as directly related to its existence. Dasein, rather than having presence at hand in the way that things do, emerges only as it exists. It is only in the process of existing that Dasein comes truly into Being. Dasein's existence thus becomes a main concern of Dasein. Dasein is concerned about its existence, because its Being is always changing. Remarkably this Being is nevertheless always experienced as one's own (*Jemeinigkeit*).

That Being which is an *issue* for this entity in its very Being, is in each case mine. (Heidegger, 1927:42)

Dasein's Being is not just a concern to Dasein, it is always its own concern. What this means is that we cannot refer to any aspect of Dasein's being in the world as definite and categorically determined. It has on the contrary to be

lived and experienced by me in the moment and is always open to new interpretation. It is this very mineness that makes it possible for me to live my life in my own way, regardless of the given circumstances or concerns. The ability of each of us to live out our potential being in the world in so many different ways opens the possibility of living it authentically or inauthentically. Heidegger very clearly puts the onus on Dasein to take charge of its own destiny and its essential ability to be 'itself'. Dasein cannot deny its own essence which is that it will determine the way in which this mineness is going to be actualized and experienced in the everyday.

Dasein has always made some sort of decision to the way in which it is in each case mine. (Heidegger, 1927:42)

Nobody can avoid being his or her own Dasein. Each can however either assume this mineness and take awareness of it, or somehow obfuscate it. Heidegger appears to suggest that both existential possibilities are necessarily part of Dasein. The authentic mode of being, in which we are aware of our own possibilities and apprehension of the world is no better or worse than the inauthentic mode of being, in which we are without that awareness and engrossed in the world, busy, excited, interested and ready for enjoyment. In addition to the inauthentic and authentic modes of being Heidegger argues that we set out in a state of undifferentiation where for the moment we are neither authentic nor inauthentic. Heidegger turns first to an investigation of this undifferentiated state.

We call this everyday undifferentiated character of Dasein "averageness" [Durchschnittlichkeit]. (Heidegger, 1927: 43)

Heidegger finds that Dasein first and foremost is in the world in this average manner, which often involves the kind of engagement with the world that does not reflect upon its place in it. We are just ordinary, just like others, just average. At those moments Being is not remembered, even though it remains

the background of Dasein's existence and inevitably continues to be an issue at all times. In particular Dasein becomes forgetful of its own Being, even though there is always some background understanding of Being in a diffuse manner. Heidegger considers the manner in which Dasein escapes from its own Being in this way.

...Dasein comports itself towards it in the mode of average everydayness, even if this is only the mode of fleeing *in the face of it* and forgetfulness *thereof* (Heidegger, 1927: 44).

It is important to remember that such forgetfulness of Dasein's own Being is an intrinsic characteristic of Dasein's and not just a primitive starting point. Our capacity for not being aware of our own role and function in relation to Being and in particular to our own Being is an essential aspect of what we are. As Heidegger points out (45) this is obvious in the way in which the sciences of biology, psychology, sociology and anthropology deal with human beings. As they study our existence they fail to reach out to the meaning of this existence in relation to Being and thus fail to grasp the actual existence of Dasein. The ontological study of Dasein can therefore never be replaced by such empirical data.

What we do need to study is the very everydayness that leads to forgetfulness of Being. As we examine Dasein in its most ordinary everydayness we discover that it is in an essentially undifferentiated state, as Mulhall points out (Mulhall 1996). Heidegger makes it quite clear that it is this undifferentiation that characterizes Dasein's existence for the most part.

At the outset of our analysis it is particularly important that Dasein should not be interpreted with the differentiated character [differenz] of some definite way of existing, but that it should be uncovered [aufgedeckt] in the undifferentiated character it has proximally and for the most part. This undifferentiated character of Dasein's everydayness is *not nothing*, but a positive phenomenal characteristic of this entity. Out of this kind of Being -and back to it again- is all existing, such as it is. (Heidegger, 1927:43)

In this undifferentiated state of averageness Dasein is not yet ready to find some definite deliberate way of existing. Dasein starts and ends in this state

of non-differentiated existence. In fact the quote suggests that Heidegger believes that all existing comes forth from such undifferentiated Being and returns to it again. This fundamental characteristic of Dasein's mode of existing is an important and positive element of its existence. As Heidegger puts it, it is not nothing. In an adequate phenomenological account of Dasein it can therefore neither be ignored nor forgotten and has to be incessantly returned to. So Heidegger suggests that we need to start looking at the way in which we are in our average everydayness. We must begin with and always return to a thorough description of the way in which Dasein is ordinarily in the world. It is in our actual Being-in-the-world that Dasein comes to light and brings Being to light at the same time.

If Being-in-the-world is a kind of Being which is essentially befitting to Dasein, then to understand Being-in-the-world belongs to the essential content of its understanding of Being. (Heidegger, 1927:86)

We have to begin by studying the very thing that Dasein is most essentially: Being-in-the-world. In our study of Being-in-the-world we find that Dasein has assigned itself to an "in-order-to" at all times. It is set in a particular direction, has a particular intention. Dasein has a potentiality for being. Being-in-the-world is Dasein's fundamental condition. It relates to the world in a particular way. This way can be either authentic or inauthentic. Dasein thus relates itself, authentically or inauthentically, to the world and is involved with it in a certain manner. Whether this involvement is authentic or inauthentic depends on how open Dasein is to itself and to the world. Its modality of relation to the world reveals the interpretation that Dasein has given of the world. As Dasein assigns itself a certain position in the world it shows a certain understanding of the world and of itself. The way, in which this happens can only be fully grasped if we first turn to the concept of care, which is the link between Dasein and the world and the vehicle for authenticity or inauthenticity.

4. Dasein and Care.

Care or *Sorge* is the fundamental way in which Dasein is in relation to the world of which it is a part. Dasein is not a separate entity in its own right. It is rather a relation. This relation is what Heidegger terms 'care'. Gelven argues that it is in *Sorge*, or care, that all existentials are unified into a single structure (Gelven, 1989:111). It brings all the other modes of existence under one common denominator and is the link between everydayness and the ontological ground on which it is based. The ultimate ontological ground is time, but Dasein in first instance has to be described as it manifests its concrete existence. In terms of this concrete everyday existence care brings everything into focus. Care is the openness that Dasein inevitably has towards its world, because by definition Dasein is a being there in that world and it brings its own being and the world together in one.

Dasein's actual existence is always characterized by its immersion in a world. This means that there are three aspects that need to be looked at more closely: namely the world, Dasein and the relationship between the two. In addressing these three aspects of care Heidegger begins by analysing Dasein's world, secondly he turns to a consideration of who it is that dwells in this world and thirdly he discusses what the actual experience of being-in-the-world is made of.

The world is always already there as a facticity that Dasein is immersed in and thrown into. As an entity that has no other Being than its own existence, Dasein cares about its world. This care must not be understood as a 'caring for'. It is to be understood as the way in which the world matters to Dasein. The concept of care in Heidegger is in this sense quite similar to the psychoanalytic concept of cathexis. All modes of being available to Dasein, whether they

consist of caring or neglecting to care are expressions of Dasein's essential capacity for Care. Care is to be understood in its ontological sense, not as an ontic care for something. It indicates the way in which the world always matters to Dasein. It points to Dasein's intrinsic interwovenness with the world into which it is thrown. Dasein takes up relationships towards the world in every case.

Being-in-the-world, as concern, is *fascinated by* the world with which it is concerned. (Heidegger, 1927:61)

Dasein cannot but be fascinated by its world in this way. This is what Heidegger refers to as concern, (*Besorgen*), which is a specific way of being in the world. This is how care manifests in terms of Dasein's Being in the world. Addressing oneself to the world and taking an interest in it is the most basic way of existing. As I do so I may not be aware that this is how I become myself in a particular way, nor that I am in the process revealing Being. Regardless of the lack of insight into all of these dealings with the world, they are what constitute my being-in-the-world. Dasein is tied in with the world in a fundamental way. Its fascination with the world denotes a lack and a deficiency. It reveals our ontological boundness to the world as well as our ontic need of the world, our inability to be without it. We are thrown into something that we become and that we remain absorbed by and cannot dispense with. We are in some fundamental way connected up to the world around us, inter-linked with it. In this way we are essentially first of all care. This realization of the prime importance of the world around us, of which we are an intrinsic part, leads Heidegger to describe the world itself as well as the entities in it. He does this through his analysis of Dasein's environment, which is that bit of the world that is closest to Dasein.

We must make a study of everyday Being-in-the-world; with the phenomenal support which this gives us, something like the world must come into view. That world of everyday Dasein which is closest to it, is the *environment*. (Heidegger, 1927:66)

Heidegger now begins his analysis of entities in the world as they are at first known to us as instruments for our use. Interestingly this analysis of entities as ready-to-hand (*zuhanden*) equipment is always centered around the recognition that entities come to Dasein in relation to work that needs to be done. We are called upon to accomplish something in relation to the world that we find ourselves in. We use 'objects' for a purpose. The 'objects' we come across are known to us as equipment. Equipment is used in order to do something. We are directly related to our equipment. It means something very specific to us. We relate to this equipment with circumspection.

Dealings with equipment subordinate themselves to the manifold assignments of the 'in-order-to'. And the sight with which they thus accommodate themselves is *circumspection*. (Heidegger, 1927:69)

We shall later on discover that this carefulness of relating to objects, this looking around them, this circumspection, is only one form of care, which is complemented by a similarly careful (although not necessarily caring), relating to others, which Heidegger will call solicitude. For the moment what matters is Dasein's orientation towards the world itself. Work is something to be accomplished. The world is something that we are connected to through the things that need to be carried out. There is always a project that we are aiming to accomplish and fulfil. Alongside this goal-oriented discovery of our environment we find nature as already there, as present-at-hand (*vorhanden*). But it is our preoccupation with the ready-to-hand that characterizes Dasein best. We become especially aware of our need for the world of entities when these are faulty or missing. For then:

Our circumspection comes up against emptiness, and now sees for the first time what the missing article was ready-to-hand *with*, and *what* it was ready-to-hand *for*. The environment announces itself afresh. (Heidegger, 1927:75)

This awareness of readiness-to-hand (*zuhanden*), the world and the significance of the world to us is thus revealed when the automatic fit between the world

and us fails. Later on we shall see that a similar process is at work between Dasein and other people. Authentic ways of being seem to be intrinsically linked to the possibility of the breakdown of what comes most easily to us. When things go wrong or fail us, when they are lacking or about to be lost, all of a sudden our world is revealed to us in a new light, in which we can become cognizant of more than we were able to perceive in it before. It is as if at those times our care for the world becomes focussed in a new way. Perhaps it is then that we can also become more aware of our own Dasein, which is no longer so hidden by the entities in the world or by other people that used to veil it and prevent it from becoming visible.

In this respect Dasein's ability for de-severance is crucial. De-severance or remoteness (*Entfernung*) (106) is about making what is distant close and experiencing it as near to us. In de-severing the ready-to-hand I bring the equipment within my reach. Dasein's essential ability to bring things into closeness and make remoteness disappear is a characteristic that may well be as important when it comes down to overcoming the distance with others or the distance towards Dasein itself.

In Dasein there lies an essential tendency towards closeness. All the ways in which we speed things up, as we are more or less compelled to do today, push us on towards the conquest of remoteness. (Heidegger, 1927:105)

This ability to alter our distance towards the world shows that distance is an issue for Dasein. It makes a difference whether something is near or far from us. Our environment thus becomes meaningful and differentiated by exercising our ability for de-severance, which is presumably a modulation of our capacity for intentionality. Our concern for the world has taken on a more profound meaning since we can actively participate in altering our relationship to it. We get a sense of direction, or directionality (*Ausrichtung*) and in the process get better at finding our own bearings. Thus care has now developed into more

complex ways to dwell in the world. It now becomes possible for instance to make room for entities in the world, as we can appraise how much 'space' these entities need to have in relation to us. This awakening to the importance of 'space' or spatiality (*Raumlichkeit*) and our ability to manipulate it could be seen as an awakening from a self-deceptive belief in our either being merged with a world where things always fit or being severed from the world in an un-overcomable way. It must be noted that we achieve this insight into the variability of distance and proximity by facing up to the discomfort of letting the gap, the lack, or the distance show itself and then making the effort to overcome it.

In the same way in which Dasein finds itself thrown into a world which is already there and finds itself amongst the ready-to-hand of that world Dasein also finds itself in a world with other people. These are two very different aspects of our world relation and yet Dasein finds itself in both relations at the same time. The ontological condition of Dasein is such that Being-in-the-world consists not only of being in an environment (*In-der-Welt-sein*), but also of a Being-with (*Mitsein*). The latter is the mode of being in relation to others, which is as essential a way of being as to be with the ready-to-hand.

In clarifying Being-in-the-world we have shown that a bare subject without a world never 'is' proximally, nor is it ever given. And so in the end an isolated "I" without Others is just as far from being proximally given. (Heidegger, 1927:117)

In the same way in which work brings us into contact with our physical environment it also exposes us to the presence of other people around us and with us. These others are encountered as Dasein-within the world. We can only encounter others if our own Dasein has the essential structure of Being-with and we allow ourselves to meet them through our essential ability for care (*Sorge*). That is to say that other people will matter to us as much as the environment matters to us. They are both of concern to us. Heidegger

however makes a distinction between the care for things and the care for others. In relation to other human beings care does not manifest as concern (*Besorgen*), as is the case in relation to entities, but rather as solicitude (*Fürsorgen*).

Heidegger describes a number of deficient modes of solicitude, such as passing one another by or being against or without one another. He also speaks of indifferent modes that characterize average everyday Being-with-one-another and which show inconspicuousness and obviousness in the same way in which using equipment in an everyday mode does.

Being for, against, or without one another, passing one another by, not "mattering" to one another-these are possible ways of solicitude. And it is precisely these last-named deficient and Indifferent modes that characterize everyday, average Being-with-one-another. (Heidegger, 1927:121)

In terms of Dasein's positive modes of relating there is a distinction made between two sorts of solicitude. In the first one leaps in for the other (*für ihn einspringen*), taking away 'care' from the other. In the second one leaps ahead of the other (*ihm vorausspringen*),

not in order to take away his 'care', but rather to give it back to him authentically as such for the first time. (Heidegger, 1927: 122)

It is interesting to note that Heidegger again refers to authentic being here, in relation to the other and with the express remark that this helping the other to become authentic is about helping the other to become transparent to himself in his 'care' and to become free for it. This is a solicitude that is guided by considerateness and forbearance (*Rücksicht und Nachsicht*), in an analogous way to the careful relating to entities with circumspection (*Umsicht*), all of which are forms of sight (*Sicht*).

Care is then one of the most fundamental aspects of Dasein's being in the world. Heidegger arrives at this view early on and comes back to it repeatedly during Being and Time. The notion of care underpins all other aspects of Dasein's being. Gelven (1989) argues that care carries tremendous obligations, which Dasein trembles to take on. He claims that our realization of the implications of care, when it is lived out with awareness would be far greater than we might bargain for.

Love, as we know, is often like this. It is only after we have turned away from loving that we become explicitly aware of the immense commitment required. Our own failure to live up to such a commitment alone truly reveals its enormity. (Gelven, 1989:114)

According to Gelven then, ontic care can only really be experienced after it has been shied away from, after we have with dread become aware of the implications of it. This deeply lived care then emerges from an authentic way of being-in-the-world, which only becomes possible after anxiety has been faced. Clearly Gelven is here moving away from Heidegger's insistence on the ontological aspect of care to a weaker ontic notion where care comes to mean something like 'caring about a person'. Of course it may well be that such a form of care can only exist on the primary foundation of our ontological ability to 'care', which as we have seen is absolutely fundamental. It is however all too easy to lose track of this central importance of care, which is not at all related to how much we do or do not care for a person or an object. The central importance of Heidegger's concept of 'care' is that it is essentially what Being-in-the-world is. 'Being-in-the-world is essentially care' Heidegger says (193). Dasein is care because the world matters to it. No matter what sort of relationship I have to the world, it is a relationship of care. Essentially Dasein's existence is care.

Heidegger finds further evidence for his claims of the centrality of care and indeed for the ontological basis of care by referring to an ancient fable, which predates any scientific knowledge and is historical evidence of Dasein's

rootedness in caring. Heidegger quotes the entire fable in Latin and then gives his own translation as follows:

Once when 'Care' was crossing a river, she saw some clay; she thoughtfully took up a piece and began to shape it. While she was meditating on what she had made, Jupiter came by. 'Care' asked him to give it spirit and this he gladly granted. But when she wanted her name to be bestowed upon it, he forbade this, and demanded that it be given his name instead. While 'Care' and Jupiter were disputing, Earth arose and desired that her own name be conferred on the creature, since she had furnished it with part of her body. They asked Saturn to be their arbiter, and he made the following decision, which seemed a just one: 'Since you, Jupiter, have given its spirit, you shall receive that spirit at its death; and since you, Earth, have given its body, you shall receive its body. But since 'Care' first shaped this creature, she shall possess it as long as it lives. And because there is now a dispute among you as to its name, let it be called 'homo' for it is made out of *humus* (earth). (Heidegger, 1927: 198)

There is thus priority of care over both body and spirit. Human beings are devoted to care for their entire lives. Care is what human beings are. Human beings may consist of earth, but their being is something quite different. It is therefore crucial to detach our observations of ontological forms of 'care' from the ontic ones and focus on the ontological aspects of Dasein's care for the most part. The Latin word 'cura', which is the essence of our being, does not only stand for care in the sense of worry and anxious exertion, but also in the sense of carefulness and devotedness. Heidegger also quotes Seneca's saying that care is what distinguishes men from gods.

Man's *perfectio*- his transformation into that which he can be in Being-free for his ownmost possibilities (projection)- is 'accomplished' by 'care' (Heidegger, 1927: 199).

What this amounts to is to say that Dasein is in itself neither complete nor unified nor full by itself. It always projects itself towards a future in which it can complete, or accomplish itself and realize its possibilities. This projection is only possible because we care and are aware of our need for the world of things, people and projects around us to complete and determine our being in the world. This brings out the importance of the existence of the world, which we usually refer to as Reality. Magda King asks the question why Heidegger speaks of Dasein initially as existence only to show later on that it really is care

(King, 2001:35). She demonstrates that care only begins to make sense in light of Heidegger's later elucidations about time. Care is only really meaningful in relation to Dasein's progress from birth to death and in final analysis refers to Dasein's mortality.

5. The main structures of Care and the existentialia

Now that we have considered care we must look at the basic structures of care that Heidegger recognizes. They are threefold. All three are particular ways in which Dasein's care manifests and they show up the fundamental aspects of Dasein that define it more specifically in relation to its own existence. Dasein is disclosed through these basic ontological characteristics. They are the *sine qua non* of Dasein's Being and Dasein cannot be understood without reference to them. Heidegger's analysis of Dasein in part I of Being and Time focuses on these existential conditions that determine Dasein as follows:

The fundamental ontological characteristics of this entity are existentiality, facticity and Being-fallen. (Heidegger, 1927:191)

Although these existentialia are held together by the embracing existential of 'Care', which gives Dasein its unity, at first Heidegger focuses on these three characteristics of Dasein. He shows that Dasein's Being-in-the-world is first and foremost characterized by thrownness, i.e. it is thrown into a world that is already there. This results in Dasein's facticity. Secondly Dasein is fallen with other people, which is a fundamental aspect of our being in the world that needs to be looked at very carefully later on. It will be discussed in detail in the next chapter since it is central to our understanding of Heidegger's distinctions between authentic and inauthentic being. Thirdly Dasein exists in some specific ways that define its existentiality and these ways are fundamentally bound up with its being in time. We need to briefly look at

these three dimensions of Dasein's structure of care before we consider the three modalities of care that Heidegger also describes, i.e. Dasein's capacity for attunement, understanding and discourse. Essentially there are three dimensions of *what* Dasein is and three ways *in which* it is. We shall now briefly consider the three dimensions of what Dasein is before discussing how Dasein is. It must be born in mind that we shall look at the dimensions of fallenness and existence in much further detail in the next chapters.

1. Thrownness or Facticity

Firstly then there is Dasein's facticity, its thrownness (*Geworfenheit*), which is perhaps the most basic reality of Dasein. Dasein's thrownness makes it part of a world that is already given and as such limits Dasein's possibilities for being. At the same time the thrownness, which is not something chosen or done by Dasein, affects Dasein most profoundly in that it continuously projects Dasein forwards.

Thrownness is neither a 'fact that is finished' nor a Fact that is settled. Dasein's facticity is such that *as long as* it is what it is, Dasein remains in the throw, and is sucked into the turbulence of the "they's" inauthenticity. (Heidegger, 1927:179)

Dasein becomes aware of its thrownness through the fact that it always finds itself in a certain position in relation to the world. The way in which Dasein is in relation to the world Heidegger calls its state of mind, *Befindlichkeit*, literally the way in which it finds itself. Dasein's state of mind reveals its particular disposition towards the world.

2. Fallenness

Secondly there is Dasein's fallenness with other people (*Verfallenheit*). This refers to our being held back by the world, our being absorbed by the world of other people, through our falling in with others. It is this fallenness that reveals the ways in which one hides in *das Man*, the anonymous They, which Dasein initially lives in and is part of. It is this process of hiding that we shall be particularly considering in the next chapters, in order to see whether it is a deliberate ploy to avoid truth or whether it is a more or less automatic way of being that Dasein happens to fall into. Heidegger points out from the start that the term falling is not to be understood as equivalent to the biblical notion of a moral falling into sin. There is no value judgement involved in the idea of falling, although we shall see later that Heidegger's understanding of falling is crucial to Dasein's tendency to be always capable of both authenticity and inauthenticity. Of course our tendency to fall in with others is a modulation of our *Mitsein*, our inevitable existence alongside other people. Perhaps our tendency to fall in with others can literally be referred to as our decadence.

Heidegger shows that we are not in a position of strength in relation to others. At first, when we encounter others in the world we are preoccupied with how we differ from others. These others are not specific others, but others in general: the "they" (*das Man*). Dasein at first stands in subjection to others. It does what others do. It is taken over by acting as if it has to be the same as 'them'. It is suggested that this way of being with others is in essence a consequence of us being thrown with others. We belong ourselves to the anonymous mass of people that we relate to and obey. A dictatorship of the "They" now unfolds:

We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as *they (man)* take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as *they* see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the 'great mass' as *they* shrink back; we find shocking what *they* find shocking. The "they", which is nothing

definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribe the kind of Being of everydayness. (Heidegger, 1927:127)

In allowing ourselves to be average in our existence we demonstrate Dasein's tendency to level down all possibilities of Being. The public nature of our existence obscures our own potentiality for Being and we become insensitive to our ability to go to the heart of things. We do not have to answer for ourselves. We do not exist as a separate individual that can make authentic decisions and choices. But we cannot simply get rid of the "they", for the 'they' does not simply exist as a group of anonymous others. It is rather, according to Heidegger an essential characteristic of Dasein itself. It is an essential existentiale, a primordial phenomenon that will always remain part of Dasein. Dasein exists as 'das Man'. It is first and foremost this anonymous 'they', the one, who does not have to account for himself.

The Self of everyday Dasein is the *they-self*, which we distinguish from the *authentic Self*, - that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way. As they-self, the particular Dasein has been *dispersed* into the "they", and must first find itself. (Heidegger, 1927:129)

Thus the issue of authenticity has become an issue of freeing ourselves of the rule of others over our everyday existence. The very same care that makes relating to others possible is also the care that entraps us into inauthenticity. To become authentic requires us to free ourselves of the going along with the 'they' and its imagined dictates. Thus becoming authentic is essentially about learning to see the 'they' in a new light. We cannot detach ourselves from the 'they' because it is an essential part of our being in the world. We can however modify our experience of the 'they', although at this stage it is not clear how this could be done. We shall come back to Dasein's struggle with its own tendency to hide in 'das Man' and experience the world in an anonymous inauthentic way. It is a crucial concept for the understanding of Heidegger's version of self-deception.

3. Existence

Thirdly we come now to what Heidegger refers to as Dasein's existence (*Existenz*), which is a little less clear initially and starts out generally with Dasein's emerging into the world in an undifferentiated way. Out of this it later becomes capable of either owning its existence or disowning it, and so it becomes possible to be either authentically or inauthentically. It is obvious that in the same way in which our thrownness leads on to our fallenness, our fallenness, or rather our struggle with it, leads in turn to our potentiality for existing in a more deliberate and authentic fashion. The three dimensions of being, Being-in-the-world, Being-with-others and Being-oneself, are thus intrinsically linked. They are, as it were, interlinked structures of Dasein, in which Dasein struggles to find itself.

The table at the end of this chapter indicates how we may represent Heidegger's overall description of Dasein's structure of Care and the way in which this relates to Dasein's being in time, its mineness and also how it articulates with the modalities of Being that Dasein has at its disposal and which we shall look at next.

6. Disposition or Attunement

We have already seen that when we look at the way in which Dasein is thrown into the world we must note at once that Dasein always finds itself in the world in a particular mode of being, which Heidegger terms *Befindlichkeit*. Macquarrie translates the concept as 'state of mind', but this does not really render its meaning very well. State of mind suggests a cognitive connotation. In fact *Befindlichkeit* literally means 'the way in which one finds oneself' and it expresses the existential a priori that makes it inevitable that Dasein will encounter the world in a particular way. Some authors have preferred to use

'disposition' as a translation of *Befindlichkeit* (Polt, 1999), to avoid conjuring up the image of an internal mental state. Dreyfus has suggested the translation of 'affectedness' (Dreyfus, 1991), which appears however to put too much emphasis on the passive and emotional side of the experience. *Befindlichkeit* is the revelation of the way in which one actually is in relation to the world. King (2001) uses the term 'attunement', because this captures the way in which Dasein is always tuned into the world in a certain way. It shows that there is always a connection between Dasein and its world. It is indeed not possible to be without a state of mind or rather without a certain disposition in relation to the world. It is an ontological given, which manifests itself ontically in everyday life as us being in a mood (*Stimmung*). Moods are the way in which we are actually attuned to the world in a particular tonality.

Heidegger immediately emphasizes that we can never not be in a mood. Even the apparent lack of mood, which can be persistent, denotes a particular attunement. Dreyfus remarks that mood is pervasive, often so completely pervasive that it becomes transparent (Dreyfus 1991:173). We might not even be aware that we are in a mood, but the mood nevertheless pervades our entire Being-in-the-world. Moods can be spoiled or change into other moods. They are the most profound way in which the world is disclosed and through which we are disclosed to ourselves. They are far more pervasive and consistent than cognitive ways of grasping the world and so is their effect on us. It is easier to grasp the ontic expression of the phenomenon of *Befindlichkeit* for moods are more tangible and familiar to us.

A mood makes manifest 'how one is and how one is faring'. In this 'how one is', having a mood brings Being to its "there". (Heidegger, 1927:134)

The mood then is the intimate link between world and 'one'. It demonstrates not just where one is in relation to the world, it also shows how one is getting

on managing in this world. Moods thus give us much valuable information about this pair of Dasein and its world.

In observing moods we come to realize that they are rooted in Dasein's being-thrown-into-a-world. The fact of our being thrown into a world that pre-exists us means that we are delivered over to a world, in which we each have to be. This facticity of our being in the world cannot be looked at in the same way as the 'facticity' of something that is present-at-hand.

The expression "thrownness" (*Geworfenheit*) is meant to suggest the facticity of its being delivered over. (Heidegger, 1927:135)

In our thrownness we are what we are and what we have to be and this is disclosed in our state of mind. Our thrownness and mood are thus closely connected. We cannot have one without the other. Mood thus reveals thrownness and thrownness makes mood possible and indeed necessary.

When we master a mood, we do so by way of a counter-mood; we are never free of moods. Ontologically, we thus obtain as the *first* essential characteristic of states-of-mind that *they disclose Dasein in its thrownness, and - proximally and for the most part - in the manner of an evasive turning-away.* (Heidegger, 1927:136)

Moods are not necessarily very articulated, as they are essentially a pre-verbal experience and do not aim at disclosing our thrownness, bringing it closer to us, but rather as an evasion of this thrownness. Heidegger notes how this evasiveness is particularly clear in bad moods, which sometimes take us over to such an extent that we get fully absorbed by them, blinding ourselves to the thrownness and position in the world that they actually reveal.

The 'bare mood' discloses the "there" more primordially, but correspondingly it *closes it off* more stubbornly than any *not-perceiving*. This is shown by *bad moods*. In these, Dasein becomes blind to itself, the environment with which it is concerned veils itself, the circumspection of concern gets led astray. (Heidegger, 1927:136)

Our very ability to be circumspect and to be concerned about the world then gets led astray. There is a paradox here, for the very mood that is our most essential way of being thrown into a world also becomes that which obscures the being-in-the-world that it is characteristic of and that it at the same time reveals and conceals.

A state-of-mind not only discloses Dasein in its thrownness and its submission to that world which is already disclosed with its own Being; it is itself the existential kind of Being in which Dasein constantly surrenders itself to the 'world' and lets the 'world' "matter" to it in such a way that somehow Dasein evades its very self. (Heidegger, 1927:139)

Heidegger here depicts mood as something that takes Dasein over and absorbs it in the world. Through our mood our absorption in the world becomes obvious. Again we see the function of mood as that essential point of contact, or even merging between Dasein and world. Mood increasingly is described as that in which Dasein is most itself and at the same time most taken over by the world. While this seems paradoxical, it may be that this paradox is not a paradox at all but that it points us towards the realization that Dasein is most itself when it is most merged with the world. There can be no *sein* (no being) for Dasein, without it happening there (*Da*). This is the logical consequence of the ontological condition of Being-in-the-world, which is an inalienable fact of our existence. But if such Being-in-the-world always finds itself in a state of mind in relation to its situation then an awareness of such state of mind must be an essential way of becoming truly Dasein. Ontically the more Dasein is there, as it is when taken over into a world of mood, the more it is actually Dasein and thus itself.

We shall have to come back to this bizarre conundrum: that Dasein is most itself when going out of itself to the world. We may already hypothesize that this will mean that Dasein is essentially authentic even when it is inauthentic. If Dasein's being is disclosure, whatever else it may be, both of world and of itself, then we have to consider the possibility that mood may be one of the

most directly genuine ways of being, as Dasein cannot escape from its moods and is continuously disclosed by them whilst at the same time disclosing its world. As Heidegger points out it is when looking at the world through our moods that we probably see it most directly:

It is precisely when we see the 'world' unsteadily and fitfully in accordance with our moods, that the ready-to-hand shows itself in its specific worldhood, which is never the same from day to day. By looking at the world theoretically, we have already dimmed it down to the uniformity of what is purely present-at-hand, though admittedly this uniformity comprises a new abundance of things, which can be discovered by simply characterizing them. (Heidegger, 1927:138)

Moods are powerful reminders of the complexity of the world and our thrownness in it. Our moods can show us what abstractions might hide. Heidegger shows that knowledge is not the most primordial way of relating to the world. Being is. Human beings are in the world in a mood. They worry about the world though the modality in which they are in the world. There is a directness about moods that is immediately related to the worldliness of the world. Our moods in some ways are the best rendering, the best expression of the complexity and unpredictability of the world.

Existentially, a state of mind implies a disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can encounter something that matters to us. Indeed from the ontological point of view we must as a general principle leave the primary discovery of the world to 'bare mood'. (Heidegger, 1927:137/138)

Of course we must be careful to continue to make a distinction between the ontological state of mind or disposition of *Befindlichkeit* on the one hand and the ontic *Stimmung* or mood on the other hand. Heidegger does insist that moods have been under-valued and that they have not been investigated much further than they were classically by Aristotle, who described them as affects or feelings. Since Aristotle very few advances have been made in understanding the significance of feelings according to Heidegger. The phenomenon of world-disclosure that happens in our feelings and moods should

be given the prominence it deserves. It is not just an accompanying phenomenon to imagination, knowledge and will, it is a primary connectedness with the world that discloses exactly that which matters to Dasein. Moods are indicators of our being there and expressive of the very quality of that being. Dreyfus speaks of Dasein as a 'self-interpreting foundness' (Dreyfus 1991:173) and by this he means that we find ourselves thrown into the world that is already there, but have to constantly take a stance to this world. In our moods we manifest this attitude towards the world as it is for us.

Heidegger considers fear as an example of a mood and he shows how this is the mood of being related to what is threatening. We see the fearsome as that which can threaten Dasein and it is Dasein's actual being that is at risk. Therefore:

Only an entity for which in its Being this very Being is an issue, can be afraid. (Heidegger, 1927:141)

In fear we lose our heads and feel bewildered. It closes off our Being-in and at the same time shows it up, makes us see it. This can be done in different ways: at a distance or nearby, slowly or suddenly. If what is threatening approaches us suddenly our state of mind is that of alarm, for instance.

Our moods thus respond to the world as we find it, but they in turn affect the way in which we find that world. Dreyfus puts it very well:

Indeed, far from being fleeting as the tradition has supposed, moods settle in like the weather and tend to perpetuate themselves. For example when I am annoyed, new events, even those which when I am joyful show up as challenging or amusing, show up as grounds for further annoyance. (Dreyfus 1991:174).

Our moods are not only expressive of our relation to the world, but in turn affect the way in which we experience the world and therefore end up

determining the way in which we relate to the world. Through my moods the world is seen to matter to me in a particular way, but they make intentionality possible and constantly affect the quality of this intentionality with which I direct myself towards the world. In some ways it is the awareness of this intentionality and of our being in the world that is most importantly shown by our moods. As we have seen that which the moods indicate of our relation to the world may be veiled and hidden by the moods, but the fact that we feel them and that we care about the world in this particular way cannot be avoided.

In an *ontico-existentiell* sense, Dasein for the most part evades the Being which is disclosed in the mood. In an *ontologico-existential* sense, this means that even in that to which such a mood pays no attention, Dasein is unveiled in its Being-delivered-over to the "there". In the evasion itself the "there" *is* something disclosed. (Heidegger, 1927:135)

Heidegger's distinction between the *ontico-existentiell*, the dimension of our concrete acts in the world, and the *ontologico-existential*, the dimension that makes our being possible in an abstract sense, is an important one. We must constantly remember that the forgetfulness of being that can be observed on the one level still confirms a fundamental characteristic of Dasein. To not be aware of what our moods are highlighting still leaves us with the inevitable realization that the world matters and that we experience it with concern and in a state of mind.

States of mind and moods are one important area in which this distinction and yet interplay between the two dimensions becomes so obvious and important. They need to be carefully observed and noted. Before we go on to examine the other modalities of care, i.e. understanding and discourse we need to complete our discussion of mood by turning to anxiety. For this is, as Heidegger claims, the most central of all moods. It is probably also that which makes the movement from disposition to understanding possible.

7. Anxiety

Heidegger conducts his analysis of the fundamental state of mind of anxiety very carefully as it can give us important information about Dasein.

One of Dasein's possibilities of Being is to give us ontical "information" about Dasein itself as an entity. Such information is possible only in that disclosedness which belongs to Dasein and which is grounded in state-of-mind and understanding. (Heidegger, 1927:184)

To take a close look at anxiety is crucial to an understanding of the way in which Dasein is in the world. Normally Dasein flees away from itself, as we shall consider in more detail in the next chapter. It is only when it is anxious that it is confronted with itself.

In everyday existence Dasein's absorption in the world and in the "they" allows Dasein to flee in the face of itself. This is the opposite of what happens in fear. While in fear Dasein shrinks away and flees from what is threatening in the world. While absorbing itself in the world Dasein on the contrary flees away from itself, we might even say, in fear (*Furcht*), though not in anxiety (*Angst*). What is important is to establish that it is itself that it is running away from and nothing else.

Dasein's falling into the "they" and the 'world' of its concern, is what we have called a 'fleeing' in the face of itself. (Heidegger, 1927:185)

This fleeing from oneself into the world of its concern and others, is what Heidegger marks out as the fleeing in the face of anxiety. This is to say that if Dasein is to be confronted with itself it has to experience anxiety. It is this facing of self in anxiety that it is anxious to avoid. This fleeing from anxiety is not at all like fleeing in fear. We flee in fear from something concrete in the world. We flee towards the world of our concerns when we want to avoid anxiety. Heidegger shows that the very experience of fear is only possible

because of the avoidance of anxiety, an anxiety that is constantly going on underneath our concrete experiences in the world that may lead us to experience fear and flee away from something in the world. Fear is only made possible against the background of the very possibility of anxiety and its fleeing from ourselves. Fear (*Furcht*) is grounded in anxiety, but it is a fleeing away from something concrete in the world. Anxiety (*Angst*) is a fleeing away from nothing. There is no thing in the world that functions as that which makes Dasein anxious. 'That which threatens is nowhere.' (186) As we saw earlier that in anxiety Dasein flees from itself we may wonder to what extent Heidegger is equating self and nothing.

It is through the study of anxiety that Heidegger hopes to reveal the embracing structure of Dasein. In anxiety Dasein is in some ways most fully itself. What seems to be suggested is that this fully being itself means to be aware of it being nothing and nowhere. Dasein is always a no longer and a not yet. It is forever moving towards something. Dasein's being is being towards its own potentiality for being. Later on we shall discover that this potentiality is also a being-towards-death.

Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its *Being towards* its ownmost potentiality-for-being-that is, its *Being-free* for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself. Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its *Being-free for (propensio in ...)* the authenticity of its Being, and for this authenticity as a possibility which it always is. (Heidegger, 1927:188)

We now immediately see how Dasein is not just a thrownness in the world, but also a possibility. Dasein is in fact free to choose itself and develop its own potentiality for being. Much of the time we deny this freedom by hiding in the world of the 'They' and in our absorption in the world of objects.

Anxiety has the same function for Dasein in becoming aware of itself as the breakdown of objects has for the revelation of the real use of objects to us. Just as we only really see things when they stop being equipment that works

and fits perfectly into our hands, we only really see ourselves as we stop being simply absorbed by the world. When this happens we get very perturbed. Just as we do not like equipment breaking down on us and would rather continue to just use objects than recognize their presence at hand, so we would rather avoid finding ourselves unable to continue being absorbed in the world. We do not like to experience anxiety.

Anxiety is a discomfoting and uneasy experience. Anxiety is the mood of being ill at ease. It is what Heidegger calls *Unheimlichkeit*, which means not being at home, and at the same time disturbance. It is a word that is translated as 'uncanny' in the standard translation, although Dreyfus has suggested the better translation of 'unsettled' (Dreyfus, 1991:179).

In anxiety one feels 'uncanny'. Here the peculiar indefiniteness of that which Dasein finds itself alongside in anxiety, comes proximally to expression: the "nothing and nowhere". But here "uncanniness" also means "not-being-at-home". (Heidegger, 1927:188)

So we find ourselves not at home, disturbed, unsettled in the world, when we experience anxiety. Anxiety is that mood which shows us to be alone, homeless and ill at ease. In the same way in which equipment breakdown brings objects into a new relief, it is this breakdown of our belonging to the world that brings us face to face with ourselves. What we have previously taken for granted can no longer be relied upon. We have to take account of the nothing and nowhere. Anxiety is a fundamental experience and in this sense it is more than a mere mood. Anxiety may be seen to belong to a more essential ontological level of Dasein and as such is a state of mind instead of just a mood.

In the complete disturbance of anxiety we become aware of the groundlessness of both world and ourselves. This groundlessness, according to Heidegger is more real and true than the familiarity and being at ease that we experience at other times. What he implies is that the soothing of being absorbed in a world in which we are at home is illusory. It is in anxiety that our real state is

revealed. It is in anxiety that we come to the world and ourselves in a more authentic mode. Our everyday familiarity is actually a fleeing from this reality.

Yet the everydayness of this fleeing shows phenomenally that anxiety, as a basic state-of-mind, belongs to Dasein's essential state of Being-in-the-world, which, as one that is existential, is never present-at-hand but *is* itself always in a mode of factical Being-there - that is, in the mode of a state-of-mind. That kind of Being-in-the-world which is tranquillized and familiar is a mode of Dasein's uncanniness, not the reverse. *From an existential-ontological point of view, the "not-at-home" must be conceived as the more primordial phenomenon.* (Heidegger, 1927:189)

Dasein is fundamentally not at home in the world. Its experience of anxiety is an expression of its actual lack of self-certainty or at least of a lack of familiarity. The fact that on an everyday basis we seek to avoid this anxiety and dim it down, only confirms that it is there the whole time. It is the tranquillized, artificially calm and trusting mode of being that is uncanny, not the anxiety that reveals our disturbance. Not being at home is part of the basic existential condition of Dasein. We must conclude that to be aware of this not being at home in anxiety is therefore an authentic mode of being. What Heidegger says about this is that both authenticity and inauthenticity are given as possible modes of being from the outset.

But in anxiety there lies the possibility of a disclosure which is quite distinctive; for anxiety individualizes. This individualization brings Dasein back from its falling, and makes manifest to it that authenticity and inauthenticity are possibilities of its Being (Heidegger, 1927:191).

It is thus clear that it is not the revelation of an authentic way of being that is of most importance, but a moving away from the usual tranquillization into an absorption with and fleeing towards the world and others. When Dasein is individualized by its own anxiety what is shown is the co-existence of authenticity and inauthenticity as two equally important modes of being. We shall come back to the importance of anxiety in chapter three when we look more carefully at the possibility of overcoming self-deception.

8. Understanding

As stated above, alongside the basic existential of disposition, there are two further existentials that modulate Dasein's existence in the world. These are Understanding and Discourse. Our capacity for understanding (*Verstehen*) reveals the way in which things are experienced by us. Whereas discourse (*Rede*), provides us with a capacity for articulating our experience. Both are in essence a modulation of our basic capacity for being thrown into a world, in a particular state of mind and with a particular take on the world. Understanding is the counterpart of state of mind. If state of mind tells me about the way in which I react to my thrownness, understanding tells me about what I am capable of. State of mind and understanding are therefore complementary aspects of Dasein.

An understanding of Being belongs to Dasein's ontological structure. As something that is [Seiend], it is disclosed to itself in its Being. The kind of Being which belongs to this disclosedness is constituted by state-of-mind and understanding. (Heidegger, 1927:182)

Two sides of the same coin, both are inevitable aspects of being human. We are always in a state of mind through which we understand the world. Yet understanding is a bit more than just being in a mood. Heidegger captures it well in his section on the temporality of understanding:

Understanding constitutes rather the Being of the "there" in such a way that, on the basis of such understanding, a Dasein can, in existing, develop the different possibilities of sight, of looking around [Sichumsehens] and of just looking. In all explanation one uncovers understandingly that which one cannot understand; and all explanation is thus rooted in Dasein's primary understanding. (Heidegger, 1927. 336)

It is only because we are intrinsically connected up to the world and immediately understand it in a particular way that we can begin to make sense of it. It is our understanding relationship to the world that also makes such

things as circumspection and concern possible, since they are ways of understanding the world and other people.

Understanding is the way in which I know how to be in the world. It is not a reflective knowledge that is analysed and on a cognitive or intellectual level, but a kind of voting with one's feet knowledge, an embodied knowing where to turn and what to do. Understanding in this sense points us towards the future and our potentiality for Being.

Dasein is the possibility of Being-free *for* its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Its Being-possible is transparent to itself in different possible ways and degrees.

Understanding is the Being of such potentiality-for-Being, which is never something still outstanding as not yet present-at-hand, but which, as something which is essentially never present-at-hand, *'is'* with the Being of Dasein in the sense of existence. Dasein is such that in every case it has understood (or alternatively, not understood) that it is to be thus or thus. (Heidegger, 1927:144)

In this way understanding is the necessary counterpart of state of mind. Because Dasein is free to discover its own potentiality it finds itself constantly in a position of revealing this to itself. We are this very possibility at every moment of our existence and it is always within our capacity to know what this is, although the kind of knowledge that we refer to here is a non-reflective knowledge. It is pre-verbal understanding.

In the same way in which state of mind cannot be escaped from, understanding cannot be avoided either. We may find that our understanding is a misunderstanding, but at some level we are in touch with our own position and situation in the world.

Understanding is the existential Being of Dasein's own potentiality-for-Being; and it is so in such a way that this Being discloses in itself what its Being is capable of. (Heidegger, 1927:144)

Understanding is thus a kind of self-disclosure. It shows us what our potentiality-for-Being is and opens up our future for us in this manner. State of mind refers to the past of our historical thrownness, whereas understanding refers to the futurity of our possible being. Heidegger calls this kind of Being 'projecting'. This has nothing to do with making definite plans for the future, but rather with our attitude and stance towards it.

Projecting has nothing to do with comporting oneself towards a plan that has been thought out, and in accordance with which Dasein arranges its Being. On the contrary, any Dasein has, as Dasein already projected itself; and as long as it is, it is projecting. As long as it is, Dasein always has understood itself and always will understand itself in terms of possibilities. (Heidegger, 1927:145)

It is now becoming clear that Dasein is characterized by this potential for Being. It never is just what it is, it is always that which it is capable of being and is projecting for itself for the future. As Mulhall points out (Mulhall, 1996:83), Dasein's true existential medium is not actuality but possibility. Heidegger himself says:

Higher than actuality [Wirklichkeit] stands *possibility* [Möglichkeit] (Heidegger, 1927:38).

This has important implications for the question of self-deception. For if Dasein is essentially possibility it will need to be in tune with this possibility if it is to be true to itself. To be out of touch with one's ownmost potential for Being would be to be out of touch with oneself. Our projective understanding of ourselves is an important step on the way towards authentic being in the world.

We shall see in the next chapters how this notion of understanding ourselves as potentiality-for-being becomes particularly important in relation to understanding ourselves as Being-towards-Death. It is thus an authentic way of understanding that will make authenticity possible at all. Of course we must not forget the role of other people in our ability to understand ourselves.

Heidegger in his section on Being-with notes how knowing oneself is grounded in Being-with, which understands primordially. Understanding comes out of an acquaintance with that which is closest to Dasein.

Solicitous concern is understood in terms of what we are concerned with, and along with our understanding of it. Thus in concerned solicitude the Other is proximally disclosed (Heidegger, 1927, 124)

But although it may be through our concern for others that we become capable of such understanding, we need to understand ourselves as well. Indeed, as our mode of being with others happens most of the time in a deficient manner, or at least in an indifferent manner, it is essential that we become 'acquainted with ourselves' (Heidegger, 1927. 124).

9. Discourse

Our understanding of ourselves is considerably enhanced by our human ability to express ourselves in discourse. Discourse is indeed the third modality through which Dasein exists along the three dimensions of care that we have described. When Heidegger refers to speech he begins by considering the Greek word *logos*. He investigates the root and meaning of *logos* and challenges the usual meaning of discourse. He points out that discourse can mean innumerable things. It can be used to indicate that language points to something and that it lets it be shown, or it can point to some way in which we make a judgement or even cover up something and make it seem different than it actually is. With language the possibility of truth and un-truth are posited. Language as a primordial ability of Dasein is therefore also what makes Dasein capable of being authentic or in-authentic. Self-deception may well consist in us concealing the truth of the world to ourselves by speaking about it in a distorted manner. Speech is a way of pointing towards things and interpreting

them. It is, unlike *noein*, pure thinking, not on the level of merely perceiving or seeing what is there.

When something no longer takes the form of just letting something be seen, but is always harking back to something else to which it points, so that it lets something be seen *as* something, it thus acquires a synthesis-structure, and with this it takes over the possibility of covering up. (Heidegger, 1927:34)

Speech in this sense is the very vehicle of Dasein's ability to be in error, to deceive or to self-deceive and it is this capacity for description and therefore false description that may be at the root of our human capacity for self-deception. It may thus be that the very highest of our abilities is also what makes us trip up.

We have already seen how Dasein's Being functions through the existentialia of state of mind and understanding. Understanding and state of mind are complemented by speech and in speech our ability to feel and our ability to find meaning come to its apogee. By expressing state of mind and understanding in speech our inauthenticity can become tangible, but so can our ability for authenticity. Words can help us to formulate things more precisely. Yet, the possible error of what we make of our feeling or our understanding can become emphasized or affirmed, when it is articulated in this manner. The possibility of interpretation is introduced with speech and therefore our ability to deceive ourselves is enhanced as well.

Discourse is existentially equiprimordial with state-of-mind and understanding. The intelligibility of something has always been articulated, even before there is any appropriative interpretation of it. Discourse is the Articulation of intelligibility. Therefore it underlies both interpretation and assertion. That which can be Articulated in interpretation, and thus even more primordially in discourse, is what we have called "meaning". (Heidegger, 1927:161)

Heidegger appears to suggest that the possibility of interpretation that is always there is merely articulated and therefore made concrete through discourse. We cannot therefore blame the possibility for untruth or self-

deception on discourse, but we must note that it is discourse that allows it to become established and rather more difficult to get rid of.

We must remember that all language is merely based in something that it refers to, that it describes, that it makes sense of. It is therefore once removed from whatever it is describing and in the process of reference and description it may attribute meanings falsely. In order to use language properly we have to have the ability to hear, or hearken, carefully and accurately.

Hearkening too has the kind of Being of the hearing which understands (Heidegger, 1927:163)

We listen and hear meanings in an understanding, interpretative way. We do not simply take in the sensory signals and render precisely what has been conveyed to us. We are not like computers, capable of accurately returning only as much as is put into us. We rather refer everything to our own understanding, which is complex and riddled with bias.

Likewise, when we are explicitly hearing the discourse of another, we proximally understand what is said, or -to put it more exactly- we are already with him, in advance, alongside the entity which the discourse is about. On the other hand, what we proximally hear is *not* what is expressed in the utterance. (Heidegger, 1927:164)

Our ability to hear is the same as our ability to interpret, to understand and to misunderstand. We use speech, both when speaking and hearing to make approximations of our real experience. These approximations are mostly distortions. We have to be aware that the distortions serve us well in that they allow us to understand others or ourselves in an approximate way, i.e. they allow us to communicate. Yet this approximation may be more of an alienation than we might admit to ourselves. We shall return to this important point when we consider self-deception further down. But we must now turn towards Heidegger's discussion of authenticity and inauthenticity in a more direct


manner since they are the concepts Heidegger uses instead of the concept of self-deception.

10. Summary

In summary we have now considered some of the fundamental ways in which Dasein's structure of care is modulated and we have found that it is Care and its various structures and modalities which underpins all of Dasein's experiences and projects.

Dasein is in the world in three fundamental ways: through being thrown into a world, being fallen with other people, and through its ownmost existence. These three ways are always embedded in Dasein's experience of temporality. Dasein relates on these three levels of its existence through its capacity for disposition, understanding and discourse. Dasein's struggles with its tendency to be taken over by the world and by others has become evident and we have seen the fundamental role that anxiety has to play in allowing Dasein to uncover its potential for being itself. Theodore Kisiel's Schematism of Existence according to Heidegger, renders the dynamic interactions between these concepts well (Kisiel, 1995:192). However they do not fully account for the concepts discussed in this paper. Below is a summary of our own findings at this stage.

Figure 1.1 Central Features of Dasein.



The figure has been derived from Heidegger's work and shows the dynamic interactions between the various characteristics of Dasein. It demonstrates the importance of the dimensions of time and care as the fundamental parameters for Dasein's existence.

We will now proceed to examine how these various structures of Dasein form the basis for our struggle with the tension between authentic and inauthentic ways of being.

Chapter Two

Heidegger's views on inauthenticity and authenticity.

1. Introduction

When Heidegger makes the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity he does not raise one to a higher level than the other (1927:43). He denies trying to evaluate them ethically although he often shows a clear preference for authenticity over inauthenticity. The word that Heidegger actually uses for authentic is *eigentlich*, which does not in fact mean authentic, which would be *authentisch* in German (Cohn, 2002). *Eigentlich*, means 'own'. It might be more proper to think of *eigentlich* existence as 'owned' existence and *uneigentlich* existence as 'not owned' existence. King talks about owned and disowned existence or about 'being one's own self and of being a disowned self' (King 2001:40). Essentially what the distinction relates to is to the fact that Dasein's capacity for 'mineness' can be either assumed with lucidity and responsibility or it can be lived in a detached and casual manner.

Although this suggests that Dasein could achieve authenticity in the long term and leave inauthenticity behind, this is not the case. Dasein, according to Heidegger seems to be doomed to continue to be both authentic and inauthentic throughout its existence. As we have noted Heidegger's analysis claims to be strictly ontological. In an ontological sense then human beings are capable of both being authentic and inauthentic. Heidegger observes the very conditions of the everyday existence of Dasein and points out that people are bound to be sometimes authentic and sometimes inauthentic. Both possibilities are equally valid ontological conditions that Dasein will encounter and experience. To be fully human inevitably involves both inauthentic and authentic existence.

As modes of Being, *authenticity* and *inauthenticity* (these expressions have been chosen terminologically in a strict sense) are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein whatsoever is characterised by mineness. But the inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify any 'less' Being or any 'lower' degree of Being. Rather it is the case that even in its fullest concretion Dasein can be characterized by inauthenticity - when busy, when excited, when interested, when ready for enjoyment. (Heidegger, 1927:43)

What Heidegger appears to be saying then, is that Dasein will inevitably lean towards an inauthentic stance when it is fully absorbed by everyday activities. Thus Heidegger indicates that inauthenticity is grounded in actuality, whereas authenticity is grounded in possibility. As human beings we are both actuality and possibility. Although Dasein is fundamentally defined by its potentiality, it inevitably becomes absorbed by the actuality of its world. Its thrownness and facticity, as well as its fallenness will necessitate an inauthentic absorbed way of being-in-the-world at times. This is stated more clearly in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, where Heidegger says:

Inauthentic self-understanding experiences the authentic Dasein as such precisely in its peculiar "actuality", if we may so say, and in a genuine way. The genuine, actual, though inauthentic understanding of the self takes place in such a way that this self, the self of our thoughtlessly random, common, everyday existence "reflects" itself from out of that to which it has given itself over. (Heidegger, 1982:160/161)

Although Heidegger aims for moral neutrality he is quite clear that Dasein is potentiality and loses this potentiality regularly in the actuality of everyday existence. His objective however was to describe and understand Being and particularly Dasein's Being, not to prescribe a particular pathway for this Being. His observations must be seen in this light. His explication of the human tendency to be inauthentic is meant to reveal Dasein's ontological possibility as well as Dasein's essential tendency to fall amongst others in an imperfect world, foregoing its ownmost potentiality for being.

The question obviously arises whether his theories of authenticity and inauthenticity are relevant to the elucidation of a notion of self-deception,

since he usually avoids the use of the word 'self', preferring Dasein on most occasions. Heidegger made it particularly clear in the lectures quoted above, which he gave at the University of Marburg in the summer of 1927 and which are now published in English as The Basic Problems of Phenomenology that authenticity and inauthenticity are however directly relevant to this issue. He shows that in spite of his lack of emphasis on self he does recognize the importance of Dasein's fundamental mineness. This mineness makes Dasein affirm its own existence as distinct from anything else. This makes it possible for Dasein to do so authentically, i.e. in a manner that is true to itself, or inauthentically, i.e. in a manner that is not true to itself. Although in much of Sein und Zeit this is not clear, he spells it out clearly in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology:

The Dasein exists in the manner of being-in-the-world and as such *it is for the sake of its own self*. It is not the case that this being just simply is; instead, so far as it is, it is occupied with its own capacity to be. (Heidegger 1982:170)

Dasein is thus involved in being for the sake of its own self. It is at all times preoccupied with its capacity for being. Being, as we have seen is an issue for it, but in particular its own Being. Dasein is thus, in fact, concerned with whether it is being itself or not. In the following text Heidegger states quite boldly that Dasein always has the possibility of being itself or not being itself:

It *is* in such a way that it is in a certain way *its own*, it *has itself*, and only on that account can it *lose* itself. Because selfhood belongs to existence, as in some manner "being-one's-own", the existent Dasein can *choose itself on purpose* and determine its existence primarily and chiefly starting from that choice; that is, it can exist authentically. However, it can also let itself be determined in its being by others and thus exist *inauthentically* by existing primarily in forgetfulness of its own self. (Heidegger 1982:170)

Choosing authentic being is always possible, but inauthenticity is equally possible. In some ways the two are equal and both are necessary. There is

nothing wrong with inauthenticity. It is part and parcel of Dasein's being in the world.

We have already said that inauthentic existence does not mean an apparent existence or an ungenuine existence. What is more, inauthenticity belongs to the essential nature of factical Dasein. Authenticity is only a modification but not a total obliteration of inauthenticity. (Heidegger, 1927: 171)

Yet, as we read Heidegger's descriptions of the way in which Dasein lets itself be led astray in this inauthentic manner we cannot fail but notice that whilst inauthenticity is described as intrinsic to Dasein's being, it is shown to be less commendable than authenticity. Heidegger indicates, if only between the lines, that the authentic path is preferable and that the perfectibility of Dasein's being-in-the-world must at the end of the day be what makes life interesting and worthwhile. Kellner has discussed the controversy over Heidegger's implied ethical system with great clarity (Kellner, 1992). He has shown that whilst Heidegger claims that his terms are purely descriptive and ontological they are actually evaluative and ontic at the same time. As Kellner shows, Heidegger's descriptions of the ways, in which we fall and remain carelessly absorbed in inauthenticity, speak volumes. They are descriptions of negative behaviour, couched in terms of 'dispersion' or 'distraction', 'evasion' or 'loss'. There can be little doubt that inauthenticity is a questionable state of being. The alternative is better. Authenticity is the goal. However his view is that authenticity can only be won against the background of inauthenticity and thus requires the shadow of inauthenticity in order to be able to shine its own light. Inauthenticity remains far more dominant a state of being than one might assume to be the case. King says:

Dasein's fundamental tendency is to turn away from himself to a self-forgetful absorption in his occupations in company with other people. Before his existence can be properly his own, Dasein has usually to wrest it back from its lostness to the world. (King, 2000:41)

This already indicates the struggle that Dasein is engaged with in order to wrest itself from being lost in the world of things and other people. There is a constant challenge for Dasein to become more true to its own potential, rather than letting itself be absorbed by the actual world it lives in. We are the entity for which the very Being that we are is an issue and our comportment towards our own Being is of foremost importance to what we become. Dasein is in this sense its own possibility and has the ability to project itself one way or another.

And because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility it *can*, in its very Being, 'choose' itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only 'seem' to do so. But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be authentic - that is, something of its own - can it have lost itself and not yet won itself. (Heidegger, 1927:42)

Heidegger thus states clearly that the possibility of authenticity is always bound up with the possibility of inauthenticity. In a sense the two are inseparable and Dasein is always faced with the challenge of winning itself. Even though we are always ourselves and nobody else we can be ourselves in a non-consuming, inauthentic manner. Each of us has to assume responsibility for ourselves if we are to win our true ownership over this mineness. The points to retain then are that: first of all Dasein can only exist inauthentically in so far as it has the possibility of authentic existence. Secondly Dasein can only exist authentically in so far as it has the possibility of existing inauthentically. Thirdly pure inauthenticity is not possible, since it is a modification of authenticity. Fourthly pure authenticity is impossible since inauthenticity always remains in the background. Having established these basic principles, we now need to examine Dasein's inauthentic ways of being in more detail.

2. Fallenness

Dasein as an everyday Being there finds itself disclosing Being-in-the-world in a particular manner. As part of its everyday existence:

...there is revealed a basic kind of Being which belongs to everydayness; we call this the "*falling*" of Dasein. This term does not express any negative evaluation, but is used to signify that Dasein is proximally and for the most part alongside the 'world' of its concern. (Heidegger, 1927:175)

Dasein is inevitably concerned with the world in which it finds itself. This world into which Dasein is thrown presents Dasein with a particularly appropriate mode of being. This mode of being is one of just becoming part of a world that already exists. This world is the world of the 'they', as we have seen earlier. We must remember again that the 'they-self' is that inauthentic mode of being of Dasein in relation to a world in which it has to function on an everyday basis. As Heidegger points out there is nothing intrinsically negative in this. Dasein will be fallen no matter what it does, for that is the inevitable counterpart of being absorbed in the world. The fallenness manifests as a being taken over by the 'they' and although this is about obedience to the anonymous one it is also essentially about a particular way of being, or rather not being, oneself.

This "absorption in..." [Aufgehen bei...] has mostly the character of Being-lost in the publicness of the "they". Dasein has, in the first instance, fallen away [abgefallen] from itself as an authentic potentiality for Being its Self, and has fallen into the 'world'. "Fallenness" into the 'world' means an absorption in Being-with-one-another, in so far as the latter is guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. (Heidegger, 1927:175)

Dasein maintains itself in conformity with others most of the time. In ordinary everyday circumstances Dasein is not aware of its unique potentiality for individuality (*Jemeinigkeit*). People are concerned to calculate their position in the social hierarchy and maintain their social status (*Abstaendigkeit*) (126). This leads to them feeling taken over by the other and living in accordance with what they think is expected of them. What 'they' approve of, praise and

command is what matters. It is important to note that Heidegger insists that this fallenness with the 'They' is a primary and fundamental aspect of Dasein. Dasein is not some sort of pure being which then becomes taken over by others. There is not some original state of bliss from which Dasein falls into sin.

So neither must we take the fallenness of Dasein as a 'fall' from a purer and higher 'primal status'. Not only do we lack any experience of this ontically, but ontologically we lack any possibilities or clues for Interpreting it. (Heidegger, 1927:176)

Dasein is a process of falling right from the start, as right from the start we are with others and we are inclined to take over their views and opinions. Our initial mode of understanding the world is by understanding it in the way They do. This is similar to his notion that we are introduced to the world of things by learning to know them as things to use, things that are ready-to-hand, before we can become aware of them as existing in their own right as present-at-hand. With objects it is only after they break down that we become conscious of their presence-at-hand status. Similarly with other people we begin by experiencing their presence as determining our own behaviour and it is only after we experience the discomfort of anxiety in relation to others and ourselves that we can begin to individualize and distinguish ourselves as separate entities with our ownmost potentiality for Being. Therefore fallenness is as essential to Dasein as ready-to-handness is to things.

"Inauthenticity" does not mean anything like Being-no-longer-in-the-world, but amounts rather to a distinctive kind of Being-in-the-World - the kind which is completely fascinated by the 'world' and by the Dasein-with of Others in the "they". Not-Being-its-self [Das Nicht-es-selbst-sein] functions as a *positive* possibility of that entity which, in its essential concern, is absorbed in a world. This kind of *not-Being* has to be conceived as that kind of Being which is closest to Dasein and in which Dasein maintains itself for the most part. (Heidegger, 1927:176)

In other words: we are not just inauthentic out of laziness, but because it is the very essence of Dasein's nature to care and to be absorbed in the world amongst others. It is part of our ontological status that we should be absorbed

in the world before we can become truly aware of our ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Falling is the way in which we are part of the world and not yet truly aware of our ability to be separate.

In falling, Dasein *itself* as factual Being-in-the-world, is something *from* which it has already fallen away. And it has not fallen into some entity which it comes upon for the first time in the course of its Being, or even one which it has not come upon at all; it has fallen into the *world*, which itself belongs to its Being. Falling is a definite existential characteristic of Dasein itself. (Heidegger 1927:176)

Dasein is inevitably fallen in its world and this world is in fact a part of Dasein itself, as Dasein is never in isolation and never without a world to which it has a relationship. Now Heidegger points out very definitely that Dasein must be fallen, since this is part of its ontological make-up. No amount of progress and authenticity will alter this fact.

We would also misunderstand the ontologico-existential structure of falling (*des Verfallens*) if we were to ascribe to it the sense of a bad and deplorable ontical property of which, perhaps, more advanced stages of human culture might be able to rid themselves. (Heidegger, 1927:176)

It is quite clear that falling is an essential and positive part of being human and not just a negative. It has a role to play in Dasein's being in its world. We are in the world of other people in such a way that we are not directly in charge of our own being. As we have seen above, Dasein originally considers itself to be a *They-self*. It has the anonymous quality of being taken over by the idea of what 'one' should do or not do.

This Being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein completely into the kind of Being of 'the others', in such a way, indeed, that the Others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the "they" is unfolded. We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as *they[man]* take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as *they* see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the 'great mass' as *they* shrink back; we find 'shocking' what *they* find shocking. The "they", which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness. (Heidegger, 1927:126-127)

The "They", das Man, or the anonymous one, is what characterizes our falling behaviour. In this way of being with others in our world we become average and reduced to the common denominator of what we imagine the crowd would expect of us. This public and average way of being levels us down.

This care of averageness reveals in turn an essential tendency of Dasein which we call the "levelling down" [Einebnung] of all possibilities of Being. (Heidegger, 1927:127)

Clearly this tendency to let ourselves be levelled down and become averaged out is bound up with an inauthentic mode of being. In being in this manner we do not even see our ownmost potentiality for Being, let alone act on it. Our mode of being has become that of what is our idea of what is expected of us by others, but it is actually us being average, without a sense of our own ability to claim a more authentic stance.

This falling and this living in the anonymous attitude of the 'They' is an everyday tendency and precedes our ability to see our own potentiality for being. It is a self-forgetfulness rather than a self-deceptiveness. It is a state that we shall always return to, no matter how adept we may become at recognizing our ownmost potential for being.

Idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity are the characteristics of this state of falling into one's world with other people and we shall consider each of these more carefully below. Idle talk is a way of groundlessly floating amongst others, of talking about this and that without ever really reflecting on anything, gratuitously going along with the interest of the moment. Curiosity is what makes us follow the path of the many, disclosing everything and anything, but leaving us everywhere and nowhere. In this way things become ambiguous, they are no longer one thing or another, they are everything at once. Finding ourselves in this confusion our ownmost potentiality for Being is suppressed,

hidden amongst everything and nothing. But while idle talk and curiosity leave us lost and confused we cannot help but to continue to be tempted to flee away from ourselves in this manner. Heidegger says:

Being-in -the-world is in itself *tempting* (Heidegger, 1927:177)

It is tempting because letting ourselves fall into the world in this manner makes it seem as if everything is in its place. It is as if, through curiosity, idle talk and ambiguity we can see and understand everything and thus do not have to worry or question ourselves.

The supposition of the "they" that one is leading and sustaining a full and genuine 'life' brings Dasein a *tranquillity*, for which everything is 'in the best of order' and all doors are open. Falling being-in-the-world, which tempts itself, is at the same time *tranquillizing* [*beruhigend*](Heidegger, 1927:177)

As Dasein gives in to this tranquillization it does however slip away from itself more and more. Although it sounds as if this falling into the world should appease us the tranquillization is far from peace giving.

However, this tranquillity in inauthentic Being does not seduce one into stagnation and inactivity, but drives one into uninhibited 'hustle' ["Betriebs"]. Being-fallen into the 'world' does not now somehow come to rest. The tempting tranquillization *aggravates* the falling. (Heidegger, 1927:177-178)

Because we are so absorbed in the world we lose track of our ownmost possibility for Being and go from one thing to another instead of finding a place to rest in ourselves. In the knowing about the world that comes with curiosity, idle talk and ambiguity we do not actually learn anything about anything. We do not even know what questions are worth asking at bottom and we drift along into alienation. We are alienated from ourselves and are out of touch with what

we are and what being is and what it is that really matters. Yet this alienation may manifest through an apparent enquiry and talking about things.

Yet this alienation cannot mean that Dasein gets factually torn away from itself. On the contrary, this alienation drives it into a kind of Being which borders on the most exaggerated 'self-dissection', tempting itself with all possibilities of explanation, so that the very 'characterologies' and 'typologies' which it has brought about are themselves already becoming something that cannot be surveyed at a glance. This alienation *closes off* from Dasein its authenticity and possibility, even if only the possibility of genuinely foundering. (Heidegger, 1927:178)

This is quite an interesting statement since it suggests that Dasein becomes taken over by a tendency to dissect itself and to think about itself in terms of typologies, in other words to make a kind of psychological analysis of itself, rather than being capable of just being itself, even if this being would involve its foundering. Clearly Heidegger's notion of inauthenticity and falling is quite different to the usual sense we have of inauthenticity. Falling is to be found in more places and situations than we would initially suspect. Yet it is important to note that as Dasein surrenders itself in this manner it does not become other than it is, but rather becomes itself in its inauthentic modality.

The alienation of falling - at once tempting and tranquillizing - leads by its own movement, to Dasein's getting *entangled* in itself. (Heidegger, 1927:178)

The downward plunge of Dasein into inauthenticity is thus a plunge into itself, into its own basic groundlessness and everyday nullity. One of the problems is that this falling into groundless everydayness is interpreted by the 'They' as what is required of a person in order to function and is therefore lost and labelled as 'living concretely'.

This 'movement' of Dasein in its own Being, we call its "*downward plunge*" [*Absturz*]. Dasein plunges out of itself into itself, into the groundlessness and nullity of inauthentic everydayness. (Heidegger, 1927:178)

Because there is no stopping this falling as there is no ground left, since there is neither reference to an external nor an internal reality, there can be no understanding and this makes the falling endless leading to an experience of turbulence.

Since the understanding is thus constantly torn away from authenticity and into the "they" (though always with a sham of authenticity), the movement of falling is characterized by *turbulence* [Wirbel]. (Heidegger, 1927:178)

As long as Dasein is, it is always in danger of finding itself in this process of being thrown into the world and falling into this kind of turbulence towards the inauthenticity of the 'They'.

Dasein's facticity is such that as long as it is what it is, Dasein remains in the throw, and is sucked into the turbulence of the "they's" inauthenticity. (Heidegger, 1927:179)

Obviously it is our very thrownness that leads to the falling of our relationships with other people. This falling is a consequence of our being thrown and not yet in touch with our ownmost potentiality for being ourselves. The question remains how we can extract ourselves from this relentless process of falling into inauthenticity, how we can retrieve ourselves authentically and come into ownership of ourselves. Heidegger argues earlier that:

If Dasein discovers the world in its own way and brings it close, if it discloses to itself its own authentic Being, then this discovery of the 'world' and this disclosure of Dasein are always accomplished as a clearing-away of concealments and obscurities, as a breaking up of the disguises with which Dasein bars its own way. (Heidegger, 1927:167)

So how do we become capable of tearing away all these disguises? How do we stop hiding ourselves away from ourselves? It is not easy to do, for fallenness has its advantages. As we have seen fallenness is a positive phenomenon, which

is intricately, linked with the way in which Dasein is in relation to others. The fascination that Heidegger refers to will always be there. It can never be completely taken away. This must mean that Dasein will always have a tendency to inauthentic being. Whether this also means that Dasein is self-deceiving is a different matter. In order to tackle the inauthentic tendencies of Dasein we need to confront them directly and look at them one by one.

3. Idle talk

Heidegger introduces the concept of idle talk (*Gerede*) in contrast with his concept of talk or rather of discourse (*Rede*) as it is usually translated. He juxtaposes idle talk and discourse by showing that discourse is a valuable way for Dasein to express itself and that as part of discourse we have the ability to remain silent. A good use of discourse is not to speak at length, for this kind of speaking might in fact mean that one is not saying very much at all and that one is hiding a lack of true understanding about what one is speaking of.

On the contrary, talking extensively about something, covers it up and brings what is understood to a sham clarity- the unintelligibility of the trivial. (Heidegger, 1927:165)

Our valuable ability for speech carries with it the dangerous ability to trivialize and betray the very thing that we should be making the most of. As usual Heidegger describes the two sides of the same coin. Discourse is a way of disclosing Dasein's most precious Being, and idle talk, which is its counterpart, is a fundamental ability to cover up this Being. As always we cannot have one without the other. By positing the disclosing ability of discourse, the closing off of idle talk is instantly introduced.

Discourse, which belongs to the essential state of Dasein's Being and has a share in constituting Dasein's disclosedness, has the possibility of becoming idle talk. And when it does so, it serves not so much to keep Being-in-the-world open for us in an articulated understanding, as rather to close it off, and cover up the entities within-the-world. (Heidegger, 1927:169)

Discourse thus has the capacity and function of articulating understanding, but it can be diverted into idle talk where it does the opposite. Idle talk covers over rather than disclosing. It is the instrument of inauthenticity rather than of authenticity. But now Heidegger makes an interesting point:

To do this, one need not aim to deceive. (Heidegger, 1927:169)

Idle talk is not a deception or a self-deception; it is rather a failure to use the instrument of discourse in a disclosing fashion. Again we find that inauthenticity is not at all the same as self-deception.

Interestingly in light of his observations Heidegger regards reticence when one is not at ease with speaking as an expression of authenticity. Idle talk on the contrary is an expression of inauthentic use of speech. Yet silence is not always the authentic option. In order to be authentically silent one must have something of value to say. Reticence is that quality of keeping silent that shows that genuine reflection is taking place in the dialogue.

To be able to keep silent, Dasein must have something to say - that is, it must have at its disposal an authentic and rich disclosedness of itself. In that case one's reticence [Verschwiegenheit] makes something manifest, and does away with 'idle talk' ["Gerede"]. As a mode of discoursing, reticence articulates the intelligibility of Dasein in so primordial a manner that it gives rise to a potentiality-for-hearing which is genuine, and to a Being-with-one-another which is transparent. (Heidegger, 1927:165)

Thus Heidegger shows how idle talk stands in the way of a real meeting and being with the other and how a refusing to be drawn into unnecessary empty talking may give rise to the discovery of one's ability to truly hear and communicate. This is of course a crucial statement in relation to psychotherapy. All at once Heidegger shows the emptiness of speaking for the sake of speaking and the desirability of remaining reticent enough to do justice

to what there is to be heard and understood. Nevertheless silence alone is no guarantee that meaning will be found. Abstinence from idle talk alone is no direct short cut to authenticity or true communication. Yet idle talk is one of the ways in which we remain alienated from others and from our own Dasein at the same time. It is one of the eminently inauthentic ways of existing.

In the same way in which Heidegger always insists upon the acceptance of inauthentic Dasein as part of its way of being, he also insists on not considering idle talk as a pejorative term. Idle talk is first and foremost a usual way for Dasein to relate to the They. Language manifests itself in the first place as a way of communicating with others and this will often be initially a fairly trivial process during which much unclarity and obscuring persists. The nature of us being with others implies a need to communicate and thus this inauthentic exchange cannot be avoided and is a necessary aspect of our Being.

Being-with-one-another takes place in talking with one another and in concern with what is said-in-the-talk. To this Being-with-one-another, the fact that talking is going on is a matter of consequence. (Heidegger, 1927:168)

Perhaps then, we must conclude that discovering the possibility of speech with others and communication with them is the more important fundamental discovery and that an awareness of the quality of that discourse comes later on. It may be that we need to accept some idle talk along with our ability to communicate. This does not mean of course that we should content ourselves with mere idle talk when we are capable of so much more. Average talking has to start with idle talk because it is more about actually engaging with the other than it is about being clear about what it is one is talking about.

And because this discoursing has lost its primary relationship-of-Being towards the entity talked about, or else has never achieved such a relationship, it does not communicate in such a way as to let this entity be appropriated in a primordial manner, but communicates rather by following the route of *gossiping* and *passing the word along*. (Heidegger, 1927:168)

In this way discourse is turned into gossip. The things that are said bear no true relationship to what is the case and yet as they have been said they become like a new reality of their own and are adhered to and reproduced by people as if they were true. The same process occurs in speech and in writing. Heidegger is acutely aware of the possibility that writing turns into a second rate activity where things are reported without foundation. He terms this kind of writing 'scribbling' [*das Geschreibe*"].

It feeds upon superficial reading [dem Angelesenen]. The average understanding of the reader will *never be able* to decide what has been drawn from primordial sources with a struggle and how much is just gossip. The average understanding, moreover, will not want any such distinction, and does not need it, because, of course, it understands everything. (Heidegger, 1927:169)

It is interesting to note how Heidegger argues that the kind of inauthentic communication that most of us are prone to favouring maintains itself by a pretence to understanding. Because idle talk and scribbling are not based on any foundation and are groundless, it is easy to maintain the belief that one has already understood or that there is really nothing more to know or understand. It is even more significant that Heidegger recognizes that this way of groundlessly proceeding amongst things is utterly attractive to us.

Idle talk is the possibility of understanding everything without previously making the thing one's own. If this were done, idle talk would founder; and it already guards against such a danger. Idle talk is something which anyone can rake up; it not only releases one from the task of genuinely understanding, but develops an undifferentiated kind of intelligibility, for which nothing is closed off any longer. (Heidegger, 1927:169)

In this passage Heidegger suggests that really knowing something, or really making it one's own requires effort. Discourse is based on the articulation of what has thus been appropriated. Idle talk is rooted in the quasi knowledge that is based on a lack of effort in coming to really know something. To be able to properly articulate the world in speech we have to investigate it thoroughly. At first we relate to the world without making this effort. We seem to have an

endless inclination to be complacent about the world, other people, existence and ourselves. Whilst we are capable of facing things as they are it appears to be tempting always to see only part of what is. We make ourselves believe that we already know what we are whilst in fact refusing to even see or investigate. This human ability to slouch and not face things as they really are, is the ground on which self-deception breeds. When Heidegger describes this ground, or rather this lack of ground, this groundlessness of human being he is not describing it as a form of self-deception however. For self-deception to occur we would have to be aware of truth and still maintain ourselves in error. In idle talk we simply do not know that we do not know. We merely let ourselves sink into an easy going along with what is being said by others. We do not yet make the effort to stand out in the way we are capable of doing.

As we shall discuss in the latter part of this dissertation psychotherapists are constantly faced with their clients' desire to remain ignorant of the very things that they need to face up to in order to overcome their predicaments. Much of psychotherapy is a process of gradually changing idle talk into reflective and careful discourse. It can take quite a while to become aware of our capacity for not saying anything whilst chatting away and to learn to speak meaningfully again. Following Heidegger's discussion of idle talk, we can see how this chatting away is not exactly a form of deception or self-deception since we are not yet able to see things as they really are, let alone to articulate them through proper speech. We are instead seduced into the belief that things are just this superficial and we maintain this illusion by continuing to pass over the surface and avoid the depth.

Idle talk does not have the kind of Being which belongs to *consciously passing off* something as something else. The fact that something has been said groundlessly, and then gets passed along in further retelling, amounts to perverting the act of disclosing [Erschliessen] into an act of closing off [Verschliessen]. For what is said is always understood proximally as 'saying' something - that is, an uncovering something. Thus, by its very nature, idle talk is a closing-off, since to go back to the ground of what is talked about is something which it *leaves undone*. (Heidegger, 1927:169)

What Heidegger is saying then, is that we simply do not bother to go to the roots of things and check the basis of what we are talking about when we talk idly. A kind of illusion is created, where we believe that we know how things are when we have not even really looked at them at all. Idle talk, although it starts out as an innocent and rather fundamental way of being in discourse, ends up as a dangerous activity, which actually closes us to our own possibilities whilst making us think that we have already grasped them. This is still not about self-deception, for we do not only not know, but we also do not know that we do not know. Indeed we positively believe that we know all there is to know and that we are communicating it very effectively to others and receiving similarly clear messages in return.

This everyday way in which things have been interpreted is one into which Dasein has grown in the first instance, with never a possibility of extrication. In it, out of it, and against it, all genuine understanding, interpreting, and communicating, all re-discovering and appropriating anew, are performed. (Heidegger, 1927:169)

At first glance what Heidegger says here would not give us very much hope, but it is the English translation that brings in this misleading insinuation that we are doomed to this kind of primary misinterpretation. In fact Heidegger makes it clear that it is only at the outset of life that we start out in this vein, implying that we need to grow out of this mode of operating as we mature. At first we cannot help being fooled and determined by hearsay and gossip. If we are to extricate ourselves of the meanings that others convey to us in this way we have to re-discover and work hard at checking things for ourselves. For on the whole we experience this groundless being as our everyday reality and we easily maintain ourselves in these states of mind created for us and conveyed to us by other people. We keep ourselves uprooted from our ability to be authentically in the world as the interpretations of the 'They' keep us contentedly floating along.

Yet the obviousness and self-assurance of the average ways in which things have been interpreted, are such that while the particular Dasein drifts along towards an ever-increasing groundlessness as it floats, the uncanniness of this floating remains hidden from it under their protecting shelter. (Heidegger, 1927:170)

It is therefore far from easy to shake oneself out of this going along with the groundless reality of idle talk. Everything is set to keep one in this state of belief in one's own understanding. The attitude of idle talk is an attitude of blindness, but much as it is blindness it is an innocent blindness. It is the blindness of not knowing any better. It is blindness in relation to a world that still remains hidden and has not yet been shown in its true reality. It has not been un-hidden yet. Our blindness at this stage is ignorance, not a self-deception.

4. Curiosity

It seems very strange that Dasein should be so blind for we have already seen that Dasein is primarily care. As care it is preoccupied, concerned with the world. This concern has been referred to as a kind of sight (*Sicht*) and has been shown to manifest as circumspection (*Umsicht*) in relation to objects and solicitude (*"Rucksicht"*) in relation to other people. Dasein has the ability to disclose the world and be like a clearing in a forest where things come to light. It has an everyday tendency to see and encounter the world in a particular manner.

We designate this tendency by the term "*curiosity*" [*Neugier*], which characteristically is not confined to seeing, but expresses the tendency towards a peculiar way of letting the world be encountered by us in perception. (Heidegger, 1927:170)

It is a kind of fundamental ability of Dasein to behold the world in this way. We cannot imagine being in the world without this and this has been recognized

in all classical philosophy, since curiosity and wonder are often referred to as the start of all philosophy. Our ability to see is directly linked to the fundamental ontological characteristic of care. The world matters to us and our ability to see is an extension of our letting the world matter to us. Seeing is a form of care. Yet, as before, with our fundamental ability of speech, which manifests itself through its limited form of idle talk, here too, the fundamental ability of sight manifests itself in a specific manner through curiosity. This 'curiosity' is another word for our fundamental ability to take heed of things, to look at them, to be interested in them. It could, in principle, be a way of reaching out to the world and seeing it as it really is.

When curiosity has become free, however, it concerns itself with seeing, not in order to understand what is seen (that is, to come into a Being towards it) but *just* in order to see. It seeks novelty only in order to leap from it anew to another novelty. In this kind of seeing, that which is an issue for care does not lie in grasping something and being knowingly in the truth; it lies rather in its possibilities of abandoning itself to the world. (Heidegger, 1927:172)

In curiosity we abandon ourselves to the world and that which we see. In consequence this kind of curiosity closes us off from the very things we extend ourselves towards. Instead of being open to the world and seeing it really and as it is, we avoid looking too carefully at anything we see at any time. We merely proceed in a sequence of sights, in an endless rushing towards new things and new experiences. In a kind of abuse of our capacity for sight we turn it into a frantic looking for the sake of looking. Seeing is no longer part of this kind of looking. We search but never find.

Consequently it does not seek the leisure of tarrying observantly, but rather seeks the restlessness and the excitement of continual novelty and changing encounters. In not tarrying, curiosity is concerned with the constant possibility of distraction. (Heidegger, 1927:172)

We allow ourselves to be drawn from one thing to the next in a never-ending sequence of curiosity. Things are passed by in this way. They are not paid adequate attention. There is a kind of race on from one thing to another. It is the quality of being able to pay attention to one thing and another that is being exploited rather than the ability to pay attention itself. We are distracting ourselves from ever having to look too carefully and take things in, understanding them. We are jumping along the world in a never ceasing sequence of amazing experiences.

But Heidegger warns that the ability to be amazed is not properly employed in this way either. True amazement comes from a direct and real confrontation with something, not from the short-lived sudden pleasure of seeing one thing only to move on to another. In this kind of curiosity we never dwell anywhere long enough to make our home or make any real observation about where we are at all.

Curiosity is everywhere and nowhere. This mode of Being-in-the-world reveals a new kind of Being of everyday Dasein - a kind in which Dasein is constantly uprooting itself. (Heidegger, 1927:173)

Curiosity is thus very similar to idle talk. We find ourselves constantly moving on and disconnecting ourselves precisely when we could be taking the time to see what is there and become more truly authentic in the process. In both situations Dasein is in a hurry to belong to the They and have the latest on what is fashionable or in the running. In idle talk and gossip we simply repeat the hearsay that determines our opinions and states of mind. In curiosity we turn to the latest things that we must have read or seen to be up to date. There can be no peace or rest, for in such a place we would actually come to face a clearing where the world would really come to light. Always on the go, we miss the very point of life itself. This is a kind of living without boundaries, without roots, preventing us from getting to know life and ourselves.

Curiosity, for which nothing is closed off, and idle talk, for which there is nothing that is not understood, provide themselves, (that is, the Dasein which is in this manner [dem so seienden Dasein]) with the guarantee of a 'life' which, supposedly, is so genuinely 'lively'. But with this supposition a third phenomenon now shows itself, by which the disclosedness of everyday Dasein is characterized. (Heidegger, 1927:173)

5. Ambiguity

This third phenomenon is that of ambiguity, which Heidegger recognizes as a fundamental aspect of Being-in-the-world in an inauthentic manner, when idle talk and curiosity dominate. As long as we go about our business with the attitude that accepts all the hearsay of gossip and all the new experiences of the fashion following and opportunism that comes with an attitude of curiosity we shall find ourselves in a world of ambiguity. We find ourselves doing one thing one day and another the next. We believe 'a' today and 'b' tomorrow. Everything we hear and see is contradicted by another thing. We become incapable of ever finding a true sense of direction. We must remain open for the ambiguous changing realities that we have opted for.

Dasein is always ambiguously 'there' -that is to say, in that public disclosedness of Being-with-one-another where the loudest idle talk and the most ingenious curiosity keep 'things moving', where, in everyday manner, everything (and at bottom nothing) is happening. This ambiguity is always tossing to curiosity that which it seeks; and it gives idle talk the semblance of having everything decided in it. (Heidegger, 1927:174)

We become absorbed by a falsehood that does not give us anything to go on. We end up being the hostages to fortune, when all our decisions are based on this blind following on the current fashion or the loudest bid for dominance. We are indeed out of touch with our own ability to judge and see things for ourselves. We are taken over by the world of the 'They' and adrift without a compass.

Being thrown into the world and fallen with others has this effect. It is not something that we can initially avoid. We must encounter this process of ambiguity, after getting sucked into being with others. We are fallen and cannot retrieve ourselves until we have fully experienced the entrapment of our position and find an active way out of it. However we can never fully escape from this process, because the idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity that we have to deal with are a phenomenon inseparable from the basic existential structures of thrownness and fallenness. We shall always retain these as a basis for our being in the world, and in the context of this reality we shall always have to struggle with the processes that keep us in the world with others. The characteristics of idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity are part of our being.

In these, and in the way they are interconnected in their Being, there is revealed a basic kind of Being which belongs to everydayness; we call this the "*falling*" of Dasein. (Heidegger, 1927:175)

It is important to understand how fundamental this falling capacity of Dasein is. Heidegger points out that it is only now that we have carefully looked at how Dasein operates in the world that we can fully appreciate that the inauthentic mode of being is central to our existence. It is not a pathological phenomenon but rather an initial absence of our ability to see our ownmost potentiality for being. It would be difficult to imagine anyone just being authentically in the world. In a sense fallenness and inauthenticity are so fundamental to Dasein that we could not even be authentic if we were not also inauthentic.

"Inauthenticity" does not mean anything like Being-no-longer-in-the-world, but amounts rather to a quite distinctive kind of Being-in-the-world - the kind which is completely fascinated by the 'world' and by the Dasein-with of Others in the "they". Not-Being-its-self [Das Nicht-es-selbst-sein] functions as a *positive* possibility of that entity which, in its essential concern, is absorbed in a world. This kind of *not-Being* has to be conceived as that kind of Being which is

closest to Dasein and in which Dasein maintains itself for the most part. (Heidegger, 1927:176)

In this passage it is clear how inauthentic being takes us over. The German word that has been translated, as 'fascinated' is actually *benommen*, i.e. taken over by, absorbed in. This renders more clearly our initial and to some extent inevitable absorption in the world of the anonymous They. Now the real nature of our Being is revealed. We are not meant to be simply authentic. Because we are Dasein and we are always in a world, we are bound, at times, to become overly absorbed by this world. Similarly, because we are Mitsein, being with others, we are bound to become preoccupied with their particular comportment. The world and others are our concern. As such they will always have a major influence over us. This influence will make us operate in an inauthentic mode. This inauthentic functioning is thus a fundamental part of our actual Being. This is what we are and this is the price we pay for it. Inauthenticity is in some ways inevitable. It is not just the negative counterpart of authenticity and it is not an act of self-deception, but rather one of blind absorption in the world around us. It is the fruit of our not being solipsistically absorbed in ourselves. Heidegger goes as far as to say that we shall continue to be in this inauthentic manner for the most time. In this sense inauthenticity has priority over authenticity. We shall have to carefully consider how we maintain inauthenticity and when and how we may be able to overcome it, or at least counterbalance it with a measure of authentic being. In doing so we must keep in mind that perhaps the most authentic person must also be the most capable of allowing inauthenticity at other times. It would probably be unrealistic and unproductive to attempt to become wholly authentic, certainly it would be impossible to expect to be able to be never inauthentic again, for this would be in contradiction with the ontological character of Dasein and would simply fly in the face of our true Being.

6. Self-forgetfulness

We have now clarified Heidegger's basic position on Dasein's authentic and inauthentic being and have noted that the two are ontologically necessary. We have also noted that inauthenticity is an absorption in the world rather than a form of deliberate self-deception. Inauthenticity is largely about being thrown into the world by default whilst being fallen with others.

Dasein, as a they-self, gets 'lived' by the common-sense ambiguity of that publicness in which nobody resolves upon anything but which has always made its decision. (Heidegger, 1927:299)

The kind of mindless falling in with the They, which is Dasein living like *Das Man*, is the way in which human beings seem to operate for the most part. This is how we live when we cannot do any better. We are self-forgetful and are often not even aware that there is an alternative way of being in the world.

The next step will now be to consider Heidegger's definition of this self-forgetfulness in order to examine whether it could, in principle amount to what we would term self-deception, i.e. to a deliberate lying to oneself. If this were the case then there are three forms of being in un-truth. Firstly there is the undifferentiated way in which we originally relate to the world. Secondly there is the inauthentic mode of living in *Das Man*, fallen in with other people. Thirdly there is potentially our active fleeing into self-forgetting, even when it has become possible to be open to our ownmost potential-for-being-ourselves.

Does Dasein ever actively conceal reality rather than stand in the way of its revelation? If so, does Dasein ever do so deliberately? It will only be possible to find an answer to these questions after first considering how inauthenticity can be overcome to achieve authenticity.

In the next chapter we shall argue that Dasein can attain awareness of its own inauthentic status and overcome it. But first we have to briefly consider whether, according to Heidegger, it may be possible that Dasein would be motivated to hold on to its inauthentic state. The nettle to grasp then is whether Dasein can be seen to artificially maintain its state of fallenness against better knowing. Does Dasein actively conceal reality? Does it seek to keep itself in untruth? Does it actively deceive itself about its being and about its potentiality for Being? If so, why should it do so? What is the purpose of this concealment and this deception? What possible gain can there be in keeping itself under the spell of the They and the rule of the One? Is there such a thing as active self-forgetfulness? How this does manifest and when? How can it be recognized and stopped, if indeed it is objectionable and deleterious for Dasein's well being? We need to carefully consider what Heidegger has to say about the ways in which we continue to keep ourselves in the dark even when there is a possibility of throwing light.

Heidegger makes it clear from the start that he sees the existentiality of Dasein as more fundamental from an ontological point of view than either its authenticity or inauthenticity. Our own existence is always an issue for us and therefore an understanding of how we remain inauthentic is crucial. When we examine average everydayness we see that it contains this possibility of forgetting from the outset.

Dasein's average everydayness, however, is not to be taken as a mere 'aspect'. Here too, and even in the mode of inauthenticity, the structure of existentiality lies *a priori*. And here too Dasein's Being is an issue for it in a definite way; and Dasein comports itself towards it in the mode of average everydayness, even if this is only the mode of fleeing *in the face of it* and forgetfulness *thereof*. (Heidegger, 1927:44)

Dasein's own existence is paramount from the start, even though it flees from this and becomes forgetful of it. Clearly Heidegger wants us to pay attention to the importance of Dasein's ability to flee in the face of its own existence

and becoming forgetful. He comes back to this later, in section 40, where he discusses the basic state of mind of anxiety and he says:

Dasein's absorption in the "they" and its absorption in the 'world' of its concern, make manifest something like a *fleeing* of Dasein in the face of itself - of itself as an authentic potentiality-for-Being-its-Self. (Heidegger, 1927:184)

This reference to fleeing from oneself makes the process of falling seem to entail a more active component than we have acknowledged up to now. Dasein may be absorbed in the world and in others, but it is also apparently doing so at its own convenience, so as not to have to face up to its own potentiality for Being. It sounds very much as if Dasein is indeed capable of letting itself be deliberately absorbed when this seems advantageous for not then having to face up to its potentiality for being itself.

But to bring itself face to face with itself, is precisely what Dasein does *not* do when it thus flees, It turns *away from* itself in accordance with its ownmost inertia [Zug] of falling. (Heidegger, 1927:184)

It is clear from this passage that Heidegger considers that there is an active avoidance that comes into play here. Dasein may find itself originally thrown into a world where it then finds other people that it falls in with. It may initially let itself passively fall into the world of others, but now there is also question of it actively turning away from having to face itself.

Macquarrie and Robinson draw attention to the importance of this passage in a footnote:

The point of this paragraph is that if we are to study the totality of Dasein, Dasein must be brought 'before itself' or 'face to face with itself' ('vor es selbst'); and the fact that Dasein flees 'from itself' or 'in the face of itself' ('vor ihm selbst'), which may seem at first to lead us off the track, is actually very germane to our inquiry. (Heidegger 1962:229)

Indeed the fact that Heidegger notes that Dasein does have this tendency to shirk its responsibility is significant. It goes well beyond the observation that Dasein is inclined to inauthentic falling. Here we are up against a further inauthentic act, which seems rather more deliberate and evasive: the act of fleeing from oneself. In fleeing from ourselves we avoid having to face up to ourselves. We forget that we might be capable of rupturing our inauthentic stance towards the world. Heidegger sees this ability to forget as quite fundamental and primordial:

Even the forgetting of something, in which every relationship of Being towards what one formerly knew has seemingly been obliterated, must be conceived *as a modification of the primordial Being-in;* and this holds for every delusion and for every error. (Heidegger 1927:62)

If forgetting is a modification of our primordial being-in then it must be actively controllable. Forgetting to turn towards ourselves and face up to our ownmost potentiality-for-being could be seen as a kind of deliberate act. Forgetting to notice our inauthenticity is however a further, possibly deliberate, act but this is not considered by Heidegger. It could involve an active self-deception, not about the matter over which we are concerned, but certainly about our own ability to see our own inauthenticity. Heidegger never really clarifies this important aspect of our relationship to ourselves any further. The possibility of this fleeing is ontologically determined, but the manner in which it happens in particular instances is an ontic phenomenon and Heidegger does not deal with it.

As psychotherapy is an ontic pursuit, this matter is in fact of central importance to the present project. We shall have to examine it in greater detail and study how Heidegger sees the process of self-forgetfulness evolving. Before we do so we must first examine how Heidegger describes Dasein's struggles with the overcoming of our inauthenticity. Self-forgetfulness will indeed have a much sharper edge and impact once it is no longer about mere absorption in the world but involves an active turning away from truth

regarding oneself. It is only then that we can consider self-forgetfulness to become associated with self-deception.

Chapter Three

Overcoming Inauthenticity and Self-Deception

1. Truth and the concept of aletheia

Before we can make sense of Heidegger's views on overcoming inauthenticity and attaining authenticity, we need to understand how Heidegger conceives of truth and untruth in general.

Heidegger uses the concept of truth in a very unusual and specific manner. He says that truth is disclosedness or uncoveredness on the one hand and being disclosing or being discovering on the other hand. At the same time he defines truth as the existential ontological foundation of uncovering itself. Truth can apply to anything that is disclosed on the one hand. On the other hand Dasein, according to Heidegger, is unique in being able to be disclosing. For the purpose of this discussion it is the disclosing nature of Dasein that is of most relevance.

Dasein, as constituted by disclosedness, is essentially in the truth. Disclosedness is a kind of Being which is essential to Dasein. *'There is' truth only in so far as Dasein is and so long as Dasein is.* Entities are uncovered only *when Dasein is*, and only as long as Dasein *is*, are they disclosed. (Heidegger, 1927:226)

Dasein obviously plays a crucial role in this world disclosing and this means it plays a major role in bringing out truth. When Heidegger analyses the concept of truth in some detail he comes to the conclusion that truth has to be understood as this kind of uncovering and un-hiding (α-ληθεια). Bringing out of forgetfulness is what the word 'aletheia' literally means and it is this that brings truth.

The most primordial phenomenon of truth is first shown by the existential-ontological foundations of uncovering. (Heidegger, 1927:220)

It is Dasein's fundamental capacity for disclosedness that makes it possible for it to be true. This equally means that for Dasein to be authentic it must be true to its own capacity for disclosure.

In so far as Dasein *is* its disclosedness essentially, and discloses and uncovers as something disclosed to this extent it is essentially 'true'. Dasein is 'in the truth'. This assertion has meaning ontologically. It does not purport to say that ontically Dasein is introduced 'to all the truth' either always or just in every case, but rather that the disclosedness of its ownmost Being belongs to its existential condition. (Heidegger, 1927:221)

This seems to bring in an interesting element of differentiation. Although Dasein's ontological character is essentially world- and self-disclosing; it can actually be true to this disclosing nature in a more or less committed manner. It can be, as it were, more or less truly disclosing. While ontologically Dasein is essentially in the truth, it is not always able to maintain this truth on an ontic level.

Heidegger now goes on to summarize the ways in which Dasein is essentially disclosing. Thus Dasein is disclosing in all the following ways:

1. It embraces and discloses the whole structure of Being through the phenomenon of *care* and uncovers entities as well as the being of Dasein.
2. *Thrownness* is constitutive of Dasein's disclosedness and makes it factual by revealing this particular world that already exists.
3. As *projection* Dasein discloses either its own potentiality-for-Being and understands itself in this way or it understands itself in terms of the world and others. Here Heidegger clearly states that it is our projection as potentiality-for-Being that is the most authentic, thus introducing levels of authenticity.

This *authentic* disclosedness shows the phenomenon of the most primordial truth in the mode of authenticity. The most primordial, and indeed the most authentic, disclosedness in which Dasein, as a potentiality-for-Being, can be, is the *truth of existence*. (Heidegger, 1927:221)

It is therefore possible for Dasein to be more or less close to this truth of existence and as Heidegger points out it becomes only clear when and how as we analyse Heidegger's authenticity.

4. Dasein is *falling* and *lost* in its world. In this way what is uncovered and disclosed is disguised and closed off by idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity. Now entities are both uncovered and at the same time disguised.

Because Dasein is essentially falling, its state of Being is such that it is in 'untruth'. (Heidegger 1927:222)

Dasein is such that it will always be disclosing and disguising at the same time. It will always be in truth, but also in untruth. From this it follows that Dasein can be more or less in truth and more or less authentic. Dasein has to struggle with this tension, this paradox.

To be closed off and covered up belongs to Dasein's *facticity*. In its full existential-ontological meaning, the proposition that 'Dasein is in the truth' states equiprimordially that 'Dasein is in untruth'. But only in so far as Dasein has been disclosed has it also been closed off; and only in so far as entities within-the-world have been uncovered along with Dasein, have such entities, as possibly encounterable within-the-world, been covered up (hidden) or disguised. (Heidegger, 1927:222)

Truth is not a simple phenomenon. It only exists in juxtaposition to untruth. Disclosing something is only possible after it has been hidden.

The factual uncoveredness of anything is always, as it were, a kind of *robbery*. (Heidegger, 1927:222)

We therefore need to consider how this robbery takes place, especially in relation to Dasein's own Being. How is it possible for Dasein to come from untruth to truth, from inauthenticity to authenticity? How does Dasein realize the potential of its own Being?

2. Anxiety

It is to a large extent through the experience of anxiety that we become awake to the possibility of our own Being. Anxiety is the key to our authenticity as we showed in a previous chapter.

We must not assume that anxiety is a negative phenomenon, which has to be eliminated. Anxiety has already been described as a state of mind and thus as a disclosure of that what is. In anxiety we feel ill at ease, we are "*unheimlich*", not at home. Anxiety shakes us out of the complacency of being at ease. The uncanniness we experience means that we can no longer simply be confident. The familiarity of things collapses and we have to face up to our own being.

So, if the "nothing" - that is, the world as such - exhibits itself as that in the face of which one has anxiety, this means that *Being-in-the-world itself is that in the face of which anxiety is anxious*. (Heidegger, 1927:187)

It is therefore in anxiety that we detach ourselves for the first time from the world. Dasein can no longer turn to the world that falls away, nor can it turn to the being with others to tranquillize itself. With the world itself not being reliable anymore we can no longer understand ourselves in terms of the thrownness and falling manner of our being. We come finally truly face to face with our own being-possible.

Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its *Being towards* its ownmost potentiality-for-Being - that is, its *Being-free for* the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself. Anxiety brings

Dasein face to face with its *Being-free for* (propensio in...) the authenticity of its Being, and for this authenticity as a possibility which it always is. (Heidegger, 1927:188)

Anxiety is thus a revelatory element, which brings out the truth of Dasein's Being in its most essential possibility of being itself, of being true to its authenticity. Dasein in its inauthentic mode of being is like a negative, which needs to be revealed by anxiety. Through the state of mind of anxiety Dasein is brought face to face with itself as never before.

Of course it is essential to every state-of-mind that in each case Being-in-the-World should be fully disclosed in all those items which are constitutive for it - world, Being-in, Self. But in anxiety there lies the possibility of a disclosure which is quite distinctive; for anxiety individualizes. (Heidegger, 1927:190)

As we have seen it is the very nature of Dasein that it is possibility. We are not a particular something, but rather a range of possibilities, a potentiality for being. To become aware of one's potential is to become anxious. Therefore anxiety is the sine qua non of authenticity. Authentic human being is anxious human being.

Being free *for* one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being, and therewith for the possibility of authenticity and inauthenticity is shown with a primordial elemental concreteness in anxiety. (Heidegger, 1927:191)

Anxiety is always an anxiety about ourselves. It is generated out of our awareness that existence involves projection and possibility and makes demands on us to become ourselves. In anxiety the structures of the They-world fade away and we come face to face with ourselves. In the process of this individualization we become more capable of understanding our own authenticity and inauthenticity.

This individualization brings Dasein back from its falling, and makes manifest to it that authenticity and inauthenticity are possibilities of its Being. (Heidegger, 1927:191)

It is interesting to note how Heidegger emphasizes the fact that when such individualization happens it brings about the realization that both authenticity and inauthenticity are possible. It is this choice that makes anxious. It is the possibility and the awareness of it that makes for this anxious openness.

This is a key statement for our investigation. For here Heidegger actually suggests that anxiety does not merely move us on from inauthentic to authentic being. It rather brings out truth and as such puts us in touch with both possibilities: that of authenticity and inauthenticity. In other words: anxiety reveals some of the basic structures of our being. It shows us not just our inauthenticity or our authenticity, but the very possibility of both. It shows us our fundamental unified being in the world, which is that of care. We are anxious because we are not complete, not safe, and not essential in ourselves. We are anxious, because something is always wanting, always missing from our being-in-the-world. We are anxious because we are care. We are anxious because we are ourselves, but not sufficient to ourselves, which means that the world and other people matter to us. We are anxious because we are aware of our ownmost-potentiality-for-Being and this includes the possibility of being authentic or inauthentic.

When anxiety opens up the individualized possibilities of our being, this does not close off the actuality of our existence. There is always a tendency to hide back in this actuality and forget about our possibilities, which make anxious.

This levelling off of Dasein's possibilities to what is proximally at its everyday disposal also results in a dimming down of the possible as such. The average everydayness of concern becomes blind to its possibilities, and tranquillizes itself with that which is merely 'actual'. (Heidegger, 1927:194-195)

Contenting oneself with less clarity and lucidity than one is capable of, in order to be tranquillized and reassured in one's anxiety is a wide-spread phenomenon. We might argue that this tactic of keeping our awareness at a lower level so

that we blind ourselves from seeing our ownmost potential for Being authentic and inauthentic is a form of self-deception. Then again, Heidegger does not call it this. He terms it a levelling off of possibilities. For the moment we shall have to leave it at that and return to the issue later.

3.Call of conscience

How can Dasein be prepared to become aware of its possibilities when levelling off seems so attractive? It is through the call of conscience. Heidegger describes the call of conscience as what brings Dasein back in touch with its ownmost potential for Being. The phenomenon of conscience brings us back in touch with the possibility of being ourselves. Conscience is a phenomenon of Dasein.

Conscience gives us 'something' to understand; it *discloses*. By characterizing this phenomenon formally in this way, we find ourselves enjoined to take it back into the *disclosedness* of Dasein. This disclosedness, as a basic state of that entity which we ourselves are, is constituted by state-of-mind, understanding, falling and discourse. If we analyse conscience more penetratingly, it is revealed as a *call* [*Ruf*]. Calling is a mode of *discourse*. The call of conscience has the character of an *appeal* to Dasein by calling it to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self; and this is done by way of *summoning* it to its ownmost Being-guilty. (Heidegger, 1927:269)

Conscience then is a kind of concomitant of Dasein in the mode of discourse, a disclosing phenomenon. Through the call of conscience we are summoned to our ownmost potentiality-for-Being. It is a constant background presence, which although it is a call does not let itself be heard through sound.

Conscience discourses solely and constantly in the mode of keeping silent. (Heidegger, 1927:273)

Conscience is therefore an essential aspect of Dasein, which forces Dasein into a kind of reticence about its own actions and its own going out of itself. Conscience could be seen as the counterpart of care. It is what keeps Dasein

faithful to itself (whatever this means as we shall explore further) and introduces the possibility of authenticity.

Who is it that originates the call of conscience? Dasein itself.

What if this Dasein, which finds itself in the very depths of its uncanniness, should be the caller of the call of conscience? (Heidegger, 1927:276)

Heidegger argues that this silent call is experienced as a passive calling, which happens always in the mood of anxiety, when we are beginning to realize that we are vulnerable and exposed. The call reminds us of our ownmost potentiality-for-Being. The caller is Dasein, which needs to pay attention to itself. Dasein is always primarily mine and therefore needs to pay attention to itself before anything else.

The call '*says nothing, which* might be talked about, gives no information about events. The call points *forward to* Dasein's potentiality-for-Being, and it does this as a call which comes *from* uncanniness. (Heidegger, 1927:280)

This call must not be mistaken for a call that comes from an outside source, or indeed should not be taken for a communication at all. The call is not only silent; its very nature is to not introduce a voice at all. Heidegger thus distinguishes the call of conscience from delusional experiences and particularly from the hallucinatory experience of the hearing of voices. Delusions, Heidegger says, are based on a mishearing of the call of conscience.

The call gets heard in such a way that instead of becoming authentically understood, it gets drawn by the they-self into a soliloquy in which causes get pleaded, and it becomes perverted in its tendency to disclose. (Heidegger, 1927:274)

In delusions Dasein becomes wrapped up in a soliloquy, which takes it away from its authentic hearing. What is this authentic hearing that conscience represents and that allows Dasein to be genuinely disclosing? It is a hearing

that can easily be lost through Dasein's ability to listen to others and distort its own understanding in the process.

Dasein, as a Being-with which understands, can *listen* to Others. Losing itself in the publicness and the idle talk of the "they", it *fails to hear* [*überhört*] its own Self in listening to the they-self. (Heidegger, 1927:270-271).

Dasein's ability to hear is therefore what stops it hearing in the right way. We get wrapped up in others and fail to hear properly, as we are lost in idle talk. We can equally get wrapped up in ourselves in delusional soliloquies, which could be argued are a kind of internal idle talk. Our ownmost possibility for hearing can thus get diverted but can also be captured again in its true being by the phenomenon of the call of conscience which is a phenomenon of disclosure. For this to be possible we have, as before, got to become aware of our own potential for mis-hearing or not hearing as well as becoming aware of our own potential for hearing.

If Dasein is to be able to get brought back from this lostness of failing to hear itself, and if this is to be done through itself, then it must first be able to find itself - to find itself as something which has failed to hear itself, and which fails to hear in that it *listens away* to the "they". This listening-away must get broken off; in other words, the possibility of another kind of hearing which will interrupt it, must be given by Dasein itself. (Heidegger, 1927:271)

It is in learning to be aware of our ability to truly hear that we shall turn towards this other hearing, this true hearing that discloses. This true hearing has to be retrieved out of the false hearing of listening away to the 'they'. We can only understand this truly if we first come to think of ourselves as failing to hear. We need to have a sense of our inauthentic hearing before we can hear authentically. True disclosure will inevitably involve a disclosure of our lack of clarity as well. This is a crucial point, since it shows again how Heidegger does not believe that authenticity can ever be had on its own. Dasein in order to be in the truth and hear the call of conscience has got to be able to allow itself to be aware of its inauthenticity as well. This is precisely what happens in the

call of conscience, which discloses to Dasein its own understanding of itself as not understanding.

But it is essential to Dasein that along with the disclosedness of its world it has been disclosed to itself, so that it always *understands itself*. The call reaches Dasein in this understanding of itself which it always has, and which is concerned in an everyday, average manner. (Heidegger, 1927:272)

The call therefore brings Dasein back to its self. Instead of being focussed on the "they" it is now focussing on disclosing itself.

And because only the Self of the they-self gets appealed to and brought to hear, the "they" collapses. (Heidegger, 1927:273)

In this way the call of conscience releases Dasein from its absorption in the "they". The Self can now no longer hide in the safe place that the "they" provided and Dasein has to come face to face with itself. Heidegger shows that the self that is being called to remains indefinite and empty. Dasein is always indefinite in this way and only comes truly into existence in its world relations. Similarly that which calls remains indefinite and cannot be made into something. This essential emptiness of Dasein and its indefiniteness is also what makes it inclined to fall into the world, away from itself. To understand Dasein's capacity for doing so is to understand Dasein as it is. The true call of conscience will reveal this openness of Dasein and will come from openness, not from something definite.

The peculiar indefiniteness of the caller and the impossibility of making more definite what this caller is, are not just nothing; they are distinctive for it in a *positive* way. (Heidegger, 1927:275)

As a rule of thumb, any call that we may hear where there is a recognizable voice or message is therefore of a different nature than the call of conscience. We can automatically assume that in such a case there is a falling phenomenon,

an inauthentic call at work. If it is possible to talk about the call of conscience we can be certain that the 'They world' is involved. We cannot influence or coax the call in a positive way.

The call of conscience exposes our indefiniteness and our uncanniness, which are essentially what Dasein is. In doing so it takes Dasein away from misunderstanding itself as something definite that is absorbed by the world.

What is it that so radically deprives Dasein of the possibility of misunderstanding itself by any sort of alibi and failing to recognize itself, if not the forsakenness [Verlassenheit] with which it has been abandoned [Überlassenheit] to itself? (Heidegger, 1927:277)

Only when we come face to face with this forsakenness and abandonment do we get to know what Dasein actually is. By the same token we shall also be able to appreciate why and how Dasein flees towards the world of the "they" ordinarily and most of the time.

The call of conscience, existentially understood, makes known for the first time what we have hitherto merely contended: that uncanniness pursues Dasein and is a threat to the lostness in which it has forgotten itself. (Heidegger, 1927:277)

The uncanniness that makes anxious and leads to the call of conscience is what saves us from our lostness in the world of the "They". It brings us back to our ability to disclose. In doing so it brings us back to a feeling of guilt, the feeling of owing something. Conscience makes us aware of our guilt. Yet guilt should not be understood in the usual sense. Heidegger analyses the ordinary meanings of guilt and summarizes them as follows:

These ordinary significations of "Being-guilty" as 'having debts to someone' and 'having responsibility for something' can go together and define a kind of behaviour which we call 'making oneself responsible'; (Heidegger, 1927:282)

Guilt in this way is defined as a debt and a responsibility, an owing of something. Heidegger goes on to show that this view of guilt is not sufficient to understand Dasein's essential nature of being guilty.

This implies, however, that Being-guilty does not first result from an indebtedness [Verschuldung], but that, on the contrary, indebtedness becomes possible only 'on the basis' of a primordial Being-guilty. (Heidegger, 1927:284)

There is a fundamental being-guilty that lies at the basis of Dasein's Being, because Dasein is a lack, a nullity, and a fundamental nothingness. Dasein's Being, as care, comprises facticity (thrownness), existence (projection) and being-with (falling) and in all these ways is always in a position of having to define its own Being, since it is potentiality-for-Being and not definite Being. Dasein, as Heidegger puts it, is thrown basis for existence.

And how *is* Dasein this thrown basis? Only in that it projects itself upon possibilities into which it has been thrown. The Self, which as such has to lay the basis for itself, can *never* get that basis into its power; and yet, as existing, it must take over Being-a-basis. To be its own thrown basis is that potentiality-for-Being which is the issue of care. (Heidegger, 1927:284)

Since we can never get our own basis into our own power we are always in question, always incomplete, always in debt. Our guilt is a fundamental aspect to our Being, since we are potentiality-for-Being which always remains to be realized. The nullity at the basis of Dasein makes guilt its natural way to be.

Care itself, in its very essence, is permeated with nullity through and through. Thus "care" - Dasein's Being - means, as thrown projection, Being-the-basis of a nullity (and this Being-the-basis is itself null). This means that Dasein as such is guilty, if our formally existential definition of "guilt" as "Being-the-basis of a nullity" is indeed correct. (Heidegger, 1927:285)

To become confronted with this implication of our own nature is to become alert to the possibility of authentically assuming our own Being as it is as a Being-guilty. To be so committed is to be resolute.

4. Resoluteness (*Entschlossenheit*)

"Resoluteness" signifies letting oneself be summoned out of one's lostness in the "they". (Heidegger, 1927:299)

Heidegger sees resoluteness as something that becomes only possible when Dasein is summoned away from being fallen with the 'they'. Dasein is saved from being lost and finds itself for the first time. Interestingly this very active resolute attitude is therefore about coming to oneself and finally knowing what one is, which is potentiality-for-Being (and with this, as we have just shown Being-guilty). To do this properly requires us to let go of trying to be something that we imagine we should be for others. Therefore resoluteness is about opening Dasein to what is actually there: i.e. nothing. It is at the same time a disclosing of what Dasein is itself: i.e. a potentiality-for-Being.

This distinctive and authentic disclosedness, which is attested in Dasein itself by its conscience - *this reticent self-projection upon one's ownmost Being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety* - we call "*resoluteness*". (Heidegger, 1927:297)

Heidegger thus connects the notion of becoming authentic with a process of paying attention to the call of conscience, which shows us our fundamental guilt and leads us to anxiety. The readiness to be open to all this is called resoluteness, i.e. authentic being-oneself. This means that to be resolute we must first have the ability to be open to truth and have found our ability to be in tune with one's conscience and our ability to live in line with our ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Heidegger plainly connects this ability with an awareness of our ownmost Being-guilty. Being guilty as we have seen is ineluctable and a basic given of Dasein's ontological make-up. Being true to it is the sine qua non of authenticity. What this means is that authentic being-

oneself is to be aware that we are a nothing that must project being a something, for we are essentially nothing but possibility, both our basis and our projection are essentially null.

Not only is the projection, as one that has been thrown, determined by the nullity of Being-a-basis; *as projection* it is itself essentially *null*. (Heidegger, 1927:285)

Because we are always nothing and having to project our potentiality-for-Being into this nothing, to be resolute is to be authentically aware of this nothingness and our ability to overcome it, but never overcome it once and for all, for every single projection will be null as well. To be authentically disclosing of what is and of what Dasein itself is, leads to an anxious openness to nullity of the future and to the fragility of the projects we create. At the same time it will lead to awareness that each of these projects still leaves others undone and unfulfilled. We can never change this fundamental paradox of our ontological nature. Nevertheless it does not mean that we are doomed to meaninglessness or nullity.

This does not mean that it has the ontical property of 'inconsequentiality' or 'worthlessness'; what we have here is rather something existentially constitutive for the structure of the Being of projection. The nullity we have in mind belongs to Dasein's Being-free for its existentiell possibilities. Freedom, however, *is* only in the choice of *o n e* possibility - that is, in tolerating one's not having chosen the others and one's not being able to choose them. (Heidegger, 1927:285)

Even as we project ourselves into the future, we still remain incomplete. In having to choose we un-choose other things. Our freedom is based on our nothingness and constitutes a further nothingness of its own. We can never be complete. As we are alive we are potential, not actuality. It is only with death, as we shall see below, that our project will be complete. Resoluteness therefore must involve a determined Being-towards-Death, which is the only possible way to be resolutely authentic. Resoluteness also involves facing our

nullity, but this does not mean thinking ourselves worthless. Resoluteness does not, however involve a turning away from others or from the world.

'Resoluteness, as authentic Being-one's-Self does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating "I". And how should it, when resoluteness as authentic disclosedness, is *authentically* nothing else than *Being-in-the-world*? Resoluteness brings the Self right into its current concerned Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with Others.' (Heidegger, 1927:298)

It is thus that Dasein can create a new sort of relationship towards its facticity and its fallenness. Instead of being at the mercy of the given world of objects, Dasein now manages this world in a concerned manner. Instead of being taken over by the They Dasein manages other people with an attitude of solicitude. Nevertheless we must not conclude that this means that Dasein overcomes its facticity and its fallenness. On the contrary Dasein continues to be ontologically bound by its facticity and fallenness, regardless of its facing and mastering them in its own new effort of grasping its potentiality-for-Being. Now we find Dasein firmly accepting its own basis of existence. On the one hand it resolves upon something with concerned solicitude, on the other hand it will remain determined by facticity and fallenness.

Disclosed in its 'there', it maintains itself both in truth and in untruth with equal primordiality. This 'really' holds in particular for resoluteness as authentic truth. Resoluteness appropriates untruth authentically. Dasein is already in irresoluteness, and soon, perhaps, will be in it again. (Heidegger, 1927:298/99)

The translation here should actually have been that Dasein 'has always already been in irresoluteness and soon perhaps will be in it again.' Heidegger affirms clearly that Dasein will always have to continue to contend with its possible irresolution as well as continuing to have to struggle towards becoming resolute again. There is here a clear understanding on Heidegger's part of the indispensable dealings with inauthentic modes of being. Dasein cannot magically elevate itself above the initial inauthentic existence. Dasein still finds itself in

a factual world and it will have to deal with its givens at all times. Even when resolutely facing a situation there is the world to contend with and inner worldly entities that will have to be taken into account and that cannot be ignored. Dasein thus has to muster the strength to keep moving between authentic and inauthentic being.

Resolution does not withdraw itself from 'actuality', but discovers first what is factually possible; and it does so by seizing upon it in whatever way is possible for it as its ownmost potentiality-for-Being in the "they". (Heidegger, 1927:299)

A kind of realism ensues where Dasein is aware of the inevitable aspects of inauthenticity that it will always have to deal with. Dasein handles the situation with other people from a new determined position, not giving in to the pressures of the 'they', not falling prey to its prescriptions and temptations, but instead by creating a margin of freedom in which its own potentiality for Being is enacted.

The irresoluteness of the 'they' remains dominant notwithstanding, but it cannot impugn resolute existence. (Heidegger 1927:299)

Dasein holds out for a resolute attitude once it has embarked on authenticity, regardless of the irresoluteness that it will continue to have to deal with in every aspect of its encounters with the 'They'. Resolution is thus constantly tested and tried and never complete or safe. Dasein, when it is committed to authentic resoluteness can muster a new approach to others and does not necessarily have to go under in the "they".

In the light of the "for-the-sake-of-which" of one's self-chosen potentiality-for-Being, resolute Dasein frees itself for its world. Dasein's resoluteness towards itself is what first makes it possible to let the Others who are with it 'be' in their ownmost potentiality-for-Being, and to co-disclose this potentiality in the solicitude which leaps forth and liberates. When Dasein is resolute, it can become the 'conscience' of Others. (Heidegger, 1927:298)

This is what gives authenticity its real opportunity and future: the fact that by being resolute we can overcome being ruled by the "They" and find authentic ways of being with others as well as with ourselves. Resoluteness is definitely the key to authentic being. Later in Being and Time, after having considered Dasein's temporality, Heidegger considers resoluteness to be mostly an authentic mode of being.

Resoluteness, which we have characterized with regard to its temporal meaning, represents an authentic disclosedness of Dasein - a disclosedness which constitutes an entity of such a kind that in existing, it can be its very "there". (Heidegger, 1927:335)

In resoluteness we then face up to ourselves as we really are, we take seriously our ownmost-potentiality-for-being. Resolute being is an awareness of one's possibilities as Dasein and this will involve us in understanding our own potential for irresoluteness and inauthenticity as well. We will inevitably get drawn back into irresoluteness, but once we are resolute, it would seem, we could not lose this completely.

"Resoluteness" signifies letting oneself be summoned out of one's lostness in the "they". The irresoluteness of the "they" remains dominant notwithstanding, but it cannot impugn resolute existence. (Heidegger, 1927:299)

When one is resolute there will still be plenty of irresoluteness to contend with, but this irresoluteness cannot ever entirely take away our ability to be resolute. This would suggest that going back on resoluteness is never a real option. This puts into doubt whether it is possible to deceive ourselves once we are in truth. This becomes even clearer later on when Heidegger points out that we will actually continue to know much irresoluteness even when we have discovered resoluteness.

Resoluteness has turned out to be a kind of existing which is primordial and authentic. Proximally and for the most part, to be sure, Dasein remains irresolute; that is to say, it remains closed off in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, to which it brings itself only when it has been individualized. (Heidegger, 1927:336)

Resoluteness continues to be something hard earned. Only by going through the process described above, which individualizes Dasein can we achieve it. Nevertheless it is this resoluteness that is primordial and authentic. The question that remains to be asked is still: what makes it possible to be resolutely authentic at some times whilst being inauthentically irresolute at other times? How can Dasein disclose its ownmost-potentiality-for-Being instead of hiding it? In order to answer the question we have to consider the context of the resolution. We have to remember that Dasein always finds itself in a situation.

5.Situation

Dasein, by definition is "there", for it is Being-there. Once Dasein has become resolute it can take awareness of the "there" in which it finds itself.

The situation is the "there" which is disclosed in resoluteness - the "there" as which the existent entity is there. It is not a framework present-at-hand in which Dasein occurs, or into which it might even just bring itself. (Heidegger, 1927:299-300)

The situation is therefore not just the circumstances in which Dasein finds itself. It is rather the context that Dasein has resolved to meet. It is only when Dasein has achieved this kind of transparency through resoluteness that a situation comes into play.

Resoluteness brings the Being of the "there" into the existence of its Situation.(Heidegger, 1927:300)

There is no such thing as an empty resolution. Every resolution is to be seen in the context of its particular situation. Resoluteness reveals where Dasein is in relation to existence. It enables Dasein to face up to its particular situation with resolution. This is the opposite of what happens as long as we are inauthentic.

For the "they" however, the Situation is essentially something that has been closed off. The "they" knows only the "general situation", loses itself in those 'opportunities' which are closest to it, and pays Dasein's way by a reckoning up of 'accidents' which it fails to recognize, deems its own achievement, and passes off as such. (Heidegger, 1927:300)

Dasein cannot help but be drawn into inauthentic articulating of its own circumstances as long as it has not mastered the art of resolute facing of its own situation. We cannot call this falling into the traps of opportunities and accidents a form of self-deception. Dasein has simply not yet become able to be transparent to itself. As long as this is the case the situation remains closed off and is not open to recognition by Dasein.

...the situation has its foundation in resoluteness (Heidegger, 1927:299).

Only when we become resolute Dasein becomes capable of imbuing a situation with a particular meaning and a specific context. Dasein can now grasp the possibilities in the situation and can act on that situation. Commitments can now be made and a particular set of moods and experiences will ensue from this, which are, relatively speaking all within the grasp and understanding of this Dasein. To be in a situation in this way is worlds apart from the original finding oneself in a 'situation'.

Of course the one is the sine qua non of the other. We can never get to the stage of creatively participating in situation unless we have first become capable of understanding the 'situations' we find ourselves in. This is what makes existential psychotherapy possible: it is the enterprise of making explicit the implicit 'situations' a person finds him or herself in so that they become available to understanding. From this understanding a gradual move towards authentic and resolute living may make it possible to actively engage with the recognition of situation, in the Heideggerian sense. This may in due course lead to Dasein actively creating new 'situations', which are founded in resoluteness and are more in keeping with an authentic existence. For this authentic existence to be possible Dasein has to be able to face the whole of its existence.

Now that resoluteness has been worked out as Being-guilty, a self-projection in which one is reticent and ready for anxiety, our investigation has been put in a position for defining the ontological meaning of that potentiality which we have been seeking - Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole. (Heidegger, 1927:301)

The authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole includes one further important concept and that is Being-towards-Death, for as long as Dasein has not faced death it has not resolutely faced the entirety of its existence. And so we now need to examine Dasein's relationship to death.

6. Being towards Death

The importance of death is not just about the death of our future demise. Death takes up an important position in Dasein's ontology. Death is an inexorable reality without which Dasein would not be Dasein. Death is the ultimate experience that one cannot go beyond.

Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein. Thus death reveals itself as that possibility which is one's ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped. (unüberholbare) (Heidegger, 1927:250)

Death is the ultimate aspect of being there. Yet it is a complex matter since we can never experience our own death. Heidegger defines death as the possibility of absolute impossibility and as such it is the ultimate negative that we all have to face. It is unthinkable that we should ever be fully authentically ourselves without openness to death. Our ownmost potentiality-for-Being includes the potential for impossibility.

Heidegger notes how we do everything in our power to avoid facing up to death and thus to our own potential for authenticity. The death we are avoiding is not just that of the end of our lives, but rather the reality of our mortality, the fact that Dasein is never complete until it has died. Our hiding in the 'They', in the anonymous selfhood that is not really us, is just another way of not yet being what we are capable of being.

As falling, everyday Being-towards-death is a constant *fleeing in the face of death*. Being-towards-the-end has the mode of *evasion in the face of it*- giving new explanations for it, understanding it inauthentically, and concealing it. Factically one's own Dasein is always dying already; that is to say, it is a Being-towards-its-end. (Heidegger 1927:254)

Death is a given that we carry with us on an everyday basis and that provides us with the possibility of facing up to our own limitations. Yet, we often prefer to ignore this potential of our being towards our own end and look away from the death that we are in a sense already dying.

One *knows* about the certainty of death and yet 'is' not authentically certain of one's own. The falling everydayness of Dasein is acquainted with death's certainty, and yet evades *Being-certain*. (Heidegger, 1927:258)

The remarkable thing here is that we know about death in principle and in theory, but that in practice we do not take into account our own Being-towards-Death. We seem to prefer to hide in an inauthentic looking away from the reality of our death and avoid this certainty of ultimate possibility of our impossibility.

The full existential-ontological conception of death may now be defined as follows: death, as the end of Dasein, is Dasein's ownmost possibility - non-relational, certain and as such indefinite, not to be outstripped. Death is, as Dasein's end, in the Being of this entity towards its end. (Heidegger, 1927:258/259)

We are always in one way or another coming to terms with our own end, on an everyday basis, whether we do this in an acknowledged manner or in an inauthentic, hidden way, we cannot escape from the ubiquitous presence of our own possibility for death. In actual life, in an ontic sense we come to death, whether we like it or not. But in a more fundamental ontological sense Dasein is incomplete without its ultimate potential for death. We come to death certainly, more certainly than anything else in the world. We come to death either by facing it or, as Heidegger terms it 'in a fugitive manner'. It is this fugitive manner of evasion that we might call self-deception.

Our everyday falling evasion in the face of death is an inauthentic Being-towards-death. But inauthenticity is based on the possibility of authenticity. Inauthenticity characterizes a kind of Being into which Dasein can divert itself and has for the most part always diverted itself; but Dasein does not necessarily and constantly have to divert itself into this kind of Being. Because Dasein exists, it determines its own character as the kind of entity it is, and it does so in every case in terms of a possibility which it itself is and which it understands. (Heidegger, 1927:259)

Heidegger seems to suggest that Dasein knows better than to hide in an inauthentic mode of Being-towards-death. It is capable of facing death authentically. It is always not-yet and it must be aware that this is so. Its not-yet can only point in one direction, in a relative manner that direction is the future, tomorrow, but in an absolute sense this not-yet can only point towards

the ultimate, i.e. death. The knowledge of the end of this not-yet road must be denied in order to remain unknown. Heidegger now continues to examine what authentic Being-towards-death consists of, for this will help us understand how and why we divert ourselves of authentic being. He argues that anticipation of (Vorlaufen, i.e. actually 'going towards') death is the authentic way of being towards it. In this anticipation, this going towards death, we grasp our ownmost possibility for death in a non-relational manner.

The ownmost possibility is *non-relational*. Anticipation allows Dasein to understand that that potentiality-for-being in which its ownmost Being is an issue, must be taken over by Dasein alone. Death does not just 'belong' to one's own Dasein in an undifferentiated way; death *lays claim* to it as an *individual* Dasein. The non-relational character of death, as understood in anticipation, individualizes Dasein down to itself. (Heidegger, 1927:263)

Dasein is therefore inevitably brought face to face with its ownmost Being, with its individuality when faced with its anticipation of death. At this moment it stops being They-self and comes to its own-self in an inexorable way.

Dasein is authentically itself only to the extent that, as concerned Being-alongside and solicitous Being-with, it projects itself upon its ownmost potentiality-for-Being rather than upon the possibility of the they-self. The entity which anticipates its non-relational possibility, is thus forced by that very anticipation into the possibility of taking over from itself its ownmost Being, and doing so of its own accord. (Heidegger, 1927:263-264)

It is an almost circular description. When we stretch out towards our non being by becoming properly aware of our own end, we escape from the power of the "They" over us. This is possible only because as we finally become absorbed in the anticipation of the end we realize that in the end we shall be simply incapable of being further taken over by others or by a fake image of our selves. Heidegger shows how we release ourselves temporarily from the prison of the 'They' and from the self that is not itself up to the point when we anticipate our death.

We may now summarize our characterization of authentic Being-towards-death: anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by concerned solicitude, but of being itself, rather, in an impassioned freedom towards death - a freedom which has been released from the Illusions of the "they", and which is factual, certain of itself, and anxious. (Heidegger, 1927:266)

Dasein's secret of authentic living is now revealed: it can only discover its release from its own illusions as it anticipates, or rather as it moves towards its own death with passion and truth. Before such anticipation we can simply not see ourselves, i.e. we have not yet come to terms with our ownmost potentiality-for Being.

For Heidegger then the question of self-deception does not arise until we have been released from the illusions of the "They". Until such time as we have been liberated we are essentially taken over by inauthentic modes of being that keep us operating blindly in a 'they' kind of anonymous manner until we are woken by the confrontation with the possibility of our death. We cannot really accuse ourselves of self-deception until such time as this lack of freedom from death has become a reality for us.

But because Dasein is *lost* in the "they", it must first *find* itself. In order to find *itself* at all, it must be shown to itself in its possible authenticity. In terms of its *possibility*, Dasein is already a potentiality-for-Being-its-Self, but it needs to have this potentiality attested. (Heidegger, 1927:268)

We need to have the whole of our potentiality-for-Being brought to our awareness before we can become truly authentic. Although we always already are the potentiality-for-Being-a-Self, we cannot actually claim this potentiality actively until we have been woken from our innocent slumbers and have been brought face to face with our potential death. This essentially means that self-deception is not really an option for us for most of the time, certainly not until we have achieved this wholeness of being ourselves through the call of conscience, guilt, anxiety and an awareness of death.

7. The Moment of Vision

When we have achieved this wakefulness and this becoming alerted to our ownmost-potentiality-for-Being, we are truly and resolutely authentic. It is our capacity for conscience which through guilt and anxiety brings us in touch with this potentiality-for-Being, which includes a becoming aware of our Being-towards-Death. Without this Dasein is inclined to be forgetful of its ownmost potentiality-for-Being and cannot be authentic.

When Dasein achieves this position where it can assume its ownmost-potentiality-for-Being it can no longer escape from the fact of its own nullity. It would therefore be an act of self-deception and a loss of authenticity to imagine that we could ever avoid nullity or death and escape from it all together. The best human beings are capable of is to face up to their essential nullity and inauthenticity and engage with the struggle to be authentic as often and as efficiently as they possibly can.

It is this becoming alert to our variability and our capacity for both inauthenticity and authenticity that makes possible our true liberation. This becomes possible when we are resolute and stop letting ourselves be taken in by inauthenticity. This happens in what Heidegger calls the *Augenblick*, literally the blink of an eye, the moment of vision.

In resoluteness, the Present is not only brought back from distraction with the objects of one's closest concern, but it gets held in the future and in having been. That *Present* which is held in authentic temporality and which thus is *authentic* itself, we call the '*moment of vision*'. (Heidegger, 1927:338)

The moment of vision is what makes true authenticity possible. It has to be understood as an ec-stasis, including past, present and future. When we can see what is behind us and in front of us and on all sides of us, we can truly place ourselves in space and time and see ourselves in perspective. We can then be truly our thrownness, our projection and fallenness at once. It is only in the context of such a full account of our own position and situation that we can overcome inauthentic being.

This term must be understood in the active sense as an ecstasis. It means the resolute rapture with which Dasein is carried away to whatever possibilities and circumstances are encountered in the Situation as possible objects of concern, but a rapture which is *held* in resoluteness. (Heidegger, 1927:338)

The moment of vision is when we genuinely let ourselves see our Situation in every sense of the word and let ourselves be moved in the direction in which we are going. We are resolute and yet taken over. We make a decision to let the situation disclose itself: we finally assume our capacity for disclosure to the full.

This inevitably means that we have to be prepared to wrest our authenticity from inauthenticity. Our activity discloses our tendency towards passivity. Certainly Heidegger wants this moment of vision to include the prospect of struggling with one's possible inauthenticity.

To designate the authentic future terminologically we have reserved the expression "*anticipation*". This indicates that Dasein, existing authentically, lets itself come towards itself as its ownmost potentiality-for-Being - that the future itself must first win itself, not from a Present, but from the inauthentic future. (Heidegger, 1927:336-337)

To be authentic is therefore to be capable of anticipating the challenges of the future and in this process to contend with the possibility of inauthenticity. In contrast to this readiness for what the future might hold in store the inauthentic way to face the future is one of waiting. It is becoming clear that

the moment of vision is very much a temporal phenomenon, which involves time in a central way.

In contradistinction to the moment of vision as the authentic Present, we call the inauthentic Present, "making present". (Heidegger, 1927:338)

In making present we do not experience a moment of vision, but instead remain absorbed in the concerns of the moment.

He who is irresolute understands himself in terms of those very closest events and be-fallings which he encounters in such a making-present and which thrust themselves upon him in varying ways. Busily losing *himself* in the object of his concern, *he loses his time* in it too. (Heidegger, 1927:410)

The person who is irresolutely and inauthentically engaged in the world does not come into contact with the situation as it arises in all its possibilities. The engagement remains a passive and non-open one. In this closedness we get very preoccupied with the world as it is and we do not experience the fullness of time. Instead we lose time as we lose ourselves.

But just as he who exists inauthentically is constantly losing time and never 'has' any, the temporality of authentic existence remains distinctive in that such existence, in its resoluteness, never loses time and 'always has time'. For the temporality of resoluteness has with relation to its Present, the character of a *moment of vision*. When such a moment makes the Situation authentically present, the making present does not itself take the lead, but is *held* in that future which is in the process of having-been. One's existence in the moment of vision temporalizes itself as something that has been stretched along in a way which is fatefully whole in the sense of the authentic historical *constancy* of the Self. (Heidegger, 1927:410).

In the moment of vision we are therefore able to bring together all the dimensions of time and let all of the implications of our experience speak to us. There is a kind of wholeness in this way of engaging with the world and all its realities and future possibilities. In seeing everything in this light of openness

we become open ourselves, not just to the world but also to the realization of things always being possible and there being enough time for what is happening.

Resoluteness brings us at one with our own decision-making about the future and at ease with our willingness to take whatever comes. We free ourselves from getting overly concerned about things. At the same time we manage an appropriate amount of care in relation to what actually has been, what is and what might be or will be. The future orientation requires a readiness to acknowledge past and present as well. The moment of vision is essentially three-dimensional if it is to have its freeing authenticating effect.

Only an entity which, in its Being, is essentially futural, so that it is free for its death and can let itself be thrown back upon its factual "there" by shattering itself against death - that is to say, only an entity which, as futural, is equiprimordially in the process of having been, can, by handing down to itself the possibility it has inherited, take over its own thrownness and be in the moment of vision for 'its time'. Only authentic temporality which is at the same time finite, makes possible something like fate - that is to say, authentic historicity. (Heidegger, 1927:385)

We have to be able and willing to bring together our history and our future, including our destruction by death, whilst being also able and willing to hold this vision in the moment and become ready to be alive in a true sense, living our own destiny. This is clearly a tall order and something hard to come by. It is also something that needs to be won over and over again as the situations we find ourselves in keep shifting. We must remember that this is not just about resolute willpower, for as Heidegger explained earlier we need to be carried by the moment of vision, rather than fabricating it. Authenticity is not something we create, but rather something we capture, a moment we savour and open ourselves up to. Perhaps there is already some trace here of his later ideas of releasement and regioning as for instance, described in Heidegger's Discourse on Thinking (Heidegger 1966).

The resolute rapture which carries us away in the moment of vision is what makes an authentic future possible (Heidegger, 1927:338)

8. Repetition

Once we become capable of living in this way we are also, in principle capable of reiterating this experience.

Inauthentic understanding temporalizes itself as an awaiting which makes present - an awaiting to whose ecstatical unity there must belong a corresponding "having been". The authentic coming-towards-itself of anticipatory resoluteness is at the same time a coming back to one's ownmost Self, which has been thrown into its individualization. This ecstasis makes it possible for Dasein to be able to take over resolutely that entity which it already is. In anticipating, Dasein brings itself again forth into its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. If Being-as-having-been is authentic, we call it 'repetition'. (*Wiederholung*) (Heidegger, 1927:339)

Authentic being involves the complexity of overseeing all one is capable of, in all the ec-stasies of time and being able to repeat oneself without holding back or covering up.

The resoluteness which comes back to itself and hands itself down, then becomes the repetition of a possibility for existence that has come down to us. Repetition is the explicit handing-down, that is, the going back into possibilities of the human beings that have been. The authentic repetition of a past possibility of existence, the choosing of one's hero, is grounded in advancing resoluteness; for in resoluteness one first chooses the choice that makes one free for the struggle of loyalty and the struggling succession of the repeatable possibility. (Heidegger, 1927:385)

Thus to live resolutely leads us to an ability to repeat that which we commit ourselves to. We retrieve it from the past. We re-collect it and re-organize it so as to make ourselves into something more specific. This repetition is not unlike Nietzsche's notion of eternal recurrence and amor fati. Heidegger too suggests that a love of what one chooses to be one's destiny enhances the level of resoluteness we are capable of.

Repeating is handing down explicitly - that is to say, going back into the possibilities of Dasein that has-been-there. The authentic repetition of a possibility of existence that has been - the possibility that Dasein may choose its hero - is grounded existentially in anticipatory

resoluteness; for it is in resoluteness that one first chooses the choice which makes one free for the struggle of loyally following in the footsteps of that which can be repeated. (Heidegger, 1927:385)

It is thus anticipatory resoluteness that remains the most important road to authentic Dasein. Repetition is a mere handmaiden of our living towards our potentiality for death. We cannot repeat anything that has not first been projected into our own future and lived valiantly with all the difficulties of moving forwards. Repetition will always have to base itself in this actually lived past. By it we can make much more of what has been and therefore of what will become possible. There is in repetition a process of re-creation of the self that was never real until it anticipated resolutely what its being there demanded of it. Repetition is neither about the past as it condemns us to something in the present, nor is it about wishful thinking for the future.

The repeating of that which is possible does not bring again [Wiederbringen] something that is 'past', nor does it bind the 'Present' back to that which has already been 'outstripped'. Arising, as it does, from a resolute projection of oneself, repetition does not let itself be persuaded of something by what is 'past', just in order that this, as something which was formerly actual, may recur. Rather, the repetition makes a reciprocative rejoinder to the possibility of that existence which has-been-there. (Heidegger, 1927:386)

The past has already been surpassed. It is left behind and gone beyond. We cannot bring it back, but it remains active and relevant in its memory of our own projection that made it possible. In the moment of vision we re-present to ourselves the past as we actively created it. We gain a kind of overview over our own abilities for being in the world, in time and in space. We grasp our own active role in the world, without wanting to change it and without wanting to hang on to what has been.

Repetition does not abandon itself to that which is past, nor does it aim at progress. In the moment of vision authentic existence is indifferent to both these alternatives. (Heidegger, 1927:386)

We must learn to be in this way: open to our own relatedness to a world and to our own capacity for projecting into the future and our death. If we abandon the desire to hold on or to move on we can learn to be just what we are in time, at one with our own fate. The reality is that we do not become historical and capable of change because of our capacity for repetition but our ability for repetition is rather the consequence of our temporal existence.

Authentic Being-towards-death - that is to say, the finitude of temporality - is the hidden basis of Dasein's historicity. Dasein does not first become historical in repetition; but because it is historical as temporal, it can take itself over in its history by repeating. (Heidegger, 1927:386)

In this point of view to become authentic is to become aware of our own possibility for history, rather than focussing on our own possibility for authenticity or inauthenticity. In fact we become rather more fatalistic than the resolute stance suggested.

Resoluteness implies handing oneself down by anticipation to the "there" of the moment of vision; and this handing down we call "fate". (Heidegger, 1927:386)

In fact Heidegger links fate also to destiny and heritage. He says that:

In repetition, fateful destiny can be disclosed explicitly as bound up with the heritage which has come down to us. (Heidegger, 1927:386)

What is being considered here is how Dasein makes sense of what happens to it and of its movement from birth to death. How can we think of making ourselves into something of a self, if we are only this kind of anticipation of death? It is, according to Heidegger, by the authentic repetition in which we envisage, in the moment of vision a kind of fateful destiny that binds us to some kind of centre, which is actually our heritage. We are not just a collection

of projections into the future. We connect somehow, through understanding with the possibilities that we come to see as ours. This happens just as well authentically as inauthentically. We find ourselves in a world, dispersed and confused and then, somehow we pull ourselves together.

Everyday Dasein has been dispersed into the many kinds of things which daily 'come to pass'. The opportunities and circumstances which concern keeps 'tactically' awaiting in advance, have 'fate' as their outcome. In terms of that with which inauthentically existing Dasein concerns itself, it first computes its history. In so doing, it is driven about by its 'affairs'. So if it wants to come to itself it must first *pull itself together* from the *dispersion* and *disconnectedness* of the very things that have 'come to pass'; (Heidegger, 1927:389-390)

It is in learning to link our experiences together and hold them together, pulling them together from their confusing dispersion that we begin to make sense of Dasein as a consistent unit, which can even begin to think of itself as a self. This 'self' will always be something that Dasein has thought up for itself out of its historicity.

The Self's resoluteness against the inconstancy of distraction, is in itself a *steadiness which has been stretched along* - the steadiness with which Dasein as fate 'incorporates' into its existence birth and death and their 'between', and holds them as thus 'incorporated', so that in such constancy Dasein is indeed in a moment of vision or what is world-historical in its current Situation. (Heidegger, 1927:390-391)

Although death remains the ultimate it becomes possible for Dasein in the moment of vision to catch up with its birth as well as its death and also with the fate that lies in between. It is Dasein's becoming thus capable of a kind of historical constancy that creates this sense of Self. Resoluteness is therefore redefined. It does not only anticipate death and firmly project the future. It also gives up and gives in to fate.

Resoluteness constitutes the *loyalty* of existence to its own Self. As resoluteness which is ready for *anxiety*, this loyalty is at the same time a possible way of revering the sole authority which a free existing can have - of revering the repeatable possibilities of existence. Resoluteness would be misunderstood ontologically if one were to suppose that it *would be* actual as 'Experience' only as long as the 'act' of resolving 'lasts'. In resoluteness lies

the existentiell constancy which, by its very essence, has already anticipated [vorweggenommen] every possible moment of vision that may arise from it. As fate, resoluteness is freedom to *give up* some definite resolution, and to give it up in accordance with the demands of some possible Situation or other. The steadiness of existence is not interrupted thereby but confirmed in the moment of vision. (Heidegger, 1927:391)

This rather long quote shows Heidegger's gradual move in the direction of accepting that there is no such thing as wilful and resolute authenticity. Resoluteness can exist in two ways. It is implied that in order to be complete it should have both these components. On the one hand an active resolving, on the other hand a rather more passive acceptance of fate and situation. Here is the giving up that makes resolution so close to Heidegger's later concept of releasement or letting go (*Gelassenheit*). Life requires both these attitudes from us for completeness. The moment of vision allows us to stand somewhere where we can encompass both. To become authentically historical is arguably the objective of psychotherapy. To overcome inauthentic historicity is what we need to bring about in our clients. Heidegger now defines these two as follows:

When, however, one's existence is inauthentically historical, it is loaded down with the legacy of a 'past' which has become unrecognizable, and it seeks the modern. But when historicity is authentic, it understands history as the 'recurrence' of the possible, and knows that a possibility will recur only if existence is open for it fatefully, in a moment of vision, in resolute repetition. (Heidegger, 1927:391-392)

To live in this manner requires us to both retrieve and let go of the past. It requires us to both anticipate the future and our death and leave ourselves open to the fate and the situation that is there for us now. To live in this manner requires a constant looking to the horizon of our being in both directions: past and future and to be aware of our constant movement in time and in the world of our destiny. It is a complex way of remaining open to our being there and may prove to be a worthy aim for psychotherapy. It is by no means an easy way of living, but one could surmise that when it is achieved there is no further room for any form of self-deception.

9. Summary of Heidegger's view

Having considered the ways in which Heidegger sees Dasein negotiating inauthentic and authentic existence we must now turn to the questions that have so far been left unanswered. We have clearly shown how the undifferentiated and inauthentic mode of being that Dasein lives in for the most part to start out with is not a case of self-deception since at this stage Dasein has not yet revealed its ownmost-potentiality-for-Being-itself. If there is no revealed self, there cannot be self-deception. As long as we live in this fundamental inauthenticity we do not yet know any better and cannot deceive ourselves. The self must be revealed in some way before I can deceive myself regarding it.

We have to accept the initial inauthentic fallen state of Dasein's absorption in the world of the "they", its being in untruth. We now know that Dasein remains dispersed in the "they" for the most part, as long as it is inconstant in its own Being through being distracted. The recognition that Dasein does actively flee in the face of itself during that time introduces the notion of self-forgetfulness, which we examined briefly above. This self-forgetfulness consists of being closed off and in untruth, in levelling off and in tranquillizing.

Then we examined how it is possible for Dasein to overcome these initial and fundamental tendencies and we described Dasein's struggle with its own disclosive tendencies. Facing up to one's ownmost potential-for-Being-oneself is possible by becoming anxious in disclosing Dasein's essential possibility for being free to be itself. Discovering the possibility for Being-towards-death and for disclosing one's ownmost being-guilty are the essential ingredients of this push for authenticity and disclosure of one's ownmost-potentiality-for-being-oneself. This requires Dasein to bring itself back from its falling by

attending to the call of conscience. The call of conscience brings into awareness the fundamental nullity of Dasein's basis in existence.

This struggle for authenticity culminates in resolute anticipation or rather in what Heidegger refers to as '*Vorlanger*', which is more like a reaching out, a yearning for death. It also results in the moment of vision where Dasein's temporality and historicity is fully grasped and the situation is revealed as constantly marred by the equiprimordial tendency to inauthenticity.

We have seen how Heidegger speaks of Dasein's failure to hear its own self and of listening away to the "They" (270-271). He also speaks of Dasein's fundamental abandonment and forsakenness (277).

He also notes that the disclosure of our nullity, which is not to be confused with worthlessness, but is rather about a fundamental freedom, introduces the risk of annihilation at all times (285).

The nullity we have in mind belongs to Dasein's Being-free for its existentiell possibilities. Freedom, however, *is* only in the choice of o n e possibility - that is, in tolerating one's not having chosen the others and one's not being able to choose them. (285)

He recognizes that irresoluteness will remain dominant because of this and he notes the possibility that Dasein will continue to take a diversion into inauthenticity when not wanting to face up to death (259).

It is a continuing effort to pull ourselves together out of the dispersion into the "They" and authenticity can never be taken for granted. (389-390)

Constancy and loyalty to the self are not an easily attained objective. Dasein will shirk its responsibility in becoming authentic again and again and revert to

inauthenticity. This disloyalty is still not described as a process of self-deception however, but rather as a diversion from truth.

This continues to beg the question of whether Dasein actively opts for inauthenticity when it has the possibility of moving towards a more authentic stance. Is it possible for Dasein to opt to lie to itself rather than opt to move towards an increasingly authentic mode of being? Of course many would argue that self-deception is a contradiction in terms and that it is simply not possible to lie to oneself, since at some level one is always aware of the truth at the same time. It is therefore not surprising that Heidegger does not directly tackle this question of deliberate seeking to divert oneself in inauthenticity. It would seem as if there is definitely no Heideggerian concept of self-deception.

We know however that even when Dasein has achieved its resolute Being-towards-Death and has disclosed its ownmost-potentiality-for-Being-itself, it continues to fall back into inauthenticity and to not be true to itself. Does this involve self-deception? We must now carefully examine what Heidegger has said about all this in order to see whether he has an implied theory of self-deception even though he has no explicit concept of self-deception.

The key to Heidegger's view on deception is in his remark that deceiving is a covering up:

'Being false' (ψευδεσθαι) amounts to deceiving in the sense of *covering up* (*verdecken*) putting something in front of something (in such a way as to let it be seen) and thereby passing it off as something which it is *not*. (Heidegger, 1927:33)

What this indicates is that deception is a covering up, a substitution of one thing for another. We can in principle cover things up for ourselves as well, but Heidegger prefers to speak of such an attitude as one of covering up rather than as one of deception. Covering up is usually done because the truth is too

anxiety provoking and covering up can tranquillize. But this tranquillizing is not done in order to deceive. It is rather done in order to cover up. Heidegger points this out quite clearly when he discusses idle talk. He remarks that idle talk is not a deliberate attempt at deception. It merely closes off the world rather than opening it up:

To do this one need not aim to deceive. Idle talk does not have the kind of Being which belongs to consciously passing off something as something else. The fact that something has been said groundlessly, and then gets passed along in the further retelling, amounts to perverting the act of disclosing [Erschliessen] into an act of closing off [Verschliessen]. (Heidegger, 1927:169)

Deception is about passing something off for something else as we have seen before, but idle talk or other inauthentic forms of behaviour are merely about changing the human ability to disclose into an act of closing off instead. Heidegger consistently sticks to this point, that human beings are much more inclined to hide or cover up the truth, than that they pass one thing off for another. Thus deception and self-deception are not so relevant to understanding human nature, but the ability to close off or hide are very important.

There is only one place in Being and Time where Heidegger uses the word self-deception directly and then only to notice that it is not such an important concept. He discusses the issue of transparency [Durchsichtigkeit] which he uses to designate 'knowledge of the Self' in the sense of selfhood being defined as a going out towards a world and providing a transparency of its own outlook and vision of this world. He contrasts this transparency with opaqueness in the following manner:

On the other hand, Dasein's opaqueness [Undurchsichtigkeit] is not rooted primarily and solely in 'egocentric' self-deceptions; it is rooted just as much in lack of acquaintance with the world. (Heidegger, 1927:146)

This passage could not be clearer. It is the only place in Being and Time where Heidegger actually uses the term self-deception [*Selbsttäuschung*]. Heidegger puts self-deception in its place alongside Dasein's more important lack of acquaintance with the world. He shows how transparency and opaqueness, or unclarity of vision are opposed. It is the opaqueness of vision that brings a not seeing of what is true. This is not a matter primarily of self-deception but rather a matter of not being open enough to what is actually in the world. Here we see once and for all why self-deception could never have been an important concept for Heidegger. Self-deception is far too narrow a concept to do justice to Heidegger's worldview, which is that of a Dasein which is not preoccupied with its self but rather is always in connection with a world. It is the transparency of one's world relation that guarantees openness and truth. A lack of transparency, generated by covering up, is a more important threat to truth than self-deception. It is Dasein's alienation that leads it astray, not its deliberate substitution of one thing for another.

In a previous chapter we have seen that Heidegger recognizes that when Dasein is tranquillized and tempted into a fallen mode of being it becomes alienated.

Falling Being-in-the-world is not only tempting and tranquillizing; it is at the same time *alienating*. (Heidegger, 1927:178)

It sounds at first as if this means that Dasein becomes only alienated from itself, but matters are a little more complex than this. Heidegger describes the way in which Dasein becomes estranged from its authentic mode of being only, whilst getting more drawn into its inauthentic mode of being.

This alienation *closes off* from Dasein its authenticity and possibility, even if only the possibility of genuinely foundering. It does not, however, surrender Dasein to an entity which Dasein itself is not, but forces it into its inauthenticity - into a possible kind of Being *of itself*. The alienation of falling - at once tempting and tranquillizing - leads by its own movement, to Dasein's getting *entangled* [*verfängt*] in itself. (Heidegger, 1927:178)

This entanglement in oneself is characteristic of an inauthentic mode of being. We do not at these moments become alienated from all of ourselves, but rather are moved into our mode of being inauthentically, where we are out of touch with our own possibility. Being alienated and entangled in this manner consists of being tempted and tranquillized. We move away from our potential for being authentic and plunge into our own inauthenticity.

This 'movement' of Dasein in its own Being, we call its "*downward plunge*" [*Absturz*]. Dasein plunges out of itself into itself, into the groundlessness and nullity of inauthentic everydayness. But this plunge remains hidden from Dasein by the way things have been publicly interpreted, so much so, indeed, that it gets interpreted as a way of 'ascending' and 'living concretely' (Heidegger, 1927:178)

What Heidegger describes here is a turbulence that sweeps us away from an authentic confrontation with our potentiality for Being into an inward movement that pretends to be authentic whilst it is in fact inauthentic. We tell ourselves that we already know what we might find out and that everything is understood when we have not begun to ask ourselves what there is to understand. The groundlessness that we plunge into is the groundlessness of our own being. There is here a repeated movement of falling, which leads to a sense of dizziness.

Since the understanding is thus constantly torn away from authenticity and into the "they" (though always with a sham of authenticity), the movement of falling is characterized by *turbulence* [*Wirbel*] (Heidegger, 1927:178).

In this turbulent falling Dasein asserts itself in its thrownness. It continues in its familiar mode of inauthenticity. We cannot conceive of this being a simple matter of losing oneself. For if we are the being for whom being is an issue, then it must be an issue to us that we continuously throw ourselves into this kind of turbulence, which allows us to continue to live away from ourselves. Heidegger concludes that the continued inauthenticity and falling is not just

some negative phenomenon but a common and positive part of Dasein's everyday being.

The phenomenon of falling does not give us something like a 'night view' of Dasein, a property which occurs ontically and may serve to round out the innocuous aspects of this entity. Falling reveals an *essential* ontological structure of Dasein itself. Far from determining its nocturnal side it constitutes all Dasein's days in their everydayness. (Heidegger, 1927:179)

Of course we have already concluded above that if it is part of Dasein's essential nature, an ontological condition of our Being that we should continue to fall in this way then inauthenticity will inevitably remain an intrinsic part of our being-in-the-world. Heidegger implies as much and he makes it quite clear that inauthenticity is not to be seen as a corruption of some morally higher state of being that we have to keep aspiring to. It is not the negative aspect of being human either. It is not the night view with the day view being authenticity. We should not generate some sort of abstract view about the desirability of authenticity or about the various states that Dasein can find itself in. We should stick with the facts of how Dasein actually is in its everyday existence.

We can conclude that Dasein for the most part in an ordinary way of being will be self-forgetful and inauthentic. Its capacity for understanding and speech will allow it though to reflect upon this and achieve occasional authenticity. It is this understanding that Heidegger seems to consider worth aiming for beyond anything else. He clearly does favour authenticity and awareness of our existence, but this does not mean that we should make assertions about Dasein's state of grace or state of sin.

But in so far as any faith or 'world view', makes any such assertions, and if it asserts anything about Dasein as Being-in-the-World, it must come back to the existential structures which we have set forth, provided that its assertions are to make a claim to *conceptual* understanding. (Heidegger, 1927:180)

This kind of conceptual understanding is only possible to the extent that we are willing and able to pay attention to the limitations of Dasein's being in the world. We must remain alert to the reality of Dasein's facticity, which makes it possible for Dasein to be inauthentic by being determined by the world and absorbed in the world of its fallenness with others. Since this facticity is an ontological given, we shall have to accept once and for all that Dasein will always remain within the power of its own tendency to fall back into an inauthentic mode of being in the world.

To settle the question of whether we need a theory of self-deception we need to decide whether this inauthenticity is always involuntary or whether it can sometimes be aimed for deliberately, against better knowing as it were. We saw earlier that an active self-forgetfulness accompanies the falling at some points. This active self-forgetfulness in first instance was simply about turning away from oneself so as to fall into inauthenticity. Now that we have seen how it is in fact possible for Dasein to emerge from this inauthenticity it becomes crucial to consider whether it still remains possible for Dasein to purposely forget its own authentic potential for Being. This indeed would amount to self-deception.

We saw that in the moment of vision Dasein achieves authentic present. In what sense, if any does the inauthentic present, 'making present', amount to or involve self-deception, or self-forgetfulness?

To making present corresponds 'having-forgotten', as the inauthentic way of having-been, which is to not come back to one's ownmost self. Such forgetting, Heidegger says, is an ec-stasis, which involves action, and this has the character of backing away in the face of one's ownmost 'been', which is closed off.

Whilst in authentic being we come to ourselves, in inauthentic being we back away from ourselves. Therefore the authentic being of anticipatory resoluteness when it is related to the past is repetition, as we have seen above.

This ecstasis makes it possible for Dasein to be able to take over resolutely that entity which it already is. In anticipating, Dasein *brings* itself *again forth* into its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. If *Being-as-having-been* is authentic, we call it "*repetition*". (Heidegger, 1927:339)

This ability to come to itself and repeat itself does not come to Dasein automatically. On the contrary it is more likely that Dasein will back away from this potential, even though it has come to the possibility of thus authentically repeating itself.

But when one projects oneself inauthentically towards those possibilities which have been drawn from the object of concern in making it present, this is possible only because Dasein has *forgotten* itself in its ownmost *thrown* potentiality-for-Being. This forgetting is not nothing, nor is it just a failure to remember; it is rather a 'positive' ecstatical mode of one's having been - a mode with a character of its own. (Heidegger, 1927:339)

There is a projection involved in this turning towards our own possibilities in this particular inauthentic way. There is a positive decision to turn away from what one could turn towards, i.e. one's ownmost-potentiality-for-Being, and a turning towards the objects of our concern instead. Dasein, as it were, throws itself back upon its own inauthentic thrownness. It opts out of the possibility for anticipatory resoluteness. Heidegger refers to this movement away from authenticity as an ecstasis, indeed as rapture (*Entrücking*). It is the opposite of the resolute rapture with which Dasein encounters the situation when it is authentic.

The ecstasis (rapture) of forgetting has the character of backing away *in the face of* one's ownmost "been", and of doing so in a manner which is closed off from itself - in such a manner, indeed, that this backing-away closes off ecstatically that in the face of which one is backing away, and thereby closes itself off too. (Heidegger, 1927:339)

At the same time as closing off the world, Dasein closes off from itself as well. The two go hand in hand. The forgetting that happens after the possibility of

authenticity has been disclosed is a much stronger forgetting than that of the mere self-forgetfulness of inauthentic being. This forgetting in the face of one's ownmost "been" is a backing away and a closing off. It is still not a self-deception. Heidegger never uses that concept. The forgetting he is concerned with is rather a covering up of what has been and could still be disclosed. We do not attend to what is available to us. We do not remain true to our own nature of being able to disclose. We close off instead.

Clearly even after conscience has made its appeal to us, we can still remove ourselves from this appeal and emerge from it. We can at any time back away from our fate, from our resolute anticipation of our being-towards-death, from the situation and from our ownmost-being-guilty. We are free, so we must also be free to back away from our freedom. We are essentially disclosing but also essentially capable of closing off. We are always capable both of uncovering and covering up. So the question is not whether to be or not to be but rather whether to be disclosing or closing off. It becomes essential to know whether or not we can make a decision as to whether to be truthful or not. But as we have seen Heidegger does not really engage with this idea. He does however recognize that these various options exist. Right at the beginning of Being and Time he discusses the variations of covering up, which he sees as the opposite of phenomenon. Phenomenon is 'that which shines forth' whereas covered-upness is that which is hidden. Heidegger says that things can be either totally covered up and not yet discovered or they can have been covered up after having been discovered. They can be either covered up wholly or in part, as when they get disguised.

The covering-up itself, whether in the sense of hiddenness, burying over, or disguise, has in turn two possibilities. There are coverings-up which are accidental; there are also some which are necessary, grounded in what the thing consists in [der Bestandart des Entdeckten]. (Heidegger, 1927:36)

There is every reason to believe that Heidegger would be consistent here and that what is the case in relation to things, would also be the case in relation to oneself. So there is an acknowledgement of the ways in which we can cover up, totally or in part what has previously been uncovered. We would however term this a disguise or a cover up rather than a deception or a self-deception. What is more, whilst recognizing that there are different modes of being in relation to our ownmost potentiality-for-being-ourselves, Heidegger never brings in an evaluative discourse about how Dasein should decide on which mode to be in.

He does not appear to formulate any principles about how to prevent our backing away from resoluteness, nor does he necessarily condemn such backing away. He observes that it is fear that makes us back away. He speaks of the bewildered making present of fear, which is what makes us want to back away.

This bewildered making-present of the first thing that comes into one's head, is something that belongs with forgetting oneself in fear. (Heidegger, 1927:342)

Fear is a forgetting which takes us away from our potential for Being ourselves. We go back to our previously discovered ways of being as thrown.

When one forgets and backs away in the face of a factual potentiality-for-Being which is resolute, one clings to those possibilities of self-preservation and evasion which one has already discovered circumspectively beforehand. (Heidegger, 1927:342)

Thus it is fear of what the potentiality-for-Being concretely exposes us to that makes us fade back into the old evasive and falling modality of being. This way of being is confusing and bewildering and is no good. It stands in sharp contradistinction to facing of our potentiality-for-being in anxiety, which is an opening up to our nullity. Anxiety relates to nothing whereas fear relates to something specific and that makes all the difference.

Anxiety discloses an insignificance of the world; and this insignificance reveals the nullity of that with which one can concern oneself - or, in other words, the impossibility of projecting

oneself upon a potentiality-for-Being which belongs to existence and which is founded primarily upon one's objects of concern. The revealing of this impossibility, however, signifies that one is letting the possibility of an authentic potentiality-for-Being be lit up. (Heidegger, 1927:343)

So, in fear we get taken over by the actual threats of the world. In anxiety we open ourselves up to the null basis of everything. Whilst it is harder to be so exposed to what is in reality, i.e. nothing, it saves us from our inauthentic preoccupation with the concrete. By impossibility being revealed we can also discover the very possibility that eludes us in fear.

This makes it very clear that we can only continue to be authentic and resolute as long as we are willing to be in anxiety and open to nullity (which includes being open to the nullity of our concerns as well as to our own potential for death). This is clearly going to be a difficult thing to maintain. But Heidegger makes it plain that anxiety is the *sine qua non* of achieving the moment of vision.

The Present of anxiety holds the moment of vision *at the ready [auf dem Sprung]*, as such a moment it itself, and only itself, is possible. (Heidegger, 1927:344)

At the same time Heidegger argues that authentic anxiety itself is only truly possible if we are already capable of resoluteness.

But anxiety can mount authentically only in a Dasein which is resolute. He who is resolute knows no fear; but he understands the possibility of anxiety as the possibility of the very mood which neither inhibits nor bewilders him. Anxiety liberates him *from* possibilities which 'count for nothing' ['nichtigen'], and lets him become free for those which are authentic. (Heidegger, 1927:344)

It is almost a circular argument. We have to be capable of resoluteness to experience anxiety, which itself is to make the moment of vision possible. In this anxious anticipatory resoluteness we can free ourselves from those things that hold us back in fear and open ourselves to the possibilities that are authentically our own. Such openness to our possibilities might well make us

fearful again however. At this moment we might again apprehensively become bewildered and taken over by inauthentic ways of being drawn into the object of our concern.

This clearly does not involve a self-deception, but rather a simple movement away from our authentic possibilities and a preoccupation with our inauthentic possibilities. In light of this we back off from our ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Heidegger recognizes that in order to avoid this continuous movement between fear, anxiety, authenticity and inauthenticity, Dasein seems to use another, quite effective strategy, which is that of indifference.

Furthermore, the pallid lack of mood - indifference - which is addicted to nothing and has no urge for anything, and which abandons itself to whatever the day may bring, yet in so doing takes everything along with it in a certain manner, demonstrates *most penetratingly* the power of forgetting in the everyday mode of that concern which is closest to us. (Heidegger 1927:345)

Here it would seem that Heidegger opts for indifference, the not letting things matter at all anymore, as the answer to the forgetting in the face of the challenge of authenticity and the possibility of the moment of vision. Indifference rather than self-deception is where forgetting leads us. This attitude of indifference is an important concept and it is to be noted that it is the opposite of equanimity, which is what one experiences in the moment of vision when we are capable of letting everything be seen and known and yet let everything be equal to us. On this occasion everything matters without upsetting us, whereas in indifference we let nothing matter to us in order to avoid upset. It must be noted that although Heidegger calls indifference a pallid lack of mood, he must consider this lack of mood nevertheless as a kind of mood, since we are always in one mood or another.

Indifference, which can go along with busying oneself head over heels, must be sharply distinguished from equanimity. This latter mood springs from resoluteness, which, in a moment of *vision*, looks at those Situations which are possible in one's potentiality-for-Being-a-whole as disclosed in our anticipation of [zum] death. (Heidegger, 1927:345)

Indifference demonstrates the power of forgetting like nothing else does, even though hiding in curiosity is its counterpart. In both cases we let ourselves get absorbed back into the world of our concern whilst nothing amounts to anything in the end. Both in indifference and curiosity we go from one thing to the next without letting anything really matter.

In never dwelling anywhere, Being-there is everywhere and nowhere. (Heidegger, 1927:347)

By keeping itself indifferent and jumping around, busying itself in the world Dasein can annihilate its possibility for the moment of vision. This is a leaping away from an awareness of its own potentiality of being rather than a self-deceiving, but it has the same net result; that of evading the possibility of being truthful to ourselves. Heidegger yet again reminds us that this untruthfulness is a fundamental given of our ontological condition.

In the 'leaping away' of the Present, one also forgets increasingly. The fact that curiosity always holds by what is coming next, and has forgotten what has gone before, is not a result that ensues only *from* curiosity, but is the ontological condition for curiosity itself. (Heidegger, 1927:347)

This is how Dasein gets entangled in itself over and over again, through temptation, tranquillization and alienation. It does not hold strong in the face of its revealed Being-towards-Death, but slides away in all these ways so as to avoid its ownmost-potentiality-for-Being.

Having been thrown into Being-towards-death, Dasein flees - proximally and for the most part - in the face of this thrownness, which has been more or less explicitly revealed. (Heidegger 1927:348)

The constant movement away from what has been revealed is thus described as a fleeing, yet again. Rather than creating a deliberate self-deception Dasein tries to escape from the hardship of its own demanding existence in terms of resolute anticipation. This looks more like *a-krasia*, an essential built-in weakness of will than like a strategy of self-deception. And yet it is not *a-krasia* either, since Dasein wills this turning away and sometimes positively turns to it.

A specific kind of *forgetting* is essential for the temporality that is constitutive for letting something be involved. The Self must forget itself if, lost in the world of equipment, it is to be able 'actually' to go to work and manipulate something. (Heidegger, 1927:354)

This is an interesting remark, which refers us to a realistic appraisal of the ontic dimension and the requirements of the practical world of work and equipment. Heidegger notes that forgetfulness is required of us if we are to function effectively in such a world, rather than remain open to authentic and resolute being. Perhaps it is this practical, but also ontologically given, fact of life that we have to work and be in a concrete world of survival with other people that explains the need to forget. Our covering up and backing away is therefore not a self-deception at all. It may be inauthentic, but such inauthenticity is an ontological necessity of Dasein's existence. As thrownness Dasein has a constant struggle to rise out of its own thrownness whilst integrating it in its ownmost-potential-for-being-itself. We have to count with Dasein's being-in-the-world, if we are going to come to terms with Dasein's tendency to keep forgetting itself.

As thrown, Dasein has indeed been delivered over to itself and to its potentiality-for-Being, *but as Being-in-the-world*. As thrown, it has been submitted to a 'world' and exists factically with Others. Proximally and for the most part the Self is lost in the "they". (Heidegger, 1927:383)

In the concrete events of everyday living Dasein has to negotiate the obstacles of world and of the presence of other people all the time. It does not progress

towards authenticity to retain itself in resolute anticipation ever after. It rather finds itself constantly disloyal to the Self it is gradually coming to terms with. This disloyalty can be countered by an increasing resoluteness in the face of one's ownmost potential for impossibility, i.e. death.

Only by the anticipation of death is every accidental and 'provisional' possibility driven out. Only Being-free *for* death, gives Dasein its goal outright and pushes existence into its finitude. Once one has grasped the finitude of one's existence, it snatches one back from the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves as closest to one - those of comfortableness, shirking, and taking things lightly - and brings Dasein into the simplicity of its *fate*. [*Schicksals*] (Heidegger, 1927:384)

To make oneself truly free for death is the only real way to achieve the authentic potential for one's own being. It is not something that one can ever assume to have completed. It is not self-deception about one's own position in the world or about one's potential that stops it, but rather the possibility for making oneself comfortable and for shirking the work of authenticity. Dasein's ability to disclose inevitably discloses this difficulty in being truly disclosing. Disclosing is something that has to be struggled towards and can be avoided in many different ways. The possibility of disclosing is always counteracted by the possibility of closing off. True disclosure includes the possibility of communicating with others, who after all struggle with the same ontological givens as we do.

Only in communicating and in struggling does the power of destiny become free. (Heidegger, 1927:384)

Heidegger explains that fate is the power to take adversity into one's stride. To be free for one's fate means to have a readiness to take anxiety and adversity on board.

Only if death, guilt, conscience, freedom, and finitude reside together equiprimordially in the Being of an entity as they do in care, can that entity exist in the mode of fate; that is to say, only then can it be historical in the very depths of its existence. (Heidegger, 1927:385)

This is the full outcome of achieving the moment of vision; to be able to be free to encompass past, present and future in all its terrible reality, including that of being shattered by death, and still be open to this true possibility of Dasein. If that is what will make us truly ourselves, then it is hardly surprising that for most of the time we shall not be able to be truly ourselves in this way. In the face of this tall order of existence we do not need a concept of self-deception. What we need is a way of looking at human being that allows us to understand that for most of the time we shall flee away from the truth. Heidegger has certainly provided us with such a way of looking at Dasein.

However his emphasis at all times remains on the overcoming of inauthenticity as far as this is possible and on the achievement of resolute authentic existing. Dasein may live in a distracted and dispersed fashion for most of the time, but its objective is firmly to extract itself out of this and find itself resolutely.

So if it wants to come to itself, it must first *pull itself together* from the *dispersion* and *disconnectedness* of the very things that have 'come to pass'; (Heidegger, 1927:390)

There has to be a constant effort to keep pulling Dasein out of its dispersion into the "they" and its lostness in the things around it. Self, it would seem, has to be put together. This is what resoluteness is about. Without it there is no self, only a going out of oneself into the world and a falling or fleeing. Of course as long as there is no self there can be no self-deception either. The Self only comes forth out of resoluteness.

Resoluteness constitutes the *loyalty* of existence to its own Self. (Heidegger, 1927:391)

There needs to be a steadiness of the moment of vision for this loyalty to become possible at all. Otherwise there is no self and no self-deception. The quandary of Dasein is that it either faces its existence or loses it. In light of

this challenge self-deception is redundant. Self-forgetting, closing off, fleeing and indifference are more to the point.

In conclusion, Heidegger's view of what might otherwise be termed self-deception and which he deals with by considering the tensions between authentic and inauthentic Dasein can be summarized as follows in the table on the next page.

Table 3.1 Authenticity and inauthenticity compared.

	Authenticity	Inauthenticity
Basic principle	Truth	Untruth
Dasein's original state	Undifferentiation	Undifferentiation
Dasein's intention	Coming to itself	Backing away from itself
Dasein's basic objective	Being-towards-Death	Comfort seeking and shirking
Dasein's fundamental ability	Disclosing	Closing off
Dasein's relation to the world	Uncovering	Covering up
Dasein's awakening	Facing anxiety	Tranquillizing
Dasein's cognition	Transparency	Opaqueness
Dasein's attitude to itself	Awareness of ownmost potentiality-for-being-oneself	Self-forgetfulness
Dasein's struggle	Attending to the call of conscience	Falling- Dispersion into the They
Maintenance of authenticity	Constancy	Turbulence
Active principle	Anticipation - Yearning	Evasion - Fleeing
Relationship to the past	Repetition	Forgetting
Relationship to the present	Being in the situation	Distraction
Relationship to the future	Resoluteness	Irresoluteness
Ultimate position	Moment of Vision	Indifference

The table shows quite clearly how Dasein's struggle is with the opposites of authentic and inauthentic modes of being rather than with the dangers of self-deception. Dasein can evade and forget what it does not feel ready or willing to deal with and does not have to deceive itself. It only does this either in fear, or for the need to work in the world along with other people. What Dasein does, is to close off or cover up what it is not ready to disclose or uncover and it always has the ability to fall into the "They", with all its tricks of curiosity, idle talk and ambiguity if it wants to flee from reality. It is however possible for Dasein to achieve a certain constancy, by facing anxiety and attending to the call of conscience and live with anticipatory resoluteness in a state of Being-towards-Death. If it does so it will be capable of a particular relationship to time and to itself that will make repetition possible and will open up the possibility of being in the situation and reaching the moment of vision. It is this that Heidegger holds out as the greatest prize, even though he is at pains to point out that inauthenticity is ontologically equiprimordial to authenticity. This means that Dasein will continue to struggle with its inauthentic mode of being even when it becomes able to live resolutely. When this happens there is no need to seek to explain what happens by the complicated and rather contradictory concept of self-deception. The strategies of distraction, indifference, backing away, covering up and forgetting, including self-forgetting, are quite powerful enough to serve their purpose.

Chapter Four

Critical considerations in relation to Heidegger's views on inauthenticity and self-deception.

1. Sartre's *mauvaise foi*

Having examined Heidegger's stance towards self deception, it will be instructive to contrast and critique it by briefly considering some later theories that were developed out of Heidegger's thinking, since these theories highlight some of the problems with Heidegger's views on self-deception.

Sartre's contribution to the understanding of self-deception is particularly relevant, in that it is both so directly founded on Heidegger's work and yet so very different to it. Sartre follows some of Heidegger's basic ideas and ends up with a very different point of view. In particular, he deals with self-deception in a more direct and straightforward manner. His term for inauthenticity is 'bad faith', '*mauvaise foi*', and this French term is often better directly translated as self-deception. In fact Being and Nothingness was intended as a phenomenological analysis of self-deception. Whilst Heidegger introduced the ontological distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity Sartre elaborated the practical implications of his ontological perspective. Unlike Heidegger Sartre has no compunction about looking at the interaction of ontological and ontic factors. When Sartre speaks of '*mauvaise foi*' or bad faith, he does so in a very practical way, developing a concrete theory of self-deception. One of the ways in which Sartre's work is however very different to that of Heidegger is in his maintenance of a Cartesian, dualistic position. It is not the subject of this dissertation to look at Sartre's ideas in any detail and we shall focus on those notions that are directly relevant to our understanding

of self-deception only, especially where Sartre's ideas imply an indirect critique of Heidegger.

Whilst Sartre's ideas were very broadly based on Heidegger's analysis of the ontological foundations of Dasein, he took these into an ontic direction and described the actual ways in which people seemed to opt out of living authentically. Sartre does not refer as much to authentic living as Heidegger does. He often dismisses 'good faith' or what he refers to as living in 'the spirit of seriousness' (*l'esprit de sérieux*) as something to be scorned and dismissed, as another form of bad faith and it is difficult to see what precisely the opposite of bad faith is.

Sartre introduces his notion of '*mauvaise foi*' at a very early stage in Being and Nothingness. He seems to juxtapose bad faith, which is in the present, to past and future, which are the other dimensions of human reality. He says that bad faith is instantaneous. The question he poses is as follows:

What then are we to say that consciousness must be in the instantaneity of the pre-reflective *cogito* - if the human being is capable of bad faith? (Sartre, 1991:45)

His search is for a description of what makes bad faith possible and in a sense inevitable. As Heidegger's inauthenticity, Sartre's '*mauvaise foi*' comes before almost any other experience of being human. It is there long before any other experience and always remains there as the background of our human living.

The lie is a behaviour of transcendence. The lie is also a normal phenomenon of what Heidegger calls the "Mitsein". (Sartre, 1991:48)

Sartre bases his notion of '*mauvaise foi*' on the idea of negativity. He emphasizes the importance of human beings as capable of disclosing negativity and absence in the world. This is an interesting departure from or addition to

Heidegger's contention that human beings disclose the world and Being, although we saw above that Heidegger too contends that disclosure involves the disclosure of nullity as well. Human beings according to Sartre do not just have the ability to reveal negativity. They are also capable of reflecting on their own negativity. He sees this as a fundamental characteristic of human being.

Consciousness is a being, the nature of which is to be conscious of the nothingness of its being
(Sartre, 1991:47)

Not only are people nothingness, or filled with nothingness, but also are they able to be conscious of this nothingness. The way Sartre puts it nothingness, which is at the core of our existence, is something we should accept and work with. It is human beings alone who can make this happen.

Sartre describes various ways in which people can manifest nothingness in this manner. He speaks of men who will live like a constant negation of themselves. He refers to Scheler's man of resentment, which must certainly be in fact a reference to Nietzsche's notion of resentment as that which motivates mediocre men. But Sartre also reintroduces Kierkegaard's notion of irony as a manifestation of man's capacity for nothingness.

In irony a man annihilates what he posits within one and the same act; he affirms to deny and denies to affirm; he creates a positive object but it has no being other than its nothingness.
(Sartre, 1991:47)

Out of this positing of nothingness grows the possibility of playing with it. Heidegger's concern with inauthenticity as a falsehood has been left behind. Sartre appears to discuss bad faith as a potential game. Far from bad faith always being associated with inauthenticity, it is often a way for a person to manipulate the environment as well as their personal status within it. This is a considerable departure from Heidegger's insistence that inauthenticity is

something we largely fall or flee into. For Sartre bad faith carries the power of disguising something unpleasant and making it into something apparently more pleasant.

To be sure, the one who practices bad faith is hiding a displeasing truth or presenting as truth a pleasing untruth. (Sartre, 1991: 49)

According to Sartre human beings are clearly much more au fait with the negative quality of their existence than Heidegger ever suggested. They are so aware of the limits of their own existence that they can manipulate its parameters in their own imagination or representation of reality. Bad faith is not something that happens to us unawares as was Heidegger's inauthenticity, but rather something that we continue to employ in a rather devious way in order to keep ourselves in a good position in the world.

One does not undergo his bad faith; one is not infected with it; it is not a state. But consciousness affects itself with bad faith. There must be an original intention and a project of bad faith; this project implies a comprehension of bad faith as such and a pre-reflective apprehension (of) consciousness as affecting itself with bad faith. (Sartre, 1991:49)

Not only does Sartre conceive of bad faith as actively intended and engaged with, he also sees the project of bad faith as a potentially profitable one. We are a long way from Heidegger's preoccupation with the inevitability of inauthenticity and the continuous struggle to emerge from it into something more authentic. What Sartre describes here is human cunning, which is inexorable even though it may be pre-reflective and thus not calculated. He describes human beings as attempting to mislead others as well as ourselves about the hard realities of life that we find it easier to dispense with.

Sartre goes to considerable length to show that this deceptive behaviour is voluntary, or at least open to a reflective process and potentially within human control. He shows Freud's idea of the unconscious to be lacking in that it

cannot explain how the unconscious decides what is dangerous to be known and what is safe to be brought to conscious awareness. Sartre claims that we are always capable of retrieving our deceptions and self-deceptions as we are their ultimate authors and as they are at least pre-reflectively disclosed to us because of the transparency of consciousness.

It follows first that the one to whom the lie is told and the one who lies are one and the same person, which means that I must know in my capacity as deceiver the truth which is hidden from me in my capacity as the deceived. (Sartre, 1991:49)

It is always within our grasp to know the truth of our own experience and to know that we are using wilful deceptions, even if we may vote with our feet to steer clear of this truth. There is no way to make it seem as if we can sometimes not know. To say so would be a further self-deception. This makes Freud's whole theory of the unconscious a huge deceptive machinery.

While many have argued with Sartre about the insufficiency of his arguments against the idea of the unconscious (Natsoulas 1985, Smith 1991) fewer people have noticed that Sartre's arguments clash as much with Heidegger's notion of inauthenticity. In Heidegger's work too, as we have shown, there is an implied level of self-forgetfulness in inauthenticity. We fall into inauthenticity or find ourselves in it. We are very rarely able to retrieve our authentic being. According to Heidegger it takes us a long time before we can even begin to see that there is the possibility of us becoming more authentic and even then we do not succeed in existing authentically for most of the time. There is thus an acceptance of a state of unawareness in everyday human being that is not dissimilar to Freud's views that unconscious processes determine much of everyday life. Sartre on the contrary describes human beings as in much more active control of their own destiny, largely related to his belief in the translucency of consciousness. He clearly considers people who do not assume this responsibility to have a diminished sense of their own freedom and

rationality. In addition he shows that their bad faith is actually a disguised expression of their own ability to be transcendent after all.

But the ambiguity necessary for bad faith comes from the fact that I affirm here that I *am* my transcendence in the mode of being of a thing. (Sartre, 1991:57)

When I act in bad faith I am therefore still exercising my ability to transcend, to choose, to freely assume a particular stance because it suits me that way, even though I may disguise my awareness of this stance to myself. One of the examples that Sartre gives of bad faith is that of the woman who goes out with a man for the first time and who pretends to herself that nothing much is happening between them. She tells herself that she is having an intellectual discussion when in fact a romantic scene is developing. The woman is clearly engaged with her situation in the way that is most beneficial to her, or at least that is most in line with her original project. At the same time it is quite likely that she would refuse to confront the idea that her actions were deliberate and were designed to allow her to continue enjoying the scene without having to make up her mind about the consequences. She would most likely deny such a confrontation, as members of psychotherapeutic groups or clients in psychotherapy often deny similar challenges of their bad faith. This is not a problem for Sartre however. He maintains that:

We have to deal with human reality as a being which is what it is not and which is not what it is. (Sartre, 1991:58)

If his evaluation of human being is correct it means that we are always in a state of self-deception and as such are being what we should be: i.e. that which we are not. It begs the question of whether such behaviour as being what we are not is a pretence or an authentic form of behaviour and whether it should be subjected to questioning and change or not. This is an important question

for psychotherapy. Whilst Heidegger's views clearly lead the psychotherapist to have an educative role with clients in helping them to become more aware of their inauthenticity and perhaps even accept it as equiprimordial with their ability to also be authentically resolute, Sartre's views might lead psychotherapists to watch bemusedly as clients invent persona and stories for themselves to suit their original project. This is very clear in Sartre's example of the waiter.

He is playing, he is amusing himself. But what is he playing? We need not watch long before we can explain it: he is playing *at being* a waiter in a café. There is nothing there to surprise us. The game is a kind of marking out and investigation. The child plays with his body in order to explore it, to take inventory of it; the waiter in the café plays with his condition in order to *realize* it. (Sartre, 1991:59)

Far from the waiter doing anything wrong by being in bad faith, he is only doing what he should be doing: he is trying to realize his particular condition. While Heidegger implied that in inauthenticity we veil our real situation and run away from it, Sartre has come to consider that bad faith is the way in which human beings try to make life more real. In some ways we do all need to play-act. In some ways we all are impostors. Heidegger would have disagreed violently. At the same time Sartre recognizes that this way of realizing one's condition narrows the human condition down. In particular playing a role stops us being aware of our nothingness and therefore of our freedom. This spares us the anguish of being responsible for our own choices, but it constricts our lives. As we play into one situation, we make it impossible for ourselves to be open to other situations. This is what society wants from us: that we settle for a narrow interpretation of our human reality, which is predictable and safe. In doing so we betray the possibilities of our human condition.

There are indeed many precautions to imprison a man in what he is, as if we lived in perpetual fear that he might escape from it, that he might break away and suddenly elude his condition. (Sartre, 1991:59)

Bad faith then is not only a useful device that helps us fit ourselves to our situation it is also a device that suits society. Bad faith is a crucial and highly adaptive way of being. It is much more clearly accepted by Sartre as the way in which we tend to live most of the time. Sartre believes though that we are at all times aware, at some level that our behaviour is no more than play-acting. We always know that we are not just what we pretend to be, or indeed that we are not at all what we pretend to be.

And it is precisely this person *who I have to be* (if I am the waiter in question) and who I am not. It is not that I do not wish to be this person or that I want this person to be different. But rather there is no common measure between his being and mine. It is a "representation" for others and for myself, which means that I can be he only in *representation*. But if I represent myself as him, I am not he; I am separated from him as the object from the subject, separated *by nothing*, but this nothing isolates me from him. I can not be he, I can only play *at being* him; that is imagine to myself that I am he. (Sartre, 1991:60)

This is quite a different matter now. The tragedy is no longer that we are being inauthentic whilst we could be authentic, the tragedy is that we desperately try to be inauthentic whilst never really succeeding at doing so convincingly. We always know that we are really nothing, that we can never assume any identity or any action with the fullness of authenticity. We are doomed to our own nothingness and cannot but try to deceive ourselves into believing we are some thing, an object that is firmly defined and devoid of the freedom of choice. It would not be so bad if we could fully believe that we were this something, but at the end of the day we are always aware of the lack of conviction in our efforts. Nobody ever fully succeeds in being their success or their profession or their personality or anything. Everyone is always aware that they are not really what they pretend to be.

It would seem that Sartre's view is in some ways the opposite of Heidegger's. Whilst Heidegger sees authenticity as both a very elusive and desirable mode of being where truth can be achieved, Sartre sees bad faith as the only way to be in relation to our overall state of nothingness. Heidegger's objective is to

become as true to our ownmost potentiality-for-being as we can, even including our inclination to inauthenticity. Sartre's objective is to remain as close to our non-being, our nothingness as we can. For Sartre engagement with the world is a good thing, for in engaging with the world we take action and make choices. Although these will always be in bad faith and will never make us really be anything in the end, they will nevertheless allow us to exist to the best of our ability. Such exercise of our being for itself is clearly the best we can wish for according to Sartre.

For Heidegger the human project is much less limited and less pragmatic than this. For Heidegger this kind of engagement with the world must always be a form of inauthentic behaviour, which would stand in the way of authenticity. But this also means that for Heidegger authenticity, as it becomes possible in the moment of vision is a real possibility. Sartre, in spite of his insistence on freedom or perhaps because of it, does not consider this possibility to be realistic. Our choices are always partial for Sartre and there is no such thing as being in good faith. Sartre and Heidegger are thus on opposite sides of the argument. While they agree that inauthenticity is an inevitable fact of life, Heidegger wants us to aim to overcome it, even though he recognizes that we will always be in inauthenticity again as well. Sartre might be said to intend us to perfect our capacity for bad faith, since we need bad faith to make ourselves feel solid. The difference rests on the fact that for Heidegger there is an ultimate truth and reality that Dasein might achieve or at least get better at disclosing, whereas for Sartre there is no such thing and human reality has to be managed in relation to its practical use and expediency.

These differences expose serious problems in the underlying and implied moral theories of existentialism in both its Heideggerian and Sartrean shapes. This is so the more interesting as both Heidegger and Sartre actively repudiated moral theorizing. Since psychotherapists have to deal with moral issues, this

begs the question of whether we encourage clients to combat their self-deceptive inauthenticity, or whether we help them manage their self-deceptive bad faith in relation to concrete life situations. What are the guidelines by which people should live their lives? Are these realistic and moral, or could they be destructive and harmful to the health of the person coming for psychotherapeutic help?

What is clear is that for a psychotherapy inspired by Being and Time the objective must be to unveil more and more of truth, standing in inauthenticity and self-forgetfulness at times, but always eventually achieving the insights and moments of vision of anticipatory resoluteness. But can we ever be sure that we are combating the right false beliefs and that the true beliefs that we encourage to be discovered are in fact true?

For Sartre at least it is clear that the objective of psychotherapy should not be sincerity. Sincerity, 'l'esprit de serieux', is no real substitute for self-deception.

How can we in conversation, in confession, in introspection, even attempt sincerity since the effort will by its very nature be doomed to failure and since at the very time when we announce it we have a prejudicative comprehension of its futility? In introspection I try to determine exactly what I am, to make up my mind to be my true self without delay - even though it means consequently to set about searching for ways to change myself. But what does this mean if not that I am constituting myself as a thing? (Sartre, 1991:63)

For Sartre I can never be authentic because the sincerity of authenticity is false. It is an attempt at presenting myself as being something when we know that we can never be something but are always nothing. How different this is from Heidegger's view. To be authentic for Heidegger is a possibility, even though it is difficult to achieve. It may even be this difficulty in achieving it that should make us suspicious. For who can actually achieve it and is it desirable to do so? And does not the very definition of Dasein as the Being that is there, preclude us from ever being authentically ourselves unless we are

fully there. What does it mean to be there, other than to be in constantly changing situations and therefore to be in a constant process of transformation? Does not Sartre's view then have a great challenge to propose to Heidegger's concept of authenticity? Could it be that Sartre is right and that authenticity is a false concept, which is in itself an example of self-deception, of wishful thinking, or at worst, an example of a philosopher misleading and deceiving those who want to be deceived in order to deceive themselves? It makes us notice the strangeness of the lack of a theory of self-deception in Heidegger at the very least. In not allowing for the possibility that the person who has achieved authenticity might thereby achieve new heights and complexities of self-deception, Heidegger posits an idealized notion of authenticity and truth, which has not been verified in ontic reality.

Sartre shows how those who believe themselves to be in a position of truth may be more in error than those who choose to be in error. He gives the example of a person who wants another person to own up to their bad faith and shows how such superior exposing of other's so called bad faith may amount to a superlative form of bad faith. He gives the example of someone wanting the homosexual to acknowledge that he is a homosexual.

We ask here: Who is in bad faith? The homosexual or the champion of sincerity? The homosexual recognizes his faults, but he struggles with all his strength against the crushing view that his mistakes constitute for him a *destiny*. He does not wish to let himself be considered a thing. He has an obscure but strong feeling that a homosexual is not a homosexual as this table is a table or as this red-haired man is red-haired. (Sartre, 1991:64)

If we apply this to psychotherapy we see the importance of not encouraging people to speak of themselves as if they were a particular personality, a specific character formed by decisive deterministic events. We would rather help them see themselves as if they are constantly in changing positions and situations where they have to make choices, more or less good ones, with which they have to immediately struggle again, so that they may be altered again.

Compare this to Heidegger and we find that we might wonder whether Heidegger is in some sense a champion of sincerity. Is he not often implying that we could be truer in the way in which we exist in the world? Does he not imply that we should aim to be so, in anticipating our ownmost potentiality-for-being-ourselves and in coming to terms with our Being-towards-death for instance? Is he not advocating the very behaviour that Sartre shows to be deficient? Is Heidegger also not implying that the person who sticks to authentic living would be immediately in the truth and would be beyond being questioned? Is in other words Heidegger's championing of such concepts as the moment of vision and finding one's ownmost-potentiality-for-being-oneself a disguised form of bad faith and self-deception? Does Heidegger not have an explicit theory of self-deception because it would reveal his own theory to be self-deceptive?

Sartre, towards the end of his chapter on bad faith goes on to show that the real problem with bad faith is that it is a form of faith. Bad faith redefines the nature of truth.

With bad faith a truth appears, a method of thinking, a type of being which is like that of objects; the ontological characteristic of the world of bad faith with which the subject suddenly surrounds himself is this: that here being is what it is not, and is not what it is. Consequently a peculiar type of evidence appears: *non-persuasive* evidence. (Sartre, 1991:68)

It is interesting to note Sartre's use of the word truth in this context. Truth is not, as it is for Heidegger the revelation of what was hidden, but rather a particular way of looking at the world, a method of thinking. In bad faith we allow ourselves to look at the world from our own perspective, we do not look for evidence to the contrary, we create a new worldview, a satisfactory lie in which we can believe. Bad faith is really just another form of faith. Is Heidegger's theory of authenticity and inauthenticity such a form of belief,

such a belief system, such a form of religiosity? These are the questions we really need to ask ourselves.

Sartre says that the way in which we slip into bad faith is the same way in which we slip into sleep.

One puts *oneself* in bad faith as one goes to sleep and one is in bad faith as one dreams. Once this mode of being has been realized, it is as difficult to get out of it as to wake oneself up; bad faith is a type of being in the world, like waking or dreaming, which by itself tends to perpetuate itself, although its structure is of the *metastable* type. (Sartre, 1991:68)

Bad faith is a mode of being. It is not just some defective mode of being. It is something we, as human beings bring about. It is something we allow ourselves to slip into, not deliberately, but by default. Perhaps this is in some ways similar to Heidegger's description of falling. Heidegger however always suggests that this is a defective way of being and that the objective is to wake up out of our fallenness through anxiety and the call of conscience and learn of our own death and our ownmost possibility for being ourselves. Yet he recognizes that this kind of awareness involves rapture, in the same way in which inauthenticity also involves rapture.

Sartre does not espouse such a belief in the possibility for us to discover our ownmost potentiality for being. For him being in bad faith is an essential human way of being, something we need in order to be what we are not and not to be what we are. Therefore we do not reflect on our being in bad faith and we do not articulate our way of being as being in bad faith.

The decision to be in bad faith does not dare to speak its name; it believes itself and does not believe itself in bad faith; it believes itself and does not believe itself in good faith. It is this which from the upsurge of bad faith, determines the later attitude and, as it were, the *Weltanschauung* of bad faith. (Sartre, 1991:68).

We have to maintain ourselves in bad faith or good faith without acknowledging fully that this is what we do. There is therefore always a doubt, always room for questioning and change and perhaps this is a great advantage of the human tendency to be always in bad faith. Bad faith emerges as a mode of being which is wanted and essential to human beings. Heidegger similarly recognized that our potential for becoming irresolute was endless, but he did not describe inauthentic being as the norm to work with.

For Sartre though, bad faith is not about being fallen with others: we need this mode of being as much in relation to ourselves and the world of objects and things as in relation to our ability to know the world and live in it. By being in bad faith and consequently in belief, yet at the same time in doubt, we generate ourselves and we also destroy ourselves continuously. In many ways bad faith is our way of constructing a self whilst destroying a self.

Thus belief is a being which questions its own being, which can realize itself only in its destruction, which can manifest itself to itself only by denying itself. It is a being for which to be is to appear and to appear is to deny itself. (Sartre, 1991:69)

We are then struggling with the ambiguity of the world as we enter into bad faith and perhaps this is the best human beings can do. Sartre concludes that it is just another consequence of our nature of being nothingness, of not being what we are. It ends up being an advantage to be in bad faith because being in bad faith allows me to be what I want to be whilst remembering at the same time that I can never truly be what I pretend to be. Through bad faith nothingness is made obvious.

But the subtle, total annihilation of bad faith by itself can not surprise me; it exists at the basis of all faith. What is it then? At the moment when I wish to believe myself courageous I *know* that I am a coward. And this certainly would come to destroy my belief. (Sartre, 1991:70)

The very nature of bad faith then keeps me exposed to the contradictions in human existence and to the impossibility of my solidity. Bad faith is what betrays my humanity and keeps me aware of it. So while bad faith is clearly a bad thing, it is a good thing in that it maintains the duplicity and ambiguity of human nature and exposes it for what it is. My self-deception, when it is reflected upon, becomes an essential tool of living. This is a remarkably different view to that of Heidegger. For Heidegger ambiguity is part of the original experience of fallenness. Its inauthentic connotation makes it into a negative state of being. Heidegger has no notion that ambiguity needs to persist, even though he acknowledges that we will always continue to move between authentic and inauthentic modes of being. Heidegger does not allow for the possibility that Dasein might need to come to terms with ambiguity in an authentic fashion, or that Dasein might have merit when it acknowledges ambiguity.

One could easily conclude that Sartre has seen through Heidegger and exposes his naïve belief in a perfect state of authenticity that raises Dasein once and for all above the paradoxes of the human condition. It would seem as if Sartre has grasped and confronted what Heidegger tried to overcome; the conflict between our being and our non-being, the struggle with our continued ambivalence between disclosing and closing off. Sartre, one imagines, has abandoned Heidegger's idealistic striving for authenticity and has replaced it with a much more realistic understanding of how human beings cover up their nullity. And yet, this appears not to be the case. In a footnote to the chapter on bad faith Sartre remarks:

If it is indifferent whether one is in good or in bad faith, because bad faith reapprehends good faith and slides to the very origin of the project of good faith, that does not mean that we can not radically escape bad faith. But this supposes a self-recovery of being which was previously corrupted. This self-recovery we shall call authenticity, the description of which has no place here. (Sartre, 1991:70)

It would seem that Sartre is backtracking here, suddenly making room for Heidegger's contribution, which is in so many ways contradictory with his own. Bad faith, it would seem can be escaped from after all, although he will not discuss this process of self-recovery. The corruption of being can be overcome and replaced with this process of recovery of self, called authenticity. It appears that Sartre's critique of Heidegger has not really been based on a radical reconsideration of the notion of authenticity after all. Authenticity has been merely pushed into the background as something outside of the scope of Sartre's writing.

Sartre has written most of Being and Nothingness as an exploration of the actual human struggle with the inherent nothingness of human existence. To explore authenticity is to go beyond this nothingness into the realm of being. Sartre has not done so. He recognizes that Heidegger is the specialist on authenticity. At the same time all of Sartre's writing puts the very notion of authentic being in question. Sartre has simply not tried to resolve his differences with Heidegger. He has not tackled the problems that we have encountered. We shall have to return to Heidegger's own theories and examine how Sartre's views alter our understanding of Heidegger's views on self-deception. But first it will be useful to turn to Fingarette who has thought about the implications of Sartre's and Kierkegaard's contribution to self-deception in a manner that will make it easier to discuss the implications of Sartre's stance.

2. Fingarette's notion of self-deception

Herbert Fingarette has proposed an analysis of self-deception that is sufficiently in line with Sartre's to clarify matters further. Like Sartre, Fingarette sharply criticizes Freud's notions of the unconscious and of defence

(Fingarette 1969). He shares Sartre's emphasis on the need to come up with a critique of Freudian psychology in order to come to a satisfactory conclusion with regards to self-deception. Heidegger's theory was developed without such a comparison with psychoanalytic thinking.

Fingarette has compared Freud's views to Sartre's and Kierkegaard's views on self-deception and has come up with an overall theory of self-deception that is very relevant to psychotherapy and in some ways strangely compatible with Heidegger's ideas.

According to this theory it is essential to go beyond Freud's narrow distinction between the conscious and unconscious aspects of the mind. Instead of assuming that a person has a hidden motivation for the actions taken in the world, we need to observe a person's actual actions and attitudes and note how this person is engaged with the world.

Someone who denies being his son's father for instance is clearly contradicting himself: he is on the one hand a father and on the other hand pretends not to be a father to the son who defines his fatherhood. Fingarette argues that this person is in a way speaking the truth if his actions show him to be engaged with the world as if he is not a father. At the same time he may be deceiving himself about his position in the world if he reports for instance that he no longer considers his son to be a son. His engagement with the need to state this shows him to be a father who disassociates himself from fatherhood. This person disavows his being a father. It is this disavowal that makes for self-deception.

To avow, then, is to define one's personal identity for oneself, not after the fact, but in that sense where we mean by 'defining one's identity' the establishing of one's personal identity in some respect (Fingarette, 1974: 83)

The important point that Fingarette makes here is that we define our own identity by the things that we avow or disavow. We, in a sense create ourselves by this process. This means that we play an active role in the process of our self-creation. We are not unconscious or passive as psychoanalysis claims. According to Fingarette avowal and disavowal are an individual act of claiming one's identity and they can have a dramatic effect.

Avowal and disavowal are accomplished by a person; they are responses by him rather than an effect upon him. (Fingarette, 1974:83)

This presupposes that the self that is created by the process of avowal and disavowal of engagements in the world is a synthetic self, rather than one that is constituted from birth. The individual has to create a self out of the engagements that are avowed and by rejecting the possibilities that are disavowed. This leaves the possibility open that there will be some engagements that will be disavowed. Children, Fingarette says, learn specific ways of engaging with the world, at first in rudimentary ways, such as the use of a spoon (remember Heidegger's description of encountering the ready-to-hand), then in more complex ways, including that of moral concepts.

A coherent unity of self is only established at a later stage when complex ways of engaging with the world have been achieved and they can become organized and opted into in a way specific to the individual. This coherent unity of engagement with the world is established around the time a child is ready for primary school and shows capability for autonomous functioning. From then on it becomes possible to make decisions about those engagements that are compatible with the self and those that are not.

To take some engagement into the personal self is not an act of physical incorporation (though Freud showed how important this image is in this connection). To take something into the self is an "act" which our notion of personal identity presupposes. It is to commit oneself to treat something as a part or aspect of oneself, or as something inherent in the engagements which the person avows. (Fingarette, 1974: 85)

It is the ability to take certain things on as part of one's personal identity, in other words the act of avowing them, or discarding them, in other words to disavow them, that makes the individual a reality and makes for the possibility of the moral or spiritual life.

Now it becomes possible to make choices about what is compatible and palatable to one and what is not. In principle we can now make decisions about the engagements that we identify with and opt into and those that we want to reject as inappropriate. This is very similar to Heidegger's acknowledgement that we have to forget ourselves if we are going to engage with the world. That too, seems to require us to opt for engagement at the price of giving up something else. Unfortunately much of life continues to be on the level of our earlier experience: of the immediate experience kind, where we simply engage because the experience is presented to us and we do not yet wonder whether or not it is compatible with our identity.

It happens-witness the self-deceiver- that an individual will be provoked into a kind of engagement which, in part or in whole, the person cannot *avow* as *his* engagement, for to avow it would apparently lead to such intensely disruptive, distressing consequences as to be unmanageably destructive to the person. The crux of the matter here is the unacceptability of the engagement to the person. (Fingarette, 1974:86)

It is then possible for a person, rather like in early childhood, to engage in the world with activities that he does not avow as his own. He pursues them nevertheless autonomously (or perhaps less autonomously, but rather as fallen with other people as Heidegger would say), whilst disavowing them as part of his identity. He has to then divide himself between those things he does with integrity and full avowal and those things in which he engages whilst disavowing the engagement. His previous identity becomes disconnected in some way from the autonomous action that is disavowed.

Even Freud spoke of disavowal in relation to defences, but he never succeeded in explaining why such defences should be necessary in the first place.

Freud spoke of defence as "disavowal" or a rejection in the case of what was "outer" or "inner" respectively. He finally saw, I think, that the generic aim of defence is, in infantile oral terms, to "spit out" or in the more everyday language which Freud used, to "disavow" or "reject". (Fingarette, 1974: 95)

Even Freud then, towards the end of his life started speaking of defences as ways of maintaining the integrity of the self. The objective of a good interpretation in psychoanalysis is to get the patient to accept and avow the previously defended against and disavowed parts of the self. In this the objective, as Fingarette sees it, would be to move the patient on, by self-reflection and avowal, from self-deception and passivity to agency and full recognition of who one is. This is similar to Nietzsche's dictum that one has to become who one is. Indeed Heidegger too speaks of wresting oneself from falling into the world. This is so the more poignant for Heidegger as Dasein is not seen as a separate entity but is rather a being-in-the-world, a thrownness that is not a separate subject or self, until it in some ways takes the initiative of existing towards its ownmost potentiality for being. Fingarette's explanations take a more separate view of subject and object for granted from the start. But it still leaves the question of why we do not in his view extract ourselves as subjects once and for all and act self-deceptively some of the time.

This might be better understood if we move to Fingarette's consideration of Kierkegaard's and Sartre's theories of self-deception, as these deal directly with the phenomenon of self-deception. In particular Fingarette draws on Sartre's remark that we put ourselves into self-deception in the same way that we go to sleep and that being in '*mauvaise foi*' is like dreaming.

Fingarette refers to Sartre's example of '*mauvaise foi*' in the situation of the young woman who goes to a restaurant with a man who she is having a flirtation with without her acknowledging her own part in this flirtation. He says that when the woman places her hand on the table innocently, but just in the right spot for the man to be able to take a hold of it, this shows that the woman is in some way well able to get it right. It also shows her intention of flirting, whilst remaining disengaged from the flirtation. The woman, in Sartre's language, lends herself to the flirtation in a non-reflective, non-thetic manner. She leaves everything un-spelled out.

If the self, as Sartre claims, is a construction of reflective consciousness, then the flirtation can be said to remain outside of the self. The project of the flirtation is not included by the Self as one of its projects by not reflecting upon it and not taking it into oneself. Of course as long as this is the case the project in question cannot be fully engaged with. The woman is in as much bad faith in relation to her companion that she is flirting with as in relation to herself. She is in other words both deceiving him and herself of her real intentions. She disavows her playing at being a brilliant conversationalist as much as she disavows her own flirtation, or her desire to remain innocent of any flirtation. It must be clear that such a conduct deprives her of her ability to be fully engaged one way or the other with any of the actions she undertakes or the feelings she has and is therefore alienating herself of the totality of herself as well.

Fingarette argues that the objective of living in good faith and in harmony with an authentic self would be achieved when:

..the freely chosen projects of Consciousness coincide with the enduring system which is the Self (Fingarette, 1974:97).

This objective of being open to both the projects that one opts for and the motivations and experiences this refers to in the Self, is congruent with Kierkegaard's notion of purity of heart (Kierkegaard, 1847). Kierkegaard indeed speaks of purity of heart, which is to will one thing, as that attitude that excludes any form of double-mindedness. Fingarette compares this to Confucius saying that at the age of 70 he was able to follow the dictates of his heart, as these were by that time in line with his integrity.

For Kierkegaard the Self (spirit) is not a given, but rather an achievement that is hard come by and that is a life long task. The Self, according to Kierkegaard is a relation that relates itself to itself. When there is a self there can therefore not be self-deception. As long as the Self relates to something other than itself, in the outside world, without this being at the same time reflected by the Self, it exists only in relation to an outside world and not as a Self.

For he who is not himself a unity is never really anything wholly and decisively; he exists only in an external sense- as long as he lives as a numeral within the crowd. (Kierkegaard, 1847:184).

It is only when we become capable, Kierkegaard argues, of choosing ourselves as we find ourselves in relation to the outside world and reflect upon this that we begin to become an individual and have a self. So the task is to choose oneself, although not anew, but rather as we are. We have to learn to avow what we are historically and allow ourselves to establish a new harmony in ourselves from what we find there. It goes beyond merely knowing ourselves: it is about choosing ourselves and thus becoming a self.

He (the self) has himself...as a task, in such a sort that the task is principally to order, cultivate, temper, enkindle, repress, in short to bring about a proportionality in the soul, a harmony, which is the fruit of the personal virtues. (Kierkegaard, 1843: 267).

Kierkegaard adds this spiritual dimension of self-creation in relation to a destiny that we encounter and have the task of reflecting upon and becoming transparent to. This is quite a bit more than Sartre's ideal of the assumption of responsibility (so similar to Heidegger's resoluteness) and takes the leap of faith into an acceptance of what is as the beginning of what we can be ourselves. Heidegger's notion of fate is similar to this, but for Heidegger the fate we uncover is outside ourselves rather than chosen. Heidegger's later reference to the concept of releasement, or the giving over to a fate greater than ourselves illustrates this difference. Heidegger too spoke of Dasein wresting a self out of its struggle to become authentic. Heidegger's notion of loyalty to the self seems remarkably similar to Fingarette's notion of avowal.

Fingarette's concept is far more developed than Heidegger's oblique reference to loyalty however. For Fingarette, like for Sartre, the ontic element is analysed much more carefully than Heidegger does, since Heidegger steers clear of the ontic out of principle. For Fingarette the person, or the self, can be said to be constituted by a series of avowals. These avowals concern those things that we inevitably and necessarily are (mortal, of a particular gender, race, culture, etc) but extend into the things that we opt into and that become part of our identity.

If we disavow the things that we engage in then we deny what makes us into a self, a person. Self-deception then is the denial of personhood. According to Fingarette:

Self-deception is resolved when the disavowed engagement of the individual is avowed; authentic avowal must be understood as a peculiarly personal and unique manoeuvre which is not subject like ordinary actions to the natural contingency of the immediate time and circumstance of the action, nor is it "an act of will" or "choice" in the ordinary sense of these phrases, though avowal has features akin to action, will, choice. (Fingarette, 1969:110).

To overcome self-deception we have to find Kierkegaard's purity of heart: willing to be ourselves as a unity and willing this absolutely. As long as we allow ourselves to go out in a multiplicity of different directions we cannot keep track of all our different engagements. We become divided against ourselves or rather, as Sartre would have it we lull ourselves into distraction, absenting ourselves from ourselves.

Whether we view the self-deceiver as inwardly evasive in a clever way towards himself, or whether we view him externally as nothing but engagement in the temporal, the particular, the immediate, there is fundamental multipleness in his existence. (Fingarette, 1969:110)

Fingarette's notion of avowing our own disavowals is in many ways the most compatible with Heidegger's own view. Heidegger's moment of vision amounts to a moment of avowal of all that is possible and impossible for Dasein and in making this crucial avowal Dasein opts for itself as the full centre of its own world for the first time. Where Fingarette differs from Heidegger in an important way is that Fingarette claims that the avowals include ontic aspects as well as ontological ones. For Heidegger the moment of vision is an almost abstract and set aside time, an ec-stasy, when we are enraptured with what is in an ontological sense, but where we have relinquished our preoccupation with the concrete world of the "They". We have at that moment taken ourselves away from our absorption in the "They" and thus are forgetful in another sense of the word. In avowing our ownmost potentiality-for-being, we disavow our limitations, our inauthenticity. We stand above the real world, in which we struggle with constant bad faith. For Heidegger authenticity is a rapture, an avowal, that saves us. This introduces a questionable unworldly attitude towards Dasein and its inevitable ontic challenges. It is perhaps this failure to address the ontic dimension that hampers Heidegger's arriving at a fully-fledged theory of self-deception.

3. Heidegger's later work: the concept of releasement

Since we are looking to take a critical stance towards Heidegger's account of self-deception in Being and Time it is necessary to briefly consider Heidegger's own evolution in his ideas. This look at his later work can only be cursory since the objective of the thesis is to stay with his position in Being and Time rather than consider the whole of his work. It would however seem incomplete to not mention some of the later concepts he introduced that in some way elucidate his earlier stance.

As Haar points out in his book *Heidegger and the Essence of Man* (Haar 1993):

Thus, from the summer of 1927 onward, the importance of the distinction between authentic and inauthentic, originary and derivative, becomes attenuated; *Dasein* moves towards *neutrality*. (Haar, 1993:40).

This remark draws attention to the fact that Heidegger must have been somewhat uncomfortable with the emphasis on resolution that he put forward in Being and Time.

In Being and Time the notion of running ahead towards death, towards the limit of one's potentiality for being, is crucial to the very idea of gaining authenticity. Inauthenticity is the way in which *Dasein* understands itself by being preoccupied with practical things and other people. In inauthenticity it does not project itself towards its own future but merely awaits.

Heidegger's later work distinguishes itself from Being and Time in relation to self-deception by applying the idea of forgetfulness no longer to forgetfulness of one's own being but rather to forgetfulness of Being. Heidegger becomes increasingly preoccupied with an ever more ontological and a less ontic description of human existence. In this process he veers towards a description of the way in which we are alienated from all that is, rather than simply being alienated from each other and ourselves.

Being is forgotten and not thought about properly, Heidegger now argues, and it is this rather than our being out of touch with ourselves that will make the difference. If we can tune back into the universe and Being then we will automatically become more authentic. Releasement into Being, regioning into the region is what we need to aim for. The implication is that we will become linked up to a greater reality and in this way become more real. Recognizing death is now a mere element of recognizing Being itself. It is as if in Being and Time Heidegger could only see the negative of Being, as it is most confrontationally manifest to human beings when they are reminded of death. Death is however only the shadow of Being and still a very human manifestation of it.

In turning to the greater metaphysical questions the whole issue of self-deception is lifted. The only way in which we deceive ourselves is by not thinking about what really matters. The only deception is to be caught up in the ontic things of the world and believe that it really matters whether we think about ourselves or not. The later Heidegger stands for a much more spiritual view of reality. In the concept of *Gelassenheit* (releasement) we discover something very similar to that which can be experienced in grace. Our being becomes again appropriated, or taken over by Being itself.

In releasement we become what we already are, but not in the way of resolute, voluntaristic being authentic, but rather as recognition of our necessity to be just what we are. We now have to simply make way for what Being can bring us. Our being in the world is seen as interplay of the forces of the fourfold (Heidegger, 1977a). As Grieder points out in his paper on essence, Dasein's task now becomes that of letting *Wesen*, essence, manifest.

At this stage, however, the notion of World as expounded in *Being and Time* has been considerably modified. Now World is the interplay of the Fourfold: Earth, Heavens, Divines

and Mortals. The ways of disclosure, i.e. the Making-way and Speaking of Essence, are correspondingly interpreted as ways of interplay of the Four. (Grieder, 1988:80)

There is no more room for mere resoluteness. Dasein is far more aware of its involvement with the fourfold manifestation of world. The notion of authenticity is now moved in the direction of being increasingly open to the influence this fourfold exerts on human beings. The task of authenticity is more than ever that of transparency to what is out there, rather than being true to some imagined self.

Now Heidegger also develops the concept of *Ereignis*, meaning happening or event, in a new way. Whilst in Being and Time it was generally used as something that would simply happen to me, now it becomes clear that happening is never neutral. Out of it our motivation is generated and it colours our world experience. *Ereignis* is an event that is of monumental importance, as opposed to *Geschehnis*, which is the mere occurrence of historical event. *Ereignis* is also contrasted with *Begebenheit*, which is a dramatic, but superficial, public event. *Ereignis* is a transformative experience in which the meaning of being is altered. To be open to such events is the new definition of authenticity. This is no longer just a matter for the individual, it is rather of the order of significance of the whole of humanity.

Being as Er-eignis. The Er-eignung makes man the property [Eigentum, literally, 'owndom'] of being.... Property is belongingness to the ER-eignung and this is being. (Heidegger 1987: 263)

Thus with the new meaning of *Ereignis* it becomes clear that for being to be authentic no longer means to own itself but rather to be owned by being. We could argue that with the possibility of *Ereignis* self-deception becomes redundant, since it is surpassed by the power of insight into the human condition. What matters is no longer whether we are true to ourselves and our ownmost-potentiality-for-being, but rather whether we are true to Being itself.

Presumably such letting oneself be in *Gelassenheit* and *Ereignis* is a superior state that goes well beyond what most clients in psychotherapy are after. Such insight and transformation is achieved by philosophers and through philosophical meditative thinking, rather than by mere humble individuals who struggle with everyday living. Heidegger's later work is not as relevant to the struggle with self-deception as it is encountered in psychotherapy.

Nevertheless this further move towards a more global, ontological outlook is in keeping with the spirit of Being and Time, in which Heidegger constantly reminded the reader that only an ontological analysis was the objective. Rather than Heidegger's later work being a critique of his own theory of authenticity and inauthenticity it is a further elaboration of this theory. In taking cognisance of Heidegger's later position we can only conclude that his intention in Being and Time must have been to not emphasize a reflective selfhood. Authenticity must be thought of as the being true to the essence of Dasein, as a being in the world. The true nature of Dasein lies in going beyond a narrow sense of self. Heidegger's notion of self-deception is therefore non-existent. In its place he elaborated the notion of Dasein's learning to be true to existence itself. It is not self-deception we need to guard against, but rather untruthfulness to being itself. It is only our original self-forgetfulness that we need to emerge from. Once we have emerged from it we need to guard against any rapture that alienates us from being open to our ownmost potentiality-for-being.

Later on this moves forward to needing to guard against being led away from our capacity for being open to the potentiality of Being itself. Heidegger's later work is the logical conclusion of his ideas as announced in Being and Time. It does not constitute a critique or a withdrawal from anything said before. It can however clarify and amplify our understanding of his earlier ideas. We

shall not find much to help us in critiquing Heidegger's theory of self-deception or lack of it in studying his later work in greater detail.

4. The Zollikon seminars

We do however briefly need to mention Heidegger's direct contribution to psychotherapy, which came from his engagement with the Swiss psychiatrist Medard Boss. Upon the latter's request Heidegger attended a yearly seminar in Zollikon, Switzerland for Boss' psychiatrist trainees, who he was teaching basic Heideggerian principles of psychotherapy (Heidegger, 1987, 2001). Boss' method was directly based on Heidegger's ideas and he termed it 'Daseins-analysis'. This approach to psychotherapy is well documented and has generated an Institute for Daseinsanalysis and an International Association for Daseinsanalysis, both encouraged by Heidegger. Apparently Heidegger at the end of his career began to feel the need for his ideas and thinking to be applied in a more concrete fashion to some worldly enterprise. He accepted that an application to psychiatry was one of the most effective means to put his work to good use.

He patiently tried to teach young psychiatrists to clear their assumptions about their patients and use the phenomenological method to approach the phenomenon of the patient's experience in a new way.

Boss (1988) describes in an article about the Zollikon seminars how Heidegger would leave the trainees ponder serious questions in silence before trying to teach them a new point of view. He wanted the trainees to clear their minds and make room for the phenomenon in front of them, moving from an inauthentic, "they-self" manner of apprehending their patients to a more authentic way of encountering them. Here is a telling quote from Heidegger from Boss' article.

"Perhaps the wisdom of the German language can help you. You know not only the substantive "Raum" (space), but also the verb "Räumen.". This verb "Räumen" means nothing other than making-free, making-open. A forest clearing: this is a place which has been cleared, i.e., a place where the Earth has been laid free of tree trunks, cleared ("geräumt") of them. So it is that spatiality as such is rooted by its very nature in freedom, openness and clearedness, and not the reverse." (Boss, 1988)

Clearly, by this time Heidegger was thinking in terms of teaching people to be resolute and authentic by clearing the clutter of inauthentic thinking. This was not, he thought, a matter of creating a space, but rather of rediscovering the freedom and openness that originally exists. We can wonder whether Sartre's insistence on freedom and nothingness being the basis of human existence had influenced Heidegger more than he would have liked to admit. But Heidegger certainly seems to have moved towards a belief in a return to original space and openness rather than describing it as something that needs to be hard earned. This is in keeping with his work on thinking, on language and on technology (Heidegger 1977a, 1966, 1977b), which also shows his increasing preoccupation with a return to the simplicity and openness of the wonder of Being.

In the same context of these lectures, Heidegger made a statement about the purpose of ethics. He said:

To be subject to the claim that presence makes is the greatest claim that a human being makes; it is what 'ethics' is. (Boss, 1988: 273).

Ethics then, in Heidegger's formulation is to be fully available to the human ability to be open and present. This brings us back again to the claim in Being and Time that to be authentic and resolute is the guarantee of truth. We do not need to take account of the possibility of self-deception, we can know all there is to know without having to take moral principles into account. All we need is to tune into presence and Being and leave the rest to fall into place. As we have seen this is a simplistic way of looking at the complexities of the ontic

realities of struggling with the presence of other people in the world or with the potential presence of evil.

We can speculate about what this would have meant in terms of his thinking about self-deception, which could be described as the wilful covering up of what could so easily be revealed. Even in the Zollikon seminars Heidegger did not make room for such a form of self-deception. He rather stuck to the idea that we can remember or forget, but that remembering is rooted in forgetting rather than the other way around. When specifically asked about his important concept of forgetting during one of the seminars, he specifically declares forgetting to be the basis for remembering.

To merely think of something again is not to remember it. We can only call a re-presentation remembering when I represent it to myself as I have actually experienced it at the time. (Boss 1988: 216)

Really remembering something therefore takes tremendous effort of conscious repetition, without such repetition it is actually forgotten. Forgetting is therefore the more omnipresent phenomenon, the fundamental basis from which we live in relation to the past. Self-deception becomes redundant in the face of such a simple mechanism of forgetting. It is sufficient for us to turn away from those things we do not want to make the effort to recollect properly. We forget them by simply not thinking of them in the full way that is required to remember. It is in Fingarette's terms sufficient to stop avowing something to lose it from sight. Sartre would have disagreed profoundly, since he would have taken the view that forgetting is a quite deliberate act of negligence. The idea of self-deception gives human beings more credit for being conscious and deliberate than Heidegger would give them. Only those human beings who are prepared to make a consistent effort to disclose, discover and recollect, in anticipatory resoluteness could be expected to ever need to deceive themselves. But, it would seem that Heidegger has infinite confidence

that such people would not wish to do so. Thus self-deception is an unnecessary concept.

The Zollikon seminars confirm that Heidegger never really turned his mind to the issue of self-deception and opted to see inauthenticity as a covering up or a turning away rather than as a deliberate substitution of a false belief for a true belief. It is also clear in these seminars that Heidegger, though keen to see his ideas applied in an ontic arena, did not really come to grips with the concrete questions that are raised by our therapeutic clients. He did however go as far as to say that analysis of patients means to free them of their chains (Boss and Heidegger, 2001:148). But how exactly such freeing was to be effected remains unclear, because most of the time Heidegger speaks in very abstract ontological terms even in this very pragmatic setting. It is this ontological focus that has been most useful and at the same time most problematic in considering the relevance of Heidegger's ideas to psychotherapy. We can now summarize some of these problems.

5. Critique of Heidegger's views on inauthenticity and self-deception.

Authenticity and inauthenticity and their equiprimordiality.

We have seen that for Heidegger the objective of phenomenology and philosophy is to let Beings be revealed in their being. The being of Dasein that is revealed in Being and Time shows that Dasein's ontological characteristic of being world- and self-disclosing is counterbalanced by its ability to close off. This should alert us to the possibility of self-deception potentially undermining Dasein's ability to be in truth. We have however found that Heidegger does not really address this problem directly.

Going along with Fingarette's notion of avowal and engagement, we have come to ask whether Heidegger's resolute anticipation could be seen as an avowal of our ownmost potentiality-for-being. If so, we may have to conclude that such an avowal would have to include our potential for inauthenticity as well as our potential for dying. Whilst Heidegger has emphasized our death as a potential he has not taken the possibility of self-deception as seriously as it deserves to be taken. Is it not the case, as is almost implied but not made explicit in Being and Time, that we are essentially having to learn to live in acceptance of our inauthenticity? Or rather, is it not the case, that if we are to reveal what is and what we are, we should equally be open to the inauthenticity that is inevitably part of our daily existence? Heidegger writes, in a passage of Being and Time, which we have already drawn attention to:

In its full existential-ontological meaning, the proposition that 'Dasein is in the truth' states equiprimordially that 'Dasein is in untruth'. But also in so far as Dasein has been disclosed has it also been closed off; (Heidegger 1927:222)

Dasein will have to take this dual nature into account and we should therefore make room for a serious consideration of how Dasein can manage its own closing off, its own untruth, and its own self-deception. If we are to take Heidegger's ideas seriously as a foundation for a new understanding of self-deception we need to allow for the tension between self-disclosure and self-forgetfulness to persist. For this tension, it seems, is one of the ontological givens of Dasein's existence.

Further on in Being and Time Heidegger reminds us again that Dasein is resolute and irresolute, in truth and untruth:

Disclosed in its 'there', it maintains itself both in truth and in untruth with equal primordially. (Heidegger 1927:298)

This is quite a far-reaching statement, since it implies that there is an ontological, therefore necessary equal primordially of both truth and untruth. It makes it crucial to consider how Dasein can be both in truth and untruth. Self-deception would seem to be an obvious possibility for a being that is both in truth and untruth at the same time, yet Heidegger does not deal with this possibility. He appears to believe that when we are in truth and untruth at the same time, truth prevails. He says:

Resoluteness appropriates untruth authentically. (Heidegger 1927:299)

This seems to imply that when Dasein has achieved a resolute stance it can take on board and own inauthenticity and untruth and somehow be in untruth or inauthentic whilst rising above it. Heidegger appears to be very confident about the superiority of authenticity once it has been achieved. This seems a remarkable way of dealing with the problem of Dasein being both in truth and in untruth. Heidegger does not seem to take the possibility of falling back into inauthenticity very seriously.

The irresoluteness of the "they" remains dominant notwithstanding, but it cannot impugn resolute existence. (Heidegger, 1927:299)

Heidegger appears to have extraordinary confidence in the superiority of resoluteness. He seems to imply that we cannot be brought down by irresoluteness once we have achieved authenticity. We can and certainly will find ourselves in inauthenticity again and again. But, somehow resolute existence will prevail. This seems to be an argument based on wishful thinking. No evidence for the superior strength of resoluteness is given. As Dasein is ontologically fallen and inauthentic and this inauthenticity will continue no matter how much authenticity is claimed, what reason is there to expect authenticity to be stronger than inauthenticity? Heidegger's claim is not supported by an argument but seems based in the abstract belief in the human

ability to achieve a certain level of unalterable authenticity. This belief does not square very well with concrete observation of everyday human reality. Psychotherapeutic practice shows us that self-deception tends to continue, whether we have achieved authenticity and resoluteness or not. Untruth preys on people and can take them over. There are no guarantees that resoluteness is maintained in the face of reality. We shall pursue the ontic critique of Heidegger's theory further down.

Ontologically speaking Heidegger's claim appears to be without foundation. He also fails to satisfactorily address how Dasein is to deal with its continued encounters of inauthenticity and irresoluteness. Nor does he fully address Dasein's potential for opting for untruth over truth. How about the possibility that Dasein may resolutely decide to deceive itself? The recognition that truth and untruth will both be present poses a serious philosophical and ontological problem not unlike the co-existence of good and evil. Heidegger appears to have neglected to notice the contradictions and paradoxes thrown up by his own views. It is undoubtedly his reluctance to consider ethical issues that has stopped him noticing these problems.

Heidegger does not even address the issue of how Dasein is able to recognize when it is in truth or in untruth. How can we know with any degree of certainty that we are being authentic or inauthentic? How is it that when irresoluteness and resoluteness co-exist momentarily we find ourselves taking the authentic path? Heidegger has clearly not considered the possibility that we might find ourselves believing to be authentic whilst acting in inauthentic fashion. It must be possible for Dasein to allow itself to become so deeply self-forgetful again, after having achieved authenticity for this to be possible. Heidegger does not consider how such a conflict might arise or how it might be tackled.

One way in which the problem could have been solved is by suggesting that one of Dasein's challenges is to maintain openness towards its own fallibility, in the same way in which it can have openness towards its own death, its guilt and its nullity. Heidegger might have suggested the need for something like a Being-towards-Fallenness or even a Being-towards-Facticity or better still a Being-towards-Inauthenticity. In psychotherapy we often need to be available to help people face their inauthenticity without condemning it. They need to embrace their desire for inauthentic behaviour before they can complement it with a more authentic exploration of their own ways of being in the world. Our potential for fallibility was well recognized by Jaspers, who referred to it through his concept of limit situations (Jaspers 1952,1964).

One solution to this problem is the stance that Kierkegaard took, which was to recognize that human beings have to accept to live with paradox and that they ultimately need to take a leap of faith in order to progress. (Kierkegaard 1843,1847). Heidegger has not proposed any particular solution, but appears to assume that once Dasein has achieved the possibility to disclose its ownmost potentiality-for-being-itself, it will somehow do so. Self-deception would be relegated to a time before such disclosure. Even at that time we are only seen to be self-deceiving because we are not yet aware of what is possible. Because of this Heidegger prefers to speak of self-forgetfulness rather than of self-deception. What happens after we become capable of taking awareness of our ownmost potentiality-for-being is an inexorable move in the direction of openness to being. Only at the outset is there a they-self in the proper sense. As Dasein becomes more able to be true to its disclosing nature, it does not become more of a self. It merely becomes more open towards the world and towards its own potentiality-for-being, including towards its own mortality. Self-deception and self-forgetfulness become non-issues as self becomes even less important and Dasein is more aware of its own potential death.

Lack of a definite theory of self-deception because of a lack of theory of self.

There can of course be no theory of self-deception for a philosophy that does not allow for the notion of self. At first glance it would seem quite easy to dismiss the possibility of finding a theory of self-deception in Heidegger's work since he does not apparently use the concept of 'self'. But this needs a little further scrutiny, since the very concept of authenticity implies that there must be some kind of self to be true to. We have to ask ourselves in what sense, if any, is there a Being of Dasein prior to explicit self-disclosure, so that it makes sense to say 'I am true to myself'? Is it possible to speak of a self in terms of Dasein's ownmost-potentiality-for-being-itself?

When Heidegger speaks of gathering a self out of repetition of the past and anticipation of the future his view on the status of self seems to become a little more affirmative. The weak definition in Being and Time, p. 42 of Dasein as 'something of its own' is confusing, for we have seen how 'the own' will shift and be altered over time. Does Dasein then need to stay in movement in order to be authentic? Would it be inauthentic to stay the same? Does this mean that we are ourselves only as we give up on ourselves or rather when we give up on trying to remain the same? If this were true then Heidegger could have developed a theory of self-deception after all. For self-deception would happen when we would attempt to remain true to ourselves, trying to remain the same. Authenticity would not be defined by being true to a stable, well-defined self, but rather through being in tune with the transformation of the self that is always in movement towards the future.

Heidegger defines Dasein as having to face its ownmost potentiality-for-being, which is indeed this transforming self of many possibilities. Trying to be anything other than this would have to be a mistake. In light of this an attempt

at being nothing but openness and authenticity would be self-defeating and potentially self-deceptive. This critique is suggested by Sartre's concept of the '*esprit de sérieux*', which he tells us, is after all just another form of '*mauvaise foi*', and self-deception. If Sartre is right and if authenticity is always infected with a certain amount of inauthenticity what does this imply for Dasein's trying to be authentic? Would it mean that we could only be authentic if we were authentically inauthentic as well? If so, what would be the objective of Heideggerian psychotherapy? Would we have to help people forget as well as to remember, in the same way in which we help them to die as well as to live? Perhaps we underestimate the importance of self-forgetfulness and one of the objectives of authentic living should be to learn to forget in the right way. Certainly good psychotherapy would enable a person to give up on a strongly held sense of self and replace this with openness towards the world instead. Heidegger has not said any of this, but it seems to be implied in his approach.

We must remember though that Dasein means 'being-there', not 'being self'. To be truly authentic would therefore have to mean to simply be there, not to strive to be a 'self'. For Dasein to be true to its ownmost potentiality-for-being-itself would have to mean for it to be true to its being there, to its being thrown and fallen. Avoiding to face up to this would involve a certain amount of self-deception. Perhaps it can be argued that the later notions of *Gelassenheit*, the letting be, and Dasein as openness of Being are the solution Heidegger proposes to the question of how to be an authentic self that is true to Dasein. For here we are concerned with a certain loss of self that is not something to be regretted but rather something to be encouraged when it is the other side of the coin of openness for Being and world disclosure.

It seems therefore fair to argue that there is no lack of a theory of self-deception in Heidegger for a lack of a theory of self, but rather that there is a

different approach to self-deception because there is a different approach to the whole issue of self. Taking Heidegger's ideas on board means to think of self-deception in a new way: we need to think in terms of unfaithfulness to world rather than in terms of deception of self. This is a far-reaching idea that has important consequences for psychotherapy. If we take Heidegger's notion seriously then psychotherapy could never address itself to strengthening a person's sense of self, or to trying to understand the ways in which the person is deceiving him or herself. We would instead have to focus on helping a person in understanding the ways in which he or she engages with the world and is not yet fully able to oversee the implications of the implied world relations. It would indeed mean that we help people direct their intentionality away from a preoccupation with self and towards a focus on the overall picture of world and being. People's problems would not be tackled directly but would rather be dissolved by diluting them in the wider currents of being.

Internal contradictions in Heidegger's views.

Authenticity only becomes possible if we release ourselves from fallenness. As Dasein finds itself thrown into the world it finds itself in a passive, fallen relationship with the anonymous other. Heidegger perceives our intercourse with others in broadly negative terms. In order to become authentic we have to stop being taken over by the 'They-self'. This means that we have to turn away from thinking in terms of our belonging to the world of others. We have to give up seeking direction in relation to what 'one' should do or to what we imagine people ought to do. Dasein has to learn to stand alone. Dasein in its authentic modality of being is rather solitary. To become so alone as Heidegger seems us to want to be before we can even begin to approach authenticity must make us rather solipsistic and a-social. This seems a strange demand to make of Dasein, since Dasein is essentially not a solitary unit, but an entity that is there in a world and with others.

Although Heidegger shows how we can be authentically with others, to become authentic we have definitely to remove ourselves from the other's influence first. This seems to imply a basic contradiction, since one of our ontological characteristics is that we are essentially with others. We cannot dispense with the *Mitsein* that is one of our defining characteristics. Heidegger does indeed show how it is possible for people to live with each other in a way in which we open up authentic possibilities for each other. This however only becomes possible after we have first drawn away from others into the discovery of our ownmost potentiality-for-being-ourselves.

This leads us to having to ask the question whether authenticity is never complete, since it overlooks part of our being, i.e. that of being fallen with others. Is it even self-deceptive to think of the very possibility of achieving an authentic form of being in the world? When we look more carefully at Heidegger's argument we immediately discover that there is no inconsistency or contradiction, since *Dasein* will never exclusively be authentic and inauthenticity will continue to accompany our existence. The question remains whether the separateness required for an authentic stance is as desirable and necessary as Heidegger seems to think. We also need to ask whether such a solitary solution is compatible with a psychotherapeutic approach. Heidegger himself contended that the authentic and resolute person could go beyond this isolation and be with others in a more authentic way.

Dasein's resoluteness towards itself is what first makes possible to let the Others who are with it "be" in their ownmost potentiality-for-Being, and to co-disclose this potentiality in the solicitude which leaps forth and liberates. When *Dasein* is resolute, it can become the "conscience" of Others. Only by authentically Being-their-selves in resoluteness can people authentically be with one another. (Heidegger 1927:298)

Psychotherapy, as a co-operative relationship aims at enhancing our understanding in talking to another. Heidegger does seem to suggest that in

principle we can have a kind of co-disclosure and co-resoluteness and pursue a kind of therapeutic venture in which we aim for authentic being together. What is slightly worrying is his talk of becoming someone else's 'conscience'.

It still begs the question of how psychotherapy can benefit from Heidegger's model of self-reflective exploration of the self-forgetfulness that stands in the way of existential truth? For it would seem in final analysis as if the concept of self-forgetfulness is the most important. As we have seen Heidegger does not really have a concept of self-deception as such. He does not argue that we wilfully deceive ourselves against better knowing. Rather like Plato he appears to believe that if the knowledge were available we would retrieve it, we would go for it. What happens rather is that we are not tuned into the world in a reflective manner a lot of the time. The concept of forgetfulness of being, a not yet being able to remember and be attentive to what is, is the far more relevant concept. It certainly lifts the exploration of human imperfection to a higher level than that of a struggle with concrete everyday obstacles.

Lack of attention to the ontic implications.

Heidegger chose not to concentrate on the ontic dimension of human existence in Being and Time, but his formulations have direct implications for the everyday reality of being human. We need to critically consider how Heidegger's thinking can be applied to the ontic dimension and how it can move us forward in our thinking about self-deception as it is at work in an ordinary everyday way. We also need to allow some evidence from practical human reality to challenge Heidegger's consideration of authentic and inauthentic existence in as far as this will clarify and further develop the theory of self-deception we have found to be embedded in Being and Time.

We must begin by reminding ourselves that for Heidegger factual human existence would inevitably be tainted by inauthenticity:

What is more, inauthenticity belongs to the essential nature of factual Dasein. Authenticity is only a modification but not a total obliteration of inauthenticity. We further emphasized that the Dasein's everyday self-understanding maintains itself in inauthenticity and in fact in such a way that the Dasein thereby knows about itself without explicit reflection in the sense of an inner perception bent back on itself but in the manner of finding itself in things. (Heidegger 1982: 171)

In other words, inauthentic Dasein is absorbed in the world rather than being explicitly and reflectively concerned with itself. When we have to be in the things rather than in ourselves, or indeed when we have to be with others rather than with ourselves the chances are that we lose ourselves. In order to be real and engaged with the world, we have to be self-forgetful. According to Heidegger the emphasis is on self-forgetfulness as distinct from self-deception. Self-forgetfulness is Heidegger's version of self-deception. Whilst one can easily argue that self-deception is an unacceptable mode of being, it would seem to be impossible for people to live without self-forgetfulness.

The inevitability of self-forgetfulness.

When we are world disclosing it may be that we become automatically self-forgetful. We seem to have a choice of how we focus our attention: on the world or on our own experience of it. The question is whether we are more self-deceiving if we do one or the other, or whether the greatest self-deception is to pretend that we can choose rather than to have to do both at different times. As Grieder put it in a paper on Heidegger's notion of understanding:

We humans constantly project possibilities and by doing so project ourselves; but what we project may or may not disclose our potential; it may even hide it, cover it over. In short, while some of our projecting also qualifies as 'disclosing' of our potentiality for being, some does not and leads us astray. There is no advance guarantee for the projection to fall within

the range of one's potentiality for being. Our projecting is fallible, our self-disclosure precarious. (Grieder 1996:74).

It is this precarious nature of our interactions with the world and ourselves that Heidegger has rather overlooked. It is easy to overlook this when we argue from the relative safety of a philosopher's study. It is impossible to overlook this precariousness when we consider the same issues from the challenging realities of psychotherapeutic practice. We therefore need to look at some of the ontic reasons why Heidegger's treatment of self-deception may be insufficient and unrealistic, whilst at the same time stimulating our thinking about the issues in a unique manner.

As Heidegger pointed out himself: we need to forget in order to get on with the world.

A specific kind of *forgetting* is essential for the temporality that is constitutive for letting something be involved. The Self must forget itself if, lost in the world of equipment, it is to be able 'actually' to go to work and manipulate something. (Heidegger, 1927:354)

We could not live in the world if we were to keep everything in mind all the time. The way Dasein is constituted is that it is an engagement with the world and this engagement is specific and because of that needs to be incomplete and selective so as to adjust to what is demanded at any one time. If Dasein is going to be in tune with its world and able to affect it, it has to be capable of making such adjustments. This inevitably means that we will be biased and only partially aware of our own comportment. We shall continuously hide things from ourselves. We shall only rarely know the moment of total vision.

Concretely and practically in an ontic, everyday fashion this is how Dasein operates in the world and there can be no other way of operating. Certainly Heidegger has not proposed a realistic alternative to pure authenticity. This has far-reaching implications, since the openness and truthful orientation of

the philosopher is not an adequate orientation for the ordinary person who has to live a life in difficult concrete circumstances.

The real question that arises out of this consideration is how we should make decisions about the appropriateness of what our vision will focus on at any one time. How, also, are we to use our conscience as it reminds us that we are not doing justice to all that we are capable of? Should we accept to fall short at all times or should we strive towards being more true to our potentiality for being? How do we prioritize and decide what is the most authentic stance to take at any one time? We can indeed question whether it is possible to answer any of these important questions without having formulated an ethical theory and without having addressed the question of potential self-deception.

Elitism of authenticity.

Heidegger's perspective can easily be misunderstood as implying an idealization of the desirability for progress from inauthentic to authentic living. This idealization would not be useful for our understanding of ordinary living. Everyday reality shows that life entails a constant struggle with truth and with our own ability to face reality. If we were to live in the expectation that we could once and for all achieve an authentic mode of being, as some humanistic psychologists have suggested, this would be contradictory with reality itself. Heidegger's standards if not looked at carefully may seem to imply this ability to progress without having to question the direction of our progress on an everyday basis.

Adorno, in his Jargon of Authenticity (1973), which is essentially a critique of Heidegger's theory of authenticity, seems to have come to the conclusion that Heidegger was wrongly proposing that authenticity was the panacea that people had to strive for. Because of this Adorno pointed out that Heidegger's

perceived objective of authenticity rather ignores the cultural and social oppressions that people suffer. It assumes that people's predicaments are abstract and can be looked at in isolation. In fact Adorno goes a little further than this and accuses Heidegger of creating a worldview that allows us to justify social injustice. From his perspective Heidegger would seem to advocate an elitist view of humanity, where those who are capable of the requirements for authenticity achieve this higher status and others are doomed to a mediocre inauthentic way of life. He alleges that Heidegger speaks of average man disdainfully, whilst failing to note that most people are more or less condemned to remaining stuck in this ordinary averageness. If Adorno's critique of Heidegger were correct Heidegger's theory would not be of much use to psychotherapists who deal with average human beings on a daily basis.

It does seem however that Adorno has not looked too carefully at the ontological contradictions that we considered above. He seems to have taken a rather superficial look at Heidegger and has neglected to notice Heidegger's views on the struggle with inauthenticity as an on-going battle of all Dasein. It is true however that Heidegger's insistence on limiting himself to an ontological stance leads to a lack of social awareness. Heidegger pays no attention to the ontic fact that some people find themselves in a more challenging position than others and that authenticity may be harder to come by in certain existential conditions than in others. This of course is not to say that greater social advantage would inevitably lead to greater authenticity. It may well be that the opposite is true. In any case from a psychotherapeutic point of view Heidegger's approach needs to be complemented with some concrete research into the ontic life conditions that favour or hamper a greater ability to live and disclose authentically.

Certainly if Heidegger's ideas are to be used as a new foundation for psychotherapy, we have to think through the implications in terms of the social,

cultural and racial variations. We also have to observe the differences that can be seen in relation to the maturational and developmental processes that individuals are subject to in reality. All of these matters Heidegger completely disregarded.

This is to say that Heidegger's ontology needs to be supplemented with a much more down to earth and objective observation of human reality in action, if it is to become the basis for effective psychotherapy.

The relative value of authenticity and inauthenticity.

We have come to the conclusion above that Heidegger's views on authenticity and inauthenticity are more relative than would initially appear. A number of pertinent questions ensue from this if we are to use Heidegger's theory as the basis for psychotherapy.

One of the most important of these questions is whether the anticipation of death necessarily is a good thing? Could it be a form of self-deception to believe that this fascination and confrontation with death leads to authenticity? There is quite a lot of evidence from psychotherapeutic practice that an excessive preoccupation with death or with one's separateness from other people can lead to weakness and morbid ways of thinking. Heidegger never considered whether his authentic mode of living might lead to a similar blindness as an inauthentic mode. Being authentic might imply that we become forgetful of living, certainly of living with the concrete tasks and problems of the moment. Is it really the hallmark of authenticity to become capable of Being-towards-death, as Heidegger states? Is the differentiation from 'The They' always and necessarily a good thing? Or, should a life that is lived true to the nature of Dasein in fact make some room for a responsible management of

our own absorption in the world of others and of a forgetfulness of our own death?

In this sense the fleeing that Heidegger is so scornful of may very well be a more important part of being human than Heidegger would like to believe. To assume our own ability for fleeing and observe it, perhaps use it sometimes deliberately, rather than fleeing from our capacity for fleeing may be what is required in order to be genuinely human. What this would mean in practice is that clients in psychotherapy would sometimes be allowed to accept their evasions instead of constantly being confronted with them. The philosopher who talks about authenticity may be more inauthentic than the philosopher who gets on with living life in a reflective manner and who accepts the necessary limits of authenticity.

Dasein's world relatedness as a necessary limit.

Heidegger shows that Dasein's being is always directional.

Concernful Being-in-the-world is directional - self-directive. Belonging-somewhere has an essential relationship to involvement. (Heidegger 1927: 368).

Dasein is always in the world of things and other people and orientates itself in relation to them. Dasein can only be in as much as it is with these things and other people. It is itself revealed in these things and other people. My Dasein is only revealed by the beings with which I concern myself. It can not live in isolation.

As Zimmerman points out (Zimmerman 1981:29):

To be a self means to be finite transcendence: Being -in-the-world. My self is not primarily revealed when I engage in theoretical self-reflection; it is revealed when reflected in the

worldly beings with which I concern myself. Thus Dasein *finds itself* primarily and constantly *in the things* of the world in which it exists.

Heidegger makes this point very forcefully in the Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology (Heidegger 1976) as Zimmerman also points out.

The self is there for Dasein itself without reflection and without inner perception, before all reflection. Reflection in the sense of turning-back is only a mode of self-grasping, but not the mode of primary self-disclosing. (Heidegger 1976:226)

My self is there first and foremost as my involvement with the world. My 'me', my authentic self, my real self is therefore more of the world than of me. Self-reflection and self-assertion are secondary phenomena. There is no such thing as a separate insulated, isolated, solid, consistent, constant, self. Dasein by definition is a being, which is there. Dasein is necessarily going out into the world. Its own going out into the world cannot but absorb it, for it cannot be without this. Any standing back, any authenticity is temporary and doomed to be abandoned for a further incursion into the world. I may temporarily extract a self out of my absorption with the world and claim it. But I cannot maintain this aloof stance for long, since the world necessarily draws me back and calls me to attention. I may know the call of conscience that reminds me of how I am falling short in relation to what I am capable of, but there is at least as potent a call that comes from the world. This call reminds me of my need to occupy myself concretely with the things that need doing for my survival in this world. Therefore Dasein is always bound for further self-forgetfulness and inauthenticity. It may be perhaps struggling to become authentic at certain times, at other times it may perhaps be quite happy to be self-forgetful.

Dasein could not be authentic if this authenticity were not to reflect its true being. Its true being is to be of the world rather than of itself, so its true being is to be also inauthentic and forgetful. Perhaps it is part of Dasein's

being to always reach out to standing outside of itself and aim for authenticity. Perhaps it is only authentic fully to the extent that it attempts to overcome its self-forgetful being part of a world. But it could never only be such authentic self-retrieval and self-disclosure, for there would not be a self to disclose if there were no world connection and no inauthentic falling into its world. Only in as much as I let myself be taken over can I become a self at all. Only because I am capable of being taken over by the world can I also take myself back from the world.

The moderating role of death.

Self-constancy is based on anticipatory resoluteness.

The constancy of the Self, in the double sense of steadiness and steadfastness, is the authentic counter-possibility to the non-Self-constancy which is characteristic of irresolute falling. Existentially, "Self-constancy" signifies nothing other than anticipatory resoluteness. (Heidegger, 1927:322).

This means on the one hand that self can only be generated by this kind of constancy. It is not there once and for all, and it is always counterbalanced by the potential inconstancy of falling. On the other hand it means that I can only become a self at all in the face of death. This constant paradox prevents any possibility of single-minded commitment to openness or completeness. I cannot be fully self-absorbed. I can only be erratic and forgetful. Of course I can respond in different modalities to this self-forgetfulness and I can either pursue it or try to overcome it. Heidegger believes that in order to be true to its nature Dasein has to face its death, but the question, that he raises himself, is whether I can actually ever face my own death.

We could argue that the death that is constantly referred to is in fact the present death that I have to die now at every moment when I become aware of the fragility of the constancy of self. It is the death of my self-forgetfulness

and my absorption in the world that I really need to take into account. For it is this death of the self that constitutes Dasein's being. This is the death of humility. It may be that allowing for this humility is paradoxically the only way of becoming true to our self, or rather lack of self. Giving up on the idea of our authenticity is then the *sine qua non* of becoming capable of any authenticity at all.

Can there be harm in teaching authenticity?

As we have seen serious doubts can be raised about Heidegger's theory of authenticity and inauthenticity. In some ways it is only to the extent that the contradictions that are inherent in his theory can be encompassed and held on to that Heidegger's theory can be useful. Since Heidegger does not have a theory of self-deception there is no easy solution to the contradictions that are presented to us. Rather than getting drawn into a simplistic pursuit of authenticity, without having to deal with potential self-deceptions, we are required to continue to struggle with the problems of our tendency to uncover and cover up again and again.

As Sartre's implied criticism showed us, a notion of pure authenticity may be a red herring, in that it would constitute a form of good faith, of sincerity, which in fact amounts to bad faith. If we were to teach people to seek to be authentic and overcome self-deception we would be doing nothing more than teaching them the rules of a new belief system, a dogma. Such a system would belie the true nature of Dasein, which is to be a dynamic, truth-seeking, organism which has to be in constant battle with the contradictions of its own ontological position.

In Heidegger's terminology the only self-deception that is possible is to believe that there actually is a self, rather than a Dasein that goes out of itself to

become a self and that will be struggling with both authentic and inauthentic tendencies. Teaching authenticity is therefore a one sided and misleading enterprise, certainly not warranted by Heidegger's thinking.

Towards a dialectical theory of self-deception.

As Dasein exists sometimes authentically and sometimes inauthentically we have both actuality and possibility and it must be our task to maintain a balance between both. Since these two modalities of existence are ontological givens they are in a sense inescapable. To be in truth is therefore to find a way to manage both modes of being. What is required is perhaps a dialectical overcoming of opposites, followed by a further opposition and a further overcoming.

Conclusions

Having looked carefully at Heidegger's views on authenticity and inauthenticity in the light of subsequent criticism we can conclude that Heidegger's thinking on Dasein has much to offer us in our understanding of the human struggle for truth. We have also shown that Heidegger did not provide an explicit and worked out theory of self-deception as such a concept and such a theory would be contradictory with his perspective on Dasein's existence. It was not by chance or by omission that he did not use the term 'self-deception' since he showed us that Dasein is too engaged with the world and with other people to be capable of being self-reflective enough to deliberately deceive itself. At any rate he did not look upon selfhood in this intra-psychic manner. Heidegger's descriptions of Dasein's grappling with its own existence require us to think about human beings as shifting their intentional stance and awareness of the world in different ways at different times as they are drawn into different world relations.

One of the most important findings in retracing Heidegger's ontology is that of the equiprimordial importance of authenticity and inauthenticity. Heidegger's emphasis on the indispensable and ontological nature of both these modes of being makes any notion of self-deception superfluous. It obliges us to comprehend the far reaching consequences of Dasein's necessary and continuing engagement with both truthful and untruthful ways of being. Dasein will always belong to its world and to some extent to other people and because of this will inevitably live in a disowned way for much of the time. Because of this Heidegger's ideas are more focussed on the worldhood of Dasein and less on its internal world. Dasein is inauthentic for most of the time and will inevitably return to inauthenticity again. Forgetfulness is often just a consequence of Dasein's absorption in its world and in others. The anonymous 'They' will continue to exert power over Dasein in a way that renders the notion of self-

deception redundant. Dasein's problem is how to be strong enough to stand up to the world it is embedded in. To wrest itself out of its engagement with the world in order to attain a position of transcendence is a continuous challenge. We have seen that Dasein can certainly achieve such transcendence momentarily in the moment of vision and with anticipatory resoluteness, but this is by no means an achievement that can be taken for granted.

In spite of Heidegger's reservations about the existence of a self, Dasein's fundamental mineness leads to Dasein's aspiration to realize or at least recognize its ownmost potentiality for being-itself. This mineness makes Dasein affirm its own existence as separate from anything else. This is more clearly spelled out in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology:

The Dasein exists in the manner of being-in-the-world and as such *it is for the sake of its own self*. It is not the case that this being just simply is; instead, so far as it is, it is occupied with its own capacity to be. (Heidegger 1982:170)

Dasein is preoccupied with its own Being and with its own abilities. These abilities include the ability to disclose and the ability to close off. This makes the idea of existing authentically, (i.e. in a manner that is owned) or inauthentically, (i.e. in a manner that is not owned), possible. Nevertheless Heidegger's own thinking suggests that authenticity could never be enough in itself and has to be counterbalanced with inauthenticity. Dasein as an organic, flexible, temporary, ecstatic relation to the world, has to absorb authentic and inauthentic, resolute and irresolute ways of being in the world. Forgetfulness will always be an important mode of operating of Dasein and its progress towards a more full engagement with the world and being will not obliterate its ability to be selective in its openness to this world. Authentic and inauthentic being are two sides of the same coin, they are like the day and night views of being. Both are necessary and each have a role to play. A dialectical theory of selfhood has got to emerge from these considerations. This would lead to an

increasing awareness that Dasein's best objective would be to perfect its own ability to evaluate its intentionality and its choice of engagement with the world, be it authentic or inauthentic. This implied dialectical theory of selfhood goes beyond a narrow theory of self-deception, which tends to be based on a more restrictive notion of self and on a dualistic perception of 'authentic' living as desirable and 'inauthentic' living as undesirable.

It is not surprising that Heidegger refused to take up a position of moral theorizing. His descriptions of Dasein and its struggle with disclosing and closing off transcend any such ethical considerations. To theorize about the preference of authenticity over inauthenticity would be as absurd as to express a moral preference for the eye being open over the eye being closed. Clearly both functions of opening and closing are equally important and necessary as long as they are used to good effect.

Nevertheless the lack of a theory of value in Heidegger would seem to be one of the major drawbacks of his approach from the practical, psychotherapeutic point of view. It is easier for practitioners to have a clear sense of pathology and desired improvement and to have a guideline for evaluation of their interventions. At the same time it is well worth considering whether Heidegger's demonstration of Dasein's overall struggle with existence and with its paradoxical and complementary modes of being, offers us a worthwhile framework for psychotherapeutic practice.

A much more serious shortcoming of Heidegger's account of human beings is its emphasis on the ontological rather than the ontic dimension. To focus on the human condition in an abstract ontological manner does enable us to rise above the limitations and errors due to our immersion in the concrete contradictions of everyday situations. But the resulting detachment from the practical facts of social, political, individual and developmental reality hampers an application

of Heidegger's ideas in practice. Taking the ontic circumstances fully into account may require an extension of the Heideggerian ontological framework. It is of course a great challenge to elaborate such a pragmatic extension without compromising Heidegger's incisive comments on the ontological underpinnings of human existence.

There are some notions in Heidegger's work on inauthenticity and self-deception that are particularly helpful in considering a further application of his ideas to therapeutic practice. The strategies of distraction, indifference, backing away, covering up and forgetting, including self-forgetting, are modalities of operating that follow from Dasein's basic structure of care. These are directly relevant to the practice of psychotherapy, where these processes regularly occur. It is these ways of hiding away from truth that Heidegger shows to be the problem when human beings appear to be in untruth. Because of people's fundamental existence as Care and as intentional Beings their world relation takes place on this dimension of faltering and fallibility, but it is not, as we have seen, at all the same as self-deceiving. There is no place for such a concept as self-deception, when there is only a self after Dasein has begun to uncover its own potentiality for being and wrest itself from its absorption in the world. Even when Dasein falls back into self-forgetting this is not a morally objectionable circumstance, but rather something that is inevitably part of Dasein's being-in-the-world. Dasein as thrown and fallen being will always be inauthentic at times. It is something that has to be accepted and juxtaposed with its possibility to ec-sist and achieve authentic being and resolute anticipation. For Dasein to become a fully grounded being authentic and inauthentic existence will have to co-exist or alternate. Dasein needs to accept the realities of its being, with all its limitations if it is to come into its own.

Only if death, guilt, conscience, freedom, and finitude live together equiprimordially in the being of a being as they do in care, can that being exist in the mode of fate, that is, be historical in the ground of its existence. (Heidegger, 1927:385)

This statement holds much promise for a therapeutic practice that is willing to leave the objectives of medical science behind and replace them with a much more realistic and philosophical outlook on human being. If we can accept once and for all that Dasein is nullity and care and that it is structured as potentiality for being rather than as mere actuality, then we can see that people will always live in the tension between an awareness of their shortcomings, failings and limitations on the one hand, and an aspiration to overcoming themselves on the other hand. Helping clients to understand their inauthenticity, their guilt, their anxiety and the inevitability of their death will thus become one of the main therapeutic objectives, since disclosure of truth will be the aim. It is only to the extent that Dasein allows itself to get a hold of itself in this complex and paradoxical fashion, not as authentic but as both authentic and inauthentic, that it becomes capable of assuming itself in the fullness of its Being. Owned and disowned existence are both necessary. This is probably the most fundamental insight to be taken from Being and Time for psychotherapy.

We have seen that we need to be in actuality sometimes, as when working or in fear and that at those times we shall inevitably fall back into a disowned mode of existing. At other times we shall be capable of drawing ourselves out of our reliance on the world and on other people and be drawn into authentic experiencing by listening to the voice of our conscience, be anxious and unsettled and allow ourselves to come to a moment of vision that makes it possible to be in anticipatory resoluteness. Such resoluteness goes beyond either authentic or inauthentic being and encompasses negativity as well as potentiality. Though I am genuine at all times, whether authentic or inauthentic, I only exist truly when I wrest myself from the forgetting and covering up that are the more usual ways in which human beings live in an everyday fashion.

The psychotherapy practitioner who takes account of Heidegger's discoveries will enable people to become ready to uncover their structures of care and come to moments of vision where they can both be aware of their fate and their destiny. In such moments they may oversee the ec-stasies of past, present and future and come into the situation with lucidity and a sense of transcendence.

We have noted that there are some dangers inherent in Heidegger's position since it does not set a moral standard and does not propose any means of verification of what is the case at any particular time. There is indeed a danger that Dasein may become so absorbed in its own moment of vision that it may lose sight of some other more worldly factors that also have to be taken into account.

If Dasein is essentially a being that discloses and it is essentially truth then there is a definite risk that it may go astray at some point. Heidegger's notion of loyalty to existence seems a nice test of whether a person is fully immersed in life. It could be a good aim for psychotherapy. It is not clear whether following this principle would give us any clear guidelines for verification of a personal truth however. Though constancy appears to be an important principle, such constancy is in last analysis hard-won and only possible for a Dasein that is constantly struggling with the complexities and adversity of a real existence. I have tried to show that Heidegger's ontological analysis can be made relevant to the lives of people in the real world. It is only in the real world that his ideas can be put to the test. We would therefore conclude that whilst Heidegger is invaluable to psychotherapists who need a philosophical framework for their work with clients, psychotherapy in turn can provide the testing ground for his ontological framework. Heidegger only came to believe in the importance of such practical verification and application when he came to give

the Zollikon seminars. Magda King illustrated the essential nature of this application very well in terms of Heidegger's own ontology:

The disclosure of being calls Dasein to the task of existing as the place of illumination in the world-all. This disclosure, however, cannot happen to some abstract Dasein in general, but only to a single, factually existing Dasein. (King 2001:367)

Heidegger himself saw the limitations of his ontological approach. He recognized that the psychotherapeutic applications he collaborated on with Medard Boss are more than a passing interest and a distraction from his philosophical work. They are the essential verification that alone can bring the ontological considerations to life.

It is consistent with the Zollikon project that this submission consists not only of this philosophical part, but includes an applied part, in the form of the three volumes of my published work on existential psychotherapy, which will be briefly introduced in the appendix.

We can think of the situation as a dialectical movement. Self-forgetfulness and the unknowing absorption in the world are the thesis. Resolute anticipation of our ownmost possibility for death is the antithesis. Heidegger did not consider the fact that we need to think in terms of a dynamic movement between the two and that therefore forgetting about one's ownmost potential is sometimes an essential counterpart to our being true to what is. Is it not in the synthesis, in the overcoming of both thesis and antithesis, that we arrive at the '*Augenblick*', the Moment of Vision?

It is the achievement of such a moment, which allows for both the disclosure of Dasein and world that is the implied existential objective in Being and Time. But such disclosure is always opposed by our covering up. To not disclose is to be untrue to Dasein. To close off any of our possibilities, including that for

inauthenticity is to not be truthfully disclosing. We shall always be confronted with our tendency to close off. In my view, Heidegger, without having formulated it explicitly, has implicitly shown us the importance of a dialectical theory of authenticity and inauthenticity. To be disclosing is an essential characteristic of Dasein, to be covering up is another manifestation of the essential structure of Dasein's being. Dasein in truth has to be both. Nevertheless we can manage a wider, overall understanding of this very mechanism by which we function in the world and we can go beyond something as narrowly based as a theory of self-deception, which requires a simplistic dualistic approach to truth and untruth and a reductionistic theory of self.

Accepting that forgetfulness will always continue to be part of Dasein's primordial being is more authentic than to pretend that such forgetfulness can be totally overcome. In the end the greatest self-deception would be to pretend to ourselves that we could get away from all inauthenticity.

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Appendices

Appendix I. Application of Heidegger to psychotherapy: overview of published work submitted.

Self-deception and psychotherapy.

The entire question of self-deception is of crucial importance to the field of psychotherapy. Not only do clients in psychotherapy struggle with issues of truth and untruth, the issue of whether they know the truth about themselves is of constant concern. Similarly the question of whether psychotherapists themselves can know the truth about their clients or patients and whether they sometimes deceive themselves about their insights into their concerns and preoccupations has got to be addressed. In addition complex interactional questions around truth arise, in that there is always the possibility that clients begin to believe things about themselves because the therapist is suggesting these things to them and they deceive themselves into believing them out of self-interest.

In this context it is helpful to remember G.J. Warnock's work on morality (Warnock 1971), which argues that deception is an essential human tool and can be a powerful instrument in obtaining what we want for ourselves.

It is possible for a person, and often very easy, by doing things, and especially in the form of saying things, to lead other persons to the belief that this or that is the case; and one of the simplest and most seductive ways of manipulating and manoeuvring other persons for the sake of one's own ends is that of thus operating self-interestedly on their beliefs. (Warnock 1971: Ch. 6)

We may deceive ourselves into believing what our therapists tell us because it is profitable for us to go along with their particular perception of reality. In espousing their worldview and their interpretation of our experience, we can

deceive ourselves into the belief that our experience has been understood and accepted and we ourselves have been validated. This may be a stronger motivation than that of the search for the truth about us. Equally psychotherapists may deceive themselves into believing that they know what the truth of their clients is when in fact they do not and their self-deception may be upheld and confirmed by their client's collusion with the proposed interpretation of reality.

Psychotherapy, which is exclusively based on human interaction and has no real point of reference in factual reality other than this relationship, may be a place where self-deception is particularly likely to flourish and be sustained so as to create a kind of 'folie à deux'. It may even be that the place of pseudo-safety that is thus created by the therapist-client couple is beneficial to the client, although it may not be based in truth. Of course it is essential that the story that the therapist and client create to capture the client's experience be sufficiently connected to external reality to be viable in the client's day to day living.

From having worked directly with the professional bodies for psychotherapy, both in the UK and in Europe it has become evident to me that many of the difficulties arising in therapeutic practice are based on a lack of reality testing. The therapist may for instance create, or go along with the illusion that the client is dependent. If this mutual self-deceptive belief is allowed to continue over a period of many years it may deeply affect the client's ability to function in the outside world. There may come a point where the client, through other external contacts becomes aware of the deceptive nature of this belief and he or she may then turn against the therapist who seemingly kept them captive in this manner.

The debate on false memory syndrome (Loftus 1993, Yapko 1994) is another telling example of what might happen if reference to facts does not rupture such self-deceptive collusion. Therapist and client may design a self-deceptive belief about the existence of a particular form of child abuse in the client's past, even though this may not actually have happened in the way they construe the alleged experience. There is a lot of evidence that such false beliefs can be encouraged by therapists (Brandon, Boakes and Glaser 1998), even though such therapists would be able to take a more truthful orientation towards their therapeutic investigation. It was shown that therapists who believe more strongly that memories can be retrieved accurately are more likely to turn to hypnosis to unearth such memories (Williams 1994). It was also shown that hypnosis is the most likely to induce false details to memories and alter their significance (Loftus, Garry and Feldman 1994).

It seems therefore that a pre-existing self-deceptive belief can lead to the creation of further self-deceptive beliefs. It can be argued that the function of the therapist's self-deception in this case is to feel a sense of omnipotence over the client's life. The therapist who retrieves memories of abuse becomes a saviour, a superior parent to the real parent. The therapist is likely to become the object of much gratitude for having rescued the client from past oppression. As long as the client believes the accuracy of the memory retrieved this state will continue unchallenged. The self-deceptive belief of the client permits the client to feel avenged for childhood frustrations, which may be very real even if the alleged abuse did not happen. Clients may report the relief of apparently having found someone they can rely on to take their side no matter what.

It must be added that such collusive self-deceptive beliefs can obviously go in both directions. It is just as possible for client and therapist to agree to deceive themselves about the absence of child sexual abuse when in fact it has

occurred, as it is to agree to act as if child sexual abuse has occurred when in fact it has not. The search for truth is never easy and quite often in therapy we are dealing with a world of memory, imagination and fantasy in which the establishment of truth is practically impossible. In Heideggerian terms we could think of this process as one in which the facts of life are being covered up and both client and therapist back away from having to face up to the full complexities of the past relationships. At the same time though, they seem to avow a different reality, one that may be imaginary rather than real. It is this human ability to conjure up imaginary situations and deceptions that is not accounted for by Heidegger. We can observe all the functions of tranquillization in the face of potential anxiety and of self-forgetfulness, evasion, distraction and irresoluteness in such a situation. Heidegger's theory provides us with a very useful template for understanding much of what goes on. We do not however have any help from the theory in understanding lies, distortions, mistakes or self-deceptions.

Search for therapeutic truth.

The internal search for truth of the therapeutic relationship needs to be safeguarded by an adherence to some basic existential ontic principles. These principles will need to be based on the ontological foundations sketched out for us by Heidegger's ideas, but they need to supplement it with a more evaluative framework of reference, a framework that will allow for ontic verification and that can guard us against the dangers we encountered in Heidegger's perspective. Keeping in mind the paradoxical nature of life, there can be no therapeutic truth without an awareness of the contradictions in the person's experience. The validity of a person's understanding of their traumatic past can only be real if it is faced up to bravely, which does not mean excusing violent behaviour or injustice. The accuracy of accusations and the retributions that may be required are a matter for lawyers and police. The therapist should be

able to restrict the therapeutic work to an investigation of how the past is lived and born by the person and this involves a resolute facing of adversity rather than a succumbing to a personal sense of being victimized.

The questions, which need to be asked urgently about psychotherapy, are then:

Is it possible to discover what the truth of a person is?

Is such truth based in facts and reality or is it a subjective truth and is it therefore sufficient to understand the way in which a person experiences the world and their own history in order to come to a satisfactory agreement on what the person's life story is?

Is it truth that people come to psychotherapists for or do they merely want confirmation of their self-deceptive beliefs about themselves and the world?

Is it the role of the therapist to confront their clients with alternative versions of the truth and puncture their self-deceptive beliefs?

Can a therapist ever know whether the client's self-deception is indeed self-deception?

Is it the therapist's duty to confront self-deceptions when these are suspected?

Is it possible that therapists may come to collude with the client's self-deceptions in order to please the client and be appreciated as a good therapist?

Is it possible that the therapist may falsely consider something to be of self-deceptive nature in the client's belief system, when it is in fact a truthful belief?

Is it likely for the therapist to hold false beliefs based on his or her own self-deception which are then conveyed to the client as truth?

Is it possible that clients adopt therapists' false beliefs from therapists, self-deceptively imagining them to be truth?

Is it necessary for therapy to lead to truth or may the adoption of falsehood and illusion be an acceptable situation as long as both parties believe they are adhering to the truth?

These challenging questions have to be asked if we are going to use philosophical principles to guide our therapeutic work. It will obviously not be easy to find answers to them, but it is the objective of the existential approach to psychotherapy to continue to be challenged by the therapeutic interaction in this profound manner.

Existential psychotherapy: a personal contribution.

The existential approach to psychotherapy takes the ability to be in doubt and to question more seriously than the ability to find answers and soothe clients into the acceptance of comforting interpretations of their experience. Unlike psychoanalysts existential psychotherapists do not assume that they can know the hidden truths underlying their clients' troubles with any certainty. Existential psychotherapy is rather more a philosophical investigation of the way in which a person is in the world, taking into account all the complexity and ontological insecurities that underpin human existence.

Heidegger's work is certainly the most important foundation on which existential psychotherapy was built. Ludwig Binswanger (1958) first attempted to base his psychiatric work on Heidegger's worldview. Karl Jaspers (1963,1964), independently, but also inspired by Heidegger's thinking, similarly devised a way of working in psychiatry that built on the phenomenological method. The history of the existential approach is detailed in Everyday Mysteries (van Deurzen 1997) and I shall therefore not belabour it further in this section.

It is important to note however that the existential approach as an unveiling of what is hidden opens a person's perspective on the world and in doing so necessarily contends with the client's self-forgetfulness and inauthenticity. Similarly one of the main obstacles to doing effective existential work is that of the many veils of assumptions and prejudice that therapists themselves bring to the therapeutic situation. Existential psychotherapy is therefore a method of tackling self-deception and encouraging a person to question such self-deceptive stance as may block their clear vision of life.

There are moments however when certain clients appear to have too much of an overview of and insight into life. They may seem blinded by the light of reality and unable to hold on to any form of comforting and soothing beliefs. In this case it may be that clients, far from needing to be challenged to be more truthful and open, must realize the necessity for sometimes hiding away and maintaining a sufficiently restricted perspective on the world to manage living within it without too much anxiety. This realization that backing away from oneself and covering up some of reality may sometimes be a virtue is something that can only be understood from working with clients in practice. Heidegger's ontological analysis was unable to recognize the positive side of self-forgetfulness.

The anxiety that is generated from resolute facing of one's ownmost Being-towards-Death, is beneficial when it invigorates our aliveness, when it is too great and leads to panic instead of anxiety, a face-saving, life-saving self-deceptive construction may be more appropriate.

Such assertions need to be examined carefully in light of clinical experience. I will now describe some of the ways in which I have elaborated such an application and modification of Heideggerian theory to the practice of psychotherapy. It was my objective from the moment I started to work in a

psychiatric setting as a psychotherapist in the South of France in 1972, to use my knowledge of philosophy to intervene with the patients I worked with. I completed my first degree in philosophy just before taking up my first counselling job and immediately began to engage in philosophical discussions with the patients who seemed to be searching for moral and spiritual answers to their predicament instead of the medical answers they were usually given. I was introduced to the work of Jaspers and Binswanger in my psychiatric training, but did not discover Boss's work (Boss, 1957a, 1957b, 1979) until much later. R.D. Laing's contribution (Laing, 1960, 1967) suddenly soared to prominence in those years in France and it appealed to me the most, since it was so directly relevant to clinical practice. It was his work as an elaboration of the existential phenomenologies of Heidegger and Sartre that formed the basis of my master's thesis in philosophy in 1975. It was almost inevitable that I should come to Britain to work directly with the movement of anti-psychiatry and live in a therapeutic community of the Arbours Association for a year.

I have described in my recent book Paradox and Passion (van Deurzen, 1998) how this experience influenced my view of existential psychotherapy and how from 1977 on I began teaching philosophy on the Arbours training programme for psychotherapists. This obliged me to search more directly for concrete ways in which to apply the philosophical theories to practice. It was only then that the work of Medard Boss who had already attempted to do this, with the direct assistance of Heidegger himself, became a source of interest.

Appendix II. Summary of 'Existential Counselling and Psychotherapy in Practice'

Introduction.

In this book I took up the challenge of outlining an existential approach to counselling and psychotherapy when there was still very little published material on the subject. I had, over ten years of teaching the subject come to a point where I had formulated a number of practical ideas that applied directly to working with clients, based on the philosophies of Heidegger and Sartre, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. I had tested these ideas in my private practice and in supervision of a large number of counselling students that I used to teach and supervise on South West London College Counselling courses, which was one of the first counselling courses in this country. I used to teach up to three groups of forty to fifty students a year and individually supervised the practical work of approximately five students a year for seven years. All these students worked in challenging settings, ranging from secure units for criminal offenders with behavioural problems to pregnancy advisory counselling services. Some students worked with foreigners; others worked with terminally ill patients in hospitals or hospices. None of them had much philosophical or psychological knowledge as most of them were drawn from the teaching, nursing or social work professions. To help them make sense of Heidegger and Sartre in a direct manner in their day to day work was a challenge indeed.

At the same time, as Director of a Masters degree in the Psychology of Therapy and Counselling for Antioch University I had designed a number of courses, explicitly aiming at translating philosophical concepts into therapeutic practice. The existential counselling book was an attempt at providing a text for these students, who had the opportunity to study the relevant philosophies but who also had to put their theoretical knowledge to the test, mainly in work in private practice. I decided that my writing should be as jargon free as was possible and should have as few references to original texts as was acceptable. It had to be to the point and practical so that people would actually be interested in the ideas without perhaps even realizing that they were learning to do applied philosophy. I wanted them to be encouraged to think about their practice in new ways and to find a very personal and reflective manner of working with the predicaments of their clients.

The book has just been published in its revised second edition and includes more references to existing literature as well as extending its practical examples to new areas of practice. It covers a number of basic counselling situations, looking at anxiety as the guiding principle of all counselling interventions.

The objective of the book is to formulate an existential approach to counselling, which has as its purpose to enable clients to learn to live in time. Living in time is defined as the ability to recollect memories from the past, whilst living fully in the present and projecting oneself effectively into the future. The approach is founded on Heidegger's distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity. Living in time therefore requires willingness to face up to personal limitations and particularly to the possibility of death as the *sine qua non* of recovering one's personal ability to become authentic.

The book provides many case examples describing existential interventions, showing the importance of helping clients to confront their everyday reality in a new way. The tendency of people to cover up their existence and deny their understanding of the adversity and possibilities on their path is constantly challenged. It is shown how one can work with clients in practice to help them to become more resolute in facing their limitations. Uncovering reality as it is encountered in the world and becoming more transparent to oneself and the way in which one experiences this world are the ultimate objectives of existential work as illustrated throughout the book. This is all in line with the present thesis and the hypothesis of the importance of working with self-deception. Self-deception, in line with our findings in Heidegger's work is seen as a state of forgetfulness. Existential counselling thus encourages people to uncover what has been covered up and to undeceive oneself. This need to face up to things does not only apply to clients; it applies to the counsellor and therapist as well.

Chapter one.

In the first chapter of the book the idea is immediately introduced that counsellors themselves need to become alert to their own theoretical bias. It is argued that counselling needs to start with the recognition of the basic assumptions that underlie one's theoretical framework of reference.

Every approach to counselling is founded on a set of beliefs and ideas about life, about the world and about people. These notions are so essential to the approach that they can easily be overlooked. Basic assumptions are implicit rather than explicit. Every intervention that a counsellor makes expresses some of her basic assumptions, in a subtle or less subtle way. (p. 1)

One could argue that not to be aware of one's theoretical framework is to be deceiving oneself about one's own position in the world in general and in relation to the client's predicament in particular. To not be aware of one's personal

bias, and not pay attention to the way in which it interferes with one's understanding of the client's world is a good example of the kind of forgetting that goes on all the time and that could, in principle have dire consequences. Whilst giving the appearance of making oneself available to clients one might in fact be indoctrinating them. An additional problem arises when clients are actually quite happy for this to happen, soothing themselves into the belief that the best thing for them is to become like their counsellor.

Some clients are keen to adopt the counsellor's implicit assumptions through osmosis and through imitation of the counsellor's attitudes and expressions. (p. 2)

This is a serious problem that needs to be monitored. Even counsellors and therapists who are willing to check their own effect on the client by monitoring transference and counter-transference, this will only catch one facet of influence. Being aware of past relationships and their impact on the therapeutic relationship will still leave plenty of scope for confusion, as this does not catch one's basic philosophical bias. It is easy to still overlook the tremendous interference with the therapeutic process that arises from the personal assumptions and prejudices we carry about life and people. Whilst working with transference and counter-transference deals with personal issues, an awareness of one's overall worldview is the sine qua non of achieving the moment of vision required to be truly available to a client. This is not easy to do, even if we do not aspire to achieve this in Heidegger's full sense of the word. To work existentially is to be open to the facts of life, one's personal stance towards them and the client's stance towards them. This is a tall order and it would be to deceive oneself indeed to believe that one can ever be so available in the therapeutic relationship. Fortunately the lack of complete authenticity, the inevitable inauthenticity that is part of every therapeutic intervention is the grist for the mill that makes the relationship work. As long as the counsellor is allowing these contradictions and limitations to surface and be disclosed it is possible for her to work existentially.

However existential work can only succeed if clients are in principle equally willing to examine their own prejudice and attitude to life.

Clients can therefore only benefit from an existential approach in so far as they come to the counselling sessions with a fundamental commitment to sorting out vital issues and coming to terms with life. (p. 3)

Many approaches to counselling do not take the view that it is important to help people face things in their stark reality. Counselling sometimes provides a set of illusions, such as that of the imagined possibility to be mostly self-determining and self-assertive. Such wishful thinking has no place within the existential approach. Yet, if Heidegger's view on forgetting is correct then we need to allow for a quite considerable measure of inauthenticity to persist even after we become capable of disclosing the world as it is. The authenticity of our attitude will be guarded to some extent by the parameters of living that flow from the ontological givens of our existence. As we have argued above authenticity and inauthenticity will therefore co-exist.

In some of the vignettes in this book such struggles with authenticity and inauthenticity are illustrated. Clients' efforts to be engaged with the world are shown to be counterbalanced by their tendency to avoid challenges and hide away from reality. This need for occasional hiding places and self-deception is also put in evidence.

The vignettes in the first chapter illustrate this tension between self-deception and truthful living. In the case histories of Jake, Jonathan and Frances the struggle between authenticity and inauthenticity is particularly obvious. The case of Daniel that follows (pp.22-26) more specifically explores the kind of negative self-deceptive belief that keeps one cloistered in the

conviction of one's own inability to function in the world because one has found it previously too hard to do. Daniel was deceiving himself into the belief that he could only be a psychiatric patient because he was seemingly unable to achieve anything more than that in a hostile world. Perhaps it could be argued that the existential counselling process provided Daniel not only with the means to challenge his faulty belief in his own social deficiency, but also to confirm his deeply held belief in his, perhaps also somewhat self-deceptive, specialness. The objective of the work with Daniel was to help him in reclaiming this specialness, but rather than hide it and experience it as a handicap claim it and turn it into a source of productivity and creativity. Daniel who had failed in society, first as a builder, then as a window cleaner, then as a painter, recovered some sense of his own capability by re-training whilst he was in psychiatric hospital. He began working in the hospital workshop painting furniture, then moved on to decorating pottery. Discovering his hidden artistic talent in this way eventually led him to find work with a craftsman, decorating porcelain and earthenware. He took great pride and pleasure in his work and his creativity and in his spare time began to do watercolours that he was able to sell occasionally in the craftsman's shop.

The point here is that in bringing Daniel back into his openness towards his ownmost potentiality for being himself, in spite of the limitations that this implied in terms of what he was able to achieve, gave him a purpose that changed his entire life. From feeling ill and incompetent and useless and unable to be with others, he became able to face up to some of the realities of being in the world with other people. The therapeutic interventions consisted largely in discussing the ontological characteristics of Dasein that he had struggled with in the belief that his human predicament was his exclusive and personal problem. After discussing Daniel's situation I therefore came to define the existential method as follows:

The aim of existential counselling is to clarify, reflect upon and understand life. Problems in living are confronted and life's possibilities and boundaries are explored. Existential counselling does not set out to cure people in the tradition of the medical model. Clients are considered to be not ill but sick of life or clumsy at living. (p. 20)

This objective of the approach makes it into a philosophical method rather than a psychological one. Existential counselling is described as a method of applied philosophy. It is, as an applied rather than a theoretical discipline, involved with the ontic manifestations of Heidegger's ontological phenomena. In this sense it moves on a different level than Heidegger's work. It deals with concrete reality and with actual everyday experience rather than with hypothetical everyday reality. In this sense the experience of doing existential counselling should inform us more correctly of actual human experience than pure philosophy ever could. Existential counselling is then a methodical exploration of everyday reality as it manifests for particular individuals. It is an attempt at being open to this reality as much as possible in an effort to reveal the truth of human existence.

The existential counsellor values truth above all. But the truth that she aspires to is a living truth, not a dogma or an abstraction. Her curiosity about the human condition is primarily directed at an exploration of the way in which people create and destroy truth in their everyday existence. (p. 29)

This means to be on the outlook for the way in which people are inevitably drawn back into self-deception about their own reality, whilst at the same time aiming to achieve a greater resoluteness and truthfulness.

Chapter two.

Thus in chapter two, which deals with the establishment of the therapeutic relationship the emphasis is on the need to acknowledge the client's anxiety. Anxiety, which is normally avoided, when faced, can open the human being up to

the aspects of life that need to be faced for authentic living to become possible again.

When there are no options, there is no anxiety. As soon as people are aware of the basic choices that life involves them in they are condemned to the experience of anxiety. (p. 39)

A discussion follows of all the different ways in which people may evade their anxiety and turn it into something else, such as boredom or depression. The sine qua non of existential counselling is therefore to locate the anxiety and expose a person to it again.

The courage to live can only be found if the possibility of death is faced resolutely. Existential counselling sets itself the task to help people to find this courage. It therefore starts by encouraging them to unearth all their anxieties and face life squarely. (Ibidem)

Anxiety is seen as that experience, which exposes our inauthentic ways of being. Self-deception is designed to stem the tide of anxiety and fool a human being about the facts of life. Anxiety is not to be avoided, but encouraged. This is true as a rule of thumb, although it must be recognized that anxiety can in fact get so extreme that it cannot itself be experienced anymore and turns into panic. Panic is not a useful experience as it plunges the person into chaos. In such a state of chaos, self-deception is not only preferable, it is indispensable. Overall however the objective is for clients to become able to monitor their own state of mind and resolutely face the whole of their existence.

When the client becomes expert at unravelling her own self-deception without too much assistance from the counsellor the end of the sessions is in sight. (p. 45)

This is easier said than done, because some clients do not feel ready to leave behind self-deceptions. Particularly those people who have withdrawn into a passive avoidance of the human condition can be reluctant to give up their hiding way of life, whilst complaining about the consequences it has for them.

The role of existential counselling in this case is to help people come to terms with the risks and anxieties involved in active living, rather than going under in the despair ensuing from passive withdrawal. (p. 46)

Most of the existential work is about learning to deal with anxiety and using it to become more truly able to let being be revealed and to actively participate in the world, taking into account one's own abilities and limitations. The ultimate objective is to enable people to become clear about their own purpose and thus find the motivation to live much more deeply and directly than before.

This is what authentic living is all about: becoming increasingly capable of following the direction that one's conscience indicates as the right direction and thus becoming the author of one's own destiny. (p. 48)

Most clients have not discovered this possibility of living according to their own authority. It is interesting that psychotherapy and counselling often cater to a person's desire to hide behind other people's authority and can quite easily be a way of jumping in for the other rather than a way of disclosing a person's ownmost potentiality for Being. Yet, in many instances people hope that therapist or counsellor will be able to open up this hidden world of deeply felt experience and connectedness to the world that they have lost or never had. They might find themselves in a state of such inauthenticity that they do not even know who they are anymore.

In extreme cases clients may describe this experience as one of not being in charge of themselves, as if they have lost all authority and cannot even claim their own experience as real anymore. It is to them as if they were living somebody else's life or as if someone else were doing their living in their place. (p. 50)

The case of Catherine at the end of this chapter on authenticity illustrates the existential counselling work that enabled this young woman who had lived a 'They'-self life to claim her ownership of her own being in the world. She moved from depression, coinciding with her sense of not belonging, not being

able to affect the world, to a sense of anxiety, as she discovered her ownmost potential for being and therefore the choices she could make to start making changes in her life. As she could no longer hide in other people's views and opinions she had to face her own existence and her inevitable responsibility for her own actions.

The point is then made that those people who manage to live authentically with resoluteness will easily become leaders, whereas those who live inauthentically tend to be followers.

Of course, there is no guarantee that authentic decisions about one's direction in life will automatically lead in the right direction. People make mistakes even when they are fully aware of their responsibility and choice making. Authenticity is not a sufficient virtue in itself and it is certainly no guarantee of truth. (p. 56)

It is possible to apparently be fully engaged with authentic living and make the wrong moral choices. Heidegger's own experience of opting for nazism for a period in his life is a good illustration of this point, since he assumed he was doing the right thing, whilst obviously doing the wrong thing. Morality is more complex than Heidegger's account of inauthenticity and authenticity allows for. This means that existential counsellors and therapists can not do a sufficient job if they do not take account of the wider need to see the individual situation in a larger context. They need to have, in other words, some way of ascertaining, or helping their clients ascertain the extent to which their decisions are right or wrong. This idea of the need for moral clarity is rather missing from Heidegger's opus, because this concerns ontic considerations rather than ontological ones. In the real world, with other people of everyday experience and decision making such ontic rules for assessing the values one wants to live by are very important. It is no good if existential counsellors ignore these and simply encourage clients to do whatever seems right and authentic...

So while the first step in existential counselling is always to help the client rediscover her original intention and her own direction, it is necessary to encourage her to check this intention or that direction in terms of their ultimate rightness. Guidelines are required to monitor one's orientation. (p. 56)

This makes existential counselling into something quite different to Heidegger's or even Sartre's project. The question arises: how can one's conscience be correctly interpreted? Or even: are the actions I take when resolutely engaged in my Being-towards-Death, always guaranteed to be morally right? Some way of checking actions and decisions needs to be put into place. In accordance with Heidegger's findings on state of mind and mood, the existential counselling method proposed is one of getting clarity on the emotions that indicate values lost and gained. A method for the clarification of the client's personal worldview is proposed. This method follows some of Binswanger's ideas in seeing human experience as always taking place in a number of different dimensions. Umwelt, or the natural world, Mitwelt or the public world and Eigenwelt or the private world, are described in the next few chapters, with the further addition of the Uberwelt, the ideal world, representing the dimension of meaning making that seems so essential to human being in the world. (p. 69)

Chapter three.

To divide human experience up into categories in this manner is rather artificial, but it provides an alternative to a system of psychopathology or personality. In looking at a person's experience in terms of dimensions of human existence we concern ourselves with the being-in-the-world of the person and have to take context and world into account. We cannot be tempted to reduce a person's experience to the intra-psychic or indeed to the interpersonal only. This is what most other approaches to psychotherapy and counselling do and it was of importance to find an existential substitute for such reductive diagnostic categories.

Chapter three therefore illustrates the use of these world-dimensions in terms of understanding a person's world relatedness and worldview. Since this is not directly relevant to the present thesis, this needs no further attention here.

Chapter four.

It is in chapter four that a return is made to the investigation of personal assumptions about the world in order to arrive at a better understanding of the client's values and system of meaning. Here again the objective is to help clients to become alert to their own taken for granted falling into the world.

Therefore the existential method consists of scrupulously responding to the client from a position of catalyst for clarification. The process is one of reminding the client how to conduct her own investigation into her mode of living, thus bringing her back to herself and her own conscience. (p. 105)

The idea is that the existential counsellor helps the client to let the light of living shine in her life again and let it illuminate what was previously obscured. Instead of passively going along with the falling attitude the client is encouraged to become actively attentive to what is happening in her life. In the next few pages follow a number of illustrations of how clients can be helped to pay attention to their intentionality, reclaiming their own connection to the world and the potential for being that this opens to them. This process of taking stock involves a number of points in relation to the recognition of personal assumptions, values and talents. This process inevitably unearths large amounts of self-deceptive behaviour. Clients deceive themselves both on the abilities they have and do not have. To be there as an ally in helping to get a truer picture of their own being in the world is a valuable service to render them. The existential counsellor works with the client as if the counsellor were the client's good conscience. This means giving the client the confidence to

face up to how things stand in the world, understanding their own position in life and facing the implications.

This demonstrates once again how the existential counsellor is to be a companion on the road towards further self-discovery. She is an ally, the voice of the client's good conscience, in the very best sense of the word. She thus enables the client to make the most of what is already there and to continue expanding the repertoire. Pointing out pitfalls and shortsightedness on the way will be the natural and logical counterpart of this role of guardian angel. As soon as the client has come to think of this monitoring as an essential and familiar function, she will cease to shy away from relating to herself in a similar fashion. (p. 133)

This is of course an idea that runs somewhat against Heidegger's view that authenticity has to be arrived at by one's own efforts and discovery. It is hard earned and requires us to face our mortality and our ability to stand out alone in the world. For Heidegger authenticity starts when we pull away from others. It is obvious from the practice of counselling and psychotherapy that some people find it almost impossible to come to the place of authentic living on their own. They do need to be reminded by someone of what is possible and what is actual. Once this has happened though, they will still need to uncover their authentic being for themselves. In last analysis there are no short cuts. Counsellors can ease the way, but not take over for the client. It would be self-deceptive to believe that we can indeed help another to be authentic once and for all.

Chapter five.

What we can do is to familiarize others with a new way of understanding themselves. In chapter five it is shown how this can be done through working with people's emotions, showing them how the state of mind and the mood can point them in the direction of their self-understanding. This part of the book draws extensively on Sartre's work on emotions, particularly on the idea expressed in his Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions (Sartre, 1939) that

emotions can be a positive phenomenon, magically changing the world experience to fit in with the person's need of the moment. A specific method of work with emotions is then developed, which uses a diagram showing emotions to be like a cycle, which takes one either down or up, away from that which is valued, or back towards it.

In a further section in the chapter specific ways of working with clients' meaning and purpose are demonstrated. A diagram is used to show how ultimate concerns and ultimate values will determine a person's sense of direction and aspiration. This model functions again as a kind of existential diagnostic tool. It needs to be taken with a large amount of salt if the existential approach is not to lose its way.

This is followed by a section on working with dreams. This is partially based on Boss's contribution to dream analysis (Boss, 1957b). Dreams are seen as the expression of a person's world view and world orientation. It is easier to locate a person's world orientation in the story of the dream than it is to see the world orientation when a person talks about their everyday experience. In the dream the person's attitude is summarized as it were and projected onto a clear screen. It can therefore be looked at structurally for what it expresses about the client's relation to the world on all its different dimensions. No interpretations will be given of what the dream signifies or symbolizes. Meanings are rather drawn from the client's own sense of how the dream expresses their current view of the world.

A section on how to work with a person's imagination follows and this is again largely based on Sartre's contribution.

Chapter six.

The final chapter six is called 'coming to terms with life' and it shows how the method works in practice in helping people make the transition from counselling sessions to everyday living. It is divided up in sections on facing the world alone, on action and commitment, on communicating and relating and on living in time. This brings out some of the Heideggerian themes again, especially those of authenticity and Being-towards-Death. It is argued here that the client is best served by being reminded of the need to find courage to live by facing up to the possibility of non-being. This is about abandoning self-deceptive beliefs, even though there sometimes may need to be some room for a little self-deception, some falling or even some evading after all.

Though the client may need some oblivion as well, more than anything she deserves a chance to discover her own strength, her own intrinsic ability to face her existence alone. (p. 189)

Counsellors should not try to sort people's problems out and create the false belief that life can be sorted. Nor should counsellors allow clients to lean on them and cultivate dependency. Existential counselling is about helping people to find the confidence to live their lives authentically in all the paradoxical complexity that this entails. Existential counsellors can not force an attitude of confronting self-deception if people are not ready for this. The discovery of authenticity can only come through maturity and individual readiness.

It can be difficult to assist someone in this discovery if she is used to gaining a sense of self through continuous confirmation in action and public respect. Someone like that frequently has many avenues of escape from anxiety open to her. As long as she prefers the comfort of re-establishing the illusion of her safety to the struggle with insecurity and aloneness there is no point in forcing the issues. No one can discover new dimensions to life unless they are ready and willing to abandon old securities. The existential counsellor must abstain from missionary zeal. The client, if not pressed, will return when more illusions have fallen apart and the urgency of further investigation is confirmed. (p. 189)

This is to say that existential crises will always arise in people's lives and open their eyes to the need to move away from illusions and self-deception in order to see life for what it is. It is when in crisis that people suddenly find

themselves in need of philosophy. Counsellors and therapists learn with experience that they cannot open people's eyes unless life itself has readied the person to do so. As Heidegger pointed out we all start out in a falling mode and it is only as we gradually differentiate ourselves from others and begin to see the realities of human existence that we become capable of authentic vision and resolute living.

In the final section of the book the notion of living in time is considered as the objective of good existential counselling.

Living in time is that mode of existence where a person is aware of his or her own inevitable progression from birth to death. (p. 222)

To learn to live in a way that takes a wider perspective of Dasein as a being that is always in a world and in time takes some doing. It is hard to define what marks an authentic existence that resolutely lives in time in this way.

A steady progress is marked by a capacity to appreciate and enjoy the present without harking back to the past or fleeing from it. It is in addition characterized by resolute facing of whatever may lie ahead. Progress may be hampered by fear of the future and holding on to present illusions of ease. It may be equally hampered by a wish to hurry on towards the future, which is invested with the imaginary powers of salvation and release of any further troubles and efforts. (p. 222)

Existential counselling must therefore constantly guard against these various forms of self-deception without falling into the trap of wanting to save people from self-deception unless they are ready to undeceive themselves. It goes without saying that to become an existential counsellor one needs the philosophical clarity about human existence that comes from studying authors such as Heidegger and Sartre, on the one hand and a large dose of living experience on the other hand. In turning to clinical practice we also soon find that Heidegger's insistence on the purity of the ontological is a useful backdrop

but not a sufficient method for work with people's actual preoccupations and problems. Heidegger's theory has to be supplemented with a more pragmatic approach. This will continue to need to be perfected and altered in line with further experience.

Appendix III. Summary of 'Everyday Mysteries: Existential Dimensions of Psychotherapy'

General purpose and outline of the book.

After writing Existential Counselling in Practice I became increasingly involved in developing training courses in the field of therapy and counselling, always with an existential orientation. Everyday Mysteries is the book that was written as the result of teaching a large number of introductory and advanced courses on existential psychotherapy both in theory and in practice over a period of ten years. These courses were established for Antioch University and Regent's College, validated by City University, and they included a Masters degree and an advanced diploma in existential psychotherapy, which specialized wholly in teaching and training students of psychotherapy focussing on a philosophical method of psychotherapy.

It was only when I had delegated the teaching of these courses to new staff members that it became apparent to me that they and the students would need my notes. This resulted in the book Everyday Mysteries in which I gave brief introductions to each of the philosophers I had considered to be relevant to trainee therapists. It also provided brief introductions to the relevant existential practitioners and then a systematic outline of existential psychotherapy as I had developed it myself over the years. The book is based on much of the experience gained in teaching students principles of psychotherapy. It provides them with a framework for their existential training, bringing theory and practice together in one volume.

The title of Everyday Mysteries refers directly to Heidegger's assertion that we need to look at the everyday in order to understand human existence and Being. It also refers to Sartre's assertion that consciousness itself is a mystery in broad daylight and not at all the hidden secret that Freud attempted to turn the Unconscious into. The book considers many classical psychoanalytic concepts and re-frames them in an existential manner. This includes the notion of the unconscious, which is looked at in some detail under the heading of the unknown. It also includes the notion of self-deception, which is posited as a useful alternative to the psychoanalytic concept of repression. The whole idea of the everyday mysteries is that we are in a constant process of not knowing and trying to come to know what there is to know. The world we live in as well as our own existence continue to be mysterious, much as we like to sometimes deceive ourselves into believing that we fully understand.

The book is probably the most scholarly of the three submitted and sets out to be a fundamental textbook for existential psychotherapists in training or in practice. Heidegger's Being and Time is a constant source of inspiration throughout the book. The case illustration at the end could however usefully have traced Heidegger's influence in a more direct manner.

At the outset of the Heidegger chapter (p.34) I quote Heidegger's statement in Being and Time:

Everydayness does not coincide with primitiveness, but is rather a mode of Dasein's Being, even when that Dasein is active in a highly developed and differentiated culture - and precisely then. Moreover even primitive Dasein has possibilities of a Being which is not of the everyday kind, and it has a specific everydayness of its own. (Heidegger 1927, 50-51)

This brings out what existential therapy is all about: an investigation of the everyday experience of a specific human being, who has a specific everydayness of its own. Heidegger always argued that the everyday is the place to look if

we are to understand Dasein. Psychotherapists are by far the best-placed individuals to do this investigation in a properly phenomenological manner. Everyday Mysteries aimed at exploring some of the aspects of such an investigation whilst realizing that this would always have to remain an incomplete and relative exploration.

Existential approaches to psychotherapy do not have magical answers, nor can they demystify, integrate or simplify the field. All they can do is to open up new horizons, new dimensions, new continents of meaning and invite those who want to explore these to do so for themselves and in their own way. There are however a lot of stepping stones that have been gathered over the years by many different authors and they are worth taking notice of when we try to reappraise life. (p. 4)

Because of the wide variety of points of view that were brought together in Everyday Mysteries the book presents a lot of different perspectives that are not always compatible with each other. Juxtaposing Kierkegaard and Derrida or Binswanger and Lacan inevitably leads to some confusion, unless one finds some way to overcome these conflicting descriptions of human experience. In the latter part of the book I describe my own way of making sense of the apparent contradictions and of coming to a formulation that is, at least temporarily, satisfactory as a method for doing psychotherapy. This method is based on the elements of theory and practice that have served me best over the years. It has been distilled from what could be learnt from the writings of others, as it made sense in practice. The practice of psychotherapy shows certain philosophical concepts to be inadequate in explaining human experience or at least insufficient in helping people manage it in practice. This leads one to having to develop new ideas in order to make sense of the apparently inexplicable. In this process of theorizing from practice and generalizing from examples there is a possibility that the theory inferred may later have to be modified or even abandoned in light of further evidence. It is also quite likely that one will generalize from individual examples and overstate one's case sometimes. It is important to keep the existential approach to psychotherapy in perspective.

Existential psychotherapy does not seek to cure or explain, it merely seeks to explore, describe and clarify in order to try to understand the human predicament. It aims to do so with an open mind or at least with a willingness to observe candidly the manifold ways in which the mind is closed. P.3/4.

The existential approach to psychotherapy consists of a phenomenological description of essential features of a person's life. This inevitably means tracing the ways in which people are avoiding a number of issues in their lives. The emphasis is therefore often on the ways in which people are self-deceptive, in the sense we have uncovered by our investigation of Heidegger's use of terminology, i.e. in terms of forgetfulness. Various existential philosophers have written about the way in which human beings obscure and hide the truth of being in general and of their own position in the world in particular. All of these reflections may be relevant to psychotherapists and deserve to be studied during the course of training in psychotherapy.

Theory.

The book therefore begins with descriptions of the contributions by Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Sartre and then gives shorter summaries of the contributions of Husserl, Merleau Ponty, Jaspers, Buber and Tillich, followed by some information on Ricoeur, Derrida and Foucault.

It is not relevant to the present discussion of the work to discuss these summaries, apart from noting that the work of all of these authors is looked at in terms of their theories of the human condition. Each of them, by writing about the ways in which people experience existence, have made a unique contribution to our understanding of what clients struggle with. To be familiar with these theories is therefore a good starting point for any psychotherapist whose work will entail a search for increased disclosure. It becomes easier to

recognize self-deception in ourselves and our clients if we have thought more sharply about human existence. The philosophers considered in this section of the book have done so to a larger extent than most.

A map of the world.

However, philosophers, on the whole, do not apply their thinking to the practice of psychotherapy (Jaspers is here the great exception) and the link between theory and practice had to be made by those psychiatrists and psychologists who were willing to apply philosophical theories to their clinical work. Before I move on to the section that details the work of the major contributors in the field of existential and Daseinsanalytic psychotherapy, I propose a layered model of understanding clients' worldviews. Borrowing from Binswanger's application of Heidegger's ideas, in terms of the fourfold, I briefly consider the ways in which human beings are always in relation to a world on a number of different dimensions: the physical, social, personal and spiritual (Umwelt, Mitwelt, Eigenwelt and Uberwelt).

In addition to introducing this model of four levels of human experience, the notion of antinomy, of opposite aspirations or values is briefly described. This is in line with Heidegger's later recognition that resolution and releasement were both necessary qualities of human living and that they, in a sense, counterbalance each other. Life comes in opposites, in the same way in which life itself is from the start counterbalanced by the certainty of death. People on the whole find a way to live somewhere in between the opposing forces of freedom and necessity, certainty and doubt, love and hate, hope and despair, and so on, unless that get drawn into one of the extremes and need help to rebalance their position.

These opposing principles and forces can never be eliminated and will continue to dominate human existence. Human living is only possible to the extent that we learn to live with these forces. I mention the word of ontodynamics to name these forces and formulate a description of the way, in which individuals orientate themselves in the world, finding their way through the paradoxes of existence. I then briefly describe each of the dimensions of world relation and note some of the challenges that face every human being on each of these dimensions as well as the strategies they may deploy for avoiding full disclosure of the problems and contradictions they encounter.

New Foundations for psychotherapy.

In this part of the book I describe the work of the existential psychotherapists who have applied existential insights to clinical practice. The authors covered are:

Jaspers, Minkowsky, Lacan, Binswanger, Boss, May, Yalom, Frankl, Laing, Szasz and Hoogendijk and Achenbach, two philosophical consultants, whose work intersects with that of existential psychotherapy. The various contributions of this wide range of authors gives a good demonstration of the breadth and depth of existential work. With hindsight I recognize that I have not done sufficient justice to the work of the American school and that I have particularly undervalued and poorly presented the work of R.D. Laing. It is difficult to give a fair representation of authors who one has known or who are still alive and the political events in the world of psychotherapy have prevented me from putting all these authors' contribution into a fair perspective. It could also be said that the importance of Lacan's work has been overstated in this volume, since his contribution is far more relevant to the history of psychoanalysis than it is to the history of existential psychotherapy. In a

future edition of Everyday Mysteries I shall hope to correct some of the injustices done.

Part II, section 2: parameters of existential psychotherapy.

In the second section of Part II of the book I give my own rendering of existential practice and describe in turn the objectives and ground rules of the approach. I go on to discuss the existential alternatives to the theory of the unconscious as well as to the notion of the Self. I present a chapter on the centrality of dialogue in the existential approach and illustrate the application of these principles with a full-length case study.

The role of self-deception in psychotherapy.

I would like to highlight some of the remarks about psychotherapy that I have made in *Everyday Mysteries* in relation to the issues of self-deception and authenticity and inauthenticity. These are particularly to be found in this final section of the book where I expose my personal take on existential psychotherapy. In the chapter 24 I describe the objectives of the approach as:

One of the most central implications of Heidegger's insights into human existence is to consider that an individual is nothing more than the focal point of a network of interactions. I am just the centre of my experience. My life is always mine, yet this mineness is profoundly problematic, for it is generated through my connection to that which is not I. I, inevitably, deeply care: for I am nothing without my relationship to the world of things and people. (p. 178)

This Heideggerian insight into the way in which Dasein is always going out of it self into the world and is essentially defined by care, has enormous implications for psychotherapy. Of course the care he speaks of is not that of caring for, but rather that of the world mattering. The recognition that self is not an

entity but a going out of itself is revolutionary. Most other forms of psychotherapy posit the self as a unit, which is then seen as being connected up to the world outside of it in a number of ways, through object relations or through conditioning and learning. Heidegger's contribution represents a complete 'Copernican' revolution for the view of the self. This is often discounted and misunderstood. Some people even accuse Heidegger of having a rather solipsistic view of the world. We have shown above that this is the opposite of what is the case however. Heidegger's understanding of the way in which Dasein is essentially embedded in the world implies a theory of the connectedness of human beings not even equalled by Levinas' emphasis on the importance of the other (Levinas 1987). People are never just people. They are what discloses being and they are in this way to be understood as the place where being comes to light.

This leads to the recognition of a profound paradox in the study of human beings and to the discovery that we cannot ever do justice to what people are unless we remain faithful to their ability to disclose. Dasein has to go out of itself in order to be what it is. So it has to be absorbed by the world, with a risk of becoming inauthentic, in order to be authentically true to its nature. This means that:

We distort the picture of what people are by studying them as if they were solid dynamic objects. We miss the fundamental human function of bringing things to light and making the world meaningful when we stick to the mechanics of human nature. This is a catastrophic omission when we are addressing human distress. Human life has to be understood in action, interactively. The study of human beings is an ecological one and has to take the entire context of human living into account in a dynamic fashion. (p. 178)

But in doing this we should not get drawn into simply accounting for the events that have happened to a person and map their developmental process and educational influences. The way in which clients have to be understood is by remaining mindful of their intrinsic connection to being.

Heidegger suggests that human being can only be understood if we are willing to abandon our egocentricity and dissolve our artificial certainty into an openness for what is and what calls out to us from beyond our cultural and parental parameters. (p. 179)

To bring clients back into touch with their ability to hear the call of conscience and let ourselves be reminded of their ownmost potential for being will transform the way in which we listen to people's predicaments. We have to remove ourselves from getting absorbed in the client's suffering and inauthentic ways of thinking about themselves. We should not encourage soliloquies of self-observation and preoccupation with individual historicizing. Instead clients can be helped to reclaim their own ability to be open to being. This entails helping people rediscover their ownmost potentiality for being in the way they are originally. We stand in for the call of conscience and let clients be recalled to their ownmost-potentiality-for-Being-themselves. On page 180 I quote from Heidegger to sharpen up the view on what existential psychotherapy would have to consist of. Heidegger's words about the call of conscience are an excellent reminder of what the existential therapeutic venture, framed as a calling back to conscience, should be about:

The call asserts nothing, gives no information about world-events, has nothing to tell. Least of all does it try to set going a 'soliloquy' in the Self to which it has appealed. 'Nothing' gets called to this Self, but it has been summoned to itself - that is, to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. The tendency of that call is not such as to put up for 'trial' the Self to which the appeal is made; but it summons to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self. (Heidegger 1927:273)

This calls for a new kind of psychotherapy that reaches people beyond their absorption in their everyday preoccupations and their self-deceptive concealment. What Heidegger asks for is an approach that does not analyse and judge the self, but that frees it from its current concealment and brings it back into transparency. This makes possible the disclosure of being in all its intricacies and all its contradictory reality.

I take up this theme of rediscovering truth in relation to the Oedipal myth (page 180) and explore its connections to the plight of Antigone. Heidegger's views are juxtaposed with Freud's views, since Heidegger wrote of Oedipus' experience as being related to the struggle for unconcealment (Heidegger 1935).

Heidegger goes on to argue that the challenge that Oedipus has to face is that of achieving authenticity in the light of the tragic givens of his life. (van Deurzen, 1997:183)

It seemed important to return to the Oedipal myth, which is so central to psychoanalysis and to follow Heidegger's interpretation of it. Whilst psychoanalysis used the story to illustrate the unruly desires of the alleged unconscious, Heidegger uses it in order to illustrate the human duty to continue to battle for authenticity. This battle for unconcealment is fought against the background of our constant need for concealment and falling into inauthenticity.

This unconcealment is not an unconcealment of secret or unconscious motivations, as psychoanalysis would have it. It is the unconcealment of the entities to be found in the world. It is an unconcealment of Being. This means that the emphasis must shift away from making what is unconscious conscious. To focus on the personal unconscious is to reify the process of consciousness and to locate it in the individual rather than in the world, where it belongs. We need new ways of thinking about human consciousness. We need to replace the theory of the unconscious with a theory of consciousness. Perhaps a more Heideggerian approach would have been to argue for a more complete theory of intentionality. In the next pages of Everyday Mysteries I consider a number of levels of consciousness that could be easily confused for aspects of the unconscious. I argue that:

Consciousness is multiple and layered. It is a complex manifestation of life that goes beyond our own understanding of it. Perhaps it is the everyday mystery *par excellence*, for we use it on a daily basis without ever coming close to guessing the capacities that we draw on and the abilities that we let lie fallow. (Ibid. 202/203)

The following are some of the aspects of consciousness that allow us to be unreflective of our consciousness and that thus may be part of a general attitude of inauthentic being in the world. Habits of self-deception can grow inside of each of these pockets of unthinking consciousness.

The instinctual level of our experience, which is unfortunately something Heidegger rather neglected. All our physiological responses that influence our way of understanding the world.

The things that we deliberately forget because we do not like them. This is something Heidegger talked about a lot as we have seen, though he never really tackled the difference between knowing something first and then forgetting it, or never really having accepted knowledge of something we could have known about.

Thoughts and images that are created by our own minds and that do not necessarily correspond to a reality shared with other people.

The area that psychoanalysts may refer to as that of repression, in other words those aspects of life that we do not want to have to face up to because they are too hard to handle.

The non-intentional and the non-reflective aspects of our lives. Making distinctions between those things we decide to reflect on or look at carefully and those things we just experience in action.

The things that we take for granted without having to reflect on them or become acutely aware of them. This may include the structure of a situation that influences us greatly but does not require us to reflect on it. It goes without saying that all of these are possible areas of forgetfulness of being and certainly of forgetfulness of self.

Those things that are implicit in all our statements and actions because they underpin our particular view of the world and our particular prejudice about it. These assumptions are what phenomenology wanted to bracket out. Working with clients' assumptions is crucial to doing existential psychotherapy. Working with the therapist's own assumptions in as far as these stand in the way of being open to the client's worldview is equally important.

There are also those implications, which concern the consequences rather than the premises of our actions, choices and beliefs. Of course this brings the dimension of time back into play as we consider the way in which our perceptions of the world and interactions with it are always defined by the three ec-stasies of time. In the case of consequences we need to take a direct look at the possible future repercussions of decisions made in the present. It is about how we will re-collect ourselves from the past into the future and how that future will determine in turn how we shall emerge from the past. Not doing so implies a degree of self-deception.

The connections between the various things we encounter in the world can also be ignored and forgotten. Not reflecting on these connections may face us with some inexplicable reminders of reality.

The realm of the unknown, i.e. of all those things that are not yet known by human beings represents another level of forgetfulness, especially when pretending that we actually do know all there is to know in the world.

Everything that is intuitive, i.e. that we perceive and react to without reflectively considering why we respond in the way that we do, is a minefield of possible self-deception, when we deny its importance or impact on us.

It is important to remember that no matter how much our consciousness does disclose the world, it will always have its limitations: our vision will always be restricted in some sense and for every light we throw on the world there will still be a shadow as well.

The limits of our consciousness are indicated in one way by the existence of subliminal and supraliminal stimuli that we cannot comprehend. It would be self-deceptive to believe ourselves capable of being aware of everything.

Some things exist only in the context or in the situation between people and we cannot know them or understand them unless we understand the whole of the system or the configuration that we are a part of.

There are, in other words, many aspects of human experience that will remain out of our sphere of conscious reflection. Does this mean that we fail to be authentic when we do not attend to them? Does it mean that these things are taking place in our unconscious? It seems an unnecessary explanation. What we have shown is that consciousness is layered, complex and does not always adequately deal with the challenges of reality. Because of this we shall always be condemned to a certain level of inauthenticity, error and fallibility.

Applications to psychotherapy.

In further chapters I go more deeply into the implications for an existential therapeutic approach. I start out by considering the therapist's bias and the client's bias in the process of the therapeutic dialogue. The assumption is that since we are always going to operate with a certain amount of inauthenticity and self-deceptive bias, it is important to pay attention to such bias.

In the process of reaching out to our client, we inevitably interpose our own biases and distorted perspective with regards to the client's experience. We can use our response to clarify both our own and their point of view. (p. 219)

The first level of bias that needs to be examined is that of the person's attitudes, which depend on the sum total of previous experiences subtracted by the experiences that we have not had. Self-deception comes mostly in the

shape of blind spots and can lead to an inability to understand another's experience, so different to our own, whilst telling ourselves that we do understand.

The second level of bias that needs to be addressed by therapists is that of one's own orientation in the world. This is about the therapist's particular theoretical framework and the ideologies underpinning the interventions that will be made. Such frameworks are useful in that they allow us to interpret the material in a particular way, but they can veil as much as they reveal and are a layer of distortion that is added between therapist and client.

The third level of bias is that of the therapist's state of mind. We bring bias into the therapeutic relationship through the way in which we are reaching out to the world and other people in each specific moment. The mood we are in colours our understanding of the client's material.

Finally we bring another bias into play when our responses to a particular client and a particular interaction brings about a reactive layer of interaction that distorts our ability to remain open to the client's point of view.

The therapeutic relationship is further complicated by the presence of the client's similarly complex network of bias. This functions on the same four levels and further enables self-deception and inauthenticity.

Clients will go through a similar process that the trainee therapist goes through: that of recognising and learning to work with the various forms of interference to open communication. (p. 222)

It is of course highly questionable whether there can ever be such a thing as open communication. Since we have concluded above that authenticity is an

unattainable target, the communication between two people struggling with self-deception will inevitably lead to certain levels of mis-communication and mutual deception. Psychotherapists working from an existential perspective have the major challenge of bridging the gap between themselves and their clients, making room for a safe in between space where the client can explore personal issues without too much interference from those of the therapist.

The experience of the selfhood of the client comes into play here and the next chapter (Chapter 28, p. 231) looks at the way in which the notion of the self is both a useful and a misleading one for psychotherapy. The idea of a flexible, changing self is paramount here. There is no such thing as a stable, constant self. Our being in the world, our Dasein, is always going out towards the world is a process rather than a thing. The images of self that people are caught up in must therefore be part of the inauthentic way of being in the world.

Existential therapy is therefore a time to begin to describe what you used to be and what you no longer are, and to recognize the many ways in which you already have abandoned what you once knew and now have lost. It is also a time to speculate about what might be, and what could come about from the ways in which you are currently connected into your world. (235/236)

Existential therapy is a method of helping the client discover anticipatory resoluteness. In letting go of the self-deceptive certainties of the past and anticipating the future a process of allowing a more open and transformative way of being is put into place.

It goes without saying that the efforts to shed self-deceptive behaviours will come up short against the limits of our understanding of the mysteries of life. It is not possible to live in complete uncertainty and with a lack of selfhood and clients soon find that they need to cover up as well as uncover. They need to affirm beliefs, sometimes against better knowing. Thus new forms of illusion

formation or of creating inauthentic ways of being in the world will follow a phase of truth seeking. As psychotherapists we should not strive to practice pure philosophy: psychotherapy is a pragmatic occupation and the everyday realities and needs of clients are more important than the theory. The need to survive is tantamount to the need to create some self-deceptions to live by.

The final case illustration (Chapter 9, p. 249) demonstrates this process of challenging self-deceptions of the client, only to see them replaced immediately with new self-deceptions. The book ends with the recognition that there can be no definitive psychotherapeutic or existential answers. We can ask questions and pose problems, but to believe that we can answer or solve these once and for all must be the ultimate self-deception. Different approaches to psychotherapy propose different interpretations of human reality. Each of these has only limited validity.

The existential approach does not claim to have a greater degree of truth and it should therefore wield its interpretative powers modestly. Nevertheless, the existential version of reality attempts to take manifold interpretations and possibilities into account and open out a person's vista until it includes a possibility of movement that was not available previously. (238)

When we begin to look for new direction, because new freedom has become available, a careful consideration of values is in order. This is discussed at the end of the book. A model of using *Befindlichkeit*, state of mind, to find one's way around the world and understand one's emotional position in relation to it, is also proposed. This is largely the same model as was proposed in the previous book as well.

The underlying idea in Everyday Mysteries is that the therapist needs to be more willing to be challenged and questioned by the client. There are no truthful worldviews or final solutions. The work that is done in psychotherapy

is that of making room for the revelation of what is experienced rather than to reveal truth. A mutual exploration of the complexities of human reality is the aim of the approach.

Therapists would do well to take a much more humble stance in their work and to realize that they are paid to be the client's servant, not their master. To be the client's servant means to work towards the client's better grasp of reality. This involves exposing one's own part in it as soberly as possible. When reality is faced up to in this manner, it results in an experience of a mutual opening up of new horizons. (285)

Appendix IV. Summary of 'Paradox and Passion in Psychotherapy'

Introduction.

This is the third book included in my submission for a doctorate in philosophy. It is a book that illustrates a number of concrete applications of existential psychotherapy. The objective of the book is to demonstrate that the professions of counselling and psychotherapy have much to gain from a greater philosophical input. It shows the relevance of a more heart felt passionate engagement with the life issues that clients are struggling with and shows these to be as relevant to the psychotherapist as to clients themselves.

This book is more personal than the other two and it draws on a number of autobiographic details to illustrate the way in which existential psychotherapy can help people to make sense of their own experience of living. It argues that the enterprise of existential psychotherapy requires therapists to be willing to consider life issues in a very personal way and to discover the paradoxical nature of living. In the introduction I argue that it is important to help people overcome their tendency to hide away from life.

Those who try to evade the human condition and who hide away from their troubles find themselves increasingly incapable of coping, because they become cut off and easily overwhelmed when things go wrong. (p. 2)

Here the reference to evading the human condition is a reference to the self-forgetfulness with which we flee from reality, rather than to a more active form of self-deception. The book takes the view that it is this self-forgetfulness that makes it difficult for people to live their lives to the full and that in facing the difficulties (death) that are unavoidable they become more able to face life itself and live it passionately (resolutely).

The paradox that should guide our work is that the more we engage with our difficulties and the more intensely we live, the stronger we get and the more satisfying life is. If we shirk and avoid facing reality, we become weak and soft and we live a life that is dull and full of denial. (p. 3)

Overcoming the forgetfulness of being that many people are caught up in is as we have seen previously, one of the objectives of existential psychotherapy. This book documents some of the ways in which such forgetfulness can be overcome or counteracted.

Ontological Insecurity.

In the chapter on ontological insecurity (p.4), I consider R.D. Laing's recognition that it is ontological security that allows people to function in an ordinary and everyday way. He claimed that this security was crucial and that those people who are deprived of it by childhood circumstances may fall into such insecurity that they cannot cope with living. My argument is that Laing is not actually talking about ontological but ontic insecurity. He seems to have overlooked the fact that ontological insecurity refers to a basic given of existence that is not dependent on developmental factors. Of course Heidegger's theories always relate to such ontological factors, showing the importance of Dasein's basic insecurity in the world. Not only does Heidegger not accept that there are ways in which people could be ontologically secure, he would certainly have argued that to gain security in the basic existential sense would always be illusory. The achievement of the kind of security that Laing refers to would be on the level of the ontic rather than the ontological. It would also be something that should not be considered greatly to be desired, since such security would have to be based on a false belief.

Ontological security then, according to Heidegger, would not be the objective, but rather the state to be avoided at all cost. Understanding this would make it impossible to consider, as Laing did, that it was families and particularly mothers that made people ontologically insecure, therefore mal adjusted and even schizophrenic as a result. It was a rather odd way to reason and took away from his important contribution in graphically describing the experience of being ontologically insecure. In spite of this many people were very taken with Laing's work because it described the state of insecurity so well. It did not necessarily do such a great service to people who had been diagnosed as schizophrenic and who might now consider themselves to have been made so by their parents. Demystifying schizophrenia was certainly a good thing. Demystifying existential anxiety was too. But to link these phenomena in an uncritical manner is far from helpful. Yet this is what some of Laing's work seemed to propose.

So, from the recognition of our insecurity, we move to the consideration of such insecurity as a pathological phenomenon, to blaming it on our family and social nexus, to fearing that we may be schizophrenic. (p. 12)

By connecting ontological insecurity and schizophrenia in this way justice is done to neither. Ontological insecurity immediately becomes seen as a pathological phenomenon and loses the benefit of Kierkegaard's and Heidegger's understanding of it as a fundamental human phenomenon. The experience of people who have been diagnosed schizophrenic may be ironically similarly depleted of its deeply distressing reality. I argue that in the end Laing's work has more to teach us about existential anxiety than about schizophrenia. Schizophrenia is quite a lot more than ontological insecurity. Laing's work can however teach us a lot about our own struggles with existence.

It is not, then, so much in order to understand, defend or rescue those of us who are schizophrenic that we may want to look again at Laing's categories of ontological insecurity, as to prepare ourselves for our own moments of insight and openness. (p. 14)

Courting death: Issues of Life and Death.

In the next chapter (p. 16) I put this to the test by looking at death and our attitude towards it. I trace my own changing perceptions of death and try to investigate the validity of Heidegger's contention that facing one's own death is a sine qua non of authenticity. Being aware of death surely makes us more aware of our own fragility. Being so aware of one's vulnerability might not necessarily be a positive, nor does it automatically lead to authenticity.

What I discovered over the years is that although I started out believing myself to be rather courageous and strong in relation to death, encountering it in various guises from an early age, I discovered later on that death has more to teach us than it would at first seem. Death is not just the absence of life or as Heidegger put it so succinctly, death is not nothing. Although it may at first seem that facing death is the same as facing nothingness and that giving into this is enough to not fear death anymore, death can actually represent a lot more than nothingness, since it represents loss and decay as well as completion and oblivion.

I start out from an exploration of death as linked to freedom and show how limited the psychoanalytic interpretations of death experiences are.

Heidegger's descriptions of Being-towards-Death do far more justice to my experience than other interpretations. He speaks of the way in which the anticipation of death brings one face to face with the possibility of Being itself and he calls it: "Impassioned freedom towards death - a freedom which has been released from the illusions of the 'they' and which is factual, certain of itself, and anxious." (Heidegger, 1927, p.266) (p. 21)

Whilst recognizing the importance of Heidegger's contribution and its direct relevance to understanding the human experience of mortality and incompleteness in living, I then explore the limitations of such a perspective on

life and death. I consider the way in which a strong focus on death may stop us from facing up to the tasks of living. Anticipating one's ownmost potential for death may not be the guarantee of authenticity that Heidegger thought it was.

Heidegger's insight that we need to face our potential, which includes our potential for dying, is undoubtedly true, but is nevertheless, limited. There is a way in which existentialism becomes somewhat morbidly fixated on limits and turns its attention away from the everyday activity of living. This is ironic in that Heidegger was the first to emphasize that we needed to study everyday existence. Then again there may be a marked difference between studying it or living it. I argue that it is important to see the existential approach in a wider perspective and not let it become the only explanation, or the alleged truth, the only powerful totalization to sum up all human existence.

Such a totalization of experience can have a paralysing and counterproductive effect. We are suddenly caught in an explanatory system that drags us down and that exercises a kind of intellectual terrorism over us. (p. 24)

After working from the assumptions of existential philosophy for nearly three decades, I needed to explore the drawbacks of becoming so preoccupied with death and I could trace in my own experience some events that challenged the notion that anticipating death was always a positive.

Not being able to connect fully to life might be both a condition and a consequence of focussing so much on death and it might be another way to deceive oneself about life. I raised the question whether learning to create being out of nothingness might sometimes not require us to forget about death. I was beginning to discover that life might actually be for living rather than for thinking about one's potential death. Living might sometimes require that we focus away from truth and particularly from being too preoccupied with death,

lest we might be consumed by it. Discovering one's limitations at an ontic level may lead to having to question whether the ontological descriptions of the theory are correct.

Confronted with the fire of our battles with death and anxiety, we need to remember that we are not salamanders or phoenixes and that only mythical animals do not get burnt to a crisp. (p. 33)

The survival of the self.

This interest in survival is then explored in a number of ways in the next few chapters, first in relation to the survival of the concept of the self (p.35). The question is raised whether if there is such a thing as self-deception there is also such a thing as self-deception about self. Of course for Heidegger the term Dasein does not leave any real room for a self-concept. In consequence any talk of self or self-assertion would automatically be based on a type of self-deception. Perhaps the belief in self is therefore the epitome of self-deception. On the other hand of course it is problematic to speak of self-deception when we do not accept the idea that there is a self to begin with.

It becomes very important to clearly define how human beings create a sense of self in the process of living in the world and to investigate whether this creation of self always involves inauthenticity. We can observe that when people are encouraged to relinquish their strong beliefs in having a self, they become more able to be open to what is in the world.

To give up the illusion of self-aggrandisement and solidity that comes with inauthenticity leads to a sense of insight and openness that allows us to reveal truth instead of pursuing various external objectives. According to Heidegger, it is our task to become capable of such exposure of what is, in reality, and let the world and being become manifest through our lives. (p. 37)

In this context I then discuss the need to have new notions of selfhood that can explain a person's experience of identity in the face of this lack of solid selfhood. I mention Dennett's (1991) view on this matter when he speaks of the self as a centre of narrative gravity. Dennett of course insists that self is a fiction, but he sees this as a very creative and magnificent fiction that is of great use to us. This is a stark distinction from Heidegger's perspective, which is more interested in exposing the inauthenticity of the They-self than in considering better alternatives. In psychotherapy however it is not sufficient to undo self-deceptions. People need beliefs, identities and purposes to live by. We have seen above how Heidegger appears to be aware of this need as well.

I adopt things from the outside world in order to create a sense of fullness and avoid the openness and hollowness that is me. I could in principle remain flexible and open to adopting different aspects of the world all the time. In practice, people usually recommit themselves daily to the same sort of thing, ideas, people, notions, concepts, beliefs, memories, as the day before. P.39)

I then further explore how people manage themselves in relation to their openness to so many influences in the world and their connections to it. Psychotherapeutic case examples demonstrate the precarious balance between authentic and inauthentic modes of being in the world and the need to find some way of mediating between the two. What emerges from an observation of people's everyday experiences in coping with their lives is that it is not possible to be either wholly authentic, or wholly inauthentic. We need both the relative, or even false, safety of inauthentic being defined by the world and the openness of authentic facing of possibility, including the possibility of nothingness.

Intimacy: closeness and distance between self and other.

In the next chapter (p. 45) I look at closeness and distance in personal relationships, in an attempt to describe some of the ways in which we both engage with the world of others and safeguard ourselves from being taken over by it in an inauthentic mode. I challenge the usefulness of the inauthentic form of intimacy that is often required of us when we are part of a group. Falling in with the culture of a group is not an effective way of achieving real interaction with others. I consider ways in which true dialogue with the other can be created and base a lot of my argument on Buber's work. (Buber, 1970, 1947)

Buber usefully makes the distinction between a relationship where I treat the other and myself as an object (I-It) and a relationship where I treat the other and myself as subject (I-Thou). Interestingly the emphasis is on the hyphen: the link between self and other, on what Buber called the in-between.

...in true dialogue, I place the emphasis neither on you nor on me, but rather on what binds us together, on the space that we have created between us. What happens between two people who stop hiding from themselves and from the other in such an unreserved encounter is that they come together on the ground that is situated in between them, where they share a common humanity. (p. 49)

It may well be that this common ground overcomes the distinction between inauthenticity and authenticity, for here we have two people who are in relation rather than locked into the illusion of self-deception or taken over by the crowd. Here is a way of being neither self nor other but rather in the moment of the overcoming of distance between ourselves. I make the point that engaging with client material in this way is always engaging with one's own preoccupations at the same time, for we meet in the space of human experience and this is relevant to all.

Alienation and adaptation: being a stranger in a foreign land.

In the next chapter (p. 52) I go on to look at the problems of feeling alienated from such an experience of communion. This brings out the possibility that in order to feel a sense of reality and of belonging we have to merge with our environment and cannot keep ourselves aloof. Perhaps there cannot really be a self without it being a They-self first of all. Being part of the world that we find ourselves in is a necessity if we are to be able to have a safe home from which to explore the possibilities of our potential freedom. It shows how badly we need our inauthentic attachments to the social and cultural world around us and how bereft and deprived we may feel without these. Heidegger did not consider these issues, which is interesting in light of his attachment to the notion of the Heimat, the homeland.

It is hardly surprising that the incidence of emotional problems is so very much higher for foreigners than for natives, in any country in the world. As soon as you uproot yourself you make yourself vulnerable: you go out on a limb. (p. 59)

We should not confuse withdrawal from the social They-world with mental health and authenticity. Authentic being separate from others and so obviously and blatantly different from them is much more likely to lead to alienation, than when one can live with the illusion of belonging and familiarity. Not being integrated almost inevitably leads to disintegration. If we consider the self to be an illusion its disintegration may be a good thing in the abstract, but in a practical sense it makes it very difficult to manage oneself in the real world.

A passion for life: rediscovering the intensity of living.

In the next chapter of the book (p. 62) I look at the way in which such disintegration and an acceptance of one's own limitations and failings can lead to a more passionate and intense way of life. This passion or vitality might be a good thing, but it is not an easy one to live with. Jaspers' Idea of limit situations

(Jaspers, 1919,1951) is helpful in understanding how we can expand our narrow view of our self to encompass the limits of human existence.

We can be so anxious to avoid such reminders of mortality and failure that we studiously eliminate any hint of drama and intensity, discarding passion from our lives. (p. 63)

There needs to be enough room for questioning and dissolution of security and of the illusion of selfhood if we are to work with clients who are exposed to the demise of their self-deceptions. Psychotherapists, I argue must be willing to suffer a little in their own lives if they are to be open enough to the passion of life that runs through the stories of their clients. I argue that this ability to allow for passion is what also allows for creativity. Perhaps creativity is, like the in-between, a concept that bridges authenticity and inauthenticity, spanning them both but going beyond them. It is this transcending of opposites that seems to be one of the things that makes human living worthwhile.

If Truth were a Woman: Reality and Meaning.

It is meaning and the notion of truth that I consider in the next chapter (p. 72). Truth, so intimately related to the notions of deception and self-deception, has been put into question by post-modern authors. Heidegger himself, in his later work challenged the idea that truth could be known in an intellectual fashion. Everything had to be put under erasure, yet what mattered was to at least engage with the search for truth. Learning to think again about these things, not in a linear, logical, rational fashion, but in a meditative, reflective way, was what Heidegger advocated. (Heidegger, 1977a)

Thinking takes us out of the virtual reality that human beings have created and brings us back in touch with underlying and overarching truths. (p. 74)

Clearly truth cannot simply be found at the surface of human existence and it is particularly important for psychotherapists to not take clients' experiences at face value. Most theories of psychotherapy provide us with some blueprint for the interpretation of the manifest content of what is being said so as to discover the deeper meanings underneath the words that have been spoken. All these various possible interpretations of a person's reality are so many versions of what the individual experiences as their personal truth. The question about whether all of these interpretations are equally valid is an important one to ask, but not an easy one to answer. What seems to be the case is that human beings learn to tell stories about things in the world and about their own lives. These stories need to take account of the facts and of other people's observations but they can vary a great deal and make a difference to how the world is seen and experienced.

I make the point in this chapter that learning to discover about dissimulating truth, or even learning to lie is therefore an important part of being human, but that in the process of learning to lie one discovers that truth binds people together whereas lies alienate them from each other. Perhaps the same could be said for self-deception, in that to deceive oneself is to not be real and to be open to truth in relation to oneself is to become more united with oneself. This still begs the question of what the self actually consists of and whether it is desirable to strengthen it or not. Connected to this is the question of whether clients come to psychotherapy in order to undo their self-deceptions or rather in order to strengthen a perhaps inauthentic self.

Many clients initially come to psychotherapy not to discover and confront truth but to establish that they are right. (p. 77)

Self confirmation and support for what one believes in or wants is an important motivation for clients and psychotherapists need to take a clear stance in

relation to this. They need, in other words, some standards and principles by which to ascertain whether it would be helpful or unhelpful to confirm or challenge a person's beliefs.

This raises the tricky question of what the truth of human living really is and how it relates to our clients' predicaments. The issue of truth is a sore point in the profession and it is usually diplomatically avoided because it is too controversial. (Ibid.)

After looking at the major approaches to psychotherapy and their implicit views on truth I argue that a meta-model for truth is needed in psychotherapy. This implies that we need to investigate the great ontological questions, as Heidegger did, and base our therapeutic approaches on our findings. This also means finding the overarching principles that go beyond the local, personal or subjective truth of any individual at any specific time. I point out that this is doubly important, since research has shown that commitment to a larger truth helps people in overcoming their problems (O'Hara 1986, Baumeister, 1991).

Hard-earned lessons: the therapist's own journey to self-understanding.

In this search for truth the aim for an overarching truth needs to be counterbalanced with phenomenological descriptions of the subjective experience of struggling with one's personal self-deceptions. In the next chapter (p. 87) I proceed to discuss some of my own struggles with illusions about my therapeutic practice over the years, discovering that the very disenchantment that comes from making mistakes and finding oneself deficient may also give rise to the greatest learning in one's search for truth.

In this chapter on hard earned lessons I show how confrontations with death, regression, delusion, pregnancy and child birth and collusion point towards some of the self-deceptions that stand in the way of making true sense of other

people's reality. The realization is that as a psychotherapist we can easily go wrong by believing that we understand when we actually do not. This may be one of the most pervasive forms of self-deception and one of the hardest to counteract. Our own current outlook on the world limits and biases us and we interpret other people's experience from the assumptions of our own experience. Our focus on what is in front of us makes us somewhat narrow-minded or even blinkered whilst believing that we see clearly.

My learning is tied up with my private interests and personal preoccupations. While these shine a particular light on the client's issues, they often at first stand in the way of my understanding, especially when the client's struggles parallel my own, which seem to be predictably the case. (p. 103)

Letting the client's life touch yours: The art of resonance.

In the next chapter (p. 106) I further elaborate this idea that we can only learn about human living through letting clients' issues stand out in their own right and struggle with them in a personal way. Helping clients in overcoming self-deceptions and finding truth in their lives requires us to be truthful as therapists as well. This inevitably means getting away from the pretence of our knowledge towards a place of greater candour where we can recognize our own limitations and failings.

Clients are quite often more helped by our failures and faults than by our merits and virtues. They need to know that we are human and struggling in the same way that they are. What matters is that we have a sense of direction and that we are actively on the way towards living life well. (p. 113)

There can be no human reality and no human truth without this struggle. If counselling and therapy are about helping other human beings in this struggle we have to face up to the implications.

Can Counselling and Therapy help? Dealing with moral issues.

In the next chapter (p. 114) I look at whether counselling and therapy can indeed help people in dealing with these moral issues, of what it means to live life well and how we can actually succeed in doing so. I argue that addressing issues of values and beliefs are the most important part of the work of counsellors and psychotherapists and that this area has been much underestimated by the profession.

Widening horizons: Universal Dimensions of the Human Dilemma.

I then move on to consider the growth of the professions of counselling and psychotherapy in the next chapter (p. 128), again looking at the role of reality, meaning and truth. My argument is that truth can only become obvious as many different people look at it from many different directions and put their shared understanding together to create a more encompassing version of truth. I put this in context with the international movement of cross-cultural psychotherapy and with the objective of agreeing common standards in psychotherapy. I use the allegory of the mountain (pp. 129-130) to illustrate the multiple realities of different people looking at the same thing from different perspectives.

To search, to doubt, to debate and explore and to keep altering their views and adding perspectives was all part and parcel of their challenge. They were only misled each time that they thought that they had found the final and definitive answer; the be-all and end-all. (p. 130)

So, in spite of the fact that there is a valid desire to sketch out universal theories of human existence that can explain everything, we need to bear in mind that such theories are very likely to be false or at most only partially true. This applies to psychotherapeutic systems as much as to philosophical

systems, in as much as the psychotherapeutic theories usually contain their own crude philosophical system.

In an age of cross-cultural migrations it is no longer possible to ignore the constant challenge that other cultures point of view presents to our self-deceptive belief that we know what is true.

To be a psychotherapist in an age of trans-nationalism requires us to have the breadth of mind to be prepared to be shown that our views are insufficient and incomplete and to start out anew. (p. 138)

The book finishes with a number of illustrations of what this means for psychotherapeutic practice and with some case examples that show the method in action.