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Opaque selling

Anderson, S. P. and Celik, L. ORCID: 0000-0002-7668-6358 (2020). Opaque selling. Information Economics and Policy, doi: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2020.100869

Abstract

We study “opaque” selling in multiproduct environments – a marketing practice in which sellers strategically withhold product information by keeping important characteristics of their products hidden until after purchase. We show that a monopolist will always use opaque selling, but it is not first-best optimal to do so. However, opaque selling might be used at the constrained optimum (with the monopolist's pricing behavior taken as given). For linear disutility costs, it is optimal for a monopolist to offer a single opaque product.

Publication Type: Article
Additional Information: © 2020. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Publisher Keywords: Opaque products, Product line design, Product differentiation, Price discrimination
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Departments: School of Arts & Social Sciences > Economics
Date Deposited: 12 Aug 2020 13:24
URI: https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/24702
[img] Text - Accepted Version
This document is not freely accessible until 7 June 2022 due to copyright restrictions.
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives.

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