When Is It Optimal to Delegate: The Theory of Fast-Track Authority
Celik, L. 
ORCID: 0000-0002-7668-6358, Karabay, B. & McLaren, J. (2015).
When Is It Optimal to Delegate: The Theory of Fast-Track Authority.
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7(3),
pp. 347-389.
doi: 10.1257/mic.20140031
Abstract
With fast-track authority (FTA), the US Congress delegates trade-policy authority to the President by committing not to amend a trade agreement. Why would it cede such power? We suggest an interpretation in which Congress uses FTA to forestall destructive competition between its members for protectionist rents. In our model: (i) FTA is never granted if an industry operates in the majority of districts; (ii) The more symmetric the industrial pattern, the more likely is FTA, since competition for protectionist rents is most punishing when bargaining power is symmetrically distributed; (iii) Widely disparate initial tari§s prevent free trade even with FTA.
| Publication Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | Copyright © 2015 AEA |
| Publisher Keywords: | Fast-track authority; Trade Policy; Multilateral Legislative Bargaining; Political Economy; Distributive Politics |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Departments: | School of Policy & Global Affairs > Economics |
| SWORD Depositor: |
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