City Research Online

Institutional Debt Holder Governance

Keswani, A. ORCID: 0000-0001-9096-7677, Tran, A. ORCID: 0000-0001-7090-8063 & Volpin, P. ORCID: 0000-0002-9287-0972 (2021). Institutional Debt Holder Governance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 56(6), pp. 2103-2135. doi: 10.1017/S0022109020000630

Abstract

Using data on the universe of US-based mutual funds, we find that two out of five fund families hold corporate bonds of firms in which they also own an equity stake. We show that the greater the fraction of debt a fund family holds in a given firm, the greater its propensity to vote in line with the interests of firm debt holders at shareholder meetings. Voting has direct policy consequences as firms that receive more votes in favor of creditors make corporate decisions more in line with the interests of debt holders.

Publication Type: Article
Additional Information: © 2021. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Publisher Keywords: corporate governance, institutional investors, agency costs of debt
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Departments: Bayes Business School > Finance
SWORD Depositor:
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