Abstract

This paper derives an optimal timing strategy for a regular slow trader considering investing in a high-frequency trading (HFT) technology. The market is fragmented, and slow traders compete with fast traders for trade execution. Given this optimal timing rule, I then char- acterise the equilibrium level of fast trading in the market as well as the welfare-maximising socially optimal level. I show that there is always a unique cost of investment such that the equilibrium level of fast trading and the socially optimal level coincide. Finally I discuss potential policy responses to addressing equilibrium and social optimality misalignment in HFT.

Publication Type:	Article
Additional Information:	© 2018 Elsevier. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Publisher Keywords:	Finance, High frequency trading, Fragmented markets, Real options
Departments:	School of Policy & Global Affairs > Economics

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