Relational contracts and supplier turnover in the global economy

Defever, F., Fischer, C & Suedekum, J (2016). Relational contracts and supplier turnover in the global economy. Journal of International Economics, 103, pp. 147-165. doi: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2016.09.002

Abstract

Headquarters and their specialized component suppliers have a vital interest in establishing long-term collaborations. When formal contracts are not enforceable, such efficiency-enhancing cooperations can be established via informal agreements, but relational contracts have been largely ignored in the literature on the international organization of value chains. In this paper, we develop a dynamic property rights model of global sourcing. A domestic headquarter collaborates with a foreign input supplier and makes two decisions in every period: i) whether to engage in a costly search for a better partner, and ii) whether to make a non-binding offer to overcome hold-up problems. Our key result is that the possibility to switch partners crucially affects the contractual nature of buyer-supplier relationships. In particular, some patient firms do not immediately establish a relational contract, but only when they decide to stop searching and thus launch a long-term collaboration with their supplier. Using firm-product-level data of fresh Chinese exporters to the US, we obtain empirical evidence in line with the predictions of our theory.

Publication Type:	Article
Publisher Keywords:	14 Economics
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Departments:	School of Policy & Global Affairs > Economics