Abstract

Many "good practices" in computer security are based on assumptions and local evidence that do not generalize. There are few quantifiable methods of establishing or refuting the validity of these practices from a user perspective. We propose a formal model of security policies that allows us to evaluate the claimed benefits to the user of the system quantitatively. We illustrate the use of the model by looking at a security policy we all live with daily: The Password Policy.

Publication Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Additional Information:	The final authenticated publication is available online at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-39345-7_27.
Subjects:	Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science
Departments:	School of Mathematics, Computer Science & Engineering > Computer Science > Software Reliability
URI:	https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/2151

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