City Research Online

Abstract

We show that politicians facing a binding term limit are more likely to engage in financial de-liberalization than those facing re-election, but only in the wake of a financial crisis. In particular, they implement policies that tend to favor incumbent financial institutions over the general population, such as increasing barriers to entry in the banking sector. We propose a conceptual framework and several mechanisms to rationalize this behavior and show that revolving doors between the government and the financial sector play a key role in encouraging bank-friendly policies after crises.

Publication Type:	Article
Additional Information:	This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Saka, O. , Ji, Y. & Minaudier, C. (2026). Political Accountability during Crises: Evidence from 40 years of Financial Policies. International Economic Review, which is to be published in final form at onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14682354. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions. This article may not be enhanced, enriched or otherwise transformed into a derivative work, without express permission from Wiley or by statutory rights under applicable legislation. Copyright notices must not be removed, obscured or modified. The article must be linked to Wiley’s version of record on Wiley Online Library and any embedding, framing or otherwise making available the article or pages thereof by third parties from platforms, services and websites other than Wiley Online Library must be prohibited.
Publisher Keywords:	Financial crises; political accountability; democracies; term limits; special-interest groups
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions H Social Sciences > HG Finance H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
Departments:	School of Policy & Global Affairs School of Policy & Global Affairs > Department of Economics
SWORD Depositor:	Symplectic Administrator

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