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Collateral Requirements and Adverse Selection in Lending Markets

Ioannidou, V. ORCID: 0000-0002-7996-2346, Pavanini, N. and Peng, Y. (2021). Collateral Requirements and Adverse Selection in Lending Markets. Journal of Financial Economics,

Abstract

We study the benefits and costs of collateral requirements in bank lending markets with asymmetric information. We estimate a structural model of firms’ credit demand for secured and unsecured loans, banks’ contract offering and pricing, and firm default using credit registry data in a setting where asymmetric information problems are pervasive. We provide evidence that collateral mitigates adverse selection and moral hazard. With counterfactual experiments, we quantify how an adverse shock to collateral values propagates to credit supply, credit allocation, interest rates, default, bank profits, and document the relative importance of banks’ pricing and rationing in response to this shock.

Publication Type: Article
Additional Information: © 2021. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0. This article has been accepted for publication in Journal of Financial Economics by Elsevier.
Publisher Keywords: Asymmetric information, Structural estimation, Credit markets, Collateral
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Departments: Bayes Business School > Finance
Date available in CRO: 08 Nov 2021 09:47
Date deposited: 8 November 2021
Date of acceptance: 1 November 2021
URI: https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/27068
[img] Text - Accepted Version
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Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives.

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