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Dynamic Contracting under Permanent and Transitory Private Information

Ungureanu, S. (2017). Dynamic Contracting under Permanent and Transitory Private Information. International Journal of Game Theory, 46, pp. 667-692. doi: 10.1007/s00182-016-0552-8


To understand how firms create and maintain long term relationships with consumers, or how procurement relations evolve over time, this paper examines a dynamic variant of the classical two-type-buyer contract with commitment in mechanism design. The utility determinant (or utility type) is not fixed nor completely random, and fair assumptions are that it evolves stochastically, or it is given by a distribution whose parameters are common knowledge. The second approach is pursued in this paper, and the distribution of the utility type is determined by a private information buyer type. With two possible types of buyers, the buyer more likely to have a high utility type will receive the first-best allocations, while the other will receive the first best only if he has the high utility type.

Publication Type: Article
Additional Information: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Publisher Keywords: asymmetric information, dynamic contracting, mechanism design, information structure
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Departments: School of Policy & Global Affairs > Economics
Text - Published Version
Available under License Creative Commons: Attribution International Public License 4.0.

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