A Note on Ex-Ante Stable Lotteries
Schlegel, J. C. (2017). A Note on Ex-Ante Stable Lotteries (17/06). London, UK: Department of Economics, City, University of London.
Abstract
We study ex-ante priority respecting (ex-ante stable) lotteries in the context of object allocation under thick priorities. We show that ex-ante stability as a fairness condition is very demanding: Only few agent-object pairs have a positive probability of being matched in an ex-ante stable assignment. We interpret our result as an impossibility result. With ex-ante stability one cannot go much beyond randomly breaking ties and implementing a (deterministically) stable matching with respect to the broken ties.
| Publication Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | Copyright 2017, the authors. |
| Publisher Keywords: | Matching; School Choice; Lotteries; Ex-Ante Stability |
| Departments: | School of Policy & Global Affairs > Economics > Discussion Paper Series |
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