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MINORITY LANGUAGE TELEVISION
- SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND CULTURAL IMPLICATIONS

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Abstract

This thesis explores the subject of minority language television by comparing the cases of Wales and Brittany, and in particular the social, political and cultural implications of the Welsh language television channel S4C.

The thesis is divided up into two interrelated parts, where the first part is an analysis on state level of French and British media policy, particularly with regards to their linguistic minorities. This part of the thesis deals with the historical, political and institutional background for the provision of minority language media in Breton and Welsh. It takes as points of reference firstly the state, and secondly the minorities in question - the Breton and the Welsh - and shows how a certain policy area, in this case broadcasting, can become a focus for minority demands. The thesis describes the historical and political background for the extreme difference in provisions for minority language broadcasting in the two countries.

The second part of the thesis takes as a starting point the actual existence of S4C - the Welsh language channel - as a minority language broadcaster, and assesses the social political and cultural implications of this organisation. This part of the thesis examines the minority level, and assesses the potential impact of Welsh language broadcasting, mainly television, on Welsh society in general and the Welsh language in particular.
Chapter 1. Introduction.

The following thesis provides an attempt to examine the different approaches of two nation-states, France and the United Kingdom, towards the management of linguistic and/or territorial minorities within their borders. The thesis refers particularly to media policy and provisions for minority language broadcasting.

After discussing the general treatment of minorities, territorial and/or linguistic, in the two countries, the thesis proceeds with the examination of one particular policy area, media policy. It reviews the media policies of the French and British state with reference to linguistic minorities. The 'cases' - i.e. the particular minorities chosen - are Brittany and Wales, which are comparable on a range of different indicators.

Both France and the United Kingdom are major industrial West European democracies, geographically situated in the north western part of Europe, and both are members of the European Community. The sizes of their populations are roughly similar, France: 54.3 millions and the United Kingdom: 56 millions, although the area of France - 547.026 km^2 - is more than twice the size of the United Kingdom's 243.000 km^2. And of particular relevance in this context, both countries have Celtic linguistic minorities on their Western seabords, the Breton-speakers and the Welsh-speakers respectively.

The apparent reason for embarking on a study of this kind, is that Wales in 1982 was given its own Welsh-language television channel: S4C (Sianel Pedwar Cymru - Channel Four Wales), which partially takes the place of Channel Four UK in Wales, broadcasting Welsh language programmes during peak hours, and Channel Four programmes the rest of the time. S4C has subsequently become the envy of other European linguistic minorities. In 1991 the weekly Welsh language output amounted to some 30 hours of broadcast television and 80 hours of radio. In Brittany by comparison, there are 1.5 hours of Breton-language television broadcast each week, and some 14 hours of state radio broadcasts in Breton.

The argument of the first part of this thesis, is that the considerable discrepancy in the provision of Breton- and Welsh-language radio and television is to a large degree the result of the different way in which the French and British
states have treated the respective minorities of the two countries. Nor is the state of minority language broadcasting so much a function of consistent media policy decisions, as a response to the needs of efficient periphery management.

The second part of this thesis deals with the interplay between the mass media and the formation of cultural identity (ies). Here, because an output of 20-30 hours weekly of Welsh-language television over a period of almost ten years should provide sufficient empirical material to examine the role of minority-language mass media, the thesis concentrates on the Welsh channel S4C. The question the second part of the thesis discusses, is which implications S4C - the Welsh language channel - and the comparatively large amount of Welsh language broadcasting has had on the broadcasting environment in Wales and the Welsh language. The emphasis will be on television as this, because of the costs involved, is a much more centralised medium than radio. As wavebands for terrestrial television are limited they are subject to strict government regulation.

In a European context the concept of culture, especially European culture has taken on a new importance, with plans of Pan European cultural and audiovisual policies. But according to the Czechoslovakian writer Milan Kundera, this newfangled enthusiasm for culture might be too late:

"In the Middle Ages, European unity rested on the common religion. In the Modern Era religion yielded its position to culture (to cultural creation), which came to embody the supreme values by which Europeans recognized themselves, defined and identified themselves. Now in our own time, culture is in turn yielding its position. But to what and to whom? What sphere will provide the sort of supreme values that could unify Europe? Technology? The marketplace?"  

Does the content of this quotation mean, that all this stress placed on European cultural issues constitutes a reaction on the part of politicians, trying to regain lost cultural space before it is too late? Does it mean that they feel helpless faced with large multinational economic interests and the challenges of modern technology, and consequently try to reach for cultural issues? One answer may be that localised culture becomes more important in a world which becomes at the same time larger and smaller, mainly due to mass media and modern transport. It is in this context

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that the concept of community and questions concerning minority language media become of interest and importance.

The ethnic revival in Europe during the last twenty years, with its attending political fragmentation, has increased the focus on minority languages in the 1990's, languages which function both as a means of communication and, more importantly, as a cultural symbol. As minority languages have taken on new functional and symbolic meanings, demands for adequate broadcasting provisions within these languages emerge. The question of this thesis is how the emerging minority language mass media influence the creation of cultural identity within the respective minorities. As expressed by the editors of Media, Culture & Society:

"Small nations without states deserve particular recognition in any discussion of media and cultural identity. If we should be generally cautious about ascribing to the media a decisive role in the formation of cultural identity in all circumstances, it seems nonetheless apparent that, for small nations without sovereign states, the media have represented an increasingly important social apparatus by means of which demands for political sovereignty and cultural autonomy can be articulated. The struggle for control over broadcasting institutions in Latvia and Lithuania are recent and dramatic examples of this centrality, though we should not forget the more long-standing, persistent - and at times also volatile - attempts by nations such as Catalonia, the Basque country, Quebec or Scotland to develop independent media structures and cultures".

The empirical work involved in this dissertation, concerning the linguistic minorities of Wales and Brittany, consists of secondary data analysis together with an analysis of S4C's annual reports and accounts for the period 1982 - 1991, with regards to programme costs, - supply and - schedules. In addition I have conducted a range of interviews with media executives, independent producers, and people otherwise involved in the (mainly) Welsh cultural industry, concerning the rationale behind the Welsh-language television channel.

The structure of the thesis is as follows. The first part of the thesis consists of historical analyses of France and the United Kingdom with regards to the formation of the state and the differences of the workings of the political systems, and the subsequent dissimilar treatment of the peripheries. At the actual policy level, the media policies of the two countries are examined. These are subsequently

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applied to the cases of Brittany and Wales, and the difference between minority
language media provisions within those two areas are explained. In the second part
of the thesis the case of Wales and S4C is used in an attempt to look closer at some
social, political and cultural implications of minority language media.

The thesis commences with a general theoretical chapter introducing a range
of conceptual elements, which are of use in the following treatment of Wales and
Brittany. As the subject of this thesis is of such complexity, it has been necessary
to involve a range of admittedly very different theoretical perspectives in order to
achieve a comprehensive picture. The theoretical chapter deals firstly with the
concept of ethnicity, introducing definitions of key concepts such as ethnic groups,
nations and nationalist movements and includes a typology of territorial and
linguistic minorities. Subsequently follows an attempt to pin down the somewhat
elusive concept of 'cultural identity'. In order to introduce the mass media element
of the thesis follows an outline of current approaches within the field of mass
communication research; and ensuing is an attempt to link theoretical approaches
dealing with territorial politics, to the field of mass communication in relation to
linguistic minorities. The rest of the chapter deals with the actual question of the
relationship between the mass media and ethnic groups, and the possible impact on
the cultural identities within these groupings; and finally it consists of a treatment
of the linguistic impact of minority language media, dealing with aspects such as
language decline, extension of the domain context of the language, status and
prestige, standardisation, and the mass media as economic and democratic vehicle.

After the theoretical chapter, the chapters of the first part of the thesis deal
with the case of France, including issues of state formation, linguistic policy and the
mass media in France; and of Brittany, including issues of history and nationalism,
the state of Breton, and television and radio in Brittany. Upon the analysis of France
and Brittany follows an analysis of the United Kingdom, including issues of state
formation, and the mass media. The case of Wales is subsequently treated, including
analyses of history and nationalism as well as the state of the Welsh language, and
broadcasting in Wales encompassing a description of the struggle for a Welsh
television channel. Ending with the advent of S4C in 1982, the above chapters
constitute the first part of the thesis, with a comparison between France and the
United Kingdom on the state level, and between Brittany and Wales on the periphery level, with regards to minority language media provisions. The argument pursued here is that, what one might term, the linguistic imperialism of the French state has been more thorough than the corresponding British one. The French state has, according to Calvet, always been able to theorize its linguistic practice and make use of the whole of the legal apparatus at its disposition to support this.\(^3\)

In the second part of the thesis the case of Wales and S4C is used in an attempt to look closer at the interplay between minority language media and cultural identity, and in general social, political and cultural implications of minority language media. After a description of the general structure of broadcasting, and cultural institutions in Wales in order to show that S4C does not operate in a vacuum, S4C itself is subsequently treated, involving issues such as administration, structure and programming, and the rationale of broadcasters in Wales is finally discussed.

The thesis concludes with an assessment of the usefulness of the different theoretical perspectives with regards to the subject: Firstly British and French media policy with regards to linguistic minorities, and secondly on assessing the social, political and cultural implications of S4C, specially with regard to the broadcasting environment in Wales and the Welsh language:

Chapter 2. THEORY.

2.0. Theoretical Considerations.

In as much as it is interdisciplinary, this thesis will necessarily contain concepts and frames of references from a number of different social science disciplines: political science, sociology and cultural studies. As the present chapter will show, it has, in the treatment of the relationship between minority language media and cultural identity, been necessary to incorporate elements from such different theoretical 'bodies of literature', as nationalism, ethnicity, mass communication, organization studies, sociolinguistics and ethnology.

Using the cases of Brittany and in particular Wales as illustrations, the thesis deals with the interplay between minority language mass media - in particular television - and cultural identity and appraise the social, political and cultural implications. A range of separate concepts are consequently of interest, and will be incorporated into a wider framework in order to put the empirical elements into perspective.

The issues involved are as follows: The minority issue involves asking about ethnicity and what actually constitutes a minority. The language issue, in this context minority language, concern what role the language plays in socially defining a minority, as well as in the defining of cultural identity. The issue of television or mass media in general, involves looking at the function of mass media in society, as well as at the cultural industries, as an arena for different professional groups with separate interests, which are echoed on the level of minority language media. Finally the issue of cultural identity entail an examination of how cultural identity can be defined, as well as of the processes of production and reproduction of cultural identities.

The theoretical chapter consequently begins with a discussion of the concept of ethnicity.
2.1. Ethnicity.

2.1.1. Definitions.

During the last 30 years the social phenomenon which has been labelled 'the revival of ethnicity', has generated increasing interest among social scientists. Of relevance to this thesis, both Wales and Brittany, along with a number of other European areas containing minorities, witnessed an upsurge in what has been termed 'ethnic nationalism', during the 1960's and 1970's. The possible explanations for this 'ethnic revival', will however be cursorily treated in the respective chapters about Welsh and Breton nationalism, as they lie outside the scope of this thesis.

The revival of ethnicity was, according to Allardt, characterized by five main features\(^1\): firstly, the timing of the strengthening of the phenomenon of ethnicity to the period beginning in the late 1960's; secondly a revival of ethnic sentiments in hitherto passive ethnic minorities; thirdly a strong professionalization of ethnic activism; fourthly, a movement towards the left; and fifthly an increased governmental ability to respond to the demands of ethnic, territorial minorities. In the above observation Allardt does not distinguish between territorial and non-territorial ethnic groups, but as it will appear below, an ethnic group does not necessarily need to be territorial.

What, however, does the actual concept of 'ethnicity' entail? In the following depiction of 'ethnicity' and related concepts, I will rely mainly on Elklit and Tonsgaard’s definitions.\(^2\) An ethnic group is defined as a social system, with an independent and distinct culture within a larger society. By the concept of 'culture' is understood a pattern of experiences, opinions, evaluations, knowledge and attitudes that exists in connection with a social system. An independent and distinct culture is, according to Elklit and Tonsgaard, a culture which has developed over a long time, more or less independently of other cultural systems within the larger society. The culture of an ethnic group can consequently differ from the dominant

\(^1\) E. Allardt (1979), p. 16.

\(^2\) Elklit & Tonsgaard (1989), pp. 4 - 5.
culture in several ways, among which Elklit and Tonsgaard assume religion and language (the national symbol-system as they term it) to be the two most important\(^3\). This definition has the advantage of combining psychological factors - the individual as bearer of the system's culture - with social factors - the culture being expressed through social interaction, common symbols, social institutions and linguistic behaviour. Elklit and Tonsgaard maintain that: "The ethnic culture on the group level has its counterpart on the individual level as ethnic identity\(^4\). The question of identity will be treated in depth in section 2.2.

Related to concepts of ethnicity and ethnic groups are those of state, nation, nationality, and nationalist movements, being core concepts in the 'revival of ethnicity'. A state is defined in Max Weber's classical terms, as an institution with a monopoly of the legitimate use of physical violence, within a certain geographical territory. A nation is according to Allardt and Starck\(^5\), defined as a group of people, which in some respects shares a common culture, and either maintains or wants to create, both social and political unity within a certain geographical territory. This definition means that the cases of Wales and Brittany can only be regarded as 'nations' in the above sense if there is a coherent intention to create a political unity. A less restrictive concept is that of nationality, which is seen as a group of people, which, on the basis of shared common cultural elements, such as a common language or a common history, wants to be considered as particular (such as Breton or Welsh), and to be recognised as a group, without necessarily having political unity as its primary goal\(^6\). Finally nationalist movements will be defined as referring to the efforts of national groups, who can not be identified with the state, to restructure or reshape present state structures".

Another notion of 'nation' is suggested by Anderson. He defines a nation as "an imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and

\(^3\) ibid.

\(^4\) op. cit., p. 4.


\(^6\) ibid.
sovereign" It is imagined as limited because even the largest of them, has finite, if elastic boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. The nation is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm. And finally imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. This concept of nation as an imagined community is one we will return to in section 2.2. in the treatment of the concept of 'cultural identity'.


Territorial and linguistic minorities constitute particular categories of ethnic groups: If we look at minorities from the point of view of territory, there are two distinct types; the first is what we can consider as a territorial minority, consisting of those who live, and have lived for some considerable time in a particular well-defined geographic area. These are indigenous, and often autochthonous - earliest known - populations. Examples of this type of minority are Basques, Frisians, French-speaking Swiss, Bretons and Welsh. The second type of minority consists of those with either no or slight territorial affiliations with the host society, such as jews, gypsies, and immigrant workers.

As mentioned above, language is seen to be one of the most important factors in the determination of a social group's cultural distinctiveness. Following this, linguistic minorities can again be divided into two types: The first is a minority among the citizens of one state which speaks the official language, or the language

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8. op. cit. p. 16.
10. op.cit. p. 132.
of the majority, of another state. Examples are French speakers in Belgium, Switzerland and Italy, Swedish speakers in Finland, Danish speakers in Germany and vice versa. The advantage for these minorities is that their language is not in any danger of extinction, and they can easily obtain support in terms of educational material, radio- and TV-programmes etc. in the official language of the other state. The second type of minorities are those who speak a distinctive language, which is nowhere spoken by the majority of the citizens of a state - nor by the groups in power. Examples of this type are Basque, Welsh, Breton, Frisian, Rhaeto-Romansch, Corsican and Catalan. These minorities face a much more difficult task in keeping their languages alive.

It follows from the above that it is possible, dependent on what type of problems one wants to examine, to treat the Welsh and the Bretons as either territorial or linguistic minorities, as in sections 2.4. and 2.6.

2.2. Cultural Identity.

In a thesis where the subject is media policy, minority language media and identity, it becomes crucial to conceptualize the notions of 'national' and 'cultural' identity, before one can examine the role of mass communication in the production and reproduction of these identities. There seems to be an absence of explicit theorization on the subject, writers on culture and mass communication ignoring problems of 'nation' and 'national identity', and writers on ethnicity and nationalism passing lightly over the concepts of mass communication.

A rare attempt has been made by Schlesinger, who seeks to combine the writings of mediologists with literature on ethnicity and social movements. He demonstrates the importance of concepts such as 'cultural identity' and 'national identity' in current discourse on culture and communication, but maintains that they are not properly defined, nor is it clear how such forms of collective identity are formed. Because collective identity is seen as a residual category in communication research, there are underlying assumptions about cultures, and how their borders are
constituted, reproduced and modified, that are not properly explored. Schlesinger finds that the most explicit conceptualization can be found within the writings on nationalism, ethnicity and social movements. The interest of the social sciences in ethnic movements and consciousness beginning in the 1960's, has been followed by an interest in the concept of ethnic identity.

According to Schlesinger, in his review of social science literature, there are a number of useful concepts when attempting to theorize about collective identity. Firstly the concept of identity implies stressing the subjective dimensions of belonging to a group in relation to the objective factors that condition group membership. Secondly "collective identity relates to a collective memory through which the contemporary group recognizes itself through a common past, remembrance, commemoration, interpretation and reinterpretation"; and thirdly that identity can be seen as a dynamic concept. In other words ethnic groups are capable of recomposing their boundaries and selecting out different criteria for membership at different times, or as Schlesinger puts it:

"the category of ethnicity is a form of social organisation, an organisational vehicle which may take on different contents at different times and in various sociocultural systems... The critical factor for defining the ethnic group therefore becomes the social boundary which defines the group with respect to other groups of the same order."

In a recent book, Anthony D. Smith describes cultural identity in a similar way:

"Collective cultural identity refers not to a uniformity of elements over generations but to a sense of continuity on the part of successive generations of a given cultural unit of population, to shared memories of earlier events and periods in the history of that unit and to notions entertained by each generation about the collective destiny of that unit and its culture." (my emphasis)

Smith operates furthermore with the possibility of dual identities "a cultural-national and a political-national identity or... a national identity within a territorial state.

13. ibid.
identity, a Breton nation within France, a Catalan nation within Spain and so on."\textsuperscript{15} In this sense the Welsh would see themselves, at the same time, as Welsh and British.

Philip Schlesinger chooses to focus upon 'national identity', which he sees as a specific form of collective identity. However as he concedes that the concepts can be used both on the national and the sub-national level, in the context of Wales and Brittany I prefer to speak of 'cultural identity'. I intend to use Schlesinger's concepts, combined with a definition of culture, and create a tentative model of the formation of cultural identity.

The concept of 'culture' I will treat as having two elements:\textsuperscript{16}

1) values, ideas, meanings, beliefs (i.e. content), and
2) the way, or the social order in which, values, ideas, meanings and beliefs are exchanged (i.e. the communication order, or - network in a social sense).

To recapitulate on the emerging 'model' of cultural identity, we are talking about processes of both exclusion and inclusion, and the critical factor for defining the group becomes the social boundary which defines the group in relation to other groups. Collective identity is based on the selective processes of memory, so that a given group recognizes itself through its collective memory of a common past. This is a dynamic view of identity, based on a social and ethnic group's ability to continually recompose and redefine its boundaries over time. But how are these groups structured, one may ask? Are they perceived as largely homogenous, or internally divided? Here we can resort to Schlesinger's remarks about national cultures:

"National cultures are not simple repositories of shared symbols to which the entire population stands in identical relation. Rather, they are to be approached as sites of contestation in which competition over definitions take place"\textsuperscript{17}.

The [national] culture is seen, inter alia, as a classification system, allowing 'us' to define ourselves against 'them', both across the social boundary of the group, but

\textsuperscript{15} op. cit. p. 138.

\textsuperscript{16} Bakke (1986), p.131.

\textsuperscript{17} Schlesinger (1987), p. 261.
also on the intra-group level, corresponding to internal structures of social divisions and relations of power and domination.

The production, reproduction and modification of collective identity are ongoing processes, where the relationship between past and present is important. "That relationship should be understood at least in part as an imaginary one, mediated by the continual selective reconstruction of 'traditions' and of 'social memory'"\(^{18}\). These processes are described by Hobsbawm as "The Invention of Tradition":

"'Invented tradition' is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past."\(^{19}\) and "inventing traditions, it is assumed here, is essentially a process of formalization and ritualization, characterized by reference to the past, if only by imposing repetition."\(^{20}\)

These processes of 'invention' direct our attention to the role of cultural institutions and practices through which the chain of identity between past and present is forged, such as the mass media. It also requires us to consider the special role of cultural producers as active constructors of national identity, of interest is the relative power of different groups to define their own identities, and the ability to mobilise these definitions through their control of cultural institutions. The specific question of the role of the mass media in the formation of identity however will be further discussed in section 2.5. In figure 2.2.1. below we attempt to construct a model of cultural identity.

The model should be read as dynamic, depicting a changing flow of 'culture' (involving both content: the "What", and form / network: the "How"). A given group within a social boundary, which defines it in relation to other groups, has a Collective memory (I), and a set of shared Traditions (I). The collective memory and traditions influence the changes in society as well as in turn being influenced

\(^{18}\) ibid.


\(^{20}\) op.cit. p. 4.
by these changes. The societal changes can be located within the fields of intra-group differences, such as class, language or geography; or in socio-economic factors, such as demographic changes or occupational structure. They may constitute a change in emphasis (such as a religious revival) within the symbols of cultural specificity, of which can be mentioned language, literature, music, sport etc. Finally societal change can be located within or coming from the social institutions, depending on the activity and changing power of for example church/chapel, local public administration or political parties. Or indeed the mass media.

Figure 2.2.1:
Construction of tentative model of the formation of cultural identity:

Having passed through, and been influenced by, these changes in society, the collective memory and the traditions now reappear in a possibly changed form as Collective memory (II) and Traditions (II), and the whole process starts all over again. As society has changed however, the Symbols of cultural specificity, Intra-group differences, Socio-economic factors and Social institutions have changed as
well, and now appear in a different shape (II). Over time it is consequently different sets of collective memories and traditions that influence, and in turn become influenced by, different societal changes.

The above suggestions of symbols of cultural specificity are not to be considered exclusive, but might include others, such as drama/theatre and military displays, depending on the community in question. It is important to bear in mind that in the recomposition of cultural boundaries, the ethnic group(s) select different criteria at different times.

Notable in the context of this thesis is the dual function of language in the above model. Language serves both as an objective factor (cf. intra-group differences) that marks a difference in communicative terms between speakers and non-speakers of a language, and a subjective factor (cf. symbols of cultural specificity) where the symbolic and cultural content of a language are emphasised.

2.3. Mass Communication Research.

Before venturing into fields relating to mass media in the context of minorities - territorial or linguistic, the following section provides a brief outline of some current theoretical aspects of communication research, with particular emphasis on the 'critical political economy' approach.

By the term "Mass Media" is understood a socially organised activity, which aims to transfer messages via specific channels to an unspecified amount of recipients\(^{21}\). In practice this definition includes books, magazines, newspapers, film, television, radio, etc. Together with other social organizations: Church, Law and School, Mass Media are important disseminators of norms, values and ideologies. By norms is understood rules concerning the selection of means, and by values, rules concerning the selection of which goals to aim for. Ideologies are defined as relatively coherent systems of beliefs, held by groups of people, comprising norms

and values, and centred around particular core ideas. A particularity about the nature of the mass media is, however, that apart from playing a role in shaping social consciousness on one level, the output is also, on another level, a commodity, a product, in economic terms, which is bought and sold.

Mass communication research in Britain has, during the past twenty years or so, mainly taken place within two distinct ideological frameworks: Pluralism and Marxist inspired research tradition. Roughly speaking the pluralist approach sees society as a complex of competing interest groups, where no group is predominant. The mass media is seen as reflecting this diversity of interests, enjoying a degree of autonomy from the state, political parties etc. The media are controlled by an autonomous managerial elite, which allows a large degree of freedom to media professionals. In contrast the marxist inspired tradition sees society in terms of class domination, and the media are regarded as an ideological arena, where class wars are fought. According to the marxist framework, media executives are socialized into the norms and values of the dominant culture, and hence express these in their output. There is therefore a lack of alternative interpretations of society available to the public.

Within the framework of marxist inspired theory, the British mass communication researchers are divided as where to put their emphasis. A 'political economy' interpretation emphasises "the centrality of economic ownership, the indirect influences exerted by the state and the structures and logic of the market". Alternatively a 'radical culturalist' approach "attributes the media's subordination principally to ideological control, in particular to the unconscious internalization of the assumptions of the dominant culture by journalists, and their reliance on powerful groups and institutions as news sources".

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22 op. cit. p. 41.
24 ibid.
25 op. cit. p. 139.
26 ibid.
According to James Curran, there has been a shift towards pluralist themes within the radical tradition in Britain: a rejection of the totalizing, explanatory frameworks of marxism, a view of the audience as creative and active in the interpretation of media content, and a shift from the political to the popular aesthetic. There are, however, still issues which separate the radical neo-marxist tradition from classical pluralism. Firstly, even if the ruling class might be perceived as a constellation of shifting alliances, groups and classes within society still have unequal access to the media and unequal resources to disseminate their views and interests. The second issue focuses on economic structures. According to the neo-marxists, capitalist ownership can shape the norms and values of news organisations, principally through control of senior editorial appointments, and the market does rarely function in a way that is neutral between different interests in society.

Within the limitations given by the various structural constraints of an economic, political and organizational nature, groupings of professionals and individual media professionals are however able to play an important role in shaping the output. The following section will treat the so-called Critical Political Economy perspective in some detail. This approach to the study of mass communication seizes on the duality in the conception of the mass media as on the one hand 'cultural industries' which are manufacturers of cultural goods and commodities, and on the other hand as playing a pivotal role in organizing the images and discourses through which people make sense of the world. Critical political economy consequently focuses on the interplay between the symbolic and economic dimensions of public communications. As a result the field of interest is how different ways of financing and organizing cultural production have traceable consequences for the range of discourses and representations in the public domain and for audiences access to them.

In the case of the cultural industries, the concern is to trace the impact of economics dynamics on the range and diversity of public cultural expression and its

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27 op. cit. p. 158.
28 op. cit. p. 144.
availability to different social groups. Critical political economists are interested in seeing how the making and taking of meaning is shaped at every level by the structured asymmetries in social relations, and are especially interested in the ways that communicative activity is structured by the unequal distribution of material and symbolic resources. Even groups who supposedly have access to the means of communicative activity, such as owners, advertisers and key political personnel, however operate within structures which constrain as well as facilitate, imposing limits as well as offering possibilities. It is a key task for a critical political economy of culture to analyze the nature and sources of these limits. According to Peter Golding and Graham Murdock, media production has been increasingly commandeered by large corporations and moulded to their interests and strategies. There has been a push towards privatization, and the vitality of publicly funded cultural institutions has declined. Cultural life has been commodified, and new domestic technologies require consumers to purchase the appropriate machine as a condition of access. This tendency has compounded the already considerable effect of inequalities in disposable income and has made communicative activity more dependent on ability to pay. One could question whether advertising supported broadcasting was not an exception to this trend, as once consumers have a TV set they have access to the full range of broadcasting. The implications of advertising financed broadcasting is, however, that people contribute to the costs of programming in the form of increased retail prices. Secondly within this system, audiences themselves are the primary commodity. The economics of commercial broadcasting revolves around the exchange of audiences for advertising revenue. This conducts programming towards familiar and well-tested formulae and formats and away from risk and innovation, and anchor it in common-sense rather than in alternative viewpoints. Hence the audience's position as a commodity serves to reduce the overall diversity of programming and ensures that it confirms established

30 op. cit. p. 18.
31 op. cit. p. 19.
32 op.cit. p. 20.
8mores and assumptions far more often than it challenges them. According to the Critical Political Economy position, the main institutional counter to the commodification of communicative activity has been the public broadcasting organisations like the BBC. Such organisations are also restrained however - there are political pressures regarding the content of news coverage as well as financial constraints.

The normative stance of critical political economists is that what they perceive as the distortions and inequalities of markets systems can only be rectified by public intervention, though they do not necessarily agree on which form it should take. But why is it considered necessary to change anything in the first place? The focus is on the question of citizenship rights:

"The history of the modern communications media is not only an economic history of their growing incorporation into a capitalist economic system, but also a political history of their increasing centrality to the exercise of citizenship. In its most general sense, citizenship is about the condition that allow people to become full members of the society at every level."

With the basis in the notion of the 'public sphere' which has been elaborated by Jurgen Habermas, critical political economy sees a communications system as an public cultural space that is open, diverse and accessible to all groups in society. Ideally communications systems would provide people with access to the information, advice and analysis, that would enable them to know their rights and to pursue them effectively.

The historical background for Habermas' model of the 'public sphere' is found in the eighteenth century bourgeoisie. It is an idealized vision of the role of the 'bourgeois public sphere' which however excluded all but the propertied classes. According to Habermas the development of early modern capitalism brought about an autonomous arena of public debate. The economic independence provided by private property, discussions in coffee houses and salons and the emergence of an independent, market based press created a new public engaged in critical political discussion. From this was forged a reason-based consensus which shaped the

33 ibid.

34 op. cit. p. 22.
direction of the state. From the second half of the nineteenth century however, the public sphere came to be dominated by an expanded state and organized economic interests. A new corporatist pattern of power relations was established in which organized interests bargained with each other and with the state, while increasingly excluding the public. The media ceased to be an agency of empowerment and rationality, and became a further means by which the public was sidelined. Instead of providing a conduit for rational-critical debate, the media manipulated mass opinion. It defined politics as a spectacle, offered pre-digested convenience thinking and conditioned the public into the role of passive consumers\(^3\). But does the model of the 'public sphere' apply today? According to Habermas, the principle is still valuable:

"Although the liberal model of the public sphere is still instructive today with respect to the normative claim that information be accessible to the public, it cannot be applied to the actual conditions of an industrially advanced mass democracy organized in the form of the social welfare state"\(^36\)

The usefulness of the concept of the 'public sphere' - its history notwithstanding - is that it provides an idea of a communications system as a public cultural space that is open, diverse and accessible.

An aspect of particular relevance for this dissertation is the question of control: how the control over broadcasting policies and eventually over the output, i.e. programme content, is exerted, and by whom. When discussing the subject of control of the communications industries, it is according to Murdoch important to distinguish between allocative control, which is the power to define the overall goals and scope of the corporation and how the productive resources are to be used; and operational control, which is decisions concerning the actual implementation of already decided policies and the effective use of the allocated resources. The central questions concerning control, subsequently become: Where is allocative control over large communications corporations concentrated, whose interests does it serve, and

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\(^36\) J. Habermas (1979), p. 200.
how does it shape the range and content of day-to-day production? At every level of the production process there is consequently a complex interplay between intentional action and structural constraints.

One of the factors playing a role in the question of control is the issue of professionalism within broadcasting personnel. According to Michael Gurevitch and Philip Elliott the concept of professionalism works on two levels. It is both a claim to status and autonomy and also a source of guidance for occupational performance:

"These two senses of professionalism are bound together in the concept of professional ideology, which is at the same time outward and inward looking - a mechanism through which the profession defines and defends its position in relation to others outside, and a mechanism through which it makes sense of ongoing tasks and problems in the work situation."38

The professional ideology consequently acts as a group unifier, as well as providing guidelines for actual work practice. Gurevitch and Elliott see the role of broadcasters predominantly as 'cultural entrepreneurs': "Their main task is to initiate cultural production, to 'translate' or popularize its products in order to facilitate their distribution to a large heterogenous audience."39 The communicators' power to do this depends on their professional control of the means of mass communications, but this control is again influenced by restraints and control exerted by various social and political groups outside the broadcasting organisations. The struggle for professional autonomy can consequently be seen both as an indication of the importance of retaining the control over their professional tools ie. the mass media, and as a protection of the exclusiveness of the profession.

In a study of the BBC from the early sixties to 1973, Tom Burns identified what seemed to be a transformation among the BBC staff towards increased professionalism. In interviews with the staff Burns observed:

"the transition of broadcasting from an occupation dominated by the ethos of public service, in which the central concern is with quality in terms of the public good, and of public betterment, to one dominated by the ethos of professionalism, in which the

39 op. cit. p. 509.
central concern is with quality of performance in terms of standards of appraisal by fellow professionals. Burns saw this as a shift from treating broadcasting as a means to treating broadcasting as an end. Professionalism became not only a guide for occupational performance, but a kind of 'moral order':

"..the word 'professionalism' is very frequently used in contexts which imply the invocation of some kind of moral order in which professional judgments, decisions and actions are grounded. The moral order endows them with a legitimacy and authority which are regarded as distinguishable from and at times superior to contractual obligations, loyalty to the organisation, or compliance with public or other 'outside' demands or claims."

In chapter 8 we shall return to the issue of professionalism a Welsh broadcasting context.

The current day broadcasting climate seems however to some extent to counteract the professionalisation tendencies identified by Burns, as the role of the professional programme maker is influenced by long term economic trends. The need among most broadcasting organizations to economize, either because of a stagnating licence revenue, or a fall in advertising revenue for commercial broadcasters, has brought about increasing use of short-term contracts, thus enforcing a casualisation of the workforce, a development which threatens the professional ideology by fostering individualism and career insecurity. Similarly the economic needs for cooperative productions and international programme marketing, increase the range of criteria that needs to be met before the start of a production, pertaining to both economy and form. These constraints subsequently reduce the role of the professional programme maker, as the allocative or external control with the product has been strengthened, to the detriment of the operational or internal control.

The concern of the critical political economy approach is in the context of co-production to explain how the economics dynamics of production structure public discourse by promoting certain cultural forms over others. The increasing reliance on international co-production agreements in television drama production impose a


41 op. cit. p. 126.
variety of constraints on form, as the partners search for subject matter and narrative styles that they can sell in their home markets. The resulting bargain may produce an americanized product which is fast moving, based on simple characterisations, works within a tried and tested action format and offers an unambiguous ending. Or it may result in a variant of 'televisual tourism' which trades on the familiar forms and sights of the national cultural heritage. What is important is that both strategies represent a narrowing of the field of discourse and inhibit a full engagement with the complexities and ambiguities of the national condition:

"The first affects closure around dominant transatlantic forms of story-telling with their clearly marked boundaries and hierarchies of discourse. The second reproduces an ideology of 'Englishness' which excludes or marginalizes a whole range of subordinate discourses."  

We shall return to this issue in chapter 8, where for 'Englishness' in the above statement read 'Welshness'. International co-production is an issue which, as we shall see, is of particular relevance to the smaller European broadcasters, as an important part of their corporate economic strategy is geared towards co-production with other countries.

The issues and questions raised above will be useful to bear in mind both when we look at national broadcasters in France and Britain and, even more, when dealing with cases of broadcasting within a 'nation without a state'. In the latter case the interplay between different societal groups within the minority culture becomes of paramount importance.

2.4. Territorial Minorities and Mass Media.

This section attempts to apply to the field of mass communication in relation to linguistic minorities some theoretical approaches that deal with territorial politics.

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43 ibid.
2.4.1. Diffusionist Theories.

The "diffusionist" theories state that societies and states consist of centres that assimilate the surrounding peripheries by diffusing the values of the governing elites, in order to form a common social, economic and political system. According to this theory, the integration of the geographic peripheries is brought about by a change of values resulting from economic development, such as industrial capitalism and urbanisation. Education and modern communication play an important role in this process by breaking down peripheral languages and cultural patterns.

From the point of view of the periphery or the minority language groups, this argument is highly denigrating as it implies that the peripheral groups are incapable of independent development and need to be 'saved' by improved modernisation.

According to Deutsch, sovereign governments cope with their regions by slowly welding them "into larger units by deep changes in the underlying structure of social organisation". Deutsch sees the processes of communication as the basis of the coherence of societies and cultures, and proposes a functional definition of nationality:

"Membership in a people essentially consists in wide complementarity of social communication. It consists of the ability to communicate more effectively, and over a wider range of subjects, with members of one large group than with outsiders."

Establishment of media structures is accordingly regarded as an important part of the nation-building process. A state that adopts a conscious policy of assimilation, will consequently make it difficult for its minorities to obtain recognition of their cultural distinctiveness, not to speak of granting them access to the mass media. The functional definition of nationality described above is interesting in as much as it stresses the crucial importance of communication, but as a definition of nationality it is too vague. There are not necessarily any limits to the size of the groups involved.

45 op. cit. p. 87.
46 op. cit. p. 97.
The diffusionist approach is however not unproblematical. It is largely deterministic and uni-directional, in the sense that political development is seen as an irreversible process towards ever higher levels of social organisation. As Williams points out, the evolutionism of Deutsch's argument,

"advocates the erosion of traits such as language, which are associated with the 'traditional past', through the external imposition of 'new' forms which will facilitate social mobilisation in the interest of modernisation and development."  

This evolutionism involve the dichotomisation of the social world into civilised/barbarian or modern/traditional, a dichotomy which pervades much social science literature.

"Inevitably, anything other than the civilised/modern end of the continuum will be denigrated and subject to both benevolence and rejection. Once language is associated with this model, ... we are faced with the perennial struggle of minority language speakers to justify and legitimise their mother tongue"  

A good example of the association of language with civilisation and progress, and the consequences of this coupling, is the case of France (see chapter 3).

However, given the existence of minority language mass media such as television or radio, we can turn Deutsch's argument to cover the function of minority media. Instead of diffusing the values of the majority, it can be argued that minority language media in theory could spread the values and the language of the minority - if they are different - thereby preventing destruction of the minority culture by the majority culture. This theory however raises questions concerning whose values are supposed to be diffused by the minority media; who it is that ultimately will operate the minority media; and where the actual control lies, either in the form of ownership of a commercial, privately owned channel or as political control of a public service broadcaster.

47 G. Williams (1992), p. 103.

48 op. cit. p. 105.
2.4.2. Relative Deprivation.

The main assumption of the diffusionist approach is that integration will necessarily be a result of contact and of suppression. The opposite is predicted by another set of theories, which appeared during the 1960's as attempts to explain the upsurge of regional ethnic movements in Western Europe. These theories involve the concepts of 'uneven development' and 'relative deprivation', and maintain that groups in the periphery both are, and also perceive themselves to be economically, politically or culturally deprived in relation to groups in the centre. Increased contact between centre and periphery then, does not further integration, but instead increases conflict by facilitating comparisons. The role of the mass media is here seen, not as integrative, but rather as strengthening regional identities by exposing the differences between the minority and the majority.

According to Hechter, who transfers the concept of 'internal colonialism' from studies of Latin America to the Celtic fringe in the United Kingdom, uneven development over territorial space creates relatively economically advanced and less advanced groups. The state power in the centre tries to subordinate the periphery to their needs "through policies aiming at the institutionalisation and perpetuation of the existing stratification system."49 This system of stratification is then seen as a 'cultural division of labour', where the inhabitants of the peripheries are given subordinate economic, political and social roles. This division will at some point lead to a reaction in the periphery, and to ethnic mobilisation.

Hechter's theory of internal colonialism has the merit of bringing together the themes of economic development and cultural distinctiveness, and has been very influential among social scientists. The theory has however been criticised on a number of points. Firstly it assumes that the peripheral groups are homogenous, that class differences within the peripheries are unimportant compared to collective group inequalities, so that ethnic identity and social class coincide. "If the major axis of exploitation is territorial and the major villain is external, does the local bourgeoisie

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thus become part of the 'territorial proletariat'? As Day points out with respect to Wales, the danger of using Hechter's theory uncritically is that:

"Cultural factors are given pride of place, and Wales is treated as an unproblematical, homogenous reality, the problems of which are reducible to the imposition of external power. Questions about the distribution and use of power within Welsh society are shelved, along with examination of its internal structure in favour of a crude opposition between 'Anglo-Saxons' and 'Celts'."  

Secondly Hechter has himself modified his theory in relation to Scotland, which can not be regarded as an underdeveloped colony, enjoying as it does a large degree of self-government, and an economic development equal and lately superior to the rest of Britain.

2.4.3. The Structural Theory of Imperialism.

The question of the homogeneity of periphery groups, can be related to Johan Galtung's "Structural theory of imperialism". This theory has its origins in the context of Development Studies, but as Galtung sees 'imperialism' as a general structural relationship between two collectivities, it can be used as an analogy and transferred to the present context. According to this theory, both the centre and the periphery have their own respective centres and peripheries. The centre in the Centre 'nation' establishes a bridgehead in the Periphery 'nation', in the form of the elites in the Periphery's centre. The elites in the Periphery act for the elites in the Centre and propagate their interests to the benefit of both parties. The ultimate losers will according to Galtung be the people of the Peripheral periphery. This collaboration between the centres and subsequent exploitation of the periphery can take different shapes. Galtung distinguishes between five types of 'imperialism': economic, political, military, communication and cultural.

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Applied to the present problem of minority language broadcasting, Galtung’s approach can contribute to problematize the role of broadcasters. Are the broadcasters in Wales and Brittany merely acting for the broadcasting elites in London or Paris, conveying the interest of the Centre via so called 'Welsh' or 'Breton' broadcasting? Where do their interests actually lie? Here we need to look at broadcasters as a profession as well as at the content of the programming. Is it just 'English' or 'French' broadcasting in Welsh or Breton, or does it properly address the diversities within the peripheral cultures.

2.4.4. Centre - Periphery Relations and State Formations.

In a somewhat similar vein Rokkan and Urwin write about centre-periphery relations in European state formations. Contrary to those, such as the relative deprivation theories, which see centre-periphery relationships as purely economic, Rokkan and Urwin maintain that the transactions between centre and periphery take place within several dimensions. These dimensions comprise economic life, political decision-making and cultural standardization. The latter dimension includes transfers of messages, norms, life styles, ideologies, myths and ritual systems. Rokkan and Urwin see these dimensions as independent, although each is influenced by the others, and no one dimension is seen as determinant. Territorial politics will then be decided by an interplay of all three dimensions. Rokkan and Urwin attribute the following characteristics to the concept of peripherality: distance, difference and dependence. A periphery is dependent "with little control over its fate and possessing minimal resources for the defence of its distinctiveness against outside pressures". It often has a poorly developed economy, and a culture that is marginal in relation to the culture of the centre, because in Rokkan’s and Urwin’s terms: "without unified and distinctive institutions of its own, its culture will be fragmented and parochial."


54. ibid.
It is interesting to note the terms Rokkan and Urwin use, when they describe peripheral cultures: In using the expression parochial (above) as well as describing language as a stigma of distinctiveness (section 2.6. below) both inherently negative expressions, Rokkan and Urwin appear to be speaking from the point of view of the centre.

The presence of cultural institutions such as for example media organisations in a periphery is, according to Rokkan and Urwin, seen as necessary to avoid the marginalisation of the culture. The population within a periphery are part of a wider system, yet are marginal to it. "They possess some sense of separate identity, but this is constantly threatened by central agencies. Their awareness of spatial distinctiveness is counteracted by the lack or weakness of established procedures for the defence and control of the boundaries separating them from the outside world"\textsuperscript{55}. Rokkan and Urwin continue: "The degree to which the political, economic and cultural boundaries of a periphery can be penetrated has important consequences for the internal structuring of the peripheral population".

In contrast to theorists such as Hechter, Rokkan and Urwin regard the peripheries as consisting of different groups which do not necessarily have corresponding interests. They distinguish between horizontal peripherality, namely peripherality in geographic terms, and vertical peripherality, where groups of actors can be compared within and across both centre and periphery. Rokkan and Urwin stress the interaction between these two dimensions of peripherality. In order to examine particular cases, it is consequently necessary to consider both differences within the population in a given area, and the territorial ties of elites and decision-makers. Using the recent debates in France over decentralization and regionalization as an example, Rokkan and Urwin outline the role of different groupings within the periphery, and their role in opening or strengthening boundaries\textsuperscript{56}. The groups consists of the peripheral 'notables', who did not oppose the opening up of economic boundaries as long as they could maintain some control of the periphery's cultural and political transactions with the centre; the 'fonctionaires', who advocate

\textsuperscript{55} op. cit. p. 4.

\textsuperscript{56} Rokkan & Urwin (1983), pp. 5-6.
increasing centre-periphery integration through the spread of public and private bureaucracies, their interest situated in the job opportunities inherent therein; and a third group consisting of typically teachers, journalists and publicists, which advocated an increasing closure of boundaries, wishing to maximize the distinctiveness of the periphery, and profit from it, having invested much time and energy in acquiring command of the artefacts and symbols of the periphery's cultural heritage, in particular the language.

2.4.5. Decentralization, Broadcasting and 'Possibility Spaces'.

Another way of looking at the interplay between mass media and centre-periphery relations is expressed in an article by Hagerstrand on "Decentralization and radio broadcasting". He distinguishes between two principles of social integration: Territorial, where nearness is the important factor. Thinking, loyalty and acting therefore become highly placebound. Conflicts arise across geographical boundaries between neighbouring groups. Functional integration occurs, where similarity is important, and thinking, loyalty and action unite what is similar in function over wide geographical areas. In this case the critical boundaries emerge between interest groups.57

Hagerstrand argues that there is a strong need for people to relate to each other in a territorial way, i.e. associate with one's neighbours and not only with, for example, work colleagues. He argues that the transformation of society into a "system society" counteracts territorial association, and he underlines "the importance of also giving adequate room to a traditional kind of territorial integration in a society which is predominantly organised along functional lines"58. But this kind of transformation will mean a restructuring of social communication in its broadest sense, as it is the growth in a society's communication abilities, that has brought about the change from a territorial integration to a functional. The


58. op. cit. p. 11.
question to ask in the context of mass media according, to Hagerstrand, is: "whether broadcasting by its very nature has to continue to be a centralizing force, or if it also possesses the capability of participating in a countermovement". Broadcasting, both radio and TV, are contemporary with the "system society", and qua being time consuming, have reduced face to face interaction and activities related to the neighbourhood. According to Hagerstrand, this reduction in interaction affects the construction of social identity: the locality and region where people live is more than a social space, at least subconsciously. What is needed is "an amplification of the internal flows of communication in regions and localities in order to enhance cross-sectoral and environmental understanding, mutual aid and cooperation, and establish platforms for public debate and distinctive cultural expression".

At this point Hagerstrand introduces the term 'possibility space', which is that domain within society in which a certain technology has the capacity of being applied. Telemedia has a tendency to promote hierarchical and centre directed links, resulting in the withdrawal of people from face-to-face communication, and both TV and radio tend to emphasize the national and international levels at the cost of local and regional content (cf. chapter 5, concerning the news coverage of Plaid Cymru). But this does not necessarily have to be so, the 'possibility space' of broadcasting is such that regional broadcasting could, in theory at least, contribute to territorial integration, and in increased consciousness of place. But at present, as Hagerstrand admits, the structure of most broadcasting systems are not particularly well suited to assist in a movement of decentralization and territorial integration, and it is precisely in this context that the actual establishment of a separately administered Welsh-language channel becomes relevant.

The question to ask is whether it will be possible to use the mass media and the new information technologies in a - for Wales or Brittany - 'national' manner. Instead of merely linking the centre with the periphery, can the internal integration of the periphery be furthered by a proper 'national' service. As for a minority

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59. op. cit. p. 13.

60. op. cit. p. 18.
language media service, it will only be possible to further the territorial integration of the periphery, if its content is deemed relevant to the population in the said periphery, a situation which does not necessarily follow from simply broadcasting in the minority language. The service has to mirror the whole spectrum of cultural specificities of the Welsh or Breton people, and not just the language.

An interesting issue is the attitudes and priorities of the different peripheral groupings towards minority language media. If there are sizeable groups within the periphery who are linked to the centre culture, this could bring about clashes surrounding the determination of priorities and allocation of resources.

2.4.6. Small States and Audiovisual Policy in Europe.

One must not assume, however, that all problems are automatically solved just by the territorial or linguistic minorities, like the Breton or the Welsh, controlling policies within their own boundaries. When territory is taken as the starting point, parallels can be drawn between media policies in Wales or Brittany and those of small countries in Europe in general. Disregarding the fact that Wales and Brittany are not independent states, and subsequently have even less freedom to conduct a media policy that is relevant for their respective areas than actual states, smallness is here seen as the common denominator. Restraints encountered by small European states in their media policies are echoed in the attempts of territorial minorities to conduct broadcasting policies of their own when possible, as for example the case of S4C in Wales. In the present section the particular problems facing small states in Europe in the audiovisual area are described.

The background is the development of European audiovisual policy in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. In 1989, the EC Directive 'Television without Frontiers' was agreed on as binding for member states from October 1991. The general aim was to permit the free circulation of television programmes across borders. Prior to this and other similar regulative measures, there had been a significant and gradual change in the broadcasting landscape, where emphasis on the economic dimensions of broadcasting imperceptively superseded the conventional
public service approach, that viewed broadcasting as a vehicle of culture, national identity, education and information.61

This integration and rationalization of the audiovisual sector, combined with an erosion of the cultural dimension upon which the European public service tradition has been based, has according to Burgelman and Pauwels, led to particular problems for the smaller European states. These countries are, in EC Community language, defined as having "a limited audiovisual production capacity and/or a limited linguistic range and geographical area".62 As well as internal structural weaknesses and inadequate national policies, small countries face external problems, such as the globalization of the audiovisual economy and the integrative action of the Community, which promotes a marginalisation of both production and culture in smaller countries. Following Burgelman and Pauwels' analysis, the industrialization of the European audiovisual sector has brought about interdependent but contradictory tendencies.

Firstly, on the programme side, the growing diversification in distribution possibilities - the increase in number of television channels, satellites etc. - is accompanied by a simplification and standardization in programme type and content. Secondly there is a contradiction between the processes of transnational integration at the economic level, with the accompanying tendency to supersede the national as the proper level of political decision-making, on the one side, and the 'nationalist' and often regionalist aspirations of countries on the other.63 For the small states the problem is, that it is, in a supranational structure, difficult to affirm cultural specificity and protect a small audiovisual industry. Their national audiovisual market is limited, and the financial means available for national production are low, which presents an obstacle to the profitability and survival of their audiovisual industries. On the internal political front, the difficulty in affirming the cultural identity of a small state will be reinforced by a national policy which weakens public service broadcasting and increasingly supports commercial television

63 op. cit. p. 172.
initiatives. The closeness of larger European countries with a wide language reach is an additional obstacle to the development of a competitive audiovisual industry for small states. A supplementary budget is needed for dubbing or subtitling. It is furthermore difficult to get attention from international television buyers who are usually orientated towards the larger countries, and costs of promotion and distribution are consequently of relatively greater importance for small countries.

In the European Community there exists an expressed audiovisual policy towards small states and cultural minorities. However Burgelmans and Pauwels find that there is marked difference between discourse and political results:

"The discourse enthusiastically applauds the manifold variations on the theme of difference, pluralism, identity and cultural specificity whereas its realization endorses the elimination or homogenization of difference by an economically restrictive audiovisual policy."

There is one European initiative, though, that is actively aiming to counteract the structural problems of small countries, and that is the MEDIA programme, with its aim of supporting the emergence of an audiovisual industry in Europe. In several of its projects MEDIA recommends 'positive discrimination' on behalf of small European states or disadvantaged regions. This is, in particular, the case for BABEL (subtitling), EFDO (film distribution), the European Script Fund, EAVE (training of professionals) and from 1991 the programme SCALE (cross border co-operation between small countries). For linguistic minorities like the Welsh or the Breton the MEDIA project constitutes a source of funding, which could be taken advantage of. The diversity of funding could help to make the audiovisual industries in the 'regions' of Europe more independent from the states of which they are a part. But like so many other initiatives of this kind, the future funding for the MEDIA programme is uncertain. The programme runs for five years until 1995 with a total budget of 200 million ECU, or 40 million ECU a year (approximately £30 million), which is not a lot compared with the money spent by American media interests in Europe. For example, in 1990, the Hollywood majors spent £40 million in the UK.

\[64\] op. cit. p. 176.
alone, on advertising cinema and video release. The Welsh use of the MEDIA programme will be further described in chapter 7.

The above section indicates that political independence is not enough to secure the culture of smaller countries. There are other constraints, as small European states have a range of problems in the audiovisual field related to their limited size and subsequent marginality both linguistically and economically. The problems are reinforced by the policies of the EC, concerning audiovisual industries, albeit that an attempt is being made to redress this imbalance by a range of initiatives involving small countries and languages.

To advance a step further to discuss the democratic role of the media in an international context, it is not only the smaller countries which face a challenge in the form of the globalization of the media industries. Based on the concept of the public sphere, media structures are seen as central to the democratic polity. According to Garnham the current process by which national media control is being eroded is part of that process by which power is being transferred in the economy to the international level without the parallel development of adequate political or communication structures. This is already apparent from the problem facing European governments in the face of satellite broadcasting of trying to match their different systems of advertising control. Garnham warns that it is necessary to develop a working international public sphere:

"Not only do we face the challenge of sustaining and developing the public sphere on a national level. Such a development will simply be bypassed if we do not at the same time and perhaps with greater urgency begin to develop a public sphere where at present one hardly exists at the international level. It is here that current threats to UNESCO and the ITU, ... need to be seen for what they are, attempts to destroy what small public sphere actually exists at an international level."

To sum up, section 2.4. shows that the concept of peripherality can be examined from a number of different angles, and becomes increasingly complicated, the more

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65 Davis (1992), p. 11.

66 Garnham (1990), p. 113.

67 op. cit. p. 114.
factors one chooses to introduce. Starting from the point of view of the centre, looking at the periphery as a whole, one can regard mass media as either a positive, integrative factor, or as a divisive factor (again from the point of view of the centre). Going 'into' the periphery, one can look at factors other than the purely economic, such as culture and communication, as well as at the different social groupings within the peripheries and their involvement in mass media imperialism. The possibilities of broadcasting on the local community level is subsequently treated. Finally the plight of small states in the audiovisual area in a single market is treated in order to put the concept of peripherality in linguistic and broadcasting terms into a contemporary and international perspective. The section ends on a warning note that the globalization of the media industries potentially constitute a threat to the democratic process of all countries disregarding size.

2.5. Mass Media and Ethnic Groups.

The present section discusses the question of the relationship between the mass media and the ethnic group - or the nation without a state, and the impact the mass media might have on the cultural identities within these groupings.

As stated above, the mass media is but one of the factors active in the process of identity formation (figure 2.2.1.), but with the increased pervasiveness of the electronic media - television in particular, the dominant cultural medium of our time^68 - it must take on a greater importance. The media and other cultural fields can be regarded as 'communicative spaces', in which contests for various forms of dominance take place. They are part of the public domain and therefore objects of public policy-making. The 'mass media' will in this context be defined institutionally: broadcasting, cinema and the press. These institutions of mass communication exist within a broader political and economic framework, which in turn imposes various constraints of financial, structural and institutional kinds. They

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are furthermore influenced by particular organizational structures, the technologies available at the time and professional practices.

When discussing the role of mass media institutions in the formation of cultural identity, it is relatively simple to identify the relationship between the media institutions and the state, for example the BBC versus the British state, and likewise the role of the French media. But it certainly becomes more difficult to assess the relationship between the media and members of a particular ethnic group, or nation without a state.

The notion of cultural identity has been elaborated on above, sufficient here to say that it is a process of collective action, and according to Schlesinger "sustained by a dual process: one of inclusion that provides a boundary around 'us', and one of exclusion that distinguishes 'us' from 'them'." In the case of a nation-state with its monopoly of the legitimate use of physical violence, these processes of exclusion and inclusion are a part of the supposedly sovereign power of the state. But for an ethnic group, linguistic minority, nation without a state etc: the "sovereign powers of enforced exclusion and assimilation are exactly what is lacking". Schlesinger continues (and I will quote at some length):

"Autonomists and separatists alike will as a matter of course look to all means possible to entrench the viability of their cultural and communicative space. The problem for such a nation without a state, or at any rate, for those elements within it who are most active in valorizing its distinctiveness, is how to further the exclusionary-inclusionary dialectic necessary to all collective identities' cultural defence. It is the missing machinery of state, or the merely partial character of existing institutions, that turn the eve to other forms of identity-maintenance. It is for this reason that so much attention has been paid to media and what they might contribute to the making and reshaping of collective identities." (my emphasis).

This statement is of particular relevance to the Welsh case, where the lack of institutions has brought about a culturally based nationalism, centred upon the language - and where the mass media subsequently has emerged as a key area of

\[69\] op. cit. p. 300.

\[70\] op. cit. p. 302.

\[71\] ibid.
Given the relevance of the question for minority groups, how do the media actually affect cultural identities - if at all? This is the main question, which as yet can only be answered tentatively. Some suggestions can be found in an article on Scottish television by Caughie. The starting point is in notions of culture and class developed among others by Raymond Williams. Caughie sees the role of a national culture,

"to provide points of identifications around which individuals or groups could discover or recognise their 'Scottishness', a Scottishness which then can be held together as a special and unique identity in the face of the pressures towards nationless and classless homogeneity".72

He points out that views of national culture exist in both progressive and regressive forms: Regressive, in a celebration of a national identity which is static and always already given; and progressive, concerned with positive images of Scotland, "with the establishment by discovery or recovery of a Scottish identity and Scottish traditions which can be mobilized as the basis for political action".73 For Caughie a national culture would be one

"which confronted and opened out the specific contradictions of the historical development of the nation, using contradiction to continually transform a national identity which was never given and will never be completed".74

Relating this to television, it becomes necessary to break up the sense of culture as an unproblematic consensus term. If Scottish (or Welsh or Breton) television is to play any useful part in the development and transformation of national culture and national identity, debates are necessary, in this context, "not only about the politics of national culture but also about the forms and modes of discourse which are appropriate to it".75 The political sophistication of television (or mass media in general) as a basis for political action, depends however "not on its capacity simply
to reflect uncritically the lives of the people, but on its ability to engage productively with their specific contradictions.\textsuperscript{76}

The importance for broadcasters, within any minority context such as a minority language channel, to address the diversities and inherent contradictions in the particular culture is underlined by de Moragas Spa\'e. When writing about Catalonia he questions the possibilities of mass media in sustaining cultural identities: "what he terms 'iconic homogenization' might occur through the circulation of uniform cultural products such as television programmes from Hollywood, even though these might be translated into the local language."\textsuperscript{77}

In discussing minority language television in particular, it becomes apparent that it does not seem to be sufficient that programmes are in the relevant minority language, they must also come to terms with and attempt to represent the different cultural traditions within the minority culture, relating to issues such as intra-group differences i.e. class, geography and language, socio-economic factors such as for example unemployment, the development within social institutions as well as symbols of cultural specificity (cf. figure 2.2.1.).

2.6. Broadcasting and Minority Languages:

This section contains some general remarks on the linguistic impact of minority language media. In the case of linguistic minorities at least, language is regarded as one of the most important factors conditioning the collective identity of the social group. According to Rokkan and Urwin: "While language is only one of several expressions of identity, it is the most pervasive and obvious stigma of distinctiveness."\textsuperscript{78} Disregarding for the time being other factors active in the production and reproduction of collective identity as discussed in section 2.2., what role can a minority language broadcasting service (TV and radio) play within the

\textsuperscript{76} op. cit. p. 119.


\textsuperscript{78} Rokkan & Urwin (1983), p. 68.
language in question? As the following list of possible consequences shows, there are a number of interrelated elements that need to be taken into consideration. The order of the list does not however express any assessment of their relative importance.

a) Reversing (or slowing) the decline of the language.
b) Extension of the domain context of the language.
c) Language prestige and status of the language.
d) Standardisation of the language.
e) Vehicle of economic development.
f) Democratic aspect.

The actual state of the Breton and Welsh languages will be treated in greater depths in chapters 4 and 6 respectively. It is sufficient to say here that one of the most salient arguments for broadcasting services in Welsh, Breton and other minority languages, has been to ensure the survival of the languages in an age of modern communication technology. Factors of importance in determining the future fate of the language are discussed below.

With an extension of the domain context of the language, the language becomes used in other areas than was the case before. In Wales, reproduction of the Welsh language has largely been restricted to the family, community and religious domains. Through pressure from the Welsh language movement, the extension of the domain context of Welsh has involved a shift into the areas of education and the media. The media can consequently serve as role models for communicative competence in areas where the domain context of the language is restricted\textsuperscript{79}, and in this way facilitate further use of the language, in domains such as public administration and law.

The \textit{prestige} of a language depends, according to Williams, on the value of the language for social mobility, in other words of job opportunities provided through that language. It constitutes the objective element, whereas the \textit{status} of a

\textsuperscript{79} G. Williams (1986), p. 299.
language is the subjective element. If official activities are conducted through the medium of the minority language, it will help raise its prestige, as mastering the language will entail added social mobility, which again will greatly enhance its general status and chances of survival. Williams notes that, the status of Welsh appears to alter spatially, depending on the prestige of the language within the locality:

"Thus, while the status of the language at the national level has increased, it would seem that the status at the local level depends upon the prestige of the language within that locality, which is not unrelated to the class configuration of Welsh speakers in each locality."^80

A standard language can be defined as "a codified form of a language accepted by and serving as a model to a larger speech community"^81, as opposed to local dialects and is usually a basis for communication across these. The problem for speakers of minority languages, was that "the prestigious forms were the standards of the dominant language which meant that the codified form of the minority language did not become a standard in the sense of being a prestige form"^82. The linguistic situation in Wales is apart from being bilingual also diglossic, which means that "two or more varieties of the same language are used by some speakers under different conditions"^83. There are two different forms of Welsh, a High - formal and written, and a Low form - used in everyday informal conversations. Furthermore there are regional differences between the northern dialect and the southern. In Brittany there are also strong dialectical differences, and several orthographies. The concept of diglossia - High and Low versions of the language in question - has however been elaborated to encompass situations in pluralingual societies^84. The dominant language becomes the High form, and the minority

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^82 ibid.


^84 G. Williams (1992), p. 98.
language becomes the Low form. The diglossic terms describe an occurrence which actually is bilingualism, but the concept is however useful to illustrate the complications inherent in such linguistic situations. It is not only a question of how large a percentage of a population speak the minority language, but also in which context the language is used. The interrelation between diglossia and bilingualism in the Welsh context coupled with until recently a lack of institutional support for Welsh, has led to many Welsh speakers substituting English for Welsh in domains where the High variety might be expected. The use of the dominant language as a High form and the minority language as Low, entails that usage of the two languages are divided into formal and informal domains. Consequently the type of vocabulary which is reproduced vary between the languages depending on the domain context.

In complicated linguistic situations like these, language standardisation is often regarded as imperative for the survival of the minority language, especially if the language is to be used as a vehicle for higher education and modern techno-economic communication. One of the most important influences comes from broadcasting, but it becomes clear that language standardisation is not an automatic process, it is to a large extent a matter of choice, and often a source of contestation.

The changing nature of the labour market has also had repercussions for Welsh language production and reproduction. According to Williams the labour market for the higher classes has expanded and in some instances taken on an international dimension. Upwards mobility has consequently changed its nature from burgther mobility, which linked local and occupational involvement, towards spiralism, which entails geographical mobility as well as social. The tendency towards spiralism generated a reaction on the part of the local bourgeoisie and petit-bourgeoisie, who attempted to close parts of the labour market by emphasising that certain occupations required a Welsh language qualification. A similar mechanism is the way professionalisation generates closure. As most of the private sector was externally owned and controlled however, the impact was limited to the public sector\textsuperscript{85}.

\textsuperscript{85} G. Williams (1986), p. 188.
As groups within society, already in possession of the 'right' attributes of culture, advocate for the standardization of these, the mass media are looked upon as arenas of contestation between different factions within society. The exclusionary-inclusionary dialectic, described in section 2.5., becomes subsequently active on the intra-group (within the minority language) level as well as between the speakers of the minority language and non-speakers. The domains of media - as well as education - are central to social reproduction and, according to Williams, as a consequence we begin to see the emergence of class varieties of Welsh - a feature which hitherto was absent. This in turn leads to a struggle within language over language purity, a struggle which has clear class dimensions.\(^86\)

The economic aspect of minority language mass media can be quite important for the geographical areas concerned. In economically marginalised areas job creation within the minority language is important, both within the media industry as well and in related occupations that benefit from a spin-off from the media industry. The export potential of television material is also of economic interest, but it is important, in this context, that job creation takes place within the private commercial sector, where jobs in the minority language have been scarce.

Finally, there is the democratic aspect of minority language media. Media are ideally speaking: ".. an essential part of democracy in whatever language they operate". They provide a forum where experiences and problems are shared and discussed and so contribute towards a public sphere. The existence of media structures as a focus for political debate and information is important to the political process within the community. According to Ned Thomas:

"In those areas of the EC where literacy in the lesser used language is poor because of past discrimination in the education system, radio and television in their own language can have the special function of admitting to the spoken democratic debate people who are neither very fluent in the state language nor very literate in their own"\(^88\)

The various areas within which minority language mass media can play a role with

\(^86\) op.cit p. 189.


\(^88\) ibid.
regards to the language, were, as shown above, halting language decline, extending
the domains in which the language is used, enhancing the prestige and status of the
language and perhaps contribute to a language standard. Finally, a minority language
media industry brings jobs to the area within the language, and the existence of the
media facilities contributes ideally speaking to the democratic process, as it
facilitates debate in the language in question.

2.7. Summary of Chapter 2.

The above theoretical sections treat different levels of centre-periphery
relationships and formation of cultural identities. The present section provides a
summary of chapter 2 and links the concepts introduced into a framework, which
will be related to the subject of
this thesis.

Section 2.1. introduced the concept of ethnicity, a concept which, during the
past twenty years, has risen to prominence within the social sciences, coinciding
with the mobilization of ethnic minorities. An ethnic group was defined as a social
system, with an independent and distinct culture within a larger society. The
concepts of state, nation, nationality and minorities, both territorial and linguistic,
were defined.

Section 2.2. presented the elements involved in a definition of cultural or
national identity, which is seen as a form of collective identity. In the 'model' of
cultural identity, we are talking about processes of both exclusion and inclusion, and
the critical factor for defining the group becomes the social boundary which defines
the group in relation to other groups. Collective identity is based on the selective
processes of memory, so that a given group recognizes itself through its collective
memory of a common past. This is a dynamic view of identity, based on a social
and ethnic group's ability to continually recompose and redefine their boundaries
over time.

Section 2.3. presented background information concerning the concepts
involved in communication research with particular emphasis on the 'critical
political economy’ approach. The main traditions within British communication research were the pluralist and the neo-marxist. The mass media were regarded not so much as an outlet for ruling-class ideas, as in the traditional marxist understanding, but as a site of contest between competing social forces. The main split between the pluralist and the neo-marxist interpretations seems to be whether these competing social groups in theory are all equal, or whether they have unequal resources and subsequent unequal access to the mass media. The Critical Political Economy approach to the study of mass communication seizes on the duality in the conception of the mass media as on the one hand 'cultural industries' which are manufacturers of cultural goods and commodities, and on the other hand as playing a pivotal role in organizing the images and discourses through which people make sense of the world. The field of interest is how different ways of financing and organizing cultural production have traceable consequences for the range of discourses and representations in the public domain and for audiences access to them. In the case of the cultural industries, the concern is to trace the impact of economics dynamics on the range and diversity of public cultural expression and its availability to different social groups. One of the key questions is where the control over the mass media is placed, both the external or allocative control, and the internal or operational control. Inherent in this matter is the question of what role the professionals within the media organisations play - or have the opportunity to play - and in general, that of the elites. Transferred to the field of minorities, the issues to look at are the interplay between the elites within the minority, and included in these are people involved in broadcasting, as well as the relationship between the centre and periphery elites within broadcasting.

Section 2.4. applied some theoretical approaches that deal with territorial politics to the field of mass communication in relation to linguistic minorities. The emphasis of the whole section was on territory, and section 2.4.1. described the diffusionist theories, which stated that contact between the centre and the periphery led to the periphery being integrated by exposure to the values and beliefs of the centre. The mass media played an important part in diffusing the values and, where relevant, also the language of the centre. Section 2.4.2. dealt with the concept of relative deprivation. Within this set of theories, contact between centre and periphery
brought along conflict, as the population of the periphery became aware of the centre’s attempts to subordinate and exploit the periphery, and the subsequent relative deprivation. By exposing the differences between centre and periphery, the mass media were conductive to a strengthening of regional identities and an increase in conflicts between centre and periphery. Section 2.4.3. treated the "Structural theory of imperialism". In this section we go into the periphery and look at the interplay between groups. According to this theory the elites in the periphery act for the elites in the centre and ultimately propagate their interests. Section 2.4.4. which dealt with centre - periphery relations in European state formations, looked at centre-periphery relations within several dimensions, not just the economic, but also cultural and political. The concept of peripherality is treated in two different ways, horizontal i.e. geographical, and vertical, i.e. functional. These two ways of being peripheral are echoed in section 2.4.5., which was about decentralization, broadcasting and 'possibility spaces'. The distinction here is between two principles of social integration: territorial, and functional. In the section it is argued that people have a need to relate to each other in a territorial way, i.e. interacting with ones neighbours. The 'possibility space' of broadcasting means that regional broadcasting could, in theory, contribute to territorial integration and an increase in the consciousness of place. The last section, 2.4.6., addressed the issue of small states and audiovisual policy in Europe. The section is an illustration of the difficulties facing not just 'nations without a state', but also established state formations, concerning leading an independent audiovisual policy in an increasingly integrated Europe. The argument is that the audiovisual policy led by the European Community is detrimental to the smaller countries of Europe, and, following from this, possibly even more so for the regions. The appearance of a albeit limited programme to encourage the audiovisual industries in small countries (MEDIA), is however a step on the way to a development of 'national' audiovisual industries in countries or regions, which in this context can be regarded as peripheral.

Section 2.5. treated the issue of the mass media and ethnic groups. The media and other cultural fields can be regarded as 'communicative spaces', where contests for various forms of dominance take place. They are part of the public domain and therefore objects of public policy making. In a nation without a state there is not the
machinery nor the institutions to advance the 'exclusionary - inclusionary' dialectic, which is necessary to further the cultural defense of the collective identity. Therefore other forms of identity production and reproduction are concentrated upon, for example the media, which subsequently become an area of conflict between the centre and the periphery, as well as within the periphery itself. However, in order to fulfil the role of producing and reproducing cultural identity (or identities) it is important that the media reflect the contradictions within the minority culture.

In section 2.6. the linguistic aspect of minority language media was stressed. The section discussed the various potential effects broadcasting in a minority language might have on the language in question. Those areas, within which minority language mass media can play a role with regards to the language, were: Halting language decline, extending the domain contexts in which the language is used, enhancing the prestige and status of the language, perhaps contributing to a language standard or alternatively presenting the different dialects within the minority language to speakers of other dialects. Finally a minority language media industry brings jobs to the area within the language, and the existence of the media facilities contributes, ideally speaking, to the democratic process, as it facilitates debate in the language in question.

2.8. Application of Theory.

In general there are, inherent in the questions of the role of minority language media, different factors to be taken into consideration. Territorial impact: within a given geographically defined territory, one has to consider issues such as nearness and locality. Linguistic impact: within a given minority language one has to consider issues such as furthering the language but also the relationship between speakers of the language and non-speakers within the geographical area.

What role do the mass media play? If the media are regarded as disseminators of ideologies, who's interests are served - those of a ruling class or a changing coalition of interests? And who controls the output the owners, or the professionals?
Within the minority, what is the role of particular groups, elites or professions in the political game of allocating resources towards minority language - or local media initiatives? And what is the role of elites or professions in determining the actual programme content, which is important for the representation of different cultural traditions within the minority culture, including a catering for, and a representation of, those who do not speak the language but still consider themselves as, for example, Welsh or Breton.

The analysis of the thesis takes place on two different levels. The first part of the thesis is an analysis and comparison on the state level of French and British media policy in general, and with regards to their linguistic minorities in particular. The theoretical elements relevant here are mainly those of section 2.1., which deals with the concepts of ethnicity, states and nations; section 2.3., treating mass communications research in general; and section 2.4., which addresses various aspects of centre-periphery relationships, with an emphasis on mass communication within these. The concepts of section 2.5. discussing the relationship between the ethnic groups and the mass media, and, to a lesser extent, those of section 2.6. dealing with the linguistic impact of minority language mass media, will be of relevance when comparing the fight for a Breton or Welsh language television service in the two areas. Having attempted to explain the background and differences in the French and British media policy with regards to linguistic minorities, the first part of the thesis ends with a comparison of the present state of the Breton and Welsh language broadcasting services.

The second part of the thesis is a closer look at the Welsh language television service, S4C. There exists in Wales compared to other linguistic minorities in Europe - apart from Catalonia - very generous provisions for minority language media. The Catalan case is however not directly comparable to the case of Wales, due to the size of the Catalan language and the general wealth of Catalonia. There have been Welsh language television programmes since the early sixties, but in 1982 Welsh language broadcasting was extended and institutionalised into one single Welsh administered institution, S4C, now broadcasting some 30 hours weekly.

The question the second part of the thesis discusses, is which implications S4C - the Welsh language channel - and the comparatively large amount of Welsh
language broadcasting has had on the broadcasting environment in Wales and the Welsh language. The central theoretical sections here are section 2.2., which includes a model of the formation of cultural identity, section 2.3. about mass communication research, and section 2.6. where minority language media are treated from the point of view of language. Those parts of section 2.4. where mass media and the local level are treated are also important in this context, as well as are the theories concerning different groupings and elites within both periphery and mass media.
Chapter 3. France.

Introducing part one of the thesis, comparing France and Britain with regards to the provision of minority language broadcasting, chapter 3 analyses the policy of the French state towards its peripheries, French linguistic policy and the mass media in France.

3.1. The French State and the Peripheries.

Traditionally France is regarded as the epitome of the modern unitary state. A unitary state is in Rokkan and Urwin’s terms:

"built up around one unambiguous centre enjoying economic dominance and pursuing an undeviating policy of administrative standardization: all areas are treated alike and all institutions are directly under the control of the centre".1

Historically France, however, is a collection of culturally different regions, the result of a dynastic creation of the Middle ages, after the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire, and the death of Charlemagne in 814. France underwent, in a way similar to other Western European countries at that time, what Guillorel terms a 'process of centre autonomy', which involved two movements: Firstly France became increasingly autonomous in relation to other centres, be it other countries or supra-territorial centres like the Papacy in Rome. Secondly the process involved the formation and subsequent control and mobilization of a periphery.2

The Capetian monarchy established in Paris in 987 only covered a small territory around the Ile de France, and it was not until the thirteenth century that Occitania in the South (about 40% of present-day France) came under the control of the French monarchy. Brittany was annexed with France in 1536 by dynastic marriage.3 There were major language differences within the territory of France,

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notably between the "langue d'oil" of the north, ie. modern French, and the "langue d'oc" of Occitania in the south, as well as Breton, Catalan and Flemish.

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the monarchy made sporadic attempts to unify and integrate the country through policies of cultural standardization, ignoring previously existing peripheral privileges. The territorial nobility were subdued and brought to Paris where they kept their privileges but not their power. The powers of the absolute monarchy were extended in all directions, but "It was left to the revolution, though, to create a French nation and with it a nation-state."4

The French Revolution in 1789, not only unified but also reinforced the state "by destroying intermediate forms of authority more effectively than the monarchy had been able to do and by investing sovereignty in the people"5 The Jacobin myth of the 'one and indivisible republic', was according to Loughlin an ideological tool to overcome the fact that France, at the time of the revolution, was in fact many and divided, composed of several societies distinguished by language, culture and ethnic origins.6 The dynamism of centralization inherited by the Jacobins from the time of the monarchy and retained as a response to internal dissension and external threats, has strongly influenced French public administration, especially when it came to demands of the peripheries for recognition of their distinctiveness. As the following comment from a French Gaullist to the National Assembly in 1968 shows, centralization was perceived to be necessary for the survival of the French state:

"Je ferai l'éloge de la centralisation à l'Assemblée nationale. C'est elle qui a permis de faire la France malgré les Francais ou dans l'indifférence des Francais. Ce n'est pas par hasard si sept siècles de monarchie, d'empire et de républiques ont été centralisateurs: c'est que la France n'est pas une construction naturelle. C'est une construction politique voulue pour laquelle le pouvoir central n'a jamais désarmé. Sans centralisation, il ne peut avoir de France."7

4 op. cit. p. 36.
5 op. cit. p. 49.
According to Calvet, the only way for the French revolution to rouse its troops against these internal and external dangers, was to invoke the concept of nation:\(^8\):

"La théorie de la nation pour sa part, fait son apparition de façon définitive avec la révolution de 1789. Et, si elle nous intéresse, c'est parce qu'elle implique elle aussi une certaine idée de la langue."\(^9\)

The idea of unity between language and nation, was readily assumed by the French revolution. In order to be a good republican one had to speak French. Is this linguistic unity however the cause or the prerequisite for a nation? According to Calvet, the contention that language is the manifestation of nation has lent itself to two different political practices. Firstly if people want to found a nation, they would want to impose a common language on future members of this future nation - a policy which became the official French policy in the 19th and 20th centuries. Secondly if a group of people speak a language which is not the one of the capital or the empire, they constitute a different nation - which is partly the present position of movements like ETA in the Basque country and FLQ in Quebec.\(^10\) And Calvet continues:

"Dans le second cas on considère la constitution d'une nation comme un fait de masse, l'unité qu'elle implique se manifestant en particulier (mais pas seulement) dans l'unification linguistique. ... A l'inverse, dans le premier cas, on considère que la nation n'est pas un fait de masse mais un fait administratif. Elle ne se constitue pas au cours de l'histoire, elle est constituée... Et c'est pourquoi il faut imposer une langue pour renforcer une nation."\(^11\)

This latter perception of the relationship between language and nation, is left as an important heritage by the French revolution: firstly, speaking French is patriotic, whereas dialects are agents of division (understanding by 'dialects' of course every language in France which is not French), French is a language of culture and Breton a language of simpletons. Secondly there is the use of the local languages by the catholic clergy, bringing language usage into the battle between laic - the secular

\(^9\) op. cit. p. 163.
\(^10\) op. cit. p. 169.
\(^11\) op. cit. p. 170.
powers - and clergy. Important means in the process of building the French nation, were military service, improved communications and general education. Education was used to propagate republican and secular values - in French - hence centralised state control over the curriculum was considered to be essential. This centralised control of the education system of course influenced the way regional languages were perceived: they were considered to be barbaric and backward, French being the sole language of progress. As Rokkan and Urwin put it:

"There was definitely a phase of cultural colonialism in France, assisted by the unification of the labour market, with the more backward peripheries treated not very differently from the overseas colonies acquired during the nineteenth century." 13

This nation-building process in France has proved however not to be entirely successful. According to Loughlin, the French national identity, which in any case is a subjective one imposed from above by a nationalistic education system14, has been superimposed on still remaining more ancient identities, of the different peoples inhabiting the territory of France, these identities once distinguished by a different language, culture and history. Hence large numbers of French people have a double identity (see section 2.2.). It is these remnants of regional identities which are seen to have paved the way for the recent ethnic and regional movements in France:

"It is the combination of these two factors, the incompleteness of the imposition of the French identity and the persistence of a more ancient identity, which has left an 'ideological space' which various forms of regionalism and ethnic nationalism have tried to fill in competition with the dominant culture"15

Additionally socio-economic factors have contributed to the rise in regionalism and ethnic nationalism. Loughlin perceives regionalism as a response of local elites (notables) faced with the disintegration of their societies either by economic decline.

12 op. cit. p. 171.


15 ibid.
or by the radical restructuring resulting from the penetration of modern monopoly capitalism. The local elites consequently either try to resist this process or alternatively exploit it to their advantage, as happened in Brittany. This process becomes radicalized by people among the younger generation of intellectuals, who move from the regionalism of their elders, which did not question the attachment of the region to the republic, to the stance of ethnic nationalism.

According to Berger, regionalism has a long history in French political life. It was one of various strategies advocated by the right for dismantling the Jacobin state and returning power to the hands of local authorities. The 1960's and the 1970's however saw a shift to the left of regional ethnicity and an increasing political salience of regional ethnic issues. Berger attempts to explain this development by suggesting four critical factors: The long-term variable has been the Gaullist monopoly of power at the centre since 1958. The failure of regional groups like the CELIB in Brittany to achieve their goals by working within the system as apolitical interest groups, led to a perceived need for an alliance with the left. Secondly, for the same reasons that the regionalists during this period began to discover the left, the left began to discover the regions. Excluded from power at the centre, the left became more interested in signs of movement at the local and regional level. The third explanation is to be sought in the growing set of grievances with objective regional bases and in the increasing visibility of those problems, that fall with uneven impact on citizens according to the regions in which they live. With the decline in agriculture in areas like Brittany, an expanding part of the population is employed in industry, and disparities in wages among industrial workers in different regions are far more transparent, than similar disparities within agriculture. Finally, a shift of decision making in the Fifth Republic from parliament to the bureaucracy, meant that the access to power for the peripheral regions became even more difficult. Brittany, with its large population and substantial political parliamentary representation, could translate at least a part of its electoral strength

16 op. cit. p. 227.
18 op. cit. p. 172 ff.
into political advantage at the centre. The shift of power to bureaucratic hands brought about a marked decline in the influence of Breton politicians and interest groups, in particular since recruitment to the higher bureaucracy is virtually the preserve of those born and educated in Paris.

During the 1960's and 1970's there were modest movements towards regional reforms. However this was not as much a result of peripheral demands, as a conviction in Paris of a need for a functional economic approach. It has been described as a 'functional regionalism' which aimed to incorporate the periphery. As Loughlin puts it:

"regionalization in France has been a means of reinforcing the control over the periphery by the centre, an administrative deconcentration rather than a decentralization which would have involved the devolution of real power to the regions".

The local elites, the notables, quickly came to terms with, and indeed took advantage of this development, but it did provoke a growing radicalization among the young.

On the cultural level some concessions were made, most notably the so called 'cultural charters' which were adopted for the various regions in 1978. The Breton charter involved a recognition of the 'cultural personality of Brittany' with the Breton language as 'one of its fundamental constituents'. It encouraged the teaching of Breton language and culture, and offered potential state and departmental funding to Breton cultural associations. It was however widely criticised by the Left as being only a half measure.

When the Socialist Party came to power in 1981, they embarked on their promised local reforms, but powers devolved to the regions proved to be modest and their financial sources constrained. As for cultural concessions, the language teaching of the Loix Deixonne (see section 3.2) has been slightly extended, television and radio broadcasting in minority languages have increased, and a Corsican committee has been established to deal with cultural problems. However these concessions have, according to Meny, mainly served to defuse regional

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19 op. cit. p. 177.
20 op. cit. p. 229.
protests and deprive the minority group of one of their favourite arguments as well as one of their most successful rallying causes\(^{22}\). And even after the socialist victory the Ministry of Culture still "remained a stronghold of centralisation, seeing its role as the diffusion of French culture to the provinces rather than the promotion of regional cultures."\(^{23}\)

Regionalist and autonomist movements have been quite strong in France especially during the 1960's and the 1970's. Their success has however, according to Meny, been more apparent than real for the following reasons: Firstly the integration of the regional problem into the national (French) political arena has limited its radical scope. The various political parties have all been seeming to want to regionalize, and hence the regional question has become one among many in electoral campaigns. Secondly the policies of the state have successfully prevented the various isolated minority movements from transforming into a huge regional coalition, with the bargaining power such a coalition would have entailed. Thirdly economic changes that worked in favour of regional consciousness 20 years ago, now seem to work against regionalization and local autonomy: in particular the international crisis affects the weaker peripheral areas.

Finally Meny considers the importance of the phenomenon of regional culture, as expressed in songs, music, literature and local languages to be overestimated, and (highly relevant to the subject of this dissertation) ultimately undermined by the commercial networks of the consumer society. He continues:

"There are certainly more students learning Breton or Provencal but these languages have withered on stony ground, find no place for expression in the press and have access to only several minutes of television broadcasting each week."\(^{24}\)

By inference if the media opportunities were better, it would consequently strengthen the possibility of linguistic expression in the peripheries, and hence benefit the regional culture.

Although the form and extent of central control has been modified, to all

\(^{22}\) Meny (1987), p.60.


\(^{24}\) Meny (1987), p. 64.
extents and purposes however, France still remains a centralised state dominated by Paris. It is merely the means of integration that have changed, and according to Meny:

"While remaining faithful to its unitary and Jacobin principles, the left was aware that an integration founded on consensus could be far more cohesive than one achieved by the more traditional, authoritarian methods."25

France is consequently still to be considered as a unitary state in Rokkan and Urwin’s terms, with the one unambiguous centre - Paris - enjoying economic dominance and pursuing a consistent policy of administrative standardization.

3.2. French Linguistic Policy.

Intrinsically connected with the policies of the French state towards its peripheries, is the question of language. Before dealing with the state of Breton, it will therefore be pertinent to say a few words about the general linguistic policies of the French government.

The French language, historically the language of the crown and of the centre of power i.e. Paris, has since the revolution played an active part in the unification of France. The other languages of France were: Flemish in the north, which is a dialect of, but different from Dutch; two spoken German dialects, Francique and Almanique as well as German in Alsace; Occitan in most of the south of France; Basque on the Spanish border; Catalan in the south-west; Corsican; and finally Breton in Brittany in the west.26

After the 1789 Revolution, a survey into the idioms of France revealed that in 1790 of a population of 26 millions, only 11 millions had French as their mother-tongue, 3 millions also spoke French, 6 millions spoke almost no French, and 6 millions did not know any at all. In other words, almost half of the population of

25 op.cit. p. 66.

France did not know the language of the Revolution. For the French post-revolutionaries in their attempt to unify the nation it was therefore imperative to provide education for all French citizens, to disseminate the use of French, not the least in order for the population to be able to understand the decrees of the Revolution. Apart from the linguistic aspect, regional particularisms were considered to be a threat to the unity of the state. In the 1880s during the Third Republic, this policy of linguistic unification gained momentum with the introduction of Jules Ferry's compulsory, free to all and secular primary schools. In these schools only French was admitted, no regional languages were to be used, and indeed demands to use any of the regional languages were associated with a reactionary or royalist philosophy.

The official French policy towards Breton was, as a consequence, a policy of 'non-recognition' that amounted to repression and stigmatisation of the Breton language and culture. School children who spoke Breton, as was indeed the case with other regional languages, were shamed by zealous school masters, by having an object, the 'simbol', hung around their neck if they used a Breton word. If the child had not by the end of the lesson succeeded in denouncing someone else for speaking Breton, he was forced to spell out the following inscription: "Defence de cracher et de parler Breton" - "No spitting and no Breton". The use of Breton was forbidden in church, and the official attitude towards the language was such, that in 1909 a minister of Education was of the opinion that "the teaching of Breton would encourage Breton separatism".

Apart from the deliberate policies of the revolution, a number of social-economic factors contributed to the decline of Breton and the other regional languages in the nineteenth century. Growing industrialisation, the exodus of Breton speaking workers to French speaking towns, improvement in infrastructure and communication, increasing importance of French speaking bureaucracy and administration, and ultimately the First World War, where non-French speaking

soldiers had to use French as a common means of communication. French was hence regarded as the language of the future and of social mobility.

After the Second World War an increased interest in minority languages and literature resulted in La Loi Deixonne from 1951, which was the first official recognition of Breton. This law was, and still is, the only significant legal basis for the official teaching and promoting of languages other than French. The Loi Deixonne, important though it might be, is really a quite modest proposal: it only allows optional teaching of Breton as well as three other regional languages: Basque, Catalan, Occitan, (and Corsican since 1974), at primary and secondary level. Pressures to further the regional languages have mainly been within the area of education, a sore point being the lack of educational credit given to courses in the regional languages. In 1985 the then minister of culture, Jack Lang, announced however that the national teaching diploma (CAPES) could now be awarded to students of Breton.

This increased interest in, and official acceptance of, minority languages, is according to Neville explained by three things: Firstly a recognition that these languages form a part of the French cultural heritage or 'patrimoine'. Secondly, the increased interest is part of a quest for identity in an increasingly impersonal bureaucratic and technological world, as well as a protest, a tendency strengthened after the events of 'May 1968'. Thirdly it has been realised that the French language and the French identity are no longer in danger from regional languages. This threat is now perceived as coming from English, with various governmental initiatives safeguarding the French language. As an example one could mention the 'Loi sur l'emploi de la langue Francaise' from 1975, which in practice imposes the use of the French language in all commercial transactions taking place on French territory, even if one or all of the participants are foreigners.

Despite the above, the French policy towards its linguistic minorities, however has not really changed. Firstly there does not exist any general legal statute

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31 op.cit. p. 156.
for linguistic rights in France. The only law that specifically deals with minority languages, the Loi Deixonne, only covers some of the minority languages of France, and in a limited field: Education, and optional education at that. Secondly in French official discourse any concept of 'minority language' is strictly forbidden, it is instead to be 'regional language'\textsuperscript{33}. France does not recognise the existence within its own borders of 'national minorities' in international law terms or even 'linguistic minorities', having long refused to sign Article 27 in the 1966 UN International Pact Concerning Civil and Political Rights, and when the French government finally signed in 1980, they had to add a proviso: that since the French Constitution declared the country to be an indivisible republic, the reference to ethnic minorities was inapplicable.\textsuperscript{34}

3.3. The Mass Media in France.

Broadcasting in France has traditionally been heavily controlled by the state; as early as 1837 the government passed a law that confirmed the state monopoly of transmission. This policy has since been maintained with state supervision of communications systems and emphasis on technologies with military applications\textsuperscript{35}.

During the thirties, radio transmissions started, and "as early as 1932, radio was used by the government to make 'the voice of France' heard at home and abroad."\textsuperscript{36} In the post war period there was a wide consensus that broadcasting should be organised as a state monopoly, with public service norms and obligations. But although there was commitment - at least rhetorically - for a BBC-type organisation, independence from the government was not envisaged. Here the French tradition of statism and Jacobin centralism asserted itself in the area of broadcasting,

\textsuperscript{33} Lafont (1990), pp. 1-3.

\textsuperscript{34} Joscelyne (1986), p. 20.

\textsuperscript{35} Sorbets (1986), p. 90.

\textsuperscript{36} op.cit. p. 91.
which was widely seen as an important nation-building device. As well as having an integrative function, a centralised government controlled media system played an important political role, in furthering the interests of the various governments.

"No government prior to 1981 was prepared to cast aside voluntarily the state monopoly over broadcasting which in practice could be commandeered to serve its own particular interests"37

Consequently broadcasting has long been highly politicized in France. The French broadcasting system has been associated with government interference, excessive bureaucracy, and accused of central promotion of a homogenous 'French' culture, which has made it a favourite target for various regional movements.

The television industry in France has become increasingly complicated during the 1980's. In 1980 broadcasting in France was a strict public monopoly, with the three stations TF1, Antenne 2 and the regional FR3; in 1990 the country was heading towards a predominantly commercial system. After President Mitterand had supported decentralization of the public function, a new law broke the state monopoly in broadcasting in 198238. Now there are a mixture of public or commercial channels with local, national and European programmes, some terrestrial and others satellite or cable relayed.

Public service channels include Antenne 2 (A2), a national channel launched in 1964; France Regions 3 (FR3), launched in 1973 and converted into a national and regional channel in 1974, with 12 regional stations. FR3 came into being as a result of the increased demands for decentralisation of decision-making in the late 60's. These demands spilled over into the field of broadcasting as demands for regional diversity in production and programming. Both A2 and FR3 are financed through a mixture of licence fees and advertising, with some sponsorship for A2. Other public service channels include Le SEPT (from 1989), which is a satellite channel, sometimes broadcasting on FR3.

Other satellite channels include TV-5 Europe, which transmits to other

French-speaking countries, and the French overseas service R.F.O.  

The private television channels include TF1 (Television Francaise 1), which was the first television channel to be launched in France in 1935, the first to carry commercial advertising from 1968, and the first and only public service channel in Europe to be privatized and sold in 1987. In 1984 'Canal Plus' was launched. This channel is privately owned and financed via subscriptions. The licence for the fifth channel 'La Cinq', was awarded in 1987, and in addition there are TV6, which is a TV music channel, and M6, a general interest channel.

The central broadcasting issue in 1990 was according to Palmer & Sorbets no longer that of government interference but rather the ability of the advertising market to finance five general interest channels. This issue is closely related to the content of programming. In fact La Cinq, which collapsed early in 1992, was fined heavily for not meeting the quota requirements in European productions, but maintained that it was cheaper to pay the fines, than to find the money to meet quota commitments; and TF1 went aggressively down-market after privatization. According to Palmer and Sorbets, the effect of all these new channels was as follows:

"La Cinq and M6, in their programme schedules (which contained many low-quality American programmes), contributed to the inflation in the cost of acquiring programme transmission rights, while failing to contribute to the production of French quality programmes; they occupied TV broadcasting frequencies that others dearly sought. In short, the increase in the number of channels did not lead to a corresponding increase in the quality of programmes on offer, and programme schedules, indeed, tended to a certain uniformity."

As for local television, there were in 1990 three local terrestrial TV channels (Lyon, 


41 The rather woolly wording in the 1989 EC Directive, 'Television without Frontiers' was after much controversy accepted as: "Member states shall ensure, where practicable and by appropriate means that broadcasters reserve for European works ... a majority proportion of their transmission time". (Hirch & Petersen (1992), p. 46.)

Toulouse, Mont Blanc) and approximately 15 cable channels in the larger cities.

On the radio front, the large number of 'pirate' radio stations have been made legal, and the public service national radio station, Radio France, has diversified into local broadcasting. In 1990 there were some 47 local radio stations, at the level of town, district or departements.

During the 1980's there have been a number of Broadcasting Acts, passed whenever the government changed. Of these, the 1982 and the 1986 reforms will be addressed. The advent of the socialist government in 1981 with their commitment to decentralisation, meant that the 1982 broadcasting reform contained provisions for regional television companies, as well as public radio stations at the departmental level, and the legalising of private local radio stations. The 1982 broadcasting reform was rather ambitious about regional television, as approximately 90% of programming was to be regionally produced. When the Right-wing government came to power in 1986, they reorganised the French television system "still further away from the traditional state system to one dominated by market forces." This development was partly a consequence of a political wish to further the French audiovisual industry and related information technology industries. The main state channel TF1, was subsequently privatised in 1987, a move which has been widely criticised. The decentralisation policy of the 1981-84 government was however not challenged.

It seems as if the French state during the 1980's relinquished the old control over the broadcasting system, and allowed a multitude of new channels, including local channels. This development has however not brought about further provisions for minority language broadcasting, and languages like Breton, Corse, and Languedoc are still sparsely covered via the FR3 system. This fact illustrates the point that minority broadcasting cannot be left to market forces, and as long as the central French attitude remains hostile towards other languages and cultures within the French borders, public service support is not likely to come.

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3.4. Summing Up of Chapter 3.

The historical centralism of the French state is reflected in the conscious use of (French) 'culture' in any form, as a means of identity (French) propagation. As a consequence of this 'cultural centralism', peripheral cultures and languages have been subjected to consistent 'cultural imperialism', at least until increase in territorial conflicts made the French state give certain limited concessions in order to defuse the territorial demands.

Both the rigid centralism and the control over the means of cultural expression, resulted in the means of mass communication being under strict government control until the 1980's. The change from state monopoly to a mixed commercial system was partly a consequence of a political wish to further the French audiovisual industry and related information technology industries. There is consequently no reason whatsoever to expect the French state to supply funds for extended minority-language television- or radio provisions. Firstly there are no industrial interests involved in this field, and secondly a minority language service does constitute, from the point of view of the state, a risk of detaching the centre's control of the minority culture.

In the following chapter the case of Brittany is explored. It discusses the historical relationship between Brittany and the French state, and the provisions for Breton-language media.
Chapter 4. Brittany.

As discussed in chapter 2, one of the potential functions of minority language media is to provide a forum within which a nation without a state is able to express its cultural specificity. As demonstrated in the previous chapter a conscious policy of the French state has seemingly been to avoid exactly such a situation. Language (French) is seen to be inherently connected with the French nation, so in order to assimilate the French culture, the French language has been imposed, and minority languages actively repressed. The present chapter explores how this policy has affected Brittany and provisions for Breton-language mass media. The chapter contains descriptions of Breton history and nationalism, the state of Breton as well as an analysis of the condition of Breton-language mass media in particular radio and television.

4.1. History of Brittany and Breton Nationalism.

Brittany is a peninsula situated in the north west corner of France. The historical area of the pre-1789 province of Brittany consists of the five departments Finistere, Cotes du Nord, Morbihan, Ille-et-Villaine and Loire-Atlantique, although the latter is not now part of the official region of Brittany (see map below). The historical area covered 34.077 km², but the modern administrative region only consists of 27.184 km².¹ The population of Brittany (historical region) is of approximately 3.6 mill., whereof 2.7 mill. live within the administrative region.² The language of Brittany, Breton, is spoken daily by about 300.000 people, and known by approximately 700.000 (see section 4.2.).

From the third and fourth centuries AD, the area of Brittany was colonized by a flow of Celtic speaking peoples from the southern parts of the British Isles, resulting in the close links between the Breton language and Welsh and Cornish.

² ibid.
the Brythonic branch of the Celtic group of languages. From the ninth century onwards Brittany became a Duchy, and a semi-autonomous state albeit already with close relations to France. After the successive marriages of Anne, Duchess of Brittany, to two French monarchs, in 1490 and 1499, Brittany became officially part of France. In 1532 with the Act of Union, the Duchy of Brittany became a French province.

Before the revolution Brittany had however been allowed to retain much of its semi-autonomous character. The church and the nobility were the main agents in maintaining a degree of cohesion of the Breton society. After the revolution, the Breton cultural distinctiveness was used by the local elites as a defence against the loss of power they were experiencing. The process in Brittany at this time is termed by Guillorel to be an example of 'spatial reification' built on the basis of a bloc opposition born out of the French revolution - the ideological bloc being 'Legitimate

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Monarchy - Catholicism - Breton language. The leading social groupings chose territorial withdrawal in order to prevent the new central bourgeois values from contaminating the social space, the Breton agrarian society, of which they wanted to remain the elite. On the economic level, this was done by rationalization of the Breton agriculture, and a mobilization of the peasantry into corporatist movements. On the ideological level the landed aristocracy, having been excluded from central power, discovered its provincial identity and developed an interest in local and regional history and regional languages.

In the middle of the nineteenth century, the Viscount Hersart de la Villemarque published a book of 'ancient' Breton poetry and folk-songs, the "Barzaz Breiz". These songs were to a large extent bogus, his own creation, but they have never the less managed to play a very important role in being instrumental in the renaissance of Breton, and contributing to the confidence and consciousness of Breton nationalism. This 'invention of tradition' in Brittany in the romantic period, was similar to the situation in Scotland with Macpherson's Ossian poems, and in Wales with Iolo Morganwg's Gorsedd (see chapter 6). As Maryon McDonald observes, the "Barzaz Breiz" was not only instrumental in defining and locating Brittany on one side in national political battles, but it also relocated whatever local traditions of songs existed in a single new tradition, on a national and international stage of popular lore and lyricism. By providing the light in which other works came to be read, the "Barzaz Breiz" made Brittany fixed as a particularly expressive land of folk-custom, mystery, ritual, song and lyricism.

As for the above mentioned ideological 'bloc': 'Monarchy, Catholicism and Breton Language', the aristocracy - the monarchists, soon differed with the clergy as to the use of Breton. The clergy saw Breton as a means of communication, whereas the aristocracy viewed it as an ideological weapon, an integrated part of a structured political vision (non-acceptance of the French revolution). At the end of the nineteenth century the monarchist candidates however became fewer and fewer.

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6 M. McDonald (1989), p.103-104.
It became more difficult to use the Breton language as the sole criterion of identification in as much as the Breton speaking space was shrinking due to the linguistic policies of the revolution. History became therefore the only criterion that could relate to a fixed space, the old Duchy of Brittany. As for the association of Brittany with catholicism, contemporary Breton militants are not interested in this linkage because the catholic space is also shrinking through secularisation. However, according to Guillorel, this last stage of disaggregation of the original bloc came too late. It is the historical impact of the identification between Catholicism and Brittany, which explains why the regionalist and autonomist movements failed, because the issues involved, such as religion and the survival of the monarchy, were universal French questions rather than pertaining to the Breton nation.

According to Berger, the Breton nationalist movement has moved from the extreme right towards a political identification with the left. Before World War I, the regionalist movement had been dominated by the Breton Regionalist Union, a conservative Catholic organization of notables. The interwar period saw the Breton Autonomist party (Breiz Atao), and a secret terrorist organisation called the White and the Black (Gwenn ha Du) after the colours of the Breton flag. Leaders of these organizations ended up in exile in Germany before the war and returned with the invading German armies, urging active collaboration. The wartime role of the Breton autonomists consequently threw such discredit on the regional ethnic movement, that although various cultural groups resumed after the war, it took twelve years before any organized political activity began. Due to the stigma of the war it was impossible at that time to place the Breton issue directly on the political agenda. The revival of the Breton movement had, according to Guillorel, consequently to begin with activities which were less political and confined to the cultural domain. In a second stage, the Breton question was raised at the socio-economic level. Finally, it eventually became possible to establish genuine political organizations and parties.

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At the cultural level, there was a huge growth in cultural reviews, journals and organizations within the Breton movement:

"Today, the most important issue, as for many other linguistic minorities, seems to be the teaching of the Breton language as well as the use of this language in the mass media. The most promising movement in this area is Diwan ('germ'), founded in 1977, which has established many Breton-speaking schools at different levels, from nursery to secondary school."  

At the socio-economic level, the creation of the regional economic organization CELIB (Committee for the Study and Liaison of Breton Interests) in 1950 was an important step. The CELIB brought together elected officials, representatives from unions, trade associations and official bodies like the chamber of commerce in an organization whose objective was regional economic development. From 1950 until 1972 when the left defected en masse, the CELIB managed to operate as if regional programs were 'above politics'.

On the political level, the Movement for the Organization of Brittany (MOB) was founded in 1957 to advocate a federal system in France and 'home rule' for the five Breton departments. In 1964 the organization UDB - the Breton Democratic Union was founded by left-wingers from the MOB, drawing support from the Marxist, non-communist left. The UDB has focused on linking the economic difficulties of Brittany to its 'colonized' status within France and on demonstrating the impossibility of solving Brittany's problems within the capitalist system. Both to the right and left of UDB are various smaller Breton political organizations including a secret organization, FLB - the Breton Liberation Front. The UDB is however, according to Guillorel, the only political organization to attain a significant organizational level, in terms of numbers of militants and importance of its newspaper (Le Peuple Breton). In electoral terms, the UDB has never been successful on its own, but as part of the left alliance strategy, for which it was criticized by other Breton organizations, it succeeded in getting a few local seats in

10 op. cit. p. 154.


12 op. cit. p. 169.
the municipal elections of 1977, 1983 and 1989.13

One attempt to explain the Breton ethnic mobilisation of the 1960's is provided by Edgar Morin in a study of a Breton village. This explanation echoes the theories of uneven development (see section 2.4.2) and emphasizes the role of the mass media. The processes of centralization and modernization, which aim to produce cultural homogeneity and national (French) political integration, also produce ethnic consciousness and a growing desire for identification with, and membership of, a community less distant and impersonal than the one advanced by the French state:

"As television, travel, education and occupational mobility brought Bretons into greater contact with other Frenchmen, they became increasingly aware of their differences. The villager who in the past had identified only with others in the little region where his own dialect of Breton was spoken, and whose only contact with France was in regard to taxation, conscription, and education, has learned from the mass media that he is a Breton."14

4.2. The State of Breton.

"Students of the geography of the Breton language find themselves entirely unencumbered by even the most general of census data or other official statistics on the survival of Breton."15 This lack of official statistics is according to Robert Lafont symptomatic of the French attitude towards its linguistic minorities, rendered additionally conspicuous by the fact that other aspects of French society tend to be statistically thoroughly documented. In order to get a picture of the state of the Breton language, one must therefore turn to estimates made by individuals and organisations concerned about the language.

Breton (Brezhoneg) is mostly spoken in the west of the country, in a region known as Basse-Bretagne or Lower Brittany, which includes the department of

Finistere, and the western parts of Côtes-du-Nord and Morbihan. East of this area is Haute-Bretagne or Upper Brittany, where the languages spoken are French, and the Gallo dialects. Since the ninth century the Breton language has lost territory, the linguistic border continuously moving west.\(^{16}\) To further complicate the situation the Breton language is divided into four different dialects, each spoken in their separate area: Leon, Tregor, Cornouaille and Vannetais.

![Map of the Breton language](image)

**Figure 4.2.1. Extent of the Breton language:**\(^{17}\)

The following information on the historic extent of the Breton language is obtained from Meic Stephens’ chapter on the Bretons in *Linguistic Minorities in Western Europe*. As there are no official census data (not that these are always to be trusted) the statistical evidence is provided by estimates, supplied by various individuals and organizations. In 1806, according to Coquebert de Montbret, there were approximately 967,000 Breton speakers and in 1886, according to Sébillot, there were 1,300,000. These estimates were based on the fact the whole population


\(^{17}\) Source: McDonald (1989), p. 322.
of Lower Brittany was wholly Breton-speaking except from a few French-speaking enclaves. The decline in the language started in the twentieth century: just before the First World War, 90% of the population of Lower Brittany, some 1,300,000 spoke Breton. In 1928 a survey estimated that still a million Bretons, 75% of the population of Lower Brittany, used Breton as an everyday language. In 1952 around 700,000 Bretons "used French only in the case of necessity" and a further 300,000 were able to speak Breton "if the need arose". After 1952 a rapid decline began "particularly after the advent of television and as the result of the governments intransigence towards repeated demands for the teaching of Breton in the State's schools"\textsuperscript{18}, and in 1974 a survey published in the newspaper Le Telegramme de Brest estimated that of the 1,500,000 inhabitants of Lower Brittany, only 44% or 685,000, were capable of speaking Breton. Of these about 385,000 persons or 25% of the relevant population, spoke Breton daily. Additionally a further 300,000 were believed to have some knowledge of the language. The Brest survey estimated that of the people speaking Breton on a regular day-to-day basis, the age distribution was as follows: about 8% of children under fourteen, 6% of young people between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four, 50% of adults aged twenty-five to sixty-four and 75% of old people aged sixty-five and over\textsuperscript{19}.

This state of decline continued to show in two surveys conducted respectively in 1983 and in 1990. In 1983 approximately half of the population of Lower Brittany, 700,000 were able to use Breton to various degrees, and of these 300,000 (20% of the population) used Breton daily more often than French.\textsuperscript{20}

In 1990, a survey conducted in the area of Lower Brittany, showed that 55,5% of the 1000 respondents understood Breton, but only 21% were able to speak it. Of these 21%, 26% declared they spoke it more or just as often as French. As for literacy, only 10.5% of all the respondents were able to read Breton and 4.5%

\textsuperscript{18} M. Stephens (1976), p. 363.
\textsuperscript{19} ibid.
\textsuperscript{20} Le Roy (1983), p. 381.
to write it. According to this survey, Breton is a language largely ignored by the young as the Breton-speaking population is concentrated in the over 40’s age groups. However about a third of the 15-19 years old understand it, although they might not speak it. It is within the groups of farmers and retired people that the percentage of Breton speakers is highest, and geographically most of the Breton speakers are to be found in the rural areas in the west of Lower Brittany. Breton is additionally perceived as a language primarily used in the local domains of the family and village life.

The stigma attached to the Breton language is illustrated in a study of Breton peasants, where a good mother by definition speaks nicely (i.e. French) to her children in order to further their chances in the French society. However this mechanism can involve a structure of values so strong that in one peasant family, "the mother spoke French to her two teenage daughters - and then Breton to cows, but French to calves, and Breton to hens, but French to their chicks, and Breton to pigs and sows, but French to piglets".

Regarding the quality of the above data on language use, it should be remembered that these are not census figures, but estimates based on various surveys, and should therefore be treated with some caution, as indeed must census data. However for our purpose there is a clear trend: a decline of the Breton language which continues to this day.

Summing-up, Breton is not officially recognized by the French state and is marginalized in all public and social sectors. No exact figure can be given as to the present number of Breton speakers, although varying estimates range from 300,000 to 600,000 who use the language as a daily means of communication. In addition, a declining language proficiency is observable from age-group to age-group, despite efforts, mainly in the field of education, to redress the situation.

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22 op. cit. p. 23.


4.3. Television and Radio in Brittany.

The first radio broadcasts in Brittany took place in 1926, but it was not until December 1946 that the first Breton-language radio programmes were broadcast, with half an hour a week. In 1964 the first Breton language television programme was broadcast, and in the period from 1964-1971, there were 3 minutes per week on television in Breton. In 1971 this was extended with a 20 minute programme every two weeks.

The Breton-language programmes are produced by the third French channel, FR3, which was converted into a regional channel in 1974. This channel functions both on a national and a regional level. The national headquarters are in Paris, and from here the national part of the programmes are broadcast, leaving broadcasting of the regional programmes to the different regions. In Brittany one finds the regional headquarters of FR3 BRETAGNE-PAYS DE LOIRE in Rennes, the regional capital. FR3 Bretagne’s output consists both of French-language programmes, such as regional news, and the Breton programmes.

The granting of a Breton 'cultural charter' in 1978 was an important event, as it aimed to "end the existing split between the regional and the dominating cultures, and give the Breton language the means necessary for its development, including education and radio/television".  

As the following table shows, there is however still a long way to go.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Radio/TV in Breton per year:</th>
<th>Before the cultural charter</th>
<th>After the cultural charter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radio:</td>
<td>148h.20m.</td>
<td>251h.45m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television:</td>
<td>11h.16m.</td>
<td>22h.16m.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3.1: Public Radio/TV in Breton per year:


On a weekly basis the Breton-language broadcasting consisted in 1979, of some 4 hours and 55 minutes of radio per week and 28 minutes of television per week, except for six weeks in the summer months when the Breton-language television programmes were replaced by non-Breton ones. The reason for this summer break in Breton-language programmes is according to Le Peuple Breton to be found in the arrival of the tourists of whom a large part are French.

In 1986 the output in Breton-language (public) radio had increased to 18 hours per week, which represented a substantial increase from 1980, when the figure was 5 hours weekly. The Ministry of Communications did however order a cut back, and since 1987 there has been a total of 13 hours and 40 minutes per week. The public station R.B.O. - Radio Bretagne Ouest transmits every day one hour of Breton programmes, half an hour of bilingual programmes, and 3 news programmes, lasting between 2 and 10 minutes. Radio-Armorique based in Rennes broadcast two hours of Breton-language programmes each week.

As for the private regional radio stations in Brittany, they transmitted approximately 30 hours Breton-language programmes weekly in 1986. In 1988 however, a report from the Conseil Culturel de Bretagne estimates that most of the local radio stations transmitting in Breton have had to close because of lack of funds. Only Radio Kreiz Breiz based in St Nicodème is in reality bilingual. It covers roughly the centre of Breton speaking Brittany, and transmits 3 hours of Breton-language programmes every day.

On television, there was in December 1988, 1 hour and 30 minutes Breton-language programmes per week, with half an hour Saturday midday, and an hour Sunday midday. From April 1990 this one and a half hour weekly slot was

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27 op. cit. 5.1568
31 ibid.
broadcast on Sundays. In 1991 the Breton-language programmes, now consisting of little over one hour and a half, were broadcast with five minutes of news every day, and a one-hour programme on Saturday.\(^{33}\)

FR3 has been criticised by the Breton movement for not allocating enough funds for producing even those few hours of Breton, as well as scheduling them off peak. One argument from FR3 is that it covers a dual region, Bretagne as well as Pays de Loire, which is entirely French speaking. Therefore, the argument went, it would be to put the non-Breton speakers at a disadvantage to schedule Breton language programmes in peak hours(!).

The 1990 survey shows however that the public is largely indifferent to the Breton-language programmes. To a question concerning the amount of Breton language on television and radio, more than half of the sample turned out to be indifferent to the issue, and approximately one third thinks that the amount is about right. Only 20% think there should be more. There is however interestingly enough no negativity towards the Breton-language programmes, as only one percent of the sample think that there is too much Breton.

According to the survey, people actually speaking Breton are, not surprisingly, more demanding towards the Breton-language programmes, than are non-Breton speakers. For radio, two thirds of Breton speakers think that there is either enough (30%) or that there is a need for more (31%). This tendency is even stronger for television, where 30.5% think that there is just enough, and 35.5% that there is a need for more. However even among the non-Breton speakers, some 15% consider that there is a need for more Breton-language television programmes.\(^{34}\)

The amount of Breton-language broadcasting may seem poor, especially when compared to Wales, but when the output of FR3 in Brittany is compared to the other linguistic regions in France, Brittany is by no means the region worst off media-wise. In other regions such as Corsica and Occitania, FR3 broadcasts between 20 and 30 minutes weekly in the minority languages.

Apart from the regional television programmes on FR3, independent video-


\(^{34}\) TMO Ouest (1990), p. 34-35.
making in Brittany is reasonably well-developed, but functions mainly through the medium of French. There is no Breton-language daily or weekly newspaper. A number of periodicals are published in Breton and variously financed by local government, Institut Culturel de Bretagne, and public subscription. A small amount of Breton is also published in the monthly Le Peuple Breton.

As may have become apparent from the previous chapters, the French government has been reluctant to relinquish any real control of the broadcasting system to the regions, not to mention provisions for regional language broadcasting. Even though local television channels have been allowed in the larger cities, these are commercial and controlled by market forces. Since the Market is not the best way of ensuring a minority language service, Brittany must be content with the provisions by the public service, Paris controlled, regional channel FR3.

The main problem seems to be a lack of funds for regional audiovisual media in France, and the victims are those language communities with no transfrontier community, i.e. Bretons, Corsican and Occitan. The German speakers of Alsace, and the Flemish speakers of the north of France can to a certain extent take advantage of the German- and Flemish-language broadcasts from Germany and Belgium respectively.

4.4. Summing Up of Chapter 4.

The argument of chapter 3 and 4, has been as follows: The centralised nature of the French unitary state, in turn influences the cultural policy of France whereby culture is used as a centrally controlled means of assimilating the historically different peoples and languages of France. The process of assimilation gained momentum with the introduction of free and compulsory schools in the 1880's. Those schools actively repressed the use of peripheral languages, and only the teaching of French and French culture was allowed. A role similar to that pertaining to the education system during the last century (as well as now), i.e. as an important disseminator of norms, values and ideologies, belongs in this century to the mass media, in particular the electronic media. It is consequently entirely consistent with
the historical development of the French state and its conscious policy of assimilation, that the minorities of France have found it difficult to obtain any recognition of their cultural distinctiveness, not to speak of any decently sized broadcasting service. The less than sympathetic attitude of the central government towards minority demands is, in short, caused by the traditional centralist ethos within the French political system, rooted in the revolution, and the inherent mistrust of the non-French languages within France.

Concerning the particular case of Brittany, the impact of the demands from the Breton nationalist movement has been weakened by the internal differences within that movement. Additionally, the Breton case has not been helped by the historical association of the Breton language with reactionary, monarchist and catholic forces.

In general, the above chapters have shown a connection between the inheritance of the French revolution and the lack of provisions for minority language broadcasting in France in general and in Brittany in particular. The conceptualisation of the French 'nation' as an artificial creation which needed active protection in order for it to survive, has influenced both policies of centralization and linguistic imperialism. It was consequently necessary to actively suppress the other languages of France, as these were perceived to be a source of dissention. The French language was in addition regarded to be the language of reason and culture, and it was considered a favour to the non-French speaking areas of France to rid them of their 'primitive' cultures and languages by bestowing the language of enlightenment and reason upon them. Apart from the linguistic policies of the French republic, the policy of centralization also influenced the structure and function of the mass media. The mass media were regarded as an active means to disseminate the culture and language of the French state, and were centrally directed until the policies of deregulation - or reregulation as it were - of the 1980's. It was consequently inconceivable to comply with the demands for either devolved regional broadcasting or - even less acceptable - broadcasting in minority languages.

Comparing the situation in France to the United Kingdom, Calvet has the following reflection on the linguistic imperialism of the French state:

"L'imperialisme francais compare à l'anglais est doublement glottoophage car il a
According to Calvet the French have been much more thorough in their approach to, and implementation of, linguistic imperialism than have the British. The following chapters 5, 6 and 7, will deal with this assertion, and demonstrate how the issue of minority-language broadcasting, in particular with regards to Wales, has been dealt with in the United Kingdom.
Chapter 5. The United Kingdom.

In this chapter I will firstly describe the relationship between state and peripheries in The United Kingdom and secondly overall British media policy.

5.1. State and Peripheries in The United Kingdom.

The United Kingdom has historically been a union state, as opposed to for example the unitary French state. The union state can - still using the terms of Rokkan and Urwin - be described as a state that does not enjoy direct political control everywhere:

"Incorporation of parts of its territory has been achieved through treaty and agreement; consequently integration is less than perfect. While administrative standardization prevails over most of the territory, the union structure entails the survival in some areas of variations based upon pre-union rights and infrastructures"\(^1\)

During the Middle Ages England entered into unions with its neighbours, Wales (1536), Scotland (1603), and Ireland (where in 1541, Henry VIII had himself proclaimed King over an Ireland united with England), and has since then followed a policy of differentiated treatment of its territories. According to Keating this treatment is explained by the absence of an official nationalist ideology, which again is caused by two factors\(^2\). Firstly in the absence of a British revolution like the French, no ideology of popular sovereignty emerged, but the sovereignty was vested in the institution of the monarch-in-parliament. Secondly the creation of the Empire made this, not the nation-state, the focus of loyalty and the target of socialisation measures, through for example education and public ceremonials.

This absence of nationalist - English as opposed to British - ideology meant that there was little conscious official policy of integration, but a large degree of flexibility in governmental arrangements, and an attitude of 'benign neglect' towards

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the distinctiveness of the peripheries. Scotland for example was allowed to keep its separate legal system, church and educational system, as long as these did not threaten the union with England. Wales on the other hand did not receive any such institutional recognitions of its territorial distinctiveness, which later meant that the Welsh ethnic revival had to concentrate on cultural aspects instead of institutional.

The centre has in general responded with ad hoc solutions to specific problems. An example of such a response to a 'national' political problem was the translation of the Bible into Welsh in 1588 - an important means in the preservation of the Welsh language. There were fears that Wales would be against the reformation, ie. the monarch as head of state and church. Elizabeth I. then decided that it should be allowed to use Welsh as well as English in the churches in Wales, and that a translation of the bible in Welsh would be a suitable means to secure Welsh support for the Anglican church, which by then was firmly attached to the English state. For the languages and culture of the Celtic periphery the British governments adopted a policy of practical neglect rather than active suppression.

In 1964 a Welsh Office was established with its own Secretary of State for Wales. It did not have the responsibilities of the Scottish Office, which had been established in 1926, but was an important step towards recognition of Wales as a political and administrative entity. In an article about the Welsh Office, Jones argues that it was neither a political expediency, as there was no electoral dividend for Labour in the policy, neither in the 1959 nor 1964 elections, nor was it just a follow up on the establishment of the Scottish Office. Both the Scottish and the Welsh Offices stand outside the prevailing principle of functional specialisation, on which most Government administration is based, as they are based on a territorial principle. But here the comparison ends, as the establishment of a Scottish Office did not require the extraction of power from Whitehall departments, but rather a unification of various semi-autonomous boards with their own legal framework. The Welsh Office on the other hand required that power be transferred from Whitehall departments,

"without the justification of a separate legal framework but simply on the basis of

establishing an administrative process closer to the people it serves in anticipation that it will be more efficient and effective. If a parallel were to be drawn therefore it should not be with Scotland but with what could happen in the English regions.

Jones sees the role of the Welsh Office as an intermediary between central and local government and as a focus for many of the expectations of the Welsh general public.

During the 1960's administrative devolution and the territorial lobbying of ministers, administrators and MP's increased the Scottish and Welsh distinctiveness. During this period the political parties formulated demands in a territorial framework. This gave rewards in terms of votes for the parties, and benefits for the regions, but required the availability of resources. The high point for Labour came in 1966, when Labour won 32 of the 36 Welsh, and 46 of the 71 Scottish seats in Parliament.

The emerging Welsh and Scottish nationalist movements, with Plaid Cymru and SNP (the Scottish Nationalist Party) running for parliament, posed electoral problems for the major British parties. They additionally posed a constitutional problem, the danger of the breakup of the British state. This problem was dealt with by Labour as a mainly economic problem to be solved by regional development policies.

The language question in Wales was for example accommodated through relatively cheap measures like the Welsh Language Act of 1967, which allowed Welsh to be used in legal procedures and public administration, expansion of Welsh as medium for education, the introduction of bilingual road-signs, and an amount of Welsh-language broadcasting that was larger than for any other minority language in Europe.

As for political concessions, devolution was proposed in 1974, while Labour was under pressure from the SNP in Scotland. There would be directly elected assemblies for both Scotland and Wales. In Scotland the assembly was to have legislative powers, whereas the Welsh assembly only would have executive powers. This difference is a reflection on both the existing administrative Scottish

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framework, as well as a recognition of the perceived greater threat from the Scottish Nationalist Party, compared to that of Plaid Cymru. The question of devolution was decided by a referendum in March 1979. To obtain a majority for devolution at least 40% of the registered voters had to vote in favour. While the Scottish proposal obtained a small majority (among those who voted) but not the necessary 40%, the Welsh rejected devolution by a large majority. The Welsh result mirrors the inadequacy of the devolution proposal, as well as the many divisions in Welsh society - linguistic, geographic and political. After the referendum the idea of a Welsh assembly was for a time abandoned, although the development in Welsh administrative functions continued.

Raymond Williams makes an interesting distinction concerning nationalism in the context of the British state. He suggests that there are two kinds of nationalism. There is that nationalism which reinforces the idea of the traditional nation-state, as was illustrated during the Falklands War. The other kind of nationalism is that which questions the whole basis of the British state. Williams considers the first kind of nationalism to be reactionary, and the second to be progressive. The argument is based on the idea that existing nation-states the size of Britain are both too small and too large for useful politics. They are too small, because the nature of the international economy and the structure of military politics mean that the average nation-state cannot be independent, and if it tries to pretend otherwise, it leaves itself morally and politically vulnerable. The nation-state of Britain is too large because of the unevenness of development and the diversity of areas within it, which makes it impossible to have policy-making in a general sense dominated by a single centre. He argues that self-determination consequently is to be wished for. not only for existing national entities like Wales and Scotland, but also for the English regions.

Economic trends show that peripheralization in Britain has sharpened core-periphery distinctions. According to John Lovering, the macro-economic developments and forms of restructuring adopted in the 1980's resulted in centripetal tendencies. Southern England has become more central to the UK economy in terms

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of output, workforce, employment and the location of growth industries, whereas activity has been drained away from the northern third of England. The peripheries of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland have however not fared so badly. Wales in particular seems to do well on certain economic indicators, such as increase in GDP between 1979-88 and increase in manufacturing GDP in particular. This is however mainly caused by external ownership, as Wales attract a large share of foreign investment. External ownership of the means of production is indeed one of the key ingredients of peripherality. In addition, the figures for Wales disguise the emergence of a marked east-west divide within Wales, where most of the reindustrialization and service sector growth has occurred in south-east Wales and in Clwyd in the north-east.

In the spring of 1992, the issue of devolution again appeared on the political agenda. The SNP seemed to be advancing, and because of the problems posed by a possible election victory for the Scottish Nationalists, all parties addressed the issue of constitutional change both in Scotland and to a lesser degree in Wales. But the election results surprisingly showed a small victory for the Conservatives, and the SNP even though they gained about one third more votes than in 1987, lost one seat and (having gained one seat in a by-election in the meantime) were back to the three seats of 1987. As there seems to be a correlation between regional policy changes and electoral threats to the major political parties, the issue of devolution is probably put on hold for now.

As the above shows, the United Kingdom has responded very diversely to the demands and problems posed by its peripheries, with a mixture of neglect and accommodation depending on the circumstances. As Rokkan and Urwin express it:

"The United Kingdom is the prototypic union state, with an accumulation of disparate historical variations. The centre has responded with ad hoc proposals for specific problems as they arose, without any overall strategy, and in this way has sought to maintain a middle ground between a unitary structure and federalism."}

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8 op. cit. p. 20.
They illustrate the case of Scottish devolution spreading to Wales, and Welsh language television spreading to the Gaels in Scotland: "a major problem is that an attempt to solve one peripheral problem cannot be insulated from the rest of the state: a spillover effect is almost inevitable"\(^{10}\)

When compared to the differently coherent policies of the French state in dealing with its peripheries, the British state has treated peripheral problems as they arose, without any particular consistent strategy. A very important factor however, which has determined the bargaining power of the British peripheral groups has been the need for the political parties to secure the Welsh and Scottish votes. As they could little afford to lose seats to the nationalist parties, which were seen to be gaining support, peripheral demands in the United Kingdom have been accommodated to a much higher degree than in Brittany. In the latter case, the nationalist party UDB - Union Democratique Bretonne - did not pose any real threat to the national French parties, as it only managed to average between 1.87% and 2.20% of the votes in general elections between 1973 and 1981\(^{11}\).

In conclusion, it must be said that the British ad hoc policy, which term also includes the short term accommodation following electoral threats as described above, has led to a higher degree of self determination for the British periphery than is the case in France. A self determination that among other things manifests itself by much better provisions for mass media in the languages of the British periphery.

5.2. The Mass Media in Britain.

The following section will deal mainly with the electronic media in the United Kingdom, as it is the development within these which provides the background for the provision of minority language television and radio.

The British system of organising television is a complicated mixture of public service television - represented by BBC, The British Broadcasting Corporation; and

\(^{10}\) ibid.

\(^{11}\) Loughlin (1985), p. 216.
heavily regulated commercial television, represented by the ITV channels and Channel Four/S4C.

BBC radio started life in 1922 as the British Broadcasting Company with John Reith as the managing director. In January 1927 the BBC changed status and became a public corporation, the British Broadcasting Corporation operating under a royal charter, and with Reith occupying the post of Director-General until 1938. Television arrived in Britain in 1936, and the BBC had monopoly on television broadcasting until 1955. BBC is entirely financed through the licence fee, and is a public service organisation with obligations to 'educate, entertain and inform'. The regional policy of the BBC has changed slightly over time. The early BBC favoured local radio programming, but later during the 1920s and 30s came to be increasingly national and London based. A policy emerged that regional BBC producers should not attempt to do what London could do better, but should focus on what they could do better than London. This policy evolved into a 1929 BBC doctrine of centralisation, deriving from a combination of financial, engineering and administrative arguments. In the 1960's however, the BBC agreed to local radio as part of a political deal involved in outlawing the pirate ship radio stations, and according to Tunstall, this forced the BBC to rethink the structure into which local radio would fit. What then emerged was one policy for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and another for the English provinces.

In 1955 competition and commercial television arrived with the advent of ITV - Independent Television. The ITV system is a federal structure with commercial companies serving different regions, supervised by the IBA - now the ITC (Independent Television Commission). The division of the ITV sector into 14 regions (the 2 licensed contractors in London, makes it 15 companies in all) was due to commercial and practical reasons, rather than a coherent regional media policy. The public service ideals of British broadcasting were carried over in the ITV system in the form of regulation of advertising and programme quality.

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13 op.cit. p. 223.
14 op.cit. p. 234.
The second BBC channel, BBC2, was launched in 1964. It is a 'high brow' channel, that aims to attract different groups of viewers than does BBC1. According to Negrine the structural changes in the media system, such as the launch of BBC2, were due to an acknowledgement by the government in the 1960's of the heterogenous nature of the national audience, and an attempt to serve and exploit sections of it.\(^{15}\)

In the 1970's the viewing pattern was stabilised to a ratio of ITV - 50%, BBC1 - 40% and BBC2 - 10%, which was enough for BBC to legitimize the licence fee. At this time the BBC's public service concepts of balance, impartiality and objectivity came under severe attack. In the old two-party system, in theory the BBC could occupy the middle ground, comfortably balance political opponents against one another and thus achieve the required objectivity. But in an age with increased fragmentation and polarisation, this concept had difficulties in representing the entire political spectrum. New lines of division went across the traditional Conservative-Labour split, such as the ethnic mobilisation in Scotland and Wales, and different social and political groupings demanding access to the media.

Following the Broadcasting Act of 1981, Channel 4 was launched in 1982. The Channel is a break with the traditional broadcasting duopoly in Britain - BBC and ITV, and aims to cater for minority interests, only seeking a 10% share of the total UK television viewing. It is a commercial channel, but regulated separately from the ITV system, directly by the IBA (now ITC). Channel 4 does not work as a production company but as a commissioning agent. It acquires a large part of its programmes from independent producers, which indeed was a novelty at the time and which has caused the emergence of a new force in the British television industry - the independent production companies. The funding of Channel 4 was up to 1993 linked to the ITV system, with the ITV companies selling Channel 4's airtime and paying a subscription to the IBA (ITC) to fund the channel. The Fourth Channel subscription was set to 17% of the ITV Programme Contractors' Net Advertising Revenue (NAR). The brief of the Channels' programming was according to the 1981 Broadcasting Act (section 11), to cater for tastes and interests not generally catered

for by ITV; to ensure that a suitable proportion of the programmes are of an educational nature; and to encourage innovation and experiment in the form and content of programmes. The division of the audience between the four British terrestrial channels was in 1990 as follows: BBC 1: 39.2%, BBC 2: 9.9%, ITV: 42.5%, and Channel 4: 8.4%.¹⁶

A separate arrangement was made for Wales, which got its own version of Channel 4, "Sianel Pedwar Cymru" (the Welsh Fourth Channel) alias S4C, with its own separate authority. The provisions for funding were originally that S4C was to receive 20% of the Channel Four subscription paid by the ITV companies, and that the local ITV company for Wales and the West, HTV (Harlech Television) was to sell S4C's airtime.

The political and cultural background for the advent of S4C as a separate channel, will be elaborated upon in chapter 7 onwards. However a few words might be relevant in this context concerning the situation in Scotland, which became a part of the Channel 4 system in line with other regions in Britain, apart from Wales. As Scottish nationalism is less bound up in the Gaelic language than is the case for Wales and the Welsh language, there was less pressure for a separate Gaelic Channel. Because of the lack of political institutions in Wales, the issue of broadcasting achieved a significance - emotional as well as rational - it could never achieve in Scotland. The few existing Gaelic programmes are broadcast on BBC Scotland and the ITV channels, but with only some 2% of the population speaking Gaelic, a separate Gaelic Channel would be difficult to argue for. However skilful lobbying in connection with the 1990 Broadcasting Act has brought about some £9.5 million a year for an extended Gaelic language service, run by a Gaelic Television Committee, which is based in Stornoway on the Isle of Lewis, in the Gaelic heartland. The service started broadcasting January 1993, both on BBC Scotland and the Scottish ITV channels.

The relationship between the BBC and the state is of a different nature to that of for example France, where political control has been strong and apparent. In Britain the BBC is in principle independent of the state (apart from funding),

although the Home Secretary has power of veto over programmes (seldom or never used). But the BBC has imposed upon itself a standard of self-regulation, as it "sees itself as an institution within the constitution". In Raymond Williams’s terms the BBC is as an autonomous organisation state-linked rather than state directed. The existence of the BBC as a public corporation is according to Williams due to the fact that there is something very specific about British culture:

"We have an unusually compact ruling class with very deeply shared cultural assumptions and habits, which allows much of the effective state life of this country, things which would in other countries be the province of the state and of official agencies, to be delegated to public appointed authorities which have a certain measure of autonomy. If you look into the real relation of those corporations to the state, then you find of course that they are subject in financial policy finally to the state, that the heads of the organisations are appointed, a characteristic of this method, but are then given the kind of term of service which takes them beyond the patronage of any particular government."

This is very different to the situation in France where the upper echelons of the French state broadcaster used to change with the electoral winds of fortune.

The future of public service broadcasting in Britain is however uncertain at the moment as the whole system is being challenged by the advent of cable and satellite TV, and with the BBC Charter up for renewal in 1996.

In 1985 a committee was established under the chairmanship of Professor Alan Peacock to investigate the future funding of the BBC. When the Peacock Committee published its report in July 1986, the recommendations were that the BBC’s licence fee was to be retained, and that BBC should not take advertising. The committee pointed out, that advertising finance was not likely to produce a programme mix that would correspond to viewers preferences. In addition the pool of advertising finance in the UK was not considered sufficient to sustain the present broadcasting structure, so a license fee or other non-advertising revenue would be required.

Following the Peacock report the Government in 1988 published a White Paper: "Broadcasting in the '90s: Competition, choice and quality", where it was stated that the BBC license fee would continue for some time to come. However all

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television services including the BBC would be given freedom to raise finance through subscription and sponsorship. Channel Four's distinctive remit of catering for minorities was to be continued, as well as the Welsh Fourth Channel, which was considered to have fulfilled its expectations. It was recognised that unlike Channel 4, there was no realistic prospect of S4C's advertising revenue covering its programming and transmission costs, and that some sort of state financing consequently would be necessary 18.

As recommended in the Peacock report, the Government also stipulated that the proportion of programming supplied by independent producers was to rise to 25% by 1992, both for the BBC and the ITV companies. This provision, however, has not brought about any significant change in programmes, as a way round this requirement has been to let some of the existing programme staff go independent, and then commission back the programmes they were already producing in-house. If anything, the provision has been an advantage for the broadcasting companies, as it provides them with a painless way of shedding staff. The new independents on the other hand have no guarantee of work when their initial contracts have ended.

The new Broadcasting Act of 1990 was intended to deregulate the commercial system, and brought about changes in the way the ITV - or Channel 3 - franchises were to be allocated. The franchises were to be given to applicants who offered to make the largest annual payment to the Exchequer, while meeting criteria about programme quality and financial security. In the previous system the payment of the ITV companies was related to advertising revenue. From January 1993 Channel 4 and S4C have to sell their own airtime, instead of having the ITV companies to sell it for them. S4C however only has to earn a small part of the budget by selling its air-time. The main part will be paid directly from the Treasury as the envisaged advertising revenue from Wales would not be enough to finance the Channel.

After the Channel 3 franchises had been disposed of, came the time for the Channel 5 franchises. The Fifth Channel was supposed to be a reality from 1994, but the project have been delayed, if not shelved. A terrestrial Channel 5 would only

be able to cover approximately 70% of the country, but as new antennae and retuning of VCR's would be necessary in the reception areas, this meant that even the 70% coverage could not be a certainty, a fact which made the prospect of finance a problem.

It is still uncertain what the increased use of cable and satellite in the future will mean for the British broadcasting structure, apart from more competition, and perhaps a smaller slice of the advertising revenue cake for the commercial channels. Cable has got potential in terms of local - or community broadcasting, but is at present little developed in Britain (approximately 2%)\(^9\). The history of satellite in the United Kingdom, has been somewhat bumpy so far with two companies BSB and Sky, offering competing satellite direct-to-home television services during the late 1980's, which resulted in losses, in particular for BSB, and a merger of the two companies in 1990 into British Sky Broadcasting, with three to five channels on the Astra satellite. As Britain is only slightly cabled, the penetration of satellite depends mainly on the sale of dishes. Autumn 1992 satellite reached some 14% of homes in the United Kingdom. The penetration for Wales (ITV region) was similarly 14%.\(^10\)

Autumn of 1991 presented the potential of radically changing the media scene in Wales, ie. the allocation of the new ITV franchises. The Broadcasting Act from 1990, states that the franchise goes to the highest bidder, in a kind of 'blind auction' provided the bid passes a quality threshold. Only in exceptional circumstances, could the ITC give the franchise to the non-highest bidder, if there were outstanding quality reasons to do so (paragraph 17.3). The blind auction which was meant to give more money to the Treasury, turned out to be a very lucrative affair for those companies who knew that they were not going to be bid against. As there was no reserve required for the bidders, but only that the bid be submitted in units of a thousand, some of the most lucrative ITV companies in the country have got licences for as little as £5.000 per year. Conversely in the area where it was known that there would many bidders, the bids reached ridiculous proportions, and some of these companies may have overbid themselves in order to get the franchise.


\(^20\) Wilcox & Doe (1992), p. 4.
In the ITC's "Invitation to apply for regional Channel 3 licences", they underlined the importance of the regional content of the new channel. Regional programmes are defined as programmes (including news programmes) which are of particular interest to persons living within the region (or subregion) for which the service is provided, and which are broadcast exclusively for them. (Paragraph 92)

This is of particular relevance for Wales, and sparked a lively debate about the Welsh context of the English language commercial channel. The situation is however complicated by it being a dual franchise area "Wales and the West", including the Bristol area, which incidentally is a very rich area and therefore of considerable interest for a commercial channel. The ITC's minimum requirements of regional programming per region per week are for Wales, 8 hours and for the West 7 hours and 30 minutes (paragraph 96).

Figure 5.2.1.: Channel 3 Areas.
The Wales and the West area attracted four bidders, one of the highest number in the country. The reasons for the many interested companies might be the rumoured economic difficulties of the incumbent ITV company HTV (Harlech Television), which made it an easy target, as well as a general dissatisfaction with the choice of English language programmes of relevance for Wales. Of the four bids only two passed the quality threshold, HTV's and that of a company called C3W (Channel 3 Wales), which had recruited key personnel from S4C. Of those two the HTV bid was the highest at £18.8 million a year, whereas C3W bid £17.8 million. The HTV bid constitutes in 1993 prices £20.53 million to be payed to the Treasury\(^\text{21}\). As the incumbent company kept the franchise, not much change was envisaged, although HTV's economic difficulties seemed to continue, the company shedding large numbers of staff.

Concerning the effect of regional television on the attitudes of British people, Butt Philip argues that

\begin{quote}
the increase in regional programmes, especially news and current affairs programmes, has served to promote regional and national loyalties within the United Kingdom by adding a perspective to British news that did not previously exist in broadcasting, and by supplying the public with new and more information about events and developments in their own regions\(^\text{22}\).
\end{quote}

Consequently the provision of regional programming in English from the Welsh ITV channel as well as that of BBC-Wales becomes of relevance to the general question of the impact of television on Welsh cultural identity.

The following study of television news coverage of Wales and the Welsh Nationalist Party, Plaid Cymru, conducted before the start of S4C, shows how little coverage there traditionally has been of Wales, and of what type this coverage has been. Through the years Plaid Cymru and others have complained that politics in Wales was virtually ignored by the London news. The traditional answer has been that Wales has got its own 'internal network', which even before the appearance of S4C was the envy of other European minorities. But this Welsh internal broadcasting network has often been perceived as being dominated by other


\(^{22}\) Butt Philip (1975), p. 70.
centralised networks (BBC/ITV) and additionally strongly influenced by the cultural, political and economic traditions of those networks. When Wales is covered in the national (UK) news the identities that are represented are cultural: wit, sport, poetry and song. Politics in British news means Parliament, and hence "marginalizing anyone else into the 'un-newsworthy' or the 'extra-parliamentary' and 'illegitimate'".23

The results of a study of the representation of Plaid Cymru and Wales, in the weekday news and current affairs television programmes broadcast to Wales, illustrates Hagerstrand's point in section 2.4.5. that telemedia tend to emphasize the national (UK) and international level at the cost of local and regional content. During the month of the study, February/March 1982, there was not one item on the two main daily UK wide television news programmes, 'News at Ten' and 'Nine O'Clock News', that even hinted at the existence of Plaid Cymru. SNP, the Scottish Nationalist Party, was only mentioned because of a by-election24. So woe betide non-London parties, they apparently do not matter in British politics.

As for the treatment of Plaid Cymru in the Cardiff news programmes, the amount of coverage was adequate. The authors of the study were however not satisfied with the mere amount of coverage, they wanted to assess in what way Plaid Cymru was covered - how the selection or exclusion of newsworthy stories represented the party in the news: The study showed that because of the exclusion of (otherwise newsworthy) stories from the news, the party became depicted:

"as not being involved in international affairs, civil rights, labour and industrial issues.
It is not represented as an alternative anti-Tory party and it is not seen as being involved in British politics".25

On the other hand the stories selected about the party identified it overall as a party that was still carrying out the nationalist style of the past.

"These Plaid activities are newsworthy because they fit into the historically established

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24 op. cit. p. 212.
25 op. cit. p. 209.
images of what nationalism is, and of Plaid being that sort of nationalist party"\(^{26}\) and
"As a result it [Plaid] is systematically marginalised, pushed out to the very edges of
a political terrain that news itself plays a major role in shaping. Plaid’s place on this
terrain is reduced to little more than minor community politics"\(^{27}\)

On top of this representation comes the combination of invisibility and
marginalisation that characterizes Wales itself in the national news:
"There cannot be a party (Plaid) Wales (Cymru) if there isn’t even a country Wales in
the news."\(^{28}\)

The above study of television news in Wales, was made before S4C came into
operation, but it does serve to underline the necessity for a Welsh channel.

Finally in completing this section on the Media in Britain, it would be
pertinent to discuss the issue of Public Service Broadcasting - PSB. Generally
speaking PSB involves the following elements\(^{29}\): Accountability to the political
system i.e. the public, which is realised through some form of administrative
organisation. An element of public finance, where programmes are not made for
profit for its own sake, as in the private commercial system. A close regulation of
content, including rules of balance, impartiality, and service of minority interests.
Universal service in geographical terms, whereby the audience is addressed more as
citizens than as consumers. And finally an element of protection from competition.

In most European countries, dual or mixed systems have replaced the public
monopolies, which existed ten years ago. The British system is a dual system, where
public stations have to compete with private commercial ones. It involves the public
BBC plus a regulated commercial sector, both of which however have public service
functions and are accountable to parliament. Recently however the concept of Public
Service Broadcasting both in Britain and abroad has faced a challenge from the
development of an increasingly commercialised and internationalised broadcasting
landscape. As a result of this challenge, which also includes a general uncertainty

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\(^{26}\) ibid.

\(^{27}\) op. cit. p. 218.

\(^{28}\) op. cit. p. 219.

concerning the future of the BBC after the renewal of the Charter in 1996, the BBC has adopted a more competitive strategy. This strategy involves competitive scheduling, in order to keep what are deemed satisfactory audience shares during peak viewing time; as well as cost-cutting exercises, such as the slimming-down of the organization.

A public service broadcaster’s concern with viewing figures, is explained in terms of legitimacy. Are there enough people watching, to justify the license fee, which is the basis for the survival of the organization. It is possible however to talk about legitimacy not only in an economic context, but also in terms of access. The BBC as a public service broadcaster has traditionally had privileged access not only to limited resources, but also to the nation’s television screens. If the BBC viewing figures fall sufficiently, other groups within the broadcasting environment could argue that they be allowed to take over, when the charter comes up for renewal.

In general British media policy can be described as characterized by gradualism - slow change, continuous evolution and policy consensus. There seems to be a lack of explicit and coherent media policy, which lead to ad hoc solutions. It is among other things this lack of a coherent media policy, which has made it possible for territorial and linguistic minorities to gain recognition of their cultural demands in the field of broadcasting. Admissions to one minority, like the Welsh, could very well bring with it further demands from other groups, such as the Gaelic speakers in Scotland, which the state would not be able to refuse on the grounds of policy - although it might very well refuse on economic grounds.

As opposed to the case of France, where a 'national' (state) ideology - perceiving the Republic as a unity - coupled with a conscious policy of assimilation, has enabled the French state to control thoroughly its linguistic and territorial minorities, the British state has not had that opportunity, and has consequently had to yield to pressures from its territorial minorities, which again is reflected in the area of broadcasting.

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Chapter 6. WALES.


Prior to the English conquest in 1282 Wales had consisted of a number of independent principalities, without any political unity. However, according to the historian K.O. Morgan, the Welsh possessed many attributes of national identity: their own language, spoken by a majority of the population, an overall ethnic homogeneity, and a continuous history as a distinct race, inhabiting a separate geographical area of the British Isles, for over thirteen hundred years.

"The Welsh retained their own legends, their folk memories and songs, a sense of shared experience and suffering over the centuries, with myths in abundance from Arthurian days down to the cultural renaissance of the eighteenth century." ¹

The last of the Welsh principalities, Gwynedd was conquered by Edward I in 1282. In 1400, however, Owain Glyndwr - a Welsh aristocrat - became the leader of a national rebellion directed against the English colonial regime. The revolt collapsed in 1410 and Glyndwr disappeared.

But in 1485 Henry Tudor acceded to the throne of England after the "Wars of the Roses" as Henry VII. Henry was of Welsh descent through his father, and with a claim to the English throne through his mother. His political base was in Wales, and the English court consequently became dominated by anglicised Welsh noblemen.

During the reign of Henry VIII, Wales became completely incorporated in the English governmental system with the "Act of Union" of 1536, introduction of English law, courts etc. English became accordingly the official language and language of liturgation, and it was forbidden for public office holders to use the Welsh language under threat of losing their office. The Welsh upper class - the landed gentry - became increasingly anglicised, and therefore isolated from a large part of the population, which consisted of monoglot Welsh speakers.

Ironically enough it was Henry VIII's daughter Elizabeth I, who supplied

Wales with the means to preserve the Welsh language - the Bible in Welsh, which was printed in 1588. It provided a literary standard for modern Welsh. As church attending was mandatory, it can be assumed that a majority of the Welsh population every Sunday listened to the Bible in Welsh.

In the beginning of the 1800's two things happened which, according to Morgan, drastically changed the situation in Wales: The first was increased industrialisation. In south Wales coal mines and iron works filled the valleys, and by 1914 the British economy was dependent on the Welsh coal mines. This industrialisation was followed by the growth of a number of larger towns: Cardiff, Newport, Swansea and Merthyr Tydfil. There is disagreement however about what the industrialisation has meant for Welsh nationalism. Some have seen it as a retarding factor in the creation of a national consciousness, as Wales and England became tied closer together economically. Others like K.O. Morgan, have seen it as the opposite. He argues that the industrialisation in Wales worked as a safety valve for the surplus population from the poor agricultural areas. Instead of having to emigrate, as was the case in Ireland for example, it was possible to find work in the new industrial areas in south Wales. In the words of Gwyn A. Williams: "Instead, Wales retained a living people and sustained a massive increase in its numbers. The remarkable Welsh national revival of the nineteenth century would have been inconceivable without it." The new towns that grew everywhere in Wales supplied many of the tools for the revival of national feeling in the late part of the nineteenth century: Chapels, Welsh newspapers, local "eisteddfodau" (music/poetry festivals), and choir festivals.

The other big change in Wales was the explosive rise in nonconformism. Methodists, Baptists, 'Independents' and other sects flourished. The number of chapels grew - even in smaller villages there could be 3-4 different chapels. In 1900, of the 434,000 members of the four major denominations in Wales, well over 300,000 attended Welsh-language chapels, which were popular focuses for social and cultural activities. The Sunday schools gave opportunities for teaching of both

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children and adults, also in non-religious subjects, and the chapels functioned as a kind of political nursery for a lot of people, as well as providing possibilities for the exercise of rhetorical skills in the Welsh language.

Non-conformism in Wales became increasingly "Welsh", and in the last half of the nineteenth century, the national movement in Wales came primarily from the chapels, whereas the anglican church was hostile towards it. This division of the faiths mirrors an important issue in Wales throughout several generations, that is, the question of "disestablishment" - separation of the Welsh church from the Church of England, which had become a symbol of the anglicised gentry's dominant role in Wales. Disestablishment united Welsh radicals to a greater extent than any other subject, and it was the final symbol of national equality before 1914.

An element important in the growth of Welsh national consciousness, lacking in the Nonconformist Welsh revival, was a recollective link with Welsh history and literature. This element was supplied by the romantic revival, which in the eighteenth century swept through Europe. This revival led to a renewal of interest in the history and languages of minority peoples, something which often had been consciously repressed by dominating nation-states. The Welsh cultural revival was initiated by exiled London Welsh, who formed various literary societies, such as the Society of the Cymmrodorion, aiming to resurrect and popularize (and sometimes invent) 'traditional' Welsh myths, literature and poetry. A result of this revival was the renewal of the tradition of the Eisteddfod in 1789, a medieval poetry festival.

In "The Invention of Tradition", Prys Morgan describes the hunt for the Welsh past in the romantic period:

"The Wales we have been describing was not a political state, and for want of such a state the people were driven to give a disproportionate amount of their energies to cultural matters, to the recovery of the past and, where the past was found wanting, to its invention".

He continues,

"The historic revival and the invention of tradition had an effect in Wales more far-reaching than anything comparable in England, though it did resemble what was

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happening in small European countries. An important political issue was Home Rule for Wales, which was advocated by the "Cymru Fydd" movement - the original Welsh nationalist movement. Cymru Fydd - Wales Will Be - was founded, amongst others, by the young Lloyd George in 1886 to "facilitate the attainment of a National Legislature for Wales with full control over all purely Welsh business, and a Welsh Executive responsible to the Imperial Parliament where Wales would still be represented." 

A further impetus for the Welsh national movement was political change. The 1867 and 1884 electoral reforms brought about a change of the political picture in Wales. From having been dominated by conservative Tories from the landed gentry, who more or less inherited the parliamentary seats, Liberal MP's were elected all over Wales. The Liberal party, and particularly the radical nonconformist part, subsequently dominated Welsh politics from 1868 till 1922. In 1890 David Lloyd George was elected MP for Caernarfon. He was in favour of Disestablishment, and also Home Rule until 1896, when the Home Rule issue fell because of disagreements between the different Liberal groupings in Wales. After that time no prominent Liberals approached the issue of Home Rule; and with Lloyd George, a Welshman, as leader of the British Liberal party and later Prime Minister, the Welsh Liberals felt that they were "on the map" as it were.

The movement for higher education in Wales was a prominent aspect of Welsh national feeling - and also dominated by non-conformist Liberals. It effected the formation of a large number of schools, which had an important effect on social mobility in Wales. By 1902, there were 95 'county' schools in Wales, which were secondary schools, partly supported by the rates. In 1893 the "University of Wales" was formed on a federal basis, so that the three different Colleges in Wales (now five) could come together in a national unity.

In 1920 Disestablishment was finally achieved, with the creation of the

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6 op.cit. p. 99.
8 P. Berresford Ellis (1968), p. 69.
Church of Wales, but at that time the Liberals in Wales were already in retreat and the Labour ascendency had started. After World War I, (with Lloyd George as Prime Minister) the Liberals lost their dominant position to Labour, whose powerbase was in the industrial south Wales. For example the first Labour MP to be elected in Wales - Keir Hardie - was elected in Merthyr Tydfil in south Wales in 1900. The rise of Labour led to a greater interest in economic questions than in nationalist ones. In the mining areas the class conflicts had been aggravated and for the proletariat the old radical liberal program, disestablishment, education and agrarian as well as temperance reforms, was irrelevant compared to questions of wages, working conditions etc.
The present nationalist movement originated in 1925 with the formation of "Plaid Cymru" - the Welsh Nationalist Party. Its original members were predominantly intellectuals, such as clergymen, university professors and school teachers, but there was also a large element of quarry workers from Gwynedd in north west Wales. The aim of the party was to preserve the Welsh culture and lifestyle. In the beginning the two most important questions were: the preservation of the Welsh language and the role of religion in Welsh society.

Plaid Cymru was, from the start, a nationalist pressure group, formed in order to counteract the increased English influence in Wales. The party perceived the problems in Wales as an effect of the inherently unsatisfactory political relationship between England and Wales, the situation being reinforced by the processes of modernization. As anglicization was for Plaid Cymru the key threat to Wales and Welsh, its political programme was in the early days dominated by the fight for the survival of the language. Plaid Cymru fought in parliamentary elections from 1929, but did not generally receive many votes. But then of course, the British electoral "First-past-the-post" system does not exactly facilitate the life of small parties, people often voting strategically for the candidate who has the best chance of defeating the party that they do not like.

The members of Plaid Cymru consequently resorted to scattered protest actions against what they saw as English domination, culminating in an arson attack on a RAF bombing school on the Llyn peninsula in 1936. The episode brought increased support for Plaid Cymru, but illustrates the party's lack of influence via the existing political channels. C.H. Williams explains the radicalisation of minority groups excluded from political influence:

"The Plaid Cymru experience confirms that periodic or permanent exclusion from power sharing tends to instil a deep sense of alienation amongst minorities; an alienation which, if not consumed within the political processes, can lead to demands for outright secession. Thus typically, demands for limited cultural equality, if not appeased, can lead on to demands for cultural autonomy and in turn may escalate to demands for political sovereignty."\(^{10}\)

The fact that Plaid Cymru concentrated its efforts on cultural and language matters,
however limited its appeal in non-Welsh speaking areas. By this time only a minority in Wales spoke Welsh, and the emphasis on the Welsh language tended to have a divisive effect.

World War II brought problems for Plaid Cymru, as many of the members were declared pacifists, as they did not identify with the British state, a stance which was not popular at the time. Surprisingly enough however the party was relatively successful just after the war in by-elections in two industrial areas Ogmore (30%) and Aberdare (20%). The campaign however, was conducted on issues relating to unemployment and economic questions, and not cultural issues. In the late 50’s Plaid Cymru changed its tactics, to concentrate more on economic and social aspects than had been the case before. An issue lacking in the nationalist debate, was an economic reasoning for autonomy, or Home Rule. The argument of Plaid Cymru was that the British centralised policies were ineffective in the allocation of goods and services to the population in the peripheries. Now the aim is self-government for Wales to safeguard the culture, language, traditions and economic life of the nation. As Gwynfor Evans puts it: "political freedom in the context of economic interdependence" The traditional Plaid Cymru policies, with emphasis on cooperation, decentralization, anti-militarism and anti-imperialism, was extended in 1981, when the party conference decided to declare the achievement of a Welsh decentralized socialist state to be one of the fundamental aims of Plaid Cymru. A state within the Commonwealth with full membership of the United Nations and the European Economic Community.

A new and more radical group, "Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg" - the Welsh Language Society - was formed in 1962, as a protest against Plaid Cymru’s new policy with its lesser emphasis on the language question, and as a direct consequence of a BBC radio lecture given by Saunders Lewis - founder and former president of Plaid Cymru - in 1962, "Tynged yr Iaith" (The fate of the language), about the necessity of using revolutionary methods in the fight for preservation of the Welsh language. There was, among many young Welsh speakers, dissatisfaction

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with Plaid Cymru's insistence on keeping within the constitutional framework. They were for a campaign of non-violent direct action. Cymdeithas' actions: demonstrations, sit-ins, painting of English-language roadsigns etc. caused the Welsh language to become a politically explosive issue as never before.

In the mid 1960's a number of things happened that gave the nationalist movement impetus. Firstly the Welsh Office was formed in 1964. Secondly there was widespread support for the nationalists' demonstrations against the opening of the Tryweryn reservoir in 1965. The new reservoir involved the removal of a whole village and subsequently flooding of their valley to supply cheap water to the Liverpool area. The decision was taken in London, and Welsh local authorities were powerless to influence the decision. In addition most of the Welsh MP's voted against the Bill to no avail. After that time water - and water prices - have become a very emotional issue in Wales. Thirdly a government committee report recommended that Welsh could be used along with English in public administration and in the courts, which became law with "The Welsh Language Act" of 1967.

In 1966 Plaid Cymru's president, Gwynfor Evans, won the party's first parliamentary seat in a by-election in Carmarthen, and the following years saw increased membership of the party and more efficient electoral campaigns. In the 1974 election, Plaid Cymru obtained three seats, all in the more Welsh speaking areas. In the elections of 1979 and 1983 Plaid kept the two seats in north-west Wales, Caernarfon and Merionnydd. In 1987, the Conservative member for Anglesey (Ynys Mon) was forced to step down after a financial scandal, and Plaid Cymru subsequently won the seat in the 1987 general election, now controlling three constituencies in Wales. In the election in April 1992, Plaid held on to these three seats and won a fourth, Ceredigion, from the Liberal Democrats.

The social background for Plaid Cymru supporters is according to a 1978/79 survey as follows: Plaid Cymru seems to derive slightly more support from men than from women, and from the younger age groups. Support is drawn from all social grades, but there is a slight bias toward the middle class, the AB and C1 categories. However in absolute numbers, nearly two thirds of its votes come from

the working class. The most significant indicator of Plaid Cymru voting is the language. Welsh speakers are nearly five times as likely to vote for Plaid Cymru as are non Welsh-speakers.

The political representation in Wales in general has changed from predominantly Liberal during the years 1880 to 1914. From the 1920's until the late 1960's the Labour party was steadily advancing, but during the 1970's and 1980's the Conservative party has begun to play a part in Welsh politics. The electoral pattern in Wales has become more patchy with several marginal constituencies. "Thus, within twenty years Wales has seen the highpoint of Labour domination (32 seats out of 36 in 1966) and the highest number of Conservatives returned from Wales this century (14 out of 38 in 1983)\textsuperscript{14}

The latest 1992 election continued the trends from the 1987 election: a fall in Conservative support to 6 seats, a rise for Labour to 27 seats, a fall for the Liberal Alliance to 1 seat, and a rise for Plaid Cymru, to 4. Added to this is the fact that a number of the Welsh constituencies are marginal, among them is in fact the most marginal in the parliament, Vale of Glamorgan, regained by the Conservatives in 1992 with a majority of 19 votes. Such a volatile electoral situation in Wales meant according to "The Economist", that the parties now had to do something for Welsh interests: "The Labour party can no longer afford to take Welsh votes for granted; the Conservative party can no longer afford to write it off as a political dead loss. Both parties now have an electoral interest in promoting Wales' prosperity"\textsuperscript{15}

The importance of marginal constituencies was illustrated by Gwynfor Evans, describing how the decision to close the Mid-Wales railway line by the 1966 Labour Government was changed, when the Secretary of State for Wales pointed out that it ran through six marginal constituencies.\textsuperscript{16}

In the beginning of the seventies Labour began to feel itself under pressure in Wales, as well as in Scotland. As a result the government began to take the

\textsuperscript{14} D. Balsom (1985), p. 11.

\textsuperscript{15} The Economist, 2-8/2-1985.

question of devolution more seriously. There were many Labour MP's, especially from south Wales, that were against the idea (one example was Neil Kinnock, the subsequent leader of the Labour Party), but in general it was thought that with the development in Welsh and Scottish nationalism taken into consideration, it would be political suicide not to do anything. In 1974 the Labour government suggested that there should be directly-elected assemblies for both Wales and Scotland. The important difference between these was, that the Scottish assembly was to have legislative powers, while the Welsh was only to have an executive role. The same number of MP's were supposed to be elected to the British parliament as before, which was important. Because Wales and Scotland traditionally have been Labour strongholds, it could affect the party's possibilities of ever getting into power again, if Labour had reduced the number of Welsh and Scottish MP's.

As mentioned in chapter 5, the question of devolution was decided by a referendum in Scotland and Wales on the 1st of March 1979. The Welsh rejected the devolution proposal with a great majority. With a voting turnout of 58.3% for the whole of Wales, the votes in favour constituted 11.8% of the total electorate, and the votes against 46.5%. This was a solid rejection of the devolution proposal, and mirrors the many divisions in Welsh society. The governments information campaign was very inadequate, and the effect of the campaign started by those members of Labour who were against the devolution proposal was greater. Although a somewhat doubtful argument, since only 20% of the Welsh population speak Welsh, their contention was that the Welsh parliament would become dominated by Welsh speakers, and this would adversely affect the English speakers in south Wales. On the other hand, the population in north-west Wales suffered from a similar fear. They were afraid that the elected assembly would become dominated by English-speaking Labour supporters from south Wales. The controversy illustrates that the divisions in today's Wales are in the areas of language and geography as well as politics. Finally there was the problem, even for the Welshmen

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18 K.O. Morgan, p. 405.  
who wanted devolution, that the government’s proposals were unattractive. The opinion polls showed that many wanted a more extensive devolution proposal, with legislative competence instead of just administrative powers.

After the referendum and the subsequent electoral defeat of the Labour Government, heralding a long period of Conservative rule, the development in Welsh administrative functions has paradoxically gained a new momentum. The last ten years have seen the establishment of new national institutions: initially S4C - the Welsh Fourth Channel; all-Wales bodies for Welsh medium education, health education, and sites of historic interest, and towards the end of the 1980’s: a National Curriculum Council, a Welsh Committee of the UK University Funding Council, a Welsh Housing Corporation - Tai Cymru - and a Welsh Language Board to promote the status of the language. The Welsh Office has had its responsibilities extended, most importantly by securing responsibility for the allocation of a block grant for expenditures, which is negotiated yearly directly with the Treasury. Finally Welsh Office Ministers have attempted to create strategies aimed at securing economic regeneration in Wales, mainly through the Welsh Development Agency. The paradox in this increased interventionism lies in the fact that it has taken place in a period with a Conservative Government, whose policy, in theory, has been to wholly withdraw from economic intervention. The Welsh Office now administers some 80% of public expenditure in Wales, (3,500 million pounds in 1988-89), and employs around 2,300 civil servants. In the absence of a directly elected Welsh assembly this size can pose problems of accountability. How can democratic control be exercised - from Westminster? John Osmond argues that "The full significance of the failure of achieving an Assembly in 1979 can now be seen as allowing control of the Welsh Office to fall into the hands of a Conservative administration."²¹

Of importance in this context are trends in unemployment, and earnings in Wales. How is Wales faring compared to the rest of Britain? Table 6.1.1. below, shows the trends in unemployment in Wales and in the United Kingdom as a whole. The figures show, that there is generally higher unemployment in Wales than in the


²¹ op.cit. p. 85.
UK. Regarding average income, people in Great Britain as a whole earn more than in Wales, and the gap is widening. In 1990, men in Wales earned on average 87.5 per cent as much as men in Great Britain as a whole earned, compared to 96.3 per cent in 1979. The same trend is evident for women, where the figures are 89.5 per cent in 1990 compared to 97.5 per cent in 1979.\textsuperscript{22}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\hline
Wales & 14.4 & 12.7 & 10.3 & 7.5 & 6.6 & 8.7 & 10.0 & 10.4 & 10.1 & 9.4 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Unemployment (percent)}
\end{table}

Table 6.1.1.\textsuperscript{23}

As the above figures show there is cause for concern, both for the groups within Wales, who want a higher degree of self-determination for Wales, as well as for the larger political parties, who want to appease the Welsh electorate, in order to keep Wales within the 'political pen', as it were.

In connection with the 1992 General Election, the question of a Welsh Assembly was again put on the agenda. Because of the pressure from Scotland, all parties have addressed the issue of constitutional reform. The Conservative Party went as far as to not entirely rule out the possibility of considering constitutional change in Scotland after the election. In Wales however they promised the passing of a new Welsh Language Act immediately in the new Parliament. The Labour Party promised the creation of both Scottish and Welsh assemblies, should Labour win the election. An opinion poll from February 1992, showed that within Wales there was now a majority in favour of a Welsh assembly. Among those with a firm opinion the figures were 60% for and 40% against a Welsh assembly. If an assembly were already introduced in Scotland, some 72% of those with a firm opinion (ignoring the

\textsuperscript{22} Welsh Social Trends, No.8 1991, p. 61.

21% undecided) would be in favour of a Welsh assembly. However as the Conservative Party won the April 1992 election, the issue of a Welsh Assembly is now effectively shelved once again, and even the Language Act was postponed. The development in Wales up to the last election is quite illustrative of the argument of chapter 5. The large parties in Britain have no firm policy concerning the regions, it is instead a question of gaining as many votes as possible, and of which party is able to win with the least concessions promised.

6.2. Contemporary Wales - Economic and Social Diversity.

In the following section issues of economic and social diversity in Wales are addressed, and supplemented with recent analyses of the class structure in Wales. In a review of the sociology of Wales, Graham Day remarks on the extreme diversity of Welsh society:

"the problems and orientations of different sections of Welsh society are widely diverse. Thus the everyday concerns of people in Mid-Wales - depopulation, decay of social provision, tourism, second homes, the struggle to preserve a language - do not find straightforward correspondences in the valleys and cities of south Wales, or, indeed on Deeside where issues of decision-making in nationalized industries, the role of multi-nationals and large-scale movements of capital, urbanization and suburbanization, bulk larger."25

At present only the barest outline of a political sociology of Wales and Welsh nationalism exist:

"The existence of a Welsh ruling class has not been examined, while very little is known about the nature of Welsh elites, the articulation of elite groups, its bearing on the practice of government or wielding of economic power, and the management of opposition"26

The internal structural and spatial diversity characterizing Welsh society, remarked

24 Western Mail 24/2 - 1992.


26 op. cit. p. 160.
upon above, is confirmed in two studies, the first by Giggs and Pattie in an analysis of the 1981 census figures with regards to social class cleavages in Welsh society, and the second by Aitchison and Carter in an analysis of the 1991 census figures concerning language and social class in Wales.

According to Giggs and Pattie, the distribution of the following four groupings of the census socio-economic groups\(^{27}\): Service class, Petite Bourgeoisie, White-collar proletariat and Blue-collar proletariat within Wales, showed "that Wales is a mosaic of distinctive regions in which the contemporary social class divisions still strongly reflect the inheritance of past cycles of economic and social development".\(^{28}\)

The petite bourgeoisie were massively overrepresented, related to the average in Great Britain as a whole, in rural Wales, with the farming communities as well as the many small businesses located in both the countryside and in the region's small towns. The blue collar proletariat in contrast, were quite strongly over-represented in the three counties which straddle the south Wales coalfield (West Glamorgan, Mid Glamorgan and Gwent), and slightly over-represented in Clwyd, which embraces the much smaller north Wales coalfield. In these areas, however, the solidly traditional masculine and manual working-class character has been considerably diluted and increasingly differentiated since their heyday, around 1921, by massive emigration (especially during the Great Depression), industrial decline and restructuring, and by the postwar development of new state-sponsored and private sector manufacturing and service industries. By 1981 about a fifth (19.3 per cent) of the employment in manufacturing and service industries was found in foreign-owned (chiefly American) firms, and these were concentrated mainly in south and north-east Wales\(^{29}\). South Glamorgan is, according to Giggs and Pattie, the youngest major socio-economic region in Wales. It is also the country's only region in which, in 1981, both the high-status service class and the lower-status white-collar proletariat were over-represented compared to the rates for Great Britain

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\(^{28}\) op. cit. p. 40.

\(^{29}\) op. cit. p. 42
in general. Giggs and Pattie finds that, this clustering of the Principality's new middle and working classes into the south-eastern coastlands has drained the rest of the country, creating a 'core' and 'periphery' which in microcosm, mimic the broader pattern of Great Britain as a whole.  

In 1981, one in five of the residents of Wales were not Welsh-born, and 83 per cent of these incomers (17 per cent of total population of Wales) were English. In proportional terms the impact of the English incomers is greatest in thinly peopled rural Wales. With regards to the correlation of social class, ethnicity and language, there appear to be status divisions within Welsh society. English-born residents were most heavily over-represented in the service class in Wales, and were also over-represented in the Welsh petite bourgeoisie. Conversely the English-born were the most under-represented group among Wales's blue-collar workers. Substantial differences in social status are also apparent among Welsh-born residents in 1981. Those literate in Welsh were relatively well represented in the higher status classes, but the non-literate Welsh-speakers and the Anglo-Welsh were best represented in the lower-status petite bourgeoisie and proletariat. Clearly, for those born in Wales, the ability to read, write, and speak Welsh was closely associated with higher status. Giggs and Pattie, however, found that there were regional variations in the relative dominance of Welsh-speakers among members of the service class: Welsh-speakers were collectively an important component of the elite service class chiefly in metropolitan south Wales and its industrial hinterland and secondarily in north-east Wales. In contrast, Welsh-speakers were actually under-represented in the service class in the Welsh-speaking rural heartland of Wales, i.e. in Gwynedd, Dyfed and Powys.

When attempting to apply the concepts of 'internal colonialism' to these findings, Giggs and Pattie conclude that only to some extent do they fit the pattern:

"Thus, despite the transformation of the Welsh economy in the postwar period, it was

30 op. cit. p. 43.

31 op. cit. p. 48

32 op. cit. p. 49."
still, in 1981, very much a blue-collar society, with heavy English over-representation in the 'commanding heights' of the national economy. However closer inspection reveals significant social and regional divides within the ethnic Welsh community too, with the emergence of a distinct Welsh-speaking middle class in and around Cardiff, contrasted against the more traditionally proletarian Anglo-Welsh found there and the illiterate Welsh-speaking minority throughout the Principality. If Wales is an 'internal colony', then, the literate Welsh-speaking middle classes are increasingly its metropolitan administrators. 33

These 1981 finds, are to some extent echoed by Aitchison and Carter in their analysis of the 1991 census data, where they address the question of "whether or not in contemporary Wales a cultural division of labour can be said to apply, with the three main ethno-linguistic communities - bilingual Welsh, Anglo-Welsh and incomers born outside of Wales - being characterized by differing class profiles."

The concept of social class is defined in slightly different operational terms than in the study above. Aitchison and Carter use the OPCS classification based on the occupations of individuals, which serve to distinguish class variations within the economically active population. When looking at the proportions of Welsh and non-Welsh speakers within class categories, Aitchison and Carter show that, a relatively high proportion of the Welsh-speaking workforce in Wales (35 per cent) is engaged in professional or managerial/technical occupations. This compares with an equivalent figure of 27 per cent for non-Welsh speakers. This result suggests that a facility in the Welsh language could be instrumental in securing higher class locations. The next question to answer is how class profiles may vary if the category of non-Welsh speakers is further subdivided to distinguish between non-Welsh speakers born in Wales (Anglo-Welsh) and non-Welsh speakers born elsewhere. The study shows that nearly 39 per cent of non-Welsh speaking incomers belong to the top two social classes, compared with 35 per cent for Welsh speakers and a mere 22 per cent for the Anglo Welsh. This latter group is seen to contain relatively high proportions of skilled manual, part-skilled and unskilled workers. As Aitchison and Carter point out:

33 op. cit. p. 52.

"Thus it is evident that as a group non-Welsh-speaking incomers tend to have a much stronger representation in the higher social classes than both Welsh-speakers and, most certainly, indigenous non-Welsh-speakers. The statistics could clearly be used to support the notion that a cultural division of labour does indeed apply in Wales. That said, the data also show that the most disadvantaged section of Welsh society at the present time is not so much the Welsh-speaking community (as is frequently argued) but the Anglo-Welsh. The Anglo-Welsh are doubly disadvantaged. On the one hand they cannot compete for often high level positions in which an ability to speak Welsh is either a necessity or a distinct asset; on the other, even where the language is not an issue, they have to face strong competition from both incomers and indigenous Welsh-speakers."

Having established that the Welsh-speakers and the incomers are doing relatively better than the Anglo-Welsh, the next question asked was whether these class differences vary from region to region in Wales. The results show that in four counties - Gwent, South Glamorgan, Mid Glamorgan, and Clwyd - there is a stronger relative representation of the upper class locations within the Welsh-speaking category than each of the other two categories. "This would appear to underline the importance of the growth in job opportunities for bilinguals in the more dynamic regions of Wales."

In the main heartland regions of the Welsh language it is, however, non-Welsh-speaking incomers who have the highest representation of upper class locations. These 1991 finds supports those of Giggs and Pattie from 1981, that Welsh-speakers were actually under-represented in the service class in the Welsh-speaking rural heartland of Wales. According to Aitchison and Carter, it is in these fragile rural areas and the declining industrial region of West Glamorgan, if anywhere, that Hechter’s concept of the cultural division of labour applies.

According to some observers, like John Osmond, there is no real notion of a Welsh citizenship, as one would find in Scotland, this being caused by the historical lack of institutions in Wales. In the recent emergence and development of national institutions in Wales, Osmond however sees a hope for the future - a growing internal government bureaucracy - that is giving a greater coherence to the

35 op. cit. p. 13.

36 op. cit. p. 15.
integrity of Wales as a whole. The location of this government bureaucracy in south Wales, mainly Cardiff, has however brought along problems of its own. Cardiff, which is the core of the least Welsh-speaking region of Wales has because of its role as the nation’s capital become the focus for most of the agencies and institutions which have been established to serve the needs of the Welsh-speaking population. As Giggs and Pattie express it:

"Given the lack of suitable employment opportunities in the rural Welsh-speaking heartland, many well-qualified Welsh-speakers have settled in Cardiff, thereby contributing to the decay of the language in Mid and North Wales. ... It would seem to us that the viability of the few remaining predominantly Welsh-speaking communities in Mid and North Wales would be considerably enhanced if they were to receive at least some of the relevant agencies which are currently located in Cardiff."38

Thus, in Wales one finds problems, which are by no means unique to the Principality but are shared with other regions of the UK, such as depopulation of rural areas and a concentration in the urban areas. But unique to Wales is the effect these processes have on the viability of the Welsh language. In the following section the developments in the Welsh language are traced.

6.3. Developments in the Welsh Language.

The 1536 Act of Union, made English the only official language. But the preservation of the Welsh language was to some extent assured by the translation of the Book of Common Prayer in 1567, and the Bible in 1588. From the seventeenth century onwards, the Welsh language was despised and ridiculed, only spoken by the 'Gwerin' (the common people), and not by the Anglicized gentry.39

In the nineteenth century Welsh however received a boost from the Methodist revival; the 'Circulating Schools' and 'Sunday Schools' of the Methodists helped to

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create a reading public in Wales and keep the language alive. In 1847 the infamous 'Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the State of Education in Wales' - by three monoglot Englishmen, since referred to as "The Treachery of the Blue Books", blamed the Welsh language for 'everything evil'. They said that "The Welsh language is a vast drawback to Wales and a manifold barrier to the moral progress and commercial prosperity of the people. It is not easy to overestimate its evil effects". This fierce condemnation of all things Welsh however had the unintended effect of stirring Welsh national sentiment. The next blow to Welsh in the nineteenth century came in the form of the 1870 Education Act, which made English the sole medium of instruction in schools in Wales. Monoglot Welsh-speaking children were forced to learn English by having to wear the 'Welsh Not' round their neck when caught speaking Welsh, only to get rid of it when they in turn denounced another child for speaking Welsh, and passed it on to him or her. This practice was, incidentally, similar to the use of the Breton 'simbol' (see chapter 4).

With the national revival at the turn of the century, came a movement for the promotion of the Welsh language, which, linked to the progress of the nonconformist chapels, led to an increased standing for the language.

The census of population in 1891, which was the first to supply data on the number of Welsh speakers, showed that 54.4% (898,000) of the adult population in Wales and Monmouthshire spoke Welsh (For a discussion of the problems of census figures in Wales, see Pryce & Williams, 1988). Although the absolute total of the Welsh-speaking or bilingual population continued to grow until the First World War, the censuses of 1901 and 1911, showed the proportion to be falling below 50%. By 1901, out of a population of 2,012,876, some 929,824 spoke Welsh of which 280,905 were monoglots. Writing and publishing in Welsh flourished as never before, and there were by 1901 some 25 weekly newspapers, 28 monthly magazines, two bimonthly magazines and two quarterlies entirely in Welsh, as well as nationally-conscious English-language journals.

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41 Berresford Ellis (1985), pp. 81-82.
During this century the percentage of people speaking Welsh has declined further from 37.1% in 1921 over 36.8% in 1931 to 28.9% in 1951 (Note that there is 20 years between these figures as there was no census during the war). In 1961 the percentage of Welsh speakers was 26, which fell to 20.8% in 1971. Since 1971 the rate of decline has however slowed to 18.9% in the 1981 census and 18.7% in the 1991 census\(^42\).

In 1939 the first bilingual school in Wales, was established in Aberystwyth. The introduction of the Welsh Courts Act in 1942 and the Welsh language Act of 1967, allowed the Welsh language to be used along with English for official, governmental and legal purposes, but did not make it an official language.

The steady decline of Welsh speakers, particularly in the 1960's as the figures above show, lead both Plaid Cymru and Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg (through non-violent direct actions), to campaign vigorously for the increased use of Welsh in daily life. As a result of these campaigns bilingual official forms for use in Wales, and, among other things, bilingual roadsigns have been introduced, culminating with the set-up of the Welsh fourth television channel S4C, of which more will be said below.

Since the Welsh Language Act of 1967, there have been the following Government initiatives regarding the language\(^{43}\): Specific grants for bilingual education were introduced in 1980 by the Secretary of State for Wales; since 1981/82 an identifiable item in the Welsh Public Expenditure Programme has been devoted to the support of the Welsh language; the passing of the Broadcasting Act 1981 - which established S4C; and most recently is the statutory place of Welsh in the new National Curriculum.

The census figures from 1981 show that the percentage of people speaking Welsh has continued to decline since the turn of the century to 18.9% in 1981, although the rate of decline seems to have slowed down in the period between the 1971 census (20.8%) and that of 1981\(^{44}\).


\(^{43}\) J.W. Jones (1990), p. 316.

\(^{44}\) C.H. Williams (1985), p.31.
Figure 6.3.1 shows the distribution of the Welsh speaking population in 1981.

Figure 6.3.1. Welsh-speaking population 1981.\textsuperscript{45}

In a summary of the 1981 census figures Colin H. Williams characterizes the Welsh speaking population as follows. It is predominantly ageing, as larger proportions of Welsh-speakers are to be found in the upper age brackets and the Welsh-speakers are relatively concentrated in the north and west of Wales. There are however limited signs of growth in Welsh-speakers amongst the younger age groups in the industrial south and east. This can largely be attributed to the development of Welsh medium education in such areas, in combination with the wider scale revival of the language and its incorporation into many aspects of Welsh public life.\textsuperscript{46} Williams is however fairly optimistic about the future of the language:


\textsuperscript{46} op. cit. p. 47.
"Elements of growth, of an increased value being attached to speaking Welsh, of an increased awareness of the utility of the language as a medium of governance in certain areas, in short, of the legitimisation of Welsh in the 'eighties would predispose one to look beyond the census and to the behaviour and activities of the Welsh people themselves. There is perhaps a greater vitality in all fields of Welsh cultural, social and educational life than at any other time in the postwar period."47

He lists the progression in the stages of granting Welsh a role in everyday life, which is: firstly Welsh-medium education and public administration; then Welsh-medium entertainment and information services, best exemplified by the establishment of Sianel Pedwar Cymru (S4C), in November 1982; followed by recognition of language rights, both for individuals and for local authorities who wish to preserve the 'cultural' balance of their communities. Williams subsequently suggests, that the logical next step for language activists would be to press for reforms within the private sector.48

In 1988 the Secretary of State for Wales established an advisory Welsh Language Board, with the task of advising on matters that would call for administrative or legislative action, assisting public or private bodies and individuals in the use and promotion of the language, as well as advising the Secretary of State on matters relating to the Welsh language. The 1967 Language Act did not confer official status on the language nor enshrine in law the principle of bilingualism or 'equal validity' with English49. Section 3(2)(a) of the 1967 Act actually states that 'in the case of any discrepancy between an English and a Welsh text the English text shall prevail'50. It is the opinion of the Welsh Language Board that a new Welsh Language Act should contain the following provision: that "any act, writing or thing done in Welsh in Wales should have the like legal force as if it had been done in English"51. This would give the language status - an important factor in

47 ibid.
48 op. cit. p. 48.
50 op. cit p. 321.
51 ibid.
terms of credibility.

The development in Welsh medium education is an indicator of the strength of the language and of the culture taught through that language. Through the years 1985-90 the percentage of primary schools in Wales where Welsh is the main language of instruction rose from 20% (355 schools) in 1985 to 24.1% (417 schools) in 1990. Conversely the percentage of primary schools where no Welsh is taught at all, fell from 22.4% in 1985 to 17.3% in 1990. (Table 7.04) The areas with the most Welsh medium primary schools were, not surprisingly, Gwynedd and Dyfed, where 71.1% and 51.4% respectively of the primary schools in 1990 were Welsh medium schools. In Gwent, on the other hand, no Welsh was taught in 95.1% of the schools. (Table 7.05)

As for secondary schools, the percentage of schools where Welsh is taught as both a first and a second language, rose slightly from 30% in 1985 to 31.6% in 1990 (Table 7.13). The number of schools involved amounted to 73 in 1990, of which 42 were defined as Welsh-speaking secondary schools (Table 7.09). The percentage of secondary schools where no Welsh was taught at all fell from 15.2% in 1985 to 10.8% in 1990 (Table 7.13).

Welsh has since 1991 become a statutory subject on the National Curriculum for Schools in Wales, and this has led to discussions between schools, parents, local authorities and the Welsh Office. Some schools in the non-Welsh speaking areas, like Gwent, have however chosen to opt out of the Welsh teaching obligation.

With regards to Welsh-language speakers and S4C, it is the period after 1982 which is of particular interest. The 1991 census figures showed that some 18.7% of the population of Wales spoke Welsh. This is a very small decline from the 1981 figures, and is welcomed as it seems to continue the predicted trend of a levelling out of the decline, and a possible turnaround in total numbers by the turn of the century. The changes in numbers of Welsh speakers, vary however greatly from county to county, with increases in some counties and losses in others. As evidence of the success of Welsh medium and bilingual education, the number of young

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52 Table numbers refer to "Statistics of Education in Wales: Schools" No.4, 1990, pp. 71 - 79.
Welsh speakers, aged 3-15 years, increased in most of the Welsh counties. Figure 6.3.2. illustrates the distribution of the Welsh speaking population in 1991.

Figure 6.3.2. Welsh-speaking population 1991.53

Compared to figure 6.3.1., it is noticeable that the decline has happened in the Welsh 'heartland' with the largest decreases in Dyfed and Gwynedd in the west. These two counties have however experienced a growth in population, which is far higher than the average for Wales as a whole. The fall in the percentage of Welsh speakers can to some extent be attributed to an influx of English speakers into the area. There have, however, been slight increases in Welsh speakers around Cardiff, in the counties of Mid Glamorgan and South Glamorgan.

The above illustrations merely show the percentage of the population able to speak Welsh. This does not, however, tell the whole story as the population of

Wales is quite unevenly distributed with more than half of the people living in the southern coastal belt in and around Newport, Cardiff and Swansea. Figure 6.3.3. show the distribution of the absolute number of Welsh speakers in Wales 1991.

Figure 6.3.3. Number of Welsh-speakers 1991.54

The map shows that a very large number of the Welsh speakers live in the south, around Swansea and in Cardiff. Additionally there is a substantial number along the northern coastline and in Dyfed.

The most recent official estimate of the number of Welsh speakers in Wales comes from the 1992 Welsh Social Survey. The survey was conducted for the Welsh Office during the autumn of 1992, and information was collected on 27,720 individuals - one percent of the population of Wales. According to the 1992 Welsh Social Survey, some 21.5% of the population spoke Welsh. In comparison with the

54 op. cit. p. 90.
1991 census the question asked in the Social Survey was slightly different, as the census questions were asked of the head of the household. The questions in the Social Survey were directed both at the head of household and at the individual members of the household. When individuals were asked about proficiency in Welsh, 21.5% aged 3 and over answered that they spoke Welsh. When the census methodology was used on head of household, it resulted in an estimate of 20.4% Welsh speakers. The Social Survey judge self-assessment to be more reliable than the head of household's assessment\(^{55}\), and consequently use the 21.5% result, which is equivalent to 590,800 people.

A survey carried out for S4C in 1993 by the broadcasting research company RSMB, indicates however that some 750,000 people in Wales spoke some Welsh. This is 27% of the population, and the difference between these figures and those of the census emphasises the problems inherent in the present census questions. The RSMB survey asked more detailed questions than the census and arrived at the following estimates:

"I understand, speak, read and write Welsh extremely well": 6%.
"I understand, speak, read and write Welsh quite well": 8%.
"I understand, speak, read and write a little Welsh": 6%.

The total claiming to "speak, read and write Welsh" was 20%, which is broadly similar to the census result. In addition "I can understand and speak some Welsh" was claimed by a further 7%, making the total claiming the ability to speak Welsh 27%. In addition RSMB asked the sample how many of them "understood a little Welsh", which generated a 'yes' response from an additional 25%. In other words there are a much greater number of people in Wales who have some - however little - knowledge of Welsh, than the census figures show. The result of the survey indicates that many Welsh speaking people do not feel that their Welsh is good enough to answer 'yes' to the census question, even if they speak Welsh.

By using the BARB 'Establishment Survey' sample of 90,000 UK homes, RSMB has in addition estimated how many people speak Welsh outside Wales. A total of 376,000 people outside Wales claimed to understand Welsh - 357,000 in

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England, 18,000 in Scotland and 1,000 in Northern Ireland. The census does not measure the incidence of Welsh outside Wales.\textsuperscript{56}

The heartening results with regards to the state of the Welsh language, i.e. a potential halt in the decline and an increase among the children, are not however quite echoed in the reactions to the long promised Welsh language Act which went through Parliament Summer 1993. The Act does not give full official status to Welsh, but makes "new provisions to promote and facilitate the language in Wales, in particular the conduct of public business and the administration of justice, on a basis of equality" with the English language. In sufficiently vague terms the Act defines this equality as being that which is appropriate within the circumstances and "reasonably practicable".\textsuperscript{57} According to the Act, the existing Welsh Language Board is upgraded into a permanent statutory body with extended powers. However no great increase in public spending is to be envisaged on behalf of the language, and critics find that the Act does not touch upon the private sector at all, and that its definition of the public sector is very narrow.

There is however another side to the coin which it would be worthwhile to bear in mind when we look at the interplay in the broadcasting domain between different interest groups in Wales. Along with a wave of support towards the Welsh language from English speakers, many of whom send their children to Welsh medium schools, there has according to Gwyn A. Williams been a growing resentment, impatience and anger. This has taken the form of an increasing dislike of the Welsh language itself, which at times and in places has become a kind of hatred.

"An English-speaking working class, neglected and treated with shoddiness, its necessities, not only social but cultural, scorned, not least by some leaders of the Welsh language movement; sees a British state subsidizing the Welsh language production of what is to them a middle-class minority. They see bilingual language qualification shutting off areas of employment for their children."\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{56} S4C Press Briefing, 25/3 - 1993.

\textsuperscript{57} Contact Bulletin, Autumn 1993, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{58} G. A. Williams (1991) p. 293.
Williams see this as evidence of a deep and ominous malaise: the denial of Welshness to the English-speaking Welsh, an exclusion which is becoming increasingly and inevitably a bitter self-exclusion of the English-speaking Welsh from the Welsh people and nation. The adjective Welsh is increasingly applied only to the Welsh-speaking component of the people, which is one-fifth of the actual number. Consequently even though there have been advances for Welsh language provisions, particularly in the fields of public administration, education and broadcasting, there is a perceived danger (real or otherwise) that this process has been at the expense of the 80% of the population who do not speak Welsh. If such a perception is widely held the legitimacy of Welsh language broadcasting as a forum for the representation of the collective identities of the community, is uncertain.

The above chapter treated the historical background for the Welsh national feeling, the diversities in contemporary Welsh society and developments within the Welsh language, in order to provide a context for the issue of broadcasting in Wales. The next chapter will consequently take a look at the development in Welsh-language broadcasting in Wales.
Chapter 7. Broadcasting in Wales.

After outlining Welsh history and the state of the Welsh language in chapter 6, we now turn towards television and radio in Wales, treating the development of broadcasting in Wales up to 1982, and the advent of S4C. Chapters 8 and 9 give a closer account of S4C, but preceding this, the organization will be placed into context by a description of the general broadcasting environment in Wales, and some of the institutions and public bodies of relevance to the Welsh cultural industry.

After having established the background for the present provisions of minority language broadcasting in Wales, section 7.3 concludes the comparison between minority language broadcasting provisions in Wales and Brittany, which was embarked upon in the chapters 3 and 4.

7.1. The Struggle for a Welsh Television Channel.

It is a commonly held notion that "Broadcasting, more than any other sphere of Welsh public life, has been the focal point of political and linguistic conflict". This statement however, is hardly surprising taken into consideration the potential function of the mass media in a nation without a state as described in section 2.5. The present section describes the development in broadcasting in Wales up to the political decision of a single Welsh-language channel in 1980 and the subsequent birth of S4C - Sianel Pedwar Cymru - Channel Four Wales.

It would however be too simplistic to attempt to deal with television in Wales without first treating the history of radio. It is easy to get the impression that the fight for S4C was a fight for or against Welsh language television. But as there around 1980 already were some 14 hours of Welsh language television per week on different channels, the fight was over the scheduling of television programmes in the Welsh language. The original battle for Welsh language broadcasting had already

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been fought some fifty years earlier over provisions for radio.

In May 1922 a decision was taken by the government to locate one of the eight UK radio transmission stations in Cardiff. According to John Davies, in his official history of the BBC in Wales, the choice of Cardiff did not arouse any controversy at the time, although it was in some ways unexpected- considering the size of Cardiff - with a population of 220,000 it was twenty-first in size among the urban centres of Britain. The most probable explanation for the choice was the feeling that, as Scotland was to have two stations, Wales should at least have one. And, as Davies points out in his history of the BBC in Wales, it should be remembered that the decision concerning the location of the stations was made by a government headed by Lloyd George.²

In 1923 the first BBC radio station in Wales was opened in Cardiff, and, in the following year a relay station in Swansea opened. Cardiff was regarded as the western regional centre and had nothing to do with a provision for Wales as a particular area. Even though the British Broadcasting Company recognized that it had an obligation to provide programmes of specific interest to listeners in Wales, it was initially incomprehensible for the Company’s officials in Wales, that the 922,000 Welsh speakers (37.1% in 1922) should be provided with programmes in their own language.³ Because of pressure from Welsh speakers there were a few radio programmes in the Welsh language during 1924-25. But as the Cardiff station also covered south-western England, and the number of licence holders were growing more rapidly there than in Wales, the few Welsh language programmes of 1925-26 were transmitted from the Swansea station. In 1927 The British Broadcasting Company changed status to that of a public corporation - The British Broadcasting Corporation. Because it changed to a public corporation the BBC was thought easier to influence, and the pressure mounted for an all-Welsh channel. There was however widespread confusion and disagreement over whether the demands were for a channel for all of Wales or all-Welsh (language) channel, a confusion which was exploited by the BBC. During 1927-28 there were regular

³ op.cit. p. 31.
broadcasts in Welsh from Radio Éireann in Dublin, which happened to be the only programmes in the Welsh language which were transmitted at fixed times. After consistent pressure from the Welsh establishment - represented by the University of Wales, local authorities, Lloyd George and the Welsh members of parliament, as well as Plaid Cymru who’s president Saunders Lewis in 1929 declared that it would soon be necessary to arrange for thousands of Welshmen to be prosecuted for refusing to pay for English programmes - the BBC, in 1935, however decided to allocate a separate wavelength for Wales and to improve the service for Welsh listeners. In July 1937, BBC Wales became a separate department of the BBC - the Welsh Region of the BBC Home Service - broadcasting a mixture of Welsh and English-language radio. The campaign launched in 1927 when BBC became a public corporation had won its objective in 1937. According to Davies, "it could be argued that the entire national debate in Wales for fifty years and more after 1927, revolved around broadcasting, and that the other concessions to Welsh nationality won in those years were consequent upon the victories in the field of broadcasting."5

During the period from 1937 to the outbreak of the war in 1939, the Welsh region established itself. In April 1937 the joint transmitter in Cardiff broadcast a total of twenty-four hours of regional material a week, nine of which were West of England productions, and fifteen those of Wales - seven hours in Welsh and eight in English.6 Even though some Welsh licence holders, particularly in the north-east, were unable to receive the Welsh service and there was a rejection of the service in parts of the south-east because people thought it was an all-Welsh service - the service attracted an estimated regular audience of some 2 million by 1939. According to the historian Gwyn A. Williams, the new radio service attracted a host of new writers:

"While the programmes were at first overloaded with religion and eisteddfodic folklore,


5 op.cit. p. 50.

6 op.cit. p. 103.

7 Similar to the present-day misconception, that S4C only carries Welsh-language programmes.
a whole new school of writers, in both languages, playwrights and entertainers, successors to the old story-tellers, emerged. Welsh radio (to be followed by television) grew into a real power, a major force in Welsh life and a vital institutional focus of patronage and enterprise. During and immediately after the Second World War it established itself as a central institution among the Welsh.\(^8\)

During the war there remained scattered Welsh language programmes, with a new element - a daily bulletin covering the world’s news in the Welsh language, which was produced in London. The justification for these news bulletins was the perceived need for the monoglot Welsh to be aware of the government’s orders and announcements.\(^9\)

Within the concept of public service broadcasting, producing radio and later television was, according to John Reith, the first Director-General of the BBC, a cultural mission. The Reithian argument of a 'cultural mission' was used by the early Welsh broadcasters to argue for a provision of Welsh-language programmes by the BBC. The BBC radio tradition of broadcasting some Welsh-language material was later carried over into BBC television.

The Reithian ethos of a cultural mission, in conjunction with the independence of the BBC from the state, made it possible for representatives for the peripheral cultures to advocate for broadcasting provisions for the minority languages of Britain. This situation is contrary to that of France, where the expressed function of the broadcasting institutions was to be the 'voice of France', and where, consequently, there was no room to accommodate peripheral demands.

After the war the Welsh Home Service was inaugurated in July 1945, and by August 1946 the service was producing 19 hours of radio programmes a week for Wales, of which 10.5 hours were in English and 9.5 hours in Welsh. Early in 1947 each of the UK regions obtained an advisory committee appointed by the BBC governors. Wales was to have a council of twenty-one, which among others included Gwynfor Evans from Plaid Cymru. Of the twenty-one ten were Welsh speaking, and half were Labour activists or Labour supporters. This was an under-representation in view of the voting habits of the Welsh electorate, but the governors of the BBC

\(^8\) G. A. Williams (1991), p. 278.

however queried whether the Council was 'overweighted to Labour'. The new Council was only advisory, it had no executive powers, but chief among the matters it raised were the demands for more broadcasts in the Welsh language.

Television appeared in a Welsh context in 1952, when the Wenwoe transmitter opened. At that time television was available to 2.3 million of the 2.6 million people of Wales, from three transmitters of which two were situated in England. Reception has always been a problem in Wales because of the mountainous terrain. In the beginning of the sixties additional transmitters and relay stations alleviated the problem, but the BBC is still in the 1990's having to sort out the costly problems of isolated pockets of poor reception.

As television hours in the early days were restricted, and there for example was a closed period between 6 and 7 p.m around the children's bedtime - 'The Toddlers Truce', the Welsh station was allowed to broadcast occasional Welsh-language programme outside network hours. The first television programme entirely in Welsh was broadcast on St. David's Day 1953.

The problems facing television in Wales were to a large extent similar to those which had faced the Welsh radio service in the 1930's: Reception problems in large areas, the Welsh transmitters were shared with England, or people only being able to receive transmitters situated outside Wales. But according to Davies, the Corporation was in the 1950's much more sympathetic to the demands from the regions than in the 1930's. This had several reasons: The director-general at the time was far more interested than Reith had been in the possibilities of regional broadcasting. As he had previous experience with BBC's Overseas Service, broadcasts in languages other than English were familiar to him. Furthermore the Controller for Wales was more concerned to serve Wales, than his predecessor in the 1930's had been, and he was supported in this by the Broadcasting Council for Wales, a body which had achieved charter status. Furthermore the threat of a commercial alternative to the BBC was increasing, and the Corporation was eager to prove that it was more capable than any potential rival body of providing Wales

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10 op.cit. p. 160.
with an adequate television service. But by the mid 1950's the television hours produced by the BBC in Wales were still limited: towards the end of 1955 there were 2 hours 40 minutes per month in English and 1 hour 40 minutes in Welsh.

Commercial television arrived in the north of Wales in May 1956 in the form of the Granada service from Manchester. The commercial television Act did not contain specific provisions for Welsh, but obliged the companies to appeal specially to the tastes and outlook of the persons served. To the astonishment of the BBC, Granada in September 1957 launched a series of hour long Welsh-language programmes twice a week. At the time BBC was broadcasting half an hour weekly in Welsh. There were however sound commercial reasons for Granada's unprecedented step. There were still prescriptions on how many hours a station was allowed to broadcast, and the only programmes permissible outside the prescribed hours, were programmes in Welsh. By broadcasting Welsh programmes, Granada increased its hours on air, and as the time allowed for advertisements was a percentage of the total air time, the company could add to its advertisements at peak hours and thereby augment its income. By 1958 the hours in Welsh from the BBC had risen to 2 hours 15 minutes each week, which were broadcast around one o'clock in the afternoon or late in the evening.

Following the technological development in the late 50's when it became possible to split transmissions, and the Pilkington Report on broadcasting services, which resulted in the 1964 Broadcasting Act, Wales got its separate television service. BBC Wales received its own wavelength and status of 'national region' - a term invented by Lady Megan Lloyd George. The Broadcasting Council for Wales became responsible for programmes produced by BBC Wales. After becoming a 'national region' in 1964, BBC Wales broadcast 6 - 7 hours of Welsh-language television a week, as well as the same amount of English-language programmes about Wales on BBC1. Compared to the situation before 1964 there was one major difference. Before, BBC Wales had shared the Wenwoe transmitter with south-

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12 op.cit. p. 209.

13 op.cit. p. 213.
western England, and all Welsh-language programmes were transmitted outside the prescribed network hours and therefore did not replace programmes in English. After February 1964 the Welsh-language programmes were transmitted during network hours, with the Welsh news and the daily magazine *Heddiw* occupying the prime time of 6.35 to 7.00 p.m.\(^{14}\) Hence the deprivation factor had been introduced - people complaining of missing out on displaced network programmes.

Commercial television in Wales has been through a lot of changes, as not less than two ITV companies have ceased to operate. The south of Wales was from 1958 covered by a company called Television Wales and the West, TWW, which also covered the Bristol area; and north Wales was covered by Granada in Manchester. Both of these companies broadcast a few Welsh-language programmes, but not in peak hours. In 1962 however the franchise for north Wales was given to a company called Television Wales, West and North (TWWN), or Teledu Cymru (Television Wales). This company made television history in Wales by transmitting Welsh-language programmes to the Welsh heartland during peak time. Teledu Cymry only lived shortly however, it went bankrupt after ten months, and the franchise was given to TWW, which then covered all of Wales. Even though Teledu Cymru only broadcast a short time, however, the competition had an important effect on both BBC and TWW, as both companies began to broadcast a regular daily news/topical show in Welsh during peak time. In 1968 TWW nonetheless lost its franchise to Harlech Television, HTV, but this change did not bring about an increase in Welsh-language programmes (see table 7.1.2.), these were still few and far between.

The television issue proved a socially divisive factor, there were many controversies between Welsh and non-Welsh speakers, about the amount of Welsh-language programmes, either there were too few or too many. The 'too many' complaint was caused by the displacement by the Welsh-language programmes of programmes in English broadcast on the BBC national network. Consequently in the mid-sixties both Plaid Cymru, the Welsh nationalist party and "Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg" - The Welsh Language Society - began to demand a separate channel for

\(^{14}\) op.cit. p. 274.
Welsh programmes.

The following tables show the distribution of Welsh and English programmes at one given time (1972), and the development of Welsh-language programmes in television and radio for the period 1959 - 72. In 1972 the BBC and ITV together were broadcasting 94.5 hours of television and radio programmes per day to Wales, but not necessarily about Wales. These were distributed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hours per day, 1972:</th>
<th>Welsh</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radio:</td>
<td>2h.09m.</td>
<td>63h.24m.</td>
<td>65h.33m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television:</td>
<td>1h.48m.</td>
<td>27h.16m.</td>
<td>29h.04m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>3h.57m.</td>
<td>90h.40m.</td>
<td>94h.37m.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.1.1.15

As this table shows, the Welsh language programmes constituted in 1972 only 4.2% of the total programming in Wales.

The next table (7.1.2.) shows the development from 1959-72 in television and radio in Welsh. Radio 4 was BBC's Wales-programme, which was a mixture of English and Welsh programmes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radio 4, Wales(radio):</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC-Wales (TV):</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWW/HTV Wales (TV):</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals (TV/Radio):</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.1.2.16

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16 ibid.
The average growth in Welsh-language programmes (both radio and television) was 5.8% per year during the period 1959-72. English-language programmes broadcast in Wales increased however by an average 6.3% per year\(^\text{17}\), which meant that even though the hours broadcast in Welsh had increased slightly, the ratio of Welsh programmes to English had fallen between 1959 and 1972.

Since the mid sixties both Plaid Cymru and The Welsh Language Society had tried to put pressure on the BBC and HTV to broadcast more Welsh television. The investiture of Prince Charles as Prince of Wales at Caernarfon Castle in 1969, further demonstrated to them the overwhelming power of the mass media, and the rigidly centralised nature of their control. It was consequently realised that: "if the Welsh language and Welsh culture were to have a sporting chance to survive, it would inevitably involve a battle for an adequate place in the television channels"\(^\text{18}\). The Welsh Language Society’s campaign of civil disobedience which followed, involved such direct actions as occupation of television studios and refusal to pay the licence fee.

An increase of Welsh language TV was not deemed possible on the existing channels. The BBC was afraid of the reaction from English speaking viewers, and HTV was afraid to lose its advertisers. An additional problem particular in south-east Wales, was that many viewers directed their aerials towards England in order to receive BBC1 and ITV without the Welsh programmes. But the effect was that they were unable to receive the English spoken programmes made in Wales about Welsh topics. It was neither desirable from a regional Welsh media-policy point of view, nor indeed from a commercial, to have a large section of the audience opting out, and was a further argument in favour of a separate Welsh television channel.

The area of radio was technically less complicated because of the availability of frequencies, and economically less costly. In November 1974, when the Crawford report was published, the BBC in Wales was producing twenty-six hours of radio programmes a week. The report endorsed the BBC’s plan to have an English language service for Wales on medium wave and a Welsh language service on VHF.

\(^{17}\) ibid.

Two separate radio channels, Radio Wales and Radio Cymru, were listed in the *Radio Times* from January 1977, but at that time both were essentially opt-outs from Radio Four. Radio Wales was relaunched in November 1978 when its hours increased from twenty-five to forty-five hours a week. The establishment of Radio Wales was regarded as an important step forward, as the BBC in Wales now had a service for which it was totally responsible and which was accessible to all the people of Wales. Radio Cymru was relaunched in November 1979 transmitting fifty-five hour a week in Welsh.

During the 1970's, three different government commissions, Crawford 1974, Siberry 1975, and the latest being the Annan Commission 1977 - recommended that Wales ought to have a Welsh-language fourth television channel. The Welsh programmes already broadcast should be transmitted on one single channel, and not on two channels as previously. The fourth channel should be launched as soon as possible - and without awaiting the decision about the use of the fourth channel in the rest of Britain. This conclusion was welcomed by Welsh language activists, even though some were worried that if the channels were linguistically divided, it would mean that a part of the Welsh speakers would only watch English television channels. In the late seventies, consequently only the technical implementation of a fourth channel was necessary for an extension of Welsh language television. But then something unexpected happened.

In a speech to the Royal Television Society at Cambridge in September 1979, William Whitelaw, the home secretary, announced that the fourth channel in Wales would not after all be used for Welsh language programmes. It was to run parallel with Channel Four in the rest of the UK. Instead of a separate channel, it was planned to increase the amount of Welsh programmes on the existing BBC and ITV channels. This was going back on a Conservative election promise, and was a clean break with the previous consensual policy advocated by a succession of governmental commissions. According to the BBC national governor for Wales at

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the time, Alwyn Roberts, the reason for this volte-face was two-fold. Firstly the election results and the massive rejection of a Welsh Assembly in the 1979 Referendum gave the Conservative government the impression that nationalism in Wales was a thing of the past. This perception combined with the second - the reluctance of the Home Office to depart from the traditional duopoly structure of broadcasting in Britain - led the government to decide to abandon the idea of a separate Welsh Channel. This last interpretation is supported by remarks made by the Under-Secretary of State for Wales, Wyn Roberts to the House of Commons in February 1980:

"The solution that we have adopted will not provide a single Welsh language service of the sort that advocates of the Welsh language fourth channel have urged, but two cardinal principles of broadcasting in this country will be preserved. ... They are that the broadcasting authorities have the editorial responsibility for what they broadcast and that there should be some diversity in the system ... Each broadcasting authority - the BBC or the IBA - will retain responsibility for the programmes in Welsh broadcast on its own channel."²³

The reaction in Wales to this volte-face was immediate and strong, many regarding the decision as a threat against the future of the Welsh language. When the Broadcasting Bill was debated in the House of Commons, a former Labour Minister of State for Industry, Alan Williams (Swansea) referred to the text of the Conservative election manifesto, quoting the following: "we are anxious to see Welsh broadcasting starting on the fourth channel as quickly as possible. We believe that this could be done more cheaply, simply and at least as quickly if both the BBC and HTV Welsh programmes are transmitted on the fourth channel." Williams went on to state the case for a single channel: "I referred earlier to the need to establish a cohesive Welsh identity on the television channel. We need a balanced mix of programmes. The more channels there are, the greater will be the overlap in timetabling and the greater will be the irritation as people have to switch out."²⁴

The two broadcasters in Wales were divided on the issue. At the BBC, the


²⁴ op.cit. c. 103-105.
Broadcasting Council for Wales expressed extreme dismay: If the BBC were to expand its output in Welsh to the level suggested, that meant depriving viewers in Wales of at least eight additional hours a week of network programmes on BBC1 and 2, which would certainly be less acceptable to those who did not understand Welsh than the fourth-channel solution. HTV on the other hand published a statement in which it welcomed the government’s proposal - a booklet, which was circulated to public figures and opinion formers. HTV envisaged that the BBC should retain its Welsh language programmes on BBC1 and that HTV itself should move its Welsh language programmes on to the new fourth channel, which was pictured as an ITV2. HTV feared that a concentration of all 22 hours of Welsh language programme on one channel, would be detrimental to the level of advertising revenue generated by the new channel in Wales and that the ITV companies would consequently have to pay for this. At the same time however, HTV very neatly wanted to shift all its Welsh language programmes over to the new channel, thus improving HTV’s own appeal to advertisers.

The government decision to abandon the Welsh fourth channel provoked a surge of support for Plaid Cymru, and a widespread campaign of civil disobedience in Wales, as many came to believe that, if a consensus established over a long period of time could be thrown over with little reason and no debate, extra-constitutional protest was the only effective course. Plaid Cymru established a fund into which people who opposed the government’s plan could pay their licence fee. By April 1980 some 2000 Welsh viewers had done so, and through the following months several went to prison for refusing to pay the fines imposed for having an unlicensed television set. In addition to this militant campaigners raided transmitters and blanked out programmes. Among the people who deposited their licence fees were the two Plaid Cymru MP’s. In June 1980 Dafydd Wigley, the

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26 "The Fourth Channel in Wales" - A Statement by HTV Wales. (1979)


Member for Caernarfon, explained to the House of Commons that, along with the Member for Merioneth:

"in a few weeks I shall be appearing in court through my refusal to pay a television license fee because of this issue. This is the first time that I have done such a thing.

... We who have carried on the fight for the Welsh language through constitutional means have said that the battle could be won through the House of Commons. ... When we say that we put all our faith in the process of democracy and that process is spurned

... it puts us in a position in which there appears to be no alternative."  

The opposition against the government's plan was personified in the sixty-eight year old president of Plaid Cymru, Gwynfor Evans, who in May 1980 declared that he would start a hunger strike in October, unless the government kept its former promise about the separate Welsh Channel. Evans's action was, apart from an attempt to changing the government's decision on the fourth channel, also motivated by a wish to boost the morale and spirit of his party, after the disappointments of the referendum and the subsequent general election. Gwynfor Evans was a former MP, a widely respected politician, and his threat was regarded as serious. Leo Abse, the Labour Member from Pontypool warned the government to consider the situation:

"For the first time, formerly reasonable men are suddenly taking unlawful action. Gwynfor Evans's intentions are not to be disregarded. I do not share the view that they are nonsense. I believe that they are a symptom of the lack of belief and confidence that Westminster can provide an answer. When people turn to extraparliamentary demonstrations it means that they feel that Parliament has failed. ... When the fast begins and the disorder spreads the Home Secretary will regret very much not taking preventative action."

As pointed out by Patrick Hannan, the particular force of Gwynfor Evans's tactic was that he was asking for something the government not only could deliver, but which it had actually promised to deliver. Labour MP's continued to warn the

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29 Hansard, 24 June 1980; Vol. 987, c. 394.
32 Hannan (1990), p. 140.
government about the threat of devolution, and as the summer passed and as an increasing number of people of impeccable character were willing to be sent to jail, rather than pay the licence fee, the Home Secretary grew concerned with the possible repercussions an escalation of the situation might have.

In the beginning of September the Establishment in Wales intervened to avoid disaster. A deputation consisting of Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos, Cledwyn Hughes, who was a former Secretary of State for Wales; the Archbishop of Wales, Dr. G. O. Williams; and Sir Goronwy Daniel, a former Permanent Secretary at the Welsh Office, offered the Government a way out. They suggested that the fourth channel solution should be seen as an experiment. If that failed, the government could change it after an appropriate period. 33

According to Alwyn Roberts, the Home Secretary was concerned about potential repercussion in Northern Ireland, and as the internal stability of the state was of ultimate concern compared with television arrangements in Wales 34, the government accepted the new proposal. On 17 September 1980 the government announced that a separate Fourth Channel Board should be established in Wales; it would have its own identity, and would determine the scheduling of both the English language Channel Four programmes and the Welsh language programmes, and was actually a more radical solution than the previous recommendations of the Home Office working parties 35. The channel was allocated 22 hours per week of Welsh language television, and the BBC was expected to supply 10 hours a week, HTV at least seven hours, and the rest was to come from either HTV or from independent producers.

It appears to have been of the ultimate importance to Labour to preserve the stability of the present system with Wales firmly linked to the rest of Britain. Limited broadcasting concession was one means of diffusing an otherwise volatile situation. The conservative volte face consequently came as an unpleasant surprise to Labour, as the fierce reaction in Wales threatened to rock the boat, just as Labour

33 op.cit. p. 143.
felt safe after the referendum rejection. As Leo Abse continued to warn the government in June 1980, the whole issue of the Welsh channel could endanger the unitary state and the trust in Westminster:

"...some hon. Members fought hard to ensure that we retained an unitary State. We believed that there would be grave dangers within the constitution if changes on devolution came about. ... We fought because we believed that here in Westminster there was sensitivity, understanding and insight about Wales. ... But when it was believed that there was unanimity, and when a pledge was given, the breach of that pledge for what appears to be marginally persuasive reasons breeds in Wales a cynicism about Westminster."36

When the House of Commons discussed the Welsh Fourth Channel solution in November 1980, after the provisions for this had been added through an amendment in the House of Lords, there was some bitterness among the Labour MP’s about the way that this decision had been made. The Labour Member for Swansea, Alan Williams again referred to the nationalist militancy so abhorred by Labour:

"it is regrettable, or it should be regrettable to the House, that the lesson that has emerged from this exercise is that the Government have been ready to listen to non-constitutional representations while they have turned a deaf ear to reasoned arguments of elected members. It is tragic that the Government’s duplicity in this matter has spread a militancy that we had quenched at the time of the devolution referendum. If that militancy revives there is no doubt as to where the responsibility will lie"37

Another issue which was raised both by Labour and Plaid Cymru during above debate, was adequate provisions for English language television. The Plaid Cymru Member for Meirionnydd, Dafydd Elis Thomas referred to the opportunity there now existed: "of providing a parallel service in the English language for the majority culture in Wales. Wales has two national cultures and two national languages, one of which is English. Therefore, it is essential that through the medium of English there should be a parallel development of the kind of service that we see developing through the medium of Welsh.”38 This issue has not gone away but has continued to be a part of the public debate in Wales, and will be returned to later.

37 Hansard, 10 November 1980; Vol. 992, c. 74.
38 Hansard, 10 November 1980; Vol. 992, c. 56.
In 1980 there was already a provision of some 7 hours BBC-programmes and 7 hours HTV-programmes in Welsh. The gain was consequently not so much in the extension of the hours transmitted, but rather in the separate administration of the Welsh programmes, as well as in the scheduling of these, as Welsh programmes previously were mainly broadcast at odd hours, out of prime time. Jeremy Tunstall makes a valid point with the remark, that had Gwynfor Evans indeed starved himself to death, he would have been not so much a television martyr as a television scheduling martyr.\footnote{Tunstall (1983), p. 231.}

In November 1982 Sianel Pedwar Cymru (S4C), or Channel Four Wales consequently went on air, for an initial trial period of three years.

7.2. The Broadcasting Environment in Wales.

Before giving a closer account of S4C, the organization will be placed into context by a description of the general structure of broadcasting in Wales, as well as some of the institutions and public bodies of relevance to the Welsh Cultural industry.

7.2.1 Broadcasting.

The major broadcasting institutions in Wales, apart from S4C, are BBC Wales, and HTV, both of which produce programmes in Welsh, as well as in English, although the Welsh language programmes are shown on S4C.

**BBC Wales,** (like BBC Scotland and BBC Northern Ireland) has a status of 'national region' within the larger BBC framework. BBC Wales has its headquarters in Cardiff, and is the biggest broadcasting operation outside London, employing some 1,085 members of staff, including about 100 working at the three local centres...
around Wales - Bangor, Mold and Swansea⁴⁹.

BBC Wales produces around 20 hours a week of television, out of which music, drama, news and current affairs programmes feature strongly. Of the weekly total of 20 hours, 10 are produced in English, and broadcast on BBC Wales, and 10 hours are produced in Welsh, and broadcast on S4C. Both the English- and Welsh-language programmes are financed via the licence fee, and the Welsh are broadcast by S4C for 'free'. Of the 1991/92 budget for BBC Wales, amounting to £45.5 million, £11.9 million was spent on producing television for BBC Wales in English, £3 million on producing network television, and £16.8 million on programmes for S4C⁴¹.

BBC Wales regards itself as the only comprehensive broadcasting institution in Wales, as it includes both television and radio production, both of which are bilingual. It has consequently two functions, producing programmes for Wales in both languages and reflecting Wales on the British networks. The policy and content of those programmes which are produced primarily for Wales, are controlled by a National Broadcasting Council for Wales. The Broadcasting Council consists of 12 people, plus the National Governor of the BBC for Wales, and is appointed by the BBC's General Advisory Council from a list of names of persons in Wales, who are interested in, and suited to the task. These names are suggested by the Controller of BBC-Wales and the National Governor. In other words, it is the management of BBC-Wales itself that suggests who is to 'govern' BBC-Wales when it comes to programming policy and content. In all fairness however, it must be mentioned that BBC-Wales on several occasions has advertised for interested members of the public to join either the National Broadcasting Council, or any of the other advisory councils.

HTV, Harlech Television, is the commercial ITV company in Wales, and has held the franchise since 1968, when it took over from TWW (Television West and Wales). The HTV franchise is dual, as it includes the Bristol area. Before the advent of S4C, HTV consequently had the difficult task of catering for three distinct

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audiences: The English speaking Welsh, the Welsh speakers and the English in the west of England. However HTV has since 1970, operated the West and the Welsh services as two completely separate entities. With the commencement of S4C, HTV was obliged by law to provide a suitable amount of programmes in Welsh, which amounted to 7-8 hours weekly. After the end of 1989 however, HTV's fixed price contract for programme supply ended, and S4C started to commission from HTV under the same conditions as from the independent sector.

Both BBC Wales and HTV have shed staff the last few years, HTV to such an extent that observers have expressed concern about HTV's future ability to fulfil the franchise requirement with regards to quality.

Alongside BBC Wales and HTV Wales, exists an independent sector developing since 1982, comprising of companies of varying sizes as well as film and video workshops, to which I will return in chapter 8.

As for radio, Radio Wales, is BBC Wales' English language channel, broadcasting 110 hours per week; and Radio Cymru is the BBC's Welsh language channel, broadcasting 100 hours of programmes per week. According to RAJAR listening figures, Radio Wales is listened to by half a million people during the week, and is second only to Radio 1, the British national pop station, in popularity in the Wales area. Radio Cymru has, like S4C, to cater for all tastes through the medium of Welsh. Radio Cymru is listened to by a quarter of a million people during the week, which is equivalent to some 50% of the relevant population - the Welsh speakers. A BBC-survey in 1991 showed that for 24% of Welsh speakers, Radio Cymru was the service they listened to most often, and that the service was most popular in Gwynedd in north Wales.

Finally, there are a range of commercial Independent Local Radio (ILR) stations, Red Dragon Radio in Cardiff, Swansea Sound, and Marcher Sound from

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43 Broadcasting Act 1981, section 48.3.
44 S4C's Annual Report 88/89, p. 10.
Wrexham, with some programmes in Welsh. There has recently been a growth in community radio stations, both Welsh and bilingual, the latest being Radio Ceredigion operating from Aberystwyth.

With regards to the penetration of satellite, it is, in Wales, similar to that of the United Kingdom as a whole, i.e. 14% in 1992.46

7.2.2. The Press.

In the Welsh language there were until recently three national weekly newspapers or magazines, albeit with small circulations: Y Cymro, Y Faner and Golwg (Y Faner closed however in 1992). There are also some regional weeklies, plus a number of monthly or bimonthly magazines, and a network of some 50 voluntary published 'Papurau Bro' - Community newspapers. These community newspaper are widely read. According to a recent survey, their circulation amounts to some 50,000, but, as they are passed on from person to person, the actual readership consists of up to 200,000 people. According to the 1992 Welsh Social Survey, Welsh language local newspapers are read by some 42% of people who are able to read Welsh. This amounts to approximately 210,171 people47. According to Skilton, the 'Papurau Bro' are culturally far more significant than their modest journalistic ambitions would suggest, representing as they do one of the only places in which the major local variants of the Welsh language are written down. They provide therefore, a written alternative to standard Welsh, with its strong links with the great literary works of the past, Bishops Morgan's bible and the pulpit.48 This last comment links on to the discussion in chapter 2, concerning the function of minority language mass media, and the controversies surrounding the issue of language standardisation. According to Skilton, the 'Papurau bro' have been praised for the use of local variants of the Welsh language, on the grounds that they have

48 D. Skilton (1990), p. 189.
provided an alternative to the language of the literati and the clergy and returned it to the people.\(^{49}\)

In general, the Welsh media (apart from S4C) are, according to Tunstall much less Welsh than the Scottish media are Scottish.\(^{50}\) That is: Since the Scottish national feeling is less language-bound than the Welsh, and rooted in an institutional framework which is particular Scottish, the Scottish media cover more issues from a national Scottish angle than the Welsh media cover national Welsh matters. This view is supported by Hume, who in a survey of the media in Wales, found that the main difference between coverage in English- and Welsh-language media was that, in the English-language media there is little to suggest that Wales is a distinct nation, the main emphasis being on local or UK news, whereas the Welsh-language media, to a higher extent, cover Welsh national issues, and not only local ones.\(^{51}\) Hume echoes the above comment concerning dialects, as Radio Cymru and S4C may have "contributed to an enhancement of national identity among Welsh speakers by offering to them a chance of hearing the varying accents and dialects of their own country." The use by presenters of local forms of speech, assists the process of comprehension of the various regional forms of Welsh speech.\(^{52}\) This perception of the function of Welsh-language media can be linked to Hagerstrand's argument (see section 2.4.5.) concerning the 'possibility space' of regional broadcasting, in particular: To contribute to territorial integration and increase the consciousness of place. In other words, the media are conceived of as contributing to an infrastructure, within which to imagine the country - the nation as it were - as a unity.

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\(^{49}\) ibid.


\(^{51}\) Hume (1986), pp. 331 & 344.

\(^{52}\) op. cit. p. 334.

Hume compares this to the situation in Brittany, where Breton speakers have virtually no provision for hearing their language in the broadcast media - this does not help a situation where many from one Breton-speaking area already have difficulty in understanding those from other areas.
7.2.3. Literature in Wales.

Literature in Wales consists of two distinct and separate bulks of work, in Welsh and English respectively. There are no figures for the production of English-language books of Welsh interest, but there are available figures of Welsh-language book production.

The Welsh language book production survives with a readership of some 60,000, a figure which represents the number of people who buy any kind of printed material in the Welsh language. As the 'Papureau Bro' survey referred to in section 7.2.2. indicates however, the actual readership might be much higher. The 'Papureau Bro' have a circulation of 50,000, but are read by some 200,000 people.

There is however a paradox connected with the production of Welsh-language literature. Although Welsh-language literature is never referred to in English literary periodicals, nor noticed by the London literary establishment, it is economically supported by the British state. Through the medium of the Welsh Office and the Arts Council, the British state "does a great deal to breathe life into a literature that it does not really believe exists".53

The above comment is incidentally quite illustrative of the overall British policy towards its linguistic or territorial minorities, as described in section 5.1. As opposed to the situation in France, no firm policy is conducted either way, instead the state attempts to buy its way out of the situation, providing economic support to, for example, Welsh-language book production, unrelated to any overall cultural policy.

Yet another paradox inherent in the production of minority language literature, is that one task of this literature is to keep the language alive by appealing to as many potential readers as possible, which is not necessarily a role that is consistent with the creation of serious literature.54 This situation is analogue to the position of S4C, where the same dichotomy can be found in the programming policies.

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54 op. cit. p. 150.
The figure below (7.2.3.1) shows the development in publication of new books in the Welsh language.

Figure 7.2.3.1. Welsh-Language Book Production 1972-1991.\textsuperscript{55}

The graph shows that the production of books in the Welsh language has more than doubled over the last twenty years. The children's titles made up for the largest part of this production. From 1980 - 1982 the production of Welsh language books rose by a third, which was caused primarily by a rise in the publication of children's books. It is interesting that this dramatic rise occurred at the same time as the struggle which immediately preceded the setup of S4C. After the advent of S4C in 1982, the linguistic and nationalist movement in Wales was perceived by many to have been defused, and this interpretation seems to be reflected in the fall in the Welsh-language publications the next couple of years. After a fall down to the 1980 level in 1985, the production of Welsh-language books rose gradually (albeit with a small fall in 1989) up to 1991. This rise is caused mainly by a consistent increase in the production of children’s books.

In the field of Welsh-language literature, the appearance of S4C has played a role in as much as it has ensured that authors in the Welsh language are able to survive as professionals writers by writing scripts for television. S4C has, in general, the opportunity to play a beneficial role with regards to Welsh-language literature by providing a forum within which the language and its literature can be exposed in a contemporary setting.

As for English-language literature, this body of literature has, without having the language problem facing the Welsh-language literature, a parallel problem in as much as Welsh national writing - or British regional writing, as it is perceived from London - does not attract notice in the London literary world.

7.2.4. Cultural Institutions and Organizations.

Before dealing with some of the institutions and organisations relevant to the area of broadcasting, it would be pertinent with a few comments on the extent to which Wales has become a 'Quangoland'. John Osmond has, in a report to the Nolan Committee on Standards in Public Life, examined the expansion of quangos in Wales. Defining quangos is however a controversial matter: According to the Government, the number of quangos in Wales has doubled to 80 since they took office in 1979. But if you add in bodies working at the local level and advisory committees and tribunals - all of which 'fulfil a public purpose, are financed by public expenditure and are controlled by appointees' - then the Council of Welsh Districts has estimated that there are some 350. The economic significance of these quangos is huge: During the 1993-4 financial year Welsh quangos were responsible for spending around £2.5 billion, which mostly came out of the Welsh Office budget, comprising 34% of the total. In comparison the entire revenue budget for Welsh local authorities was about the same at £2.5 billion. In terms of personnel, the Secretary of State for Wales makes some 1400 appointments (400 each year) to

Welsh quangos, which employ around 60,000 people.\textsuperscript{57} The problem with this system is the lack of accountability - these people are not elected by - and answerable to the public, but appointed by an administration, which since 1979 has been controlled by a minority political party within Wales. But are the memberships of quangos skewed towards the conservative party? The Labour MP for Delyn, David Hanson surveyed in 1993 the 452 appointees to 51 quangos, and concluded, that Wales's quangos are "overstuffed with white male businessmen, lawyers and accountants, with a sprinkling of establishment figures for good measure. The pattern of appointments represents the face of the Conservative Party and their sympathisers, not the people of Wales\textsuperscript{58} Apart from the political nature of the appointments, the same people appear again and again on the boards on different quangos, thus creating an intermeshed network of influence\textsuperscript{59}. As a point in case, the chairman of the BBC Broadcasting Council for Wales also used to be chairman of the Welsh Development Agency. The latter post was offered to him after a chance meeting with the Secretary of State for Wales, at a conservative fund-raising lunch.

Of the cultural institutions and organisations mentioned in this chapter, the BBC Broadcasting Council for Wales, S4C's Authority and the Arts Council for Wales are all quangos - financed by public expenditure and controlled by people who are appointed, not elected.

As for cultural institutions relevant to the area of broadcasting, the Welsh Arts Council is, via its Film department, an important agency in the allocation of grants to various film and video workshops around Wales, as well as supporting media education initiatives. A recent initiative is the establishment of The Welsh National Film and Video Archive in 1989 in Aberystwyth, which is financed by, among others, S4C, the Welsh Arts Council and BFI - the British Film Institute. The task of the archive is to locate and preserve film and video material of Welsh interest, which is in danger of being lost, as film is a very unstable substance, which

\textsuperscript{57} ibid.

\textsuperscript{58} op.cit. p. 29.

\textsuperscript{59} ibid.
deteriorates if not treated properly. In 1992 the archive changed status from a pilot project to a permanent institution.

Also in Aberystwyth one finds the Welsh centre of the MERCATOR project, which is The European Network for Documentation and Information on Lesser-used Languages. The project is coordinated by the Bureau for Lesser-Used Languages in Dublin, a body funded by the European Commission. The MERCATOR centre in Aberystwyth, is the project’s Media Centre, and is a database containing media related information (in its widest sense) about the lesser-used languages in Europe including Eastern Europe. The Aberystwyth centre is financed by the European Commission and by S4C.

Ffilm Cymru, the Film Foundation for Wales, was another innovation on the Welsh cultural scene. It was a joint venture between BBC Wales and S4C, and was launched in May 1988. It aimed to create a business structure for film making in Wales, within which to commission, develop or co-produce films in Welsh, English or indeed other European languages. In 1992 Ffilm Cymru was disbanded as a production force and two new organisations were established instead, Cyngor Ffilm Cymru (the Welsh Film Board) and Scrin Cymru (Screen Wales). S4C and BBC Wales are still partners in both organisations, and for Cyngor Ffilm Cymru the new partner is the Film Committee of the Welsh Arts Council. Cyngor Ffilm Cymru concentrates on the cultural dimensions of film production, whereas Screen Wales concentrates on developing the industrial base of film-making in Wales. The parties involved in Screen Wales are, apart from S4C and BBC Wales, the Welsh Development Agency, TAC - the organisation of Welsh independent producers, and local government. Both organisations are committed to operating within a wider European context.

TAC (Teledwyr Annibynwyr Cymru) is the independent television producers employers association, situated in Caernarfon in north west Wales. TAC started around 1983, and the members are Welsh independent producers, who work for HTV, BBC and S4C as well as English broadcasters. TAC deals with the unions on behalf of the independent producers, liaises with the broadcasting organisations and the Welsh Office, and in general provides public relations service.
7.2.5. European Connections.

Of growing importance for Wales are the various MEDIA schemes, managed by the Commission of the European Communities. The original Media 92 programme, has now been extended and become the MEDIA Programme. The aim of this programme is to encourage the development of the European audiovisual industry. There are some 17 programmes in the scheme, divided into training of professionals, improvement of production conditions, distribution mechanisms, cinema exhibition, contribution to the establishment of a "second market", and stimulation of financial investments. The schemes mainly used in Wales so far have been the EAVE scheme, which is a training course for television producers, with the aim to develop European co-productions; the CARTOON scheme which provides support to the European animation industry; the BABEL scheme, which supports dubbing or subtitling in order to promote the wider distribution of television programmes; and the SCALE scheme which aims to encourage development of the audiovisual industries in the smaller countries of Europe. There are however problems involved for Wales in the participation in the SCALE scheme, as the scheme is primarily meant for the smaller states of the European Community, rather than the smaller nations. This means that Wales, as it does not have the status of a state, has to co-produce with one of the small states of Europe, like Ireland or Belgium, rather than with one of the other regions, like Catalonia or the Basque Country.

The concept of 'Europe' has taken on a larger importance in Wales in recent years, as 'Europe' is perceived as a means to export Welsh-language programmes to countries that are used to a multilingual broadcasting environment. For example Screen Wales has recently been established as a MEDIA antenna, with the aim of marketing Welsh film and television production abroad. The question remains however of how effective all these schemes are in a broadcasting environment which, is becoming increasingly dominated by powerful international economic interests, working toward further integration and subsequent homogenization. It must be said though, that however limited the effects of the European support for the regions must seem, compared to the overall development in the audio-visual sector
for the whole of the Common Market, S4C and Welsh-language broadcasting has
certainly benefitted from it. Everything else being equal, the existence of the
schemes provide funding opportunities that were not there before, which the Welsh
film- and television industry has been able to exploit.

The above section 7.2. is a portrayal of the general cultural environment of
broadcasting in Wales. It shows that S4C does not operate in a vacuum, but interacts
with other actors on the Welsh cultural scene. S4C is both supported by, and under
pressure from, these various cultural agents, which contribute to a Welsh cultural
environment - both through the Welsh and the English languages.

Before we take a closer look at S4C in chapter 8, this chapter concludes the
comparison between minority language broadcasting provisions in Wales and
Brittany, which was embarked upon in the chapters 3 and 4.

7.3. Wales and Brittany Compared.

When comparing provisions for minority language broadcasting in Wales and
Brittany, the most glaring difference is the existence of some 30 hours of Welsh-
language television programmes weekly, compared to only one and a half hours of
Breton-language programmes. The reasons for this can be attributed to differences
in the way the state and the broadcasting culture in France and Britain operate with
regards to the peripheral minorities.

The different policies of the two states, when it amounts to dealing with
territorial or linguistic minorities, have been described in chapters 3 and 5. Suffice
to say here, that the French unitary state led a conscious policy of assimilation of
the historically disparate regions of France. The revolution, with its attendant myth
of the one and indivisible republic, facilitated this process. The conceptualisation of
the French 'nation' as an artificial creation, which needed active protection in order
for it to survive, has influenced both policies of centralization and linguistic
imperialism. It was consequently necessary to actively suppress the other languages
of France, as these were perceived to be a source of dissention. The French language
was in addition regarded as the language of reason and culture, and it was
considered a favour to the non-French speaking areas of France to rid them of their 'primitive' cultures and languages by bestowing the language of enlightenment and reason upon them. Apart from the linguistic policies of the French republic, the policy of centralization also influenced the structure and function of the mass media.

The United Kingdom on the other hand started life as a union of different and hitherto relatively independent 'nations', who were allowed to keep various degrees of self-determination. The different relationships - or administrative arrangements - between the various regions and the centre have consequently made it difficult for the British state to conduct a coherent policy of assimilation towards the peripheries. Instead the state has led a kind of ad hoc policy, where it has responded to particular problems as they arose, in an attempt to find solutions which did the least damage to the union. Such solutions, like the translation of the Bible into Welsh, have however in some cases had the unintentional effect of underlining, and indeed protecting, the distinctiveness of the regions, and have therefore worked against a complete assimilation. The linguistic imperialism of the British state, while still existing, has, following the argument of Calvet, been implemented much less systematically than was the case in France. The British ad hoc policy, which also includes short term accommodation following electoral threats, has led to a higher degree of self-determination for the British periphery than is the case in France. A self-determination that, among other things, manifests itself by much better provisions for mass media in the languages of the British periphery.

The broadcasting cultures of the two countries have been different, as they have fulfilled different functions vis a vis the state. In Britain one finds the BBC tradition of public service, in principle independent of the state, whereas in France it is a state dominated system with a commercial element tacked on. The cultural mission of the BBC, plus its relative autonomy from the state, coupled with competition from independents in the commercial sector, made production of Welsh-language radio and television programmes conceptually possible. In France on the other hand, the function of the French broadcasting system has traditionally been that of the 'voice of France'. Into such a function could not of course be

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incorporated that of the voice of the peripheries, as this would be counter-productive to the whole ethos of the one and indivisible republic.

When it comes to an assessment of the development in Welsh-language broadcasting, it must also be said that the provision of Welsh-language television and radio programmes has, compared to most other European linguistic minorities - not only the Bretons - usually been favourable.

Finally we find a difference in the relative ability of the peripheral groups to mobilise support for their case. Because the Welsh national feeling to a large extent was culturally based, and as there were no institutions to hinge it on, like in Scotland, the issue of broadcasting attained a deep emotional significance in Wales, which the large campaigns of civil disobedience bear witness to. In Brittany on the other hand, the issue of broadcasting has never been allowed to reach such a size as to obtain much emotional significance, as the result of the survey in chapter 4 shows.

In general however, limited cultural concessions seem to be a favourite way of defusing regional protest both in Britain and France. It is a relatively cheap way of depriving the minority groups of some their most successful rallying causes. The workings of the British political system however, made it possible for the peripheral groups of Britain to gain concessions, which were denied their French counterparts.
Chapter 8. S4C - Administration and Structure.

In chapter 8 below are examined issues such as S4C's organisational structure, funding, composition of potential viewers, viewing figures, output, administration, staff, commissioning policies, co-production and subtitling, and the growth in the independent sector in Wales.

8.1. Control and Funding.

The structure of S4C offers a break with the established British organizational divide between public service and commercial television. The 1981 Broadcasting Act states that even though S4C is the Welsh equivalent of Channel 4 (CH4), which is a commercial channel, S4C is to be regarded as a public service channel with an obligation for disseminating information, education and entertainment. S4C is, like CH4, a commissioning broadcaster, i.e. it does not produce any programmes itself but commissions them from outside suppliers.

The control of S4C is vested in The Welsh Fourth Channel Authority, which consists of five people appointed by the relevant Secretary of State, who in 1982 was the Home Secretary, and since 1992 has been the Minister of National Heritage. As for the composition of the Authority, the 1990 Broadcasting Act states only that there at any one time must not be more than one member from the BBC and the ITC respectively. In the first Authority of 1982, two members were the Governor of BBC-Wales and the IBA's Welsh member, and a third was a member of the board of CH4, UK.¹ This arrangement was not stipulated in the 1981 Broadcasting Act, but was a matter of convenience at the time. Appointment to the authority is made by the Secretary of State, for a period of five years, from among people suggested by the industry and the cultural elites, and consisted in 1992 of five people representing civil servants, academics, and business. The BBC Governor from Wales is a member, and the Chairman of the Authority is former Chairman of The Welsh Tourist Board, and incidentally a brother to the first Chief Executive of

S4C. The non-democratic appointment system to the Authority plus its lack of political accountability, at least up to January 1993, when S4C became directly accountable to the treasury, has created some concern in Wales, both among people from the industry and academia.

The financing of S4C reflects its dual role as commercial and public service broadcaster. Following section 39(1) of the 1981 Broadcasting Act, the IBA (later ITC) provides the Welsh Fourth Channel Authority with funds to run S4C according to the requirements in the Broadcasting Act. The necessary funds are obtained by the IBA from the Fourth Channel subscription which for each financial year is a proportion (17%) of the Net Advertising Revenue (NAR) of the ITV programme contractors. The funds raised by the IBA (ITC) are divided on the basis of 20% to S4C and 80% to CH4. Thus S4C received up to 3.4% of the previous years NAR. There is however a "safety net" clause for S4C, in that they can apply to the Secretary of State if the money received from the IBA is not deemed sufficient to carry out S4C's public service obligations.

These funding arrangements continued until 31 December 1992. After this date S4C receives funding according to the new 1990 Broadcasting Act. S4C receives from the Treasury approximately 3.2% of the terrestrial NAR (Section 61), and will retain income from the sale of its own airtime. The latter is important, as the sale of airtime on S4C had previously been totally separated from the running of the channel, and the sole responsibility of HTV, who also kept the revenue engendered. From 1 January 1993, S4C does not receive funding from the ITC any more, but gets its subvention directly from the Treasury and is accountable to the relevant Secretary of State, which since April 1992 has been the Minister for National Heritage.

The mixture of public service broadcasting and commercial interests inherent in the concept of S4C, is also mirrored in the supply of programmes. Of the 22 hours originally agreed upon in 1982, BBC-Wales supplied 10 hours of programmes per week, which are payed for through the licence fee. The remaining 12 hours were produced by HTV and by independent producers or television companies, with originally 7 3/4 hours supplied by HTV and the independent companies supplying 4 1/4 hours.
The editorial control lies with S4C, and the Welsh-language programmes are shown at prime time, between 6.30 pm and 10.00 pm (Section 57, 2 (b)). When Welsh programmes are not shown, S4C broadcasts material from CH4, UK, selected and rescheduled by S4C. According to Jeremy Isaacs, the founding Chief Executive of CH4, the relationship between S4C and CH4 never caused any problems, even though to the lasting regret of CH4 the "Channel 4 News" could never be shown in Wales. The English-language CH4 programmes broadcast on S4C bear however no particular relevance to Wales. It is important to point out, that it is only in the broadcasting of the Welsh-language programmes that S4C is the 'Welsh' Channel. When it amounts to English-language programmes concerning Wales, those are the responsibility of BBC-Wales and HTV. According to the Broadcasting Act, S4C can only broadcast a non Welsh-language programme "which is being, has been or is to be broadcast on Channel 4" (Section 57, 3). As S4C however is a commercial channel, there is a need to maximize the audience. This means, that in the rescheduling of English-language CH4 programmes, those of 'minority interest' or in other words innovative 'quality' programmes rate a low priority. It is subsequently mainly audience-catching programmes, such as soaps, american series, chat shows etc. which are broadcast. CH4 thus loses its minority channel aspect in Wales much to the disquiet of people in Wales who cannot at the same time receive S4C and CH4.

8.2. The Audience.

The area covered by S4C is geographical Wales. The potential S4C audience is according to BARB's (Broadcasters Audience Research Board) Establishment Survey August 1990 - June 1992 as follows: The population of Wales consist of 2,776,000 individuals living in 1,087,000 households. Of these 2,425,000 individuals in 943,000 households in Wales are able to receive S4C, which amounts to some 87% of the population.

3 BARB's Establishment Survey, August 1990 - June 1992, Tables 1 & 5a.
As for CH4 reception, there is an overlap in certain areas, where it is possible to receive both. 437,000 households in Wales are able to receive CH4, which constitutes some 40% of the population. Of those able to receive S4C, 34% are also able to receive CH4. 97% of all homes in Wales receive BBC1, BBC2 and ITV (but not always from Wales).

Of particular relevance to S4C's Welsh-language programmes, the BARB Establishment Survey operates with a concept of "Welsh-speaking homes", which are homes where 50% or more of the family can speak Welsh. The number of "Welsh-speaking homes" is 264,000 in which 713,000 individuals live. All Welsh-speaking homes receive S4C. 21% of these also receive CH4, which amounts to 56,000 households. Because of the BARB concept of 'Welsh speaking' homes, invented for television audience research purposes, the percentage break-downs into age and social group for the potential S4C audience might differ from those of the census. Table 8.2.1 below shows the age group break-down for "Welsh-speaking homes":

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-3</td>
<td>31,000</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-9</td>
<td>72,000</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-15</td>
<td>68,000</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-24</td>
<td>79,000</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>81,000</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-54</td>
<td>186,000</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55+</td>
<td>194,000</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(of which the largest single group is 65+ at 130,000 or 18%)

Table 8.2.1.6

4 op.cit. Table 1.
5 op.cit. Table 1 & 5b.
As for the social distribution, table 8.2.2 shows the break-down into social groups for people aged 15+ in Welsh-speaking homes, which is a total of 541,000 adults:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Group</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AB</td>
<td>93,000</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1</td>
<td>133,000</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>163,000</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>78,000</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>73,000</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.2.2.7

The above picture of the S4C universe, defined as the BARB 'Welsh speaking homes', suggests that from a commercial point of view, the composition of the S4C Welsh viewers might present a problem. Among the Welsh audience, there is an overweight of the C2DE social groups (58%), groups which are of limited interest for advertisers. This grouping reflects a large proportion of elderly people. In other words the S4C audience is to some extent an advertisers nightmare: Poor and ageing, not likely to consume a great deal.

This is however only partly true, as surveys have shown that S4C predominantly is viewed by the ABC1 groups. This is ideal from the point of view of a commercial broadcaster, but for a public service broadcaster, which S4C also is, it constitutes a real problem. For S4C to legitimize its existence as a public service broadcaster, it must ideally attract all layers in Welsh society. An attempt to do this was made in 1990 with the launch of the programme HENO, of which more will be said below.

With regards to advertising, S4C's problem, apart from the social composition of its viewers, is that advertisers traditionally prefer a mass audience,
and as S4C is a minority channel, it will not attract this kind of mass audience. Having said this, the development within advertising strategy offers some hope. Advertising has become increasingly targeted towards specific social groups. An example is the advertising of up-market products in connection with late night programmes on CH4. Instead of a large indifferent audience, it is interesting to target an albeit smaller but at the same time more appreciative audience, such as - perhaps - the viewers of Welsh language programmes. The requirement for S4C to be in charge of the sale of its own airtime from January 1993, has brought about a development towards more Welsh language adverts. Up to this point in time there had been few Welsh language adverts on S4C. During 1993, however, S4C carried a total of 82 different Welsh language adverts, and 65% of all local and regional adverts were in Welsh. In addition 6 national brands ran Welsh commercials.

Moving away from the composition of viewers, how much is S4C actually watched: Figure 8.2.1 below shows S4C’s average weekly reach for the period 1982 - 1991, and for 1992 - 94. The reach is the percentage of potential S4C viewers who actually viewed the channel at some stage during the week, for a minimum period of three minutes. The reach is calculated for all programmes, both Welsh and English.

In 1991, S4C decided that the BARB panel, on which basis the estimates of viewing were made, was not sufficiently representative with regards to the social and, in particular, the geographic distribution of Welsh speakers. A separate BARB 'boost' panel for Welsh speakers was consequently constructed to measure S4C programmes, and the extra cost of setting it up was met by S4C. The case of S4C illustrates the general point that in order to obtain usable data it is not enough to simply make a mini-version of a larger audience research system, as the sample sizes need to be of a certain size to yield statistically reliable data. It is therefore more expensive per viewer to measure viewing of linguistic minority programmes.

The new S4C panel came into operation in August 1992, so from August 1991 to July 1992 S4C did not publish any audience figures. As the graphs below

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8 S4C Report and Accounts 1993, p. 66.

show, the new figures show an increase on the earlier figures, but figures for the old and new panel are of course not directly comparable.

Figure 8.2.1. S4C's average weekly reach.

The graph shows the reach for 'All viewers' and from 1984-85 also for 'Welsh speakers'. The graph indicates a steady consolidation and stabilising of the S4C total audience. Between 1984 and 91 the reach averaged 60.5% for 'all viewers' and 71.6% for Welsh speakers. The figures for the new panel show an 1992-94 average at 65.3% for 'all viewers' and 82.6% for Welsh speakers. This last figure is very close to the result of the 1992 Welsh Social survey, where 81.5% of Welsh speakers watched Welsh programmes on S4C regularly or sometimes.10

The next graph, figure 8.2.2 shows S4C's average share for the same periods. The share is the hours of S4C watched as a percentage of the hours of all TV watched in the area. Both of the graphs refer to all programmes, both Welsh and English combined. The two graphs show that in the first months of S4C's existence a smaller audience was viewing for longer, probably due to the curiosity element, and was an indication of a smaller group of viewers who were very interested in

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most of the Channel's output. This group of viewers has however expanded steadily over the years to include people who were not initially interested in S4C. As the average reach has become stable in the 60% range, S4C's share of viewing seems to have stabilised in its third year. The higher figure of the first ten months dropped in the following year, but picked up again in 1984 and has since remained stable at 6.7% for 'all viewers' and 10.6% for Welsh speakers. The figures reflect a steady pattern of viewing achieved in a relatively short period of time. The figures from the new BARB panel are higher: an average share of 8.8% for 'all viewers' and 18.2% for Welsh speakers during 1992-94. As something new, S4C has started to publish the share among Welsh speakers in particular day parts. During the Welsh language peak, the share among Welsh speakers averaged 19% in 1993-94.

Figure 8.2.2. S4C's average weekly share.

It is interesting, in this context, to look at how S4C fares in comparison with other channels. A problem here, however, is to determine what channel best to compare S4C with. In the sense that it is a minority channel (and the Welsh CH4) one could compare it with CH4 or BBC2, both of which have audience shares around the 10%. This minority channel aspect would be true for the English programmes, but within the Welsh-language programming, the aim of S4C is to
cater for all tastes, which includes mainstream, middle of the road, popular programming as is shown on BBC1 and ITV. This is indeed one of S4C's problems: its brief is to be everything to everyone within the Welsh speaking community, cutting across class and gender, that are key variables in normal broadcasting planning, from the outset a difficult remit. As the types of programmes change dependent on the language, the answer must be to look at the viewing figures for particular programme strands. It shows that those English language programmes which do well on CH4 also do well on S4C, and some of the Welsh language programmes do very well overall. In particular the soap "Pobol Y Cwm" - People of the Valley, usually tops the S4C charts, even in competition with English programmes like the CH4 soap "Brookside".

From the 22 hours of Welsh language programmes in 1982, the S4C average weekly hours have quietly expanded and by the end of December 1991 topped at 34.9, approximately one fourth of the channel's total scheduled hours. The year after, the hours fell to 31.8, but then increased over the two following years, to an average 33.7 hours weekly in 1994. Figure 8.2.3 illustrates the development in average weekly hours from 1983-94. It is indexed with 1983/84 as starting point, as this was the first full financial year. Also showing on the graph is the indexed development in S4C's income, and programme costs. The figure for 1991 must be approached with some care, as the 1991 S4C annual report only covers the last nine months of 1991, as the financial year changed to the calendar year in January 1992. The illustrated figures are consequently arrived at by multiplying the total 1991 figures by 12/9.

The graphs shows that the weekly Welsh-language output has risen by approximately 50% during those eleven years, whereas the income - understood as the amount received from the IBA/ITC and since 1993 from The Department of National Heritage - has more than doubled. Most of this rise in income has been followed by a similar rise in programme expenditure, as the programme cost curve shows. Programme costs is here understood as the 'costs of programmes commissioned or acquired from programme suppliers', and do not include operational costs. The steep rise in programme costs illustrates S4C's need to commission indigenously produced programmes of an acceptable quality to fulfil
their public service obligations. If taken into consideration that the BBC at the start of S4C, provided and still provides 10 hours weekly for 'free' - payed via the licence fee - the actual rise in programme hours that S4C needs to commission, and pay for, is roughly from 12 hours in 1982 to 24 in 1994. This constitutes approximately a 100% rise, which is reflected in the programme cost/income curves.

Figure 8.2.3
S4C's income, average weekly hours and programme costs.

It is clear that the income is not going to continue to rise steadily as it did up to 1992. S4C's income is tied up with the Net Advertising Revenue (NAR), which is, if not actually falling, at least not rising to the same degree as it used to. This problem is accentuated by the fact that since January 1993, S4C receives an even smaller slice of the NAR cake, and now - like CH4 in the UK - has the responsibility of adding to its income by selling its own airtime. The S4C airtime was up to 1993 sold by HTV, which retained the income. The sale of airtime did however in 1993, in the first year, generate 2.761 million to S4C, which increased in 199411.

The challenge of a potentially falling income, was acted upon from 1990-91, where the average cost per hour commissioned was reduced from 49,066 in 89/90, to 44,800 in 90/91. This was brought about by two factors: by launching the relatively cheap magazine type programme HENO in September 1990, and by HTV's expensive fixed price contract coming to an end in December 1989. In addition to these two factors the quantity of repeated programmes rose.

8.3. Administration and Staff.

The administration of S4C is situated in Cardiff, as are HTV's and BBC-Wales', a decision which originally raised some criticism of 'the Cardiff media establishment'. The setting-up of S4C, has however resulted in the growth of a number of smaller independent TV/video companies in Wales, especially around Caernarfon in north Wales, an issue, which will be treated in section 8.6 below, and this has somewhat evened out the geographical score.

Another type of criticism which has been levelled at S4C is the actual content of the Welsh programmes. The language was by some perceived to be the only difference between the Welsh programmes and the usual English mainstream television. This criticism was related to the fact that the people who worked for, and to a large extent still work for, S4C, had previously worked within the traditional broadcasting establishment in Wales i.e. BBC Wales and HTV. Hence the perception that the alternative content of the Channel was bound to be limited. The first chief executive of S4C Owen Edwards, as well as the second, Geraint Stanley Jones have both been controllers of BBC Wales, and the majority of the senior staff at S4C have either worked for BBC or HTV (or both).

Of 22 senior members of the S4C staff from 1982 to 1994, seven had worked for the BBC throughout their broadcasting career, and three had worked uniquely for HTV. Two people had worked for both BBC and HTV, and a further two had worked for either BBC or HTV and the Independent sector. One person had

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previously worked in local radio, and as something relatively new, the experience of the new S4C Chief Executive derives mainly from the independent sector. Six people came from a non-broadcasting background, typically areas like the legal profession, accountancy and public relations.

The educational background of the S4C management is also very similar. Of 16 managers and commissioning editors, four people had been to University of Oxford, nine people to University of Bangor, two people had attended University of Aberystwyth and one person University of Glamorgan. This common background from the major broadcasting organisations is hardly surprising though, given the smallness of Wales and the need for experienced broadcasters, but it does nothing to further the idea of S4C as a potentially fresh and radical institution. However it is not only within S4C this is the case: A large number of the Welsh independent producers are former staff of one of the large broadcasting organisations in Wales, who have gone independent either by choice or because of redundancy, gaining the kind of social mobility they would not otherwise have attained. In the words of one HTV journalist: "The whole broadcasting environment in Wales is very incestuous".

The 1995 list of members of TAC (the Welsh independent producers association) contains 87 companies with some 129 individuals. Of these approximately 33% have worked for BBC (not only BBC Wales, but also BBC network), 22% for HTV/ITV and 9% for both. To some extent it is a question of generations: Most of the younger TAC members belong to the new group of programme makers, comprising some 36% of the TAC members, who have neither worked for BBC or HTV, but have gained experience within the independent sector, which grew after the advent of S4C. Symptomatic of this development is the fact that the third Chief Executive of S4C, who officially took over in June 1994, was appointed from the ranks of the independent sector. With a background first as a pop singer (however appearing on television for both BBC and HTV), then in the recording business with the Welsh-language record company Sain, and later as a director of the facility house, Barcud in north Wales, Huw Jones is one of those new independents who have little or no background within any of the major broadcasting organisations in Wales.

Apart from the common professional background of many of the Welsh
broadcasters and programme makers, there is also the gender and class issue. The management of S4C as well as the other broadcasting institutions in Wales, are drawn from a white, middle-class background, and are predominantly male. An improvement from many other broadcasters, there have constantly been two women on the S4C Board of management. But as criticized by female independent producers in Wales, there has only ever been one female commissioning editor at S4C, and that was in the area of children and young people. The social background of the broadcasters along with their concentration in south Wales risk putting them out of touch with their audience. The Welsh Consumer Council has, in a report from 1985, criticized S4C for not providing enough consultation and accountability, and has argued that S4C needs to do more in order to gauge the views of in particular non-Welsh speakers, young people and ethnic minorities.\(^{13}\)

The common background within the same kind of organizations, which as Tom Burns found in his study of the BBC were strongly influenced by the notion of 'professionalism', tend to further the kind of professional ethos mentioned in section 2.3. The professional ethos acts both as a group unifier for Welsh language media professionals (as well as the ones working through the medium of English), and provides guidelines for the actual work practice, like established wisdom concerning such things as for example the art of scheduling, i.e. where a particular programme fits in; and programme formats, i.e. what a particular type of programme is supposed to look like. When related to the issue of control over the means of mass communication, there is both a fear of relinquishing the control of broadcasting policies, and a protectiveness towards the profession, which manifests itself in a slight arrogance towards consumer groups and the like, who know little about making television, but would like to have a say in the process. In 1985 the Welsh Consumer Council suggested the establishment of a consumers' consultative committee for S4C, in order to safeguard the interests of the consumers, as S4C is a monopoly supplier, when it amounts to broadcasting television in the Welsh

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\(^{13}\) The Welsh Consumer Council’s Evidence to the Home Office Review of the Fourth Channel in Wales. October 1985, p. 5.
language\(^{14}\). S4C choose from the outset to rely on the co-operation of the BBC’s Broadcasting Council for Wales, and the IBA’s Wales Advisory Committee, neither of which, of course, are uniquely concerned with the affairs of S4C. In addition to this there have been an S4C educational advisory panel, which was abolished in 1992\(^{15}\), as well as a religious advisory panel, abolished in 1993\(^{16}\). The recommendations from the Welsh Consumer Council to the Home Office about a consultative body was not acted upon, but according to the Consumer Council a number of improvements were however made in the way S4C gets feedback from viewers. But according to the Council, television cannot afford to be complacent and needs to develop more structured ways of representing consumers’ interests\(^{17}\).

The provision in the 1990 Broadcasting Act (section 64) stipulates however that the Welsh Authority, i.e S4C, makes provisions for ascertaining the state of public opinion concerning programmes, the possible effect of these programmes, and the type of programmes the public would like to see broadcast on S4C. In other words, S4C has had the issue of accountability towards the public forced upon it from January 1993. With the advent of a new Chairman in 1992 who, with a background as Chairman of the Wales Tourist Board, stresses the marketing of the channel and increasing emphasis on S4C’s response to the needs of the viewers\(^{18}\), a viewers hotline was established in 1993, and a system for monitoring all phone calls and letters put in place. Additionally two public meetings were held in 1993, and four in 1994.

It is, however, a somewhat paradoxical situation that S4C, as one of the most important means for a nation without a state to develop its cultural identity, i.e. television in the minority language, needs prescriptions from the centre concerning


\(^{15}\) S4C Report and Accounts 1992, p. 42.

\(^{16}\) S4C Report and Accounts 1993, p. 58.

\(^{17}\) The Welsh Consumer Council’s response to the Institute of Welsh Affairs concerning the options for English language broadcasting in Wales. March 1990, p. 2.

\(^{18}\) S4C Report and Accounts 1992, p. 3.
how to involve the peripheral public before they take that particular task seriously. This brings to mind Galtung’s theory, which problematizes the role of broadcasters. Are the broadcasters of Wales qua their socialization within the national British broadcasting professions, merely acting for the broadcasting elites in London. Are they - intentionally or not - contributing to the production of Welsh 'pulp' television in order to diffuse the discontent, or feeling of relative deprivation on the cultural field, which led to the demonstrations and civil disobedience campaigns of the late 1970’s? Or is it possible for S4C to contribute towards the workings of a 'public sphere' in Wales?

The point outlined above, i.e. the protection of the interests of the professional group, is for Wales accentuated by broadcasters being both professionals, as well as members of a cultural elite, a cultural elite which in Wales is closely related to the language. Because of the smallness of the place this elite is more visible than in larger communities. It is easy to identify families, even whole dynasties, involved in cultural production, be it literature or broadcasting etc. As Butt Philip puts it: "The professional broadcasters in Wales generally form a close community, often linked by kinship or marriage, and drawn from the educated bilingual middle class, a small section of Welsh society." Hence it is understandable if members of the general public might regard the Welsh television industry as an inherently elitist venture for the chosen few. In his review of the sociology of Wales, Graham Day however cautions of the analytical problems involved in this practice of personalizing the question of power structure in Welsh society. This section will end on Day’s pertinent warning not to loose sight of where people come from:

"to the uninitiated, Welsh politics seems to consist of a plethora of names; this lends to political movements the appearance of bands of sturdy individualists united around shared values. Reasons can be suggested for this: the smallness of Wales, the intimacy of leading circles, the excellence of channels of communication; but the personalization of political life allows to fall from view the existence of underlying interests, better handled in sociological categories."20


In the following section some aspects of S4C's history is entered into. In order to illustrate the political and legislative background a brief description will be given of what Owen Edwards, the first chief executive of S4C, regards as five distinct periods in the 'political' history of the channel. Furthermore are treated the developments in S4C commissioning policies.

The first period in S4C's history - and the longest in terms of time - was the struggle to get S4C onto the 1981 Broadcasting Act. The second was the eighteen months between the Broadcasting Act, and going on air in November 1982. The third period covered the first three years of the station's life, and finished in October 1985 with the governments assurance that S4C was there to stay. According to Owen Edwards, the fourth period lasted until the government published its White Paper on: "Broadcasting in the '90s: Competition, choice and quality", the forerunner to the 1990 Broadcasting Act, where they stated that "The Welsh Fourth Channel has fulfilled expectations" and that the programming remit of S4C had been a striking success. In the fifth period, it was clear that S4C's future was secure, the only question was how - there was a worry about the prospect for S4C in the environment of increased competition and commercialism, inherent in the Thatcher era.

The Broadcasting Act of 1990 ensured the survival of S4C, but it can be argued that a new and sixth period in the station's history began in January 1993, with the responsibility for the sale of its own airtime.

Apart from these political and legislative phases, there have been developments in the channel’s commissioning policies during the first ten years. The commissioning policies, which are central to the influence of S4C on any notion of Welsh identity, have developed since the set up of S4C, and can, according to a former S4C Deputy Chief Executive, be divided into three stages: The first stage consisted of an attempt to fulfil the expectations of what could be considered S4C's traditional audience, i.e. the Welsh speakers, who had fought for the channel.

Additionally there was the strain of a three years trial period, which meant that one aim of S4C, was to entrench itself so firmly into Welsh society, that it would create problems (for example in terms of unemployment) if it were to be scrapped after those three years. A positive factor assisting in this process was the change or disintegration in broadcasting structures during the 1980’s, represented by CH4, with the break up of the traditional broadcasting duopoly and the subsequent rise in independent companies. The strategy was accordingly the 'social engineering' of a Welsh media infrastructure (see section 8.6), including supporting workshops, to give people the possibility of expressing themselves via the media. A choice was to use more contributions from independent producers than was strictly necessary according to the Broadcasting Act 1981, which gave S4C a choice as to whom they could obtain programmes from: Apart from the 10 hours guaranteed by the BBC and provided free, the ITV company operating in Wales was required by the IBA to supply S4C with a 'reasonable proportion' of the required Welsh programmes, on commercial terms. S4C was additionally allowed to obtain programmes from other sources.22 An important reason for the decision to use contributions from independent producers was economic, in order to put pressure on HTV who initially wanted a much higher price for supplying S4C with Welsh language programmes than the channel was willing to pay. As S4C’s bargaining position was very low at the time, due to the general lack of programme suppliers, an expansion of the independent sector was deliberately encouraged, even to the extent of persuading some of HTV’s Welsh producers to become independent, as admitted by Owen Edwards in his article "Sianelu".23 The outcome of the negotiations with HTV was that HTV got a fixed price contract from 1982 to December 1989 for initially 7 3/4 hours, rising to 9, only to be modified according to inflation.

The second stage of commissioning policies began in autumn 1989 culminating in the "New Launch", January 1990, which stressed the importance of co-operation with other countries or broadcasters in Europe. It involved some schedule changes and a greater emphasis on identifiable programme strands. S4C


was to take more control of the commissioning process by appointing more commissioning editors, each with an editorial responsibility for a subject. In other words S4C wanted to shape its own policy: Instead of the programming being producer led, it would now be commissioning led. Among other things, this new policy was a reflection of S4C's safer programme supply situation, and the reaction of the independents was not surprisingly none too favourable. The aim was to reach a wider audience than before: The BBC produced soap, "Pobol Y Cwm", (People of the Valley) went daily (weekdays plus subtitled repeats on Sundays); children's programmes were given a new priority; and the Welsh learners programme "Now You are Talking" under the organization ACEN, was introduced. This phase included according to one S4C executive, a "philosophical broadening of the audience" in the sense that S4C wanted to encourage more Welsh speakers, as well as infrequent users of the language, to view the channel. This envisaged broadening of the audience was of both a social and geographical nature. Socially S4C wanted to attract the C2DE social groups, who traditionally did not watch much S4C, but who constituted a large proportion of the possible viewing universe. Geographically the widening of the catchment area meant Swansea. There are quite a number of Welsh speakers in this area, but because of the 'producer-led' (according to S4C) programming policy, mentioned above, and the lack of independent producers around Swansea, there had not been much viewing of S4C in this area. The solution was to go down-market and to do it in Swansea, with a daily (weekdays), early evening, tabloid format, magazine style programme, "HENO" (Tonight). This decision has been somewhat controversial, and sparked a lively debate within the Welsh community. As one observer (and later member of S4C's Authority) expressed it:

"HENO's very existence is fraught with controversy: the decision to site the company in Swansea outside the traditional hinterland of the established independents in Gwynedd and Cardiff; to give £5m to an unproven company for an untested product; to run a programme which runs the gauntlet of having to be manifestly national and rootedly local; to give all this high risk money to a company in which there were individuals who had fallen foul of HTV for tendering for another operation whilst still under staff contracts. All of this adds up to a broadcasting environment where it is more than usually difficult to find neutral critical perspectives on either S4C's decisions..."
or the quality of the programmes"²⁴

HENO was launched in September 1990, and has received a very mixed response, as well as a very fluctuating audience. The occasional use of English in some of the items has brought about strong criticism from language purists, but does not seem to unduly annoy most viewers of the programme.

In a speech at the "new launch" of S4C, in January 1990, the Chief Executive, Geraint Stanley Jones, described the challenges S4C had to face. Firstly, the nature of Welsh society is becoming more urban, and with a higher proportion of Welsh learners. Secondly, more television choice for the population of Wales, including satellite, means more competition for S4C, in particular in the area of light entertainment. Thirdly there was the new European dimension. The existence of a multi-cultured, multi-lingual market, where bilingualism is a norm, was seen as a chance for S4C to develop new marketing and co-producing possibilities.

The third stage in the commissioning policies of S4C, was entered into in January 1993, when S4C to some extent had to become more commercial, and according to the Broadcasting Act was responsible for selling its own airtime. S4C has to interpret the expectations of the audience and try to meet it, which involves a higher priority on audience research, as well as convincing the advertisers that they get the audience they want. This last factor reflects back to the observations in section 2.3. The fact that S4C now has to be responsible for the sale of its own airtime, entails yet more restraints as the channel now has to deliver an sizeable audience to the advertisers. Previous to January 1993, S4C was to some extent free from the pressures of being a partly commercially funded channel as HTV was in charge of selling airtime on S4C and kept any gains or bore any losses, without involving S4C. Now that S4C has to treat their audience as a commodity, something which can be sold to advertisers, there may be a danger of a reduction in the overall diversity of programming.

8.5. On co-productions and subtitling.

Co-productions have increased over the last years, and co-production partners include companies from Japan, France, Scotland, Australia, USA, Germany and Italy. The advantage of co-production is that the cost of a programme or a series of programmes are divided between several broadcasters, which minimises the cost for each, and places the name of S4C before a wider audience. Via S4C’s sales department Mentrau (Enterprises), programmes have been sold all over the world. Animation in particular has been popular, and is one of S4C’s strong points as S4C at an early stage encouraged the build up of a thriving animation industry in the Cardiff area. From the first one "Super Ted", which has been sold to Disney, to more grown up animation, such as "Shakespeare - The Animated Tales", co-produced with the BBC and Soviet animators; "The Animated Operas"; and Dylan Thomas’ play for voices: "Under Milkwood", which was co-produced with BBC-Wales, using the original 1954 soundtrack with Richard Burton. The soap "Pobol Y Cwm" (People of the Valley) has been sold to The Netherlands, and was broadcast autumn 1992, in Welsh with Dutch subtitles. It was also shown with subtitles on BBC2 network television during the spring of 1994.

Co-productions however, even if they are entered into with enthusiasm by, in particular, smaller broadcasting organizations, do lend additional restraints on the freedom of programme-makers in the production of programmes. These restraints are related both to the economy surrounding the programme as well as the form. There is a danger that the final programme becomes alienated from its original idea and cultural content, because of the demands of finance and co-production partners. Such external demands might be a greater problem for Welsh-language productions than for English ones, simply because there are fewer of them. With so few feature films that are made in the Welsh language, one ideally can not afford to waste scarce resources on projects that have no relevance to Wales, or contemporary Welsh society just in order to co-produce with a world known broadcaster. According to the commissioning editor for drama at S4C, the proposed projects must have some relevance to Wales, either with a Welsh director or a Welsh company. An example however of co-productions, resulting in products with little to do with
Wales or the Welsh, were the series about Pirates and Treasure Islands, which were co-produced with the American Discovery Channel and the Gaelic Television Committee during 1992.

In the context of co-production a related issue crops up, namely the question of back-to-back versions of programmes, which are parallel productions of the same film, but in different language versions. When making programmes - feature films in particular - it is normal to make back-to-back versions in Welsh and English, using the same actors. The Welsh version is shown on S4C only, while the English version is used for export, including 'export' to the English TV network. This practice, it could be argued, may defeat the object of the S4C exercise, understood as the safeguarding and expansion of the Welsh language. If S4C and the Welsh language producers do not themselves take the Welsh language seriously as a medium through which to produce cultural commodities, but turn to English as soon as they want to go outside the area of Wales, why should anyone else take Welsh seriously. This issue of course touches upon the old British phobia about other languages (and subtitles); an attitude which actually pervades the Welsh themselves - being very 'British' when it comes to any language other than Welsh and English. It could be argued that ideally S4C should be proud of the language and stick to Welsh versions, which are subsequently subtitled. That would save costs and liberate resources to more and better programmes. If the argument that the culture is inherent in the language - which incidentally was one of the reasons for the demands for Welsh language television - holds, then it is self defeating automatically to make back-to-back versions, as if to say that the language doesn't matter after all. However the - at least in theory - increased interest in Europe for diversity in terms of different cultures and languages, does provide a basis in the attempt to use the Welsh language abroad. This challenge is being reacted upon from the part of the Welsh film and television industry with the setting up of Screen Wales, which aims to market Welsh films and television programmes abroad, as well as acting as an 'antenna' i.e. a contact office for the MEDIA project.

The issue of different language versions, is related to that of subtitling. S4C has subtitled more and more programmes for the benefit of non-Welsh speakers, but mainly on teletext. According to the 1994 S4C Annual Report, 56% of the Welsh
language hours are now subtitled on teletext. The problems, however, with the use of teletext are the added cost of the teletext TV’s, which means that not everybody can afford it, and the un-attractiveness of the actual teletext subtitles. According to the BARB Establishment survey, August 1990 - June 1992, 39% of the households receiving S4C possess a teletext set, compared to 42% for the UK as a whole. Surveys have revealed that it is a minority of these who actually use the subtitling facility. Because the teletext subtitles serve several purposes, among others a service for the hard of hearing, they are slow, with different colours representing different people talking, and can take up a third of the television screen. This makes them quite unattractive to look at compared to on-screen subtitles, and they cannot be recorded on video, except with very advanced equipment. If therefore one of the goals of subtitling is to present the S4C programmes to non-Welsh speakers, another way might be to broadcast repeats of the best programmes with on-screen subtitles, something S4C has started to do.

8.6. The Economic Impact of S4C on the Independent Sector.

As the major players on the Welsh broadcasting arena, BBC, HTV and S4C, have been treated above, this section concentrates on a description of the independent sector in Wales. The appearance of this sector is the main innovative aspect following the set-up of S4C, and as discussed in section 2.6., the build-up of a media industry working through the medium of the Welsh language helps to increase the prestige of the language, by providing job opportunities through Welsh, thus increasing the value of the language for social mobility. This in turn enhances the general status of Welsh and its chances of survival. Concluding the section, is an attempt to link the growth of a Welsh media industry to arguments concerning the role of telecommunications in peripheral economies.

The television industry in Wales can be regarded as consisting of three sectors: broadcasting, production and provision of facilities and services. In the large organisations, BBC and HTV, all three aspects exist in-house. S4C, however, only broadcast programmes commissioned from outside the organization. The advent of
S4C consequently created an opportunity for the growth of an independent Welsh-language based sector entailing production and facility-provision.

An additional reason for the growth in independent companies, not only limited to Wales or Welsh language programmes, was the recommendations of the Peacock Committee from 1987. The report suggested that a substantial part of the programming for both BBC and ITV should be supplied by independents. This recommendation was further established in the 1990 Broadcasting Act, as not less than 25% per year.

The geographical distribution of the Welsh media industry is as follows: The Cardiff area is home for the broadcasting headquarters of BBC-Wales, HTV and S4C, and a range of production and service companies. In north Wales, the Bangor and Caernarfon areas in particular have got a concentration of producers and facility services. As figure 8.6.1 shows, other production firms are scattered throughout Wales, with some Welsh producers working from Bristol or London.

Figure 8.6.1.25
Location of Welsh Television Industry:

The growth of the Welsh independent sector was to a large extent supported and guided by S4C. In the 1981 Broadcasting Act, which was the legal foundation for S4C at the time, section 48.(4), only states that:

"Nothing in this section shall be taken to preclude the Welsh Authority from obtaining television programmes in Welsh from sources other than the BBC and the TV programmes contractor referred to in subsection (3)."

No further specifications were given about how many hours should come from these "other sources", if any. The Welsh Authority interpreted this passage to mean that they should use independently produced programmes, but they could in theory have chosen mainly to rely on programmes from BBC-Wales and HTV without actually going against the letter of the law. S4C chose however to use a number of independents right from the start, not least because of problems of programme supply and costs encountered with HTV, and in this way encouraged the growth of a new sector of Welsh-language based independents.

As figure 8.6.1. shows, the Bangor/Caernarfon area is home to a range of producers and facilities. Prior to 1981, there was already an existing media industry in Cardiff, with BBC-Wales and the HTV headquarters located here, but very little in north Wales. The following section concentrates consequently on the appearance of these media related enterprises in north Wales, which were directly caused by the advent of S4C.

The historical background for the north Wales media concentration was a conscious decision, taken in 1981 by a group of producers, to locate in north Wales. This decision was reached for political reasons as opposed to merely commercial, and the idea was backed by S4C. According to one of the producers involved, the rationale behind the choice of location was an attempt to regenerate Welsh speaking areas, as well as a wish to move back from Cardiff, where, until then, the bulk of the media jobs in Wales had been situated. For Wales in general, it is estimated, in a report on the television industry in Wales by Philip Cooke and Carmel Gahan, that over half of the companies surveyed had been formed at the time of the establishment of S4C, usually by ex-employees of either HTV or BBC-Wales.26 In

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26 op. cit. p. 25.
north Wales there were some already existing facilities, including people with media experience, for the independent sector to draw upon, such as actors and writers. The existing activities were BBC Bangor, which was a BBC studio, the Welsh-language record company Sain, near Caernarfon, and a theatre company in Bangor. The crucial element in the decision to move a large share of the media industry to north Wales was the isolation factor: as north Wales was too far away from the existing media centres, either Cardiff or Birmingham/Manchester, it would not be viable for people to commute (especially given the rather problematic Welsh infrastructure). It was consequently necessary for people employed in north Wales to actually move to the area, in order to work there. So as soon as there was a critical mass of producers/production companies, the idea was that the area would become self-sustaining in terms of workforce, facilities etc. Apart from the creation of a Welsh-language media industry in the Welsh 'heartland', one rationale for producers settling in a north Welsh community, was, ideally speaking the different responsibility it would give to actually live among the audience, and constantly being confronted with it, something Welsh-language producers could easily avoid if they lived in a city like Cardiff: "Here it is possible to be confronted with your audience afterwards in the village pub". Ideally, the north Wales producers try to cater for their local audience, which mainly is working class or farmers with Welsh as their first language.

An important element in the north Wales media picture is the facility-house BARCUD, which is situated outside Caernarfon. The company was founded in 1982 by a group of independent producers, to provide OB - outside broadcasting - equipment and studio facilities for producers in north Wales. This venture was funded by personal investment from the involved producers, and investment from the Welsh Development Agency. BARCUD now employs some 50 people, mainly technicians.

Also situated in Caernarfon is the independent television producers employers association, TAC (Teledwyr Annibynwyr Cymru), dating from around 1983, with Welsh independent producers as members. TAC deals with the unions on behalf of the independent producers, liaises with the broadcasting organisations and the Welsh Office, and in general provides public relations service. TAC also administers a
sponsorship scheme for the independent producers. 10% of the members gross revenue goes towards sponsorship of cultural activities, in principle both in English and in Welsh, but as most suggestions to support cultural projects do come from Welsh-language companies, mainly in Welsh. The existence of this cultural sponsorship scheme illustrates the commitment to a strengthening of Welsh culture, without which the Welsh independent producers to some extent would have lost their raison d'être.

An additional 10% of the TAC members gross revenue goes towards training of Welsh speaking technicians through the organisation CYFLE (Opportunity), which also is based in Caernarfon. CYFLE was established in 1985 as a response to the lack of Welsh speakers on the technical side of the media industry, and it is, apart from TAC, funded by S4C, local authorities, the European Community and the Manpower Services Commission.

In the years from 1981 to approximately 1988 the independent sector in north Wales expanded, but since 1989 it has consolidated itself, and concentrated on the building up of commercial viability.

Right from the outset the various ventures mentioned above have had support from S4C. It must be said however that this S4C support was by no means caused by altruism, but had several good reasons. It was in S4C's interest to secure a supply of programmes from independent producers, having committed themselves to broadcast such, which then demanded the existence of production companies with access to relevant facilities. Additionally, as pointed out earlier, this 'social engineering' of the media infra-structure was in the interest of S4C, as they had a three years trial period. The aim during that period was to firmly integrate and entrench S4C into Welsh society, so that it would create a furore (especially in terms of unemployment in economically disadvantaged areas) if anything were to happen to S4C after the trial period was over. One factor facilitating the interaction between the independent companies and S4C during the build-up phase, was a perceived consensus concerning goals. There was according to Cooke and Gahan a

"common belief in the aims of Welsh language television, ... a common financial interest in its success as well as an awareness of its precarious dependence on the
which ensured a large degree of stability. But because of S4C's monopolistic position as the only outlet for Welsh-language television programmes, and as an effect of the shift to more 'commission-led' policies described above, this consensus has to some extent diminished. However, S4C's monopoly status, plus a certain loyalty based on the fact that S4C could be politically vulnerable if too much fuss were made, effectively reduces the level of criticism from the independent producers.

But what has the economic effect of this growth in the independent sector been, in terms of the number of jobs and derived income from the television industry. Cooke and Gahan suggest a figure of approximately 450 permanent full or part time jobs and an additional 1000 freelance or occasional job opportunities in the smaller independent sector of the TV industry in Wales.28

In a report concerning the multiplier effect, i.e. the economic influence on the local economy in Wales of that part of S4C's revenue which goes to independent companies, Dr. Glyn Williams makes the following points. Of the money allocated by S4C to independent producers, 72% go to either the Cardiff or Arfon (Bangor/Caernarfon) areas, with 34.3% going to Cardiff, and 37.7% going to Arfon. The rest of the revenue is distributed as follows: 1.9% go to the rest of Gwynedd (North-west Wales apart from the Arfon area), 13.1% to the rest of Wales (mainly the south-west) and 13.0% go entirely out of Wales29. Illustrating the importance of the independent producers for the Arfon area, is the fact that the amount of money coming into the region in the survey period, September 1989 to April 1990, amounted to some £6 million30. In terms of the number of job equivalents involved, Williams estimates that this figure corresponds to between 786 and 856 jobs in Arfon alone, and for north-west Wales as a whole from between 825 and

27 op. cit. p 23.

28 op. cit. p. 33.

29 G. Williams (1990), p. 5.

30 op. cit. p. 19.
899 jobs. For the Arfon area, this constitutes a substantial proportion, namely between 5% and 6% of the workforce in the area. However, the relative large part of the money that leaves Wales entirely some £2 million, Williams sees as a source for concern. It should be possible to reduce this amount, for example via intensified technical training of the workforce, such as the CYFLE scheme for training Welsh-speaking technicians. Williams stresses the increased level of skill and competence in the workforce in the Arfon area, brought about by working in or for the media industry. This competence might be useful in a wider competition situation, both in a British and in a European context. Thus, the media industry can be regarded as a vehicle for generation of skills and competence in the minority language, as was touched upon in section 2.6. This leads us to a discussion of the possible role of information technologies and telecommunications in economically peripheral areas.

In a report for the European Commissions’ FAST programme, "European competitiveness in the 21st century", the authors stress the importance of preserving the diversity which the different European countries have to offer. They see institutional and cultural differences as an advantage in terms of competition with America and Japan in high-technology areas. Advances in information technology now offer new opportunities. Recommending a decentralised approach, production can become more localised and distributed. And of particular relevance to the peripheral areas of Europe:

"This structural change can have considerable impact on unemployment and regional development by allowing small local companies to function as active producers" and the report continues: "It may also safeguard against the possible danger that the Internal Market of 1992 will give rise to polarisation of activities in specific geographical areas with a resultant worsening of conditions in the European periphery."

It is the drift of populations from the periphery areas which the authors of the report regard as having:

"both cultural and economic implications and will reduce further the diversity which could be part of Europe’s long term strength."\(^{32}\)

31 op. cit. p. 9.

Communications network are perceived as a remedy against such exodus, and can ensure an effective activity across Europe including the peripheries. Such communications network must, as far as possible, use the language of the particular community, and embody language exchange centres.

"The flexibility of its small and medium sized companies together with a culture of innovation could provide important opportunities for European industry in the coming years. These developments will however require systematic support on the part of employing companies, institutions and the educational infrastructure"\(^{33}\).

As an example of such an opportunity for the Welsh community, inherent in the development of new technologies, one could mention the use of interactive television in an S4C context.

In relating the above recommendations to the case of Wales, it is tempting to invoke the concept of 'technical culture'. According to Gerry Sweeney, who uses the term in an examination of why economic development is a local phenomenon and not a national one:

"A central factor is "technical culture", a product of the transformation of the indigenous culture by the technological orientation of the education system. The technical culture sets the preconditions for the conversion of the entrepreneurial potential of a region into dynamic entrepreneurial and innovative economic activities"\(^{34}\).

Sweeney maintains that the economically weaker regions in Europe, including regions in the UK, have a university - and general education system which is strongly oriented to academic science and the humanities, and where consequently the numbers of young people with technical skills of a high level is relatively low.\(^{35}\) Applied to Wales, and to north Wales in particular, the argument would go as follows: The lack of industrial development in north-west and west Wales, meant that historically the only way of social upward mobility within Wales and the Welsh language, has been through teaching or within the church or the chapels. Consequently the Welsh-language educational culture has stressed the humanities

\(^{33}\) op. cit. p. 16.

\(^{34}\) Sweeney (1990), p. 1.

\(^{35}\) op. cit. p. 4.
rather than science, a fact which is illustrated by the modern day need to develop a technical vocabulary in Welsh; and the Welsh-speakers were mainly found within non-technical areas. In the area of broadcasting in particular, English speakers have traditionally been dominant in technical jobs, whereas Welsh-speakers were dominant as producers etc. Consequently the organisation CYFLE was set up in order to train Welsh-speakers in the technical aspects of broadcasting.

One other aspect of the Welsh broadcasting industry worth mentioning in this context is the development of the Cardiff animation industry, although it functions, to a large extent, through the medium of English. Under S4C's patronage the Welsh animation industry has grown and now there are some ten companies in Wales, mainly situated in the Cardiff area. The investment in animation was done on purpose to launch S4C both at home and abroad. Animation is popular with children, who were an important audience to reach, if the aim to safeguard the Welsh language should succeed. In addition animation is easy to sell abroad, and easy to adapt for foreign audiences. The foundation was laid with Super Ted, which became the first UK animation series to be sold to Disney in the US, and it went on from there. Apart from S4C the Welsh animators now produce for American companies, like Disney and Hanna-Barbera.

The above section illustrates a definite measurable economic impact of S4C, in particular in Cardiff and in north-west Wales, and shows that the advent of S4C launched a growth in the Welsh media industry.

Chapter 8 above has dealt with issues of S4C organisational structure, such as control and funding, where S4C crosses the traditional organizational divide between public service and commercial television. The potential audience is to some extent older and from the C2DE social groups, but the viewing figures - up to 1994 - show that S4C is on the way to reaching their target of a 20% audience share, and a 85% reach among the Welsh speakers. The section on administration and staff showed that not only the S4C staff but also the majority of the independent producers had previously worked for either BBC or HTV (or both), and that this similar background tended to further a professional ethos which makes it difficult for consumer groups to influence the S4C programming. The particular worry of for example the Welsh Consumer Council is S4C's actual monopoly position with

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regards to Welsh language television. In line with the improved supply situation for S4C, the commissioning policies changed over time from being producer- or supply led to become commissioning- or demand led. The section on co-production showed that co-productions might be a financially good idea, but they do lend additional restraint on the freedom of programme makers and there is a risk that the cultural content of the final product will be lost. Finally section 8.6 analyzed the growth in the independent sector in Wales. The analysis showed that S4C has generated the development of a new media infrastructure in Wales. The last ten years have witnessed creation of jobs both directly in the media sector and also in supplying sectors. It is however possible that the economic problems facing the broadcasting environment in the 1990's have effectively stopped, and possibly reversed, the earlier growth in the Welsh media industry.

Chapter 8 has only touched slightly on the subject of the content of S4C's programmes, particularly related to the question of cultural identity. The following chapter 9, consequently contains an analysis of S4C programmes.

Whereas the above chapters have touched upon the structure of broadcasting in Wales, this present chapter will deal with which types of programmes are actually produced. Where do the programmes originate from i.e. who produces them and what are the costs involved? How does the content of the programmes relate to ideas behind broadcasting in Welsh, and to the issue of cultural identity, and how are different programme types within the Welsh language received by viewers?

9.1. Schedule.

The structure of the schedule has evolved over the years. In 1983, the pattern for the Welsh language programmes was to place them within three blocks during weekdays: half an hour early afternoon for schools and nursery programmes; a forty minutes slot around four o’clock for children’s programmes, and from approximately seven until nine o’clock was the main sequence of Welsh language programmes. Saturday followed a similar pattern apart from the schools programmes, and on Sunday there would be two Welsh language programmes during the afternoon as well as the evening schedule from seven to nine.

In 1987 this pattern had altered slightly, on weekdays schools programmes were broadcast in the morning and the children’s programmes were at four o’clock followed by programmes for young people. The main bulk of the Welsh language broadcasting was still scheduled in the evening from seven to approximately ten o’clock. On Saturday afternoon sport was shown, in particular rugby. On Sunday morning one hour of children’s programme was scheduled.

In September 1988 the schedule changed significantly. Instead of one news bulletin at seven o’clock, there were two short ones at 12.30pm and 6pm, and an extended one at 8.30pm. Apart from the change of time the emphasis also changed with an increase in coverage of north Wales news. In addition to this another change was made: a daily soap opera. "Pobol Y Cwm" - "The People of the Valley" - which had been broadcast weekly, since 1974 on BBC Wales and from 1982 on S4C, was
now broadcast daily at 6.40pm, with subtitled repeats for the Sunday Omnibus edition. It is produced by BBC Wales, and became the first European soap opera rehearsed, recorded and transmitted the same day. In September 1990 the new programme "HENO" ("Tonight") was launched. HENO is an early evening magazine programme, produced in Swansea with a brief to experiment with different ways of reaching those parts of the Welsh speaking audience, which were considered not to identify with the channel. At first part of HENO was broadcast before the early news programme, but as this was felt to be too fragmented, HENO was subsequently moved to 6.10pm and Pobol Y Cwm to 7pm from its previous slot at 6.40pm.

The 1992 Welsh language schedule on weekdays was as follows: Schools programmes in the morning, the news followed by nursery programmes at midday and a youth programme in the afternoon at 4.30pm. In between these programmes S4C transmits English CH4 programmes, which are rescheduled to suit the context. Then from 6pm onwards one finds the bulk of the Welsh language programmes with fixed slots at 6.00pm with the news, at 6.10pm with HENO, at 7.00pm with Pobol Y Cwm, and at 8.30pm with the half hour news bulletin. In between these programmes, that is from 7.30pm to 8.30pm and from 8.55pm to approximately 10 o’clock, S4C transmits programmes from different categories such as light entertainment, current affairs, learners programmes, documentaries, music, drama, and sport. On Saturdays S4C broadcasts a children’s programme in the morning, sport for a couple of hours in the afternoon, and from seven o’clock, the news often followed by light entertainment, sport and sometimes drama. The Sunday programme offers a substantial amount of Welsh language programmes starting with of repeats of learners programmes at midday followed by a current affairs programme. From 5.30pm to 7.05pm is the omnibus edition of Pobol Y Cwm with on-screen (as opposed to teletext) subtitles. The short news bulletin is at seven, followed by the news for Welsh learners. Then follow programme types like comedy, magazine programmes, religious programmes, and drama programmes, either in the shape of a feature film or as part of a series.

The following section contains an analysis of the S4C schedule broken up into programme categories, firstly for 1984/85 compared with 1989/90, and subsequently for 1992, 1993 and 1994. The reason for the choice of years is that
S4C’s Annual Reports not all include lists of programme hours broken down into categories, and that the categories themselves have changed over time, which makes it difficult to compare from one year to another.

Up to 1989/90 the programmes were divided into the following main categories: News, Current Affairs, Drama, Documentary, Education, Light Entertainment, Children, Religion, Music, Sport, Magazine, Special Events (like coverage of the Eisteddfod), and dubbed programmes. These categories changed from 1992 to include fewer and wider categories, namely: News & Current Affairs, Drama, Light Entertainment, Youth & Children, Music & Arts, Education, Sport and Religion.

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**Figure 9.1.1.**

**S4C Programme Categories 1984/85 & 1989/90.**

Figure 9.1.1. above shows the amount of the different types of programmes broadcast during the financial years 1984/85 and 1989/90. The figure shows that the amount of News programming had increased in 1989/90 compared to 1984/85, reflecting the schedule changes of 1988, which are described above. The Current Affairs programmes fell between 1984/85 and 1989/90. The Drama category on the other hand rose sharply, but this is mainly due to the fact that Pobol Y Cwm, from

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1 S4C Annual Report and Accounts 1984/85, p. 74, & 1989/90, p. 27.
being broadcast once a week, went daily (weekdays) in 1988, and consequently increased the drama output by approximately four times half an hour on weekdays plus the omnibus repeat on the Sunday. Both the Documentary and the Education output fell, whereas there was a rise in Light Entertainment programmes. The Children, Religion and Music categories fell between 1984/85 and 1989/90, but the Sports programming almost doubled in those five years. The Magazine programmes also increased dramatically, and some of this increase might be attributable to a learners magazine programme started in September 1989. The Special Events coverage more than doubled between 19984/85 and 1989/90, and the already small element of dubbed programmes fell to about four hours in a year.

The above graph which spans a period of five years does perhaps give a false impression of the consistency of the schedule. Figure 9.1.2 below shows the development between programme categories for the calender years 1992, 1993 and 1994, and demonstrates how volatile the programme categories can be from one year to another. The programme categories are however fewer, which makes it difficult to compare directly with the previous graph.

Figure 9.1.2.

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Figure 9.1.2. shows that the News & Current Affairs programmes now are bracketed together and encompass documentary programmes, events as well as some magazine programmes. This group includes more than a third of all programming hours, and fell between 1992 and 1993 whereupon it grew slightly in 1994. The Drama programmes can be compared with 1989/90 and the graph shows that Drama programmes in 1992 had fallen to a level below that of 1989/90 (from 148 hours to 117) but then in 1993 rose to a level slightly above 1989/90, which it almost kept up in 1994.

A feature of figure 9.1.2, which might not be immediately apparent, is the fall in light entertainment between the examined periods. In 1989/90 there were some 241 hours a year, which by 1992 had fallen to 146 hours. The light entertainment hours fell further the following year but then grew slightly in 1994. Part of the explanation is to be found in the appearance of the magazine programme HENO, in September 1990. Heno is broadcast five times forty-five minutes weekly, and includes an element of light entertainment. The programmes for Youth & Children have increased substantially from the number of programmes in the children's category in 1989/90. It is impossible to tell whether this increase is real or merely caused by the re-categorisation of programmes. There was a drop between 1992 and 1993, but then the Youth/Children programmes increased in 1994. Music & Arts programmes grew steadily from 1992 to 1994. Education programmes more than doubled between 1992 and 1993, but then fell slightly in 1994. Sports programmes had fallen between 1989/90 and 1992 from 213 hours to 175 hours, but then rose to 194 hours in 1993, whereupon they fell slightly in 1994. The amount of programmes in the religious genre had almost doubled, from 35 hours in 1989/90 to 71 hours in 1992, but then fell back to the previous level with 30 hours in 1993 and 33 hours in 1994.


The two graphs above in figure 9.1.1 and 9.1.2 illustrated the movements between programme types within the schedules. The next issue of interest is whether
these movements can be related to the programme supply. To avoid the duplication of resources that was common before the start of S4C, where the same types of Welsh language programmes were produced and broadcast by both BBC Wales and HTV, there has been a kind of division of labour between BBC Wales, HTV and the independent producers, with regards to programme types.

BBC Wales was from the start of S4C solely responsible for the news programmes, apart from current affairs programmes. BBC furthermore contributed with the soap Pobol Y Cwm which had been produced and broadcast by BBC Wales since 1974, a hymn singing programme, sport, children's programmes and in general such a mix of other programmes as exists on BBC's television network in English. The current affairs programmes were to be supplied by HTV as well as light entertainment programmes, countryside programmes, children's programmes, drama etc. The independent producers have typically covered areas such as feature films, drama series and single plays; as well as documentaries, light entertainment, children's, learners and magazine programmes.

The emphasis on the term 'supply' when describing the programme sources, is by no means accidental. As the programmes from BBC Wales are supplied to S4C free of charge, one must assume that S4C to some extent has to accept what is offered. In practice there is an ongoing consultation process between S4C and BBC Wales concerning types, content, and scheduling of the programmes supplied. As for HTV and the independent producers the problem for S4C at the start was to meet the required target of a production of 22 hours a week, from an initial production by BBC Wales and HTV of some 14 hours. A problem encountered with HTV was their inability from the start to supply S4C with the required nine hours weekly, which led to an opening for the independent producers to supply S4C with the remaining needed programme hours. The supply situation has now improved from the S4C point of view, as the growth of a television industry in Wales has improved not only the quality of the produced programmes, but also the competition between the companies. The change in the supply situation and the end of the fixed price HTV contract has enabled S4C to change from a "producer" - or supply-led programming policy to one which is "commissioning-led" as described in section 8.4.
Figure 9.2.1 shows the development in transmitted Welsh-language programmes (inclusive repeats) obtained from BBC, HTV and the independent sector respectively, between 1983/84 and 1989/90.

![Diagram showing programme hours]

**Figure 9.2.1**

*Development in programme supply 1983/84 - 89/90*.

The graphs show a steady rise in S4C's total Welsh programme output up to 85/86, a period corresponding to S4C's three years trial period. This rise is mainly made up of an increase in programme hours received from HTV, which follows from the initial contract made with HTV in 1982. Between 85/86 and 86/87 the total output of Welsh language programmes fell, caused by a slight fall in the BBC contribution, and a larger fall in the HTV contribution. From 88/87 onwards the total amount of hours has steadily risen. The BBC contribution in general has been relatively constant, around the required 10 hours weekly until 98/90 where the hours supplied rises sharply, showing the effect of Pobol Y Cwm going daily. As figure

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3 Source: S4C annual reports 1983/84 - 1989/90.
9.2.1. however includes repeats, the increased BBC graph is a reflection of the added omnibus edition on Sundays, and not an indicator of an actual rise in programmes produced. The contribution from the independent producers on the other hand rose steadily until 87/88 where it started to increase sharply, until it in 89/90 actually exceeded the contribution from HTV, which corresponded to the end of the HTV contract in December 1989.

It has not been possible to continue the graph beyond 1989/90, as there are no published distinctions between programmes received from HTV and "independents", after the end of the HTV contract. S4C have however kindly provided the equivalent figures for HTV between 1989 and 1994. These show that from providing 421 hours of programmes in 1989/90, HTV’s contribution has steadily dropped year by year to 160 hours in 1994. As BBC in 1994 were still supplying around 519 hours annually, the rest of the hours, some 800, are now produced by the independent producers. Over ten years this development represents a huge increase in business for the independent sector from supplying around 200 hours annually in 1983/84 to 800 hours in 1994. According to the Director of Programmes at S4C, the fall in HTV hours is linked to the fact that most of HTV’s experienced producers, particularly in the field of light entertainment, have left HTV and gone independent. Quite apart from perhaps bearing old grudges against, what they considered as HTV taking unfair advantage of S4C’s initial weak situation back in 1982, S4C naturally prefer to commission from individuals, whom they know can deliver the desired product. Consequently S4C have transferred a large part of the hours previously produced by HTV to ex HTV staff in the independent sector.

During the illustrated period Channel 4’s output, and subsequently S4C’s English language output, has also increased, increasing the necessity of rescheduling. The proportion of Welsh language programmes to total hours has varied since the start of S4C. In 1983/84 the ratio was 32.7% rising to 34.9% in 1985/86, and then falling to 22.3% in 1990. During 1993 and 1994 the percentages had however risen again to 34.9% and 34.8% respectively.
9.3. Programme Costs.

Another aspect to the differences in programme supply illustrated above is the difference in average cost per hour between the programme suppliers. As mentioned before, BBC Wales supplies programmes free of charge for S4C - the cost being included in the licence fee. The programmes that S4C consequently has to pay for, are those which are above the 10 hours weekly supplied by BBC Wales - averaging at the beginning some 12 hours weekly. These are supplied by HTV and the independent companies. The average hourly costs varies between HTV and the independent companies and figure 9.3.1. shows the development in these costs from 1983/84 - 89/90.

Figure 9.3.1.
Average hourly programme costs. HTV and Independent Companies.

As the figure shows, the independent companies had in the beginning higher cost than HTV. But whereas after a couple of years the HTV costs continued to rise, the independents’ fell to under the HTV level. It must be said however that the concept 'average hourly costs' covers the whole of the programme spectrum. As some programme types are more expensive than others, the mix of programmes produced is important but does not show in the average cost per hour calculation.
The hourly cost per programme varies from sport, magazine and music which are relatively cheap, ranging from £15,000 - £22,000, over drama and feature film at £82,000, to animation in particular at £186,000 per hour. Animation is exceptionally expensive as its production is very time-consuming.

The average cost per hour for the independent sector included animation until the year 1987/88. Part of the explanation for the reduction in costs in 86/87 was a fall in the production of animation as well as an increase in the production of longer series, which meant that the independent producers could take advantage of economies of scale, as well as some co-production opportunities. The inclusion of animation meant that the average hourly cost for the independent sector was automatically higher than that for HTV. From 87/88 consequence has been taken of this fact, and the animation costs were removed from calculations of the average hourly costs, thus facilitating direct comparison between HTV and the independent companies.

As figure 9.3.1 shows HTV’s costs were contractually fixed and index linked until December 1989, whereas the independent producers have been forced to economise in order to compete. This is the positive interpretation of the graphs. A more negative interpretation, which is prevalent among independent producers, is that now the supply of Welsh language programmes has been secured, and competition between the producers established, S4C uses its de facto monopoly regarding the demand for Welsh-language television programmes to squeeze the prices as much as possible to the detriment of the product ie. the programme quality.

Summing up on the issues of schedule, supply and costs: The present schedule can be described as rather rigid, dominated as it is by a range of fixed programme strands like News, HENO and Pobol Y Cwm. On the supply side, the suppliers before 1982 were BBC-Wales and HTV. The independent companies have however caught up with HTV, and at the end of the 1980’s their contribution was second to that of BBC-Wales, to the extent that by 1994 almost half the Welsh

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4 These examples of average cost figures are obtained from the S4C Annual Report 1984/85, p. 75.

5 S4C Annual Report 1986/87, p. 11.
language hours on S4C originated from independent producers. As for costs, the fixed HTV contract kept the cost of the HTV programmes up. Those of the independent companies, after an initial period of being higher than HTV, fell to a significantly lower level. Depending on the interpretation, the independent companies have either learned to run a business efficiently, and take advantages of economies of scale, or they are slowly being squeezed on the price.

9.4. Programme Content.

The above sections contain descriptions of programme schedule, suppliers, and differences in programme costs. But what do the different programme types entail, and what relevance do they bear to the question of cultural identity. As mentioned in section 2.5. concerning the mass media and ethnic groups, it is not only the language which is important in the production and reproduction of cultural identity. The media ideally provide a forum within which to display and address the diversities and inherent contradictions of the particular culture. How then does the content of the Welsh-language programmes, broadcast on S4C, relate to this ideal? The following section provides an analysis of different programme types and particular issues encountered by S4C in this context.

The coverage of news is an important feature of any television service. The BBC-produced news programmes face the challenge of presenting stories from not only Wales but also from the rest of Britain as well as the rest of the world. This entails added demands on the Welsh language. The vocabulary has had to be adapted and extended to cover new situations. The coverage of British news also presented editorial problems concerning issues of dubbing or subtitling items in English which all viewers understands in the first place. The problems with vocabulary is illustrated by the fact that "Newyddion" - the News - regularly have been critiziced for using a formal, literary and difficult Welsh. The difference

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6 For example in survey conducted for S4C by Beaufort Research in Cardiff, reported in the Western Mail 8.8.92.
between formal and informal usage in Welsh is very marked, and according to lecturer in Welsh and member of the S4C authority, Gwenllian Awbery, the language of different programmes must reflect the nature of the content. News bulletins and documentaries for example are felt to be rather formal and serious in tone, and presenters normally tend to use the formal end of the linguistic spectrum. According to Awbery this is complicated in practice by a number of conflicting attitudes among native speakers of Welsh:

"There is on the one hand a strong purist element in Welsh culture and, associated with it, the belief that only formal Welsh is good Welsh. Informal usage is, in this view, corrupt and debased, and certainly inappropriate to a high status public domain such as television. On the other hand we find that many native speakers of Welsh because of the low status the language had for many years, have received little or no formal education in the language. They feel threatened by what they perceive as the rigidity of formal Welsh, and feel at ease only with the informal registers they have grown up with in the home."

These kinds of problems are also found with regard to the necessary introduction of new terms and words needed where Welsh has expanded into fields which were previously dominated by English. Again according to Awbery:

"These new terms are, however, unfamiliar to those who have little contact with the formal language through the education system, with the result that otherwise fluent native speakers complain that these news bulletins, for instance, are hard to follow. The danger is that they will conclude that their Welsh is not good enough to follow programmes on S4C, and switch to an English channel."

BBC Wales, which produce the news programmes, are now going to introduce teletext subtitles on all news programmes from autumn 1995. A learners news programme, broadcast on Sunday evenings, has been produced by BBC Wales since 1991, and the language in this is easier to follow. A new departure for news is the introduction of a Welsh language news programme for children, to be scheduled in the afternoons from autumn 1995. Despite all the criticism, the news programmes, however, belong to some of the most viewed programmes on S4C, and the audience appreciation scores are generally higher for the Welsh news than for the UK

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7 G. Awbery (1995), p. 84

8 op.cit. p. 85
The main current affairs programmes, "Y Byd ar Bedwar" - The World on Four - produced by HTV, and "Taro Naw" produced by BBC Wales, present detailed reports from foreign countries from a Welsh perspective, as well as in-depth coverage of Welsh items. According to the then editor of "Y Byd a Bedwar", the question of cultural identity is not something programme makers normally are conscious about, or indeed should be: "Cultural identity is undefinable and unthinkable. In programming the question of identity is a cul de sac - you make programmes if you have something to say. Identity is underlying in the programmes - it is not explicit."

In an article on contemporary mass media in Wales, Ian Hume examines the content of Welsh- and English-language news and current affairs programmes. Hume finds that both before and after the 1982 change, the pattern of television broadcasting seems to be differentiated in style and presentation according to language used:

"Broadcast media in the Welsh language appear to have a relatively clear identity, linked to a perception of Wales as a spatially defined political, social and cultural entity."

BBC-Wales' Welsh news editors however share studio and other production facilities with the English-language news, and must rely on BBC's London-based sources for material from outside Wales. Technical factors put pressure on the Welsh editors to reproduce reports as received, already edited, and merely providing them with an appropriate Welsh soundtrack. Considerations of urgency and immediacy mean that 'Welsh' perspectives are harder to introduce. During the 1984-85 miners strike there was the use of categories received from the UK media such as 'picket line violence' and 'split communities', as well as a similar concentration on the portrayal of the issues as revolving round the personalities of MacGregor (British Coal) and Scargill (leader of the National Union of Miners). However, there was also a use of differing style of analysis based on categories such as 'defence of

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communities' in Wales-originated reports.\textsuperscript{10}

In response to demand for programmes with 'light' topical items, "Hel Straeon" was launched in 1986. Hel Straeon is produced by independent producers in north Wales, and covers stories from all over Wales. In addition to this the magazine programme HENO, was launched in Swansea in the Autumn of 1990. HENO is a mixture of current affairs, topical items, light entertainment, even cooking is covered. HENO has also met with criticism concerning the language used, but contrary to that of Newyddion - the News, the criticism against HENO encompasses what is considered an excessive use of English in the programme, even to the extent of showing items completely in the English language. According to S4C's deputy chief executive, S4C wanted to compete with ITV and BBC at that time of the evening by creating a programme which would bring in the sort of viewers who like tabloid TV: "We are trying to capture the audience which has always believed that S4C is too serious."\textsuperscript{11} Apart from an attempt at audience maximization in particular in south west Wales, HENO is, according to one of its producers, specifically designed to reach out to that proportion of the audience who are interested, but who do not think their Welsh is good enough. There are many functionally illiterate people in Wales and according to the HENO producer, Welsh language TV has done immense damage to people's selfconfidence. As Welsh language TV took over the language of the pulpit, it compounded the problem of people's selfconfidence in Welsh. They used formal - and correct - Welsh in all news and current affairs programmes. The dilemma with the medium is that television inherently involves a pacifying one-way communication situation, and secondly that the vocabulary used is problematic. This does not activate peoples' use of the language, and it even creates a loss of confidence in the passive language because of the vocabulary used. In this context, the challenge facing S4C is to give selfconfidence to the large body of Welsh speakers out there. Thus the people producing HENO ideally regard themselves as doing their bit for the survival of the Welsh language - in their own way.

\textsuperscript{10} op. cit. p. 337.

\textsuperscript{11} Western Mail, 16/10 - 1990.
Light entertainment programmes have been numerous on S4C. S4C has over the years broadcast an abundance of quizzes, chat shows, light musical programmes and comedy series. The light entertainment programmes are typically studio productions from HTV or produced in north Wales, by independent producers using the BARCUD studios. There is however a particular problem with light entertainment in Wales. There is, according to a former S4C light entertainment commissioning editor, little Welsh language variety theatrical tradition and consequently no Welsh showbizz scene. This means that the experience of entertainers is gained in English language 'showbizz' and television - in other words through a completely different language. For entertainers in the Welsh language, the main experience is gained in television, and they have little alternative to this medium. This can be compared to the situation in English language light entertainment, where the presenters/entertainers typically have years of experience as stand-up comedians in clubs, where they front a live audience before they ever appear on television. In addition to this, there is also a shortage in Wales of talented script writers especially within the field of situation comedy. This lack of light entertainment experience and skills within a Welsh language context is to a certain extent caused by the smallness of the country, but it is characteristic of the Welsh cultural scene that people with stage experience in the Welsh language are typically singers or musicians, within either folk or rock music. Musicians count for a fair number of the Welsh language actors.

The drama output on S4C covers soaps, series, and single plays. These often reflect the geographical divide in Wales, in as much as they usually are set either in the North or the South with the language varying accordingly. The BBC produced soap "Pobol Y Cwm" has often been attacked for a lack of engagement with any progressive notion of 'Welshness', instead reproducing dominant, safe, tried and tested forms of representation. In an investigation of the reception of "Pobol Y Cwm" by Welsh school-children, Alison Griffiths however discusses "Pobol Y Cwm" within the context of the soap as a genre and draws some more encouraging conclusions about the way the programme has developed:

"the soap is becoming increasingly self-conscious, both in its handling of issues socially and culturally specific to Wales, and in its position as a Welsh-language discourse
within popular culture. Virtually dormant for fifteen years, the soap has suddenly
woken up to the realisation that socio-political references and entertainment are not
mutually exclusive.12

Looking at storylines from the soap, Griffiths found that "Pobol Y Cwm" is fully
able to deal with contemporary issues:

"The ideological 'effect' of "Pobol y Cwm" is the extent to which it transmits certain
'ideas' and constructs a specifically Welsh discourse. Issues socially and culturally
specific to Wales, such as the sale of second homes to English people, depopulation of
rural areas and increasing urbanisation, unemployment, problems facing the agricultural
community etc., can be explored through the familial/domestic framework."13

She concludes that:

"It would therefore be misleading to assume that "Pobol y Cwm" embodies a single,
consistent ideological position in relation to its particular social and cultural identity,
since its ideological 'effect' is not something fixed and static but changes and develops
as new storylines and characterisations shift ideological sites and discourses into new
territories."14

The area of comedy is, according to an independent producer of drama, far behind
in Wales, and does not reach the heights of UK comedy drama. The reasons are
financial and the fact that there has not been a long tradition of TV comedy in
Wales. It has been too easy in the past to get your work (in Welsh) on screen, which
means that there has not been a sufficient learning process for people. The lack of
pilots and lack of stage experience means a general lack of experience, so the
products have not always been sufficiently good when they hit the screen. In
addition comedy writers only get experience on screen and then it is too late. One
forum, however, where it is possible to be experimental at relatively little cost is
Radio Cymru, which then can function as a nursery for comedy writers.

The production of feature films in Welsh can, according to the S4C
commissioning editor for drama, be divided into two types. One is a 'Welsh' type,
which tries to go back to and reflect the cultural roots in Welsh society, dealing with
both traditional Welsh subject matters as well as more contemporary issues in

13 op. cit. p. 16.
14 op. cit. p. 18.
Wales. These often have their offspring in Welsh literature, such as the classic plays by Saunders Lewis. Another is a more international type of drama production, with little or nothing to do with Wales, co-production money is often involved, and the films are produced with back-to-back English versions, usually selling easily abroad. The latter type of film is however also regarded as an attempt to get to the working classes in Wales, who are used to the anglo-american fare in entertainment. The problem for S4C in this context is, that Wales virtually is next door to England and the audience is used to British - American films. The rationale for S4C, apart from attracting more viewers, is according to the commissioning editor for drama, that the money which this type of films make are ploughed back into the making of Welsh drama. When the 'Welsh' type film really works, like the Oscar nominated "Hedd Wyn", the reason was that it used a Welsh story, albeit a strong one, as a vehicle to treat a universal theme - in this case The First World War.

Programmes for children and young people are very important for S4C, as it is only within this group that the number of Welsh speakers is growing, and consequently it is here that the hope for the future of the language lies. The nursery programme "Slot Meithrin" (the nursery slot) is transmitted at midday every weekday, and is very popular with young children. The youth audience is of course a very desirable audience for S4C, both for the sake of securing the Welsh language, but also for S4C’s own future. The teenage audience is however a group that is notoriously difficult to please, as well as being constantly exposed to the Anglo-American pop culture. S4C has tried to overcome these problems by scheduling drama-series, light entertainment and current affairs programmes specially intended for the young as well as pop music programmes, covering both the international and the Welsh rock scene.

An initial obstacle to overcome for S4C, when scheduling children and youth programmes is the factor that, as P.W.Thomas has shown in research on S4C and Welsh speaking school children from 1986, the children still consider Welsh to be oldfashioned, whereas English on the other hand is perceived to be modern. As Thomas states: "That such attitudes are apparent across the linguistic background spectrum can but be a cause of concern for all those seeking to propagate a minority
language such as Welsh."\textsuperscript{15} An interesting phenomenon in Thomas’ study is that children of parents able to speak Welsh but who do not choose to do so with their children, not only lag behind their fellows from completely Welsh-speaking homes in their tendencies to watch Welsh television programmes, but may also be less likely to watch Welsh programmes than children from the other end of the linguistic spectrum, i.e. those from completely non-Welsh-speaking homes\textsuperscript{16}. The above study dates from 1986, but the aim of S4C is obviously still to attract the children of Wales to the channel, and to make sure they remain S4C viewers as they grow up. In this context the aim of the new S4C chief executive is to attract more young parents: "My main mission will be to enlarge the channel’s audience, particularly when it comes to young parents in the 25-40 age group. My aim is not just to attract them to the channel but also their children as well. This will ensure we have an increasing number of viewers in the future."\textsuperscript{17} A way to attain this aim is a children’s news programme and a children’s drama series both starting September 1995. As an indication of the top priority of this exercise, more effort - and money - went in to the development of the children’s drama series than normal for S4C. As well as recruiting Phil Redmond, the successful creator of the youth series "Grange Hill" and "Brookside", and his Welsh-born wife as consultants, four different pilot programmes were produced and subsequently tested on school children before one was chosen for production\textsuperscript{18}. In addition the S4C chief executive wants more alternative comedy on S4C to attract young people: "It is that sort of clever comedy the younger generation wants from television and which we have not had enough of on S4C. It is also the most difficult thing to do."

Closely related to the children’s programme category is animation, although the Welsh animation industry lately has produced a number of animation

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{15} P.W.Thomas (1986), p. 321.
\item \textsuperscript{16} op.cit. p. 318-319.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Western Mail 4/11 - 1993.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Western Mail 6/2 - 1995.
\item \textsuperscript{19} ibid.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
programmes for an adult audience. But animated programmes for children continue to be very popular, both among Welsh and English speaking children in Wales. Programmes such as Super Ted, which incidentally was the first British animation programme to be bought by Disney; Sam Tan (Fireman Sam) and others have been exported to most of the world, as well as bringing in income through sales of related merchandise.

The most popular religious programme, and one of the more popular programmes on S4C, is the programme "Dechrau Canu, Dechrau Canmol", which is a hymn singing programme, like the UK "Songs of Praise", visiting different parts of Wales, and broadcast once a week on Sundays. This programme was originally produced by BBC Wales, but was dropped by the BBC around 1992, and subsequently commissioned by S4C from an independent company. Religion in Wales has however changed significantly this century. One indicator of Welsh culture, in the early years of this century, was the strong presence of Welsh non-conformity. This feature has changed, along with the decline in the influence of organized Christianity, the corresponding secularization of Welsh society, accompanied by the weakening of the place of the Welsh language in some of its traditional strongholds\(^{20}\). This secularization coupled with the immigration of families of non-Welsh or non-European origin bringing with them other faiths than Christianity, means that Wales is no longer an exclusively Christian society. Numerically, church attendance in Wales has fallen since the beginning of the century. The percentage of the people of Wales claiming membership of one of the mainline churches as well as the number of those attending a Christian place of worship on a Sunday is far lower now than at the turn of this century. In 1905, some 40% of the population were church members, compared with 23% in 1982. The fall is also perceptible when looking at absolute numbers even though the total population of Wales has increased in the meantime. In 1905 the total membership of 'Protestant' Churches (i.e. excluding Roman Catholic) was 743,361. The corresponding number in 1982 was 393,500. Roman Catholic membership has however nearly doubled from 64,800 in 1905. But in terms of numbers, there is no

question that organized Christianity is considerably weaker in Wales today than it was at the turn of the century.21

This is not to say however, that the interest for all things religious in Wales has ceased. Even though organized and in particular Protestant Christianity has decreased, paradoxically religion as a phenomenon still seems to be capable of arousing widespread public interest at all levels in Wales. And according to Davies, the "prominent place given to religion, predominantly Christianity, by the broadcasting media in Wales is a commercial response to public demand. As many, if not more, people listen to or watch an act of worship on radio or television on a Sunday as attend a place of worship, while religious 'entertainment' programmes such as "Highway" (ITV), "Songs of Praise" (BBC) or "Dechrau Canu Dechrau Canmol" (S4C) have an enormous following"22 - at least among older people.

Music programmes are non-language specific, as well as being relatively cheap to make, and are therefore regarded by S4C as a means of attracting the non-Welsh speaking viewers in Wales. The following section, will deal firstly with classical music in Wales, which is non-language bound, and secondly with Welsh-language popular music in Wales. Paradoxically enough Wales has long been regarded as the land of song, an appellation which has little to do with the actual composition of music in Wales. In an article on classical music in Wales, Geraint Lewis quotes the Welsh composer and professor of music, William Mathias for the following comment:

"Perhaps the real problem lies in the fact that the Welsh have somehow been persuaded into thinking that they are a musical people. As a result they have the greatest difficulty in taking music at all seriously, preferring rather to place a high value on its social usefulness."

According to Lewis it is the implicit musicality in the Welsh poetic tradition, which helps to explain the preference of the Welsh for vocal musical expression, either in the form of declamation or simply as song, which the many Welsh choirs bear

21 op. cit. p. 211.

22 op. cit. p. 212.

witness to. Historically the Welsh medieval classical musical tradition disappeared with the change in patronage after 1500. When the Tudors assumed the English throne, the focus of Welsh courtly life was shifted eastward, and the aristocratic patronage of poets and musicians in medieval Wales disappeared. Later in history the material poverty of Wales after the exploitation of the Industrial Revolution, was one reason, why there was no infrastructure of professional music-making in Wales in the early twentieth century. The recent development in composition and performance of Welsh classical music has been caused by the modern-day patronage of the cultural institutions in Wales, the BBC, with its Welsh Symphony Orchestra, along with the Welsh Arts Council. Recently the advent of S4C has contributed an additional financial input to the Welsh classical music scene.

Of performing institutions in Wales can be mentioned, apart from the BBC Welsh Symphony Orchestra, the Welsh National Opera, the National Youth Orchestra of Wales, the National Youth Choir of Wales and the National Youth Brass Band. This lively Welsh classical music scene is deeply dependent on the patronage obtained from the Arts Council and the broadcasters. In this context the contribution of S4C, as a national cultural organization, has been to provide both additional economic support, but also a forum where Welsh performers can express themselves.

An additional feature of Welsh musical life is the festival or the 'Eisteddfod', of which the main ones are the yearly Welsh National Eisteddfod in August, the Llangollen International Eisteddfod in July, and the Urdd Eisteddfod (youth) in May. There are also a number of small local Eisteddfodau, which "stress the importance of a healthy amateur tradition which cultivates high standards of performance". Both the National Eisteddfod and the Urdd move around the country, and take place in different locations from one year to another. According to the Eisteddfod Office, the attendance to the National Eisteddfod, which lasts a week has averaged 144,000 people between 1990 and 1994. The Urdd Eisteddfod, now also lasting a week, regularly attracts 90,000 - 100,000 people, depending on the weather. Coverage of

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24 op. cit. p. 126 - 127.

25 op. cit. p. 131.
these annual cultural events are broadcast by S4C in Welsh, and also to a lesser extent by BBC Wales and HTV in English.

As the Welsh English-language popular music is virtually indiscernible from the English pop music, the following section will primarily deal with Welsh-language pop music. Compared to classical music, the Welsh popular music scene has benefitted less from Arts Council money. Instead this type of music has had to care for itself on commercial terms, with some help from the broadcasting organizations.

In a survey of the music industry in small countries Roger Wallis and Christer Malm argue that access to recording technology is a crucial factor in the development of a local pop/rock culture. The Welsh-language recording studio "Sain" (Sound) was started in north Wales by Welsh artists in 1969, and had by the mid 1970's virtually a monopoly on the production of Welsh pop/rock. Not unlike the situation of S4C today, this monopolistic status during the 70's brought about much criticism of Sain for being too commercial and not putting more money into lesser-known Welsh rock groups. As Wallis and Malm express it: "As a monopoly, an organization can expect to be the target of much scrutiny, especially when the issue involves such emotional aspects as cultural identity and nationalism." During the eighties however a number of small recording facilities appeared in different parts of the country, which relieved Sain of some of its cultural responsibility in this field.

Apart from the existence of studio capacity, another important factor in the development of a local pop/rock culture, it being in a minority language or not, is access to the broadcasting media. There is however interdependence, in particular, between the minority language broadcasting institutions and the creative milieu, be it production of Welsh-language television programmes or pop songs. Wallis and Malm mention as an example the introduction of Radio Cymru, the BBC Welsh radio channel, which in the 1970's provided an important boost for companies producing Welsh music. But Radio Cymru needs as well a large amount of recorded

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Welsh music, to develop its all-Welsh image.\textsuperscript{28} As for S4C, the role of this institution in a popular music context is to provide a small culture with the means of competing in the same media as the larger dominating culture.\textsuperscript{29} As is the case with classical music, the main function for S4C is to provide the Welsh popular music culture with a forum in which to express and develop itself, in other words provide that access to the mass media for Welsh-language cultural expression which is practically denied them everywhere else, and without which there would not be a Welsh-language music industry. The last comment indicates that as Welsh-language popular music is language bound as opposed to classical music, the existence of a Welsh-language television channel along with a Welsh language radio channel like Radio Cymru is imperative for the survival of this form of cultural expression.

Sports programmes are, like the music programmes above, relatively cheap to make although the increased competition within the field of rights acquisition are pushing the cost of sports coverage up. They are non-language specific, and are therefore seen a means of attracting the non-Welsh speaking viewers in Wales. The sports coverage of rugby matches in Wales, snooker and football, British as well as European, attracts a fair number of viewers. A problem for S4C is that the BBC produced coverage of live rugby or soccer games, usually is transmitted simultaneously on BBC Wales (either on 1 or 2) and on S4C. On the rare occasion where S4C gets an exclusive showing of a live match, the audience figures increase dramatically.

On the sports field, the game of rugby is the one symbol of cultural specificity widely associated with Welsh culture. Ironically enough, Rugby is not an indigenous Welsh game, but was imported towards the end of the nineteenth century from a background in the English public school tradition. In south Wales the arrival of rugby coincided with the greatest industrial explosion Wales had ever experienced, as some 200,000 people moved into Glamorgan between 1880 and 1900. As the late nineteenth century saw a movement for Welsh national institutions,
the founding of the Welsh Rugby Union in 1881 was an integrated part of this
movement. According to Eric Hobsbawm, sport combined the invention of political
and social traditions by providing a medium for national identification and artificial
community. "The rise of sport provided new expressions of nationalism through the
choice or invention of nationally specific sports - Welsh rugby as distinct from
English soccer".

But why was it Rugby which during the latter half of the nineteenth century
became the national game of Wales? According to the official chroniclers of the
Welsh Rugby Union, the game of rugby was most popular in south Wales, due to
the proximity to the West of England, with its strongholds of rugby. Both
considerations of the travel costs of playing away from home, as well as the influx
from 1880 onwards of immigrants from the West of England to the industrializing
south Wales meant that rugby football became the dominant game in south Wales.
Similar circumstances influenced the case of north Wales, where the same
preconditions of geography and east-west communications determined that north
Wales was drawn increasingly closer to soccer-playing Merseyside. Rugby
consequently became the game of south Wales and soccer that of north Wales. As
the bulk of the Welsh population lived in south Wales there was basis for rugby to
attract vast crowds and become a spectator sport. north Wales, on the other hand,
was sparsely populated, and there were simply not enough people in north Wales to
make soccer the national sport of Wales.

In contemporary Wales rugby was played by 2.3% of the population in
1991/92 or some 53,000. This was a slight increase from 1987/88 where the
participation was 2%. Soccer, on the other hand, is played by twice as many people
- 4.7% in 1991/92, which is slightly less than the 4.9% of 1987/88, and the 5.3%
of 1989/90. Rugby is however still a middle class game. The participation in
rugby is higher among the ABC1 social classes, than among the C2DE’s, whereas
there is an overweight of C2DE’s among those playing soccer. The participation in

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rugby and soccer also differ regionally as well as socially. The participation in rugby is higher in the Glamorgans and Gwent, whereas soccer participation is strongest in Gwynedd and Clwyd in north Wales. In this age of television participation, however, international rugby games, broadcast on BBC Wales and on S4C, achieve higher audiences than soccer. In particular, the Wales versus England matches are watched by over a fifth of the Welsh population, regularly attracting some 70% of those watching television at the time. So even with the relatively low number of people actually participating in the game - rugby, because of tradition and the illustrious past of the game in Wales, is still regarded as the national sport of Wales.

A scheme for producing learner's programmes and educational material was launched 1989 with ACEN (Accent) - a comprehensive Welsh learners project including a television series for complete beginners: "Now you're talking", broadcast on S4C from the autumn of 1990, audio cassettes, video cassettes and a work-file with notes and exercises to complement the series, as well as activities for the family. The "Now you're talking" series moved on to a second series of television programmes: "Now you're talking 2". Programmes for more proficient learners included "Saith ar y Sul", which is a news programme produced by BBC Wales and broadcast Sunday night; and "Bwrw Mlaen", a magazine programme.

ACEN was financially supported by S4C during the first year only, and now works as a publishing house on a commercial basis, partially sponsored by the Welsh Development Board. The background for the launch of ACEN was according to its director, a perceived need for S4C to live up to its cultural responsibility in safeguarding the Welsh language, as well as a need to make S4C accessible to a wider audience for both political and commercial reasons. The aim was to attract two types of audiences, the Welsh learners and the young. The social groups targeted were C1, C2, D and E's, as the A and B groups were regarded as being able to look after themselves in terms of learning Welsh. As the target group was a popular soap opera watching audience, this was reflected in the programme content. The programme "Now you're talking" was consequently not aimed at long time concentration, but contained short and quick learning units, mixed with

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descriptions of, and stories from, the various parts of Wales that were used as settings for the learning content. A feature of Welsh is the slight difference in vocabulary and dialect between the North and the South, a point emphasised by the fact that the ACEN audio tapes come in a north and a south Walian version. According to the ACEN director, the system is aimed at the C1/C2DE groups, who would not wish or not be able to benefit from traditional learning systems. In addition to the home learning, the Welsh learners organisation CYD arranges family activities for learners in connection with the ACEN course, such as outings for the whole family structured in Welsh.

The targeting of young families by ACEN is reasoned in that even if people do speak Welsh, they often have no confidence in their own Welsh. Young people who have attended bilingual schools, left with only the school vocabulary and no domestic vocabulary with which to talk to their children, and consequently speak to them in English. The 1989/90 education statistics show that some 14,248 primary school pupils or 6.6% of the age group are classified as: "Do not speak Welsh at home but can speak it with fluency". One of the aims of ACEN is to return Welsh to the family, as it were, as the Welsh learned in school needs to be reinforced by Welsh used at home. This is a slightly paradoxical situation, in the sense that one of the traditional domain contexts for Welsh has been the domestic.

The viewing figures for "Now you're talking" show that the programme was doing well. In the period from October 1990 and July 1991, "Now you're talking" was shown twice a week, Wednesday night and Sunday afternoon. The Sunday afternoon repeat did considerably better than the Wednesday evenings programme, achieving a share of the audience averaging 12.4% among 'all viewers' of S4C, and slightly more among the Welsh speaking audience. This share is almost twice as high as the overall S4C average share, for all programmes, for the period, which was 6.7%. More than half of the "Now you’re talking" programmes managed to get into the S4C "Top Ten" list, at times topping it, and had an average weekly audience of 60,000, which at times reached as high as 120,000.

With regards to the development in Welsh learners, ACEN estimates that

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34 "Statistics of Education in Wales: Schools" No. 4, 1990, Table 7.02.

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with the amount of people buying the ACEN material (80,000) as well as learners in summer schools or night classes, there were approximately some 100,000 people learning Welsh in 1992. These figures have risen from 4,000 in 1982, 7,000 in 1984, 10,000 in 1989 to 100,000 in 1992. One thing is however to embark on a language course, another is to actually finish the course and become fluent. A lot of the ACEN learners will have a passive knowledge of Welsh but not be used to actually using the language with other people, a problem ACEN is trying to address with community projects in Gwent and Powys.

Even though the finishing rate for this type of courses is usually not particular encouraging, more people, however, completed in 1992 than ever before. According to the Welsh Joint Education Committee, there has been a rise in the number of people passing the exams of the "Communicative Objectives Scheme", which aims to give people the means to communicate through Welsh, and which provides recognised certificates. The table below shows the number of people in Wales passing exams under this scheme at the three levels of competence, with level 1 as the easiest.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1992</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level 1:</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>1455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2:</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 3:</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As the figures in table 9.4.1. show, there is obviously a large number of people embarking on Welsh language courses, who do not get further than the very beginners level. The development in the 1991 and 1992 figures show, however, that not only did the number of people embarking on the language tests rise rapidly, but the percentage of people going on to passing the higher levels also improved 35.

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35 Data supplied by the Welsh Joint Education Committee.
As the above section has shown, the learning of Welsh has progressed rapidly during the last ten years. This rise can be regarded as an indicator of an increased awareness of, and interest in, the Welsh language. One factor contributing to this development is the exposure and increased visibility that the advent of S4C has brought to the Welsh language.

9.5. Beyond 1993?

S4C's declared goal of attracting more young people to watch S4C, does however encounter problems which are inherent in the very provisions for Welsh language broadcasting as set out in the Broadcasting Act. The act states "that the programmes broadcast on S4C between 6.30pm and 10pm consist mainly of programmes in Welsh." If this is interpreted as no Welsh programmes are to be scheduled after 10pm, then this might very well interfere with the provisions for young people, an issue relating to the question of innovation in programming. It is generally understood that a television channel cannot afford to schedule innovative and perhaps risky programmes in peak viewing time. As there is no BBC2-type channel to experiment on in Welsh television, and if no, or only a few, Welsh programmes are broadcast outside peak time, this leaves little space to be innovative. Welsh television consequently risks being defined by what it is possible to show between 6.30pm and 10pm, in other words traditional family oriented, audience catching peak time viewing.

Much to the chagrin of 'progressive' programme makers in Wales as well as the commissioning editors, the S4C programmes that stubbornly stay the most popular with viewers, are programmes like "Pobol Y Cwm" (soap), "Cefn Gwlad" (countryside), "Noson Lawen" (a 'social evening' light entertainment programme, with participation from the audience) and "Dechrau Canu, Dechrau Canmol" (hymn singing). These are all programmes which can be said to appeal to an ageing audience, and not to young people. In the words of one independent drama producer:

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Broadcasting Act 1990, Section 57, subsection (2) b.

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"There is a struggle between the "Pobol Y Cwm" and "Dechrau canu" brigade, and people who want well made modern films. One part of the Welsh audience accepts uncritically any old crap (amateurish) 'Village hall' type, but will recoil from polished programmes. They equal this with things English." Some of the newer drama productions, which have been departures from the traditional, have however been a fair success with the viewers, which means that S4C might not be afraid of commissioning those types of programmes again.

This is a very real dilemma for S4C, and one that has been reinforced by the commercial demands in the new Broadcasting Act, limited as the consequences may seem to be for S4C. From a commercial point of view it is the conventional 'Welsh' programme types (as the ones listed above), that perform best in terms of maximising the audience. But these Welsh-language programmes do not necessarily constitute any challenge to the viewers nor any innovation in terms of the development of Welsh television programming. To this one could pose the eternal question of who should be allowed to judge what other people should watch. But as S4C does have public service broadcasting obligations according to the Broadcasting Act (section 57 subsection (2) a) this question is beside the point. The fact remains that S4C, qua its position as the sole broadcaster within the Welsh language, has an obligation to 'educate, inform and entertain'. Inherent in the concept of public service broadcasting is an obligation to ensure diversified and balanced broadcasting aimed at all strata of the population, and broadcast the types of programmes which are not necessary being broadcast by commercial channels. These requirements are not however automatically fulfilled merely by the programmes being in the Welsh language. And the present very rigid schedule, does not leave much space for innovation.

The Broadcasting Act, with the requirement for S4C to sell its own airtime from January 1993, has sparked discussions within the organization concerning the need to be commercial and for competitive scheduling. Has this however affected the schedule? Below is listed a Thursday schedule March 1993. The Welsh-language schedule was as follows: 25 minutes of schools programmes in the morning, from 9.55am to 10.20am. At midday the 30 minutes nursery slot, from 12.30pm to 1.00pm. In the afternoon a children's quiz from 4.25pm to 5.00pm. From 6.00pm
the main Welsh-language block starts with "Newyddion" (news) at 6.00pm, followed
by "HENO" (magazine) at 6.10pm, "Pobol Y Cwm" (soap) at 7.00pm, at 7.30 "Tony
Ac Aloma" (music/light entertainment), at 8.00pm "Adlais" (folk music), 8.30pm
"Newyddion" (news) and ending with "Taro Naw" (current affairs) which lasts from
8.55pm to 9.30pm.

The above schedule illustrates the rigidity of the peak-time programming.
Two hours out of three and a half hours evening programmes are the same every
week-day, which only leaves one hour before the news at 8.30pm, and up to one
hour after, 'free' for other kinds of programmes. These other programmes were, on
that particular Thursday evening, two music/light entertainment programmes in a
row, and a current affairs programme at the end. Is this however a typical picture
of the S4C schedule? Going through the week, Monday offers us, apart from the
'fixed' programmes mentioned above, one hour of soccer and half an hour of
satirical entertainment. Tuesday shows half an hour of a comedy series, and a half
hour programme on weddings. After the news follows a one hour programme with
the Welsh theatre group Brith Gof. Wednesday has half an hour of farming
magazine, half an hour of a hospital drama series, and a half hour programme on
old weather sayings. Friday: half an hour of sport, half an hour of country side
programme, and twenty minutes of parliamentary coverage from Westminster. The
weekend schedule consists of, on Saturday: twenty minutes of news, half an hour
of light entertainment, fifty minutes of drama, and fifty minutes of sport. And on
Sunday: children's and learners programmes in the morning, half an hour of hymn
singing at five o'clock, the Popol Y Cwm omnibus repeat, twenty minutes of light
entertainment/phone in, a magazine programme, one hour of drama, and the news
followed by the learners news.

The rigidity of the schedule, with several hours of fixed programmes a day
in an otherwise limited (timewise) schedule, leaves little space to try anything new,
considering that space is needed for just 'normal' programme types, other than news,
soap and magazine. With the exception of a few programmes, the S4C schedule of
the above kind does not contain a lot of challenge to the viewers. The ideal role of
television in a minority context, such as a nation without a state, is to address the
diversities and contradictions within the particular culture. The S4C schedule,
because of its very rigidity and 'safe' content, runs the risk of failing to do just that.


Chapter 9 above treated the structure of the schedule, programme supply and costs, and the content of the programming. The chapter discussed the content of the programmes and the cultural background for some of the editorial choices involved, and ended with the warning that the rigidity of the S4C schedule might make it incapable of properly addressing the diversities and contradiction within Wales.

As for the implications of S4C, there is a definite economic impact as described in chapter 8 above, where the increase in Welsh-language broadcasting has brought about the growth of a media industry in particular in and around Cardiff, and in north Wales. The provision of Welsh language jobs outside Cardiff might counteract the move to Cardiff of Welsh language professionals and the resulting erosion of the Welsh language in the rural areas.

The cultural implications of S4C is however more difficult to assess. When related to the concepts of section 2.6 dealing with the potential impact on the language, the decline of the Welsh language seems to have slowed down. Whether this is a direct consequence of the existence of S4C is impossible to assess, but it has definitively been a contributing factor by fulfilling other functions of section 2.6. The programmes on S4C contribute to an extension of the domain contexts within which the language is used. The use of Welsh within an extended domain context enhances the prestige and status of the language, as the acquisition of Welsh becomes worthwhile in terms of enhancing job prospects. Finally a minority language media industry brings jobs to the area within the language as described above. Apart from the strictly linguistic issue, where the Welsh language is advancing among the children and the young, the role of S4C seems to be a forum where different aspects of Welsh culture can be expressed.

A key function of S4C seems to be that of the supplier of patronage, both in the shape of direct economic support and encouragement to various cultural
initiatives and events. This function is however largely a thing of the past given the economic dire straits facing the media industry at the moment. Apart from the function of patron, S4C ideally acts as a window or mirror for the Welsh society - a forum within which the Welsh nation can express itself, thus contributing to the democratic process in Wales.
Chapter 10. Rationale of Broadcasters.

The following chapter provides an attempt to summarize the rationale of Welsh broadcasters and programme-makers, in terms of how they see their role in a Welsh language context.

As previously discussed, the media constitute a particular important means of identity production and reproduction in a nation without a state. The media subsequently comprise an area of potential conflict between different social groupings within Wales, both in the Welsh language and in English. There will invariably be differences within the broadcasting community concerning how S4C, and the issue of Welsh language broadcasting, is perceived. These differences usually depend on the degree of access to the means of mass communications as well as the economic dependence upon these. In other words, the level of criticism directed towards the policies of S4C, frequently depends on whether the people in question work for S4C, either directly or as programme suppliers.

The main emphasis in the following chapter will be on S4C and the independents, as they are the innovations in the Welsh media structure, but also BBC-Wales and HTV will be treated. The following comments from broadcasters and programme makers in Wales were obtained via personal interviews, unless otherwise stated. The interviewees were asked general questions about their perceptions of Welsh-language broadcasting and Welsh cultural identity. Depending of the type of organization/company, people were asked about its role with regards to Welsh-language programming.

The chapter below presents comments from four senior S4C executives, one BBC-Wales senior executive and one senior executive from HTV. With regards to the independent sector the chapter brings comments from the TAC representative in north Wales, one north Wales independent, two from west Wales and two from south Wales. In the course of the work with this thesis many more people were interviewed than are quoted below. Material from those interviews have been quoted in the previous chapters, or used as background material.
10.1. The World According to S4C.

Before venturing into the subject of S4C, it must be pointed out that even within the S4C management, as within Wales as a whole, one encounters differing opinions as to priorities, especially concerning public service television versus the issue of commerciability. But even so, people occupying a particular role in a broadcasting institution - or indeed any institution - are of course restricted with regards to what they can allow themselves to say in an interview situation. From the point of view of S4C, it is interesting to note that according to the Deputy Chief Executive:

"the setting up of the channel originally was seen primarily as a safeguard for the Welsh language and less to make good programmes in Welsh - the need for which arose later. This attitude is probably responsible for some of the early criticism which was raised against S4C, concerning the content of the programmes in the Welsh language".

and:

"Attitudes towards S4C hinge on the fact that it is more or less the only national Welsh-language institution in Wales, and therefore takes on a disproportionately large importance, at least in the minds of the Welsh cultural elites. The recurring discussions within Wales about the language used on S4C (purity - standardization etc.) is caused by the institutionalization of the language itself. Due to the lack of institutions in Wales, the language becomes an institution in itself - a club with a closed membership, whose members see themselves as guardians of the institution i.e the language".

Inherent in the above statement, is a perception of the language as an instrument of exclusion, it is not only Welsh-speakers versus non-speakers but also the speakers of 'good' Welsh defending the 'purity' of the language. It is exactly in this context that S4C finds in one of its roles, the safeguarding of the language, a source of contestation: which sort of language is to be safeguarded, and how does one go about it? According to the Director of Programmes, S4C now has to be more restrictive in its activities:

"During the last ten years S4C has been a cornerstone of Welsh Wales and Welsh society, working as social engineer, sponsor and innovator. The problem is that S4C has had to be everything to everybody - it being the only national cultural institution that Welsh Wales has got. But if the income base shrinks which it most certainly will
do, S4C will have to be less broad ranging in its activities, than it has been in the past. A further argument for this is that the relevant infrastructure to a large degree has been created by now. The creation of the HENO programme was perhaps the last experiment, in order to strengthen early evening viewing and gain a new audience".

When questioned on the subject of S4C and its possible impact on Welsh cultural identity, the S4C executive argued as follows:

"The notion of traditionally Welsh-speaking culture which is prevalent in the mind of most people is the picture of pious, chapel-going, rural, choir-singing, non-drinking, cultured peasants writing poetry. If this were ever true - at least the chapel attendance and the poetry writing was higher than in the rest of UK - this concept has now been shattered. The chapels are shut, the Welsh-speakers are not primarily rural any more, and the countryside has been invaded by the English. This process has consequences for S4C, in as much as the most popular programmes on S4C are a bit about this mythical Welsh culture, such as the soap "Pobol Y Cwm", countryside, farming and hymn singing programmes. These types of programmes are always popular, but popular with an ageing population. No contemporary common myth about Welshness has taken its place, instead different types of Welsh identity appear, which perhaps always was the case. S4C’s job is to cater for these different identities in Welsh society, but not necessarily to create a new common identity myth. The commissioning policies will however admittedly influence the depiction of Welsh identity on S4C".

A similar view to the one above, but one which stresses the future context of S4C in Wales in the light of the development on the language front comes from the Chief Executive:

"S4C has a role to play in shaping a vision of a new Welsh society, alongside a coming new language act as well as alongside the new advances in education. In as much as S4C has had more money to spend in Welsh Wales, it has been looked upon as a saviour, but the main justification for its existence now is as a broadcaster. It is undoubtedly important in terms of language, but only by working alongside other institutions. With the growth of other Welsh language 'activities' the rationale of S4C within the organisation itself has changed, from the function of saving the language to that of being a broadcaster. Now S4C can concentrate on being a broadcaster whose first aim is to communicate."

On a question concerning the cultural influence of S4C, the executive sees it as huge, but difficult to determine, as it is unclear whether broadcasting leads or follows. The model in figure 2.2.1. provides an illustration to this last point, by presenting the media and other institutions as influencing the traditions and
collective memory of a society, but also in turn being influenced by changes in this collective memory. Any broadcasting institution is therefore an integral part of and, at the same time, a product of the society that surrounds it. But according to the Chief Executive:

"What can be said however, is that ideally the programmes on S4C highlight changes in society, by crystallizing a number of tastes, and subsequently increase an awareness of these changes in taste. The cultural influence of S4C in reflecting and highlighting a changing society is not problematic provided the output is varied. Otherwise a bias might occur, and S4C admittedly would have a worrying influence if this were the case. It is in this context that the public service obligation becomes of paramount importance. S4C has a statutory obligation to schedule a wide range of programmes, in order to reflect the society as a whole. The much abused term of public service broadcasting ideally stands for standards, high quality and universality. Important is the wide range of programmes, and as S4C is a public service channel, funded by the majority for the minority, it must protect itself against being a ghetto, providing a full service, which also includes light entertainment".

It is however questionable as to whether the schedule as described above in section 9.4. corresponds to this ideal type. Does the fact that approximately a whole third of the schedule is taken up by two types of programme, soap and magazine, give credence to such rhetoric concerning the wide range of programmes? The prospect of S4C becoming increasingly commercial from 1993 was regarded with mixed feelings:

"The advent of January 1993, from when S4C will be responsible for earning £3.5 million a year by selling its own airtime, while £54 million comes from other sources i.e. the Treasury, is regarded with mixed feelings. However one opinion is that commerciality could give S4C a little edge, improve schedules, bring the ratings up, and ideally save S4C's future, as politicians too are sensitive to viewing figures, and the future of S4C ultimately depends on political decisions. If the commercial requirements of the 1990 Broadcasting Act had to come, they came at the right time. Ten years after its start, S4C needed something to sharpen it up, in order to avoid being complacent about its achievement. Commercial practice is not regarded as a bad thing in broadcasting, as long as the market forces don't take over, in which case the minority content would be lost. But the provision for public service broadcasting protects S4C against developments like these".

When asked about Europe and the interest for co-production, the Chief Executive stated that:
"In both commercial and cultural terms, Europe is seen as a natural place for S4C to go. It provides a wider marketplace for programme sales and co-production, and what is important a marketplace where bilingualism is the norm. S4C is not an oddity in a European context, as it is in Britain. Co-production is facilitated by the fact that S4C has no problem coping with the linguistic diversity in Europe. However not all co-productions have been equally successful, nor relevant to Wales, but it is sometimes necessary to allow some problematic co-productions to be made in order to make yourself known in Europe. A problem for S4C, which is one of the reasons for turning towards Europe, is that S4C has to be different from other UK broadcasters. S4C has to be careful not to be UK broadcasting through the medium of Welsh, and has therefore chosen to adopt a more European style. The game show "Jeux Sans Frontiers", which is a co-production between some eight European countries, each sending their own teams, is an example of this kind of programmes, with an European, not an American feel."

In summing up on the world according to S4C, executives of this institution see its role as ideally representing changes in Welsh society, becoming commercially more viable, attracting a wider base of viewers, improving the ratings in Wales, selling programmes to the rest of the world and developing co-productions, all in the context of safeguarding the Welsh language. This is somewhat of a mouthful, and the question is whether these goals to some degree are not mutually exclusive. Is it possible to combine increased commercialism with that particular function of providing a unique forum within which to produce and reproduce collective identities, which is characteristic of broadcasting in a nation without a state? It can be argued that this very existence of such a forum of identity representation as is broadcasting through the Welsh language, is the genuine raison d'être of S4C. It is certainly the reason that broadcasting became such an emotional issue in Wales, to which S4C owes its very existence as it would not otherwise have been born. The history and cultural role of S4C, gives it an added responsibility towards the people of Wales, in particular as it has a monopoly status with regards to Welsh language television. Considering the quite liberal funding provisions for S4C, is it necessary and indeed justifiable to try to emulate an 'ordinary' commercial channel, by providing a rather bland and unvaried schedule, with emphasis on the 'popular', merely in order to increase viewing figures, so that the channel looks viable in commercial terms?
As for the future, the new S4C Chief Executive of S4C appears not to be worried over the envisaged multi-channel future facing today's broadcasters. As every channel will need to have a strong individual identity to survive in an area of almost unlimited choice, "S4C will have a distinct advantage because it already has an identity as the sole supplier of Welsh language programmes."¹ In other words S4C intend to turn its original 'handicap' - the relatively limited potential audience to Welsh language programmes - to an advantage in terms of a positive identity in this new world where every channel is a 'minority' channel. But this should however not preclude S4C from showing programmes which adequately reflect contemporary life in Wales. But according to the Chief Executive: "As long as our programmes are relevant to our viewers, as long as we continue to add some value to their lives, we will have an audience"²

10.2. The World According to the "Independents".

As other chapters will have shown there was, in the early days of S4C, a widespread consensus between the S4C management and the independent sector, concerning aims and goals of the Welsh language channel. This consensus has however lately become a bit strained. Naturally the change in S4C commissioning strategy from being 'supply led' to 'demand led' has not been a complete hit with the independents. and the TAC office declares that:

"there is far more imposition now and less consulting than was the case before."

As for attitudes towards programming among the independent producers, these differ widely. One is that:

"the programmes should have popular appeal, like a Welsh-language ITV, in as much as saving the Welsh language means appealing to the masses not the intellectuals."

Another is that:

"S4C as a minority language channel needs to appeal to the whole of the population,

¹ The Western Mail, 6/2 - 1995.
² ibid.

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in other words a wide range of programmes are called for".

Concerning the issue of a contemporary Welsh identity, this is according to one north Wales independent producer:

"continuously being worked on and redefined everyday in the production of television programmes. Welsh values have traditionally been community based, there is no class system to speak of. The smallness of Wales brings about a localised and communal culture".

The above comment however seem to reflect a somewhat conservative and unproblematic idea of Welsh society. It does not take into account that Welsh society, and consequently 'Welsh values', are continuously changing, as a result of for example the increased urbanization. As for Wales supposedly being a classless society this is not the case, as the same class divisions are to be found in Wales as in the rest of the United Kingdom. It is however a common claim in a Welsh language context, which arises from the fact that class varieties are nowhere as well developed within minority languages as within the dominant languages. As Williams points out "it is often difficult to determine a bilingual's class location when he/she speaks the minority language, whereas it can be relatively easy when the same person speaks the dominant language".

As for the overall role of S4C, it is according to one film-maker based in south Wales,

"the lack of political representation of the Welsh people that makes the cultural representation so important. This is the case not only for S4C but also for the other television channels in Wales as well as other types of mass media. But because of the limited amount of hours available on S4C it is difficult for the channel to represent a total of Welsh society through the Welsh-language programmes. Given limited economic resources, the S4C management does try, but a problem lies in the background of the S4C executives. As most of them are ex BBC staff, they have a background within a large corporation, which provides a relatively safe job environment. In other words most of the S4C management have never tried to be independent producers, and consequently do not understand what it is like out there".

The above critique links on to the issue of the media as an area of contestation between different societal groups. It is ultimately the S4C management that decide what the content of the channel should be, and constitutes consequently an automatic

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target for critique. Some independents have expressed concern regarding the
eagerness with which S4C is interested in co-productions:

"particularly if S4C gets involved with co-production projects with little or no
relevance for Wales, just for the sake of co-producing and becoming known abroad.
There is then a risk of the Welsh-language version of the programme just becoming a
token, with the additional disadvantage of making the project a third more expensive
(the cost of an extra language version). The scarcity of available programme resources,
for programmes in the Welsh language means that any co-production ought to be
highly relevant to contemporary Wales and Welsh culture".

The issue of control is also integrated in that of co-production. According to west
Wales based independents:

"the role of S4C in co-production contexts is changing from merely being a
broadcasting organization, to that of an actual producer. Often the co-production deal
is worked out between S4C directly and the prospective co-production partners, and
subsequently handed out as a complete project to a chosen Welsh director. One reason
for this 'interference' is the background of the S4C management as former employees
of BBC and HTV. They have been used to being producers in their past positions and
find it difficult to relinquish this function".

The problem is, according to the producer, accentuated in a minority culture:

"Because they have worked in the industry they know one another - in breeding. It is
difficult getting new blood unless Wales develops an independent sector, but people in
the independent sector have also worked for BBC, HTV, and S4C. Wales need a
genuinely independent sector, where the independent sector itself bring up a new
generation of independents. This is to some extent already happening - but they would
not have grown without S4C."

From a West Wales based producer originates the following comment regarding both
content and form:

"There is a temptation for S4C to broadcast programmes, that are copied from English-
language formats. However S4C ideally provided a chance for Wales to get an
experimental channel. But S4C has failed in this context, as it is the same types of
programmes that are broadcast as are shown in English, merely in Welsh. The
possibilities of new technology are unexploited. One distinct possibility for S4C is the
usage of interactive television. This would make S4C become directly involved in the
community and provide a more direct reflection of Welsh society".

And with regards to S4C's international coverage:

"S4C should not simply reflect what is happening inside Wales, but broaden the
horizons of the population of Wales. As S4C is a minority channel it can supply a
different perspective from the British 'majority' broadcasters."

A positive assessment of S4C is comes from a south Wales based producer concerning the issue of language reversal. Television is perceived to be a crucial element in the reversal of language decline:

"The S4C experience has done two things: firstly it has secured the present use of the language, by providing the Welsh speakers with self-confidence about their language, and secondly it has assisted in the development of new speakers, by providing technical jobs within Welsh. The aspect of providing self-confidence in one's Welsh is relevant to both the general public as well as the programme-makers themselves. For the latter the self-confidence is in terms of the ability to produce programmes in the Welsh language, which are just as good as programmes in other languages".

S4C is seen to have functioned as a nursery:

"Now there is more variety in Welsh language broadcasting than there is in English language broadcasting in Wales."

On the whole, when independent programme-makers in Wales, who work through the Welsh language, assess S4C, they all agree on the need for a Welsh-language service, a fact which is hardly surprising, as the existence of S4C does provide their livelihood. There is however not universal satisfaction with the way the S4C administration solves the admittedly difficult task of representing all of Wales through only 30 hours Welsh-language television weekly.

To put S4C into a context of general broadcasting in Wales, the two other broadcasting institutions, and major suppliers to S4C, are referred to with regards to both broadcasting in Wales in general and in the Welsh language in particular.

10.3. The World According to HTV.

HTV is the local ITV company and as such both produces and broadcast programmes in the English language. The role of HTV vis-à-vis S4C has however changed during the last ten years, and with regards to the Welsh-language programmes. HTV is now just another independent company, albeit a very large one. When questioned on the function of Welsh-language television the HTV Director of Programmes answered as follows:
"Welsh-language television is considered as an integral part of Welsh culture, which however is dependent on the support of the Government for its survival. The old antagonism against the Welsh language in the context of television has lessened, but now the argument is of an economic nature, and the question is whether Welsh-language television can be afforded. As HTV now functions as any other independent company, S4C commissions from it on the basis of ideas".

Incidentally some of the economic difficulties HTV have been through during 1992, have publicly been blamed on S4C’s reluctance to commission in advance, which makes the independent companies unable to plan in advance, a factor which is especially problematic for a company with large overheads like HTV.

With regards to the question of identity representation the HTV response was as follows:

"the fact that the programmes are made in the Welsh language, means that there are common terms of reference, and a shared experience inherent in that of being a Welsh speaker. The produced programmes may vary with regards to their 'Welsh’ content, from programme types like current affairs programmes, where the aim is to portray issues relevant to the whole of Wales, to some music programmes, which may look glossy, but have no particular Welsh content".

It seems then, that it is not only the fact that a programme is in the Welsh language which matters, as there are programmes with more or less 'Welsh’ content, even though they are in the Welsh language. With regards to English-language programming, HTV is not dependent of the commissioning policies of S4C in the production of programmes:

"it is possible for HTV to plan the composition of the 8-10 hours weekly, which is the allowance for regional broadcasting, as the whole editorial policy rests with HTV. Television is an integral part of Wales, and HTV must therefore not just provide a service, but must reflect what is going on in the community. The Welsh nation has to be reflected in the media. HTV’s role is ideally to reflect Wales to Wales, which entail reflecting Wales as a unit."

The preceding interview with the Director of Programmes at HTV was obtained after HTV won the Channel 3 franchise with its associated requirements for regional broadcasting. From March 1994 HTV however, in line with parts of the ITV system, rescheduled their main regional early evening news programme from 18.00 to 18.30. The popular Australian soap "Home and Away" is transmitted immediately preceding the regional news, which means that the HTV news ideally inherits the
large soap watching audience. But from the point of view of the Welsh television consumer, this manoeuvre effectively reduces the choice of regional programmes, as the HTV regional news now clashes with BBC Wales’ regional news programme. As there is only a limited amount of regional broadcasting, this competitive scheduling is from the consumers point of view a wasteful way of using scarce resources. The question is whether this way of allocating resources could not be considered to be against - if not the letter - then the spirit of the regional requirements in the original franchise agreement.

10.4. The World According to BBC Wales.

BBC Wales produces both Welsh-language and English-language programmes, as well as operates two radio services, Radio Cymru in Welsh and Radio Wales in English. On the subject of the general provision for television in Wales the Controller states:

"The provision in Wales is considered to be better for the Welsh-language programmes than for English-language 'Welsh' programmes. In Welsh approximately 25 hours weekly are of a non-news nature, whereas in English the provision consists of some 10 hours weekly of non-news nature, on BBC-Wales. There is accordingly a much fuller and wider provision for Wales in Welsh than in English".

The above statement only covers the BBC’s English-language 'Welsh' programmes, but even if HTV’s regional broadcasting requirement is added (8 hours including news) the figures for the English language would still be under those of Welsh-language programmes.

"The Welsh - like the Scots - are perceived to have several identities at the same time, i.e. both Welsh and British. This element of dual identity is represented in the BBC-Wales set-up, contributing both to the BBC network and to Wales alone. There is however a development within BBC-Wales to consider itself more like a national broadcaster for Wales, rather than a regional one. National/regional television whether it be through Welsh or English has a function as identity conferrer, by treating Wales as a whole, and couching stories in Welsh terms. The terms of reference are of importance for the influence on cultural identities, exemplified in the usage of Welsh related terms and the treatment of say news items in a Welsh context".
According to the Controller, drama production is of particular relevance in this context:

"The production of drama is gaining priority, as it had been allowed to previously decline on BBC-Wales, but is now going up. Drama is at the heart of any portrayal of any nation or community's cultural identity, even to the extent the following statement expresses: "...in television it is a case of no drama, no nation.\"", or in a similar vein - if you are not portrayed in drama you do not exist. There is a difficulty however in the limited amount of English-language drama in Wales. But in the development of a Welsh drama production in both languages BBC-Wales has the distinct advantage of the bi-media function. As BBC-Wales consists of both a radio and a television service it is possible to develop new writers through the relatively cheap medium of radio-drama, before spending a lot of money on television".

The general differences between the television and radio services in Wales are from the BBC perspective perceived as follows:

"Apart from being so much cheaper, which is of course why the radio provisions for Wales are better than those of television, with two full services from BBC-Wales, as well as the commercial channels, there is another difference between the radio and the television situation in Wales. A problem for BBC-Wales pertaining to both the Welsh-language programmes on S4C, and the English-language programmes on BBC, is that the BBC-Wales produced programmes are a kind of 'guests' on the other channels. BBC-Wales have no control over the schedule, and the context in which their programmes are shown. This is not the case for radio, as BBC-Wales here is a free agent. As radio in Wales is a single service, it is possible for BBC-Wales to adopt a particular line, and create an identity for the radio channels".

With regards to the appearance of S4C the opinion from BBC-Wales is that:

"In general the advent of S4C has given a boost to the total media industry in Wales, which is important in both economic and promotional terms. S4C has been able to generate projects such as co-production, and collaborative ventures such as Ffilm Cymru and Screen Wales. The appearance of such institutions has made it possible to get money from the EC, and has generally boosted the confidence in Wales, in the possibilities for the Welsh film and television industry to go out on their own in order to get funding, either in terms of co-production, or EC support. The infrastructure generated by the setup of S4C has lessened the mentality of dependence within Wales in the field of film and television. At the same time however the increased provision for Welsh-language television has generated demands from people working in the English language, as to adequate provisions for English-language 'Welsh' programmes".
As both HTV and BBC-Wales are directly responsible for broadcasting to Wales through the English language, they are naturally concerned about the English-language provision of Welsh regional programming. The editorial responsibility for the Welsh-language programming rests with S4C, and in this context HTV and BBC-Wales are merely programme suppliers.

10.5. English Language Broadcasting in Wales.

The above sections have primarily dealt with Welsh language broadcasters and programmes makers but there is an additional group in Wales which is very vocal in its critique of S4C and all it stands for. This group consists of Welsh Labour MP’s and some programme makers working through the medium of English. There are three points of criticism levelled against S4C and what is perceived as the Welsh language establishment. The first is the lack of a similar service for non-Welsh speakers, the second is frustration about what is seen as discrimination against English language programme makers, and the third are accusations of political bias in favour of Plaid Cymru.

Within the Welsh broadcasting industry there have been complaints that the advent of S4C has meant a diminishing in the quality of the English-language service in Wales, because of funds going towards Welsh-language programming. This may be so, but a fact is that the advent of S4C illuminated the lack of Wales-related English language programmes. One consequence of the advent of S4C is therefore an increasing demand from the English-speaking Welsh that they are adequately represented/depicted in the media as well as the Welsh-speakers. In other words,

"the presence and success of S4C will act as a continual measure against which the English-language output of BBC Wales and HTV Wales will be gauged - both starting from a position of being overwhelmingly dominated by the schedules of the London network".4

Consequently, the existence of a 'Welsh national channel' could in theory be an

impetus for the English-language Welsh broadcasters to provide a 'national' Welsh coverage.

It is however not exclusively the English speakers who want an new English language television channel. Also the Welsh Language Society, Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg, has called for a comprehensive service for Welsh and non-Welsh speakers as a fundamental right. The society attacked recent remarks by Labour MP Kim Howells about "language zealots", which according to the society can only undermine any unity in favour of a channel for non-Welsh speakers by creating bitterness and suspicion where there is need for agreement and co-operation.5

Perhaps the most realistic contribution to this debate comes from the Welsh Consumer Council which, while still hoping for a new English language channel in Wales, points out that there is room for improving the existing television service to English-speakers in Wales. One practical means of doing so would be to promote the co-ordination of programming between the two channels. Given the comparatively few hours of English language broadcasting in Wales, viewers are badly served when there is a clash in scheduling.6 The document continues that peak hour news programmes are a notable exception to this. But with HTV's move of the regional evening news in spring 1994 to 18.30, the same time as BBC's, viewers of English language news programmes now have even less choice and the recommendations of the Consumer Council consequently become even more pertinent.

The second criticism against S4C is frustration about what is seen as discrimination against English language programme makers. In January 1990 a Commons motions was tabled by south Wales MP's while English speaking programme makers were staging demonstrations outside the Welsh Office in Cardiff. The Commons motion stated that it "regrets that the English speaking majority of people in Wales are not afforded the opportunities and facilities to make television programmes which reflect contemporary life in Wales similar to those afforded to

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5 Western Mail, 17/11 - 1990.

Welsh-language speakers through the publically subsidised channel, S4C.\textsuperscript{7} Kim Howells, the Labour member for Pontypridd, claimed that dual standards were being imposed in Wales, as preference is constantly given to Welsh speakers for jobs and in producing programmes. He furthermore alleged that it was creating a political bias within Welsh TV with people getting jobs "because they know an awful lot about Plaid Cymru or the Welsh Language Society."\textsuperscript{8} Similar claims are made by the award winning director Karl Francis: "The result is an in-ward looking system of patronage, in which everyone seems to employ each others' friends or relatives. Now you can be an actor in five minutes if you speak Welsh. If you speak English, it will take you 15 years. So programmes in Wales are being made by people who are interested not in films but in the Welsh language."\textsuperscript{9}

These frustrations are a natural consequence of the situation in Wales, where Welsh-speakers can work in both languages and English-speakers only in the one. On the one hand, the Welsh Labour MP's are, in the terms of section 2.4.5, a noticeable group within the periphery which is linked to the centre culture, and as such contest both the determination of priorities and allocation of resources. Many of them are, as chapter 7 showed, against devolution. They support the Union with the rest of Britain, and are naturally hostile towards Plaid Cymru as a rival political party. But on the other hand they do have Welsh constituencies, particularly in the Valleys, where people do not find their Welsh identity tied up with the Welsh language. And as the advent of S4C illuminated the lack of Wales-related English language programmes, one consequence is therefore an increasing demand from the English-speaking Welsh that they are adequately represented/depicted in the media as well as the Welsh-speakers.

\textsuperscript{7} The South Wales Echo, 11/1 - 1990.

\textsuperscript{8} ibid.

\textsuperscript{9} The Observer, 4/4 - 1990.
10.6. Summing up on the Rationale of Broadcasters.

When the rationale of broadcasters and programme makers is related to the model in figure 2.2.1., ideally the role of the media is seen as highlighting changes in society, and disseminating them to the viewers and society as a whole. This might again lead to new changes which will then be picked up by programmes makers and passed on to the S4C output, in a feedback process. Questions have however been raised, concerning the internal differences and conflicting interests within the broadcasting industry in Wales. This is predictable according to the model, as intra-group differences play a part in contributing to the changes in the collective memory and traditions of the "nation".

The democratic aspect of minority language mass media, can be examined from two angles. There is the aspect of democracy in the relationship between the centre and the periphery, where the very existence of a minority language media service is in theory a safeguard of the minority’s right and ability to participate in the democratic debate in their own language. But within the periphery itself the democratic aspect is also of consequence. Who are to decide what is to be broadcast to whom? It is through being in control of the processes of communication within the periphery, that S4C as a monopoly broadcaster for Welsh language television, has attracted the most criticism. There have been demands of increased accountability with both organization and programming. In a slightly different vein are demands for the use of the Welsh-language television provision for more experimental purposes, such as using interactive television, in order to get out into the communities. The conflicts in the broadcasting field in Wales manifest themselves on both levels of the 'critical political economy' duality. On the one hand broadcasting is an industry with jobs and people’s livelihood involved, where the precariousness of S4C’s situation to some extent meant that overt criticism from the Welsh language producers was subdued. On the other hand broadcasting in Welsh is also a forum of debate for the Welsh language community, and as such ideally functions as a public space that is open diverse and accessible.

At this point it would be pertinent to relate the problems encountered by the S4C management to the general issues related to media policy in small countries.
If we disregard, for the time being, the fact that Wales is still a part of Britain and regard it in a broadcasting context as an independent entity, the problems concerning broadcasting in Wales are not particularly different from problems encountered by small countries in general. There are particular problems involved in being a small country in a broadcasting context such as dependence, shortage of resources, and the smallness of the market. Dependence means that great efforts are taken to be flexible towards the dominant powers of the relevant political-economic environment; shortage of resources could be financial or in the form of education or training opportunities; and the smallness of the market means that small countries consist solely of 'minority audiences'.

Consequently in Wales apart from the cultural restraints facing S4C, there are a number of structural restraints inherent in simply being a small country - politically independent or not. Disregarding however the practical problems involved in being small, it could be argued that S4C has a cultural obligation towards Wales. It is one of the few national institutions working through the medium of Welsh, and its monopoly of Welsh-language television in particular, is that very factor, which means that S4C cannot ideologically rid themselves of this responsibility. The responsibility is of a cultural nature, and presents a special challenge for a minority language broadcaster to adequately represent the diversities of the area through the minority language, in particular where, as is the case in Wales, this is the only forum where this is possible.

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10 Meier & Trappe (1992), p. 130 - 133.
Chapter 11. Conclusions.

The thesis is divided up into two interrelated parts, where the first part is an analysis on state level of French and British media policy in particular with regards to their linguistic minorities. This part of the thesis deals with the historical, political and institutional background for the provision of minority language media in Breton and Welsh. The second part of the thesis takes as a starting point the actual existence of S4C as a minority language broadcaster, and tries to assess the potential impact of this organisation on Welsh society. As the subject of this dissertation is of such complexity, it has been necessary to involve a range of different theoretical perspectives in order to achieve a comprehensive picture. These theoretical perspectives include:

The concept of ethnicity, which had during the past twenty years, risen to prominence within the social sciences, coinciding with the mobilization of ethnic minorities. A definition of cultural or national identity seen as a form of collective identity was presented, and in the 'model' of cultural identity, we talked about processes of both exclusion and inclusion. The critical factor for defining the group is the social boundary which defines the group in relation to other groups. Collective identity is based on the selective processes of memory, so that a given group recognizes itself through its collective memory of a common past. This is a dynamic view of identity, based on a social and ethnic group's ability to continually recompose and redefine its boundaries over time.

In order to contextualize the communication aspect of the thesis, concepts involved in British communication research were presented, with particular emphasis on the 'critical political economy' approach. The main split between pluralist and neo-marxist interpretations are whether competing social groups, in theory, are all equal, or whether they have unequal resources and subsequent unequal access to the mass media. The critical political economy approach to the study of mass communication seized on the duality in the conception of the mass media as on the one hand 'cultural industries' which are manufacturers of cultural goods and commodities, and on the other hand as playing a pivotal role in organizing the images and discourses through which people make sense of the world. The field of
interest was how different ways of financing and organizing cultural production have traceable consequences for the range of discourses and representations in the public domain and for audiences' access to them. In the case of the cultural industries, the concern was to trace the impact of economics dynamics on the range and diversity of public cultural expression and its availability to different social groups. A key question was where the control over the mass media is placed, both external or allocative control, and internal or operational control. Inherent in this matter is the question of what role the professionals within the media organisations play - or have the opportunity to play - and in general that of the elites.

Emphasising territory, it was subsequently attempted to apply to the field of mass communication, in particular in relation to linguistic minorities, some theoretical approaches that dealt with territorial politics. Diffusionist theories state that contact between the centre and the periphery lead to the periphery being integrated, by exposure to the values and beliefs of the centre. The mass media play an important part in diffusing the values and where relevant also the language of the centre.

Theories involving the concept of relative deprivation, on the other hand, predict that contact between centre and periphery is bound to bring along conflict, as the population of the periphery become aware of the centre's attempts to subordinate and exploit the periphery, and the subsequent relative deprivation. By exposing the differences between centre and periphery, the mass media are conductive to a strengthening of regional identities and an increase in the level of conflicts between centre and periphery.

The approach of the "Structural theory of imperialism" moves into the periphery and looks at the interplay between groups. According to this theory the elites in the periphery act for the elites in the centre and ultimately propagate their interests.

In Rokkan and Urwin's framework, centre - periphery relations in European state formations were examined within several dimensions, not just the economic, but also cultural and political. The concept of peripherality is here treated in two different ways, horizontal i.e. geographical, and vertical, i.e. functional.

These two ways of being peripheral are echoed in the following section,
which is about decentralization, broadcasting and 'possibility spaces'. The distinction
here is between two principles of social integration: territorial, and functional. It is
argued that people have a need to relate to each other in a territorial way, i.e.
interacting with ones neighbours. The 'possibility space' of broadcasting means that
regional/local broadcasting, in theory, could contribute to territorial integration and
an increase in the consciousness of place.

The last section treated the issue of small states and audiovisual policy in
Europe. The content of this section is an illustration of the difficulties facing not just
'nations without a state', but also established state formations, when it amounts to
leading an independent audiovisual policy in an increasingly integrated Europe. The
argument is that the audiovisual policy led by the European Community is
detrimental to the smaller countries of Europe, and, following from this, possibly
even more so to the regions. The appearance of an albeit limited programme to
encourage the audiovisual industries in small countries (MEDIA), is however a step
on the way to a development of 'national' audiovisual industries in countries or
regions, which in this context can be regarded as peripheral.

To sum up, section 2.4. showed that the concept of peripherality could be
examined from a number of different angles. It becomes increasingly complicated,
the more factors one chooses to introduce. Starting from the point of view of the
centre, looking at the periphery as a whole, one can regard mass media as either a
positive, integrative factor, or as a divisive factor (again from the point of view of
the centre). Going 'into' the periphery, one can look at factors other than the purely
economic, such as culture and communication, as well as at the different social
groupings within the peripheries and their involvement in mass media imperialism.
The possibilities of broadcasting on the local community level is subsequently
treated. Finally the plight of small states in the audiovisual area in a single market
is addressed in order to put the concept of peripherality in both linguistic and
broadcasting terms into a contemporary perspective.

Subsequently the issue of the mass media and ethnic groups was treated. The
media and other cultural fields can be regarded as 'communicative spaces' where
contests for various forms of dominance take place. They are part of the public
domain and therefore objects of public policy making. In a nation without a state,
there is not the machinery, nor institutions to advance the 'exclusionary -
inclusionary' dialectic, which is necessary to further the cultural defense of the
collective identity. Therefore other forms of identity maintenance is concentrated
upon, for example the media, which subsequently arises as an area of conflict
between the centre and the periphery, as well as within the periphery itself. In order
to fulfil the role of producing and reproducing the identity (or identities) the media
must however reflect the contradictions within the minority culture.

In the final section of the theoretical chapter, the linguistic aspect of minority
language media was stressed. The section discussed various potential effects that
broadcasting in a minority language might have on the language in question. Those
areas within which minority language mass media can play a role with regards to
the language were halting language decline, extending the domain contexts within
which the language is used, enhancing the prestige and status of the language,
perhaps contributing to a language standard or alternatively presenting the different
dialects within the minority language to speakers of other dialects. Finally a minority
language media industry brings jobs to the area within the language, and the
existence of the media facilities contributes ideally to the democratic process, as it
facilitates debate in the language in question and contributes towards an accessible
public sphere.

As stated above, the thesis is divided up into two interrelated parts, where the
first part is an analysis on state level of French and British media policy in
particular with regards to their linguistic minorities. This part of the thesis deals with
the historical, political and institutional background for the provision of minority
language media in Breton and Welsh. The comparison with Brittany was included
as a kind of "zero example" in order to contrast the S4C experience with a
completely different approach to a comparable issue, i.e. how a state deals with
broadcasting provisions for linguistic minorities.

The first part of the thesis takes as point of reference firstly the state, and
secondly the minorities in question - the Breton and the Welsh - and shows how a
certain policy area, in this case broadcasting, can become a focus for minority
demands. The conceptual approaches of particular relevance here have been those
emphasizing territory as the critical factor, and looking at the function of
broadcasting within this framework.

Introducing part one of the thesis, chapter 3 analyses the policies of the French state towards its peripheries, French linguistic policy and the mass media in France. The legacy of the French revolution and the historical centralism of the French state is reflected in the conscious use of (French) 'culture' in any form, as a means of (French) identity propagation. As a consequence of this 'cultural centralism', peripheral cultures and languages have been subjected to consistent 'cultural imperialism', at least until increase in territorial conflicts made the French state give certain limited concessions in order to defuse the territorial demands. Both the rigid centralism and the control over the means of cultural expression, resulted in the means of mass communication being under strict government control functioning as the 'voice of France'.

Chapter 4 explores how the French policy of assimilation has affected Brittany, the Breton language and the provisions for Breton language media. After centuries of systematical persecution, Breton and the other minority languages of France now seem to have gained some concessions particularly in the field of education. The Breton language is still declining however, and provisions for Breton language television consist of only one and a half hours a week. This figure however is still substantially higher than the provisions for the other minority languages of France.

Chapter 5 contains a brief depiction of the politics of the British state with regards to the peripheries. This is linked to the question of media policy. Because of particular historical factors, firstly the unionist nature of the British state, and secondly the lack of an English nationalist ideology, caused by the absence of a British revolution like the French, coupled with the creation of the Empire, meant that the British state did not conduct a conscious policy of assimilation. To a certain degree the state was flexible towards the peripheries, largely by ignoring them. The 'ad hoc' nature of British media policy mirrors that of the general British policy towards the peripheries. The lack of firm and coherent policies in these two areas means that it has been comparatively easy for the territorial and linguistic minorities to gain recognition of their cultural demands when it came to broadcasting.

Chapter 6 shows that the 'revival of ethnicity' also appeared in Wales during
the 1960’s and the 1970’s, where the nationalist movement in the form of Plaid Cymru and the language movement advanced. Feelings of relative deprivation have cause to exist as both employment and average income are lower in Wales than in the rest of Britain. The response from the London political parties to any unrest in Wales has usually been to give concessions when it was absolutely necessary in order to gain votes, and otherwise ignore the problem.

Chapter 7 demonstrates the importance attached to Welsh language broadcasting in Wales, an importance which, from an outside point of view, might seem somewhat exaggerated. This phenomenon is a good example of the argument, that it is the missing machinery of state, which makes the media an important forum for identity production and reproduction and consequently areas of contestation, both with regards to the majority culture, but also within the minority culture. The background for the advent of S4C in its particular shape, with all the Welsh language programmes on one single - and independently administered - channel, was not as much a function of media policy as a response to problems in the peripheries. Not only the situation in Wales but also the experience from Northern Ireland contributed to the fact that the British government felt very uncomfortable with regards to potential martyrs. The set up of S4C was generally regarded by London to be a means of diffusing Welsh nationalism.

Chapter 7 closes with a comparison of the policies of the French and British states with regards to minority language broadcasting. When comparing Wales and Brittany as to provisions for minority language broadcasting, the most glaring difference is the existence of some 30 hours of Welsh-language television weekly, compared to only one and a half hour of Breton. The reasons for this difference are examined on three levels, including the state, the broadcasting culture, and the peripheral minorities.

The French unitary state has always led a conscious policy of assimilation of the historically disparate regions of the French nation. The revolution, with its attendant myth of the one and indivisible republic, facilitated this process. The conceptualisation of the French ’nation’ as an artificial creation which needed active protection in order for it to survive, has influenced both policies of centralization and linguistic imperialism. It was consequently necessary to actively suppress the
other languages of France, as these were perceived to be a source of dissention. The French language was in addition regarded to be the language of reason and culture, and it was considered a favour to the non-French speaking areas of France to rid them of their primitive cultures and languages by bestowing the language of enlightenment upon them. Apart from the linguistic policies of the French republic, the policy of centralization also influenced the structure and function of the mass media.

The United Kingdom on the other hand started life as a union of different and hitherto relatively independent 'nations', who were allowed to keep various degrees of self-determination. The different relationships - or administrative arrangements - between the various regions and the centre has consequently made it difficult for the British state to conduct a coherent policy of assimilation towards the peripheries. Instead the state has led a kind of ad hoc policy, where it has responded to particular problems as they arose; in an attempt to find solutions which did the least damage to the union. Such solutions however, like the translation of the Bible into Welsh, have in some cases had the unintentional effect of underlining and indeed protecting the distinctiveness of the regions, and have therefore worked against a complete assimilation. The linguistic imperialism of the British state, while still existing, has following the argument of Calvet, been implemented much less systematically than was the case in France. Concluding, it must be said that the British ad hoc policy, which also includes the short term accommodation following electoral threats, has led to a higher degree of self-determination for the British periphery than is the case in France. A self-determination that among other things manifests itself by much better provisions for mass media in the languages of the British periphery.

On the broadcasting level, the broadcasting culture of the two countries have been different, as they have fulfilled different functions vis a vis the state. In Britain one finds the BBC tradition of public service, in principle independent of the state, whereas in France it is a state dominated system with a commercial element tacked on. The cultural mission of the BBC plus its relative autonomy from the state, coupled with competition from independents in the commercial sector, made production of Welsh-language radio and television programmes conceptually
possible. In France on the other hand, the function of the French broadcasting system has traditionally been that of the 'voice of France'. The voice of the peripheries could not of course be incorporated into such a function, as this would be counterproductive to the whole ethos of the one and indivisible republic.

The third level of the analysis dealt with the relative ability of the peripheral groups to mobilise support for their case. Because the Welsh national feeling was culturally based, as there were no institutions to hinge it on, the issue of broadcasting attained a deep emotional significance in Wales, which the large campaigns of civil disobedience bear witness to. In Brittany on the other hand, the issue of broadcasting has never been allowed to become of such a size to obtain much emotional significance.

The second part of the thesis takes as a starting point the actual existence of S4C as a minority language broadcaster, and tries to assess the potential impact of this organisation on Welsh society. This part of the thesis examines the minority level, and assesses the potential impact of Welsh language television on Welsh society in general and on the Welsh language in particular. The conceptual approaches relevant here have been those which discuss the production and reproduction of cultural identity; mass communication research and the role of broadcasters; mass media and ethnic groups; and those which looked at potential impact on language of minority language broadcasting.

After outlining the background for the birth of S4C, the second part of chapter 7 showed the cultural institutions surrounding S4C, and chapter 8 addressed S4C in greater detail - looking at structure, finance, staff, audience, cost etc. Chapter 9 looked at the content of S4C's programme schedules, and chapter 10 ended with a summary of the rationale of broadcasters and programme makers in Wales and their opinion of S4C.

These chapters illustrate the fact that, within the field of minority language media, the very lack of political and administrative institutions - the missing machinery of state - causes the broadcasting institutions, in this case S4C, to take on an enhanced role in the production and reproduction of collective identities. This is a role which is less important for 'normal' broadcasting institutions, which typically share the role of identity conveyor with institutions of the state. Apart from
added pressure on S4C from various groups in society, this situation also entails a responsibility towards the nation. This cultural responsibility is caused by S4C’s status as a monopoly, when it comes to Welsh-language television, and includes the duty to adequately depict contemporary Wales and the Welsh.

A question which has been put repeatedly through this thesis concerns the issue of control and interests of professions and elites within the minority in general and the broadcasting industry in particular. It has been useful to involve the concepts of both professional interests and elite interests as they illustrate that the minority group cannot be regarded as a homogenous whole, but that there are a range of varying interests - also when it comes to broadcasting in the Welsh language.

The executives of S4C might choose to see themselves primarily as commercial broadcasters, but S4C happens to be in a particular situation vis a vis the Welsh nation and constitutes a monopoly, with public service obligations. It is consequently not acceptable that S4C be regarded merely as yet another commercial broadcaster, with an overweight of audience catching programming. The executives of S4C are in charge of an important means of identity dissemination, particularly important as it is in a nation without a state. This is not to say however that it is they who should solely decide on the portrayal and representation of Welsh identities. In this context, audience - and consumer representation could play a role, along with an increased role of S4C on the community level.

The existence of S4C is safe for the next few years at least, and has an economic safety-net in the form of money direct from the Treasury, so it could be argued that S4C ought to take advantage of this fact and experiment with increasing contact to the community. It seems now to be time to reiterate the original strategy of S4C in the early 1980’s of entrenching itself firmly into Welsh society, and experiment on the community level. Otherwise there might be a danger that Wales could end up with yet another commercialised channel of little relevance to the community, the only difference being that this one is in Welsh. However it is exactly the political nature of the economic safety-net, which gives the S4C executives cause for concern. It could be revoked after 1997, and from S4C’s point of view, it would be convenient to show that television in the Welsh language is
commercially viable.

An interesting paradox appears here: is the case of S4C a question about the perpetuation of an organization in spite of its original goals? The argument would go as follows: In order to ensure the survival of the channel, the schedule includes a very high proportion of the very 'popular' programmes, as well as music and sports programmes, which are not language specific. This might perhaps attract more viewers but at the same time it diverges from the original aim, which was to safeguard the Welsh language and provide a relevant television service for the population of Wales. So although the economic-political argument concerning numbers of viewers could be said to have been won, the cultural-political argument concerning programme content and the channel's ability to 'constructively engage in a debate about the struggles and contradictions of contemporary Wales' is lost. Consequently the channel could be said to have lost that cultural raison d'être, which was the very reason for its appearance in the first place. In other words in order to secure the perpetuation of the organization per se, its executives have conducted a policy, which has led the organization away from its initial aim.

S4C has, to some extent, been a success over the past twelve years, but cannot allow itself to become too complacent, as the institution occupies, in theory at least, a very important position within Welsh society. This society keeps changing however, and so does the need for Welsh-language television. Twelve years on, the mere symbolic effect of the existence of a Welsh-language channel has somewhat diminished and there is now a need for not only Welsh-language television programmes, but a variety of programmes which represents all features of Welsh society.

The question is whether this aim is achieved by an increasingly commercialized schedule, with emphasis on the safe and already popular, such as soap-opera five days a week plus repeats, spiced up with light magazine programmes every weekday. This is of course not an entirely fair description of the schedule, but the point is that out of only some thirty hours of Welsh-language television programmes available, some ten are used on this type of programme. However there need not necessarily be a dichotomy between an audience-catching schedule and one that is relevant to the society in question - but if the schedule is
saturated with just the types of programme that are safe and attract large audiences, then there is no room for experiments, a problem accentuated by the limited programming time.

This said - what has the implications of S4C on Welsh society been? With regards to the economic impact, the creation of S4C has had a definite effect on the development of an independent media sector in Wales. The general change of direction in the British broadcasting environment towards more independently produced programmes has, however, also contributed to the independent sector in Wales, as many companies work in both languages. But within Welsh language production, S4C is the only purchaser, and as such must get the credits for the growth of a lively Welsh-language independent sector. Unfortunately, its monopoly situation places an added responsibility on S4C to sustain this independent sector. There is accordingly a large degree of inter-dependence between S4C and the Welsh language independent sector, as S4C is just as dependent (or perhaps more) on the existence of a healthy, creative Welsh language television production sector, as this sector is on S4C. It would consequently not be in the long-term interest of S4C to exploit its monopoly advantage.

The cultural impact of S4C is however more difficult to assess. A somewhat unintentional function of S4C, has been to be a yardstick against which the regional Welsh English-language broadcasting can be measured, and this has generated increasing demands from the English-speaking Welsh for an adequate representation in the media. When related to the potential impact on the language, the decline of the Welsh language seems to have slowed down. Whether this is a direct consequence of the existence of S4C is impossible to assess, but S4C might have been a contributing factor. The programmes on S4C contribute to an extension of the domain contexts within which the language is used. The use of Welsh within an extended domain context enhances the prestige and status of the language, as the acquisition of Welsh becomes worthwhile in terms of enhancing job prospects. Finally a minority language media industry brings jobs to the area within the language as described above. Apart from the strictly linguistic issue, where the Welsh language is advancing among the children and the young, and it therefore becomes important to attract these groups to view S4C, the role of S4C is as a
forum where different aspects of Welsh culture can be expressed.

The political impact of S4C could be argued to be its symbolic value as a national institution. Apart from the fact that it is a Welsh language institution, it is important that it is independently administered. Although S4C financially is dependent on the continuous goodwill of the British government, the administration of the service is entirely located in Wales, and the channel is not like both BBC Wales and HTV restricted by the requirements of the ITV and BBC network schedules. Illustrative enough some of the heaviest criticism directed against S4C come from individuals who represent some of the guardians of the British Union State - namely the Welsh Labour MP's.

As the thesis has shown, because minority language mass media have the opportunity to be a part of the production and reproduction of collective identity, they are bound to constitute areas of contestation.
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Interviews.

List of persons interviewed or talked to during the course of my research for the thesis on minority language broadcasting.

Formal interviews:
Ann Beynon, Head of international relations, S4C
D.P. Davies, Professor in Theology, Lampeter University.
John Davies, Historian
Geraint Talfan Davies, Controller, BBC Wales
Prys Edwards, Chairman, S4C Authority.
Aled Eirug, former HTV current Affairs, now Head of News and Currents Affairs, BBC Wales.
John Hefin, Director Ffilm Cymry, now Cyngor Ffilm Cymru.
Carol Byrne Jones, Y Wennol, west Wales (independent).
Eleri Wynne Jones, ITC's Welsh member, former member of S4C's Authority.
Gareth Wyn Jones, Filmiaw Ty Gwyn, north Wales (independent).
Geraint Stanley Jones, Chief Executive of S4C
Huw Jones, independent producer, BARCUD, Sain records, now Chief Executive of S4C (independent (former)).
Sion Pyrs, TAC representative, Caernarfon.
Ellen Rhys, ACEN (independent).
Menna Richards, Director of Programmes, HTV
Ifan Roberts, former Commissioning editor light entertainment S4C, now Head of Personnel.
Ned Thomas, Director University of Wales Press.
Paul Turner, director, south Wales (independent).
Dafydd Huw Williams, Commissioning editor Drama S4C
Deryk Williams, Director of Programmes, S4C
Euryn Ogwen Williams, former Deputy Chief Executive and Programme Controller of S4C 1982-91.
Norman Williams, Ffilmiau Eryri, north Wales (independent).
Rhodri Williams, Agenda, Swansea (independent).
Others:

Iola Baines, Welsh Film Archives, Aberystwyth.
Alain Bienvenu, former head of Breton-language programmes, FR3.
D.H. Davies, former chief executive Dyfed County Council, member of the BBC Broadcasting Council for Wales.
Gwyn Griffith, publicity Officer, BBC Wales.
Joergen Hansen, European Commission Officer, Cardiff.
Beyno Hughes, Publicity Officer S4C
Bedwyr Lewis Jones, Professor of Welsh, University of Bangor.
Gwennan Owen, Welsh Film Archives, Aberystwyth.
Alwyn Roberts, ex BBC Governor for Wales, Director of Extra Mural Studies, and Vice Principal, Bangor University.
Mike Sweet, Film Officer, Welsh Arts Council.
Dafydd Elis Thomas, former MP and president of Plaid Cymru, now Lord Elis-Thomas.
David Hedley Williams, Coordinator Dyfed Media project
Glyn Williams, University of Bangor