Rural Urban Migration and Its Impact on Economic Development

-A Case Study in China-

Thesis submit to the doctor degree of philosophy

By

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January 1994

ABSTRACT

In 1990, a research project called "Rural Surplus Labour and its Employment Exploration" was set up in China, undertaken by the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Development Centre of the State Council. From February to July 1992, I visited Shuangmiao Village in Qianshan County, Anhui Province, Xianfeng Village and Kangle Village in Dingxi County, Gansu Province, Tianliao Village and Xiting Village in Changnan County, Zhejiang Province and, Longgang Zhen in Wenzhou Region, Zhejiang Province, where I conducted a questionnaire survey among 300 households.

The model built up in this thesis is a multi-disciplinary model based on the author's documentary research in the disciplines of sociology/anthropology and development economics. My particular focus and my critique concerns two sociological theories illustrated by Revanstein and Lee and two economic models inferred by Lewis and Todaro, which have been widely quoted in the literature of migration.

There are altogether six chapters. The first chapter is a review of the literature of internal migration both in developed and developing countries, and a brief introduction to and critique of the four migration models. The main task of the second chapter is to hypothesise a set of social/anthropological and economic variables and their relationships to the internal migration decision, and to build up a multi-disciplinary internal migration model. In the third and fourth chapters, a detailed description of the field study in the five villages, one town and one city is given and a qualitative analysis follows. The fifth chapter is the quantitative analysis, testing the model to see whether or not there is correlation between the hypothesised independent variables and the making of the internal migration decision. Finally, a conclusion and some proposals for further research are given in the sixth chapter.

Content

Tables

The Directory of Some Chinese Special Term

1 jin 斤= 0.5 kilogram

1 li 里= 0.5 kilometre

1 mu = 1/15 hectare

Xiang 乡 - Former commune

Zhen 镇 - Town

Xian 县Î Count

Xiang Zhen Enterprises (XZEs) 乡镇企业Î Township Enterprise

HUKOU 户口 - A registration system in the cities which affects the employment, children education, food and edible oil ration, housing and medical treatment etc.

BAOGONGTOU 包工头 - The private contractor

Preface

Several books and many articles, on the subject of internal migration in China have been published in the field of sociology and development economics, especially since the late 1970s. However, for various reasons, the studies of this area in China, by comparison with other developing countries, are relatively superficial.

In 1990, a research project called "Rural Surplus Labour and its Employment Exploration" was set up in China, undertaken by the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Development Centre of the State Council. It was a great honour for the author to have the permission of the leading group of this project for an independent investigation in the sample areas of the project, and other areas in China. From February to July 1992, I visited Shuangmiao Village in Qianshan County, Anhui Province, Xianfeng Village and Kangle Village in Dingxi County, Gansu Province, Tianliao Village and Xiting Village in Changnan County, Zhejiang Province and, Longgang Zhen in Wenzhou Region, Zhejiang Province, where I conducted a questionnaire survey among 300 households. All the numerical data and coding data collected from the questionnaires were later put into a computer database, which, together with other data and materials, provided first hand information about rural-urban and rural-rural migration in China after 1980.

The model built up in this thesis is a multi-disciplinary model based on the author's documentary research in the disciplines of sociology/anthropology and development

economics. My particular focus and my critique concerns two sociological theories illustrated by Revanstein and Lee and two economic models inferred by Lewis and Todaro, which have been widely quoted in the literature of migration.

There are altogether six chapters. The first chapter is a review of the literature of internal migration both in developed and developing countries, and a brief introduction to and critique of the four migration models. The main task of the second chapter is to hypothesise a set of social/anthropological and economic variables and their relationships to the internal migration decision, and to build up a multi-disciplinary internal migration model. In the third and fourth chapters, a detailed description of the field study in the five villages, one town and one city is given and a qualitative analysis follows. The fifth chapter is the quantitative analysis, testing the model to see whether or not there is correlation between the hypothesised independent variables and the making of the internal migration decision. Finally, a conclusion and some proposals for further research are given in the sixth chapter.

Although the latest research on this subject conducted by Chinese academics has been taken into account, the theoretical framework of this thesis is based on the literature from the West, which was mainly developed from the societies dominated by the free market system and capitalist institutions. Will this research methodology be applicable to China where the central planning system and socialist institutions predominate? My answer would be negative if the question were applied before 1980. But since 1980 the situation in China has been transformed in the direction of the market mechanism. The HUKOU system, which was a main barrier to internal migration in China, could no longer restrict people's movement from place to place, due to the abolition of the ration of grain and edible oil to the urban citizen. Then my answer herein is that there is, and will be no big

difference between China and other developing countries in the context of internal migration. Therefore, the author is confident that western methodology in connection with the research on internal migration is applicable to China. However, this should not lead to an assumption that the author altogether agrees with the present theories concerning internal migration in developing countries. On the contrary, the author considers that any development theory, including migration theories, should be based on reality and practice in the developing countries, which is utterly different from developed economies. This is a main guideline of this thesis.

In the West, after the Industrial Revolution, rural-urban migration was closely linked to industrialisation. In the eighteenth century, when the whole world was still sleeping in the feudalist agricultural period, a great revolution - the Industrial Revolution - began to take place in Europe which was to change the whole world. With the invention of the steam engine and its application to production, productivity improved drastically. Under the colonial, or free trade system which was enforced by warship and gun, western industrial products could be dumped everywhere. They met with almost no competitors and tariff barriers. In other words, the western countries had the whole world as their market at that time. So the textile industry in Manchester could grow at a rate of 8-10% continuously for more than half a century. By contrast with the present day, at that time technology was mainly labour intensive. So expansion just meant an increased labour demand. Therefore, those who had originally been peasants, voluntarily or involuntarily, rushed into the cities to become industrial workers. Industrialisation not only attracted, or forced the rural labour force to the cities but also made agricultural mechanisation in the West possible. Take Britain for example, where the percentage of agricultural population declined from 35.9% in 1801 to 18.7% in 1861 and further to 8.7% in 1901. (Caleman, 1992. p.31) Over time, western European countries and some of the countries

they colonised became today's industrial economies. A miracle had happened in the West. Today, in the United States, the labour force remaining in the agricultural sector is only 4% of the total labour force. They not only produce enough agricultural products to feed the whole nation but have become one of the biggest exporters of agricultural products. As Todaro wrote: "Only a few years ago, rural-urban migration was viewed favourably in the economic development literature. Internal migration was thought to be a natural process in which surplus labour was gradually withdrawn from the rural sector to provide needed manpower for urban industrial growth. The process was deemed socially beneficial since human resources were being shifted from locations where their social marginal products were often assumed to be zero to places where this marginal product was not only positive but also rapidly growing as a result of capital accumulation and technological progress." (Todaro 1989, 274.) This means that the process of industrialisation, urbanisation or modernisation in the West is largely a process of rural-urban migration too.

But, too often, the historical background of the relationship between industrialisation and rural-urban migration has been forgotten by teachers or academics writing papers on this subject. When some distinguished scholars talk about unlimited labour supplies from agriculture in the developing nations they have clearly neglected the absolute number of the total population and agricultural population in the West at that time. For instance, in Britain, the number one industrial country in the world at that time, the total population in 1800 was only 9,287,000 according to the estimation of Malthus, which was less than the present population of Shanghai, China. The agricultural labour force in England and Wales in 1831 was only 1,243,000 (Mitchell, Abstract of British Historical Statistics. 1962.). Furthermore, due to high infant mortality, the population growth rate was very

low though the fertility rate was not low. The demographic data of Finland[1] shows us that the fertility rate in 1785-1790 was 3.8% and mortality rate was 3.2% and, therefore, the natural growth rate was only 0.6%. With stable social and economic development, when medical technology improved, contributing directly to the decline of the mortality rate, the people in the West also began to desire more leisure time, and the women preferred to work rather than to be housewives. All these factors led to the decline in the fertility rate in the West as well. If we calculate the population growth rate as F - M = P, where F is fertility rate, M is mortality rate and P is net growth rate then the trend of population growth in Finland during the last two hundred years or so is: 3.8% - 2.4% = 1.4% (1825-1830); 2.9% - 1.7% = 1.2% (1910-1915); 1.3% - 1.0% = 0.3% (1970-1976) (See Shen Yi Liang, 1981). The situation in England and Wales was the same, from 1701 to 1801, although the average fertility rate was 3.6% the average net population growth rate was only 0.46%, due to the high average mortality rate which was 3.14%.(Jackson, 1982) Probably the situation would not have been significantly different in other European countries at that time. From this we can see that rural-urban migration in the West during the last one hundred years or more was taking place in conditions of a small population base with a low growth rate on the one hand, and expansion in industry with the whole world as a market on the other.

However, these two advantageous conditions were entirely reversed when all developing countries began to develop their economies. After the Second World War, the populations of the developing nations were much bigger than those of the western nations one hundred years or more earlier. Owing to the expansion of medical knowledge, the mortality rate in the developing nations has declined sharply but the fertility rate has not dropped simultaneously. As a result, the developing nations have experienced, and are

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[1] The demographic data of Finland collected by Sen Yiliang is relatively completed during that period - Author.

still experiencing a population explosion. The population growth rate for many developing nations has been, and still is, about 3%. According to a World Development Report, 1991, many low income countries like Kenya, Sudan, Liberia, Togo, Zambia and Tanzania have recorded annual population growth rates higher than 3% from 1965 to 1989. The average population growth rate for all low income economies during the same period was 2.3%, for middle income economies it was 2.3% and for low middle income economies 2.5%. Big populations with a high growth rate have become disadvantageous for most developing nations in the development of their economies on the one hand. And the world market, on the other hand, is no longer free for the late comers. Developing nations have to face all the trade barriers and protectionist policies enforced by western countries. Consequently, the expansion of their industry has been constrained. A big population with a high population growth rate leads to a large labour supply whereas constraints on the expansion of industry mean limited labour demand. This is exactly the situation which exists in most of the developing nations. Take China for example, (excluding Taiwan) where the agricultural labour force almost doubled from 173,170,000 in 1952 to 330,000,000 in 1983 but the cultivated land has always been about 2,600,000 mu (Statistical Year Book of China, 1986) Let's assume technological progress is a dummy variable (it is rather difficult to estimate how much unemployment was caused by the progress of agricultural technology although no one has denied this argument) and employment was full in 1952, then rural unemployment or underemployment in China would be 156,830,000. According to the classical theory of economics, we could expect industry in China to absorb all the surplus labour force of agriculture as long as incomes in the industrial sector were higher than in the agricultural sector. Actually, industry in China has been expanding at an annual rate of 13% in the last four decades. But all the labour force it needed during the period, based on such a fast expansion, turned out to be only equivalent to the total urban labour force supply during that period. Chinese industry absorbed only a tiny part, if any, of the rural labour force. Of course, in the last

ten years or so Xiang and Zhen Enterprises have been significantly developed and they successfully created 96.1 million jobs by 1991. (Statistical Year Book of Xiang and Zhen Enterprises in China, 1992, The Department of Xiang and Zhen Enterprises, Agricultural Ministry) But this is another issue which I will illustrate in the third chapter.

The examples mentioned above reveal the essential issue for the discussion of rural-urban migration in the developed countries one hundred years or more ago and in the developing countries in the post-war era. The agricultural labour force in Britain was 1,243,000 in 1831. In China, it was 173,170,000 in 1952. Even though British industry had absorbed 80-90% of its agricultural labour force, it was only something like one million people. But 1% of the Chinese agricultural labour force in 1952 would have been 1.7 million! However, this essential issue has not been given enough attention by some researchers in the west. Many economics models dealing with internal migration assume that peasants in the developing countries are well educated and informed, that they could make rather complicated calculations of the benefits and the costs of their mobility decision. (See the text books of Economics of Development like Todaro's, Gillis's, Thirlwall's, Myers's and etc.) It may be correct to apply this assumption to the developed countries but it is not realistic where the developing countries are concerned. In his research into modern migration in West Africa S. Amin points out: "A comparative costs and benefits analysis, conducted at the microeconomic level of the migrant, has no significance. In fact it only gives the appearance of objective rationality to a 'choice' (that of the migrant) which in reality does not exist because, in the given system, he has no alternatives... when the migrant is driven from his village by private appointment of his land, his 'income' is zero. So this analysis is nothing but a pretentious tautology, which does not teach us anything. (Amin 1974: 100)" His comments are not exceptional but applicable to most developing nations. In some cases, the migrant's marginal income in his/her original place is not only zero but negative, and his/her probability of finding a job

from the industrial sector in the destination area is also close to zero although the expected income could still be assumed, say by Todaro's model. When the likelihood of getting this expected income is zero, or near zero, then this so-called expected income would be nothing but an illusion. If the peasants in the developing countries could really estimate the probability coefficient of finding a job and then calculate the income they could expect in the city, then they would prefer to stay at home rather than move. But the fact is that in the developing countries people still move from rural areas to urban areas. Therefore, the question is why do they still move? To answer this question, one needs firstly to look into the practices of the developing countries to get a better understanding of the local situations which include local history, culture, society and the economy. Only by looking at the practice of the developing countries in a comprehensive way, can one establish certain theories about rural-urban migration, build certain migration models, and find certain rules of rural urban migration there.

I am very grateful to the Social Science Department of City University for allowing me to take part in this exciting work by offering me their facilities and expertise.

A special note of thanks is due to Mr. Liu Zhongyi, the Minister of Agriculture for giving me the chance to join the research project of rural surplus labour force in China which is jointly sponsored by the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Labour and the Development Research Centre.

The field study would have been more difficult had it not been helped by Mr. Cu Zhigao, Mr. Tian Baozheng, Mr. Su Hui, Mr. Li Huichuang and Mr. Lin Qianquan who were my field guides in the villages of Shuangmiao, Xianfeng, Kangle, Tianliao, Xiting and the town of Longgang. I would also like to express my sincere thanks for some financial support offered by the Great Britain-China Centre in London for the field study.

My final and most sincere thanks should be reserved for Dr. Stephan Feuchtwang. Without his generous support and serious supervision this thesis would never have been possible.

CHAPTER I Introduction

Human migration is an activity which involves people's economic calculations, their living conditions, their local sociological situation, their geographical constraints, cultural and historical factors. Therefore a multi-disciplinary theoretical hypothesis is assumed and both quantitative and qualitative methodologies have been adopted in this research. The merit of this multi-disciplinary model is that it will not neglect or miss an essential influential factor which dominates migration activity in one particular area. For instance, in area A the order of a range of variables which influence migration activity could be **Economic (E), Social (S), Historical (H)** etc.. But in area B and C the order could be **S E H** and **H S E**. From a purely economic model the situation in the area B and C won't be explained accurately. It would be the same for a purely sociological model and etc. Variables, under some particular circumstances, could be dropped or added in the model proposed here.

Based on a theoretical hypothesis, 28 questions were designed for a person to person questionnaire. For instance, in the questionnaire (see the appendix at the end of this chapter) there are some conventional questions with respect to migration research about the informant's gender, age, birth place, time they have lived in the original place, marriage status and educational level. Then some particular questions follow. Take question No. 11 for example, which asks the informant the place of destination and its name. The intention is to investigate data and information about the distance. So the answer in part **a** could be 外村 (wai cun) which means outside the village but within the county, or 外县 (wai xian) which means outside the county but within the province and 外省 (wai sheng) which means outside the province. This is in order to define the geographical distance. Then in part **b** the nature of migration activity whether or not it is rural-urban or rural-rural is defined by the answers of **village** 村, **town/city** 城镇 and **city** 城市. Here the definition of rural means all the places where people hold a rural Hukou (农

村户口). The places where people hold an urban Hukou (城市户口) belong to "urban". So in this questionnaire the **village** in the questionnaire not only means the villages but includes the marketing town (集镇) where the residents hold the rural Hukou. The **town** in the questionnaire, and in the whole thesis means administrative town (建制镇) where the residents hold urban Hukou and the **city** means (市). After that the questions No.12, 13 and 14 are designed to investigate the economic impact on the informant's household either in a positive or negative way by asking him/her whether or not he/she took money with him/her when he/she migrated out, or whether or not his/her family has sent him/her money, and how often and how much money he/she has sent back. Questions No. 15, 22, 23 are aimed at obtaining information as to whether or not this particular person's out migration affects the household's agricultural production. In this thesis an innovational variable - attraction gap (see Chapter III) is included in the model and the question No. 18 is designed for this particular purpose. Whether or not his/her decision to move out is determined by his/her household's income level is reflected in question No. 19. The purpose of questions No. 24, 25 is to test the influential level of contacts in the discussion to migrate. Question No. 26 asks the question has an historical factor played a role.

By and large, the task of the questionnaire is to obtain data for the purpose of testing the validity and merit of rural-urban and rural-rural migration theoretical models in this thesis.

The method of choosing the samples is random sampling. The households which had at least one family member migrating out at the time when this survey was conducted in the villages were all target households. So the first thing that had to be done to select the samples was to find out the total number of migration households as the numerator. Then according to the size of the village the designed numbers of 50 for small village (up to 200 households), 80 for medium (200-300 households) and 100 for big village (300+ households) were given as the denominator to get the random number. Finally the sampling households were selected. The 60% minimum responding rate was given which means if the responding rate turned out to be less than 60% then a supplementary sample

selecting process would be taken. In this survey in the five villages none of them recorded less than a 60% responding rate. Although the samples chosen were households which had a very close relationship with individual migration behaviour the actual research object in this thesis is each individual migrant. The reason for taking the household rather than each individual migrant as the sample unit was that this was the most effective way to find each individual on the one hand, and on the other hand each individual's family economic, historical background could also be obtained through the survey. So most variables designed in the models were to observe the relationship between each individual's action and their related influential factors. A household's economic, social and historical background are only some of the factors which influence the individual's action.

Altogether five villages and one town were chosen. They were Shuangmiao Village (双庙村) in Anhui Province, Xianfeng Village (先锋村) and Kanle Village (康乐村) in Gansu Province and Xiting Village (西厅村), Tianliao Village (田辽村) and Longgang Town (龙港镇) in Zhejiang Province. It is well known that in 1992 any questionnaire survey in China conducted by Western scholars, or by Chinese scholars studying and working in the West in the field of social sciences were subject to great suspicion by the Educational Ministry. So I had to rely on my personal contacts in China to conduct this questionnaire survey. Fortunately, the father of one of my friends, Mr Liu Zhongyi was the Minister of Agriculture and I read in the "China Daily" that the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Labour and the Development Centre of the State Council (两部一中心) had just started a joint research project in 1991 called "Rural Surplus Labour and its Employment" (农村剩余劳动力的开发). So I wrote a letter to Mr Liu explaining my interest in this project and requesting him do me a favour by offering me a chance to do some investigation in the pilot areas selected by this project. I received a reply from the Law and Regulation Department (法规司) which was in charge of this project saying that they would be happy to co-operate with me. These five villages then were recommended by this department taking into consideration the geographic and economic developmental differences within China. Although the villages and town in Zhejiang Province could reflect the situation along the coastal areas, the village in Anhui could reflect the mid parts

and the villages in Gansu could reflect the poor and remote areas in China the author has no intention to exploring the whole situation of rural-urban and rural-rural migration in China. What the author really intends to do, through the villages selected from different parts of China which reflect the different levels of social and economic development, different local culture and custom is to obtain data and information to test the multi-disciplinary theoretical models of migration. The models could later be applied to other parts of China, even other developing countries should their merit and validity be proved. However, the five villages recommended by the Law and Regulation Department cover the coastal area, the muntainous area in the mid part of the country and the remote area in Northwest China and it was a reasonable selection for the purpose of research. So far as Longgang Town is concerned, I visited it by chance because I went to Zhejiang together with the staff of the Agricultural and Labour ministries. They were to conduct an investigation in that town and I was told that it was worth having a look since this town is an exceptional case in terms of migration and urbanisation research. I joined their investigation and then included it in my research although it was not planned before.

During the survey, guides were employed. The initial intention was to hire them as the interpreters since the local dialects in Anhui and Zhejiang were rather difficult to follow. All the guides I selected were high middle school graduates. The guide in Shuangmiao, Mr. Chu Zhigao did a population survey for the national population census. In the end he became my assistant. Mr. Tian Baozheng was an accountant in Xianfeng Village and helped me a great deal in terms of statistical information. Mr. Lin was a member of staff of the Agricultural Technology and Mechanics Department of Changnan County 苍南县 and was very familiar with the situation in the two villages of Xiting and Tianliao where we went. So it turned out to be a great success that they not only offered a good interpretation service but arranged my investigation in a very efficient way. For instance, in Anhui I chose one hundred households which were spread over 19.6 square kilometres of muntainous area. If the No.1 household is in the east part of the village and No.2 is in the west part then it would have taken me more than half a day to walk from No.1 household to No.2 household. Sometimes the chosen household was not available at that

particular time, so I had to go to another household. So my guide arranged my visiting route in a very efficient way which allowed me to finish my survey much earlier than I had planned. Furthermore, when the informants had difficulty to follow or understand my questions the guide would help me to explain in the local dialect. They could also tell me if the information which I got was true or not according to their own information and previous observation.

Some particular comments about Chapter IV and V should be made. In spite of questionnaire investigation the author also took notes about the general and specific economic, cultural and sociological situations of each village. All this descriptive information and new findings in addition to the questionnaire survey have been organised into Chapter IV. A special introduction about the exceptional case of migration which took place in Longgang Town has also been added in this chapter. In other words, the task of Chapter IV is to deliver any findings which were not included in the hypothesis although some processed statistical data are also used in this chapter. Then Chapter V is to test each variable in the model to see whether they are accepted or rejected and then explain the reasons why.

In the thesis the income difference between rural and urban is an important factor influencing the decision to migrate. However, there are some arguments as to whether or not the scissors gap between urban income and rural income exists in China. According to Chai ".... Piecing together the evidence of rural and urban income inequality, the urban-rural consumption gap and the share of the real urban population, the overall consumption disparity appears to have remained relatively stable or even declined slightly in the first phase of reform, mainly due to the reduction of the urban-rural consumption gap and urban income inequality. But from 1985, with a widening urban-rural consumption gap, and increasing income inequality within the urban and rural sectors, as well as a rise in the share of the non-agricultural population, the overall consumption disparity has been rising again." (p.741, The China Quarterly, No.131, September 1992) But some consider that, due to the urban fast inflation factor, the real income in urban areas has not been as high as

people thought hitherto. Therefore, the urban-rural income gap should be re-estimated. I am not going to discuss the detailed disputes about this subject since this is not the task of this thesis. However, some explanation is necessary because whether or not there is an income gap between the rural and urban areas does affect rural-urban migration in China.

First of all, I consider that rural income in China should be roughly divided into three categories which include rural income in prosperous areas, middle level areas and poor areas. In the prosperous rural areas like Jiangsu and Zhejiang rural income from 1978 to 1991 increased significantly. The annual income growth rate during this period was 15% for Jiangsu and 15.3% for Zhejiang. (see the table below) In a city like Shanghai the average annual salary for an ordinary young worker in 1978 was about 480 yuan and it increased to 3,375 yuan in 1991.(ZGTJNJ 中国统计年鉴, 1993) The annual income growth rate from 1978 to 1991 was 16%. So in this case, the income gap between Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shanghai has been stable, once the inflation difference[2] factor between the two regions is taken into account. For some areas like Shengze Zhen

AGRICULTURAL HOUSEHOLD NET INCOME PER CAPITA BY REGION

(Yuan)

Region	1978	1980	1985	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Jiangsu	152.10	217.94	492.60	626.48	796.76	875.70	959.06	920.72
Zhejiang		219.18	548.60	725.13	902.36	1010.72	1099.04	1210.77
Hebei	91.50	175.78	385.23	444.40	546.62	589.40	621.67	657.38
Shangdong	101.20	194.33	408.12	517.69	583.74	630.56	680.18	764.04
Gansu	98.40	153.33	255.22	296.14	339.88	365.89	430.98	446.42
Qinghai			342.95	392.15	492.82	457.52	559.78	555.52

AGRICULTURAL HOUSEHOLD LIVING EXPENDITURE PER CAPITA

(Yuan)

	1978	1980	1985	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Total of living expenditure	116.06	162.21	317.42	398.29	476.66	535.37	584.63	619.79

Source: ZGTJNJ 中国统计年鉴, 1993. The Statistical Bureau of China.

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[2]. Chinese government did not announce any inflation figure for the sake of its so-called socialist nature. However, the inflations between Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang during that period were not much different. They were all around 15% annually, according to the estimate of the food consumption given by local people.

(盛泽镇), Wujiang City where the annual income growth was as high as 22% during the same period, the gap narrowed. However, the situation in a poor area is quite different. The Table above shows that in a remote area like Gansu the income per capita in 1991 was only 446.42. The gap in the income per capita between Gansu and the nation-wide average urban area in 1978 was the difference between 98.40 yuan and 615 yuan (516.6 yuan) and it increased to 446.42 yuan and 2,340 yuan (1,893.58 yuan) in 1991. The income per capita gap between Gansu and Shanghai in 1991 was 446.42 yuan and 3,375 yuan (2,928.58 yuan). Of course, it is well known that official data in China always play down the urban inflation factor. But the huge income gap between Gansu and Shanghai is there, even if we take the inflation factor in Shanghai into account. So I consider it would be reasonable to take note of the changing situation in terms of income gap between the prosperous rural areas and the urban areas whilst recognising the big income gap between poor rural areas and the urban areas in China. In this thesis the income gap between rural origin and urban destination is calculated separately for each village.

At the time when this thesis was finished in December, 1993, research in connection with internal migration in China depended mainly on second hand materials and data, which means that investigations and surveys either went to the county level and used the reports and statistical data there, or asked the village officials to fill in questionnaires for them. The big research projects like "Collection of survey data from one hundred villages 全国百村劳动力情况调查资料分析 " (Chinese Statistical Press, 1989.) "China Migration of 74 Cities and Towns Sample Survey data 中国 74 城镇人口迁移调查研究报告 " (Ma Xia, Special Issue Population Sciences of China, June, 1988) which covered the whole country were all finished within a few months. Like many other Chinese social scientific studies these researches were conducted at the macro level and aimed at finding out the so-called common rule of internal migration in China in order to help the government to make appropriate policies. So although the surveys cover 74 cities and towns, and one hundred villages, their research object, as a matter of fact, took China as a whole.(see Chapter II, **The Migration Studies in China**) This dessertation, on the contrary, concerns five micro-studies to test a general, theoretical model.

Although several village studies have been conducted by Western anthropologists there had been no single person to person questionnaire survey conducted in villages in China by Western scholars on migration at the time when this survey was carried out. Research articles like "Urbanization in China, 1982-87: Effects of Migration and Reclassification" written by Sidney Goldstein (p.673-672, Population and Development Review 16, No.4 December 1990) which has been widely quoted in the research on migration in China was mainly based on second and third hand data and materials offered either by Chinese official units like the State Statistical Bureau or the outcome of research conducted by Chinese research units and individuals which have been mentioned in the previous paragraph in this chapter. At the end of this article, Goldstein stressed:

> "*The foregoing evaluation of the effects of reclassification and migration on the size and characteristics of China's urban and rural populations indicates that urbanization in China means something far different from what may be implied by an uncritical acceptance of the official statistics on changes in population, and in the levels and rate of urbanization. Great caution must therefore be exercised in using these official statistics to assess the inter-relations between urbanization, migration, and development in China. Absent such caution, it might be erroneously concluded that urbanization has minimal connection to development and modernization in China, or that the Chinese have found a way to achieve high levels of urbanization while also controlling migration to urban areas and rapid urban growth.*".

The **great caution** mentioned by Goldstein has been strictly exercised in this research. So given the situation in the research on internal migration in China up to the end of 1993 when this thesis was completed, there were no Chinese or Western scholars conducting person to person investigations at the village level on the caurses of internal migration in China, which this research did. Although this research, due to time and financial constraints could only conduct a questionnaire survey of 350 households, the author did spend eight months in the villages and interviewed the informants in person. Therefore, with the help of the guides, this survey avoided inaccurate information as far as possible.

The attention of this thesis is focused on the difference between the different areas in the matters of economy, society, culture and level of the development. Instead of looking for a common rule for internal migration in China, the author is trying to find different influential variables in different regions through a multidisciplinary model, as shown both in the hypothesis and the findings of the thesis, which affect migration behaviour in different ways. Therefore, the theoretical background and research methodology of this thesis are very different from their Chinese counterparts. The author hopes that this work will play a bridging role between western and Chinese research. The author believes that it would not be an exaggeration to claim this piece of work is pioneering research based on first hand data and information in the area of rural-urban and rural-rural migration in China. Therefore, there is no comparison to be found from either Chinese or Western studies in this subject.

Questionnaire

RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION AND ITS IMPACT ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA

This questionnaire is part of an academic research. It aims to investigate and understand the social and economic factors which influence project rural-urban migration behaviour. It also aims to explore the impact on migration behaviour on rural and urban economic development. The outcome of this questionnaire should offer valuable materials and data for theoretical analysis which could help to lead this human behaviour in a positive direction.

Your co-operation would be warmly appreciated.

Respondent's

Name:

Gender:

Age:

Occupation:

Education:

1.a) Has any of your family member lived outside of this village in the last five years?

Yes 1 No 2

b) What his/her name?

2. Gender

Male 1 Female 2

3. His/her relationship with the head of household.

(See the family relationship coding)

4.a) How old was he/she when he/she left the village?

Age:

b) When was he/she born

Date_____Month_____Year_____

c) His/her birth place

This village 1 Other village 2 Other town/city 3

5. How long did he/she live in this village before he/she left?

_____years and _____months

6. How long haven't you seen him/her since his/her last visit?

_____years and _____months

7. Can you tell me when will he/she come back?

3 months	1	6 months	2
1 year	3	1 year+	4
Don't know	9		

8. His/her marriage status

Married	1	Single	2
Widow	3	Divorce	4
Separated	5	Other (specified)	6
Don't know	9		

9. How many years has he/she studied in the school?

_____years

10.a) The reasons he/she left the village (choose three most important reasons in order)

Work transfer	01	Unemployment	02
Poor income	03	Bad job	04
To do business	05	For better income	06
Got better offer	07	For education	08
For children's education	09	Marriage	10
Join the family	11	Move with the parents	12
Social contacts	13	Poor environment	14
Poor living standard	15	Other (specify)	16
Don't know	99		

11.a) Where did he/she go?

Other village	1	Other county	2	Other province	3

b) What kind of place?

Village	1	Town	2	City	3

12.a) How much money did he/she take with him/her when he/she left? (if no go to 13.)

_____yuan

b) The money came from:

Own saving	01
Family saving	02
The gift from the relatives/friends	03
Borrow from the relatives/friends	04
Loan from the bank	05
From employer	06
Sale of the house	07
Other (specify)	08

Don't know 09

13.a) Have you or other of your family members ever sent him/her parcel or money?

Yes 1 No 2

b) Why?

For his/her living	01
Investment	02
Gifts	03
To buy things back	04
To buy house/apartment	05
To pay the debt	06
Tuition	07
Travel	08
Other (specify)	10
Don't know	09

14.a) Has he/she ever sent money back?

Yes 1 No 2 (go to 15.)

b) Altogether how much has he/she sent back?

_____yuan

c) How long did it take him/her to send money back after his/her leaving?

_____Months_____Years

d) Does he/she often send money back?

Often 1 Not often 2 When we ask 3

15. Was the money used for the following items?

Tools for agricultural production	Yes	1	No	2	Don't know	9
Fertiliser	Yes	1	No	2	Don't know	9
Non-agri equipment	Yes	1	No	2	Don't know	9
Tuition	Yes	1	No	2	Don't know	9
Pay the debt	Yes	1	No	2	Don't know	9
For other family member fee of moving out	Yes	1	No	2	Don't know	9
Building the house	Yes	1	No	2	Don't know	9

Other (specify) Yes 1 No 2 Don't know 9

16. What is the monthly income of his/her relatives or friends in the city?

_____yuan

17. What was his/her monthly income when he/she was her?

_____yuan

18.a) Will you still go if your income would be lower than your friends/relatives although it is slightly higher than your income here?

Yes 1 No 2 (go to b)

b) How much will be high enough to let you make decision to go?

_____yuan

19. Your household's total income last year

_____yuan

20. Your household's total expenditures last year

_____yuan

21. Your household's labour force situation

a)	Before 1980	Not sufficient	1	All right	2	Surplus	3
b)	After 1980	Not sufficient	1	All right	2	Surplus	3

22. Would you mind to tell me the annual agricultural output in the last five years?

(take the note)

23. Has his/her absent affected the agricultural production?

Yes 1 No 2 Don't know 9

24. Under the circumstances when the income would be similar, what kind of place will you go if you want to go?

The city with long distance (have relatives/friends)	01
The city with long distance (have no relative/friends)	02
The city with short distance (have relatives/friends)	03
The city with short distance (have no relatives/friends)	04
Don't know	99

25. Was he/she introduced by the relatives or friends to go there?

Relative 1 Friend 2 Self 3

26.a) Has any of his/her family member emigrated before 1958?

Yes (go to b) 1 No 2

b) It was his/her

(see the relationship coding)

27. Has his/her neighbour or village fellow ever emigrated out in the last ten years?

a) Yes (go to b) 1 No 2

b) When?

Year_____

28. Has he/she written or visited home often?

Yes 1 No 2

PS

If the respondent himself/herself is an emigrant then the second version would be used which just change he/she into you.

CHAPTER II. Human Migration and Its Literature

"White storks travel by cross-country soaring between Europe and their winter haunts in Africa, an average distance of about 7,000 km."

"Manx shearwaters: Average chicks have a fuel ratio close to 40% and it is probable that many young birds cover the autumn flight from Britain to Brazil, almost 10,000 km."

"Common buzzards Buteo buteo vulpine, covering the 10,000 km journey between East Europe/West Siberia and South Africa."

"The most extensive migrants are the grey, humpback, blue, fin and mink whales. The distance covered annually on a return migration between latitudinal limits in each hemisphere of e.g., 20 degree and 65 degree, would be between 5,000 and 6,000 nautical miles."

D. J. Aidley

For the purpose of survival and reproduction, all the creatures of the world know how to move or, how to migrate. The ape, from which human beings evolved, also migrated from the forest to the plain, from the north to the south and from place to place in order to cope with climatic change, to avoid natural disasters etc. Migration in the first place is a natural instinct rather than a skill or a knowledge which has to be learned. Apes had no ideas at all about shopping, savings and investment, but they knew how to migrate! Human beings are no longer animals. They have evolved into a civilised species and created a modern world which contains history, culture, politics economics and etc., but many of their natural instinct remain. The motivation for thousands and thousands of

wildebeest in Africa to migrate from the south to the north and then from the north to the south is very simple. They are moving for their survival. So do human beings. If their essential living environments are endangered they simply move. Of course the migration of human beings is no longer as simple as that, because on the whole they no longer live in a primitive environment. Their behaviours are influenced by various social and economic factors. For this, Przaworski and Teune gave a very detailed list of the factors influencing migration. "...such variables may be (1) historical: e.g., characterised by whether a country has a French or British colonial background...; (2) institutional: e.g., characterised by whether the country has ... a population policy with demographic objects; (3) external: e.g., relating to whether a country has a family planning association affiliated with the International Planned Parenthood federation; (4) behavioural: e.g., relating to the efficiency of the government and its ability to mobilise the village population for national purposes; (5) physical: characterised e.g., by whether a country has a terrain that makes internal communication difficult." (Przaworski & Teune 1970: 49-57) We can list more variables which also influence human migration. In other words, any of those factors could influence the decision of people to migrate.

For instance, in the Seventeenth century when Manchus conquered the Ming Dynasty many Chinese fled to Southeast Asia. Today we would call them political migrants. American blacks were shipped from their African motherland to America as slaves about two hundred years ago. We call these kind of migrants involuntary migrants. Europeans went to Australia and North America for a better life before the war. They could be considered economic migrants. Migration differs over time and from country to country. Even within a country it is different from region to region. For example the people in North Jiangsu and Anhui provinces in China have quite a long history of migrating from

rural areas to cities like Shanghai and Nanjing. But in Zhejiang and Jiangxi, the neighbouring provinces, the people are not keen to LI XIANG BEI JIN.[3]

All this reminds us to avoid over simplification and generalisation in our research. On the other hand, like any other socio-economic phenomenon, rural-urban migration in developing countries must have its own characteristics and rules which need to be analysed and studied.

The earliest research into migration can be dated back more than one hundred years, when the sociologist Ravenstein published his two seminal papers " The Laws of Migration" in the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society in 1885 and 1889. Unfortunately, after that migration research was, for a long time, at a low ebb by comparison with other subjects. After the Second World War, the subject gained the attention of sociologists and economists again. The trend of research into migration has coincided with the phenomenon itself. The dualistic socio-economic structure of the economic development of developing countries has made people move from the poor countries to rich countries, from peripheral areas to central areas and, from rural areas to the cities. Now there are hundreds of books and survey reports and thousands of papers about migration. Rural-urban migration has become an important constituent of courses in sociology, anthropology, development economics and the economics of transport.

Many important works about migration have been written by sociologists since the Second World War. Among these are Bogue (1959); Lee (1966); Elizsga (1972); Balan et al. (1973); Ritchey (1976); Findley (1977); DeJong and Gandner (1981) etc. They have considered a wide range of factors influencing individual and household migration decisions, including demographic factors such as age, sex, education, marriage, race,

[3] LI XIANG BEI JIN means to leave one's hometown for somewhere else.

household size and composition; geographic factors such as distance; socio-psychological factors such as the desire for wealth, status, comfort, stimulation, autonomy, affiliation and morality (See Psychological Clusters below); economic factors such as income, employment, cost and benefit; and attitudinal factors such as aspirations for improving one's socio-economic status, being close to friends and relatives and so on.

PSYCHOLOGICAL CLUSTERS OF MOTIVATION TO MIGRATE

Wealth:

- having a high income and a stable income
- having economic security in old age
- being able to afford basic needs; some luxuries
- having access to welfare payments and other economic benefits

Status:

- having a prestigious job
- being looked up to in the community
- obtaining a good education
- having power and influence

Comfort:

- having an "easy" job
- living in a pleasant community
- having ample leisure time
- having comfortable housing

Stimulation:

- having fun and excitement
- doing new things
- being able to meet a variety of people
- keeping active and busy

Autonomy:

- being economically independent
- being free to say and do what you want
- having privacy
- being on your own

Affiliation:

- living near family/friends
- being part of a group/community
- having a lot of friends
- being with spouse/prospective spouse

Morality:

- leading a virtuous life
- being able to practice religion
- exposing children to good influences
- living in a community with a favourable moral climate.

(Gordon F DeJong & James T. Farcett, 1981: 49-50)

Recent research on internal migration in the social sciences has mainly focused on issues of space, demography, and social and economic environments. In the following paragraphs my introduction and evaluation will mainly focus on these areas.

Geographers focus their research on the spatial problem. The main works in this field are Kosinski and Prothero (1975); Brown (1970); Mabogunje (1970); de Castro Lopo (1975); Courgeau (1976); Shaw (1975) and Bennett and Gade (1979). The difference between geographers and other social scientists is that their focus is not so much on who migrates or why, or on the consequences of migration, as on identifying spatial patterns and directions of movement. A significant part of human geography is referred to as economic geography, which examines economic determinants of migration at the regional or ecological level. The distance factor is inherent in geographical research and figures prominently in the well-known "gravity" model, in which migration between places is directly proportional to their mass and inversely proportional to the distance between them. They also talk about "centre-periphery models of economic development" and "diffusion of modernisation". Now, some are beginning to feel that such a proposition is mistaken and that the advantages of the core area have not spread to the periphery, given the existing political and economic frameworks. In this context the importance of the accessibility and availability of transportation and communication networks to facilitate and encourage movement is readily seen. The close linkage between the geographic and economic approaches to migration are also seen in the focus of geographic research on the role of differences in economic opportunities and government investments on population redistribution across areas or regions.

Demographers, in the literature of internal migration, tend to be content with empirical findings and not interested in analysis. A typical model concerning the demographic events would be:

$$P = (B - D) + (Mi - Mo) \qquad (1)$$

where P=population growth

B=births

D=deaths

Mi=in-migrations

Mo=out-migrations

Then the equation for the measurement of migration would be:

$$\text{Net Migration} = (\text{Population Growth}) - (\text{Natural Increase}) \quad (2)$$

In-migration rate = No. of in-migration in interval/Population at beginning of interval

(3)

Out-migration rate = No. of out-migration in interval/Population at end of interval.

(4)

The most common source of data on migration for demographers is a census or a sample survey of households. A second major source is a population registration system in which individuals must transfer their record or register in the new location when they

move. Mobility data from a census or survey usually takes the form of responses to one or two questions about a person's place of birth or place of residence one year, five years, or any given number of years ago.

So the demographic methodologies and models of migration show us that theoretical analyses have been neglected. That is why Vance, in his presidential address to the Population Association of America, entitled "Is Theory for Demographers?" asks "Is there room [in demography] for the bold and audacious?" (Vance 1952; 9-13) But on the other hand, we should recognise that this discipline gives us a more accurate picture of migration.

All economic models have an assumption of rationality which assumes that people are all ideal individual decision makers who act in their own interest within the economic system as far as their information and potential for operation in the market permits. Their inferences are all in the framework of equilibrium. Normally, they view wages, employment/unemployment, costs and benefits as influential factors for migration decisions. The best known literature in this field has been written by Lewis (1954); Fei and Ranis (1961); Byerlee (1974); Greenwood (1975, 1979); Todaro (1976, 1980); Bilsborrow (1976); Gande (1976); Stark (1979); Cebula (1979) and; DaVanzo (1981). Due to the exclusion of non-economic variables and the failure to analyse migration at the individual or household level, the level at which migration decisions are usually made, their policy orientation towards benefit and cost analysis quite often appears to have been exaggerated. Only in recent research, have some development economists like Todaro begun to pay attention to some non-economic variables and to take these into account.

The Migration Studies in China

The research on internal migration in China, up to the 1980s, was mainly focused on policy making. For instance, in Northeast China there had been the so-called MANGLIU problem. The meaning of MANGLIU in China is all those who move to the residential areas without their DANWEI[4] permission and therefore have no HUKOU. How to make a policy which could stop these MANGLIU and how to deport them back to their original place of residence was the main subject of research. The research during that period really belongs to administration work rather than to academic studies.

Since then research into migration has entered into a new phase which is characterised by detailed survey and serious theoretical analysis. Feng Lanrei and Jiang Weiyu in their article "A Comparative Study of Transferring Surplus Labour from Agriculture" postulated four Chinese models which are: BU LI XIANG BU LI TU (neither leave the rural residential areas nor the land) which means solving employment problems in the original place; LI XIANG BU LI TU (leave the residential areas while keeping the farm land) which means finding employment in the place of destination but still keep the farm land in the rural areas; LI TU BU LI XIANG (leave the farm land but not the rural areas) which means to migrate to nearby places to engage in non-agricultural activities and; LI XIANG YOU LI TU (leave the farm land and the rural areas entirely) which means long distance and permanent migration.(Feng Lanrei, Jiang Weiyu. SHE HUI KE XUE 1987; No.5) XIAO CHENG ZHEN (Small cities and small townships) is another main subject for rural surplus labour research.

However, the most exciting research concerning migration in China is "The Studies of Migration and Urbanisation in China" which was described by Ma Xia as:

We planned to reach following four aims through a very big urban migration survey.

1) Based on the outcome of the survey to provide the information and data of urban migration and mobility.

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[4] DANWEI means working unit.

2) **To summarise the experiences and lessons of urban migration and mobility since the liberation by analysing the information and data mentioned above.**

3) **Based on the analysis and summary of those data and the information, the theoretical framework would be given in the light of inherent essential connection between migration and mobility under the socialist system and the socialist economic development.**

4) **Finally, based on the experience summary and theoretical discussion, to raise the suggestions toward the policies of population migration and urban development in China.**

The survey was conducted through household questionnaire which was composed of **a)** the volume of urban migration and mobility; **b)** the destination of urban migration and mobility; **c)** the population structure of urban the migration and mobility; **d)** the causes of urban migration and mobility and **e)** the effect of urban migration and mobility. The survey began in July, 1987 and ended at the end of 1987. They chose 15 nuclear cities, 6 big cities, 12 medium cities, 10 small cities and 31 towns. It was called later on in the publication as "The Survey of Urban Migration in 74 cities and towns in China". In this survey, 23,895 households and 1,643 collective households were investigated, which covered the population of 4.35 million. "The Conference of Migration and Urbanisation in China" held at the end of 1987 was a direct result of this survey. 41 articles were selected by the Institute of Population Studies in the Chinese Social Sciences Academy into a publication named "The Studies of Population Migration and Urbanisation in China". In this collection Chinese scholars discuss the subject from various angles and raise many constructive points of view. By and large, research has exposed many new phenomena of rural-urban migration in China. However, this book also has shown that the investigations were more macro and policy oriented and were lack of detailed micro studies. I believe that more thorough, comprehensive and multidisciplinary studies should be carried out in the future.

The Definition of Migration

How do we identify migrants? Which group belong to rural-urban and rural-rural migration? Before my definition is given I would like to review some other definitions given by some scholars.

Lee defines every act of migration as involving an origin, a destination, and an intervening set of obstacles no matter how short or how long, how easy or how difficult. He prefers that "no restriction be placed upon the distance of the move or upon the voluntary or involuntary nature of the act, and no distinction be made between external and internal migration. Thus, a move across the hall from one apartment to another is counted just as much as an act of migration as a move from Bombay, India, to Cedar Rapids, Iowa, though, of course, the initiation and consequence of such moves are vastly different." (Lee 1966:49)

Thus, Lee underestimates differences of initiation and consequence of migration when he gives this definition of the subject. There would be no argument if we were just discussing the definition of the word **migration**. However, when we are discussing the definition of migration in the context of social scientific research, Lee's definition would not be helpful. In social scientific research migration is a social phenomenon. Migration can in no way be separated from its initiation and consequence. According to Lee's definition the research would mix people who just visit their friends and relatives together with migrants. During the time of Spring Festival, country residents in China visit their city friends and relatives and bring them their own agricultural products. They might live in the city for a month or so. However, they go to the city just for a visit rather than for a job. They do not give up their countryside work. If the migration census included these visitors, the number of migrants would be exaggerated and the outcome of research

about the social consequence of migration would be diluted. So I see serious defects in Lee's definition of migration for the purpose of this research.

Some researchers define migration as a relatively PERMANENT moving away of an individual or a collectivity from one geographical location to another preceded by decision-making on the part of the migrants on the basis of a hierarchically ordered set of values or valued ends and resulting in changes in the living place of the migrants. They consider human migration as the changing of the place of abode PERMANENTLY or, when temporarily, for an appreciable duration as e.g. in the case of seasonal workers. Migration, from their point of view, is used symbolically in the transition from one surrounding to another in the course of human life. (See Mangalam 1968; Weinberg 1961) This raises the question as to which kind of migrant could be considered permanent and which temporary, and to this they give no answer.

In the 1950s, due to the liberalisation of women in the cities in China, many housewives left their kitchens for factory jobs. As a result, many rural women came to the cities to take up the work left by the original housewives. But these rural women periodically went back home for various reasons and came back to work again. Take a nanny in my family as an example. She worked at my home in 1957 and went back to attend her husband's funeral. She stayed in the countryside for two years and then came back to work at my home again in 1959. Was she a permanent or a temporary migrant? Should she be included in or excluded from the census of rural-urban migration? According to the above definitions we can find no answer.

"We define migration as the physical transition of an individual or a group from one society to another. This transition usually involves abandoning one social setting and entering another and different one." (Eisenstadt 1953; 1) "Henceforth, we will use the

term 'migration' for the change of residence of an individual from one parish or commune to another." (Hagerstrand 1975; 28) "Change of community as an index of migration affords a very rough gauge of the meaning to be assigned to such indeterminate words as 'permanent' or 'significant' in the usual definition of migration - the relatively permanent movement of persons over a significant distance." (Petersen 1969; 254) All these comments about the definition of migration emphasise the change of the social surroundings or settings. The problem of all these definitions is whether people who move to other places for extra or better earnings for quite long periods but never change their social settings should be considered permanent migrants? What movements belong to relatively permanent and what distance is a significant distance?

The debate could be endless if we focus on these rather vague concepts of RELATIVELY, PERMANENTLY, SIGNIFICANTLY AND DISTANT and etc. But we must have a definition when we begin to discuss the subject of migration. As I mentioned before, since the subject in this thesis will be studied within the framework of the social sciences, we should take migration as a human behaviour with social consequence. For instance, a young woman who goes to Shanghai seeking work as a housekeeper is different from a person who just goes to Shanghai to visit his/her relative. This woman will be part of the labour force, no matter for how long, in the informal labour market in Shanghai. But a visitor will not! Based on this assumption, I will consider all the people who leave the countryside for the purpose of gaining better social-economic opportunities in the cities (including towns at the county level) as rural-urban migrants. The reason for such a simple definition is that this kind of movement from rural to urban areas will have social and economic consequences on the socio-economic development of a society, whether positive or negative.

SOME REEVALUATION AND CRITICISM OF FOUR INFLUENTIAL MODELS

Ravenstein and Lee represent two different periods of sociological theory about migration. As I said before, research on migration was at a period of low ebb. Ravenstein's research was the first thorough and theoretical work on migration before the low ebb period and Lee's general theory of migration was set up after the period. So these two works have often been quoted in sociological research on migration. In the economics of development, Lewis and Todaro represent classical and neo-classical schools of thought in this subject.

The following is a detailed discussion and some criticism of these models. Based on the re-evaluation and criticism of these models, I will raise my theoretical hypothesis for research on rural-urban migration in the second chapter.

Ravenstein's Laws of Migration:

According to Lee and Todaro, Ravenstein's laws of migration could be categorised as follows.

(1) Migration and Distance

The rate of migration between two points will be inversely related to the distance between these points. "The great body of our migrants only proceed a short distance" and "migrants enumerated in a certain centre of absorption will ... grow less as distance from the centre increases." (Ravenstein 1885; 198-199) Migrants who travel long distances will

tend to "go by preference to one of the great centres of commerce and industry." (Ravenstein 1885; 199)

(2) Migration by stages

"The inhabitants of the country immediately surrounding a town of rapid growth flock into it; the gaps thus left in the rural population are filled up by migrants from more remote districts, until the attractive force of one of our rapidly growing cities makes its influence felt, step by step, to the most remote corner of the kingdom." (Ravenstein 1885; 199) In other words, the currents of migration in which a country's inhabitants tend to move are first towards nearby towns, eventually gravitating towards the most rapidly growing cities.

(3) Stream and Counterstream

"Each main current of migration produces a compensating countercurrent." (Ravenstein 1885; 199) While rural-urban migration may dominate the over-all current or stream of migration there will always be a counterstream of reverse urban-rural migration so that net migration from point i to point j will always be less than gross migration between these two points.

(4) Urban-rural differences in propensity to migrate

"The natives of towns are less migratory than those of the rural parts of the country." (Ravenstein 1885; 199)

(5) Technology, Communications and Migration

Migration streams will have a built-in tendency to increase over time as a result of increases "in the means of locomotion and a development of manufactures and commerce" (Ravenstein 1889; 288)

(6) Dominance of the Economic Motive

"Bad or oppressive laws, heavy taxation, an unattractive climate, uncongenial social surroundings, and even compulsion (slave trade, transportation), all have produced and are still producing currents of migration, but none of these currents can compose in volume with that which arises from the desire inherent in most men to better themselves in material respects." (Ravenstein 1889; 286)

His first seminar paper in 1885 was mainly based on the evidence of England and Wales at that time, and he enlarged his data collection to Europe, North America and Australia in his second seminar paper in 1889. From this we can see that Ravenstein focused his attention on geographical factors such as distance in relationship to migration. His (1)-(4)comments, were later developed by some scholars into geographical diffusing models, chain models and gravity models. Although he mentioned the propensity of migration his argument was rather vague. Only in 1889, when he gave his second seminar paper, did his point about the relationship between migration and economic and technological development become clear. It is no exaggeration to say that Ravenstein's work on migration was not developed in any significant way until the 1960s, as Lee pointed out in his 1966 paper, entitled "Theory of Migration", saying:

"In the three-quarters of a century which have passed, Ravenstein has been much quoted and occasionally challenged. But, while there have been literally

thousands of migration studies in the meantime, few additional generalisations have been advanced. True, there have been studies of age and migration, sex and migration, race and migration, distance and migration, education and migration, the labour force and migration, and so forth; but most studies which focused upon the characteristics of migrants have been conducted with little reference to the volume of migration, and few studies have considered the reasons for migration or the assimilation of the migrant at destination."

Above all, Ravenstein's work is extremely impressive since at the time when he wrote his two seminar papers there was neither a precedent in the theory of this subject which could be followed nor were these complete data available. Even nowadays, some of his conclusions about migration are still valid and have room for further development. However, because his work was done a hundred years or more ago, its over generalisations and lopsidedness have become more and more obvious.

His two seminar papers are both entitled "The Laws of Migration". The obvious question is whether or not what he illustrated are laws. Actually, Ravenstein himself gave a specious rather than a clear explanation of the meaning of his laws. In his second paper he says: "Of course I am perfectly aware that our laws of population, and economic laws generally, have not the rigidity of physical laws, as they are continually being interfered with by human agencies." (Ravenstein 1889; 241) Here, he only pointed out the difference between his laws and physical laws but failed to give a further explanation of the meaning of his laws. Why did he give the name laws rather than other norms? In his papers he didn't give any explanation. So, according to the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society of June 1889, the criticism from Mr. Humphreys, in the discussion of Ravenstein's seminar, was "After carefully reading Mr. Ravenstein's former paper, and listening to the

present one, he arrived at the conclusion that migration was rather distinguished for its lawlessness than for having any definite law." Mr. Humphreys was to some extent right. In his general conclusion, Ravenstein used principles, laws and causes to describe one similar concept. His two long seminar papers described the characteristics of migration rather than the laws. He even contradicted his own argument at times. For example, his migration by stages law contradicts his economic motive to migrate illustration. He mentions: "It is thus that the surplus population of one part of the country drifts into another part, where the development of industry and commerce, or the possibility of producing productive land still in a state of nature, call for more hands to labour. But how is this call supplied? Suppose there exists a surplus of labour in one province and a deficiency in another, whilst the intervening provinces are able to find remunerative occupation for all their inhabitants. Will the labourer, in search of work, travel across these intervening provinces, in order to supply to deficiency? I say, no!" (Ravenstein 1889; 286) Although he pointed out an economic motive "which arises from the desire inherent in most men to 'better' themselves in material respects" , in his later conclusion, he totally excludes the possibility of migrants, for economic benefit in the destination area, migrating across the intervening areas. He concludes "...under normal conditions the migratory movement will be a gradual one; it will proceed step by step, and will be transmitted from province to province. I may be permitted to liken this movement to that which is produced in a cistern of water after the tap has been turned on." (Ravenstein 1889; 286) I think his first mistake was that in order to prove one phenomenon he denied another phenomenon which also existed. He also believed that his illustrations could convey lessons of practical utility with reference to the colonisation of tropical regions. There he made another mistake.

By examining the history of migration in China, we can find that migration does not always happen as Ravenstein predicted, which means movement from origin to

destination step by step, never crossing intervening places. In the provinces along the coastal areas of China like Shandong in the north and Fujian and Guangdong in the south, where the density ratio of the population/land is high, migration has always been quite common. People in Shandong consider migration "CHUANG GUANG DONG" which means to brave the journey to Northeast China. Shandong people prefer to migrate thousands of miles away to the northeast because there is plenty of land in BEI DA HUANG.[5] According to Ravenstein, Shandong people should move to their neighbouring provinces like Shanxi, Hebei and Jiangsu first. But they have never done so since they know quite well that the situation there is no different from that of their hometown. Instead, they crossed Hebei, Liaoning and Jiling to Heilongjiang province. The same is true of Fujian and Guangdong, where people chose to XIA NAN YANG (go to Southeast Asia) rather than migrating to nearer places. The reason is the same. I think Ravenstein might be right if his theory is applied to his own time when transportation was still poor, but his theory is no longer valid in most parts of the world nowadays, since advanced transportation has made the world much more accessible. In my second chapter this will be discussed in detail.

However, "urban-rural differences on propensities to migrate", which was pointed out by Ravenstein one hundred or more years ago, is, I should say, a profound finding in his research. There is multifarious research concerning migratory behaviour in developing countries after the Second World War. As Lee describes, there are studies of sex and migration; education and migration; age and migration; race and migration; distance and migration; climate and migration; environment and migration and labour force and migration. But all of these phenomenon occur around a core, that is, rural-urban propensity. (It is interesting enough that the finding from my case studies in the five villages in China show that the main volume of internal migration in China is rural-rural

[5] BEI DA HUANG means the Great Northern Wildness at today's north part of Heilong juang Province.

rather than rural-urban. See chapter three.) The main volume of migration in the developing countries is from rural to urban, although we could find some other currents of migration like rural-rural, urban-urban and urban-rural. Why do people move from rural areas to urban areas and what are the influential factors has been the core question for all migration researchers to answer. The first person to raise this question was, I think, Ravenstein.

Lee's General Theory of Migration

"A General Theory of Migration", the title of Lee's paper which was published in the Journal of Demography in 1966, reveals the main intention of his research. In his paper, after a brief introduction to the literature, he immediately came straight to the point of the factors influencing the act of migration. He considered all factors associated with migration to be included in four categories. They are

1) Factors associated with the area of origin.

2) Factors associated with the area of destination.

3) Intervening obstacles.

4) Personal factors.

According to his explanation, "In every area there are countless factors which act to hold people within the area or attract people to it, and there are others which tend to repel them.", "Some of these factors affect most people in much the

same way, while others affect different people in different ways". In order to make his viewpoint clearer he drew a schematic chart which is reproduced above. We can see that in this chart there are +, - and 0 symbols in both origin and destination areas. All factors which attract people in the diagram are +, and those which tend to repel them are -. 0 represents neutral factors. Between origin and destination areas there are many intervening obstacles. He gave an example when he wanted to describe the identity of those symbols saying that "...a good schooling system may be counted as a + by a parent with young children and a - by a house owner with no children because of the high real estate taxes engendered.". (Lee 1966; 50) His interpretation means the same factor could have different functions for different people. The same is true of intervening obstacles. He believed that "Different people, of course, are affected in different ways by the same set of obstacles. What may be trivial to some people - the cost of transporting household goods, for example - may be prohibitive to others." (Lee 1966; 51) His comments about the personal factors are "we must note that it is not so much the actual factors at origin and destination as the perception of these factors which results in migration. Personal sensitivities, intelligence, and awareness of conditions elsewhere enter into the evaluation of the situation at origin, and knowledge of the situation at destination depends upon personal contacts or upon sources of information which are not universally available. In addition, there are personalities which are resistant to change - change of residence as well

as other changes - and there are personalities which welcome change for its own sake. For some individuals, there must be compelling reasons for migration, while for others little provocation or promise suffices." (Lee 1966; 51) By and large, all those + and - factors in both origin and destination could affect migrants differently given that people, or personalities are various.

Based on a set of origin and destination factors, a set of intervening obstacles and a series of personal factors, Lee formulated his migration hypotheses as follow:

Volume of Migration

1) The volume of migration within a given territory varies with the degree of diversity of areas included

in that territory.

2) The volume of migration varies with the diversity of people.

3) The volume of migration is related to the difficulty of surmunting the intervening obstacles.

4) The volume of migration varies with fluctuations in the economy.

5) Unless severe checks are imposed, both volume and rate of migration tend to increase with time.

Stream and Counterstream of Migration

1) Migration tends to take place largely within well defined streams.

2) For every major migration stream, a counterstream develops. (This is taken from Ravenstein.)

3) The efficiency of the stream (ratio of stream to counterstream or the net redistribution of population

affected by the opposite flows) is high if the major factors in the development of a migration stream

were minus factors at origin.

4) The efficiency of stream and counterstream tends to be low if origin and destination are similar.

5) The efficiency of migration streams will be high if the intervening obstacles are great.

6) The efficiency of a migration stream varies with economic conditions, being high in prosperous times

and low in times of depression.

Characteristics of Migrants

1) Migration is selective.

2) Migrants responding primarily to plus factors at destination tend to be positively selected, i.e. they are

higher qualified (more educated, younger, skilled, etc.)

3) Migrants responding primarily to minus factors at origin tend to be negatively selected, i.e. most

Chinese migrants to Southeast Asia during the pre-war period were poor peasants driven from their

homes by economic hardship, war, etc.

4) Taking all migrants together, selection tends to be bimodel.

5) The degree of positive selection increases with the difficulty of the intervening obstacles.

6) The heightened propensity to migrate at certain stages of the life cycle is important in the selection of

migrants.

7) The characteristics of migrants tend to be intermediate between the characteristics of the population at

origin and the population at destination.

We can see, from Lee's concept of migration, that he strongly emphasised the different functions played by the same factor, given the condition that people are various. He might be right when he means each individual person, but his prediction would be problematic when thousands of households are taken into account. According to the theory of statistics, while each individual man is an insoluble puzzle, in the aggregate he becomes a mathematical certainty. You can, for example, never foretell what any one man will do, but you can say with precision what an average number of men will do. Individuals vary, but percentages remain constant. A good school system may be a minus factor to one particular household or a plus factor to another as Lee described. But, on average, it will never have a dual function when you explore the relationship between migration behaviour and a good school system in one area.

Furthermore, his highly abstract generalisations makes his theory less applicable. Todaro's critique of Lee's general theory of migration is a valid one. He pointed out: "While Lee's general theory of migration is appealing because of its simplicity and persuasive because of the intuitive validity of many of its hypotheses, it is of limited help for policy analysis in developing countries because of its high degree of generality and the interdependence of many of its hypotheses. More important, the apparent validity of many of the hypotheses does not lead us to determine which plus factors and which minus factors at both origin and destination are quantitatively the most important to different

groups and classes of people. Nor does the existence of intervening obstacles help us to know which are major and which are minor.".(Todaro 1980; 19) Nevertheless, we should also bear one important fact in mind. Since Ravenstein's brilliant work on migration there had been a long period of total silence in the literature of the subject. Lee's work in 1966 undoubtedly belongs to a new generation's interest in research on migration. Therefore, his academic contribution to this literature is invaluable. Many of his hypotheses have opened new trains of thought for other migration researchers.

Lewis's Theory of Rural Urban Migration

In economics, the classical approach assumes that out-migration, by diminishing the number of employable people without affecting a location's natural advantages, will eventually cause wages to increase and therefore halt or even reverse the tendency for net out-migration. In other words, rural-urban migration will be halted when urban wages equal rural incomes. Based on this theoretical assumption, Lewis wrote his famus "Economic Development With Unlimited Supplies of Labour" (Lewis 1954), and this was later formalised by Fei and Ranis (Fei and Ranis 1961). In this well known model, they assumed that the economy consisted of two sectors, that is, the traditional subsistence agricultural sector and the capitalist industrial sector. Due to the continual population increase with constantly cultivated land the marginal product of labour in agriculture becomes zero, or even negative. Since the wages in industry, or in the cities, are higher than agricultural incomes, the surplus labour force in agriculture will transfer from rural to urban areas continuously. Under these circumstances, both labour transfer and urban employment growth are brought about by output expansion in the modern sector. The speed with which they occur is given by the rate of industrial capital accumulation in the modern sector. Finally, the level of wages in the urban industrial

sector is assumed to be constant and determined as a fixed premium over a constant subsistence level of wages in the traditional agricultural sector.

Figure 1 is a simple illustration of Lewis-Fei-Ranis model which can help to give us a better understanding.



The vertical axis in the figure represents the real wage and the marginal product of labour and the horizontal axis is the quantity of labour. OA is the average level of real subsistence income in the traditional rural area. OW is the real wage in industry. WS is the unlimited labour supply curve from the agricultural sector to the industrial sector. Curves of D1L1, D2L2 and D3L3 are the labour demand from urban industry. Given a fixed investment in the initial stage of industrial growth as D1, the demand curve for labour will be D1F, therefore OL1 amunt of labour force in the agricultural sector will be absorbed into urban areas. This first stage production will produce output which is shown in the figure 1 as OD1FL1. Among which, OWFL1 will be wages to workers and WD1F will be the total profits. Then the model further assumes that industry will reinvest all its profits for the next stage growth, therefore the accumulated capital will increase to D2 and the demand curve will shift rightwards to D2G. As a result, further L1-L2 amunt of the surplus labour force in the agricultural sector will move to the industrial sector. The process will carry on and on until point S, when all the surplus labour force in the

agricultural sector is absorbed into the urban industrial sector. Thereafter the labour supply curve becomes positively sloped and both urban wages and employment will continue to grow.

Of course, this model can definitely be tested by empirical evidence from the Western developed countries. For the developing countries the L-F-R model can hardly explain two essential issues:

1) given modern technology, the increase of investment does not

mean a proportional increase of demand for labour (See the demand curves movement in Figure 2);



2) Due to the current situation both in the international market and the domestic market, developing

countries can in no way expand their industry to the extent that it can absorb the whole agricultural

surplus labour force, therefore they will never reach point S (See Figure 2). In Figure 2 we can see

that the movement of curve D2L2 is different from the Figure 1, which means that with adoption of

advanced technology, the increase of capital, or investment does not necessarily increase the demand

for labour. Sometimes it will even decrease the demand for labour as in Figure 2 where L1 > L2.

As I mentioned before, with regard to industrial growth in developing countries the labour supply from the agricultural sector is really unlimited. On the other hand, with regard to the market, industrial expansion in developing countries is really limited. This reversed picture shows us very clearly that the major assumptions made in the L-F-R model do not apply to developing countries, therefore, apart from its historic and academic importance, the model offers limited analytical and policy guidance for understanding the process of rural-urban migration in developing countries.

Todaro's Migration Model

Finally, I would like to give a brief survey of Todaro's migration model which is compulsory reading for the courses of development economics and economic sociology/anthropology. Like Lewis in his model, Todaro assumes that the economy consists of two sectors. They are the industrial sector in urban areas and the agricultural sector in rural areas. Like any other classical economic approach , the theoretical principle of Todaro's model is also based on rationality and equilibrium. He considers that the decision to migrate will be made if the urban income exceeds the rural income. However one thing is new in his model, and that is the expected urban income, which emphasises that migrants are calculating the expected income in a certain period rather than the current real difference in income between the cities and the countryside. The main characteristics of Todaro's model are:

1) Migration is stimulated primarily by rational economic considerations of relative benefits and costs,

mostly financial but also psychological.

2) The decision to migrate depends on "expected" rather than actual urban-rural real wage differentials,

where the expected differential is determined by the interaction of two variables, the actual urban-rural

wage differential and the probability of successfully obtaining employment in the urban sector.

3) The probability of obtaining an urban job is inversely related to the urban unemployment rate.

4) Migration rates in excess of urban job opportunity growth rates are not only possible but rational and

even likely in the face of wide urban-rural expected income differentials. High rates of urban

unemployment are therefore inevitable outcomes of serious imbalance of economic opportunities

between urban and rural areas of most underdeveloped countries. (Todaro 1976)

The core issue of his approach is the relationship between migration and the expected urban-rural wage differential. The model postulates that rural-urban migration in developing countries is assumed to be a function of the expected urban-rural wage differential, which means

$$M = f(d) \qquad (1)$$

where M is rural-urban migration, and

$$d = \omega\pi - \gamma \qquad (2)$$

where ω is the urban real wage, γ is the average rural wage, and π is the probability of obtaining a job in the urban sector.

The probability of obtaining a job in the urban sector can be described as

$$\pi = \varphi N/ (W - N) = \varphi H/U \qquad (3)$$

where φ is the net rate of new urban job creation, N is the level of urban employment, W is the total urban labour force and, U is urban unemployment. If we substitute equation (3) for equation (2) we will get:

$$d = W\varphi N/U - \gamma \qquad (4)$$

If it is assumed that migration will come to a stop when the expected urban wage equals the rural wage (i.e. when d = 0), we can derive from (4) the equilibrium level of unemployment as:

$$U e = W\varphi N/\gamma \qquad (5)$$

where U e is unemployment rate.

From equation (5) we can solve the equilibrium ratio of unemployment to employment and give some quantitative content to the model. Dividing both sides by N gives U e/N = $W\varphi/\gamma$. Thus, for example, if the industrial wage is twice as high as the rural wage (W/γ = 2), and $\varphi = 0.05$, the equilibrium ratio of unemployment to employment will be 10%.

According to the above explanation, if the income in the city and the village is 200 and 50 units respectively then rural-urban migration will only stop when the urban unemployment rate reaches the equilibrium ratio of 75%.

From the above illustration we can see that the strength of Todaro's model is its inventive idea of **EXPECTED INCOME** based on **PROBABILITY OF OBTAINING A JOB** in one time period horizon. Unfortunately, this is, in my opinion, very problematic. We should know that the structure of the labour market in many developing countries is dualistic, which means there is a formal labour supply and demand market on one hand and an informal labour supply and demand market on the other. Before I start to illustrate this dualistic feature of the labour market in developing countries, in this case in China, I will give a definition of this formal and informal labour market.

The recruitment requirement of the formal sector in China is quite different from the informal sector. Looking at all the job advertisements from the formal sector they all require local HUKOU and high-middle school qualifications. Of course, the so-called local HUKOU is imposed by the government and has nothing to do with the firms, companies and factories. But the high-middle school qualification is an actual requirement for jobs in these enterprises. Therefore, due to this requirement, the formal sector in China totally excludes the possibility of employment for most rural-urban migrants. But the informal sector, has not made these conditions. Furthermore, many of them are self-employed. So the income, or as Todaro pointed out, the **expected income** in the formal sector has no direct relationship with the inflow of rural-urban migrants. Take Figure 3.



In Figure 3, the graph a) represents the formal labour market and graph b) represents the informal labour market. The vertical axis represents wages and the level of investment in the formal sector and the horizontal axis represents the quantity of the labour supply in both graphs. From the graph a) we can see that the quantity of labour supply in the formal sector is determined by the supply curve WS and demand curve WrD given OW wage and OWr investment. In graph b) AS is the supply curve in the informal sector which is inelastic first and then responds to wages and investment in the informal sector. As a matter of fact, there is no direct relationship between investment and wage in the formal sector and the inflow volume of rural-urban job seekers. Take Shanghai for example, all recruitment advertisements have two preconditions for the applicants. First is a graduation certificate at high middle school level and the second is a valid Shanghai HUKOU. So the job expansion in this market has no demand for the rural-urban migrants. Then where is the demand for rural-urban migrants? The demand, or let's say the opportunity, is in the informal labour market. (In the next chapter I will give the definition of formal and informal sector in China.) The question here is what is the average wage and the unemployment rate in the informal sector? Todaro's model needs an answer.

CHAPTER III THE HYPOTHESIS OF THE RESEARCH

Our static theory specifies equilibria ... A dynamic theory, when one is found - will probably describe the change in terms of simpler concepts.

J von Neumann

"Theory of games and Economic Behaviour. 1944"

The multidisciplinary research like De Jong., R.W. Gardner (Ads. 1981. Migration Decision Making: Multidisciplinary Approaches to Microlevel Studies in Developed and Developing Countries.) is actually an edited book written by several authors who are sociologists, anthropologists, economists, geographers, historians etc. It is still hard to find an individual researcher who has conducted this kind of research. The difficulty is that when an individual researcher does his/her research he/she has to identify his/her academic identity, that is which "ist" he/she belongs to. If you are an economist but investigating something which strictly speaking belongs to an anthropologist's job, you might be considered to be either "invading other people's academic territories" or to be unprofessional. People could easily challenge you by asking: "what is the theoretical background of your model?". It is true that normally economists are much more familiar with general economic theories than other academic professionals. But it is not necessarily true that it is impossible for a sociologist/anthropologist to be an expert in a particular economic research subject, or vica-versa. If we want to stay with the idea of a correct theoretical background then what kind of answer would we have had if we had asked Adam Smith, Comte, Newton or Freud the same question?

The reason I emphasise the importance of multidisciplinary research is because migration itself is a complicated human behaviour. It could be influenced by natural instincts, cultural factors, historical factors and economic factors. It is not always possible to divide all these factors neatly into academic disciplines. For instance, in Fujian province there is an area called Huian where females migrate to other places for construction work. But when you take the whole province into account this phenomenon turns out to be non typical. How do we explain this difference? Definitely, we can't explain this social phenomenon by using purely economic terms. We therefore have to search for some sociological/anthropological variables to explain this difference.

Before raising my hypothesis I would like to point out that the developing countries differ in terms of their size of population, economic structures, political and social systems as well as their historical experiences. Therefore, there is hardly a generalisation about the developing countries that holds true, no "rule" that does not have its exception. The reason I want to point this out is to emphasise the difficulties in describing human migration conditions, trends and policy issues in developing countries. The diversity can only be understood by a review of individual countries. I therefore choose one particular country, in this research, China, first as an example, based on which I could try to make some statements and point to some trends, even though there will be countries to which they do not immediately apply.

In the model I will set up two variable clusters. One is an economic cluster and another is a sociological/anthropological cluster. Each cluster will contain a group of independent variables which are thought to influence rural-urban migration. Since I will take China as a sample country for my research I have to give a further explanation of the relationship between one very important and odd independent variable, the HUKOU system and rural-urban migration, before I start to describe the two clusters.

Dualistic Labour Market and Rural-Urban Migration in China

It has been well acknowledged that in the urban areas in developing countries there are two different employment sectors, namely the formal sector and the informal sector. According to the subsequent studies revealed by International Labour Organisation in 1981 the share of the urban labour force in many developing countries engaged in informal sector activities ranges anywhere from 20 to 70%, the average being around 50%. But the criterion for defining these two sectors are various. For instance, as we all know, in China all the state owned enterprises, the joint ventures and foreign companies are registered. In other words, the number of the employees and their income appear in the Annual Statistics published by the Statistics Bureau in China. But on the other hand there are a vast number of hawking, street vending, knife sharpening, junk collecting, selling fireworks, house-keeping, self-employed decorating, carpenters, barbers and etc., who are not included in the Annual Statistics Books because they are not registered. Therefore it is extremely difficult to give an accurate estimate of how big a percentage of the labour force are employed by the informal sector in the cities in China. However, every body knows that they are there. In this thesis, I will consider all the enterprises which are registered to belong to the formal sector, excluding outside planned temporary workers.[6] Then all those who are unregistered belong to the informal sector. In the formal sector the employment ratio, the ranges of the wages and the amunt of the wages are decided and fixed by the government or foreign employers. In the informal sector, however, employment and wages fluctuate with the demand and supply of the market and they are not restricted by government policy. For instance, a textile mill in Shanghai has

[6] In Shanghai, all the texitle mills contract the work to one or few contractors and it is contractor's responsibility to find workers. In that case, the factories could avoid rather complicated procedures to apply for the vacacies for those outside planned temporary workers. As a matter of fact, 100% of workers were from either rural areas or small towns.

to make an annual recruitment plan and report to its upper level company for approval. Its employment is entirely controlled by the proportion of the wages in its budget targeted by the Department of Light Textiles of the municipal government. But the demand for and the pay of the street vendors, housekeepers, carpenters etc. are determined by the market mechanism rather than an official plan.

Now let's examine how economic factors from both original and destination areas affect migration behaviour. According to Todaro's model, the rate of rural-urban migration is a function primarily of (1) the probability that an urban labourer can successfully find a **modern sector job** which in its most elementary form can be written as some simple (positive) monotonous function of the current urban employment rate

$$Eu/Lu$$

or a negative function of the unemployment rate

$$(Lu-Eu)/Lu$$

(Eu is urban employment; Lu is urban labour supply), and (2) the urban - rural real income differential which can be expressed as a ratio $Yu/Yr = W$ (Yu is urban income and Yr is rural income), where $W > 1$ and is assumed to be fixed as a result of an institutionally determined urban wage and a given rural average product; migration will also be related to (3) other factors, Z, such as distance, personal contacts, urban amenities, etc. But Todaro left Z unexplained. So the basic Todaro migration model can therefore be written as

$$M = f(Eu/Lu, W, Z) \qquad (1)$$

From this model we can see that the essence of Todaro's theory is the employment rate and the probability of obtaining a job since he assumed the wage differential between rural and urban areas to be fixed. If the urban income is 200 units and the rural income is 100 units and the employment rate (Eu/Lu)=0.7, then the expected income for a rural-urban migrant will be 200*0.7=140 which is still greater than the rural income. So rural-urban migration will continue until the employment rate is 0.5. The problem with this assumption is that he failed to recognise one very important fact, as I pointed out before, the dualistic characteristic of the developing countries. The labour market in developing countries is a dualistic rather than a monistic one. In his fourth edition of "Economic Development in the Third World", Todaro did mention the informal sector and its earning in the relationship with rural-urban migration. But he still considers this informal sector to be a kind of subordinate to the formal sector in the cities. In this book he quoted the following diagram designed by D. Byerlee to describe his new idea.

Urban wage



In this diagram we can see that the urban income is composed of the urban wage (the income of the formal sector) and self-employed earnings (the income of the informal sector). So the expected urban income would still be to some extent determined by the income of the formal sector, which I consider is incorrect. In the context of rural-urban migration I think the diagram should be like this, which means only the informal sector's



income determines the expected income in the cities. This is because, as I mentioned before, the labour market in the developing countries is dualistic rather than monistic. In China for example, modern enterprises like the Beijing Chemistry Company and the Baoshan Steel Mill in Shanghai would only employ people who had a secondary school education at the very least, since the work there is very technically demanding. So most of their employees would come from the cities, since the educational level in the cities is much higher than in the countryside in China. Furthermore, the formal enterprises are not allowed to employ any person who has no local HUKOU. In this case, no matter how many vacancies there are in this sector there will not be opportunities for rural-urban migrants. Normally, job seekers from rural areas are looking for their chances in another sector, such as street vendors, hairdressers, casual workers for a construction company etc. As well as the difference in the demand for a labour force in these two sectors, the

employment rate and income are also different between these two sectors. Normally wages in the modern industrial sector are higher, more secure and stable than in the informal sector. In order to show the irrelevance between incomes and job opportunities in the formal section in the city and the volume of rural-urban migration, let's observe the real situation in China. The institutionalised annual wage was 2,140 yuan for Chinese workers and the annual income for each Chinese peasant was 1,493 yuan in 1990, according to the official statistics. The gap would be much wider if we take the cost of housing and the living standard into account. In the cities each household only pay at most 5% of their income for their rent. But in the countryside, most households would spend all their net income on building new houses. So the real urban income in China is definitely higher than most rural incomes. But, restricted by the lack of educational qualifications and the local HUKOU, the probability of obtaining a job in registered enterprises for a job seeker from the rural area in China is nearly zero. Therefore Todaro's expected income in the city here is also nearly zero. Do migrants from the countryside stop coming? If you go to the train station and the housekeeper agencies to have a look you will find thousands of job seekers still there. What are they coming for? They come for the opportunities which have not been printed in the statistical book but exist in the informal labour market. For this informal labour market, the estimation for average income and employment is entirely different from the official data collection.

By looking at the housekeeper market in Shanghai we can get an idea of how this informal labour market works. Since 1979 grain tickets have played a less and less important role in the purchase of food in the cities in China, and the people's communes in the countryside have been dismantled. As a result, peasants in the villages have become free again to go to the cities to seek casual jobs. Housekeepers came to Shanghai either through Housekeeper Agencies in the cities or by being recommended by their relatives, friends or fellow villagers who were already housekeepers in Shanghai. Those who came

through agencies would also try to find their fellow villagers and establish a network in order to hear all the information about the housekeeper market and to look after each other. In Shanghai, most housekeepers are young women who come from Anhui Province. The reason for their interest in the housekeeper market was not because they were qualified professional housekeepers, but because they knew quite clearly that they could only find jobs in this market. Normally a new job seeker would ask her friend or fellow villager who already worked as a nanny: "How much do you ask for when you start to work and how much do the employers pay?". Then she would decide what kind of terms she should accept. She would never accept pay which was far below the average level in Shanghai even though this pay might be much higher than what she could earn in her home town. The reasons she would not accept such terms were (1) she would not want to feel inferior in front of her fellow villagers; (2) if she accepted the terms it would possibly cause her colleague's terms to be downgraded and she would therefore face conflict with her colleagues which she would not like. In this case, if the average pay for a housekeeper in Shanghai was 50 yuan, a newcomer would ask for this level and would possibly accept 45 yuan for the first three months. She would not accept a monthly salary of 30 yuan although her monthly income in Anhui might have been less than 10 yuan. Therefore, in my rural-urban migration model, one of the determining factors for rural people to move to the cities, let's say Mij, is the average wage of the informal sector ((Y1...n)/n) which could be written as

$$Mij = f((Y1 + Y2 + Y3 \ldots + Yn) / n) \quad (2)$$

If we let

$$\beta = (Y1 + Y2 + Y3 \ldots + Yn) / n \quad (3)$$

then the equation (3) can be simplified as

$$Mij = f(\beta) \qquad (4)$$

where β > the rural income.

Now the question is (1) how much β higher than the rural income should the city income be for people to move and (2) how do we define the employment rate in the informal sector?

To answer the first question, I will first of all assume that the rural income is 80 units, and the villagers would not consider moving to the urban areas if the real income (nominal income - the cost of moving) is no more than 80 units. Would they move if the urban real income is 80.1 units? According to orthodox economic models they would move as long as the urban income is greater than the rural income. But in practice, they would only start to think about it and not really decide to move. People would not move just for one penny of benefit! They would have to calculate and weigh the cost and benefit in many ways. If we further assume that over time the real urban income increases from 80.1 to 80.2 ..., then action would eventually be taken when the urban income increases to 9.0 units. From 80.1 to 80.9 this migration decision maker's determination becomes stronger and stronger. The whole attraction process is shown in the figure below:



In the figure OB is the urban average wage for the informal sector, OA is rural income and the spot lines represent the process of consideration and CM is the amunt of rural-urban migrants. We find that there is a gap between 80 units and 90 units. In my model I will call this gap the **attraction gap** which is very important for research into rural-urban migration in the developing countries. After taking this attraction gap into account, the average wage of the informal sector in the city β should be rural income Yr + the attraction gap, say σ, which means

$$\beta = Yr + \sigma \qquad (5)$$

The significance to study this attraction gap is because when people decide to move, apart from the economic calculation of the benefits and costs, they are also influenced by other social factors like their local culture, the degree of their satisfaction with local life. the psychological adjustment, the underlying reluctance to leave their hometown etc. To overcome all these barriers not only takes sufficient economic incentive but time as well. People need time to wonder and then consider, to persuade themselves and to convince themselves. So this process is a complex one, although the gap itself is quantified by economic terms. Any studies of rural-urban and rural-rural migration in developing countries would definitely be divorced from reality if they failed to address this comprehensive process. Therefore, the model which assumes that rural residents will migrate to the urban areas so long the urban income > rural income is so simplistic as to be inaccurate. The real situation is that rural-urban migration will happen only when urban income > rural income + attraction gap.

The employment rate in the informal sector in my model is determined by the flow of rural-urban migration, which means a reversal relationship between the opportunity to obtain a job in the informal sector in the city and the flow of rural-urban migration. The more rural people flow into the city the less opportunity of obtaining a job these people will have. The reason I exclude the city labour supply is because only a very small number of them are looking for jobs in this sector. For instance, we might find some university students doing housekeeping work during their vacation. But they would not influence the market since they are only a few in number. But the flow of young women from the countryside will definitely affect the housekeeper market. I will give a more detailed discussion of this in the next chapter.

The difference between Todaro's probability of obtaining a job theory and this hypothesis is very clear. For Todaro, he calculates the employment rate as urban employment Eu divided by the urban labour force Lu. The employment he indicates here is the employment in the industrial sector in the city. This means that the rural-urban migrants respond directly to the employment rate in the formal sector. To apply his theory to the practice in China, girls move from Anhui to Shanghai because of vacancies in the formal sector such as posts for teachers, interpreters, or technicians etc. If this model was valid then the policy makers would assume that they should either decrease the scale of employment in the formal sector or reduce the wage levels in this sector if they wanted to stop rural-urban migration and to control the size of the city population. By doing so they would find in the end that all these measures would not stop rural-urban migration unless they developed the Tertiary Industry[7] to replace the function of the informal sector. So Todaro's analysis of the employment rate has turned out to be problematic both in theory and in practice in China, and I believe in many developing countries as well

[7] This is a socilaist term which is slightly different from the western term of service industry. For the socialist term, Agriculture, Forestry belong to the First Industry, Industry and Mining belong to the Second Industry and all non-productive industries belong to the Tertiary Industry.

since this dualistic feature of the labour market also exists there. In my model I want to show that only the employment rate in the informal sector will affect rural-urban migration behaviour.

A determining factor affecting the informal sector's employment rate is the Tertiary Industry in the city. In the West, it is called the service sector. Although the implications for the Tertiary Industry are slightly different from the service industry there is no significant difference between them. In order to avoid the confusion, I will use the term service industry to apply to the Tertiary Industry in China. The service industry is one of the back-bone industries for western economies, the so-called informal sector will have very limited chances to develop in the west. But most developing countries, guided by the industrialisation theory, have focused mainly on developing manufacturing industries in the last few decades. As a result, this development strategy has left quite a lot of room for the development of informal industries. In China before 1980 you could see long queues everywhere. In restaurant you queued up for tickets and then for seats, in the market you queued up for each type of food you wanted to buy, at the taxi station you queued up to book a taxi and so on. In the service industry[8] in China demand far exceeded supply. So after 1980 when the policy became more flexible the service industry of the informal sector began to develop. Citizens could find carpenters from North Jiangsu to make furniture for their new home. They no long needed to queue up for their vegetables and meats because those products were available in the free market at anytime. All these informal industries developed on the basis of insufficient service industries in the cities. For instance, the clothing business in the free market was booming at the beginning of the 1980s but declined a decade later when all formal clothing shops started their business on the basis of the contract system. So this see-saw relationship between the formal service

[8] Some manufacturing characterised services such as tailers, carpenters etc are included in service sector in this thesis.

industry and the informal sector is assumed in my model which means the smaller the formal service industry the higher the probability of obtaining an informal job. If we let Mf = the flow of rural-urban migration and S = the size of the formal service industry and E = the informal employment rate, then the relationship between them could be

$$E = f(Mf, S) \qquad (6)$$

Therefore rural-urban migration Mij is also a function of the probability of obtaining a job in the informal sector in the cities. Together with equation (5) the model can now be developed as

$$Mij = f(\beta, E) \qquad (7)$$

Since the data about this sector is neither available from any official sources nor possible from an individual field survey, I can not but leave this variable untested at the moment.

The Assumption for the Cost Variable

Nevertheless, despite the influential variables described above, there are some constraint variables which are of similar importance to the research of rural-urban migration. One constraint variable which has often been mentioned is the cost of moving. On the whole, most of the cost analysis has not escaped oversimplification. For instance, in many economic models the researchers simply put the transport fee as the cost of rural-urban migration. A further simplification is to use the distance as a cost symbol since the longer the distance the more expensive the fare will be. It is not wrong to take transport as a cost of moving. But we should bear in mind that this is not the only cost, to some

extent not even a major cost. In other words, the transport fee will not be a very important factor in determining whether or not people move. In China the train fare for a hard seat from the south to the north would be 150 yuan for a single person at the most. If we add another 50 yuan for the cost of food on the journey then the total cost of transport would be 200 yuan. The average wage for a hospital helper (to take care of a patient in the wards) in 1991 in Shanghai was 200 yuan a month. Therefore, one months salary could cover this cost totally (remember 200 yuan is the cost from southern China to Northern China. Actually, the train fare from Anhui to Shanghai would only cost about 20 yuan) So the cost of transport is not a major explanatory constraint variable for rural-urban migration in China.

In my opinion, the living expenses in the cities would be a major constraint variable. As in the assumption above, if the average income in the urban informal sector is 140 units and the rural income is 70 units and the employment rate in the informal sector is 0.8, then the decision maker will immediately ask how much their living expenses would be in the city. If the expected income for this person is lower than what he earns at home he will not move. Here the expected income is 140 * 0.8 = 112 units. If we consider the attraction gap assumption is valid then his moving decision will bring him 112 - 70 - 10 = 32 units. Obviously he will move to the city since these 32 units are high enough for him/her to make decision. But, in this calculation, the cost of moving is not included. Let's further assume a return fare from the original place to the destination is 200 units and he/she plans to work in the city for three years. Then his/her benefit will be 32 * 36 - 200 = 952 units. Based on this cost model, after deducting the transport fare, he/she will still move. However, the picture would be totally different if we take three years living expenses into account. The long term expenses for living in the city are determined by urban inflation. The reason I only emphasise urban inflation not national inflation is because in China it is only in the cities that inflation affects living standard. In most rural

areas the peasants still live in a self sufficient mode and have much less to do with the purchase of subsistence goods, therefore, their lives are much less affected by inflation. Our previous assumption shows that this migrant's urban income is 32 units higher than his/her rural income. If the annual inflation rate in the city is 20%, in five years time his/her real annual net income in the city will decline and he/she will find that it is no longer worth staying in the city. The deflated income equation which is used to express the long term cost should be

$$W1 = W2/I * 100 \qquad (8)$$

Where W1 is real wage and W2 is nominal wage, or say, expected wage, and I is accumulated inflation index. If we can assume W2 = 112 which is 32 units higher than rural income and the inflation indexes for year1 to year5 are 100, 120, 140, 160 and 180 then

year1' W1 = (112/100) * 100 = 112

year2' W1 = (112/120) * 100 = 93.3

year3' W1 = (112/140) * 100 = 80

year4' W1 = (112/160) * 100 = 70

year5' W1 = (112/180) * 100 = 62.2

So other variables remaining constant, from the fourth year onward this migrant will find that his/her real income in the city is no longer higher than was his/her rural income. Since there is a time gap the long term relationship between the cost and rural-urban migration should be

$$C = W2 * (1 - I) Sq\ n \qquad (9)$$

where C is the cost, W2 is urban income, I is inflation rate and n is time horizon. So the model could now be written

$$Mij = f(\beta, E, C) \qquad (10)$$

Sociological Influential Variables to Rural-Urban Migration

In the following discussion I will analyse the relationship between social factors and rural-urban migration. As we have discussed before, when people consider moving they would first of all calculate the economic costs and benefits. But this does not mean at all that economic factors are the only factors which determine rural-urban migration behaviour. There are many social factors, which are of similar importance to economic factors, which influence rural-urban migration. Village women in Sichuan, for example, go to cities like Guangzhou, or Shenzhen, thousands of miles away, to be prostitutes in order to enjoy the luxurious life of the cities; Shandong girls leave their home towns for no definite destination simply in order to escape from arranged marriages; some parents decide to move to the cities, no matter how difficult it is, for the education of the next generation; in some places male migrants outnumber female and in some places we see the opposite picture; single persons would migrate much more readily than married persons and even within a region, village A has more out-migrants than village B although economic conditions are almost the same etc. All in all, the phenomena listed above cannot be explained by economic models because they are all determined by various social factors rather than economic factors. Without taking these social factors into account, any conclusions about rural-urban migration would inevitably be lopsided, and in some cases, be wrong. The question is how to take these various and complicated

social factors into account for rural-urban migration research. It is true that, keeping the economic factors constant, a single individual moving from a rural area to an urban area could be determined by different social factors. He/she could go to the city to be reunited with the family, or to be closer to his/her relatives and friends, or for the convenience of language, or for escaping from an unbearable social environment and so on. As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, each individual's situation could vary, but in the quantitative analysis when all of them become mathematical units, the percentage remains constant. Only from quantitative studies therefore, can we tell which social variables in what percentage have been determining rural-urban migration behaviour.

Like many other sociological/anthropological models, I will take age, sex and marriage as influential variables in my model. The explanation of the relationship between those variables and rural-urban migration will also be very similar to others, which means that people between 18-35 have a higher propensity to migrate than people below 18 and above 35; among rural-urban migrants, there are normally more male than female, although in some areas in Southern China it is the picture opposite; and single persons are more likely to migrate than married persons.

In spite of these standardised variables, I am going to explore more sociological variables which, in China case determine the migration behaviour.

HUHOU System and its impact on migration behaviour

In China, since the end of the 1950s when the strict policy of controlling the size of the population was implemented, rural residents have not been allowed to move into the cities to live without permits from certain units. It was not accidental for the Chinese government to make the HUKOU system extremely strict to the rural-urban migration at

the beginning of 1960s. After three years of the GREAT LEAP FORWARD China experienced three years of "difficulty" which was formally called by the government "three years of natural disaster". From then on the food and vegetable oil supply in the cities in China has been rationed. To buy rice, biscuits and cake in the shops and to go to restaurants you had to pay not only money but food coupons as well. Food coupons were distributed according to the number of residents, their age and occupation in the book of HUKOU. On the other hand, people's communes were set up everywhere in the countryside and all the peasants became organised commune members. Consequently, the HUKOU system restricted people from moving into the city by imposing the grain ration system on the one hand and restricted people from moving out of the village by the commune system on the other hand. Therefore, the current of rural-urban migration in China during that period was almost totally stopped. Ma Xia in his article " A Great Rural-Urban Mobilisation in Modern China" continued to describe the policy as one of 'control the big cities, develop middle cities appropriately and actively develop the small cities' which was only started in 1980. The policy of 'the peasants who want to establish their business with their own capital and grain should be allowed to' was further started at the beginning of 1984". (Ma Xia. A Great Rural-Urban Mobilisation in Modern China. p.30) In 1984, the state council set a regulation saying "The security sections should approve permanent residence (HUKOU) to the people who have permanent accommodation in the cities, the capacity to engage in his/her own business, or have a permanent contract with city enterprises.". So during the period before the 1960s and after the 1970s the extent of rural-urban migration was very limited and did not usually happen for economic reasons at all. During that period, most rural-urban migration was allocated migration which means that all the movements were arranged or approved by the government rather than by the migrants themselves. The migrants mainly were spouses, military veterans and university graduates. The significant movement only started in 1980 when the Chinese government's policy became more open and flexible.

The results can be seen in an investigation conducted by the United Nations. According to its 1984 assessment, as we can see from Figures 1 and 2, the trend in rural-urban migration turns out to be a U shape from 1950 to 1980. (See the tables below)

Table 1: Urbanisation Trends in Asia, by Subregion and Selected Country

	1960		1980		2000		2020	
	a	b	a	b	a	b	a	b
Total	359	21.5	688	26.6	1242	35.0	2151	49.3
East Asia	198	25	331	28.1	485	32.9	770	45.8
China	125	19	203	20.4	315	25.1	570	39.7

a = Urban Population (million).

b = Percentage of total.

Source: UN Urban and Rural Population Projections 1950-2050: The 1984 Assessment (New York. 1986).

From Table 2 we can see that between 1950 and 1960 when the HUKOU system was not strictly implemented the annual growth rate for the urban population was 7.2%, and for the rural population was 0.8%, which were respectively above and below the average level of all other developing countries. If we consider 1960-1970 and 1970-1980 to be the period of HUKOU control, then the average urban population growth rate during these two decades should be (2.9+2.0)/2=2.45. Therefore the difference in the growth rate of the urban population of the pre-HUKOU (1950-1960) and post-HUKOU (1960-1980)

control periods will be 7.2 - 2.45 = 4.75. The annual average population growth rate from 1960 to 1980

Table 2: Annual Average Rate of Change in Urban and Rural Population in Developing Countries, by Type of Economy, (%)

	50-60		60-70		70-80		80-90		90-2000	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
All Developing Countries	4.7	1.4	3.8	2.0	3.6	1.7	3.4	1.3	3.4	0.9
Low Income	4.9	1.4	3.3	2.1	3.1	1.9	3.1	1.4	3.6	1.0
Middle Income	4.2	1.8	4.2	2.0	4.2	1.8	4.0	1.4	3.8	1.0
Upper Income	4.4	1.1	4.2	0.8	3.8	0.3	3.3	0.1	2.6	0.0
China	7.2	0.8	2.9	2.2	2.0	1.8	1.7	1.1	2.7	0.6

Source: UN Urban and Rural Population Projections 1950-2025: The 1984 Assessment (New York. 1986).

was 2.02%.[9] After deducting the population control factor the result would be 2.73%, which means that the HUKOU system, by comparison with non-HUKOU period, has made the urban population growth rate in China 2.73% lower than it would have been. The research carried out by Liu Juzhe also showed that among the people who migrated from rural areas to urban areas in five cities of Henan from 1949 to 1986 only 3.68% were rural-urban migrants who looked for new employment. Of these 75% happened after 1979 when the HUKOU system began to be more flexible.(Studies of Migration and Urbanisation in China. September, 1988. p.353) Liu's work has also shown, "among the people who were **allowed** to move in to the cities, 20.26% were spouses who came to get together with their husbands and wives and 14.20% were allocated by the government.". These 14.20% allocated migrants were the people whose original HUKOU were rural. After serving in the army and studying in the university they became cadres and were allocated to work in the cities. Obviously, all those three categories were not part of a labour force movement. The people who would have liked to move to the cities to seek better jobs and lives were strictly prohibited if they did not have useful connections. Therefore, the figures for migration from countryside to towns and cities during that period (1960-1979) were reduced significantly by the HUKOU system. If we let HUKOU = H, Mij = the amunt of rural urban migration, then the relationship between rural urban migration and the HUKOU System would be

$$Mij = f(H) \qquad (11)$$

where the function f is negative. This means that the more strictly the system was implemented the less rural urban migration there was.

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[9] This calculation si based on the Statistical Year Book in China, 1984.

But this constraining variable could be removed or set up as a dummy variable if the model is applied to other developing countries which do not have this kind of system, just as many researchers consider the two oil shocks in 1974 and 1979 to be dummy variables when they want to observe the relationships between other constant factors and international economic development in the post war period.

Education as a social variable in the long term

My hypothesis about further social factors will focus on the variables to which not enough attention has been paid, or which have wrongly been given attention. I will first of all study the variable of education. P. Paul Shaw, in his book "Migration theory and Fact", said that " It is likely that within the educational structure in the under-developed country, a small increment in educational attainment at a seemingly low level (e.g. from late primary to early secondary school) may have a considerable impact on the propensity to migrate whereas in a developed country such an increment would be likely to have a negligible effect." (Migration Theory and Fact, 1962, p42) Shaw's point about the relationship between education and rural-urban migration in the developing countries is shared by many other scholars. The point is very simple. The higher the educational level, the more likely it is that people will migrate. The relationship can be shown on the graph below:



On the graph OX represents the level of education, OY represents the propensity to migrate and the curve OM represents the trend of rural-urban migration. It may be right in the short term for a particular area where the public educational level is extremely poor. But it would be a challengeable argument in the long term. If this hypothesis is acceptable then the solution for rural-urban migration in the developing countries would be to reduce the educational investment in rural areas if one wanted to alleviate the migration pressure in the cities. I said that it may be right in the short term because it does explain the relationship between education and migration. There is no doubt that a middle school graduate rural-urban migrant will find his/her job in the city much more easily than an illiterate one. Of course, a well



educated person is also a well informed person. But it is only true for a certain period of time, not forever. The long term relationship between education and rural-urban migration is shown in this graph Here we can see a turning point. When curve OM reaches point a it starts to stabilise and then decline, which means that when the public educational level reaches Oa the propensity to migrate will keep still and then decline. According to this hypothesis, the government's educational investment in the rural areas in the developing countries will stimulate the villagers to migrate in the short run and stop rural-urban migration in long run. The curve representing the relationship between

education and rural-urban migration turns out to be a reversed U shape. This hypothesis cannot, at the moment, be tested by the data in most of the developing countries because the educational level in the developing countries is still at the upward part of the curve. But when they reach the level at point a, say equivalent to the level in the West, rural-urban migration will decline. According to this reversed U hypothesis, when education in rural areas improves from the basis of illiteracy to junior primary school level, peasant's reading capability improves and the scope of their reading is widened. With more information and knowledge about the outside world, their desire to find a better living will increase. Inevitably, rural-urban migration will be stimulated. But when the educational level in the whole countryside equals the level in the city those young country men will find that they are no longer a few rural privileged princes but part of a huge job searching troop. They will realise that they could put their learning into practice in their home town more than in the cities. Already in China secondary school graduates find themselves more useful in the village/township enterprises than in the cities.

The Relationship Between Contacts and Migration

In the model I will further hypothesise that contacts among people are another influential variable in rural urban migration. Contacts could be divided into direct and indirect. When a person considers moving he/she has to have the relevant information from the destination area. In the developed countries a potential out-migrant could obtain information about the job opportunities, wages, living conditions and expenses in the destination area through official organisations such as job centres or other agencies and associations. Normally, such information is free of charge. But in a developing country like China, although there are some labour force firms in the counties and the cities they are organisers rather that information service agents. They give information through official channel but not to each individual. So in China rural people have little access to

this information. Therefore, when a person decides to move he/she usually gets this information through his/her contacts in the destination area. His/her direct contacts could be his/her direct relatives and his/her close fellow villagers with whom he/she has kept contact The indirect contacts normally mean the relationships which are introduced by other friends and relatives. All those contacts function as an information network in the developing countries which influence rural-urban migration decision making.

Now I will examine how this network works. In the case of direct contacts, say an Anhui girl would like to go to the city to find a job, she would write a letter to the place where she has an uncle or a close friend to ask whether she could find a job there or not. She would certainly ask about the working conditions, income and living expenses and the employer's attitude towards the employee etc. If she had no direct contacts as described before, she would probably ask one of her relatives or friends who had direct contacts in the destination area to help her to obtain this information. Of course, the probability of obtaining the information would not be the same through these two different contacts. Take this Anhui girl for example, if she has a close friend from the village in the destination area who has been working there for several years already, she can write to him/her directly to ask for all this necessary information. Let us assume that she writes ten letters and gets seven replies. So the probability rate of getting information through this direct contact is 7/10 = 70%. Then what will happen in the situation of indirect contacts? Supposing that this Anhui girl would like to leave the village for the city but knows nobody in the city. But her uncle has a friend who lives there. She will write a letter to her uncle and ask him to write a letter to his friend for the information. For the convenience of inference I will just assume that this 70% response rate is equal for everyone. In this case

Diagram A



Diagram B



this girl will get 0.7 * 0.7 = 0.49% response to the information she has asked for. But on the other hand, people normally have more indirect contacts than direct contacts. For example, a rural person in my generation in China may have 3 to 5 uncles and aunts as direct relatives. Then each of these uncles and aunts will have a number of their relatives and the friends. Therefore, through his/her direct relatives he/she would have many other indirect contacts. From the diagram we can see a clearer picture of this subject.

In the diagram A we see that a person has four direct contacts. But in the diagram B, through his/her four friends, or relatives, a person has sixteen indirect contacts. The

diffusion area in diagram B is much larger than in diagram A. Therefore, although for each individual contact, the direct contact would get a higher response rate than indirect contact, people do get much more responses from indirect contacts rather than direct ones. Besides providing the information both kinds of contact can also help these rural-urban migrants to settle down when they arrive in the city. People are always more anxious about a new place of which they have had no experience at all. Then the contacts would play a role in their decision to move. Of course, the direct contacts would be more likely to offer more care than the indirect contacts. But, we should bear one thing in mind, that although in one individual case the direct contacts would give a higher response rate for the information and more caring help, the probability of having a contact in the city would be much higher in the indirect category rather than the direct one as we have seen in the diagram already. By and large, both these types of contact influence the person who is considering migrating from the rural area to the urban area.

Let α = the information rate through direct contacts and χ = the information rate through indirect contacts. Keep others constant, then the influential relationship between the contacts and the information rate could be

$$\text{Cont} = f(\alpha, \chi) \qquad (12)$$

Historical Influence on the Behaviour of Migration

It is well known in China that Sichuan people are fond of hot pepper and Shandong people love garlic. Then we might ask why Sichuan people not Jiangsu people are fond of hot pepper since they are all Chinese, or precisely speaking, Han people. I think that one answer might be that Sichuan people have been fond of hot pepper for generations.

Historical factors often influence present day human behaviours! So they do rural-urban migration. If we go to any Chinatown in San Francisco, Toronto, or London we will find that most of the Chinese community there immigrated from Guangdong via Hong Kong. In the northeast part of China we can see lots of Shandong migration communities. The phenomenon which I pointed out is not a coincidence. As Sichuan people love hot pepper, so Canton people are more ready to move. For generations they have left their poor villages to seek a better life abroad. Historical factors influence people in a way which is quite different from others. People can easily tell you how they were influenced by the prospect of a higher income in the cities but they would find it difficult to tell you how they were influenced by historical factors. Custom exerts an imperceptible influence on people's behaviour without their knowing it themselves. A child who lives in a village in Canton will be brought up in an environment where he/she is told not to be a good-for-nothing and stay in the village but to try to earn good money elsewhere like many other people. He/she would also see lots of his/her fellow villagers going to Hong Kong and other countries to seek a better life. All this would inevitably influence his/her desires for the future. As a result, he/she will have a stronger tendency to migrate than a child who lives in a village where people have no interest at all in moving out. So in my research I have put this historical factor as a variable which either has a positive or a negative relationship to rural-urban migration.

As I said before this variable is a rather abstract one, so the definition is a little problematic. How can one weigh this variable in the quantitative analysis? I will, first of all, set a time limit for this variable which means I am only interested in the last three or four generations and not any longer. The reason for this time limit is because I want to observe the relationship between historical factors and present rural-urban migration. The history of migration is itself quite a big research project which is far beyond the scope of my research. Therefore, in my investigation, I will see how much villagers have

migrated to the cities in the last half century. The more out-migrants there were, the higher the variable will be. Conversely, the fewer out-migrants there were, the lower the variable will be. The relationship could be written as

$$H = m/p \qquad (13)$$

where H is the historical factor, m is the number of out-migrants in the last half century and p is the population at the same time.

For instance, if we assume that p = 1,000, in village A there were 100 out-migrants and in village B the number is 50, then the weight of H in village A is 100/1,000 = .10 and in village B is 50/1,000 = .05. With the acceptance of this hypothesis, rural-urban migration in village A will be more than in village B if other variables are held constant.

The Relationship Between Rural Development and Migration

In the literature of rural-urban migration in the developing countries the pull and push factors have been a central argument for decades. The school which emphasises the factors in the cities has considered that the urbanisation bias development strategy has formed a pull factor to allure the peasants to migrate and created a problem for development. But the rural development school holds the view that due to a lack of rural development and a failure to change the poor and backward situation in the countryside then the push factor plays a dominant role in the context of rural-urban migration. Without directly dealing with the problem in the rural areas, rural-urban migration and its consequent problems can never be solved. Each argument attempts to sort out a dominant factor which has a main influence on the rural-urban migration. I consider the argument which separates push and pull factors rather than taking them as a combined phenomenon

is a mistaken argument. Actually, the so-called pull and push factors are two sides of a coin and they are united rather than contradictory. When an object falls down to the earth, is it because of the planet's attraction or the subject's weight? Definitely we cannot separate the two because they are both preconditions which determine this movement. If there is no dualistic characteristics existed in the developing countries it would be meaningless for us to discuss the subject of rural-urban migration and its impact on social and economic development. Rural-urban migration is a function of the huge differences between the urban areas and rural areas, or the pull and push factors. When you analyse the factors in the cities it does not mean that you deny the factors in the rural areas. I point this out in order to avoid some misunderstandings in my following explanation of another variable and its relationship to rural-urban migration.

Whether the push/pull factors are social and economic or governmental policies would be another` question to be answered. Let's first of all scrutinise the situation in rural areas. The reasons for rural people to move out could be poor income, insufficient employment, local conservative tradition or natural disaster. Local tradition and natural disaster definitely are neither governmental policies nor the consequences of governmental policies. But poor income and insufficient employment or underemployment in rural areas are consequences of the government's city bias in development policies. So when poor income and insufficient employment become the push factors for rural migration they are the consequences of the government's policies. The explanation for the pull factors from the cities would be the same which means the government's city bias in development policies which make the cities more attractive to rural people. By and large, the push/pull factors of internal migration in China do have a cause and effect relationship with governmental policies although they themselves are not directly governmental policies.

In the mobilisation of the inhabitants from the rural areas to the urban areas the level of development of the original area plays a very crucial role. The tendency in many

developing countries has been that the more severe the imbalance of the development a country has adopted the more rural-urban migration will take place. The direct result of this imbalance in the development strategy is poverty and backwardness in the rural areas. But how do we define the variable of the level of development in the rural areas? Apparently, we cannot expect to have any one particular official statistical data for this variable. So in my survey in the villages I will investigate several questions which could roughly reflect the level of development in the rural areas.

First, I will investigate the situation which includes irrigation, transportation and the extent of the network of agricultural technology as the definition of the level of development in the village. The irrigation data will mainly be the ratio of irrigated lands to total cultivated lands. The transportation data will include road mileage and efficiency (the extent of the network) and for the last the data will be the availability of staff, subsidised fertiliser and pesticide prices, and the HYV (high yield variety). Agricultural production in many developing countries is still totally dependent on the weather. The inability to control floods and to deal with drought has been the main cause for the failure to secure harvests. The irrigation system could alleviate the damage done by these natural disasters. Of course, an efficient transport network could deliver the materials necessary for agricultural production on the one hand and transport all products to the market on the other. Also, each individual farmer is not able to improve the quality of seeds, to increase the amunt of fertiliser and pesticide used at his own expense. So without the government's support, significant progress in agricultural production will be impossible.

Another important factor to measure the level of rural development could be Xiang Zhen Enterprise, which has been booming in the last decade in China. According to the statistical data published by the Department of Xiang Zhen Enterprise of the Ministry of

Agriculture, by 1991, Xiang Zhen Enterprises in China have employed 96.091 million workers and the value of production in that year reached 1,162.169 billion yuan. So in 1991 it produced 26.6% of GNP and occupied 16.5% of total employment in China. So if you go to Jiangsu province you will find that the development of Xiang Zhen Enterprise has not only absorbed the rural labour force but urbanised the rural areas as well. Based on this exceptional social change in China I will consider Xiang Zhen Enterprise as an exceptional variable which has a negative relationship with the rural-urban migration.

If we let D be the level of development in the rural areas then the meaning of it will be

$$D = f(Ir, Rd, Ex, Xiang) \qquad (14)$$

Where Ir = the irrigation system, Rd = the quantity and efficiency of the roads, Ex = the extension network and Xiang is the level of development of Xiang Zhen Enterprises.

One thing that should be pointed out is that when we discuss the relationship between rural development and the rural-urban migration we should allow a time lag. This year's construction of irrigation, road and factory could only affect economic performance some time later. So the expression of this should be

$$Mij = f(Lagn\ D) \qquad (15)$$

where n is time horizon.

The Model of Rural-Urban Migration in China

From all these theoretical hypothesis we can design a general rural-urban migration model which is composed of one economic model and one sociological/anthropological model. The detailed expression is

The Sub-Model I of Rural Urban Migration

$$Mij = f(H, \beta, E, C) \qquad (16)$$

H = HUKOU System;

β = average income of informal sectors plus the attraction gap σ;

E = probability of obtaining a job in the informal sectors;

C = long term cost of rural-urban migration.

The Sub-Model II of Rural-Urban Migration

$$Mij = f(A, S, M, E, CONT, HIS, D) \quad (17)$$

A = the age of the migrants;

S = the gender of the migrants;

M = the marital status;

E = the average level of education in the region;

CONT = the direct and indirect contacts in the cities;

HIS = the migration history of the region;

D = the level of development in the region.

CHAPTER VI RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION IN CHINA

This chapter is about description and the analysis of rural-urban migration in China based on observations and a questionnaire carried out during a field study in six villages from January to July 1992. The first part will be an introduction to my field work which was carried out in villages spread over three provinces in the east, the middle east and the Northwest.

The Basic Indicators in the Five Villages, 1990

	Shuangmiao	Xianfeng	Kangle	Xiting	Tiangliao
Household	223	634	386	420	136
Population	1050	3070	1864	2053	722
Labour Force	550	1500	880	1708	403
Income per capita (yuan)	150	499	336.9	388	403
Cultivated land per person	0.65	2.6	5.14	0.28	0.3

3.1. My field studies were conducted in three different rural areas. They were Xiting Village and Tianliao Village in Changnan County, Zhejiang Province; Shuangmiao Village in Qianshan County, Anhui Province and Xianfeng Village and Kangle Village in Dingxi

County, Gansu Province. Zhejiang is one of the richest provinces in China. The so-called Xiang Zhen Enterprises were initiated in Jiangsu and Zhejiang in the 1970s and 1980s. This area has relatively advanced sea and inland transportation and communication systems and a long history of commercial activity. The cultivated land is highly fertile and well irrigated. The favourable climate allows the peasants to have three harvests a year. Hence the title of " Jiang Nan Yu Mi Zhi Xiang 江南鱼米之乡", which means "Jiangnan, the place is full of rice and fish" is well deserved. Rural residents in this region are much better informed about the outside world. But on the other hand, the population density in Zhejiang Province is one of the highest in China. The peasants in the villages I visited for my research have only 0.2 mu of cultivated land per person. The picture in Gansu Province turns out to be much worse. Its " Big Northwest 大西北" name means nothing more than space and wilderness and isolation from the prosperous areas. It used to be a place where many dissidents and prisoners were sent to not very long ago. The cultivation here is totally dependent on the weather because of the shortage of water. There was far less awareness of commercial possibilities than in the coastal areas. As Mr. Han Zhengqin, the Chief Commander of the Sanxi (三西) Project and Fu Pin (Poverty Alleviation 扶贫) Office, pointed out with humur:" There has always been a time lag in adopting the open door policy between the coastal provinces and us. Due to efficient information, they put the policies into practice immediately and get the benefit from it. But for us, by the time we know how to do it, the benefits would be almost over. So every time the Central Government wants to stop a decentralised policy it chops the tail off the coastal area, but the head off Gansu Province." The situation of Anhui was just between the coastal and Northwest areas.

These five villages in three provinces represent different social, economic and cultural backgrounds in rural China which means the research can be carried out in a comparative way. From the observations in the different villages we then can find how these social,

economic and cultural factors affect the migration behaviours of Chinese villagers and, further test my theoretical hypothesis about this subject.

3.2 Shuangmiao Village, Nishui Xiang, Qianshan Xian , Anhui Province

Shuangmiao Village is located in Dabieshan Region 大别山地区, Anhui Province. In China people are quite familiar with the name Dabieshan. In 1947, Liu Bucheng and Deng Xiaoping marched their army into this muntainous area in order to avoid doing battle with Nationalist troops. The reason they chose this area was because it was an extremely poor and remote area where the Nationalist troops considered Liu and Deng would be unable to survive. Of course, Liu and Deng survived, but that is another story. The issue of how to survive in the Dabieshan muntainous region has always been a problem for insiders and outsiders.

Nishui Xiang is one of Dabieshan's xiangs located in the west part of Qianshan County, Anhui Province. It is composed of seven villages with a population of about 10,000 altogether. The average height of Nishui Xiang is about 500 metres above sea level and the highest part of the xiang is about 1,000 metres. One obvious characteristic of this mu ntainous xiang is that most of its lands are forest land. In February 1992 there were altogether 64,900 mu of forest lands in this xiang. A rather simple and mud-surface road links Nishui Xiang to Qianshan County. It takes about two hours to drive to the office of the xiang from the county capital although the distance is only 50 km. According to the State Council Document No. 19 in 1985, any xiang in China that has less than 200 yuan income per capita in that year would be defined as a Poverty Xiang which means this xiang can receive special financial support from the government. Nishui Xiang is one of these Poverty Xiangs in China. Given the infertile soil they did not produce much timber and it was of a poor quality. The grain produced from their cultivated lands was only

enough for half a year's food, and the rest had to be bought from the government's rice shops at the state price. So there had been a scissors tendency for their income and expenditure over the last few years, which means that their income from timber production, due to the poor quality and the limited quantity, had been declining over time, and their expenditure for grain, due to the government price policy to encourage grain production, had been increasing. As a result, all the villages in Nishui Xiang, beside Heming 何明村 Village, are below the poverty line set by the State Council. Heming Village escaped from poverty in 1987 when a paper mill was set up in the village by a brave peasant, Mr. Chu Haochuang which I will illustrate later.

Shuangmiao Village is one of the poorest villages in Nishui Xiang. It is about 4 km distance on a mountainous path from the xiang office to the village office and it took me about 50 minutes to walk there. The path was extremely narrow, and some parts were steep and slippery. This poor transport had, on the one hand prevented the villagers from getting access to outside regions and on the other hand had been an obstacle to economic development in the village.

Over the years of the Land Reform, Cooperativisation, Collectivisation and the People's Commune, the administrative structure in the rural areas in China has been changed several times. So it is difficult to tell the exact size of the original Shuangmiao Village before liberation though some elders in the village could remember roughly what it was. Also, after the first two demographic censuses conducted in 1953 and 1962 there had been no demographic census until 1983. The worst thing was that no one could find out the original data of the first three censuses in Shuangmiao Village. Therefore, the only thing I could do was to talk to the secretary of the village (WEN SHU 文书) about the brief history of the village. According to his description, there were about 200 households at the beginning of liberation. According to the China Statistical Year Book,

from 1949 to 1989 the average annual population growth rate in China was 1.893%. At this rate, the population in Shuangmiao in 1949 should have been 1,050/(1+0.01893)**43 = 469. Assuming the average household size to be 4 people, there should have been about 117 households. If one assumes the average to be 5 people then there should have been about 94 households at that time. Obviously the figures he gave me were quite inflated because, according to his data, the population at that time should have been at least 800. The latest population census conducted in 1991 in Shuangmiao showed that the total population in the village was 1,050, (786 males and 724 females). The secretary told me that the labour force in the village was 550.

The total area of cultivated land in the village is 679 mu which means that the land per person is 679/1,050=0.65 mu (0.043 hectare). Due to the geographical conditions, there was less sunlight and shorter periods without frost than in other southern Anhui villages. So the yield of production in Shuangmiao was only 800 to 1,000 jin 斤 (1 kilograms = 2 jin 斤) per mu. This low land/person and yield/unit ratio was the root-cause of the grain shortage in Shuangmiao after liberation. Like many other villages in the region they always bought their half a year's grain from the state rice shop. The amunt of rice they bought from the shop was rationed quarterly by the numbers in each household. The last day of March, June, September and December was the deadline, which meant that if the peasants failed to buy their quarterly ration of grain by that day then it would be automatically invalid. I witnessed the peasants at the end of March, with the poles on their shoulders, carrying two bags of grain along that small, narrow path, in threes and fours. Some poor families, had to borrow money from their neighbours, friends and relatives to buy this rationed grain. They just couldn't give up the ration because the price on the free market was much higher than the state price. It was really difficult for a poor family to beg from lenders, even if the lenders were their neighbours or relatives, because everyone there was basically poor and was not in a position to lend.

It was very pleasant that during my investigation I had Mr. Chu Zhigao with me as my guide and interpreter. The reason I had him was because I found I could hardly understand the local dialect and find the location of the village. Mr. Chu was 26 and was a high middle school graduate. It was he that did the 1991 demographic census in Shuangmiao and his work was highly valued by the xiang government. In the end I realised that not only was he my guide and interpreter but my survey assistant too. In order to avoid the situation where the informants whom we were going to interview next day would be out, he informed them either via their kids in the xiang's school or by himself one day in advance. Quite often when the informants had difficulties understanding my questions and gave some vague answers he helped me to give some helpful explanations to them and did some corrections when the informants didn't answer properly.

My survey starts with population policy investigation in the village. The family planning policy issued by the State Family Planning Committee allowed for a second child only if the first had been a girl but stipulated that the gap between two births should be at least four years. According to this policy, Qianshan County decided that any woman who gave birth to a first boy or had a second birth should be sterilised voluntarily, or by force. This is because a few years earlier they had got a yellow flag which means a warning from the State Family Planning Committee. Without strict regulations, they found it difficult to stop the peasants having more children. The penalty for disobedience was a heavy economic fine. Sometimes they even pulled down their houses if the person concerned could not pay the fine. As Mr. Peng, vice director of the Fu Pin Office (The Office of Alleviation of Poverty) said blankly:" You can't explain anything to the peasants who have a poor education. You can't expect them to understand the far-reaching significance of our family planning policy. The population growth rate can easily escalate if you are

not tough enough. The very reason we got a yellow flag was because we wanted to be kind in implementing this policy!" So in Shuangmiao I didn't find one family who had violated the regulation since 1982. I remember one day, by chance, we popped in to Mr. Chu's elder sister's house. I asked her why didn't she have another child since her son was eight years old already (I had always thought the peasants in the countryside were allowed to have two children). She smiled and gave me no answer. Later on Mr. Chu told me that his sister had been sterilised soon after her son was born. He said:" That is a law here and everyone must obey!".

The achievement was impressive. But, for western critics the question is whether this success had been established at the expense of human right and freedom. Can Shuangmiao people have more, or more meaningful human rights and freedoms by abolishing the birth restriction? What will be the best alternative for the benefits of Shuangmiao people? I can make three forecasts, according to empirical evidence in China, for discussing this question. During the 1960s the Chinese people enjoyed complete "freedom" of having their children. The annual population growth rate recorded its highest as 3.33% with an average of about 2.8%. If we calculate with the highest, average and lowest growth rates of 3.33%, 2.8% and 1.2%, by 2020 the total population in Shuangmiao would be 2,627, 2,275 and 1,466 respectively. This means that the cultivated land per person would be 0.26, 0.3 and 0.46 mu respectively if the area of cultivated land remained constant. With 0.65 mu per person they needed to buy half a year's grain from the state shop and with 0.26 mu per person they would have needed to buy ten months grain from the state shop. Obviously, more freedom in this area would have led to much more severe problems in feeding themselves! The current family planning policy in Shuangmiao Village would at least, from my point of view, stabilise the surplus labour force situation in the near future. In other words, this strict policy would reduce the power of the push factor in terms of migration from the village.

In Shuangmiao the only way I could travel was by foot and I had to rely on the paths trodden by generations of peasants. The whole area of this muntainous village was 19.6 square kilometres so if you wanted to visit a household at the other end of the village it would take you about two hours to get there. Poor transport was an obstacle for local people's mobilisation and local economic development! Take the timber business for example. There were several timber brokers in the village who were doing business with some factories in Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces. Each year they went around the village twice to buy the timber that the peasants were selling. It was the sellers responsibility to carry the timber to the broker's warehouse. The only way of transporting this timber was on their shoulders. Afterwards the brokers would hire some young peasants to carry all the timber from the village to the public road to load it on trucks and transport it to their client factories. One broker told me that it would take him more than half a year to complete one deal due to the poor transport. A forest guard criticised it in rather a humorous way. He said: " Poor transport makes my job easier because I do not have to worry about timber theft. It is impossible for them to chop down the trees and transport them out to the market!".

Another negative factor influencing mobility and development in Shuangmiao was poor communications. Mail from Shanghai to Shuangmiao needs 7 to 10 days. The public postman just took all the mail to the office of the xiang and left the rest of the job to villagers who incidentally popped into the office of xiang to bring it back to the village. Normally they would leave the mail in the village office but if the office was closed, and it was for most of the time I was there, they would bring the mail back home and probably would forget it altogether in the end. For ordinary peasants they did not write often so this did not matter to them. But for a visitor like myself doing a survey where I needed frequent communication with the outside world it was most inconvenient. During a three

month period there I lost two letters from England and many from Shanghai. There was no way for me to complain because no body could tell who should take responsibility for the matter. So by living there I could see that it was totally unsafe to send mail to Shuangmiao.

There was no telephone in the village. When I first arrived in Nishui Xiang I failed to contact the Head of Shuangmiao Village because of this. Usually the xiang office pass their messages to the village either through their staff or some villagers who have called in. But at that time they couldn't send any of their staff to Shuangmiao and there were no villagers from Shuangmiao either. So in the end I could only give up the idea of meeting the Head of the Village and went directly to interview the peasants on my own. For Shuangmiao, I believe, the first thing they need to do is not to set up a factory, although many young men were keen to do so, but to complete the infrastructure like the transport and communication facilities. I was pleased to see a mud-surfaced road project was in operation from Nishui Xiang to Shuangmiao Village. By and large, poor transport systems and communications had, to some extent, stopped the local villagers moving out.

In Shuangmiao I interviewed 100 households. Like I intruduced in Chapter I that this 100 households were selected randomly from the households which had at least one family member migrated out. Apart from that I also interviewed some households which had no family member migrated out.

From the answers I found that 92% of those who had migrated out would come back within six months and 65% were searching for jobs in the area of Qianshan County. Only 24.2% of migrants had migrated to other provinces. This means that the outflow of migration from Shuangmiao was mostly seasonal and within a short distance. This result surprised me because I had always been informed that Anhui people, especially in the

poor areas, favoured long distance migration. In Shanghai and Beijin 斤g there were Anhui housekeepers (Bao Mu 保姆) everywhere. Why were Shuangmiao people different? After careful observation of the local economic, social and cultural situations I found that some economic and social factors were influencing the migration behaviour of the Shuangmiao people.

First, in comparison with other villages which I will describe later in this chapter, the surplus labour in Shuangmiao was seasonal rather than wholly surplus labour. The data of Shuangmiao showed us that the cultivated land per person there was 0.65 mu and an average household size was about 4.5 members. So each household in the village had 2.9 mu cultivated land on average. According to the local peasant's estimation, a strong unit of the local labour force can look after 2 mu of production during the peak season if he works very hard. If we conservatively consider a healthy woman or an old man as half a strong labour force then each household would have 1.5 strong labour force on average. So roughly, during the peak seasons there would be no surplus labour in the village. But there were about six months off-peak season when only half the amunt of labour was needed. Therefore the surplus labour during the off-peak seasons for each household in Shuangmiao would be 1.5 * 50% = 0.75 unit, which means that in the event of one strong labour force migrating out in the off-peak season it would only affect 0.25 of off- peak agricultural production. But it would affect production severely if one strong labour force migrated out in the peak season. This was confirmed by my interviews with many households in the village. As one old peasant told me, if his son left home permanently they would loose more than half of their harvest. Having lived there for more than 60 years he knows better than any one the meaning of a grain shortage for a poor peasant's family. So he would never allow his son to go out to find a job in the peak season. Of course, as he admitted, he was quite happy to see his son find something to do to earn some extra money during the off season period. But the situation could also be quite

different for some families. For instance, Mr. Chao Fulong had five sons living with him and they were all strong labour forces. The elder son was preparing to go to Shenyang to do some bamboo handicraft work. Mr. Chao was still keen to know whether his other sons could find permanent jobs somewhere since his contract land only needed a three strong labour force. Nonetheless this was an exceptional case because normally married sons in the village would set up their own families and the original family would be divided into several sub-households (Fen Jia 分家).

The villagers were poorly informed about the situation outside of the region because of the long term separation from the outside world. A person would be very proud if he/she could tell his/her friends that he/she had been in Anqing 安庆, the capital of the region. I often had to answer questions like :" Where is Shanghai?" " Is the moon in Shanghai more round than here?" " Is England far away? How much is the coach fare to there?" ...etc. Even Mr. Chu, my guide had never been out of his County although he was a high level intellectual in the village. Also only a few families in the village owned televisions and radios. There were no newspapers at all. The muntainous people, as they called themselves, were shy and quiet. They did not know what was happening outside of the muntainous region and they did not even know how to get to Shanghai.

People quite often use the Huaibei 淮北 (North of Huai River) and the Huainan 淮南 (South of Huai River) to divide Anhui. The former is poor and the latter is well off. This is because the Huang He 黄河 (Yellow River) cut the exit of the Huai River to the sea in the twelfth century and the Huaibei Plain had suffered frequently from floods and droughts, which was the main reason for the region's poverty. But people should realise that the division is too simplified. Actually southern Anhui should be further divided into west and east. So-called Huainan was, in fact, Southeast Anhui because Dabieshan had never been considered a rich part of Anhui and it was located in Southwest Anhui. If we

observed carefully we could find that the culture and tradition of Southeast and Southwest Anhui were significantly different. The Southeast part of Anhui was closely linked to Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces in the east and Jiangxi province in the south. So in culture, economy and traditions it is more integrated with the east coastal area. But if you entered Dabieshan area you would immediately find it to be much closer to the north Hubei culture. Take language for example. The Anhui dialect, though it has a very thick local accent, could communicate with most of the east coastal area. But the local dialect in Shuangmiao was absolutely different and people could certainly not communicate with other parts of Anhui. It was more like the north Hubei muntainous language. There were other differences as well. The people in Southeast Anhui, to some extent even in north Anhui, were more open, active and commercialised but the Dabieshan people, for some reason, were silent and conservative. Many peasants said they felt more secure working near home. They just dared not leave their home. Of course, as I described before, the poor communication and transportation was one reason for the lack of information from outside. But being locked in this region for ages, had led to them forming their own culture and tradition. Transportation and communication could be improved in the near future but to change an established local culture and traditions would take much longer.

From 100 interviews I noticed that most of the Shuangmiao out-migrants were unskilled labour. Most went to other areas to be building assistants to do heavy manual work. Only a few of them were bamboo handicraftsmen making simple products like bamboo brushes etc. According to some old people's memories, there were some traditional handicraft skills, say cracker paper production, in the village before liberation, and even at the beginning of the post-liberation period. But afterwards, starting from the commune period, these self-employed handicrafts production were all considered the "tails" of capitalism by the authority and were "chopped". Since then the peasants in Shuangmiao had no longer been engaged in any kind of skilled production. Nowadays the local people

only know how to build mud-brick houses and can only be manual labourers for some construction projects. This was also the reason why most peasants liked to search for their jobs in nearby regions, because they knew that it would be more risky to launch a long distance migration without a particular skill to offer. In the neighbouring villages or towns if they were unable find work they could simply come back home. But it would be a disaster for them if they failed to find a job in a place far away from home.

Whenever I asked female villagers if they would consider working outside the village they answered: " That is the men's job. Women in this village have never worked outside the village.' 93.5% of out-migrants in Shuangmiao Village were male. This was another difference I found in this village. This further proved the cultural difference between Dabieshan area and other parts of Anhui Province. It is clearly recognised that, according to traditional Chinese values, to be a good woman you must be a good mother and nice wife at home. (Xian Qi Liang Mu 贤妻良母) Girls before marriage were called Gui Nu （闺女）which means the girls who have always stayed at home. A typical symbolic tradition for this concept was women's bound feet to show their commitment to stay and work at home rather than outside. So the evidence from Shuangmiao confirmed that tradition in the village, in the comparison with other parts of the province, was more conservative. This conservative tradition had certainly affected out-migration behaviour in the village.

Between the capital of Nishui Xiang and Shuangmiao Village there was a village called Heming Village. At the time when Shuangmiao was categorised as a Poverty Village Heming was too. The only difference between Shuangmiao and Heming was that the latter was located just along the road from Hefei 合肥, the capital of Anhui Province, to Yuexi of Hubei Province. In 1984, a brave peasant, Chu Haochuang, signed a contract with the local government to take the responsibility for the production of 10,100 mu of

forest lands. Instead of selling raw timber, he decided to set up a factory to produce paper. In order to guarantee the capital he issued 20,000 shares of the factory, approved by the local authorities, to sell to the peasants. Each share was valued 10 yuan. In the end he successfully gathered 200,000 yuan of capital to start his business: producing paper for cracker production. The progress was striking! In three years time they achieved the mechanisation of production. By 1988 the value of production reached 1.09 million yuan. In 1991 production value of the enterprise broke the 10 million record and reached 13.8 million yuan. Heming Village was no longer a poor village but was quite well off within the region. By 1991 the income per capita in Heming Village was 500 yuan. The significance was that they not only got rid of the poverty but also solved the employment problem for surplus labour as well. The leader of the village told me that by 1991, apart from some carpenters or craftsmen, there was no out migration in Heming Village. Here we can see the importance of adequate transportation. Could Heming Village have set up a factory, or could the factory have been successful in selling their products to the market without a main public road? The answer would be obviously "NO"!

By and large, however, the case of Heming was an exception and the other six villages represented the common situation of labour migration in the region, of which Shuangmiao was one. From the interviews outlined above I will summarise the out-migration in Shuangmiao as follows:

I. In Shuangmiao Village the labour surplus[10] is seasonal because most of the strong labour force are still needed to work in the lands in the peak season due to the seasonal characteristics of agricultural production. The permanent absence of a strong labour

[10] The definitions of surplus labour in rural China used by the Chinese government and the research institutes are varied and subjective. My survey in Shuangmiao Village, and other villages as well, define the surplus labour in the way as **Total Labour Force - ((Total cultivated Land * (Real Labour Demand per Unit * Cultivated Land)).**

force in a household would inevitably lead to the reduction of its grain production. Since full production could only provide half a year food supply and another half a year's supply was purchased from the state rice shop by ration, a permanent out-migrant would mean the household would have to purchase more grain from the free market where the price was much higher than the state price. That would really matter for them because they would not be able to afford it. On the other hand, there was surplus labour during the off-peak seasons. Therefore, the peasants considered that short distance job searching would be more sensible.

Data from Shuangmiao Survey, 1992

	%	Valid %
Other village	9.7	10.0
Other town	62.9	75.0
Other province	24.2	25.0
Missing	3.2	
Total	100.0	100.0

II. Due to a radical policy before the 1980s, the already very weak local handicrafts were destroyed. This had limited the possibilities of local people moving further afield to obtain jobs.

III. Out of the 100 households investigated there were only 9 female migrants. This single sex feature was a result of cultural rather than economic factors. Of course, with the invasion of outside cultural influences and the improvement of local education, traditional values have less and less influence on young women in the village. The 9 female out-migrants they were all aged between 15 and 28. Eight of them were under 22 and none of them were illiterate.

Actually, there was great potential for surplus labour to be employed in the village should the infrastructure problem be solved. For instance, the climate and soil condition there were quite suitable for mulberry plantation. According to Mr. Chu Zhigao's estimate, 300,000 trees could be planted in the village. The market price for each shoot was 0.25 yuan which means the total cost for planting 300,000 trees would be 75,000 yuan. It would take three years for a tree to mature. We should reckon another 75,000 yuan for the cost of taking care of the trees. The current interest rate at that time for agricultural loans was 6%, so the total investment for this project would need to be about 150,000 * (1+0.06)square 3 = 180,000 yuan. But from the fourth year each tree could produce 1 yuan of silk cocoon by raising silkworms, which means the annual outcome of this project would be 300,000 yuan. Deducting the costs, the net income of this project could be about 100,000 yuan in the fourth year and then about 200,000 to 250,000 yuan in the following years, excluding the inflation factor. The whole project would include tree plantation and raising silkworms which would absorb most of the surplus labour in the village. But, the obstacles for this project were lack of financial resources, poor information about the silkworm nursing and cocoon selling market and, poor transportation.

3.3. Xianfeng Village, Dingxi Region, Gansu Province

Dingxi County, which is located in the Northwest yellow plateau of Gansu Province, is a typical Northwest drought area. The total area of Dingxi County is 3,638.711 square kilometres. It is tilted from Southwest downwards to Northeast. The highest place in the county is 2577.3 metres above sea level and the lowest 1671.3 metres. The water resources in the county are extremely poor. Neither the underground water endowment nor the rain fall are sufficiently reliable for cultivation. So in this area, for quite a long time, no irrigated cultivation was mentioned in the literature. Only in the late Qing

Dynasty, some orchard farms began to apply well and stream irrigation, and these were less than 3,000 mu. According to data from Ding Xi County, by 1985 there were about 110,000 mu of irrigated lands, of which 100,000 mu belonged to guaranteed irrigated lands which represented 4% of the total cultivated lands in the county.

The historical records show that Ding Xi County had suffered tremendous natural disasters, such as droughts, floods, hail and frosts, in the last thousand years. Among these disasters drought was the worst. According to the same records, from the Song Dynasty to 1946, there were 29 droughts, and 12 of these were fatal ones. This indicated that during this period there was a drought every 30 years . But if we focus our attention upon the period of the Qing Dynasty (268 years) we would find 17 droughts which means the average span for each drought was shortened to 17 years. Then from 1921 to 1946 there were 8 droughts and the span was further shortened to every four years. The accurate records from weather forecast station showed that from 1950 to 1974 there were 17 droughts. The span between two droughts was only 1.5 years! Take two big droughts (the criterion set by the weather station for drought was when the rain fall is less than up to 49% of the average level this belongs to a general drought, less than 50% belongs to big drought, or fatal drought). In 1980 and 1982 for example, 78% and 86% of total grain and oil cultivated lands were hit by drought. As a result, most inhabitants in the region could only live on the drinking water supply transported by the government. As a matter of fact, due to this particular circumstance, Dingxi people have suffered a great deal from the shortage of drinking water. Among 23,300 households there was a population of 134,000 (if we assume the average household size is six people then the households run out of drinking water should be 22,333) who had frequently run out of drinking water and relied on the government transported drinking water. This means most of households in Dinxi suffer from the shortage of drinking water.

Table 3. The Economic Growth Index of Xianfeng Village 1980-1990

	1980	1985	1990
Households	461	513	634
Population	2482	2662	3070
Cultivated Land (mu)	8250	8200	8000
Total Production (kg)	969450	1107000	1374000
Production/mu (kg)	117.5	135	171.8
Cultivated/person	3.33	3.08	2.6
Production/person (kg)	390.5	416	447.5
Total Production Value (0,000 yuan)	33.2	93.5	351.9*
Income per capita (yuan)	133.76	351.34	449

Sources: The Statistical Records of Xianfeng Village.

- I should point out that all the official data I have collected from the villages are not totally reliable due to the propaganda characteristic of reporting their data. This 3.519 million yuan figure is telling the great achievement since Deng Xiaoping's policy was implemented.

Although, as a whole region, Dingxi is a poor county there were some well off villages in it. Xianfeng Village, one of my sample villages in Ding Xi was relatively better off. The figures of either the yield per person or the income per capita show that Xianfeng Village was not a poor village at all. While the whole area of Ding Xi had suffered from

drought Xianfeng Village, with its rich underground water resource, had to some extent escaped from the disasters. Of its 8,000 mu of cultivated lands 72% were valley lands which means they could be irrigated. The rest were muntainous lands and they relied totally on natural rainfall. From the beginning of the 1980s, with the financial support of the Poverty Relief Office, the village started to set up 24 pump wells for its 13 residential groups - former production teams which had basically solved the problem of watering the crops. The only fee that peasants had to pay was the electricity bill for using the pump well. So by each May and June the local villagers would start to irrigate their crops, which was called (FANG SHUI 放水), or irrigating season. Some well off households would irrigate twice but most households just did it once a year. Although they had this extra cost for their agricultural production their harvests became more promising than other villages in Ding Xi County. The Table above showed us that a stable growth of grain production from 1980 to 1990 had been achieved. In the last few years, I was told, the peasants in Xianfeng were growing tree seedlings for the demand for forestation in the Ding Xi area and some of them even grew fruit tree seedlings for better profits. As Mr. Zhang Gengsheng, the Party's Secretary of Ding Xi County, explained, Xianfeng Village was a **scientific cultivation model** in the county. As well as the tree seedling production the local transport service was another major industry in the village. In Xianfeng Village there were about 20 small tractors owned by individuals. These individual tractor owners ran a transport business and paid the local tax to the village. Some owners also hired some young peasants as their loaders.

There was a plastic bucket production workshop owned by the village with registered capital of 10,000 yuan. I found that instead of causing pollution like many other Xiang Zhen Enterprises, it was solving pollution problems by its production. As the Party's Secretary of the village explained, after a few years of tree seedling production there were loads of used plastic sheets everywhere in the village. Since there are no public cleaning services in the rural areas in China these used plastic sheets became public waste,

polluting the environment of the village. This workshop used waste as raw material melting the plastic first and then using mulds to produce buckets. So this village enterprise had not only created six job opportunities and some profits for the village, but helped to clean the environment!

With the diversification of agricultural production Xianfeng Village had achieved very impressive economic growth. Within the last decade the production value and income per capita had been increased 26% and 12.87% respectively annually. Now almost every household in the village had about 5,000 to 10,000 jin 斤 of grain in their storage. Economically Xianfeng Village no longer needs any relief funds from the Poverty Alleviation Office.

When I selected 100 sample households from the HUKOU Books in the village office I discovered that most young couples who got married after 1980 had more than two children. According to the data from the village, from 1980 to 1990, the population had grown by 2.15% annually. This was much higher than the state target rate of 1.4%. Consequently, the cultivated land per person had declined from 3.33 mu to 2.6 mu. At this rate of decline, if the total lands had not been reduced, by the year 2000 each person in the village would have only 2 mu of cultivated land. Fast population growth had lowered the standard of living in many young families and will further affect the local economic and social development. Here I can give a vivid example from my survey of how too many children could affect a family's life.

Mr. Tian Baozhen was 33 and his wife was 34. Both of them were healthy and hard working people. Tian Baozhen had his father and step-mother living together with him because he was an only son. After their marriage 14 years ago and until 1990 his wife had four children and all of them were

daughters. According to local culture, the daughters would marry out and couldn't carry on the family's surname. So Mr. Tian was facing the fact that his family line would end with himself if he did not have a son. After a discussion with the village leader he got their sympathy and was allowed to have another baby. Fortunately the last baby was a boy. So altogether he had five children and his family size, including his parents, was two times bigger than the average size of 4.8 people in the village. Last year, beside the contract land's production, he also raised 39 sheep and three pigs. The total income of his family was 2,000 yuan which was not too bad at all. But due to their big family size, each person in his family could only have 222 yuan which was very much below the poverty line (To take the price inflation factor into account the local government set 300 yuan annual income per capita as the poverty line in the region in 1992.) He found it extremely difficult to support the daily living expenses of the family. He even found it difficult to pay his three daughters school fees although it was a tiny amunt. He admitted to me that every year they were struggling for survival!

Obviously, Mr. Tian's family was poor mainly because of its big size rather than for any other reason. His family would been much better off if he had only had two children. In that case, with six family members the average income per person would have been 333.33 yuan which was not very much below the average level in the village. The population in Xianfeng Village will be about 4,500 by the year of 2010 given the current population growth rate. Nevertheless, during the time I was there, I saw no signs at all of the possibility of changing the current demographic situation. The leaders who were in charge of family planning complained of the state family planning policy being too strict and unrealistic. They found it difficult, or rather were reluctant to implement it. So the

situation was totally different from Shuangmiao where the family planning policy has been strictly implemented.

The topographical characteristics of Dingxi is its vast broadness. On the way from Lanzhou to Dingxi, within a distance of ten miles, I could only see endless yellow earth along the road sides. From one residential area to another there were no households at all. In the coastal areas, which I will describe later, a visit from one village to another village would only take you a quarter of an hour on foot. But if you wanted to visit Youfeng Village from Xianfeng it would take you more than half a day's walking although they are in the same xiang. In the coastal area you would always see some households between two residential areas. But in Dingxi area you often saw none. This difference could be drawn on a comparative diagram as follows.

Diagram A



Diagram B



In the diagram, part A represents the populated pattern in the coastal areas and part B represents the Northwest areas. Diagram A shows that the residential areas A, B, C, D are linked by scattered households which are represented by scattered dots. But when we

observe diagram B we find that the households are all concentrated in residential areas A, B, C, and D. There are no scattered households between them.

By and large, Xianfeng Village is a recently developed Northwest village. On the one hand, with the diversification strategy and relatively better conditions for agricultural production, it has changed its poor and backward situation. But on the other it is still a village surrounded and influenced by local tradition, culture and environment. How these combined factors affect the local villager's migration behaviour will be the next discussion.

Xianfeng Village was 20 km from the capital of Dingxi County and had 13 residential groups, former production teams spread along both sides of a public road. It was an administrative village which was set up by the local government at the time of collectivisation and reorganised during the people's commune period. The main part of the village was called "Wo Long Chuan 卧龙传" before liberation which means the place a dragon used to lie. There were three government paid officers, the Party Secretary, the Village Head and the Battalion Commander of the People's Militia. The other four village staff were paid by the way which was called the subsidy from the village's revenue and were not full time. The village was awarded the title of **model village** 样板村 by Ding Xi County in 1990 which means it was considered an example for other villages to follow.

The age structure of the population in Xianfeng Village, given the particular demographic situation, was slightly different from that in Shuangmiao Village. In Shuangmiao the structure turned out to be an oval shape. But in Xianfeng, although the old dependent portion was relatively small there was a much bigger young dependent portion due to the fast population growth rate in the last decade. (I was told that during the commune period the population growth rate was better controlled.) So the labour

force (the village office considered all men and women between the ages of 18-55 to be a labour force) in Xianfeng Village was about 1,500, almost 50% of its population. The amunt of cultivated land per person in the labour force was 5.2 mu, which was higher than in Shuangmiao. Does this mean that there was no surplus labour in Xianfeng? The answer is no. Due to climatic differences between north and south in China, the shorter frost-free season in the north only allowed the peasants to have one harvest a year whilst in the south two harvests a year were very common and in some parts peasants could even have three harvests a year. So when a strong labour force in Shuangmiao could take up two mu's work it did not mean the same in Xianfeng Village. As a matter of fact, as most villagers agreed, a unit of strong labour force there could do the job for at least eight mu. Therefore the surplus labour in Xianfeng should be (8 - 5.2)/8 = 0.35, which means 35% of the labour force would be surplus if all the labour force were in full efficient use. Of course, this does not mean that in Xianfeng Village the out migration rate was 35%. As a matter of fact, the real figures from my investigation were lower. The villager leader told me that in 1992 about 250 of the labour force migrated out to work, which constituted only 15% of the total labour force in the village. This was mainly because some surplus labour did not go out on the one hand, and on the other the labour force was not used altogether efficiently.

Summery

Seventeen households out of 100 sample households were not available. The response rate was 83%. From the 83 answers, again, I found that most of the out-migration from the village was for a short period and within a short distance. 96.1% of out-migrants would come back within one year and only 6% went to other provinces. Most of these

short distance out-migrants were working as casual labourers in small brick kilns in nearby small towns like Neiguang and Chengguang. During the off-peak seasons they went to work in the morning and came back home in the evening by bike. Only a few young married couples rented a room in the town and lived there. During the harvest or irrigating seasons some of them would come back to the field to work. But many of them would only come back home for the Spring Festival. So, although from the result of the survey, 33.8% of them would come back home after nine months but before one year, many of them actually would just come back for the holidays. These people represented one third of this 33.8% which should belong to long period or permanent out migration within a short distance. So 86% would be a more accurate estimate to describe the ratio of short period and short distance out migration in the village.

Data from Xianfeng Survey, 1992

	%	Valid %
Other village	58.0	69.9
Other town	20.0	24.1
Other province	5.0	6.0
Missing	17.0	
Total	100.0	100.0

As I have mentioned, the wildness and broadness feature of the Northwest was another factor to influence the local people making fewer long distance moves. People hardly even knew what was really happening in their neighbouring counties since it took them several days to get there. So it was almost impossible for them to think about moving to a place of which they knew nothing. The survey revealed another social factor which had influenced the villager's migration behaviour. In my investigation I asked two particular questions. One was " Are you proud of being a resident in this village?" and

another was " Did any of your family member migrate out in the last four decades?". The answers showed that 87.5% were proud to be villagers there and only 11% of them had family members who migrated out in the last four decades. This indicated quite clearly that from a social point of view there was no pushing factor in the village which could encourage the villagers to migrate out. It also confirmed that Xianfeng villagers had no out migration history.

In Dingxi region you find small brick kilns everywhere. In one village alone like Xianfeng there were about 10 brick kilns. Almost every peasant knew how to make roof tiles and bricks. Anyway of all the out migrants 97% were casual labourers who worked in the small brick kilns outside the village. It was no more than obvious that this local traditional skill did encourage the peasants to migrate out.

Whether this out-migration had affected agricultural production was another issue I looked at. So this particular question was put into my questionnaire. The result shows that from 81 answers 42% said "yes" and 58% said "no". Of course, the answers were rather subjective since I had difficulty in setting a criterion for the definition of effect. In which way the out migration had affected the agricultural production was not clear. All I could do was to check the output of the households which had a family member who had migrated out and compare it with the households where there were no out migrants. I found that for those 42% who said "yes" only 8 households had an agricultural output which was less than that of the non-migrant's households, which means that only about 7% of all household's agricultural production were affected by out migration. This tied in with the results of my investigation about the surplus labour force in the village. That is there was the surplus labour force and the current out migration in Xianfeng Village had not visually affected agricultural production.

As in many other Chinese rural areas the migrants from Xianfeng Village were nearly all male. Out of 83 respondents there was only one female who went out with her husband as a spouse. Bearing this in mind I visited Mr. Zhang Hang who was 72 and the oldest intellectual in the village. He told me :" in this area a woman who works outside will risk being disliked by her husband, or will have trouble finding a husband. A respected woman should be good at her housework and field labour and raising the children.". It was true that during the time I stayed there I saw many female labourers doing work in the fields. This was an obvious difference from some coastal areas. I remember in 1980 when I asked an Anhui housekeeper why she came out to work rather than her husband she answered:" I am a woman and can't do as much as my husband does in the field. But being a housekeeper in the city, I can earn almost as much money as a man can. It would be a waste if I stayed at home and let my husband come.". Her comment made it very clear that, for the economic reason, she migrated out. What I want to emphasise is that she would not have come to the city if her village had similar traditional values towards women as Xianfeng and Shuangmiao. Of course, she would also have to take her reputation in the village into account if she wanted to make a decision to go out. In Xianfeng , at the time of my survey, the villagers had not accepted the concept that women, like men, should go out to find jobs.

4.4 Kangle Village

Table 4. The Economic Index of Kangle Village in 1990

Total Population	1862	Total Cultivated Land (mu)	9579
Male	995	Muntainous Land	8886

Female	907	Valley Land	711
Labour Force	880	Terraced Land (%)	84
Male	431	Water container	684
Female	449	Grain Production (kg)	550900
Households	386	Production/mu (kg)	71.5
Income/person (yuan)	336.9*	Production/person (kg)	295.9

- When they report to FU PIN BAN they would have used another figure which is below 300 yuan.

Sources: The Statistical Data of Kangle Village, 1990.

Kangle Village was one of the poorest villages in Gejiaca Xiang, Dingxi County. The situation of out-migration there was totally different from that in Xianfeng and Shuangmiao.

The mud-surfaced road from Dingxi County to Gejiaca Xiang was full of ramps. Looking out from the Jeep all the scenery I could see along both sides of the road made me feel as if I was in the desert. I could see no grass and trees but endless stretches of yellow earth during the whole two hour journey. I was told that there had been no rain for the last three seasons and there was not much drinking water left in the water containers. These so-called water containers were actually oval shaped underground holes dug by each household in the village to collect rain water for drinking. The villagers told me that people who lived there could only have two baths throughout the whole of their lives. One when they were born and the other when they died. When a big drought hit the region as it had this year the villagers had to kill all their cattle in order to save the

drinking water. The local government would transport rationed water to the village when their water containers ran out. The village leaders said that there would be no harvest this year and the villagers would live on government relief. Although each person in the village had 9.5 mu of cultivated land on average they were below the poverty line due to the poor water endowment. Their cultivation literature was called GUANG ZHONG BAO SHOU 广种薄收 which means to cultivate broadly in order to make up for the low yield per unit. Water had always been a severe problem for agricultural production and their lives.

Under such adverse circumstances the villagers in Kangle Village, like many African peasants, could not find much to do in agricultural activities. During the commune period there was a very popular song called " The Commune Members are all Sunflowers" to symbolise the relationship between the commune members and Mao. Later on they used the title of this song to indicate that all the peasants there had nothing to do but always sat under the sun for sun baths. But after 1983 when the people's commune was disbanded out migration became more and more popular so that they could find something to do elsewhere. The most common way for Kangle villagers to go to other places to work was through private contractors - **BAOGONGTOU** 包工头.[11] Mr. Ma Yaofang, one **BAOGONGTOU**'s brother told me that in the village there were about 10 **BAOGONGTOU**. His bother organised 52 villagers, of whom 8 were female spouses of migrants, who last April went to Inner Mongolia to work for small brick kilns. The requirement for the migrants was that they must be under 45 and hard working people. This year, as Mr. Ma said, about 300 villagers had migrated out and they would work there all year around and only come back for the Spring Festival. The result of my survey

[11] BAOGONGTOU is a Chinese word which means the private contractor. This kind of contractors were prohibited by Chinese government during the period of people's commune in the countryside and re-emerged again in the 1980s. The people who became the contractor normally have broader contacts in other places, are better educated and informed. Quite often they have certain kinds of entrepreneur family background.

of 50 individuals confirmed Mr. Ma's introduction. Among those 50 out-migrants, 96% were male and only 4% were female. All of them were under the age of 45 and 72% of them were under 28. 74.2% out migrants from the village would not come back within one year and 92% went to other provinces to find jobs. So the characteristics of out migration in Kangle Village were long period and long distance out-migration.

Data from Kangle Survey, 1992

	%	Valid %
Other town	8.0	8.0
Other Province	92.0	92.0
Total	100.0	100.0

Summery

From the example of Kangle I found that out migration patterns could be very different even within the same social and cultural zone if the economic conditions were very different. In Xianfeng, apart from grain production, people could still do private transport business, tree seedling growing and etc. owing to there being water and convenient transportation. But for Kangle the conditions were quite the reverse. As the head of xiang told me " the only job for the peasants to do here in the fields is to spread the seeds on their lands and then to wait until the harvest. They do not even have to use much fertiliser since, without irrigation, it would be a waste. There would be more out migrants if they could find more work outside. The whole year's income for a strong labour force working hard all year around was only 400 yuan in a good year and nothing in a bad year. So it has been extremely difficult for a man here to support his family." Definitely, the long period and long distance features of out migration in Kangle were determined by poor developmental conditions in the village. In this case it was the

economic factors rather than the social and cultural factors which played a key role. People found their lives much easier elsewhere than in their home village. A casual worker in a small brick kiln in Inner Mongolia, for instance, could earn at least 1,000 yuan a year in comparison with about 200 - 400 yuan annual income at home.

But the problem for individual peasants in Kangle Village was that they felt extremely insecure about going to other provinces and searching for jobs. They were not well educated and informed about the other places in the country. So that is why certain kinds of person or organisation was necessary. Therefore, the **BAOGONGTOU** emerged. Normally they were risk taking persons with better education and experiences. Relatively speaking they were better informed about other provinces than ordinary peasants in the village. **BAOGONGTOU** in Kangle went to Inner Mongolia or Xinjiang to search for proper employers. After signing contracts they came back to recruit the workers from the village. Villagers also trusted them since they were fellow villagers and they felt more secure going to other provinces with these **BAOGONGTOU**. Even the county government found them helpful, because although there was a Labour Export Company in the county it could in no way take care of all poor villages in the area.

Although most out-migration from Kangle Village was long distance and long period, it was rural-rural rather than rural-urban migration. The result of the survey showed that

Data from Kangle Survey, 1992

	%	Valid %
Village	74.0	74.0
Town	6.0	6.0
City	20.0	20.0
Total	100.0	100.0

none of them went to the cities. In the village I had several talks with my informants. I asked them why their husbands, brothers or other relatives didn't go to Lanzhou or Urumuqi but instead went to small towns in the rural area to work. Most of them answered that they just followed the **BAOGONGTOU** and they themselves did not have any ideas about where they would go. The only thing that mattered to them was whether or not there was a job there. Then I understood that it was the **BAOGONGTOU** who determined the destination of out migration. So I went to Mr. Ma again to ask him why did his brother always choose small towns in rural Inner Mongolia rather than the city, Huhehaote. He said:"...my brother trusts countrymen more than citymen. He would feel nervous dealing with businessmen in the cities because he feels he could be duped at anytime. It would be more relaxing for him to work in a small town in the rural area even though he would earn less money than in the cities." This comment was very interesting. It revealed the basic reason why out migration from Kangle was rural - rural rather than rural - urban. Will they eventually target the cities? Why? This will be discussed in detail when I show my investigation in the villages in Zhejiang Province.

5.5 Wenzhou Region, Zhejiang Province

The survey in Zhejiang Province was initially conducted together with research staffs from the Labour Ministry and Agricultural Ministry in Longgang Town and then by myself in Xiting and Tianliao Villages, Luqi Xiang, Changnan County.

Actually, Longgang Town was not in my survey plan. But the Agricultural Ministry advised me that I must have a look at this very special town in Wenzhou Region which was only six years old. I was told that this town was set up exclusively by the local

peasants and didn't use one penny of the government's money. There was no state ownership at all in the town. In the end I decided to go with them to have a look, and it was certainly worth while.

The town was located in the coastal area of Zhejiang Province and was about 160 km south of Wenzhou City. Although Wenzhou, due its economic boom after 1980, had been a hot topic of conversation in Chinese development models over the last decade, its transportation was disappointing. The bad quality asphalt road from Wenzhou to Longgang was narrow and bumpy, in sharp contrast to the luxurious tombs along the road sides. I recalled the comments of Professor Lu Xueyi that the "Wenzhou model is a Chinese style Portuguese model. Like Portugal it has no long term future since they invested nothing in the infrastructures for the sake of long term economic development." (From a personal talk in July, 1992) . It seems to me that his comments were right to some extent. We left Wenzhou at 2:00 p.m. and arrived in Longgang at 6:00 p.m. My first impression of Longgang was that it was cleaner and more modern than any other countryside town in China.

Mr. Li Qitie, the head of the town, told me that until 1984 Longgang had been only a very small, poor fishing village with a population of 6,000. People worked in the fields during the peak agricultural seasons and did some coastal fishing during the off-peak seasons. Neither agricultural production nor fishing could make the people of Longgang rich. In 1984, Mr. Chen Dingmo, then Party Secretary of Longgang Xiang, found that after several years of the open door policy there was quite a bit of capital in the local peasant's hands. He believed that by using this capital to set up a new town he could create an industrialised zone which could solve the employment problem on the one hand and develop Longgang in the long term on the other. The first step they decided on was

to sell the land leaseholds (these were cultivated lands!) to any peasant who wanted to start a business in Longgang. They advertised " All the land to all the investors." in the local newspaper to encourage the peasants to leave their villages and start with new opportunities in Longgang. Within 30 days they received 5,000 applications. These 5,000 newcomers were the pioneers of the current Longgang. The price of land was divided into six grades from 700 yuan to 5,000 yuan per units of 42 square metres, according to the return ratio. By the end of 1985 they had collected more than 10 million yuan from this sale. From 1987, due to the endless applications, the Longgang Government began to sell the land leaseholds by auction. The highest bid for one square metre was 2,000 yuan. All the income from these land leasehold sales were , in return, to be invested in the infrastructure construction. The post office building, the water tower, the power station, the hospital, The fire station and the Longgang avenue mushroomed one after another. By the end .

Table 5. The Social and Economic Index of Longgang 1984-1990

	1984	1987	1990	Annual Growth Rate
Industry (million yuan)	2.4	75.8	232	114.2
Post Industry (0,000 yuan)	1.6	64.99	173.57	118.4
Tax Revenue	84	521	1543	62.4

(0,000 yuan)				
Income per capita (yuan)	401	921	1223	20.4
Housing (0,000 sq. m)	1.5	69	114	106
School Enrolments (primary and middle)	2070	6057	10017	30.1
Telephone	70	450	1600	68.5
Ward Beds	10	90	130	53.3
Population (0,000)	0.6	2.2	5.4	44.2

Sources: Li Haoran " The Longgang Development Model ", 1991, Shanghai Social Science Academy Press.

of 1990 they had invested more than 5 million yuan in the infrastructure. So starting from 1984, within six years, all Longgangers became enterprise employees and the former small fishing village became quite a modern town with a population of 54,000. They had not only absorbed all the local rural labour force into the factories but also another 23,000 rural surplus labour forces from other rural parts of China. As long you can prove that you are employed or that you are in a position to set up your own business you are allowed to migrate into Longgang. no HUKOU is needed. All residents in Longgang buy their food from the free market and there are no rice coupons there. The table shows us the great changes which took place in Longgang from 1984 to 1990.

The achievements were striking. The far reaching significance of this development was that all the residents in Longgang were free to move, either in or out. As Mr. Li Qitie proudly said:" What we are doing is to let the rural surplus labour force LI XIANG AND LI TU 离乡又离土 (to leave their villages totally) set up their own businesses with their own capital.". The Longgang model has first of all challenged the Government's orthodox agricultural policy (see "Chinese Agricultural Economy" edited by Guo Shutian, 1991), which emphasised grain production as the key issue for agriculture. Instead of producing grain, they simply sold all their agricultural lands and got rid of grain production. So some traditional political economists and officials in China questioned this model by asking:" What would happen if all our peasants got rid of agricultural or grain production?". Their argument was based on the fact that China is a huge nation with a 1.2 billion population and could in no way rely on grain imports. Any development strategy which sacrificed agricultural production or grain production would run into the danger of social turmoil in the future. He Kang, the former Ministry of Agriculture, pointed out: "It must be pointed out here that the emphasis on the fundamental status of grain production in agriculture does not want to deny the importance of diversified development which includes agriculture, forestry, sideline production, fishery and Xiang and Zhen Enterprise. What I want to emphasise is that the fundamental role of grain production is unreplaceable. ...Some people questioned this argument by raising the point that so long as we develop cattle farms we would have enough meat and milk to replace the grain. But they failed to see the fact that to produce these products it needs a huge amunt of grain which would be several times more than these cattle products. The suggestion of learning from the cattle farm model in the foreign countries to develop our agriculture would be totally out of touch with the reality of our country." ("The Fundamental Position of Grain Production and Its Development Strategy" He Kang, from " The Development Strategy and Policy for Grain Production in China" edited by He Kang, Agricultural Press, 1990. p 6-7.) He

Kang's argument was not simply a personal point of view but an official policy. Actually, Tian Jiyun, Vice Premier who is in charge of agriculture, wrote a preface for this book.

Other schools considered Longgang a very successful model. Fudan Professor Yuan Enzheng in his preface for " Longgang Development Model " written by Li Haoran wrote:

> **Urbanisation is an inevitable end of agricultural industrialisation and commercialisation. What we are doing today is called the socialist road with a Chinese character. Therefore, the Longgang experience is undoubtedly a part of the experience of this socialist road with a Chinese character.".**

It is well known that the so-called socialist road with a Chinese character was labelled thus by Deng Xiaoping, which means a market economy under the leadership of the communist party. Whether or not the peasants will stay in their lands or get rid of their lands will be determined by market mechanisms rather than the government's policy, according to the school of socialism with a Chinese character. Mr. Li's calculation about different production in Longgang deserves some consideration. In his book he wrote:

> **From the point of view of land efficiency, the income from paddy production per mu around Longgang is 200 yuan, from vegetable and fruits is 2,000 yuan, and from flowers is 10,000 yuan. But a factory set up on this one mu of land would have 400,000 yuan of income!".**

Whatever, according to what I saw in Longgang, had happened there was at least good for the local people. It had not only tripled their income within six years but created 23,000 employment's for peasants from other parts of China. With regard to the matter of internal migration in China, Longgang had offered much more freedom of choice for the rural peasants to move. With those immigrants in Longgang, given the situation of

unemployment and underemployment in China's countryside, their leaving had alleviated the employment pressure in the original place and they became a productive labour force in this small scale town.

However, if we are intending to apply the Longgang model to the other parts of China we must remember the particular conditions for and the limit of this model. First of all, Longgang is located in Wenzhou region where peasants did have enough saving to buy the land and property, which is not applicable at all for many other rural areas in China where peasants are still struggling for the essential needs for their daily lives. Secondly, even within Wenzhou region, if other villages all follow this model to sell their lands to build the towns then marginal utility will decline which will cause the price to decline. Eventually villages will not be able to collect enough capital to set up towns like Longgang. Thirdly, if all the villages in China sell their lands to set up towns to develop the Xiang Zhen Industry then it will inevitably reduce cultivated lands and, therefore, affect agricultural production and push the price of agricultural products up. As a result, the cost of production for Xiang Zheng Industry will be more expensive. Eventually, Xiang Zhen Enterprises will lose their competitiveness. Taking all these considerations into account, it will be dangerous for Chinese government to encourage all other parts of China to follow the Longgang model. However, for Longgang people, by selling their lands to set up a town, they are better off than before. They are contributing more tax to the provincial government than before. To this extent, I would agree that the Longgang is successful.

There was a village called Xiabu Village 下埠村 which was about 15 minutes walk away from the centre of the town. I was told that its social and economic development was entirely affected by the emergence of Longgang Town. Together with Mr. Li, a staff

member of the Longgang Employment Exploration Sampling Office, I did a brief investigation of the migration situation in the village.

According to the population growth rate in the village the local labour force should have been 1,010. But in the Table the labour force in 1991 was 1,142. That was because there were 132 who migrated in from other places. From the Table we can see that a great change in the labour structure had taken place in Xiabu Fu Village from 1980 to 1991. The percentage of agricultural labour force declined from 100% in 1980 to 12.6% in 1991 due to the development of other industries. By 1991 there were 166 young people from this village working in the factories in Longgang town. On the other hand, 132 labour force had migrated in. This could happen because, for the local villagers, their income from the factories was much higher than a rural income. In the village a young peasant could earn 1,500 yuan a year. But in Longgang, he/she could earn at least 3,000 yuan a year. So almost all the young labour force in the village migrated out to work in the town since they had the advantage of a close location to the town. On the other hand, this 1,500 yuan annual income was very attractive to peasants who could only earn about 300 to 400 yuan a year. Apart from those out migrants, the village itself also had developed new industries of transport, services, fishing and commerce which created 536 employment by 1991. Furthermore, according to the Table, this development did not take place at the expense of agricultural production. But, the Head of the village told me that in a few years time, according to the town's development plan, this village would be a part of the town. So the urbanisation of the Longgang area had shifted the local labour force from agriculture to other industries and absorbed the labour force from outside as well.

3.6 Xiting and Tianliao Villages, Luqi Xiang, Changnan County

Table 7. The Economic Index of Xiting and Tianliao Villages, 1991

	Xiting	Tianliao
Total Income (yuan)	795900	290700
Industry	42600	19600
Agriculture	286200	68900
Tea and others	426000	19600
Income per capita	388	403
Population	2053	722
Households	420	136
Labour Force	1708	403
Male	1027	242
Female	681	161
Cultivated Lands (mu)	572.5	219
Cultivated Lands/person	0.28	0.3

Sources: The Annual Statistical Books of Xiting and Tianliao Villages, 1991.

Luqi Xiang was located in the most southern part of Zhejiang Province and bordered on Fuding County of Fujian Province. It was a muntainous xiang. As in other parts of Zhejiang the population density was very high. The amunt of cultivated land per head in Luqi Xiang was only 0.2 mu. The main income for the local peasants was from the production of unprocessed tea. One thing that struck me was that, instead of the Zhejiang dialect, the local dialect was Min'nan (southern Fujian Province) dialect. Mr. Li Shengshuan, my survey guide in Luqi told me that all the residents here were descendants of Min'nan people who immigrated several hundred years ago. But nobody in the area could tell exactly when and why their ancestors immigrated over here.

The most popular transport in the region was privately owned minibuses and motor tricycles which were converted from vans and motor hand-tillers. The main road network linking Changnan County and each region (DI QU) were asphalt roads. Then the smaller road network which linked each region to each xiang were narrow mud-surfaced roads. I went to Changnan County from Longgang town by a minibus and it took me about one hour. From the county to Luqi Xiang I took another bus which had no timetable at all for departure. The bus would only depart when it had enough passengers. So I waited for almost one hour and it took me another hour to reach my destination. The transportation in Changnan, in comparison with Dabieshan and Dingxi areas, was more advanced. During my journey from Longgang to Luqi I saw minibuses and motor tricycles busy coming and going. Most of the passengers were private small businessmen from each village in the region going about their daily business. By the main road sides there were always some simple restaurants, motels and garages. So the whole area impressed me with its economic activity and thriving nature.

The Economic Index of Xiting and Tianliao Villages, 1991

	Xiting	Tianliao
Total Income (yuan)	795,900	290,700
Industry	42,600	19,600
Agriculture	286,200	68,900
Tea and Others	426,000	19,600
Income per capita	388	403
Population	2,053	722
Households	420	136
Labour Force (M)	1,027	242
Labour Force (F)	681	161

Cultivated Lands (mu)	572.5	219
Cultivated Lands Per Head	0.28	0.3

Sources: The Annual Statistics Book of Xiting and Tianliao Villages, 1991.

I selected 50 households from each village by the same method I adopted in Anhui and Gansu. From these there were two households in Tianliao Village which had migrated out totally and left only the empty houses in the village. So the response rate in this survey was 98% which was very high.

The difference between Zhejiang villages and Anhui, and Gansu villages was obvious. The size of the villages in Shuangmiao, Xianfeng and Kangle was very large. Sometimes it would take you half an hour to walk from one residential group to another. But in Xiting, I could walk around the whole village within 15 minutes. Actually, the village was just like a small scale town. There was a stone-paved main street where the villagers did their daily shopping. The villagers, both in Xiting and Tianliao, were living next door to each other although they were divided by residential groups. These were typical natural villages of Jiangnan. Lin was a main surname in Xiting Village and Liu was a main surname in Tianliao Village. My investigation in these two villages was much easier because I did not have to worry too much whether or not the informants would be in his/her house because I could simply go to another sample household if one informant was out.

In my surveys, 74% in Xiting and 64% in Tianliao answered "don't know" when I asked when their family members who had migrated out would come back. Technically, "don't know" answers were all coded 9, 99 or 999 in the questionnaire which means missing. But for this particular question I included this missing value into the permanent category. The reason for this was because the informants found it difficult to answer since,

in my questionnaire, I required them to give an accurate figure. Although some of them did answer "never come back" most informants just used "don't know" instead of answering "never come back". It was quite clear that the reason they answered "don't know" was not because they did not know whether their men will come back in a few days or a few months time but because they did not know whether their men would come back at all in the end. This was further confirmed by my later chats with the informants. Therefore, the result, after adding up these "don't knows" percentage, was 6% who would come back within one year and 94% would not come back after at least one year's time in Xiting Village. Otherwise, the percentages would relatively be 23% and 77%. In Tianliao Village the two percentages including the "don't know" answers were 9.8% and 90.2%, otherwise they were 27.8% and 62.2%. Another interesting thing was that this permanent out migration did not adversely effect agricultural production, according to the survey results. In Xiting 74% of informants considered their agricultural production was not affected by out migration and in Tianliao the percentage was 66.7%. I found that this was mainly because of the high density of population to cultivated lands. As we saw from the Table the cultivated lands per head in the two villages were only 0.28 mu and 0.3 mu. Since the average size of the households was 4.9 persons in Xiting and 5.3 persons in Tianliao, each household had contract lands of 1.37 mu and 1.59 mu respectively, an average which was below one strong labour force's labour capability. During my interview I also found that some whole families' labour forces had migrated out. These households just rented their contract lands either to their fellow villagers or to people from other, poorer areas to cultivate. The standard rent per mu was 100 yuan. These families considered that agricultural production was not affected and I thought they were right. The essential factor in my judgement was whether or not the real agricultural production was sacrificed. In these two villages it was not! So my conclusion about the surplus labour force in these two villages is that the surplus labour there was absolute which therefore determined its permanent characteristics.

Certainly, the low income from agriculture was another reason for the villagers to migrate out. To engage in one mu of land's production they needed about 100 yuan's worth of pesticide and fertiliser. The average yield from two harvests was 1,400 jin 斤. The state purchase price at that time was 0.28 yuan per jin 斤, then the final income from one mu land's production was about 290 yuan. Given the average cultivated lands contracted by each household the average income from agricultural production in Xiting was 290 * 1.36 = 395.3 yuan and 290 * 1.61 =467 yuan in Tianliao. Including the income from the side-line produce like unprocessed tea the total annual income for a local strong labour force could be about 800 yuan. But the annual income for a miner or a construction worker in Shanxi or Hubei where they migrated to was from 3,000 to 4,000 yuan. That's why some families would prefer to rent out their lands and migrate instead of staying in the villages.

However, the potential exploration for employment in this region was limited by the poor local infrastructure. The road from Diqu town to Luqi Xiang was very narrow and could only allow small vans to pass each other. So it would have been a problem if any Xiang or village wanted to set up some enterprises. Actually, they could have set up some tea processing factories rather than exporting raw tea. They could also have produced bamboo products since there were plentiful bamboo resources in the muntains. But they could not do so because of poor transportation. Then why didn't they follow the Long Gang example and gather the capital from peasants to build the road themselves? The answer was because most peasants there had no money in their hands. As we have already seen from the Table the nominal income per capita in 1991 was 388 yuan in Xiting Village and 403 yuan in Tiangliao Village. The real income per capita would be 289.55 and 300.75 yuan respectively in Xiting and Tianliao if we assume a moderate 5% annual inflation rate from 1985 to 1991, and would be as little as 219 and 227.68 yuan if

the assumed annual inflation rate was 10%, which is closer to the reality in China. So both assumptions show that according to the calculation based on the 1985 fixed price, the peasants in both villages were living just above the poverty line. Although there is a possibility that the local peasant's income was underestimated since the local governments in the poor regions always tended to underestimate income in order to obtain the status of poverty region and therefore receive the relief fund from the government, it is still true that they were poor. For instance, in the village I noticed that most peasants were living in houses which were built several decades ago. There were only a few newly built houses. Therefore, I believe, without government investment it would be impossible to improve the local infrastructure. But during the time I was there I had no confirmation from the leaders of Luqi Xiang that the local government would have the money to invest here.

The out-migration situation in Xiting and Tianliao was quite different from Xiabu. In Xiabu, whether they were being employed by Zhen enterprises or doing their own business, the form of migration was mainly self-organised. But in Xiting and Tianliao, as in Kangle Village, they were organised by **BAOGONGTOU**. **BAOGONGTOU** organised out-migration occupied 78% of the total out-migration in Xiting Village and 74.5% in Tianliao Village. The destination for the **BAOGONGTOU** organised out-migration was either Shanxi Province or Hubei Province to be coal miners or road construction workers. The background for the emergence of the **BAOGONGTOU** in Xiting and Tianliao was similar to that in Kangle Village, according to my 98 interviews in the two villages.

Summery

Again, the number of male out-migrants overwhelmed that of female out-migrants in these two villages. Female out-migrants constitute only 14% and 17.6% of total out-

migrants in Xiting and Tianliao respectively in 1991. But if I deducted those who did not migrate to other provinces then the percentage would only be 6% and 8% respectively. In Xiting of three female out-migrants who went to other provinces one had a primary school education and the other two were illiterate. In Tianliao all four were illiterate. They either went together with their husbands as spouses or went for the purposes of avoiding family planning policy in their original place. On the other hand, female out-migrants who migrated to other towns, within the province, were all young and well educated. Actually all of them were employed by the Zhen enterprises in towns like Longgang. By and large, female out-migration was still insignificant in the region in comparison to male out-migration. But it could form a great potential out-migration in the near future should the current more open and relaxed policy continue. From the Table we know that the labour (labour force) cultivated lands (mu) ratio was 1:0.33 and 1:0.54. For the convenience of inference I will just take these two villages as one. Then the ratio would be 1:0.37. Since a strong labour force in the region could do the job of two mu cultivated lands then the full employment labour lands ratio should be 1:2. This means the surplus labour in this region was 1,741, or about 80% of the total labour force. If we multiply 80% with the total female labour force in the two villages then the result would be 674 which means the female surplus force was 674. This could be, at some time, another out-migration flow from this region.

Summery

The information from the five villages in China show that the factors which determined people to migrate out are from rural rather than from urban areas although they are varied from area to area. If a village like Kangle becomes extremely poor then the out-migration ratio would be high and the nature of migration could be permanent. The local economic

conditions in Shuangmiao and Xiting and Tianliao were almost similar but they had quite different out-migration situation. In Shuangmiao, due to the lack of grain people still took great care of their grain production. Therefore, the nature of the out-migration was short distance and temporary. But in Zhejiang Province, so long you have cash you do not have to worry about the grain. As a result, villagers migrated to other provinces permanently. The relatively lower out-migration ratio in Xianfeng Village is another evidence to convince the argument that the influential factors to migration were from rural areas.

The out-migration volume could even have been higher should women in these villages also go out to search the job. This is to say that the current local tradition has a pull effect in terms of rural-urban and rural-rural migration.

The surplus labour, according to the survey from the five villages, are mainly seasonal, which means seasonal out-migration would not have a severe negative effect to agricultural production.

Chapter V. Some Casual Investigations of Rural-Urban Migration

Beside the questionnaire survey in the five villages, I also have conducted some casual investigations in connection with the subject of rural-urban migration in China. In this chapter I will use the materials and data from those casual investigations as a supporting evidence to the Chapter III.

4.1 Government Organised Labour Export

The Labour Export Company set up by each county government in China has played a very important role in helping the surplus labour force from the local area to find jobs in other places. This particular organisation was a side-line outcome of the recent open door policy. Before the local government's only function in the mobilisation of residents was one of restriction. They preferred the residents to stay in the region rather than being mobile. But the situation changed with the open door policy after 1980, especially since the people's commune system was dismantled. Out-migration become more and more popular in rural China. In the face of this irresistible tendency, each county government changed their policy from restriction to organisation. Then this so-called Labour Export Company emerged. My investigations of this subject concentrated on Dingxi County, Gansu Province. From this rather simple investigation we can at least have a brief idea of how the Chinese local government organised the local residents to find jobs in other places, and of the difference between the self-organised migration and the government organised migration.

The Vice Governor who was in charge of this subject told me that the Labour Export Company of Dingxi County was set up in 1985 when the problem of a surplus labour force in the rural area turned out to be more obvious than ever before. Although some of the surplus labour force migrated out by themselves some of them still remained in the villages. They did not have any information about outside regions and had no idea where to go and what kind of work to look for. In order to solve this problem they decided to set up an institution which could constantly deal with this issue. The company staff are all paid by the government. They are under the leadership of the Labour Department in Dingxi County. Their information comes mainly from the Provincial Labour Department and their own contact with some enterprises in and outside the province. The company first of all negotiate a contract with the employer. Then it informs each xiang's government to organise a certain number of peasants who would meet the qualification

requirement to come to Dingxi County. Then, led by one of the company's staff, this group of government organised out-migrants go directly to the place where they will work. During the period of contract the company supervises the peasants to meet the requirements demanded by the employer on the one hand, and protects the benefits of the peasants which were agreed by the contract on the other. As the Vice Governor told me, during the last five years there was no incident at all of breaking the contract by either side.

I found that, according to the Dingxi experience, this kind of out-migration has the following positive effects:

1. It can make up for the short comings of poor information caused by the dispersed labour market in China. Like many other developing countries the labour market is dispersed rather than a complete one. So, quite often, the situation of over supply and supply shortage of labour force could happen simultaneously in areas A and B. The labour force in the over supplied area would not move to the area with a shortage because they simply would not have information. But this government company, under the centralised labour department network, would be able to transfer the information between the labour force seekers and job seekers.
2. The work can be connected with the alleviation of poverty. In Dingxi, according to the practice of the last few years, the people who live along a public road can migrate out more easily than those in a poor and remote area due to the transportation and communication differences. Almost all the surplus labour force in the remote, muntainous poor villages remained at their homes before the mid-1980s. Since the establishment of the company, priority has always been given to these remote and poor areas. From 1986 to 1991 the company has organised 47,409 peasants from these areas to work outside.
3. The company can offer more security. In the last few years many self-organised out-migrants went out without accurate information and met with a lot of difficulties.

Some of them spent all their money and came back in the end with empty pockets because they couldn't find jobs. Some of them were taken in by crooks, due to inexperience about the terms of contract. The government organised out-migrants can avoid these troubles. The company organise the peasants only after finding a proper employer. Since they mainly find the employers through the centralised labour department channel, the jobs are more secure.

Beside the labour export company, there are also some job agencies in small towns in southern China. These agencies are semi-commercial and semi-governmental. On the one hand they have to get their income from their profits. On the other they are under the leadership of the Labour Department which means their work must be under the guidance of government's labour policy. These agencies main function was to help their clients, the peasants, find proper jobs. For example, in Longgang there were 375 factories and firms. Their demands for labour were varied. So each individual would have difficulty finding a suitable job by themselves. Then the job agencies emerged. They established a constant information relationship with certain enterprises and knew the detailed requirements of each employer. The fee varied from 50 yuan to 200 yuan per person for each deal. In 1991 there were 8 registered job agencies in Longgang with 35 staff. In that year they introduced 5,600 people altogether to the different factories and firms in Longgang. The agency's success rate to introduce the applicants to the concerned employers was 78.3%, according to an official in the Labour Department of Longgang Town.

Of course, the government organised migration in China is still relatively small in comparison with self-organised migration. The reason I put forward this particular model in the discussion is that it only exists in China, examining the practice in the last few years time and is important for the research of rural-urban migration in China.

Table 8. Labour Export in Dingxi County 1986-1992

Year	G. Organised	Self Organised	Income (million yuan)
1986	4,812	23,188	11.20
1987	5,577	26,711	10.59
1988	6,793	28,881	16.20
1989	7,915	28,959	16.68
1990	7,612	28,117	18.58
1991	7,700	27,900	20.50
1992 (Jan-June)	7,000	28,000	9.19
Total	47,409	191,756	102.94

Source: Archives of Dingxi Policy Research Institute, 1992.

4.2 Xiang Zhen Enterprises and Migration

The Xiang Zhen Enterprises or Township and Village Enterprises, according to the Annual Statistical Yearbook published by the Department of Xiang Zhen Enterprises of the Agricultural Ministry, produced the value of 116.217 billion yuan in 1991 which occupied 59.2% of the total value of agricultural production and 26.6% of the GDP in China. From 1978 to 1991 the unit of Xiang Zhen Enterprises grew from 1,524,000 to 19,079,000 with an average annual growth rate of 21.46%. Meanwhile, the number of workers employed in the Xiang Zhen Enterprises increased from 28,266,000 to 92,648,000. The average annual job creation rate during this period was 9.87%. If we assume that employment in rural areas in 1953 was full and keep other factors constant, then the surplus labour force in rural areas would have been (A - B) * C where A is the 1991 labour force, B is the 1953 labour force and C is the percentage of the labour force

in rural areas. According to the Statistical Yearbook of China, the labour force (age 16 - 60) in 1953 was 314.25 million, and in 1991 it was 659.41 million, of which 80% was in the rural areas. Therefore, the surplus labour force in rural areas in China in 1991 would have been (659.41 - 314.25) * 0.8 = 276.12 million. Based on this estimation we can see that the Xiang Zhen Enterprises had employed 92.648/276.12 = 33.55% of Chinese rural surplus labour force in the last 13 years. This, I must admit, is a great miracle in the history of job creation in the developing countries after World War II.

From the Table we can see that the workers employed by the Xiang Zhen Enterprises in Huadong and Huanan by 1990 occupied 65.11% of the total of all Xiang Zhen Enterprise's employment in the country. But in Xinan and Xibei, in comparison with the east part of the country, the Xiang Zhen Enterprises were far less significant. In 1990, all Xiang Zhen Enterprise's employment represented

Table 9. The Distribution of the Employment of XZEs in Different Region in 1991 (Million)

	Total Enterprise	Huabei	Dongbei	Huadong	Huanan	Xinan	Xibei
Total (1)	567,394	63,912	44,819	171,134	154,811	95,846	36,829
XZEs (2)	92,648	11,768 (12.7%)	6,226 (6.7%)	34,613 (37.36%)	25,711 (27.75)	9,655 (10.42%)	4,675 (5%)
(2)/(1)	16.33	18.41	13.89	20.23	16.61	10.07	12.69

The sample provinces and cities chosen in: **Huabei Region** include Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi and Inner- Mongolia; **Dongbei Region** include Liaoning, Jiling and Heilongjiang; **Huadong Region** include Shanghai, Shandong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Anhui, Jiangxi and Fujian; **Huanan Region** include Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi

and Hainan; **Xinan Region** include Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan and Xizhuang and; **Xibei Region** include Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang.

16.33% of the total employment in China. The employment created by the Xiang Zhen Enterprises in Huabei, Huadong and Huanan regions were higher than the average level meanwhile Dongbei, Xinan and Xibei had the records below the average level in the country.

In the following paragraphs about the Xiang Zhen Enterprises and rural-urban migration, my analysis will be based mainly on the data collected from my 1985 survey in Shanghai County and 1992 survey in Dingxi County.

In December, 1985, I carried out a rural development survey in Longhua Xiang, Shanghai County, which included the development of the Xiang Zhen Enterprises. Altogether I investigated three villages in Longhua Xiang. They were Dongwan Village, Huapu Village and Guanggang Village. This area, together with other Shanghai suburban villages, is considered to be pioneering in terms of Xiang Zhen Enterprises. As early as 1984 the value created by the enterprises in Dongwan and Guanggang occupied 80% and 83% of the value of production in the village respectively. In Dongwan and Huapu by that year the enterprises run in the village had absorbed the whole male labour force. In Guanggang the enterprises absorbed the whole female labour force and off-peak season's male labour force. They told me that agricultural production had been severely affected by the shortage of labour force.

Table 10. The Economic Index of Three Villages in Longhua Xiang, 1984

	Dongwan	Huapu	Guanggang
Population	1,780	875	1,445

Cultivated Lands (mu)	1,437	1,015	1,382
Income per capita (yuan)	731	1,371	3,367
XZEs	2	3	8
Production Value (00,000yuan)	98.91	120	486.47
Labour Force in XZEs	Male	Male	Female and some Male

Sources: The Statistical Records in Dongwan, Huapu and Guanggang Villages in 1984.

As a matter of fact, the villages there developed into a kind of micro-town. You could find schools, shops, restaurants, tailors, markets etc. The main street and most of the side streets were asphalt surfaced. The labour force moved from agricultural production to industrial production rather than from rural areas to urban areas. But I was told when I revisited Dongwan Village in 1992 that, due to the shortage of a labour force for agricultural production, in the last few years quite a few peasants had migrated from Hueibei (northern Anhui), Subei (northern Jiangsu) and some muntainous areas of Zhejiang to the village. Some immigrants rented contract lands from the local peasants, or let's say the residents, to carry on agricultural production. Some of them were doing business of supplying vegetables to the city. They bought vegetables from the villagers or immigrants and sold them in the free markets in the city. This phenomenon was quite common in the Jiangsu and Zhejiang areas according to Professor Shen Guanbao of Shanghai University who has been studying the rural economy in Jiangsu for quite a long time. The Xiang Zhen Enterprises in this region have absorbed almost all the local labour force and then left the agricultural production to immigrants who came from poor rural areas. In directly, the development of Xiang Zhen Enterprises in Huadong and Huanan Regions have encouraged rural-rural rather than rural-urban migration from poor and backward areas to relatively advanced areas.

But the function of the Xiang Zhen Enterprises in Dingxi County turned out to be quite different. They developed about 10 years later in this region than the coastal areas and most of Xiang Zhen Enterprises in 1992 were at the county level.[12] According to Mr. Chen Shude, the Director of the Institute of Policy Research of Dingxi Diqu, they began to set up Xiang Zhen Enterprises in 1983, and only in the mid 1980s were the Xiang Zhen Enterprises in Dingxi put into production. From 1986 to 1991, employment in the Xiang Zhen Enterprises increased from 12,525 to 19,405. The annual average growth rate was 9.15%. But on the whole it was still in its infancy. Its employment of about 20,000 was, compared to the total labour force in the county, tiny. The DINGXI ZHI (History of Dingxi) showed that in 1982 the total labour force of the county was 195,600. Assuming, conservatively, that the annual labour force growth rate in the period of 1982 to 1991 was 1.4% then the total labour force in 1991 was 195,600 * (1 + 0.014) square 9 = 221,672. Therefore employment in the Xiang Zhen Enterprises only occupied 8.75% of the county's total labour force. It was even less than half of the organised labour export. As opposed to the coastal areas, the Xiang Zhen Enterprises in Dingxi, or in the Northwest Region has had some constraints on its development. First of all, it is technologically backward in comparison with its counterparts in the Huadong and Huanan Regions. Secondly, it is far away from the markets which are concentrated in the east part of China, which means higher cost of transport. Finally, poor transportation in the Northwest also curbed its fast development. So while the Xiang Zhen Enterprises in suburban Shanghai have absorbed all the local labour force the enterprises in Dingxi could only create the employment for 8.75% of its labour force. In the light of rural-urban and rural-rural migration, the Xiang Zhen Enterprises in Dingxi has not yet become a significant influential factor.

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[12] The author has recongnised that the Xiang Zhen Enterprises in Shanghai belonged to the village level and the Xiang Zhen Enterprises in Dingxi belonged to county level. It is inappropriate to make any simple comparison by using these data. However, they still can be used to show the difference in terms of Xiang Zhen Enterprises development between the coastal areas and the inland areas in China.

From my two sample investigations, we can see that the relationship between the development of the Xiang Zhen Enterprises and rural-rural migration can only be observed in an area like suburban Shanghai. Its development in the first place changed its local rural labour force into an industrial labour force, or as the Chinese government called it, the "labour force of Xiang Zhen Enterprises", and then attracted the rural labour force from other poor areas to the local area. This kind of redistribution of the labour force would not only be of benefit to the areas where Xiang Zhen Enterprises existed but also to the benefit of other poor rural areas where those migrants came from.

4.3 Some Comparison of Migration Behaviour Between These Villages

The observations of these different villages in China reveal a fact that the migration behaviours are different from village to village although they are all poor. For instance, both Shuangmiao Village in Anhui and Xiting, Tianliao Villages in Zhejiang are poor muntainous villages. The migration in Shuangmiao turned out short distance and seasonal. Almost all out-migrants went back during the peak-season time to do their agricultural work and at the Spring Festival for family gathering because they consider Shuangmiao is their hometown. But the out-migrants in Xiting and Tianliao just simply gave up their agricultural production and left home permanently for some coal mine and road construction jobs in other provinces. Although the percentage to answer "yes" to the question about the family migration history in the last four decades from these three villages were quite similar, 30.6% for Shuangmiao, 36% and 27.5% for Xiting and Tianliao, that was just the result of the government's previous migration control policy. As I described before that, as a matter of fact, the current inhabitants in Xiting and Tianliao are the descendants of immigrants who migrated from Min'nan area. When they

talked about their own village it seems to me that they would like to degrade rather than appreciate it. They were quite proud to tell me that their ancestors were from Min'nan. But for Shuangmiao people their ancestors were from different places and do not have such a clear picture about their original place several hundred years ago. This difference also exists between Gejiaca and Xiting, Tianliao. Although the out-migrants in Gejiaca were all permanent and long distance they still came back to the village for family gathering at the Spring Festival. They went out for better income but they did not have intention to leave their hometown entirely. So from this comparison I have found that the different feeling towards each other's hometown makes the migration behaviour different.

I have also found, from this observation, that the degree of the poverty in the original place will affect the nature of migration. Take Shuangmiao and Xianfeng villages for example, the former is still below the poverty line and the latter is just beyond the poverty line. They are poorer than many other villages in China but better than a village like Gejiaca. For Shuangmiao and Xianfeng there are still lots of agricultural work for the local inhabitants to do. Only during the off-peak season the surplus labour problem occur. But for Gejiaca, due to the desperate environmental condition, peasants there are extremely poor and their harvests rely more on heaven rather than their hard works. Then the migration behaviour in Shuangmiao and Xianfeng was seasonal and short distance, and in Gejiaca it was permanent and long distance. Therefore, the immediate question I would like to raise in this discussion is would the out-migration in Gejiaca be long distance and permanent if the irrigation problem was solved.

Another important finding of the survey is that most migration happened between rural areas rather than from rural to urban areas. Since the urban income in China is higher than the income in most of rural areas and, most economic rational models suggest the

migrants would move to the higher income place, this outcome contradict the rational theory. Here, we should pay enough attention to other factors rather than pure economic factors. For the peasants in these villages, on the one hand they are expecting their income in destination areas as high as possible but on the other hand they are nervous to go to the cities. As a result, as Mr. Ma in Gejiaca described, they prefer to search for their jobs in rural areas even though the income there is lower than in the cities. Of course, over the time as their confidence to work in the cities is building up they might eventually move to the cities. This evidence just tells us that beside the economic factor there are other cultural and social factors affecting people to make decision to move.

4.4 Some Investigations in the City

In Shanghai I visited and interviewed some immigrants who came from different parts of rural areas and were doing different kinds of work in Shanghai at that time. All these investigations were casual, given the situation that they were living scattered all over the city it was difficult to do the kind of survey I did in the countryside. Nevertheless, these investigations more or less reflected the situation of rural-urban immigrants in Shanghai.

It happened that one of my friends was undertaking a contract for a spinning workshop with a textile mill. So she had hired several country girls and some retired textile workers to do the jobs. She told me that these girls were living in her village which is located in a suburban area of Shanghai where many immigrants were living. Finally, with her help I visited her village and neighbouring villages, and interviewed about 30 immigrants. As an introduction, the following are the notes of three of my interviews. The abbreviation of Q is interviewer and I is the interviewee:

I 1: Wei Lina, 22, Female, From Shishanke Village, Zhilu Xiang, Luoshan County, Henan Province.

Q: How long have you been in Shanghai? Will you go back home and when?

I: I have been here about two years and do not yet plan to go back home.

Q: Are you married?

I: No, I am single.

Q: Can you tell me your educational level?

I: Middle school.

Q: Do you mind to tell me why did you decide to leave your home for Shanghai?

I: Well, I don't know really. I think for a better job and a better income is the right answer. (I always had to show a list of reasons for leaving the hometown. Otherwise nobody would have been able to answer this question).

Q: How did you find this accommodation?

I: A fellow villager who worked in Shanghai helped me to find this place.

Q: Why did you choose Shanghai rather than any other city?

I: Because Shanghai is a big city and the education and environment here is better.

Q: Did you work at home? What was your income?

I: No. I was unemployed.

Q: What are you doing here and what is your income?

I: Spinning, 150 yuan a month.

Q: Would you still come if the income was lower than your current one.

I: Yes, as long as there was a job I would still come since I was unemployed anyway.

Q: Can you tell me who introduced you to this job?

I: A fellow villager.

Q: Have any of your family members, or neighbours migrated out before?

I: None of my family members migrated out before. But there were lots of my neighbours going out to search for jobs.

Q: Do you often write home telling your family and your friends about your life and work in Shanghai?

I: Yes.

Q: Have you sent back any money to your family?

I: 500 yuan.

I 2: Xu Xiuyun, 20, Female, Single, From Liuzhong Village, Yanggang Zhen, Yixing Shi, Jiangsu Province.

Q: Why did you come to Shanghai?

I: I just wanted to see this mysterious city.

Q: Who helped you to find accommodation?

I: My friend helped me to find this place before I came. I would not have come if I did not have friends in Shanghai.

Q: Would you mind to tell me your family's income last year?

I: Certainly not. I think it was about 5,000 yuan.

Q: How much do you get paid in Shanghai?

I: Oh..., about 150 yuan a month.

Q: Would you have come if your pay was less than 150 yuan?

I: My reasons for coming to Shanghai was not money. We were quite well off at home. I came here to broaden my horizons!

Q: How many years have you been in school?

I: Nine years.

Q: Through whom did you find this job?

I: One of my indirect relatives.

Q: Have any of your family members or your neighbours in your village migrated out before?

I: Some of my neighbours did.

Q: Do you often send money back?

I: No. As a matter of fact we all brought some money with us when we came over here.

Q: Do you often write to your family and your friends?

I: Yes.

I 3: Ren Jiming, 30, Male, Married, From Liuwu Village, Chenxi Xiang, Taixing County, Jiangsu Province.

Q: How long have you been here? Will you go back home?

I: More than three years. Well, it depends. I really have no plan at all. I may or may not.

Q: Would you please tell me about your education?

I: Middle school.

Q: Why did you decide to leave home and come to Shanghai?

I: For a better job and a good income.

Q: Why did you choose Shanghai?

I: My brother-in-law worked in Shanghai and could help me to find accommodation.

Q: Do you often go back for a visit?

I: Yes, three times a year. Once for the Spring Festival, and twice to do agricultural work at peak season time.

Q: Being a self-employed tailor, is your income satisfactory?

I: Yes, It is. At home I could only earn something like 70 yuan a month even in the enterprise. I am earning about 500 yuan a month here.

Q: Would you have come if you earned less than 500 yuan a month?

I: No, I wouldn't. It is not worth moving from countryside to the city if the money is not good enough.

Q: How much have you brought back home during the last three years?

I: About 10,000.

Q: What was your agricultural income last year?

I: About 2,000.

Q: Is migrating out very popular in your village?

I: Yes.

Q: Who introduced you here?

I: My brother-in-law.

Q: Do you often write home?

I: Yes, I do. I just tell my fellow villagers not to come. life here is not easy.

My investigations revealed that the immigrants living in these villages mainly came from Subei, Sunan, Zhejiang, Henan and Shandong. The occupations which they had were casual workers of textile mills, loaders at the harbour, self-employed tailor and vegetable vendors and middlemen and etc. They were all young and relatively well educated. Most of them were single and female. The ages of these interviewees were between 20 and 30. Most of them were between 20 and 23. Although all of them told me that their educational level was middle school I found that some of them were actually junior primary school level, judging from their writing. This was because most employers in Shanghai required a minimum education qualification from middle school.

It impressed me that the girls from Yixing did not come to Shanghai for primarily economic reasons. They often corrected me by saying:" We are not country girls. Yixing is no longer a county. It has been promoted into a city already.". Miss Xu said that they were a lot better off in recent years. They could easily have found jobs in the local Xiang Zhen Enterprises and their income would not have been less than in Shanghai. But they wanted all the experience of living in a big city like Shanghai and to see how that would feel. In other words, these girls were lured by the " city lights ". These girls did not work very hard and paid no attention to bonuses, as my friend said. Quite often they were late to work, because of watching a particular TV series. Normally they stayed in Shanghai

just for a few months or half a year. But she still liked to hire the girls from this region because they could learn much faster than the girls from Henan and Sichuan. The situation was totally different with the girls from Henan. Due to the underdeveloped situation of their hometown they found it difficult to find jobs. There were no Xiang Zhen Enterprises and there was no work for them to do in the fields either. So they had no income at all in their hometowns. So their answers were that so long as they could find jobs in Shanghai they would come. These immigrants were on the one hand happy to have their income in the city but were on the other hand not happy to be in the bottom class and to be looked down upon by other Shanghai citizens. So when I asked them:" Would you still come if your hometown was not as poor as it is?" they all answered:" No ". Obviously, unlike the Yixing girls, these Henan girls were pushed out by the poor condition in their original place.

Of course, for Mr. Ren, the self-employed tailor, it was another story. Together with his wife he rented a big room on the ground floor to open a tailors shop to serve the villagers nearby. The only investment necessary was a sewing machine. He did the design work and his wife did sewing. The business was very profitable. His monthly income was about 500 yuan according to him but my friend said it would in fact be more than that. But he could hardly have done a similar business in his hometown since most of his fellow villagers still made their own clothes. He said that he could earn 70 yuan a month in the enterprise at his hometown. But when I asked him whether or not he would come if the monthly income here was less than 500 yuan he answered no. I was told that his rent for that room was 100 yuan a month and food would cost them another 150 yuan. This means that his net income was about 250 yuan. The gap between his income in Shanghai and his hometown was about 180 yuan. According to him, he wouldn't have come if the gap was less than that.

In these suburban villages I also interviewed two immigrant families who shared one rented room. There were two women in their 30s at home and their husbands went out buying and selling vegetables. Probably they were suspicious that I was checking their HUKOU and were nervous about answering a stranger's questions. However, I was allowed to have a chat with them and not take any notes. They came from a muntainous area in Zhejiang Province. The reason they left their village was because it was too poor. Their husbands hired tricycles as transport to buy vegetables from the local villages or somewhere further and transport them to the city to sell to vegetable vendors. When I asked them how much their husbands could earn from this work they answered:" We don't know.". There were two coal stoves and some kitchen utensils near the door. Their bedding were mended and dirty. From this I could tell that they were living very hard lives. I was told that in the vegetable markets in Shanghai there were many vendors from outside. These immigrants often rented a room from the suburban villagers to do their business in the city. Profits fluctuated with the market. Sometimes they made good profits and sometimes they lost money.

Housekeeper in Shanghai

There was a report about the housekeeper market in Shanghai soon after the Spring Festival on February 22nd, 1992 in the Shanghai Evening Standard. The title of the report was "IT IS NO LONGER DIFFICULT TO FIND A HOUSEKEEPER". It went on:

> **The housekeeper market in the city has gradually become a buyer's market. People will even take 70 yuan/month pay' offer. But most of those applicants are new comers who lack experience.**

Soon after the Spring Festival this year the housekeeper agencies were extremely crowded. The waiting queue could be 200 a day in some agencies.

Many of them come from the rural areas of the provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Anhui. Some come with their sisters and some with the fellow villagers. Ms. Li from Anhui has been working in Shanghai as a housekeeper for four years. She can speak fluent Shanghainese and dresses like a city woman. When she went back home her neighbours and friends were envious. So this time she came back to Shanghai with two girls from her village.

...in the past the monthly pay for a housekeeper in Shanghai was at least 90 yuan, but now it has declined to 70 and even to 60.

The problem is that most of the applicants are young and inexperienced countrywomen. They are not well educated and trained to be housekeepers. Some employers have found that they don't even have rudimentary knowledge.

It was true that one or two years ago there was a supply shortage of housekeepers in Shanghai which boosted the monthly pay from 50 yuan to 150 yuan. With this kind of market situation, many country girls flooded into Shanghai as this report said. As a result, the seller's market turned into a buyer's market. People who were interested in having a housekeeper became more selective and of course they put the price down. So by the time this report was written the monthly pay had declined to about 70 yuan. For an Anhui girl she just couldn't bear to loose her transport fee from her hometown to Shanghai and her living expenses while she was waiting for the job, which would be about

150 yuan. Therefore, even though the monthly pay was 70 yuan she would still take the job. But this situation didn't last long. I was told when I went back to Shanghai five months later that most of them either got a pay increase to about 100 yuan or left their employers and went back home. As I assumed in the previous chapter, although 70 yuan monthly was more than their income at home, it was much lower than other housekeepers in Shanghai. So they would obviously ask for a wage increase. On the other hand, other employers would try to reduce the monthly pay from 150 yuan to 100 yuan for their housekeepers. So the average monthly pay for a housekeeper in Shanghai at that time became 100 yuan rather than 150 yuan. The girls who expected 150 yuan pay and who now had monthly pay below 100 yuan all left Shanghai and went back home. This average housekeeper pay determined their migration decision which had almost no connection with the income situation in Shanghai at all.

Two years ago when those Henan and Sichuan girls came to Shanghai to earn 150 yuan a month as spinning workers they felt quite happy about it. But after two years of staying in Shanghai they began to realise that with the sharp increase in inflation their real income had been declining all the time. The rent of a single room in Shanghai in 1989 was 20 - 30 yuan per month. In 1992, it climbed to 50 yuan. During the same period the food expenses for a person per month increased from 25 yuan to 70 yuan. So within three years the living expenses in Shanghai for a single person increased from 55 yuan to 120 yuan, which meant their real income declined from 95 yuan to 30 yuan. So from the middle of 1992 those with workshops like my friend contracted began to face the shortage of labour because most of their workers quit due to the fixed wage. The last letter from my friend told me that she herself was doing one shift because she just couldn't find any casual workers. Since the contract was signed once a year she had to carry on until the date when the contract is ended. Otherwise she would have to pay a fine for breaking the contract. From this example we can see that although the income gap

between Shanghai and their hometown didn't change drastically, owing to the inflation factor in Shanghai, the real income declined. When this decline reached a certain level, let's say below the top band of the attraction gap, migration will stop. The inflation rate here dominated the migration behaviour.

Another thing I found in Shanghai was that the demand for redecorating flats was steadily increasing. Almost all my friends in Shanghai were redecorating their flats. The cost of redecorating a flat varied from 4,000 yuan to 20,000 yuan. To meet this demand, a group of self-employed builders emerged. It happened that my sister was allocated a new flat when I was in Shanghai. She hired a self-employed decorator who had several employees with him. By talking to him I found out how they organise their firm. Normally the foreman was Shanghainese, and often he was a professional builder. He would find his assistants or employees from the countryside because labour there was cheaper than in Shanghai. For one reason or another, they often went to their original hometown to find labour. In the case of this foreman, his father migrated to Shanghai from Subei before liberation although he was born in Shanghai. He hired all his workers from his hometown in Subei. Four of them charged my sister 4,000 yuan for fitting the wooden floor, painting the wall, building some shelves and redecorating the kitchen and the toilet. Apart from 3,000 yuan of materials they earned 1,000 yuan from this 10 day project. His three assistants who from Subei got 10 yuan pay a day from him, which means 300 for this project. His net income from this project was 700 yuan. He said that he would still provide their living expenses during the time when they had no work. But it has never happened. Here we can see quite clearly that these Subei migrants came to Shanghai because of this relationship. One of his assistant told me that he would not have come if he had not had this relationship. This foreman not only provided them with jobs but with security as well. I have noticed that this kind of self-employed building firm would face a similar situation to the housekeepers if they kept on flooding into Shanghai.

The competition had already started. You could often see carpenters who had erected their saws and axes on the street as an advertisement for work. However, the demand was still high at the time I was there.

By and large, these casual investigations rendered some information about rural-urban migration and its employment in the informal sector in Shanghai. The occupations in the informal sector included textile workers; spinning workers; loaders, housekeepers; tailors; vegetable vendors and middlemen; self-employed builders; rubbish collectors etc. Some of them went to Shanghai for the purpose of broadening their horizons and seeing the city lights. Some of them were pushed out by the poverty of their original places. Some of them set up their own businesses and had long term plans and some of them were more dependent on their relatives and friends in the city. Their motivations for migrating were various based on their different economic, cultural and social backgrounds. However, there was a common feature for all these rural-urban migrants. That is they were young, single and relatively better educated.

Chapter VI. Some Tests of the Hypothesis

My survey in the villages of Shuangmiao, Xianfeng, Kangle, Xiting and Tianliao has rejected the general assumption of this research that internal migration in China is above all rural-urban migration. As a matter of fact, according to the data collection from the questionnaire, the migration which took place in Shuangmiao, Xianfeng and Kangle was mainly a rural-rural movement which means that 63.3%, 63.4% and 74% of migrants from these villages migrated to other rural areas to find jobs, regardless of whether this was seasonal or permanent. In Xiting and Tianliao, 97.9% and 94% of out-migrants went to small towns (Zhen) rather than to cities. Overall, of the five villages, 20% of out-migrants from Kangle went to the cities, which is the highest number, and Tianliao

represents the lowest rate which is 2%. Therefore, all my following theoretical testing and analyses will be based on the assumption of all kinds of internal migration in rural China and its impact on economic development.

Test 1: The Relationship between Migration and Sex, Age, Education and Marriage

According to empirical evidence, out-migrants in developing countries are mainly male, young, relatively well educated and single persons. In my model I included sex, age, education and marriage as a set of independent variables in order to test whether or not they influenced migration behaviour in China. The data I collected from five villages in China through questionnaire show that there is a relationship between migration behaviour and these independent variables. But the outcome is quite different from the empirical evidences mentioned before.

Table 11 The information about sex, age, education and marriage of Out-migrants in the five villages in China

	S	X	K	XI	TIA
Sex (%): M	93.5	82.0	96.0	82.0	82.4
F	6.5	1.0	4.0	14.0	17.6
Missing		(17.0)		(4.0)	
Age: Min	15	18	13	16	17
Max	48	42	43	57	55
					165

Edu (%)	1	3.2	3.7	16	0	0
	2	3.2	0	32.0	8.3	11.8
	3	59.7	11.0	18.0	39.6	43.1
	4	32.3	72.0	32.0	43.8	41.2
	5	1.6	13.4	2.0	8.3	3.9
Marriage(%)	Y	45.2	89.2	44.0	60.4	51.0
	N	54.8	10.8	56.0	39.6	49.0

Sex

In Table 11. we can see that the outcome of sex ratio does confirm the empirical evidence which means male migrants dominated the proportion of out-migrants in these five villages. 96% of out-migrants from Kangle Village are male which represents the highest male ratio of these five villages, Xianfeng Village and Xiting Village have 82% respectively and represent the lowest. In all these villages the number of female out-migrants is small, according to the ratio shown in the table. Nevertheless, in a regional comparison, the female out-migration in Zhejiang Province is relatively higher than in Anhui and Gansu. This, as I mentioned in the last chapter, may reflect the difference in the level of development between the coastal areas and the inland areas in China, that is to say there is a positive relationship between female out-migration and the degree of social and economic development. In Anhui and Gansu provinces where I conducted surveys, the social status of women is still low and they are subordinate to the men who are dominant in the family. Women have no right to make decisions to migrate. But the social status of women in the coastal areas, especially young women is relatively higher, and they have much more freedom to make their own decisions.

Age

Next I will look at the age variable. From appendix 4.11 we can see that, within a certain age group, the relationship between migration and age is not as some empirical evidence has suggested. All the out-migrants in these five villages are concentrated within the age group 17 to 48. When I put ages 13-20 into group 1, ages 21-30 into group 2, ages 31-40 into group 3 and ages 41-57 into group 4 I find that group 2 is the most active group in terms of migration. If I further put group 2 and 3 together which means ages 21-40, then this age group would represent from 60% to 86.8% of total out-migrants in these five villages. So the relationship between migration and age turns out to be a reversed U curve rather than a right downward one. I believe this is much closer to the reality. Clearly for a manual labourer age 21 to 40 is the best period in his/her working life. By comparison with younger people he/she is more experienced and mature, and by comparison with older people he/she is physically stronger and more energetic. Therefore the tendency among this age group to migrate out from the villages would be much stronger than either younger or older age groups. Owing to this reversed tendency the linear relationship between different ages and out- migration is distorted and a single regression model would fail to express the relationship between age and migration behaviour. I will return to this later.



Marital Status

From the survey in these five villages there is a very interesting finding which rejects the hypothesis of a correlation between migration behaviour and marriage status. The outcome of the survey suggests that there is no relationship. It is more logical, as much empirical evidence has suggested, for a single person rather than a married person to leave his/her hometown, when the given circumstances are the same. But the survey in these five villages, as shown in Table 4.11, suggests that people migrated out no matter whether they were married or not. We can see that of the out migrants in four of these five villages far more were married than single. The reason why this hypothesis is rejected in the case of China is basically because of cultural differences between China and some other countries. In the west, and in many other developing countries as well, the most important precondition for setting up a family is family residence unity. Faced with a decision whether or not to leave his/her family for whatever reason for a relatively long period a man/woman would find this decision extremely difficult to make. If he/she decided to go then the family might split up because one of the most important conditions for family unity is removed. However, the essential condition for organising a Chinese family is determined by loyalty rather than practical residential values. Living together has been much less important for Chinese family life. In ancient China there was an imperial examination system for a number one scholar (KAO ZHUANG YUAN). A man would often have to leave his family for that examination one year or even longer in advance for reasons of transport. For the sake of this title his wife and children would be happy to tolerate that separation. Several decades ago many Chinese men migrated to Southeast Asia and Northeast China to earn money. They quite often left their family for quite a few years at a time. Most of their wives simply waited for them until they came back. This kind of loyalty is highly appreciated by Chinese society. Even nowadays, we can still see

thousands of Chinese students and visiting scholars leaving their families, often for several years, for the western countries to pursue academic activities in the west which has surprised many of their western colleagues. In the west if a scholar decided to leave his wife for such a long period it would be considered tantamunt to divorce. But many Chinese scholars do not take family residential unity into account when they make a decision to go abroad, although some divorce cases have occurred for this reason. By and large, Chinese culture has formed its own family values which are based on loyalty to each other. Therefore we can see no difference between married persons and unmarried persons in terms of internal migration. So the outcome of the survey just reveals that there is a cultural difference between China and other developing or developed countries, rather than proving that there is no relationship between marriage status and migration behaviour.

Education

Appendix 4.11 shows that the educational level of out-migrants in the five villages falls mainly between primary and middle school. As a matter of fact, the educational level of the whole population in the five villages in the age group of 25 - 35 is also between primary school and middle school. According to the data from the HUKOU files in the villages or xiangs in my survey areas, the enrolment rates for primary school and middle school in the five villages are about 95% and 70%. Therefore, in the age group from 18 to 50 the ratio of illiteracy turned out to be just about 5%. Of course, if inhabitants who are over 50 years old are included then this ratio would increase to around 10 to 12%. Since there are only a few young people able to pursue a high middle school education, this ratio is also very low. Given the circumstances in the five villages, the outcome of the

questionnaire in terms of the correlation between education and out-migration should not be interpreted as a reversed U curve. Only if the educational strata were evenly distributed between the different age groups could we interpret it in this way. In order to adjust this distortion I calculated the proportion of migrants from totals for each educational level.

Table 12. The Percentage of Each Educational Strata from Total in the Five Villages

	S	X	K	XI	TI
Non (survey)	2	3	8	0	0
%(survey)	3.2	3.7	16.0	0	0
total	18	29	103	22	17
%	11.0	10.3	7.8	0	0
Can (survey)	2	0	16	4	6
%(survey)	3.2	0	32.0	8.0	12.0
total	38	25	68	63	30
%	5.3	0	23.5	6.3	20.0
Pri (survey)	37	9	9	19	22
%(survey)	59.7	11.0	18.0	38.0	44.0
total	435	545	534	877	272
%	8.5	1.7	1.7	2.2	8.0
Mid (survey)	20	59	16	21	21
%(survey)	32.3	11.0	32.0	42.0	42.0
total	607	831	573	901	280
%	3.3	7.1	2.8	2.3	7.5
High(survey)	1	11	1	4	2
%(survey)	1.6	72.0	2.0	8.0	4.0

total	6	244	4	17	9
%	16.7	4.5	25.0	23.5	22.2

S = Shuangmiao Village;

X = Xianfeng Village;

K = Kangle Village;

XI = Xiting Village and;

TI = Tianliao Village.

The figures in Table 12. indicate that, in fact, people without education and with education all migrated out. Therefore the hypothesis of a positive relationship between education and migration in China is rejected again in this survey. In China this probably reflects the fact that the demand for a relatively

The Graph of the Five Village's Education



higher educated rural labour force in the cities is still constrained by the government's policy. The main demand for rural migrants exists in the informal labour market, where no qualifications are required. So it would make no difference whether or not workers were educated. I believe that when the constraints are lifted and the general level of education is improved there will be a relationship between educational level and migration behaviour in China.

Test 2: Is the Attraction Gap Assumption Valid?

In Chapter II I assumed that migration behaviour in developing countries would not proceed as economic rational models suggest. Quite often people would not move even though the urban wage > rural wage. There is a gap between considering something and making a decision. I called it the attraction gap. In order to prove this assumption I designed two questions in the questionnaire for the survey. Question one was " How much higher than your current income would the wage in the destination area have to be for you to decide to migrate out?", and question two was " Would you still move if the urban wage was only slightly higher than your current income but lower than what you had expected?". The answers to these two questions convinced me that this attraction gap does exist, although it varied from village to village.

In Shuangmiao Village 76% of informants answered that they would go out to find some work during the off-peak seasons no matter how much higher wages were than their current income. 28.3% of informants considered that moving out would be determined by whether or not they could earn enough money. Among these 28.3% informants the range of the attraction gap was from 40 yuan to 80 yuan. The mean attraction in Shuangmiao Village is 16.79 yuan (this low value is mainly caused by the high percentage of 0 answers). The answers from the next question just confirmed the first question. 72.7% of the informants said that they would still go even if the real income in the destination area was lower than they had expected, and only 27.3% said that they would not go.

In Xianfeng Village only 9.8% of informants answered that they would go out to find some work no matter how much higher wages were than their current income. 90.2% of informants considered that moving out would be determined by whether or not they could earn enough money. The range of the attraction gap was from 40 yuan to 150 yuan. The mean attraction gap was 72.32 yuan. But when I asked them whether or not they would still go if the income in the destination area was only slightly higher but lower than they had expected 55.1% answered "yes" and 44.9% answered "no". The difference between the two answers, in my opinion, indicates the flexibility of some Xianfeng people toward the attraction gap. However, there are still about 44.9% of informants who would be influenced by this attraction gap in Xianfeng Village, according to the data (See appendix 4.21).

In Kangle Village, although economic conditions were relatively poor, the ratio of the people who were influenced by this attraction gap, on the contrary, was relatively higher. Only 12.5% of informants answered that they would go out to find some work no matter

how much higher wages were than their current income. The others considered that moving out would be determined by whether or not they could earn enough money. The range of the attraction gap in Kangle Village was from 40 yuan to 80 yuan and the mean attraction gap was 50 yuan. The answers from the second question just confirmed the first question. 84% of informants answered that they would not go if the income in the destination area was only slightly higher than their current income but lower than what they had expected.

The answers from Xiting and Tianliao villages are a little bit more moderate than the villages mentioned above. 35% and 36.6% of informants in these two villages said that their migration decision would not be determined by this attraction gap. Another 65% and 63.4% of informants considered that they would not go if the income in the destination area was not sufficiently higher than their current income. The ranges of the attraction gap in these two villages were from 60 yuan to 200 yuan and 50 yuan to 200 yuan. The mean attraction gaps were 72.25 yuan and 65 yuan respectively. The answers to the second question in these two villages were slightly different. 45.8% and 38.8% of informants said "yes" which means that about 25% of informants were flexible with regard to this attraction gap.

Above all, the investigations from the five villages have proved the existence of the attraction gap, although it varies in degree and scale from village to village. So the question arises why is migration behaviour in Shuangmiao Village less affected by this attraction gap than in other villages? To answer this question we should first of all look at the economic background and the migration characteristics of Shuangmiao Village. By comparison with Kangle, Xiting and Tianliao villages out migration in Shuangmiao Village is seasonal and short distance. Although its seasonal and short distant characteristics are comparable with Xianfeng Village it is economically poorer. So the

poor economic conditions and seasonal and short distance migration mean that Shuangmiao people are more flexible with regard to the extra income in the destination area. When people are poor they are often much less selective. " Hungry people never select their foods!". But for Xianfeng Village the lack of flexibility

Table 13. The Attraction gaps in the Five Villages

	Income/person	Mean gap	Feature	Flexibility
Shuangmiao	150.00	14.35	seasonal and short distance	Yes
Xianfeng	447.00	59.30	seasonal and short distance	No
Kangle	336.90	48.00	permanent and long distance	No
Xiting	387.68	57.80	permanent and long distance	Yes
Tianliao	402.63	61.18	permanent and long distance	Yes

Flexibility = ("no" ratio of the second question) - ("yes" ratio of the first question). "Yes" means positive and "No" means equal or negative.

towards the attraction gap is obvious. They would prefer to stay at home if the income in the destination areas is not high enough. The reason is because their situation in the village is not desperate. Therefore, this test has not only told us the existence of the attraction gap but also about the degree of flexibility towards the attraction gap which indicates the negative relationship between the local economic situation and the degree of flexibility towards the gap.

The Relationship Between the Attraction Gap and Income



Test 3: The Relationship Between Contacts, Historical Factors and Migration Behaviour

In my model I also assumed that direct and indirect contacts, and historical factors in the original place would affect migration behaviour. So in the questionnaire there is a question, " How did you find the job in the destination area? Was it introduced by your relative, your friend or found yourself?". Then a further question asked: " Given that the income in the destination area was the same, which place would you choose 1) long distance with relative or friend; 2) short distance without relative or friend." The answers to the first of these two questions from the five villages are quite interesting and the detailed results are listed in Table 4.31. What we see from the Table is that,

Table 14. The Percentage of Out-migration Via Their Relatives, Friends and Themselves

	Relatives	Friends	Self
Shuangmiao	59.3	35.2	5.6
Xianfeng	22.2	56.8	21.0
Kangle	8.0	88.0	4.0
Xi	20.8	62.5	16.7
Tianliao	19.6	56.9	23.5

apart from Shuangmiao Village, where the contacts were mainly relatives, the relationship of friends played quite an important role in terms of finding jobs for out-migrants in these villages. However, adding up the "relative" column and "friend" column the overall contact represents from 76.5% in Tianliao Village to 96% in Kangle Village. For migrants themselves to go out and find work, according to my survey, was not very common. Especially with regard to long term and long distance migration, there was no one who went to the destination area without contact from either relatives or friends. But, as I mentioned in the previous chapter, in villages like Kangle, Xiting and Tianliao, most out-migration was organised by **BAOGONGTOU**, which was not included in my questionnaire. The informants in these villages considered the **BAOGONGTOU** as their village fellows and friends. Therefore, the category of friend actually includes **BAOGONGTOU**, although the relationship between **BAOGONGTOU** and out-migrants is different from the relationship with friends. However, this will not affect the assumption about the role of contact in the case of out-migration. The answers from my further question are shown in appendix 4.31. In general, If the income situation in the destination was similar, only the out-migrants in Kangle would choose short distant

migration without relatives and friends. All other four villages overwhelmingly preferred places where they had relatives and friends, even if they were much further way.

So the outcome of the survey suggests that by comparison with the contact variable the distance variable would be much less important. Only in Kangle Village did people consider that a short distance was more important than contacts. Therefore, the assumption about the role of contacts in the model is not rejected.

Historical Factors

Whether or not historical factors influence migration behaviour is another testing question for the research. I had assumed that the migration history of either the family or the village would affect the outflow of migration from the family and the village. But, due to the restrictions of the HUKOU system over the last forty years, there was almost no migration history from 1949 till the early 1980s in all five villages. Although most of the inhabitants in Xiting and Tianliao villages are the descendants of Min'nan immigrants, this happened too long ago and has no influence on current migration decisions except in their lack of attachment to the villages themselves (see p - 161). So the so-called migration history in the family and the village is actually either within the ten years before 1949 or after 1980. Nevertheless, in the questionnaire two questions were designed for exploring this matter. One is " In the last fifty years has any of your family members migrated out? If so, what is the relationship between you and him/her." Another one is " In the last fifty years did any of your friends or neighbours in your village migrate out before you did?". Here are the results which show us that of the informants in the five villages from 8% in Kangle Village to 32.2% in Shuangmiao Village had family members who migrated out during the last fifty years. But, as we can see from Appendix 4.32, from 62.5% to 92% of all informants in the five villages had village fellows and friends

who migrated out before they did. It is rather difficult, according to the data from my survey, to see a correlation between the ratio of family and village migration history and the ratio of out-migration (The out-migration ratio is the number of out-migrants divided by the total labour force in each village. So in Shuangmiao it is 42%; Xianfeng 30%; Kangle 62%; Xiting 48% and Tianliao 41%). But, I still believe that this assumption could be tested had more villages been investigated, especially in Fujian and Guangdong provinces.

Test 4: The Relationship Between Rural Development and Migration

I set up four indexes for judging rural development variables. They are the quality of the road; the accessibility to the road; the percentage of irrigated land, and whether or not there is a Village or Xiang enterprise in or nearby the village. In addition, I designed a particular question with sixteen different reasons asking :" Why did you decide to migrate out?" (See Appendix 4.41) and asked them firstly to choose two reasons they considered important and then to pinpoint one as the most important reason for them to migrate out. The three indexes of rural development were taken mainly from my own observations in the five villages. In order to quantify the indexes I give weight from 0 to 1.0 to each index. 0.1 to 0.3 represents poor; 0.4 to 0.6 represents average and 0.7 to 0.9 represents good. 0 means absolutely none and 1.0 absolutely perfect. For instance, all two way asphalt roads in my investigation are included in the **Good** category (the roads with even surfaces, safety fences and traffic signs will be weighed 0.9; no safety fences and traffic signs with even surface 0.8 and; no safety fences and traffic signs with uneven surface 0.7). All two way mud surfaced roads are in the category of **Average**, and their weight criterion is the same as for asphalt roads. All the mud surfaced roads of poor

quality built by local people are in the **Poor** category. The weights given for accessibility to the road depend on the walking distance. Within 30 minutes walking distance belong to the category 0.7 to 0.9; from 30 minutes to one hour belong to category 0.4 to 0.6 and; more than one hour belongs to category 0.1 to 0.3. The weight for the Village or Xiang Enterprise depends on its location and scale. All enterprises located in the village will be weighted from 0.7 to 0.9; nearby the village 0.4 to 0.6 and; nearby the xiang capital 0.1 to 0.3. According to these criteria, together with the out-migration ratio, I produced the following Table 4.41 in order to explore the relationship between the degree of rural development in these village and the ratio of out-migration. The weights of road accessibility are based on the information about these five villages which I have given in Chapter III. The percentages of irrigated lands in the five villages are taken from the five village's statistics. The weights of VXE are based on the following description. In Shuangmiao Village there is no enterprise. But its neighbouring village - Heming has a Paper Mill

Table 15. Information of Rural Development and the Out-Migration in Five Villages in China

	Road Accessibility	Irrigation	VXE	Out-M %
Shuangmiao	0.4 0.6	84.3%	0.4	42
Xianfeng	0.8 0.9	62.7%	0.7	30
Kangle	0.4 0.5	0.07%	0.4	62
Xiting	0.3 0.4	61.8%	0.4	48
Tianliao	0.3 0.4	38.4%	0.4	41

VXE = Village or Xiang Enterprises.

therefore 0.4 to 0.6 weight should be given. Since this Paper Mill by that time mainly employed the workers from its own village and did not affect Shuangmiao Village very much I gave it 0.4. In Xianfeng Village there is a small workshop and several self-employed tractor transport teams, and there is quite a big Xiang Enterprise just nearby the village which did employ some village girls. So the weight in Xianfeng is 0.7. In Kangle Village there is no enterprise either in the village or in the xiang. But there are some enterprises in other xiangs. Given this poor situation 0.1 weight is given. The situation in Xiting and Tianliao villages is very similar to Shuangmiao Village so 0.4 is weighed for both the villages.

It is not difficult to see from Table 4.41 that Xianfeng Village enjoys the highest weight, the second highest percentage of irrigated land, and the lowest out-migration ratio. Kangle Village has the lowest weight and irrigated land ratio, with the highest out-migration ratio. Shuangmiao, Xiting and Tianliao are in between Xianfeng and Kangle in terms of weight and out-migration. Although Shuangmiao has the highest irrigated lands ratio it is not significant since the amunt of irrigated land per person is only 0.38 mu. Furthermore, the answers to the questionnaire are also very supportive of the rural development assumption. There were 75.4%, 86.6% and 41.2% of informants in Shuangmiao, Xianfeng and Tianliao villages who said that the most important reason for them migrating out was that the local income was too low. In Kangle and Xiting villages, 92% and 50% of informants pointed out that the most important reason for out-migration was unemployment.[13] Therefore, I would like to conclude that the assumption of a

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[13] The difference between the surplus labour and the unemployment in this thesis is that the surplus labour is calculated by author in terms of full and efficient use of labour, however, the unemployment is

negative relationship between rural development and out-migration is not rejected, according to my observations in these villages, which means the more rural development the less out-migration from the villages and vice versa.



The Graph of the Development Coefficient, Irrigation and Out-Migration in the Five Villages

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defined by the villagers themselves. So there is no connection between the surplus labour and unemployment in this thesis.

Test 5: The Relationship Between Migration Behaviour and Income in the Informal Sector

There is no accurate official data about the informal sector in China since the informal work is not regularly registered. So one can only estimate how much vegetable sellers, decorators, street vendors, self-employed restaurant owners etc. earn monthly. Quite often these estimates are varied, subjective and inaccurate. Therefore first hand data with regard to this matter had to be obtained by field study. In Shanghai I visited a Housekeeper Agency in Wanping Residential Area and the Shanghai Ninth Textile Mill. The Housekeeper Agency in Wanping Residential Area was set up in 1980 for the purpose of helping local residents to find housekeepers in the first place and became a professional job agency dealing with the business of Housekeepers. It used to be illegal for country girls at that time to live in Shanghai without temporary HUKOU. This agency could help them to get this permit. It was free of charge before 1984. Now the fee for each deal is 15 yuan. The staff of the agency told me that the housekeepers in this area mainly come from Anhui, Zhejiang and north Jiangsu. According to the registration files in the agency the average monthly wage of housekeepers in this area increased from 30 yuan in 1980 to 140 yuan in 1990 and then declined to 80 yuan in 1992. (See Table 4.51)The figures show that from 1983 till 1989 the inflow of housekeepers increased steadily. Then the demand for housekeepers in the Wanping Residential Area declined owing to the increase in wages. But the supply of housekeepers kept on increasing. Inevitably, as a result, their monthly wages decreased sharply from 140 yuan in 1990 to 80 yuan in 1992. By the time of this survey I saw no change in supply. The latest news in 1993 from

Shanghai was that many housekeepers began to quit their jobs and go back home due to this wage decrease and the long queue at the agency had disappeared. The financial cost for a country girl to move into Xhanghai to be a housekeeper is her transport fee, which is only about 20 to 40 yuan (a very small portion of her monthly wage). She would have free meals and accommodation at her master's flat. So the inflow of these job seekers is mainly determined by the employment probability and income in this particular labour market (please see equation 5 in Chapter II). According to the figures in columns 1, 2 and 4 which means Applicants, % of A/R and Wage/month there is a time lag between 1 and 3, 4. If we let Y = the supply of housekeepers, P = the employment probability and W = the income of housekeepers then the relationship between the housekeeper supply and the employment probability and the income is

$$\mathbf{Lag}n(Y) = f(P\ W) \qquad 5.1$$

Table 16. The Records of Housekeeper Agency in Wanping Residential Area, Shanghai 1980-1992

Year	Applicants	Recruitment	% of A/R	Wage/month
80	26	26	100.0	30
81	89	77	86.5	40
82	75	70	93.3	50
83	96	80	83.3	70

84	108	75	69.4	70
85	113	83	73.5	80
86	126	106	84.1	80
87	118	110	93.2	80
88	147	145	98.6	100
89	158	120	75.9	120
90	209	74	35.4	140
91	214	56	26.2	120
92	205	11	5.4	80

Source: From survey data collected by W. Qian.

Unfortunately, as I explained above, since I could only obtain the decline tendency data from the income and probability of obtaining a job and could not get the decline data from the inflow amunt by the time when this survey was conducted I can't regress lagged Y on P and W but Y on P and W. The predicted equation resulted, Y = 112.12 - 0.95(P) + 1.04(W) (See Appendix 5.1) R-sq = 93.3% and R-sq (adj) = 92%.

Graph 5.11 **Application 80-92**



Graphic 5.12 Probability of obtaining a job



Another investigation was carried out in Shanghai Ninth Textile Mill where about 80 contract workers from the countryside were employed in a Spinning Workshop. The reason this textile mill employed these contract workers was very simple. The former workers in this workshop asked for more pay for this hard work and the mill had no authority to give them more. In the end the mill authorities just shifted these permanent workers to other workshops where the work was relatively lighter and employed contract workers from the countryside to do this hard low paid work. These country girls had to pay their accommodation and food. The data I collected from this mill shows that the amunt of the applicants over that period is negative in relation to the probability of obtaining the job and the income. In Shanghai the main living cost for these country girls worked in the textile mill was food and accommodation. So their net monthly income could be calculated by minus their food and accommodation fee from their gross monthly income. In that case I found that their net income from 1987 to 1992 had actually declined. It declined further if I used the 1987 price, which means deducting the inflation factor. Assuming a 5% annual inflation rate from 1987 to 1992 their monthly net income would be 35 * (1 - 0.05) sqrt 5 = 27.08 yuan. If we assume that the annual inflation rate during this period was 10% then their real net income would decline from 45 yuan to

20.67 yuan. Therefore, the tendencies between the income and the application would be coincident. As a result, from 1992 the mill faced a shortage of supply of these contract workers and employed some retired workers to fill the vacancies.

Table 17. The Information about the Contract Workers in Shanghai Ninth Textile Mill, 1987-92

year	1	2	3	4	5	6
87	134	85	63.4	80	35	45
88	115	85	73.9	90	50	40
89	127	120	94.5	100	65	35
90	146	120	82.1	115	80	35
91	128	120	93.8	150	100	50
92	97	120	123.7	150	115	35

1=Application; 2=Recruitment; 3=% of Application/Recruitment; 4=Monthly income; 5=Monthly expenses and; 6=4-5.

Graph 5.13 Application 87-92



Graph 5.14 Probability of obtaining a job



Certainly, the data I collected from these two units is not sufficient to prove, or test the hypothesis. But they give a clear indication of exactly what is happening in Shanghai. This migration behaviour has no connection with the income of urban industry in general but is closely connected to the income level of each particular informal labour market. Meanwhile the living costs, as we can see from the Table 4.52, in long term would affect the ability of these migrants to stay.

Test 6: The Impact of Out-Migration on Economic Development

Some researches (Dasgupta, 1979; Harris, 1972; Barber, 1961.) have suggested that as long as the number of out-migrants does not exceed one third or one half of the village's total labour force, local agricultural production would not be affected. Meanwhile other scholars (Schultz, 1965; Lipton, 1968.) considered that unless such withdrawal is synchronised with the agricultural cycle, off-season migration or other compensatory measures are adopted, local agricultural production would be affected. So

what was the situation in the case of these five villages? I will examine this subject for each village.

Shuangmiao Village: With a high population density and a shortage of grain Shuangmiao people can never afford to give up their agricultural production. Their migration behaviour is characterised by short distance and is seasonal (See Chapter III). Even though the out-migration rate reached 42% in 1992 these migrants were not divorced from their agricultural production. On the other hand, as we can see from Table 4.61, the remittances from these out-migrants are quite significant. The mean remittance from each out-migrant was 308.25 yuan which is two times higher than the income per person in the village. The WEN SHU (Administrative Secretary of the village) estimated that the annual amunt of out-migration in the village could be around 200 which means they could bring back about 60,000 yuan in remittances. Most of the remittances were used to build houses, according to the survey. Therefore, it did not directly affect agricultural production either.

Xianfeng Village: As in Shuangmiao the out-migration in Xianfeng Village was also short distant and seasonal. In 1992 the out- migration rate in this village was 30%. The mean remittance sent back by the out-migrants in Xingfeng was 320.56 yuan. According to my investigations from this village, the out-migration did not reduce local agricultural production. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, agricultural production in Xianfeng Village has been awarded as a model in the county. Grain production per mu was 300 jin in 1990, which was quite high for that region. So on the whole, the out-migration has quite a positive impact on the local economic development.

Table 18. The Remittances From The Out-Migrants In Five Villages (yuan)

	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Sum
Shuangmiao	308.25	0	3000	17570
Xianfeng	320.56	0	4000	23080
Kanle	1723.33	0	6000	82720
Xiting	1491.25	0	9000	71580
Tianliao	758.33	0	5000	36400

Kangle Village: The situation in Kangle Village is a little bit complicated. Agricultural production in this village is totally dependent on natural rainfall in the first place and demands much less on labour force than villages like Xianfeng. Therefore, the surplus labour force in this village is high. Given this situation, agricultural production in this village did not decline



although 62% of the labour force migrated out permanently with long distance in 1992. But the remittances from these out-migrants were huge. The mean remittance was 1,723.23 yuan. According to the estimates given by the village's cadres there were about 500 out-migrants which means the total remittances the village received could have been about 86,000 yuan! Unfortunately, not one penny was spent on agricultural production, although everyone was hoping for an irrigation scheme. Therefore, the out-migration in

Kangle Village had neither a positive nor negative effect on local agricultural production, but increased the income of each migrant's household significantly.

Xiting and Tianliao villages: According to the Key-link for grain production stipulated by the State Council during the People's Commune period, these two villages should be expected to produce more than 800 jin grain per mu. But the real yield they harvested in 1990 was only 332 jin and 317 jin per mu respectively. I was informed that since the dismantling of the commune, grain production in these two villages has progressively declined. The peasants complained to me about the low purchase price of grain and the increasing production costs. However, whatever the causes which lured the peasants from their lands to other places, the consequences were very obvious. Emigration (48% in Xiting and 41% in Tianliao) did reduce agricultural production in these two villages. Another reason the peasants there could afford this change was that the grain supply in the market for the whole region was abundant. As we can see from the Table 4.61 the remittances sent back by the out-migrants were more than enough to compensate for the loss of grain. The remittances, as I was told, were used either to build houses or to do small business. Since the cost for grain production was considered too high nobody in these two villages would invest the money in this industry. So the impact of out-migration on the local economic development in these two villages turned out to be more negative, although some of the remittances were invested in some small household businesses such as a small shop in the village.

APPENDIX

4.11 The Frequencies of Different Educational Group in Five Villages.

Shuangmiao Village

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
non	1	2	3.2	3.2	3.2
canread	2	2	3.2	3.2	6.5
primary	3	37	59.7	59.7	66.1
middle	4	20	32.3	32.3	98.4
high middle	5	1	1.6	1.6	100.0
Total		62		100.0	100.0

Valid cases 62 Missing cases 0

Xianfeng Village

	Valid	Cum

Value Lable	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
non	1	3	3.0	3.7	3.7
primary	3	9	9.0	11.0	14.6
middle	4	59	59.0	72.0	86.6
high middle	5	11	11.0	13.4	100.0
Missing	9	18	18.0		
Total		100		100.0	100.0

Valid cases 82 Missing cases 18

Kangle Village

Value Lable	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
non	1	8	16.0	16.0	16.0
canread	2	16	32.0	32.0	48.0
primary	3	9	18.0	18.0	66.0
middle	4	16	32.0	32.0	98.0
high middle	5	1	2.0	2.0	100.0
Total		50		100.0	100.0

Valid cases 50 Missing cases 0

Xiting Village

Value Lable	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent

canread	2	4	8.0	8.3	8.3
primary	3	19	38.0	39.6	47.9
middle	4	21	42.0	43.8	91.7
high middle	5	4	8.0	8.3	100.0
Missing	9	2	4.0		
Total		50		100.0	100.0

Valid cases 48 Missing cases 0

Tianliao Village

Value Lable	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
canread	2	5	10.0	10.0	10.0
primary	3	22	44.0	44.0	54.0
middle	4	21	42.0	42.0	96.0
high middle	5	2	4.0	4.0	100.0
Total		50		100.0	100.0

Valid cases 50 Missing cases 0

4.21: Frequencies of the Gaps in Five Villages.

Shuangmiao Village

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent

0	38	61.3	71.7	71.7
40	2	3.2	3.8	75.5
50	4	6.5	7.5	83.0
60	5	8.1	9.4	92.5
70	1	1.6	1.9	94.3
80	3	4.8	5.7	100.0
Missing	999	9	14.5	
Total		62	100.0	100.0

Valid cases 62 Missing cases 9

Xianfeng Village

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	0	8	8.0	9.8	9.8
	40	2	2.0	2.4	12.2
	50	10	10.0	12.2	24.4
	60	9	9.0	11.0	35.4
	70	8	8.0	9.8	45.1
	80	13	13.0	15.9	61.0
	90	11	11.0	13.4	74.4
	100	18	18.0	22.0	96.3
	120	1	1.0	1.2	97.6
	150	2	2.0	2.4	100.0
Missing	999	18	18.0		
Total		100		100.0	100.0

Valid cases 82 Missing cases 18

Kangle Village

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	0	6	12.0	12.5	12.5
	40	3	6.0	6.3	18.8
	50	19	38.0	39.6	58.3
	60	13	26.0	27.1	85.4
	70	3	6.0	6.3	91.7
	80	3	6.0	6.3	97.9
	100	1	2.0	2.4	100.0
Missing	999	2	4.0		
Total		50		100.0	100.0

Valid cases 48 Missing cases 2

Xiting Village

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	0	14	28.0	35.0	35.0
	60	1	2.0	2.5	37.5
	70	1	2.0	2.5	40.0
	80	5	10.0	12.5	52.5
	90	3	6.0	7.5	60.0
	100	8	16.0	20.0	80.0
	120	2	4.0	5.0	85.0
	150	3	6.0	7.5	92.5
	200	3	6.0	7.5	100.0
Missing	999	10	20.0		

Total		50		100.0	100.0
Valid cases	40	Missing cases	10		

Tianliao Village

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	0	17	34.0	35.4	35.4
	50	1	2.0	2.1	37.5
	60	1	2.0	2.1	39.6
	70	1	2.0	2.1	41.7
	80	5	10.0	10.4	52.1
	90	5	10.0	10.4	62.5
	100	12	24.0	25.0	87.5
	120	3	6.0	6.3	93.8
	150	1	2.0	2.1	95.8
	180	1	2.0	2.1	97.9
	200	1	2.0	2.1	100.0
Missing	999	2	4.0		
Total		50		100.0	100.0
Valid cases	48	Missing cases	2		

4.31: Frequencies of idealgo

long F/R = long distance with the contact of friends and relatives;

short non-F/R = short distance without the contact of friends and relatives.

Shuangmiao Village

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent

long F/R	1	25	40.3	83.3	83.3
short non-F/R	2	5	8.1	16.7	100.0
Missing	9	32	51.6		
Total		62		100.0	100.0

Valid cases 62 Missing cases 32

Xianfeng Village

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
long F/R	1	64	64.0	91.4	91.4
short non-F/R	2	6	6.0	8.6	100.0
Missing	9	30	30.0		
Total		100		100.0	100.0

Valid cases 70 Missing cases 30

Kangle Village

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
long F/R	1	2	4.0	5.7	5.7
short non-F/R	2	33	66.0	94.3	100.0
Missing	9	15	30.0		
Total		50		100.0	100.0

Valid cases 35 Missing cases 15

Xiting Village

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
long F/R	1	47	94.0	100.0	100.0
Missing	9	3	6.0		
Total		50		100.0	100.0

Valid cases 47 Missing cases 3

Tianliao Village

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
long F/R	1	47	94.0	100.0	100.0
Missing	9	3	6.0		
Total		50		100.0	100.0

Valid cases 47 Missing cases 3

4.32: Frequencies of family migration history.

Shuangmiao Village

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
yes	1	19	30.6	32.2	32.2
no	2	40	64.5	67.8	100.0
Missing	9	3	4.8		
Total		62		100.0	100.0

Valid cases 59 Missing cases 3

Xianfeng Village

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
yes	1	11	11.0	13.3	13.3
no	2	72	72.0	86.7	100.0
Missing	9	17	17.0		

Total		100		100.0	100.0
Valid cases	83	Missing cases	17		

Kangle Village

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
yes	1	4	8.0	8.0	8.0
no	2	46	92.0	92.0	100.0
Total		50		100.0	100.0
Valid cases	50	Missing cases	0		

Xiting Village

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
yes	1	18	36.0	37.5	37.5
no	2	30	60.0	62.5	100.0
Missing	9	2	4.0		
Total		50		100.0	100.0
Valid cases	48	Missing cases	2		

Tianliao Village

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
yes	1	14	28.0	29.2	29.2
no	2	34	68.0	70.8	100.0
Missing	9	2	4.0		
Total		50		100.0	100.0

Valid cases 48 Missing cases 2

4.33: Frequencies of the friend or neighbour migration history

Shuangmiao Village

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
yes	1	46	74.2	82.1	82.1
no	2	10	16.1	17.9	100.0
Missing	9	6	9.7		
Total		62		100.0	100.0

Valid cases 56 Missing cases 6

Xianfeng Village

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
yes	1	3	3.0	3.6	3.6
no	2	80	80.0	96.4	100.0
Missing	9	17	17.0		
Total		100		100.0	100.0

Valid cases 83 Missing cases 17

Kangle Village

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	0	1	2.0	2.0	2.0
yes	1	46	92.0	92.0	94.0
no	2	3	6.0	6.0	100.0
Total		50		100.0	100.0

Valid cases 50 Missing cases 0

Xiting Village

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
yes	1	40	80.0	100.0	100.0
Missing	9	10	20.0		
Total		50		100.0	100.0

Valid cases 40 Missing cases 10

Tianliao Village

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
yes	1	43	86.0	100.0	100.0
Missing	9	7	14.0		
Total		50		100.0	100.0

Valid cases 43 Missing cases 7

4.41: Frequencies of the reasons for migrating out in five villages.

Shuangmiao Village

Number one reason:

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
transfer	1	4	6.5	6.6	6.6
unemployed	2	4	6.5	6.6	13.1

too low income	3	51	82.3	83.6	96.7
poor surroundings	14	1	1.6	1.6	98.4
other	16	1	1.6	1.6	100.0
Missing	99	1	1.6		
Total		62		100.0	100.0

Valid cases 61 Missing cases 1

Number two reason:

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	0	4	6.5	6.6	6.6
unemployed	2	1	1.6	1.6	8.2
too low income	3	2	3.2	3.3	11.5
better pay	6	10	16.1	16.4	27.9
unification	12	1	1.6	1.6	29.5
poor surroundings	14	41	66.1	67.2	96.7
poor living	15	2	3.2	3.3	100.0
Missing	99	1	1.6		
Total		62		100.0	100.0

Valid cases 61 Missing cases 1

Xianfeng Village

Number one reason:

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
transfer	1	1	1.0	1.2	1.2
too low income	3	73	73.0	88.0	89.2
better pay	6	5	5.0	6.0	95.2
better work	7	1	1.0	1.2	96.4
unification	12	1	1.0	1.2	97.6
poor living	15	2	2.0	2.4	100.0
Missing	99	17	17.0		
Total		100		100.0	100.0

Valid cases 83 Missing cases 17

Number two reason:

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	0	2	2.0	2.4	2.4
too low income	3	3	3.0	3.6	6.0
business	5	1	1.0	1.2	7.2
better pay	6	48	48.0	57.8	65.1
better work	7	15	15.0	18.1	83.1
edu for kids	9	6	6.0	7.2	90.4
poor living	15	7	7.0	8.4	98.8
other	16	1	1.0	1.2	100.0
Missing	99	17	17.0		
Total		100		100.0	100.0

Valid cases 83 Missing cases 17

Kangle Village

Number one reason:

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	0	3	6.0	6.0	6.0
unemployed	2	24	48.0	48.0	54.0
too low income	3	22	44.0	44.0	98.0
better pay	6	1	2.0	2.0	100.0
Total		50		100.0	100.0

Valid cases 50 Missing cases 0

Number two reason:

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	0	18	36.0	36.0	36.0
unemployed	2	3	6.0	6.0	42.0
too low income	3	27	54.0	54.0	96.0
marriage	10	1	2.0	2.0	98.0
other	16	1	2.0	2.0	100.0
Total		50		100.0	100.0

Valid cases 50 Missing cases 0

Xiting Village

Number one reason:

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
unemployed	2	28	56.0	58.3	58.3
too low income	3	16	32.0	33.3	91.7

better pay	6	2	4.0	4.2	95.8
unification	12	1	2.0	2.1	97.9
poor surroundings	14	1	2.0	2.1	100.0
Missing	99	2	4.0		
Total		50		100.0	100.0

Valid cases 48 Missing cases 2

Number two reason:

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	0	1	2.0	2.1	2.1
unemployed	2	1	2.0	2.1	4.2
too low income	3	27	54.0	56.3	60.4
better pay	6	11	22.0	22.9	83.3
family	11	2	4.0	4.2	87.5
poor surroundings	14	6	12.0	12.5	100.0
Missing	99	2	4.0		
Total		50		100.0	100.0

Valid cases 48 Missing cases 2

Tianliao Village

Number one reason:

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent

unemployed	2	12	24.0	24.0	24.0
too low income	3	29	58.0	58.0	82.0
marriage	10	1	2.0	2.0	84.0
family	11	2	3.9	3.9	88.0
poor surroundings	14	6	12.0	12.0	100.0
Total		50	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 50 Missing cases 0

Number two reason:

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	0	1	2.0	2.0	2.0
too low income	3	13	26.0	26.0	28.0
business	5	1	2.0	2.0	30.0
better pay	6	21	42.0	42.0	72.0
family	11	1	2.0	2.0	74.0
poor surroundings	14	12	24.0	24.0	98.0
other	16	1	2.0	2.0	100.0
Total		50		100.0	100.0

Valid cases 50 Missing cases 0

5.1 The regression equation of regress the variable of Applicants (appli) with the Probability of obtaining a job (P) and the income.

The regression equation is

appli = 112 - 0.950 P + 1.04 Income

Predictor	Coef	Stdev	t-ratio	P
Constant	112.12	23.43	4.78	0.000
P	-0.9499	0.1792	-5.30	0.000
Income	1.0423	0.1672	6.24	0.000

s = 15.85 R-sq = 93.3% R-sq(adj) = 92.0%

Analysis of Variance

SOURCE	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	2	35090	17545	69.82	0.000
Error	10	2513	251		
Total	12	37603			

SOURCE	DF	SEQ SS
P	1	25320
Income	1	9770

Chapter VII. Conclusions

It remains to summarise the implications of this research, as I have attempted to view migration behaviour in China in a wider context within the field of social sciences, for economic/sociological/anthropological theories of internal rural- rural and rural-urban migration in China.

6.1 Firstly, according to the outcome of the field studies outlined in the previous chapters, internal migration in China since 1980 shows a very strong seasonal, short distance and rural-rural tendency, which contradicts the original hypothesis which assumed that internal migration in China is mainly rural- urban in character, and also makes it different from many other developing countries, where the migration is mainly rural-urban in character. (See Eades, 1987, Todaro, Chap. 9, 1989, Gillis, Chap. 8,

1983, Thirlwall, Chap. 3, 1986, De Jones, 1981, etc.) My explanation, after re-examining the situation in China, is, first of all, the fact that in China every peasant household is guaranteed a certain amunt of cultivated land, although they do not own this land. So, more or less the rural labour forces are bound by agricultural production, during the peak seasons in particular, regardless of whether or not these resources are efficiently used. Although grain production in rural China has become less and less profitable, this has not affected most peasant households significantly as they are still self-sufficient small household grain producers rather than commercial farmers. Therefore, the cultivated land, in the context of internal migration in China, has to some extent played a significant retaining role. Due to the seasonal character of agricultural production this retaining effect determines the seasonal and short distance character of internal migration. However, the rural-rural character of Chinese internal migration is first of all a consequence of the Chinese HUKOU system which has been imposed over the last three decades. Although the effectiveness of the HUKOU system has been declining since 1980 it still has some influence on prohibiting the peasants from moving into the cities. Indeed, the peasants no longer need to worry about their food supply when they stay in the cities since the LIANPIAO[14] They still face the HUKOU requirement as regards employment in the formal sector in the cities, which means they have no chance of obtaining it. As a matter of fact, the HUKOU requirement in the cities in China is quite similar to the work permit requirement for foreigners for job applications in the West. Furthermore, without local HUKOU the migrants children would not have access to local education. These restrictions would of course stop many potential rural-urban migrants from going to the cities. Instead, they would choose to look for job opportunities in rural areas. Secondly, as I described in the previous chapter, in some cases the Chinese peasants prefer to go to

[14] In urban areas in China the food and edible oil are rationed through the means of distrobuting monthly coupon. The food coupon is called LIANPIAO and the edible oil coupon is called YOUPIAO. Before 1980 people in China can not buy rice from the rice ship without LIANPIAO and edible oil from the oil shop without YOUPIAO. Since 1980 these two coupons become less and less important since people in China can buy rice and edible oil from the market with the market price.

rural areas for searching jobs rather than heading to the cities. Of course, with the open door policy going on the peasants would feel more secure to go to the cities.

The rural-rural character of internal migration in China could further be explained by the fact, due to the strict restrictions of HUKOU imposed during the period of 1957 - 1980, of a changed social contact network. Nowadays the Chinese peasants do not have many relatives in the cities who possess the urban HUKOU. It has become quite a common phenomenon of the social contact network in China that peasants' relatives and friends are peasants and urban residents' relatives and friends are urban residents. Therefore, when a peasant in China plans to go out searching for a job most of his/her information and contacts would come from rural areas rather than urban areas. This kind of information and contact network would determine the destination areas which he/she finds. This study has shown, according to the surveys, that there is more rural-rural migration. However, as we have seen, both the guaranteed cultivated lands and the HUKOU system are institutional intervening variables. But these two variables, accompanied by economic development and institutional reform, very likely could change. Sooner or later the peasants in China may not be so tied to their land. With more and more privatisation of urban enterprises, the restrictions imposed by the HUKOU system in terms of employment would have less and less effect. Therefore, I believe that this rural-rural character of internal migration in China may also be changed in the future.

6.2 The surveys from the five villages in China have confirmed the hypothesis that there exists an attraction gap in the context of internal migration. Although in the model this gap is expressed as **Mij = Yu - (Yr + S)** it is not purely a process of economic calculation. It is also a process of psychological adjustment. On the one hand people are looking for a higher income, or additional income, but on the other hand they find it difficult to leave their hometown. To overcome this psychological barrier it not only takes

time but sufficient attractions from the destination area as well. When a person said that they wouldn't go unless their net income in the cities was 50 yuan or 100 yuan higher than their current income they did not mean that this 50 yuan or 100 yuan was the exact amunt which would compensate their psychological adjustment. The reason they gave this figure was because to adjust their reluctance of leaving their hometown they needed something to encourage them to make this decision. This is the function of the attraction gap which I emphasised. This is to say that the length of the attraction gap has a positive correlation to the level of local income. The significance of this finding is that it can amend the overestimation in the prediction of the volume of internal migration. Let's have a look at the graph 5.1. where 0Y is the level of income and 0X is the volume of internal migration. 0r is rural income, 0u is urban income and rs is the length of attraction gap. With the same migration function curve the prediction of the volume of internal migration without the attraction gap would be 0b and with the attraction gap would be 0a. The gap between 0b - 0a is the overestimation if we fail to take the attraction gap into consideration.

Graph 5.1



6.3 Direct and indirect contacts, which were tested in the previous chapter, are a very important factor of getting information and initial help for migrants when they arrive in the destination areas. As previous research has shown, of all these contacts indirect contacts affect migration behaviour much more than direct contacts. This is because the indirect contact is a kind of chain relationship network and operates in a much wider context than the direct relationship network. The outcome of the surveys further suggests that the newly emerged **BAOGONGTOU** - private contractor in some rural areas like Gansu and Zhejiang provinces have played far more important a role than direct and indirect contacts. Many labour export companies at the county level also played very important role in terms of contact. With the decentralisation policy towards the labour market in China, **BAOGONGTOU** will be more and more popular to reallocate the labour resources among the rural areas and between rural and urban areas. It should be pointed out that government-organised labour export companies could be particularly important in a country like China for the reallocation of labour resources, since the market mechanism has not yet been fully functioned. Since these two phenomena have not been included in the model, further investigation should be carried out in terms of illustrating the contact variable. This means the contact variable should include direct relatives and friends, indirect relatives and friends, **BAOGONGTOU**, and government organised labour export companies.

6.4 So far as the distance variable is concerned, the case studies show that it is not as Ravenstain described. According to the surveys the distance variable has a close relationship to seasonal migration, which means that seasonal migrants would choose short distance migration. However, due to the **BAOGONGTOU** and the government-organised labour export companies, the peasants are less concerned about distance. This research has found no direct correlation between distance and internal migration in China. This is because in China the internal migrants, whether permanent or temporary,

married or non-married, often migrate out without bringing their families with them (see chapter three). For a single person using modern transportation like coach and train, distance would no longer be a barrier preventing a decision to migrate out.

6.5 The correlation between the level of rural development and the volume of out-migration, according to the investigations from the five villages, which include the quality and quantity of the roads and accessibility to the road, the quantity of irrigation and the quantity of local enterprises, is negative. Of course, many other factors like HYVs,[15] the fertiliser input, the degree of diversification of agricultural production etc. should also be included in future investigations. By doing so, the accuracy of the correlation coefficient between the degree of local rural development and the volume of out-migration could be strengthened. However, as we all know, projects for local rural development require the employment of local rural labour forces. And the completion of local rural development projects would improve local agricultural productivity on the one hand, and lead to the diversification of agricultural production on the other, developing the Village and Xiang Enterprises. In short, local rural development would offer many job opportunities for local surplus labour, which would otherwise be potential out-migrants.

6.6 Local social and cultural factors affect decision making in various ways in China when local people intend to migrate out. For instance, women in areas like Gansu's Dingxi and Anhui's Dabieshan are still prevented by local traditional values from migrating out. But the situation in a coastal area like Zhejiang's Changnan is quite different. The out-migration rate for women is much higher than inland, due to the regional social and economic degrees which have led to the opening of local traditions. Also, as shown in the previous chapter, marriage status does not affect migration decision in China since loyalty is the essential value in the country to bind a family together rather

[15] High Yield Varieties.

than the emphasis of being attached to each other residentially. In women out-migration case, the Chinese local traditional culture has reduced to some extent the volume of out-migration. But in the case of marriage status, the Chinese local culture has encouraged more out-migration.

6.7 Given the current rural educational situation and the employment restriction in the cities in China, the assumed relationship between each individual's level of education and the propensity to migrate out turns out to be insignificant, according to the result of the test. But the author suggests that this variable should remain to be tested in the future.

6.8 Both rural-rural and rural-urban migration have increased the income of each migrant's household, however, according to the surveys, they have not yet contributed to reinvestment for agricultural production. The remittances sent by the migrants in the five villages in China varied between the short distant and seasonal migrants and the long distant and permanent migrants (see Table 4.61 in Chapter IV), and varied from household to household. For some households the remittances they received constituted additional income whereas for others they constituted their main income. But on the whole, the long distance and permanent out-migration sent much more remittances than the short distance and seasonal ones.

The effect of out-migration on agricultural production also varied from area to area. However, agricultural production was not negatively affected by seasonal migration, according to the investigations from the five villages in China. With long distance and permanent migration as in Xiting and Tianliao villages, agricultural production was negatively affected. But in the case of Kangle Village in Gansu it is difficult to distinguish

whether the negative effect was caused by the local ecological environment or by out-migration. By and large, the effect was insignificant because the villagers, as I pointed out before, still considered grain production a kind of security for their lives.

It may be concluded from this that internal migration in the LDCs, in this case in China, is not only influenced by economic factors in the original and destination areas but by a variety of other factors as well. For instance, the institutional intervening factor like government policies like the HUKOU system, and reform and open door policies after 1980, the cultural factor like local traditions and attitudes towards women in Shuangmiao Village, the factor of natural condition like the environmental problem in Kangle Village, social factor like direct and indirect contacts etc. It is a human behaviour which is decided by multi-social, economic and cultural factors rather than an equilibrium analysis under a complete competitive market system.

Internal migration in China at the current level and stage has no negative effect on agricultural production, but makes no contribution to reinvestment for agricultural production either.

There were different kinds of internal migration in China such as seasonal and short distance, permanent and long distance, self-organised, BAOGONGTOU organised and government-organised, rural-rural and rural-urban migration, which have alleviated the unemployment and underemployment problems in rural areas on the one hand, and provided cheap labour for economic development in the destination areas on the other. But in some places, uninformed migration has already caused serious social and

employment problems in the destination areas. Therefore, as an alternative policy, according to this research, a whole package of local rural development would be another way to deal with rural surplus labour in China.

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