Regulating lawyers on client or case acceptance: The case of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs)
Boon, A.
ORCID: 0000-0003-1494-4005 (2026).
Regulating lawyers on client or case acceptance: The case of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs).
In:
Lawyers, Gatekeeping and Access to Justice.
(pp. 151-169). London, UK: Routledge.
doi: 10.4324/9781003596318-14
Abstract
In liberal states, the legal role involves maintaining a balance between representing the interests of clients and observing duties to legality, whether expressed as duties to the rule of law or the administration of justice. Thus, lawyers must not advise clients on how to break the law nor assist them in doing so. Additionally, they are sometimes called on to discriminate against potential clients whose interests they consider conflict with the public interest. The problems and possibilities of an approach requiring lawyers to refuse clients’ legal objectives is examined using the example of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs). Analysis of the response to such cases in England and Wales suggests that lawyers’ individual discretion in accepting clients should be exercised within a framework of clear regulation rather than as a matter of personal moral conscience.
| Publication Type: | Book Section |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | This chapter has been made available under a CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license. |
| Subjects: | K Law > K Law (General) |
| Departments: | The City Law School |
| SWORD Depositor: |
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives.
Download (963kB) | Preview
Export
Downloads
Downloads per month over past year
Metadata
Metadata