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The impact of resale on entry in second price auctions

Che, X., Lee, P. & Yang, Y. (2013). The impact of resale on entry in second price auctions. Mathematical Social Sciences, 66(2), pp. 163-168. doi: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.04.002

Abstract

This paper investigates the effect of resale allowance on entry strategies in a second price auction with two bidders whose entries are sequential and costly. We first characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in cutoff strategies. We then show that there exists a unique threshold such that if the reseller’s bargaining power is greater (less) than the threshold, resale allowance causes the leading bidder (the following bidder) to have a higher (lower) incentive on entry; i.e., the cutoff of entry becomes lower (higher). We also discuss asymmetric bidders and the original seller’s expected revenue.

Publication Type: Article
Additional Information: © Elsevier 2013. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Departments: School of Arts & Social Sciences > Economics
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