Symmetric Equilibrium Strategies in Game Theoretic Real Option Models with Incomplete Information

Delaney, L. ORCID: 0000-0003-0944-9894 (2018). Symmetric Equilibrium Strategies in Game Theoretic Real Option Models with Incomplete Information. Economics Letters, 174, pp. 42-47. doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.10.020

Abstract

This paper considers a real options model with incomplete information in a duopoly setting. I show that even in the presence of a first-mover advantage, there are circumstances in which the preemption region is eroded entirely and the only equilibrium strategy is of simultaneous-type: both players should exercise together or not at all. This outcome arises if the price paid by a player from exercising the option simultaneously with his competitor (over exercising alone as a Stackelberg leader) is low. Such an outcome has not been previously recognised in the literature. The underlying information structure has been applied in a one-firm setting to a range of different contexts of late, all of which have competitive pressures in practice. As such, the existence of this equilibrium under certain conditions ought to be recognised.

Publication Type:	Article
Additional Information:	© Elsevier, 2018. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Publisher Keywords:	Timing games; Real options; Preemption; Incomplete information
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Departments:	School of Policy & Global Affairs > Economics