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Friendly Lobbying Under Time Pressure

Minaudier, C. ORCID: 0000-0001-8067-888X & Awad, E. (2022). Friendly Lobbying Under Time Pressure. American Journal of Political Science, doi: 10.1111/ajps.12754

Abstract

Lobbyists often target legislators who are aligned with them rather than opponents. The choice of whom to lobby affects both what information becomes available to legislators and how much influence special interest groups exert on policies. However, the conditions under which aligned legislators are targeted are not well understood. We investigate how the pressure to conclude policies quickly affects the strategic decision of whom to lobby. We derive conditions on the cost of delaying policies and on the distribution of legislators’ preferences for lobbyists to prefer targeting allies. We show that the use of allied intermediaries has important implications for the duration of policy making and the quality of policies. Counter-intuitively, an increase in time pressure can increase the duration of policy making and a longer duration does not always lead to better-informed policies.

Publication Type: Article
Additional Information: This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Minaudier, C. & Awad, E. (2022). Friendly Lobbying Under Time Pressure. American Journal of Political Science, which has been published in final form at 10.1111/ajps.12754. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions. This article may not be enhanced, enriched or otherwise transformed into a derivative work, without express permission from Wiley or by statutory rights under applicable legislation. Copyright notices must not be removed, obscured or modified. The article must be linked to Wiley’s version of record on Wiley Online Library and any embedding, framing or otherwise making available the article or pages thereof by third parties from platforms, services and websites other than Wiley Online Library must be prohibited.
Publisher Keywords: Dynamic Lobbying, Friendly Lobbying, Persuasion, Strategic Information, Transmission
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
Departments: School of Policy & Global Affairs > Economics
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