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Strong boards, ownership concentration and EU banks' systemic risk-taking: Evidence from the financial crisis

Battaglia, F. & Gallo, A. (2017). Strong boards, ownership concentration and EU banks' systemic risk-taking: Evidence from the financial crisis. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 46, pp. 128-146. doi: 10.1016/j.intfin.2016.08.002

Abstract

We examine the effects of board composition and ownership on traditional measures of bank risk and proxies of bank tail and systemic risk. Both banks’ corporate governance shortcomings and systemic risk-taking have been recognized among the potential causes of the 2007 financial crisis. Yet, their interaction has received less attention so far. Based on a sample of 40 European banks over the period 2006–2010, we find that the boards ‘characteristics affect banks’ systemic risk, except for board independence and that this relation depends on capital regulations, banking systems’ ownership structures and bank activity restrictions.

Publication Type: Article
Additional Information: © 2017, Elsevier. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Publisher Keywords: board composition; bank ownership; systemic risk; financial crisis
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Departments: Bayes Business School > Finance
SWORD Depositor:
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