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Abstract

This article revisits the ‘race to the bottom’ in international labour law, in light of new developments in evolutionary and epistemic game theory and considering new empirical findings on the economic effects of labour rights. Accordingly, it explores two solutions to this collective action problem not previously analysed in labour law literature—‘indeterminate play’ and the ‘correlating device’—and it shows how these solutions relate to international trade law and international labour law. Moreover, a new perspective is offered, according to which international labour law and international trade law can be complementary in fostering global co-operation on labour regulation and in supporting development efforts. Through a novel characterisation of global labour governance according to three game theoretical models, this study ultimately highlights the importance of freedom of association and collective bargaining in enhancing co-operation among states and promoting processes by which countries’ social and economic development can be incrementally raised.

Publication Type:	Article
Additional Information:	This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies following peer review. The version of record [insert complete citation information here] is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqz029
Publisher Keywords:	international labour law, international trade, collective action problem, evolutionary game theory, systems theory, freedom of association
Subjects:	J Political Science > JX International law K Law > K Law (General) K Law > KZ Law of Nations
Departments:	The City Law School The City Law School > Academic Programmes
SWORD Depositor:	Symplectic Administrator

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