City Research Online

City, University of London Institutional Repository

CHANGE IN POLICING SYSTEMS

A Systems Perspective of the Processes and
Management of Change in Police Organisations

By

James M. Hart

THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE
OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

City University

Department of Systems Science

London

April 1995

ALL MISSING PAGES ARE BLANK

IN

ORIGINAL

LIST of CONTENTS

Chapter Three

Chapter Four

Chapter Five

Chapter Six

Chapter Seven

Chapter Eight

Appendix A

LIST of FIGURES

Chapter Six

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

DECLARATION

In accordance with the regulations of the
City University, this declaration confirms that
none of the research material contained in
this thesis has been submitted for
examination for the award of any degree,
at this University, or any other.

Powers of discretion are granted to the
University Librarian to allow reproduction of
single copies of the thesis, in whole or part,
for study purposes only and subject to
the normal conditions of acknowledgment.

ABSTRACT

A Systems Perspective of the Processes and Management of Change in Police Organisations

Neighbourhood Policing (N.P.) was first described and presented in two undergraduate theses at the City University, London. An experimental system was designed to test the N.P. propositions and implementation of evaluated trials followed at selected London and Surrey police divisions between 1982 and 1986. From this origin, the Metropolitan and Surrey Police organisations developed their present geographical policing systems.

The duration of the change process exceeded ten years from specification to widespread and effective implementation of the N.P. principles. The period of change is argued to be associated with the process and management of change in police organisations, rather than features of the N.P. project itself. It is argued that design of the N.P. system was an appropriate and practical derivation of an accurate systems analysis of the policing 'problem situation'.

Change in police organisations is the focus of this research, using the N.P. project as an empirical study. A systems based, multi-disciplinary approach is adopted to review the N.P. project and evaluations, as well as to analyse the nature of organisational change in the context of policing systems.

Chapter One introduces the subject and specifies the research objectives. Chapters Two and Three describe details of the policing environment, the N.P. concepts, the elements of the policing system and the N.P. systems evaluation concept. Chapter Four reviews the project evaluation material and advances a critical analysis of the findings. Chapters Five, Six and Seven analyse the process of change within policing systems, examining both organisational issues and human characteristics. Heuristic models of the processes, dynamics and complexity of change are proposed. Chapter eight concludes that the systems approach, the systems analysis and the systemic design of N.P. are all appropriate to contemporary policing. The implementation processes and the subsequent evaluations of N.P. are argued to have made less than adequate contributions to the successful achievement of major organisational change.

The research concludes by advancing a number of principles for change management in police organisations.

CHAPTER ONE

Summary

This introductory chapter briefly describes the origin and development of the Neighbourhood Policing (N.P.) project within the Surrey Police and the Metropolitan Police in London. The major features of the policing methods are summarised and the objectives of this research in relation to the management of change are stated. A summary of the concluding findings is presented, together with the resulting proposed principles of change management in police organisations.

1.1 Introduction to the Research

1.1.1. Neighbourhood Policing (N.P.) was first described and presented in two undergraduate theses at the City University, London. (Hart 1981, Beckett 1981) From this origin, the Metropolitan and Surrey Police organisations have developed their present divisional policing systems that now operate throughout both police areas.

1.1.2. N.P. was a 'designed system', (Checkland 1981) in that the authors considered that the fundamental work of policing took place from police divisions which were suggested to be the basic organisational unit of policing. The police division thus became the 'system of interest' (Flood and Carson 1993) and N.P. was created as a complete integrated system, for delivering policing services from a police division.

1.1.3. N.P. possesses three distinct features that may be seen as
differentiating the scheme from other approaches to day to
day policing methods, although not being radical in nature in
comparison to conventional thinking on policing.

    i. The police division was seen as constituting a
complete policing system. N.P. was designed to fully
integrate and harmonise all divisional policing
resources and functions into a holistic policing system.
Hitherto many such functions and processes operated
separately and independently from one another.

    ii. The authors of N.P. *(ibid.)* suggested that existing
policing systems possessed a predominance of
'closed' organisational characteristics, whereas the
(N.P.) analysis of the police 'problem situation'
(Checkland 1972, Chapter Two) indicated they
needed to tend towards a more 'open' concept. (Katz
and Kahn 1978, Kast and Rosenzweig 1981)

    iii. The response and patrol functions of police were
predominantly organised around rotating eight hour
tours of police duty. The N.P. analysis indicated that a
greater association with communities (Alderson 1979)
and improved productivity in the face of increasing
demands (Figure 2.1) might be achieved by
geographical assignments for officers, performing .
duty when demands were greatest

1.1.4. An experimental system was designed to test the N.P.
propositions and implementation followed at selected
London and Surrey police divisions. The trial was
evaluated by the Police Foundation (Irving et al 1989) as
the external and independent evaluators, and by an internal
police project team. (Turner 1987 [a-e]) The trials were
undertaken between 1982 and 1986 and the evaluation
reports published subsequently.

1.1.5. Separately from the evaluation of N.P., the Metropolitan Police Service (M.P.S.) implemented many separate components of the N.P. system throughout London which were established as organisational policies. (M.P.S. 1985 [a-b], M.P.S. 1991) At the same time, individual divisional commanders were permitted to implement local variants of the N.P. system under the generic term 'geographic policing', if they so wished. (M.P.S. 1985 [c])

1.1.6. During 1989, work commenced under the major M.P.S. internal review process, known as the 'PLUS' programme, (Olins 1988) to develop a further refined system of divisional policing, based upon the N.P. principles. Force wide implementation of what was to become known as 'sector policing' followed during the early 1990's. (M.P.S. 1992, M.P.S. 1994 [a])

1.1.7. Meanwhile, the Surrey Police were implementing their version of the N.P. scheme that was known as 'Total Geographic Policing'. (T.G.P.) This was developed and refined to the present system that is known as 'Area' or 'Local' Policing. (Annual Reports of the Chief Constable of Surrey 1985 - 1992)

1.1.8. This process took place over a period of approximately ten years between the original specification of the N.P. policing system and effective implementation of the principles. The widespread implementation took place despite what will be shown to be, substantially negative evaluations of both the elements of the project and its systematic attributes.

1.1.9. It will be argued that design of the N.P. system was an appropriate, and practical derivation from an accurate systems analysis of the policing 'problem situation'. (ibid.) The subsequent experimentation and development process leading to widespread implementation, may be considered as lengthy in terms of organisational change programmes,

even for large organisations such as the Metropolitan and Surrey Police. So why, given the problems facing the police during the early 1980s, (Chapter Two) did it take almost ten years to implement the organisational changes?

1.1.10. The process of change in police organisations is thus the focus of this research, using the N.P. project as the practical case study. A multi-disciplinary, systems based approach (Cummings 1980) is adopted to review the N.P. project, the subsequent evaluations and to examine the nature of organisational change in the context of policing systems.

1.2   Objectives of the Research

1.2.1. There are three principal objectives of this research that may be considered as integrative of the subject matter and are considered as major sections of the research. Six supplementary objectives contribute to the principal objectives and address specific aspects of the subject matter.

1.2.2. The objectives and their relationships are specified below and are summarised in the flow chart model at Figure 1.1.

   i. to undertake a multi-disciplinary review of the implementation and outcomes of the N.P. scheme,

   ii. to undertake a multi-disciplinary review of the factors and processes significant to the management of change in organisations,

   iii. to advance conclusions and to suggest models and/or principles, if possible, for change management in police organisations.

1.2.3. The following supplementary objectives contribute to the achievement of the above principal objectives in the relationships shown at Figure 1.1: .

    i. to specify the N.P. principles and design

    ii. to consolidate and summarise the substantial volume of evaluation material relating to N.P. experimentation and to draw any general conclusions,

    iii. to review and comment upon the evaluation methods and processes and their appropriateness to both the N.P. project and the subsequent organisational development,

    iv. to undertake a systems analysis of the processes of organisational change,

    v. to propose heuristic models of the major factors involved in the change processes in police organisations,

    vi. to compare the outcomes from the N.P. experiment with the results of the analysis of the organisational change processes.

Figure 1.1 Flow Chart Model of Relationships between Principal and Supplementary Objectives

1.3 Sequence of Presentation

1.3.1. Chapter Two describes the environment in which policing was taking place during the 1970's and thus sets the background against which 'Neighbourhood Policing' (N.P.) was developed.

1.3.2. The characteristics of the elements and sub-systems of the N.P. system are described, together with the systems principles that underscored the overall project. The chapter concludes at the point where decisions were made within both the Surrey and Metropolitan Police to run a major, evaluated trial of the new policing system.

1.3.3. Chapter Three expands upon the N.P. project implementation principles and describes the original experimental design that relied upon the existence of a 'control condition'. Following changes to the wider organisation that precluded the retention of such a design, the principles of the project are set in the context of a fresh evaluation model.

1.3.4. The NP project approach considers a macro, or system level of functioning and a micro or behavioural level of analysis to be appropriate. This dualist approach to evaluation is discussed in detail and argument is advanced as to why the chosen approach was considered to be satisfactory in the light of organisational development.

1.3.5. Chapter Four describes the systems approach to the implementation of the N.P. treatments. The concept of delivery systems for the implementation of change are introduced and the relationship between the strategic aims of N.P. and policing sub-systems are described.

1.3.6. The evaluations of the trials of N.P. are reviewed within the context and purpose of the delivery systems and judgements and conclusions are made on the basis of the available evidence as to the benefits of the outputs.

1.3.7. It is concluded that N.P. was not judged to be an overall success. It is asserted that this outcome is equivocal and more likely to have occurred as a result of the process of change and implementation, rather than:

    i.   the systems approach adopted,

    ii.   the appropriateness of the N.P. strategy,

    iii. the design of the individual elements.

1.3.8. Chapter 5 is the first stage in the development of the series of models that build towards a system of change in police organisations. The desirability of adopting the systems approach is justified in the light of the contemporary schools of management thinking and the absence of any unifying or overarching theories of change.

1.3.9. A macro model of change is proposed that comprises three major elements of the change process,

    i.   the stimuli for change,

    ii.   the target for change,

    iii. the type of implementation.

1.3.10. Each element of the macro model is analysed in turn and the attributes are examined in relation to other relevant contemporary work. Models of three basis implementation methods are discussed and variations are advanced. Comparative advantages and disadvantages are examined in the police system context.

1.3.11. Chapter Six considers the significance of the outputs from an individuals' psycho social sub system to the process of change. A manager's process model of change is derived and the conflicts and contrasts present in the organisational change process are examined from a managers' perspective.

1.3.12. The issue of resistance to organisational change arising from both organisational and human factors is discussed and a model of an individual's dynamic response to the process of change is advanced. The predominant skills and needs of individuals are examined in relation to various stages of change and these are related to the three change targets suggested in Chapter Five.

1.3.13. The resulting complexity of the change process is noted and described in the context of the 'change cube' model.

1.3.14. The elements of the suggested system of organisational change are summarised and restated in Chapter Seven in order to lead to models of the dynamics of change at the overall police organisational level. The models are described in the context of the implementation options advanced in Chapter Five and developed in order to advance a model of the N.P. implementation process.

1.3.15. From this position, a model of a system of change for police organisations is advanced. It is argued that this system is inherently complex, thus presenting considerable challenges in order to bring about change.

1.3.16. Individuals' motivation to change is described in the context of a system of motivation, which is developed into an analysis of the options available to police managers for implementing change.

1.3.17. The concluding Chapter Eight of this research, suggests there are five possible explanations for the apparent divergence between the findings of the N.P. evaluators and contemporary policing practice.

1.3.18. It is concluded that whilst the N.P. systems approach, analysis and design were generally appropriate, the implementation methods were not adequate in the face of considerable individual and organisational resistance to the changes.

1.3.18. It is further concluded that the N.P. evaluations were too narrow in scope to be of value to the organisations concerned, and thus implementation of the principles of N.P. continued within both the Metropolitan and Surrey Police.

1.3.19. The research concludes by deriving and proposing six principles for the introduction and management of change in police organisations.

1.3.20. It is noted that the principles and characteristics of N.P. are now fully implemented throughout the Metropolitan and Surrey Police areas.

1.4   Summary of Findings

1.4.1. The five categories of suggested explanations of the outcomes of the N.P. project may be summarised as follows:

i.   **N.P. Systems Analysis** - is argued as being an accurate and appropriate representation of the problem situation and the external change stimuli that N.P. sought to address. (Chapters Two and Three)

ii.   **N.P. Systems Design** - is argued to be appropriate as a 'designed system' (Checkland 1981) and directed at relevant change targets, having the potential for improving the police problem situation. (*ibid.*)

iii.   **N.P. Systems Implementation** - is shown to be inadequate in a number of significant respects in the light of the knowledge of high levels of individual and cultural resistance to change within police organisations.

iv.   **N.P. Evaluations** - are shown as not having addressed the significant holistic and integrative features of N.P., or the change dynamics within police organisations. Thus it is concluded that the evaluations have not fully and reliably represented the outcomes of the N.P. trials.

v.   **N.P. Systems Approach** - there no evidence to emerge from the N.P. project that weakens the original assertions (Section 2.16) that systems thinking and approaches offer the best opportunities for improving the design and performance of policing organisations.

1.4.2. This research proposes that a number of principles of change management might be established that are particularly significant to the implementation of change in policing systems, as follows:

    i.   effective internal staff communications and effective external public communications,

    ii.   active senior and intermediate management support for the vision and changes proposed,

    iii.   effective change leadership at all levels,

    iv.   change implementation co-ordinated simultaneously across all change targets; systems, structures and culture.

    v.   the use of a combination of coercive and participative approaches to change implementation.

    vi.   the creation and /or development of internal teams to manage change,

CHAPTER TWO

Summary

This chapter describes the environment in which policing was taking place during the 1970's and thus sets the background against which 'Neighbourhood Policing' (N.P.) was developed. The characteristics of the elements and sub-systems of the N.P. system are described, together with the systems principles that underscored the whole project. The chapter concludes at the point where decisions were made within both the Surrey and Metropolitan Police to run a major, evaluated trial of the new policing system.

2.1   In The Beginning

2.1.1.   The origin of 'Neighbourhood Policing' was quite unremarkable. It arose from the general dissatisfaction of two young police inspectors with their respective organisations. At the time, this dissatisfaction was probably nothing more than the commonplace grumbling of most working individuals. These grumblings gradually developed into the more structured notion that some recognition should be taken of the experience of policing schemes and initiatives of the past in order to develop a fresh way forward for contemporary policing. These thoughts coincided with the opportunity for both officers to undertake three year scholarships to The City University London. Inspector Ian Beckett (now Assistant Chief Constable of the Surrey Police) to read Psychology and the writer, Systems and Management.

2.1.2.   The opportunity was thus presented by way of undergraduate dissertations to say something about the

nature of policing and to propose a model of a policing system that had at least the theoretical potential to correct some of the problems as they were seen. The two theses that formed complementary halves of the project were completed and submitted during March 1981 and were subsequently entitled 'Neighbourhood Policing'.

2.1.3. During the Autumn of 1981 the Metropolitan Police and the Surrey Constabulary agreed to collaborate with a view to running an experimental scheme based upon the theses. A police project team comprising the authors, police staff and researchers was established and the Police Foundation were invited to be the evaluators.

2.1.4. This was the beginning of a major effort by the two organisations to endeavour to examine and change the style of delivery of policing services. The experimental process was to last until January 1986 with final conclusions and recommendations being made in 1987. The outcome of this extensive process is that today, both the Surrey Constabulary and the Metropolitan Police operate a system of 'geographic' or 'sector' policing based upon the original Neighbourhood Policing Project.

2.2 The Policing Environment of the 1970s

2.2.1. Policing during the 1960's and 1970's was characterised in both rural and urban environments by major developments in communications technology. Unit beat policing (U.P.B.), as it was known, was introduced virtually nation-wide in order to capitalise on the introduction of personal radios for patrolling officers both on foot and in the ubiquitous panda cars. The idea simply enough, was to free patrolling officers from the repetitive burden of contacting their base station by public telephones at pre-determined intervals, a practice colloquially known as 'making points'. The personal radio

allowed officers to be directed quickly to the scene of an incident and provided a great deal of personal security for officers when patrolling alone. This simple technological development however, irreversibly changed the style and nature of policing in the United Kingdom. On one hand the public's expectation of a rapid response to their calls for assistance increased markedly. The patrolling officers' job became one of providing a more reactive service than hitherto, and in so doing officers became more distant from the communities they were policing. Thus the major development of the mid sixties had turned into a major problem by the late seventies.

2.2.2. The public, as well as a growing number of interested and informed observers were beginning to scrutinise and question police activity in a far more searching way than hitherto, especially in urban conurbations. Police officers were increasingly seen as becoming remote characters only associated with law enforcement activities and bad news. (Whitaker 1979) The demise of traditional policing was blamed on the panda car which by the late seventies had become an indispensable tool to meet the exponential increase in public demands for police services. Despite this major alteration in the way policing was being delivered, little in the way of internal management changes were occurring inside police organisations.

2.2.3. A number of regional amalgamations had occurred throughout the nineteen seventies, largely to capitalise on the economies of scale and to do away with some very small, and cost inefficient police forces. However, nothing had occurred in terms of structures or systems to re-shape the operational aspects of police organisations for the future. Police forces remained largely bureaucratic, hierarchically managed autocracies, based loosely on a traditional military model. Yet, by 1980 it was becoming increasingly clear not only to the authors of N.P. , but also to a number of

observers both inside and outside the police that dramatic organisational changes were likely to become necessary.

2.2.4. Changes were especially necessary to increase the amount of contact between police officers and the public they were charged to serve. This problem of an widening 'distance' between police and public was becoming increasingly apparent in major conurbation's more so than in more rural areas, although there is some evidence to suggest that many rural communities who had been traditionally served by their village constable were becoming increasingly discontent with the U.B.P. system.

2.2.5. Essentially, U.B.P. amounted to a panda car arriving at regular intervals, known in advance, and parking in a prominent position in a village or small town where the constable might be available to the public. Inevitably the officers' visits became less frequent, less predictable and generally more unreliable as the demands from the personal radio sent him or her elsewhere to calls for assistance.

2.2.6. It quickly became established in police culture that the priority was to respond to the radio calls, rather than to spend time involved in the daily problems of a community. In the absence of any clear prioritisation from management levels, the demand/react culture quickly took hold. This approach offered a much more exciting prospect for officers. It enabled them to absorb the variety and excitement brought by mobility, rather than to spend often long, lonely hours patrolling an area where seemingly nothing was happening and nobody needed a police officer. (Keeton 1975)

2.2.7. Although U.B.P. was not adopted in London in precisely the same ways as the provinces, the broad philosophy was understood and this resulted in much of the patrol activity taking place in the ubiquitous 'panda car'. (Critchley 1978) This contributed to the London policing culture whereby the

police increasingly saw themselves as the arbiters of good and bad public behaviour. Policing focused on law enforcement activities that were reinforced by the law, management systems and the hierarchy. Productivity meant more arrests and summonses with an emphasis upon dealing quickly with whatever demands the time of day could produce. This style of policing not only isolated the law abiding public from the police but had a much more damaging effect on many minority groups who increasingly felt marginalised by police. In many cases, ethnicity was associated with criminality in a very negative way and used as justification for police intervention. (Smith 1983 et al)

2.2.8. This situation, that was becoming increasingly acute by the early 1980's, culminated with the riots in Brixton in April of 1981. (Scarman 1981)

2.3   An Emerging Philosophy

2.3.1. The events at Brixton had the effect of focusing much attention on the environmental preconditions as well as the policing methods that were to be subsequently criticised by the enquiry. (Scarman 1981) However, Alderson (1979), as the Chief Constable of the Devon and Cornwall Police had recognised the potential problem situation and described in considerable detail the issues as he saw them. He concluded that there was a need for a radical reform of policing in a modern, pluralist, democratic society. His ideas of 'community policing' influenced a great deal of thinking about policing at the time (and indeed controversy). Alderson's work amounted to a philosophy of policing but did not go on to suggest any sort of system or organisational model that made clear how his style of policing could be delivered. He did however set out ten objectives for policing that would steer a police organisation away from the

conventional legalistic model of operation. He further proposed a number of features of the new style of policing.

2.3.2. Alderson's (1979) ideas of 'community policing' suggested there would be little prospect of containing criminality to publicly acceptable levels unless the police worked jointly with the public to tackle crime. He argued that unless the trend of increasing police isolation was reversed and the police stopped seeing themselves as the only significant interveners in the law and order problem, then there would be little hope of *".... transforming the seed-beds of criminal behaviour...."*. His solution, whilst short of specifying a system for delivery or intervention in the problem situation, was to suggest that police must be proactive within communities and be active in stimulating *"....healthy and constructive social endeavour..."*. This was the proposition that gave rise to the much misused expression 'community policing'. The expression is generally taken to mean proactive police involvement in communities outside a straightforward legalistic or reactive police role.

2.3.3. 'Policing Freedom' (Alderson 1979) was a milestone in police thinking and indeed many of the changes that have been brought about since that time can trace their philosophical origin to this work. His views were derived from concern about the nature of 'police accountability' - a phrase that was to dominate debates on policing issues throughout the nineteen eighties. (Jefferson and Grimshaw 1984, Stephens 1988, Feilding 1991)

2.3.4. Much of the research (Alderson 1979, Whitaker 1979, Mawby 1979) that was undertaken in the preparatory stages of N.P. indicated that police have a vital role to play in assisting a community to deal with crime and social disorder itself. It seemed that the police should be acting as motivators and facilitators, so providing skilled assistance to communities in the areas of crime prevention and social attempts to control crime.

2.3.5. It therefore became a principle of the N.P. project, albeit not original, that crime control was not exclusively a police responsibility. Consideration of the resources available to police suggested that the only viable remaining source that was essentially untapped was the communities themselves. This implied a return to the traditional concept of a contract between the police and the public to work together in the maintenance of public order and the prevention of crime.

2.4   The Reactive Loop

2.4.1. The authors of N.P. were aware of the analysis of Alderson and others, as well as their conclusions, but it was apparent that a similar conclusion could be reached by a quantitative examination of the nature of demands on police.

2.4.2. It has already been noted that unit beat policing had significantly altered the nature of police patrol activity, (Critchley 1978) and it was evident that U.B.P. had also contributed to increased public access to police services and thus an increased level of public demands on police. (Alderson 1979). It was equally evident that police resources had not increased at a corresponding rate, or were likely to in the future, given the rate of increase of crime and demands on police. (Hart 1981). The result was that police officers spent an increasingly large proportion of time responding to calls at the cost of what might be described as the preventive aspects of policing. (Critchley 1978)

2.4.3. This straightforward proposition was the starting point for N.P. and was described as the 'reactive spiral' in the original thesis, although the model is more akin to a loop. In summary, this central tenet of the project asserted that when apparently free police services are offered, the demands for

such services will invariably meet and exceed the organisation's capacity to respond. Even when additional resources are provided, the demand for services will again outstrip resources, unless a significant proportion of these new resources are directed towards preventing crime.

Figure 2.1 The Reactive Loop

2.4.4. Figure 2.1 shows this process in the form of a signed digraph. The model illustrates that as the level of police resources reacting to incoming demands from the public increases, so the police capacity (or opportunity) to attend to preventive measures decreases. Thus the link is a negative or inhibiting relationship. As police attention to preventive measures falls, so the rate of crime and the degree of public disorderliness increases as a positive or augmenting relationship. As the crime rate increases, so the positive link

to demands on police is established and the level of resources devoted to reacting to demands is augmented by this effect.

2.4.5. This process described by the model thus established an escalating system of demands on police that was suggested to spiral higher on each iteration of the model through time. Implicit in the model are time lags between the elements, the duration of which would predominantly depend upon the policing environment in which the system is operating. For instance, in a supportive policing environment with proportionally few active criminals, police preventive measures are likely to be effective sooner than in a more hostile environment where crime and criminals are more prevalent. Similarly, levels of police resources reacting to incoming demands are more likely to quickly reach maximum capacity in a hostile environment, than those in a more supportive area.

2.4.6. Although the process described by the model by no means provides a complete explanation of the balance police must achieve between prevention and reaction, it did provide a sufficiently powerful focus for the subsequent direction of N.P. project development.

2.4.7. If the police were to intervene in the 'reactive spiral' by introducing an inhibiting effect on the system in order to control the seemingly unending escalation, then it was apparent that either:

    i. substantial new resources would be required, or

    ii. the police would have to find some way of both limiting future demands and managing existing demands more efficiently.

2.4.8. It was clear that additional resources on the scale that would be necessary would be both politically and economically

unacceptable, as well as being unlikely to provide a long term solution. The model implied that public demand would almost certainly increase to a point where the benefit of all additional resources would be absorbed by the public's insatiable consumption of 'apparently free' public services. Therefore the N.P. project focused on ways in which the second option (ii) might be realised.

2.5 Intervening in the Loop

2.5.1. The authors returned to Alderson's concept of community policing as providing a possible solution. It was accepted by Alderson (and has been subsequently validated, Scarman 1981, Smith 1983, Stephens 1988), that the police can only operate effectively with the consent and support of the majority of the public. He went on to suggest that the traditional link of a contract between the professional police and the general public provided the only realistic means of limiting crime and anti-social behaviour in a democratic society. Therefore the first proposition of N.P. was to re-establish the publics' obligation to support and actively assist their police. This proposition additionally served to emphasise that police were not solely responsible for combating increases in crime, but rather the responsibility was shared. Additionally, the idea was introduced that there was a realistic limit to police capability and that it was necessary to prioritise police activity. Although straightforward, this amounted to a radical departure in police thinking that had traditionally accepted that the service would respond to whatever was demanded of it.

2.5.2. Acceptance of a limit upon police capability, together with the publics' obligation to help, lead to the idea that the public cannot continue to make unrestricted demands on the police. This implied that the public should become actively involved in the maintenance of public order and the prevention of

42

crime, thus to some extent helping themselves, rather than increasingly relying on the professional police.

2.5.3. Two difficulties were posed by this approach. Firstly, how far can a community actually contribute to policing activities? Secondly, how might a police organisation motivate and control their assistance?

2.5.4. The suggestion that the general public or a concerned community should, or even must, assist police in their work, raises the question of what exactly is police work, what do police officers actually do and how might the public assist?

2.5.5. The project's investigation into police work, especially at the uniformed beat constable's level concluded that police actions could be described as:

> "...behaviour that benefits other people by providing the type of help or assistance to a victim of crime or other anti-social actions, that might reasonably be expected from a concerned fellow citizen." (Beckett 1981 pg. 151)

This description of the behaviour of uniformed beat patrol officers led to the answer to the above question and the second, but embarrassingly simple proposition, that essentially police officers help people, especially the victims of crime.

2.5.6. In effect this meant that preventive policing involved taking steps to prevent people from becoming victims of crime or other anti-social acts. The conclusion that police officers help people thus began to suggest a direction for police strategy and training. Also implied by this proposition was that in order to assist the police, members of a community should assist their neighbours if they were victims of crime or were likely to become so.

2.5.7. Research carried out as a part of the N.P. project (Beckett 1981) indicated that where there is a viable community, there seems to be a lower incidence of street crime. Additionally, where police encourage the public to help each

43

other and are responsive to reasonable community demands, satisfaction with police is enhanced. This being indicated by lower levels of complaints against police. However, probably most importantly, where such communities exist, there appears to be a lower level of public demand for police response services.

2.6   The Police Problem Situation

2.6.1. The project thus determined that the problem situation to be tackled by the police would be to design a policing strategy and system that balanced these positive attributes with the need to maintain an adequate response to public demands. In addition, it was suggested, police officers would need to be motivated to work within the strategy and initially stimulate a community to voluntarily play their part in assisting police.

2.6.2. In other words, what was needed was a delivery system to operationalise Alderson's (1979) community policing philosophy. In turn, the delivery system would require a change in police officers behaviours and operational practices to bring about and sustain the new approach.

2.6.3. It was suggested that in troublesome or difficult urban areas, as well as less hostile environments, there would be little need for radical change to existing policing methods. Rather, the approach should be to systematically plan the well proven policing methods and incorporate them into a system that was designed to place an emphasis on preventive policing.

2.6.4. To this end, many past policing systems and experiments were examined in an attempt to discover how they might benefit modern strategies and which particular aspects of

those systems were clearly not beneficial to more modern approaches.

2.7 Strategic Principles of Neighbourhood Policing

2.7.1. As a result of this work the N.P. project proposed a policing strategy that broadly relied upon the following principles:-

i. Emphasis upon the use of proven and tested methods, including the extensive use of uniform foot patrols, yet still providing the publicly expected rapid response to requests for assistance and the ability to maintain public order.

ii. Flexibility within the strategy to allow local command to reflect local needs, according to a broad policy framework.

iii. The involvement of the maximum number of police officers in everyday police work to enhance community understanding and contact, also to reduce to a minimum the worst organisational effects of over specialisation

iv. The preservation of the service element of traditional policing

v. The efficient use of information fed back from the community in everyday policing

vi. The development of existing training methods to establish more positive police attitudes towards the public, particularly in younger officers.

2.8   The Characteristics of the NP System

2.8.1.   The characteristics of the NP system were as follows:

i.   operational police officers should understand the problems of their station area in a wider context than previously,

ii.   they should have the necessary flexibility and motivation to respond to those problems and needs,

iii. they should have the ability to utilise all police resources to that end,

iv.   they should involve other service agencies and the public themselves to tackle identified problems,

v.   they must be responsive to management controls.

2.9   The Neighbourhood Policing Sub-systems

2.9.1.   In order to realise the design of a model characterised by the foregoing principles, the following sub-systems were suggested as necessary for the new policing system:

i.   a source of data for the evaluation of day to day police work and the problems against which it was directed, (This being necessary in order to ascertain requirements, assist decision making, aid planning and measure effectiveness for feedback purposes.)

ii.   an organisational structure to facilitate flexibility and motivation at the lowest operational levels, yet still responsive and accountable to local management,

iii. a means of achieving an appropriate balance between response and preventive policing,

iv. a network to gather information from the community,

v. a means of stimulating and controlling the community's active participation.

2.9.2. In order to illustrate how the above elements might be practically applied and co-ordinated, the project described how the overall strategy could be implemented at a single police station. Essentially, this was to be the 'Neighbourhood Policing System' in its original form.

2.9.3. The strategy was described in four categories as follows:

i. Evaluation

ii. Management

iii. Training

iv. Operations

2.10   Evaluation

2.10.1. What was then described as a "low cost, desk-top" computer would be installed at the selected police station. This was to accumulate information from the incoming station demand messages (message pad) and the daily duty state (record of the duty and disposition of patrolling officers). The computer system would provide the following outputs:

i. location and type of the heaviest workloads,

ii. summaries of the actual workloads at the station,

iii. an analysis of the effective manpower and its capacity to deal with this work,

iv. a duty state summary and overtime returns.

2.10.2. Additionally, it was suggested that surveys of the public should be undertaken in order to identify existing or viable communities and to assess the external effect of the policing strategy.

2.10.3. Schematically, the inputs and outputs to the M.I.S. computer system were described as follows:

Figure 2.2   Inputs to and Outputs from the Management Information System

2.11. Management

2.11.1. Management information generated by the above system was to be analysed at the police station by a unit set up for the purpose to be known as the Divisional Information Unit (D.I.U.) The aim was to determine the most effective resource deployment patterns, having regard to existing communities, or where communities needed to be developed.

2.11.2. Using this analysis, the ground covered by the station would be roughly divided into two parts, or sectors. The existing four shifts ('reliefs') of police officers that provided the current response to demands from the public would retain their separate unit structure. But, two of the teams would have special responsibility for one sector of the police station area, whilst the other two would take responsibility for the remaining portion of the area. This was shown schematically as follows:

Figure 2.3   Geographic Responsibility for Teams

2.11.3. The home beat officers (H.B.O.s) who traditionally had been associated with small beat areas on police divisions were to be attached to one or other of the appropriate reliefs and re-titled permanent beat officers (P.B.O.s). They had hitherto worked in a separate unit within a police division, not under the direct command of the relief inspectors.

2.11.4. Each relief together with the P.B.O.s were to form a team under their inspector and sergeants, who in turn were to be allocated specific geographic responsibility within their sector of the police station area. When each team of officers worked their normal eight hour shift (tour of duty), the constables apart from the P.B.O.s were to provide the response policing for the whole station area, allocating any remaining unassigned patrol capability to their own sector. This was the most straightforward of the deployment options and is shown diagramatically at Figure 2.4.

SECTOR 'A'

When a sector 'A' team are on duty, they provide 'neighbourhood policing' for their own sector and response policing to the remainder of the police station area.

Sector 'A' teams Off Duty

SECTOR 'B'

Sector 'B' teams Off Duty

When a sector 'B' team are on duty, they provide 'neighbourhood policing' for their own sector and response policing to the remainder of the police station area.

Figure 2.4   Alternating Teams Provide Complete Policing for the Whole Station Area.

2.11.5. A number of systems were devised to ensure that each sector received special patrol attention from a group of officers working on alternating reliefs, with a normal pattern of rest days. They varied in complexity from the most straightforward shown above to some enormously elaborate variations.

2.11.6. However, in practical terms, all the variations were designed to ensure that the whole area covered by the police station would at all times receive the same, or even an improved level of police service than conventionally provided at that time. In addition there would be a daily, planned, co-ordinated and concentrated application of available police resources towards the more long term problems within each sector of the station area.

2.11.7. Within the context of above model, the inspector, sergeants and constables who have specific geographic responsibility would be expected to initiate contact with members of their local communities and be personally known to a large number of residents. It was envisaged that during the early stages of implementation, this aspect of the strategy would rest mainly with the P.B.O.s, supported and directed by the relief supervisors. (sergeants and inspectors)

2.11.8. The inspectors' role was considered to be vital. It was emphasised that the major responsibilities for harmonising, co-ordinating and controlling the sector teams would rest with inspectors generally, although it was suggested that the more senior of each pair of inspectors would be responsible for the function of co-ordinating police initiatives in his or her respective sector.

2.11.9. Although the project put forward this outline model for an organisational structure to support the main objectives of the project, it was emphasised throughout that a number of options for management strategies existed. It was stated that the model proposed was only a framework that might be

adapted to suit local needs. The important issue was that the basic philosophy was to be adopted. It was seen as vital that officers started to identify with an area of ground when they were on duty, rather than merely the eight hour period of duty as hitherto. The inevitability was recognised that detailed adaptations would be necessary to suit local conditions and manpower levels and it was suggested that such decisions would best be made at the local (divisional) level.

2.12   Training

2.12.1. Consideration of the scale and scope of the necessary changes led to the view that an extensive training programme would be necessary as a crucial factor in introducing and maintaining the new system. It was stated that before the suggested (or similar) structures could be implemented with the associated new responsibilities, it would be essential for all officers to have *"... the right attitude towards contact with the community."* Additionally, they would also need to be competent in their behaviour, whilst maintaining close contact with the public and dealing with day to day policing problems.

2.12.2. These aims were to be achieved by specially designed training which would have two main functions:-

   i. to develop favourable police attitudes towards the service tradition of policing and,

   ii. to teach the skills required to obtain compliance of the public without resort to force.

Figure 2.5   Sequence of Training and Selection

2.12.3. As shown in Figure 2.5, all officers were to receive a preparatory training course, but the selected permanent beat officers would receive further training, as would those who found some difficulty in displaying the skills required to deal effectively with the public. Inspectors and sergeants were to receive a management course in addition, that would essentially address those new skills that would be required for the neighbourhood policing system.

2.13.   Operations

2.13.1. In order to produce an efficient and effective policing service, the reactive loop model (Figure 2.1) suggests that it will be necessary to establish a balance between the police station manpower devoted to the community beats and that applied to response policing. This means that the volume of demands entering the police station would have to be dealt with in a satisfactory manner. Satisfactory in this context meaning that demands should not receive cursory or

impersonal police attention as suggested to have been the outcome of the U.B.P. system. (Critchley 1978)

2.13.2. The permanent beat officers, supervised by their respective sector sergeants, would be allocated to specific community beats in accordance with the information previously obtained during the pre-implementation phase. They would then prepare an in depth study of their own beat, gathering information for this purpose from a wide variety of sources. Using this study, the team inspector would make decisions as to the specific policing tasks to be tackled and the tactics to be applied to each beat. The duties of the P.B.O.s were to be organised in conjunction with these tactics and also in such a way that it was ensured that the P.B.O.s spent some of their duty time working with their sector team.

2.13.3. The P.B.O.s were then to be directed to achieve close contact with the community, especially the local youth in their groups and gangs. Local residents were to be encouraged to volunteer for such activities as victim support schemes and to serve as special constables within their community. The main thrust was to come from the P.B.O.s, but with the encouragement and support of their supervisors who were also to have particular responsibility for achieving and supervising specific community tasks.

2.13.4. Contact should be established with existing residents' associations or similar groups, and their formation should be encouraged. The inspectors working with the P.B.O.s would then establish a formal information link between themselves and the residents' associations or groups. The information so obtained enabling the inspectors to make decisions and where appropriate, recommendations concerning the policing tactics in their particular community or sector.

2.13.5. During this period, the officer in charge of the police station was to have developed the inspectors and other senior officers into a management team. Through this team he or

she would provide direction and advice as to the progress of the overall strategy at the operational level. Thus it was suggested, all activities would be co-ordinated.

2.13.6. It was noted that detective officers from the criminal investigation department (C.I.D.) would also have to participate in this planning in order to ensure that their operations and day to day work were harmonised with the new policing strategy.

2.13.7. Another important responsibility at the police station level would be for the officer in charge to ensure that the day to day activities of other relevant agencies were co-ordinated with the police strategy at the operational level. For instance, social services departments, probation and after care etc.

2.13.8. It was recognised that above the operational level, a similar team comprising the most senior officers of the police station would need to ensure that all police activity was co-ordinated and that the local strategy and policies were based upon the information being provided by the policing system.

2.13.9. The model shown at Figure 2.6 summarises this team approach to police station management that links operational issues to command strategies. The operations level is commanded by inspectors who are members of the police station (or divisional) management team that is commanded by either a superintendent or chief superintendent. The superintendent or chief superintendent is then in turn a member of the higher level command team that sets strategies for the whole police force or area.

Figure 2.6 The Team Approach to Police Station Management

2.13.10. This simply expressed notion of linking teams represented a considerable departure from the more conventional, hierarchical organisational chart traditionally associated with the management structures and processes of police forces.

2.13.11. Neighbourhood policing envisaged that the policy formulated by this process should be expanded to influence policy decisions made by all other agencies who provide any kind of service to communities. It seemed that many of the problems that police routinely tackled in urban environments were only likely to be resolved by a joint approach by statutory agencies. Alderson (1979) suggested that although the police were the primary preventers of crime, they also should have a vested interest in the work

of other statutory agencies whose work touches upon crime and associated matters.

2.13.12. The record of co-operation between various agencies had not been reported as especially satisfactory beyond local arrangements. Whitaker (1979) provides evidence of the isolation of police from other agencies, and Alderson (1979) made similar assertions citing the Maria Colwell Inquiry (D.H.S.S. 1974) as an example of a lack of effective communication and liaison between agencies. Despite this apparent parochialism of the statutory agencies it seemed to the authors of N.P. that the police should take the lead in stimulating effective joint problem solving, as only through such an approach could problems be tacked in their entirety, rather than from a solely law enforcement perspective.

2.13.13. Where agency policies were incompatible, it was proposed that the police should make attempts to convince the other parties as to the value of a co-ordinated approach. It was considered that liaison with local political figures would be important in this regard. (Beckett and Hart 1981) The political will to achieve a co-ordinated approach seemed important. The reluctance of statutory agencies to become involved in joint approaches to problems, albeit understandable, was not producing sustainable solutions to local problems that were seen by the N.P. authors and others as necessary. (Alderson 1979, Whitacker 1979)

2.13.14. It was not envisaged at the early stages of this policing method that the present operational activities of specialist departments (such as traffic patrol, specialist investigative squads etc.) would be altered in any significant way. Rather, neighbourhood policing would continue to require their support in the same way as previously. However, it was suggested that there would be an improved flow of information from street level to specialist units that may increase their effectiveness.

2.14   Management Evaluation

2.14.1. Neighbourhood policing was a completely untried system of providing policing services, although it was assembled from well tried and tested policing tactics that had been used successfully for many years in isolation. The concept of bringing these apparently successful elements together in a self supporting system was unique. Therefore it was proposed that an evaluation should be conducted that would seek to address whether or not the sought for objectives and improvements had been achieved. It was suggested that the broad criteria for evaluation should be:-

     i.   demands made by the public for police services

     ii. satisfaction with police

     iii. level of citizen involvement

     iv. police attitudes

     v. levels of complaints against police.

2.14.2. It was suggested (Beckett 1981) that the above factors may eventually influence and lead to:-

     i. a decrease in the levels of street crime, and

     ii. a raising in the quality of life for local residents.

2.14.3. Where this evaluation showed that the strategy was not effective, or the results did not justify the effort entailed, then it was suggested that the particular part of the system should be modified or discarded. Such decisions would have to be made by the senior management teams of the police stations or divisions concerned, who would have access to reliable

management information from operational levels to support their decision making.

2.15 Implementation and Evaluation Summary

2.15.1. Figure 2.7 shows the major stages of the neighbourhood policing system schematically.

2.15.2. The outline plan was to implement the local management information system and gather pre change information from the police station area. This information collection process would continue throughout the life of the project, but would initially be used to influence the training programme that formed the basis of the selection process for the P.B.O.s and the sector teams.

2.15.3. The teams would then set about implementing the new policing style involving the public and other agencies with a view to achieving local objectives.

2.15.4. Information concerning the success or otherwise of these activities would then be available to compare with the earlier problems and thus some judgements might be made as to the benefits or otherwise of this approach. It was suggested that the system might then be changed or aborted dependant upon successes.

Figure 2.7   Implementation and Evaluation Summary

2.16   The Conceptual Differences of the N.P. System

2.16.1. The neighbourhood policing system was not propounded as an ideal system providing an ultimate answer to the problems facing police, neither was it suggested that all the propositions would prove to be correct or effective. However, nothing in the new system was completely untested. Similar components that had been incorporated into the overall design of N.P. could be observed to be operating successfully in other police forces, albeit in isolation and in a different context.

2.16.2. As a plan for major change to police operations, N.P. differed in that the project assembled successful elements of existing policing practices into a unified system. Hitherto, much police development had concentrated on improvements to single functional aspects of police operations, rather than to examine the whole task of day to day policing from a strategic viewpoint and then to tackle the design of a complete system. The approach of the N.P. project drew from Checkland's (1972) concepts of systems based problem solving in real world situations.

2.16.3. N.P. differed from previous schemes not only in terms of its systems approach but also by identifying three key areas to be tackled in order to bring about the necessary changes. The detailed elements already identified were developed and refined to three key strategic areas of concern that could be approached and managed more effectively. It was considered that change would not end with the implementation of a fixed sequence of changes.

2.16.4. It was seen as necessary to create a system that was adaptive and which could take advantage of opportunities to improve as it evolved. Conceptually, the aim was to design a self-learning, self-adapting policing system. This was thought to be necessary as the alternative would have been

to implement a more traditional, rigid and tightly defined change programme that would not be greatly dissimilar to the previous attempts to improve policing.

2.16.5. If the preferred approach were followed, the overall policing system could be dynamic and not become unsuited to environmental conditions as had happened previously. It was proposed that the full benefits of the scheme would not be realised unless the identified areas were tackled simultaneously and allowed to develop under local conditions. It was considered that the dysfunctional effects of one isolated change on another would militate against the positive benefits of the change if this strategy were not followed.

2.16.6. The key strategic areas to be managed were as follows:-

i. demand management - the adverse effects of the reactive loop,

ii. police /public contract - active stimulation of this traditional concept,

iii. police organisation and efficiency - tackling inappropriate structures and processes

2.16.7. Policing structures and organisations were for the most part operating in the opposite way to that implied by Checkland's (1972) concepts. They were largely functionalised and compartmentalised in order to gain the benefits of specialisation and the administrative convenience of routine resource planning. A negative outcome of this structure whereby one functional sub-system interacts with, and influences others in a dysfunctional way was widespread within police organisations, particularly in London, (Belson 1975, Christian 1983) The consequential effect of this phenomena throughout the organisation was disruptive and

led to inefficiencies. A major aspect of the police problem situation was therefore the internal management of the effects of these unplanned consequential effects between internal work groups and functional specialisations.

2.16.8. The N.P. project recognised the inefficiencies caused by this situation and proposed changes to the operational level by focusing management attention on the policing environment and on the actual service that was needed, rather than the internal mechanisms by which the existing system functioned.

2.16.9. This systems approach to the re-design of policing operations was seen as a major departure from current thinking and the potential benefits of the approach were rapidly assimilated by senior police decision makers.

2.17   Demand Management

2.17.1. As had already been noted, the resources available within the police organisation to cope with rising demands were clearly limited. Historically, new resources had been poured into reactive or response policing and had been conspicuously unsuccessful at limiting that demand.

2.17.2. In addition, the traditional assistance the police had received from other statutory agencies had to be viewed against a background of economic restriction. Since, in the main, they too were reacting to problems after they occur and also might expect to suffer from a similar effect to that suggested by the reactive loop.

2.17.3. Despite the constraints, it was considered that demand for police services should be managed and brought under a measure of control before community oriented strategies could be introduced. It was apparent that areas traditionally

hostile to policing would have to be become priorities for police attention and recidivist offenders brought to justice in advance of the introduction of the NP changes. It was likely that a failure to do so, would harden resistance from the law abiding sections of the community who would wish to see existing criminality curbed.

2.18   Police/Public Contract

2.18.1. The notion of an informal contract between the police and public to tackle crime together would clearly depend to a large extent on the willingness of the public to co-operate. Research had shown (Beckett 1981 et al) that where strong, stable communities exist, the incidence of street crime is lower and satisfaction with police is higher. However, of more concern to police were the urban areas where environmental conditions were poor, demands for police services were high and there was little sense of community identity.

2.18.2. In such areas there was seen to be little incentive for individual members of the public to help each other or to co-operate with the police (Mawby 1979). Since the police were already struggling to cope with the high demands placed on them, they were becoming progressively less effective and resorting to more and more response type policing with the consequent reduction in the general level of public satisfaction.

2.18.3. The neighbourhood policing project was therefore an attempt to systematically direct police effort towards securing this contract. There was a marked emphasis within the project towards preventive measures and the preservation of the service element of traditional policing.

2.18.4. The project also encouraged local officers to seize the initiative; actively seeking out and strengthening viable communities where they exist, or fostering a new sense of community identity where little or no such community identity existed.

2.18.5. It was not however just a public relations exercise, designed only to increase public satisfaction with police (M.P.S. 1981). Although there was definitely a need in the wake of the Brixton disorder to improve the image of the Metropolitan Police (Scarman 1981), the N.P. project was treated by the organisation as a major initiative of the *"...highest priority..."* to tackle the wider problems of policing the Capital. (Receiver of the Metropolitan Police, M.P.S. 1981)

2.18.6. One of the unintended consequences of a purely public relations approach, would be likely to have been an increase in public demand for police services, which was one of the very problems that the scheme sought to tackle. Rather, the thrust was to be towards getting the public actively involved in crime prevention and providing support for their own victims of crime.

2.18.7. The N.P. approach was to aim for the ideal system in which professional police and a community establish a partnership which results in a significant proportion of policing services within that community being provided voluntarily by community members.

2.18.8. This may be seen to contrast starkly with other approaches to policing both here and abroad, whereby law enforcement is the total responsibility of the professional police.

2.19   Police Organisation and Efficiency

2.19.1. There was no doubt that most police organisational structures had evolved rather than been designed to meet a defined purpose. It was clear that if police effort was to be re-directed towards securing the contract by way of increased community involvement, there was likely to be a penalty in terms of the cost of police resources used. However, as has already been discussed, police resources were straining to meet the existing and rising demands without the new burdens of increased community involvement.

2.19.2. The N. P. project proposed that a possible means of creating the necessary opportunities to tackle the suggested new initiatives could be achieved by reducing the number of inefficient and non productive processes and procedures that were currently being undertaken. The opportunities thus created could then be taken up with problem directed preventive issues and not dissipated on administrative or response type tasks. Therefore much of the organisational aspects of the N.P. project were concerned with becoming more efficient and dispensing with many non productive tasks that would not contribute to the overall system aims.

2.19.3. Given that something could be done about resource management, the project proposed a fundamental reassessment of how resources were matched to incoming demands. Local police station senior officers were to examine ways of optimising the deployment of their scarce resources. In simple terms , to have more officers on duty when the level of demands were highest, and not to dissipate manpower unnecessarily by allocating resources equally throughout the day and night. This single proposition was in direct conflict with much established organisation practice and culture. Many established practices affecting police officers' duty times and rest day rosters had been

incorporated into Statutory Instruments and were for most practical purposes not negotiable for change. (Police Regulations 1969)

2.19.4. For it to be accepted therefore, the only way in which the customs and cultures of generations could be altered and the concept adopted, was slowly through a formal communications system between the senior managers and the officers actually performing operational policing.

2.19.5. The communications system devised was therefore based upon the perceived need for a participative model of management rather that the hierarchical or militaristic control model that currently existed. This was seen as necessary not only to ensure that operational officers were involved in the challenging process of changing work practices, but also to ensure that senior officers had an accurate view of the problems confronted by front line officers on a daily basis. This problem and the need for a more consultative style of management within the Metropolitan Police was later to be addressed in detail by Smith and Gray (1983) in their extensive examination of 'The Police in Action' in London. The emphasis within the established system was upon issuing instructions and a reliance on procedures, rather than upon achieving an end result or objectives.

2.19.6. The maintenance of the hierarchical system was dependant largely upon ensuring compliance with rules and procedures without question, whereas a process of participative management would necessarily have to be well informed with access to relevant information regarding problems, performance and achievements. Accurate data rather than opinions based on experience and others' anecdotes was obviously to be vital. The significance of the police station management information system therefore became central to the project.

2.19.7. A number of further efficiency improving initiatives were to be introduced as the project developed in order to facilitate the new style of policing. All such changes were directed towards creating the opportunity to free operational officers to develop their communities in the manner described. However, the most significant alterations were to be:

    i. the change to local structures in order to facilitate the 'new' style of policing,

    ii. the proposed changes of duty times to align with the response demand profile,

    iii. the moving of the emphasis away from autocratic control towards participative management and,

    iv. the greater management reliance on objective data.

2.20   Evolution in Policing

2.20.1. To the police organisation and many influential police decision makers, neighbourhood policing represented an acceptable compromise between two policing philosophies. At one extreme was 'hard policing' characterised by a strongly reactive style and typified by operation 'Swamp' that preceded the disorders at Brixton in April 1981 (Scarman 1981). At the other extreme, were the radical concepts of community policing as propounded by Alderson (1979). This approach being characterised by a more proactive style, fulfilling agreed community needs and generally seen as a 'softer' style.

2.20.2. The public debate on policing methods that followed the publication of Lord Scarman's report stimulated a groundswell of opinion to adopt a more community orientated style of policing. However, it was apparent that

such moves were not universally popular within the Metropolitan Police. (Smith et al 1983)

2.20.3. To the more progressive element within the Metropolitan Police, N.P. represented an opportunity to implement a more proactive policing style that was not seen as impossible to achieve. To others, in particular the traditionalists, the propositions were seen as unnecessary, potentially damaging to the police and likely to be totally ineffective. (Metropolitan Police 1981, Irving et al 1989)

2.20.4. Despite a considerable high level of internal unease that would resist the prospect of such change (Smith 1983b), the external climate had altered and was exerting considerable influence on the style of policing that was being delivered in London. There was no doubt that senior officers within the Metropolitan Police saw the need to consider what alternatives might exist to the policing methods that were likely to be seen as a major contributory factor to the Brixton disorders. (Scarman 1981)

2.20.5. When Lord Scarman's findings were made public in November 1981 he had indeed concluded that:

> *"Chief officers of Police should re-examine their methods of policing...with particular reference to....the pattern of patrolling....the role of home beat officers and their integration into mainstream policing....provision of opportunities for officers to get to know their communities.....and ways of ensuring greater continuity..."* (Scarman 1981 pg. 130)

2.20.6 Lord Scarman continued with recommendations that, *inter alia,* were to alter and increase the nature of local police consultation and accountability. It was known that the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police was under considerable pressure to take up new initiatives in accordance with Scarman's recommendations (Irving et al 1989) and indeed Lord Scarman noted that *"...a new*

approach is required....and that has already begun." (Scarman 1981 pg. 135, Irving et al 1989 pgs. 11-12)

2.20.7 Therefore, it was not a difficult decision for the most senior officers of the Metropolitan Police to proceed with a trial of N.P., albeit on the basis of the fairly limited research.

2.20.8 In November 1981 such a decision was made at New Scotland Yard. It was agreed on behalf of the Commissioner that a major experiment would be conducted to assess the potential benefits of N.P. in collaboration with the Surrey Constabulary. Over a period of months, resources were made available for the scheme, a project team was established and a steering committee appointed to oversee progress and monitor costs. The project was afforded considerable importance.

2.20.9 The Commissioner and the Receiver of the Metropolitan Police made it quite clear that *"...this is an important project of high priority for which the necessary resources of finance, staff, equipment, etc., will need to be found."* (M.P.S. 1981, Irving 1989 pg.12)

2.21   The Need for Evaluation

2.21.1. Resulting from the many frustrations experienced during the research for the original thesis, the authors were convinced that there was an urgent need for rigorous and objective evaluation of policing operations. Traditionally, policing had been managed by well intentioned, but never the less relatively poorly informed decision makers who only had their own experience and that of their advisors to inform major decisions. This situation was apparent from the relatively small amount of organisational, management, social and psychological research material available on the subject of U.K. policing prior to the late 1970's. (This

situation was dissimilar to the U.S.A. where there was a well established literature on many aspects of policing.)

2.21.2. The approach to decision making based almost solely upon instinct, experience and opinion might have been previously satisfactory , but in the politically critical climate of the late seventies and early eighties it was becoming inappropriate. (Critchley 1978) Circumstances were changing to a point where critical police decisions concerning priorities, methods and deployments were being openly questioned by politicians, the media, opinion formers of disparate views and others with interests in the criminal justice system. (Scarman 1981, Smith et al 1983, Jeffferson 1984)

2.21.3. It was apparent that many decisions regarding priorities and deployments that had been conventionally made by police alone in relative secrecy, were likely to be exposed to a greater degree of external scrutiny in future. It was therefore reasonable to conclude that in the future, it would be necessary to be able to describe the approach to many such decisions and the information on which they were based. Observers of diverse characteristics and motivation would need to be able to satisfy themselves that proper bases existed to such decisions. (Stephens 1988) A need was thus created for objective data which could more accurately inform decision making, rather than convention, opinion or the traditional belief that the 'police know best'.

2.21.4. Traditionally, policing had not been a highly controversial or politicised activity. (Keeton 1975) However in the months following the Brixton riots, policing in London at least had become associated with many of the problems of inner city life and thus the object of a great deal of scrutiny and public debate. (Scarman 1981, Smith et al 1983). Therefore it was considered vital that any major efforts to alter the methods and style of policing should be accompanied by some form of objective assessment.

2.21.5. Consequently a great deal of attention was directed to how the N.P. project might be evaluated to the longer term benefit of the Service, whether or not the projects propositions were successful. The N.P. project evaluation proposals were originally scheduled to run for approximately two years after initial implementation. The aim at the end of that period was to provide an authoritative evaluation report of both police and public contributions. The evaluation function was to be divided into two parts:

    i. the independent evaluation to be undertaken by The Police Foundation and,

    ii. the internal evaluation to be undertaken by the police project team.

2.21.5. The separate evaluations were not seen as mutually exclusive but rather addressing similar issues from complimentary standpoints. It was envisaged that operational managers and decision makers would have feedback from the evaluation process as the project developed, thus having the opportunity to make alterations to systems and procedures to achieve the best effect.

2.21.6. By this means it was considered that for the first time in the evolution of policing, the Service would have a reliable study addressing the effectiveness of a community based style of policing applied to a major conurbation. This apparently simple aim was derived from a memorable remark made by Sir Peter Matthews, then Chief Constable of Surrey who in conversation with the authors said *"...we need to find a way of policing the large towns and cities in the same way as we police the villages..."*

CHAPTER THREE

Summary

Chapter Three describes how the N.P. project was to be implemented around an original experimental design that relied upon the existence of a 'control condition'. Following changes to the wider organisation that precluded the retention of such a design, the principles of the project are set in the context of a fresh evaluation model.

The N.P. project approach considers a macro or system level of functioning and a micro or behavioural level of analysis to be appropriate. This duellist approach to evaluation is discussed in detail and argument is advanced as to why the chosen approach was considered to be satisfactory in the light of organisational development. The references quoted in this chapter are those drawn upon at the time of writing of the original work.

3.1 Implementation

3.1.1. A police project team was formed in January 1982 to implement and evaluate an experiment based upon the major principles of Neighbourhood Policing, namely;-

    i. to increase public satisfaction with the police,

    ii. to decrease the fear of street crime,

    iii. to influence the street crime rate,

iv. to influence the level of demands falling on police,

v. to bring about a change in public behaviour whereby an active part is taken in the prevention of crime.

3.1.2. Additionally the newly formed independent research institute, The Police Foundation adopted the project as their principal research effort and were to expend considerable resources on an independent evaluation. (Irving et al 1989)

3.1.3. A range of organisational changes or treatments were designed that it was suggested would provide the necessary organisational systems to achieve the NP principles. A set of behavioural hypotheses were proposed that defined specific actions and activities the were suggested to be appropriate towards achieving the required outputs. It was proposed that the organisational changes in combination with the police behavioural changes would bring about the NP system aims.

3.2   The Original Experimental Design

3.2.1. As the project was to be a collaborative undertaking between the Surrey Constabulary and the Metropolitan Police, the experimental design required similar efforts in each police area. Therefore the following (straightforward) model, Figure 3.1, was adopted that provided both test and control conditions in both police areas, with the addition of a separate site to monitor the effects of the computerised management information system (M.I.S.). This feature was considered necessary as the M.I.S. was an original development and the benefits and/or costs were unknown.

	Metropolitan Police Area	Surrey Police Area
Test Site: To receive full project treatments	Notting Hill	Camberley
Computer only site: To receive only the computerised M.I.S.	Carter Street	Caterham
Comparison (control) site: To remain effectively unchanged and to be the 'control'	Hackney	Walton on Thames

Figure 3.1　Matrix Model of Original N.P. Experimental Design

3.2.2. Project implementation commenced with pilot research at Brixton in London and pilot implementation at Addlestone in Surrey. Both these locations were outside the experimental design, but were used in order to develop experience of both evaluation and implementation techniques. Using the experience of this pilot work, pre-testing commenced at Notting Hill and Hackney in 1982 and at Caterham and Camberley early in 1983.

3.3 The Difficulties with Pure Experimentation

3.3.1. As the project developed, it was becoming apparent that the approach of pure experimentation with social systems, whereby unequivocal results are obtained would have to be abandoned. This approach whereby causality could be attributed to the treatments applied did not lend itself to the evaluation of policing methods and operations due to the turbulence of the policing environment and the need of the police organisation to continually react to it.

3.3.2. The major difficulties of experimentation in a police setting arise from ethical considerations; the need for ongoing operational efficiency and the inability to control all the variables. In a true experimental situation, a number of the treatments tested would be designed to have no effect, or a detrimental effect on the system's operation. This would result in the public living in the experimental area receiving an inferior level of service, which would be difficult to justify.

3.3.3. A further difficulty had also become apparent from the pilot work arising from the impracticability of securing an equivalent control group (Cook and Campbell 1979) who found that equivalence in terms of the organisational environment was a continual difficulty for field trials in social settings. Although it initially seemed straightforward to match two or more police divisions on the basis of environmental similarity, (population, size, workload, urban deprivation etc.) it quickly became apparent that normal organisational development involving routine procedural changes, movement of staff etc. would militate against the concept of equivalence being maintained throughout a trial that was likely to extend to several years. It was apparent that different divisions progressed in organisation development terms at different rates and whilst a commonalty of purpose existed, at any single point in time, significant variations between divisions might exist.

3.3.4. In January 1983 the decision to abandon the original experimental model was finally made in the light of the above as well as a further and major organisational development.

3.3.5. The newly appointed Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Sir Kenneth Newman, was aware of the N.P. project and was committed to a number of its proposals as well as to a planning strategy derived from an American publication, Policing by Objectives. (Lubans and Edgar 1979) This approach to strategic planning was based on a large number of 'action plans' that in themselves were very similar to a number of the fundamental elements of the N.P. project.

3.3.6. It was not possible therefore to retain the experimental concept of a control site in London. The control would quickly become confounded by the implementation of action plans that would be so similar to N.P. treatments that it would not be possible to observe a discernible difference in outcomes between the experimental site and the control site.

3.4 The Fresh Approach to N.P. Evaluation

3.4.1. In order to overcome these difficulties and also achieve a meaningful evaluation, albeit not totally based upon pure experimentation, the multiple method approach (Saxe and Fine 1979) was adapted to meet the needs of the project. This approach suggests that the variety of methods available to evaluation researchers, true experimentation, quasi-experimental, systems analysis, operations research etc., are fully compatible with one another.

3.4.2. The choice of methodology should depend upon the context of the experimental programme and the evaluation requirements. It is therefore possible to use methodologies either singly, or together, as part of the overall evaluation of the project. For some purposes one type of methodology might

be employed and for other purposes another method might be used. For multiple evaluation purposes, such as those appropriate for policing schemes, multiple methods might be used within the same evaluation programme under the overall framework of the systems approach.

3.4.3. It was considered for the most part that the N.P. project would constitute a quasi-experimental design. (Campbell and Stanley 1966). In quasi experiments, assignment of a treatment to a condition occurs in some non random fashion, unlike true experiments, where the experimental units are randomly assigned to conditions. (Cook and Campbell 1976)

3.4.4. However, it may be possible to approach a true experimental design by inclusion of more test localities within the programme design and randomly assigning the various treatments and control to each area. But clearly, this would not have been a realistic proposition due to the number of separate sites necessary for such an approach. At the basic economic level the quasi-experimental design appeared to be the only realistic choice.

3.4.5. Within the limitations of a quasi experimental design, Saxe and Fine (1979) suggest that by use of a macro-micro approach, it is possible to realise an evaluation which is close to a true experimental design.

3.4.6. The term macro evaluation is used to refer to the use of non-randomised control group techniques to assess the overall efficiency of a scheme.

3.4.7. The term micro evaluation refers to the use of randomised control group experiments developed to test hypotheses about central components of the suggested design.

3.4.8. When applied in conjunction with one another, macro and micro evaluation studies can provide a complete and practical assessment of the suggested design and for

multiple evaluation purposes. This approach was developed in the original N.P. project documentation (Beckett and Hart 1981) when the outline of the systems methodology for the project was described.

3.4.9. It may be seen from this description how the two levels of abstraction may be merged using the eclectic properties of the systems approach and used as an overall evaluation design. The macro evaluation being based upon the systems approach and the micro evaluation on scientific method which provides inputs to the macro study.

3.4.10. This approach to evaluation can be viewed as integrative. Its object was to generate data, both concerning the viability of the N.P. programme and its implementation as well as the effectiveness of the operational features. The integration would allow organisational decision makers to have information concerning the operation of the system as a whole, as well as more detailed information respecting the components of the system. This could be achieved by satisfying the scientific demands for data collections within semi controlled micro studies, without forfeiting the collection of non-experimental data about the system through the macro studies.

3.4.11. In practice the macro study may assume the form of a comparative time series design between experimental sites which monitored the phased implementation of the scheme from inception through to pre-tests, mid term tests and post tests. The macro study could provide decision makers with direct information about the operation of the experimental system as well as providing data for routine operational decisions.

3.4.12. The micro studies were to take the form of a series of semi controlled experiments within each experimental condition, whereby comparisons are achieved from the conditions themselves. The efficacy of particular components of the

programme, i.e. community and victim helping behaviour, could thus be assessed in relation to their influence on social modelling. These data could then be generally applied both within and beyond the confines of the actual experimental scheme and help to establish its construct validity.

3.4.13. One basic assumption was that the macro and micro level assessments should be conducted in a fashion whereby each level proceeds simultaneously and feed into each other. The purposes of both types of studies is to understand the processes underlying the degree of effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the scheme. Problems identified by the macro evaluation might be examined more rigorously in micro studies.

3.4.14. Similarly, findings from the micro studies might reveal possible problems, suggest the need for changes, or highlight a shift in emphasis of the macro studies. Such an approach may be seen as systemic and an appropriate systems methodology for the project, representing a holistic rather than piecemeal approach to evaluation. In this way, it was seen as possible to gain sufficient knowledge about the police systems' operation to enable objective decisions to be made concerning replication or cessation.

3.4.15. This multi level approach was not new. Systems theory has provided a powerful problem solving approach to many complex problems (Warfield 1976, Weinburg 1975). However, this approach could be criticised for lacking in addressing detailed issues and it was considered that the inclusion of a more conventional scientific approach through the micro level evaluation would redress that potential shortcoming. (Fairweather and Tornatzky 1977) In this way, the body of existing scientific knowledge may be applied to the policing system, the behaviour of which is comparatively poorly understood.

3.4.16. In the field of psychology, the systems approach has achieved an important position (Kast and Rosenzweig 1981) and therefore it is appropriate not only to adopt the systems approach for the macro level evaluation but also to use the same approach to harmonise the micro level into a cohesive framework. The aim was to create an evaluation that was a holistic assessment rather than a reductionist approach that would fail to acknowledge the complexity of modern urban policing.

3.5 The Macro Evaluation

3.5.1. The term macro evaluation in the N.P. project was used to refer to the evaluation of the total effect of a range of treatments applied to non-equivalent test conditions in a non-random fashion. The macro evaluation was based upon a systems methodology (Checkland 1972) and utilises the open systems theory of organisations (Katz and Kahn 1978).

3.5.2. The open systems approach with respect to the N.P. project takes the police station as the system of interest and views this system as exchanging information with and being inter-related to its immediate human and physical environment.

3.5.3. The evaluation process began by identifying and modelling repeated cycles of input to the police station, the transformation of the inputs by police and the subsequent output. This in turn creates a renewed input to the station which is processed by organisational procedures and output to the environment. Thus a continuous cyclical effect is maintained similar to processes observed in biological sciences.

3.5.4. It is the quantity and quality of information, appropriate behaviour and the speed at which the cycle operates that determines the degree of openness of the system. It is this 'degree of openness' that the N.P. project sought to increase at the macro level through the application of selected treatments.

3.5.5. Adoption of the concept of feedback is vital to the open systems approach. It is clear from the foregoing that such a process results in the police station system affecting the environment and the environment affecting the system of interest. It is information, behaviour and information implied by behaviour that brings about this symbiosis - the mechanism that creates the cyclical effect is feedback.

3.5.6. The corollary of the open system concept is the closed system, whereby there is little or no feedback from the systems' environment. Examples are typically found in purely electrical and mechanical systems. In reality, closed systems are seldom, if ever encountered in social systems. The implication of this concept is that open systems exist in varying degrees of openness, i.e. with varying degrees of feedback.

3.5.7. Therefore, applying open systems theory to police organisations, a proposition can be presented that police systems (stations) exist in varying degrees of openness, i.e. the quantity, quality and speed of feedback is a function of the openness of the system with its environment. It was further proposed that the series of treatments applicable to a 'Neighbourhood Policing' station would increase the degree of openness of the station system and that such an increase was desirable.

3.5.8. The testing of this proposition was presented as being the macro level evaluation objective. The proposition fell short of amounting to a hypothesis or set of hypotheses, in that it

is not the convention to use classical hypothetical concepts within the systems approach.

3.5.9. A definition was suggested for the ideal police station system that brought together the aims of the project as follows. "A police station system which seeks to optimise available resources including all relevant agencies and the community itself in order to   prevent crime and offences whilst an adequate patrol and investigative capability is maintained in order to detect crime and offences and deal with emergencies within given constraints." (Beckett and Hart 1981)

3.5.10. In essence, this statement is defining a policing system that is predominantly open in character and thus a system which did not share similar features to such a system, would be closer to a closed system and not as effective in the N.P. project's aim.

3.5.11. The treatments implemented through the project were all designed to increase the openness of the policing system in ascending degrees through time. But when and where a final state of openness was reached was not specified, as the limits of what might be achieved were largely speculative. It was not therefore considered appropriate to evaluate each individual treatment in isolation, but rather to assess the combination effect   insofar as it affected the degree of openness of the police station as a whole.

3.5.12. This approach was a direct product of the systems thinking that encouraged the tackling of organisational systems as a whole and not a set of discreet parts that could be changed in sequence and then reassembled into a meaningful whole.

3.5.13. Many case studies indicate that where this incremental approach is adopted, the benefits of a single change are not felt because other key elements of the system are allowed to remain unaltered and thus militate against the success of

the new order. In other words the benefits are so slow accrue that the dysfunctional effects of other features of the system will overwhelm the marginal achievements. The solution, according to Checkland (1972) was to tackle the whole system.

3.5.14. The aim of the macro study therefore was not to ascribe causality to individual treatments, but rather to assess the impact of the station system as a whole through identification of the significant associations from the systems perspective described. Additionally, the macro evaluation was to attempt to relate costs (in organisational terms) to the quality, quantity and speed of information feedback.

3.5.15. There are clearly limits to which it is appropriate to enhance information flows as there is always likely to be a cost in some form associated with the supply of information. It is appropriate therefore to consider whether the benefit arising from the supply of the information exceeds the cost of obtaining it. A secondary aim of the macro evaluation was therefore to try to determine the optimum quantity, quality and speed of information feedback to satisfy the minimum needs of successful operation.

3.5.16. For the purposes of the macro evaluation, the police station system was seen as comprising three sub-systems, each of which exchanges inputs and outputs by a feedback process. The project applied the open systems concept to the police station and its sub-systems as summarised in Figure 3.2 below.

3.5.17. Here, the three police station sub-systems are shown in the context of the police station's human and physical environment which are discussed over leaf. Each sub-system itself comprises a range of elements and relationships which were to be the subject of data collections.

Figure 3.2   The Police Station Sub Systems

3.6   The Police Station Sub-Systems

3.6.1. *Police Organisation and Methods.* A distinction is made between 'organisation' (i.e. structure) and 'methods' (i.e. process). The elements within 'organisation' are relatively static and include the component parts of the organisation and the relationships between them which form the established organisational pattern. In contrast, 'methods' are dynamic and include those additional elements which amount to policies, procedures, controls and co-ordination that guide the activities of people operating within the organisation. Elements within this category necessarily include planned

and formalised functions as well as those aspects of station functioning which are unplanned and/or unwanted.

3.6.2. *Individual Police Officers.* This sub-system encompasses the attitudes and behaviour of the human police resource, both individually and collectively. Additionally, social psychological phenomena and skills affecting the performance of police in the light of organisational methods, resources and the influence on individuals of the human and physical environment are features of this sub-system.

3.6.3. *Police Resources.* The police resources sub-system is seen as comprising physical resources, (as distinct from human resources) but includes those of a less tangible nature such as available time

3.7 The Physical Environment

3.7.1. The physical environment contains elements relating to the size, degree of urbanisation, economic activity, physical history, physical description and character of the test condition environment.

3.7.2. The characteristics of the phisical environment may be regarded as those features of any particular location that differentiate it from any other, i.e. apperance, wealth, open spaces, buildings, trees, commercial premises, places of entertainment, residential accommodation type and style.

3.8 The Human Environment

3.8.1. The human environment comprises demographic, attitudinal, behavioural and cultural phenomena at the individual and group levels. The major factors at the group level being those that impact directly on the immediate system environment and which have a predominantly local membership and purpose. The focus at the individual level is upon residents.

3.8.2. The three police sub-systems interact with one another and form a multiple intersection which represents the aggregate of the police station outputs to the environment. However, each of the police sub-systems interact individually with the environment and it is the significant individual interactions which form the subject of the policing aspects of the micro evaluation.

3.8.3. The macro evaluation is therefore concerned with the impact of the intersection of the police sub-systems, i.e. the police systems output, with the human and physical environment. A complex situation thus exists whereby the three police station sub-systems effect the features of the environment and vice versa.

3.8.4. For macro evaluation purposes, the precise nature of interaction between the police system and the environment may be largely ignored and treated as a 'black box'. This is a consequence of the very large and varied number of interactions that occur and which are largely conditioned by prevailing circumstances. Thus it is only realistic to consider the aggregate effect, i.e. the overall system output.

3.8.5. The evaluation plan suggested there would be a number of actions and interactions occurring that amount largely to police behaviours that convert inputs to the police system into outputs. (DeGreene 1970). The overall effect of these behaviours was to be assessed at an aggregate level rather than at an individual level for the purposes of the macro study.

3.8.6. The concept here being that it was the combined behavioural output of the police system that would bring about the N.P. aims, rather than any single type of police behaviour. However, the overall behavioural output comprised many separate, individual behaviours, the detailed nature of which would be subject of the micro level studies.

3.8.7. These concepts as applied to the police system constitute the macro evaluation principles and are summarised in Figure 3.3 which shows the intersection of the three police sub-systems (V, W, X,) providing information (I) and behaviours (B) to the black box.

3.8.8. The black box also receives inputs from the intersection of the environmental sub systems (Y, Z) in the form of public information (EI) and public behaviours (EB). The result is the intersection of the five sub systems creating an output which is fed back to each individual sub system in the form of renewed information (RI[1]&RI[2]) and behaviour (RB[1]&RB[2]). thus the cycle is established.

Information (RI[1]) and Behaviours (RB[1])

Individual
Police Offficers
(V)

Information (I) & Behaviours (B)

Police
Resources
(W)

Police
Organisation
and Methods
(X)

Black Box

Human
Environment
(Y)

Information (EI) and Behaviours (EB)

Physical
Environment
(Z)

Information (RI[2]) and Behaviours (RB[2])

Inputs to 'Black Box' from Police System and Environment
Outputs from 'Black Box' to the Police System and the Environment
Boundary of police sub-systems and environment

Figure 3.3 The Macro Evaluation Concept

89

3.8.8. There are six specific inputs and outputs that is addressed by the macro level evaluation, each of which is determined by a multiple measures.

i.   Information   (I) from the police system to the environment - measured by police and public surveys i.e. the police output from the police view, which constitutes an input to the public and is in turn assessed from the public's view.

ii. Police behaviour (B) - measured by surveys of police attitudes toward   defined behaviours   and police physical behaviour study. In addition a public attitude survey assesses the public view of these behaviours.

iii. Information (EI)   from the environment to   police - measured by police questionnaire addressing police knowledge of environmental   information and a demand study of the assessment made by police officers of the quantity and quality of public demand on police.

iv. Behaviour by police interacting with the public within the human environment (EB) measured   by individual attitude questionnaire, police demand studies and police behavioural studies.

v.   Renewed information (RI) as an output from the black box measured by (i) and (ii) above. RI[1] in respect of police feedback   and RI[2] in respect of   public feedback.

vi. Renewed behaviours (RB)   as an output   from the black box measured by (ii) and (iv) above. RB[1] in respect of police behaviours and RB[2] in respect of public behaviours.

3.8.9. The above six indicators were to be considered by both quantitative and qualitative methods. The combination of the two assessment methods in relation to the evaluation would enable two overall system assessments to be determined.

3.8.10. The speed of feedback of RI[1], RI[2], RB[1] and RB[2] will provide a macro measure of system efficiency resulting in change. A slow rate of feedback will indicate a low level of efficiency at the station in achieving the stated aims of the project, whereas a faster rate of feedback will indicate a greater efficiency and responsiveness in achieving the openness required. Efficiency in achieving the collective project objectives may be assessed by this indicator on the grounds that (I), (EI), RI[1] and RI[2] are known at the pre implementation stage and the same inputs and outputs will be known at the post test stage. Therefore the effort applied through project treatments in (I) and (EI) will produce an output in RI[1] and RI[2].

3.8.11. The quantity of information and to some extent the quality and type of information being fed back (RI[1] & RI[2]) will provide a measure of the degree of openness of the system. The project required that a greater exchange is made between police and public through a range of specified treatments. The macro measure for this aspect is the degree of openness determined by the quantity of information fed back in relation to the initial situation. Here it will be possible to determine how much output is obtained from the given inputs established by the collective treatments. Qualitative indicators will relate principally to factors affecting the specific environmental condition and may not therefore be of direct significance to the comparative studies.

3.9 Systems Efficiency and Systems Effectiveness

3.9.1. In the context of the preceding paragraph it becomes important to define what is meant by efficiency and effectiveness. Figure 3.4 shows the police station as a box that receives inputs and transforms them into outputs. The goals for the police station are shown as inputs and outputs. Primary goals are set for a station by the wider organisation but the station also has internal goals with discretion in terms of which services it provides, to what extent and to which specific area. The internally generated goals serve to direct and focus the station's efforts and are fed back to the wider organisation.

Figure 3.4 Model of Efficiency and Effectiveness Feedback

(Adapted from CLELAND and KING 1983)

3.9.2. Figure 3.4 also shows two feedback loops. The lower labelled 'efficiency feedback' involves the comparison of outputs to inputs. This is a measure of the ability of the station to make the transformation from inputs to outputs. This aspect is the concern of the macro evaluation which proposes that the system should be more open. The systems ability to transform a greater and more varied level of inputs into outputs is a measure of its efficiency (Cleland and King 1983) associated with a particular degree of openness.

3.9.3. The upper feedback loop, effectiveness feedback, relates outputs to the goals of the police organisation. Thus, while efficiency measures show how well the station is transforming inputs into outputs, effectiveness measures show how well the outputs correspond to desired achievements, i.e. the internal and organisational goals.

3.10   The Macro Evaluation - Experimental Design

3.10.1. To return to the original proposition, it is an illusionary concept that causality in policing systems research may be ascribed with complete certainty outside pure experimentation, or total elimination in order to arrive at a singular explanation. This situation is not unique since similar problems are posed in studies which concern for instance, macro economic research.

3.10.2. The methodologies adopted therefore have to recognise and cope with these difficulties. The situation is summarised in Checkland's (1972) description of action research:

> "The point is, being concerned with intervention in purposeful systems, the action researcher , unlike the researcher in experimental science or technology can express his research aims as hopes, but cannot with certainty design them into his experiments. He is prepared to react to whatever happens in the research situation; he has to follow wherever the situation leads

him, or stop the research." (in Beishon and Peters 1976 pg. 57)

3.10.3. The aim should therefore be to approach the study with as much rigour as resources allow and to fully exploit the techniques and methodologies available. The alternative is to ignore the complexity of the organisational/environmental interactions and concentrate on limited, but necessarily isolated evaluations, which due to their nature are generally simpler and therefore more manageable.

3.10.4. The usual attempt in any experimental design is to match conditions and subjects as closely as possible with only the experimental treatment as a variable, i.e. treatment and control. This proved to be impossible in the context of the N.P. project and is now considered inappropriate in the context of policing systems due primarily to the difficulty of securing a truly equivalent control group that is subject to the same environmental inputs.

3.10.5. The environments of each police station have their own unique and distinct characteristics, making each markedly different from each other, despite their many apparently equivalent features. The police practices, methods and individuals at the selected stations also differ, although the police officers themselves displayed many similarities which were to prove significant. Although the sites had a great number of common factors they had significantly more differences and it had to be accepted that the concept of a control site was inappropriate. Additionally, the implementation of very similar treatments on a force wide basis through the action planning process removed any possibility of an equivalent control group being maintained. (Paragraph 3.3.3)

3.10.6. Therefore, a change to the macro evaluation project design was made. The new macro evaluation was to comprise three features as follows:

  i. repeated treatments,

  ii. interrupted time series,

  iii. case studies.

3.11   Repeated Treatments

3.11.1. It was considered that the difficulty of securing an equivalent control group could be overcome to some extent by using the four police station sites to control against each other. Cook and Campbell (1979) specified a model for a repeated treatment experimental design whereby at a single condition, treatments are phased in and out and a judgement is made as to attribution on the basis of the resulting time series.

3.11.2. This would seem not to be a totally practical solution for a complete policing system although the approach did seem to have possibilities at the micro level. However it was thought possible to repeat the implementation of a similar range of treatments at each of the four sites in sequence. Should similar outputs be observed at all four sites then some certainty might be ascribed to the association between output and treatment. If each site displayed a similar trend across a range of similar indicators then overall attribution might be ascribed to the project treatments.

3.11.3. Say the probability of any given system output occurring by chance, or some wider organisational design is P[0.5] for each of the four test conditions. Assuming that the probability of the system outputs occurring by design of the

project is higher, say P[0.75], then the probability of the specified outputs occurring by chance at all four conditions would be P[0.06] (i.e. P[0.5 x 0.5 x 0.5 x 0.5]) but the probability of all occurring by design would be much higher, P[0.32]. Therefore, should the four test conditions show substantial similarity in findings then it would be probable that there was a non-random effect occurring and some judgements may be made as to attribution.

3.12   Interrupted Time Series

3.12.1. Secondly, implementation of treatments was to be phased between the four test conditions which thus established four separate sequences of implementations which are considered as four simple interrupted time series. At its most basic, a simple interrupted time series requires one test condition and multiple observations before and after a treatment. However, in the case of the N.P. project, it would be known with some precision when the various treatments were applied to the four test conditions. It would therefore be possible to observe when and whether the expected changes had occurred after implementation. i.e. there would be some interruption to the established output which would be repeated at the four test conditions in sequence.

3.12.2. It would not be known until after the treatments have been applied to the first condition the extent of the time lag before an interruption occurs. However, once this has been established at the first condition, a similar finding after a similar lag at the second and subsequent site would provide some re-enforcement to judgements as to attribution. This method is somewhat more problematic than the earlier design in that the speed of the effect of the treatments would depend largely on the organisations receptiveness to change at the test conditions, which is largely outside the control of the project.

3.12.3. Much of the data required to create the time series models would already exist in police archives. The duration of the project would almost certainly be too short to establish reliable time series of data specifically collected for the evaluation. By utilising data collected for other purposes as a part of the routine organisation functioning it would be possible to establish the necessary time series.

3.12.4. However, such an exercise would not be without difficulties. Seasonality, other exogenous cyclical variations, variations in recording practices, inappropriate data groupings (weekly, monthly, annual etc.) and the very limited availability of behavioural data would all complicate and thus reduce the rigour of this approach. Despite these difficulties, the use of archive material was considered appropriate as the sources were readily available and thus cost effective. Amongst those suggested sources were:-

    i.   reported crimes, including arrests and clear-ups,

    ii.   reported traffic accidents,

    iii.   police response data,

    iv.   staffing levels,

    v.   demographic data, (i.e. local age profile)

    vi.   racial attack and other minority group incident data,

    vii.   juvenile crime statistics,

    viii.   public order tension indicators,

    ix.   police sickness,

    x.   complaints against police,

3.13   Case Studies

3.13.1. Thirdly, the N.P. project   by its very nature, might be assessed by four separate case studies whereby the progress of the project is objectively observed at each test site. Without the benefit of any comparative assessments, case studies in isolation are still able to provide a useful assessment of change.

3.13.2. The principal benefit arises from the un-confounded pre-test information that was taken at the beginning of the project before the structure and output of the project were widely known at station level. Additionally the pre-test data taken form the other stations involved form a reliable base line from which individual station case studies might be commenced.

3.14   The Modified Experimental Design

3.14.1. The three foregoing features that comprise the multiple method approach for the N.P. project were to be applied to four separate sites, or test conditions. The results from each site would combine to form a potentially reliable basis from which a systems level assessment might be made of the N.P. project.

3.14.2. In London, the original site selection decisions were reviewed and four divisions were selected to form the new experimental model. These were to be Notting Hill, Hackney, Brixton and Kilburn divisions. In the Surrey Constabulary area the original site selection decisions were not altered although the concept of a control site was dropped on the basis of the difficulties described. This left Camberley to be considered only as a case study.

3.14.3. The original decision to integrate the management information system (M.I.S.) into the experimental design was also dropped and the M.I.S. was considered as a case study only at one site in London and one in Surrey. The reasons for this alteration were more practical than theoretical. Considerable difficulties were experienced with development of the system which made co-ordinating implementation with other aspects of the project virtually impossible. This issue is later discussed in more detail. (Section 4.3)

3.15   The Micro evaluation - Police Methods and Concepts.

3.15.1. The proposition that '...*the prevention of crime as well as the detection of offenders...*'[1] is an important theoretical goal and is as appropriate now as when professional police forces were formed in 1829. However research, (Punch 1979 and Jones 1980) has indicated that the practical reality of present day policing reflects a bias towards a legally oriented police organisation where professional police norms very much favour offender detection as the behaviour of an 'ideal' police officer and thus constitutes 'real' police work (Beckett 1981).

3.15.2. The evidence indicated that whilst police have demonstrated considerable success in some areas, they are gradually failing in their statutory and publicly expected duties of crime control (Gurr 1978). It has been argued (Shaffer 1980 and Hart 1981) that the observed offender detection bias constitutes an ineffective police strategy and that more prevention oriented policies must be implemented by police. The N.P. project attempted to add evidence to this proposition through the micro evaluation studies.

---

[1] This quotation is attributed to Charles Rowan and Richard Mayne, the first joint Commissioners of the Metropolitan Police in 1829. (Critchley 1978 pg.52)

3.15.3. Although the detailed range of micro evaluation studies fall outside the scope of this present research it is appropriate to describe the underlying principles and theories in order to set the N.P. project in context.

3.16   Police Behaviour

3.16.1. Initial research into modern urban policing, (Mawby 1979 and Punch 1979) concluded that contrary to police preferences, police spend too little time in offender detection and mainly provide assistance to various members of the public who are, or consider themselves to be, victims requiring help.

3.16.2. The type of help demanded and usually provided is the type of help or assistance one might reasonably expect from a concerned fellow citizen. (Manning 1977). The evidence would therefore indicate that professional police behaviour is made up of large amounts of helping or prosocial behaviour responses directed at victimised members of the public.

3.16.3. The N.P. project suggested that it may be possible to influence and increase the development of prosocial behaviour in both police and public. The model developed by the project was based on theories by Staub (1978) and provides a testable framework within which it is possible to influence the behaviour of individuals.

3.16.4. The most direct methods of influence are either by providing experience and improving competence, or by providing rewards and enhancing self esteem when prosocial behaviour is exhibited. Environmental influences are also considered important in creating the 'ideal' conditions for prosocial behaviour to be the accepted norm. It is in this context that the adoption of personal modelling within a

social learning paradigm (Bandura 1971) is suggested to be a powerful aid to developing norms of prosocial behaviour in individuals.

3.16.5. The primary response that the N.P. project suggested to be important to policing behaviour was 'victim' helping, that could be exhibited either by a police officer or a private citizen. The N.P. project defined victim helping behaviour as:

"Behaviour that benefits other people by providing the type of help or assistance to a victim of crime, or other circumstance, which one might reasonably expect from a concerned fellow citizen". (Beckett 1981)

3.16.6. The N.P. project proposed three hypotheses on the basis of this assertion (Beckett 1981) which are stated informally as:

i. an increase in victim helping behaviour will increase public satisfaction with police,

ii. an increase in victim helping behaviour by police will predict an increase in such helping behaviour by members of the public, (on the basis of social learning)

iii. an increase in victim helping by community members will predict a reduction in street crime.

3.16.7. It was recognised that it would be extremely difficult to introduce a practical police strategy in an urban environment that would stimulate individual members of the public to be influenced in such a way, simply due to the numbers of individuals concerned. It was suggested that a possible means of influencing the desired behaviours and reducing the challenge to manageable proportions was to use group learning techniques through established community groups. (Beckett 1981)

3.16.8. The community group appeared to be the most appropriate vehicle for influencing deviant behaviour towards beneficial group norms. In the police context, deviant behaviour is taken to encompass outside, or street crime.

3.16.9. The urban environment appeared to militate against the successful maintenance of such community groups, the bias being towards smaller and smaller units of people and many isolated individuals.

3.16.10. Additionally, the range and diversity of such groups tends to suggest that consensus about norms of behaviour may only be achieved in respect of the most extreme forms of deviance. Although some groups such as deviant criminal gangs find the urban environment more conducive to formation and maintenance, finding as they do, sufficient individuals with like deviant norms to form a group and an environment in which their type of behaviour is successful.

3.16.11. It was suggested (Beckett 1981) that the most important requirement is a behaviour which can be measured at both the individual and community (group) level. He concluded that such behaviour could be called 'community helping behaviour' and was defined as *"Behaviour that benefits the creation, development or stability of a community group the function of which is to increase services to the community"*

3.16.12. The significant difference between community helping and victim helping behaviours is that community helping is aimed at groups of people rather than the individually oriented victim helping behaviour.

3.16.13. The N.P. project suggested that by using the influence of modelling on behaviour, communities might be created and maintained in an urban environment. The agents in such a process would be professional police officers and public volunteers. The project thus proposed five further hypotheses which are informally stated as:

i. an increasing community helping behaviour by police will increase public satisfaction with police,

ii. an increase in community helping behaviour by police and a significant number of directly influenced community volunteers will increase the overall level of positive community oriented activities and will predict an increase in the level of community helping responses by indirectly influenced community members, (through social learning)

iii. an increase in community helping behaviour by community members will predict an increase in victim helping behaviour by community members,

iv. an increase in community helping behaviour and victim helping behaviour by community members will predict a decrease in the actual level of street crime in the geographical boundaries of that community,

v. an increase in community helping behaviour and victim helping behaviour by members of the community will predict a decrease in community demands for immediate police response services.

3.16.14. It will be noted that increases in both victim and community helping behaviour by police are suggested to have little effect other than initially increasing public satisfaction. This is because it was thought that such behaviour in isolation by the police without full public participation would only serve to further fuel the police response loop previously described. (Figure 2.1)

3.16.15. In order to stabilise the loop or even reduce it, input is required from the public, thus emphasising that services are not free in that they entail a social cost to the users. In this way it was suggested that a reduction in the demand for police services might be brought about. (Beckett and Hart 1981)

3.16.16. The vital element in this policing strategy was the front line, foot patrol officer who interacted with the public on a day to day basis. However, as indicated previously it was thought that the existing police organisational system was not conducive to such a complex tactic to support the required police behaviours.

3.16.17. Therefore the N.P. project suggested a number of organisational, structural and process changes in order to more appropriately support a policing system that reinforced such behaviours rather than constraining them.

3.16.18. The dependant nature of front line policing on its environment indicates that considerable attention should be given to developing a more open system at lower levels in order that police officers may be more responsive to their environment. Additionally, the complex nature of such work with little discernible end product and the difficulties of effective supervision suggest that small work groups may provide the most appropriate front line structure.

3.16.19. The training of front line officers for the N.P. project thus had two aims. Firstly to enable individuals to internalise and understand the organisational goals and secondly to enhance competence in the various types of behaviour within geographically assigned work teams. Two further hypotheses were thus proposed which are simply stated as:

i. a change in police training and organisational rewards/reinforcement will change police attitudes,

ii. a change in police training, organisational rewards/reinforcement and police attitudes will predict a change in police behaviour.

3.17 The Micro Evaluation Model

3.17.1. The N.P. micro evaluation contained fifteen separate variables arising from the ten hypotheses. These are summarised in the signed di-graph at Figure 3.5. This systematic representation shows how the various elements of the micro behavioural aspect of the project relate together.

3.17.2. In Figure 3.5, the circles represent the various hypothesised behaviours described in Section 3.16. The connecting lines and arrows indicate the direction of either an augmenting effect, indicated by a [+] sign, or an inhibiting effect indicated by a [-] sign.

Figure 3.5 Signed Di-graph of Micro Evaluation
Aggregate Variables

CHAPTER FOUR

Summary

Chapter Four describes the systems approach to the implementation of the Neighbourhood Policing (N.P.) treatments. The concept of delivery systems for the implementation of change are introduced and the relationship between the strategic aims of N.P. and policing sub-systems are described. The evaluations of the trials of N.P. are reviewed within the context and purpose of the delivery systems and judgements are made on the basis of the available evidence as to the benefits of the outputs. It is concluded that N.P. was not judged to be an overall success. It is asserted that this outcome is equivocal and more likely to have occurred as a result of the process of change and implementation, rather than the systems approach used, the appropriateness of the N.P. strategy, or the design of the individual elements.

4.1 The Approach to Implementation

4.1.1. Throughout the planning of N.P., a systems approach advanced by Jenkins (1976) was adopted and advocated. Jenkins suggested that successful change to organisational systems had to be achieved by an overall and holistic approach. He rejected a reductionist approach on the grounds of the rapidly increasing complexity of modern organisations. He argued that organisations would come to depend on overall and co-ordinated system functioning for success and competitiveness.

4.1.2. The implications of Jenkins (1976) approach for policing organisations were that plans would be necessary for changes to the entire policing system at a police station, rather than to progress with a more conventional,

incremental and piecemeal approach. The desirability and potential benefits of adopting such an approach was reinforced by a number of prominent writers on systems approaches to organisational change. (Beer 1980, Checkland 1972, Cleland and King 1983, Koontz and O'Donnell 1976, Kast and Rosenzweig 1981 et al)

4.1.3. It was repeatedly asserted by the authors of N.P. (Beckett and Hart 1981) that introducing change to a single feature of the police system in isolation should be avoided. Arguing that it was considered probable that little benefit from the change would be realised. It was suggested that dysfunctional influences of existing components of the policing system, that were not designed to co-ordinate with new elements, would negate the benefits of change. (Cleland and King 1972)

4.1.4. N.P. was designed as a synergistic system whereby each element of N.P. system relied upon other elements operating efficiently in order that potential effectiveness could be realised. Therefore it was argued to be conceptually inappropriate to implement each element in a sequence, whereby each succeeding element would only be introduced as the preceding change was seen to be effective.

4.1.5. In order to overcome this problem, whilst avoiding further difficulties associated with implementing each treatment simultaneously, N.P. was designed so as to facilitate sequential implementation of groups of elements. (Chapter 5) A detailed implementation plan was prepared and presented in the form of a P.E.R.T. chart from which a series of more detailed of flow charts were developed. The charts showed the sequence of changes that were designed to provide a logical and timed progression from one change event to the next. (The P.E.R.T. chart and samples of detailed flow charts are reproduced in a reduced format at Appendix A.)

4.1.6. The proposed advantage of this approach was seen to be a compromise between a sudden, total system change, that could be argued to be unethical, (Beckett 1981) and a more protracted approach. On the basis of the evidence relating to systems approaches *(ibid.)* it was considered by the authors that if each element of N.P. were introduced separately and sequentially, then evaluated and assessed, the overall implementation time would be unacceptably extended and the potential advantages of the systems approach could be lost. (The relative advantages and disadvantages of differing approaches and timings of implementations are discussed in detail at Chapter Five.)

4.1.7. Whilst there is a logical sequence to the programme of N.P. changes, it was apparent that the sequence would need to be varied to suit local circumstances. Factors such as the motivation of local management, equipment availability, training capacity and variations in the speed of dissemination of information about the changes would all influence both the pace and sequence of the changes.

4.1.8. In order to manage the resulting complexity, the N.P. elements are organised into groups according to their strategic aim as described in the original proposals. (Section 2.16.) The elements grouped in this way provide a manageable sequence for the implementation of changes and may be considered as change delivery systems. The principal feature of a change delivery system being that it combines elements of the policing sub-systems into a unified change initiative, i.e. outputs (I & B) and (RI & RB) shown in Figure 3.3. Here, individual police officers and their resources work in a new structure, with new procedures, to bring about the actual alterations in routine police work that will achieve the strategic aims viz.:

i.   demand management,

ii. police organisation and efficiency,

iii. the police/public contract.

4.1.9. Demand management elements were to be introduced first, in order to stabilise the existing policing system. It was considered in Section 2.4, that some control should be gained over the demand led nature of policing before new internal systems to improve organisational efficiency could succeed.

4.1.10. Such an approach was to be closely linked to the provision of management information concerning the demands on police and the associated management systems and procedures, in order to promote the necessary action and change. Finally, with demand, management and organisational systems introduced, it would be possible to implement the policing behavioural changes that would address the police public contract and thus the preventive aims of N.P.

4.1.11. Conceptually the implementation sequence for N.P. is as described at Section 2.15. and in Figure 2.7. Below, the stages of the implementation sequence are summarised with a feedback loop and comparison to the original situation. The design of N.P. envisaged a continuous process of feedback from each of the groups of treatments as they were implemented. In this way it was envisaged that the system would be adaptive to local conditions.

4.1.12. The comparisons of outputs with the original situation would be made on the basis of monitoring, measuring and evaluation at the macro level as set out in outline at Figure 2.7 and in more detail in Chapter Three. Data for monitoring purposes would be available form the M.I.S. and D.I.I.U. and feedback from management and staff would provide the qualitative comparison.

Figure 4.1 N.P. Learning Related Implementation Sequence

4.2   System Evaluation

4.2.1.   The approach to evaluation set out in Chapter Three describes how an assessment of the overall system functioning might be achieved without necessarily understanding in detail, the nature of the interactions in the 'black box'. (Paragraph 3.8.4.) It was not therefore proposed as necessary to understand precisely how each of the elements of the system interacted with each other. Rather, it would be necessary to know whether each element was producing the desired output in order to complement and co-ordinate with other elements of the system. The outputs of the N.P. system, whether beneficial or otherwise, would be considered at the macro or system level, rather than by considering each element in isolation.

4.2.2.   For this purpose, the elements of the N.P. system may be most conveniently analysed within the three strategic areas associated with their respective delivery systems as described before. (Paragraph 4.1.8) The association between police sub-systems and the delivery systems are shown in the diagram at Figure 4.2.

4.2.3.   Here, the police sub-systems (Section 3.6) are shown interacting together to produce a collective output. This amounts to the total police system output to the environment. The total output is then shown as divided into three delivery systems which operationalise the specified changes. The changes produced then affect the human and physical policing environment, as well as feeding back to the police sub-systems. The feedback therefore bringing about changes to the overall policing system.

4.2.4.   Each of the police delivery systems contain a group of the N.P. treatments or elements that either associate together by virtue of their strategic aim, or which are mutually supporting by virtue of their synergistic relationship. (4.1.4)

Figure 4.2 Police Operations Delivery Systems

4.2.5. Pragmatically, it will be apparent in that each N.P. element is not mutually exclusive, or solely confined in its operation to a single strategic purpose or delivery system. Each element whilst operating within its own sub-system, will have an influence on a range of other elements, thus influencing their operation and other strategic aims. This is the practical realisation of systems concepts applied to a real world organisational systems and illustrative of the complexity involved in the process of change.

4.2.6. The N.P. elements grouped according to their delivery systems are shown at Figure 4.3.

DELIVERY SYSTEMS		
Demand **Management**	**Police Organisation** **and Efficiency**	**Police Public** **Contract**
Management information system and divisional information and intelligence unit Aligning duties to demands Crime management and case screening Graded response to demands Dedicated communications officers	Geographic responsibility Directed patrolling Targeting and surveillance Participative management Sector and divisional planning	Information exchange Community crime prevention Community and victim helping Community development
Initial and follow on training for N.P. *(These elements are associated with each delivery system)*		

Figure 4.3   N.P. Elements in Delivery System Groups

4.2.7.   A review of the elements of the N.P. system follows, where
each element is evaluated in the sequence shown in Figure
4.3 within delivery system   groups.   Each element is

assessed in the context of associated objectives including training, together with how each operates within its own particular policing sub-system. Also considered is the interaction and co-ordination with other elements and sub-systems in accordance with the evaluation concept described in Chapter Three. Training as a separate subject is considered within the police organisation and efficiency section.

4.3   Demand Management - The M.I.S. and D.I.I.U.

4.3.1.   The original problem situation summarised by the self reinforcing, 'reactive loop' of demands shown at Figure 2.1 represented the first strategic area to be tackled. Central to achieving success in this regard, was to be quantitative monitoring of incoming demands on police by the station based management information system (M.I.S.).

4.3.2.   Over a period of two years commencing in August 1981 with the assistance of the Management Services Department and the Department of Computing Services of the Metropolitan Police, the N.P. project team designed and installed a working M.I.S. at three of the test stations. (Figure 2.2)

4.3.3.   The M.I.S. was designed to process data inputs captured from incoming demands (incident information) to the station which incorporated location, day, time, type and result information. Resource availability data was also to be a feature of the design, enabling managers to assess how staff availability corresponded to the station demand profile throughout each twenty-four hour period. This information was essential for adjustments to be made to officers' shift and deployment patterns. Outputs were provided in the form of daily, weekly and four weekly charts which displayed

summary information in the from of bar charts and pie charts. (Hall and Hart 1983)

4.3.4. The M.I.S. was installed in conjunction with the creation of the N.P. element known as the 'Divisional Information and Intelligence Unit' (D.I.I.U.). This small unit was staffed by two or three police officers and civilian staff who were responsible for operating the M.I.S., collecting and collating other relevant information and preparing it for dissemination to appropriate managers and staff.

4.3.5. This section will demonstrate that the concept of the D.I.I.U. may be claimed to be one of the major successes of the N.P. project, although at the experimental stage a number of major difficulties limited the potential effectiveness of the units.

4.3.6. Despite the early setbacks, by the mid 1980's every division in London was operating such a D.I.I.U. and the Metropolitan Police had published an internal booklet setting out guidelines and best practice for establishing and running such units. (M.P.S. 1991). The progress and development of the experimental M.I.S. to this point was not straightforward however, nor originally successful in relation to the realisation of the design expectations. (Atkinson and Wilmore 1984)

4.3.7. The M.I.S suffered from a sequence of major setbacks and delays, any one of which having the potential to terminate the M.I.S. project. (Atkinson and Wilmore 1984; Irving et al 1989) These may be summarised as follows:

    i. the bespoke software was very unreliable in an operational setting, despite having passed acceptance testing,

    ii. the software did not conform to the user requirement (Hall and Hart 1983) in several significant respects

which reduced functionality, e.g. the M.I.S. could not show the numbers of incoming demands to the police station by time of day or beat, a mapping feature was not provided, duty state information (staff availability data) was not provided and the software suite was so highly structured that enhancements and changes could not easily be realised,

iii. the choice of hardware proved to be inappropriate both in terms of reliability and suitability for the software suit,

iv. the M.I.S. system design was not generally seen by the end users as wholly appropriate to their needs,

v. the implementation process suffered from a series of delays and system failures, although the training given to operators and the appreciation presentations for supervisors and managers were generally successful and appreciated.

4.3.8. The external evaluators, (The Police Foundation) were convinced of the worth of the concept of the M.I.S. describing it as *"...the logical hub of the N.P. wheel..."* (Irving et al 1989 pg. 69). This confidence was seen to have been well placed, as by 1987 the Metropolitan Police had fully adopted the concept of the M.I.S. and adapted the functions into a station based microcomputer system called T.O.P.S.Y. (Territorial OPerations SYstem). The essential difference between the original M.I.S. and T.O.P.S.Y. was a greater degree of user flexibility built into the latter. This was almost certainly achieved by result of packaged software developments, as opposed to the bespoke software approach used for the experimental M.I.S.

4.3.9. Despite the longer term success of the station based M.I.S. concept, the evaluators were critical of both the N.P. project team and operational officers involved in trying to establish

the M.I.S. (Irving et al 1989). Criticism at the station level centred upon the reluctance of most local officers to appreciate or foresee how such a system could be of value to their work. Operational officers could see value in a system that collated criminal intelligence information, but not one that collated and presented only statistical data concerning incoming demands. A number of presentations on the subject of the M.I.S. were made by project team officers, but these only served to raise the expectations of local officers which were subsequently to be unrealised by the actual performance of the computer system (Irving et al 1989)

4.3.10. The project team was widely criticised by the evaluators in respect of the M.I.S. design, the realisation and the implementation of the computer system and the D.I.I.U. concept. It is difficult to find any positive assessments of the M.I.S. or D.I.I.U. in any of the evaluation material. Turner (1987[a]) goes even further than Irving (1989) in his condemnation and states *"...the cost effectiveness of the D.I.I.U. was rated as zero or marginal..."* (pg. 26)

4.3.11. It would be misleading to attempt to speculate as to which single factor was the major cause of the early rejection and failure of the M.I.S. There is little doubt that any of the above factors could have the potential to produce a situation that would result in a failure. It seems more likely however, that the initial M.I.S. suffered from the combined effect of a number of faults and shortcomings, which resulted in both a failure of the computer system itself, and the associated temporary rejection of it by police station users. The issue of the human reaction to change and cultural resistance to it, is discussed in more detail in Chapters Five and Six. But it is worthy of note at this stage, that a possible reason for the failure of the M.I.S. concerns the issue that the M.I.S. had the potential to alter the style of policing undertaken by local officers. The M.I.S. output if acted upon, would have focused management attention on the nature and extent of incoming

demands and the police response to them, rather than the arrest and charge rate that had been the traditional implied measure of performance. (Smith et al 1983) Such an emphasis would alter the style of local policing away from a law enforcement orientation towards a more service directed approach which was one of the strategic aims of N.P. (Paragraph 2.7.1.)

4.3.12. Such a possibility was not addressed by the evaluators; neither was the desirability of linking the provision of management information to the strategic needs of the whole organisation. Atkinson & Wilmore (1984) advanced the view that the operational officers' role should be linked to the provision of appropriate information. They comment, *"The primary problem appears to be the lack of* (a force wide) *planning strategy for information."* (pg. 105) Despite the views of the objective evaluators the concept of station based computerised information systems has grown in popularity and by the 1990s considerable emphasis was to be placed upon quantitative analysis of demands, resources and performance at every Metropolitan police station. (M.P.S. 1991) So desirable is this now seen by both police for operational purposes and public and government for accountability purposes, the regular reporting of police performance information has become a statutory requirement. (Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994 Section 4. Ch. 29)

4.3.13. One common finding that emerges from each of the three separate evaluations of the M.I.S. and D.I.I.U. (Atkinson and Wilmore 1984; Turner 1987; Irving et al 1989) is the failure of the Metropolitan Police as it was then organised, to adequately develop and co-ordinate the actual operational data needs of practising officers with potential technological solutions. Possible reasons for this in the context of the dynamics of change processes in both organisations and humans are examined in more detail in Chapters Five and Six. The specific findings from the reports of the above N.P.

evaluators regarding the likely organisational reasons for poor technological support, may be summarised as follows:

i.   a lack of clarity as to the organisations' priorities,

ii. the absence of a corresponding information strategy,

iii. a computing department largely familiar with only bespoke software and large centralised mainframe applications,

iv. little organisational experience of representing operational users' priorities in the design of flexible computer solutions,

v.   organisational size, structure and culture unsuited to quickly developing small computer applications,

vi. an unfamiliarity at operational levels of the potential of 'micro' (personal) computers,

vii. an unfamiliarity at operational management levels in both specifying and using information to improve performance.

viii. a traditional reliance on reported crime statistics as the principal barometer of the police environment.

4.4   Demand Management - Aligning Duties with Demands

4.4.1.   The proposal to align police officers duty times to correspond to the hourly time profile of incoming demands is essentially straightforward in concept. Practically, it is dependant upon the ability of a police station to accurately measure the incoming rate of demands from the public across a 24 hour period for each day of the week.

Operational officers are then assigned to duty times that correspond to need, i.e. larger numbers on duty at times of predictable peak demand, reducing to minimum numbers at times of forecast zero, or minimal demand.

4.4.2. It is an essential feature of police operations that sufficient staff are available at all times to react satisfactorily to emergencies. But the tradition and practice in London as well as in many forces elsewhere, had been to divide the operational officers at any particular division into four separate work groups of approximately equal numbers. The work groups, known in London as 'reliefs' and typically identified as A, B, C, or D, were then assigned to an 8 hour tour of duty, from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m. (early), 2 p.m. to 10 p.m. (late), or 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. (night) with the fourth relief having a rest day. A roster was applied that covered a twenty-eight day period and ensured that each relief worked for 7 days each of early shift , late shift and night duties with 8 rest days in any twenty-eight day period. (The eighth rest day being taken on a rotational basis, usually when a 6 am to 2 p.m. shift was rostered)

4.4.3. A predictable and administratively convenient system thus ensured that an equal number of officers were on duty throughout any 24 hour period.

4.4.4. The advantages of this method were:

    i.   simple and straightforward to manage and administer,

    ii. routine and easily predictable staffing levels,

    iii. supply of officers invariably exceeded demands at slack times and thus a contingent staffing level was available for sudden emergencies,

    iv. duties and leisure activities were straightforward for individuals to plan well into the future,

v. officers always worked with the same colleagues and supervisors, thus strong team identity was established for each relief.

4.4.5. The rules and regulations that controlled these conditions of employment were incorporated into legislation through statutory instruments and the Police Regulations enacted under primary legislation of the Police Act in 1964. Therefore there was little local managers could alter in respect of basic working practices without the active co-operation of the work force and staff associations.

4.4.6. It was considered by the N.P. project team that the variability of incoming demands to a police station fluctuated sufficiently throughout the day so as to make alterations to the existing system worthwhile. A sample frame was developed that randomised internal and external variables to produce a mean daily rate of incoming demands that required a response from police. The example shown below is in respect of Notting Hill police station, but similar tables were produced for all other experimental sites, all of which showed broadly similar profiles.

	Mon	Tues	Wed	Thur	Frid	Sat	Sun	Total
Early	10	15	16	14	17	12	9	93
Late	31	25	33	26	19	22	18	174
Night	12	7	10	14	14	17	11	85
Total	25	15	15	27	26	30	15	153

Figure 4.4 Notting Hill Division - Mean Daily Response Messages

4.4.7. It will be seen at Figure 4.4. that the late shift is considerably busier than the other two shifts, although less significantly so at weekends. Further data collections established a reliable

pattern on an hourly as opposed to shift basis. This more detailed analysis illustrated how the majority of demands arose before 2.00 am on night duty and after 8.00 am on early shift. This pattern was similarly repeated across each division tested by the N.P. project team, although some significant variations arose at weekends at different locations. There was no evidence of seasonality where the data collections were repeated at intervals of several months, or any evidence to suggest that there was any pattern to the severity or difficulty of the demands.

4.4.8. This in itself was an important finding in that the amount of police time consumed by any single demand is not only a function of its severity, but also its difficulty in terms of complexity or uniqueness. For instance, a domestic murder although severe in nature, is a potentially straightforward matter for the responding officers, especially if the suspect has remained at the scene. After the initial response, the investigation would be entirely handed over to senior detective officers. A domestic dispute that has not resulted in a death however, may be much less severe in character, but in terms of difficulty, may occupy the responding officers for many hours.

4.4.9. It was ascertained that severity and difficulty of incoming demands on the police were randomised across times of the day and days of the week. Therefore, the basic demand frequency data shows there is a persuasive argument to justify altering duty times in order to more closely align officer availability, with the periods of highest numbers of incoming demands.

4.4.10. Turner (1987) in his evaluation of N.P. found that the alteration of officers duties to correspond with incoming demands was not found to be general practice within the trial. He suggests that experience at Hackney division was typical in that the senior officers thought the initiative to be worthwhile, but not considered to be practical by lower

ranking officers. This contrasts with the evaluation of the divisional commander who asserted that:

> *"From an operational point of view, this was very successful in combating the (demand) problems affecting the division. It particularly meant that there was a greater awareness of problems and of the varied responses available to them"* (Stapley, 1986 pg. 15)

4.4.11. The Police Foundation evaluation of the Notting Hill trial did not directly address the issue of duty alterations either in concept or practice. (Irving et al 1989) Within their report of observations and discussions with officers at Notting Hill however, it is clear that there was a strong feeling that the relief team should remain established in the existing duty roster pattern. More significantly however, Irving found that patrolling officers apparently had sufficient time to engage in more community contact within the existing duty roster system.

4.4.12. This contrasts sharply with the reports of officers interviewed within the overall N.P. research. These officers generally asserted that they were usually too busy dealing with incidents that required a response, which prevented them from engaging in other more proactive functions. Irving's finding is summarised as follows:

> *"There is no evidence that the level of incidents which patrol officers had to deal with precluded engaging in more community encounters, or further extending the range and scope of helping and other non-crime encounters. The message from this analysis is that patrolling officers appeared to have adequate time to engage in other activities if they had a mind to."* (Irving 1989 pg. 143)

4.4.13. This finding at Notting Hill appears to have been reinforced to some extent at Brixton where small teams of operational officers who were allocated to especially busy and sensitive

areas, adjusted their times of work to match peak demand times and were reported as being "....*the most productive work units with a range of multiple objectives being achieved.*" (Beckett, 1989 pg. 295)

4.4.14. Although widespread implementation of this initiative did not occur during the field trial of N.P., there did appear to be sufficient evidence to emerge from the project to warrant further exploration of the concept. The major advantages appearing as:

i. economic, in that a greater proportion of officer time may be demonstrated as being used productively, leaving less unaccountable time to be used at the officers' discretion,

ii. greater visibility of officers to the public during peak times,

iii. improved efficiency in that more officers are available to deal with demands at peak times,

iv. the duty roster can be designed to correspond to local community needs as opposed to administrative convenience.

4.4.15. The concept of aligning duties to demands was subsequently implemented throughout the Metropolitan Police from 1991 onwards (M.P.S. 1992) on the basis of the foregoing advantages.

4.5   Demand Management - Case Screening and the Crime Desk

4.5.1.   The recording and investigation of allegations of crime reported to the Metropolitan Police had traditionally been

the major function of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID). Minor crimes were generally allocated to more junior officers and the more serious allegations to progressively more experienced and senior officers. Functional variations in the form of specialist squads were frequently established at divisional level to deal with specific types of crime, i.e. very minor or 'beat crime', robberies, drug dealing, murder etc. The principal determining factors as to whether to form a squad, being the seriousness of the problem and/or the amount of police time allocated to the investigation(s), or specialist/specific knowledge involved. However the majority of crime reported to a police station was customarily allocated by CID supervisors to CID officers to investigate.

4.5.2.   It had been illustrated by Hart (1981) and has been subsequently reinforced in the O.P.R. (1990) that crime reporting rates, as well as other demands on police have been steadily increasing, at least over the preceding ten years. This overall, steady increase of between 7% and 15% per annum had not been matched by corresponding increases in police numbers, or in Government or local authority spending on the police. The result was significantly less police time being expended on the investigation of minor crimes and those crimes where it was quickly apparent that a successful outcome was unlikely. CID supervisors were thus in the position of having to make informal judgements as to which crime would attract more investigative effort than others. The rationale for this approach was simply that there was insufficient time to tackle every crime that was reported with the same rigor as hitherto.

4.5.3.   This was not a unique situation. An almost identical problem had previously existed in many regions of the USA. As a result, The Stanford Research Institute (P.E.R.F. 1979) had conducted a study amongst twenty-six separate police departments and produced a model for selecting which cases should be subject of further investigation and which

should not. Essentially, the model drew from contemporary research into crime report characteristics and correlated a range of factors relating to the circumstances of a burglary and the subsequent reporting to police, with the final outcome of the investigation. Thus, the greater the incidence of a particular feature when correlated with successful outcomes, the greater the value of the feature to an investigation. Weights in the form of numerical points were assigned to the features of a crime that were found to be the most reliable predictors of success in the subsequent investigation. The weights were allocated according to a ratio scale, in that a score of 7 represented that the value of the presence of the particular feature was seven times more valuable to the investigation, than a feature weighted at 1. The Stanford model assigned weights as follows:

i	Estimated range of time of occurrence (1 to 24 hours since occurrence)	0 to 5
ii	Witness report of offence	7
iii	'On view' report of offence	1
iv	Usable fingerprints	7
v	Suspect information (Description or name)	9
vi	Vehicle description	0.1
vii	Any other factors	0

4.5.4. The resulting arithmetic total indicated whether or not the crime should be 'screened out' and not investigated further unless additional information came to light. (e.g. in the Minnesota police agency the score for any single crime had to exceed 10 for an investigation to proceed)

4.5.5. Essentially the crime screening system was explored as a means of providing a more methodical and rigorous means of making management decisions regarding the allocation of resources to crime investigations, which hitherto had been made on the basis of an individual's experience and local circumstances.

4.5.6. The N.P. problem situation (Section 2.6) had clearly identified the desirability of regulating and managing incoming crime demands. The Stanford model offered such an opportunity by incorporating a systematic process into the overall N.P. model.

4.5.7. In order to administer a similar system, the N.P. project team suggested it would be necessary to introduce a single point at which the case screening decision might be made, in order to ensure consistency. This gave rise to the concept of the 'crime desk'.

4.5.8. The paper report of each crime made out by a police officer would be studied by the crime desk staff who would make the screening decision in the light of the likelihood of a successful outcome. The crime desk was to be staffed by experienced officers who would be available to both police and public on a 24 hour basis and who would provide a focus for crime report administration at a police station. The generalised sequence of the crime report process and the N.P. case screening system are shown in the diagram at Figure 4.5.

Figure 4.5   The N.P. Crime Screening System

4.5.9. The potential advantages of the case screening and crime desk system were seen as:

i. improved use of C.I.D. officer time,

ii. improved detection rates,

iii. a singe point at which the public could seek information regarding the progress of an investigation,

iv. a greater opportunity to recognise, co-ordinate and utilise crime intelligence arising from crime reports,

v. a greater opportunity to recognise crimes following a pattern or trend.

4.5.10. Turner (1987) produced data from which the following table is drawn that illustrates the mean proportional rate at which crimes were screened out at N.P. stations.

	Notting Hill	Hackney	Brixton	Kilburn
Beat and Motor Vehicle Crimes	59%	78%	59%	68%
Major Crimes and Robberies	18%	2%	18%	18%
Burglaries	26%	78%	74%	52%
All	40%	68%	52%	55%

Figure 4.6 Proportion of Reported Crimes 'Screened Out' (1986/7)

4.5.11. Figure 4.6. shows considerable variation between screening rates at different locations. These variations tended to depend on workload and the existence or not of specialist squads to deal with particular types of crime, e.g. robbery, burglary etc. (Turner 1987) As might have been expected however, the screening out rates for the generally less serious beat and motor vehicle offences are substantially higher than for the more serious types of crime. In practice this represented release of a large proportion of C.I.D. officer time. This time having been previously expended in investigating predominantly minor crime, or crime that could have been initially predicted as being realistically unlikely to successfully conclude.

4.5.12. If the substantial amount of time thus saved had then been allocated to those cases that showed a higher probability of successful investigation, then it would be reasonable to predict that a corresponding increase would be observed in both arrest and conviction rates for the more serious crimes.

4.5.13. Turner's (1987) analysis of the N.P. stations made comparisons with the crime report, arrest and conviction rates for the remainder of the Metropolitan Police and the 1987 British Crime Survey. He concluded that his figures *"...gave no support to the case that case screening has made any material difference to the allocation of resources or chance of detections."* (Turner 1987 [a] pg. 25)

4.5.14. There could be a number of explanations for this outcome:

i. the actual time saved was not 'new' time, as it is likely that in practice every crime was not fully investigated prior to the introduction of case screening - case screening merely formalised existing practice,

131

ii. the time saved was expended on other, non crime investigation activities,

iii. there exists a natural limit to the number of cases that have the potential for successful investigation that is considerably below the report rate - so screening out a proportion of 'low potential' cases will not influence the number of 'high potential' cases.

iv. arrest and conviction rates are more sensitive to factors other than investigative time, e.g. the skill of the individual officer, information available from informants, quality of witness accounts etc.

4.5.15. The operation of the crime desk received a similarly negative evaluation from Turner (1987). He concluded that the wider aspects of crime management including dealing with external enquiries were all handled by the crime desk staff, but there was little evidence that the methods adopted were any "...different from normal practice". (pg. 25)

4.5.16. This is an incomplete finding in that a purpose of the crime desk was to centralise normal practice at a single physical location and in this regard it appears to have been successful. Stapley (1986) in his evaluation is more positive as to the benefits of the crime desk, especially insofar that operational officers were released from administrative functions. He also recognises the benefits of standardisation in crime management procedures, including screening decisions. Beckett (1989), in his assessment of N.P. at Brixton division, also reports favourable features of the operation of the crime desk, especially in respect of the transfer of crime intelligence information to the D.I.I.U.

4.5.17. The findings from the N.P. experiment evaluators are equivocal in relation to case screening in particular and the operation of the crime desk concept in general. Despite some fundamental uncertainties regarding case screening in

1988, the Metropolitan Police implemented a comprehensive system of case screening throughout London which was associated with the implementation of the crime desk system. The basis of this implementation was a consensus view from operational detectives that the crime desk system was the most efficient and effective way to allocate crimes to investigators, to deal with victim follow up procedures and to generally manage and account for action in respect of all incoming reports of crimes. (M.P.S. Crime Investigation Priority Project [C.I.P.P.] 1988)

4.5.18. The case screening model that was implemented throughout the M.P.S. was similar in all fundamental respects to the N.P. system. Initially, the system was applied to offences of burglary using those known features of a report of such a crime that were thought to be reasonable predictors of a successful outcome. (Paragraph 4.5.3) Case screening was later extended to other types of theft, dishonesty, damage and a range of less serious crimes. The rationale for the implementation was that the growth in the rate of reported crimes was such that the police were unable to deal with every crime report as hitherto, and a scheme to prioritise police effort was therefore essential. (M.P.S. 'C.I.P.P.' 1988, O.P.R. 1990)

4.5.19. Both case screening and crime desk systems have subsequently been fully incorporated into police station crime procedures and become an established feature of divisional crime management. The operation of both have been fully justified by extensive internal research that examined the complete range of administrative and management procedures in relation to crime. (M.P.S. 'C.I.P.P.' - Final Confidential Report, 1991)

4.5.20. The questions that remain which will be addressed in Chapters 5 and 6 concern how and why such initiatives apparently fail in the short term. Is it the way they are

implemented, a staff resistance to change, or that the ideas themselves are underdeveloped at the outset?

4.6 Demand Management - Targeting and Surveillance Teams

4.6.1. The N.P. strategy had assumed that the C.I.D. time liberated by the application of the case screening model and the operation of the crime desk would be productively applied to activities of targeting and surveillance. By directing the energies of experienced detective officers to those known criminals who persistently commit crime (targeting) and watching their movements and activities until such time as they offended, or revealed evidence of offences, (surveillance) it was suggested that arrest and clear up levels would increase. Such techniques were not uncommon hitherto but had largely only been applied to specific types of crime, usually serious in nature and not to the day to day investigations at local police stations.

4.6.2. A number of variations were possible for organising officers to function in this specialised way and the N.P. project settled on the following three alternative approaches:

i. in the Metropolitan Police, locally based crime squads to have their establishment supplemented by additional detective officers (released from more mundane duties' by case screening) who would identify targets and co-ordinate the new work with the activities of the crime squad,

ii. dedicated targeting and surveillance teams might be created under the overall direction of C.I.D. managers,

iii. individual C.I.D. officers might be tasked on a rotational basis to undertake such duties alongside their other responsibilities.

(This approach was generally less favoured, in that the benefits of specialisation would be lost in routine day to day duties.)

4.6.3. Despite the logic of this initiative, the comparative ease of implementation and the attractiveness of such techniques to operational police officers, Turner (1987) could find little evidence of success in London. He does note that at the Surrey Police sites some successes were reported and these were attributable to N.P. He speculates that a probable cause was that the initiative was largely new to Surrey and they adopted a dedicated team approach as outlined above. In London however, the role description of divisional crime squads in theory at least, already included this approach to crime detection.

4.6.4. Given the concern of officers respecting criminality and their reported concern to deal with offenders (Irving et al 1989) it is surprising to find that they did not take full advantage of the opportunities presented by this particular aspect of N.P. It is possible therefore that the explanation concerns issues not connected with the actual tasks of targeting and surveillance as criminal investigation techniques, but rather organisational and/or motivation factors. These and associated matters are discussed further in Chapters Five and Six.

4.6.5. It is significant to note at this stage that surveillance and targeting techniques are now firmly established as major features of criminal investigation in London. The value of these approaches is illustrated their use and success as a part of the recent major anti burglary campaign known as 'Operation Bumblebee' which has been widely publicised and advertised in the public media during 1993/4. This

initiative and others utilising a similar approach depend upon:

i. dedicated officers allocated to deal with all incoming reports of burglary,

ii. the screening - in of all reports of burglary,

iii. the collation of all potentially useful information from the scene of each reported burglary,

iv. the collation of intelligence concerning known active burglars,

v. active follow up of the source of all recovered stolen property, i.e. markets, car boot sales, dealers etc.

4.6.6. It is not known whether the success of such initiatives is simply due to the additional resources concentrated on a particular type of crime, (at cost to some other police activity), or whether higher levels of resources provide the opportunity to apply the above combination of techniques. It seems plausible that where sufficient resources are not applied to a specific problem, then diminishing returns in the form of clear-ups will set in earlier than where a combined approach is sustained. The decision as to the extent of resources to apply to the investigation of a particular crime or category of crimes is often finely balanced. Under resourcing, even by a marginal level, may result in the total failure of an investigation, whereas a marginal increase in resources may produce a complete success. The N.P. trial did not produce any reliable data to aid such decisions, although such targeting and combination techniques continue to be regarded with favour by operational officers.

4.6.7. Again, the question that remains is why, given a negative evaluation in the N.P. project, targeting and surveillance techniques have proved to be successful in other settings?

4.7 Demand Management - Graded Response.

4.7.1. The reactive/demand loop model (Figure 2.1) at the basis of the N.P. project, shows how police resources are primarily demand led by external environmental factors. The major source of such demands arise from members of the public making a call for a police response, although a minority arise from administrative sources. Demands occur when an individual, or an organisation, experiences a difficulty, problem, or need which might broadly fall into one or more of the following categories:

> i.   a problem to which it is perceived the police might have, or ought to have a solution, i.e. crimes, traffic accidents/incidents, law enforcement etc.,

> ii. a problem the police are able to completely solve, but an assumption is made that the police will help and/or may know of an appropriate agency or individual who will, i.e. lost property, neighbour/domestic disputes, missing persons etc.,

> iii. through desperation in not knowing where else to go to alleviate a personal or social problem and being unable to cope with a situation - using the police as the most easily accessible 24 hour social service, i.e. homelessness, injury/death, mental illness, fear etc.,

> iv. public access to the statutory police roles in respect of licensing matters, i.e. liquor, firearms, taxis (in London), aliens registration etc.

v. internal demands arising from the courts, Crown Prosecution Service, internal procedures, local and national government and other administrative sources; such demands principally concern statutory responsibilities falling on police support services but may constitute a demand on operational officers.

4.7.2. Calls for police services may occur at the time of the incident, at a time when the individual concerned has given the matter some thought, at a convenient moment, or even days later when say, in the case of a crime, insurers insist that a report is made to the police. Thus the nature and frequency of incoming calls for police attention is determined by:

i. the type of incident,

ii. the perceived level of seriousness,

iii. the perception of success of police involvement,

iv. accessibility to a means of contact,

v. convenience to the individual making the report,

vi. statutory or mandatory requirement to report.

4.7.3. It may be appreciated from the foregoing list, (which is not exhaustive) that many factors which drive police resource allocation are not under the immediate control of police. Additionally, many police organisational surveys have established that demands on the police arising externally were increasing substantially against a static resource profile. (Oxford 1983, O.P.R. 1990)

4.7.4. Therefore as already described, a major feature of the policing problem situation was the established need to

provide a fast and immediate response to all incoming demands for police attention. By providing such a service, it seemed the police had little opportunity to engage in proactive work originated by themselves.

4.7.5. The police role had gradually but steadily become predominantly one of reaction to the public's problems and this in turn had moved the culture of the police officers towards a more reactive orientation. This was apparent from the common habit of officers regularly using uncommitted time waiting for an incoming demand to which they could react, rather than utilising the time pro actively. (Irving et al 1989, Smith 1983)

4.7.6. The aims of a satisfactory solution to this problem would thus contribute to moving the goal of policing away from a predominantly reactive paradigm towards one of a more preventive orientation. It was apparent that two principle interventions would be necessary:

    i. a mechanistic system for managing demand,

    ii. a means of influencing the 'reactive culture'.

4.7.7. The N.P. project proposed that it should be possible to manage incoming demand in a way that was acceptable both to the public and the police. This was considered feasible as it seemed that the public motivation to make a call to the police at a particular time was not solely a determinant of the incident itself.

4.7.8. If incoming demands could be managed to achieve a smoother demand profile, then an improved utilisation of resources could be achieved through more rigorous staff duties planning. Officers would therefore be able to engage in more preventive activities and work they originated themselves. Benefits would thus accrue towards influencing

the demand/reaction loop model and also the cultural bias that favoured reaction to prevention.

4.7.9. The system that was introduced by N.P. to address this problem became known as 'graded response'. A number of other experimental systems were examined, principally from American police departments that were variously known as 'differential response', 'planned response', etc., but all essentially sought to manage the police response to incoming demands, rather than for police to be predominantly demand led.

4.7.10. The system involved grading incoming calls to a police station at the time of the report and advising the caller as to when a police response might be expected. It was found to be the case and has subsequently been validated by research (O.P.R. 1991) that the public would generally be satisfied with a non immediate response to a non urgent problem, provided they were advised at the time of report. In other words there is a public expectation that the police will respond immediately to everything, but there is also a realisation that it is not practicable, necessary, nor even desirable to always do so.

4.7.11. The N.P. graded response system that is shown schematically at Figure 4.7 assigns incoming demands to four categories as follows:

i. **Immediate Response** - To take precedence over all other grading and to result in an immediate deployment of a police officer, mobile, foot, uniform, or any other unit, who will arrive at the scene in the shortest possible time. This category would be an appropriate response to emergency incidents and crimes actually in progress.

ii. **Delayed Response** - To a reasonably urgent, but not necessarily immediate time scale. A incident where a

police deployment need not be made straight away and where if a less pressing response is made, such a response would not materially effect the outcome. This category would be appropriate for incidents where a significant delay had occurred between the time of the incident and the time of the report to the police. Additionally the matter would be non-urgent, either in respect of the nature of the incident itself, or in relation to the preservation of evidence, availability of witnesses etc. This category would require the agreement and consent of the caller for the police response to be delayed.

iii. **Extended Response** - An appointment at a mutually convenient time to be dealt with by a particular officer who has the specific skills, or particular knowledge of the subject matter.

iv. **Referred Response** - Those calls that essentially seek advice and which do not require a physical police response. Customarily such demands are referred to a department within the police station for the caller to be given appropriate information or advice.

4.7.12. Detailed criteria and examples of the above were provided at the experimental sites in order that officers could quickly appreciate which category applied to any particular incident. This was important as hitherto the police culture had strongly reinforced the necessity for an immediate response to demands from the public and indeed officers were customarily criticised and in some cases sanctioned for not dealing with matters with due haste.

Figure 4.7 The N.P. Graded Response System

4.7.13. From informal observations after the implementation of this process, it was seen that officers were uncomfortable with the concept of introducing a delay into the system which had previously required immediate attention. The detailed grading criteria were therefore seen as an important statement of commitment from senior officers. A major concern in this respect was the need for an assurance that sanctions would not be exercised against officers, where delays they had introduced in good faith, were subsequently found to have exacerbated or worsened a situation.

4.7.14. The evaluation of the graded response system may be seen to be very closely linked with the individual officers who operated the system. This evaluation is therefore addressed in the following section. (Section 4.8)

4.8 Demand Management - Dedicated Communications Officers

4.8.1. In order to properly implement the graded response system it was necessary to provide adequately trained and experienced officers to deal with the incoming calls from the public. Officers working in the divisional control rooms had been assigned to those posts on a random, daily basis. Customarily, young or inexperienced officers, officers recovering from sickness or injury and even those who had demonstrated unreliability in an operational context, found themselves posted as control room operators. The task was not generally popular, largely due to the negative connotations attached to post holders. (Stapley 1986)

4.8.2. The N.P. project recognised that if graded response was to succeed, it would be necessary to have officers dedicated to the posts of control room operators. Appropriate advice was published on the criteria and selection of suitable staff and

training was given in both telephone answering techniques and the mechanics of the graded response system.

4.8.3. It was recognised in the evaluation of N.P. that dedicated communications staff were "... *the single most valuable deployer of resources in the station...*" (Stapley 1986 pg. 19). However, despite this recognition little effort was reported from the experimental sites to fully exploit the benefits of dedicated staff or the associated graded response system. Turner (1987) in his reports of Brixton and Hackney divisions found that neither initiative operated satisfactorily. He found that once trained, the dedicated communications staff were not exclusively used as control room operators and that their training was incomplete, (although he neglects to specify in which aspect).

4.8.4. The major projected benefit of graded response was not realised according to Turner in that the system did not release any additional officers or officer time into non responding activities. Neither was there any perceived effect on public satisfaction, either positively or negatively. Turner suggests that if there was any effect then it was too small to be detected by public survey.

4.8.5. In all the evaluation material associated with the N.P. project there is little of a positive nature that can be found respecting the graded response system, or dedicated communications officers. This is surprising, in that there can be little doubt that graded response as a procedure' operated by dedicated communications officers is the gate keeping sub-system into the larger police organisation. As noted by Stapley (1986), the effective allocation of police resources is under their direct control and they "... *markedly affect the efficiency and effectiveness of the station.*" (pg. 19)

4.8.6. It was noted earlier that the police culture at a station level had a strong bias towards reaction as a style of policing. This officer preference has been noted in a number of

extensive studies of officer behaviour (Smith 1983, Irving et al 1989) and probably accounts for the apparent failure of this aspect of the N.P. system. What is also of significance, is that given the acknowledgement of senior divisional officers that such procedures are vital for effective management, it is surprising to find that the procedures were not satisfactorily implemented, or implemented incompletely.

4.8.7. On the basis of this analysis, it is reasonable to suggest that something that might be termed a 'response culture' existed at police stations. The response culture seems to have developed as a strong influence on officer behaviour to the point where officers would rather meet public needs than the expectations of their senior officers. Irving et al (1989) reinforced this finding with the observation that whilst patrolling officers apparently had sufficient time to engage in proactive work, they generally preferred to wait for a call to which they would then respond. (Section 4.10.1-2)

4.8.8. Despite the experiences with graded response and dedicated communications officers associated with the N.P. project, the M.P.S. took the opportunity to re-introduce the initiatives at the same time as the introduction of the force wide computer aided dispatch system (C.A.D.). This London wide networked system necessitated extensive officer training to operate the sophisticated computerised message switching procedures that are associated with the recording of all incoming calls to the police. Thus operators had to be dedicated to the control room posts in order to be sufficiently knowledgeable to efficiently operate the equipment.

4.8.9 Graded response as a procedure was perceived as a feature of the new technology and today operates as originally designed. However, despite the acceptance of the mechanistic procedures of graded response, there has not been a noticeable alteration in the response culture, or the preference and perceived significance that officers assign to being demand led. (O.P.R. 1991)

4.9 Police Organisation and Efficiency - Geographic Responsibility

4.9.1. The original N.P. thesis established the proposition that the association of a police officer with a specific geographic area or community was preferable to the established model of time based, or 'relief' policing (Beckett and Hart 1981) The postulation was that officers were more likely to engage the strategic aims of N.P. (Section 2.8) and thus the day to day problems of a particular community, if they routinely worked in the same area. Rather than relying on irregular, ad hoc visits and patrols for local knowledge that are associated with time based, response policing. (Sections 2.2 and 2.3)

4.9.2. The basic model that was proposed for geographically structuring local police service delivery is described in outline in Section 2.11. This basic model was the simplest structure that could be derived from the major design principles of N.P., listed below. The variety of differing existing police organisation structures militated against proposing anything other than the most general structure in the original work to illustrate the principles. It was acknowledged that local adaptations would be necessary to the basic structure to suit local conditions and establishment levels. (Hart 1981)

4.9.3. The desirability of incorporating local flexibility to adaptations of the basic model quickly became apparent at the experimental sites, where each division evolved a different structure, although each essentially conformed to the basic design principles (Sections 2.7 and 2.8) as follows:

  i.   a police system must possess sufficient flexibility and adaptability to respond quickly to changing inputs from the environment and from variable elements within the system,

146

ii. police officers should operate within a system that allows them opportunity to expand their role and increase their job satisfaction,

iii. team approaches to both reactive and preventive roles should be adopted and team objectives should closely coincide with those of the organisation,

iv. the changing environment in which police systems operate best suit an organic police structure,

v. there is benefit to be achieved from well defined roles and functions, but flexibility is also significant and a balance needs to be achieved,

vi. the opportunity for police officers to influence their career direction is important, but not at cost to the overall system,

vii. the benefits of functional divisions and specialisation are limited at divisional level and care should be exercised over the number of separate functions created and the corresponding difficulty of co-ordination and aggregation,

viii. formal and informal information systems are necessary,

ix. the effects of staff establishment fluctuations should not result in a permanent change to the character of the system,

x. task allocation should be supervised and non-urgent tasks used as an opportunity to develop public contact,

xi. contact should be developed on an interactive basis with the public,

xii. individual constables should be responsible for specific, designated geographic areas,

xiii. response policing must be efficient and available on a regular basis,

xiv. supervisors should have clear roles and responsibilities,

xv. supervisors must be familiar with the problems and needs of specific, designated geographic areas,

xvi. supervisors should be responsive to information systems and be able to co-ordinate the full range of police resources including functional specialists,

xvii. specialist officers should be associated as closely as possible with day to day policing.

4.9.4. Many of the above principles are aspirational in character and therefore may not be totally realised from a structural design alone. The underlying hypothesis however, was that the structure of local policing would, to some extent, determine the character or style of service that was delivered. Thus, if the organisational structure was designed, or had evolved to deliver an efficient response service, then it was likely that the same structure and officers operating within it would not be most appropriately organised for a more proactive, or problem solving approach to police work. Geographic responsibility was seen by the authors as the fundamental feature of the N.P. system that would help to shape and maintain appropriate behaviour of officers working within it. (Beckett 1981)

4.9.5.   In order to cater for local variations to the organisational structure, the N.P. project team relied upon the deliberations of the participative management process and in particular the divisional working party. (Section 4.9). This resulted in some extreme variations in structure. Notably at Camberley in Surrey, the concept of reliefs (time based policing) was completely abandoned in favour of a structure that gave geographic assignments to all uniform officers. At Notting Hill, the relief method was retained for an especially sensitive portion of the division. (This was thought appropriate to cater for the unique and symbolic significance of the All Saints Road area[1].) The remainder of the division was policed by officers who were allocated specific geographic responsibility but who still retained membership of the rotating relief work groups. Further variations and detail adaptations were conceived by the working parties at Brixton, Kilburn and Hackney which they considered appropriate for their particular local needs.

4.9.6.   Despite the local variations in structure, Turner (1987) could not find any visible benefits from geographical responsibility in crime or clear up rates at any of the sites. It is reasonable and intuitively sensible to conclude from this finding that structures in themselves do not materially effect police performance against crime. Turner did however suggest that it was likely that geographic responsibility improved police contact with community groups, although not with individuals, so far as he could determine.

4.9.7.   Irving et al (1989) concentrated his analysis on the developmental process of designing a system of geographic responsibility at Notting Hill. The account describes in considerable detail, the tortuous group processes of local management and the project team trying to involve local

---

[1] All Saints Road had been a focal point for drug dealing for a number of years and had a reputation within the M.P.S. for being a difficult and hostile area to police effectively and to prevent from becoming a police 'no-go' area.

officers through a working party in the design of an appropriate model. There was much resistance from operational uniform officers to changes to the existing 'relief' system. The main objections concerned:

i. the alteration of duty times, (described at Section 4.4) that were closely associated with implementing geographic responsibility,

ii. difficulties of communication between officers commencing duty at different times,

iii. maintaining minimum staffing levels in what was seen as a hostile policing environment.

4.9.8. Perhaps more significantly than the specific objections of officers to the new system, whether justified or not, Irving's account describes a process of stalled negotiations and prevarication by all concerned, covering a period of over 18 months. It is clear form his account, although not specifically analysed by Irving, that the root of the problem was a deep underlying resistance to change of any sort that effected the established relief teams and the very strong culture associated with those work groups.

4.9.9. Other observers of the N.P. experimental process support this interpretation. In particular, Stapley (1986) asserts that geographic responsibility was the most fundamental of all the changes and was central to allowing the principles of good job design to be applied to operational policing. It is so fundamental that "...managers should not look for quick results.....and results may go down initially." (pg. 28) He continues by suggesting the police attitude to such change is "...particularly harsh..." and that "Culture can be a brake on change..." (pg. 28)

4.9.10. It seems that whilst most objective observers agree that geographic responsibility is the central and thus the most

150

vital element of the N.P. system, it is the change that attracted the most resistance from operational officers. As the officer deployment system for N.P. and being closely linked with staff duty rosters, it is the subject that substantially affects more officers than any other in the N.P. change programme. Officers attitudes to working within such a system free of the encumbrance of the prospect of change from the known model are therefore highly relevant.

4.9.11. At Brixton, Goddard (1984) and Beckett (1989) report favourable changes in officer attitudes to a system of geographic responsibility:

	% officers preferring geographic to time based responsibility
1983	10
1986	70

4.9.12. The same questionnaire survey in 1986 showed that 58% of officers who had regular experience of geographic assignments at Brixton had agreed that the system had led to improvements to policing in the area. Few officers (10%) wanted the system abolished and approximately 1 in 2 felt they spent more time working on their sectors in:

i. getting to know people,

ii. patrolling on foot,

iii. receiving information from the public,

iv. identifying crime spots and trends,

v. working as part of a team,

vi. looking at long term problems.

4.9.13. This finding contrasts fairly sharply with the qualitative and more subjective analysis of observers provided by Irving (1989) on the Notting Hill experience. Turner (1987) reinforces Irving's findings so far as Notting Hill senior officers (Inspectors and above) are concerned, finding that a reduced proportion thought that geographic responsibility offered some improvement over a two year period. (83% reduced to 61%). This finding was broadly repeated at Hackney, although 75% of inspectors as a group preferred managing officers with geographic responsibility. It seems that at least in the case of Hackney, the problem for senior officers was a frequently reported shortage of officers that accounted for expressed preference to see changes. (58%)

4.9.14. Turner's work at Brixton (1987b) generally supports Beckett's positive findings at that division, but both senior and junior officers wanted to make some detail changes to the system but did not want to return to the previous methods of working. Turner found a similar situation at Kilburn (1987c) where generally attitudes of both senior and junior officers were positive towards geographic responsibility, although detail changes were thought necessary and shortage of staff was seen as the major cause of problems. 87% of all those surveyed preferring to continue with geographic responsibility, rather than return to the former methods.

4.9.15. The frequently expressed concern of both junior and senior officers that systems of geographical responsibility require either more staff, or greater availability of existing staff is not born out by Turner's analyses. He found no evidence to support the notion that geographical responsibility, *"...consumes more manpower..."* than other arrangements. (Turner 1987c)

4.9.16. The findings from all sources in relation to geographical responsibility are thus equivocal as might have been expected given the variation in models. However, some

findings, as follows, are consistent across policing environments and are therefore likely to be repeated wherever geographic responsibility is implemented:

i. The view of police officers at all levels is generally supportive of the concept, but officers at operational level are reluctant to see the demise of the relief system in favour of geographic responsibility. (Irving et al 1989)

ii. The public have consistently expressed support for any system that brings uniformed police patrols to their neighbourhood more frequently in the form of officers who are known to them. (deKerdrel 1983, Wood 1985, O.P.R. 1990)

iii. The system does not produce a consistent, measurable improvement in police performance against crime, or a measurable alteration in number of crime reports from the public. (Turner 1987)

4.9.17. These findings were generally unsurprising, although it was to be hoped that police performance against crime in terms of clear-ups would improve. However, the measurement of police performance by recourse to reported crime statistics is an imprecise study due to the variability in the publics' propensity and motivation to report crimes as demonstrated by the British Crime Surveys. (Home Office - H.M.S.O.) In the light of Beckett's (1989) findings in relation to a small area of Brixton Division, where police crime performance and reporting rates did show improvements, it is possible that the measurement methods used by Turner (1987) were too insensitive to record any crime trends in the time available.

4.10   Police Organisation and Efficiency - Directed Patrolling

4.10.1. The elements of the N.P. system not only addressed structures and procedures, but also police officer behaviours and activities. Directed patrolling moves police patrol activity away from random, unplanned patrols towards more precise tasking and purpose. Customarily, much police patrol activity is completely discretionary for the most part. One of the consequences of the introduction of personal radios from 1966 onwards, was the releasing of officers from fixed beats or patrols to a far wider area of movement, whether on foot or mobile. Amongst the effects of this change has been that officers customarily fill the periods of time in between responding to calls and other reactive type duties, with random patrol activity. They generally move around the area to which they have been assigned as their initiative takes them.

4.10.2. According to Irving et al (1989), these uncommitted periods account for well in excess of a quarter of an officers' time, whether engaged on foot, or on a mobile patrol. In terms of patrol productivity, this type of random activity does not maximise the potential benefits of the opportunities available. Therefore the N.P. project defined a process of directed patrolling.

4.10.3. At its most basic, directed patrolling is simply extending conventional officer briefings at the commencement of a shift to incorporate specific patrol objectives. Such objectives might concern concentrating patrol activity on a particular street or area at a particular time with a view to preventing a repetitious crime, or other incidents of which complaint has been made. This type of direction is frequently given to patrolling officers working in conventional policing systems. Although the benefits of such direction are far from clear in

terms of numbers of crimes thus prevented, it will be apparent to members of the public who notify police of some regular occurrence, that something has happened in response to their complaint.

4.10.4. However directed patrolling at its most ambitious is described in detail by Beckett (1989). The process concerns a sophisticated grasp of a specific environments' potential for crime and disorder derived from a divisional D.I.I.U. (Section 4.3) and then carefully selecting the appropriate police strategy for officer intervention. The police intervention is designed to suit the environment and to secure a solution through public co-operation with community and victim helping tactics. (Section 3.16) Such interventions are planned to start with establishing police public contact, then moving to providing help to both the community and victims and finally reducing crime and conflict in a partnership with residents.

4.10.5. At one extreme, N.P. saw directed patrolling as the means by which areas of acute social instability that were hostile to police could be managed by officers at both strategic and practical day to day levels. At the other extreme, directed patrolling could be used as the means by which high quality policing services could be efficiently delivered to less volatile and supportive communities.

4.10.6. The key feature of the initiative was that officers patrol activities were directed according to a plan that had been developed by officers with their supervisors. In effect this meant that the uncommitted random patrol time could be directed to specific tasks or areas and thus achieving greater productivity towards identified local problems

4.10.7. The results from the N.P. experiment do not however follow what might be suggested as the line of least resistance for the officers involved. It would be reasonable to expect that the effect of such a treatment might have been more

successful in a supportive policing environment. However, neither Turner (1987) or Irving et al (1989) could find any effects of directed patrolling at any of the N.P. sites in Surrey or London except Brixton. Here, in arguably one of the most hostile policing environments, a reduction in reported crime levels was achieved by directed patrolling over an extended period.

4.10.8. Turner did not find it possible to attribute crimes prevented to individual events or occasions of directed patrol (D.P.), due to the long term nature of the N.P. tactics. The intended output of directed patrolling was not necessarily seen by the authors as measured by arrests or crime detections. Rather as a means of achieving comparative tranquillity in an area, represented by a decrease in street incidents, an improvement in safety as a result of police presence and thus an improvement in the quality of life for people using the streets.

4.10.9. Over a period of nine months crime steadily reduced in a section of Brixton division and Turner notes that "...DP must be a candidate for the continuing crime reductions..." (Turner 1987[d] pg. 43) This reduction is illustrated by the fall in residential burglaries across Brixton division during 1985 (Figure 4.8.) when the directed patrolling tactics were introduced.

1983	1984	1985	1986
3353	4209	3274	3622
2%	25%	22%	11%
Increase	Increase	Reduction	Increase

Figure 4.8   Residential Burglaries - Brixton Division

4.10.10. At minimum, directed patrolling clearly provides at least a theoretical means of fully utilising officer patrol time. Where it has been fully implemented and officers directed towards the resolution of specific, long term problems, the scheme appears to have met its design objectives, and as Turner suggests, has shown the potential to achieve further crime reductions. *(ibid.)* However, as with many organisational changes, the design of a system to ensure that officers are appropriately directed with patrol objectives seems to be at the basis of the potential success of this element of the N.P. system.

4.11 Police Organisation and Efficiency - Participative Management

4.11.1. Traditional police management processes had tended towards a quasi militaristic model, the predominant feature of which was a vertical hierarchy based on rank. Decisions were taken according to a set of authority levels for particular subjects or issues and procedures to be followed were specified in some detail, typically in the now abolished Metropolitan Police General Orders. (A common and popular remark in police circles which epitomised the spirit of General Orders was that they amounted to a catalogue of the organisation's reaction to every mistake that had ever been made!)

4.11.2. It was clear to the authors of N.P. that if policing was to become more responsive to community needs, then management systems would need to reflect this change by becoming more flexible. The existing closed system of decision making would need to be replaced with a management system that was able to quickly respond to environmental changes.

4.11.3. As the knowledge of community needs generally rested with the operational levels of police officers, it was appropriate to design a system of participative management that allowed the senior officers at a station to be familiar with the issues confronting their more junior staff. This seemed little more than common sense for any organisation. However, due the existence of a highly prescriptive system of standard operating procedures, the management task had tended to concentrate on ensuring conformity with procedures, rather than to allocating resources to problems and priorities.

4.11.4. The diagram at Figure 2.6 shows the basic N.P. approach to team management that was quickly to be replaced at each of the experimental sites with the model shown at Figure 4.9.

4.11.5. Here, a similar approach is shown to the basic model, but with the addition of a working party that had been established at each division to progress implementation of N.P. and to adapt the basic principles of the project to suit local conditions. It was appropriate that the working party was an integral part of the management system and not an adjunct to it. Therefore the structure shown at Figure 4.9. became the standard model.

(In Figure 4.9 over leaf, the circles represent the boundary of meetings whose membership in terms of ranks is shown in the intersections, the senior rank being the chair.

No contact occurs at the central intersection of three circles which has no significance to the model)

District (Area) Management Meetings

Chief Superintendent

Divisional Management Team Meetings

Chief Inspector(s) *Inspectors*

Working Party Meetings

Constables and Sergeants

Relief Meetings

Divisional Information and Intelligence Unit

Feedback

Information

Figure 4.9 The N.P. Divisional Management Team Model

4.11.6. The management system was designed to operate in such a way that the leader of each team, described by a circle in the model, was represented on at least one other level of the structure in addition to his or her own. It was considered that the system would improve information flows and feedback whilst keeping the management chain as short as possible. The district management comprised the most senior officers from a group of divisions who would hold regular structured meetings to co-ordinate a unified approach to policy and planning, as well as the more usual assessment of day to day operational problems. It was hoped that chief superintendents would bring with them to those meetings, timely and apposite information gained

from their D.I.I.U. and the process of local planning by their divisional management teams.

4.11.7. The divisional management team (D.M.T.) comprises the local divisional senior officers under the command of the chief superintendent. This group was responsible for co-ordinating the medium and long term planning of the division through the participative management system. They were charged to jointly formulate the actions necessary for the implementation of N.P., as well as realistic and challenging objectives in respect of operational policing for the division. These D.M.T. meeting were to be formal, structured by agenda and minutes taken that were to be made available to all divisional personnel, as well as to the more senior level.

4.11.8. The working party was the central unit responsible for early identification of problems posed by data provided by the D.I.I.U. It was to be composed of both selected and elected representatives of all ranks functions at the division. The primary purpose of the working party was to agree options for tackling operational problems that could be put forward to the D.M.T. for decision and action.

4.11.9. Additionally the working party were to have a key role in the implementation of N.P. in addressing those features of the project that required local design or adjustment to suit the local policing need. They were to consider the feasibility of variations of N.P. elements for their particular division and then to put forward options and recommendations to the D.M.T.

4.11.10. The remaining element in the participative management structure was the relief meeting. Here the aim was that each relief representative on the working party under the chairmanship of the relief inspector would keep his team up to date on the changes that were being considered. The forum would also provide the opportunity for relief officers

to express their views on forthcoming changes and thus have their suggestions considered. Relief meetings were also to be the means by which the inspector could promulgate instructions from the D.M.T. on plans and strategies that had been agreed for the division as a whole and develop the directed patrolling priorities. It was considered that effectively conducted relief meetings would become increasingly important to the efficient operation of the station as directed patrolling and the setting of personal objectives became more common.

4.11.11. The implementation of the participative management system at the first experimental site at Notting Hill was not achieved without difficulty. Irving (et al 1989) reports upon this process largely from the perspective of the working party and the internal process of that group. The outcome of this study is generally vague and shrouded in much verbatim reporting of officers comments that were interpreted by the observers as significant. However one conclusion that does emerge is that the whole process was very unfamiliar to the participants and the status or influence of the various groups was far from clear to the members.

4.11.12. This uncertainty, combined with the unfamiliarity with the N.P. strategy and aims presented the working party, in particular, with a daunting prospect. It is not surprising therefore that the working party did not enjoy rapid success. Rather over a period of two years, the management process developed and matured, gradually and progressively functioning more effectively.

4.11.13. Turner (1987) takes a far more positive and much wider view than Irving of the participative management model and process at each of the experimental sites. He concludes that the process was cost effective despite the cost of time spent on meetings and seminars and generally the system was seen to meet its objectives. Officers views

were generally favourable towards the system whether at senior or junior level, although the working party was the subject of more unfavourable comment than other features of the system. Stapley (1986) in his observations of the process, reports an interesting variation that is not mentioned elsewhere. He observed that some officers had a strong view that participation was valuable and should always be a feature of management processes, whereas others strongly felt it was a mistake to do so, preferring to be told what to do and when. He concludes that this arose in part because individuals simply did not know what was expected of them in such an unfamiliar system.

4.11.14. The outcome of the introduction of participative systems of management within the Metropolitan Police Service (M.P.S.) has been significant. Within three years of the introduction of N.P., the M.P.S. had produced and distributed a booklet to every manager setting out 'Divisional Guidelines for Participative Management' (1985). Shortly after, the major re-structuring of the M.P.S. known as the Force Organisation and Management Review (F.O.M.R.) incorporated the principles of participative management into job titles and job descriptions. The principle example of which being that of the post of divisional chief superintendent whose primary role became that of 'team leader' for the divisional management team (D.M.T.)

4.11.15. It is not possible to claim that the major cultural change in the M.P.S. from a quasi militaristic model of management to a more shared, participative style was entirely attributable to N.P. However, there is no evidence to suggest that the necessity for such changes were widely recognised prior to N.P. Indeed the action planning process introduced into the M.P.S. during 1982/3 (Paragraph 3.3.5) did not include a specification for participative management associated with the process of objective setting. The assumption being that divisional senior officers would set objectives within their

spans of command and then rely upon directives to subordinates to achieve results, without any attempt at participation to foster 'ownership'.

4.11.16. This situation was corrected by the subsequent force wide adoption of the N.P. management model by the process referred to at 4.11.14 and Section 4.12 following. The N.P. management model was initially specified outside the project environment in an internal publication entitled 'Planning for a Police Station' (M.P.S. N.P. Project Team - Jan. 1984) and there does not seem to have been any specification prior to N.P., of structures to operationalise the participative management concept as normal police organisational practice.

4.11.17. Therefore it is legitimate to record that N.P. achieved a lasting success by altering the M.P.S. management style and culture through force wide implementation of the participative management initiative.

4.11.18. It is also the case however, that the principles and practice of participative management at divisional level were very slow to be internalised by operational managers. Possible reasons for this are examined in Chapters Five and Six, but, it is appropriate to note at this point, that had the changes towards a more participative style been achieved faster at the N.P. sites, it is likely that implementation of the more challenging features of the project would have been less problematic.

4.12   Police Organisation and Efficiency - Sector and Divisional Planning

4.12.1. The production of detailed written plans for a geographic sector that aggregate into an overall divisional plan were incorporated into N.P. as a result of inspiration from the work of Lubans and Edgar. (1979) Their description of

'Policing by Objectives' provided a means of bringing the well established principles of management by objectives (Drucker 1954, Koontz and O'Donnell 1976, et al) into the police service. The approach enabled officers to think carefully about precisely what they wanted to achieve in pro-active terms and to plan a strategy for achieving it. The plans were to include precise verifiable objectives, as well as data sources for measurement, time scales and criteria for success.

4.12.2. The approach seemed particularly appropriate for officers who had a well defined span of responsibility, such as geographic (sector) inspectors and those officers undertaking directed patrols, (Section 4.10) or engaged in targeting and surveillance operations. (Section 4.6)

4.12.3. According to Turner (1987) the N.P. planning system was more or less fully implemented at each of the test sites. As noted previously however, (Section 3.3) the introduction of the N.P. planning system preceded the more widespread planning system for the M.P.S as a whole by only one year. Therefore it became difficult to distinguish between the effects of N.P. and those brought about by the newly introduced central planning system. Turner does not make this distinction and accordingly notes that with the exception of Brixton, it was not possible to "... *distinguish any results that could be ascribed or enhanced by these plans."* (Turner 1987[a] pg. 22) Rather he speculates that where improvements were found, they were attributable to the operational treatments, i.e. directed patrolling, geographic responsibility etc., rather than the planning system itself.

4.12.4. Turner's view of the planning system as a whole was that apart from small areas of special policing significance, such as Railton Road in Brixton and All Saints Road in Notting Hill, plans were produced and then largely ignored.

4.12.5. From informal observations at the four experimental sites it became quickly apparent that the classic critique of management by objectives, equally applied to the planning aspect of N.P. (Koontz and O'Donnell 1976)

4.12.6. These shortcomings combined with the additional difficulties created by the juxtaposition of the new force wide planning system, (Section 3.3.5) with the original N.P. planning system were to prove troublesome for both the N.P. project team and the trial site management teams. The force wide system was centrally administered from New Scotland Yard and the original N.P. system was administered by local managers. Difficulties were created for local managers in that both planning systems had to be satisfied and this led to a degree of genuine confusion for both the project team and officers at the trial sites. In order to overcome this and other difficulties associated with the administration and mechanics of the two planning systems, the N.P. project team were tasked by the planning unit at New Scotland Yard to produce:

i.   the planning guidelines for the M.P.S. as a whole,

ii. a training programme for officers who were directly involved in the administrative and co-ordinating aspects of planning.

4.12.7. The planning process was detailed by the N.P. project team in a large document, the first edition of which was entitled 'Planning for a Police Station' (A2[3] Branch Jan. 1984). Subsequent versions drew from this initial specification of the planning process and effectively sustained this approach to planning within the M.P.S. for the next decade.

4.12.8. A training programme was similarly designed and provided by the N.P. project team which essentially equipped officers who were tasked with implementing the planning system across the whole of the M.P.S., with similar techniques that

had been utilised during the design of the N.P. project. These included project planning, the use of descriptive statistics, questionnaire design and presentational skills.

4.12.9. Again, it is noted that despite an apparently adverse evaluation, albeit incomplete, the M.P.S. substantially adopted the N.P. planning initiative despite the emerging findings. It is notable that prior to N.P. however, there was little formal planning at divisional level in any rigorous and observable way. This being the case, the organisational bias towards a reactive mode of operations becomes more understandable.

4.13 Police Organisation and Efficiency - The N.P. Training

4.13.1. It is convenient to review and evaluate the N.P. training in the context of the police organisation and efficiency delivery system, although in practice the N.P. training started at the outset of the project and continued at each site throughout the implementation phase. The training specification in the original N.P. documentation did not develop the detail necessary for the design and implementation of an appropriate programme. The diagram at Figure 2.5 provides an outline of the training concepts that were subsequently developed by Joss et al (1982). At the most basic, the training was to address two issues:

i. familiarisation with the N.P. project and its multiple components for both operational officers, supervisors and managers,

ii. training for operational officers to provide the knowledge and skills necessary to realise the behaviours hypothesised as appropriate for the specified outcomes. (Section 3.16)

4.13.2. The N.P. project at each site commenced with a three day seminar for divisional managers. The objective was to achieve (i) above and to establish commitment to adopting the principles of N.P. After a difficult start with the Notting Hill managers, the process refined and subsequent seminars became more productive in terms of achieving the above aims. Stapley (1986 pg. 8) records that the event was *"...of considerable value..."*

4.13.3. After the divisional managers' seminar, classroom training commenced for all officers at that division. Classroom training of one week's duration was directed towards the foregoing objectives that were refined to detailed lesson objectives by the officers delivering the training. (Joss 1982) This exercise at each test division proved to be a major logistical and operational undertaking, but over a period of approximately three months the majority of officers from any one division could attend. The major difficulties arose from abstracting officers from operational work and the consequential demands on the remaining staff.

4.13.4. The classroom sessions were evaluated by the training staff and although the results have never been written up in a formal sense, there remains little doubt that the training was effective having regard to the objectives and most officers thought it worthwhile. Turner (1987) identifies the difficulty of establishing the quality of the training due to the lack of data, but does report that the majority of all officer sat the test sites did receive the initial training input.

4.13.5. Of far greater significance however, is to what extent the skills and knowledge imparted in the classroom were carried over to operational duties? In this regard, the training programme must be seen as a failure, with the possible exception of the specialist skills training that was given to small groups of officers undertaking specific roles. (e.g. dedicated communications, D.I.I.U., crime desk) In summary, both Irving (1989) and Turner (1987) are clear that N.P.

could not be successfully implemented by training procedures of the type and style adopted. Irving notes that the N.P. philosophy has the ability to generate enthusiasm and dedicated adherents. Translating the philosophy into organisational reality by the chosen means cannot be considered to have been successful. Irving considers that the training stopped short of creating a "hard core" of enthusiasts for N.P. at Notting Hill. It is likely that this was also the case elsewhere, as the basic training programme did not alter substantially between sites which were essentially similar in policing character.

4.13.6. This observation does have to be set against the practical difficulties of expending extended periods on officer training to the detriment of the operational service levels. It must be acknowledged however, for whatever reason, that the initial N.P. training did not deliver the expected outcomes either in terms of operationalising the N.P. aims, or in terms of officer behaviour change.

4.13.7. It is not clear from any of the evaluation material whether this was due to poor quality training, or whether the general training aims were too ambitious and thus unrealisable within organisational constraints. Some explanations are offered in Chapters Five and Six of possible limitations on the effectiveness of training as a part of a change process.

4.14   Police - Public Contract

4.14.1. The notion of a contract between police and public is described at Section 2.18. It originates from the traditional concept of British policing that the majority of policing activities are essentially matters for the public themselves.

4.14.2. From the earliest era of the parish constable (900 - 1750) policing functions have been undertaken by individuals from

within local communities . The title of constable originated from Norman times and was used in Britain through to the advent of the justice of the peace, when the office took on responsibilities on behalf of the court , which was in itself constituted around representatives of communities. The title continued and was adopted as a rank upon creation of professional police officers in London in 1829. (Critchley 1979)

4.14.3. In law, all police officers hold the office of constable, regardless of their rank, and are charged by the Monarch to exercise original authority and not a delegated authority. Thus, police officers are individually accountable through the courts for their actions. (Critchley 1979)

4.14.4. The premise that communities are responsible for their own policing is thus firmly established in British history, where imposed policing has rarely featured as an approach to community regulation and control. Rather policing traditions in Britain have grown up around the notion of 'policing by consent' which is the idea that communities collectively and willingly submit themselves to regulation by largely unarmed constables. (Alderson 1979 et al)

4.14.5. Thus the notion emerges of a contract between the police and public where obligations exist on either side. (The name is slightly misleading in that a contract implies an enforceable agreement, whereas only the law enforcement aspects of the police/public contract are enforceable at law.)

4.14.6. The N.P. project envisaged a number of constituent elements to the police - public contract as shown at Figure 4.10. The delivery system for realising the police side of the contract being made up of the interaction of the four elements that might be described separately, but which in practice are interdependent and inextricably linked, as follows:

Figure 4.10   The N.P. Elements of the Police/Public Contract

4.14.7.   Turner in his 1987 analysis of N.P. concluded that it was not possible to distinguish between the cause and effect of the community involvement treatments at station level, or to differentiate between their outputs as they merged together. It is   therefore entirely consistent with the evaluation concept (Sections 3.5 to 3.8) to consider the collective output of the community involvement features of N.P. without attempting to separate the contribution   of each element in isolation.

4.14.8.   The exchange of information between the police and other statutory organisations with a responsibility for improving

the quality of life was a fundamental feature of N.P. If policing is a shared responsibility between police and public, then implicit in that relationship is a need to share information concerning common problems.

4.14.9.   N.P. specified a range of treatments to improve the flow of information to external bodies with a view to stimulating a   multi agency response to policing problems. These treatments included already well established and accepted practices such as schools involvement, through to initiatives that were seen as more radical, such as the creation of sector working parties that brought together police and residents to tackle local issues.

4.14.10. Irving et al (1989) undertook a detailed study of the community and agency influence of N.P. Over 40 differing groups were interviewed and reported variously on their experience of co-operation with police. As might be expected, the results are equivocal. Some agencies reporting favourable contacts and exchanges of views and information with police, whilst others saw that much more might be achieved.

4.14.11. Generally, contact at more senior levels was successful with other statutory agencies such as the local authorities, with whom it was suggested, police felt more comfortable. With the less hierarchically structured groups, such as community associations, residents groups, the local law centre and to some extent the Social Services Department, Irving found that liaison was less effective. It was reported that in general, officers involved did not appear to be interested in understanding genuine community problems and tackling them.

4.14.12. From a police perspective, officers found it difficult to distinguish who constituted the law abiding community with whom they might establish the necessary partnership,

especially in the more sensitive and hostile areas. (Irving et al 1989)

4.14.13. At Brixton, the only site to establish sector working parties with members of local communities, a more favourable outcome was reported. Beckett (1989) considers that significant success was achieved with the involvement of the public in the joint planning of police activities directed towards issues that residents of the respective sectors saw as problems. He also comments that at Brixton, the senior officers of the division were highly committed to achieving results through community partnership.

4.14.14. This contrasts sharply with Irving's (1989) account of senior officer attitudes at Notting Hill that suggests that senior officers were less than fully committed to the approach.

4.14.15. At Hackney, Stapley (1986) found that whilst an inter agency approach to shared problems was desirable, this was largely unachievable due to an official Council policy at that time that prevented officials collaborating or co-operating with police. It is interesting to note however, that despite this official policy, a great deal of co-operation did exist between police officers and officials at an operational level, which Stapley felt could be enhanced by joint training to foster a reciprocal appreciation of needs, abilities and problems.

4.14.16. The N.P. community based crime prevention concept advocated two approaches:

i. treatments directed towards involving residents to contribute to crime prevention such as neighbourhood watch, sector working parties, crime prevention panels, residents associations and many other group initiatives designed to heighten awareness of crime and the

172

actions that the public might take to prevent becoming a victim,

.

  ii. treatments directed towards making the physical environment safer such as improving the design characteristics of public places and buildings so as to reduce the opportunity for crime, street lighting programmes, opening of sight lines in public places to reduce criminal opportunity, in fact any environmental improvement that might reduce the potential for victimisation.

4.14.17. It was envisaged that when the preceding N.P. treatments had been implemented, local officers would be better able to co-operate with local residents, groups and agencies to help bring about such initiatives that by definition would be unique to the location, but generally in accordance with the above approaches.

4.14.18. Both Irving (1989) and Turner (1987) found improvements arising from such local initiatives but stopped short of attributing the benefits to N.P. The suggestion being that such improvements, schemes or desirable outcomes could have taken place independently of N.P. The effects of the schemes were not assessable in terms of crimes prevented or offenders caught. Two thirds of the Neighbourhood Watch scheme co-ordinators who were questioned however, thought they were effective in improving the information flow between police and public, bringing neighbours closer together and improving police/public relations.

.

4.14.19. A major feature of the N.P. community intervention programme was the hypothesised police behaviours, (Sections 3.16 and 3.17) that were suggested to be able to influence crime and disorder through community

development and through victim and community helping by police and public. Both Irving (1989) and Turner (1987) are condemnatory of this approach. In summary, Irving et al (1989 pg. 210) recommends that *"All notions of pro-social education of the public by role modelling and social engineering should be abandoned"* Additionally, their evaluations do not put forward any evidence that could be construed as supporting any of the hypothesised micro evaluation behaviours or effects. (Section 3.17 and Figure 3.4)

4.14.20. Beckett in his (1989) assessment of N.P. at Brixton ignored the concepts of pro social or helping behaviour by police as a role model for community members. Officers at Brixton when surveyed at the conclusion of N.P. however, agreed that there was a greater propensity for members of the public to involve themselves at the scene of a problem, telephone the police or be a witness at court than hitherto. (Beckett 1989) It is not possible however to attribute this finding to pro-social modelling by police.

4.14.21. Therefore at best, the micro evaluation concept of hypothesised behaviours must be considered as untested. Although is interesting to note that despite the unattractiveness of the approach to the evaluators, public surveys undertaken during the evaluation (Turner 1989) reveal a strong public liking for ideas such as community crime prevention schemes that bring residents and neighbours together. This could be interpreted as community development as originally hypothesised. However, the link between this phenomena and the incidence of crime is cannot be established with certainty.

4.14.22. Regrettably, neither Irving or Turner in their evaluations of N.P. considered the interactions that take place between the police and public at contact points. N.P. proposed that the starting point for improving the popular image of the police and thus starting the process of improving

community involvement was at the contact points where police and public most frequently interact viz.:

i. the front counter of the police station,

ii. telephone and written communications to the police station,

iii. patrolling officers on the street.

4.14.23. It was not until 1988 that a report prepared for the M.P.S. by Wolff Olins identified similar issues concerning corporate image and external communications. This in itself was unsurprising as many observers would have agreed that the M.P.S. was in need of a more businesslike image at that time. What is surprising however, is that the Olins (1988) report recommended solutions much along the lines of the N.P. approach that had been fiercely criticised by Irving and Turner.

4.14.24. Olins strongly recommended the systems approach to holistic, cultural change of the organisation, advocating changes to management systems, behaviour, attitudes communication and visual identity. Amongst the recommendations for action to improve the situation were treatments that were entirely consistent with and similar to the aims of N.P., viz.:

i. developing training programmes related to service skills,

ii. ensuring that existing training reflected the values of the organisation,

iii. implementing a system that monitors performance that reflects the importance of the service concept and

iv. clarifying the role and accountability of managers in relation to tasks.

4.15   Evaluation Overview

4.15.1. In reviewing the formal evaluations of N.P. is becomes difficult to point to positive outcomes that can be unequivocally associated to N.P. treatments. The overall tone of both the major contributions is negative and both conclude that N.P. was not in general a success, either with regard to the aims, or cost effectiveness. The evaluations of others who contributed to the assessment of elements of the scheme tend to be more positive in tone and more optimistic as to the value of the approach if not the trial results. Beckett (1989), Atkinson and Wilmore (1984), Stapley (1986) et al.

4.15.2. The evaluators leave no doubt that they were not comfortable with the systems approach adopted for N.P., either specifically in relation to N.P., or more generally as an approach to real world problem solving. To them it conflicted with the more conventional scientific methodologies for the social sciences. (Turner 1987 pgs. 1-2, Irving et al 1989 pg. 191)

4.15.3. Turner repeatedly asserts that one modest change should have been implemented at any one time, tested, assessed, then followed by another single change and so on until the entire N.P. programme had been implemented. All this should have taken place, according to Turner, against the background of a control condition, as originally proposed by the authors (Section 2.21 and Chapter Three)

4.15.4. Irving's (1989) review includes a rather trivial analogy of the systems approach, likening an open system to a ship at sea effected by the world on shore. He concludes that proposing

an open system model for a policing *"... may be attractive from a theoretical point of view, but hardly represents the political, psychological or sociological reality."* (pg. 191)

4.15.5. Irving and Turner's critique *(ibid.)* of the systems approach adopted for N.P. seems to arise from their unwillingness or inability to conceptually embrace anything other than the established methodologies of their disciplines. The evaluators continually comment on their inability to adequately reduce the elements of N.P. into discreetly measurable activities and then ascribe causality to the N.P. treatment. Although they appear to have little difficulty in ascribing causality to the N.P. project treatments when they perceived outcome as negative.

4.15.6. The logic that is argued by the evaluators (Irving et al 1989 pgs. 191-2) for the inappropriateness of a systems approach to policing operations broadly follows the sequence:

i. if policing is an open system then there should be a balance between police system inputs and outputs,

ii. this balance will not occur because the public in inner city areas are not altruistic insofar as they will not help each other to prevent crime and thus input to the policing system,

iii. a policing system cannot be open, due to the strong internal culture of a twenty-four hour occupational community, the degree of management autonomy and the limited power of external agencies to influence police,

iv. hence an open system concept is inappropriate to police operations,

v. therefore the systems approach and systems analysis is dismissed as inappropriate because:

"...systems analysis is primarily used for tackling mathematically determinate relationships between variables. Used in this context it leads a determinate air to complex arguments which are highly probabilistic." (pg. 188)

4.15.7. As has been demonstrated throughout, each of the N.P. elements were designed to co-ordinated with other features of the total policing system, resulting in more open, and thus more effective policing system. (Paragraph 3.5.2) Irving et al dismiss this approach without advancing anything other than value laden opinion.

4.15.8. It will be argued in Chapters Five and Six that many of the outcomes of the N.P. trial, that have been reported in negative terms by the evaluators might be explained by the dynamics of major change within the Surrey and Metropolitan Police, and not by any inherent weaknesses in either the systems approach or the N.P. treatments.

CHAPTER FIVE

Summary

Chapter Five is the first stage in the development of the series of models that build towards a system of change in police organisations. The desirability of adopting the systems approach is justified in the light of the contemporary schools of management thinking and the absence of any unifying or overarching theories of change. A macro model of change is proposed that comprises three major elements of the change process, (i) the stimulus for change, (ii) the target for change and (iii) the type of implementation. Each element of the macro model is analysed in turn and the attributes are examined in relation to other relevant contemporary work. Models of three basis implementation methods are discussed and variations are advanced. Comparative advantages and disadvantages are examined in the police system context.

5.1 The Approach to Change

5.1.1. The processes and dynamics of change in the functioning, structure and work force of organisations is a well documented subject from Basil & Cook (1974) to the more recent works of Moss-Kanter (1989), Senge (1991) and Pedler et al (1991). Most writers on organisations, it seems advance some comment on the phenomena and consequences of change from their own particular perspective.

5.1.2. Theories of change management however, are far from complete and the phenomena of change management is relatively poorly explained. (Evered 1980) In relation to both change interventions at an overall organisational level and changes at an individual task level there is little commonly

agreed material in the form of action guides for either participants or managers. This absence of any unifying theories that explain the change as a dynamic systematic process might be justified, or at least explained, by the number, complexity and variability of the factors involved. Issues as diverse as individual psychological phenomena to macro economic and political theory all potentially have their place in explaining organisational change.

5.1.3. A recurring theme of many writers, is that the effects and consequences of organisational change can be widespread, even from the most seemingly insignificant alteration to a task or procedure, through to major organisational re-structuring and re-sizing. The consequential effects of either the prospect of change, or the actual implementation of change are often found to extend far beyond the immediate issue that is the focus of the change itself. (Beardshaw and Palfreman 1990)

5.1.4. This phenomena presents a major dilemma for both the rational and human relations approaches to the management of organisations. (Flood and Carson 1993) Both conceptual approaches view the change process from a single perspective. Because of this, and despite the insight they bring, they cannot encompass all the ramifications and outcomes of what are invariably complex processes involving the interactions of humans with work procedures, organisational structures and relationships.

5.1.5. The rational model of organisations, that is principally derived from the structural and procedural approaches,[1] does not extend to encompass the major psychological and social psychological phenomena that are also significant during the process of change.

---

[1] Typified by the work of Taylor, Weber, Fayol, Urwick and other writers in a similar vein - summarised in Pugh et al (eds. 1971)

5.1.6. The human relations approach, typified by the work of McGregor (1960), Argyris (1964), Hertzberg (1968), and Perrow (1972) whilst considering the effects on staff of changes in their work and work environment, does not extend to consider the more mechanistic aspects of the management of organisations.

5.1.7. It is frequently apparent in daily life that a change to an established plan, albeit a regular occurrence, has the potential to be one of the most unsettling events in everyday life. A change arising from an alteration to a trivial routine such as a journey to work, or a more substantial or dramatic change, such as those affecting lifestyle, job, family etc. all seem to possess the potential to produce a de- stabilising and potentially negative, or detrimental effect. In terms of the individuals' reaction to what is perceived as negative change, or alteration to a steady state, it is widely reported that stress will be experienced by the individual. This stress in turn produces reactions such as frustration, defensiveness in 'fight or flight', a general rise in levels of anxiety and a lowering of self esteem. (Davis and Shackleton 1975, Bass and Stogdill 1990, Brown and Campbell 1994, Carnall 1990).

5.1.8. It may be demonstrated that within organisations, these reactions frequently produce antagonism towards the source of the stress, which may rightly or wrongly be perceived as the change. When the change relates to work associated procedures, or structures, the negative outcomes can range from a temporary and marginal reduction in productivity, through to internal sabotage and/or major industrial action. The outcomes will be dependant upon a large number of inter-relating factors and competing individual objectives such as the security of employment, future potential/remuneration, type of work etc. (Bass and Stogdill 1990)

5.1.9. From this brief analysis, it is suggested that in order to understand and describe the process of change in organisations, it is necessary to consider not only the human reactions to change, but also the mechanistic organisational functions and processes that bring about those effects in humans. Any attempt to disentangle functional, process and structural issues from the social and psychological aspects of the work force will result in an incomplete analysis.

5.1.10. Such an approach would ignore many of the dynamics that are critical to the functioning of organisations. These dynamics mainly arise and develop from humans beings within the system interacting with structures, functions, processes and procedures, in fact their entire work environment. (A distinction is made here between the concept of the 'work environment' and the 'external environment' associated with the work of the contingency theorists, Lawrence and Lorsch. 1967,1969)

5.1.11. In relating these propositions to large, multi functional and complex organisations such as police forces, it seems appropriate to adopt a unifying approach that enables the process of change to be tackled holistically. Jackson and Keys (1984) in their proposition of a 'system of systems methodologies' described difficulties similar to those encountered by taking a single theoretical standpoint. They point out the inappropriateness of such an approach and further suggest that some analytical methodologies are inappropriate to some problems.

5.1.12. This issue is addressed in more detail at Section 5.5, but in summary, they suggest that if a problem is examined from a particular (single) methodological perspective then it is unlikely that either the full situation will be understood, or that the resulting changes will be appropriate.

"Difficulties are almost certain to occur when methodologies suited to particular problem contexts are transferred and adopted for use in a problem situation for which they are not designed." (Jackson and Keys 1984 pg. 5)

5.1.13. Similarly, Checkland and Scholes (1990) describe the difficulties and limitations of adopting a 'scientific' approach in order to understand the complexities of managerial and organisational systems. For instance, they suggest that in order to accommodate such limitations, management science has *"...moved* [away from aspirations to be scientific] *to try to increase its relevance to the world of management..."* (pg. 15)

5.1.14. As explained by Checkland and Scholes (1990), it would be doubtful whether an engineering methodology would be wholly appropriate to the understanding of an organisational system. It is similarly argued here, that single social science methodologies, are inappropriate to the holistic understanding of complex organisational issues, such as policing systems.

5.1.15. The systems approach to the study of organisations (Kast and Rosenzweig 1981) was found appropriate for the original N.P. study, including the soft systems methodology (S.S.M.) applied to the development of the N.P. project itself. (Checkland 1972, 1981)

5.1.16. The principles of systems thinking were successful in understanding the overall situation that had to be tackled, designing the necessary changes and planning the implementations.

5.1.17. Therefore in understanding the processes involved in the overall N.P. change programme and in the light of the more contemporary work on systems methodologies (Jackson and Keys 1984, Flood 1988, Elohim 1993), it would seem appropriate to maintain the same approach in order to

analyse the process of change. Jackson and Keys conclude *inter alia* that each problem to be tackled requires separate consideration of an appropriate approach. In the absence of any general theories of change, (Cummings 1980) the benefits of the established N.P. approach *(ibid.)* are seen as appropriate to a holistic understanding of the considerable complexity (Chapter Seven) involved in implementing a lengthy and widespread change programme such as N.P.

5.1.18. If the change process were fragmented and reduced to analyses of individual features of the process which correspond to existing micro theories, then it is unlikely that an holistic analysis could subsequently be assembled. Such a product would more probably amount to a set of unrelated observations of the change programme that could not be related together in any meaningful way. An overarching macro approach is therefore required.

5.2 Openness and Unplanned Change

5.2.1. It was shown in Chapters Two and Three that police organisations could be considered as open systems and the concept of their 'degree of openness' was introduced. (Section 3.5.2) Here it was suggested that that the greater the amount of information shared by a policing system with its environment, the greater the degree of openness.

5.2.2. This proposition was linked to the N.P. design aim, that a police system that showed open characteristics, was more appropriate to the contemporary policing environment. It was shown that policing systems needed to be responsive to both their human and physical environments as well as being locally accountable.

5.2.3. This being the case, it is argued that police systems that are more open, will inevitably change more than others that are not. If an open organisation is in constant interaction with its environment, then it will be responsive to external influences through the openness of the system boundary. (Kast and Rosenzweig 1981) This in turn implies that a more open system will potentially experience high levels of unplanned changes as the organisational system will not be in sufficient control of its environment to prevent such events.

5.2.4. Ironically the simplest means of avoiding such unplanned changes would be exclude inputs from the environment, thus limiting the stimuli to change. Change of this type to the system characteristics would alter the degree of openness and move the system towards a more closed mode of operation, which has been argued to be undesirable in policing systems. Such closed policing systems being typified by the characteristics described at Section 2.2, as well as by Scarman (1981) and Smith et al (1983), whereby the policing system was not responsive to inputs from the human environment.

5.2.5. The degree of openness of the system boundary implies that some interactions which take place between the system and its environment will be appropriate to the systems' behaviour, whilst some will not. e.g. It would be appropriate for a policing system to be responsive to inputs from a Community Police Consultative Committee that sought to reduce crime in a particular area, but perhaps not so appropriate for police to be responsive to an informal residents association's wishes to reduce policing in their area in order that unlawful activities might flourish.

5.2.6. Further, it might be suggested that some interactions between the environment and the policing system might be forecast and therefore the policing system response might be potentially planned, whilst others might be more

spontaneous and the response unplanned. e.g. It is regrettable, but nevertheless highly probable, that a new housing estate in an inner city area will become a target for criminal activity unless preventive measures are taken at the outset and incorporated into the design of the buildings and infrastructure. The police system response to such a development may therefore be planned, possibly through direct involvement with the architects and developers.

5.2.7. Spontaneous incidents of public disorder are however virtually unpredictable in terms of time and location and the response of the police system is therefore based on general contingency plans and a general level of preparedness, rather than specific detailed plans for a known situation.

5.2.8. This notion that the stimuli for change can arise externally and be either welcome or unwelcome, planned or unplanned, introduces a further level of potential complexity to what might otherwise be seen as a rational process that is internal to the organisational system.

5.2.9. It is likely that welcome or beneficial change, whether it is planned or unplanned will be seen as advantageous to the organisation. Unwelcome change that is forecast at least has the potential of some ameliorating, or "damage limiting" action to be taken in advance of the worst or dysfunctional effects of the change.

5.2.10. Unplanned change however, of an unforeseen nature is potentially the most damaging to the performance of an organisational system. Such changes would be characterised by sudden and wide ranging changes to system objectives, as opposed to an adaptation of objectives. For instance the policing of the Miner's dispute during 1984-5 required both the officers involved, as well as organisational systems and structures to alter considerably.

5.2.11. The objectives of policing such a dispute were in direct contrast to those described at Section 2 for policing residential communities and it is arguable that this sudden change irrevocably and adversely changed conventional policing systems (Reiner 1991). It was suggested that:

> *"The generally accepted view was that the strike had profoundly damaged police-public relations....It had also changed the image of the police in an unfortunate direction..."* (Reiner 1991 pg. 182)

5.2.12. Unplanned and unforeseen change to an organisation will generally arise if the organisation does not have sub-systems designed to monitor leading or key indicators of environmental activity that critically influence the systems' performance. Despite disciplined and careful environmental scanning, police organisations might still be victims of unplanned change arising from:

i. environmental crises that in themselves were sudden and unforeseen,

ii. systems entropy either internally or externally such that the known, gradual decline in a systems' performance suddenly and unpredictably accelerates with a catastrophic effect, forcing sudden change,

iii. sudden and unforeseen psychological and social/psychological factors effecting either staff internally or the public externally.

5.3   The Macro Model of Change

5.3.1. The degree of complexity involved in the organisational change process thus gives rise to the need for the specification of a simple macro model of the change process. Figure 5.1 shows three elements of the change process:

     i. the stimuli for change,

     ii. the target for change,

     iii. the stages of the implementation.

STIMULUS for CHANGE — Identifies → **TARGET for CHANGE**

Feedback to / Subjected to

TYPES and STAGES of CHANGE IMPLEMENTATION

Figure 5.1   The Macro Model of Change

5.3.2.   The individual elements of the model of change are analysed in detail at Sections 5.4 to 5.6, but at the macro level, Figure 5.1 initiates at the point where a stimulus for a future change leads to the identification of the target for change. The target is the actual system or procedure that is to change and is thus the subject of the change implementation that will be achieved through one or more stages. As implementation progresses, so observation and evaluation of the results will feedback to the original situation which originally gave rise to the stimulus for change.

5.3.3.   If the system outputs satisfy the need for change, then the stimulus for change will reduce or disappear. If not, then the stimulus to change will modify, perhaps identifying a different target for change implementation and so on until the need is met and there are no further stimuli to change. The model is therefore iterative and dynamic, in that repeated passes will bring an alteration to both the system and the situation in need of change.

5.3.4.   A steady state will only be achieved when there are no inputs from the environment, or further internal inputs to create stimuli for change. This is a most unlikely situation for policing systems that are seen to exist in turbulent social environments (Jackson and Keys 1984) and are thus subject to frequent environmental stimuli to change, if they have open characteristics. (Section 5.2)

5.3.5.   Additionally, a steady state would only be achieved if every change implementation were wholly successful in respect of achieving design objectives. It is argued later, that a process of adjustment to systems is likely to be necessary after implementation. (Paragraphs 3.9.2-6)

5.3.6.   Therefore whilst the macro model of change might be argued to be stochastic, it is more probable that in relation to policing systems it is perpetually dynamic.

5.4   Macro Model - Change Stimuli

5.4.1. The principle that open systems exchange signals through a boundary with their environment, gives rise to the concept of inputs to a system that stimulate and motivate change - these may be termed 'change stimuli'. Kast and Rosenzweig (1981) adopted the synonymous term *"...sources of impetus for change..."* (pg. 565) and noted that they arise from many sources, namely:

i. environmental,	iv. psychological,
ii. technical,	v. managerial,
iii. structural,	vi. goals and values

5.4.2. Moss-Kanter (1991) used the expression 'forces for change' to convey a similar idea which she suggested arose from:

i.   a departure from tradition

ii. a crises or galvanising event,

iii. strategic decisions,

iv. individuals who are 'prime movers',

v.   action vehicles - the mechanisms that practically achieve change.

5.4.3. Similarly, Senge (1990) describes the inter-relatedness and linkages of elements in the change process in suggesting that 'levers' can be identified to assist in the process. Beckhard and Harris (1987 pgs. 10-18) also describe the concept of the inter relatedness of external factors as *"...multiple constituencies..."* and refer to *"...forces in the*

environment.." which might help or hinder the process of change.

5.4.4. These propositions are essentially similar in concept, in that they imply that inputs to an open system can be identified which stimulate and encourage the process of change. This point can be developed conceptually to encompass inputs arising from the system environment, (external stimuli), and those arising from within the sub-systems of the system of interest, (internal stimuli).

5.4.5. Additionally, Moss Kanter (1984 pg. 289) adopted the term *"...building blocks...in corporate changes."* to describe the amalgamation of issues giving rise to change. Although the words 'building blocks' in the change process have an apparently more mechanistic meaning than 'change stimuli', the implied meaning is of a similar concept. She suggests that small events and accomplishments build over time to create the point at which 'breakthrough' changes occur which are an accumulation of the building blocks of change.

5.4.6. In general terms, it seems that leading writers have identified similar phenomena and ascribed a slightly different emphasis to their explanations.

5.4.7. For the purpose of examining change in police organisations the expression 'change stimuli' has been chosen to amalgamate the ideas of the above writers with changes effecting police systems arising from any one or more of the following sources, either internally or externally:

    i.   managerial initiative and/or 'fashion in management'

    ii. social and/or psychological factors of staff and the public, including criminals, victims, other involved individuals, as well as opinion formers,

iii. cultural factors - assumptions by staff as to how the organisation operates,

iv. structural design - the relationship between parts of the organisation,

v. technological developments

vi. organisational goals and values

vii. political and/or economic factors, national, regional or internal.

5.4.8.   The diagram at Figure 5.2 shows the origins of the major types of change stimuli that input to policing systems and start the process of change.

5.4.9.   It is suggested that change stimuli do not either exist, or bring about change in isolation, whether internally from other organisational sub-systems, or externally as discrete inputs from the environment.

5.4.10. Rather, change stimuli are likely to be complex mixtures of pressures and motivations that have arisen from a number of apparently disconnected sources. This proposition is expanded by Senge (1991) in his description of 'connectedness' and 'interdependencies' between systems and their environments.

INTERNAL

V.F.M. measures
Cost cutting
Reaction to unexpected
    events
Higher workloads
    and demands
Management trends
IT and similar
    technological
    implementations
Response to
    organisational
    strategy   i.e.
    quality of service
    higher performance
Directive from higher
    authority
Better way of doing
    things is envisaged

EXTERNAL

Reaction to changes in
    the physical
    environment   i.e.
    new roads, estates
    criminal opportunity
Failure to meet public
    needs
Reaction to changes in
    the human/social
    environment i.e.
    changed levels of
    criminality, public
    expectations, norms,
    values etc.,
Reaction to changes in
    political & economic
    environment and
    government goals,
Reaction to changes in
    the technological
    environment i.e.
    communications & IT
    development, energy
    supplies and the
    criminal use of
    technology.

Stimulus
for
Change

Target
for
Change

(A)

Implementation

Boundary of Policing System

Internal and External
Change Stimuli

(A) Feedback after
Change Implementation

Elements of
the Macro Model
of Change

Direction of Influence

KEY

Boundary of Policing System Environment

Figure 5.2   Internal and External Change Stimuli

193

5.4.11. Figure 5.2 distinguishes between internal and external origins of change stimuli, but it is not the case that the headings shown are mutually exclusive. It is likely there will be some degree of external influence on every internal feature. For instance, trends or fashions in management approaches and style usually have their origins outside the police service, but through the process of learning and experience, police managers adopt the principles of a particular 'style' and implement the corresponding changes. Thus the origin of the change is external to the police system, but the stimulus arises internally.

5.4.12. Change stimuli may emerge from a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats (S.W.O.T.) analysis of the political, economic, social, technological and environmental (P.E.S.T.E.) factors arising around the organisation's activities. Alternatively, the change stimuli may impact directly upon the Service in the form of new legislation or government directives. In either case the effect is similar in that the Service has to respond to an externally stimulated change, rather than an internally identified need for change.

5.4.13. The issue being that the police service as an open system will, by definition, change through time by virtue of inputs from the human/social environment. These inputs may act directly upon, and influence existing members of the organisation and therefore be reflected in the attitudes and culture of the staff. (Section 5.6) Thus changes in society brought about by changing values, education and social norms would progressively bring about changes to policing systems.

5.4.14. Policing systems are however principally constituted of police officers who are continually leaving the system, predominantly through retirement, whilst new recruits join the system. The organisation is volatile and thus becomes increasingly subject to the values and attitudes of the newer members.

5.4.15. Models of social evolution may add a further potential complexity to the analysis of stimuli for organisational change. (Khandwalla 1977) For instance, if the police service is constitutionally representative of the society it protects (Critchley 1967), then if society changes through time, then so too will the police service. If the policing system is open as suggested, then it is argued that whether societies are subject to evolutionary or revolutionary change, then the changes occurring in the policing environment will be reflected in the characteristics of the policing system.

5.4.16. In societies with closed policing systems, it is suggested that the policing organisation would probably peruse its own goals and objectives despite changes in the human environment. Examples of policing systems where this seems to be the case are widespread in totalitarian regimes. (Alderson 1979)

5.4.17. The more obvious examples of such long term change stimuli would be those coinciding with cultural changes in wider society. i.e. attitudes to equal opportunity issues, race, gender and age, as well wider employment issues relating to leisure time, work re-location and the manufacturing/service industry ratio.

5.4.18. The motivation for internal change in the police service may often be seen to be the dominant characteristic of a change programme, whereby the achievement of the change is seen as an end in itself. For example, such a situation would exist where more staff energy was applied to the implementation of a computerised information system than to the use of the data subsequently produced.

5.4.19. This example although trivial in itself appears to be similar in principal to many problems commonly found within the commercial organisations described by Moss-Kanter (1991) and Senge (1990) and it serves to illustrate a significant

principle. As a first step towards implementing change, it is highly desirable that the change stimuli are correctly identified, prior to analysing the current situation and designing the changes. Failure to do so is likely to lead to unsuccessful implementations, or inappropriate changes that will not correspond to the original problem situation and thus the address the stimuli for change.

5.5   Macro Model - Change Targets

5.5.1.   The concept of a 'target for change' arises from the proposition that whether organisational change is planned or unplanned (Section 5.2) the focus of attention (manifestation) of the change will be apparent. Whether or not the stimulus for change arises externally or internally to the organisational system, it can be suggested to have direction and thus have an apparent target. Kast and Rosenzweig (1981) used the expression 'foci of attention' to convey a similar idea and suggested the concept of 'levels of foci'.

5.5.2.   These commence at the individual level of people and ascend through roles, interpersonal issues, inter-team and inter-group factors to the final level of the whole organisation.

5.5.3.   However this definition seems to omit many of the relationships, information flows and dynamics that are vital attributes of the functioning of organisational sub-systems. A more complete concept can be developed using Checkland's (1972, 1981) methodology as a starting point, where the notion of a 'root definition' and a 'rich picture' are advanced. The idea being that a system, or a part of a system, that is relevant to a problem situation can be defined precisely and then elaborated to incorporate significant elements and relationships. This is much closer to the concept of a change

target   in that the root definition would encompass all relevant attributes and the rich picture would relate these to other sub-systems and the environment, or system climate.

5.5.4.   Other writers make similar distinctions in order to isolate the portion of an organisation that is the centre of attention. For example, Flood and Carson (1993) explain the value of making a distinction between a 'narrow system of interest' which forms part of a 'wider system of interest'. Jackson and Keys (1984) refer to the notion of the 'problem context', which incorporates the sub-system itself, the   relevant decision makers and the problem solvers.

5.5.5.   As summarised earlier, Jackson and Keys (1984) arrive at their notion of the 'problem context' on the basis of the inappropriateness of some (O.R.) methodologies to some problems. The solution they suggest is for problem solvers to   initially   examine   situations   from   a   variety   of methodological perspectives and to determine which is the most appropriate on that basis before proceeding further. The difficulty, of course being, that in doing so, the boundary of the 'system of interest' may be drawn too wide for ease of analysis. Thus essential detail may become inconspicuous behind the broad picture.

5.5.6.   Despite   the   practical   complexities   surrounding   this approach, the concept of a target for change is considered important. The target for change provides a focus for where the change is to take place within the organisation, whilst allowing a full understanding of what it is that has to be changed and the consequential effects. It helps the problem solver to avoid considering change in isolation from other significant features of the system.

5.5.7.   The concept of a change target may be illustrated by an example from police systems. An external change stimulus from the public exerting pressure for a greater number of high visibility police patrols would inexorably lead to

consideration of the officers' duty roster system, as the device that governs officers' deployments, as the target for change. Practically, it may be that a police patrol activity analysis would reveal that officers customarily patrolled areas where demands for their services were greater, though not necessarily where they could be seen by the most people.

5.5.8. In other words they were dealing with incoming demands, rather than the public perception of problems that might be prevented by high visibility patrolling. The target for change would be where the attention for change became focused and in this example it may not be the duty roster but the public information or demand management sub-systems.

5.5.9. The target for change is seen as the actual sub-systems, including all procedures and staff that are subject of change or alteration. Targets for change are seen as occurring in three generic groups as shown at Figure 5.3.

Figure 5.3 Types of Change Target

5.5.10. Figure 5.3 implies that the targets for change although occurring within three identifiable groups, interact to produce the actual situation that is to be changed, more conveniently described as the 'narrow system of interest'.

5.5.11. On the basis of the work arising from the major schools of organisational theory, it can be proposed that organisations will have change targets within the three broad generic groups shown which broadly correspond to the major schools of theory as follows:

    i.   culture - essentially the human relations school, incorporating social, psychological and human features and phenomena,

    ii. structure - incorporating the rational approaches, including power, authority and accountability relationships, operating procedures and rules,

    iii. systems - the unifying approach that understands the organisation to be interacting with its own sub-systems and environment.

5.6   Change Target - Organisational Culture

5.6.1. The concept of organisational culture is complex. By definition, it consists of a large set of taken-for-granted implicit assumptions that encompass how members of a work group view both their internal and external relationships. (Schein 1985)

5.6.2. If the group, which may be an entire work force, have a shared history of any length, these assumptions about how their environment behaves and how they behave towards each other will have become aligned with one another. They will have created a pattern that reflects a set of assumptions

about 'how things are', i.e. time, reality, space, people, relationships etc. This pattern of basic assumptions amounts to 'organisational culture' and will be very strong in long and well established organisations. It reflects the basic human need for consistency and order in working life. (Schein 1985, Kilmann et al 1986)

5.6.3. It seems that if an organisation has a highly developed culture in this sense, it is most likely that the culture will effect most, if not all features of its functioning including:

      i.   strategies, policies and objectives,

      ii. structures - the established pattern of formal and informal relationships,

      iii. people - staff internally and people who associate with the organisation externally,

      iv. processes - the way things are done,

      v. control systems - the way people and processes are controlled,

      vi. reward systems - who benefits and how.

5.6.4. An example of how culture might negatively shape police organisational processes would be the widespread incidence of a tough, uncompromising, task-driven, autonomous, law enforcement oriented, self image amongst police officers. The internalisation of such a cultural stereotype by officers would strongly effect how the police organisation undertook its work. In this case away from the service concept of policing towards a sharply defined non discretionary, law enforcement model. Such a culture would include behaviours which were rewarded by peers, the organisation of the work groups and the style of strategies they pursued.

5.6.5. If such a culture were to be encouraged, or even tolerated by the wider organisation, then the norms of behaviour of the officers seen as successful would be copied by new arrivals and others trying to emulate their success. Thus the negative culture would spread and become the organisational norm. If such a situation persisted, then in time, nothing would be seen as untoward or unusual and the organisation would have developed a culture that was self sustaining and reinforcing and extremely difficult to alter. As individuals who are recognised as typifying the culture are rewarded and advanced, so the strategy and outlook of the organisation becomes more aligned to the culture. The process is then self re-enforcing and self-perpetuating and highly resistant to change. (Byars 1991) In this particular example the process would have occurred despite organisational goals to the contrary.

5.6.6. Kilmann et al (1985) provides a number of similar examples from commercial organisations where the organisational culture has become the dominant feature. Smith et al (1983 [a, b & c]) in studies of the Metropolitan Police during the early nineteen-eighties provided timely evidence of the emergence of strong cultural traits within some officers and features of the organisation that were not widely different from the foregoing example. Fielding (1991) suggests that the police culture is both resistant to change and resilient in the face of external pressures to change.

5.6.7. Sathe (1985) provides a model of the process of how culture tends to perpetuate itself within commercial organisations and which appears to be equally appropriate to police organisations. The model is shown in an adapted and extended form at Figure 5.4.

```
        ┌──────────────────┐                          ┌──────────────────┐
        │      - A -       │                          │      - B -       │
        │ New and Existing │                          │ Removal and/or   │
        │   members of the │                          │  rejection of    │
        │  organisation are│                          │   members who    │
        │ socialised to conform                       │  deviate from the│
        │ to the organisational                       │  organisational  │
        │     culture      │                          │     culture      │
        └──────────────────┘                          └──────────────────┘

                    ┌─────────────────────────────────┐
                    │  ORGANISATIONAL  CULTURE         │
                    └─────────────────────────────────┘

        ┌──────────────────┐                          ┌──────────────────┐
        │      - E -       │                          │      - C -       │
        │    Cultural      │                          │   Behaviours     │
        │  Communications  │                          │                  │
        └──────────────────┘                          └──────────────────┘

                    ┌──────────────────┐
                    │      - D -       │
                    │  Justifications  │
                    │       of         │
                    │   Behaviours     │
                    └──────────────────┘

   ┌──────────────────┐                      ┌──────────────────┐
   │ Entry to and Exit from│                 │    Cultural      │
   │   Organisational │      ───►            │  Re-inforcement  │  ───►
   │     Culture      │                      │   Sub-system     │
   └──────────────────┘                      └──────────────────┘
```

Figure 5.4   How Culture Tends to be Perpetuated

(Developed from Vijay Sathe 1985)

5.6.8.   Figure 5.4 shows the process already described of new
individuals being influenced by existing members of the

202

organisation. This may be as straightforward as older members passing on information to the newer members, or the more subtle acquisition of standards, etiquette's, demeanours etc. by behaviour modelling.

5.6.9. At minimum it is the acquisition of knowledge of how things are done by a process of socialisation. (Byars 1991) It is the case that some new members quickly absorb the cultural norms of an organisation whilst others do so more slowly, or not at all. In Sathe's (1985) analysis it is suggested that only two options exist for an employer whose staff do not acquire desirable features of the organisational culture. Firstly getting people to accept the pattern of beliefs, or secondly, removing them from the organisation.

5.6.10. In the case of a work group, this notion can be extended to encompass the rejection by a group of individuals who do not display the appropriate cultural attitudes and behaviours. Some will acquire the necessary traits whilst others will not and will be ostracised by the group for either positive or negative reasons. Thus there is a flow of people from box 'A' through the cultural process to box 'B'.

5.6.11. The cultural re-enforcement sub-system takes place from box 'C' through to box 'E'. Conventional wisdom is that beliefs and values influence behaviour. However a substantial body of social science literature indicates that one of the most effective ways of changing a persons beliefs and values is to change the corresponding behaviours. (Sathe 1985) However, behaviour change does not necessarily produce cultural change because of the intervening process of justification of behaviour, box 'D'. Here, Sathe sees individuals justifying the new behaviours in the context of the previous situation or some external factor. This is summarised as compliant behaviour without commitment to the culture.

203

5.6.12. Box 'E' in the process encompasses both implicit and explicit communications that take place within organisations about the way things are. Cultural communications range from straightforward messages sent by, say, logos headed paper, corporate uniform and dress, to the explicit communications of both managers and staff designed to secure adherence to the organisations' or work groups' values.

5.6.13. Figure 5.4 therefore demonstrates that the organisational culture will be self perpetuating and increasingly resistant to alteration without external interventions to influence the process. Thus when change to an organisation is tackled, it is likely that a number of well established practices and habits which derive from the culture will have to be addressed. In so doing, the culture will become a target for change.

5.6.14. Such well established practices may be associated with the values of many experienced and long serving members and change to such practices and habits may well produce negative reactions from the individuals concerned. However, it is the older more conservative elements of work groups that provide the stability and perpetuation of traditional values and it may be that such attributes are seen by the organisation as desirable. Such cultures do however, have the potential to be a power for disruption, as well as for consistency and stability. It seems to be the case that such cultures are more resistant to change than perhaps those typically associated with apparently more challenging, but more outward looking groups.

5.6.15. In such circumstances it is possible that a counterculture can form amongst those who advocate change in order to overturn the existing practices (Schein 1985) It is possible to see how such a development could be very harmful to an organisation. The conflicting values would quickly consume the full attention and energy of the protagonists and thus the

organisation would become more and more introspective and less open. In the case of a police organisation, exactly the opposite of the desired effect.

5.7 Change Target - Structure

5.7.1. At its most basic, the structure of an organisation might be considered as the established pattern of relationships among the component parts of the organisation. (Kast and Rosenzweig 1982) The term structure in this sense is used to emphasise the relations between the parts, as well as the identity of the parts which constitute the whole organisation. (Beer 1972)

5.7.2. The organisation's structure is typically associated with the ubiquitous organisation chart that schematically represents people, job titles or functions in boxes which are linked by lines indicating responsibility and accountability. Frequently such charts are drawn to indicate hierarchies and used to emphasise superior/subordinate relationships. Such diagrams allow both managers and staff to have a straightforward visual representation of what is essentially an extremely complex set of relationships in anything other than the smallest organisation. (Cleland and King 1972)

5.7.3. Size is probably the most important variable influencing the structure and shape of an organisation (Kakabadse et al 1987) and since police organisations within the UK are all 'large' in comparison to the majority of other organisations it will be useful to consider the common features of the structures large organisations. Kakabadse (1987) drew the following conclusions:

i. Larger organisations usually have the most formalised systems and procedures,

ii. larger organisations tend to develop a network of complex interrelations between a number of different specialist groups,

iii. larger organisations require extensive systems of co-ordination as much as of control,

iv. size in itself does not seem to determine either efficiency or quality of output,

v. size is an important determinant of the predominantly held attitudes amongst staff. (i.e. in a large organisation with a 'tall' structure, the culture may be formal and authoritarian, whereas the leadership style may be more informal in smaller, 'flatter' or matrix style organisations.

5.7.4. For the purpose of analysing the nature of organisational structure a distinction is often made between the formal and the informal structure of organisations. The formal structure being the planned structure representing the deliberate attempt to establish a pattern of relationships to achieve the organisations goals and the informal being those aspects of the organisation that occur spontaneously out of the interactions and activities of the participants.

5.7.5. The analysis of the formal structures of organisations is usually associated with the rational approach to the study of organisations and informal structural analysis with the human relations school. The following lists are drawn from a variety of sources (Kast and Rosenzweig 1982, Cleland and King 1972, Cummings 1980) in order to define the characteristics of the formal and informal organisation:

FORMAL

i. The pattern of formal relationships and duties - the organisation chart plus job descriptions, role definitions and /or position guides,

ii. the way in which various activities or tasks are assigned to different departments and/or people in the organisation,

iii. the way in which separate activities are co-ordinated and integrated,

iv. the power, status and hierarchical relationships with the organisations authority systems,

v. the planned and formal policies, procedures and controls that guide the activities and relationships of people in the organisation.

INFORMAL

i. social, psychological and social-psychological factors influencing managers and staff,

ii. inter and intra work group/team dynamics,

iii. personal relationships and objectives.

5.7.6. Although the distinction between the formal and informal attributes of organisational systems is useful for analytical purposes, in large and complex organisations the two types of structure merge inextricably together. It may be seen from the foregoing characteristics that none can exist in isolation, or are mutually exclusive.

5.7.7. It may thus be appreciated that it is not possible to precisely determine how the nature of the formal organisation

operates without an understanding of the informal relations and unofficial norms. (Blau and Scott 1962) The obverse is also true in that the formal organisation will effect the behaviour, attitudes and performance of individuals within it. (Senge 1990)

5.7.8. In terms of managing change this point is crucial. It can be assumed that an organisation is a goal seeking system, by definition (Cleland and King 1972). There is also considerable agreement that the formal structure of an organisation is the means by which strategy is pursued and objectives achieved. (Senge 1990, Kakabadse 1987, Cummings 1980, et al) This being the case, then the target for change in many circumstances will be the formal structure. Simply, if the organisation's strategy shifts or changes, then it is axiomatic that the formal structure will have to alter to more appropriately pursue the new aims.

5.7.9. However, it does not necessarily seem to be the case that the reverse process will follow, due to the existence of the informal structures. If the target for change is an alteration to the formal structure alone, the result will not necessarily be an alteration to the output in terms of the organisations performance and objectives.

5.7.10. This proposition is reinforced by Senge's (1990) observation that different people will produce qualitatively similar results within the same structure. Hence, if the structure is changed` and the people remain the same, then it is likely the earlier outputs will continue until other change targets are altered, i.e. culture or systems.

5.7.11. Cummings (1980) and Senge (1990) both offer the explanation that organisational structures must be harmonised not only with other organisational sub-systems, but also with their environment in order to be at their most productive. This implies that if changes are made to structures that are incompatible with other features of the

organisation, or are inappropriate to the organisations' environment, then individuals within the system will simply perpetuate the previous order of things. In other words things will be done the way they always have been, despite the structural changes.

5.7.12. This amounts to the most satisfactory explanation as to why organisational structures are so frequently the target for change, but when the structural changes are implemented, there is often little observed alteration to the outputs.

5.7.13. It is arguably the case that an organisation's structure should facilitate the accomplishment of organisational objectives rather than to detract from achievement. It is in this latter regard that the motivation for change to organisational structures in the police service probably arises. It is clear that too many management levels make communication and co-ordination needlessly difficult. Too many meetings attended by too many people are classic symptoms of an inappropriate structure, as is too much attention directed towards 'proper procedures' and inter function/department conflicts. (Byars 1991)

5.8   Change Target - Systems

5.8.1. The third interrelating target for change shown at Figure 5.3 are 'systems'. Here the word system is used in the dual sense of being both an intellectual discipline for the analysis of organisations (*inter alia*) but principally in this section, as a sequence of actions, such as a set of connected activities or procedures designed to achieve some organisational objective. The latter sense may be more appropriately explained as being similar to the concept of organisational standard operating procedures. (S.O.P.s) However to use the expression S.O.P. would be to ignore the other characteristics of a 'system' in the former sense. The word

system is therefore used with the dual meaning in this section.

5.8.2. A group of organisational activities, seen as a sub-system produce outputs which are largely determined by the purpose of that particular set of S.O.P.s. For instance, administrative procedures largely produce administrative outputs, transport procedures produce movement of goods or people, criminal court procedures produce verdicts and so on.

5.8.3. Each of these sequences of activities may be defined in terms of systems concepts and taken to include both the cultural and structural factors previously discussed. Here, the meaning is more precise in that cultural and structural attributes are considered as separate sub-systems inter relating with a sub-system called 'systems'. It is the organisational systems that comprise those activities that actually produce the current output that amounts to the 'narrow system of interest'. Thus leading to the definition of the word 'system' in this context, as the elements of the S.O.P.s and the relationships between them. (i.e. the police prosecution system is the officer activities, paperwork and relationships that result in a file capable of prosecution in court. Similarly, the police community liaison system comprises mutual stored knowledge and police communications with a community.) Identification of the sub-systems and systems boundaries will always be problematic, (Flood and Carson 1993) but it is the concept that is considered significant to the model of the target for change.

5.8.4. Examples of changes in commercial organisations where the target for change has been systems are numerous in the majority of management texts. Such changes are typified by an alteration to, say, a proforma, a manufacturing procedure, or any work routine that is made in isolation. The consequential effects of the change are not fully experienced

210

until after implementation when the systemic effect produces unforeseen outputs.

5.8.5. Similar effects can be seen inside police organisations. Alterations to the many legal and procedural systems which constitute a large portion of the 'business' of the Service are commonplace. Changes to reporting procedures, new or amended legislation, changes to criminal justice procedures and rules etc., are very frequent and amount to systems changes.

5.8.6. A small alteration to the way in which a particular element of information is transmitted from, say, a police division to a court in terms of timing or style of presentation may have substantial influences on other aspects of the police or court system. Such a change could have a significant impact on the routine of how police officers, civil servants, court officials, advocates and the bench pursue their own functions as well as having a considerable effect on efficiency.

5.8.7. Therefore in considering targets for change, 'systems' are a vital area for analysis if unwanted consequential effects are to be avoided and the organisation's potential is to be maximised.

5.8.8. This proposition is not new or even original in respect of commercial concerns. The discipline of systems thinking is the fundamental theme of Senge (1990) in his description of 'The Fifth Discipline'. Here it is emphasised and reinforced with evidence of case studies, that to change an element of an organisation without considering associated sub-systems and the environment is to court disaster in terms of effectiveness.

5.8.9. Evered (1980) in his consideration of the use of systems thinking for organisational development cites what he believes to be the 'beneficial fallout' of systems thinking

which encapsulates the major features of the approach which are seen as:

i. studying the characteristics of organisations at a higher level of abstraction, enabling a strategic approach to be taken,

ii. providing a language for describing organisational phenomena,

iii. thinking in terms of relationships between entities, rather than in terms of things in isolation,

iv. stimulating a holistic approach that encourages consideration of the entire organisation in the setting of its environment,

v. modifying science away from a reductionist causal approach, towards a more synthesising, transactive, contextual discipline,

vi. highlighting two kinds of explanation and reason, firstly deduction derived from logical analysis and secondly the kind stimulated by systems thinking, that of pattern recognition and creativity (gestalt) on the part of the observer.

5.8.10. It is argued that the above list of advantages for systems thinking about organisations are as appropriate to police organisational systems, as they are suggested to be for commercial type organisations. This analysis has argued that whilst the goals and objectives of policing systems may be less precise than those for commercial organisations, the nature and characteristics of the organisational structures, cultures and systems have much in common.

5.8.11. Police organisations in common with many service type organisations have people as their principal resource. This

implies that those features of organisational systems that involve the organisation of people and the way in which they function, both individually and collectively, are probably similar. Therefore it is argued that the conceptual approach of systems thinking and associated analytical methods that are successfully applied to commercial organisations, have the potential to be equally successful when applied to policing systems. The anticipated benefits are as potentially appropriate to police organisations as they have been to other concerns.

5.9 Macro Model - Types of Implementation

5.9.1. The actual changes necessary to bring about an alteration to the target, have to be subjected to a process of implementation for the change process to be complete. It is only when the changes have been made and the outputs from the new processes are fed back to the change stimuli (Figure 5.2), that it becomes possible to determine whether there is a continuing need for change and/or adaptation. Cleland and King (1983) referred to this feedback process as the 'project control sub-system'.

5.9.2. The process of implementation is conceptually more straightforward than either planning for change, or subsequently making the new system operate according to expectation. It might be argued that if a system is not performing according to design and/or expectation then it has either not been fully implemented, or it is not an appropriate system to realise the expected or desired change.

5.9.3. It is argued here, that there is a distinction to be made between the type of processes of planning, designing and organising for change, and the later stages of implementing the changes and then actually stimulating/adjusting the new

system to produce the required results. It is suggested that the earlier stages are essentially intelectual processes, whilst the later stages need the addition of leadership and motivational skills (Bass 1990) to actually produce the changes.

5.9.4. The transition from designing change to a process of implementation is described by Checkland (1972, 1981) in stages 5 and 6 of his soft systems methodology (S.S.M.). He suggests a comparison is made between the problem situation and the conceptual models of the new system in stage 5; then feasible and desirable changes are identified at stage 6. These two stages of Checkland's S.S.M. are broadly similar to the concept advanced here of delivery systems (Sections 4.1 and 4.2) that harmonise and co-ordinate individual police system treatments prior to the actual process of implementation.

5.9.5. Implementation then follows, which is considered here to be the process of actually changing what is happening now, into the new system, and is broadly similar to Checkland's S.S.M. stage 7 in that it involves actions to make changes.

5.9.6. As suggested above it is also considered here that there is a further distinction to be drawn between implementing a new system and actually stimulating and adjusting the new system to produce its designed performance. It is argued that this requirement is achieved by studying the series of feedback comparisons between what is required/designed and what is actually happening, i.e. 'the project control system' (Cleland and King 1983) This process is analogous to a new aircraft or ship that has to be operated by an experienced crew whilst detailed modifications are made before the vessel can be considered to be operating optimally.)

5.9.7. Here, three basic models of change implementation will be considered:

i.   abrupt system change whereby the old procedures stop and the new start immediately,

ii. phased implementation whereby the old procedures are gradually replaced with the new,

iii. and parallel operations whereby both old and new systems run simultaneously for a period before the old is terminated.

5.9.8.   These basic models of system change implementation although conceptually straightforward have many possible variants which are appropriate to different change targets.

5.9.9.   The models of change implementation at Figures 5.5 to 5.13 have been developed on the basis of S.S.M. (Checkland 1972, 1981) in order to examine the major variants and to explore the possibilities of adapting the basic change models to suit particular organisational needs.

5.9.10. Each type of implementation has advantages as well as disadvantages in terms of time, resources and complexity, but additionally, each has advantageous features for differing situations. Thus, using the models it is possible to make comparisons between 'what is' in real situations and what is desirable or feasible in planning changes.

5.9.11. A basic model of abrupt change is shown at Figure 5.5   The horizontal axis represents time from any point in the systems evolution t[n] through arbitrary increments to t[n+3]. The vertical axis represents systems utilisation which is the proportional amount of a system that is functioning at any particular time. A fully functioning system is thus shown as a horizontal line at the 100% level. Abrupt change is therefore simply represented by the vertical straight line at the arbitrary point of change, t[n+1].

Figure 5.5 Abrupt System Implementation

5.9.12. The advantage of implementations of this type is that it can be a fast process that enables new system to be potentially fully functioning as soon as possible. The period of transition and uncertainty associated with the change process is reduced to a minimum and it is potentially cheaper in terms of resources allocated to the change process. Abrupt change is attractive in situations where there are few individuals involved and where speed and cost are high priorities.

5.9.13. However, the approach carries with it considerable disadvantages that make it less attractive in many settings. Once the old system has been discontinued, complete reliance has to be placed on the new system, unless it is possible to revert to the old system.

5.9.14. The abrupt change method presents only limited opportunities to ensure the new system will operate satisfactorily prior to replacement of the old system. Such

216

opportunities are confined to testing the new system in an artificial environment, i.e. by exercise or simulation which may not address a further difficulty in that the consequential effects of change may be largely unforeseen until after implementation in the real 'world setting'. Staff training and familiarisation with the new system may be beneficial, but the staff involved with making the new systems function in a 'real world' operational environment will have a limited opportunity to adjust at the point of abrupt change

5.9.15. Figure 5.6 illustrates an approach that overcomes many of the problems of abrupt change - the parallel system operation. Here the old system continues to fully function at 100% output, and at t[n+1] the new system is implemented alongside to run simultaneously, until t[n+2] when the new system fully replaces the old.

Figure 5.6   Parallel System Implementation

5.9.16. Although parallel system implementation may be seen to diminish many of the disadvantages of the abrupt change model, it has potentially more than double the cost implications until the new system replaces the old. Such costs, are likely to be justified only where:

    i. continued satisfactory operation of the system is essential,

    ii. the risks associated with even a marginal loss of output are unacceptable.

5.9.17. Figure 5.7 shows a variant of the parallel system implementation whereby only selected sub-systems are operated in parallel in order that combined system utilisation does not exceed 100%. The boundary lines between the new and old systems represent an abrupt cessation of the old sub-systems and replacement with corresponding sub-systems from the new system, or a more gradual transition shown by the sloping lines.

5.9.18. The model implies that combinations of these implementations are feasible in that a gradual implementation of new sub-systems at t[n+1] could be followed by an abrupt termination of the old system at t[n+2].

Figure 5.7 Parallel Sub-System Implementation

5.9.19. The advantages of parallel sub-system implementation are that new and old critical sub-systems can be run simultaneously, whilst satisfactory functioning of the new sub-systems is verified or adjusted. Thus the risk of failed system output is substantially reduced, whilst those less critical features of the system are changed without unacceptable risk to the operation of the overall system. The cost advantages of this model combined with the reduced risk of failure will make this approach to change attractive in many situations.

5.9.20. The model at Figure 5.8 is the third basic system implementation type - a straightforward phasing of the elements of change through time.

Figure 5.8   Phased System Implementation

5.9.20. Figure 5.8 shows that the change process might be progressed quickly, line (1), or extended over a longer period of time, line (2). The shorter the time taken, the greater will be the likelihood of disadvantages accruing associated with the abrupt change model. However, the longer the time taken, the greater will be the risk of developing dysfunctional effects that might limit the success of the system implementation.

5.9.21. At worst, the outcome would be that the complete new system might never be fully implemented. This and other potentially unsatisfactory outcomes might arise because the implementation process was progressing so slowly that:

    i.   staff attention becomes distracted from the main change objectives and becomes focused on minor, consequential effects, to the detriment of the overall systems operation and output,

ii. changes are insignificant and take so long to achieve that the new system/process is discredited and resistance to change increases,

iii. changes in the systems' environment influence operation of the new system to a level that the earlier planned changes become inappropriate,

iv. the notional cost of human energy and skill expended on the change process exceeds that directed towards the operation of the system itself.

5.9.22. The model at Figure 5.9 demonstrates a variation of phased system implementation whereby the output of the old system, line (a) is not maintained at 100% when phased implementation of the new system, line (b) commences at t[n+1]. Here, before the new system is functioning at 100% the old system is phased out, with the resulting drop in output either side of the phasing intersection.

5.9.23. It would be feasible to plan a similar implementation whereby the old system was phased out and the new system phased in parallel so as to avoid a drop in output. Such an approach would incur the increased costs associated with any form of parallel implementation, but would not be as high as those implied by the model at Figure 5.6.

System
Utilisation

100%

OLD
SYSTEM   (c)   (d)   NEW
                              SYSTEM

          (a)   (b)

0%

t_n t_{n+1} t_{n+2} t_{n+3}

.... Boundary between old and new systems   Time

Figure 5.9   Phase Out - Phase In System Implementation

5.9.24. An implementation that corresponded to the model shown at Figure 5.9 would only be appropriate where the maintenance of 100% system output was unnecessary.

5.9.25. An extreme variation of such a model is indicated by vertical lines (c) and (d) where the old system output ends at t[n+1], either through entropy or design and a time lag occurs before implementation of the new system at t[n+2]. The system output would thus fall to zero for the duration of the lag, (t[n+1]-t[n+2]).

5.9.26. Figure 5.10 develops the variation of a time lag between old and new systems by introducing the concept of a prototype system that is fully implemented between the old system ending and the finalised new system starting. The expression 'prototype system' is used here in the sense of a preliminary system, or model that it is known will have to be adapted, or modified during the prototype phase before it might be considered to be the finalised new system.

222

5.9.27. A prototype system may contain known weaknesses, albeit that it is capable of achieving full output for the limited duration of the prototype trial. Such weaknesses may only be possible to correct with the prototype system functioning in its real environment, thus making such an approach to implementation the only feasible option, if the risks of implementing a completely untried system are to be avoided.

Figure 5.10   Prototype System Implementation

5.9.28. The principal difference between a prototype system and a trial, or experimental system is that it is known at the outset of implementation that a prototype system will be adapted during operation within the context of its environmental influences.

5.9.29. Thus experimental causality, in a rigorous sense, (Fairweather and Tornatzky 1977) is not an outcome of the prototype period. Rather, data will be generated representing whether the system meets its design criteria within its operating environment and information as to how output might be improved.

5.9.30. A trial, or an experiment with a social system implies that the system of interest in its entirety will be tested against a set of objectives, or test criteria, with the environment held steady, so as to determine causal relationships. (Fairweather and Tornatzky 1977) (Difficulties with this approach in relation to policing systems are discussed in Section 3)

5.9.31. In respect of change targets and their interaction (Figure 5.3) it is not possible to isolate the relevant sub-systems and test them in controlled conditions, so such trials are not experimental in the classical sense. However, this does not mean that non-experimental research in this classic sense, is not scientific. But it does imply that controlled experimentation is not an option and that other methods have to be used. (deNeufville and Stafford 1971)

5.9.32. Two such approaches of parallel and phased trial implementations are shown at Figures 5.11 and 5.12 where trials are taking place either alongside the fully functioning old system, or where selected sub-systems replace corresponding sub-systems from the old system.

Figure 5.11   Parallel Trial System Implementation

5.9.33. At   Figure 5.11 a trial of selected sub-systems is taking
place in parallel to the old system. At a point when sufficient
information has been generated from the trial,   the old
system can be phased out to be replaced by a development
of the trial system into the new system.

5.9.34. The benefit of such a model is that the trial can take place
without effecting the systems' output which in turn provides
the opportunity to develop and implement the new system
with the knowledge gained from the trial.   The cost
necessarily being that of the parallel trial.

5.9.35. Figure 5.12 illustrates how such costs might be reduced by
incorporating the trial within the operation of the existing
system.

Figure 5.12   Phased Trial System Implementation

5.9.36. The model at Figure 5.12 might initially seem attractive in combining the benefits of experimentation without the corresponding costs of parallel operations. However, the data generated from the trial is likely to be weaker than that obtained from trials that are not an integral part of the functioning system. The functioning   system will be influenced by its environment and thus any trial that takes place as a connected sub-system, must also be influenced by the environmental inputs. Therefore if the system is to be replicated elsewhere in similar environments, it is likely that the additional costs associated with a parallel trial are likely to be worthwhile in terms of achieving a closer to optimum design for the new system.

5.9.37. Figure 5.13   provides a schematic representation of non-linear possibilities that may apply to all the foregoing models of implementation. It intuitively seems unlikely that most implementations would follow the linear implementation routes used for the benefit of simplicity in the forgoing models.

226

Figure 5.13   Non Linear Phased System Implementation

5.9.37. The three curves illustrated are representative of the many possibilities that could exist. Curve (1) approximates to a steep exponential whereby the rate of implementation increases as a function of elements already implemented and approximates to the model, x^a where a > 1.0. In other words, the more implementation that has taken place, the faster will be the rate of subsequent implementation.

5.9.38. Curve (2) is representative of implementations that do not progress at an even or steady rate.   Rather, periods of achievement are   followed by periods of either slower implementation activity, or much faster progress. The rate of implementation is shown to slow perceptibly as 100% system utilisation is approached.

5.9.39. Curve (3) typifies the implementation programme that has a very slow rate to start, but which increases quickly once progressively more elements are implemented and approximates to the model x^a where a < 1.0. The rate of

increase is shown to be greatest as 100% system utilisation is approached.

5.10 The Macro Model of Change - Conclusions

5.10.1. The macro model of change has sought to identify and relate together the major elements of the change process. In doing so a number of key characteristics of organisations have been introduced, culture, structure and systems. The macro model of change is iterative in that the process of feedback from the implementation stage will determine whether or not the stimulus for change continues to exist and whether or not there is a need for further change.

5.10.2. The model is dynamic in that through each iteration the elements will have adapted to the original change stimulus, change targets identified and appropriate changes implemented. If the feedback does not cancel out the stimulus, then a steady state will not be achieved and the process will continue. Each iteration changes the system and bringing it closer to a steady state. In practice, such a steady state might never be wholly achieved, as the stimulus from a turbulent environment will invariably promote continuous change in a police organisation. But like the organisation itself, the model reflects these dynamic characteristics.

5.10.3. A feature of the change process that is not considered by the macro model are the internal changes that arise during the process of change and which are not directly connected with the stimulus for change, These factors are largely the psychological and social psychological factors affecting staff that form a pattern during the process of organisational change. Although culture is a legitimate consideration at the macro model level and culture has been shown to be a product of individuals' psychological attributes or

perceptions, the individuals' needs and those of the organisation are clearly a major factor in the process of organisational change.

5.10.4. The degree to which latent human capability can be utilised to achieve corporate goals is often the key to successful organisations. Therefore changes to morale and motivation in individuals and groups brought about by the process of change can be critical in this regard.

5.10.5. Chapter Six analyses this important feature of the change process and relates the dynamics of psychological and social psychological factors to the macro model of change.

CHAPTER SIX

Summary

The significance of the outputs from an individuals' psycho social sub system to the process of change are considered in this chapter. A process model of change is suggested and the conflicts and contrasts in the change process are examined from a managers' perspective. The issue of resistance to organisational change arising from both organisational and human factors is discussed and a model of an individual's dynamic response to the process of change is advanced. The predominant skills and needs of individuals are examined in relation to various stages of change and these are related to the three change targets suggested in Chapter Five. The resulting complexity of the change process is noted and described in the context of the 'change cube' model.

6.1 The Human Dimension of Change

6.1.1. The outputs of the human psychological and social psychological (psycho social) sub-system are seen as crucially significant to the process of implementing change, whatever the change stimuli. If the change requires individuals or work groups to make some adaptation to their routines and procedures at work, then psycho social factors will have a major influence on the outcome. (Brown 1954, Argyle 1972)

6.1.2. If staff support for change is required and is not forthcoming, the impact of a technical change can be zero, or even negative. (Kast and Rosenzweig 1981) Therefore an understanding of the common human processes of change that are repeated throughout organisational change programmes is essential for achieving successful implementations. Thus benefit for the organisation might be derived and organisational goals achieved.

Figure 6.1 Manager's Process Model of Change

232

6.1.3.   The macro model of change described in Chapter Five provides the basis for the development of a generalised process model of change that · incorporates the role of managers. The inclusion in the model of an organisation's manager's role is vital to the process of change, as it is only through staff and their effective direction, motivation and co-ordination that the organisation's goals might be approached. (Koontz and O'Donnell 1976)

6.1.4.   Such a model might be seen as a manager's process or action guide for addressing change. Figure 6.1 assembles the minimum necessary management activities for achieving change associated with the elements of the macro model in the form of a flow chart.

6.1.5.   The process shown at Figure 6.1 initiates with identification of the change stimuli. This will enable decision makers to determine whether changes are to be of a systemic nature at a strategic level, or confined to limited tasks and procedures that may take place without management intervention. In such an event, managers will need to be aware of alterations to tasks as the consequential effects may not be clear from the operational level.

6.1.6.   The management and staff communication sub-systems include all the formal and informal information routes customarily utilised within the organisational system for the exchange of information between staff and managers, as well as for providing managers with system output performance information. In the case of major change the communications sub-system is likely to include special communications procedures and arrangements designed to promulgate information specifically relating to the change programme.

6.1.7. Management information will enable the target for change to be identified and decisions made as to which aspects of the system need to be changed. Further research may be necessary at this stage and systems thinking will enable the consequential effects of the proposed changes to be managed appropriately. (Senge 1990)

6.1.8. The implementation method may then be selected from the feasible variations (Section 5.9) and action plans prepared that will allocate tasks to people or work groups. There will always be costs associated with change, even if these are only notional or opportunity costs of staff time. Resourcing issues must therefore be considered before implementation can commence.

6.1.9. The counter resistance sub-system continually interacts with the implementation process in such a way as to facilitate the implementation at every stage. It will be shown (Sections 6.3 - 6.8) that resistance to change in organisational systems by staff and managers is a very common phenomena which can be relied upon to emerge in one form or another during most change programmes. (Kast and Rosenzweig 1981) It is therefore desirable to provide for the eventuality by planning effective counter measures.

6.1.10. Various measures might be more or less appropriate at different stages of implementation, depending upon progress. Such measures might include one or more of the following:

i. the provision of a dedicated or enhanced internal communications system to promulgate change information to the work force,

ii. regular, persuasive demonstrations of the positive features of the change by describing the advantages and benefits accruing to those involved,

234

iii. presentation of a rational analysis of the inappropriateness of the old /existing system,

iv. association of achievement of change with the internal reward systems i.e. advancement, recognition, financial rewards and/or tangible inducements,

v. association of non achievement of change with internal sanctions system, i.e. threat to security, lack of advancement, worsened financial prospects, loss of, or reduced status/position, use of formal disciplinary procedures.

6.1.11. Finally, when implementation is complete, Figure 6.1. shows a decision point where a judgement is made as to the suitability of the new output. If the output is not meeting the design requirement and the stimulus for change remains present, then more research may have to be undertaken and the process re-started.

6.1.12. If a marginal improvement is observed then it is possible that an inappropriate target was selected, or the new system has only been partially implemented. In such an event, the change process should re-commence with identification of the target for change, which in any event, may have altered since the first change process.

6.1.13. For police managers, as with others, change is an issue that may be relied upon to frequently recur, bringing with it many predictable challenges, especially regarding staff. Managers and leaders are by definition agents of change; they are people whose acts affect other people, more than other peoples' acts affect them. (Bass and Stogdill 1990)

6.1.14. The management of the change process is therefore one of critical significance to managerial effectiveness. It is also potentially the subject that poses the greatest threat to managers, as so often change involves a shift from the known and comfortable, into the unknown and uncomfortable. Clearly, managers themselves are not immune in any way from the adverse effects that change and stress can produce.

6.1.15. It is a common and long established phenomena for managers to experience excessive and damaging levels of stress as a direct result of changes arising in their working lives. (Basil and Cook 1974) Although recent research indicates that some stress may be beneficial and if handled correctly can improve performance and self esteem. (Carnall 1990)

6.1.16. It seems probable that much of this stress may arise not only from the nature of the change itself, (the change target), but from the conflicting expectations of both managers and staff inherent in the process of change, whatever the target. Not only is the manager faced with leading the change as a change agent (Bass and Stogdill 1990), he or she is confronted with a number of inherent conflicts within the change process itself.

6.2   Conflicts and Contrasts in the Change Process

6.2.1.   A great deal is written about how managers should manage in their daily working lives. Generalist and specialist literature ranging from popular bookstall publications to detailed organisational case studies and theoretical texts offer much insight and advice to individuals in managerial positions. The police service in common with many other large organisations, places much emphasis on management training.

6.2.2.   A situation is thus created where a manager is likely to have many normative expectations of the management role. Many of these expectations will be potentially realisable and many will be clearly out of reach. Additionally, staff themselves will have expectations of their managers, some of which will be legitimate and achievable, whereas some will be perceptual and inappropriate.

6.2.3.   Within this plethora of learning, experience, advice and expectations,   there are a   number of   issues that are brought into conflict with one another as a result of the process of change. Some learning will conflict with some experiences, some advice will conflict with some legitimate expectations.

6.2.4.   A situation is thus created where the manager is not only confronted with managing the   change target and implementation, but also the conflicts and contrasts generated by the change process.

6.2.5.   In order to illustrate the foregoing propositions, a representative summary table of the many possible types of conflicts that might be presented to a manager during the change process is set out below. The issue in column (A) contrasts and potentially conflicts with that in column (B).

6.2.6.   Figure 6.2. needs little by way of commentary as the principles advanced are generally well known and seen as desirable in contemporary management practice in the police service, as well as in other organisations. (Bradford and Cohen 1984, Cleland and King 1983)

6.2.7.   The conflicts   demonstrated are not   necessarily irreconcilable. A long established major role for managers is the harmonisation and reconciliation of apparently competing priorities and objectives. (Cleland and King 1972)

6.2.8. For instance, it is not a trivial assertion that individuals should be 'happy' at work as far as possible. (In this context, 'happy' is considered to be an individuals' state of mind which reflects pleasure, harmony and a contentment with work circumstances.)[1]

6.2.9. It is desirable, if not in terms of productivity, but in terms of the social content of work, that individuals derive some happiness from their work experience. Change to this routine state of contentment may be suggested to create some 'unhappiness' which, as will be shown later (Section 6.9) may manifest in many different ways.

6.2.9. It may be argued as not unreasonable for the manager to ✓ forsake the individuals' immediate happiness for the achievement of the change. Then to look for some other stimuli to recreate, or re-introduce a degree of happiness at a later stage. It might be entirely consistant, in the short term, for a manager's objectives to put the needs of the organisation above those of an individual's happiness. Although it would be probable, that if this situation persisted, an adverse reaction would arise in the individual(s) concerned. (i.e leaving the organisation and /or sabotage in extreme cases) (Dubois 1979)

6.2.11. So, whilst the conflicts and contrasts are presented as potential difficulties for managers to overcome in the process of managing change, they should not be taken as irreconcilable although some will be easier to tackle than others, as in the foregoing example.

---

[1]The term 'happy' has been used in order to differentiate from 'job satisfaction' and 'motivation' that have more-precise meanings in the context of similar research.

Conflicts and Contrasts in Managing Change	
(A)	**(B)**
Understanding current day to day issues	Maintaining a strategic view and direction
Effective, high profile, charismatic leadership, with an empathetic style, (management by walking about!)	Maintaining distance from day to day issues whilst providing effective leadership.
Understanding staff and the psycho social problems associated with work	Allowing staff sufficient freedom to develop solutions in order to promote individual development and ownership of changes.
Identifying personally with the necessary changes.	Encouraging delegation and staff ownership of the changes.
The need for and desirability of corporacy.	The desirability of constructively challenging existing practices.
Maintaining staff and self happiness.	Making changes happen in reality.
Implementing solutions to 'today's' problems	Creating a dynamic organisation that will tackle 'tomorrow's' problems 'today'.
Possession of necessary attributes for implementing effective change. i.e. determination, confidence, certainty, robustness etc.	Such attributes are dysfunctional in other key aspects of change management. i.e. team building, delegation, trust , corporacy etc.

Figure 6.2   Conflicts and Contrasts in Managing Change

6.2.12. Of greatest potential difficulty is the conflict between styles of management necessary for day to day, strategic or routine management and the management style required to achieve effective change. Most writers seem to agree that modern management and leadership styles are to a great extent situational. (Bass and Stogdill 1990) However, there has been a gradual but steady trend over the last four decades or so, to move away from authoritarian and autocratic styles towards more participative and democratic approaches to management. (Moss-Kanter 1984 & 1989, Senge 1990) This trend has been reflected in commercial, as well as public service organisations and has extended to bureaucracies that are largely rule bound, such as the police service and other quasi military style organisations.

6.2.13. The benefits of participatory styles are well known in achieving motivation and commitment to corporate and work group objectives, including the creation of opportunities for greater productivity. (Vroom and Deci 1978) There is substantial evidence to support the trend to greater participation and the benefits to be achieved by this approach. (Robson 1982, Bradford and Cohen 1984)

6.2.14. The contrast arises in that there appears to be much agreement that the operationalisation of major change requires a clear strategy and management attributes of determination and robustness. This is necessary in order to sustain change activities in the face of the trend of-staff to dilute or moderate the changes, especially by those who perceive they will be adversely affected for whatever reason.

6.2.15. The assertive management style thus conflicts with the experiences of many modern middle managers who have become habituated to more participative styles. Moss-Kanter (1984) identified a similar conflict and found that middle managers and staff were reluctant to invest energy in their work when faced with the conflict between a robust top

down change programme and their normal corporate style of participation and involvement.

6.2.16. The conflict was found to be exacerbated by the tendency of managers to focus on short term objectives when faced with the prospect of further change without involvement or participation. Thus the opportunity of harnessing managerial skills and energy to translate strategic necessities into operational changes was *"...constrained...and...inhibited..."* by the conflict in management styles. (Moss-Kanter 1984 pgs. 47-58)

6.2.17. Advocates of a participatory approach to management would claim that communication and consultation should take place in advance of the change implementation in order to secure the commitment of the work force. (Francis 1987) However, it may be demonstrated that individuals will strive to find reasons to minimise change if they do not perceive them to be directly in their interests, whether or not they are involved in a consultative or participatory system. (Tichey and Devanna 1986, Bass and Stogdill 1990) It is possible in such cases that participation and debate in advance of the proposed changes has the potential to harden resistance to change, rather than to facilitate it.

6.3   Resistance to Change - The Change Balance

6.3.1. Despite the commonalty of organisational change, typified by the assertions of Handy (1984 pg. 10) that organisational life is changing *"...fast and dramatically..."*, Carnall (1990 pg. 28) *"In a changing world, an organisation must change to survive..."* and others in a similar vein, (Evered 1980, Porras 1987) people in organisations often seem to resist the process.

241

6.3.2. It may be that in generations to come, or possibly sooner, people in organisations will consider change to be the norm. But for the time being, and despite the inducements of material rewards associated with profit policies of both government and commerce, individuals persistently demonstrate a resistance to change in their working lives. Senge (1990 pg. 88) notes that sudden resistance to changes can seem to *"... come from nowhere..."*, but adds that resistance to change is predictable, in that it invariably arises from threats to traditional norms and ways of doing things.

6.3.3. It is inaccurate to assume that resistance to change is always a negative phenomena, although it is frequently perceived in that way. Organisations whether commercial or public service, have a need to pursue multiple objectives for survival and amongst these is likely to be a need for some stability, balanced with a need to change. (Carnall 1990)

6.3.4. Police organisations, especially those operating within conurbations, carry out their function within an extremely turbulent human environment (Scarman 1981, Jackson and Keys 1984) where both public and government opinion can fluctuate rapidly and widely.

6.3.5. To correspondingly react to such fluctuations would severely curtail the ability of the police to strategically and efficiently tackle crime and other issues. The same argument may be said to be true for government departments who see their role as providing stability in the face of political changes in government.

6.3.6. Similarly, it might be argued that a commercial organisation that tried to continually adapt its product to suit every market opportunity, might discover the desirability of some stability in order to consolidate its position. In the extreme, a situation could be envisaged where all the energy of such an organisation could be consumed by managing changes,

rather than generating output; the organisation having become totally introspective. Carnall (1990 pg. 28) describes this situation as follows:

"...while we are changing, we must still deploy people to produce goods or services as normal, even if we are demanding extra effort from them as they experience change."

6.3.7. Senge (1990) introduced the concept of 'balancing loops' to convey the management desirability of a balance between a static system without change and a dynamic system that is continually changing. Kast and Rosenzweig (1981) refer to the 'dynamic equilibrium' of organisations, which is the state in which an organisation is stable to environmental perturbations, but which is also adaptive and innovative. Therefore, if a state of balance is desirable, then a degree of resistance to change in an organisation is also desirable.

6.3.8. At Section 5.6, reference was made to the stability created by long serving members of staff who continue to exhibit the traditional values of the organisation and who are highly resistant to change. In organisations where traditions are significant to the operation, i.e. the market or trading position, corporate image, corporate integrity, then a high turnover of such staff would be undesirable.

6.3.9. In such circumstances resistance to change would amount to a corporate asset rather than a constraint. In order to stimulate change under such conditions it would therefore be necessary to bring about gradual alterations to the corporate culture that was being sustained by the long serving members. Such a process is described at Section 5.4. and by the model at Figure 5.4.

6.3.10. Here, the organisational balance would be towards resistance rather than change. Whereas in an organisation

that was dependent upon a creative reaction to it's environment, the balance would favour adaptive staff, who are possibly younger and less inclined to exhibit values associated with established norms of 'how things are done'.

6.3.11. Resistance to change can therefore occur as a result of the characteristics of the particular organisation or industry. Contemporary examples of such a style of organisation and their workers are common i.e. dock workers, car assembly operators, miners, railway drivers and signal operators.

6.3.12. In such cases, resistance to change has been high when it has been seen as necessary by the workforce to resist technological progress and to retain traditional practices in order to preserve job security and standard of living.

6.3.13. The majority of explanations for resistance to change do not however arise through characteristics of a particular organisation or industry, but through the people in the work place, both individually and collectively.

6.3.14. The human and social factors contributing to a resistance to change form a complex psycho social sub system, the elements of which may be categorised as follows. Each will be discussed in turn:

     i. psychological factors,

    ii. psycho-social factors,

   iii. sunk costs,

   iv. personal strategies,

   v. confusion.

6.4   Resistance to Change - Psychological Factors

6.4.1. The following table presents the frequently encountered, major psychological factors that may be apparent singly, or in combination to produce an individuals' resistance to organisational change. There are many unusual, or even abnormal psychological conditions that may occur in people that will create a resistance to change, or constrain them from tackling unfamiliar circumstances, i.e. psychopathy, acute paranoia, schizophrenia. (Sacks 1985)

6.4.2. Such conditions are exceptional and the list presented here, drawn from the following sources, does not attempt to be exhaustive in this respect. (Brown 1954, Davies and Shackleton 1975, Lupton 1978, Vroom and Deci 1978, Brown and Campbell 1994) Rather those conditions shown are attitudinal phenomena that exist in the majority of humans at work. (Argyle 1972)

    i.   **Uncertainty** - Staff not knowing in sufficient detail what has to be done, or what the new system requires of them may create a situation where change will be resisted. Uncertainty can arise due to:

        (a) poor internal communications,

        (b) staff inattention to new instructions,

        (c) an inability or reluctance to understand what is required,

        (d) a situation that is inherently uncertain and cannot be made more certain.

ii. **Confidence** - a lack of confidence in individuals that they will actually be able to perform the new tasks or procedures will militate against implementation of change. Poor levels of confidence may arise from:

(a) inadequate training or communication,

(b) the absence of an opportunity to experiment in a safe environment.

iii. **Anxiety** - a condition exacerbated by poor confidence and uncertainty which manifests as worry, which in turn may create unacceptable levels of stress in staff. It is natural for humans to strive to reduce the source of anxiety and if this is perceived to be the impending change, then the changes may be selectively ignored and/or resisted.

iv. **Stress** - a potentially severe constraining condition that may limit the performance of routine activities and in such severe cases, will result in inactivity, a loss of self esteem and a disregard of new or unfamiliar challenges or changes.

v. **Confusion** - a state of mental disorder brought about by not being able to relate the present activities with the new requirements. Likely to be compounded by poor internal communication and/or a failure by managers to agree clear objectives.

vi. **Fear** - an emotion brought about by the prospect of imminent danger the reaction to which is either to fight or flee. Fear of impending but unknown change will limit current performance and create future resistance to change, even before proposals are drafted. The implementation of new technologies have demonstrated how some staff have 'fled' from the prospect of assimilating new skills.

vii. **Depression** - a personal mood of helplessness, excessive melancholy and inadequacy often associated with other physical or mental conditions. Will severely constrain an individual's motivation to progress current work and especially to develop and/or implement changes.

6.5 Resistance to Change - Psycho Social Factors

6.5.1. In Section 5.6 the concept of organisational culture was described and the importance of culture to the change process was recognised and developed as one of the targets for change. The significance of organisational culture to the change process principally arises from the potential of people in groups to have common set of values that can be applied to disrupt or resist change. (Gahagan 1975)

6.5.2. Culture in the broadest sense is no more that a combination of psycho social factors interacting with organisational goals in the workplace to produce observable effects. The elements of a cultural sub-system have been identified from

a variety of sources by Schein (1985) and may be summarised as follows:

    i.   observed behavioural regularities - language, rituals, dress, demeanour,

    ii. the norms that evolve in working groups - fair day's work for a fair day's pay,

    iii. dominant values - quality of service, adherence to the law,

    iv. organisational philosophy - the vision or knowledge that guides an organisation towards its staff and /or customers,

    v. the rules - that have to be learnt by a newcomer in order to be accepted,

    vi. feeling or climate - the impression created by physical layout and how staff interact with outsiders.

6.5.3. Both Schein (1985) and Bass and Stogdill (1990) show evidence that where the above factors develop into an organisational culture that is resistant to change, it becomes difficult to envisage how successful development and innovation may be achieved. Examples are particularly striking in this regard where technology has dramatically altered the nature of certain tasks and change implementation has been resisted at a high cost to all concerned. i.e. the newspaper and printing industries, television and video services, railway signalling and robotics in production industries.

6.5.4. From a management perspective the prospect of implementing change against such resistance would represent a considerable challenge. If the stimuli for change

were clear and strong, then the pressure on a manager to implement change would be likely to be considerable. But ironically, when such change is tackled, a worsened situation is probable for the manager.

6.5.5. This presents a personal dilemma for managers. Is the change to be avoided and the short term prospect improved, leaving the long term position at risk? Or, is the change tackled with probable high personal costs in the short term, with the long term outcome possibly remaining uncertain?

6.5.6. If the manager is experiencing stress from other aspects of working life, then in the face of such a dilemma, it would not be surprising to find the manager adopting methods for avoiding change as a deliberate strategy. (Basil and Cook 1974)

6.5.7. The view that organisational cultures tend to persist and are resistant to change was put forward in Chapter Five, but there is not a straightforward solution to avoid the managers' dilemma and to achieve successful implementation of cultural changes. Kilmann et al (1985) suggests that if managers wish to change cultures they need to consider three steps:

    i. minimising the opportunity for external justification and the minimal use of extrinsic forms of motivation, rewards, punishment,

    ii. giving individuals the opportunity to see the inherent worth of what they are being asked to do, intrinsic motivation,

    iii. providing a way out of the organisation for people who cannot accept the new pattern of values and beliefs.

6.6   Resistance to Change - Sunk Costs

6.6.1.   The 'sunk cost' concept refers to the situation where time, energy and/or money have been invested in an existing system by key individuals who retain some influence. Sunk costs can include vested interests, but may also represent the considerable investment of personal resources in the current systems made by an experienced manager. (Kast and Rosenzweig 1981)

6.6.2.   This may mean that regardless of the merits of a proposal, an experienced manager may be highly resistant to changing the situation in which he has a sunk cost. Thus attempts to alter the status quo by either external consultants, or internal innovators is likely to encounter this difficulty. The sunk cost concept may therefore explain why it appears to be more difficult to bring about changes in an organisation that is predominately populated by older, more experienced individuals. They are simply more likely to have sunk costs in existing systems.

6.6.3.   Moss-Kanter (1984)   refers to a similar phenomena (*"Innovating Against the Grain"* pg. 69) and suggests that it is rare in any long established, traditional organisation for a manager to be positively innovative. *"...in such organisations, most people never bother to peruse ideas for improvements."* (pg. 70)

6.7   Resistance to Change - Personal Strategies

6.7.1.   The following categories, drawn from a variety of sources, (Hyde 1990, Basil and Cook 1974, Schein 1985) show some methods by which managers might form deliberate personal strategies to avoid change. It will be argued that whether or

not they are successful will depend to a large extent on their prevailing psychological condition and how far the manager might be committed, either individually, or conspiratorially to resisting change.

6.7.2. It will be noted that the first three methods are also the involuntary means by which humans cope with other unpleasant psychological effects. For instance, ignoring the obvious, or blocking out is the brain's reaction to high and excessive levels of stress. Looking backwards is a means of coping with present unpleasant emotions, (such as bereavement) and simplification is a short term solution to coping with an excessive number of simultaneous difficulties of many types. (Davies and Shackleton 1975)

6.7.3. The issue here is that these three methods are natural human responses that are a part of the brain's programmed defence mechanisms. These defence responses help to protect individuals from unpleasant and potentially damaging effects, which make the identification of what is an individual's deliberate strategy and what is a natural reaction, difficult to separate.

i. **Blocking out** - by adopting a 'closed mind' which selectively rejects any input associated with the subject of change, it is possible for the individual to ignore any issues that are thought likely to be conflictual or troublesome. A problem can be compounded when potentially manageable changes are avoided to the extent that the problems build to a point where they present an insoluble crises to the individual.

ii. **Looking backwards** - the individual adopting this method relies upon earlier experiences by applying 'yesterdays' solutions to 'today's' problems. The approach may be seen as potentially safe, but frequently the problems will be significantly altered through time within open organisations. The environment in which the problems exist will also probably have changed to a point where existing solutions may be inappropriate. It is highly probable that neither problems or solutions in social systems remain the same. There may also be a tendency for individuals to reflect upon successful strategies that have contributed to personal success and achievement in the past. It may be tempting in such circumstances to consider that similar strategies might always produce the same successes.

iii. **Simplification** - the when the situation to which the change relates, is made easier to understand and tackle by narrowing and simplifying the issues to a point of over generalisation, trivialisation, or superficiality. In the search for a straightforward and non fallible change, the individual may reduce the complexity of a seemingly insoluble problem to a simple and safe change that is not too threatening to herself, himself, or others. Superficially it may look as though change has taken place, whereas in reality any change is marginal. Such an avoidance approach may be seen as the opposite to a systemic approach to change.

iv. **Tokenism** - a more sophisticated version of simply doing nothing. Typically the individual will agree to changes, debate implementation programmes etc., but practically, only the most superficial change will occur. This avoidance method is often associated with an apparently highly active approach to the changes, designed to persuade others (and perhaps the individual?) that change is progressing. However, once the activity has ceased, little will have changed in practice.

v. **Specialisation** - involves concentration on a narrow subject to the exclusion of all other information and issues. It is another method that can be successfully adapted by the individual to demonstrate that change is taking place, whereas in reality little is occurring. Changes in the area of speciality have the potential to be successful in the short term. Ultimately, it is probable the changes will affect other elements of the system and wider more adventurous changes will have to be tackled, with the perceived attendant risks to the individual.

6.8   Resistance to Change - Confusion

6.8.1. Whenever individuals do not clearly understand the purpose, mechanics, or consequences of a change they are likely to resist it. (Kast and Rosenzweig 1981) If individuals involved in the implementation process, especially line managers, are to be effective, then it is essential that they know exactly what it is that has to be achieved.

6.8.2. Of crucial importance is confusion or uncertainty about what lies ahead. In the absence of any knowledge about the changes that have taken place, or which are about to take place, rumour and speculation regarding negative consequences are almost certain to develop.

6.8.3. It has been argued in this chapter that organisational change is frequently perceived by staff in a negative context. Given that this occurs, it would not be surprising to find that where individuals are confused as to the future, resistance to the change develops faster than otherwise.

6.8.4. A potential solution to this situation would be to increase communication and thus learning about the change. The relationship between learning and confusion as a feature of the change process is presented in the model at Figure 6.3.

6.8.5. Here levels of learning and confusion are shown in an inverse relationship through stages of time. As learning about change increases, so confusion is reduced and thus resistance is also potentially reduced. Often associated with high levels of confusion are high levels of anxiety, but as confusion reduces, confidence will increase and anxiety will reduce.

6.8.6. Implicit from Figure 6.3 is the notion that the reverse situation applies. If there is only little or ineffective communication, then there will be limited learning and thus the state of confusion and resistance to change will persist.

Figure 6.3. Relationship Between Learning and Confusion
Following Organisational Change

(Adapted from W. H. Newman, 'Constructive Control', Prentice-Hall 1975)

6.9   Resistance to Change - Individual's Dynamics

6.9.1. The variety and intensity of the human factors affecting the process of change have been shown to combine together to form a highly complex psycho social sub system. This complexity is compounded by the varying responses from individuals as the change process progresses through time. This progress and an individuals, response to it may be termed an individual's dynamic response to change.

6.9.2. It is suggested by a number of writers, especially from the Human Relations school of thought, (Trist 1968, Glen 1975, et al) that if an individual perceives he or she has ownership of the change then they will feel able to exercise some control over the situation.

6.9.3. Similarly, if an individual is at least allowed to participate and influence the change process, then some degree of ownership and control will be felt. (Williams 1994)

6.9.4. However if the perceived level of an individual's control over a change process is low, then it might be suggested that many of the elements and outputs of the psycho social sub-system will manifest as a resistance to change.

6.9.5. The cause of the resistance to change may alter through time, thus amounting to a continuum of obstacles to the change process. To an observer, it will not necessarily be possible to determine which particular output of an individual's psycho social sub system is causing the resistance at any particular time. Although it will possibly be apparent if the individual(s) display any behaviours associated with the resistance, i.e. anger, depression, stress.

6.9.6. Figure 6.4 adapted from Carnall (1990) shows the suggested relationship between stress and performance or self esteem. It is argued by Carnall that gradually increasing levels of stress might indicate an increasing level of performance. But it is suggested that the curve is parabolic, such that a point is reached when if stress continues to increase, performance will decline.

6.9.7. It is also suggested that in addition to these performance effects, where there is significant organisational change, a decline in self esteem will become apparent in many of those staff directly affected

Figure 6.4 Relationship Between Performance, Self Esteem,
Stress and Change through Time

[Adapted from Carnall (1990) Page 140]

6.9.8.   Carnall (1990) suggested that a relationship exists between
the stress following change and an individual's self esteem
and performance. The   model at Figure 6.5. shows an
adaptation of this relationship. Here it is suggested that after
a significant organisational change occurs, an individuals
self esteem may significantly reduce through time, resulting
in a later, but corresponding alteration in performance. As
self esteem is regenerated, so performance rises after a lag.

Figure 6.5   Model Representing the Relationship between an
Individual's Self Esteem and Performance
Following Organisational Change.

Developed and Adapted from Carnall (1990)

258

6.9.9.   Through this process of the lowering of self esteem following change, Carnall (1990) suggests there are five stages, namely, denial, defence, discarding, adaptation and internalisation. These stages are shown as points on the model at Figure 6.6 together with other possible staff reactions. The points are not discreet events that may be precisely observed, nor is it suggested to be necessary to move from one to another in sequence. Rather the model represents a continuum of responses that may occur singly, or in combination throughout the change process. (Paragraph 6.9.5)

6.9.10.   Figure 6.6 illustrates how an individual's performance might alter through points in time associated with different outputs from the psycho social sub-system. If a change occurs shortly after $t[n]$ and the individual perceives a loss of control over the situation, then a state of shock will set in. (Moss-Kanter 1989) This shock may result in feelings of helplessness, indecision, being overwhelmed, or a devaluing of previously highly regarded skills. (Williams 1994)

6.9.11.   The shock frequently gives way to 'denial' (Carnall 1990), or rejection of the changes, $(t[n+1])$ which often becomes apparent from a negative and uncooperative attitude. It is suggested by Tyson and Jackson (1992) that when people are faced with the prospect of change, they often place a high value on their present circumstances and seek to defend the existing situation. This is the stage referred to as 'defence' by Carnall (1990).

Figure 6.6   Model Representing the Alterations to an Individual's
Degree of Control During the Process of Change

[Developed and adapted from Carnall (1990), Tyson and Jackson (1992) and a
presentation from Clive Williams and Associates,
Management Consultants 1994.]

6.9.12. Such attitudes can develop into anger, resulting in an active blocking of the changes, which in the worst manifestation may amount to sabotage of the changes, (Dubois 1979) as indicated between t[n+1] and t[n+2]. This is the stage referred to as 'discarding' by Carnall (1990)

6.9.13. From the incentive and motivation theories of Herzberg, Maslow and Alderfer (in Kakabadse 1987) it may be suggested that such a situation would be likely to lead to dis-satisfaction, a lack of motivation and a state of depression. (t[n+2])

6.9.14. Depression and stress may occur at any stage of the change process (Davies and Shackleton 1975, Brown and Campbell 1994), but will be more likely when a sense of complete helplessness is experienced as a result of failing to gain some control over the changes. (Bass and Stogdill 1990, Senge 1990) It is reasonable to suggest that if the state of acute depression persists as a result of organisation changes then an individual is likely to seek ways of alleviating it by one means or another, i.e. leaving the organisation, and/or finding alternative work, alcohol abuse, legal or illegal use of drugs. (Senge 1990)

6.9.15. However, if as a result of taking stock of the situation, the individual remains at the task and resolves to cope with the changes, then much of what has occurred will be put in perspective and justified through cognitive dissonance. This is the psychological process whereby the perceived incongruity between a person's attitude and behaviour is resolved by them making changes to attitudes and beliefs. (Aronson 1976) This means that a person who stays with the job and starts to perform tasks in accordance with the required changes, will rationalise their behaviour by changing their attitude towards the changes from negative to positive. This is the stage referred to as 'adaptation' by Carnall (1990).

6.9.16. At this stage an individual may even seek to convince others of the appropriateness of preceding decisions and actions, becoming positively progressive in advancing the changes as a means of demonstrating self justification. (Aronson 1976) There will be a restored feeling of having gained some control over the situation and in this state, further creativity and innovation may become possible. (Moss-Kanter 1989) This final stage is that referred to by Carnall (1990) as 'internalisation'.

6.10 Skills and Needs for Change Through Time

6.10.1. The foregoing sections have demonstrated that resistance to change might arise from both the characteristics of the organisation and the dynamic nature of an individual's psycho social sub-system. The potential for resistance to organisational change has been shown to be considerable. Therefore, if the change process is to be successful, it follows that a series of counter resistance measures are necessary as indicated in the managers' process model of change at Figure 6.1..

6.10.2. Evered (1980) advanced the view that *"... organisations were in a continuous state of change..."* and the management of the change process remained *"...one of the most difficult and least understood of the management functions."* (pgs. 6-7 in Cummings et al 1980) He went on to advance the view that *"...systems thinking...offers a real prospect for understanding and managing change in organisations."* (*ibid.* pg. 12)

6.10.3.   On the basis of these assertions it is desirable to examine the foregoing analysis of resistance to change in order to determine:

i. the management skills potentially capable of preventing or minimising resistance to change,

ii. any ameliorating actions by staff or managers that might lessen the effect of resistance to change,

iii. the staff or management (human) needs that are likely to reduce resistance to change.

6.10.4.   It is argued here that human needs and skills appropriate to the process of change are likely to vary and change themselves through different stages of the process of change. Tyson and Jackson (1992) suggest, for instance, that during the 'discarding' stage shown at Figure 6.6. the appropriate leadership style would be empathetic, whilst during the 'adapting' stage, a style based upon support and recognition is appropriate.

6.10.5.   At Figure 6.6, a model is suggested of a concept of the dynamics of human responses to change. Figure 6.7 extends this concept by examining changes in three periods of time, the past, present and future and relating these stages to managers and staff skills, human needs and an organisations needs.

	Managing Changes in the Past	Managing Changes in the Present	Managing Changes in the Future
Managers Skills	Objective analysis of performance	Supportive leadership	Creativity and ideas
Human Needs	Job enrichment	Reassurance and security	Opportunity to participate
Organisations Needs	Feedback on performance	Commitment to change	PESTE/SWOT analysis

Figure 6.7 Matrix of Principal Skills and Needs Through the Process of Change

6.10.6. Each cell within Figure 6.7 gives the title of a principle need or skill that has been shown to be significant during the process of change. The complexity of the change process has been discussed, from which it might be implied and argued here, that both individuals and the organisation itself will have need for and apply a range of skills and resources through a change programme.

6.10.7. It is not therefore suggested that each of the attributes shown at Figure 6.7 are either applicable singularly, or are the only attributes appropriate at a particular stage in time. Rather the matrix conveys what has been shown to be the principle and common characteristics.

6.10.8. Column 1 shows that where a change has taken place during a period in the past, it is necessary for managers to examine the operation of the system in relation today's needs and objectives. This will necessitate an objective analysis of the situation, which is as far as possible, free from any value judgements, or subjective beliefs about what used to work satisfactorily in the past. (Checkland 1981 et al). Rather the emphasis should be on what is necessary at present.

6.10.9. Individuals that were involved in the process that have settled into the change may be seeking minor alterations to their working practices, procedures and roles that will more fully meet their work objectives. Such alterations may be termed job enrichment (Koontz and O'Donnell 1976 Kakabadse et al 1987) whereby both the individual and the organisation gain from the alterations.

6.10.10. Job enrichment in this context is seen as comprising the three factors suggested to be crucial to both job satisfaction and motivation by Hackman and Oldham (1976 in Kakabadse et al 1987) They suggest that the more an individual experiences the following states, the greater will be the degree of intrinsic motivation and hence the higher the level of positive feelings about the work:

i. the person must experience the work as meaningful in respect of his/her own values,

ii. the person must experience responsibility for the results of the work in order that he/she is accountable for the work outcomes, (if the quality of the work done is more dependant on external factors than own efforts, there is no reason to feel personally proud)

iii. the person must have knowledge of the results of the work in order to provide a base for positive feelings about having done well, ·or unhappy about doing badly.

6.10.11. The final cell of column 1 indicates that the organisation itself has a need for feedback on the performance of the mature system and how it is functioning in comparison with other units. This amounts to internal management information as to how the system is functioning and should, at minimum, be timely, reliable and in sufficient detail to enable appropriate corrections to be made if necessary. (Lincoln 1990)

6.10.12. It has been argued that police organisations comprise a number of interrelated and interdependent sub-systems. In order for each sub-system to approach optimal performance, it is necessary for each section to have information about how other sections are performing. Additionally, managers who are seeking to control the organisation and its processes will need feedback on overall performance.

6.10.13. Thus the sum of the attributes shown in column 1 represent an organisation that is effectively managing systems and objectives that were established as a result of changes made in the past.

6.10.14. Column 2 relates to the present time and links the human need for reassurance during a period of uncertainty, such as having just come through a period of change, to the management attribute of supportive leadership. (Bass and Stogdill 1990) Such a style of leadership may be shown to be the most appropriate when managing the organisations' need to secure a commitment to maintain a continuous process of change. (Carnall 1990, Senge 1990, Bass and Stogdill 1990)

6.10.15. Column 2 in conjunction with column 1 represents an organisation that is actively pursuing currently appropriate objectives and providing effective leadership of its human resources, recognising that the organisation will have to undertake a reappraisal of its goals and then design systems to achieve new objectives.

6.10.16. Column 3 adds the future attributes. The organisation needs to be continually aware of its strengths, weakness, opportunities and threats (S.W.O.T.) whilst being aware of inputs from its political, economic, social, technological environment, as well as its natural environment. (P.E.S.T.E.) Managers will need to respond to future circumstances with ideas and creativity. (Moss-Kanter 1984) Further changes will become necessary and if resistance from staff and managers is to be avoided, opportunities to participate will have to be provided for all those likely to be involved.

6.10.17. On the basis of the findings so far, the matrix at Figure 6.7 if considered as a whole, provides an initial focus for management attention during the process of change. However, in Section 5.3, the concept of targets for change was introduced which were suggested to exist in three types, cultural, structural and systems.

6.10.18. Therefore in order to meet the purpose set out in Paragraph 6.11.3, it is necessary to relate the dependant characteristics shown in Figure 6.7 to each of the three types of change target.

6.11 Skills and Needs for Differing Types of Change Target

6.11.1. The matrix model at Figure 6.8 shows the predominant attribute in managers' skills, human needs and organisational needs for each type of change target.

	Managers' Skills	Human Needs	Organisational Needs
Cultural changes	Effective leadership	Reassurance and security	Consistency of approach
Structural changes	Flexibility and adaptability	Effective dedicated communications	Appropriate information systems
Systems changes	Knowledge of new operating procedures	Job and task descriptions	Performance indicators

Figure 6.8   Matrix of Principal Skills and Needs for Differing
Types of Change Target

6.11.2.   The first column, headed managers' skills, shows that leadership is the   principle skill associated with   cultural change. (Kilmann et al 1985, Schein 1985) The point is made in both sources that   confusion (and thus resistance to change)   will result if managers have different outlooks towards the   implementation of cultural change. If one manager views cultural change as evolutionary, another sees it as adaptation and another sees it as a process to

direct, Schein suggests they are likely to *"...end up in confusion and disagreement."* (Schein 1985 pg. 309)

6.11.3.   The solution is that effective leaders must have the ability to articulate and sell new visions and concepts in order to change the cultural assumptions of an organisation. (Section 5.6) Schein (1985 pg. 324) refers to this process as leaders inducing *"...cognitive redefinition..."* and is seen as vital to effective cultural change. Kilmann (1985) suggests that *"Managers engaged in cultural change must communicate the new pattern of beliefs and values and get people to adopt them."* (pg. 248)

6.11.4.   Flexibility and adaptability are the management attributes associated with structural change due to the frequency of this type of change and the direct de-stabilising effects associated with altered lines of responsibility and accountability. (Section 5.7) A manager who is unable to quickly adapt to changes in an organisation's structure is unlikely to be successful either in personal or organisational terms. (Moss-Kanter 1989)

6.11.5.   Knowledge of an organisation's new operating procedures is vital for a manager if he or she is to be effective at controlling and co-ordinating the efforts of other staff throughout systems changes. (Beckhard and Harris 1987) If change is introduced to a system and staff have to perform tasks differently, or produce different outputs, it will be necessary for their manager to have knowledge in some detail as to how the new objectives are to be achieved. Failure to master such knowledge, or to effectively communicate it to the work force would result in little learning by staff (Figure 6.3) and a negation of the management function. (Kast and Rosenzweig 1981) Confusion would result as to what exactly was expected and resistance to the change would almost certainly follow.

6.11.6. Human needs shown in the centre column of Figure 6.8 will be many and various, according to the particular individuals' personality, attitude to work and overall psycho social sub-system outputs. (Argyle 1972, Davies and Shackleton 1975, Brown and Campbell 1994) On the basis of the foregoing analysis of resistance to change, it may be argued that the attributes shown represent at minimum, the most frequently apparent and predominant human needs which are likely to require fulfilment at most levels within organisations during change processes.

6.11.7. Reassurance and personal security will be high on an individuals list of needs when the working culture is changed. (Kilmann et al 1985) Effective communications will be important in satisfying this need and also when new lines of accountability and responsibility are created in a structural change. (Porter and Roberts 1977, Francis 1987)

6.11.8. It has been previously discussed that the absence of effective communications and learning will bring about confusion and thus resistance. However it is significant to note at this point that Kilmann (1985 pg. 246) demonstrates that "...behaviour compliance..." does not necessarily imply "...cultural commitment." The motivational theories of work (Vroom and Deci 1978, Kakabadse 1987) indicate the significance of security to high motivation in the workplace. Therefore reassurance that security will remain at least at the same level as earlier, must be a welcome message for most staff undergoing major changes at work.

6.11.9. Similarly, the provision of a new job description is a significant feature of a changed work role. By a process of straightforward written communication many of an individuals' most pressing psycho social needs might be met. In terms of a systems level change, a job description will provide both communication of what is required and a

means of control, in terms of lines of responsibility and accountability. Conceivably a job description might be so brief as to be of little value, or so detailed that every task is specified and flexibility thus reduced.

6.11.10. The following list drawn from Thomason (1991) and Byars (1991) suggests the minimum contents and advantages of a job description which would meet the major purposes associated with the management of change:

i. improved productivity by specifying information about the nature of the exact task(s),

ii. improved personal job evaluations by providing expected performance standards associated to (i) above,

iii. improving recruitment in that information is provided from which inferences might be drawn about the most suitable person,

iv. identification of training needs, in that it will indicate what demands are to be made which are either not currently being met by personnel performing the jobs, or are not likely to be capable of performance by recruits without training,

v. improved judgements as to the worth of a job in that demands on the job holder are identified in a rigorous fashion.

6.11.11. The benefits of a job description are clear as a feature of the change process to each of the types of change target. However, it is apparent from the established authorities concerning organisational culture, (Schein 1985, Kilmann et al 1985) that such devices alone, are insufficient to bring about cultural change in organisations.

6.11.12. Cultural change as an organisational need requires a consistency of approach as shown in column three at Figure 6.8, by providing continual intrinsic motivation and reinforcement to the work force. (Section 5.6) It is unlikely that cultural change will occur in the short term, rather a sustained, clear and consistent message to the work force is required. (Kilmann et al 1985) It is argued *(ibid.)* that this approach to behaviour change with a minimum reliance on rewards and punishments is the most appropriate way to bring about cultural change. *"Essentially, this means people must be made to see the inherent worth of what it is they are being asked to do." (ibid.* pg. 246) Finally it is suggested that people who do not accept the new pattern of beliefs should be given the opportunity of *"...leaving and transferring to another organisation." (ibid.* pg. 248)

6.11.13. The organisational need for structural changes is shown in Figure 6.8 to be 'appropriate information systems'. New or adapted information systems will be a prerequisite in order to determine whether or not the new lines of control and responsibility are functioning correctly and whether new objectives are being achieved. (Lincoln 1990) It is also likely that in large, complex organisations, the project management system for planning and co-ordinating a major change programme, will need to be based on a computer based information system, with appropriate project control software. Implementing structural change without corresponding management information systems would deprive managers of the opportunity of knowing whether the organisation was meeting, or even approaching its output objectives.

6.11.14. A refined version of a straightforward information system, whether manual or I.T. based, is shown in Figure 6.8 as appropriate for system type changes. Here, the provision of output performance data or performance indicators derived from an analysis of the overall functioning of the new system would be provided. Such information would enable

comparisons to be made with previous system outputs to determine relative efficiency and effectiveness. Alterations may then be made to current planning to take account of this knowledge and provide valuable feedback to the staff involved. (Lincoln 1990)

6.12   Complexity and the Change Process

6.12.1.   If the interactions are considered between each of the features of the cells of the matrix models at Figures 6.7 and 6.8 it may be considered that the complexity of the change process builds very quickly. One feature or attribute influences another, then both effect a further feature, and so on, whilst feedback from some feature to others, further complicates the process.

6.12.2.   In order to aid the clarity of display and explanation, the models at Figures 6.7 and 6.8 have been shown in two dimensions. However it is proposed that a combination model can be conceived in three dimensions, represented by a three, by three, by three cube, offering a minimum of twenty-seven possible attributes for consideration.

6.12.3.   Conceptually the 'change cube' would have the three dimensions of:

i.   stages through time,

ii.   skills and needs,

iii.   targets for change.

Such a model is represented diagramatically at Figure 6.9.

273

Skills and Needs

Targets for Change

Stages Through Time

Figure 6.9 'The Change Cube'

6.12.4. It is suggested by Patching (1990) that each of the twenty -
seven small cubes that constitute the visually similar, but
mechanical 'Rubics Cube', may be considered as
interrelated sub systems which constitute the overall
system. This analogy applies appropriately to the model at
Figure 6.9, although clearly not mechanical system. It is
suggested that each small cube here, has a dimension of
time, a change target and a skill or need.

6.12.5. Thus, for example, drawing from Figures 6.7 and 6.8, a
cultural change, that had occurred in the past, could be
considered as a manager's skills sub system, a human
needs sub system and/or an organisational needs sub
system. Each amounting to a differing perspective of the
process of cultural change, but interacting to produce an
overall, larger sub system of cultural change.

6.12.6. The concept illustrated by this example is similar to that described by Flood and Carson, (1993) in that the situation (cultural change) is seen as a dimension of complexity in itself, that may be *"...appreciated by different people in different ways..."* and amounts to the *"People Range"* (pg. 35)

6.12.7. That is not to say that it is the *"same"* situation being appreciated from different viewpoints, as suggested to frequently occur by Checkland (1981) Rather, there are three different situations to be appreciated in this particular example. Similarly, it is argued that there would be three separate situations to consider in respect of structural and systems targets for change. Thus when these targets are integrated with the other dimension of the 'change cube', the twenty-seven separate sub-systems may be seen to have been identified.

6.12.8. Therefore, it is argued that is appropriate to view the 'change cube' (Figure 6.9) as a complex set of interrelating sub systems that in total amount to the process of change in police systems. (This suggested complexity and associated dynamics is further analysed and discussed in Chapter Seven.)

6.12.9. Conceivably however, yet greater complexity might be introduced if the basic models of implementation from Section 5.9 are added to the 'change cube' producing a four dimensional model with a minimum of 3^4, or over 81 identifiable change sub-systems.

6.12.10. Such a model would associate the three dimensions shown at figure 6.9. with the suggested fundamental methods of change implementation, viz., abrupt change, parallel operations and phased implementation.

6.12.11. A number of variations to these basic models of implementation are suggested at Section 5.9 that would further increase the potential complexity of the change process. For instance, a non linear, phased implementation system is suggested at Figure 5.13 that would have the effect of introducing fluctuating, as opposed to steady rates of change, within each of the suggested twenty-seven change sub -systems.

6.12.12. Such a situation would be considerably more complex than the suggested approximate linear equivalents used for the purposes of illustration in this chapter. It may be argued that there are few linear relationships in human activity or social systems, which would imply that a police organisation change process system, would largely consist of non linear relationships. It is stated by Weinberg (1975 pg. 232) that *"No system we know is strictly linear."*

6.12.13. This assertion seems to be especially relevant to police change systems that have been shown to be non linear in a number of significant respects. The suggested non linearity is argued to arise from both within police systems themselves (i.e. human dynamics of the change process, Section 6.9) and from the policing environment (i.e. open systems interacting with a turbulent policing environment , Section 5.2)

6.12.14. A further example of considerable complexity could be envisaged where a new system was implemented in parallel with an existing system (Paragraphs 5.9.15 - 19). If there were interaction between the new and old systems during the implementation stage (as would be probable in policing systems) the number of active sub systems would be effectively doubled. Conceptually this situation might be represented as two change cubes simultaneously interacting with one another, creating $27^2 = 729$ possible interactions. i.e. every sub system in the old system, affecting every other sub system in the new system.

6.12.15. The significance of this suggested complexity to the system of change, is that it is not possible to isolate and bring about change to one feature of a policing system without it affecting some other aspect of the sub system, or overall system. The likely consequences of such an approach being unwanted and potentially damaging outcomes in other parts of the policing system. It will be argued in Chapters Seven and Eight that this attribute of policing systems and the dynamics of change within them, precludes an element by element, sequential change process or evaluation.

6.12.16. Rather, it is argued that the concept of change delivery systems is appropriate (Paragraphs 4.2.5-7) in order to achieve successful implementations and overcome resistance to change. Thus allowing policing systems to at least keep pace with the rate of change in the environment, in a similar way as suggested to be necessary for commercial organisations. (Hitchins 1992)

CHAPTER SEVEN

Summary

The elements of the suggested system of organisational change are summarised and restated in order to lead to models of the dynamics of change at the overall police organisational level. The models are described in the context of the implementation options advanced in Chapter Five and developed in order to advance a model of the N.P. implementation process.

From this position, a model of a system of change for police organisations is advanced. It is argued that this system is inherently complex, thus presenting considerable challenges in order to bring about change. Individuals' motivation to change is described in the context of a system of motivation, which is developed into an analysis of the options available to police managers for implementing change.

7.1   The Elements of Change Complexity

7.1.1.   In Chapter Four, (4.2.2, Figures 4.2 and 4.3) the concept of police delivery systems was introduced whereby groups of N.P. elements were associated together for the purpose of evaluation and implementation, viz.

i.   demand management,

ii. police organisation and efficiency,

iii. the police public contract.

7.1.2. The delivery system concept was developed from the premise that each change treatment was dependent upon others in the sub-system for success. Hitchins (1992) advances a similar proposition with the concept of an *"enabler system"* (pg. 180) A similar distinction is made here between the system that produces the set of changes that are dynamic throughout the process of change (change delivery system) and the system of change management that Hitchins (1992 pg. 1980) calls a *"director/co-ordinator system"*

7.1.3. The argument was developed previously (Chapters Two and Three), that it was inappropriate to implement a single treatment, evaluate it and then proceed to the next in sequence. Such a process was suggested to limit the potential benefits of the systematic approach to change envisaged by N.P. (Sections 2.16 and 3.3)

7.1.4. As a means of describing and associating the major characteristics of the change process, Chapter Five introduced a macro model of change suggested to have three elements, (Section 5.3) viz.

    i. the stimulus for change,

    ii. the targets of change and

    iii. the types and stages of implementation.

7.1.5. Experience of the N.P. project implementation indicated that three types targets for change might be identified (Section 5.5 and Figure 5.3) viz.

    i. culture,

    ii. structure,

    iii. systems.

7.1.6. It is now suggested that the above change targets in general terms broadly correspond to the N.P. delivery systems approach:

TARGET for CHANGE	DELIVERY SYSTEM
Culture	Police Public Contract
Structure	Police Organisation and Efficiency
Systems	Demand Management

7.1.7. Chapter Five expanded the third element of the macro model and developed the three basic alternative types of method of implementation viz.

    i. abrupt change,

    ii. phased change,

    iii. parallel operations

7.1.8. Chapter Six introduced details of the human social and psycho social reactions to progressive stages of the process of implementation of change (Figure 6.4) and suggested that individuals' skills and needs altered throughout this process. (Figure 6.5)

7.1.9. It was shown that different needs and skills were appropriate for the suggested three change targets. (Figure 6.6)

7.1.10. Chapter Six concluded with an illustration of a conceptual model in the form of a 'change cube' that related the human dynamics of change to the identified change targets. It was further suggested that the change cube model might be extended into a multi dimensional concept.

7.2 The Dynamics of Change Complexity

7.2.1. It is now suggested that the remaining feature of the dynamics of the change process itself might be added to the models developed so far to produce the highly complex overall 'system of change' for police organisations.

7.2.2. Figure 7.1 shows time along the horizontal axis and the degree, or amount of organisational development activity (Cummings 1980) along the vertical axis. Organisational development in this context is taken to mean the collective activity taking place inside a police organisation arising from implementation of a change delivery system.

7.2.3. Each separate change delivery system is represented by the horizontal bars (change 1, 2, ...n), in which the elements of the macro model, represented by 'S', 'T' and 'I' are shown in sequence through time. The higher the position of the change along the vertical axis, the more organisational development activity taking place.

Figure 7.1   Dynamics of the Sequential Change Process

7.2.4.   Figure 7.1   represents the   situation whereby each change delivery system is implemented sequentially. Here   the consequences of the implementation of each change   are fed forward to the stimulus for the next change event.

7.2.5.   The 'phased'   method   of implementation is represented here where each successive change benefits from the outputs and experience of the previous change, at cost of a more protracted time scale and other dysbenefits identified at Section 5.9.

7.2.6.   Conventional scientific approaches for observing change would progress in a   manner illustrated by Figure 7.1   by identifying cause   and   effect   relationships   and   then attempting to predict future behaviour of a system from that basis. (Kaye 1993)

7.2.7. It is suggested that complex systems such as those encountered in the management of changes in large police organisations cannot proceed in a sequential process, or be described in such a predictable manner.

7.2.8. The increasingly turbulent human and physical environment in which policing, as a social system, is carried out (Jackson and Keys 1984) has been described in Chapter Two. It is argued that these environmental effects, as well as the internal organisational and human change dynamics (Chapters Five and Six) militate against a predictable, linear, sequential change process.

7.2.9. Rather, the probable police system behaviour has to be anticipated from the overall interaction of the many elements of the sub-systems that produce the final system output. (Flood and Carson 1993)

7.2.10. Figure 7.2 shows more than three changes taking place simultaneously and the consequences of the implementations of each change directly affecting each of the others.

Figure 7.2   Dynamics of the Abrupt Change Process

7.2.9.   Such a process is   associated with the 'abrupt' model of
change (Section 5.9.11) and represents each of the change
delivery systems being implemented simultaneously. In the
event of the   existing system continuing to operate
throughout the implementation of the various change
delivery systems, the 'parallel' method of implementation
(Section 5.9.15) could be similarly represented by Figure
7.2.

7.2.10. With abrupt and parallel changes, the change stimuli will be the same for each change event as they are occurring at approximately the same point in time. The target for each change will be different, but the effect of one change upon another will be realised through the practicalities of the implementation as shown by the double interacting links between each of the implementation stages whereby each change effects every other change. The relationship between each of the implementation stages is transitive in that 'I' of change 1 will effect 'I' of change 2 through to 'I' of change 'n'.

7.2.11. It will be appreciated that the model illustrates the principle difficulty with simultaneous changes in that it is not necessarily possible to foresee the practical consequences of a change until after implementation. (Section 5.9.14) However, this practical difficulty has been shown to be a necessary characteristic of a systems approach to change, if unwanted and dysfunctional side effects of the change process are to be avoided (5.9.20-21) and the benefits of systems level changes realised.

7.2.12. It has been argued that if police systems are to operate effectively, it is necessary for each sub-system to be mutually supportive. The evidence from the N.P. trial (Chapter Four) indicated that if change was made to one feature of the system, without corresponding changes being successfully implemented to associated sub-systems, then it becomes difficult to achieve system level benefits and further change is likely to become more difficult as human resistance consolidates. (Section 6.9)

7.2.13. Checkland and Scholes (1990) suggest that this resulting situation of complex implementations becomes in itself a 'problem situation'. They also suggest that as here, the situation and systems might be conceptualised and

286

modelled with a view to designing a system to make the changes. (Figure 7.5 and Paragraph 7.2.29)

7.2.14. In order to benefit from the advantages of systems implementations it is necessary for other changes taking place simultaneously to proceed without the benefit of inputs from the current change to their stimuli or target stages. In effect, a state of *"deterministic chaos"* is created, (Kaye 1993 pgs. 3-8) in that a (policing) system has been described in which all the major constituent elements have been identified, but the interaction between them and the resulting complexity is so complicated that they must be studied holistically and experimentally, (Kaye 1993) rather than theoretically, or by surface observation (Flood and Carson 1993).

7.2.15. Kaye's (1993) definition of *'deterministic chaos'* is therefore appropriate to this situation. It has been argued that conventional scientific determinism is an inappropriate approach to the explanation of police organisational change, due to the complexity of police systems' and their environments. Similarly, a totally probabilistic approach might be argued to be inappropriate, as police systems and environments have been shown to be dynamic in nature, making probabilistic predictions uncertain.

7.2.16. Therefore a concept of *'deterministic chaos'* is argued to be appropriate as it enables known and predictable outputs, such as those shown to be apparent in humans associated with the system (Chapter Six) to be combined with those less certain features of the change process such as those implied by Figure 7.2 , to be considered in an overall system of change.

7.2.17. This definition is considered more appropriate for policing systems than the definition of three ranges of complexity advanced by Weaver (1948, in Flood and Carson 1993) Here it is argued that complexity exists in three ranges:

    i. organised simplicity,

    ii. disorganised complexity.

    iii. organised complexity,

7.2.18. According to Weaver (1948), organised simplicity is a condition in which only a small number of elements in a system are significant to the overall output, whereas disorganised complexity occurs when a large number of elements exhibit random behaviour. Organised complexity is suggested to lie between the two extreme points of Weaver's (1948) range. (Flood and Carson 1993)

7.2.19. It is suggested here that these two end point concepts are inappropriate to policing systems. It has been shown (Chapter Two) that many elements are significant to police system outputs and to reduce police activity to *'...a small number of significant factors...'* (Flood and Carson 1993 pg. 35) in order to conform to the concept of *'organised simplicity'*, would be to ignore many highly relevant attributes of police systems.

7.2.20. Similarly, there is very little activity within policing system that is truly and wholly random. Therefore it is not possible to suggest that *'...there are many variables that exhibit a high level of random behaviour'* in order to meet the criteria for *'disorganised complexity'*. (Flood and Carson 1993 pg. 35)

7.2.21. The concept of *'organised complexity'* may initially appear more attractive as it has been suggested that many social and organisational systems exhibit such characteristics. (Klir 1985 in Flood and Carson 1993) On the basis of the N.P.

experience (Chapter Four), it is argued here that police system characteristics are more closely aligned to a highly complex, holistic paradigm, predominantly consisting of probabilistic, deterministic and teleological explanations. Such a definition does not incorporate a large element of randomness.

7.2.22. It has been shown how the elements of the N.P. policing system were organised in such a way as to enable the characteristics of the overall system outputs to be inferred (Chapter Four). In Chapters Five and Six, models were advanced which it was suggested would enable the process of change to be understood on the basis of system inputs and system dynamics.

7.2.23. Therefore it is argued that there is little within policing systems, or the process of changes to them, that is truly random. Rather, it has been shown (Chapters Five and Six) that there is considerable complexity in which outputs occur which combine deterministic (including deductive), probabilistic and teleological (functional and purposive) explanations.

7.2.24. It is argued that it should not be assumed that elements within policing sub-systems, or their environments are behaving randomly, when it is possible that the reason for the behaviour is obscured by the complexity of the system and its outputs.

7.2.25. Figures 7.1 and 7.2 may be seen as representing extreme types of change implementations at opposite ends of a change implementation continuum. Such a continuum may be suggested to broadly correspond with Weaver's (1948) range of complexity where 'organised simplicity' is represented by Figure 7.1 and 'disorganised complexity' and unpredictability represented by Figure 7.2.

7.2.26. Figure 7.3 combines these extremes and is therefore potentially the basis of a model which more accurately represents a practical situation.

Figure 7.3   The Dynamics of the Phased Change Process

7.2.27. The same conventions are used in Figure 7.3 which shows the outputs from each change implementation influencing the stimulus for next change as indicated by the heavy lines and arrows. The implementation of earlier changes also have the potential to effect both the target for subsequent changes, as well as the implementation itself, as indicated by the dotted 'conditional influence' relationships.

7.2.28. For example, at Section 4.11 a description and evaluation of the N.P. participative management system explained how a poor implementation of the working party arrangements (Irving et al 1989) subsequently effected the motivation of police managers to proceed with changes to other features of the management system. Change stimuli arising from other sources urged further change in management systems, which in turn altered the target for change away from operational to management levels.

7.2.29. Several separate change initiatives associated with management procedures followed, eventually resulting in a successful overall participative management system. Thus the overall management system was not achieved by an abrupt change of all the constituent elements, or a sequential implementation of the management elements. Rather a complex interaction of changes to different elements and attributes of the management system, proceeding at differing rates and with varying degrees of development and success.

7.2.30. It has been shown to be appropriate for N.P., (Chapter Four) that a number of different change initiatives have to be planned for, and implemented both simultaneously and sequentially.

7.2.31. It is further suggested that this is a necessary feature of change implementations in police systems generally, due to the complexity of policing systems, the change process and human factors. (Section 6.12) However, this characteristic of

the realities of the change in policing systems increases the complexity of implementation dynamics considerably and this situation is presented in the model at Figure 7.4.

Figure 7.4 The Dynamics of the N.P. Change Process

7.2.32. Here, similar conventions show a combination of foregoing implementation dynamics interacting together. 'Change 1' is phased with 'change 2' in order that the 'change 2' stimuli may benefit from the 'change 1' implementation outputs. 'Change 3' operates in parallel with 'change 2' and outputs sequentially to 'change 4'. 'Change n' is phased with '4' in order that both the target and implementation phases receive outputs form the implementation stage of 'change 4'. The dotted 'conditional influencing' relationships indicate how earlier changes might influence successive changes.

7.2.33. An example of such a process from the N.P. project would be the implementation of geographic responsibility (Section 4.9), directed patrolling, (Section 4.10) and the participative management system (Section 4.11) within the 'Police Organisation and Efficiency' sub-system. (Section 4.2) Here, a locally appropriate variant of geographic responsibility could not be achieved without development by local operational level officers. This required a functioning participatory management system in order for officers to feedback information to adapt the basic model to the particular station environment.

7.2.34. The operational aim of geographic responsibility was, *inter alia*, to focus the attention of patrolling officers to specific local issues which could not be achieved without implementation of a system of geographic responsibility. Thus, each of these elements was dependant upon a satisfactory sequential implementation of the other. Geographic responsibility could not be tested without directed patrolling and participative management required cultural changes that could not be achieved quickly.

7.2.35. Therefore the dynamics followed a pattern whereby the implementation of participative management was phased, the geographic responsibility model once developed was implemented abruptly and directed patrolling implemented in sequence.

7.2.36. Other elements with this particular delivery system (targeting, surveillance and sector and divisional planning) were implemented in parallel. Thus a situation developed that approximates to Figure 7.4 and which is shown in greater detail at Appendix 'A' and referred to at Section 4.1.5.

7.2.37. If the possible relationships between each stage of change implied by the model at Figure 7.4. were to be developed to represent each N.P. element within each delivery system, then considerable complexity would result. If this situation were then related to the change cube model at Figure 6.7 then a 'chaotic situation' envisaged by Kaye (1993 Chapter 1) would exist.

7.2.38. However, it has been argued that the resulting system of change is not a 'randomly chaotic system' where there is a complete absence of knowledge regarding the contributory causes. Rather the system of change has inputs from a combination of probabilistic, deterministic and teleological attributes that result in outputs that have the character of 'deterministic chaos and complexity'. (Kaye 1993 Chapter 1)

Figure 7.5 Characteristics of the Inputs to and Outputs
from the System of Change.

7.2.39. Similar propositions have been advanced in respect of non
police organisations by Checkland and Scholes (1990)
where it is suggested that implementations themselves are
problem situations. Such situations are complex in
themselves and it is argued (*ibid.*) that soft systems
methodologies (Checkland 1981) are appropriate in these
circumstances.

7.3   The System of Change in Police Organisations

7.3.1.   The foregoing elements of the change process and the resulting complexity is represented systematically in the model at Figure 7.6.

7.3.2.   Figure 7.6 shows the three elements of the macro model of change (Section 5.3) linked in a sequence as suggested at Section 7.2. Each element of the macro model contains the principle elements and attributes of the change process that have been derived from this analysis.

7.3.3.   Internal and external change stimuli are shown as interacting which identify the target for change. (Figure 5.2) The change targets of culture, structures and systems combine to produce outputs to police delivery systems. (Section 4.2) These change targets constitute the elements, relationships and attributes that are synergetic and produce the co-ordinated police system output.

7.3.4.   The delivery systems are implemented according to the chosen implementation method (Section 5.9) which have been shown to follow a number of stages.

7.3.5.   The dynamics created by the process of change implementation makes varying demands upon human resources at different stages of the change process. Different skills and needs becoming more or less significant at different stages of implementation. (Figures 6.5 and 6.6)

Figure 7.6 The System of Change for Police Organisations

7.3.6. The resulting dynamics of the change process in police organisations is argued to be highly complex and the overall system is suggested not to be amenable to traditional forms of scientific, deterministic, or causal analysis. (Kaye 1993) It is suggested by Beckhard and Harris (1987 pg. 116) that managing change and *"...intervention in large* [organisational] *systems is.......largely an art."* although they do add that such interventions are *"...becoming more of a science..."* (*ibid.* pg.) In this respect they suggest that *"...systematic procedures and technologies in the planning and management of large systems change can only be of help."* (*ibid.* pg. 117)

7.3.7. It is argued that these assertions are consistent with and support both the experience of the N.P. trial and the much wider experiences of Checkland and Scholes. (1990) They describe the advantages of systems and systematic methodologies which have been used in various organisational contexts to the benefit of corporate goals, albeit in commercial as opposed to police service organisations.

7.3.8. The final level of Figure 7.6 shows evaluation and feedback as occurring at the end of the implementation stage. (In respect of the overall process of change, these features are considered in Chapter eight.)

7.3.9. It has been argued that the process of change in police organisations, especially the stage of implementation, is complex and thus difficult to plan and achieve. The challenge for managers is therefore how to understand and thus manage the complexity. Much has been written on this subject, which has been frequently referenced throughout this analysis. Therefore it is appropriate to review managers' options and on the basis of the N.P. experience, to consolidate the change management strategies most appropriate for police systems

7.4 Implementation and the Management of Complexity

7.4.1. Beckhard and Harris (1987 pg. 115) advance the view that organisational leaders must *"... understand the organisational system...".* Moss-Kanter (1984 pg. 45) suggests that managers should adopt a *"new"* management style involving teamwork and participation in order to meet the challenges of managing the transformation (change) of organisations.

7.4.2. Senge (1990) and Argyris (1990 in Senge 1990) disagree, suggesting that multi-disciplinary management teams who at least appear to have the potential to tackle the considerable complexity of managing large organisational challenges, generally do not have the necessary resilience. They suggest that eventually personal power, ego and other personal and psycho social factors will militate against effective team management. Argyris is quoted, *"Most management teams break down under pressure,"* (Senge 1990 pg. 24, Argyris 1990)

7.4.3. Tyson and Jackson (1992) describe how attempts to implement effective change through employee participation in experiential training programmes has generally been less than successful. Their critique of such methods is encapsulated in the expression, *"...there is a major difference between the intention to change and the actual implementation of any agreed change."* (pg. 197)

7.4.4. Checkland and Scholes (1990 pg. 52) suggest that changes will only be implemented if *"... they are perceived as meaningful within the* (human) *culture..."* This assertion gives rise to their claim that changes will only be introduced if they are *"culturally feasible"* (Checkland 1981 pgs. 180-182 & 313). Additionally, it is suggested that as organisational systems are purposeful by definition, then change must also

be perceived as *"systemically desirable".* *(ibid.* pgs. 180-82 & 318)

7.4.5. It is problematic therefore, in the face of such evidence, (albeit not exhaustive), to suggest change strategies that will lead to probable and predictable successful outputs, even given known preconditions. Beckhard and Harris (1987 pg. 117) encapsulate this conclusion by asserting that successful intervention in large systems *"...is not a cookbook process"*

7.5   Motivation and the Implementation of Change

7.5.1. On the basis of the foregoing analysis summarised in the following points, it becomes problematic to advance a detailed and reliable model of change implementation in police organisations:

   i.   the absence of any robust, theoretical model of organisational change (Cummings 1980),

   ii. the empirical studies of systems and organisational development (O.D.) practitioners within commercial organisations *(ibid.),*

   iii. the evidence of the N.P. project trial.

7.5.2. Empirical, activity based models of change (e.g. Figures 4.5 and 4.7) are likely to be too specific to be of general applicability and process models (e.g. Figure 6.1) whilst potentially useful in understanding and describing change processes, are likely to become generalised and therefore of limited value in providing a guide for change implementations.

7.5.3. It has been argued that the complexity of the change process builds very rapidly involving the environment, organisational systems, structures, processes and psycho social factors. The implementation of a change programme in the knowledge of this complexity and in the absence of guiding principles, either theoretical or empirical, may therefore become a reactive process.

7.5.4. Many writers on organisations and successful O.D. practitioners have advanced the view over a long period that planning is an essential feature of successful management. (Marrus 1984, Below et al 1987) Therefore to rely upon spontaneous management reaction to the complexity of the change process, might be argued to be reckless, if organisational objectives are to be realised.

7.5.5. The reactive approach therefore seems to be inappropriate when managing change in organisations generally and specifically in the case of police organisations. It is clearly not possible to suspend police service delivery for a period, whilst change takes place. It is neither ethically nor practically feasible to close down a section of police activity implement a change and then resume an altered, albeit improved service. (Paragraph 3.3.2) Such a process of abrupt change is described and discussed in more detail at Section 5.9.

7.5.6. It seems therefore that Moss-Kanter's (1984 pg. 299) conclusion becomes especially apposite for police organisations:

> "...actions implied by changes cannot reside on the level of ideas...but must be concretised in actual procedures, or structures, or communications channels, or appraisal measures, or work methods, or rewards."

7.5.7. A major difficulty is thus presented in that many of the conventional motivational methods customarily available to commercial organisations (Kakabadse, Ludlow and Vinnicombe 1987) are not routinely available to police managers.

7.5.8. It is argued that whilst the established theories of an individuals' motivation to work are appropriate to police employees (Vroom and Deci 1978), such theories do not wholly apply to a individuals' motivation to change work practices in police organisations. The model of a change motivation system at Figure 7.7 illustrates this argument.

7.5.9. Figure 7.7 shows individuals' motivation to work influences individuals' motivation to change, which feeds back to the motivation to work. It has been suggested (Figure 6.4) that if the motivation to change is not present, but change is in prospect, then a range of personal strategies may be adopted to resist the change and thus the motivation to work may be adversely effected.

7.5.10. The individual is thus locked into a progressively unproductive system that will, if un-corrected, become disruptive and which is likely to eventually result in the individual leaving the organisation, voluntarily or otherwise. (Kakabadse et al 1987)

7.5.11. Figure 7.7 suggests that motivation to work might be explained by one or more of the three established groups of motivation theories:

    i.   those based upon individuals' needs (i.e. Maslow, McClelland and Alderfer in Kakabadse, Ludlow and Vinnicombe 1987),

ii. those based on external influences or incentives characterised by Herzberg's two-factor theory (Vroom and Deci 1978)

iii. those based upon expectancy or instrumentality theories, whereby individuals are suggested to optimise their opportunities and then adjust behaviour to achieve the maximum rewards. (Vroom et al in Kast and Rosenzweig 1981)

7.5.12. An individuals' motivation to change in a police organisation is shown in Figure 7.7 as being a function of the organisational communication of one or more of a number of change motivators. These change motivators may be distinguished from the majority of work motivators, as with the exception of individual satisfaction, they involve the exercise of external power.

7.5.13. It has been argued that unless an individual perceives benefit for him or herself in the change to an organisational system, then the change is unlikely to be accepted without the exercise of an external influence or authority.

7.5.14. The major external influences that are suggested to be relevant to the implementation of change are the *"power levers"* .(Kakabadse et al 1987 pg. 246) This expression is used by Kakabadse in the context of the straightforward application of influence of one individual over others. However, the concept of *"power levers"* is suggested to be especially appropriate to the implementation of change as used in a similar context to that by Senge. (1990 Chapter 1)

Figure 7.7 Motivators and the System of Motivation

7.5.15. Power has to be communicated to be effective (Kakabadse et al 1987) and the leverage effect is suggested to be greater when the organisational communication systems are operating at the most effective level. The influence and

effect of a particular type or combination of powers, thus being enhanced by the efficiency of the communication systems.

7.5.16. In terms of actually making changes occur within police systems, it is argued that police organisations do not possess the opportunities to exercise the full range of powers, or combination of powers implied by Figure 7.7.

7.5.17. Promotion and advancement are achieved only through competitive examination and assessment, with financial rewards being linked only to rank and experience. Only limited leverage therefore might be obtained from the conventional motivators applicable within many organisations that are not constrained by statute in this respect, such as public and private commercial organisations.

7.5.18. Kakabadse (1987 pg. 147) adopted the expression *"action levers "* to convey the concept of a range of work motivation options available to managers. It is suggested here that whilst these *'levers'* are appropriate to motivating the implementation of change in commercial type organisations, it is argued that only a limited number (vii - ix below) of *"action levers"* are wholly appropriate to police organisational systems.

   i.   recruit only the best person who matches the current job,

   ii.   individuals should know how to become better performers,

   iii.   individuals should be encouraged to stretch themselves and be rewarded accordingly,

   iv.   the reward system should be applied fairly,

v. individuals should understand the reward system,

vi. high performance should be followed up with appropriate rewards,

vii. monitor individuals' performance,

viii. managers need to understand tangible and non tangible reward systems,

ix. effective communication is vital.

7.5.19. With the exception of a regular performance review of each employee, the use of recognition rewards as opposed to tangible rewards and an effective communications system, none of the foregoing "*action levers*" are entirely suitable or appropriate to police organisations.

7.5.20. Considerable limitations are imposed by the various statutory provisions governing the service conditions of police officers. These regulations preclude the use of many of the "*levers*" that offer the potential of direct advantages to the achievement of change. Tangible rewards and the threat of some direct punishment, such as a loss of reward, or even employment, are often quoted as being one the most effective means of introducing change and such practices may be frequently observed in the aftermath of commercial company acquisitions and take-overs. Yet these two fundamental motivators are not available within police organisations.

7.5.21. The relevant Police Acts and Police Regulations provide, *inter alia*, for the continuous service of officers for generally thirty years and only exceptionally, for a longer period. Police officers and civil staff in police organisations are largely salaried within pay bands defined through Statutory Instruments (S.I.). The opportunity therefore to provide

financial rewards for particular achievements or performance is not a possibility at present.

7.5.22. Service within the police is subject to adherence to disciplinary regulations[1] that specify standards of conduct and behaviour, not achievement, performance or motivation[2]. It may be appreciated therefore, that in implementing change programmes, police managers have to rely upon a very limited range of options, or "levers" to bring about the change.

7.5.23. In effect, it is not possible to achieve change in police organisations by adopting coercive or motivational techniques that are common in commercial organisations, viz.:

    i. tangible rewards for achievement of change objectives,

    ii. re-distribution of consequential financial benefits to staff in the form of enhanced profit sharing or bonuses,

    iii. threat or implication of dismissal or redundancy for non-compliance.

7.6   Options for Implementing Change

7.6.1. In practice, change in police organisations has to be largely achieved by means other than reward and punishment. It has been argued above, that monetary and other tangible rewards are not a generally realistic option for police organisations and similarly punishment, or sanctions for non-compliance are only exceptionally feasible.

---

[1] The Police (Discipline) Regulations 1985 (SI 518)
[2] It is anticipated that during 1995 regulations will be introduced to cater for unsatisfactory performance.

7.6.2. The only exception to foregoing approaches arise from external changes imposed by legislation, whereby the police are required to adopt new procedures. In such event (i.e. Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1985, Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994, Criminal Justice Act 1994 etc.) the police have to comply with detailed legal procedures that are subject to scrutiny by courts and other external agencies that are seen to be holders of legitimate power to effect change. (i.e. National and Local Governments, Crown Prosecution Service, Police Complaints Authority, etc.)

7.6.3. Non compliance in such an event therefore becomes a matter of public account and sanctions apply for non-compliance, malpractice or negligence, either through the formal police complaints and disciplinary procedures, or the criminal courts.

7.6.4. The option of recourse to formal disciplinary procedures for punishment purposes is always available for failing to comply with a lawful order, or being inefficient through negligence or malpractice. However the use of these procedures necessitates a formal investigation and charge that is progressed in much the same way as a criminal enquiry. Such an approach would eventually result in the appearance of the individual before an internal disciplinary board. Here, the standard of proof to secure a conviction for the alleged disciplinary offence would be the same as that required to prove a successful conviction at a criminal court viz., proved beyond reasonable doubt.

7.6.5. The standard of investigation and associated procedures that are followed in such an event, make formal disciplinary proceedings a lengthy and costly process. The protracted nature of such enquiries, the rights to formal defence against the changes and the standard of proof required make the formal disciplinary process an inappropriate management option for achieving organisational change, even if coercion were seen to be a viable approach.

7.6.6. The remaining options and strategies available to police managers for potentially achieving successful change are listed below:

i. **Management Style** - a participative management style that recognises and reflects the views of the staff affected by the changes. (Bass & Stogdill 1990, Senge 1990)

ii. **Leadership** - a persuasive and supportive leadership style, whereby individuals understand both the nature of the change and the reason for it; leaders tend to be more tolerant of change than followers and are thus able to predict the consequences of some changes and to impart information the future, thus reducing uncertainty. (Bass and Stogdill 1990)

iii. **Training** - formal training programmes directly imparting relevant information and helping affected staff to understand the changes, gain commitment and reduce uncertainty, (Beckhard and Harris 1987, Kakabadse et al 1987)

iv. **Job development** - informal training in the work place given by supervisors and managers as part of work routines, which may be associated with a wider programme of job enrichment. (Paragraph 6.10.10, Bass and Stogdill 1990)

v. **Organisational communications** - the strategic, planned and persuasive use of organisational communication systems (brochures, posters, house newspaper, open letters, videos etc.) to inform and to progressively shape staff opinions, attitudes and behaviours in respect of changes and the reasons for them, (Porter and Roberts 1977, Kakabadse et al 1987)

vi. **Interpersonal processes** - one to one, one to several, small group and cascade processes to introduce a motivation and commitment to change, (Olsen 1982)

vii. **Rewards** - use of non-tangible rewards and Herzberg's 'Motivators' *(ibid.)* i.e. support, encouragement, commendations, personal letters of thanks and other positive leadership features that publicly provide recognition for achievement, or progress towards desired change objectives. (Kast and Resenzweig 1981, Hodgkinson 1983, Bass and Stogdill 1990)

7.6.7. Each of the foregoing options for implementing change may be used individually or in combination. The options selected are likely to be dependant upon a large range of situational and circumstantial factors, the most frequently encountered are as follows:

i. **Time available** - e.g. if changes are required to be introduced rapidly, it may be inappropriate to develop a supportive leadership style throughout the organisation prior to implementing the change. (e.g. The operation was a success but the patient died!)

ii. **Skills available** - e.g. the creation of persuasive internal communications programmes is a specialised activity, the skills for which may not be available within a police organisation.

iii. **Type of change** - differing types of change are likely to require different approaches to implementation (Section 5.9, Figures 6.4 and 6.6 et seq.)

iv. **Complexity of the change(s)** - the more complex the change and the greater number of associated changes occurring, the greater the likelihood that a combination of the above implementation options will

be appropriate at different stages of the change programme (Figure 7.4)

v. **Resource implications** - it has been shown that implementing major organisational change to police systems is likely to be a lengthy and thus costly undertaking. The financial costs involved need to be assessed before implementation options are selected. e.g. In order to communicate information to staff, a poster is likely to be less costly than a professionally produced corporate video, but the effect may be considerably different. Such factors will bear upon the decision as to which implementation options are selected.

vi. **Opportunity costs** - of finance, staff and time. Implementing change has been shown to be a demanding undertaking for managers and also potentially for staff. As there is a natural but variable limit to individual achievement during a working day, it is necessary to consider what is to be foregone, or put back in order to implement changes. The opportunity costs associated with finance and time will be no less significant to the implementation options adopted.

7.6.8. Change implementation options can be operationalised by individuals or groups from either inside, or outside the organisation and is arguably the most significant aspect of the change process. Cleland and King (1983 pg. 60) emphasise the importance of this step *"The literature of planning is replete with descriptions of plans that have been painstakingly developed and then 'placed in a file'..."* In deciding who will implement the changes, a major consideration must therefore be who is most likely to achieve the changes required, on schedule and within budget?

7.6.9. As previously, the decision as to who is most appropriately placed to put into effect the changes will depend upon a wide range of factors and constraints, principal amongst which will be those shown above. (Sections 7.6.6-7)

7.6.10. The following options exist in police organisations for managing change programmes:

    i.   internal line manager(s),

    ii. internal functional manager(s),

    iii. internal project manager(s),

    iv. external project manager(s).

    v. external consultant(s),

    vi. project team.

7.7   Internal Line Managers as Change Implementors

7.7.1. The management of change by existing line managers was shown to be problematic in the case of N.P. (Chapter Four) This experience was analysed and developed in Chapter Six where a table is provided (Figure 6.2) which suggests some of the conflicts for line managers when implementing change.

7.7.2. In effect, beyond intuition and a personal knowledge of the strengths and attitude of a particular manager, there are a very limited number of reliable approaches for determining whether a future change will be seen by a line manager in a positive light or not. If such an individual is selected to implement the changes, it is possible that the changes will be undermined, if the individual concerned does not

perceive them to be in his or her best interest, or within the prevailing work group culture. (Checkland 1981, Schein 1985)

7.7.3. Conversely and in general terms, if the individual does perceive the proposed changes to be supportive to personal goals and work group culture, then the change is more likely to be conscientiously pursued. (Kakabadse 1987)

7.7.4. It argued by Carnall (1990) that the situation may be even more complicated. He asserts that if the degree of job security felt by an employee is either high or low then the response to change will be very much that of rejection, suppression or distortion. Carnall argues that it is only managers who are mid-way between the extremes of job security that are likely to positively respond to change, as it is they who will listen, clarify and explore alternatives. Those at the lowest extreme of security seeing any change as a threat, and those who are highly secure, not seeing the necessity to make any change.

7.7.5. A further difficulty for the line manager may be that there is simply insufficient time available to maintain the required organisational performance, as well as implementing a change programme. Therefore, benefits might be lost that could have accrued by virtue of the line managers' detailed knowledge of the tasks that have to be performed and her or his value as a supportive leader of the change process. (Carnall 1990, Bass and Stogdill 1990)

7.7.6. Such circumstances may apply in situations where management and supervisory jobs have been reduced as part of an organisational restructuring and cost reduction programme. In such circumstances a managers' motivation to implement change may be very limited, due to the acceptance of new and greater responsibilities associated with restructuring (de-layering). The increasing

management responsibilities associated with contemporary organisational restructuring programmes is likely to result in managers being more distant from the jobs they control. (Handy (1994) This 'distance' may become apparent in two specific ways within policing systems:

i. physical, in the sense that work is not co-located with the manager,

ii. intellectual, in the sense that the manager need not have a direct knowledge of the work being undertaken.

7.7.7. A number of solutions to these potential difficulties are suggested in contemporary management texts *(ibid.)* the majority of which tend to rely upon the manager appreciating the value of adopting a fresh approach to the survival of the organisation and the new organisational regime. Methods for dealing with management and thus change issues from a 'distance', are suggested to incorporate employee motivation, participation and trust strategies. (Senge 1990, Pedlar et al 1991, Handy 1994)

7.7.8. It has been shown however, that the imperatives within commercial organisations that are potentially likely to focus the attention of a manager on the need to change, are not necessarily available within police organisations. Where a management acceptance of the need to progress change is not achieved, as has been shown to be the case in the N.P. trial and to be generally likely within in police organisations, (Irving et al 1989 pg. 196 *"... the motivation to change problem..."*) it becomes a possibility that line managers are not automatically and necessarily the most appropriately placed individuals to implement change.

7.7.9. The approach adopted within the N.P. trial was to appoint a 'change agent' who worked alongside the divisional line managers in order to assist with the implementation of the project. The main functions of the change agent was to be a face to face communicator at the trial site. Informing and explaining what was required by way of agreed alterations to procedures and assisting those affected to achieve the changes. In effect the change agent was a person who had a good knowledge of the N.P. project aims and who was to provide an additional resource to divisional line managers to achieve the necessary changes. Whilst this approach appeared to meet both the needs of the line managers and the project designers, there is no evidence advanced by either internal or external evaluators to suggest that change was achieved more or less easily as a result of the appointment.

7.7.10. The concept of the role of the change agent is advocated by Tyson and Jackson (1992) and there is evidence advanced[3] by Checkland and Scholes (1990) that there is value in such a role. The main functions of a change agent *(ibid.)* being seen as:

   i. helping with the diagnosis of need,

   ii. planning and undertaking training activities,

   iii. initiating the change process and acting as a catalyst in the management of internal change,

   iv. contributing knowledge of the change process and helping to maintain the momentum of the changes,

   v. co-ordinating the change activities.

---

[3] Chapter 7 - "SSM in an Organisational Change Programme"

7.8　Internal Functional Managers as Change Implementors

7.8.1.　Internal functional managers within police organisations may be described as those managers having charge over a particular specialisation which involves the exercise of a functional authority over specified procedures, practices, or policies (Koontz and O'Donnell 1976) i.e. crime, traffic, personnel etc.,

7.8.2.　Similar difficulties are presented for change implementation for functional managers as for line managers. Additionally however, functional managers will invariably have to cope with change programmes that extend beyond their own functional boundaries and which encroach into other managers' areas of responsibility.

7.8.3.　It has been argued that change within police organisations cannot be confined to isolated areas of operation, but rather must encompass the sub-systems within which the task/operation is performed, as well as those other sub-systems where inputs are conditioned by the functioning of the sub-system of interest. This being the case, it is argued that change cannot be confined within a single functional area. Thus of necessity, the functional manager must assume wider responsibilities if change is to be implemented.

7.8.4.　Such an expansion of a functional manager's responsibilities, will in itself create additional dynamics within the change process that may not be advantageous. For instance, other functional managers may perceive that change is being imposed on their areas of responsibility without having the necessary participation and control within the process. It is probable that in such circumstances the necessary 'ownership' of the changes that have been shown to be necessary will not be achieved. (Chapter Six)

7.8.5.   In order to overcome this problem, a change strategy that attempted to confine change implementation to areas of functional responsibility would create a need for co-ordination between the various functional responsibilities. This would be necessary in order to ensure that the tasks performed within the various functional divisions continued to be harmonised towards overall organisational goals and not limited to narrow functional goals or self interest. (Katzenbach and Smith 1993)

7.8.6.   The function of co-ordination in itself will invariably consume additional organisational resources. Whether co-ordination is achieved through hierarchical means i.e. a more senior manager co-ordinates the efforts of the functional managers, or through administrative means, i.e. formal paper/mail flow procedures, additional costs will be incurred, at least in the form of staff opportunity costs. (Kast and Rosenzweig 1981) Thus higher demands are likely to imposed on staff who have to cope with the consequential costs of implementing the change programme, as well as their routine responsibilities.

7.8.7.   The avoidance of a many functionalised divisions within a police organisation thus becomes desirable, if change is to be a persistent feature of organisational development. A large number of functional divisions relative to the overall size of the organisation, would present a major problem of co-ordination for even the most modest change to the overall output.

7.9   Internal Project Managers as Change Implementors

7.9.1.   It is suggested that many of the difficulties associated with managing change within functionalised organisations and the police in particular, may be overcome by adoption of the project management concept. A project manager in these

terms is one who heads a specific project which spans a number of separate functions, departments and/or divisional commands, involving the exercise of a 'matrix' type of authority, horizontally as well as vertically through organisational divisions. (Cleland and King 1983) i.e. information technology projects, communications projects, corporate image projects etc.

7.9.2. In effect this amounts to the systems approach to change implementation. *(ibid.)* This means that all aspects of an organisational system are brought together in a temporary structure designed to bring about co-ordinated change(s) throughout the system which are mutually complimentary and directed towards organisational goals.

7.9.3. A manager of appropriate experience and seniority from within the organisation might be appointed as the project manager for the change process. The advantage being that a suitably experienced person would possess much knowledge of the existing organisational practices and culture, as well as being able to exploit knowledge of how to operationalise changes through existing staff and systems.

7.9.4. Internal project management responsibilities may be in addition to normal and routine work, or given as a full time responsibility in respect of major change programmes. In contrast to the role of the change agent, the project manager's role may be characterised by the following principles drawn from Cleland and King (1983), Carnall (1990) and Tyson and Jackson (1992):

   i. the project manager operates independently of the organisation's normal chain of line command, this may result in some staff having more that one manager, one for functional purposes and one for change issues,

ii. the project manager negotiates directly with functional managers for support and resources, (Cleland and King (1983) suggest that a deliberate conflict is created here between the competing needs and objectives of the functional and project managers, the resolution of which is significant to resulting ownership and success of the changes)

iii. a sharing of decisions, results, and accountability between functional and project managers, together with an emphasis on team and task culture, although the project manager is the organisations focal point for the change project.

7.9.5.   As indicated above, a major difficulty with the internal project management approach is the potential for conflict between functional, line and project managers. Although such conflicts may have constructive outcomes, and indeed some would argue that some conflict is essential, if lasting progress is to be achieved, (Katzenbach and Smith 1993) but it is nevertheless a strategy with risk.

7.9.6.   Should managers fail to resolve their conflicts, long lasting grievances may be nurtured, resulting in reduced effectiveness. In the extreme, winners and losers may emerge, or at least be perceived in that way by staff. Should staff identify the winner with the established situation and the looser with the change project, then the opportunity for present and future organisational development will have been severely impaired.[4]

---

[4]In respect of the N.P. Project, Irving et al (1989) implied that staff actively made assessments as to whether the project was likely to survive within the organisation in the face of other major influences. Judgements were made by senior staff based upon the high level of resources applied to the project and thus the relative importance within the organisation, when compared to other apparently important initiatives. Irving implies that such judgements affected perceptions of future success or failure, and thus how much active support the project would be given.

7.10 External Project Managers as Change Implementors

7.10.1. The appointment of an external project manager is a means of overcoming the potential difficulty of conflict when an internal project manager is appointed. An appointment of this nature may be made from another division of the same organisation, where this opportunity exists, or from a firm of management consultants. In either event the project manager's term of appointment is usually fixed, even if this means handing over the project to an individual with different skills at some point. (Cleland and King 1983)

7.10.2. A project manager from within the same organisation, but not from within the division or group is the option that potentially maximises the benefits of the project management approach without the attendant risks arising from conflicts. For the police service, such an option is realistic and practical, but has generally not been practised in anything other than the larger organisations. Even in the largest organisations however, there does remain a risk of long term grievances arising from conflicts between managers associated with the implementation of change projects.

7.10.3. The concept and advantages of constructive conflict might be argued, especially in relation to management team development and the management of change. (Katzenbach and Smith 1993) However, the opposite point of view may also be advanced, Carnall (1990) in a case study, describes the negative effect on organisational goals of conflicts between functional directors.(pgs. 3-7) . Senge (1990) encapsulates this position *"...many people who get hooked on conflict manipulation come to believe that only through being in a state of continual anxiety and fear can they be successful."* (pg. 157) He develops this argument to a point where it is suggested that individuals so motivated associate willpower with success and strive to overcome

resistance to achieving their goals *"...at any price...defeating any opposition ...surmounting any obstacle."* (pg. 158)

7.10.4. The argument has been advanced that police organisations need to be open in character and to develop and change in accordance with the long term wishes of those being policed - policing by consent. (Chapter Two, Sections 2.18 and 5.2) Such a narrow and robust approach to police organisation development as implied above, would thus be inappropriate.

7.10.5. Therefore in appointing an external project manager who had an unequivocal remit to implement the changes within a specified time, care would be necessary to ensure that feedback on the changes was considered. Failure to consider the effects of the police system outputs in this way would amount to a closing of the police system as a result of the change implementation process; arguably the opposite of the desired effect.

7.11   External Consultants as Change Implementors.

7.11.1. There seems no shortage of management consultants who offer services associated with change management. Such services clearly have a direct cost which is principally based on the amount of consultant time involved, the degree of expertise and experience required and the level of fixed costs, i.e. printing, data processing and travel costs . A wide range of services are advertised as available, ranging from problem analysis, through development of options, plans, communication and training strategies, to implementation and evaluation stages. Group process facilitation, team building seminars, culture modification projects, management development programmes and many other services all form a part of the overall management consultants portfolio of products.

7.11.2. For many public services and the police in particular, the cost of extensive management constancy can be prohibitive especially, if a complete change management programme is commissioned from analysis through to implementation. Therefore the use of consultants' services has to be considered in relation to other priorities and in the context of the organisations overall budget.

7.11.3. A dilemma for an organisation in considering whether or not to employ consultants, will be the need to carefully consider what exactly is required, whether appropriate skills are available internally and recognition of the need to appoint a manager to act as the liaison point if consultants are appointed. Yet when this has been undertaken, the organisation is likely to have already achieved much of the work for which the consultants will subsequently charge.

7.11.4. This view of the role of management consultants should be balanced against the benefits of having an objective external advisor who will have experience of managing change and possess the potential to prevent many costly mistakes from arising. Additionally, many methodologies and techniques that are highly appropriate to organisational development, especially in relation to personal and team development (Katzenbach and Smith 1993, Checkland and Scholes 1990) are only available internally within the largest organisations and generally will have to be externally contracted. Such techniques when applied to internal line, functional and project managers have the potential to stimulate the necessary commitment to change from within the organisation and can be highly cost effective. (Carnall 1990)

7.11.5. A major limitation however that attracts to the extensive use of management consultants is that the resulting organisational changes may not be associated with the current management regime and thus lack 'ownership'. Rather the changes may be seen by staff as a passing trend

or fashion. Managers of doubtful integrity are then presented with the opportunity of dis-associating themselves with the changes, blaming negative outcomes on the consultants.

7.12 Project and Management Teams as Implementors of Change

7.12.1. Project teams are a group of individuals drawn internally or externally who share a common organisational (project) goal. A persuasive argument for the creation of a project team to manage complex organisational change is that identifying a single project manager with perfect qualifications and experience is not a realistic proposition. (Cleland and King 1983) Therefore it is desirable to draw together individuals who have complementary personal and functional skills in order that the team shares overall knowledge of the organisations activities. Such a team may include an external management consultant but should be led by *"...the best manager available..."* (*ibid.* pg. 354)

7.12.2. The work of Belpin (1981 and 1976 in Tyson and Jackson 1992) gave insight as to how teams might be assembled that would be successful in relation to common objectives. In summary, he concluded that an ideal team should possess individuals who would accept people oriented roles, task dominated roles and ideas dominated roles. He also advanced a methodology that seeks to determine the classifications into which any individual would be most comfortable functioning. Belpin's original work *(ibid.)* concluded that an overall balance to a team would be most effective, but later work concluded that provided the nature of an imbalance was known, then training and awareness could correct shortcomings. Additionally, it was suggested that teams with certain characteristics would be more appropriate for certain tasks. (The techniques associated

with categorisation of team members and the identification of imbalances are among those requiring registration and licensing referred to at Section 7.11.4 above.)

7.12.3. There seems little doubt that there are potentially considerable advantages to the use of teams in the management of organisational change. Katzenbach and Smith (1993) advance persuasive arguments for the team approach to management and advance the concept of the *"high performance team"*. Here, the performance of the team is seen as extending beyond the advantages of complementary skills of the individual members.

7.12.4. A "high performance team" is argued to be identified and characterised by the degree of commitment of the, members. Such commitment is seen to *"... extend beyond civility and teamwork...to achieve personal and professional goals ... beyond company activities and even beyond the life of the team itself."* (*ibid.* pg. 65)

7.12.5. In contrast, Senge (1990) advances a warning of the *"Myth of the management team."* (pg. 24) He argues that all too often teams of managers spend their time *"... fighting for turf, avoiding anything that will make them look bad personally...but maintaining the appearance of a cohesive team."* As previously noted, Senge (1990) quotes Argyris (1990) as asserting that teams function well for routine management matters, but break down when they confront complex issues. Argyris (1990) argues that teams find collective enquiry inherently threatening and therefore avoid it. The consequence is *"....that teams full of people... are increasingly proficient at keeping themselves from learning."* (Senge 1990) This is what Argyris (1990) calls *"skilled incompetence"*

7.12.6. Thus in tackling the management of change in large police organisations, which has been argued to be inherently complex, it is difficult on the basis of Senge's and Argyris's arguments to be totally confident about the benefit of project teams.

7.12.7. It may however be suggested, that these arguments appear only to be strongly significant to the management of change in exceptional or unusual circumstances. Advocates of the benefits of team approaches, typified by Kasenbach and Smith, (1993) demonstrate that in most management circumstances, team based methods of problem solving and change management will probably result in an improved overall performance and outcome when compared with alternatives.

7.13 The System of Change in Police Organisations - Conclusion

7.13.1. As implied throughout there is no clear prescription that might be followed to achieve effective change in police organisations. Carnall (1990) tackles the issue of managing complex change by suggesting a menu of core competencies for achieving change, viz.

    i. decision making skills, including vision and intuition,

    ii. coalition building skills, gaining support by persuasive communication,

    iii. achieving action by motivating staff and handling opposition,

    iv. maintaining momentum, including team building, being flexible, trusting staff, giving feedback and sharing problems.

7.13.2. What is apparent from the above (summarised) list of core competencies is that the management of major change is suggested to demand a considerable array of personal skills and attributes.

7.13.3. It is seductive to conclude therefore, that it is unlikely to conveniently find the requisite skills in any one individual, and hence a well managed team should present the best option for managing major change in police organisations. Optimally, such a team might include external consultants, line managers and functional specialists from every division of the organisation affected by the change.

7.13.4. It is persuasively argued though by experienced academics and management specialists (Section 7.12.5, Senge 1990, Argyris 1990) that such a solution is doomed to failure in the face of conflict and complexity.

7.13.5. The best solution that can be offered on the basis of current research is the impact of the charismatic qualities of an effective leader working through a skilled and appropriately balanced team. Carnall (1990), Senge (1990) and Tyson and Jackson (1992), all finally place the emphasis on improved organisational performance through satisfactory achievement of complex change, directly onto the qualities and competencies of the 'leader'.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Summary

The concluding chapter of this research suggests there are five possible explanations for the apparent divergence between the findings of the N.P. evaluators and contemporary policing practice. It is concluded that whilst the N.P. systems approach, analysis and design were generally appropriate, the implementation methods were not adequate in the face of considerable individual and organisational resistance to the changes.

It is further concluded that the N.P. evaluations were too narrow in scope to be of value to the organisations concerned. Despite these difficulties, implementation of widespread changes based upon the principles of N.P. continued within both the Metropolitan and Surrey Police. The research concludes by deriving six principles for the introduction and management of change in police organisations. It is noted that the principles and characteristics of N.P. are now fully implemented throughout the Metropolitan and Surrey Police areas.

8.1 Explanations for the N.P. Findings

8.1.1. The work to improve policing services through the Neighbourhood Policing (N.P.) project started from the proposition that if certain principles were followed, (Sections 2.7 and 2.8) it would be possible to design and implement a policing system that represented an improvement to existing and previous practice. It was further suggested that if a systems approach were followed to both the design and implementation of the policing scheme, then benefits would also accrue by virtue of this integrative and holistic approach. (Section 2.16)

8.1.2. It is evident from the summary of the evaluations presented at Chapter Four that in the view of some assessors, (Irving et al 1989, Turner 1987[a]) the overall project was not seen as successful. Similarly, it has been shown that the evaluation of a number of the individual N.P. treatments did not indicate the positive outcomes that had been anticipated.

8.1.3. The results of these evaluations contrast sharply with contemporary police practice which has incorporated much of the N.P. approach into day to day police work, as well as many of the N.P. treatments. (i.e. Chief Constable of Surrey 1993, M.P.S. 1994)

8.1.4. A significant question that remains of concern is why, given the reported largely negative assessments of the scheme, (Turner 1987 [a-e], Irving et al 1989) is so much of the substance of the N.P. policing system incorporated into police organisations? In particular, the Metropolitan and Surrey Police Organisations where the scheme is widely recognised as the most appropriate system for delivering community based policing services across a wide diversity of policing environments. (M.P.S. 1994[a], Surrey Police 1994)

8.1.5. A partial explanation of this outcome may arise from the argument that the major evaluations were too narrow in scope. Turner (1987 [a-e]) and his team concentrated upon the efficacy or otherwise of the individual N.P. treatments and endeavoured to assess each in isolation from others. There was no attempt made to assess the N.P. scheme holistically.

8.1.6. Turner was particularly critical of the attempt to change a policing system, as opposed to individual elements of it. He states:

> *"Experiments* (in policing) *should be severely limited in their individual scope.....no more than one aspect should be changed at any one place at any one time and the extent of the change should be modest..."*
> (Turner 1987 [a] pg. 31)

8.1.7. In contrast, Irving et al (1989) provided an account of a largely observational study of the work of the N.P. project team and the process of implementation at Notting Hill Division. This account is sub-titled 'The Natural History of a Policing Experiment' which accurately describes the style of evaluation.

8.1.8. Reliance is predominantly placed upon accounts and commentary upon the meetings of the divisional working party, the attitudes of its members and the behaviour and attitudes of operational officers. Much of the evaluation report is given to a review and critique of the original N.P. theses (Hart 1981, Beckett 1981) In a similar vein to Turner, Irving widely criticises the systems approach in general, and its use throughout the N.P. project in particular.

8.1.9. In consequence of the evaluators comments and findings, the general propositions of this research are that the results of the N.P. evaluations is unsurprising, given:

    i. the arguments presented here about the nature of change and its effect within police organisations,

    ii. the characteristics of the systems approach and the inappropriateness of the evaluation methods adopted when applied to a 'systems concept' change programme.

8.1.10. The above propositions imply that a number of explanations may exist which might assist in accounting for the apparent divergence between the N.P. evaluations and modern police practice.

8.1.11. It is suggested that none of the following explanations are likely to completely account for the outcomes described. In combination however, together with the evidence presented here (Chapters Five and Six) regarding the systemic approach to change associated with police organisations, it is argued that a more complete explanation of the N.P. trial is possible.

8.1.12. The following categories of explanations correspond to the features of the elements of the process model of change suggested at Figure 6.1. and the macro model of change derived at Section 5.3 Each is discussed below:

i. **N.P. Systems Analysis** - the original police systems analysis was incomplete or inaccurate, (identification of the stimuli for change - Section 5.4 and Paragraph 6.1.5)

ii. **N.P. Systems Design** - the subsequent police system design and N.P. treatments were therefore inappropriate, (targets for change - Section 5.5, Paragraph 6.1.7)

iii. **N.P. Systems Implementation** - the implementation of N.P. project treatments was inappropriate or incomplete, (implementation of change - Section 5.9, Section 4.1 and 4.2, Paragraphs 6.1.8 -16)

iv. **N.P. Evaluations** - the evaluations were narrow in scope and did not therefore address the most significant aspects of the N.P. system, (N.P. evaluation concepts - Chapter Three)

v. **Systems Approach to N.P.** - the overall systems approach adopted for the N.P. project was an inappropriate methodology. (Sections 2.16, 4.1/2)

8.2   N.P. Systems Analysis

8.2.1. The original work in respect of the N.P. systems analysis was undertaken between 1979 and 1980 and is summarised in Chapter Two, drawn from Hart (1981) and Beckett (1981). Fundamentally, it was argued on the basis of work by Alderson, (1979) that the nature of policing would alter unless police formed partnerships with the communities they policed and reflected the public's views in their priorities. (Section 2.3)

8.2.2. If such changes did not occur, it was suggested that the character of British policing would move away from the principle of policing with the consent of the public. It was further suggested that such a move would result in a more imposed and reactive style of policing characterised by a further distancing of the police from the public needs and wishes. (Whitacker 1979, Alderson 1979, Paragraph 2.18.2)

8.2.3. It was argued that if this were to become the case then the imposition of policing would be seen as inappropriate by the public and resisted. (Alderson 1979, Beckett 1981) Further it was argued by Hart (1981) that if police continued to rely upon current reactive approaches to crime and demands from the public, then the rate of increasing demands would overtake the resources available to deal with them. The solution was seen as involving the public and all relevant agencies in preventive measures. (Section 2.4 and Figure 2.1)

8.2.4. The original analysis, although not exhaustive, drew from a detailed knowledge base. This included the views of some of the most senior and respected officers in the Service at that time, senior academics, the professional and academic staff at the Police Staff College and members of a number of police forces who were active in police organisational development. Additionally, a substantial number of reliable published sources reinforced the N.P. approach and were cited in the analysis, which was presented in considerable detail. (Hart 1981, Beckett 1981)

8.2.5. The overall project analysis adopted Checkland's (1972) methodology for problem solving in order to present a systematic and integrated representation of the situation. The analysis incorporated consideration of the policing environment, policing structures, policing behaviours and police standard operating procedures. Irving et al (1989 pg. ix) comments:

> "It (N.P.) was a remarkable document in its scope and the systematic way in which synthesis of findings from many different disciplines was directed at producing an integrated policing strategy which....was a complete system, a major innovation."

8.2.6. Over six months after the production and submission of N.P., Lord Scarman's (1981) report of the Brixton disorders was published. It is suggested here to be of considerable significance, that this report of the inquiry that followed these disorders of April 1981 entirely supported the N.P. propositions. Irving et al (1989 pg. ix) notes:

> "In the aftermath of the Brixton riots and with the prospect of Lord Scarman's inquiry concluding that police strategy in London required overhauling, the thesis (N.P.) was thrust into the limelight because it offered a ready made new approach....that was not merely theoretical but contained a detailed plan for implementation..."

8.2.7. The methodology for the Scarman (1981) inquiry contrasted to N.P. in that it followed a quasi legal process, whereby oral and written evidence was collected and presented to the inquiry by counsel. Although the Scarman inquiry had its origins within, and its focus upon, the difficulties of policing Brixton, the report did advance principles for policing generally, that corresponded closely with those of N.P. The main thrust of the inquiry's conclusions may be encapsulated as follows, *"If they* (the police) *neglect consultation and co-operation with the local community, unrest is certain and riot becomes probable."* (Scarman 1981 pg. 135)

8.2.8. Alderson (1979) and Scarman (1981) whilst advancing a philosophy and some general principles of policing, both stopped short of specifying a model of a system for delivering policing services of a style implied by their findings. (Section 2.3)

8.2.9. provided such a system specification, the root definition (Checkland 1972) of which may be seen to correspond with the approaches of Alderson and Scarman as follows,

> *" A policing system which seeks to optimise available resources including all relevant agencies and the community itself in order to prevent crime and offences..."* (Hart 1981 pg. 58)

8.2.10. It is argued that the congruence of the conclusions from two separate and independent methodologies (Scarman and N.P.), arising from two mutually independent studies, is probably not coincidental.

8.2.11. It is further argued that the similarity of conclusions from two differing perspectives provides mutual reinforcement and confidence as to the accuracy of the analysis (Cook and Campbell 1979[a]) undertaken by both examinations of policing and the relevance of their findings.

8.2.12. On this basis, it is suggested that it is probable that the systems analysis for N.P. was appropriate and provided a largely accurate examination and definition of the policing 'problem situation' (Checkland 1972) to be tackled, as summarised here in Chapter Two.

8.3 N.P. Systems Design

8.3.1. The design of the N.P. project treatments was based upon the police systems analysis which is summarised at Figure 4.3. The design of the treatments is considered here in the context of the 'change target' in the macro model of change (Section 5.5) The change target is suggested to consist of three generic groups of targets, namely, structures, systems and culture.

8.3.2. Changes to structures and systems essentially involved designing alterations to existing police operational structures (Section 5.7) and standard operating procedures (Systems - Section 5.8) that were considered most appropriate for achieving the N.P. strategic aims. (Section 2.7)

8.3.3. A number of police system models were studied in order to determine whether existing and tested processes and structures might be appropriate to co-ordinate together within the overall N.P. system concept. Having achieved this, the basic N.P. model was developed and the various treatments specified. (Chapter Four)

8.3.4. It was acknowledged at the time, (Hart 1981, Beckett 1981) and has subsequently been restated, that there was little within the N.P. project treatments (systems or structures) that was in itself new or radical. (Turner 1987 [a], Irving et al 1989) The significant difference was that a range of policing 'best practice' procedures had been incorporated into and specified as a unified policing system. Each treatment being

designed to co-ordinate and harmonise with every other, and all directed towards the achievement of specified and common N.P. goals. *(ibid.)*

8.3.5. There were two propositions that underscored the development of the design of the N.P. system:

    i. the project treatments sought to preserve and build upon the most successful existing practices where these corresponded with the N.P. aims,

    ii. every policing division and every policing environment was different from every other, in some significant respect. Therefore local officers would need to adapt the basic project treatments to suit local conditions, within the overall systemic project principles and framework.

8.3.6. On the basis of the foregoing principles, it was accepted by the Commissioner, the Chief Constable of Surrey and the Police Foundation that the N.P. trial should proceed. A brief account of parts of this decision making processes given by Irving. (1989 et al)

8.3.7. It is acknowledged that there may be many unknown reasons why it was considered appropriate to proceed with the N.P. trial and it is also acknowledged that the Scarman Inquiry (1981) report was known to be exerting pressure on the Commissioner of the Metropolitan police in particular, to review policing methods. (Paragraph 2.20.5)

8.3.8. It is argued here that despite the pressures on the police decision makers to instigate change, if in the opinion of these individuals and their advisors, the design of the N.P. structures and systems had been so deeply flawed as to be unrealistic or unrealisable, the project would not have proceeded unaltered. The N.P. project could have been conveniently ignored and other initiatives developed, if they

had not seen that the treatments themselves, or the system design was unlikely to realise any benefits.

8.3.9.   It is therefore concluded that the N.P. design, at minimum, was seen to have the potential to change the various experimental conditions to some extent.

8.3.10. It should be noted at this stage, but the point is discussed later, (Section 8.5) that Turner (1987[a] pg. 30) disagrees with this proposition. He states without citing supporting evidence,

> "Most of the (N.P.) elements can be expected to have only a very small (if any) impact themselves on the state of crime, or the views of the general public."

8.3.11. It is also worthy of note, that the results of the more recent, national public survey, commissioned as part of the Operational Policing Review (O.P.R. 1990 Sect. 4 - Harris Research/M.P.S.) indicate that Turner's above assertion is wholly incorrect. i.e.

> "The public have a very strong preference for the caring community style of policing....There is no disagreement about what the priorities should be and the public fully support the law enforcement role, but would wish to see it implemented by the officer who involves himself with the community and uses discretion." (O.P.R. 1990 pg. 8)

8.3.12. The feature of the macro model of change that is acknowledged as not being fully considered during the design stage of the N.P. treatments was that of the police organisational culture. (Section 5.6)

8.3.13. It was considered by the N.P. authors and others, that the implementation of systems, procedures and structures that were designed to bring about altered patterns of work, would gradually lead to changes in the attitudes of those involved, i.e. behaviour change preceding attitude (cultural) change. (Kakabadse et al 1987) However, this was shown

to be far from the case. (Irving et al 1989) The police operational culture proving to be resistant to rapid change, despite alterations to working practices.

8.3.14. Irving et al (1989) provides a good deal of anecdotal evidence from Notting Hill, that police officers were slow to accept the necessity for the N.P. changes, despite changes to their day to day routines and procedures. In some instances, the changes being actively undermined and resisted.

8.3.15. From the highest levels of both the Metropolitan Police and the Surrey Constabulary, the management attitude to implementing change was that if working practices had to alter, then it would be sufficient to implement the structural and systems changes and everything else would follow. Such was the predominant style of police management at that time. (Reiner 1991) This style being characterised by a tendency towards promoting autocratic personalities and the creation of mechanistic processes. This style contrasts to the more participative, less mechanistic and organic procedures that are common in the police service today.

8.3.16. Training in the new procedures and structures for N.P. was provided, (Section 4.13) although it was not anticipated that this would necessarily be effective in changing attitudes. Rather it was intended to stimulate an interest and awareness of the N.P. system, whilst being persuasive in style. The evaluations indicated this to be the case. (Irving et al 1989, Turner 1987[a]) It should be noted however, that both evaluations are critical of the quantity, scope and potential achievements the training provided for the N.P. system; but not the inclusion of the training processes in the N.P. design. (Section 4.13)

8.3.17. It has been argued that the strength of the police operational and management culture to resist the N.P. changes was apparently not appreciated by the most senior decision

makers, or the N.P. project team. (Section 6.6) It had been considered by the authors that the progressive changes of the N.P. system would gradually create a climate of acceptance. In fact it was originally asserted that a radical approach was not necessary. (Section 2.6)

8.3.18. Nothing could have been further from the truth. The operational (relief) culture in both the Metropolitan Police and the Surrey Constabulary remained strongly resistant to the implementation of the changes, despite the eventual certainty that N.P. was the required corporate style of policing. *"It was right* (of the N.P. authors) *to identify the relief culture as an obstacle to organisational change..."* (Irving et al 1989 pg. 202)

8.3.19. There is no basis from which to speculate as to which of the personal or group resistance strategies described at Sections 6.8 to 6.10 were predominant amongst those divisional officers involved. Suffice to say, that it is probable that all, either individually or collectively, were adopted either deliberately, or unconsciously by a large number of officers at many levels involved in the N.P. change process.

8.3.20. From the basis of the two propositions at Paragraph 8.3.5. it is difficult to propose that it was the N.P. treatments and system that created the resistance to change. The N.P. treatments themselves were little more, in most instances, than extensions of existing police practices and were widely recognised as such. Additionally, local officers had the opportunity to refine and adapt the treatments to suit local conditions.

8.3.21. The significant difference of the N.P. project was that the individual treatments, instead of being applied in isolation as hitherto, were integrated into an overall, systematic policing scheme.(Section 2.16) It was this integration that was claimed by the authors to offer the best opportunity of tackling contemporary policing problems, without applying

substantial additional resources. (Section 2.4, Hart 1981, Beckett 1981)

8.3.22. Irving et al (1989 pg. ix) comments that it was this synthesis directed at producing an integrated policing strategy amounting to "...a complete (policing) system..." that was the "...major innovation." of N.P.

8.3.23. The implication being that it was the overall design of N.P. that was seen as the 'major innovation' that was worth pursuing by way of trials. It may argued from this basis, and the assertion that there was little that was radically new within the N.P. treatments, that it was not the N.P. treatments, or N.P. system design, that stimulated the resistance to change by operational officers, but other factors or conditions.

8.3.24. In other words, it may be that the officers would have resisted any change that threatened to disrupt existing working practices and thus the work group culture. The security of existing practices and being seen by some officers as necessary for personal safety when working in a policing environment perceived as threatening and hostile.

8.3.25. Following the evaluation of the N.P. trial at Notting Hill, Irving et al (1989) report a different attitude towards the holistic and integrative nature of N.P. It is argued by these evaluators that systems analysis is "...primarily used for tackling mathematically determinate relations between variables." and thus used in the context of N.P. "...lends a deterministic air to complex arguments which are highly probabilistic." (pg. 188) This assertion is made despite the cautions within the N.P. text that the systems models of N.P. are not descriptions of reality, but a means of structuring the elements and relationships involved. Irving's argument then continues, that in a situation that is as inherently complex as policing, where great "...political value is placed in rendering the complexity comprehensible and

manageable...", the models become *"...articles of faith, ways of dealing with the world."* (*ibid.* pg. 188) Checkland and Scholes (1990 pg. 309) address this concern, but in so doing, highlight what seems to be Irving's misunderstanding, or avoidance of the purpose of such models, *" ...the models are not models of real world activity, they are models relevant to debating it."*

8.3.26. Irving 's arguments do not criticise the N.P. system design in itself, but rather infer that the analysis used to arrive at the design was inappropriate. This being argued as the case, because the considerable complexity of the social and social-psychological processes involved in police/public interactions were modelled in a such a way as to make the complexity more manageable. (i.e. Figure 3.5)

8.3.27. This deduction, although arguably rational from a social science perspective is not seen by some as a prerequisite for a satisfactory system design. Checkland and Scholes (1990) describe a methodology for transferring concepts of *"human activity systems"* (pg. 309) into models of *"perceived reality"* (pg. 306) and then into *"real world action".* (pg. 289)

8.3.28. In a similar vein, Hitchins (1992 pg. 46) suggests that despite the complexity of human behaviours, *"It seems likely that human behaviour is reasonably predictable given an understanding of the situation, environment culture and pre-cursor events."* Precisely the argument originally advanced by the N.P. authors. (Section 3.16)

8.3.29. It is argued here that although Irving et al (1989) make it clear that they are uncomfortable with the application of systems analysis to 'soft system problems' (Checkland 1981) they present no evidence, other than opinion, to support their assertions. More compellingly however, they do not point to any features of either the N.P. treatments, or system

design, that they consider to be inappropriate having regard to the design aims.

8.3.30. In fact despite the overall negative assessments of the Notting Hill trial it is reported that:

> *"The logic of the system linking demand control, geographic responsibility and directed patrol has not been dented by this attempt at implementation."* (Irving et al 1989 pg. 208)

8.3.31. They do however advance some persuasive evidence and arguments as to why some of the treatments were not as successful as anticipated, i.e. the N.P. training, pro-social modelling by police.

8.3.32. In contrast however, Turner (1987) does not mention the phenomena of organisational culture and the difficulties that it might present to the change process, he concludes:

> *"The changes intended in procedures, attitudes and behaviour, were too great to be brought about by training, persuasion and edict."* (Turner 1987 [a] pg. 30)

8.3.33. From this observation it is difficult to appreciate how Turner envisages that any significant organisational change might be achieved.

8.3.34. It is argued therefore that the N.P. system design, based upon an accurate analysis, potentially possessed the necessary attributes to realise the projected benefits of the scheme if fully and satisfactorily implemented.

8.4 N.P. Systems Implementation

8.4.1. It has been argued above that both the systems analysis and systems design of the N.P. treatments are considered appropriate to the N.P. 'problem situation'. (Checkland 1972

and Section 2.6) This being accepted as the case, it follows from the macro model of change (Figure 5.1, Section 5.9) that the remaining issue that might explain the outcomes, would be that of the project implementation. The means by which the actual changes were brought about.

8.4.2. Explanations have been advanced why N.P. was designed by the authors as a complete system of policing , who as serving police officers, were themselves, potential users of the system. It has also been shown that N.P., although the work of two individuals, was largely a synthesis of many well established and conventional police practices.

8.4.3. In fact, N.P. drew from a great many reliable and informed sources, as well as from accounts of previous policing 'experiments'. (i.e. Keeton 1975, Critchley 1978, Whitaker 1979, Alderson 1979) The authors made a number of study visits to police divisions throughout the country and were personally advised by some of the most senior and experienced police officers in the U.K. both in command of police forces and at the Police Staff College, Bramshill. (i.e. Sir Peter Matthews, Sir Kenneth Newman, Brian Hayes, Maurice Buck, John Alderson et al)

8.4.4. However, despite this level of analysis, experience and the reliance upon established thinking, N.P. in its original form, lacked the input of the eventual operational users of the system at the locations where the trial scheme was to be implemented.

8.4.5. At Section 2.20 it has been shown that N.P. was seen at the most senior levels of The Metropolitan Police and Surrey Constabulary as a new approach to policing with the potential to improve policing services that were the subject of public criticism. *(ibid.)*

8.4.6. It may be suggested therefore that there was a high level organisational emphasis towards action in implementing N.P. rather than in undertaking further development. This is a point strongly made by Irving et al (1989) in respect of N.P. and generally reinforced by Beckhard and Harris (1987 pg. 116) who state:

> *"One of the biggest traps for large-system change efforts is the failure of organisational leaders to resist the temptation to rush through the planning process to get to the 'action' stage."*

(Interestingly, this contrasts with Checkland's view that it is tempting for managers of change to linger in the intellectual and modelling processes of change planning, rather than to engage the practical difficulties of actually bringing about change in the real world.(Checkland and Scholes 1990)

8.4.7. It is further suggested that the need to implement N.P. however, only existed at the highest levels in the police organisations concerned. At intermediate management levels, (divisional and district command) and operational levels, there is little evidence to suggest that such changes would either be seen as welcome or necessary.

8.4.8. The attitude of the majority of operational police officers was that they were in some way set apart from the bulk of society. Whitacker (1979) They saw themselves as law enforcers, engaged in a relentless struggle against an increasing wave of criminality and public disorder. (Smith 1983[b])

8.4.9. The police task, and the training for it was understood by most officers as providing protection through law enforcement for a society that was experiencing steadily increasing levels of crime and disorder. The major role was seen in straightforward terms, being that of bringing offenders to justice. (Whitacker 1979, Smith 1983 [b])

8.4.10. It may be argued therefore that the police possessed a set of informal organisational values and a culture that had developed to resist moving with social trends. Such social trends being perceived by the police to be encouraging lawlessness and anti-social behaviour. (i.e. Scarman 1981)

8.4.11. Additionally, it is argued that the police culture was not only highly resistant to internal change at the operational level, (Section 8.3) but similarly resistant to change at intermediate levels, which is suggested to arise from a learned resistance to external pressures to change. Scarman (1981 pg. 60) addressed this point, finding evidence to describe police of all ranks in London as *"...unimaginative and inflexible in their relationships with the community....and in the methods of policing they adopted."*

8.4.12. This situation is similar to that described by Carnall (1990 pg. 112) who stereotypes the culture of such organisations as characterised by *"...stability, prescription, rules, standards..."* Carnall suggests that such cultures can exist and be very efficient in a stable environment, but are inappropriate in a turbulent environment.

8.4.13. It was suggested at Section 2.2. that the policing environment of the early 1980s was highly turbulent, resulting in London in the Brixton disorders and the subsequent Scarman (1981) inquiry and report. This report was to give an impetus to many radical changes in policing nationally, as well as the Metropolitan Police that had been the focus of attention during the inquiry (*ibid.*)

8.4.14. The high level decision to implement N.P. did not seem to take account of a police culture with 'stable characteristics' and an environment with 'turbulent characteristics'. If this mismatch had been recognised, the need for widespread communication of the necessity for rapid change would perhaps have been undertaken.

8.4.15. Internal communication addressing the need to change was not seen as a priority. The development of a culture that was supportive of the need to change was certainly not promulgated throughout the Service at that time. This is surprising in the light of the highly publicised Scarman report in November 1981 and later, the report of the Policy Studies Institute who were critical of many aspects of policing in London. (Smith et al 1983) Both reports focused on specific features of policing in London that needed to be changed, many of which were already incorporated within the N.P. project.

8.4.16. It is significant to note, in relation to the level of resistance to change in the police culture, that nearly ten years later, the Operational Policing Review (O.P.R. 1990) drew attention to similar distinctions between the views of the public and the police in relation to the police role. The police were reported as continuing to see their role as predominantly reactive, law enforcers, whilst the public have a strong preference for a 'caring, community oriented style' of policing. The O.P.R. did however report that there was now (1990) little distinction between police and public views as to priorities for police, which is an alteration since the analysis stages of N.P.

8.4.17. The desirability of communicating to the organisation, the need for change prior to implementation of N.P. was recognised by the project team. This was undertaken through individual presentations, seminars and classroom training at the divisions who were to implement the trial of N.P. Other groups at both operational and management levels were recipients of N.P. presentations, if they were considered to be significant to the progress of the project. (Irving et al 1989, Stapley 1986) A significant comment is made by Irving et al in this respect, (ibid. pg. 202) that the senior members of the project team were *"...too busy....selling it* (N.P.) *to the organisation to provide on-line, technical support to each site..."*

8.4.18. The communication of the need to change was coupled with the outline description of the N.P. principles and treatments. It was a part of the implementation strategy that each division would refine and modify the basic N.P. treatments to suit local conditions and implement their own adaptations. (Sections 2.7 - 2.9) Provided that the basic principles of N.P. were adopted and followed, this approach was seen as capable of achieving a balance between a pre-determined package of changes and local innovation.

8.4.19. The detailed, pre-specified package approach was considered by the authors to be too prescriptive in character and unlikely to be accepted by local managers. Uncontrolled local creativity and innovation however, was seen as appropriate to secure the necessary 'ownership' for changes, but carried unacceptable risks of changes being made in an inappropriate direction, that would be difficult to subsequently alter.

8.4.20. A similar distinction is described by Hersey and Blanchard. (1972) between *"coerced change"* and *"participative change"* They suggest a that coerced change cycle is fast in terms of implementation effect, but that the change will only be maintained as long as the leader is in a position to exercise influence. Whereas a participative implementation cycle, is slower and evolutionary, but is likely to be long lasting, since those involved will be highly committed to the change. (Kirkpatrick 1985)

8.4.21. The resulting dilemmas for implementing large changes in police systems are summarised in the matrix model at Figure 8.1.

		STABLE and CLOSED	DYNAMIC and OPEN
Environmental Characteristics	**SLOW to CHANGE**	PARTICIPATIVE and SLOW	PARTICIPATIVE and SLOW or COERCIVE and FAST
	TURBULENT	COERCIVE and FAST	COERCIVE and FAST developing into PARTICIPATIVE and FAST

Figure 8.1   Police Organisational and Environmental
Characteristics Associated with
Styles of Change Implementation

8.4.22. Figure 8.1. relates groups of stable and dynamic characteristics of police organisations to static and turbulent characteristics of their environments. Each cell of the matrix suggests the type and corresponding speed of the most appropriate implementation style.

8.4.23. It is argued that the model shows the limited opportunity for adopting wholly participative methods for change implementation in police organisations. It has been argued that police organisations operating during the early 1980s

were predominantly stable and closed in character, whilst their human and physical environments were turbulent. (Sections 2.2 - 4 and 5.2)

8.4.24. The first cell of the top row in Figure 8.1 indicates that a participative approach to implementation would be appropriate where a 'slow to change' environment is partially interacting with an organisation with stable and closed characteristics. Here a police organisation would have the opportunity to begin consultation with both public and staff, develop and refine options and then implement the most appropriate solution(s), confident in the knowledge that the environmental characteristics would remain largely unchanged, or only changing slowly, during the change process. During this process, the N.P. experience suggests that the organisation would become progressively more open and move towards the second cell of the top row.

8.4.25. A police organisation with dynamic and open characteristics, operating in a 'slow to change' environment, could adopt either approach, or a combination of both. Here, the predominantly static environment would tolerate either type of change implementation, either participative and slow or coercive and fast, provided the police system output remained appropriate and did not conflict with environmental factors in any inappropriate, or negative way.

8.4.26. For instance, the sudden and unexplained change (closed characteristic) to the enforcement policy of minor regulations where previously only discretionary enforcement had applied, (open characteristic) i.e. parking enforcement in residential roads. Such a change in the police output would be likely to attract criticism and consequently a reduction in support for police in other activities. (In such circumstances, the benefit of the tactic would have to be weighed against the potential dysbenefits.) Whereas, such a change might be achieved after first ensuring those to be affected were aware of say, the injury accident risk caused by the parking.

This straightforward example illustrates the more complex issue, that changes in police output might be achieved quickly and inappropriately or slowly and satisfactorily in a relatively 'slow to change environment.'

8.4.27. A slow and participative process of change may be seen as a particular type of an evolutionary approach to change. (Kirkpatrick 1985) The participative model providing a gradual and progressive approach to change, whereas the coercive model would be more likely to produce a series of more abrupt changes. Section 5.9 provides models of implementation methods and Figure 5.13 suggests some non linear variations of this concept.

8.4.28. It has been argued here, (Section 2.2) by Alderson, (1979) and others that police organisations exist within highly turbulent human and physical environments. This situation is represented by the lower row of Figure 8.1.

8.4.29. If a police organisation tended towards closed characteristics, as has been suggested was typical in the 1970s and early 1980s, (Sections 2.2 and 5.2) then the organisation would be resistant to many changes stimulated from the human policing environment. (Section 5.4) It follows therefore that internal participative and evolutionary processes would not be effective in developing changes arising from such stimuli. Rather it is suggested that such a police organisation could become introspective and self serving by virtue of the process of the perpetuation of culture described at Figure 5.4.

8.4.30. When the stimuli for change accumulated to a level that could no longer be resisted by the organisation, the pressure to change would be likely to be high, requiring immediate improvements. Therefore, the implementation style would need to be coercive and fast, despite the consequential dangers of hostility and animosity from affected staff. It is suggested that a broadly similar situation

faced the Metropolitan Police in the aftermath of the publication of the Scarman (1981) report. Change having been avoided for a sufficiently long period, that the resistance strategies had been internalised into the cultures of the operational and intermediate management levels. (Sections 5.6 and 6.4 - 9)

8.4.31. The second cell of the lower row in Figure 8.1. represents the situation where a dynamic and open organisation interacts with a turbulent environment. Here it is suggested that in order to create the first changes to make an organisation more responsive to environmental factors, a fast and coercive change implementation style would be appropriate. Such a style would be necessary in order to rapidly reflect changing environmental needs within an appropriate time scale.

8.4.32. It is suggested that a participative style would militate against an initial change occurring, that was sufficiently rapid to allow the organisation to retain open characteristics. It has been argued that participative change frequently involves a longer period for implementation than alternatives. Therefore it is suggested that the elapsed time necessary for an effective participatory process to take place, would prevent the organisation from accurately reflecting the environmental inputs. Effectively then, the organisation would be displaying closed characteristics, the changes occurring as a result of internal, rather than external stimuli.

8.4.33. Hitchins (1992 pg. 239) relates this situation to a commercial case:

> "...there is a need to overcome the natural resistance to change within a company, and its inertia must be balanced against the rate of change essential to catch up with the market."

8.4.34. In a police context, if the organisation's inertia regularly prevented it from 'catching up' with the expectations of the human environment, (its market) then it would effectively be a closed police system and thus not meet the N.P. criteria.

8.4.35. It may be proposed as possible though, for such an organisation to develop a change culture that would anticipate change as the normal state of affairs. An organisation with these characteristics might develop participative procedures after significant coercive changes have altered both the degree of openness and the internal responsiveness of staff.

8.4.36. The aim being to develop both staff and systems to a point where participative change procedures operate at a speed appropriate to the environment and the goals of the organisation. In the ideal situation the organisation would be predicting the likely future changes and planning internal action for those eventualities. (Pedlar et al 1991)

8.4.37. Such an organisation would be similar to that characterised and described as the *"learning organisation"* by Senge. (1990) A dynamic organisation in an open relationship with its environment incorporating human and physical systems that are designed to promote continual development and adaptation.

8.4.38. Hitchins (1992) describes a practical means of achieving the necessary communication, co-ordination and change evolution through a 'change management system'. Such a system, similar to that envisaged by the N.P. design, would continually monitor the environmental change stimuli and co-ordinate the organisations response through all functions and levels.

8.4.39. Hitchins (1992) suggests that the change management system would be essentially human in nature, but it is further suggested here that the most significant feature of a change management system in an open organisation, would be teams, as opposed to individuals.

8.4.40. The advantages and disadvantages of project and management teams as change implementors are discussed at Section 7.12 and it is concluded that teams provide the most reliable structure for progressing organisational change in police organisations. As Katzenbach and Smith (1993 pg. 195) express the strength of the advantages, "Teams and major change, an inevitable combination."

8.4.41. It is asserted by Katzenbach and Smith (1993) that teams play a critical role in the implementation of major change in organisations. They state that "...every single major change effort we know about has depended on teams." (pg. 211) Others show (i.e. Kast and Rosenzweig 1981, Tyson and Jackson 1992) that teams of managers and operational staff in open organisations need to learn about the business of the organisation and the environment in which it operates in order to be successful. Senge (1990 pg. 10) argues that, "...unless teams can learn, the organisation cannot learn."

8.4.42. Environmental change stimuli affecting police organisations will be significant not only because they will bring about changes to the nature of policing, but also because they will determine how fast changes are implemented. Kirkpatrick (1985) suggests the speed at which change is implemented may be as important as the change itself. He suggests that if resistance to the change is likely to be strong then the change should be implemented slowly. Whereas if staff are eager for change then it should proceed quickly.

8.4.43. However, this proposition ignores a significant feature of the nature of change to police organisations. Major changes to police systems may be stimulated from the environment

(Figure 5.2) that necessitate sudden, internal organisational change, despite the views of staff. (i.e. changes in legislation, legal procedures, trends in crime and disorder e.g. police officers having to work a higher number of anti-social hours in order to address a particular problem) Policing is a publicly and legally accountable public service and has no modern or historical remit to exist, or to organise itself in defiance of lawful government, or public wishes. (Critchley 1978)

8.4.44. It is argued that external stimuli created a growing pressure to change police practices during the 1970s which culminated in London with the Brixton disorders in 1981, and resulted in the Scarman (1981) report. Thus, the situation being faced during 1981 and 1982 by the police generally, the Metropolitan Police in particular, and hence the N.P. project team, is suggested to be characterised by the following interrelated factors:

i. a growing environmental pressure on the police to be more responsive to public wishes, needs and priorities,

ii. police organisations at this time exhibited predominantly closed characteristics,

iii. the police culture and individuals were resistant to change,

iv. the Brixton disorders and the Scarman report *(ibid.)* provided the 'trigger' for sudden major change.

8.4.45. Whilst the significance of the 'trigger' situation was appreciated by the most senior decision makers of the police, it is suggested that it was not appreciated by the majority of operational officers and their managers who largely considered that they could continue as before. (Smith et al 1983)

353

8.4.46. It is argued therefore that the implementation of the N.P. project was undertaken against a culture characterised by a substantial resistance to change at all, but the most senior levels of the police service.

8.4.47. Irving et al (1989) does not tackle this proposition specifically as an organisational cultural issue, but does make reference to the very strong culture that existed at a uniform operational (relief) level. (Paragraph 4.9.8, Sections 5.6, 6.5,) Irving does however provide a number of specific examples of both organisational and individual resistance to the N.P. project that lend support to this argument, i.e.

> "Senior officers at Scotland Yard gave it (N.P.) a feint blessing... ", (pg. 204) "...implementation of any element of N.P.....(involved)....selling the plan often against fairly entrenched opposition..." (pg. 207)

8.4.48. It is concluded therefore that the methods of change implementation for the N.P. project were not sufficiently thorough and robust to overcome the widespread cultural resistance. The need to change was not effectively communicated by the most senior officers of the Service, with the result that intermediate levels of management could argue they were unsure of what was required.

8.4.49. A small project team operating outside the principal line management of such large organisations was unlikely to influence such strongly entrenched cultures, without the assertive and effective communication of senior and intermediate level management support.

8.5   N.P. Evaluations

8.5.1.   Smith (1981 pg. 266) describes a concept of 'meta-evaluation' as being an *"evaluation of evaluations   or evaluators"*, undertaken in order to understand and improve the practice   of evaluations. He suggests a number of methods for conducting such meta-evaluations ranging from rigorous secondary   data analysis   studies, through to comparatively informal and unstructured methods, such as public review and criticism.

8.5.2.   It is intended here, to   undertake   a brief   meta-evaluation by means of a review of the evaluator's approaches,   (Smith 1981) in the   context of the N.P. project's   aims   and methods. It will be argued that the methodologies of the N.P. evaluators, whilst providing a degree of insight to   the N.P. treatments and behavioural hypotheses (Section 3.15), did not address the overall N. P. system level factors. (Macro evaluation concepts, Section 3.5 - 8)

8.5.3.   It has been shown in Paragraph 8.2.5 that the N.P. project attracted some recognition and acclaim for the integrative and   holistic properties of the policing system design. Yet it is   these attributes, that were not addressed by   any of the evaluations. (Section 8.3 and Figure 3.3) It will be   argued that this amounts to a partial   explanation as to why many of the N.P. treatments are now   well established policing practice despite the largely negative evaluations[1] within the N.P. experimental context.

8.5.4.   The evaluation of wide ranging organisational change projects such as N.P.   will almost certainly present those undertaking the   assessments with problems and dilemmas. Both Irving et al (1989) and Turner (1987) as the leading independent evaluators, both make reference to   a number of problems   and difficulties they   encountered. Irving

---

[1]The exception being Brixton Division, Turner 1987[d], Beckett 1989.

regularly criticises the lack of precision and definition of the N.P. treatments, whilst Turner's major complaint is that N.P. was a systematic and integrated project that did not allow him and his team to isolate the effect of one treatment from another.

8.5.5. Both the above examples amount to genuine and legitimate difficulties for the N.P. evaluators to overcome. It is suggested however that these difficulties are neither original or unique. It is proposed that similar problems would be encountered in evaluating any major organisational change programme based upon systemic and systematic principles.

8.5.6. It has been established that staff participation in organisational change programmes is highly desirable if high levels of resistance to the changes are to be avoided. (Kirkpatrick 1985, Carnall 1990 et al)

8.5.7. Further, many writers have described the benefits of the systems approaches to organisational change. (Beckhard and Harris 1987, Porras 1987, Senge 1990 et al) It is probable therefore that attempts to evaluate change programmes that incorporate the foregoing principles will encounter similar problems to those of the N.P evaluators.

8.5.8. This does not imply however, that organisational change programmes should be altered to suite existing evaluation methods or evaluators. Rather, it seems more appropriate that evaluation methods should be devised that enable such complex change programmes to be assessed holistically. This being acknowledged as more straightforward where there is a single overall unit of measurement and straightforward success criteria. Such measurement criteria being more common in commercial, as opposed to police organisations i.e. measurement by units of money with well defined success criteria, such as

profit levels, and other leading indicators of commercial success e.g. return on capital, share growth and dividend.

8.5.9.   In policing however, measurement and success criteria are varied, imprecise and difficult to quantify, making the task complicated for both manager and evaluator. (O.P.R. 1990) This difficulty is developed and illustrated at Figures 8.2 (i-iii) where the major organisational characteristics of commercial and police organisations are compared.

8.5.10. It was argued at Section 7.5 that many of the incentives and motivators available to commercial organisations when implementing change are not similarly available to, or feasible for use within police organisations. In making distinctions between the characteristics of commercial and police organisations, the tables at Figures 8.2 (i-iii) reinforce this proposition, as well as illustrating the features of similarity and contrast that are significant to evaluation of change processes.

8.5.11. The tables are not intended to be exhaustive, either in relation to organisational characteristics, or the suggested contrasting features in each cell. In making generalisations of this type, exceptions are likely that do not correspond to either type of organisational profile. Similarly, there will be commercial organisations that are very close to the police in terms of many of the suggested characteristics. Conversely there are characteristics of every police organisation that are very distinct from the majority of commercial organisations i.e. purpose, values, resources.

ORGANISATIONAL CHARACTERISTIC	COMMERCIAL ORGANISATION	POLICE ORGANISATION
Purpose	Mission is usually fixed and clear - set internally by the owners and/or the organisation itself	Mission is often partially obscure and variable - set by government, the law and the public
Values	Ambitious and competitive may be possessive and acquisitive	Altruistic and non-competitive, corporate ethics based on fairness, integrity and truth
Size	May be large or small, growth may often be a major goal and contraction unavoidable	Comparatively large and generally stable, with only marginal expansion or contraction
Formalisation of activities	May be formal or informal in structure and culture - mechanistic or organic in style	Invariably formal in structure, hierarchy and culture - tends towards mechanistic and bureaucratic in style
Co-ordination	Multiple means, either formal and/or informal	Primarily through hierarchical structures, with well defined and standardised administrative and operating procedures

Figure 8.2 (i)   Comparative table of Police and Commercial Organisational Characteristics

ORGANISATIONAL CHARACTERISTIC	COMMERCIAL ORGANISATION	POLICE ORGANISATION
Source of authority	Self promotion of knowledge, skills and expertise	Primarily legal, based on common law, with publicly recognised expertise/experience
Procedures and rules	May be few and general, unwritten and unspecified. May also be highly regulated	Always many, specific and formal, arising from procedural legislation, statutory regulations and need for operational consistency
Openness to environmental influences	Usually adaptive to customers needs and market forces	Always required to cope with uncertainty and reflect public priorities, whilst preserving ethical values and relying on precedent
Structure	May be tall or flat, adaptive and flexible	Always tall, hierarchical and virtually static
Management	Volatile and adaptive, often with movement between competitors dismissals and redundancies not uncommon	Secure and career based, frequently within a single organisation - dismissals and redundancies exceptional

Figure 8.2 (ii)   Comparative table of Police and Commercial Organisational Characteristics

ORGANISATIONAL CHARACTERISTIC	COMMERCIAL ORGANISATION	POLICE ORGANISATION
Measurement	Clarity of objective(s) and success criteria, usually measured by units of money	Multiple and diverse objectives, with unclear success criteria, measured by both quantitative and qualitative indicators
Resources	Assets publicly or privately owned, capital may be invested and borrowed, assets sold or acquired	Always publicly owned, cannot benefit from sale of assets, may not borrow or invest capital
Accountability	To owner(s), shareholders or partners	To the public, the law and the government
Differentiation of activities	All activities eventually contributing to single goal - may involve some risk as to outcome	Many activities contributing to diverse goals, but risk aversive at organisational level
Operation	May be confined to a single location during a conventional working week and/or multiple times/locations - operations controlled by management	Always twenty-four hours, every day, throughout multiple locations - operations frequently outside management control and determined by reactions to events

Figure 8.2 (iii)   Comparative Table of Police and Commercial Organisational Characteristics

8.5.12. It may be argued that if N.P. had been specified in the degree of detail that Irving would have preferred, then it is probable there would have been little opportunity to reflect local staff preferences and variations into the scheme. It being a fundamental principal of N.P. that local policing should reflect local needs. (Section 2.8). Therefore adherence to one of the fundamental principles of the project, created a problem for the evaluators, in that it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of any change if the aim is not specified in sufficient detail at the outset.

8.5.13. Variations that occur during the development of changes at a local level may alter the target, and thus the outcome of the change. If the evaluation process does not recognise and take account of such dynamics, then it is possible that the change will be reported as unsuccessful, in that it did not meet the original aim. The temptation it seems, is for the evaluators to concentrate upon the process towards the specified change, rather than the outcome of the change itself.

8.5.14. This may be illustrated in the N.P. project by reference to the establishing of a system of geographic assignments for officers. The precise method of achieving such a system was not specified, although various models were supplied by the project team. The N.P. evaluators and Turner (1987) in particular consider this change to be an aim, or end, in itself. Whereas the N.P. authors clearly state that police geographic assignments are the means by which greater community contact might be achieved. The method for doing so, being less significant, and obviating the need and the desirability for detailed specification.

8.5.15. Likewise, Turner's complains, that it was not possible to isolate and assesses the effect of the N.P. treatments with the degree of rigour he would have preferred, was due to the integrated nature of the N.P. system. Again, this feature was a fundamental principle of the N.P. project, in that each

of the treatments were associated together in such a way that benefits would accrue through the integration and the harmonisation of the N.P. sub-systems. (Section 2.16)

8.5.16. If the N.P. system had been re-designed and altered in order to relieve these two major difficulties for the evaluators, it is argued that the systematic characteristics of the project would have been lost. At minimum, the project would have been changed so significantly, that the projected benefits of N.P. would not have been achievable as originally suggested

8.5.17. In such an event, N.P. would have consisted of a set of detailed specifications of 'best practice', defined by individuals who were not responsible or accountable for the operations or outcomes of the treatments. Implementation of the 'best practice' would then have implied a sequence of changes, separated through time, or test location, in order that each change could be independent of every other for evaluation purposes.

8.5.18. By such means the evaluators problems might have been addressed in part through the project design. However, as shown at Chapter Three, there are considerable difficulties associated with holding a control site independent and free of the confounding effects of normal organisational dynamics. Turner's (1978[a] pg. 31) suggestion that *"...control sites should invariably be used for comparison"* indicates that he considers the process of evaluation to be more significant than the process of making effective changes. This conclusion being determined after the earlier N.P. experience of attempting such an evaluation model (Section 3.2)

8.5.19. The view expressed by Turner *(ibid.)* on the nature of evaluations and the associated constrained view of organisational development (Section 4.15) coincides with

Easterby -Smith's (1994) categorisation of assumptions made by evaluators.

8.5.20. Easterby-Smith (1994) draws a distinction between two types of approaches by evaluators:

  i. the *"agency view"*, concentrates on individual members of the organisation achieving their aims and aspirations for change; the considered view of these evaluators is that in order to achieve change in social systems, it is necessary to dismantle existing social and organisational structures and create new systems,

  ii. the *"determinism view"*, in contrast, is the position adopted by those whose assumed wish is to preserve the *status quo* - i.e. what takes place in organisations is largely determined beforehand and is constrained by roles, hierarchies and structures

8.5.21. This distinction is significant to the N.P. evaluation process as Easterby-Smith *(ibid.)* associates determinism with a consensus view of an organisation's decision making. Thus, it might be rational to assume that if an evaluation is seen as being of high technical quality, then it is more likely to be adopted and used. Whereas a conflict view of the organisation, based on individuals endeavouring to organise and progress change, (the agency view) would see evaluations as a part of an ongoing political process within the organisation or community in question. Easterby-Smith (ibid.) suggests that this is because evaluations are largely about generating or re-generating information and it is likely that as a part of the ongoing political process of the organisation, that evaluations will be *"...dragged into the political arena..."* (pg. 114) despite it seems, their technical quality!

8.5.22. Easterby-Smith qualifies these views in that the technical quality of an evaluation is invariably important to all evaluations. He asserts that being able to demonstrate that a *"...reasonably technical job..."* has been achieved, is an important political advantage, in order to ensure others take notice of the evaluation. It is not unreasonable therefore to suggest the opposite might also apply. If the evaluation is perceived as not being a *"...reasonably technical job..."*, then it becomes difficult for it to achieve recognition within the organisation.

8.5.23. Easterby-Smith (1994 pg. 117) suggests that if evaluations are to be taken seriously within organisations then it is necessary to be aware of how decision makers customarily receive their information. He suggests three categories:

   i. **scientific form** - written reports with quantitative performance indicators and statistical detail,

   ii. **bureaucratic form** - written reports with less reliance on substantiating claims with evidence, but rather demonstrating that the information has come from a perceived correct and legitimate source,

   iii. **anecdotal form** - reports that are not normally written and formal, but rather a part of the natural conversation exchanges between members of the organisation and which address, or reinforce, a particular point of view through enlightening (and *"horrific"*) accounts of experiences.

8.5.24. Thus, solutions to evaluators' problems involving the adoption of evaluator's suggestions, raise the further dilemma for decision makers, of how far an evaluator should become involved in the process that is being evaluated? This particular issue was described as a difficulty by Irving et al (1989) and may well have arisen through the close

proximity between evaluators, the project team and divisional officers at the test locations.

8.5.25. It is suggested that the evaluators had not understood the way in which evaluation information would be accepted and used within the organisation as suggested above. If they had wished to have their work noticed and acted upon, then presumably they would shape and target their reports by one or more of the above means.

8.5.26. In the case of N.P., the evaluators did not construct their work on this basis, or on the basis of skills that would address the features of N.P. that were considered most significant to the organisation. Rather the evaluations were designed and progressed on the bases of the practical and intellectual skills available to the evaluation teams.

8.5.27. Even in a large and comparatively well resourced organisation such as the Metropolitan Police Service, the economic reality of having to adapt existing resources to problems is a common occurrence. No criticism is therefore implied, but the proposition is made that an evaluation of a project such as N.P. will almost invariably reflect the skills of the evaluators and the implicit assumptions they make about the nature of change in social systems and organisations. (Easterby-Smith 1994)

8.5.28. This proposition is especially evident from the work of Turner (1987 [a-d]) who's previous employment was with the Government's Treasury and who reflects a strong cost consciousness throughout his evaluations. A factor that was not addressed by the authors of N.P. in other than in the conceptual sense of organisational efficiency and effectiveness. (Section 3.9)

8.5.29. During the N.P. project, the evaluators needed to work closely alongside the project team and divisional officers to gain the trust of their subjects in order to gather data. The

socialisation of the evaluators into the policing cultures, whilst allowing them to undertake their studies, also inextricably involved them with the project.

8.5.30. The evaluators were therefore very aware of the features of evaluations that would attract attention within police organisations and be seen as legitimate. A dilemma was thus presented for the evaluators as to whether and how they should intervene when the programme being evaluated, provided negative indications. (Irving et al 1989)

8.5.31. An additional dilemma was also presented in that if they decide to intervene and seek an alteration to the project , how should negative assessments be introduced to the organisation without running the risk of having further assessments rejected?

8.5.32. It may be argued to be unethical for evaluators of socially significant systems i.e. policing, education, health care, to remain wholly independent and silent, when the evaluations of such systems are giving negative indications. Bluntly, the outcome of such an evaluation, would be analogous to claiming a surgical operation to be successful when the patient did not recover!

8.5.33. Easterby-Smith (1994) however, demonstrates how such interventions in similar organisational situations could be inappropriate. He argues from the basis that there is a fundamental problem in trying to deduce actions for the future, based only on knowledge of what has taken place. Such as the information that would normally be available to evaluators from a current study. Easterby-Smith (ibid.) quotes Patton; (1978 and 1981) that creative thinking is the only way to bridge the crucial gap between knowledge and action.

8.5.34. On this basis it is argued that it is inappropriate for evaluators to seek to intervene in the direction of change programmes unless there are major public safety or ethical issues at stake. It is also argued that it is equally inappropriate on the basis of this rationale for evaluators to assess the creative thinking that produces the momentum for change by recourse to inappropriate methodologies and arguably invalid measures.

8.5.35. For instance, the police attitude data gathered by Irving and Turner *(ibid.)* that indicates some of the N.P. treatments were not welcomed by operational officers. This might have been an expected outcome, given knowledge of the police culture in relation to change. (Chapter Four and Section 5.6) It is suggested that this evaluation result does not indicate or support the assertion that the changes were either inappropriate or unnecessary as the evaluation methods used are argued to be largely invalid. Again, bluntly, the situation is analogous to using a thermometer to measure distance!

8.5.36. In the case of the N.P. project it is argued that the lengthy and expensive evaluations (Irving et al 1989, Turner 1987 [a-d]) together with the evaluators' recommendations were largely ignored by both the Metropolitan and Surrey Police for the following reasons, derived from the preceding meta-evaluation:

    i. The methodologies (scientific in style) did not conform to the customary means by which the most senior officers of the police service receive their information, (bureaucratic and anecdotal in style)

    ii. The major attraction of N.P. to the senior decision makers was the integrative and holistic approach to policing. (Irving et al 1989) The systematic features and suggested potential benefits of this approach were not addressed by the evaluators, other than by

negative critique of systems and integrative methodologies. (Easterby-Smith 1994 pg. 124) suggests that if evaluators are unable to convince people that:

"...there is something wrong with the present state and make positive suggestions as to how to get started with change, there is unlikely to be much consequence resulting from their efforts.")

iii. The evaluations relied upon methodologies in which the evaluators were skilled, rather than those that would have been most appropriate for a project such as N.P. Irving et al (1989) adopted a sociological, attitudinal and behavioural approach, based principally on limited observational and questionnaire data. In contrast Turner (1987 [a-e]) adopted a reductionist approach which sought to assess and compare the benefits of each of individual N.P. treatments at each test site by questionnaire, reported crime and cost/benefit data *"...without the benefit of any personal field experience..."* and with *"... a certain amount of personal judgement..."* (Turner 1987 [a] pg. 29)

8.5.37. In concluding his assessment of evaluation methods and politics, Easterby-Smith (1994) supports the conclusions of this review of the N.P. evaluations. He found that where the more traditional, experimental research evaluation methods were adopted, such as those used for N.P., the findings were invariably equivocal or negative.

8.5.38. Easterby-Smith (1994) argues that such interventionist styles of evaluation are generally not welcome at policy making levels. He suggests they are likely to have little value there, because the scale of policy decisions are beyond the scope of most evaluators. Precisely so; the N.P. evaluation experience has been shown to have focused on

issues and features of N.P. that were almost wholly subordinate to the organisation's need to implement an accountable and pro-active policing style as envisaged by Scarman (1981) and others.

8.6 The Systems Approach to N.P.

8.6.1. The genesis of N.P. has been described in Chapter Two and it is not necessary to re-visit the decision to adopt Checkland's (1972) methodology for 'real world problem solving'. It was clear to the authors of N.P., and it seems to others, that the more conventional, reductionist approaches to organisational development were not successful in the policing context. (Sections 2.20 and Paragraphs 8.5.6-7)

8.6.2. It has been shown that the integrative and holistic approach of N.P. was seen as a strength by the authors and a weakness by the evaluators. *(ibid.)* A number of decision makers and observers were clearly attracted to the overall, co-ordinated design of the policing system, as well as to some of the central treatments, i.e. geographic responsibility, alignment of duties to demands. (Paragraphs 2.20.9, 8.3.22)

8.6.3. There are therefore two outstanding questions for this research related to the adoption of systems methodologies and techniques.

   i. Whether the systems approach in total or part accounted for what has been described as largely unsuccessful by the external evaluators? (Turner 1987 [a], Irving et al 1989)

   ii. Whether in the light of the N.P. results, systems thinking and the associated methodologies remain an appropriate approach for the analysis and design of policing systems?

8.6.4. The open system concept (Section 2.16, Figure 3.1) applied to police organisations is discussed by Irving et al (1989, pg. 191) who argues that the concept is *"...attractive from a theoretical point of view, but hardly represents the political, psychological or sociological reality."*

8.6.5. Despite his condemnation of the approach, Irving uses the open system concept in order to challenge the appropriateness of adopting a systems approach for the design of policing systems. He describes the issue of the balance of power between police and the community as evidence of this. The thrust of this criticism being that the N.P. thesis did not address the question of a balance of power between the policing environment and the policing system. He saw N.P. as increasing the influence of police to run strongly out from the police system, to the human environment, but that influence not being reciprocated by the community.

8.6.6. Irving et al (1989) specifies a number of police organisational characteristics in support of this argument in order to show, that in systems terminology, policing organisations tend towards a 'closed' organisation model, viz.

    i. a strong police culture that influences police behaviour

    ii. high levels of practical autonomy for senior officers,

    iii. the police disciplinary and complaints system being handled by police themselves,

    iv. the limited power of community representatives and agencies to obtain changes in police operational behaviour.

8.6.7. This was precisely the situation that N.P. sought to correct by implementing treatments that altered the organisational conceptual model from a 'closed' to a more 'open' style. (Section 5.2)

8.6.8. Irving's argument however, seems to have little relevance to a critique of a systems approach, the 'open/closed' organisation model, or systems methodology. Rather the argument has much to do with personal and political views, regarding the influence and accountability of police in the community.

8.6.9. Due to the inclusion of the personal views and values, that when written were high on the national political agenda, it is not possible to precisely determine whether Irving et al (1989) accept or reject the fundamental systems propositions of N.P. (Chapters Two and Three)The fact that Irving's evaluation is not a purely technical account would not be regarded as surprising by Easterby-Smith (1994) who comments *"...how value laden is most evaluation practice."* (pg. 166)

8.6.10. Similarly, Turner (1987 [a-e] does not directly address the N.P. systems propositions. Criticisms are however made that imply a general dissatisfaction with the holistic approaches for organisational change. In summary these are as follows:

> *"Implementation of so many separate elements of change at the same time is impracticable." (ibid.* pg. 30)

> *"Even if it <u>had</u> been practicable, proper evaluation of them would have been impossible , because no satisfactory comparison can be made when more than one change is made at a time." (ibid.* pg. 30)

> *"Experiments should be severely limited in their individual scope. In general no more than one aspect should be changed at any one place at any one time, and the extent of the change should be modest and taken in steps if necessary." (ibid.* pg. 31)

> *"A joint trial of elements should only be attempted when the effects of each individually are known."* (ibid. pg. 31)

8.6.11. It may be inferred for the foregoing that Turner rejected holistic concepts for experimental systems and organisational change projects. Clearly and understandably for him, the technical quality of the evaluations was more significant than achieving improvements in policing. However what is surprising, is that in arguing that each of the N.P. treatments should have been tested individually, Turner asserts that;

> *"Most of the elements can be expected to have only a very small (if any) impact themselves on the state of crime, or the views of the general public."* (ibid. pg. 30)

8.6.12. Exactly so, precisely the reason it was originally argued that a systematic, co-ordinated and integrated design was necessary in order to achieve worthwhile improvements. It was suggested that the overall benefits of such a design would accumulate and be greater than the sum of the benefits of the individual parts. Additionally the integrated design would negate many of the inter-group and inter-personal conflicts likely in an uncoordinated system. (Hart 1981)

8.6.13. The arguments advanced by Irving (ibid.) in respect of REF (ii) above are clear. He asserts that the representation of complex individual and group processes by the use of systems analysis techniques, flow charts and diagrams is inappropriate where the theories and relationships being presented, are in themselves, only probabilistic. He argues that the use of such devices adds a deterministic value to the relationships on the basis that systems analysis is *"...primarily used for tackling mathematically determinate relations between variables"* (ibid. pg. 188)

8.6.14. In seeking to manage the acknowledged complexity of such situations and relationships, Irving adds that such techniques lend an inappropriate, concrete and graphical representation to such complexity. This he argues was a particular weakness of the systematic N.P. approach that synthesised a number of many disparate theories into a single metatheory. The weaknesses in individual probabilistic theories were thus compounded by graphical systems analysis techniques in order to present the concepts to non scientific audiences.

8.6.15. Although Irving does not suggest that there was any deceit involved or intended by such representations, he does imply that non scientific (police) decision makers, were persuaded by such techniques. The underlying implication being that senior police officers did not understand the intricacies of the psycho-social factors and theories involved, but that these were made understandable by the use of charting and similar techniques. Irving's difficulty seems to lie in what was seen as predictive qualities of such devices, (i.e. in a transitive relationship if $a \Rightarrow b$, $b \Rightarrow c$, then $a \Rightarrow c$) where such logic was applied to complex behavioural phenomena, such as modelling pro social behaviour by police officers.

8.6.16. It is argued here that the techniques adopted for the N.P. analysis and design conformed to the rules and principles specified by Checkland. (1979 in Flood and Carson 1993) It is accepted that such diagrams are a powerful and persuasive means of visualising complexity. However, it does seem probable that individuals, informed or otherwise, will draw conclusions and make assumptions on the basis of what is seen in the device. It seems this is likely to occur despite explanations of the limitations of such models (Flood and Carson 1993)

8.6.17. In the case of N.P. it is acknowledged by Irving et al (1989 pg. 188) that a warning of the limitations of the models was provided, " *the systems model is not a description of reality...it is a vehicle for structuring the many and various elements and relationships in a complex system."* (Hart 1981)

8.6.18. It is argued that the real difficulty was that the problem situation being analysed and presented, involved complex psychological and behavioural phenomena that had traditionally only been studied by specialists working to conventional social science methodologies. Such methodologies had sought to reduce the variables in human activity systems and human behaviour, to precisely defined and thus scientifically testable definitions.

8.6.19. N.P. *inter alia,* attempted to synthesise behaviours and incorporate predicted outcomes into a systematic design of police operations. Such an approach whilst attractive in some respects to social scientists, arguably presents insurmountable difficulties for existing social science methodologies and evaluations.

8.6.20. The synthesis and aggregation of systems processes, Irving argues, leads to "fuzzy concepts" that arise from the development of such metatheories. It might be seen as inevitable however, that traditional social scientists would find such an approach inappropriate. It is argued here though, that 'fuzziness' in the sense used by Irving, is a metaphor for complexity, which is a significant attribute of many social, and human activity systems, (Flood and Carson 1993), policing being no exception.

8.6.21. Checkland and Scholes (1990) in suggesting a model for social systems analysis conclude that the account of a social system described by the model can never be complete or static. It is evident that social and human systems in the organisational context are continually altering as they are

living, dynamic and continually interacting with each other and their environment. It is argued that this complexity is inevitable and for the purposes of police organisational development should be tackled holistically. To reduce the human factors in policing systems to a set of precisely defined, individually testable behaviours would be to misunderstand the nature of policing. (Sections 2.2-6)

8.6.22. It is suggested that there is nothing within the N.P. external evaluator's assessments of the project that presents any serious threat to the appropriateness of the systems approach.

8.6.23. A number of relevant arguments have been advanced by the evaluators as to why the approach may have been weak, incomplete or potentially misleading. These criticisms however, are more criticisms of the application and work of the N.P. authors, rather than the identification of inherent weaknesses or failures of the systems approaches. It is argued therefore that there was nothing within the systems approach to N.P. that would indicate the inappropriateness of the methodologies for analysing and designing changes to policing systems.

8.7   Summary of Findings

8.7.1. The five categories of suggested explanations of the outcomes of the N.P. project have been discussed above and may be summarised as follows:

i.   **N.P. Systems Analysis** - has been argued as being an accurate and appropriate representation of the problem situation and external change stimuli that N.P. sought to address. (Section 8.2)

ii. **N.P. Systems Design** - has been argued to be appropriate as a 'designed system' (Checkland 1981) and directed at relevant change targets, having the potential for improving the police problem situation. (Section 8.3)

iii. **N.P. Systems Implementation** - has been shown to be inadequate in a number of significant respects in the light of the knowledge of high levels of individual and cultural resistance to change within police organisations. (Section 8.4)

iv. **N.P. Evaluations** - have been shown as not having addressed the significant holistic and integrative features of N.P., or the change dynamics within police organisations. Thus it is concluded that the evaluations have not fully and reliably represented the outcomes of the N.P. trials. (Section 8.5)

v. **N.P. Systems Approach** - there no evidence to emerge from the N.P. project that weakens the original assertions (Section 2.16) that systems thinking and approaches offer the best opportunities for improving the design and performance of policing organisations. (Section 8.6)

8.8 Overall Conclusions

8.8.1. It is undoubtedly the case, that N.P. was evaluated by individuals who were not police officers and who viewed policing systems from a conventional social science background. This approach contrasts with the design and development of N.P., having been undertaken by practising police officers, taking a systemic approach to the design of an operational policing system.

8.8.2. It is suggested therefore that in such a complex human activity system as policing, it is unlikely that there would be high levels of agreement as to approach, design or outcomes from these two perspectives. (Easterby-Smith 1994)

8.8.3. It is equally arguable that in complex human activity systems of this type, a full understanding and explanation of the dynamics of routine operations and the dynamics of change (Sections 6.10 -11) will never be fully understood. Thus making a reductionist approach to evaluations even more inappropriate. Flood and Carson (1993 pg. 33) suggest that *"Complexity does not exist solely in things to be observed..." "Human actors have reasons, or intentions that lie behind each action....Observation is not enough to properly appreciate human actions."*

8.8.4. This argument is developed (*ibid.*) and it is suggested that human actions can only be understood in the context of the existing set of social rules and practices that aid understanding of human action. In other words, even accurate observation of behaviour is insufficient, some understanding of the context of the actions is necessary.

8.8.5. This argument may be extended in the context of organisations with strong internal cultures, such as police organisations. It has been suggested how such strong internal cultures might be perpetuated. (Figure 5.4) It is concluded here that internalisation of such strong cultural behaviours can amount in themselves to a set of organisational rules which need to be understood before the actions of individuals within the cultural system might be understood, as suggested by Flood and Carson (1993)

8.8.6. The implication of this conclusion for change to policing systems is that the behaviour of police staff needs to be understood at the overall police system level and in the context of the police culture. Thus, there are few change

targets within policing systems that will not effect the cultural sub-system in some way.

8.8.7. It has been shown (Sections 5.6 and 6.6) that change to cultural sub-systems is likely to be met with resistance and may take a considerable time. Therefore the methods of the change implementation in police systems need to reflect this difficulty, to a much greater extent than a mere acknowledgement of the problem.

8.8.8. The N.P. experience has established that a number of principles of change management are particularly significant to the implementation of change in policing systems, as follows:

    i.   effective internal and external communications,

    ii.   senior and intermediate management support,

    iii.   effective change leadership,

    iv.   change implementation co-ordinated simultaneously across all change targets,

    v.   using a combination of coercive and participative approaches to change.

    vi.   establishing internal teams to manage change,

8.8.9. Each of the foregoing principles is summarised below in the context of the findings of this research:

    i.   **Communication** - an effective means of communicating both the vision, need and the nature of the changes foreseen, is an essential feature of the change process. (Beckhard and Harris 1987) External communications become significant as the police system increases in 'openness' and the need to

exchange information about changes necessary to improve outputs becomes relevant. These aspects of the change process have been shown to be especially significant within policing systems and largely absent from the N.P. trials.

ii.   **Management Support** - a willingness to change by senior management cannot be assumed to consistent with the views of individuals at operational or intermediate levels. The active support of senior and intermediate managers is essential to satisfactory change (Tyson and Jackson 1992) .

iii.   **Leadership** - has been shown as necessary in order to overcome the high levels of uncertainty likely to accompany major change. The principles of effective change leadership (Bass 1990) should be applied to individuals and groups experiencing difficulty with practising new procedures and working within unfamiliar circumstances. Effective leadership will reduce confusion, improve individual's levels of confidence and self esteem, thus improving work performance. (Sections 6.9 -10)

iv.   **Change Targets** - in recognising the difficulty of changing organisational culture, it is suggested that to be successful, change must effect each of the associated change targets simultaneously (section 5.5), if long term evolutionary change is considered as too slow for the needs of the organisation. For instance, appropriate management support and effective communication must be swiftly followed by changes to structures that are seen as reinforcing the nature of the change. Such changes must then be aligned with the necessary alterations to systems and procedures that actually produce the altered style of output. It has been shown that reliance on a single approach to change implementation is likely to be

unsuccessful in a strong anti-culture. (Paragraph 8.4.11)

v. **Coercive and Participative Change** - the above conclusion leads to the proposition that a combination of an initial coercive change, succeeded by more participative approaches to further changes, is likely to be appropriate where a strong culture exists *(ibid.)*. It has been shown that unless the organisational culture can be altered sufficiently quickly, the culture may become a powerful force in resisting further attempts at change. It is unlikely that a participative approach to change would be successful in negotiating major, fundamental changes, perceived as deeply affecting cultural norms. As many of the inducements and motivators available to commercial organisations are not available to police (Section 7.5 and Figure 8.2), it is concluded that coercive change is necessary to quickly tackle resistant cultural issues. Such an approach should be followed with a more participative style to address associated detailed changes.

vi. **Change Teams** - it has been argued that major change to policing systems is an inherently complex process. It is suggested as highly unlikely that the requisite skills detailed here for the management of the change processes will be available in a single individual or focused to a single individual by a hierarchical structure. Rather, the necessary complementary skills and experience might be incorporated in the concept of a 'change team' or 'task force' (Pedler et al 1991) which is suggested as appropriate within police systems. Multiple changes within different functions and locations might be achieved by establishing a 'network of teams' as suggested by Katzenbach and Smith (1993)

8.8.10. This research has demonstrated that in order for major change to be effective within police organisations, a systems approach to both the changes themselves and the change process is necessary. Minor incremental alterations to procedures that are reliant upon single implementation methods are unlikely to produce significant benefits in the strong work culture of policing.

8.8.11. Neighbourhood Policing survived as a systems concept in both the Metropolitan and Surrey Police despite the experience of the experimental trials. Both organisations refined and adapted the original ideas, changing the name to 'sector' and 'area' policing respectively, but retaining all the fundamental principals set out in the original thesis. (Hart 1981, Beckett 1981, Chapter Two)

8.8.12. 'Sector policing' features as a priority for the Metropolitan Police corporate strategy (M.P.S. 1994 [b]) and area policing is now a well established feature of the approach to police service delivery throughout the County. (Chief Constable of Surrey 1993)

8.8.13. The final quotation comes from the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, but it is appropriate to record that both the offices of the Chief Constable of Surrey and the Commissioner have consistently sustained and supported the N.P. concept:

> *"The completion of the change to sector policing during 1993 resulted in closer community contact and better alignment of resources to demand across all divisions. Divisions compared the patterns of calls for assistance from members of the public and the number of officers performing street duty, resulting in an improvement in the availability of officers to meet demands. More flexible shift patterns, minimum staffing levels and proactive sector initiatives have all combined to improve performance on visible street duty."* (M.P.S. 1994 [a] pg. 8)

APPENDIX 'A'

Appendix 'A' to Chapter Four (Paragraph 4.1.5) provides examples of various charts used by the N.P. project team to illustrate and explain the systematic features of the N.P. project and its implementation. The charts were designed in varying levels of detail depending upon the subject and purpose. The original documents were produced on translucent drawing paper for reproduction in display size. The copies reproduced here are significantly reduced in size from the originals.

Appendix A1 to A5	A sectionalised copy of the PERT chart developed for the sequential implementation of all elements of the N.P. project over a one year period
Appendix A6	An implementation bar chart of the overall NP project showing the various project stages at each test site.
Appendix A7	An example of an implementation sequence chart for a specific test site showing precise implementation and activity dates.
Appendix A8	An example of an outline implementation sequence for a specific project treatment.
Appendix A9	Box and Arrow diagram used to explain relationships between project elements at test sites.
Appendix A10 to A12	Examples of flow charts used as visual representations of project elements for training and presentation purposes at test sites.

(A1)

DIVISIONAL
MANAGEMENT
TEAM

WORKING
PARTY

DIVISIONAL
INFORMATION
UNIT

RELIEF
TEAMS

TRAINING

Identify & Select
Training Team

Select equipment & accommodation for Training Team & commence
Programmes.

Set up D.I.U.

LEGEND

C.C.P.	–	Community Crime Prevention.
C.I.D. T & S	–	C.I.D. Targetting & Surveillance Team.
C.R.	–	Conflict Reduction.
D.C.O.	–	Dedicated Communications Officer.
D.I.U.	–	Divisional Information Unit.
D.I.I.U.	–	Divisional Information & Intelligence Unit.
D.S.U.	–	District Support Unit.
D.M.T.	–	Divisional Management Team.
Dir. Pat.	–	Directed Patrolling.
Geo. Resp.	–	Geographic Responsibility.
Gra. Resp.	–	Graded Response.
H.B.O.	–	Home Beat Officer.
N.P.	–	Neighbourhood Policing.
N.W.	–	Neighbourhood Watch.
P.B.O.	–	Permanent Beat Officer.
W.P.	–	Working Party.

Activity 4/8

Latest Completion
Time

Event Number

Earliest Completion
Time

D.M.T. start informal information

Working Party carries out

Reliefs start informal Informat...

| 23 | | D.M.T. finalise No. |
| 22 | 22 | of P.B.O's |

| 19 | 20 | D.M.T. consider long term implications of M.P. Objectives and in particular |
| 20 | 20 | Geographic Responsibility. |

| 16 | 14 |
| 14 | 14 | D.M.T. team development |

| 9 | 11 |
| 11 | 11 | Train D.M.T. |

| 7 | 9 | Set up |
| 9 | 9 | D.M.T. |

| 4 | 0 |
| 0 | 0 |

| 20 | 20 | Working Party considers content |
| 20 | 20 |

| 13 | 13 | Train Working Party |
| 13 | 13 |

| 10 | 11 | Set up / reconstitute Working Party |
| 11 | 11 |

| 5 | 0 |
| 0 | 0 |

W.P. produce proposals for (1) Geographic Responsibility (for Inspectors only)

(2) No. of Permanent Beat Officers.

Working Party (1) Produce recommendations for staffing/equipment/accommodation for proposed D.I.U. (2) Develop role of C.I.D.

including Crime Investigation Desk.

| 24 | 22 | 24 |

| 14 | 13 |
| 13 | 13 |

| 6 | 0 |
| 0 | 0 | D.I.U. carry out Demands and Resources study/update |

: up D.I.U. (enhanced
1 Det. Const)

D.I.U. carry out Demands and Resources study/update (incl. Abstractions from Duties)

D.I.U. carry out Front Office & Communications Office study & Pre-test study for Graded Response.

| 25 | 22 | 22 |

| 26 | 22 | 22 | Recommend Improvements to |
| 21 | 20 | 20 | Police/Public Contact Points |

| 17 | 16 | Reliefs consider (1) Geo. Resp. for reliefs |
| 16 | 16 | (2) Alignment of Duties to Demands. |

| 12 | 12 | Commence Relief Meetings - discussion of Divisional |
| 12 | 12 | Problems and Directed Patrolling 1 |

| 22 | 20 | 20 |

| 18 | 17 | Inspectors Training (2 x 3 day course) |
| 17 | 17 | incl. Directed Patrol & Sector Planning. |

| 15 | 13 | Train Working Party |
| 13 | 13 |

| 11 | 11 |
| 11 | 11 | Train D.M.T. |

| 8 | 9 |
| 9 | 9 |

One day presentation to all staff on M.P.

preparation of Training

387

D.M.T. prepare launch of Neighbourhood Policing

start Informal Information to/from Public at Senior/Middle Management levels

49 | 36 | 36 — D.M.T. finalise & publish Sector Plans incl. Conflict Reduction I & Community Crime Prev.

45 | 33 | 33 — D.M.T. finalise (1) Front Office/D.C.O.staff level (2)Improvement to Police/Public contact pts.

48 | 35 | 35 — D.M.T. review Station performance

37 | 30 | 30 — D.M.T. (1) Co-ordinate Sector Planning. (2) Develops role of C.I.D – identifies C.I.D. T & S team (3) Works out composition of D.I.I.U. (incl. Crime Investigation Duty Desk).

36 | 30 | 33

23 | 22 | 22 — D.M.T. finalise Geo.Resp. for Inspectors.

D.M.T. finalise No. of P.B.O's

38 | 30 | 30 — D.M.T. review own performance

32 | 25 | 25 — D.M.T. review Station Performance

50 | 36 | 36 — W.P. submit proposals for (1) Geo. Resp. for Reliefs. (2) Alignment of Duties to Demands. (3) Graded Resp.

51 | 36 | 36 — C.I.D. T & S set up & develop targets with D.I.I.U. Crime Investigation Duty Desk set up.

52 | 36 | 36 — D.I.I.U. evaluates success of current N.W. sites & suggests possible new sites. Evaluates current use of Special Constab.

53 | 36 | 36 — (1) Insp's implement D.C.O's recmd Staff levels (2)Reliefs consider Inter-Agency Co-op.

46 | 33 | 33 — C.I.D. commence Crime Analysis

43 | 32 | 32 — 3 day Seminar to finalise Sector Plans incl.C.R.I & C.C.P. discuss(1) Geo.Resp. for Reliefs (2)Alignment of Duties (3) Graded Resp.

44 | 32 | 32 — D.I.U becomes D.I.I.U. develops Intelligence Sec. of Beat Profiles

47 | 33 | 33 — (1) Insp's identify D.C.O's & start employing them exclusively. (2) Reliefs consider Inter-Agency Co-op.(2)Reliefs consider Vict.Supt, Schts.Liais, Case Scrn.

39 | 30 | 30 — Working Party produces recommendations for Front Office/Comms Office staffing levels & improvements in Police/Public Contact Points.

40 | 30 | 30 — D.I.U. examines the Crime Analysis System.

41 | 30 | 30 — (1) Insp's assume Geo.Resp. (2) Prepare Sector Plans incl.Conflict Reduction I and Community Crime Prev. (3)Start Dir.Pat. I.(4) Relief Teams set up (P.B.O's aligned to Insp's)

42 | 30 | 33

Reliefs prepare launch of Neighbourhood

35 | 29 | 30

Working Party carries out simultaneous consideration of Alignment of Duties to Demands & Geographic Responsibility for Sergeants and Constables.

28 | 24 | 24 — Working Party considers content of Beat Profiles

29 | 24 | 24 — D.I.U. institute Content Analysis of Minutes

30 | 24 | 24 — (1) Identify & Select P.B.O's (2)Reliefs consider Gra.Resp.

24 | 22 | 24

25 | 22 | 22 — D.I.U continuously collates Beat Profiles into Beat/Sector boundaries.

26 | 22 | 22 — Recommend Improvements to Police/Public Contact Points

33 | 27 | 27 — D.I.U. examines the Crime Analysis System.

34 | 28 | 28 — H.B.O. Training takes place (Phase 1 - 2 x 2 week course) H.B.O's become P.B.O's

31 | 24 | 24 — Sergeants Training (3x3day courses)

Constable Training

start informal "Information to/from Public" at Relief level

Scale: 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52

Launch of Neighbourhood Policing at D.M.I. level — D.M.I. set up formal Public Information Network incl. Inter-Agency Co-op.
- 54 | 40 | 43
- 70 | 50 | 53

D.M.I. finalise (1) Geo.Resp. for Reliefs. (2) Alignment to Demands (3) Graded Response.
D.M.I. formulate guidelines for Working Party to review the use of the D.S.U. for non - Public Order tasks.
D.M.I. finalise (1) Action on N.W. sites. (2) Case Screening Procedures & policy on (3) Victim Support (4) School Liaison (5) Special Constab.
- 55 | 40 | 40
- 66 | 46 | 46
- 71 | 50 | 50

D.M.I. review own performance
D.M.I. review Station performance
D.M.I. review own performance
- 56 | 40 | 40
- 65 | 45 | 45
- 72 | 50 | 50

W.P. formulate method & local procedures for (1) Victim Support. (2) School Liaison. (3) Inter-Agency Co-operation.
W.P. formulate methods & procedures for Case Screening.
- 57 | 40 | 40
- 62 | 43 | 46

W.P. develop information package for launch of N.P.
W.P. consider progress/re-launch/expansion of current Neighbourhood Watch sites.
W.P. consider (1) Community Involvement. (2) Community Crime Prevention II. (3) Conflict Reduction II.
- 58 | 40 | 40
- 67 | 46 | 46
- 73 | 50 | 50

C.I.D's Target & Surveillance Team begin targetting high fear crime and persistant criminals - now becomes Directed Tasking.

63 | 44 | 47

D.I.I.U. carry out evaluation of current Case Screening.
D.I.I.U. assesses potential for Conflict Reduction
D.I.I.U. start to utilize Management Information System
- 59 | 40 | 40
- 68 | 46 | 46

(1) Reliefs consider progress/expansion of N.W.sites (2)Train D.C.0's in Gra.Resp.(3) Reliefs discuss use of Special Constab.
Reliefs commence recommended method of (1) Geo.Resp. for Sergeant & Constable. (2) Alignment of Duties to Demands. (3) Implement Sector Plans. (incl. Conflict Reduction I. and Community Crime Prevention). (4) Implement Graded Response.
Reliefs implement (1) Case Screening Supt (2) Schools Liaison (4) Special
- 60 | 40 | 40
- 74 | 50 | 50

Launch of Neighbourhood Policing at Relief level
Reliefs set up formal Public Information Network including Inter-Agency Co-operation
- 61 | 40 | 43
- 64 | 44 | 47
- 75 | 50 | 53

Policing
...ning (4 day courses with 12 - 16 Uniform Officers plus 2 - 3 Detective Constables on each course)
P.B.0's course (Phase 2) 2 x 1 week course)
- 69 | 48 | 48
- 76 | 50 | 50

391

on going

Neighbourhood Policing
(Police/Public Contract)

83

60 60

O.M.T. prepare full mid-test evaluation

W.P. considers alternative uses of D.S.U in line with Force/Area
Policy - and recommends non-Public Order tasks.

D.I.I.U. carry out Alignment of Admin. Study.

Reliefs implement (1) Community Involvement (2) Community Crime Prevention II
(3) Conflict Reduction II

Post training support and Training II

80 | 55 55

Consider impending
Admin. Study.

81 | 55 55

82 | 55 55

78 | 53 53

79 | 53 53

77 | 53 53

O.M.T. finalise policy (1) Com. Involve. (2) Com.
Crime Prev. II (3) Conflict Reduction II

O.M.T. review Station performance

W.P. considers problems in C.I.D/Uniform Admin and formulate
areas of interest prior to D.I.I.U. study

Management Information System

Reliefs implement (1) Case Sreening (2) Victim
Supt (3) Schools Liaison (4) Special Constab.

Evaluation of Training Programme

393

51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

(A6)

OUTLINE TEST AND IMPLEMENTATION SEQUENCE

FOR

NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICING

Quarter

NOTTING HILL (BH)

HACKNEY (GH)

BRIXTON (LD)

KILBURN (QK)

ADDLESTONE (AD) & WALTON (AW) (Surrey)

CAMBERLEY (CA) (Surrey)

CATERHAM (BC) (Surrey Control)

PROJECT TEAM

Legend:
- FIXED HEAD & TAIL EVENTS
- ON GOING ACTIVITY
- VARIABLE HEAD & TAIL EVENTS

Activities shown: PRE-TESTING, IMPLEMENTATION, M.I.S. INSTALLATION, MIDI TESTING, POST TESTING, MIDI TESTING PILOT, M.I.S IMPLEMENTATION, PRE-TESTING (AW), IMPLEMENTATION (AW), M.I.S INSTALLATION (Walton & Addlestone), PRE-TEST RPT, PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION GDE, TRAINING RESEARCH. SPECIFICATION & REPORT, IMPLEMENTATION & TRAINING, MIDI TESTING SPECIFICATION

PRE - IMPLEMENTATION NETWORK

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
12.9.82	19.9.82	26.9.82	3.10.82	10.10.82	17.10.82	24.10.82	31.10.82	7.11.82	14.11.82	21.11.82	28.11.82	5.12.82	12.12.82	19.12.82	26.12.82	2.1.83	9.1.83	16.1.83

Insp & P.S. Training

Constable Training

END

Check availability of C.C. D.C.C. A.C.C.s (O) & (A) for attendance at Presentations

Send Invitations for Presentation Evenings

Presentation Evenings commence up to 1 per week

Introduce Policing System

Commence Monitoring (Project Team)

END

Obtain Decisions re Traffic Dept Involvement

Obtain Decision on Graded Response

Presentations to Specials & Civilians

END

Write Instructions on Graded Response

Prepare Press Release & Conference.

Fix Date of Press Conference and Invite Participants

Commence Presentations to M.T.C.

END

END

Commence System of Graded Response

Arrange Printing of Message Forms

Prepare Maps of Areas

Introduce new Message Forms to Station Office at anytime up to 2.1.83

Prepare General Memorandum on Exceptions to Gen. Orders

Ensure Adequate Issue of Maps to all Staff & Offices

Issue Gen Memo to all AD Personnel

END

Select Constables

Publish Duties Commencing 2.1.83.

Evaluate Training & Document

Familiarise Staff with Documentation

Introduce Briefing & Self Briefing System.

Produce Self Briefing Proposals

Issue 3rd Information Memo to all Staff

Issue 2nd Information Memo to all Staff

Prepare Instructions & Issue to all Staff

END

Personal Briefing/Beat Profile Binders ordered

Await Report on Front Office Proposals

Ensure Involvement of HO to resolve Radio Difficulties before 2.1.83

Issue Final Information Memo to all Staff + Xmas Message !

END

START

DIV + A2(3)
SELECT SUITABLE SITES

AC'A
ACQUIRE AUTHORITIES TO PROCEED

A2(3)
DEVELOP PUBLIC SURVEY

MARKET RESEARCH COMPANY
PUBLIC SURVEY — SITE FIELDWORK

ANALYSE & REPORT RESULTS
A2(3)

A2(3)
ARRANGE & DESIGN COMMUNITY GROUPS SURVEY

A2(3) WITH EXTERNAL RESEARCH GROUP
COMMUNITY GROUPS FIELDWORK

A2(3)
ENVIRONMENTAL DATA COLLECTION INC. ANALYSIS OF POLICE RECORDS

A2(3) - 'F' DEPT
PREPARE DETAILED PROPOSALS & ACQUIRE AUTHORITIES

A2(3) WITH A & S DEPTS
INVESTIGATE ACCOMMODATION OPTIONS

SELECT STAFF (P.S & P.C.s)

A2(3) + 'D' DEPT
POST & TRAIN STAFF

A & S, ENG & 'G' DEPT
ACQUIRE & EQUIP ACCOMMODATION

PUBLICITY 'P' DEPT

WEEK	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28

PUBLICITY 'P' DEPT

LIVE RUNNING
c. 6 MONTHS

A2(3) + MARKET RESEARCH COMPANY
POST-TEST PUBLIC QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY

A2(3) WITH EXTERNAL RESEARCH GROUP
POST-TEST COMMUNITY GROUPS SURVEY

A2(3)
ENVIRONMENTAL DATA POST-TEST INC. ANALYSIS OF POLICE RECORDS

A2(3)
PREPARE & SUBMIT EVALUATION REPORT

END

WEEK	28	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68

OUTLINE SEQUENCE
OF
IMPLEMENTATION OF ESTATE NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICING POSTS

NETWORK OF ELEMENTS SHOWING NECESSARY LINKS

(Meaning of arrows : 'a' ___is necessary for___ 'b')

```
                        DEDICATED
                       COMMUNICATIONS
                         OFFICERS
                     a)


                              M.I.S.
                            c)

              GRADED RESPONSE
            b)
                                    D.I.U.              RELIEF/DIVISION/AREA
                                  d)                       MEETINGS
                                                        h)
   PRIORITY RULES
 j)                                                                      TRAINING & INTEREST
                                       CRIME DESK                          BUILDING
                                    s) CASE SCREENING    WORKING PARTIES  r)
          DIRECTED PATROL                              k)
        f)

                                       SURVEILLANCE &
                                    t)   TARGETTING



                              GEOGRAPHICAL
                              RESPONSIBILITIES        CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEES
                              (inc. P.B.O's)            INFORMATION NETWORK
                            e)                          CONTACT POINTS
                                                      l)

   SECTOR/DIVISIONAL/AREA
 g) -      PLANS                                   COMMUNITY CRIME
                                                 m)  PREVENTION

                                            CONFLICT REDUCTION
                                          n)

                                    COMMUNITY SUPPORT
                                  p) (e.g. Victim Support)

                              COMMUNITY BUILDING
                            q)  (e.g. Youth Clubs)
```

CRIME INVESTIGATION SYSTEM

LEGEND

C.P.O. — Crime Prevention Officer.
D.C.I — Detective Chief Inspector.
D.I.I.U — Divisional Information & intelligence Unit.
P.B.O. — Permanent Beat Officer.
V.S.S. — Victim Support Scheme.

403

SYSTEM FOR SCREENING AND MANAGING ALL CRIME

```
┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│  Sector Planning/Monitoring Process  │◄──┐
│  - highlights particular problem.    │   │
└─────────────────────────────────┘   │
              │                        │
              ▼                        │
┌─────────────────────────────────┐   │
│  With the assistance of the D.I.I.U. │   │
│  identify all Agencies which have    │   │
│  an interest in the problem.         │   │
└─────────────────────────────────┘   │
              │                        │
              ▼                        │
┌─────────────────────────────────┐   │
│  Is the scale of the problem and     │   │
│  its solution :—                     │   │
├──────────────────┬──────────────┤   │
│   DIVISIONAL     │    SECTOR     │   │
└──────────────────┴──────────────┘   │
```

┌──────────────────────────────┐
│ Refer to Divisional Management │
│ Team for discussion.   │
└──────────────────────────────┘

```
┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│  Identify appropriate level of       │
│  consultation within identified      │
│  Agency.                             │
└─────────────────────────────────┘
              │
              ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│  Does relevant Agency agree to       │
│  a joint approach.                   │
├──────────────────┬──────────────┤
│    a) NO         │   b) YES      │
└──────────────────┴──────────────┘
              │
              ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│  In association with relevant        │
│  Agency develop strategy to deal     │
│  with identified problem.            │
└─────────────────────────────────┘
              │
              ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│           Plan agreed.               │
├──────────────────┬──────────────┤
│    a) NO         │   b) YES      │
└──────────────────┴──────────────┘
              │
              ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│        Implement Plan                │
└─────────────────────────────────┘
              │
              ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│        Evaluate results              │
└─────────────────────────────────┘
```

407

REFERENCES and BIBLIOGRAPHY

ACKOFF, RUSSELL L.   1974
Redesigning the Future
A Systems Approach to Societal Problems
John Wiley   New York

ALDERSON, JOHN   1979
Policing Freedom
Dilemmas of Policing in Western Democracies
Macdonald and Evans   Plymouth

ANTHONY, JOHN   1994
A Better Beat
Police Review Vol. 102 No. 5281- 19/8/94

ARGYLE, MICHAEL   1972
The Social Psychology of Work
Pelican   London

ARONSON, ELLIOT   1976
The Social Animal
2nd Edition
W. H. Freeman   San Francisco

ATKINSON, A. and WILMORE, J.   1984
Evaluation of the Neighbourhood Policing MIS Micro Computer
A Joint Study by A2(3) Branch M.P.S. and the Police Foundation
Metropolitan Police London
Internal Evaluation Report

BASS, BERNARD M.   1990
Bass & Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership
Theory, Research and Managerial Applications - 3rd Edition
Collier Macmillan London

BEARDSHAW, JOHN and PALFREMAN, DAVID.   1990
The Organisation in its Environment
4th Edition
Pitman   London

BECKETT, IAN C. 1981
Policing Behaviour
Unpublished Thesis
B.Sc. Thesis, The City University, London

BECKETT, IAN C. 1989
Policing Systems
Planning and Management of Police in an Urban Environment
Ph.D. Thesis, The City University, London .

BECKHARD, R. and HARRIS, R. T.   1987
Organisational Transitions
2nd Edition
Addison-Wesley   Wokingham

BEER, M.   1980
A Social Systems Model for Organisational Development
In, 'Systems Theory for Organisational Development'
Ed. Cummings T. G.
John Wiley   Chichester

BEER, STAFFORD. 1981
The Brain of the Firm
2nd Edition
John Wiley   Chichester

BEISHON, J. and PETERS, G.   1976
Systems Behaviour
(2nd. Edition)
The Open University Press   London

BELOW, P.J., MORRISSEY, G.L., and ACOMB, B.L. 1987
The Executive Guide to Strategic Planning
Jossey -Bass   London

BELSON, WILLIAM A.   1975
The Public and the Police
Harper and Rowe   London

BLAKELY, EDWARD J.   1979
Community Development Research
Concepts, Issues and Strategies
Human Science Press   New York

BRADFORD, DAVID L. and COHEN, ALLAN R.   1984
Managing for Excellence
Guide to Developing High Performance in
Contemporary Organisations.
John Wiley   New York

BRAMSHILL   1992
Association of Chief Police Officers, Quality of Service Committee
Quality of Service Seminar - 8th December 1992
Police Staff College, Bramshill

BROWN, J.A.C.   1954
The Social Psychology of Industry
Pelican   London   .

BROWN, J.M. and CAMPBELL , E.A.   1994
Stress and Policing
Sources and Strategies
John Wiley   Chichester

BYARS, LLOYD L. 1991
Strategic Management
Formulation and Implementation, Concepts and Cases 3rd. Ed.
Harper Collins   New York

CAMERON, ALEX. 1995
Easing the Pain of Change
Management Consultancy, March 1995
VNU Business Publications   London

CAMPBELL, D.T. and STANLEY, J.C.   1966
Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research
Rand McNally   Chicago

CARNALL, COLIN A.   1990
Managing Change in Organisations
Prentice Hall   London

CHECKLAND, P. B. and SCHOLES, J. 1990
Soft Systems Methodology in Action
John Wiley   Chichester

CHECKLAND, PETER.   1972
Towards a System-based Methodology for
Real World Problem Solving
Journal of Systems Engineering, 3.2.   U.K.

CHECKLAND, PETER.   1981
Systems Thinking, Systems Practice
John Wiley   Chichester

CHIEF CONSTABLE of SURREY   1993
Annual Report of the Chief Constable of Surrey
Surrey Police   Guildford

CHRISTIAN, LOUISE   1983
Policing by Coercion
Greater London Council   London

411

CLELAND, D. I. and KING, W. R.   1983
Systems Analysis and Project Management
McGraw Hill   London

COOK, T. D. and CAMPBELL, D. T.   1979(a)
The Design and Conduct of Quasi-experiments in Field Settings
In Dunnette (Ed.) Handbook of Industrial and Organisational
Psychology
Rand McNally   Chicago

COOK, T. D. and CAMPBELL, D. T.   1979(b)
Quasi-Experimentation
Design and Analysis Issues for Field Settings
Rand McNally   Chicago

CRITCHLEY, T.   1978
A History of Police in England and Wales
Constable   London

CUMMINGS, THOMAS G. 1980
Systems Theory for Organisational Development
John Wiley   Chichester

DAVIES, D. R. and SHACKLETON, V. J.   1975
Psychology and Work
Essential Psychology, Ed. Peter Herriot
Methuen   London

DEGREENE, K. B. 1970
Systems Psychology
McGraw Hill   London

DUBOIS, PIERRE. 1979
Sabotage in Industry
Pelican   London

EASTERBY-SMITH, MARK   1994
Evaluating Management Development, Training and Education
Second Edition
Gower   London

ELOHIM, J. L.   1993
Theory and Practice of Systems Methodology
Instituto Politecnico Nacional, Mexico.
Postgraduate Section Paper.

EVANS, PHIL.   1975
Motivation
Essential Psychology Ed. Peter Herriot
Methuen   London

EVERED, ROGER 1980
Consequences of and Prospects for Systems Thinking
in Cummings, T.G. 1980
Wiley   Chichester

EYSENCK, HANS and MICHAEL.   1981
Mindwatching
BCA - Michael Joseph   London

FAIRWEATHER, G. W. and TORNATZKY, L. G.   1977
Experimental Methods for Social Policy Research
Pergammon   New York

FIELDING, N.   1989
Police Culture and Police Practice
In M. Weatheritt (Ed.) Police Research
Avebury   Aldershot

FEILDING, NIGEL G.   1991
The Police and Social Conflict
Rhetoric and Reality
The Athlon Press   London

FLOOD, ROBERT L. and CARSON EWART R.   1993
Dealing with Complexity
An Introduction to the Theory and Application of Systems Science
Plenum   London

FRANCIS, DAVE. 1987
Unblocking Organisational Communication
Gower   Aldershot

GAHAGAN, JUDY. 1975
Interpersonal and Group Behaviour
Essential Psychology Ed. Peter Herriot
Methuen   London

GELLERMAN, SAUL W.   1974
Behavioural Science in Management
Pelican   London

413

GIBBONS, SARAH. 1995
Managing Change
Police Review, Vol. 103 No. 5307 - 24/2/95

GLEN, FREDERICK. 1975
The Social Psychology of Organisations
Essential Psychology, Ed. Peter Herriot
Methuen   London

GURR, T.R. 1978
Crime Trends in Modern Democracies since 1945
Paper in 'Prevention of Crime in Europe'
Peel Press   London

H.M.C.I.C. 1990
Annual Report of Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary
H.M.S.O.   London

HANDY, CHARLES B. 1994
Presentation to the Institute of Personnel and Development
In "Police' Vol. XXVII No. 3 Nov. 1994

HANDY, CHARLES B. 1976
Understanding Organisations
Penguin   London

HANDY, CHARLES B. 1984
The Organisation Revolution and How to Harness It
'Personnel Management' July 1984   London

HART, J. M. 1981
A Systems based Perspective of Police Operations
B.Sc. Dissertation, The City University
Unpublished Thesis   London

HART, J. M. 1992
The Challenge of Change
Unpublished paper - Strategic Management Assignment
Senior Command Course
The Police Staff College, Bramshill

HERSEY, P. and BLANCHARD, K.H. 1972
The Management of Change
Training and Development Journal, January 1972

HITCHINS, DEREK K. 1992
Putting Systems to Work
Wiley   Chichester

HODGKINSON, CHRISTOPHER 1983
The Philosophy of Leadership
Blackwell   Oxford

HORTON, CHRISTINE and SMITH, DAVID J. 1988
Evaluating Police Work
An Action Research Project
Policy Studies Institute   London

I.P.D. 1994
People Make the Difference
An I.D.P. Position Paper
Institute of Personnel and Development London

JACKSON, MICHAEL C. and KEYS, PAUL   1984
Towards a System of Systems Methodologies
Journal of the Operational Research Society Vol. 35   UK

JEFFERSON, TONY and GRIMSHAW, ROGER   1984
Controlling the Constable
Police Accountability in England and Wales
Frederick Muller   London

JONES, J.M.   1980
Organisational Aspects of Police Behaviour
Gower   London

KAKABADSE, ANDREW and DAINTY, PAUL   1988
Police Chief Officers: A Management Development Survey
Journal of Management Psychology, Vol. 3, No.3, 1988

KAKABADSE, A., LUDLOW, R. and VINNICOMBE, S.   1987
Working in Organisations
3rd International Edition
Gower   Aldershot

KAST, F. E. and ROSENZWEIG, JAMES E.   1981
Organisation and Management
A Systems and Contingency Approach (3rd Edition)
McGraw Hill   Tokyo

KATZ, D. and KAHN, R. L.   1978
The Social Psychology of Organisations (2nd Edition)
John Wiley   New York

KATZENBACH, J.R. and SMITH , D.K. 1993
The Wisdom of Teams
Creating the High-Performance Organisation
Harper Collins   New York

KAYE, BRIAN   1993
Chaos and Complexity
Discovering the Surprising Patterns of Science and Technology
VCH   Weinheim

KEETON, G. W.   1975
Keeping the Peace
Barry Rose   London

KHANDWALLA, PRADIP N.   1977
The Design of Organisations
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich   New York
KILMANN, R. H. et al   1985
Gaining Control of the Corporate Culture
Jossey Bass   London

KIRKPATRICK, DONALD L.   1985
How to Manage Change Effectively
Jossey-Bass   San Francisco

KOONTZ, HAROLD and O'DONNELL , CYRIL 1976
Management (6th Edition)
A Systems and Contingency Analysis of Managerial Functions
McGraw Hill Kogakusha   London

LEGGE, DAVID   1975
An Introduction to Psychological Science
Essential Psychology, Ed. Peter Herriot
Methuen   London

LINCOLN, TOM.   1990
Managing Information Systems for Profit
John Wiley   New York

LUPTON, TOM   1978
Management and the Social Sciences
Penguin   London

MANNING   1977
Police Work
M.I.T. Press   New York

MARRUS, STEPHANIE K. 1984
Building the Strategic Plan
Find, Analyse and Present the Right Information
John Wiley   New York

MAWBY R.   1979
Policing the City
Saxon House   Farnborough,

MCLEAN, ADRIAN. et al   1982
Organisation Development in Transition
Evidence of an Evolving Profession
John Wiley   Chichester

METROPOLITAN POLICE SERVICE   1981
Metropolitan Police, Registered File No. 81/GN/97/81/208 Part 1
Unpublished - Policy File for the Neighbourhood Policing Project
M.P.S.   London

METROPOLITAN POLICE SERVICE   1985(a)
Divisional Guidelines for Graded Response
M.P.S.   London

METROPOLITAN POLICE SERVICE   1985(b)
Divisional Guidelines for Participative Management
M.P.S.   London

METROPOLITAN POLICE SERVICE   1985(c)
Divisional Guidelines for Geographic Responsibility
M.P.S.   London

METROPOLITAN POLICE SERVICE   1988
Crime Investigation Priority Project
Internal Report
M.P.S.   London

METROPOLITAN POLICE SERVICE   1991
DIIU Booklet
Internal publication for 'Sector Policing'
M.P.S.   London

METROPOLITAN POLICE SERVICE   1992
Sector Policing
A Presentation for Community Groups
Public Information Booklet to Accompany Presentation
M.P.S.   London

METROPOLITAN POLICE SERVICE   1994(a)
Report of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis 1993/4
M.P.S.   London

METROPOLITAN POLICE SERVICE   1994(b)
The Metropolitan Police Corporate Strategy - Priorities 1994/5
M.P.S.   London

METROPOLITAN POLICE SERVICE   1994(c)
The Metropolitan Police Service Corporate Strategy 1994/5 - 1998/9
M.P.S.   London

MOSS KANTER, R 1984
The Change Masters
Corporate Entrepreneurs at Work
Routledge   London

MOSS KANTER, R. 1989
When Giants Learn to Dance
Mastering the Challenges of Strategy, Management and Careers
Routledge   London

MURRELL, HYWELL.   1976
Motivation at Work
Methuen   London

OFFICE FOR PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 1984
Key developments in the Management of British Policing
Report of Two Seminars on 9/12/93 and 21/3/93
Office for Public Management   London

OLINS, WOLFF   1988
A Force for Change
A Report on the Corporate Identity of the Metropolitan Police .
Wolff Olins   London

OLSEN, SHIRLEY A. (Ed.)1982
Group Planning and Problem Solving Methods in Eng. Mgt.
John Wiley   New York

OXFORD, K. G.   1983
The Increasing Demands on Resources
Address to the ACPO/Local Authorities Joint Summer Conference
Merseyside Police

PARSTON, GREG. 1984
Public Service, Public Management and the Police
Office for Public Management   London

PATCHING, DAVID.   1990
Practical Soft Systems Analysis
Pitman   London

PEDLER, M. BURGOYNE, J. and BOYDELL, T.   1991
The Learning Company
A Strategy for Sustainable Development
McGraw-Hill   London   .

PORRAS, JERRY I. 1987
Stream Analysis
A Powerful Way to Diagnose and Manage Organisational Change
Addison-Wesley   Wokingham

PORTER, L.W. and ROBERTS K.H. (Eds.)   1977
Communication in Organisations
Penguin   London

PUGH, D. HICKSON , and D. HININGS , C. (Eds.)   1971
Writers on Organisations
Structure of, Functioning of, Management of, People in
Organisations in Society
Penguin   London

PUNCH M.   1979
Policing the Inner City
McMillan   London

REINER, ROBERT. 1978
The Blue-Coated Worker
A Sociological Study of Police Unionism
Cambridge University Press   Cambridge

REINER, ROBERT. 1991
Chief Constables
Bobbies, Bosses, or Bureaucrats?
Oxford University Press   Oxford

ROBSON, MIKE   1982
Quality Circles
Gower   Aldershot

SACKS, OLIVER   1985
The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat
Picador   London

SAXE L. AND FINE M.   1979
Expanding our View of Control Groups in Evaluations
In, Datta and Perloff (Eds.) 'Improving Evaluations'
Sage   London

SCARMAN, LORD 1981
The Brixton Disorders 10-12 April 1981
Report of an Inquiry by the Rt. Hon The Lord Scarman
Cmnd. 8427
H.M.S.O.   London

SCHEIN, EDGAR H.   1985
Organisational Culture and Leadership
A Dynamic View
Jossey Bass   San Francisco

SENGE, PETER   1990
The Fifth Discipline
Doubleday   London

SHAFFER, E. B.   1980
Community Policing
Groom Helm   London

SILVERMAN, DAVID   1978
The Theory of Organisations
A Sociological Framework
Heinemann   London

SMALL, STEPHEN. 1983
Police and People in London
II A group of young black people
Policy Studies Institute   London

SMITH, NICK L. (Ed.)   1981
New Techniques for Evaluation
Volume 2
Sage   London

SMITH, DAVID J.   1983(a)
Police and People in London
I A Survey of Londoners
Policy Studies Institute   London

SMITH, DAVID J.   1983(b)
Police and People in London
III A survey of police officers
Policy Studies Institute   London

SMITH, DAVID J. and GRAY, JEREMY. 1983
Police and People in London
IV The police in action
Policy Studies Institute   London

STAPLEY, L.F.   1986
Implementation of Neighbourhood Policing
An Experimental Divisional Policing System
Internal evaluation document circulated throughout
the Metropolitan Police
D15 Branch, Metropolitan Police Service   London

STAUB, E.   1980
Social and Prosocial Behaviour
In, 'Personality : Basic Aspects and Current Research'
Prentice-Hall New York

STEAD, PHILLIP J. 1985
The Police of Britain
Macmillan   New York

STEPHENS, MIKE. 1988
Policing - The Critical Issues
Harvester-Wheatsheaf   London
SURREY POLICE   1994
Surrey Police Strategic Plan 1994/5 - 1996/7
Chief Constable of Surrey Guildford

THOMASON, GEORGE   1991
A Textbook of Human Resource Management
Institute of Personnel Management   London

TICHY, N. and DEVANNA, M.   1986
Transformational Leadership
Wiley   New York

TOWNSHEND, CHARLES   1993
Making the Peace
Public Order and Public Security in Modern Britain
Oxford University Press   Oxford

TURNER, P.   1987(a)
Evaluation of Neighbourhood Policing
Overall Report
Internal Evaluation Report
Metropolitan Police Service   London

TURNER, P.   1986(b)
The Evaluation of Neighbourhood Policing
Notting Hill Division
Internal Evaluation Report
Metropolitan Police Service   London

421

TURNER, P.   1986(c)
The Evaluation of Neighbourhood Policing
Hackney Division
Internal Evaluation Report
Metropolitan Police Service   London

TURNER, P.   1987(d)
The Evaluation of Neighbourhood Policing
Brixton Division
Internal Evaluation Report
Metropolitan Police Service   London

TURNER, P.   1987(e)
The Evaluation of Neighbourhood Policing
Kilburn Division
Internal Evaluation Report
Metropolitan Police Service   London

TYSON, S. and JACKSON, T.   1992
The Essence of Organisational Behaviour
Prentice Hall   London

VROOM, VICTOR H. and DECI, EDWARD L.   1978
Management and Motivation
Penguin   London

WADDINGTON, P. A. J.   1986
The Objectives Debate
Policing 2(3)   London

WALDROP, MITCHELL M.   1993
Complexity
The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos
Viking   London

WARFIELD, J. N.   1976
Societal Systems
John Wiley   New York

WASHNIS, G. U.   1976
Citizen Involvement in Crime Prevention
Lexington   New York

WEINBERG, G. N. 1975
An Introduction to General Systems Thinking
John Wiley   New York

WHITAKER, BEN. 1979
The Police in Society
Eyre Methuen   London

WILLIAMS, C.   1994
The Effect of Change
Notes from a presentation by Management Consultants
Clive Williams and Associates, Management Consultants, London

WILLIAMS, TREVOR A.   1982
Learning to Manage our Futures
The Participative Redesign of Societies in Turbulent Transition
Wiley   New York